On May 11th, 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit corporation based out of California focused on civil liberties issues relating to technology, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, representing itself, sought injunctive relief, claiming that the FBI had wrongfully withheld agency records requested by the plaintiff under FOIA pertaining to the re-authorization of three provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the FBI had failed to comply with the statutory time limit for processing FOIA requests and that the plaintiff had exhausted all administrative remedies in trying to obtain the requested records. The plaintiff requested that the FBI immediately process the requested records in their entirety, disclose the requested records and make copies available to plaintiff upon completion of processing, and to do so in a timely and expedited manner. Subsequently, on June 14th, 2010, District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly ordered the parties to confer and propose a schedule for proceeding, specifically addressing, among other things, the status of the plaintiff’s FOIA request, the anticipated number of documents responsive to the request, and the anticipated date of the documents’ release. On June 28th, 2010, the parties submitted their status report from their conference. The defendant reported that it had completed its search for all potentially responsive documents to plaintiff’s FOIA request, and they amounted to around 1,700 pages. The defendant reported that it had forwarded all potentially responsive documents for processing and classification review, and that it expected to be finished processing all 1,700 pages by November 15th, 2010. On November 30th, 2010, the parties submitted their updated status report. The defendant reported that it had completed processing plaintiff’s FOIA request and had released all responsive, non-exempt information to plaintiff. Thus, on December 2nd, 2010, Judge Kollar-Kotelly ordered the defendant to submit its motion for summary judgment and all parties to submit their motions and cross-motions. On March 4th, 2011, the defendant moved for summary judgment. It claimed that, because that the FBI had satisfied its burden under FOIA and had released all reasonable, segregable information that was neither exempt nor not subject to FOIA to the plaintiff, the lawsuit should be resolved. However, on April 5th, 2011, the plaintiff filed a memorandum, partially opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and supporting its own cross-motion for summary judgment, submitted on the same day. In it, the plaintiff supported most of the defendant’s motion, but disputed the FBI’s continued withholding of five pages of material showing charts and statistical information related to the FBI’s use of expiring Patriot Act provisions. The plaintiff claimed that this information was non-exempt, responsive material to its FOIA request, and the defendant had not sufficiently proved that it legitimately withheld this information because the material did not pertain to national security or law enforcement. On April 22nd, 2011, the defendant answered the plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment. It claimed that the FBI was no longer withholding any material the plaintiff referenced in its cross-motion. Apparently, five out of six of the pages the plaintiff was seeking had already been inadvertently released to the plaintiff when the other responsive material was being processed, and the FBI just decided to voluntarily release the last remaining page, though the defendant maintained that these documents would have been exempt from FOIA under the deliberative process privilege. Because there was no longer any live issue at dispute, the defendant re-asserted that summary judgment should be granted. On June 16th, 2011, the parties reached a settlement agreement to satisfy the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, expenses, and litigation costs. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $4,000 for the costs associated with the lawsuit. In return, the plaintiff agreed to seek dismissal of the case with prejudice. The case was dismissed on June 16th, 2011.

Summary: In 2010, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit focused on civil liberties issues relating to technology, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff alleged that the Department of Justice (DOJ), specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), had wrongly withheld records the plaintiff requested under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) pertaining to three expiring provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). After an initial conference between the parties ordered by District Judge Coleen Kollar-Kotelly, the parties worked out a schedule for the processing and release of all responsive documents to plaintiff's FOIA request. However, even after the defendant released all 1,700 pages of requested documents to the plaintiff, the parties still disputed over six remaining pages pertaining to statistical information of the FBI's use of the expiring provisions via cross-motions for summary judgment. Ultimately, the defendant released the remaining six pages to the plaintiff and the parties settled over the plaintiff's attorneys' fees, with the defendant agreeing to pay the plaintiff $4,000. The case was then dismissed on June 16th, 2011.


On October 13, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the complaint, plaintiff is a nonprofit organization with a "mission is to protect our democracy from descending into a more autocratic form of government by preventing those in power from depriving Americans of a free, fair, and fully-informed opportunity to exercise ultimate sovereignty." As part of its mission, plaintiff aims to inform the public about executive branch activity, in part by filing FOIA requests and releasing the results on its website. Plaintiff was represented by its own counsel and the law firm Covington & Burling. The lawsuit was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. Under the Freedom of Information Act, plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Customs and Border Protection (CBP), as well as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), that would shed light on government policies and plans to hire new immigration enforcement personnel. In his Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13767 and Jan. 30, 2017 Executive Order 13768, President Trump directed DHS to hire 5,000 additional CBP agents and 10,000 additional Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. In order to meet these targets, plaintiff alleged, defendants intended to relax hiring standards and use independent contractors -- decisions that might "undermine the integrity of CBP and ICE and have negative consequences for border security." The complaint alleged that on Aug. 4, 2017, plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to all four defendant agencies, seeking records related to the agencies' plans for addressing border enforcement and illegal immigration. The request to OPM specifically sought all documents, including communications, memoranda, assessments, and final determinations, related to DHS' requests for hiring authorities addressed in its 90-day progress report on EO 13767. The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiff had not received a substantive response from any of the four defendant agencies. Plaintiff sought an expedited disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. On Oct. 24, plaintiff filed a notice in another case with the same name, stating that these two cases were related: Protect Democracy Project v. DHS, No. 1:17-cv-02202 (D.D.C. Oct. 24, 2017). The parties filed a series of status reports, showing that the defendants had produced some records and the parties continued to confer on the request's scope and production's responsiveness. In the joint status report dated May 6, 2019, the parties agreed that defendants CBP and OPM have completed their planned productions, and the parties had agreed that defendants DHS and OMB need not make further productions. The parties indicated that they continue to confer regarding any attorneys’ fees. Accordingly, the court ordered that the OMB and DHS were no longer required to make future productions. The parties continued to discuss the calculation of attorneys’ fees and the plaintiff’s entitled amount. The most recent joint status report by the defendants on May 19, 2020 indicate that the discussion has been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The next status report is due June 12, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Oct. 13, 2017, the Protect Democracy Project sued DHS, CBP, OMB, and OPM in D.D.C. under FOIA. Plaintiff sought disclosure of agency records on the government's policies and plans to hire thousands of additional CBP and ICE immigration enforcement agents, pursuant to Trump's EO 13767 and 13678. In their latest status report on May 6, 2019, the parties agreed that defendants CBP and OPM have completed their planned productions, and the parties had agreed that defendants DHS and OMB need not make further productions. The parties continue to discuss the matter of attorneys' fees.


This is a case about how quickly United States Citizenship and Immigration Services must process, print, and mail Employment Authorization Documents (EADs or Form I-766) for immigrants who have received approval for their Applications for Employment Authorization (Form I-765). On July 22, 2020, an immigrant who had received employment approval but had not received her EAD filed this class action suit in the Southern District Court of Ohio Eastern Division. She sued the agency and its Acting Director and Chief of the Office of Intake and Document Production under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and a writ of mandamus for damage sustained by the plaintiff and putative class members resulting from the agency’s intentional slowing and stopping of printing EADs and for the violation of plaintiffs’ 5th Amendment right to Due Process. The plaintiff had been unable to work due to the agency’s delay in printing her EAD and her employer was threatening to fire her if she did not return to work before August. On July 28, 2020, the defendants filed for a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On August 3, 2020, Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley denied defendants’ motion and granted the plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order that would require defendants to issue EADs to putative class members immediately or within seven days of the court’s order. Counsel for plaintiffs and defendants began mediation talks in early August. Settlement talks continued until August 21, 2020, when Chief Judge Marbley signed the parties’ consent order. As part of the consent order, the remaining plaintiffs filed an order of voluntary dismissal. In the consent order, the defendants denied all of plaintiffs’ allegations and stated that the consent order was not and should not be taken as or construed to be an admission of responsibility. Plaintiffs also withdrew their motion for class status in the consent order. In terms of interim relief, the defendants agreed to post a notice on the agency’s website explaining how an alternative form (Form I-797) could be used in place of an EAD while a person awaits the printing of that document (this policy expires October 15, 2020). The defendants also agreed to create a putative class list which will include all plaintiffs and putative class members. The list is divided into two categories: sub-class one and sub-class two. Subclass one members were defined as immigrants whose EADs are already queued for printing at the time of list creation. For these individuals, the defendants agreed to mail EADs within a week of the execution of the consent decree. Subclass two members were defined as immigrants who EADs have not been queued as of the day the list was created. For these members of subclass two, the defendants agreed to mail EADS within seven days of USCIS collecting biometric data for the individual. The class list list tracks the receipt number for the submitted I-676 form, the date the I-765 was approved, and the date the EAD was produced. In a status report filed on September 9, the agency reported that 45,565 putative class members had yet to receive their EADs. In the second report filed on September 30, USCIS reported that they had sent EADs to all of the sub-class one members and 15,177 of the 17,736 total sub-class two members. In addition to the list creation, the defendants also agreed to pay $90,000 in attorneys fees. As of October 15, 2020, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, immigrants who had received approval for their Applications for Work Authorization but who had not yet received Employment Authorization Documents (EADs) from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services filed this class action complaint in the U.S. Southern District Court of Ohio Eastern Division. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency was intentionally delaying or stopping printing the documents altogether, making it impossible for the putative class members to work. This was in violation of their substantive Due Process rights under the 5th Amendment and of the Administrative Procedure Act. In August 2020, the parties reached a settlement that required USCIS to create and update a list of putative class members and to produce and mail EADs to the pertinent class members. The case remains open.


On July 13, 2016, organizations whose members have participated in and witnessed protests in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in response to the death of Alton Sterling, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Louisiana, and the New Orleans Workers' Center for Racial Justice, the plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as rights arising from the Louisiana Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants and their high-ranking policymaking officials intentionally developed and implemented customs, practices, and/or policies under which protestors were detained, harassed, threatened, dispersed, and charged for allegedly obstructing vehicular traffic on public streets, even when the protestors were engaged in no actual obstruction and created no risk to pedestrian or traffic safety. The plaintiffs further claimed that the defendants' actions deprived the plaintiffs of a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct was criminal. On July 14, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. A motion hearing was set for July 28, 2016, but the parties filed a joint motion to continue on July 20, 2016, which was granted. All of the previously fixed dates were thus vacated. On July 27, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss with prejudice the plaintiffs' complaint with respect to the East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney. After the plaintiffs advised the district court that they would not oppose this motion to dismiss in a August 4, 2016 telephone conference, U.S. District Judge John W. deGravelles granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on August 8, 2016. The case against the remaining defendants, however, would continue. On December 5, 2016, Judge deGravelles granted a joint motion to dismiss the case. The parties had come to a Memorandum of Understanding, which recognized "the rights of all persons to assemble and engage in the public for the purpose of peaceful public discourse and protest," and stipulated that the law enforcement parties would make every effort to ensure reasonable alternatives were available if protesters disturbed other parties. Both parties maintained the right to return to the court if the Memorandum was violated. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 13, 2016, organizations whose members have participated in and witnessed protests in Baton Rouge, Louisiana in response to the death of Alton Sterling, filed this civil rights lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants and their high-ranking policymaking officials intentionally developed and implemented customs, practices, and/or policies under which protesters are detained, harassed, threatened, dispersed, and charged for allegedly obstructing vehicular traffic on public streets, even when the protesters are engaged in no actual obstruction and create no risk to pedestrian or traffic safety. In December 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs motion to dismiss with prejudice, conditioned on the parties adhering to a Memorandum of Understanding voluntarily entered into by both parties.


On June 13, 2005, represented by the Center for Justice, in Spokane, the plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, seeking to strike down a Washington state statute as unconstitutional. The statute, RCW § 70.48.390, allowed jails to require each person who is booked into jail to pay a fee based on the Jail's actual booking costs or one hundred dollars, whichever is less. The fee is payable immediately from any money then possessed by the person being booked into jail. RCW § 70.48.390. In accordance with RCW § 70.48.390, the Spokane County Board of Commissioners passed Resolution 04-0160 in February 2004. That resolution authorized the Spokane County Jail to develop and implement a procedure to collect a fee from persons booked into jail. On May 5, 2004, pursuant to Resolution 04-0160, the Jail adopted an official policy authorizing the collection of a booking fee. Under this Policy, federal inmates are charged the federal daily rate while non-federal inmates are charged the actual jail booking costs--$89.12. Pursuant to the statute, the Policy allows the fees to be taken directly from any funds found on the person at the time of booking. In this case, the plaintiff was arrested based on a domestic violence complaint and booked into the Spokane County Jail on October 31, 2004. His wallet was inventoried as personal property that would be returned upon his release, but the Jail took all of the money in it as payment on the booking fee. The Spokane County jail did not inform the plaintiff he was being charged a booking fee, that there was a reimbursement policy in place, or that the money was required to be returned if his charges were dropped or he was acquitted. He was released from jail the next day after all of the charges were dropped. Upon his release, his money was not returned and he did not receive a copy of the Jail's reimbursement policy. The Spokane County Jail eventually returned the plaintiff's money several months later, after his lawyer sent a letter to Spokane County stating the Jail's booking fee policy was unconstitutional. In January 2005, the Jail modified its forms and procedures related to the collection of booking fees, instituting the requirement that each person booked into jail receive paperwork outlining methods for obtaining reimbursement. Further, persons who were released and not charged within 72 hours, automatically, without request, were to have their booking fees returned if paid in part or in full. The Jail also automatically voided any unpaid--but not paid--booking fees for all inmates who were found not-guilty, acquitted, or had their charge dismissed. The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment, arguing that the statute and the implementing policy were facially unconstitutional. The County, joined by the State as intervenor, defended. On August 29, 2006, Judge Fred Van Sickle granted plaintiff's motion, holding that the statute and policy violated due process, because they allowed the deprivation of plaintiff's property without a hearing or other chance to oppose the confiscation. The County and State moved for reconsideration. On April 13, 2007, Judge Van Sickle granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a facial challenge as to the constitutionality of RCW § 70.48.390 and the Jail's booking fee policy. The plaintiff's damage claim survived. Judge Van Sickle ordered further briefing on the issue of whether the application of RCW § 70.48.390 and the Jail's booking policy to the plaintiff and others was constitutional. On October 12, 2007, Judge Van Sickle partially granted the plaintiff's summary judgment motion on the issue of liability. It held that under Matthews v. Eldridge [424 U.S. 319 (1976)], the application of the Jail's booking fee policy to the plaintiffs deprived them of due process of law. To satisfy the test, the court found that seizure of all of the funds in the plaintiffs' possession implicated a significant private interest, and that the risk of erroneous deprivation in application of the policy was extreme compared to the municipality's interest in increasing revenue. In this situation, due process required a pre-deprivation hearing. Class certification was granted on August 25, 2008. It included all individuals from May 5, 2004 to December 20, 2006 who were deprived of their property pursuant to the booking fee policy of the Spokane County Jail without being provided the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the grant of class action status, saying that the booking policy changed in January 2005. In denying the motion to reconsider, the court said that although the January 2005 policy mandated that individuals booked into jail receive paperwork outlining methods for reimbursement and booking fees and were automatically returned to persons not charged within 72 hours, it still resulted in the deprivation of individuals' property upon booking into the Jail without due process. The actual deprivation of property, without due process, occurred upon the collection of a booking fee without an opportunity to contest the taking of the money. In the same order, the judge denied the defendant's motion to reconsider the October 2007 grant of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. However, he granted a certification for interlocutory review. On January 26, 2009, the defendant filed an appeal of the October 2007 grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit [09-35074]. For most of 2009, the parties worked on a settlement agreement. In the Ninth Circuit, the case was referred for mediation, but the parties never met before the mediator as a settlement was reached out of court. A preliminary joint settlement was approved by the District Court on September 18 of 2009. After hearing out some objections from the defendant's side, the parties filed a final joint motion for settlement on March 1, 2010. It was approved by the court on March 19. The appeal was dismissed after the settlement was approved by the District Court. The plaintiff class received $491,668, with $147,487.48 going to attorney's fees. The named plaintiff, Shawn Huss, received $10,000 as an incentive award. From March to December 2010, a handful of individual class members appealed with the Ninth Circuit in order to opt out of the settlement agreement. The case was voluntarily dismissed on April 9, 2012.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought a class action suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging a Washington statute and Spokane County Jail policy that collected fees from an individual booked into jail. The named plaintiff had his wallet inventoried as personal property that would be returned upon his release, but the Jail took all of the money in it as payment on the booking fee. The Jail did not inform the plaintiff he was being charged a booking fee, that there was a reimbursement policy in place, or that the money was required to be returned if his charges were dropped or he was acquitted. He was released from jail the next day after all of the charges were dropped. Upon his release, his money was not returned and he did not receive a copy of the Jail's reimbursement policy. The money was only returned months later after prodding by the plaintiff's attorney. Class certification was granted and it included all individuals, from May 5, 2004 to December 20, 2006, who were deprived of their property pursuant to the booking fee policy of the Spokane County Jail without being provided the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law. Claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were dismissed for lack of standing to bring a facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute and Jail's booking fee policy. The claim for damages went forward and a settlement was approved by the court on March 19, 2010. The class received $491,668 in total.


After a study of the Southeastern Virginia Training Center (SEVTC) revealed that essentially all of the individuals in the institution could be placed in the community, the Governor of Virginia announced his desire to close SEVTC. Contemplating revisions to the services Virginia provides to individuals with intellectual disabilities, the state legislature created a new plan to fund the construction of new Intermediate Care Facilities and to build a new and modern SEVTC with 75 beds. The Arc of Virginia inferred from that plan that 75 individuals currently placed in SEVTC would be moved to the new facility, and sued in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to enjoin the state from constructing the new facility, claiming that the diversion of state resources toward building a new institution violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Arc claimed that the state must provide services in the most integrated setting possible, and that the diversion of funds toward the construction of a new institution violates this command. On December 17, 2009, the court (Judge Robert E. Payne) granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the Plaintiffs' claims were not ripe. The Plaintiffs had not alleged that a current live controversy existed because it was not clear that placement decisions had been made or that the 75 beds in the new facility would be filled by residents of the current SEVTC facility. The state legislature may generally choose to create and structure its provision of services to people with disabilities. The court held that "it is possible that the placement decisions, when made, may offend federal law. But, that will depend on future actions and there is no indication now that Virginia's decisional process is unlawful or that persons will be placed in settings that are inappropriate to their individual needs or at odd with their choice." Several years later, the DOJ and Virginia settled a procedurally unrelated Olmstead case dealing with the same issues. That case is PB-VA-0003 in the Clearinghouse.

Summary: Arc of Virginia sued to prevent the construction of a new institution for individuals with intellectual disabilities in Virginia. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia dismissed the lawsuit, finding that there was no ripe controversy at that time.


This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge the City's anti-immigrant housing law, Ordinance 2892 (subsequently repealed and reenacted in slightly altered form as Ordinance 2903). See IM-TX-0001, IM-TX-0002 and IM-TX-0004. This case and two others filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Vazquez v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0001) and Barrientos v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0002) were assigned to District Court Judge Sam A. Lindsay. Judge Lindsay ordered that the three cases before him be consolidated. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch was designated as the lead case for purposes of the consolidated action. The Ordinance required apartment owners and managers to determine the citizenship or immigration status of their tenants and imposed penalties for their failure to do so. It was largely patterned after similar ordinances enacted by local governments in Hazelton, Pennsylvania, and Escondido, California. The constitutionality of those ordinances has also been challenged. See IM-PA-0001 and IM-CA-0001. On May 12, 2007, the voters of Farmers Branch approved Ordinance 2903 by a margin of 4,058 to 1,941. On May 21, 2007, a day before the Ordinance was to go into effect, the District Court (Judge Lindsay) granted plaintiffs' applications for a temporary restraining order enjoining enforcement of the Ordinance. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 2007 WL 1498763, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36918 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2007). Plaintiffs were ordered to post a $1500 security bond. On June 1, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) dismissed the Barrientos plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. The Court reasoned that since the Barrientos plaintiffs operated retail businesses in Farmers Branch and were not tenants or property owners, the Ordinance had no direct effect on them. As such, they had no standing to challenge the Ordinance. The Court also denied the Federation of American Immigration Reform, Inc. leave to intervene in the case on behalf of the defendants. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 245 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Tex. 2007). A preliminary injunction hearing was held on June 5, 2007, and on June 19, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Farmers Branch from enforcing Ordinance 2903 pending a trial on the merits. He found that as the Ordinance attempted to regulate immigration, and did so differently from the federal government, it was preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F.Supp.2d 757 (N.D. Tex. 2007). Farmers Branch then requested an increase in the amount of the bond posted by plaintiffs. That request was denied. On June 26, 2007, the Court (Judge Lindsay) denied the City's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 2007 WL 1836844, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46508 (N.D. Tex. June 26, 2007). On December 11, 2007, however, the Court (Judge Lindsay) granted a more narrowly drawn motion by the City to dismiss the Villa plaintiffs' claims for compensatory damages, finding that the Villa plaintiffs had suffered no damage from the Ordinance because it had never come into force due to the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction issued by the Court. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3:06-CV-2371-L, 2007 WL 4322147, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91021 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007). On February 22, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of preemption and due process violation. The City also filed for summary judgment on the same day. On May 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Lindsay) granted the plaintiffs' motion and deferred ruling on that of the City. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.Supp.2d 858 (N.D. Tex. 2008). It found that the Ordinance was both preempted and a violation of due process and that a permanent injunction should be issued barring its enforcement. Following its granting of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, the Court allowed the parties to brief it regarding plaintiffs' remaining claims and whether judgment should be entered. After briefing, on August 29, 2008, the Court (Judge Lindsay) denied the City's motion for summary judgment, and denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the rest of its claims as moot, as they sought relief identical to that plaintiffs had already been granted. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 577 F.Supp.2d 851 (N.D. Tex. 2008). On the same day, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction barring the enforcement of the Ordinance. There was no appeal, as the City had already passed a third iteration of the law, Ordinance 2952. (See IM-TX-0028 for the case on this law.) A dispute over attorney's fees was submitted to mediation and settled in 2009, although another mediation report in 2010 stated that the parties were unable to reach a settlement. This case is now closed.

Summary: This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge a city ordinance that required apartment owners and managers to determine the citizenship or immigration status of their tenants and imposed penalties for their failure to do so. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Judge Sam A. Lindsay) issued a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and finally, on August 29, 2008, a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the law as preempted by federal law. A new, similar law, however, has since been passed. (See IM-TX-0028 for the case on that law.) This case is now closed.


Plaintiffs filed their class action lawsuit on July 6, 1994, alleging that Citibank had engaged in redlining practices in the Chicago metropolitan area in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691; the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619; the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-bank rejected loan applications of minority applicants while approving loan applications filed by white applicants with similar financial characteristics and credit histories. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, actual damages, and punitive damages. This case has received a good deal of press and blogger attention because one of the plaintiffs' lawyers was Barack Obama, then just a couple of years out of law school. U.S. District Court Judge Ruben Castillo certified the plaintiffs' suit as a class action on June 30, 1995. Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 322 (N.D. Ill. 1995). Also on June 30, Judge Castillo granted Plaintiffs' motion to compel discovery of a sample of Defendant-bank's loan application files. Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Sav. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 338 (N.D. Ill. 1995). The parties settled the case on May 12, 1998, with an agreement that provided for waiver of some fees for class members, should they reapply for a loan, and also for various procedures to ensure that Citibank followed its own loan policies in a race neutral way.

Summary: This was a discriminatory lending class action brought in 1994 against Citibank, in Chicago. The case has received a good deal of press and blogger attention because one of the plaintiffs' lawyers was Barack Obama, then just a couple of years out of law school. The case settled in 1998 with an agreement that provided for waiver of some fees for class members, should they reapply for a loan, and also for various procedures to ensure that Citibank followed its own loan policies in a race neutral way.


On July 16, 2010, arrestees/inmates held in Franklin County Ohio Corrections Centers filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by Ohio Legal Rights Service, challenged the excessive use of force by deputies at the Corrections Centers. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that corrections deputies routinely used tasers to inflict pain, fear, corporal punishment, and humiliation in violation of the arrestees' Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and money damages. On December 14, 2010, the court (U.S. District Judge Edmund A. Sargus) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and permitted the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to intervene as a full party. 2010 WL 5173162. The court provisionally certified a class consisting of "all persons who, now or at any future time during the pendency of this litigation, are or will be placed in the custody of the Franklin County Sheriff's Department at the Franklin County Corrections Centers." On January 25, 2011, the court permitted the intervention of the Fraternal Order of the Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9, which is the collective bargaining representative of the Franklin County Deputy Sheriffs. Shreve v. Franklin Cnty., Ohio, 2:10-cv-644, 2011 WL 250407 (S.D. Ohio 2011). On February 4, 2011, the plaintiffs and the DOJ agreed to separate settlement agreements with the Franklin County Sheriff's Office. The terms of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the DOJ required that the Sheriff's Office provide and enforce policies prohibiting the use of tasers except in exigent circumstances when other alternatives have been exhausted. The DOJ settlement also provided details around what alternative measures are and factors to consider before resorting to the use of tasers, and prohibited the use of tasers on restrained subjects. The DOJ settlement further provided for a reporting policy in instances of use of force and medical evaluation for those that have been tasered. The DOJ settlement established standards for training and internal accountability the Sheriff's Office must meet, as well as provisions around implementation of and compliance with the agreement. The terms of the agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants incorporated the provisions of the settlement with the DOJ, but modified the provisions around implementation and compliance. The court approved the settlement agreement between the DOJ and the defendants the same day. On March 10, 2011, the court also approved the plaintiff's and defendant's settlement agreement and conditionally dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint subject to the defendants achieving substantial compliance with the terms of the agreement. The plaintiffs issued an order of non-compliance with the settlement agreement to the Sheriff's Office in August 2011. The Sheriff's Office responded stating that the cited instances of non-compliance occurred prior to the settlement's effective date. The Sheriff's Office also indicated that it would have to delay implementing the training required by the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs requested mediation, though it is unclear what proceeded as a result of this request. On September 7, 2011, the court consolidated this case with two other related cases (11-cv-261 and 11-cv-415), and with a third in March 2012 (2:12-cv-70). Litigation continued as the defendants sought to dismiss the claims of the various plaintiffs. In September 2012, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted on January 2, 2013, thereby dismissing the claims of one of the outstanding plaintiffs. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on January 24, 2013, which affirmed the district court's decision on February 6, 2014. Meanwhile, four of the other plaintiffs settled in January 2013. There is no further activity on the docket until December 2015, when the Court granted the parties motion to terminate the Court's authority to enforce the settlement agreement on the grounds that the Sheriff's Office achieved compliance with the agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: This class action case challenged the use of excessive force by taser by the Franklin County Ohio Correctional deputies and sought injunctive and monetary relief. The parties reached a settlement agreement on February 4, 2011, which required the defendant to develop and implement a revised policy, provide training, and develop improved accountability processes. This case was consolidated with three other cases, and litigation continued with regard the claims of the various newly added plaintiffs. Four plaintiffs settled, and one appealed the Court's granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to his claims to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed in February 2014. In December 2015, the Court granted the parties motion to terminate the Court's authority to enforce the settlement agreement on the grounds that the Sheriff's Office achieved compliance with the agreement.


On December 23, 2020, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, with several other immigration service organizations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Catholic Legal Immigration Network sued the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) under the Administrative Procedure Act. Represented by private counsel, the National Immigration Law Center, and the American Immigration Council, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. (CLINIC) sought a stay in the effective date of a rule promulgated by EOIR that set a new fee schedule for removal proceedings. They claimed that EOIR's new fee-schedule rule was arbitrary and capricious and that its comment period was too short, violating the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirement. CLINIC also claimed that the new rule violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection clause because the fees were so high that they effectively barred asylum seekers from meaningfully participating in removal proceedings. Judge Amit P. Mehta stayed the effective dates of the final rule as to a specific subset of fees pending adjudication of the lawsuit on January 18, 2021. 2021 WL 184359. The last action of the case was an order staying proceedings, including pleading deadlines, until April 2, 2021. As of February 18, 2021, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. and other immigration service organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that a new rule promulgated by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, which set a new fee schedule for removal proceedings, violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the due process and equal protection rights of asylum seekers. In 2021, the court stayed the effective date of the final rule pending the outcome of the litigation. This case is ongoing.


On June 30, 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Macomb County. PLN, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. PLN claimed that an October 2013 policy at the Macomb County Jail unlawfully prohibited its publication from reaching inmates at the jail, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On June 30, 2015, PLN also filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to stop Macomb County from improperly censoring publications and correspondence mailed to prisoners at Macomb County Jail by PLN and other senders pursuant to a postcard only policy. On September 30, 2015, the Court (Judge Avern Cohn) denied the motion without prejudice for reasons stated in court on the record at a hearing on September 30, 2015 for which transcripts have not been obtained. The Court ordered the claim for injunctive relief is to be tried by the Court and money damages to be tried by a jury, with the claim for injunctive relief tried first. On June 17, 2016, Judge Cohn ordered a stipulated injunction. The court ordered the defendants to deliver all publications to prisoners directly from any publisher, and clarified that defendants may censor a publication only if it is determined to be detrimental to the security, good order, or discipline of the institution or if it might facilitate criminal activity, and not solely because its content is religious, philosophical, political, social or sexual, or because its content is unpopular or repugnant. The court additionally ordered defendants to deliver all mail to prisoners, including publications from the plaintiffs. The defendant was also required to establish an appeals process for any undelivered material, and to state the reason for any censorship. The court gave the defendant 30 days to comply and to notify its employees of the new policy, and 60 days to notify the plaintiff in writing of the compliance. The court retained jurisdiction for enforcement purposes. On January 11, 2017, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. The court denied this motion on June 13, 2017. The court dismissed the case on October 10, 2017, and retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the Stipulated Injunction of June 17, 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, Prison Legal News filed this lawsuit in Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Macomb County. PLN claimed that an October 2013 policy at the Macomb County Jail unlawfully prohibited its publication from reaching inmates at the jail, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In June 2016, the Court issued a stipulated injunction delivery of publications to inmates. The case is now closed.


On December 7, 2012, a journalist filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (Greenbelt) under Section 1983 against Montgomery County, Maryland. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief and punitive and compensatory damages. He claimed that he had been falsely arrested, subject to unreasonable search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and battery. The plaintiff alleged violations of the the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as a violation of the Privacy Protection Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that while he had been peacefully observing and recording an arrest in which he thought the officers might be using excessive force from over 100 feet away, officers of the county police department had flashed him with a spotlight and instructed him to stop recording. When the officers realized that the plaintiff was recording the arrest, one of them approached him. The plaintiff identified himself as a journalist, the officer stated that he was under arrest, placed him in a choke-hold, and dragged him across the street to the police cruiser. The officers placed the plaintiff in the squad car and threatened to arrest his wife as well if she came any closer. Once they reached the police station, the plaintiff watched an officer take the battery and memory card from his camera and place it in his pocket. The plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct. The report filed by the arresting officers showed no evidence of disorderly conduct by the plaintiff. When he was released some hours later, the memory card for his camera was not returned to him. On August 23, 2013, Judge J. Frederick Motz granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss some of the charges. Charges against the individual officers were dismissed, but the charges against Montgomery County itself were allowed to proceed. On June 6, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Theodore David Chuang. Discovery was contentious and continued throughout the course of 2014. On January 20, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment on February 19. On November 5, 2015, Judge Chuang issued a memorandum opinion granting in part and denying in part both motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the court granted the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's claim for damages for one officer for his alleged First Amendment violation. The court, however, denied the defendants' motion with respect to the claim for declaratory relief and all other counts at issue in the motion. Additionally, the court granted the plaintiff's cross motion as to the offenses of hindering an arrest and second-degree assault only, but denied the motion in all other respects. On June 24, 2016, the court granted the parties' partial stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Privacy Protection Act claim asserted against Montgomery County. The parties engaged in settlement discussions regarding the remaining claims. After reaching a private settlement agreement, the court granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all remaining claims on March 6, 2017, except for the plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. On March 22, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding the plaintiff $283,559.25 in fees and $12,402.34 in costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 7, 2012, a journalist filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Montgomery County, Maryland and several of its police officers for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, battery and malicious prosecution stemming from the plaintiff's arrest while recording the defendants arrest another individual. After the court granted in part and denied in part both the defendants' and the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment in 2015, the court granted the parties' partial stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all claims except for the Privacy Protection Act claim asserted against Montgomery County on June 24, 2016. After reaching a private settlement agreement, the court granted the parties' stipulation of dismissal with prejudice of all remaining claims on March 6, 2017, except for the plaintiff's claim for attorneys' fees. The court awarded the plaintiff $283,559.25 in fees and $12,402.34 in costs. The case is now closed.


On Jan. 30, 2014, several Wyoming-based Catholic organizations, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the federal department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate (including the accommodation offered by the government to some of the plaintiff-organizations) violated the FRFA and First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the accommodation provided by HHS for certain religious organizations, which requires them to self-certify that they meet certain criteria and provide a copy of the self-certification to its insurance company or third-party administrator, still burdens their religious faith. Under the accommodation, their insurance plans, the plaintiffs argue, "are the vehicle by which 'free' abortion-inducing products, contraception, sterilization, and related counseling are delivered to the organizations' employees." The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which District Judge Scott W. Skavdahl denied on May 13, 2014. The Court determined that submitting a self-certification to their insurance carriers is not a substantial burden on the organizations' religious exercise. The self-certification "enables nothing," Jusge Skavdahl wrote. "The sole 'enabler' is the federal statute that [plaintiffs] ha[ve] been allowed to opt out of." (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the Court held, the plaintiffs did not establish their likely success on the merits, and a preliminary injunction was not warranted. The plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, and the district court stayed the case until that appeal was resolved. On June 30, 2014, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (Judges Lucero and Matheson) reversed the district court and granted the preliminary injunction provided that the plaintiffs "inform the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing" that they were non-profit, religious organizations with religious objections to providing contraceptive services. The plaintiffs did not, however, need to inform their insurance carriers of anything. The court based this injunction on one granted by the Supreme Court in a factually similar case, Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 134 S. Ct. 1022 (2014). On Oct. 18, 2017, the stay was lifted. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. Later in October 2017, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the case, which the defendant did not oppose. The case was dismissed on Nov. 8, 2017.

Summary: On Jan. 30, 2014, several Wyoming-based Catholic organizations filed this lawsuit under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment against the federal department of Health and Human Services, claiming that the ACA's contraception mandate, as well as the accommodation provided by HHS, violated their religious beliefs. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, but the plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which granted one. The resulting injunction required the plaintiffs to inform the Secretary of HHS in writing that they were non-profit, religious organizations with religious objections to providing contraceptive services, but did not obligate them to notify their insurers.


On May 28, 2003, plaintiffs who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident during their removal proceedings filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. Plaintiffs alleged they applied for their alien registration card ("green card") and temporary proof of their legal permanent resident status in the United States but that the government had not issued that documentation. Without such documentation, plaintiffs alleged, they were denied employment, travel, educational, and public benefits privileges granted to other legal permanent residents. Plaintiffs asserted claims for violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq., as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Attorneys with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law of Texas and private law firms, represented the plaintiffs. On March 31, 2004, the District Court (Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa) certified the case as a class action, over the objection of the government. Plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction was denied. Thereafter, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment which were amended and supplemented numerous times. Plaintiffs' complaint likewise underwent numerous amendments. Along with their filings, the parties also notified the Court in July 2004 that substantially identical cases were pending in federal courts in California (Santillan v. Ashcroft, No. 3:04-cv-02686 (N.D. Cal.), IM-CA-0003) and Florida (Amor v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.), IM-FL-0021). Discovery and litigation continued. On September 9, 2005, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) instructed the parties to refile new motions for summary judgment to address rulings made in the California case, Santillan v. Ashcroft. At a motion hearing on March 22, 2006, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) granted a motion to stay the case pending Santillan (a certified national class action on the same issue), and set a status conference for early the following year. The Court also denied the cross-motions for summary judgments without prejudice to refiling. After several continuances, a status conference was held on August 10, 2007 at which time the parties advised the Court that they were still waiting for the resolution to Santillan, but that they were also finalizing a resolution to the Padilla case. On September 27, 2007, the Court (Judge Hinojosa), noting that the parties had urged little action over the past two years, ordered an indefinite stay of the case pending the resolution of Santillan and inviting the parties to file for reinstatement if a resolution was reached in California that would allow the case to progress. Meanwhile, the parties had been negotiating, and in December 2007 both they and the parties in Santillan came to an agreement with the federal government. On January 25, 2008, the parties jointly moved to reactive the case and have it transferred to the Northern District of California to facilitate a settlement of both Padilla and Santillan on identical terms. On February 25, the Court (Judge Hinojosa) granted their motion and the case was transferred to be consolidated with Santillan. On July 22, 2008, the California court approved a settlement for both cases; see the entry on Santillan for more details.

Summary: On May 28, 2003, plaintiffs who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident during their removal proceedings filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. The parties reached a settlement in December 2007, and on February 26, 2008, the case was transferred to the Northern District of California to be consolidated and settled on identical terms with a case there, IM-CA-0003.


On December 12, 2012, two individual plaintiffs filed suit against Contra Costa County (California) and its Office of the Public Defender (PD) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (in San Francisco). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of indigent criminal defendants who, they alleged, were inadequately represented by the PD. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph Spero. The written policy of the PD provided for indigent people accused of crimes (both felonies and misdemeanors) to appear alone at their first court appearance. The court would then refer the criminal defendant to the PD, and postpone the arraignment for an arbitrary period (typically five to thirteen days), not based on the needs of the Public Defender or the exigencies of the particular defendant’s case. During that period, the person remained in jail and opportunities for bail or other release were delayed until the postponed arraignment. The plaintiffs argued that the Public Defender’s policy was unconstitutional because counsel is required at all <i>critical</i> stages of criminal proceedings, including the initial court appearance. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process (procedural due process with respect to bail or other release, and both procedural and substantive with respect to statutory speedy trial rights). The plaintiffs sought a declaration of the policy’s illegality and an injunction to block the policy and compel the PD to perform the duties required by California Government Code § 27706. The plaintiffs also requested nominal damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their constitutional rights, damages under the California State Civil Rights Act for denial of their statutory speedy trial rights, attorneys’ fees, and punitive damages. The PD moved to dismiss the complaint on January 31, 2013. While this case was pending, the PD changed the contested policy for people charged with felonies, allowing for representation at their first court appearance, but the policy remained unchanged for misdemeanor defendants. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley for settlement negotiations on April 29, 2013, but a settlement was never reached. On May 8, 2013, the court granted the PD’s motion to dismiss with leave to amend, citing insufficient facts and vague legal reasoning in the complaint. 2013 WL 1915700. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 13, 2013, and another on May 31. These amended complaints contained more developed legal reasoning, and alleged more particular facts regarding the ways that the delays had affected them. These effects included additional charges brought against the plaintiffs, exclusion of positive information from their bail reports, and loss of opportunity to interview witnesses. On August 7, 2013, the court granted the PD’s motion to dismiss all federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed all California statutory claims without prejudice. 2013 WL 4042276. Magistrate Judge Spero directed the district court clerk to close the case on August 30, 2013. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit (court of appeals docket # 13-16781). More than 2 years later, on December 7, 2015, in a joint opinion by Circuit Judges Kim Wardlaw, William Fletcher, and Mary Murguia, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment claims (the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Supreme Court, which did not hear their appeal). However, the court of appeals reversed the district court as to the dismissal of the Sixth Amendment claims. The Sixth Amendment, the court of appeals held, required that counsel be appointed at a reasonable time, and it was not clear how long of a delay would be constitutionally unacceptable. Because the district court had not considered this question before dismissing the claims, the Ninth Circuit remanded. 637 Fed. Appx. 986. On remand in the district court, the plaintiffs filed another amended complaint. On April 28, 2017, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the PD had failed to provide counsel at a critical stage (namely the initial appearance), but declined to dismiss the Sixth Amendment claim of unreasonable delay. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on November 22, 2017, this was followed by a cross-motion for summary judgment by the PD. The court granted the PD’s summary judgment motion on the Sixth Amendment claims on January 2, 2019. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ remaining California law claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, allowing the plaintiffs to bring that claim in a California court (it does not appear that the case was ever pursued in state court). On January 31, 2019, the plaintiffs filed another appeal in the Ninth Circuit (court of appeals docket #19-15152). The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling on March 30, 2020. In a joint opinion by Circuit Judges Ronald Gould, Morgan Christen, and Daniel Bress, the court of appeals held that the plaintiffs did not establish that the district court erred in ruling that the PD violated their Sixth Amendment rights by failing to provide counsel “within a reasonable time” after arrest and before trial. 799 Fed. Appx. 520. The plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing in the Ninth Circuit was denied and the court of appeals stayed its ruling pending an appeal to the Supreme Court. The plaintiffs filed for certiorari on October 27, 2020; the Supreme Court issued an order denying certiorari on February 22, 2021. This effectively ended the case.

Summary: Two criminal defendants filed this class action against the Contra Costa County Public Defender. The suit opposed a policy that denied representation to indigent detainees at their initial court appearance and allowed courts to postpone arraignment for five to thirteen days while the matter was referred to the Public Defender’s office. During the pendency of this lawsuit, the Public Defender changed its policy with respect to felonies, but not with respect to misdemeanors. The district court dismissed the lawsuit; the Ninth Circuit remanded for reconsideration of one of the claims. The district court dismissed that final claim; the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal. The plaintiffs sought and received a stay pending appeal to the Supreme Court and they filed for certiorari on October 27, 2020. The high court denied cert. on February 22, 2021, effectively ending the case.


Parents, as next of friend of their minor daughters, filed suit on June 27, 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma against Independent School District #9 of Tulsa County, also known as Union Public Schools, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the school district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 by denying female students, specifically female softball players equal access to interscholastic and school-sponsored athletics. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school had discriminated against female softball players in the funding of athletics, equipment and supplies, the scheduling of practice times, travel and meals, assignment and compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition, and the provision of training facilities and services. The plaintiffs sought class certification for all present and future female students wishing to participate in softball at Union Public Schools. The parties held a settlement conference on December 13, 2001 before Magistrate Judge Claire V. Eagan. On February 12, 2002, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal to Federal District Judge Sven Erik Holmes. Judge Holmes granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and accepted the parties' settlement agreement on March 26, 2002. In the settlement agreement, the defendant school district agreed to maintain accounting records for expenditures and revenues for male and female sports and to provide a copy of such record to a requesting party. The school district also agreed to maintain a substantially equal ratio to coaches for both the baseball and softball teams, negotiate for equalized salaries for softball and baseball coaches, provide access to the weight rooms on a gender-neutral basis and equip weight rooms with equipment appropriate for female athletes, and maintain practice and competition facilities on a gender-neutral basis. Additionally, the school district agreed to provide softball players with a designated locker/dressing area, ensure that private donations benefit the softball team on an equitable and gender-neutral basis as compared with other athletic teams, and increase promotion of the district's commitment to providing an equal opportunity to male and female students through publication and distribution of the Student Handbook, which would include a grievance process for parents and students. Oversight of compliance with the settlement agreement was referred to the district's Title IX Officer. The case was dismissed on March 26, 2002.

Summary: Parents, on behalf of and as next of friends of their minor daughters, filed suit against Union Public Schools, alleging that the school district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment with respect to accommodations and facilities provided to female softball players. Class certification was granted on behalf of all present and future softball players at Union Public Schools. In a settlement agreement dated March 26, 2002, the district agreed to remedy the discriminatory practices by offering funding and facilities on an equitable and gender-neutral basis for both softball and baseball players.


COVID-19 Summary: The plaintiffs sued Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources Daniel Eichenger to challenge Executive Order No. 2020-42, which prohibited the use of motorboats in response to the coronavirus pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that the prohibition on motorboat usage for fishing and recreation violated state and federal law. The plaintiffs requested the case be dismissed without prejudice.<hr> On April 16, 2020, three individual plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Michigan against Michigan Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources Daniel Eichenger, alleging unlawful infringement on their constitutional liberty interest. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983 to challenge Governor Whitmer’s Executive Order No. 2020-42, which criminalized the use of a motorboat either alone or with members of one’s own household. On April 9, 2020, Governor Whitmer had issued Executive Order 2020-42, which is described as a “[t]emporary requirement to suspend activities that are not necessary to sustain or protect life” in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The FAQ page on the michigan.gov website stated: "Physical outdoor activity like kayaking, canoeing, and sailing is permitted under the order, but using a motorboat, a jet ski, or other similar watercraft is not." Additionally, the Michigan Department of Natural Resources posted on its webpage that using a motorized boat for recreational purposes was temporarily prohibited. The plaintiffs, residents of Ottowa County, Michigan, each owned a motorboat which they desired to use either alone, or with members of their own household, in and on Michigan waterways. The plaintiffs claimed that they would be able to use their motorboats consistent with social distancing recommendations. However, pursuant to the Executive Order, doing so would result in a misdemeanor conviction. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that Executive Order No. 2020-42 violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and also violated the Emergency Powers of the Governor Act of 1945. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees. The case was assigned to District Judge Paul L. Maloney. On April 29, 2020, the plaintiffs dismissed the case without prejudice.

Summary: COVID-19 Summary: The plaintiffs sued Governor Gretchen Whitmer and the Director of the Michigan Department of Natural Resources Daniel Eichenger to challenge Executive Order No. 2020-42, which prohibited the use of motorboats in response to the coronavirus pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that the prohibition on motorboat usage for fishing and recreation violated state and federal law. Plaintiffs dismissed this case.


On November 14, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for a permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against the corporation because it violated the owner's religious freedom. On November 22, 2013, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings. On November 27, 2013, Judge Joan N. Ericksen of the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota granted the motion and stayed the case pending resolution of the appeal in either of the cases (1) O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or (2) Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), or until the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a substantially similar case, whichever occurred first. Both of the aforementioned cases involved similar legal issues and the same defendant. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 14, 2014, the parties jointly submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Injunction in Favor of Plaintiffs and Stipulation for Fee Motion Briefing Schedule, which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On November 18, 2014, Judge Ericksen issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. On December 30, 2014, the parties stipulated for an extension of time for the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. Judge Ericksen granted this stipulation in an order extending the deadline to March 3, 2015. The docket shows no record of the plaintiffs moving for attorneys' fees, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On November 14, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, and upon the joint stipulation of the parties, the court ordered that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.


On December 18, 2003, current and former female wrestlers at the University of California-Davis ("UC Davis") filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued UC Davis on behalf of all current and future female Davis students denied equal athletic participation opportunities and scholarships. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief under Title IX and also asserted equal protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. During the 2000-2001 academic year, Davis eliminated all women from the wrestling team. After the students protested to administrators and filed a complaint with the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Davis agreed to permit women again to participate in varsity wrestling, conditioned on their ability to beat male wrestlers in their weight class, using men's collegiate wrestling rules. As a result of these new requirements, the female students were unable to qualify for the wrestling team and lost the benefits associated with varsity status, including scholarships and academic credit. In April 2006, just before the scheduled hearing on class certification, the plaintiffs requested a stay due to their attorney's serious illness. During the ten-month stay, the only named plaintiff still attending Davis graduated. The plaintiffs moved to add as plaintiffs three students, all then enrolled at Davis. On March 20, 2007, the District Court (Judge Frank C. Damrell) denied the motion, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the good cause required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 when such a motion is filed after the issuance of a scheduling order. Without any named plaintiffs currently attending Davis, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the class claims for injunctive relief. In April 2008, the District Court dismissed the § 1983 claim as "subsumed" by the Title IX claim. The District Court then granted the University's motion for summary judgment, holding that the students had failed to perfect their Title IX claim by failing to give Davis advance notice and the opportunity to cure. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On February 8, 2010, in a published opinion (amended on April 20, 2010), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that (1) the plaintiffs' challenge to the district court's denial of their motion to add additional plaintiffs was moot; (2) the plaintiffs were not required to give university notice and an opportunity to cure an alleged Title IX violation before bringing suit; (3) genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Title IX ineffective accommodation claim; (4) Title IX did not preclude claim under § 1983 to enforce rights under Equal Protection Clause; and (5) § 1983 claim was not barred by statute of limitations. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2010). On December 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr.) denied the University's renewed motion for summary judgment. A fifteen day bench trial was held beginning May 2011. On August 3, 2011, District Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr., J., held that the university failed to effectively accommodate athletic interests and abilities of members of both sexes. However, the plaintiffs lost on their other theories of Title IX liability, as well as their Equal Protection Clause claims. Specifically, Judge Damrell held that (1) the university's failure to sponsor separate women's team did not contravene Title IX; (3) the assistant athletic director could not be held liable for alleged Equal Protection violations; and (4) other officials were entitled to qualified immunity as to alleged Equal Protection violations. 816 F. Supp. 2d 869 (E.D. Cal. 2011). On December 8, 2011, the Court ordered this case be set for a settlement conference to decide damages. After months of negotiations, the parties and their counsels reached agreement on all major terms of the settlement. The university agreed to pay $1,350,000 in attorneys' fees and costs incurred during the lengthy case. On April 6, 2012, the action was dismissed without prejudice and the case was closed.

Summary: In 2003, current and former female wrestlers at the University of California-Davis ("UC Davis") filed this class action against UC Davis in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that their exclusion from men's intercollegiate wrestling team violated Title IX and their equal protection rights under § 1983. After the District Court dismissed the § 1983 claim and granted summary judgment to the defendants on the Title IX claim, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. By August 2011, the District court found for the plaintiffs, based on Davis's failure to demonstrate a continuing practice of program expansion. The plaintiffs lost on their other theories of Title IX liability, as well as other Equal Protection Clause claims. Parties settled on remaining issues and action was dismissed without prejudice in April 2012.


The plaintiff in this case was strip-searched after being arrested for a minor offense. He was not suspected of possessing drugs or weapons, and he was ultimately not charged with any crime, but the City of Chester's policy allowed police to conduct strip searches on anyone they arrested. In this lawsuit, filed by private counsel on February 25, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff named the City of Chester and three police officers as defendants. He alleged that under 42 U.S.C. §1983 the city had violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as his rights under Pennsylvania law. He sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Robert F. Kelly. On May 1, 2019, the plaintiff dismissed the majority of the claims in his complaint, stipulating that his Monell claim against the city would be limited to its policy and custom of strip searching detainees, and dismissing all other grounds for liability against the city (with prejudice), including his claim for punitive damages, his claim of malicious prosecution, and his state law claims. 3 months later (August 1), he stipulated to the dismissal of one of the police officer defendants. The case was reassigned to Judge Paul S. Diamond in October 2019. The following year, on May 20, 2020, Judge Diamond denied the city’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that it "cannot conclude as a matter of law that the City’s Policy comports with the Fourth Amendment." 2020 WL 2571100. On May 27, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, seeking class certification of a class of individuals who were, like him, arrested on minor charges and strip-searched in spite of the police having no particularized suspicion that they were carrying drugs, weapons, or other contraband. The putative class included all such people arrested from March 1, 1995 until such date as injunctive relief would be granted. This expanded complaint sought class-wide compensatory and punitive damages, a declaration that the city had violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the class members, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The proposed injunction would require the city to “establish appropriate policies and procedures for when strip-searches may be lawfully carry out,” and would prohibit the city from conducting strip searches in minor arrests without a particularized suspicion that the suspect was concealing drugs, weapons, or other contraband. The complaint also sought attorney’s fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. §1988. As of June 16, 2020, a class certification hearing is scheduled for August 28, 2020.

Summary: This is a class action lawsuit about Chester, Pennsylvania’s police policy allowing officers to strip-search anyone arrested, regardless of whether there is a suspicion that the arrestee is concealing drugs or weapons. Alleging that the city’s policy was a violation of his rights under Pennsylvania law and the United States Constitution, the plaintiff filed this suit as an individual on February 25, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In May 2020, he expanded his complaint to seek class certification for all people similarly arrested from 1995 onward.


On July 12, 2012, the United States, on behalf of over 34,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts in the United States District Court, District of Columbia. Plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the United States Department of Justice, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the discriminatory lending practices of Defendant adversely affected African American and Hispanic borrowers. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that during and between 2004 and 2009, Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in residential mortgage lending. Two other cases -- Baltimore v. Wells Fargo (FH-MD-0001 in the Clearinghouse) and Memphis v. Wells Fargo (FH-TN-0002 in the Clearinghouse) have made essentially equivalent allegations. On July 12, 2012, the Court entered a consent order resolving Plaintiff's claims. The settlement provided $125 million in compensation for wholesale borrowers who were steered into subprime mortgages or who paid higher fees and rates based on their race or national origin. Defendant also agreed to provide $50 million in direct down payment assistance to borrowers in certain areas of the country. Additionally, Defendant agreed to conduct an internal review of its retail mortgage lending and will compensate borrowers who were placed into subprime loans based on their race or national origin. This case is ongoing with semi-annual reports by the Defendant.

Summary: The United States, on behalf of certain African-American and Hispanic borrowers, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. The Court entered a consent order that provided Plaintiffs with over $175 million in compensation. Under the decree, Defendant agreed to alter its lending practices to ensure compliance with the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. The case is ongoing pending semi-annual reports by the defendant.


This is a case about the legality of the U.S. military’s policy prohibiting the enlistment or promotion of people with HIV. On May 30, 2018, an enlisted service member and attorney, along with the Modern Military Association of American (formerly OutServe-SLDN), filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where it was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. Represented by Lambda Legal, OutServe-SLDN and private counsel, the plaintiff sued the Secretary of Defense under the Fifth Amendment due process clause. The plaintiff alleged that he had been denied a commission as an officer because he was HIV positive and requested declaratory relief, attorneys’ fees, and an injunction directing the defendants to commission him as an officer and refrain from discriminating against other HIV positive individuals in the future. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was denied a commission as Judge Advocate General officer due to his HIV status as a result of Army Regulation 600-110, which prohibits people with HIV from entering the Army or Reserves. Additionally, in February of 2018, the Department of Defense implemented a new policy that required non-deployable service members, a category which includes people with HIV, be discharged from service after 12 months, in effect laying off all HIV positive personnel. In the following months since the plaintiff filed this case, the same organizations filed companion cases in the District of Columbia (Voe v. Mattis, D.D.C. 1:18-cv-1251), District of Maryland (Deese v. Esper, D. Md., 1:18-cv-2669) and the Eastern District of Virginia (Roe v. U.S. Department of Defense (E.D.Va. 1:18-cv-1565)). On July 19, 2018, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to suspend the Department of Defense’s policy of discharging HIV positive personnel. The defendants moved to dismiss on August 16, 2018. At a hearing on September 14, 2018, Judge Brinkema denied all these motions from the bench and the case proceeded. However, in one of the companion cases, Roe v. Department of Defense, a similar motion for a preliminary injunction was granted and upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Roe v. Department of Defense, 947 F.3d 207 (2020). However, that order pertained to members of the Air Force and the Roe plaintiffs brought that claim under APA. It did not affect the proceedings in this case. Litigation over discovery issues continued for close to a year, eventually ending in an opinion from Judge Brinkema on May 22, 2019 concerning the scope of deliberative privileged invoked by the defendants. Harrison v. Shanahan, 2019 WL 2216474. The defendants again moved to dismiss the case, challenging the standing of OutServe, the LGBT service member’s non-profit. On March 27, 2020 Judge Brinkema denied that motion, as well as an identical motion in Roe v. Spencer. In that order, the judge found that the Department of Defense’s policies regarding HIV caused OutServe to reallocate its resources away from other important projects to support HIV positive service members. In the summer of 2020, both parties moved for summary judgment. Those motions remain pending as of September 9, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, an Army Reservist and lawyer filed this complaint for injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia after allegedly being refused a commission as a Judge Advocate General officer in the D.C. National Guard. The plaintiff challenged Department of Defense policies preventing HIV positive service members from being hired or promoted and discharging present service members with HIV, alleging violations of his Fifth Amendment rights. After several years of pretrial litigation, the case is ongoing.


Disability Rights Florida ("DRF"), brought this suit against the Florida Department of Corrections ("FDOC") in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on January 26, 2016. The plaintiff, a federally designated protection and advocacy agency for the State of Florida, alleged that the defendant failed to provide inmates with disabilities access to its programs and services in violation of federal law. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to provide interpreters, hearing aids, telecommunications access, and effective emergency alerts to inmates who were deaf or hard of hearing; failed to maintain wheelchair-accessible facilities or provide and maintain wheelchairs and prosthetic devices for inmates with mobility impairments; excluded inmates with disabilities from education, employment, and recreational programs; charged inmates for accommodations relating to their disabilities; retaliated against those who asserted their rights as persons with disabilities; and failed to train staff on issues related to disability rights and federal disability law. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On April 25, 2016, the state filed a motion for partial dismissal. Florida argued that several of the inmates named in the Complaint were no longer in FDOC custody or had already settled their claims. The defendant also argued that several of the allegations were barred by a four-year statute of limitations. The parties engaged in conferences over the next several months. On January 9, 2017, the United States moved to intervene in the case, claiming a substantial interest because of the ADA and Section 504 issues at stake. On January 30, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. On February 6, 2017, the parties jointly moved for a stay of proceedings so that they could actively pursue settlement. On July 7, 2017, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. The settlement required the FDOC to implement changes that would make Florida prison services, programming, and other aspects of daily activities, including emergency notifications, accessible to inmates with physical disabilities. The settlement also required FDOC to provide appropriate training for staff members on disability laws as well as establish internal policies regarding inmates with disabilities. The settlement required that DRF be able to conduct visits and speak confidentially with inmates to ensure compliance with the agreement. The settlement also required the FDOC to pay $2,000,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On July 11, Judge Robert L. Hinkle issued an order requiring the parties to comply with the Settlement Agreement, dismissing the claims, and retaining jurisdiction solely for the purpose of enforcing the Agreement. On July 13, the parties filed a motion asking the court to alter the July 11 order to reflect their wish that the Agreement be enforceable only through a breach of contract action in state court, not through an order of the U.S. District Court. Accordingly, on August 7, Judge Hinkle issued a new order recognizing as effective the parties' joint stipulation to dismiss the case with prejudice and end the court's jurisdiction. However, in the fall of 2017, a number of inmates of FDOC, acting pro se, submitted filings to the court stating that they had been denied access to the settlement agreement or had been retaliated against for submitting grievances to the prison administration for issues relating to their disabilities. One inmate filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 6, 2017, Judge Hinkle denied the motion, reasserting that the case was closed and suggesting that the individual file a separate lawsuit if he intended to pursue legal action. The same individual, again acting pro se, filed an appeal on December 4, 2017, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, challenging the court's order closing the case. On December 18, he also appealed the order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. On February 5, 2018, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. On July 15, 2019, a prisoner who was not a party to the law suit and had not been included in the class submitted a letter requesting relief based on inadequate medical care. The court entered this letter in the record as a motion for injunctive relief, and issued an order denying this motion on August 6, 2019. The settlement is set to expire on July 6, 2021 so long as the defendants remain in compliance with the agreement. As of the latest update in March, 2020, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Disability Rights Florida, brought this suit against the Florida Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on January 26, 2016. Plaintiff brought claims under the ADA, Section 504, the Eighth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause, making extensive allegations about defendant's failure to provide reasonable accommodations and services to inmates with disabilities. After over a year of negotiations, the parties settled the case and the court adopted their stipulated order of dismissal on August 7, 2017. The settlement remains in effect until 2021.


On July 23, 2014, Pro-Life Mississippi filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, against the City of Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Police Department, and various city officials (collectively, Jackson). The plaintiffs, represented by the Life Legal Defense Foundation and private counsel, sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Mississippi state law, alleging that Jackson intentionally deprived them of their First Amendment rights and violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pro-Life Mississippi is a pro-life nonprofit organization that frequently holds rallies in front of or near the Jackson Women's Health Organization (JWHO), an abortion clinic in Jackson. The complaint stated that the plaintiffs and Pro-Life Mississippi affiliates "regularly stand, walk, hold signs, hand out literature, sit, speak to passerby, and sidewalk counsel on the public sidewalks and public right of ways around and near the JWHO." Pro-Life Mississippi's activities outside of the JWHO have attracted the defendants' attention for years and have been the subject of previous litigation. In 2008, District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. entered a consent decree against the City of Jackson and its officials because they "violat[ed] the free speech rights of Plaintiff Pro-Life Mississippi and individual pro-life advocates by discriminatory and unconstitutional enforcement of Mississippi statutes" stemming from the defendants' actions limiting the plaintiffs' activities on public property outside of the JWHO. For more details on the earlier case, see Britton v. Anderson. The plaintiffs alleged that a little over a year after the 2008 consent decree was no longer judicially enforced the defendants resumed their activities violating pro-life individuals' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants arrested their members who were on sidewalks, threatened arrest, and seized the plaintiffs' pro-life materials. Allegedly, the defendants justified this behavior by telling the plaintiffs that they were disturbing the peace, obstructing the sidewalks, and engaging in disorderly conduct. The plaintiffs contend that the defendants' activities were intentional and meant to "stifle and suppress" their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction, damages, and attorneys' fees. On August 9, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction. These motions were denied by District Judge Carlton Reeves on October 27, 2014. This decision was appealed by the plaintiffs, but the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in a three-sentence opinion on January 26, 2016. 628 F. App'x 269. Later in 2016, the trial court began active management of the case, scheduling both trial and settlement conferences for the parties. The parties quickly came to an agreement and on September 23, 2016, asked the court to approve the consent decree; the court approved the decree on October 4, 2016. The consent decree stated that defendants could not intentionally engage in activities that violate individuals' First Amendment rights on public property. Additionally, the defendants were barred from seizing materials used to promote individuals' First Amendment rights unless all other ways short of seizure are first exhausted. The defendants also agreed to create a training program to educate city officials and law enforcement about protecting First Amendment rights. The charges against all of the plaintiffs were dropped and their property was returned. The defendants were also forced to pay the plaintiffs $2,500.00. The consent decree was enforceable by the court for one year after it was entered. After one year, the case will be "dismissed with prejudice and without prior notice to the parties." However, more than two years following the date of the consent judgement, the case had not been dismissed. JWHO filed a motion to intervene on January 24, 2019 so it could file a motion to dismiss. It claimed that the decree had a chilling effect on the defendant's enforcement of constitutionally valid ordinances and laws. On June 27, 2019, Judge Reeves denied the motion to intervene. Specifically, the court found that a party cannot intervene to dissolve a consent decree that does not exist, noting that the consent expired on October 4, 2017. Given the court's clear statement that the consent decree no longer exists, the case is now presumably closed.

Summary: On July 23, 2014, Pro-Life Mississippi filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against the City of Jackson, Mississippi, the Jackson Police Department, and various city officials. The group alleged the City deprived them of their first Amendment rights by stopping them from protesting near an abortion clinic. In 2016, the court entered a judicially enforced consent decree protecting the organization's First Amendment rights. The decree expired in 2017, and case is now closed.