On July 1 2018, Sigma Beta Xi (a non-profit organization) and three children filed this class action in the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, National Center for Youth Law, and private counsel, sued the County of Riverside under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. They claimed that Riverside's Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program, which was an alleged probation supervision program, violated their constitutional and state rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not give children adequate notice of charges against them, and used coercion and other misleading tactics to induce them to enter the YAT program without their informed consent. As part of this program, the defendants allegedly searched the homes, belongings, and persons of the children in the YAT program and prohibited children in the YAT program from associating with anyone the program did not approve of. Notably, the complaint contended that the YAT program had a significant adverse impact on Black and Latinx children. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from engaging in the YAT program practices that violated the plaintiffs' rights. On September 5, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint, denying generally and specifically the plaintiff's allegations. They stated that the purpose of the YAT program was to "divert certain youth from the juvenile justice system and instead handle them in an informal, treatment-oriented manner, including, without limitation, the provision of school attendance and behavior monitoring, mentoring, and involvement in pro-social activities" and not, as plaintiffs claimed, to "target, ensnare, and discriminate against children in...schools in Riverside County, by stripping them of their constitutional rights and treating them like criminals." The individual plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to be certified as a class on September 13, 2018. On September 17, 2018, the court granted their motion after determining that the children satisfied the necessary elements of a class (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy). The class was certified as: "All children in Riverside County who have been referred to the Riverside County Youth Accountability Team ("YAT") program pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 601, and who had either been placed on a YAT probation contract or had been referred but not yet placed on a YAT probation contract." The case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution in December of 2018. On January 2, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to a protective order for the youth plaintiffs during the course of this case. After out of court negotiations, the parties moved for class action settlement on July 24, 2019. The proposed settlement agreement mandated the following: 1) Narrowing the category of youth who fall under the jurisdiction of Welfare & Institutions § 602 and will be enrolled in a Welfare & Institutions Code § 654 program or referred for prosecution under Welfare & Institutions Code § 60 2) Defendants agree not to seek or accept referrals from any source regarding any youth under the age of 18 into the YAT program 3) Creation of a presumption for the protection of youth charged with school disruption, possession of alcohol, cigarettes, or marijuana, and possession of a laser pointer or graffiti tools. The Probation Department will counsel and close these matters or refer the youth to a community-based organization 4) Addition of defense counsel to the YAT team to legally advocate for the youth 5) Improvements in the risk-assessment tool used by the YAT program 6) Improvements in communication with youth and their parents/guardians about the responsibilities and expectations involved in the program, including an updated contract 7) Updates in records keeping, data tracking, and personnel policies and training 8) The addition of community representatives to the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Committee The agreement appointed Scott MacDonald and Naomi Goldstein as third-party monitors to report annually on the settlement progress. The agreement is set to expire after 5 years, and the court will retain jurisdiction during that time. The hearing for final approval of the agreement is set for June 20, 2020, although it may be subject to further postponement due to the COVID-19 public health emergency. This case is ongoing.

Summary: A non-profit and children enrolled in the Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program filed this class action on July 1, 2018 against County of Riverside for implementing practices in the YAT program that violated participants' constitutional rights. The court granted class certification in September 2018 and the case remains ongoing.


On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as class action status for the case, claiming that the defendants' failure to administer medical treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. The defendants refused to provide needed treatment for their medical conditions, Hepatitis C, because the plaintiffs had not completed a DOCS-sponsored substance abuse program. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on September 2, 2005. The state had recently lost similar lawsuits in federal and state courts (see, for example, case PC-NY-52 in the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse database) and, in October 2005, revised its policies so that completion of DOCS substance abuse programs was not required prior to provision of Hepatitis C treatment to prisoners. The defendants thus argued that, as the plaintiffs were now receiving treatment under the revised policy, the plaintiffs' equitable claims were now moot and that class action status should not be accorded the case. District Judge David N. Hurd rejected the defense arguments in a memorandum and order filed on February 27, 2006. He found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot, because the defendants had failed to show (1) there was no reasonable expectation of re-institution of the substance abuse treatment policy and (2) complete eradication of the prior policy's effects. The court noted that the revised policy expressly changed due to litigation losses, not due to the defendants' medical judgment, making it difficult for the court to accept that the defendants might not again revise the policy, at some point, to the plaintiffs' detriment. Additionally, Judge Hurd found class certification appropriate, as some 500 of the approximately 9,000 Hepatitis C-positive prisoners in defendants' custody had been deprived of treatment due to the prior policy making treatment contingent upon meeting the substance abuse program requirement. Plaintiffs' counsel were appointed to serve as class counsel. Hilton v. Wright, 235 F.R.D. 40 (N.D. N.Y. 2006). In the following months, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, including conferences with the court. On July 25, 2007, the parties filed with the court their interim settlement agreement. It made explicit the parties' joint agreement that participation in DOCS' substance abuse programs was not a precondition to provision by DOCS of treatment for Hepatitis C and required notification to DOCS medical personnel and known Hepatitis C-positive prisoners of this policy. Prisoners previously denied treatment under the old policy would now be re-evaluated and would receive treatment, if doing so was medically appropriate. Also under the agreement, DOCS had to report its compliance with the agreement's terms to class counsel, and had to pay class counsel's fees stemming from the case, including those incurred over the two year compliance monitoring period established by the agreement. The period could be extended by agreement of the parties or by order of the court. On January 2, 2008, Judge Hurd approved the settlement, but denied the plaintiff's class application for permission to amend their complaint to assert a claim for damages. On December 14, 2009, Judge Hurd dismissed the first amended complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appealed this decision and the order was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On May 25, 2010, Judge Hurd awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees of $23,152. Judge Hurd had also denied attorney's fees beyond the sum of $23,152, but the plaintiffs appealed this order and it was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On April 20, 2012, the Second Circuit vacated in part the judgment and remanded the case on the basis that the district court did not adequately explain why it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for damages. In addition, because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the Court of Appeals vacated the part of the order denying the plaintiffs' application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court for it to determine in its discretion whether to grant, full or partially, the plaintiffs' application for such costs. Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2012). On May 11, 2013, Judge Hurd issued an opinion vacating the previous orders that the first amended complaint be dismissed and the portion of the order denying attorneys' fees beyond the sum of $23,152. Judge Hurd also granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. All claims relating to the 2003 denial of Hepatitis C treatment based on the length of incarceration requirement was waived. Judge Hurd dismissed all of the claims against the chief medical officer. Judge Hurd awarded additional attorneys' fees of $17,385.45, for a total fee award of $40,537.45. Hilton v. Wright, 928 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). On August 28, 2013 Judge Hurd ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiff $120,000 in full settlement of any and all claims, inclusive of any and all damages, fees, and costs of any kind. Judge Hurd also ordered that all claims or counterclaims were discontinued.

Summary: On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to administer treatment for Hepatitis C based on completion of a substance abuse program constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. Parties reached a settlement that required treatment regardless of completion of the substance abuse program and defendants were required to pay $120,000 in damages, fees, and costs.


On September 26, 2011, individuals with disabilities and several related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against New York City and its mayor under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), New York City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 et seq. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Advocates, claimed that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against disabled individuals by inadequately planning for the evacuation of people with disabilities, failing to provide an accessible shelter system; ignoring the unique needs of people with disabilities in the event of a power outage; failing to communicate adequately with people with special needs during an emergency; and failing to account for the needs of people with disabilities in recovery operations following a disaster. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the City's discrimination in emergency planning was demonstrated by the City's response to Hurricane Irene and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which failed in various ways to appropriately accommodate those with disabilities. On June 29, 2012, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a plaintiff and clarify their factual claims. On November 7, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jesse M. Furman) issued an opinion ruling that both the organized and individual plaintiffs had standing to sue and certifying the class defined as "all people with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, who are within the City and the jurisdiction served by the City's emergency preparedness programs and services." 290 F.R.D. 409. On May 10, 2013, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed a statement of interest urging the court to find that the defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and noting among other things that the defendants nowhere contended that making reasonable accommodations was impractical. On November 7, 2013, after a six-day bench trial on the question of liability the District Court (Judge Furman) ruled that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYCHRL. Specifically the court found that: "(1) The City's evacuation plans do not accommodate the needs of people with disabilities with respect to high-rise evacuation and accessible transportation; (2) its shelter plans do not require that the shelter system be sufficiently accessible, either architecturally or programmatically, to accommodate people with disabilities in an emergency; (3) the City has no plan for canvassing or for otherwise ensuring that people with disabilities -- who may, because of their disability, be unable to leave their building after a disaster -- are able to access the services provided by the City after an emergency; (4) the City's plans to distribute resources in the aftermath of a disaster do not provide for accessible communications at the facilities where resources are distributed; (5) the City's outreach and education program fails in several respects to provide people with disabilities the same opportunity as others to develop a personal emergency plan; and (6) the City lacks sufficient plans to provide people with disabilities information about the existence and location of accessible services in an emergency." 980 F. Supp. 2d 588. On December 4, 2013, the District Court ordered the parties to engage in settlement negotiations with a mediator to be paid for by the defendants. Settlement negotiations progressed throughout 2014. On September 30, 2014, the parties indicated they reached a settlement. The court held a fairness hearing on February 13, 2015. On March 6, the court granted final approval of the settlement. The final settlement provided a remedial plan that included increasing shelter accessibility, surveying facilities for use as hurricane shelters, standardized procedures and amenities in emergency evacuation centers and shelters, operational plan for post-emergency rapid survey of population to determine critical needs, development of adequate accessible transportation and communication, increased accessibility to power outage services, hiring of a Disability and Access and Functional Needs Coordinator and the creation of a Disability Community Panel, and development of a high rise evacuation plan. The settlement also provided monitoring and reporting procedures. On August 24, 2015, the parties stipulated to an agreement that the plaintiffs would be awarded $3,700,000 in attorney's fees. Further, the court would retain jurisdiction over the settlement until May 2019, when the agreement's obligations were set to terminate. On three different occasions between 2018 and 2019, the parties jointly agreed to extend the deadline by which the defendant needed to comply with particular terms of the settlement. The defendant has continued submitting status reports with the court. Monitoring appears to be ongoing.

Summary: In 2011, individuals with disabilities and related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and its mayor alleging that they failed to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities in their emergency response plan. After a bench trial in November 2013, the District Court ruled for the plaintiffs and later approved a settlement which included policy changes, ongoing monitoring, and attorney's fees. As of April 10, 2020, monitoring appears to be ongoing.


On September 17, 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities under the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs, represented by North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, brought the suit against the state of North Carolina. They asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants discriminated against them. Specifically, they alleged that by reason of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs. Prisoners within the DOC can earn credits that shorten their terms of incarceration if they work or participate in certain programs. Pursuant to the medical gain time policy, the DOC grants disabled inmates sentence reduction credits only if it determines that they are medically unfit to participate in the traditional sentence reduction credit programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOC's definition of "medically unfit" misclassified numerous prisoners with disabilities and excluded them from participation in the medical gain time program even when they were physically unable to participate in traditional sentence reduction credit programs. Furthermore, even when prisoners with disabilities were given the opportunity to earn sentence reduction credits through the medical gain time policy, the DOC discriminated against them by providing the opportunity to earn credits at two-thirds the rate available to prisoners without disabilities. On September 19, 2011, Judge Terrence Boyle granted class certification. The class was defined as all present and future prisoners of the DOC with disabilities "who have been, and may in the future be, discriminated against, excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs by reason of their disabilities." 276 F.R.D. 452. On August 15, 2013, Judge Boyle approved the parties' stipulated consent decree. The agreement mandated that the DOC establish, implement, and modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities. The plaintiffs' attorneys must have an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed policy changes. Additionally, the DOC must create various new full-time positions, including a position dedicated to monitoring the implementation of the new policies and the consent decree. The DOC was required to pay $56,199.02 to Prisoners Legal Services for expenses associated with the implementation of the consent decree. The requirements of the agreement were set to terminate two years following the date of entry, and the agreement allowed for judicial enforcement. On November 1, 2013, Judge Boyle denied hearing any further action in the case from individuals other than through counsel in the suit. Judge Boyle’s decision did not prohibit individuals from filing separate and distinct suits. This case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities within the custody of the North Carolina DOC filed a class action lawsuit against the DOC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that, on account of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In August 2013, the Court approved the parties' stipulated consent decree, in which the DOC agreed to modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities and allow a monitor to oversee the implementation of such policies.


On January 20, 2004, Cintas Corporation employees filed a lawsuit against Cintas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Unfair Business Practices Act, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented initially by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, equitable, and compensatory relief, claiming that Cintas engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that Cintas engaged in, among other practices, discriminatory hiring, recruitment, promotion, assignment, transfer, and compensation. On October 29, 2004, the Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) issued a stipulation and order that defined the scope of the class claims, allowed Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint, and outlined limited discovery and the schedule for Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. On March 22, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel three plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims and stayed the action as to those plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss those plaintiffs from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 658984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2005). The Court granted the EEOC's motion to intervene on April 26, 2005. Finding that the subject matter was of public importance, that the litigation was still in its early stages, that neither party would be prejudiced, and that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant objected to the EEOC's intervention, the Court ordered the EEOC to file a complaint in intervention within seven days. The EEOC filed its complaint in intervention on April 27, 2005. The complaint asked the Court for equitable relief, back-pay, and punitive damages. On September 20, 2005, after the parties filed a stipulation, the Court issued an order relating Ramirez v. Cintas with Houston v. Cintas (Northern District of California, Docket No. C-05-03145-CRB). The Houston case was also transferred to Judge White. On November 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel another plaintiff to arbitrate his claims and stayed that action as to that Plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss the Plaintiff from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 2894628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2005). On December 8, 2005, based on the parties' joint stipulation, the Court dismissed the class action representatives individual claims with prejudice and removed her as the class representative. The order specified, however, that the former class representative could participate as a member of the certified class if she qualified under the class definition. On January 12, 2006, the Court dismissed another putative class representative's claim claims and individuals claims based on the parties' joint stipulation. The Court found that the individual Plaintiff could not serve as class representative and was not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The Court issued a similar order regarding another individual plaintiff on March 9, 2006. On May 11, 2006, the Court ordered that class claims of discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, and women in hiring for certain positions at Cintas' Rental Division, made pursuant to Title VII and § 1981, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. All other claims had been dismissed or stayed pending arbitration. The arbitrator filed an opinion on September 15, 2006. The arbitrator found that the Cintas Employment Agreements permit class-wide arbitration and that there was no limitation to where the class action may be heard. The Court denied Defendant's motion to vacate the arbitration decision on November 22, 2006. The Court found that the arbitrator had not "manifestly disregarded the law" and that the decision was not irrational. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2006 WL 3388628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2006). The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the putative class action claims without prejudice so that they were able to proceed with their individual claims through arbitration on April 3, 2009. Defendant did not oppose the motion and the case was closed on January 28, 2010.

Summary: This case was brought by African American and Hispanic employees of Cintas Corporation against Cintas, alleging employment discrimination in hiring, promotion, and pay. The case went into arbitration, and the District Court dismissed all claims on January 28, 2010.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the countries granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On August 21, 2019, the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, along with the city of New York, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiff States sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as well as the acting secretaries of both departments in their official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Plaintiff States sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s final public charge rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The Plaintiff States also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defined personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, under the proposed Rule, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. The Plaintiff States asserted that this Rule would force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain permanent resident status. The Plaintiff States further argued that the Rule causes damage to the health and livelihood of immigrant families by deterring them from using these benefits, thereby undermining the sovereign interests of the Plaintiff States and interfering in the policies designed to support the well-being and civil rights of residents. The Plaintiff States contended that the Rule exceeds the Defendant's jurisdiction and authority under the APA; is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion; and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On September 9, 2019, the Plaintiff States filed a motion for preliminary injunction and stay pending judicial review, arguing they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims made in the complaint, and that preliminary relief is in the public interest. The Rule, unless prohibited, was set to go into effect on October 15, 2019. The Plaintiff States asserted that the Rule should not take effect while the legal action was still pending. On September 27, 2019, the Defendants filed an opposition to the motion. The Defendants contended that the Rule is a "well-reasoned definition of public charge providing practical guidance to Executive Branch officials making public charge inadmissibility determinations" based on foundational principles of United States immigration law. The Defendants also argued that the Plaintiff States and City did not meet their burden of establishing standing, that they did not show an actual or imminent threat of harm as the result of the Rule. Although the Plaintiff States claimed that enforcement of the Rule would cause irreparable harm, the Defendants argued that those claims are not enough to establish standing. The Defendants further argued that the Motion should be dismissed because the Plaintiff States' substantive claims lack merit and because the Plaintiff States are outside the zone of interests regulated by the APA. On October 11, 2019, Judge George Daniels granted the motion for preliminary injunction. First, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States had standing, that their claims were ripe for judicial review, and that they were within the zone of interests regulated by the APA. Then, after analyzing the long-standing definition of the term public charge and whether Congress intended to redefine public charge, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States sufficiently alleged that the Rule exceeds statutory authority and is contrary to law. Judge Daniels also ruled that the Plaintiff States sufficiently demonstrated that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States and "law-abiding citizens who have come to this country to seek a better life" will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Finally, Judge Daniels ordered that the injunction be applied nationwide, in order to unify national immigration policy and in consideration of nearly two dozen other jurisdictions that have had suits brought challenging the Rule. 408 F.Supp.3d 334. On October 30, 2019, the Defendants filed an appeal of the order granting preliminary injunction; the Defendants also sought to stay the preliminary injunction. On December 2, 2019, Judge Daniels denied the Defendants' motion to stay. Judge Daniels reasoned that "to stay the injunction would be inconsistent with this Court's underlying findings of Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, and of the irreparable injury that Plaintiffs, noncitizens, and the general public would suffer in the absence of an effective injunction." 2019 WL 6498250. On January 8, 2020, while the Defendants' appeal was pending, the Second Circuit denied the Defendants' motion for stay pending appeal of the nationwide preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 95815. On January 13, 2020, the Defendants submitted to Justice Ginsburg of the Supreme Court an application for stay of the preliminary injunction while the appeal is pending in the Second Circuit. Justice Ginsburg referred the application to the Supreme Court on January 27, 2020. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Defendants' application for stay and thus stayed the District Court’s October 11, 2019 orders granting a nationwide preliminary injunction. In granting the Defendants' application, Justice Gorsuch, writing the opinion for the court, addressed the many suits, injunctions, and stays regarding the Rule occurring across the country and concluded that the "routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions." These nationwide injunctions, Justice Gorsuch reasoned, shared a similar flaw in that "they direct how the defendant must act toward persons who are not parties to the case." Justice Gorsuch also found that these nationwide injunctions encouraged gamesmanship and forum shopping, that if a single district court issued a nationwide injunction, "the government’s hope of implementing any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep, parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0 victory in the courts of appeal." Thus, in granting the Defendants' application for stay and staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court found the occasion to address its concerns with the proliferation of nationwide injunctions. 140 S.Ct. 599. After the Supreme Court ruling, the Defendants stated that the rule would take effect on February 24, 2020. Following the Supreme Court's stay of the preliminary injunction and a Ninth Circuit opinion "concluding that the Rule falls well within the Executive Branch’s discretion to interpret and implement the public charge inadmissibility provision in the INA," the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on February 14, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants were taking "a third bite at the apple" and that because Defendants offered "no new substantive arguments, and this Court has already evaluated and rejected Defendants’ contentions under the more stringent standards governing entry of a preliminary injunction," the motion to dismiss should be denied. On the same day, the Plaintiffs, along with the Plaintiffs in <i>Make the Road New York, et al. v. Kenneth Cuccinelli, et al.,</i> filed a motion to consolidate the two actions for pre-trial purposes. The parties argued that the cases meet the standard for consolidation as they share many common questions of fact and law and also assert the same constitutional violation and cause of action. On March 6, 2020, the Plaintiff States sent a letter to the Defendants urging them "to immediately stop implementation of [the Rule] ... in the wake of the COVID-19 coronavirus." The Plaintiff states asserted that, in the context of a nationwide outbreak of COVID-19, "DHS’s policy of deterring immigrants from using the medical benefits to which they are legally entitled directly undermines and frustrates our public health professionals’ efforts, putting our communities and residents at unnecessary risk." On April 13, 2020, the Plaintiff States filed a motion in the Supreme Court to temporarily lift or modify the Court's stay of the district court's October 11, 2019 and December 6, 2019 orders. The Plaintiffs' asserted that, while state and local authorities had taken "extraordinary efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and protect the health and well-being of ... residents," the Rule undermined those efforts by "deterring immigrants from accessing healthcare and public benefits that are essential tools for protecting the public at large . . . ." The Supreme Court denied the motion to temporarily lift or modify the stay on April 24, 2020, but ruled that “[t]his order does not preclude a filing in the District Court as counsel considers appropriate.” Back in the district court, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction and stay or a temporary restraining order on April 28, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that immigrants would be deterred from seeking public health benefits out of fear of violating the public charge rule, which would exacerbate the national health crisis. These changed facts, the plaintiffs believed, provided the district court the authority to issue an injunction despite the Supreme Court's previous stay. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. 2020 WL 4347264. The Defendants appealed the court’s preliminary injunction order to the Second Circuit on August 3, 2020. On August 12, 2020, the Second Circuit stayed the injunction with respect to all states but the Plaintiff States (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) until the Second Circuit ruled on the motion to stay. The Second Circuit then stayed the second preliminary injunction altogether on September 11, 2020 while the Second Circuit considered the Defendants’ appeal of the district court’s first preliminary injunction order. 974 F.3d 210. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. As a result, the Plaintiffs argued, DHS’s and USCIS’s implementation of the Rule exceeded the departments’ statutory authority under FVRA and was not in accordance with the law under the APA. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s initial preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that the Rule is contrary to the INA and arbitrary and capricious. 969 F.3d 42. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Following their Second Circuit win, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. In response, on November 17, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims that the Rule was invalid because it was issued by an unlawfully serving Acting DHS Secretary, insisting that the Rule was promulgated pursuant to the APA and ratified by lawful agency officials, including the Acting DHS Secretary. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In August of 2019, three states and the City of New York filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Department of Homeland Security's Public Charge Rule, enacted in August of 2019, expanded the number of programs that the federal government would consider when making public charge determinations to include health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Public Charge Rule would result in harm to the Plaintiff States and its residents by deterring legal residents from enrolling in basic benefit programs out of fear of being determined a "public charge" and rendered inadmissible for citizenship. District Court Judge George Daniels granted the Plaintiff States' Motion to Stay Pending Judicial Review and Preliminary Injunction, resulting in the Rule not being implemented as planned. In January 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, and Defendants accordingly implemented the Rule in February 2020. In April 2020, the Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay of the January 2020 order in light of the ongoing COVID-19 national emergency. The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the district court, asserting that the Rule is hindering efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and causing irreparable harm to citizens and non-citizens. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction. The court then enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. The Defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which stayed the second preliminary injunction order until it ruled on the first. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, where the matter was pending as of December 19, 2020. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. The Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs' motion and moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims that the rule was promulgated improperly. The court has yet to rule on these motions as of December 19, 2020. This case is ongoing.


On May 17, 2000 the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance that required all police officers and firefighters over the age of 63 to be involuntarily retired at the end of the year. Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). This act makes it unlawful to discharge a person because of his or her age but contains a public safety exception for police officers and firefighters so long as the forced retirement is not a subterfuge. Plaintiff also alleged due process violations under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The case was consolidated with Minch v. City of Chicago, a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On April 9, 2001 Chicago filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Elaine E. Bucklo) granted defendant's motion to dismiss in regards to the due process claims of the police plaintiffs but denied it in regards to all other claims on March 25, 2002. Chicago then filed a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit which was granted on May 5, 2002. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner, Judge Manion, and Judge Rovener) ruled on April 9, 2004 that it was possible for a plaintiff to prevail in a case of this sort but that in this particular case it was not. The Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the ADEA claims. On May 13, 2004 the district court (Judge Samuel Der−Yeghiayan) did so. The cases were completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 after the firefights elected not to continue with their due process claims.

Summary: Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and his due process rights. The case was consolidated with a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On March 25, 2002 the due process claims of the police plaintiffs were dismissed. Defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit which directed on April 9, 2004 that the ADEA complaints be dismissed. The case was completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 when the firefighters elected not to continue with their due process claims.


On February 4, 2020, three Michigan residents whose vehicles were seized and impounded by police filed this putative class action lawsuit against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the public interest organization Institute for Justice and private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983; they contended that Wayne County's vehicle seizure policies and practices are unconstitutional. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief for violations of the 4th Amendment, the excessive fines clause of the 8th Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The complaint alleged that Wayne County's policies create incentives for "the seizure of property without probable cause" and are designed to "maximize revenue" rather than fight crime. Wayne County allegedly seized and impounded cars "based simply on their proximity to crimes" committed by someone other than the driver. Once confiscated, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay "arbitrary fees" or go through a lengthy nuisance-abatement proceeding without the opportunity to assert an "innocent owners" defense. For the named plaintiff, her car was allegedly impounded because her boyfriend was suspected of engaging in prostitution-related activities. She alleged that her car was impounded twice merely because it was in proximity to prostitution and drug-related activities, and that she was ultimately forced to pay a flat redemption fee to reclaim her vehicle, without an opportunity to assert that she was not present or involved in the alleged activity that prompted the seizure. This process ultimately forced her to file for bankruptcy and lose her car. The plaintiffs seek to certify a class of "persons who own a vehicle (or other property within a vehicle) that has been or will be seized by Defendant Wayne County on or after February 5, 2018 and before the date of class certification, whether pursuant to Michigan’s Controlled Substances Act (MCL 333.7521, et seq.), the Public Nuisances chapter of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 (MCL 600.3801, et seq.), or the so-called Omnibus Forfeiture Act (MCL 600.4701, et seq.)," as well as a subclass of individuals who had their vehicles so seized when they were not present or present but not suspected of any wrongdoing. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on March 12, 2020. They argued that the named plaintiff lacked standing and suffered no constitutional violation because she waived any challenge to the seizure of her property. Further, they contended that there was probable cause - the car was suspected of being connected to prostitution-related activities - to seize her vehicle, and that therefore she had no legal claim. On May 1, 2020, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to specify that the police did not have probable cause to suspect any prostitution-related activities. Additionally, the amended complaint added an new plaintiff to the lawsuit and greater detail about Wayne County's alleged unconstitutional processes and their impact on the defendants. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur J. Tarnow presiding.

Summary: In 2020, Michigan residents whose cars were seized and impounded filed this putative class action against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that Wayne County's policy of seizing and impounding vehicles and asset forfeiture process violated their 4th, 8th, and 14th amendment rights. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur Tanow presiding.


On June 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed this class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. The alleged violations stemmed from Monsanto's conversion on January 1, 1997, of its pension plan from a conventional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. As the case proceeded other cases were consolidated and various additional plaintiffs who had similar complaints and defendants with the same pension plan were joined. On September 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed their final amended consolidated class action complaint. It contained ten counts that constituted three general allegations: that the pension plans violated ERISA by ceasing or reducing the rate an employee's benefits accrued on account of age, that the plans violated ERISA by back-loading the rate at which benefits accrued for older workers, and that the payment of interest on late benefit payments was below the rate specified in one of the plans. On August 29, 2007, the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007, the court dismissed three counts of the complaint relating to the reduction of the rate at which benefits accrued with prejudice on the basis of a recently decided case in the Seventh Circuit. Class action status was certified on May 22, 2008. The district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) issued two opinions on June 11, 2009, concerning the competing motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on the claim that one plan failed to pay adequate interest on delayed pension payments. But the court granted defendants summary judgment on the counts relating to the back-loading of the rate at which benefits accrued. On October 27, 2009, plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on September 22, 2010, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. On September 30, 2014, the district court ordered the exhibits to be destroyed or disposed of, and the case closed.

Summary: On June 23, 2004 plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. On August 29, 2007 the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007 the court dismissed part of the complaint. On June 11, 2009 the district court summary judgment to the plaintiffs on one remaining claim and to defendants on all others. On October 27, 2009 plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on July 30, 2010 the decision of the district court was affirmed.


On June 17, 2015, death row prisoners at California's San Quentin prison, who had been kept in prolonged solitary confinement, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were confined under inhumane and degrading conditions for excessively long periods, from three to twenty-six years, without meaningful review of their placement or hope of release. The plaintiffs claimed that they were deprived of basic human needs, suffered serious psychological and physical injury, had been coerced into providing information, and were subject to disproportionate punishment. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that they were placed in solitary confinement on the basis of allegations of gang affiliation without reliable evidence, even though they were not involved in any current gang activity. On August 17, 2015, this case was reassigned to Judge Claudia Wilkens, who had also been assigned to a similar case, Ashker v. Brown. On September 8, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas for settlement and a settlement conference was set for October 28, 2015. As of May, 14, 2016, settlement negotiations were ongoing, and both parties continued to submit status reports. On October 10, 2016, there was a settlement conference before Judge Vadas but the matter was not settled. Another settlement conference was scheduled for January 3, 2017, and it was rescheduled for February 15, 2017. On January 17, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. On February 15, 2017, the defendants and five of the six plaintiffs entered into a full settlement of the case. Under the settlement, the parties agreed to stay the litigation and suspend all activity until July 18, 2017. The litigation was to remain stayed for an additional ninety days, during which time the plaintiffs could move to have the stay lifted by showing current, ongoing, and systemic constitutional violations continued to exist as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. If the plaintiffs did not file such a motion by October 17, 2017, the parties agreed that the case would be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. One plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement, and because of this, the plaintiffs argued that the settlement agreement was invalid. The parties continued to negotiate and the plaintiffs presented the defendants with a proposed settlement agreement that was signed by all six plaintiffs. The defendants requested further time to negotiate. On July 24, 2017, the parties requested to stay the litigation once again. On August 21, 2017, Judge Wilken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the parties' ongoing efforts to settle the case. On October 3, 2017, the parties were still negotiating and declared that they would update the court on their progress towards settlement on October 10, 2017. On October 10, 2017, the parties were still negotiating. On November 9, 2017, the parties requested that the matter be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and Judge Wilken granted this order. On January 10, 2018, there was a motion to intervene filed and on January 26, 2018, there was a motion for relief from judgment. Both motions were filed by the same individual, and both motions were denied by Judge Wilken on September 5, 2018.

Summary: In 2015 death row prisoners at San Quentin prison, who have been kept in solitary confinement for years without meaningful review, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was voluntarily dismissed.


Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. They faced imminent removal to Iraq. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, the ACLU National Immigrant Rights Project, and other counsel, they alleged that their removal into dangerous circumstances would violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and that removing them without giving them a chance to assert their defenses under the INA and CAT would violate the Due Process Clause. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and was assigned to Judge Mark Goldsmith. The same day as they initiated the action, petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The government filed its opposition, and the motion was heard on June 21, 2017. The next day, the District Court granted a 14-day emergency stay of removal pending fuller consideration and decision on the court's authority over the matter. The stay was set for 14 days preliminarily. On June 24, 2017, the petitioners filed a complaint and amended habeas petition, along with a motion to expand the June 22nd 14-day Order Staying Removal to cover a nationwide class of Iraqi nationals facing imminent removal to Iraq. On June 26, the Court granted that the motion, staying removal of "all Iraqi nationals in the United States with final orders of removal, who have been, or will be, arrested and detained by ICE as a result of Iraq’s recent decision to issue travel documents to facilitate U.S. removal." 2017 WL 2806144 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The stay was effective for 14 days, until July 10. On June 29, 2017, the petitioners/plaintiffs (the petitioners became plaintiffs when they filed the complaint in addition to the habeas petition) filed a motion to extend the 14-day stay of removal until resolution of the preliminary injunction they said they'd file on July 14; they also sought discovery of basic information about the putative class. The government opposed both motions. On July 6, Judge Goldsmith extended the 14 day stay until July 24; on July 22, he ruled that he had jurisdiction, and confirmed that the stay would remain in effect. He wrote:
"This Court concludes that to enforce the Congressional mandate that district courts lack jurisdiction — despite the compelling context of this case — would expose Petitioners to the substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution before their legal claims can be tested in a court. That would effectively suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which the Constitution prohibits."
 At a subsequent status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule; the petitioners' preliminary relief brief was due July 17, the government's response July 20, and any reply by July 21 in the morning. The court undertook to rule on that motion by July 24. On July 24, 2017, the District Court granted the petitioners' requested preliminary relief, staying the enforcement of final orders of removal directed to any and all Iraqi nationals in the United States who had final orders of removal on June 24, 2017, and who have been, or will be, detained for removal by ICE. 261 F.Supp.3d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The court explained that the stay of removal would last for each particular class member until he or she completed adjudication of a motion to reopen through the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and (if he or she lost in the immigration courts) until the U.S. Court of Appeals denied an individual stay of removal. The motions to reopen are due, the court said, within 90 days of when the government provides each class member with his or her immigration file. (If a class member fails to file a motion to reopen, or fails to appeal, the stay of removal will expire, as well.) On September 22, 2017, the government appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal on the July preliminary injunction was proceeding, various administrative matters moved forward: immigration files were delivered, etc. More substantively, the plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 13, 2017, raising claims that the class's prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 1, the government moved to dismiss. On November 7, plaintiffs sought a second preliminary injunction on the new detention claims (and also filed an amended motion for class certification). After a hearing on December 22, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on January 2, 2018; he held that any detainee who had spent more than 6 months in detention -- nearly all of them -- was entitled to release 30 days later unless an Immigration Judge found by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing that that detainee poses a flight risk or public safety risk. 285 F.Supp.3d 997 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit consolidated that second appeal with the prior one, which had not yet been argued. Consolidated argument was held April 25, 2018. The matter continued in the district court, with many small issues contested and decided. Among those decisions: The court decided that the regulatory process for governmental immigration bond appeals was unlawful, because it allowed the government to unilaterally extend prolonged detention, and because the process by which the government could obtain a stay of bond release was standardless and deprived the detainee of the opportunity to be heard timely. On June 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion, seeking to remedy alleged coercion by the government, which was trying to obtain detainees "voluntary" agreement to be deported. On June 20, 2018, the court issued an order requiring, among other things, seven day notice to class counsel of any consular interviews, that the government permit and facilitate communication between the class and class counsel, and that the government cease any threatening or coercive communications with class members. However, class counsel argued that the government was failing to comply, in part by failing to provide detainees with notice of their right to communicate with class counsel at a specific staging facility. The petitioners also argued that class members were suffering mistreatment at the Calhoun County Jail as a result of their involvement in this case. On August 22, 2018, Judge Goldsmith agreed that the government was not obligated to provide this notice at temporary staging facilities under his previous order, but found the petitioners claims of mistreatment substantiated. He ordered the government to provide class counsel with the names of detainees at the Calhoun County Jail who had faced administrative or disciplinary sanction. Judge Goldsmith denied the government’s motion to dismiss on September 24, 2018, at the same time granting the petitioners’ motion to certify the primary class. 342 F.Supp.3d 751 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The petitioners moved for a third preliminary injunction on November 1, 2018, arguing that the subclass of detainees who had been held longer than six months were entitled to immediate release from detention because there was not a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioners argued that under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in the absence of such a likelihood, prolonged detention was unlawful. On November 20, 2018, Judge Goldsmith granted that injunction, ruling to release all detainees who had been held longer than six months under orders of supervision. 349 F.Supp.3d 665 (E.D. Mich 2018). The releases were to take place no later than December 20, 2018. All but a handful of the detainees were released by that date. On January 18, 2019, the government appealed. Also on December 20, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in the consolidated appeals from the first two preliminary injunctions. 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). Writing for the court, Judge Alice Batchelder vacated the District Court’s preliminary injunctions halting removal and ordering bond hearings. The case was ordered remanded with instructions to dismiss the removal-based claims for lack of jurisdiction. On February 4, 2019, the petitioners filed for en banc rehearing of the decision, arguing that the INA did not strip the court of jurisdiction, and that such a broad reading would create a circuit split as well as intra-circuit conflict. The petition for rehearing delayed the effective date of the Court of Appeals order until it was denied; the order then became effective on April 9, 2019. That meant that as of April 9, 2019, the stay of removal was lifted. However, the vacatur of the bond order did not mean that anyone got redetained, because those released on bond were protected by the third preliminary injunction, the release order. The third appeal was still pending, and back in District Court, Judge Goldsmith issued an order on March 12, 2019, staying the case pending resolution of that third appeal. Although Judge Goldsmith stayed future substantive proceedings at the district level, he ruled that the court would continue to supervise compliance with non-reversed court orders. So the release order remained in effect. However, Judge Goldsmith set up a process by which the government could seek to redetain individuals whom ICE believed were close to removal; for several of these individuals, the Court granted redetention. It seemed that Iraq had begun to allow a few removals of class members. In fact, one such class member  died in Iraq shortly after his repatriation there. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs/petitioners sought certiorari review of the Sixth Circuit's stay ruling. On January 3, 2020, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision with regard to the third preliminary injunction, which required the government to release all primary subclass members once the government has detained them for six months. Judge Jeffery Sutton delivered the opinion, in which the court vacated the injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The appeals court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this class-wide injunction and that it was inappropriate to extend Zadvyas to this setting. Similar to the reasoning in the appeals court's last opinion, the district court lacked jurisdiction because the INA stripped all courts, save for the Supreme Court, of "jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232." The appeals court reasoned that Zadvyas should not be extended because in that case aliens were detained under one provision while in this case, the government has detained class members under four provisions. Because the provisions in each case differed, the appeals court reasoned that the district court should not have extended the Zadvyas standard onto the different provisions. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on February 16, 2020. On February 16, 2020, Judge Goldsmith issued an order administratively closing the case pending resolution of appellate matters. Judge Goldsmith concluded that administratively closing the case was appropriate because the Sixth Circuit had yet to issue an operative ruling and that such a ruling would eventually impact further proceedings. While the case was administratively closed for the time being, the district court would continue to supervise and maintain the status quo of the third preliminary injunction until the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate. As of March 16, 2020, the first preliminary injunction (the stay of removal) was vacated, but the matter remained pending on a petition for Supreme Court review. Both the second and third preliminary injunctions were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On July 2, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the the petition for writ of certiorari. On November 25, 2020, one of the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied on December 23. The plaintiff filed a letter on December 24, 2020, which the court treated this letter as a motion for reconsideration of the denial. On January 25, 2021, the court denied to reconsider it because they did not find that there was a palpable defect in the original denial. On March 3, the parties filed a joint memorandum requesting an adjournment of a status conference in light of the Department of Homeland Security's plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021. On March 4, the court granted the request. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The district court stayed petitioners' removal, but that injunction was vacated by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioners petitioned for Supreme Court review, which was denied on July 2, 2020. The case is ongoing and the Department of Homeland Security plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021.


On April 23, 2015, a group of inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act (the "FCA"), 47 U.S.C. §§201,206,207 and 276, and Pennsylvania law. They alleged that GTL participated in unjust, unreasonable, unfair and deceptive conduct from January 1, 2000 through the present (the "Class Period") by charging exorbitant rates and fees - up to 100 times normal market rates for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities throughout the United States. GTL and its subsidiaries serve over 2,200 correctional facilities and 1.1 million inmates in forty-eight states. The plaintiffs sought certification of this action as a class action and declaratory and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that GTL created a monopoly through exclusive contracts with thousands of correctional facilities, and therefore faces little or no market competition to challenge its intrastate telephone rates. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that in return for this monopoly power, GTL provided kickbacks to the contracting facilities. Reports have estimated that the kickbacks paid to correctional facilities exceed $124 million per year. During rule-making proceedings, the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") looked at whether intrastate charges were unreasonably high, unfair, and far in excess of the cost of providing service. The FCC concluded that they were, and that GTL had exploited their economic position by charging rates for intrastate calls greatly exceeding the cost of providing service, in direct violation of Sections 201 and 276 of the FCA that those rates be just, reasonable, and fair. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiffs' filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Western District of Arkansas to join a related pending cases against GTL. That motion was granted on May 31, 2016. Once transferred, the case was consolidated with <i>Chruby et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corporation</i> by Judge Timothy L. Brooks. Once consolidated, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was considered and denied by Judge Brooks, citing aspects of the cases brought that required overwhelmingly claimant-specific factual analysis. Plaintiffs' filed an appeal on this question to the US Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 12, 2017, and the petition was denied and October 27, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 27, 2018.

Summary: In 2015, inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act. They alleged that GTL charged exorbitant rates and fees for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities. Following consolidation with related cases in the Western District of Arkansas, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied, as was their petition to appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case was dismissed with prejudice in 2018.


On March 18, 1997, a federal inmate in state custody in Texas filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that the defendants had exhibited a deliberative indifference to his medical condition and as such had violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that when he entered the custody of the Defendants his initial medical screening health questionnaire was incorrectly completed in violation of policy. The Plaintiff asserted that as a result of the indifferent administration of the initial medical screening health questionnaire, he was incorrectly classified as not disabled which prevented him from receiving the accommodations he required. Plaintiff in fact has epilepsy, major depression, and a number of other disabling disorders. The Plaintiff was subsequently housed in the administrative segregation section, rather than in the hospital ward as he claimed was required by his medical condition. The Plaintiff contends that this initial misclassification upon entry into custody lead to 17 months of being housed in an incorrect unit without access to the proper accommodations he was entitled to as a disabled person. The Plaintiff claimed that the lack of proper accommodations led to excessive seizures and mental anguish. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition and failed to adequately treat the Plaintiff's chronic kidney disorder for 17 months, which had serious implications for his health in violation of the equal protection clause and the due process clause. Additionally, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had breached their duty owed to the Plaintiff as a disabled person by compelling him to wear leg irons, despite their use having been restricted because of his orthopedic disability. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care to control his diabetes, which led to a partial loss of his vision. The Plaintiff further contended that as a result of his inadequate medical care and incorrect classification, he stood trial for a federal crime in a diminished mental and debilitative state in violation of his 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights. On motion for summary judgment, the District Court first found that Congress did not intend for the Americans with Disabilities Act to apply to the treatment of prisoners within state prisons. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff's ADA claim. Pursuant to the 11th Amendment, the District Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities. On the Plaintiff's deprivation of medical care claims, the court held that o amount a constitutional deprivation of medical care, the acts or omissions must be "sufficiently serious to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Negligent failure to supply medical care does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Consequently, as to the Plaintiff's §1983 claims, the District Court held that Hall was not denied medical care and consistently received medical care throughout his incarceration, therefore even taken as true, the Defendant's acts and omissions did not amount to a constitutional deprivation of medical care. Therefore, the Plaintiff's §1983 claims were dismissed by the District Court. In the end, the District Court granted all of the summary judgment motions before it, and dismissed a number of claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff argued that the District Court incorrectly granted the motions for summary judgment and the dismissals for failure to state a claim. On October 26, 1999, the 5th Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders but also held that the District Court had erred in holding that the ADA does not apply to prisoners incarcerated in state prisons. Nevertheless, though it held that the ADA applies to the Plaintiff while incarcerated in the County Jail, the 5th Circuit upheld the District Court's decision on grounds of qualified immunity because the Plaintiff failed to show that the Defendants had shown a deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.

Summary: In this prison conditions case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to prisons. The Court upheld the District Court's denial of plaintiff's claim on qualified immunity grounds.


On November 15, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner and former prisoner observation aid (POA) at the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility (Huron Valley), filed a claim against the warden of Huron Valley, as well as a corrections officer and another staff member at Huron Valley in the U.S. District Court of Eastern Michigan. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The case was presided over by Judge Sean F. Cox. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, monetary damages, and for the plaintiff to be reinstated as a POA at Huron Valley. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants fired her from her position as a POA in retaliation for reporting misconduct against two mentally ill prisoners to external professional advocates and organizations when her internal reports went unanswered and unresolved. Specifically, the plaintiff witnessed and reported the following: a mentally ill prisoner being “hog-tied” naked and left for an extended period of time screaming in pain, as well as another mentally ill prisoner whose water was intentionally cut off from her cell for multiple days and who later went into cardiac arrest after foaming at the mouth and vomiting from severe dehydration. In both instances, the plaintiff made repeated reports to appropriate officers and staff at Huron Valley, but these reports were ignored. On June 1, 2018, the defendant's motioned for summary judgement. The motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 27, 2019. The court granted the summary judgement in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claims, as well as her First Amendment retaliation claim as it pertained to monetary damages. The summary judgement was also denied in part in favor of the plaintiff with regard to the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against the defendants in their official capacity. The case was dismissed on July 26, 2019 after a settlement agreement was reached between the two parties. Through the settlement agreement, the plaintiff was awarded $6,000 in damages, the option to resume her position as a POA at Huron Valley, and the removal of any records of notations regarding the plaintiff’s initial termination. In addition to the relief awarded directly to the plaintiff, the defendants agreed to instate a new policy allowing POA’s to report misconduct to outside organizations if internal reports are ignored, a training for POA’s on this new policy, and a mandatory annual training given to prison officers and staff regarding prisoners with mental illness. Lastly, defendants agreed to pay $60,000 in attorney's fees.

Summary: A former prison observation aid witnessed and reported two instances of gross misconduct by prison staff against mentally ill inmates to appropriate supervisors but plaintiff's reports went unanswered. After reporting the misconduct to external organizations and advocates, the plaintiff was fired in retaliation. The case was dismissed after a settlement agreement between the parties; plaintiff was awarded relief and reform was made to the prison's policies.