COVID-19 Summary: Five particularly vulnerable immigration detainees and organizations comprised of immigration attorneys filed this complaint on March 30, 2020, challenging EOIR and ICE's failure to implement a uniform policy suspending in-person immigration court appearances and providing for remote communication alternatives. Their emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking the suspension of in-person hearings and the implementation of procedures for remote communications, was denied in late April. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. <hr> On March 30, 2020, individuals detained in ICE facilities and several organizations whose members include attorneys representing current and prospective clients detained in U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facilities filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), ICE, and the directors of those agencies in their official capacities. The plaintiffs claimed that in failing to "put in place a uniform policy suspending in-person appearances and enacting protective measures for detained noncitizens who wish to proceed with their immigration hearings," the defendants violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the First Amendment, and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought injunctive relief ordering the defendants "to suspend in-person immigration hearings for detained individuals and to provide robust remote access alternatives for detained individuals who wish to proceed with their hearings" during the COVID-19 pandemic and to "guarantee secure and reliable remote communication between noncitizens in detention and their legal representatives." The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and costs, personal protective equipment should it be necessary, and, in the alternative, "injunctive relief ordering temporary release for detained immigrants who have inadequate access to alternative means of remote communication with legal representatives or the immigration court." The case was assigned to Judge Carl J. Nichols. This case was filed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the potential for in-person court appearances as a risk factor for further outbreak of the disease. States and countries around the world had taken unprecedented measures to control the spread of the disease (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) including shutting down nonessential businesses, restricting public gatherings, and imposing “shelter-in-place” orders. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) warned that courthouses, because of the level of interaction with people and objects that in-person court appearances require, are especially susceptible to the spread of the virus. The CDC recommended social distancing measures and specifically urged “alternatives to in-person court appearances, such as virtual court, as a social distancing measure to reduce the risk of COVID-19 transmission.” As such, federal courts and the Bureau of Prisons have taken measures to implement uniform policies to minimize the health risk. Yet, the plaintiffs asserted that EOIR has not taken the same uniform protective measures and most immigration courts remain open for business, putting the health and safety of attorneys and clients at risk. Moreover, plaintiffs contended that the defendants were still holding in-person immigration hearings, despite the availability of telephonic and video teleconferencing capabilities, and continued to require paper filings to made at physical court locations. Lastly, the plaintiffs' contended that the lack of a uniform policy and unavailability of remote access have made "effective representation by counsel extremely challenging." The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to issue and implement uniform, reasonable policies were arbitrary and capricious and interfered with the detained plaintiffs' right to counsel, in violation of the APA and INA. Furthermore, the detained plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' policies deprived noncitizens of their ability to retain counsel and to receive their counsel's legal advice, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendment. The organizational plaintiffs claimed that defendants' policies restricted their ability to communicate with and advise their clients and risked the safety and health of their members, in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments. Lastly, the detained plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' practice of continuing to hold in-person proceedings subjected them to "an unreasonable risk of serious harm and punitive conditions, in violation of their rights under the Due Process Clause." On April 8, the plaintiffs filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Request for Hearing, seeking an order that defendants "suspend in-person hearings during the health emergency and require EOIR and ICE to adopt policies and procedures to enable the conduct of remote hearings consistent with Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights." The plaintiffs argued that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their statutory and constitutional claims, that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO, and that the public interest weighs heavily in favor of a TRO. Defendants asserted that the court does not have jurisdiction to grant this motion. Moreover, defendants argued that plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits of their APA claim or their right-to-counsel and procedural-due-process claims. Finally, defendants contended that plaintiffs' "speculative claims of future injury do not outweigh the public interest in retaining EOIR's and ICE's flexibility to respond to changing circumstances." After a hearing on the emergency motion for TRO, Judge Nichols issued a minute order on April 15 requiring that "in the event that Defendants issue any further guidance or otherwise make policy changes relevant to this case, then Defendants shall provide the Court with immediate notice." The order also required that, "in the event that any of the individual Plaintiffs' upcoming hearings are continued, rescheduled, or otherwise changed, then the Party who learns of the change first shall provide the Court with immediate notice." On April 28, following supplemental briefing and an amicus brief from the National Association of Immigration Judges, Judge Nichols issued a memorandum and order denying the plaintiffs' emergency motion for TRO. First, Judge Nichols concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish that the court has jurisdiction over their claims. Judge Nichols further stated that even if the court had jurisdiction, "Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits. Plaintiffs have not pointed to EOIR and ICE actions that are reviewable under the APA, and, perhaps most important, they also have not demonstrated that EOIR’s and ICE’s actions are arbitrary and capricious given the rapidly changing situation relating to the COVID-19 pandemic." Judge Nichols also found that "Plaintiffs have not established that they are 'certain' to suffer an 'imminent' injury, especially when weighed against their chances of prevailing on the merits." Finally, Judge Nichols held that the balance of equities and public interest did not tip in favor of preliminary injunctive relief, as the court was"not certainly not well-positioned to second-guess those health and safety determinations" made by defendants. 2020 WL 2026971. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.

Summary: In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the United States, immigrant detainees and organizations comprised of immigration attorneys filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued EOIR, ICE, and their directors for violations of statutory and constitutional rights. The plaintiffs challenged defendants' failure to implement a uniform policy suspending in-person court appearances and provide for remote communications. In April, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, seeking the suspension of in-person court appearances and access to remote communications. The court denied this motion in late April. On June 2, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.


On February 13, 2008, a prisoner at the Monroe County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Monroe County. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the living areas in the jail were grossly overcrowded, leading to unsanitary and dangerous living conditions. The plaintiff claimed the existence of overcrowding that harmed prisoners. The prisoners were forced to sleep on the floor of a gymnasium. The facilities had only two showers and limited toilets for over 200 prisoners. The overcrowding led to increased tensions, frequently erupting into violence. Cell blocks and showers were unsanitary and food was served cold. Finally, there was so much crowding that there was no space to engage in walking or exercising during the day, and the prisoners were not taken for outdoor recreation. On August 4, 2008, the District Court (Judge Richard Young) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiff's motion to certify the case as a class action, defining the class as “any and all persons currently confined, or who will in the future be confined, in the Monroe County Jail.” 2008 WL 3084766. The Court (Judge Young) found that although the plaintiff's individual claims for relief were moot, he had standing to represent the class. On August 14, 2009, the parties entered a stipulation to a private settlement agreement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to make reasonable efforts to continue to meet with the judges of the Monroe Circuit Court to discuss ways of keeping the jail population under its capacity. The defendants also agreed that if the population exceeded the number of available beds for a specified period of time, the jail would take reasonable steps, including informing the board of commissioners, transferring prisoners, and requesting orders to release prisoners to reduce the population. Additionally, the defendants agreed not to accept prisoners from other counties on a per diem basis and to only accept Monroe County prisoners that the jail was legally required to accept. Under the settlement, the prisoners were granted at least two hours each week of vigorous physical exercise and were guaranteed reasonable sleeping arrangements, requiring the jail to have stacking bunks when they run out of permanent beds. The parties also agreed to reporting requirements. Finally, defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff's attorneys fees and costs for $20,000. The parties agreed that absent a court order or written agreement, the settlement would remain in effect until October 1, 2011. On September 30, 2011, the District Court (Judge Young) granted the plaintiff's motion to modify the parties' agreement and extend the private settlement agreement. The District Court (Judge Young) granted similar motions to modify the parties’ agreement and extend the private settlement agreement on October 1, 2012, September 18, 2014, and September 14, 2016, thereby extending the agreement to October 1, 2018. The October 1, 2018 extended the previous settlement agreement and additionally required a study as to whether a new jail facility was necessary. On January 15, 2019, the Court acknowledged that the parties had once again extended their settlement agreement to January 14, 2021, and the court modified its past orders to provide that the parties move for dismissal of the case on January 14, 2021. As an additional condition on the settlement agreement, a study of the Monroe County criminal justice system and alternatives to incarceration was required. As of February 13, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2008, an inmate at the Monroe County Jail filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Monroe County Sheriff and Commissioners, in their official capacities. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claimed that overcrowding and general living conditions in the jail violated Indiana state law and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2009, the parties agreed to a private settlement agreement, under which the defendant had to make reasonable efforts to control the population and improve living conditions, as well as paying the plaintiff's legal costs. The settlement agreement was modified and extended in 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, and again in 2019. The agreement is ordered to apply through January 2021.


On June 14, 2013, a disabled adult beneficiary of a state-run Medicaid waiver program who was also on a waitlist for another Medicaid waiver program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration and two heads of divisions of that agency in their official capacities under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs, and class action certification. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the "integration mandate" of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by changing its eligibility requirements for Medicaid waiver programs and by not allowing an appeal from the policy change as required by the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3). Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant [1] removed the waitlist for the Indiana's Community Integration and Habilitation Medicaid Waiver Program and established new "priority criteria" that limited access to the program that many and [2] instituted a new policy for Indiana's Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program and its Traumatic Brain Injury Medicaid Waiver Program require recipients to require "a nursing facility level of care." The plaintiff claimed both of these actions violated the "integration mandate" because they deprived disabled persons of the assistance they need to be integrated into the community. The plaintiff further claimed that the defendant failed to inform plaintiff that she could appeal her removal from the waitlist under the Medicaid Act and that the defendant provided no means for securing such an appeal. On June 14, 2013, the plaintiff moved to have the case certified as a class action. That same day, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that defendant be enjoined from removing plaintiff from the Aged and Disabled Medicaid Waiver Program pending further order of the court. The preliminary injunction was withdrawn without prejudice on September 23, 2013. On March 24, 2014, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2014 WL 1213390 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 24, 2014). On June 26, 2014, the court dismissed the original named plaintiff's individual claims because they had become moot--she received a waiver--but she still retained the right to appeal the denial of class certification. The individual claims of intervening plaintiffs still remained. Later in 2014, the defendants and the plaintiffs both moved for summary judgment. On Mar 27, 2015, the US filed a statement of interest in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In May 2015, the court heard oral argument on the motions for summary judgment. On May 28, 2015, the court dismissed another one of the individual plaintiff's claims because they had become moot--he received a waiver. He also reserved the right to appeal the denial of class certification. On June 9, 2015, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ integration mandate claims were not ripe for review. The integration mandate focuses on the setting in which services are administered, not the amount of services received. The plaintiffs did not contend that the setting in which they received services had changed as a result of Indiana's policy change. Subsequently, the plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification, the dismissal of the individual plaintiffs, and the grant of summary judgment to the Seventh Circuit. On May 10, 2016, the Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgement and affirmed denial of class certification. The court found that the State's narrow reading of integration mandate was unwarranted and that there was no reason to interpret it as only applying to "claims by people who literally have been institutionalized." The court held that "setting" does not necessarily refer merely to physical structures, finding that the text of the statute does not compel such a restrictive interpretation and that the integration mandate's protection would be undermined "if plaintiffs were required to segregate themselves by entering an institution before they could challenge an allegedly discriminatory law or policy that threatens to force them into segregated isolation." Indeed, the court pointed out that Indiana's institutions do not have capacity for most people who could be institutionalized. The court also pointed to the purpose of the ADA, which was to prevent outright discrimination. Ultimately, the court held that "the integration mandate is implicated where the state’s policies have either (1) segregated persons with disabilities within their homes, or (2) put them at serious risk of institutionalization." 823 F.3d 902. The case then returned to the district court for further proceedings. On December 19, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal after having reached a settlement, and the court ordered the case dismissed with prejudice the next day. The settlement agreement is not currently available. The case is now closed.

Summary: Physically disabled adult Medicaid beneficiaries filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the Secretary of the Indiana Family and Social Services Administration under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Medicaid Act after the state changed the policy for two Medicaid waiver programs. The court denied class certification and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Seventh Circuit reversed the summary judgment. The parties shortly thereafter stipulated dismissal, and the case is now closed.


On July 21, 2011, current and former students represented by private counsel, and two non-profit public interest firms, the Southern Poverty Law Center and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota (Judge Joan N. Ericksen, Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau) against their school district. The plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and damages, claiming denial of equal protection on the basis of sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they experienced physical and emotional harms due to unlawful discrimination based on sexual orientation and sex-based stereotypes that the defendant perpetuated and enforced through its policies and practices. The defendant's allegedly discriminatory policies were first instated in the mid-1990s, with a health curriculum policy prohibiting teachers from teaching that homosexuality was "normal" or valid. In 2009, the defendant created the "Sexual Orientation Curriculum Policy," which disallowed the teaching of sexual orientation as part of the school district's curriculum, and suggested that these matters were better addressed outside of the school. The plaintiffs claimed that this policy prevented school officials from responding adequately to anti-LGBT bullying and led to differential treatment of LGBT students. Between August 23, 2011 and March 1, 2012, the parties engaged in several settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Steven E. Rau. On March 1, 2012, the Court (Judge Ericksen) granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate this case with another case concerning similar questions of law and fact (E.R. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 11-CV-2282) for pretrial proceedings. On March 6, 2012, the Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's Office filed an intervenor complaint on behalf of the plaintiffs. On March 6, 2012, the Court (Judge Ericksen) entered a consent decree negotiated by the plaintiffs, the defendant, and the United States. The five-year decree required the school district to revise its policies and appropriately respond to student harassment in accordance with Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of the Higher Education Act of 1965, and the United States' Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance. As per the decree, the school must provide, among other things: annual harassment and diversity training for students and employees, a mental health professional meeting certain requirements at all times, an anti-bullying survey, more active monitoring of potential harassment "hot spots," and a better platform for student input. The school district's insurance carrier also paid $270,000 to the plaintiffs as settlement. On May 6, 2013, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to seal certain pleadings. Doe v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64126, at *1 (D. Minn.). The decree term ran its course in March 2017 and no further litigation has ensued. The case appears closed.

Summary: Five students sued their school district under the Fourteenth Amendment, discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title IX, and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant perpetuated and enforced sexual orientation and sex-based stereotypes through its policies and practices, and that said policies prevented school officials from responding adequately to anti-LGBT bullying. The parties negotiated a five-year consent decree requiring the school district to revise its policies and appropriately respond to student harassment, and the defendant's insurer paid $270,000 to the plaintiffs.


In September 2006, the EEOC's Seattle Field Office filed this suit in U.S. District Court, District of Montana, against Les Schwab Tire Centers of Montana, Inc. and Les Schwab Tire Warehouse, Inc. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act; it alleged that the defendant had harassed a Native American employee because of his race, and then retaliated against him when he complained. Judge Donald W. Molloy was assigned to the case. The employee who was allegedly discriminated against intervened in the EEOC's suit. On February 19, 2008, the defendant filed two separate motions for partial summary judgment. On April 21, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement conference. The following day, the court granted the motion and the parties began negotiations. Those negotiations led quickly to a settlement. On June 27, 2008, the defendant filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the intervenor’s claims and the EEOC filed a proposed consent decree. Judge Molloy granted both that same day. In exchange for resolving all issues and claims arising out of the EEOC’s complaint, the defendant agreed to monetary and injunctive relief that would last two years, without admitting guilt. The complainant received $185,000 in damages and the defendant agreed to various injunctive provisions including training, reporting, and promising that its managers and employees would not engage in practices which constitute harassment based on an employee’s race or retaliation. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction for two years. There is no further activity in the docket, so presumably the case closed without incident in 2010.

Summary: This 2006 lawsuit was brought by the EEOC in the District of Montana. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, they alleged that the defendant racially discriminated against a Native American employee. On July 27, 2008, the parties settled. The defendant paid $185,000 in damages and was required to provide equal employment opportunity training to its employees. There is no further activity in the docket, so presumably the case closed without incident in 2010.


On December 21, 2007, juvenile detainees filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs alleged that the Youth Study Center (YSC), run by the City, did not provide adequate nutrition, discriminated against disabled youth, excessively confined youth, failed to provide medical care, failed to provide educational services, and unlawfully restricted access to courts and to family visitation. Plaintiffs argue that in doing so, the City violated the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses, as well as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorney fees. After litigation began, the City further restricted access by plaintiffs' counsel to youth in the YSC, where children were being detained. However, on March 4, 2008, the Court (Ivan L.R. Lemelle) granted plaintiffs' motion to access other potential members of the class. Months later, the Court granted plaintiffs' motions to join additional plaintiffs, and on February 6, 2009, plaintiffs' motion to certify class was granted. 255 F.R.D. 406. In June and August of 2008, the Court denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. 2008 WL 2522127. The defendants also moved the Court to sanction plaintiffs' counsel, alleging that they violated a Court order by asking the youth questions during a visit to the YSC after the Court issued an order prohibiting expert inspections, but the Court denied the motion, holding that the violation was not "willful" disobedience of "specific and definite" instructions. 2009 WL 363456. The parties eventually settled, and on February 12, 2010, the Court signed two consent decrees - one for the education claims, and one for the confinement conditions claims. The decrees required the parties to each retain consultants with expertise in juvenile detention educational services to monitor the YSC, and that the YSC improve building safety, food service, provide more health care for physical and mental conditions, reduce hours of continuous confinement, train staff, implement new grievance policies for detained youth, and to improve educational services and equipment for detained youth. The decree set February 11, 2012 as the target date for compliance. However, after numerous monitoring reports indicated that much progress was needed to reach full compliance, the Court granted multiple motions modifying both decrees to allow extensions of the Court's jurisdiction. On January 17, 2013, the Court granted a joint motion to dismiss the Conditions of Confinement Consent Decree on the condition that a new YSC facility be finished by April 1, 2014. (The case was subject to reinstatement on motion by a party if that condition was not accomplished.) On December 3, 2013, the Court granted joint motion to dismiss the Conditions of Education Consent Decree upon the implementation of the recommendations listed in the November 26, 2013 status report. On May 28, 2014, the Court granted a motion to dissolve the Conditions of Education Consent Decree. Since no motion was filed prior to April 1, 2014, on the conditions claims, the case is therefore concluded.

Summary: On December 21, 2007, juvenile detainees filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the City of New Orleans. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment clauses, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the American Disabilities Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The Court (Ivan L.R. Lemelle) signed two consent decrees to improve the Youth Study Center detention facilities; after years of progress, the Court granted two conditional motions to dismiss the decrees. On May 28, 2014, the case concluded.


On September 24, 2013, a group of non-profit Catholic-based organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, who all provide healthcare to their employees through the Christian Brothers Employee Benefit Trust, were represented by the public interest firm Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction to keep the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate. On October 24, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants opposed this motion on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On November 8, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, or, alternatively for summary judgment. On December 27, 2013, Judge William J. Martinez denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On December 27, 2013, the plaintiff appealed the court's decision to deny preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit (No. 13-1540). On December 31, 2013, the appellate court denied the plaintiff's motion for an emergency injunction. That same day, however, Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor granted plaintiff's requested injunction pending receipt of a response by the government. On January 24, 2014, the Supreme Court issued an injunction pending appeal, stating: "If the employer applicants inform the Secretary of Health and Human Services in writing that they are non-profit organizations that hold themselves out as religious and have religious objections to providing coverage for contraceptive services, the respondents are enjoined from enforcing against the applicants the challenged provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and related regulations pending final disposition of the appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. To meet the condition for injunction pending appeal, applicants need not use the form prescribed by the Government and need not send copies to third-party administrators. The Court issues this order based on all of the circumstances of the case, and this order should not be construed as an expression of the Court's views on the merits." On March 6, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to consolidate this appeal with two similar cases: Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius and Reaching Souls International v. Sebelius. On March 31, 2014, the Court of Appeals denied the defendant's motion to consolidate. However, on July 14, 2015, the Court of Appeals denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in an opinion that joined this case and Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius. (794 F.3d 1151). The same day, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The plaintiffs objected to using the expanded accommodation designed by the court, in which they would not have to notify their insurers directly about their religious opposition to contraception, but would have to communicate that opposition and the name of their insurer to the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs requested a rehearing en banc, but the Tenth Circuit denied the request in an order on September 3, 2015. 799 F.3d 1315. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case in order to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell [II]. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S. Ct. 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. While the case was back in the District Court, President Trump issued an Executive Order in May 2017 directing the Department of Health and Human Services to address conscience-based objections to the preventive care mandate. The Department of Health and Human Services followed the Executive Order, issuing an exemption to religious organizations like the Little Sisters of the Poor. The case was dismissed voluntarily on June 26, 2018 and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 24, 2013, a group of non-profit Catholic-based organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Colorado under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. After many appeals, this case was consolidated with six others in the Supreme Court, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, and ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. But following an Executive Order from President Trump, the HHS issued an exemption for religious organization like Little Sisters of the Poor, and the case was voluntarily dismissed.


On February 5, 2013, the Catholic owner of a corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("ACA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring the organization to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech and association contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On March 22, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings. On March 25, 2013, defendants gave notice of non-opposition to plaintiffs' motion. On April 2, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge John R. Tunheim granted the preliminary injunction and stayed the case pending resolution of the appeal in either of the cases (1) O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or (2) Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), or until the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a substantially similar case, whichever occurred first. Both of the aforementioned cases involved similar legal issues and the same defendant. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 24, 2014, the plaintiff submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Injunction in Favor of Plaintiffs and Stipulation for Fee Motion Briefing Schedule, which was also signed by the defendants, and which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On November 26, 2014, Judge Tunheim issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. The plaintiff moved for and received several extensions of time to file a motion for attorneys' fees, but the docket shows no record of the plaintiffs moving for attorneys' fees, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On February 5, 2013, the Catholic owner of a corporation and the corporation itself filed a lawsuit seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, and upon the joint stipulation of the parties, the court ordered that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.


On July 24, 2009, an inmate at the Susquehanna County Jail filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the County of Susquehanna under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the Susquehanna Prison policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching all inmates, regardless of the nature of their charged crime or the likelihood that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. Although the case was initially assigned to Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie, it was later reassigned to Chief Judge Yvette Kane and then to Judge A. Richard Caputo. The parties sought class-action status for a statewide class of those who were strip-searched after being charged with minor violations or misdemeanors in the judicial district. Meanwhile, as litigation in this case continued, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that blanket strip search policies were constitutional. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2010). In light of the new holding, the plaintiff sought class certifications for two new classes pertaining solely to the delousing portion of the strip search procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that the delousing policy was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment and that it violated the detainees' rights to refuse unwanted medical treatments under the Fourteenth Amendment. On October 5, 2011, Judge Caputo certified the Fourteenth Amendment Class but denied the Fourth Amendment Class, on the grounds that the court in <i>Florence</i> held that the strip search procedures, including the delousing portion, were reasonable. 621 F.3d 296. The liability class consisted of all people who had been placed into the custody of the Susquehanna County Jail after being sentenced or as pre-trial detainees who were deloused upon their entry into Susquehanna County Jail. The defendants appealed this decision, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition to appeal the order. Extensive discovery followed between 2012-2013. On September 13, 2013, Judge Caputo granted the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment with respect to the constitutionality of the delousing policy. The Court reasoned that the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a sanitary facility, that the policy was reasonable, and accommodating inmates’ right to refuse the treatment would substantially burden the defendant. 2013 WL 5201571. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 24, 2009, an inmate at the Susquehanna County Jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. Middle District Court of Pennsylvania against the Country of Susquehanna. The plaintiff alleged that the written blanket policy of delousing, showering and strip-searching of Susquehanna County Prison, regardless of the nature of their charged crime and without inquiry into or the presence of reasonable suspicion to believe that the individual was concealing a weapon or contraband violated the Fourth Amendment. On September 13, 2013, the court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a sanitary facility, the policy was reasonable, and accommodating inmates’ right to refuse the treatment would substantially burden the defendant.


On May 15, 2020, the plaintiffs, inmates at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pro se in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, claiming that their indefinite solitary detention in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU) violated their rights. They sued the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), which runs the facility, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201. They sought declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction, a temporary restraining order, damages, and costs. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants placed them in the SHU for over five years without committing an identifiable infraction, and stayed in the facility for indefinite periods. As a result, they claimed that they were denied access to the facility's exercise yard and law library, had their mail searched, and were denied in-person visitation with their families. In addition, they alleged that the guards at the facility hindered their ability to make this claim by forcing them into a burdensome grievance process that they claimed they worked within. They alleged that this led to intense emotional distress. They claimed that this treatment violated the Constitution's Eighth Amendment prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and substantive and procedural due process clause. In addition, the defendants invoked the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), saying that their treatment violated the basic rights laid out in these treaties. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 5. They added a First Amendment violation due to the guards' refusal to let the plaintiffs discuss their case or make their claims in court and a Sixth Amendment violation blocking access to legal counsel and the courts. After receipt of this amended complaint, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson issued an order dismissing parts of the complaint without prejudice on September 10, 2012 (2012 WL 3966363, S.D.Ind.). She dismissed the claims relating to the grievance process, saying that the inmates' access to the process fulfilled the requirements for due process, and the international law claims, since treaty law alone does not create a cause of action in the United States. She also removed the extra plaintiffs from the suit. She allowed the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process claims related to indefinite detention to continue. The plaintiff submitted a statement of revised complaints reflecting the Judge's statement on September 24; this was treated as the complaint going forward. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's due process claims on September 23, 2014. After discovery, the plaintiff's disciplinary history showed a pattern of violent behavior and non-cooperation with prison staff, which Judge Magnus-Stinson showed to be sufficient to justify his stay in SHU in an entry granting summary judgment on the issue on June 24, 2014 (2014 WL 2866197, S.D.Ind.). Discovery also demonstrated that the facility regularly conducted administrative reviews every 30 days and reviews where the plaintiff could state his case every 90 days. Judge Magnus-Stinson said that this was more than the due process clause requires of inmates. The defendants did not seek summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim, and asked the plaintiff to show cause that the claim had not been abandoned, which he did on August 11, 2014. The defendants never filed another summary judgment motion, and a bench trial on the Eighth Amendment issue occurred in July 2015. The plaintiff was now represented by counsel. On September 25, 2015 (2015 WL 5672702, S.D.Ind.), Judge Magnus-Stinson ruled in the defendants' favor, saying that, while she was concerned about the length of time the plaintiff was in solitary confinement, which now totaled over eight years, he has regularly been given avenues to get out of solitary confinement and chose not to take them. In addition, she ruled that the lighting, access to food and clothing, and communication with outside counsel did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff moved to appeal on October 15, 2015. On February 6, 2017, the defendants in the original trial moved to dismiss the appeal, noting that one of the plaintiff's separate appeals surrounding a refusal to provide him with Kosher meals was dismissed on February 3 and the facts in that case were nearly identical to this one. For the appeal, the plaintiff retained private counsel. In an opinion dated May 10, 2017 (856 F.3d 508, 7th Cir.), an appeals panel composed of Judges Diane Wood, Joel Flaum, and William Conley upheld the District Court's decision on the Eighth Amendment claim, reiterating Judge Magnus-Stinson's reasoning. However, the panel reversed and remanded Judge Magnus-Stinson's grant of summary judgment on the due process claim, noting that for a stay this long in the SHU, more process may be needed than brief statements on the outcomes of 30-day reviews. Upon remand, a bench hearing with Judge Magnus-Stinson was set for September 24, 2018. On December 19, 2018, Judge Magnus-Stinson released an opinion ruling that the defendants violated the plaintiff's due process rights because the periodic reviews of his continued detention in SHU were "perfunctory" and continued to punish him for acts years ago instead of providing new offenses each time. She also noted a discrepancy in previous statements from the defendants; initially, during summary judgment motions, she was told that 30-day reviews are sufficient due process, but, during this hearing, the defendants claimed that the real reviews were the 90-day ones, which, theoretically, would allow the 30-day reviews to be surface-level. Judge Magnus-Stinson granted $314,000 in compensatory damages and a total of $22,500 in punitive damages spread across multiple defendant-employees in the IDOC. In addition, she granted the plaintiff's claim of injunctive relief and directed the defendants to draw up a plan for the plaintiff's release from SHU; when created, the plaintiff would have 14 days to contest it. On January 4, 2019, the defendants provided the plan, which would move the plaintiff to a general population cell immediately but mandated that the plaintiff participate in a SHU release program for permanent integration into general population. The plaintiff filed a motion contesting this plan two weeks later, saying that the program could extend indefinitely based on assessments of his behavior, and he hoped a more expeditious SHU release plan could be found. On March 4, 2019, Judge Magnus-Stinson approved the defendant's plan, since it immediately moved him out of SHU, the point of the initial injunction. This closed the case in District Court. However, the defendants appealed the final decision to circuit court on April 2, 2019. All proceedings in the case were stayed on March 20, 2020, with the circuit court asking for an update on the status of mediation by May 20, 2020. No update has been filed, likely due to COVID concerns; the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, the plaintiff, an inmate held in solitary confinement in an Indiana prison for over five years, filed a complaint pro se in the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging that this treatment violated his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The District Court granted summary judgment on the due process claim and rejected the Eighth Amendment claim, but the Seventh Circuit remanded the grant of summary judgment on appeal. On remand, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, dispensing compensatory and punitive damages and approving a release plan. The defendants appealed this ruling; the case remains with the Seventh Circuit.


On July 12, 2007, four black homeowners filed this lawsuit, individually and on behalf of a class of all others similarly situated in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries (Countrywide), alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (ECOA), and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (FHA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement, and restitution of monies disparately obtained from black borrowers, claiming that Countrywide's home financing policies and practices were discriminatory. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Countrywide's policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loan applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than similarly situated white applicants. On September 10, 2007, Countrywide filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not allege a sufficiently specific discriminatory policy to support a disparate impact claim under ECOA or FHA. The District Court (Judge Nancy Gertner) denied this motion on July 30, 2008, allowing the case to proceed. Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. Mass. 2008). In June 4, 2008, the plaintiffs moved for consolidated or coordinated pre-trial proceedings with two other actions against Countrywide (Garcia v. Countrywide Financial Corp., C.A. No. 5:07-1161 (C.D. Cal.); Jenkins v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., C.A. No. 1:08-2935 (N.D. Ill.)). On August 4, 2008, The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a transfer order to U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky (Judge John G. Heyburn II). Information about this case after its transfer may be viewed here: FH-KY-0002.

Summary: In July 2007, four black homeowners filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank, alleging violations of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, disgorgement, and restitution, claiming that Countrywide's home financing policies and practices had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loan applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than white applicants. In August 2008, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. So for more information see FH-KY-0002.


On April 10, 2019, two female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail and the Georgia Advocacy Office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the Fulton County Sheriff’s Office and the South Fulton Municipal Jail under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the Georgia Advocacy Office, sought class certification, declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act through their use of prolonged solitary confinement on individuals with mental disabilities; through conditions of confinement that deprived the plaintiffs of basic human needs; excluded plaintiffs and other women from the competency restoration program on the basis of sex; and by denying plaintiffs’ access to important services and programs solely by reason of their disabilities. Over 200 female detainees within South Fulton Municipal Jail with psychiatric disabilities were detained in 23-hour solitary confinement. The conditions within the mental health pods deprived women of basic human needs. During visits to the South Fulton Jail, plaintiffs’ counsel described seeing women unresponsive on the floor, covered in their own food and feces, feces smeared on the walls, pods that had mold growing on the walls, urine puddles on the floor, and women sleeping on metal cots without any bedding. Plaintiffs described that they spent on average less than one hour per day outside of their cells to the pod common area often alone and unable to have any social interactions with others. The plaintiffs argued that the solitary confinement and the totality of the conditions increased their risk of psychological harm. No programs or therapy were provided to the female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Jail. In contrast, male detainees in the Fulton County Jail system with mental disabilities were provided with therapeutic restorative programs. On April 12, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to certify a principal class that consisted of women who experienced mental disabilities and were or would be in the future confined in the Fulton County Jail system, and a subclass for women who experienced mental disabilities who were or would be deemed incompetent to stand trial while confined in the Fulton County Jail system. Defendants moved to dismiss the class action on May 3, 2019. They argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a proper claim upon which relief could be granted against the defendants. Further, the defendants argued that: (1) they had Eleventh Amendment immunity from all claims in their official capacities; (2) even under the assumption that the plaintiffs’ claims were true, the Fourteenth Amendment did not prohibit the plaintiffs from having limited out of cell time; and (3) the plaintiffs did not fully exhaust their administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On May 7, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to remedy unconstitutional conditions in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail. The plaintiffs requested that the court order for defendants to offer at least four hours of daily out of cell time to all female detainees in the mental health pods, including one hour per day of outdoor time; and within a month, establish and present the Court for approval a plan to be implemented within another month for providing a medically sound environment for women with mental disabilities. The defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss. The amended motion brief provided the same arguments as the original, with the addition of several affidavits from the defendants. On July 23, 2019, Judge William M. Ray granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the motion because: plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of their claim that defendants were deliberately indifferent to the mental health needs of the plaintiffs; the defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs; and that the potential for harm to the plaintiffs outweighed potential harm to the defendants. Defendants were ordered to: (1) within 7 days to develop a system to monitor plaintiffs' out of cell time and permit each woman to at least three hours of free time; (2) within 30 days offer at least four hours of out of cell time; and (3) establish and file a plan with the court outlining how to provide sanitary conditions and out of cell therapeutic programs. On July 30, 2019, Judge Ray denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the dismissal was not warranted based on immunity, failure to state a claim, or lack of exhaustion. On August 20, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction order. On September 10, 2019, Judge Ray granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was defined as "a psychiatric disability class consisting of all women who experience psychiatric disabilities who are now or will in the future be confined in the mental health pods for female detainees in the Fulton County Jail system." But the court declined to certify the requested subclass. On October 18, 2019, the defendants appealed the court's order for preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit (Docket No. 19-14227). But in the district court, the parties continued with discovery and the plaintiffs sent requests for interrogatories and discovery to the defendants. On December 6, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to modify the preliminary injunction to reflect changes made by the defendants regarding housing for women with psychiatric disabilities. The plaintiff's discovered that the South Fulton Jail began housing these women in the "G-Pod"—a disciplinary segregation unit where women were given one hour per day or less out-of-cell time. The plaintiffs requested that the preliminary injunction also cover these women so that they would also be provided adequate mental health care. The court has yet to rule on the motion to modify, the appeal is pending, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2019, two female detainees in the South Fulton Municipal Regional Jail and the Georgia Advocacy Office filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, and the Americans with Disabilities Act by placing detainees with mental disabilities in prolonged solitary confinement, maintaining conditions of confinement that deprived the plaintiffs of basic human needs, excluding plaintiffs and other women from the competency restoration program on the basis of sex, and denying plaintiffs’ access to important services and programs solely by reason of their disabilities. The court granted a preliminary injunction in July 2019, which the defendants appeals. The case is ongoing.


On December 7, 2017, eighteen death row prisoners in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) alleged they had been kept in solitary confinement at the Broad River Correctional Institution (BRCI) for between nine and twenty years. Plaintiffs sued SCDC, its Director, and its Warden under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights. The prisoners alleged that they were placed in solitary confinement regardless of behavioral history or individual status. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Thomas E Rogers, III. On December 22, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction asserting that they were transferred from Lieber Correctional Institution to the Maximum Security Unit at Kirkland Reception and Evaluation Center, which provided even harsher conditions than those previously experienced in their solitary confinement at Lieber. On June 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Rogers issued a Report and Recommendation that the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction be denied. 2018 WL 3802100. Judge Rogers found that the plaintiffs failed to make a showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. The court adopted this recommendation and subsequently denied the motion on August 9, 2018. 2018 WL 3773933. One of the plaintiffs then filed a motion for protective order on August 21, 2018 which was granted on August 23, 2018. On April 16, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second motion for preliminary injunction on May 21, 2019, along with a motion for temporary restraining order. On June 5, 2019 however, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew both motions. They explain in the supporting documentation that defendants had worked with plaintiffs counsel to voluntarily make some changes to the facility that made the preliminary relief no longer necessary. They maintained that the ultimate question regarding conditions at BRCI remain valid and that they intended to continue pursuing the lawsuit. The court issued a scheduling order on December 2, 2019 regarding discovery and hearing preparation. As of April 10, 2020, there have been no other entries in the docket. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On December 7, 2017, eighteen death row prisoners in the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) alleged they have been kept in solitary confinement for between nine and twenty years. Plaintiffs sued SCDC, its Director, and Wardens of prisons within the SCDC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by being denied any meaningful opportunity to challenge their conditions of confinement. The prisoners alleged that they were placed in solitary confinement regardless of behavioral history or individual status. On December 22, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, but on June 26, 2018, Magistrate Judge Rogers issued a Report and Recommendation that the plaintiffs request for a preliminary injunction be denied. The case is ongoing.


This class action lawsuit was filed on June 18, 2020 in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of California. The suit came after police in Sacramento, California allegedly used illegal tactics in an effort to disrupt protests that occurred after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were several Sacramento residents who were injured during the protests; the defendants were the City of Sacramento, the Sacramento Police Department (SPD), one named officer, and 125 Does (public employees and agents). The lawsuit had eleven different claims, including violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution under § 1983, violations of the California state constitution, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bane Act. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the defendants from engaging in the behavior allegedly in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the California Constitution, as well as compensatory, punitive, and special damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On August 14, the plaintiffs amended the complaint. They added numerous plaintiffs and also added a section explaining how each plaintiff exhausted their administrative remedies by submitting government claims to the City of Sacramento and Sacramento Police Departments. The plaintiffs also added tort claims under state law, alleging assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. The factual allegations and sought after relief largely stayed the same. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was brought on June 18, 2020 in response to the Sacramento Police Department using allegedly illegal tactics to quash the protests that arose after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution, the California state constitution, the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Bane Act. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on August 14, adding additional plaintiffs and state tort claims. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.


On December 14, 2007, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) began an investigation into the conditions at four Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS) facilities: Lansing Residential Center, Louis Gossett, Jr. Residential Center, Tryon Residential Center, and Tryon Girls Residential Center. The investigations were conducted pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. On August 14, 2009, the DOJ published in its findings letter that the facilities had violated the due process rights of the confined youths. It also concluded that 1) staff resorted to use force disproportionate to the level of juveniles' infractions and used excessive restraints to discipline them; and 2) investigations into uses of force and restraints were inadequate and that, in many instances, OCFS failed to hold staff accountable for gross violations of policy. On July 14, 2010, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York to enforce a settlement agreement with the State of New York and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The United States sought declaratory relief and an order enjoining the defendants from continuing practices of excessive force and restraints as detailed in the findings letter and to ensure lawful conditions of confinement. The United States claimed that the harms outlined in their findings letter, specifically that the defendants failed to take reasonable measures to prevent staff from inflicting serious harm on the youths and did not provide adequate mental health care and services, violated the the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case was assigned to Senior Judge Frederick J. Scullin, Jr. and referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Homer. On the same day, the parties also filed the settlement agreement. 2010 WL 10900167. The agreement put forth a remedial plan addressing each of the issues identified in the DOJ's original investigation. It outlined limits on use of restraints—including a prohibition on chemical restraints and psychotropic medications—and use of force in only the least amount necessary. The institutions also agreed to institute new incident reporting procedures and provide improved mental health care and treatment. A monitoring team would produce status reports approximately every six months regarding the facilities' compliance with implementing the settlement provisions. The settlement would last until the facilities achieved substantial compliance with the settlement terms for twelve consecutive months. On July 19, 2010, Judge Scullin, Jr. approved this settlement agreement. In January 2011, the State closed Tryon Residential Center. Tryon boys were transferred to Finger Lakes Residential Center (formerly Louis Gossett, Jr. Residential Center). In August 2011, the State closed Tryon Girls Residential Center. Tryon girls were transferred to Taberg Residential Center for Girls (Taberg) and Columbia Girls Secure Center. Both parties agreed that Taberg and Columbia would be monitored under the Settlement Agreement. In August 2013, the State closed Lansing Residential Center. The girls held at Lansing were released on community supervision. After years of monitoring and biannual status reports, the court began to dismiss the institution defendants one by one. On September 8, 2014, the court dismissed Columbia Girls Secure Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. On December 21, 2015, the court dismissed Finger Lakes Residential Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. And on October 20, 2017, the court dismissed Taberg Residential Center, which had maintained substantial compliance under the settlement agreement for twelve consecutive months. Dismissing Taberg Residential Center concluded the State’s obligations under the settlement agreement. This case is now closed.

Summary: In December 2007, the DOJ Civil Rights Division began an investigation into the conditions at four New York juvenile facilities. After an investigation, the DOJ published a findings letter detailing improper and unconstitutional use of excessive force and restraints within the facilities. On July 14, 2010, the United States filed suit to enforce a settlement agreement against the State of New York and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services. The agreement set forth remedial terms and required monitors to produce status reports. By October 20, 2017, all of the facilities had either closed or achieved substantial compliance with the settlement agreement. This case is now closed.


On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Mantech MSM Security Services, Inc., on behalf of a black employee who was offered a settlement that purported to waive his rights to file charges with the EEOC and to participate in its investigations. It is also unclear whether the agreement was specific to the employee or a standard agreement offered to all Mantech employees. It is likewise unclear whether the employee had or knew of any discrimination claims against Mantech at the time he was offered the settlement and release agreement. The EEOC alleged that the agreement constituted per se retaliation and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). The EEOC sought monetary relief and injuctive relief barring Mantech from using such waiver agreements. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge Alexander Williams Jr.) approved and entered on September 21, 2006. The one-year agreement required Mantech to modify all releases of employment discrimination claims to inform signers that the agreement neither prevents them from filing charges with the EEOC, participating in investigations, or benefiting from injunctive relief obtained by the EEOC nor requires them to inform the company of communication with the EEOC. The decree also empowered the EEOC to monitor Mantech's practices by requiring Mantech to provide copies of claim releases it would have employees sign. Under the terms of the decree Mantech also had to pay the employee the amount of money offered in the original release agreement with interest ($7557 total). The case is now closed. The decree was entered in 2006 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Mantech MSM Security Services, Inc., on behalf of a black employee who was offered a settlement agreement that appeared to waive his right to file charges with the EEOC and participate in its investigations. It is unclear whether the agreement was specific to the employee or a standard agreement offered to all Mantech employees. The EEOC alleged that the agreement constituted per se retaliation and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.). The EEOC sought monetary relief and injunctive relief barring Mantech from using such waiver agreements. The Court entered the parties' one-year settlement as a consent decree. The decree required Mantech to modify its releases, report each claim release it obtained in connection to an employee's settlement of employment, and to pay the employee the amount of money offered during the original release agreement plus interest ($7,557 total). The case is now closed.


This suit was filed on November 23, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California by the California Hospital Association (CHA), against the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services in his official capacity. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief preventing the state from implementing reductions to the reimbursement rates paid for hospital services under Medi-Cal, the state's Medicaid program. In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed several acts modifying the state's Medicaid plan. Under the Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. (the Medicaid Act), such modifications must be approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being put in place. As the result of litigation in related suits, at the time this suit was filed, preliminary injunctions were already in place preventing the defendant from implementing several of these rate reductions. See related cases. The plaintiff in the instant case sought new injunctions preventing the reductions established by California Assembly Bill X4 5 (AB 5), passed on July 28, 2009. Unlike the state's earlier efforts to reduce its reimbursement rates, AB 5 was not a flat percentage reduction. In contrast to the plan submitted to and approved by CMS, which provided for annual updates, AB 5 limited the reimbursement of certain classes of hospital services and locked the reimbursement rates for hospital services to the rates paid in the 2008-09 year. The plaintiff argued this was a violation of the Medicaid Act. The plaintiff brought the suit under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, arguing that the state's failure to submit a plan to amend its Medicaid program to CMS for approval prior to implementing the reductions made them unlawful and therefore preempted by the federally approved plan. The plaintiff also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of its members' civil rights. The plaintiff sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the AB 5 rate reductions and a declaratory judgment holding the reductions unlawful. On January 11, 2010, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the contested effects of AB 5, which the Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted on February 24, 2010. The defendant appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 26, 2010; shortly thereafter it requested a stay of appellate proceedings because of a pending request for certiorari review by the Supreme Court in Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, a related case (Clearinghouse code PB-CA-0016). The Supreme Court accepted that case for review on the question of whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a cause of action in this class of cases, and so on June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this case from the District Court's active case list pending the outcome of Douglas. She ordered that the parties file quarterly joint status reports until the case was either reactivated or voluntarily dismissed. The case was also stayed at the Appellate Court pending the decision of the Supreme Court in Douglas. CMS approved most of the California Medicaid plan amendments while Douglas was still awaiting adjudication. In light of this, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce the Medicaid Act against a state. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in Douglas and remanded that case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2012). After the Supreme Court decision, the instant case as well as Douglas and several other cases entered joint settlement mediation in the Ninth Circuit. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on May 28, 2014, pursuant to the parties' joint request for dismissal. The parties reached a settlement agreement on August 19, 2014, and their agreement was approved by the district court on September 22, 2014. The Settlement Agreement provided that the plaintiffs would release state and federal entities from all liability relating to the payment reductions. In return, the defendants agreed to release plaintiffs from liability relating to "DHCS’s Claimed Excess Payments." The court dismissed the case with prejudice on April 23, 2015, and determined that each party was required to bear its own costs in accordance with the dismissal. The district court retained jurisdiction until January 1, 2016 to entertain any applications for attorneys' fees, and to enforce the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: This suit was filed on November 23, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California by the California Hospital Association against the Director of the California Department of Health Care Services in his official capacity. The Plaintiff sought an injunction preventing State Medicaid reimbursement reductions established by California Assembly Bill X4 5 (AB 5), which locked the reimbursement rates for hospital services to the rates paid in the 2008-09 year, contrary to the plan that the State submitted to and approved by the federal Department of Health and Human Services. The Plaintiff brought the suit under the Supremacy Clause, arguing that the rate reductions were preempted due to their being non-compliant with federal Medicaid law. The Court issued a preliminary injunction forbidding the enforcement of the contested effects of AB 5 and the State appealed. The case was stayed at the Appellate Court pending the Supreme Court's decision in a related case. After that decision was issued, this case and several other cases entered joint settlement mediation. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2014, and the case was dismissed with prejudice in 2015.


On May 9, 2007 organizations and individuals present at a May 1st immigration rally in MacArthur Park in Los Angeles, CA filed suit against the City of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Police Department in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, included the Multi-ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network, the Korean Immigrant Workers Alliance, the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights Los Angeles, IDESPCA, Pilipino Workers Center, Garment Workers Center, and numerous individuals. The plaintiffs alleged that the LAPD used excessive force in trying to disperse the rally, therefore violating the U.S. Constitution's 1st, 4th, and 14th amendments, the California Constitution, and California Civil Code § 52.1. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with damages. On January 8, 2008, District Court Judge Howard Matz certified a class for both structural relief and monetary relief. The certification for structural relief included anyone who engaged or may engage in peaceful demonstrations in LA, and who at the time of the demonstration were or are: (1) one of the plaintiff organizations; (2) officers and representatives of the plaintiffs' organizations, including people who participate in the Plaintiffs' organizations' events; (3) other organizations who advocate and/or organize on behalf of individuals' right to free speech and assembly; and (4) people who participate in events put on by the organizations described in (3). The certification for monetary relief included any persons present at the May 1, 2007 rally between 5-7pm who did not engage in conduct justifying the LAPD's use of force, and who were subject to the force or other unlawful police activity. The parties worked with Magistrate Judge Carla Woehile to negotiate a settlement agreement. On March 19, 2009, the court granted preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. The settlement created a class fund of $250,000 for unrepresented class members, and a represented individuals fund of $12,550,000 for the individual plaintiffs named in the suit. The agreement also stipulated an award of the class attorney's fees of $3,753,000. Judge Matz granted final approval of the settlement agreement on June 23, 2009 and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The structural relief order, issued by Judge Mantz on June 24, 2009, restricted the LAPD from interfering with individuals' right to free speech for any reasons other than protecting public safety or public health, and required LAPD officers to issue a Declaration of Unlawful Assembly before taking any action. The relief order also placed restrictions on the methods of disbursement the LAPD may use, including limiting the use of less lethal weapons, batons, motorcycles and low-flying helicopters that would interfere with the demonstrators' right to free speech. Aside from these restrictions on use of force, the order stipulated that LAPD officers undergo annual training on proper crowd control policies and techniques.

Summary: This class action was brought by protesters at a 2007 immigration rally in Los Angeles who were victims of excessive force by police officers trying to disperse the rally. The 2009 settlement awarded the plaintiffs damages of over $12 million and attorneys' fees of $3.7 million, as well as both structural reform of the LAPD. The structural reform placed limitations on the LAPD's ability to interfere with nonviolent demonstrations, including issuing a declaration of unlawful assembly before any using force to break up the demonstration. The order also restricted the methods of disbursement the LAPD can use, including limitations on the use of less lethal weapons, batons, motorcycles and low-flying helicopters that would interfere with the demonstration. Additionally, the order stipulated that all LAPD officers receive annual training on the proper crowd control and disbursement techniques.


On May 19, 2015, former inmates at the all-female jail on Rikers Island filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued New York City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by Legal Aid and private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of New York violated their rights of due process and free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that at the Rose M. Singer Center, the all-female jail on Rikers Island, the City of New York permitted corrections officers to sexually assault inmates and that inmates were allowed to be retaliated against when they reported the sexual assault to higher authorities. On January 5, 2016, District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein released a summary order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. He found that the class was not sufficiently ascertainable as proposed and that the plaintiffs lacked typicality and commonality in their claims. Judge Hellerstein was also concerned that granting class certification would make it more difficult for currently unknown victims to file a damages suit in the future. However, he ruled that the claims of the individual plaintiffs survived for both monetary and equitable relief. On March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After engaging in discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which was approved by Judge Hellerstein on May 26, 2017. Due to the stipulation of dismissal, the appeal to the Second Circuit was withdrawn. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 19, 2015, former inmates at the all-female jail on Rikers Island sued the city of New York for an alleged culture of sexual assault. The plaintiffs sought class action certification but were denied in an order released on January 5, 2016. On March 17, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. After engaging in discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and stipulated to a dismissal of the case, which was approved by Judge Hellerstein on May 26, 2017. Due to the stipulation of dismissal, the appeal to the Second Circuit was withdrawn. The case is now closed.


On March 5, 2012, the plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of all Connecticut residents who, since March 5, 2009 have applied or will apply for food stamps from the Connecticut Department of Social Services in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the Connecticut Department of Social Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers from the Greater Hartford Legal Aid and the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, asked the court for injunctive relief for the processing of food stamp applications. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant was noncompliant with the Food Stamps Act 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) for application for food stamps. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant was failing to process food stamp applications in a timely manner as well as refusing to properly use the expedited process for eligible food stamp applications. For example, from January 2010 to February 2012, almost 30% of the Department's pending food stamp applications were over 30 days old. This prevented the plaintiff and other similarly situated persons from meeting their nutritional needs. On December 4, 2012, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to properly process food stamp applications for plaintiff and denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The defendants appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, docket 14-01328. This appeal was denied without an opinion. On May 13, 2013, the court signed the preliminary injunction order as well as the order granting class certification. The class was defined as: "All persons in Connecticut who have applied, who are currently applying, or who will apply in the future and whose application was not timely processed for food stamps as required by 7 U.S.C. § 2020(e)(3) and (e)(9); 7 C.F.R. § 273.2" On March 24, 2014 the court denied defendant's motion to amend the preliminary injunction. On July 6, 2015 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction order. 792 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2015). On September 8, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On May 19, 2016, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robert A. Richardson for settlement conference. Throughout the remainder of 2016, the parties continued to engage in settlement discussions. The parties reached an agreement on December 16, 2016. The Court dismissed the case as settled and directed the clerk to terminate this file without prejudice to reopening on or before February 20, 2017. The parties submitted their settlement agreement to the Court for approval on January 5, 2017. The settlement agreement provided that the defendant would comply with the timely requirements for processing food stamps applications. Fully complying with the timely processing required the defendant to meet a 96% timely processing standard, starting no later than the month following the date that the settlement was approved by the Court. The defendant would also enact policies and train staff to meet this timely requirement. The defendant was to provide plaintiff with monthly SNAP Application Timeliness Reports, for the duration of the Order. The Court was to retain jurisdiction over this matter indefinitely until the defendant achieved full compliance of the settlement agreement for 26 months of any 30 month period or for 22 consecutive months, whichever came first. Class notice was to take the form of posting a notice in both English and Spanish in various DSS offices' waiting rooms, on DSS's website, and in the waiting room of Greater Hartford Legal Aid. The Court preliminarily approved the settlement on January 6, 2017 and scheduled a fairness hearing for March 8, 2017. After the fairness hearing, Judge Bryant granted approval of the settlement on March 9, 2017. On September 11, 2017, the parties entered a stipulation and order of settlement regarding defendant payment of attorney's fees, costs and expenses of $922,000. As of January 2019, this case was open pending the demonstration of full compliance with the settlement agreement.

Summary: In 2012, plaintiff looked to seek injunctive relief in order to ensure the proper application processing for food stamp applicants. The plaintiff alleged severe noncompliance with federal law in processing food stamp applications. In 2013, the District Court for the District of Connecticut filed an order for preliminary injunction granting plaintiff's claim. The case settled in December 2016, with defendant agreeing to comply with the legal timeliness requirements of processing food stamp applications. The case is closed.


On March 29, 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of thirteen women employed by Sing Sing Correctional Facility. Ten additional women were later identified as complainants. The plaintiff sued New York State Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant violated federal law by providing inferior benefits to female employees on maternity leave. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctive relief, reinstatement for several employees, backpay, and attorney’s fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant gave male employees with work-related injuries up to six months of paid workers’ compensation leave, and though women were allowed the same leave, pregnant employees on paid workers’ compensation leave were involuntary switched to maternity leave at or around the time they gave birth. The company’s maternity leave policy required that women first use their accrued paid time off before switching to sick leave with half pay and then unpaid sick leave. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, by failing to make a case-by-case judgement concerning each female employee’s eligibility for workers’ compensation, engaged in employment discrimination through its categorical determination that female employees who had recently given birth should be transferred from workers’ compensation leave and benefits to the lesser-paid maternity leave policy. On October 23, 2007, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin referred the case to Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman for settlement. On May 21, 2008, the parties reached a settlement that provided $972,000 in compensatory damages, liquidated damages, back pay, and interest to the complainants. The order also contained a provision through which the court could order monetary relief to additional victims identified after the settlement. The order was subject to monitoring by the EEOC and the court for up to five years. Although it was not made clear on the docket, the consent decree indicates that the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) got involved in this matter and filed a separate case in 2008 (08-4419). The two plaintiff parties shared a consent decree with similar stipulations. Enforcement of the DOJ’s consent decree lasted three years. The settlement also enjoined DOCS from engaging in any act or practice that discriminated against any employee on the basis of pregnancy or childbirth, including the removal of any female employee from workers’ compensation solely because of childbirth. The DOCS was required to provide each employee who requested to use maternity or child-rearing leave with written notification of the company’s policy. Additionally, the court ordered DOCS to provide for its administrative staff anti-discrimination training, including a discussion of pregnancy discrimination and discrimination in pay and benefits. DOCS was to forward a copy of attendance sheets for such trainings to EEOC and to the court. The settlement also allowed for the later identification and inclusion of employees who were affected by discriminatory practices of DOCS but not listed in the initial complaint. A total of twenty-three complainants were in the initial consent decree. Since the order was signed in 2008, it has been modified to include 5 more women. The defendant paid a total of almost $147,000 to these women. The consent decree is now complete and the case closed.

Summary: On May 12, 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of approximately 23 women employed by Sing Sing Correctional Facility. The plaintiff sued New York State Department of Correctional Services under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant violated federal law by providing inferior benefits to female employees on maternity leave. On May 20, 2008, the parties reached a settlement of $972,000, providing compensatory damages, liquidated damages, back pay, and interest to the plaintiff. The order was subject to monitoring for up to five years.