On March 28, 2008, the Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. (ICP) - a Texas non-profit that helps integrate low-income black families into Dallas's predominately white suburban neighborhoods - filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs (TDHCA) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, and the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604 and 3605. In its complaint, ICP, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief, alleging that the TDHCA allocated federal tax credits to housing developers in a discriminatory manner, disproportionately granting credits for development in minority neighborhoods and disproportionately denying credits for development in white neighborhoods, thereby perpetuating racially segregated communities by creating a concentration of subsidized low-income housing in minority areas. ICP offered two theories of discrimination: disparate treatment under § 1982 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and disparate impact under the FHA. Disparate treatment requires that the plaintiff show discriminatory intent, whereas disparate impact allows a plaintiff to establish illegal discrimination by showing that seemingly race-neutral policies disproportionately harm racial minorities without adequate justification. In September 2010, the District Court (Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater) denied the TDHCA's motions for summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings, and granted ICP partial summary judgment. The court concluded that ICP had standing to bring the suit and had made a sufficient initial showing of both disparate treatment and disparate impact discrimination. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 749 F. Supp. 2d 486 (N.D. Tex. 2010). The case then proceeded to trial. On March 20, 2012, Judge Fitzwater held that ICP failed to establish that the TDHCA had acted with discriminatory intent and thus found for the TDHCA on the disparate treatment claims. However, the court ruled in favor of ICP on its disparate impact claim under the FHA and imposed an injunction on the TDHCA. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012). Following trial, the court began to craft the injunction. It considered proposals from the parties and ultimately adopted a remedial plan in August 2012, which stipulated changes to the TDHCA's tax credit allocation process and provided for monitoring by the court for at least five years. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 2012 WL 3201401 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2012), amended in part, 2012 WL 5458208 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2012). In February 2013, the court awarded ICP attorneys' fees and costs totaling $1,893,969. The TDHCA appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the issue of whether the District Court correctly found that ICP proved a violation of the FHA based on disparate impact. On March 24, 2014, the Fifth Circuit (Judge James E. Graves, Jr.) held that the District Court applied the wrong legal test for assessing disparate impact claims and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings under the correct test. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014). The Fifth Circuit's reversal also nullified the remedial plan, and vacated and remanded the award of attorneys' fees. Following the ruling from the Fifth Circuit, the TDHCA sought Supreme Court review, which the Supreme Court granted on October 2, 2014. The TDHCA had sought review on two questions: whether disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, altogether, and if they are, the appropriate standards. The Court limited its review to the former issue. The district court stayed proceedings until the Supreme Court's resolution. On June 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In a majority decision by Justice Kennedy, the Court agreed that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability, but emphasized that liability followed only if the challenged policy or practice actually caused a racial disparity, not merely accompanied one. The Court emphasized, as well, that remedies should not themselves promote unduly racialized decision making. Justice Alito wrote the principal dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Thomas; Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings in light of its opinion. 135 S. Ct. 2507. On remand, the district court decided that the plaintiff’s disparate impact claim should be decided on the current (or a supplemented) trial record. On August 26, 2016, Judge Fitzwater held that the plaintiff had not proved a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that a challenged practice caused a discriminatory effect and dismissed the disparate impact claim. The court applied a more onerous prima facie burden of proof than the one applied originally. 2016 WL 4494322. On October 4, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial. The case is now closed.

Summary: In March 2008, a Texas non-profit brought a housing discrimination suit against the Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs, alleging its allocation of low income housing tax credits resulted in discrimination against African-Americans. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Sidney A. Fitzwater) granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiff, and, after bench trial, found discrimination under a theory of disparate impact, adopted a remedial plan, and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit (James E. Graves, Jr.) reversed and remanded, holding that the lower court employed the wrong legal test in assessing disparate impact claims. In October 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on issue of whether disparate impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act, and the District Court stayed the proceeding until the Supreme Court's resolution. On June 25, 2015, the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit. In a majority decision by Justice Kennedy, the Court agreed that the Fair Housing Act encompassed disparate impact liability. On remand, the District Court held that the plaintiff had not proved a prima facie case of discrimination and dismissed the disparate impact claim. The case is now closed.


On August 15, 2014, a transgender woman from Pennsylvania filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued Cabela’s Retail, Inc., under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000(e) et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (“ADA”). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. She claimed that she has been harmed by the defendant’s discriminatory employment practices. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that due to her transgender status, she was harassed by her co-workers and subjected to hateful comments, was refused consideration for promotions and was forced to work alone in undesirable shifts. Although the plaintiff reported these incidents to higher ups in the company, it always fell on deaf ears. The Human Resources Director at the company would not even allow her to wear a name tag with her chosen female name or to use the women’s bathroom in the store. The plaintiff was eventually dismissed from her position, despite excellent job performance. The plaintiff argued that her bad treatment constituted sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII, and disability discrimination, in violation of the ADA. She further argued that 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)--which excludes gender identity disorder from coverage by the ADA--is unconstitutional. On October 22, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss but after the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the court rejected the dismissal motion as moot. On November 18, 2014, the defendant filed a new partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Subsequently, on February 10, 2015, the case was reassigned from Judge Jeffrey L. Schmehl to Judge Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. Meanwhile, on January 22, 2015 the plaintiff informed the United States that she was challenging the constitutionality of the Gender Identity Disorder ("GID") exclusion provision of the ADA. That provision excludes "transexualism...[and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment" from the ADA definition of a disability. The United States responded with a Statement of Interest; it stated that the District Court should resolve the plaintiff's Title VII claims before addressing the constitutional challenge, because wherever possible, courts should seek to avoid adjudication of constitutional challenges. On February 23, 2015 six prominent LGBTQ advocacy organizations urged the court to invalidate the GID exclusion as unconstitutional or alternatively to find that gender dysphoria is outside the scope of the GID exclusion. Judge Leeson was apparently unpersuaded by the U.S.'s constitutional avoidance argument; on September 21, 2015, he ordered the United States to file a supplemental statement of interest actually addressing the constitutionality of the ADA's GID exclusion. Finally, on November 16, 2015, the United States filed a second Statement of Interest which argued that the District Court should adopt the construction that gender dysphoria, because it has a physical cause, falls outside the scope of the GID exclusion provision, allowing gender dysphoria to be included under the ADA's definition of "disability". This construction again allowed the District Court to avoid addressing the constitutionality of the GID exclusion provision itself. Various LGBT advocacy groups filed an amici statement in support of this construction that found gender dysphoria outside the GID exclusion. Oral argument on the issue was held on December 9, 2015. On May 18, 2017, Judge Leeson denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's ADA claims, in an opinion marking the first time the court ruled that transgender people are not categorically barred from seeking relief from discrimination under the ADA. 2017 WL 2178123. Judge Leeson did not rule on the constitutionality of the GID exclusion from ADA coverage, but adopted a narrow interpretation of the term gender identity disorders to "refer to only the condition of identifying with a different gender, not to encompass (and therefore exclude from ADA protection) a condition like Blatt's gender dysphoria, which goes beyond merely identifying with a different gender and is characterized by clinically significant stress and other impairments that may be disabling." Judge Leeson found that Blatt's gender dysphoria was therefore not excluded from ADA coverage, and that Blatt had plausibly alleged the elements of an ADA retaliation claim: 1) she suffered from a disabling condition under the ADA, not encompassed in the GID exclusion; 2) she engaged in protected activity by reporting discrimination and requesting accommodations for disability; 3) she was subjected to a "pattern of antagonism" as a result of this activity, including Cabela's allegedly intentional and repeated refusal to provide her with a correct name tag. The defendant filed an answer to the plaintiff's amended complaint on August 1, 2017. The parties scheduled a mediation with former Judge Annette Rizzo on September 11, 2017. Magistrate Judge Henry S. Perkin dismissed the case on September 18, 2017 because the parties reached an undisclosed settlement. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for 90 days thereafter. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 15, 2014, a transgender female citizen of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged harassment, discrimination and eventual termination due to her gender identity. The parties reached an undisclosed settlement in September 2017.


On October 15, 2014, the plaintiff, an inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against prison administrators, including the warden and guards, for violating his Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff filed pro se, but requested representation. Specifically, the inmate alleged that he was forced to inhale second-hand cigarette smoke which jeopardized his health in general and aggravated his asthma. He alleged that prison staff acted with deliberate indifference to the dangers cigarette smoke posed to his health, and even encouraged the smoking by selling large amounts of cigarettes to inmates. Moreover, he noted that the prison had a policy against indoor smoking, but this regulation was rarely if ever enforced. The inmate sought an injunction to stop the smoking at Crossroads and other correctional centers, as well as prohibiting the sale of tobacco products in prisons. On May 8, 2015, the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction was denied because the complaint called for post-judgment relief. On June 8, 2015 the case was dismissed due to the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, however, he was able to reopen the case by filing an amended complaint on June 30, 2015. On October 7, 2015, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the Eighth Circuit to challenge the district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief. The Circuit Court assessed a $505 fee for the appeal, which the plaintiff was unable to pay. Therefore, on October 15, 2015 the plaintiff requested the appeal be dismissed, which the court granted on October 20, 2015. Months later, on July 11, 2016, the district court appointed private counsel to represent the plaintiff in this case. The parties subsequently entered into mediation to try reaching a settlement. However, these mediation talks fell apart in late October 2016, and the parties began to prepare for trial. On April 12, 2017 the trial was held before a jury. The jury delivered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff awarding him $40,000 in compensatory damages and $71,000 in punitive damages. Following the trial the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees and expenses. On May 10, 2017, however, the defense filed a motion with the court requesting a judgment as a matter of law in their favor or a new trial. Both requests were denied on June 26, 2017. The court found that deliberate indifference was evident, in part, because the plaintiff was able to show he had previously filed eight grievances with information about his suffering health. Defendants did not do anything to alleviate the problem, and the court found that a reasonable jury could conclude that serious injury could result from such treatment. The damage amount remained in place and the Court found no evidence to support the defendants’ motion for a new trial. On June 27, 2017, the court advised the parties to enter mediation concerning the injunctive relief. 2017 WL 2773709. While mediation continued, defendants appealed the amount of damages to the Eighth Circuit on July 26, 2017. On September 21, 2017, the two parties indicated they had reached an agreement regarding the implementation of injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff, and together made a joint motion for post judgment injunctive relief, which was then affirmed by the court, issuing an order for post judgment injunctive relief. The court ordered that all correctional facilities across Missouri should remove cigarette products from their facilities on or before April 1, 2018. On October 3, 2017 the court awarded plaintiff’s counsel $161,681.02 in attorneys fees. The plaintiff was also ordered to pay $11,100, which was ten percent of the award granted to him by the jury. 2017 WL 4399566. In 2018, the Eighth Circuit issued their opinion. 900 F.3d 549. They held that, while plaintiff showed that defendants were sufficiently indifferent to his well-being to justify damages, plaintiff did not provide evidence that defendants were malicious in their treatment toward him, so he was not owed punitive damages. The court vacated the award of punitive damages and remanded for further proceedings. On April 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice.

Summary: An inmate at Crossroads Correctional Center brought this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against prison administrators. He alleged that the prison violated his Eighth Amendment rights by not enforcing a nonsmoking policy. The case went to trial, and the jury awarded the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages due to the prison staff's deliberate indifference to plaintiff's condition. The parties later agreed to a joint motion that ordered all prisons in Missouri to stop sales of tobacco products to inmates. The defendant appealed the damages amount to the Eighth Circuit, and the appeals court overturned the award of punitive damages against the defendants.


On September 20, 1996 parents of a child with special education needs filed suit against the Arkansas Department of Education (ADE), Arch Ford Education Services Cooperative, and the local school district, in the Eastern District of Arkansas for their failure to provide additional treatment to their child, consistent with the "Lovaas methodology," an educational methodology found to have had success in treating children with autism. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district's refusal to implement 40 weekly hours of Lovaas-based education was a violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The ADE moved for dismissal or summary judgment, asserting in part that the Eleventh Amendment prevented a federal court from exercising jurisdiction over the IDEA, § 504, and § 1983 claims. The district court judge denied this motion. The judge agreed with the order in Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ., which held that the Congress properly exercised its power when it legislated the provisions of IDEA that abrogate the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of Educ. (E.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 1997)(holding that Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) made IDEA's abrogation provisions valid.) In August, 1999, Bradley was reversed on appeal by the 8th Circuit. 189 F.3d 745, 756 (8th Cir. 1999). Arkansas subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal for this case, arguing that the Bradley panel's decision that declared § 504 invalid for stepping over state sovereign immunity should apply here. 189 F.3d 745, 756 (8th Cir. 1999). But on plaintiffs' suggestion for rehearing en banc on the spending-power issue alone, the 8th Circuit in January, 2001 vacated that portion of the panel's opinion in Bradley and held that Section 504 is a valid exercise of Congress's spending power. 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001). In the same opinion, the 8th Circuit held that Arkansas waived its immunity with respect to Section 504 suits by accepting federal funds and accordingly affirmed the judgment of the District Court denying the State's motion to dismiss. 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 949 (2001). However, in April, 2001, the district court held that the defendant school district has provided the plaintiff with an education program that satisfies the district's legal obligations. First, the court agreed with the 1996 ruling from the administrative hearing that was in favor of the school district. Upon the plaintiffs' request to implement the Lovaas-based instruction, an adminisitrative due process hearing was held under IDEA. At the hearing, experts testified that there are similarities between the Lovaas method and the teaching methods adopted by the ADE and pointed out negative components of the Lovaas method. In a decision dated August 21, 1996, Hearing Officer Ammel ruled in favor of the school district. Second, the court found that after the 1996 hearing, the district continued to reimburse the Plaintiffs for 19 weekly hours of Lovaas instruction which were carried out in the Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs continued supplementing, at their own expense, the amount of Lovaas instruction funded by the district so that the plaintiff was receiving about 40 hours of weekly Lovaas instruction. Third, the court agreed with the 1999 administrative due process hearing, which ruled that the school district had met its burden of proving that J.C.'s IEP was reasonably calculated to offer him educational benefits. Therefore, the court concluded that the state defendant was compliant with IDEA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, finding no manifest error of law or fact. The Supreme Court denied cert.

Summary: Parents who demanded the "Lovaas" instruction for their child with special needs brought suit in 1996 against the Arkansas Department of Education, claiming that the ADE failed to comply with Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The State of Arkansas, defending ADE, filed an interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the section 504 claim was moot. But pursuant to the 8th Circuit's decision in <i>Bradley</i>, 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2000), Arkansas was held to have waived its immunity with respect to Section 504 suits by accepting federal funds, and the lawsuit proceeded at the district court. In April, 2001, the district court held in finality that the defendant school district has provided the plaintiff with an education program that satisfies the district's legal obligations.


On December 15, 2006, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Oklahoma and its' officials and subgroups responsible for operation of the L.E. Rader Center ("Rader") juvenile detention facility. The complaint, as amended on May 4, 2007, alleged that the defendants (1) denied Rader's residents their rights to protection from harm from staff, from other residents, and from improper administration of psychotropic drugs; (2) provided inadequate mental health care at Rader, particularly as to screening, assessment, treatment and transition planning, and psychiatric and psychological services; and (3) failed to provide required special education services to qualifying Rader residents. Represented by Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorneys, the federal government initiated the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The amended complaint alleged that the state defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and related regulations, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401. The case, assigned to District Judge Gregory K. Frizzell, prompted motion and discovery practice resulting in several June 2007, unpublished orders by Magistrate Judge Frank H. McCarthy. These addressed matters such as protective orders to keep disclosed information about residents confidential; scheduling of on-site inspections at Rader by plaintiffs' counsel and expert consultants; who would bear the cost of security escorts during the visits (the United States, said the magistrate); and whether interviews conducted during the visits would have to be recorded (they would). In June 2008, a settlement was reached and on September 9, 2008, the court (Judge Frizzell) entered an order incorporating the consent decree. The case was terminated at this time. The consent decree included resolutions to protect juvenile residents from harm, prevention of suicide and self-harm, mental health care, and special education claims, and was set to expire three years from the date it was signed. In September 2011, a little over a week before the consent decree was set to expire, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to modify the decree. The plaintiffs alleged that since Rader was closed by the state in 2011, there had been several incidents at two "replacement" facilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had not given them full access to investigate the incidents. The plaintiffs wanted the consent decree modified to extend to these other facilities so that the incidents could be investigated with the support of the court. The defendants objected, arguing that Rader was the only facility under the order and that the two facilities are not replacements as defined in the consent decree. The court agreed with the defendants, finding that the separate, pre-existing juvenile centers were not replacements under the terms of the consent decree. Defendants then filed a Motion to Dismiss, citing the expiration of the consent decree, which the court granted on November 18, 2011.

Summary: On December 15, 2006, the United States filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the state of Oklahoma and its' officials and subgroups responsible for operation of the L.E. Rader Center ("Rader") juvenile detention facility. Represented by Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorneys, the federal government initiated the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The amended complaint alleged that the state defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and related regulations, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401. A consent decree was entered in 2008 with a term of three years. The case is now closed, despite plaintiffs' efforts to extend the Consent decree after defendants closed the Rader facility and refused to abide by the decree with respect to incidents reported at centers plaintiffs argued constituted "replacement facilities" under the decree.


On March 31, 2016, individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They sued the state of Ohio, including the state's disability departments, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Social Security Act. The plaintiffs issued a press release on the same day, available here. The case was assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. The plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf of all patients institutionalized, or at serious risk of institutionalization, at Intermediate Care Facilities (ICF) for individuals with intellectual disabilities, even though they had preferred to reside in an integrated, community-based setting and receive integrated, community-based employment or day services. They claimed that they were experiencing, or were at risk of experiencing, pervasive and widespread isolation and segregation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C. (along with the listed statutes above). The Ability Center of Greater Toledo also joined the suit as a plaintiff, claiming that it suffered economic injury. The complaint estimated that the class included approximately 27,800 similarly situated individuals. In the period from May until October, the defendants made several motions to dismiss. On August 22, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On September 21, 2016, Magistrate Judge Deavers issued an order regarding discovery, setting a due date of January 31, 2017 for the plaintiffs’ amended motion for class certification. On March 23, 2017, Judge Sargus issued an opinion and order denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss (except for Governor John Kasich’s motion, which was granted in part and denied in part). 244 F. Supp. 3d 662 (S.D. Ohio 2017). The court rejected the Director of Opportunities for Ohioans with Disabilities’ argument that the court should dismiss the class action because Disability Rights Ohio (whose attorneys represented the plaintiffs and signed the complaint) was precluded from bringing the action; the court explained that the scope of representation was a collateral issue best left to the governing agency. The court granted in part the Governor’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ ADA and Social Security Act claims and denied in part his motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ Rehabilitation Act claim. The court rejected the Director of the Ohio Department of Developmental Disability’s claim that a consent decree from a prior case, Martin v. Taft (S.D. Ohio, 2007), and res judicata compelled dismissal; the court explained that this case concerned allegations that arose after Martin. The court also rejected defendants’ arguments concerning justiciability and standing under the Social Security Act. On March 27, 2017, the court (Judge Sargus) issued an opinion and order granting what it described as the plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for class certification. 2017 WL 1148358. The court certified the class as consisting of the following: “All Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio who, on or after March 31, 2016, are institutionalized, or at serious risk of institutionalization, in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds, and who have not documented their opposit[ion] to receiving integrate[d], community-based services.” However, on March 30, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to expedite reconsideration of the class certification order, given that, according to the defendants, the parties were conducting class-based discovery and the defendants’ response to the plaintiffs’ motion was not yet due. On April 7, 2017, the court (Judge Deavers) issued an order setting a new deadline for conducting class discovery (May 19, 2017), and a new deadline for the defendants to file their motion in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification (June 16, 2017). The court also granted the defendants’ unopposed joint motion for extension of time to answer the plaintiffs’ class action complaint. The defendants filed their answers on April 20, 2017. On April 19, 2017, ten individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities served by Ohio's ICF system filed, through their guardians, a motion to intervene as plaintiffs. Following the guardians' motion for intervention, 99 individuals (other guardians of individuals in Ohio ICFs) filed motions to join in intervention. The guardian intervenors indicated that, for their wards, they did not want movement from their current institutional setting and that forcing them to move would cause substantial harm. They feared that the plaintiffs' claims and relief would deny individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities the choice to remain in an ICF. They sought intervention to protect their choice for their ward to remain in an ICF and for ICF placement to be provided as an option for people living in the community with unmet service needs. On May 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition, stating that the requested relief would in no way foreclose the right of individuals to exercise informed choice to remain in ICFs. On June 5, 2017, the court held a settlement conference in which the parties and the proposed intervenors participated. In an order of July 25, 2017, the court (Judge Sargus) permitted intervention by the guardian intervenors and by Ohio Association of County Boards of Developmental Disabilities (OCB). The parties engaged in mediation and significant discovery around the reconsideration of class certification. In light of the class-based discovery and the intervention by the ICF guardians and the county board association, the plaintiffs moved to modify the class definition on August 28, 2017. The court granted the motion on September 20, 2017, and in their October 20, 2017 reply brief, the plaintiffs submitted the following modified class definition: "All Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio who, on or after March 31, 2016, are qualified for home and community-based services, but (a) are institutionalized in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds, and, after receiving options counseling, express that they are interested in, or may be interested in, integrated community-based services; or (b) are at serious risk of institutionalization in an Intermediate Care Facility with eight or more beds and have, by placing themselves on a waiting list for community-based services, expressed an interest in receiving integrated services while continuing to live in the community." On March 30, 2018, the court (Judge Sargus) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 307 F. Supp.3d 701 (S.D. Ohio 2018). The court exercised its discretion to modify class definitions, and revised the class definition as follows: "All Medicaid-eligible adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities residing in the state of Ohio, who, on or after March 31, 2016, are qualified for home and community-based services, and, after receiving options counseling, express that they are interested in community-based services." On September 14, 2018, the guardian intervenors filed a third-party complaint, filing suit against (1) Ohio and its disability departments and (2) the OCB and Disability Rights Ohio. The guardian intervenors filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Social Security Act, the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment, and state law. The sole intention of their suit was to ensure that ICF right was actually offered, properly administered, and adequately funded. Guardian intervenors sought declaratory relief stating that defendants were violating the statutes above, as well as permanent injunctive relief to remedy violations of those statutes. On September 25, 2018, the court (Judge Edmund A. Sargus) issued an order memorializing its definition of the class in response to the dispute about the class definition. The court defined the class as all Medicaid-eligible adults residing in Ohio with intellectual and development disabilities who were qualified for home and community-based service and, after receiving options counseling, wanted community-based services. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of this definition on October 9, 2018, arguing that the class definition should be broader. The court denied this motion on December 7, 2018. On October 25, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the guardian intervenor’s claim. The guardian intervenors withdrew their complaint and voluntarily dismissed their claims on November 20, 2018. On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement. On October 18, 2019, the court issued an order granting preliminary approval of the settlement. The settlement stipulated that the defendants would offer a second round of options counseling to run through June 30, 2021. The counseling would help to identify which individuals interested in community-based services. The defendants also agreed to allocate additional funds to facilitate home and community-based services, including $24 million for housing assistance. The agreement had a tentative end date of January 8, 2023 subject to the resolution of any compliance disputes. Judge Sargus conducted a fairness hearing on December 17, 2019. As with class certification, some individuals living in institutional settings who did not want to receive community-based services were concerned that they would lose access to their current services due to the settlement. On January 10, 2020, Disability Rights Ohio issued a press release asserting that existing services would not be reduced under the settlement. As of March 2020, Judge Sargus has not yet decided whether to give final approval to the settlement.

Summary: On March 31, 2016, individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the State and State departments. They claimed that they were experiencing, or were at risk of experiencing, pervasive and widespread isolation and segregation in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., and the Social Security Act. On March 23, 2017, the court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the case. On March 27, 2017, the court granted class certification, but the defendants subsequently asked for reconsideration, and the court entered a revised class definition on March 30, 2018. On May 10, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement that would entail expanded options counseling and additional funding for individuals with intellectual and development disabilities.


On May 10, 2000, children in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (including a subclass of African American foster care children) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, against the state of Tennessee. The plaintiffs, represented by Children’s Rights and private counsel, sought to enjoin the state from subjecting class members to practices that violated their rights. The plaintiffs alleged that the state violated their substantive and procedural due process rights arising from the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, and relevant regulations; the Americans with Disabilities Act; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The African American class members also alleged violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and its implementing regulations, 42 C.F.R. §80.3 <i>et seq</i>. Specific alleged violations included the state’s placement of children in restrictive institutional settings, placement in emergency shelters for long periods of time, large caseloads and inadequately trained caseworkers, inappropriate foster placements, and too-frequent foster placements. In sum, the actions (or inaction) of the state endangered the health and well-being of the children in the class. The district court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied the state’s motion to dismiss on October 26, 2000. 149 F. Supp. 2d 941. The court urged negotiation of a settlement agreement, which was later approved in July 2001. The settlement agreement called for DCS to hire more caseworkers and to provide better training for them; to develop new placements; and to improve the computerized management system. It also required better review systems measuring outcomes in different areas impacting foster care, and an assessment of disparities related to African American children in care. Finally, an independent monitor was appointed to report on compliance. Following a monitor report that documented DCS’s substantial failure to comply with the agreement, the plaintiffs filed a contempt motion on November 4, 2003. At that point, DCS was in full compliance with only 24 of 136 provisions. The plaintiffs requested an independent administrator to create a plan for implementing the remaining terms. In December 2003, the parties settled the contempt motion. They agreed that DCS would collaborate with a technical assistance committee of five child welfare experts to develop a new implementation plan, which was later approved by the court in August 2004. Although the progress of the implementation plan was slow at first, DCS improved in areas such as staffing and data reporting. The settlement agreement was modified in May 2007, October 2008, and December 2009. The plaintiffs reported that the new DCS leadership team had made significant strides in many areas, including placing more foster children with families and reducing institutional placements. However, Children’s Rights also reported that they would remain in place as a watchdog to hold the agency accountable until all court-ordered reforms were implemented. Periodically, the parties filed modified settlement agreements and exit plans, which recognized the state’s progress and set out specific requirements needed in order for the state to successfully complete the court-ordered improvements and end court involvement. On April 11, 2016, the district court ruled that DCS had reached all of the mandated goals to overhaul its foster care system. The state then entered a yearlong holding period, during which it had to sustain its performance on every measure before requesting an end to the court oversight. On April 27, 2016, the court approved the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, ordering the defendants to pay $186,000. On April 5, 2017, the court approved an additional $135,000 in post-judgment attorneys’ fees. Finally, on November 27, 2017 and January 18, 2019, the court approved additional attorneys’ fee awards of $226,000 and $35,000. On January 10, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. On July 17, 2017, having found that DCS had largely maintained its compliance, the court issued a modified settlement agreement and exit plan. The court terminated its jurisdiction over all matters except for the section of the exit plan pertaining to the external accountability reporting structure. Specifically, DCS was tasked with creating an external accountability reporting center and the court retained jurisdiction to monitor this portion of the agreement for 18 months. Upon termination of the court’s jurisdiction, the Center would begin public reporting. On January 17, 2019, DCS filed an unopposed notice of compliance with the relevant section of the exit plan. On February 25, 2019, the court dismissed the case, terminating its jurisdiction.

Summary: In 2000, children in the custody of Tennessee’s Department of Children’s Services filed this class-action lawsuit against the State of Tennessee, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs, represented by Children’s Rights and private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the defendants from subjecting the members of the class to practices that violated their constitutional rights by endangering their health and well-being. The court approved a settlement agreement in 2000. After sixteen years of litigated implementation, the court determined in 2016 that Tennessee was in compliance with all the requirements of the agreement. On July 17, 2017, the court issued a modified settlement agreement and exit plan, terminating its jurisdiction over all matters except the section of the exit plan pertaining to the external accountability reporting structure (Section XIX), over which the court would retain jurisdiction for 18 months. The court approved a total of $582,000 in attorneys’ fees. In January 2019, DCS filed an unopposed notice of compliance with Section XIX. The court terminated jurisdiction and dismissed the case on February 25, 2019.


On May 1, 1990, male and female youth confined at the Ferris School and Bridge House in Wilmington, Delaware, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Youth Rehabilitation Services (YRS) and the State of Delaware in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the National Prison Project of the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and to the least restrictive treatment under the least restrictive conditions, and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended the defendants subjected the plaintiffs to overcrowding, fire safety hazards, unhealthy living conditions, inadequate medical care, abusive punishment, improper classification, inadequate education, lack of due process, restrictions on communication, inadequate nutrition and recreation. On January 10, 1992, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to expand the class and include more specific allegations with respect to (a) the physical environment, (b) living conditions, (c) physical and verbal abuse, (d) medical, dental and psychiatric care, (e) mental health care, programming and treatment, (e) classification, due process, and the grievance system, and (f) special education services. Further, the amended complaint added a First Amendment claim of right to access to the courts and families. On January 16, 1992, the case was reassigned from Judge Caleb M. Wright to Judge Sue L. Robinson. On March 31, 1992, the case was reassigned from Judge Sue L. Robinson to Judge Roderick R. McKelvie. On May 20, 1992, the District Court (Judge Roderick R. McKelvie) certified a class consisting of those presently or in the future confined at Ferris School or New Castle County Detention Center in Wilmington, Delaware. While settlement negations proceeded, a trial was scheduled. Apparently, the Court would not allow a continuance, so the parties agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice to allow more time for settlement. This dismissal happened on May 3, 1993. On joint motions, in January 1994, the case was restored to the active docket by vacation of the prior dismissal order. The parties submitted their proposed settlement agreement. After a fairness hearing, on May 6, 1994, the District Court (Judge McKelvie) approved the settlement agreement and issued an order for dismissal without prejudice, finding the negotiated settlement agreement to be fair, reasonable and adequate as a basis for compromising the claims of the plaintiff class. Under the settlement agreement, YRS agreed, for three years, (a) to follow stipulated policies on grievances, discipline, control and confinement, (b) to provide the plaintiffs with recreation, exercise, education, medical and mental health care, and (c) to do certain other things with respect to programming, staffing, life safety, sanitation and hygiene. Further, the settlement agreement required YRS to develop a plan to ensure compliance, including the appointment of a Monitor. The dismissal order allowed the plaintiffs to move to reopen the case to request a court order for the performance of the agreement's terms. We have no more information on this file.

Summary: On May 1, 1990, male and female youth confined at the Ferris School and Bridge House in Wilmington, Delaware, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Youth Rehabilitation Services (YRS) and the State of Delaware in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the National Prison Project of the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and to the least restrictive treatment under the least restrictive conditions, and under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Under a settlement agreement, YRS agreed, for three years, (a) to follow stipulated policies on grievances, discipline, control and confinement, (b) to provide the plaintiffs with recreation, exercise, education, medical and mental health care, and (c) to do certain other things with respect to programming, staffing, life safety, sanitation and hygiene. Further, the settlement agreement required YRS to develop a plan to ensure compliance, including the appointment of a Monitor.


On December 7, 2016, an individual formerly detained in a D.C. jail filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff claimed the district had violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The complaint labeled the plaintiff as both the "Overdetained Named Plaintiff" and the "Strip Search Named Plaintiff." As the "Overdetained Named Plaintiff," he sought to represent a class consisting of "(a) Each person who has been, is, or in the future will be incarcerated in any District of Columbia Department of Corrections facility from August 1, 2013 forward; and (b) who was not released, or, in the future, will not be released by midnight on the date on which the person is entitled to be released by court order or the date on which the basis for his or her detention has otherwise expired (or within two hours of being ordered released or otherwise becoming entitled to release if the person was a court return)." As the "Strip Search Named Plaintiff," he sought to represent a class consisting of "each member of the class who was, or in the future will be, from August 1, 2013, forward: (i) in the custody of the Department of Corrections; (ii) taken to court from a Department of Corrections facility; (iii) ordered released by the court or otherwise became entitled to release by virtue of the court appearance because the charge on which he had been held was no longer pending or was dismissed at the hearing, was ordered released on his own recognizance, or had posted bail, was sentenced to time served, was acquitted or was otherwise entitled to release; (iv) was not the subject of any other pending case or cases which imposed any condition of release other than personal recognizance; (v) was not the subject of any detainer or warrant; (vi) was returned from court to the DC Jail or CTF or other District facility, to be processed out of Department of Corrections custody; and (vii) was subjected to a strip search and/or visual body cavity search without any individualized finding of reasonable suspicion or probable cause that he was concealing contraband or weapons; before being released, regardless of whether he was over-detained." On March 21, 2017, the District of Columbia moved to dismiss the case, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On April 5, 2017, the plaintiff submitted an amended complaint. The amended complaint claimed that the harm experienced by the plaintiff was part of the District's revived pattern and practice of overdetention. These claims were brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 19, 2017, the defendant again moved to dismiss. The motion alleged the same arguments as the previous motion to dismiss. On August 22, 2018, Judge Dabney L. Friedrich granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court granted the District's motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's claim that his over-detention constituted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Judge Friedrich denied the district's motion to dismiss the claim that the plaintiff's over-detention violated his substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Judge Friedrich also denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for municipal liability. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims that the strip searched violated the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment. As for the plaintiff's common law claims, the court dismissed the the false imprisonment, false arrest claims, and invasion of privacy claims. 322 F.Supp.3d 78 (D.D.C. 2018). Eight days later, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff asked the court to reconsider the only common law claims. The court held oral argument on April 3, 2019 on the issue of the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. Although the plaintiff had only requested reconsideration on the common law claims, the briefings made it clear that the arguments on the common law claims implicitly challenged the dismissal of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. Two months later, Judge Friederich issued an opinion granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The judge restored the common law claims for false imprisonment (based in over-detention) and invasion of privacy (illegal strip searches) in full. Judge Friederich restored the section 1983 claims for over-detention and illegal strip searches only to the extent that they asserted claims under the Fourth Amendment. 2019 WL 5690341 (D.D.C. 2019). In September of 2019, the parties issued a joint status report informing the court that the issues in the case had been resolved. On October 16, 2019 Judge Friederich issued a stipulation of dismissal. The parties agreed that the plaintiff's claims against the District of Columbia were resolved. Information on how the parties resolved this case is not available. The case was dismissed with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 7, 2016, an individual formerly detained in a D.C. jail filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff claimed the district had violated his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff claimed that he had been over-detained and illegally strip-searched. Three years after the initial complaint was brought, the parties notified the court that they had resolved the plaintiff's claims. Information on how the parties resolved the case is not available. Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(i)(A)(ii) of the Federal Ruled of Civil Procedure, Judge Friederich dismissed the case with prejudice and the case is now closed.


On Sept. 11, 2017, an individual private plaintiff in San Diego filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Private counsel from the law firm Arnold & Porter represented the plaintiff. In the complaint, plaintiff stated that he had been a two-time DACA recipient since 2013. He alleged that in May 2016, DHS had apprehended him in a raid, detained him for a month, and initiated removal proceedings against him solely for unlawful presence. DHS denied the plaintiff's allegations and claimed the arrest was for alien smuggling. Because of the removal proceedings, DHS automatically terminated his DACA status, including his employment authorization, leading to his job loss. Plaintiff argued that this automatic status termination, with no notice or opportunity to respond, ran contrary to USCIS's DACA Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and thus violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The plaintiff also alleged that DHS's actions violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief for his DACA authorization to be reinstated and not terminated prior to notice and an opportunity to respond, as required in the SOP. The plaintiff also noted that President Trump had, on September 5, 2017, announced a phase-out of the DACA program but with a renewal option for current DACA holders with a deadline of Oct. 5, 2017. Given this impending deadline, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on the same day as the complaint, requesting an expedited hearing. Judge Jeffrey Miller, who was assigned to this case, scheduled a motion hearing for September 28, 2017. On September 21, 2017, DHS responded to the plaintiff's TRO motion. The government argued that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because he could challenge removal only in removal proceedings in Immigration Court and not in the District Court and because DACA and its associated employment authorization were a discretionary program not governed by the Constitution or the APA. The plaintiff replied on September 26, 2017 in support of his claims and that the defendants' jurisdictional arguments rely on a mischaracterization of the plaintiff and DACA, and that the harm imposed by the defendants is irreparable. Judge Miller held a TRO motion hearing on September 28, 2017. The next day, the court issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining DHS's revocation of plaintiff's DACA status, so that the plaintiff could apply for an extension. 2017 WL 4340385 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2017). The court found that they had jurisdiction to review DHS's termination of the plaintiff's status, even though the court lacked jurisdiction in the plaintiff's immigration removal proceeding. Next, Judge Miller held that the plaintiff had established a likelihood of success on his claim demonstrating that DHS's termination of his status without reference to the DACA SOP was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. Further, due to the status termination and loss of employment, the plaintiff had suffered irreparable harm. On November 13, 2017, the plaintiff moved to modify the preliminary injunction. He explained that USCIS had not yet adjudicated his pending DACA renewal application, but that his status would expire on December 22, 2017. He asked the Court to modify the preliminary injunction to ensure he would retain his status while USCIS processed the renewal application. DHS responded on December 4, 2019, and the plaintiff replied on December 7, 2019. Following a December 12, 2017 motion hearing, the plaintiff alerted the court of a December 13, 2017 a news report that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had detained a Pennsylvania DACA recipient after a postal delay with his renewal application had caused his status to lapse. DHS objected to the plaintiff introducing the news report. On December 15, 2017, Judge Miller denied the plaintiff's motion to modify the preliminary injunction. The court stated that DHS had complied with the order by reinstating plaintiff's DACA status and employment authorization and accepting his renewal request. Although DHS intended to terminate the plaintiff's status by December 22, 2019, USCIS was also adjudicating his renewal request. The court concluded that since it had ordered DHS to comply with the APA and SOP, DHS was unlikely to improperly terminate the plaintiff's DACA status, detain, or remove him before December 22, 2019. On December 22, 2019, DHS asked the Court for an order dissolving the preliminary injunction and allowing the status termination to take effect. On January 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction. At this point in time, DHS had already terminated the plaintiff's DACA status and denied his renewal application based upon the removal proceedings. Plaintiff alleged that these actions violated the APA as they lacked reasoned explanation guided by the DACA SOP. The plaintiff asked for a preliminary injunction vacating and enjoining the purported termination and the purported subsequent denial of his renewal application. DHS responded on February 5, 2018, and the plaintiff replied on February 12, 2019. DHS moved to dismiss on February 23, 2018. DHS argued that the plaintiff lacked standing after his DACA termination, that the case belonged in removal proceedings rather than before the district court, and that the termination implicated no constitutional interest. On April 12, 2018, the court granted DHS's February 23, 2019 motion to dismiss without leave to amend the complaint, dissolved the initial preliminary injunction, and denied the plaintiff's January 12, 2019 motion for a new preliminary injunction. In the order, the court held that the second revocation of the plaintiff's DACA grant complied with the SOP, so that the preliminary injunction could be dissolved. In his view, DHS had considered all relevant factors in determining that the plaintiff due to the allegations of alien smuggling against him, even with no further evidence was an enforcement priority within the SOP and other agency materials. In addition to seeing no APA violation, the court also saw no constitutional violation. The court conceded that DACA implicated due process interests, entitling recipients to a notice and hearing before termination. Judge Miller held that the plaintiff had in fact received these procedural due process protections. In addition, the court dissolved the preliminary injunction issued on September 29, 2017. 2018 WL 1757668. On May 10, 2018, the plaintiff filled a motion for reconsideration for denying his motion for preliminary injunction and granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion for reconsideration on July 20, 2018 because no newly discovered evidence was presented, no error was made in the initial judgement, and that there had been no change in the controlling law. On August 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court, docket #18-56037. After reviewing the district court docket, the 9th Circuit ordered that the appeal did not appear to be a preliminary injunction appeal. The plaintiff last filed a reply brief on May 29, 2019 clarifying that the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction, dismissal of the case, and entry of judgement was legally erroneous and should be vacated, reversed, and remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction setting aside USCIS's termination of the plaintiff’s DACA status and benefits, as well as its denial of his DACA renewal application, which was based solely on that unlawful termination. The appeal remained pending as of November 13, 2019 and this case is ongoing.

Summary: On Sept. 11, 2017, a two-time DACA recipient in San Diego filed suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for apprehending him in a raid, detaining him for a month, and initiating removal proceedings against him solely for unlawful presence. On April 12, 2018, the court granted DHS's February 23, 2019 motion to dismiss without leave to amend the complaint, dissolved the initial preliminary injunction, and denied the plaintiff's January 12, 2019 motion for a new preliminary injunction. On August 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed an appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit Court. The plaintiff's lawsuit was one of many challenges to DHS's decision to revoke DACA benefits in individual cases. A class actions filed for the American Civil Liberties Union in a separate federal district court in California.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. Several non-profit corporations (Affiliates), which were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia (Archdiocese) and participated in the archdiocese health care plan, were required under the Affordable Care Act and its regulations (Mandate), as issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, to sign and deliver a self-certification to a third party administrator. The administrator could unilaterally choose to supply abortifacients and contraceptive services, in contradiction of the religious belief held by the Affiliates. Meanwhile, the Archdiocese, which was itself exempted from the Mandate, refused to facilitate any provision of contraceptive services in the archdiocese health care plan for the same religious reason. Not wanting to pay any monetary penalties for noncompliance with the Mandate or to expel the Affiliates from the plan, the Archdiocese, along with the Affiliates, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the "RFRA"). The complaint against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Treasury was filed on June 2, 2014 and the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees. They claimed that the defendants, through the Mandate, had imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion, in violation of the RFRA as well as the First Amendment Free Exercise and Free Speech clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On June 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Buckwalter raised doubts as to Plaintiffs' standing to bring their RFRA challenge and found that Plaintiffs had not met their burden to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. 2014 WL 2892502 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2014). That same day, the Plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit (14-3126). On September 2, 2014, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgement and remanded the case for reconsideration of the denial of the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit also enjoined the Government from imposing any fines until the District Court makes its decision on reconsideration. On August 23, 2016, the parties issued a joint status report indicating that the district court had stayed all proceedings in this matter pending the Third Circuit’s resolution of Zubik v. Burwell, which was remanded after the Supreme Court's directive that the parties develop accommodations for religious exercise. 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). The parties continued to file a number of status reports indicating that they were working on a joint resolution to this case. On August 24, 2018, the parties stipulated to dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to private agreements entered into by the parties. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 2, 2014, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Philadelphia and its affiliated non-profit corporations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Labor and U.S. Department of Treasury. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants through the ACA Mandate had imposed a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. On June 26, 2014, the District Court (Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter) denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit. After resolution of Zubik v. Burwell, the parties stipulated to dismiss this action with prejudice. The case is now closed.


On March 9, 2017, the plaintiffs filed this class action suit challenging the adequacy of the Missouri State Public Defender (MSPD) on behalf of all indigent adults and juveniles who were charged with any offense that carries the potential for incarceration as a penalty and who are eligible to be represented by MSPD. The complaint was originally filed in Circuit Court of Cole County but defendants removed it to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri on April 7, 2017. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the MacArthur Justice Center sued the State of Missouri along with its governor under 42 §U.S.C §1983, alleging a violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel also guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution Art. I, § 18(a) and the Missouri Criminal and Juvenile Codes. The plaintiffs also alleged a violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments right to due process, also guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution Art. I, § 10. The lawsuit asked the court to declare Missouri’s public defense system unconstitutional and to order the defendants to take the steps “necessary to bring the system into compliance with federal and state law.” The complaint alleged that the State of Missouri had failed "to provide the resources required to adequately represent poor people accused of crime in Missouri, leading to the actual and constructive denial of counsel for, and ineffective representation of, indigent defendant across the State.” Moreover, it stated that the budget for indigent defense was “shockingly inadequate" and alleged that attorneys had little time to spend on each case, causing poor defendants to needlessly sit in jail for prolonged periods until their public defender has time to work on their case. The complaint stated that there was a lack of attorneys at arraignments and bond hearings, and that many appointed attorneys were unprepared to effectively advocate for a client. The case was assigned to Judge Nanette Laughrey and was also included in Missouri's Mediation and Assessment Program with Magistrate Judge Matt J. Whitworth assigned to be the mediator. On April 21, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On June 6, 2017, the case was reassigned to an outside mediator. The plaintiffs requested the court to certify their class on June 8, 2017. The proposed class consisted of "all indigent persons who are now or who will be during the pendency of this litigation, under formal charge before a state court in Missouri of having committed any offense the penalty for which includes the possibility of confinement, incarceration, imprisonment, or detention (regardless of whether actually imposed), and who are eligible to be represented by MSPD." On July 5, 2017 the court held oral argument on the defendants' motions to dismiss, and on July 24, 2017 Judge Laughrey granted the defendant's motion to dismiss in part as to one of the plaintiffs who lacked standing to sue. 268 F.Supp.3d 992. The court denied the motion as to the other plaintiffs. Regarding the state of Missouri, the court found that the state had waived sovereign immunity by removing the case to federal court. The court also denied the motion to dismiss as it related to the governor of Missouri, finding that the plaintiffs had alleged that the governor had a sufficient connection to the challenged conduct to place him squarely within the Ex Parte Young exception to sovereign immunity. On August 18, 2017, two Defendants, the state of Missouri and its Governor, appealed to the Eighth Circuit their denied motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Docket No. 17-2857). Arguments were held on April 10, 2018, Meanwhile, in the district court, the parties began discovery until, on January 18, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay the case pending resolution of the appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The same day, the defendants filed a motion to realign the MSPD defendants as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the realignment on January 31, contending that there was no legal basis to realign the MSPD defendants as plaintiffs and that there were actual and substantial conflicts between the two groups. On February 9, both parties filed their respective motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on all of their declaratory and injunctive claims and an order requiring the defendants to propose a plan to provide adequate representation to all indigent criminal defendants in Missouri within 30 days. The defendants contended that the Eleventh Amendment immunity barred all claims to the state, that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, and that the plaintiffs failed to state plausible constitutional claims. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion to strike the designation of plaintiffs’ experts and exclude the testimony of the experts at trial. The plaintiffs submitted an opposition to the motion to strike on March 2. The motions to realign the MSPD defendants, the parties’ motions for summary judgment, and the motion to strike the plaintiffs’ experts were all denied on April 17, 2018. In an opinion written by Judge Benton, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court in favor of the defendants on January 10, 2019. 913 F.3d 736. Regarding the state of Missouri, the Eighth Circuit held that sovereign immunity is broader than Eleventh Amendment immunity and in the absence of an express statutory exception or a recognized common law exception, sovereign immunity is the rule and applies to all suits against public entities. The Eighth Circuit also reversed the district court's holding regarding the governor, rebutting point by point how the Ex Parte Young exception did not apply in this case. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The plaintiffs’ claims against the state of Missouri and the governer were denied on February 26, 2019, and Judge Laughrey also denied the plaintiffs' class certification. 2019 WL 954982. The defendants’ motion to stay was also denied as moot. District Judge Laughrey, in light of the Eighth Circuit decision, ordered parties to proceed with mediation on March 1, 2019. The parties submitted a joint motion to enter a consent judgment, proposing a variety of obligations to MSPD on May 13. Specifically, the consent judgment proposed that the MSPD must ensure public defenders argue for release at every client’s initial appearance, implement a caseload standard on individual public defenders, and provide for a monitor to ensure compliance. The following day, the Attorney General filed a motion to intervene as a defendant and sought a temporary stay on the litigation. The Attorney General contended that despite their right to participate in litigation concerning the state’s interest, the proposed consent judgment did not adequately consult the Attorney General in the mediation process. The plaintiffs filed an opposition to the two motions on May 28. On July 12, 2019, the motion to intervene was denied but the court permitted the Attorney General to submit an amicus brief addressing whether the proposed consent judgment comported with Missouri law, as well as other concerns on public safety and welfare. 2019 WL 3069856. On July 26, the Attorney General submitted the amicus brief and appealed the intervention decision to the Eighth Circuit with a motion to stay pending appeal. (Docket No. 19-2584). The district court partially granted the motion to stay and decided to stay the consent order pending resolution of the ruling. On January 27, 2020, the parties’ joint motion for consent judgment was denied by the district court. Judge Laughrey determined that the rigid caseload capacity ceiling would impose an impossible constraint upon the public defenders in trying to comply with the consent decree and court orders to defend indigent clients. 2020 WL 420833. The parties engaged in a teleconference before the court on May 8, 2020. There, Judge Laughrey told the plaintiffs that they must either dismiss the case without prejudice or proceed to a bench trial. The plaintiffs opted for a bench trial, and Judge Laughrey noted that discovery was closed but permitted the parties to participate in consensual discovery. In another teleconference hearing held on May 19, the Defendants argued that only one plaintiff still had standing and therefore any remedy must be tailored to her specific case. On June 10, 2020, the parties notified the court that they had reached a resolution. The case was dismissed without prejudice on June 15, 2020. On June 16, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the pending appeal before the Eighth Circuit as moot given that the district court case concluded. The Eighth Circuit granted the motion on July 8, 2020. This case is now closed.

Summary: This lawsuit challenges the adequacy of the Missouri State Public Defender (MSPD), which provides legal representation to all indigent citizens accused or convicted of crimes in Missouri state court. After the state of Missouri and the governor were dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds, the case was eventually resolved through a private settlement.


On July 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black forklift operator (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Tennessee under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Stein World, LLC. The EEOC sought the defendant's compliance with a prior settlement agreement, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated a prior settlement agreement between the parties since it harassed the plaintiff-intervenor based on his race and discharged him in retaliation of filing this suit and participating in the an EEOC-sponsored mediation. In January 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor was hired by the defendant as a forklift operator. He was the only black forklift operator employed by the defendant. In April 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor reported to the defendant that a temporary employee had cursed him and that he was working in unsafe conditions. On May 5, 2005, his employment was terminated. On May 17, 2005, he filed a claim with the EEOC. Shortly after, he was hospitalized for pneumonia and eventually had to undergo a lung transplant. The defendants agreed to mediate the matter and on July 6, 2005, the plaintiff-intervenor and the defendant entered into a settlement agreement, where among other things, the defendant agreed to pay for the plaintiff-intervenor's medical expenses. When the plaintiff-intervenor gave the hospital bill to the defendant, they refused to pay more than $5,000, arguing that the mediator failed to include the $5,000 cap in the settlement agreement and that the plaintiff-intervenor made fraudulent misrepresentations to them by saying his medical expenses were only "a few thousand dollars." On August 16, 2006, the defendant filed its answer and third-party complaint against the black employee involved in this suit, alleging that they never would have agreed to the prior settlement had the plaintiff-intervenor not made fraudulent misrepresentations to them. On October 11, 2006, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a default judgment against the plaintiff-intervenor, but then that order was set aside on March 7, 2007. On March 15, 2007, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On March 27, 2007, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) denied the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the defendant's counter claim and third-party complaint. The parties then went through the discovery process. On May 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $15,000, and his hospital $42,426.41 for the third-party defendant's medical expenses.

Summary: On July 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black forklift operator (third-party defendant and plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Tennessee, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Stein World, LLC. The EEOC sought the defendant's compliance with a prior settlement agreements, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant violated a prior settlement agreement between the parties since it harassed the third-party defendant based on his race and discharged him in retaliation of filing this suit and participating in the an EEOC-sponsored mediation. On May 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Jon P. McCalla) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the third-party defendant (plaintiff-intervenor) $15,000, and his hospital $42,426.41 for the third-party defendant's medical expenses.


In 1998, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted an investigation of the Columbus Division of Police (CDP). As a result of the investigation, the DOJ determined that CDP officers were engaged in a pattern or practice of using excessive force, making false arrests and lodging false charges, and conducting improper searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On October 21, 1999, the DOJ filed a complaint against the City of Columbus, Ohio pursuant to the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 14111, in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the CDP. The case was assigned to Judge John D. Holschuh and Magistrate Judge Norah M. King. Contemporaneously with the filing of the DOJ's complaint, the DOJ filed a motion to stay the proceedings so that the parties could explore settlement. Judge King entered a stay, which expired on December 20, 1999, without the parties reaching a settlement. On October 25, 1999, the Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City Lodge No. 9 ("FOP") filed a motion to intervene as a defendant in the action. Judge King granted the FOP's motion to intervene on February 7, 2000. The City then moved to dismiss the case, and the FOP moved for a judgment on the pleadings. In those motions, the defendants noted that no court had yet interpreted or applied the language of 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The defendants maintained that §14141 was an unconstitutional enactment, outside Congress' authority pursuant to § 5 of the 14th Amendment and in violation of the Tenth Amendment. The defendants further argued that § 14141 must be construed to incorporate the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases for determining municipal liability. The defendants argued that the DOJ's complaint was therefore deficient because it failed to plead facts that the City caused, or was deliberately indifferent to, the pattern or practice of CDP officer misconduct as alleged in the complaint. The DOJ filed a brief responding to the constitutional challenge to 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The DOJ also argued that the language of § 14141 imposed vicarious liability on the City for the acts of its officers. The DOJ argued that the § 1983 standards of municipal liability were not applicable to § 14141 cases, and therefore the complaint properly stated a cause of action. On April 26, 2000, Judge Holschuh referred the dispositive motions to Magistrate Judge Norah M. King for a report and recommendation. She issued her report in August, finding that 42 U.S.C. § 14141 was constitutional. She construed § 14141 to require the same level of proof as is required against municipal entities in actions under § 1983, as set forth in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) and its progeny. In response to the Judge King’s report, U.S. Representatives John Conyers, Jr., the ranking minority member of the House Judiciary Committee, and other representatives moved for leave to participate as amici curiae. Representative Conyers was an original cosponsor of the Police Accountability Act - legislation that contained the language that ultimately was embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 14141. As grounds for their participation, the representatives stated that their interest was to correct the Judge King’s interpretation of § 14141 as imposing § 1983's "policy or custom" test for determining municipal liability that they believed was a misapplication of the statute. The Grand Lodge of FOP, the national police officer labor organization, also filed an amicus motion, taking positions supportive of those taken by the City and the local FOP. On November 20, 2000, Judge Holschuh granted the motions for leave to participate as amici curiae, and amicus briefs were then filed. After an extended round of additional briefing, there was a lengthy period of case inactivity while settlement negotiations continued. On September 4, 2002, Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman submitted a settlement proposal to the DOJ that outlined various reforms the CPD agreed to make in exchange for the dismissal of the DOJ's complaint without prejudice. In the settlement proposal, Mayor Coleman listed their ongoing efforts to remedy the alleged issues through:
- The expansion of the staffing and scope of responsibility of the Internal Affairs Bureau implemented in July 2001. This included specialized training and community outreach programs to publicize and explain the new citizen complaint process; - The expansion of the definition of actions that constitute a use of force, enhanced reporting of all uses of force and adoption of a use of force continuum; - Heightened commitment to prevent racial profiling including specialized training as well as an implementation of regular, periodic reviews; - Passing of Ordinance 1475-01 by Columbus City Council on September 24, 2001, to specifically include racial profiling as a criminal offense; - Installation of video and audio recorders in police cruisers; and - Agreement to provide copies of relevant Division of Police documents to the Department of Justice through the end of 2003.
 The DOJ found the efforts satisfactory and agreed to end the litigation. On September 4, 2002, Judge Holschuh granted the DOJ's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 21, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the city of Columbus, Ohio, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14111 to remedy a pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the Columbus Division of Police. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and it followed a DOJ investigation which analyzed the CDP's use of force. In September 2004, the Mayor of Columbus submitted a settlement proposal to the DOJ, and teh DOJ accepted the terms.


On March 4, 2002, immigrants granted asylum in the United States filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Attorney General of the United States and Immigration and Naturalization Services. Plaintiffs alleged that federal immigration agencies and officials had improperly administered the system and waiting list that determined when asylees could become lawful permanent residents and had failed to provide asylees with proper employment endorsements. Plaintiffs brought this case under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Bivens, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), alleging violations of the INA, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.; the APA; 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.; and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Represented by the American Immigration Law Foundation and the Massachusetts Law Reform Institute, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as class certification. At issue was the government's handling of "refugee admission numbers." Under the Refugee Act of 1980, the President could annually authorize the admission of up to 50,000 refugees to the U.S. Out of that number, the Attorney General could use up to 10,000 refugee admission numbers to grant lawful permanent resident status (green card) to asylees already in the U.S. Plaintiffs alleged that between 1994 and 2002, over 20,000 refugee admission numbers that had been set aside by the Attorney General for asylee adjustment went unused and that Defendants should have used those numbers to clear out the backlog of asylees who applied for green cards. Plaintiffs further claimed that once refugees were granted asylum the government was required to provide proper work papers to the asylees, but it continually failed to do so. Defendants denied the allegations and took the position that unused refugee admission numbers expired at the end of each fiscal year. On January 14, 2003, the District Court (Judge Richard H. Kyle) certified the case as a class action on behalf of tens of thousands of asylees, defining the class and subclasses as: All asylees in the United States who have applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent residence and whose applications for adjustment remain pending; Subclass I - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications with the INS on or before January 16, 1998; Subclass II - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after January 16, 1998, and on or before June 9, 1998; Subclass III - All asylees who filed their adjustment of status applications after June 9, 1998; Subclass IV - All asylees who applied for or applied to renew an Employment Authorization Document. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On February 12, 2004, Judge Kyle denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. Judge Kyle ordered Defendants to (1) use all unused and misused asylee adjustment numbers that had been made available in prior years to adjust the status of asylees and (2) provide all asylees with an employment authorization endorsement that was valid throughout the duration of the alien's status as an asylee. Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F.Supp.2d 1076 (D.Minn. 2004). Defendants appealed. Settlement negotiations followed, and the parties reached a proposed settlement agreement in January 2005. Defendants' appeal was stayed pending court approval of the settlement. The Court conducted a fairness hearing on June 15, 2005, and formally approved the class settlement on July 12, 2005. Ngwanyia v. Gonzales, 376 F.Supp.2d 923 (D.Minn. 2005). Under the Settlement Agreement, the government agreed to make an additional 31,000 asylee adjustment numbers available during 2005-2008 to adjust the status of asylees who had applied for permanent residence. The Agreement also provided for changes to the issuance of work permits to asylees. The agreement was to remain in effect for three years or until the Defendants completed the requirements of the agreement, whichever was longer. The District Court retained jurisdiction throughout the settlement. The Settlement has since finished and the case is now closed.

Summary: On March 4, 2002, public interest attorneys filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota on behalf of immigrants granted asylum in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that federal immigration agencies and officials had improperly administered the system that determined when asylees could become lawful permanent residents and had failed to provide proper employment endorsements. Three years later a settlement was reached between the parties that required Defendants to make additional asylee numbers available and to make changes to the issuances of work permits for asylees.


This is a case about whether the federal government must include undocumented immigrants in the 2020 Census count. On July 21, 2020, President Trump issued a memo ordering the exclusion of undocumented immigrants from the state-population totals used to calculate the state's apportionments. In response, on July 24, 2020, twenty states, ten cities, four counties, and the District of Columbia filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the New York State Office of the Attorney General and other government attorneys sued the President of the United States, the Department of Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census, and the Director of the United States Census Bureau. The plaintiffs claimed that the “[d]efendants’ decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from the apportionment base following the 2020 Census . . . is unauthorized by and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States;” that the decision to do so is “intentionally discriminatory in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[,]” and that the “[d]efendants’ decision and any implementing actions they take are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law within the meaning of [the Administrative Procedure Act.” The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, writs of mandamus, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. This case was assigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. The case was related to State of New York v. U.S. Department of Commerce, another 2020 Census case assigned to Judge Furman. That case is in the Clearinghouse, here. On August 3, 2020, the complaint was amended adding Maine, Wisconsin, the United States Conference of Mayors, and Howard County as plaintiffs. Additionally, the first claim was updated to emphasize the Constitution's use of the phrase “actual Enumeration,” and a new claim was added alleging the Memorandum violated the Census Act which requires the enumeration in the census of the whole number of persons in each State. Judge Furman ordered this case to be consolidated with New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump on August 4, 2020. That case can be found here in the Clearinghouse. The complaint was updated, on August 6, to reflect this consolidation. At the plaintiffs' request, on August 7, 2020, Judge Furman requested the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit appoint a three-judge panel because, under 28 U.S.C. §2284, "[a] district court of three judges shall be convened when . . . when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body." Chief Circuit Judge Robert A. Katzmann granted the request on August 10, 2020 and appointed Circuit Judges Richard C. Wesley and Peter W. Hall to join Judge Furman. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their claims for relief under Article I, the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause, and the Census. In the alternative, they requested a preliminary injunction. Numerous organizations, including the U.S House of Representatives, businesses, the League of Women Voters, scholars and historians on the census and immigration, and the Immigration Reform Law Institute, filed motions for leave to file amicus briefs, and on August, 17, 2020 and August 21, 2020, Judge Furman issued in orders permitting them to file amicus briefs. On August 19, 2020, the government filed a motion to dismiss because they claimed that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The government also alleged that the plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary or permanent injunction because they could not establish any imminent irreparable harm. The Court heard oral arguments on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction and the defendant’s motion to dismiss on September 3, 2020. A week later, on September 10, 2020, Judges Wesley, Hall and Furman granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied the government's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 5422959. Final Judgement was entered for the plaintiffs after the court found, that the President’s Memo constituted an “ultra vires violation of Congress’s delegation of its constitutional responsibility to count the whole number of persons in each State and to apportion members of the House of Representatives among the States according to their respective numbers under 2 U.S.C. § 2a and 13 U.S.C. § 141.”. The Secretary of Commerce, the Director of the Census Bureau, the US Department of Commerce, and the US Census Bureau are permanently enjoined from “including in the Secretary’s report to the President pursuant to Section 141(b) any information permitting the President to exercise the President’s discretion to carry out the policy set forth in section 2 of the presidential Memorandum.” Section 2 of the President’s memorandum concerned the number of aliens in each State who are not in a lawful immigration status under the Immigration and Nationality Act. On September 16, 2020, the government filed a motion to stay pending appeal. There was a question about jurisdiction, so the government appealed to both the Second Circuit (case number: 20-2630) and the Supreme Court (case number: 20-0366). The motion to stay pending appeal was denied on September 29, 2020. 2020 WL 5796815. On September 22, the government filed a motion for the Supreme Court to expedite consideration of the jurisdictional statement. On October 16, it was announced that the question of jurisdiction was postponed to the hearing of the case on the merits. The case is set for argument on Monday, November 30, 2020. As a result, the Second Circuit ordered the case before Circuit Judge Raymond J. Lohier, Jr. to be held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's resolution. In early October, appellees, New York filed a motion to affirm, and appellees, New York Immigration Coalition, filed a motion to dismiss or affirm. Additionally, amicus briefs were submitted by Citizens United and the Immigration Reform Law Institute. Supreme Court are arguments set for Monday, November 30, 2020. This case is ongoing

Summary: In July 2020, several states and local governments filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the “Defendants’ decision to exclude undocumented immigrants from the apportionment base following the 2020 Census … is unauthorized by and contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United States;” that the decision to do so is “intentionally discriminatory in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment[,]” and that the “Defendants’ decision and any implementing actions they take are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law within the meaning of [the Administrative Procedure Act,] 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).” In August 2020, this case was consolidated with New York Immigration Coalition v. Trump. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the government filed a motion to dismiss. On September 10, 2020, the three judge panel denied the motion to dismiss and granted the motion for summary judgment. The government is appealing the permanent injunction to the Supreme Court. The government motioned for a stay pending appeal. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on Monday, November 30, 2020.