On November 17, 2009, several lesbian and gay employees of the State of Arizona, each of whom was receiving family coverage for his or her committed same-sex life partner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs, represented by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Section 38-651(O) of the Arizona Revised Statutes ("Section O") violated the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Section O, which eliminated family health insurance coverage for non-spouse domestic partners, violated the equal protection and substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment because precluded same-sex domestic partners but not opposite-sex domestic partners from obtaining coverage. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 25, 2010, the State moved to dismiss the case, and on April 1, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On July 23, 2010, the District Court (Judge John W. Sedwick) addressed both motions in one order, granting the State's motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs' due process claim but otherwise denying it, and granting plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Collins v. Brewer, 727 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Ariz. 2010). The Court found that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their equal protection claim, as the denial of benefits to employees with same-sex domestic partners was not rationally related to the State's interests in cost control, administrative efficiency, and the promotion of marriage; it therefore enjoined the State from enforcing Section O and ordered it to make family health insurance coverage available to employees with same-sex partners. The State appealed, and the District Court stayed proceedings pending the decision of the Court of Appeals. On September 6, 2011, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Mary M. Schroeder and Sidney R. Thomas and District Judge Mark W. Bennet of the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by appointment) affirmed. Diaz v. Brewer, 656 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). In an opinion by Judge Schroeder, the panel held that the District Court had correctly applied the rational basis test, and that while state employees have no constitutional right to benefits, "when a state chooses to provide such benefits, it may not do so in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner that adversely affects particular groups that may be unpopular." Id. at 1013. 656 F.3d 1008, 2011 WL 3890755, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18467. The State filed a petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en banc, both of which the Ninth Circuit denied on April 3, 2012. Diaz v. Brewer, 676 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2012). Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, joined by Judge Carlos T. Bea, dissented, arguing that there was no evidence that the Arizona legislature passed Section O with discriminatory intent and that the District Court had misapplied the rational basis test. He also noted that the District Court and panel's holding that opposite-sex-only marriage rules serve no rational purpose may be dispositive in challenges to state laws refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. 676 F.3d 823, 2012 WL 1109335, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 6623. On July 2, 2012, the State filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, and the District Court again stayed its proceedings pending the petition's resolution. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on the same day it issued its decisions in Windsor (PB-NY-0017 in this Clearinghouse) and Hollingsworth . The court ordered the case to proceed with discovery and indicated complaints should be amended to reflect the effect of the Supreme Court's decisions. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 9, 2013. The Court granted class action status on December 23, 2013. The class included all same-sex partners who are now or will in the future be eligible for partner health insurance benefits Ariz. Admin. Code § R2-5-10. On September 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and on October 1, 2014, the defendants did the same. However, on October 31, 2014, before the court ruled on those motions, the plaintiffs and defendants entered a Joint Motion seeking to dissolve the preliminary injunction and dismiss the case. On November 6, 2014, the court granted the motion, dissolving the preliminary injunction on midnight of December 31, 2014 and dismissing the case. The Joint Motion was filed based on the plaintiffs' belief that, following the decisions in Connolly v. Brewer (PB-AZ-0003 in this Clearinghouse) and Majors v. Jeanes (PB-AZ-0004 in this Clearinghouse) and the Attorney General of the State's announcement that those decisions would not be appealed, same-sex couples' right to marry in Arizona would not be challenged and so the preliminary injunction in this case was moot. On November 20, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the previous order dissolving the preliminary injunction and dismissing the case, due to the November 17, 2014 appeals of Connolly v. Brewer and Majors v. Jeanes by the Attorney General that could potentially result in the dissolution of the Connolly and Jeanes permanent injunctions. On December 10, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion and on January 13, 2015, the preliminary injunction was dissolved and the case closed in regards to all matters except ongoing litigation over attorney's fees. On March 5, 2015, the court ordered that within seven days of receipt of the notices from plaintiffs, defendants must affix address labels and send them by U.S. mail to all State of Arizona employees who received family health coverage for a same-sex domestic partner or domestic partner’s child(ren) in 2014. On June 5, 2015, the court granted plaintiffs’ application, and was awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $305,049.95 and costs in the amount of $1,936.67. 2015 WL 3555282. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by several lesbian or gay employees of the State of Arizona, each of whom was receiving family coverage for his or her committed same-sex life partner, against the State, alleging that the enactment of a statute eliminating family health insurance coverage for non-spouse domestic partners and thereby precluding same-sex domestic partners but not opposite-sex domestic partners from obtaining coverage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Other concurrent cases in the court had ruled that Arizona law barring same-sex marriage was unconstitutional, and both parties consequently filed a joint motion for dissolution of the preliminary injunction and voluntary dismissal of the case in November 2014, which was granted by the court one month later. This case was dismissed in January 2015, and in June 2015 the court granted plaintiffs’ application, and was awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $305,049.95 and costs in the amount of $1,936.67.


This case, Maryland NAACP v. Baltimore City Police Department, 1:06-cv-01863-CCB (D. Md. 2006) was one of three cases filed about the same time alleging mistreatment of persons arrested and taken to Baltimore Central Booking and Intake Center ("Central Booking" or "CBIC") for booking and processing. (The other cases were JC-MD-0007: Jones v. Murphy, Case No. 1:05-cv-01287-CCB (D. Md. 2005) and JC-MD-0011: Rodney v. Murphy, 24-C-05004405, filed in Maryland state court.) Central Booking was opened in 1995 as the central location for booking and processing arrestees in Baltimore City. Operated by the Maryland Division of Pretrial Detention and Services, part of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, Central Booking processed approximately 100,000 arrestees annually. This case was a class-action lawsuit filed in the United States District for the District of Maryland on July 21, 2006, by five individuals and two NAACP entities. Represented by the ACLU of Maryland Foundation and private attorneys from New York and Washington, D.C., the plaintiffs alleged that the Baltimore City Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of illegally arresting tens of thousands of individuals each year who were not and could not be prosecuted. The plaintiffs further alleged that, after being illegally arrested, the individuals were taken to Central Booking where they were strip-searched and detained for days, as long as 54 hours, in inhumane conditions, until they were released without being charged with a crime. This practice, plaintiffs alleged, was encouraged by the Baltimore Police Department, which rewarded officers for high arrest productivity and punished officers with few arrests, regardless of the success of the prosecution. In 2005, 30% of those arrested without a warrant were never charged. The plaintiffs alleged there were illegal arrests for things such as stopping on the street to watch a woman being handcuffed, handing out religious pamphlets, sitting on the steps of a building, dropping a food wrapper, and walking down the street. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, and certification for a class consisting of "arrestees who were (1) arrested by the Police Department without probable cause and (2) released without charges after being booked at CBIC." The defendants included the City of Baltimore, the Baltimore Police Department, the warden of Central Booking, and other state officials. The State defendants answered by generally denying the charges. The City and Police Department moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On December 1, 2006, the District Court (District Judge Catherine C. Blake) denied the motion to dismiss. 2006 WL 3626898 (D. Md. Dec 01, 2006). As discovery progressed, Judge Blake required the parties in this case and Jones v. Murhpy, another pending before her, to provide periodic status reports to the Court. The state defendants produced electronic data pertaining to arrests from 2002--August 2007 and numerous hardcopy documents. The plaintiffs also took the depositions of various officials with the Police Department and Central Booking. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on December 18, 2007, adding 9 individual plaintiffs and several new defendants, including the new Mayor of Baltimore and several police officers. On February 27, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding additional plaintiffs and defendants. On April 25, 2008, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. Following leadership changes at BPD, the parties entered into settlement negotiations, which culminated in settlement agreement to end the lawsuit. On June 29, 2010, the parties reached a settlement agreement that was approved by the court. The comprehensive settlement provided for significant reforms of the BPD's arrest and monitoring practices and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement for three years. The BPD committed to new policies and training to ensure officers knew the limits of their authority, and would address low level offenses with actions short of arrest whenever possible. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $630,000 in damages and attorneys' fees. The agreement also required the BPD to implement a new system of comprehensive data collection and monitoring, which would be overseen by an independent auditor. The job of the auditor was to ensure not only that the data is being kept and appropriately used and analyzed, but also to review probable cause statements to verify that officers had sufficient cause for an arrest, and that supervisors are adequately monitoring officers' actions, and intervening as necessary. The auditor's reports can be found on the ACLU's website here. On April 30, 2012, the auditor released his first report and the plaintiffs alleged in a press release that the BPD had failed to comply with the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs stated that the status report revealed that BPD officers did not or could not justify arrests for quality of life offenses in at least 35 percent of the cases examined; that the BPD was almost one and half years late in creating a database to allow it to effectively monitor officer and supervisor behavior; and that the BPD was improperly refusing to give the auditor records of arrests that resulted in persons being released without charge, the very arrests most likely to be improper, and the ones that led to the lawsuit in the first place. The docket sheet does not reveal any plaintiffs' motion regarding this alleged noncompliance with the settlement agreement. For the next three years, the auditor continued to file report documenting the defendants' implementation of the settlement agreement. The auditor filed his final report in 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the NAACP, represented by the ACLU of Maryland, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged a pattern of improper arrests by the Baltimore City Police Department (BPD). In 2010, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement changed policies and training within in the BPD and established an independent auditor who filed reports regarding compliance. The auditor filed his final report in 2015 and the case is now closed.


On April 16, 2019, ten children in the custody of the Oregon Department of Human Services filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Oregon, the Director of the Oregon Department of Child Welfare, and the Oregon Department of Human Services along with its director, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12131(2)), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 USC § 794), the Adoption Assistance Program (42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.), and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA) of 1980 (42 U.S.C. § 620 et seq.). The plaintiffs, represented by A Better Childhood, Disability Rights Oregon, and private counsel, sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. They also sought an injunction against the defendant’s unlawful practices and attorney’s fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Oregon DHS exhibited a pattern of 1) failing to follow through on numerous federal recommendations to hire more caseworkers, follow up with foster-home monitoring, and improve “permanency planning;” 2) failing to ensure a sufficient number of foster homes for the disabled and non-disabled children in its care; 3) sending excess disabled and non-disabled children to for-profit, out-of-state foster care centers unequipped to properly care for disabled children while failing to maintain oversight of such centers’ practices and child welfare; and 4) subjecting disabled and non-disabled children to the risk of harm through placement instability. On June 24th, parties convened settlement negotiations, setting additional conferences for the months ahead. But the negotiations went nowhere and, during the second conference on July 11th, future settlement conferences were cancelled. Only July 25th, the defendants moved to dismiss or make more definite the complaint. They argued that the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction because it would be inappropriate for a federal court to tell Oregon how to run its juvenile court system as the plaintiffs demanded. They also argued that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ADA, Child Welfare Act, and § 1983. Specifically, the defendants illustrated DHS efforts to improve its foster services, placement, and permanency, and argued that these efforts met the Constitution's requirement that the State care for children’s basic needs; they also asserted that the ADA and CWA require reviews to be conducted only in state court. On August 8th, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their response to the motion to dismiss. They argued that abstention should only be exercised in the most extraordinary of cases and that the cases cited by defendants did not apply to the factual background of this case. The plaintiffs argued that DHS’ practices and case plans were inconsistent with provisions under the CWA and ADA and alleged that the defendants’ motion to dismiss both lacked legal merit and was inconsistent with the congressional intent to have the ADA and CWA apply as equally to disabled children as to non-disabled children. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Ten children in the custody of the Oregon Department of Human Services filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the Oregon Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA) of 1980. The plaintiffs, represented by A Better Childhood, Disability Rights Oregon, and private counsel, sought a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights and injunctive relief to prevent future harm. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss, and the case is ongoing as of October 2019.


On May 16, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of New York under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GINA), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (collectively Title VII) against Founders Pavilion, Inc. (Founders). The class, employees and applicants, claimed that the defendant employer requested family medical history as part of its hiring and continued employment practices, terminated employment on the basis of disability, failed to provide reasonable accommodation, discriminated against pregnant applicants and terminated an employee because she was pregnant. The plaintiffs asked the court to grant permanent injunctions to prevent the defendant from discriminating on the basis of genetic information, disability or pregnancy; to require the defendant to provide equal employment opportunities for qualified individuals regardless of genetic information, disability or pregnancy; and to provide compensatory and punitive relief to eradicate the effects of its unlawful employment practices. Founders sold its nursing facility on July 2, 2013 and has since ceased operating any business. On November 26, 2013, the parties entered into a consent decree, recognizing the class. The consent decree had a duration of five years. If Founders ever owned or operated any healthcare facility or other business, they would be enjoined by the consent decree from requesting genetic information, including family medical history from any applicant or employee. They were further enjoined from failing to provide reasonable accommodation to applicants or employees with disabilities, terminating any employee on the basis of that employee’s disability or perceived disability, and failing to hire an applicant or terminating an employee because of her pregnancy. Additionally they had to institute training and provide information about these policies. The consent decree further required Founders to pay a total of $259,600 to five claimants as compensatory damages and back pay. Founders also paid a class award of $110,400, with each class member eligible to receive $800. The class consisted of the 138 individuals who were hired by Founders during the time that Founders utilized the “Occupation & Environmental Health Services Patient History Form” that included a “Family History” section. The five year time period passed without any further litigation and as of March 2019, the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2013, the EEOC sued an employer for unlawful employment practices that discriminated on the basis of genetic information, disability and pregnancy, seeking injunctive, compensatory and punitive relief. Founders entered into a consent decree to pay $259,600 to five claimants and $110,400 in a class award for all individuals hired by Founders during the time that Founders used a form that included a "Family History" section. The five year stated time period for the consent decree passed without any further litigation and as of March 2019, the case is presumably closed.


The U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division filed this lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) on June 13, 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The action proceeded under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et. seq., alleging policies and practices that discriminated on the basis of sex. In 2009, MDOC allocated certain officer positions in its female correctional facilities as female-only assignments, such as Food Service Officer, Yard Control Officer, Property Room Officer, and Electronic Monitor Officer. MDOC instituted a freeze on all transfers out of female correctional facilities. MDOC denied female officers' transfer requests, while allowing male officers to move between facilities. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. In the complaint and the amended complaint, filed July 27, 2016, the DOJ alleged that MDOC policies denied female employees the opportunities provided to men and were required to work overtime at the expense of their health. DOJ sought monetary damages and an order to enjoin the defendants from further discrimination in job assignments based on sex and in the grant of transfer requests. The complaint also sought to compel the state to develop and implement appropriate and effective measures to prevent discrimination, such as policies, procedures, and training for employees. On October 9, 2018, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement and stated that they planned to submit the settlement to the court for approval. As a part of the proposed settlement, the defendant agreed to create a Title VII-compliant process in consultation with the DOJ, provide a limited number of priority transfers to class members, create a compensation fund of $750,000, and establish a dispute resolution process. Before the court made a decision on the settlement, four members of the class who had filed complaints with EEOC filed a motion to intervene. The intervenors alleged that the DOJ was not keeping them informed on the litigation and failed to consult with or notify the intervenors regarding the settlement. In light of the government shutdown, Judge Borman granted a stay lasting from December 28, 2018 to February 5, 2019. On March 29, 2019, Judge Borman denied the intervenors' motion, stating that DOJ representatives had been in regular contact with the intervenors and that the proposed settlement was was fair and would allow them an opportunity to object at a fairness hearing. As a result, Judge Borman believed that granting the motion to intervene would be futile. The proposed settlement is currently pending the court's approval.

Summary: In 2016, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff alleged that Michigan Department of Corrections violated Title VII by engaging in sex discrimination by denying female employees the professional opportunities provided to men. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief. The parties reached a proposed settlement that awaits the court's approval.


On November 16, 2011, an individual resident of Louisiana filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The plaintiff, represented by various public interest and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants violated the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") by failing to make records available. Following Hurricane Katrina, the plaintiff co-founded Common Ground Relief ("CGR") to provide short-term relief to Gulf Coast storm victims, as well as long-term support for rebuilding communities in the greater New Orleans, Louisiana area. After discovering that one of CGR's employees was an FBI informant, the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking documents pertaining to the informant and either the plaintiff or CGR. The FBI denied the FOIA request, stating that it would not respond to a FOIA request concerning an individual absent a "privacy waiver" from that individual. The plaintiff appealed the denial, but the DOJ affirmed the FBI's refusal to produce the documents. On May 31, 2013, the District Court (Judge Susie Morgan) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court found as a matter of law that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his request for records pertaining to himself and CGR. In addition, with respect to the plaintiff's request for records pertaining to the FBI informant, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence that any alleged government impropriety occurred. Finally, the Court concluded that if any exclusion was in fact employed by the defendants as to the records requested, it was justified. On May 31, 2013, the Court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

Summary: On November 16, 2011, an individual resident of Louisiana filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, claiming they violated the Freedom of Information Act by failing to produce records about a third party unless a privacy waiver was submitted. The complaint was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment on May 31, 2013.


In December 2013, the EEOC brought this lawsuit against Children's Hospital and Research Center in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In this case, an employee of the Children's Hospital and Research Center suffered breast cancer and could not perform the daily tasks of caring for herself because she was weakened from her impairment and its treatment. The plaintiff initially took a two month medical leave of absence in January 2012 and sought to extend the medical leave three times to undergo treatment for her disability, including a double mastectomy, reconstruction surgery for each breast and removal of her fallopian tubes, ovaries and uterus. In July 2012, the hospital rejected her doctor's medical certification, which stated that the employee was still recuperating from surgery but could return to work in September 2012. The hospital denied any further medical leave and fired her as an office assistant because they thought that she would not be able to return to work by September 2012. The EEOC requested (a) a permanent injunction enjoining the Children's Hospital and Research Center from terminating employment because of a disability, and engaging in other employment practices that discriminate against an employee on the basis of disability; (b) an order for the Children's Hospital and Research Center to institute and carry out policies, practices and programs prohibiting discrimination; (c) an order for the Children's Hospital and Research Center to provide backpay and compensation to the discharged employee; and (d) punitive damages. On August 14, 2014, Judge Edward M. Chen approved a joint stipulation by the parties to refer the case to private mediation. On February 10, 2015, Judge Chen approved a joint proposed consent decree. The consent decree provided for both general and specific injunctive relief, including enjoining the Children’s Hospital from unlawfully discriminating against any employee due to his or her disability, requiring the Hospital to make reasonable accommodations for disabled employees as required by law, and having the Hospital revise its employee and supervisor ADA training. For the specific terminated employee, the Hospital was required to provide her with a neutral reference for her future employers and pay $300,000 in monetary relief. Each side agreed to bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs. The court maintained jurisdiction over the consent decree for three years. It terminated in 2018 without any further litigation, and the cases is now closed.

Summary: In December 2013, the EEOC brought this suit against Children's Hospital and Research Center for not providing a reasonable accommodation and discharging its employee who got breast cancer and required treatment and recovery. In February 2015, the District Court granted approval of a joint proposed consent decree that provided for general and specific injunctive relief, as well as $300,000 for the plaintiff.


The City and County of San Francisco filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on Aug. 11, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff explained that following a series of Trump Administration efforts to target so-called "sanctuary cities," the Administration released a new such policy on July 25, 2017. It imposed two new conditions on recipients of federal funding for policing (such as San Francisco) including: "to (1) provide federal immigration officials access to local detention facilities to interrogate any suspected aliens held there ('Access Requirement'); and (2) provide the Department of Homeland Security ('DHS') with 48 hours’ notice before releasing an individual, where the federal government has requested notice in order to take that individual into custody for immigration reasons ('Notice Requirement') (together, the 'Notice and Access Requirements')." San Francisco argued that the Notice and Access Requirements could compel city officials "to unlawfully hold inmates longer than they otherwise would to ensure that DHS receives the required 48 hours of advance notice" and would force the plaintiff to ignore its own laws. As such, the plaintiff argued that the Notice and Access Requirements violated the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers and spending clauses. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to ensure it retains federal funding while preventing the defendant from enforcing its newest policy. San Francisco's "sanctuary city laws" prohibit city employees from using city resources to enforce federal immigration laws unless legally required to do so. Specifically, local law enforcement officers are prohibited from cooperating with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) voluntary detainer requests, and are also limited in when they may provide the federal government advance notice of a person’s release from jail. The plaintiff's complaint states that the city enacted these laws "based on robust evidence showing that San Francisco is a safer, healthier, and stronger city when its officials do not enforce federal immigration laws." San Francisco's complaint stated that the funding at risk comes from the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG). By imposing new conditions on this funding, the plaintiff alleged, the Notice and Access Requirements threatened the implementation of the plaintiff's sanctuary city laws while also threatening a critical source of municipal funding. The case was assigned to Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on Aug. 15, and reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick on Aug. 24. On Aug. 17, the State of California moved to relate this case to its own case, State of California v. Sessions, also challenging the Byrne JAG funding conditions. On Aug. 23, the U.S. consented to relate the case but reserved the right to make objections. Judge Orrick then related the two cases on Aug. 25. The City of Los Angeles moved to intervene on Aug. 22; DOJ opposed this motion on Aug. 29 and Los Angeles replied the next day. Judge Orrick denied the motion on Sept. 11. DOJ requested an extension of time to answer the complaint. San Francisco objected, noting that the government had recently moved to stay the nationwide injunction in Chicago v. Sessions. Judge Orrick nevertheless granted DOJ's request. DOJ moved for summary judgment on Oct. 31. It argued that statutory language (in the INA and Byrne JAG statute) authorized DOJ to impose the immigration-related conditions on the grants, without violating the Separation of Powers or Spending Clause principles. San Francisco filed an amended complaint on Dec. 12, noting that DOJ's grant conditions included San Francisco's compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. San Francisco requested a declaration that it complies with § 1373. Judge Orrick held a motion hearing on summary judgment on Dec. 13. On Jan. 19, 2018, DOJ moved to dismiss the case. DOJ argued that the challenged conditions were not unlawful under any statutes, the Separation of Powers Clause, the Spending Clause, or any independent constitutional bar. DOJ also maintained that San Francisco was not entitled to a declaration of its compliance with § 1373 due to lack of standing and ripeness. San Francisco responded on Feb. 2, and DOJ replied on Feb. 14. After a Feb. 28 motion hearing, on Mar. 5, Judge Orrick denied DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, Judge Orrick held that San Francisco had standing because it had a well-founded fear of enforcement, injury-in-fact, and ripe claims (because DOJ would not provide a Byrne JAG grant to San Francisco due to its sanctuary city laws), similar to how the plaintiffs in Judge Orrick's other cases County of Santa Clara v. Trump and State of California v. Sessions established standing. Next, Judge Orrick held that San Francisco had stated legally sufficient claims for relief with respect to the notice and access conditions, following the reasoning in City of Chicago v. Sessions and City of Philadelphia v. Sessions which found the conditions to exceed DOJ's statutory and constitutional authority. On Sept. 10, 2018, the court related this case to two additional cases: City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. On October 5, 2018, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for San Francisco. 2018 WL 4859528. The court held that the challenged conditions violated the separation of powers and that the DOJ exceeded its Spending Power and therefore violated the Constitution. The court reasoned that Congress inappropriately delegated its spending power to the executive, and that even if validly delegated, the conditions were too ambiguous and unrelated to their goal for the DOJ to validly exercise the delegated power. The court also held that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, because the DOJ did not give adequate reasons for imposing the conditions and it did not consider important problems with its conditions. Finally, the court held that California and San Francisco's laws comply with the federal conditions anyway under the court's interpretation of Section 1373 "limiting it to information relevant to citizenship or immigration status not including release date information" and not requiring "state and local governments to share contact information and release status information with federal immigration officials." The court thus issued a nationwide injunction. On November 20, 2018 the court amended the judgment, at the government's request, so that it would not preclude the DOJ from bringing preemption claims under other federal statutes. The amended judgment retained the prohibition on the government from relying on § 1373 as an independent federal ground for placing conditions on other programs. The DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket #18-17308). The Ninth Circuit finally heard oral argument on December 2, 2019. On July 20, 2002, the Ninth Circuit ( Circuit Judges Richard R. Clifton, William A. Fletcher, and Eric D. Miller) affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 965 F.3d 753. The Ninth Circuit upheld the injunction barring DOJ from using Access and Notice Conditions as Byrne funding requirements for any California state entity and the injunction barring DOJ from denying funds based on plaintiffs’ alleged non-compliance with § 1373. However, the Court limited the reach of the injunction to California’s borders, finding that the district court abused its discretion in granting a nationwide injunction. Though San Francisco offered evidence of other locations across the country that may like an injunction against the funding requirements, the Court found that nothing in the record suggested that such broad relief was needed to fully protect the plaintiffs. On November 13, 2020, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court (docket #20-666). In response to the petition, on January 13, 2021, California suggested that the Supreme Court defer action on the petition until President Joseph Biden took office and it could understand the incoming administration’s stance on these issues. After President Biden took office, the government filed a letter on January 27, 2021, agreeing with California, and recommended the Court hold the petition in abeyance. In addition, the government recommended that the petition in this case be consolidated with similar petitions filed in New York v. Department of Justice and City of New York v. Whitake. The parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the cert petition on March 4, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The City and County of San Francisco sued DOJ on Aug. 11, 2017 over policies targeting "sanctuary cities" by imposing immigration enforcement conditions on federal funding for law enforcement. The U.S. District Ct. for the District of Northern California granted summary judgment for San Francisco, entering a nationwide injunction. DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court but limited the scope of the injunction to just California. The government filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court in November 2020. In January 2021, President Joesph Biden took office and the government filed a letter with the Supreme Court recommending it hold the petition in abeyance until it could determine the administration's position on these issues. Then on March 4, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the cert petition. The case is ongoing.


An amended complaint was filed on March 22, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada by private counsel on behalf of two plaintiffs who also claimed to be friends, one an attorney and the other a Nevada state prisoner. The initial complaint had been filed on June 2, 2005, and initially amended on June 15, 2005. The amended complaint stated that officials of the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) violated the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by interfering with the prisoner's efforts, via mail, to provide paralegal/law clerk-type assistance, both for free and for pay, to the attorney. The marked legal mail that the defendants allegedly refused to forward from the attorney-plaintiff to the prisoner-plaintiff related to cases other than the prisoner's own cases and, sometimes, contained public record-type court documents that the prisoner had ordered from court clerks, according to the amended complaint. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages, filing their case pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983. The defendants were said to have censored and refused to deliver marked legal mail without providing due process or an adequate review procedure and, similarly, denied without due process or sufficient review the prisoner's right to conduct a paralegal/law clerk business from prison. Plaintiffs claimed that other similarly-situated prisoners had been allowed to conduct businesses from prison. In addition to denial of due process and equal protection rights, plaintiffs complained that the defendants' conduct impinged upon rights to privileged attorney-client communications, to free speech, to free association, to petition the government for redress of grievances, and to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Prison officials were also said to have violated these same rights by retaliation, via imposing restrictions on the prisoner's activities and inhibiting his work on civil rights cases other than his own personal legal matters. On November 18, 2005, District Judge Edward C. Reed granted a preliminary injunction against the defendants, enjoining the prison officials from restricting non-legal correspondence between the plaintiffs but allowing, for security reasons, the officials' required redaction from the plaintiffs' correspondence of some information personally identifying others. Evans v. Vare, 402 F.Supp.2d 1188 (D. Nev. 2005). The plaintiffs and the prison officials cross-appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court's unpublished October 13, 2006, memorandum decision partially affirmed and partially reversed the district judge's ruling. The appellate court noted that not all correspondence between an attorney and a client is necessarily privileged or presumed confidential. While the defendants argued that the prisoner was restricted from engaging in a business relationship as a paralegal by state statute, the court observed that the defendants had not shown in the district court that the prisoner was engaged in such a business activity, as opposed to corresponding about a common interest or hobby. Still, as long as restrictions on a prisoner's First Amendment rights reasonably serve a legitimate penal interest, the officials could impose such restrictions. Thus, the Ninth Circuit panel felt that the preliminary injunction was not too restrictive of the plaintiffs' freedoms. Privacy and security concerns warranted allowing the defendants to examine mail between the two plaintiffs and requiring the attorney, with respect to documents that have not been published, to redact from those documents personal identifying information about other persons. The case was remanded to the district court. There, Judge Reed modified his earlier injunction on December 29, 2006, in view of the appellate ruling. His unpublished modified order allowed prison employees to examine mail from the attorney to the prisoner, but barred denying receipt or forwarding of their mail which either (1) consisted of regularly-published court decisions law or regulations, or (2) was other legal correspondence than described in (1), above, and had the names, social security numbers, addresses and other identifying information of other persons blacked out. Discovery proceedings ensued over the next several months in the district court, as reflected by the PACER docket sheet. The last entry we have on that docket sheet is on May, 21, 2007, and indicates that discovery was due by September 26, 2007, with pretrial motions due a month later. We have no further information about the case. There was a settlement conference on January 25, 2008, during which each party agreed to pay their own attorney's fees and costs. On April 11, 2009, the court ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from denying plaintiffs the receipt or forwarding of mail involving legal matters, when either of two conditions are met: (1) The mail consists of regularly published court decisions, laws or regulations or (2) Where to mail does not consist of regularly published court decisions, laws or regulations, Plaintiff's correspondence regarding legal matters shall not be interfered with if the names, social security numbers, addresses, and other identifying information of other persons are blacked out.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of prison officials monitoring legal mail between the two plaintiff without due process. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants were permanently enjoined from restraining or denying transfer of mail between plaintiffs that falls under two established categories.


This case, filed on February 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, is one of a number of cases filed in various federal district courts across the county by Catholic organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government. Plaintiffs claim their free exercise of religion and freedom of speech rights are being violated by the portion of the interim final regulations adopted to implement the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) ("the ACA") that would require them to cover contraception as part of their health insurance offerings. On April 30, 2012, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that the regulations were in the process of being amended; that no part of the law had been enforced against any of the Plaintiffs; and that the Plaintiffs lacked standing. On July 17, 2012, in a 45-page opinion, the Court, (Senior Judge Warren K. Urbom) granted the Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. On September 14, 2012, the plaintiff appealed the decision to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the appeal on August 21, 2013.

Summary: This case, filed on February 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, is one of a number of cases filed in various federal district courts across the county by Catholic organizations seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against the federal government. They claim their rifghts to free exercise of religion and spech are violated by the portion of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that requires inclusion of contraceptive care as part of their health insurance plans. The Court dismissed the case without prejudice on July 17, 2012.


On October 16, 2018, PEN America, Inc. brought this lawsuit against President Donald Trump in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, an organization representing writers and literary professionals, sued under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) alleging that the President used his power against media and press to violate the First Amendment freedom of speech and the press. PEN America was represented by the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School and Protect Democracy. The case was assigned to Judge Lorna G. Schofield. The complaint alleged that President Trump used, or threatened to use, the regulatory and enforcement powers of government to punish the speech of journalists in at least four ways: initiating a government review to raise postal rates to punish the owner of the Washington Post; directing DOJ enforcement actions against media companies, including CNN’s parent company; interfering with press access to the White House; and threatening to revoke broadcast licenses. Further, it alleged that President Trump expressed his animus toward media entities for their coverage of him and then threatened government retaliation. PEN America sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In its amended complaint of February 6, 2019, PEN America included allegations related to the President’s threatened and actual revocations of security clearances of media commentators and White House press credentials, including those of PEN America member and CNN reporter Jim Acosta. On April 10, 2019, President Trump sought to dismiss the complaint, claiming that PEN America lacked standing to bring claims on behalf of its members and on its own behalf, and that it failed to state a plausible claim for relief. He also claimed that prospective relief could not be implemented, as “the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such injunctive relief [i.e. a district court injunction against the President of the United States] would be 'extraordinary' and beyond the power of the federal courts.” On March 24, 2020, the court granted in part the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denied the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On the remaining claims, the court granted declaratory relief but found injunctive relief improper. 2020 WL 1434573. As of June 29, 2020, discovery has been stayed until at least July 6.

Summary: On October 16, 2018, PEN American Center brought this lawsuit against President Donald Trump in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, an organization representing writers and literary professionals, sued under 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) alleging that the Presidents used his power against media and press to violate the First Amendment freedom of speech and the press. Specifically, the complaint alleged that President Trump used, or threatened to use the regulatory and enforcement powers of government to punish the speech of journalists. PEN America filed an amended complaint on February 6, 2019. In the amended complaint, PEN America included allegations related to the President’s threatened and actual revocations of security clearances of media commentators and White House press credentials, including those of PEN America member and CNN reporter Jim Acosta. Discovery was stayed on April 16, and will remain so until at least July 6.


This is a case about Harris County's practice of arresting people without warrants by finding probable cause based on unsworn statements. On December 28, 2016, two individuals arrested without warrants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and under provisions of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Represented by the Civil Rights Corps and the Texas Fair Defense Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, an injunction, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's practices violated their Fourth Amendment rights to probable cause determinations and their Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural due process. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class for those arrested without a warrant "who are currently detained, or will be detained, by Harris County and who have not been provided, or will not be provided, a prompt, neutral determination of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation." They also sought to certify a subclass for those arrested for misdemeanors without a warrant "who are currently detained, or will be detained, by Harris County and who have not been provided, or will not be provided, a neutral determination of probable cause supported by oath or affirmation within 24 hours of arrest." The plaintiffs claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless arrest on account of probable cause based on unsworn statements violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, they also claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless misdemeanor arrest without offering bond when eligible for release violated Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. § 17.033(a)–(b). The same day the plaintiffs filed their complaint they also moved the court for a preliminary injunction to cease this practice. The case was initially assigned to Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt. It was transferred to Chief Judge Lee H. Rosenthal following an agreement between the judges. The defendant filed an answer on May 18, 2017. On November 1, 2017, the parties settled. The District Attorney agreed to change the process of presenting probable cause statements for warrantless arrests so that an officer now swears to the facts inputted into the District Attorney Intake System (DIMS). The defendants paid the plaintiffs $75,000 in attorneys' fees, but did not admit liability or that they engaged in the practices alleged by the plaintiffs. The court ordered for the settlement to be monitored for three years by an independent monitor to ensure the District Attorney made the promised changes to DIMS. The monitoring is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, two individuals arrested without warrants filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against Harris County. Represented by the Civil Rights Corps and the Texas Fair Defense Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, an injunction, and attorneys' fees. They claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless arrest without providing a determination of probable cause based on sworn statements violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Similarly, also claimed that keeping people in custody after a warrantless misdemeanor arrest without offering bond when eligible for release violated the Texas Criminal Procedure Code. On November 1, 2017, the parties settled. The District Attorney agreed to change the process of presenting probable cause statements for warrantless arrests so that an officer now swears to the facts inputted into the District Attorney Intake System (DIMS). The defendants paid the plaintiffs $75,000 in attorneys' fees, but did not admit liability or that they engaged in the practices alleged by the plaintiffs. The court ordered for the settlement to be monitored for three years.


On December 10, 2013, the owner of a non-profit religious corporation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff alleged the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates his religious freedom. The plaintiff, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom and private counsel, asked the court to strike down the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations. Specifically, the plaintiff sought both preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against it. On January 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the contraception insurance mandate substantially burdened the plaintiff's religious exercise. On April 17, 2014, the Court (Judge Robert E. Blackburn) granted the preliminary injunction. Dobson v. Sebelius, 38 F.Supp.3d 1245 (2014). The federal government appealed to the Tenth Circuit, and on July 7, 2014, the Tenth Circuit agreed to the parties' request to hold the appeal in abeyance until the seven cases consolidated as Zubik v. Burwell were resolved by the Supreme Court. Nearly two years later, on May 16, 2016, in Zubik, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective Courts of Appeals; instructing the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of that case. Two of the Zubik cases had come from the Tenth Circuit -- Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius and Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius. Both were remanded to the Tenth Circuit as part of the Zubik decision; that judgment issued on June 17, 2016. In this case, on June 22, the U.S. defendants filed a status report requesting another 30 days to evaluate appropriate next steps in light of the Zubik order. On September 27, 2016, Judge Blackburn ordered the original case closed administratively, as there was no knowing how long the appeal would continue to be abated. The Appellees, or the original Plaintiffs, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on July 21, 2017. Judges Matheson and Bacharach denied the motion, and declared that the abatement would continue and that the parties would file status reports advising the court of the status of rulemaking proceedings and any other related events. On October 6, 2017 the Appellants, now representing the administration, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal. The order was granted without judicial action on October 23, 2017. On June 19, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to reopen the case, again seeking permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and Judge Blackburn reopened the case. On March 26, 2019 Judge Blackburn granted a permanent injunction to prohibit enforcement of the mandate by defendants against the plaintiffs and to prohibit defendants from assessing penalties against plaintiffs for their refusal to comply with the mandate. The court explained that with regard to the RFRA claim, the plaintiffs have been successful on the merits under RFRA and face potential irreparable harm unless an injunction is issued. Per the Declaratory Judgment Act, the court also declared that the rights of plaintiffs under RFRA are violated by enforcement of the mandate against plaintiffs in a way that (1) requires plaintiffs to include coverage of abortifacients in the group health plan for employees; (2) requires plaintiffs to execute and deliver the exemption form; or (3) imposes a penalty on the plaintiffs due to their failure to include coverage of abortifacients in its group health plan or to execute and deliver the exemption form. The court declined to rule on anything other that the RFRA claim. On April 16, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted their next status report and moved for dismissal with prejudice of the remaining non-RFRA claims and entry of final judgment on the RFRA claim. They also asked for additional time to submit a motion for attorney’s fees. Defendants did not oppose the motion. On March 13, 2020, Judge Blackburn granted plaintiffs’ motions and entered the Final Judgment. Plaintiffs notified the court on March 24 that the parties had reached a resolution and settlement on attorneys’ fees, but the notice does not specify the amount. As of May 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On December 10, 2013, a non-profit religious corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Colorado against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff believes the Affordable Care Act's requirement that employee health plans provide coverage of contraception violates his religious freedom. On July 7, 2014, the Tenth Circuit ordered the case held in abeyance pending resolution of Zubik v. Burwell. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Zubik on May 16, 2016, which took no position on the merits. On June 19, 2018, plaintiffs moved to reopen the case, again seeking permanent injunction and declaratory relief, and Judge Blackburn reopened the case. The court granted the permanent injunction on March 26, 2019 for the RFRA claims. On April 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for dismissal with prejudice of the remaining non-RFRA claims and entry of final judgment on the RFRA claim, which Judge Blackburn granted. The case is ongoing.


On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the city of Albuquerque in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The DOJ brought this action under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, alleging that officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) were engaging in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and § 14141. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that the APD used excessive force unreasonable deadly force during arrests and detentions, posing an unacceptable risk to the Albuquerque community, and that the city and the APD had failed to address these issues. The DOJ requested declaratory and injunctive relief against the APD to enjoin them from this unlawful conduct. This lawsuit resulted from a civil investigation conducted by the DOJ beginning in 2012, documented in a findings letter sent to the Albuquerque city government on April 10, 2014. On November 14, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion notifying the court that a settlement had been reached. The agreement required the APD to revise and implement force policies, training, and accountability systems to ensure compliance with the Fourth Amendment and other applicable law. In addition, the agreement established a new Civilian Police Oversight Agency to receives and investigates complaints of misconduct against the APD. The agreement called for the appointment of an independent monitor to assess and report on the implementation of the agreement. Finally, the parties also moved for an opportunity for community members and other stakeholders to express their views as amici curiae to assist the court in the development and execution of the agreement. On January 21, 2015, District Judge Robert C. Brack held a fairness hearing for interested parties to express their views on the proposed agreement. Seven groups presented their arguments, among them the Albuquerque Police Officers' Association (APOA), the exclusive bargaining representative of the police force. Prior to the hearing, the APOA and 23 concerned citizens filed motions to intervene in this action. Of the 23 individual motions, 14 were eventually withdrawn. On February 19, 2015, Judge Brack granted the APOA's motion to intervene, finding that the APOA had a sufficient interest in this action for intervention as of right. Judge Brack denied the individual motions to intervene, finding that the government (through the DOJ) adequately represented the individuals' interests. In a separate order also filed on February 19, Judge Brack appointed Dr. James D. Ginger as independent monitor to assess and report on whether the APD was fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. On March 6, 2015, Disabilities Rights New Mexico, the ACLU of New Mexico, and the Native American Voters Alliance Education Project filed a motion to intervene. On June 2, 2015, Judge Brack denied the motion to avoid delays in the implementation of the agreement and the litigation of the current parties' rights. In a separate order also filed on June 2, Judge Brack approved the settlement agreement and entered it as a consent decree. Reviewing amici submitted by community organizations, Judge Brack found that amendments to the agreement adequately addressed the community's concerns. In addition, Judge Brack found no conflicts in the agreement with the APOA's collective bargaining agreement, state, or federal law. Regarding the duration of the consent decree, the parties said that if after six years from the effective date the parties disagree whether the City has been in full and effective compliance for two years, either party may seek to terminate the settlement agreement. On August 21, 2015, the parties filed a joint stipulation to modify certain deadlines set forth in the consent decree. The independent monitoring team determined that while the APD had made significant progress, an extension of certain deadlines would be beneficial. On September 24, Judge Brack granted the motion. Since the settlement began, numerous status reports have been filed without indication of significant noncompliance. As of May, 2017, the APD had accomplished most of the "low-hanging fruit" required by the consent decree, such as writing and approving policies and designing and initiating training programs. However, Dr. Ginger identified eight specific actions by the APD that had substantially slowed compliance achievement, such as extended delays in revising the department’s use of force policy and use of covert “Special Orders” to subvert policies agreed upon by the parties and Dr. Ginger. Dr. Ginger also issued over 300 recommendations for the APD. The case was reassigned to Judge James O. Browning on February 27, 2019. As of June 10, 2020, implementation of the consent decree is ongoing. According to Dr. Ginger's twelfth report, filed on September 3, 2019, the APD continued to increase compliance over the years, and has shown good faith effort in complying with the consent decree. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 12, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the city of Albuquerque alleging that officers of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD) were engaging in a pattern or practice of use of excessive force, including deadly force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The parties reached a settlement agreement on November 14, 2014, which was entered as a consent decree on June 2, 2015. Implementation of the consent decree is ongoing.


The New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a putative class action complaint against Preferred Labor LLC (doing business as Preferred People Staffing) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in August 2006. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. According to the EEOC, the defendant employment agency discriminated against female applicants on the basis of their sex; unlawfully classified jobs on the basis of sex; complied with requests for employees on the basis of sex; and retaliated against a female employee who complained about the discrimination. The case was referred to a magistrate judge for mediation. In April, a status conference was scheduled for 7/14/2008. On July 21, 2008, the plaintiff amended its complaint to include Preferable People LLC as a defendant. Preferable operated a temporary day laborer operation similar to Preferred but had not operated in Worcester, Massachusetts. Preferable purchased most of Preferred’s assets in Worcester and purchased the rights to use the name “Preferred.” Preferable then operated out of Preferred’s former offices but did not engage in any discriminatory practices. EEOC acknowledged that Preferable had not engaged in any discriminatory practices, but argued that Preferable was Preferred’s successor and that liability should attach. In response, Preferable asked the court to dismiss them from the lawsuit. On February 13, 2009, District Judge F. Dennis Saylor IV granted Preferable’s request to be dismissed from the lawsuit. On July 6, 2009, the court approved a consent decree in favor of the plaintiff. This decree took into account that the defendant no longer operated the business at issue. So, although the decree had a duration of five years, if the defendant resumed its business within that time-frame, then the duration would be reset from the time the business resumed. The court retained jurisdiction throughout the duration of the decree to resolve any issue related to the decree. If the defendant resumed its business, then it would have to implement non-discriminatory policies and procedures, this would include prohibiting sex discrimination and retaliation. The defendant would then be required to implement anti-discrimination training for its employees. If the defendant resumed business, this decree required that the defendant implement a complaint procedure for applicants and employees who believed they have been discriminated or retaliated against. Afterwards, the defendant was then required to implement and maintain procedures to investigate complaints. After an investigation, the defendant had to provide the EEOC with reports on any complaints of discrimination and/or retaliation within the first four months it resumed business and every four months after. In addition, this decree required the defendant to pay $ 250,000 in monetary damages. The five years for the consent decree have passed, and there has been no further litigation. The case is now presumably closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this sex discrimination and retaliation lawsuit against Preferred Labor in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on August 2006. The defendant allegedly discriminated against women applicants and its women employees. And in one instance, the defendant retaliated against an employee that complained about the discrimination. On July 6, 2009, the court approved a consent decree in favor of the plaintiffs. This decree demanded that the defendant adopt anti-discriminatory practices and train employees should the defendants operate as a temporary day laborer and to pay the plaintiff $250,000 in monetary damages. The court retained jurisdiction for five years to ensure the defendant complied with the decree.


On June 29, 1994, disabled prisoners and parolees in California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, charging that, on account of their disabilities, the two divisions of the California Youth and Adult Corrections Authority California, Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") and Board of Prison Terms ("BPT"), were generally depriving disabled prisoners of benefits and accommodations provided to other prisoners or required by due process. The plaintiffs were represented by the Prison Law Office, the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, and private attorneys. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12131-34, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehab Act), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The district court (Judge Claudia Wilken) certified the plaintiff class in January 1995. In December 1998, the parties stipulated to amend the class definition to include "all present and future California state prisoners and parolees with mobility, sight, hearing, learning, and kidney disabilities that substantially limit one or more of their major life activities." The class was further modified in January 1999 to include prisoners and parolees with developmental disabilities. By agreement of the parties, the claims against CDCR (prison claims) and BPT (parolee claims) were bifurcated and proceeded on two different litigation tracks. The plaintiffs and CDCR entered into a settlement agreement that agreed to liability for CDCR, if the district court found the ADA and Rehab Act applied to prisons. The district court did find that both statutes applied to state prisons. Armstrong v. Wilson, 942 F.Supp. 1252, 1258-59 (N.D. Cal. 1996). The court also found that the State was not entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for its violations of the ADA and Rehab Act. Id. at 1263. The district court entered a remedial order and injunction directing CDCR to develop a plan for compliance with the statutes by improving access to prison programs for prisoners with physical disabilities at all of California's prisons and parole facilities. The State appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Alfred Goodwin) affirmed. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997). The claims against BPT were litigated by the parties; the district court held a bench trial in April 1999. The plaintiffs offered evidence including stories of a prisoner who used a wheelchair forced to crawl to a hearing, a deaf prisoner rendered unable to communicate with a sign language interpreter because he was shackled, and a blind inmate left without assistance to read complicated written materials. The court issued a permanent injunction in March 2001 and ordered the State to come into compliance with the ADA and the Rehab Act by identifying disabled prisoners and providing them with accessible locations for parole hearings, assistance in communicating, and special aid in the screening, appeals, and grievance processes. The State appealed, asserting that the injunction regarding parole hearings was overbroad and violated the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). In November 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) found that the class certified by the district court was overbroad, in that it included "sexually violent predators, mentally disordered offenders, and prisoners or parolees with renal impairments"--groups not represented by any named plaintiff. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2001). The injunction was upheld in all other respects. The court entered a Revised Permanent Injunction on February 11, 2002, which required that the State create and maintain a system for tracking prisoners and parolees with disabilities, take reasonable steps to identify prisoners and parolees with disabilities prior to parole proceedings, and provide reasonable accommodations to prisoners and parolees with disabilities at all parole proceedings, including parole revocations and revocation extensions, life prisoner hearings, mentally disordered offender proceedings, and sexually violent predator proceedings. The State failed to fully comply with the provisions of the Revised Permanent Injunction and the Plaintiffs filed an enforcement motion, which was granted in an order against the BPT defendants entered on May 30, 2006. In November 2006, the plaintiffs sought imposition of a population cap in California state prisons. Many of the plaintiffs' complaints about disabled prisoners being denied their rights stemmed from the fact that prisons were dramatically overcrowded, resulting in disabled prisoners often being placed in administrative segregation due to lack of space. However, at this time there were several ongoing class action law suits having to do with prison conditions in California. In this case, the district court appointed an expert in 2007 to facilitate the coordination of remedial processes in this case with three other pending class actions: Coleman v. Brown (E.D. Cal.), Plata v. Brown (N.D. Cal.), and Perez v. Tilton (N.D. Cal.). The district court also decided that issues relating to the sought population cap would be addressed in the other lawsuits. On January 18, 2007, Judge Wilken issued a separate Injunction. She found that despite extensive monitoring of CDCR institutions by plaintiffs' counsel, the State was continuing to severely violate the rights of prisoners with disabilities under the ADA and Rehab Act. She found the State was not compliant with the law, the Revised Permanent Injunction, or its own Remedial Plan (first put forth in 1998, and amended in 2001, 2002, and 2006). The violations were occurring with regard to inaccessible housing, denial of sign language interpreters to prisoners who need them, confiscation of medically prescribed assistive devices, late and inadequate disability grievance responses, and inadequate disability tracking. Judge Wilken ordered that the State increase the number of staff on its compliance and grievance response teams, develop and implement a statewide computerized tracking system and integrate it with the tracking system previously ordered in February 2002, generate an inventory of accessible housing, develop a system to hold wardens and prison medical administrators accountable for compliance with the Remedial Plan and other court orders, provide proper training to health care staff and correctional officers, and establish permanent salaried positions for sign language interpreters. The remedial phase of the litigation has continued since 2007. The defendants argued unsuccessfully on numerous occasions that they have no duty to provide reasonable accommodations for prisoners and parolees under the ADA. The defendants also argued that when they sent class members sent to county facilities, they were not responsible for any ADA noncompliance that occurred. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) issued an opinion in 2010 that summarily rejected these arguments. However, it did remand to the district court for further hearings on whether system-wide relief was necessary on the grounds that the evidentiary record as presented was not sufficient. Once remanded, the plaintiffs submitted additional evidence as to the nature and extent of violations, and the district court issued an order granting the renewed system-wide enforcement motion. On March 28, 2011, the court entered a stipulation order requiring the parties to file periodic joint statements describing the status of the litigation every other month, beginning on May 16, 2011. In 2012, the district court modified the 2007 injunction to clarify what was expected of the State. The modified injunction provided that the court-appointed expert would solve disputes between the parties. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Tashima) vacated the provisions in the modified injunction relating to the dispute resolution mechanism, finding that it was an impermissible delegation of authority to an expert. The district court then amended the dispute resolution mechanism to make it reviewable by the district court on motion by any dissatisfied party. On February 3, 2015, the district court granted a motion for further enforcement of the 2007 injunction. Judge Wilken found the State was still routinely housing class members in administrative segregation because of lack of housing in violation of the ADA and the court's prior orders. She ordered that if the State placed class members in administrative segregation, they needed to fully document their reason for doing so and submit such report to plaintiff's counsel. 2015 WL 496799. On March 26, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2014. The amount totaled $1,190,379.99. On June 29, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the first quarter of 2015. The amount totaled $1,090,718.30. On September 25, 2015, Judge Wilken filed a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the second quarter of 2015. The amount totaled $1,246,103.35. Attorney fees and costs remained undisputed. Over the next four years, the parties filed several joint status reports. As of May 2020, the most recent status report was filed on January 15, 2020. The statement presented the status of issues such as allegations of abuse and violence by CDCR staff, accommodations for deaf prisoners, the problem of equal access to job and program assignments for people with disabilities, statewide durable medical equipment reconciliation and accuracy of disability tracking information, accommodations for blind and low vision class members, and more. For the most part, the parties continued to work collaboratively and in good faith. However, the plaintiffs expressed concern about ongoing reports of discrimination by CDCR staff against class members. In 2019, the plaintiffs had sent a letter cataloguing multiple incidents of staff misconduct against Armstrong and Coleman v. Brown (E.D. Cal.) class members at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJD") over the past two and a half years and demanding that CDCR implement remedial measures by January 1, 2020. Given the ongoing reports of abuse, plaintiffs had begun taking depositions of CDCR staff members in January 2020. Additionally, plaintiffs remained concerned about accommodations for D/deaf prisoners, in particular with respect to defendants' heavy reliance on video remote interpretation (VRI), which plaintiffs' counsel have observed to be inadequate in many group settings, in violation of the ADA and court orders. On February 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a sealed motion for an injunction stopping defendants from assaulting, abusing and retaliating against people with disabilities at RJD. In support of their motion, 54 incarcerated people submitted declarations. Some of the declarants alleged instances in which correctional officers at RJD retaliated against them or others for, among other things, submitting or threatening to submit complaints regarding staff misconduct or failures to provide disability accommodations. Some of the declarants also alleged instances in which correctional officers at RJD retaliated against incarcerated people by charging incarcerated people with false rules violations reports. On March 17, 2020, the court entered a stipulation in which defendants agreed to prohibit RJD staff members from retaliating against declarants (or others involved in the February 28 motion) and to implement procedures to assess allegations of retaliation. On March 6, 2020, Judge Wilken entered a stipulated order confirming the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2019. The amount totaled $2,215,330.36. On June 3, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for an injunction, alleging similar abuse to the February 28, 2020 motion through CDCR's many facilities and requesting statewide relief. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on July 1, 2020, requesting that the court move some of the declarants who had been victims of retaliation. Judge Wilken granted the temporary restraining order the next day, though the defendants had not transferred the declarants in question on July 16, 2020. The court heard arguments on the February and June injunction motions on July 16, 2020. On July 30, the court issued a preliminary injunction, finding that the defendants had retaliated against the two declarants who were the subject of the TRO and again ordering the defendants to move them to a different facility. In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that another declarant had died at the hands of his cellmate, after a corrections officer ignored his requests to be moved for his safety. After an August 11, 2020 oral argument, on September 8, 2020, the court issued a lengthy opinion granting much of the relief requested by the plaintiffs in the February 28, 2020 motion. After describing numerous instances of unpunished staff violence on class members at RJD, the court found that the defendants violated the class members' rights under the ADA and the Rehab Act. In one such instance, one of the declarants who Judge Wilkens ordered transferred to another facility on July 30 received a threatening note signed by a "correctional officer gang" the night before his transfer. Finding that the defendants' failure to investigate and discipline staff was the "root cause" of the violations, the court ordered the defendants to work with the plaintiffs to create a modified remedial plan including: installing surveillance cameras in areas of RJD accused by class members, equipping RJD corrections officers with body cameras and creating policies for their use, revamping the staff complaint, investigation and discipline process, third party monitoring, information sharing with the plaintiffs' counsel, increased supervision and training of staff, and further anti-retaliation measures. 484 F.Supp.3d 808. The court also set a schedule for the development of the remedial plan, with a due date of October 20, 2020 for both the plaintiffs and defendants. It appears from the docket, however, that this deadline was extended. On September 25, 2020, the defendants appealed the district court's September 8 injunction to the Ninth Circuit, where the case was docketed as number 20-16921. The defendant-appellants' brief is due on May 5, 2021. During this time, the district court entered stipulated orders for attorneys' fees and costs. The order on September 17, 2020, confirmed $2,227,769.01 for the second quarter of 2020; the order on January 27, 2021, confirmed $3,000,035.18 for the third quarter. The district court had left the June 3, 2020, motion for statewide injunctive relief pending in its decision on September 8, 2020, because the issue had not been fully briefed. A hearing on this motion was held on December 12, 2020. On March 11, 2021, the district court granted the motion in part, requiring new remedial procedures at five of the seven prisons named in the motion. The court set another schedule for a remedial plan for these five prisons and required measures including installing security cameras, wearing body cameras throughout the prisons, reforming staff complaint and disciplinary procedures, and increasing supervisory staffing. 2021 WL 933106. The defendants appealed this to the Ninth Circuit on April 2, 2021. (21-15614). On March 31, 2021, the district court confirmed the undisputed attorneys' fees and costs for the fourth quarter of 2020: $2,432,256.82. (This brought the running total to $13,402,593.01.) By this point, the remedial plan for the September 8, 2020, injunction had been submitted, and the parties disagreed over one of its sections. On April 7, 2021, the district court set a briefing schedule, with objections due by May 4, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Disabled prisoners and parolees in California filed a class action lawsuit in 1994 in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, charging that, on account of their disabilities, the state was depriving disabled prisoners of benefits and accommodations provided to other prisoners or required by due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. In a series of injunctions and remedial orders, the court ordered that the State had to identify and track disabled prisoners and parolees and provide reasonable accommodations in prison facilities and at parole hearings. The court has declared that failing to adhere to the ADA and its prior orders on the grounds of shortage of bed space is impermissible and a violation of law. Currently the State is under extensive monitoring by plaintiff's counsel. The court granted injunctive relief for one prison on September 8, 2020, and for five more on March 11, 2021. The defendants appealed both injunctions. The case is ongoing.


On November 15, 2001 a group of current and former African American managers filed suit against Cargill in the Federal District Court for the District of Minnesota. Plaintiffs alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and state law by a pattern or practice of discrimination that resulted in both disparate treatment and disparate impact on African Americans employed by Cargill in terms of advancement, compensation, and termination. On July 15, 2002 the district court (Judge Donovan Frank) granted defendant's motion to dismiss in part and motion for summary judgment in part. The remaining claims continued into discovery. Plaintiffs sought class action certification and a hearing was scheduled for October 2004. In the process of discovery, however, defendant learned of possible unethical conduct by plaintiffs' counsel, Sprencer & Lang (S & L). The conduct concerned the behavior of one attorney from S & L who obtained documents, some of which were privileged, from a former high-level executive in Cargill's Human Resources Department. The privileged documents were at least cursorily examined and retained, likely by mistake. Though the facts were highly disputed the court found on September 24, 2004 that the conduct of S & L was unethical and was sufficient to disqualify them from representing plaintiffs in the case. New counsel was obtained and discovery resumed. On June 20, 2006 the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Subsequently some individual plaintiffs dropped out of the case while others pursued settlement negotiations with Cargill. Individual settlements were finalized in June 2007 for all remaining plaintiffs and the court entered a final order dismissing all plaintiffs' claims with prejudice on July 10, 2007. The details of each individual settlement are not known.

Summary: On November 15, 2001 a group of current and former African American managers filed suit alleging that Cargill had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination relating to advancement, compensation, and termination. Plaintiffs obtained new counsel after the court ruled on September 24, 2004 that their previous attorney had engaged in unethical conduct. Class certification was denied on June 20, 2006. The individual plaintiffs then either dismissed their claims or reached settlements with Cargill.


On July 1, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The EEOC sued four private corporations under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The complaint asked the court for a permanent injunction and damages, including back pay and other monetary compensation. Suing on behalf of three named black employees and all others similarly situated, the EEOC claimed that defendants had allowed black employees at a Pennsylvania construction project to be subjected to egregious and sustained racial harassment, creating a racially hostile work environment. The EEOC alleged that despite being aware of the situation, the defendants failed to take any remedy the situation. Specifically, the four black individuals named in the suit worked on a construction site outside of Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as employees of the defendant construction companies. The employees alleged that they were subjected to a racially hostile work environment, including: (1) Racist graffiti on the walls of the portable toilets (including comments such as "n----- trash mother f--ker", "who let that dirty n----- into local 36", "sieg heil," and "KKK"); (2) Racially offensive comments made by foreman, including "black people are no good and you cannot trust them"; (3) A hangman's noose in the work area. The employees alleged that despite the fact that defendants had notice of such incidents and treatment, they failed to take any remedial action. On October 13, 2005, the court (Judge Gene E.K. Pratter) consolidated four individual suits (filed by the three employees mentioned above and another employee) into this litigation by the EEOC. On May 25, 2006, the court dismissed the fourth employee's claims for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. 2006 WL 1451527. However, on July 21, 2006, Judge Pratter granted that same plaintiff's motion to intervene. On August 9, 2006, the case was transferred to the Hon. Thomas M. Golden. Through 2006, 2007 and into early 2008, the case continued to move to trial, with Judge Golden denying various parties' motions for summary judgment and entertaining other pretrial motions. On July 24, 2007, however, the court granted summary judgment to defendants Ironworkers Local Union 36 and International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 375. One of the plaintiffs had sued these unions as part of his separate suit stemming from the incidents at the construction site -- a suit that was consolidated with the EEOC suit against all of the workplace defendants noted above. In granting the motion, the court noted that a labor union may only be held liable under Title VII if the Union itself instigated or actively supported the discrimination or if it refuses grievances. Further, labor unions do not have an affirmative duty to investigate and take steps to alleviate discrimination on the part of employers. The employee-plaintiff later appealed, but then withdrew the appeal when the matter settled. Apparently the parties reached an agreement on money, but not injunctive relief, because on February 19, 2008, Judge Golden entered an order that the case was "dismissed without prejudice so that the parties can resolve the non-monetary aspects of the litigation." Notwithstanding this purported dismissal, on May 8, 2008, the court approved separate consent decrees between the EEOC and the four defendants. The court retained jurisdiction over the consent decrees, which were set to last for four years. The defendants agreed to pay, in total, $1,650,000 to the employees. The also agreed to develop and implement a written policy prohibiting racial discrimination and unlawful harassment and retaliation against their employees. Additionally, the defendants agreed to implement complaint procedures and to provide for prompt investigation of all complaints of harassment. They also agreed to do a Title VII training for management. The four years have passed, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In this case, the EEOC brought suit on behalf of four African-American workers, who claimed that the defendant employers on a large construction site had allowed them to be subjected to severe racial harassment, in violation of Title VII. The court approved a consent decree between the EEOC and each of the defendants, providing for monetary for the employees and injunctive relief for the employees and all those similarly situated.


On November 20th, 2014, four persons convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and awaiting execution of that sentence while confined on death row at Virginia’s Sussex I State Prison (SISP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections and SISP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court to extend the declaratory relief awarded to Mr. Prieto in Prieto v. Clarke to themselves, to enjoin defendants from failing to extend to the plaintiffs their rights and privileges afforded Mr. Prieto as a result of this court's order in his case. The plaintiffs also sought reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988. The plaintiffs alleged two violations. First, they contended that the conditions of their confinement on death row and the procedures for placing them there violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Second, they argued that their permanent segregation subjects them to an inhumane existence unrelated to any legitimate penological goal, amounting to imposition of cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amendment. On Feb 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. This motion was denied on April 17, 2015. On December 21, 2015 both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On July 8, 2016, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denying plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as moot. 2016 WL 3766301. The court found that defendants made several significant changes to the conditions of SISP, resulting in new conditions of confinement that plaintiffs conceded do not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court also found that because the improvements voluntarily made by defendants have rendered plaintiffs' claims moot, it would be inappropriate under the specific facts of this action to reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims or to invoke the injunction authority of the court. On August 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, claiming that the improvements made to the conditions on death row did not moot their claims (16-07044). On January 25, 2017, the court (Judges Paul v. Niemeyer, William B. Traxler, Jr., and James A. Wynn, Jr.) heard oral arguments. Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on March 24, 2017, ruling that the improvements made did not render the plaintiffs’ claims moot. 852 F.3d 358. The case was reversed and remanded to the district court due to the defendants' unilateral capacity to reinstitute the challenged policies, their refusal to promise not to reinstitute said policies, and the defendants' outlining of certain instances when those policies might be reinstituted. Back in the district court, the parties reopened discovery, and on August 25, 2017 both parties moved for summary judgment. On February 21, 2018, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' and denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment. 290 F.Supp.3d 518. Judge Brinkema declared that the pre-2015 conditions of the prison, including periods of isolation lasting up to 23 hours a day, were unconstitutional and in violation of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights. It was further ordered that the defendants be enjoined from reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. The injunction was to remain in place for two years, absent a finding that the prison reverted to pre-2015 conditions. The defendants appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on March 13, 2018. On December 13, 2018, the court (Judges Paul V. Niemeyer, Robert B. King and James A. Wynn) heard oral argument. Judge Wynn delivered the opinion of the court on May 3, 2019, amending the opinion on May 6 and affirming the district court's decision. First, the court found that the district court's grant of summary judgment was appropriate. Under the undisputed facts, the challenged conditions of confinement on Virginia’s death row created a “substantial risk” of serious psychological and emotional harm, thus satisfying the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis. Further, the court found that the subjective prong was also satisfied, as the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of serious psychological and emotional harm. Second, the court upheld the district court's injunction against reinstituting the pre-2015 conditions. 923 F.3d 348 (4th Cir. 2019). The defendants filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc; it was denied on July 26, 2019, with five votes to grant rehearing en banc (Judge Wilkinson, Judge Niemeyer, Judge Richardson, Judge Quattlebaum, and Judge Rushing). As of April 1, 2021, the case appears to be closed.

Summary: On November 20th, 2014, four persons convicted of capital murder, sentenced to death, and awaiting execution of that sentence while confined on death row at Virginia’s Sussex I State Prison (SISP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Virginia Department of Corrections and SISP under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On July 8, 2016, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. On August 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wynn ruled in the plaintiffs' favor and remanded the case to the District Court. On remand, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring the death row conditions unconstitutional and enjoining the defendants from enacting policies to create such conditions. On March 13, 2018, the defendants filed an appeal to U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wynn affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and an injunction for the plaintiffs, finding that the pre-2015 prison conditions were unconstitutional and in violation of the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights. The defendants filed a petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc; it was denied on July 26, 2019, with five votes to grant rehearing.