On May 2, 2006, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against California and state officials responsible for operation of two California mental hospitals: the Metropolitan State Hospital and the Napa State Hospital. The United States sued under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C § 12101. The United States sought declaratory and injunctive relief to end the substantial departures from generally accepted professional standards of care at each hospital that the Department of Justice had identified in multiple CRIPA investigations during the proceeding years. The first investigation involved the Metropolitan State Hospital ("MSH"). On May 13, 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent a findings letter to California's governor, advising him that it had identified "significant and wide-ranging" deficiencies in child and adolescent patient care at MSH, a state facility housing children, adolescents, and adults who suffered from mental illness. The letter resulted from a CRIPA investigation of MSH that occurred during June and July 2002. The letter listed minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories. It also invited continued collaboration toward resolving the many deficiencies and alerted the state that, absent improvement, a CRIPA lawsuit would be filed to compel correction of the deficiencies and protection of MSH patients' rights. During the investigation, DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended MSH staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for patient well-being. Nevertheless, the DOJ concluded that deficiencies at MSH existed in a dozen topic areas, including (1) psychiatry; (2) nursing services; (3) psychology; (4) pharmaceutical services; (4) general medical care, including deficiencies in vision services, x-ray reviews, and incontinence and headache evaluation; (5) infection control; (7) dental care; (8) dietary services; (9) placement in the most integrated setting; (10) special education; (11) protection from harm; and (12) First Amendment and due process rights to confidentially communicate with investigators. On February 19, 2004, the DOJ sent another findings letter to the governor that focused on adult patient care at MSH. The letter described the investigation process as essentially the same as used in reviewing the younger patients' situations; however, the larger number of adult patients (and of programs housing them) made for lengthier investigative and evaluative processes. The findings, however, were equally gloomy. Overall, the DOJ identified significant and wide-ranging deficiencies in MSH's provision of care to adult patients. The letter set out categories of deficiency as follows: (1) substandard integrated treatment planning; (2) inadequate psychiatric, psychological, rehabilitative, and social history assessments; (3) poor to almost-nonexistent discharge planning for placement in the most integrated setting; (4) substantial departures from generally accepted professional standards of care in each of MSH's psychiatric, psychological, nursing and unit-based, pharmaceutical, general medical, infection control, dental, physical and occupational therapy, and dietary treatment services; (5) insufficient documentation of patient care and progress; (6) excessive and unnecessarily restrictive use of seclusion, restraints, and "as-needed" medications; (7) failure to protect patients from harm, stemming from ineffective incident management and quality assurance systems and from multiple environmental hazards; and (8) denial of patients' First Amendment and due process rights to confidentially communicate with investigators. This second findings letter listed almost twenty pages of minimally-acceptable remedial measures addressing each of these categories. It invited continued collaboration toward resolving the many deficiencies and again alerted the state that, absent improvement, a CRIPA lawsuit would be filed to compel correction of the deficiencies and protection of MSH patients' rights. A third DOJ findings letter dated June 27, 2005, addressed deficiencies found at the Napa State Hospital ("NSH"), another California mental health facility. The letter began by noting that the state had stopped cooperating with DOJ investigators, denying them and their consultants access to NSH and other state mental health facilities the DOJ was then investigating (Patton and Atascadero state hospitals). The DOJ advised that it drew an adverse conclusion about the facility from the state's non-cooperation. It also considered information from regulatory and standards agencies that had surveyed NSH and information from interviews of NSH staff, advocates, family members of patients, and patients. Not only did DOJ find "significant and wide-ranging" deficiencies in NSH patient care, it concluded these deficiencies were "widespread and systemic." NSH deficiencies had been the subject of a prior CRIPA investigation, which led to a 1990 consent decree that was dismissed in 1995. Nevertheless, the DOJ found that significant problems at NSH had recurred. These problems included: (1) failure to protect patients from harm from assaults and suicide (and from staff sales of illegal drugs to patients); (2) inappropriate use of seclusion, restraint and PRN ("pro re nata" or "as-needed") psychotropic medications; and (3) inadequate medical, nursing and psychiatric care. In addition to the recurring problems, the DOJ received information showing (4) deficient mental health treatment planning, programming, and nutritional management; (5) unsanitary conditions; and (6) failure to place patients in the most integrated setting, as required by law. For each of these categories, the findings letter included several specific examples of malfeasance or misfeasance, often describing instances of neglectful or cruel conduct by state personnel. The DOJ noted that it could obtain remedial measures by filing a CRIPA lawsuit against the state, although the letter invited the state to avoid litigation and work cooperatively with DOJ to resolve the identified deficiencies. The DOJ letters eventually resulted in cooperative resolution of these hospitals' many problems, at least on paper. California's officials and the DOJ reached an agreement that became the basis of a consent judgment filed contemporaneously with this lawsuit. The consent judgment contained an explicit "Enhancement Plan" nearly eighty pages long. The plan set out details of standards for comprehensive improvements in care and conditions at MSH and NSH. The consent judgment named an expert independent monitor, Mohamed El-Sabaawi, M.D., to oversee the process of implementing these standards. Dr. El-Sabaawi would have full access to the facilities, patients, and staff, and his periodic reports would go to the court, the parties, and hospital administrators.All terms of the plan were to be implemented within three years, except for the immediate implementation of suicide prevention components of the plan. By its terms, the consent judgment would terminate after five years, with earlier termination possible if the state complied earlier. While the consent judgment remained in effect, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the order. District Judge George P. Schiavelli promptly accepted the settlement and entered the consent judgment. Also on May 2, the DOJ sent California findings letters based on its CRIPA investigations of conditions and practices at two more state mental health facilities: Patton State Hospital and Atascadero State Hospital. DOJ officials and expert consultants had visited the facilities, reviewed a wide array of documents and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The investigations found significant deficiencies in patient care at both Patton and Atascadero Hospitals, specifically with respect to psychiatric and pharmaceutical services, medical care, protection from harm, use of restraints, seclusion, and medications. The findings were broadly similar to those of the MSH and NSH investigations. On February 27, 2007, the parties filed an amended consent judgment. Its terms and duration remained the same, but it added as defendants the officials operating Patton State Hospital and Atascadero State Hospital. Thus, all four hospitals were subject to the consent judgment's enhancement plan. Judge Schiavelli again entered judgment in accordance with the parties' agreement. On December 12, 2007, a detainee in Coalinga State Hospital filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to comply with the amended consent judgment. The plaintiff argued that the judgment applied to the Coalinga State Hospital, where he was being detained. On August 19, 2008, the court denied the petition, finding that the judgment did not apply to residents of the Coalinga State Hospital. A pro se group of residents at Atascadero moved to intervene in the suit on June 21, 2011. The United States and the defendants both opposed the motion to intervene, and the district court denied the motion on October 31, 2011. The residents appealed, but the Ninth Circuit (Judges Michael D. Hawkins, Sidney R. Thomas, and M. Margaret McKeown) upheld the district court's decision. In a decision filed on August 13, 2013, the panel found that the residents' motion to intervene had been filed too late. 538 F. App'x 759. Back in November 2011, the court found Atascadero and Patton State Hospitals had sufficiently complied with the consent judgment and no longer were subject to the court's jurisdiction. MSH was later released from the consent agreement in October 2012. In October 2012, the court released NSH from the consent judgment except regarding sections pertaining to placing residents in prone restraints. A recent restraint death at the hospital prompted the court to continue the restraint-related sections of the consent judgment for one more year. Napa State Hospital was eventually released from the consent judgment in October 2013. The case is now closed.

Summary: A series of Department of Justice CRIPA investigations into California state mental hospitals revealed system-wide deficiencies. As a result, the United States and California entered into a consent decree designed to improve conditions at the hospitals. Over the course of seven years, California made reforms to its hospitals that satisfied the court it had adequately complied with the consent decree.


On June 16, 2003, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Colorado Rockies baseball club in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. Because no documents are available for this case, the details are unknown. Presumably, however, they are similar to the parties in the related action. The complaint in that action is available, and it named three plaintiffs, the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, Inc., a Colorado resident with spina bifida who used a wheelchair for mobility and his father who accompanied him to baseball games. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that prior to 2001, the defendant provided wheelchair accessible seats at Coors Field behind home plate, which were the only accessible seats providing a front-row or "near-in" viewing experience at the infield. These seats cost $27 to $38. Inaccessible seats in the same location were approximately $100. In 2001, to create a luxury seating area, the defendant raised the prices on the accessible seats behind home plate to $100 and removed some of the seats, leaving no affordable equivalent viewpoint for disabled individuals. The complaint brought a single count under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq. The plaintiff asked for declaratory relief, an injunction requiring the defendant to bring the stadium in compliance with the ADA, and attorneys' fees and costs. On June 2, 2003, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. On April 2, 2004, the court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, in a published opinion. Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Colorado Rockies Baseball Club, Ltd., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Col. 2004). The defendant argued that clustering accessible seating at the top of certain sections in the ballpark was permissible under the ADA. The court denied the motion, noting that "The Rockies may not 'ghettoize' wheelchair spaces or designate a few token wheelchair spaces in the luxury seating areas as has been done." A trial took place from April 19 to April 22, 2004. On August 31, 2004, the court granted a joint stipulated dismissal with prejudice of all claims. It is unclear whether the parties settled and if so what the terms of that agreement are. This order is the last entry on the docket. No documents are available through PACER.

Summary: Plaintiffs were disabled individuals who sued the Colorado Rockies baseball club after it removed accessible seats in Coors Field and raised prices on others. There was a trial held, after which the court dismissed all claims by stipulation. It is unclear, however, whether the parties settled.


On August 9, 2018, two Rhode Island cities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island, challenging the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) policy of conditioning federal funding on compliance with immigration-related conditions. The cities argued that the new conditions forced them to make an impossible choice: accept unlawful conditions that undermined their ability to protect their communities or forfeit funding crucial to protecting their communities. Accordingly, the cities argued that the new conditions violated the separation of powers, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Tenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, and also constituted ultra vires conduct. The cities sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Along with the complaint, the cities filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and sought a writ of mandamus directing the DOJ to immediately disburse the cities' fiscal year 2017 award funding. The case was assigned to Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. The cities, Providence and Central Falls, were previous recipients of the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Grant (Byrne JAG). The cities argued that the new immigration-related conditions were not relevant to Byrne JAG’s purpose, which was to provide funding for states and local government in support of local activities related to criminal justice. The program, according to the complaint, was designed to create flexibility in federal funding to allow localities to address their particular law enforcement needs. But, on July 25, 2017, the DOJ announced the imposition of new immigration-related conditions on Fiscal Year 2017 Byrne JAG funds. The conditions required localities to: (1) provide federal immigration enforcement agents with access to the localities’ correctional facilities (“access condition”), (2) provide federal immigration officials with notice before an individual’s scheduled custody release (“notice condition”), and (3) certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (“Section 1373 condition”). Specifically, § 1373 prohibited localities from restricting their officials from communicating with federal immigration officials regarding the immigration status of any individual. The cities argued that these new conditions were an “attempt to force states and localities to forsake their own policy judgments and aid in federal civil immigration enforcement.” But, citing City of Chicago v. Sessions, the complaint argued that the Byrne JAG program did not empower the DOJ to impose such conditions. As a result, the complaint further argued, the DOJ’s conditions violated the separation of powers between Congress and the Executive. The cities also argued that the conditions violated statutory and constitutional anti-commandeering principles by compelling local governments to enforce federal immigration laws. Because the conditions were "ambiguous as to what state and local governments must do to be in compliance and are not germane to the local criminal justice purposes of the Byrne JAG program," the cities argued they also violated the spending clause. Finally, the cities claimed the conditions violated the APA because they were imposed without any reasoning or opportunity for local governments to respond to them. The cities filed an amended complaint on November 9, 2018. In addition to its previous claims, the new complaint further argued that on June 28, 2018, the DOJ announced new immigration-related conditions on four public safety grants for FY2018. The complaint alleged that these conditions were essentially "re-packaged versions" of the previous three conditions, as well as a new condition prohibiting the public disclosure of any federal law enforcement information that might hide undocumented immigrants from federal authorities (“gag-order condition”). On December 21, 2018, the cities filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their claims relating to the FY2017 grant conditions. They also requested a permanent injunction enjoining the DOJ from imposing the access, notice, and § 1373 conditions on the cities. On March 2, 2019, the government filed a cross-motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claims relating to the FY2017 grant conditions. On June 10, 2019, Judge McConnell granted the cities' motion for partial summary judgment. He concluded that the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority in imposing the challenged conditions. Thus, he granted the cities' request for a writ of mandamus directing the DOJ to immediately disburse their FY2017 award funds and reissue FY2017 award letters without the challenged conditions. He also directed the parties to draft a permanent injunction. 385 F.Supp.3d 160. On June 24, 2019, the government filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's June 10 order with respect to the portion of the order directing the DOJ to reissue the FY2017 award letters absent the challenged conditions. Judge McConnell granted this motion on June 27. On June 27, Judge McConnell also issued an order permanently enjoining the DOJ from imposing the notice, access, and § 1373 conditions on any Rhode Island recipient of a Byrne JAG award for FY2017. It also directed the DOJ to disburse the cities' FY2017 awards. On June 27, the cities also filed a motion for partial summary judgment on their claims relating to the FY2018 grant conditions. On August 9, 2019, the government appealed Judge McConnell's June 10 ruling to the First Circuit (docket #19-1802). On August 12, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' claims relating to the FY2018 grant conditions. On November 14, 2019, Judge McConnell granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on their FY2018 claims. He found that the Attorney General had again gone beyond his powers by imposing conditions not authorized by Congress. He granted a writ of mandamus directing the DOJ to immediately disburse the FY2018 funds and directed the parties to draft a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction enjoining the DOJ from imposing the FY2018 conditions. 415 F.Supp.3d 302. On January 10, 2020, Judge McConnell issued an order permanently enjoining the DOJ from enforcing the challenged conditions on the cities for FY2018 and mandating the disbursement of the cities' FY2018 awards. On March 10, 2020, the government appealed Judge McConnell's November 14 ruling to the First Circuit (docket #20-1296). On March 24, 2020, the First Circuit issued a decision affirming the District Court's June 10, 2019 grant of summary judgment relating to the FY2017 conditions. The First Circuit agreed that the Attorney General, and by extension, the DOJ, lacked statutory authority to impose the challenged conditions. 954 F.3d 23. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 9, 2018, two Rhode Island cities challenged the U.S. Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) policy of conditioning federal funding on compliance with immigration-related conditions. The cities argued that the new conditions violated the separation of powers, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Tenth Amendment, the Spending Clause, and also constituted ultra vires conduct. The cities sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The District Court ultimately bifurcated the plaintiffs' claims based on the fiscal year being challenged (grants for FY 2017 and 2018). The Court then granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their claims relating to the challenged conditions for both fiscal years. The government appealed both decisions. On March 24, 2020, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment with respect to the FY2017 conditions. The case is ongoing.


Plaintiffs in this federal marriage equality lawsuit are four same-sex Indiana couples -- two male, two female, one of each gender seeking to get married, and one of each gender seeking to have their out-of-state marriage recognized. They filed the lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on March 7, 2014, to challenge the constitutionality of Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage. Indiana's statute banning same-sex marriages and "void[ing]" out-of-state same-sex marriages is IC 31-11-1-1, Indiana's Defense of Marriage Act, which provides: "(a) Only a female may marry a male. Only a male may marry a female. (b) A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized." Plaintiffs alleged that the Indiana law violates the federal Constitution. And, to the extent it is purportedly authorized by the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), they claimed that the federal statute is also unconstitutional. (Section 2 of DOMA provides: "No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship."). They brought claims under the Equal Protection Clause (alleging both sex and sexual orientation discrimination), the Due Process Clause (arguing that marriage is a fundamental right), the First Amendment (arguing that the marriage ban violated their freedom of association), the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the right to travel, and the Establishment Clause. On June 25, 2014, the court (Judge Richard Young) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On June 26 and July 27, Governor Pence's legal counsel issued two memoranda on the issue of same-sex marriage. The Plaintiffs then sought reconsideration on the court's dismissal of the case, arguing that the memoranda demonstrated the Governor did have authority to enforce the ban and the court therefore did have subject matter jurisdiction over the issue. On September 16, Judge Young granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. He held that the memoranda demonstrated the Governor did have the "specific ability to command the executive branch regarding the law." Therefore, claims as to the state's refusal to recognize out-of-state marriages could be heard against the Governor. But the claims brought by unmarried plaintiffs remained dismissed because the Governor and agencies lacked the authority to grant the relief sought. 47 F.Supp.3d 805. The following day, the court reopened the case. On February 23, 2015, the plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal, stating they had resolved all of their claims. We have no further information on the resolution. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs in this federal marriage equality lawsuit were four same-sex Indiana couples--two male, two female, one of each gender seeking to get married, and one of each gender seeking to have their out-of-state marriage recognized. They filed the lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on March 7, 2014, to challenge the constitutionality of Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage. In June 2014, the court (Judge Richard Young) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court (Judge Young) reinstated the married plaintiffs' claims in September. The case is pending as of November 24, 2014.


On December 21, 2020, nonprofit organizations that serve LGBTQIA+/H individuals filed this lawsuit against the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that DHS was acting contrary to legal precedent on the issue of refugee policy, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the U.S. Constitution when enacting new rules regarding asylum eligibility. Plaintiffs asserted that changes to asylum rules included denying the ability for people to claim persecution on the basis of gender or interpersonal animus, which would disproportionately harm LGBTQIA+/H persons, frustrate the plaintiff organizations’ missions, and divert the plaintiff organizations’ resources toward litigation. Represented by Lambda Legal, Immigration Equality, and Kramer Levin, plaintiffs sought to vacate the rules as well as attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs argued that the rules set forth by DHS exceeded the latter’s statutory authority, were arbitrary and capricious, and procedurally ignored public comments and the interests of other parties, all in violation of the APA. Plaintiffs additionally alleged violations of asylum seekers’ due process. Moreover, plaintiffs claimed that the rules were invalid because the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, was without official authority. Judge Jeffrey S. White was assigned to the case. On December 23, 2020, the court sua sponte moved to refer this case to Judge James Donato, who was assigned Pangea Legal Services v. DHS in the same district court. On December 29, 2020, following Judge Donato’s determination that the two cases were related, the case was re-assigned to him. On January 8, 2021, the court granted a preliminary injunction in the two related cases. Reasoning that the plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable chance of success at trial and that there was risk of irreparable harm without injunction, the court enjoined DHS from enacting the revised rules on a nationwide scale. On January 28, 2021, the two related cases were stayed so as to allow the incoming administration to review and revise the refugee policy. That status report will be due on April 19, 2021.

Summary: Nonprofit organizations serving LGBTQIA+/H populations sued the Department of Homeland Security alleging that the latter's revised rules surrounding asylum seekers were overly restrictive. The court granted a preliminary injunction and has since stayed the case due to the administration change pending review and revision of the regulations.


The facts of this case are provided by a memorandum filed by the plaintiffs following their original complaint because the complaint filed on October 2, 2000 is unavailable. On October 2, 2000, five plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that the Mayor of Seattle, the Police Chief of Seattle and the City of Seattle violated their first amendment rights to free speech and assembly by instituting mass arrests in response to protests of the World Trade Organization (WTO) conference held in Seattle from November 30, 1999 to December 3, 1999. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from Trial Lawyers for Public Justice and several private attorneys. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief that a no protest zone and mass arrests violated their first amendment rights, as well as monetary damages. The plaintiffs represented over 600 people who arrived in Seattle to protest the WTO in 1999. On the first day of the conference, protestors marched throughout downtown Seattle, disrupting the conference and preventing attendees from making the conference. Allegations emerged that protestors turned violent and posed a threat to the safety of the conference attendees. In response to the protests, the mayor of Seattle declared a state of civil emergency and issued Order Number 3, which created a No Protest Zone through 24 blocks of the downtown area. However, protestors would be allowed to continue assembling outside of the zone. On December 1 and 2 of 1999, mass arrests took place throughout the city. Most of the protestors were later released after the end of the WTO conference without facing any charges in court. On March 26, 2001, the plaintiffs proposed an amended complaint adding more named plaintiffs. Judge Barbara J. Rothstein granted the motion a few weeks later. On September 4, 2001, Judge Rothstein referred the motion for order to grant class certification to Magistrate Judge John L. Weinberg. On October 29, 2001, Judge Rothstein ruled on summary judgment motions from both the defendant and the plaintiffs. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, granting summary judgment in part, denying in party, and denying the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion. The court found that the emergency provisions instituted by the city were constitutional on their face, and that the mayor was within his authority to declare a state of civil emergency, establish a curfew, and create a restricted area. The court also ruled that Order Number 3 was constitutional on its face. The remaining issues of fact after the ruling were whether probable cause existed to arrest the individuals who violated the order, if probable cause existed to arrest the individuals who blocked traffic, and whether city policy led to a failure to train and supervise officers in insuring the rights of the plaintiffs. On November 13, 2001, the plaintiffs moved for clarification on two issues remaining from the October 29 summary judgment order. First the plaintiffs wanted clarification on whether the order applied to facial and as applied claims. Second, the plaintiffs asked whether the order applied to individuals outside of the No Protest Zone established by Order Number 3. On December 7, the court stated that the order applied to as applied claims as well as facial claims but it did not cover individuals outside of the No Protest Zone. On January 8, 2002, in response to the clarification order, Magistrate Judge Weinberg recommended that the trial court deny certification of the class because all common questions for the class had been resolved by the court in the clarification order and summary judgment order. The district court adopted the magistrate court’s recommendation and denied certification of the class. The plaintiffs moved for the right to appeal the denial of class certification, which the district court granted. However, the Ninth Circuit denied leave because the plaintiffs did not have standing. In response to the clarification order and summary judgment order, the defense moved on August 1, 2002 to dismiss the mayor and the police chief as defendants because no claims remained that held the two individuals liable. The court granted the order later that month. The only defendant throughout the rest of the action was the City of Seattle. On September 12, 2002, the plaintiffs sought class certification of a new class: individuals who had been arrested outside of the No Protest Zone in an area around First Avenue and Broad Street. Five of the initial plaintiffs also sought final judgment against them because they no longer fit within the class under the new complaint. A separate case, Menotti v. City of Seattle, had gone up on appeal relating to arrests made within the No Protest Zone, and the five plaintiffs wanted to join in that action. On November 5, 2002, the court granted class certification for the First Avenue and Broad Street plaintiffs, stating that the class satisfied the requirements for classwide declaratory relief and the superiority and predominance requirements for damages. While the defense raised the issue of timeliness, the court determined that the case was timely because a previous order had vacated all deadlines for bringing a motion of class certification for this case. The court also granted final judgment for the plaintiffs who would not qualify in the First Avenue and Broad Street class. The non-First Avenue plaintiffs then joined the Menotti appeal. On August 19, 2003, the First Avenue plaintiffs’ case was reassigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman. On October 9, 2003, the defendant and the First Avenue plaintiffs filed for summary judgment. On December 29, 2003, the court granted both motions each in part. The main issue addressed by the court in its order was whether a municipality could be held liable without relying on respondeat superior. While the court found that the municipality could not be liable for the mayor’s order or through the actions of the police captain, there remained a question of material fact as to whether the police captain’s acts were ratified by those with policymaking authority, thus making the municipality liable for the arrests. The court granted the defendant’s motion with respect to the direct use of and delegation of final policymaking authority, but denied ratification of certain actions by persons with final policymaking authority. The court granted the plaintiffs’ claim that there was no probable cause of the arrests, but denied the claim with respect to the liability of the plaintiffs. As the parties prepared for trial in early 2004, they also began engaging in settlement talks. The proposed terms of the settlement agreement included payment of $250,000 by the City of Seattle to be distributed to members of the class after deducting attorneys' fees and the ability of the plaintiffs to expunge their records. On April 9, 2004, the court approved both the expungement and preliminary settlement agreement. On June 17, 2004 the plaintiffs filed a motion for approval of the final class settlement, which added an additional term granting $2000 to the name plaintiffs. The $250,000 promised to the class would be distributed 60 days after final approval by the court, and one third of the $250,000 would be set aside for attorneys' fees and costs. On July 15, 2004 the court approved the final settlement. On October 28, 2004, Judge Pechman dismissed the case with prejudice. On June 2, 2005, the <i>Menotti<i> appeal was reversed and remanded for the four plaintiffs who had joined the appeal on both the issue of class certification and the “as-applied” challenge to the Order No. 3. <i>Menotti v. City of Seattle<i>, 409 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2005). On January 19, 2006, the four plaintiffs filed a new class certification document for individuals arrested near Westlake Park. They later amended their complaint against the City of Seattle, which requested a declaration that the violations of their state and federal were unconstitutional, damages for the violations, and attorney’s fees. On June 5, 2006, Judge Pechman granted the class certification. The court found the class satisfied the predominance and superiority requirements necessary for establishing a class. In the order, Judge Pechman also bifurcated the trial so that if there was a finding for the plaintiffs, individual damages would be determined separately. As trial preparations continued, the defendant filed for summary judgment, while the plaintiffs filed for partial summary judgment asking for a ruling that individualized probable cause did not exist for the arrests in Westlake Park. The court on December 13, 2006 denied the defendant’s motion but granted the plaintiff’s motion. The trial took place between January 8 and January 24, 2007. The Westlake Park plaintiffs asserted two main claims. First, they were unlawfully arrested under the Fourth Amendment. Second, the plaintiffs argued they were arrested because of their viewpoint, which would violate their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. The jury returned with a special verdict on January 29, finding for the plaintiffs on their Fourth Amendment claim, but finding for the defendants on the plaintiffs’ First Amendment Claim. Following the trial, the parties engaged in settlement conferences. Ultimately the settlement agreement, which was proposed in April 2007 and finalized in October 2007. The plaintiffs received a $1,000,000 lump sum cash payment, where $450,000 would cover the attorneys' fees while the remaining amount would go to the class. The four named plaintiffs would also receive an additional $2,500. The plaintiffs would also have their records expunged. The City would incorporate the court rulings regarding probable cause into police officer trainings. The case ended with the court’s approval of the final class settlement between the Westlake Park plaintiffs and the City of Seattle on October 26, 2007.

Summary: Protestors, who had been detained in protesting the World Trade Organization conference in Seattle, sued the city for violating their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages and declaratory relief from the City of Seattle, and ultimately won $1,250,000 in two class action suits.


On April 12, 2006, a group of Muslim and Christian prisoners in various Michigan correctional facilities filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). On January 27, 2010, the prisoners, then represented by both the ACLU and private counsel, filed a second amended complaint seeking class certification for all current and future similarly situated inmates. The prisoners claimed that the MDOC violated § 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA") 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq.; the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions restricted them from attending religious services because of mandatory prison activities such as work duty. Specifically, the Muslim prisoners sought the following relief: accommodation to attend a religiously-required service on Fridays that did not conflict with other mandatory prisoner activities, such as work assignments; reversal of any punishment by the MDOC against inmates who refused to attend prison assignments that required the prisoners to miss any provided Friday Islamic religious services; accommodation for Muslim prisoners to be provided a religiously-mandated halal diet; and finally, accommodation to observe two annual religious feasts. In addition, a Seventh-Day Adventist prisoner sought similar accommodations for observance of the Saturday holy day and reversals of similar disciplinary measures. The prisoners sought injunctive and declaratory relief remedying and enjoining the actions by the MDOC. The case was assigned to Judge Avern Cohn and Magistrate Judge David Grand. On December 20, 2012, Judge Avern Cohn adopted Magistrate Judge Grand's report and recommendation and granted the prisoners' motion for class certification. The class was certified as “'all current and future Michigan Muslim inmates who desire but have been denied ... the ability to participate in Jum'ah because of a conflicting work, school or similar detail. With respect to the provision of a halal diet, plaintiffs seek to certify a class comprised of “all current and future Michigan Muslim inmates who desire but have been denied ... a halal diet that is free of contamination by foods considered haram,' i.e., non-halal meats and/or vegetarian foods that have been 'contaminated' by coming into contact with such meats." <i>Dowdy-El v. Caruso</i>, No. 06-11765, 2012 WL 6642763, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2012). On May 24, 2013, Judge Cohn granted in part and denied in part both the prisoners' and the MDOC's motions for summary judgment. Judge Cohn dismissed the prisoners' Equal Protection claims relating to the prayer services and dietary accommodations. The court also dismissed the free exercise claims relating to prayer services. But the free exercise claims relating to a halal diet were allowed to proceed as were the RLUIPA claims relating to both prayer services and dietary accommodations. Judge Cohn granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on all claims relating to the two annual religious feasts. On September 10, 2013, the prisoners moved for approval of a proposed class settlement agreement regarding the remaining issues before the court (the free exercise and RLUIPA claims for a halal diet and RLUIPA claims regarding accommodation for prayer services). On September 17, 2013, Judge Cohn issued an order preliminarily approving the parties' proposed settlement agreement which introduced new MDOC policies designed to meet the prisoners' remaining concerns. The agreement required the defendants to provide meals that comport with halal religious tenets and to provide notice to prisoners within 30 days of entry of judgment informing them that all disciplinary actions were to be expunged insofar as they related to requests for halal meals. On November 20, 2013, the court approved the settlement agreement and dismissed the case. In doing so, he also overruled several non-party objections to the settlement agreement and also denied several parties' motions to intervene. The court also found that the MDOC had adopted an appropriate policy regarding accommodations for halal diets. The court further directed the MDOC to expunge from prisoners' records any punishment for missing a jail appointment such as a work, school, or administrative assignment due to a conflicting religious service. The court retained jurisdiction solely for the purpose of enforcing any provision of the court's order. The MDOC filed two appeals, but the Sixth Circuit rejected both for lack of jurisdiction on January 15, 2014 and March 3, 2014, respectively. Over the next four years, separate members of the class action filed several motions seeking injunctions against the defendants for failure to comply with the settlement. The court repeatedly denied these requests for failure to state a claim. One such member of the class action appealed to the Sixth Circuit in December 2015. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny this member’s request for relief for allegedly being served contaminated halal food–the Sixth Circuit found such relief was not within the scope of the original settlement. Judge Cohn denied a motion for contempt and enforcement of judgment on August 29, 2018. As of April 10, 2020, the case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.

Summary: A group of Muslim and Christian prisoners in various Michigan correctional facilities filed a class action lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections ("MDOC"). The prisoners claimed that the MDOC violated § 3 of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"); and both the Fourteenth and First Amendments. The prisoners sought the access to religious services and religiously-required diets. On May 24, 2013, Judge Cohn dismissed several claims, but the Free Exercise claims relating to a halal diet were allowed to proceed as were the RLUIPA claims relating to both prayer services and dietary accommodations. Following the MDOC's adoption of new policies, the parties settled the remaining issues before the Court. On November 20, 2013, Judge Cohn approved the settlement agreement and monitoring is ongoing.


On July 9, 2010, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and individual tax-payers and residents of Arizona filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Arizona, District of Phoenix. The plaintiffs sued the state of Arizona and its governor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 8 U.S.C. § 1101. The plaintiffs, represented by their own counsel and by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted S.B. 1070 violated the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and that S.B. 1070. The S.B. 1070 included a provision that required, in the context of a lawful stop, the verification of an individual's immigration status where there was a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual was unlawfully present in the United States. The plaintiffs claimed that the training materials provided to law enforcement to explain "reasonable suspicion" were vague and imprecise. The plaintiffs also claimed that enforcement of S.B. 1070 would cause them substantial and irreparable harm. The proposed class certification was as follows: “All persons present in the State of Arizona who are not the subject of final non-appealable orders of removal issued by the United States Government and who have in the past or may in the future be detained or arrested by Arizona law enforcement authorities for allegedly not being in possession of an alien registration receipt, or for allegedly having violated 8 U.S.C. § 1306(a), or for allegedly having committed a public offense that makes them removable from the United States.” On July 9, 2010, the case was assigned to the Honorable Neil V. Wake. That same day, the plaintiff moved to transfer the case to Judge Susan R. Bolton, who had presided over six similar cases. This motion was granted on August 11, 2010. On December 15, 2010, Judge Susan R. Bolton granted the Motion to Dismiss filed by the defendants Governor Brewer and the State of Arizona. The plaintiffs’ claims against the State of Arizona were dismissed with prejudice because the State was immune from prosecution in this case. The plaintiffs’ claims against Governor Brewer were dismissed without prejudice for a lack of standing. The plaintiffs were directed to file any amendments to their pleading within 30 calendar days. On January 24, 2011, the tax-payers residing in Arizona filed an amended class-action complaint against the governor of Arizona and officials in Maricopa and Pima counties. They brought the same legal claims, but sought certification for a class of “all persons present in the Counties of Pima and Maricopa who are county taxpayers and whose tax payments have been or will in the future be used to implement S.B. 1070.” The plaintiffs claimed that the State of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 included a broad set of provisions that were designed to “work together to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens” by making “attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.” The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that Sections 1-6 of S.B. 1070 were invalid, null and void; preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the further implementation Sections 1-6 of SB 1070; declaratory judgment that LULAC members could not be detained, arrested, or prosecuted by defendants or their agents for not having or for transporting people who were not registered pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1302, not carrying registration receipt cards pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1306, or for seeking or accepting employment in Arizona; and attorney’s cost. On March 14, 2011, Judge Bolton issued an order granting Defendant Sheriff Arpaio’s motion for joinder in defendant Brewer’s motion to dismiss. On August 26, 2011, Judge Bolton granted in part and denied in part the portion of Governor Brewer’s motion to dismissal the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim. Judge Susan R. Bolton found that LULAC had organizational standing to challenge S.B. 1070 on First Amendment grounds, but that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their taxpayer claims. Moreover, LULAC had associational standing to bring an equal protection or § 1981 claim related to differential treatment of different groups of immigrants, but the plaintiffs’ claims under the Equal Protection Clause and § 1981 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court dismissed the unnamed plaintiffs because the FAC contained no allegations referencing these plaintiffs. Finally, the Court declined to dismiss or stay any remaining claim in this case on the grounds that it was similar to or duplicative of claims in Friendly House v. Whiting or United States v. Arizona. On November 22, 2011, Judge Susan R Bolton issued an order requesting that counsel for the plaintiffs to show cause in writing within 7 days why this case should not be dismissed for the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with this Court's September 27, 2011 scheduling order. The response by the plaintiffs’ attorney was received on November 28, 2011 and the case continued. On February 1, 2012, Judge Susan R. Bolton dismissed with prejudice the case against the head of the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Maricopa County, and Pima County, prejudice as per the plaintiffs’ request. On March 2, Governor Brewer moved to dismiss the case based on LULAC’s failure to comply with discovery orders. On May 31, 2012, Judge Bolton rebuked LULAC for its failure, but decided against dismissing the case. Instead, she stayed the case pending final rulings in Friendly House v. Whiting and United States v. Arizona. In addition, Judge Bolton denied as moot the Governor’s Motion to Consolidate Action. On September 4, 2015, Judge Bolton lifted the stay issued on May 31, 2012 because the final rulings had been issued in both Friendly House v. Whiting and United States v. Arizona. The cases had upheld the constitutionality of the component of the bill requiring law enforcement to check immigration during stops. Judge Bolton ordered that the parties to confer and advise the Court how they wished to proceed. The parties agreed to file a stipulation to dismiss this case with prejudice, with each party to bear their own fees and costs. On September 30, 2015, Judge Susan R. Bolton dismissed the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 9, 2010, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and a group of individuals filed suit challenging Arizona's "show me your papers" law. The case was ultimately dismissed with prejudice.


On April 17, 2007, former sales associates of Sears, Roebuck & Co. filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against the company and Sears Home Improvement Products ("SHIP"), a wholly owned subsidiary. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the company violated the ADEA when it transitioned the plaintiffs from their sales positions at Sears to inferior positions at SHIP. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that this transition had a disparate impact because it caused a disproportionate number of employees age forty and older to terminate their employment or be terminated. Sears formed SHIP in 2001 in order to combine into a single corporation several home improvement companies it had acquired. Citing an interest in expanding its business, the company decided in 2004 to transition the Sears sales associates to SHIP, which the company claimed had one of the best business models in the country for selling home improvement goods. Under the transition plan, each employee was to be terminated by Sears and then hired by SHIP. The plaintiffs claimed, however, that Sears and SHIP offered drastically different compensation and benefits: after the transition, sales associates were no longer reimbursed for business expenses, they lost much of their paid time off, and they worked longer hours while covering a larger sales territory. The plaintiffs alleged that this transition caused many company employees above age 40 either to resign or be terminated. On August 20, 2007, the Court (Judge George C. Steeh) denied the defendants' motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, holding that they had failed to show that fairness and practicality strongly counseled in favor of such a transfer. Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 07-11706, 2007 WL 2406921 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 20, 2007). In the same order, the Court denied without prejudice the defendants' motion to dismiss. It determined that the plaintiffs could still allege facts showing that the transition plan constituted an employment policy or practice sufficient to satisfy the first prong of a disparate impact claim. After several months of discovery, on February 25, 2008, the Court (Judge Steeh) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the disparate treatment age discrimination claim, although it permitted the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 07-11706, 2008 WL 544951 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2008). The plaintiffs had stated at a November 2007 scheduling conference that they would pursue discovery on a disparate treatment theory in addition to their disparate impact theory. The defendants filed this motion to prevent the plaintiffs from doing so, arguing that they could not raise the disparate treatment claim because that claim was not plead in the complaint. On March 11, 2008, the plaintiffs accepted the court's invitation and amended their complaint to include a count for disparate treatment under the ADEA. The parties then engaged in discovery for the next year. On April 15, 2009, the Court (Judge Steeh) granted the plaintiffs' motion to conditionally certify a collective action. The defendants then argued that the Portal-to-Portal Act barred the claims of former sales associates who were not named as plaintiffs because the associates failed to file their written opt-in consents in time. The Court (Judge Steeh) rejected this argument in an order issued on January 20, 2010. Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., No. 07-11706, 2010 WL 259069 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20, 2010). It invoked a judicial exception to the filing rule that allows an alleged victim of discrimination who failed to timely file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to "piggy back" on the charge of a plaintiff who did timely file. Because the Court determined that the timely filed claims in this case provided sufficient notice to the defendants that the claims were brought on behalf of all class members, it denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims that were not timely filed. The Court (Judge David M. Lawson) issued an order on July 23, 2010, setting a time and date for a facilitative mediation. The parties failed to reach an agreement, however, and on August 30, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The Court (Judge Steeh) granted the motion and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety on March 10, 2011. Allen v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 803 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Mich. 2011). In the order, the Court separately analyzed the disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. It explained that the disparate impact claim failed for three reasons: the plaintiffs did not identify a facially neutral practice or policy, they failed to provide statistical evidence that the defendants' decision to eliminate reimbursement and paid time off disproportionately impacted older workers, and the defendants demonstrated that the transition and the related policy decisions were based on reasonable factors other than age, a full affirmative defense to a disparate impact claim. As for the disparate treatment claim, the Court held that this claim failed because none of the plaintiffs experienced an adverse employment action and because the defendants provided legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the transition and the decisions executing it. After entering judgment for the defendants, the Court also terminated the case on March 10, 2011.

Summary: On April 17, 2007, former sales associates of Sears, Roebuck & Co. filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") against the company and Sears Home Improvement Products ("SHIP"), a wholly owned subsidiary. The plaintiffs claimed that the company violated the ADEA when it transitioned the plaintiffs from their sales positions at Sears to inferior positions at SHIP. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that this transition had a disparate impact because it caused a disproportionate number of employees age forty and older to terminate their employment or be terminated. (The plaintiffs later amended their complaint to include a charge of disparate treatment under the ADEA.) On March 10, 2011, the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint in its entirety.


On July 11, 2007, a group of teenage girls in the Columbia Training School, a state-run reform school in Mississippi, filed a class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the State of Mississippi in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Mississippi Protection and Advocacy Inc., a congressionally authorized nonprofit organization that enforces the civil rights of people with disabilities, is also a plaintiff in the suit. The plaintiffs are represented by the Bazelon Center, the Mississippi Youth Justice Project (MYJP), which is a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center, and Robert B. McDuff, a civil rights attorney in Jackson, Mississippi. The plaintiff girls range in age from 13 to 17. All suffer from mental illnesses and all were committed to Columbia for non-violent offenses. Most are victims of past physical or sexual abuse, and they allege that the defendants have violated their constitutional rights by subjecting them to "horrendous" physical and sexual abuse. The complaint asks the court to require the state to provide federally required mental health and rehabilitative treatment to girls confined in the Columbia Training School. Specifically, they allege the following: 1) In an apparent response to unsubstantiated allegations that they planned to escape, five of the plaintiffs were shackled around their ankles for 12 hours a day for periods ranging from eight days to a month. They had to eat, attend school, use the bathroom, participate in recreational activities and visit with their families while wearing the painful shackles. 2) One girl was sexually assaulted by a male employee of the facility while she was confined in a segregated area. She reported the assault but was never informed of the results of an investigation and never received counseling to help her deal with the trauma. 3) Three of the girls cut themselves while on suicide watch. None of them received any psychological help during their isolation. No attempt was made to stabilize their moods, and staff members failed to perform periodic checks to ensure their safety. One girl was placed in a cell alone for 14 hours, during which time she carved the words "HATE ME" into her forearm. One sliced her wrists with glass, and another sliced her wrists on the edge of her concrete bunk. According to a press release discussing the complaint, most of the girls at Columbia were sent there for nonviolent offenses such as shoplifting, running away, disorderly conduct and other minor offenses, and most could be treated far more effectively - at half the cost - in community-based programs that focus on rehabilitation and mental health treatment. The State of Mississippi spends $5 million a year to house an average of 60 girls at Columbia. After the case was filed, the state decided to close the Columbia facility, rendering the claim for injunctive relief moot. In September 2008, the plaintiffs amended their complaint: they dropped the claims for injunctive relief so that only three claims for damages remained. The following summer, two of the defendants moved to dismiss the claims. According to the plaintiffs' Motion for Relief filed August 18, 2009, the plaintiffs inadvertently failed to respond to this motion, and the court entered an order granting the request to dismiss and ordering the plaintiffs to show cause why the entire action should not be dismissed. The court allowed the case to proceed for several more months, but after the case failed to settle, the court dismissed the case with prejudice on June 17, 2010. We have no further information about a possible settlement for damages on the remaining claims.

Summary: On July 11, 2007, a group of teenaged girls in the Columbia Training School, a state-run reform school in Mississippi, filed a class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the State of Mississippi in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint asks the court to require the state to provide federally required mental health and rehabilitative treatment to girls confined in the Columbia Training School. The state closed the facility shortly after the case was filed, and the case was dismissed in 2010 following a failure to come to a settlement on the claims for damages.


On May 24, 2016, the Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute and three Michigan voters filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of Michigan's 2015 Public Act 268, which eliminated straight party voting. The plaintiffs claimed that PA 268 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Section 2 of the VRA, and the ADA. Specifically, they claimed that by abolishing straight party voting, PA 268 unreasonably burdened the right to vote of all Michigan citizens, unreasonably and disproportionately burdened the right to vote of African American citizens, and denied and abridged the right to vote of African Americans because of their race. On May 27, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of PA 268, which they followed on June 1, 2016, with their first amended complaint that added the Common Cause nonprofit as another plaintiff. Judge Gershwin A. Drain issued an opinion and order granting a preliminary injunction on July 21, 2016, amended on July 22. Judge Drain found that:
 1. PA 268 places a "disproportionate burden on African Americans' right to vote," so plaintiffs will likely succeed on the merits. 2. "When constitutional rights are threatened or impaired, irreparable injury is presumed." 3. Defendant will not be significantly harmed by an injunction, which would only result in the state using ballot procedures that it has used for many years past. 4. The public interest in protecting the right to vote exceeds the state's interest in changing its voting system.
 Judge Drain also rejected defendant's arguments against the injunction, concluding that plaintiffs did not delay filing the lawsuit, either purposefully or through lack of diligence. The lawsuit was appropriately filed in federal court because plaintiffs alleged federal claims, that state control of elections did not remove constitutional limits on how they may do so, and that plaintiffs had standing because they reasonably argued that the statute would disproportionately impact them as individuals. However, Judge Drain questioned the sustainability of plaintiff's allegation that PA 268 violated the ADA because "[n]one of the listed Plaintiffs are described as having any disabilities as recognized by the ADA." 209 F.Supp.3d 935. Over the next month, defendant sought an order from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals striking down the preliminary injunction but was unable to persuade Judge Drain to stay the injunction pending appeal. On August 17, 2016, Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore, joined by Judges Gilman and Stranch, denied defendant's motion for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Using the same four-factor analysis as Judge Drain, Judge Moore found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by granting the injunction. Judge Gilman wrote separately to emphasize that the Circuit Court's decision was not a final judgment on the merits. Finally, on September 19, 2016, the Sixth Circuit granted defendant's motion to withdraw their appeal against the preliminary injunction. 833 F.3d 656. Possibly due in part to the defects of their original ADA claim, plaintiffs moved for leave to modify their complaint on November 14, 2016. Plaintiffs sought to remove their allegation that PA 268 violates the ADA, add an allegation that PA 268 intentionally discriminated against African Americans, and add an allegation that PA 268 violated the First Amendment. On January 19, 2017, Judge Drain issued an order and opinion granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. In particular, Judge Drain:
 1. Approved plaintiff's request to remove their ADA claim, 2. Approved plaintiffs' request to add a count of intentional discrimination under Sixth Circuit precedent "demonstrat[ing] that multiple Equal Protection claims can co-exist within the same cause of action," and 3. Denied plaintiffs' request to add a First Amendment claim because "[p]laintiffs fail to cite a single relevant authority to support this argument." 2017 WL 3390364.
 On January 26, 2017, plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint with these changes. After several months of procedural battles, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on October 16, 2017. On January 19, 2018, Judge Drain rejected defendant's summary judgment motion. In a detailed opinion based on voluminous expert reports and social science research, Judge Drain found that PA 268 created "more than a minimal" burden on African Americans and that "reasonable minds may disagree" about PA 268's impact. Thus, Judge Drain declared summary judgment inappropriate. However, Judge Drain held that the white plaintiff lacked standing because she did not allege a particularized injury. 2018 WL 493184. Following the denial of defendant's summary judgment motion and disputes between plaintiffs and the defendant regarding admissibility of certain types of evidence, the case was tried before Judge Drain. On August 1, 2018, Judge Drain delivered an opinion on the merits and issued a permanent injunction against PA 268. 2018 WL 3640439. Judge Drain's amended opinion of August 9, 2018, included findings of fact that PA 268 would "increase wait times" for all voters and "disproportionately" affect African Americans who used straight-party voting at higher rates than whites. In addition, Judge Drain found that PA 268 would reduce voting across all demographics and "disproportionately deter" African Americans. As a result, Judge Drain held that:
 1. PA 268 violates the Equal Protection Clause because the state's interest in regulating its own elections does not outweigh the burden PA 268 placed on African Americans' voting rights. 2. Michigan "intentionally discriminated" against African Americans by enacting PA 268, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause. 3. PA 268 violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act because it "links with social and historical conditions of discrimination" to disparately impact African Americans. 2018 WL 3769326.
 Following Judge Drain's ruling, defendant appealed to the Sixth Circuit and requested from the District Court a stay of the injunction pending appeal. Judge Drain denied the stay on August 23, 2018. 2018 WL 4024895. However, Circuit Judge Boggs, joined by Judge Kethledge, overruled the District Court and issued a stay on September 5, 2018. Applying the same four-factor test that Judge Drain used to issue the original preliminary injunction but reaching the opposite conclusion, Judge Boggs questioned the opinion's "factual underpinnings and . . . legal analysis," and said defendants established a "likelihood of reversal." Judge Kethledge issued a concurring opinion in which he stated that racial animus does not follow from the fact that PA 268 will likely benefit Republicans. Judge Donald dissented, arguing that the majority neither adequately consider the history of voting discrimination nor gave enough deference to the trial court's findings before granting the stay. The appeal on the merits is ongoing at the Sixth Circuit. On November 6, 2018, Michigan voters passed Proposal 3 which amended the state constitution to preserve straight party voting, in addition to bringing other voting reforms. As a result of Proposal 3, on January 14, 2019, the Sixth Circuit dismissed defendant's appeal of the permanent injunction as moot. (Circuit Judge Boggs, Kethledge, and Donald). On February 7, 2019, in accordance with the Sixth Circuit's order, Judge Drain vacated the August 1, 2018 judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and 52 U.S.C. § 10310(e). Finding that the plaintiffs prevailed with respect to the preliminary injunction but not with respect to the request for a permanent injunction, Judge Drain awarded plaintiffs with attorneys’ fees and costs for work completed in connection with the preliminary injunction in the amount of $530,874.29.

Summary: On May 24, 2016, the Michigan State A. Philip Randolph Institute and three Michigan voters filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Secretary of State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of Michigan’s 2015 Public Act 268, which eliminated straight party voting. The plaintiffs claimed that PA 268 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, Section 2 of the VRA, and the ADA. Specifically, they claimed that by abolishing straight party voting, PA 268 unreasonably burdened the right to vote of all Michigan citizens, unreasonably and disproportionately burdened the right to vote of African American citizens, and denied and abridged the right to vote of African Americans because of their race. Judge Gershwin Drain granted a preliminary injunction on July 21, 2016 and then a permanent injunction against PA 268 on August 1, 2018. Defendant appealed to the Sixth Circuit and despite Judge Drain's denial of a stay of the injunction pending appeal, the Sixth Circuit issued a stay in September of 2018. On November 6, 2018, Michigan voters preserved straight party voting when they passed Proposal 3. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot and Judge Drain vacated the August 2018 judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice.


On July 1, 2011, a law student who was legally blind and learning disabled filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont against the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the ACT, which administrated the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). The complaint alleged that the defendants violated the ADA by refusing to allow the plaintiff to take an electronic version of MPRE with screen reading and magnification software she had used for all of her post-secondary education. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a preliminary injunction, declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees. On July 20, 2011, the United States Department of Justice submitted a Statement of Interest support plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and asking the court not to adopt the "reasonableness" standard advocated by the defendants. Instead, it argued that the court should adopt the United States Department of Justice's reading of the relevant provisions of the ADA to established a standard that "best ensures" that the aptitude of the examinee is measured by the test and not their disability. On August 2, 2011, the District Court (Chief Judge Christina Reiss) granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to allow her to use her screen reading and magnifying software on the MPRE, finding a high likelihood of harm and a likelihood that plaintiff would win the case. The District Court also adopted the "best ensures" standard advocated by the United States Department of Justice. On September 7, 2011, the District Court (Chief Judge Reiss) granted defendants' motion to amend the preliminary injunction to include different types of software, denied defendants' motion to amend the preliminary injunction to prevent others from taking the test using plaintiff's accommodations, and denied defendant's motion for a stay that would allow it to keep from giving plaintiff her score until she was ready to apply for admission to the bar in 2012. On August 15, 2011, defendant appealed the District Court's order to grant plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, which was dismissed as moot. On August 9, 2012, the plaintiff and defendants entered a joint order requesting final judgment and noting that defendants agreed to let plaintiff take, and if necessary retake, the test with accommodations. On August 13, 2012, the District Court (Chief Judge Reiss) awarded the plaintiff $275,000 in attorney's fees and closed the case.

Summary: On July 1, 2011, a law student who was legally blind and learning disabled filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont against the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the ACT, which administrated the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE). The complaint alleged that the defendants violated the ADA by refusing to allow the plaintiff to take an electronic version of MPRE with screen reading and magnification software she had used for all of her post-secondary education. On August 9, 2012, the plaintiff and defendants entered a joint order requesting final judgment and noting that defendants agreed to let plaintiff take, and if necessary retake, the test with accommodations.


On November 14, 2013, a group of Catholic non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan claiming violations of the First Amendment. According to the plaintiffs, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act should have barred the defendant U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing the the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance requirements, even with its accommodations for non-profit organizations. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the mandate was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs also asked for a permanent injunction to keep the government from enforcing any contraception coverage requirement against the organizations and other similarly situated religious non-profits. They alleged that the ACA's religious accommodations were a "shell game" that still in effect required them to provide contraceptive coverage to employees. On November 20, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On December 27, 2013, U.S. District Court (Judge Gordon J. Quist) denied it on the grounds that the ACA accommodations did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. 989 F.Supp.2d 577. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. And on January 3, 2014, U.S. District Court (Judge Gordon J. Quist) granted the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief pending appeal. On January 13, 2014, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the government's motion to consolidate this appeal with Roman Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius. Oral arguments took place on May 8, 2014 before Circuit Judges Karen Nelson Moore and John M. Rogers, and District Judge John Nixon (sitting by designation). On June 11, 2014, in an opinion by Judge Moore, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction for all plaintiffs. Organizations exempt from the contraception mandate faced no burden on the exercise of their religion, and therefore were unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 989 F.Supp.2d 577. On December 18, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a letter notifying the district court that the plaintiff had filed a petition for certiorari regarding the Sixth Circuit's denial of a preliminary injunction. The district court dismissed the defendant's summary judgment motion pending the Supreme Court's decision on the plaintiff's petition. On May 29, 2015, the Supreme Court issued a judgment vacating the denial of the plaintiff's requested preliminary injunction. The Court remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit in light of the Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, which held that the ACA's contraception coverage mandate exemption for religious non-profits should be extended to closely held private corporations. On August 21, 2015, a Sixth Circuit panel consisting of Judges Moore and Rogers (as well as District Judge Nixon serving by designation) affirmed its previous denial of a preliminary injunction: the plaintiffs—all non-profits rather than closely held corporations—could not show that the ACA's existing exemptions and accommodations placed a substantial burden on them. 807 F.3d 738. On March 9, 2016, the plaintiffs' again filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. On June 24, 2016, the Supreme Court issued an order remanding the case to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration in light of Zubik v. Burwell, in which the Court had declined to strike down the existing ACA accommodations for religious non-profits. On November 2, 2017, the plaintiffs entered a joint stipulation of dismissal and the case is now closed.

Summary: On November 14, 2013, a non-profit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with accommodations for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, and the suit was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs following the Supreme Court's decision in Zubik v. Burwell, in which the Court declined to strike down the ACA contraception requirement accommodations as applied to religious non-profits.


The Indianapolis district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Unitrin Specialty (a business segment of Unitrin, Inc.) and Trinity Universal Insurance Co. (a wholly owned subsidiary of Unitrin, Inc.) in September 2006 in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that an employee had been fired in retaliation for complaining about sex and age discrimination in the workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In 2006 and 2007, the parties began discovery and started to engage in court-ordered mediation. On September 22, 2008, Judge Walter Herbert Rice granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s conduct was not actually protected under Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e or the ADEA. Therefore, retaliation in violation of the ADEA or Title VII had not occurred. The defendants then moved for attorney fees on October 3, 2008, but the court denied this request on August 31, 2009. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that an employee had been fired in retaliation for complaining about sex and age discrimination in the workplace, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). In 2008, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the lawsuit for summary judgement.


On November 26, 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN), a project of the Human Rights Defense Center, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the GEO Group, a Florida for-profit corporation that operates and manages the New Castle Correctional Facility, and the State of Indiana. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Indiana and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendants violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by censoring its monthly journal, Prison Legal News. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' prison mail policies unconstitutionally prohibited the distribution of its journal to prisoners in custody and failed to provide PLN with notice of this censorship and an opportunity to contest it. The Indiana Department of Correction forbade prisoners from using pen-pal services, and the defendants allegedly refused to deliver Prison Legal News because it features advertisements from companies that offer these services. In response, PLN argued that defendants' mail policies lacked a rational basis because prisoners were permitted to receive many other publications with advertisements for items or services that they could not access. PLN therefore claimed that defendants' conduct violated its First Amendment right to communicate with incarcerated individuals and its Fourteenth Amendment right under the Due Process Clause to receive notice of and an opportunity to challenge any decisions to censor its speech. On January 21, 2015, the parties reached an agreement and filed a stipulation to enter a consent injunction. One day later, the Court (Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson) entered the injunction. Pursuant to the consent agreement, the Court enjoined the defendants from refusing to accept delivery of Prison Legal News and from preventing the prisoners from receiving the journal on the basis that it contained advertisements for prohibited goods or services. The Court also stipulated that if the defendants prevent the prisoners from obtaining any publication in the future, the defendants must mail a notification letter to the sender to inform the sender of the rejection and explain the basis for the decision. The publisher or sender will then have an opportunity to appeal. As another component of the stipulation, the Court directed the defendants to post a copy of the consent injunction in the prisoners' living area for ninety days and to keep a copy in the facility's law library. Finally, the Court ordered the defendants to conduct a live training session for the facility's mailroom staff on complying with the consent injunction. The defendants must certify compliance with this provision within ninety days of the order. The parties continued to work out a case management plan and set a settlement conference date to discuss the defendant's future performance and whether the previously agreed upon injunction resolves all of plaintiff's claims. The matter was resolved by the parties and they submitted a stipulation of dismissal in August 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: In November 2014, Prison Legal News filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal district court against The GEO Group, a for-profit corporation that operates and manages a state correctional facility in Indiana, as well as against the state. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by prohibiting the distribution of its monthly journal to prisoners in custody and by failing to provide notice of this censorship and an opportunity to contest it. In January 2015, the parties reached an agreement and filed a stipulation to enter a consent injunction, which the court ordered the next day. Under the agreement, the defendants are enjoined from preventing the distribution of the journal without providing sufficient justification and are required to post the consent injunction in their facilities and conduct compliance training for the mailroom staff. The case is now closed.


On September 20, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3612(o) against the owners of a single family home, their real estate agent and his employer, and a real estate brokerage firm. The plaintiff filed the action on behalf of an African-American family (and their real estate agent) to whom the defendants refused to sell their home on the basis of their race. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief, and civil penalties. The plaintiff alleged that when the owner first engaged the services of a real estate agent, he told the agent that he would prefer not to sell to a black family, but that for the right price, he didn't care who bought it. The agent found the family, negotiated with their agent and, on behalf of the owners, agreed to a price and drafted a sales contract. The owners discovered the family was black and refused to sign the sales contract, saying they had changed their minds about moving, had trouble finding a new home, trouble finding a suitable school, and other reasons the family found pretextual. On January 28, 2010, the family filed a charge with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. After an investigation, HUD found reasonable cause to believe that the owners had violated the Fair Housing Act. The owners then offered the home to the family, but at a much higher price. The family refused and the lawsuit was filed. On November 09, 2011, the Court (Judge Der-Yeghiayan) approved a three-year Partial Final Consent Order agreed to by the Plaintiff, the real estate agent, his employer, and the brokerage firm (the "Settling Defendants"). The Consent Decree did not include the homeowners, the claims against whom were still to be litigated. The Consent Decree 1) enjoined the settling defendants from refusing to sell or negotiate on the basis of race or color, and 2) ordered Defendants to pay $30,000 in compensatory damages. It also required training and education for new agents, notice of non-discrimination policies and other injunctive relief. On July 27, 2012, a second final partial consent decree was approved by the judge between the plaintiff and the owners. This 3-year decree required the owners to agree to non-discriminatory practices, to permit compliance testing and monitoring, and to pay $6,000 to the family's realtor. As of March 2019, there have been no further updates to the case; the case is now closed.

Summary: The United States filed this race discrimination case in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the owners of a single family residence and their realtor on behalf of an African American family. The plaintiff claimed the owners refused to sell to the family when they discovered they were black. After a HUD finding of reasonable cause, the owners' realtor, his employer, and brokerage firm entered and the judge approved, a consent decree requiring non-discrimination training, general non-discrimination prohibition and the payment of $30,000 to the aggrieved parties. Later, the owners also entered into a consent decree which provided for compliance testing to assure that the owners complied with non-discriminatory policies and practices, and payment of $6,000 to the family's realtor. This three-year decree concluded the case.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing lawsuit regarding Arkansas state laws that limited abortions. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the laws were amended to include abortion restrictions instituted by an executive order banning all elective procedures issued by Arkansas's governor on April 4, 2020. The court initially granted a temporary restraining order, which blocked the bans on abortion for a two-week period. However, on appeal the Eighth Circuit overturned the decision on April 22. On April 27, the state issued a revised directive that allowed elective procedures, but only under certain conditions like mandatory testing for patients. The plaintiffs challenged the revised directive, but their request for a temporary restraining order was denied, since the new order was even less restrictive for patients and providers than the April 3 order. The case is ongoing. <hr> Two consolidated federal lawsuits were prompted by Arkansas state laws that limited the circumstances under which a woman could seek an abortion. The plaintiffs in both cases, abortion-providing facilities in Arkansas and the doctors that worked at them, claimed that Arkansas already regulated abortion to make it safe and that these laws unnecessarily restricted access. Specifically, they alleged that the 18-week ban prevented abortion before viability, the Reason Ban was unconstitutionally vague, and the OBGYN requirement needlessly restricted the pool of available abortion providers without providing any scientific benefit to women. The first case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas on December 15, 2018, by Planned Parenthood of Arkansas and Eastern Oklahoma (PPAEO) and Little Rock Family Planning Services (LRFPS), two abortion-providing facilities, and doctors that worked at the clinics. This suit contested Arkansas laws enacted in 2015 that required abortion providers to have a signed contract with admitting privileges to a hospital and to comply with requirements listed on the final printed label of an abortion drug. Then, on June 16, 2019, the same group of clinics and doctors filed an additional suit contesting new laws. These laws, enacted on April 24, 2019, restricted circumstances under which a woman could request an abortion after 18 weeks gestation, prevented doctors from aborting a fetus if the doctor "has knowledge" that the woman was seeking an abortion solely because the fetus had Down Syndrome (the "Reason Ban"), and barred anyone other than a board-certified obstetrician or gynecologist (OBGYN) from performing an abortion. The plaintiffs sued Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and judgments that various new Arkansas laws violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the new laws in the Arkansas unconstitutionally limited access to abortion in that state. The court consolidated the two cases in a July 5, 2019 order (2019 WL 2913505); Judge Kristine Baker presided over the consolidated matter. Judge Baker issued a temporary restraining order in favor of the plaintiffs on July 23, 2019 (398 F.Supp.3d 330) and granted preliminary injunctive relief in favor of the plaintiffs on August 6, 2019 (397 F.Supp.3d 1213). The state immediately appealed; that appeal has been briefed and argued in the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals, but no decision has yet been rendered. After Arkansas's Governor Asa Hutchinson signed an executive order on April 4, 2020 banning all elective abortions during the COVID-19 crisis, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to include the new bans. Judge Baker issued a temporary restraining order overturning the bans for two weeks between April 14 and April 28, 2020 (2020 WL 1862830). The defendants sought appellate review of the COVID-19 decision, asking the Eighth Circuit to block the restraining order and halt subsequent emergency relief. The appeals panel of Judges James Loken, Bobby Shepherd, and Ralph Erickson agreed to that request on April 22, 2020 (956 F.3d 1018), holding that abortions were elective, non-necessary medical procedures that should be halted in a time of medical crisis when personal protective equipment is scarce. The panel determined that because the April 3 directive was issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, even if it was “an outright ban on all pre-viability surgical abortions, it [was] not subject to constitutional challenge unless it ‘[had] no real or substantial relation to’ the public health crisis, or ‘[was], beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of’ a woman’s right to elective abortion.” On April 22, the plaintiffs filed motions with the district court seeking another temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief on their amended complaint. However, on April 27 the Arkansas Department of Health issued a revised directive that permitted elective surgeries under certain conditions. This directive didn't single out abortion providers or surgical abortions, so it was less restrictive than the April 3 order. On May 1, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint and directed that the amended complaint and related motions for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief be filed as a separate action in light of the Eighth Circuit's decision denying to enjoin the less restrictive April 3 order. That same day, the plaintiffs pleadings were randomly assigned a new docket number (4:20-cv-00470) and the case was assigned to Judge Brian Stacy Miller. On May 7, Judge Miller allowed the plaintiffs amended complaint to proceed but denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. Based on the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, Judge Miller found that the April 27 directive was much less burdensome for both abortion providers and patients than the April 3 directive because it permitted elective surgeries as long as certain precautions were taken, whereas the April 3 directive prohibited them altogether. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In a case combined in 2019, abortion providers in Arkansas successfully sued the state over laws from 2015 and 2019 restricting access to abortion. The federal judge granted preliminary injunctive relief until further notice. Then, during the COVID-19 crisis, Arkansas's Governor banned all elective medical procedures, including abortions. The plaintiffs first won a temporary retraining order to the executive order, but the Court of Appeals blocked the restraining order on April 22. On April 27, the state issued a revised directive that allowed elective procedures, but only under certain conditions like mandatory testing for patients. The plaintiffs challenged the revised directive, but their request for a temporary restraining order was denied, since this order was even less restrictive than the April 3 order. The case is ongoing.