On Oct. 5, 2017, the Inland Empire Immigrant Youth Collective and one of its members sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California and the ACLU's national Immigrants' Rights Project, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The organizational plaintiff is a grassroots association led by immigrant youth. The individual plaintiff, a 23-year-old three-time Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipient, is one of its members. In Feb. 2017, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) arrested him and placed him into removal proceedings, on grounds that he had smuggled undocumented immigrants. However, the Immigration Judge rejected this allegation and plaintiff was never charged with any crime. Nevertheless, defendants revoked his DACA status, including his work authorization, and he could not have it reinstated. Plaintiffs alleged that in addition to this one incident, defendants were revoking other DACA recipients' status based not on disqualifying convictions, but on minor incidents in criminal records or unsubstantiated suspicions of criminal conduct, including arrests and charges later resolved in the applicants' favor. These status terminations lacked advance notice, a hearing, or an opportunity for reinstatement. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as certification of a nationwide class of people whose DACA status had been unlawfully revoked. Plaintiff argued that, in terminating DACA status without notice and hearing, defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). On Oct. 6, this case was assigned to Judge Michael W. Fitzgerald. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on Oct. 18. They argued they were likely to succeed on the merits and that the individual plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without reinstatement of his DACA status. Plaintiffs pointed to two recent preliminary injunctions of revocation of DACA status without due process, in Gonzales Torres and Colotl Coyotl. On Oct. 30, defendants responded, opposing plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. Defendants argued that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, first because the District Court lacked jurisdiction over immigration removal proceedings, and also because DACA was a discretionary DHS program not protected by the Constitution. Plaintiffs replied on Nov. 6. The case was transferred to Judge Philip S. Gutierrez on Nov. 14. After a Nov. 20 motion hearing, Judge Gutierrez granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. Judge Gutierrez first held that the individual plaintiff had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of his APA claim that defendants' revocation of his DACA, based solely on his deportation proceedings, was arbitrary and capricious. The individual plaintiff had also demonstrated the existence of irreparable harm due to loss of income and job opportunities. Further, neither a balancing of hardships nor the public interest favored defendants. Judge Gutierrez enjoined USCIS's decision to terminate the individual plaintiff's DACA status and accompanying work authorization. 2017 WL 5900061. On Dec. 21-29, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, motion for class certification, and motion for preliminary injunction. The amended complaint added two more individual plaintiffs who had also lost DACA status after ICE initiated removal proceedings against them. Plaintiffs sought to certify two nationwide classes of DACA recipients lacking disqualifying criminal convictions: a "notice class" (whose status was revoked without notice), and an "enforcement priority class" (whose status was revoked after being classified as an enforcement priority). In the preliminary injunction motion, plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin DHS's revocation of the individual plaintiffs' and proposed class members' DACA and work permits. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' amended complaint and motions on Feb. 1-14, 2018. Regarding the class certification motion, defendants argued that they had discretion to revoke DACA without notice once enforcement proceedings started and without court intervention, making class certification instead of individual evaluation improper. As for the preliminary injunction motion and amended complaint, defendants argued that plaintiffs lacked standing and ripeness, the Court lacked jurisdiction, or plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, because defendants' discretion in revoking DACA was unconstrained by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), APA, or Constitution. Plaintiffs responded on Feb. 12 and later on Mar. 26; defendants replied on Apr. 2. The Court will hold a hearing on Apr. 16. On Feb. 26, Judge Gutierrez granted plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a class-wide preliminary injunction. Regarding the class certification motion, Judge Gutierrez held that because plaintiffs committed no disqualifying criminal convictions, they were entitled to notice and opportunity to respond, and so they were properly class members. The class was certified as:
 All recipients of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") who, after January 19, 2017, have had or will have their DACA grant and employment authorization revoked without notice or an opportunity to respond, even though they have not been convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense.
Regarding the preliminary injunction motion, Judge Gutierrez first held that the Court had jurisdiction. Next, he held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their APA claim (that automatic termination was arbitrary and capricious) and would suffer irreparable without an injunction (because of loss of earnings, job opportunities, and drivers' licenses without DACA). 2018 WL 1061408. A Mar. 26 order clarified that the class consisted of DACA recipients, not subject to certain disqualifying categories, who have had or will have their DACA and employment authorization terminated without notice or opportunity to respond. The rest of the order specified the procedures by which defendants had to identify and notify the class. On Apr. 19, Judge Gutierrez denied defendants' motion to dismiss. First, he held that the organizational and individual plaintiffs had standing, and that the INA did not bar jurisdiction. Next, he held that plaintiffs had stated valid claims under the APA (i.e., that the applicable regulations do not allow automatic DACA revocation on the basis of a removal order, rendering it arbitrary and capricious) and under the due process doctrine (i.e., that the DACA grant is a conferred benefit that requires procedural safeguards before termination). Defendants then, on Apr. 26, appealed the preliminary injunction order to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-55564). As the parties prepared to file their respective motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs prepared to file a motion for permanent injunction, on Dec. 21, 2018, Judge Guitierrez ordered the defendants to certify the administrative record (AR) in this case. On Feb. 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the court to order the defendants to complete the AR. The plaintiffs asserted that the AR that the defendants provided was incomplete and did not include all documents directly or indirectly considered by agency decision-makers. The defendants asserted that these "predecisional documents regarding the policy of terminating DACA with notice were properly withheld from the termination AR because they are protected by deliberative process privilege." On Apr. 8, 2019, Judge Guiterrez ordered that the defendants either add these "predecisional documents" to the AR or provide a privilege log. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' argument was "more in line with the Ninth Circuit’s instruction that the administrative record should consist all documents directly or indirectly considered by agency decision-makers.'" On June 28, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Kim Wardlaw, Jay Bybee, and John Owens) issued an order staying the appeal proceedings pending resolution by the Supreme Court in Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Following the stay of the appeal proceedings, on July 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay further district court proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the preliminary injunction appeal. The defendants opposed this motion, arguing that the plaintiffs would not suffer any irreparable harm absent a stay and requested instead that the court enter an order setting a briefing schedule on cross-motions for summary judgment. Judge Gutierrez granted the plaintiffs' motion on November 7, 2019, concluding that the court cannot properly decide the legal questions here without guidance from the Ninth Circuit in this case and the Supreme Court in Regents. Judge Gutierrez also found that the defendants did not establish that a stay would cause them any damage. 2019 WL 8011739. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Regents on Nov. 12, 2019, on the issues of whether the DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to wind down the DACA policy is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held in Regents that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation of the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay on the appeal of the preliminary injunction in this case on June 23, 2020. The Court directed the parties to file briefs addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Regents on this case. In early July 2020, the parties filed their briefs. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." The Ninth Circuit again stayed the case on April 7, 2021, pending anticipated rulemaking concerning DACA. The government is to file a status report every three months. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In Oct. 2017, an immigrant rights' organization and an individual member sued DHS, USCIS, and CBP, seeking reinstatement of the member's terminated DACA status on the basis of an unsubstantiated criminal allegation, and nationwide class certification of people whose DACA status had been unlawfully revoked. The Court twice granted preliminary injunctions as well as class certification; defendants have appealed to the 9th Cir. The case was stayed pending resolution of Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security by the Supreme Court. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay on the appeal of the preliminary injunction and directed the parties to file briefs addressing the impact of the Supreme Court's decision in Regents on this case. In early July 2020, the parties filed their briefs. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." The Ninth Circuit again stayed the case on April 7, 2021, pending anticipated rulemaking concerning DACA. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On March 14, 1990, attorneys for the Legal Services of Central New York filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on behalf of residents with intellectual disabilities of New York State psychiatric centers at Mohawk Valley, Hutchings and Binghamton in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the facilities at Mohawk Valley, Binghamton and Hutchings, as psychiatric centers, were not staffed or otherwise prepared to provide services, programs or training to persons with intellectual disabilities. Defendants included the state of New York and officials from the New York State Office of Mental Health ("OMH") and State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities ("OMRDD"). Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Attorneys for the Public Interest Law Firm of Syracuse University Law College and Prisoners' Legal Services also assisted in the representation of plaintiffs. Our information as to the procedural history of the case is very limited. According to the PACER docket, the District Court (Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn) approved the Stipulation for Settlement of Class Action on April 15, 1999. On August 2, 1999, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order, awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs $179,290.68. John S. v. Cuomo, 1999 WL 592693 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 1999). We have no further information on this matter.

Summary: On March 14, 1990, attorneys for the Legal Services of Central New York filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 on behalf of residents with intellectual disabilities of New York State psychiatric centers at Mohawk Valley, Hutchings and Binghamton in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Plaintiffs alleged that the facilities at Mohawk Valley, Binghamton and Hutchings, as psychiatric centers, were not staffed or otherwise prepared to provide services, programs or training to persons with intellectual disabilities. Our information as to the procedural history of the case is very limited. the District Court (Senior Judge Neal P. McCurn) approved the Stipulation for Settlement of Class Action on April 15, 1999, and later awarded plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $179,290.68.


On August 1, 2018, six non-citizens detained at the Federal Correctional Institution Medium II, also called Victorville, filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Civil Rights Education Enforcement Center, among others, sued the President, the Attorney General, and the directors of the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Federal Bureau of Prisons (FBP), the Los Angeles ICE Field Office, and the Warden of Victorville Prison under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The case was assigned to Judge Jesus G. Bernal. ICE moved a large group of detainees to Victorville on June 8, 2018, and many of the plaintiffs had been detained there from that date. The plaintiffs alleged they were denied adequate food and recreation time, accommodations to practice their religions, and access to healthcare. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of their Fifth Amendment right to due process, First Amendment right to free exercise, and RFRA protections from policies that substantially burdened their religious practice. They asked the court to order the defendants to move all ICE immigration detainees from Victorville as quickly as possible. In the meantime, the plaintiffs also asked that they be provided with adequate health care, nutrition, out-of-cell time, programming, reading materials, and accommodations for religious practice, including compliant diet, clothing and jewelry, religious texts, and opportunities for prayer and group worship. In September 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expedited discovery. The defendants requested extra time to respond, which the court granted. The parties then jointly requested additional time, saying they were actively working toward an agreement. On October 26, 2018, the defendants filed a notice of settlement with the court, indicating that the parties had reached a resolution. However, on November 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case. They stated that the parties had been unable to consummate a settlement. A court employee noted that the plaintiffs erroneously marked their filing as a status report but did not direct them to amend it. As of May 2020, there has been no further action in the case, and it is unclear whether the litigation remains active.

Summary: In 2018, immigrants and refugees detained at Victorville Medium Security Prison filed this putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that detaining asylum seekers violated their Fifth Amendment rights to due process, and the conditions of their confinement violated their First Amendment and RFRA rights to free exercise of religion. The plaintiffs filed for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and expedited discovery in September. On October 26, the defendants filed a notice of settlement with the court; but, on November 28, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the case, stating that the parties had been unable to consummate a settlement. As of May 2020, there has been no further action in the case.


On September 26, 2013, a same-sex couple, married under the laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's marriage law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1704, to the extent that it barred recognition of same-sex marriages legally valid under the laws of other states. They also challenged Section 2 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C, to the extent that the Pennsylvania statute purported to be authorized by this federal law. Specifically, the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief including a declaration that Pennsylvania's refusal to recognize marriages validly entered into under the laws of another sovereign state violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the fundamental right to travel of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Pennsylvania statute barring same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that Section 2 of DOMA violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. Finally, the plaintiffs sought an injunction directing Pennsylvania to recognize the marriage of same-sex couples validly entered into in states other than Pennsylvania. On May 22, 2014, the Court ordered that the Plaintiffs show cause as to why their case should not be dismissed as moot, given that Whitewood v. Wolf held that the state law was unconstitutional. 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (PB-PA-0012 in this Clearinghouse). The Court then, on September 8, 2014, placed this matter in civil suspense pending an appeal to the United States Supreme Court in Whitewood v. Wolf. The parties then voluntarily dismissed the case on October 22, 2014, in accordance with the Court's decision in Whitewood permanently enjoining the enforcement of the Pennsylvania same-sex marriage ban. The Court denied the Philadelphia Metro Task Force's motion to intervene on November 29, 2014. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to deny the motion to intervene and the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The case is now closed.

Summary: A same-sex couple, married under the laws of Massachusetts, filed suit challenging Pennsylvania's prohibition on same-sex marriage and refusal to recognize marriages of same-sex couples validly entered into under the laws of another state. Following a decision in another related case holding that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional, the parties voluntarily dismissed the case.


On December 9, 1977, a group of residents at the Dr. Joseph H. Ladd School, a state facility for intellectually disabled and other handicapped individuals, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this action against the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals (now the Department of Behavioral Healthcare, Developmental Disabilities and Hospitals) and the Ladd School under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. The plaintiffs claimed that the Ladd School, which was home to approximately 750 residents, failed to provide suitable living conditions to its residents in violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Ladd School failed to provide residents with an individualized living program, provide safe and humane facilities, maintain adequate staffing, develop new facilities for transfer of residents into the community, and provide necessary medical and dental care. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result, the vast majority of residents had actually regressed and deteriorated since being admitted to the Ladd School. The plaintiffs also alleged that as a result of the Ladd School's actions, they had been denied benefits under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., which requires that funds appropriated pursuant to the Act be spent to provide care and treatment in non-institutional facilities when possible. The plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief from the defendants' constitutional violations. On April 6, 1979, the parties reached agreement on an interim consent decree, which required the defendants to develop a comprehensive plan on service for all intellectually disabled citizens of Rhode Island, with special emphasis on residents of the Ladd School. The plan would include development of a policy for providing suitable facilities, rehabilitation services, and dental and medical care for these disabled individuals. The comprehensive plan was submitted to the plaintiffs on July 5, 1979. After additional discovery and discussion, the parties reached a final stipulation, which U.S. District Judge Francis Boyle ordered effective on April 29, 1982. The Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals agreed to provide services for the development, education, rehabilitation, and care of the intellectually disabled members of the plaintiff class. In addition, the Department would provide annual individualized assessments in accordance with Title XIX regarding whether individual residents could be placed in the community to reduce the resident population at the Ladd School. The stipulation also required a court order for placement in the Ladd School and that the Ladd School would serve only as a last resort for disabled individuals. The Ladd School agreed to maintain their facilities in a manner eligible for certification as an Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded under Title XIX. The stipulation allowed for a monitor to ensure the defendants' compliance with the stipulation. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $48,000 for attorneys' fees and costs. On December 15, 1985, after receiving a report from the Ladd Center Monitoring Committee, Judge Boyle ordered that the defendants reduce the resident population at the Ladd School to not more than 240 residents by January 1987. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs an additional $6,721 in attorneys' fees and costs. In 1986, Rhode Island Governor Edward DiPrete announced the closing of the Ladd School. On November 17, 1987, the defendants moved to vacate the previous stipulation and to dismiss this action. In 1994, the Ladd School was finally closed.

Summary: In December 1977, a group of residents at the Dr. Joseph H. Ladd School, a state facility for intellectually disabled and other handicapped individuals, filed this class action lawsuit against the Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals and the Ladd School. The plaintiffs claimed the Ladd School failed to provide residents with an individualized habilitation program, provide safe and humane facilities, maintain adequate staffing, develop new facilities for transfer of residents into the community, and provide necessary medical and dental care, thus violating the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties reached a stipulation in April 1982 which required the Ladd School to improve the facility's conditions and to deinstitutionalize residents as possible. The Ladd School was closed in 1994.


On April 15, 2010, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on behalf of all children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of the Massachusetts Department of Children and Families ("DCF") as a result of abuse or neglect. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that the Massachusetts foster care system is causing physical and psychological harm to the children within the system. Plaintiffs claimed that DCF harmed children through a high rate of child abuse and neglect within the system, a high degree of placement instability, a low rate of adoption from foster care, overadministration of psychiatric medication, not adequately preparing foster children to live independently as adults, and further abuse and neglect after reunification with their families. Plaintiffs alleged that these harms to children were caused by Defendants' failure to effectively manage the agency's workforce, resources and practices. Plaintiffs claimed that DCF and state officials had long been aware of the systemic failings of the program but had failed to remedy the situation. On August 20, 2010, Defendants filed a joint Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendants attacked the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' allegations and offered three threshold arguments: (1) that Plaintiffs lacked standing; (2) that the court should abstain from hearing the case pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); and (3) that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars all claims as to Defendant Patrick. On January 4, 2011, the Court (Senior Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Mass. 2011). On February 28, 2011, the Court (Judge Ponsor) granted Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class and Appoint Class Counsel, holding that all necessary requirements to certify this Rule 23(b)(2) class were satisfied. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 272 F.R.D. 288 (D. Mass. 2011). Following the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), Defendants moved to decertify the Plaintiff class. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff class no longer met the higher burden for class certification that Wal-Mart imposed. On November 10, 2011, the Court (Judge Ponsor) denied the motion, holding that (1) the Wal-Mart case had "little explicit application to this much different case," and (2) that Defendants' motion was "the substantive equivalent of an appeal," and was therefore untimely, as it was filed seven months after the original certification order. Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 278 F.R.D. 30 (D. Mass. 2011). Over the next year, the parties completed fact and expert discovery. On October 18, 2012, with trial scheduled for January 2013, the Defendants moved to change venue. The Defendants argued that having a trial in Springfield would be burdensome for DCF officials who would be forced to travel to testify, and asked the Court to transfer the case to the Eastern Division in Boston. On November 14, 2012, the District Court (Judge Ponsor) granted Defendant's order of transfer, vacated the scheduling order, and transferred the case to Boston. The case was reassigned to District Judge William G. Young. The Court (Judge Young) largely reinstated the original scheduling order and set a trial date for January 22, 2013. Jut eleven days before trial, the Court denied Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, "not on the merits, but as a matter of judicial economy," and indicated he would rule on all claims at trial. The bench trial before Judge Young commenced on January 22, 2013 and continued intermittently over the next few months. Plaintiffs rested their case on March 1, 2013. On April 30, 2013, Defendants moved for judgment on partial findings. The Court continued to take evidence at trial, and adjourned on May 14, 2013, following twenty-four days of trial. On September 30, 2013, the District Court (Judge Young) entered an order granting Defendants' motion for judgment on partial findings and entered judgment for Defendants on all counts. The Court, however, did not accompany his order with an opinion, and instead stated that "[t]he parties ought rest assured, however, that a memorandum setting forth the relevant findings of fact and conclusions of law, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(c), is to follow in due course." Nearly two months later, on November 26, 2013, the Court (Judge Young) issued its findings and rulings. The Court was very critical of the state of the Massachusetts foster care system, but stated that Defendants were not responsible for the shortcomings. Instead, the Court stated that "financial and administrative constraints - not the alleged mismanagement by DCF officials - pose the greatest threat to children in the Massachusetts foster care system today." In applying the two-pronged substantive due process standard formulated by Judge Ponsor, Judge Young held that (1) DCF did not substantially depart from accepted professional judgment, and (2) the conduct of the state with respect to foster children did not "shock the conscience." The Court stated that, while the accounts of the Named Plaintiffs were "harrowing," Plaintiffs failed to prove that "the deprivations complained of were felt class-wide." Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 985 F. Supp. 2d 129 (D. Mass. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Plaintiffs argued that: (1) the District Court erred in applying a new, two-pronged standard for Plaintiffs' substantive due process claims; (2) the District Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs did not experience class-wide professional deprivations, and that such deprivations did not depart from accepted professional judgment; and (3) that the District Court improperly relied on fiscal considerations in denying Plaintiffs relief. Defendants, for their part, argued that DCF was imperfect, but that their failures did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. On December 15, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of judgment on partial findings. The Court stated that Plaintiffs "have not established, based on the facts, that there have been constitutional violations as to the class of foster children, [and] so they are not entitled to an injunction or federal court oversight." The Court held that, even if applying the two-pronged substantive due process standard was error, Plaintiffs failed to meet the lower standard that they sought: departure from accepted professional judgment. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court did not improperly rely on budget constraints to deny Plaintiffs relief--it did not find that there were violations and then excuse them by budgetary constraints. It found, in the first instance, that there were no constitutional violations. The Court stated that "[t]he problems are now for the Governor and legislature of Massachusetts to resolve." Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 774 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2014).

Summary: On April 15, 2010, plaintiff foster children filed a class action lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the Commonwealth subjected them to unconstitutional harm and risk of harm, high degrees of placement instability, low rates of adoption, and overprescribed psychiatric medication. Mid-trial, the District Court (Judge William G. Young) granted Defendants' motion for judgment on partial findings and denied Plaintiffs relief on all claims. The ruling was subsequently affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.


On July 21, 2011, the ACLU of Michigan group filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plaintiff asked the court for an injunction, claiming that the FBI was not timely in its response, and that information was improperly redacted from documents that were received. On July 27, 2010, the ACLU of Michigan submitted a FOIA request to the FBI requesting documents pertaining to the use of race and ethnicity to conduct assessments and investigations. More than four months later on December 22, 2010, the FBI released the first batch of documents to the ACLU. The documents included duplicate pages that had been redacted and none were specific to Michigan or the Detroit Field Office. More documents were released on September 29, 2011 and October 31, 2011. The FBI claimed that the documents were released in a reasonable timeframe and that any information withheld was proper under exceptions to FOIA. On September 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff) denied summary judgment for the ACLU and granted summary judgment for the FBI. The court found that the ACLU had not exhausted itsadministrative remedies and any information withheld by the FBI fell under the proper exceptions to FOIA. On August 21, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's ruling. American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. F.B.I., 734 F.3d 460.

Summary: Only July 21, 2011, the ACLU of Michigan filed a FOIA complaint against the FBI. They claimed that the information given by the FBI following their FOIA request was insufficient, improperly redacted, and not delivered in a timely manner as is required by FOIA. The FBI responded that the information withheld fell under exceptions to FOIA. On September 30, 2012, the Court granted summary judgment for the FBI. Finding that not only that the information withheld properly fell under the exceptions, but also that the ACLU of Michigan had not fully exhausted its administrative remedies.


On November 21, 2007, three female inmates in South Dakota Women's Prison filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court of South Dakota, alleging that they were denied medication and treatment for their mental illnesses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that they and other inmates were routinely denied medication that had been prescribed by their treating physicians on the orders of prison staff who were not doctors and not authorized to prescribe medication. Cost was one alleged factor for the medication denial. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well class certification. On October 31, 2008, Judge Charles B. Kornmann granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification of "All individuals who are now or who will be in the future incarcerated at the South Dakota Women's Prison and who are denied or delayed access to medication or medical treatment that has been prescribed by a treating medical doctor . . . based on decisions made by persons who are not themselves medical doctors." 2008 WL 4774895. On Dec. 08, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants' appeal of the certification decision. On April 04, 2011, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to prosecute, which Judge Kornmann denied on June 10, 2011. On April 17, 2012, Judge Kornmann approved a class action settlement and consent decree. 2012 WL 1339148. The defendants agreed that no prescription medication or dosage would be substituted, changed, increased, reduced or discontinued except under the direction of a qualified physician or other person authorized by law to prescribe medications. The settlement noted that the duration of the agreement would be in accordance with the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That means the case was terminable by the defendant after a period of two years of enforcement. Each party agreed to bear its own costs and attorney's fees with the plaintiffs' attorney agreeing to donate his time, and the court maintained jurisdiction for the remainder of the decree. The case has been long dormant.

Summary: On November 21, 2007, three female inmates in South Dakota Women's Prison filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the U.S. District Court District of South Dakota, alleging that they were denied medication and treatment for their mental illnesses in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that they and other inmates were routinely denied medication that had been prescribed by their treating physicians on the orders of prison staff who were not doctors and not authorized to prescribe medication. On October 31, 2008, the court granted class certification. On April 17, 2012, Judge Kormann approved the class action settlement and consent decree, in which the defendants agreed that no prescription medication or dosage would be substituted, changed, increased, reduced or discontinued except under the direction of a qualified physician or other person authorized by law to prescribe medications.


On July 20, 2016, the executrix of the estate of an African-American man who died in the Sullivan Correctional Facility (NY) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against various prison officials, both guards and guard supervisors, in their individual capacities and a doctor in his individual capacity that did not effectively diagnose and treat the decedent's mental illness. The plaintiff sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, 42 U.S.C. 1985(2, 3), and New York State medical malpractice law in the case of the doctor. The plaintiff, represented by pro bono private counsel, sought a jury trial, damages, and costs. Specifically, the complaint detailed the decedent's medical history, including a diagnosis of Schizoaffective Disorder, Delusional Disorder, Antisocial Personality Disorder, and Polysubstance Dependence. It alleged that his condition was stable under treatment at the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC), but upon transfer to Sullivan, he was routinely placed in isolation, where his condition deteriorated further. The complaint noted that the defendant doctor said the decedent should have been transferred back to CNYPC after a long stay in isolation, but he did not order the transfer. The complaint outlined a pattern of abuse and racial insensitivity by the guards. The complaint described an incident where guards "trashed" the decedent's cell and the decedent refused to clean it, asking the guards to do it. The guards forcibly removed the decedent from his cell and severely beat him. The complaint alleged that the decedent died of his injuries, and the prison administration withheld information surrounding the death from the decedent's family. Besides this lawsuit, the plaintiff filed two complaints in state court. The parties agreed to dismiss the state actions pending full relief on the federal claim, which they eventually got. Judge Colleen McMahon referred the case to trial after receiving the initial complaint. The plaintiff amended the complaint on April 25, 2017 to add the doctor as a defendant and outline allegations against him. The plaintiff amended the complaint again on February 18, 2018 to name previously unknown correctional officers involved in the beating. After discovery, the defendants filed three summary judgment motions (one motion each against the officers, supervisors, and doctor) in May and June of 2019. On August 21, 2019 (2019 WL 4383187), Judge McMahon issued one opinion on all three summary judgment motions. She denied the motions related to the officers and the supervisors, saying that genuine issues of material fact remain as to their conduct surrounding the beating. However, she partially granted the motion related to the doctor, dismissing claims related to deliberate indifference in failure to provide adequate medical care. She stated that genuine issues of material fact arose on the medical malpractice claim, but determined that those claims were separate to the beating issue at the center of this case. She asked the plaintiff to show cause that the medical malpractice issues should not be separated from the initial one, and the claims against the doctor were severed on September 12, 2019 through an order signed by Judge McMahon (2019 WL 4382206). The parties were unable to settle the case in pre-trial negotiations, and the case went to trial on February 24, 2020. Shortly before closing arguments on February 25, the parties jointly filed a proposed settlement agreement, terminating the case before the jury reached a verdict. Judge McMahon ordered the case to be dismissed on May 5, 2020. The terms of the settlement agreement showed that the State of New York agreed to pay the plaintiff $5 million, which covers compensatory damages and the plaintiff's attorney fees. The settlement added that the Sullivan Correctional Facility should install cameras to prevent future beatings, but left the details on camera installation vague. The plaintiff sought action from the Judge to clarify this point, but she denied the order, leaving it to the parties to settle. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2016, the executrix of the estate of an inmate who died in the Sullivan Correctional Facility (NY) filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York against guards and doctors at the facility. The complaint alleged that the guards beat the inmate to death and willfully ignored his mental illness. The case went to a jury trial in 2020, but before a verdict could be reached, the parties reached a landmark settlement that gave the plaintiff $5 million in attorney fees and damages, and mandated the installation of cameras in the facility where the inmate died.


On March 28, 2013, MK Chambers, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On April 4, 2013, Judge Denise Page Hood denied the plaintiff's emergency ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs had sought this motion in order to continue providing insurance coverage to their employees without the medications they object to. Judge Hood's order stated that it was not clear plaintiffs would succeed under their RFRA claim, not likely they would succeed on their First Amendment claim, since the ACA has no purpose to target religions. Judge Hood also found that since the plaintiffs had filed their lawsuit over two months after the mandate went into effect, their claim of irreparable injury was not convincing. On April 26, 2013, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. It argued injunction relief was warranted to prevent the ACA mandate from infringing on the plaintiff's religious beliefs. On May 22, 2013, the defendant filed a memorandum in opposition to injunctive relief and a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff will not suffer irreparable harm from the mandate. On June 6, 2013, the defendant re-filed their memorandum in opposition to injunctive relief and filed a separate, amended motion to dismiss as required by the court's local rules. No substantive changes were made to either. On September 13, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The court found the plaintiff was unlikely to show the ACA mandate put a "substantial burden" on the corporation owner's religious beliefs. On January 31, 2014 the parties filed a joint motion to stay the case until the Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, No. 13- 354; and Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, No. 13-356. Judge Denise Page Hood granted the stay on February 21, 2014. On August 21, 2014, following the Supreme Court's holding in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations, the parties agreed to a stipulated preliminary injunction in this case. The preliminary injunction said the government could not sanction the plaintiffs for failing to provide contraceptive care to which the plaintiffs hold religious objections. On November 21, 2014, the district court entered a stipulated order and judgment in this case. The judgment established a permanent injunction against government enforcement of the June 30, 2014 version of the contraceptive mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby, where for-profit corporations could not access a religious exemption to the contraception mandate. After the ruling in Hobby Lobby, the government designed an exemption similar to the one used for non-profit religious employers, allowing religious, closely-held for-profit employers to notify the government of their religious objection to contraception. The government would then work with the insurer directly to provide contraception coverage to the employees. The court's November 21, 2014 order further awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On March 13, 2015, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a hearing on attorney fees and costs

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, on November 21, 2014 the plaintiffs won a permanent injunction against enforcement of that version of the contraceptive services mandate.


On December 9, 2004, an inmate in the Vermont Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court District of Vermont. The plaintiff sued the Commissioner of the Vermont Department of Corrections and the Superintendents of Southern State Correctional Facility and Northern State Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The pro se plaintiff sought declaratory relief stating the defendants’ actions were unlawful and violated the plaintiff’s rights, along with an injunction stopping the conduct itself. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment and inflicted cruel and unusual punishment by illuminating cells with bright lights twenty-four hours per day, thus preventing him and other inmates from sleeping. In September 2005, many other inmates attempted to join the suit by filing motions to intervene. The plaintiff filed a Notice of Class Action on September 15, 2005. However, the court denied these motions and issued an order denying class certification because Plaintiff was pro se on September 26, 2005. After the plaintiff filed three motions for appointment of counsel, the court finally appointed counsel on December 1, 2005. Over the next several months, more inmates filed motions to intervene, which were granted by the court. The plaintiff filed a new motion for class certification on July 11, 2006. On October 16, 2006, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification shortly after a report and recommendation from Magistrate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier. 2006 WL 2975752. The class consisted of inmates: "who have been subjected, are currently being subjected, or who will be subjected to constant illumination in Vermont prison cells and who suffer injuries as a result." The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on April 16, 2007. After about two years of discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on April 30, 2009. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on December 20, 2010. 2010 WL 5389996. The plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order to the Second Circuit on April 11, 2011. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the district court appointed class counsel whose performance was deficient. The Second Circuit agreed and found that the district court abused its discretion in appointing the class counsel because it did not consider counsel’s inexperience in class actions and the lack of resources for counsel to litigate the case properly. In addition, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgment order and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the district court appointed new class counsel for the plaintiffs. After further discovery, the parties came to a settlement agreement that was approved by the court on July 12, 2017. The settlement required that the correction facilities keep the lights dim, make sleep masks available to inmates, provide sleep masks, and pay $50,000 in attorneys’ fees. On July 14, 2017, the court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice, costs, and attorney’s fees in accordance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed that the settlement agreement met the requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 3626). The PLRA provides that the settlement is terminable upon motion of any party two years after the date the court approved the settlement agreement. As of April 2021, there was no further activity on the case and the settlement agreement remained in place. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: An inmate filed a lawsuit against the Vermont Department of Corrections in 2004 for constant illumination of cells, preventing inmates from sleeping well. Plaintiff eventually obtained class certification from the court for other affected inmates. The case settled when the Defendant agreed to dim the lights, make sleep masks available to inmates, and pay $50,000 in attorneys' fees.


On October 23, 2014, a transgender woman in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("DCJ") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive relief, and damages against the defendants, several officials of DCJ, for violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and §1988. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the abuse she received from male inmates and refused to place her into secure housing or take other steps to reduce her abuse. On January 9, 2015, the defendants moved to transfer venue to the Western District of Texas on the grounds that the plaintiff was housed in the Western District from 2011-13 and several defendants work and reside in the Western District. The Court (Judge Alfred H. Bennett) denied their motion as several Defendants resided in the Southern District and the Defendants failed to identify key witnesses that would not be available for testimony if the case remained in the Southern District, instead only offering mere allegations of witness unavailability and inconvenience. 2015 WL 1893737. The Defendant Executive Director of DCJ moved to the dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on February 17, 2015. The Defendant contended that the complaint failed to plead any specific facts establishing that the Executive Director participated in the failure to protect the Plaintiff, thus failing to meet the requirement established by the Supreme Court case Ashcroft v. Iqbal that a supervisory official must be personally involved to defeat qualified immunity. The defendant further argued that the injunctive relief claim should be dismissed because there was no actual ongoing controversy, as the Plaintiff no longer resided in the facility where she alleged abuses. Lastly, the defendant argued that retrospective injunctive and declaratory relief claims were improper as they implicated Eleventh Amendment concerns on state sovereign immunity. The Court denied the Executive Director's Motion to Dismiss on March 14, 2016. The Court found Plaintiff successfully stated a claim as the Executive Director had participated in hearings about prison rape and had been called by the Department of Justice to account for the statistics concerning sexual assault within DCJ. Because of the Executive Director's awareness, the Court found the Plaintiff had sufficiently alleged facts that the Executive Director knew of and was deliberately indifferent to the risk of sexual assault at the facilities. Further, the Plaintiff successfully stated a claim because she sought to hold the Executive Director liable for personally failing to train and supervise DCJ personnel and failing to establish adequate policy, and was not attempting to hold the Executive Director liable via respondeat superior. The Court found that qualified immunity would not apply because sending an LGBT prisoner back to the general population after experiencing multiple attacks is an unreasonable policy to maintain. 169 F. Supp. 3d 687. The Court next found that the Plaintiff successfully stated a claim for injunctive relief because the plaintiff could be transferred at any time, and thus the fact that she was not currently in a unit where she experienced assault did not render her claim moot. Finally, the Court found that the Executive Director's claim that the Plaintiff sought retrospective injunctive relief was incorrect because the Plaintiff sought expungement of her disciplinary records, and a request for expungement is prospective. 169 F. Supp. 3d 687. On March 1, 2017, the Court granted a motion to stay proceedings pending the parties' finalization of a settlement agreement. Settlement negotiations continued through February 26, 2018, when the parties submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice pursuant to their settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was private, but was reported to include a monetary payment, systematic policy changes, and training of DCJ staff. Lamba Legal, Lamba Legal Reaches Favorable Settlement for Passion Star, Transgender Woman Sexually Assaulted in Texas Men's Prison, Lamba Legal (March 15, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20180315_tdcj-settlement. The case is closed; the settlement apparently did not include any provision for ongoing jurisdiction to enforce its terms.

Summary: A transgender woman in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("DCJ") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against DCJ personnel and executives for being deliberately indifferent to her reports of assault from male inmates and ignoring her request for secure housing. The parties eventually reached a private settlement. The Plaintiff received monetary payment and the Defendants agreed to impose policy changes and training for the DCJ staff.


On January 17, 2006, the Center for Constitutional Rights and five of its attorneys who represented clients suspected of involvement with terrorist organizations, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs originally sought an injunction that would prohibit the government from conducting warrantless surveillance of communications in the U.S, claiming that such surveillance violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Separation of Powers doctrine, and the First and Fourth Amendments. Plaintiffs based these allegations primarily upon statements by President George W. Bush and other government officials in December 2005 admitting that the NSA had monitored, without a warrant, communications between the U.S. and a foreign country where one of the parties was believed to be a member or affiliate of al-Qa'ida. FISA explicitly authorized electronic surveillance for the purposes of collecting foreign intelligence only upon orders issued by federal judges on a special court. By January 2007, the government claimed to have shut down the surveillance program, having received approval from a FISA Court judge to carry out the same surveillance pursuant to court order. (On re-application, it seems that another FISA Court judge disagreed; the threatened end of the program led to the enactment first of the Protect America Act and then the FISA Amendments Act, in 2007 and 2008, respectively; these allowed the surveillance in question.) There remained, however, one final set of claims not affected by the end of the non-FISA surveillance program: the plaintiffs asked the Court to order the government to destroy any records of surveillance of the plaintiffs. The government argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they lacked evidence that they had actually been surveilled. In late 2006, the Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel transferred the case to the Northern District of California to be consolidated with the Multi District Litigation. On February 23, 2007, the Panel consolidated the case with the MDL, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see NS-CA-0004. Ultimately, on January 31, 2011, the District Court (Judge Vaughn R. Walker) granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing for any of their claims. The plaintiffs appealed. On June 12, 2013, Judge McKeown wrote for the Ninth Circuit and affirmed the district court's dismissal. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecommunications Records Litig., 522 F. App'x 383 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Clapper v. Amnesty International, (133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013)), NS-NY-0006, in this Clearinghouse. On November 1, 2013, The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing, and on March 19, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review. The case is therefore done.

Summary: On January 17, 2006, a non-profit legal advocacy organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, and Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in electronic surveillance without court order and thereby violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and the First and Fourth Amendments. The lawsuit was subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California where summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendants as the District Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to establish standing for any of their claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied review.


On July 26, 2010, two young adults in Hidalgo County filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive and damage relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, the county and county magistrates and justices of the peace, had violated their constitutional rights by failing to conduct an indigency examination prior to their jailing for the failure to pay the fines associated with the failure to attend school citations that had been issued by their school district's police department. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, by failing to conduct an indigency examination to determine whether the plaintiffs were indigent and whether they had made a good faith effort to pay their fines, the defendants had violated their right to due process and equal protection by jailing them for being unable to pay a fine. On June 24, 2011 Judge Randy Crane granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief against the judicial defendants. The court found that §1983 does not allow for injunctive relief against judicial officers for acts or omissions taken within their official capacities unless "a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." The court further dismissed the claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity because case law in the 5th circuit allows for "unnecessary parties" to be dismissed. The district court found that the official capacity claims against the Sheriff in reality were claims against the county. As such, the district court found that the Sheriff's presence in the lawsuit was unnecessary and dismissed the claims against him in his official capacity. Judge Randy Crane denied, however, the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for declaratory relief against the judicial defendants and the claims for injunctive, declaratory and damage relief against the county. On October 18, 2011, the remaining defendants filled a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs then filed a cross motion for summary judgment on November 10, 2011. In an order issued on February 15 2012, Judge Randy Crane 1) denied class certification, 2) dismissed Plaintiffs' individual claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Magistrates and County for lack of standing, 3) granted summary judgment to the named plaintiffs' for their claim for damages against the county because it violated their federal due process and equal protection rights by failing to afford them an affirmative indigency determination before incarcerating them for their failure to pay fines and costs, 4) ruled that plaintiff De Luna was entitled to nominal damages of $1, and 5) ruled that plaintiff Diaz’s entitlement to compensatory damages could not be resolved on summary judgment. To demonstrate standing to obtain an order declaring as unconstitutional and enjoining Defendants’ challenged practices, the plaintiffs had to show that they faced a “real and immediate” threat that, while indigent, they will again be charged with a Class C, fine-only offense and then arrested and incarcerated solely because they are unable to pay the fine, without being afforded an indigency screening. The court believed that there were simply too many contingencies for the threat to be "real and immediate." In granting summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim for damages, the court focused on potential defendants who might not think to "speak up" during arraignment, saying that providing the opportunity to bring up indigency is merely a gesture of, but does not provide, due process. Plaintiff De Luna did not show "actual injury" so was only awarded $1 for the unconstitutional violation of due process rights. With the plaintiff Diaz, the court said that the question of whether she knew that she could avoid jail time by bringing up her inability to pay at arraignment still needed to be determined. If she voluntarily chose to serve jail time, there would be no actual injury and she would only recover nominal damages. A hearing on the remainder of the motions did not take place as the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss (R41) on April 29, 2012, saying that the matter had been amicably resolved. The agreement was filed under seal. The court then approved the motion on April 30.

Summary: Two young adults who were jailed after nonpayment of fines for not attending school (a "Class C" fine) sued Hidalgo County (TX), its magistrates, and its justices of the peace for failing to conduct an indigency examination prior to their jailing. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by failing to conduct an indigency examination to determine whether the plaintiffs were indigent and whether they had made a good faith effort to pay their fines, the defendants had violated their right to due process and equal protection. All claims for injunctive relief were dismissed during summary judgment by the court either because an injunction against a judicial defendant is not allowed under 42 U.S.C. §1983, or that they lacked standing as the likelihood of being jailed in this manner again was not "real and immediate." Class certification was also denied. However, in February 2012, the judge granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to declaratory relief - that the county violated their due process and equal protection rights by failing to afford an affirmative indigency determination before incarceration for failure to pay fines. One plaintiff was awarded $1 in nominal damages for this constitutional violation, but failed to show "actual injury." The other named Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages was not decided at the summary judgment stage. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss rather than go to trial after coming to an agreement that remains under seal. The judge affirmed the motion on April 30, 2012.


On October 24, 2012, two U.S. citizens detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) after taking pictures of ports of entry filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, under 5 U.S.C. § 702, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and Bivens, against CBP, an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of San Diego and private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, alleging that CBP's policy and practice of prohibiting the use of camera and video recording devices at or near CBP-controlled facilities without CBP's prior approval was unconstitutional, in violation of the plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment rights. The complaint explained that, as the Human Rights Director of Alliance San Diego, the plaintiff ran a blog and took pictures of the port of entry, CBP officers, and attempted to detail suspicious activity of law enforcement officers. The complaint detailed two separate interactions one of the plaintiffs had with CBP officers. On both occasions, the officers confiscated his camera/phone and deleted the pictures the plaintiff had taken of the entry port and male officers patting down females. On the first occasion, the plaintiff was also detained, and he claimed an officer used excessive force to take his camera away and arrest him. On both occasions, CBP officers explained it was their policy to not permit pictures to be taken. On this basis, the plaintiff claimed his First Amendment right to take pictures and use them in his blog was violated. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that undergoing an unreasonable search and seizure of their persons and their phones violated their Fourth Amendment rights. On January 29, 2013, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction. On February 19, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas J. Whelan) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs failed to show citizens had a First Amendment right to photograph the interior of secondary inspection areas for US ports of Entry, that they suffered irreparable harm, or that the First Amendment concerns outweighed the public interest of border security. 2013 WL 1561546. On September 30, 2013, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion in part. The court dismissed without prejudice the claim that the defendant’s policy against picture taking violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The court also dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs' claim that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the CBP photography policy was unconstitutional because the policy did not say the officers must delete the pictures. However, the claim that the practice of deleting the pictures and temporarily detaining the plaintiffs was not dismissed and neither was the claim for excessive use of force. 2013 WL 5462296. On November 27, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the partial dismissal of their motion to dismiss the case. On April 17, 2014 the court found that permitting leave to amend the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim was proper. However, the court ordered further briefing by the plaintiffs and the defendants because the lack of probable cause claim required reconsideration. 2014 WL 1600410. On April 24, 2014, the plaintiffs, and on May 1, 2014, the defendants, filed supplementary briefing. On January 29, 2015, the court granted the defendant’s motion for reconsideration because taking pictures of the port of entry was considered a crime and therefore the CBP officers had probable cause to assume the plaintiffs had committed a crime. Under this logic, the court found a warrantless search was permissible. However, the remaining Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force remained. 2015 WL 12434362. On November 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The new complaint removed the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims and emphasized the First Amendment claims surrounding the CBP photography restriction and the importance of the removal of this policy. On December 18, 2015 and January 8, 2016, the defendant’s filed a motion to dismiss the complaint again for failure to state a claim. On March 23, 2016 the court found the First Amendment claim was substantively the same and therefore the complaint was dismissed with prejudice. 2016 WL 4597529. On May 17, 2016 the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On September 28, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted a brief for review explaining why their complaint should not be barred by case law and their amended complaint to reiterate the factual and legal underpinnings. These alternations were ignored by the district court. On October 5, 2016, the CATO institute, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, and seven media organization filed amicus briefs. The CATO brief argued that the First Amendment protected taking pictures of officers and the CBP’s policy failed the strict scrutiny test because the restriction of photography in this way did not leave alternative options. The Reporters Committee argued that photography and visual recording were essential elements of the media’s reporting of numerous matters of public concern, including those arising at the border. They also claimed there were strong policy reasons to allow photographing public officials including CBP officials and national security concerns did not provide the compelling interest to justify the CBP media restrictions. On August 14, 2018 the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court's holding on the First Amendment claim and remanded for further proceedings. The court found the First Amendment claim to not be precluded from reconsideration based on the earlier dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim. Moreover, the court held that the government’s action was content-based restriction of speech in a public forum and required a more substantial showing that banning photography achieved the compelling interest of promoting border security. 899 F.3d 1035. Discovery continued throughout much of 2017 and 2018. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 10, 2019 that focused on their First Amendment claims. The case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Allison Goddard on September 16, 2019; she oversaw discovery and settlement negotiations. As of May 2020, the parties had not reached a settlement agreement, and negotiation is ongoing.

Summary: On October 24, 2012, two U.S. citizens detained by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) after taking pictures of ports of entry filed a lawsuit against CBP in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, alleging that CBP's policy and practice of prohibiting the use of camera and video recording devices at or near CBP-controlled facilities without CBP's prior approval was unconstitutional. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thomas J. Whelan) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing.


On May 13, 1998, two individuals with developmental disabilities eligible for services under Florida's Medicaid Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program ("HCBSW") filed this class action lawsuit against various Florida state officials in their official capacities under the American with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, et seq., 1396n, et seq., and 42 C.F.R. § 431.200; the Due Process Clause; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Fort Lauderdale Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that state officials routinely denied or provided without reasonable promptness critical HCBW services for Medicaid-eligible, developmentally-disabled persons based on funding concerns rather than medical necessity concerns. On July 31, 1998, the plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding four new individual plaintiffs and one institutional plaintiff, the Advocacy Center for Disabled Persons. On January 19, 1999, the plaintiffs amended their complaint a second time to add, among other things, twelve additional individual plaintiffs and a cause of action to enforce certain sections of the Medicaid Act requiring states participating in Medicaid to provide early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment to eligible persons under the age of 21. On March 10, 1999, the Court (Judge Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr.) granted the class certification motion. In response, defendants appealed the order to the 11th Circuit. On August 11, 2000, the 11th Circuit (Judge Stanley Marcus) vacated the class certification order and remanded the case to the district court. However, before the issuance of the Circuit Court opinion, on August 1, 2000, the parties filed a joint motion seeking approval of a settlement agreement. According to the Settlement Agreement, the Department of Children and Family Services ("Department") would, among other things, certify all Waiver providers, provide relevant training, create a Quality Assurance System, and incrementally enroll more eligible persons on the Waiver pursuant to the timeline in the Agreement. On August 9, 2001, the Court (Judge Ferguson) approved the settlement. On November 1, 2004, the parties reached an agreement regarding attorneys' fees and litigation expenses, according to which, the State of Florida agreed to pay $1.15 million in full settlement of all claims for attorneys' fees and litigation expenses. On September 7, 2005, the Court (Judge Patricia A. Seitz) ordered the case closed.

Summary: This case was brought by a group of people with developmental disabilities eligible for the Home and Community Based Services Waiver Program against the state of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On September, the Court closed the case due to the fulfillment of the Settlement Agreement reached between the parties.


On October 26, 2010, a group of Latino men and women filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Police Department. The plaintiffs, represented both by private counsel and Yale Law School's legal services organization, sought (1) compensatory damages for their individual injuries; (2) punitive damages; and (3) injunctive relief adequate to prevent the continuation and recurrence of the unlawful conduct by the Town and Police Department. The complaint alleged the Town and Police Department engaged in a campaign of racial profiling against Latino men and women. The defendants allegedly enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion and demonstrated anti-Latino bias through officials' derogatory statements. The plaintiffs further claimed that the Town and Police Department denied Latinos their constitutional rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and seizures, beatings, use of Tasers, illegal arrests, and excessive use of force. These practices were done for the purpose of intimidating the Latino community. On April 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Janet Bond Arterton) granted the United States' Motion to Intervene and stay the case pending the resolution of a related federal criminal case. The case was reopened on November 11, 2012 and, on June 26, 2012, transferred to Judge Alvin W. Thompson because he was presiding over a related civil case (USA v. East Haven, 3:12-cv-01652-AWT, PN-CT-0001) brought by the United States against the Town. Following the settlement of that case, the Town and Police Department were required to institute new policies and practices as part of the settlement agreement. As a result, on August 12, 2014, Judge Thompson approved the parties' Consent Motion to Approve Stipulation as they entered a Settlement Agreement for conditional dismissal, pursuant to the similar one reached in USA v. East Haven, against all defendants except one officer. East Haven agreed to: pay total damages in the amount of $450,000; implement remedial training relating to the use of force, stops and searches and seizures; and implement bias-free policing, supervisory review, and a complaint-review process. The agreement stated that the injunctive relief would remain in effect until the later of the two options: four years from the date that the Board implements its new policies or the time at which the district court terminates the settlement agreement. On September 26, 2014, the Court approved the parties' stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice and without costs. As of January 30, 2019, no further docket activity occurs and the injunctive relief window is finished, so this case is presumably closed.

Summary: In October 2010, a group of Latino men and women brought a civil action against the Town of East Haven and its Police Department alleging a campaign of racial profiling. In August 2014, the case settled and plaintiffs were awarded monetary damages. The Police Department's policies and procedures were changed under a settlement agreement in a related case brought by the United States. As of January 30, 2019, no further docket activity occurs and the injunctive relief window is finished, so this case is presumably closed.


On October 2, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Utah, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Reid School, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant terminated and/or failed to hire the complainant because of her sex and pregnancy. On March 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tena Campbell) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $34,500.