On July 5, 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to Vermont's governor, advising him of the results of the late summer 2004, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Vermont State Hospital ("VSH"), a facility housing mentally ill persons. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended VSH staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for patient well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found deficiencies in patient care at VSH, in that conditions and services at VSH substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of patients at VSH were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies in conditions of patient care and treatment at VSH existed as to three topic areas, including VSH's: (1) failure to protect patients from harm and undue restraints (e.g., inadequate suicide prevention measures; use of seclusion and restraints for staff convenience and initial punishment, rather than in patients' best interests; excessive duration and failure to document use of seclusion and restraints); (2) failure to provide adequate psychiatric and psychological services (inadequate and dated treatment planning, psychiatric and psychological assessments and diagnoses; poor medication management and monitoring; rudimentary or non-existent behavior plans) and (3) failure to ensure adequate discharge planning and placement in the most integrated setting appropriate to each patient's individualized needs (e.g., failure to initiate, maintain, monitor, or adjust adequate discharge criteria or to maintain an adequate utilization review process necessary to ensure appropriate lengths of stay). The letter provided details of deficiencies for all three of these categories. Moreover, the findings letter stated that these shortcomings were at times historical problems, rather than sporadic recent failures. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation and by providing notice that, absent a resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at VSH. On July 21, 2006, DOJ simultaneously filed both a CRIPA complaint against Vermont and a consent judgment between the parties, the latter setting out an agreed-upon settlement including obligations by the state to implement the remedial measures set out in the findings letter. The lawsuit set out that the state's practices at VSH violated its' patients' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C § 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure (depending on the component of the plan, within six, eighteen, twenty-four, or thirty months) improvements that would bring the facility up to generally accepted professional standards of care, including integrated treatment planning, adequate and complete mental health assessments, and improved discharge planning and community integration. The settlement also set out time frames for psychiatric, psychological, and pharmacy services improvements, documentation improvements, and implementation of modern practices in the use at VSH of restraints, seclusion and emergency use of psychotropic medications, as well as reporting and supervision measures to provide protection from harm and adoption of an integrated incident management system. Improvement in quality assurance and environmental conditions were also mandated by the agreement. The parties' settlement appointed Mohamed El-Saabawi and Jeffrey Geller as jointly-selected experts to monitor the implementation of the agreement, with the federal and state governments, respectively, paying each monitor's reasonable costs and expenses. Every six months, the monitors would produce to the parties a joint report on compliance. The agreement would terminate in four years, unless earlier compliance could be established. District Judge William K. Sessions III approved the settlement and issued a conditional dismissal of the case on July 31, 2006. Shortly before the settlement agreement was set to expire, the parties agreed to extend the term of the agreement from July to October 2010 in order to continue working together to address conditions at the hospital. Following the parties' Joint Motion for Final Dismissal, on October 28th, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: This 2005 case in the U.S. District Court of Vermont is the result of the DOJ's investigation of conditions and practices at the Vermont State Hospital, a facility housing mentally ill persons. The DOJ simultaneously filed both a CRIPA complaint and a settlement agreement setting out remedial measures to improve the level of care provided at the hospital. In 2010, the court dismissed the case per the terms of the settlement agreement.


On January 13, 2012, three non-profit organizations that advocate for independent living for individuals with disabilities filed this civil rights lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles, the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles ("CRA"), and 34 owners of CRA-funded apartment complexes under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and California Government Code §1135 for failure to ensure that housing was accessible to people with disabilities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for the injuries incurred as a result of the defendant's allegedly discriminatory practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's actions have frustrated the plaintiffs' missions and undermined the effectiveness of the programs and services they provided, including encouraging community integration of people with disabilities, providing assistance to individuals and families searching for housing or affected by discriminatory housing practices, and eliminating discriminatory housing practices. After being served, the CRA was dissolved and ceased to exist as of February 1, 2012. Its authority, rights, powers, duties, and obligations were transferred to successor agencies and entities. One of those agencies was the DRA, which was also a named defendant and subsequently sued in a cross-claim by the City of Los Angeles. Another was the CRA/LA, which was operating under the supervision and direction of a newly constituted Oversight Board. On June 1, 2012, the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint naming the CRA/LA and the Oversight Board as defendants, and adding additional nominal defendants. In an August 13, 2012 status report, the parties stated that they had conducted preliminary settlement conversations, and that the plaintiffs' lead counsel had attempted to engage the defendants in further discussions for a possible mediation. On August 20, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint correcting the name of a defendant. Over the next few months, the defendants individually filed answers to the plaintiffs' first amended complaint, which the Court deemed to be responses to the second amended complaint. On September 20, 2011, the City, CRA/LA, and the Oversight Board filed motions to dismiss. In a November 29, 2012 meeting in chambers, U.S. District Judge S. James Otero dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the FHA as to DLA and the City, and all of the plaintiffs' claims as to the Board. On December 17, 2012, the Court referred the case to alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Later that month, the Court entered a scheduling order, giving the parties until September 2013 to complete discovery. The case was transferred to Judge Fernando M. Olguin for all subsequent proceedings. When the parties failed to meet the September 2013 deadline, Judge Olguin became involved in the process by attempting to work with counsel to forge a plan to proceed with discovery. After that, Judge Olguin held more than thirteen hearings to work through the various discovery issues. The primary area of contention was electronically stored information, the production of which would have resulted in both sides spending tremendous amounts of time and money going through those documents. Meanwhile, the defendants were involved in a battle of cross-claims. The City of Los Angeles filed a Crossclaim for Contribution, Indemnity, and Declaratory Relief against the owner defendants and the CRA/LA. The CRA/LA subsequently filed a nearly identical crossclaim against the owner defendants. The owner defendants filed a motion to dismiss the City and the CRA/LA’s crossclaims, which was granted on September 19, 2013. 973 F.Supp.2d 1139. Judge Olguin found that: (1) the owner defendants could not be liable to the government defendants based on plaintiffs’ claims; (2) no express or implied right of contribution or indemnity existed under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act; (3) the comprehensive remedial scheme of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act preempted state-law rights to contribution and indemnity; and (4) the government defendants could not rely on contractual indemnity provisions as an "end run around the unavailability of indemnification or contribution under these civil rights statutes." On December 17, 2013, CRA/LA filed a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the Amended Cross-Claim for Indemnity and Contribution by the City of Los Angeles, which was granted the following September. The parties' discovery dispute continued well into 2016. On February 25, 2016, the CRA/LA moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the plaintiffs' second amended complaint. This motion was denied in an August 31, 2016 order, in which Judge Olguin held that the CRA/LA could be found liable as a successor to the CRA based on the extensive factual allegations in the second amended complaint. 205 F.Supp.3d 1105. On July 29, 2016, the plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles reached a settlement agreement. The agreement provided that over the following 10 years, the City would ensure that at least 4,000 of its affordable housing units met the highly accessible standards required by federal law, and would enforce policies to ensure that those units were inhabited by people who needed the specific accessibility features provided. The city would spend at least $200 million during the life of the agreement. Over the 10 years of the agreement, the plaintiffs were to assist people with disabilities to transition into the newly-accessible units. In September of 2017, the plaintiffs and CRA/LA reached a separate settlement agreement. 2017 WL 3976623. In it, CRA/LA agreed to take all actions necessary to provide 250 accessible units by no later than January 2021. It also agreed to establish a Housing Accessibility Fund. It committed $8,750,000 to the retrofits necessary to upgrade the 250 accessible units, and committed $160,000 to a court-appointed monitor. The monitor, to be appointed in early 2018, would evaluate CRA/LA’s compliance with the agreement. A corrected settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles was filed on December 13, 2017. It finalized the determination of attorneys fees. The owner defendants, who were explicitly unaffected by the settlement agreements between the other defendants and the plaintiffs, filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on October 5, 2017. In it, they argued that the plaintiffs had no remaining stated claims against the defendants in light of the two settlement agreements, and that the plaintiffs had achieved complete relief absent the owner defendants’ participation. On January 31, 2018, the court was notified of a related case, 2:11-cv-00974-PSG. This is an action brought by the United States for damages and civil penalties under the False Claims Act. The FCA claim does not appear to have affected the outcome of this case. On September 28, 2018, Judge Olguin denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that it was an inappropriate device for challenging the consent judgments. 2018 WL 6118574. On October 23, 2018, Judge Olguin appointed a settlement monitor. On February 15, 2019, the monitor submitted their first report and concluded that the defendant was not on track in complying with the settlement agreement, finding that the defendant missed every deadline related to the settlement. After several semi-annual monitoring reports finding compliance issues, the plaintiffs invoked the dispute resolution process set forth in the settlement agreement. They argued that the defendant violated numerous settlement provisions. After unsuccessfully mediating the dispute, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On December 19, 2019, Judge Olguin granted the motion. Monitoring will continue until Judge Olguin finds substantial compliance with the settlement agreement or 2026, whichever is later.

Summary: On January 13, 2012, three non-profit organizations that advocate for independent living for individuals with disabilities filed this civil rights lawsuit in the District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles, the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles ("CRA"), and 34 owners of CRA-funded apartment complexes for failure to ensure that housing is accessible to people with disabilities. The plaintiffs settled with the City of Los Angeles in 2016, and separately settled with the CRA/LA in 2017. The plaintiffs and the owner-defendants are still in litigation.


This case was transferred from the Northern District of Alabama and is a later development of the case EE-AL-0119. On October 18, 2006, several current and former employees of the defendant's Albertville, Alabama facility filed a lawsuit against the company under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Middle Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this class action seeking damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant Wayne Farms violated the FLSA. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim the company failed to account for all compensable time of its employees, including time spent clearing security and time walking to and from security to donning and doffing areas. On June 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge R. David Proctor) ordered the case stayed because the court had received Defendant's Notice of Motion to Transfer and Consolidate for Pretrial Proceedings to the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. On November 5, 2007, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that the case be transferred to the Southern District of Mississippi. On October 9, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 17, 2008, holding that seven plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. On October 15, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 17, 2008, on the ground that two plaintiffs failed to list the FLSA claim as an asset in their bankruptcy petitions and thus were estopped from asserting the claim. On November 17, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 18, 2008, on the ground that one plaintiff never worked more than 40 hours in any contestable work week and thus, did not have an FLSA overtime claim. On November 24, 2008, the defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was granted on December 19, 2008, on the ground that 3 plaintiffs worked only as Quality Assurance employees and had been paid already for all the activities cited in the Complaint. On April 9, 2009, the parties reached a settlement. On August 17, 2009, the District Court (Judge Keith Starrett) granted preliminary approval to the terms of the settlement agreement, which provided that defendant pay $1,375,000 (which included attorneys' fees). On March 31, 2010, the District Court (Judge Starrett) issued the Judgment of Dismissal. However, on June 10, 2010, the Court reopened the case for the limited purpose of filing the distribution plan. The court ultimately closed the case on September 1, 2010.

Summary: This case was brought against Wayne Farms, LLC by current and former employees seeking monetary damages under the FLSA. The case settled for $1,375,000 and was dismissed by the court on September 1, 2010.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule. Casa de Maryland and two of its Members Sue Over the Public Charge Rule On September 16, 2019, Casa de Maryland, a nonprofit immigrant rights organization serving over 100,000 members, and two of its members filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs, represented by Georgetown Law’s Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection (ICAP), sued Donald J. Trump, in his capacity as President of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaration that the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Rule) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment and an order setting it aside. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Charles B. Day and then immediately reassigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. In their complaint, the plaintiffs asserted four claims for relief. First, the plaintiffs claimed that the Rule was not in accordance with the plain meaning of public charge in the INA and that defendants acted beyond their statutory authority. The plaintiffs further contended that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious because it "departs from over a century of prior practice without adequate explanation for this change in policy" and defendants' proffered rationales are "not supported by the evidence in the record, and a pretext to conceal the true motivation for the policy change." The plaintiffs also proclaimed that the Rule violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, arguing that it is so vague that affected persons will "struggle to know how to accord their conduct to avoid adverse immigration consequences." Lastly, the plaintiffs contend that because "defendants’ promulgation of the Public Charge Rule was motivated at least in part by the Trump Administration’s intent to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, and national origin," the Rule violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that the Rule will cause them and their members harm by producing a chilling effect that discourages eligible members from utilizing public benefits and requiring Casa de Maryland to allocate significant resources to combat this chilling effect. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing or enforcing the rule or, at the least, delaying its implementation date. The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to win on the merits of their APA and Constitutional claims, that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in favor of an injunction. In support of their request for a nationwide injunction, the plaintiffs contended that a nationwide scope is appropriate in order to ensure uniformity in immigration enforcement and to provide plaintiffs with complete redress. On September 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint and a corrected motion for preliminary injunction, making minor formatting and substantive changes to both documents. In their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction filed on October 1, 2019, the defendants argued that the "plaintiffs provide no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a sweeping overhaul of core immigration law principles." The defendants asserted that the individual plaintiffs and Casa de Maryland did not establish standing and that the "plaintiffs’ claims are even more sweeping and aggressive than those of other litigants challenging the Rule." The District Court Grants a Nationwide Preliminary Injunction Following a hearing on October 10, 2019, Judge Grimm issued an opinion and order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on October 14, 2019. The order enjoined the defendants from enforcing the Rule nationwide and postponed the implementation of the Rule pending the resolution of this case. Judge Grimm concluded that a nationwide injunction was appropriate given the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, the irreparable harm they would face absent a nationwide injunction, and the need to have a uniform immigration law. 414 F.Supp.3d 760. The defendants filed a motion for stay of injunction pending appeal to the Fourth Circuit on October 25, 2019. Defendants argued that they are likely to succeed on appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing, did not fall within the zone of interests of the relevant statute, and the Rule is fully consistent with the INA and the APA. Defendants also contended that, because they would be "forced to grant lawful permanent residence (“LPR”) status to aliens likely to become public charges at any time under the Rule," they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay as their interest in "ensuring that 'aliens be self-reliant'" would be affected. On October 30, 2019, the defendants filed an appeal of the order for preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit. The appeal was docketed on November 4, 2019 (Docket No. 19-2222). On November 14, 2019, Judge Grimm issued an order denying the defendants' motion for stay pending appeal. Judge Grimm concluded that the defendants did not make a strong showing that they were likely to succeed on their appeal, that they did not establish irreparable injury in the absence of a stay, and that the defendants offered no arguments addressing why a stay would be in the public's best interest. 2019 WL 7565389. The Fourth Circuit Stays the Injunction Pending Appeal The next day, the defendants filed a motion for stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal, rehashing the main arguments from their motion to stay in the district court. On December 9, 2019, a Fourth Circuit panel issued an order granting the motion to stay the injunction pending appeal without issuing an opinion explaining their reasoning. Circuit Judges J. Harvie Wilkinson III and Paul Niemeyer voted to grant the motion and Circuit Judge Pamela Harris voted to deny the motion. On December 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Fourth Circuit's order granting stay of the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that it was inappropriate for the panel to grant the motion, and threaten to upend the status quo, with limited briefing and without oral argument. The plaintiffs further contended that should the Fourth Circuit grant the stay, "DHS’s new rule would go into effect in all or most of the country before any appellate court rules on the merits of the preliminary injunctions—causing irreparable harm to Appellees and to noncitizens around the country." The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 3, 2020, maintaining the claims and arguments as the first amended complaint and adding the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs asserted that the immigrant communities of Baltimore will be harmed by the chilling effects caused by the Rule. On January 14, 2020, after the defendants filed a response in opposition, the Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, again without issuing an opinion explaining its rationale. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court issued orders staying a nationwide injunction in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security and an injunction for the State of Illinois in Cook County, Illinois v. Wolf. Following these decisions, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. Defendants Move to Dismiss On May 27, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants asserted that the complaint should be dismissed in full "[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s repeated stays of injunction, the Ninth Circuit’s detailed opinion on the Rule’s legality," and because the Rule does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses. The Fourth Circuit Reverses the Preliminary Injunction On August 5, a split Fourth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Harvie Wilkinson III, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert King) issued an order and opinion denying the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction. 971 F.3d 220. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson held that Casa lacked standing; that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits of their claims because the Rule was a permissible interpretation of "public charge;" and that a nationwide injunction was an overly broad remedy. Judge King dissented. Citing a decision of the Seventh Circuit two months prior (962 F.3d 208), he disagreed on all points. He held that plaintiffs did have standing; that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits because the Rule is not a permissible interpretation of "public charge" given the statute and history; and that a nationwide injunction was an appropriate remedy given the circumstances. In light of this decision, back in the district court, Judge Grimm back issued an order on August 7, directing the parties to supplement their briefings on the pending motion to dismiss. The Reversal is Stayed Pending a Rehearing en banc On September 15, the Fourth Circuit's order was stayed pending ruling on a petition to rehear the case en banc. That petition was granted on December 3, 2020, and oral arguments are scheduled to begin in March 2021. President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. The parties began conferring to determine how this would impact the litigation. On March 1, 2021, the District Court denied the government's motion to dismiss without prejudice, noting that the motion would be subject to reinstatement once the administration reviewed the rule. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision that vacates the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 11, the Fourth Circuit issued an order granting the government's voluntary dismissal of its appeal. That same day, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants. They also moved to reconsider the dismissal. They filed similar intervention motions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. The Fourth Circuit denied the motion to intervene, as well as the motion to reconsider, on March 18. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 16, 2019, a non-profit immigrant rights organization in Maryland and two of its members filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. In October 2019 the district court ordered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule nationwide. A Fourth Circuit panel stayed the injunction in December 2019, reversed it in August 2020, but in December 2020 agreed to rehear it en banc. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.


On May 21, 2013, director and editors of Antiwar.com filed this suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sought disclosure of records maintained by the FBI regarding a 2004 threat assessment conducted by the FBI regarding this website. Represented by private counsels and ACLU of Northern California, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs separately filed requests with the FBI seeking expungement of all FBI records that describe each plaintiff’s exercise of First Amendment rights. In August 2013, the FBI responded that maintenance of records regarding the plaintiffs was proper under Section 552a(j)(2) of the Privacy Act. The plaintiffs appealed this decision and the FBI responded that because the matter was subject to judicial review, the appeal had been administratively closed. The plaintiffs also appealed the denial of the expungement request and sought amendment of any records that pertain to individual plaintiffs that were inaccurate, irrelevant, untimely, or incomplete. The FBI denied the appeal because the matter was currently subject to judicial review. On May 1, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint alleging four claims for relief, including two new claims under the Privacy Act. On November 12, 2015, FBI filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion on December 17, 2015. On May 10, 2016, the Magistrate Judge Jacqueline S. Corley entered an order regarding the cross-motions for summary judgments. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ third and fourth claims for relief under Sections (e)(7) and (d)(2) of the Privacy Act that the FBI must expunge or correct the memos. The court denied without prejudice both parties’ motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ first and second claims for relief regarding disclosure under FOIA and Privacy Act claims. 2016 WL 2642038. On January 23, 2017, after four years of extensive litigation, the parties stipulated a proposed settlement agreement. On the same day, Magistrate Judge Corley granted the agreement. The settlement required the defendant to produce relevant information to the plaintiffs to satisfy its obligation under the FOIA. The parties stipulated to dismiss all FOIA claims, with the exception of attorney’s fees. On February 10, 2017, the parties entered into a further stipulation of settlement agreement to propose that they will (1) either file a stipulation of settlement and dismissal as to the plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees pursuant to FOIA or (2) propose a briefing schedule with respect to the attorney’s fees to the court by April 14, 2017. The court granted further stipulation on February 13, 2017. On July 18, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration regarding their Privacy Act claims and allowed the plaintiffs to bring claims under the Privacy Act based on newly produced documents. 2017 WL 3035157. On October 5, 2017, the defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment. On October 26, the plaintiffs also filed a second cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 12, 2018, having considered the parties’ briefs and oral argument, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion. 2018 WL 398236. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (USCA Case Number 18-15416). In the Court of Appeals, the parties exchanged briefs and multiple institutions filed amici briefs. Oral argument took place on June 12, 2019 before a three-judge panel consisting of Judge A. Wallace Tashima, Judge William A. Fletcher, and Judge Marsha S. Berzon. On September 11, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an order affirming in part and reversing in part the trial court's judgment. 937 F.3d 1284. The Ninth Circuit held that unless a record is pertinent to an ongoing authorized law enforcement activity, an agency may not maintain it under Section (e)(7) of the Privacy Act. The Ninth Circuit held that the FBI had not met its burden of demonstrating that the one memo, the 2004 Memo, was pertinent to an ongoing law enforcement activity, it must be expunged. However, another memo, the Halliburton Memo, need not be expunged because the FBI had met its burden to prove that it was pertinent to ongoing law enforcement activities. On November 20, 2019, Judge Corley of the Northern District of California issued an amended final judgment ordering the FBI to expunge from its records the 2004 threat assessment memo. With this final order, the case closed.

Summary: In May 2013, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the FBI in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking disclosure of documents pursuant to FOIA and the Privacy Act. Represented by ACLU of Northern California, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties settled on the FOIA claims and the court ruled in favor of the FBI on the Privacy Act claims in 2017. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that one memo was no longer pertinent to an ongoing law enforcement activity and must therefore be expunged, but another memo was pertinent and did not need to be expunged.


On March 14, 2007, a group of female current and former employees of Sanofi-Aventis US (a pharmaceutical company) filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and New York Executive Law § 296. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, including back pay, front pay, and compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against female employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Sanofi-Aventis discriminated with respect to its policies, practices and selection procedures for promotion, a disparate pay scale, and differential terms and conditions of employment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant subjected female employees to a continuing systemic discrimination that resulted in both a disparate impact and disparate treatment in the areas of promotion, training, and performance evaluation, which relied on subjective judgments, and further that the defendant's refusal to establish clear guidelines could not be justified as a business necessity. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant:
- pre-selects and "grooms" male employees for promotions, favorable assignments and training - fails to provide all employees with a consistent and timely notice of job openings and promotional opportunities - requires managers to give permission to an employee to apply for any promotion - fails to prevent sexual harassment targeted at female employees by male managers; and - selectively and disproportionally disciplines and punishes women for minor infractions - retaliates against females who seek relief through human resources
On February 29, 2008, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, but the Court rejected this motion. Between February 2008 and November 2009, the parties engaged in discovery. On November 16, 2009, the parties submitted a stipulation informing the court that the action was settled and the parties were in the process of preparing class action settlement agreement. On August 5, 2010, the Court approved the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs received over $15 million in damages and their counsel was awarded over $4.5 million for the settlement. The settlement also included injunctive terms for the defendant to develop non-discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation policies that ensure its female employees enjoy equal terms and conditions of employment comparable to their male counterparts. These policies were to include:
- prohibiting discrimination based on gender or marital status; - prohibiting harassment and retaliation that result from employees' reporting of gender discrimination; and - improving policies on pay and promotions
The settlement was to last three years, or until 2013. The case is now closed.

Summary: In March 2007, a group of female current and former employees of a pharmaceutical company filed this class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant discriminated against female employees, and therefore violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. and New York Executive Law § 296. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement that awarded the plaintiffs over $15 million in damages and injunctive relief. The case is closed.


On September 21, 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 ("Local 117") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of the union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued the Washington State Department of Corrections ("DOC") for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sections 2000e, et seq. More than thirty days prior to the institution of this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed charges of unlawful discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that defendant violated Title VII. Local 117 is the exclusive certified bargaining representative of approximately 6,000 State employees employed by the DOC. In July 2007, prior to the filing of this case, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of females inmates against DOC, alleging that certain staff had engaged in sexual misconduct ("the Jane Doe lawsuit"). The DOC responded to the Jane Doe lawsuit by conducting an investigation and hiring consultants to look at the issue. As a result of this investigation, the consultants hired by the DOC recommended increasing the number of female correctional officers in the women's correctional facilities. The consultants did not recommend decreasing the number of male correctional officers. The plaintiffs' experts in the Jane Doe case suggested that increasing the number of female correctional officers would limit the potential for sexual misconduct. Both the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, the Department of Justice, and the National Institute of Corrections Information Center recommended increasing overall staffing levels at women's correctional facilities in order to improve safety. In May 2008, the DOC submitted a request to the Washington State Human Rights Commission ("WSHRC") to designate numerous existing correctional officer positions at several women's correctional facilities as female-only, asserting that gender is a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") for those positions. In February 2009, the WSHRC approved DOC's request to designate the requested positions as female-only, and upon receipt of those approvals, the DOC indicated to Locall 117 its intent to designate the positions as female-only and began recruiting and reassigning employees accordingly. In this lawsuit, Local 117 alleged that DOC failed to undertake any individualized analysis of each position before designating approximately 110 positions as female-only, and they further alleged that many of these positions were improperly designated as female-only. Local 117 alleged that, as a result, male correctional officers were discriminated against, such as being forced to transfer to less desirable positions and being skipped-over on overtime opportunities. In addition, the female staff were required to work more overtime hours. Further, following the designation of additional female-only positions, DOC employees reported that violence against staff by inmates had increased, as had violence between inmates. DOC employees believed that a lack of male staff presence in the female living units has emboldened violent offenders to act out. Both sides moved for summary judgment. On April 8, 2013, Judge Settle granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and found the plaintiff's motion moot. 2013 WL 1412335 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 8, 2013). On April 19, 2013, plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On June 12, 2015, the Ninth Circuit filed an opinion affirming the trial court's decision. 789 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2015). The plaintiff filed petitions for rehearing en banc and panel rehearing, but the Ninth Circuit denied these petitions on August 5, 2015.

Summary: In 2011, the Teamsters Local Union, No. 117 ("Local 117") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Washington on behalf of its union members who worked for the Washington Department of Corrections. The plaintiff sued DOC for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by designating certain existing correctional officer positions at women's correctional facilities as female-only. In 2013, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and in 2015 the Ninth Circuit affirmed this decision.


On May 1, 2012, the family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado ("ADX") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendants' failure to treat the prisoner's serious mental illness violated his Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant "exhibited persistent and deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's mental illness, which lead to the death of the prisoner in an incident determined to be a suicide. A related class action case was filed on June 18, 2012. See PC-CO-0019. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 31, 2012, adding a second cause of action for deprivation of the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death. On April 23, 2013, the district court (Judge Richard P. Matsch) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the First Amendment claim and denied the motion to dismiss on all other claims. On June 21, 2012, the defendant filed an appeal of the district court's order denying the motion to dismiss. On July 22, 2014, the U.S. Circuit Court for the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, finding a lack of factual support for the allegation that the named defendant could be held personally liable for any shortcomings in the treatment of the prisoner. The court (Chief Judge Mary Beck Briscoe) remanded the case with direction to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss. 572 Fed. App'x 611 (10th Cir. 2014). On remand, the district court (Judge Matsch) entered an order dismissing the case on November 13, 2014. No. 12-cv-1144-RPM, 2015 WL 9583378 (Col. 2015). On December 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Seek Relief from Judgment and Leave to Amend the Complaint. The plaintiff claimed that he could prove that Warden Davis knew Vega and knew of his mental condition through new evidence obtained in discovery in Cunningham, et al v. Federal Bureau of Prisons (PC-CO-0019). Judge Matsch granted the motion on April 23, 2015. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on July 15, 2015, alleging that, had Warden Davis performed his job duties and read Vega’s records, he would have been aware of the suicide risk. Instead, he failed to take any preventative action. The amended complaint included a count of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, and a count of deprivation of right of familial association. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the claim of deprivation of the right of familial association on the grounds that the claim was already adjudicated by the 10th Circuit, and also filed a motion to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim on the basis that the complaint still failed to state an individual-capacity claim against the defendant. On December 31, 2015, the judge granted the motion to dismiss, determining that the defendant was not accountable for the death under the doctrine of qualified immunity without direct knowledge or notice. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals on January 21, 2016. The appellate court determined that, although the deliberate indifference claim was nudged closer to the line of plausibility than in his initial complaint, the plaintiff still failed the facial plausibility standard. As such, the 10th Circuit Court affirmed the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss. 673 Fed App'x 885 (10th Cir. 2016). The case is now closed.

Summary: The family of a deceased prisoner formerly held at the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum in Florence, Colorado ("ADX") filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against agents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant disregarded the family's right to the prompt return of the prisoner's body and his personal possessions following his death, in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The case twice failed on qualified immunity grounds. The case is now closed.


On May 18, 2016, thirteen lawful permanent residents (LPRs) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs sued U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs, represented by a private immigration law firm, claimed that USCIS had unlawfully delayed adjudicating their naturalization applications by classifying them under its CARRP (Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program) policy. The plaintiffs sought an injunction compelling USCIS to dismantle CARRP policies and to adjudicate the plaintiffs' applications, and a declaratory judgment that CARRP violated the INA, APA, the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution, and the Due Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment. Subsequently, on June 21, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, increasing the number of plaintiffs to twenty. The plaintiffs were all from countries with significant Muslim populations — Albania, Pakistan, Iraq, Palestine, Egypt, Nigeria, Bosnia, India, Iran, Afghanistan, Yemen, Mali, and Sudan. USCIS's CARRP policy directed adjudicating officers to identify any immigration benefits application by any applicant that might implicate a "national security concern." When so classified, the officers were required to delay or deny the application. Although the total number of people subject to CARRP is not known, USCIS data revealed that between 2008 and 2012, more than 19,000 people from twenty-one Muslim-majority countries or regions were subjected to CARRP. CAARP's definition of a "national security concern" was broader than the INA's, drawing on the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database, which the plaintiffs alleged was based on vague, overbroad, and uncorroborated information. All the plaintiffs in this case submitted naturalization applications that were subject to CAARP. Some of the plaintiffs had already also had naturalization interviews and examinations, part of the statutorily defined naturalization process under the INA. That statute specified that USCIS must process a naturalization application within 180 days from the filing date and within 120 days of the interview and examination date. All the plaintiffs had been waiting for a decision for longer than the 180-day period -- in one case, for more than two years. Further, USCIS did not notify plaintiffs that they had been classified under CARRP, nor did the plaintiffs have an opportunity to respond to this action. In addition to the INA claim, the plaintiffs challenged CARRP as a violation of the APA due to USCIS's arbitrary and capricious action and action contrary to law. CARRP never passed through the APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking process, nor did Congress approve it. The plaintiffs alleged that the INA, rather than USCIS's additional non-statutory criteria, must govern naturalization entitlements because the Naturalization Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to set naturalization law through statutes. After the plaintiffs filed their complaints, during the rest of 2016, the individual plaintiffs filed three voluntary dismissal motions, after either USCIS had adjudicated their applications or the particular plaintiffs themselves had withdrawn them. By the end of 2016, only one plaintiff remained. On December 19, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that USCIS had already denied this plaintiff's application in October 2016, and so the Court lacked jurisdiction. In response, on January 3, 2017, the remaining plaintiff opposed the defendants' motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court retained jurisdiction because the litigation had started before the USCIS adjudication. The defendants replied on January 10. On June 1, the defendants notified the Court that a federal grand jury had indicted the plaintiff for selling contraband cigarettes. On August 24, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. The Court held that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court stated that the plaintiff had failed to challenge USCIS's adjudication jurisdiction while the amended complaint was pending; that USCIS had already adjudicated and denied her naturalization application, thereby making the case moot; and that an appeal to the denial was pending in the agency, preventing ripeness. Further, the plaintiff lacked standing to procure a declaratory judgment as to CAARP's validity, due to unlikelihood of future injury. The Court thus dismissed the case without prejudice. 2017 WL 3658916. This case is now closed.

Summary: LPRs sued USCIS alleging unlawful delays in adjudicating their naturalization applications due to USCIS' classification of their applications as posing "national security concerns." Most plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew during 2016. One plaintiff remained, and the Court dismissed the case in Aug. 2017 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.


On April 23, 2012, the United States on behalf of black firefighters filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and against the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary compensation, alleging that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion had a disparate impact on black firefighters. On April 30, 2013, the NAACP and Jacksonville Brotherhood of Firefighters filed a complaint in intervention, echoing the claims and allegations of the United States while adding to the action several named plaintiffs and a class of Black Firefighters who tested for and were denied promotion while the testing practice was in place. The District Court (Judge Timothy J. Corrigan) denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on December 27, 2013. In their motion, the U.S. asked that the Jacksonville Fire Department be required to set aside five slots from the next round of promotions following the November 2013 test for those fire suppression captain candidates allegedly discriminated against on the 2004 and 2008 test administrations. The court denied the motion because the remedy offered did not correlate to the severity of the alleged injury, it would be difficult for the city to administer, and the plaintiffs had not established that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case. On June 9, 2015, the court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff finding the plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case of disparate impact, which enabled the parties to engage in additional phases of discovery. 2015 WL 3618367. Over the next eighteen months, the parties participated in discovery. The plaintiff amended the complaint three times, the latest of which was filed on November 28, 2016. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. After months of completing prerequisites for a settlement agreement, a fairness hearing took place on December 19, 2018. Judge Corrigan approved the agreement in a consent decree on February 5, 2019. The settlement included total payments of $4.9M in individual relief to classmembers and creation of new promotion examinations. The agreement also awarded attorneys' fees to counsel for the NAACP in the event it took over monitoring and enforcement of the decree from the U.S. The decree was set to remain in effect for the duration of settlement payments; fulfillment of the defendant's obligation to create the promotion positions; and completion of the second regular test administration of the new promotion procedure. The consent decree included details on this procedure and the promotion positions. The court held a second fairness hearing in May 23, 2019 and in June the court directed the parties to proceed with administration of individual relief. The case is ongoing as the consent decree is under enforcement.

Summary: On April 23, 2012, the United States, on behalf of black firefighters, filed a complaint against the City of Jacksonville, FL and the union representing its firefighters. The plaintiffs alleged that the Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department's practice of testing to screen and select candidates for promotion has a disparate impact on black firefighters, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On January 13, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative settlement and requested the case be removed from the trial calendar. The case is ongoing.


This case involved claims arising from a juvenile detention center being used for a television show. Two children previously detained in the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) filed this class action lawsuit on August 24, 2016. Defendants included numerous Fox entertainment companies (collectively “Fox”); Cook County, Illinois; the Chief Judge of the District Court of Cook County; and various officials connected to JTDC. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed with the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (in Chicago). Allegedly, plaintiffs’ rights were violated due to the filming of the hit Fox television show, Empire, at JTDC. They sought disgorgement and monetary damages. Judge Amy St. Eve. was assigned. The complaint was brought following the summer of 2015. Plaintiffs claimed JTDC locked down for approximately two weeks to be used as a set to shoot scenes for Empire. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants knew the children housed at the JTDC would be confined to their cells and pods at the facility to make room for the shooting. Throughout the two weeks, numerous areas, including JTDC's school, its facilities for family visits, and the outdoor recreation yard, were placed off-limits to the children living there. The lockdown allegedly harmed the children of JTDC. It had “interrupted and degraded the rehabilitation and structured programming that is designed to address the problems that brought the children to the JTDC,” including the children’s access to education. Psychological damage was also alleged as children were forced to sit still in their pods, unable to get up from their chairs without permission, for days at a time. The following claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

Due process violations

Unlawful seizure

Monell liability (JTDC/Cook County official’s liability as final decision-makers)

Joint action liability

Respondeat superior (Fox defendants)

Conspiracy

Additional claims were brought under Illinois state law:

Breach of fiduciary duty (Cook County/JDTC defendants)

Inducement of breach of fiduciary duty (Fox defendants)

Intentional infliction of emotional distress

Civil conspiracy

Respondeat Superior

Indemnification (Cook County defendants)

Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 5, 2016. They clarified the allegations against Cook County’s Chief Judge. They particularly focused on the Chief Judge’s role as the final decisionmaker regarding the JTDC lockdowns. Numerous defendants filed motions to dismiss on December 5, 2016. The court granted these motions in part on April 20, 2017. First, the court denied all defendants’ claims for qualified or Eleventh Amendment immunity. Second, the court dismissed counts II, V, and X. Third, the court dismissed counts IV, V, VIII, and IX, but also allowed plaintiffs to re-plead. 2017 WL 1425596. On May 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. They added an unjust enrichment claim (Count XIII) against Fox defendants and fixed the deficiencies in their earlier pleadings. Fox filed a motion to dismiss several of the claims in this complaint on June 19, 2017. The court granted the motion in part on October 16, 2017. Counts IV, VI, and X were dismissed with prejudice. However, counts VIII and XIII proceeded. 2017 WL 4620841. In March 2018, this case was reassigned to Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer. Plaintiffs filed for partial summary judgment on December 9, 2019. They argued that Cook County’s Chief Judge was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. Shortly after, in early 2020, the parties began settlement negotiations. The court denied class certification on January 16, 2020. They cited plaintiffs’ failure to meet the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 23(a) and (b). However, the court stated plaintiffs could be in compliance with modifications to their motion. The court also encouraged parties to seek a settlement rather than continue litigation. 334 F.R.D. 518. Defendant Chief Judge moved for summary judgment on January 17, 2020. He sought to dismiss all claims against himself. Stated reasons included his not being a person subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment's bar against lawsuits for damages against the states. Plaintiffs renewed their motion to certify a class on June 15, 2020. Three days later, the motion's text was sealed at plaintiffs’ request. However, according to the court’s eventual order on June 10, 2021, three classes were requested. In order to narrow their focus plaintiffs required all class members detained at JDTC for at least 24 consecutive hours. Class 1 included all those confined to their pods longer than they otherwise would have been because of filming. This class had numerous subclasses involving the denial of various services during the filming period. Class 1(a) included those who did not receive at least one hour of “Large Muscle Exercise.” Class 1(b) included those who did not receive scheduled outdoor recreation. Class 1(c) included those who did not receive off-pod recreation or programming. Class 1(d) included those who did not travel to a nearby school for classes. Class 1(e) included those who did not receive various off-pod activities including “game room.” Class 1(f) included those who did not leave their pods for 24 consecutive hours. Class 2 included all those who had family visits during the June and July filming periods. Class 3 included all those confined in pods with populations that exceeded a safe capacity. The court granted summary judgment for defendant Chief Judge on November 23, 2020. The court determined that Chief Judge acted as "an arm of the State of Illinois when he operat[ed] and administer[ed] the JTDC." As such, the Chief Judge was protected by the Eleventh Amendment's bar against lawsuits for damages against the states. Any § 1983 claims against this defendant were rendered moot. 502 F.Supp.3d 1285. On December 16, 2020, defendants from Fox and Cook County filed an updated motion for summary judgment and a new motion for summary judgment, respectively. On June 10, 2021, the court issued an order addressing plaintiffs’ claims and the renewed motion for class certification. 2021 WL 2376017. The court dismissed plaintiffs’ federal claims, including those regarding conditions of confinement. The court also granted in part plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification. The four classes certified were class 1(c) concerning off-pod recreation, class 1(d) concerning attending classes, class 1(e) concerning various off-pod activities, and class 3 concerning pods that exceeded a safe capacity. The remaining classes were denied. Classes 1(a) and 1(f) both failed the FRCP 23(b)(3) requirement that common questions must predominate over individual ones among class members. Classes 1, 1(b), and 2 all failed the FRCP 23(a)(3) requirement that claims of the parties representing the class be typical among class members. In the same order, the Court addressed the plaintiff's state law claims. First, the court dismissed claims against Fox regarding unjust enrichment and inducement of Chief Judge’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The court determined that plaintiffs failed to show that Fox had actual knowledge of the alleged breach. Second, the court dismissed plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court stated that plaintiffs made "no effort to explain how [their] harm was sufficiently severe to support an IIED claim.” Third, the court did not dismiss claims regarding Cook County’s indemnification of defendant Chief Judge. Because Cook County funds the JTDC, it thus remains liable to indemnify claims arising within JTDC and the Chief Judge’s official capacity. Fourth, the court did not dismiss claims regarding defendant Chief Judge’s alleged breach of fiduciary duty. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find the Chief Judge had a guardian-ward relationship with the plaintiffs’ juvenile detainees. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, two children previously housed the Cook County Juvenile Temporary Detention Center (JTDC) filed this class action lawsuit against both Fox Broadcasting and Cook County officials connected to the JTDC. They alleged degraded conditions of confinement caused by JTDC being used as a filming location for the Fox television show, Empire. Plaintiffs secured class certification and now continue to pursue various claims including indeminfication and JTDC official's breach of their fiduciary duty during the filming period. This case is ongoing.


On September 13, 2016, seven school children, represented by a California public interest law firm, filed this class action suit against Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and state education officials in the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the state denied students their constitutional right to literacy. Background The plaintiffs were students at five of Detroit’s lowest performing schools: Hamilton Academy, Experiencia Preparatory Academy, Medicine and Community Health Academy at Cody, Osborn Academy of Mathematics, and Osborn Evergreen Academy of Design and Alternative Energy. The student proficiency rates in these schools hovered near zero in core subject areas. At Hamilton, for example, 100% of the 6th graders scored below proficiency in both reading and math. The complaint documented what it alleged to be pervasive conditions that denied children the opportunity to attain literacy, including lack of books, classrooms without teachers, insufficient desks, buildings plagued by vermin, unsafe facilities, and extreme temperatures. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the fundamental right to literacy, as compared to other students in Michigan, and by functionally excluding plaintiffs from Michigan’s statewide system of public education. Second, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated the state-created danger doctrine by affirmatively creating and increasing the risk that plaintiffs would be exposed to dangerous conditions, from which the plaintiffs were harmed as a result. Third, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution by intentionally discriminating against the plaintiffs, or responding with deliberate indifference, on the basis of the plaintiffs’ race. Fourth, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when the defendants utilized criteria or methods of administration that had the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin. The defendants sought a judicial declaration that the defendants had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Additionally, they asked the court to order the State to provide appropriate, evidence-based literacy instruction at all grade levels and to address physical school conditions that impaired access to literacy. Procedural History On November 17, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants argued that the claims brought by the plaintiffs were non-justiciable because the plaintiffs lacked standing under U.S. Constitution, Article III, §2; the relief requested was barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity; and the claims themselves were barred by the Rooker/Feldman Doctrine. As to the last point, the defendants argued that a case with similar claims that sought to include all children of the Detroit Public Schools had been brought and dismissed in state court (Moore v. Snyder), and that by bringing this case, the plaintiffs were asking the Federal District Court to review state judicial proceedings, which the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to do. Furthermore, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims must be dismissed because they failed on the merits: there was no fundamental right to literacy, the claim failed under the state-created danger doctrine, there was no constitutional violation on the basis of race, and there was no discrimination under Title VI. Several amicus briefs were filed for both parties. On May 16, 2017 District Court Judge Stephen J. Murphy III held a hearing on the motion to dismiss. On July 27, 2018, Judge Murphy granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. 329 F.Supp.3d 344. He found that there was no constitutional right to access literacy and that Michigan's implementation of various educational laws was not irrational and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Judges Eric Clay, Jane Stranch, and Eric Murphy heard oral arguments on October 24, 2019. On April 23, 2020, Judges Clay and Stranch delivered an opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the District Court. They agreed with the lower court that the plaintiffs had not proven their Equal Protection or compulsory attendance-Due Process claims. They held, however, that a basic minimum right to education is a fundamental right under the Constitution, and that a basic minimum right to education includes a foundational level of literacy, which plaintiffs had adequately demonstrated they did not receive in their schools. 957 F.3d 616. Judge Murphy dissented, disagreeing that the court had the authority to establish a new fundamental right to education. On May 14, 2020, Governor Gretchen Whitmer and plaintiffs' counsel announced that they had reached a settlement agreement. The settlement included individual awards to the seven student plaintiffs to further their education, funding to support literacy programs in Detroit schools, and the creation of two task forces to monitor the quality of education in Detroit and advise the Michigan Governor on education reform in the city. The Governor also agreed to propose legislation that would provide Detroit schools with even more funding for literacy programs, and to remove a prohibition on Detroit's use of bonds to raise capital for its schools. There is no official end date on the settlement and no official monitor, though the parties agreed that they could seek judicial enforcement if necessary. On May 19, 2020, after the settlement was announced, the Sixth Circuit took the unusual step of voting sua sponte to rehear the case en banc. 958 F.3d 1216. This vacated the Sixth Circuit opinion that found a basic minimum right to education. The plaintiffs subsequently moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that it was moot because a settlement had been reached. The Sixth Circuit granted the dismissal on June 11, 2020. Current Status Because the Sixth Circuit vacated the April 2020 opinion, it does not have precedential value, though the language of the opinion still exists for plaintiffs to potentially draw on in the future. The settlement still stands and its terms are ongoing.

Summary: On September 13, 2016, seven students at five of Detroit’s lowest performing schools, filed a federal class action suit against Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and state education officials for denying their constitutional right to literacy. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Constitution and federal civil rights laws by functionally excluding plaintiffs from Michigan’s statewide system of public education, exposing plaintiffs to dangerous conditions at schools and in fact harming them, and intentionally discriminating the plaintiffs based on their race. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged defendant's violation of Title VI when the defendants utilized criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of the plaintiffs' race. Plaintiffs are seeking an order from the federal court that would make the State of Michigan provide the plaintiffs' class appropriate, evidence-based literacy instruction at all grade levels and repair of physical school conditions. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 17, 2016. The court granted the defendants' motion on July 27, 2018. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the district court on April 23, 2020 and found a fundamental right to a basic minimum education under the Constitution. Subsequently, the state and the plaintiffs reached a settlement on May 14, which provided for funding for literacy-related programs in Detroit and across the state as well as the creation of two committees to advise the Governor on education reform in Michigan. The Sixth Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc on May 19, vacating the April 23 opinion. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss given the successful settlement, and the case was dismissed on June 11. The Sixth Circuit opinion remains vacated, but the settlement is in force.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing case to secure sanitary water in a psychiatric hospital in which the plaintiffs filed additional motions for temporary restraining orders in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, requesting release and mitigation measures including: adequate mental health care, social distancing, and hygiene products. The court granted a temporary restraining order on April 25 and a preliminary injunction on May 24, ordering the defendants to isolate patients exposed to the virus and to conduct testing throughout the facility to determine the spread of COVID-19 among staff and patients. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction on June 22 and filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. The case is ongoing. <hr> On October 23, 2019, four individuals at Saint Elizabeths Hospital, a psychiatric hospital in D.C., filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. on behalf of themselves and all other patients at the hospital. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of the D.C., Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia and Saint Elizabeths Hospital. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging violations of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Saint Elizabeths had not had safe, running water since at least September 26, 2019, the date the water supply was completely turned off. This prohibited patients and staff from routinely flushing toilets, washing their hands, showering, drinking water from water fountains, and washing their clothing. The case was initially assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper, but randomly reassigned to Judge. Randolph D. Moss on October 30, 2019. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on December 16, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to state a Due Process or ADA claim and that the hospital officials were entitled to qualified immunity. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, seeking to represent "all current and future Saint Elizabeths Hospital patients." On April 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint in light of COVID-19, adding a petition for writ of habeas corpus. They alleged that although the defendants had turned the water back on in October 2019, they continued to foster conditions that exacerbated the dangers to their patients by failing to take adequate steps to protect their patients from COVID-19. Plaintiffs also asserted that, as of April 15, four patients had died of COVID-19 and that "32 patients and 47 staff at the Hospital have tested positive for COVID-19." The motion was granted on April 22. 2020 WL 1935524. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on April 18, requesting the court order the defendants to reduce the population, both by halting admission to the hospital and releasing current patients, and to develop COVID-19 mitigation measures including testing, hygiene products, social distancing, educational programming, and daily reporting. The defendants filed a motion in opposition on April 21. On April 25, Judge Moss granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to isolate individuals exposed to COVID-19, conduct clinical evaluations prior to releasing individuals from isolation, and produce bi-weekly reports of compliance with the order. 456 F.Supp.3d 126 (Apr. 25, 2020). Following a status conference, this order was extended until May 11. On May 11, Judge Moss again extended and expanded the temporary restraining order, additionally requiring defendants to complete and report the results of two baseline point prevalence surveys to determine the spread of COVID-19 among staff and residents at the facility, and to assign staff to only one unit per day. 2020 WL 2410502. On May 14, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting the incorporation of the current restraining order into an injunction, a reduction of the number of patients in the facility, appropriate mental health care, the appointment of an independent monitor, and reporting. The defendants filed a motion in opposition on May 19. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in part on May 24, converting the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction which required the defendants to file a status report by June 8 detailing plans for further mitigation measures in the facility. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion in all other respects. 464 F.Supp.3d 132 (May 24, 2020). On June 22, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. They also filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. Discovery is ongoing, and defendants continue to submit bi-monthly notices of compliance to the court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Four patients in a psychiatric hospital sued due to alleged unconstitutional conditions within the facility, specifically a lack of running water that prohibited them from showering, washing their hands, flushing toilets, and drinking water. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in light of COVID-19, alleging that the hospital was not taking adequate measures to protect patients from the virus. The court granted a preliminary injunction, requiring isolation and testing on May 24. On June 22, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. They also filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on July 10. The case is ongoing.


On July 25, 2016, prisoners at the Tennessee Department of Corrections filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs sued the Commissioner and the Medical Director of the Tennessee Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide medically acceptable care to prisoners with the Hepatitis C Virus (HCV), despite having knowledge of the proper standard of care and medical advances in HCV treatment. Such a policy, alleged the plaintiffs, constituted deliberate indifference to the suffering of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU, Disability Rights Tennessee, and private counsel. They sought a declaration that the policies and practices of the defendants were unconstitutional and an injunction to require defendants to implement a plan to eliminate the risk of serious harm resulting from inadequate diagnosis, assessment, and treatment of HCV infections, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated. Plaintiffs further sought monetary relief in the form of the costs of the suit and attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. On September 16, 2016 the plaintiffs moved to certify their class, and on May 4, 2017, Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw granted the motion. The class consisted of "All persons currently incarcerated in any facility under the supervision or control of the Tennessee Department of Corrections or persons incarcerated in a public or privately owned facility for whom the Tennessee Department of Corrections has ultimate responsibility for their medical care and who have at least 12 weeks or more remaining to serve on their sentences and are either currently diagnosed with Hepatitis C infection or are determined to have Hepatitis C after an appropriate screening test has been administered by the Department of Corrections." 2017 WL 1737871. The defendants tried to appeal this class certification decision, but were denied leave to appeal on August 10, 2017. A lengthy and heavily contested discovery process followed. On June 29, 2018 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied on June 6, 2019. The case went to trial on July 16, 2019, and finished July 19, 2019. On September 30, 2019 Judge Crenshaw issued a judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on October 30, 2019, and on August 24, 2020 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Raymond M. Kethledge and Eric E. Murphy) affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court’s reasoning was significantly influenced by the parties' agreement to focus on the 2019 policy for HCV rather than the original 2016 policy at the trial. Quoting the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusion of law, the Sixth Circuit agreed that the 2016 policy was “erratic, uneven, and poor” and “border[ed] on deliberate indifference” as it “prioritized” the best treatment, direct-acting antivirals, for only those with severe liver scaring giving no consideration to other factors, despite the knowledge that antivirals often halt the progress of HCV or cause it disappear completely. However, the court found that the 2019 policy represented a significant improvement. It expanded testing for HCV and established more forgiving criteria for which cases received the direct-acting antivirals (not all cases could receive the treatment due to budget restrictions). Moreover, the 2019 policy established “continuous care and monitoring of infected inmates, regardless of their course of treatment.” The court thus held that the defendant “sought to employ the finite resources at his disposal to maximize their benefit for the inmates in his care.” And it observed that, while the plaintiff’s claim that every inmate should have received the antiviral is certainly desirable, such a demand would have required the defendant to “spend money he did not have.” Judge Ronald Lee Gilman dissented, and argued that the court failed to consider the serious harm caused by the delay in proper treatment as a result of the defendant's 2016 policy and the continuing rationing of care in the 2019 policy. Moreover, he argued that lack of funding (which he suggested the defendant could have tried harder to address) was not an excuse for the violation of the Eight Amendment. 972 F.3d 734. The case is likely over, but the plaintiffs could still appeal or seek reconsideration of the Sixth Circuit's ruling.

Summary: On July 25, 2016, prisoners at the Tennessee Department of Corrections filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Plaintiffs sued the Tennessee Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants failed to provide medically acceptable care to prisoners with Hepatitis C and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to oppose class certification, but on May 4, 2017, Chief Judge Crenshaw granted the plaintiffs class certification. A lengthy and contested discovery discovery followed. On June 28, 2018 defendant filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied on June 6, 2019. After a trial, Judge Crenshaw issued a judgement for the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed on October 30, 2019. On August 24, 2020 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that in contrast to the 2016 policy, the 2019 policy reflected satisfactory medical practice given the limited resources at the disposal of the defendant.


On December 22, 2011, a Christian liberal arts college filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the ACA rules requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiff considered an abortifacient. The plaintiff did not object to other forms of contraception. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene its Christian faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 27, 2012, the defendant Departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the U.S. was in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 22, 2012. The amendments expanded on the plaintiff's objections to providing emergency contraception and claimed that the plaintiff would be subject to federal enforcement action no later than July 1, 2014, even given the "safe harbor" period and anticipated amendments. That same day, the plaintiff also filed an opposition to the U.S. motion to dismiss, arguing that it faced imminent harm despite the safe harbor period and anticipated amendments. On April 9, 2012, the U.S. moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of jurisdiction, arguing as before that the safe harbor period and anticipated amendments prevented the plaintiff from alleging any imminent harm. The plaintiff opposed this motion on the same grounds as the first motion to dismiss. On January 7, 2013, the District Court (Judge Christine M. Arguello) granted the U.S. motion to dismiss. Judge Arguello found that, in light of the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review. Judge Arguello declined to reach the question of the plaintiff's standing. Colorado Christian University v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 93188 (D. Colo. January 07, 2013). The next day, the District Court issued a final judgment dismissing the case in its entirety.

Summary: In 2011, a Christian liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their group health insurance plan. In January 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated imminent harm, and issued a final judgment declaring the case dismissed in its entirety.


On April 19, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) notified the Nassau County Correctional Center (NCCC) in New York of its intent to investigate conditions at the jail to determine whether they were unconstitutional. The DOJ conducted this investigation under the authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1997, also known as the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). On September 11, 2000, the DOJ issued a findings letter containing evidence that NCCC unconstitutionally physically abused inmates and behaved with deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs. In April 2002, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and the parties' settlement agreement was attached to the complaint. The case was assigned to Arlene Lindsay. The complaint alleged that NCCC violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting inmates to improper use of force and failing to provide medical care. Under the settlement, the NCCC agreed to develop and implement appropriate policies regarding inmate medical care and mental health services. Specifically, the policies were to address issues in the areas of inmate prescreening, staffing levels, sick call, medication distribution, emergency care, dental care, mental health care, substance abuse treatment, disease control, records, training, mortality reviews, inmate education, sanitation, immunization, and medical grievance procedures. The NCCC also agreed to develop and implement new procedures concerning the use of force against inmates. Specifically, the policies were to address issues in the areas of staff training, reporting and documenting use of force, use of chemical agents, use of restraints, physical contact between staff and inmates. On May 7, 2002, the court conditionally dismissed the complaint, provided that the defendant had substantially complied with the agreement over the course of three years. In August 2002, the court reassigned the case to Judge Leonard Wexler. On July 15, 2005, the parties jointly stipulated that NCCC was in substantial compliance with the portion of the settlement agreement about improper use of force and the court accordingly dismissed that portion of the case. However, the parties agreed that NCCC was not in substantial compliance with the portion of the settlement agreement relating to the provision of medical care and the court thus retained jurisdiction until NCCC was in substantial compliance. On March 14, 2008, the parties stipulated that NCCC was then substantially compliant with settlement agreement related to provision of medical care. Accordingly, Judge Wexler dismissed the case in full. The case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging that the Nassau County Correctional Center alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint alleged that inmates were subject to excessive force and denied access to medical care. The parties entered into a settlement agreement and the court retained jurisdiction to ensure substantial compliance. In March 2008, the parties agreed that NCCC was in substantial compliance with the entirety of the settlement agreement and the case was closed.