On Feb. 20, 2018, the Democracy Forward Foundation filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Represented by its own counsel, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. According to the complaint, the plaintiff is a nonprofit organization that "works to promote transparency and accountability in government, in part, by educating the public on government actions and policies." The plaintiff stated that the Trump administration sought to expand the detention of undocumented immigrants with Executive Order 13767 -- a practice which would increase reliance on private detention facilities. However, these facilities had long faced criticism for health and safety hazards resulting in deaths, sexual abuse, and other injuries. Further, the private detention industry significantly supported Trump's campaign and business enterprises, raising questions as to the extent of these contributions in the administration's use of private detention. The plaintiff thus sought information on DHS's relationship with private detention corporations. The plaintiff stated that it had submitted a FOIA request to DHS on May 18, 2017, seeking the following records created since Trump's inauguration on Jan. 20, 2017: 1. Records relating to the procurement of services for the planning, construction, operation, or maintenance of private detention or immigration-detention centers and/or facilities, or by private detention center and/or facility companies; 2. New contracts or new amendments to contracts related to services rendered for private detention centers and/or facilities, or by private detention center and/or facility companies; and 3. Records containing certain relevant keywords, that were sent or received by specific DHS employees. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from DHS, and that the plaintiff had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Feb. 20, this case was assigned to Judge Rudolph Contreras. Per a joint status report filed on May 15, 2018, the government completed the requested searches and was to process 500 pages per month. Beginning in June, the government was to produce any responsive records on a monthly basis. Subsequent status reports indicated the production was ongoing. The joint status report dated March 21, 2019 indicated that the defendants had completed their response to the plaintiff’s request, but that the plaintiffs had asked the defendant for “additional information regarding the searches that each agency component performed, as well as a Vaughn index for Defendant’s withholdings under FOIA Exemption 5, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)." According to a status report dated May 17, 2019, the defendant provided the plaintiff with descriptions of its searches performed by DHS Headquarters, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection on May 3. ICE also completed a supplemental search, as reported on July 15. A year of status reports followed, during which ICE reported that it had reviewed non-exempt responsive records on a monthly basis, at a rate of 500 pages per month, with some pages redacted as per FOIA exemptions. The case remains ongoing with the next status report due June 16, 2020.

Summary: On Feb. 20, 2018, the Democracy Forward Foundation sued DHS under FOIA, seeking records relating to DHS's relationship with private immigration-detention corporations. Per a joint status report filed on May 15, 2018, the government completed the requested searches and is to process 500 pages per month. The next status report is due on June 16, 2020.


Plaintiff, a man with cerebral palsy, filed this class-action lawsuit against the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (DPW) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on September 27, 2013. As a person with a physical disability, plaintiff was eligible for in-home services under the State's Act 150 Program, a program aimed at allowing individuals with disabilities to live as independently as possible in their communities. However, plaintiff alleged that because the Program had at least a two-year-long waiting list, he was unable to receive services and was therefore forced to reside in a nursing home. Plaintiff claimed that defendants' failure to provide him and other similarly-situated persons with in-home care services resulted in unnecessary institutionalization in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by the Disability Rights Network of PA and the Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, plaintiff sought class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 3, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction which, if granted, would require defendants to provide him with appropriate community-based attendant care services and allow him to leave the nursing home where he had resided for over two years. On October 9, an Amended Complaint was filed to include a second named plaintiff. The second plaintiff, Ms. Smith, a woman with multiple sclerosis, was also on the waiting list for Act 150 services and, while she was able to remain in her own home under the care of her teenage daughter, anticipated being forced to move into a nursing home once her daughter left for college unless she received in-home care. On October 24, the original plaintiff removed himself as a party and the case continued with one named plaintiff, Ms. Smith. On October 30, plaintiff moved to certify a class defined as "all Pennsylvanians who are or will be placed on the waiting list for the Act 150 Program." The parties began discovery in November of 2013. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment on April 11 and May 9, 2014, respectively. DPW argued that any change in the way it provided its services would constitute a fundamental alteration its state programs and would impermissibly interfere with its discretion to administer Medicaid services. Before any motions were decided, on June 12, the U.S. Department of Justice submitted a statement of interest. The DOJ asserted that because the ADA requires states to avoid unnecessary institutionalization, including where a reasonable accommodation is available to avoid said institutionalization, if the court found that a plausible accommodation was available that would allow plaintiffs to avoid living in a segregated setting, DPW would have the burden of showing that providing that accommodation would constitute a fundamental alteration of its programming. The DOJ also pointed out that several other courts had found that changing the location of services provided from an institutional setting to a community setting was not in itself a fundamental alteration. After several months of conferring, the parties submitted a voluntary stipulation of dismissal on June 11, 2015. While it is probable that the parties reached a private settlement agreement, no information on any agreement is available. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals with physical disabilities who required attendant care services, brought this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on September 27, 2013. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the Department of Public Welfare of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, had violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to provide care services in the most integrated setting possible. Defendant had placed plaintiffs on a two-year waiting list for the in-home attendant care services they needed, which meant they were forced to live in nursing homes against their wishes while they waited. After discovery, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest. The parties apparently negotiated for several months, and voluntarily dismissed the case in June of 2015.


On February 16, 2010, Project Vote, a nonprofit organization working to mobilize underrepresented voters, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Eastern Virginia against the state of Virginia. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state's refusal to turn over certain voting records violated the rights granted to them under the National Voter Registration Act. At the district level, arguments focused on whether Project Vote had appropriate standing and whether voter registration applications were accessible under the NVRA's public disclosure provision. The District Court (Judge Rebecca Smith) denied the state's motion to dismiss, finding in favor of the plaintiffs on each of those points (752 F.Supp.2d 697). Using the same logic, the District Court later granted a motion for summary judgment brought by the plaintiffs (813 F.Supp.2d 738), but also granted a stay pending appeal, holding that the defendant's and the public's injury without a stay outweighed the plaintiff's interest in immediate access to the records (275 F.R.D. 473). The Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling, holding that voter registration applications were covered by the NVRA's general disclosure mandate (682 F.3d 331). On remand, the District Court determined appropriate attorney's fees (887 F.Supp.2d 704) and held that the injunction became effective on the day that the case was decided (889 F.Supp.2d 778).

Summary: On February 16, 2010, Project Vote, a nonprofit organization working to mobilize underrepresented voters, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Eastern Virginia against the state of Virginia. The Fourth Circuit upheld the District Court's ruling, holding that voter registration applications were covered by the NVRA's general disclosure mandate.


On June 27, 2014, a student with mental disabilities and his mother, joined by the Parent/Professional Advocacy League, filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by the Center for Public Representation, the Bazelon Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) against the City of Springfield, its mayor, the Springfield Public Schools, and its Superintendent. The complaint alleged that the defendants operated a discriminatory public school system that consigned hundreds of children with mental health disabilities to the Public Day School. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief for ongoing violations of the ADA, including an order that the defendants provide the student plaintiff and the plaintiff class with school-based behavior services in neighborhood schools to afford them an equal educational opportunity and enable them to be educated in neighborhood schools with their peers without a disability. On July 28, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The defendants asserted that the complaint did not meet Federal pleading standards and elements of the plaintiff’s ADA claim could not be proved. On August 14, 2014, the United States filed an amicus brief on the proceedings in support of the plaintiff. And on February 11, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, modifying their pleading to add the Disability Law Center as a plaintiff. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni held a hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss on May 13, 2015. He denied the motion on November 19, 2015, ruling that, because plaintiffs pled sufficient facts to make a showing as to each element of their ADA claim, dismissal for failure to state a claim was inappropriate. 146 F.Supp.3d 414. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class consisting of all students with a mental health disability who were or had been enrolled in Springfield Public Day School who were not being educated in a Springfield neighborhood school. Two months later, Judge Mastroianni denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 318 F.R.D. 210. The denial turned on the fact that although the named plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies under ADA and IDEA prior to litigation (the ADA ruling was appealed), the proposed members of the class had not. The Court held: "Exhaustion is not only required before a party can litigate issues arising under the IDEA; a litigating party must also exhaust before bringing suit “pursuant to a different statute so long as the party is seeking relief that is available under subchapter II of IDEA.” On December 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an appeal on the District Court’s denial of class certification to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On April 8, 2017, the City of Springfield moved for judgment on the pleadings. It argued that the organization plaintiffs—the Disability Law Center, the Massachusetts advocacy system, and the Parent/Professional Advocacy League—did not have standing to sue. After a few months, the court stayed discovery until the resolution of the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and the First Circuit's resolution of the plaintiff's class certification appeal. But on November 30, 2017, the parties agreed to dismiss the claims solely relating to S.S. as an individual, one of the named plaintiffs. On March 8, 2018 the parties requested that the case be transferred to a court sponsored mediator for resolution. The court granted this motion and assigned the case to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman. On July 19, 2018, the magistrate judge found in favor of the defendants. Although the plaintiffs had associational standing, they had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies requires by the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. 332 F.Supp.3d 367. On August 9, 2018 the plaintiffs appealed this judgment to the First Circuit, which held oral arguments in June 2019. This appeal was consolidated with the appeals challenging the granting of judgment on the pleadings and the denial of class certification. On August 8, 2019, the First Circuit (Toruella, Lynch, and Kayatta) affirmed the district court's judgment but on partially different grounds. Specifically, the First Circuit upheld the district court's decision to deny class certification, and it found (contrary to the district court) that the organizational plaintiffs lacked standing. 934 F.3d 13. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 27, 2014, a student with mental disabilities and his mother, joined by the Parent/Professional Advocacy League, filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the ADA. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and dismissed the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the First Circuit, which affirmed the district court's class certification ruling and found that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The case is now closed.


Prisoners detained at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women filed this class-action lawsuit against Armor Correctional Health Services and the Virginia Department of Corrections on July 24, 2012. Brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §2201, the suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia and assigned to Judge Norman Moon. The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Justice Center, the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the prison provided insufficient medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Armor, a for-profit corporation, provided health care at the prison. The Department of Corrections contracted with Armor to provide this service, but the Department remained responsible for administration and oversight. The plaintiffs claimed that the Department and Armor were deliberately indifferent to prisoners’ medical needs, and that Armor’s profit motives led to deviations from accepted standards of care. In order to minimize costs, Armor employed licensed practical nurses rather than physicians or registered nurses; failed to devote time and attention to examining and diagnosing potentially serious medical problems; refused to refer prisoners for specialized care; failed to carry out treatments prescribed by specialists; and refused to provide prisoners with medication for severe chronic pain. The plaintiffs also claimed that the prison deviated from accepted standards of care on the basis of purported security concerns, devoid of any legitimate penological justification. They claimed that as a result, they and others similarly situated experienced physical pain, mental anguish, and the risk of premature death. The Department moved to be dismissed as a defendant, arguing that Armor, not the Department, provided medical services, and that the Department could not be held liable on a theory of <i>respondeat superior</i>. On December 11, 2012, the court denied the Department’s motion. 2012 WL 6151967. 10 months later, on October 4, 2013, the court granted Armor’s motion to dismiss because Armor’s contract with the Department had expired. Corizon Health, which had assumed the contract to provide medical services at the prison, was subsequently named as a defendant. From 2013 to 2015, the parties engaged in extensive and contentious discovery in preparation for trial scheduled in December 2015. The court issued multiple discovery-related opinions, which are posted in the “Documents” section of this case. On November 20, 2014, the court granted class certification, certifying a class of all women who then resided or would in the future reside at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women and who had sought, were then seeking, or would in the future seek medical care for serious medical need. 2014 WL 6609087. Five days later, on November 25, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, stating that prison officials had a non-delegable constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment, that the plaintiffs’ specific health conditions constituted serious medical needs, and that deliberate indifference to those needs was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. 2014 WL 6680691. The same day, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement in principle. The parties informed the court on April 21, 2015 that though a formal written settlement was still in progress, they had agreed that constitutionally appropriate care was required. A final settle agreement was submitted to the court on September 15, 2015; the court gave preliminary approval the following day. Notice of the proposed settlement was distributed to each prisoner at the prison. The court conducted a fairness hearing on November 9, 2015. On February 5, 2016, the court approved the settlement. 2016 WL 452164. The settlement agreement provided for comprehensive changes to the medical care system at the prison, and a monitor to oversee implementation. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement, which would last at least three years. After three years, the agreement would terminate when the monitor found that the Department had provided constitutionally adequate medical care on a consistent basis for at least one year. The agreement also required the state to pay $1.5 million for plaintiff attorneys’ fees. On September 5, 2017, the plaintiffs sought for the court to hold the defendants in contempt, for repeatedly falling short of their obligations regarding the quantity and quality of medical care provided in the prison. On June 12, 2018, the court ordered the defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. The court entered an injunction against the defendants on January 2, 2019, explaining that they were in violation of the settlement agreement’s terms requiring them to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to the plaintiffs. The injunction was meant to remedy the violation of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights as provided for by the parties in the agreement, and this injunction was the least intrusive means necessary to do so. The injunction required the defendants, within 45 days, to give the prison’s nurses training necessary to give adequate medical care. The court also withdrew its June 12 show-cause order regarding contempt. On January 30, 2019, the defendants moved to alter the injunction. They claimed, among other things, that only pharmacists and physicians (not nurses) could dispense medication, and that the injunction had essentially rewritten the settlement agreement. The court granted the defendants’ motion, in part, on May 22, 2019. 391 F.Supp.3d 610. The defendants appealed this partial modification (Fourth Circuit docket number 19-1687), and the plaintiffs cross-appealed (Fourth Circuit docket number 19-1719). As of July 2020, the appeals are pending. Prior to the district court’s ruling, on April 30, 2019, an individual plaintiff filed an emergency motion to enforce the injunction: the prison’s “continued and demonstrated failures to appropriate[ly] manage [her] medication” were a threat to her life. While this motion was pending, she died, 3 months before her scheduled release. On September 17, 2019, the court directed the parties to schedule a status conference “to address any current actions requested from the Court, and any then-pending motions before the Court,” except for the plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees. After participating in the status conference, the plaintiffs filed a status report on October 23, 2019. The report, among other things, asked the court to order that “Counsel for the Parties along with [Fluvanna] medical personnel shall meet regularly to attempt to resolve any issues concerning patient care at [Fluvanna],” and “Defendants shall not unreasonably withhold information regarding patient issues raised by Plaintiffs.” At the status hearing on October 30, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiffs to name remaining systemic issues of noncompliance at the prison that must be remedied in order to bring the prison into compliance with the settlement agreement in the next status report. On November 5, 2019, the court issued an oral order that plaintiffs address the “need for a functional Continuing Quality Improvement (CQI) program directed by a qualified expert at the [prison], as well as Plaintiffs’ ongoing need for further relief requested in part in their October 23, 2019 Status Report.” The plaintiffs addressed both issues in the status report filed on January 2, 2020. Along with the status report, the plaintiffs filed a motion for further relief, outlining the defendants’ violations of the settlement and injunction and requesting the court to order various steps to “ameliorate barriers to effective, accurate monitoring and cooperative problem-solving between the parties.” The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement on March 5, 2020. Although the settlement agreement entitled the plaintiffs to quarterly reports from the prison regarding its compliance with the terms of the agreement, and although the plaintiffs had made repeated requests for such reports, the prison failed to provide adequate information. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys’ fees and costs for filing this motion. On March 16, 2020, the court granted in part the plaintiffs’ requests made in status reports as well as their motion for further relief. Among other things, the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for regular status conferences and denied their requests for a direct line of communication to the prison's medical director and for regular meetings with prison medical personnel. On May 7, 2020, the court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The court ordered the parties to work cooperatively to ensure that “(1) Plaintiffs receive timely, fulsome quarterly reports and (2) Defendants not be unduly burdened with requests for performance information that are overbroad, duplicative, or of marginal utility given other sources of data and information available to Plaintiffs.” 2020 WL 2263535. On May 28, 2020, the court ordered the defendants to pay $1.04 million in attorneys’ fees and litigation costs ($934,000 in attorneys’ fees, and $105,000 in costs). 2020 WL 3120993. The plaintiffs had sought $1.99 million. On July 2, 2020, the court issued an order referring the case to Magistrate Judge Joel C. Hoppe for mediation regarding the prison's failure to produce documents to the plaintiffs as ordered by the court. As of July 16, 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, prisoners detained at the Fluvanna Correctional Center for Women filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia against the Virginia Department of Corrections and its contracted health service provider. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department and the contractor provided inadequate medical care, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. In 2014, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement which required the defendant to provide constitutionally adequate care. Progress toward that goal was to be overseen by an appointed monitor. In 2019, the court ordered an injunction after it determined that the prison remained in violation of the settlement agreement. Later that year, an individual prisoner sought an emergency order from the court to enforce the injunction; she died before the court ruled on her motion. In May 2020, the court issued further orders enforcing the reporting requirements of the settlement agreement; as of July 2020, the prison is not in compliance with the court's May 2020 order.


On Mar. 21, 2017 the city of Richmond, California filed this action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging President Trump’s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13768, which dealt with immigration enforcement. The Order threatened to withhold federal funds from "sanctuary jurisdictions" and take enforcement action against any locality that impeded the federal government's enforcement of immigration law. Plaintiff, represented by its own counsel and the law firm Cotchett, Pitre & McCarthy, asserted that the U.S. had begun to designate certain cities as "sanctuary jurisdictions" and that Richmond stood to be designated as such, putting it in financial and legal jeopardy. Specifically, Richmond asked for a declaration that it had complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, and that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, would require the plaintiff to violate the Fourth Amendment, and violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses. The plaintiff alleged that the Executive Order violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses by usurping Congress' spending power, as well as by imposing new and unrelated conditions on existing funding. The plaintiff also maintained that the Executive Order violated the Tenth Amendment by coercing cities to choose between losing federal funding and losing control of their municipal self-governance. The Executive Order and subsequent administrative Memoranda provide an unconstitutionally vague definition of what it means to be a "sanctuary" jurisdiction, apart from referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which provides that a local government entity cannot prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities. The plaintiff alleged its own compliance with § 1373, noting that ICE had not requested information or detainers from the plaintiff. Since 1990, Richmond had maintained a policy requiring approval of the city manager or police chief before any city employee may inform, cooperate with, or assist Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The State of California had also enacted legislation restricting the information that local law enforcement could provide to federal immigration enforcement. Due to these local and state policies, Richmond feared being designated as a "sanctuary jurisdiction" under the Executive Order and thus losing federal grants. As a small city with a large Latino immigrant population, Richmond feared the implications of such a loss of key funding for its municipal budget, including for public services that have nothing to do with immigration. Richmond alleged it had already suffered costs since the issuance of the Executive Order, because it was forced to expend resources in planning for the loss of federal funding for critical services, and because immigrant residents were discouraged from contacting the police. Finally, Richmond alleged that the Executive Order would compel the city to detain people who would otherwise be released, thus exposing Richmond to liability for violating the Fourth Amendment. The case was at first assigned to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, but on Mar. 24, 2017, it was reassigned to Judge William H. Orrick after he issued an order relating this case to one already assigned to him, County of Santa Clara v. Trump (IM-CA-0089 in this Clearinghouse). On Apr. 4, 2017, Richmond filed a motion for preliminary injunction, alleging that it was likely to succeed on the merits of its claims that the Executive Order was unconstitutional and would expose the plaintiff and its critical municipal services to irreparable financial harm. On Apr. 18, 2017, the defendants opposed Richmond's motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants argued that Richmond could not show irreparable harm because no immediate, concrete federal action against plaintiff yet existed. Defendants also argued that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim lacked ripeness. The defendants also maintained that the President had broad discretion in the enforcement of immigration law and that no injunction should issue against the president to avoid separation-of-powers concerns. In the alternative, defendants argued that if any preliminary injunction did issue, it should be limited to plaintiff and should not apply nationwide. On Apr. 25, 2017, Judge Orrick entered a nationwide preliminary injunction suspending operation of the Executive Order at issue in the related San Francisco/Santa Clara litigation. On May 22, Judge Orrick denied Richmond's Apr. 12 motion for preliminary injunction as moot in light of the nationwide injunction. 2017 WL 6945397. On June 8, 2017 the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that Richmond lacked standing, that its claim was not ripe, and that it failed to state a claim regarding the Order (which defendants claimed was an internal directive not affecting plaintiff), regarding the AG Memorandum, and regarding its own compliance with § 1373. On June 16, the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of defendants' motion to dismiss. On July 6, plaintiff Santa Clara (followed by joinders from San Francisco and Richmond on July 7) moved for leave to file a surreply in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argued that recent statements by President Trump and Department of Homeland Security officials contradicted assertions in defendants' reply brief. On July 12, 2017 Judge Orrick held a hearing (in all three related cases) on defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. Although on July 20 he denied defendants' motions regarding Santa Clara and San Francisco, and on Aug. 21 he granted defendants' motion regarding Richmond. In the latter order, Judge Orrick contrasted the other plaintiffs, which the federal government had clearly identified and targeted as sanctuary jurisdictions, with Richmond, which the federal government had apparently not targeted at all. He held that Richmond had established neither pre-enforcement standing (as it had demonstrated no well-founded fear of enforcement against it), nor a viable claim for declaratory relief (as it had demonstrated no actual controversy with the federal government about its compliance with § 1373). 2017 WL 3605216. Judge Orrick noted that if the federal government does target Richmond as a sanctuary jurisdiction in the future, Richmond may then litigate its claims by filing an amended complaint. On Aug. 25, Judge Orrick found State of California v. Sessions to be a related case. That case also challenges DOJ's immigration-related conditions on law enforcement funding. On Sept. 25, Richmond filed a notice that it would not file an Amended Complaint. It added:
 Richmond will accept the Court’s invitation to continue as an amicus curiae in this important case and if Defendants’ position against Richmond changes, Richmond will litigate the issues. . . . Richmond will continue to support its immigrant community and all residents of Richmond.
 In the absence of an amended complaint, this case appears to be closed in light of the July 12 dismissal.

Summary: On Mar. 21, 2017, the city of Richmond, CA challenged Trump’s Executive Order, which withholds federal funding from "sanctuary jurisdictions." Richmond sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that it would be subject to financial and legal jeopardy if the federal government withheld funding from its municipal services. On Aug. 21, the Court granted the government's motion to dismiss, distinguishing Richmond's case from the related San Francisco/Santa Clara litigation. Because Richmond had not demonstrated that it had been targeted by the Order or that Richmond was not in compliance with the Administration's interpretation of 8 U.S.C. 1373, Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the Northern District of California found that Richmond lacked standing and that its claim was not yet ripe. Richmond declined to amend its complaint, and it appears this case has since been dismissed.


On December 12, 2018, six low-income older adults and adults with disabilities filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The case was assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. Represented by Disability Rights Florida, Southern Legal Counsel, and Justice in Aging, the plaintiffs sued the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration and the Florida Department of Elder Affairs, under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Medicaid Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ administration of the Medicaid long-term care system violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs by requiring them to choose between receiving needed care and remaining in their homes. Specifically, the defendants’ administrative, planning, and funding decisions heavily favored treatment in nursing facilities, perpetuating the unnecessary institutionalization and segregation of older adults and people with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated Title II of the ADA. They sought declarative and injunctive relief. On March 12, 2019, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class. The proposed class consisted of adult residents of Florida who were at risk of unnecessary institutionalization without home- and community-based long-term care services because they: (1) were residing, and wish to remain, at home or in a community residential setting; (2) qualified or would qualify if allowed to enroll in the Long-Term Care Waiver; and (3) had been placed on the Long-Term Care Waiver waitlist. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 3, 2019, adding four new plaintiffs. On October 11, 2019, the defendants sought partial summary judgment as to the plaintiff's claim that "despite the specific permission that federal law confers on Florida to limit the capacity of its program, the limits on enrollment in the long-term managed care program violate the general prohibition against discrimination in Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act." The court denied class certification on October 27, 2019, citing a conflict among proposed class members and stating that the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently establish the numerosity requirement for class certification. 2019 WL 5677948. This led the defendants to file a second motion for partial summary judgment on February 6, 2020, asserting that the plaintiffs could recover only individual relief, not classwide relief. Following this motion, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification on February 10, 2020, modifying the proposed class to eliminate conflicts among proposed class members. In addition, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as to one plaintiff, on February 20, 2020. On March 31, 2020, the court issued a series of rulings on the motions. First, the court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, stating that although “the ADA requires a state to provide reasonable accommodations for disabilities...the ADA does not require such an accommodation if it would fundamentally alter a state's programs.” An injunction requiring the state to serve additional individuals through the waiver—to obtain an increase in or to exceed the cap—would fundamentally alter the state's program. 2020 WL 1547880. Second, the court denied the plaintiff’s second motion to certify a class, finding that the motion was untimely and failed to adequately meet the prerequisites of class certification. 2020 WL 1545739. Third, the court granted in part the defendant’s second motion for summary judgment. As the court denied the plaintiff’s second motion to certify class, the court dismissed any claims for relief on behalf of individuals who were not named plaintiffs. 2020 WL 1545738. On May 11, 2020, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement in principle and would file dismissal documents in 30 days. The next day, the court dismissed all claims and reserved jurisdiction to enforce the order to comply with the settlement agreement. As of June 10, 2020, the settlement agreement has not been posted publicly. But as the enforcement of the settlement agreement is ongoing, this case remains open.

Summary: On December 12, 2018, six low-income older adults and adults with disabilities filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ administration of the Medicaid long-term care system violated the civil rights of the plaintiffs by requiring them to choose between receiving needed care and remaining in their homes. On May 11, 2020, the parties notified the court that they have reached a settlement in principle. The next day, the court voluntarily dismissed on all claims, retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.


On May 11, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio and Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from cutting off the plaintiffs' access to state and federal funding. The plaintiffs claimed that on February 21, 2016, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed a law to bar Ohio Planned Parenthoods from receiving government funding for non-abortion services and programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the funding in question was necessary for vital health and education services used by the men, women, and teenagers of Ohio. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the law violated the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by denying funding in retaliation for the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected advocacy for abortion rights. On May 23, 2016, Judge Michael R. Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the defendants from cutting off funding until June 6, 2016. He held in abeyance the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. For the next few months both parties carried out discovery. 188 F.Supp.3d 684. On August 12, 2016, Judge Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions. The court found that the law in question did violate the plaintiffs' First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. Judge Barrett permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the law against the plaintiffs and other similarly situated. 2016 WL 10333130. On September 6, 2016, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On April 18, 2018, a unanimous panel of the Sixth Circuit (Circuit Judges Helene N. White, Eugene E. Siler, Jr., and Eric L. Clay) affirmed the district court’s grant of plaintiffs’ motions for judgment on the merits and for a permanent injunction. 888 F.3d 224. However, the full court of the Sixth Circuit then voted for a rehearing en banc. On March 13, 2019, Circuit Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, writing for the full court, reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have a due process right to perform abortions. Furthermore, the court found no evidence that the ban posed an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion. Although the plaintiffs argued that it had no obligation to establish an undue burden because the funding condition itself was unconstitutional, the court rejected that argument because the plaintiffs—who were providers, not women—did not possess the constitutional right to perform abortion; since there was no constitutional right, there was no unconstitutional condition. Circuit Judge White, who wrote the opinion for the April 2018 panel, dissented. 917 F.3d 908. The case was remanded to the district court, but the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal shortly thereafter. The case was officially dismissed on July 1, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: On May 11, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Greater Ohio and Planned Parenthood of Southwest Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from cutting off the plaintiffs' access to state and federal funding. On August 12, 2016, Judge Barrett granted the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions to enjoin the defendants from cutting off funding to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. On March 13, 2019, the full court of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The plaintiffs subsequently stipulated to a dismissal. The case was officially dismissed on July 1, 2019.


On July 15, 2014, this class action was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the New York State Department of Health and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance. The plaintiffs are elderly or disabled Medicaid recipients in New York who receive home-care services through Medicaid Managed Care Organizations (MCOs), which are privately-owned and operated companies contracted by the state. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief under the Medicaid Act, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of their due process rights under the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs allege that these MCOs terminated or reduced their home-care services without proper notice; that the services were terminated or reduced without any change in their condition or circumstances that would warrant such an alteration; and that they were denied aid-continuing benefits pending internal appeals. The three named plaintiffs tell a similar story: They each received a letter from their MCO summarily reducing their amount of home care. The letters claimed to be new authorizations of care, rather than reductions in current services. In one case, the letter reduced the plaintiff's care from 10 hours per day to 5. Another's was tapered over a period of four months from 24 hours/day to a total termination of care. None of the notices identified any changes in the plaintiffs' conditions to warrant such a reduction. The plaintiffs were also denied continued care while their requests for fair hearings were pending. In filing their complaint, Plaintiffs claimed that this action was related to another case currently pending in the Southern District of New York, Strouchler v. Shah. Thus, this case was originally assigned to the judge of the Strouchler case (Judge Shira A. Scheindlin). But on August 4, 2014, the case was declined as not related. It was then assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon. The defendants filed an answer on November 14, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a motion to to amend the complaint to add another named plaintiff on March 16, 2015, and moved to certify class that day, with the proposed class defined as "All current and future Medicaid recipients in New York State who receive home care services through Medicaid Managed Care Organizations and who have suffered or will suffer threatened or actual denials, reductions, or terminations of their home care services without timely and adequate notice, and/or without any change in their condition or circumstances which would justify a reduction or termination, and/or without aid-continuing benefits to which they are entitled." In April 2015, the Department of Health began to require the use of standardized forms to give recipients notice about the appeals process. The plaintiffs claimed that the adoption of the forms was "not a panacea of for all of the systemic harms suffered by Plaintiffs." On July 27, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add another named plaintiff, but denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Though the court acknowledged that the case was paradigmatic of a type of case that was routinely certified as a class action prior to Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., it found it was not appropriate to certify it as a class action now. Class certification was denied because the claims of the named plaintiffs did not meet the "commonality" and "typicality" requirements after Wal-Mart. While the court acknowledged that the April 2015 implementation of model notices might provide some commonality, the named plaintiffs had not received the new standardized notices, and therefore the court found that their claims were not typical of the claims of individuals who were beginning to receive the new standardized form notice. The parties proceeded with discovery, until on October 13, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of all claims against the defendants, with all parties to bear their own costs and attorney's fees. Nothing in the docket indicates the reason for the dismissal—we don't know if the case was settled out of court or if the plaintiffs simply gave up. The case was dismissed without prejudice on October 14, 2015.

Summary: On July 15, 2014, this class action was filed in the Southern District of New York against that state's Department of Health. Plaintiffs are Medicaid recipients whose home care was terminated or reduced without proper notice. The court denied class certification on July 27, 2015, and the parties proceeded with discovery for some months until the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 13, 2015.


On October 11, 2013, the Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities ("CRPD") filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued Colorado Homeless Families under the Federal Fair Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Represented by private counsel, CRPD asked for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's leasing policies discriminated against individuals with disabilities because they did not accept government benefits as a source of income. The defendant, Colorado Homeless Families, leases transitional housing to participants at favorable rates in order to help them "get back on their feet" and become self sufficient. On April 11, 2014, both parties filed a joint settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to alter its leasing requirements to accommodate individuals with disabilities. On April 11, 2014, the District Court of Colorado (Judge William J. Martinez) dismissed the suit in accordance with the settlement.

Summary: In 2013, the Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Colorado against Colorado Homeless Families, a transitional housing landlord. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant violated the Federal Housing Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by discriminating against individuals with disabilities whose only source of income was government benefits. The parties settled, and the defendant altered its leasing policies to accommodate individuals with disabilities.


On July 19, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, challenging the conditions of confinement at the Garfield County Jail in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. The plaintiffs alleged that prisoners in the Jail were subjected to a pervasive pattern of excessive force by Sheriff Deputies, including the misuse and abuse of pepperball guns, restraint chairs, tasers, electroshock belts, and pepper spray. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Sheriff failed to have proper written policies in place regarding the use of force and failed to enforce the policies that did exist. To remedy the alleged violations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. An amended complaint was filed on August 1, 2006, adding claims that inmates were often subjected to harsh discipline without being afforded due process and that the Sheriff denied mentally ill prisoners mental health care. That same day, the plaintiffs also filed an amended motion to certify the case as a class action. The case was originally assigned to District Court Judge Phillip S. Figa. Judge Figa referred the handling of scheduling and discovery issues to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Watanabe. On January 8, 2008, the case was reassigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel, in light of the death of Judge Figa. On March 13, 2008, the District Court partially granted and partially denied the motion to certify a plaintiff class. This decision was appealed, and on February 4, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ordered the District Court to reconsider its class certification order. The case is ongoing. On March 18, 2011, counsel for both parties filed a joint status report, indicating that they had reached a settlement subject to the approval of the four named plaintiffs, the terms of which are unknown. On April 28, 2011, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party bearing its own attorney fees, costs, and expenses. This case is closed.

Summary: On July 19, 2006, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Colorado filed a class action lawsuit challenging the conditions of confinement at the Garfield County Jail in Glenwood Springs, Colorado. After the parties agreed to a settlement, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, with each party bearing its own attorney fees, costs, and expenses. The terms of the settlement are unknown. This case is closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This class-action lawsuit originated with a claim that the Louisiana State Penitentiary provided inadequate medical care that violated the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights. Upon learning that the penitentiary planned to transfer individuals with COVID-19 to the penitentiary, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to stop the transfer and re-open discovery to determine that the defendant's policies for COVID-19 were adequate. Both motions were denied as non-justiciable. A settlement conference was held on June 4, and the case is ongoing with minimal docket activity. <hr> On May 20, 2015, inmates incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana (Baton Rouge). The plaintiffs sued the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed to have serious medical needs that went untreated, undertreated, or mistreated by the defendants in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants engaged in systemic practices that exposed the plaintiffs to unacceptable risks to their health. These practices included routinely delaying specialty care, declining to provide medically necessary treatment, discouraging plaintiffs from requesting medical assistance, punishing plaintiffs who seek medical treatment, and maintaining an insufficient number of qualified medical personnel. The case was assigned to Judge Brian A. Jackson. On December 14, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for Entry of Protective Order Governing Protected and Individually Identifiable Health Information (PHI/IIHI). The order was granted on December 16, 2015 and the terms will survive through the end of litigation, and continue to fully apply to all materials containing PHI/IIHI. Further, the court will retain jurisdiction over all parties and persons who received access to such materials, indefinitely. Plaintiffs moved for class certification on October 14, 2016. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on their ADA and Eighth Amendment claims on January 6, 2017. Defendants moved to disqualify the judge on February 28, 2017. The court (Judge Brian A. Jackson) granted defendants' motion to disqualify the judge on April 20, 2017, and the case was reassigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. Defendants filed a sealed motion for summary judgment on May 12, 2017. The court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on September 21, 2017, but granted parties to re-urge the motions, without being required to refile them, following the hearing on the class action certification. The court granted class action certification on February 26, 2018 as "all inmates who now, or will be in the future, incarcerated at LSP" and a granted a subclass of "all qualified individuals with a disability, as defined by the ADA/RA, who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated at LSP." Defendants subsequently moved to re-urge their motion for summary judgment on July 11, 2018. A bench trial was held between October 11 and October 25, 2018. After both parties submitted post-trial briefs, they engaged in a settlement conference before the court on July 24, 2019. The parties were unable to reach a resolution. While negotiations continued, the court conducted a site visit at Angola State Penitentiary on February 4, 2020. Almost three weeks later, the court issued an order informing the parties that it was preparing to issue a ruling on the merits. The order stated that the court planned to find the medical care at Angola State Penitentiary unconstitutional in some respects and was prepared to order injunctive relief to remediate these findings. The court encouraged the litigants to reach an agreement on some or all of the claims. The sudden onset of the COVID-19 pandemic led the plaintiffs to file an emergency motion to re-open discovery on March 28. Given the congregated nature of the Louisiana State Penitentiary and penitentiary's history of inadequate medical care, the plaintiffs were concerned that the penitentiary would be a "tinderbox" for a COVID-19 outbreak. Therefore, the plaintiffs moved to re-open discovery for the "limited and sole purpose of ensuring that Defendants' policies and practices concerning COVID-19 do not place class members at a substantial risk of serious harm or likely death." Three days later, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to restrain the defendants from transferring COVID-19 carriers to the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The plaintiffs argued that the penitentiary already possesses inadequate medical care (as evidenced by the original claim of this case alleging that the medical care was unconstitutional), and that the planned transfer would place the class members at particular risk given that many members are either elderly or suffer from underlying medical conditions. If the transfer were to occur as planned, the plaintiffs argue, the harm would be irreparable. On April 2, Judge Shelly Dick denied the plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Re-open Discovery, and denied the plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Restrain Defendants from Transferring COVID-19 Carriers. The judge found both measures to be non-justiciable. The two measures were found to be beyond the scope of the original claims asserted, and the plaintiff did not cite an authority for joining these independent claims to their ongoing case. Further, Judge Dick found the plaintiff's measures to be based on speculation and conjecture as to what the defendant "might" do with respect to transferring inmates. A settlement conference was held on June 4, and the case is ongoing with minimal docket activity.

Summary: In 2015, inmates currently incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The class was certified on February 26, 2018, and settlement discussions are in progress.


On April 11, 2003, three individuals with brain or spinal injuries who were on the waiting list for the Brain or Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver Program (BSCI Waiver Program) filed a lawsuit against several Florida state officials under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §1201 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794(a); Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396 et seq., and Due Process Clause in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. The plaintiffs, represented by public service attorneys, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that due to defendants' underfunding and poor administration, only 176 individuals were receiving BSCI Waiver Program services in Florida, despite a waiting list of 226 who met eligibility requirements. On March 1, 2004, the Court (Judge Stephan P. Mickle) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. After a long period of discovery and negotiations, the parties reached a Settlement Agreement on October 10, 2006, according to which, defendants agreed to make it a priority to seek funding to expand the BSCI Waiver Program by at least 200 slots for the next three years. On January 4, 2007, the Court (Judge Mickle) approved the Settlement Agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: This case was brought by three individuals with brain or spinal cord injuries who were on the waiting list for the Brain or Spinal Cord Injury Medicaid Home and Community Based Waiver Program against the state of Florida seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 4, 2007, the case was dismissed because of the settlement agreement reached between the parties.


On October 24, 2006, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless ("NEOCH") and Service Employees International Union ("SEIU") filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against the State of Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and declaratory relief challenging numerous aspects of Ohio's comprehensive voter-identification law set forth in Ohio's House Bill 3. The plaintiffs argued that the law was impermissibly vague and treated voters differently based on when they voted and what type of identification they provided, and thus violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, which was granted by District Judge Algenon Marbley on October 26, 2006. 2006 WL 8424056. The court found that a number of the phrases in the law were unconstitutionally vague and were being unequally applied by the Board of Elections, particularly as to absentee voters. Accordingly, the court temporarily enjoined the voter identification law as it applied to absentee voter ballots until arguments could be heard on the motion for the preliminary injunction. The state appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stayed the temporary restraining order on October 29, 2006. The plaintiffs and the Secretary of State then conducted negotiations and, on November 1, 2006, entered a consent order approved by Judge Marbley. The consent order clarified Ohio's statutory voter identification requirements including what identification voters must show at the polls on Election Day. The following year passed quietly, though the case again erupted in activity during the Fall 2008 election season, when the plaintiffs sought uniform procedures for counting provisional ballots. On October 24 and October 27 of 2008, Judge Marbley entered orders requiring uniform processing of provisional ballots and requiring that provisional ballots would not be invalidated due to poll worker error, respectively. Roughly a year and a half later, on April 19, 2010, Judge Marbley entered a second consent decree signed by the parties. This consent decree provided the following injunctive relief for voters using the last four digits of their social security number for voter identification (SSN-4 voters): the State would not reject provisional ballots that, due to poll-worker error, were cast (1) in the wrong precinct but correct polling place, or (2) with nonconforming or incomplete ballot affirmations. This consent decree was set to expire on June 30, 2013. The following year, the Ohio Supreme Court issued a decision holding that Ohio's election laws offered no protections for wrong precinct provisional ballots caused by poll worker error. State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 941 N.E.2d 782, 794 (Ohio 2011) (per curiam). Following this, the plaintiffs requested a modification of the consent decree on June 20, 2012 and defendants requested to vacate the consent decree on June 27, 2012. Around the same time a related case, Service Employees International Union Local 1 et al. v. Jon Husted,  VR-OH-0080 in the Clearinghouse, was filed. The plaintiffs in this new case sought essentially identical relief as the current plaintiffs' motion to modify the decree, and so the court combined the motions. On July 9, 2012, Magistrate Judge Terence Kemp denied defendants' requests to vacate the consent decree. NEOCH, No. 06-CV-896, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94086 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2012). Defendants appealed. The two cases were consolidated on appeal. On October 11, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a per curium opinion, upheld the district court's decision on the denial. However, the circuit court remanded the case to address the plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree in light of the equal protection issues created by the decree's provision for the counting of deficient-affirmation ballots by SSN-4 voters. Ne. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). On October 26, 2012, Judge Marbly granted the plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree and order county boards of elections to count all provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct, irrespective of whether they are cast in the correct polling place or an incorrect polling place. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Husted, 906 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ohio 2012). The court further stated that to treat deficient affirmation ballots differently for SSN-4 voters would deny equal protection to those provisional voters using alternative forms of identification. On November 13, the District Court entered an order clarifying this ruling. On June 30, 2013, the plaintiffs moved to extend the consent decree indefinitely. District Court Judge Marbly granted the plaintiffs' motion, but opted to extend the decree for only one election cycle, until December 31, 2016. On January 14, 2014, the parties entered into a confidential agreement that would lead to a complete settlement if the court were to vacate its clarifying ruling made on November 13, 2012. The District Court vacated the clarifying order on February 7, 2014. The plaintiffs filed a second supplemental amended complaint on Oct. 30, 2014, based on subsequent events. Two new laws were signed in February 2014. The plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin portions of S.B. 205 and S.B. 216, arguing that they "will unlawfully disenfranchise thousands of Ohio voters who cast absentee or provisional ballots in upcoming elections—and who primarily are minority voters and/or voters who support the Democratic Party." If enacted, these laws would have effectively superseded portions of the 2010 consent decree. According to the complaint, the challenged provisions had the effect of requiring absentee and provisional voters to demonstrate an ability to read, write, understand, and interpret any subject before their votes could be counted. The complaint further argued that the provisions empowered boards of elections to refuse to count absentee or provisional ballots where there were "technical [or] immaterial errors or omissions." The plaintiffs challenged provisions requiring forms to be completely filled out, barring election officials from helping voters fill out the form, and shortening the time available to cure a defective form. Moreover, the plaintiffs argued that the laws were intended to discriminate against African-American and Latino voters residing in areas with historically high percentages of absentee and provisional ballot voting. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs argued that the provisions in question violated the Voting Rights Act, as well as the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Litigation and discovery continued into 2016, at which point the parties prepared for trial. The trial took place over two weeks in March 2016. Judge Marbley issued a final judgment on June 7, 2016, enjoining enforcement of some of the challenged provisions. The court found that the provisions in the two laws requiring complete and accurate information as a condition of counting the ballot, prohibiting poll workers from helping voters, and shortening the cure period were unconstitutional and violated the Voting Rights Act. The court found that "[d]ue to the [Ohio] General Assembly’s retrenchment and the social and historical conditions affecting African-American Ohioans, SBs 205 and 216 have a discriminatory impact on African-Americans" in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The court also found that the three provisions posed an undue burden on voters, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The court, however, did not find that the defendants had violated due process or that the laws had discriminatory purpose in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 2016 WL 3166251. The defendants appealed the judgment, and the court stayed enforcement of its final judgment pending the appeal. The plaintiffs filed a cross appeal on June 22. The Sixth Circuit (Judges Damon Keith, Danny Boggs, and John Rogers), issued its opinion on Sept. 13, 2016. That court affirmed the plaintiffs' undue burden claim regarding the provision requiring completeness and accuracy for the vote to be counted, but reversed the finding that the provisions prohibiting assistance and shortening the cure period posed an undue burden. The court found that the burden would be minimal because "[i]n most cases, poll-worker assistance will not fix the errors that result in the rejection of absentee and provisional ballots," and there was no evidence that shortening the cure period by three days would create anything beyond a trivial burden. The Sixth Circuit also reversed the finding of disparate impact, ultimately concluding there was no violation of the Voting Rights Act. The court did not find the statistics supporting a disparate impact finding to be persuasive, nor did it find that the ballot form constituted a literacy test by asking basic identification questions. The court affirmed all other lower court findings. 837 F.3d 612. As a result, the Sixth Circuit left in place only certain portions of the permanent injunction barring enforcement of parts of SB 205. The remainder of the injunction was overturned. The Sixth Circuit denied a rehearing en banc on Oct. 13, and the Supreme Court denied cert on June 19, 2017. Meanwhile, on Oct. 12, 2016, the court awarded $2,618,140.78 in attorney's fees for litigation conducted in 2012 and 2013. Following mediation, the court entered a stipulated judgment regarding all attorney's fees and costs stemming from the litigation. On March 28, 2018, the state defendants agreed to pay a total of $1,100,000, split between the three law firms representing the plaintiffs. On April 28, 2017, the court denied the plaintiff's motion to extend the April 19, 2010 consent decree. The consent decree therefore expired on April 28, 2017. There has been no docket activity since 2018, but the injunction against parts of SB 205 remains in effect.

Summary: On October 24, 2006, the plaintiffs, the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless ("NEOCH") and Service Employees International Union ("SEIU"), filed a lawsuit under against the State of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the State's voter identification laws. Litigation continued over the following years, with a number of consent decrees entered that barred the state from enforcing part or all of several challenged voting laws. The case is now closed.


On December 24, 2004, private civil rights attorneys and attorneys for the Youth Law Center, Inc. the Children's Law Center, Inc, and the Ohio Justice & Policy Center filed a § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, challenging the treatment of juveniles in the custody or under the supervision of the Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS). The ODYS operated juvenile correctional institutions in Ohio which included Circleville Youth Center, Cuyahoga Hills Boys School, Indian River School, Marion Juvenile Correctional Center, Mohican Youth Center, Ohio River Valley Youth Center, Scioto Juvenile Correctional Center, and the Freedom Center. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the individually named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class members were subjected to abusive, inhumane, and illegal conditions, policies, and practices, which included: excessive force, physical abuse, unreasonable mechanical restraints, lockdown and isolation for arbitrary reasons, improper strip searches, inadequate mental health care and medical treatment, inadequate education services and programs, and ineffective disciplinary measures. Plaintiffs further alleged that the ODYS denied equal access and services for girls in its custody. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Plaintiffs amended the complaint on June 15, 2005. Defendants moved to dismiss. On July 29, 2005, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Terence P Kemp) stayed the case at the request of the parties so that they could pursue settlement negotiations. The Court denied plaintiffs' request for class certification without prejudice to refilling and administratively closed the case. On April 4, 2007, plaintiffs requested that the court ordered stay be lifted and that they be granted leave to file a second amended complaint. On May 18, 2007, United States Magistrate Judge Kemp appointed Fred Cohen as Independent Fact Finder. Cohen assembled a team of 10 experts with whom he conducted intensive site visits of various Ohio Department of Youth Services (ODYS) facilities. The team interviewed staff, youth and ODYS officials and reviewed numerous records and reports. On December 13, 2007, Cohen issued a 214 page Fact-Finding Final Report, which addressed his team's findings and its recommendations for an overhaul of the ODYS system and facilities. On May 21, 2008, the court approved a settlement in the case. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendants agreed to a comprehensive continuum of care in a regionalized services delivery system, a system of monitoring, youth-focused care, quality treatment interventions, engagement of families, education and vocational training of youths in the system, a grievance system, access to advocates/attorneys, strong re-entry programs, and a fair and effective release process. Less than a week before the settlement was approved, the Department of Justice filed its own suit. Details on that case (JI-OH-0006 in this Clearinghouse) are available here. That case was soon settled, and compliance work on the two has continued together. On Feb. 11, 2015, the monitoring Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, issued a report showing a dramatic decline in use of seclusion.

Summary: This was a class action lawsuit challenging the treatment of juveniles under the supervision of the Ohio Department of Youth Services. On May 21, 2008, the court approved a settlement in the case where the defendants agreed to a comprehensive continuum of care in a regionalized services delivery system, a system of monitoring, youth-focused care, quality treatment interventions, engagement of families, education and vocational training of youths in the system, a grievance system, access to advocates/attorneys, strong re-entry programs, and a fair and effective release process.


On August 24, 2006, a citizen of New Braunfels with complete bilateral hearing loss filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Texas under the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against the City of New Braunfels. The plaintiff, represented by Advocacy, Inc., asked the court for declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages, claiming that no reasonable accommodations were made by emergency personnel, discriminatory practices by the city in their dealings with disabled persons. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that police and emergency responders willfully refrained from obtaining a qualified American Sign Language interpreter during a response and investigation of plaintiff's 911 call. According to the complaint, the plaintiff had returned home to find her boyfriend motionless on the couch and called 911. When police came to her home, they were completely unable to communicate to her what was happening, why they needed to search, what the process was, or to provide consent to the search. From the time the complaint was filed through April 2, 2008, the parties engaged in discovery and interviews with various experts. On May 9, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The plaintiff settled for $75,000 and a promise by the city to change its policies and enforce the changes with respect to accommodations for hearing impaired persons. On May 14, 2008, Judge Xavier Rodriguez granted the joint motion to dismiss.

Summary: This was a case where a deaf plaintiff sued the city under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Services Act of 1973 for failing to provide translation services, despite her request that they do so, when they responded to an emergency in her home. She argued that without an interpreter, she couldn't consent to a police search of her apartment or find out if she was a suspect in a murder investigation. The city argued that communication was effective, and that the ADA didn't apply because this wasn't an arrest. The case ended in a settlement agreement under which the city agreed to hire interpreters.


In 2010, New Orleans Mayor Mitchell Landrieu invited the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to review civil rights issues at the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD), and propose any necessary reforms. The DOJ opened the requested investigation on May 15, 2010, pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following a comprehensive investigation, on March 17, 2011, the DOJ announced its findings that the NOPD had engaged in misconduct that violates the Constitution and federal law, including a pattern or practice of excessive force, illegal stops, searches, and arrests. The investigation also found a pattern or practice of gender discrimination in the Department's under-enforcement and under-investigation of violence against women, as well as strong indications of discriminatory policing based on racial, ethnic, and LGBT bias, and a failure to provide critical police services to language minority communities. After extensive negotiations, on July 24, 2012, the Department of Justice filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. 14141 and, concurrently, a proposed consent decree. The case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan. The decree is very comprehensive--122 pages, with 19 sections. It covers recruitment; training; policy development; use of force; stops, searches and arrests; effective supervision; bias free policing; access to effective police services for people with limited English skills; data collection and integrity; officer assistance; effective investigation of crimes involving violence against women; evaluation and promotion of officers; effective internal systems to investigate officer misconduct; and secondary employment. The Consent Decree also involved the appointment of a Monitor to oversee NOPD's development and compliance. On January 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Susie Morgan) approved the Decree without modification. On January 31, 2013, the City formally moved to vacate the Court's order approving the Decree, and to stay implementation of the Decree pending resolution of its Motion to Vacate. The City's brief complained that the DOJ had waited until after the police department Consent Decree was executed to inform the City that the required reform of the Orleans Parish Prison would likely cost $35 million. This jail reform litigation was in a separate case brought against the New Orleans Sheriff, rather than the City (Jones v. Gusman,  JC-LA-0028. In addition, the City expressed its view that one of the DOJ's negotiators was an inappropriate person to have such a role, because of his blogging and other activities. Finally, the City argued that the Consent Decree's provisions dealing with "secondary employment" of police personnel may run afoul of the Fair Labor Standards Act. On February 8, 2013, the District Court denied the City's motion to stay the implementation and enforcement of the consent decree with a written opinion. United States v. City of New Orleans, 2013 WL 492362 (E.D. La. Feb. 8, 2013). The District Court denied the motion to vacate on May 23, 2013. 947 F. Supp. 2d 601. The City appealed both. On June 5, 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the City's appeal of the district court's ruling on the motion to stay. On September 27, 2013, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling denial of the motion to vacate the Consent order. United States v. City of New Orleans, 731 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2013). On July 5, 2013, the Court ordered that Sheppard Mullin be selected as the Monitor required by the Consent Decree. On December 2, 2013, the Monitor filed the first Quarterly Report. The second report was filed on May 28, 2014, and the third on September 29, 2014. These reports indicated that the City continued to struggle with consistent record keeping, particularly with documenting use of force reports. However, they also noted that requiring body-worn cameras had a material positive impact on officer use of force. Over the course of 2014, the NOPD faced staffing changes. On November 12, 2014, the Inspector General issued a report that alleged pervasive problems within the NOPD’s Special Victims Section, which prompted staff reassignments and an internal investigation led by a newly created task force. By December 2014, the Monitor reported that the NOPD's policy drafting process had begun to improve, but noted ongoing "serious deficiencies" with the NOPD Training Academy, deficiencies in supervision and recordkeeping, unmet Crisis Intervention Team obligations, and outdated technology hindering some of NOPD's compliance efforts. In a report of April 28, 2015, the Monitor found that the NOPD's revised use of force policy met the requirements of the consent decree. On July 21, 2015, the Monitor issued a special compliance report on NOPD supervision policies and practices. It found "persistent non-compliance" with the consent decree's supervisory requirements, which it attributed primarily to "lack of attention, guidance, and/or accountability devoted to supervision by NOPD." As a result, compliance in other areas of the consent decree was affected; for example, the report found supervisors were not ensuring compliance with the recently implemented in-car camera policy, nor discharging their responsibility to report malfunctioning cameras. The Monitor recommended forms and reporting requirements for supervision and evaluation of the non-supervisory duties assigned to supervisors. Over the course of 2015, the NOPD also developed a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) as required by the consent decree, drafting policies, assigning a dedicated program manager, providing train-the-trainer sessions, and conducting its first training of CIT officers. By the end of 2015, the Monitor highlighted the need for further improvement in use of force practices and recordkeeping and expressed ongoing concern about the Training Academy. By early 2016, the NOPD had hired additional staff to help implement the consent decree. The NOPD also implemented a policy for public release of body-worn camera footage of critical incidents. Throughout 2016, the NOPD implemented changes leading to a "remarkable turnaround" in the Special Victims' Section, with significant reform of its sexual assault and domestic violence practices. Ongoing concerns remained around the Police Training Academy, supervision, and community oriented policing. In February 2017, several minor amendments to the consent decree were implemented in order to address staffing during holiday events such as Mardi Gras. On May 15, 2017, the Monitor issued a special report on NOPD uses of force. The report noted significant progress in the area of use of force, particularly in reporting of incidents of involving officer use of force. However, areas of improvement included supervision and poor officer tactics that contributed to the perceived need to use force. On August 4, 2017, the court extended the monitoring in this case by three years, from its original termination date of August 2017 to August 2020. On January 25, 2019, the monitoring team publicly presented their report on NOPD progress under the consent decree. The report acknowledged the slow start to compliance, but was ultimately hopeful that NOPD was making progress towards the two-year compliance requirement. On June 3rd, 2020 the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Donna Phillips Currault. As the NOPD has not reached full-compliance, the case is ongoing.

Summary: After extensive investigation invited by the Mayor of New Orleans, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and New Orleans proposed a consent decree on July 24, 2012, to address nearly every aspect of policing in New Orleans. The decree was approved by the District Court on January 11, 2013. On July 5, 2013, the Court ordered that Sheppard Mullin was selected as the Monitor required by the Consent Decree. Monitoring is ongoing.


On November 18, 2014, plaintiffs, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Civil Clinic, which provides no-cost civil legal services, and ABLE, a non-profit legal assistance firm, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. §552, against U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant had failed to deliver records regarding the "Sandusky Bay Border Patrol's practices and procedures related to racial profiling" within statutory deadlines imposed under FOIA. On January 29, 2015, defendant moved to change venue to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on the grounds that defendant had been litigating the Muñiz-Muñiz case in the Northern District of Ohio, and information related to the plaintiff's FOIA request was filed under seal subject to a protective order for that case. Judge Gregory L. Frost found in favor of the defendant, and ordered the venue change on April 28, 2015. 2015 WL 1928736. Over the following months, the parties discussed and outlined a plan for phased production of documents responsive to the plaintiffs' FOIA request. Judge Jack Zouhary ordered implementation of the plan on July 24, 2015. The plan narrowed the original request of the plaintiffs, separated document production into three phrases, and required that the government provide status reports to the Court at the end of each phase. On February 24, 2016, the parties jointly moved to have the court determine whether the defendants were able to redact various information including dates, entry landmarks, arrest landmarks, and codes used to decipher landmarks under FOIA exemption 7(E), which exempts disclosure of techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations. On June 1, 2016, the court ordered that the defendant was required to disclose date information but found the landmark information properly redacted. Production was completed on July 22, 2016, and the parties jointly moved for dismissal with parties bearing their own costs on July 27, 2016. The case was dismissed on July 28, 2016.

Summary: On November 18, 2014, plaintiffs, the Ohio State University Moritz College of Law Civil Clinic, which provides no-cost civil legal services, and ABLE, a non-profit legal assistance firm, filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the District of Southern Ohio under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. §552, against U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant had failed to deliver records regarding the "Sandusky Bay Border Patrol's practices and procedures related to racial profiling" within statutory deadlines imposed under FOIA. The parties agreed to a narrowed phased document production and the case was dismissed following the completion of said production on July 27, 2016.


Two incarcerated plaintiffs brought this class-action lawsuit seeking to obtain the benefits provided under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economics Security (CARES) Act. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class all people incarcerated in the United States between March 27, 2020 until August 1, 2020 (the date the complaint was filed) who was tax-eligible to receive the benefits. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants (the United States of America, the US Department of Treasury, the IRS, the Secretary of the Department of Treasury Steven Mnuchin and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue) refused to issue Economic Impact Payments (EIP) to incarcerated people as part of the CARES Act. Brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, the complaint contended that Congress did not exclude incarcerated people from receiving benefits through the CARES Act, and that the IRS did not have a reasonable basis to exclude incarcerated people from the EIP benefit program because they still have tax obligations while incarcerated. The plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, declaratory judgment that the defendants lacked authority to withhold EIP benefits from incarcerated people, and injunctive relief ordering the defendants to automatically issue EIP benefits to entitled individuals in prison, and to reconsider any filed claim that was denied solely based on the claimant's incarcerated status. Three days after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs also moved for a class-certification and a preliminary injunction declaring the defendants' policy unlawful and ordering EIP benefits to be provided to eligible class members. The plaintiffs were represented by Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP and Equal Justice Society. After being initially assigned to Judge Charles R. Breyer, the case was reassigned to Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton for all future proceedings. Judge Hamilton permitted plaintiffs from <i>Galvan v. Mnuchin</i>, No. 1:20-cv-04511 (N.D. Ill.), to intervene, as those parties were seeking class certification of an identical class to the one at issue in this case. On September 24, 2020, Judge Hamilton granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and their motion to certify class. 2020 WL 5702129. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment five days later, but the defendants subsequently appealed to the Ninth Circuit on October 1 and requested that the district court proceedings be stayed during appeal (Docket No. 20-16915). Defendant's motion to stay was denied, and the Ninth Circuit appeal was dismissed on December 12, 2020. On October 14, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied defendants’ motion to stay. As part of that order, the court entered a permanent injunction similar to its preliminary injunction, declared defendants’ policy of withholding benefits solely based on an eligible individuals’ incarcerated status to be void, and certified the class. On December 11, 2020, two individuals who are incarcerated in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico filed a motion to intervene in this suit individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated. Plaintiff-interveners argued that, like the plaintiffs, they were eligible to receive EIPs, but were being denied on the basis of their incarcerated status. They maintained that their interests were not adequately represented by the plaintiffs, due to the unique laws governing the U.S. territories and possessions, and therefore sought to certify a subclass of incarcerated residents of the U.S. territories and possessions who would otherwise be eligible for an EIP but did not receive a payment. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed oppositions to plaintiff-intervenors’ motion. On January 11, 2021, the court denied the motion to intervene since it would unduly delay adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Plaintiff-intervenors’ claims would require the court to address questions, particularly those involving the CARES Act and the Treasury Department’s plans with the territories and possessions, that shared no commonality with the questions already addressed in this litigation. Following the October 14, 2020 order, the court received status updates from the parties and held two status conferences to confirm defendants’ compliance with the declaration and permanent injunction. Following this compliance, final judgment was entered on January 21, 2021. The Court retains jurisdiction over this matter for purposes of enforcing its October 14, 2020 permanent injunction and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Class-action lawsuit seeking CARES Act relief to be provided to incarcerated people was granted certification and a preliminary injunction, and final judgment was rendered on January 21, 2021.


On October 17, 2007, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel, asked the court for a preliminary injunction for expedited release of the information sought. The plaintiff claimed that FOIA entitled it to expedited release of requested documents. Specifically, the plaintiff requested documents relating to communications between ODNI and telecommunications companies or staff of members of the Senate or the House of Representatives related to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) amendments. It also claimed that defendant did not properly expedite the documents as would be proper and had also failed to process the request under the standard deadline. On November 27, 2007, Susan Illston found that ODNI failed to show any evidence of extraordinary circumstances. As such, the court ordered ODNI to provide an initial release to plaintiff's FOIA request by November 30, 2007, as well as release all non-exempt documents by December 10, 2007. The court also ordered the defendant to release an affidavit with the reasoning for withholding any documents it did not release. On June 4, 2008, the court granted plaintiff $52,271.97 for costs and attorneys' fees. The court found that plaintiff's rates were reasonable but its hours were too high when calculating the requested $68,205.00 award amount.

Summary: In 2007, The Electronic Frontier Foundation challenged delays in processing FOIA requests by ODNI over communications regarding amending FISA. The Courts granted the documents and required reasoning provided on any documents withheld. (N.D. Cal.)


On November 14, 2003 Ohio inmates filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Of Ohio, alleging that the conditions of confinement at the Mahoning County Justice Center ("Justice Center") and the Minimum Security Jail ("MSJ") violated their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected severe overcrowding and corresponding deprivations. They sought equitable and declaratory relief. On March 5, 2004, the District Court (Judge David D. Dowd Jr.) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. A bench trial was held on December 13-15, 2004. Following the trial, Judge Dowd issued his Memorandum, Opinion and Order, including Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. In a Summary Conclusion, the Court stated: "The Court hereby declares that the plaintiff class has met its burden of proof with respect to its claims that class members (1) are being denied their constitutional rights not to be punished without due process of law and/or not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) are being denied their constitutional right of access to the courts. As a result, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff class and against the defendants." The Court did not enter a final judgment and instead appointed Vincent Nathan to act as a Special Master pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(f)(1)(B) to assist the parties in a complex and lengthy remedial phase aimed at reaching a final resolution. The Special Master formed the Mahoning County Criminal Justice Working Group which, along with the Special Master, submitted reports and recommendations to the Court. On June 8, 2006, Judge Dowd requested that Chief Judge Danny J. Boggs appoint a three-judge court for the purpose of considering whether there should be a prisoner release order to rectify the unconstitutional conditions which the Court found existed. The Chief Judge appointed Hon. Alice M. Batchelder, Hon. David D. Dowd Jr., and Hon. Dan Aaron Polster to act as the three-judge court. By order dated August 2, 2006, the City of Youngstown was permitted to intervene as a matter of right to oppose the imposition of a prisoner release order. The District Court appointed Special Master Nathan to serve as a court expert within the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 706(a) for the express purpose of serving and filing an expert report collecting his findings relative to the question of whether crowding at the Jail is the cause of constitutional violations. On May 17, 2007, the three-judge district court entered a consent decree, which addressed overpopulation problems, double celling, provision of bunk beds rather than mattresses on the floor for inmates, classification procedures, staffing issues, table space for inmates at mealtimes, access to legal aid, disciplinary procedures, facility maintenance issues, lockdowns, and recreation, as well as granted attorney fees to plaintiffs. The three-judge panel entered the decree; it included a population cap and was therefore beyond the authority of a single district judge. 2007 WL 1655505. Before the decree's expiration date in 2010, the plaintiffs and the County moved to extend the decree in order to prevent the City from continuing to detain nonviolent misdemeanants and overcrowd the facilities. On May 18, 2010, the Court denied these motions, stating that there was no basis upon which to extend the decree, and finding that the defendants had taken all reasonable steps to comply - thus the decree ended on May 17, 2010. In June of 2010, the Court also denied plaintiffs' motion to hold the City in contempt after finding that the defendants had taken all reasonable steps to comply with the decree. 2010 WL 2598193. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 14, 2003 Ohio inmates filed a class action lawsuit against Mahoning County, alleging that the conditions of confinement (severe overcrowding and corresponding deprivations) at the Mahoning County Justice Center ("Justice Center") and the Minimum Security Jail ("MSJ") violated their constitutional rights. After a trial, the district court entered a consent decree that lasted until May 17, 2010.