On July 3, 2017, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. EPIC sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity and individual members of the Commission under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Advisory Committee Act and the Fifth Amendment to the United State Constitution. EPIC, a nonprofit, public interest, research group whose members included registered voters across the country, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to halt the Commission's efforts to gather personal voter data from the states. The Commission had been established by executive order to "study the registration and voting processes used in federal elections." Specifically, on June 28, 2017, the Commission began an effort to collect detailed voter histories from each state. The Commission sent a letter asking states to provide the "full first and last names of all registrants, middle names or initials if available, addresses, dates of birth, political party (if recorded in your state), last four digits of social security number if available, voter history (election voted in) from 2006 onward, active/inactive status, cancelled status, information regarding any felony convictions, information regarding voter registration in another state, information regarding military status, and oversees citizen information." It also sought information on "voter fraud" or "registration fraud." EPIC alleged that the Commission had failed to conduct a privacy impact assessment, which was required under the E-Government Act of 2002 for any agency seeking to conduct a new collection of information that could be used to contact a specific individual. The Plaintiff claimed that the Commission's failure to make a privacy impact assessment available for public inspection violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Moreover, it alleged that the Commission's attempt to gather voter information violated information privacy rights of millions of Americans as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. On July 7th and July 11th, EPIC submitted a first and a second amended complaint, adding the Department of Defense and the Director of the White House Information Technology as defendants in the litigation. EPIC alleged that the Department of Defense had last approved a privacy impact assessment in 2015, when it had specifically prohibited the collection, maintenance, or dissemination of this information from members of the general public. EPIC also claimed that the Director of White House Information Technology was repurposing the computer system to collect voter information data, and that the Director was subject to the E-Government Act. On July 13th, EPIC submitted an amended motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction prohibiting the Defendants from collecting voter data until a Privacy Impact Assessment was completed and released to the public. On July 24, 2017, District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly denied the Plaintiff's motion. She held that the Plaintiff had standing to sue the Defendants based on the alleged injury it suffered when the Defendants failed to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment as required by the E-Government Act. But, the Plaintiff did not have standing to bring suit on behalf of its advisory board members for any alleged constitutional or statutory violations. The court found that the Plaintiff must rely on the Administrative Procedure Act for a cause of action in the suit. Because the Administrative Procedure Act only allows for suit against an agency, and because the Defendants were not an agency but entities in close proximity to the President, the court could not review the collection process. If the Commission's scope expanded to be more than an advisory body, then the Plaintiff could ask the court to revisit the decision. 2017 WL 3141907. The following day, EPIC appealed Judge Kollar-Kotelly's order to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Stephen F. Williams, and Douglas H. Ginsburg), in an opinion issued December 26, 2017, affirmed Judge Kollar-Kotelly's order, but stated different reasons. The Court of Appeals held that EPIC had not shown a substantial likelihood of standing because it had not shown likelihood of injury from either deprivation of information (the privacy assessment) or organizational injury of the type the E-Government Act seeks to prevent. The Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal of this decision on January 7, 2018. 139 S.Ct. 791. The Court of Appeals, on April 2, 2018, denied to rehear the appeal en banc. 2018 WL 1896522. Back in district court, the Defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint and to stay the proceedings pending the appeal on September 5, 2017. On January 3, 2018, the President terminated the Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. Judge Kotar-Kotelley denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss as well as the plaintiff's motion to file a third amended complaint—the substantive issues in the case had been resolved by the termination of the commission. The court ordered the defendant to confirm that all voter data had been deleted before the case would be dismissed. Judge Kotar-Kotelley dismissed the case on August 22, 2018 in light of the fact that all voter data collected by the Commission had been deleted. The plaintiff had concurred that this would secure the substantive relief requested. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 3, 2017, the Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Plaintiff sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, individual members of the Commission, the Department of Defense, and the Director of the White House Information Technology. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated U.S. statutes and the U.S. Consititution when it started to collect private voter information without first releasing a Privacy Impact Assessment to the public. After losing a motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs found their claims mooted by the President's termination of the Commission. All voter data was deleted and the case is now closed.


On May 26, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern Division of the Eastern District of Missouri against Sappington Garden Shop Company on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC alleged Sappington Garden violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et. seq.) by failing to correct and prevent the sexual harassment of the employee and by firing the employee in retaliation for opposing the sexual harassment. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy and practice reform, back pay, compensation for emotional harm, and back pay. The employee, represented by private counsel, was permitted to intervene in the lawsuit on August 14, 2006. The employee's claims substantially mirrored the EEOC's. The employee amended her complaint on November 9, 2006, to add N.G. Heimos Greenhouse Company, Inc. on an integrated enterprise theory, which would treat the two corporations as the same employer. The parties participated in an alternative dispute resolution process on December 13, 2006 and reached a settlement agreement. Because of the settlement, the employee voluntarily dismissed her claims against both companies with prejudice, which the Court (Judge Charles A. Shaw) approved on January 22, 2007. The terms of the agreement(s) between the employee and the two defendants are private and unknown. The EEOC, which did not bring any claims against Heimos Greenhouse, had its agreement with Sappington Garden entered by the Court as a consent decree on January 29, 2007. The EEOC's settlement was with a two-year consent decree that included both monetary and injunctive provisions. Under the decree, the employee was paid $75,000, inclusive of attorneys' fees, while Sappington Garden agreed to train all its employees on the issue of sexual harassment, to provide all employees with its sexual harassment policy, to post an equal employment notice, and to keep records of all complaints of possible sexual harassment it received during the ensuing three years. The decree also required Sappington Garden to notify the EEOC of sexual harassment complaints it received during the decree term. The EEOC and Sappington Garden bore their own costs. No further court activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII sexual harassment and retaliation suit against Sappington Garden Shop Company on behalf of a female employee. The EEOC Sappington Garden failed to correct or prevent the employee's supervisor's sexual harassment and fired the employee for opposing the harassment. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief. The employee intervened in the suit and added a defendant under an integrated enterprise theory. After alternative dispute resolution the parties came to a settlement. The employee settled her claims with the defendants privately and voluntarily dismissed them. The EEOC entered into a two-year consent decree with Sappington Garden that provided monetary and injunctive relief. The case is now closed.


On July 19, 2013, two men, married in Maryland, filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio seeking declaratory and injunctive relief compelling Ohio to recognize their marriage. The complaint was based on Ohio's alleged violation of plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitutions. Plaintiff John Arthur was suffering from late stage ALS and was likely to die soon. Plaintiffs were married in Maryland and claimed that Ohio's refusal to recognize their marriage on John's probable death certificate, while simultaneously recognizing the unions of heterosexual couples married outside Ohio whose unions would not be allowed inside Ohio, is unconstitutional. On July 22, 2013, Judge Timothy Black issued a temporary restraining order, stipulating that should the plaintiff die, Ohio was barred from recording a death certificate that did not reflect the plaintiffs' marriage. Judge Black reasoned that Ohio had a long history of accepting out of state marriages for purposes of death certificates and the like. Therefore, under Windsor, failure to recognize Plaintiffs' union would be unconstitutional discrimination that could not be construed as supported by a state interest. John died on October 22, 2013, but the court denied a motion to dismiss. The court issued a permanent injunction on December 23, 2014. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and other cases from four states. DeBoer v. Snyder (PB-MI-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Henry v. Hodges (PB-OH-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Love v. Beshear (PB-KY-0001 in this Clearinghouse). Tanco v. Haslam (PB-TN-0005 in this Clearinghouse). It was unwilling to find a Constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), which it found not overruled by Windsor nor by "doctrinal developments". It found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither in violation of the Constitution nor due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that "[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries." (DeBoer v. Snyder Page p. 38). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 772 F.3d 388. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review of all the 6th Circuit cases on Jan. 16, 2015. Bourke v. Beshear, 135 S. Ct. 1041 (2015). The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that the right to marry was fundamental, and that it demeaned gay and lesbian couples to deprive them access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a separate dissent. Back in District Court, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs on September 11, 2015. The plaintiffs requested $1,096,142.50 in fees and $51,360.12 in expenses, as well as a fee enhancement of 50%, from defendant Hodges only. The parties agreed that the defendant would pay the plaintiffs in this case $1,300,000 and Judge Black entered this stipulated judgment on November 2, 2015. Also on November 2, Judge Black entered the final judgment and permanent injunction. This case is now closed.

Summary: This is the case in which the Supreme Court struck down same-sex marriage bans, nationwide. It began on July 19, 2013, when a same-sex couple, one suffering from ALS, filed suit in the Southern District of Ohio seeking declaratory and injuctive relief and costs, based on Ohio's alleged violation of Plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitutions. The district court issued a permanent injunction requiring Ohio to recognize Plaintiffs' marriage on a death certificate, but the 6th Circuit Curt of Appeals reversed, before it was, itself, reversed by the Supreme Court on June 26, 2015. The plaintiffs were awarded $1.3 million in attorney's fees and expenses. This case is now closed.


On October 28, 2004, an instructor of microbiology and immunology at Columbia University filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that he was denied his constitutional due process right to a fair trial and was unlawfully incarcerated for 20 months due to the practices and policies of the City of New York as implemented by the New York Police Department and the New York County District Attorney's Office. This case originated with a claim of sexual assault against the plaintiff, who was at that time a doctoral student at Columbia University. The victim, an undergraduate student at Barnard College, alleged that the plaintiff assaulted her for nearly twenty hours, stating that she had been tied up, violently raped and sodomized, beaten multiple times with a club, burned with candle wax and repeatedly gagged. A Grand Jury indicted the plaintiff on December 19, 1996 and at trial, a jury found the plaintiff guilty of kidnapping, assault and sexual assault. He was sentenced on May 29, 1998 to fifteen years to life in prison. On appeal, the Appellate Division, First Department, of the New York Supreme Court vacated the conviction due to errors in the trial court regarding the judge's application of rape-shield law. See People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1st Dept 1999). This led to a reversal of the plaintiff's conviction in December, 1999 and a remand for a new trial. On November 1, 2001 the state dismissed all charges against the plaintiff after the victim refused to testify. On October 28, 2004, the plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C §1983 and 42 U.S.C §1988, seeking $20 million dollars in damages plus attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff stated multiple claims against a New York Police Department Detective for false arrest, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, and denial of a fair trial. The plaintiff also claimed that the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) assigned to the case deprived the plaintiff of his right to a fair trial. Lastly, the plaintiff claimed that the City of New York maintained policies and customs that gave rise to the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. On December 21, 2009, defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the plaintiff's claims. Critical to the plaintiff's claims against the NYPD Detective was the plaintiff's allegation that the Detective fabricated evidence regarding the presence of candles in the plaintiff's apartment and that this false information unfairly influenced the jury, depriving the plaintiff of his right to a fair trial. The District Court found that the Detective's allegedly false testimony could not, by itself, have resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty because it was material to only one of the eleven charges against him. Additionally, probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution and malicious abuse of process claims under New York law. Because a Grand Jury indictment creates a presumption of probable cause that the plaintiff failed to rebut, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendant on both these claims. The plaintiff also alleged that the Assistant District Attorney assigned to his criminal trial made extrajudicial statements that violated the ADA's ethical responsibilities and deprived the plaintiff of a fair trial. Although the plaintiff demonstrated that the ADA did make statements to the press, he failed to show that any juror was prejudiced by the ensuing news coverage. Accordingly, the District Court held that no reasonable juror could find that the plaintiff had been deprived of his right to a fair trial. The plaintiff also sought to hold the New York District Attorney's Office and the New York Police Department liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of its agents. The plaintiff claimed that these municipal entities had official policies or customs of making inflammatory statements to the press that were prejudicial against defendants, which deprived them of their constitutional right to a fair trial. While the plaintiff had examples of such improper leaks in the instant case, the District Court found that the plaintiff failed to provide evidence that would adequately prove a policy or custom of the agencies in question. On September 28, 2012, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Crotty) ruled in favor of the defendants, and granted their motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which on August 28, 2012, affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

Summary: Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit against the City of New York, an NYPD detective, and an Assistant District Attorney for malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, and deprivation of a right to a fair trial. The plaintiff also claimed that the City of New York maintained official policies and customs that gave rise to the alleged constitutional violations. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Paul A. Crotty) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's decision.


On May 1, 2007, an employee of the George S. May International Company, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act against his employer in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff, who proceeded pro se, asked the court for damages, claiming that he, and others similarly situated, were denied commissions, endured a hostile work environment, suffered breach of contract, suffered retaliatory action, and experienced discrimination based on his age. The case was assigned to Judge Ricardo Hinojosa of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The Court ordered mediation on December 19, 2008. The parties, however, were unable to resolve the case via mediation. On October 7, 2009, the District consolidated this case (07-094) with another case (09-154) filed by the plaintiff in 2009. On October 9, 2009, the Court orally granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII retaliation claim. The Court also granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim. The Court allowed discovery on the plaintiff's age discrimination to be completed by November 23, 2009. Discovery and other pre-trial procedures were continued throughout 2009, 2010, and 2011. On March 12, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 28, 2012, Judge Hinojosa granted that motion. (Defendants had not acted in case for over one year, including not replying to the motion for summary judgment). Plaintiff was awarded $5,873 in damages for contract claims, and $25,000 in damages for age discrimination claims.

Summary: This case was brought by an employee of George S. May International Company against his employer seeking damages as a result of age discrimination and violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act in May 2007. Court-order mediation failed to resolve the case. In October 2009, Judge Ricardo Hinojosa of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim and hostile work environment claim. The Court allowed discovery on the plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Discovery continued for several years. In March 2012, the plaintiff filed motion for summary judgment. The defendants failed to reply to this motion, and failed to act in the case generally for a year. On September 28, 2012, Judge Hinojosa granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, awarding $30,873 is total damages to the plaintiff.


On April 28, 2016, the disability rights group Disability Rights Florida brought this lawsuit against the Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Miami-Dade), on behalf of two deaf persons (Plaintiffs A and B) who had been denied disability-accommodations by Miami-Dade. Plaintiffs alleged that despite knowing of plaintiffs’ disabilities, and despite judicial rulings ordering Miami-Dade to provide plaintiffs with American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters and other accommodations, Miami-Dade consistently failed to do so during their arrests, detentions, and court hearings. The suit is in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §701 et seq.). Both plaintiffs alleged that they were not provided with ASL interpreters during arrests. This was particularly detrimental because English, even in its written form, was a second language to plaintiffs. They were thus unable to effectively explain or understand complicated legal situations without an ASL interpreter or some other form of specialized communication aid. Plaintiff A alleged that on February 8, 2016, officers in an unmarked car drove to his home, and arrested him without an ASL interpreter, or indeed any communication whatsoever. Plaintiff B alleged that when was arrested on October 13, 2015, he was not provided an ASL interpreter during the arrest or during the recitation of his Miranda rights, and that he was then held at a police station for several hours with no ASL interpreter or other means of communication. Both plaintiffs also allege that they were not given an ASL interpreter or adequate communication aids during pre-trial legal proceedings. Plaintiff A alleged that on July 9, 2012, when was given an ankle bracelet and sentenced to house-arrest as a condition for his pre-trial release, he was not given an ASL interpreter to explain the rules and regulations relating to his ankle-bracelet. On July 19, 2012, his ankle-bracelet registered an alert, and he was arrested again for violating the conditions of his house-arrest. Plaintiff A also alleged that he signed a waiver of presence agreement for pre-trial sounding and conferences without having an ASL interpreter or communication aid that would have enabled him to understand what signing that waiver meant. Plaintiff B in turn alleged that on October 14, 2015, and again on February 4, 2016 for a separate arrest, he wasn’t provided with an ASL interpreter during his bond hearings. Because of that, he was forced to rely for interpretation on his mother, who had only basic knowledge of sign language, which made presenting his legal case more difficult. Plaintiff A further alleged that he was not given an ASL interpreter or adequate communication aids while incarcerated and during his probation. He alleged that Miami-Dade’s failure to provide him with an ASL interpreter or communication aids while he was in prison meant that he was unable to understand or participate in prison orientations, medical appointments, mental health appointments, disciplinary hearings, classification reviews, religious services, and educational programs. Moreover, Miami-Dade’s failure to provide either of those during his probation hearing meant that he had to rely on a court attorney as an interpreter to explain complicated legal matters to his own attorney, which made it impossible to speak to his attorney in private. The plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaration that Miami-Dade violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; (2) a permanent injunction requiring Miami-Dade to end any practices, policies, and/or procedures that serve to deny plaintiffs equal access to Miami-Dade’s services; (3) enforcement and equitable relief to ensure that Miami-Dade continues to provide equal access to its services in the future; and (4) costs and attorneys’ fees. The parties reached a settlement outside of court, and moved jointly for dismissal with prejudice contingent upon the Court's enforcement of the settlement agreement; following this motion, Judge Jose E. Martinez dismissed the case with prejudice and denied all pending motions as moot on October 24, 2016. According to Disability Rights Florida, the settlement requires Miami-Date County to provide interpreters for all jail programs or services, provide access to video relay phones and TTYs, and repairs and replacement batteries for hearing aids and cochlear processors. The county was also required to train its employees on effective communication with people with deafness and develop procedures for providing accommodations for inmates with deafness. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 28, 2016, the disability rights group Disability Rights Florida brought this lawsuit against the Miami-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Miami-Dade), on behalf of two deaf persons who were not provided with access to ASL interpreters during their arrests, detentions, and court hearings. They brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §701 et seq.). They asked the court for declaratory relief, permanent injuntive relief, and costs and attorneys' fees. The court denied all claims with prejudice based on the parties' settlement agreement.


On March 14, 2017, a teenage boy who had formerly been in the Grays Harbor County Juvenile Detention Facility’s custody brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. (As the boy was a minor, his mother filed the complaint on his behalf.) The plaintiff sued Grays Harbor County for repeatedly putting him in solitary confinement for minor rule violations during his time at the juvenile detention facility. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Washington, the plaintiff sought damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He claimed that the county's actions were a violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Ronald B. Leighton. After the close of discovery, settlement negotiations began, and the plaintiff was appointed a guardian ad litem to represent his best interests. On June 26, 2017, the guardian ad litem proposed a settlement agreement that required the county to pay the plaintiff $45,000 in general damages and revise its juvenile detention policies. The guardian ad litem also outlined a structured settlement plan in which the plaintiff would receive his damages in installments over the next three years, with much of the money unavailable until after he turned eighteen. On October 13, 2017, the parties settled. The county agreed to pay $45,000 in damages, which it delivered in a lump sum to the plaintiff's lawyer. The county also agreed to pay for the guardian ad litem's time and the cost of the mediation that had already occurred. The settlement also required the county to revise its juvenile detention policy such that solitary confinement was only used in extreme circumstances and that the living conditions in solitary confinement were improved. The county agreed to have the revisions made and presented to the plaintiff by ninety days after the settlement date, the new training protocols related to the revised policy made and presented to the plaintiff by 120 days after the settlement date, and all juvenile detention center staff trained on the revised policy by December 1, 2017. The county was also required to provide refresher training in the revised policy to staff once every twelve months for an undetermined period of time, as well as provide the legal guardians of juvenile detainees with those detainees' files. In return, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss all of the claims in the lawsuit with prejudice within thirty days of the county fulfilling its contractual duties to him. If a dispute arose, both parties agreed that it would be submitted to Paris K. Kallas, a former county judge from a different Washington county, for binding arbitration, and the losing party would pay attorneys costs and arbitration fees. Because the parties agreed to settle out of court, the plaintiff did not receive declaratory relief, and the first paragraph of the settlement stated that the county agreement was not an admission of the county's violation of any law or failure to fulfill any duty to the plaintiff. On January 24, 2018, the plaintiff dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiff presumably continues to monitor the county's compliance with the injunction-like provisions of the settlement and may submit instances of noncompliance for arbitration. The settlement agreement does not state how long the county's obligations will be in effect; this issue may be resolved in arbitration if the plaintiff decides to bring it. The court no longer has jurisdiction, so the case is now closed.

Summary: In March 2017, a teenage boy who had previously been detained in the Grays Harbor County Juvenile Detention Facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff alleged that the county violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because the detention center repeatedly put him in solitary confinement for minor rule-breaking. Later that year, the parties settled out of court. The plaintiff received monetary damages, and the county agreed to revise its juvenile detention policies.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an action filed on July 22, 2020 by advocacy groups, public school districts, and parents of children who attend public schools. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief against the U.S. Department of Education for creating an agency rule that conflicts with the text of the CARES Act. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on September 4, 2020 and vacated the new rule. <hr> This case is about the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES ACT), which was passed by Congress in March 2020 to provide economic relief to citizens during the COVID-19 pandemic. Certain provisions in the CARES Act appropriated billions of dollars in funding for elementary and secondary schools. In April 2020, the Department of Education ("DOE") issued guidance about CARES Act funding for private schools, stating that funds should be used to serve all non-public school students and teachers without regard to family income, residency, or eligibility based on low achievement. In the DOE’s view, the CARES Act forbids differentiation between public and private schools. This position was made binding in July 2020 with an interim final rule. The plaintiffs in this case--the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, public school districts, and parents of children who attend public schools--filed suit against United States Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on July 22, 2020. The case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. On August 11, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, summary judgment. Plaintiffs asserted that the DOE’s actions were in violation of the separation of powers, that the formal rule created by the DOE violated the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and that the DOE violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as an agency action not in accordance with law or statutory authority. That same day, the plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint. This complaint added two additional APA claims: an arbitrary and capricious challenge and a challenge to the DOE's invocation of the "good cause" exception to notice-and-comment rulemaking. Since these two claims did not present pure questions of law, they were not consolidated into the expedited motion for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not show that the DOE acted without legal authority. Judge Friedrich granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, vacating the DOE's interim final rule, on September 4, 2020. 2020 WL 5291406. Judge Friedrich determined that the CARES Act provided a particular formula for providing funds to private schools based on the number of children from low-income families. However, the CARES Act did not give the DOE discretion over any disbursements from any of the CARES Act’s provisions, so the DOE exceeded its authority in creating its formal rule about how funds are allocated. Because the APA fully resolved the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, the Judge Friedrich did not to rule on any of the constitutional questions.

Summary: In July 2020, the NAACP, public school districts, and parents of children who attend public schools filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Education violated the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its authority in creating a rule that stated that CARES Act funding must disbursed to non-public schools without regard to family income, residency, or low achievement. In September 2020, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the Department of Education violated the APA and vacated the rule.


This is one of 12 cases filed on May 21, 2012 in federal district courts across the country by Catholic organizations challenging the contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Plaintiffs, two Roman Catholic, non-profit organizations, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the Federal Government under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the ACA extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that providing, paying for, or facilitating access to such services is inconsistent with its religious beliefs and contend that compliance with the contraception requirement is a substantial burden on their religious exercise. On March 22, 2013, the Court (Judge Algenon L. Marbley) granted the Federal Government's motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. The court noted that the Federal Government had initiated a safe-harbor period while it refashioned the regulation. As a result, Plaintiffs could not show that it faced any penalty or restriction based on the existing regulatory requirement or that the harm alleged will ever occur. The court recognized that, in fact, harm to the plaintiffs was unlikely to occur because they would likely fall into the broadened definition of religious employer as put forth in the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM).

Summary: This is one of 12 cases filed on May 21, 2012 in federal district courts across the country by Catholic organizations challenging the contraception mandate provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Plaintiffs, two Roman Catholic non-profit organizations, asked the court to grant preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the contraception of the mandate. On March 22, 2013, the court dismissed the case for lack of ripeness.


On August 16, 2006, attorneys with the Immigrant Justice Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Louisiana Justice Institute, and the National Immigration Law Center filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of about 300 H-2B guest workers who traveled to the U.S. to work in luxury hotels in New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina. Plaintiffs alleged that their employer, Decatur Hotels, L.L.C., violated the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., by failing to reimburse them during their first week of employment for travel, visas, recruitment, and other expenses incurred in migrating to the U.S. The District Court (Judge Eldon E. Fallon) found that FLSA applied to the expenses claimed by the H-2B guest workers. So, it denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted in part the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The Court then certified the question so that the defendants could take an immediate appeal. 488 F. Supp. 2d 565 (2007). A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Judges E. Grady Jolly, Edith H. Jones, and Catharina Haynes) affirmed the District Court's decision in an original and later a revised opinion. 559 F.3d 332 (2009); 576 F.3d 274 (2009). But the en banc Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants. Specifically, the Court found that no statute or regulation expressly stated that inbound travel expenses must be advanced or reimbursed by an employer of an H-2B worker, no law or regulation provided that fees for the employee side of the visa application process must be paid by the employer, and no statute or regulation required an employer to provide reimbursement for job placement firm fees paid by employees. 622 F.3d 393 (2010). This case is closed.

Summary: A putative class of H-2B guest workers sued their employer under the Fair Labor Standards Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. They alleged that the FLSA required their employers to reimburse them for travel, visas, recruitment, and other expenses incurred in migrating to the United States. The Fifth Circuit found that the FLSA did not require reimbursement of these expenses and directed the district court to enter judgment for the defendants.


On October 6, 2003, three days before his scheduled execution by lethal injection, an inmate at the Holman Correctional Facility in Atmore, Alabama, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Alabama Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were threatened by the defendant's use of the "cut-down" procedure, which required an incision into his arm or leg to assess his veins (which had been severely compromised due to years of intravenous drug use) in anticipation of the lethal injection. The plaintiff argued that the use of the procedure constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs because it would "create risks of complications, be inhumane, conflict with evolving standards of decency, and entail unnecessary mental and physical pain and suffering." He sought a permanent injunction against the procedure, as well as a temporary stay of his execution so that the court could consider the merits of his petition for the injunction. On October 7, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (Judge Myron H. Thompson) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claim, holding that the Section 1983 claim was functionally equivalent to the plaintiff's earlier habeas corpus claim, which had been denied by the court. Nelson v. Campbell, 286 F.Supp.2d 1321 (M.D.Ala. 2003). The plaintiff appealed. On October 8, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Robert Lanier Anderson III) affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the prisoner's Section 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of the previously denied habeas corpus claim, and that the prisoner had not been denied access to his physician in violation of Alabama law. Nelson v. Campbell, 347 F.3d 910 (11th Cir. 2003). On October 9, 2003, the plaintiff's request for a rehearing en banc was denied. Nelson v. Campbell, No. 03-15095, 85 Fed.Appx. 728 (11th Cir. 2003). The plaintiff sought Supreme Court review. On October 9, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of execution of sentence of death pending their decision on whether to grant certiorari. Nelson v. Campbell, 540 U.S. 942 (2003). On December 1, 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of whether a complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by a death-sentenced prisoner, who seeks to stay his execution in order to pursue a challenge to the procedures for carrying out the execution may be properly recharacterized as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S. 2254. Nelson v. Campbell, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003). On May 24, 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court (Justice O'Connor) reversed and remanded the case back to the Eleventh Circuit, holding that Section 1983 was an appropriate vehicle for a prisoner to challenge the "cut-down" procedure, and that the prisoner's request for temporary stay of execution did not transform his conditions of confinement claim into a challenge to the validity of his death sentence sounding in habeas corpus. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637 (2004). On July 20, 2004, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case back to the District Court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court opinion. Nelson v. Campbell, 377 F.3d 1162 (11th Cir. 2004). On October 7, 2004, the District Court (Judge Thompson) entered an order that the defendants should not use the "cut-down" procedure on the plaintiff, but rather that they must use either a peripheral-venous-access procedure or a peripheral-central-venous-access procedure on him. The plaintiff had asked for these procedures because he believed that they would be "less invasive, less painful, faster, cheaper, and safer than the cut-down procedure," as well as being humane and not in violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants agreed to utilize one of these methods if it became necessary to obtain a central line on the plaintiff, so the order was based on their consent. On October 29, 2004, the defendants asked the court for summary judgment in light of that substantial agreement. On October 22, 2005, the plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, alleging that there were still material facts at issue in the case. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that if the agreed-upon central line placement procedure was not performed by a qualified physician in an appropriate medical environment, his Eighth Amendment rights would still be violated. He asked the court to direct the defendants to consult with medical experts and promulgate a protocol concerning venous access that comports with contemporary standards of medical care and the Eighth Amendment. On June 15, 2006, the court designated Dr. Warren Bagley, M.D. to be the court's independent medical expert, and on July 28, 2006, the court ordered Dr. Bagley to assist the court in understanding the outstanding issues of fact in the case. On September 26, 2006, the District Court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that there were still facts at issue in the case, and stating that the court would reconsider the motion for summary judgment after Dr. Bagley had submitted his report. On November 15, 2006, the defendants again asked the court for summary judgment in light of the fact that, in the opinion of Dr. Bagley, access to the plaintiff's central veins would not be necessary, since there were three locations on the plaintiff's body where peripheral veins could be easily accessed, and that a it would not be necessary to obtain a highly trained specialist to access those veins. The defendants argued that this made the plaintiff's complaint moot, leaving no genuine issues of material fact in the case. On March 31, 2008, the District Court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the United States Supreme Court's decision in Baze v. Rees could inform the decision in the case at bar. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for summary judgment with leave to renew within 30 days of the Baze decision. On May 15, 2008, the defendants renewed their motion for summary judgment because the United States Supreme Court had handed down its decision in Baze v. Rees. The defendants' motion argued that the Court's decision in Baze supported their contention that the execution protocol used in Alabama was constitutional. Specifically the Defendants argued that "the Supreme Court's recent decision in Baze applies to Alabama's execution protocol because it is substantially similar to Kentucky's," which was upheld by the Court. On July 21, 2008, the plaintiff filled his response to the defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's main argument was that Baze did not support the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff made clear that the Supreme Court held that "when a condemned establishes that his execution will involve a "substantial risk of serious harm" or an "objectively intolerable risk of harm..." based on how it is to be carried out. Accordingly, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' execution protocol was unconstitutional because it would subject him to an unconstitutional level of pain. Specifically, the plaintiff insisted that "the administration of the protocol to the Plaintiff will result in a substantial and objectively intolerable risk of serious harm due to the Plaintiff's medical condition and severely compromised peripheral veins." On December 9, 2009, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment as moot. The court recognized that the motion had become moot because of the death of the plaintiff. Alabama news sources reported that the plaintiff died of natural causes on November 3, 2009. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by an inmate on death row, seeking a permanent injunction against the "cut-down" procedure to be used for lethal injection. The case went up to the Supreme Court, which held on May 24, 2004 that §1983 was the appropriate vehicle to challenge the procedure. On November 3, 2009, the plaintiff died of natural causes, mooting the case.


This class action involving women formerly employed at Ruth's Chris Steak House was filed on October 8, 2010, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against female employees, thereby violating federal and state antidiscrimination laws. The plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies through the EEOC and were issued Right to Sue notices prior to filing. The complaint alleged that defendants developed a culture that is demeaning and hostile towards women and engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against female employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants discriminated against women and favored men with comparably fewer qualifications in terms of compensation and promotion; that female employees were faced with "glass ceilings" and "glass walls," under which plaintiffs were segregated into less lucrative and prestigious departments within the company; that defendants' senior management failed to monitor the company's promotion and compensation practices, which subjected plaintiffs to ongoing harm; that female employees were subjected to sexually hostile and demeaning treatment, including unwelcome sexually charged commentary and physical touching; that the company imposed harsher discipline for female employees; that female employees were terminated from the company for conduct that did not result in termination when engaged in by males; that defendants engaged in retaliation against plaintiffs; that defendants treated pregnant employees adversely; and that older female employees were terminated and replaced with younger female employees. The requested relief included compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the adoption of appropriate policies and programs consistent with the defendants' legal obligations to operate a work environment free from sex discrimination. The plaintiffs also sought back pay, front pay, benefits, pre- and post-judgment interest, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The docket shows that parties engaged in extensive discovery process. After filing several sealed documents with the court on July 17, 2013, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice. This request was granted by the court on October 9, 2013.

Summary: Plaintiffs, all former female employees of Ruth's Chris Steak House, sought compensatory and injunctive relief for defendants' alleged sex, pregnancy, and age discrimination. After extensive discovery, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice and the Court dismissed the case on October 9, 2013.


This case challenges Louisiana's alleged practice of detaining prisoners longer than necessary after those prisoners receive "time-served" sentences. On April 15, 2020, three former prisoners filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Middle District of Louisiana. Represented by the civil rights firm Loevy & Loevy, local counsel, and the Promise of Justice Initiative, a public interest group, plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (DOC), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under Louisiana state law. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for their alleged overdetentions. All three named plaintiffs received sentences that were already complete upon sentencing due to the time they had already served prior to conviction. However, all three were held in DOC custody for weeks after their sentencing due to slow processing. Plaintiffs alleged that this constituted an illegal depravation of freedom under the 14th Amendment's due process clause. Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that the DOC has subjected "thousands" of criminal defendants in like situations to similar unlawful imprisonments and that the department's Secretary was "deliberately indifferent" to these alleged violations. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge John Wheadon deGravelles, sitting in Baton Rouge, LA. As of writing, this case is in discovery, and the judge has not decided whether plaintiffs' class should be certified. On December 3, 2020, seemingly prompted by this lawsuit, the U.S. Department of Justice launched an investigation under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act into Louisiana's prisoner release practices.

Summary: In 2020, three former Louisiana inmates filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Middle District of Louisiana. Plaintiffs claimed that their overdetentions and the overdetentions of thousands of other former inmates due to slow processing constituted a violation of their 14th Amendment right to due process and that James LeBlanc was deliberately indifferent to these violations. As of writing, this case is still in discovery, and the plaintiffs' class has not yet been certified.


Shortly after President Joe Biden's inauguration on January 20, 2021, Acting Homeland Security Secretary David Pekoske issued a memorandum ordering U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to halt most deportations from the United States for 100 days ("100 day pause"). The 100 day pause was intended to allow time for ICE to overhaul its enforcement priorities and focus its efforts on threats to national security, public safety, and border security. The 100 day pause did not apply to individuals who arrived after November 1, 2020 and allowed for certain exceptions, including national security. Two days later, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this lawsuit against the United States, Acting Secretary Pekoske, DHS, USCIS, CBP, ICE, and various officials from each agency in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to try and block the 100 day pause on deportations. Texas sought a declaration that the memorandum was unlawful, a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the defendants from implementing the memorandum, and attorney's fees and costs. Texas alleged that the 100 day pause violated an agreement Paxton and Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed with former Acting Deputy Secretary of Department of Homeland Security Ken Cuccinelli that required the federal government to provide six months notice and consult with Texas before taking action that could reduce immigration enforcement or increase the number of noncitizens who were removable or inadmissible in the United States. Paxton and Abbott signed this agreement days before President Biden's inauguration. Texas also argued that the 100 day pause violated the Take Care Clause of the Constitution because it directed the executive to not enforce the law. In addition, Texas alleged that the 100 day pause violated the APA in several different ways. First, Texas argued that the 100 day pause violated the APA because the pause would prevent DHS from complying with Section 1231 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1231 provides that “when [a noncitizen] is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the [noncitizen[ from the United States within a period of 90 days.” Texas argued that this created a 90 day deadline for removals to occur and that a 100 day pause in removals would necessarily cause DHS to go beyond this deadline. Second, Texas argued that the pause violated the APA because it was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Texas alleged that the 100 day pause represented a sharp departure from previous policy but that the memorandum failed to explain the change or consider the harm halting removals would cause, thereby rendering it arbitrary and capricious. Third, Texas alleged that the 100 day pause was a legislative rule requiring notice and comment under the APA. Lastly, Texas argued that the 100 day pause prevented DHS from enforcing immigration laws and was ultra vires because it exceeded the authority DHS could delegate. The case was assigned to Judge Drew B. Tipton. Immediately, Texas filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. Texas argued that the 100 day pause would irreparably harm Texas by increasing the amount of money the state would have to spend on services, such as education, healthcare, and social services if the federal government stopped removals. After a hearing on the motion, Texas filed a notice on January 24, 2021 citing a Fox News report claiming that ICE was releasing all noncitizens from detention in Texas. The defendants responded that this was not the case, but that ICE had released a group of noncitizens pursuant to an injunction in Fraihat that required class members with specified COVID risk factors to be released. The ACLU and ACLU of Texas filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants. They argued that the agreement between Texas and the federal government was unenforceable, that Texas lacked standing, and that Texas could not demonstrate irreparable harm. Judge Tipton granted the temporary restraining order on January 26, 2021. Texas v. United States, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2021 WL 247877 (2021). The temporary restraining order suspended the 100 day pause nationwide for 14 days. Judge Tipton made clear that the order was not based on the agreement between Texas and the federal government signed just before President Biden's inauguration. He stressed that the issues raised by the agreement with Texas were "of such gravity and constitutional import that they require further development of the record and briefing prior to addressing the merits." Instead, Judge Tipton based the order on Texas's claims under the APA. Judge Tipton found that Texas was likely to succeed on at least two of its claims under the APA: that the 100 day pause violated Section 1231 and that the defendants arbitrarily and capriciously departed from previous policy. He also found that Texas demonstrated it would suffer irreparable harm because of the financial costs of additional social services. Finally, he found that the threat of injury to Texas outweighed any harm to the defendants and the temporary restraining order served the public interest. Two days later, FIEL Houston and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services ("RAICES"), represented by ACLU national, the ACLU of Texas, and the ACLU Immigrant Rights' Project, filed an emergency motion to intervene as defendants in the case. The two organizations' members and clients include noncitizens at risk of deportation and other adverse consequences if Texas were to succeed in this lawsuit. The organizations requested the Court permit them to intervene to protect the interest of their clients by providing their expertise on the immigration system and their perspective on impacted communities. Judge Tipton granted the organizations permission to intervene on February 6, 2021. 2021 WL 411441. He found that FIEL Houston's and RAICES' motion was timely, that there would be no undue delay or prejudice by permitting intervention, and that they asserted defenses that shared a common question of law and fact with the lawsuit. Judge Tipton noted how both the intervenors and the defendants challenged Texas's standing to bring the suit and the enforceability of the agreement between DHS and Texas. Finally, the Court found that the organizations had interests that the federal defendants may not adequately represent because the federal defendants' arguments would focus on expansive executive authority whereas the intervenors' would focus on the effect of the pause on individuals subject to a final order of removal. On February 5, 2021, Texas filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Texas argued that they were likely to succeed on their APA claims, their argument that the January 20 Memorandum violated the Take Care Clause, and their argument that DHS violated its Agreement to notify and consult Texas. Texas also pointed to the brevity of the administrative record filed by the defendants on February 3, 2021. They argued that this demonstrated the defendants failed to consider alternative possible policies and by failing to consider other policies, acted arbitrarily and capriciously. In addition, Texas repeated their arguments from the TRO motion that they would suffer irreparable harm by increasing the amount of money Texas would have to spend on mandated social services. Texas also sought a 14 day extension of the temporary restraining order. The Court granted the extension to give the parties time to develop the record and because the briefing for the preliminary injunction extended beyond the initial temporary restraining order. This case is ongoing. More updates to come.

Summary: Shortly after President Joe Biden's inauguration on January 20, 2021, Acting Homeland Security Secretary David Pekoske issued a memorandum ordering U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to halt most deportations from the United States for 100 days ("100 day pause"). The 100 day pause was intended to allow time for ICE to overhaul its enforcement priorities and focus its efforts on threats to national security, public safety, and border security. Two days later, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton filed this lawsuit against the United States, Acting Secretary Pekoske, DHS, USCIS, CBP, ICE, and various officials from each agency in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to try and block the 100 day pause on deportations. Texas sought a declaration that the memorandum was unlawful, a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the defendants from implementing the memorandum, and attorney's fees and costs. Texas alleged the 100 day puse violated an agreement the state signed with former Acting Deputy Secretary of DHS Ken Cuccinelli requiring the federal government to consult with Texas before taking action that could reduce immigration enforcement. Texas also argued that the 100 day pause violated the APA because it was unlawful in violation of Section 1231 of the INA, arbitrary and capricious, required notice and comment, and was ultra vires. Immediately, Texas filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The ACLU and ACLU of Texas filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants. Judge Tipton granted the temporary restraining order on January 26, 2021 and suspended the 100 day pause nationwide for 14 days. Judge Tipton found that Texas was likely to succeed on at least two of its claims under the APA: that the 100 day pause violated Section 1231 and that the defendants arbitrarily and capriciously departed from previous policy. This case is ongoing.


On April 30, 2003, LGBT advocacy organizations, represented by Lambda Legal and the ACLU, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, against the Attorney General of Nebraska challenging the federal constitutionality of Article I, Section 29 of the Nebraska Constitution. Section 29 prohibits government recognition of the "uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship." The plaintiffs sought to have Section 29 declared unlawful as a denial of equal protection and a bill of attainder. On June 30, 2003, the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, the case was unripe, and the cause for action for bill of attainder should be dismissed. The District Court (Judge Joseph F. Bataillon) denied the motion on November 10, 2003. Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc., v. Bruning, 290 F.Supp.2d 1004. On May 12, 2005, the Court ruled that Section 29 violated the Constitution of the United States. Citizens for Equal Protection, Inc., v. Bruning, 368 F.Supp.2d 980. The Court first found that Section 29 deprived same-sex couples of the right to associational freedom and the right to participate in the political process, both protected by the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finding no rational relationship between Section 29 and any legitimate state interest, the Court held that Section 29 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the Court concluded that Section 29 amounts to punishment by legislation as it operates to prohibit persons in same-sex relationships from working to ever obtain governmental benefits or legal recognition, and thus was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. The Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of Section 29 and on August 1, 2005, granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Attorney General filed a notice of appeal on June 9, 2005. On July 14, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Judge James B. Loken) reversed the District Court on all three of its conclusions, as well as the award of the plaintiffs' attorneys fees. Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859. The Court held that sexual orientation was not a suspect classification and thus Section 29 was not entitled to be subjected strict scrutiny. Under the alternative standard of rational basis review, the Court held Section 29 did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found the bill of attainder claim to be without merit, and found that Section 29 did not violate the First Amendment because it does not directly and substantially interfere with plaintiffs' ability to associate in pursuit of a common goal, and it seems unlikely it will prevent persons from continuing to associate. The plaintiffs sought rehearing en banc; the Eighth Circuit denied that motion on August 30, 2006. The plaintiffs did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 4, 2007.

Summary: In 2003, LGBT advocacy organizations represented by Lambda Legal and the ACLU filed suit in the U.S. District Court of Nebraska against the State Attorney General alleging that Article I, Section 29 of the Nebraska State Constitution, which prohibits same-sex marriage and civil unions, violated the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, asserting that Section 29 violated the Equal Protection clause under the Fourteenth Amendment and was a bill of attainder. On May 12, the District Court held that Section 29 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and was a bill of attainder, and therefore was unconstitutional and awarded the plaintiffs attorneys fees. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit for the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision on all counts. The appellate court held that because sexual orientation was not a suspect classification, Section 29 only needed to pass rational basis review, which the Court held it did. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 4, 2007.


On March 17, 2010, women who came from their permanent residence in Mexico to work at a seafood processor in North Carolina pursuant to the guestworker visa program (H-2B), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiff’s sued their employer Capt. Charlie’s Seafood under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA), the Fair Labor Standards Act, the North Carolina Equal Employment Practices Act, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Plaintiffs sought reimbursement fees they incurred in receiving H-2B visas, as well as monetary relief for sex discrimination in job assignment, allocation of hours, and wrongful discharge. The women were represented by the North Carolina Justice Center and the ACLU Women’s Rights Project. Capt. Charlie’s Seafood was certified to hire forty-nine workers under the H-2B visa program during 2008 and 2009. Each year, workers paid in excess of $300 in fees to acquire and maintain the visas (visa reciprocity fee, U.S. consulate fee, bordering crossing fee, bus transport from Mexico). At no time did Captain Charlie’s reimburse the plaintiffs for these costs. An employer is required to pay H-2B workers a “prevailing wage” (20 C.F.R. § 655.22(e)) of around $7 per hour. By not receiving reimbursement for the various fees, the plaintiffs claimed that they actually received a “negative wage” for their first week of work. Plaintiffs also alleged that they received fewer hours of work and less desirable jobs within the processing plant because they were women. Further, twenty women were also discharged from the plant. The Settlement Agreement provides for Capt. Charlie’s to pay each NCWHA Class member $100 for each season in which that class member obtained a new H-2B visa to work for Defendants from March 17, 2008 through the end of 2010. The parties agree that these payments are to be accounted as reimbursement for a portion of the costs they incurred in order to obtain H-2B visas and/or to travel to North Carolina to work for Defendants. The agreement further requires Capt. Charlie’s to pay the difference between what each worker would have made had they been paid the promised wage and what they were actually paid from March 17, 2008 through the end of 2010. These amounts totaled to $18,600. Attorney’s fees were also paid in the amount of $28,000. Additionally, Capt. Charlie’s agreed to pay named plaintiffs Covarrubias, Flores, and Sandoval $2,500 for each alleged violation of Title VII. The Settlement Agreement also provided for a three-year consent decree in which Capt. Charlie’s would pay the visa and transportation expenses of their H-2B employees, and create and implement an anti-discrimination policy and a gender-neutral policy for assigning jobs.

Summary: Women who were residents of Mexico went to work in a North Carolina seafood processing plant under the H-2B guestworker visa program. Each worker paid hundreds of dollars in fees to obtain the visa and travel to North Carolina. The processor, Capt. Charlie's Seafood, never reimbursed workers for these fees, which the plaintiffs alleged left them with a "negative wage" for their first week (a violation of state and federal wage statutes). Plaintiffs also alleged that women were given fewer hours and less desirable jobs than similarly situated men, and that twenty women were fired because of their sex. A settlement paid out the women for visa fees, transportation from Mexico, any underpayment of wages, and attorney's fees ($18,600 in total plus $28,000 for attorney's fees). The three named plaintiffs additionally received $2,500 for each Title VII violation against them. A consent decree lasting three years required Capt. Charlie's to pay for all visa and transportation expenses for their H-2B employees, and to create and implement anti-discrimination and gender-neutral policies for assigning jobs to workers.


COVID-19 summary: This is a class-action complaint brought by four parents and a public charity against the College Entrance Examination Board and Education Testing Services for breach of contract on behalf of all students registered to take at-home Advanced Placement (AP) exams, for the defendant’s failure to administer its AP exams without prejudice. The suit was filed after students experienced a series of technical difficulties with their AP exams, administered at home by the defendant due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached contract by failing to ensure a fair and equitable testing opportunity and that the defendant knowingly discriminated against under-resourced and disabled students, and students in remote locations. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages exceeding $500 million, and punitive damages. No outcome yet. <hr> In March 2020, the College Board moved AP exams to be administered at home due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Prior to the exams, counselors and educators communicated concerns that the at-home exams were not fair to students who had no access to a computer, internet, or quiet workspaces, under-resourced students, and students requiring accommodations. The plaintiffs claimed that prior to the exams, the defendants acknowledged that the “digital divide” could prevent low-income and rural students from participating, however, they did not change their policies to address the issues. After three days of at-home exams, the defendant announced that there were failures in uploading the exams due to technical difficulties. According to reports, anywhere between 5% to 20% of examinees were unable to submit their responses during the first three days of exams. The plaintiffs noted that many students relied on AP exam scores for the financial benefits of college placement and credit. On May 19, 2020, four parents and the National Center for Fair & Open Testing brought suit against the College Entrance Examination Board and Education Testing Services on behalf of their minor children and all other similarly situated students registered to take at-home Advancement Placement (AP) exams. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants breached their implied contract by failing to ensure a fair and equitable testing opportunity and by failing to prevent anyone from gaining an unfair advantage. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants knowingly discriminated against under-resourced students, disabled students, and students in remote locations in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Unruh Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. They further alleged unfair competition, false advertisement, and negligence. Filed in the District Court of the Central District of California, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the College Board to accept any test answers by timestamp, photo, and email, as well as compensatory damages exceeding $500 million. The plaintiffs also sought punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interests and costs. The plaintiffs also sought class certification and a jury trial. The plaintiffs were represented by the Miller Advocacy group and private attorneys. The case was assigned to District Judge Philip S. Guitierrez and Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 22, 2020, and the defendants sought to stay the case pending arbitration on August 31. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This was a class action complaint brought by four parents and a public charity against the College Entrance Examination Board and Education Testing Services for breach of contract on behalf of all students registered to take at-home Advanced Placement (AP) exams, for the defendant’s failure to administer its AP exams without prejudice. The suit was filed after students experienced a series of technical difficulties with their AP exams, administered at home by the defendant due to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant breached contract by failing to ensure a fair and equitable testing opportunity and that the defendant knowingly discriminated against under-resourced and disabled students, and students in remote locations. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages exceeding $500 million, and punitive damages. No outcome yet.


On August 14, 2012, a deaf individual awaiting his BOP surrender date filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), and the Director of BOP under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. The plaintiff, represented by his attorney, sought a temporary restraining order to ensure he would have access to a qualified ASL interpreter, non-aural notification of emergencies, a videophone, and costs and fees. The plaintiff claimed that the lack of accommodations would discriminatorily impair his ability to effectively communicate, violate his due process right to an interpreter at disciplinary hearings, deny his right to adequate medical treatment, right to informed consent to and privacy in medical treatment, his right to a reasonably safe environment, and deny his right to freedom of speech. Specifically, he claimed that the prison facility failed to provide qualified ASL interpreters and other meaningful auxiliary aids, which prevented adequate communication of disciplinary rules. He further alleged that the absence of qualified interpreters denied him the ability to communicate medical information, give informed consent, and receive mental health services. The plaintiff argued that the use of other inmates as interpreters during medical and mental health appointments violates the constitutional right to privacy in medical treatment. He claimed the defendants failed to provide his right to a reasonably safe environment by failing to provide adequate alarms, pagers, or message boards that would alert him to an emergency. Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the failure to provide him with appropriate telecommunication equipment impaired his ability to communicate with his family and friends outside the prison. On August 17, 2012, District Judge Huvelle denied the motion for temporary restraining order as moot and converted it into a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants opposed the motion on September 4, 2012, because after the plaintiff filed, the BOP assigned him to a different federal detention center in order to provide him with access to the accommodations he sought and place him closer to his family. The plaintiff responded on September 17 that auxiliary aids the defendants had offered were still insufficient under the Act. He alleged that the new facility in Tucson had no videophones, which he would need to communicate with his two youngest children who could communicate only through sign language, as they were too young to read or write fluently. His home had no telephone line, necessary to use the TTY telephone equipment the defendants offered. One of his children lived with his mother, the plaintiff’s wife, to care for her during her illness, and had access solely to VideoPhone. The defendants submitted a supplemental declaration on September 25, 2012, outlining the prison’s plan to further accommodate the plaintiff. The parties stipulated to the plan, that included among other things, assigning an inmate to act as the plaintiff’s helper, assistance with the TTY system, providing live interpretation during medical and disciplinary-related activities, installing emergency lights as visual alarms, providing inmate email for public notices and messages, and providing the plaintiff a dry erase board and pens to communicate with staff. The only dispute that the parties were unable to settle was the videophone issue. That same day, Judge Huvelle heard testimony on this issue. On September 27, 2012, Judge Huvelle ordered the defendants to complete an evaluation by May 25, 2013 to determine whether providing a videophone “would result in a fundamental alteration in the nature of a program or activity or in undue financial and administrative burdens.” Judge Huvelle granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part because the defendants had failed to meet their burden of proving the installation of a video system would result in undue financial and administrative burdens, but denied the motion insofar as it sought an order requiring the installation. Judge Huvelle approved the parties’ stipulation and administratively closed the matter but maintained jurisdiction in case the plaintiff amended his complaint based on the defendant’s videophone evaluation. The plaintiff moved for attorney fees on October 9, 2012. Judge Huvelle sent the attorney fees motion to Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola on November 2, 2012. The defendants opposed the plaintiff’s attorney fees motion because they argues he was not the prevailing party, the fees were unreasonably, and the costs were unjustified. On April 29, 2013, Judge Huvelle awarded attorneys fees but reduced what the plaintiff asked for by 40%, for a total of $69,291.60. Judge Huvelle awarded the plaintiff costs related to filing fees, photocopying, deposition transcripts, interpreter services, and the per diem rates for his expert witnesses, totaling $2,744.43, but reduced the amount based on the plaintiff’s level of success to $1,646.66. 942 F.Supp.2d 71. On May 30, 2013, the defendants notified the Court that the plaintiff had received a written determination regarding his request of a video phone. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, a deaf individual awaiting his surrender to federal prison, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that the Federal Bureau of Prisons failed to provide adequate accommodation for his impairment, violating his rights under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. In the fall of 2012, the parties reached a settlement that provided a series of accommodations to allow the plaintiff to effectively communicate while incarcerated. He received 60% of the attorneys fees and costs he sought, and the case closed in the spring of 2013.


On November 19, 2009, the plaintiff, a pregnant inmate, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana against Lake County, its sheriff, and the medical doctor and chief officer of its detention facility, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment and Article II, Sections 10 and 22 of the Montana Constitution. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and the ACLU of Montana, asked the court for declaratory relief, and nominal, compensatory and punitive damages. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that the defendants unconstitutionally denied necessary medical care while she was jailed in the county detention facility. While undergoing a long-term drug addiction treatment program, the plaintiff was incarcerated in the detention facility, where she claims she was denied her prescribed medication. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff became extremely ill as a result of withdrawal from the medication and that she was eventually released from the detention facility due to medical complications. On March 3, 2011, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the medical doctor from the lawsuit. Subsequently on March 14, 2011, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On April 4, 2011, before the court ruled on the motion, the parties agreed to settle the case, pursuant to which, Lake County adopted a policy for medical care for pregnant inmate addition to opiates. On April 5, 2011, the District Court (Judge Donald W. Molloy) dismissed the case with prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs.

Summary: Plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana against Lake County, its sheriff, and the medical doctor and chief officer of its detention facility for failure to provide medically necessary treatment by denying the plaintiff her prescription medication for drug addiction. The parties settled subject to the defendants adoption of a policy regarding treatment of pregnant inmates with opiate addictions.


In August 2003, a former driver for C.R. England filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that C.R. England discriminated and retaliated against him because of his HIV-positive status. The EEOC issued a determination regarding his complaint in September 2004, concluding that C.R. England had violated the driver's rights under the ADA. On September 27, 2006, the EEOC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, asserting that C.R. England had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by (1) "[d]isclosing and requiring [the driver] to disclose medical information concerning his disability, in writing, to driver trainees before they could be trained by [him]"; and (2) "[u]nlawfully limiting, segregating and/or classifying [the driver] on the basis of his disability." On March 3, 2007, the individual driver intervened in this action, alleging multiple ADA violations—including discrimination, failure to provide reasonable accommodation, and retaliation—as well as several tort claims under Utah state law—including intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy. In March 2008, the EEOC moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of (1) whether the driver was a "qualified individual with a disability" protected by the provisions of the ADA; and (2) whether C.R. England was liable for violating the ADA by limiting, segregating, or classifying the driver on account of his disability. On that same day, C.R. England filed two motions for summary judgment—one against EEOC and one against the named plaintiff. In its motion regarding the EEOC's claims, C.R. England argued that (1) the driver "was an independent contractor, not an employee [of C.R. England], rendering the [ADA] inapplicable"; (2) "even if [the driver] is deemed an employee, EEOC's ADA claims fail because it cannot establish that [he] is 'disabled' or that England took any adverse action against him because of any alleged disability"; and (3) "any purported unlawful disclosure claim is legally insufficient." In its motion regarding the driver's claims, the company argued that (1) he was not an "employee" of C.R. England; (2) that his ADA claims fail because he was not "disabled," and could not establish that C.R. England "took any adverse action against him because of any disability, or . . . retaliated against him"; and (3) that "his three state law claims are legally insufficient." The court subsequently sealed all of these documents. On September 17, 2009 Judge Bruce S. Jenkins held, in a sealed opinion, that triable issues of fact existed regarding (1) whether the driver was an independent contractor, as opposed to an employee of C.R. England, and (2) whether he had a cognizable "disability" under the ADA. But the district court held that C.R. England "ha[d] shown that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to each of the plaintiffs' claims, and th[at] EEOC ha[d] failed to show such entitlement as to the issues raised by its motion for partial summary judgment." Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in C.R. England's favor on all claims. The named plaintiff and the EEOC filed appeals. The briefs of both sides in both appeals were subsequently sealed by the court. On May 3, 2011 Judge Jerome A. Holmes of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued a single opinion for both appeals, upholding the district court decision, and finding that the plaintiffs had not stated a viable claim under the ADA, and that the district court had committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of C.R. England. The case is closed.

Summary: On September 27, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Utah based trucking and transportation company C.R. England. The EEOC and an intervening plaintiff, a former driver for C.R. England, alleged that the company violated the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminating against their driver because of his HIV-positive status. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C.R. England on all claims. Both the named plaintiff and the EEOC appealed the decision. In a sealed opinion answering both plaintiffs' appeals, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court decision. Judge Holmes found that the plaintiffs had not stated a viable claim under the ADA.


On November 20, 2013, Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. The plaintiff's complaint was substantially similar to one it had filed in 2011, Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius [II], which was dismissed on August 13, 2013 because the contraception mandate had not yet harmed the plaintiffs. On January 29, 2014, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay this case pending the Supreme Court's resolution of Priests for Life v. Sebelius (later consolidated as Zubik v. Sebelius [II] , and heard by the Supreme Court in 2016). On November 3, 2014, the plaintiffs, for unspecified reasons, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice.

Summary: In 2013, a Catholic liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. On November 3, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice.


COVID-19 Summary: This was a preexisting lawsuit addressing conditions of confinement in the Santa Barbara County Jail. On March 18, 2020, class counsel wrote the county to urge significant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter urged population reductions, and a variety of other steps (increasing education, access to cleaning supplies, free communications methods, and the like). The parties reached a settlement that was approved in July 2020 which granted many of the plaintiffs' preexisting demands for relief.
 On December 6, 2017, several prisoners of the Santa Barbara County Jail (SBCJ) in pre-trial detention filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Santa Barbara and the Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.6, and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights California, the Prisons Law Office, and private counsel sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to District Judge George H. Wu and referred to Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. The plaintiffs alleged that, in operating a jail that is old and dilapidated, severely overcrowded, and understaffed, the defendants forced prisoners to live in dangerous, unsanitary conditions. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants failed to provide adequate health care for prisoners, that they overused solitary confinement as punishment, and that the defendants discriminated against and failed to accommodate people with disabilities. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from continuing the unlawful acts, conditions, and practices described above. The plaintiffs wanted the defendants to provide equal access to programs, services, and activities for people with disabilities, including but not limited to housing people with physical disabilities, appropriate access to assistive devices, housing people with disabilities in the least restrictive and most integrated settings appropriate to their needs, and providing an effective grievance system to contest disability discrimination. On the day of filing the complaint, the plaintiff filed a notice of related cases. The plaintiff asked the court to recognize two cases as being related to the present case. These cases were Quinton Gray v. County of Riverside, available in this Clearinghouse  here, and George Topete v. County of San Bernardino, also available in this Clearinghouse here. On March 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the case as a class action that included two classes. They defined the general class as “[a]ll people who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the Santa Barbara County Jail system.” The plaintiffs also defined a subclass (the “Disabilities Subclass”) of “[a]ll people who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the Santa Barbara County Jail system and who are qualified individuals with disabilities, as that term is defined in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §12102, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B), and California Government Code § 12926(j) and (m).” Judge Wu granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion for class certification on May 31, 2018, certifying the class and subclass requested in the plaintiff’s motion. In late June 2018, both parties requested that the court stay discovery to engage in settlement negotiations. The parties filed periodic status reports updating the court on the progress of their negotiations. The eighth status report was filed with the court on January 17, 2020 and stated that the parties were close to final settlement terms. On March 18, 2020, the class counsel wrote the county to urge significant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter urged population reductions, and a variety of other steps (increasing education, access to cleaning supplies, free communications methods, and the like). The parties filed a Notice of Settlement on July 17, 2020 that contained a Stipulated Judgment and a Remedial Plan. The Remedial Plan required the defendants to implement policy improvements in nine areas: medical care, mental health care, suicide prevention, disability accommodations and access, environmental health and safety, custody operations/segregation, staffing for health care services, and training related to treatment of prisoners with special needs. Under the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs’ class counsel and designated court-appointed experts will monitor implementation of the Plan. The court has the power to enforce the judgment through specific performance and other remedies. The judgment will last for four years with judicial oversight and enforcement through specific performance and other remedies unless terminated earlier or extended. Attorney's costs and fees, $1,132,809, were awarded to the plaintiffs' counsel for litigation and the plaintiffs' counsel will also receive costs and fees up to $125,000 per year for monitoring and enforcement. The Consent Judgment was approved by the court on July 31, 2020.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by several prisoners of the Santa Barbara County Jail in the U.S. District for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs' alleged that the defendant violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs were granted class certification and the parties agreed to a settlement in plaintiffs' favor in 2020. The defendants agreed to implement a remedial plan to provide adequate mental health and medical care, limit use of solitary confinement, prevent discrimination against people with disabilities, and improve living conditions for people incarcerated at the jail.


On April 6, 2004, travelers who claimed that they were identified by the "No-Fly List" merely because their names were identical or similar to names on the No-Fly List filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Declaratory Judgment Act against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the TSA's administration and management of the "No-Fly List" violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment. The TSA began implementing the No-Fly List in November 2001 and circulates the list to commercial airlines and security personnel with instructions to detain and question any passenger whose name matches or is similar to one on the No-Fly List. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that many innocent passengers were routinely stopped, questioned, and searched because of the list. The TSA and DHS would not reveal why individuals were on the list and passengers had no meaningful opportunity to clear their names. On January 7, 2005, Judge Thomas S. Zilly granted the TSA and DHS's motion to dismiss because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction over all of the passengers' claims except for the Fifth Amendment Due Process claims as it related to the clearance procedures established by the TSA. However, Judge Zilly dismissed that remaining claim because the passengers failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Green v. Transportation Security Administration, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005).

Summary: In 2004, innocent passengers who were identified by the "No-Fly List" because their names were identical or similar to names on the No-Fly List filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Declaratory Judgment Act against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The passengers claimed that the TSA's administration and management of the "No-Fly List" violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Search and Seizure Clause of the Fourth Amendment. On January 7, 2005, Judge Thomas S. Zilly granted the TSA and DHS's motion to dismiss because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim.