In 2012, the EEOC adopted a guidance document stating that employers may not categorically exclude felons from hiring. When a felon who was denied employment with the Texas Department of Public Safety filed a complaint with the EEOC, Texas brought suit seeking to prevent enforcement of the Guidance. This lawsuit, filed on November 4, 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that by issuing the Guidance, the EEOC had overstepped the authority granted to it by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The case was assigned to Judge Sam R. Cummings. On August 20, 2014, the court granted the EEOC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It held that the injury that Texas alleged was merely speculative, since the EEOC could not bring a direct enforcement action against the state, but could only refer the state’s case to the U.S. Attorney General for litigation or issue a right-to-sue letter to an aggrieved person. With only a speculative injury, Texas lacked Article III standing to sue. 2014 WL 4782992. Texas appealed this decision on August 25, 2014. Nearly two years later, on June 27, 2016, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment: as Texas was the object of enforcement, even indirectly, it had standing to challenge the Guidance. Notably, this ruling was guided by the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.Ct. 1807, which had been unavailable to the district court at the time of its 2014 ruling. The Fifth Circuit therefore withdrew the reversal on September 23, 2016, vacated the district court’s original ruling, and sent the case back to the district court for a new judgment in light of Hawkes. 832 F.3d 327. Nearly a year later, after the district court had denied an EEOC motion to dismiss, both Texas and the EEOC moved for summary judgment on September 14, 2017. On February 1, 2018 the court granted partial summary judgment to Texas. Holding that the Guidance was a substantive rule, promulgated without notice and the opportunity for comment, the court issued an injunction barring the EEOC from enforcing the Guidance until it had “complied with the notice and comment requirements under the APA for promulgating an enforceable substantive rule.” The court declined to rule that the EEOC did not have authority to issue substantive rules, and it dismissed the state’s claim for declaratory judgment. Both the EEOC and Texas appealed the ruling. On September 30, 2019, the Fifth Circuit (Judges Smith, Wiener, and Elrod) modified the district court’s injunction, upheld the modified version, and upheld the dismissal of the state’s other claims. The court held that the Guidance was a substantive regulation that the EEOC had no authority to promulgate. The modified injunction, therefore, enjoined the EEOC and the Attorney General from enforcing the Guidance against Texas, regardless of compliance with APA notice and comment requirements.

Summary: Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the State of Texas filed this lawsuit against the EEOC. Texas alleged that the EEOC overstepped its authority under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by issuing an Enforcement Guidance that purported to limit the extent to which employers, including Texas, could exclude convicted felons from employment. The district court issued an injunction, upheld by the Fifth Circuit, barring the EEOC from enforcing the Guidance against Texas.


This case was brought by physicians who served poor patients through the Medicaid program in Ohio. They filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on September 3, 2010, against the Secretary of State, challenging a state law that made it a crime for attorney-general or county-prosecutor candidates to accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person having an ownership interest in the provider. The plaintiffs intended to donate money to then-candidate for Ohio Attorney General Cordray's campaign but feared prosecution. The cause of action in this case was 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They also alleged that the Statute in question violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On October 27, 2010, the District Court (Judge Donald C. Nugent) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Lavin v. Brunner, 2010 WL 4340981 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2010). After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On July 22, 2011, Judge Nugent granted summary judgment for the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. Lavin v. Husted, 803 F. Supp. 2d 756 (N.D. Ohio 2011) rev'd and remanded, 689 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Raymond M. Kethledge) reversed the lower court's decision on August 3, 2012, holding that the Statute here violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests. Lavin v. Husted, 689 F.3d 543 (6th Cir. 2012). As a general rule for contribution limits to be permissible, the government needs to show that the limits are closely drawn to serve a sufficiently important state interest. The Court found that the contribution ban that applied to all Medicaid providers was not closely drawn to serve the important state interests to prevent corruption and fraud committed by only a handful of them. On September 11, 2012, the District Court in its Judgment declared the Statute unconstitutional in its entirety, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court further issued a permanent injunction, prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Statute against candidates to whom the named plaintiffs may elect to donate money or the plaintiffs themselves. On June 13, 2013, the Court awarded attorneys' fees and litigation costs in sum of $135,223.74 to the plaintiffs. Lavin v. Husted, 2013 WL 2950334 (N.D. Ohio June 13, 2013). This ended the case.

Summary: Physicians who served poor patients through the Medicaid program filed a lawsuit in the federal court on September 3, 2010, against the Secretary of State, challenging a state law that made it a crime for attorney-general or county-prosecutor candidates to accept campaign contributions from Medicaid providers or any person having an ownership interest in the provider. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the Statute in question violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on October 27, 2010 and granted summary judgment for the defendant on July 22, 2011. The plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment decision to the Six Circuit. The Sixth Circuit Court reversed the lower court's decision on August 3, 2012, holding that the statute violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment interests and was not closely drawn to serve the important state interest to prevent corruption alleged by the defendant. On September 11, 2012, the District Court declared the Statute unconstitutional in its Judgment and issued a permanent injunction that banned the enforcement of the Statute against the named plaintiffs and the candidates that they may elect to finance. The Court awarded attorneys' fees and litigation costs in sum of $135,223.74 to the plaintiffs on June 13, 2013. This ended the case.


This lawsuit, filed by the city of Chicago on August 7, 2017, challenged the federal government's imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. The plaintiff, represented by its corporation counsel and private counsel, sued the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In its complaint, Chicago alleged that the DOJ was pursuing the federal government's anti-"sanctuary city" policy by new, but still unlawful, means. Since the narrowing (in Santa Clara) of President Trump’s January 25, 2017 Executive Order 13768, the President's ability to place new immigration-related conditions on federal funds was limited. Nevertheless, the DOJ threatened to withhold federal law enforcement funding—the Byrne JAG Program—from cities, including Chicago, that refused to certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. (This section provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities.) Chicago alleged it complied with § 1373 but argued that the DOJ was adopting "increasingly aggressive" and unconstitutionally vague definitions of what compliance meant. In a July 25, 2017 press release, as Chicago interpreted it, the DOJ defined compliance as allowing DHS to enter city correctional or detention facilities, interrogate arrestees about their immigration status, and in doing so, hold them longer than justified by probable cause. Such compliance would force Chicago to abandon its longstanding "Welcoming City Ordinance" policy, intended to improve cooperation between immigrant residents and municipal police. The city's policy restricted Chicago from seeking and disclosing information about residents' immigration status, as well as from honoring ICE detainer requests without an independent public-safety reason. Chicago alleged that the federal government lacked constitutional or statutory authority to coerce the city to abandon its "Welcoming City Ordinance" policy. Statutorily, Chicago argued that the Byrnes JAG statute did not grant the DOJ authority to impose these conditions, and that the APA prohibited the DOJ's conduct as arbitrary and capricious and as lacking the requisite notice-and-comment procedure. Constitutionally, Chicago argued that the DOJ was usurping the authority both of Congress to spend funds, and of state and local governments to administer their own law enforcement. Thus, Chicago alleged, the DOJ was unlawfully coercing the city to choose between accepting the new unconstitutional conditions and losing its "Welcoming" policy to retain funding, or to reject them and lose funding critical for public safety. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Chicago sought a declaration that it complied with § 1373 and that the DOJ's immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG funding were unconstitutional. Chicago also sought an injunction against the new conditions in advance of the imminent September 5, 2017 deadline to apply for Byrnes JAG funding. A couple of days after filing the complaint, Chicago filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the DOJ from imposing the new conditions. The case was assigned to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber on August 7. On August 24, the DOJ responded to Chicago's preliminary injunction motion. The DOJ argued that Chicago's motion was likely to fail because Congress had expressly authorized the AG to impose these conditions on federal funding, and because all federal funding is also independently conditioned on compliance with federal statutes including § 1373. The DOJ also asserted that the conditions would not require Chicago to violate the Fourth Amendment because they would not require Chicago to hold an arrestee beyond the time she or he otherwise would have been released. Furthermore, the DOJ argued, Chicago faced no immediate harm because it had not yet applied to the FY 2017 Byrne JAG Program, and the federal funding constituted a very small fraction of its law enforcement budget. Finally, the DOJ maintained, the public interest and balance of equities allowed the federal government to enforce federal law, including immigration law, in its funding programs. Several amici briefs were filed in support of Chicago on August 31-September 1, by the California State Legislature, the County of Santa Clara (California), Cook County (Illinois), legal scholars, prosecutors and law enforcement leaders, businesses, social service providers, and immigrants' rights organizations. Judge Leinenweber held a preliminary injunction hearing on September 11 and issued an order on September 15, granting in part and denying in part Chicago's motion. Judge Leinenweber found that Chicago had established a likelihood of success on the merits only on challenging the notice and access conditions (by which Chicago had to provide the federal government with notice of and access to detainees), but not the compliance provision (related to § 1373). Regarding the former, the Judge found that the DOJ's imposition of the conditions exceeded its statutory authority under the Byrne JAG statute, and Chicago had also demonstrated irreparable harm by losing funding. However, regarding the latter, he held that the federal government was authorized to require compliance with applicable federal laws, including § 1373. Judge Leinenweber saw § 1373 as presenting no commandeering problem in violation of federalism because the provision required no mandatory action from Chicago, but rather prohibited Chicago from restricting officials' voluntary cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. Finally, in enjoining the notice and access conditions, Judge Leinenweber noted that the injunction applied nationwide. 2017 WL 4081821 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15, 2017). On September 26, the DOJ appealed to the Seventh Circuit and moved to stay the injunction pending the appeal. The DOJ argued that the injunction should not be nationwide in scope because Chicago suffered no cognizable injury from conditions imposed on other Byrne JAG applicants. Additionally, the DOJ argued that the nationwide injunction would irreparably harm it by forcing it either to abandon the notice and access conditions for all outstanding FY 2017 Byrne JAG applications (even if the conditions were later held lawful), or to suspend the Byrne JAG program pending further litigation. On October 6, the U.S. Conference of Mayors moved to intervene as a plaintiff. The Conference, which represents over 1000 mayors nationwide, had adopted a policy opposing federal penalties on sanctuary cities. The Conference argued that a stay would force many cities to individually sue defendants to enjoin the conditions on their own FY2017 Byrne JAG applications. Consequently, the Conference wanted the nationwide injunction to remain in place. On October 13, Judge Leinenweber denied the government's request for a stay of his September 15 preliminary injunction pending appeal. Judge Leinenweber held that the DOJ's "constitutional transgression is national in scope because the notice and access conditions, shown to be likely unconstitutional, were imposed nationwide." Judge Leinenweber found the "extraordinary remedy" of a nationwide injunction appropriate because it was "based on the need for federal uniformity and [because of] the unfairness resulting from disparate applications[,]" and that it would benefit judicial economy. 2017 WL 149847 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13, 2017). The DOJ then immediately went to the Seventh Circuit and sought a partial stay of the nationwide preliminary injunction pending appeal. In this October 13 motion, the DOJ argued that the principles of standing and equity limited the injunction to Chicago, so that the DOJ could still administer the Byrne JAG grants to other cities during the scheduled FY2017 timeline. Back in the district court, on October 13, Chicago sought partial reconsideration of the September 15 preliminary injunction, specifically the part declining to enjoin the § 1373 condition because it likely did not violate anti-commandeering principles. Chicago alleged that DOJ had contradicted itself, first by representing to the Court that § 1373 imposed no affirmative obligations on the plaintiff, but later notifying Chicago that it intended to extend § 1373 to Chicago's policy governing whether and under what circumstances to notify federal officials of the release date or custody status of individuals held by Chicago. Accordingly, in the Seventh Circuit, on October 16, Chicago moved to suspend briefing, arguing that the Seventh Circuit lacked appellate jurisdiction until the district court ruled on Chicago's partial reconsideration motion. On October 18, the DOJ opposed this motion, and Illinois and California moved to file amici briefs in support of Chicago. On October 20, the Seventh Circuit granted Chicago's motion to suspend briefing until the district court ruled on Chicago's partial reconsideration motion. Back in the district court, the U.S. Conference of Mayors moved for a preliminary injunction, repeating the reasoning that the Court had used in granting the preliminary injunction order for Chicago, and the arguments that Chicago had made in its motion for partial reconsideration. On November 16, 2017, Judge Leinenweber denied Chicago's motion for partial reconsideration and the U.S. Conference of Mayors' motion to intervene as a plaintiff. Judge Leinenweber first upheld his denial to enjoin the § 1373 compliance condition on the Byrne JAG grant. He stated that DOJ's correspondence with Chicago as to DOJ's interpretation of § 1373 would not alter the Court's facial analysis of the provision. Turning next to the Conference's motion, Judge Leinenweber held that although the Conference had standing, it could not intervene as a plaintiff because it could not demonstrate that its interests would be impaired without intervention. The next day, the DOJ asked the Seventh Circuit to exercise its jurisdiction and consider the DOJ's motion for a partial stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. However, the Seventh Circuit denied the DOJ's motion on November 21. Briefing in the Seventh Circuit proceeded, with the States of California and Illinois filing an amicus brief in support of Chicago. In the District Court, on January 3, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants argued that the challenged conditions were authorized by statute, were consistent with the Spending Clause (as related to the purpose of Byrne JAG funding), did not commandeer Chicago (because it may decline the funds), and did not violate the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (as not final agency action and not arbitrary and capricious). On January 31, Chicago moved for partial summary judgment; fifteen states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief on behalf of Chicago. On April 19, 2018, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion affirming the District Court's preliminary injunction. The Court held that the District Court did not err in finding Chicago likely to succeed on the merits (that DOJ lacked the statutory authority to impose the conditions) and did not abuse its discretion in granting a nationwide injunction (because effective relief from this nationwide policy could not be limited to just the City). 888 F.3d 272. Judge Rovner for the majority wrote:
The Attorney General in this case used the sword of federal funding to conscript state and local authorities to aid in federal civil immigration enforcement. But the power of the purse rests with Congress, which authorized the federal funds at issue and did not impose any immigration enforcement conditions on the receipt of such funds. [. . .] It falls to us, the judiciary, as the remaining branch of the government, to act as a check on such usurpation of power.
 Subsequently, in the Seventh Circuit, the DOJ moved for a partial stay of the injunction (as applied to localities other than Chicago), pending a rehearing en banc and if necessary a petition for a writ of certiorari. However, the Seventh Circuit denied this motion on April 24. The DOJ then petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and also moved for a partial stay pending that rehearing, which was again denied; the DOJ again asked for an en banc reconsideration of the partial stay request. On June 4, 2018, the Seventh Circuit granted the partial stay request, staying the preliminary injunction beyond the City of Chicago. 2018 WL 4268817. Meanwhile, on July 27, 2018, the district court granted the City's motion for partial summary judgment and denied the DOJ's motion to dismiss. The court held that in light of a 2018 Supreme Court decision, the anti-commandeering analysis was now "whether Section 1373 'evenhandedly regulates an activity in which both States and private actors engage,' as opposed to regulating activities undertaken by government entities only, thus conscripting state action in the implementation of a federal scheme." The court then held that § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment on its face because it did not "evenhandedly regulate activities in which both private and government actors engage;" rather, it requested immigration information be provided to federal authorities by local government employees acting in their official, state-employed capacities. Further, Judge Leinenweber held that the DOJ still had not proven its statutory authority to impose the notice and access funding conditions and so the Seventh Circuit's prior reasoning in affirming the earlier injunction controlled. The Judge also held that while the compliance funding conditions were likely within statutory authority, they were otherwise unconstitutional and therefore not subject to such analysis. Finally, the court held that the pending Seventh Circuit rehearing did not bar the district court from granting this new injunction, though it limited the injunction to just Chicago pending the Seventh Circuit's rehearing en banc. 321 F.Supp.3d 855. The DOJ again appealed this latest injunction to the Seventh Circuit. On August 10, 2018, the Seventh Circuit vacated its prior order granting a rehearing en banc in order to avoid piecemeal appeals. The Court found that because of the district court's July 27 decision (and its intent to enter a permanent injunction), the preliminary injunction had become meaningless and the appeals process needed to restart. So, the Court maintained the stay of the nationwide scope of the earlier injunction until the district court issued a proper permanent injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, and it indicated it would hear an appeal once there was a final judgment from the lower court. 2018 WL 4268814. The district court then entered final judgment on August 15, 2018 in favor of the City and against the DOJ. Once again, the DOJ appealed to the Seventh Circuit (docket no. 18-02885). The Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on April 10, 2019. On October 12, 2018, the City of Chicago had filed another lawsuit in this district court, again challenging the imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding, but for FY2018 grants (City of Chicago v. Sessions III). The case was also assigned to Judge Leinenweber. The challenged conditions in that case were almost identical to those presented here, and on September 19, 2019, Judge Leinenweber granted summary judgment to the city of Chicago and entered a permanent injunction. The nationwide scope of that injunction was also stayed due to the pending appeal of the injunction in this case. The government also appealed that injunction to the Seventh Circuit. Consequently, on November 20, 2019, the Seventh Circuit ordered the appeals in these two cases to be consolidated for purpose of disposition. On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Leinenweber's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide. The Court found that while the executive branch has significant powers in the realm of immigration, it does not have Congress' power of the purse and thus cannot withhold Byrne JAG grants in order to force Chicago to alter its behavior. The Court affirmed the district court's grants of declaratory relief to Chicago, finding that the Attorney General exceeded the authority delegated to him by Congress in imposing the challenged conditions to the FY2017 and FY2018 grants, and that the Attorney General's decision to impose the conditions in both years violated the separation of powers. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of § 1373 under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The government had relied on language in 34 U.S.C. § 10153 to support its imposition of the compliance condition. § 10153 states that in a request for a grant, the application shall include a certification that the applicant "will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws." The government had argued that the reference to "all other applicable Federal laws" allowed it to require that applicants certify compliance with § 1373. However, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with this interpretation and instead found that the phrase could not be construed so broadly as to encompass all federal laws that applied to states or localities, including federal immigration statutes. The Court also held that a nationwide injunction was proper due to the interconnected nature of applicants for the Byrne JAG grants. In order for the grant amounts to be properly calculated for Chicago, the Court held that the unlawful conditions could not be imposed elsewhere. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to determine whether any other injunctive relief was appropriate in light of its determination that § 10153 could not be used to incorporate laws unrelated to the grants or grantees. 957 F.3d 772. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed by the city of Chicago on August 7, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenged the federal government's imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city (specifically, for FY2017 Byrne JAG grants). Chicago sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on Sep. 15, 2017. The DOJ appealed to the Seventh Circuit and on April 19, the preliminary injunction was upheld, but the nationwide scope of the injunction was later stayed by the Circuit Court pending a rehearing en banc. The district court granted the city's motion for partial summary judgment in July 2018, finding a permanent injunction was warranted, but staying its nationwide scope pending the Seventh Circuit appeal. The DOJ again appealed this latest injunction. On August 10, 2018, the Seventh Circuit decided to vacate its prior order granting a rehearing so that the district court could formally enter a permanent injunction, which the government could then appeal; the nationwide scope of the injunction would remain stayed. The district court then entered final judgment in favor of the City, and the DOJ appealed. After hearing oral argument, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeal in this case with the appeal of an injunction in the related case, (City of Chicago v. Sessions III) (which challenged essentially the same funding restrictions, but for FY2018 Byrne JAG grants). On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide.


On March 27, 2007, individuals with mobility impairments and an advocacy group filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against five operators of "over the road bus" transportation, for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Colorado law. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to provide accessible bus service. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that they all experienced numerous problems with wheelchair access, including drivers not knowing how to operate wheelchair lifts, defective lifts, drivers not allowing them off the bus at rest stops, and accessible buses not being available despite 48 hours advance notice to the bus companies. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants' actions violated the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 42 U.S.C. § 12184; the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-112. The plaintiffs alleged violation of the regulations 49 C.F.R. 37, which implemented the ADA as to companies that operated bus service. The CCPA allows a claim for damages against defendants who engage in deceptive trade practices. The plaintiff alleged defendants engaged in deceptive practices by promising accessible bus service but then failing to deliver. The plaintiffs sought an injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. All defendants eventually settled and were dismissed by stipulation. The only substantive motions were a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment by two defendants, which they withdrew on June 5, 2008. It is unclear whether Greyhound and Busco/Black Hills also settled with the plaintiffs. Presently, none of the settlement agreements are publicly available.

Summary: Disabled individuals brought claims against five operators of "over the road bus" transportation, for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Colorado law. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants failed to provide accessible bus service. All five defendants were dismissed by stipulation of the parties and it appears they all settled with the plaintiff, though presently the settlement agreements are not publicly available.


On August 3, 2018, the Human Rights Defense Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act. In March 2018, the plaintiff had requested from ICE certain records related to litigation against the organization. The plaintiff appealed ICE’s denial of its records request to the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, but had not received a response to the appeal by the time it filed the complaint. The plaintiff alleged that ICE wrongly withheld documents responsive to its properly submitted request in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as an order that ICE disclose the requested records and attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas S. Zilly. On August 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to note that the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor had emailed a final denial of the appeal on August 6. On March 15, 2019, the parties submitted a joint status report in which the defendants acknowledged that the plaintiffs were entitled to the requested records subject to exceptions delineated in the Freedom of Information Act. The parties noted that they had conferred regarding a rolling production schedule. Although the court set a trial date for December 2, 2019, the parties noted in their joint status report that the case will most likely be resolved by motions practice. On February 14, 2020, the parties requested that the court continue the trial until after ICE's anticipated completion of its production of documents in response to plaintiffs' FOIA request. The motion states that "the parties agreed on a rolling production schedule where ICE processes 500 pages per month" and that ICE anticipates production through October 2020. The parties also submitted a proposed briefing schedule to begin in December 2020, but the parties stated that the case will most likely be resolved without the need for a trial. Judge Zilly granted the parties' motion on February 18; plaintiff's dispositive motion is due December 18, 2020 and a bench trial is set for April 26, 2021.

Summary: On August 3, 2018, the Human Rights Defense Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act. On March 20, 2018, the plaintiff requested from ICE certain records related to litigation against ICE. The plaintiff appealed ICE’s denial of its records request to the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor, but as of the date of filing this action had received no response to the appeal. The plaintiff alleged that ICE wrongly withheld documents responsive to its properly submitted request in violation of the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as an order that ICE disclose the requested records and attorneys’ fees. The case is ongoing.


This class-action lawsuit was filed on January 12, 2017, in the United States District Court For The Middle District Of Tennessee. The plaintiffs and the proposed class was incarcerated in the Tennessee Department of Corrections (“TDOC”) and housed at Trousdale Turner Correctional Facility in Hartsville, TN, a private prison owned and operated by CoreCivic. The class is defined as persons with insulin-dependent diabetes (Type 1 or insulin dependent Type 2) who were, who had been, or who in the future would become, housed at Trousdale Turner correctional facility. The plaintiffs were represented by private council, and the case was been assigned to District Judge Eli J. Richardson. The named defendants are CoreCivic, TDOC, and the Commissioner of TDOC. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide accommodations and discriminating on the basis of disability resulting in physical injury. They also alleged that defendants had demonstrated deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of the class resulting in physical injury in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process. Specifically, the complaint alleged that as a result of CoreCivic's policy and practice of understaffing, defendants were often unable to provide persons with insulin-dependent diabetes with access to basic diabetes care, including blood sugar checks and insulin administration coordinated with regular mealtimes. They sought permanent injunctive relief, court orders to transfer those with insulin-dependent diabetes out of the Trousdale prison and to cease assigning these prisoners to that facility, and court orders to change training and institutional policy regarding diabetes care. The court certified the class on Oct 3, 2018 (2018 WL 4776081). That same day, the court also dismissed the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment and denied the American Diabetes Association's motion to intervene (2018 WL 4800836 and 2018 WL 4799770, respectively). The parties entered a joint motion for class settlement on May 16, 2019, which was subsequently granted on May 23, 2019. On July 25, 2019, Judge Richardson entered judgment against CoreCivic requiring that they provide access to blood sugar checks and insulin administration in coordination with regular mealtimes, as well as procedural changes to accommodate inmates with insulin-dependent diabetes. The judgment also requires training changes, as well as a payment of $99,950.00 to the plaintiff's counsel for attorneys fees. The court dismissed all claims against TDOC and its commissioner with prejudice. The settlement agreement was to be in force for two years. The case is ongoing for the purposes of enforcement.

Summary: Inmates at a privatized prison in Tennessee run by CoreCivic sue in a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Of Tennessee. They allege that the prison has failed to provide them adequate accommodations for their insulin-dependent diabetes, demonstrating deliberate indifference to their serious medical need. The court certified the class and ruled in their favor, requiring the prison to change their policy to provide adequate care for diabetic inmates, as well as paying attorneys fees.


On November 1, 2006, private counsel and attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class-action civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging a series of raids conducted by federal immigration authorities in Southeast Georgia over the course of at least two weeks in September 2006. Plaintiffs alleged that federal agents with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, under the guise of locating suspected undocumented workers who had been employed at the Crider poultry facility in Stillmore, Georgia, illegally raided and searched the homes of Latinos in an effort to drive the Latino community out of Southeast Georgia. Plaintiffs specifically alleged that agents searched, detained and interrogated citizens merely because they looked "Mexican," in violation of their rights secured by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs sought actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and class certification. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss the case. On May 1, 2007, the District Court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) stayed discovery and briefing on plaintiffs' request for class certification, pending the Court's ruling on defendants' dispositive motions. A first amended complaint was filed on June 14, 2007. Defendants responded by moving to dismiss, or for summary judgment, the various counts alleged in the amended complaint. On December 5, 2007, the court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) granted defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief to redress violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The court found that plaintiffs had not shown a real and immediate threat of future harm. Therefore, on March 27, 2008, the court denied as moot plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to the dismissed claims. That same day, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint asserting Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA) claims against the United States. The FTCA claims were for false imprisonment, assault, battery, and trespass. Plaintiffs also asserted Bivens claims against the federal law enforcement agents employed by ICE for violation of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Once again, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. They argued that the FTCA claims should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior to filing the FTCA claims, the claims fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, and the plaintiffs didn’t state viable tort claims under Georgia law. They also argued that the Bivens claims should be dismissed because the claims were against unidentified John Does. Plaintiffs then asked for leave from the court to file a third amended complaint that identified the John Does by their actual names. On March 31, 2009, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the FTCA and Bivens claims. 2009 WL 900800. The court found that plaintiffs had exhausted their remedies prior to filing the FTCA claims and that the FTCA claims did not fall under the discretionary function exception. The court also granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, which they filed on June 19. On July 31, 2009, plaintiffs, citing a settlement agreement, filed an unopposed motion asking the court to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. The case was dismissed on July 31. The Southern Poverty Law Center provided the settlement agreement. In the settlement, the United States agreed to pay plaintiffs $35,000 and plaintiffs agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case.

Summary: In November 2006, private counsel and attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center filed a class action civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, challenging a series of raids conducted by federal immigration authorities in Southeast Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") agents had illegally raided and searched the homes of Latinos in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Those claims were dismissed, but in an amended complaint plaintiffs asserted that defendants had violated the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") and the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss the FTCA claims. In July 2009, the parties settled the case and defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $35,000.


On June 12, 2015, three individuals incarcerated and suffering from complications due to Hepatitis C viral infections filed this class action suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment, and of Article I § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Represented by private counsel and the PA Institutional Law Project, the plaintiffs alleged that the DOC had a policy and practice of denying necessary medical care to inmates diagnosed with Hepatitis C. In denying care, the DOC placed the inmates at serious and unnecessary risk for irreparable harm and death. The plaintiffs estimated that 20% of the state's prisoners were infected with Hepatitis C at the time of the lawsuit. The defendants did not authorize treatment with drugs that recently were established to be effective and the new standard of care, and in fact ceased providing treatment altogether. The plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 7, 2016, Judge John Padova ordered that the motion for class certification be stayed pending resolution of the defendant's motion to dismiss. On March 21, 2016, Judge Padova issued an order partially granting and partially denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. 2016 WL 1125580. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 3, 2017, and the defendants filed another motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on February 8. The court ruled on this motion on August 8, 2017, granting it in part and denying it in part. The court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that defendants had been deliberately indifferent, and that portion of the complaint met the standard to survive a motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the allegations of the medical defendants, finding that they were not responsible for creating the DOC's policy and could not be held responsible for it. A number of additional claims were dismissed pursuant to the agreement of the parties. 2017 WL 3394605. The defendants moved for summary judgment on October 2, 2017. Meanwhile, the court granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for class certification on May 24, 2018. The class was certified as all persons who are currently incarcerated in a Pennsylvania DOC facility with a diagnosed condition of Chronic Hepatitis C, who have at least twelve weeks remaining on their sentences, and who have a life expectancy of over a year. 2018 WL 2388665. On July 12, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion with respect to one plaintiffs' personal claims for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief under Article I, § 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, and a portion of the medical malpractice claim. The court denied the remainder of the counts. 2018 WL 3388305. The parties held a settlement conference on October 17, 2018. On November 19, 2018, the parties entered into a settlement agreement on plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. The defendant agreed to replace its current Hepatitis C protocol with a new protocol that incorporated the terms of the settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to provide enhanced medical evaluation and treatment to class members, including direct-acting antivirals to class members when necessary. The settlement agreement also amended the class to include inmates with Hepatitis C who entered the Department of Corrections after the date of class certification. DOC also agreed to provide ongoing reports to plaintiffs' counsel with data regarding testing, diagnosis, evaluation, and treatment of all class members in prison currently diagnosed with Hepatitis C. The agreement also allowed for a notice-and-comment period prior to any revisions or changes to the Hepatitis C Protocol. Plaintiffs' counsel agreed it would provide the defendant with notice of any potential noncompliance. The parties agreed to enter into good-faith discussion to solve any disputes that may arise from unforeseen circumstances. The parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement was to be subjected to the final approval of the court, and that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement and to resolve any disputes that may arise. The DOC agreed to pay the plaintiffs’ $195,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The court approved the settlement agreement on February 7, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction over the case until June 30, 2022. The court may only extend the agreement in one year increments in the event of a finding of noncompliance with its terms, but not beyond five years from the date of approval. Therefore, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2015, three inmates suffering from Hepatitis C viral infections filed this class action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had a policy and practice of denying inmates diagnosed with Hepatitis C viral infections the necessary medical care, despite effective available treatments, thereby placing inmates at serious and unnecessary risk for irreparable harm and death. The case settled in February 2019 and remains in effect.


On July 19, 2017, four prisoners suffering from the Hepatitis C virus who were under the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sued the executive director of the CDOC, the chief medical officer of the CDOC, and the director of clinical and correctional services of the CDOC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had denied the plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, direct-acting antiviral (DAA) medication in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. This case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher, but on August 1, 2017, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya. Then, on September 19, 2017, because all parties did not consent to jurisdiction under Judge Tafoya, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson. On September 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding four plaintiffs and one defendant, the Interim Chief Medical Officer of the CDOC, without altering the claims or requests for relief. On October 2, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently allege both the objective and subjective components of an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment. In congruence with this motion, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery pending its resolution, but Judge Jackson denied the motion to stay discovery on October 27, 2017. On February 7, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class defined as "[a]ll current and future prisoners in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections who have been or who will be diagnosed with chronic Hepatitis C virus, who have at least 24 weeks or more remaining on their sentences and a life expectancy of more than one year, with the exception of prisoners who are already receiving or who have already completed treatment with Direct Acting Antiviral medications." The parties submitted a joint notice of private settlement agreement on August 18, 2018. The contents of the settlement are not available through PACER, but Prison Legal News reports that under the terms of the settlement prison officials agreed to: 1) spend all available funding for 2018-19 in the amount of $20.5 million to treat prisoners with HCV; 2) reduce the threshold liver damage score to allow more prisoners to receive treatment; 3) provide another $20.5 million in treatment for 2019-20; 4) eliminate the drug and alcohol program precondition; and 5) remove the disciplinary action restriction. The CDOC also agreed to pay attorneys’ fees and costs totaling $175,000. In response to the notice of settlement, the court dismissed as moot the pending motion for class certification and motion to dismiss. The parties jointly moved to administratively close the case on April 22, 2019. The motion was granted the following day. This case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by four prisoners under the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs claimed that the CDOC and other defendants had violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment by refusing to give the plaintiffs medically necessary treatment for Hepatitis C. The parties settled. Under the settlement, the CDOC agreed to spend more on Hepatitis C treatment and relax treatment eligibility guidelines.


The Denver and New Mexico Offices of the EEOC filed this action in the District Court for the District of South Dakota. The Defendant was Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, LLP, an outpatient surgical center for oral and maxillofacial surgery. The controversy involved the alleged termination of one complaint because of her pregnancy, and the alleged failure to hire the other complainant due to her sex. The lawsuit was filed in December 2004 and was tried to a jury in April 2007. The jury awarded a total of $21,098 to the two complainants, both of whom had intervened in the case. The defendant initially filed a motion to sever, and later a motion for separate trials, both of which were denied. They also had a motion for summary judgment denied in part, although the court did dismiss the EEOC's pattern-or-practice claim. After the jury verdict in their favor, the EEOC filed for injunctive relief, which was denied. Both parties appealed, but consented to withdrawing the appeal to allow the district court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest due on the award of backpay. The defendant appealed the district court's award of interest, which is still pending as of 4/22/2008.

Summary: The Denver and New Mexico Offices of the EEOC filed this pregnancy and sex discrimination action in the District Court for the District of South Dakota against Siouxland Oral Maxillofacial Surgery Associates, LLP, on behalf of two women, who intervened in the case. The jury awarded a total of $21,098 to the two complainants, both of whom had intervened in the case. The EEOC's motion for injunctive relief was denied. An appeal of prejudgement interest was pending as of this writing.


Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Ft. Bayard Medical Center ("Ft. Bayard"), a public nursing home facility in southwest New Mexico, operated by the state in an old military facility. The investigation resulted in a May 1, 2006, findings letter being sent by DOJ to the governor. The letter stated that in July and October 2005, the DOJ conducted an investigation of the facility pursuant to CRIPA authority. The investigation relied upon site visits by DOJ personnel and consulting experts, reviews of medical records and facility documents setting out procedures, policies, and practices, and interviews of Ft. Bayard administrators, professionals, staff, and residents. The letter noted that earlier, when concluding the first of the on-site visits, the DOJ expressed to state personnel "deep concerns" concerns about the life-threatening conditions at the facility. These prompted the Chief of the DOJ Civil Rights Division's Special Litigation Section to send a July 25, 2005 letter to counsel for the State of New Mexico. That letter memorialized the concerns and documented the nursing home's inadequate medical care and dangerous psychotropic medication usage, requesting that the State take immediate remedial action to address the most serious deficiencies. By the time of the second on-site visit, according to the May 2006, findings letter, the State had taken several steps to begin to remedy the deficiencies that had been identified. Significant deficiencies remained, however, such that the findings letter advised the state that residents of Ft. Bayard suffered significant harm and risk of harm from (1) the facility's inadequate medical and nursing care services; (2) improper and dangerous psychotropic medication practices; (3) failure to provide adequate safety; (4) inadequate nutritional and hydration services; and (5) inadequate restorative care and specialized rehabilitation services. Additionally, the investigation found that the state failed to provide services to certain Ft. Bayard residents in the most integrated setting, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. In every medical record reviewed, the DOJ consultants found substantial departures from the generally accepted standards in nursing home care. In nearly every record reviewed where psychotropic medication was prescribed, there were often multiple failings, including: the absence of a diagnosis justifying the use of the medication; the absence of behavioral indications warranting the administration of the medication; the absence of any evidence that non-medication interventions were tried and/or considered and found ineffective; the absence of monitoring of the medication's efficacy; the absence of side-effect monitoring; the absence of appropriate response to medication side-effects; and the absence of informed consent for the use of the medication. Relatedly, DOJ found that medications were also prescribed in excessive dosages. The letter set out specific examples of deaths, pain, and suffering resulting from the many deficient practices at Ft. Bayard. Additionally, the investigation noted a possibility that Ft. Bayard staff may have allowed residents to suffer needless pain while staff members took (or sold) pain medication intended for residents. Residents were often at risk from falls, yet few had sufficient fall prevention planning provided for them. Others would repeatedly become combative with other residents or staff without adequate interventions from staff to ameliorate the harm or risk of harm. The environment itself at Ft. Bayard was unsuited for usage as a nursing home, according to the findings letter. The DOJ also found that Ft. Bayard's nutritional and hydration services substantially departed from generally accepted professional standards of care and that the nursing home offered grossly substandard activity programs for its residents. While most residents were appropriately placed in a nursing home and their reintegration in the community would be inappropriate, those able to and who could benefit from community residence were deprived of that option by Ft. Bayard's inadequacies in assessing and planning for such transitions, as well as by the state's few non-nursing home resources for such persons. The DOJ findings letter proposed what it termed as "minimal" remedial actions to remedy the deficiencies, invited the state to address the issues, and alerted the state to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. The DOJ's letter described a cooperative approach with the state during the course of the investigation. This atmosphere evidently continued during ensuing negotiations, because the state and the DOJ soon entered into a settlement agreement obligating the state to improve a wide range of policies and practices at Ft. Bayard. The settlement contained substantive provisions addressing (1) timely assessments and care planning, (2) safe and appropriate psychotropic medication usage, (3) improved and appropriate pain management practices, and disciplinary reporting of employee diversion of residents' medications, (4) adequate protection of residents from harm from neglect, abuse, and assaults, (5) fall prevention, (6) appropriate nutrition and hydration services, and aspiration prevention, (7) activities program improvements, (8) improvements in environmental aspects of the facility, particularly increasing privacy, (9) treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate to individualized needs, and (10) compliance with applicable federal laws and implementing regulations, including Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 et seq.; Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396r et seq.; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132 et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The settlement allowed for DOJ and its consultants to retain access to Ft Bayard, its residents, and documents and records, for monitoring and technical assistance purposes. The state had to implement the changes called for in the settlement document which, by its terms, expired in two years. Attorneys for the state and DOJ signed and filed the agreement on or about May 14-16, 2007, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico and, at the same time, the United States filed its complaint against the state and the state official responsible for the operation of Ft. Bayard. The CRIPA-based complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, citing the deficiencies at the facility and alleging that the defendants' conduct violated residents' federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights, including those due process protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the statutory protections provided by Social Security Act, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act (and implementing regulations). On Jan. 28, 2008, the parties jointly moved to partially dismiss the settlement agreement. In the motion, the DOJ stated that after a number of visits, it was satisfied that the facility was in compliance with the Environment and Most Integrated Setting sections of the settlement agreement. The other aspects of the settlement agreement were not affected by the motion. The Court (Judge William P. Johnson) granted the motion on Feb. 5. On Oct. 8, 2008, Judge Johnson granted a joint motion to extend the effective date of the settlement agreement until Nov. 2011. The Court also required that the defendants submit to the DOJ plans of correction setting forth the tasks and timetables for the state to come into compliance with all the settlement agreement provisions. On Oct. 11, 2009, Judge Johnson accepted the parties joint corrective action plan outlining timetables for implementing the settlement agreement. On Oct. 17, 2011, Judge Johnson granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss the complaint. The parties agreed that the facility was in substantial compliance with the settlement agreement.

Summary: In May 2007, after a years-long investigation, the DOJ filed suit against a New Mexico-run nursing home facility for violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The parties soon entered into a settlement agreement, which set timetables for the state to substantially change their treatment programs. By Oct. 2011, the parties both agreed that the state had substantially satisfied the agreement, and the Court granted their joint motion to dismiss the complaint.


On April 16, 2004, a former Macy’s employee filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, Federated Logistics, Federated Department Stores, Inc., Macy’s East, the Frick Company, managerial staff and other employees at Macy’s East, and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, New York State Human Rights Law, Executive Law §290, and the New York City Human Rights Law § 8-107. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that his employers discriminated against him because of his race. He further alleged that his employers accused him of stealing from the store, denied him legal or union representation, and subsequently took him to the police station after he refused to sign a document stating that he had stolen. The plaintiff sought punitive damages and legal fees. The plaintiff had two allegations against his employers: (1) discrimination because the plaintiff and fellow employees of color were passed over for promotions despite the plaintiff’s lengthy employment at Macy’s and his positive performance reviews; and (2) hostile work environment as evidenced through racist comments and a “Shortage Awareness” program that rewarded employees for accusing fellow employees of theft. The plaintiff also claimed that on March 6, 2002, he was arrested for allegedly stealing from Macy’s. The plaintiff claimed that the prosecution continued despite his employer’s inability to produce proof of theft. The plaintiff therefore included the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, and individual police officers for his alleged unlawful arrest and malicious prosecution. On September 2, 2004 the defendants filed a motion to sever the plaintiff’s discrimination allegations from his arrest and prosecution allegations. The defendants argued that the allegations pointed to different occurrences. On September 26, 2005 U.S. Magistrate Judge Pitman denied the defendants’ motion. 2005 WL 2105550. On April 1, 2005, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgement. The NYPD and the City of New York filed a motion for summary judgement on the grounds that: (1) “the NYPD is not a suable entity; and (2) the plaintiff failed to meet his burden to establish liability against the City of New York.” Macy’s filed a motion for summary judgement and claimed the plaintiff could not prove that he was passed over for promotion because of discrimination and that Macy’s could be held liable for the conduct of its employees in this case. Finally, an individual defendant manager at Macy’s East filed a motion for summary judgement on the claim that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the manager was involved in the plaintiff’s arrest or was liable for the plaintiff’s treatment at work. On March 15, 2006, Judge Jones granted all three motions for summary judgement citing the reasons laid out in the motions for summary judgement and for the plaintiff’s failure to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 13, 2006, the plaintiff filed an appeal. On January 12, 2007, this appeal was dismissed with prejudice. No further explanation for the appeal or dismissal is accessible, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2004 a Macy's employee filed this suit against a number of defendants including The City of New York, the New York Police Department, and Macy's East. The plaintiff alleged employment discrimination, intentional arrest, and malicious prosecution. The defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgement, all of which were granted.


On March 13, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the American Center for Law and Justice, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the company's owners. On April 1, 2013, United States District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stay of the case. The court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiffs until 30 days after the appeal of either of the cases (1) O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or (2) Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), was decided by the Eighth Circuit, whichever occurred first. Both of these cases involved similar legal issues and the same defendant. Before a decision was reached in either case, on June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 10, 2014, the parties submitted a Joint Motion for Entry of Injunction and Judgment, in which they jointly agreed that that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, that a permanent injunction should be entered, that all other claims against the defendants should be dismissed, and that the deadline for any petition by plaintiffs for attorneys' fees should be extended to 60 days after the entry of judgment. On November 18, 2014, Judge Fliessig signed the consent injunction and judgment, and the case was dismissed. The plaintiffs never moved for attorneys' fees.

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violated the owner's religious beliefs. The case was stayed pending other cases involving the same legal issues and the same defendant. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the parties submitted a consent judgment permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing the mandate, which was signed on November 18, 2014.


On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. The Catholic Diocese represented several other religiously affiliated schools and organizations. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 31, 2013, U.S. District Court (Judge Terry R. Means) denied the U.S. motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness. On August 22, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint addressing the government's newly released accommodations for non-profit, religious organizations. On October 9, one of the plaintiffs—The University of Dallas—filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On December 31, 2013, Judge Means granted the plaintiff's motion, adopting the analysis set out by Judge Rosenthal in her opinion in E. Texas Baptist Univ. v. Sebelius just three days prior. Both Judges agreed that the accommodation imposition on the plaintiffs to self-certify their religious objections to this requirement of the ACA met the substantial burden test. On February 24, 2014, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit. (Case No. 14-10241) The remaining plaintiffs—Catholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth, Inc., Our Lady of Victory Catholic School, and Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth—filed a motion for preliminary injunction on April 18, 2014. Judge Means granted the preliminary injunction on June 5, 2014, enjoining the defendant from enforcing the ACA provision at issue in this case until further order from the court. The defendant filed an interlocutory appeal to the 5th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals on June 9, 2014. The plaintiffs Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth and Our Lady of Victory Catholic School filed a motion for voluntary dismissal, and on September 30, 2014 Judge Means entered a final judgment dismissing the case without prejudice as to the two plaintiffs. Given the lead plaintiff’s dismissal from the case, the name of the plaintiff in the case was changed to “Catholic Charities, Diocese of Fort Worth, Inc.” at this time. In addition to this case, there was also a case filed in the Eastern District of Texas and one filed in the Northern District of Texas, all alleging the same ACA violation. The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals of the claims in all three district courts into one appeal, under the case name, East Texas Baptist University v. Burwell. Judge Jerry E. Smith delivered the opinion on June 22, 2015. The Circuit Court’s decision reversed all of the District Courts’ decisions, including Judge Means' grant of the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, because the “plaintiffs have not shown and are not likely to show that the requirement substantially burdens their religious exercise under established law.” 793 F.3d 449. The plaintiffs of this consolidated case filed a petition to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari on May 17, 2016. The Supreme Court vacated the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals decision on the same day in the case University of Dallas v. Burwell. The Court remanded this consolidated case back to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in light of its recent remand in Zubik v. Burwell, which reached no decision on the merits of a similar case. 136 S.Ct. 2008. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the case. A final judgment was entered in accordance with the plaintiffs’ joint stipulation of dismissal on January 11, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice and is now closed.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Fort Worth filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Texas against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs.


On August 28, 1997, three African-American farmers, on behalf of a putative class of 641 African-American farmers, filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and monetary relief, alleging that both the USDA and county officials to whom the USDA delegated authority discriminated against them in the provision of farm loans and other credit programs. The plaintiffs challenged a history of discrimination in the USDA's farm lending programs and benefits programs, a history that led to a dramatic decline in the number of African-American farmers in America. The USDA administers billions of dollars in farm loans and guarantees each year. It has delegated authority to approve or deny loan and benefit applications to county committees elected by local farmers and ranchers. Under one percent of the commissioners nationwide were African American. The plaintiffs alleged that the county commissions either denied them loans because of their race or made it much more difficult for them to obtain credit than similarly situated white farmers. This problem was compounded by the fact that the USDA disbanded its Office of Civil Rights in 1983, and therefore stopped responding to African-American farmers' claims of discrimination. A USDA-sponsored investigation conducted in 1997 revealed that the USDA had a large backlog of uninvestigated complaints. Because of the USDA's policies and practices, many African Americans lost their farms to foreclosure and had to leave farming. Others were able to continue farming, but suffered the consequences of institutional discrimination. The plaintiffs brought their fair lending claims under the ECOA and alleged that the discriminatory provision of non-lending benefits, such as disaster relief benefits, violated the APA. Ultimately, the District Court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) approved a consent decree on April 14, 1999. Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1998). The Consent Decree covered a class of all African-American farmers who farmed or attempted to farm between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, applied for a farm loan or USDA benefit program, believe they were discriminated against on the basis of their race, and filed a complaint on or before July 1, 1997. Class members could either opt out of the Consent Decree or resolve individual claims pursue one of two settlement tracks. The settlement tracks allowed for out-of-court adjudication of individuals' claims. Class members could have elected to submit "substantial evidence" that they were victims of discrimination and receive a capped settlement amount under Track A of the Consent Decree. Class members with better-documented claims of discrimination could have elected to pursue Track B, which entitled them to a one-day trial in front of an arbitrator. Track B was only available to farmers with ECOA claims; it was not available to farmers who only brought claims under the APA relating to discrimination in the distribution of non-credit benefits. A court-appointed monitor (Randi Roth) oversaw the implementation of the Consent Decree. Track A of the Consent Decree was designed for the large majority of the class. As the District Court recognized, many of the class members lacked the type of documentation of the USDA's discrimination necessary to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard. This was in part due to the USDA's failure in processing discrimination complaints from farmers. Track A participants could prove that they submitted a complaint to the USDA by providing documents demonstrating that they complained directly to the USDA, to a member of Congress, to the White House, or to a government official who forwarded to complaint to the USDA. Class members who did not have such documentation could submit an affidavit from a non-family member which, based on personal knowledge, described the way in which the class member lodged a complaint. To receive relief under Track A, class members claiming ECOA violations needed to prove that they owned or leased land or attempted to own or lease land, that they applied for USDA credit at a county office between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996, that the USDA discriminated against them by denying the loan or providing it on less favorable terms than similarly situated white farmers, and that they were harmed by the discriminatory treatment. Class members claiming discriminatory denial of benefits in violation of the APA needed to prove that they applied for a benefit program between January 1, 1981 and December 31, 1996 and that the request was denied or provided on less favorable terms than similarly situated white farmers received. Track A claims were to be resolved within 110 days of the filing date. The claimant submitted the application to a facilitator, to whom the USDA could also submit information on damages and liability. The facilitator then submitted a recommendation to an arbitrator who was to issue a decision. The arbitrator's decision was final, unless a Court-appointed monitor determined a clear and manifest error occurred. Claimants that submitted successful claims received a $50,000 cash payment, forgiveness of all debt owed to the USDA stemming from a program upon which their claim was based, a tax payment equivalent to a quarter of the total debt forgives and cash payment, immediate termination of any USDA-initiated foreclosure proceedings, and one-time consideration for a priority loan. Under Track B, claimants with more documentation could choose to litigate their claims in mini-trials. Claimants who unsuccessfully pursued a remedy under Track B were ineligible to receive Track A benefits. Class members seeking damages under Track B could have chosen to be represented by class counsel or counsel of their choice. Claimants opting in to Track B were able to conduct limited discovery, including depositions, for 180 days before a one-day mini-trial. Following the trial, in which class members had to demonstrate that they were the victim of lending discrimination and suffered damages from the discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence, an arbitrator issued a decision within sixty days. Successful claimants under Track B were entitled to actual damages as well as priority consideration for loans. As with Track A, the decision of the arbitrator was final unless the Court appointed monitor found that "a clear and manifest error" had occurred and that the error was "likely to result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (Judges Judith W. Rogers, David B. Sentelle, and David S. Tatel) affirmed the District Court's approval of the Consent Decree. Pigford v. Glickman, 206 F.3d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 2000). A number of factors led to the parties entering the Consent Decree. Shortly after the complaint was filed in 1997, a number of farmers sought to intervene in the case. Class counsel added those farmers as named plaintiffs, and allowed their attorneys to join as class counsel on the condition that they would only seek attorneys' fees through statutory fee-shifting provisions and would not bill the individual farmers or take a contingency fee. On October 9, 1998, the District Court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) certified a class of plaintiffs. Pigford v. Glickman, 182 F.R.D. 341 (D.D.C. 1998). On October 21, 1998, President Clinton signed into law a bill waiving ECOA's statute of limitations for farmers that filed a discrimination complaint with the USDA between January 1, 1981 and July 1, 1997. Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999P.L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, §741. This bill mooted the USDA's statute of limitations defense. The plaintiffs filed a Seventh Amended Complaint on October 26, 1998. In January 1999, the parties filed a joint motion to consolidate the Pigford case with Brewington v. Glickman, Case No. 98-1693. The allegations in the Brewington complaint tracked those in the original Pigford complaint, but were made on behalf of farmers who filed discrimination complaints with the USDA after February 21, 1997 and before July 7, 1998. The parties also jointly moved to expand the class definition to reflect the addition of the Brewington class members, and filed a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed Consent Decree along with a notice to class members. The court approved each request, and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 2, 1999. After hearing objections, the Court approved the final Consent Decree on April 14, 1999. Following the entry of the consent decree, various class members continued to litigate issues specific to the Consent Decree and attorneys fees. Parties were still filing papers with the court through 2014. As of April 1, 2012, 15,645 out of 22,552 Track A claimants prevailed in their claims. Approximately 169 claimants elected to pursue Track B, of which 104 prevailed or reached a class settlement. The federal government paid a total of $1.05 billion to prevailing Track A and Track B claimants. A large number of farmers filed claims after the Consent Decree's deadline. The Consent Decree required claimants to submit claims by October 12, 1999. The court (Judge Paul L. Friedman) provided the arbitrator with the discretion to extend the filing deadline until September 15, 2000 for farmers who missed the deadline because of extraordinary circumstances. Farmers who could not participate in the Consent Decree are the subject of subsequent litigation, In re Black Farmer's Litigation, found in this database at FH-DC-0007. The case now appears to be closed, though the court retained jurisdiction over the consent decree's implementation.

Summary: In 1997, four African-American farmers represented by private counsel sued the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), alleging that the USDA discriminated against them and a class of other farmers in the provision of farm loans and other benefits. They brought their claim under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551. In April of 1999, the parties entered into a Consent Decree that allowed the farmers to pursue their claims out of court utilizing one of two tracks. Track A provided successful claimants with $50,000 and other benefits provided the claimants produced evidence of discrimination. Track B allowed claimants to recover full damages if they prevailed in a one-day mini-trial. As of April 2012, the United States made over $1 billion in payments to over 15,000 claimants.


On February 25, 2005, the Jesus Christ Christian Ministry, along with fifteen California prisoners, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the California Department of Corrections, under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Pacific Justice Institute, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that the Department's refusal to deliver mail that contained religious material from the Ministry violated the RLUIPA and the prisoners' First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. The Ministry sent the indigent prisoners books of worship and CDs with music to allow the prisoners to practice their chosen religion, Christianity. However, California prison policy only allowed religious materials to be acquired through a list of four organizations. The Ministry was not one of these four organizations. As such, any Ministry materials that were mailed to prisoners were returned to sender, and any Ministry materials found within the prison were considered contraband. The prisoners filed grievances with the Department, but those grievances were either rejected or ignored. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On September 28, 2006, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Dale Drozd) granted in part and denied in part the prisoners' motion for summary judgment, while also granting the Department's motion as to one prisoner (456 F.Supp.2d 1188). In the decision, Judge Drozd held that the policy violated the prisoners' First Amendment right to free exercise and free speech, as well as their rights under the RLUIPA. The Court determined that the distinction between approved and unapproved vendors was arbitrary, and thus could not serve any legitimate penological interest. Following the grant of summary judgment, the two sides reached a settlement. According to a Prison Legal News article, "the parties stipulated to a Temporary Operational Procedure for SATF, to be a pilot project at (only) SATF for the purpose of developing a workable final CDCR-wide policy." Under the pilot program, "once per month, JCPM shall ship all such requests in bulk to SATF," at which time "the designated chaplain shall be responsible for randomly reviewing tapes/CDs to verify valid religious content." The District Court maintained jurisdiction for six months after implementation of the pilot program, and $16,400 in attorneys' fees and costs were also awarded. Following the settlement, the case was voluntarily dismissed.

Summary: The Jesus Christ Christian Ministry, along with fifteen California prisoners, brought suit against the California Department of Corrections, alleging that the Department's refusal to deliver mail that contained religious material from the Ministry violated the RLUIPA and the prisoners' First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs were granted summary judgment on most substantive points, at which point to parties agreed to a settlement which called for the establishment of a pilot program to allow the Ministry to send mail to prisoners.


On April 13, 2010, several employees of the State of California with same-sex domestic partners or spouses recognized under California law filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, Oakland Division, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, against the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Board of Administrators of the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS). The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and a provision of the federal tax code violate the Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process by barring the same-sex legal spouses and registered domestic partners of California public employees from enrollment in the CalPERS long-term care plan, even though opposite-sex legal spouses are permitted to enroll. The plaintiffs' initial complaint included only claims by same-sex married couples and none by same-sex domestic partners. On January 18, 2011, the Court (Judge Claudia A. Wilken) denied a defense motion to dismiss these claims, finding that the plaintiffs had "sufficiently stated a claim that the laws at issue...do not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government interest." Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Shortly after this, on February 25, 2011, the Department of Justice, representing the federal defendants, notified the court that it had come to the conclusion that § 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional and that it would thus cease to defend that provision. In response, the House Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group intervened to provide a defense. On September 17, 2011, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint including claims by same-sex domestic partners. The Department of Justice, while no longer opposing the claims of the same-sex married couples, moved to dismiss these new claims. On January 26, 2012, however, the Court (Judge Wilken) denied this motion, finding plaintiffs had sufficiently stated a claim for domestic partners as well. Dragovich v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, No. C 10-01564 CW, 2012 WL 253325 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2012). Meanwhile, on January 19, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the Department of Justice submitted a brief supporting the motion as it pertained to same-sex married couples. It made a cross-motion for summary judgment as to the domestic partnership claims, and defendant-intervenors cross-moved for summary judgment as to all claims. On May 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Wilken) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the cross-motions of defendants and defendant-intervenors. It held that Section 3 of DOMA violates the equal protection rights of same-sex spouses and that Section 7702B9(f)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code violates the equal protection rights of registered domestic partners, and issued an injunction prohibiting CalPERS from denying enrollment to same-sex spouses or registered domestic partners based on those provisions. It also enjoined the Treasury from disqualifying CalPERS's plan from beneficial tax treatment for following its order. The order was stayed pending appeal. On October 28, 2013, the 9th Circuit granted appellants motion to vacate in part and remanded the case for further processing consistent with United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry. On November 26, 2013, Judge Wilken ordered briefing regarding subsequent legal developments, including the Windsor and Perry cases, and their implication on this case. On August 28, 2014, plaintiffs moved for additional remedies in the case, for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and for summary judgment. The defendants replied in opposition and filed cross motions for summary judgment. The court heard the proceedings on November 20, 2014. The court issued its order on December 4, 2014, maintaining the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs as to same-sex spouse class members and granting the defendants' request for summary judgment as to same-sex registered domestic partner class members. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of ongoing discrimination against the latter group in light of the <i?Windsor and Perry decisions, because such couples were now free to get marriage licenses and enroll in the CalPERS long-term care plan. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168539. The court awarded plaintiffs $95,000 in attorneys' fees and costs on October 20, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 24, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California held that the Defense of Marriage Act and a provision of tax law unconstitutionally discriminate against same-sex couples and domestic partners, by precluding their participation in the long-term care plan offered by the California Public Employees Retirement System, or CalPERS. The court stayed the order pending appeal and other legal developments, including the Windsor and Perry cases. The case has since been appealed and remanded for further proceedings. The parties have filed cross motions for summary judgment but the court has not yet issued a ruling.


On December 1, 2000, fifteen African-American employees employed by the Veterans Affairs Medical Center ("V AMC") located in Birmingham, Alabama filed a class action against defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that their employer, the VAMC, engaged in and followed racially discriminatory employment practices and policies. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the VAMC, with regard to African-American employees, failed to promote them, failed to inform them of job openings, failed to adequately train them, retaliated against them, and subjected them to a hostile work environment. On March 15, 2001, the case was transferred to the Northern District of Alabama. On July 27, 2001, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs did not file any formal individual and/or class administrative complaints of discrimination, and urged the Court to dismiss the case. Upon looking at each individual Title VII claim, on October 20, 2001, the Court (Judge William Marsh Acker, Jr.) dismissed the class aspect, all § 1981 claims, and ten of the plaintiffs' Title VII claims. On November 23, 2001, the plaintiffs amended the complaint in accordance with the October 20, 2001 Memorandum Opinion. On October 21, 2002, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 3, 2003, the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs tried to obtain an extension of time for discovery by perpetrating a fraud on the Court. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed, but the Appellate Court affirmed the District Court's decision, dismissing the appeal as frivolous.

Summary: The case was brought by 15 African-American employees of the Veterans Affairs Medical Center against defendant Secretary of the Veteran Affairs seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. On January 3, 2003, the Court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case accordingly.


On June 27, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against United Airlines on behalf of a black female employee. The EEOC alleged that United Airlines had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) by subjecting the employee to sexual and racial harassment and retaliating against her for complaining about the discrimination. The EEOC sought its costs, monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, back pay, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The Court (Judge Suzanne B. Conlon) granted the employee's motion to intervene in the case on July 23, 2002. The employee's complaint proceeded under Title VII and elaborated on the harassment and retaliation to which she had been subjected. The employee sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC but also specifically sought reinstatement. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber) entered as a consent decree on April 13, 2004. The 2-year decree provided for monetary relief ($225,000 and 200,000 frequent flyer miles) and contained various injunctive provisions. United Airlines agreed to provide employment references according to normal procedure (which did not mention negative details), to post an EEOC notice, to maintain records of complaints of racial and sexual harassment and their resolution, to make reports to the EEOC every six months, and to provide all supervisors and managers with annual Title VII training. The parties bore their own costs. The decree was subject to extra conditions related to United Airlines' bankruptcy case, but it appears that the bankruptcy did not affect the decree. No further court activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed.

Summary: On June 27, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against United Airlines on behalf of a black female employee whom it alleged to have been subjected to racial and sexual harassment and retaliation. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber) entered as a consent decree on April 13, 2004. The 2-year decree provided for monetary relief ($225,000 and 200,000 frequent flyer miles) and contained various injunctive provisions. The case is now closed.


On June 16, 2017, an individual who had previously been held at Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility (“MDCDF”) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued CoreCivic of Tennessee (formerly the Corrections Corporation of America), a private company operating the facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process guarantee. The plaintiff claimed that CoreCivic had systematically failed provide adequate health care at MDCDF, a 1,300-bed prison for male and female pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners serving sentences. Specifically, the plaintiffs said a scabies outbreak occurred in 2016, but the defendant refused to implement an effective infection-control policy prior to, during, or after the outbreak. The plaintiffs asked for punitive damages, as well as an injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from "intimidating, threatening, and retaliating against inmates for demanding medical care for their serious medical needs and to immediately provide adequate oral and topical medication sufficient to fully treat all those diagnosed with scabies." The complaint also asked for the court to require the defendant "to provide a full medical staff adequate to meet the needs of those infested with scabies and capable of dispensing medication and monitoring their treatment until completion.” On October 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that added another individual plaintiff. The case was assigned to the U.S. District Judge Aleta A. Trauger. The plaintiffs sought to certify three different subclasses:

The “Scabies Class:” All current and former inmates who had a skin rash consistent with a scabies infestation who were denied treatment, or whose delayed treatment by the Defendant caused the inmate’s condition to worsen, since October 1, 2016.

The “Denied Prescriptions Class:” All current and former inmates who were prescribed medication that was not administered as prescribed, or whose prescribed plan of treatment was interrupted or delayed by the Defendant, since October 1, 2016.

The “Denied Medical Attention Class:” All current and former inmates who requested, but were denied medical attention or treatment since October 1, 2016.

On September 25, 2017, the court consolidated this case with John Doe v. CoreCivic of Tennessee, also in this Clearinghouse, brought before the same trial court by other individuals who contracted scabies and were denied adequate medical attention while confined at MDCDF. On June 27, 2018, the court denied certification of the “Denied Prescriptions” and “Denied Medical Attention” subclasses because the plaintiffs had not shown that the violation affected enough people to justify the use of a class actions. It also denied certification of any class seeking injunctive relief because the plaintiffs had all been released from MDCDF and thus lacked standing to seek prospective relief for others still at MDCDF. However, the court certified the “Scabies Subclass.” During the year following class certification, the parties engaged in discovery and began to prepare for trial. They also entered into as-yet fruitless mediation, and CoreCivic moved for summary judgment and to decertify the class. As of January 17, 2020, the parties are continuing to prepare for trial, and the summary judgment motion remains pending before the court.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was brought before the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee in 2017, by two former inmates of the Metro-Davidson County Detention Facility. The plaintiffs alleged the violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment and substantive due process, and the failure to train their medical staff. The class action was certified on June 27, 2018, and the class was defined as “all former inmates of MDCDF who are not currently incarcerated and who, while still incarcerated at MDCDF, had a skin rash consistent with a scabies infestation and who were denied treatment, or whose delayed treatment caused the condition to worsen, since October 1, 2016.” The case is ongoing.