The United States federal government filed this suit on March 6, 2018 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, challenging California's "sanctuary city" state laws. This lawsuit comes after a series of lawsuits filed by California jurisdictions challenging the federal government's sanctuary city policies, which deny federal funding to jurisdictions that impede the federal government's immigration policies. For more information on those cases, see the the Clearinghouse Special Collection page. This suit challenged three California laws in particular: (1) the Immigrant Worker Protection Act ("AB 450") that prohibits private employers from voluntarily cooperating with federal officials without a judicial warrant or subpoena for purposes of immigration enforcement, (2) Assembly Bill 103 ("AB 103") that requires the state attorney general to investigate federal immigration detention facilities and processes, and (3) Senate Bill 54 ("SB 54") that limits local law enforcement from providing information about or transferring individuals subject to federal immigration custody to federal enforcement. The U.S. argued that the three laws "reflect a deliberate effort by California to obstruct the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law," that the federal law preempted the state laws, and that the federal government had "preeminent authority" regarding immigration. The U.S. argued that California therefore violated the Supremacy Clause and that the Supremacy Clause rendered the state laws invalid. The U.S. sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The same day, the U.S. moved for preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the implementation of these provisions within the three California laws. Meanwhile, a series of entities filed amici briefs and California moved to dismiss the case on May 4, 2018. A hearing on both motions was held on June 28. On July 5, 2018, Judge Mendez granted in part and denied in part the motion for preliminary injunction, holding that "AB 103, SB 54, and the employee notice provision of AB 450 are permissible exercises of California’s sovereign power," but that the other provisions of AB 450 "impermissibly infringed on the sovereignty of the United States." As to AB 103, the court found that there was no indication "Congress intended for States to have no oversight over detention facilities operating within their borders," that AB 103 did not otherwise conflict with federal law, and that its burden on detention facilities is minimal since it did not impose any substantive requirements upon detention facilities but rather merely requires the detention facility to allow for access to review it. The court upheld AB 450's requirement that employers provide notice to their employees of any upcoming I-9 inspection but struck down under the supremacy clause the provisions prohibiting employers from verifying employment eligibility when federal law did not so require and from consenting to let immigration enforcement agents enter nonpublic labor areas to access, review, or obtain employee records. Finally, the court held that SB 54 did not conflict with federal law requiring information sharing, that the federal law was further potentially unconstitutional, and that California merely refusing to help federal law enforcement was different from impermissibly impeding federal law enforcement. 314 F.Supp.3d 1077. On July 9, 2018, Judge Mendez granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated above. The court dismissed the government's supremacy clause claim against AB 103, its claim against AB 450's notice provision, and its supremacy clause claim against SB 54. The court maintained the government's claims against AB 450's consent, access, and reverification provisions. 2018 WL 3361055. The U.S. immediately appealed the two decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on April 18, 2019. 921 F.3d 865. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial in large part of the government's motion for a preliminary injunction. First, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to AB 450, agreeing with Judge Mendez that it neither burdens the federal government nor conflicts with federal activities. Next, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to those provisions of AB 103 that simply duplicate inspection requirements mandated by California law. However, the court concluded that one subsection of AB 103, which requires examination of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension and transfer of immigration detainees, "discriminates against and impermissibly burdens the federal government, and so is unlawful under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity." With respect to SB 54, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, agreeing with Judge Mendez that any obstruction caused by the law is consistent with the State's prerogatives under the 10th Amendment and anti-commandeering rule. It also found that SB 54's information-sharing restrictions did not conflict with federal law. The court then remanded for reconsideration of the equitable factors relevant to the question of whether to issue a preliminary injunction as applied to AB 103. The U.S. filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court requesting review. Back in the district court, Judge Mendez stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court’s decision on certiorari. On June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 141 S.Ct. 124. Judge Mendez lifted the stay and the parties began briefing on whether to issue a preliminary injunction as applied to AB 103. The defendants also filed a motion to dissolve the existing injunction. Oral arguments were set for January 2021, but after the election of President Joseph Biden, the district court continued hearing on the motions. It asked the U.S. to inform the court if the U.S. after review by the Biden Administration, planned to continue pursuing this case. As of February 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: The United States government filed this suit on March 6, 2018, challenging California's "sanctuary city" state laws and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. This lawsuit comes after a series of lawsuits filed by California jurisdictions challenging the federal government's sanctuary city policies, which deny federal funding to jurisdictions that impede the federal government's immigration policies. The U.S. argued that three California laws "reflect a deliberate effort by California to obstruct the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law," violating the Supremacy Clause, and that the Supremacy Clause rendered the state laws invalid. On July 5, 2018, Judge Mendez granted in part and denied in part the motion for preliminary injunction, holding that "AB 103, SB 54, and the employee notice provision of AB 450 are permissible exercises of California’s sovereign power," but that the other provisions of AB 450 "impermissibly infringed on the sovereignty of the United States." As to AB 103, the court found that there was no indication "Congress intended for States to have no oversight over detention facilities operating within their borders," that AB 103 did not otherwise conflict with federal law, and that its burden on detention facilities is minimal since it did not impose any substantive requirements upon detention facilities but rather merely requires the detention facility to allow for access to review it. The court upheld AB 450's requirement that employers provide notice to their employees of any upcoming I-9 inspection but struck down under the supremacy clause the provisions prohibiting employers from verifying employment eligibility when federal law did not so require and from consenting to let immigration enforcement agents enter nonpublic labor areas to access, review, or obtain employee records. Finally, the court held that SB 54 did not conflict with federal law requiring information sharing, that the federal law was further potentially unconstitutional, and that California merely refusing to help federal law enforcement was different from impermissibly impeding federal law enforcement. 314 F.Supp.3d 1077. On July 9, 2018, Judge Mendez granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss for the reasons stated above. The court dismissed the government's supremacy clause claim against AB 103, its claim against AB 450's notice provision, and its supremacy clause claim against SB 54. The court maintained the government's claims against AB 450's consent, access, and reverification provisions. 2018 WL 3361055. The U.S. immediately appealed the two decisions to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit issued its decision on April 18, 2019. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial in large part of the government's motion for a preliminary injunction. First, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to AB 450, agreeing with Judge Mendez that it neither burdens the federal government nor conflicts with federal activities. Next, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction with respect to those provisions of AB 103 that simply duplicate inspection requirements mandated by California law. However, the court concluded that one subsection of AB 103, which requires examination of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension and transfer of immigration detainees, "discriminates against and impermissibly burdens the federal government, and so is unlawful under the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity." With respect to SB 54, the court affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction, agreeing with Judge Mendez that any obstruction caused by the law is consistent with the State's prerogatives under the 10th Amendment and anti-commandeering rule. It also found that SB 54's information-sharing restrictions did not conflict with federal law. The court then remanded for reconsideration of the equitable factors relevant to the question of whether to issue a preliminary injunction as applied to AB 103. The case is ongoing.


On May 3, 2010, a prisoner with mental illness incarcerated at a “supermax” facility in the Colorado State Penitentiary in Canon City filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC), the warden of the Colorado State Penitentiary, and the Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections. The plaintiff alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center and the University of Denver Civil Rights Clinic, alleged that by placing him in segregation for over a decade and not allowing him to experience daylight, fresh air, or outdoor exercise, the defendants had denied him numerous privileges afforded to other prisoners because of his mental illness. Further, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him appropriate treatment for serious mental health issues. In the alternative, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendants punished him for his actual or perceived disability-related behavior without reasonable accommodations. He alleged that the prison made him ineligible for early release credits due to an arbitrary demerit system that punished his improperly treated mental illness without notice of what behaviors he was charged with and without sufficient procedures for review. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages under the Rehabilitation Act, and attorneys' fees and costs. This case was assigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson and referred to Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya. On May 25, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the case and the district court denied the motion. On March 26, 2012, both the plaintiff and the defendants’ motions for summary judgment were denied on the merits. 848 F.Supp.2d 1291. The case proceeded to a bench trial which occurred between April 30 and May 8, 2012. On August 28, 2012, the court released a final order and judgment. 887 F. Supp. 2d 1133. The court stated: "denial of any opportunity to be outdoors and to engage in some form of outdoor exercise for a period of 12 years is a serious deprivation of a human need" and is "a paradigm of inhumane treatment." The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff since it found a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. The court ordered the CDOC to develop and present a plan that ensured the plaintiff had access to outdoor exercise for at least one hour three times a week. The court also ordered that the defendants assign a CDOC psychiatrist to evaluate the plaintiff's mental health treatment needs. The court noted that the formulary list of pre-approved medication could not be a bar to the plaintiff receiving whatever medication the psychiatrist deemed appropriate. Because the CDOC’s system for disciplinary proceedings had changed during the course of litigation, the court ruled in favor of the defendants to give their new policy a chance. However, the judge wrote in his opinion that if the new system proved to be "form over substance, [the plaintiff] knows where to find me." The court found that the plaintiff largely prevailed, and therefore awarded him costs and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff made subsequent motions: to alter or amend the judgment (September 21, 2012), for post-judgment discovery (November 16, 2012), and to enforce the settlement agreement regarding attorneys’ fees (July 15, 2013). The court granted the motion for discovery on January 2, 2013 and denied the other motions without prejudice on September 4, 2013. That same day, the court found that the exercise cells being used at CDOC’s Sterling facility did not amount to an acceptable permanent solution for providing an opportunity to exercise. It also found that there was uncertainty about how the mental health treatment issue was being resolved, as it was unclear whether there was inadequate treatment available or whether the plaintiff was refusing to accept available treatment. Per the parties’ request, the court permitted them to engage in settlement discussions. The parties received several time extensions until the court made clear that it would not continue to grant extensions indefinitely. On September 12, 2014, the plaintiff moved to enforce the August 28, 2012 judgment and further relief or, in the alternative, for a hearing on the order to show cause by the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff had been given a more substantial opportunity to exercise and access to mental health treatment, he was concerned that he would not be provided these services in the future. On April 7, 2015, the court issued an order denying the plaintiff’s motion. 2015 WL 1593884. The court noted that the plaintiff had been permitted to exercise outside since July 2014 and had been placed on a treatment plan by a psychologist in the facility the month before. The court expressed its confidence in the CDOC’s leaders’ commitment to following through on the policy changes made in the prison. There have been no further developments since the April 2015 order.

Summary: A prisoner with mental illness was kept in segregation for over a decade without access to outdoor exercise or proper medical treatment. The authorities refused to inform him about what he could do to advance out of segregation. He sued in federal court in May 2010 and in August 2012 the district court ordered that he be allowed regular outdoor exercise and access to proper mental health treatment. There have been no further developments since the April 2015 order.


On March 28, 2018, Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a non-profit organization dedicated to providing prisoners access to information about their civil and legal rights, filed a complaint against the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority, the Superintendent of the Jail Authority, and ten unnamed Jail Authority employees in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. HRDC brought the claim under 42 USC §1983, alleging that the Jail Authority’s mail policy had violated HRDC’s First Amendment right to free speech and Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. HRDC, represented by its own counsel and by private litigators, sought injunctive relief, both compensatory and punitive monetary damages, and attorney fees. Specifically, HRDC claimed the defendants were censoring and refusing to deliver educational material HRDC was sending to prisoners. Furthermore, HRDC claimed the defendants were enacting these policies without consistently notifying HRDC of their decision when they blocked information and without offering any way to appeal decisions to block material from prisoners. HRDC moved for a preliminary injunction on March 29, 2018. Judge James P. Jones granted the preliminary injunction on July 3, 2018, preventing the defendants from continuing to censor and block prisoners’ access to HRDC’s educational materials. 2018 WL 3239299. HRDC filed an amended complaint on February 18, 2019 that added additional allegations of censorship. A few months later, on April 12, 2019, HRDC filed a motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. In response, the Jail Authority and the Superintendent filed a motion for summary judgment. The Jail Authority also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and the Jail Authority employees filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. Shortly thereafter, on April 26, 2019, HRDC filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of its claims against the Jail Authority employees. The court accordingly denied the employees' motion on May 15, 2019 and dismissed the claims against them. On June 5, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part both motions for summary judgment, finding that the Jail Authority violated HRDC's First Amendment rights by prohibiting prisoners from receiving books that hadn't been preapproved and by banning magazines altogether, but that the Superintendent was protected by qualified immunity from HRDC's First Amendment Claim. 396 F.Supp.3d 607. The court also found that both the Jail Authority and the Superintendent violated HRDC's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by rejecting or confiscating HRDC mailings without adequate notice or justification or an opportunity to appeal the decision. The court scheduled a jury trial to assess damages and a hearing to determine injunctive relief. Before the trial could be held, the parties agreed that the Jail Authority defendants would pay HRDC $1,500.00 in compensatory damages. More than nine months later, on March 25, 2020, the court granted HRDC's motion for a permanent injunction, finding that a permanent injunction was necessary to protect HRDC's First Amendment rights and ensure that the Jail Authority does not reoffend. 448 F.Supp.3d 581. The injunction allowed the Jail Authority to reject publications for legitimate penological reasons, but required the Jail Authority to notify the sender(s) of the rejection and afford the sender(s) an opportunity to appeal. The injunction went into effect on the same day the court's order was filed. The court also awarded HRDC reasonable attorneys' fees in the amount of $225,563.14. 2020 WL 4934603.

Summary: In 2018, Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), a non-profit organization dedicated to educating incarcerated men and women about civil rights, filed a suit against the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority, the Jail Authority Superintendent, and other Jail Authority employees for violating HRDC's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. HRDC specifically challenged the Jail Authority's policy of censoring the educational materials HRDC sends to prisoners. Later in 2018, a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to stop preventing prisoners from receiving educational materials from HRDC. In April 2019, HRDC dismissed the claims against the Jail Authority employees but maintained the suit against the Jail Authority and the Superintendent. In June 2019, the court held the Jail Authority liable for HRDC's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims and the Superintendent liable for HRDC's due process claim. Then, in March 2020, the court issued a permanent injunction against the defendants, requiring them to implement a notice and appeal process for senders of mail rejected by the Jail Authority. The parties agreed on compensatory damages but not on attorneys fees. The court later awarded HRDC attorneys fees.


On March 11, 1987, mentally ill patients at G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital (GPW), filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. The plaintiffs, represented by Florida Rural Legal Services, Advocacy Center, Southern Legal Counsel, the School Board of Manatee County, the Center for Public Representation, a public defender and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the State was violating their constitutional rights by providing substandard care and housing at GPW, and by failing to release them when they were "discharge ready." Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the State: (1) violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to discharge them into less restrictive settings; (2) denied them procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by arbitrarily revoking privileges without formal standards and with no opportunity for challenge; (3) abridged their First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by arbitrarily restricting visitation privileges; (4) infringed their right to counsel in violation of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to provide legal assistance or an adequate law library, and (5) violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by providing inadequate medical staffing, recreation, vocational training, security and nutrition. On March 16, 1989, the District Court (Judge Paul Game, Jr.) certified a class consisting of "all persons who are now or will in the future be committed" to GPW, and a subclass of present and future patients "who have been determined by their treatment team to be 'discharge ready' for a period of 15 days or longer, but who have not been discharged." Significantly, the court later expanded the class to include "former patients at GPW even after they are discharged into community treatment facilities." In June 1989, the parties partially settled the case by entering into a consent decree under which the State of Florida agreed to make various changes in the hospital's operations. The consent decree provided for specific community living arrangements well beyond federal law standards. And, on September 13, 1989, the District Court (Judge Game) appointed David Ferleger, Linda Glenn, and Dorothy Rowe as monitors as provided by the consent decree. Following substantial litigation respecting the monitors' recommendations, on November 17, 1989, the District Court (Judge Game) adopted the monitors' workplan and budget. On December 5, 1989, the District Court (Judge Game) denied the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants appealed. On March 26, 1990, the District Court (Judge Game) denied the defendants' motion to remove the monitors. The defendants appealed. On March 27, 1990, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defendants' motion to expedite the appeal from the District Court's denial of partial summary judgment. On December 12, 1990, the District Court (Judge Hodges) redefined the plaintiff class to include only those persons confined at GPW into a community treatment facility, reserved ruling on the length of the defendants' obligations to the class as well as to whether the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with the consent decree, and denied the monitors' request for access to a central abuse registry. There followed substantial litigation concerning payment of the monitors and attorneys' fees. On December 30, 1991, the case was reassigned to Judge Anne C. Conway. On February 4, 1992, the District Court (Judge Conway) approved the parties' joint stipulation to reduce the number of monitors, and also created a protocol to pay the monitors including a system of reconciliations. Numerous stipulations relating to payment followed. The parties apparently worked out a settlement agreement and, on June 2, 1993, the District Court (Judge Conway) granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a fairness hearing on the settlement agreement. The Court also granted a number of motions for attorney fees for the plaintiffs, throughout the course of litigation. On January 3, 1994, the case was reassigned to Judge Susan C. Bucklew. Litigation continued concerning reconciliation payments for monitoring and attorneys' fees and, during this time, the defendants began moving to vacate the consent decree in whole and in part, as well as to recuse the monitors. On November 29, 1994, the District Court (Judge Bucklew) ordered the monitors to show cause why they had not yet met with the defendants to discuss a new budget. And, on April 25, 1995, the Court referred a number of motions to Magistrate Judge Thomas B McCoun III, who recommended that the motions be denied. On January 3 and July 11, 1995, the Court awarded the plaintiffs interim attorneys' fees. The defendants filed interlocutory appeals for reconsideration or to amend the Court's awards. The plaintiffs cross-appealed. On November 13, 1995, the District Court (Judge Bucklew) referred the case to mediation and appointed Martha Cook as mediator to resolve the issues of quarterly reconciliations, payment applications, the monitors' budget and the monitors' recusal. A settlement followed, approved by the Court on March 7, 1996. The Court then referred to the mediator, Martha Cook, issues respecting exit criteria and legal access. On May 15, 1996, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants' appeal of the District Court's July 11, 1995, order. On January 27, 1997, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the defendants' appeal of the District Court's January 3, 1995, order. Previously, on May 17, 1995, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a letter to the Governor of Florida indicating an intent to investigate conditions at Landmark Learning Center and GPW pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. After the State of Florida repeatedly denied DOJ access to the facilities, on November 9, 1995, the DOJ sent a findings letter to the Governor basing its information on public documents. On July 10, 1996, the United States submitted a motion to intervene in this case as a plaintiff. On March 23, 1998, the District Court (Judge Becklew) adopted Magistrate Judge McCoun's recommendations, denying the defendants' motion to vacate, and granting the United States' motion to intervene. On November 18, 1998, the Magistrate Court (Judge McCoun) ordered the defendants to comply with the monitors' request for access to class members as well as to mortality and budget information. Significant litigation followed regarding attorneys' fees, substitution of attorneys, discovery, mediation, scheduling and continuance of a trial and compliance with the consent decree, during which time several emergency motions for protective orders were granted. After a bench trial in August and September 2000, on June 28, 2001, the District Court (Judge Bucklew) entered judgment for the defendants and closed the case. Johnson v. Murphy, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24013 (D. Fla. June 28, 2001). The Court held that "[i]n this trial, the burden of proof was on the plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants are violating the statutory and constitutional right of current and former GPW patients" and that "they have not done so," holding instead that "[w]hile the plaintiffs have offered evidence that mistakes have been made and that conditions and programs could be different or in some cases better, they have failed to prove that the patients at GPW are inadequately supervised; inadequately treated for self-injurious behavior; inadequately protected from environmental hazards; or that adverse incidents are inadequately investigated and/or responded to." After one of the monitors apparently resigned, there was substantial litigation respecting the appointment of a replacement and the removal of the interim monitor. In February 2002, GPW was closed. On June 3, 2002, the District Court (Judge Bucklew) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' supplemental motion to terminate the consent decree and to dismiss the case with prejudice. The Court specifically denied the defendants' motion to terminate paragraphs of the consent decree pertaining to the monitoring of the defendants' community obligations and the Community Compliance Exit Criteria. A number of defendants filed separate appeals. On October 29, 2003, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge R. Lanier Anderson III) affirmed the District Court's June 3, 2002, refusal to lift all conditions of the consent decree. Johnson v. Florida, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 22282 (11th Cir. Oct. 29, 2003). The Court held that the district court did not err by refusing to vacate the consent decree under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) because the state acknowledged that approximately 90 patients were still in the state's physical custody because they could not be released when the hospital closed. Moreover, it found that the district court's findings in the Justice Department's case that the hospital's conditions met substantive due process standards were not conclusive as to the consent decree, as the issues were not identical. It found that the district court did not err by denying the state attorneys' fees from the Justice Department under 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997c(d) because the DOJ case was not frivolous. On March 19, 2004, the Magistrate Court (Judge McCoun) entered an order resolving the two remaining exit criteria issues. Over the next few years, the monitors submitted several budget plans for the defendants to follow, and the Court granted all of them. On September 30, 2009, the Court held that people moving out of the area were no longer considered part of the class. Consequently, the Court found that two of the defendants sufficiently complied with the consent decree, and granted defendants' motion to exit the consent decree as to those two defendants. The following year, the Court granted defendants' motion to exit for the remaining two defendants, and the consent decree was dissolved.

Summary: On March 11, 1987, mentally ill patients at G. Pierce Wood Memorial Hospital (GPW), filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Florida in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division. Plaintiffs alleged that the state violated many of their constitutional rights by not providing adequate medical care and legal access and by failing to discharge patients who were ready to be discharged. A consent decree was signed by the Court to improve the conditions at the hospital. After the hospital closed in 2002 and the patients discharged to various centers, monitoring of the centers continued until compliance was sufficient. The consent decree was dissolved completely in February of 2010.


On December 17, 2013, plaintiffs, two Houston residents and taxpayers, filed a lawsuit in the Harris County, Texas family law court because the City's employee benefits program had become available to spouses of same-sex marriages. The complaint alleged violations of the Texas Family Code; the Houston City Charter; and the Texas Constitution against the City of Houston. The plaintiffs sought temporary and permanent injunctions to prevent the City from making the City's employee benefits program available to same sex spouses of City of Houston employees. The state court judge issued a temporary order in the plaintiffs' favor, which remains in effect. On December 27, 2013, the City removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas Houston Division, where it was assigned to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal. The City argued that the case asserted a federal claim, because the complaint alleged that the City had violated a section of the Houston City Charter that refers to federal law. The defendants also asserted that the decision to begin offering benefits to same-sex spouses of employees was required by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). The plaintiffs disagreed; they argued that the case was a state law matter and asked the District Court to send the case back to state court. On August 28, 2014, Judge Rosenthal for the District Court found that the it lacked removal jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' complaint did not present a federal question, and remanded the case to the 310th Judicial District of Harris County, Texas. On November 5, 2014, Judge Lisa Millard of the 310th Judicial District of Harris County issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the City from "furnishing benefits to persons who were married in other jurisdictions to City employees of the same sex." The City filed a notice of interlocutory appeal on November 21, 2014. While the City's appeal from the injunction was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Obergefell that a state may not "exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples." Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015). On July 28, 2015, Texas's Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's injunction and remanded for proceedings consistent with Obergefell and DeLeon v. Abbott (the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas finding that article I § 32 of the Texas Constitution and Texas Family Code § 6.204 unconstitutional, and enjoined the State of Texas from enforcing them; Fifth Circuit Court affirming the trial court's determination in light of Obergefell. DeLeon, 791 F.3d 619, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2015)). Parker v. Pidgeon, 477 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. App. 2015). The plaintiffs sought discretionary review from the Supreme Court of Texas. Though it initially denied review on September 2, 2016, 549 S.W.3d 130 (Mem), the Supreme Court of Texas later withdrew that order on rehearing and granted review, hearing arguments in March 2017. In 2016, the case name changed to Pidgeon v. Turner. On June 30, 3017, the Supreme Court of Texas found that the court of appeals' opinion and judgment imposed, or could be read to impose, greater restrictions on remand than Obergefell required, and reversed the ruling of the court of appeals. Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. 2017). According to the court, Obergefell “did not address and resolve” the “specific issue” of state spousal benefits, and "did not hold that states must provide the same publicly funded benefits to all married persons." Therefore, the Supreme Court of Texas found that the state appeals court erred in ordering the trial court to resolve the case “consistent with Obergefell and De Leon.” The court instructed the trial court to settle the issue itself, reversing the court of appeals' judgment and vacating the trial court's orders. On September 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. It denied review on December 4, 2017. 138 S.Ct. 505. The Supreme Court of Texas's mandate reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, vacating the trial court's injunction, and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings issued on February 28, 2018. The defendants filed a notification of removal to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas on March 5, 2018. On April 10, 2018, the court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand to the 310th District Court of Harris County, Texas, finding that the federal district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' pleadings presented no issues of federal law or constitutional claims. On February 18, 2019, state court judge Sonya Heath dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit after considering written arguments. On March 13, the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas at Houston. On December 23, the appellants submitted a brief and requested an oral argument. On April 7, 2020, the case was to be scheduled for submission of briefs without oral arguments on May 20, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This case began in December 2013 when two Houston residents and taxpayers filed a state court lawsuit seeking to prevent the City from making the City's employee benefits program available to same sex spouses of City of Houston employees. A state court judge issued a temporary order enjoining the same-sex benefits, and after various appeals and proceedings, the case is currently back in Texas state trial court after the Texas Supreme Court found that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell did not resolve the question of state spousal benefits and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari review on December 4, 2017. The Supreme Court of Texas's mandate reversing the judgment of the court of appeals, vacating the trial court's injunction, and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings issued on February 28, 2018. On April 10, 2018, the court remanded the case to the state court, and the state court dismissed the lawsuit on February 18, 2019. The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas at Houston on March 13. No outcome yet.


On Dec. 6, 2006, several individuals with mobility issues who used wheelchairs, scooters, or other mobility devices filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against Chipotle restaurants, alleging violations of (1) the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq; (2) the California Public Accommodation Law, California Civil Code §§51, 52, and 54, et seq; (3) the California Health And Safety Code § 19950. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, an injunction ordering defendants to cease violations of and modify restaurants to become compliant with the statutes; statutory damages; compensatory damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs alleged that the 44-inch wall separating customers from the food preparation area in the defendant's restaurants only permitted non-wheelchair-using customers to view the ingredients and watch the construction of their burritos. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had an unwritten policy that employees were permitted, but not required, to raise ingredients (either in spoons, a small cup, or in the pan) above the wall to make them visible to wheelchair-using customers, who were otherwise unable to see them. The defendant also permitted employees to place samples of food items in small cups, place them on a tray, and construct the burrito on the (lower) cashier counter or on an adjacent dining table, so that the wheelchair-using customer could view the making of their burrito. The plaintiffs alleged that this was "unfair, humiliating, and degrading" and denied them the true "Chipotle experience." The case was assigned to the calendar of Magistrate Judge Louisa S. Porter. On Jan. 11, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a notice of related case. One of the plaintiffs in this case had also sued the defendant in Aug. 2005 as an individual, based on similar legal issues. See Antoninetti v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Case No. 3:05-cv-01660. The plaintiffs requested that the present case be reassigned to District Judge Napoleon A. Jones, Jr. and Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr., who had both already been assigned to the first-filed individual case. The motion was granted and the case was transferred on Jan. 24, 2007. On Jan. 12, 2007, the defendant moved to dismiss the individual case or in the alternative, to consolidate it with this case. On Mar. 20, 2007, Judge Jones denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the individual case and granted their motion to consolidate for purposes of discovery only, leaving open the question of consolidation for trial. Meanwhile, on Feb. 23, 2007, the defendant had implemented a written nationwide "Customers with Disabilities" policy ("the Policy"), and formally began training its employees on the policy between March and May 2007. Among other things, the Policy required managers to greet disabled customers and ask them whether they required accommodations, and instructed managers and crew that efficiency was secondary to ensuring a positive experience for disabled customers. Both parties moved for summary judgment in the individual case, and on June 7, 2007, the court ordered that discovery be stayed until after Judge Jones issued his rulings on the cross motions for summary judgment in the individual case. On June 17, 2007, the court granted in part and denied in part partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims in the individual case. On Sept. 6, 2007, the defendant moved to consolidate the individual and putative class action cases for trial, but the motion was denied on Sept. 7, 2007. At this time, the individual case was already ready for trial, and this case was still in the formative stages. The Court thus found that consolidation for purposes of trial was not merited because the potential for delay and prejudice outweighed any savings of time or effort. 2007 WL 2669531 (Sept. 7, 2007). In the individual case, a four-day bench trial was held in late November and early December 2007. On Jan. 10, 2008, Judge Jones concluded that the defendant's prior practice of informally accommodating customers had been insufficient to comply with the ADA, but that the Policy was sufficient. The court also found that the plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction requiring the defendant to lower the wall, but that the plaintiff was entitled to $5,000 in damages for the occasions on which he encountered barriers to his entrance into the restaurants. 2008 WL 111052 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2008). In April or May 2008, the plaintiff appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the defendant cross-appealed. Meanwhile, on Oct. 28, 2009, the parties in this case jointly moved to stay the case until the final resolution of the individual case, and their motion was granted on Oct. 30, 2009. On Dec. 7, 2009, both cases were reassigned to Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz. On Aug. 19, 2010, the Court lifted the stay in this case, finding that the individual case had largely concluded. On Sept. 1, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to reimpose the stay, but this was denied on Oct. 27, 2010. Meanwhile, in the individual case, after a hearing on Nov. 16, 2010, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision that the Policy was compliant with the ADA, finding that the Policy was not equivalent because the “substitute experience” for disabled customers lacked the customers’ personal participation in the selection and preparation of the food that the full “Chipotle Experience” furnished and, therefore, violated the ADA. The Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine the scope of injunctive relief necessary to remedy the plaintiff's inability to view the food preparation counters. On Jan. 13, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which was deemed to be filed on Jan. 10, 2011. On Feb. 11, 2011, the court ordered an order regulating discovery and other pretrial dates, including a mandatory settlement conference that was to be held on June 20, 2011 in the chambers of Magistrate Judge William McCurine, Jr. On Apr. 18, 2011, the lead plaintiff filed a motion for class certification. On July 12, 2011, the parties jointly moved to vacate the settlement conference until after the court had ruled on the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, and the motion was granted the same day. Meanwhile, the lead plaintiff had died on May 9, 2011, and on May 20, 2011, his widow and successor in interest to the claim filed a motion to substitute the plaintiff. The court granted the motion on July 25, 2011. On August 28, 2012, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification without prejudice. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief were moot, because the defendant had already lowered the height of their counters in California restaurants and the Ninth Circuit had already held that the counter heights had been in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines ("ADAAG"). Thus, a class action would not be superior to other available methods for adjudication. 2012 WL 3762440 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2012). On Sept. 11, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and/or clarification. On Jan. 14, 2013, Judge Moskowitz issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration, granting the motion for clarification, and scheduling trial to begin on July 8, 2013. 2013 WL 149722 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2013). On Feb. 6, 2013, the court issued a new order regulating discovery and other pretrial dates. On Mar. 13, 2013, both parties moved for a 60-day continuance on the trial date and pre-trial deadlines, stating that they had been engaged in global settlement discussions regarding (1) the claims of all plaintiffs in this case, (2) the claims of all plaintiffs in the related class action Perkins v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Case No. 13-cv-01831-BTM, which was stayed in the Central District of California, and (3) the claims of individual plaintiffs in thirteen state court actions, and intended to consolidate the Perkins class action and various related state court actions with the current case to facilitate a global settlement. The parties had reached a tentative agreement currently being reviewed by the defendant and all of the plaintiffs in the various aforementioned actions. They stated that they hoped to file a joint motion for approval of their proposed global settlement by Mar. 29, 2013. This motion was granted on Mar. 14, 2013. On May 10, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion for another 60-day continuance, stating that they had made “significant headway” toward a global settlement but were still exploring various issues. On May 20, 2013, the court granted the motion, extending the discovery and trial deadlines, and setting the trial date for November 18, 2013. On June 19, 2013, a status conference took place, and the court ordered the parties to give notice to potential class members by e-mailing to disabled rights organizations and posting on the defendant’s website a notice saying that class certification had been denied and that the plaintiffs intended to settle the case and not appeal the denial. On July 19, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the complaint to add new plaintiffs, and the court granted the motion on July 23, 2013. On Aug. 14, 2013, the parties moved for approval of notice to the putative class regarding settlement. They had finalized settlement and stipulated to the language of the notice to be posted on the defendant’s website. On Aug. 20, 2013, the court granted the motion. On Sept. 27, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to retain jurisdiction to determine attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses, and to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement that they had reached. On Oct. 3, 2013, the district court granted the parties’ joint motion to retain jurisdiction. On Nov. 12, 2013, the court issued an order stating that the settlement notice approved by the court had adequately protected the claims of the putative class members, such that its dismissal without prejudice would not infringe upon the rights of putative class members. Accordingly, it ordered that any joint motion for consolidation of Perkins and the present case and for dismissal should be filed within seven calendar days. On Nov. 19, 2013, the plaintiffs in both Perkins and in this case as well as the defendant filed a joint motion to consolidate cases, for retention of jurisdiction by the court, and dismissal of the consolidated action. The parties also requested that the district court retain jurisdiction over the consolidated cases, even after dismissal for purposes of interpreting and enforcing the settlement agreement. Finally, contingent on the court consolidation of the two cases, the parties also jointly requested that the court dismiss the claims in the consolidated action. On Dec. 3, 2013, the court granted the motion, consolidating Perkins and the present case, retaining its jurisdiction over the consolidated action even after dismissal, incorporating the settlement agreement, and finally dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and dismissing the claims of putative class members without prejudice. On Jan. 31, 2014, this case was transferred from Magistrate Judge McCurine to Magistrate Judge David H. Bartick. Then, on Mar. 28, 2014, the case was transferred to Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt. On Dec. 2, 2013, the plaintiffs had filed a motion seeking attorneys’ fees and costs of $1,671,197.27, plus fees. On Sept. 29, 2014, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court found that the plaintiffs could have achieved the same result without their pursuit of class certification, injunctive relief, and thus reduced the award to account for the excessive time spent on class certification. The court awarded $317,927.50 in attorneys’ fees and $19,824.77 in costs to the plaintiffs, for a total of $337,752.27, and the case was ordered closed. 49 F.Supp.3d 710 (S.D. Cal. 2014). One plaintiff appealed the award of attorneys’ fees to the Ninth Circuit on Oct. 27, 2014. On June 9, 2015, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the appeal. On Sept. 29, 2016, the Ninth Circuit panel unanimously found the case suitable for decision without oral argument, and ordered that the case be submitted on the briefs and record on Oct. 20, 2016. On Jan. 4, 2017, a panel consisting of United States Circuit Judge Morgan B. Christen and United States Circuit Judge Richard C. Tallman for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, as well as Circuit Judge Barrington D. Parker, Jr. for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation, reviewed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees and costs for abuse of discretion. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, with costs awarded to the defendant. As of Feb. 3, 2018, the case appears to be closed.

Summary: Group of individuals sued Chipotle in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, alleging violations of Title III of the ADA, the California Public Accommodation Law, and the California Health and Safety Code § 19950. The plaintiffs sought class certification, which the court denied. Ultimately, the parties reached a global settlement agreement, which consisted of this case and fourteen other consolidated actions.


On April 26, 2007, three community activists filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, U.S.C. 42 § 1983, and state law against the City of New York and two New York City Police Department police officers. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant officers violated their rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments when they arrested plaintiffs while the plaintiffs were recording the arrests of two other people. According the complaint, all charges against the plaintiffs were dropped, but only after they were held in jail overnight and required to make at least 10 court appearances in relation to the incident. The plaintiffs also brought a Monell claim, alleging that the police department's policies encouraged violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. On September 19, 2008, the District Court (Judge Miriam Cedarbaum) accepted the parties' Stipulation of Settlement and Dismissal. As part of the settlement agreement, each of the three plaintiffs received $15,000 and fees from the defendants in exchange for dismissal of their complaint. The defendants did not admit any violation of the plaintiffs' rights.

Summary: In 2007, three community activists filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and two New York City Police Department police officers, alleging that they were subjected to excessive force and arrested without probable cause for lawfully recording the arrests of two other individuals. The parties settled in September 2008, with each of the three plaintiffs receiving $15,000 and fees from the defendants in exchange for dismissal of their complaint.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class action complaint filed by seven children and their parents against the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States, challenging the social security number ("SSN") requirement of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the refusal of economic impact payments due to the parents’ undocumented status, as well as monetary damages. On May 22, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on June 19. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 5, seven children and their parents filed a putative class-action against the Secretary of the Treasury and the United States, challenging the social security number (SSN) requirement of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. On March 27, President Trump announced the CARES Act aimed to provide economic impact payments to those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act authorized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute $1200.00 to each eligible individual with a social insurance number (SSN). The plaintiffs alleged that the SSN requirement was discriminatory as SSNs were only issued to citizens and immigrants with work authorization. The plaintiffs noted that immigrants without work authorization used an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) to pay their income taxes, which was not accepted. The plaintiffs further alleged that as a result, the Act discriminated against children with undocumented parents in violation of the due process clause under the Fifth Amendment. Filed in the the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the refusal of economic impact payments due to the parents’ undocumented status. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages awarding $500 to each citizen child plaintiff or to the parent plaintiffs. Represented by the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection, and Villanova University, the plaintiffs sought to represent all children with one or both parents with undocumented status. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. The plaintiffs sought to certify a nationwide class of all U.S. citizen children under age 17 who had been or would be denied the benefits of economic impact payments for “qualified children” under the CARES Act solely because the children have a parent who is an undocumented immigrant who has no social security number. They also sought to certify a second class for damages, defined as: persons whose U.S. citizen children have not received the benefits of economic impact payments for “qualified children” under the CARES Act solely because at least one of the children’s parents is an undocumented immigrant who has no social security number. On May 22, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked both Article III and statutory standing because qualifying children are not entitled to the tax credit. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state an equal protection claim since there was no impermissible alienage classification as the CARES Act turns on whether a person has an SSN, not alienage. Finally, they argued that the Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity. On June 19, the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. 2020 WL 3402300. The court found that the plaintiffs had Article III standing and adequately alleged an equal protection claim despite not being direct recipients of the credit. The court also found jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, a statute that waives immunity protection and authorizes monetary claims founded upon the constitution. Since the plaintiffs’ claims for relief arose under the constitution and the CARES Act can be interpreted as a money-mandating statute, the court found subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants filed an answer on July 10. Two plaintiffs filed stipulations of dismissal on October 22. The court is expected to schedule a summary judgment briefing. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a putative class action complaint filed by seven children and their parents against the Secretary of the Treasury and the U.S.A., challenging the social security number (SSN) requirement of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the refusal of economic impact payments due to the parents’ undocumented status, as well as monetary damages. On May 22, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on June 19. The case is ongoing.


On December 17, 2013, a transgender federal prisoner filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) under <i>Bivens </i>in violation of her Eight Amendment rights. Represented by Prisoners' Justice League of Colorado and private counsel, the plaintiff sought nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. The plaintiff also sought an injunction requiring the BOP to provide her with permanent safe housing and adequate medical and mental healthcare. The plaintiff identified as female but was anatomically male, and was housed in an all-male prison. The plaintiff alleged that the BOP failed to protect her from a violent sexual assault perpetrated against her at the United States Penitentiary in Florence, Colorado, on December 17, 2011. She further alleged that the BOP had failed to protect her from actual and ongoing substantial risks of serious harm and to properly diagnose and treat her Gender Dysphoria. She also alleged that the defendants failed to provide her with adequate mental health care pertaining to her Rape Trauma Syndrome and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. The individual defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction on July 21, 2014. The plaintiff amended the complaint on September 25, 2014, against the individual defendants in the lawsuit. On October 15, 2014, the court then denied the defendants' motions to dismiss without prejudice as moot because the complaint had been amended. All defendants filed a joint motion for a referral for a settlement conference on February 19, 2015. The court denied this motion on February 23, 2015, citing a lack of good cause shown for a judicially facilitated settlement in the case. The court stated that although the parties had had settlement discussions, there was no showing that they had sought private mediation or were unable to do so. As a result, the parties entered into private settlement talks. On April 29, 2015, the parties indicated that they had a settlement on nearly all substantive terms, and were very close to resolving the few remaining outstanding issues. As a result, the parties filed a joint motion for an order to set a deadline to file dismissal papers. On May 2, 2015, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the motion. The court ordered that the parties submit dismissal papers by June 1, 2015. On May 29, 2015, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement of injunctive and declaratory relief claims. The BOP agreed to house the plaintiff in a wet cell with a pre-screened cellmate and periodically re-evaluate the propriety of housing the plaintiff at a male facility. The BOP will provide adequate medical and psychological treatment for the plaintiff’s gender dysphoria and require the plaintiff’s medical professionals to periodically evaluate the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s treatment. The term of the injunctive portion of the agreement is two years. Each party agreed to pay its own attorney’s fees and expenses and the United States agreed to pay $70,000 to settle the FTCA Claim. The settlement agreement further provided that the plaintiff voluntarily dismiss the <i> Bivens </i> action against the defendant and instead file an amended complaint that contains an injunctive relief claim against the BOP and a negligence claim for failure to protect against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (the “FTCA”). The plaintiff agreed to dismiss the failure to treat claim and not reassert it in the amended complaint. Parties also agreed to file a stipulation of dismissal to dismiss this action. On June 1, 2015, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint as agreed. On the same day, the defendants and plaintiffs stipulated dismissal of the case with prejudice. This lawsuit was then terminated on June 2, 2015, pursuant to the stipulation to dismiss as filed. The agreement ended in 2017 and the case is now closed.

Summary: On December 17, 2013, a transgender federal prisoner filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Colorado, seeking compensatory and punitive damages against the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") for violations of her Eighth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The plaintiff also sought an injunction requiring the BOP to provide her with permanent safe housing and adequate medical and mental healthcare. The plaintiff later amended her complaint to alter the causes of action. The amended complaint alleged negligence under the Federal Tort Claims Act and deliberate indifference to substantial risk of serious harm and serious medical needs by defendant BOP in violation of the plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. This lawsuit was terminated on June 2, 2015 pursuant to a stipulation to dismiss. A private settlement was reached.


On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black applicant, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as amended, against Brown Group Retail, Inc. The EEOC sought instatement of the applicant, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant refused to hire or even allow the applicant to obtain an application for the job because of her race, black. On July 27, 2007, the District Court (Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $8,500.


This case was litigated by the ACLU of Missouri’s against the City of St. Louis for declaratory and injunctive relief arising from the police response to protests from September 15 to September 17, 2017, against the acquittal of St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) officer Jason Stockley. There was also a separate class action filed after this suit was initiated, litigated by private counsel, seeking monetary relief for injuries caused by the police “kettling” of protesters on the night of September 17, 2017. Following the acquittal on September 15, 2017, of a SLMPD officer for the 2011 killing of the 24-year-old-African American man, Anthony Lamar Smith, protests broke out in St. Louis. On September 22, 2017, two individuals involved in protests on the night of September 17, 2017, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to unlawful retaliation by police after exercising their right to engage in First Amendment protected activity, namely, the right to record police officers in public places. The plaintiffs sued the City of St. Louis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged unlawful seizure, excessive force, and procedural due process violations. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction requiring the City of St. Louis to act in accordance with the Constitution when declaring protests “unlawful assemblies” and ordering protesters “to disperse.” The plaintiffs also asked for attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to District Judge Ronnie L. White, who set the first hearing for about two weeks later on October 3, 2017. Before that hearing, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in which they added more individual plaintiffs to the case. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which mooted a request for a temporary restraining order made on the same day as the original complaint. The requested preliminary injunction sought to prevent officers from giving any order of dispersal in the absence of violence by protesters and to prevent enforcement of an order of dispersal without first allowing sufficient opportunity to exit the area. The plaintiffs also asked the court to prohibit the unlawful utilization of chemical agents, such as tear gas, and to prohibit retaliation against any individual who photographs or records law enforcement officials in the course of their duty. On October 5, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all persons “who will observe, record, or participate in protest activity within the City of St. Louis in a traditional or designated public forum.” On October 13, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to disqualify Judge White because of Judge White’s relationships with the City Counselor’s Office and concerns of partiality. On that same day, the court granted the request; District Judge Catherine Perry replaced Judge White. Judge Perry held a hearing over two days in October, and on November 15, 2017, granted the preliminary injunction, noting the video, photographic, and documentary evidence of police misconduct. 2017 WL 547840. The district court found that plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence showing that the SLMPD violated Section XIII of its own Special Order 1-01 relating to the use of pepper spray for crowd dispersal and the 2015 settlement agreement they entered into to resolve a prior lawsuit, Templeton v. Dotson. The preliminary injunction prohibited the defendant and its agents from declaring unlawful an otherwise lawful assembly and prohibited the use of chemical agents against persons engaged in expressive, non-violent activity in the City of St. Louis in the absence of probable cause and without granting adequate warning and sufficient opportunity to exit the area. 2017 WL 5478410. On that same day, the district court referred the case to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and mediation. Though the preliminary injunction was an appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. §1292(a)(1), the City did not appeal. On May 4, 2018, the District Judge Perry ordered ADR to continue for another six months, to conclude before June 1, 2019 and scheduled a bench trial for September 26, 2019. The plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 5, 2018 and filed another motion to certify the class in accordance with the Second Amended Complaint on February 1, 2019. On March 29, 2019, the City moved for a dissolution of the preliminary injunction and dismissal of the Second Amended Complaint for lack of equitable jurisdiction. The mediator informed the district court on May 6, 2019, that the parties had not reached a settlement. On May 7, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but ordered that the class be defined so as to exclude protesters who engaged in violent, unlawful activity. 2019 WL 2009589. In another order dated May 15, 2019, the district court denied the City's motion to dissolve the injunction, finding that it was trying to relitigate its failed attempt to stop the preliminary injunction with new counsel. As for the motion to dismiss, District Judge Perry rejected this as well, noting that she had subject matter jurisdiction over the matter and that a dispute over the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims did not warrant dismissal. The City appealed both the certification of the class and the denial of its motions to dismiss and dissolve to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On July 12, 2019, further proceedings were stayed at the district court pending resolution of the appeal. 2019 WL 3068046. (But the prliminary injunction remained in place.) The Eighth Circuit ruled on the appeal in an order and opinion issued on April 27, 2021. Writing a majority opinion for a three-judge panel, Circuit Judge James Loken affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and reversed its certification of the class action. On the preliminary injunction issue, Judge Loken held that the district court erred in its May 15, 2019, order by not considering the length of time that had passed since the entry of the preliminary injunction (November 15, 2017) a changed factual circumstance that would make the continued enforcement of the injunction “detrimental to the public interest.” Circuit Judge Loken noted that while the preliminary injunction was meant to control the City’s activities “pending a prompt trial” on the merits of the claims for a permanent injunction, this trial never occurred after mediation failed. Though the circuit court affirmed the denial of the motion to dissolve, on remand it instructed the district court to vacate and dissolve the injunction no later than October 31, 2021, if at that time it is not replaced with a final order either granting a permanent injunction or denying injunctive relief. Judge Ralph Erickson agreed with the reversal of the class certification discussed below but wrote a concurring opinion where he disagreed with Judge Loken’s holding that passage of time by itself constituted a factual change sufficient to consider the dissolution of a preliminary injunction. 995 F.3d 635. As for the issue of class certification, Circuit Judge Loken found that the individual claims which would be brought by class members were not suited to the requirements of a Rule 23(b)(2) class. Importantly, the circuit court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that class members were harmed in “essentially the same way.” However, the Eighth Circuit left open the possibility that the plaintiffs could renew their request for certification once a final order is entered on their claim for permanent injunctive relief. As such, the class certification order was vacated without prejudice to plaintiffs. 995 F.3d 635. The Eighth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ request for a rehearing of the appeal en banc on June 8, 2021, with a formal mandate issued on June 15, 2021. Things got moving back in the district court after the Eighth Circuit ruling came down in late April 2021. The plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay which was granted on April 29, 2021. On May 17, 2021, Chief District Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri transferred the case from Judge Perry to Judge Matthew Schelp. In June 2021, Judge Schelp set a non-jury trial for August 23, 2021.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed in 2017 in the Eastern District of Missouri, alleged that law enforcement in the City of St. Louis violated individuals' right to protest by classifying assemblies as "unlawful" and used chemical agents without probable cause or fair warning. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the City to quell police misconduct and granted class certification, but the defendants successfully appealed both the class certification and preliminary injunction orders. Because so much time had passed since the 2017 entry of the preliminary injunction, the Eighth Circuit instructed the District Court to vacate and dissolve the preliminary injunction by October 31, 2021, if it has not been replaced by a permanent injunction in the meantime. It also left open the possibility that the plaintiffs could renew their request for class certification if a permanent injunction were granted. A non-jury trial is set for August 23, 2021.


On July 24, 2007, three female student-athletes at the University of California, Davis (UC Davis) filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued under Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law. The plaintiffs were represented by Equity Legal, Equal Rights Advocates, and private counsel. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that UC Davis engaged in sex discrimination and thus deprived female athletes of an equal opportunity to participate in varsity athletics. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the University employed a discriminatory process for establishing and maintaining varsity teams. During the 2005-2006 academic year, for example, females constituted 56% of the population of UC Davis, but only 50% of participants in varsity sports were female. In late December 2007, Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr. denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for everything, although it did grant the motion as it related to claims that the plaintiff brought under state law. 2007 WL 4365521. The plaintiffs moved for, and were granted class status defined as "all present, prospective, and future women students at the University of California at Davis who seek to participate in and/or who are deterred from participating in intercollegiate athletics at UCD." 2008 WL 11512299. On December 12, 2007, Judge Frank C. Damrell, Jr., dismissed the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims, leaving only the Title IX claim to be litigated. After two rounds of mediation, the parties decided they would settle this final claim. On October 19, 2009, the Court approved a Settlement Agreement in which the University agreed to (1) form and fund a women's field hockey team set to start competition in 2009, (2) pay $110,000 to a non-profit organization aimed at the development of female athletes in the UC Davis club sports program, (3) report on and decrease the disparity between the percentage of women enrolled at UC Davis and the percentage of women participating in varsity sports, (4) pay each of the three class representatives $8,000 in damages, and (5) pay $460,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The settlement agreement was to remain in effect through the 2019-2020 academic year. On October 20, 2009, the Court granted the joint motion for final approval of settlement and signed the stipulated judgment and order. 2009 WL 8634478. As of July 2020, there was nothing further on the docket; if there were any enforcement issues, they did not make their way into court.

Summary: This Title IX class action lawsuit was filed against the Regents of the University of California on July 24, 2007 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The class representatives, three female athletes at the University of California, Davis, claimed that the University engaged in sex discrimination, denying them of an equal opportunity to participate in varsity athletics. On October 19, 2009, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the University agreed to field a women's field hockey team, to pay $110,000 to a non-profit organization aimed at the development of female athletes in the UC Davis club sports program, to implement a plan to increase the percentage of female athletes at UC Davis, and to pay the Plaintiffs $460,000 for attorneys' fees and costs. The settlement agreement will remain in effect through the 2019-2020 academic year.


On November 18, 1999 the ACLU of Kentucky and several individuals filed a lawsuit against McCreary, Harlan, and Polaski Counties in Kentucky in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Defendants' display of the Ten Commandments in public schools and county courthouses violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, requesting McCreary County and Pulaski County’s Ten Commandment displays in their courthouses be removed. Prior to resolution of this motion, the counties altered their displays. This second display included additional documents that were largely religious in nature. On May 5, 2000, the Court (Judge Jennifer B. Coffman) denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction, on the grounds that the altered displays did not serve a secular purpose and therefore violated the Establishment Clause. The injunction ordered the defendants to remove their displays from their Courthouses and to refrain from erecting similar displays in the future. 96 F.Supp.2d 679 (E.D.KY. 2000). The county defendants complied with the injunction and, for the third display, added other historical documents to the display that included the Ten Commandments. The counties did not repeal or overrule the resolutions that authorized the second displays on the grounds of religious importance when they erected this third display. In response to this third display, the plaintiffs sought to extend the injunction to McrCeary County’s current display, as well as Pulaski County’s courthouse display and the displays in Harlan County schools. On June 22, 2001, Judge Jennifer B. Coffman granted this request on similar grounds and ordered all the displays to be removed. 145 F.Supp.2d 845 (E.D.Ky. 2001). On December 18, 2003, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Eric L. Clay) affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that the defendants’ displays lacked a secular purpose. 354 F.3d 438, 462 (6th Cir. 2003). The counties appealed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals opinion to the Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted on October 12, 2004. Before oral argument, the counties repealed the provisions that authorized their second display, based on the importance of religion. On June 27, 2005, Justice Souter writing for the majority affirmed the Sixth Circuit ruling. The Court held that the plaintiffs’ sufficiently demonstrated that the defendants’ original displays and revised displays were done with a religious purpose, which is a clear violation of the Establishment Clause. The court found the defendants’ repeal of their display authorizations before oral argument to be minimally significant in proving their displays had a secular basis. 545 U.S. 844. On September 28, 2007 Judge Coffman ordered the plaintiffs claims against defendant Harlan County School District dismissed with prejudice and denied both the plaintiffs’ and the defendants’ motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the second display, which was the basis for the motion for dismissal, no longer existed. The only relevant legal issue in the case was whether the defendants had taken action after the Supreme Court decision to erect displays with a predominantly secular purpose. The Judge also referred the case to settlement, whereupon the Defendants made slight policy changes. 2007 WL 2903210. On August 4, 2008, the District Court declared the first, second, and third displays unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against all three displays. The Judge also reversed its ruling in the previous order dismissing the claim against defendant Harlan County without prejudice, because there is no guarantee that the prohibited conduct would not resume in the future. On March 13, 2009, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding $393,798.00 in attorneys' fees and $8,133.34 in costs. 2009 WL 720904. On June 9, 2010 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's permanent injunction. 607 F.3d 439. The parties signed a joint notice of satisfaction of judgment on December 21, 2011. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 18, 1999 the ACLU and several individuals filed a lawsuit against three Kentucky counties in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, claiming that the display of the Ten Commandments in public schools and county courthouses violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On August 4, 2008 the District Court declared all three displays implemented throughout the litigation as unconstitutional and entered a permanent injunction against all three displays. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's permanent injunction on June 9, 2010. 607 F.3d 439


On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against IKEA. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to disparate terms and conditions of employment when he was terminated in lieu of demotion because of his race. On October 28, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On May 3, 2006, the District Court (Judge Deborah k. Chasanow) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $52,500.

Summary: On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of an African American employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Maryland, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against IKEA. The EEOC claimed that the defendant subjected the complainant to disparate terms and conditions of employment when he was terminated in lieu of demotion because of his race. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay $52,500.


On October 27, 2008, a disabled man with a pre-existing cardiovascular condition filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the City of East Providence, Rhode Island and various city officials under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 and State of Rhode Island's Fair Employment Practices Act. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and with permission from the EEOC, asked the court for declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages and attorney's fees. The complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against plaintiff by requiring only the plaintiff, because of his cardiovascular disability, to undergo a vigorous physical as a condition of his employment in violation of state and federal employment law and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had appointed plaintiff to the position of Assistant Harbormaster, but discriminated against him when it, with knowledge of his cardiovascular condition, required that the plaintiff undergo a rigorous physical examination as a precondition of employment, which no other employee had been subject to. There was little activity in the case over the next two years. On September 29, 2010, the parties settled for $15,000 in attorney's fees and $7,000 in damages. The defendant did not admit any fault or wrongdoing. The District Court (Judge William E. Smith) dismissed the case with prejudice on October 5, 2010.

Summary: On October 27, 2008, a disabled man filed action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the City of East Providence, Rhode Island and various city officials under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state and federal employment law, alleging the defendant city created discriminatory terms and conditions of employment by requiring him, and no other candidate, to undergo a rigorous physical examination as a precondition of his employment. The parties settled for $22,000 and the case was dismissed with prejudice on October 5, 2010.


This is a case challenging the Georgia city of Calhoun's use of a bail schedule that did not account for ability to pay, leading to longer detention of poor criminal defendants. On September 8, 2015, a 54-year-old indigent man filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the city of Calhoun, Georgia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Represented by Equal Justice Under Law and the Southern Center for Human Rights, the plaintiff claimed that the City had refused to release individuals arrested for minor offenses from jail unless they paid a generic bond amount. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the City used a "fixed secured money-based detention scheme" that operated to detain the most impoverished misdemeanor arrestees. The City holds court hearings only once per week, so someone who is arrested for a minor crime but is indigent will have to remain in jail for up to seven days. The plaintiff argued that this practice violated the Fourteenth Amendment and asked the court for injunctive relief and a declaration that the city's conduct was unlawful. With the complaint, the plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order, or in the alternative, a preliminary injunction, to prevent the City from keeping him and similarly situated individuals in jail without offering release on unsecured bond or recognizance. After his release from jail, however, the plaintiff withdrew his motion for a temporary restraining order. But the plaintiff continued with his request for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff also moved for class certification. On November 2, 2015, the City moved to dismiss this case for failure to state a claim. In the alternative, the City requested that the plaintiff submit a more definite statement of his claim. On December 2, 2015, Judge Murphy denied the City's motion. Judge Murphy held that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a cause of action and found that the plaintiff’s complaint was not so vague or ambiguous that the City could not appropriately respond. 2015 WL 13547012. On January 28, 2016, Judge Murphy granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Murphy ordered the City to implement post-arrest procedures that comply with the Constitution. In addition, unless and until the City implemented lawful post-arrest procedures, the defendant had to release any other misdemeanor arrestees in its custody, or who come into its custody, on their own recognizance or on an unsecured bond in a manner otherwise consistent with state and federal law and with standard booking procedures. The City could not continue to keep arrestees in its custody for any amount of time solely because the arrestees could not afford a secured monetary bond. 2016 WL 361612. On the same day, Judge Murphy also certified the plaintiff class. 2016 WL 361580. On February 5, 2016, the City appealed Judge Murphy’s orders for a preliminary injunction and class certification to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Amicus briefs were filed by a number of interested parties, including a statement of interest by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Civil Rights Division argued that "a bail scheme that imposes financial conditions, without individualized consideration of ability to pay and whether such conditions are necessary to assure appearance at trial, violates the Fourteenth Amendment." On March 9, 2017, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, finding the injunction to be overly broad. 682 Fed. Appx. 721. Back in district court, Judge Murphy directed both parties to advise the court what they thought should happen. The plaintiffs responded by indicating that the court should just enter a more specific injunction while the defendants maintained essentially their same objections to the injunction. After considering these recommendations, on June 16, 2017, Judge Murphy agreed with the plaintiffs and granted a more specific preliminary injunction. The defendant would be prohibited from detaining arrestees who are otherwise eligible for release but are unable to post bail because of their poverty. Further, the court established procedures whereby an indigent plaintiff can demonstrate financial hardship. 2017 WL 2794064. The defendant again appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on July 12, 2017, and also motioned to stay proceedings with the district court on August 4, 2017. Judge Murphy granted the motion to stay proceedings on August 17, 2017. On August 22, 2018, Eleventh Circuit Judges Beverly Martin, Julie Carnes, and Diarmuid O’Scannlain vacated the second preliminary injunction. The court applied a heightened scrutiny review standard and allowed the City an opportunity to develop an evidentiary record about its need for a 48-hour detention policy for indigents before considering this case on the merits. On September 24, the district court vacated the preliminary injunction in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit order. On October 5, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to bar the City from reinstating its original bail policy; they notified the court of their intention to file a certiorari petition in the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in this case. On November 26, 2018, the district court stayed the proceedings in this matter through the earlier of (1) the Supreme Court’s resolution of the plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari; or (2) June 28, 2019. The court also denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. On April 1, 2019, plaintiffs' certiorari petition to the Supreme Court was denied. 139 S.Ct. 1446. The next day, the district court lifted the stay and the plaintiffs moved for a narrow preliminary injunction consistent with the Eleventh Circuit decision. On August 5, 2019 plaintiffs moved to have the case referred to mediation, which the defendant did not oppose. Accordingly, Judge Murphy referred the case to Chief Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson for mediation on September 6, 2019. A settlement conference was scheduled for October 21st, but mediation was canceled because the parties had agreed to a settlement. On November 18th, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement. Under the proposed settlement agreement, the City agreed to three substantive policies for the benefit of the class members. First, the City would not return to the bail policies or procedures that were in effect when plaintiff was arrested in September 2015. Second, the City would provide a copy of the 2019 Standing Bail Order to the Gordon County Sheriff’s Office to ensure that no arrestee under the jurisdiction of the City of Calhoun Municipal Court would be held in jail after arrest pursuant to a secured monetary bond solely because the arrestee cannot afford to pay the bond amount, except for a reasonable amount of time, not to exceed 48 hours, needed to process the arrestee and bring her or him before a neutral decision maker for a hearing on the arrestee’s indigence and alternative release provisions. Third, the City would incorporate into a resolution for reappointment of the current municipal court judge, and all future municipal judges, a provision requiring that the 2019 Standing Bail Order is followed as the policy of the Calhoun Municipal Court. There is no enforcement mechanism included in the settlement agreement. By an agreement that was negotiated separately, the City agreed to pay $20,000 to plaintiff to resolve his individual damages claims, and $30,000 of attorney’s fees for plaintiff’s counsel. On November 22, 2019, Judge Murphy granted the joint motion for preliminary approval. On January 30, 2020, the case was reassigned to Judge Steve C. Jones. Judge Jones approved the parties' class action settlement agreement on February 18, 2020. Plaintiffs then moved for $30,000 in attorney's fees as agreed upon in the settlement and final order and Judge Jones granted the motion on February 25, 2020. On March 18, 2020, the parties jointly stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice.

Summary: In 2014, a 54-year-old indigent man filed a lawsuit against the City of Calhoun, Georgia, for himself and others similarly situated, for injunctive relief and a declaration that the city's conduct is unlawful. He claimed the city was unlawfully detaining impoverished misdemeanor arrestees by using a fixed-amount bail system. In 2016, the court issued a temporary injunction against the City and required the release of arrestees who were only in custody because they could not afford a secured monetary bond. The Eleventh Circuit reversed the injunction and the District Court issued a new, revised preliminary injunction on June 16, 2017. Defendants again appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and the injunction was again vacated. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs writ of certiorari in April of 2019. In August, the parties moved to have the case referred to mediation and the reached a preliminary class action settlement agreement in November of 2019. In the proposed settlement agreement, the City agreed to three substantive policy changes to assure that they would not return to the bail policies in effect when plaintiff was arrested and to ensure no arrestee is held in jail pursuant to a secured monetary bond solely because they cannot pay, except for a reasonable amount of time, not to exceed 48 hours, needed to process the arrestee and bring them before a neutral decision maker. The parties separately negotiated an agreement for the City to pay $20,000 to plaintiff to resolve his damages claims and $30,000 in attorneys fees. The court approved the agreements on February 18, 2020.


On September 6, 2007, a black homeowner filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against private banks and lenders, Direct One Mortgage Company and HSBC Finance Corporation, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black applicants in their home financing policies and practices, including fraudulent concealment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on black homeowners, creating a significantly higher likelihood of exposure to discretionary points and fees. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injuctive relief. On November 2, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, though after the plaintiff amended his complaint, the Court (Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr.) ruled the motion to dismiss moot. On November 27, 2009, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The complaint added three named plaintiffs, who were Hispanic. Thus, the complaint was not a class action on behalf of similarly situated black and Hispanic homeowners. The complaint also added several defendants, who were subsidiaries of HSBC. In other respects, the compliant reiterated the original allegations. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a notice of settlement. Under the settlement agreement, the parties sought to certify class consisting of "all African-American or Hispanic persons throughout the United States who, between January 1, 2004 and the date of entry of the Preliminary Approval Order, obtained residential closed-end real estate secured loans from any of the following businesses: Decision One, HFC/Beneficial, HSBC Mortgage Corp. (USA) or HSBC Mortgage Services Telesales. The defendants agreed to identify class members based on their data. The defendants agreed to pay $6,500,000.00 for the benefit of the settlement class, including $1,800,000.00 in attorney's fees and $15,000.00 in service fees to the plaintiffs. Class members, who borrowed from Decision One, could claim $200 per loan. Two organizations received $125,000.00 to support financial education, homeownership education and/or foreclosure counseling activities. If anything remained, the two organizations would be paid a larger amount, but not exceeding $750,000.00. Any residual monies would be paid to charitable organizations engaged in housing assistance or consumer credit education, to be chosen by the mutual agreement of the parties. The defendants agreed to provide quarterly reports to the class counsel for the duration of the agreement. The defendants agreed to provide loan restructuring and foreclosure mitigation programs to class members until June 30, 2010. On December 9, 2009, the Court issued an order preliminarily approving the settlement and certifying class. Following a fairness hearing, the Court issued the final judgment in the case approving the settlement on May 13, 2010.

Summary: On September 6, 2007, a black homeowner filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against private banks and lenders, Direct One Mortgage Company and HSBC Finance Corporation, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black applicants in their home financing policies and practices, including fraudulent concealment. On November 27, 2009, the complaint was amended to include class allegations on behalf of Hispanic homeowners. The parties settled. The agreement was approved and class of black and Hispanic borrowers certified on May 13, 2010. The defendants agreed to pay $6,500,000.00 for the settlement class, including $1,800,000.00 in attorney's fees and $200 to some class members.