A private plaintiff brought this case against New Prime, Inc., a trucking company, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri in March 2001. The case was consolidated with a suit brought by the EEOC in August 2001. Two other complainants intervened in this case. The defendant filed several motions to dismiss, which were denied. The defendant also filed several partial motions for judgment on the pleadings, one of which was granted. The defendant also filed several motions for summary judgment, one of which was granted. The case went to a jury trial in September 2003. The jury found for one plaintiff on her Title VII claims and for the defendant on the other plaintiff's claims. The EEOC, an intervenor, and the defendant appealed the district court's judgment, but the appeal was dismissed in July 2004 after the parties reached a settlement. The court entered injunctive relief in December 2003. This included providing a neutral reference for and expunging the employment record of the complainant; conducting sexual harassment training to all employees; issuing yearly reports to the EEOC stating that training was conducted; and posting a notice of employment rights.

Summary: A private plaintiff brought this case against New Prime, Inc., a trucking company, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri in March 2001. The case was consolidated with a suit brought by the EEOC in August 2001. Two other complainants intervened in this case. The case went to a jury trial in September 2003. The jury found for one plaintiff on her Title VII claims and for the defendant on the other plaintiff's claims. The EEOC, an intervenor, and the defendant appealed the district court's judgment, but the appeal was dismissed in July 2004 after the parties reached a settlement. his included providing a neutral reference for and expunging the employment record of the complainant; conducting sexual harassment training to all employees; issuing yearly reports to the EEOC stating that training was conducted; and posting a notice of employment rights.


On September 3, 2008, inmates at the Passaic County Jail (PCJ) filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Passaic County, Passaic County Jail and its various officers, and the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from ACLU - New Jersey, Seton Hall University School of Law's Center for Social Justice, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Passaic County violated their constitutional rights due to the deplorable conditions of confinement at the PCJ. Specifically, the complaint alleged constitutional violations as a result, among others, of overcrowding (the PCJ was designed to hold 896 inmates, but it routinely held more than 1,700 inmates), leading to a lack of privacy, loss of sleep and the threat of inmate violence; unsanitary living conditions; unsafe and inadequate food; inadequate fire detection and alarm systems; use of excessive force by Correction Officers, including the use of dogs for intimidation; restrictions on religious freedom; and (10) retaliation for airing grievances. They also alleged that the DOC was complicit in the violations, as they failed to enforce state regulations on the conditions of confinement against PCJ. On May 27, 2009, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) granted class certification to the plaintiffs and denied the DOC's motion to dismiss the claims. The certified class consists of all persons who were then or would afterwards become incarcerated at the PCJ. Afterwards, the parties exchanged informal discovery and engaged in extensive settlement negotiations. On January 13, 2012, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) entered an order directing notice of settlement between the plaintiffs and the defendants, not including the Commissioner of the DOC. The settlement agreement was to be provided to each inmate at the PCJ, or made otherwise available, to allow the Court scheduled a Fairness Hearing to evaluate the merits of the settlement agreement based. On February 23, 2012, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) entered an order directing notice of settlement between the plaintiffs and the Commissioner of the DOC. The Court similarly ordered that each inmate have the copy or access to the copy of the settlement agreement and other relevant information, and schedule a fairness hearing. On April 24, 2012, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) approved the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendants Passaic County, PCJ and others, not including the Commissioner of the DOC. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case. Under the agreement, the defendants do not admit any liability and the plaintiffs reserved the right to litigate the issue of overcrowding further, if the agreement is not complied with. It has no preclusive effect except as between the parties. The defendants are to comply with various requirements to remedy the violations, including among others, annual use of force training, not putting beds closer than a certain distance from the toilets, conducting population management study if the monthly population exceeds 1022 inmates, install CCTV in most areas of the PCJ. The compliance will be monitored through an independent Monitor, who is entitled to conduct two site inspections annually, and is to submit a report after each site inspection. The parties are under an obligation to try dispute settlement before any judicial enforcement of the agreement, except in the cases of emergency. The agreement is in force for five years from the date of the agreement, which is April 24, 2012, unless compliance by PCJ is achieved before that date. The inmates at PCJ are to have access to the agreement. The defendants also agreed to pay $325,000 in attorney's fees under the agreement. On May 7, 2012, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) approved the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant Commissioner of the DOC, dismissing all claims against the latter with prejudice. The term of the agreement is five years from the date of judicial approval. The agreement does not signify admission of liability by the defendant. The DOC is under an obligation to remove from PCJ all state inmates who received sentences or inmates who received parole revocation, and conduct inspections of the PCJ. The defendant also agreed to pay $25,000 in expert fees. The agreement is to be made available to all the inmates at the PCJ. The case is closed, subject to the reporting by the Monitor.

Summary: On September 3, 2008, inmates at the Passaic County Jail (PCJ) filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Passaic County, Passaic County Jail and its various officers, and the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that Passaic County violated their constitutional rights due to the deplorable conditions of confinement at the PCJ. They also alleged that the DOC was complicit in the violations, as they failed to enforce state regulations on the conditions of confinement against PCJ. The plaintiffs entered into two settlement agreement with the defendants, both approved by the Court. The Passaic County is to remedy the conditions of confinement at the PCJ.


On November 20, 2006, five women of Asian decent filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Oakland Police Department and Richard Valegra, an officer of the City of Oakland Police Department, on behalf of all women of Asian decent who were subject to sexual harassment by defendant Valegra or another Oakland police officer on duty. The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting police officers from engaging in sexual harassment while on duty, a declaratory judgment that the defendant's conduct was a violation of the plaintiffs' rights, compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees, claiming that the police department and defendant Valegra had discriminated against them on the basis of race and sex. Specifically, they each claimed that defendant Valegra had pulled them over for a reason not having to do with any legitimate law enforcement purpose, ordered them to sit in his police vehicle with him, told them they were not free to leave, and proceeded to ask them questions unrelated to any law enforcement purpose, take their phone numbers, touch them, and kiss them. On September 10, 2007, the plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding eleven additional named plaintiffs. On June 16, 2008, the court (Judge Chesney) denied the plaintiffs' request for class certification on the bases that the proposed class was too indistinct and that injunctive relief seemed moot in light of defendant Valegra's discharge from the police department. On June 27, 2008, Judge Chesney dismissed the charges without prejudice in light of an undisclosed settlement agreement negotiated by the parties.

Summary: In late 2006, five women of Asian decent filed a class-action lawsuit against the City of Oakland Police Department and one individual officer. The complaint was later amended to include a total of sixteen plaintiffs. In 2008, the parties settled.


On June 26, 2020, in the midst of widespread racial justice protests challenging police conduct, President Trump signed Executive order 13933, entitled Protecting American Monuments, Memorials, and Statues and Combating Recent Criminal Violence. Days later, Acting Security of Homeland Security Chad Wolf began implementing this Executive Order by deploying federal law enforcement agents – including agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Marshals Service, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection – to Portland as part of “Operation Diligent Valor.” The city of Portland did not invite or consent to the presence of federal law enforcement. The cities of Portland, OR and Oakland, CA brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security on October 14, 2020, challenging the federal government’s new policy that expanded the jurisdiction of federal law enforcement. Plaintiffs asserted that the federal agents deployed during “Operation Diligent Valor” acted beyond the purpose of protecting federal persons or property. The cities, represented by their respective city attorneys and Public Rights Project, brought the suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the actions taken by the defendants were not in accordance with the law, were arbitrary and capricious, and were in excess of federal authority. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Chad Wolf was not legally authorized to hold the position of Acting Secretary of Homeland Security under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Homeland Security Act and therefore any actions he took to enact, enforce, or contribute to the policy must be held unlawful and set aside. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the federal government acted in violation of the Tenth Amendment by commandeering the Portland Police Bureau and interfering with Portland’s police powers as designated to it by the State of Oregon. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim on October 14, 2020. Plaintiffs declined to proceed before a Magistrate Judge and the case was reassigned to Judge Edward M. Chen. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or in the alternative to transfer venue on December 21, 2020. The Court has yet to decide the motion. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 21, 20201 that, for the most part, maintained the core aspects of the original. As of March 7, 2021, the case remains pending before the District Court with the Initial Case Management Conference set for October 7, 2021.

Summary: On October 14, 2020, the cities of Portland, OR and Oakland, CA sued the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice alleging that the federal government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by setting federal law enforcement policy in excess of statutory authority and deploying federal law enforcement agents outside of their jurisdiction during "Operation Diligent Valor" in response to the 2020 racial justice protests. They further alleged that Chad Wolf was not legally authorized to perform the duties and functions of the Secretary of Homeland Security. Finally, the suit alleged that the federal government violated the Tenth Amendment by commandeering the Portland Police Bureau. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. As of March 7, 2021, the case remains pending before the District Court.


On November 4, 2013, Right to Life of Michigan ("Right to Life") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, Right to Life of Michigan contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement violated its sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 13, 2014, the federal Government moved to dismiss the complaint. The Department of Justice argued that Right to Life challenged aspects of the ACA that had been superseded by the 2013 Final Rule, which, the U.S. suggested granted accommodation to eligible non-profit religious organizations. Right to Life therefore, according to the U.S., lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On January 27, 2014, Right to Life amended its complaint to specifically challenge the 2013 Final Rule. Under the new regulation, Right to Life still did not fall within the "religious employer" exception, but did qualify for the accommodation as an "eligible organization." Right to Life challenged this accommodation, arguing that it required them to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections to the regulation, which in turn triggerdd an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs found objectionable. Plaintiffs continued to ask the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On February 3, 2014, the court (Judge Robert J. Jonker) ordered that the amended complaint replace the original complaint rendering the Federal Government's motion to dismiss moot. On February 10, 2014, the Federal Government filed an unopposed motion to stay the proceedings pending the Sixth Circuit's ruling in the consolidated appeals of Catholic Diocese of Nashville and Michigan Catholic Conference. On February 14, 2014, the court (Judge Robert J. Jonker) granted the motion to stay. The court issued another stay on September 10, 2014 pending proposed federal regulations. The stay was lifted on February 17, 2015. On May 13, 2015 the plaintiffs filed a motion for declaratory judgment and on May 21, 2015 defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and entered judgement in favor of the plaintiff on October 21, 2015. The court found that the plaintiff’s claims were identical to the other recent cases in the Sixth Circuit in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff’s kind of challenge to the accommodations under RFRA. See Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Family Services v. Burwell, 807 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2015). This case is now closed.

Summary: On November 4, 2013, Right to Life of Michigan ("Right to Life") filed A U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Southern District of Michigan against the Federal Government seeking the court to grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Citing recent binding Sixth Circuit precedent, the court dismissed the plaintiff's suit and entered judgement for the defendant on October 21, 2015.


This is a lawsuit challenging mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles in Michigan. On November 17, 2010, juvenile prisoners filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the State of Michigan, challenging the state law that prohibited the Michigan Parole Board from considering for parole juveniles who were sentenced to life in prison without parole for first-degree murder. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, asked the court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The state subsequently moved to dismiss this case. On July 15, 2011, the district court (Hon. John Corbett O'Meara) granted, in part, the state's motion to dismiss, holding that all but one of the plaintiffs were barred from action by the statute of limitations. 2011 WL 2788205. The state moved the court for certification of interlocutory appeal to dismiss that final claim while the plaintiffs moved the court to reconsider their holding regarding the statute of limitations. In January of 2012, the Court denied both motions. 2012 WL 75313. On February 1, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include a number of new plaintiffs whose actions were not barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Supreme Court had held in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. On January 30, 2013, the court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, ordering that the plaintiffs should have a fair and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that they are appropriate candidates for parole, and directing the parties to provide briefing on what would constitute a "fair and meaningful" opportunity. 2013 WL 364198. On August 12, 2013, the court defined the scope of the January 30, 2013 order as applying to all persons convicted of first-degree murder in the State of Michigan as juveniles and who were sentenced to life in prison without parole. The state appealed the January 30 order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and requested that the Circuit stay the court's order pending appeal. After two years at the appellate court, on June 20, 2016, Judge Jane Stranch issued an opinion for the Sixth Circuit vacating the district court's orders from January and August of 2013 and remanding the suit to the district level for consideration of several new legal developments. 821 F.3d 763. The Supreme Court's 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012), prohibited sentences of life without parole for juveniles except in very rare and extreme circumstances. The Court later held in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), that the decision in Miller would apply retroactively to juveniles sentenced to life without parole. In addition, Michigan passed new statutes, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25-25a, in response to the Miller decision. The plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint in response to Michigan's new statutes, alleging that the revised parole system was unfair and inequitable. The case was remanded to the district court where Judge O'Meara granted the plaintiff's motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on July 7, 2016 to stop the re-sentencing of juvenile offenders that would occur under Michigan's new laws. The state appealed this decision, and a second appellate decision was issued on July 20, 2016. 2016 WL 4046827. There, the Sixth Circuit (Stranch, Merritt, Bouie Donald, JJ.) reversed the district court's order for a TRO reasoning that the district court was effectively issuing an injunction contrary to the original June 2016 Sixth Circuit opinion. On August 3, 2016, Judge O'Meara denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 2016 WL 4119805. The plaintiffs were seeking to stop prosecutors from re-sentencing juveniles under Michigan's new laws, but Judge O'Meara noted that Miller did not entirely prohibit sentences for life without parole, so states had discretion to determine which rare offenders would continued to be sentenced to life without parole. On February 7, 2017, Judge O'Meara granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the court no longer had jurisdiction over the matter at hand. 2017 WL 492076. Based upon the change in the legal landscape the plaintiffs were to receive individualized sentencing hearings taking the new statute and the plaintiff's age at the time of the alleged crime into account. The court held that this should redound to the plaintiff's benefit and that any claims regarding the constitutionality of the new statute must be brought up at the forthcoming sentencing hearings or under the writ of habeas corpus. A month later, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit. On December 20, 2017, that court issued its opinion, affirming the district court's dismissal of counts I and II as moot and reversing counts IV, V, and VI. While claims concerning the state's statutes issuing life without parole were barred from constitutional challenge under Heck doctrine, Heck did not bar review of the state's policies and procedures regarding parole eligibility. Younger abstention was not warranted. The amended complaint's ex post facto claims good time credit revocation were sufficiently stated and ripe for review. These claims were remanded to the district court for review. 878 F.3d 193 (6th Cir. 2017). The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on count V for injunctive relief and again for class certification once the case was remanded. The case was reassigned to Judge Mark A. Goldsmith in Detroit. The court held hearings on March 22, and the defendants moved to stay the results of those proceedings in the event an injunction was granted. On March 30, in anticipation of an unfavorable summary judgement ruling as to count V, the state moved to request a 14-day stay of any forthcoming order from the court to allow time to file an appeal. On April 9, 2018 Judge Goldsmith granted the plaintiff’s motions for class certification in full and partial summary judgement as to count V, and denied the state’s request for a 14-day stay. 308 F. Supp. 3d 398. Judge Goldsmith certified a class consisting of “all individuals in Michigan DOC custody who were convicted of first-degree murder for offenses committed when they were below 18 years of age, were or will be subjected to resentencing under M.C.L. § 769.25a, and are or could become eligible for parole.” He also certified two subclasses: the first including “all persons in the primary class whose offenses occurred prior to December 15, 1998,” and the second consisting of “all persons in the primary class who are still awaiting resentencing." Judge Goldsmith found that Pullman abstention was not warranted in this case as Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6) was “unmistakably clear” and solidly supported the plaintiffs' position that it retroactively deprived them of good time and disciplinary credits previously earned. He also said that Pullman abstention would carry too great a risk of constitutional guarantees going unenforced, noting the state’s pattern in this case of failing to carry out court orders to anyone other than the named plaintiffs. Judge Goldmith found that Younger absention would be inappropriate because the plaintiffs were not seeking to interfere with any ongoing state judicial proceedings, noting that it is the responsibility of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), not Michigan state courts, to calculate good time and disciplinary credits. Judge Goldsmith then held that Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6) was an unconstitutional ex post facto law because it retroactively removed the plaintiffs’ credits, and ordered the state to apply good time and disciplinary credits in calculating parole eligibility dates for juvenile lifers resentenced to a term of years, denying the state’s request for a 14-day stay. Judge Goldsmith denied without prejudice both parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment as to the Count VI allegation that the denial of rehabilitative programming denied the plaintiffs a fair and meaningful opportunity for release, pointing out that no discovery had taken place on this issue. The state appealed the April 9 decision to the Sixth Circuit and moved for an emergency stay of the district court’s order to deny the 14-day stay. 2018 WL 1782710, 308 F.Supp.3d 893. A week later, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Stranch) denied the state’s request for a stay of the district court order but said that the Court of Appeals would consider the appeal on an expedited basis. In its appeal, the state asked the Sixth Circuit to determine that the district court should not have considered Count V, based on either the Pullman or Younger abstention doctrines. On August 14, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion by Judge Stranch rejecting both of the state's arguments and affirming the decision of the district court. Under Pullman abstention, the defendants argued that "whether Plaintiffs earned good time credits while serving their life sentences is an unsettled question of Michigan law that must be answered, in the first instance, by Michigan courts." Judge Stranch said that the relevant statutory provisions were unambiguous and supported the plaintiffs’ position and that Michigan courts had made it clear that individuals previously serving life sentences without parole who received new sentences may not be deprived of the credits earned during their prior sentences. As for Younger abstention, Judge Stranch said that "the late stage of the litigation rendered the doctrine incongruous and inapplicable." The district court had awarded the plaintiffs summary judgment on Count V (the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ good time and disciplinary credits in Section 769.25a(6) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause) and ordered permanent injunctive relief that prohibited the defendants from enforcing or applying the statutory provision that effected the credit elimination, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.265a(6). Judge Stranch affirmed this decision, concluding that because the elimination of credits delayed the plaintiffs' release, Mich. Comp. Laws § 769.25a(6) makes a defendant's sentence more onerous, and thus violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. Judge Stranch affirmed the district court’s decision to grant summary judgment and permanent injunctive relief for the plaintiffs. 900 F.3d 260 (6th Cir. 2018). The Sixth Circuit later denied rehearing en banc. While the state's appeal was pending before the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their claim for money damages in exchange for the state withdrawing its defense that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. On November 13, 2018, Judge Goldsmith entered a stipulated order of voluntary dismissal as to Count IV of the plaintiff's second amended complaint. This cause of action alleged that the statutory scheme under M.C.L. §§ 791.231 through 791.246 violated the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment) and Fourteenth Amendment (due process) rights because the mandatory term of imprisonment is the equivalent of life imprisonment and they would not be guaranteed a meaningful opportunity for release on parole before the end of their natural lives. The same day, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment as to Count VI of plaintiffs' second amended complaint. This claim alleged Eighth Amendment violations on the part of two individual defendants for refusal to provide the plaintiffs with the programming, education, training, and rehabilitation opportunities necessary for the plaintiffs to demonstrate their suitability for release, and thereby denying the plaintiffs parole opportunities. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance with judgment, alleging that the defendants had refused to apply credits as required by state law and Michigan Department of Corrections policies for at least two subclass members, in violation of the April 2018 judgment. After a hearing, the motion was denied by Judge Goldsmith on February 26, 2019. Also in February, Judge Goldsmith denied the plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees without prejudice because Count VI of the plaintiffs' second amended complaint remained pending before the court. On July 12, 2019, Judge Goldsmith issued an opinion on the defendants' motion for summary judgment with regard to Count VI. Judge Goldsmith granted summary judgment as to the issue of whether plaintiffs were being denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation because of their inability to take core programming. However, Judge Goldsmith denied summary judgment as to whether denial of core programs to plaintiffs without an early release date/parole board jurisdiction date affects their ability to obtain release on parole. 2019 WL 3067977 (July 12 2019 E.D. Mich.) The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on October 29, 2019 adding two new causes of action. Count VII alleged that subjecting the plaintiffs to life in prison without a meaningful opportunity for release based on their juvenile status and their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation violates international law reflected in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Count VIII alleged that the defendants' failure to provide resentencing hearings to the plaintiff class violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. A fourth amended complaint was filed on February 27, 2020, adding new plaintiffs. In March 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss count VIII of the plaintiffs' fourth amended complaint. In June 2020, Judge Goldsmith issued an opinion denying the defendants' September 2019 motion for summary judgment as to count VI of the plaintiffs' complaint, writing that the defendants had not established that their policy of denying class members access to core programming did not result in a deprivation of their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. 2020 WL 2849969 (June 2 2020 E.D. Mich.) Two weeks later, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration. The parties proceeded with settlement talks before Magistrate Judge David R. Grand throughout the summer and reached a settlement agreement during a conference on September 17, 2020. Under the terms of the settlement, the Michigan Department of Corrections agreed to complete a file review and propose programming recommendations for all class members yet to be resentenced, subject to approval by the Parole Board. An artificial Earliest Release Date of 25 years would be calculated for all class members awaiting resentencing and class members will be placed in programming or on waitlists based on their artificial Earliest Release Date. Upon resentencing, placement on programming waitlists will be automatically adjusted based on their actual Earliest Release Date. In addition, the Attorney General agreed to send written communications to all elected county prosecutors in each county where class members' resentencing hearings were not completed. The communication would include a request that prosecutors complete review of cases not yet resentenced and notify the sentencing court and Attorney General whether they intended to seek reimposition of life-without-parole. It would also include an offer to provide staffing and resources for case reviews and/or to intervene and complete a case review upon request of the prosecuting attorney. The court approved the settlement and entered final judgment on November 17, 2020.

Summary: In November of 2010, juvenile prisoners filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the State of Michigan, challenging the state law that prohibited the Michigan Parole Board from considering for parole those sentenced to life in prison for first-degree murder. On January 30, 2013, the Court held that plaintiffs are entitled to a fair and meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that they are appropriate parole candidates, and ordered both parties to provide briefs on what would constitute a "fair and meaningful" opportunity. The defendants appealed the orders from the District Court. On May 11, 2016 the Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the case, urging the District Court to consider new Supreme Court cases and new Michigan Law. On August 3, 2016 the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, to prevent re-sentencing of juvenile offenders. The district court's decision to grant the defendant's motion to dismiss was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The plaintiff's ex post facto claims survived and <i>Heck<i> does not bar review of the state's policies and procedures regarding parole eligibility. The court has not yet ruled on whether the defendant's policy of denying class members access to core programming results in a deprivation of their right to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release. The parties were referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand for settlement negotiations, which are ongoing. As of July 2020, the case is open.


On June 2, 2011, a female former manager filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against KPMG LLP, a large accounting and professional services firm. The plaintiff asserted claims of gender discrimination under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and state and local laws. Represented by private counsel, she sought permanent injunctive relief and damages for gender-based employment discrimination. The case was assigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. In September 2011 and in May 2016, the plaintiff joined claims with several other former and current female employees at KPMG. The plaintiffs ultimately requested class certification for: “all female exempt Client Service and Support Professionals, including but not limited to Associates, Senior Associates, Managers, Senior Managers/Directors and Managing Directors…who are, or have been, employed by KPMG nationwide during the applicable liability period until the date of judgment.” The plaintiffs also brought analogous claims under New York City and New York state laws and sought to certify a New York subclass. The plaintiffs claimed that KPMG had engaged in a pattern and practice of gender discrimination stemming from policies that lacked transparency and fairness. In total, the complaint alleged nineteen counts of employment discrimination on behalf of different combinations of named and putative class plaintiffs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following on behalf of the nationwide class:

pay discrimination, promotion discrimination, and pregnancy and caregiving discrimination in violation of Title VII;
denial of equal pay for equal work under the Equal Pay Act.
They also alleged the following on behalf of the New York subclass:

pay discrimination, promotion discrimination, and pregnancy and caregiving discrimination in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law and the New York City Human Rights Law;
denial of equal pay for equal work under the New York State Equal Pay Acts.
Finally, the named plaintiffs pursued individual claims for retaliation in violation of Title VII and New York City and New York state laws; pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act; and race discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981. On February 7, 2013, the court granted the KPMG’s motion to strike class claims under New York State and New York City laws that were brought on behalf of plaintiffs who neither worked nor lived in the relevant jurisdictions. The court also dismissed some individual counts of discrimination, but denied KPMG’s motion with respect to all other counts. 925 F. Supp. 2d 453. The case was reassigned to Judge Lorna G. Schofield in March 2013. On July 8, 2014, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for conditional certification of the class. 2014 WL 3298884. On September 4, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. (Under the principle of equitable tolling, the court has discretion to suspend the statute of limitations period in certain situations to prevent an inequitable outcome.) The court adjusted the limitations period to cover all claims from March 2009–March 2012, and to cover all class-action plaintiffs who had opted in by April 2015. 2015 WL 5178400. The Equal Pay Act claims consisted of 1,112 opt-in plaintiffs. However, on November 30, 2018, the court held that the plaintiffs could not meet the requirements for class certification in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, which made it extremely difficult for a gender discrimination suit to proceed as a class action where the discriminatory treatment was the product of local supervisors exercising their discretion in awarding pay and promotions. The district court found that the plaintiffs here could not show a common mode of decision-making by supervisors that would warrant class certification with respect to the Title VII claims and that the plaintiffs had not shown that members of the opt-in class for the Equal Pay Act claims worked for a “single establishment” and were all “similarly situated.” The Court also denied class certification for the New York subclass. 2018 WL 6264853. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision, but on March 19, 2019, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Rosemary Pooler, Denny Chin, and Richard Eaton) denied the appeal, holding that immediate appeal was not warranted. The Second Circuit also granted a motion allowing non-parties to file an amicus brief. Discovery continued in the district court. On September 27, 2019, KPMG filed a motion to dismiss certain Equal Pay Act claims. This motion was partially granted as to certain plaintiffs but not others on July 15, 2020. 2020 WL 4003367. This case is ongoing as of August 2020.

Summary: A class of female managers and associates filed a putative class action lawsuit against their employer, KPMG LLP, for employment discrimination based on gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Equal Pay Act, and several New York state laws. The plaintiffs claimed that KPMG engaged in a pattern and practice of gender discrimination stemming from policies that lacked transparency and fairness. The court conditionally certified a class, but later denied class certification following the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes. The court allowed class action plaintiffs who had opted in to prosecute their claims individually. As of August 2020, the case is ongoing.


On January 31, 2005, private counsel filed a class-action suit against three Illinois state officials: the Director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid, the Secretary of the Illinois Department of Human Services, and the Director of the Office of Developmental Disabilities. On the following day (February 1, 2005), a slightly modified Amended Complaint and Motion for Class Certification was filed. The Plaintiffs alleged that Illinois had insufficiently funded its Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program, which was established under § 1915(c) of the Social Security Act. The purpose of the waiver program was to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities who, in the absence of the HCBS, would require care in a large institution. The complaint listed two named plaintiffs, who were also representatives of the proposed class, defined as all developmentally disabled persons with intellectual disabilities, eighteen or older, who were HCBS recipients and who sought additional funding for services through the program. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) and § 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, by opting to provide an HCBS waiver program, Illinois had committed to make available a specified number of HCBS waivers to participants (10,000 waivers in 2005), and to fully fund the services required by participants so as to enable them live in an integrated community setting. The Plaintiffs alleged that Illinois had issued too few waivers each year, and that it had denied waiver recipient requests for necessary services. Among the services available under HCBS was the option for individuals to live in Community-Integrated Living Arrangements (CILAs), a type of state-licensed group home for eight or fewer residents where individually customized habilitation and personal care support and services were provided. The complaint alleged that because of supposed insufficient funding, Illinois was denying the requests of qualified Medicaid HCBS recipients for placement in CILA residences, and instead was placing or offering to place them in large institutions where they would be effectively segregated from the rest of society. Both of the named plaintiffs had been denied placement in CILA residences despite being HCBS waiver recipients. The Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Illinois to provide funding for and to make available to the Plaintiff class a full range of HCBS services, including CILA services. They sought a declaratory judgment holding the failure to provide funding unlawful under 24 U.S.C. §1396a(a) (the Medicaid Act) and 42 U.S.C. §1983, and further sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs. Illinois argued that the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) had specifically approved Illinois' use of certain priority criteria to limit the number of CILA recipients when it approved the state's HCBS waiver program, and that if CILA and other services were not distributed on a the basis of priority criteria, but on a first-come, first-served basis, those most in need would not necessarily receive them. On June 8, 2005, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, and on July 7, the Defendants filed their own summary judgment motion. On September 25, 2006, the Court (Judge Virginia M. Kendall) issued an Opinion and Order denying the Plaintiffs' motion and granting Illinois' motion. The Court held that, because the CMS had specifically approved Illinois' use of certain priority criteria to limit the number of CILA recipients when it approved the state's HCBS waiver program, Illinois was not in violation of federal law. The Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied as moot. The Plaintiff filed an Appeal to the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 9, 2007, the Court of Appeals (Chief Judge Frank Hoover Easterbrook, writing for a three judge panel) affirmed the lower court's decision. Bertrand ex rel. Bertrand v. Maram, 495 F.3d 452 (7th Cir. 2007) (rehearing denied). The case is closed.

Summary: On January 31, 2005, a class-action suit was filed against three Illinois state officials. The Plaintiffs alleged that Illinois had insufficiently funded its Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services (HCBS) waiver program. The waiver program was designed to provide services to individuals with developmental disabilities who, in its absence, would require care in a large institution. The complaint defined the class as all developmentally disabled, eighteen or older, who were HCBS recipients and who sought additional funding for services through the program. Illinois had committed to make available a specified number of HCBS waivers to participants, and to fully fund the services required by participants so as to enable them live in an integrated community setting. The complaint alleged that because of the supposed insufficient funding, Illinois was denying the requests of qualified Medicaid HCBS recipients for placement in community-based group homes residences, and instead offering to place them in large institutions where they would be effectively segregated from the rest of society. The Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring Illinois to provide funding for and to make available to the Plaintiff class a full range of HCBS services. They sought a declaratory judgment holding that Illinois past failure to provide this funding was unlawful, and further sought to recover attorneys' fees and costs. Illinois argued that the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services had specifically approved Illinois' use of certain priority criteria to limit the number of CILA recipients when it approved the state's HCBS waiver program, and that if CILA and other services were not distributed on a the basis of priority criteria, but on a first-come, first-served basis, those most in need would not necessarily receive them. On September 25, 2006, the Court granted Illinois' motion. The Plaintiff filed an Appeal to the federal Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. On September 9, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. The case is closed.


On August 5, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The named plaintiffs were the company and its shareholders and the defendants were the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Treasury, and the U.S. Department of Labor. Represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom and Americans United for Life, the plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On August 14, 2013, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction and stayed the case at the defendant's request. The court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. Gilardi was held while the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. On June 30, 2014, the Court in Hobby Lobby held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. Following this ruling, the district court reviewed recommendations for further proceedings that the parties submitted. On October 8, 2014, the court noted that while the parties agreed that the plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction following Hobby Lobby, they disagreed over the scope of that injunction. The court instructed the parties to file supplemental memorandum detailing the injunction language they supported or objected to. The parties filed the memoranda on October 29, 2014, but as of May 13, 2020 the court has not recorded an order, and no other substantive litigation has occurred. Nevertheless, attorney appearances continue to be entered on the docket, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage for contraception because it violated the owner's religious beliefs. The court granted a preliminary injunction pending the conclusion of related cases in the courts of appeals. Following the Supreme Court's resolution of Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, involving similar issues, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction but disagreed as to its proper scope. As of May 13, 2020, the court has not yet issued a final order in this case.


On June 2010, the Advocacy Center OF Louisiana (the federally funded Protection & Advocacy organization serving people with disabilities in Louisiana) and a patient detainee incarcerated by the State of Louisiana filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of Louisiana inmates who had been deemed incompetent to stand trial. The plaintiffs sued the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by the Advocacy Center itself, the ACLU, and the law firm of Kirkland and Ellis sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, attorney’s fees and costs. According to the plaintiffs, many of these severely mentally ill individuals were being kept in jails and prisons for long periods of time without the benefit of appropriate mental health treatment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that certain provisions of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure and Louisiana Revised Statute Section 28:25.1 were unconstitutional as applied. According to Louisiana law, if a criminal defendant lacked the mental capacity to stand trial as a result of a mental disease or defect, his or her mental capacity was unlikely to be restored by outpatient care within 90 days, had been charged with a felony and was deemed likely to commit a crime a violence, that person had to be committed to Feliciana Forensic Facility. However, the Revised Statute required Feliciana, the only facility in Louisiana equipped to administer inpatient restorative treatment, to refuse to admit patient detainees if it would cause overcrowding or if it would be unable to provide appropriate care or treatment. The problem, the plaintiffs claimed, was that Feliciana was full, and therefore these patient detainees were turned away, dooming them to spend months or sometimes years in Louisiana Parish prisons awaiting admittance without proper care or treatment. On May 27, 2010, the State filed a motion to dismiss the case, while the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On June 16, 2010 the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Subsequently, on August 9, 2010, Chief Judge Sarah S. Vance denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the case as well as denying their motion to strike. 731 F. Supp 2d. 583; 731 F. Supp 2d. 603. Judge Vance also granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Vance ordered the state to provide restorative treatment to all such prisoners, requiring them to be transferred to Feliciana Forensic Hospital, where they would receive mental health treatment, within 21 days of their detention. Defendants appealed. On August 30, 2010, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkerson, Jr. from Magistrate Judge Daniel E. Knowles, III. On April 13, 2011, LDHH and ACED entered into a Consent Decree ensuring that the patients committed to Feliciana were admitted in a timely manner, setting different deadlines for admission to the hospital based on the urgency of detainees’ needs for mental health care. The Consent Decree provides that individuals who met either of two criteria (based on their score on a behavioral assessment or the determination of doctor) should be admitted to the Feliciana Forensic Facility within two working days of having a Behavioral Health Assessment. The state agreed to submit monthly reports about all detainees detailing if the patients were committed properly, assuring that the wait time for each patient was no more than 30 days following the Order for Inpatient Treatment and that the patients had access to needed emergency mental health care. The state also agreed to voluntarily dismiss their appeal and pay the plaintiffs $260,000 in attorney’s fees. The Consent Decree provided that the matter should be dismissed three years after July 10, 2011, if the defendants had substantially complied during the term of the decree. According to reports provided to the Court by the Department of Health and Hospitals, the state had repeatedly failed to comply with the decree. Indeed, of the 37 people included in the defendants’ reports, at least six were not admitted within the deadlines provided in the Consent Decree. Most importantly, the inmates who were being admitted late were those people who had the most serious emergency mental health needs. LDHH indicated that they planned to continue to ignore the criteria as written and delay placement for these individuals with the most severe mental health needs. In light of this failure, on September 7, 2011, the Advocacy Center filed a motion for contempt. On September 19, the state filed a motion to change the Consent Decree’s criteria for emergency admissions. Subsequently, on November 9, 2011, the parties filed a consent motion to modify the Consent Decree. Judge Vance accordingly modified the Consent Decree on November 15, 2011. The Amended Consent Decree changed the definition of Behavioral Health Assessment, Incompetent Detainee with Emergency Mental Health Needs, and Incompetent Detainee with Major Mental Health Needs as well as adding a provision concerning the classifications as an Incompetent Detainee with Emergency Mental Health Needs and as an Incompetent Detainee with Major Mental Health Needs. It also expanded the reporting provision, also requiring all certifications by the FAC Medical Director and the number of Incompetent Detainees by gender and facility to which admitted. On August 8, 2014, the defendants filed a motion for termination of the Consent Decree and dismissal of the matter with prejudice, stating that they complied with the provisions of the Consent Decree and Amended Consent Decree, even going beyond the decrees' requirements by continuing to send monthly reports after the expiration date of the mandatory reporting period. The plaintiffs agreed to termination. On December 8, 2014, Judge Vance terminated the Consent Decree and Amended Consent Decree and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On June 2010, the Advocacy Center for the Elderly and Disabled (“ACED”) and a patient detainee incarcerated by the State of Louisiana, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana on behalf of Louisiana inmates who had been deemed incompetent to stand trial. The plaintiffs alleged that many of these severely mentally ill individuals were being kept in jails and prisons for long periods of time without the benefit of appropriate mental health treatment. In 2014, the case was dismissed following over 3 years of compliance by the defendant's to a Consent Decree addressing the issue.


On August 19, 2013, Priests for Life, a non-profit Catholic group organized in opposition to abortion, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Represented by the American Freedom Law Center, the plaintiffs asked the court for monetary relief and to enjoin the contraceptive services mandate in the Affordable Care Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the contraceptive services mandate was unconstitutional and violated the plaintiffs' rights to freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of expressive association, and equal treatment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their sincerely held religious beliefs cause them to object to providing any direct or indirect support for contraception, sterilization, or abortifacients. They claimed that the accommodation for non-profit religious employers allowing them to have nothing to do with the contraceptive services provided by a third party insurer did not assuage their concerns. They claimed that even though the entire cost of the services would be absorbed by the third party, they would be furthering these services by paying for coverage through an insurer that provided these services. This case involves the same dispute as Priests for Life v. Sebelius in the Southern District of New York, FA-NY-0005 in this Clearinghouse, which was dismissed without prejudice on April 15, 2013, and was refiled in the District of Columbia later in the year. Priests for Life is one of a number of organizations that is religiously based and has a particular objection to the contraception mandate, but is not covered under any of the religious exemptions in the statute or in regulation, which are generally limited to churches and religious orders. Priests for Life objects to the fact that a health care plan that they purchase for their employees will provide those employees with access to contraceptive services. On December 19, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a judgment for the defendant. The court found that the actions of third parties do no create an impermissible burden, and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed this case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on December 19, 2013. 7 F. Supp. 3d 88 (D.D.C. 2013). The appeal included the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Appeals Court ruled on November 14, 2014 that the accommodation the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has designed for religious nonprofits to comply with the contraceptive coverage mandate does not burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom, and affirmed the District Court's ruling. 772 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2014). On May 20, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied plaintiffs request for rehearing en banc, reasoning that the result in  Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius does not compel them to credit plaintiffs’ misinterpretation of the regulation the plaintiffs are challenging and on June 10, 2015, the Circuit Court ordered that the mandate be stayed through August 26, 2015, pending petition for writ of certiorari. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases were known as Zubik v. Burwell [II] . This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Circuit Court, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On Oct. 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The case appears to be settled, though any settlement agreement is not currently publicly available. The Circuit Court dismissed the case on Nov. 6, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, Priests for Life, a non-profit religious advocate organization, filed suit against HHS objecting to the contraceptive services mandate in U.S. District Court for D.C. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, and ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement. 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of these cases.


On February 20, 2013, Christian owners of non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Religious Freedom and the Liberty Institute, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring the organization to provide employee insurance coverage for abortion-inducing drugs through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing this coverage would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech and association contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On March 19, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On April 19, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. On July 19, 2013, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their case without prejudice against the defendants.

Summary: Christian owners of a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit on February 20, 2013, seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and First and Fifth Amendments. On July 19, 2013, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice against defendants.


On July 17, 2012, Obama for America, the Democratic National Committee, and the Ohio Democratic Party sued the State of Ohio in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order a preliminary and permanent injunction against recent changes to Ohio's system for managing absentee balloting and early in-person voting. They claimed that these changes would disproportionally effect poor and minority voters in violation of their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, in 2005, following widespread voting difficulties in the 2004 election, Ohio had expanded participation in absentee balloting and in-person early voting to include all registered Ohio voters. But in 2011, the state legislature limited access to in-person early voting during the three days prior to Election Day to only active duty military personnel and overseas residents. Ohio Revised Code 3509.03, Secretary of State Directive 2012-35. In addition, for most voters, weekend in-person early voting was eliminated, as was non-working hour voting-except for the last two weeks prior to Election Day, when elections boards are open until 7 p.m. weekdays. Plaintiffs presented evidence that most early voting had previously taken place in the non-work hours, and on weekends, and that this was particularly true for poor and African-American voters. They argued that Ohio's changes would disproportionately impact these voters. On August 31, 2012, District Court Judge Peter Economus granted a preliminary injunction in the plaintiffs' favor. 888 F. Supp. 2d 897 (S.D. Ohio 2012). He explained that, under Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000): "The right to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection applies as well to the manner of its exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." The court found, that under Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), the interests asserted by the state were outweighed by the burden to would-be early voters. Defendants appealed. On October 5, 2012, The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Eric Clay, affirmed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). On October 16, without recorded dissent, the Supreme Court rejected an application by the State of Ohio for an emergency stay pending a petition for certiorari review. 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012). The Ohio Secretary of State promptly issued Directive 2012-50 to localities requiring that they remain open from 8 to 2 on the Saturday and Monday prior to Election day, and 1 to 5 on the Sunday prior to Election Day. The November 2012 election came and went. In early 2014, the Ohio Secretary of State issued Directive 2014-06 which limited early in-person voting to only Saturday and Monday before an election, not Sunday. On May 1, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and requested that the court order a permanent injunction enjoining the Ohio Secretary of State from enforcing the restrictions codified in § 3509.03 and requiring him to restore in-person early voting to three days immediately preceding all future election days. District Court Judge Peter Economus granted the motion on June 11, 2014, and entered a permanent injunction against the Secretary of State from implementing and enforcing the Friday before election day close of in-person early voting.

Summary: On August 31, 2012, District Court Judge Peter Economus, of the Southern District of Ohio, granted a preliminary injunction in favor of Obama for America, the Democratic National Committee, and the Ohio Democratic Party, mandating that early voting be restored in Ohio, during the three days prior to the upcoming November 2012 election. The Sixth Circuit affirmed on October 5, 2012, in an opinion by Judge Eric Clay. Secretary of State Husted promptly issued a directive to localities requiring that they remain open from 8 to 2 on the Saturday and Monday prior to Election day, and 1 to 5 on the Sunday prior to Election Day. On June 11, 2014, District Court Judge Peter Economus entered a permanent injunction against the Secretary of State from implementing and enforcing the Friday before election day close of in-person early voting.


On April 5, 2016, nineteen American Muslim individuals listed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's ("FBI") Terrorist Screening Database filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"), and the Terrorist Screening Center ("TSC"). Represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this case under 5 U.S.C. § 702 and 5 U.S.C. § 706. The complaint claimed that the defendants' terrorist screening database unfairly included individuals based on mere guesses, hunches, conjecture, and even simply based on matters of race and ethnicity. The plaintiffs alleged that such watch list disproportionately represented and affected Muslims: the listed individual was no longer permitted to fly, obtain licenses, and own a firearm, and was also subjected to stigmatization. Moreover, the complaint alleged that individuals on the watchlist were unable to challenge the basis for their inclusion, which violated the U.S. Constitution and individual's rights to Due Process. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and the case was assigned to U.S. District Judge James C. Cacheris and referred to the Magistrate Judge Michael S. Nachmanoff. On August 2016, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to request a jury demand. The plaintiffs also sought to conduct a discovery to identify unknown defendants, which Magistrate Judge Nachmanoff denied during the motions hearing held on August 12, 2016. On September 2, 2016, fourteen out of fifteen defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim as well as a partial summary judgment, and the remaining defendant later filed a motion to join the claim. On October 18, 2016, the court ordered both parties to submit briefs of their respective positions on whether this case should be stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Turkmen (IM-NY-0007 in this Clearinghouse). Defendants sought to continue with the process and not stay this case while the plaintiffs argued otherwise. On November 1, 2016, Judge Cacheris ordered to stay the case. On June 29, 2017, Judge Cacheris lifted the stay. A hearing was scheduled for August 16, 2017, but was postponed after the defendants filed an unopposed motion for extension of time to file a supplemental briefing. However, on September 13, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Ziglar v. Abbasi, where it held that a right of action for monetary damages against a federal official required special factors. The court granted the dismissal on September 14, 2017. This case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs, nineteen American Muslim individuals listed in the FBI's Terrorist Screening Database, also known as the "watch list," filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs alleged that their inclusion on the list was based on mere hunches and violated their constitutional rights to Due Process, including their inability to travel by airplanes. The court stayed the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Turkmen. As of February 2017, the case is ongoing.


On August 23, 2006, the disability rights group Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. and two individuals with disabilities acting on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated sued the California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") and its director in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to remedy an alleged "systematic pattern and practice of discrimination being committed by Caltrans against people with mobility and vision disabilities." Represented by the public interest law office Disability Rights Advocates, the plaintiffs alleged that Caltrans, which provided an extensive network of facilities throughout the state including sidewalks, pedestrian crossings and a system of Park and Ride facilities, systematically failed to maintain pedestrian rights of way or provide accessible alternative routes in construction areas. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 19, 2006, adding as a plaintiff another disability rights group (California Council of the Blind) and alleging seven causes of action, four of which were based on state law and two of which were federal claims. The two federal claims arose under, respectively, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794. The seventh cause of action requested declaratory relief "in order that each of the parties may know their respective rights and duties and act accordingly." Plaintiffs did not seek damages but, rather, an injunction to prevent Caltrans from continuing its alleged violations of state and federal law. On September 20, 2007, Caltrans filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, seeking dismissal of all claims except for the one based on the Rehabilitation Act. On October 23, 2007, plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, seeking class certification for their federal law claims only. In her March 13, 2008, unpublished order, District Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong ruled on these motions, as follows: She granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, defining the class as "All persons with mobility and/or vision disabilities who are allegedly being denied access under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 due to barriers along sidewalks, cross-walks, pedestrian underpasses, pedestrian overpasses and any other outdoor designated pedestrian walkways throughout the state of California which are owned and/or maintained by the California Department of Transportation. For purposes of class certification, persons with mobility disabilities are those who use wheelchairs, scooters, crutches, walkers, canes or similar devices to assist their navigation along sidewalks. For purposes of class certification, persons with vision disabilities are those who due to a vision impairment use canes or service animals for navigation along sidewalks." Judge Armstrong dismissed the plaintiffs' state law-based claims, without prejudice, given that the defendants contended her federal court lacked jurisdiction over them and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss them. She refused to dismiss the ADA claim, since Caltrans had not shown that it was entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity from ADA claims and since precedent allowed discrimination lawsuits against state officials. The judge agreed with the defendants, however, that no private right of action existed to enforce either the self-evaluation or transition plan federal regulations implementing Title II of the ADA. Thus, that component of the plaintiffs' claims was also dismissed. The ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims remained pending against the state. On January 29, 2009, the defendants once again moved for judgment on the pleadings. On February 17, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment regarding defendants' obligations to make temporary pedestrian routes accessible. In an order filed on March 31, 2009, Judge Armstrong granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On June 4, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on (1) whether Caltrans' policies for design of pedestrian facilities complied with federal law and regulations, and (2) whether Caltrans had system-wide procedures to ensure that pedestrian facilities were designed and constructed pursuant to its design policies. Judge Armstrong denied this motion in an order filed on August 4, 2009, finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Caltrans provided accessible pedestrian facilities to the individual petitioners. A trial began on September 16, 2009. During the proceedings, however, the parties proposed temporarily suspending the trial to engage in settlement discussions before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth LaPorte. The parties reached an agreement and filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of settlement on December 22, 2009. On January 25, 2010, Judge Armstrong issued an order granting the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement. On June 2, 2010, Judge Armstrong approved a proposed settlement agreement. The settlement agreement included (1) a funding commitment of $1.1 billion over the next thirty years to eliminate barriers and improve access for people with mobility and vision disabilities to 2,500 miles of sidewalk and Park and Ride facilities owned or maintained by Caltrans; (2) a monitoring procedure, which would include the hiring of an access consultant to oversee compliance for the first seven years, and mandatory annual reporting by Caltrans for the next thirty years; (3) a grievance procedure for public complaints relating to access issues and Caltrans responses thereto; and (4) payment of attorneys' fees for past work and future compliance services. All pending issues in the Class Action were then dismissed--but the Court retained jurisdiction to resolve any compliance-related dispute. The court continues to monitor compliance with the settlement. Additional information about the settlement is available from plaintiffs' counsel, Disability Rights Advocates, at  http://https://dralegal.org/case/californians-for-disability-rights-inc-cdr-et-al-v-california-department-of-transportation-caltrans/

Summary: Californians for Disability Rights, Inc. and two individuals with disabilities acting on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated sued the California Department of Transportation ("Caltrans") and its director in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2006. They alleged that Caltrans systematically failed to maintain pedestrian rights of way or provide accessible alternative routes in construction areas. The plaintiffs sued under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The parties reached a 30-year settlement agreement in 2010 that included $1.1 billion in funding to remove barriers, monitoring, grievance procedures, and attorneys' fees. The court continues to monitor the settlement.


On August 4, 2014, a 57-year-old disabled African-American woman and her 37-year-old son who lives with her filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under the Law, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to a baseless, illegal and embarrassing home raid conducted by Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") officers. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the police obtained a warrant to search their home based only on the fact that another family member had been found with an illegal gun, yet there was no evidence connecting them or their home to any illegal activity. The plaintiffs further alleged that the raid was a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The raid happened on March 26, 2013. That day, the plaintiffs were at home when, without warning, at least ten heavily armed officers from the MPD broke down the front door. The officers forcibly handcuffed the female plaintiff, who had difficulty moving around without her cane, and stripped searched her son in front of his family. No guns, ammunition, or other contraband were found during the defendants' violent home invasion of the plaintiffs' residence. On September 16, 2014 the District of Columbia moved to dismiss the complaint claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for which they could receive relief from the court. On January 27, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel, which was denied the next day, without prejudice, because it was unclear whether the plaintiffs complied with a rule requiring that they confer with opposing counsel. On April 28, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, and on May 24, 2015 filled an amended complaint, naming the individual police officers involved in the violent raid. On March 31, 2016, U.S. District Court Judge Tanya S. Chutkan issued an order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss in part, and on April 5, 2016, Judge Chutkan ordered the defendant to respond to the plaintiffs' amended complaint. Judge Chutkan found, however, that if the complaint's allegations were true the search warrant application did not make out probable cause to search the plaintiff's home. Judge Chutkan noted that the District's contention that officers could search whoever they found in any home search at any time and without any evidence about the person "ludicrous on its face." 177 F.Supp.3d 347 The parties were then ordered to conduct discovery, which was to end on December 23, 2016, however, there was a joint motion filed in September 2016 to stay discovery; this motion was granted by the Court. In a November 21, 2016 status report, the parties indicated that they were still in negotiations, and asked the Court to continue the stay for 30 more days. On February 21, 2017 the parties submitted a joint status report indicating the parties agreed to settle the case. Subsequently, on April 24, 2017 the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal having reached a private settlement agreement. On April 25, 2017 the Court dismissed the case with prejudice, and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: A disabled African-American woman and her adult son sued the District of Columbia alleging that their rights were violated during an illegal search of their home on March 26, 2013. The plaintiffs alleged that they were at home when, without warning, at least ten Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") officers raided their home. The disabled plaintiff was handcuffed although she has difficulty walking without her cane, and her adult son was strip searched in front of the rest of his family. On August 4, 2014 the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under § 1983 claiming that the raid violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After the defendant's motion to dismiss was granted in part, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. After proceedings held before Judge Chutkan, the parties were ordered to conduct discovery, however, the parties jointly moved to stay discovery. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to stay and set a deadline of November 21, 2016 for the parties to submit a status report. That status report stated that the parties were still in negotiations. The parties remained in negotiation, and subsequently submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal once they reached a private settlement agreement. The Court dismissed the case with prejudice on April 25, 2017.


This lawsuit relates to civil forfeiture, a practice of many police departments across the county under which the departments seize money that they claim is being used for illicit purposes. The resulting process is civil rather than criminal. In the District of Columbia, civil forfeiture is authorized by D.C. Code § 48-905.02, which allows police to seize money they believe is involved in a violation of the Controlled Substances Act. However, the law also requires that the Government of the District of Columbia (the District) provide “. . . written notice of the seizure together with information applicable to the procedures for claiming the property,” to the person from whom the money is seized and, if the person replies within 30 days, that the District either returns the money or begins civil forfeiture proceedings within a year of resolution of the underlying charges. The two plaintiffs in this case had money seized from them after being arrested by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) on suspicion of trafficking narcotics, but were neither given the required notice nor had proceedings brought against them within a year of resolution of the underlying charges against them. In response, plaintiffs sued the District under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They argued that the District had violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by taking their money without following the procedure required by D.C. Code § 48-905.02. Plaintiffs asked the Court to: grant the plaintiffs class action certification to represent other persons who had had money seized by the MPD without notification or timely forfeiture proceedings; issue a declaration that the District had violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights; issue an injunction requiring the District to alter its practices to conform to D.C. Code § 48-905.02; order the District of Columbia to return all money unlawfully retained, plus restitution for loss of use; award the named plaintiffs and class members compensatory damages; and award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. After two motions for class certification by plaintiffs had been rejected without prejudice on March 10, 2010 (when the issue was deemed not yet ripe), and February 28, 2012 (as overbroad), the second judge assigned to the case, Judge Robert L. Wilkins, granted the plaintiffs' third request for class certification on August 22, 2012. 283 F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 2012). Plaintiffs’ class included persons who (1) were arrested by an officer of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department ("MPD") (2) had cash taken from their persons by the MPD (3) were not given their cash back by the MPD because the MPD kept that cash (4) on or after June 8, 2006, and on or before May 24, 2012, had an administrative forfeiture notice mailed to them by the District but didn’t send back a signed mail receipt (5) were not re-sent a notice regarding the cash upon failing to send a signed mail receipt and, (6) didn’t have a civil forfeiture action filed against them by the district within one year of the resolution of the underlying criminal charges against them. Plaintiffs’ class also included persons who met steps 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 of the previous list, but were held by or in the custody of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections when administrative forfeiture notice was sent, and neither received the notice at their place of incarceration nor we re-sent notice after they were released from custody. On November 4, 2013, plaintiffs and defendants notified the court that they had reached a settlement agreement and asked the court for preliminary approval of that settlement. Judge Wilkins granted preliminary approval of the agreement on December 20, 2014. After a final approval and fairness hearing on June 19, 2014, the third judge assigned to the case, Judge Christopher R. Cooper, approved a final settlement agreement. In the settlement agreement, plaintiffs dropped their request for declaratory and injunctive relief, and accepted an award of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. The total amount that defendants paid was $855,000 total, including: $2,500 to each of the class representatives as an award for bringing the class action suit; $14,001.85 for attorney's expenses; $52,665.15 to Class Action Administration, Inc. ("CAA"); $283,333 for attorney's fees; and $500,000 on approved claims to plaintiffs and other members of plaintiffs’ class. If the total of approved claims exceeded $500,000 total, the settlement agreement stipulated that payments to approved claimants would be reduced by the same percentage for all claimants to the extent necessary to prevent the total payout from exceeding $500,000. 49 F. Supp. 3d 48 (D.D.C. 2014).

Summary: Two men who had money seized and kept by the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police (MPD) through a practice called civil forfeiture sued the government of the District of Columbia (the District) because the MPD had failed to give plaintiffs proper notice of the seizure or initiate civil forfeiture proceedings against them within a year of criminal charges against plaintiffs being resolved. On June 8, 2009, plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. federal court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. §1983, and argued that the MPD had violated both the D.C. law authorizing civil forfeiture (D.C. Code § 48-905.02) and the Fifth Amendment. On June 20, 2014, the court granted final approval to a settlement agreement between plaintiffs and the District, under which the district agreed to pay $855,000 total, including: $2,500 to each of the class representatives as an award for bringing the class action suit; $14,001.85 for attorney's expenses; $52,665.15 to Class Action Administration, Inc. ("CAA"); $283,333 for attorney's fees; and $500,000 on approved claims to plaintiffs and other members of plaintiffs’ class.


On April 4, 2012, a pre-trial detainee in the Cook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Cook County and its sheriff under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The plaintiff claimed that Cook County had a practice of “holding in custody or imprisoning free citizens following a trial” at which the citizen is acquitted. Such individuals were often returned to the general jail population. When this happened to the plaintiff, he alleged, he was beaten up by other inmates who learned he would soon be released. The plaintiff sought certification of a class of those who had similarly been unlawfully detained. This motion was denied on December 20, 2013. The plaintiff then amended his complaint to add a count for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff argued that female inmates were treated differently, as they were not returned to the general jail population after acquittal. After class certification discovery into the policies and practices of Cook County Jail, the plaintiff was granted class certification on September 2, 2014. On October 30, 2015 both parties sought summary judgment. On January 7, 2016, Judge St. Eve denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim, Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, and Equal Protection claim. Judge St. Eve granted Cook County’s motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Discovery lasted several years, and, on the eve of trial, on February 18, 2016, the parties settled. The settlement involved comprehensive injunctive relief and monetary damages to class members. Cook County agreed to implement a new policy that provides mechanisms for identifying potential discharges and ensures they are not returned to the general jail population. Within 90 days, the defendants had to implement these changes and file a status report to the court. The court retained jurisdiction over the implementation and enforcement of these procedures for 9 months. The class members were each awarded $100, the original plaintiff received $15,000 in a service award, and the attorneys were awarded $2,000,000. This settlement was approved and ordered on August 11, 2016 and the 9-month injunction period is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, former inmates of Cook County Jail filed this class action in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy of detaining citizens following their acquittal violates their right to freedom. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement that requires better procedures for processing acquitted inmates and awards monetary damages to class members.


On January 23, 2012, a same-sex couple, individually and on behalf of their three adopted children, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, against the State of Michigan. The case proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and began by challenging the Michigan law preventing adoption by unmarried parents. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel (including a professor at Wayne State law school), asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the provisions of MCL 710.24, which prohibited second parent adoptions by unmarried persons, violateed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued, the court should prohibit judges in Michigan from blocking second-parent adoptions based on the unmarried status of the couple. The case was assigned to Judge Bernard Friedman. News reports recount that on August 29, 2012, at a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, he encouraged the plaintiffs to broaden their case to challenge, as well, the Michigan Marriage Amendment, which prohibited same-sex couples from marrying. Mich. Const. 1963, art. 1, § 25. He gave them 10 days to decide whether to file an amended complaint addressing this issue. They did file such an amended complaint on September 7, 2012, adding a claim that under the federal Constitution, the state must permit the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. On September 24, 2012, Judge Friedman granted the formal motion to amend and then denied pending motions to dismiss and for summary judgment as moot. The state renewed its motion to dismiss, but the District Court denied it on July 1, 2013, based on the Supreme Court's decision the prior week in United States v. Windsor. Both plaintiffs and defendants then filed motions for summary judgment. In his opinion denying the motions on October 16, 2013, Judge Friedman explained that the State was proposing several justifications in support of Michigan's exclusive recognition of opposite-sex marriages: "(1) providing children with 'biologically connected' role models of both genders that are necessary to foster healthy psychological development; (2) forestalling the unintended consequences that would result from the redefinition of marriage; (3) tradition or morality; and (4) promoting the transition of 'naturally procreative relationships into stable unions.'" These depended on facts that needed to be presented and contested at trial, he held. The trial occurred over eight days in February and March 2014. On Friday, March 21, 2014, Judge Friedman ruled for the plaintiffs, finding that the Michigan Marriage Amendment violated the federal Equal Protection Clause. He entered an injunction against the ban on same-sex marriage. 973 F.Supp.2d 757. The state immediately sought a stay in the Sixth Circuit. Because Judge Friedman's order was docketed after 5 pm on Friday, it appears that the state's county clerks offices were already closed. Several county clerks' offices (Washtenaw, Ingham, Oakland, Muskegon) were open and issuing marriage licenses on Saturday, March 22; the statutory three-day waiting period is frequently waived in Michigan, and was waived by some county clerks' offices. The first wedding took place at 8 am, in Ingham County. The district court's injunction was stayed that afternoon by the 6th Circuit; the motions panel soon extended the stay to last until the case was resolved on appeal. However, on March 28, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that the federal government would recognize the marriages that took place on March 22. The defendants appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on May 9th, 2014. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and other cases from four states. Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse); Henry v. Hodges (PB-OH-0004 in this Clearinghouse); Love v. Beshear (PB-KY-0001 in this Clearinghouse); Tanco v. Haslam (PB-TN-0005 in this Clearinghouse). It was unwilling to find a Constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither in violation of the Constitution nor due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that "[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries." (DeBoer v. Snyder Page p. 38). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 772 F.3d 388. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review of cases consolidated into Obergefell v. Hodges. The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, the Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. The right to marry is fundamental, the Court held, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. On July 28, 2015, the Supreme Court ordered $34,209.80 in attorney's fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: This federal lawsuit by a Michigan same-sex couple, for themselves and on behalf of their children, challenges the constitutionality of Michigan laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and second-parent adoptions for unmarried couples. The District Court ruled on March 21, 2014 for the plaintiffs, striking down the Michigan Marriage Amendment under the federal Equal Protection Clause. The state has sought a stay from the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. Several county clerks' offices (Washtenaw, Ingham, Oakland, Muskegon) were open and issuing marriage licenses on Saturday March 22; the statutory three-day waiting period is frequently waived in Michigan, and was waived by some clerk' offices. Although some weddings did occur, the district court's injunction was stayed that afternoon by the 6th Circuit, which upheld the states' ban in November 2014. The case is pending before the U.S. Supreme Court.