On December 23, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of approximately 76,000 African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against National City Bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, African-American and Hispanic borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their home mortgage loans than non-Hispanic White borrowers. The complaint asked the court for injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, and monetary damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant allowed its mortgage brokers to set wholesale loan prices unrelated to credit risk characteristics and loan terms; did not require mortgage brokers to justify or document the reasons for the amount of broker fees and prices set above the par rate; failed to monitor for disparities based on race or national original because of its policies and practices; and created a financial incentive for mortgage brokers to charge higher fees and interest rates. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order with the complaint that was entered by the Court (Judge Cathy Bissoon) on January 9, 2014. The Consent Order addressed National City Bank's practices between 2002 and 2008. Subsequently, PNC Bank acquired the defendant, and so the Consent Order is between PNC Bank and the plaintiffs. Per the order, the bank was to establish an interest-bearing settlement fund of $35 million "to compensate affected borrowers for monetary damages, equitable relief, and other damages that they may have suffered as a result of National City Bank's alleged violations of the ECOA and the FHA." The order also provided a process for determining who the settlement fund recipients should be and for disbursement. The order was to terminate three months after final disbursement. On Jan. 6, 2017, the court approved disbursement of the last of the settlement fund. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 23, 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of approximately 76,000 African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. A consent decree was entered on January 9, 2014. As of February 24, 2014, this case is still open, pending a motion to intervene filed by several African-American and Hispanic borrowers.


On October 18, 2016, a Louisiana naturalized citizen filed this lawsuit against the State of Louisiana in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for denying his constitutional rights to marriage. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Louisiana’s Act 436, which required all applicants for a marriage license to provide a certified birth certificate and permitted this requirement to be waived by individuals born in the U.S. The plaintiff, born in an Indonesian refugee camp without a birth certificate, alleged that Act 436 violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment because it prevents certain foreign-born individuals from exercising their fundamental right to marriage. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the State's denial of his marriage license violated the Constitution, in addition to a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining defendants from further denying a marriage license to the plaintiff. On February 2, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. Amicus briefs were filed in support of the plaintiff by Constitutional Accountability Center, ACLU, and National Center for Lesbian Rights. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on February 23. On March 23, Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The Court found that the plaintiff had standing and that he satisfied all the necessary elements for a preliminary injunction. 2017 WL 1091261. The plaintiff then filed the first amended complaint on April 12, 2017 with minor modifications. On May 24, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and permanent injunction. On August 8, Judge Lemelle granted the plaintiff’s motions. The court found that Louisiana failed to demonstrate that “this classification based on national origin furthers a compelling governmental interest that justify treating this Plaintiff and other similarly situated U.S. citizens differently from U.S. born citizens.” In addition, the court found that the plaintiff has also demonstrated actual success on the merits of the due process claim. 301 F.Supp.3d 661. On February 21, 2018, Judge Lemelle ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $154,754 in attorney’s fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 18, 2016, a Louisiana naturalized citizen filed this lawsuit against the state in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana for denying his constitutional rights to marriage. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of State of Louisiana’s Act 436 for violating the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 23, 2017, Judge Ivan L.R. Lemelle granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction; On August 8, 2017, Judge Lemelle granted the motion for permanent injunction. The case is now closed.


On September 21, 2005 the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, representing Hispanic and African American employees of Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that African American and Hispanic employees were subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race and national origin. The plaintiff also alleged that one employee was discharged in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. On August 21st, 2006, the plaintiffs and defendants jointly moved for a protective order to maintain confidentiality over certain information and documents. On September 6, 2006, Judge Joan B. Gottschall entered the agreed protective order. Specifically, the order stated information and documents such as wage, financial, or tax information; social security numbers; physical and mental health information; trade secrets; performance evaluations; employee complaints; proprietary business processes and procedures; and defendant's affirmative action plans were to remain confidential. Between 2007 and 2008 the parties conducted multiple settlement conferences. On April 4, 2008, both parties consented to transferring the case to Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys. On April 9, 2008, Chief Judge James F. Holderman signed an Executive Committee Order transferring the case to Magistrate Judge Arlander Keys. On May 21, 2008 the Honorable Arlander Keys signed a consent decree. The decree included injunctive and monetary relief. The injunctive relief enjoined the defendant from discriminating against employees on the basis of race; required the defendant to create a policy prohibiting discrimination in the workplace; and required posting, record keeping, and training. The monetary relief totaled $425,000 to be distributed among 17 class members.

Summary: On September 21, 2005 the Chicago District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Bridgestone/Firestone North American Tire LLC under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff claimed that African American and Hispanic employees were subjected to different terms and conditions of employment and were subjected to a hostile work environment because of their race and national origin. The plaintiff also alleged that one employee was discharged in retaliation for complaining about the discrimination. On May 21, 2008 the Honorable Arlander Keys signed the consent decree. The decree included injunctive and monetary relief.


On April 21, 2004, eleven former male detainees of the Fulton County Jail, represented by private attorneys, brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional the Jail's practices of (a) conducting "blanket strip searches" of inmates entering and/or returning to the Jail without any individualized determination that such searches would reveal contraband; and (b) detaining inmates past their scheduled release dates ("over-detention"). The plaintiffs alleged that these practices had persisted at the Fulton County Jail for years and estimated that some 10,000 or more inmates were affected. The plaintiffs claimed that the practices were improper under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Georgia Constitution and common law. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages and class certification. The complaint was amended four times. In addition to suing the former and current Fulton County Sheriffs, the plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the City of Atlanta, alleging that those governmental entities were liable because their police forces had entrusted arrestees to the Fulton County Jail with knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions that existed there. The plaintiffs alleged that three types of blanket strip searches occurred at the Jail: (1) blanket strip searches of arrestees as part of their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AR Group); (2) blanket strip searches of detainees who posted bond or were ordered released at the Jail before their point-of-entry booking into the Jail (AL Group); and (3) blanket strip searches of detainees who returned to the jail from a court appearance after having been ordered released in state court (CR Group). The defendants denied all allegations and sought dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim and under the defenses of both Eleventh Amendment immunity and qualified immunity. On July 5, 2005, the District Court (Judge Richard W. Story) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss. The Court determined that: (1) the Sheriffs were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for the monetary claims against them in their official capacity; (2) the Sheriffs were entitled to qualified immunity for the strip search claims; (3) the Sheriffs were not entitled to qualified immunity as to the over-detention claims; (4) the detainees adequately stated § 1983 claims against the county; and (5) the detainees lacked standing to seek injunctive relief against the county defendants. Powell v. Barrett, 376 F.Supp.2d 1340 (N.D.Ga. 2005). All parties appealed. In two separate August 23, 2007, opinions, one published and one unpublished, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the District Court. In the published opinion, the Eleventh Circuit panel (Justice Susan Harrell Black) found that some plaintiffs could pursue their strip search claims against former Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity. All of the strip search claims against current Sheriff Freeman, Fulton County, and the City of Atlanta were ordered dismissed. Powell v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2007). In the unpublished opinion, the Eleventh Circuit panel (per curiam) let stand the over-detention claims against former Sheriff Barrett in her individual capacity. All other over-detention claims were ordered dismissed. Powell v. Barrett, 246 Fed.Appx. 615 (11th Cir. Aug 23, 2007). On February 4, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit, acting en banc, vacated the August 23, 2007 panel opinions and agreed to rehear the appeal. On September 4, 2008, the en banc Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in which they ruled that a policy or practice of strip searching all arrestees as a part of the process of booking them into the general population of a detention facility, even without reasonable suspicion to believe that they may be concealing contraband, is permissible, so long as the strip search is no more extensive than the one upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The en banc panel then remanded the case back to the original Eleventh Circuit panel for proceedings in line with this decision. The case was promptly remanded to the district court, which on March 27, 2009, dismissed the City of Atlanta, the State of Georgia, and Fulton County from the case and entered judgment in their favor. The case proceeded against other defendants. On March 3, 2011, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants as to the strip-search claims, but denied the motion for summary judgment for the over-detention claims. Discovery continued regarded the over-detention claims. On February 17, 2012, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' over-detention claims. Since no claims remained, the court entered final judgment in favor of the defendants. 2012 WL 567065. The plaintiffs appealed both grants of summary judgment for the over-detention claim and the strip-search claim. On March 7, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Hull) affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs' over-detention and strip search claims. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit held that 1) assuming without deciding that, when they were over-detained, the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by jail employees, the plaintiffs failed to establish that sheriff was liable as a supervisor; 2) the jailers did not violate pre-trial detainees' Fourth Amendment rights by visually searching them for legitimate safety and penological reasons prior to admitting or readmitting them to the jail's general population; and 3) pre-trial detainees have no constitutional right, much less a clearly established right, to be held in a particular cell or a separate area of a jail and not be placed back in the general jail population. 511 F. App'x 957, 964 (11th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court to hear the case, but on November 4, 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 134 S. Ct. 513 (2013). The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2004, eleven former male detainees of the Fulton County Jail, brought a class action lawsuit challenging the Jail's strip search and over detention practices. Overruling its own circuit precedent, the en banc Eleventh Circuit ruled in 2008 that a policy or practice of strip searching all arrestees as a part of the process of booking them is permissible, so long as the strip search is no more extensive than the one upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish. The district court ultimately granted summary judgment on all claims to the defendants, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court declined to hear the case in 2013.


On October 26, 1999, a disabled athlete and employee of the Paralympic Games sued the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming the USOC gave better training, benefits, and rewards to non-disabled olympic athletes, in violation of Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. As an employee of the USOC, he also sued under Title I of the ADA for employment discrimination, and state law for breach of contract .  Although the Court never specifically ordered consolidation, a June 14, 2006 an order consolidated the Shepherd Case with Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, also filed in the District of Colorado before Judge Kane. This case appears in the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse Database as DR-CO-0016. The facts are largely analogous - paralympic athlete sued the USOC for discrimination in training, accommodations, funding, and so forth. Many other motions and appeals were consolidated in the two cases after the June 14, 2006 order. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed the USOC provided benefits to non-disabled olympic athletes, including tuition assistance, health insurance, financial support, access to training facilities, and rewards for medals achieved in the Olympic Games. The USOC provided either inferior benefits to paralympic athletes or no benefits at all. Count II of the complaint alleged violation of Additionally, the plaintiff's position at the USOC required that he promote awareness of disabled sports and promote them, among other functions. The complaint alleged that the USOC failed to provide him with pay, advancements, bonuses, budgeting, support staff, and promotions that it provided to similarly situated non-disabled employees of the USOC. The plaintiff also alleged retaliatory termination. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. On April 20, 2000, the District Court addressed the USOC's motions for summary judgment and to strike, with varied results. A summary of this order appears on the docket. The parties then engaged in a lengthy discovery battle, in which several third parties sought protective orders. On September 21, 2005, the District Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and on June 14, 2006, the District Court ordered the parties to submit proposed orders regarding the viability of Counts I and II of the complaint, the "athlete" claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee, No. 99-2077, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39295 (D. Colo. Jun. 14, 2006). This order also consolidated similar motions for summary judgment by the defendants in Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, mentioned above. On November 16, 2006, in a published order, the District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts II and III, the "athlete" counts, leaving only the "employment" counts, I and IV. Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Colo. 2006). The Court found many parts of the claims problematic: the training facilities were not really "public accommodations" because they were limited to athletes preselected by the USOC; and the ASA separated the Olympics and Paralympics programs and created separate governing bodies, thus plaintiffs had not been "excluded." On January 10, 2007, final judgment was entered against the plaintiff as to Counts II and III. In this order, the court also granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary adjudication regarding the employment claims. On July 2, 2007, the docket indicates that a 2 week jury trial was scheduled for February 18 to 29, 2008. It appears the parties settled the employment-related claims. The case was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation on January 10, 2008. No settlement agreement is publicly available at this time. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the Shepherd and Hollonbeck cases on Plaintiff's appeal of the District Court's grant of the defendant's motion to dismiss the "athlete" claims. Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., writing for himself and Judge Jerome A. Holmes upheld the District Court's dismissal, finding that although the USOC's policy resulted in disparate impact on disabled athletes, this did not state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Judge William J. Holloway, Jr. dissented and would have reversed the District Court. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 513 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2008). There has been no further development in this case.

Summary: A disabled athlete of the Paralympic Games sued the U.S. Olympic Committee (USOC) under the Americans With Disabilities and Rehabilitation Acts because the USOC gave better training, benefits, and rewards to olympic athletes. The plaintiff was also an employee of the USOC and he sued under the ADA and breach of contract for discrimination in employment. The District Court dismissed the disparate treatment claims and it appears the parties settled the employment claims, though no agreement is publicly available.


On June 12, 2014, the mother of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the County of San Mateo, the Mateo County Sheriff, the County of Monterey, the Monterey County Sheriff, the City of Monterey, the Monterey Police, the California Forensic Medical Group, and the Community Hospital of Monterey Peninsula under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, as well as state law. Represented by private counsel, she asked the court for monetary relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, she alleged failures to provide medical care, to protect from harm, and to furnish medical care. She also claimed a deprivation of substantive due process, medical malpractice, negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention, and wrongful death. In 2013, the detainee committed suicide while in his administrative segregation cell at the Monterey County Jail by hanging himself with a bed sheet. The detainee had a history of mental illness and had been arrested three days prior for a murder he committed during a bipolar episode. The plaintiff alleged that the Jail's policies and practices for screening, supervising, and treating prisoners at risk for suicide were inadequate. The plaintiff also alleged serious deficiencies in the delivery of mental health care at the Jail. The detainee had been previously detained at the Jail and had not received adequate mental health care. On October 9, 2014, the District Court granted in part Monterey City's and Monterey County's motions to dismiss with leave to amend to the complaint. The Court also denied the County's motion to strike. On October 28, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint adding a claim of general negligence and allegations to other claims against Monterey and Monterey County. Then, on November 19, 2014, Judge Labson Freeman denied the Hospital's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 22, 2015, Judge Freeman approved the stipulated dismissal of the County and the Sheriff as defendants. Two days later, she approved the stipulated dismissal of the Hospital as a defendant. Presumably these were based on out-of-court settlements. The case proceeded against the remaining defendants. On January 12, 2016, the court granted summary judgment for a defendant police officer and denied summary judgment for defendant Monterey City. The court found that the plaintiffs had indicated an intention to dismiss the police officer and did not oppose summary judgment as to him. With respect to the City, the court held that there was a dispute as to the issue of whether or not the City "lacks minimally necessary policies and procedures for identifying a detainee’s mental health issues and responding to those issues appropriately by either transferring the detainee to a mental health facility or transmitting information regarding the detainee’s mental health to the next custodian." On February 22, 2016, the court granted partial summary judgment for county defendants and medical defendants. The parties then progressed toward trial, but on March 28, 2016, the parties indicated they had reached settlement. Accordingly, they moved for voluntary dismissal two days later, which the court granted while retaining jurisdiction over the settlement's enforcement. The court related this case to Estate of Sandra Vela v. County of Monterey, No. 5:16-cv-02375, on May 12, 2016. The settlement is not publicly available, though a status report indicates that "[t]he Agreement required payment of all funds by June 24, 2016, as well as the return of Mr. Claypole’s personal property and handwritten suicide note by that date." There has been no further docket activity since July 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, the mother of a pretrial detainee who committed suicide while in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the jail, the hospital, and the communities who interacted with him prior to his suicide for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and other claims including wrongful death. The case settled.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: On May 1, 2020, two qualified voters and five public interest organizations filed this lawsuit against the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, and the Shelby County district attorney general, challenging Tennessee’s restrictions on absentee voters, its criminal penalties against those who aid voters to obtain absentee ballots, and the inability for absentee voters to fix their ballots if they are rejected due to errors such as a signature mismatch. The petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. No outcome yet.
 On May 1, 2020, two qualified voters and five public interest organizations whose many members are not eligible for vote by mail filed this lawsuit against the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, and the Shelby County district attorney general. The plaintiffs challenged Tennessee’s restrictions on absentee voters, its criminal penalties against those who aid voters to obtain absentee ballots, and the inability for absentee voters to fix their ballots if they are rejected due to errors such as a signature mismatch. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the current vote by mail system was in violation of the plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the vote by mail eligibility criteria was a violation of the plaintiff’s fundamental right to vote, that the defendants’ failure to provide absentee voters with any opportunity to cure perceived signature-related deficiencies with their absentee ballot was a denial of the plaintiffs’ procedural due process, and that criminalizing the encouragement of voting through absentee ballots violated the plaintiff’s rights of free speech and association. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from excluding any eligible voter from casting an absentee ballot in the August and November 2020 elections, rejecting absentee ballots on the basis of alleged signature-related deficiencies without first providing an opportunity to cure, and enforcing criminal penalties for the unsolicited dissemination of requests for application for absentee ballots by any person. They further sought an order requiring the defendants to establish a procedure by which voters may attempt to cure deficiencies in their absentee ballots, and an order requiring additional reasonable steps necessary for facilitating absentee voting in the context of a pandemic, including broadly publicizing the relief granted by the court, instructing and training election officials and poll workers as to the relief granted, and providing for the in-person drop-off of absentee ballots on election days in 2020. They also sought attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs were represented by the Campaign Legal Center and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private attorneys. This lawsuit was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The case was assigned to Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, who self-recused. The case was then reassigned to Eli J. Richardson. Tennessee is among the few states with an excuse requirement for the upcoming August and November 2020 elections in light of COVID-19. The five organizations, A. Phillip Randolph Institute, the Equity Alliance, Free Hearts, Memphis Central Labor Council, and the Tennessee State Conference of the NAACP, face restrictions preventing them from carrying out necessary voter engagement activities. Under current Tennessee law, criminal penalties for giving voters unsolicited requests for an absentee ballot include up to 11 months and 29 days in prison, a fine of up to $2,500, or both. The two individual plaintiffs are ineligible under current laws to receive absentee ballots in the mail. On June 12, 2020 the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, further seeking to enjoin the defendants from excluding otherwise absentee-eligible voters from casting an absentee ballot solely because they are first-time voters. Current law requires that voters who register to vote by mail must vote in person in their first election after registering, regardless of whether they are otherwise eligible to vote by mail. The same day, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants responded to the complaint on June 26, arguing that they have the “broad powers to determine the conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised,” and that the plaintiffs seek to “upend the current election plans and substitute a plan of their own design” that will result in a dramatic increase in absentee voting. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 1, 2020, two qualified voters and five organizations filed this lawsuit against the Tennessee Secretary of State, the Tennessee Coordinator of Elections, and the Shelby County district attorney general, challenging Tennessee’s restrictions on absentee voters, its criminal penalties against those who aid voters to obtain absentee ballots, and the inability for absentee voters to fix their ballots if they are rejected due to errors such as a signature mismatch. The petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case is ongoing.


On September 23, 2009, Orange County residents named as defendants in a public nuisance abatement action targeting the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC) filed this lawsuit against Orange County in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and state law, plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. The plaintiffs alleged that they were denied procedural due process when defendants enforced a permanent injunction against them as members of OVC without a constitutionally adequate hearing. This case originates from a related proceeding, People v. Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang, Orange County Superior Court, 30-2009 00118739 (Feb. 17, 2009), in which the Orange County District Attorney's Office (OCDA) sought a permanent injunction against members of the OVC. The injunction restricted a range of activities in a gang operation area in the city of Orange, deemed the "Safety Zone," and included a curfew as well as a ban on certain clothing, "intimidating" behavior, and many other elements implicating free speech, movement, and associational rights. However, the OCDA voluntarily dismissed plaintiffs who appeared by filing an answer in that case. The OCDA subsequently obtained a default judgment against the remaining individuals and OVC as an entity. OCDA then served the order on the individuals originally named as defendants but voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit, a tactic known as "dismiss-and-serve." Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated their procedural due process rights by failing to provide an opportunity for plaintiffs to contest whether the order applied to them. On November 17, 2009, the United States District Court for the Central District of California (Judge Valerie B. Fairbank) denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of the permanent injunction against them, on the grounds that it lacked the requisite specificity and detail. On April 19, 2010, Judge Fairbank granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying as a class the individual defendants in the state case who appeared in the Superior Court to defend themselves but were voluntarily dismissed by OCDA. The Court also certified a sub-class of juveniles named as individual defendants in the state court for whom no guardian ad litem was appointed and who were voluntarily dismissed by the OCDA. Following an eleven day bench trial, on May 10, 2011, Judge Fairbank granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the order. Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 2011 WL 1791091 (C.D. Cal. May 10, 2011). The Court held that the OCDA deprived plaintiffs of constitutionally protected liberty interests and failed to provide adequate procedural protections, including an adequate pre-deprivation hearing. The Court denied the writ of habeas corpus because the plaintiffs were not in "custody" for the purposes of the writ. The Court awarded plaintiffs' attorney's fees on July 28, 2011. Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 2011 WL 3320482 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2011). On November 5, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's issuance of injunctive relief barring enforcement of the state's court order against the plaintiffs. Vasquez v. Rackauckas, 734 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2013) (Judge Marsha S. Berzon). However, the Circuit Court reversed the District Court's judgment as to the state claim against Defendant Rauckauckas, sued in his official capacity as the head of the OCDA, on the grounds that it was barred by Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Alderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). This official immunity analysis did not impact the plaintiffs' federal due process claims or the corresponding relief granted. In accordance with this ruling, the Circuit Court held that because Rackauckas was not subject to equitable remedies for violations of state law, there may be some difference in the amount of attorney's fee award that could be applied to him. On June 10, 2015, the District Court adopted the parties' Joint Stipulation about Attorneys' Fees and Costs, whereby defendants agreed to pay a total of $3,348,139.47 to the plaintiffs in attorneys' fees and costs. Further, the defendants agreed to pay a total of $573,107.99 in connection with the appeal. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 23, 2009, Orange County residents named as defendants in a public nuisance abatement action targeting the Orange Varrio Cypress Criminal Street Gang (OVC) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 28 U.S.C. §1983 and state law against Orange County. Plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that plaintiffs were denied procedural due process when defendants enforced a permanent injunction against them as members of OVC without a constitutionally adequate hearing. On May 10, 2011, the District Court granted a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the state order against the plaintiffs. On November 5, 2013, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The case is now closed.


The case began on August 4, 1998, when a state prisoner filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The plaintiff was paraplegic and used a wheelchair; he was incarcerated at the Georgia State Prison (GSP) in Reidsville, Georgia. The defendants were the State of Georgia and various officials, entities, and subdivisions of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC), including the GSP and Augusta State Medical Prison (ASMP), the Hearing Officer for the Office of Inmate Discipline at GSP, and the Commissioner of the GDOC. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act or RA), 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Eighth Amendment (suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection of the law by not accommodating the plaintiff's needs as a handicapped individual and discriminating him because of his disability. He had been housed in disciplinary isolation in the K-Building, which was designated a high maximum security section of the prison. He alleged that he had been denied the opportunity to bathe or shower and to have yard call, church privileges, cold food, wheelchair accessible space (especially because K-Building cells were smaller than regular prison building cells), medical care and treatment, law library access, and legal materials. The plaintiff was pro se when he filed the complaint, but was later was represented by private counsel. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The case was first assigned to Judge B. Avant Edenfield, then later reassigned to Magistrate Judge James E. Graham. The history of this case spans 15 years, from its filing in 1998 to settlement in 2010 and appeal attempts in 2013. The case involves many defendants, several of whom throughout 15 years were terminated (in their official and/or individual capacities) from the case at different points in the timeline. It also involved multiple appeals, which led to certain claims against some of the defendants to be reversed and remanded by the Court of Appeals to be redetermined by the district court. In addition, it is worth noting that toward the end of the case in 2010, the United States participated as Amicus Curiae in support of the plaintiff. Miller v. King, 2004 WL 2290751 (11th Cir.) (supplemental brief for the U.S. as intervenor). See generally Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004) (explaining the background of the lawsuit). During the course of the case's history, the plaintiff tried multiple times to get the court to prohibit what he alleged were discriminatory acts by the Defendants. Initially, the plaintiff filed a motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary injunction in September 1998. Judge Edenfield denied this motion on December 16, 1998. The plaintiff's efforts continued into January 1999, when the plaintiff tried again to enjoin the defendants by moving for a protective order and, again, a preliminary injunction. Magistrate Judge James E. Graham suggested in his March 1999 Report & Recommendation (R&R) that Judge Edenfield deny both motions. On April 9, 1999, Judge Edenfield adopted the R&R and denied both of the plaintiff's motions. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1257 (C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004) (summarizing the details of the Report and Recommendations and its adoption by Judge Edenfield). The plaintiff appealed this denial on April 20, 1999, but on January 11, 2000, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (USCA) dismissed the appeal on the basis that it was frivolous. Meanwhile, the defendants sought to dismiss the case: on August 4, 1999, they filed a motion for summary judgment. In January 2000, Magistrate Judge Graham recommended in his R&R that Judge Edenfield grant the motion for summary judgment on the claim of deliberate indifference against the former Warden of GSP and the claim of due process violations against the former Commissioner of the GDOC. On February 25, 2000, over the plaintiff's objections, Judge Edenfield adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendations for the above two issues. However, he denied summary judgment for the State of Georgia, GDOC, and the Hearing Officer for the Office of Inmate Discipline at GSP. He did not explain the reasoning behind his decision. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1258 (C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004). In July 2000, the Plaintiff filed a third motion for preliminary injunction and a second motion for protective order, but Judge Edenfield denied them the next month. The plaintiff appealed, but USCA denied the appeal. In November 2001, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge James E. Graham. The parties also commenced the discovery process around this time. The discovery process and the case were moving along on schedule when the defendants attempted again to get the case dismissed by filing in December 2001 a supplemental motion for summary judgment. They asserted that: - the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections are immune from suit; and - an individual employed by the Department of Corrections is not subject to liability under the ADA. While the defendants' motion was pending, the plaintiff in January 2002 filed numerous motions: TRO, Preliminary Injunction (fourth time), protective order, subpoenas, a writ of habeas corpus, and a motion to compel the defendant to produce discovery for the plaintiff. Magistrate Judge Graham resolved these motions throughout January and February 2002, mostly against the plaintiff. Judge Graham granted the defendants' December 2001 motion for summary judgment for certain defendants but only for some of the claims. He granted summary judgment for: - the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections on the claim that they violated the plaintiff's rights under Americans with Disabilities Act; and - the Former Warden of GSP on the claim that he violated the plaintiff's rights under ADA (the only remaining claims against this defendant were retaliation and due process violations in prison disciplinary hearings). While Judge Graham did not explain his reasons for denying all of the plaintiff's motions, he did note with respect to some motions that the allegations were irrelevant to the case. A jury trial took place in February 2002, which yielded a verdict for the defendants on the 14th. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or for new trial, but Judge Graham denied his motion on June 6, 2002 because the plaintiff failed to show evidence that jury's finding was against the weight of evidence. The plaintiff appealed immediately. On September 14, 2004, the Court of Appeals (Judges Frank M. Hull, James C. Hill, and Edward E. Carnes) generally affirmed the district court's grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendants (specifically, the ADA claims for monetary damages as to all defendants and as to all other claims against all defendants). However, it found that fact issues precluded summary judgment for a single defendant--the Warden of GSP. The USCA explained that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from suing state officials in their official capacities for injunctive relief. Moreover, a plaintiff may sue an official in his/her individual capacity for monetary damages. Thus, USCA found that the Warden was a suable defendant for both monetary and injunctive relief. Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248, 1253–54, 1260 (C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004). However, this decision was short-lived. After the Supreme Court decided United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, the Eleventh Circuit vacated in full its prior opinion from September 2004. In its new decision, the USCA affirmed the dismissal of all claims against all Defendants except for 1) the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and ADA claims against the Warden; and 2) ADA claims against the State of Georgia and the Georgia Department of Corrections. For these two claims, the USCA concluded that the case should be remanded to the district court for the plaintiff to amend his complaint so that a claim-by-claim analysis could be undertaken. Miller v. King, 449 F.3d 1149, 1151 (C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006). Soon after USCA's decision, on November 20, 2006, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, in which he added many new individual defendants affiliated with the Georgia prison system. He also resubmitted a number of motions: for a preliminary injunction (fifth time) in December 2006 and (sixth time) in January 2007, and a protective order. However, Judge Graham dismissed all these motions on January 9, 2007. After the plaintiff filed his amended complaint, the defendants persisted over the next few years to try to dismiss the case. Over time and little by little, Judge Graham dismissed many of the claims against the defendants. First, in February 2007, the Defendants submitted a pre-answer motion to dismiss. On July 24, 2007, Judge Graham granted the dismissal of: - ADA or RA claims against the defendants in their individual capacities; and - 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for damages against state defendants or individual defendants in their official capacities He denied the motion in all other respects, most importantly the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion. The injunctive relief claims remained pending. The case temporarily paused between summer 2007 and March 2008 because the parties and Judge Graham agreed to stay the case pending a comprehensive medical exam on the Plaintiff. Judge Graham lifted the stay on May 3, 2008. The defendants' next attempt to dismiss the case occurred when the defendants tried again to argue that the Plaintiff's remaining arguments were moot because of claim preclusion. After the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on this ground (that the plaintiff's § 1983, RA, and ADA claims were barred because he had already made them and lost), on September 21, 2009, Judge Graham ruled in favor of the defendants. He decided to dismiss many of the plaintiff's surviving claims, which included a denial of access to the courts claim. However, Judge Graham denied for the second time the defendants' claim preclusion argument. (The defendants later filed a motion for reconsideration of this order, but Judge Graham again denied the claim preclusion claim--see Miller v. King, 2009 WL 3805568 (S.D.Ga. Nov. 10, 2009).) From this point forward, Judge Graham started to not only dismiss more of the Plaintiff's claims, but also Defendants from the lawsuit. In January 2010, per the parties' stipulation, Judge Graham dismissed ASMP and GSP as Defendants (because they were part of GDOC) while the claims against GDOC remained pending. On July 6, 2010, Judge Graham dismissed all remaining claims against individual defendants. Furthermore, during that same month, Judge Graham ordered the termination of the following defendants as parties: the former Commissioner of the GDOC; the former Warden at GSP; and the State of Georgia. A few claims against a small set of Defendants remained pending: - The claims brought under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for damages against the GDOC; and - All claims for injunctive relief against the GDOC and the remaining individual defendants (including the Warden of ASMP). Despite the many dismissals, the plaintiff was able to negotiate a settlement of the remaining claims. On September 14, 2010, Judge Graham ordered that the case be administratively closed. He gave the parties 60 days to file a dismissal of judgment, and if the parties did not request that, the court was planning to dismiss the case with prejudice. The remaining defendants filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice on October 15, 2010. A proposed Settlement Agreement, included with the motion, stated the following important provisions. It included both monetary and injunctive relief. The Agreement were to be in effect until the plaintiff leaves the facility. The defendants agreed to: - make a $50,000 payment to the plaintiff; - make a $90,000 payment to the plaintiff's attorneys; - improve the accessibility of the prison facilities to conform with the ADA; - ensure that the plaintiff has the appropriate devices that would allow him to take showers and maintain hygiene; - assist him with daily activities; and - maintain a written medical Treatment Plan for the plaintiff. In exchange, the plaintiff was to release the defendants from all pending claims in this suit. Judge Graham approved the Settlement Agreement on November 1, 2010 and dismissed the case with prejudice. However, the plaintiff attempted three times to reopen the case and set aside the judgment between June 2011 and June 2013. Judge Graham denied the request each time, in part because the plaintiff's motions were largely unrelated to the issues in this case. In March 2013, the plaintiff tried to appeal the district court's decision, but the USCA dismissed the request. The plaintiff has not attempted to reopen the case or take other action to enforce the settlement agreement since 2013.

Summary: In 1998, a wheelchair-bound inmate confined at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. He sued the State of Georgia, and various officials, entities, and subdivisions of the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDOC). The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law by not accommodating his needs as a handicapped individual. After 15 years of discovery and negotiating, the parties settled in 2010. The plaintiff obtained money damages and changes in prison policies.


On July 9, 2010, a retired NYPD officer, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and the New York City Police Pension Fund under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. According to the plaintiff, in computing the plaintiff’s pensionable earnings, the defendants failed to rely on the plaintiff’s average rate of compensation and failed to take into account the compensation the plaintiff would have received but for his periods of military service. The plaintiff claimed that as a result of the computational errors that were in violation of USERRA, the plaintiff suffered a loss of pension benefits in an amount to be determined at trial. The case was assigned to Judge Richard J. Sullivan and Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman. On October 8, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the ground that the complaint failed to state a claim because USERRA does not require defendants to include overtime and night shift differential pay that plaintiff did not earn due to military service in calculating plaintiff’s pension. Disagreeing with the plaintiffs, Judge Sullivan denied this motion. 2011 WL 4469513. In their answer to the complaint, the defendants made a counterclaim, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to make reimbursement payments owed to the City of New York in the amount of $78,481.80. On December 16, 2011, the plaintiff moved to dismiss this counterclaim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively, for failure to state a claim. Agreeing with the plaintiff’s jurisdictional argument, the court dismissed the defendants’ counterclaim on February 22, 2012. On June 15, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal of the court’s dismissal of the defendant’s counterclaims. Then, on July 30, 2012, the court denied the defendants’ motion for leave to appeal for reasons that are unavailable on the docket. That same day, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, adding class allegations and two additional plaintiffs who were also retired NYPD officers. On June 17, 2013, the plaintiffs moved the court to preliminarily approve the settlement agreement and to certify class for the purposes of settlement. On July 2, 2013, the court approved this motion and retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure compliance. The settlement agreement provided substantial relief for then-current NYPD officers who were members of the Police Pension Fund, NYPD service member retirees who were receiving pensions from the Police Pension Fund, and current City employees belonging to other City retirement systems. Active officers were entitled to significant injunctive relief, while retirees were entitled to both injunctive relief and full monetary relief. Additionally, the agreement required the defendants to recalculate the pensionable earnings of NYPD actives, publish the agreement so that it might be readily available to its active and retired employees, and train the defendant’s employees responsible for performing the calculations. Finally, and importantly, the City of New York had agreed to take steps to ensure that all of the principles outlined in the agreement would apply to other City of New York employees, both active and retired. Specifically, the City would request that other city retirement systems implement the principles of the agreement with respect to their members. On December 30, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for final approval of the settlement agreement, which the court granted on January 14, 2014. Over the next two years, the parties moved for extensions of time to comply with the settlement agreement. The docket was last updated on April 13, 2016 with a compliance deadline of June 29, 2016. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: This 2010 class action lawsuit was brought by a retired NYPD officer in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged that the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and the New York City Police Pension Fund violated Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 by failing to accurately calculate the plaintiff’s pensionable income, thus denying him a portion of his pension benefits. In June 2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby the defendants would recalculate the pension benefits of the plaintiff and members of the class and the City would take steps to extend the principles outlined in the agreement to other New York City retirement systems. The case is presumably closed.


On August 29, 2011, the United States Department of Justice filed suit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, against owners, operators and managers of a 16-unit apartment building in New Orleans, Louisiana. The DOJ alleged that testing completed by the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center revealed that the defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of rental discrimination on the basis of race or color. Specifically, the complaint alleged that defendants refused to return phone calls from prospective renters who were African-American, but did return phone calls from prospective white renters, and otherwise made units unavailable to persons of color. The U.S. sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief as well as civil penalties. Settlement negotiations preceded the lawsuit, and the parties filed a proposed settlement concurrently with the complaint. On September 02, 2011, the Court (Judge Kurt D. Engelhardt) approved that four-year Consent Order. The decree covered all properties in which the defendants have any ownership or management interest; in addition to generally prohibiting discrimination, it required development and posting of non-discrimination policies, prominent posting of availability of units with the Equal Housing Opportunity slogan, explicit anti-discrimination notices in all advertising, and training of all employees. The settlement also provided for a system of recordkeeping to insure people of color were not being turned away, and maintenance of a timely updated list of available units. Defendants paid $50,000 to the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center and $10,000 as a civil penalty. The case terminated on September 07, 2011.

Summary: The Department of Justice filed suit under the Fair Housing Act against the owners, operators, and managers of a 16-unit apartment building in New Orleans, Louisiana. The DOJ alleged that defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of rental discrimination on the basis of race or color. The parties reached a settlement which covered all properties in which the defendants have any ownership or management interest; in addition to generally prohibiting discrimination, it required development and posting of non-discrimination policies, prominent posting of availability of units with the Equal Housing Opportunity slogan, explicit anti-discrimination notices in all advertising, and training of all employees. The settlement also provided for a system of recordkeeping to insure people of color were not being turned away, and maintenance of a timely updated list of available units.


On December 10, 2013, a non-profit religious organization filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The plaintiffs alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate violated the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs contended that the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations was insufficient to remedy these harms. The plaintiffs sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction that would keep the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them. On December 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against the defendant and for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff stated that it would be harmed as soon as the new insurance requirements became effective on January 1, 2014. Because of this impending harm, the plaintiff claimed it required an injunction, which would prevent the government from enforcing the mandate against it. The defendants opposed this motion on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiff's irreparable harm. On December 23, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss or summary judgment in the alternative. The defendant argued that the ACA did not substantially burden the plaintiff's exercise of religion and that, even if it did, the ACA met strict scrutiny. On January 2, 2014, the District Court ordered that the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction because the accommodation imposed a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion. Specifically, the mandate impermissibly required the head of a religious organization to sign a form that authorized a third party to provide contraception insurance coverage to the organization's employees. 10 F. Supp. 3d 725. The next day, the court ordered a final judgment and order of injunction that stated its terms and the acts restrained. The defendants appealed on February 24, 2014. On appeal, this case was consolidated with other cases, including East Texas Baptist University v. Sebelius. The Fifth Circuit overturned the district court, stating that "the acts that violated their faith are those of third parties" and that, under RFRA, the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the acts of those third parties. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that the ACA, with its exemption, substantially burdened the plaintiffs' religious exercise. The plaintiffs appealed and on May 17, 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court vacated the judgement and remanded the case, citing Zubik, which held that it was appropriate to vacate and remand so that the courts of appeals could address the arguments in response to the order for supplemental briefs. The supplemental briefing request asked parties to address how contraceptive coverage could be obtained by employees through insurance companies that did not require any involvement by plaintiffs beyond their decision to provide health insurance without contraceptive coverage. 136. S. Ct. 1557. The court of appeals then granted defendants' motion to stay the proceedings to allow the parties to negotiate a solution in accordance with the Supreme Court's order. On October 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss, citing new regulations that afforded the plaintiffs an exemption. The new regulations stated that forcing the plaintiffs to choose between the contraception mandate or penalties imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. On October 19, 2017, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Court granted the joint stipulation and dismissed the case. The case is closed.

Summary: On December 10, 2013, a non-profit religious organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. After appeals to the Fifth Circuit and the Supreme Court, the parties settled in a joint stipulation acknowledging that new regulations acknowledged the plaintiffs' religious rights.


On Apr. 18, 2002 the plaintiff, a female employee of International Profit Associates (IPA), filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued IPA under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and sought declaratory relief, monetary relief and attorneys fees. The plaintiff claimed that throughout her employment at IPA she was repeatedly sexually harassed and sexually discriminated against, and that this discrimination and harassment led her to experience severe emotional distress. Specifically, she claimed that beginning shortly after her employment began, she was subject to graphic sexual comments, unwanted physical contact and sexual propositions. She claimed that her discharge on August 28, 2001 was retaliatory because she refused to have sex with a manager and participated in an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission investigation against IPA. The case was assigned to Judge Joan B. Gottschall. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on May 14, 2002. They alleged that the case should be dismissed on the grounds that at the time of filing, the plaintiff was already a class member of a prior pending action arising out of the same set of facts. Separately, they alleged that the claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust state remedies. On September 26, 2002 the plaintiff filed a notice for a voluntarily dismissal of her individual case because of health reasons. She sought leave instead to intervene in an ongoing EEOC action against her employer, found at EE-IL-0123. The court granted leave to intervene on January 17, 2003 and the case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiff, a female employee of International Profit Associates filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They plaintiff claimed that throughout her employment at IPA she was repeatedly sexually harassed and sexually discriminated against, and that this discrimination and harassment led her to experience severe emotional distress. On September 26, 2002 the plaintiff filed a notice for a voluntarily dismissal of her individual case and sought leave to intervene in Case No. 01 C4427. The court granted the Plaintiff’s Motion to intervene and the case was closed.


On May 2, 2013, six African American and Latino men, represented by a law firm specializing in civil rights litigation, Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, LLP, and the public interest group The Bronx Defenders, brought this lawsuit against officers of the NYPD and the City of New York in the federal district court for the Southern District of New York. They alleged that the NYPD had charged them with misdemeanors for what should have been a less serious "violation"; concealed possession of marijuana. The different charges are significantly different as a misdemeanor charge often includes pre-trial detention, numerous court visits, and goes on a person’s criminal record, while a violation doesn’t require pre-trial detention, includes less court visits and doesn’t go on a person’s criminal record. Plaintiffs further claimed that officers of the NYPD were motivated by plaintiffs’ race when targeting them, that this practice was a widespread and well-known in the NYPD, and that it was a result of the NYPD’s policy of requiring officers to fill a quota for misdemeanor arrests. Plaintiffs argued that the NYPD’s practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, along with New York law. They sought damages, an injunction explicitly prohibiting NYPD officers from manufacturing misdemeanors for concealed possessions of small amounts of marijuana, and attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1988, and New York law. The case settled on January 7, 2014, when plaintiffs’ accepted New York City’s settlement offers, under which four of the plaintiffs received $12,501, and the other two received $50,001. The city didn’t admit to any legal liability, or admit that the plaintiffs had suffered injury at the hands of the NYPD. The plaintiffs in turn waived any right to continue or renew suit against the city or any of its agents over the NYPD’s actions. On January 30, the court also ordered the city to pay the plaintiffs’ lawyers $125,000 in attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs did not obtain any declaration or injunction.

Summary: Six African American and Latino men convicted of misdemeanors for possession of marijuana sued the NYPD on May 2, 2013, alleging that the NYPD had manufactured misdemeanor charges for what should have been violation offenses, that this was part of a widespread practice that disproportionally targeted minorities, and that the practice violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution along with New York Common Law. Plaintiffs sought damages, along with declaratory and injunctive relief, but settled for damages and attorneys fees without receiving the other requested relief.


On February 10, 2009, two parolees filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Michigan Parole Board in the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Detroit Division. The plaintiffs, represented by several public interest organizations, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Parole Board's conditions of parole were unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Special Conditions of the parole board in sex offender cases, imposed without input from the parolees, that limited romantic relationships, prohibited contact with their own children and minor siblings violated substantive due process. Plaintiffs were both convicted of sex offenses. One was convicted of attempted criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. The other plaintiff pled no contest to criminal sexual conduct in the third degree. After periods of incarceration, both plaintiffs were eventually released on parole. As a condition of their parole, they were not allowed contact with any minors, even family members, and not allowed to maintain romantic relationships or cohabitate with anyone who had custody of minor children. One of the plaintiffs could not visit his parents (because his minor child resided with the parents). Another could not visit his fiancée because she had custody of a minor child. On February 19, 2009, Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the conditions because they were not directly related to rehabilitation. Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew the motion, because a settlement was in sight. On April 30, 2010, the Court (Judge Marianna Battani) approved a stipulation and ordered dismissal of the case because the parties had settled. The stipulation provided the plaintiffs would be allowed contact with their children, and that the plaintiffs could have contact with minors, provided an adult responsible for that minor was present. It also allowed plaintiffs to accompany their children to places in which other minors were present, as long as they did not initiate contact with other minors. Finally, the stipulation provided that the plaintiffs could date or marry a person with minor children, if first approved by the field agent. The case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: Plaintiffs were parolees who, as a condition of their parole, could not interact with their own children, or maintain romantic relationships with people who had children. The ACLU and Michigan Child Advocacy Clinic filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Michigan Parole Board, alleging that the conditions violated substantive due process. The plaintiffs were successful in settling the case and modifying their parole conditions to allow them contact with their children and to maintain romantic relationships with the approval of their field officer.


On October 2, 2017, the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by Muslim Advocates and private counsel, the Brennan Center sued the Department of State (DOS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Brennan Center is an organization with a mission "to advance effective national security policies that respect the rule of law and constitutional values." They sought information about President Trump's September 24, 2017 Proclamation restricting entry of persons into the United States from six Muslim-majority countries (and two non-Muslim majority countries), including those with bona-fide relationships with U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. (More detail is in the Hawaii litigation.) The Proclamation stated that it had emerged from a provision of Executive Order 13780 of March 6, 2017, which directed the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in consultation with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, to "identify whether, and if so what, additional information will be needed from each foreign country to adjudicate an application by a national of that country for a visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA (adjudications) in order to determine that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat." The Proclamation specified that the DHS Secretary had submitted this information to President Trump on July 9 and September 15, 2017. The complaint arose from the Brennan Center's July 20, 2017 FOIA request to the State Department seeking copies of certain records relating to the worldwide review process mandated by Executive Order 13780 and the Trump Administration's "extreme vetting practices." In the complaint, the Brennan Center claimed that, to date, they had not received a substantive response from DOS. In the complaint, the Brennan Center sought: 1. The report that the DHS Secretary submitted to President Trump on July 9, 2017, referred to in Section 1(c) of the Proclamation; 2. The report that the DHS Secretary submitted to President Trump on Sept. 15, 2017, referred to in Section 1(h) of the Proclamation; 3. If not included in the above items (1) and (2), the final reports that the DHS Secretary submitted to President Trump on each of the eight countries identified in Section 2 of the Proclamation, i.e., Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Somalia; and 4. If not included in the above items (1) and (2), the final reports that the DHS Secretary submitted to President Trump on the 16 countries that the Secretary identified as "inadequate," referred to in Section 1(e) of the Proclamation, to the extent that they were not included in the list of seven countries in Section 1(h)(ii) of the Proclamation. They sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action, because the Proclamation contained portions that had already gone into effect immediately and others that would go into effect on October 18, 2017. They also wanted to secure the requested documents so that it and the public could become more informed about and evaluate the Proclamation for unconstitutionality. On October 3, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge John G. Koeltl and designated to Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox. The case was then reassigned to Judge Paul G. Gardephe on October 17, 2017. On December 21, 2017, both parties filed a series of motions. The Brennan Center moved to expedite the case and claimed that DOS had not properly informed them whether it would grant or deny the FOIA request. They argued that expedition was proper because of the public interest in the topic. DOS opposed the motion to expedite, arguing that it had already produced six responsive records and referred the request to DHS, which needed time to process records containing classified information. The Brennan Center replied, asking for production of the six responsive records within 21 days. The Court held a pretrial conference on January 4, 2018 and followed with a January 10 order, compelling DOS to produce all non-exempt materials and an explanation of exemptions by February 9, 2018. 300 F. Supp. 3d 540. Judge Gardephe wrote that the Brennan Center had shown that its FOIA request merited expedited treatment, given the strong public interest in the subject and the time that had already passed since the initial FOIA request. On March 15, 2018 the Brennan Center moved to compel DOS's compliance with the Jan. 10 order, but the government moved to oppose. On April 16, 2018, Judge Gardephe denied the motion, finding it premature to assess DOS's index, and instead set a briefing schedule for summary judgment, to be completed by July 22, 2018. On June 29, 2018, Judge Gardephe granted the parties' joint motion for a time extension on their cross-briefing for summary judgment. On August 2, 2018, DOS filed their summary judgment motion, arguing that the government had adequately searched responsive records and properly withheld certain records exempt from FOIA. On the same date, the Brennan Center filed their summary judgment motion and reply in opposition to the government's summary judgment motion. They argued that the government overstated the breadth of the Presidential-Communication Privilege and failed to show that its records search was adequate. In support of these requests, they submitted a memorandum of undisputed facts regarding President Trump's history of statements against Muslims, the histories of the three travel bans, and an unclassified cable that was sent to consular posts in 191 countries detailing the implementation of the second travel ban. Judge Gardephe granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment to the extent it requested that the court order in camera review of the requested records to determine the applicability of the presidential communication privilege. The remainder of the plaintiffs' motion was denied without prejudice, pending the court's in camera review. 2019 WL 10984173. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied without prejudice to renewal of the motion following the court's in camera review. The order also required the defendants to provide the court with copies of the five documents in question by April 8, 2019. They were later granted an extension of time to file and filed the documents on April 15, 2019. The Court continued to review the documents in camera to determine if and to what documents the presidential communications privilege applied. On July 30, 2020, the plaintiffs requested that the Court act expeditiously and proceed with the case as soon as possible. The plaintiffs reiterated that FOIA cases were entitled to expedition by statute and that the subject matter of this FOIA request was of great public interest. As of February 24, 2021, there was no response to plaintiffs’ request. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Oct. 2, 2017, the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law sued DOS under FOIA, seeking information about Trump's "extreme vetting practices" including the Administration's Mar. 6, 2017 EO and Sept. 24, 2017 Proclamation restricting entry of persons into the US. The Court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on March 29, 2019. It also ordered the defendants to provide the court with copies of five documents in question for in camera review on the applicability of the presidential communication privilege. The court continues to review the documents to determine and to what extent privilege applies. On July 30, 2020, the plaintiffs requested the court to act expeditiously and as soon as possible given the great public interest in the subject matter of the suit. This case is ongoing.


This was one of the LGBT discrimination cases consolidated before the Supreme Court in 2020 when it held that "[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]." District Court This case addresses the scope of the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and asks if employers are barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sexual orientation under the statute. A gay man filed this lawsuit on Sept. 23, 2010 against Altitude Express and its CEO, arguing that he was terminated from his employment there on the basis of his sexual orientation. He argued that Altitude had thereby discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation and so violated Title VII and New York gender and sexual orientation discrimination state law. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The plaintiff sought damages for the employer's conduct. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and assigned to Judge Joseph F. Bianco. Altitude Express is a corporation that facilitates opportunities for individuals to skydive. The plaintiff, Don Zarda, was seasonally employed at Altitude Express as a licensed skydiving instructor over several summers until July 2010. Zarda was openly gay. In his complaint, Zarda stated that he was required to be at work seven days per week for approximately twelve hours per day, though he was only paid per jump. As a result, there were days when he did not earn any income. The complaint described the process of skydiving, which included the client being strapped to the instructor and sitting so strapped in the instructor’s lap in the airplane just prior to the jump. Zarda asserted that it is a tense situation for a client, and so instructors tried to “break the ice” by making jokes about the situation, including gay jokes. Though gay jokes were considered acceptable, one female client complained about such a joke that Zarda made on June 18, 2010, and he was subsequently suspended from work. Zarda asserted that he “merely stated he was gay” to the client. The complaint asserted that Altitude Express's CEO, who was “hostile to any expression of sexual orientation that did not conform to sex stereotypes,” stated he fired Zarda because he had discussed his “personal escapades” with the female client and had touched her inappropriately. Zarda argued that neither of those allegations were true, and that other employees often discussed their personal intimate lives at work without consequence. Further, he argued that there was no proof the client accused him of inappropriate touching or that such touching ever occurred. Ultimately, Zarda argued that any accusations of touching were a pretext to terminate him because of his sexual orientation. The case immediately entered into discovery disputes. The employer moved for summary judgment on Feb. 11, 2013, while Zarda moved for partial summary judgment as a matter of law a few weeks later. Zarda argued that the Second Circuit in Sassaman v. Gamache allowed litigants on a case-by-case basis to claim discrimination under Title VII on the basis of sex stereotypes. Based on this precedent, Zarda asked the court to grant him summary judgment as to the employer's liability under Title VII. The court granted in part and denied in part the employer's motion for Summary Judgment on Mar. 28, 2014. The court denied the motion with respect to the sexual orientation discrimination and minimum wage claims under New York state law, and it granted the motion with respect to the gender stereotype discrimination, hostile work environment, and overtime claims. The court also denied Zarda's motion for partial Summary Judgment. Zarda then filed his second amended complaint the same day, which eliminated the claims of violation of the Federal Labor Standards Act and New York overtime state law. The employer then moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction on Apr. 15, 2014, which the court denied on May 8. Zarda filed a letter on June 19 documenting a statement from opposing counsel that Zarda believed to be homophobic. According to the letter, opposing counsel made references to Zarda’s “high-pitched voice”; Zarda believed this to be a direct use of known discriminatory stereotype specifically targeted at gay people. In an unexpected turn of events, on Oct. 7, 2014, Zarda’s lawyer filed notice that Don Zarda passed away due to a base-jumping accident in Switzerland. The plaintiff moved to substitute Zarda’s estate for Zarda on Nov. 19, which the court granted on Dec. 3. The plaintiff moved for reconsideration of partial summary judgment on Aug. 7, 2015 in light of new case law. The motion argued that a 1984 case, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, held that deference is owed to "agency interpretation in the absence of evidence of Congressional intent." The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is charged with enforcing Title VII, and the plaintiff argued that the EEOC's interpretation of what constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII had developed over the years to be more expansive and include sexual orientation. Thus the plaintiff argued that as a matter of law, partial summary judgment should be granted because this court should defer to the EEOC's interpretation of sex discrimination. Moreover, the plaintiff argued that deference to the EEOC pursuant to Chevron should take precedence over a Second Circuit decision in Simonton v. Runyon that did not find that discrimination based on sexual orientation constituted discrimination based on sex under Title VII. The trial was held in October 2015; the jury returned its verdict on Oct. 28, ruling for the employer. The plaintiff appealed on Nov. 20, 2015 to the Second Circuit. Court of Appeals With the case in the Second Circuit, the following parties filed amicus briefs: New York Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union, 9 to 5, A Better Balance, Coalition of Labor Union Women, Equal Rights Advocates, Gender Justice, Legal Voice, National Women's Law Center, Southwest Women's Law Center, Women Employed, Women's Law Center of Maryland, Women's Law Project, and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund. A Second Circuit panel of three judges confirmed the lower court judgment in a per curiam opinion on Apr. 18, 2017. 855 F.3d 76. The judges explained that as a panel of the Second Circuit, they were bound by the prior Second Circuit precedent, under which sexual orientation discrimination was not encompassed by Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. 855 F.3d 76. Only the entire court -- sitting en banc (all together) -- could change the precedent. 855 F.3d 76. On May 2, the plaintiff accordingly moved for a rehearing en banc, which was granted on May 25. On June 23, the EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, arguing that sexual orientation discrimination "necessarily involve[s] impermissible consideration of a plaintiff’s sex, gender-based associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping," and such sexual orientation discrimination falls under Title VII's discrimination ban. Dozens of other parties then filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff, including individuals, senators, organizations, and states. In an unusually public inter-governmental dispute, on July 26, 2017 the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief against its sister federal agency and in support of the employer, arguing that the EEOC is not entitled to any "deference beyond its power to persuade." The DOJ argued that Title VII does not reach sexual orientation, and that it is the role of Congress rather than the court to expand its application. A Title VII claim as to sex discrimination is only triggered when an employer treats similarly situated individuals of different sexes unequally. Several other organizations also filed briefs in support of the employer. After both sides submitted a series of briefs, the en banc hearing was held on Sept. 26, 2017. On February 26, 2018, the Second Circuit released its decision in this case, overruling the Simonton and Dawson circuit precedents, and holding that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex, and thus a subset of sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII. 883 F.3d 100. The Court concluded that sexual orientation discrimination is a subset of sex discrimination because sexual orientation is defined by one's sex in relation to the sex of those to whom one is attracted, making it impossible for an employer to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation without taking sex into account. Sexual orientation discrimination, the Court held, is also based on assumptions or stereotypes about how members of a particular gender should be, including to whom they should be attracted, which is forbidden by Title VII as impermissible discrimination based on sex. Finally the Court determined that sexual orientation discrimination is associational discrimination because an adverse employment action that is motivated by the employer's opposition to association between members of particular sexes clearly discriminates against an employee on the basis of sex. Each of these three perspectives was sufficient to support the Court's conclusion and together they amply demonstrated that sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination. The Court vacated the District Court's judgment on the Title VII claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. U.S. Supreme Court On May 29, 2018 Altitude Express filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States in response to the Second Circuit’s en banc opinion. Specifically, they requested certiorari regarding the question of “whether discrimination against an employee because of sexual orientation constitutes prohibited employment discrimination ‘because of…sex” within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2.” Zarda filed a brief in response to the petition on August 16, 2018, stating that this case was a bad vehicle for answering the questions presented, largely because one of the petitioners was not Zarda’s employer for the purposes of Title VII liability, and because Altitude Express was dissolved, so it was unclear whether they remained liable or if a successor company not seeking review was actually liable. Petition for writ of certiorari granted on April 22, 2019, and the case was consolidated with Bostock v. Clayton County and EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. for briefing and oral argument. More than three dozen amicus briefs were filed in support of Bostock and Zarda, including one brief joined by 206 companies--including businesses such as Apple, Google, Proctor and Gamble, Walt Disney, and Coca-Cola. The companies argued that a ruling that Title VII bans discrimination based on sexual orientation would not be “unreasonably costly or burdensome” for employers, but instead that this would create benefits for business, providing “consistency and predictability” nationwide and making it easier to “recruit and retain top talent.” Oral argument occurred on October 8, 2019, with the ACLU and the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Clinic arguing for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 15, 2020. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination "because of" sex. Justice Gorsuch stated that the statutory language "because of" implies a but-for causation analysis, meaning "so long as the plaintiff's sex was one but-for cause of that decision [to fire], that is enough to trigger the law." The opinion stated that "if an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual's sex, the statute's causation standard is met and liability may attach." LGBT discrimination against employees met this test, because "an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have question in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids." 590 U.S. ___. The decision of the Second Circuit was affirmed and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: This case addresses the scope of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination, and asks if employers are barred from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sexual orientation under the statute. A gay man filed this suit on Sept. 23, 2010 against Altitude Express and its CEO, arguing that he was terminated from his employment there on the basis of his sexual orientation. In so doing, the plaintiff argued that the employer discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation and so violated Title VII and New York gender and sexual orientation discrimination state law. Title VII is a federal law part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is charged with enforcing Title VII. The plaintiff sought damages for the employer's conduct. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York and assigned to Judge Joseph F. Bianco. Trial was held in October of that year. The jury returned its verdict on Oct. 28, ruling for the employer. The plaintiff appealed on Nov. 20, 2015 to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit confirmed the lower court judgment in a per curiam opinion on Apr. 18, 2017. The court argued that it would not overturn an opinion issued by a prior Second Circuit panel (Simonton v. Runyon). On May 2, the plaintiff moved for a rehearing en banc, which was granted. The EEOC filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff, and the Department of Justice filed an amicus brief in support of the employer. After both sides submitted a series of briefs, the en banc hearing was held on Sept. 26, 2017. On February 26, 2018, the Second Circuit released its decision in this case, overruling the Simonton and Dawson circuit precedents, and holding that sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex, and thus a subset of sex discrimination for purposes of Title VII. 883 F.3d 100. The Court vacated the District Court's judgment on the Title VII claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. The employer filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which affirmed the Second Circuit's decision.


On February 25, 2008 a group of pre-trial detainees at Northumberland County Prison filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Northumberland County Prison and the Northumberland County Prison Board. Their cause of action was 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and they alleged violations of the First, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically they claim that there was inadequate medical care, dental care, and mental health care. They claimed that the facility was a life-threatening fire hazard, that there were chronic environmental problems, that the women's facility was overcrowded, that there was inadequate clothing provided, that there was no confidential space to meet with attorneys, that disciplinary and restraint procedures were unconstitutional, and that women were discriminated against in relation to outdoor exercise, work release, and other programs. They sought class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. On June 11, 2008, the court (Judge John E. Jones III) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification without prejudice. On March 17, 2009, the court (Judge Jones) disposed of three pending motions that had arisen during discovery. It granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, granted the plaintiffs' motion to supplement the complaint, and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. The class consisted of all inmates of the Northumberland County Prison but some of the claims plaintiffs sought to have included were denied as proper claims for the class to raise. On April 29, 2011, the court granted the parties' joint motion for a settlement agreement. The settlement stipulated that the prison would provide increased medical, dental, and mental health care. It also requires written policies and protocols relating to that care. Additionally, the settlement mandates changes to discipline and restraint practices, better conditions in the basement cells, improved heating and cooling units, extermination of pests, improved fire safety, limitations on the population in the women's dormitory, and changes to the policies in the women's dormitory concerning discipline and recreation. The court dismissed the action and retained jurisdiction for a period of 15 months after the entry of the settlement agreement.

Summary: On February 25, 2008 a group of pre-trial detainees at Northumberland County Prison filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Northumberland County Prison and the Northumberland County Prison Board alleging a variety of constitutional violations related to medical care, environmental conditions, fire safety, overcrowding, discipline, and the availability of prison programs for women. On April 29, 2011, the judge granted the parties' joint motion for a settlement requiring improved medical care, fire safety, and environmental conditions as well as changes to the discipline policies and recreation programs at the prison. The defendant also agreed to pay $300,000 to the plaintiff to cover litigation costs.


On March 6, 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female banker, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Louisiana, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Wells Fargo Financial Louisiana, Inc. The complaint claimed that the defendant deprived the complainant equal opportunities of getting promoted because of her race, African American, and her sex, female. On January 3, 2001, the EEOC filed an amended complaint since it incorrectly named the defendant in its original complaint. The complainant was an Assistant Manager who was repeatedly denied a promotion to Branch Manager, despite having gotten positive recommendations from another Branch Manager. On two separate occasions, two lesser qualified White males who were also Assistant Managers were promoted to Branch Managers. The complainant was offered an intermediate position which offered a higher pay but she was never promoted to Branch Manager. The complainant then felt forced to quit because of the stress of not being able to be promoted based on her race and sex. On August 15, 2001, the District Court (Judge F. A. Little, Jr.) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $12,000.

Summary: On March 6, 2000, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female banker, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Louisiana, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Wells Fargo Financial Louisiana, Inc. The complaint alleged that the defendant reused to promote the complainant because of her race and her sex. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $12,000.