On February 7, 2005, a prisoner at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") in Beaumont, Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq., against the United States. The plaintiff, representing himself pro se, asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief requiring defendants to consider his requests for religious accommodation. The plaintiff is an observant Jew and has continued his practice of Judaism while incarcerated. Plaintiff's sincerely held religious beliefs dictate that he drink at least 3.5 ounces of red wine while saying Kiddush, a prayer sanctifying the Sabbath, during Friday night and Saturday Shabbos services. Plaintiff believes that wine must be used because it has been dictated by the Code of Jewish Law and by practice. Plaintiff also believes that he must drink four cups containing at least 3.5 ounces of wine during the Passover Seder. Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") staff denied plaintiff's request to be provided with wine for the Kiddush and Passover observances and instead provided grape juice. On September 24, 2008, the parties entered a Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, FCI will spend up to $500 on religious materials. FCI will also provide plaintiff with challah bread for his Friday night and Saturday morning Sabbath observances and Rosh Hashanah, a cup of at least 3 ounces of nonalcoholic wine on Friday evenings and Saturday mornings, and 4 cups of at least 3 ounces of nonalcoholic wine during the two Passover Seders and other specified religious observances. The terms of the agreement are limited to the current term of plaintiff's incarceration and each party agreed to bear their own costs and fees.

Summary: In February 2005, plaintiff brought a suit challenging the BOP's failure to accommodate his religious practices, specifically the consumption of wine during religious ceremonies. In September 2008, the parties entered a settlement stipulating that the Federal Correctional Institution will provide the plaintiff with nonalcoholic wine on religious occasions.


A group of practicing Muslim prisoners at the Monroe Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on June 10, 2018, alleging that prison staff deprived them of nighttime meals while they were fasting during Ramadan. Represented by the Center for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), they brought this action against the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) and sought declaratory and emergency injunctive relief. According to the plaintiffs, despite their requests, the prison chaplain refused to add them to a list of prisoners to be served specially-timed meals during the month of Ramadan (“the Ramadan List”), in effect subjecting them to a “starvation policy” because the normal schedule for meals at the prison all fell within the time of day when they are fasting. They alleged that this violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Along with their complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would force the prison to provide them with legally adequate meals through the end of Ramadan; that motion was granted by District Judge Ronald B. Leighton the same day. In its answer, the DOC denied virtually all of the pertinent allegations in the complaint. It disputed the plaintiffs’ contention that it refused to add them to the Ramadan List, maintaining that the prisoners had not signed up during the established sign-up period. It denied the existence of a “starvation policy” towards Muslims at the prison. Finally, it made a number of different affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity for state government officials. The case has been assigned to District Judge Ricardo S. Martinez. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 4, 2018. On October 3, 2018, in light of the plaintiffs' amended complaint, submitted on September 12, 2018, the court dismissed the defendants' motion as moot. The parties began discovery in preparation for the trial, scheduled for October 7, 2019. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 9, 2019. Their motion asserted that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing their amended complaint. Defendants also argued that the sign-up procedures for the "Ramadan List" did not significantly burden the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and served a compelling government interest, making the RLUIPA claims not viable. They defendants further asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the constitutional claims. The plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment that same day. Their brief reasserted an argument for the validity of their RLUIPA claims, the 8th Amendment claim, and their Equal Protection and Free Exercise claim. They also argued that the defendants should not be entitled to qualified immunity. The court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2019 and dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims as moot. 2019 WL 4246981. Defendants filed for costs on September 27, 2019. Their request was granted in part and denied in part on October 22, 2019. The plaintiffs appealed the order granting the defendants motion for summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit. On December 29, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their available administrative remedies, and therefore could not bring their claims in court. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2018, a group of Muslim prisoners at the Monroe Correctional Complex who were fasting during Ramadan filed this lawsuit against the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. They alleged that prison staff subjected them to a "starvation policy" by refusing to provide them with meals outside of the hours in which they were fasting, in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). The same day they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order ordering the prison to provide them with legally adequate meals meeting their religious needs through the end of Ramadan. The DOC denied all of the pertinent allegations in its answer filed in July 2018. The case is still ongoing.


This case began on July 2, 2014, when a Texas resident filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the state of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff represented himself and asked the court to declare that Texas laws that prohibit same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. The plaintiff claimed that the same-sex marriage ban violated his Fifth Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. On July 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss, and the next day it was granted by the court (Honorable Judge Gregg Costa). The pro se plaintiff's stated reason for dismissal was the existence of a similar lawsuit in the state of Pennsylvania.

Summary: This case began on July 2, 2014, when a Texas resident filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas U.S. District Court against the state of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff represented himself and asked the court to declare that Texas laws that prohibit same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. The plaintiff claimed that the same-sex marriage ban violated his Fifth Amendment rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution.


The City of Seattle commenced this lawsuit on March 29, 2017 to challenge President Trump's January 25, 2017 Executive Order (EO), Executive Order 13768. The EO denies federal funding to cities that resist enforcing the federal government’s immigration enforcement policies. Represented by private attorneys, the City of Seattle filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory relief. According to the complaint, Seattle decided on a policy that law enforcement should not inquire into anyone's immigration status "unless specifically required to do so by law or court order." Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1373, a city that restrict the government from information regarding the immigration status of any individual would be designated as a "sanctuary jurisdiction,” thus in violation of the statute. The effect of such a designated would be denying Seattle “significant funding that it uses for such essential purposes as home care for the disabled elderly and nutrition assistance for needy children.” Seattle requested that the Court declare it to be in compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373 and also declare that the EO violated the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 5. The motion argued that Seattle cannot show injury and that the claim is not ripe. The motion also argued that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Meanwhile, on April 25, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against operation of the Executive Order. See San Francisco v. Trump for details. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 26, 2017 and on July 5, the court struck the motion to dismiss as moot. Then, on July 10, defendants filed a new motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint, arguing that the cities have not met their burden of showing clear injury and that the cities' amended complaint is based on mere speculation as to the order's scope. The court denied the motion to dismiss on October 19. On October 30, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings pending resolution in County of Santa Clara v. Trump in the Ninth Circuit. The court granted the motion the next day. In the Santa Clara case, the Ninth Circuit held that the executive branch could not refuse to disperse the federal grants without congressional authorization under the Separation of Powers principle and the Spending Clause. 897 F.3d 1225. Back in this court, on October 24, Judge Jones, in a summary order, entered judgment, declaring the EO unconstitutional and the withholding of funds from Seattle and Portland pursuant to the EO unconstitutional as well. There is no more docket activity after October 24, 2018, and no appeal was noticed. The case is now closed.

Summary: The City of Seattle commenced this lawsuit on March 29, 2017 to challenge President Trump's January 25, 2017 Executive Order (No. 13768). The EO denied federal funding to cities that resist enforcing the President's immigration policies. On October 24, 2018, Jones declared the EO unconstitutional and the withholding of funds from Seattle and Portland pursuant to the EO unconstitutional as well. The case is closed.


On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Dallas filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On February 26, 2013, Judge Jane J. Boyle granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Dallas filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. On February 26, 2013, Judge Jane J. Boyle granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness.


On May 15, 2012, four women represented by the ACLU filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii against state officials in Hawaii's Department of Public Safety under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interference with their 14th Amendment right to marry. The four women's fiancés were prisoners in Hawaii's custody (though some were in Arizona prisons) and were required to complete an application to have their marriage approved. The women alleged that this burden on their right to marry was imposed without a legitimate state interest. The ACLU, which had previously intervened on behalf of an unrelated prisoner who had been denied marriage approval because of his status, had been given assurances that a new policy would be promulgated and followed to prevent unconstitutional denials of marriage. The women alleged that the various officials continued even under the new policy to deny marriage on the basis of prisoner status. Plaintiffs sought monetary, declarative and injunctive relief, including damages and attorneys' fees. On May 29, 2012, Plaintiffs filed an amended motion for a preliminary injunction and an amended complaint that dropped one of the women from the case. On June 5, 2012, Defendants filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for lack of jurisdiction and failure to join a required party, claiming that the women could not sue to advance the prisoners' marriage interests and that the prisoners should have been joined in the suit. On July 5, 2012, the parties stipulated to dismiss a second plaintiff from the case. The parties then stipulated to various facts on July 9, 2012. On July 19, 2012, the district court (Judge Susan Oki Mollway) denied the state's motion to dismiss, ruling that Plaintiffs had standing because they were seeking redress for infringement of their own rights to marry and that the prisoners were not required parties. On August 2, 2012, the court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, requiring the state to allow Plaintiffs to marry their fiancés without further interference and without reapplication. 2012 WL 3202222. On May 28, 2013, the district court approved the parties' stipulation for dismissal with prejudice. Because of the preliminary injunction, the remaining plaintiffs had married their fiancés. The parties came to a settlement that included damages, attorneys' fees, and a mild policy change. Under the settlement, Defendants were to pay $86,871.21 ($25,000 to both plaintiffs, $35,000 in fees to the ACLU, and $1871.21 in costs to the ACLU); the new marriage policy was to be included in marriage application materials; and the Director of Public Safety was to issue an internal memorandum instructing officials to presume marriage applications should be approved unless they violate the policy. The case is closed.

Summary: Four women represented by the ACLU filed suit against state officials in Hawaii's Department of Public Safety under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for interference with their 14th Amendment right to marry. The women's fiancés were prisoners under Hawaii's custody (though some were in Arizona prisons) and were required to complete an application to have their marriage approved. The women alleged that they were being denied their right to marry because their fiancés were prisoners instead of for a legitimate state interest. The ACLU, which had previously intervened on behalf of an unrelated prisoner who had been denied marriage approval because of his status, had been given assurances that a new policy would be promulgated and followed to prevent unconstitutional denials of marriage. The women alleged that the various officials continued even under the new policy to deny marriage unconstitutionally. Plaintiffs sought monetary, declarative and injunctive relief, including damages and attorneys' fees. The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction allowing them to marry, and the parties later settled. The case is now closed.


On June 19, 2003, an individual employee filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, against the FedEx Corporation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. On November 13, 2003, the case was consolidated with a case of the same nature, Satchell v. FedEx Express, which had been filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in 2003. The plaintiffs, who were represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, rightful place relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees. The plaintiffs alleged disparate impact and disparate treatment concerning minority employees and minority lower-level managers with regards to promotions, training, job assignments, compensation, and discipline. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that FedEx disproportionately assigned minority employees to part-time and casual positions, provided them with fewer promotions than non-minority employees, granted less compensation for minority employees than similarly situated non-minorities, and disciplined minority employees more harshly. On September 11, 2004 the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and on September 28, 2005, the court (Judge Susan Illston) granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Two classes were certified: a Minority Employee Class and an African-American Lower-Level Manager Class, both incorporating all employees meeting these standards since October 17, 1999 and working in FedEx's Western Region. The court also bifurcated the litigation into two phases, one to address liability and relief applicable to the class and the second to address individual compensatory and equitable relief. On December 5, 2006, the court (Judge Illston) dismissed the class claims certified under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act in accordance with the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On April 13, 2007, the court (Judge Illston) granted preliminary approval of the consent decree, which provided for an award of $15 million in attorneys' fees and reimbursement. Caldwell v. FedEx, 2007 WL 1114010 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The court (Judge Illston) also granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and reimbursement of costs and expenses. Caldwell v. FedEx, 2007 WL 2343904 (N.D. Cal. 2007). The court (Judge Illston) then signed the consent decree. The provisions of the settlement agreement included monetary relief, attorneys' fees, and injunctive relief, consisting of the new guidelines for granting positions, training, job assignments, compensation, and discipline within the FedEx Corporation. Judge Illston entered the final judgment dismissing the case with prejudice, in accordance with the terms of the Consent Decree on August 14, 2007. The parties continued to litigate such issues as attorneys' fees through January 2008, but they ultimately reached an agreement regarding those issues. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by a FedEx employee against the FedEx Corporation, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, rightful place relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees. The case was settled through a consent decree approved on August 14, 2007, resulting in extensive injunctive relief, damages and attorney fees and costs.


On June 5th, 2020, Black Lives Matter - Los Angeles (BLMLA) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Judge Consuelo B. Marshall was assigned to the case. The case arose out of the nationwide protests following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN. The complaint alleged that, over the course of a week, the LAPD arrested approximately 2,600 people who were engaged in lawful protest. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the LAPD violated the class members' First Amendment right to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. The complaint also included a Fourth Amendment claim based on excessive force, namely use of batons and rubber bullets. Finally, a due process claim alleged that the police failed to respect the protesters' liberty interest when it held them for many hours, rather than citing and releasing them, as required by state law. In addition, plaintiffs claimed that the LAPD violated the terms of a settlement agreement struck in 2000 that required the LAPD Incident Commander to make an evaluation as to the feasibility of isolating and arresting protesters behaving unlawfully before the LAPD arrested anyone at all. Second, plaintiffs alleged that the LAPD was in violation of a 2007 settlement agreement which dictated that the LAPD must facilitate protests and issue instructions via a loud speaker in the event that a protest blocks traffic, rather than attempt to disrupt the protest. On June 21st, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint and a first corrected amended complaint. The new complaint added several plaintiffs to the lawsuit (and eliminated one). More importantly, however, it divided the claims for relief by different classes. The first claim for relief was for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law to prohibit the LAPD from violating plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to protest. The second claim established an Arrest Class, composed of those protesters who were arrested in what plaintiffs called a violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The third claim established a Direct Force Class, composed of individuals who had been shot with rubber bullets or hit with batons. Plaintiffs said this constituted violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The fourth claim established an Infraction Class, made up of people who had been "charged with infractions, arrested and taken into custody and not released into the field" in a way plaintiffs said violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On June 24th, the plaintiffs submitted an ex parte proposed emergency restraining order to enjoin the defendants from using projectiles (including rubber bullets) to disperse protestors; using batons against protestors; and detaining people charged solely with infractions for extended periods of time. In support of that motion, they submitted declarations by several of the plaintiffs which corroborated the allegations made in the complaint. Six days later, defendants issued a response to that motion, arguing that plaintiffs did not meet their burden for getting a temporary restraining order (TRO). Defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, that they did not demonstrate that they would suffer irreparable harm absent the TRO, and that the balance of equities was not in their favor. On July 14, the court denied the TRO on the grounds that the plaintiffs had not shown that they would suffer irreparable harm without it. The court did not foreclose the opportunity of a preliminary injunction, however. The parties requested to engage in alternative dispute resolution on September 3, 2020. The Court subsequently referred the case to the court mediation panel for mediation. The parties selected Richard T. Copeland to serve as mediator. The Court set a deadline of September 20, 2021 for settlement negotiations and set a jury trial for April 26, 2020. The plaintiffs filed another motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction on April 13, 2021. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Los Angeles Police Department from using 40 mm and 37 mm projectiles on protestors. The plaintiffs alleged that, despite the defendants promises to the court to refrain from using excessive force, the projectiles were continually fired upon non-violent protestors at extremely close range. The court granted the TRO on April 19. Judge Marshall founds that the plaintiffs were likely to exceed on their Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, given that the defendants fired the projectiles at a much closer range than is recommended. Additionally, Judge Marshall found that the plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm because the plaintiffs planned to continue organizing demonstrations, at which the defendants could likely repeat their use of excessive force. The court denied the defendants' subsequent motion to dissolve the TRO, but modified it to permit officers who completed required training to use projectile launchers after giving a warning to disperse. On May 10, the court granted the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction for the same order. As of May 24, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: This complaint arose out of nationwide protests against police brutality following the killing of George Floyd. The complaint alleged that LAPD unlawfully arrested thousands of peaceful protesters, used excessive force, and violated protesters' First Amendment rights. In addition, the complaint alleged that the police were also in violation of two settlement agreements they had already struck.


On September 29, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the City of Gallup, New Mexico in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The D.O.J. alleged that the city engaged in a pattern or practice of intentional employment discrimination against American Indians in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint specifically alleged that the City of Gallup, including the City's Police, Fire, Solid Waste, and Utilities Department excluded qualified American Indians from the City’s workforce by: (1) failing or refusing to recruit and hire American Indians on the same basis as whites and Hispanics; and (2) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to correct the present effects of the discriminatory policies and practices. The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief. On October 27, 2004, the district court entered a consent decree ordering that: (1) American Indians were not to be subjected to discrimination on the basis of race in recruitment or hiring for City employment in violation of Title VII; (2) the City adopt and maintains policies and procedures that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race in discrimination in employment, including recruitment and hiring; (3) individuals who complain of race discrimination in employment were not to be retaliated against because of such complaints; and (4) the City provide monetary relief and/or priority hiring with retroactive seniority to claimants who from January 1, 1997 to the date of entry of the Decree, were denied employment with the City due to the claimant's race. In August 2009, Gallup's motion to dismiss and terminate the consent decree was granted, concluding the case.

Summary: In 2004, the Department of Justice sued the City of Gallup, New Mexico in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico for discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices against American Indians under Title VII. The court entered a consent decree ordering that the city cease such practices, establish policies to prevent future discrimination, and provide monetary relief, priority hiring, and retroactive seniority to those affected. The case concluded in August 2009 with the termination of the consent decree.


In this challenge to President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order banning admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, two lawful permanent residents of the U.S. were detained at Los Angeles International Airport on Jan. 28. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, on Jan. 29, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to allow them entry into the U.S. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California; it was assigned to Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. Later on the day of filing, Jan. 29, the plaintiffs were released from detention, mooting their original request for a writ of habeas corpus and their ex parte application for a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs filed an amended petition and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint includes individual plaintiffs detained at the airport, as well as organizations seeking to provide them with legal counsel but unable to do so. It alleges violations of Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act. The plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on Feb. 1 regarding practices pursuant to the executive order that target Muslims. A series of declarations were also filed in support of the application, but none of these documents are currently publicly available. On Feb. 2, the case was reassigned to Judge S. James Otero. On Feb. 3, the plaintiffs withdrew the temporary restraining order motion because LAX was no longer detaining individuals. However, the complaint sought for the court to declare portions of the executive order unlawful. In light of that, the court ordered the plaintiffs to submit a brief indicating why the action was not moot. The plaintiffs did so on Feb. 7., and on Feb. 8, defendants filed a response. On Feb. 17, plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case, presumably in light of the government's announcement that it was planning to rescind the Executive Order and replace it with a different version (and the nationwide injunction against operation of the Order, entered in Washington v. Trump. The court in ordered this case dismissed on Feb. 28. Documents pertaining to the dismissal are not currently available. The case is now closed.

Summary: In this challenge to President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order banning admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, two lawful permanent residents of the U.S. were detained at Los Angeles International Airport on Jan. 28. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, on Jan. 29, they filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order to allow them entry into the U.S. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California; it was assigned to Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. Later on the day of filing, Jan. 29, the plaintiffs were released from detention, mooting their original petition for writ of habeas corpus and ex parte application for a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs filed an amended petition and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint includes individual plaintiffs detained at the airport, as well as organizations seeking to provide them with legal counsel but unable to do so. It alleges violations of Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act. The plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order on Feb. 1 regarding practices pursuant to the executive order that target Muslims. A series of declarations were also filed in support of the application, but none of these documents are currently publicly available. On Feb. 2, the case was reassigned to Judge S. James Otero. On Feb. 3, the plaintiffs withdrew the temporary restraining order motion because LAX was no longer detaining individuals. However, the complaint sought for the court to declare portions of the executive order unlawful. On Feb. 17, plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case, presumably in light of the government's announcement that it was planning to rescind the Executive Order and replace it with a different version (and the nationwide injunction against operation of the Order, entered in Washington v. Trump. The case is now closed.


On May 9, 2005, an undocumented immigrant detained in the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF) filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging his conditions of confinement. SDCF was a contract detention facility in Otay Mesa, California operated by Corrections Corporation of America, Inc. It housed civil immigration detainees in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At first, the Court (Judge Dana M. Sabraw) summarily dismissed the complaint, but the plaintiff was granted leave to amend it. Eventually, attorneys with the ACLU's National Prison Project and Immigrants' Rights Project, the ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties, and private firms agreed to represent the plaintiff. A Second Amended Complaint was filed in February, 2007 on behalf of the original plaintiff, several newly named individual plaintiffs, and a proposed class of over 1,000 immigrants detained at SDCF. ICE, the Corrections Corporation of America, and several of their respective agents were named as defendants. The Second Amended Complaint alleged unconstitutional and inhumane conditions which violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, including: severe overcrowding (use of triple-celling); denial of adequate shelter, reasonable safety, and basic human needs; exposure to respiratory and other infections; poor access to medical, mental health, and dental services; denial of exercise and dayroom space; and unsanitary shower and toilet facilities. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On June 21, 2007, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motions to dismiss. Claims of two named plaintiffs were dismissed as moot, as they had already been deported. The claims of the other three plaintiffs survived. Judge Sabraw certified the case as a class action on behalf of immigrants detained at SDCF, over the objections and motions to reconsider by defendants. In her order denying reconsideration dated October 29, 2007, Judge Sabraw noted that the defendants "continue to assert triple celling is not unconstitutional, and continue to engage in other allegedly unconstitutional practices such as housing detainees in the common day room." Given those facts, the Court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing and could pursue injunctive relief as a class. On June 19, 2008, the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement with the court. On July 11, 2008, the district court administratively closed the case, and on August 20, 2008, the court approved the settlement. Some members of the plaintiff class appealed the settlement, and on December 3, 2008, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed that:

SDCF's population would not exceed its design capacity; and

The defendants would provide information about cell assignments to the plaintiffs.

The settlement expired on January 28, 2009. On that day, the parties filed a joint motion for dismissal, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On May 9, 2005, an undocumented immigrant detained in the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF) filed a lawsuit challenging his conditions of confinement. On June 19, 2008, the parties filed a proposed settlement with the court, and on August 20, 2008, the court approved the settlement. Some members of the plaintiff class appealed the settlement, and on December 3, 2008, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. On January 28, 2009, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice after the settlement expired.


On 09/27/2000, three prisoners in New York state prisons, filing pro se, sued officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") and prison ministerial program coordinators. Professing to be Shiite Muslims, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in that the defendants failed to provide them religious accommodations separate from those provided for Sunni Muslim prisoners. Their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, sought class-action status for the case. On September 27, 2000, an unpublished order of District Judge Michael B. Mukasey observed that the complaint set out conclusions rather than factual specifics. Judge Mukasey directed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to include specific allegations of how their religious freedom was burdened and what alternate means of worship the defendants should provide, so that the allegations would enable the defendants to mount an intelligent defense. On November 17, 2000, the pro se plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. It sought a total of $500,000 in compensatory damages and injunctive relief. The relief would require the defendants to provide Shi'a prisoners a separate prayer area and access for Shi'a volunteers to assist in worship and religious study. Part of their complaint alleged that the DOCS religious program serving Islamic prisoners was administered by an openly hostile Sunni imam provided by DOCS. The judge held an initial case management conference on June 7, 2001, with the plaintiffs appearing by telephone. Defendants' counsel advised that the case may be moot, in view of changes DOCS was making in response to a recent ruling in state court case, Cancel v. Goord, 717 N.Y.S.2d 610 (N. Y. App. Div. 2000). Defendants stated that they would add measures designed to secure the First Amendment rights of Shiite prisoners, but they disagreed with plaintiffs that separate services were constitutionally mandated. The unresolved dispute prompted the court to direct the parties to proceed to discovery. On August 13, 2001, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, challenging the adequacy of the DOCS programs for Shiite prisoners and seeking an injunction requiring defendants to establish a separate religious program for Shiite prisoners. District Judge Gerard E. Lynch denied the plaintiffs' motion on January 3, 2002, in Pugh v. Goord, 184 F.3d 326 (S.D. N.Y. 2002). The judge observed that DOCS' protocol formed the basis of the constitutional claims. Judge Lynch reviewed the measures DOCS had taken in August 2001 (post-Cancel v. Goord) to improve protections of Shiite prisoners’ rights. He adjudged these measures reasonable, ruling that establishing separate services for Shi'a and Sunni prisoners was not constitutionally required, in view of administrative and security burdens stemming from separate services. The defendants also had taken steps to address the alleged conduct of the imam. Plaintiffs could not, by this lawsuit, require the defendants to do more to discipline or control him, according to the court, since the plaintiffs had not exhausted available administrative remedies (as required by a part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, before bringing a § 1983 action with respect to prison conditions). In denying the motion for preliminary injunction, the judge ruled that plaintiffs' case would be dismissed, as well, since his decision considered all information relevant to plaintiffs' central goal of separate services. Private counsel then entered on behalf of the plaintiffs and, on March 15, 2002, requested that the district judge vacate his order of dismissal. The request was accompanied by extensive discussion of Shiite-Sunni differences, DOCS practices, and alleged discrimination against Shiites in other DOCS facilities; however, Judge Lynch denied the plaintiffs' request on October 10, 2002. His unpublished order adhered to his earlier finding that DOCS had set forth reasonable justifications for refusing to provide separate opportunities for congregate worship. The judge also declined to consider a new argument that defendants' conduct violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), since that claim had not been made previously. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. There, on September 24, 2003, a panel of the court ruled that Judge Lynch had erred by dismissing the case entirely without first providing notice to the parties, who at that point only had reason to expect a ruling on the pending motion for a preliminary injunction. The appellate court did not address the merits of plaintiffs' claims. The panel did note that the plaintiffs, on remand, would have an opportunity to amend their complaint, if they chose. Pugh v. Goord, 345 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2003) (Circuit Judges Richard C. Wesley, Guido Calabresi, and Ellsworth Alfred Van Graafeiland). On January 18, 2004, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. (By this time, one plaintiff had been released from prison.) The complaint now set out in detail what the plaintiffs contended were substantial religious differences between Shiite and Sunni Muslim beliefs and practices. It asserted that DOCS provisions for Islamic prisoners failed to adequately respect these differences, and noted that DOCS-provided Sunni religious leaders had denigrated Shiite beliefs in prison sessions. Nonparty co-conspirators were named in the complaint and were alleged to have conspired with certain of the named defendants (past and present Islamic ministerial program coordinators) to make an extremist form of Sunni Islam the official version of Islam within DOCS facilities and to deny Shiite prisoners free exercise of religion and equal protection of the laws. The complaint noted that the prisons the defendants operated provided separate religious accommodations for eight denominations of Christian religious adherents and three variants of Islamic religious beliefs, but not for Shiites. Alleged violations of plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights by the defendants included their (1) imposing of an unjustified substantial burden on plaintiffs' religious exercise, contrary to 42 U.S.C. § 2000-cc (the "RLUIPA"); (2) denial of plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment guaranteeing the free exercise of religion, precluding the official establishment of a religion, and providing for equal protection of law; (3) conspiracy to deny in violation of 42 U.S.C § 1985, and failure to prevent a conspiracy to deny in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986, these First and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and (4) violation of the rights to free exercise of religion provided by the New York constitution and statutes. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory, nominal and punitive damages, and an award of attorney's fees and costs. On September 15, 2004, the case was reassigned to District Judge Kenneth M. Karas. In the following months, discovery ensued, as did a challenge to the constitutionality of the RLUIPA. The challenge resulted, on January 19, 2006, in the United States filing a motion to intervene in defense of the constitutionality of that statute. The motion was granted on May 1, 2006, without opposition. On April 5, 2006, the plaintiffs filed for summary judgment. They later supplemented their motion on November 7 and 13, 2007. On September 4, 2007, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard J. Sullivan, and oral arguments were scheduled for February 13, 2008. On August 1,2008, the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was granted and denied in part. The judgement granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to finding the now released plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief as moot, and ruled in favor of the defendants with regard to the plaintiff's claim that a successful claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) could include monetary damages. The defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied in all other respects. 571 F.Supp.2d 477. On August 15, 2008, defendants appealed, on September 3, 2008, the plaintiffs cross-appealed. A status conference was held on October 31, 2008. As a result of that meeting, the court ordered that the parties submit a joint status letter by November 21, 2008, informing the court of the status of their settlement negotiations; this deadline was extended until January 9, 2009. On January 29, 2009, the parties signed a settlement agreement and the plaintiffs dropped their claims against the defendants. The settlement agreement awarded damages of $6,000 total to the plaintiffs. It also created a policy for New York State Department of Correctional Services requiring that for three years after the agreement is signed, correctional facilities provide Shi’a services, including providing volunteer facilitators and a Shi’a imam. The parties agreed that once the three years passed, if the New York State Department of Correctional Services chose to end the program, they would need to notify the plaintiffs within sixty days. The agreed-upon services were conditional upon at least five people being present at the service, including the imam. Current inmates would be able to opt into the service within sixty days of the program being rolled out, and incoming inmates would be able to also opt-in to the services within sixty days of beginning their sentence. The case was closed and inactive as of July 1, 2009.

Summary: In July 2000, three prisoners in New York state prisons, filing pro se, sued officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") and prison ministerial program coordinators for violating their First and Fourteenth Amendments by not providing religious accommodations for Shiite Muslims. In July 2009, a settlement agreement was reached that awarded $6,000 in damages to two of the plaintiffs and created accommodations for incarcerated Shiite Muslims for, at minimum, January 2009-January 2012.


On June 14, 2004, individuals and families potentially eligible for food stamps in New York City filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York under 7 U.S.C. § 2020 and 7 C.F.R. §273.2. The defendants to the lawsuit were the New York Department of Social Services and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Urban Justice Center, Welfare Law Center and the New York Legal Assistance Group, asked the court to permanently enjoin the defendants from (1) failing to provide food stamps to eligible families within the federally-mandated time frames, (2) deterring needy families from applying for food stamps, (3) failing to provide expedited food stamps for eligible families within the federally-mandated time frames, and to (4) identify all parties unlawfully deterred and provide them with benefits. The plaintiffs also asked the to court to enter declarations stating the failures of the defendants' policies. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants have practices and policies in place that discourage, deter, and event eligible families from filing applications for Food Stamps. The plaintiffs also alleged that the state defendants failed to adequately oversee the city defendant's administration of Food Stamps. Two additional individuals filed, and were granted, motions to intervene on July 14, 2005. The class was certified on March 3, 2008. The District Court approved a settlement in 2008. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants will: (1) screen all Food Stamp applications submitted to Food Stamp Centers for eligibility for expedited processing; and (2) provide Food Stamps to eligible households within five days if eligible for expedited food stamp processing, and within thirty days if otherwise eligible, unless the delay was caused by the household. OTDA must supervise The New York Department of Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services's (HRA) implementation of the federal timeliness requirements. The original settlement did not include cost of attorney fees. The parties disputed the cost of attorney fees in court for the next four years, until a settlement was reached where the plaintiffs were rewarded $65,000 in attorney fees in 2012.

Summary: In 2004, this federal lawsuit was filed by New Yorkers alleging a failure to timely provide food stamps to eligible applicants at HRA's Non-Cash Assistance Food Stamp Centers. The District Court approved a settlement in 2008. Under the terms of the settlement, the New York Department of Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services will: (1) screen all Food Stamp applications submitted to NCA Food Stamp Centers for eligibility for expedited processing; and (2) provide Food Stamps to eligible households within five days if eligible for expedited food stamp processing, and within thirty days if otherwise eligible, unless the delay was caused by the household. Plaintiffs were also rewarded $65,000 in attorney fees.


On November 30, 2016, a male prisoner and a transgender female prisoner in the Lincoln Correctional Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The court granted the plaintiff’s motions to file in forma pauperis on December 29, 2016, allowing the plaintiffs to pay reduced court fees. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint suing employees of the Lincoln Correctional Center in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, filing pro se and later appointed counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiffs alleged that the employees at the Correctional Center interfered with their right to marry. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants denied the plaintiffs permission to marry four times, denied the male plaintiff’s request for notary services for an affidavit required for a marriage license, and separated the plaintiffs until the male plaintiff was transferred to Nebraska State Penitentiary. Before he was appointed counsel, the male plaintiff moved for temporary restraining orders on December 27, 2016 and January 3, 2017. Judge Richard G. Kopf denied the first motion and stayed the second until the defendants responded to the complaint. Defendants moved for to dismiss on March 29, 2017. All pending motions were stayed on March 31, 2017, when the court appointed counsel for the plaintiffs. The court set his fees at $1,000 upon accepting the case, $1,000 upon the entry of judgment and reasonable fees to be paid out of the Federal Practice Fund. The case was removed from the pro se docket and randomly assigned to Judge Robert F. Rossiter. After several extensions, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 17th, 2017. On January 23, 2018, defendants moved to consolidate the case with docket 4:18-CV-3011 because both cases involved inmates incarcerated in different facilities that wish to have the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services facilitate their marriage. Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied the motion on March 23, 2018 because of factual differences in the cases. After several extensions and party substitutions due to personnel changes in the Nebraska Department of Corrections, the transgender prisoner reached a settlement agreement with defendants. The State of Nebraska agreed to pay the transgender prisoner $400. The transgender prisoner's voluntary motion to dismiss was granted on January 17, 2019. Court-appointed counsel was dismissed and paid the $1,000 remainder of his stipulated fee as well as $500 for reasonable expenses. The male plaintiff objected to the transgender prisoner's settlement and voluntary dismissal of her claims and requested appointment of replacement counsel. Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied both requests on February 14, 2019. The judge declined to appoint counsel because the plaintiff might no longer have a claim asserting a constitutional right to marriage if the transgender prisoner no longer wished to marry him. The male plaintiff also received a $75,000 settlement in 2014; this source of revenue had not been disclosed in his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. The male plaintiff was directed to continue pro se. On February 12, 2019, the male plaintiff filed an objection to the dismissal filed by his former co-plaintiff, the transgender female prisoner. The male prisoner asserted that the female prisoner's counsel misrepresented her wishes. Two days later, Magistrate Judge Zwart denied his motion on the grounds that he lacked standing to challenge the dismissal of the female prisoner's case. Both the male plaintiff and the defendants filed motions for summary judgment on March 14, 2019. Additionally, the male prisoner filed a motion for appointment of counsel, which was denied by Magistrate Judge Zwart in a July 9, 2019 opinion. 2019 WL 3006966. After a conference with Magistrate Judge Zwart in August 2019, the defendants filed another motion for summary jugdment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). On April 10, 2020 Judge Rossiter granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, and the case was dismissed without prejudice. 2020 WL 1860954. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2016, a male prisoner and a transgender prisoner filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs alleged that employees of the Lincoln Correctional Center interfered with their right to marry, violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2019, the transgender prisoner reached a settlement with the State of Nebraska and court appointed counsel was dismissed. The male prisoner's request for replacement counsel was denied. The female transgender prisoner filed a voluntary motion to dismiss, which the male prisoner objected to. Magistrate Judge Cheryl R. Zwart denied the male prisoner's objection due to lack of standing. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in August 2019, and Judge Robert F. Rossiter granted the defendants motion because of the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Judge Rossiter dismissed the case without prejudice.


On February 22, 2012, a college student group (University of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Americans for Liberty, UC YAL) filed a lawsuit against University of Cincinnati in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Earlier that month, UC YAL initiated on-campus signature gathering in order to put a certain amendment on the ballot. The process was delayed due to the University's policies, which subjected on-campus speech to a prior notice and permit scheme, and designated limited space for expressive activities. UC YAL, represented by public interest attorneys, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. It claimed that the University's speech policies violated its First Amendment rights. UC YAL further claimed that the University's policies were unconstitutionally vague and subject to arbitrary enforcement. On June 12, 2012, the District Court (Judge Timothy S. Black) granted in part UC YAL's motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the University from enforcing certain notice and location requirements of its free speech policies as applied to students, while denying the University's motion for summary judgment. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Americans for Liberty v. Williams, 2012 WL 2160969 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2012). On the same day, UC YAL filed its second amended complaint. The University revised relevant part of its policies subsequently. On August 22, 2012, Judge Black granted a University's employee's motion to dismiss the claims against her in her individual capacity, for UC YAL failed to bring a plausible claim for relief. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Americans for Liberty v. Williams, 2012 WL 3637315 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2012). On the same day, Judge Black granted UC YAL's unopposed motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent one. Univ. of Cincinnati Chapter of Young Americans for Liberty v. Williams, 2012 WL 3636932 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 2012). The Court also found the revised policies were in accordance with the preliminary injunction order. On October 1, 2012, the parties settled the rest of the lawsuit and filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case, with the Court retaining jurisdiction over the case for the purpose of enforcing the settlement. The terms of this settlement do not appear to have been made public. This ended the suit.

Summary: On February 22, 2012, the University of Cincinnati Chapter of the Young Americans for Liberty (UC YAL), a student group, filed a lawsuit against University of Cincinnati in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. It claimed that the University's expressive speech policies, which contained prior notice, permit and location requirements, violated its First Amendment rights. On June 12, 2012, the District Court granted in part UC YAL's motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the University from enforcing its notice and location requirements of its free speech policies as applied to students. On the same day, UC YAL filed its second amended complaint. On August 22, 2012, Judge Black granted UC YAL's unopposed motion to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent one. On October 1, 2012, the parties settled the rest of the lawsuit and filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case. This ended the suit.


On July, 8, 2002, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, service providers harassed Hispanic borrowers and engaged in abusive debt collection services. The complaint asked the court for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant entered the subprime credit card market and finalized agreements with four service providers to market its subprime credit cards without ensuring that the service providers complied with fair lending laws. These allegations were discovered during routine compliance examinations completed by the Office of Thrift Supervision on June 15, 1998 and May 17, 1999. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on July 18, 2002 that was signed by the court (Judge Gershon) on July 25, 2002. Under the consent order, the defendant is permanently enjoined from engaging in any act or practice that violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or Regulation B and agrees to practice lending standards in compliance of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B. Both parties filed a motion for a settlement extension of ninety days on June 24, 2005, which was signed by the court (Judge Gershon) on July 8, 2005.

Summary: On July, 8, 2002, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant entered the subprime credit card market and finalized agreements with four service providers to market its subprime credit cards without ensuring that the service providers complied with fair lending laws. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on July 18, 2002 that was signed by the court (Judge Gershon) on July 25, 2002. Under the consent order, the defendant is permanently enjoined from engaging in any act or practice that violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or Regulation B and agrees to practice lending standards in compliance of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B.


On November 1, 2013, female inmates housed at the all-women Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Pittsfield Township, Michigan, sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) over its strip-search policies. Beginning in 2009, MDOC required each prisoner at Huron Valley to sit on a chair and spread her labia to allow female corrections officers to check her vaginal cavity for contraband after returning from off-site visits and after meeting with anyone during direct-contact visits. The plaintiffs alleged that the chairs were improperly sanitized, and that prisoners weren’t able to properly sanitize their hands before touching their genitals, exposing them to a heightened risk of contracting diseases through contact with the bodily fluids of other prisoners. They further alleged that the searches were carried out in view of other prisoners and male corrections officials. The plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. §1983. They argued that by requiring strip searches in unsanitary conditions and in view of other prisoners and male corrections officials, MDOC was deliberately indifferent to the health, safety, privacy and bodily integrity of inmates, in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for class certification to represent other prisoners who are, were, or will be confined at Huron Valley and who have been or may be subjected to spread-labia search. They further asked the court to: declare the spread-labia search technique unconstitutional; issue a permanent injunction requiring Huron Valley correctional staff to stop performing such searches; issue an injunction requiring Huron Valley to provide medical and mental health care to address ongoing harm being suffered by the plaintiffs, including mental anguish, trauma, and infections caused by the unsanitary conditions; award damages to the plaintiffs for harm suffered, including punitive damages where appropriate; and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. On May 1, 2015, the court granted in part and denied in part MDOC’s motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. It also found that, because the warden had taken reasonable steps to avert the risks associated with the spread-labia search procedure (conducting an inquiry, taking action to make it more sanitary, and eventually ending it as a routine procedure in 2011), correctional staff had not violated the Eighth Amendment. However, the court found that if the spread-labia searches were carried out under unsanitary conditions with other prisoners and male corrections officials watching, then the prison may have violated the prisoners’ Fourth Amendment right to privacy. The court further found that because the plaintiffs had also alleged that the spread-labia search was still being carried out, even if it was no longer officially a routine procedure, the plaintiffs could be entitled to prospective injunctive relief prohibiting corrections officials from continuing the practice. This meant that the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment claim was sufficiently strong to survive MDOC’s motion to dismiss. On March 9, 2016, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the court’s denial of qualified immunity to the prison’s warden, and dismissed MDOC’s appeal of the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for prospective injunctive relief. 643 Fed. App’x 526. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on August 11, 2016, but the definition of their proposed class changed multiple times throughout the proceedings. In an effort to ensure the class was ascertainable, the plaintiffs proposed in their reply brief the following class definition: “current and former women incarcerated at WHVCF since 2010 who were eligible for offsite trips and contact visits and were thus, pursuant to the practice of WHVCF subject to the ‘chair portion’ of Defendants’ strip searches.” During oral argument, the plaintiffs proposed two subclasses: (1) women who were currently or had formerly been incarcerated at the relevant facility and were subject to the chair portion of the strip search in view of other people sometime between November 1, 2010 and November 1, 2013; (2) women who were currently or had formerly been incarcerated at the relevant facility and were subject to the chair portion of the strip search under unsanitary or unhygienic conditions between November 1, 2010 and December 16, 2011. The plaintiffs asserted that individuals in both subclasses had suffered compensable injuries. In its decision on December 22, 2016, the court rejected the motion for certification as to both proposed subclasses. As to the unsanitary conditions subclass, the court denied certification because the Sixth Circuit had affirmed that MDOC was protected by qualified immunity. As to the subclass of inmates subjected to search in public, the court found that the class was ascertainable, but did not meet the adequacy of representation, numerosity, and typicality requirements for class certification. 2016 WL 7409953. The parties were referred to Magistrate Judge Steven Whalen for a settlement conference on July 19, 2017. The court denied motions for summary judgment from both parties on August 24, 2018. On September 16, 2019, the court again denied class certification, and scheduled a bench trial (named plaintiffs only) for November 6, 2019. On October 17, 2019 the plaintiffs, without explanation, dismissed their claims. The court closed the case on October 18, 2019.

Summary: On November 1, 2013, female inmates housed at the Huron Valley Correctional Facility sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. They alleged that an invasive and public strip search technique violated their constitutional rights. After the court dismissed the bulk of the plaintiffs’ claims, the plaintiffs dismissed the remainder of their claims on October 17, 2019.


On November 24, 1993, inmates who adhered to Native American religion filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs challenged the Alabama Department of Correction's (DOC) policies restricting Native American religious practices, including religious objects, ceremonial grounds, hair length, and sweat lodge ceremonies. The plaintiffs alleged that their First Amendment rights and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act were violated by the DOC's policies. Initially, the parties engaged in extensive discovery and settlement negotiations. The parties reached a stipulation in 1998 encompassing all of the plaintiffs’ claims other than the sweat-lodge claim and the hair-length claim. The DOC agreed to comply with new policies regarding ceremonial days, the ceremonial grounds, medicine bags, feathers, moccasins, prayer pipes, drums, and other religious items. In addition, the DOC agreed to provide training for correctional officers on inspection procedures and procedures for allowing inmates to retain their religious items upon transfer. On September 10, 1999, Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody issued a recommendation to approve the parties’ stipulation. The magistrate judge issued a separate recommendation regarding the sweat-lodge and hair-length claims and recommended the district court find in favor of the DOC on those claims. On June 12, 2000, the district court adopted both recommendations. The court retained jurisdiction over the matter for one year, while the DOC changed their policies and complied with the stipulation. The plaintiffs appealed the order as far as it entered judgment in favor of the DOC on the sweat-lodge and hair-length claims. Meanwhile, in October 2000, a Muslim inmate filed a pro se “writ of mandamus” alleging that Muslim inmates were also being discriminated against. The district court treated the pleading as petition for intervention and denied the petition on October 31, 2000. The court stated the inmate could file a separate lawsuit in the Northern District of Alabama where his prison was located. While the case was on appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Congress responded to the Supreme Court's partial invalidation of the RFRA (in the <i>City of Boerne</i> case) by enacting the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Therefore, on June 12, 2001, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. On October 1, 2001, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to include claims under RLUIPA, which they did on October 11, 2001. The parties engaged in a brief period of additional discovery. On March 14, 2003, Magistrate Judge again recommended a grant of summary judgment on the hair-length claim, but denied summary judgment on the sweat-lodge claim. Accordingly, on September 29, 2003, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on their hair-length restriction claim. The plaintiffs appealed. In December 2004, the DOC changed its policy and to permit inmates who declare Native American spirituality as their religion to participate in sweat lodge ceremonies four times a year. As a result, on September 14, 2006, the district court dismissed the sweat-lodge claims—the plaintiffs’ last remaining claim—as moot. It was undisputed that, since December 2004, sweat lodge ceremonies had been held repeatedly pursuant to the new policy. 2006 WL 2642388 (M.D.Ala., Sep. 14, 2006). The plaintiffs also appealed this order. As an aside, five prisoners filed a motion for injunctive relief and contempt in 2007 because when they were transferred out of Alabama to a Louisiana prison, Louisiana did not allow them to practice their Native American religion. The magistrate judge recommended that their motion be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, and the district court adopted that recommendation on April 6, 2007. 2007 WL 1063524 (M.D.Ala., Apr. 06, 2007). Also, in 2007, an Alabama inmate tried to intervene in the case requesting an emergency restraining order. However, on October 5, 2007, the district court denied the motion because the case was closed according to the September 13, 2006, order dismissing the plaintiffs’ final claim. 2007 WL 2926205 (M.D.Ala., Oct. 05, 2007). But the case did not stay closed. On October 19, 2007, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the sweat-lodge claims, but reversed the district court’s dismissal of the hair-length claims. The Eleventh Circuit held, per curiam, that 1) the inmate's sweat-lodge claims were moot; 2) the inmates were not entitled to monetary relief on their sweat-lodge claims; and 3) there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DOC's total ban on long hair was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling governmental interests of security, discipline, hygiene, and safety, which precluded summary judgment. The Court noted that the evidentiary record relating to the hair-length claims is over ten years old and that in the intervening time, prison staffing and administration, prison safety and security, and the prison population in Alabama had changed. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case to the district court for a full evidentiary hearing and bench trial, following which the district court would make detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 251 F. App'x 665 (11th Cir. 2007). On remand, Magistrate Judge Coody held an evidentiary hearing and a bench trial. Afterward, Magistrate Judge recommended judgment in favor of the DOC on the hair-length claims on July 11, 2011. 2011 WL 7477105 (M.D.Ala., July 11, 2011). On March 8, 2012, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations over the plaintiffs' objections. 2012 WL 777274 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2012). Final judgment was entered in favor of the DOC. The plaintiffs appealed, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed on July 26, 2013. 723 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. On January 26, 2015, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Holt v. Hobbs. 135 S. Ct. 1173 (2015). On remand, the Eleventh Circuit considered the case in light of Holt v. Hobbs, but still ended up affirming the district court’s judgment in favor of the defendants on the hair-length claim. The policy furthered compelling interests and that the policy was the least restrict means of furthering those compelling interests. 796 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2015). Again, the plaintiffs petitioned for certiorari. On February 4, 2016, the petition for certiorari was docketed. On May 3, 2016, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. As of April 2019, there is no further docket activity and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 1993, inmates who adhered to Native American religion filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs challenged the Alabama Department of Correction's (DOC) policies restricting Native American religious practices in violation of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In 1998, the parties settled all claims, except for the hair-length and sweat-lodge claims. Ultimately, the DOC voluntarily changed its policy on sweat lodges and the court granted judgment in favor of the DOC on the hair-length claim, despite many rounds of appeals. On hair-length claim, the court ultimately found for the DOC.


On June 22, 2018, Innovation Law Lab and an immigration detainee at Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Sheridan filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DSHS), the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Acting Field Office Director for the Seattle office of ICE, the Attorney General of the United States, Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the Warden of FDC Sheridan in their official capacities. They filed their claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and also included a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the detainees at Sheridan were unlawfully denied their rights under the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Oregon and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought (1) a declaration that the defendants were in violation of the APA, INA, and constitutional law; (2) that the detainees be released unless they receive adequate attorney access; (3) installation of telephones in the detainee’s units; and (4) attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed Innovation Lab's attorneys had been repeatedly denied access to the detainees at Sheridan, which prevented it from communicating with clients or conducting intake interviews and “know-your-rights” trainings. Additionally, prisoners lacked telephone access or any other meaningful forms of communication with the outside world. The plaintiffs' complaint was accompanied by a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) requesting immediate access to prisoners and installation of telephone lines. The District Judge issued an order on June 25, 2018 for a TRO of 28 days, which instructed the defendants to provide adequate access to counsel for detainees at Sheridan and to install telephones in the detainees' units capable of making free calls to legal counsel. Significantly, the judge ordered that detainees could not undergo the asylum interview process until they had received either a know-your-rights training or consulted with legal counsel. Additionally, when detainees' asylum interviews were scheduled, the court required that the Federal Public Defender’s office as well as any representative counsel must be given timely notice of the proceedings. The TRO was extended by seven days until July 30, 2018, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 22, 2018. They argued that the 35-day time period had not been sufficient to give constitutionally adequate counsel to the detainees at Sheridan. The plaintiffs requested continued access to the detainees but no longer requested a suspension of removal proceedings or asylum interviews. The District Judge approved the motion and ordered a preliminary injunction requiring continued adequate access to legal counsel for the detainees. Additionally, detainees would not be transferred outside Oregon without the consent of their counsel or prior leave of the court. On October 5, 2018 the court approved the plaintiffs' motion to amend the preliminary injunction to reduce the number of attorney visitation rooms requested. On December 4, 2018 the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit because no detainees remained at Sheridan. 97% of the detainees had been released to pursue their immigration court proceedings in a non-detained setting after receiving Innovation Law Lab legal counsel. One detainee successfully secured asylum and a final detainee was denied asylum and transferred to to FCI Tacoma while he pursued appellate options. This case is now closed.

Summary: Innovation Law Lab and a detainee at FCI Sheridan successfully received a Temporary Restraining Order and subsequent Preliminary Injunction to mandate detainee's access to legal services and telephones in 2018. Innovation Law Labs, a Portland based legal advocacy group and the detainee sought relief against DSHS, ICE, the Federal Bureau of Prisons, U.S. A.G., and FCI Sheridan. The plaintiffs claimed that Innovation Law Labs' attorneys had been repeatedly denied access to the detainees at Sheridan in violation of the under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and Habeas Corpus.


On July 1, 2008, the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, specifically asking the release of certain records that had previously been requested. The case was assigned to Judge James Robertson. News reports raised the possibility that law enforcement officers were, at least in some circumstances, obtaining cell phone tracking data directly from mobile carriers without obtaining warrants for probable cause from the court. The plaintiffs claimed that on November 29, 2007, they filed FOIA requests with the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys (both part of the DOJ), asking for expedited processing and seeking records about the government's tracking of the location of individuals' mobile phones without first obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. The requests sought all records about defendant's policies, procedures, and practices for obtaining mobile phone location information for law enforcement purposes. They also sought all information on criminal prosecutions of particular individuals who were tracked using mobile phone location data where the government did not secure a prior warrant based on probable cause. Nine months later, plaintiffs claim that defendant never gave them a complete response, failing to reply to administrative appeals, and that DOJ failed to release the records. Plaintiffs sought an order for defendant to immediately process and provide all outstanding requested records; an injunction from defendant's charging plaintiffs processing fees; a declaratory judgment that the ACLU qualifies as a "representative of the news media" for purposes of fee assessments under the FOIA; and an award for plaintiffs' costs and attorneys' fees. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On March 26, 2010, the Court (Judge James Robertson) granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, as to the identified case names and docket numbers of criminal prosecutions of persons who have been convicted or have entered public guilty pleas. The Court, however, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment as to the production of docket information in prosecutions of those who were acquitted or whose cases were dismissed or sealed, and denied their request for disclosure of case names in "draft application" and "template application" documents. ACLU v. Dep't of Justice, 698 F. Supp. 2d 163 (D.D.C. 2010). On September 6, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit issued an opinion. ACLU v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 655 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011). The Court (in an opinion by Judge Merrick Garland) affirmed the district court's order requiring the disclosure of docket information from criminal cases in which the government prosecuted individuals after obtaining a warrant for cell phone data without showing probable cause, and where those individuals were ultimately convicted or entered public guilty pleas. The Court, however, vacated the remainder of the district court's decision and remanded the case for further development of the record and reconsideration. The Court noted that FOIA includes a strong presumption in favor of disclosure. Here, the Court found that the public interest in disclosure outweighed the marginal privacy intrusion that may occur. However, because the lower court drew a distinction between the permissible and impermissible documents in a way that neither side briefed, the case was remanded to develop the record further to see how many cases existed in the different categories and to gain more information about some of them. The Court also noted that, at oral argument, defendant's counsel had suggested that defendant might be able to provide plaintiffs with the data they really want, rather than disclosing the individual documents. The Court said that might be the basis for a settlement, but that the Court could not consider it because it was not raised in the appellate briefs nor in the district court proceedings. The case proceeded after reassignment to Judge Jackson, and in April 2012 the defendant moved for summary judgment, which the Court eventually granted on February 15, 2013. The Court explained the case had been remanded solely for the purpose of determining whether withheld records were from cases that resulted in acquittal or that were dismissed or sealed. 923 F. Supp. 2d 310, 313. The Court's initial grant of summary judgment, that is, had not been overturned--or even criticized--in the appellate opinion. Id. at 314. Subsequent information provided by the defendant to the Court revealed the withheld records were from two cases that resulted in acquittal and four that resulted in dismissal. Id. at 313. These facts, the Court held, did not affect the initial grant of summary judgment, and thus it merited reaffirmation. Id. at 311. Plaintiffs again appealed, arguing disclosure about criminal prosecution is not an invasion of privacy. Thus, plaintiffs contended, defendant could not have demonstrated such a disclosure could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and the district court had therefore erred in granting summary judgment. Oral argument was held February 20, 2014. On August 20, 2014, the Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Kavanaugh, Tatel, and dissenting, Brown) affirmed the district court's judgment. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice on February 27, 2015. 700 F.3d 927. The case is now closed.

Summary: News reports raised the possibility that law enforcement officers were, at least in some circumstances, obtaining cell phone tracking data directly from mobile carriers without obtaining warrants for probable cause from the court. In November 2007, the American Civil Liberties Union filed requests with the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain records related to their practices in this area, which went unanswered. After the ACLU filed a lawsuit, the District Court granted partial summary judgment to both sides, demanding disclosure of some categories of documents and shielding other categories. The Court of Appeals affirmed the part of the judgment which compelled disclosure and remanded the remainder of the opinion for further development of the record. On remand, the Court reaffirmed its grant of summary judgment for the defendant, finding new information disclosed by the defendant did not affect the initial grant. The plaintiffs again appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.


On April 29, 2014, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, the Austin Lawyers Guild, the Prison Justice League, and individual defense attorneys filed this class action lawsuit against Securus Technologies, Inc, the Travis County Sheriff's Office, the Travis County District Attorney's Office, and the Travis County Attorney's Office. The lawsuit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Federal Wiretap Act, and the Texas Wiretap Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the phone and videoconferencing technology provided by Securus Technology, and used by the Sheriff's Department, records confidential attorney-client communications between attorneys and detainees in Travis County Jail and the Travis County Correctional Complex, and that those recordings are disclosed to prosecutors in the Travis County and District Attorneys' Offices. Plaintiffs argue that this amounts to an unreasonable search and therefore violates the Fourth Amendment rights of individual plaintiffs and the Austin Lawyers Guild, and those of inmates, which harms the Prison Justice League. They further argue that defendants' actions violate detainees' Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and Fifth Amendment right of access to the courts, both of which require confidential attorney-client communication, and that these violations have forced plaintiff Prison Justice League to "redirect resources." On February 4, 2015, U.S. Magistrate Judge Mark Lane submitted his report and recommendation on the defendants' motion to dismiss to the District Court (Judge Lee Yeakel). Magistrate Judge Lane recommended that the Travis County Sheriff's Office, Travis County District Attorney's Office, and Travis County Attorney's Office should be dismissed as defendants, and plaintiffs' claim for violation of the right to access the courts under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment should be dismissed. He recommended that defendant Securus Technologies, Inc.'s and defendants Hamilton (Travis County Sheriff), Lehmberg (Travis County DA), and Escamilla (Travis County Attorney)'s Motions to Dismiss plaintiffs' claims for violations of the Federal Wiretap Act and Texas Wiretap Act; unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and denial of effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution should be denied, so that the case would continue on those issues. 2015 WL 10818584. On March 23, 2015, the court ordered the adoption of the report and recommendation. On February 17, 2016, the court issued an Order for Settlement Papers, and the parties signed a settlement agreement on March 10, 2016. The settlement established a procedure to detect and mitigate breaches of confidentiality in privileged attorney-client communications. Specifically, the agreement provides that as soon as any assistant county attorney obtains knowledge of potentially privileged communication, he must immediately stop reviewing it and notify his supervisor. The supervising attorney will then determine if the communication is in fact privileged, and if so, shall disclose the fact of its existence and possession to the defendant's lawyer within two business day and provide all known copies of the communication the defendant's lawyer as soon as possible to the extent that it is appropriate to do so. The settlement further stipulated that these new policies will be published on the County Attorney's website and remain in effect for the duration of Attorney Escamilla's term. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 10, 2016 and a stipulation of dismissal the next day. On March 14, 2016, the case closed.

Summary: The Austin Lawyers Guild, the Prison Justice League, and individual defense attorneys filed a class action lawsuit against Secures Technologies, Inc, the Travis County Sheriff's Office, the Travis County District Attorney's Office, and the Travis County Attorney's Office, alleging that the phone and videoconferencing technology provided by Securus Technology and used by the Sheriff's Department records confidential attorney-client communications and that those recordings are disclosed to prosecutors in the Travis County and District Attorneys' Offices, in violation of the constitutional and statutory rights of detainees in Travis County Jail and the Travis County Correctional Complex. The parties settled on March 10, 2016 in an agreement that established a procedure to detect and mitigate breaches of confidentiality in privileged attorney-client communications.


The Chicago and Minneapolis offices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Sara Lee Corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota on September 26, 2006. The case was assigned to Judge Lawrence Piersol. The complaint, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleged that the Corporation had engaged in racial discrimination against employees. More specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against three black former Sara Lee employees by failing to promote them because of their race. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief for the claimants. The claimants subsequently filed complaints as intervenor plaintiffs on December 12, 2006. In addition to the claims included in the EEOC complaint, the intervenor complaint alleged that the defendant retaliated against the claimants for complaining about the discrimination, the defendant created a hostile work environment, and the defendant constructively discharged the claimants. The intervenor complaint also made claims under South Dakota law. Neither the EEOC nor Sara Lee objected to the intervention, and the court granted intervention on February 6, 2007. On June 29, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint, removing all reference to one of the intervenor plaintiffs because it decided that using public resources to recover this plaintiff’s victim-specific relief would be inappropriate. On November 25, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement and filed a proposed consent decree. Six days later, the court approved the consent decree. The consent decree required Sara Lee to provide African-American employees with the same training and conditions of employment as all its other employees and enjoined Sara Lee from retaliating against employees for asserting their Title VII rights. Sara Lee also had to reform its internal complaint procedures and hiring/promotion procedures, as well as provide anti-discrimination training sessions to its managers and supervisors. To ensure compliance, Sara Lee had to report back to the EEOC annually with a certification of compliance, as well as notify the EEOC of any complaints of race discrimination or retaliation. Additionally, Sara Lee agreed to pay $245,000 in damages, to be distributed among the three claimants. The duration of the consent decree was two years, during which the court retained jurisdiction to enforce its terms. On December 8, 2008, the court dismissed this case with prejudice. The order of dismissal is the final entry in the docket; there is nothing to suggest noncompliance with the consent decree. So, the case presumably closed in December 2010 with the expiration of the consent decree.

Summary: In September 2006, the EEOC filed a complaint against Sara Lee Corporation, alleging racial discrimination. The case ended in a settlement granting injunctive and monetary relief to the claimants.


On December 18, 2006, three female, officer-level, former employees filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all current and former female officers and officer equivalents employed by Willis Holdings Group, Ltd. since 1998. The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, the Human Rights Laws of the State and City of New York, and the New York Administrative Code § 8-107 against Willis Holdings, Ltd. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a permanent injunction prohibiting the company and its employees from engaging in discriminatory practices, back pay and other job benefits, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, claiming that the company had discriminated against them on the basis of sex. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Willis Group knew about the existence of a glass ceiling but did nothing to remedy it, had a pattern of paying female employees substantially less than male employees doing similar work, refused to consider female candidates for promotions, steered more business toward male employees, required females to complete a higher volume of work than similarly situated males, scrutinized females more heavily than similarly situated males, and terminated female employees who brought attention to the discrimination. On September 17, 2007, the Court (Judge Gerard E. Lynch) denied a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs had not met the administrative requirements for maintaining a Title VII lawsuit or alternatively, that the plaintiffs' claims were subject to mandatory arbitration. On July 3, 2008, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint containing additional individual allegations for two of the named plaintiffs, neither of whom stated any individual allegations in the initial complaint. The additional allegations reference discriminatory hiring practices, compensation, promotions, and treatment in the workplace. On November 20, 2008, Judge Lynch granted the defendant's motion to compel arbitration for the individual claims of one of the named plaintiffs and dismissed those claims from the lawsuit, due to a prominent arbitration clause in her employment contract. On October 18, 2011, Judge Lynch filed a preliminary approval order, certifying, for settlement purposes, a proposed class of women employed in Willis Group's New York office in officer or officer-equivalent positions between 2002 and 2007. On December 19, 2011, Judge Lynch approved the consent decree. Willis Group agreed to conduct performance evaluations of all its employees based on observable behavior, set forth in writing the criteria on which compensation decisions are made, post vacancies so that all current employees may apply, investigate all discrimination claims made to Human Resources in a timely manner, and submit any changes in policy to a court-approved monitor. In addition, Willis Group agreed to pay $11,595,030.85 to members of the class. The amount included attorneys' fees.

Summary: In late 2006, three female, officer-level former employees filed a class-action lawsuit against Willis Holdings Group Ltd. for sex discrimination. In 2011, the parties settled. Willis agreed to implement significant measures to prevent discrimination and paid monetary damages to the class.