This case was filed directly in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Along with this case, there is a related mandamus matter with a different docket number. The Plaintiff is an independent nonprofit research center in Washington, D.C. Its mission is to protect the public's privacy and human rights. On July 2, 2010, the Plaintiff filed a petition for review with the Appellate Court. This case was about three agency actions of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). EPIC petitioned the Court for review of these three actions: (1) failure to act on EPIC'S May 31, 2009, 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) petition (the First EPIC Petition): The First EPIC Petition noted the TSA's announcement of a plan to deploy full body scanners (also called "advanced imaging technology" or AIT in the court documents) as the primary means of screening airline passengers in the United States and urged the DHS to undertake a 90-day formal public rulemaking process to receive public input on the agency's use of full body scanners. The DHS wrote a letter to EPIC on June 19, 2009, but failed to grant or deny EPIC's petition for the formal rulemaking concerning TSA's use of full body scanners (the DHS Letter). (2) the May 28, 2010 Order of the TSA refusing to process of EPIC's April 21, 2010 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) petition ("the Second EPIC Petition"): The Second EPIC Petition sought repeal of the TSA's rule mandating the use of body scanners at airport checkpoints as primary screening. On May 28, 2010, the TSA issued an order refusing to process the Second EPIC Petition, asserting "TSA does not interpret your letter to seek a rulemaking or to constitute a petition under 5 U.S.C. $553." (the TSA Order). (3) the TSA Rule mandating the use of "full body scanners" at airport checkpoints as primary screening. The TSA entered this Rule recently, but failed to make public the text of the Rule or its date. The TSA recently issued this Rule on a date unknown to Petitioners. This Rule is a final administrative action, and constitutes a final agency rule. On July 15, 2011, the judges granted in part and denied in part the petition, and ordered, without vacating the rule, that the rule be remanded to TSA to promptly conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings (notifying the public of the proposed new or changed rule and to accept public comments). In summary, the Court ruled for EPIC on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) claim. One of the factors that the court considered was the need for the TSA to continue its airport security operations without interruption. The court instructed the agency promptly to proceed in a manner consistent with its opinion. According to the court, the TSA's denial of the petition on the ground that it “is not required to initiate the APA rulemaking procedures each time the agency develops and implements improved passenger screening procedures” rested upon an interpretation of the APA. Therefore, the court focused on the analysis of the APA and certain exceptions to the rulemaking standard procedure in the APA. Specifically, the court analyzed whether the several exceptions that the TSA claimed fit within the APA's exceptions. In its decision, the court explained that the APA's exceptions urged by the TSA did not apply in this case to justify the TSA's failure to give notice of and receive comment upon such a rule. The court determined that the rule is legislative and not merely interpretive, procedural, or a general statement of policy. In summary, the court determined that the TSA has not justified its failure to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking before announcing it would use AIT scanners for primary screening. As for the petitioners' claims, the court denied the petition with respect to the statutory arguments and claim under the Fourth Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). EPIC in August 2011 petitioned for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. On September 12, 2011, the court denied both petitions. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2010, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for review of a lawsuit against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Plaintiff petitioned for review of three agency actions, including the TSA's failure to act on EPIC's two previous petitions regarding the TSA's deployment of full body scanners as the primary means of screening airline passengers in the United States and the TSA Rule mandating the use of these full body scanners. In 2011, the court ordered that the rule be remanded to the TSA to promptly conduct notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings (notify the public of its rule and accept the public's comments).


In this case, plaintiff alleged that the additional security delays he experienced when traveling by air constituted a violation of his Constitutional right to travel. On October 3, 2014, a Michigan resident filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the FBI and its Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). The plaintiff brought this suit on behalf of himself and "all those who are believed to be included on the No[-]Fly and Terrorist Watch List, have been the victim of harassment and disparate treatment at airports when attempting to board their flights, and have not been given any legitimate means of redress." Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the additional delays he experienced when traveling by air – in the form of additional security screenings – constituted a violation of his constitutional right to travel. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to attorney’s fees, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The case was assigned to District Judge Judith Levy. Shortly after Plaintiff's filing, TSC moved to stay the case until the Sixth Circuit could decide Mokdad v. Holder, which TSC believed would provide controlling precedent as to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. On February 13, 2015, Judge Levy granted the motion, and the case was stayed pending further development. Almost one year later in January 2016, after the Mokdad v. Holder appeal was resolved in favor of the FBI and the Department of Justice, TSC moved to dismiss the case. On July 14, 2016, Judge Levy granted TSC's motion to dismiss for Plaintiff's failure to join a necessary party, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). In Mokdad v. Holder, the Sixth Circuit held that a challenge to the redress process for the Selectee List was, in effect, a challenge to a TSA order, thus making TSA a necessary party. Judge Levy determined that the Plaintiff in this case had challenged only the redress process and not his inclusion on the list in the first place, thus making Mokdad binding. For reasons unclear, Plaintiff expressly stated at the case's hearing that he did not want to amend his complaint to include TSA as a defendant, so Judge Levy dismissed the complaint. In the same opinion, Judge Levy also denied Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint on the grounds that it would be futile. Because Plaintiff did not seek to amend his complaint to join the TSA as a party, the court concluded that his challenge to the redress process would be unsuccessful. Further, the court reasoned that a direct challenge to the plaintiff’s placement on the Selectee List would also fail because it did not establish a violation of a constitutional interest protected by the Due Process Clause. On August 17, 2016, Plaintiff appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit, which consolidated this case (docket no. 16-2168) with Bazzi v. Sessions (docket no. 16-2406). Bazzi v. Sessions asserted similar facts, invoked the same causes of action, and was dismissed by the District Court for similar reasons; however, Bazzi additionally named the TSA as a defendant. The Sixth Circuit reviewed both of the District Court's determinations de novo. On September 12, 2017, the Sixth Circuit found that, although the District Court erred in saying that the plaintiffs had not challenged their initial inclusion on the Selectee List in their separate complaints, the District Court's constitutional analysis was correct in finding that the plaintiffs could not prove a deprivation of their constitutional rights. The Sixth Circuit specifically noted that the plaintiffs had significantly limited their options by making no equal protection claim and by expressly abandoning a procedural due process claim during oral arguments, leaving only the possibility of a substantive due process claim. 871 F.3d 459. The plaintiffs petitioned to have the case reheard en banc, but the appellate court denied the plaintiffs’ motion on November 28, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: A Michigan resident filed a class-action suit against the FBI and its Terrorist Screening Center after allegedly being repeatedly singled out for additional security screenings at airports. While TSC neither confirmed nor denied it, the plaintiff believed he had been added to the FBI’s "Selectee List" of persons subject to greater airport security. The plaintiff challenged this as a violation of his right to travel freely, but the court ultimately dismissed the case, finding that he had not suffered a deprivation of rights amounting to a constitutional violation.


This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”), which was passed on March 23, 2016. For the others, see related cases section, below. On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicle for hire, and city contractors. The city ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. In response, on March 23, 2016, the North Carolina legislature held a special session and passed House Bill 2; it was signed that same day by North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory. HB2 prohibits municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removes the statutory and common-law private right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. It also requires that in government buildings, individuals may only use restrooms and changing facilities that correspond to the sex on their birth certificates. For many transgender people, this prevents them from using the restroom consistent with their gender identity (in North Carolina, only people who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the sex on their birth certificates; some other jurisdictions have even more restrictive rules). In addition, the legislation changes the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,” which prevents discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. On May 4, in a letter to Governor Pat McCrory the Justice Department informed him that the U.S. had concluded that HB2 violates federal law. The DOJ asked the Governor to respond by close of business on May 9 that he will remedy the violations, "including by confirming that the State will not comply with or implement H.B. 2." Instead of providing the demanded assurances, the Governor sued the United States on the morning of May 9, in the Eastern District of North Carolina, seeking declaratory relief that HB2 didn’t violate federal law. The next day, on May 10, this suit was brought by an unincorporated, non-profit association which seems to serve primarily as vehicle for the right-wing Christian advocacy group Alliance Defending Freedom to challenge the DOJ's and DOE’s positions on transgender bathroom access. They sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, asking the court to rule that the North Carolina Law doesn’t violate Title IX of The Education Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, or the Violence Against Women Act of 2013 (VAWA, 42 U.S.C. § 13925(b)(13)). They asked the court to find that the DOJ and DOE had violated the constitution and federal law by threatening North Carolina with legal action. And they asked the court to enjoin those agencies from any action against North Carolina for enforcing HB2s restrictions on transgender bathroom access. On May 24, plaintiffs asked the judge assigned to this case, Judge Louise Wood Flannagan, to consolidate this case with the case brought against the DOJ by Governor McCroy, Carcaño. Previously, when the plaintiffs in another lawsuit defending HB2, Berger v. United States DOJ, sought consolidation with Carcaño, governor McCrory had indicated that he would oppose consolidation if it interfered with his request to have the case moved to the middle district of North Carolina. On June 14, 2016, the DOJ filed a memorandum opposing consolidation of this case with Carcaño, noting that the plaintiffs in this case were challenging the DOJ’s position that HB2 violates Title IX while the plaintiffs in the Carcaño and Berger cases were not. On June 29, 2016, Judge Louise Wood Flannagan denied the motion to consolidate the cases, holding that Carcaño was a less rigorous case, while Berger and the present case raised multiple different questions. Nevertheless, at the same time, the court decided to transfer the cases to the Middle District, holding they should be tried alongside Carcaño because they involved common questions and was filed first. The court was also stated that the transfer would benefit the parties, who would have a single judge rendering timely decisions and coordinating the proceedings, and the public, that would be benefited by consistent decisions by the same judge. The case was transferred to the Middle District on June 30, 2016 (Docket No. 1:16-cv-00845). On August 22, 2016, the plaintiff filed its first amended complaint, for the purpose of adding individual plaintiffs and streamlining the language of the original claims, without adding new ones. However, on August 31, 2016, without explanation, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the case without prejudice to the defendants. As a result, the case was closed.

Summary: After DOJ indicates that it believes a North Carolina law limiting transgender individuals access to bathrooms violates federal law, the private non-profit association North Carolinian for Privacy brought suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina asking for declaratory and injunctive relief. They asked the court to say that the law doesn't violate the laws cited by the DOJ, to say that the DOJ's actions and a guidance document by the DOE that the DOJ cited are illegal and unconstitutional, and to issue an injunction against the DOJ and DOE to prevent them from taking legal action against North Carolina for enforcing the new law's restrictions on transgender bathroom access. After the case was transferred to the Middle District of North Carolina, however, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, and the case was closed.


On October 6, 2011, the plaintiff filed this individual lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued a police officer and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff, represented by a combination of private and public interest attorneys, sought monetary damages and injunctive relief to redress her claims. The case was assigned to Judge Steve C. Jones. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that the defendant Officer violated her First Amendment rights when he and other officers employed by the City of Atlanta told her and then forced her to stop recording their behavior around the area she lived. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant officer, along with the other officers employed by the City of Atlanta, also violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they took her camera and refused to give it back without a warrant. The plaintiff last contended that the defendants violated her Fourth Amendment when they arrested her and charged her with crimes. Within the month of filing, the parties were engaged in settlement negotiations, and on March 12, 2012, the court signed an order granting the motion for settlement. The settlement terms required the defendant City of Atlanta to pay the plaintiff $50,000 and implement revisions to the Atlanta Police Department Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Finally, the Defendant City of Atlanta was required to conduct mandatory in-person training of all police officers every two years under the settlement.

Summary: On October 6, 2011, plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiff sued the City of Atlanta and Officer Jeffrey Branum under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff represented by a combination of private and public interest attorneys sought monetary damages and injunctive relief to redress her claims. On March 12, 2012, the court signed an order granting a settlement between the parties that gave the plaintiff monetary relief and required revisions to the defendants' standard operating procedures.


This lawsuit, brought on November 3, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenged President Trump’s revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs were Microsoft, the Trustees of Princeton University, and a DACA recipient attending Princeton University as an undergraduate. The plaintiffs benefited from and relied upon DACA in various ways, and they argued that its termination violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection and due process guarantees. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program through policy statements by the Department of Homeland Security. The program offered work permits—and temporary protection from deportation—to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children. As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he would end the program in March 2018 unless Congress acted to provide statutory authorization for the program. As the complaint highlighted, in promoting DACA, the Obama administration had made key promises to immigrants: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement, and that barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. In addition to the individual plaintiff’s reliance on DACA, the complaint argued that Princeton and Microsoft benefited from and relied upon the contributions DACA recipients made as students and employees. They argued that the termination of the DACA program would put DACA recipients at risk for deportation, loss of benefits, and having the information they used to enroll in DACA used against them. The rescission would also cost Princeton and Microsoft the contributions of students and employees who had been able to join those communities because of DACA. Moreover, Princeton and Microsoft would lose the return on their investment given the resources put into students and employees, diversity in their communities, and competitive edge in the world. Ultimately, the plaintiffs argued, the DACA rescission would lead to “loss of opportunity in the United States.” Further, the complaint indicated that the rationale for terminating the program was confusing and at odds with other administration policies and views. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper and marked as related to NAACP v. Trump on November 3, 2017 (these two cases were later consolidated). On November 22, 2017, the defendants moved for dismissal or, in the alternative, summary judgment. They argued that the case was not justiciable because “[t]he Rescission Policy is a classic exercise of enforcement discretion ‘presumed immune from judicial review.’” Further, they argued that the complaint failed on the merits because DACA was “indistinguishable” from DAPA (“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans”), a related program which had never been implemented due to a nationwide injunction from the Fifth Circuit. The defendants argued they had provided a rational explanation for their policy change, that the rescission did not require notice-and-comment rulemaking, and that DACA recipients had no constitutional right to deferred action. On December 15, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and/or preliminary injunction. They argued that the rescission of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act, because the government had not offered legal analysis for its decision to rescind, and because the government had ignored the reliance that millions of people had placed on DACA. Recognizing that DACA recipients had provided personal information to the government as part of the DACA program, the plaintiffs sought to bar the government from using such information for current enforcement purposes. The court received amicus briefs from nearly 200 individuals and organizations, including:

120 businesses, from Ben & Jerry’s to Levi Strauss to Google;
20 current and former heads of law enforcement agencies, from Salt Lake City to Seattle to Storm Lake, Iowa;
more than a dozen legal services organizations; and
50 institutions of higher education, from the University of Michigan to the San Francisco Community College District.
On January 3, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge John D. Bates. This case was consolidated with  NAACP v. Trump (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Docket No. 17-1907) on January 18, with NAACP v. Trump designated as the lead case. On April 24, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ procedural APA and information-sharing claims, and sustained the substantive APA and constitutional claims. 298 F. Supp. 3d 209. The court deferred ruling on the equal protection claim, but granted summary judgment on the substantive APA claim. It held that DHS had violated the APA, finding that the rescission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious because “[n]either the meager legal reasoning nor the assessment of litigation risk provided by DHS to support its rescission decision is sufficient to sustain termination of the DACA program.” The court vacated DHS’s decision to rescind DACA, ordering DHS to accept and process new and renewal DACA applications. However, the court stayed its vacatur order for 90 days, “to allow the agency an opportunity to better explain its rescission decision.” The government moved to have the court revise the order, but the court denied the motion on August 3, 2018, holding that although the government had provided additional information regarding its decision to rescind DACA, it had “fail[ed] to elaborate meaningfully on the agency’s primary rationale for its decision.” 315 F. Supp. 3d 457. Instead, the government had simply “repackaged” its previous legal arguments, and inappropriately added post hoc rationalizations to justify its actions. The government appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on August 6, 2018. Oral argument was held on February 22, 2019 before Judges Griffith, Millett, and Edwards. On August 14, 2018, the government filed a motion for the district court to stay its April 24 decision, pending the appeal in the D.C. Circuit, and a motion to clarify that the plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims were moot. The district court granted the motion to clarify on August 17, 2018. 321 F. Supp. 3d 143. It also granted the motion for a stay, but only as to new DACA applications and applications for advance parole; the court’s order for DHS to process DACA renewal applications remained in effect. While the government’s appeal was pending in the D.C. Circuit, the government also appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal, consolidating NAACP v. Trump with Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 139 S. Ct. 2779. The three consolidated cases were heard under the caption of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. The Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, it ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in all three cases, affirming the judgment of the district court in this case. 140 S. Ct. 1891. As a result, on July 23, 2020, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to remand to the Department of Homeland Security for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. The district court remanded the same day. The Department of Homeland Security then issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020. In this memo, Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In a joint status report on September 16, 2020, the plaintiffs indicated that they did not intend to challenge the July 28th Wolf Memorandum, but reserved the right to do so in the future or to challenge any future agency actions with respect to DACA. They asked the court to continue holding the cases in abeyance. Though the plaintiffs in this case declined to challenge the July 28th Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump challenged the memo, arguing that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully appointed to his position and did not have authority to issue the memo and that the memo was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court in Batalla Vidal and State of New York found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary and did not have authority to issue the memo. On December 4, 2020, the court in Batalla Vidal and State of New York ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately shifted the executive's approach to DACA. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit, brought on November 3, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenged President Trump’s revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs were the Trustees of Princeton University, Microsoft Corporation, and a DACA recipient attending Princeton University as an undergraduate. The plaintiffs benefited from and relied upon DACA in various ways, and they argued that its termination violated the Administrative Procedure Act, as well as Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process guarantees. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Although the case was originally assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper, it was reassigned to Judge John D. Bates on January 3, 2018. This case was consolidated with NAACP v. Trump (No. 17-1907) on January 18, 2018, with NAACP desiginated as the lead case. The district court vacated DHS’s decision to rescind DACA. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the government’s appeal of the district court’s ruling. In June 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, and the district court remanded the case to DHS for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020 stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf reconsider DACA's future and in the interim instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. The plaintiffs in this case declined to challenge the July 28th memo, but the plaintiffs in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump challenged the memo and the court in those cases ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On June 17, 2014, prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, ADAP, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that ADOC provided inadequate medical and mental health services and involuntarily medicated prisoners. On September 8, 2015, Judge Myron H. Thompson split the case into two phases: Phase 1 would include all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to physical disabilities; and Phase 2 would include all ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims related to mental health together with all other claims. During the next year, the parties engaged in fractious discovery and crafted a settlement for the Phase 1 claims. The court also rejected ADOC's invitation to dismiss claims by plaintiffs who had been released from prison for lack of standing on October 6. 148 F. Supp. 3d 1329. Judge Thompson approved the parties’ Phase 1 settlement and adopted it as a consent decree on September 9, 2016. The court found that the named plaintiffs had standing and certified a settlement class defined as "any current or future inmate in the physical custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections who has a disability . . . excluding those inmates whose disabilities relate solely to or arise from mental disease, illness, or defect." The agreement required ADOC to:

Evaluate all facilities that house disabled prisoners and identify necessary changes;
 Provide reasonable accommodations for disabled prisoners to access prison programs;
Provide disability screening and physical examinations for prisoners;
Not increase a prisoner's security level solely based on a disability;
Provide auxiliary aids and services to prisoners with hearing and vision impairments;
Designate employees, create plans, and run drills to evacuate disabled prisoners in the event of an emergency;
Implement a procedure for prisoners' requests for accommodations and appoint an ADA coordinator for each of its facilities to handle ADA-related matters;
Provide ADA training to correctional officers and ADA coordinators; and
Create a quality-assurance program.
 The agreement also contained the following provisions related to implementation:

ADAP will monitor ADOC's compliance with the consent decree and prepare quarterly reports on ADOC's compliance;
Claims that ADOC is not in compliance must be resolved in arbitration;
This consent decree will terminate after six years if no extension is granted; and
 ADOC will pay attorneys' fees and costs of $1.25 million plus fees associated with monitoring. 318 F.R.D. 652.
Judge Thompson split the remaining Phase 2 claims into two parts on September 19: Phase 2A would consider the plaintiffs’ ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and Eight Amendment mental health claims along with their involuntary medication claims, and Phase 2B would consider the remaining Eight Amendment claims about inadequate medical and dental care. Judge Thompson issued three important rulings on November 25, 2016. First, he largely denied ADOC’s motion for summary judgment, although he dismissed the claims of six individual plaintiffs who had already been released from prison. 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100. Second, he found that ADAP had associational standing under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI), 42 U.S.C. § 10805. 219 F. Supp. 3d 1163. Third, he certified two classes. The first consisted of prisoners with serious mental health problems who are or will be subject to ADOC’s mental health care policies, and the second consisted of prisoners with serious mental health problems who are or will be subject to ADOC’s involuntary medication policies. 317 F.R.D. 634 The Phase 2A trial took place in early 2017, and the parties concurrently worked towards a settlement. They proposed a class action settlement of the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims on January 11, which Judge Thompson preliminarily approved on February 22. And on April 25, the parties proposed a settlement of the plaintiffs’ involuntary medication claims that Judge Thompson preliminarily approved on May 11. However, the parties were unable to resolve the plaintiffs’ Eight Amendment mental health claims. On June 27, 2017, Judge Thompson issued a 302-page opinion and order on the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment mental health claim. He concluded that ADOC’s "horrendously inadequate" mental health services violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. As reported in The Atlantic, the trial included testimony from a prisoner who had not received adequate mental health care in prison, became agitated during testimony, and had to be coaxed back to the stand from the judge's chambers. Judge Thompson was concerned and ordered a full report on the prisoner’s condition and steps taken to address it. Sadly, the prisoner committed suicide ten days after his testimony and before corrective measures were taken. In his opinion, Judge Thompson noted, "[w]ithout question, [the prisoner’s] testimony and the tragic event that followed darkly draped all the subsequent testimony like a pall." He added "[ADOC] could have taken [remedial] action in 2015, after the first meeting on suicides, or in 2016, after the second meeting, rather than waiting until January 2017. By that time, twelve more people, including a plaintiff in this lawsuit, had committed suicide." Judge Thompson found that ADOC acted with deliberate indifference towards its prisoners. He also rejected ADOC’s arguments that its leaders lacked the authority to fix the problems and that a federal court could not order a state to spend money on prisons. Emphasizing the "severity and urgency of the need for mental-health care," Judge Thompson declared that the proposed relief must be both immediate and long term and ordered the parties to meet to discuss a remedy. 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171. The next day, Judge Thompson adopted the parties’ Phase 2A ADA and Rehabilitation Act settlement as a consent decree. His order certified an injunctive relief settlement class defined as “any current or future inmate in the physical custody of ADOC who has a disability . . . relating to or arising from mental disease, illness, or defect.” Under the terms of the settlement, ADOC agreed to provide adaptive behavior/life skills training to inmates with certain mental disabilities. The training would be designed to help prisoners make good decisions, manage stress, communicate, identify consequences of their actions, advocate for themselves, access prison services, maintain hygiene, make good use of time, and understand prison rules. ADAP obtained access to ADOC’s facilities and records to monitor ADOC’s compliance. ADOC could request termination once the consent decree was in place for at least five years and it was in substantial compliance for at least twelve consecutive months. As part of the order, the plaintiffs obtained $250,000 of attorneys' fees and $12,000 per year of monitoring fees. On July 25, Judge Thompson issued an opinion that provided a legal basis for his approval of the settlement. 321 F.R.D. 653. Judge Thompson issued a final approval order and consent decree for the involuntary medication settlement on September 6, 2017. ADOC agreed to strengthen the procedural safeguards for prisoners facing involuntary medication. It also agreed to provide ADAP with monthly reports of involuntary medication proceedings and pay $230,000 in attorneys' fees. The consent decree was set to expire in two years. The resolution of the plaintiff’s involuntary medication claims left outstanding only the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment remedy and Phase 2B claims. On September 13, Judge Thompson decided to address the remedies for the Phase 2A Eight Amendment violations in parts, starting with ADOC's chronic staffing shortfalls. He also severed Phase 2B’s medical and dental claims on September 28, 2017. In early 2018, the plaintiffs informed the court that ADOC was holding prisoners with serious mental illnesses in segregation (that is, solitary confinement). Judge Thompson ordered ADOC to provide information on certain mentally ill prisoners who had been confined in segregation for at least 30 days on February 8, 2018. And on February 16, he expanded the order to require ADOC to provide weekly lists of prisoners in segregation to the plaintiffs. On February 20, 2018, Judge Thompson issued the first opinion on the Phase 2A Eighth Amendment remedies. The opinion largely adopted ADOC’s plan to address understaffing. Under the plan, (1) ADOC would retain consultants to analyze its flaws and develop mental health staffing guidelines; (2) ADOC would contract with a mental health services vendor to hire additional staff immediately; and (3) ADOC’s Office of Health Services Staffing would reorganize and begin to exercise oversight over ADOC’s facilities. 2018 WL 985759. In a series of orders issued in April, May, and June 2018, Judge Thompson ordered ADOC to:

Increase staffing and the Bibb Correctional Facility and, in particular, improve conditions or transfer prisoners from its Restrictive Housing Unit, 2018 WL 1805594 (April 9, 2018);

Adopt a new system to classify inmates’ mental health status and direct mental health providers to submit lists of inmates’ classifications weekly, 2018 WL 2168705 (April 25, 2018);

Screen new inmates for mental health problems, 2018 WL 2440287 (April 25, 2018);

Screen inmates for mental health problems before segregating them, 2018 WL 4725265 (May 3, 2018);

Provide comprehensive mental health training to staff, 2018 WL 4927698 (May 7, 2018);

Move prisoners with serious mental disabilities out of restricted housing, 2018 WL 5316025 (June 4, 2018);
Create treatment teams responsible for inmates' mental health, 2018 WL 6319111 (June 4, 2018); and

Adhere to enumerated standards of care for inmates in various kinds of facilities and protect patient confidentiality, 2018 WL 6274058 (June 19, 2018).

 In early 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to stop ADOC from placing prisoners with serious mental illnesses in segregation. In response, Judge Thompson ordered ADOC to provide a comprehensive list of prisoners with serious mental illnesses in segregation on January 22. The court decided to treat the motion as a request for a preliminary injunction on February 14 and consider it within the context of unresolved Phase 2A remedial measures. Litigation over remedial measures ground on into May 2019, when Judge Thompson decided to act more aggressively because of a spate of prisoner suicides: fifteen in the prior fifteen months. On May 4, he found that “ADOC continues to fail to provide adequate suicide-prevention measures” and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for immediate relief on the issue of suicide prevention. His opinion, largely based on an expert report prepared by outside investigators, ordered ADOC to:

Stop placing suicidal inmates on mental-health observation instead of suicide watch;

Follow up with prisoners released from suicide watch at least four times;

Refer prisoners who are suicidal for more than 72 hours to higher levels of care or document reasons for not doing so;

Only transfer prisoners from suicide watch to segregation in “exceptional circumstances” and after a documented mental health evaluation;

Train nursing staff who screen prisoners being transferred to segregation to spot suicidal behavior;

Conduct unannounced security checks to monitor conditions in restrictive housing units;

Comply with previously agreed to confidentiality standards including out-of-cell evaluations; and

Try to save the lives of prisoners who have attempted suicide. (On one prior occasion, ADOC staff discovered a prisoner hanging from an improvised noose but left him there for over half an hour before taking him down.)

The court ordered ADOC to track its progress towards compliance and decided to appoint an external monitor (whose identity was left to the parties) with the power to review records and conduct site visits. After two years, either party can move to terminate the external monitoring. 2019 WL 1978476. Later that month, Judge Thompson directed the parties to file a report on their “pursuit of a path” to “global resolution” of the remaining issues in the case. On June 10, 2019, the court agreed to stay the proceedings regarding mental and dental-care claims and several Phase 2A remedial orders. The continuing matters, however, included remedying ADA-noncompliance, preventing prisoner suicides, and addressing ADOC’s chronic understaffing. On September 5, 2019, the parties jointly submitted a notice of an agreed-upon schedule for implementing ADA alterations (such as installing ADA-compliant restrooms and improving access to outdoor spaces), and the next day, they submitted a notice describing agreed-upon suicide prevention remedies (including increasing the number of staff on hand and stipulating training and preparation requirements for staff). The court conducted a hearing on October 21, 2019, during which the parties requested to modify the Phase 1 consent decree, and on October 24, Judge Thompson granted them leave to revise the consent decree to reschedule evidentiary hearings and status conferences. 2019 WL 5459721. The parties conducted a status conference before Judge Thompson on October 31, after which the defendant moved to redact the transcript of that meeting. Judge Thompson ordered oral argument on the redaction request, which took place on December 6, 2019. After the December 6 hearing, Judge Thompson ordered the parties to file a joint report updating the court with ADOC’s mental-health statistics and caseload information by December 20. He also commanded that the Phase 2A remedial efforts regarding suicide prevention would go into effect beginning December 13. On December 11, Judge Thompson approved the parties’ proposal for a mental-health staffing plan, and on December 13, he agreed to grant the redaction request. 2019 WL 6833843. On December 19, the judge ordered the parties to come up with a process to “identify functional segregation,” instructing the defendants to identify spaces that, although not officially built or designed to be segregation units, could safely and effectively serve as such units. Judge Thompson specified that he was interested most in how the parties’ evaluated what made a functional segregation unit, “with the goals of creating a manageable, not overly burdensome, and yet objectively verifiable process.” 2019 WL 7041620. On January 10, the court issued several interim injunctions as the result of several joint stipulations by the parties, including several instituting procedures and practices regarding mental health classification and mental illness identification, stopgap measures for removing inmates with serious mental illnesses from segregation, confidentiality orders, understaffing remedies, and functional segregation unit solutions. On January 14, 2020, Judge Thompson, expressing concerns about whether transferring mentally ill patients might present due process concerns, requested that the parties meet to discuss this issue. 2020 WL 398557. The parties met on January 17, after which the issue was dismissed and set aside. On January 22, 2020, the court instituted a notice-and-comment period for the proposed modifications to the parties’ ADA settlement. ADOC was instructed to collect comments from the class members and to respond to objections and concerns raised by those members. ADOC was also instructed to provide accommodations to inmates who had difficulty reading, writing, or accessing the notice. Summaries of the comments and objections were due back to the court by March 30. The parties have continued to file regular staffing updates and mental health statistics. As of March 12, 2020, the case is ongoing. Related opinions: 148 F. Supp. 3d 1329 318 F.R.D. 652 219 F. Supp. 3d 1100 219 F. Supp. 3d 1163 317 F.R.D. 634 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171 321 F.R.D. 653 2018 WL 985759 2018 WL 1805594 2018 WL 2168705 2018 WL 2440287 2018 WL 4725265 2018 WL 4927698 2018 WL 5316025 2018 WL 6319111 2018 WL 6274058 2019 WL 1978476 2019 WL 5459721 2019 WL 6833843 2019 WL 7041620 2020 WL 398557

Summary: In 2014, disabled prisoners and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, alleging that the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the ADOC was deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of disabled prisoners and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to provide medical and mental health care to all plaintiffs.


On May 3, 2018, a deaf individual in federal custody at Schuylkill Satellite Camp in Minersville, Pennsylvania filed this lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by the National Association of the Deaf and private counsel, sued the Bureau in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794. Alleging that the Bureau had violated the Act by refusing to provide videophone access. Hearing prisoners were allowed access to phones for communication with their family and friends. Because he was deaf, he could not use the phones, and the one TTY device available to him at the prison was cumbersome and frequently inaccessible. Further, TTY did not allow him to communicate in his primary language (American Sign Language). He sought a declaration that the Bureau was in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, a preliminary injunction requiring the Bureau to provide access to videophones immediately, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge James M. Munley. The plaintiff had previously sought administrative relief from the Department of Justice. An EEO officer issued a letter of findings determining that the TTY service provided to the plaintiff was an appropriate of the phone service provided to other prisoners. The plaintiff appealed the findings and had a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, who upheld the EEO officer’s determination. The plaintiff again appealed, and a Complaint Adjudication Officer reversed the previous determinations, finding that TTY did not provide the plaintiff with equal participation opportunities, and further finding that the Bureau had failed to provide evidence that videophones would cause any undue administrative or financial hardship to the prison. However, the decision left the prison unlimited time to install a videophone, explaining that these “matters may take some time.” Three months later, in May 2018, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit. After the lawsuit was filed, the Bureau began taking steps to install videophones, and the court ordered a series of status reports to track the Bureau’s progress. In June 2018, the Bureau’s Central Office provided notice to the prison that a national contract for video services had been renewed, instructing the prison to prepare, purchase, and install these videophones. On August 10, 2018, the court held a preliminary injunction hearing and heard evidence that the prison was preparing its infrastructure and computer systems to install three videophones and two monitoring stations. On November 28, 2018, the plaintiff made a phone call using the newly installed videophone at the prison. On January 4, 2019, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, noting a videophone had already been installed, and the plaintiff had access to that phone. The following month, the Bureau moved to dismiss the case as moot; the plaintiff opposed dismissal, arguing that the court should retain jurisdiction over the case because there was no guarantee that the Bureau would continue allowing the plaintiff access to the videophones. On March 25, 2019, the court stayed discovery pending resolution of the motion for dismissal. The court retained jurisdiction, and indicated that the plaintiff could seek expedited discovery or other relief in the event that the Bureau curtailed or eliminated the plaintiff’s access to videophones. On March 27, 2019, the plaintiff renewed his opposition to dismissal, arguing that the prison still refused to commit to providing him videophone access for the remainder of his incarceration. He further argued that because the Bureau continued to insist that the Rehabilitation Act did not provide a private right of action, there was still a live controversy before the court. The court should retain jurisdiction, he argued, to ensure that he had continued access to a videophone until his release. On May 15, 2019, Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson recommended that the Bureau’s motion be denied, and that the case be deferred as moot “pending completion of all aspects of [the plaintiff’s] sentence.” On August 6, 2019, District Judge Munley granted the Bureau’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiff’s claims were moot. 2019 WL 3564697. On June 16, 2020, the court approved a settlement agreement requiring the Bureau to pay $156,000 in plaintiff attorneys’ fees. The case is closed.

Summary: On May 3, 2018, a deaf individual in federal custody at FCI Schuylkill filed a complaint against the United States Bureau of Prisons, alleging a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiff alleged that the Bureau violated the act by refusing to provide videophones allowing him to communicate with family and friends in American Sign Language. He sought an injunction requiring the prison to install a videophone. He had previously sought this relief through the Justice Department's administrative process; a Complaint Adjudication Officer had found that the prison must install a videophone, but had granted unlimited time for the prison to comply. On November 28, 2018, the Bureau informed the court that a videophone had been installed and that the plaintiff had used the device. The court dismissed the complaint as moot on August 6, 2019.


On September 4, 1992, prisoners at the Tehama County Jail and the Work/Education Facility filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California again the County and the County Sheriff, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, among other things, the overcrowding at the jail and the lack of access to the law library violated the Eight Amendment. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On the same day that they filed their complaint, plaintiffs moved the Court for a preliminary injunction, and on September 15, 1992, they moved for a temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order, this one relating to law library access on September 30, 1992. The District Court (Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds) held preliminary hearings on the plaintiffs' motions on October 1, 1992, and on November 3 ordered additional oral argument on the preliminary injunction. On November 25, 1992, the parties stipulated to and the Court (Magistrate Judge Moulds) ordered an injunction that barred defendants from bedding inmates on the floor, set maximum capacities for the County Jail and the Work/Education Facility, barred defendants from adding beds over capacity, authorized the Sheriff to release prisoners from a housing unit if it came within 10% of capacity, and required the Sheriff to release prisoners or refuse new prisoners if a facility reached capacity. The order was set to expire when 75% of a new addition to the County Jail was occupied. The parties conducted discovery of the course of the following months, and an eight-day trial was held starting June 22, 1993. The docket indicates that defendants implemented new law library procedures, but does not detail how they differed from the previous procedures; after this, there is a four-year gap in activity. The docket picks up again in 1997, with several status conferences, and then on February 25, 1998, the Court (Magistrate Judge Moulds) issues an order giving notice that a class action settlement has been reached, with a fairness hearing set for April 23, 1998. Under the terms of the settlement, the old part of the Tehama County Jail was to operate with a maximum bed capacity of 106 and defendants were to inform plaintiffs counsel whenever the old side operated at 90% of capacity for 30 continuous night. Defendants also agree to pay $55,000 in attorneys' fees. After the fairness hearing, the Court (Judge Garland E. Burrell) approved the settlement and entered judgment on April 24, 1998. The docket indicates no further developments of note as of the date of this summary.

Summary: On September 4, 1992, prisoners at the Tehama County Jail and the Work/Education Facility filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California again the County and the County Sheriff, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. On November 25, 1992, the Court issued an injunction capping population at the two facilities until an addition to the County Jail was constructed, and on April 24, 1998, it approved a settlement instituting a population cap post-addition.


On June 6, 1996, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) notified Los Angeles County that it intended to investigate conditions in the Los Angeles County Jail system (the Jails) pursuant to the Civil Rights of the Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). In August of 1996, the DOJ toured the Jails with correctional mental health experts. The investigation found that the Jails were failing to provide care meeting constitutional standards to mentally ill inmates. On September 5, 1997, the DOJ issued a letter reporting its findings based on the tours and the County's response. The DOJ concluded that mental health care at the Jails violated the inmates' constitutional rights. The DOJ's findings report detailed numerous alleged constitutional deficiencies with regard to mental health care, including inadequate: (1) intake screening and evaluation, (2) diagnosis, (3) referral to mental health professionals, (4) treatment plans, (5) administration of medications, (6) suicide prevention, (7) tracking and medical record keeping, (8) staffing, (9) communication, and (10) quality assurance. The report also noted that mentally ill inmates were abused through excessive force and improper restraint. The report included a list of recommended remedial measures addressing the screening and treating of mentally ill inmates. The recommendations also included providing adequate and sanitary conditions for mentally ill inmates, providing access to recreation and other privileges, and promptly investigating reports of mistreatment or abuse of mentally ill prisoners. Other recommendations addressed record-keeping systems and suicide watch procedures. On December 19, 2002, the parties reached a Memorandum of Agreement that required adequate mental health care and suicide prevention at the Los Angeles County Jail System. The Agreement stated that (1) all inmates would be screened for mental illness upon intake to the Jails; (2) all inmates who may be mentally ill would be referred to a mental health professional, and the County should provide adequate mental health treatment, including medication; (3) all inmates under suicide watch would be evaluated by a mental health professional; and (4) the jails would keep detailed medical records with regard to mental health. Also, the County was to provide sufficient mental health staffing to ensure timely access to adequate mental health treatment. Finally, the County had to implement and document a continuous quality improvement program for mental health services, specifying the procedures for medical and administrative review for various events, such as suicides and attempted suicides. In September 2013, the DOJ had opened a separate investigation of the Jails under CRIPA and The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to address allegations of use of excessive force against all prisoners at the Jails, not just prisoners with mental illness. During the course of their investigation, the County and the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement to resolve Rosas v. McDonnell, JC-CA-0073. Rosas was a class action lawsuit alleging abuse and excessive force by staff at certain Jails located in downtown Los Angeles. As part of the Rosas settlement agreement, the County and LASD agreed to implement significant measures to protect prisoners from excessive force by staff, including improvements in policies, training, incident tracking and reporting, investigations, resolution of prisoner grievances, prisoner and staff supervision, and accountability. On June 4, 2014, the DOJ issued a letter stating that, since the entry of the Memorandum of Agreement twelve years before, there had been significant improvement in the delivery of mental health services. However, serious systemic deficiencies remained with regard to some aspects of the Jails' mental health program. Concerns remained surrounding the Jails' suicide prevention and mental health care—which resulted from from the partial implementation of the 2002 agreement and current conditions within the Jails. To address these issues, the parties developed another settlement agreement. On August 5, 2015, the U.S. filed this lawsuit against the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles County Sheriff in his official capacity in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The DOJ sued under CRIPA and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. It sought equitable and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge Dean Pregerson and referred to Magistrate Judge John McDermott. On the same day the complaint was filed, the Government and the County filed a stipulated settlement. The court-enforceable settlement agreement provided for a series of new or enhanced policies and practices intended to ensure that the County would provide safe and secure conditions. These policies would ensure the inmates' reasonable safety from harm, including serious risk from self-harm and excessive force, and provide adequate treatment for their mental health needs. The agreement also extended the remedial measures in the Implementation Plan of the Rosas settlement to fully resolve the DOJ’s findings of alleged mistreatment of prisoners with mental illness. It also settled claims under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which alleged excessive force against prisoners at all of the Jails. The parties agreed that an independent monitor would issue a report every six months detailing the implementation of this agreement until the defendants remained in substantial compliance with every substantive provision of the agreement for twelve consecutive months or until the monitor and the court determined that the objectives and goals of the agreement were satisfied. On September 3, 2015, Judge Dean D. Pregerson approved the settlement agreement. On September 28, 2015, individuals with mental illnesses and disabilities—individuals frequently cycled between the City's jails and streets—sought to intervene, arguing that paragraph 34 of the settlement agreement, covering discharge procedures, violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, and their Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights. The individuals alleged that Paragraph 34 facially discriminated against disabled prisoners whose disability stemmed from personality disorders, substance abuse and dependence disorders, dementia, or developmental disabilities, as well as all disabled prisoners who spent seven days or fewer in jail. The individuals further alleged that Paragraph 34's discharge procedures were inadequate, as many disabled prisoners would be unable to obtain needed medication or services if provided with nothing more than a prescription or list of referrals upon discharge. On December 15, 2015, Judge Pregerson granted the motion to intervene. 2015 WL 8783449. On January 14, 2016, the intervenor plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On March 14, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the intervenor’s first amended complaint. The defendants argued the intervenors lacked standing to assert injunctive relief claims because none of them were incarcerated at that time or had suffered any harm as a result of the policies. The defendants also claimed that the intervenors’ allegations of inadequate medical treatment failed to state a claim because the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act did not create a remedy for deficient medical services. Finally, the defendants argued that the intervenors’ allegations did not state any viable constitutional claims because, by their own admissions, none of them had been deprived of constitutional rights. Judge Pregerson disagreed. The court found that the intervenors had adequately alleged constitutional violations and denied the motion on May 17, 2016. 2016 WL 2885855. On May 16, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to disqualify the intervenors’ counsel for violation of the rules of professional conduct. On the same day, the defendants filed for review of Magistrate Judge McDermott’s April 27, 2016 minute order allowing the intervenors to depose the Director of the Los Angeles County Health Agency. 2016 WL 4060314. On July 27, 2016, the court denied the defendant’s motion to disqualify the intervenors’ counsel and affirmed the court decision allowing the intervenors to depose the Director. 2016 WL 4059712. During the duration of the intervenors’ case, the monitor continued reporting on the implementation of the 2015 settlement agreement. The monitor’s first report, published on May 1, 2016, found that of the 69 provisions in the Settlement Agreement subject to monitoring, the defendants were in substantial compliance with 5 provisions and in partial compliance with 16 provisions. The monitor found that the defendants were in substantial compliance with housing and sanitation, suicide intervention and first aid kits, and weekly rounds in restricted housing modules. The defendants were only in partial compliance with suicide hazard mitigation plans, suicide prevention training, staffing requirements, and inmate safety checks in mental and non-mental housing. The monitor published a second report on September 1, 2016. The defendants were in substantial compliance with mental health assessments, maintenance plans, investigation of staff misconduct, and law enforcements investigations of suicides. But the defendants were in partial compliance with suicide hazard mitigation plans, screening for mental health care and suicide risk, and initial treatment plans. And the defendants were not in compliance at all with provisions regarding reporting of self-injurious behavior and threats, therapeutic services in mental health housing, and active mental health caseloads. The monitor’s third report was published March 1, 2017. The defendants were in substantial compliance with suicide hazard mitigation plans, initial treatment plans, and weekly rounds in restricted housing modules. The defendants were in partial compliance with suicide prevention training, identification and evaluation of suicidal inmates, and disciplinary policies. And the defendants were again not in compliance with reporting of self-injurious behavior and threats, active mental health caseloads, and referral for mental health care. The monitor published a fourth report on September 1, 2017. The defendants were in partial compliance with reporting of self-injurious behavior and threats suicide prevention training, identification and evaluation of suicidal inmates, and disciplinary policies. The defendants again were not in compliance with provisions on active mental health case loads and referrals for mental health care. A fifth report was published on March 1, 2018. There were 34 provisions that no longer required monitoring because the defendants were in substantial compliance for twelve consecutive months. The monitor also found the defendants were in substantial compliance with investigation of staff misconduct; in partial compliance with disciplinary policies, interruption of self-injurious behavior, and staffing requirements; and were not in compliance with active mental health caseloads. The monitor’s sixth report was published on August 31, 2018. A total of 38 provisions no longer required monitoring because the defendants were in substantial compliance for twelve consecutive months. The monitor found the defendants in partial compliance with identification and evaluation of suicidal inmates, initial mental health assessments and treatment plans, and interruption of self-injurious behavior. The defendants were still not in compliance with staffing requirements. As of April 10, 2020, the defendants had not maintained compliance with the 2015 settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. The settlement agreement remained in effect and the defendants were continued to be monitored.

Summary: In 1996, the Department of Justice began a CRIPA investigation of the Los Angeles County Jail system. The investigation found that the Jails were failing to provide care meeting constitutional standards to mentally ill inmates. In 2002, the parties reached a Memorandum of Agreement. The parties continued working to resolve deficiencies in the settlement agreement. In August 2015, a new settlement was reached focused on suicide prevention and mental health care within the Jails. In December 2015, individuals with mental illnesses and disabilities previously incarcerated in the Jails were granted the right to intervene in this matter. The settlement agreement remains in effect.


The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On January 29, 2018, during the Trump administration, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) voted to disclose a memorandum (the Nunes Memo) revealing existence of a FISA warrant for the electronic surveillance of Carter Page, who served as a onetime foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign until September 2016. The Nunes Memo was declassified by President Donald Trump on February 2, 2018. The Nunes Memo revealed that on October 21, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) sought and received a probable cause order from the FISC authorizing electronic surveillance on Carter Page. The Nunes Memo further disclosed that in addition to the initial warrant application, the government had received three renewal orders from the FISC. The initial warrant application and the three renewal orders were eventually disclosed by the Department of Justice on July 21, 2018. See In re Carter W. Page, a U.S. Person, NS-DC-0127 in this Clearinghouse. On May 3, 2018, Judicial Watch filed a FOIA complaint against the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking transcripts of any hearings related to Carter Page. The complaint alleged that Judicial Watch had submitted a FOIA request to the DOJ on February 16, 2018, but that as of May 3, 2018, the DOJ had failed to either produce the requested records or respond to them. On June 18, 2018, Judicial Watch received a letter from the DOJ stating that the DOJ did not have "any records responsive" to Judicial Watch's request. On August 30, 2018, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the National Security Division (NSD), which maintains operational files regarding the FISC, "searched the locations likely to contain responsive records and reasonably determined that there are no responsive records." Furthermore, the DOJ maintained that its FOIA staff had consulted with subject matter experts in the Office of Intelligence who confirmed that, "as is typical in proceedings before the FISC, no hearings were held with respect to the acknowledged Carter Page FISA applications, and thus no responsive transcripts exist." On September 24, 2018, in light of the fact that the DOJ did not have any responsive transcripts, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of this action with prejudice. The case is now closed. However, on July 25, 2018, after receiving the DOJ's letter, Judicial Watch filed a motion with the FISC for publication of all transcripts related to Carter Page. As of February 2019, there has been no other activity in this matter that has been publicly disclosed. See Misc. 18-03, NS-DC-0129 in this Clearinghouse.

Summary: On May 3, 2018, Judicial Watch filed a FOIA complaint against the Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking transcripts of any hearings related to Carter Page. After the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment, maintaining that no responsive transcripts existed, the parties stipulated to a dismissal on September 24, 2018. The case closed in September 2018.


On August 28, 2017, three transgender individuals, either currently serving or hoping to serve in the military, along with two civil rights organizations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs, represented by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, sued the President of the United States (Donald Trump) and the Secretary of Defense for alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ federal policy banning transgender individuals from serving in the military was unconstitutional and motivated by animus against transgender people. The plaintiffs accordingly sought a judgment declaring the federal ban unconstitutional, a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from taking any action against transgender individuals, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint on September 14, 2017, adding four additional transgender individuals and a third civil rights organization. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on October 16, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiffs’ suit was premature because the President had issued a memorandum directing the Secretary of Defense to halt any actions until a policy review had been completed. The President had also stated in the memorandum that no changes to the current policy were to be made until at least March 2018. The defendants therefore alleged that the plaintiffs could not show that they would suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction because their harms were speculative at this stage. On December 11, 2017, District Judge Marsha J. Pechman denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ equal protection, substantive due process, and First Amendment claims, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction; the preliminary injunction took effect immediately and was ordered to remain in effect until the suit was resolved. 2017 WL 6311305. On December 14, 2017, the defendants appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On December 15, 2017, the defendants filed an emergency motion to the Ninth Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction, alleging that the injunction would impose irreparable harm on the defendants and general public by forcing the military to implement a service accession policy in a rushed timetable. However, the defendants soon withdrew their motion for a stay, and on December 30th they voluntarily dismissed the appeal. Meanwhile, on December 14, the State of Washington filed a complaint as an intervenor-plaintiff against the defendants in order to protect itself, its residents, and the Washington National Guard from the federal ban. On January 25th, 2018, the plaintiffs and the State of Washington filed motions for summary judgement. On February 12, 2018, the defendants responded with a motion arguing that they were entitled to conduct discovery before summary judgement. On February 21, 2018, the defendants' motion was denied. 2018 WL 993973. On February 28, 2018, the defendants filed a cross motion for partial summary judgement and an opposition to the plaintiffs’ and intervenor’s motion for summary judgement. On March 23, 2018, White House released a new proposed plan, which would ban transgender people from serving openly in the U.S. Armed Services. Based on this new plan, the defendants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction. On March 27, 2018, the plaintiffs argued that the new plan, too, was clearly unconstitutional. On April 13, 2018, the district court rejected the new plan and ordered that the preliminary injunction remain in effect. 2018 WL 1784464. The court also granted in part and denied in part all motions and cross-motions for summary judgement. Specifically, the court denied summary judgment as to plaintiffs’ and Washington’s equal protection, due process, and First Amendment claims. The court granted the plaintiffs’ and Washington’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the applicable level of scrutiny (strict scrutiny). As the Court said in its order, "This means that before Defendants can implement the Ban, they must show that it was sincerely motivated by compelling interests, rather than by prejudice or stereotype, and that it is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests." The Court also refused to dismiss President Trump from the case, allowing the plaintiff and Washington's claims for declaratory relief to move forward against him. On November 27, 2018, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, asking the Court to directly review the District Court's preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court stayed the December 11 order granting the preliminary injunction while the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending. 139 S.Ct. 950. On March 8, 2019 the defendants notified the court of the Maryland District Court’s decision in <i>Stone v. Trump</i> to stay the same preliminary injunction. The defendants stated their intent to implement the policy via a Directive-type Memorandum, which the Secretary of Defense released on March 12, 2019. The Ninth Circuit issued an opinion on the writ of mandamus on June 14, 2019. The panel, composed of Raymond C. Fisher, Consuelo M. Callahan, and Richard R. Clifton, vacated the order striking the motion to dissolve the restraining order, stayed the preliminary injunction through further consideration of the motion to dissolve the injunction, and settling several discovery disputes. Regarding the motion to dissolve, the panel concluded that the 2018 change in policy was sufficiently different from the 2017 order that inspired the injunction; as a result, they held that the court should review if the injunction should remain in place based on these changes. They remanded the motion to the lower court to make this determination. In addition, they referred to the Supreme Court's opinion on staying the injunction when directing the district court to continue staying the injunction through the review of its necessity in light of the new policy change and any appeals that may follow. Finally, the panel stated that the 2018 policy was due a degree of deference, though not rational basis review, because it appeared to be the "product of an independent military judgment." The judgment went into effect on August 7. 926 F.3d 1180. The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint on July 31, 2019. The amended complaint reflected the current list of plaintiffs (the plaintiff group voluntarily dismissed one plaintiff on July 23) and revised the facts section to reflect the changes in the 2018 policy memorandum. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) intervened in response to the new complaint on August 29. On August 16, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation to consolidate this case with another case of the same name, 19-cv-01206. The second case originated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, and was just a motion to compel compliance with a subpoena order on Dr. Paul McHugh. The subpoena case was moved to the Western District of Washington for convenience, and combined for that reason. The court officially consolidated the cases on August 28. Discovery continued. It was quite contested; the plaintiffs regularly sought information from the defendants on deliberations surrounding the creation of the 2018 policy, and the defendants resisted using deliberative process privilege. Unable to efficiently resolve the discovery disputes, the district court appointed James Donoghue as Special Master on April 9, 2020, after seeking recommendations from the parties. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 2017, transgender individuals, currently serving or hoping to serve in the military, along with civil rights organizations, filed this action against the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that the federal government's ban on military service by transgender individuals violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights and their First Amendment right to gender expression. On November 23, 2018, Defendants filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. The Supreme Court stayed the preliminary injunction until the Ninth Circuit reached a decision on June 14, 2019. The circuit court vacated the order to dissolve the injunction, saying that amendments to the policy in 2018 were enough to warrant a new review of the necessity of the injunction. This remanded the decision to the district court, which is engaged in a protracted discovery dispute on the issue.


On January 23, 2017, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a complaint against President Donald J. Trump, arguing that he had violated the Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, and assigned to Judge George B. Daniels. The complaint alleged that because President Trump had refused to step away from his businesses while he was in office, he was receiving benefits from the U.S. government and foreign countries through valuable real estate deals at home and abroad, leases of his buildings, and guests and events at his properties. The plaintiff alleged that his acceptance of these benefits violated the Constitution and created doubt about whose interests he was actually representing while negotiating with foreign countries. The plaintiff sought a judgment declaring that this conduct violated the Emoluments Clauses, and injunctive relief to prevent further violations. The complaint was later amended to include as plaintiffs:

a nonprofit organization engaged in the protection of workers in the restaurant market and in managing its own restaurant;
an individual who worked in the hotel market and whose compensation was tied to a percentage of the revenue of the events she booked for foreign governments in hotels; and
the owner of several hotels, restaurants, bars and event spaces in New York, which attract foreign government clients and U.S. government officials.
On June 9, 2017, the President moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a sufficiently concrete injury, and that their alleged injury did not fall within the “zone of interests” of the Emoluments Clauses (which were intended to protect against corruption and foreign influence, not to protect business competitors). In other words, the clauses should only apply to personal compensation, not to transactions involving companies in which the President had financial interest in. Finally, the President claimed that an injunction against him in his official capacity would be unconstitutional. The district court granted the President’s motion to dismiss on December 21, 2017. 276 F.Supp.3d 174. It found that the plaintiffs had failed to allege a sufficient injury stemming from the President’s actions. Regarding the injury alleged by the plaintiffs with ties to the hotel and restaurant industry, the court found that Donald Trump had already been wealthy and famous before becoming president, and that it was natural that interest in his properties would generally increase after he was elected. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injury did not fall within the zone of interests of the Emoluments Clauses. The court also concluded that the question of whether the President could continue to receive income from foreign governments through his private businesses without the consent of Congress was a non-justiciable political question. On February 16, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal (Second Circuit, Docket 18-474). In their brief, filed on April 24, 2018, they argued that the President’s acceptance of emoluments had tilted the marketplace and skewed the incentives of its participants, disadvantaging (and thus injuring) the plaintiffs, who competed with Trump hotels and restaurants for governmental business. The plaintiffs reasoned that the Emoluments Clauses sought to achieve goals of preventing corruption, tempering foreign influence, and respecting federalism, and thereby to protect individuals from the personal harms that result from a violation of these constitutional principles. Therefore, they argued that the complaint fell within the Emoluments Clauses’ zone of interests. The plaintiffs also addressed the argument that the issue was barred by the political question doctrine. First, the Domestic Emoluments Clause did not include any provision about a possible congressional consent. Second, the Foreign Emoluments Clause made it clear that without congressional consent, it was illegal for certain federal officers to accept any foreign emoluments. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued, if the Foreign Emoluments Clause could be enforced only by Congress, as the district court had concluded, it would make little sense—Congress would not need to give “consent” to foreign emoluments in order to validate them. Hence, the plaintiffs asserted that so long as Congress remained silent, the President was breaking the law by accepting emoluments, and injured parties must be able to seek redress in federal court. The Second Circuit heard oral argument on October 30, 2018, and issued its opinion nearly a year later on September 13, 2019. It vacated the district court’s ruling and sent the case back for further proceedings, finding that the district court had erred in several ways. First, the case was not barred by the political question doctrine. “In the undisputed absence of Congressional consent, the President has violated this provision of the Constitution, if…he has accepted what the Constitution describes as ‘emoluments.’” The definition of emoluments was not something for the political branches to decide, but rather it was the responsibility of the federal courts to find the facts and interpret the Constitution. “The mere possibility that Congress might grant consent does not render the dispute non-justiciable.” Second, the plaintiffs had standing. Third, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami had made it clear that the zone of interests question did not affect plaintiffs’ standing or courts’ jurisdiction. The district court had therefore erred in dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. The Second Circuit went on to conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims were actually within the zone of interests of the Emoluments Clauses; however, it amended its opinion on March 30, 2020, deleting the zone of interests merits analysis. 953 F.3d 178. The President petitioned the Second Circuit for rehearing en banc. That petition, submitted October 28, 2019, is still pending as of July 24, 2020.

Summary: On January 23, 2017, the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) filed a complaint against President Donald J. Trump, arguing that he had violated the Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. They alleged that because the President had refused to step away from his private businesses following his inauguration, he was receiving benefits from U.S. and foreign officials through real estate deals and other official uses of his properties. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed the complaint on December 21, 2017; the Second Circuit Court of Appeals vacated that ruling and remanded on September 13, 2019. The President petitioned for a rehearing before the entire Second Circuit, and that petition is pending as of July 24, 2020.


On January 28, 2017, a lawyer named Andrew W. Shalaby filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Proceeding under California "Private Attorney General" statutes, the action purported to be by the "People of the United States of America and the State of California," "for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights and for their vindication pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988." The lawsuit challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States. The complaint contended that the EO violated the separation of powers doctrine without statutory exception and that it violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The complaint additionally alleged that section 217(a)(12) of the INA, referenced by the EO, "does not appear to exist." The case was filed as a civil complaint and sought an immediate injunction of the EO "until its validity and constitutionality is adjudicated." On Jan. 30, the case was assigned to Hon. James Donato. Several procedural updates occurred next. On Jan. 31, the plaintiff moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. On Feb. 1, Judge Donato dismissed the complaint for failing to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case and subsequently denied the IFP as moot. Judge Donato's order gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the complaint by Feb. 15. On Feb. 4, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration, which the court denied on Feb. 6. On Feb. 13, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the deadline for reconsideration until Mar. 10 in order to file an amended complaint in the event that President Trump re-drafts the EO. Judge Donato granted this motion on Feb. 14, noting that no further extensions would be granted and reminding the filing attorney that any amended complaint must conform to the Court's dismissal order. The plaintiffs filed statements of support for the repeal and recession of the EO from seven of in the individuals represented in the lawsuit on Feb. 19. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. The plaintiffs responded on Mar. 10 with an amended complaint. In it, the plaintiffs noted that President Trump did a "commendable job" in revising the EO; they narrowed their challenge to just section 3 of the revised order. On Apr. 4, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On May 1, the court concluded that defendant's motion to dismiss could be decided without oral arguments and vacated a hearing that had been sent for May 11. On Dec. 7, Judge Donato granted defendant's motion to dismiss with prejudice citing that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 28, 2017, a lawyer named Andrew W. Shalaby filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Proceeding under California "Private Attorney General" statutes, the action purported to be by the "People of the United States of America and the State of California," "for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights and for their vindication pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988." The lawsuit challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (Travel Ban 1.0) The complaint contended that the EO violated the separation of powers doctrine without statutory exception and that it violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause. The case was filed as a civil complaint and sought an immediate injunction of the EO "until its validity and constitutionality is adjudicated." Case dismissed with prejudice after submitting amended complaint because the court held the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to amend his brief to include the Court's recommendations to gain standing.


On October 2, 2017, the group Iranian Alliances Across Borders filed this complaint on behalf of a group of plaintiffs of Iranian descent. The suit challenged President Trump's Sept. 24 Proclamation indefinitely restricting travel from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. Otherwise known as EO-3, the proclamation was the President's third attempt to restrict travel from particular countries. The first attempt was by and Executive Order (EO) issued in January 2017. In response to that order, a slew of litigation ensued. That litigation, and the decisions that followed, eventually led the President to issue a new, revised order. However, the litigation continued, and in September, President Trump issued his proclamation just as the second EO was about to expire. In response to that proclamation, and alongside other suits challenging the EOs, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Maryland District Court. The case was assigned to Judge Chuang, who also was presiding in <href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15637">IRAP v. Trump. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the proclamation targeted and discriminated against Muslims and that it violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by discriminating based on national origin. Plaintiffs also alleged that the order violated the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Speech Clauses and the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. As relief, plaintiffs requested a nationwide injunction barring the government from enforcing the new order. On October 12, 2017, the government responded to plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction by arguing that the case should be dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing. The government also argued that, irrespective of standing, the President has broad authority to issue orders on immigration matters, particularly when national security is at stake. That day, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add to new plaintiffs, and on October 17, Judge Chuang granted in part plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. In his order, Judge Chuang enjoined the government from enforcing Section 2 of the proclamation, which suspended the entry of nationals from eight specified countries. However, the injunction only applied to those individuals who have a bona-fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. Later that week the government followed up with a notice that it would appeal Judge Chuang's order. On October 20, 2017, the appeal was consolidated with two other cases: IRAP v. Trump and Zakzok v. Trump. To read more about what happened to this case on appeal, please visit the IRAP v. Trump Clearinghouse page. Those cases progressed to the Supreme Court. On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Trump rejected plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to EO-3. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a broad view of presidential power, holding that under the INA the President has "broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States” and that here the President "lawfully exercised that discretion.” The majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that the President must explain his findings, calling the argument “questionable” and writing that “the 12-page Proclamation—which thoroughly describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations underlying the President’s chosen restrictions—is more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under §1182(f).” As for plaintiff’s Establishment Clause argument, the Court first noted that EO-3's facially neutral policy towards religion forced the Court to take the extra step of probing "the sincerity of the stated justifications for the policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which were made before the President took the oath of office.” Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that “the Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says nothing about religion.” Notably, the Court did however use the opinion to officially repudiate Korematsu writing that the decision was "was gravely wrong the day it was decided.” Back in this district court, on November 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. In it, the plaintiffs withdrew their claims as to the INA. On November 7, 2018, the government moved to dismiss plaintiffs' allegations for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On May 2, 2019, the district court granted the government's motion with respect to plaintiffs' claims arising under the Administrative Procedure Act but denied the motion as it pertained to claims under the Constitution. The court reasoned that the standard for an injunction was higher than that at the dismissal stage. Therefore, the court stated that while the plaintiffs may not be likely to succeed on the merits and thus not entitled to a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs did successfully allege plausible claims for relief. On June 18, 2019, the court granted the government leave to file a motion to file an interlocutory appeal. On August 20, 2019, the court granted the government's motion to file an interlocutory appeal, but it did not stay discovery. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stayed the case in the district court on September 11, 2019. On June 8, 2020, the Fourth Circuit reversed this district court's ruling on the government's motion to dismiss. 961 F.3d 635. The appellate court reasoned that the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Trump had already made a determination that it was not possible, and thus not plausible, for Constitutional challenges to the EOs to survive rational basis review. This was because of the great judicial deference that the courts ought to afford in areas of immigration, particularly as they may pertain to claims of preserving national security. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case and instructed this district court to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. After the appellate court denied a motion to rehear the case en banc, this district court dismissed the case with prejudice on August 31, 2020.

Summary: On October 2, 2017 the Iranian Alliances Across Borders filed this complaint on behalf of a group of plaintiffs of Iranian descent. The suit challenges President Trumps Sept. 24 Proclamation indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. Otherwise known as EO-3, the proclamation was the President's third attempt to restrict travel from particular countries. The first attempt was by and Executive Order (EO) issued in Jan. 2017. In response to that order, a slew of litigation ensued. That litigation, and the decisions it led to, eventually led the President to issue a new, revised order. However, the litigation continued, and in September President issued his proclamation just as the second EO was about to expire. In response to that proclamation, and alongside other suits challenging the EOs, plaintiffs filed their complaint in the Maryland District Court. Judge Chuang was assigned to the case. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the proclamation targeted and discriminated against Muslims and that it violated the Immigration and Nationality Act by discriminating based on national origin. Plaintiffs also alleged that the order violated the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Speech Clauses and the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. As relief, plaintiffs requested a nationwide injunction barring the government from enforcing the new order.