On September 11, 2017, several states initiated this action in the District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging President Trump’s attempted revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiffs alleged that DACA provided invaluable protections to young people across their states and allowed them to pursue education and employment. In turn, DACA recipients have contributed to state economies and the educational experiences of all students in state school systems. The complaint argued that the proposed revocation violated Fifth Amendment Due Process and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The plaintiffs sought equitable estoppel to prevent the government from divulging the personal information of DACA recipients, as well as an order from the court enjoining the government from rescinding the program. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program via Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policy statements. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children (and who meet some additional requirements). As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless Congress acted within the next six months. As the plaintiffs' complaint highlights, the Obama administration made key promises to applicants when it promoted DACA: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement purposes, and that, barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. The plaintiffs were the states of California, Maine, Minnesota, and Maryland. The complaint noted that California in particular was home to more DACA recipients than any other state in the country (over 200,000). The states argued that rescinding DACA "violates fundamental notions of justice" by leaving recipients without access to jobs and making them vulnerable to deportation. The complaint also alleged that DACA recipients were required to divulge confidential information in order to apply for the program, including information about their immigration status and address. Recipients were previously assured that the information would be kept confidential. By revoking DACA, the plaintiffs argued that the government created a "confusing and threatening situation" in which that private information was at risk of being used against recipients in future immigration proceedings. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on Sept. 11, 2017, and reassigned to Judge William Alsup on Sept. 18, after it was related to Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security(No. 17-cv-05211). The cases were subsequently related to Garcia v. United States of America (No. 17-cv-5380), a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16156">City of San Jose v. Trump, (No. 17-cv-5329), and County of Santa Clara v. Trump (No. 17-cv-5823). On October 6, in a related challenge led by Regents of University of California before this judge, the government filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception up to the decision to rescind it. On October 17, after the University in the related case moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so in all related cases, including this one. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission: specifically, they failed to produce related documents that Acting DHS Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on October 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court denied the requested stay on October 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the District Court and an emergency motion for stay. On October 23, the District Court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition, stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until DACA was intended to end (March 5, 2018). On November 16, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered, and the District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by November 22. On November 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the US Supreme Court no later than November 20. The government requested that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of that petition. On November 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction was with the District Court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on November 20 agreed to stay all discovery until December 22 when the augmented administrative record would be due. On December 1, 2017, the government filed notice that it appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On December 20 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the District Court should have stayed implementation of the October 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have "first resolved the Government’s threshold arguments" (that the Acting Secretary’s determination to rescind DACA is unreviewable because it is “committed to agency discretion,” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record. 138 S.Ct. 443 (2017). The same day, the District Court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. 138 S.Ct. 371 (2017). On January 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the rescission. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who had never before received deferred action. 279 F. Supp. 3d 1011. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on January 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well as the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). 298 F. Supp.3 d 1304. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on January 16, 2018. The government also sought certiorari from the US Supreme Court on January 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time-sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on February 26, 2018, indicating the justices assumed "that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case." 138 S.Ct. 1182. The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. In February and March 2018, the parties and amici filed their briefs, which can be found here. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on November 8, 2018. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because the government was not exercising discretion in rescinding the program, but rather acting out of a belief that DHS lacked the authority to issue DACA in the first place, and so rescission was necessary. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because it did not fall within one of the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. 2018 WL 5833232. As to the merits of a preliminary injunction, the panel held that "DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion," and that the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it "promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress." Id. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in three DACA cases: Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and NAACP v. Trump, all of which were pending before different circuit courts of appeal. The Court consolidated the three cases (No. 18-587). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation fo the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020 ("Wolf Memorandum"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that the Acting Secretary Wolf actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in another case challenging the Wolf Memorandum,Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump, ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Several states filed this lawsuit on September 11, 2017, challenging President Trump’s revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). The plaintiffs alleged that the government's decision to end DACA violated due process and equal protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. In November 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction to preserve the program. The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review and oral argument was heard on Nov. 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On November 13, 2015, ten residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several MDEQ officials, the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Mayor of Flint, the Director of Public Works for Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the City of Flint under U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that their Due Process rights were violated when the defendants took safe drinking water from Flint and replaced it with water known to contain high levels of lead and other corrosive contaminants. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by replacing the safe water with corrosive water the defendants harmed their property, caused physical and emotional injury, and violated their right to bodily integrity. The plaintiffs sought an order certifying the class as all “individuals who from April 25, 2014 to present were exposed to toxic Flint water and experience an injury to their person or property or who in the future will be so injured.” Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and cost, and injunctive relief to remedy harm to property, establish a medical monitoring fund, and appoint a monitor to oversee Flint’s water operation. Additionally, the plaintiffs demanded a jury trial. From 1964 until 2014, the City of Flint provided safe, clean water to residents via the Detroit water system. According to the complaint, although Flint and MDEQ officials were aware that the water of the Flint River was highly corrosive and dangerous, in April 2014, the Emergency Manager ordered the city to switch its water source to the Flint River. Despite continued protests from Flint residents, defendants insisted the water was safe and declined to switch back to the Detroit water system. It was not until October 8, 2015 that Governor Snyder ordered Flint to switch back to the Detroit water system. However, the plaintiffs alleged that due to the prolonged exposure to contaminated water they suffer from property damage and serious physical and emotional injuries, such as high levels of lead and copper in their bloodstreams, skin lesions, hair loss, and neurological and psychological disorders. On April 1, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to consolidate six class action cases pending before the Court and designate a process for selecting interim lead counsel. The six class actions were all brought on behalf of Flint residents, consumers or businesses and based on the City of Flint switching its water source to the highly corrosive and dangerous water of the Flint River. Shortly after, on April 4, 2016, Governor Snyder and the State of Michigan filed a motion to dismiss. Additional defendants-the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Director of Public Works, the City of Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the Mayor of Flint-filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on April 18, 2016. Both the motions argued that the officials were entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Safe Drinking Water Act precluded action under § 1983 for alleged deprivations of constitutional rights related to water quality standards, and the complaint fails to state a claim for a violation of substantive due process. Instead, the defendants argued that this claim must be brought under the Safe Drinking Water Act. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 25, 2016, adding allegations that their Equal Protection rights were violated on the basis of race and wealth when the defendants elected to provide clean water to the remainder of Genesee County but not Flint. In addition, the plaintiffs added claims of conspiracy to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under U.S.C. § 1985(3), allegations of state law violations, and several defendants, including the Treasurer for the State of Michigan, the Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHSS), and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner. Finally, the plaintiffs anticipated that additional negligence claims would be added against the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on October 25, 2016 or after. Following the amended complaint, multiple defendants again filed a motion to dismiss. Governor Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Treasurer and the Director of MDHSS filed a motion to dismiss on June 27, 2016 again arguing that the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Safe Drinking Water Act precluded the plaintiffs § 1983 claims, and the amended complaint fails to state a claim for violation for substantive due process. They additionally argued that the plaintiffs’ other claims fail because there was no showing of discriminatory intent or involvement of a fundamental right. Additional motions to dismiss were filed by the Emergency Managers, City Officials of the City of Flint, the MDEQ officials, and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner on July 29, 2016 and August 1, 2016. Although the groups of defendants filed separately, the motions all argued similar reasons for dismissing the plaintiffs’ lawsuit. Due to the overwhelming local media coverage and publicity of the Flint water crisis, the MDEQ officials filed a motion for change of venue and requested that the case be transfer to an out-of-state venue or to the Norther Division of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The MDEQ officials simultaneously requested the Court stay all proceedings, such as the motions to dismiss, until the Court decided their motion for change of venue. On February 2, 2017, Judge John Corbett O’Meara granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss. 2017 WL 445637. Relying on its decision in Boler v. Earley (Case No. 16-10323), Judge O’Meara agreed with the defendants that the Safe Drinking Water Act and its enforcement scheme precluded the plaintiffs from bring suit under § 1983. Judge O’Meara concluded that without viable constitutional claims, the plaintiffs’ conspiracy claims under § 1985(3) also fails. In addition, Judge O’Meara declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ state claims. Later in February 2017, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint to the Sixth Circuit. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeal with an appeal to Boler v. Earley (Case No. 16-10323). On July 28, 2017, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge O’Meara’s decision to dismiss the claims because there was no express indication in the Safe Drinking Water Act Congress intended to preempt § 1983 claims, the remedies of the Act were not so comprehensive as to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude claims under § 1983, and the rights and protections of the Act diverge from the constitutional claims so as to prevent an inference of congressional intent. (Circuit Judges R. Guy Cole Jr., Jane Branstetter Stranch, and Bernice B. Donald). 865 F.3d 391. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claims against the State of Michigan because the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The defendants filed a writ of certiorari, but on March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari. Because this case appeared to be a companion case to Waid v. Snyder (Case No. 16-10444), on October 19, 2017, this case was reassigned to District Judge Judith E. Levy and Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. On April 6, 2018, this case was consolidated with Waid v. Snyder, PB-MI-0014 in this Clearinghouse; for subsequent activity, see that record.

Summary: On November 13, 2015, ten residents of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), several MDEQ officials, the Emergency Managers of Flint, the Mayor of Flint, the Director of Public Works for Flint, the Utilities Administrators of Flint, and the City of Flint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. In particular, the plaintiffs alleged that their Due Process rights were violated when the defendants took safe drinking water from Flint and replaced it with water known to contain high levels of lead and other corrosive contaminants. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on May 25, 2016 and alleged that their Equal Protection rights were violated on the basis of race and wealth, that defendants conspired to violate constitution rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and state civil rights laws were violated. In addition, the plaintiffs added e Treasurer for the State of Michigan, the Director of Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHSS), and the Genesee County Drain Commissioner as defendants. On April 6, 2018, this case was consolidated with Waid v. Snyder.


This school desegregation case began after the DeKalb County School System (DCSS) adopted a free choice program in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s integration mandate in Brown v. Board of Education. The plan had little overall effect; a few black students decided to attend the previously all-white schools, but no white students decided to attend the previously all-black schools. This summary is based on information from historical sources and judicial opinions. On July 5, 1968, several black school children with their parents, filed a putative class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against DeKalb County. They argued that the free choice plan was insufficient, based on the Supreme Court's May 1968 decision in Green v. School Board of New Kent County, holding that the mere adoption of school choice plans did not satisfy the desegregation requirements of Brown v. Board of Education. In Green, the Supreme Court held school districts needed to be desegregated with respect to all aspects of school administration including: student assignment, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and physical facilities. These six areas of school operations have come to be known as the Green factors. After the filing of the DeKalb complaint, the School District began working with the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to create an integration plan. The plan eliminated school choice and required instead that all previously designated black schools be closed and the students be enrolled in the remaining, (previously white) schools. This plan was approved in a consent decree by the District Court in June of 1969 and the District Court maintained jurisdiction. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). In 1976 the District Court ordered additional requirements for the integration plan to be added. The DCSS was required to: (1) expand their Majority-to-minority transfer program (a program that allowed students that were in the majority race of their current school, to transfer to a school where they would be the minority race); (2) create a bi-racial committee to oversee future boundary line changes and the transfer program; (3) reassign teachers so that the ratio of black to white teachers at a given school was similar to the racial balance of the school district’s population. According to Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992), there had been large population shifts in the district, resulting in an increase of black families and school children in the southern part of the district (and an increasingly white population in the northern district). Accordingly, in 1983, the District Court ordered DCSS was again to make changes to the transfer program. As populations continued to shift, DCSS made adjustments to the integration plans. But this brought about new issues. For example, when one primarily white school became over enrolled, DCSS attempted to expand the physical grounds of the school rather than transferring the extra students to a neighboring black school. The District Court found this action was acceptable because the DCSS had been a unitary school district since 1969. On March 22, 1985, the Fifth Circuit reversed this order, finding the school district was not desegregated, and that until it became a unitary district, any state action perpetuating the dual features would violate the mandate to desegregate. Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985). In 1986 the School District moved to dismiss the case because it had met all of the requirements of the consent decree – creating a unitary system. In 1988, the District Court found that DCSS had achieved maximum practical desegregation from 1969 to 1986 and was a unitary system with regard to student assignments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities (referencing the Green factors). The court ruled it would order no further relief in those areas. Additionally, it found the rapid population shifts in DeKalb County were not caused by any action on the part of the DCSS. The District Court relinquished jurisdiction over the four completed Green factors but ordered the School District to remedy the remaining factors of teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of education. For the remaining three categories the District Court maintained jurisdiction. See Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989) for a detailed description of the satisfied Green factors. Both parties appealed to the 11th Circuit. The 11th Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that a school achieves unitary status only after satisfying all six factors addressed in Green and that judicial control over all categories was required. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (1989). The School District obtained review to the Supreme Court. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, reversed the 11th Circuit. The Court held that, in the course of supervising desegregation plans, federal courts have the authority to relinquish supervision and control of school districts before full compliance had been achieved in every area of school operations. Justice Kennedy stated the vestiges of segregation must be the actual causal link to the de jure violation being remedied and therefore the any remedy imposed could only be implemented in so far as it advanced the objective of alleviating the initial constitutional violation of segregation. But, where re-segregation was the result of private choice, it was beyond the authority of the federal courts to take measures to counteract massive demographic shifts. Justice Kennedy explained District Courts should consider whether there had been satisfactory compliance with the remedial decree, whether retention of judicial control was necessary, and whether the school district had demonstrated it had a good-faith commitment to the whole of the remedial decree and the requirements of the Constitution. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). The 11th Circuit remanded to the District Court to consider the remaining Green factors and the additional factors of education quality and the good faith commitment of the school district. Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 979 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1992). The procedural history following the 11th Circuit remand is documented in Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). On September 8, 1995 the Court issued an order stating it would not dismiss the suit with respect to the categories of faculty assignments, resource allocation, quality of education, and “good faith”, because the district was not in full compliance. The Defendants later moved to dismiss. On June 12, 1996, the District Court found DCSS had met its requirements and dismissed the case. Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). There was further litigation regarding attorney’s fees as discussed in Mills by Mills v. Freeman, 118 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1997). This case is now closed. Reported decisions: Pitts v. Freeman, 755 F.2d 1423 (11th Cir. 1985). Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1989). Pitts v. Freeman, 891 F.2d 907 (Table) (11th Cir. 1989). Freeman v. Pitts, 498 U.S. 1081 (1991). Freeman v. Pitts, 498 U.S. 1081(1991). Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). Pitts by Pitts v. Freeman, 979 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1992). Mills v. Freeman, 942 F. Supp. 1449 (N.D. Ga. 1996). Mills by Mills v. Freeman, 118 F.3d 727 (11th Cir. 1997).

Summary: The DeKalb County School System adopted a school integration plan after Brown v. Board of Education and Green v. New Kent County. In the process of integrating the school district the Court relinquished control back to the school district over areas the court deemed to be integrated. The Supreme Court held District Courts should relinquish control of the School Districts even if full compliance had not been met. Several years later the school district was finally considered integrated.


On February 10, 2019, a group of beneficiaries of Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) from Honduras and Nepal and their U.S.-citizen children filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, and private attorneys, sued the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs challenged the Trump Administration’s recent decisions to terminate the TPS designations for Honduras and Nepal, alleging that the decisions violated the APA as well as equal protection and due process under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs pointed to another recent lawsuit challenging the Administration’s decisions to terminate TPS (in that case for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan), where this District Court issued a preliminary injunction halting the terminations. The plaintiffs claimed that the same defects in the terminations at issue in that case, Ramos v. Nielsen (located here in this Clearinghouse), existed here. The case was originally assigned to Judge Jon Tigar, but was later reassigned to Judge Edward Chen after this case was related to Ramos v. Nielsen. TPS is a form of humanitarian immigration relief that permits individuals from TPS-designated countries to lawfully live and work in the U.S. when they cannot safely return to their country of origin due to an exceptional circumstance, such as armed conflict or a natural disaster. The complaint stated that more than 100,000 individuals from Honduras and Nepal currently have TPS, most of them having lived in the U.S. for the majority of their lives. Many are also the parents of U.S.-citizen children, who would be faced with the choice of being separated from their families or leaving the only home they had ever known if their parents lost TPS. The minor plaintiffs sought to represent the following nationwide class: U.S.-citizen children, from ages five to eighteen, of all TPS holders from Honduras and Nepal. The complaint explained that typically, when DHS was considering whether to terminate a country’s TPS designation, it would consider all of the conditions in that country, including the impact of crises or exceptional circumstances that occurred after the country’s original TPS designation. The plaintiffs then alleged that since President Trump took office, DHS, without any formal announcement, explanation, or acknowledgment of a departure from past practice, adopted a new interpretation of the TPS statute that no longer considers intervening country conditions. The plaintiffs claimed that this new interpretation and subsequent decisions to terminate TPS designations for certain countries were motivated by racial animus, highlighting President Trump’s various past statements denigrating non-white, non-European immigrants. On March 12, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to a stay of the proceedings in this case pending final resolution of the defendants’ appeal of the preliminary injunction in Ramos. Judge Chen granted the stipulation, finding that the “interests of justice and judicial economy would be served by treating the decisions terminating TPS for Honduras and Nepal similarly to the decisions at issue in Ramos during the pendency of the Ramos appeal.” The defendants agreed to abstain from implementing their decisions to terminate TPS for Nepal and Honduras pending the resolution of that appeal. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on August 14, 2019. The Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction in Ramos on September 14, 2020. 975 F.3d 872., but the appellate court has yet to issue a directive to the district court to make the decision effective. On December 9, 2020, DHS published a  notice extending TPS for Honduras and Nepal through October 4, 2021 As of March 16, 2021, the injunction remains in effect, and the defendants still may not terminate TPS for Nepal and Honduras. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On Feb. 10, 2019, a group of TPS beneficiaries from Honduras and Nepal and their U.S.-citizen children filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Department of Homeland Security's decisions to terminate TPS designations for those two countries. The plaintiffs alleged that these decisions violated the APA, equal protection, and due process. In March, 2019, the case was stayed pending the resolution of an appeal in a parallel case, <i>Ramos v. Nielsen</i>, challenging TPS rescissions for another group of countries. As of March 16, 2021, DHS had extended TPS for Honduras and Nepal through October 4, 2021


On April 1, 2010, five current and former prisoners in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) who were transferred to experimental "Communications Management Units" (CMUs), and two spouses of those prisoners, filed suit under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the U.S. Attorney General and the BOP in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights as well as attorneys from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, and asked the court for declaratory relief and injunctive relief either compelling the BOP to return them to the general population of an appropriate BOP facility or enjoining the BOP from operating the CMU in a way that violated the plaintiffs' rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that placement in the CMU was discriminatory and imposed atypical and significant curtailments on their ability to communicate with loved ones. That, they said, violated the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. They also alleged that the BOP had failed to provide an opportunity for notice and comment on a dramatic change in policy that contradicted existing regulations, violating the APA. In 2006 and 2007, the BOP secretly created two experimental prison units designed to isolate certain prisoners from the rest of the BOP and the outside world, called "Communication Management Units." The CMUs, unlike other federal general population units, categorically banned any physical contact with visiting friends and family and placed severe restrictions on CMU prisoners' access to phone calls and prison programming. More than two thirds of the prisoners confined in the CMUs were Muslim, over-representing the BOP Muslim population by roughly 1,000%. On March 30, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Ricardo M. Urbina denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, allowing the plaintiffs to proceed on their procedural due process and retaliation claims. 774 F. Supp. 2d 147. The case then went into discovery for several years. During discovery, on April 4, 2012, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard Roberts. Then, on November 5, 2012, the case was again reassigned to Judge Barbara J. Rothstein. On July 12, 2013, Judge Rothstein dismissed one plaintiff's claims as moot, as the plaintiff had been released from BOP custody, and dismissed the other plaintiffs' claims for mental and emotional injury against one defendant in his individual capacity, as the Prison Litigation Reform Act barred such claims. The remaining claims (procedural due process violation for both plaintiffs, and retaliation for one plaintiff) continued in discovery. 953 F. Supp. 2d 133. On April 23, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on their remaining claims, and on May 21, defendants filed their own motion for summary judgment. The next year, on March 16, 2015, Judge Rothstein denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the two remaining plaintiffs' procedural due process claims and one plaintiff's retaliation claim. Judge Rothstein reasoned that the plaintiffs' procedural due process claims failed because they could not establish a "private liberty interest" as required by Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). A plaintiff, Judge Rothstein explained, can establish a liberty interest by showing that restrictions impose "atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." The baseline for "ordinary incidents of prison life" is administrative segregation (solitary confinement) or "the most restrictive confinement conditions that prison officials . . . routinely impose." Here, Judge Rothstein found that the conditions of administrative segregation at the facilities were generally harsher than those in the CMUs, noting, "except where communication is concerned, CMUs function like a general population unit." Judge Rothstein further granted summary judgment to the defendant on one plaintiff's retaliation claim, deferring to the judgment of the prison administrators that the plaintiff's transfer in response to speech had a "valid, rational connection" to a legitimate government interest. Prison officials had described the plaintiff's speech as "inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population," and Judge Rothstein deferred to their judgment, holding that the plaintiff's speech was not protected by the First Amendment. 2015 WL 3749621. The plaintiffs appealed and filed their opening appellate brief on October 28, 2015 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On August 19, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court in part and reversed and remanded in part. 833 F.3d 242. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the government regarding the retaliation claim, agreeing that the plaintiff could not show his First Amendment rights were violated. The Court also upheld the District Court's earlier summary judgment dismissing the claims of mental and emotional injury. Unlike the District Court, it found the plaintiffs alleged harms qualifying for compensation under the PLRA but upheld the grant of summary judgment because the prison official was entitled to qualified immunity. On October 12, 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed on the "liberty interest" claim; it found the duration and atypicality of CMU designation sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest. On this claim, the case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the appellants were afforded sufficient process. The parties returned to discovery and litigation. In a joint status report filed on May 10, 2018, the defendants stipulated that given one plaintiff's release from prison and new CMU procedures, supplemental briefing addressing the court's jurisdiction and the merits of the case would be necessary. In the time before the briefing, though, the second plaintiff was released from prison custody in February 2019. On April 12, 2019, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' claims were moot. In early November 2019, the court first granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and subsequently denied the motion to intervene. In the court's opinion granting the motion to dismiss, the court concluded that even though one plaintiff had since been removed from BOP custody, ongoing consequences from the continued existence of the CMU-related documents continued to affect the plaintiff. As to the second plaintiff, the defendant indicated that the plaintiff had since been deported following release from BOP custody. As a result, the court held that the second plaintiff's claim was moot. Between June 2019 and January 2020, four other CMU prisoners filed pro se motions to intervene in the case. Judge Rothstein denied these motions in a June 25, 2020 opinion. 2020 WL 7974325. In an October 13, 2020 opinion, Judge Rothstein granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment against the remaining plaintiff and denied the plaintiff's cross motion. She found that the process by which the plaintiff had been placed in the CMU, as well as the BOP's periodic reviews of his designation, did not violate his due process rights. 2020 WL 7251386. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on December 9, 2020. The appeal remains pending in the D.C. Circuit under docket number 20-5368 as of April 11, 2021.

Summary: Five prisoners in the custody of the BOP filed suit in April 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging violations of their First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights as well as a violation of the APA's notice and comment rulemaking requirement. The prisoners had been transferred to experimental "Communications Management Units," (CMUs), which restricted their ability to communicate and banned physical contact with visitors. The District Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, but the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded in part. Some of the plaintiffs were released from prison, and the court held their claims were moot. The defendants won a summary judgment motion against the remaining plaintiffs in October 2020, which the plaintiffs have appealed.


On August 14, 2017, the State of California's Attorney General filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), including its component Office of Justice Programs (OJP), in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The State challenged the DOJ's imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the state. California and its political subdivisions receive federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) Program administered by the DOJ. California alleged that the latest DOJ requirements for FY2017 program funding imposed new conditions on recipients: "to: (a) provide federal immigration enforcement agents with the Department of Homeland Security ('DHS') access to detention facilities to interview inmates who are 'aliens' or believed to be 'aliens' (the 'access condition'); and (b) provide 48 hours’ advance notice to DHS regarding the scheduled release date of an 'alien' upon request by DHS (the 'notification condition')." California stated that it believed its relevant laws (the TRUST Act and TRUTH Act statutes, governing DHS's access to inmates in state and local custody) in fact complied with these conditions but that the DOJ misinterpreted these laws as non-compliant. In any event, California argued that the conditions were so ambiguous that the DOJ could continue to wrongly deny California the funding. Additionally, California believed that Congress did not intend Byrne Jag funding to be conditioned in this way. California argued that by imposing these conditions on this funding, the DOJ threatened the implementation of state laws and also a critical source of state and municipal funding to "support law enforcement programs, reduce recidivism, conduct prevention and education programs for at-risk youth, and support programs for crime victims and witnesses." Furthermore, California stated that the access and notification requirements would compel it to choose between either maintaining federal funding or maintaining its own sovereignty over public safety, but not both. Finally, California argued that the access and notification requirements violated the U.S. Constitution's Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses (by usurping Congress' ability to set conditions for funding), as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (as arbitrary and capricious and exceeding the DOJ's statutory authority). Furthermore, California stated that the requirements would force it to violate the Fourth Amendment by holding detainees past their ordinary release time. In advance of the imminent Sept. 5, 2017 city deadline and Sept. 25, 2017 state deadline to apply for FY2017 Byrnes JAG funding, California sought declaratory and injunctive relief. California asked the Court to declare that California complied with relevant federal law, and that the notification and access requirements were invalid. California also asked the Court to enjoin the DOJ from conditioning funding on the notification and access requirements or otherwise withholding funding based on California's existing relevant laws. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on Aug. 15 and reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick on Aug. 28. Judge Orrick had, on Aug. 25, related this case to City and County of San Francisco v. Trump following the State of California's motion in that case. California filed an amended complaint on Oct. 13. It included an update, maintaining that the DOJ had aimed to send award notification letters by Sept. 30, but that neither California nor any of its local jurisdictions had received a letter. California requested a declaration from the Court that relevant state laws (the Values Act and the Shield Confidentiality Statutes, in addition to the TRUST Act and TRUTH Act) do not violate the DOJ conditions. California then moved for a preliminary injunction on Oct. 31, amended Nov 7. It argued, first, that it would likely succeed on the merits of its claim that the JAG's 8 U.S.C. § 1373 conditions are unlawful under the Spending Clause and arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and that the state's relevant statutes do not violate § 1373. California also alleged that the conditions would cause it permanent and irreparable harm. The DOJ opposed the preliminary injunction motion on Nov. 22. First, it argued that the funding conditions were constitutional because the INA links immigration enforcement and law enforcement. Additionally, the DOJ noted that it had not determined that the TRUTH Act or TRUST Act violated § 1373, and argued that the Values Act was unlikely to comply with § 1373. Finally, the DOJ alleged that California would not suffer harm because it had accepted the same funding condition in FY2016. On Dec. 4, the DOJ notified the Court that it had awarded a COPS grant to California, but that these funds were unavailable until the DOJ completed its inquiry into whether California complied with § 1373. Judge Orrick held a Dec. 13 hearing on California's motion for preliminary injunction, and denied it in a Mar. 5, 2018 order. 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015. He held that the DOJ's withholding of the grant would not cause irreparable injury because the amount of money was small in comparison to California's budget and payment appeared to be delayed rather than denied. On Jan. 16, 2018, the DOJ moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the challenged conditions were authorized by statute and did not violate the Spending Clause, separation of powers, or the APA. On March 5, 2018, Judge Orrick denied the DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, he held that California had standing because it had a well-founded fear of enforcement, injury-in-fact, and ripe claims. Next, he held that California had stated legally sufficient claims for relief with respect to the notice and access conditions, following the reasoning in City of Chicago v. Sessions and City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, which found the conditions to exceed the DOJ's statutory and constitutional authority. In response to Judge Orrick's Mar. 5 order denying California's motion for preliminary injunction, California moved for reconsideration. However, Judge Orrick denied this second motion on Apr. 24. 2018 WL 3399214. On Sept. 10, 2018, the court related this case to two additional cases: City and County of San Francisco v. Sessions III and State of California v. Sessions. On October 5, 2018, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for California. 349 F. Supp. 3d 924. The court held that the challenged conditions violated the separation of powers and were unconstitutional, and that the DOJ exceeded its Spending Power and therefore violated the Constitution. The court reasoned that Congress inappropriately delegated its spending power to the executive, and that even if validly delegated, the conditions were too ambiguous and unrelated to their goal for the DOJ to validly exercise the delegated power. The court also held that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious under the APA, because the DOJ did not give adequate reasons for imposing the conditions and it did not take into account important considerations. Finally, the court held that California and San Francisco's laws comply with the federal conditions anyway under the court's interpretation of § 1373 "limiting it to information relevant to citizenship or immigration status not including release date information" and not requiring "state and local governments to share contact information and release status information with federal immigration officials." The court thus issued a nationwide injunction. On November 20, 2018 the court amended the judgment, at the government's request, so that it would not preclude the DOJ from bringing preemption claims under other federal statutes. The amended judgment retained the prohibition on the government from relying on § 1373 as an independent federal ground for placing conditions on other programs. In December of 2018, the DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit finally heard oral argument on December 2, 2019. On July 13, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bases for the injunction but limited its scope, thus reducing it from a nationwide injunction to one applicable only within California's borders. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs did not offer reasons that relief needed to be extended to non-parties to the suit in order to shield the plaintiffs. The government appealed the case to the Supreme Court on November 17, 2020. Following the 2020 election of President Joseph Biden, however, the incoming Biden administration asked the Court to hold the petition in abeyance until the DOJ could re-formulate its policy. After the Supreme Court rescheduled the conference twice in February, on March 4, 2021, the DOJ and challengers agreed to dismiss the appeal to the Supreme Court.

Summary: On Aug. 14, 2017, California sued the DOJ over policies targeting "sanctuary" jurisdictions by imposing immigration enforcement conditions on federal funding for law enforcement. In October 2018 the district court granted summary judgment for California and issued a nationwide injunction. The DOJ appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On July 13, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the bases for the injunction but limited its scope, thus reducing it from a nationwide injunction to one applicable only within California's borders. The government then filed for review with the Supreme Court but dismissed their petition following the change in administration from President Trump to President Biden.


On September 12, 2000 five elderly and disabled individuals filed suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the Division of Medical Assistance, and the Executive Office of Health and Human Services in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They alleged that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They claimed that the defendants applied more stringent standards consisting of high recurring deductibles to the elderly in computing Medicaid benefits and that this forced elderly patients into nursing homes even though with appropriate care they could be treated within the community as they desired. Plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction on September 12, 2000 but these motions were avoided by a series of agreements that addressed the needs of the plaintiffs while the suit was pending. The parties negotiated adjustments to the system while conducting discovery and on December 31, 2001 Massachusetts submitted a State Plan Amendment to Center for Medicare and Medical Services for approval that would enable the state to meet the needs of the plaintiffs. On March 5, 2002 the district court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied plaintiffs motion for class certification without prejudice. After the amendment to the state plan was approved the defendants proceeded to fully adjust state Medicaid rules to make it easier for the elderly to receive benefits that enabled community based care, developed new application forms and information booklets, and trained staff as to how to provide additional aid to the elderly. Based on these developments that parties settled the lawsuit and entered the settlement with the court on February 5, 2003. The settlement provided for a one year period of reports by the defendants to the plaintiffs regarding progress in providing additional care to the elderly. The settlement ended in 2004, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 12, 2000 five elderly and disabled individuals filed suit against Massachusetts and two state agencies in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. They alleged that the defendants applied more stringent standards to the elderly in computing Medicaid benefits and that this forced elderly patients into nursing homes even though with appropriate care they could be treated within the community as they desired. The parties negotiated adjustments to the system and on December 31, 2001 Massachusetts submitted a State Plan Amendment for approval. After it was approved the defendants proceeded to adjust the state Medicaid system to address the plaintiffs' complaints. The parties entered the settlement with the court on February 5, 2003 providing for one year of reporting to monitor continued progress in addressing the needs of the elderly.


Plaintiffs, prisoners in various Florida state prisons, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) officials operating the prisons on October 28, 1997. In the allegations in the second amended complaint, their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case alleged that prisoners housed in "Close Management" (CM) status in these prisons suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs, seeking class action status, also sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. Their attorneys included counsel from the Florida Justice Institute. According to the plaintiffs, the thousands of Florida prisoners in CM Units are generally there for disciplinary reasons and live with marked restrictions upon, for example, time outside their cells, visitation and library access, religious and recreation opportunities, and communication with fellow prisoners and the outside world. The cells are small, sparse, and poorly ventilated. Although CM status allows for three level of restrictive conditions, the plaintiffs contend all levels result in physical and, particularly, mental harm. The harsh conditions exacerbate pre-existing mental illness in some prisoners and trigger mental illness in others, according to the plaintiffs, with resultant increases in prison violence and anti-social behavior by persons living in these conditions. On February 2, 1998, District Judge Federico A. Moreno denied the plaintiffs' request for class action status. However, after amended pleadings were filed, Judge Moreno certified the matter as a class action on July 26, 2000. At various times during this case, the defendants tendered settlement offers of judgment, without admitting liability. These offers included detailed plans for revised operation of the CM program in the Florida prison system. The revisions included consolidation of facilities, improved staff training and mental health services, and levels of access to reading materials, telephones, and media. New state administrative regulations and requests for legislative funding applicable to CM improvements were also part of the offer. On November 11, 2001, plaintiffs filed their notice of acceptance of one of these offers. The settlement required defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and to make periodic reports to plaintiffs' counsel and the court regarding implementation of the improvements to the CM program. District Judge Paul C. Huck approved the settlement on December 27, 2001, and sent a February 25, 2002, notice to class members that their time to object to the settlement had passed and that grievances, if any, about the CM program were to be sent to the FDOC. After nearly two years, on January 8, 2004, plaintiffs asked that the court restore the case to its trial docket, alleging that the state had failed to implement the promised reforms and that the CM program continued to operate to deny plaintiffs their Eighth Amendment protections. In support of their request, the plaintiffs submitted reports by experts they had retained who were familiar with the conditions imposed in the CM program. On March 10, 2004, District Judge Donald L. Graham issued an order transferring the case to the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The case continued there and resulted in a bench trial before District Judge Henry Lee Adams, Jr., between September 11 and 21, 2006. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 27 and 28, 2007, in the case, now styled Osterback v. Secretary, docket number 3:04-cv-00210-HLA-MCR. The case was then reassigned again to Judge James R. Klindt, docket number 3:04-cv-210-J-25JRK. However, shortly thereafter, Judge Adams, terminated the proposed injunctive relief in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's limitation on the time span of prison reform decrees and the clerk was directed to close the case on March 25, 2008.

Summary: A certified class of prisoners in various Florida state prisons, brought a § 1983 suit against Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) officials alleging that prisoners housed in "Close Management" (CM) status in these prisons suffered cruel and unusual punishment in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. On November 11, 2001, plaintiffs accepted a settlement offer which included detailed plans for revised operation of the CM program, but defendants admitted no liability. On March 10, 2004 the case was transferred to the District Court for the Middle District of Florida because defendants did not follow through on their compliance promises. The case was again reassigned and ultimately dismissed in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act.


On January 7, 2011, a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons at Victorville filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff, a hearing-disabled adult, sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons had violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for the plaintiff’s hearing disability, and also alleged violations of his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that, despite his numerous requests through the Bureau of Prisons’s administrative relief process, he had been denied access to several accommodations that would enable him to communicate effectively and live more safely within the custody of the Bureau of Prisons. These accommodations included: access to a qualified American Sign Language interpreter, since the plaintiff did not read lips and had difficulty reading and writing; a non-aural notification system, such as a vibrating pager, so that the plaintiff could be alerted as to announcements and emergency situations occurring in the prison; access to closed-captioning on television; functioning hearing aids and replacement batteries; and access to a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) or videophone. The plaintiff also alleged that he had been arbitrarily placed in restrictive housing (the SHU) for failing to communicate and for failure to respond to announcements, despite his repeated assertions that he could not hear them. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on May 31, 2011, responding that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies through the prison system as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Judge Christina A. Snyder granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion on July 11, 2011, finding that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies, but staying the constitutional claims until the conclusion of an administration determination of the merits on the Rehabilitation Act claims. 2011 WL 13261983. The plaintiff’s claims then went before Administrative Law Judge Ellen K. Thomas. The hearing, a Bureau of Prisons Equal Employment Opportunity hearing, was originally scheduled for April 12, 2012, but the Bureau of Prisons failed to provide the plaintiff with a qualified American Sign Language interpreter as he requested, so the hearing was rescheduled to July 31. While the administrative hearing procedures continued, the parties conducted three separate, unsuccessful, settlement negotiations. On September 4, 2013, the Bureau of Prisons Equal Employment Opportunity hearing concluded, finding that the Bureau of Prisons had violated the Rehabilitation Act as alleged by the plaintiff. The Bureau of Prisons's Equal Employment Opportunity Officer issued a Letter of Findings, which found that the Rehabilitation Act required the Bureau of Prisons to acquiesce to the plaintiff's requests and that the Bureau had violated the Rehabilitation Act by failing to do so. The final Administrative Decision ordered the Bureau of Prisons to provide the plaintiff with the requested relief. However, the Bureau of Prisons failed to comply with all the requested relief. Notably, it failed to provide him with a qualified ASL interpreter for the GED course he attempted to take, and it failed to replace his hearing aid when it stopped working. The plaintiff therefore requested leave to file an amended complaint. Judge Snyder granted leave to file, and on December 20, 2013, the plaintiff filed a First Amended and Supplemented Complaint, containing and incorporating the results of the BOP EEO proceeding and the subsequent events. The plaintiff included, as part of this complaint, the defendants' failure to comply with the Administrative Decision, and expressed a concern in the complaint that whatever relief the defendants might provide would be short-lived and irregular. The defendants filed a motion to change venue on February 18, 2014, arguing that venue in the District of Arizona was proper because the plaintiff, who had originally been incarcerated in Victorville, California, he had been transferred to federal prison in Tucson, Arizona in 2011. The administrative hearing before Judge Thomas had been held in Tucson, and the defendants argued that the relief sought would eventually take place in Arizona. However, on March 26, 2014, Judge Snyder denied defendants’ motion to change venue to Arizona, noting that there was no guarantee that the plaintiff would stay in Tucson and that the events giving rise to the original complaint had taken place in California. 2014 WL 1266241. Defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff’s request for relief was moot, as the defendants had fulfilled his requests regarding his current situation in Tucson, and his request for relief from Victorville was moot since he had left that institution. Judge Snyder denied this motion as well. 2014 WL 2472255. The parties continued to hold regular settlement conferences, which continued to be unsuccessful. The parties began conducting pretrial proceedings simultaneously with settlement conferences. Finally, on September 12, 2016, the parties, under the supervision of Magistrate Judge Jay C. Gandhi, met for a seventh settlement conference, which was ultimately successful. Under terms which were not disclosed in a reported filing or order, the parties agreed to accept Magistrate Gandhi’s “mediator’s proposal” and to provide the details to Judge Snyder’s Court within thirty days of the acceptance. On March 8, 2017, Judge Snyder dismissed the case pursuant to the settlement. There has been no further docket activity, and case is presumably now closed.

Summary: In 2011, a hearing-disabled inmate of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons filed a Rehabilitation Act complaint against the Bureau in the U.S. District Court of Central California. The plaintiff alleged that the Bureau of Prisons had denied him necessary accommodations under the Act and had also infringed upon his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement under the guidance of a mediator magistrate judge, but the terms of the settlement are unknown. The district court closed the case in 2017.


On June 12, 2014, six individuals formerly held in the Floyd County Jail filed a class-action complaint in the Southern District of Indiana, against Floyd County, Indiana, the Sheriff in his official and unofficial capacities, corrections officers of Floyd County Jail, and other sheriff department workers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought actual and punitive damages for themselves and the other members of their class, declaratory judgment stating all policies enforcing humiliating and torturous practices were unconstitutional, and an injunction prohibiting the defendants from practicing or enforcing those policies. The plaintiffs claimed their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights were violated. Specifically, they claimed that during detention in Floyd County Jail, through use of excessive force, they were stripped of their clothing and kept in a state of undress in a padded cell in violation of their constitutional rights. In the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed they were stripped of their clothing without probable cause or provocation. They claimed this action was done in front of members of the opposite sex, in view of jail employees, and on surveillance tapes containing images of the plaintiffs' naked bodies. The plaintiffs were kept in a padded room without access to a phone or bathroom and left in the state of undress until given a smock. The plaintiffs additionally claimed the defendants used excessive and unnecessary force through pepper spray or taser absent provocation or probable cause. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were using the same policies and practices implemented against them on other detained individuals. The plaintiffs alleged these abuses were a result of policies and practices implemented by the jail. The plaintiffs later amended their complaint on November 12, 2014, to include three more representatives. One of the new plaintiffs moved to sever their claim, which Chief Judge Richard Young granted on February 17, 2016. On June 15, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which Judge Young granted on February 16, 2016. The final approved designated class was: “All inmates confined from June 12, 2012, to present in the Floyd County Jail who were not on a suicide watch, but were housed in a padded cell where they were deprived of clothing, bedding, and hygiene products.” The court also approved a subclass of “[t]hose class members who were subjected to weapons deployment while confined and secured in the padded cells.” 313 F.R.D. 72. On March 1, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the class certification arguing that the main class did not meet the requirements for commonality and predominance. Additionally, the defendants argued the subclass did not contain enough members. On July 25, 2016, Chief Judge Young granted the defendants' motion in part and denied in part. He found that the court did not err with respect to the main class but the subclass did not include enough members. 2016 WL 4088748. The plaintiffs appealed the redetermination of the subclass on July 29, 2016, arguing there would be enough members. The motion was denied on October 27, 2016, because Chief Judge Young found the subclass definition involved an officer’s choice to use force and therefore could not be used for class certification. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit the plaintiffs' main class certification and moved for a stay pending their appeal. On August 24, 2016 the appeal to the Seventh Circuit was denied. The motion for stay was denied two days later. On February 6, 2017, the parties moved jointly to approve settlement. Magistrate Judge Baker approved the settlement on August 2, 2017. The settlement detailed the creation of a settlement fund for $1,230,000. Attorney fees amounted to 37% of the settlement fund, and each plaintiff was paid an additional $15,000 for their time as class representative in the litigation. The rest of the settlement fund was to be distributed to the class. Each member who was subjected to the deployment of taser or pepper spray with a valid claim were to receive an additional $3,000. Any remaining funds were to be redistributed evenly among class members with each member not getting more than $25,000. Any remaining funds were to be returned to the defendants. The settlement fund was agreed to be explicitly for damages resulting from alleged personal injuries and not as a form of punitive damages. The settlement also detailed the policy advising the treatment of individuals in this manner was to be suspended. Additionally, Field Training Officers were to be independently certified, and new employees were to go through orientation and receive training on how to handle new inmates. Finally, the facility supervisor, security supervisor, and classification officer needed to attend Inmate Behavior Management and Training conducted by the National Institute of Corrections. The court approved the parties’ Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement on August 2, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, six former inmates of Floyd County Jail filed a class action complaint in the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs claimed the policies of the jail for stripping inmates of their clothes and use of force as enforced against them violated their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2017, the parties reached a settlement included a settlement fund of $1,230,000 and a change in policy as well as a update in training of corrections officers.


On January 19, 2005, an African-American employee filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against his employer, alleging discriminatory employment practices under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel alleged that the employer created a hostile work environment through the use of many racial slurs and jokes/comments. The plaintiff amended his complaint to include more detail in previous allegations and to include allegations of a hostile work environment and retaliation for refusal to commit illegal acts, as well as to add a request for more damages. On May 2, 2006, after consolidating this case with a similar case brought by the EEOC against the same defendant, the Court entered a consent decree that required, among other things, that the defendant pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $57,500, refrain from discriminating for the duration of the decree, give notice to employees of anti-discrimination employment law, and provide a positive reference for plaintiff's future employment.

Summary: On January 19, 2005, an African-American employee filed suit against his employer for discriminatory employment practices under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The parties settled the suit outside of court and entered a consent decree signed by the court on May 24, 2006. The decree required defendant to pay plaintiff damages in the amount of $57,500, refrain from discriminating for the duration of the decree, give notice to employees of anti-discrimination employment law, and expunge plaintiff's employment record and provide a positive reference for plaintiff's future employment.


On October 11, 2011, three protestors associated with Occupy Dallas, a large continuous political protest, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Dallas under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the City of Dallas' requirement that in order to be issued a event permit plaintiffs obtain general liability insurance in the amount of $1,000,000 deprived plaintiffs of their right to expression. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the city acted intentionally to chill plaintiffs' speech, discredit them by damaging their reputation, and punishing them for exercising their free-speech rights. Plaintiffs sought damages for lost earnings and damage to reputation. On October 12, 2011, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin the City of Dallas from unreasonably interfering with their rights to free expression in public forums. The Court (Judge Jane J. Boyle) ordered a hearing on the motion. On October 14, 2011, the parties agreed to stipulations. The stipulation stated, inter alia, that the "Special Events" of the Dallas City Code did not apply to the grounds of the Dallas Convention Center. Accordingly, no permit from the city was necessary for the plaintiffs to continue their protesting activities. On October 18, 2011, the parties filed an agreed motion to dismiss the case without prejudice. The District Court (Judge Jane J. Boyle) entered the order on the same day.

Summary: On October 11, 2011, three protestors associated with Occupy Dallas filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Dallas under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First Amendment rights. On October 18, 2011, the case was voluntarily dismissed after stipulations were agreed to.


On April 19, 2016, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization concerned with technology-related civil liberty issues, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the United States Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §552. The case was assigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. It was public knowledge that the government had attempted to compel third parties to assist in surveillance activities, such as when the FBI publicly demanded court orders requiring Apple to create a backdoor to the iPhone. The Electronic Frontier Foundation sought to learn about the government’s efforts to obtain non-public court orders. The Foundation had filed a Freedom of Information Act request on March 7, 2016, seeking documents pertaining to requests for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to compel third parties to provide access to their customers’ encrypted communications or to provide other technical assistance in gaining access to private communications. When the Justice Department withheld the requested documents, the Foundation filed this lawsuit for an injunction requiring the Department to produce all such documents created between 1978 and June 1, 2015. In the fall of 2016, both parties moved for summary judgment. While these motions were pending, the Justice Department worked to process the original Freedom of Information Act request. A year later, after the parties acknowledged that the scope of their dispute would not be known until the document production process was complete, the court denied both summary judgment motions as moot on September 29, 2017. On September 25, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 22, 2018, the Justice Department released a total of 73 documents, out of 79 identified as responsive to the Foundation’s request. The Department claimed that the remaining six documents, opinions written by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, were classified and exempt from disclosure. Both parties filed new motions for partial summary judgment in the fall of 2018. The Foundation argued that the Justice Department could not legally withhold the remaining documents: although the six documents were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, they were also subject to Section 402 of the USA FREEDOM Act, which required the declassification of certain opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. On March 26, 2019, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the Justice Department. 376 F.Supp.3d 1023. Although Section 402 might require the government to declassify the opinions, that statute created no private right of action to enforce the requirement. The court found that it would be inappropriate to use the Freedom of Information Act to enforce Section 402, and therefore declined to even address whether Section 402 actually required the government to declassify the opinions. It found that the Justice Department had provided sufficiently detailed factual information to support its exemption claims, and that the Foundation had failed to overcome the presumption of good faith to which the Department was entitled. On April 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint status report, notifying the court that aside from attorneys’ fees, no dispute remained to be resolved. The parties submitted a proposed judgment in favor of the Justice Department as to its responses to the Foundations’s requests. They also requested that the court order the parties to provide a status report, due by May 9, 2019, regarding their efforts to resolve the dispute over attorneys’ fees and costs. Upon receipt of the status report on May 10, 2019, the court extended the deadline for notifying the court of the status of the parties’ efforts to finalize the agreement concerning attorneys’ fees and costs to June 10, 2019. On June 10, 2019, the parties submitted a joint status report indicating that the parties finalized their agreement concerning attorneys’ fees and costs and have signed a settlement agreement. The parties jointly agreed to dismiss the case on July 3, 2019.

Summary: In 2016, a civil liberties non-profit filed this freedom of information act (FOIA) complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief for for the release of any documents relating to DOJ applications to the FISC requesting third parties to provide access to encrypted communications or to provide other types of technical assistance to access private communications. On September 25, 2017, January 31, 2018, and August 22, 2018, the DOJ released a total of seventy-three out of seventy-nine documents it had identified as being responsive to EFF’s FOIA request. The DOJ contended that the remaining six documents were exempted from disclosure under FOIA exemptions. On March 26, 2019, Judge Gilliam granted the DOJ’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the EFF’s cross motion. On April 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint status report, notifying the court that, outside of attorney’s fees, no dispute remained to be resolved.


On January 7, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the State of New Jersey Civil Service Commission. The U.S. claimed that the promotional practices established by the New Jersey Civil Service Commission had an illegal disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic candidates for promotion to the rank of Police Sergeant. The U.S. Department of Justice sought a court order barring written examinations as a pass/fail screening method for promotion to Police Sergeant, and certification of candidates for promotion to Police Sergeant from eligibility lists in descending-rank order. The U.S. also asked for retrospective remedies including back pay with interest and priority promotion with retroactive seniority to candidates affected by the allegedly discriminatory practices. The case focused on New Jersey's written multiple-choice examination, which was used as a pass/fail screening mechanism for eligibility for promotion; this testing protocol resulted in a statistically significant gap in the percentage of African-American and Hispanic candidates placed on an eligibility list. The practice of certifying candidates for promotion from the eligibility list in descending-rank order based on exam scores and seniority also resulted in a statistically significant percentage of African-American and Hispanic candidates on the list not being certified for promotion. On November 22, 2011, the parties agreed to a consent decree that enjoined the New Jersey Civil Service Commission from using the challenged promotion practices as well as any practices that violate Title VII, established settlement funds for awarding back pay, policies for enacting priority promotions, and dates and processes to notify individuals who may be eligible for relief. The consent decree was set to expire on the latest of the following dates: three years from the date of entry, upon fulfillment of the defendants' obligations regarding individual relief, or upon the state's administration of the second police sergeant exam. Each party agreed to pay its own attorneys' fees. On June 12, 2012, the District Court (Judge Katharine S. Hayden) issued an opinion approving the consent decree for final entry. 2012 WL 3265905. After notifying individuals eligible for relief under the consent decree, proceedings taking objections to the consent decree, and fairness hearings determining individual relief, the parties submitted a relief awards list and all objections to the list. On May 10, 2013, various parties who objected to the approval of the final relief awards list appealed the decision of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judges Sloviter, Fuentes, and Rother), which upheld the decision of the District Court on June 13, 2013. 522 Fed.Appx. 167. The same parties petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review, but cert was denied. Hamdeh v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 529 (2013). On April 10, 2014, the court (Judge Katharine S. Hayden) issued an opinion approving the final relief award list. 2014 WL 1404642. Subsequently, the DOJ moved to modify paragraph 67 of the consent decree arguing that in certain jurisdictions, alternating on a one-to-one basis between the two lists might afford some priority promotion candidates greater than make-whole relief because they would receive a promotion before individuals on an SRL who have earlier actual appointment dates. However, on September 30, 2015, the court (Judge Hayden) denied the motion. By its terms, the consent decree expired in September 2016 after Commission administered two police sergeant examinations. On September 12, 2016, the U.S. filed a motion for extension of the consent decree. Based on unsatisfactory results from the second administration of the exam, the U.S. sought to extend provisions of the consent decree that authorize it to oversee the composition and administration of a third examination. On June 30, 2017, Judge Hayden denied the U.S.'s motion for extension of the consent decree. The U.S. argued that, based on the unexpected results of the second examination, it hadn't actually had a chance to review New Jersey's police sergeant selection procedure as required by the consent decree, and that therefore a third examination was required. Based on its terms, extending the consent decree requires a showing of good cause. However, Judge Hayden applied a different standard: whether circumstances had sufficiently changed such that the basic purpose of the original consent decree had been thwarted. The Court found that the parties had fulfilled their defined obligations, and that the consent decree would be substantially modified were it revived and the DOJ given an additional measure of authority over the administration of a third examination. Therefore, the consent decree has expired.

Summary: In 2010 the United States sued the New Jersey Civil Service Commission for violating Title VII. Police departments used an exam as a pass/fail screening device to determine who could be eligible for promotion to Police Sergeant and then certified candidates for promotion in descending order, resulting in a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic Candidates. The parties agreed to a decree that forbade the current process, mandated back pay and priority promotion for those effected, and established guidelines for a new hiring process. The consent decree expired in September 2016.


On September 30, 2002, the Miami District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Airguide Corporation and Pioneer Metals. Airguide manufactured air conditioning units, and Pioneer Metals was Airguide's parent company. The EEOC, who brought suit on behalf of eight current and former male and female employees and other similarly situated individuals who were employed by Airguide, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, alleging that Defendants engaged in pervasive sexual harassment and retaliation. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that female Airguide employees were sexually harassed by their supervisor, which created a hostile work environment. The EEOC further alleged that Airguide retaliated against male and female employees by discipline, demotion, and termination for complaining to management about the discriminatory practices, participating in the EEOC's investigation, or filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. On February 6, 2003, eight current and former employees who were among those named in the EEOC complaint intervened in the lawsuit. On July 17, 2003, this case was consolidated with an action made by a male Airguide employee who was terminated in retaliation for complaining of discriminatory practices and participating in the EEOC investigation. An early referral to ADR did not bear fruit, but eventually the parties settled, and a consent decree was entered in June of 2004. The defendants agreed to pay a total of $1 million, of which $650,000 went directly to the complainants and $350,000 went for attorney's fees. As set forth in the Consent Decree, Airguide and Pioneer Metals were enjoined from engaging in conduct that violates Title VII and retaliating against any employees who participated in the lawsuit. Pioneer Metals was further required to establish a written policy prohibiting sexual harassment and retaliation, to disseminate that policy among all its employees, and to implement an anti-discrimination training program. The decree was entered in 2004 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: In September 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida under Title VII against Airguide Corporation and Pioneer Metals. The complaint alleged that Defendants had engaged in pervase sexual harassment and had retaliated against employees who had complained of the discriminatory practices, participated in the EEOC's investigation, or filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In June 2004, the court entered the Consent Decree, which awarded Plaintiffs $1,000,000 and prohibited Defendants from violating Title VII.


On September 27, 2006, parents, as next friends of their minor daughters, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. against Ponca City Independent School District No. 71, also known as Ponca City Public Schools. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Ponca City Public Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, by denying plaintiffs' daughters' equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Ponca City Public Schools had discriminated against plaintiffs' daughters in the funding of athletics; access to equipment and supplies; the scheduling of games and practice times; the assignment and compensation of coaches; and the provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition and training facilities and services. The parties held settlement conferences before the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner) on January 12, 2007 and March 27, 2007. On April 9, 2007, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that settled all claims, except that they agreed to submit the issue of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to the court for determination on the basis of briefs submitted. On September 11, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner) reported and recommended that plaintiffs' motion for awarding of attorneys' fees and costs be granted in part and denied in part, and awarded plaintiffs $39965.33, which was to be paid by defendants. On September 26, 2007, the Court (Federal District Judge Claire V. Eagan) ordered that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation be accepted. On September 28, 2007, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice to the Court. While the settlement agreement is not available, media reports state that the defendant agreed to improve the softball field and upgrade the plaintiffs' uniforms, equipment, and locker-room facilities. The case was closed on September 28, 2007.

Summary: In 2006, plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Ponca City Public Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying plaintiffs' daughters' equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The parties reached a settlement agreement on April 9, 2007, and plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs on September 26, 2007. While the settlement agreement is not available, media reports state that the defendant agreed to improve the softball field and upgrade the plaintiffs' uniforms, equipment, and locker-room facilities.


On August 12, 2003, four pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of Illinois on behalf of those suffering from mental illness while confined. The plaintiffs sued Cook County, the president of the Cook County Board, the Cook County sheriff, and the Director of the Cook County Department of Health Services under 42 U.S.C. §12101, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declarative relief from the defendants' policy and practice of disallowing inmates with mental illness from participating in prerelease programs, claiming that this was in violation of the ADA. The plaintiffs also challenged the defendants' policy of discharging such individuals without providing them medication and referrals to manage their mental illness as violative of the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA. On September 9, 2003, the defendants moved to dismiss both counts claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that three of the defendants did not meet the definition of public entity under the ADA and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims. On March 2, 2004, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs fell under a decree that authorized pre-release programs to alleviate overcrowding in the county jails. The judge held that because the plaintiffs claims were inextricably intertwined to the decree, the original court monitoring that decree was the proper forum to hear a proposed modification. Thus, the complaint was dismissed without prejudice, allowing plaintiffs to refile their claims before the appropriate presiding judges. The plaintiffs filed a motion to alter and amend the judgment on March 16, 2004 which was initially denied. On May 5, 2004, the plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Seventh Circuit, but on October 26, 2004, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted the plaintiffs' motion for relief and the case was reopened to rule on the previously filed motion to dismiss (the reason for this change is unclear). On February 1, 2005, Judge Elaine Bucklo granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the case. The court applied an exhaustion requirement to the ADA claim that inmates were prevented from participating in prerelease programs. 2005 WL 283419. The court also found plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that they lacked standing to bring the claim (all four had been released since the complaint was filed), but did not address the issue of whether defendants were not proper under the ADA.

Summary: On August 12, 2003, four pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail brought this class action suit in the Northern District Court of Illinois on behalf of those suffering from mental illness while confined. The plaintiffs sued defendants Cook County and county officials under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought injunctive and declarative relief from the defendants' policy and practice of disallowing inmates with mental illness from participating in prerelease programs, claiming that this was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs also challenged the defendants' policy of discharging such individuals without providing them medication and referrals to manage their mental illness as violative of the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment and the ADA. The court granted the defendants motion to dismiss on February 1, 2005. It applied an exhaustion requirement to the ADA claim that inmates were prevented from participating in pre-release programs. The court also found plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies and that they lacked standing to bring the claim, but did not address the issue of whether defendants were not proper under the ADA.