On January 2, 2009, an inmate at Tippecanoe County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the Tippecanoe County Superior Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tippecanoe County. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging several violations of Indiana law and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had a policy of opening inmates' mail, including mail from legal counsel, outside the presence of the inmate to whom it is addressed; denying inmates reasonable access to the law library; and failing to respond to inmate grievances within a reasonable period of time. On January 20, 2009, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The District Court heard oral argument on the plaintiff's motion for class certification on March 18, 2009, but reserved its ruling on the class certification issue pending a ruling on the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. On June 22, 2009, the District Court (Judge Allen Sharp) granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the plaintiff's transfer away from Tippecanoe County Jail rendered the cause of action moot. Olson v. Brown, 2009 WL 1766667 (N.D. Ind. June 22, 2009). On July 7, 2009, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the case was inherently transitory for any possible named plaintiff and therefore fell within the exception to the mootness doctrine. On February 4, 2010, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal and remanded the case for consideration of plaintiff's motion for class certification and defendant's motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim. Olson v. Brown, 594 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2010). The Court of Appeals also ordered a bill of costs in favor of the plaintiff for the cost of the appeal. On July 25, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jon DeGuilio), who was reassigned the case on remand, granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion to certify class. Specifically, the District Court (Judge DeGuilio) ordered that the class be certified to pursue relief under Indiana state law, the First Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court (Judge DeGuilio) dismissed as moot any claims not certified for class treatment. That same day, the District Court (Judge DeGuilio) also granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court (Judge DeGuilio) held that the class plaintiffs had stated a claim that the jail's mail policy violated class members' right to access to court by hindering confidential communications with attorneys regarding non-frivolous claims, but that the class plaintiffs were not entitled to relief under the First Amendment or Indiana law. On August 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals denied the defendant's petition for permission to appeal the class certification order. On May 7, 2013, the parties entered a stipulation to enter a private settlement agreement following notice to the class. On July 7, 2013, Magistrate Judge Paul Cherry entered an order approving the settlement. On August 19, 2013, Judge Cherry dismissed the case with prejudice. At this point, the case concluded.

Summary: In 2009, an inmate at Tippecanoe County Jail filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, in his official capacity. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the jail violated the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and various state laws through their policy of opening inmate mail outside of the presence of the addressee, denying inmates reasonable access to the library, and failing to respond to inmate grievances. In 2013, the parties resolved the case by entering into a private settlement agreement.


On March 1, 2013, the Christian owners of a closely-held corporation and the corporation itself filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the federal government (the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury) under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The plaintiffs, represented by in-house counsel, the Thomas More Society, and the Jubilee Campaign - Law of Life Project, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA) violated their religious freedom by requiring the corporation to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech and association contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On July 12, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 13, 2013, the government filed a motion to stay proceedings in light of Korte v. Sebelius and Grote v. Sebelius, cases raising the same issue pending before the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The government also gave notice of non-opposition to a preliminary injunction until the Grote and Korte appeals were resolved. On July 16, 2013, U.S. District Court Judge Thomas M. Durkin granted the preliminary injunction. On August 14, 2013, the Court granted the government's motion to stay proceedings until the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Korte and Grote. 2013 WL 12212731. On September 30, 2015, the District Court granted a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, following the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius. The plaintiffs had requested an injunction of any regulation related to the ACA's contraception mandate, but the Court limited the injunction to the regulations implementing the mandate that were at issue in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius and the plaintiffs' complaint. Those regulations would have required all for-profit corporations, whether closely held or not, to provide contraception as part of their employee health plan. The Supreme Court also denied review in Korte, and the lower courts addressed it under Hobby Lobby. 2015 WL 13439819. On November 30, 2015, the plaintiffs in this case appealed to the Seventh Circuit. On February 9, 2016, the Seventh Circuit granted the government's motion to hold the appeal in abeyance pending Supreme Court review of Zubik v. Burwell [II]. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order in Zubik remanding all seven consolidated cases to their respective courts of appeals. The Court ordered lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. Following that order, the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument in this case on November 1, 2016. The case focused on whether district court should have issued an injunction against the version of the contraception mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby (as the district court did) or an injunction against all further enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate. On December 27, 2016, the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed the District Courts' ruling, but it later withdrew its opinion and the appeal remained under consideration. On January 9, 2017, the parties were ordered to filed briefs discussing whether or not the case was subject for debated given the regulatory accommodation for religious employers was revised in July 2015 to include closely held, for-profit employers. Following the filing of briefs on the issue, one August 28, 2017, the Seventh Circuit vacated the case and remanded it with instructions to dismiss it as moot. The court found that, because the plaintiffs' initial claim had been based on the unrevised regulation, they had sustained no harm due to the injunction during litigation, and the revised regulation post Hobby Lobby no longer posed prospective harm to the company. The Circuit Court therefore dismissed the case. The court also ordered both parties would bear their own cost of fees for appeal. 855 F.3d 730. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, the Christian owners of a corporation filed this lawsuit seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and First Amendment. On July 16, 2013, the Northern District of the U.S. District of Illinois granted a preliminary injunction in this case. On September 30, 2015, the District Court granted a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, following the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius. Plaintiff had requested an injunction of any regulation related to the ACA's contraception mandate, but the Court limited the injunction to the regulations implementing the mandate, that were at issue in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius and plaintiff's complaint. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Zubik v. Burwell [II] to remand the relevant cases to the lower courts so plaintiffs and the government could try to come to accord, the Seventh Circuit heard oral argument on this case on November 1, 2016


On September 30, 2004, the EEOC's Baltimore Office filed suit against Worthington, Moore, & Jacobs, a collection agency operating out of Ellicott City, Maryland. The complaint, filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland and brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), alleged that the company president sexually harassed a number of female employees, and that the company retaliated against those who complained. On February 19, 2009, the court (Judge Everett Legg), due to the defendant's abandonment of the pretrial process and the withdrawal of its counsel, entered a default against the defendant. On April 29, 2009, the court found that the defendant violated section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000 by discriminating against employees on the basis of gender by subjecting them to sexual harassment. The court also found that the defendant violated section 704(a) of Title VII by retaliating against employees for their complaints about sexual harassment by subjecting them to retaliatory harassment and by terminating their employment or effectuating a constructive discharge by deliberately creating intolerable working conditions. On August 5, 2009, the court ordered that the defendant pay 1) claimant 1 back pay of $75,256.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000.00, 2) claimant 2 back pay of $21,966.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000, 3) claimant 3 compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000.00, 4) claimant 4 back pay of $17,734.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000.00, 5) claimant 5 back pay of $75,042.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000.00, 6) claimant 6 back pay of $114,737.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000, 7) claimant 7 back pay of $23,591.00 and compensatory and punitive damages of $50,000.00. Several writs of garnishment were served over the next two years in order to collect the damages awards. There has been no docket activity since 2011, so the case is likely now closed.

Summary: The EEOC's Baltimore Office filed suit against Worthington, Moore, & Jacobs, a collection agency, alleging that the company president sexually harassed a number of female employees, and that the company retaliated against those who complained. After the defendant defaulted, the court found that the defendant violated Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000 and Section 704(a) of Title VII and ordered that the defendant pay the complainants a combined total of $678,326.


These consolidated cases involved challenges to a gender-based staffing policy of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department. The Sheriff reorganized inmate housing in mid-2006 in San Francisco so that all female inmates were placed in County Jail #8 in female-only housing units. From October 2006 forward, the Sheriff implemented a policy that only female deputies be assigned to staff these particular units. The first of the consolidated cases, Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, was filed in 2007. The second case, Walker, was filed in 2008. The third, Ortega, was filed in 2009. All involved sheriff's deputies who alleged that the Sheriff's staffing policy constituted employment discrimination in violation of Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. (Several of the plaintiffs also brought retaliation claims.) They were consolidated in 2009. After consolidation, on February 17, 2010, the Court granted summary judgment to the Sheriff on almost all of the plaintiffs' claims. 2010 WL 934006. In her opinion, U.S. District Judge Susan Illston held that the policy was implemented to protect the interests that amount to the essences of the Sheriff's business and the Sheriff was entitled to deference in his policy judgment to implement department policy. Further, the policy was found to be reasonably necessary to ensure the normal operation of the jails and the alternatives to the policy were not feasible alternatives that furthered the overarching objectives of safety, security and privacy. The deputy was found to have exhausted administrative remedies for the retaliation claim and the denial of transfer requests by the deputy was not a form of retaliation. Finally, the fact that the deputy made certain statements was a legitimate, and non-retaliatory reason to terminate the deputy. These statements were made to the National Academy of Arbitrators and involved content that the sheriff was influenced by financial contributions and nepotism, and that the sheriff's general counsel had engaged in sex tourism. Judge Illston also denied summary judgment on retaliation claims brought by three of the plaintiffs. These plaintiffs alleged that the defendant retaliated against them by reprimanding them for complaining that the policy constituted gender discrimination and for participating in this lawsuit. The parties then agreed, three weeks before trial was scheduled to commence, to continue in order to enter into settlement negotiations on the remaining claims. A settlement conference was held with Chief Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James on June 8 and 10, 2010, and everyone agreed that the parties had settled the case. The agreement was read into the record, and Judge Illston entered an order dismissing the case with prejudice upon settlement. On May 27, 2011, Judge Illston heard argument on competing motions filed by the parties: a motion for entry of judgment filed by plaintiffs and a motion to enforce the settlement agreement filed by the defendants. The parties disagreed over the terms of the aforementioned settlement. The court granted each motion in part and denied in part. The court granted plaintiff's request that it enter judgment, but only after the parties signed a written settlement agreement. The court then granted the defendant's request that the parties be ordered to execute a written settlement agreement. The parties continued to disagree over attorney's fees and other costs, and on July 5, 2012, the court awarded each party costs on the part of the case they had won: plaintiffs received $3,239.80 in costs, and defendants $48,330.72. The settlement consisted of the City of San Francisco revising its previously published list and policy listing places for which an employee can complain regarding harassment, retaliation and whistleblowing. The City would also prepare and publish a new list and statement permitting complaints outside the chain of command for an employee to be distributed to each Sheriff's Department employee. Further, the City would work with the plaintiffs to determine which pieces of paper exist in their personally files related to this suit. There were further individualized claims settled with the plaintiffs relating to their retaliation claims. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In an opinion from July 2, 2014, the Ninth Circuit held that the City was not entitled to summary judgment based on bona fide occupational defense, in light of the fact issue as to whether there was a reasoned decision making process that led to the sheriff's adoption of the policy. Second, the Ninth Circuit found that the county easily met its burden of demonstrating that there were job qualifications derived from four justifications of safety, security, privacy and rehabilitation that were reasonably necessary to operating the county jails. Further, the Ninth Circuit found that fact issues existed as to whether the policy of excluding male deputies because of their sex was a legitimate proxy for reasonably necessary job qualifications. Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs could not establish prejudice from the district court's evidentiary rulings, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys fees, and the county was entitled to summary judgment on terminated deputy's retaliation claims. The lower court's holdings were affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part and the appeal dismissed in part. 757 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). After continued settlement conferences, the case was dismissed on January 26, 2016 pursuant to the execution of the settlement agreement and its approval by the San Fransisco Board of Supervisors. The court retained jurisdiction with regard to the distribution of the settlement award as stipulated in the settlement agreement. As of August 10, 2016, there are no further docket entries and the case appears to be closed.

Summary: This federal lawsuit in the Northern District of California involves a fair employment challenge to the San Francisco Sheriff Department's policy of staffing its women's jail with only female deputies. It was filed in 2007 and settled in 2010 for updated policies in the City of San Francisco and individually tailored settlements for each plaintiff with retaliation claims. The Ninth Circuit found that the county was not entitled to summary judgment based on its policy, but also found that the county met its burden of establishing that their policy and justification of job qualifications were reasonably necessary to operating the county jails, but found fact issues as to whether the policy of excluding male deputies was a legitimate proxy.


On June 20, 2005, several African American employees filed a putative class action racial discrimination lawsuit against their employer, the Walgreen Company [Walgreens], in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois in East St. Louis, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, ["Title VII"] and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs alleged that Walgreens practiced nationwide systemic racial discrimination against its African-American management employees by: (1) denying African-Americans selection for entry level positions of Assistant Manager/Management Trainees; (2) denying promotions to African-American employees in retail and pharmacy career paths, and in district and corporate management; and (3) making store assignments to African-American management trainees, managers, and pharmacists by steering them into stores which fall into predominately African-American and/or lower income peer groups. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of all former, current, and future African-American management employees and applicants for management nationwide, as well as for current and former African-American pharmacists. On September 22, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, over defendant's objection. The defendant then moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' disparate impact claims and certain claims of a named plaintiff. On December 4, 2006, following a hearing, the District Court (Judge G. Patrick Murphy) denied Walgreens' motion to dismiss. At the request of the parties and the mediator Mr. Hunter Hughes, the District Court (Judge Murphy) issued a stay of the action for 60 days so that settlement negotiations could continue. The Stay was lifted on March 7, 2007 by Judge Murphy and the case was reset for a status conference on April 23, 2007. Also on March 7, 2007, the EEOC filed a separate racial discrimination lawsuit against Walgreens in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. That case was styled EEOC v. Walgreen Company, 07-cv-00172-MJR-CJP [EE-IL-257 in the Clearinghouse -- linked under "related cases"]. On March 12, 2007, the EEOC filed a motion to consolidate the EEOC case with the Tucker v. Walgreen Company case. The motion to consolidate was granted by Judge Murphy on April 23, 2007 and the parties to both cases were ordered to file all further pleadings in the Tucker case, Case No. 05-440-GPM-CJP. Judge Murphy also allowed another individual to intervene as a party plaintiff. She filed her Complaint in Intervention on April 26, 2007. The District Court conditionally certified the Settlement Class on October 5, 2007 as "All African Americans who are or were employed by Walgreens in a Management Trainee, Executive Assistant Manager, Store Manager, Pharmacist, or Pharmacy Manager position for any length of time between June 20, 2001, and the Preliminary Approval Date." On March 24, 2008, Judge Murphy approved a consent decree pursuant to which a settlement fund of $24,407,500 was established to be distributed among class members, representatives and to cover attorney fees and expenses. Additionally, the consent decree called for injunctive relief in the form of requiring Walgreen to abide by all applicable laws, to retain consultants to review its employment processes, to establish Promotional Benchmarks for the selection of African Americans, and to create a non-discrimination training program to all employees in relevant positions. The decree was scheduled to last (and be enforceable) for 5 years. On Sept 21, 2011, Judge Murphy approved the parties' agreement that Walgreens reimburse the now closed Qualified Settlement Fund by making direct payments to the late-appearing class members whose shares were not paid previously because said class members did not surface until after the disbursement of the settlement funds. There are no further docket entries. So presumably, the case closed as scheduled in 2013, five years after entry of the consent decree.

Summary: In 2005, private plaintiffs filed a class action racial discrimination lawsuit against their employer, the Walgreen Company, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs alleged that Walgreens practiced nationwide systemic racial discrimination against its African-American management employees. In 2008, Judge Murphy approved a consent decree pursuant to which a settlement fund of $24,407,500 was established to be distributed among class members. The case closed in 2013.


On May 1, 2006, attorneys for the National Prison Project of the ACLU Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation Inc. filed a civil rights class action in the United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of female inmates incarcerated at Taycheedah Correctional Institution (TCI) in Fond du Lac, Wisconsin. Plaintiffs alleged that their conditions of confinement violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S .C. § 794. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged insufficient medical, mental health, and dental care; disparity in mental health treatment between male and female prisoners; and disability discrimination. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and moved for immediate class certification. Defendants denied the allegations, moved for summary judgment and requested that all discovery be stayed. The District Court (Chief Judge Rudolph T Randa) granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the case as a class action, with the class defined as: (1) the TCI Class consisting of all prisoners who are now or in the future will be confined at TCI; and (2) the ADA Subclass consisting of all individuals with disabilities who are now or in the future will be confined at TCI. The defendants' motion for summary judgment was denied and as was the request to stay discovery. Flynn v. Doyle, 2007 WL 805788, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22659 (E.D.Wis. Mar. 14, 2007). The Court then entered a scheduling order which governed discovery and various case deadlines. On January 23, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which Judge Randa granted on April 24, 2009. Judge Randa ordered the defendants to make sure that all controlled medications at Taycheedah Correctional Institution (TCI) be distributed by trained medical personnel with credentials equal to or greater than those of Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) as defined by Wis. Stat. § 441.10. The defendants shall ensure that LPNs distributing medications are trained in institution-specific and department-specific medication administration and documentation practices and protocols. On November 24, 2009, Judge Randa granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to only the claims related to dental care, but denied the motion for partial summary judgment in all other respects. On August 23, 2010, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which Judge Randa approved on December 2, 2010. With regard to medical care, the agreement required TCI to attain accreditation by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care and to retain a jointly appointed paid consultant for a set period of time to make sure TCI continued to meet the medical care standards set in the agreement. The defendants were also required to hire a full-time physician board-certified in a primary care to serve as Associate Medical Director who would provide patient care and administration of clinical care at TCI for the duration of the agreement. The settlement also outlined the procedure to be followed if the consultant indicated that there was noncompliance with the agreement. With regard to mental health care, the agreement required Wisconsin Women's Resource Center to complete construction of and initiate services at planned annexes at TCI to provide space for out-of-cell therapeutic activities and group and individual therapy for prisoners with serious mental illnesses. With regard to access for prisoners with disabilities, the agreement required the defendants to provide interpreters and readers for prisoners with hearing and/or vision impairments, other accommodations for hearing impaired prisoners, and maintain paths, walkways, and thoroughfares between buildings to ensure access to core programs and services for prisoners with mobility disabilities. In addition, the defendants must permit prisoners with mobility disabilities to eat in the dining hall at the same time as their non-disabled peers and adhere to DAI Policy & Procedures for disciplining prisoners with hearing disabilities. The agreement allowed the plaintiffs to seek reasonable attorneys' fees for the work done through the date of the final approval of the agreement and for work done to facilitate and monitor the implementation of the agreement. On December 14, 2010, Judge Randa ordered defendants to pay $950,000 in attorneys' fees.

Summary: On May 1, 2006, female inmates incarcerated in Wisconsin filed a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Wisconsin under U.S.C. § 1983 against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. Plaintiffs alleged that their conditions of confinement violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S .C. § 794. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged insufficient medical, mental health, and dental care; disparity in mental health treatment between male and female prisoners; and disability discrimination. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief and moved for immediate class certification. On March 14, 2007, Judge Rudolph T. Randa granted class action certification. On November 24, 2009, Judge Randa granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to only the claims related to dental care, but denied the motion for partial summary judgment in all other respects. On August 23, 2010, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which Judge Randa approved on December 2, 2010. On December 14, 2010, Judge Randa ordered defendants to pay $950,000 in attorneys' fees.


The Dallas district office of the EEOC filed this complaint against the Exxon Mobil Corporation on September 22, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. EEOC alleged that Exxon Mobil violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by prohibiting pilots, including the complainants in this case, from piloting corporate planes once they reached the age of sixty. Exxon Mobil forced the complainants under the company's policy into involuntary retirement. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, damages for the complainants, attorneys' fees, and a correction to an unlawful employment practice that discriminated on the basis of age. The request for preliminary injunction was denied, but in a subsequent hearing the judge ruled that the plaintiff would stay employed, but "grounded" and maintain the same rate of pay. Exxon Mobil filed for summary judgement, arguing its policy was a “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” (BFOQ), meaning that prohibiting pilots from flying after a certain age was reasonably necessary to the business and it would be impossible or highly impractical to deal with the older employees on an individualized basis. The court granted summary judgment on April 28, 2008 (2008 WL 1958992). On July 3, 2008, the EEOC appealed to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that it had not been allowed sufficient range of discovery in terms of establishing the continuing validity of the BFOQ and the FAA’s age-based rule as a matter of law before summary judgement was issued. The Fifth Circuit found for the EEOC and the case was remanded on August 27, 2009. 2009 WL 2710072. On remand, the district court heard arguments relating to continuing validity. Through expert testimony, Exxon Mobil established that the risk of sudden incapacitation increases with age and no test can adequately anticipate the likelihood of when an incapacitating event may occur. The EEOC argued that the risk for incapacitation was rare and that advances in medicine rendered a blanket policy regarding age unnecessary. The court found that Exxon Mobil has established the continuing validity of its age-based rule as a matter of law. Summary Judgement for Exxon Mobil was granted on September 13, 2012 and amended on December 19, 2012. 2012 WL 6608755. The EEOC appealed again to the Fifth Circuit on February 13, 2013 for reconsideration. The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s ruling on March 25, 2014. 560 Fed. Appx. 282. This case has been closed.

Summary: The EEOC sued Exxon Mobil Corporation, arguing that the company's involuntary retirement policy violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court held that Exxon's policy was in accordance with the FAA standards and that Exxon had established that prohibiting pilots from flying after a certain age was reasonably necessary to the essence of the business. The EEOC appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The circuit court remanded for a hearing on continuing validity but, even with the widened scope of discovery, the district court still found for Exxon Mobil Corporation and the Fifth Circuit affirmed.


On November 18, 2015, pretrial detainees at the Santa Clara County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Northern California. The plaintiffs had been imprisoned in solitary confinement from November 2014 to November 2015 without knowing why they had been placed there or opportunities to appeal the decision. While in solitary, the prison denied the plaintiffs access to adequate medical care. The plaintiffs sued Santa Clara County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. They alleged class-wide violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Represented by the Prison Law Office and several private attorneys, they asked the court for a declaration that Santa Clara County violated their constitutional rights. In addition, the plaintiffs sought an order to enjoin Santa Clara County from holding people in solitary confinement for prolonged periods and from using unnecessary and excessive force, and to require that the County provide constitutionally adequate healthcare and meaningful opportunities to challenge solitary confinement decisions. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 20, 2016, adding an excessive use of force claim. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nathanael M. Cousins for settlement discussions on April 28, 2016. The plaintiffs moved for class certification, and Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas granted the motion on September 20, certifying a class of "All people who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the Santa Clara County jails." The court also certified a subclass of "All people who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the Santa Clara County jails and who have a psychiatric and/or intellectual disability, as defined under the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act." On January 17, 2017, the parties agreed to vacate the trial date and stay motions practice so they could pursue settlement. In April, the parties updated the court with the status of a possible consent decree. The court then scheduled to visit the facilities the following June. However, by November 6, 2017, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illman. The parties continued to meet over settlement conferences in front of Judge Cousins. On October 23, 2018, the parties reached a proposed settlement, filed for a consent decree with the court, and proposed a plan to deliver notice to the class. On November 27, 2018, the magistrate judge approved the proposal and set a date for a final approval hearing. Nearly a dozen members of the class wrote expressing concerns and objecting to the class action settlement. Despite these letters, the court granted final approval of the consent decree on March 20, 2019. 2019 WL 1281981. The defendant agreed to collaborate with the plaintiffs' counsel in drafting the policies to fulfill their obligations under the remedial plan. Thirty days prior to implementing new policies, the defendant would submit these plans to the plaintiffs' counsel for review. The jail agreed to cease using unlawful segregation and force, as well as ensure compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The remedial plan mandated that the parties agree on neutral experts to monitor compliance. The experts would complete comprehensive reviews of the county's progress and would have access to all parts of the jail. Additionally, the plaintiff's counsel would have the ability to monitor compliance and access to the jails to inspect at least twice per year. In the event of a dispute, the parties agreed to first engage in informal resolution with a mediator. The court retained jurisdiction in the event that mediation failed. Finally, the County agreed to pay the plaintiff's counsel $1.6 million for merits fees and expenses, and $200,000 per year for monitoring fees and expenses. The consent decree will remain in effect until the County is found in substantial compliance with the Remedial Plan for one year. Pursuant to the decree, the court ordered the clerk to close the case. The court noted that the court is closing the case simply as a “housekeeping matter”; as of this writing, the court retained continuing jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the decree.

Summary: Pretrial detainees filed this complaint in November 2015 after spending over a year in solitary confinement in the Santa Clara County Jail. The court certified a class for allegations of violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties reached a settlement, and a consent decree was in force at the time of this writing The case remains ongoing.


On January 25, 2018, five Pennsylvania prisoners who had been sentenced to death filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). Represented by the Abolitionist Law Center, the ACLU National Prison Project, and the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief along with attorneys’ fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs challenged the DOC's practice of automatically placing all prisoners who were sentenced to death into solitary confinement merely because they had been sentenced to death and claimed that this violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs alleged that conditions in solitary confinement meant that prisoners spent 22-24 hours a day inside an 8’-by-12’ cell. Unlike other prisoners, this placement in solitary was not triggered by violations of prison rules or a need for protective custody, and there was no procedure for prisoners to challenge placement in solitary. Nearly 80 percent of these prisoners had spent more than a decade in this form of solitary confinement. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from automatically placing all prisoners who had been sentenced to death in indefinite solitary confinement with no opportunity for review. The plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction requiring the defendant to present a plan that provides for individual assessment of prisoners who had been sentenced to death based on a validated risk assessment. The case was assigned to Judge John E. Jones III. On March 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to certify a class and appoint class counsel. The plaintiffs defined the proposed class as “all current and future death-sentenced prisoners in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” On April 3, 2018, Judge Jones granted the unopposed motion. The parties spent the next several months pursuing discovery. The defendants attempted to compel mental health examinations of the plaintiffs but ultimately withdrew the motions. On November 18, 2019, the parties submitted a joint motion for settlement. The settlement provided that the department of corrections would still house prisoners who had been sentenced to death in specific prisons, but that they would offer to these prisoners rights and privileges offered to prisoners in other state facilities, including:

At least 42.5 hours out-of-cell activity every week, including yard and outdoor time, law library time, meal time, treatment or counseling meetings, religious worship, work assignment, and visitation;

Permission to use the phone on a daily basis for at least 15 minutes per usage;

Incarcerated people will not be subjected to strip-searches, shackling, or other restraints, unless security measures are required in response to a temporary, emergent situation;

Contact visits with family, lawyers, and religious advisors; and

Resocialization assistance for individuals psychologically damaged by long periods in solitary confinement to help them in the transition to living in a general population setting, as well and physical and mental health baseline evaluations due to years of neglect.

 The agreement was set to last for 3 years, with provisions for shortening or lengthening the term by one year, based on compliance or noncompliance. The court was to maintain jurisdiction during that period, for enforcement of the agreement. The parties agreed the agreement was compliant with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's constraints on entry of enforceable relief, and that they would not seek to terminate the case except based on substantial compliance, for a period of four years. The court preliminarily approved the settlement on November 20, 2019, and it directed the parties to distribute notice to class members by December 4. The court received several objections to the interim settlement agreement after class notification and conducted a fairness hearing on March 16, 2020. Judge Jones issued a memorandum and final order approving the final settlement agreement on April 9, 2020, noting that most of the objections concerned implementation of the settlement rather than substantive or procedural aspects of it. One class member filed a pro se motion to extend time to launch an appeal on May 18, 2020. The court accepted the motion, but no appeal has yet been filed. If no appeal is filed, the case will be considered closed.

Summary: On January 25, 2018, five prisoners who had been sentenced to death in Pennsylvania filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC). The plaintiffs challenged the DOC's practice of automatically placing all prisoners who were sentenced to death into solitary confinement merely because they had been sentenced to death and claimed that this violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs obtained class certification, and the parties proposed an ultimately accepted settlement agreement under which the defendant would reform its solitary confinement practices.


This case arose out of the detention and separation of the named child plaintiffs from their parents upon their entry into the United States. These detentions and separations were part of the broader Trump Administration "Zero Tolerance" policy of separating immigrant children from their parents upon entry into the country, which was intended to deter immigration to the United States by instilling fear in migrants, especially those from Central and South American countries. This case was filed on September 5, 2018 by child plaintiffs who were forcibly separated from their parents and detained, on behalf of similarly situated children across the United States. They sued the U.S. Attorney General, the Secretary of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the White House Chief of Staff, and other government officials in their individual capacities. The complaint alleged several due process violations, a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Guarantee, a Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and a Refusal or Neglect to Prevent or Aid in Preventing Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. The plaintiffs sought damages and the establishment of a fund for the mental health treatment of all class members to remedy the harm caused by the forcible separation. The first complaint defined the class as all minor children nationwide who entered the United States and had been separated from their parent(s) by DHS or its sub-agencies and detained in Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) custody, ORR foster care, or Customs and Border Protection custody (CBP) or Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody without a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child. The case was assigned to Massachusetts District Judge Timothy S. Hillman. On January 8, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On January 29, 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which supplemented the alleged basis for the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendants and added a Fourth Amendment violation claim. The defendants filed a second motion to dismiss, again arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. The court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on June 17, 2019. On February 3, 2020, Judge Hillman granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction and that the venue was improper. He ordered that the case be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was transferred on February 3, 2020 and assigned to Judge Rudolph Contreras. The court issued an order and a memorandum opinion granting the defendants' motion to dismiss on June 23, 2020, without granting the plaintiffs leave to amend. The court found that the plaintiffs' due process violation claims and claim of a Fifth Amendment violation were brought under the wrong theory and, as pled, the plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action. The court also found that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the Refusal or Neglect to Prevent or Aid in Preventing Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claims. The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on August 21, 2020 (USCA Case Number 20-5255). The case is ongoing as of November 5, 2020.

Summary: In 2018, a a group of child Plaintiffs who were forcibly separated from their parents and detained, filed a class action on behalf of similarly situated children across the United States. The plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration's policy of separating migrant children from their parents violated the children's due process rights and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The case was dismissed in Massachusetts and transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The DC District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on June 23, 2020. The plaintiffs appealed. The case is ongoing as of November 5, 2020.


EEOC's Baltimore, MD office alleged violations of Title VII, ADEA, and ADA in the hiring and recruiting process of the defendant, PJAX, Inc. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland (Baltimore) on 05/27/2003. The defendant, headquartered in Gibsonia, PA, operated facilities and terminals nationwide. EEOC made allegations on behalf of two individual complainants and two class complainants. EEOC alleged that a class of qualified females that applied for the positions of driver and dockworker were rejected because of their sex. It was also alleged that the defendant required all applicants that applied for the driver and dockworker positions to complete a medical questionnaire as to their disabilities and rejected those that indicated disabilities. Additionally, EEOC claimed that a 55-year-old female was refused employment at defendant's Cleveland, OH terminal because of her sex and age. EEOC also alleged that a former regional operations manager at defendant's Baltimore terminal was subject to retaliatory termination because of his oppositions to the discriminatory hiring practices based on age, sex and disability. None of the complainants intervened or filed a separate lawsuit. The defendant proposed settlement before answering the complaint. The district court entered a consent decree on 11/24/2003. Under the two-year consent decree, the defendant agreed to pay $200,500 to the terminated manager, $25,000 to the female who was refused employment, and a total of $1.775 million to all eligible claimants. The eligible claimants include two classes: all qualified females that applied for driver and/or dockworker positions from 01/01/1997 to the entry of the consent decree but were rejected because of their sex; all qualified applicants that applied for driver and dockworker positions in the same period but were rejected because of their elicited disabilities. The consent decree also required the defendant to give all eligible claimants priority hiring consideration. Additionally, the defendant was required to provide training and post notice of its EEO policies at all its facilities and terminals nationwide. The defendant was also required to create an internal HR Specialist position to ensure compliance with federal laws at all facilities and terminals nationwide.

Summary: This was one of two simultanously litigated cases brought by the EEOC in 2003 against PJAX, a large shipping company in Pennsylvania. This case dealt with sex and disability discrimination in hiring, and settled for $2 million and significant injunctive relief. The related case (EE-PA-0133) dealt with sexual harassment and settled for $500,000 and injunctive relief.


In the 2012 general election, California voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 35, a human trafficking ballot initiative, enacting the Californians Against Sexual Exploitation Act (CASE Act), which required that anyone who was a registered sex offender - including people with misdemeanor offenses such as indecent exposure and those whose offenses were not related to internet activity - turn over to law enforcement their e-mail addresses, user and screen names, or any other identifier they used for instant messaging, for social networking sites, or at online forums and in internet chat rooms. On November 7, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of two registered sex offenders and a putative class of all such persons, as well as a website on which sex offender laws are discussed and debated. The plaintiffs sought class certification as well as declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of California. The complaint alleged that the requirements of the law would burden and chill protected speech in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Thelton Henderson in San Francisco, who immediately granted a temporary restraining order blocking enforcement of the law. Doe v. Harris, 2012 WL 6101870 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2012). At this point, two private citizens who were proponents of Proposition 35 moved to intervene as co-defendants. On January 10, 2013, Judge Henderson granted their motion to intervene. Doe v. Harris, 2013 WL 140053 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2013). The Court noted that the intervenors were not entitled to intervene but the Court permitted it anyway in the hope that their intervention would contribute to a just and equitable resolution of the disputes. On January 11, 2013, Judge Henderson granted the plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Doe v. Harris, 2013 WL 144048 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013). The court applied intermediate scrutiny and found that the state had failed to demonstrate that the reporting requirement under the CASE Act was narrowly tailored to serve its legitimate interests in protecting individuals from sex offenses and human-trafficking. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their First Amendment speech claim, noting that the plaintiffs enjoyed no lesser right to anonymous speech simply because they were unpopular. Therefore, the court enjoined the state government and all law enforcement personnel from implementing the reporting requirement under the CASE Act. The State and two private intervenors appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The district court stayed the proceedings pending the appeal. On November 18, 2014, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's granting of the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction and remanded the matter to the District Court for further proceedings. Doe v. Harris, 772 F.3d 563 (9th Cir. 2014). At a case management conference on April 6, 2015, the intervening defendants requested a stay of proceedings in District Court while they pursued a legislative resolution of the matter. They stated that if legislation was not approved by the California legislature by September 14, 2015, or if legislation was approved by that date but the Governor vetoed the legislation, then the intervenors would stipulate to a permanent injunction. On April 7, 2015, the Court granted the intervening defendants' motion to stay proceedings until September 15, 2015. On September 14, 2015, the defendants submitted a status report stating that legislation addressing the constitutional concerns raised by Proposition 35 - Senate Bill 448 - was approved by the California Senate with a 39-0 vote on September 1, 2015. SB 448 amended Proposition 35 in the following ways: (1) Eliminated the requirement that sex offenders register Internet service providers, and clarified that sex offenders need only register those Internet identifiers actually used to participate in online communications; (2) Limited the public disclosure of sex offenders' Internet identifiers to instances where the Attorney General had determined, based on specific, articulable facts, that disclosure was likely to protect members of the public from sex-related crimes, kidnappings, or human trafficking; (3) Provided sex offenders with 5 working days to register new Internet identifiers, rather than 24 hours; and (4) Applied the registration requirements only to those who were required to register for a crime where the use of the Internet was essential to the commission of the crime. While the Assembly was unable to vote on SB 448 before the legislative session ended on September 11, 2015, the plaintiffs stated that they had good cause to believe that the Legislature would approve SB 448 shortly after the Legislature reconvened on January 4, 2016, and that the resulting legislation would resolve the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. The intervenors stated that since further litigation was unnecessary, they would allow the current stay to lapse according to its terms, and that the parties would meet and confer about how to proceed. On October 26, 2015, by the parties' stipulation, the District Court declared that the challenged provisions "violate[d] the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and cannot be enforced." It then deferred entry of final judgment to allow the intervenors to pursue legislation that would amend the law in a way that would resolve the matter without further proceedings. On October 28, 2016, the Governor signed into law SB 448, which amended the challenged provisions. When it went into effect on January 1, 2017, SB 448 significantly narrowed the scope of the challenged Internet registration requirement, only requiring registration for people convicted after January 1, 2017 of a limited number of enumerated offenses who used the Internet as part of the crimes. The parties agreed that the amendment made this litigation moot. On December 27, 2016, the parties stipulated that they had agreed that the defendant would pay to the plaintiffs a total of $522,611.07 ($715.77 in costs and $521,895.30 in attorneys' fees), and Judge Henderson entered an order with this agreement on January 3, 2017. On January 11, 2017, the parties jointly requested that the case be dismissed, and Judge Henderson dismissed the case the next day.

Summary: In 2012, California voters approved a ballot initiative requiring registered sex offenders to turn over to law enforcement their e-mail addresses, user and screen names, or any other identifier they used on the Internet. The ACLU and two private parties brought suit alleging constitutional violations. The litigation lead to legislative changes to the ballot and the case was dismissed.


On January 30, 2008, two arrestees detained at jails operated by the Geo Group Inc., a private corrections management company, filed a nationwide 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Geo Group, Inc. engaged in improper strip-search practices at its facilities in violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights. The Geo Group, Inc. manages numerous correctional, detention, mental health, and residential treatment facilities in the United States and operated the George W. Hill Correctional Facility in Thornton, Pennsylvania under a contract with Delaware County, Pennsylvania. The Plaintiffs were arrested and brought to the George W. Hill Correctional Facility where they were allegedly strip-searched without reasonable suspicion in front of other inmates pursuant to the Geo Group's blanket policy of strip-searching every pre-trial detainee that entered its facilities, regardless of the crime charged and without making a determination whether there was a reasonable suspicion that the detainee possessed weapons or contraband. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, monetary, and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Specifically, the Plaintiff's requested monetary damages for Fourth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, declaratory judgment as to the Fourth Amendment violations, and preliminary and permanent injunctions as to the Fourth Amendment violations. Additionally, the Plaintiff's brought claims under state law for battery, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. On May 2, 2008, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiff's battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims. The Plaintiffs did not oppose the motion. On May 30, 2008, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Judge Jan E. Dubois) granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss. On September 18, 2008, the Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On March 25, 2009, the District Court (Judge Dubois) denied the Defendant's motion. Allison v. Geo Group, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 2d 433 (E.D.Pa. 2009) On March 1, 2010 the parties reached a settlement agreement. The terms of the settlement provided that since January 31, 2008 the Defendant stopped strip-searching without reasonable suspicion, and the Defendant instituted new strip search policies that are constitutional. All officers and employees will have access and training regarding the Defendant's strip search policy. An injunction order to ensure the Defendant's compliance with the revised strip search policy will remain in force for eighteen months from the date of the final approval of the settlement. Additionally, the settlement entitled each class member to a share of the $2.999 million settlement. The approved settlement class is described as follows: All persons who were placed into the custody of one or more of the Jails after being detained for misdemeanors, summary offenses, or other crimes that did not involve the possession or distribution of drugs, possession of weapons, crimes of violence, or felonies, who had no history of such charges, and did not behave in a manner at intake that would give intake officers reasonable suspicion that the inmate was carrying or concealing contraband, but were strip searched upon their admission into one or more of the Jails pursuant to Defendants' then existing strip search policy. The Class Period is from January 30, 2006 to January 30, 2008 for George W. Hill Correctional Facility, Frio County Detention Center, Dickens County Detention Center, Tri-County Detention Center, and Newton County Correctional Center, and from January 30, 2005 to January 30, 2008 for Guadalupe County Correctional Facility. On October 22, 2010 the District Court (Judge Dubois) granted final approval regarding the settlement agreement.

Summary:
On January 30, 2008, two arrestees detained at jails operated by the Geo Group Inc., a private corrections management company, filed a nationwide 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging that the Geo Group, Inc. engaged in improper strip-search practices at its facilities without reasonable suspician in violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Constitutional rights.

On March 1, 2010 the parties reached a settlement agreement. The terms of the settlement provided that on January 31, 2008 the Defendant stopped strip-searching without reasonable suspicion, and the Defendant's instituted new strip search policies that are constitutional. All officers and employees will have access and training regarding the Defendant's strip search policy. An injunction order to ensure the Defendant's compliance with the revised strip search policy will remain in force for eighteen months from the date of the final approval of the settlement. Additionally, the settlement entitled each class member to a share of the $2.999 million settlement.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLU Foundation of Texas filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders (EO) that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding the Executive Order," including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order. The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Houston Field Office, including Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport and Bush Intercontinental Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The case was assigned to Judge Vanessa D. Gilmore. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion, see this case. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer May 30, arguing that "[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice." On Jun. 26, the court ordered proceedings stayed pending the decision by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on the government's transfer motion. On Aug. 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that although the thirteen FOIA cases share "a limited number of factual issues," these issues "appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." The parties filed a joint status report on Jan. 8, 2018 indicating that the government had produced a batch of responsive records, that its search for additional records was ongoing, and that it would make future productions on a rolling basis. Production continued throughout 2018 and was completed around the end of that year. The plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal on February 1, 2019, and the court officially dismissed the case on February 12, 2019.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLU Foundation of Texas filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. After the government failed to consolidate all of these lawsuits, it produced the requested documents.


On April 28, 2016, family members of inmates at the Wilson County Correctional Facility filed this class action in the U.S. District Court of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff’s office for Wilson County, Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification, and attorneys’ fees. The jail implemented a policy that prohibited inmates and their correspondents from sending letters enclosed in envelopes. Instead, inmates were required to conduct all correspondence on pre-paid U.S. Postal cards. The plaintiffs claimed this impermissibly restricted outside correspondents from exercising their right to communicate with inmates in writing in violation of the First Amendment. Further, the plaintiffs contended that the postcard-only policy violated due process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment because neither sender nor recipient had any way of knowing that their mail had been rejected. Judge Julie A. Robinson granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on August 4, 2016 since the defendants never responded to the plaintiffs’ motion. Judge Robinson defined the class as “all current and future outside correspondents who wish to write letters to, and/or receive letters from, inmates in the Wilson County Correctional Facility and who are subject to or affected by the Postcard-Only Mail Policy.” The court noted that the class included only outside correspondents seeking to send mail to the inmates—not the inmates themselves. 315 F.R.D. 670. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Kenneth Gale on April 28, 2016. Judge Gale oversaw the parties’ settlement negotiations from October 15, 2016 until the parties reached a settlement agreement on June 16, 2017. On July 19 of the same year, Judge Robinson granted the parties’ joint motion for a preliminary class action settlement. After a fairness hearing, the court found the settlement proposed by the parties to be fair, reasonable, and adequate and approved the agreement and consent decree on November 3, 2017. 2017 WL 5068906. Per the terms of the settlement, the sheriff’s office was given 21 days to revise its mail policies so as to not restrict the volume or method of letters sent to inmates of Wilson County Correctional from outside correspondents. The defendants agreed to give notice of the settlement to all the members of the class through publication of the results in a local paper and through posting flyers in each visitation area in the jail. The Court adopted the consent decree while retaining jurisdiction to enforce its terms and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on November 3. 2017 WL 5068906. One critical factor leading to settlement was the plaintiffs’ promise to significantly reduce attorneys’ fees requested to less than $100 an hour. The case has been marked “closed” on the docket since the November 3, 2017 order. However, as of July 31, 2020, the case remains under jurisdiction of the court for enforcement of the decree under the PLRA.

Summary: In 2016, the family members of inmates at Wilson County Correctional in Kansas filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court of Kansas. The plaintiffs alleged that the jail's postcard-only mail policy violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2017, the parties reached a settlement requiring the jail to revise its mail policy. The case appears closed but the court retains jurisdiction.


On September 30, 2013, two Wyandotte County Adult Detention Center inmates filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas against the Wyandotte County Sheriff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Kansas and the Social Justice Law Collective, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the jail's Postcard-Only Mail policy violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that a policy restricting all outgoing and ingoing mail to two 5" by 7" postcards, with the text visible to all persons handling the postcard, violated their right to privacy and freedom of speech. On November 25, 2013, the District Court (Judge Eric F. Melgren) granted the motion for class certification on behalf of all present and future inmates at the Wyandotte County Jail. On June 26, 2014, the parties met with a private mediator. The resulting conversations between the parties lead to a settlement agreement. This was submitted to the District Court for approval on October 30, 2014. The settlement held that the plaintiffs were allowed to send and receive an unlimited number of letters in envelopes. The defendants also agreed to provide indigent inmates with sufficient writing materials to send two letters a week without cost. On February 23, 2015, the District Court (Judge Eric F. Melgren) approved the settlement agreement and dismissed the case.

Summary: On September 30, 2013, inmates filed a lawsuit against the Wyandotte County Jail, alleging that the Postcard-Only Mail policy violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights. The policy restricted the inmates' correspondence to two 5" by 7" postcards a week. The plaintiffs requested and received class certification later that year. The parties eventually settled and the court approved the settlement on February 23, 2015. The settlement agreement allowed inmates to send letters in envelopes without restriction as to volume. In addition, the defendants agreed to providing writing supplies to indigent inmates.


On June 1, 2017, nine indigent residents of South Carolina filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiffs sued Lexington County, South Carolina, the Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County, and the Associate Chief Judge for Administrative Purposes of the Summary Courts in Lexington County all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Margaret B. Seymour and referred to Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had created a modern-day debtors' prison through a system that routinely deprived indigent people of their rights under the U.S. Constitution. Under what was called the Default Payment Policy, Lexington County magistrate courts routinely ordered the arrest and jailing of people who could not afford to make payments toward court fines and fees in traffic and misdemeanor criminal cases. When an indigent person was unable to pay in full at sentencing, the magistrate court imposed a payment plan that required steep monthly payments that were usually beyond the individual's financial means. According to the plaintiffs, if the indigent person failed to pay, the magistrate court ordered law enforcement to arrest and jail the individual. The plaintiffs claimed that, by regularly jailing indigent persons despite their inability to pay court fines and fees, the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, as well as the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of "[a]ll indigent people who currently owe, or in the future will owe, fines, fees, court costs, assessments, or restitution in cases handled by Lexington County magistrate courts." On August 18, 2017, the defendants moved for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that such claims were either moot or would require intervention by the district court in ongoing state criminal proceedings. Later, the defendants filed a supplemental motion, adding the argument that such claims by the plaintiffs had been rendered moot by a Memorandum to Magistrates and Municipal Judges that Chief Judge Donald W. Beatty issued on September 15, 2017. The September 2017 memorandum addressed the right to counsel by noting that "[a]ll defendants facing criminal charges that carry the possibility of imprisonment must be informed of their right to counsel and, if indigent, their right to court-appointed counsel prior to proceeding with trial." The defendants claimed that this sentence cured any concern the plaintiffs may have had with regard to the right to counsel in situations carrying the possibility of imprisonment. On October 19, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding two plaintiffs and one defendant with additional details in the factual allegations to accommodate the new parties. On October 31, 2017, the defendants moved for summary judgment of the damage claims, arguing that the claims were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, judicial immunity, and legislative immunity. The defendants also argued that as a matter of law, no defendant had the legal authority to create the policies alleged by the plaintiffs. On February 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge Hodges filed a report and recommendation regarding the two motions for summary judgment and the motion to certify class. She recommended that the court deny the plaintiff's motion to certify class, grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief and deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' damages claim against Lexington County for failure to afford counsel on grounds of mootness based on a memorandum from the South Carolina Supreme Court and grant the motion as to all other claims. Partially agreeing with Judge Hodges, Judge Seymour denied the motion to certify the class without prejudice on March 29, 2018 because it relied on claims for prospective relief. Contrary to the recommendation, however, the court denied both motions for summary judgment, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact. 2018 WL 1556189. In response to the court's order, the plaintiffs filed a second motion to certify the class on April 17, 2018 and the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration as to the denials of summary judgment on April 24, 2018. Without first waiting for a ruling on their motion, the defendants appealed the denial of the two motions for summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Before the Fourth Circuit could rule on the summary judgment motions, Judge Seymour denied the defendants' motions for reconsideration on July 10, 2018, rejecting the defendant's argument that the claims were now moot. After several motions and conferences in the fall, Judge Seymour referred the case to mediation under the guidance of Judge Hodges on October 19, 2018. Upon moving the case to mediation, Judge Seymour dismissed the motion for class certification without prejudice, granting the plaintiffs' leave to refile should mediation fail. During mediation negotiation, a Fourth Circuit panel composed of Judges J. Harvie Wilkinson, Diana Gribbon Motz, and Allyson K. Duncan found that they lacked jurisdiction to provide judgment on the defendant's interlocutory appeals on the summary judgment motions on January 23, 2019. They found that the record before them did not give them the opportunity to tell if the defendants were eligible for immunity, which was the subject of the appeal, and they remanded the case to the District Court to resolve this question of material fact. Mediation is ongoing as of June 2020.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by nine indigent residents of South Carolina in the U.S. District for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged the Lexington County and its magistrate judges had created a modern day debtors’ prison by imposing high court fees and a payment plan requiring steep monthly payments that were usually beyond the individual’s financial means. The case has been moved to mediation; all motions to certify the class have been dismissed with leave to refile if mediation negotiations fail.


On February 24, 2011, the Defendant, the City of New York, removed this case from the New York Supreme Court to the U.S. District Court of New York. The plaintiff, a cook in a correctional facility, filed suit against the city of New York and the correctional facility under 42 USC §1983 for violations of his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights for exposure to carcinogens and/or toxins on the premises. The plaintiff developed thyroid cancer in 2008 and seeks monetary damages. On June 2, 2011, Judge Richard J. Holwell ordered that this case be combined with five other cases: 11 Civ. 1300, 11 Civ. 1301, 11 Civ. 2149, 11 Civ. 2150, 11 Civ. 2697, 11 Civ. 3277, 11 Civ. 4780, and 11 Civ. 504, under the docket number of Barley v. City of New York. On March 28, 2012, Judge Loretta A. Preska granted the defendant's motion for dismissal for failure to state a claim.

Summary: On June 2, 2011, the suits of several previous employees of the City of New York's correctional facilities were compiled as one suit against the city under 42 USC §1983 for violations of their Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed exposure to carcinogens and/or toxins on the premises. On March 28, 2012, Judge Loretta A. Preska dismissed the case(s) for failure to state a claim.


On January 30, 2014, an inmate at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiff initially filed the suit pro se, but subsequently obtained private counsel and submitted his first amended complaint on September 15, 2014. The plaintiff sued the state of Louisiana, the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (LDPSC), and the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola for serious transgressions of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs as required by the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff alleged that LDPSC utilized discriminatory policies against individuals with disabilities by refusing to pay for “elective surgery,” failing to make reasonable work accommodations, and excluding individuals with disabilities from participating in beneficial prison programs and activities. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants knew about his medical condition but unreasonably delayed treatment, resulting in serious pain and suffering. Specifically, the plaintiff had been suffering from deteriorating eyesight for years as a result of cataracts, but—despite numerous doctors’ recommendations that he required surgery to remedy his progressing blindness—the defendants refused to pay for his cataracts surgery on the grounds that it was “elective surgery.” They also required the plaintiff to work in dangerous manual labor jobs, despite his deteriorating vision that made him more susceptible to injury, and excluded him from prison programs such as physical exercise, arts, and music. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and monetary damages. This case was assigned to Judge John W. deGravelles and referred to Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes. Shortly after the plaintiff filed his initial pro se complaint, the defendants allowed him to receive cataracts surgery—first for one eye in July 2014, then both eyes by September 2014. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved to file a second amended complaint on March 4, 2015. However, the magistrate judge ruled one week later that the plaintiff had failed to serve his first amended complaint on the defendants in a timely manner and ordered him to show cause for this delay, lest his complaint be dismissed. The magistrate judge also denied the plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. Meanwhile, the defendants submitted motions to dismiss the plaintiff’s first amended complaint—first, the warden in his individual capacity on March 12, 2015, then all the other defendants on March 24, 2015. The warden’s motion to dismiss alleged that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for a violation of civil rights since the warden was not a public entity under the ADA and that Louisiana was the real party to the lawsuit. The remaining defendants’ motions to dismiss alleged that they were protected under Eleventh Amendment immunity, that the plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages was frivolous, and that the plaintiff had failed to establish good cause for his delay in serving his first amended complaint. However, the day before, the plaintiff filed his response to the magistrate’s order to show cause for his delay in serving his first amended complaint. The plaintiff claimed that he had two main reasons for failing to serve: (1) at the time of the complaint filing deadline, he was still unsure as to whether the cataract surgery had been successful, and (2) he had already moved to file a second amended complaint, which would need to be served on the defendants, so he did not want to risk unnecessary expense by serving the first amended complaint. On April 9, 2015, the court granted both motions to dismiss the first amended complaint, but vacated these orders the next day. The court then granted the plaintiff’s motion to file his second amended complaint on June 2, 2015. The plaintiff filed his second amended complaint that same day. The plaintiff’s second amended complaint, instead of focusing on the denial of the cataract surgery itself, was framed around LDSPC’s discriminatory policies that led to the long delay before the plaintiff’s surgery and which caused him to experience pain and suffering in the interim. Specifically, these included LDSPC’s policies to delay surgery for certain types of disabilities by not paying for “elective surgery,” which included cataract removal surgery, to not make reasonable work accommodations for individuals with disabilities, and to exclude disabled individuals from the benefits of the prison’s services, programs, and activities. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, monetary damages, and any other relief the court deemed necessary. The defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on June 15, 2015 and June 30, 2015, first by the warden and the secretary of LDSPC in their individual capacities and then all defendants in their official capacities. They alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for a violation of civil rights, that they were protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court did not rule on these motions to dismiss until January 25, 2016, declaring them moot. In the meantime, both parties moved for summary judgment—the defendants on September 11, 2015 and the plaintiffs on November 6, 2015. The court denied both motions on June 6, 2016. 2016 WL 3167176. Both parties appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on July 6, 2016, but both appeals were voluntarily dismissed on July 26, 2016. The parties then scheduled a settlement conference order on December 12, 2016, but they were unable to come to an agreement. Five days before trial, on January 25, 2017, the parties disputed the issue of injunctive relief. The defendants alleged that the court should declare plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief moot, since the plaintiff no longer suffered from a disability under the ADA. The plaintiff, on the other hand, alleged that he still suffered from a disability since he was waiting for surgery for his torn pectoralis muscle, an injury sustained as a result of the defendants’ discriminatory policies, and that the defendants’ discriminatory policies were still in place, which could result in future violations of the ADA. The jury trial began on January 30, 2017. The parties agreed that the court should decide the issue of injunctive relief instead of the jury. The court declared injunctive relief moot on January 31, 2017. Subsequently, the judge dismissed Louisiana and its governor as defendants in the lawsuit. The jury returned its verdict on February 7, 2017, ruling in favor of the defendants. The jury said that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a disability under the ADA before he received the cataract removal surgery, and that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs under the Eighth Amendment by delaying surgery and by requiring him to do manual labor despite his visual impairment. After the trial, on February 17, 2017, the plaintiff asked the court to certify that an appeal of the February 7, 2017 judgment was not frivolous and to grant him a free transcript of his trial. The plaintiff alleged that his grounds for appeal were because the defense counsel had violated the court’s January 17, 2017 holding regarding the acceptability of certain categories of evidence, thereby resulting in a trial that was unfairly prejudiced against him. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defense counsel had violated restrictions by mentioning specific details about the plaintiff’s sentence or crime, medical care not pertaining to the plaintiff’s cataracts, and comparing the plaintiff’s medical care to that of “free people.” The defendants disputed the veracity of these claims, but ultimately the court ruled that the plaintiff’s appeal was not frivolous and gave him a copy of the trial transcript on March 2, 2017. The plaintiff moved for a new trial on March 2, 2017, alleging that the defense counsel violated the court’s restrictions regarding acceptable evidence, that a key witness misrepresented the definition of a disability under the ADA, and that the evidence overwhelmingly contradicted the jury’s verdict. Through March and April 2017 the parties disputed whether a new trial was warranted. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial on October 30, 2017. The court held that the plaintiff made no specific showing of prejudice from the defense counsel’s violations, that the jury could reasonably have rejected the plaintiff's and other inmates’ testimony that the plaintiff’s visual impairments actually affected his daily life, and that the jury could reasonably have found that none of the defendants acted towards the plaintiff with deliberate indifference, as required to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim. 2017 WL 6803760. The plaintiff appealed this holding on November 3, 2017. On December 27, 2018, the Fifth Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial. The Fifth Circuit found that a reasonable jury could have found that the plaintiff was not disabled and that the plaintiff did not show that he was prejudiced by defense counsel mentioning excluded categories of evidence, since those references were brief and vague. 2018 WL 6822306. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, a prisoner at Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola who suffered from cataracts filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiff alleged that the policy of delaying "elective surgery," failing to make reasonable work accommodations, and excluding prisoners with disabilities from beneficial prison programs violated the American with Disabilities Act and his Eighth Amendment rights. After filing his initial lawsuit, the plaintiff received cataracts surgery, but the lawsuit continued over the broader discriminatory policies. The case went to a jury trial in 2017, which returned a verdict for the defendants. The jury said that plaintiff failed to prove that he suffered from a disability under the ADA before his cataracts surgery and that the defendants did not violate his Eighth Amendment rights by delaying surgery and requiring him to do manual labor despite his visual impairment. The plaintiff moved for a new trial in March 2017. The district court denied his motion in October 2017 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed in December 2018. This case is now closed.


On June 27, 2011, the EEOC, on behalf of a Muslim woman, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. and Hollister Co. California LLC. The EEOC asked the court for a permanent injunction, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, claiming 1) the defendants failed to accommodate the sincerely held religious belief and the practice of wearing a hijab (head scarf) of the Muslim woman, and 2) the defendants fired the Muslim woman because of her religion, Islam. On September 9, 2011, the Muslim woman filed a complaint as a plaintiff-intervenor, represented by Legal Aid Society - Employment Law Center and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (San Francisco Bay Area chapter), asking the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and interest. The plaintiff-intervenor claimed that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against her and discharged her because of her religion, and also failed to accommodate her religion, both under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and California Fair Employment and Housing Act. In October 2009, the plaintiff-intervenor applied for a job at Abercrombie and Fitch ("A&F") in San Mateo, CA and was told her hijab comported with A&F's "Look Policy." She was hired as a stockroom employee but on February 9, 2010, a manager saw her on the sales floor. On February 15, 2010 she was told by human resources to remove her hijab since it violated the company's "Look Policy." When she explained she could not remove it because of her religious beliefs, she was suspended until further notice. She was told to come back to work on February 22, 2010 but was told to remove her hijab. When she refused to do so stating it was part of her religion, her employment was terminated. The plaintiff-intervenor filed a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and DFEH on March 1, 2010. The EEOC was involved in two other cases with A&F at the time for similar charges. The EEOC and A&F tried settling the case numerous times but to no avail. On June 27, 2011, the EEOC filed this suit. After the plaintiff-intervenor's complaint on September 9, 2011, the court (Judge Edward J. Davila) ordered case management conferences and the parties went through the discovery process for a couple years. In September 3, 2013, the court (Judge Edward J. Davila) granted plaintiffs' (EEOC) motion for partial summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment. The defendants did not dispute plaintiffs' prima facie case but stated that accommodating the plaintiff-intervenor would cause undue hardship, or more than a de minimus cost. The defendants did not claim economic harm specifically but said deviating from the "Look Policy" would detract from the in-store experience, negatively affect the brand, and threaten the company's success. The court (Judge Davila) found that the defendants failed to meet their burden because they provided no evidence other than opinion testimony. The defendants then tried a novel commercial speech defense arguing that its employees are like "living advertisements," but the court (Judge Davila) rejected this argument. The court (Judge Davila) also denied defendants' motion for partial summary judgment as to the injunctive relief and punitive damages claims. On September 19, 2013, the Court approved a stipulated judgment and decree. Among other things, the Court ordered the defendants to not discriminate on the basis of religious accommodation and to reasonably grant requests for religious accommodations. The plaintiff-intervenor received $48,000 for backpay and compensatory damages, a statement of regret, and a letter of reference. The defendants will also be subject to monitoring and reporting. The decree is to be in force for three years. The decree was entered in September 2013 and scheduled to last until September 2016. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: On June 27, 2011, the EEOC on behalf of a Muslim woman, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Abercrombie and Fitch Stores, Inc. and Hollister Co. California LLC after the woman was fired for failing to remove her hijab. On September 19, 2013, the court approved a stipulated judgment and decree whereby the defendants, among other things, had to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $48,000, were enjoined from discriminating, and and had to submit to monitoring and reporting requirements for three years.


On March 13, 2017, the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing and Opportunity Council ("EHOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff sued the City of Maplewood, Missouri, under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. and Missouri Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.040 et seq. for discriminatory treatment and disparate impact. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgement that the defendant’s actions violate the FHA and the MHRA; a permanent injunction restraining Maplewood from enforcing the nuisance ordinance; compensatory damages; punitive damages; and attorneys’ fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the nuisance ordinance issued by the city of Maplewood, Missouri discriminates against and disproportionately impacts nonwhite residents, women (especially those who are survivors of domestic violence), and people with disabilities. Specifically, they challenged the city of Maplewood "chronic nuisance ordinance" pursuant to which the city revoked the occupancy permits of residents (it’s a crime to live in the city without it) whom it deems to be "chronic nuisances." They claimed that Maplewood designated certain residents to be nuisances simply because they had been the subject of multiple police calls, regardless of whether they did anything wrong. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on May 11, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 and Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 213.040 for which relief could be granted. On December 8, 2017, District Judge Ronnie L. White granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. He found that the facts did not create an inference that the defendant enforced its nuisance ordinance for the purpose of adversely affecting African American residents, women, and/or disabled residents and failed to identify specific instances where the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive in providing favorable treatment to white and/or non-disabled residents over other residents based on race, gender, disability, or any other improper criteria when enforcing its nuisance ordinance. He also found that the plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead a causal connection between the alleged discriminatory policy, Maplewood's nuisance ordinance, and the alleged discriminatory disparate impact on African Americans, women, and disabled residents. The Judge also dismiss the state law claim without prejudice, stating that because the federal claim had been dismissed, he did not have jurisdiction to hear the state claim. 2017 WL 6278882. On January 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for relief from judgment alleging that claims regarding EHOC’s sex and disability discrimination were conceptually distinct from the race discrimination claim, and the Court erred in dismissing them for the same reasons. The defendant asserted that the plaintiff could not relitigate the merits of its case and that the court fully addressed all of plaintiff’s claims as pleaded. On May 8, 2018, Judge White denied the plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment as an attempt to “re-litigate the issues which the Court thoroughly addressed.” The case is now closed. 2018 WL 10396918.

Summary: In 2017, a private non-profit corporation filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff alleged that the city of Maplewood, Missouri's "chronic nuisance ordinance" discriminated against African American residents, women, and/or disabled residents. In 2017, the Judge ruled that the plaintiff failed to state a claim of disparate treatment and/or disparate impact and dismissed the case. On January 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgement alleging that claims regarding EHOC’s sex and disability discrimination were conceptually distinct from the race discrimination claim, and the Court erred in dismissing them for the same reasons. On January 8, 2018, the plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgement alleging that claims regarding EHOC’s sex and disability discrimination were conceptually distinct from the race discrimination claim, and the Court erred in dismissing them for the same reasons.