This case record includes documents from three separately-filed federal lawsuits: Daniels v. Brevard County School Board, Hartley v. Brevard County School Board, and Landow v. Brevard County School Board, filed in that order, in 1997, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida . Daniels, the first case, was filed on September 29, 1997, by a plaintiff on behalf of his two minor daughters; he alleged violations of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. and state law by the School Board. Represented by private counsel, Daniels asked for preliminary injunctive relief to improve the Merritt Island High School ("MIHS") softball field, claiming unlawful discrimination against the girls' softball team, compared to the boys' baseball programs at MIHS. On November 25, 1997, the Court (District Judge Anne C. Conway) determined that the Board was violating Title IX and state law and granted plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. In its Order, the Court identified specific inequalities, including electronic score-board, batting cage, bleachers, signs, bathroom facilities, concession stand/press box/announcer's booth, and field lighting. Without entering an injunction that day, the Court directed the parties to submit plans describing proposed remedies to the deficiencies it had identified. Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 985 F.Supp. 1458 (M.D. Fla. 1997). Before responses to the Court's November 25th order were due, on December 4, 1997, the Daniels plaintiff joined with other parents who, on behalf of their minor daughters and others similarly situated and represented by private counsel, filed the Landow action, a separate class action suit under Title IX and state law, challenging SBBC's treatment of girls' softball, county-wide. In this second suit, plaintiffs complained, inter alia, of the fact that three of the ten high schools in Brevard County had boys' baseball fields, but no girls' softball fields. On December 9, 1997, Daniels amended his earlier-filed complaint, adding class action allegations, seeking to make his daughters representatives of a class of those similarly situated. Finally, the Hartley action was filed on December 10, 1997, by another group of plaintiffs on behalf of their minor daughters and others similarly situated, also under Title IX and state law. This third lawsuit also challenged SBBC's treatment of girls' softball on a county-wide basis. Back in the Daniels case, on December 23, 1997, the Court (Judge Conway) entered the promised preliminary injunction against the Board. Noting that, as a result of the Landow and Harley cases, the Title IX focus had expanded from the softball facilities at one high school to girls' softball programs throughout Brevard County; that these cases presumably sought to force, inter alia, the construction of softball fields at three other high schools; and that the potential financial impact on the School Board had been "dramatically alter[ed];" the Court could not reasonably determine the amount of additional funds the Board should be required to expend to remedy the inequities at MIHS. Accordingly, with the exception of lighting on the MIHS girls' softball field, which SBBC had already committed to install, the Court imposed only injunctive measures that did not require additional funding, including making changes to signage and improving girls' access to extant facilities and equipment. Daniels v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty., 995 F.Supp. 1394 (M.D. Fla. 1997). On April 22, 1998, the Court (Judge Conway) granted Daniels' attorneys' interim fees totaling $15,958.12. In the meantime, on January 5, 1998, Judge Conway ordered Hartley and Landow temporarily consolidated, to decide whether either or both should be accorded class treatment. On April 24, 1998, Judge Conway denied the motion for class certification in Hartley and dismissed it (without prejudice). At the same time, Judge Conway granted class certification in Landow and ordered it consolidated with Daniels for all purposes, including trial, with all future pleadings and papers to be filed only in Landow. The Court (Judge Conway) awarded plaintiffs' counsel an additional $2,437.50 in interim attorneys' fees on May 19, 1998. Nearly two years passed, and, due to improved conditions at Brevard County high schools, on March 30, 2000, the parties filed a joint stipulation, substantially narrowing their dispute to conditions at just two of them. On September 12, 2000, Judge Conway ordered that the order and preliminary injunction entered on December 23, 1997 be dissolved; that Daniels be closed; and that any remaining issues in Daniels, including attorneys' fees, be addressed in Landow. On December 15, 2000, following a bench trial, the Court (Judge Conway) ordered that SBBC had violated Title IX and state law by virtue of disparities between the boys' baseball and girls' softball programs at the two high schools at issue. As a result, the Court determined that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief and directed the parties to submit a joint plan for remedying the inequalities identified in the Court's order, or, if they could not reach agreement, to file separate proposals. Landow v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard County, 132 F.Supp.2d 958 (M.D. Fla. 1997). In accordance with this direction, on March 5, 2001, the parties submitted a stipulated joint plan, under which new softball fields were to be constructed at the two high schools at issue. These fields and their associated amenities were to be substantially equivalent to those provided to the boys' baseball teams at those high schools. On March 7, 2001, Judge Conway approved this plan, and permanently enjoined defendants to carry it out. The case was closed.

Summary: This Title IX litigation began on September 29, 1997, when Daniels, a single plaintiff, filed a complaint on behalf of his two minor daughters, against the School Board of Brevard County, asking for preliminary injunctive relief to improve his daughters' high school's softball field. The Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to preliminary relief in December 1997. After some procedural complications, involving two other lawsuits, class action status was granted in one of them, Landow, and the initial matter consolidated with it. Almost two years passed, and due to improved conditions at Brevard County high schools, on March 30, 2000, the parties filed a joint stipulation substantially narrowing their dispute to conditions at just two of ten County high schools. The preliminary injunction entered in December 1997 was dissolved and that first action, Daniels, was closed. A bench trial was then held in the class action, Landow. On December 15, 2000, the court ruled that the School Board had violated Title IX and state law by virtue of disparities between the boys' baseball and girls' softball programs at the high schools at issue. A stipulated joint plan, under which new softball fields were to be constructed, was submitted on March 5, 2001. These fields and their associated amenities were to be substantially equivalent to those provided to the boys' baseball teams at the two high schools at issue. On March 7, 2001, the plan was approved, defendants were enjoined to carry it out.


This lawsuit was brought on August 15, 2005, by abused and neglected children, currently or formerly in the custody of Missouri's foster care system, who have highly specialized medical, mental health or other special needs. They filed a complaint and an emergency temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri to prohibit Missouri Senate Bill 539, a new adoption subsidy law, from taking effect. The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights and a broad coalition of local advocates, complained that the law violated the Equal Protection rights of foster children through the application of a "means test" to the income of adoptive parents, denying adoptive assistance benefits for certain foster children. Additionally, the plaintiffs charged violations of the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended by the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, and the Equal Protection and Contracts Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On August 30th, the federal district court (Judge Scott O. Wright) entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the law. On September 8, 2005, the court granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction blocking Senate Bill 539 from taking effect until trial on the merits. On September 29, 2005, the Court entered an order granting class certification. Defendants filed an appeal from the injunction and class certification orders on October 7, 2005. Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss defendants' interlocutory appeal of the class certification order challenging the Eighth Circuit's subject matter jurisdiction. Subsequently, both the district court and the appellate court denied defendants' request for a stay pending the preliminary injunction appeal. Following a trial in April 2006, plaintiffs won on all legal claims and the court permanently banned the adoption subsidy provisions of Senate Bill 539 from ever taking effect. The Missouri Department of Social Services immediately appealed the ruling, but the appeal was later withdrawn and the permanent ban on Senate Bill 539 remains in place.

Summary: This case in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri was brought in 2005 by abused and neglected children, currently or formerly in the custody of Missouri's foster care system, who have highly specialized medical, mental health or other special needs. Following a trial in April 2006, they won a ruling barring implementation of Missouri Senate Bill 539, whose means test (based on the income of adoptive parents) the court held violated federal law. The Missouri Department of Social Services immediately appealed the ruling, but the appeal was later withdrawn and the permanent ban on Senate Bill 539 remains in place.


On October 27, 2011, three photographers and the National Photographers' Rights Organization filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 USC § 1983, the California Constitution, Article 1, § 2, and California Civil Code § 52.1 against the County of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory judgment that the defendant's actions and policies violate the U.S. Constitution, for an injunction to prevent further detention and search of photographers in the county of Los Angeles, monetary damages, and attorneys' fees. The complaint alleged that the defendants unfairly stopped, detained, and searched photographers solely because they were taking photos in public places. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they had been taking photographs of subway terminals, police officers, industrial refineries, among other subjects from public sidewalks when County of Los Angeles police officers stopped them, asked them what they were doing, searched their bags and the contents of their cameras, and in some circumstances handcuffed them. The complaint alleged that the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD) instituted a terrorism prevention policy, which required officers to report "suspicious activities." Furthermore, it was alleged that the definitions and examples of such activities included the photographing of public buildings or infrastructure. Therefore, the complaint alleged that as a result of said program, the plaintiffs were harassed when they were taking photos of various public buildings. One plaintiff photographer claimed that he had stopped to take photos of the turnstiles of the LA Metro when a police officer saw him and questioned what he was doing. He claimed that when he denied wrongdoing, the officer denied his right to take photos in the metro and then placed him in handcuffs against a wall. Meanwhile, the photographer claimed that the officer searched the contents of his pockets and ran his license all without his permission. The same photographer claimed that on another day while he was taking photos of an incident near the Hollywood Star Walk, he was asked to move a full block away from the incident solely on account of his photography, even though no one else was asked to move further away. The officer said in justifying his request that the police did not permit photography between the metro and the large hotel across the street. A third incident occurred when, at the entrance to another metro station, a photographer began taking photos of two police officers talking to two young women. The photographer claimed that he was told he could not take such photos because the women were underage and that the officers then proceeded to place him in handcuffs, search his pockets, bag, and person, and place him in the back seat of their car for twenty five minutes of questioning before letting him go without a citation. Another photographer claimed that when he was taking photos of drivers at an intersection across the street from the Long Beach Superior Court that several LAPD officers approached him and asked him what he was doing. He claimed that they then proceeded to frisk him, look through the contents of his camera, and question him for a period of about twenty minutes, because according to his complaint the officers thought his behavior was "suspicious." He was released without a citation. The photographers complained about several other similar occurrences, including stops when photographers were taking photos at night of the LA refineries, the LA County Central Men's Jail, and various metro platforms and entrances. On October 11, 2013, Judge Dean D. Pregerson ordered a stay of the case pending approval of a mediator's proposal or the conclusion of a settlement agreement. On January 22, 2014, Judge Pregerson removed the case from active caseload. The case was dismissed on April 21, 2015, However, the Court retained jurisdiction for a period of three years to enforce the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement stipulated training police about rules governing civilian rights to photography. In addition, the plaintiff would be paid $50,000 for personal injury and $340,000 in attorney fees and costs. The settlement agreement ran the three years without further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 27, 2011, three photographers and the National Photographers' Rights Organization filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under 42 USC § 1983, the California Constitution, Article 1, § 2, and California Civil Code § 52.1 against the County of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs claimed that the County of Los Angeles through its Sheriff's Department had established an anti-terrorism policy that deemed any photography of public buildings or other infrastructure "suspicious behavior," and that as a result, the plaintiffs were stopped and searched on several occasions. The parties' agreed to a settlement that stipulated new guidelines for police training and awarded plaintiff damages in addition to attorney fees.


On December 29, 2006, a prisoner at the Indiana State Prison sentenced to the death penalty filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Indiana Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were threatened by the defendants' use of thiopental, potassium chloride, and pancuronium bromide during lethal injection, which he believed would leave him conscious and subjected to extreme pain and torture in violation of the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff requested a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction barring execution in this manner, and attorneys' fees. On April 10, 2007, the District Court allowed two other death-sentenced prisoners, Michael Lambert and David Leon Woods, to intervene in the case. Woods applied for a preliminary injunction, and on April 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana (Judge Richard L. Young) denied Woods' motion for injunctive relief. The court reasoned that Woods had failed to demonstrate that Indiana's lethal injection method violated the Eighth Amendment, and that the last-minute nature of his claims strongly weighed against granting him relief. Rather, the court wrote, it indicated that he brought the claims merely to delay the execution. Woods was executed on May 4, 2007, and he was dismissed as a party to the case on June 8, 2007, because the action as to him had become moot. On May 18, 2007, the action was set for trial on September 22, 2007. Three days later, the Indiana Supreme Court set a June 15, 2007 date for Lambert's execution. Lambert filed a motion for preliminary injunction, and on June 12, 2007, the District Court (Judge Young) denied Lambert's motion for injunctive relief for the same reasons that it had denied Woods' motion—he had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits and that he had brought the claim merely to delay the inevitable execution. Lambert appealed this decision, and on July 9, 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. On July 12, 2007, Lambert was dismissed as a party to the lawsuit. The defendants asked the court for summary judgment in their case against Norman Timberlake, and on August 16, 2007, the District Court (Judge Young) granted them summary judgment and vacated the earlier scheduled trial date. The court reasoned that since they had already twice found (in the cases of Mr. Woods and Mr. Lambert) that Indiana's execution protocol did not violate the rights of the executed prisoner, Mr. Timberlake had not established a genuine issue as to whether the state's execution protocol created a significant risk that he would suffer unnecessary pain during the execution process, therefore making summary judgment appropriate. On September 17, 2007, Timberlake appealed the district court’s decision. His appeal was heard but the Court of Appeals vacated the decision and remanded the case with the instruction to dismiss the case for lack of case or controversy. Timberlake had passed away before the Court of Appeals could decide the case. On January 9, 2008, the District Court dismissed the case with accordance to the instructions for remand. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 26, 2006, a prisoner at the Indiana State Prison filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Indiana Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff alleged that his constitutional rights were threatened by the defendants' use of the combination of three chemicals during lethal injection, which he believed would allow him to be conscious and subject to extreme pain and torture in violation of this Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. After two plaintiffs joined the action, the defendants were awarded summary judgement on August 16, 2007. The plaintiff appealed the decision, however, the Circuit Court remanded the case with the direction to dismiss after the plaintiff died. The case is now closed.


On October 1, 2015, Prison Legal News, a legal news magazine intended for inmates, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons claiming that the U.S. Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence (ADX) illegally censored the magazine, violating the First and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act, and Bureau of Prison regulations. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant did not deliver certain issues of Prison Legal News to ADX prisoners or give them proper notice that the magazine would not be delivered. Apparently, the BOP's refusal to deliver the magazine was because the issues contained information related to legal proceedings involving ADX prisoners and staff. Plaintiffs contended that the refusal to deliver these issues served no legitimate penological interest, and that the improper notices deprived prisoners of the opportunity to appeal administratively. Plaintiff was represented by Northwestern Law School's clinic and by private counsel; it sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge Raymond Moore. On February 23, 2017, pursuant to ADX's motion to dismiss, the Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak recommended that the motion be denied. He found that there was neither constitutional mootness, nor prudential mootness. Judge Varholak also found there were plausible First Amendment, due process, and APA claims. ADX appealed the recommendation to the district court. The District Judge Moore rejected the recommendations on March 28, holding that there was in fact a mootness problem because "ADX fundamentally revised its official policies and procedures with respect to review of publications" after the suit was filed. The court further found that the plaintiff's previously rejected issues were reviewed and delivered to inmates, mooting the need for injunctive relief. The court found that because the policies had changed, the plaintiff's concern for enjoining future conduct was also mooted. The plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment the next day, arguing that the judgment was entered before the plaintiff could respond to ADX's objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendations. The court granted the motion on August 14, 2017, renewing its review of the recommendations and objections. On May 14, 2018, the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment and the defendant moved for summary judgment. The plaintiff’s motion argued that there was no issue of material fact with regards to its First Amendment claims for the censorship of past issues, and the accompanying Fifth Amendment violation of due process claim based on the defendant’s failure to provide sufficient notice of the reason for the rejection of those issues. The defendant, meanwhile, argued that the issue was nonjusticiable since the court could grant nothing more than an advisory opinion, and any order pertaining to future issues would lack ripeness since it would be premised on unknown facts. The defendant also argued that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden in showing there was not a rational connection between a legitimate penological interest and the ADX’s newly implemented publication policies. In September, Judge Moore denied the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. 2018 WL 10466903. The court found that plaintiff’s claims rested on ADX’s past policy of censoring based on names of prison employees and that practice has since been changed. Although the plaintiff argued that a future warden may adopt a similarly restrictive policy, the issue as it before the court was moot. The judge also found that plaintiff’s claims arguing that ADX failed to inform Prison Legal News of the reasons for rejection lacked sufficient evidentiary support in the record. Pursuant to the Rules of Federal Procedure, the defendant proposed a bill of costs, although the plaintiff was granted a stay on this issue while appealing the district court’s order. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit (Circuit Judges Matheson, Seymour, and Hartz) affirmed the lower court’s decision. Prison Legal News v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 944 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2019). The plaintiff’s claim sought declaratory and injunctive relief, not compensatory damages. Therefore, when the defendant altered their procedures for reviewing publishable materials, the plaintiff’s claim became moot. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant bore a heavy burden to prove that the voluntary cessation exception to mootness does not apply, but found that the defendants met that burden. The bill of costs appears to be an open issue, and therefore this case is still ongoing.

Summary: Prison Legal News alleged that the Federal Bureau of Prisons violated the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Administrative Procedure Act, by refusing to deliver certain issues of Prison Legal News to inmates in ADX Florence, a maximum security facility in Colorado. The defendant modified their publication policy, thereby making this case moot.


This is a case about Houston police arresting individuals without warrants and detaining them without probable cause. On December 5, 2016, two plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated sued the City of Houston under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Represented by private counsel and the Civil Rights Corps, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees. They claimed that the City of Houston regularly arrested individuals without warrants and detained them without probable cause hearings for longer than permitted by the United States Constitution. The case was assigned to Judge Kennth M. Hoyt on December 7, 2016. The City filed a motion to dismiss the initial complaint. One of the named plaintiffs withdrew from the case and on March 1, 2017, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add three more named plaintiffs. As a result, on March 7, the court denied the City's motion to dismiss on grounds of mootness because the filing of an amended complaint renders a prior complaint void and moots any motion to dismiss. The City filed an amended motion to dismiss, which was denied on June 6, 2017. The court found that the defendants had essentially admitted that the facts the plaintiffs pleaded were true. The case proceeded to discovery, and the parties engaged in lengthy discovery disputes. On August 30, 2018, the District Court issued an order stating that the City of Houston had intentionally destroyed evidence pertinent to the lawsuit. As a result, the Court held that inferences were appropriate: (1) throughout the class period, the City of Houston had a policy of not releasing warrantless arrestees who had not received neutral determinations of probable cause within the constitutionally required period of time; (2) throughout the class period, the City’s policymakers were aware of this policy; and (3) the City acted with deliberate indifference with respect to its unconstitutional policy of not releasing warrantless arrestees who hadn’t received probable cause hearings in the appropriate amount of time. On December 11, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify their class. The first amended complaint detailed a single class of plaintiffs seeking compensatory relief, which applied to all those arrested without warrant and held for more than 48 hours without a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 13, 2018, which added a fifth named plaintiff. Additionally, this second amended complaint defined two classes seeking compensatory relief. The first subclass included all those arrested and held held by the City of Houston without a warrant or a judicial determination of probably cause for 48 hours or more, and the second subclass included those who were arrested and held between 24 and 48 hours. In spring 2019, the District Court issued an order overruling a motion from the City that asked the Court to exclude certain documents that they claimed to be privileged from evidence. The plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the city to produce these documents, which was stayed by Judge Hoyt pending the City’s appeal. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals then vacated the District Court’s order with respect to one document, and denied the City’s claim of privilege in all other respects. Upon remand, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to compel. In late June 2019, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On July 3, 2019, Judge Hoyt granted the plaintiffs’ earlier motion for class certification. One week later, the City filed a motion to stay the case pending interlocutory appeal regarding the class certification issue, which was denied by the district court in early August. And, shortly after on August 8, 2020 the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants leave to appeal the grant of class certification. At some during the summer of 2019, the parties began going through mediation and started settlement negotiations, and on August 13, 2019, a joint order to stay the case pending the finalization of settlement was granted. In July 2020, Houston City Council voted to pass a settlement awarding the plaintiffs $1.17 million in exchange for indemnity. The court granted a joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on October 22, 2020. The case is ongoing pending the court's approval of the settlement agreement.

Summary: In 2016, individuals who had been arrested without warrants and held by Houston city police for longer than 48 hours without a judicial determination of probable cause filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Houston. The plaintiffs alleged that this was a violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2020, the parties reached a settlement providing the plaintiffs with financial compensation in exchange for indemnity for the City of Houston.


On May 12, 2016, an inmate who had been in solitary confinement since 1979 filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, represented by the Abolitionist Law Center and private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment and the procedural and substantive components of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleged that “confinement in small cells for approximately 23 hours a day for more than three decades has harmed his mental and physical health, resulting in permanent damage,” including “increasing feelings of anxiety, frustration, loneliness, difficulty concentrating, memory loss, and depression.” The plaintiff also submitted an expert report with his lawsuit from psychologist Dr. Craig Haney, one of the leading psychologists and scholars of the harms of solitary confinement. Dr. Haney’s report states that the plainitff has been subjected to a “social death” due to his having “been kept in solitary confinement for an extraordinary amount of time—an amount that greatly exceed any of the limits recommended or countenanced by any legal, mental health, or human rights organization of which I am aware.” The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction in the form of a court order mandating a “step-down” process to end his long-term solitary confinement On May 12, 2016. The plaintiff moved to compel discovery on July 13, 2016. On August 5, 2016, Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner granted, but deferred portions of the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery. On August 10, 2016, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery on the portions that were deferred. On September 20, 2016, Judge Conner granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and directed the parties to develop a “step-down” program for the plaintiff’s reintegration into the general population. 209 F. Supp. 3d 766. On September 30, 2016, the parties provided a joint step-down program for the plaintiff. According to the Philadelphia Inquirer, the program includes time out of cell and social interactions, progressive increase in social interaction and mental health monitoring and treatment. The parties subsequently engaged in settlement negotiations and on June 28, 2017, Judge Conner dismissed the case as the parties had reached a voluntary settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: A prisoner who was in solitary confinement since 1979 brought this lawsuit in May 2016. The plaintiff sued for violations of his 8th Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and his rights to procedural and substantive due process. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the parties to develop a step-down program for the plaintiff's reintegration into the general population.


Onuoha v. Facebook (also known as Mobley v. Facebook) was filed on behalf of people of color challenging race and national origin discrimination in employment, housing, and credit ads on Facebook. A ProPublica article highlighted Facebook’s tools which allowed advertisers to exclude specific groups called “ethnic affinities.” In response, three individuals who used Facebook to search for housing and/or employment filed a class action complaint the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on November 3, 2016. Facebook and 9,999 unidentified advertisers were listed as defendants. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant advertisers were enabled by Facebook's "ethnic affinities" feature to discriminate against potential renters and employees. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class for all U.S. Facebook users that had “not seen an employment or housing-related advertisement on Facebook for the last two years” because of Facebook’s usage of “ethnic affinities” tools. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU’s Immigrants’ Rights Project, plaintiffs sued under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e). Relief sought included declaratory relief, temporary and permanent injunctive relief, and monetary damages, both in the form of statutory damages and civil penalties. Judge Edward J. Davila was assigned to the case. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 13, 2017 that named only Facebook as the defendant. Plaintiffs elaborated that in offering this tool, Facebook allegedly engaged in a pattern or practice of "providing racially discriminatory marketing, recruitment, sourcing, advertising, branding, information, and/or hiring services for and on behalf of employers, housing providers, and creditors in violation of federal and state civil rights laws." They also cited additional federal and California state laws. Facebook moved to dismiss the case on April 3, 2017. They claimed immunity under the Communications Decency Act (47 U.S.C. § 230), as providers of an “interactive computer service” cannot be held liable for information “provided by another content provider.” Additionally, they argued plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to properly allege Facebook itself engaged in discrimination. Four days later, the court stayed discovery pending the resolution of the motion. The parties had started mediation by May 2017. During mediation, Facebook moved to officially relate four recently filed cases on August 24, 2018. The court denied this motion on September 10, 2018. Facebook filed a proposed order containing the settlement agreement on February 12, 2019. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice allowing for settlement on March 19, 2019. Facebook reached settlements in three civil rights cases and two complaints before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission over ad discrimination on its platform. The settlement included the present case, Spees v. Facebook (E.E.O.C.), National Fair Housing Alliance v. Facebook (S.D.N.Y), Communications Workers of America v. Facebook (E.E.O.C.), and Riddick v. Facebook (N.D. Cal.), all available on the Clearinghouse. The terms of above settlements included promises by Facebook to change their advertising tools to prevent advertisers from targeting users based on protected characteristics. Facebook also promised to change how it targets audiences for advertisements without using protected classes like race and gender to generate an audience. The changes affected Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger. Facebook agreed to create a separate portal for ads in areas of housing, employment, and credit. The parties also agreed to monitor the changes for three years and to study whether the algorithm creates unintended bias. The above settlements mooted the class certification sought by plaintiffs. This case is ongoing to enforce the settlement as of July 19, 2021.

Summary: In November 2016, numerous people of color challenged Facebook's tools which allowed advertisers to exclude users based on characteristics like race. By March 2019, Facebook reached a settlement promising to implement changes to prevent advertisers from targeting users based on protected characteristics such as race. As of July 19, 2021, the settlement was being enforced.


On May 19, 2011, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a non-profit organization concerned with technology-related civil liberty issues, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff sought the release of a document that the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had prepared to examine the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f) to obtain certain telephone records without administrative subpoenas or any other legal process. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had wrongfully withheld this document under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and (5) and that the plaintiff had exhausted the available FOIA administrational remedies to obtain this opinion. On November 10, 2011, the DOJ filed for summary judgment. On December 19, 2011, the EFF filed a cross motion for summary judgment. On September 21, 2012, Judge Richard J. Leon granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied that of the plaintiff. The court held that the requested document, in its entirety, was exempt from FOIA disclosure for two reasons: 1. The document was properly exempt from disclosure in the interest of national security because it contained classified information pertaining to intelligence activity. If disclosed, the information could threaten national security; and 2. The document fell under the “deliberative process privilege” because it was pre-decisional and deliberative in nature and it was generated as part of a continuous process of agency decision-making. (892 F.Supp.2d 95). On November 15, 2012, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District Columbia. The plaintiff contested the ruling that the document was covered by the deliberative process privilege and argued that even if this privilege were to apply to the document, the FBI had waived the privilege by relying on the document in dealings with Congress and the Office of the Inspector General. The plaintiff also alleged that the district court had erred in failing to determine whether there was unclassified, factual information that was “reasonably separable” from the document’s other content and therefore disclosable. (739 F.3d 1). The Court of Appeals held oral arguments before Judges Sri Srinivasan, Harry T. Edwards, and David B. Sentelle on November 26, 2013. On January 3, 2014, Judge Edwards, for the Court of Appeals, affirmed the district court’s decision. He held the following: 1. The requested document was covered by the deliberative process privilege; 2. The FBI had never waived the deliberative process privilege by adopting the document’s determination as its own; and 3. As the document was exempt from disclosure under deliberative process privilege, the court did not need to decide whether particular sections of the document were properly withheld as classified, or whether some material was reasonably segregable from the material properly withheld (739 F.3d 1). On October 14, 2014, the US Supreme Court denied EFF’s petition for writ of certiorari. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2011, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. EFF sought to obtain a document that the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel had prepared to assess the authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f) to gather telephone records without legal process. In 2012, the District Court held that the DOJ had rightly withheld the document. In 2014, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed this decision. In October 2014, the Supreme Court refused EFF’s request to hear the case. The case is now closed.


On February 12, 2003, a separation-of-church-and-state advocacy group and state prisoners sued the State of Iowa, Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC) officials, and certain vendors ("InnerChange" and "Prison Fellowship"), claiming violations of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause and the equivalent provision of the Iowa state constitution. The plaintiffs challenged a contract that provided for payments to vendor organizations for pre-release rehabilitation services at the DOC's Newton facility through the organizations' "values-based" program, based on Evangelical Christianity. The claimants, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, sought declarative and injunctive relief, as well as nominal damages. The plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa by retained and in-house counsel for the advocacy group, Americans United for Separation of Church and State. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, making the same basic allegations, on August 8, 2003, with a second amended complaint filed on August 21, 2003, after two similar pending cases (Ashburn v. Mapes, Case No. 4:02-cv-90447, and Shukr v. Kautzky, , Case No. 4:03-cv-90101) in the same federal district court were consolidated with this one. The amendments added relatives of the prisoners as plaintiffs and stated that money deposits these relatives would otherwise make to the prisoners' telephone accounts had been used and would, without the requested relief, be used by the state to help fund the conduct allegedly violating the Establishment Clause. Additionally, these plaintiffs objected to the state's using funds from a tobacco litigation settlement to fund the objectionable conduct. The amended complaints set out numerous specific practices in which Christian teachings and beliefs were explicitly a part of the rehabilitative services, asserted that participation in the program was pre-conditioned upon acceptance of Christian teachings, and noted that parole recommendations were made with input from the operators of the overtly Christian rehabilitative program. The plaintiffs sought a complete prohibition on state funding of this religious-based program or, alternatively, establishment of equivalently funded rehabilitation programs available to prisoners not participating in the InnerChange program. The plaintiffs also sought repayment to the state of taxpayer funds already paid to the vendors, as well as money taken from prisoner telephone accounts to help fund the program. The complaint also set out the desire to return some plaintiffs who had been transferred in order to make space for the program to prior housing assignments in the DOC system. Discovery and depositions ensued. On April 29, 2005, District Judge Robert W. Pratt's unpublished order denied three pending cross-motions for summary judgment. The judge found that disputed factual issues existed, including what process the state used to select values-based pre-release rehabilitation programs, the voluntary nature or compulsive nature of this particular program, and whether the program was pervasively sectarian. Numerous individual defendants were dismissed from the case by stipulation between the parties on July 27, 2005, in light of the plaintiffs dismissing their claims for nominal damages. The case proceeded to a bench trial, but not without the court first denying pretrial motions the parties had filed seeking to limit introduction of certain evidence or to require certain statements made in prior pleadings to be viewed as admissions. 395 F. Supp. 2d 805 (S.D. Iowa 2005). After the trial, the District Court's June 2, 2006, order by Judge Pratt held that: (1) the service providers were operating under color of state law, for purposes of amenability to suit under § 1983; (2) the program was pervasively sectarian; (3) the program did not involve payments made at direction of prisoners, which would not violate Establishment Clause; (4) the program fostered excessive entanglement of government with religion; (5) the contract violated the federal and state constitutions' Establishment Clauses; and (6) the service providers (InnerChange and Prison Fellowship) were enjoined from further contract performance, would not be paid amounts due under contract for services already rendered, and would be forced to return to the state all payments received since the inception of the contract in 1999. The defendants were not required to pay the expenses incurred by the state for its provision of in-kind support. Judge Pratt's order required the DOC to make pro rata refunds to individual telephone accounts from which funds were taken, with the remainder of the recouped money to be returned to the tobacco settlement trust. 432 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Iowa 2006). The court did not require the state to establish alternative secular programs, as doing so would encourage the court to micro-manage a state correctional agency. Likewise, the court declined to order the state to return certain prisoners to their prior housing assignments, since they had no rights based on an expectation of certain living quarters. The court issued its formal judgment on June 5, 2006 based upon Judge Pratt’s order. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. That court's three-judge panel (including retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, sitting by designation) issued an opinion on December 3, 2007. Written by Circuit Judge William Duane Benton, the opinion affirmed the district court's ruling in all but two respects: (1) the non-prisoner contributors to the prisoners' telephone fund lacked standing to sue, and (2) it had been an abuse of discretion for the lower court to grant recoupment for services rendered prior to its June 2, 2006 order. Other aspects of Judge Benton's opinion rejected the claim that completed performance of the contract rendered the plaintiffs' claims moot. The Circuit court also rejected the vendors' objections to having been found to be state actors for § 1983 purposes. Similarly unpersuasive to the Court of Appeals was the state's claim that changes it had made in funding the multi-year program, resulting in a shift from cost-reimbursement to per diem payments (as an effort to make InnerChange an indirect aid program), limited the period during which state funding violated the Establishment Clause. 509 F.3d 406 (8th Cir. 2007). Requests for rehearing by the panel and rehearing en banc were denied by the Eighth Circuit on January 9, 2008, and the case was remanded to the district court. On August 22, 2008, Judge Pratt granted a joint motion ordering the defendants to pay $20,000 in a settlement agreement plus attorney's fees. There has been no further substantial activity on the docket, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: In February 2003, prisoners sued the Iowa Department of Corrections (DOC) and the State of Iowa in the Southern District of Iowa for violating the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOC paid pre-release rehabilitation services based on Evangelical Christianity. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs sought declarative and injunctive relief as well as damages. Proceeding amended complaints set out numerous specific practices in which Christian teachings and beliefs were explicitly a part of the rehabilitative services, asserted that participation in the program was pre-conditioned upon acceptance of Christian teachings, and noted that parole recommendations were made with input from the operators of the overtly Christian rehabilitative program. The plaintiffs sought a complete prohibition on state funding of this religious-based program or, alternatively, establishment of equivalently funded rehabilitation programs available to prisoners not participating in the InnerChange program. The plaintiffs prevailed at a bench trial but defendants appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The Circuit court's opinion affirmed the district court's ruling in all but two respects: (1) the non-prisoner contributors to the prisoners' telephone fund lacked standing to sue, and (2) it had been an abuse of discretion for the lower court to grant recoupment for services rendered prior to its June 2, 2006 order. The court remanded the case for further proceedings. Back in district court, Judge Pratt granted a joint motion on August 22, 2008 requiring the defendants to pay $20,000 in a settlement agreement plus attorney's fees. The court retained jurisdiction over enforcement of the settlement agreement through September 2008 and the case has since closed.


On March 11, 2008, individuals who were arrested in New York for loitering filed a class action suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District for New York. The plaintiffs filed against the City of New York for continuing to enforce loitering statutes s. 240.35(3) and (7) of the NY Penal Law after both were declared unconstitutional. These provisions dealt with loitering for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct and loitering in a transportation facility without sufficient reason. 240.35(3) was notable for being used to harass gay men seeking to engage in consensual sexual activity. In June of 2009, plaintiff's motion for class certification was granted. The class consisted of all persons who had been arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of 240.35(3) or (7). Judge Scheindlin marked this case as related with Brown v. Kelly as both dealt with loitering statutes previously held unconstitutional. For a full summary of the outcome, see Brown v. Kelly in the Clearinghouse PN-NY-0042. The plaintiff classes in Casale and Brown settled for $15 million plus attorney's fees, and the City was ordered to removed all records relating to those arrested or charged under the loitering statutes, as well as to conduct officer training.

Summary: The City of New York failed to stop enforcing three loitering statutes [NY Penal Law s. 240.35(1),(3),(7)] that were declared unconstitutional by the courts in 1983, 1988, and 1992. NYPD and the DA's office was held in contempt of court for its failure to follow court orders in ceasing to arrest, charge, and prosecute individuals under the statutes, subjecting it to escalating fines for any future enforcement. A Class Action Fund of $15 million was awarded to the plaintiffs in a settlement agreed to in 2012.


On October 22, 2015, individuals who had been found incompetent to stand trial on criminal charges filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services, Norristown State Hospital, and Torrance State Hospital under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act). Represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private counsel, they asked the court for class certification (a class of plaintiffs waiting in jails for placement and a class of plaintiffs in state hospitals who were unlikely to be declared competent) and declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Sylvia H. Rambo. The individuals who were declared incompetent to stand trial suffered from a range of mental health issues, including intellectual and cognitive disabilities, traumatic brain injury, and mental illness, including serious mental illness and dementia. When a court would rule that an individual was incompetent to stand trial on criminal charges, it would stay the proceedings and then order treatment to restore competency. If, at some point, the individual became competent, the criminal charges could be reinstated. Once a court issued an order for competency restoration treatment, the person was transferred to a mental health facility to be treated. Upon issuance of the court order, responsibility for the criminal defendant was immediately transferred to the state’s Department of Human Services. The plaintiffs claimed that DHS’s denial of timely treatment, and failure to address delays, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the regulations promulgated under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and court orders. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that DHS’s failure to allocate sufficient resources for providing competency restoration treatment resulted in some of the longest delays in the country: many criminal defendants waited more than a year, while some federal courts had deemed more than seven days’ wait unconstitutional). These delays caused the plaintiffs to spend time in jail, where there was minimal to no mental health care, and they often suffered in solitary confinement. On January 27, 2016, the parties filed, and the court approved, a settlement agreement enforceable by the court for three years. The state agreed not to oppose class certification for those plaintiffs waiting in jails for placement. It also agreed to allocate necessary resources to remove currently incarcerated class members from jails, and to prevent future jail detentions beyond constitutionally allowable times, including the creation of new placement options and making at least $1 million available to create supportive housing opportunities in Philadelphia. The DHS would also assess every person on waiting lists for treatment at Norristown State Hospital or Torrance State Hospital, as well as every person currently confined at either hospital by order of a criminal court, to determine which criminal defendants were eligible for less-restrictive placement. The parties agreed to postpone the impending preliminary injunction while they worked together to develop a strategic plan for reducing wait times and attempted to negotiate a maximum allowable wait time, which would be incorporated into the settlement agreement. The state agreed to pay the plaintiffs’ costs and attorneys’ fees. On May 11, 2017, the plaintiffs, claiming that the state was failing to meet the requirements of the settlement, again moved for a preliminary injunction. Although the state had added additional resources as required by the settlement, the waitlist had grown and the wait times remained in excess of sixty days—which the state acknowledged was unconstitutional. On June 15, 2017, the parties reached a second interim settlement agreement and the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the second interim settlement agreement, the state agreed to hire an independent consultant to conduct an assessment of the state’s competency restoration systems and processes and produce a report with a recommended strategy to reduce wait times to constitutional levels. The state also agreed to add additional resources for class members over the following nine months. Following the completion of the consultant’s report, the state agreed to implement the plan or propose alternative strategies to the plaintiffs. If the parties were unable to reach an agreement, the plaintiff might again move for a preliminary injunction. The parties also agreed to attempt to reach an agreement on a maximum allowable wait time for mentally ill criminal defendants. In addition, the state agreed to pay the costs and consulting fees of the independent consultant, as well as the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. On March 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for a preliminary injunction, alleging that the state was failing to address the unconstitutional wait times. The plaintiffs requested that the court compel the state to transfer all class members to a mental health facility within seven days of the filing of a commitment order. On April 23, 2019, the state filed a response to the plaintiffs’ motion, arguing that seven days was not an appropriate legal standard, and that DHS needed twenty-one days to transfer incompetent patients. The parties began renewed settlement discussions and the court stayed the proceedings, pending a settlement agreement, on June 3, 2019. On June 22, 2020, the court approved a joint motion to extend the second interim settlement agreement for 6 months while negotiations continued on a third settlement agreement. As of July 23, 2020, those negotiations are ongoing.

Summary: In 2015, individuals who have been found incompetent to stand trial on criminal charges filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged that the Pennsylvania Department of Human Services denied them timely treatment and failed to address unconstitutionally long delays, during which plaintiffs were held in jails. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement agreement that required the allocation of resources to alleviate the problem and cooperation between the parties to develop a plan to further remedy the situation. In 2017, the parties reached a second settlement agreement that required the additional allocation of resources and an independent consultant's assessment of defendants' program in order to develop a plan to remedy the situation.


On July 2, 2013, owners of a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the company's owners. On September 11, 2013, United States District Court (Judge John R. Tunheim) granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiffs until 30 days after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled on either O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), both of which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On October 24, 2014, counsel were directed to provide a joint status report regarding the appeals before the Eighth Circuit in the two aforementioned cases. On November 7, 2014, the parties submitted a joint status report stating that they were engaged in negotiations that could lead to a stipulation regarding entry of judgment. On November 14, 2014, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, the parties stipulated and agreed that judgment would be entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants. The stipulation stated that plaintiffs intended to make a motion for attorneys' fees. On November 19, 2014, the Court granted the stipulation. The plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees is not reflected in the docket, so the parties may have reached a negotiated settlement. The case appears to be closed.

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs.


This lawsuit, filed by the City of San Francisco on January 31, 2017, challenges President Trump’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order on immigration enforcement, which threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The City filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint argued that this issue was one of "state sovereignty and a local government’s autonomy to devote resources to local priorities and to control the exercise of its own police powers, rather than being forced to carry out the agenda of the Federal government." Thus, the plaintiff alleged that the executive order violated the Tenth Amendment. The complaint addressed 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. After asserting its compliance with the statute, the complaint alleged that the U.S. had begun to designate non-compliant cities as sanctuary cities and that San Francisco had been designated as such. The complaint asserted that §1373 unconstitutionally regulated state governments and that San Francisco stood to be harmed by the executive order. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for a declaration that San Francisco complies with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) violates the Tenth Amendment, and that the executive order's enforcement directive violates the Tenth Amendment. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna Ryu, but on February 10, Judge William Orrick granted a motion to relate this case to County of Santa Clara v. Trump, IM-CA-0089 in this Clearinghouse, and reassigned this case to himself. On February 27, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The amended complaint added that San Francisco seeks a declaration that the EO's funding restrictions violate the Tenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, and Article I, sec. 1 of the Constitution. On March 8, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. In the motion, the plaintiff requested that the court enter a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the executive order. The plaintiff also sought to enjoin the defendants from taking any action that would declare San Francisco a sanctuary city, thereby making the city ineligible for federal funds. On March 23, the city of Richmond moved to relate this case to Richmond v. Trump (IM-CA-0090 in this Clearinghouse), which had been filed on March 21 in the same court. The court granted the motion on March 23. Several individuals and organizations have filed amici briefs in support of the plaintiff including the State of California, a local chapter of the NAACP, and several Silicon Valley technology companies. After an April 14 hearing, the Court, on April 25, entered a nationwide injunction against operation of the Order. The court explained that the federal government at the hearing had disavowed a robust reading of the Executive Order:
 It explained for the first time at oral argument that the Order is merely an exercise of the President’s “bully pulpit” to highlight a changed approach to immigration enforcement. Under this interpretation, Section 9(a) applies only to three federal grants in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that already have conditions requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373. This interpretation renders the Order toothless; the Government can already enforce these three grants by the terms of those grants and can enforce 8 U.S.C. 1373 to the extent legally possible under the terms of existing law. Counsel disavowed any right through the Order for the Government to affect any other part of the billions of dollars in federal funds the Counties receive every year.
 The Court held, however, that the Executive Order "is not reasonably susceptible to the new, narrow interpretation offered at the hearing." Yet a broader reading was, Judge Orrick explained, unconstitutional: "The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that the total financial incentive not be coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves." Accordingly, the Court granted a preliminary injunction against any broader implementation of the order, although it emphasized that the preliminary injunction "does not affect the ability of the Attorney General or the Secretary to enforce existing conditions of federal grants or 8 U.S.C. 1373, nor does it impact the Secretary’s ability to develop regulations or other guidance defining what a sanctuary jurisdiction is or designating a jurisdiction as such." County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017). The government moved for reconsideration pursuant to a May 22, 2017 memorandum from the Attorney General regarding the implementation of the EO. The memo specified that "the Department of Justice will require jurisdictions applying for certain Department grants to certify their compliance with federal law, including 8 U.S.C. § 1373, as a condition for receiving an award. This certification requirement will apply to any existing grant administered by the Office of Justice Programs and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services that expressly contains this certification condition and to future grants for which the Department is statutorily authorized to impose such a condition. All grantees will receive notice of their obligation to comply with section 1373." Further, "the term 'sanctuary jurisdiction' will refer only to jurisdictions that 'willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.'" On May 23, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss on June 6. On July 6, the plaintiff Santa Clara (followed by joinders from San Francisco and Richmond on July 7) moved for leave to file a surreply in opposition to the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs argued that recent statements by President Trump and DHS officials contradicted assertions in the defendants' reply brief. On July 12, the plaintiff also filed a supplemental request for judicial notice of recent statements by AG Sessions. On June 16, 2017, the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 28, 2017, many organizations, including labor unions, civil rights groups, and public schools, as well as individual sheriffs and police chiefs, moved to file amici briefs in support of the plaintiff's opposition to the defendants' motion to discuss. On July 12, 2017, Judge Orrick held a hearing (in all three related cases) on the defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. He issued an order on July 20, denying the defendants' motions. He denied the motion for reconsideration because the AG Memorandum did not change the analysis from the preliminary injunction order. Additionally, he denied the motion to dismiss because the AG Memorandum did not change his findings of the plaintiff's standing and their claims' ripeness and likelihood of success. Finally, he concluded that the plaintiff had adequately stated a claim for declaratory relief. County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 2017 WL 3086064 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2017). On August 15 and 17, 2017, the plaintiff in an administrative motion and supplemental statement asked the court to relate City and County of San Francisco v. Trump to City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions. The plaintiff argued that both cases concerned substantially the same parties and challenged the President's withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities. On August 18, 2017, the defendants responded, arguing that the cases should not be related because the first challenged an EO and the latter an AG program. On August 23, 2017, Judge Orrick granted the plaintiff's request to relate this case to City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions. Then on August 25, 2017, he found State of California v. Sessions to be a related case, and reassigned it to himself. That case also challenges DOJ's immigration-related conditions on law enforcement funding. On August 30, 2017 San Francisco and Santa Clara moved for summary judgment. San Francisco argued that the EO was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Consequently, San Francisco argued, the court should permanently enjoin the EO's implementation. The defendants, in their September 27, 2017 response, argued that the Constitution authorized their broad immigration enforcement powers as implemented in the EO and § 1373. On September 18, 2017 the defendants appealed, to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Orrick's April 25, 2017 preliminary injunction and July 20, 2017 order denying the defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. The Ninth Circuit opened a docket for the appeal, No. 17-16886. The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on April 11. In the district court, Judge Orrick held an October 23 hearing on the plaintiffs' August 30 motion for summary judgment. On November 20, he granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as "sanctuary jurisdictions." The injunction applied nationwide because Section 9(a) was facially unconstitutional. In his opinion, Judge Orrick held that the EO had caused and would continue to cause constitutional injuries, by violating the separation of powers doctrine and depriving the plaintiffs of their Fifth and Tenth Amendment rights. Judge Orrick first stated that the EO's plain language impermissibly empowers the President to place new conditions on all federal funds -- a power properly reserved to Congress under the Spending Clause. The President's and AG's subsequent comments on the EO had confirmed, rather than narrowed, this broad scope. Further, the Fifth and Tenth Amendments forbid funding conditions that are vague, unrelated to the funds at issue, and coercive: "Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves." On November 29, 2017 the parties jointly requested that the Court dismiss San Francisco's claim for declaratory judgment (that it did not violate § 1373), which the Court would consider instead in San Francisco v. Sessions. The next day, Judge Orrick granted this request. On December 14, 2017 the defendants appealed Judge Orrick's November 20 permanent injunction, asking the Ninth Circuit to consolidate this appeal with the other two appeals in process. The plaintiffs, for their part, asked the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the consolidated appeals as moot because they challenged a preliminary injunction that the permanent injunction had superseded. The defendants responded on December 27. Eleven states filed a December 22, 2017 amicus brief supporting the defendants. However, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' request on January 4, denying all pending motions as moot. The Ninth Circuit held oral argument on April 11, 2018. On August 1, 2018 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment, but vacated and remanded for reconsideration of the nationwide injunction. The panel held that the executive branch could not refuse to disperse the federal grants without congressional authorization under the Separation of Powers principle and the Spending Clause. The panel found that Congress had not so authorized, and so summary judgment was proper, but that there were no findings to support an injunction with nationwide reach. 2018 WL 3637911. On August 29, 2018 the plaintiff in an administrative motion asked the court to relate City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. The defendants did not oppose the motion. On September 10, 2018, the court related the cases to this case. On August 15, 2019, by the plaintiffs' stipulation, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' request for a nationwide injunction and closed the case.

Summary: On January 31, 2017, San Francisco challenged Trump’s Executive Order which threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impedes the federal government's immigration law. The City filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and asked for a declaration that San Francisco complies with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and that 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) and the Executive Order violate the Tenth Amendment. After a hearing, the district court, on April 25, 2017 entered a nationwide injunction against operation of the EO. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and issued a nationwide injunction to prevent enforcement of the EO. On November 20, 2017 the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as "sanctuary jurisdictions." The injunction applied nationwide because Section 9(a) was found facially unconstitutional. On August 1, 2018 the Ninth Circuit upheld the grant of summary judgment, but disagreed that a nationwide injunction was proper. The case is ongoing.


On June 26, 1998, a class of high school girls in Michigan filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under §1983, alleging that the Michigan High School Athletic Association (MHSAA) violated provisions of Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by private counsel and by the National Women's Law Center and Equity Legal, the plaintiffs contended that MHSAA refused to authorize additional sports for high school girls, provided inferior practice and playing facilities for post-season tournaments held in certain girls' sports, and required girls to play certain sports in disadvantageous seasons. This allegedly reduced participation opportunities for high school girls by shortening playing seasons, thereby preventing participation in club competitions and all-star competitions involving players from other states and negatively affecting their chances of being recruited for collegiate-level sports programs. MHSAA defended by arguing that its placement of the girls' sports seasons at issue was advantageous for female athletes and thus not discriminatory. The MHSAA also asserted that legitimate reasons (mostly logistical) existed for scheduling some male and female teams of the same sports in different seasons. On April 19, 1999, the District Court (Judge Richard Enslen) certified a class for the case of "all present and future female students enrolled in MHSAA member schools who participate in interscholastic athletics or who are deterred from participating in interscholastic athletics because of Defendants' discriminatory conduct and who are adversely affected by that conduct." 192 F.R.D. 568, 570 (W.D. Mich. 1999) On September 30, 1999, the Justice Department filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs. In addition, the Justice Department asked the court to allow the Justice Department to intervene on the plaintiffs' side. Judge Enslen allowed the United States to participate as “litigating amicus” on behalf of the class of Michigan high school girls. On January 21, 2000, the district court (Judge Richard Enslen) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 80 F.Supp.2d 729. Judge Enslen granted MHSAA permission to take an interlocutory appeal, but a three-judge panel of the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals denied permission to appeal. In the summer of 2001, the parties participated in mediation which resulted in a settlement of all claims except for the issue of when the female athletes would have their playing seasons. That issue went to trial. (In May 2001, the court first released two opinions on evidentiary matters, which are misdated in Westlaw. 2007 WL 5830967 (correct date: May 2, 2001), 2007 WL 9221306 (May 2, 2001); The court conducted a two-week bench trial in September 2001 and received evidence concerning the following questions: (1) whether MHSAA, by assuming controlling authority over interscholastic athletics from member schools that receive federal funds, is subject to Title IX; (2) whether MHSAA is a state actor; and (3) whether MHSAA's scheduling of only girls' sports in disadvantageous seasons violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. On September 24, 2001, the trial began on the scheduling of seasons issue and lasted two weeks. On December 17, 2001, the court found for the plaintiffs on all three issues. The court held that MHSAA is subject to Title IX and is a state actor, and that its scheduling practices violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The court ordered MHSAA to submit a compliance plan to remedy the discriminatory scheduling of girls' sports. Throughout early 2002, the parties fought over what kind of injunctive relief should be ordered. MHSAA submitted a compliance plan, which Plaintiffs and the United States opposed. Plaintiffs suggested other options, including the scheduling of boys and girls in the same season in all sports. MHSAA rejected this option outright, claiming that its member schools did not want it. Alternatively, Plaintiffs suggested flipping the girls’ basketball and volleyball seasons because doing so would not impact any boys’ sports. They then suggested moving girls’ swimming to the winter to not only take advantage of the better season but to provide much needed athletic participation options for girls in the winter. They further suggested moving girls’ soccer and/or golf to the fall. Again, MHSAA rejected those options. The Court held a public, evidentiary hearing on the compliance plan on July 26, 2002. Recognizing that any compliance plan must change the girls’ volleyball and basketball seasons in order to be equitable, the Court rejected the compliance plan and gave MHSAA another opportunity to submit its own plan. MHSAA polled its member schools and held informational meetings throughout the state to discuss various options. The compliance options submitted to the schools were widely circulated in the press and were widely submitted to the schools, the coaching associations, the athletic directors’ association, the principals, the superintendents, and the school boards. In the end, MHSAA submitted the option that it contended that its members and affiliated groups most supported. Although Plaintiffs again objected to the plan (Dkt #612), the Court approved it on November 8, 2002, and amended it on February 27, 2003. MHSAA was given a court-approved compliance scheme, which was to be implemented throughout Michigan by the 2004-2005 school year. The Court ultimately approved the rest of MHSAA's remedial plan, finding that the switching of the remaining sports at issue (soccer, golf, tennis, swimming, and diving) balanced the inequity of nontraditional playing seasons between high school boys and girls in Michigan. The plaintiffs filed a fee petition on January 30, 2002 seeking $5,155,136.05-- $5,023,991.25 in attorneys' fees and $131,144.80 in costs. On appeal, in July 2004, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that MHSAA's scheduling of sports violated the Equal Protection Clause. 377 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2004). MHSAA then sought review by the Supreme Court. On May 2, 2005, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and instructed the Sixth Circuit to reconsider the case in light of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005), a case addressing the availability of damages under federal statutes. On August 16, 2006, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion that again affirmed the district court's ruling that the sports schedule discriminates against female athletes on the basis of sex. 459 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2006). On December 7, 2006, the Sixth Circuit denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. Defendants again sought review by the Supreme Court, but on April 20, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court denied review. 549 U.S. 1322. Shortly following that denial, the Michigan High School Tennis Coaches' Association and several parents filed a Motion to Intervene seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain the Lower Peninsula high school girls' tennis season during the fall. On June 7, 2007, a second Motion to Intervene was filed by some coaches of Upper Peninsula high school girls' soccer teams and several additional parents, seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain girls' soccer in the Upper Peninsula during the spring season. On June 12, 2007, a third Motion to Intervene was filed by some coaches of Upper Peninsula high school boys' soccer teams and certain parents of team members, as next friends, seeking to modify the Compliance Plan to maintain boys' soccer in the Upper Peninsula during the fall season. The Court denied these motions as untimely. 2007 WL 2078753 (July 13, 2007). On March 31, 2008, the court awarded the plaintiff $4.4 million in attorneys' fees and over $130,000 in costs, plus interest. 2008 WL 906031 (Mar. 31, 2008). On August 14, 2008, the court also awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel an additional $94,309 in fees and expenses related to litigating fees. 2008 WL 3834024. The defendants appealed, but on April 1, 2009, the parties negotiated and entered into a Settlement Agreement pursuant to which plaintiffs agreed to payment of a lesser amount in satisfaction of the fee judgments so as to not compromise defendant’s ability to operate the sports programs it provided the student-athletes in the state of Michigan. Specifically, the Settlement Agreement included that the plaintiff pay $6 million in full and complete resolution of any and all claims that Plaintiffs may have against the MSHAA arising out of, or relating to, the Litigation, the Fees Judgments, or any other fact, transaction, or occurrence as of the date of this Agreement. Upon the Agreement, the parties submitted a mutually accepted stipulated order for approval to the Sixth Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal with prejudice and without costs. The court approved the Settlement Agreement on April 3, 2009.

Summary: Plaintiffs brought a suit against the Michigan High School Athletic Association, alleging that they were excluded from opportunities to participate in interscholastic athletic programs and received unequal treatment and benefits in those programs. The district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court also denied review of the defendant's petition for certiorari. The parties eventually negotiated and entered into a settlement agreement which plaintiffs agreed to payment of a lesser amount in satisfaction of the fee judgments.


On July 14, 2004, a 62-year-old employee filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northeast District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Maytag Corporation, his former employer, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). he plaintiff claimed that he was demoted and denied a promotion because of his age. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought lost profits, liquidated damages, reinstatement to his former position, attorney’s fees, and pre-judgement interest. The case was assigned to Judge William Hart and subsequently transferred to Judge Ronald A. Guzman. On September 20, 2004, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to follow the necessary procedures of first filing a claim of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court denied this motion on September 22, 2004 because it consolidated this case with EEOC v. Maytag, 1:04-cv-04632, a class-wide age discrimination against a group of Regional Sales Managers already begun by the EEOC. The court found that both cases involved the same issues and requested the plaintiffs to jointly file a new complaint. The defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the consolidation was denied on October 28, 2004. As requested by the court, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2004. The amended complaint alleged that the defendant demoted a class of employees over the age of 50 from Regional Sales Managers to Zone Managers. The defendant again filed a motion to dismiss the original individual plaintiff's claims on November 12, 2004, claiming he had failed to file his claims within the statutorily mandated time period. The defendant also claimed that the EEOC never filed charges of discrimination, and so their claims also required dismissal. On May 12, 2005, the court disagreed. It denied the motion to dismiss because the EEOC had provided sufficient notice to the defendant of alleged age discrimination involving an entire class of employees. The EEOC's action was triggered by the individual plaintiff's complaint, sufficient to inform the defendant of the possibility of a class-wide issue. As to the time bar, the plaintiffs did not assert at what time the individual became aware of the fact that he was being discriminated against. This event, and not when the discriminatory action was alleged to have actually occurred, would trigger the time limit. The motion to dismiss was denied in its entirety. 2005 WL 1563109. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 7, 2005 and a consent decree was entered on December 2, 2005 resolving both cases. The defendant agreed to pay class members a total of $334,500, to post notice of the decree on non-public bulletin boards used for employee communication, to provide training in age discrimination law for its managers and supervisors, and to report semi-annually to the EEOC on the age of employees promoted and demoted. The defendant also agreed its employees would not retaliate against any person who opposed practices that were unlawful under the ADEA. The parties incurred their own attorneys' costs and fees and the settlement agreement remained in effect for two years. This case is now closed.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in July 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois by a 62-year-old employee against his former employer. The plaintiff alleged that he was demoted and not promoted because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. In October 2004, the case was consolidated with EEOC v. Maytag, which alleged class-wide age discrimination against a group of Regional Sales Managers. After surviving a motion to dismiss, the cases resolved by consent decree in December 2005. Maytag agreed to pay class members a total of $334,500, to post notice of the decree for employees, to provide training in age discrimination law for its managers and supervisors, and to report semi-annually to the EEOC on the age of employees promoted and demoted. The settlement agreement remained in effect for two years. This case is now closed.


On January 9, 2003, four persons represented by attorneys from several law firms in Louisville, Kentucky, filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs challenged the strip search policy of the Hopkins County, Kentucky, jail. The plaintiffs alleged that they were searched pursuant to a blanket strip search policy of the jail which required all pretrial detainees transferred from other facilities to be strip searched, without regard to the individual circumstances surrounding the transfer or other factors indicating a reasonable suspicion to believe the transferee was concealing weapons or contraband. The plaintiffs maintained that the policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and sought monetary damages, injunctive relief and class certification. On March 18, 2005, the District Court certified the case as a class action involving two classes, pursuant to an agreed order of the parties defining the classes as: (1) an "admission class" consisting "of all individuals arrested for minor offenses who were required to remove their clothing for a visual inspection on admission to the jail despite the absence of any reasonable suspicion that they were carrying or concealing weapons or contraband;" (2) "release class" consisting of "all persons who were required by defendants in the jail, just after becoming entitled to release, to remove all of their clothing for a visual inspection despite the absence of any reasonable grounds for doing so." To determine the scope of the classes, some 7,000 questionnaires were mailed to potential members. The plaintiffs also filed an Amended Complaint on March 18, 2005. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on June 8, 2005 and a Third Amended Complaint on March 9, 2006. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on numerous grounds, including asserting a statute of limitations bar, lack of standing, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to meet the physical injury requirement of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The District Court (District Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr.) denied the motion in all respects. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2005 WL 3478152 (W.D. Ky. Dec 19, 2005). The defendants then requested that the Court establish a deadline for the return of inmate questionnaires. The District Court (Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel) denied the request. Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11243 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 16, 2006). See also Sutton v. Hopkins County, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3152 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 11, 2007) (Judge McKinley overruled defendants' objection to Magistrate Goebel's order). Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the jail policy of strip searching pretrial detainees who were transferred from other facilities, which remained in effect until May 25, 2006. The plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants, in turn, moved to decertify the class. Judge McKinley denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and for a preliminary injunction and granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, concluding that Hopkins County Jail's policy of strip searching pretrial detainees who were transferred from other facilities was reasonable and justified. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2007 WL 119856 (W.D. Ky. Jan 11, 2007). The defendants' request for class decertification was denied. Sutton v. Hopkins County, Ky., 2007 WL 119892 (W.D.Ky. Jan 11, 2007). On July 17, 2008, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the Court for approval. On July 18, 2008, the court (Magistrate Judge E. Robert Goebel) granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. On October 20, 2008, the court (Judge Joseph H. McKinley) granted final approval of the settlement agreement. The settlement was for $3 million, with the named class members getting a larger amount. Each class member would apply for compensation according to the procedure established in the settlement agreement. The settlement set forth procedures for claimants to appeal decisions from the claims administrator to the court. For example, on August 20, 2009, the court reversed and remanded a decision by the claims administrator denying relief to a plaintiff who had been strip-searched. 2009 WL 2589506 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 20, 2009). One of the potential class members had challenged the approval of the settlement agreement and filed for a declaration of rights, to intervene and to hold in abeyance. The class member also filed a motion for equitable relief, for relief pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b), or, in the alternative, to reopen the case. On October 9, 2009, the court permitted the class member to submit a claim form to the claims administrator in accordance procedures set forth in the settlement. However, the Court declined to decide whether she qualifies as a member of the class at this time. Instead, the parties would adhere to the claims approval and appeal process set forth in the settlement. 2009 WL 3294843 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2009). Also on October 9, 2009, the court allowed another potential class member who had been left out of the proceedings to submit a late claim form. 2009 WL 3299597 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2009). On January 25, 2010, the court issued final judgment and dismissed this class action and all claims against defendants and their insurers with prejudice. All class members who did not make a timely request to be excluded from the class were barred and enjoined from commencing and/or prosecuting any claim or action against the defendants relating to the claims alleged in this case. In 2013, a prisoner who had been deposed by the defendants but did not receive his claim filed a motion for relief. On March 4, 2013, the court denied his motion for relief. No other motions have been filed in the case since then.

Summary: In 2003, four persons represented by attorneys from several law firms in Louisville, Kentucky, filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs challenged the strip search policy of the Hopkins County, Kentucky, jail. The parties settled the case in 2008 and the defendants agreed to pay $3 million to the plaintiffs.


On January 3, 2012, a deaf prisoner filed a lawsuit against the Indiana Department of Correction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Represented by the ACLU of Indiana, the plaintiff filed his suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that he was only allowed access to a TTY telephone during working hours or after-hours by making a written request for access while other prisoners had unlimited daily access to telephones from 6 am to 11 pm, seven days a week. In addition, the plaintiff's phone calls were restricted to a length that is not comparable to the length of time allowed to the prisoners who were not hearing impaired. He asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The parties negotiated a settlement agreement, and on March 5, 2012, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson dismissed the case according to the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal. We do not have a copy of the settlement agreement.

Summary: In 2012, a deaf prisoner filed lawsuit against the Indiana Department of Correction in the US District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff filed under, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging that his phone calls were restricted unlike other prisoner who were not hearing-impaired. The parties settled.