This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. In the fall of 2019, district court judges from across the countries granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule. But after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The District Court in this case issued a preliminary injunction enjoining implementation of the public charge rule and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction. However, the order affirming the injunction is currently stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for review from cases in the Second and Seventh Circuits. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. California, Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania and D.C. Sue Over the Public Charge Rule On August 16, 2019, the states of California, Maine, Oregon, and Pennsylvania along with the District of Columbia filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. The plaintiffs claimed that the Rule is unlawful because it was enacted contrary to the meaning of statutory terms in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the plaintiffs' statutory option to provide healthcare and nutrition benefits to the affected immigrants. The plaintiffs also asserted that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because defendants "relied on factors that Congress did not intend, failed to consider important aspects of the problem the agency is addressing, and has offered no explanation for the Rule that is consistent with the evidence that is before the agency." Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the Rule violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it was "motivated by improper discriminatory intent and bias against non-White immigrants" and because defendants "adopted it to harm a politically unpopular group and advance unconstitutional animus." The plaintiffs further contended that the Rule will cause plaintiffs to lose federal funds as immigrants disenroll from affected programs. They also asserted that the Rule, by causing confusion and fear in immigrant communities, will impose significant administrative costs and disrupt health and social services systems. Lastly, the plaintiffs proclaimed that the negative health outcomes that will result from the Rule will ultimately be paid for by the plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs Seek A Nationwide Injunction On August 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction, or, alternatively, an injunction limited to the five plaintiff states and the District of Columbia, enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because of their likely success on the merits and that absent an injunction, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm. The plaintiffs also asserted that a nationwide injunction was necessary, as a "five-state injunction would compound confusion (and concomitant harms) for any immigrant who moves back and forth between Plaintiff States and other jurisdictions." The court issued an order on August 27, 2019, relating the current case with City and County of San Francisco v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (IM-CA-0156), another case challenging the validity of the Rule under the APA. The case was reassigned to District Court Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton. In their opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction filed on September 13, 2019, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs have "no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a nationwide injunction." The defendants asserted that, in speculating that the Rule will result in economic harms, the plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing standing. Furthermore, the defendants contended that the Rule is not unlawful, as it "reflects Congress’s delegation of broad authority to the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of 'public charge'" and was "the product of a well-reasoned process that considered the plain text of the statute, legislative intent, statistical evidence, and the substance of hundreds of thousands of comments submitted by the public." The District Court Grants a Preliminary Injunction Following a hearing on October 2, 2019, on October 11, 2019, Judge Hamilton issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. 408 F.Supp.3d 1057. Judge Hamilton concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. However, Judge Hamilton did not grant the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the implementation of the Rule nationwide. Because the plaintiffs did not establish "the necessity of such relief," the scope of the injunction was limited to California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. The defendants filed a motion for stay of injunction pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit on October 25, 2019. Defendants argued that they are likely to succeed on appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing and did not fall within the zone of interests of the relevant statute. Defendants also contended that, because they would be "forced to grant lawful permanent residence (“LPR”) status to aliens likely to become public charges at any time under the Rule," they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay as their interest in "ensuring that 'aliens be self-reliant'" would be affected. On October 30, 2019, the defendants filed an appeal of the order for preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was docketed the next day (Docket No. 19-17214). In the Ninth Circuit, on November 15, 2019, the defendants filed an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The defendants' arguments before the Ninth Circuit mirrored the arguments they put forth in their motion to stay in the district court. The Ninth Circuit Stays the Preliminary Injunction  On December 5, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Jay Bybee, Sandra Ikuta, and John Owens) issued an order and opinion granting the defendants' emergency motion to stay the district court's injunction. 944 F.3d 773. The panel also granted a stay of a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule that was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security). The panel first concluded that the plaintiffs had standing and that the motion was not moot, despite nationwide injunctions put in place by district courts in Maryland and New York. Next, the panel found that the defendants demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Rule's definition of public charge was consistent with the relevant statutes and not arbitrary or capricious. Finally, the panel determined that the defendants had adequately explained the reasons for the Rule, that they would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay, and that, despite potential harms to the plaintiffs, these factors weighed in favor of granting a stay. Judge Bybee concurred, and wrote a separate opinion to note that "no one should mistake the court’s judgments for its policy preferences" and that it was time for Congress to weigh in on recent immigration debates instead of leaving them for the courts to decide. Judge Owens concurred with the majority's jurisdiction analysis but would have denied the defendants' motions to stay, in light of: "(1) government’s heavy burden due to the standard of review, (2) opaqueness of the legal questions before the court, (3) lack of irreparable harm to the government at this early stage, (4) likelihood of substantial injury to the plaintiffs, and (5) equities involved." In light of the Ninth Circuit's order, Judge Hamilton terminated the defendants' district court motion to stay the injunction on December 6, 2019. On December 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ninth Circuit's order granting stay of the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, in State of New York, issued a stay on all nationwide injunctions enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. 140 S.Ct. 599. Following this decision, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. The Plaintiffs Seek the Administrative Record Two days later the plaintiffs filed a motion in the district court seeking to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record (AR) and requesting leave to take discovery in support of their Equal Protection claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the AR provided by the defendants was inadequate, lacking key documents "critical to the Court’s evaluation of how the Rule departs from prior policy and practice." On February 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Judge Bybee and Judge Ikuta voted to deny the motion and Judge Owens voted to grant the motion. On April 1, 2020, Judge Hamilton granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to complete the AR and compel discovery on their equal protection claim. 2020 WL 1557424. Judge Hamilton concluded that plaintiffs had rebutted the presumption of a complete AR and were thus entitled to documents concerning "inter-agency communications providing comments to DHS" about the Rule. Moreover, Judge Hamilton found that plaintiffs' constitutional claim existed outside of their APA claim, and thus discovery on the claim was appropriate. District Court Grants in Part, Denies in Part Motion to Dismiss On April 22, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a plausible claim. Defendants asserted that the complaint should be dismissed in light of the Ninth Circuit's ruling that "the Rule falls well within the Executive Branch’s discretion to interpret and implement the public charge inadmissibility provision in the INA and is not arbitrary or capricious," because the plaintiffs lack jurisdiction, and because the complaint included "no well-pled allegation that DHS issued the Rule based on any improper discriminatory motive." On August 3, 2020 the district court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss. 476 F. Supp. 3d 994. Judge Hamilton denied that plaintiffs lacked jurisdiction, but granted dismissal of the claims relating to the Rehabilitation Act, state healthcare discretion, and Fifth Amendment Equal Protection. The first and fourth claims of the complaint, relating to violation of the INA and allegations of being arbitrary and capricious, were deferred pending the ruling on the preliminary injunction in the Ninth Circuit. Ninth Circuit Affirms the Preliminary Injunction, But the Order is Stayed On September 15, 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard arguments for the district court's stayed preliminary injunction with a new panel of judges (Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder, William Fletcher, and Lawrence VanDyke). On December 2, 2020, citing recent other circuit court decisions, it issued an order and a 2-1 opinion affirming the injunction, but vacated the nationwide application of the State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security injunction. 981 F.3d 742. Writing for the majority, Judge Schroeder first concluded that the plaintiffs had standing because they were suffering financial harm from immigrants shifting to state and local aid. Next, she found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Rule's definition of public charge was inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. She also found that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the plaintiffs. Finally, she determined that the nationwide injunction was not appropriate because identical injunctions had been and were still being litigated in other federal district and circuit courts. Judge VanDyke dissented from the majority's analysis for the same reasons as the December 5, 2019 decision, citing the Supreme Court's stays from January, a dissenting opinion from a similar ruling in the Seventh Circuit (962 F.3d 208), and a contrary ruling from the Fourth Circuit (971 F.3d 220). On December 16, 2020, DHS requested a stay of the Ninth Circuit's affirming order pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for review from the Second and Seventh Circuits. Since the other parties did not dispute it, Judge Hamilton granted the request on December 17, as did the Ninth Circuit panel on January 20, 2021. The new public charge rule was to remain in effect until the Supreme Court ruled on the petitions. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide from (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Ninth Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. On April 9, 2021 the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to deny the motion to intervene without an opinion. 2021 WL 1310846. However, Judge Vandyke wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the Biden administration was now colluding with the plaintiffs in the Public Charge lawsuits, making their interests at odds with the interests of the states who were seeking to intervene. He explained that this case was clearly still worth pursuing, since it had sufficient merit to warrant Supreme Court review and the government was circumventing APA requirements. Moreover, even though the Rule had been vacated, there was still a chance the Supreme Court may reverse that decision, making this lawsuit not yet moot. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The parties are currently conferring on how this will impact litigation. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 16, 2019, the states of California, Maine, Oregon, and Pennsylvania along with the District of Columbia filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In October 2019 the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. After the government appealed the district court's order for preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, a Ninth Circuit panel issued an order staying the injunction pending appeal. In August 2020, the District Court dismissed four of the six claims in the complaint, but deferred ruling on whether the Rule violated the INA or was arbitrary and capricious until the preliminary injunction was ruled on. The preliminary injunction was subsequently affirmed in December 2020. However, the order was stayed a few weeks later, leaving the stay of the preliminary injunction in effect. The Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021 and vacated nationwide. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.


On April 13, 2012, a number of Muslim Americans residing in Michigan filed this Religious Freedom Restoration Act lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, against the Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Border Patrol, and the Transportation Security Administration. The plaintiffs claimed that they have been subjected to invasive body searches, prolonged detentions, and religious questioning each time they cross the U.S.-Canada border, while never being provided with a reason for this treatment. Represented by the Council on American Islamic Relations, they asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that targeting and detaining Muslim Americans at the border to question them about their religious beliefs violates the First Amendment, as well as plaintiffs' Equal Protection rights, because people of other faiths are not similarly questioned. On September 14, 2012, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss. On November 16, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding in the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant. Again, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On June 11, 2013, Judge Avern Cohn bifurcated the claims against the official-capacity defendants from the claims against the individual-capacity defendants to handle them separately. Cherri v. Mueller, 12-11656, 2013 WL 2558154 (E.D. Mich. June 11, 2013). Judge Cohn then granted in part and denied in part the official-capacity defendants' motion to dismiss. He held that (1) the plaintiffs had standing to sue and the claims in the plaintiffs' first amended complaint were justiciable; (2) the plaintiffs had adequately pled the existence of an official policy, custom and practice; and (3) pursuant to that official policy, custom, and practice, the plaintiffs sufficiently stated a Fifth Amendment claim (Count IV). However, Judge Cohn held that the plaintiffs did not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the First Amendment or the RFRA and therefore dismissed those counts. Cherri v. Mueller, 951 F. Supp. 2d 918 (E.D. Mich. 2013). On June 17, 2013, the plaintiffs filed two additional amended complaints, one for the individual-capacity defendants and another for the official-capacity defendants. On August 14, 2013, the parties agreed to a stipulated order of dismissal of individual-capacity claims only. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2014. On March 16, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to compel discovery of several documents that the plaintiffs claimed were improperly withheld under law enforcement privilege along with three depositions. On April 28, 2015, the defendants cross-moved for a protective order from the three depositions. After a long discovery period, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on May 28, 2019, and the plaintiffs filed their own cross-motion for summary judgment on July 29, 2019. The case was reassigned to District Judge Denise Page Hood on January 2, 2020. In a March 24, 2020 memo, she stated that she would rule on the summary judgment motions without oral argument. No judgment has yet been entered.

Summary: In 2012, Muslim Americans residing in Eastern Michigan filed a federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act against the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Border Patrol, and the Transportation Security Administration. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were targeting and detaining Muslim Americans at the U.S.-Canada border to question them about their religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The case is ongoing.


On July 16, 2018, the City of Evanston, Illinois, along with the U.S. Conference of Mayors, filed this lawsuit against the United States Department of Justice. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the DOJ from imposing three new conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG program), a federal grant program that provides crucial support for law enforcement in hundreds of cities nationwide. These three conditions would require that cities (1) give the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 48 hours’ notice (or at least as much notice as practicable) prior to releasing any alien from custody (the “notice condition”); (2) give DHS officials unlimited access to local law enforcement facilities to interrogate any suspected noncitizen held there (the “access condition”); and (3) certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644, which bar local governments from withholding immigration status information from the federal government (the “compliance condition”). The plaintiffs sued the DOJ under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, arguing that the DOJ lacked statutory authority to condition Byrne JAG funds on the notice, access, and compliance conditions, and that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, they argued that the three conditions amounted to improper usurpation of Congress’s spending power by the executive branch, thus violating separation of powers. Even if there were no separation-of-powers violation, the plaintiffs argued that Congress could not have authorized the three conditions because they did not satisfy Spending Clause requirements. The conditions also violated the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering principle. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the DOJ’s requirements were unlawful, and sought an injunction preventing the DOJ from imposing the conditions. The case was originally assigned to Judge Charles R. Norgle, but was shortly thereafter reassigned to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. On July 20, 2018 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On August 9, 2018, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing and issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the DOJ from attaching the three challenged conditions to grants awarded to the City of Evanston or to any member of the Conference of Mayors. However, given a pending Seventh Circuit ruling on a nationwide injunction in a parallel case (City of Chicago v. Sessions), the court stayed its injunction as applied to the Conference. The plaintiffs appealed the stay, which was lifted by the Seventh Circuit on August 29, 2018. On October 5, 2018, the DOJ appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the Seventh Circuit. However, the parties filed a joint motion to hold appellate proceedings in abeyance, which was granted on October 15. On December 10, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint challenging two additional conditions on Byrne JAG program funding: (1) the “questionnaire condition,” which required a city to answer questions about whether it had any policies about how employees may communicate with DHS or ICE and (2) the “harboring condition,” requiring cities to agree not to violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (a prohibition on hiding or harboring undocumented immigrants). On February 11, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion on April 9, 2019. The DOJ then filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction, and in the alternative, for summary judgment. The court denied the DOJ’s motion to dismiss on September 26, 2019. On the same day, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the notice, access, compliance, and harboring conditions, as well as an additional certification requirement. It granted a declaration that 8 U.S.C. §§1373 and 1644 violated the anti-commandeering doctrine, declaring that “the Attorney General cannot require compliance with these statutes as a condition” of funding. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from imposing any of the challenged conditions in future grant years. 412 F.Supp.3d 873. The DOJ appealed. While the appeal was pending, the court granted a plaintiff motion for attorneys’ fees and expenses on April 23, 2020. It awarded $97,546.43 in attorneys’ fees and $283.75 in costs and expenses. On July 2, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs an additional $21,953.38 in supplemental fees. As of July 2020, the appeal is currently pending.

Summary: On July 16, 2018, the City of Evanston, Illinois and the U.S. Conference of Mayors filed this lawsuit against the Justice Department to enjoin it from imposing three new conditions on federal funding for local law enforcement (the Byrne JAG program). The plaintiffs sued the DOJ under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking a declaration that the DOJ’s three conditions on Byrne JAG funding were unlawful, as well as an injunction preventing the DOJ from imposing the conditions. The court issued a preliminary injunction on August 9, 2018. On September 26, it granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring that the conditions the DOJ had placed on funding were unconstitutional. It issued an injunction barring the DOJ from enforcing the conditions on funding, and granted attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. As of July 2020, the DOJ's appeal is pending before the Seventh Circuit.


On January 18, 2008, minority borrowers filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Greenpoint Mortage Funding, Inc. ("Greenpoint"), under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive, equitable, and monetary relief, alleging Greenpoint's practices had a disparate impact on minority applicants for home mortgage loans. Specifically, they alleged that Greenpoint's credit pricing policy, whereby subjective and discretionary financing charges and interest mark-ups were authorized, led to a higher likelihood of discretionary points, fees and interest rate mark-ups to minority applicants and increased the average cost of mortgage loans to minorities. Minorities were defined as black and Hispanic applicants. The case then spent some time in pre-trial motions and alternative dispute resolution. On March 13, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The parties continued settlement negotiations. On December 4, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On December 16, 2009, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) issued an order expressing several concerns about the proposed settlement, such as low amount of payment ($15) to each class member, and the amount of attorney's fees. On March 15, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which the Court granted. The class consisted of all African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States to whom Greenpoint originated a residential-secured loan in GreenPoint's wholesale lending channel between January 1, 2004 and January 1, 2008. The defendant appealed. On November 3, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, which the Court granted on December 10, 2010. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed not to appeal class certification, and as such, the same class as above was included. The defendant agreed to pay $14,750,000.00 to the class, distributed among class representatives, pro rata among class members, and for attorney's fees. The defendant agreed to submit quarterly reports to the plaintiff's class counsel until the payments were fully made. $150,000.00 out of the payment went to a non-profit that would provide foreclosure counseling to class members. The defendant warranted that it was not originating any new wholesale residential real estate secured loans. If it did so, it would notify the plaintiffs first. In accordance with the proposed settlement, the plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint on December 14, 2010. The plaintiffs stated the same facts, alleging pattern or practice of discrimination by Greepoint, and seeking injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. Following a fairness hearing, the Court issued a final approval order on April 12, 2011. It approved the settlement class (same as above). The attorney's fees were in the amount of $3,687,500.00, plus actual costs of $425,412.04. The Court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement and administration of the agreement.

Summary: On January 18, 2008, minority borrowers filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Greenpoint Mortage Funding, Inc. ("Greenpoint"), under under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive, equitable, and monetary relief, alleging Greenpoint's practices had a disparate impact on minority applicants for home mortgage loans. The parties settled with the final order issued on April 12, 2011. The defendants agreed to pay $14,750,000.00 to class members as monetary award, and for various costs.


On April 14, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in Indiana filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Southern District of Indiana Court against the State of Indiana. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought a declaration that Indiana laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. They also sought a permanent injunction directing the defendants to recognize the plaintiffs' marriage, directing the Pension Fund to administer benefits to same-sex couples, and awarding the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. They claimed that Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. Furthermore, members of each of these couples have served in an Indiana police or fire department, and they claim that lack of state recognition of their marriages has interfered with the flow of pensions and benefits within their families. On June 25, 2014, Judge Richard L. Young entered a judgment on the plaintiffs' and the defendants' motions for summary judgment. They ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from denying a marriage license to same-sex applicants, the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban, and the Indiana Public Retirement System was enjoined to administer the same services and benefits to all married couples regardless if they are same-sex or different-sex. The decision was stayed pending appeal, which was filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the same day. In September 2014, the Seventh Circuit invalidated and enjoyed Indiana's prohibitions of same-sex marriage. Baskin v. Bogin, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), (PB-IN-0005 in this Clearinghouse). The Supreme Court denied review and the case was subsequently dismissed. The parties reached an agreement on attorneys' fees that was not disclosed to the Court. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs are several same-sex couples residing in Indiana who on April 14, 2014, filed a lawsuit against the state of Indiana in the Southern District of Indiana U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that Indiana laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, as well as a permanent injunction directing the defendants to recognize the plaintiffs marriage, directing the Pension Fund to administer benefits to same-sex couples as well as different-sex, and awarding the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The District Court enjoined Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the decision in three other same-sex marriage cases. The Court accordingly dismissed this case and it is now closed.


On September 22, 2000, eight plaintiffs filed a civil complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. All the plaintiffs had felony convictions, had completed their sentences, and had not had restoration of their civil rights to register and vote. In the complaint, they challenged the Florida constitution's felony disenfranchisement provision under the federal Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They contended that the state's disenfranchisement law violated prohibitions on racial discrimination and, through a restoration of civil rights process that requires payment of restitution debts prior to restoration of voting rights, effectively imposed an improper poll tax and wealth qualification on voting. State and county officials having responsibility for conducting elections in Florida and the state officials comprising the clemency board were named as defendants in the case. All defendants were sued in their official capacities. The plaintiffs sought class action status for their case and requested declaratory and injunctive relief from the court. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law and from the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law. The parties conducted discovery and plaintiffs offered their experts' opinions that the Florida disenfranchisement enactments had a racially discriminatory intent and effect. In January 2002, the state moved for summary judgment and, two weeks later, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. On July 18, 2002, the district court granted the state's motion for summary judgment on both the statutory and constitutional issues. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp.2d 1333 (S.D. Fl. 2002) (District Judge James Lawrence King). Judge King found that Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit precedent required denial of the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims as to alleged due process and equal protection clause violations, particularly in view of section 2 of that Amendment, which affirmatively sanctioned felon disenfranchisement. Likewise, the judge rejected the plaintiffs' other constitution-based challenges. He found that plaintiffs' evidence of a racially-discriminatory purpose in the 1868 enactment of the disenfranchisement provision was undercut by the 1968 re-enactment of that provision for racially-neutral reasons. Judge King found that the VRA claim could also be dismissed, as the plaintiffs had been unable to show that their being denied the right to vote turned on their race, as opposed to a racially neutral cause, i.e., the plaintiffs disenfranchised themselves by committing a felony. The judge rejected plaintiffs' claim that voting was improperly conditioned on wealth, saying that they had already lost the right to vote by means of their felonious conduct and that it was the possible restoration of that right, not the voting itself, which was conditioned upon restitution payment (and which payment, under an available administrative mechanism, could be waived by the state). The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eleventh Circuit. A divided panel of that court upheld the poll tax portion of the earlier decision but otherwise reversed the district court on December 19, 2003. The court said that the plaintiffs' evidence established that disputed issues of fact existed to be resolved, making summary judgment inappropriate. The majority of the panel felt that evidence of the circumstances of the 1968 re-enactment of the disenfranchisement provision of the Florida constitution was not sufficiently clear to break the causal chain of racial discrimination that they saw as motivating the provision's original enactment in 1868. Similarly, the panel ruled that the VRA statutory claim should not have been summarily decided, given the totality of the circumstances and the plaintiffs' evidence. Johnson v. Bush, 353 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (Circuit Judge Rosemary Barkett). On July 20, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the panel's decision and ordered rehearing en banc. Johnson v. Bush, 353 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Rehearing resulted in the full Eleventh Circuit's opinion affirming summary judgment for the state. Johnson v. Bush, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Circuit Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, who had been the dissenter to the panel opinion, wrote the majority en banc opinion. It stated that the 1968 amended version of the felon disenfranchisement provision removed any equal protection taint from the original version of the enactment. The court noted that Florida's felon disenfranchisement law pre-dated the civil war and was enacted when blacks could not vote, regardless of criminal record. To the majority, this observation, together with what the court saw as a dearth of contemporary commentary suggesting racial motivations for the 1868 retention of the disenfranchisement provision, undercut the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs' experts. Moreover, the majority found that the1986 re-enactment of the provision substantially altered it and occurred without evidence of racial bias. Additionally, the majority ruled that the VRA prohibition against voting qualifications that result in the abridgment of the right to vote on account of a person's race did not apply to Florida's felon disenfranchisement provision. To rule otherwise would allow a congressional enactment overrule a federal constitutional provision (Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) and would be contrary to legislative intent , in the view of the majority. Concurring, Circuit Judge Gerald B. Tjoflat wrote that the cause of the denial of the right to vote to felons in Florida consists entirely of their conviction, not their race. The plaintiffs sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, but the application for a writ of certiorari was denied. Johnson v. Bush, 546 U.S. 1015 (2005). A post-remand effort to re-open the judgment was denied by the district court in December 2006. Judge King also then denied a certificate of appealability, according to the district court's docket sheet. A May 2007 motion to reconsider the case was also denied. Appeals of these rulings were dismissed for failure to pay filing fees. In August 2007, another motion to re-open the case was filed, followed by an October 2007, memorandum in support. The district court repeatedly denied Defendant Rivera's motion to reopen the case. The United States Court of Appeals denied the Defendant's motion to reopen for failing to pay the requisite filling fees. On July 14, 2008 the Court of Appeals dismissed the case for want of prosecution. The case is now closed.

Summary: Eight individuals with felony convictions who had completed their sentences filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida challenging the Florida constitution's felon disenfranchisement provision. On July 18, 2002, Judge James Lawrence King granted the state's motion for summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the summary judgment opinion on July 20, 2014. The Supreme Court denied certiorari and the District Court refused to reopen the case. It is now closed.


On July 9, 2018 plaintiff, the American Immigration Council, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Represented by the American Immigration Council and Dorsey & Whitney, the plaintiff brought their claim under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff brought three claims under FOIA: Failure to Conduct an Adequate Search for Responsive Records, Failure to Disclose Responsive Records, and Failure to Grant Plaintiff's Public Interest Fee Waiver Request. The case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. The FOIA request sought specific identified data regarding (a) each individual who was apprehended by CBP, (b) each individual who was encountered by ICE, (c) each individual who was arrested by ICE, (d) each individual who was arrested by CBP, and (e) each individual who was removed or returned from the United States between January 1, 2016 and October 10, 2017. On July 16, 2018 plaintiff filed an amended complaint reasserting the claims from the July 9th complaint. After several joint status reports, the defendants moved for summary judgment on March 29, 2019. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on April 26, 2019. Judge Berman Jackson issued an order on the motions for summary judgment on May 27, 2020, partially granting and denying both sides' motions. She granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment related to birthdates and identifying information on the spreadsheets ICE redacted in previous versions. She wrote that birthdates alone would not constitute a risk of identity theft, ICE's proffered reason for withholding the information. She granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regards to the location information of ICE stations, since this would tangentially provide information on staffing levels at various ICE posts across the country, a protected internal procedure under FOIA. As a result, ICE was instructed to resubmit documents with the identifying information provided. 2020 WL 2748515. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The American Immigration Council brought a suit against U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for violating the Freedom of Information Act. The parties were largely cooperative and sought to avoid litigation. After cross-motions for summary judgment, ICE was instructed to provide the American Immigration Council with documents that list birthdates and similar identifying information, but it was entitled to withhold location data on ICE posts. The case is ongoing.


On January 23, 2017, four minor children confined to the state juvenile facilities Copper Lake School for Girls and the Lincoln Hills School for Boys filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs sued various state officials responsible for the facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by wrongfully and unlawfully imposing solitary confinement, mechanical constraints, chemical agents such as pepper spray, and strip searches on the minor prisoners. Represented by the ACLU and the Juvenile Law Center, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to District Judge James D. Peterson and Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker. The State of Wisconsin operated the Lincoln Hills School for Boys and the Copper Lake School for Girls, which incarcerated approximately 150–200 youth prisoners who were as young as 14 years old. According to the plaintiffs, the Schools routinely subjected these prisoners to unlawful mechanical restraints and pepper spraying, as well as to solitary confinement whereby the children were forced to remain in their cells for 22–23 hours a day. Many of these children were forced to spend their only free hour outside of a solitary confinement cell in handcuffs and chained to a table. The plaintiffs alleged that officers also repeatedly and excessively used bear mace and other pepper sprays against the children, causing them excruciating pain and impairing their breathing. The plaintiffs claimed that these practices constituted serious violations of the children’s constitutional rights, including their rights to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. On January 24, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for certification of a class defined as “[a]ll prisoners who are now, or in the future will be, confined at Lincoln Hills School for Boys and Copper Lake School for Girls.” On September 18, 2017, Judge Peterson granted class certification. On April 17, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding five plaintiffs and additional factual allegations regarding those plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also requested attorneys’ fees and costs in their amended complaint. On April 19, 2017, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants and their agents to eliminate the use of solitary confinement for disciplinary or punitive purposes, the routine use of mechanical restraints, and the use of pepper spray for punishment and behavior management or control. They also requested that the defendants limit any use of chemical agents to rare and temporary responses necessary to prevent imminent and serious physical harm to persons. In support of this motion, the plaintiffs argued that each of these practices violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On June 21, 2017, the Wisconsin State Journal, the Wisconsin Freedom of Information Council, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, the Wisconsin Newspaper Association, and the Associated Press moved to intervene for the limited purpose of objecting to any closure of any part of any proceedings in this lawsuit. Specifically, the intervenors objected to the plaintiffs' motion to close the courtroom for the display of videos to protect the identities of juveniles, urging the court to consider the public’s interest in transparency. That same day, the court entered an order granting the plaintiffs’ motion to close the courtroom but, in light of the intervenors’ objection, required the court to take a break before displaying the videos, and asked that those who remained in the courtroom sign a non-disclosure agreement. Finding the plaintiffs’ arguments compelling, the court granted a preliminary injunction on July 10, 2017, barring defendants from using disciplinary or punitive restrictive housing or any other form of disciplinary or punitive solitary confinement in any manner other than in very limited and brief specific instances outlined by the court. The court also enjoined the defendants from using chemical agents in any manner other than where a prisoner engaged in physical harm to himself or others. Additionally, the court required the defendants and their agents to meet certain minimum standards with regard to their use of restrictive housing and their use of mechanical restraints. The parties began settlement negotiations in September 2017. In January 2018, the Wisconsin State Legislature voted to close Lincoln Hills and Copper Lake by January 1, 2021. (In the summer of 2019, that deadline was pushed back to July 1, 2021). The parties continued their negotiations in mediation sessions before Magistrate Peter Oppeneer in April and May 2018. On June 1, 2018, after reaching a settlement, the parties jointly moved the court to grant preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement. On June 20, 2018, Judge Peterson granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement agreement and approved the proposed notice. The preliminary approval contained eleven points for the parties to use as guidelines in reaching an agreement. These included: reducing the maximum amount of time incarcerated youth are held in solitary confinement, reducing the use of pepper spray, increasing opportunities for physical exercise, and ending a rule that only one book be allowed to inmates in solitary confinement. (Details here). On September 21, 2018, Judge Peterson approved the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement required the defendants to adopt policy changes with regard to punitive solitary confinement, the use of chemical agents and mechanical restraints, and the administration of strip searches. All of these practices were in large part prohibited by the settlement agreement and those few instances where they were not prohibited were clearly defined by the agreement. The agreement also required that the defendants be monitored during the three-year-minimum settlement term and that they submit reports detailing the use of the new policies and practices. The defendants agreed to pay for a monitor's reasonable fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $885,000 in fees and costs for work done through June 18, 2018 and an additional $220.50/hour for work done by the plaintiffs' counsel from June 19, 2018 until entry of the settlement agreement. The court retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance. Pursuant to the parties' agreement that the facilities be monitored, the monitor submitted her first report on January 14, 2019, indicating partial compliance with the settlement by the defendants and a need for documentation of policies to be improved. The majority of youth were no longer in solitary confinement for more than seven days, however, challenges as to the reliability of documentation remained. Under the settlement terms, administrative confinement was only to be used for a youth posing a serious risk of imminent physical harm to others, however, the monitor observed instances where administrative confinement was used though the youth wasn't at risk of imminent physical harm to others. Additionally, though strip searches had decreased, staff had been utilizing a "hygiene" check instead, where they required the youth to strip to their underwear. The monitor noted that this search should only be used for probable cause of youth possession drugs or weapons. In general, the monitor noted that documentation for policies, programs, and quality assurance needed to be improved further. As of July 31, 2020, the court-appointed monitor continues to submit regular reports.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by four minor children under the custody of the Copper Lake School for Girls and the Lincoln Hills School for Boys in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by wrongfully and unlawfully imposing solitary confinement, mechanical constraints, chemical agents such as pepper spray, and strip searches on the minor prisoners. In January 2018, the state legislature voted to close the facilities by January 1, 2021 (that deadline was later delayed to July 1, 2021). In June 2018, the parties reached a settlement that changed the policies and practices regarding the above punishments by largely prohibiting practices. The settlement required monitoring during its three-year-minimum term. The first monitor report was submitted on January 14, 2019, indicating partial compliance. As of July 31, 2020, monitoring is ongoing.


On August 19, 2010, the ACLU of Illinois filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the Cook County State's Attorney. The ACLU, represented by its own attorneys and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The Illinois Eavesdropping Act criminalized non-consensual audio recording of oral communication of others. The ACLU intended to record police officers performing their duties in public without their consent and make the recordings available to the general public. Due to its fear of prosecution under the Act, the ACLU sought to challenge the statute and this started the lawsuit. On October 28, 2010, the District Court (Judge Suzanne B. Conlon) granted the State's Attorney's motion to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of standing. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 2010 WL 4386868 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The Court denied the ACLU's motion to alter the judgment and to amend the complaint on January 10, 2011. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 2011 WL 66030 (N.D. Ill. 2011). Judge Conlon held that the ACLU suffered no First Amendment injury, reasoning that the First Amendment did not protect its right to audio record unwilling speakers. The ACLU appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit. On May 8, 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court (Diane S. Sykes) reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2012). The appeals court ordered the district court to allow the amended complaint and to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the State's Attorney's prosecution of the ACLU under the Act. Judge Sykes explained that the lower court abused its discretion in its ruling regarding the ACLU's standing. The Court of Appeals found that audio recording was entitled to First Amendment protection, and that the willingness of the speakers was irrelevant to the standing issue. Regarding the ACLU's First Amendment claim, the Seventh Circuit found that the First Amendment interests were strong in this case and that a heightened scrutiny applied. The Act burdened directly the speech and press rights under the First Amendment, and was not closely tailored to the government's interest in protecting conversational privacy. Judge Richard A. Posner dissented, focusing on the importance of privacy, especially that of the civilians interacting with police officers in public. (The State sought Supreme Court review, but its certiorari petition was denied on November 26, 2012.) On remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Sharon J. Coleman. On July 6, 2012, Judge Coleman issued a preliminary injunction according to the appellate court's order. The ACLU filed its amended complaint on July 10, 2012. On December 18, 2012, the District Court granted summary judgment to the ACLU for reasons set forth in the appellate opinion. ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez, 2012 WL 6680341 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Judge Coleman further ordered a permanent injunction in favor of the ACLU on January 14, 2013, which prohibited the State's Attorney from prosecuting the ACLU for its audio recording of on-duty police officers without their consent in public. On March 5, 2013, Judge Coleman ordered the State's Attorney to pay the ACLU in sum of $645,549 for attorneys' fees and litigation costs. This ended the case.

Summary: On August 19, 2010, the ACLU of Illinois filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Cook County State's Attorney. The ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Illinois Eavesdropping Act, which criminalized non-consensual audio recording of police officers on duty in public, violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Although the district court originally found that the ACLU lacked standing to pursue the matter, this was reversed by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals in May 2012. In an opinion by Judge Sykes, the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to issue a preliminary injunction preventing the State's Attorney's prosecution of the ACLU under the Act. Judge Richard A. Posner dissented. On remand, the district court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the ACLU on January 14, 2013, which prohibited the State's Attorney from prosecuting the ACLU for its audio recording of on-duty police officers without their consent in public. The ACLU also won attorneys' fees and costs.


On June 21, 2010, a former employee of the Greenville County School District filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina against the school district, the South Carolina Employment Security Commission, and two EEOC employees. The pro se plaintiff sought monetary damages for loss of wages and unemployment benefits as well as injunctive relief, alleging that she was discharged without the Human Resources Department's knowledge and without being notified of her right to appeal. On August 13, 2010, the Court (Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks) issued a Report and Recommendation for Dismissal of Parties. Specifically, Judge Hendricks recommended that the court dismiss the EEOC employees and the South Carolina Employment Security Commission (SCESC). His recommendation regarding the EEOC employees was based on the plaintiff's failure to state a cognizable claim and on the fact that the EEOC employees were not subject to suit under Title VII in the case. He based his recommendation regarding the SCESC on the fact that the Eleventh Amendment "bars suits against a State filed by it [sic] own citizens. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)." On December 9, 2010, the plaintiff and the defendants (excluding the EEOC employees and the SCESC) filed a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice, stipulating that no matter of controversy existed and that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed. The next day, the District Court (J. Michelle Childs) adopted the earlier Report and Recommendation for Dismissal of Parties and dismissed the two EEOC employees and the SCESC. This ended the case.

Summary: This case was brought by an hourly wage employee of the Greenville County School District against the school district and the South Carolina Employment Security Commission. The plaintiff sought monetary damages for loss of wages and unemployment benefits as well as injunctive relief, alleging that she was discharged without the Human Resources Department's knowledge and without being notified of her right to appeal. On December 10, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.


On June 2, 2010, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Detroit in the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (ACLU) asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory damages for violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that a misdemeanor citation for leafleting outside a concert was a violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On July 31, 2009, Plaintiff, an animal rights activist, in conjunction with others, decided to distribute leaflets outside of the Warped Tour at Comerica Park in downtown Detroit. After successfully distributing literature for two hours, plaintiff was approached by a Detroit Police Officer, who informed him that he required a permit to distribute the leaflets. The plaintiff asked for the city ordinance that made it a crime to distribute without a license, but the officer would not provide one. The officer detained the plaintiff and issued the plaintiff a misdemeanor citation for distribution leaflets without a license. Plaintiff argued that distributing noncommercial leaflets is not a crime, and furthermore constitutes protected speech under the First Amendment. He was charged with unlawfully distributing commercial leaflets and operation of a business on a public sidewalk. Plaintiff was required to pay a $500 bond. On November 19, 2009, the charges were dismissed shortly after being filed, with prejudice. Plaintiff brought this action for compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief as a result of that experience. On August 11, 2011, the Court (Judge Avern Cohn) entered an order of dismissal, noting that the parties had settled the case. On December 6, 2011, plaintiff filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement, Impose Sanctions, and Award Attorney's fees. The plaintiff alleged that after the case had settled in August, and the Order of Dismissal had been entered, the Defendant city refused to sign the Settlement Agreement and caused extraordinary delay. On December 19, 2011, the City signed the Settlement Agreement, agreeing to compensate plaintiff (another similar case had been consolidated with the original plaintiff's) for injury, and pay attorney's fees in the amount of $20,000. The City also agreed to issue training directives on First Amendment rights, Retaliation, and Loitering, to be read to every shift every day for a week, and once a week for six months thereafter. It also agreed to alter its policy of allowing complaints regarding police conduct to be filed even when charges are pending against the complainant. Lastly, the City agreed to make available literature regarding the complaint process available on its website, in its precincts, and accompanying the complaint forms. On March 14, 2012, the Court entered a stipulated order of voluntary dismissal with prejudice, closing the case. We have no further information about the City's compliance with the Settlement Agreement.

Summary: A Detroit Police Officer issued a misdemeanor citation to an activist distributing literature without a license. This turned out to not be a crime, and plaintiff claimed the prosecution was malicious. The City settled for $20,000 and agreed to engage in reforms regarding training about First Amendment rights, as well as reform its civilian complaint process for police conduct.


On November 4, 2009, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 against the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. PLN, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked for punitive and compensatory damages and injunctive relief, claiming that PLN's right to free speech and due process had been violated. Specifically the plaintiff claimed that a prisoner at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Hilltop Unit ordered a copy of Women Behind Bars from PLN and once it arrived to Hilltop, informed the prisoner she could not receive the book due to a content violation. PLN did not receive notification of this denial. PLN sent multiple copies of Women Behind Bars and other books critical of the prison system and the books were all denied entry. PLN claimed that their First Amendment rights to free speech and expression had been violated, their liberty interest in communicating with incarcerated individuals had been denied, and that there was no legitimate penological interest for doing so. Furthermore, PLN claimed that they had been denied due process of law because PLN had not been given notice when their publications were not allowed into the prison. On January 4, 2011, the District Court (Judge Janis Graham Jack) granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court held that First Amendment rights do not apply to readers and publishers alone, but also to book distributors, as long as the recipient of the book is willing. However, the court found that stopping these books from coming into prisons was a legitimate government interest for the TDCJ. The court noted that since this was not a facial challenge of book banning practices in Texas prisons, but was an as applied challenge, it was much harder to rule in favor of the plaintiffs in this case as the judgment of prison officials is given broad deference. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the summary judgment ruling was affirmed on June 1, 2012 after a de novo review.

Summary: On November 4, 2009, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Texas asking for punitive and compensatory damages and injunctive relief, claiming that PLN's rights to free speech and due process had been violated by members of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Specifically the plaintiff claimed that a prisoner at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) Hilltop Unit ordered copies of books but was informed that she could not receive the book due to a content violation. PLN did not receive notification of this denial. PLN claimed that their First Amendment rights to free speech and expression had been violated, their liberty interest in communicating with incarcerated individuals had been denied, and that there was no legitimate penological interest for doing so. Furthermore, PLN claimed that they had been denied the due process of law because PLN had not been given notice when their publications were not allowed into the prison. On January 4, 2011, the District Court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that there was no applicable First Amendment challenge to the case and there was no violation of due process. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the decision for summary judgment was affirmed on June 1, 2012.


On October 12th, 2015, the plaintiff, who was a black 7 year-old with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), was attending after school program administered by defendant Flint & Genesee Chamber of Commerce. While there, the plaintiff experienced some behavioral challenges related to his disability, which staff were aware of. The plaintiff’s behavior reportedly involved kicking a supply cart and running around on the bleachers. Staff requested a school resource officer (SRO), who arrived on the scene and handcuffed the plaintiff behind his back. After the plaintiff's mother arrived and demanded that the handcuffs be removed, the officer responded that the key was in a lockbox and he would need to await the arrival of other officers to remove the handcuffs. The plaintiff remained handcuffed for nearly an hour in the lobby of the building, attracting a crowd of observers. The complaint also noted that the plaintiff's ADHD may have been exacerbated or caused by the health crisis happening in Flint, MI at this time. Residents were urged to stop drinking Flint’s tap water due to high levels of lead in the drinking water, which can cause behavioral problems and learning disabilities in children On July 31st, 2018 plaintiff’s mother filed this lawsuit on her son's behalf in the U.S District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Represented by the Disability Rights Program of the ACLU, the ACLU of Michigan, and private counsel, the plaintiff sued the City of Flint, MI, Flint's Chief of Police in his official capacity, the school resource officer in his individual capacity, the Flint Chamber of Commerce, and the Genesee Chamber of Commerce under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctive relief that would prohibit the defendants from taking similarly excessive action against schoolchildren in the future and declaratory relief establishing that the defendants have violated his constitutional and civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan's Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff also sought compensatory and punitive damages for the significant emotional suffering, psychological injury and trauma he suffered, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred during the litigation. The defendants City of Flint and City Police Chief filed a motion to dismiss on October 9, 2018. On April 12th, 2019 the motion to dismiss was granted for the Chief of Police since the court felt that those claims overlapped with the claims against the City, since the plaintiff was suing the Chief of Police in his official capacity. The Chief of Police was removed from the litigation on May 20th, 2019. The order to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part with respect to the claims against the City, sustaining most of the claims against the City, but removing the claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, since the plaintiff failed to allege that the City or the other defendants were aware of the plaintiff's disability. After that failed motion to dismiss, the parties began a series of settlement conferences, meeting 8 times between November 15th, 2019 and July 10th, 2020. During those meetings the parties negotiated the following settlement agreement:

The creation of a fund of $40,000 to help address the plaintiff's needs, and new policies adopted by the after-school program and the Flint Police Department.

The Flint-Genesee Chamber of Commerce agreed that the after-school program will adopt the following policies, among others:

 No physical restraint or intervention except as a last resort;

 No school resource officer involvement except when there is imminent danger;

 Require documentation of physical restraint and notice to parents; and

 Provide training for staff regarding disabilities.

The Flint Police Department’s juvenile offender policy will be revised to encourage officers to do the following, among other things, whenever possible:

 Limit police involvement at schools to criminal offenses and not become involved in school discipline issues;

 Use alternatives to arresting juveniles;

 Use the lowest level of enforcement for elementary school children;

 Involve parents whenever possible;

 Release children without further action when there has been no property damage or physical injury;

 De-escalate whenever appropriate; and

 Participate in training related to implicit bias, de-escalation, special education, and positive behavior intervention.

 Defendants also covered the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees

 The Clearinghouse does not have access to the full settlement agreement, but details regarding the settlement can be found in this ACLU press release. The parties reached this agreement on August 14th, 2020. The settlement was approved by District Judge Denise Page Hood on September 9th, 2020, who subsequently dismissed the case on September 29th. The settlement is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the ACLU and the ACLU of Michigan filed a lawsuit against the Flint Police Department and the Flint Chamber of Commerce on behalf of a child with disabilities who was handcuffed by a school resource officer (SRO) when he was seven years old. Plaintiff, who is black, has Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). The case ended in a settlement agreement in the fall of 2020, which created a fund t0 help address plaintiff’s needs and new policies adopted by the afterschool program and the Flint Police Department.


The EEOC's Philadelphia district office sued International Longshoreman's Association Local 1694, a Delaware dockside union, on August 29, 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The EEOC's complaint alleged that the union violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act when it disallowed a union member from attending training sessions based on age, but allowed younger members to attend. The court entered a consent judgment on September 19, 2006, which stipulated that the union would pay the aggrieved employee $10,000 in damages, post a notice of compliance with the ADEA, draft non-discrimination policies and complaint procedures, and provide ADEA training to all local union members. The terms of the agreement were to run for 2 years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place, so the case closed in 2008.

Summary: The EEOC obtained a consent judgment that required a union to pay $10,000 in damages and comply with Age Discrimination in Employment Act requirements after alleging that the union disallowed a union member to attend training due to age.


On April 30, 2012, a family of Catholic business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On June 8, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not claim any imminent harm because they had not shown that they could not escape enforcement by virtue of the regulations' grandfathering provision. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and an amended motion for injunctive relief on June 26, 2012, detailing reasons why their insurance plan could not claim exemption from the regulations via the grandfathering provision, and why they faced imminent harm absent injunctive relief. On July 13, 2012, the U.S. moved to dismiss this amended complaint and opposing the amended injunction motion, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the government claimed that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a substantial burden on their religious freedom, and that even if a substantial burden existed, the contraceptive coverage regulations were the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest in women's health and equality. On July 27, 2012, the District Court (Judge John L. Kane) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs could not avoid imminent harm to their constitutional and statutory rights via either the grandfathering provision or the defendants' enforcement "safe harbor" period. Judge Kane further found that the regulations were not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive mandate against the plaintiffs. Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. July 27, 2012). The U.S. appealed the preliminary injunction order to the 10th Circuit (Docket No. 12-01380). On October 26, 2012, District Court Judge Kane granted the plaintiffs' motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the 10th Circuit appeal. On March 29, 2013, the 10th Circuit Clerk (Elisabeth A. Shumaker) filed an order denying the defendants' motion to consolidate the case with appeal number 12-6294, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius. On October 3, 2013, without hearing oral argument, Circuit Court Judge Scott M. Matheson, Jr., affirmed the district court's decision to grant injunctive relief and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. On January 31, 2014, the government sought review in the Supreme Court; the petition was held pending the Supreme Courts' decision in Hobby LobbyBurwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius) and Conestoga Wood Specialities Corps. The Hobby Lobby decision issued on June 30, 2014: In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. (The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available.) The next day, the Supreme Court denied the government's petition for review in this case. On March 16, 2015, the District Court granted an unusually broad permanent injunction for the plaintiffs. 83 F.Supp.3d 1122. The injunction prevented the government not only from enforcing the version of the contraception mandate that existed at the time of the Hobby Lobby decision against the plaintiffs' business, but any future version of the mandate. Permanent injunctions in similar cases have limited the government only from enforcing the version of the mandate that was at issue in Hobby Lobby. The Court emphasized that the injunction did not apply beyond the particular plaintiffs in the case. In this injunction, the government bears the burden of seeking to dissolve it if it issues a version of the contraceptive services mandate that complies with the RFRA. The injunction applied to the plaintiffs' family business, Hercules Industries, and the claims of the individual plaintiffs were abated pending further action by the court. On April 29, 2015, the parties notified the court that attorneys' fees and costs had been resolved out of court by settlement.

Summary: In 2012, a family of Catholic business owners filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their business's group health insurance plan. The District Court granted injunctive relief, which was affirmed by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. The government sought review in the Supreme Court, but its petition was denied on July 1, 2014, the day after the Supreme Court issued its Hobby Lobby decision on a similar question. On March 16, 2015, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' business, Hercules Industries, an unusually broad permanent injunction. The injunction prevents the government from enforcing future version of the contraceptive services mandate against the plaintiff business.


On November 9, 2012, Prison Legal News (PLN), a monthly publication that reports on criminal justice-related issues, filed a federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Texas against Upshur County, Texas, alleging violation of its rights to free speech and due process at the Upshur County Jail. On October 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint adding allegations of violations of the right to free press. PLN was represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project, as well as by lawyers who work for its umbrella organization, the Human Rights Defense Center. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. According to the complaint, PLN mailed copies of its monthly publication to jail prisoners, as well as copies of a book titled Protecting Your Health and Safety. The jail rejected approximately 90 of PLN's publications over a one-year period. The jail also rejected legal mail sent to prisoners by PLN. No notice was provided to the prisoners regarding the censorship of PLN's publications. The complaint alleges that the Upshur County Jail's prisoner handbook "contains no written criteria explaining when a publication will be rejected," and jail policy "does not provide a sender any notice or explanation when a book is censored." On September 30, 2013, the district court (Judge Rodney Gilstrap) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court (Judge Gilstrap) found that modifications to the jail's "correspondence plan" were necessary in order to meet standards guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court (Judge Gilstrap) ordered implementation of specific terms for rejecting correspondence. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the court on December 6, 2013. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed to adopt a new policy for correspondence and agreed to distribute publications such as Prison Legal News. The jail also agreed to provide notice to senders and prisoners, and an opportunity to appeal, when mail was censored or rejected.

Summary: In November 2012, Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit against Upshur County Texas, alleging that Upshur County Jail authorities rejected those and refused to deliver the monthly publication to prisoners. PLN argued that the jail's actions violated its rights to free speech, free press, and due process under the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. The court (Judge Rodney Gilstrap) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, which ordered the jail modify its policies on correspondence. In December 2013, the parties agreed to settlement, under which the jail agreed to adopt a new policy and distribute Prison Legal News.


On August 24, 2001, the Louisville Area Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, London Division, alleging disparate treatment of female employees, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and seeking relief for a class of similarly situated female applicants who had been adversely affected. Specifically, Plaintiff EEOC claimed that Wal-Mart had failed to hire a specific female applicant as well as others in the class into vacant positions within its London, Kentucky facility. Plaintiff asked the court for a remedy consisting of injunctive and monetary relief for the class. The case was assigned to Judge Karen Caldwell. The complaint alleges that in October 1998, a female employee of Wal-Mart's retail store in London, Kentucky was denied a transfer to work in the DC 6097 location as a freezer department "order filler." She filed a charge with the EEOC asserting that Wal-Mart discriminated against her because of her gender when her transfer application was denied. The EEOC notified Wal-Mart of the charge, conducted an investigation, and determined that evidence supported Smith's allegations and that there was evidence that a class of women were not hired as order fillers because of their gender. On July 15, 2009, Wal-Mart filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the EEOC had not provided sufficient evidence to establish its prima facie case of discrimination, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear part of the case. On February 12, 2010, the court denied Wal-Mart's motion for summary judgment on both grounds. 2010 WL 567316. On March 1, 2010 the parties entered into a consent decree. The terms of the consent decree were that Wal-Mart would be enjoined from discriminating against females in its hiring of order-filler positions, and that Wal-Mart would not retaliate in hiring or any other manner against those applicants or employees that had made a charge against Wal-Mart under Title VII. Furthermore, the consent decree required that Wal-Mart would retain all records of applications and employment, post notices of the non-discrimination policy at each of its facilities in Kentucky, provide training on what constitutes an unlawful employment practice under Title VII, and attempt to recruit female employees for order-filler employment. The consent decree also required Wal-Mart to hire a certain number of order-filler positions from a list of class members provided by the EEOC. Finally the consent decree required that Wal-Mart pay $11,700,000 in monetary relief to the class. On October 15, 2010, the EEOC filed a motion to enforce the terms of the consent decree claiming that Wal-Mart had violated the decree by failing to instate the listed class-members and instead requiring them to apply for the positions as outside applicants would. Furthermore, the EEOC claimed that Wal-Mart had instated a physical abilities test that had not been discussed as part of the consent decree and that none of the more than 90 class members from the list who had applied for positions had been offered a position by Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart's response to this motion claimed that they had made diligent efforts to offer these positions to the class-members on the list but that most had either turned the position down or not met the qualification requirements for the position. Wal-Mart also argued that the plain language of the consent decree allowed for those applicants of the class members list to be subjected to the same qualification standards as outside applicants. On January 6, 2011, the court denied the EEOC's motion, holding that Wal-Mart's hiring policy was in compliance with the consent decree. 2011 WL 42997. On March 7, 2011, the EEOC moved for a fairness hearing for class members (and people who wanted but did not have class status) to air their concerns before damages were distributed. The EEOC filed around 100 objections from people who were dissatisfied with the allocation of recovery under the consent decree. In preparation for the hearing, the parties conferred, and several people were found to be entitled to more money due to an administrative error made by Wal-Mart. On August 25, 2011, the parties jointly moved to modify the consent decree, with Wal-Mart agreeing to pay $120,000 more in order to cover the revised settlement payments.The fairness hearing took place on October 25, 2011. On December 11, 2011, the court ordered that the settlement money be distributed. 2011 WL 6400160. The court retained jurisdiction for five years after entry of the consent decree, and the docket shows no activity during that period. Presumably, the case closed in March 2015.

Summary: In August 2001, the EEOC brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiff alleged that Wal-Mart discriminated against women in hiring for positions in one of its distribution centers, in violation of Title VII. The parties reached a settlement agreement in March 2010 in which Wal-Mart agreed to pay $11.8 million to the class members. The case closed in March 2015.


On April 18, 2002, inmate Roderick Johnson filed an extensive complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that Texas prison officials failed to protect him from repeated sexual assault and therefore violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Johnson brought separate Equal Protection claims for failure to protect because of his race and because of his sexual orientation. Johnson, a black homosexual, claimed that prison officials failed to protect him from prison gangs that repeatedly raped him and bought and sold him as a sexual slave while he was housed at the Texas prison system's Allred Unit. Plaintiff Johnson was represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and several private attorneys. The defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity and a failure on the prisoner's part to exhaust administrative remedies. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Judge Jerry Buchmeyer) in April, 2003, denied the defendants' motions, and the defendants brought interlocutory appeals. Johnson v. Johnson, No. 02-87, 2003 U.S. Dist. WL 21510816 (N.D.Tex. June 9, 2003). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Johnson's race-based Equal Protection claims and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings on the remaining claims. Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeals noted that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, requires that a prisoner exhaust administrative remedies available within the correctional facility before bringing suit under Section 1983 regarding prison conditions. The Court held that Johnson had exhausted the available administrative remedies for his Eighth Amendment claims. The Court also found that Johnson had exhausted remedies for some of his Equal Protection sexual orientation claims because his grievances were sufficient to give prison officials fair notice that there might have been a sexual-orientation-related aspect to Johnson's problems. The Court further held that certain defendant prison officials were not entitled to qualified immunity because they did not reasonably respond to Johnson's grievances and their conduct was clearly illegal. On remand before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, the case was reassigned to Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn on January 3, 2005, and on March 22, 2005, the case caption was modified to Johnson v. Wathen to reflect the dismissal of several defendants. On September 8, 2005, Judge Lynn granted plaintiff Johnson's petition for writs of habeas corpus. The case was tried before a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants on each of Johnson's claims on October 18, 2005. There was some subsequent litigation over attorney's fees. In January 2006, the court ordered costs against the plaintiff. On May 23, 2012, the plaintiff moved for the court to grant him a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff filed the motion pro se (on his own behalf). The plaintiff was released from prison and placed on parole in 2003, but he returned to prison in the fall of 2007. The plaintiff alleges that on September 11, 2007, the ACLU contacted the Executive Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice requesting that the plaintiff be placed in “safe keeping” because he was at extreme physical risk. The plaintiff alleges that he was subsequently placed in temporary “safekeeping”. In October 2007, the plaintiff alleges that he was transferred to the New Mexico Department of Corrections under the Interstate Corrections Compact due to concerns for his safety. The plaintiff alleges that on August 9, 2011, he was involuntarily returned back into the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The plaintiff alleged that immediately upon arrival in Texas he was placed in solitary confinement under punitive conditions. The plaintiff alleged that he was in constant fear that prison officials would follow through with their threats to have him killed in retaliation for his petitioning for the redress of his grievances administratively and through the courts. The plaintiff also alleged that prison officials were being deliberately indifferent to the serious mental health risks posed by the conditions of isolation he was being kept in. The plaintiff alleged his treatment was retaliation for his prior suit against the Texas prison system. He alleged he had filed over 25 administrative grievances with the prison in regard to his treatment. The plaintiff alleged that the publicity surrounding his case will not ensure his safety in the Texas prison system. The plaintiff requested to serve the rest of his sentence in another jurisdiction. On June 4, 2012, Magistrate Judge Paul D. Stickney was added to the case. On June 4, 2012, the plaintiff moved for the court to appoint him counsel. On August 12, 2012, Judge Stickney ordered a new case to be opened in regard to the plaintiff’s current claims. This new case was 7:12-cv-00138. On September 11, 2012, the case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas. This new case was 4:12-cv-02728. The following dockets have been consolidated with this case: 7:12-cv-00138 (the Northern District of Texas), 4:12-cv-02728 (the Southern District of Texas). The case was assigned to Judge Sim Lake. On October 4, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Within his amended complaint, he reiterated his allegations from his May 23, 2012 motion. On February 21, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. On July 22, 2013, Judge Slim granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim. The case was dismissed with prejudice. (2013 WL 3816727). On August 23, 2013, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the case to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 1, 2014, Judge W. Eugene Davis, Judge Edith Brown Clement, and Judge Gregg J. Costa affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s case. (WL 4854212) This case is closed.

Summary: On April 18, 2002, inmate Roderick Johnson filed an extensive complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging that Texas prison officials failed to protect him from repeated sexual assault and therefore violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. Johnson brought separate Equal Protection claims for failure to protect because of his race and because of his sexual orientation. Ultimately, the court ruled in favor of the defendants.