On December 21, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of black job applicants and incumbents, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of Ohio under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, Kaplan, Inc., and Kaplan University. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendants' discriminatory selection criteria for hiring and discharge, namely its use of credit history information, had a disparate impact on black applicants and incumbents and was not job-related or consistent with business necessity. The defendants participated in a highly regulated industry since they, as educational institutions, had to abide by the Department of Education's ("DOE") requirements and guidelines. The defendants' financial aid departments routinely utilized the National Student Loan Data System (DOE's student aid database) to access student and parent information. Prior to 2004, the defendants discovered breaches of their systems in which business officers misappropriated student payments. As a result, the defendants took additional steps to ensure compliance with financial rules and regulations, as well as DOE guidelines. Shortly thereafter, the defendants began utilizing credit history checks for applicants of certain positions, looking in particular for those who had "financial stress or burdens" that might compromise their ethical obligations. On March 4, 2011, the defendants moved to partially dismiss the plaintiff's complaint. The District Court (Judge Patricia A. Gaughan) granted this motion on May 10. The defendants argued that employment decisions made more than 300 days before the suit was filed were time-barred. The plaintiffs argued that the continuing violations doctrine would apply here, however, the District Court disagreed and found that decisions to hire and fire were discrete, individual decisions instead of a series of connected discrete acts. 790 F.Supp.2d 619. Over the next several months, the parties engaged in discovery, then, on March 14, 2012, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. Discovery continued, and on November 30, both parties moved for summary judgment--the defendants in full, the plaintiff in part. On January 28, 2013, Judge Gaughan granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the EEOC failed to present a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination due to its failure to provide reliable statistical evidence of employment discrimination. 2013 WL 322116. The EEOC then filed a motion for reconsideration, but Judge Gaughan denied it on May 6, 2013. 2013 WL 1891365. On June 3, 2013, the EEOC appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment and its denial of EEOC's motion for reconsideration. The EEOC argued that by excluding their expert's testimony, the District Court abused its discretion. On April 9, 2014, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Kethledge, Keith, and Cook) issued a unanimous opinion affirming the district court's holding. 748 F.3d 749. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 21, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of Black job applicants and incumbents, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Ohio under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against Kaplan Higher Education Corporation, Kaplan, Inc., and Kaplan University. The EEOC alleged that the defendants' discriminatory selection criteria for hiring and discharge, namely its use of credit history information, had a disparate impact on Black applicants and incumbents and was not job-related or consistent with business necessity. On January 28, 2013, the District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. In June 2013, the EEOC appealed the district court's decision. The appeals court affirmed the decision in April 2014.


On April 18, 2006, a group of male African American workers filed a lawsuit under the Declaratory Judgment Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), 2201 and 2202; and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (hereafter § 1981) against Super Steel Schenectady Incorporated in United States District Court, Northern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief and damages to remedy the racially hostile work environment at Super Steel. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the work environment at Super Steel Schenectady was one of volatile racial remarks and actions. The plaintiffs also claimed that this practice of racial discrimination and segregation has challenged their personal safety, prevented them from training opportunities, prevented promotions, and caused some to even leave their job. On January 25, 2007, the United States District Court of Northern New York with Judge Gary Sharpe, approved a Settlement Agreement and dismissed the action with prejudice. According to the Consent Decree, the defendant agreed to pay a total of $1,250,000 and also adopt various equitable remedies to reduce discrimination. The decree was entered in 2007 and scheduled to last 2009. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: This case was brought by a group of male African-American workers against Super Steel Schenectady seeking monetary and injunctive relief. On January 25, 2007, the case was settled for $1,250,000 in damages and injunctive relief.


On July 12, 2011, prisoners in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections ("GDC") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private counsel, asked the Court for compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that beatings inflicted upon them by correctional officers violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On August 12, 2010, members of the GDC assaulted the plaintiffs at Hays State Prison. The plaintiffs were beaten while handcuffed and did not offer any resistance or commit any act that justified the use of force. The plaintiffs were punched, stomped on, kicked in the groin and face, struck with a flashlight, and suffered injuries including fractured teeth, a facial injury requiring oral surgery, loss of consciousness, fractured toes, and neurological damage. On February 23, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, voluntarily dismissing the case with prejudice. The parties settled outside of court. According to the plaintiffs' counsel's press release, the settlement was for $93,000 and specified medical care for the plaintiffs.

Summary: In July 2011, inmates in the custody of the Georgia Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit alleging that they had been severely beaten by correctional officers at Hays State Prison. In February 2012, the parties voluntarily dismissed the case, settling the case for $93,000 and specified medical care for the plaintiffs.


On June 23, 2017, six parents of schoolchildren who attend schools within the Jordan, Granite, and Canyons School Districts in Utah filed this class action lawsuit against their respective school districts, those districts’ superintendents, and the Utah High School Activities Association (UHSAA) in the U.S. District Court for Utah. The lead plaintiff helped start a recreational-girls only tackle football league, which had approximately 200 participants in spring 2017. Plaintiffs alleged sex discrimination because their school districts did not afford equal opportunities and protection for female students with respect to school athletics teams. They sought injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. Represented by private counsel, the parents sued under Title IX and 42 U.S. § 1983, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the school districts and UHSAA did not make available the same kinds of athletic opportunities, including football, to female students and thus, discriminated against female students. The parents alleged three violations under Title IX: (1) failure to provide contact sports; (2) failure to provide equal accommodation; and (3) failure to provide equal treatment. The Title IX counts were alleged against the school districts, and the § 1983 counts were alleged against both the school districts and UHSAA. Judge Clark Waddoups was initially assigned to the case but recused himself due to a conflict, after which Judge Robert J. Shelby was assigned. Plaintiffs initially sought class certification with respect to two groups: (1) all current and prospective female students within these three school districts and (2) all current and female students within these three school districts who do participate, seek to participate, or are deterred from participating in sports that their school districts do not offer. They also sought partial summary judgment. On February 8, 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint so that one of the parent-plaintiffs could represent another one of their children. On February 13, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on specific components – regarding the disparity of male and female sports as well as the Districts’ lack of history or a continuing practice of expanding sports – of their equal accommodation claim. On February 26, 2018, discovery began, and, after a series of revisions to the schedule, was scheduled to end on July 8, 2019. On May 21, 2018, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the court’s granting partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. This was denied on July 17, 2018. On June 7, 2018, the parents amended their complaint to redefine the classes that the plaintiffs sought to represent. The parents narrowed the classes and re-alleged the complaint on behalf of (1) all current and future female students who do participate, seek to participate, or are deterred from participating in athletics and (2) all current and future female students who seek to participate or are deterred from participating in high school girls’ football. On October 9, 2018, Judge Shelby granted in part but denied in part the parents’ motion to certify the class made on May 22, 2018. 2018 WL 4899098. Specifically, the Court denied class certification relating to all Title IX claims and to the first and broader class of all current and future female students who are participating or might participate in athletics. The Court reasoned that the former set of claims were too individualized of queries that required gauging interest level at the respective high schools. Additionally, the Court denied class certification for the first and broader class because it found no ascertainable number of potential class members and thus, the class failed the the numerosity requirement. The class was certified as current and future female students who seek to participate or were deterred from participating in high school girls’ football and their § 1983 claims. Twice more, on February 20, 2019, and May 20, 2019, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint; however, each time the court denied the motion. 2019 WL 7517396; 333 F.R.D. 220. On February 20, 2019, the plaintiffs also moved to conduct a survey regarding female student interest in football. On April 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead granted in part and denied in part the motion. 2019 WL 7546140. However, the defendants moved on February 3, 2020, to stay or deny the request for a survey. The court granted the defendants’ motion on June 1, 2020. On June 14, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr. On May 24, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Similarly, UHSAA moved for summary judgment on October 28, 2019. The school districts and their superintendents concurrently moved for summary judgment on the same day, October 28, 2019. These cross-motions were mostly denied on June 1, 2020. The Court only granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on its Title IX claims against Canyons School District and their equal treatment claim as to all the defendant school districts. The parties continued to prepare for trial and then, from September 8, 2020 to September 25, 2020 a bench trial took place. Following the trial, the parties made their closing arguments on October 28, 2020. As of February 19, 2021, the Court has yet to rule on the case. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Parents of students across three Utah school districts allege sex discrimination because of disparities in opportunities between male and female athletics. Suing on behalf of a class of similarly situated parties, the parents seek injunctive relief and equal availability of sports like girls' football.


A Mexican citizen brought this complaint against the City of Highland Park, its mayor, the city manager, the chief of police and the police commander on June 14, 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. According to the plaintiff, an officer sprayed him directly in the face with pepper spray while he was detained in jail and caused him immense pain. The plaintiff argued the officer’s actions were catalyzed by racial discrimination because the plaintiff was not white. He placed this specific officer’s actions within an alleged policy of discrimination that the police chief promoted. In particular, the plaintiff claimed that the department followed a de facto policy called the “NUT Ordinance,” or “N— Up Town Ordinance,” which referred to the Chicago police tactic of limiting minorities in the traditionally white part of Chicago. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, brought this § 1983 action claiming violations of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and $3,000,000 in damages. Several months later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the plaintiff failed to state a claim of a policy of discrimination. On January 23, 2002, Judge William J. Hibbler denied the motion to dismiss in part. Taking the allegations by the plaintiff to be true, the court found the possibility of a <i>Monell</i> claim, a case that allows a plaintiff to sue a city under §1983. However, Judge Hibbler granted dismissal of the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim because the Eighth Amendment does not extend protection to pretrial detainees. Judge Hibbler denied the plaintiff’s motion to reconsider or certify appeal of the order. As the case progressed into discovery, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss, this time claiming that the plaintiff had obstructed justice. During discovery, the defendants unveiled that the plaintiff had filed the complaint under a false name. They also called for sanctions against the plaintiff’s attorney because he knew of his client’s false name when the complaint was filed. The court denied the motion to dismiss on November 12, 2002, claiming the issue of fraud against the court was narrow and the defendants were not prejudiced by the new information. Following the second failed attempt to dismiss the case, the parties began settlement talks. On April 16, 2003, they reported to the court that the parties had reached a settlement. The settlement agreement terms were not publicly available at the time of this writing. The court dismissed the case with prejudice with leave to reopen the case on or by May 16, 2003. On May 3, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case. The plaintiff stated that he could not explain the facts of the case, and he did not explain the defendant’s violation of the settlement agreement in his motion. The plaintiff requested that the court court compel the defendants to comply with the settlement agreement within three days or grant the plaintiff damages. The court denied the motion to reinstate the case, but extended the leave to reopen until June 17, 2003. The plaintiff filed twice more to extend the leave. The court granted each motion, extending the final leave until October 13, 2003. The plaintiff stopped filing motions to reinstate the case in June of 2003 and the case has been closed since October 2003.

Summary: A Mexican citizen sued the City of Highland Park and individual officials under § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed he had been sprayed in the face with pepper spray by an officer while detained in jail. He alleged that his treatment was part of a de facto policy within the department that condoned discrimination on the basis of race. The claim survived a motion to dismiss in part and the suit eventually settled. The case is now closed.


On November 23, 2009, a class of former telecommunications installers, with an average age of 55 or older, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against Alcatel-Lucent Inc. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, reinstatement and damages, claiming disparate impact based on age discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their employer disproportionately selected older employees for permanent transfer. On February 9, 2012, the Court (Judge Nancy G. Edmunds) granted plaintiff's motion for conditional class certification, which comprised the 36 original plaintiffs and allowed for opt-in plaintiffs within 10 days, which drew an additional 158 plaintiffs. On May 20, 2013, the Court approved plaintiffs' proposed settlement agreement, which provided for a settlement fund of $1.4 million and attorneys' fees and costs. After each plaintiff was provided with an estimated award and an opportunity to seek reconsideration of that award, the Court granted final approval to the parties' settlement and dismissed the action with prejudice.

Summary: In November of 2009, a class of former installers sued their employer for age discrimination based on disproportionate selection of older employees for permanent transfer. In May of 2013, the Court approved conditional class certification. The class settled for $1.4 million.


On June 24, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The ACLU sued the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights. Specifically, the ACLU argued that HHS violated the constitutional restriction on state establishment of religion by allowing the use of taxpayer funds, including the individual taxes paid by ACLU members, to impose religiously based restrictions on noncitizens. The ACLU sought a declaration and permanent injunction, requesting that the court order HHS to ensure that grants by its component agency, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), be implemented without religious restrictions. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. In its complaint, the ACLU alleged that HHS, in order to achieve its statutory obligation under the Homeland Security Act and the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) to ensure the best interests of unaccompanied immigrant minors, authorizes ORR to administer federally funded grants to private organizations that provide care and custody for these minors. Some of these grant recipients are religious organizations, most prominently the U.S. Conference of Conference Bishops (USCCB), which allocates its grant money to many sub-grantee Catholic organizations throughout the country. The USCCB's sub-grantees, as well as other religious organizations running custody programs, object to contraception and abortion on religious grounds. They therefore refuse to facilitate minors' access to reproductive healthcare while in custody. The ACLU further argued that, under both statutory law and because of the unique situation of women who end up in immigration custody, many being the survivors of sexual assault, the women are entitled to reproductive healthcare. If they try to access such services while in custody under USCCB's sub-grantees, however, the religious organizations deny them access and sometimes transfer them to other secular custody programs, even if the transfers are not in their best interest. These restrictions, the ACLU alleged, violate not only the First Amendment (a violation which directly injures taxpayers) but also the Flores v. Reno agreement, and an ORR regulation implementing the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The agreement and regulation mandate that the defendant ensures that minor victims of sexual assault in immigration custody can access family planning services, post-assault care, and abortions. The parties proceeded with discovery. On September 26, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, citing a lack of standing. The Magistrate denied this motion on November 29, finding the ACLU had standing as a taxpayer. 2016 WL 6962871 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2016). On December 15, 2016, the USCCB sought to intervene as a defendant, which the court allowed on February 7, 2017. 2017 WL 492833 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 7, 2017). On February 1, the ACLU filed an amended complaint. In addition to the earlier allegations, the ACLU asserted that the defendants refused to help trafficking victims obtain reproductive health services and apply for visas for same-sex spouses. On March 9, the defendants moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The defendants argued that the case had no meaningful tie to the Northern District of California, whereas the parties (including ACLU National), witnesses, and operative facts were located in the District of Columbia. In response, the ACLU argued that the case should stay in the Northern District of California where the ACLU of Northern California and its members were located, where unconstitutional activity had partly taken place, and where the court was already familiar with the matter. Magistrate Judge Beeler held an April 27 hearing and issued an order the next day, denying the defendants' motion to transfer the case. She held that the defendants had not overcome the deference afforded to the ACLU's choice of forum. 2017 WL 1540606 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2017). On October 6, 2017, the ACLU moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO), amendment of the complaint, and class certification. The ACLU was responding to the federal government’s March 2017 policies preventing shelters from taking any actions facilitating access to abortions, including transportation to medical appointments, without signed approval from the ORR Director. In response, the ACLU sought to add a new plaintiff (who was at a federally funded, secular shelter in Texas) as class representative for a nationwide class of pregnant unaccompanied minors, plus new class claims for injunctive relief due to violations of the minors’ Fifth Amendment right to privacy and liberty and First Amendment right to be free from compelled speech (by being forced to discuss their decision to have an abortion with a crisis pregnancy center). The ACLU also sought a TRO compelling the defendants to transport this plaintiff for a scheduled abortion on October 13. Magistrate Judge Beeler held an October 11 motions hearing and issued an order. She denied all of the ACLU's motions, on the basis that the new plaintiff should bring a separate case – the plaintiff was not in the Northern District of California, none of the relevant events had happened there, and her claims were not "closely related" to the ACLU's Establishment Clause claim. (The ACLU has brought this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia as Garza v. Hargan, also in this Clearinghouse.) Judge Beeler also permitted several states (Louisiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas) to file amici briefs. 2017 WL 4551492 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2017). Discovery ended on December 22, 2017. Over the next seven months, the parties prepared motions for summary judgment. On October 11, 2018, Magistrate Judge Beeler issued an order denying the ACLU's motion for summary judgment and granting the defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment. 2018 WL 4945321. Judge Beeler stated that there was no evidence in the record that any unaccompanied minor or trafficking victim who wanted an abortion or contraception during the time period relevant to this case was unable to obtain them, nor was there evidence that any grant funding was used for any religious purpose. And, while the ACLU claimed that harm results when minors seeking abortion are transferred to secular shelters, the ACLU could not base its claim on alleged harms that it did not bear itself. Thus, Judge Beeler did not find an Establishment Clause violation, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2016, the ACLU of Northern California sued HHS alleging the unconstitutional use of federal taxes to fund religiously-based restrictions on unaccompanied minors' access to reproductive healthcare while in immigration custody programs managed by religious organizations. The District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment for the defendants on October 11, 2018, finding no Establishment Clause violation. The case is closed.


On January 29, 2010, prisoners in the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) who were deaf or hard of hearing filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and Virginia state law against Virginia state agencies, departments, and employees thereof. The plaintiffs, represented by the Washington Lawyers Committee and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the defendants refused to comply with state and federal laws protecting the rights of the plaintiffs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate access to qualified sign language interpreters, adequate notification of daily events and safety announcements, and adequate means to communicate with individuals outside of prison. On April 13, 2010, the plaintiffs filed the first amended class action complaint. On May 11, 2010, Judge Ellis allowed the plaintiffs to voluntarily dismiss several counts of their plaintiffs' first complaint. On June 21, 2010, the plaintiffs entered a stipulation for voluntary dismissal of three of the individual defendants. On September 14, 2010, the plaintiffs and the medical provider defendants reached a private settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to pay a total of $37,500 to the plaintiffs and to the plaintiffs' attorneys and to amend policies to ensure protection of the rights of the plaintiffs. On November 15, 2010, the parties entered a stipulation of voluntary conditional dismissal for all claims. The defendants agreed to ensure that deaf inmates would no longer be discriminated against and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all remaining claims. The settlement covered a wide variety of issues, including general policies, initial classification, assessment and assignment, housing, provision of auxiliary aids and services, qualifications and use of sign language interpreters, additional communications, disciplinary matters, visual alert notifications, telecommunication devices, training, and monitoring and compliance. The settlement permitted the Virginia Department of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing to have access to each prison that housed a deaf/HOH prisoner, twice a year for five years. In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel got similar access, annually, for two years. If the defendants failed to comply, the agreement allowed plaintiffs to move for reinstatement of the lawsuit, or to proceed in state court and seek specific performance of the agreement. The agreement remained in effect, according to the order entering it, through October 18, 2015. On October 27, 2014, about a year before the settlement term ended, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reinstate the action, alleging systemic noncompliance with the agreement. The instigating event was when nearly all the deaf prisoners were moved from Powhatan Correction Center, which had been fairly well equipped for them, to the Greensville Correctional Center, which was not. Over the next several months, the plaintiffs' counsel did several prison visits and negotiated further, and then withdrew the motion to reinstate. (One plaintiff disagreed, and there was some litigation over his role and status, where he was separately represented and his lawyer did some prison visits/negotiation. This ended up in him withdrawing his disagreement in March 2016.) There was no extension of the agreement term, and the last substantive item on the docket is the March 2016 withdrawal, so presumably the case is closed.

Summary: In 2010, inmates in the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) who were deaf or hard of hearing filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and Virginia state law against Virginia state agencies, departments, and employees thereof. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate access to qualified sign language interpreters, adequate notification of daily events and safety announcements, and adequate means to communicate with individuals outside of prison. In that same year, the plaintiffs and the defendants entered into private settlement agreements dismissing the claims and addressing the discrimination issues.


This is a case about Michigan's emergency manager law, Public Act 436. The Act gave the state legislature power to appoint "Emergency Managers" for municipalities in financial emergencies. Emergency Managers had powers that were previously reserved for locally elected officials, not limited to financial decisions, and were exempted from certain local laws. Under this Act, broad discretion was given to the governor to appoint individuals for these positions. The Michigan legislature enacted Public Act 436 after Michigan voters rejected a similar ballot provision. In response, Michigan residents filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on December 1, 2017. The plaintiffs sued a number of state officials, including the governor of Michigan, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the National Lawyers Guild, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief holding that Public Act 436 was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs alleged that the Act unlawfully took voting power away from local communities. They further alleged that the Act invidiously discriminated against predominantly African-American communities. The case was assigned to Judge George Caram Steeh. On March 12, 2018, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On September 5, 2018, the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed claims by the majority of the plaintiffs on grounds of mootness and lack of standing. Plaintiffs also stipulated to the dismissal of two former state treasurers after they acknowledged that their claims against these treasurers were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 338 F.Supp.3d 651. Shortly after beginning discovery, the parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff could bring the case at a later time. The court dismissed the case on December 11, 2018, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Michigan residents sued for a declaration that Michigan's emergency manager law (Public Act 436) invidiously discriminated against African-Americans and violated the Equal Protection Clause under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims as moot or because the plaintiffs lacked standing, and the plaintiffs stipulated to a dismissal of their remaining claims.


This case is about the adoption of American Indian children under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act. On July 6, 2015, an attorney representing two Indian children as their “next friend,” and two sets of foster parents of (other) American Indian children filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They brought the case on behalf of themselves; all off-reservation Arizona-resident children with Indian ancestry; and all off-reservation non-Indian Arizona-resident foster, preadoptive, and prospective adoptive parents in child custody proceedings involving a child with Indian ancestry. The plaintiffs sued the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Secretary of the Interior and the Director of the Arizona Department of Child Safety. Represented by the Goldwater Institute and a private law firm, the plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was assigned to Senior Judge Neil V. Wake. In general, the plaintiffs requested that the Court declare unconstitutional certain provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and the accompanying Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Guidelines and then enjoin their application. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ICWA’s transfer, active efforts, burdens of proof for removal, burdens of proof for termination of parental rights, and placement preference provisions violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by treating Indian children and non-Indian adoptive parents differently than non-Indian children and Indian adoptive parents during child custody proceedings. The plaintiffs also claimed that ICWA exceeds the federal government’s power under the Indian Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment by regulating state court proceedings and abrogating state laws concerning foster care placement, pre-adoptive placement and termination of parental rights. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that ICWA violates the associational freedoms under the First Amendment and that the BIA Guidelines represent unlawful agency action. On October 29, 2015, the federal and state governments filed motions to dismiss. In their motions, the governments argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the case because their alleged injuries were theoretical and speculative. Even if they did have standing, the governments argued, the plaintiffs did not state a valid claim for relief because ICWA is constitutional and the BIA Guidelines are not final rules and therefore not agency “action." Several national child welfare programs and Indian rights organizations filed amicus briefs in support of the governments’ motions to dismiss, including the Casey Family Program, the National Indian Child Welfare Association and the National Congress of American Indians. Before the Court could rule on the governments’ motions, the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs were successful and filed their amended complaint on April 5, 2016. The amended complaint added Title VI of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d-7) as a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims against the state government. The governments refiled their motions to dismiss immediately after the amended complaint was filed. Shortly thereafter, the Judge Wake granted the motions to intervene of Gila River Indian Community and Navajo Nation, the tribes of the Indian children whose custody was at issue. 2016 WL 5464582. The Tribes immediately filed their own motions to dismiss, arguing (like the federal and state government) that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that their claims were foreclosed by existing Supreme Court precedent and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over non-binding agency action, including the BIA Guidelines. On March 16, 2017, Judge Wake dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the case because they had not suffered a concrete and particularized injury. 2017 WL 1019685. Judge Wake held that the plaintiffs did not specifically show that the challenged ICWA provisions delayed the placement or adoption of the children whose custody was at issue or had otherwise harmed them. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending that the individual plaintiffs had standing to seek retrospective and declaratory relief and that the class had standing to seek prospective relief. However, as the appeal was pending, the individual Indian children whose custody was at issue were adopted. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot. 743 Fed.Appx. 823. The plaintiffs sought review in the Supreme Court, but the Court declined to take the case. 2019 WL 246401.

Summary: On July 6, 2015, an attorney representing Indian children as a “next friend” and foster parents of American Indian children filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs alleged that certain provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act were unconstitutional because they discriminate against Indian children and non-Indian foster, preadoptive and prospective adoptive parents on the basis of race. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Bureau of Indian Affairs Guidelines that accompany the Act were unlawful agency action. On March 16, 2017, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing because the plaintiffs did not allege an injury. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but the Court dismissed the case for mootness because the children involved in the case were adopted before the appeal could be heard. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case.


On September 18, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to force federal immigration official Respondents to process her I-765 application for employment authorization ("EAD") in accordance with 8 C.F.R. §274.13(d), and without regard to Requests For Evidence ("RFEs") issued in conjunction with any application other than the I-765 itself. Petitioner alleged that the government was misapplying several federal regulations, namely 8 C.F.R. § 274.13(d) and 8 C.F.R. § 103.2(b)(10)(ii). Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §103.2(b)(10)(i), the government could put a hold on any immigration application or petition (of any type) if it was "missing required evidence." If the application was held in suspension, the applicant was not entitled to receive "interim benefits." The government would then issue a RFE, giving the applicant the opportunity to supply the missing evidence. Petitioner alleged that the government was applying this regulation to withhold interim EADs when an RFE had been issued in relation to an application other than the EAD, such as the underlying adjustment application. Petitioner sought to enjoin that practice. An amended complaint, submitted on October 21, 2007, added two more petitioners in similar circumstances. On December 10, 2007, defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot, indicating that petitioners had all responded to the RFEs with the evidence requested and had been issued EADs. After an unexplained ten-month gap on the docket, the Court (Judge Andrew S. Hanen) granted the motion on October 22, 2008.

Summary: On September 18, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, seeking to force federal immigration official Respondents to process her I-765 application for employment authorization ("EAD") without regard to Requests For Evidence ("RFEs") that had been issued in relation to a different application. In the end, petitioner submitted the evidence requested by the RFEs and was issued her EAD, and the case was dismissed as moot.


The Philadelphia district office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit in September 2006 against DHL Express (USA), Inc., a major national shipping company, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The complaint alleged that DHL refused to hire a 53-year-old applicant because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). The applicant applied for the position of Delivery Driver/Courier Guard. The plaintiff alleged that DHL instead hired less qualified individuals under the age of 40 for the same position. The EEOC sought a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from engaging in discriminatory hiring practices. Judge Patricia A. Gaughan granted DHL’s motion for summary judgment on November 20, 2007. In the motion to dismiss, DHL asserted that the applicant did not have the relevant driving experience required for the position. Additionally, DHL contended that the applicant “did not communicate well and appeared unprepared.” Judge Gaughan found that DHL articulated a non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the applicant and the plaintiff failed to provide a pretext as to why DHL’s explanation more likely than not was not the reason the applicant did not get the job. The EEOC appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in January 2008 but did not pursue the appeal later that year. The court dismissed the appeal at the request of the parties in May 2008 and the case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued DHL Express (USA), Inc. in the Northern District of Ohio. EEOC alleged that DHL refused to hire a fifty-three-year-old applicant because of his age, thereby violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district court granted summary judgment to DHL in November 2007. EEOC appealed the case, but the parties later decided not to pursue the appeal and the case closed in May 2008.


In 1984, voters in Washington, DC (The District) passed the Right to Overnight Shelter Act (ROSA) which guaranteed to all homeless people in the District the right to adequate overnight shelter. Later the City Council passed a law that created an emergency shelter program for eligible families; this program was approved by and partially funded by the federal government via the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. The city council later amended these laws to explicitly state that an entitlement to shelter did not exist, citing rising costs as the basis for the amendments. The District's denial of an entitlement to shelter, the allegedly insufficient level of funding it made available to its shelter system, and the allegedly arbitrary means it used to determine placement in shelters lead to the cases summarized below. On August 19, 1992, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless (the Legal Clinic) filed a lawsuit on behalf of homeless individuals living in Washington, D.C. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the District's Mayor in her official capacity. No documents from this first case are available as electronic documents, but it quickly resulted in a non-binding memorandum of understanding (MOU) wherein the District said it would allow limited access to advocates for those individuals applying for emergency shelter. In light of the MOU, this first case was dismissed without prejudice on October 30, 1992. The Washington Legal Clinic and several homeless families filed a second suit in the same court against the same defendant on April 5, 1993. The suit was filed on behalf of all "Homeless families seeking eligibility determinations after November 1, 1991, under the District of Columbia state plan for Emergency Assistance." The Plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint are not available, but the Clearinghouse does have several substantive opinions from the case, from which this summary is derived. The original complaint listed six counts under which the plaintiffs sought relief. The first count alleged that the District had violated, under color of law, federal requirements governing the District's participation in the Emergency Assistance program under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 602 et seq., compliance with which, the plaintiffs argued, was enforceable by private suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second count alleged that the District had arbitrarily refused to evaluate the eligibility of applicants for services and did not provide them with oral or written notice of denial of shelter. The third and fifth counts involved allegations that the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated when the District denied Legal Clinic advocates access to the Shelter Office waiting room (this appears to have been the subject of the earlier MOU.) Counts four and six involved due process and equal protection challenges relating to allegations that the District distributed public benefits in an arbitrary manner, and also to the District's enforcement of local laws, including one requiring the District to obtain all federal funding for emergency shelters for which it was eligible. Three months after filing the second suit, the Plaintiff's filed a motion seeking a preliminary injunction requiring the District to comply with federal and local laws governing the emergency assistance program. The day before a hearing was scheduled on the injunction motion, the District filed a supplemental memorandum in which it argued that the issue was moot because the City had opted to withdraw from the family shelter portion of its federally approved and funded emergency assistance program. On July 30, 1993 the Court denied the preliminary injunction in light of the District's ceasing to operate the disputed family shelter program. On July 29, 1993, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which added as a seventh claim for relief the allegation that the District's having opted to not apply for federal funding for the emergency family shelter program, and its elimination of those services, was in violation of local law. The defendant then moved to have the case dismissed. On April 15, 1994 the Court (Judge Joyce Hens Green) denied this motion in part and granted it in part. The court dismissed the first and second counts, but allowed the other five claims to move forward. In the same order, the Court granted class certification and certified two of the named plaintiffs as class representatives. Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Kelly, 1994 WL 823564 (D.D.C. 1993). After the July 1993 order, there was an extended discovery period. A trial was conducted in May of 1995. On February 23, 1996, Judge Green entered her judgment, which was largely in favor of the Plaintiffs, finding that the plaintiff class had an entitlement to emergency shelter that amounted to a protected property interest and which was therefore sufficient to trigger due process protection. However, the court found that the District had not violated the equal protection clause. The Court found that the District had violated the First Amendment when it restricted the times when Legal Clinic advocates could enter the shelter office. The court issued an injunction ordering the District to develop policies and procedures that would not violate the plaintiff class' due process rights. Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 918 F.Supp. 440 (D.D.C. 1996). On July 23, 1996, Judge Green denied the Defendant's motion for a stay pending the outcome of their appeal. In the same opinion she also issued orders relating to the documentation requirements imposed on applicants for public benefits by the District. Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 1996 WL 422494 (D.D.C. 1996). On March 4, 1997 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge David S. Tatel, writing for a three-judge panel) reversed the lower court's decision with respect to the due process claim, holding that the Plaintiffs' entitlement to emergency shelter was not a property right under the law of the District of Columbia. It upheld the lower court's First Amendment findings. Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless v. Barry, 1997 WL 634555 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This decision effectively ended the case.

Summary: On April 5, 1993, the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless (the Legal Clinic) filed a lawsuit on behalf of homeless individuals living in Washington, D.C. The suit was filed in federal court on behalf of all homeless families seeking eligibility determinations for placement in shelters, against the District's Mayor. Plaintiffs alleged that the District had violated, under color of law, federal requirements governing the District's participation in the Emergency Assistance program under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, and that the Defendants had violated the Plaintiffs constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. In 1993, the District ended the disputed family shelter program altogether. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which added the allegation that the District's elimination of these services was in violation of local law. A trial was conducted in May of 1995. On February 23, 1996, the Judge entered her judgment, which was largely in favor of the Plaintiffs. This decision was reversed on appeal. This effectively ended the case in favor of the District.


On July 9, 2014, this class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of all children who are or will be in immigration proceedings who do not have legal representation in their proceedings. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and several public interest groups, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants' failure to ensure legal representation for the plaintiffs and the putative class at immigration proceedings violated the INA and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. On September 29, 2014, the court (District Judge Thomas S. Zilly) denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs' motion did not ask the Court to compel the defendants to provide them with legal representation at government expense; rather, it sought an order enjoining defendants from denying continuances of plaintiffs' removal proceedings. Judge Zilly found, however, that plaintiffs had not first sought such continuances from immigration judges, and he held that the plaintiffs' motion was thus "not ripe for adjudication" and that the court "currently lacks jurisdiction to grant the specific relief sought by plaintiffs." Judge Zilly further stated that "[t]he core issue of whether plaintiffs are entitled, under the Fifth Amendment, to counsel at government expense is not now before the Court and must await another day." The court deferred, however, a ruling on plaintiffs' class certification motion until it considered Defendants' recently filed motion to dismiss. 2014 WL 12515265 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2014). On April 13, 2015, after considering the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' INA claims because of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of IIRIRA and the Real ID Act. The court also struck plaintiff's request for class-wide injunctive relief on the grounds that it could provide only class-wide declaratory relief. But focusing on the plaintiffs already in removal proceedings and not yet ordered removed, the court held that it had jurisdiction to decide plaintiffs' Due Process claim. Under the <i>Mathews</i> due process test, the plaintiffs had a high liberty interest in avoiding removal and plausibly faced a risk of erroneous deprivation of this interest without counsel, though the court could not determine the cost to the government in providing counsel. 107 F. Supp. 3d 1119 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2015). The defendants requested leave to file an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to clarify the jurisdictional issues. The defendants also asked the district court to stay the litigation there in the meantime. But in an August 27, 2015 order, the court explained that, although it had granted defendants' first request (for an appeal), it had denied their second request (for a stay). According to the court, defendants were unlikely to prevail on their jurisdictional challenge, plaintiffs were soon to age out of being minors, and discovery could continue. At the same order, however, the court also denied plaintiffs' most recent request for class certification, finding the proposed class of unrepresented minors to be too broad. The court also noted that, of the remaining six plaintiffs, five had either won some form of immigration relief or now had counsel. The court thus dismissed the three plaintiffs who had already received permanent resident status. 2015 WL 9839679 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2015). On December 4, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. This complaint included fourteen named plaintiffs in removal proceedings without counsel, and it sought class certification for indigent minors in removal proceedings unable to afford counsel. As in the original complaint, the plaintiffs requested injunctive relief on statutory (INA) and due process constitutional grounds. On January 21, 2016, however, the court issued an order denying plaintiffs' most recent request for class certification. The court held that the proposed class was still too broad and that the named plaintiffs' respective situations (i.e., nearing 18 years old or on track to receive permanent resident status) were not representative of proposed class members. 2016 WL 4533605 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 21, 2016). The defendants again moved to dismiss. In an April 15, 2016 order, the court granted, denied, and deferred different parts of the motion. Judge Zilly dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the USCIS Director and dismissed as moot the claim of one plaintiff who had turned 18 and was no longer in removal proceedings. The court deferred, however, a decision on the claim of another plaintiff who had turned 18 and was on track to permanent resident status but was still in removal proceedings. As for the claims of the remaining plaintiffs, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court rejected the defendants' argument that arriving noncitizens had no procedural due process rights beyond those specified by Congress, but it also conceded that noncitizens who entered without inspection may have fewer due process rights than those who were lawfully admitted. Accordingly, the court found appropriate for trial the issue of whether due process rights include the right to counsel at government expense. 180 F.Supp.3d 811 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 15, 2016). Returning to the class certification process, the court, in a June 24, 2016 order, certified the class of minors in removal proceedings in the Ninth Circuit as of the date of the order who were financially unable to afford legal representation, were charged with inadmissibility, and had credible claims to relief under asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture, or existing U.S. citizenship. 2016 WL 3458352 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 2016). After oral argument, the court on July 8, 2016, denied plaintiffs' most recent motion for preliminary injunction (on behalf of one plaintiff) but did not provide written reasoning. Next, the Ninth Circuit, where the parties had litigated defendants' interlocutory appeal on the jurisdictional questions, issued an order on September 20, 2016. Without reaching the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court had no jurisdiction over either the statutory or constitutional claims (thus reversing the district court's Apr. 13, 2015 determination of jurisdiction over the latter only). According to the Ninth Circuit, the INA required plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies and then file for circuit court review, thus foreclosing district court review. 837 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2016). After this order, the district court on the same day struck the trial date and all remaining deadlines and motions. The court struck them without prejudice, however, to permit reinstating them in the event that the Ninth Circuit's decision was vacated, reversed, or modified before a mandate issues. On November 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied a motion to rehear the case en banc. 908 F.3d 1157. Circuit Judge Marsha S. Berzon (joined by Circuit Judges Kim McLane Wardlaw, William A. Fletcher, Richard A. Paez, and Mary H. Murguia) dissented and voted to rehear the case. Judge Berzon argued that the panel read the INA’s jurisdiction stripping provisions too broadly and that the relevant provisions only precluded review of claim where an order of removal was entered and an individual seeks relief from that order. The mandate of the Ninth Circuit was entered on November 27, 2018. Judge Zilly then issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. On December 6, 2018, the plaintiffs responded that they would not appeal the Ninth Circuit decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. As the plaintiffs declined to appeal the Ninth Circuit decision, the court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction on May 2, 2019.

Summary: On July 9, 2014, a group of minors in immigration proceedings filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement fail to guarantee their constitutional and statutory rights by not ensuring that minors in immigration proceedings have legal representation. On Sept. 20, 2016, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims, but did not reach the merits of the claims. The Ninth Circuit denied a motion to rehear the case en banc on November 13, 2018. As the plaintiffs declined to appeal the Ninth Circuit decision, the court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction on May 2, 2019.


On October 16, 2005 the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §1001 against IBM Personal Pension Plan in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that amendments made to their pension plans when it was transformed from a traditional cash balance plan to a defined benefit plan based on a point system constituted age discrimination. Specifically they alleged that the changes were discriminatory because rather than defining benefits by salary at retirement the plan now defined benefits based on time served and salary and awarded interest to employees who left IBM before retirement. Hence the benefits for an employee who spent 20 years at IBM between the ages of 25 and 45 would be greater than those for an employee who spent 20 years at IBM at the same salary between the ages of 45 and 65. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought damages and attorneys' fees and costs. On September 17, 2001 the district court (Judge Murphy) certified the suit as a class action and separated three classes depending on how long the relevant members had been with IBM. On July 31, 2003 the court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and found that the pension plan did discriminate based on age. Before appeal the case moved to the determination of damages and two settlement agreements were reached with the subclasses and were approved by the court on January 10, 2005 and August 16, 2005. The settlement agreement set total damages to be paid to the plaintiff's and their attorneys at $1,714,293,000 should the district court's ruling regarding liability be upheld on appeal. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Easterbrook, Judge Bauer, and Judge Manion) heard arguments on February 16, 2006 and reversed the district court on August 7, 2006. The court held that the alleged age discrimination stemmed only from the effect of time on money through compound interest and that this did not constitute age discrimination. The case was concluded on January 16, 2007 when the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari.

Summary: On October 16, 2005 the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit based on the Employee Retirement Income Security Act against IBM Personal Pension Plan in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that amendments made to their pension plans when it was transformed from a traditional cash balance plan to a defined benefit plan based on a point system constituted age discrimination. On September 17, 2001 the district court certified the suit as a class action and on July 31, 2003 the court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment and found that the pension plan did discriminate based on age. Before appeal the case moved to the determination of damages and two settlement agreements were reached with the subclasses and were approved by the court on January 10, 2005 and August 16, 2005. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court on August 7, 2006. The case was concluded on January 16, 2007 when the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari.


On January 14, 2011, the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia under the Fair Housing Act against the Wheeling Housing Authority. The Department of Justice, on behalf of African-American residents of the Hil-Dar apartment complex, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the Wheeling Housing Authority failed to take appropriate action when informed of racial harassment directed some African-American residents by other residents of the apartment complex. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant failed to respond to reports of verbal abuse, racial slurs, threats, and attempted assaults by a neighboring family. On April 26, 2012, a consent order was approved by Judge Frederick P. Stamp in which the defendant agreed to cease all forms of racial discrimination, provide general notice of nondiscrimination to its tenants and prospective tenants, provide nondiscrimination training to its employees, maintain certain records and adhere to a reporting schedule, and provide the plaintiffs with monetary relief in the amount of $18,500. The consent order was in effect until 2015. On May 30, 2013, parties agreed to modify the terms of Paragraph 19 of the Consent Order to ensure that the defendant establish and adopt a policy to contact the Wheeling Police Department within seven days of receiving notification, from a resident or another source, that the Wheeling Police Department has visited the Hil-Dar Apartment Complex, and collect any reports of such police visits. On March 18, 2014 Judge Stamp, in response to a motion filed by the plaintiffs, issued an order to distribute monetary damages to a minor who was soon reaching the age of majority. The consent decree terminated in 2015, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The United States, on behalf of African-American residents of the Hil-Dar apartment complex, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against the Wheeling Housing Authority, claiming that the Wheeling Housing Authority failed to take appropriate action when informed of racial harassment directed at the plaintiffs by other residents of the apartment complex. A consent order was approved by the court (Frederick P. Stamp) in which the defendant agreed to 1) cease all forms of racial discrimination, 2) provide general notice of nondiscrimination to its tenants and prospective tenants, 3) provide nondiscrimination training to its employees, 4) maintain certain records and adhere to a reporting schedule, and 5) provide the plaintiffs with monetary relief in the amount of $18,500. The consent order was in effect until 2015.


On October 9, 2009, an inmate of the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility Authority (WVRJA) filed a class-action lawsuit against the WVRJA and the executive director of the facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, Huntington Division. The plaintiff claimed that after his arrest on non-felony charges, he was taken to Western Regional Jail and required to undergo a visual cavity strip search and delousing pursuant to a WVRJA policy. Plaintiff argues that this strip search and delousing policy as applied to pretrial detainees charged with misdemeanors or other minor crimes is unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and others similarly situated seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On October 28, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action. On August 05, 2010, Judge Robert C. Chambers denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Discovery proceeded in this case until June 1, 2011, when Judge Chambers signed the parties’ proposed stipulation to stay further proceedings in this matter until after the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, another strip search case in a jail setting. The court's decision in Florence, delivered on April 12, 2012, held that correctional officials have a significant interest in searching detainees to ensure they are not bringing any contraband into a facility, even when detainees are held for minor offenses. On September 13, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint and the parties proceeded with discovery. On August 12, 2013, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgement. On August 27, 2013, the plaintiffs responded with a cross-motion for summary judgement. On October 4, 2013, Judge Robert C. Chambers released an order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgement and denying the plaintiff's. Judge Chambers ruled that based on the precedent set in Florence, defendant's strip search and delousing of plaintiff was not unconstitutional, and in doing so denied plaintiff's class-action certification. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 9, 2009, plaintiff filed a class-action lawsuit against the West Virginia Regional Jail and Correctional Facility, claiming that the strip search and delousing process for pretrial detainees charged with minor crimes violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2011, the court stayed the discovery process until the Supreme Court issued its decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders. In 2012, the Court ruled that strip searches and delousing was not unconstitutional even for those charged with minor crimes. In October 2013, Judge Robert Chambers granted defendant's motion for summary judgement based on the precedent set by Florence.


On August 31, 2011, female prisoners formerly and currently incarcerated at the Montana Women's Prison ("MWP") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 against the Montana Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Montana and private counsel, claimed that MWP's policy forcing them to participate in the "Right Living Community" program ("RLC") and forbidding them from participating in boot camp constituted discrimination on the basis of gender, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments. They asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. While incarcerated at MWP, plaintiffs were forced to participate in the RLC program. RLC is purported to serve as a substitute for the statutory right of prisoners in Montana to attend boot camp. Boot camp is a program that uses physical activity, military-style discipline, and intensive counseling, education, and treatment programming. Successful completion of boot camp has led to dramatically decreased recidivism rates, eligibility for sentence reduction, and conversion to probation. Female prisoners, including the plaintiffs, do not have the opportunity to attend boot camp and have no programs available for sentence reduction upon successful completion. Instead, women prisoners are required to participate in RLC. RLC does not provide the same treatment and education skills that boot camp provides. Rather, RLC is designed to restructure thinking patterns and change human behavior. RLC divides female prisoners into a hierarchy. Members of the higher levels of the hierarchy maintain power over others. RLC participants must participate in two "family" meetings each day, attend a weekly "talking circle," and complete homework assignments. Plaintiffs allege that this has caused significant negative impacts on the conditions of incarceration at MWP. The only option for women who choose not to participate in RLC is to be housed in solitary confinement. Male prisoners in the Montana State Prison are not required to participate in any treatment program unless ordered by a sentencing judge. On October 28, 2013, upon joint motion of the parties, Judge Sam Haddon dismissed the case with prejudice. The parties settled all claims among themselves.

Summary: In August 2011, female prisoners incarcerated at Montana Women's Prison filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana against the Montana Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs alleged that their forced participation in the exclusively female "Right Living Community" program and inability to participate in the exclusively male "boot camp" program constituted discrimination on the basis of gender, in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. In October 2013, the parties reached a private settlement agreement and the Court dismissed the case.


On May 10, 2004, several people who applied to work at Cintas filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued Cintas under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, sought monetary damages. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that she personally applied for three positions as a Route Sales Driver with Cintas over the course of six months and was denied three times despite being well qualified for the positions. For the class action component, plaintiff alleged that Cintas' behavior affected more than 100 women who applied for positions with the company in the state of Michigan and were denied jobs between June 12, 1999 and the date of filing. The case was assigned to Judge Sean F. Cox. On September 2, 2005, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. This complaint modified the scope of the class by changing it from Michigan specific to a nationwide class that potentially covered thousands of positions. Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that the specific mechanism that allowed this discrimination was the wide latitude given to regional hiring managers, who were exclusively men. In December 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a motion to intervene in the case. On March 31, 2009, the District Court denied plaintiff's motion to certify class on the grounds that there was not commonality among the class members, not typicality among the class members, and that the representative plaintiff would not adequately represent the members of the class. This denial of class certification was appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which vacated the District Court's ruling on November 9, 2012. After this ruling, a writ of certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court, which was denied on October 9, 2013. Over the next two years, it appears that the parties engaged in settlement negotiations. On November 25, 2015, the parties entered into a consent decree, where Cintas agreed to pay $1.5 million in backpay to class members and implement broad solutions to fix the issues identified, including hiring training, the drafting of new hiring practices, and monitoring by the EEOC. The class was defined as: "Women who applied to work at a Cintas rental facility in the state of Michigan but were not hired as a SSR from January 1, 1999, through March 31, 2005." Then, on December 21, 2017, the parties agreed to amend the consent decree. In the initial consent decree, any remaining funds of the $1.5 million dollar were to be delivered to class members evenly. However, this amendment changed the distribution arrangement so that any remaining funds would instead be delivered to a charity that assisted women in finding employment. The consent decree remained in force until March 15, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 10, 2004, several people who applied to work at Cintas filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs sued Cintas under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, specifically Title VII. On November 25, 2015, the parties entered into a consent decree, where Cintas agreed to pay $1.5 million and implement broad solutions to fix the issues identified, including hiring training, drafting new hiring practices, and monitoring by the EEOC.


On July 9, 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to Iowa's governor, advising him of the results of the November 1999, and April-May 2001, DOJ investigations of conditions and practices at two state-operated centers for developmentally and mentally disabled persons: the Woodward State Hospital-School (subsequently renamed Woodward Resource Center) ("Woodward") in Woodward, Iowa, and the Glenwood State Hospital-School (subsequently renamed Glenwood Resource Center) ("Glenwood"), in Glenwood, Iowa. The investigations occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facilities twice, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended Woodward and Glenwood staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for resident well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found deficiencies in resident care at both facilities, in that certain conditions and services at one or both substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at the facilities were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies existed in conditions of resident care and treatment (1) at Woodward (and, to a lesser degree at Glenwood), regarding the use of restraints and restrictive procedures (e.g., over-use of restraints; use of electronic tracking devices at Woodward for staff convenience rather than resident care); (2) at Glenwood, regarding the substandard general medical care provided (e.g., lack of a medical director, a peer review quality assurance tool, a pharmacy and therapeutics committee, or policies and protocols to ensure consistent provision of care; insufficient provision of neurological resources) and, (3) at both centers, in their provision of deficient (a) psychiatric and psychological care (e.g., inadequate psychiatric and psychological assessments and diagnoses; unjustified use of psychotropic medications; poor monitoring of treatment outcomes; defective or non-existent pharmacy and therapeutics oversight; failure to obtain informed consent; inappropriate behavior plan development; non-integrated pharmacological and behavior plans), and (b) community placement programs (neither facility had established protocols ensuring adequate assessments to determine the most integrated setting appropriate for individuals' wants and needs). Nutrition management, physical and occupational therapy, and protection from harm deficiencies were described in the letter, depending on the facility, as ranging from non-existent to notable, with Woodward also described as lacking in appropriate habilitation services. Erroneous and incomplete record keeping plagued both facilities, according to the DOJ. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all of these categories. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter provided notice that, absent a resolution of the federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at Woodward and Glenwood. On November 18, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against Iowa and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing an attached plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures (believed to be those set out in the findings letter; we do not have a copy of the "plan," so we infer this). The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, set out that the state's practices at Woodward and Glenwood violated their patients' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically report upon its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facilities up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The settlement also allowed for the United States to conduct regular compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. The Court (Judge Ronald E. Longstaff) approved the settlement on November 24, 2004. On December 9, 2004, he issued an unpublished order which administratively closed the case, but retained jurisdiction to enforce his order of November 24th. In April 2009, the DOJ filed a notice to update the court on the monitoring activities and changes at the two facilities, and extending the monitoring period another year. By May 13, 2010, the defendants filed a notice with the court that the consent decrees for both facilities had expired. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 18, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against Iowa and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter referencing an attached plan obligating the state to implement remedial measures at two state-operated centers for developmentally and mentally disabled persons. The agreement expired in 2010.


On January 15, 2015, a deaf, Ethiopian-born American citizen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff sued the Arlington County Sheriff and Virginia Department of Corrections. The suit was brought under two federal statutes: Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiff, represented by both private counsel and counsel from the National Association of the Deaf, sought compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees. In the complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he was not provided with American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters during his detention at the Arlington County Detention Facility (Detention Facility) following his arrest at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport for allegedly stealing an iPad. Because the plaintiff is originally from Ethiopia, he struggles to understand, read, and write English. His primary way of communicating is through ASL. When he was arrested, the plaintiff attempted to ask for an ASL interpreter because he did not understand why he was being detained. The officers responded by writing notes to the plaintiff; however, he could not understand what they were writing. Plaintiff remained at the Detention Center for approximately six weeks. During that time, he did not have access to an interpreter to communicate his dietary and medical needs. He also did not have access to a videophone to speak to his public defender. Throughout his stay at the Detention Center, plaintiff made multiple requests for interpreters and other services to allow him to communicate with the Detention Facility’s staff, but these requests were denied. He eventually pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of receiving stolen property in exchange for a sentence of time served. He later explained that he did not understand why he was arrested until he went to court and that he pleaded guilty only to get out of jail. His alleged victim — another deaf, homeless man who was sleeping at the airport — eventually withdrew the allegation, saying he had made a mistake and that the missing iPad had been found. The defendants immediately moved to dismiss the claims. On April 28, 2015 Judge James C. Cacheris granted the state-level officials’ motion to dismiss and denied the sheriff’s motion to dismiss. The judge reasoned that the plaintiff’s allegations, if true, showed the sheriff did not do anything to accommodate the plaintiff’s disability under Title II of the ADA. The plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint compelled the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia to investigate the case. The investigation substantiated the majority of the plaintiff’s allegations and uncovered the Arlington County Sheriff’s Office’s general failure to comply with the ADA. As a result, ACSO entered settlement negotiations with the Department of Justice (represented by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia). On November 16, 2016, the ACSO signed a settlement agreement with the Department of Justice. The agreement stipulated that Arlington County had to pay the plaintiff $250,000. Furthermore, the settlement required that ACSO take steps to better accommodate inmates with disabilities. ACSO agreed to, amongst other things, appoint employees to coordinate ADA compliance, modify policies/procedures to screen prisoners who have disabilities, provide additional auxiliary aids and interpretive services to inmates who are deaf or hearing disabled, and revamp procedures to keep track of services provided to prisoners. It will stay in effect for three years, after which the matter will be closed. Back in the court case, on December 20, 2016, the court entered a voluntary dismissal.

Summary: A deaf prisoner received a $250,000 settlement from the Arlington County Sheriff's Office, which failed to provide him with ASL interpretive services when he was in custody.


On December 12, 2012, a prisoner at the SCDC serving a life-sentence without the possibility of parole filed this pro se lawsuit against the director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The plaintiff claimed the SCDC was substantially burdening his practice of religion which violated the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). Additionally, the plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that the SCDC violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff had been in administrative segregation since 1995, after his involvement in a riot where several guards were taken hostage. Since being placed in administrative segregation, he had committed no infractions. The plaintiff practiced a religion called the Nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a derivation of the Nation of Islam, also known as the Five Percenters. The SCDC did not recognize NOGE as a legitimate religious denomination and classified NOGE as a Security Threat Group. The plaintiff claimed that the SCDC would not release the plaintiff into the general population unless he renounced his religion. On October 9, 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge David C. Norton. After requesting supplemental memoranda on the case, Judge Norton granted summary judgment to the defendant in district court on March 11, 2014. The director of the SCDC was terminated on March 11, 2014, and the new director's name was substituted on the docket. The plaintiff then appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On July 1, 2015, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court affirmed the dismissal of the RLUIPA claims because the plaintiff failed to show that his confinement in administrative segregation was because of his religious affiliation rather than because of his participation in the riot. The appeals court reversed the district court’s decision as to the Fourteenth Amendment due process claims. The appeals court determined that the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest because of the hardships of indefinite solitary confinement. Though a prisoner’s placement in administrative segregation was reviewed every 30 days, the appeals court determined there was a triable dispute as to the adequacy of the procedure and remanded that issue. After the case was remanded, the plaintiff retained private counsel. While it is likely that the case was resolved outside of court after counsel became involved, as of March 2017, no further motions have been filed in response to the remanded section of the case.

Summary: On December 12, 2012, the plaintiff filed this pro se lawsuit against the director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The plaintiff was a prisoner at the SCDC serving a life-sentence without the possibility of parole and had been in solitary confinement since 1995 after his involvement in a riot. Since then, he had committed no infractions. The plaintiff was a member of the Nation of Gods and Earths (NOGE), a derivation of the Nation of Islam. The SCDC had classified NOGE as a Security Threat Group and could be released into the general population if he renounced his affiliation with NOGE. The plaintiff claimed this was a violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, and in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, and the director of the SCDC was terminated that day. The plaintiff appealed and the appeals court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The appeals court affirmed the dismissal of the RLUIPA claims because the plaintiff failed to show his solitary confinement was because of his religious affiliation rather than his participation in the riot. The appeals court remanded the procedural due process issues because they found the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest and there was a triable dispute as to whether the SCDC had provided adequate procedural due process.


On April 5, 2016, a group of Muslim-American U.S. citizens represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (in Alexandria). Judge Anthony J. Trenga was assigned to the case. Defendants included the FBI, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCC). Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs alleged that they were placed on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB or “the watchlist”) without warning and without a constitutionally adequate mechanism for having their names removed. Plaintiffs alleged that their placement on the watchlist subjected them to burdensome travel screening and reputational harm that diminished their employment prospects. They argued that the burdens and reputational harm they suffered violated their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine. On September 2, 2016, the government moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on September 23, 2016, to add twelve new plaintiffs (bringing the total to 25 plaintiffs) and add Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as a defendant. On September 5, 2017, after a period of inactivity, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ substantive due process, equal protection, and non-delegation claims, but allowed their procedural due process and APA claims to proceed to discovery. 303 F. Supp. 3d 453. Rejecting the government’s arguments, Judge Trenga held the following. First, the alleged enhanced screening and detention endured by plaintiffs infringed their rights of travel. Second, the government’s alleged dissemination of the plaintiff’s information with private third parties violated their right to be free of reputational harm. From November 2017 to March 2019, the parties disputed various steps of the discovery process. One of the disputes that may be of particular interest to legal scholars is that which followed the “first” motion to compel filed by plaintiffs on March 15, 2018. This motion requested access to documents relating to the standards and procedures for watchlist additions, screening policies that utilize watchlist information, the government’s procedures for handling requests from individuals who wish to be removed from the watchlist, and statistics on the watchlist’s overall effectiveness. In response to this motion, the government, via an affidavit from Attorney General Jeff Sessions filed on April 23, 2018, formally invoked the state secrets privilege. Attorney General Sessions asserted the privilege over documents that touched on information shared by foreign governments and other sensitive national security information. After hearing oral arguments on the motion, on May 18, 2018, Judge Trenga ordered the defendants to produce the requested documents to plaintiffs “redacted of any information they believe is privileged or classified” with redactions removed for in camera inspection. However, for the documents requested in the March 15 motion to compel, Judge Trenga did not require the government to include the names of foreign countries that provided information in “sharing agreements” used to populate the TSDB in discovery materials provided to the plaintiffs or the Court. On March 11, 2019, parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Both parties then filed memorandums in opposition and continued discovery. On September 4, 2019, Judge Trenga issued an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. 391 F. Supp. 3d 562. Judge Trenga held that plaintiffs were entitled to a favorable judgment as a matter of law on their procedural due process and Administrative Procedure act claims. Additionally, the government’s motion for summary judgment was denied. Judge Trenga based this decision on his finding that the travel difficulties faced by the plaintiffs, such as being handcuffed at border crossings and being subjected to invasive secondary searches at airports, were significant and that the plaintiffs had a right to procedural due process when their Constitutional rights were infringed. The District Court also held that the Department of Homeland Security Traveler's Redress Inquiry Program ("TRIP"), which has a process through which plaintiffs may challenge their inclusion on the watchlist, was not adequate to protect their liberty interest. Judge Trenga ordered the parties to submit additional briefing related to the outstanding issue of remedies within fourteen days. District Judge Trenga entered an order on December 18, 2019, making his September 4 order a final judgment. The defendants filed a motion to vacate this order on December 20, presumably so that they would have time to apply for an appeal following the holidays. Judge Trenga granted the motion to vacate his December 18 order on December 26 and reentered final judgment on the same day. On January 31, 2020, the defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. On appeal was the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment granted on September 4, 2019, regarding both the procedural due process and ACA claims. On March 30, 2021, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded for entry of a judgment in accordance with its holding. Writing for a three-judge panel, Circuit Judge Harvie Wilkinson III held that the TSDB does not violate the Fifth Amendment Right to procedural due process. This holding had two subparts. First, delays or inconveniences that plaintiffs faced at airports or while entering the U.S. at land borders did not rise to the level of an infringement on the right to travel. Second, the listing of the plaintiffs’ names on the TSDB database did not meet the standard for a Fifth Amendment claim based on reputational injury. Because the APA claim was essentially based on the same theory of a violation of a Constitutional right as the procedural due process claim, it also failed. 993 F.3d 208. Following their failure to persuade the three-judge panel, the plaintiffs filed a motion on May 14, 2021, requesting an en banc rehearing of the case at the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit denied the plaintiffs an opportunity to reargue the case. A final mandate to the District Court was issued on June 7, 2021. The plaintiffs have 150 days from that date to apply for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

Summary: The plaintiffs, a group of Muslim-American U.S. citizens who believed that they were on the Terrorism Screening Database (the “watchlist”), filed their lawsuit in April 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They said that the watchlist subjected them to invasive travel screening and reputational harm and lacked a constitutionally adequate mechanism for having their names removed. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated their Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the nondelegation doctrine. In 2017, Judge Anthony J. Trenga dismissed the plaintiffs' substantive due process, equal protection, and non-delegation claims, while allowing their procedural due process and APA claims to proceed to discovery. Though the plaintiffs successfully argued a procedural due process violation at summary judgment in September 2019, the Fourth Circuit reversed in May 2021.