COVID-19 Summary: In this preexisting class action addressing medical care in Arizona's prisons, the district court denied COVID-19 emergency relief on March 23, 2020. Notwithstanding the grave threats posed by congregate imprisonment during the pandemic, the court held that the emergency measures sought by the plaintiffs were outside of its authority under the settlement agreement in this case. However, the Court did (subsequently) order Arizona to disclose to class counsel who had been tested and the results.
 This case is a direct descendant of Gamez v. Ryan, docket number CV-10-2070-PHX-JWS (MEA). That case was dismissed with prejudice on March 21, 2012 after the district court judge determined that the third amended complaint added additional claims and the plaintiffs that were not within the contemplation of the court at the time that it dismissed the second amended complaint. On March 22, 2012, fourteen Arizona prisoners brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), under § 1983. Represented by the ACLU, the Prison Law Office, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the ADOC deprived them of access to adequate health care and that even when prisoners were allowed access to treatment, they did not receive adequate care. They also alleged the defendants subjected prisoners in isolation to unconstitutional conditions. The case was assigned to Judge Neil Wake. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, that the plaintiffs did not sufficiently exhaust administrative remedies, and that their claims were moot. The District Court denied the motion as to all three claims. On March 6, 2013, Judge Wake granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification, finding that all the prerequisites for class certification had been met. The class included all prisoners who were subjected to any of the following practices: failure to provide timely access to health care; failure to provide timely emergency treatment; failure to provide necessary medication and medical devices; insufficient health care staffing; failure to provide care for chronic diseases and protection from infectious disease; failure to provide timely access to medically necessary specialty care; failure to provide timely access to basic dental treatment; practice of extracting teeth that could be saved by less intrusive means; failure to provide mentally ill prisoners medically necessary mental health treatment (i.e. psychotropic medication, therapy, and inpatient treatment); and/or failure to provide suicidal and self-harming prisoners basic mental health care. The class certification also included subclasses of prisoners who were held in isolation and suffered from any of the following practices: inadequate psychiatric monitoring because of chronic understaffing; use of chemical agents against inmates on psychotropic medications; lack of recreation; extreme social isolation; constant cell illumination; limited property; and/or insufficient nutrition. 289 F.R.D. 513. On July 10, 2013, the defendants appealed the grant of class certification to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals because the class included all 33,000 prisoners in the ADOC. The following day, the defendants filed an Emergency Motion to Stay in the District Court, pending adjudication of the appeal. Judge Wake denied the defendants' emergency motion on August 9, 2013, weighing heavily the nature of the allegations and the potential risk to the plaintiffs. To mitigate the burden on the defendants and to conserve judicial resources, Judge Wake set firm parameters for the completion of discovery. A three-judge panel in the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of class certification on June 5, 2014. 754 F.3d 657. The defendants petitioned for a rehearing en banc on July 3, 2014. The petition was denied on April 21, 2015. On May 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which was denied on August 7, 2014. 2014 WL 3887867. The defendants' primary argument was that the named plaintiffs received constitutionally adequate medical and dental care and therefore lacked standing. Judge Wake denied summary judgment on this point because the plaintiffs were not challenging care on any particular occasion, but exposure to the risk of harm stemming from inadequate policies and practices. The District Court also denied summary judgment on the conditions of solitary confinement claim. While the defendants argued that each particular practice or condition challenged was constitutional, the District Court stressed that the relevant issue was whether the totality of the conditions in the isolation units exposed the prisoners to a substantial risk of serious harm (a lack of social interaction and environmental stimulation). On October 14, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation. The defendants agreed to remedy the ADOC health care system by meeting more than 100 performance measures, including particular screenings and procedures, staffing requirements, and the provision of interpreters for health services. The agreement also required the defendants to reform policies relating to prisoners with serious mental illnesses in isolation units. Modifications included increasing access to mental health treatment, increasing time spent outside of the cell, and restricting the use of pepper spray to a last resort in preventing serious injury or escape. Finally, the settlement provided for ongoing monitoring and oversight by the plaintiffs' lawyers. The parties consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court over disputes arising out of the stipulation, and agreed not to move to terminate the stipulation for at least four years. The defendants agreed to pay $4.9 million in attorneys' fees and costs and up to $250,000 a year in reasonable fees for enforcement in the future. On February 18, 2015, the stipulation was approved by Magistrate Judge David K. Duncan, who was assigned to oversee enforcement of the stipulation. Between the confirmation of the stipulation in February 2015 and April 2016, there were many court-mediated discussions regarding the defendants’ fulfillment of the stipulation. On May 20, 2016, the court ordered the defendants to submit a plan detailing how they were going to comply with certain stipulation measures they had failed to address. On May 27, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for criminal investigation, arguing that the failure to provide adequate medical care and the reckless tolerance of those conditions is a felony that should be investigated by the F.B.I. and the Department of Justice. This motion was denied, but was followed by another motion to enforce the stipulation on July 12, 2016. Over the next two years, the plaintiffs filed several motions to enforce the stipulation and the defendants were ordered to submit several plans for correcting their non-compliance. Per court orders, the parties also met and conferred about once a month regarding the defendants’ compliance with the stipulation. On July 25, 2017, the court ordered defendants to stop harassing and intimidating witnesses who provided information to the court. The plaintiffs’ counsel had previously been asked to notify the court about any allegations of retaliation that occurred in the prisons. There were several evidentiary hearings concerning these allegations. On September 30, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part several of the plaintiffs’ motions to enforce the stipulation. The court found the defendants to be in compliance with some of the performance measures but not with others. On October 10, 2017, however, the court ordered that the defendants had been so substantially non-compliant that it considered imposing civil contempt. The court listed the performance measures the defendants had not properly complied with. Per the court’s instructions, by January 5, 2018 the defendants were required to file a list of instances of non-compliance during December 2017 and on January 9, 2018, the defendants had to show why the court should not impose sanctions of $1,000 per incident of non-compliance. After receiving several extensions to file this list, the defendants provided a partial list. The parties could not agree on what would qualify as “substantial noncompliance” to trigger the enforcement process. In February 2018, Judge Duncan ruled that the defendants will be “substantially non-compliant” with the stipulation whenever a performance measure falls below 85% for more than six months within any 24-month period, or if a performance measure falls below 85% for three consecutive months. On June 22, 2018, the court issued several orders in an attempt to resolve the issues faced since the stipulation came into effect. First, the court found the defendants in civil contempt, determining 1,445 instances of violations of performance measures. The defendants were ordered to pay $1,445,000 in contempt fines. 2018 WL 3239691. Next, because there had been little progress made by the defendants’ multiple revised remediation plans, the court used its authority under the stipulation to require the defendants to hire outside experts to evaluate the continuing violations. The six categories to be evaluated were: pharmacy, intersystem transfers, access to care, diagnostic services, specialty care, chronic care, and infirmary care. The defendants were required to submit a list of two experts in each category to the court for evaluation and selection. 2018 WL 3238938. Additionally, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to terminate monitoring of certain performance measures. The court ordered the defendants to retain an expert to evaluate the monitoring process, ensuring the defendants would not overstate their compliance. 2018 WL 3238944. Further, the court ordered the defendants to reinstall the health needs request form boxes that had been removed from housing units in the prisons and to resume the previous process for collecting and logging prisoners’ health requests. 2018 WL 3083847. The court also ordered the defendants to file a plan to implement the recommendations made by BJ Millar of Advisory Board Consulting. Finally, the court awarded the plaintiffs additional attorney’s fees in the amount of $1,259,991.98 for the work performed since the stipulation began. 2018 WL 3238944. The case was also reassigned a few days later to Senior Judge Roslyn O Silver after Judge Duncan retired. On September 28, 2018, the court again granted a motion filed by the plaintiffs to enforce parts of the stipulation and ordered the defendants to file a plan to address the non-compliance. On December 11, 2018, the court appointed outside expert Dr. Mark Stern to evaluate the defendants’ non-compliance and analyze the cause of it, following its order on June 22, 2018. While the parties had a disagreement on the scope of the expert engagement, including the scope of the information the expert could access, the court solved this dispute by ordering the defendants to allow the expert quite broad access to the documents and the personnel he needed to fulfill his obligation. 2019 WL 396930. On December 20, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the federal judge “may, in the future, consider ordering Defendants to develop and implement a plan to increase [health care] staffing in general as a remedy for Defendants’ non-compliance.” See Parsons v. Ryan, 912 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 2018). On January 11, 2019, the defendants filed the motion to terminate the monitoring and reporting of Maximum Custody Performance Measure which required the defendant to provide the isolated inmates out-of-cell time, including time for exercise and group-programming, claiming that they achieved the condition for termination by achieving most of the requirements. The plaintiffs objected to the motion, claiming that the defendant’s monitoring and reporting system was so unreliable that their self-reported findings could not support termination. In January 2019, ADOC announced that they would change the healthcare provider from Corizon to another private company as of July 1, 2019. After this announcement, some of the plaintiffs received medical bills and collection notices that should have been paid by Corizon. Also, the plaintiffs were concerned that the upcoming transition of health care provider would not be properly made because a jail in the other jurisdiction had reported that Corizon’s operation for the transition of health care provider was flawed and caused a serious problem in meeting the medical and mental care need in the facility. To ensure the appropriate transition of the healthcare provider, the plaintiffs filed a motion to require the production of a Health Care Transition Plan on March 4, 2019. On October 11, 2019, after the court expert filed a report that “confirm[ed] the Court’s long held belief that pervasive issues have precluded accurate monitoring of certain performance measures and that even the low compliance levels reported in some instances may be worse,” Judge Silver issued an order that gave the parties three options to proceed in this case. The parties had the options to proceed by: (1) robust efforts to coerce compliance with the stipulation, (2) a new settlement based in part on Dr. Stern’s recommendations, or (3) concluding the stipulation to be irretrievably breached by the defendants and proceeding to trial. The parties agreed to engage in settlement negotiations, and the court granted the parties 60 days to attempt to reach a new agreement. Settlement did not occur. The defendants appealed the District Court's eleven orders issued on June 22, 2018, imposing contempt sanctions, awarding attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs, appointing expert witnesses, and otherwise enforcing obligations under the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs cross-appealed from the attorneys’ fees order. On January 29, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s order holding the defendants in contempt; affirmed the order partially granting and partially denying the defendants’ motion to terminate the monitoring of certain performance measures; affirmed the order requiring the defendants to reinstall Health Needs Request boxes for prisoners to submit forms requesting medical assistance; dismissed the remainder of the medical needs appeal for lack of jurisdiction; and affirmed in part and reversed in part the order awarding plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for work performed post-stipulation. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit vacated the attorneys' fees order and remanded with instructions to (a) recalculate the fee award by determining the correct hourly rates for each year, (b) exclude from any fee award the 11 hours erroneously included; (c) modify the costs award down by $1,285.79 in light of the district court’s failure to reflect the downward adjustments in its prior order; and (d) reweigh whether a fee enhancement was appropriate. See Parsons v. Ryan, No. 18-16358, 949 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. Jan. 29, 2020). The defendants' petition for rehearing en banc was denied on April 17, 2020. On January 31, 2020, Judge Silver issued an order finding that the defendants remain substantially noncompliant with a significant number of Performance Measures at multiple locations. In light of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the district court may impose contempt sanctions to coerce performance, the court found further sanctions appropriate and required defendants to pay a $100,000 monthly fine for each instance of future noncompliance beginning on March 1, 2020. The court ordered that the defendants shall come into compliance regarding every Performance Measure and location identified in the January 31, 2020, order by March 1, 2020. The court ordered that if further monetary sanctions did not result in the defendants’ compliance with their contractual obligations as of the compliance numbers for July 2020, the court would set the case for trial. On February 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the stipulation, claiming that the parties had completed the multi-step process regarding eleven performance measures and asking the court to order the defendants to produce a remediation plan regarding those performance measures. The court granted the motion on April 23, 2020 and ordered the defendants to submit a remediation plan for non-compliant performance measures within 14 days. On April 27, 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Appellate Commissioner ordered $152,069.40 in attorneys' fees to be paid by defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On May 6, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the stipulation as to the performance measure requiring urgent specialty consultations and diagnostic services to be scheduled and completed within 30 calendar days of any requests. The plaintiffs claimed that the state had missed the deadlines to cure their noncompliance imposed in May 2019 and therefore should be fined a total of $400,000. Additionally, the plaintiffs asked the court to order the defendants to consult with a court-appointed health care expert to discuss their failures and implement his recommendations. On May 8, the Ninth Circuit addressed four consolidated appeals regarding various orders in 2018, including the defendant's contempt order, plaintiff's appeal of the attorneys' fee calculation, and several orders relating to specific medical needs. The court affirmed the district court’s contempt order but remanded the calculation of the attorneys’ fees due to errors in the calculation of hourly wage. For the medical needs appeals, the court affirmed the district court’s termination order denying the defendant’s request to terminate certain Performance Measures and the HNR-Box order, in which it ordered defendants to reinstall HNR boxes, but dismissed the rest for lack of jurisdiction. On May 20, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to enforce the stipulation for certain performance measures relating to the minimum time required for the prisoners to spend outside their cells. The plaintiffs asked the court to find the defendants noncompliant for the period of November 2016 to August 2019 for all maximum custody units. They also sought an order requiring the defendants to implement the terms of the Stipulation. On May 27, the defendants responded to the May 6 motion and argued that the court’s May 2019 order was valid only for June 2019, and not for the period after July 2019.
 COVID-19 Litigation: On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion requesting the court to order the defendants to collaborate with Dr. Marc Stern, the court’s expert, to immediately develop and implement a plan for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in Arizona prisons. Specifically, plaintiffs' suggested plan included the following components: 1. Patient education; 2. Screening, testing, treatment, and housing of class members; 3. Provision of hygiene and cleaning supplies; 4. Health care and custody staffing plans; 5. Coordination with community hospitals and among the ten prisons; and 6. Reduction in the density of the population for class members who are high risk according to the standards set forth by the CDC. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested that the court order defendants to suspend all department orders, policies, and/or regulations that: 1. Charge class members for hygiene supplies including soap; 2. Charge class members $4.00 for submitting a Health Needs Request seeking medical care; 3. Designate ethyl-alcohol based hand sanitizer as contraband. The District Court granted expedited briefing, and the defendants responded on March 18, 2020. They argued that the ADOC is following a prevention and response plan guided by CDC recommendations and outlined the policy changes in effect in light of COVID-19. Because the defendants maintained that ADOC already has a robust and detailed plan in place, they recommended that the plaintiffs' emergency motion be denied in full. The plaintiffs' replied on March 20, 2020, urging the court to order the defendants to work with Dr. Stern, the expert, because in the past the defendants repeatedly failed to meaningfully implement proposed plans and failed to provide basic healthcare. On March 23, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion. Although the court acknowledged that defendants have failed to comply with the performance measures, it found that "that does not empower the Court to exercise general control over matters such as prisoner education or the distribution of hygiene and cleaning supplies." Additionally, the court found that plaintiffs’ motion did not point to clear provisions of the stipulation that would authorize the type of order they seek. On March 23, 2020, the defendants issued a press release stating that six prisoners had been tested for COVID-19. The next day, plaintiffs’ counsel wrote defendants’ counsel, requesting the class members’ identities, and asking to be notified if and when additional class members are tested in the future so that plaintiffs’ counsel could monitor the delivery of health care to these persons. The defendants refused to provide the requested information on the basis that the stipulation does not cover COVID-19 or require defendants to provide this information to plaintiffs. On April 2, 2020, the court ordered defendants to produce this information, finding that COVID-19 is covered by the parties' stipulation. Therefore, to comply with the stipulation and the specified performance measures, the court ordered the defendants to provide plaintiffs the names and identification numbers of prisoners tested for COVID-19 and the results, on a weekly basis. On April 27, two individuals filed a motion for injunction and house arrest, seeking preventative measures to combat COVID-19 or for release from custody. The motions were denied on June 9 as they are class members and cannot file motions on their own behalf. On June 12, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce paragraph 14 of the stipulation, which required an interpretation of healthcare encounters for non-English speakers. The defendants responded on July 28, arguing that the motion is based largely on information that predates Centurion’s assumption of inmate healthcare in July 2019, and that translation services are currently available. A mediation was held on August 24, 2020, to address the parties' compliance with the Stipulation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Defendants continue to provide monthly status reports regarding their compliance with court orders. $147,265.20 in attorneys' fees was awarded to plaintiffs on December 28, 2020. The case is currently in discovery and ongoing.

Summary: On March 22, 2012, fourteen Arizona prisoners brought this suit alleging that the ADOC deprived plaintiffs of adequate health and dental care and claiming that defendants subjected prisoners in isolation to unconstitutional conditions. Class certification was granted in March 2013 and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in June 2014. The parties filed a stipulation on October 14, 2014 in which defendants agreed to reform both the health care system and policies relating to prisoners in isolation. After filing the stipulation, the parties worked with the court to enforce the stipulation. The court ordered the defendants to pay civil contempt sanctions for their non-compliance. On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 outbreak, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion requesting the court to order the defendants to collaborate with Dr. Marc Stern, the court’s expert, to immediately develop and implement a plan for the prevention and management of COVID-19 in Arizona prisons. The case is ongoing.


This action, filed on January 28, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States. The case was filed on behalf of an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa, as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from detention and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint argued that detaining a lawful U.S. visa holder solely pursuant to the executive order violates Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The ACLU of Southern California represented the plaintiff. The plaintiff was an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa issued pursuant to a petition filed by his son, who was a U.S. citizen. When he landed at Los Angeles International Airport on the evening the executive order was issued, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained him and threatened to deport him back to Iran as soon as the next day. Had he been granted admission to the U.S., he was to receive a green card seven weeks later. While detained at the airport, the plaintiff was denied access to counsel. At the same time as the complaint was filed, the plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stay his removal (deportation). However, before the court could review the application, the plaintiff was placed on a flight to Dubai. The plaintiff filed an amended application on January 29, 2017, and Judge Dolly Gee granted the temporary restraining order that same day. The order requires the federal government to transport the plaintiff back to the U.S. and permit him to enter the country. The assignment to Judge Gee was on an emergency basis over the weekend; on Monday, Jan. 30, 2017, following ordinary procedures, the case was reassigned to Judge S. James Otero. In February, a series of procedural updates took place: a status conference was set to discuss compliance with the temporary restraining order, the case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish for Discovery. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a status report on Feb. 9, though it is not currently available publicly, and a status conference was held the following day. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On Mar. 17, defendants filed a status report. Then on Apr. 25, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On May 4, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to vacate the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court ordered the hearing vacated on May 8, as well as stayed the briefing schedule until further notice. The plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal on June 26, and the court ordered the case closed on June 27. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement. This case is now closed.

Summary: This action, filed on January 28, 2017 with the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenges President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen from entering the United States. The action was filed on behalf of an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa as a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking immediate release from detention and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint argued that detaining a lawful U.S. visa holder solely pursuant to the executive order violates Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Counsel for the plaintiff are the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Southern California. The plaintiff is an Iranian citizen with a U.S. visa issued pursuant to a petition filed by his son, who is a U.S. citizen. When he landed at Los Angeles International Airport on the evening the executive order was issued, U.S. Customs and Border Protection detained him and threatened to deport him back to Iran as soon as the next day. Had he been granted admission to the U.S., he was to receive a green card seven weeks later. While detained at the airport, the plaintiff was denied access to counsel. The same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiff also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to stay his removal (deportation). However, before the court could review the application, the plaintiff was placed on a flight to Dubai to be sent back to Iran. The plaintiff filed an amended application on January 29, 2017, and Judge Dolly Gee granted the temporary restraining order that same day. Per the order, the plaintiff is to be transported back to the U.S. and permitted to enter the country. The case was assigned to Judge S. James Otero on January 30, 2017. The case ended in a settlement. The plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on June 26. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement. This case is now closed.


On August 17, 2006, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued Benni's LLC (d/b/a Bennigan's) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC, representing a female employee at Benni's and an intervening female employee, asked the court for a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in employment practices that discriminated on the basis of sex, and for monetary relief for the two employees. The EEOC claimed that Benni's subjected the complaining parties to a sexually hostile work environment, leading to one employee's constructive discharge. On March 28, 2008, Judge Warren W. Eginton granted a motion for default judgment. This judgment adopted a recommended ruling for default judgment because Benni's had not obtained counsel. On September 18, 2008 Judge Warren ordered default judgment damages and attorneys fees. This ruling included injunctive relief in the form of postings, anti-discriminatory policies, trainings, and monitoring. It also required the defendant to pay a total of $190,000 to the two employees and to pay their attorney fees. The injunction was scheduled to last for five years; there is nothing more on the docket since, so presumably the matter ended finally in 2013.

Summary: On August 17, 2006 the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued Benni's LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant subjected the complaining parties to a sexually hostile work environment, leading to one employee's constructive discharge. On March 28, 2008, Judge Warren W. Eginton granted a motion for default judgment. The default judgment damages included injunctive relief in the form of postings, anti-discriminatory policies, trainings, and monitoring. It also required the defendant to pay a total of $190,000 to the two employees and to pay their attorney fees.


On September 23, 2014, two Scott County, Mississippi residents who had been arrested and detained filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by the ACLU and the MacArthur Justice Center, the plaintiffs sued Scott County, an Eighth Circuit Judge, and Scott County Justice Court judges. The plaintiffs filed on behalf of themselves and sought to certify a class of those similarly situated. They brought this class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they were indefinitely detained without individualized bail hearings in Scott County and were indefinitely denied counsel throughout the Eighth Circuit Court District, which violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, attorneys fees, and a declaratory judgment. After the plaintiffs were arrested in Scott County, the judges set their bail without any individualized hearing or consideration of the bail factors required under state or federal law, including the ability to afford bail and the appropriateness of non-monetary bail options. The bail was set such that the plaintiffs were financially unable to pay the bond or the set percentage of the bond that would be required to secure the bond through a bond company or agent. Additionally, the plaintiffs had to wait more than one month before the court appointed a public defender to represent them, even though they had both completed Affidavits of Indigence and Application of Felony Indigent Counsel. Under Mississippi law, they should have had immediate representation by a public defender after submitting their affidavits and applications. Scott County also enforced a custom and policy of not providing counsel to indigent felony arrestees until they had been indicted, which could take months. As a result of these practices, felony arrestees in Scott County were routinely detained prior to indictment simply because they were too poor to afford bail. The scarcity of grand jury panels further exacerbated the risk of indefinite pre-indictment detention in Scott County. A felony arrestee could have waited three to five months to learn if he had been indicted and, consequently, to be appointed representation. This meant that felony arrestees did not have attorneys to represent them at their initial appearance where they had to argue for release or reasonable bail. The plaintiffs alleged that these practices violated the plaintiffs' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the assistance of counsel, their Sixth Amendment rights to a speedy trial, their Fourteenth Amendment rights against excessive and punitive pre-indictment detention, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to an individualized bail hearing and determination. On September 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class. Following the plaintiffs' filing of an amended complaint, all of the defendants in this case filed motions to dismiss. On September 30, 2015, Judge Wingate issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, and dismissing the plaintiffs' motions to certify a class as moot. The court granted the motions to dismiss of both the Eighth Circuit judge and the Scott County Judge Court judges. Additionally, the court granted Scott County's request to dismiss the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and/or declaratory relief. However, the court retained the plaintiffs' demand for monetary damages against Scott County. The court stayed that portion of the lawsuit pending the conclusion of state court criminal proceedings. Finally, because the only remaining claims were the plaintiffs' individual damages against the county, the court dismissed the motions to certify classes as moot. On April 17, 2017 the parties reached a settlement. Accordingly, on June 27, 2017, Judge Henry T. Wingate issued a final judgment--a stipulated declaratory judgment and a settlement agreement. Scott County agreed to provide counsel to all indigent defendants and to provide "applications" for indigent representation within 48 hours of arrest. The plaintiffs agreed that on Scott County's implementation of these orders, no further injunctive relief would be necessary, and therefore agreed to dismiss all claims once that happened. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, and the settlement provided for periodic meetings to discuss compliance issues as they arose. The settlement stated that these periodic check-ins were to occur for 24 months after the agreement went into effect, with the potential for future court action if it was not implemented. The case closed in 2019 with no further enforcement action filed.

Summary: Two Scott County, Mississippi residents who had been arrested and detained filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued Scott County, an Eighth Circuit Judge, and Scott County Justice Court judges. The plaintiffs alleged that they were indefinitely detained without individualized bail hearings in Scott County and were indefinitely denied counsel throughout the Eighth Circuit Court District, which violated their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The parties settled the case in July 2017, requiring the county to provide arrestees with applications for legal representation before their first court appearance. The settlement agreement lapsed in 2019 with no enforcement action filed in the District Court.


On August 8, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Shree Lalaji LLC (trading as Best Western Salisbury Plaza) on behalf of a black employee, who it alleged was subjected to racial epithets and remarks and retaliation, and a class of black employees who were subjected to the racially hostile work environment that accompanied the situation. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the general manager made racially hostile statements, treated black employees less favorably, refused service to and overcharged black guests of the hotel, and reduced the individual employee's hours in retaliation for his complaints about the general manager's racially motivated actions. The EEOC also alleged that the employee had been constructively fired. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the black employees, including backpay, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge William M. Nickerson) entered as a consent decree on December 6, 2006. The decree provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee who allegedly had been constructively fired received $7,000 in back pay and $8,000 in compensatory damages, while the class of black employees received a total of $5,000. Under the decree, the Best Western was restrained from racial discrimination and creating a hostile work environment. The Best Western agreed not to retaliate against employees who oppose practices believed the employees to violate Title VII, and was required to post an equal employment notice and provide its employees with at least four hours of training on keeping the work environment free of racial harassment. The parties bore their own costs and attorneys' fees. The decree did not have a specific overall duration, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII suit against Shree Lalaji LLC (trading as Best Western Salisbury Plaza) on behalf of a black employee who it alleged was subject to racial epithets and remarks and retaliation and a class of black employees who were subjected to the racially hostile work environment that accompanied the situation. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for retaliation and racially hostile work environment. The Court entered the parties' settlement agreement as a consent decree. The decree provided a total of $20,000 in monetary relief and required the Best Western not to retaliate or discriminate on the basis of race, to post an equal employment notice, and train its employees in keeping the work environment free of racial harassment. The decree did not have a specific overall duration, and the case is now closed.


On July 12, 2017, three private American citizens filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages against the Trump Campaign alleging its participation in the Russian Email Hacking and in the decision to disseminate the information discovered. The complaint stated that part of the information released involved included the plaintiffs' private emails, social security numbers, dates of birth, addresses, and phone numbers. They argued that the defendant's alleged actions violated D.C. privacy law and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) (conspiracy to intimidate lawful voters from giving support or advocacy to electors for president and to injure citizens in person or property on account of such support or advocacy). They further made tort claims alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiffs include a former foreign service officer, a former staffer for the finance team of the Democratic National Party (DNC), and a lottery winner who gave away most of his winnings. All three plaintiffs donated to the DNC during the 2016 U.S. presidential election cycle and allegedly had their emails stolen by Russians who hacked the DNC’s electronic database. They were represented by the Protect Democracy Project, United to Protect Democracy, and a law professor at the University of Michigan Law School. On September 26, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional factual allegations. On October 25, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. On July 3, 2018, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint without prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the court had the jurisdiction and was the appropriate venue for their claim. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 12, 2017, three individuals sued Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. and a senior adviser to the Trump campaign team alleging damages stemming from having their private information stolen by Russians who hacked the Democratic National Committee’s electronic database during the 2016 Presidential election cycle. On September 26, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional factual allegations, and on October 25, 2017, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. On July 3, 2018, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed plaintiffs’ amended complaint without prejudice, holding that it was the wrong forum for the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. The case is now closed.


On November 19, 2003, a plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Abercrombie & Fitch Co. in United States District Court in the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief including punitive damages, alleging that the defendant engaged in systemic discrimination against African-Americans. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant routinely refused to hire African-Americans because they did not fit the Abercrombie "look." Hawk v. Abercrombie, 23145625 WL 3-9 (D.C.N.J. 2003). While the plaintiff took the time to file with EEOC, and also file in Court (Judge Rodriguez) the case never went anywhere beyond these initial filings and the complaint. On December 5, 2003, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. The Court (Judge Rodriguez) granted the motion without prejudice and the case was closed that same day.

Summary: On November 19, 2003, a plaintiff filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Abercrombie & Fitch Co. in United States District Court in the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff contended that the defendant routinely refused to hire African-Americans because they did not fit the Abercrombie "look." On December 5, 2003, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. The Court (Judge Rodriguez) granted the motion without prejudice and the case was closed that same day.


In September 2006, the EEOC's Philadelphia District Office filed suit against the restaurant chain Denny's. The complaint was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and alleged that Denny's violated Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by refusing to allow a disabled employee to continue working there, and by refusing to grant reasonable accommodations by making exceptions to its policy placing a cap on medical leave time. Between 2008 and 2010, the parties held multiple failed settlement negotiation conferences and engaged in discovery. On January 15, 2010, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that one of the named plaintiffs was not a person with a qualified disability and that there were other settled facts barring her claim. On July 16, 2010, the court denied this motion finding that there was sufficient evidence to support that a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff. Beginning in December 2010, the parties again engaged in settlement negotiations. On June 24, 2011, the court entered a consent decree for a two year duration. The consent decree requires the defendant to not discriminate or retaliate against persons with disabilities in its hiring practices, to change its policies on accommodation and leave, to provide training to its employees, submit to reporting requirements, to pay $1,300,000 in to the claimants, and provide offers of reinstatements to the claimants. The decree laid out various timeframes to complete trainings and had a bi-annual reporting requirement for two years. There has been no further docket activity and so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission sued the restaurant chain Denny's in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The EEOC alleged Denny's violated Title I of the Americans with Disability Act by refusing to accommodate an employee with a disability who requested additional medical leave. In 2011, the parties agreed to a two year consent decree which required the defendant to pay $1,300,000 in damages, changes its policies, provide training to employees, among other requirements.


On June 8, 2011 the Southern Poverty Law Center ("SPLC") filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the Jackson Public Schools Board of Trustees and several officials of the school district. The Plaintiff class (all students who currently attend and/or will attend the Capital City Alternative School in the future), represented by attorneys from the SPLC and by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Defendants' punishment methods were unconstitutional. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants would routinely shackle or handcuff students to railings and leave them unsupervised for up to six hours at a time as punishment for noncriminal violations of school policies. During these punishments, students were forced to eat their lunches while restrained, and had to beg school officials to let them use the restroom. On April 12, 2012, the Parties presented a Settlement Agreement to the Court that was focused on overhauling the Defendants' disciplinary policies. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement banned the use of fixed restraints on all students, banned the use of handcuffs for punishment of noncriminal behavior and completely banned the use of handcuffs on any student under the age of 13. Additionally, the agreement required the Defendants to consult with experts to rework their disciplinary system, and to implement a system of record keeping and reporting of all instances in which restraints of any kind were used on students. Finally, the court appointed a monitor to follow the case for 24 months to ensure that the Defendants were in compliance with the agreement. This Settlement Agreement was approved by the Court on May 25, 2012, and did not preclude any class member from bringing an individual damages claim against the Defendants. On July 17, 2015, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the case, indicating they had achieved compliance with the Settlement Agreement. On July 27, 2015, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit was filed on June 8, 2011 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of all students who currently attend and/or will attend the Capital City Alternative School in the future. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendant school district's practice of shackling students to railings for up to six hours at a time was an unconstitutional form of punishment for noncriminal violations of school policies. On May 25, 2012, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement that banned the use of handcuffs on any student under the age of 13, and on all students in cases of noncriminal violations of school policies. It further required the Defendants to overhaul their disciplinary system, and called for extensive monitoring of the Defendants' progress over the next 24 months. This Settlement Agreement addressed declaratory and injunctive relief only, and left class members the opportunity to bring individual damages claims against the Defendants.


On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLU of Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request at issue in this case in particular concerned implementation at CBP’s Miami Field Office (including Miami International Airport and various ports of entry) and CBP’s Tampa Field Office (including Orlando International Airport and various ports of entry). In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding" of how defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through the Miami and Tampa Field Offices, and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." Plaintiffs noted that the Miami and Orlando airports are especially busy hubs for international passengers, and that a direct flight route runs from Dubai to Orlando. On Apr. 12, the case was assigned to Judge Darrin P. Gayles. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion and subsequent procedure see this case. Pending a transfer decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Judge Gayles administratively closed the case on June 29, effectively staying it until the Panel made a decision. On Aug. 2, the Panel denied defendants' transfer motion. The parties jointly moved to reopen the case on Aug. 8, and Judge Gayles granted this motion on Aug. 22. On Nov. 16, the parties submitted a joint scheduling report, agreeing that setting a trial date would be premature. Judge Gayles ordered the parties instead to submit a joint status report by Dec. 15. In the Dec. 15 status report, the parties explained that defendants were working to identify whether records they released in the other ACLU cases were also responsive to this this. The report also explained that defendants' processing capacity had recently improved. Plaintiff continued to monitor production. On Jan. 8, 2018, the parties reported that, in all the nationwide cases combined, defendants had to process thousands more pages than they had previously estimated they could. The parties thus agreed that, in this case, defendants would process 300 pages of potentially responsive records and produce responsive non-exempt records to plaintiff by Feb. 28, 2018. In the latest status report, of Mar. 7, the parties stated that defendants had agreed on a production schedule. Subsequently, on Mar. 9, Judge Gayles ordered defendants to process 400 emails by Apr. 30, 800 emails by June 30, and 95% of all emails by Sept. 30, ending with completed production by Dec. 31. Status reports filed May through October indicated that DHS had processed over 19,000 pages of potentially responsive emails and produced over 14,000 pages of responsive emails. From 2018 to 2019, the defendants continued to file status reports updating the court as to the production. Aside from a brief stay that occurred when the federal government shut down at the end of 2018, document production was relatively uneventful. On July 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation for dismissal prejudice, which was granted the next day. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. This case is now closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Florida sued DHS and CBP under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at Miami and Tampa airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation, and this case is proceeding here.


On April 8, 2018, a prisoner in Galveston County Jail filed this class action in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The case was assigned to Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. Represented by the ACLU of Texas and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Galveston County and various Galveston County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that Galveston County’s bail policies—especially the practice of setting a high minimum bail and failing to appoint defense counsel for arrestees’ bail hearings—favored wealthy arrestees over poorer arrestees and violated poor arrestees’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the same day the initial complaint was filed, the plaintiff filed for class certification. The putative class would encompass all people who are or will be detained in Galveston County Jail because they are unable to pay secured bail set at magistration. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 4, 2018, to join a second prisoner as a named plaintiff. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed an amended motion for class certification to reflect the added plaintiff. On June 8, 2018, the defendant parties filed separate motions to dismiss. First, Galveston County moved the court to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the County did not make policy to detain individuals without inquiring into their ability to pay and that the County did not set a bail schedule. Second, the District Court Judges also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims against them in their individual capacities should be dismissed due to their inability to administer relief. Third, the Magistrate Judges filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, alleging that they did not create the policy; that § 1983 was not the proper vehicle for challenging state court detention release procedures under Fifth Circuit precedent; and that the plaintiffs had no viable Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment claims. Fourth, the District Attorney filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under immunity grounds. He alleged that he did not set bail or make bail recommendations in misdemeanor cases, and that one of the named plaintiffs lacked standing because he received bond. On September 9, the District Judges filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They alleged that one of the named plaintiff’s claims were moot because his criminal case concluded. Further, they argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff’s claims and that he could not file under Ex Parte Young. Regarding relief, the District Judges reasoned that they did not possess jurisdiction to alter or control bail determinations until after the indictment stage. In September, the parties began discovery. On December 10, 2018, Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison entered recommendations regarding the motions to dismiss. On January 10, 2019, Judge George Hanks approved and adopted the Magistrate’s recommendations. The court denied the County’s motion to dismiss for subject-matter jurisdiction, the District Attorneys’ motion to dismiss, and the District Judges’ motion to dismiss for subject-matter jurisdiction. It granted the District Judges’ motion to dismiss regarding the claims against them in their individual capacities. It denied in part and granted in part the defendant magistrates’ motion to dismiss, allowing the magistrates to remain in the case in their personal capacities and only for purposes of declaratory relief. In this order, the court held that the plaintiff’s release from jail did not moot the claim. Second, the County alleged that its changes in policies mooted the case, but Galveston County did not offer evidence to show that new processes were followed uniformly or consistently applied. The court also held that Younger abstention did not apply in light of Fifth Circuit precedent, O’Donnell v. Harris County (available at CJ-TX-0010 in this Clearinghouse). It rejected the argument that a writ of habeaus corpus offered the sole federal remedy. While the District Attorney contended that sovereign, prosecutorial, and qualified immunity protected him from the claims, the court applied Ex Parte Young, rejecting this argument because the claims were for prospective relief, not damages. Finally, the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged the § 1983 claim establishing the District Court Judges’ liability and the District Attorney’s policymaker role in setting the bail practices. 352 F. Supp. 3d 718. On January 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed requests for a preliminary injunction. The first request included propositions that the County must amend its bail setting procedures. The second required the County to provide defense counsel for any person arrested for a felony unable to retain counsel, who would represent arrestee at any hearing concerning pretrial release. On August 7, the Magistrate recommended that the court deny the first and grant the second motion, which Judge Hanks adopted and approved on September 11, 2019. 2019 WL 4305457. The court denied the first because the County had begun reforms to its bail system to bring it into compliance with O’Donnell. The County modeled its new bail policy on the suggested preliminary injunction in that case. With the changes, the magistrate would possess financial information about the individual. Also, for those unable to afford bail review, the court would schedule an individualized bail review hearing within 48 hours after the initial appearance. The second motion for preliminary injunction sought an order requiring the County to provide counsel at initial bail hearings for indigent arrestees charged with felonies. The court held that this initial bail hearing constituted a “critical stage” of the criminal proceedings, thus affording the arrestees a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The injunction required that Galveston County provide any indigent felony arrestee with counsel to represent the arrestee at the initial hearing concerning conditions of pretrial release. 2019 WL 3714455. Subsequent to the preliminary injunction order, the District Court Judges, the District Attorney and the County appealed to the Fifth Circuit (USCA No. 19−40785). On February 15, 2019, the plaintiffs and the District Court Judges filed motions for respective proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 12, 2019, the Magistrate recommended that the court grant class certification. Two weeks later, Judge Hanks adopted the Magistrate Judge’s memorandum and recommendations granting the motion for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief. The class included “all people who are or will be detained in Galveston County Jail on felony and state-jail felony charges because they are unable to pay secured bail set at magistration.” 2019 WL 1129492. As a result, the District Court Judges, the District Attorney, the County, and the Magistrates each filed a notice of appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (USCA No. 19−40395) at the end of April and the beginning of May. Further, on April 12 and April 23, 2019, the parties filed second proposed findings of fact and conclusions on the preliminary injunction. On July 6, the court granted a motion to suspend deadlines until the Fifth Circuit addressed the appeals. On September 13, the case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey Brown. The case is ongoing pending appeal as of October 31, 2019.

Summary: In April 2018, a prisoner in Galveston County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Galveston County, alleging that Galveston County’s bail policies favored wealthy arrestees over poorer arrestees and violated poor arrestees’ rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case is ongoing.


On January 30, 2006, on behalf of a female and a male plaintiff, the Chicago civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint challenged the Cook County Sheriff's blanket policy of requiring a strip and body cavity search of every detainee who entered the Cook County Jail for booking/intake, irrespective of the nature of the charge against the detainee and of whether there was any reasonable suspicion that the detainee was concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiffs contended that suspicionless strip and body cavity searches of detainees accused of misdemeanors and other minor offenses violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also alleged that the searches of male detainees were conducted in a degrading manner that was significantly different than the manner in which females were searched. All female detainees, however, were also allegedly given, without their consent, sexual transmitted disease (STD) testing by a vaginal swabbing procedure. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification on the various claims. Approximately a month later, an amended complaint added a third named plaintiff. A month after that, a second amended complaint was filed adding three additional persons, including officers of a health care contractor, to the multiple jail, public health, and governmental officials named as defendants along with Cook County. Defendants responding by moving to dismiss the case on numerous grounds which included: (1) no personal involvement was alleged as to the individual defendants; (2) testing for STDs by vaginal swabbing was not unconstitutional; (3) the County had no control over the Sheriff; (4) one of the three named plaintiffs (Johnson) was arrested for a felony drug crime, so the strip search of him was lawful; (5) each pretrial detainee arrived at the jail after a judicial determination of probable cause; (6) the issue of living conditions and treatment of pretrial detainees at the jail was decided by the district court in Duran v. Sheahan, Case No.74 C 2949 and the case is therefore barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion; and (7) the Sheriff had no control of the health care company that performed the vaginal swabbing. With the exception of dismissing the official capacity claims against the individual defendants, the District Court (District Judge Matthew F. Kennelly) denied the motion to dismiss by order dated August 25, 2006. On April 25, 2007, Judge Kennelly certified the case as a class action, with the classes defined as follows: (1) all males who were subjected to a strip search and/or a visual body cavity search as new detainees at the Cook County Jail on or after January 30, 2004; and (2) all persons charged only with misdemeanor or lesser offenses not involving drugs or weapons who were subjected to a strip search and/or a visual body cavity search as new detainees at the Cook County Jail on or after January 30, 2004. Defendants sought leave to appeal the certification order to the Seventh Circuit, but leave was denied. Plaintiffs decided not to seek class certification on the vaginal swabbing claims. On October 3, 2008, the individual defendants filed two motions for summary judgment, the first based on the constitutionality of the search policy in question, and they second based on principles of qualified immunity. On November 10, 2008, Cook County filed a motion for summary judgment, and on the same day, the plaintiffs also filed a partial summary judgment motion on the issue of liability. On February 23, 2009, the district court (Judge Michael Kennelly issued an opinion in which it granted the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity but denied the individual defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the constitutionality of the search policy. The court also granted Cook County's motion for summary judgment with respect to the respondeat superior claims, but otherwise denied the motion. The court granted the plaintiff motion for summary judgment with respect to the claims of the Class II members and with respect to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims of the Class I members for searches that occurred prior to the installation of privacy screens, but otherwise denied that motion. On March 5, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on April 2, 2009. 616 F.Supp.2d 834, N.D. Ill 2009. On August 13, 2009, the case went to trial, and the following day, the jury reached a verdict. They found in favor of the plaintiffs, and held that county jail employees violated the law in the manner in which they conducted strip searches of detainees. The defendant subsequently made two motions in response to the judgment and the district court denied them both. First, on September 15, 2009, the district court denied the sheriff's motion to stay the proceedings pending his interlocutory appeal of a purported 11th Amendment issue, specifically, the Court's ruling denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law at the recent jury trial. The court held that the interlocutory appeal was frivolous. 2009 WL 2986109 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2009). Second, on November 17, 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law of for a new trial. The issue of damages still remained, so from March 29, 2010, to April 7, 2010, the court held a jury trial on damages. Immediately after the jury trial and before the verdict was issued, the parties entered into settlement talks. On April 28, 2010, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) denied the defendants' interlocutory appeal of the District Court's denial of "11th Amendment" immunity (Judge Easterbrook admonished the parties for confusing 11th Amendment sovereign immunity with qualified immunity). Judge Easterbrook held that the denial was not from a “final decision” and that the appeal was frivolous. The defendants had waited three years before they asserted immunity, so the District Court had held that the immunity was waived. 604 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2010) But on August 11, 2010, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, but did not decided the amount of damages or attorney's fees. Instead, the parties reached a settlement agreement deciding those amounts. On November 24, 2010, the Court preliminarily approved the class-action settlement, and on March 4, 2011, the Court granted final approval of the class action settlement. The defendants agreed to pay roughly $18 million in attorney's fees and costs and $365,000 in incentive awards to the class representatives. The defendants also established a $55,000,000 cash fund to pay the claims of individual class members as they were submitted to the court. After the settlement agreement, the court retained jurisdiction and has been handling the claims of individual class members from 2011-2016. As of April 7, 2016, there have been no new motions from late claimants. Note: There was another strip search case against the Cook County Sheriff in the same District Court. That case, Bullock v. Sheahan, No. 04 C 1051, alleged an unconstitutional practice and policy of strip searching male inmates prior to their release from the Cook County Jail. See JC-IL-0039.

Summary: In 2006, a Chicago civil rights law firm filed this class action civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint challenged the Cook County Sheriff's blanket policy of requiring a strip and body cavity search of every detainee that entered the Cook County Jail for booking/intake, irrespective of the nature of the charge against the detainee and of whether there was any reasonable suspicion that the detainee was concealing weapons or contraband. After two jury trials, the court found for the plaintiffs. The parties reached a settlement agreement regarding monetary relief in 2011.


COVID-19 Summary: Two immigrants detained pending removal proceedings obtained a temporary restraining order that required their immediate release to protect them from the risk of infection.
 On March 26, 2020, two detained immigrants filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by Public Counsel, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs Enforcement. They alleged that their detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment right to safe conditions of confinement. Specifically, they alleged that detention during the COVID-19 outbreak (1) constituted a state-created danger; (2) violated the government’s Fifth Amendment duty to care for those in its custody; and (3) functioned as punitive detention. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of habeas corpus. The Department of Homeland Security originally detained the plaintiffs in early March pending removal proceedings. They were held in Adelanto, a for-profit detention facility run by Geo Group, Inc. with a history of health and safety violations. Around the same time, COVID-19 was spreading throughout the world. California declared a state of emergency on March 4, 2020, and the United States declared a national emergency on March 13. Coronavirus spreads easily between people in close contact, posing risks to detainees. To reduce the risk of COVID-19 infection, the plaintiffs immediately moved for a temporary restraining order providing for their release. Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. granted the motion on March 27, the day after the suit was filed. Judge Hatter declared that “[t]he law is clear—the Government cannot put a civil detainee into a dangerous situation.” As a result, a detainee’s Fifth Amendment rights are violated if “a condition of his confinement places him at substantial risk of suffering serious harm, such as the harm caused by a pandemic.” He also rejected the defendants’ arguments that the plaintiffs must first exhaust their administrative remedies and lacked standing. As part of the March 27 order, Judge Hatter directed the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be granted. 2020 WL 1502864. On April 6, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition adding another individual plaintiff. On the same day, Judge Hatter ordered the amended petition to be stricken and declared that relief for additional petitioners would only be available in separate proceedings absent class certification. Judge Hatter extended the temporary restraining order by 14 days on April 10 to allow more time for the court to consider whether to issue a preliminary injunction. On April 13, the court severed one of the two individual plaintiffs' claims so they could be resolved in a new case. This case was stayed on April 24, 2020 due to developments in Roman v. Wolf, another COVID-19 case seeking the release of immigrants in detention. The Roman plaintiffs had obtained provisional class certification and a preliminary injunction, and the plaintiffs in this case fell within the Roman class and the scope of its preliminary injunction. As a result, Judge Hatter stayed this case pending Roman's conclusion. The court released a scheduling order on June 1, 2020. The court found that the petitioners were entitled to an evidentiary hearing on their habeas corpus petition and decided to combine the evidentiary hearing with a court trial regarding the petitioners' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. The hearing and trial were scheduled for October 6, 2020 but this date was subject to change due to the pandemic. The court found that it had the authority to entertain a class-wide motion for bail and, if granted, would then individually consider each member for bail. As of February 26, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: Two immigrants detained pending removal proceedings sued the Department of Homeland Security. They alleged that detention during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights and sought immediate release. The next day, the court issued a temporary restraining order providing for the plaintiff's release. The case was stayed after the plaintiffs in a related case obtained class-wide relief that protected the individual plaintiffs in this case.


In 1977 (and thereafter amended a number of times), the foster children of Jackson Missouri, represented by Children's Rights Inc., and Legal Aid of Western Missouri, filed a class action aimed at reforming the state's child welfare system. The federal complaint charges the Missouri Division of Family Services (DFS) with endangering the lives of children in state custody by failing to properly investigate and monitor foster homes that were found to be unsafe, unsanitary and unsupervised. Plaintiffs alleged that children were exposed to contagious diseases, deprived of medical and psychiatric care, subjected to physical and emotional abuse, and transferred between foster homes inappropriately and without adequate preparation. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §601 et. seq, and 42 U.S.C §1302. We don't have the early parts of the docket sheet in this case, so do not know the ins and outs of the subsequent litigation. But in 1983, a settlement agreement was reached mandating top-to-bottom reform of the foster care system. In 1985, DFS sought a modification of the consent decree, which was countered by a contempt motion from the plaintiffs for state failure to implement court-ordered reforms. In 1992, a full trial was held in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Judge Dean Whipple) resulting in a finding of contempt due to a "lack of commitment to make a good faith effort." The court order called for defendants to increase budgets through state lobbying and directed defendants to transfer caseworkers to Jackson County to ease caseloads. G.L. v. Stangler, 873 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. Mo. 1994) In response, a new settlement agreement was reached in 1994, following the assessments of an expert panel. The settlement mandated such improvements as training for foster parents and mandatory criminal history and child abuse checks for prospective foster families. In 1995, a monitoring plan was developed in addition to semi-annual compliance reports thereafter. Based on defendants' substantial compliance with components of the consent decree, in 2000, the parties renegotiated the decree, allowing the state to exit from some provisions. On January 30, 2001, the court approved an Amended Decree and Operational Guide. The amended decree created a permanent community quality assurance committee, which was to take over system monitoring once DFS reached substantial compliance and exited from the decree. Over the next ten years, with court oversight, DFS successfully implemented all of the reforms required by prior court order. On February 1, 2006, the court conditionally dismissed the case, court oversight officially ended, and the state agreed to keep in place until 2009 the policies, practices and staff positions created as a result of the lawsuit.

Summary: In 1977, the foster children of Jackson County, Mississippi filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. §601 et. seq, and 42 U.S.C §1302. The plaintiff, represented by Children's Rights Inc., and Legal Aid of Western Missouri asked the court to reform the foster care system, claiming poor monitoring of foster care homes leading to unsafe conditions for children. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that children were exposed to contagious diseases, deprived of medical and psychiatric care, subjected to physical and emotional abuse, and transferred between foster homes inappropriately and without adequate preparation. In 1994, the Court found the Missouri Division of Family Services to be in contempt of the consent decree reached between the parties and ordered the defendant to increase its budget and increase its staff to adequately handle high caseloads. Afterwards a monitoring plan was developed and successfully implemented the court conditionally dismissed the case in 2006.


On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Erie and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 22, 2013, Judge Sean McLaughlin granted the U.S motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims as unripe.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Erie and affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On January 22, 2013, Judge Sean McLaughlin granted the U.S. motion to dismiss all of plaintiffs' claims as unripe.


This case, Flick v. City and County of San Francisco, is a companion case to Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), a class action case challenging the strip search policy of the City and County of San Francisco. [See JC-CA-0007]. Flick filed her case on September 3, 2003, represented by attorneys C. Schwartz and Mark E. Merin, who were also class counsel in the Bull case. Flick alleged that she was subjected to false arrest by several San Francisco police officers, purportedly for the charge of public intoxication. Plaintiff alleged that she was transported to the County Jail, where she was forcibly striped naked and thrown into a "cold room." She remained naked in the cold room, until she was released the next morning. No citation or any criminal charges were ever filed against her. Plaintiff alleged violations of her rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. She sought general, special, exemplary, and statutory damages, as well as attorneys' fees. On November 6, 2003, the Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) issued an order relating the case with Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), a class action case challenging San Francisco's strip search. [See JC-CA-0007]. Bull was filed by the same attorneys who represent Plaintiff. On November 21, 2003, Plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, battery, negligence, violations of her rights under California law, as well as false arrest, detention, and imprisonment. On March 18, 2011, the Court stayed this matter pending the resolution of the Bull case after establishing Plaintiff's membership in Bull's plaintiff class. Two years later, the parties in the Bull case settled and the case was dismissed. On September 30, 2013, after the Bull case was dismissed, the parties in this case reached a settlement and the Court dismissed this case, though the details of the settlement were not provided.

Summary: In September 2003, a woman who had been arrested and detained in the San Francisco County Jail filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §1988 against the City and County of San Francisco in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiff sought general, special, and exemplary damages, claiming that her arrest and subsequent detention violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Establishing that Plaintiff belonged to the plaintiff class in a related case, Bull v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal.), the Court stayed this case pending Bull's resolution. [See JC-CA-0007]. The parties settled and this case was dismissed on September 30, 2013.


On April 4th, 2012, a professional video journalist filed a lawsuit in the United States Eastern District of New York against Suffolk County and one of its police officers, alleging violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privacy Protection Act, and state law. The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys, asked the court for a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, punitive damages, injunctive, and attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that while filming a police proceeding, the defendant police officer ordered him to "go away." The plaintiff then moved to another public area farther away and continued filming, at which point the defendant police officer drove his car towards plaintiff, allegedly causing plaintiff to fear for his safety. The defendant police officer then arrested the plaintiff and confiscated his camera and other belongings. The plaintiff was detained for approximately two hours at the police station. The complaint also argued the defendant police officer's actions were the result of a department policy to engage in such unconstitutional behavior. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2012 and 2013, and a trial was scheduled for June 9, 2014. Before trial could take place, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The parties presented the proposed settlement agreement to the Suffolk County Legislature, as required for municipal settlements by local rules, and the Legislature authorized the settlement and payment on May 8, 2014. The parties executed a stipulation of dismissal without prejudice on May 15, 2014. In consideration for the plaintiff’s release of all claims against the defendants, Suffolk County paid $200,000, including attorney’s fees and costs. The agreement also outlined Department General Orders issued by the Suffolk County Police Department (SCPD), including one relating to interacting with and releasing information to the media, one relating to bystanders at police incidents, one relating to recorded media in the possession of bystanders and media personnel, and one relating to dispute resolution between SCPD and members of the media arising out of or in connection with news media coverage at scenes of police activity. The SCPD also instituted a video training module addressing the rules and procedures of the SCPD and the constitutional right of the public and press to observe, photograph, and record police activity in locations open to the public. Suffolk County, through SCPD, was also to form a Police-Media Relations Committee to enhance communications between the SCPD and the media. Magistrate Judge William D. Wall entered the stipulation and order of settlement on July 22, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 4th, 2012, a professional video journalist filed a lawsuit in the United States Eastern District of New York against Suffolk County and one of its police officers, alleging violations of the plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Privacy Protection Act, and state law. After engaging in discovery, the parties settled in 2014, with Suffolk County paying monetary damages to the plaintiff and implementing policies, procedures, and training regarding police and media relations.


On Mar. 23, 2018, three Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients from El Salvador, as well as the immigrants' rights organization Casa de Maryland which has many Salvadorian members, filed this lawsuit. Represented by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and the private law firm Akin Gump Strauss, the plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)'s recent revocation of TPS for Salvadorians living in the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Under the INA, the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country's conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. In such a situation, the Secretary may grant TPS to these nationals for six to eighteen months, with a possible extension following a review of country conditions. TPS allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. DHS had initiated TPS for Salvadorians following a devastating earthquake in that country in 2001 respectively. After each 18-month period since then, DHS had reviewed the program, determined that the nationals could not yet return safely to El Salvador (due to severe safety, health, housing, and infrastructure problems, exacerbated by subsequent natural disasters), and extended the program. This policy, however, ended with DHS's Jan. 2018 announcement that it would soon terminate TPS for Salvadorians, effective Sept. 2019. The plaintiffs argued that DHS's decision to end the program was based not on a change in conditions in El Salvador, but rather on invidious discrimination toward Latino immigrants on the basis of race, ethnicity, and/or national origin. This racial animus allegedly appeared in President Trump's public remarks disparaging Latin American immigrants. The plaintiffs also argued that DHS's action was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. This case was assigned to Judge George Jarrod Hazel. On Nov. 28, 2018, the court (Judge Hazel) largely denied DHS' motion to dismiss. 355 F.Supp.3d 307. The court held that it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the TPS statute did not bar the plaintiffs' claims. The court found that the statute's language and scheme did not unambiguously preclude judicial review, and that the alternative methods of review of the plaintiffs' claims that DHS offered were meaningless. The court upheld the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, finding that the court owed the government less deference in this case and that President Trump's clearly racist statements regarding Latino immigrants provided sufficient evidence to make the claim plausible. For similar reasons, the court also upheld the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim. The court upheld the APA claim in so far as it alleged the government's actions were arbitrary and capricious because they were motivated by racial discrimination and because the government failed to conduct an objective assessment of El Salvador's conditions. But the court dismissed the APA claim in so far as it alleged the government's actions were arbitrary and capricious because the government did not consider the reliance interests of those implicated. The court concluded that the TPS statute did not require the government to make such considerations. Finally, the court kept President Trump as a defendant, concluding that although "ultimately, relief against the President himself is extraordinarily unlikely in this case, none of the authority cited by Defendants requires that the President be dismissed at this early stage." DHS then filed its answer to the complaint on December 12, 2018. In light of the TPS termination date of September 9, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a scheduling order to resolve the dispute before then. They argued the protection of the Ramos v. Nielsen preliminary injunction issued in the Northern District of California was insufficient, as the government had appealed that order to the Ninth Circuit. DHS opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion to stay the litigation until the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on the Ramos preliminary injunction. Both parties filed a series of responses. With the government shutdown, DHS moved to stay proceedings because of a lapse in appropriations. The court granted the DHS’ second motion on January 8, 2019, and stayed proceedings until after the government reopened. By the end of the month, DHS had received funding, and the plaintiffs sought to amend their proposed scheduling order. Following a conference, the court ordered its schedule and the parties proceeded to discovery. Since then, the parties have pursued discovery. Following the Supreme Court's decision in  Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security in which the Court held that the APA required the government to consider reliance interests before rescinding DACA, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's dismissal of their APA claim. The plaintiffs argued that the court previously dismissed the APA claim because it declined to consider the plaintiff's theory that the defendants failed to consider reliance interests when deciding whether to extend or terminate TPS and that this ruling now conflicted with Regents. As of December 23, 2020, the case is ongoing and the motion for reconsideration remains pending. The case is still ongoing as of July 24, 2020.

Summary: On Mar. 23, 2018, three Salvadorian TPS recipients and an immigrants' rights organization sued DHS for revoking TPS for Salvadorians living in the U.S. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, seeking injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment. Having survived a motion to dismiss, the case proceeded to discovery.


On October 8, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff believes the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates the business owner's religious freedom. The plaintiff, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them. On November 15, 2013, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and the defendant filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings until the resolution of one of either of two cases implicating the same issues, to which the Supreme Court had recently granted writs of certiorari: (1) Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013) or (2) Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (Third Cir. 2013). On December 3, 2013, U.S. District Court (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) granted the plaintiff's motion. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on July 15, 2014, Judge Smith lifted the stay. On September 23, 2014, Judge Smith issued an order continuing the preliminary injunction and directing the parties to file a proposed injunction and judgment. The parties filed their respective proposed injunctions and judgments, and then their replies. On November 12, 2014, Judge Smith permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. The case was then dismissed.

Summary: On October 8, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.