On July 1, 2005, several employees who worked at ConectIv and three sub-contractors filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued ConectIv under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Plaintiffs represented by private attorneys sought monetary damages and injunctive relief to redress their racial discrimination claims. On October 13, 2005, the case was transferred to a new docket (No. 2:05-cv-03389) with the EEOC filing a suit on plaintiff’s behalf. The case assigned to Judge Thomas M. Golden. The agency alleged that defendants ignored almost constant harassment of plaintiffs. In one instance, black employees discovered the n-word graffitied on the work site bathrooms and alleged that defendant’s foremen did nothing to address the incident after being told. In another instance, the agency alleged that worksite supervisors used the n-word when referring to a black employee. In a third instance, the agency alleged that a hangman’s noose was found hanging from a beam in a black employee’s work area and when employee complained, a supervisor said he “thought the hangman’s noose was funny.” On May 8, 2008, the EEOC entered into four consent decrees, one for each defendant company. The consent decrees required defendants to pay a sum of $1,650,000 to plaintiffs. The consent decrees required each defendant to do notice posting of the consent agreement. The consent decrees further required each defendant to draft and publish anti-harassment, anti-discrimination, and anti-retaliation policies in plain language in both English and Spanish. Additionally, they mandated that each defendant must institute supervisor and foreman accountability practices for how to respond to future issues. After the four-year period, this decree terminated in 2012.

Summary: On July 1st, 2005, several employees who worked at ConectIv and three sub-contractors filed a class-action law suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued ConectIv under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Plaintiffs represented by private attorneys sought monetary damages and injunctive relief to redress their racial discrimination claims. On May 8th, 2008, the EEOC entered into four consent decrees, one for each defendant company that required complete overhaul of the company's anti-discrimination practices.


The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Jefferson Dental Clinics, P.A., in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas in August 2004. The case was assigned to Judge David Godbey. The complaint was filed on behalf of four female employees alleging they had experienced sexual harassment and constructive discharge for complaining in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of four former female employees of Jefferson Dental. In January 2005, the four female complainants moved to intervene in the case. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in March 2005. Both of these motions were denied on September 7, 2005: the proposed intervenors could not intervene because they had already brought a suit on the same claims in state court. The defendant could not get summary judgment based on the existing state court case because the EEOC and the proposed intervenors were not in privity with each other. 2005 WL 2170858. On February 3, 2006, the defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal of the district court's denial of summary judgment. On May 29, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order in part, requiring summary judgment in favor of the defendant on some but not all of the EEOC’s claims, and remanded the case. At the Fifth Circuit, the case was heard before Judge Carolyn King, Judge Wiener, and Judge Edith Brown Clement. 478 F.3d 690. On May 21, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court entered a consent decree. Under the terms of this consent decree, Jefferson Dental had to publish a non-harassment policy and provide non-harassment training for its employees. The consent decree was to last for one year after its date of entry, during which the district court would have jurisdiction to enforce it. No entries appear in the docket since 2008. The consent decree expired in May 2009, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In August 2004, the Dallas District Office of the EEOC sued Dental Clinics, P.A. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The EEOC brought the case after four female complainants alleged sexual harassment and constructive discharge. The case ended in a settlement in 2008, which lasted one year.


Parents, on behalf of and as next of friend of female students of Claremore Public Schools, filed suit on December 15, 2000 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against the Independent School District #1 (also known as Claremore Public Schools), alleging that the district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by denying female students equal access and opportunity to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The plaintiffs sought certification of all present and future female students of Claremore Public Schools as a class. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district had selected and offered sports and other athletic opportunities that discriminated against female students. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school district discriminated against female students in the following areas: 1. funding of athletics, 2. equipment and supplies, 3. schedule of games and/or practice times, 4. travel and/or meals, 5. opportunity to receive qualified coaching, 6. assignment and compensation of coaches, 7. provision of locker rooms and facilities for practice and competition, 8. provision of training facilities and services, and 9. publicity. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the school district had violated the female students' rights and injunctive relief remedying the discriminatory conduct by, among other things, offering additional female athletic teams. The parties held a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Claire V. Eagan on January 19, 2001. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal on March 23, 2001. Chief Judge Terry C. Kern granted class certification and approved the settlement agreement on March 30, 2001. In the settlement agreement, the school district agreed to offer interscholastic volleyball to grades 7-12, conditioned upon the identification of 13 students at either the middle school or high school level that played volleyball. The district also agreed to establish a ninth-grade fast-pitch volleyball team in the for the 2001-2002 school year if a minimum of 13 students indicated a commitment to participate on the team. Additionally, the district agreed to promote all athletic teams and opportunities, compensate coaches on a gender-neutral basis, and implement procedures for surveying interest in the establishment of other athletic programs for female students. The school district agreed to maintain records of funding and expenditures for both male and female sports teams, select and hire coaches for teams on a gender-neutral basis, establish the basketball schedules on a gender-neutral basis, provide access to the weight-room and other training facilities on a gender-neutral basis, and promote female athletic programs on an equivalent basis with that of male programs. The case was dismissed on March 30, 2001.

Summary: Parents, on behalf of their minor daughters and all female students, brought suit against a school district, alleging that it had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against female students in the opportunities, athletic facilities, schedules, coaching compensation and promotion made available to female athletic teams. In a settlement agreement entered into on March 30, 2001, the school district agreed to adopt specific practices so as to remedy the discrimination.


On June 29, 2005, the EEOC's New Orleans district office filed this action on behalf of employees of the Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCS) in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The complaint alleged that KCS had disciplined and discharged its black employees due to their race and retaliated against complaints of discrimination. The EEOC claimed KCS's actions violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The EEOC sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the defendant from engaging in racial discrimination and to institute polices and programs to promote equal employment opportunities. The plaintiff also requested punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to judge Sarah Vance. On July 27, 2005, the EEOC filed an amended complaint to remove one of the employees from the statement of the claims. In October 2005, this case was related to a case filed privately by an individual who sought to intervene against the same defendant. The case was transferred to Judge Helen C. Berrigan. Multiple individuals sought to intervene individually between October 2005 and July 2006. Eventually, the case was consolidated with all claims against KCS in Turner v. Kansas City South Railway Co. on July 25, 2006, which became the primary docket sheet. The elements for a claim of race discrimination against the employer were identical in the two consolidated cases. In November, the matter was transferred to Judge Donald E. Walter. On March 4, 2009, the defendant filed for summary judgment in Turner, which the judge granted on May 19, 2009, dismissing all claims against defendant with prejudice. The court found for the defendant because the plaintiffs were unable to establish their burden that KCS intentionally discriminated or retaliated against them on the basis of race. The plaintiffs appealed on July 17, 2009. On July 31, 2012 the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's grant of KCS's motion for summary judgment on discrimination claims related to decisions to discipline certain employees, but reversed on the claims related to decisions to dismiss others. The court reasoned that KCS had not met its burden of evidence of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons motivating its employment decisions. The parties settled by consent decree on January 31, 2013. KCS promised not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment based on their race. It agreed to provide one of the original plaintiffs with a job recommendation by a senior level manager and to consider rehiring the other. It also agreed to provide Equal Employment Opportunity training to its employees about employment discrimination. The consent decree lasted for one year and both parties agreed to pay their own attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: EEOC sued the Kansas City Southern Railway Company for discriminatory and retaliatory conduct against its black employees on the basis race. After the plaintiffs appealed a lost summary judgment motion to the Fifth Circuit, the parties settled on remand. KCS agreed to provide training to its employees about employment discrimination and promised not to discriminate against any of its employees or applicants based on their race. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by immigration detainees in Georgia with underlying medical conditions that made them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. The detainees alleged that their continued detention was unconstitutional and requested release. The court denied a TRO on April 10, and denied a preliminary injunction on June 3. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the action on August 17, 2020. <hr> On April 7, 2020 ICE detainees in Georgia detention centers filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and Asian American Advancing Justice - Atlanta, the plaintiffs sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Stewart Detention Center, the Irwin County Detention Center, and the Atlanta ICE Field Office. Suing under the federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for violations of the Fifth Amendment, the detainees alleged that the current conditions in the detention centers were unconstitutional, as they facilitated the spread of COVID-19 and that ICE was not doing enough to prevent it, including: lack of social distancing, poor water quality, lack of disinfectant materials and soap, unsanitary communal areas. They sought the release of the detainees, in light of these unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The case was assigned to Judge Clay D. Land and Magistrate Judge Stephen Hyles. On April 8, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order, requesting the release of the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a motion in opposition on April 9, stating that they had taken affirmative steps to combat the spread of COVID-19 in ICE facilities including increased screening and sanitization practices, encouraging social distancing, and a focus on medical care. The court denied the motion for TRO on April 10, finding that the appropriate relief for unconstitutional conditions was not release but discontinuance of any improper practices causing violations of the Constitution. Because the plaintiffs only sought release, Judge Land held that the court had no jurisdiction to decide a habeas claim based upon allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement and that release was not an appropriate remedy for the constitutional violations. 2020 WL 1847158 The plaintiffs filed an amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on April 24 and a motion for preliminary injunction on April 30, seeking release or in the alternative, that the court require ICE to follow CDC guidance and take measures to protect detainees from COVID-19. The defendants filed an opposition on May 6. The plaintiffs filed another amended petition on May 18. Judge Land denied the motion for preliminary injunction on June 3, finding that the plaintiffs had not proved that they were being subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement that could only be remedied through release, which meant the court did not have jurisdiction to enter habeas relief. Similarly, because the plaintiffs had not proved unconstitutional conditions, they were not entitled to any other injunctive or declaratory relief they sought, either. 2020 WL 2988307. On July 6, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the petition for habeas relief and to stay discovery. That same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 3 order, citing that the new spread of COVID-19 in the detention facility constituted newly discovered evidence that merited reconsideration. The defendants filed a response to the motion for reconsideration on July 21. Judge Land denied the motion for reconsideration on July 23, stating that the evidence of the spread of COVID-19 in the center did not change the Court's previous findings and conclusion in a material way. On August 17, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and it appears closed now.

Summary: This is a habeas action brought in the Middle District of Georgia, alleging unconstitutional conditions in ICE detention facilities in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought release from detention, or in the alternative, improved conditions that adhered to CDC guidelines. The court denied the TRO on April 10, and denied a preliminary injunction on June 3, finding that the plaintiffs had not proved constitutional violations in the detention centers. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on Aug. 17.


The defendant here, former Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio (“Sheriff Arpaio”) was referred for criminal contempt on August 19, 2016. The U.S. prosecuted Sheriff Arpaio and obtained a conviction on July 31, 2017. 2017 WL 3268180. On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump pardoned Sheriff Arpaio. On August 28, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio moved for two forms of relief (1) to dismiss this matter with prejudice, and (2) to vacate the verdict and all other orders in this matter, as well as the sentencing on October 5th. The district court Judge, Susan Bolton, granted Sheriff Arpaio’s first request, and on October 4, 2017, the district court dismissed with prejudice the action for criminal contempt. The district court denied Sheriff Arpaio’s second request to vacate the verdict and all other orders on October 19, 2017. 2017 WL 4839072. The district court and refused to grant “relief beyond dismissal with prejudice.” The court specified that the power to pardon is an executive prerogative of mercy, "not of judicial recordkeeping." The court found that the pardon undoubtedly spared the defendant from any punishment that might otherwise have been imposed, but it did not "revise the historical facts” of this case. That same day, Sheriff Arpaio filed a timely notice of appeal. The U.S. responded that it “does not intend to defend the district court’s order from October 19, 2017 . . . instead, the government intends to argue, as it did in the district court, that the motion to vacate should have been granted.” On April 17, 2018 the Ninth Circuit granted a motion to appoint a special prosecutor, finding that "the merits panel of our court that will decide this appeal will not receive the benefit of full briefing and argument unless we appoint a special prosecutor to defend the decision of the district court." 887 F.3d 979. On October 10, 2018, the Ninth Circuit declined to review en banc the earlier decision to appoint a special prosecutor to defend the ruling of a lower court. 906 F.3d 800. On October 15, 2018, the Circuit court appointed a special prosecutor by an order providing that “[t]he special prosecutor will be limited to the functions a government attorney would have performed in connection with Arpaio’s appeal in this Court had the government been willing to perform those functions.” In January of the following year the defendant petitioned for cert, arguing that the Ninth Circuit should not have replaced DoJ prosecutors with a special prosecutor. That petition was denied three months later. On appeal, Arpaio argued that the district court should have granted both the vacatur and the dismissal, rather than just the dismissal. Arpaio claimed that failure to grant vacatur was an abuse of the district court's discretion. In February of 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion, which ruled that the district court was correct to not vacate Arpaio's verdict. 951 F.3d 1001. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that, because Arpaio was not sentenced, he had not received a final judgment and was therefore not entitled to vacatur.

Summary: The defendant here, former Maricopa County Sheriff Joseph M. Arpaio (“Sheriff Arpaio”) was referred for criminal contempt on August 19, 2016. The U.S. prosecuted Sheriff Arpaio and obtained a conviction on July 31, 2017. 2017 WL 3268180. On August 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump pardoned Sheriff Arpaio. Upon motion from the Sheriff, the District Court dismissed the case without vacating the verdict. The Sheriff appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the lower court's position. On August 28, 2017, Sheriff Arpaio moved for two forms of relief (1) to dismiss this matter with prejudice, and (2) to vacate the verdict and all other orders in this matter, as well as the sentencing on October 5th. The district court, Judge Susan Bolton, granted Sheriff Arpaio’s first request, and on October 4, 2017, the district court dismissed with prejudice the action for criminal contempt. The district court denied Sheriff Arpaio’s second request on October 19, 2017. 2017 WL 4839072. The district court denied vacatur and refused to grant “relief beyond dismissal with prejudice.” The court specified that the power to pardon is an executive prerogative of mercy, "not of judicial recordkeeping." The court found that the pardon undoubtedly spared the defendant from any punishment that might otherwise have been imposed, but it did not "revise the historical facts” of this case. That same day, Sheriff Arpaio filed a timely notice of appeal. The U.S. responded that it “does not intend to defend the district court’s order from October 19, 2017 . . . instead, the government intends to argue, as it did in the district court, that the motion to vacate should have been granted.” On April 17, 2018 the Ninth Circuit granted a motion to appoint a special prosecutor, finding that "the merits panel of our court that will decide this appeal will not receive the benefit of full briefing and argument unless we appoint a special prosecutor to defend the decision of the district court." 887 F.3d 979. On October 10, 2018, the Ninth Circuit declined to review en banc the earlier decision to appoint a special prosecutor to defend the ruling of a lower court. 906 F.3d 800. On October 15, 2018, the Circuit court appointed a special prosecutor by an order providing that “[t]he special prosecutor will be limited to the functions a government attorney would have performed in connection with Arpaio’s appeal in this Court had the government been willing to perform those functions.” In February of 2020 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's ruling to dismiss his case with prejudice but without vacating the verdict. On January 16, 2019, defendant Arpaio filed a petition for a writ of mandamus for the Supreme Court to appeal the Ninth Circuit's decision.


On January 28, 2011, two high school seniors who were in a lesbian relationship filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against their school district. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Southern Poverty Law Center and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, asked the court for injunctive relief claiming that the school had violated the plaintiffs' rights to freedom of expression and equal protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school had canceled a festival procession because the two girls had planned to walk in as a couple. The plaintiffs were elected to Royalty Court and announced their intention to walk together in the processional as a couple. Historically, when members of Royalty Court have been permitted to choose their processional partner and when a male student and female student in a relationship have both been elected to Royalty Court, they have been permitted to walk together. Plaintiffs were told that they could not walk together as a couple and that the school was going to cancel the processional. The case was settled on January 31, 2001 with an agreement that allowed the plaintiffs to walk in the procession together. The District Court (Judge Susan Richard Nelson) dismissed the case after plaintiffs filed a voluntary notice of dismissal on January 31, 2011.

Summary: Two high school seniors who were in a lesbian relationship filed a lawsuit against their school district when their school cancelled a festival procession because the two plaintiffs had planned to walk in together as a couple. The school district settled with an agreement that allowed the plaintiffs to walk in the procession as a couple.


Applicants and beneficiaries of the Central American Minors (CAM) parole program filed this class-action lawsuit on June 13, 2018, challenging the Trump Administration's termination of the program and its revocation of parole for nearly 3,000 children. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as that the defendants be equitably estopped, the plaintiffs alleged that the termination of the program violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), regulations promulgated by the Department of Homeland Security, and Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs were represented by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP) and the law firm Arnold & Porter LLP. The plaintiffs filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. Established in 2014, the Departments of State (DOS) and Homeland Security (DHS) set up CAM as a dual refugee/parole program in response to the dramatic rise in the number of unaccompanied children from the so-called “Northern Triangle” countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. The CAM program allowed children from these countries who had at least one parent living lawfully in the U.S. to apply for refugee resettlement or parole while still in their home countries; in the two and a half years it was in operation, the program enabled at least 3,000 people to emigrate to the U.S. However, within a few days of President Trump’s inauguration and without any public announcement, the CAM program stopped processing applications, even those which had already been submitted. On August 16, 2017, DHS formally announced that the CAM program would be terminated and that conditional parole for all CAM beneficiaries who had not yet traveled to the United States would be rescinded. On July 12, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction which would prevent the government from terminating the CAM program and restore the conditional parole approvals that had been rescinded in August 2017, arguing that the continued separation of children from their parents was causing them irreparable harm. On December 10, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the government’s motion to dismiss. 363 F. Supp 3d 1048. Judge Beeler denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' APA claims, finding the government’s mass revocation of conditional parole approval to be unlawful. The judge dismissed all other claims. On the same day, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer about the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion from July. On March 1, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 990680. While Judge Beeler denied the motion to enjoin DHS from terminating the CAM program going forward, the Judge ordered the government to resume processing for the approximately 2,700 children who had already received conditional approval. The government was also prohibited from enacting any policy, procedure, or practice to not process the beneficiaries or to put their processing on hold en masse. On April 12, 2019, the parties entered into a binding memorandum of understanding. The settlement agreement converts the court’s order into a permanent injunction, over which the court retains jurisdiction to enforce. The agreement requires the government to finish processing those applicants whose applications were in their final stages when the government terminated the CAM program. On May 17, 2019, the final judgment and order for permanent injunction were filed by the court which finalized the agreement between the two parties. DHS was enjoined from rescinding conditional approvals for the 2,700 individuals who had been approved for parole. Additionally, DHS was ordered to complete the post-conditional approval processing for those 2,700 individuals under the policies that had been in place before January 2017. Finally, DHS was enjoined from adopting any policy or practice that would bar it from processing the 2,700 individuals or putting their processing on hold en masse. On October 1, 2019, the defendants filed their first status update, which is required of them every three months until the processing is complete. They reported that most of the specific processing items required of them were still in process, but all items, if not completed already, were expected to be completed by the end of October 2019. The defendants filed additional status reports on December 27, 2019, and March 31, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Applicants and beneficiaries of the Central American Minors (CAM) program filed this class action challenge in June 2018 to the Trump Administration's termination of the program in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the termination of the program and the revocation of parole for children who had already been approved violated the Administrative Procedure Act, DHS regulations, Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, and the doctrine of equitable estoppel. An agreement was reached between the two parties on May 17, 2019 that stopped the defendants from rescinding conditional acceptances and forced the defendants to resume the program under the standards that existed before January 2017. Defendants will continue to supply status updates every three months until each component of the agreement is fulfilled.


On June 25, 2004, two African-American job applicants filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, against Defendant Merrill Gardens LLC. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the Merrill Gardens, a private corporation, maintained a secret policy of notating all African-Americans’ job applications in an effort to prevent African-Americans from being hired. This, they said, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This case was ultimately assigned to Chief Judge Theresa Springmann. On January 4, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) separately filed suit in a case available (in this Clearinghouse) against Merrill Gardens under Title VII for a pattern or practice of refusing to hire people of color and failing to preserve records relevant to determining whether discriminatory practices had taken place. The EEOC sought relief for six named applicants of color and a class of people of color adversely impacted by the defendant’s alleged discrimination. Because of the similarity between the claims and the classes, the court consolidated the two cases. On June 16, 2005, the parties negotiated a proposed resolution of the cases together because they involved overlapping claims and classes. The parties requested that the cases be consolidated solely for the purpose of approving requested class relief in the Hill action and entry of a proposed consent decree in the EEOC action. The court accordingly granted preliminary approval of the requested class relief and the proposed consent decree. On September 9, 2005, Judge Springmann held a fairness hearing whereby the court heard evidence and testimony of interested parties to determine whether the proposed settlement was fair, adequate, and reasonable. On October 6, 2005, the court granted final approval of the class action settlement and entry of the consent decree. 2005 WL 2465250. The class included the named plaintiffs (the “known class”) and all non-white job applicants who applied for a position at Merrill Gardens between February 17, 1998 and April 18, 2005 who were denied employment for positions that were or may have been given to non-minority applicants (the “unknown class”). The settlement agreement awarded $324,000 to the known class, shared among the named plaintiffs. The unknown class received $325,000. In addition, the agreement awarded class counsel $100,000 in attorneys’ fees. On October 4, 2005 in the parallel EEOC action, the court entered a negotiated consent decree against Merrill Gardens. The decree, which lasted a total of 42 months, ordered Merrill Gardens to:

Post a notice of nondiscrimination
Provide equal employment opportunity training to all employees and provide the Commission all written materials for review prior to the training
Revise its application and hiring procedures in accordance with nondiscrimination best practices.
 There has been no litigation subsequent to the approved settlement agreement and the case is now closed. [SORT THIS OUT] The consent decree requires Merrill Garden to hire without using race as a basis, and generally not to discriminate or retaliate in violation of Title VII. It requires the defendant to pay a total of $750,000 to known and unknown class members, including $100,000 in attorneys' fees. Additionally, Merrill Gardens must post and distribute a notice of non-discrimination, give non-discrimination training to its employees, keep relevant records, and report to the EEOC. The docket sheet doesn't show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2009.

Summary: In 2004, two African-American job applicants filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Plaintiffs alleged that Merrill Gardens LLC, a private employer, discriminated against them on the basis of race. The EEOC filed a similar lawsuit against the employer. All parties agreed to work together to negotiate the terms of the settlement. In 2005, the case settled with the defendant paying $750,000.


On February 24, 2009, the plaintiff, a prisoner at the Wyoming State Penitentiary (WSP) filed a class action lawsuit in the United States Court for the District of Wyoming under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the WSP, alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was singled out for filing a complaint against a corrections officer, and denied due process by the WSP warden, who did not allow him to present evidence in his favor during his disciplinary hearing. The plaintiff was represented by the Wyoming ALCU, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 28, 2008, approximately 25 prisoners at WSP witnessed an altercation between a guard and a prisoner. The plaintiff claimed to see one of the guards intentionally and unnecessarily kick the prisoner in the head while he was shackled and held beneath several additional guards. When the plaintiff indicated to the officers that he intended to file a complaint against their conduct, he was threatened with a disciplinary action. When the officer did file a grievance against the officer, he was sanctioned. Thereafter, he was not allowed by the officer reviewing his disciplinary sanction to call witnesses who had overheard the threatened action, or others who had witnessed the guards kick the prisoner in the head. The plaintiff alleged that the Warden summarily denied his appeal of the disciplinary sanction because he did not present any evidence (which he was not allowed to do by the reviewing officer). The plaintiff was put into solitary confinement for two months as a result. The plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff challenged the disciplinary procedures and the specific policy of overly redacting documents provided to prisoners that were non-confidential. On July 30, 2009, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the suit. He was no longer a prisoner at WSP, and was living at home with his ailing mother as her full-time caregiver in a bordering state. According to the stipulation of dismissal, he could not attend the depositions and maintain the action along with his caregiving responsibilities. The Court (Judge Alan B. Johnson) dismissed the case without ruling on class certification on the same day. The case was not closed, and it was not dismissed with prejudice. However, because the plaintiff may have lost standing to restart the action, this case is likely over.

Summary: The ACLU filed a lawsuit on behalf of a plaintiff class challenging the redaction of non-confidential documents and the practice of not allowing prisoners to present witnesses in their disciplinary hearings. The case was voluntarily dismissed because of the hardship litigation was placing on the plaintiff after his release from prison.


On December 14, 2006, two female former inmates of the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) in Washington, D.C. filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, sought damages for violations of their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiffs claimed that they were each sexually assaulted by CTF staff and that CTF failed to protect their safety through negligent hiring practices, inadequate safety training, ineffective assault reporting mechanisms, and failure to enforce policies to minimize the risk of sexual assaults, including supervision of staff-inmate interaction and ineffective investigative and disciplinary action in response to allegations of sexual assault. On April 9, 2002, one of the plaintiffs was being escorted back from a court hearing when she alleged she was taken by a corrections officer to a staff bathroom, where he raped and sexually assaulted her. A few days later, the same corrections officer repeated his rape and assault. The officer later attempted to touch the plaintiff in a sexual manner, but the plaintiff was able to fend off his advances. Over the subsequent period, the plaintiff suffered panic attacks, but she was not provided with treatment and she had difficulty getting her complaint investigated. The male officer was eventually terminated for an unrelated incident. On December 25, 2003, the second plaintiff was taken by a male corrections officer to a broom closet, where he raped and sexually assaulted her. The plaintiff called the DC Dept. of Corrections sexual misconduct hotline and an investigation was begun. When the officer was placed on paid suspension, the allegations became common knowledge among the officers, which resulted in rumors and attempts to determine the plaintiff's identity. The officer resigned before the investigation was completed. The plaintiffs entered a motion on December 14, 2006 to proceed under pseudonyms, which was initially granted but eventually denied on November 16, 2007 by Judge Ellen Huvelle. After some other discovery disputes, the parties reached a closed settlement on October 21, 2008.

Summary: Two female former inmates of the Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF) in Washington, D.C. filed suit against the District of Columbia on claims of sexual assault perpetrated by staff members of CTF in 2002 and 2003. Both plaintiffs complained that the management of the facility did not provide sufficient safeguards to protect inmates from staff and afterwards did not provide appropriate investigation of the claims nor effective treatment for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs entered a motion on December 14, 2006 to proceed under pseudonyms, which was initially granted but eventually denied on November 16, 2007 by Judge Ellen Huvelle. After some other discovery disputes, the parties reached a closed settlement on October 21, 2008.


This is a case about a prisoner who has been kept in solitary confinement on death row for thirty-three years. On June 12, 2017, a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution in Greene County, Pennsylvania, filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the public interest organizations Abolitionist Law Center and MacArthur Justice Center, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. He claimed that the defendants keeping him in solitary confinement despite his perfect disciplinary record in DOC custody and well after his death sentence was vacated in 2003 was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and violated the plaintiff's rights to liberty, equal protection, and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly. On June 29, 2017, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to move him from solitary to the general population, which the court denied on July 12 to give the defendants a chance to respond to the complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction on August 8, 2017, which the court denied on September 15. In its order denying the motion, the court said that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim. The appeals regarding the order vacating his death sentence were still pending a resentencing hearing and thus his death sentence was still operative. On July 9, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted on November 8. The court held that the plaintiff's procedural due process claims were not viable because his death sentence was still active, that the substantive due process claims were redundant because of the Eighth Amendment claim, and that the plaintiff did not provide evidence for his Eighth Amendment claim. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on November 9, 2018. On September 1, 2020, the appeals court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for the substantive due process and Eighth Amendment claims, the latter of which was on the grounds that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. However, the appeals court reversed summary judgment for the procedural due process claim. In 2017, the Third Circuit had held in Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (848 F.3d 549), that Fourteenth Amendment due process "limits the State's ability to subject an inmate to the deprivations of death row once the death sentence initially relied upon to justify such extreme restrictions is no longer operative.” Here, the Third Circuit applied Williams to death row prisoners whose orders vacating their death sentence were still pending pursuant to local rules, such that the prisoner here had a procedural due process right in avoiding continued indefinite solitary confinement. The defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim, and the Third Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. 974 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2020). The defendants filed for a rehearing on September 28, 2020, and that the Third Circuit denied on October 28. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 5, 2017, a prisoner at the State Correctional Institution in Greene County, Pennsylvania, filed a complaint in the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by public interest organizations, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. He claimed that the defendants keeping him in solitary confinement despite his perfect disciplinary record in DOC custody and well after his death sentence was vacated in 2003 was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and violated the plaintiff's rights to liberty, equal protection, and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on August 8, 2017, which was denied on September 15. The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on November 9, 2018. On September 1, 2020, the appeals court affirmed the district court's granting of summary judgment for the substantive due process and Eighth Amendment claims, and the appeals court reversed summary judgment for the procedural due process claim and remanded the case to the district court to determine damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. 974 F.3d 431 (3d Cir. 2020). This case is ongoing.


On December 17, 2002, a pre-trial detainee filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, challenging the Knox County Sheriff's policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in Knox County Jail. Plaintiff alleged that officers subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches regardless of the crime charged and without having reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband or weapons, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. The defendants denied those allegations and asserted that their policies, practices and procedures were at all times consistent with constitutional requirements. The District Court (Senior District Judge Gene Carter) certified the case as a class action, defining the class as: All people who after November 19, 1996, were subjected to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without evaluation for individualized reasonable suspicion while being held at the Knox County Jail: (1) after having been arrested on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or (2) while waiting for bail to be set on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or (3) while waiting for an initial court appearance on charges that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony; or (4) after having been arrested on a warrant that did not involve a weapon, drugs, or a violent felony. Tardiff v. Knox County, 218 F.R.D. 332 (D. Me. 2003), affirmed by Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2004) (Circuit Judge Michael Boudin). Discovery and litigation continued, with the Judge Carter issuing various discovery and procedural orders. See Tardiff v. Knox County, 224 F.R.D. 522 (D. Me. 2004) (holding that reinsurance agreements between self-funded insurance pool of counties and its reinsurers were subject to discovery); Tardiff v. Knox County, 226 F.R.D. 10 (D. Me. 2005) (plaintiff was required to identify class members from county's jail log sheets without the assistance of the County); Tardiff v. Knox County, 2006 WL 2827604 (D. Me. Sept. 11, 2006) (limiting the scope of testimony for defendants' expert witness); Tardiff v. Knox County, 2006 WL 2827600 (D. Me. Sept. 18, 2006) (denying plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of a prior order); Tardiff v. Knox County, 2006 WL 2827603 (D. Me. Sept. 18, 2006) (order denying plaintiffs' motion for judicial determination of the number of people in the class); Tardiff v. Knox County, 453 F.Supp.2d 190 (D. Me. Sept. 21, 2006) (striking all of the parties exhibits for violating a court order directing preparation of consolidated exhibit list); and Tardiff v. Knox County, 2006 WL 3043223 (D. Me. Oct. 24, 2006) (approving substitution of the named class representative). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, which Judge Carter granted in part and denied in part. He held the County's blanket strip search policy unconstitutional, but said there were fact issues regarding the claims of several class members that needed to be resolved. He determined that the Sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for searches of detainees alleged to have committed non-violent, non-weapons, non-drug felonies, but was not entitled to immunity for searches of detainees alleged to have committed misdemeanors. Tardiff v. Knox County, 397 F.Supp.2d 115 (D. Me. 2005). In Tardiff v. Knox County, 425 F.Supp.2d 159 (D. Me. 2006), Judge Carter clarified and denied reconsideration of his summary judgment order and denied a certificate of appealability in Tardiff v. Knox County, 451 F.Supp.2d 253 (D. Me. 2006). On September 19, 2006, the Court bifurcated the remaining liability and damages issues. The case was ordered to proceed to determine liability (as to the class) and then would thereafter proceed as a non-class action with regard to determining individual amounts of recoverable compensatory and punitive damages. Tardiff v. Knox County, 2006 WL 2827556 (D. Me. Sept. 19, 2006). The parties then participated in a Judicial Settlement Conference with Chief District Judge George Z. Singal on September 29, 2006, and settled the case. The initial Settlement Agreement was submitted to the Court for preliminary approval, but rejected. Dare v. Knox County, 457 F.Supp.2d 52 (D. Me. 2006). After several modifications, a third version of Settlement Agreement was preliminarily approved on December 18, 2006. Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 14 (D. Me. 2006). In accordance with the revised Settlement Agreement, the Court entered an Injunction prohibiting Knox County, its Sheriff, and all jail employees from strip searching any persons charged with a crime that did not involve weapons, violence or controlled or scheduled substances during the jail admission process, unless the officer or person conducting the strip search had reasonable suspicion to believe the person does possess a weapon, controlled or scheduled substances, or other contraband. Dare v. Knox County, 465 F.Supp.2d 17 (D. Me. 2006). Following a final fairness hearing on April 23, 2007, Judge Carter approved the settlement. Under the terms of the Agreement, the County agreed to pay the sum of $3 million for settlement of all class claims. From that amount, attorneys' fees in the amount of $750,000.00 (25%) were paid to class counsel, as well as litigation costs of class counsel, claims administration expenses, and class representative bonuses. The remainder was to be distributed equally to class members that timely submitted a claim, regardless of the number of times that they were booked into the jail and searched during the class period. See also Dare v. Knox County, 2007 WL 2071787 (D. Me. July 09, 2007) (approving $23,822.74 in litigation costs to class counsel). The PACER docket reflects that in January 2008, Judge Carter ordered that unclaimed portions of the settlement fund went to a charity pusuant to the "cy pres" doctrine. We have no further information showing activity in the case.

Summary: On December 17, 2002, a pre-trial detainee filed a class action civil rights lawsuit challenging the Knox County Sheriff's policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in Knox County Jail. The district court held the County's blanket strip search policy unconstitutional, but said there were fact issues regarding the claims of several class members that needed to be resolved. On September 19, 2006, the Court bifurcated the remaining liability and damages issues. Following a settlement conference on September 29, 2006, the parties settled the case.


On March 26, 2018, Human Rights Watch filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide it with records relating to due process violations towards people seeking asylum at the U.S.-Mexican border as required by the FOIA and the APA. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief. According to the complaint, the Human Rights Watch is a "non-profit, non-partisan international human rights organization." It sought information on USCIS officers' knowledge of Customs and Border Protection (CBP)'s alleged due process violations toward asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexican border. Human Rights Watch stated that it had submitted a FOIA request to the defendants on November 17, 2015, seeking the following records from October 1, 2006 to the present: "[A]ll records held by the USCIS Asylum Division and prepared by USCIS asylum officers relating to, and/or mentioning or referring to alleged due process violations or other alleged misconduct by Customs and Border Protection (CBP)[,] [specifically] any alleged or asserted due process Violations; alleged conduct inconsistent or in violation of agency policy or regulations; alleged conduct outside the scope of the law, allegations that CBP failed to record fear of return expressed by migrants at the border; and alleged intimidation, coercion and physical abuse. This request include[s] all Records referring to due process violations by CBP agents discovered by Asylum officers during credible fear interviews with noncitizens." The complaint alleged that the defendants' original productions—around 110 heavily-redacted documents—were insufficient. The plaintiff further alleged that it had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies, and that the defendants violated the APA by failing to timely respond. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On March 26, 2018, this case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. The parties participated in an alternative dispute resolution (ADR) phone conference on August 14, 2018. On August 29, the parties met before Judge Ryu, who ordered them to continue to hold conferences to resolve the disagreement. The parties continued to meet and confer on a court-monitored schedule until they filed a joint motion to vacate case management conferences on February 13, 2019. On July 23, 2019, the parties filed a joint status update saying that the discussions had been “productive” and requesting additional time to resolve the conflict. In a September 9, 2019 status report, the parties stated that they had reached an initial settlement agreement. This initial agreement has not been publicized; as of April 30, 2020, the parties remain in negotiation over the attorney compensation prong of the agreement. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 26, 2018, Human Rights Watch sued DHS and USCIS under FOIA and the APA, seeking records relating to USCIS officers' knowledge of CBP's alleged due process violations toward asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexican border. The parties reached an initial settlement agreement and were in negotiations over allocation of attorney fees in April 2020.


The Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 15, 2006, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o), on behalf of a minority renter. The DOJ alleged that the Defendant-landlords had been contacted by a prospective tenant who expressed interest in renting one of Defendants' properties and that the Defendants refused to rent the property to the prospective tenant because of her race. On July 31, 2006, the parties entered a consent decree with the District Court, which would retain jurisdiction for three years. Under the consent decree, the Defendants agreed to pay the prospective tenant $40,000 in damages, operate under an injunction against future violations of the FHA, post notices of its nondiscrimination policy, and create a training program to guard against future violations of the FHA. Judge John F. Fullam approved the consent decree on September 6. The consent decree ended in 2009, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on March 15, 2006, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3612(o), on behalf of a minority renter. The case ended in a consent decree.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed on April 24 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a temporary restraining order (TRO). On July 7 and October 9, the defendants filed motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2021 after the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 was passed, which effectively provided the same relief as sought by the plaintiffs. This case is believed to be closed. <hr> On April 24, 2020, an individual married to a spouse without a social security number (SSN) filed this putative class-action lawsuit against the U.S. government to challenge the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The defendants were Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President, Mitch McConnell, in his official capacity as U.S. Senator and sponsor of the CARES Act, and Steven Mnuchin, in his official capacity as Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury. The plaintiff alleged that the social security number requirement violated the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution including the right of association, the right to due process of law, and the right to equal protection. The plaintiff also claimed to have suffered substantial mental pain and suffering and severe emotional distress and injury and included a claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. The plaintiffs filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and were represented by private attorneys. The plaintiff’s proposed class sought to include all U.S. citizens married to a spouse without an SSN, and who filed joint tax returns with immigrants who would otherwise qualify. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of the CARES provision at issue. The plaintiff also sought attorney fees and class certification, and also requested a jury trial. The case was assigned to District Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman. On March 27, President Trump announced the CARES Act aimed to provide emergency assistance and health care response to individuals and families affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act authorized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute $1200.00 to each eligible individual who is U.S. citizens, permanent residents, or qualifying residing aliens with a valid SSN. Under Section 6428, or the Exclusion Provision, the applicant was also required to provide a “valid identification number,” or, an SSN of their spouse on their tax returns. The plaintiff, married to an immigrant with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) but without an SSN, did not qualify for the Advance Payment. There are 1.2 million Americans married to immigrants who do not hold Social Security numbers. The plaintiff argued that her exclusion from eligibility on the basis of her choice to marry a non-citizen was a violation of her First Amendment rights. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the Exclusion clause was against the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as it infringed her fundamental choice to marry whom she wished, and discrimination based on the fundamental right to marry is presumptively unconstitutional and subject to strict scrutiny. The plaintiff also argued that Section 6428 was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest, no rationally related to any legitimate government interest. On April 27, the plaintiff submitted an amended class action complaint, adding that the Act violated the penumbra of privacy rights under the First, Third, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but removing the claim of emotional distress. On April 30, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. On May 2, the plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint and added two defendants, Charles Rettig, in his official capacity as U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the U.S. Department of Treasury, and the United States of America. The defendants opposed the motion for a TRO on May 18, claiming that the court had no jurisdiction and the plaintiff failed to state a claim. They also argued that the plaintiff would not suffer irreparable injury because monetary relief would remedy the alleged harm and that the plaintiff had non-equitable remedies available because they could claim a credit under the CARES Act by filing a tax return separately from their spouse. On July 7, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case against all defendants other than the United States of America, as the lawsuit was a constitutional challenge for equitable relief, for which they argued that the United States alone is the proper defendant. And on October 9, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim. On December 14, the court granted and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, dismissing the individual defendants from the lawsuit. On January 19, 2021, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs stated that, in December 2020, President Trump passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which contained a provision that amended the CARES Act to allow stimulus checks for a spouse or otherwise qualifying child as long as the valid identification number of at least one spouse was included on the tax return. Thus, the new act retroactively repealed and replaced the Exclusion Provision with one that provided substantially the same relief as sought by the plaintiffs. The court granted the motion on the same day. The plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and defendants' motion to dismiss were stricken as moot. On February 18, the plaintiffs moved for attorney fees, and the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs motion on February 26. The court granted the defendants' motion on the same day, as the plaintiffs did not comply with Local Rule 54.3. The court stated that plaintiffs were permitted to file a renewed motion if they complied with the Rule. This case is believed to be closed.

Summary: This is a class action filed on April 24 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a temporary restraining order (TRO). On July 7, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case against all defendants other than the United States of America and on October 9, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims against the United States on the basis of sovereign immunity and failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in January 2021 after the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 was passed, effectively providing the same relief as sought by the plaintiffs. This case is believed to be closed.


On Dec. 3, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, fourteen states (South Dakota, Louisiana, Alabama, Texas, West Virginia, Kansas, Georgia, Nebraska, Utah, Wisconsin, Montana, Idaho, South Carolina, and Indiana) and four governors (of Mississippi, Maine, North Carolina, and Idaho) sued the U.S. government for violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take Care Clause of the U.S. Constitution, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The original plaintiffs were later joined in the suit by Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and the Attorney General of Michigan. The lawsuit claimed that President Obama had "unilaterally suspend[ed] the immigration laws as applied to 4 million of the 11 million" undocumented immigrants in the United States. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the executive's intended expansion of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) -- the deportation reprieve offered to undocumented immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as children -- and the intended creation of Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (DAPA) -- a temporary deportation reprieve for undocumented parents of U.S. citizens and lawful residents. Plaintiffs alleged that these executive actions amounted to an unlawful suspension of the nation's immigration laws, in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution, and that the policies were arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and issued without regulatory authority or the required notice and opportunity for public comment, in violation of the APA. The case was assigned to District Judge Andrew S. Hanen. Three Jane Does sought to intervene to defend the legality of DACA and DAPA. The Jane Does were noncitizens who had lived in the United States for more than ten years with minor children, seeking to benefit from the executive actions. But on Feb. 11, 2015, Judge Hanen denied intervention. They appealed on March 9, 2015. On Nov. 9, 2015, in an opinion by Circuit Judge Jennifer Walker Elrod, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court, holding that the Jane Does satisfied the necessary requirements for intervention. 805 F.3d 653 (5th Cir. 2015). The program was set to take effect on Feb. 18, 2015, but on Feb. 16, Judge Hanen granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the U.S. had failed to comply with the APA. Finding that the administration's programs would impose major burdens on states, encourage illegal immigration and strain state budgets, and that the administration had not followed required procedures for changing federal rules, the Court enjoined the government from implementing the expansion of the deferred action program, which was to take effect on Feb. 18, pending the final resolution of the case. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015). On Feb. 23, 2015, the U.S. appealed the district court's order to the Fifth Circuit. On the same day, the U.S. asked the district court to stay its order pending appeal to allow the expanded program to go into effect. In April, however, the district court denied the stay; the government then sought a stay from the Fifth Circuit. After briefing and oral argument, a motions panel (Judges Smith, Elrod, and Higginson) denied the stay; an opinion by Judge Smith declared that the appeal was unlikely to succeed on its merits. Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2015). Judge Higginson dissented. The appeal then proceeded before Judges King, Smith, and Elrod. In another opinion by Judge Smith, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction on Nov. 9, 2015, this time with a strong dissent by Judge King. The court held that the states had standing; the matter was justiciable; the program should have been the subject of notice-and-comment rulemaking, and was in any event beyond the authority granted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA); and that the states had satisfied the other elements required for an injunction (substantial threat of irreparable injury; balance of harms; public interest). Judge King dissented on all of these issues. 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015). The U.S. sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court in a petition filed just a few days later, on Nov. 20, 2015: the speedy petition was to try to enable the Court to complete review of the case before the end of the 2015 term (that is, by the end of June 2016). On Jan. 20, 2016, the Court granted review. The case was argued in the Supreme Court on Apr. 18, 2016, two months after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia. The Supreme Court was divided 4-4 on the issue, so on June 23, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order affirming the Fifth Circuit without opinion. 136 S.Ct. 2271. The U.S. petitioned for a rehearing. Back in the District Court, on May 19, 2016, Judge Hanen addressed alleged misconduct by DOJ lawyers. (DOJ had lawyers told the Court that the new DACA/DAPA programs were not being implemented. In fact, as they later informed the Court, most of the new provisions were indeed stayed, but DHS had begun to grant 3-year extensions of DACA status, rather than the prior program’s 2-year extensions.) Judge Hanen ordered all DOJ lawyers admitted to practice in any of the plaintiff states to take a continuing legal education program centered around ethics, led by non-DOJ teachers. The Court also stated that due to the conduct of the lawyers, it would seek to revoke the pro hac vice status of the out-of-state lawyers who had appeared before it. Finally, the Court ordered DOJ to provide the Court with a list of all the DACA applicants so he could consider giving that list to the plaintiff states. This list would have included tens of thousands of immigrant youths who received three-year DACA grants between Nov. 2014 and Feb. 2015. The U.S. immediately sought a stay in the district court, and a stay and mandamus in the Fifth Circuit. On June 7, 2016, Judge Hanen stayed his own address disclosure and ethics order. In an Aug. 31, 2016 status conference, the parties agreed that the district court should continue the stay until the Supreme Court ruled on the U.S.'s petition for rehearing. Once the Supreme Court denied this petition on Oct. 3, Judge Hanen ordered the parties to confer on a scheduling order. They did so, and returned to the court on Nov. 18 with a proposal to stay proceedings on the merits of the plaintiffs' claims until Feb. 20, 2017, following the installation of the Trump administration. On Jan. 19, 2017 -- the day before the Trump inauguration -- Judge Hanen revisited the issue of the sanctions against DOJ lawyers. After extensively criticizing DOJ's alleged misconduct, Judge Hanen let stand his May 19, 2016 opinion but withdrew the sanctions order because no harm had ensued from the conduct. On Mar. 22, 2017, Judge Hanen granted the parties' request to stay the merits proceedings. Over the next several months, Judge Hanen granted several continuances of the stay, since the U.S. had not yet changed its guidance on DACA or DAPA. After DHS issued guidelines phasing out DACA and expanded-DACA and rescinding DAPA, on Sept. 12, 2017 plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal. This case is now closed.

Summary: In Dec. 2014, 22 states, 4 governors, and 1 state AG sued the Obama administration, challenging intended executive actions on immigration -- the expansion of DACA and the creation of DAPA. In Feb. 2015, S.D. Tex. issued a PI preventing the government from implementing the actions; the 5th Cir. affirmed; SCOTUS affirmed on a tie vote. After the Trump administration eliminated the programs, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.


On May 21, 2015, the six transgender individuals filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the State of Michigan under the Declaratory Judgment Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint alleged that the current Drivers License policy, put in place by the Secretary, violated the plaintiffs' rights to privacy (U.S. Const. amend. 14), free speech (U.S. Const. amed. 1), equal protection, interstate travel (U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1), and independence in making important medical decisions. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, asked the court to order the State to change the Drivers License policy and put in its place a system, like those found in Washington and California, which allow transgender persons to change their gender identification without obtaining an amended birth certificate or undergoing gender reassignment surgery. 2015 WL 3464089 (E.D.Mich.). Obtaining an amended birth certificate can be difficult if not impossible. Not every transgender person needs or wants surgery and many people do not have insurance coverage or the money to pay for it. Most transgender people do not undergo such a procedure. On November 16, 2015, Judge Edmunds denied defendant's motion for dismissal, rejecting defendants' argument that plaintiffs had failed to state a constitutional claim. The court decided that individuals had a privacy interest in the disclosure of information likely to result in the threat of bodily harm, and requiring plaintiffs to disclose their transgender status directly implicates their fundamental right to privacy. The court held that the defendant’s License Policy jeopardized the fundamental right to informational privacy, a plausible claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court did not adjudicate any additional constitutional questions on the plaintiffs’ remaining four claims. 146 F.Supp.3d 848. On January 10, 2016, Judge Edmunds denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the November 16, 2015 order. It held that the defendant bore the burden of establishing that the License Policy was narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that if the court did not address the substantive merit of the remaining claims, the parties will be forced to pursue costly and voluminous discovery. It held that each of plaintiff’s five claims was tethered to one overarching concern, and sought the same relief – a declaration that the License Policy was unconstitutional. 2016 WL 106612. On August 23, 2016, the court granted the defendant’s converted motion for summary judgment because the old License Policy had been abandoned and there was no longer a "live controversy" between the parties. This order was granted due to a change in policy that occurred in March 2016, when the defendant published a “a notice regarding an update to what is required for changing the sex designation on a driver license or personal identification card." Under the new policy, an applicant seeking to change the gender on their state ID “must provide any one of the following documents that show a sex other than currently designated on the drivers license or [personal identification card]: a certified birth certificate, a valid US Passport, valid US Passport Card or court order changing the sex of the individual.” This development was particularly important to the transgender community because, according to plaintiffs, the U.S. Department of State only requires a doctor’s certification that a person “has had appropriate clinical treatment for gender transition” to change the gender on their passport. Plaintiffs also agreed that the new, less restrictive policy conformed to “current scientific knowledge and research regarding transgender individuals and the medical standard of care for treating persons diagnosed with gender dysphoria.” 2016 WL 4437667. This order closed the case in its entirety and it was dismissed.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case, represented by the ACLU, are claiming that Michigan's Driver's License gender identification policy violates their constitutional rights as transgender people. They are suing the State to change the policy. In March 2016, the State changed its policy, whereby an applicant seeking to change the gender on their state ID “must provide any one of the following documents that show a sex other than currently designated on the drivers license or [personal identification card]: a certified birth certificate, a valid US Passport, valid US Passport Card or court order changing the sex of the individual.” This is broader than the requirements of the U.S. Department of State. Due to the change in policy, the court closed the case in its entirety and was dismissed in August 2016.


On September 23, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this federal lawsuit on behalf of an employee of Boh Brothers Construction Company, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The lawsuit, filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sought a permanent injunction enjoining the employer from engaging in discriminatory employment practices and sexual harassment. The plaintiff also asked that the employer institute a sexual harassment policy and provide backpay with interest along with compensation for emotional stress. The employee complainant claimed that his supervisor viewed him as excessively feminine, and therefore verbally and physically sexually harassed him, feigned anal sex with him, and urged him to look at the superintendent's penis. When the employee complained, his employer transferred him to a different office with a longer commute, lower pay, and then terminated his employment. Following a jury trial, Boh Bros was found to have permitted hostile work environment sexual harassment. The jury awarded a total of $1000 in back pay, $200,000 in compensatory damages, and $250,000 in punitive damages; the district court reduced this amount to $301,000 because of statutory limits. The district court also entered injunctive relief to prevent future discrimination. The injunction required the company's chief executive officer to send a letter to all employees "advising them of the verdict against Defendant in this case on the claim of sexual harassment, stating that Defendant will not tolerate sexual harassment or retaliation, and that Defendant will take appropriate disciplinary action against any manager, supervisor, or employee who engages in sexual harassment or retaliation." The court further ordered that Boh Bros. may not rehire the harassing supervisor during the life of the injunction. Boh Bros. appealed, and in April 2012, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the jury verdict, finding that the evidence did not establish that Boh Bros. had harassed Woods "because of sex." The Fifth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, and in September 2013, a majority of the Court of Appeals found that the law and evidence supported the jury's finding that Boh Bros. had illegally harassed Woods because of sex, in violation of Title VII. The en banc Fifth Circuit also rejected the company's appeal of the district court's entry of a judgment of injunctive relief. Thus, the en banc Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals restored the jury's finding of illegal harassment and the injunction. However, it vacated the punitive damage award, and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, including setting the proper amount of emotional damages in light of the appellate decision. On remand, the company agreed to a compensatory damages award of $125,000 (and therefore a total of $126,000 in money damages), ending the case.

Summary: On September 23, 2009, an employee of Boh Brothers Construction Company, L.L.C. filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Louisiana under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against his employer, alleging sexual harassment by a supervisor who found him too "feminine." The EEOC won a jury verdict for $451,000 (reduced to $301,000 because of statutory limits) and an injunction. The judgment against the employer was first reversed by a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, but then reinstated by the en banc appellate court. On remand, the damages were reduced by agreement to $126,000.


On March 27, 2017, an inmate and eligible voter serving a sentence for a misdemeanor charge in the Allen County Jail (ACJ) brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sued the Allen County Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The jail provided no absentee ballots to any of the 450–550 eligible voters serving misdemeanor sentences during the 2016 election. According to the plaintiff, the defendant also did not allow inmates to vote in-person at a voting center located only a block from the facility. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought monetary relief and attorneys’ fees because he claimed that the jail violated his and other class members’ fundamental right to vote under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was originally assigned to Judge Jon E. DeGuilio. It was reassigned to Chief Judge Theresa L. Springmann on May 1, 2017; to Judge Holly A. Brady on May 1, 2019; Judge William C. Lee on May 10; Chief Judge Springmann on May 13; and Judge Damon R. Leichty on September 4, 2019. On March 28, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, defining the proposed class as “All individuals held at the Allen County Jail on November 8, 2016 who on that date were US citizens, residents of Indiana, were at least eighteen years of age, were not serving a sentence for a conviction of a felony crime, had not previously voted in the 2016 general election, were provided neither an absentee ballot nor transportation to a voting center, and were registered to vote or had been denied the opportunity to register to vote while held in the Allen County Jail.” The original plaintiff filed an amended complaint and motion to certify the class in June 2017, adding a second plaintiff, and they filed a second amended complaint in August 2017. The second amended complaint added facts regarding the number of jail inmates affected and the lack of communication between the jail and the Allen County Election Board. On November 13, 2017, the court denied the class certification motion, with leave to refile, because the plaintiffs had failed to show that many of those in the class were registered to vote on November 8, 2016. In the court’s view the plaintiffs had shown that as many as 500-600 inmates may have been injured, but did not support any particular number with sufficient facts. Additionally, the court dismissed the original named plaintiff because he lacked standing, having failed to request an absentee ballot in time to be eligible to vote. On March 7, 2018, the remaining plaintiff filed a second motion to certify the class; the court granted that motion on May 17. This time, the plaintiff had supported his claim with a list of inmates who were eligible to vote and incarcerated in the Allen County jail on November 8, 2016. The court found that the class was sufficiently numerous and identifiable and that there were common questions among the class members. Several months later, on July 23, 2018, the Sheriff moved for partial summary judgment. Following the motion for partial summary judgment, the parties entered mediation. On March 1, 2019, the magistrate judge overseeing mediation notified the court that a second mediation would be scheduled upon the court’s resolution of the defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment. On April 3, 2019, the court granted summary judgment as to prisoners who were incarcerated at the jail on or before October 31, 2016. The claims of class members incarcerated at the jail after that date remained before the court. As of July 16, 2020, a 5-day trial is set to begin on September 14, 2020.

Summary: This 2017 class-action lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District for the Northern District of Indiana on behalf of all inmates of the Allen County Jail who were denied their right to vote in the 2016 general election. The county failed to provide any absentee ballots and refused to allow inmates to vote at a polling center only a block away from the prison. On March 17, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class; on April 3, 2019, it dismissed the claims of all prisoners incarcerated at the jail on or before October 31, 2016. As of July 2020, a 5-day trial is scheduled for September 2020.


On March 14, 2016, several homeless individuals (one with a disability) and two organizations that help homeless individuals filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the City of Los Angeles, seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and damages under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs alleged continuing violations of the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs were represented by the Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and by private counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) had begun to arrest homeless residents of the Skid Row area for quality of life infractions and to seize or destroy the homeless residents' property. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that starting at least as early as December 2015, the LAPD had begun arresting homeless individuals for non-violent quality of life crimes -- such as sitting, sleeping, or lying on the sidewalk or keeping shopping carts from private businesses -- that would otherwise be charged as infractions and not result in arrest. After arrest, the LAPD seized and destroyed the homeless individuals' property, including blankets, clothing, medications, walkers, diabetes testing machines/nebulizers, personal documents, and other items. The plaintiffs further alleged that after an arrestee was taken into custody, the arrestee was not given a chance to identify or reclaim their items. If the property was saved at all, officers and city employees commingled multiple arrestees' property because the seized property was not bagged or labeled. The City allegedly delayed sending the arrestees' property to the "excess property warehouse," making it difficult for the arrestees to get their property back. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were given no notice of their property being at risk of being seized and/or destroyed and were not given an opportunity to reclaim their property in a timely manner. The plaintiffs alleged that, by taking and destroying the medicine, tents, tarps, and blankets of the plaintiffs, the defendants exposed the plaintiffs to the elements in the winter without adequate shelter on the streets. All this, the plaintiffs claimed, violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and a number of state law provisions, including California Civil Code §§ 51, 52.1, and 2080, and California Government Code § 11135. The complaint also stated counts for common law conversion and false arrest. The plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction enjoining and restraining the defendants from engaging in the discriminatory policies and practices, as well as declaratory judgment that the defendants' policies violated the plaintiffs' rights under the U.S. and California Constitutions and the laws of California. The plaintiffs additionally requested an order directing defendants to provide replacement items for the property they had destroyed, including blankets, tents, tarps medications, and critical personal documents. The plaintiffs additionally requested damages and attorneys' fees. On March 31, 2016, Judge Philip Gutierrez declined to have the case transferred to him. Judge Gutierrez explained that Lavan v. City of Los Angeles, which was pending before him, was not sufficiently factually related to this case to justify a transfer. On April 13, 2016, Judge S. James Otero granted the plaintiffs' application for a preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the City of Los Angeles and its agents from confiscating property in Skid Row absent "an objectively reasonable belief that it is abandoned, presents an immediate threat to public health/safety, is evidence of a crime, or is contraband." The preliminary injunction also enjoined the City from destroying property, storing seized property in a facility not open during business hours, failing to provide notice of where seized property was located, failing to clearly catalog and segregate seized property in storage, and failing to make seized property available for reclamation within 72 hours of seizure. The injunction also required that medication, blankets, and other sleeping materials be accessible within 24 hours of seizure. Finally, the City was required to provide notice to the homeless residents of the area at least 24 hours in advance of planned cleaning operations. 2016 WL 11519288. On May 6, 2016, Judge Otero granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' causes of action for false arrest and conversation were dismissed without leave to amend. 2016 WL 11519289. On May 11, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to clarify the terms of the preliminary injunction. Judge Otero clarified the area covered by the injunction and noted that the injunction did not forbid the City from removing property in general as part of its cleanup efforts, or from removing "bulky items" from the street and destroying them if they posed a threat to public health or safety. The parties then entered into settlement negotiations, as the defendants continued to request clarification of the preliminary injunction as to removing property from the street generally and removing and storing bulky items in particular. On September 25, 2017, Judge Otero decided that the injunction required no more clarification than he had already provided and that the defendants were inappropriately attempting to argue constitutional questions using the motion to clarify. 2017 WL 10545079. On December 4, 2017, the Judge ordered the case to a mediation panel. On March 6, 2019, the City Attorney of Los Angeles was authorized to settle the case. On May 31, 2019, the April 13, 2016 preliminary injunction was dissolved entirely and the case dismissed with prejudice because the parties had reached a settlement agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, the City of Los Angeles agreed to immediately pay the plaintiffs $645,000 in damages and attorneys' fees. The City also agreed to not seize property in the Skid Row area unless the property was reasonably believed to be abandoned, a threat to public health or safety, or was contraband. The City could not perform large street cleaning operations unless the City first gave the homeless residents 24 hours notice, 30 minutes of warning before cleaning began, and only if it was not cold or raining on the day of the cleaning. Homeless residents could obtain their medical equipment and medications after cleaning had begun if they so requested before the police bagged them for storage. If property was seized, the City had to post a notice of where it was being stored and mark the seized property with the owner's name. These provisions did not apply to large furniture or appliances, such as mattresses, couches, or barbecues. The City was able to move property if it obstructed access to a building. But the City was obligated to help a homeless person move their property if the homeless person was physically unable to comply with a request to move it. The non-monetary terms of the Settlement were to be enforced by the Court for three years (starting on May 31, 2019), with the option to extend the Agreement if both parties request it. On June 24, 2019, the DTLA Alliance for Human Rights and fourteen individuals represented by the DTLA Alliance moved to intervene in the case, objecting to the May 31, 2019 settlement agreement. Specifically, the intervenors argued that their interests were diametrically opposed to the terms of the settlement. All of the individuals were residents or business owners in the Skid Row area and wanted property removed from the sidewalks because they feared increased crime or disease unless the property was removed. For more information on reactions to the settlement from the LA Times, see here. Judge Otero denied the motion to intervene, noting that the underlying case had been dismissed on May 31, 2019 and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over the motion because there was nothing to intervene in. The Settlement Agreement did not bind any parties other than the named plaintiffs and defendants, so the intervenors were free to challenge the settlement on their own. DTLA Alliance appealed to the 9th Circuit on September 26, 2019. The plaintiffs and defendants from the original suit are now the appellees before the 9th Circuit. On October 24, 2019, the 9th Circuit's mediator released the parties from the court's Mediation Program. The case is ongoing, with initial briefs due by December 30, 2019. Arguments have not been scheduled as of November 2019.

Summary: On March 14, 2016, several homeless residents of the Skid Row area in Los Angeles filed this § 1983 case in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, alleging violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and various California laws. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief against the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department. The plaintiffs alleged that the LAPD had started arresting homeless people for non-violent quality of life infractions, seizing their property, and destroying it, including medical equipment and blankets. Judge S. James Otero granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction on April 13, 2016. After lengthy settlement negotiations, the parties came to an agreement on May 31, 2019, and the underlying case was dismissed. The three-year Settlement Agreement required the City to provide notice to the homeless in the Skid Row area before street cleaning operations, to properly store seized property and promptly make it available for its owners to reclaim, and to pay the plaintiffs damages and attorneys' fees. Soon after the case was dismissed pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the DTLA Alliance for Human Rights attempted to intervene in the case. Judge Otero determined that the court did not have jurisdiction because the underlying case had been dismissed. Judge Otero's decision on the DTLA Alliance's motion to intervene has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit and briefing is due by the end of 2019.


This case addresses the expansion of the southern border wall, a major controversy during the Trump presidency. On February 16, 2019, three non-profit organizations that defend wildlife and habitats along the southern border—the Center for Biological Diversity, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund—filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Trevor N. McFadden. The plaintiffs, represented by their internal counsel, sued President Trump, the Secretaries of Defense, Homeland Security, the Interior, and the Treasury, and the Chief of Engineers of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment stating that the Emergency Proclamation issued by the President on February 15, 2019 was unlawful, and an injunction preventing the reallocation of funds to construct a border wall. As relevant background, from December 21, 2018 to January 25, 2019, the federal government was shut down. The shutdown was the result of months of disagreement between the President and Congress over the administration’s $5.7 billion demand for a border wall. Several times during the shutdown and several times after the shutdown ended, the President publicly mentioned that he might declare a national emergency if the administration could not reach an agreement with Congress about border wall funding, describing the declaration as something he had an “absolute right” to do under the National Emergencies Act. When the President issued the Emergency Proclamation declaring a national emergency at the southern border on February 15, he said at a press conference that same day, “I could do the wall over a longer period of time—I didn’t need to do this—but I would rather do it much faster….I just want to get it done faster, that’s all.” The President then directed the reallocation of up to $601 million from the Treasury Forfeiture Fund, $3.6 billion in unspent funds appropriated for military construction projects, and up to $2.5 billion in unspent funds appropriated for support for counter-drug activity support, towards border wall construction. The plaintiffs claimed that the President’s issuance of this Emergency Proclamation violated several federal laws. First, they alleged that the President exceeded the scope of his authority under:

The National Emergencies Act, because the President’s own statements and the totality of surrounding circumstances showed that the proclamation was made as a political negotiating tactic, not a valid “emergency” as Congress intended under the NEA;
10 U.S.C. §2808 (Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency), because the statute did not provide for the transfer of emergency funds from military construction to border wall construction;
10 U.S.C. §284 (Support for counterdrug activities and activities to counter transnational organized crime), because this statute was intended to authorize non-emergency military support to domestic law enforcement and does not provide for emergency funding for border wall construction; and
31 U.S.C. §9705 (Department of the Treasury forfeiture fund), because the specific categories of funding for which the Secretary of Treasury has discretion to allocate funds did not cover border wall construction.
Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the President had violated the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution by unlawfully reallocating money without Congressional approval, and had violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution by failing to comply with the requirements and limitations of federal law. On April 2, 2019, the President moved to dismiss the case, arguing either that the court lacked jurisdiction or, alternatively, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 15, 2019. This complaint added new claims for relief, such as failure to properly create environmental impact statements in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act (40 C.F.R. § 1501.5 and § 1501.6); and unlawful transfer of appropriated funds from counter-drug appropriations in violation the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act. In an April 2, 2020 ruling, the court partially granted the President’s motion to dismiss. Regarding jurisdiction, the court held that all plaintiffs, except for Green Latinos and the Labor Council for Latin American Advancement, had “plausibly alleged standing;” those two groups were dismissed as plaintiffs. The court dismissed some APA claims but allowed others to proceed. It also held that it had no jurisdiction over the challenge to the lawfulness of the President’s emergency declaration, because it was a non-justiciable political question. President Trump was dismissed as a defendant. 453 F. Supp. 3d 11. On May 29, 2020, the plaintiffs sought summary judgment. The government filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 26, 2020. As of July 23, 2020, the court has not ruled on these motions; the case is ongoing.

Summary: This case addresses the expansion of the southern border wall, a major controversy during the Trump presidency. On February 16, 2019, three non-profit organizations that defend wildlife and habitats along the southern border filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, along with all Secretaries that deal with the U.S. border, seeking a declaratory judgment stating that the Emergency Proclamation issued by the President on February 15, 2019 was unlawful and an injunction preventing the reallocation of funds to construct a southern border wall. The court dismissed two plaintiffs on April 2, 2020; it also dismissed President Trump as a defendant. The plaintiffs and the agencies filed motions for summary judgment; those motions are pending as of July 23, 2020.