On September 12, 2017, the Sierra Club sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. In its complaint, the plaintiff described itself as "the nation's oldest grassroots environmental organization, [which] . . . has long advocated to protect and preserve the cultures of the borderland communities, as well as the region's land, wildlife, and environment." The plaintiff stated that it feared potential environmental damage that could result from President Trump's Executive Order (EO) No. 13767, authorizing expansion or replacement of portions of the U.S.-Mexico border wall. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff had submitted several unfulfilled FOIA requests to defendant agencies, seeking information about the environmental impacts of border wall proposals. First, in 2013, the plaintiff had asked for records since 2010 about border wall construction in a wildlife refuge and flood plains in parts of Texas. Although DHS released a few highly-redacted documents and promised to follow with more information, as of 2017 DHS had not yet completed its search for responsive records and had made no further determination. Next, on March 17, 2017, the plaintiff requested records since 2006 relating to a government consultant's work on the border wall, but the plaintiff had received no further communication from DHS. Finally, on May 4, 2017, the plaintiff requested records related to the EO, specifically:
1. All records related to the border wall referred to in the Presidential Administration's FY 2017 supplemental appropriations request; 2. All maps and related documents identifying all locations considered or planned for border fencing/tactical infrastructure described in the FY 2017 appropriations legislation; 3. All bids by vendors related to border wall proposals and submitted to DHS and/or CBP; 4. All communications related to border wall proposals between DHS and/or CBP; 5. All communications between DHS and CBP related to border wall proposals, including, but not limited to: funding, timetables, and vendor selection; 6. All existing and/or proposed timetables for the execution and construction of border wall proposals; 7. All communications between DHS and/or CBP with the White House that relate to border wall proposals; 8. All communication between DHS and/or CBP and any other federal agencies that relate to the border wall proposals.
DHS then responded to the plaintiff on August 29, 2017, asking it to narrow the scope of its request, and asserting that this request did not constitute a denial. The complaint alleged that, in all three of the requests above, DHS violated FOIA by failing to issue a determination within the statutory 20-day deadline and by failing to conduct an adequate records search. Further, regarding the 2013 request, the plaintiff alleged that DHS had violated FOIA by wrongfully withholding non-exempt records. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA and attorneys' fees. This case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore on September 12. A case management statement was filed on December 5, an ADR conference was held on December 7, and a case management conference on December 12. Plaintiff also filed an amended complaint on December 12. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James for settlement, but the parties on March 26 agreed to a new production schedule. The defendants were set to produce 1000 pages monthly for six months, followed by 750 monthly until completion. On September 6, 2018, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas S. Hixson for settlement. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations for several months. Then, on February 1, 2019, the plaintiff requested that the court set a case management schedule to establish a production schedule for documents that the defendants had yet to produce and a briefing schedule to address the defendants' withholdings or redactions. The plaintiff stated that the defendants had not produced any documents since November 18, and the documents that had been produced were heavily redacted. On April 18, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting that the scheduled settlement conference be continued until June. The parties explained that they had informally agreed to a new production schedule whereby the defendants would increase their production from the previously-agreed 750-1,000 pages per month to 1,200 pages per month. The defendants also agreed to re-evaluate certain redactions that they had claimed under FOIA exemptions and conduct new searches for documents responsive to the plaintiff's FOIA requests. The parties requested an additional continuance in June 2019. In October 2019 the parties requested a continuance until April 2020. In their update to the court, the parties stated that the defendants had completed productions for the 2013 and 2017 FOIA requests and had begun productions on the 2016 request. The plaintiff again stated that it believed the productions had been heavily redacted and that the parties continued to disagree about the scope and nature of the redactions; however, the parties wished to continue working together informally toward a resolution. The documents released by the government are available here. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Sept. 12, 2017, the Sierra Club sued DHS and CBP under FOIA, seeking disclosure of agency records regarding the environmental impacts of DHS's plans to implement the border wall Executive Order 13767. The parties agreed to a production schedule of 1000 pages monthly for six months, and following that, 750 pages monthly until completion. The case is ongoing.


On October 20, 2004, a woman who had been subjected to a strip search after being charged with resisting arrest filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Contra Costa County Sheriff's policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Contra Costa County Jail. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that she was arrested on March 1, 2004 for resisting arrest (misdemeanor) and was taken to Contra Costa County Jail in Martinez, California, where she subjected to a strip search and body cavity search. Plaintiff also alleged that she was compelled to produce a urine sample while being directly observed by male deputies. Plaintiff alleged that her search was conducted pursuant to the Contra Costa County Sheriff's blanket policy of subjecting all detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned, regardless of whether any reasonable suspicion existed that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons. This policy, plaintiff alleged, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. Plaintiff moved to certify a class consisting of "[a]ll persons, since October 20, 2002, and continuing until Defendants' prior custom and policy was brought into compliance with the law on June 1, 2003, or such other more recent date when the policy was implemented, who were arrested on any charge (including felonies) not involving weapons, controlled substances, or felony violence, and who were subjected to a uniform and indiscriminate (blanket) strip/visual body cavity search(es) by defendants before arraignment at the Contra Costa County Jails without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband. This class may include arrestees who were subjected to subsequent blanket strip searches before arraignment after the initial strip search, without any reasonable individualized suspicion that they had subsequently acquired and hidden contraband on their persons." Plaintiffs' amended complaint was filed on August 11, 2005, adding an additional representative plaintiff who was arrested on December 3, 2002 (prior to the June 1, 2003 policy change) for a felony DUI charge and then strip searched. Defendants moved to dismiss his claims as time barred. The District Court (District Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted defendants' motion to dismiss, with respect to the individual's state law claim for monetary relief, but denied the motion as to his § 1983 claim for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief. Barnett v. County of Contra Costa, 2005 WL 5095264 (N.D. Cal. Oct 31, 2005). On April 10, 2007, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, denied plaintiffs' request for an interlocutory appeal of the District Court's order. In June 2007, the district court held joint case management discussions concerning both individuals' cases. On November 27, 2007, the plaintiffs were granted leave to file a second amended complaint, adding an additional individual as a representative plaintiff. On September 11, 2009, the Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims, but denied summary judgment on the §1983 claim. On November 3, 2009, the Court granted plaintiff's motion for class certification. On June 21, 2010, Plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Class Action Complaint. Three days later, the parties stipulated to dismissing the case with prejudice. The dismissal was agreed to pursuant to the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 565 F.3d 964. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the Court on March 18, 2011. In this agreement, defendants agreed to pay $19,999 to one individual in return for her agreement to dismiss her claim with prejudice.

Summary: On October 20, 2004, a woman who was strip searched at the Contra Costa County Jail after being charged with resisting arrest filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Contra Costa County Sheriff's policies and practices concerning strip searches in the Contra Costa County Jail. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the Court in March 2011; defendants agreed to pay $19,999 in damages.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a preexisting putative class action case about conditions of confinement in the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, MS. On March 16, 2020, plaintiffs sought emergency relief--various precautions to slow the spread of the coronavirus, which was denied on April 24. On June 9, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, alleging unconstitutional living conditions, which was denied on March 19, 2021. On November 12, the case was consolidated with another case initiated by current and former residents of the same prison for prison conditions that they alleged violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
 On January 14, 2020, prisoners at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. This suit seems to have had some connection to a public letter from entertainment mogul Jay-Z to Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant decrying the conditions at state correctional facilities. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections and the Superintendent of the Mississippi Penitentiary under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel--Quinn Emmanuel, in New York--and by local counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants were aware of and deliberately indifferent to inhumane conditions in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Parchman’s chronic understaffing and overcrowding, frequent outbreaks of violence, and physical neglect to the facilities violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. On January 23, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In the accompanying brief, the plaintiffs outlined how Parchman’s frequent outbreaks of violence culminated in eight deaths in the first month of 2020. The understaffing and overcrowding at Parchman led to severe failure to provide adequate living conditions, including exposure to raw sewage and extreme temperatures, denial of urgent medical care, and food and water unfit for human consumption. The plaintiffs requested an evidentiary hearing at Parchman and appointment of a special master or independent special monitor. On January 28, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which included a request for certification for a class composed of "all prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subjected to the degrading policies and practices of MDOC and filthy, inhumane conditions endangering prisoner health and safety for the duration of their incarceration at Parchman." On January 31, 2020, the court published an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction as incomplete and inadequate. The court did, however, agree to allow limited discovery in support of that motion. On February 10, 2020, the court published an order specifically allowing an inspection of Parchman facilities and medical evaluations of the plaintiffs. These inspections and evaluations occurred between February 11 and February 14, 2020. On February 21, 2020 the court granted Plaintiffs 30 days to amend their preliminary injunction and Defendants 30 days to respond to this motion. On March 16, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a renewed emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and mandatory preliminary injunction based on the spread of COVID-19. The plaintiffs requested mandatory testing for prisoners at Parchman and mandatory screening for high fevers. The plaintiffs also sought non-punitive quarantine for prisoners who tested positive, had contact with prisoners who tested positive, or who were symptomatic for coronavirus as well as a 14 day quarantine for all new prisoners at Parchman. The plaintiffs requested mandatory and immediate improvements to personal and institutional hygiene including increased sanitation and provision of hand sanitizer to prisoners. Measures demanded also included the limitation of contact visitation, waiver of medical co pays, identification of supply chain shortages, and weekly reporting to the court. These precautions were based on Parchman prisoners' inability to take personalized measures to protect themselves from the spread of COVID-19 and total reliance on the defendants for their personal safety in the face of this public health crisis. In light of the special urgency of this motion, the court mandated that the defendants respond by March 19, 2020, and the plaintiffs reply by March 20, 2020. On March 19, 2020, defendants filed their response, asserting that plaintiffs had no support for their assumption that plaintiffs' requested measures would be more effective than measures already taken by MDOC. Defendants also committed to implement procedures to better address the pandemic. In response, on March 20, 2020, plaintiffs modified the relief they sought to "ensure that these measures [were] effective and actually implemented." On April 7, Judge Debra M. Brown issued an order directing the plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief by April 13, 2020, addressing the extent to which Parchman officials were not complying with the CDC's Interim Guidance issued on March 22, 2020. On April 24, 2020, Judge Debra M. Brown denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient likelihood of success in proving deliberate indifference and evidence supporting the assertion that they would suffer irreparable injuries. Furthermore, Judge Brown asserted that plaintiffs' proposed motion would harm the public interest in that it would hinder the state's ability to implement prison policy. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on June 9, naming four plaintiffs currently living in unconstitutional conditions at Parchman. The alleged conditions included deficient medical care, rat and cockroach infestation, and lack of repairs for air conditioning, toilets, and electrical wiring posing electrical hazards. The defendants opposed the motion on July 13, arguing that the plaintiffs have not met their burdens under the TRO and preliminary injunction standard, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, or the Eighth Amendment. They further argued that the requested relief have either already been remedied, or do not warrant remediation. On November 12, the court consolidated this case with another case, Lang v. Taylor (4:20-cv-30) initiated by 227 current and former residents of the same prison, Parchman, for prison conditions that they alleged violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They stated that the cases should be consolidated because both involved common questions of law and fact, similar plaintiffs and counsel, and similar procedural postures. Discovery is ongoing, as plaintiffs await full disclosure of requested information by defendants. On December 1st, the court denied plaintiff's motion to compel due to the absence of a good faith conference but stipulated that if discovery disputes remain outstanding once the good faith conference requirement is satisfied, the plaintiffs may renew their motion to compel as to such disputes. On March 19, 2021, the court denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court based this denial on the fact that while conditions in the prison were clearly horrific in early 2020, the changes that the prison has made since then make the limited injunctive relief requested for these four inmates inappropriate in early 2021. However, the court did stipulate that the prison administrators are "encouraged, if not cautioned" to continue making such improvements to the conditions at Parchman to ensure that the Parchman of early 2020 never returns. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On January 14, 2020, prisoners at the Mississippi State Penitentiary in Parchman, Mississippi filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that Parchman's chronic understaffing and overcrowding, frequent outbreaks of violence, and physical neglect to the facilities violated the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment. On March 16, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a renewed emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and mandatory preliminary injunction based on the spread of COVID-19, which was denied on April 24. On June 9, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, alleging unconstitutional living conditions, which was denied on March 19, 2021. The case is ongoing.


Introduction & Importance of this Case In early 2012, the federal government initiated criminal prosecution of Jamshid Muhtorov (January 19) and Bakhityor Jumaev (March 14) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Both defendants were charged with providing, conspiring to provide, and attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 2339B. Defendants were represented by the Federal Public Defender (Muhtorov) and counsel appointed under the Criminal Justice Act (Jumaev), as well as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Colorado. After close to six years of litigation, both men were convicted. This case is in the Clearinghouse because the parties litigated the constitutionality of Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). While Section 702 is the focus of this summary, more details on the underlying criminal prosecution are provided at the end. This case is also the first time the government notified a defendant of the government's intent to use information gained from a FISA warrantless wiretap after a 2013 DOJ internal policy change. The question of whether or not the 2008 FISA Amendments Act is constitutional is expected to ultimately reach the Supreme Court. All the cases regarding criminal challenges to warantless wiretapping are available in the Criminal cases challenging FISA surveillance special collection. In addition to challenging the FAA, defendants also challenged evidence acquired through surveillance under other provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); these issues are addressed briefly at the beginning. Initiation of the Criminal Case Muhtorov, who spent most of his life in Uzbekistan as a human rights activist but resettled in Colorado in 2007 as a political refugee, was accused of providing material support to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), an extremist organization. The FBI investigated Muhtorov's communications with an IJU-affiliated website, which allegedly include committing his allegiance to IJU and arranging to send funds to IJU. On January 19, 2012, Muhtorov was charged by complaint and arrested at O'Hare Airport a few days later, while attempting to travel overseas. This case involves "numerous intrusive" searches of his computer, email accounts, personal residence, and personal effects, including interceptions of his communications. On March 14, 2012, the government filed a complaint against Jumaev, a friend of Muhtorov who resided in Pennsylvania. He was arrested on March 15 on the same charges. In particular, the government alleged that he pledged support for the IJU and sent Muhtorov $300 intended for the IJU. Shortly after Muhtorov's initial appearance in Colorado on February 2, 2012, the government notified defendants that it intended to use and offer into evidence information obtained through electronic surveillance and physical search conducted pursuant to FISA. Notice was made to Muhtorov on February 7, 2012 and later to Jumaev on April 4, 2012. Muhtorov moved to suppress the use of FISA-acquired evidence for purposes of his bail hearing on February 8, 2012 and for bail on February 13, 2012. The government responded on February 10, claiming that a detention hearing could be held using FISA-derived information while FISA suppression litigation was pending. On February 15, 2012, Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty order Muhtorov detained pending trial. In doing so, Magistrate Judge Hegarty found that when a defendant moves to suppress FISA-acquired information which the government intends to use in a hearing, the court must determine whether the surveillance was lawfully authorized and conducted under FISA § 1806(f). However, a contradictory provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f), states that the rules of admissibility do not apply to evidence used for determining pretrial detention. Magistrate Judge Hegarty ultimately relied on § 3142(f), as applied in United States v. Hightower, 203 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 2000), which permitted reliance during detention on FISA material even if it was ultimately determined to be inadmissible. Muhtorov appealed the Magistrate Judge's detention order to the district court on March 1, 2012. District Judge John L. Kane denied that motion on April 11, 2012. Meanwhile, Jumaev was arrested on March 15, 2012 and made his first appearance in the District of Colorado on April 2, 2012. The government gave Junaev notice that it intended to use FISA evidence against him at trial on April 4, 2012. On April 12, 2012, Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland ordered Jumaev detained pending trial. Litigation Over FISA On May 25, 2012, Muhtorov filed a supplement to his initial motion to suppress FISA-acquired evidence during the trial. On July 30, 2012, Jumaev filed several FISA related motions, including a motion (1) to adopt Muhtorov's motion to suppress, (2) for disclosure of FISA materials, and (3) for leave to file a Franks motion after receipt of the government's discovery. Judge Kane denied Muhtorov's motion to suppress and Jumaev's FISA-related motions on September 24, 2012. After conducting an in camera review, Judge Kane found that the FISA motions failed because the facts supported a finding of probable cause to believe that defendants were agents of a foreign power under FISA. Issues relating to Section 702 of the FAA arose on October 25, 2013 when the government filed a notice of intent to use information obtained under the FAA, § 1881(a), against Muhtorov. The government did not provide such notice to Jumaev. Unlike traditional FISA, Section 702 of the FAA does not require the government to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Further, it does not require the government to specify the nature of the surveillance or the particular location of where the electronic surveillance will occur. When the government makes an FAA application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), it simply asks the court to approve the overall targeting and minimization procedures that will guide the government's surveillance. Until recently, the government had a policy of concealing from criminal defendants any connection between the FAA and their prosecutions. When the government's policy of withholding notice of FAA surveillance came to light after Clapper v. Amnesty International, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013), the DOJ changed its policy and affirmed its notice obligation. Muhtorov was the first person charged as a defendant in a criminal prosecution to receive notice of FAA surveillance. After the initiation of the case, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court addressed a number of issues related to detention, a protective order, the Classified Information Procedure Act, and translation of documents. On October 25, 2013 the government filed a notice of intent to use FAA-obtained information as to Muhtorov, at which point the parties began litigating Section 702. On January 29, 2014, Muhtorov filed a motion to suppress FAA-obtained evidence and a motion for discovery. He challenged the constitutionality of Section 702, claiming that such monitoring of his communications violated both the warrant and reasonableness requirements of the Fourth Amendment. He also claimed that Section 702 violated Article III, because it authorized the FISC to issue mass acquisition orders in the absence of any case or controversy and review the legality of government procedures in the abstract. Muhtorov also moved for discovery to permit him to understand the role that the FAA played in the government's investigation so he could challenge the specific manner the FAA was used in his case. Muhtorov claimed that he was entitled to such discovery under FISA and the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution. As Jumaev had not been provided notice that the government intended to use FAA-obtained evidence against him, on October 28, 2013 he moved for notice of whether the government intended to use such evidence. The government responded on November 19 that it would have provided notice if it intended to use FAA-obtained information. Jumaev filed a reply on January 10, 2014, claiming that there were grounds to believe that FAA-derived evidence was used against him. On January 30, 2014, he moved to adopt Muhtorov's motion to suppress. On May 9, 2014, the government filed a response to Muhtorov's motion to suppress. Defense counsel was provided with a redacted, unclassified version of the response. On May 22, 2014, the government filed its classified response in camera, ex parte, and under seal. In the unclassified response, the government claimed as follows: that Jumaev lacked standing to challenge the FAA; that court review should be limited to an as applied (rather than facial) challenge; that 702 was constitutional as applied; that government actions were lawfully authorized and conducted in accordance with the FAA; that defendants' discovery requests should be denied to the extent they seek disclosure of FAA related materials; and that the good faith exception to exclusionary rule applied. On June 12, 2014, Muhtorov moved to require the government to disclose or provide defense counsel access to its classified pleading and objected to ex parte proceedings. On June 18, Jumaev filed a similar motion to disclose. On July 2, the government filed a combined response to the motions for disclosure, claiming that the FAA does not allow a defendant such relief unless the court finds, after conducting its own ex parte review of the FISA material, that disclosure of portions of that material is necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance. On July 2, the government also supplemented its response to defendants' motion to suppress with the opinion in United States v. Mohamud, 2014 WL 2866749 (D. Or. June 24, 2014), which upheld the constitutionality of Section 702. Muhtorov filed a reply to the government's response on July 3, 2014, and Jumaev filed a reply on July 11. On October 20, 2014, Jumaev filed an attorney surveillance motion requiring the government to provide notice of interceptions of defense counsel communications. Muhrotov moved to adopt this motion on October 28. On November 19, 2015, Judge Kane denied the defendants' motion to suppress. 187 F.Supp.3d 1240. He held that, both on its face and as applied to the defendants, Section 702 did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Judge Kane also held that Section 702 did not violate Article III, but did not offer any analysis as to how he reached this judgment, leaving this issue "to a higher court." After an interview was given by defense counsel to a local broadcast journalist on October 29, 2014, the government filed a motion to clarify the protective order. On December 3, 2014, Judge Kane granted the motion to clarify the protective order. He noted that, with the exception of disclosing sensitive discovery materials, counsel were free to make extrajudicial statements and that there was no basis for sanctions in this situation. Judge Kane advised that it would be prudent for counsel not to make extrajudicial comments, but that the freedom of expression permitted it. In January of 2018, both the House and Senate passed amendments reauthorizing section 702, and on January 19, 2018, the President's signature made the FISA Amendments Act of 2017 law. The reauthorization extended Section 702 for another six years, setting it to expire on December 31, 2023. Post-FISA Litigation On June 23, 2017, the court granted Muhtorov's motion for bail, but abated the order for his release so that the specific combination of conditions that would be attached to his release could be determined with comment from all sides. After a hearing a few days later, the court approved a release on certain conditions and got a stay pending the Tenth Circuit's decision. On July 21, 2017, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court decision and ordered Muhtorov detained pending trial. 702 F. App'x 694. Muhtorov's petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on November 6, 2017. After years of litigating discovery and evidentiary issues related to FISA, Jumeav's case went to trial in March 2018. After a 25-day jury trial, Jumaev was convicted of all charges against him. However, on July 19, 2018, Judge Kane sentenced Jumaev to time served (approximately six years of pretrial detention) and 10 years of supervised release. Muhtorov's jury trial began on May 24, 2018. On June 21, 2018, Muhtorov was found guilty on counts one, two, and three of the second superseding indictment. On August 30, 2018, Judge Kane sentenced Muhtorov to 96 months imprisonment on counts one and two, and 132 months on count three, all to run concurrently, for a total term of 132 months. Muhtorov was also placed on supervised release for 15 years as to counts one, two, and three. Appeals Both defendants filed direct appeals of their convictions. Jumaev claimed on appeal that the six year delay between his arrest and trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial. He also argued that the district court should have sanctioned the government for its inability to comply with discovery and Brady obligations and argued that certain search warrants were illegally obtained. Muhtorov joined Jumaev's speedy trial challenge, and made several other challenges to FISA. Muhtorov argued that the electronic surveillance conducted pursuant to Section 702 of FISA violated the Fourth Amendment and that the government's refusal to disclose underlying materials for the Section 702 surveillance and possible use of other warrantless surveillance to investigate Muhtorov were unconstitutional and contrary to statute. On November 19, 2020, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit consisting of Circuit Judges Carlos F. Lurcero, Scott Matheson Jr., and Allison H. Eid heard oral argument on the appeal. The case remains pending as of February 23, 2021.

Summary: In early 2012, the federal government initiated criminal prosecution of Jamshid Muhtorov and Bakhityor Jumaev in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The government charged defendants with providing, conspiring to provide, and attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 2339B. This case is in the Clearinghouse because the parties litigated the constitutionality of Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA). On October 25, 2013 the government filed a notice of intent to use information obtained under the FAA against Muhtorov. The government did not provide such notice to Jumaev. On January 29, 2014, Muhtorov filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained through the FAA and a motion for discovery. Muhtorov challenged the constitutionality of Section 702 on the basis that it violated the Fourth Amendment and Article III. The government filed its reply on May 9, 2014. On November 19, 2015, Judge Kane denied the defendants' motion to suppress, holding that Section 702 did not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article III. The defendants were ultimately convicted, and their appeals are pending.


On September 28, 2007, the EEOC filed this sex discrimination case against BFI Waste Services, LLC, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas at Little Rock. The case was brought on behalf of three female employees and a class of females who were affected by the employer's illegal employment practices, including its refusal to hire women as drivers. Although the complaint described a class of affected workers, no class certification was sought and the case was settled within six months of filing with no discovery. A consent decree was entered by U.S. District Judge William R. Wilson, Jr. on March 27, 2008, providing damages to the claimants in the total amount of $190,780, and an injunction requiring the employer to stop refusing to hire female drivers on the basis of their sex and not to retaliate against any employee or applicant for their participation in the litigation. The decree also calls for non-discrimination training for the employer's managers and supervisors, posting of open driver positions and EEO policies, and reporting. The decree is to remain in effect for three years, beginning with its entry on March 27, 2008. It will expire on March 27, 2011.

Summary: This sex discrimination case was brought by the EEOC in District Court in Arkansas on behalf of female employees who were being refused jobs as drivers for BFI Waste Services on the basis of their sex. The case settled quickly with a three-year Consent Decree prohibiting the empoyer's refusal to hire female drivers, prohibiting retaliation, requiring non-discrimination training, open position posting, EEO policy posting, reporting, and $190,780 in damages to the claimants. The Decree expires on March 27, 2011.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. Defendant’s bankruptcy terminated February 9, 2019, but the parties continue to coordinate the distribution of the settlement funds. On Aug. 7, 2013, ten Indian guestworkers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International at its Orange, Texas site. Signal was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In July 2014, Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case sued based on events at Signal's Orange, Texas site, whereas plaintiffs in cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana sued based on events at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. Magistrate Judge Hawthorn also issued a report and recommendation on July 30, 2014, denying Signal's motion to dismiss, holding that plaintiffs had pleaded enough factual content to draw the reasonable inference that the alleged pendent state law claims occurred in Texas, so that the Court had personal jurisdiction over defendants for alleged tortious acts committed there. Judge Crone adopted Magistrate Judge Hawthorn's report and recommendation on Sept. 9, 2014. On Sept. 16, 2014, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to allege that the Burnett (immigration attorney) defendants had violated the Ku Klux Klan Act and state tort law. On Feb. 27, 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn recommended denying the Burnett defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs had validly pleaded the new claims. Judge Crone adopted this report and recommendation on Mar. 23, 2015. In June 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. While discovery was underway, the Court stayed the case in July 2015 after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, Marimuthu, the parties are updating the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. In September 2018, the court dismissed one plaintiff who became non-responsive and could not be located. As of the parties' most recent July 3, 2019 update to the Court, the remaining nine plaintiffs had reached a settlement with the Burnett (immigration attorney) defendants. The plaintiffs advised that they would be dismissing their claims against them soon because the Burnett defendants had met their obligations under the settlement. In addition, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with the Dewan (recruiter) defendants. They similarly had met their obligations and the plaintiffs planned to dismiss claims against them. The status report also noted that the Signal bankruptcy proceeding was closed on February 5, 2019. Part of the plan was to distribute the proceeds of the Signal Litigation Trust to plaintiffs, but none had been distributed. The automatic stay was no longer in effect because the bankruptcy case terminated. The plaintiffs asked the court to further stay the case while they coordinated dismissal of the Burnett and Dewan defendants and awaited distribution for the Signal Litigation Trust. This case is ongoing. As of February 27, 2021, there have been no additional status reports.

Summary: On Aug. 7, 2013, 10 Indian guestworkers filed a lawsuit in E.D. Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme by Defendant Signal International. While discovery was underway, Signal filed for bankruptcy and the Court stayed this case pending bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. Defendant’s bankruptcy terminated February 9, 2019, but the parties continue to coordinate the distribution of the settlement funds.


The ACLU filed this federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2014, a few days after the police shooting of Michael Brown, in Ferguson, Missouri, and during the days of protests that followed. The lawsuit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri State Highway Patrol, the County of St. Louis, Missouri, and the City of Ferguson. The lawsuit claimed that people photographing and recording police actions in Ferguson have a First Amendment right to do so. The day after the case was filed, the parties reached a recorded agreement:
Parties acknowledge and agree that the media and members of the public have a right to record public events without abridgement unless it obstructs the activity or threatens the safety of others, or physically interferes with the ability of law enforcement officers to perform their duties.
 Agreement 1. This agreement substituted for a Temporary Restraining Order. The ACLU filed a First Amended Complaint on November 12, 2014. This added a Due Process claim, alleging that defendants' interference with individuals who are photographing or recording at public places, but who are not interfering with law enforcement, fails to provide them with a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited, and "authorizes and encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." First Am. Compl. 6. On November 14, the ACLU also filed for a Preliminary Injunction. On November 20 and 21, the plaintiff asked the court to approve consent judgments between the plaintiff and each of the three named defendants--the Missouri State Highway Patrol, the County of St. Louis, Missouri, and the City of Ferguson. On November 21, the District Court (Judge John A. Ross) granted all three orders. The orders for the Missouri State Highway Patrol and the County of St. Louis permanently enjoin those institutions from "interfering with individuals who are photographing or recording at public places but who are not threatening the safety of others or physically interfering with the ability of law enforcement to perform their duties." See Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to Missouri State Highway Patrol); Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to County of St. Louis). This differs from the language in the order directed at the City of Ferguson. That order provides that the City and its employees or agents
shall not enforce or threaten to enforce any rule, policy, or practice that grants law enforcement officers the authority or discretion to arrest, threaten to arrest, or interfere with any individual, including any member of the media or member of the public photographing or recording in public places unless that person is threatening the safety of others or physically interfering with the ability of law enforcement to perform their duties.
 Order Granting Joint Mot. to Relief (as to City of Ferguson). Although these orders resolved the case, the court specifically retained jurisdiction to enforce all three orders.

Summary: The ACLU filed this federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri on August 14, 2014, a few days after the police shooting of Michael Brown, in Ferguson Missouri, and during the days of protests that followed. The lawsuit claimed that people photographing and recording police actions in Ferguson have a First Amendment right to do so. On November 21, 2014, the court approved consent orders between the plaintiff and all three named defendants. These orders enjoined all defendants from interfering with individuals who are photographing or recording in public places, and resolved the case.


On October 31, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The HRDC sued Greene County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. HRDC sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages and attorneys’ fees. They claimed that the defendant violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights when it censored mail that HRDC sent to inmates at the Greene County Jail (GCJ). This case was referred to Judge Thomas M. Rose. On the same day, HRDC filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting that Judge Rose prohibit the defendants from arbitrarily censoring plaintiff’s materials sent to prisoners housed in the GCJ. The plaintiff also requested that the court require the defendants to provide HRDC notice stating the reasons for any rejection of HRDC’s publications and an opportunity to be heard on the matter before finally rejecting any mail sent by HRDC. The plaintiff argued that their publications posed no threat to the safety and security of the facility and that the defendant’s policies and practices did not advance a legitimate penological objective. On November 29, 2017, the HRDC and the defendants filed a settlement agreement resolving all injunctive claims raised in the complaint. In the settlement agreement, the defendants agreed that they would not censor nor refuse to deliver items mailed to prisoners at the GCJ since July 2017. It was also agreed that the defendant would deliver all mail sent after the settlement agreement if it was consistent with the defendants’ legitimate penological interests and express policy terms on publications and other materials sent to prisoners from publishers, book clubs, bookstores, or established vendors or distributors. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the enforcement of the settlement agreement, but the agreement did not state how long it would last. It was presumably permanent. On March 7, 2018, Judge Rose ordered the parties to take part in a court conducted mediation supervised by Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington to address the remaining monetary issues. On July 13, 2018, the plaintiff moved to enforce the settlement agreement. According to the plaintiff's motion, the initial settlement agreement explicitly stated that the agreement addressed only the injunctive relief, and not monetary damages. The motion stated, "Defendants now disavow the enforceability of the executed Settlement Agreement because they profess that they were unaware that the agreement dealt solely with injunctive relief, despite the plain and explicit terms of the agreement, and that regardless of its clear and express intent, they are not bound by the terms." The plaintiffs asked the court to retain jurisdiction over the earlier agreement and require the defendant's compliance. Without ruling on the motion, Judge Rose reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman on August 28. On October 11 2018, the parties filed a second settlement agreement. The parties agreed that the defendants denied any liability in this case. However, in order to avoid the burden of litigation, the parties agreed to a settlement as to the constitutional violations. Greene County agreed to pay HRDC a total of $45,000 in full and final settlement of all claims for damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. HRDC agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice, but the court retained jurisdiction for enforcement of the first and second settlements. One day later, Judge Ovington dismissed the case with prejudice, with the exception of the two settlement agreements. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) in the U.S. District for the Southern District of Ohio. HRDC alleged that the defendant violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners by prohibiting delivery of mail sent from HRDC to prisoners. In November 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement on injunctive relief, and in October 2018, the defendant agreed to pay HRDC a total of $45,000 for all claims of damages, attorneys’ fees and costs.


This is one of many legal challenges to the series of Trump's executive orders (EOs) known collectively as the "Travel Ban" or "Muslim Ban." This suit in particular challenged the waiver system that accompanied the ban, which was purportedly instated to prevent the EOs from arbitrarily denying people entry into the country. Twenty six individuals who had been denied a travel visa, or whose relatives had been denied a travel visa as a result of the EOs, filed this putative class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of California (in San Francisco) on March 13, 2018. District Judge James Donato was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States; the U.S. Attorney General; the Department of Justice; the Secretary and Department of Homeland Security; the Secretary of State and the State Department; and the Director of National Intelligence along with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Plaintiffs brought this case against defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), alleging defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Immigrant Advocacy and Litigation Center, Public Counsel, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration's failure to grant visas to individuals because of their nationality was unconstitutional. They argued the resulting separation of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents from their families was in contravention of Congress' purpose in the INA—promoting family reunification. Therefore, the government's actions amounted to an arbitrary and capricious act in violation of the APA. Plaintiffs also argued that the government's refusal to consider applicants' eligibility for waivers on a case-by-case basis or develop meaningful guidance was, as a matter of law, arbitrary and capricious and therefore a violation of the APA. The plaintiffs further alleged that the government targeted individuals with discriminatory intent based on national origin without any lawful justification in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment. First, plaintiffs cited the lack of a provision for waivers coupled with the government’s blanket denials of visas to applicants targeted by EOs. Second, plaintiffs cited statements made by government officials concerning their intent and the application of the travel ban. As a result, plaintiffs asked the court to order the government to consider plaintiffs' eligibility for waivers. Plaintiffs requested the certification of two classes: "Family Member Class" and "Visa Applicant Class." The Family Member Class was defined as US citizens and permanent residents "with approved family-based visa petitions or whose family members have applied for visa categories covered by the ban, and whose family members have been or will be refused pursuant to the Proclamation without an opportunity to apply for and be meaningfully considered for a waiver or are awaiting adjudication of a waiver." The Visa Applicant Class is defined as "Iranian, Libyan, Somali, Syrian, and Yemeni nationals who have applied for immigrant or nonimmigrant visas that have been or will be refused pursuant to the Proclamation without an opportunity to apply for and be meaningfully considered for a waiver or are awaiting adjudication of a waiver." Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on July 29, 2018, and the government moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on September 12, 2018. On February 4, 2019, the court denied the motion to dismiss for the APA claim and granted the motion for the Fifth Amendment and mandamus claims. For the Fifth Amendment due process claim, the court held that plaintiffs failed to allege any constitutionally protected right for either plaintiff class. The court found that the equal protection claim assumed the EOs unconstitutionally excluded Muslims or illegally discriminated on the basis of nationality, but that the Supreme Court had already decided that these travel orders passed rational basis review in Trump v. Hawaii. Based on this precedent, the district court held that the government’s national security justification for the EOs was sufficient to stand against an equal protection challenge. Lastly, the court dismissed the mandamus claim because the APA claim would go forward and therefore plaintiffs would not have exhausted all other avenues for relief to make a writ of mandamus appropriate. 365 F. Supp. 3d 1009. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on February 23, 2019. On February 26, 2019, the government moved to consolidate this case with  Pars Equality Center, et al. v. Pompeo, . After oral argument on April 11, 2019, the court denied the motion and decided to allow both cases to proceed, ordering the parties to work together to minimize duplication between the two cases. In response to the second amended complaint, the government filed a motion to dismiss or obtain summary judgment on June 13, 2019. The motion argued the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state an actionable claim and that the existing waiver process was “not a sham” but rather an adequate procedure for the handling of thousands of visa applications. A contentious period of discovery ensued throughout the rest of 2019 and into 2020. During this time, two plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on October 30, 2019. On June 5, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss following the same reasoning and outcome from the February 4, 2019, order that addressed the first amended complaint. The motion to dismiss was denied for the APA claim and granted for the Fifth Amendment and mandamus claims. In addition, the court denied summary judgment and denied the opportunity for another round of pleading amendments. 365 F. Supp. 3d. 1009. Discovery continued through 2020. But the EOs at issue were revoked by Joe Biden on his first day in office, January 20, 2021. This revocation was announced by way of  Proclamation 10141 which also ordered the State Department to resume processing visa applications from people affected by the EOs. The Proclamation instructed the Secretary of State to provide a report including the number of visa applicants being considered for a waiver of the Travel Ban EOs’ restrictions, a plan for “expeditiously adjudicating” these applications, a proposal to ensure the reconsideration of denied applications under the revoked EOs, and a plan to ensure that the cases of re-applicants were not to be prejudiced as a result of a previous visa denial resulting from the revoked EOs. This change in executive policy prompted mootness rulings and withdrawals of claims in other actions arising out of the implementation of the EOs. On February 11, 2021, the government filed a notice to the district court informing it of two mootness rulings issued by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits on appeals from travel ban litigation following Biden’s inauguration day proclamation. (One of the cases they cited in this notice, Arab American Civil Rights League v. Trump, can be found  here in the Clearinghouse. In addition to notifying the court of these appellate decisions, the government asked the district court to dismiss the case. Instead of dismissing the lawsuit on March 23, 2020, the court stayed proceedings pending DHS’ execution of President Biden’s January 20 Proclamation. The court also directed the parties to file a joint status update by June 7, 2021. The parties filed their joint update on June 7, 2021. In the update, the parties explained why they have not reached a settlement. The plaintiffs claimed, among other things, that following the January 20 proclamation, the government invited them to reapply for visas, denying them the benefit of their earlier application date. On the other side, the government claimed that because the Proclamation undid the EOs that were the source of the harm experienced by plaintiffs, that there was no live case or controversy for the district court to adjudicate. On June 16, 2021, District Judge Donato set a status conference for September 2, 2021. Plaintiffs moved to lift the stay of proceedings on July 13, 2021, and the government filed an opposition to his motion on July 27, 2021. As of this writing, no orders have been made by the district court on when proceedings will continue. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 13, 2018, 26 individuals who had been denied travel visas, or had relatives denied a travel visa under Donald Trump's "Travel Ban" sued the federal government. They claimed that denying individuals' travel visas because of their national origin was unconstitutional and violated federal law. President Biden revoked the “Travel Ban” and ordered that visa applications resume processing on January 20, 2021. In a joint status update filed on June 7, 2021, the parties explained why they had not reached a settlement. The plaintiffs claimed that following the January 20 proclamation from President Biden, the government invited them to reapply for visas, denying them the benefit of their earlier application date. On the other side, the government claimed that because the Proclamation undid the EOs that were the source of the harm experienced by plaintiffs, that there is no live case or controversy for the district court to adjudicate. The case is ongoing.


On October 24, 2008, an association of home health care providers brought this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to home medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 2201. The Director moved to stay the action or continue the hearing on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and extending time to respond to the two new related cases. On November 3, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder ordered this case and two related cases stayed in their entirety until further notice. On June 1, 2011, this case was ordered removed from the list of active cases of the Central District of California. It was further ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action was reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal was filed. On November 28, 2011, the Director filed notice that the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) approved the State Plan Amendment (SPA) that the plaintiffs opposed. CMS approved the proposed reimbursement rate reduction. While the docket contains almost no further activity, it appears that the plaintiffs appealed this decision. On April 23, 2015, the plaintiffs sought to dismiss the case, which the court approved on May 4. The case is now closed.

Summary: Home health care providers brought suit to prevent implementation of a ten percent reduction in payments. The case was ultimately dismissed.


On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against the City of Meadville, PA. The plaintiffs alleged that Meadville had used federal funds to repave roads and had failed to install mandatory curb cuts and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq. Class certification was sought but the parties entered a court-approved Consent Decree before a decision on class certification was issued. The Court granted approval of the parties' Consent Decree on May 17, 2005, wherein the City of Meadville committed to ensure, to the maximum extent feasible, that all roads resurfaced in 2005 would be accessible to individuals with disabilities. This included a commitment to ensure that all resurfaced intersections had curb cuts. They also agreed to require all bids and contracts for the work specify ADA compliance. The City of Meadville also agreed to issue an Annual Report of Compliance on or before January 31, 2006, the report would list each intersection resurfaced in 2005 and state where new curb cuts had been installed. The City agreed to retrofit roads that had been resurfaced in 2003 in order to bring them into compliance with the ADA. A Second Consent Decree was entered on August 9, 2005. In the Second Consent Decree, the City of Meadville agreed that all resurfacing in 2006 and thereafter would comply with the ADA. The City agreed to prepare a list of all roads resurfaced since January 26, 2002 and provide the ADA compliance status of all relevant intersections and sidewalks. The parties also agreed to enter good faith negotiations to identify areas in need of retrofitting. In the Consent Decree, the plaintiffs acknowledged that certain highways in the City of Meadville had been resurfaced by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT), and that the City would not be responsible for retrofitting these areas. The City of Meadville agreed to prepare a list of streets resurfaced by PennDOT and submit them to the Court within ninety days of the effective date of the decree. The Second Consent Decree granted the plaintiffs $82,762 in attorneys' fee and costs. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decrees. In 2006, a related case was filed against PennDOT (see related cases). On March 11, 2009, the plaintiffs, the City of Meadville, and PennDOT entered another Consent Decree, wherein the City of Meadville and PennDOT divided responsibility for the resurfaced roads, sidewalks, and intersections in Meadville still in need retrofitting in order to be ADA-compliant. The City of Meadville agreed to retrofit the roads for which it was responsible by no later than December 31, 2013. The parties also agreed to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees. After several years of providing status reports to the Court and fulfilling all of its obligations under the various Consent Decrees, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss all claims against the City of Meadville on August 8, 2017. There has been no action on the docket since this date.

Summary: On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Meadville, PA. The Plaintiffs alleged that Meadville had used federal funds to repave roads and had failed to install curb cuts and other accommodations mandated by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties entered a series of consent decrees, wherein Meadville committed to retrofit the roads and intersections, and to comply with ADA requirements on all future resurfacing projects. After several years of providing status reports to the Court and fulfilling all of its obligations of the various Consent Decrees, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss all claims against the City of Meadville on August 8, 2017.


On March 7, 2000, prisoners in Illinois' supermax prison, Tamms Correctional Center, brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The prisoners sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging that their selection by prison officials for transfer to and continued confinement at Tamms violated their rights to petition the government, to due process, and to freedom of association, as well as the ex-post facto clause. They also alleged that defendants engaged in illegal retaliation. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center, the prisoners sought injunctive relief to prevent retaliation and violation of their constitutional rights, and asked, as well, for transfer into more appropriate prison facilities. The plaintiffs also sought both compensatory and punitive damages as well as attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Patrick Murphy. Specifically, the prisoners alleged that IDOC severely restricted their movement and isolated inmates through the usage of self-contained individual cells, leaving inmates solitary for 23-24 hours a day. Plaintiffs claimed the punishment was imposed in retaliation for filing grievances and complaints and against the prison system and that the plaintiffs were not given a meaningful opportunity for a hearing before their transfer. Some of the plaintiffs also alleged violations of their First Amendment rights because they had been transferred to Tamms based on their membership in groups or gangs. On July 18, 2003, the judge granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because their initial grievance had not notified defendants that plaintiffs were put into supermax in response to litigation activities. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit on August 27, 2003. The Seventh Circuit decided the appeal on September 9, 2005, and reversed and remanded the case for all but one plaintiff on due process and retaliation claims. 422 F.3d 570. The Seventh Circuit upheld summary judgment for the defendants on the First Amendment claims. Back in the district court, on February 7, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class. On June 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint which incorporated their class action allegations. Plaintiffs sought a class of all inmates who have been transferred to Tamms Correctional Center since January 1, 1998, and all prisoners who will be transferred to Tamms in the future. On September 12, 2006, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, adopting their proposed class definition and appointing the Uptown People's Law Center as class counsel. 2006 WL 2639972. On December 6, 2006, the court affirmed the findings of a magistrate judge and denied plaintiffs' discovery motion to compel inspection of confidential prison information. 472 F.Supp.2d 1034. On January 8, 2008, the court denied a plaintiff's motion for appointment of separate counsel. One plaintiff had withdrawn from class representation, and the court ruled that under these circumstances he should proceed pro se, and was not entitled to the appointment of his own attorney. 2008 WL 131166 On September 4, 2009, the court denied the class plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. Specifically, the court granted defendants' motion on qualified immunity to damages for the due process claim and on the retaliation claims by the plaintiffs who were assigned to Tamms before the current director of the IDOC took his position. 2009 WL 2905548. On January 15, 2010, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the claim of exhaustion of administrative remedies. 2010 WL 235003. Specifically, the court found that no administrative remedy had ever existed to challenge placement in supermax. On July 20, 2010, after a bench trial, the court awarded injunctive relief. 725 F. Supp. 2d 735. The injunctive relief required review of all transfers into Tamm and notice of reason for transfer to all inmates and hearings as a part of the review procedure. The hearings were to receive internal review and were appealable within the IDOC. The relief was granted for two years unless further relief was found to be necessary. On August 19, 2010, defendants appealed the injunction to the Seventh Circuit. On October 12, 2010, the district court denied a stay of the injunction and also denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. Specifically, the court found defendants did not have a high chance of succeeding on the merits and that harm to defendants by transferring prisoners out of supermax was small. 2010 WL 4000599. But on June 6, 2012, the Seventh Circuit vacated the injunction and required a new injunction more narrowly tailored to the scope of the constitutional right. 682 F.3d 679. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit found the requirements on reporting guidelines and timing of reports were broader than constitutionally required. The PLRA required that relief be more narrowly drawn. On June 20, 2012, the district court required the defendant to submit a new proposed injunction. Defendants appealed this to the Seventh Circuit. However, in the interim, Illinois governor Pat Quinn vetoed all state budget appropriations for Tamms, effectively shutting the facility down. On March 27, 2013, the district court proposed a grant of defendant's motion to vacate the injunctive relief on the grounds there were no longer any prisoners in the facility. 2013 WL 1286971. On April 3, 2013, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to vacate the injunction due to the lack of prisoners at the facility. However, on remand the district court upheld its award of $297,848.60 in attorney's fees for the plaintiff. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 7, 2000, inmates in Illinois's supermax prison, Tamms Correctional Center, brought this action pro se against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The inmates alleged that their selection by prison officials for transfer to and continued confinement at Tamms violated their right to petition the government, their due process rights, their freedom of association, and a violation of the ex-post facto clause. The trial court originally found for defendants on summary judgment but the Seventh Circuit reversed on the issues of due process and retaliation. During the pendency of the case, the Governor of Illinois closed the prison by vetoing appropriations for its budget.


During the period from at least 1988 until January 1, 1994, five female janitors who worked in the School City of East Chicago, a school district in Northern Indiana, were assigned to and allowed by the school district to work only seven hour shifts, while their male counterparts were assigned and allowed to work eight hour shifts. The female janitors lost hourly earnings due to the school district's practice of limiting their hours. The five female janitors then filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe the Title VII allegations were true. After unsuccessful attempts to conciliate the matter, the EEOC referred the charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). On September 15, 1998, the DOJ reached an agreement with the school district and filed a complaint against it in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under Title VII on the same day. In the complaint, the DOJ sought an injunction prohibiting the school district from engaging in its discriminatory practice as well as compensatory backpay for female janitors who were adversely affected by such practice. This was the sixth case filed by the DOJ since 1993, alleging that women had not been given equal access to higher paying custodial jobs in public schools. According to a DOJ press release, under the agreement, the school district would create a fund of $250,000 to compensate all female janitors who lost money as a result of its sex discrimination regarding working hours. Furthermore, the school district agreed to pay the attorneys' fees for the five female janitors. Even though we had little information about any injunctive relief, it is highly likely that the agreement contained the relief sought in the complaint, requiring an end to the school district's discriminatory practice in question. On September 24, 1998, the District Court (Judge James T. Moody) issued a consent decree, and approved the DOJ's proposed monetary relief determinations on August 16, 1999. This ended the case.

Summary: During the period from at least 1988 until January 1, 1994, five female janitors who worked in the School City of East Chicago, a school district in Northern Indiana (the Employer), were assigned to and allowed by the Employer to work only seven hour shifts, while their male counterparts were assigned and allowed to work eight hour shifts. The female janitors lost hourly earnings due to the Employer's practice of limiting their hours. The five female janitors then filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. The EEOC investigated the charges and found reasonable cause to believe the Title VII allegations were true. After unsuccessful attempts to conciliate the matter, the EEOC referred the charges to the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ). On September 15, 1998, the DOJ reached an agreement with the Employer and filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against it under Title VII. In the agreement, the Employer agreed to create a fund of $250,000 to compensate female janitors who lost money as a result of its practice of limiting their working hours. Furthermore, the Employer agreed to pay the attorneys' fees for the five female janitors. An injunction that prohibited the sex discrimination in question was likely issued as well. The District Court issued a consent decree on September 24, 1998, and approved the DOJ's proposed monetary relief determinations on August 16, 1999. This ended the case.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on April 29 by twelve individual voter plaintiffs and a non-profit corporation against the Indiana Secretary of State and members of the Indiana Election Commission to challenge Indiana’s absentee voting laws. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 21, the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction was denied. The plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit shortly after. The case is ongoing.
 On April 29, twelve Indiana voters who did not qualify to vote by mail in the general election under Indiana’s voting law and a non-profit corporation filed a suit against the Indiana Secretary of State and members of the Indiana Election Commission. The plaintiffs challenged Indiana’s excuse requirement to vote absentee, alleging that Indiana’s absentee voting law unconstitutionally burdened their right to vote and violated the equal protection clause against the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they sought an order requiring the state to extend mail voting to all Indiana voters and to permit no-excuse absentee voting for the November elections. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees, and were represented by private attorneys. The case was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana and assigned to Judge James Patrick Hanlon. On May 4, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to include an allegation that the challenged law violated the Twenty-Sixth Amendment as it denied Indiana voters under the age of sixty-five their right to vote by mail. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on June 8 and a motion for class certification for a class of all Indiana voters on June 16. The defendants filed a response in opposition to the preliminary injunction and class certification on July 24. On August 18, the defendants filed a motion to consolidate the case with another case posing a constitutional challenge on Indiana’s absentee voting laws, Common Cause Indiana et al. v. Election Commission Members et al. The motion for consolidation was denied on August 20, finding that they have not shown that many of the same facts will be relevant in both cases, or that the legal issues are substantially the same. 2020 WL 4877434. On August 21, the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction was denied. 2020 WL 4926439. The court concluded that Indiana’s excuse requirement was a policy choice and not a violation of equal protection. The same day, the court accepted the Disability Rights Education and Defend Fund’s motion to file an amici curiae brief, filed earlier in the month. On August 24, the plaintiffs appealed the court’s decision to the Seventh Circuit. The motion to certify class remains pending, and the case is ongoing.


In early October 2011, a large protest movement emerged in Oakland, CA, associated with the national Occupy movement. Several of the Occupy Oakland protesters set up an encampment with tents and other facilities in Frank Ogawa Plaza in front of Oakland City Hall. The group regularly held rallies and meetings at the Plaza. Early in the morning on October 25, 2011 Oakland police and other municipal employees forcibly removed the Occupy protesters and their property from Frank Ogawa Plaza. Approximately seventy people were arrested. The OPD used "less-lethal" weapons, such as rubber-encased bullets, tear gas, and flash-bang grenades, to disperse the demonstrators, and allegedly gave insufficient dispersal notice, inaudible to many of the demonstrators. The OPD destroyed property including tents belonging to the encamped demonstrators. On November 2, 2011, in response to the police actions on October 25, Occupy Oakland called for a general strike and a day of peaceful protest in the city. Thousands marched to shut down the Port of Oakland. There was minimal conflict between the OPD and the demonstrators during the day, but late in the night and into the next morning the police again used "less-lethal" weapons to disperse the demonstrators, firing them directly at individual demonstrators and into crowds. This again allegedly occurred without the demonstrators first being provided with sufficient notice and opportunity to disperse. On November 14, 2011 several individual plaintiffs and institutional plaintiff the ACLU of Northern California, represented by attorneys from the National Lawyers Guild, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Northern California. The suit was filed against the City of Oakland and its acting chief of police. The individual plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they wished to continue exercising their first Amendment rights by participating in further demonstrations but that they were concerned for their safety because of the Oakland Police Department's (OPD) alleged use of excessive force to disperse two earlier Occupy demonstrations and because of incidents of police violence at other Occupy-related rallies and marches. The ACLU of Northern California stated that many of its members would like to participate in Occupy demonstrations but were afraid to do so because of the actions of the OPD. The plaintiffs sought a restraining order and temporary and preliminary injunctions preventing the City of Oakland and the OPD (and law enforcement agencies cooperating with them at their request) from violating Oakland's Crowd Control Policy. They also sought a declaration that the defendants' actions had been unlawful, and to enjoin the defendants from violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. They sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, and legal costs and attorneys' fees. Many of the individual plaintiffs had been injured by the police during the demonstrations. One plaintiff had been filming the police and was asked to step back. He moved back several steps and asked if that was far enough. The police did not respond, and so he continued filming and was then shot in the leg with a "bean bag," actually a bag of lead pellets fired from a shotgun. He recorded the incident with his camera. Another plaintiff was allegedly shot with an unspecified "less-lethal" munition while alone on his bicycle near the demonstration but not between the police and the demonstrators. One plaintiff was hit in the ankle by a projectile. The other individual plaintiffs were demonstrators who had witnessed individuals being injured or incidents of excessive force at the demonstrations and who were therefore afraid to continuing participating in the demonstrations despite their desire to do so. The complaint describes other uses of force by the police at the demonstrations, such as the shooting of a Marine Corps veteran in the head with a non-lethal projectile, which fractured his skull and led to his being hospitalized for three weeks. When other protestors attempted to rush to his aid the police shot tear gas and flash-bangs at the small group, impeding their efforts. Plaintiffs alleged that during both incidents the OPD had failed to follow the procedures of the City's official Crowd Control Policy, established by the settlement in Local 10 ILWU v. City of Oakland (see related cases). These rules were established in response to earlier use of excessive force by the OPD in response to non-violent protests. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence and forbade the OPD from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful. It also required the OPD to provide an opportunity for demonstrators at assemblies declared unlawful to safely disperse prior to arrest, and forbade the indiscriminate use of less-lethal munitions directly against crowds, even when specific individuals in the group were violent. On November 16, 2011, the Court (Judge Richard Seeborg) declined to issue a restraining order against the defendants requiring them to comply with their own Crowd Control Policy, although by the terms of the Local 10 ILWU settlement and the Policy itself such compliance was already mandatory. The Judge held that the balance of equities and the public interest did not clearly weigh in favor of either party, because the "plaintiffs' own evidence demonstrate[d] that the great majority of the interactions between police and Occupy Oakland protestors ha[d] been peaceful. Thus, to arrive at the conclusion that irreparable injury is imminent, plaintiffs must assume that confrontations between police and protectors will escalate in the future." Campbell v. City of Oakland, 2011 WL 5576921, 2011. On December 12, 2011, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, relying on substantially the same reasoning. After the motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed, the parties began an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed on July 25, 2013. The settlement order included a monetary settlement of $1,170,000. The agreement also contained two non-monetary provisions requiring that the plaintiffs' arrest records be sealed and destroyed and that the defendants continue to abide by Oakland's Crowd Control Policy in accordance with the settlement agreement in Spalding v. City of Oakland, also in this Clearinghouse (PN-CA-0022). Following the approval of the settlement agreement, there has been no further litigation.

Summary: On November 14, 2011 a lawsuit was filed in federal court by several individual plaintiffs associated with the Occupy Oakland movement and by institutional plaintiff the ACLU of Northern California. The suit was filed against the City of Oakland and its acting chief of police. The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that they wished to continue exercising their first Amendment rights by participating in further demonstrations but that they were concerned for their safety because of the Oakland Police Department's (OPD) alleged use of excessive force to disperse two earlier Occupy demonstrations and because of incidents of police violence at other Occupy-related rallies and marches. The police had used "less-lethal" weapons to disperse the demonstrators, firing directly at individual demonstrators and directly into crowds. This allegedly occurred without the demonstrators first being provided with sufficient notice and opportunity to disperse. The plaintiffs sought a restraining order and temporary and preliminary injunctions preventing the City of Oakland and the OPD from violating Oakland's Crowd Control Policy. They also sought a declaration that the defendants' actions had been unlawful, and to enjoin the defendants from violating the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. They sought compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, and legal costs and attorneys' fees. On November 16, 2011, the Court declined to issue a restraining order against the defendants requiring them to comply with their own Crowd Control Policy. The Judge held that the balance of equities and the public interest did not clearly weigh in favor of either party. On December 12, 2011, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, relying on substantially the same reasoning. After the motion for a preliminary injunction was dismissed, the parties began an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) process. The parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2013 that included monetary compensation for the plaintiffs, the destruction of plaintiffs' arrest records, and an agreement by defendants to abide by Oakland's Crowd Control Policy.


The San Antonio District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Doubletree Hotels Corporation, Doubletree Hotel Systems, Inc, Felcor Lodging Trust, Inc., FCH/DT Holding, LP (d/b/a Doubletree Hotels and Doubletree Guest Suites Austin), Hilton Hotels Corporation, and DT Management, Inc. (d/b/a Doubletree Hotel and Doubletree Guest Suites Austin) in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas in September 2003. The complainant brought suit against the defendants in August 2003 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The EEOC's complaint alleged sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The private plaintiff's complaint alleged sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII, and violations of 42 U.S.C. ß1985(3), RICO, FLSA, Texas Labor Code, and Texas tort law. The cases were consolidated in March, 2004. Prior to consolidation, very little litigation activity occurred in the EEOC's case. In the private plaintiff's case, the individual defendant filed several partial motions to dismiss, some of which were granted and some denied. Shortly after consolidation, both cases were settled by settlement agreement in May 2004. The 2-year settlement agreement, containing an anti-discrimination clause, required the defendant to: post notice of anti-discrimination policy, provide both management and supervisor training and training for all employees, retain records of complaints of sexual harassment, report to the EEOC regarding training, and pay the complainant $285,000.

Summary: A private plaintiff and the EEOC for the San Antonio District brought lawsuits against Doubletree Hotels Corporation, Doubletree Hotel Systems, Hilton Hotels Corporation and other associated entities in the federal court, alleging sexual harassment in 2003. Both cases were consolidated in March, 2004, and settled in May, 2004. The 2-year settlement agreement required the defendant to post notice of anti-discrimination policy, provide both management and supervisor training and training for all employees, retain records of complaints of sexual harassment, report to the EEOC regarding training, and pay the complainant $285,000.


This is a case about detaining people for warrant searches without reasonable suspicion. On March 25, 2019, two African-American and Latino men filed this putative class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the New York Police Department (NYPD) policy of detaining people for warrant searches without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and that the NYPD has engaged in a long-standing pattern and practice of unlawful searches and seizures. They also claimed that the NYPD officials failed to properly train or supervise police officers regarding these searches. The case was assigned to Judge Valerie E. Caproni. On January 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which included adding five more plaintiffs and changing the class definition to use the specific term "NYPD record searches" instead of "warrant searches." On April 3, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to stay, citing difficulties with accessing documents as a result of work-from-home policies during the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 6, 2020, the court ordered for the case to be stayed for 45 days. In late May 2020, the stay concluded the litigation resumed. The parties began discovery and as of October 18, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a case about detaining people for warrant searches without reasonable suspicion. On March 25, 2019, two African-American and Latino men filed this putative class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that the NYPD policy of detaining people for warrant searches without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They also claimed that the NYPD's policy was widespread and that the NYPD officials failed to properly train or supervise police officers regarding these searches. On January 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which included adding five more plaintiffs and changing the class definition to use the specific term "NYPD record searches" instead of "warrant searches." As of October 18, 2020, the case is ongoing.


In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice notified Clay County of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail. In 1995, following the investigation, the DOJ notified the Chairman of the Clay County Commission of its findings and made recommendations regarding construction of a new jail; staffing and supervision; exercise; access to religious services, courts, and reading material; medical and mental healthcare; suicide prevention; general sanitation; fire safety; plumbing; bedding supplies; food services; and plumbing. Apparently after negotiation, the Attorney General filed an action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. section 1997 et seq., against the jail. Six days later, the District Court for the Middle District of Georgia (Judge Hugh Lawson) issued a consent decree. The consent decree laid out steps the county must take to improve issues discussed in the DOJ's letter of findings and recommendations. According to the docket from PACER, the court adopted the consent decree as judgment in 1997 and dismissed the case in 2000.

Summary: In 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice notified Clay County of its intention to investigate conditions of the county jail. In 1995, following the investigation, the DOJ notified the Chairman of the Clay County Commission of its findings and made recommendations regarding changes needed. After the Attorney General filed a lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. section 1997 et seq., against the jail, the parties agreed to a consent decree.