On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of New York and other affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On December 4, 2012, the court (Judge Brian Cogan) issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that plaintiffs' complaint were ripe for adjudication. 907 F. Supp. 2d 310. Because the health plan in question was grandfathered into contraception exemptions (specifically under safe harbor provisions granting temporary relief from mandatory contraception as federal regulations are re-written), that plaintiffs lack standing for that specific claim. That said, plaintiffs maintained a cause of action for impending injury from future regulatory changes that would implement mandatory contraceptive coverage for the health plan when the safe harbor provisions terminate. On April 23, 2013, defendants filed a motion to halt proceedings. They argued that because of pending amendments to the regulation, the contraception mandate would not at any time or under any circumstances be enforced against the plaintiff. On April 24, 2013, the court (Judge Brian Cogan) granted defendant's motion, and stayed the proceeding pending completion of the rulemaking proceedings, but requiring defendants to provide a written status update every 60 days. On August 14, 2013, the plaintiffs amended their complaint in response to the 2013 Final Rules ACA. They argued that the amended definition of "religious employer" continued to require them to violate their sincerely held religious beliefs by facilitating access to contraception services. This is because the accommodations put forth in the amended law require plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn triggers an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs find objectionable. As a result, the plaintiffs were the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage. The plaintiffs asked the court to grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On December 13, 2013, the court (Judge Brian Cogan) issued a final judgment, dismissing the claims of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Rockville Centre, New York, but enjoining the government from enforcing or implementing the challenged regulation against Catholic Health Care System, Catholic Health Services of Long Island; Cardinal Spellman High School; and Monsignor Farrell High School. The court found that the Diocesan plaintiffs fell within the definition of "religious employer" and were entirely exempt from the mandate. While the remaining plaintiffs were not defined as a "religious employer," the court found that they did suffer substantial injury to their sincerely held religious beliefs by being required to complete self-certification through a third party, but this injury posed no burden to the exempt Diocesan plaintiffs. 987 F. Supp. 2d 232. On February 11, 2014, the federal government appealed the district court's decision to the Second Circuit. On August 7, 2015, the Second Circuit (Judge Rosemary Pooler, Judge Pierre N. Leval, and Judge Denny Chin) reversed the District Court and denied the injunction, finding that the regulatory accommodation allowing the plaintiffs to opt out of the contraceptive services mandate does not in itself substantially burden the plaintiff’s religious expression. 796 F.3d 207. Plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Second Circuit denied in an order on December 1, 2015. On January 4, 2016, the Second Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ request to stay pending the filing of a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review, and vacated the judgment of the Second Circuit and remanded the case on May 23, 2016 in light of Zubik v. Burwell. In Zubik, the Supreme Court had directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. The Court took no position on the merits of the case, but issued a per curiam order remanding the cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. Back in the Second Circuit, the parties entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On October 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the case, which the court so ordered the next day. The settlement agreement is not currently publicly available. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Archdiocese of New York and other affiliated Catholic organizations filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On December 13, 2013, the court granted in part and denied in part an injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions. The Government appealed to the Second Circuit, which denied the injunction on December 1, 2015. The Second Circuit granted the plaintiffs’ request to stay on January 1, 2015 pending filing of a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Zubik v. Burwell, and in 2017, the parties settled after a change in administrations.


On September 3, 2002, the United States filed an action under the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act against Edward Rose & Associates, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The United States had already filed a similar lawsuit against the same defendants on January 18, 2001, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice, asked the court for an injunction to enjoin defendants from discriminating against persons with disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants discriminated against persons with disabilities by failing to design and construct covered multifamily dwellings and places of public accommodation in accordance with subsection 804(f)(3)(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. The Defendants answered the complaints in the Michigan action and the Indiana action, and in both, denied any and all allegations of alleged violations of the Fair Housing Act or the Americans with Disabilities Act. However, the parties agreed that they should avoid further contested litigation and resolve the dispute without an evidentiary hearing or findings of fact. On February 21, 2003, The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan enjoined certain of the Rose companies from proceeding with the construction and occupancy of nineteen apartment buildings at two complexes where the buildings, as designed, would have had descending steps to the entrances to the covered dwelling units directly across from the parking lot and the only accessible way into the covered dwelling units would have been by walking around the opposite side of the building and through the patio doors. On August 25, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of a preliminary injunction. On December 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied the Rose Companies' Petition for Rehearing En Banc. In the Consent Agreement entered in the United Stated District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on September 30, 2005, the parties agreed that the Defendants would ensure the future design and/or construction of covered multifamily dwellings by the Rose Companies and/or the Architectural Defendants shall comply with the design and construction requirements of the Fair Housing Ac, 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1)-(3) and where applicable, the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§12182(a) and 12183(a)(1). The Defendants agreed to $950,000 into an interest-bearing escrow account administered by counsel fro the Rose Companies for the purpose of paying settlement amounts to individuals alleged by the United States to qualify as "the Settlement Fund." Further, the Defendants were to pay the United States a sum of $110,000 as a civil penalty pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §3614(d)(1)(C) and 42 U.S.C. §12188(b)(2)(C)(i). Each party bore its own costs and attorneys' fees associated with the litigation. Except for the complaints against Gary Weaver, the complaints in the Michigan and Indiana actions have been dismissed with prejudice as agreed in the consent order entered in the Untied Stated District court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Indiana action against the Edward Rose & Company is located in our database at FH-IN-0004.

Summary: On September 3, 2002, the United States filed actions under the Fair Housing Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Edward Rose & Associates, Inc. in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice, asked the court for an injunction to enjoin defendants from discriminating against persons with disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants discriminated against persons with disabilities by failing to design and construct covered multifamily dwellings and places of public accommodation in accordance with the features of accessible and adaptable design and construction required by subsection 804(f)(3)(c) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. In the Consent Agreement entered in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on September 30, 2005, the parties agreed that the Defendants would ensure the future design and/or construction of covered multifamily dwellings by the Rose Companies and/or the Architectural Defendants shall comply with the design and construction requirements of the Fair Housing Ac, 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(1)-(3) and where applicable, the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§12182(a) and 12183(a)(1). Defendants also agreed to establish a Settlement Fund of $950,000 and to pay a penalty of $110,000 to the United States. The parties also stipulated to the transfer of the United States' claim against the defendants in the Indiana Action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, for a separate consent decree to resolve claims from both the Michigan and the Indiana complaint.


On July 18, 2003, employees who had filed suit in state court against their employer removed their class action lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by public interest attorneys and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged violation of state laws and sought relief for the class of employees in the form of declaratory judgment, injunctive, relief, and damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged discrimination on the basis of national origin and race. Plaintiffs also alleged that their employer failed to compensate them for overtime, in violation of California state law. On December 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint and the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the lawsuit from federal court, opting to bring the case in state court. In 2007, the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County (case number BC289199) approved a class action settlement. Though the filings are not available, it seems that the parties settled for injunctive relief and 1.475 million dollars.

Summary: In 2003, employees sued their employer alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin and race, as well as nonpayment of overtime in violation of state law. Although the plaintiffs removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the parties agreed to remand the case back to state court as no federal claims were alleged. In 2007, the Superior Court of the State of California, Los Angeles County (case number BC289199) approved a class action settlement. Though the filings are not available, it seems that the parties settled for injunctive relief and 1.475 million dollars.


On January 10, 1995, detainees at the Bernalillo County Detention Center (BCDC) in Albuquerque, New Mexico filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the BCDC under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d), alleging that gross overcrowding and racial discrimination at the jail violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments along with 18 U.S.C. §§ 242, 245, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3766), the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 (31 U.S.C. § 1242), the Public Works Employment Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 6727), and various federal regulations. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief; on February 16, 1995, they moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the operation of the BCDC in its present condition. The parties engaged in abbreviated discovery related to overcrowding in preparation for a hearing on the preliminary injunction. A day before the hearing, District Judge Martha Vazquez made an unannounced visit to the jail, where she observed, among other things, prisoners sleeping on the floor on mattresses and a strong smell of urine coming from some cells. On August 23, 1995, she granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the jail to reduce its population. From the start, the jail had conceded that crowding was a problem, and the preliminary injunction largely adopted the jail’s own population reduction proposal. (Because the jail was cooperative, and because the jail could qualify for additional funding if it avoided a ruling that conditions at the jail were unconstitutional, the court opted not to find conditions unconstitutional, but rather deferred that determination for a later time.) The injunction included a schedule of decreasing population caps for the BCDC, and detailed conditions concerning daily operation of the facility. The order also required that any detainee with a psychological impairment must be housed separately from the general population until a qualified mental health professional issued a written report stating that they could safely live in the general population. On September 7, 1995, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which the district court approved. The agreement converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction and, among other things, required the jail to comply with its own existing policies regarding medical, dental and psychological services and access to a reasonably current law library. The defendants also stipulated to certification of a class defined as the "present and future residents of BCDC." The district court retained jurisdiction to enforce or modify the injunction. One day prior, on September 6, 1995, lawyers working for the New Mexico Protection & Advocacy System and the American Civil Liberties Union moved to intervene on behalf of a proposed subclass of all present and future residents of the BCDC with mental and/or developmental disabilities. On October 26, 1995, the district court granted “limited intervention” to the plaintiff-intervenors. Intervention was limited to matters “before the court by virtue of the original Plaintiffs’ Complaint.” On November 22, 1995, the plaintiff-intervenors filed an amended complaint on behalf of the proposed subclass. It alleged that the jail was discriminating against people with disabilities, in violation of the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. They also alleged violations of the equal protection rights of female class members, and violations of procedural due process, the right of access to courts, and the Eighth Amendment. In early 1996, in an effort to meet the population caps imposed by the September 7, 1995 settlement agreement, the defendants started housing prisoners in makeshift off-site facilities while a new, enlarged facility was under construction. On March 22, 1996, the court ordered that before using an interim facility to house prisoners, the defendants must allow the plaintiffs’ counsel to tour the proposed facility. The defendants appealed this order; the Tenth Circuit granted a stay pending appeal on April 2, 1996. 79 F.3d 1014. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot on November 15, 1996. 100 F.3d 863. (In the meantime, the defendants had completed the new facility, so they were no longer using interim holding sites.) The Prison Litigation Reform Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997e) became effective in April 1996. This statute imposed detailed requirements on federal courts when hearing challenges to conditions in jails and prisons, and it allowed for the termination of certain types of court orders which were issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The defendants moved to terminate the orders that the district court had issued in this case; under the PLRA, the court then had 30 days to make findings of unconstitutional behavior by the defendants, or the court’s prior orders would be automatically stayed until the court made such findings. (The district court had, of course, deferred ruling on the constitutionality of the defendants’ behavior in order to preserve access to funding that was supposed to help the defendants improve conditions at the jail.) On October 29, 1996, the court held that the automatic stay provision of the PLRA was unconstitutional, as a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers (the court’s reasoning was later abrogated by the Supreme Court in Miller v. French). The previous orders were therefore not automatically stayed, and the court proceeded to consider whether to issue the PLRA-required findings in response to the defendants’ motion to terminate the prior orders. 29 F. Supp. 2d 1267. The defendants’ motion was finally resolved on January 10, 1997, when the court approved two settlement agreements and adopted them as consent decrees. In the first of these two decrees (the “PLRA Order”), the court found (as required by the PLRA) that prisoners’ federal rights had been violated by the jail. The court required the jail to implement remedial measures designed to address the needs of inmates with mental illness and/or mental disabilities, particularly with regard to diagnosis and medical treatment. These consent decrees resulted in dismissal with prejudice of all the plaintiffs’ claims, except for the female class members’ claims regarding equal protection and access to courts. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreements. Between 1997 and 2003 the County made efforts to reduce the jail population, but the BCDC remained overcrowded. In September 2000, the court entered an order finding that the jail had been in violation of the PLRA Order’s population cap for eleven of the preceding twelve months, with the population at times approaching the dangerously high levels that had led to the 1995 injunction. The court ordered the jail to comply with the PLRA Order, and to consider and implement other measures to reduce the BCDC population. The defendants responded by constructing a new facility, the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), which was completed in the summer of 2003. By June 17, 2003, all detainees housed at the BCDC had been transferred to the MDC. On July 11, 2003, the court ruled that the previous orders now applied to the MDC, and that the court had continuing jurisdiction to enforce those orders. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1250. On October 10, 2003, the city and county moved to vacate the PLRA Order under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5) and (6). They also asked the court to reconsider its decision to exercise jurisdiction over the MDC, arguing that the PLRA Order had been directed at the BCDC, and should not be applied to the MDC. In 2005, while that motion was pending, the parties entered into two additional settlement agreements, which the court adopted. The defendants had signed an Intergovernmental Agreement with the federal government, agreeing to use the now-vacated BCDC (renamed the Regional Corrections Center or RCC) to house federal prisoners. The plaintiffs agreed that since the city and county were not responsible for the federal prisoners housed at the now-RCC, that jail would no longer be covered by this litigation. However, the plaintiffs later discovered that under the Intergovernmental Agreement, the city and county had actually assumed certain responsibilities for prisoner welfare at the RCC. In light of the defendants’ misrepresentation, the plaintiffs asked the court to withdraw its approval for the 2005 agreement, and to reassume jurisdiction over the RCC. The court did so on March 31, 2009, concluding that the inmates at the RCC were potential class members because the county had maintained operational control over the facility. In withdrawing its approval of the 2005 settlement agreement, the court gave the plaintiffs the option to rescind that agreement, which they did the following month (April 2009). The defendants appealed this decision to the Tenth Circuit. They also moved to disqualify Judge Vazquez. In their April 21, 2009 motion to disqualify, the defendants alleged that Judge Vazquez had had ex parte communications regarding this case with several people. They also alleged that Judge Vazquez’s sister-in-law had been incarcerated at the MDC multiple times, most recently in March 2009, shortly before the withdrawal of the 2005 settlement agreement. Judge Vazquez recused herself from the case on May 18, 2009, and the case was reassigned to Judge James A. Parker the following day. In her order of recusal, Judge Vazquez accused the County of maliciously misrepresenting facts in order to gain a tactical advantage in the litigation; their motion, she explained, was filed because they disagreed with her March 31, 2009 order, not because there was any reason for her to recuse. “The County’s Motion is a blatant attempt to malign and discredit the Court in an effort to achieve its objective of having this Court removed from the present case.” Regarding the defendants’ allegations that she had had ex parte communications, she wrote that the defendants’ counsel “either lacks a basic understanding of this common legal principle, or knowingly misuses the phrase to incite distrust in this Court’s impartiality. Either explanation is unacceptable for a licensed attorney obligated to uphold the New Mexico Rules of Professional Conduct.” The County’s failure to file the motion 2 years earlier, and instead to wait to file it immediately after it received a disfavor able ruling from the court, was evidence that the County was unethically abusing recusal for tactical advantage. Still, she found that the County had succeeded in making it appear that she was not impartial, and she therefore granted the motion for recusal. Nearly two years later, on January 12, 2011, the Tenth Circuit (Judge Neil Gorsuch) ruled that the defendants could not bring an interlocutory appeal because the withdrawal of the settlement agreement was not a final decision within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 630 F.3d 1288. On December 7, 2011, the court appointed three experts and asked them to evaluate conditions at the MDC in the areas listed in the 2005 settlement agreements. On February 26, 2013, after receiving reports from the three experts on conditions at the MDC, which had become dangerously overcrowded, the court ordered the city and the county to appear and show cause why the MDC should not cease “[h]ousing female residents, who have not been classified or who have different classifications, in the same Segregation housing unit.” On the day of that hearing, the parties agreed to alter the conditions for female inmates at the MDC. This pattern repeated itself in a May settlement agreement that required the county to draft a plan addressing a host of issues, ranging from double-celling to out-of-cell time, and to implement the plan before September 1, 2013. The court referred to the February and May agreements as the 2013 Stipulated Orders. On July 24, 2013, the court issued another order to show cause, requiring the county to show how it had complied with the 2013 Stipulated Orders. At a hearing on August 8, 2013, it became clear that the county had failed to comply with the 2013 Stipulated Orders in several areas; on August 19, the plaintiffs asked the court to find the defendants in contempt. On April 25, 2014, the county filed a motion to terminate some of the court’s prior orders under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On May 12, 2014, the court entered an order incorporating many of the provisions of prior orders and also requiring the county to create an Emergency Population Management Plan in cooperation with the Criminal Justice Review Commission (CJRC) to ensure that the population at the MDC remained at or under 1,950. The order contained provisions for the court’s experts to resolve disputes over implementation of the order’s requirements. On September 23, 2014, the court ordered three experts to evaluate the conditions of confinement at the MDC and to determine whether the county was in compliance with each provision of the previous orders. At a status conference on March 10, 2015, the court asked the parties to develop a plan for disengagement of court oversight and for eventual dismissal of the lawsuit. The parties worked with Special Master Alan C. Torgerson (who before his retirement had been the Magistrate Judge assigned to this case) to develop a settlement agreement that would bring the litigation to an end while ensuring that positive changes in conditions at the MDC would become permanent. After months of negotiations with the Special Master, the parties submitted a settlement agreement, and the court granted final approval on June 27, 2016. This agreement described eight domains in which the county was required to meet specified standards:

Medical Services
Mental Health Services
Operations Group A
Operations Group B
Population Management
Housing and Segregation
Sexual Misconduct
Use of Force and Internal Investigations
The standards established in these domains contained nearly every substantive requirement of the court’s previous orders. Under the settlement agreement, once the court found the County in initial compliance with the relevant set of requirements, the County would then “self-monitor” for an additional court-specified period of time. While self-monitoring, the County was required to submit quarterly reports to the appropriate expert monitor and to counsel for the plaintiffs. At the conclusion of the self-monitoring period, the experts would conduct a “Check-Out Audit” and make a finding of compliance using standards detailed in each Check-Out Agreement. Based on the county’s reports and on the experts’ proposed findings, the court would vacate its order as to that particular domain. Finally, once the County demonstrated substantial compliance with all eight of the domains, the court would enter a permanent injunction containing the following provisions:

the population of the MDC would be limited to the operational capacity of the MDC (which at the time was 1,950);
no inmates would be triple-celled;
no inmates would sleep in day rooms, except for detoxification units;
high-risk or security-threat inmates or inmates requiring segregation would not be double-celled with other inmates unless determined to be compatible;
segregated inmates who were in protective custody or new intakes could be double-celled if it was determined that they were low risk and compatible; and
unclassified inmates would not be housed with segregated inmates.
The settlement also stated that any permanent injunction would contain the findings required by the PLRA. After entry of this permanent injunction, the court could dismiss all claims and vacate all existing orders. On November 30, 2016, the plaintiffs and the plaintiff-intervenors filed a joint motion seeking an order requiring employees in the RCC’s medical unit to complete a specialized competency-based training. They also sought to have employees without necessary specialized skills transferred out of the unit. In the same motion, they asked the court to hold a show-cause hearing regarding compliance with some of the court’s previous orders. The court granted this motion, and ordered the jail to demonstrate that it was in compliance with the following:

The court’s 2001 Supplemental Order, which required the city to give “direction to law enforcement officials under the control of the City…to issue citations where appropriate and to use the ‘walk through procedures,’ rather than incarcerating individuals, where appropriate.”
Another provision of the 2001 Supplemental Order, which required the city and county to “schedule a meeting or meetings concerning the provision of mental health services in Bernalillo County…to plan how to implement an effective jail diversion program for persons with psychiatric or developmental disabilities.”
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, with regard to detaining and arresting individuals with mental illnesses or developmental disabilities as a means of removing them from the streets.
The court granted the plaintiff-intervenors’ request to conduct limited discovery before this show-cause hearing. While this discovery ensued, the parties engaged in mediation efforts with Magistrate Judge Karen B. Molzen. On September 11, 2017, the court denied the motion for further remedial relief and decided not to hold the defendants in contempt. Despite the MDC’s training deficiencies and its hesitation when faced with allegations of abuse, the court believed that there was not yet sufficient evidence to hold the county in contempt. The court did state that the county would have to improve the MDC’s mental health services before the court would find substantial compliance as required by the settlement. On that same day, the court granted final approval of another settlement agreement, this time between the city, the plaintiff class, and the plaintiff-intervenor subclass. This settlement was not directly related to conditions at the jail, but instead required the city and county to revise their arrest procedures. Specifically, the defendants agreed to issue a special order directing police officers to issue citations wherever appropriate, and directing that individuals alleged to have committed non-violent misdemeanor offenses not be arrested unless circumstances required an arrest. The defendants also agreed to pay $80,000 in attorneys' fees. Following the death of one of the experts, Manuel Romero, in November 2017, the court on February 5 appointed Margo Frasier as a replacement. The court asked Ms. Frasier to evaluate whether the MDC was in compliance with the standards described in the Check-Out Audit agreement. The court instructed Ms. Frasier to: prepare her first report by August 31, 2018; prepare her second report by February 28, 2019; and then to continue preparing subsequent reports at six-month intervals. Between December 2019 and February 2020, the court found the defendants to be in initial substantial compliance with 3 of the 8 domains described in the 2016 settlement agreement. For those 3 domains, the court-ordered self-monitoring periods will end between August 31, 2020 and August 19, 2021. As of August 6, 2020, the defendants continue to work toward initial substantial compliance in the remaining 5 domains.

Summary: Detainees in Albuquerque, New Mexico filed this class action lawsuit against the Bernalillo County Detention Center and later its successor, the Metropolitan Detention Center. Over the course of 25 years, the plaintiffs and the defendants negotiated how to reduce overcrowding, resulting in a long series of settlement agreements. The case now focuses on whether the defendants have demonstrated substantial compliance required by the latest settlement agreement. As of August 2020, the defendants have achieved initial substantial compliance in 3 of the agreement’s 8 domains.


This lawsuit grew out of the Trump Administration's family separation policy, by which kids were separated from their parents at the U.S.-Mexico border. On July 2, 2018, two children from Central America who had been separated from their parents after crossing the U.S.-Mexico border filed these separate lawsuits and petitions for habeas corpus against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the Yale Law School's clinic (the Jerome Frank Legal Services Organization) and by Connecticut Legal Services, sought injunctive relief, habeas relief, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs claimed violations of Fifth Amendment substantive and procedural due process, Fifth Amendment equal protection, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The plaintiffs alleged that after they were apprehended in Texas by Border Patrol, a subagency of the Department of Homeland Security, they were forcibly separated from their parents and placed with a resettlement agency in Connecticut. They alleged that they were then kept incommunicado from their parents for several weeks at a time, and that the forced separation caused severe mental and emotional trauma. The plaintiffs each filed motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on July 5, 2018, arguing that separation from their parents caused them irreparable harm. The government objected that a preliminary injunction in this case would interfere with its efforts to implement the relief ordered in a concurrent lawsuit, Ms. L. v. ICE, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The judge in that case had already ordered the government to reunite all families separated by the Trump Administration’s “zero tolerance” policy by July 26. 2018 WL 3129486. There's more information on the Ms. L. case here. The two Connecticut cases were consolidated on July 9, 2018. After a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motions on July 11, District Judge Victor A. Bolden granted the plaintiffs' motions in part and denied them in part. Judge Bolden sided with the plaintiffs’ arguments that their constitutional rights were violated. 2018 WL 3421321. Although he agreed with the government that ordering the immediate reunification of the parents with the plaintiffs would merely duplicate the relief ordered in the California case, he noted that the relief in that case was designed to remedy the constitutional wrong suffered by parents separated from their children, whereas his injunction in this case was designed to remedy that suffered by children. He thus issued writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum so that the parents would be physically present at a July 18 status conference intended to address the proper form of relief for the two plaintiffs, including any treatment for the trauma they had suffered. He also ordered that the plaintiffs be allowed to communicate daily with their parents via video conference. On July 16, the government filed a notice of compliance indicating that the plaintiffs would be reunited with their parents that same day, and that ICE would parole the parents from custody. As this article explains, the plaintiffs' lawyers offered this case as a model for other litigators elsewhere. Because the lawsuit focused on repairing harm to the children, Judge Bolden allowed the kids to be released to their parents outside of federal custody, without even ankle monitors to keep track of their location. At the July 18 status conference, the plaintiffs' attorneys requested additional time to confer and determine what, if any, other forms of relief they might seek. The defendants argued that this case was now moot, and the court continued the matter to July 27. On July 26, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking a continuance of the status conference. The same day, the defendants objected to the plaintiffs' motion, arguing that the defendants had already advised the plaintiffs that they would be provided with referrals for treatment and other services, and that the case should be dismissed. In response, the court cancelled the July 27 hearing and scheduled a hearing for September 5 to address the issue of mootness. On August 29, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with the court. Each party was to bear its own costs, expenses, and fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2018, two children from Central America filed separate complaints and petitions for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs alleged that after being apprehended by ICE, they were forcibly separated from their parents as part of the Trump Administration's "zero tolerance" policy toward illegal border crossings, in violation of their Fifth Amendment due process rights. Before the two complaints were filed, a federal district court in California had already held that ICE's forcible family separations violated parents' constitutional rights and ordered the government to reunify them with their children, but the plaintiffs in this case successfully argued that the relief ordered in that case would be inadequate for them, because as children they were not in the class affected by that order. The court ordered ICE to make the parents physically present for a later status conference, and a few days later the government filed a notice of compliance indicating that the plaintiffs would be immediately reunified with their parents and the parents would be paroled from detention by ICE. The government agreed to make referrals for the plaintiffs so that they could receive treatment for the trauma they suffered while separated from their parents. On August 29, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with the court and the case was closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by a church against the State of California’s enforcement of stay-at-home orders and prohibition of in-person religious policies. The plaintiffs alleged that California’s four-stage “Reopening Plan,” had relaxed the stay-at-home order for certain retail organizations as part of stage 2 of the reopening, however, churches were to be opened months later. On May 15, the court denied the TRO and the plaintiffs appealed. The Ninth Circuit denied the injunction pending appeal on May 22, and the Supreme Court denied the application for injunctive relief on May 29. <hr> On May 8, 2020, the South Bay United Pentecostal Church and two religious figures filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California against the State of California and other health officials and police officers against the enforcement of stay-at-home orders and prohibition of in-person religious policies. California’s four-stage “Reopening Plan” had relaxed the stay-at-home order for certain retail organizations as part of stage 2 of the reopening, however, churches were not allowed to be reopened until stage 3, as they were categorized as "higher risk workplaces."Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed this action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First Amendment right to Free Exercise, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the California Constitution. Specifically, they alleged that church services were “essential,” and therefore, the policies, as applied to the plaintiffs, were unconstitutional. The case was initially assigned to Judge Anthony J. Battaglia and Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin, then reassigned to Judge Cynthia Bashant and Magistrate Judge Allison H. Goddard on May 12. On May 11, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to request an expedited briefing schedule and filed a motion for temporary restraining order. On the same day, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaint against two defendants, the Mayor and the Chief of Police of the City of San Diego, and one of the plaintiffs, a rabbi, also voluntarily withdrew from the suit. On May 14, the defendants filed a response in opposition to the temporary restraining order, contending that in-person church services posed a higher risk than retail organizations. On May 15, the court denied the temporary restraining order. 2020 WL 2814636. On the same day, the plaintiffs submitted an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, and the next day, a motion to grant an injunction pending appeal. The motion for an injunction pending appeal was denied by the district court on May 18. 2020 WL 2529620. The Ninth Circuit also denied the injunction pending appeal on May 22. 959 F.3d 938. The plaintiffs filed an emergency application for a writ of injunctive relief to the Supreme Court on May 26. However, that same day, President Trump announced that all state governors must immediately lift executive orders that discriminated against religious conduct. On May 29, the Supreme Court denied the application for injunctive relief. 140 S.Ct. 1613. In the Ninth Circuit appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims were now moot, as the county’s guidance order had since been superseded, allowing in-person worship. On July 10, the plaintiffs sought a limited remand in order to supplement the record and to address how the recent changes in California’s pandemic regime and enforcement of the regime impacted its injunction analysis. The district court requested the remand to the Ninth Circuit on July 14. On July 20, the plaintiffs sought a jury trial. The limited remand was granted on July 29. The plaintiffs renewed their motion for a TRO on August 10, claiming that the defendants haD had more than four months to meet their burden of establishing the constitutionality of their actions. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: On May 8, 2020, the South Bay United Pentecostal Church, a California non-profit organization and two religious figures filed this action against the State of California and other health officials and police officers against the enforcement of stay-at-home orders and prohibition of in-person religious policies. The plaintiffs alleged that California’s four-stage “Reopening Plan,” had relaxed the stay-at-home order for certain retail organizations as part of stage 2 of the reopening, however, churches were to be opened months later. On May 15, the court denied the TRO and the plaintiffs appealed. The Ninth Circuit denied the injunction pending appeal on May 22, and the Supreme Court denied the application for injunctive relief on May 29. The case is ongoing.


On September 2, 2009, the publisher of the Prison Legal News, a monthly magazine distributed to prisons and jails across the counrty, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, Phoenix Division. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona, asked for declaratory, injunctive relief, and actual damages, claiming that the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the refusal to distribute its publication to prisoners in defendant's facility violated their free speech, due process, and equal protection rights. From December 2007 to February 2009, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), operator of the Saguaro Prison in Arizona, censored and with-held from prisoners of that facility copies of the Prison Legal News. On June 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Roslyn O. Silver) entered an Order of Dismissal because the parties had settled the case. The Settlement Agreement provided that the plaintiff would be added as an authorized retailer, and its publication would be permitted in the facility. It furthermore provided that CCA would provide notice to the plaintiff if outgoing communications were being prevented. CCA also agreed to pay the plaintiffs a lump sum of $70,000, to cover actual damages and attorney's fees. The agreement terminated on December 5, 2011 without incident.

Summary: Plaintiff publisher sued a defendant operator of a private prison facility in Arizona for the defendant's censoring and refusal to allow prisoners to subscribe to plaintiff's prison news publication. The case settled, with defendants agreeing to distribute the Prison Legal News to subscribing prisoners, and to pay plaintiff $70,000.


COVID-19 summary: Two organizations filed this action in November 2010 to challenge Arizona’s Election Day Receipt Deadline, which required mail-in ballots to be received by county election officials before 7 PM on Election Day. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from rejecting ballots postmarked by Election Day that arrive within five business days of Election Day. The plaintiff later argued that COVID-19 increased the burdens on voters. The parties entered into a settlement on June 18, 2020. Under the terms of the settlement, the Election Day deadline remained but the defendant agreed to expand their efforts for voter outreach. On June 19, the court deemed the pending claims moot and dismissed all claims . <hr> On November 26, 2019, two organizations filed a suit against the Arizona Secretary of State to challenge Arizona’s Election Day Receipt Deadline, which requires mail-in ballots to be received by county election officials before 7 PM on Election Day. Under Arizona law, individuals may vote up to 27 days before the election. Arizona voters may also choose to automatically receive a mail ballot, and 80% of Arizonans vote early. However, these ballots are subject to the Election Day Receipt Deadline, which requires the mail-in ballots to be received by 7 PM on Election Day, or by the time the polls close. The plaintiffs brought this case as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the deadline violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the state’s failure to count the votes of those who lawfully mailed their ballots before or on Election Day but were not received before the polls close through no fault of their own placed an undue burden on otherwise eligible voters and denied procedural due process. The plaintiffs also argued that the barriers to voting disproportionately impacted Hispanic and Latino voters in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from rejecting ballots postmarked by Election Day that arrive within five business days of Election Day. The plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, also sought attorney fees. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Dominic Lanza. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on December 2, 2019 to strike the request for declaratory relief declaring that the Election Day Receipt Deadline disparately impacted Hispanic and Latino voters and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. On February 3, 2020, the Arizona Secretary of State moved to dismiss the amended complaint. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs lacked organizational standing and that the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiffs’ claims. The defendant also argued that the Election Day Receipt Deadline posed little imposition on the plaintiffs’ right to vote and was justified by the state’s interest to ensure a fair election and to count the votes within a reasonable time. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on February 24, 2020. The following day, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, pertaining to the election in November 2020. In response, the defendant filed an emergency motion to stay the case on March 4 and to extend the 14-day deadline to respond to the plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion. On March 13, the defendant’s stay was granted in part. 2020 WL 1236352. On March 20, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. In their response in April 2020, the plaintiffs argued that the Election Day Receipt Deadline imposes a cutoff that voters will miss due to unreliable and slow mail service in Arizona as well as the inconsistent messaging on these deadlines. At the same time, COVID-19 has rendered in-person delivery of those mail ballots unrealistic. The parties entered into a settlement on June 18, 2020. Under the terms of the settlement, the Election Day deadline remained. However, the defendant agreed to continue to expand their efforts to address late returns, such as voter outreach and funding for counties to increase early voting opportunities. On June 19, all claims were dismissed. The plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendant’s motion to dismiss were denied as moot, with each party responsible for its own costs and attorney fees.

Summary: On November 26, 2019, two organizations filed this lawsuit to challenge Arizona’s Election Day Receipt Deadline, which requires mail-in ballots to be received by county election officials before 7 PM on Election Day. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from rejecting ballots postmarked by Election Day that arrives within five business days of Election Day. The plaintiff later argued that COVID-19 further increased voting burdens. The parties entered into a settlement on June 18. Under the terms of the settlement, the Election Day deadline remained but the defendant agreed to expand their efforts for voter outreach. On June 19, the court dismissed all claims.


This lawsuit was filed on June 25, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The suit was made in response to police tactics used on protesters amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May and June of 2020. Represented by private counsel and ACLU attorneys, plaintiffs in this case were Black Lives Matter 5280, a Denver-based chapter of Black Lives Matter, and nine individual plaintiffs. They brought this suit against the city and county of Denver, officers of the Denver Police Department (DPD), and officers of the Colorado State Patrol (CSP). The plaintiffs alleged that the city and state police used a number of less-lethal weapons on them as they were peacefully protesting, including but not limited to tear gas, smoke canisters, rubber bullets, foam bullets, pepper balls, flash bang and rubber-pellet grenades, and pepper spray. According to the plaintiffs, these actions constituted various constitutional violations. They alleged that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights to free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition under the First Amendment. Secondly, they alleged that defendants' actions violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments' prohibitions on unreasonable seizures and excessive use of force. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief stating that defendants' actions were illegal, injunctive relief to prohibit defendants from engaging in the same behavior, and compensatory and punitive money damages. They also sought costs and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. However, on July 31 the case was reassigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson. Several days later, the Court ordered that this case and a related case, Cruz v. County of Denver, be consolidated. The actions were consolidated under the Black Lives Matter 5280 docket. In early September, the Court held a scheduling conference. The plaintiffs are to file a motion for class certification on or before March 26, 2021 and a fifteen-day jury trial is set for March 7, 2022. On October 28, 2020, the Court on its authority consolidated another recently filed case-Acker v. City and County of Denver- with Black Lives Matter 5280. Black Lives Matter 5280 was designated as the lead case. In Acker, filed on October 22, 2020, another individual who participated in protests in Denver following the death of George Floyd sued the City and County of Denver, the Denver Chief of Police, and five Denver police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that while assisting other protesters who had just been pepper-sprayed and hit with projectiles, he was hit with a 40mm round in the eye. Similar to the complaint in Black Lives Matter 5280, the individual alleged that the defendants violated his rights to free speech and free assembly under the First Amendment, unlawfully retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights, and used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. This case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.

Summary: This case arose out of the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleges that during the protests in Denver, city police and state patrol officers used less-lethal weapons against protesters in violation of the Fourth/Fourteenth Amendments' prohibitions on excessive force and the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition. This case was consolidated with Cruz v. County of Denver on August 4. Later in October, it was also consolidated with Acker v. City and County of Denver. The litigation in all cases continues as of January 2, 2021.


On May 14, 2008, two private citizens in the state of California who had their vehicles impounded under the California Vehicle Code filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the State of California's Business, Transportation and Housing Agency ("BTH"), the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), and the City of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and California law. The plaintiffs sought declaratory equitable and injunctive relief for unlawful seizures and impoundments of their vehicles. Under California's Vehicle Code, a peace officer could "cause the removal and seizure of" a vehicle for various reasons, and the vehicle may be impounded for 30 days. Following the seizure of a vehicle, the vehicle's owner was entitled to a "storage hearing," during which any mitigating circumstances will be considered. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated various aspects of the Vehicle Code, thereby violating the plaintiffs' rights under the Constitution, the California Constitution, and California law. The plaintiffs had four main allegations: First, the plaintiffs alleged unlawful search and seizure for the wrongful seizure and impoundment of their vehicles for driving without a license. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated their Fourth Amendment rights, and also violated the California Constitution. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the conditions leading up to the seizure and impoundment of the plaintiffs' vehicles did not meet the requirements of the community caretaking doctrine (in other words, it did not present a threat to public safety), and therefore violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and California law. Third, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated procedural due process with misleading hearing notices and inadequacy of hearing officers, standard and procedures surrounding the "storage hearings" following the seizure and impoundment of vehicles. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated their Fifth and Fourteenth amendment rights and the their rights under the California Constitution. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' policy imposing a fee on vehicles seized and impounded that exceeded the administrative costs was in violation of California's Vehicle Code, and therefore unlawful under California law. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants had the power to prevent the plaintiffs from recouping their property via threats, intimidation, and coercion, thereby violating their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and their rights under the California Constitution and California law. The plaintiffs sought to certify two plaintiff classes and a defendant class. On January 1, 2012, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify either class, but allowed them to proceed on their individual claims against the named defendants. 2012 WL 10972131 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2012). Both parties moved for summary judgment. On March 4, 2013, Judge S. James Otero granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment for the federal claims and dismissed without prejudice the state law claims. Judge Otero also denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 2013 WL 794059 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013).

Summary: In 2008, two private citizens in the state of California who had their vehicles impounded under the California Vehicle Code filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the State of California's Business, Transportation and Housing Agency ("BTH"), the Commissioner of the California Highway Patrol ("CHP"), and the City of Los Angeles. In 2013, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the claims. On March 4, 2013, the court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs took nothing on their Third Amended Complaint.


On February 22, 2012, twenty-one university students and recent graduates filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the Regents of the University of California (the Chancellor was Katehi, hence the case caption) and against members of the campus police. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief; declaratory relief; compensatory, punitive, exemplary, and statutory damages; and attorney's fees. They alleged a violation of the First Amendment (freedom of speech and assembly), the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure), and the Fourteenth Amendment (taking property without due process of law). Plaintiffs also alleged violations of corresponding provisions of the California Constitution, and also of § 836(a) of the California Penal Code (false arrest/imprisonment); § 52.1 of the California Civil Code; and § 845.6 of the California Government Code (failure to provide medical care to the protesters). The events giving rise to the lawsuit occurred on November 18, 2011. University of California at Davis students in the campus quad engaged in a nonviolent protest against university privatization, distribution of resources, tuition hikes, police brutality, and other policies adopted by the University administration and the Board of Regents. The students set up tents and met to "occupy the quad" (modeled after the "Occupy Wallstreet" movement). On the afternoon of November 18, the police chief delivered a letter from the Chancellor directing students to remove the tents, but they decided to continue their protest. Campus police then allegedly arrested students without probable cause and shot high-concentration pepper spray directly into their faces. These actions were recorded on video and circulated nationally. Nineteen of the plaintiffs were university students at the time of the incident and two were recent graduates. On March 14, 2012, the Court approved an extension of time so that the parties could explore settlement. On August 15 and 16, 2012, the parties engaged in mediation (before the Ret. Hon. Raul Ramirez) and reached an agreement. They filed this settlement with the Court on September 26, 2012. The defendants agreed to pay $630,000 to the plaintiffs ($30,000 per named plaintiff). Defendants also agreed to pay $20,000 to each additional class member whose claim was approved, with the total damages for the class members capped at $100,000. Defendants also agreed that for two years they would provide the ACLU attorneys with an opportunity to review, comment, and provide input on the Davis campus' written policies about the use of force by police, the handling of student demonstrations, and crowd control (and would pay attorneys' fees for their time). The Chancellor also agreed to give a personal, written apology to each of the plaintiffs and to any class members who submit an approved claim form. Further, the settlement stated that a student affairs representative would provide academic assistance and counseling to any plaintiffs and class members who need such assistance as a result of the incident. The settlement also included $250,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The proposed settlement defined the class as: "All persons who were arrested or directly sprayed with pepper spray by police officers working for or on the behalf of the University of California, Davis Police Department on November 18,2011, on the area known as "the Quad," on the University of California, Davis campus." On September 27, 2012, the Court (Judge John A. Mendez) granted preliminary approval of the parties' proposed settlement, certified the settlement class, approved class notice, and scheduled the final approval hearing. On January 9, 2013, the Court (Judge Mendez) approved the settlement. There has been no further litigation and the case is now closed.

Summary: In November 2011, students of the University of California at Davis engaged in a nonviolent protest in the quad. The university told them to disperse. When they did not, campus police allegedly arrested them without probable cause and shot high-concentration pepper spray directly into their faces. Videos were taken of the incident and publicized nationally. In February 2012, twenty-one of the protestors filed suit against the Regents of the University of California and against campus police officers. Plaintiffs alleged violations of their free speech rights, unreasonable search and seizure, due process violations, and violations of state law. In August, the parties reached a settlement agreement. This agreement provided for damages; for ACLU review of university policies for two years; for a written apology; for academic and counseling support to the plaintiffs; and for attorneys' fees. On January 9, 2013, the Court approved of both the settlement class and the substance of the settlement.


This case is a response to actions taken by the Department of Justice (DOJ) following litigation in the 2017 case, City of Los Angeles v. Sessions (IM-CA-0104). On August 22, 2018, the City of Los Angeles filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued the DOJ and the Attorney General under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiff, represented by its legal department and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys fees and costs. The city claimed that by unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city, the government violated separation of powers, the spending clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the APA. Judge Manuel Real was assigned to the case. Los Angeles had been receiving federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG), a criminal justice grant administered by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), a component of DOJ. DOJ requirements for its 2018 program funding imposed immigration-related conditions on recipient cities, including Los Angeles. The plaintiff alleged that four of these conditions were materially identical to conditions imposed on other Byrne JAG grants that had been enjoined by the courts in other litigation. The conditions required that local government entities not prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Recipients would have to provide DHS at least 48 hours advance notice of any noncitizen's scheduled release from custody and allow DHS to access any correctional or detention facility to question suspected undocumented immigrants about their right to be in the country. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had included requirements to not publicly disclose federal law enforcement information in an attempt to conceal, harbor, or shield individuals from detention, and required certification that funding recipients were in compliance. On October 5, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding allegations regarding another federal grant program: the Gang Suppression Planning Grants Program (Juvenile Gang Prevention Grant). This Grant was issued under authority of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, which authorized the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), a sub-component of DOJ, to make grants to local units of government in order to promote the goals of preventing, controlling, and reducing juvenile delinquency. The plaintiff alleged that unlawful conditions materially identical to those placed on the Byrne JAG grant had also been imposed on the Juvenile Gang Prevention Grant. The same day, the plaintiff also moved for partial summary judgment as to the counts alleging the unlawful conditions imposed on the Byrne JAG grant. On November 13, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the city's claims and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On February 15, 2019, Judge Real granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and permanently enjoined the defendants from imposing the challenged conditions on FY2018 Byrne JAG awards and Juvenile Gang Prevention Grants nationwide. He held that the defendants' imposition of the immigration conditions was ultra vires as a matter of law and a violation of separation of powers. Judge Real also held that the plaintiff's remaining claims were moot. 2019 WL 1957966. On March 13, 2019, the defendants appealed Judge Real's order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (docket no. 19-55314). They also sought a partial stay of the order pending appeal, which the plaintiff consented to. On April 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for indicative ruling; the parties requested that, if the Ninth Circuit were to remand the portion of the injunction relating to the Gang Prevention Grants, Judge Real vacate that aspect of the injunction to permit further substantive motions from the parties. On April 19, 2019, Judge Real granted the defendants' request for a partial stay of the injunction pending appeal; the only part of the injunction to remain in effect was that which enjoined the conditions on the Byrne JAG grant for FY2018 in relation to the plaintiff city. On May 10, 2019, Judge Real granted the parties' motion for indicative ruling (indicating that he would grant a joint motion to vacate the portion of his earlier order relating to the Gang Prevention Grants). The parties then filed a joint motion for limited remand with the Ninth Circuit, which was granted. They had also filed a separate joint motion to stay briefing pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of City of Los Angeles v. Barr (IM-CA-0104). The Ninth Circuit agreed to stay proceedings on July 18, 2019. Once the case was remanded back to the district court, the parties jointly moved to vacate the portion of Judge Real's order relating to the Gang Prevention Grants on May 31. That motion was granted on July 1, 2019. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment with regard to the plaintiff's claims concerning the Gang Prevention Grants for FY2018. On December 31, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Josephine L. Staton. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the city of Los Angeles filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the Department of Justice was again unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city (specifically, Byrne JAG funding and Gang Prevention Grants) in violation of the separation of powers, the spending clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff with regard to the Byrne JAG funding conditions; that order is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The parties continue to litigate in the district court regarding the Gang Prevention Grant conditions.


On March 20, 2003, thousands of people gathered in Chicago to protest the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Roughly 700 of these demonstrators were allegedly detained, arrested, jailed, or falsely charged with crimes. On April 10, 2003, represented by The People's Law Office and private counsel, these protestors filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City and its Police Department. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for alleged violations of the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly and Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful detainment and arrest. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants unlawfully detained and imprisoned the class by "herding," "sweeping" and then "pinning" them in a small area, and then preventing them from either leaving or continuing to peacefully demonstrate. The plaintiffs also claimed they were subjected to unnecessary and excessive force, arrested, and imprisoned in police vehicles and cells for as long as 36 hours. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. After several lengthy discovery disputes, on April 17, 2006, the District Court (Judge Virginia M. Kendall) certified a class of: "all persons who were surrounded by Defendants on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue, just east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way ("the bounded area"), between approximately 8:30 p.m. and 11:30p.m." The Court also certified three sub-classes:
 1. Subclass A-1 members: “all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area for one and a half to three hours before they were allowed to leave the area." 2. Subclass A-2 members: "all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at a police station. These individuals were released without being charged with any crime or ordinance violation." 3. Subclass A-3 members: “all class members who were surrounded by Defendants in the bounded area, arrested and detained at the police station. These were charged with criminal offenses, released only upon conditions of bond, required to appear in court on criminal charges and later the charges against them were dismissed in their favor."
Two days later, the Court denied various motions by the defendants to dismiss claims and denied the defendants' motion seeking to relieve the City of Chicago from liability for the acts charged.
 In April 2004, the City of Chicago filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs and the class they represented and filed an amended complaint in May 2006. The City alleged that the plaintiffs had violated the Municipal Code of the City of Chicago during the protest by failing to obtain a permit and obstructing public streets and were liable to the City for cost incurred by the police. The plaintiffs moved to dismiss the counterclaim but the Court denied the motion in August 2006. On March 10, 2008, the court denied the City’s motion for class certification of its counterclaim against the plaintiffs because the class members’ individual issues would predominate and counter-defendants would likely have different defenses. Ultimately the court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim in its opinion on February 27, 2009, holding that the defendants had failed to identify specific behavior leading to specific damage and that the plaintiffs could not be held liable for the defendants’ costs solely because of their association with the protest. 624 F. Supp. 2d 933. On January 5, 2009, the court consolidated this case for trial with another case, Beal v. City of Chicago, involving individuals also arrested on Chicago Avenue during the protest (some of whom claimed they were not protesters but merely people trying to travel on that street). The class action plaintiffs and the City defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. On February 27, 2009, the Court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the officers had probable cause, that there was insufficient evidence of civil conspiracy, and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 624 F. Supp. 2d 933. The plaintiffs appealed, and on March 17, 2011, the Court of Appeals (Judges Richard A. Posner, Diane P. Wood, and Lynn Adelman) reversed and remanded the District Court judgment, finding that there were issues of fact that precluded summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claims of the plaintiffs. Specifically, there was an ongoing dispute as to whether the defendant police had effectively communicated the order to disperse to the protesters before arresting them, whether the protester crowd was peaceable, and whether the police superintendent could be held liable under §1983. 639 F.3d 738. After several more months of discovery disputes, on June 28, 2012, the District Court approved a class settlement, and on November 7, 2012, the court issued a final judgment outlining the terms of the settlement as well as payments to be made by the defendants. In exchange for all class members being barred from bringing suit in the future, A-1 Subclass Members were to receive $500 per person, A-2 Subclass Members were to receive $8,750 per person, and A-3 Subclass members were to receive $15,000 per person. The 11 named plaintiffs were to receive $7,750 per person, 39 deposed class members were to receive $948.71 per person, and the class counsel's expert witness was to receive $14,000. The City was also to pay attorneys' fees and costs of $4,800,000. The sum total of payments equaled approximately $10,267,250. The City also agreed to provide criminal history record information to any Subclass A-2 or A-3 member and to seal or expunge their records of arrest related to the 2003 protest at no cost. There was no further significant litigation after this settlement and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2003, demonstrators arrested during a war protest filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago and its Police Department for violations of their rights to free speech and assembly and to be free from unlawful detainment and arrest. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement, but the Seventh Circuit reversed on appeal. On June 28, 2012, the court approved a class action settlement awarding payments to all class members.


On March 8, 2002, an employee of Combined Insurance Company of America ("Combined") filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against her employer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged sex discrimination and asked the court for damages and an injunction against future violations Specifically, the plaintiff contended that Combined had discriminated with regard to hiring and had created an atmosphere of male sexual aggression and constant sex-stereotyping. On August 25, 2003, the court (Judge James B. Zagel) granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Palmer v. Combined Ins., 217 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Ill. 2003). According to the PACER docket, the court (Judge Zagel) approved a settlement agreement on August 10, 2004, and a final settlement hearing was held on October 22, 2004. On January 12, 2005, the parties made some corrections on the Settlement and Consent Decree. According to the corrected Consent Decree, defendant would pay a total of 8.5 million dollars in addition to other injunctive remedies. On the same day, the court (Judge Zagel) dismissed the case.

Summary: This case was brought by an employee of defendant seeking monetary and injunctive relief. On January 12, 2005, the case was dismissed because of the settlement reached by the parties.


On September 20, 2002, four New York residents who had attended New York City public schools filed this putative class action complaint against the New York City Board of Education, the New York City Department of Education, and the New York City School District. A third and final amended complaint with six additional plaintiffs was filed on July 15, 2003. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. § 1400, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 ("ADA") U.S.C. § 12132, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs alleged that children with disabilities were being excluded from New York public schools and denied educational services to which they were entitled without due process. The case was assigned to Judge Charles P. Sifton. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory, and other relief, alleging numerous incidents of students with disabilities being removed from schools and deprived of educational opportunities. The complaint further alleged a general lack of oversight in the New York City school system and argued that, because the problems in the school system were systemic, it was not necessary that they show exhaustion of administrative remedies in each individual case in order for the court to have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim as would normally be required. On July 25, 2003, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion argued that plaintiffs either had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the IDEA, or that the claims of those plaintiffs who had properly sought relief through the administrative process had been rendered moot. Defendants further argued that because of the varying factual backgrounds of individual cases, solutions to problems must be sought on a case-by-case basis. In support of this, defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claims were exactly the sort that should be addressed through the administrative process, and further noted that, at the time the motion was filed, six of the ten named plaintiffs had resolved their claims by way of the administrative process. On January 29, 2004, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Citing precedent from the Second Circuit, the judge noted that the requirement in IDEA that parties exhaust administrative options prior to litigation had exceptions. Several plaintiffs claimed lack of appropriate notice in their being denied services. In keeping with precedent that held that lack of notice of procedural rights waived the exhaustion requirement, the judge exempted plaintiffs from the requirement. On August 18, 2004 the judge granted plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class of “disabled New York City children age three through twenty-one who have been, will be, or are at risk of being excluded from school without adequate notice and deprived of a free and appropriate education through suspensions, expulsions, transfers, discharges, removals and denials of access.” On July 24, 2015 the judge issued a stipulation approving a settlement agreement between the parties. 2015 WL 13707092. The settlement stipulation primarily covered suspensions and removals, transfers, and discharges. It also allowed for the plaintiffs to monitor compliance. In the case of suspensions, the settlement required that suspensions of more than six days be given only upon approval from Department of Education’s Office of Safety and Youth Development or the Superintendent for the district. The settlement further allowed students to remain in school pending suspension hearings in some cases and required that plaintiffs' counsel be provided with data on suspensions every semester over the course of the stipulation period. The settlement also called for “Manifestation Determination Reviews” for students receiving a high volume of suspensions in order to monitor whether students were receiving suspensions for conduct that was “caused by, or had a direct relationship to” the student’s disability. If it was determined that the student was suspended for conduct directly related to a disability, the school would not be allowed to suspend the student. The Department of Education was also required to institute special reviews and programs for tracking and helping students who received a certain number of suspensions. Students who received suspensions for a full year were provided with alternative instruction. Additional provisions of the settlement placed substantial restrictions on when students could be moved between schools and transferred to GED programs. The settlement covered the first six full academic semesters beginning with the Fall Semester of the 2015-16 academic year. Plaintiffs also obtained counsel fees “as though they are prevailing parties” and the rights to monitor defendants to ensure their compliance with the terms of the settlement. The trial court retained exclusive jurisdiction to consider all further matters arising out of or connected with the settlement. The settlement expired in October 2018.

Summary: This is a class-action lawsuit on behalf of disabled students in the New York City school district seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that disabled students were being denied access to the educational opportunities to which they have a right by law without due process. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement that limited how and when students could be suspended and increased oversight.


On Dec. 10, 2003, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), the American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (ABFFE), and the Freedom to Read Foundation (FTRF) filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs sought disclosure of DOJ and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) records related to the DOJ's implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. In Aug. 2002, the plaintiffs filed a FOIA request to obtain records related to the FBI's implementation of the Patriot Act's surveillance provisions. Enacted in 2001, the Patriot Act substantially expanded the government's power to collect information about people living in the United States. In particular, Section 215 of the Act allowed the FBI to require disclosure from any person or organization of any tangible thing without probable cause or individualized suspicion, as long as there was an ongoing foreign intelligence or terrorism investigation. In their FOIA request, the plaintiffs sought expedited processing, but the government did not comply. In an earlier case, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on Oct. 24, 2002 and moved for a preliminary injunction on Nov. 13, 2002. After a hearing, the court ordered the government to process the FOIA request. Although the government released 391 pages of responsive material, the government relied on an exemption to FOIA and issued the documents in heavily redacted form. One of the redacted documents was a list of times when the FBI had invoked Section 215 of the Patriot Act between Oct. 26, 2001, and Feb. 7, 2003. Both the list itself and the line indicating the total number of times that the FBI used Section 215 were redacted. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted the government's motion for summary judgment, upholding the government's withholding under Exemption 1 of FOIA. This case is available in this Clearinghouse. In the following months, there was increased public concern about the Patriot Act and Section 215. The Attorney General issued a memo stating that Section 215 had never been used before and in doing so, declassified the information. The memo did not explain why the government was previously insistent that national security would be compromised if it released the number of times it had invoked Section 215. The plaintiffs then contacted former government counsel in the prior litigation and he agreed to request an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List from the FBI. However, the FBI did not respond to the attorney's request. As a result, on Oct. 23, 2003, the plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to the FBI seeking the following: 1. An unredacted copy of the Section 215 List, containing the total number of Section 215 requests received by the FBI; and 2. Any and all records relating to Section 215 of the Patriot Act, including any and all records indicating the number of times Section 215 has been used. The plaintiffs again sought expedited processing of the FOIA request on two grounds: (1) that the records related to a matter of widespread media interest implicating possible questions about the government's integrity which affect public confidence; and (2) that the plaintiffs were primarily engaged in the dissemination of information and there is an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged government activity. However, on Oct. 30, 2003, the FBI told the plaintiffs that their request for expedited processing had been denied. The plaintiffs then engaged in a protracted back-and-forth with the FBI's Office of the General Counsel, during which the plaintiffs attempted to obtain an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List. However, they were ultimately unable to obtain the List. In its answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, the government raised grounds for dismissal, but did not file a dispositive motion. As a result, Judge Huvelle issued an order directing the government to file either a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment. On Feb. 17, 2004, the government moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs' FOIA request for the Section 215 List and the request for expedited processing. The government argued that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred the plaintiffs from re-litigating the release of an unredacted copy of the Section 215 List, as the court previously ruled the document was properly withheld. Additionally, the government argued that the court should deny plaintiffs' request for expedited processing because the plaintiffs failed to show that their FOIA request deserved expedited treatment at the expense of earlier submitted requests. On Mar. 1, 2004, the plaintiffs also filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the government's non-compliance with the FOIA. On May 10, 2004, Judge Huvelle ordered that the plaintiffs were entitled to expedited processing of their request and that the government was required to process the request for all records relating to Section 215 "as soon as practicable." ACLU v. DOJ, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004). Judge Huvelle also ordered that the government had properly withheld the information contained in the Section 215 List. Regarding the court's holding on expedited processing, Judge Huvelle weighed three factors in determining that the plaintiffs had demonstrated an "urgency to inform" and hence a "compelling need" for the requested documents. Regarding the first two factors —whether the request concerned a matter of current exigency to the American public and whether the consequences of delaying a response would compromise a significant recognized interest—the court noted the records' relation to current government surveillance efforts and held that the potential invasion of the public's privacy interests was of immediate concern. Regarding the third factor, the government conceded that the plaintiffs' request concerned federal government activity. Thus, the court found that the government had erroneously denied the plaintiffs' request for expedited processing. The court found that the plaintiffs also met the media-related standard for expedited processing. The plaintiffs had cited numerous newspaper articles about the Patriot Act, which the court held was sufficient to demonstrate that the subject matter of their request involved a matter of widespread media interest concerning the government's integrity. Regarding the court's holding on the government's argued FOIA exemption, the court held that the doctrine of res judicata did not preclude the plaintiffs' request for the redacted Section 215 List. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs were attempting litigate a new question: whether the statistic they sought was properly withheld in light of the Attorney General's declassification decision with respect to that statistic. However, the court nonetheless held that the government had provided a sufficiently detailed and persuasive explanation to justify the continued withholding of the redacted Section 215 List under Exemption 1, FOIA's national security exemption. In Aug. 2004, the parties agreed to a settlement. In exchange for the government's disclosure of the requested documents, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on Aug. 24, 2004. Though not all of the documents released by the government are available online, this page references some of their contents. Following litigation about attorneys' fees, the docket ends in 2004. It is unclear what resulted with respect to attorneys' fees.

Summary: In 2003, the ACLU and several other nonprofits that advocate for privacy and free speech filed this FOIA lawsuit against the DOJ in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought disclosure of DOJ and FBI records related to the DOJ's implementation of Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. In 2014, the court held that the government had properly withheld the Section 215 List, but found that plaintiffs were entitled to expedited processing of the remaining documents related to Section 215. Following the opinion, the parties reached a settlement, under which the government disclosed the requested documents and the plaintiffs agreed to drop the lawsuit.


On November 4, 2010, eight African-American male residents of Philadelphia filled this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia division ("PPD"). The plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia and individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Pennsylvania state law. The putative class, represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, sought injunctive and compensatory relief. They claimed that the defendants had illegally stopped and searched thousands of African-American and Latino males solely because of their race in violation of the 4th and 5th Amendments to the United States Constitution. On June 21, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Dalzell entered an order accepting a binding settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree between the parties and appointed a monitor. The City agreed to train its police officers to use the proper electronic database to record relevant information after each time a subject is stopped and frisked within Philadelphia. The plaintiffs and the defendants also agreed to jointly review current police department training, supervision, and discipline procedures to determine if changes are needed to ensure that stops and frisks only occur where there is probable cause to believe the subject could lawfully be detained. The plaintiffs were to report to the Court the results of periodic reviews of stop data. The Decree left open the individual damage claim by a named plaintiff, who did not settle. In a November 3, 2011 order, the Court set a jury trial on this issue and on December 20, 2011, judgment was granted in favor of the named plaintiff, who was awarded $50,000. The Decree was to stay in place until the Court, upon motion of a party, determined that the provisions regarding data foreclosure and analysis, document production, Monitor Reports and Recommendations, and Court review are no longer necessary to ensure that the PPD stop and frisk policies and practices are consistent with constitutional standards. In the time since the agreement, the plaintiffs and defendants have filed 6 reports each. The plaintiffs' reports address ongoing issues of police misconduct, such as the racial disparities of arrests and the disproportionate number of arrests in certain districts of certain racial makeups. The defendants, in their reports, provide updates on progress and address the concerns raised by the plaintiffs. The most recent report was filed by the plaintiffs on March 22, 2016, concluding that data still showed significant racial disparities in stop-and-frisk that in almost all respects could not be explained by non-racial factors. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 4, 2010, eight African American male residents of Philadelphia filled a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Pennsylvania state law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia division. The Plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia and individual police officers claiming that as a result of the defendants' policies, customs, and procedures, members of the Plaintiff class had been subject to unconstitutional searches, seizures, frisks and detentions by the defendants, and at times those stops were accompanied by unreasonable levels of force. On June 21, 2011, U.S. District Court Judge Stewart Galzell entered an order accepting a binding settlement agreement, class certification, and consent decree between the parties and appointing a monitor. The agreement was to stay in place until the Court, upon motion of a party, determined it was no longer needed to ensure that the PPD stop and frisk policies and practices are consistent with constitutional standards. As of March 22, 2016, the plaintiffs were still submitting status reports to the Court, and there was also a status conference held on that day which leads us to believe the case is still active.