On May 22, 2015, non-citizen applicants for employment authorization documents (EADs) and two legal service organizations who assist immigrants and asylum seekers with these applications, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) and Advocates for Human Rights, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of mandamus under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), its accompanying regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the American Immigration Council, and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agency U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for their policies and practices of unlawfully delaying adjudication of EAD applications and refusing to issue required interim EADs. The individual plaintiffs were all eligible for EADs and would be eligible to work with appropriate documentation, were it not for the government’s unlawful delay in adjudicating their applications. As a result, they had lost drivers’ licenses and experienced financial hardship, including inability to pay for utilities and medically necessary care. The organizational plaintiffs claimed that they had to divert limited resources to try to remedy these delays by contacting USCIS and Congresspeople, as well as employers, to try to keep clients’ jobs open while they waited for EAD adjudication. The individual plaintiffs sought to represent a nationwide class of non-citizens who had filed or would file an EAD application that was not or would not be adjudicated within the required regulatory time frame. The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart. The government filed a series of sealed motions, including an August 10, 2015 motion to dismiss. On February 10, 2016, the court issued a sealed order granting in part and denying in part the government’s motion to dismiss. It ruled that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over several of the plaintiffs, and that the claim would have to be heard in state court if at all. The plaintiffs filed a sealed amended complaint on February 22, 2016 which included the five original plaintiffs and eight additional plaintiffs. They included:

immigrants who sought EADs on the basis of their “U Nonimmigrant” status as crime victims who cooperated with law enforcement;
F-1 student visa holders seeking temporary work after the completion of their university programs;
asylum applicants seeking initial and renewal applications while their asylum matters remained pending; and
recipients of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program (DACA) seeking renewal.
The plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification on March 22, 2016; the government filed a sealed motion to dismiss on April 18, 2016. Oral arguments on these motions were heard on September 7, 2016. On October 5 the court issued an order dismissing some plaintiffs for lack of standing or for failure to state a claim, but allowing others to proceed, and denying without prejudice the individual plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, with leave to amend. 325 F.R.D. 671. The plaintiffs filed a third motion for class certification on November 4, 2016, proposing nationwide classes of individuals whose EAD applications had been delayed 30 days (for asylum applicants) or 90 days (for others). The government moved to dismiss in part on March 2, 2017, and oral arguments took place on July 13. On July 18, 2017, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the 30-day plaintiff class’s motion for class certification, but also granting the government’s motion to dismiss as to 90-day plaintiff class and subclass’s claims (because revised regulations now required the government to take action). The certified 30-day class was defined as “[n]oncitizens who have filed or will file applications for employment authorization that were not or will not be adjudicated within…30 days…and who have not or will not be granted interim employment authorization.” The order also dismissed the organizational plaintiffs. 2017 WL 3034447. On October 17, 2017, the court set a briefing and discovery schedule. Discovery was scheduled to be completed by April 2, 2018. On July 26, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion and denied the government’s cross motion for summary judgment. While the court’s written decision is not publicly available, the docket indicates that it ordered the government to submit status reports on their compliance with its order every 30 days. On August 27, 2018, the parties filed a sealed, joint implementation plan of the court’s order. On September 27, 2018, the government appealed the summary judgment order to the Ninth Circuit. In the district court on October 10, 2018, the parties submitted briefing regarding whether the court should specify specific rates for EAD adjudication compliance as part of an implementation order of the court’s July 26, 2018 decision. They also made proposals regarding the appropriate venue for filing any federal district court action where an EAD application was not adjudicated in compliance with the court’s order. On March 20, 2019, the district court issued an order declining to require the government to comply with the injunction by a specific date. It also declined to require individuals to file EAD applications with the court before compelling the government to adjudicate the applications. 2019 WL 1275097 The government dismissed its Ninth Circuit appeal on May 5, 2020; on July 28, it asked the district court to vacate the injunction, due to a “material change in the law.” That motion is pending as of August 7, 2020.

Summary: Noncitizens entitled to employment authorization filed a class action lawsuit alleging that USCIS's policies and practices unlawfully delayed adjudication of their application for employment authorization and that USCIS unlawfully refused to issue interim employment authorization. On July 26, 2018, the district court certified a nationwide class and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but later dismissed its appeal on May 5, 2020. As of August 2020, the government continues to submit monthly status reports to the district court.


On April 5, 2011, several homeless individuals filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs sued the City of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the City violated their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights when it seized and destroyed their personal possessions. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary and permanent injunction, declaratory judgment that plaintiffs' rights were violated by the defendant, monetary damages, and attorneys’ fees. On April 22, 2011, the court filed an order granting a temporary restraining order against the City. 2011 WL 1533070. This was followed by a preliminary injunction, granted by the court on June 23, 2011. 797 F.Supp.2d 1005. The City responded with several appeals over the next few years. On July 25, 2011, the City appealed the order for preliminary injunction. After first ordering the parties to explore the possibility of mediation, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the City’s appeal. 693 F.3d 1022. On April 29, 2013, the City filed an ex parte application for an order modifying the preliminary injunction to conform with the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Essentially, the City had a problem with the language in the preliminary injunction. While the injunction issued by the trial court prohibited the City from seizing property, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals used language in their denial that prohibited the City from performing the combined act of seizing and destroying property. The City wanted this narrower language construed in the injunction. On June 17, 2013, the trial court denied the application, saying that the City failed to identify any change in law or circumstances that would support a modification. On July 17, 2013, the City again appealed in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, this time about the trial court’s denial of modification of preliminary injunction. The City later decided they would not pursue this appeal and filed a motion to dismiss it, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 1, 2014. Back in trial court, Plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on April 20, 2014, which the court denied on July 24, 2017. 2014 WL 12693524. On December 15, 2015, after several settlement conferences, the parties filed a joint notice of tentative settlement. The City agreed to pay $822,000 plus attorneys’ fees to settle the case. Though this settlement is not found in the pleadings, please see <a href="http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-attorney-fees-homeless-case-20160613-snap-story.html">this LA Times article </a> regarding the settlement. On July 25, 2016, the court issued an order dismissing the action with prejudice against the City. This case established precedent that the Los Angeles Police Department cannot “summarily [destroy] the property of homeless individuals without notice.” 693 F.3d 1022.

Summary: Eight homeless individuals sued the City of Los Angeles for seizing and destroying their property. After plaintiffs won a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction that survived several appeals, the City agreed to pay an $822,000.00 settlement.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigration detainees in Arizona, seeking release due to their high risk of illness or death from COVID-19. The court partially granted an injunction on May 11, 2020, requiring the defendants to list measures they could take to comply with CDC and ICE guidelines.
 Thirteen immigration detainees at La Palma Correctional Center or Eloy Detention Center (both private immigration detention facilities) filed this petition for habeas corpus on April 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The petitioners were represented by private counsel and lawyers from several public interest groups, including the ACLU National Prison Project, the ACLU Foundation of Arizona, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the Florence Immigration and Refugee Project. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus against the wardens of the two detention centers, the centers' field directors, and the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The complaint alleged that the spread of COVID-19 put the detainees at high risk of illness or death and that the steps the centers had taken to mitigate its spread were inadequate. In fact, petitioners argued that given the seriousness and contagiousness of the illness, particularly for detainees with co-morbidities, the only adequate remedy was release. The complaint set forth two theories under which continued detention violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Under the first theory, the respondents owed petitioners a certain degree of medical care and reasonable safety, since confinement established a special relationship between them. Under the second theory, the respondents violated the Fifth Amendment's protection against punitive detention for civil offenders. Petitioners argued that, given the spread of the disease and the centers' lack of precautions, they were treated worse as civil offenders than convicted criminal offenders were. Petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, an injunction ordering their release. They also sought declaratory relief and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Steven P. Logan and referred to Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf. The court partially granted the petitioner's request on May 11, 2020. It found that there was a substantial risk to the detainees, that the respondents had made intentional decisions by failing to take measures to protect high-risk detainees from infection, that this failure was objectively unreasonable given the measures available to them, and that this failure could cause serious illness or death among the detainees. However, the court did not find that the only available remedy was release. Instead, Judge Logan asked each party to submit lists of measures that could be taken to make conditions consistent with CDC and ICE guidelines. The parties were given two days to submit these lists. 2020 WL 2319980. Also, the court on May 15 ordered that an individual petitioner be placed in a single-occupancy cell without a roommate and with adequate access to hand sanitizer and personal protective equipment. It is unclear from the opinions why this petitioner secured relief. In the following weeks the parties submitted status reports regarding the effort to bring the centers into compliance with ICE and CDC guidelines. And on June 12, 2020, the court granted the petitioners' motion to transfer Espinoza v. Howard (No. 2:20-cv-01134), another case by detainees at the same facilities seeking similar relief, to Judge Logan. Since the transfer, the petitioners in Espinoza moved for a preliminary injunction, but the parties have become bogged down in ongoing efforts to thoroughly brief the motion. On July 15, 2020, the Urdaneta respondents appealed the court's May 11 ruling. The appellate docket does not show why they appealed, and the respondents voluntarily dismissed the appeal on September 14 before the Ninth Circuit acted on it. On November 25, 2020, the petitioners moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. The motion was granted on November 11, 2020. On February 25, 2021, the parties stipulated to allow the petitioners to apply for fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Thirteen civil immigration detainees held in two private Arizona detention centers filed this petition for habeas corpus on April 1, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that the centers' failures to take measures that would mitigate the spread of COVID-19 violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. They sought habeas corpus or, in the alternative, injunctive relief to secure relief along with attorneys' fees and costs. The court on May 11 directed the parties to list measures to bring the centers into compliance with CDC guidelines and continues to monitor implementation.


On June 5, 2014, a same-sex couple, represented by private counsel, in Michigan challenged the state's refusal to recognize their marriage, filing a claim against the state pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Windsor, plaintiffs had traveled to the State of New York and gotten married under state law. Upon returning, Michigan did not recognize this marriage. Specifically, Michigan Public Act 324 had invalidated by statute all same-sex marriages in Michigan, and Michigan Public Act 334 prohibited the recognition of same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions (both statutes were passed in 1996). Additionally, the 2004 Michigan Marriage Amendment essentially codified these restrictions into the state's constitution. One of the plaintiffs here was a legal parent to an adopted child, but the couple was prevented from joint adoption in Michigan because of their unrecognized marriage. The plaintiffs alleged that this deprives their child of many benefits associated with recognition of a legal family unit and deprives the couple of equal protection under the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the out-of-state marital nonrecognition provisions of the Michigan Marriage Amendment and the 1996 statutes violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment; an injunction preventing the defendants, in their official capacities, from attempting to block state and local governmental recognition of existing, valid marriages between same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions; and an award of attorney fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On February 10, 2015, the court (Judge Arthur J. Tarnow) granted a stay in this case, pending the U.S. Supreme Court resolution of DeBoer v. Snyder. The latter case, while not featuring a couple with a marriage recognized in a different jurisdiction, challenged the constitutionality of the Michigan Public Acts at issue here as well as the Michigan Marriage amendment. DeBoer v. Snyder invalidated Michigan's same-sex marriage restrictions at the district court level, was reversed by the 6th Circuit, and was heard in a consolidated action as Obergefell v. Hodges before the United States Supreme Court in April of 2015. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision in Obergefell that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). On July 16, 2015, the stay was lifted and this case was reopened. On July 30, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs' claims were moot in light of the Obergefell decision, after the plaintiffs' counsel denied a request for concurrence in the motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs' response was that while the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell granted a substantial part of the relief they requested, the invalidation of the Michigan Marriage Amendment, it did not grant another part of their requested relief: the invalidation of the 1996 statutory provisions. On October 22, 2015, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that regardless of whether the 1996 provisions had technically been declared invalid, there was no reasonable chance that that the defendants would again deny recognition to the plaintiffs' marriage. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as moot and found that the plaintiffs would not be "prevailing parties" entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 5, 2014 a same-sex Michigan couple challenged the state's refusal to recognize their valid out of state marriage performed in New York, filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Plaintiffs filed an equal protection claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 on their own behalf and on behalf of their adopted child, as Michigan's refusal to recognize the marriage prevents a joint adoption (one parent is legal guardian). On February 10, 2015 the court granted a stay in this case, pending the United States Supreme Court's resolution of DeBoer v. Snyder, which also raises constitutional questions regarding Michigan's refusal to recognize valid same-sex marriages performed out of state. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims were rendered moot by the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges which required all states to recognize same-sex marriages in other states.


On January 9, 2009, six inmates of the Canyon County Jail filed a class action lawsuit against the jail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief claiming their confinement was indecent, cruel and, inhumane due to overcrowding, inadequate ventilation, inadequate plumbing, inadequate recreation, inadequate medical care and overall lack of cleanliness. On August 21, 2009, the court (Judge B. Lynn Winmill) entered an order preliminarily approved the parties' consent decree, conditionally certified the plaintiffs' class, directed notice to the plaintiff's class, and scheduled a final fairness hearing. On November 12, 2009, the court (Judge Winmill) approved the Consent Decree, which requires the jail to adhere to its functional capacity except in rare circumstances, and even then, for periods of no more than 48 hours. The Consent Decree also contains detailed provisions concerning sanitation, temperature control, water temperature, staffing levels, special meals and a prohibition against sex discrimination in the work release programs for female prisoners. On April 15, 2010, the parties moved to amend the Consent Decree. The amendments included new provisions relating to security checks in the prisons. Specifically, the jail agreed to train its staff to perform security checks, simplify and revamp the procedure for logging security checks, and generate reports for jail administrators showing the number of security checks each day. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the amendment on May 3, 2010. The parties moved for a second amendment to the Consent Decree on December 28, 2010. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the amendment on January 3, 2011. Under the amendment, work release prisoners are to be released to a specific unit with a designated functional capacity. The parties moved for a third amendment to the Consent Decree on November 19, 2012. With the exception of attorneys fees, which the parties resolved by separate agreement, the parties agreed that the third amendment resolved all issues in the complaint. The amendment states that the defendant substantially complied with the 2009 Consent Decree, and that the only sections still remaining would be those in the third amendment. The third amendment set forth detailed provisions regarding ventilation, sanitation, plumbing, outdoor recreation, staffing and rule enforcement, and implementation and verification. The court (Judge Winmill) approved the order on January 8, 2013. The Consent Decree was to remain in place for a minimum of one year, after which it was susceptible to termination under the PLRA. No further action has been taken in this case.

Summary: In January 2009, inmates at Canyon County Jail filed a class action lawsuit against the jail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and alleging overcrowding and inadequate sanitation, recreation, and medical care. The parties entered into a Consent Decree in 2009. The Decree was subsequently amended three times, most recently in 2012.


On September 29, 2005, the Memphis District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The EEOC sued Tri-State Plumbing, Heating & Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc. ("Tri-State"); United Association Of Plumbers, Pipefitters and Sprinklerfitters Plumbers, Local Union No. 17 (Local No. 17); and United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and Canada, AFL-CIO ("United Association"). The case was assigned to Judge J. Daniel Breen. The complaint alleged racial and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violations of equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, it alleged that the employer Tri-State, a construction firm, subjected a group of African-American employees--seven male, one female--to multiple forms of racial discrimination, culminating in their dismissal once they complained; it also alleged that the female employee was additionally discriminated against due to her gender. The complaint also said that the local plumber's union failed to represent the workers because of their race and denied them work referrals because they complained of discrimination. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employees. The employees all worked on the FedEx Forum arena construction site in Memphis, Tennessee from 2003 to 2004, where they said their co-workers made racially derogatory comments towards them and drew racist graffiti. Their employer allegedly assigned them the most dangerous tasks due to their race, and denied them the opportunity to work overtime while allowing the same to their white colleagues. They complained to their local union in May 2004, but they said that the union rather than advocating for them, alerted Tri-State, who subsequently fired them that June in retaliation. In the months that followed, the union's business manager allegedly told them there was no work, yet other union members who had not complained were being referred to jobs. They filed a formal charge against both Tri-State and the local union with the EEOC (the exact date is unclear based on the available documents from the case). After an investigation, the EEOC concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that they had been unlawfully discriminated against. Negotiations between the EEOC and Tri-State to reach a conciliation agreement were ultimately unsuccessful, leading the EEOC to file this lawsuit. The eight employees moved to intervene as plaintiffs on December 2, 2005. Although the precise reasons for their motion could not be confirmed from the available documents in the case, their motion was granted by Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham on January 6, 2006. They filed their own complaint on March 8, 2006, largely reiterating the same allegations from that filed by the EEOC. United Association filed a motion to dismiss on March 13, 2006; it argued that the intervening plaintiffs allegations, if true, failed to establish either that Local No. 17 was acting as its agent or that the plaintiffs exhausted all their administrative remedies before filing suit. United also filed an answer to the intervening plaintiffs' complaint that same day denying their pertinent allegations in full. On May 12, 2006 the intervening plaintiffs filed their response rebutting each of United's principal arguments. They also indicated their intention to file an amended complaint that would clarify their specific complaints against United, and did just that on July 12; the amended complaint added more detail about Local No. 17's agency relationship with United and about their actions before contacting the EEOC. Tri-State filed its own motion to dismiss on Sept. 14, 2006, this one responding to both the intervening plaintiff's and the EEOC's complaints. Tri-State alleged that the EEOC and the intervening plaintiffs' attorney conspired to ensure the failure of conciliation efforts, and that such bad faith activity was fatal to the lawsuit. District Judge J. Daniel Breen denied United Association's motion to dismiss on February 27, 2007 and Tri-State's on August 21. Judge Breen noted that none of the cases relied on by United Association in its motion were directly applicable to the precise issue raised in this case. 2007 WL 649088. As for Tri-State, he found that its assertions that the EEOC negotiated in bad faith was largely contradicted by correspondence between the two parties in the run-up to the EEOC's filing of the lawsuit. 502 F. Supp. 2d 767. For the next few months, the parties undertook discovery. On May 21, 2008 the case was reassigned to Judge S. Thomas Anderson, a newly appointed district court judge. On November 5, 2008, the court approved a consent decree between the defendants, the EEOC, and all but one of the intervening plaintiffs. Among its provisions, the decree required Tri-State and the Local Union to update their anti-discrimination policies and provide anti-discrimination trainings to their members. Tri-State and the Local Union also agreed to pay a total of $360,000 to be distributed among the intervening plaintiffs as directed by their counsel and the EEOC. The consent decree was to last for three years, during which the court would retain jurisdiction for enforcement. Two weeks after the consent decree was entered, the EEOC and seven of the eight intervening plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims. Discovery then continued with all defendants and the one remaining plaintiff representing himself pro se. On September 10, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to compel discovery and sanction Hunt for failing to attend his deposition. The plaintiff filed no response to the motion, and the court granted the defendants’ motion on October 12. The defendants rescheduled the deposition, but Hunt again failed to show up without notice. After Hunt did not respond to the defendants' motion to dismiss on October 29, the court finally dismissed the case on December 3. The consent decree expired in 2011, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2005, the EEOC brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged race and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and violations of equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Eight complainants intervened in the EEOC's suit in January 2006. The case settled as to most of the plaintiffs in November 2005, with the defendants agreeing to enter a consent decree providing for anti-discrimination policies and damages payments to seven of the employees. The one remaining plaintiff's case was dismissed for failure to prosecute in 2011.


This lawsuit was filed on June 18, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The suit was filed in response to police tactics used to quell protests in Indianapolis that ensued following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs were Indy 10 Black Lives Matter (a Black Lives Matter chapter out of Indianapolis) and three individual plaintiffs. They were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Indiana. The only defendant was the City of Indianapolis. The complaint alleged that Indianapolis police used stun grenades, tear gas, and pepper-balls against peaceful protesters, in addition to rubber bullets and police dogs. Plaintiffs alleged that these actions violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights to free speech and free assembly and their Fourth Amendment rights from excessive force. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from interfering with peaceful protests, especially with excessive force. They also sought money damages and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson and Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor. At the end of June, the court ordered a hearing for the preliminary injunction. Briefing on the motion for a preliminary injunction continued throughout July and August. In early September, the parties indicated that they were working with Magistrate Judge Pryor to try and reach a settlement. On October 5, the parties reached a settlement, and shortly after, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for a preliminary injunction. Under the settlement, the Indianapolis Metro Police Department ("IMPD") may only use force that is objectively reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances. No riot control agents that under City and IMPD policies require approval abuse would be used to deter protestors from going to another location, against protestors because elsewhere in the City there were unlawful activities taking place, and against protesters engaged in passive resistance. In addition, the settlement required IMPD to take reasonable measures to ensure announcements to disperse were heard by all and to announce the use of riot control agents. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on December 11, 2020, and the Court dismissed the case on December 14, 2020. This case is closed.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in response to police tactics used in Indianapolis to quell the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleges that Indianapolis police used chemical weapons and rubber bullets, among other weapons, to unlawfully put down the protests. The plaintiffs were Indy 10 Black Lives Matter and three private individuals, while the defendant was the City of Indianapolis. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's actions violated their First Amendment and Fourth Amendment rights, and sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. In October 2020, the parties reached a settlement limiting the use of chemical agents against protestors by the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice in December 2020, and the Court dismissed the case. This case is closed.


On September 6, 2019, a legal services provider and seven individuals detained at the South Texas Family Residential Center in Dilley, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The individual plaintiffs, along with the Refugee & Immigrant Center for Education & Legal Services (RAICES), challenged new directives that the government issued at two detention centers in Texas, which effectively gave asylum seekers just twenty-four hours to prepare for their credible fear interviews (“the Directives”). Represented by Democracy Forward Foundation, RAICES, and Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), the plaintiffs alleged that the Directives violated the First Amendment, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and the Appointments Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and the case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. In their complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the combination of three new USCIS directives resulted in an unlawful infringement on the right to seek asylum in the U.S. Specifically, the Directives reduced the time given to asylum seekers to consult with third parties prior to their credible fear interviews, mandated that requests for extensions be denied absent the most extraordinary circumstances, and eliminated a legal orientation program for asylum seekers at the Dilley facility. The plaintiffs made the following legal claims in their complaint:<blockquote>(1) that by impeding asylum seekers’ ability to consult with persons of their choosing and preventing them from fully and effectively participating in the credible fear interview process, the Directives violate IIRIRA; (2) the Directives are arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion under the APA as they were motivated by racial animus and the defendants failed to provide an adequate justification for changing policy; (3) the Directives violate the APA because they were issued absent notice and comment; (4) the Directives violate the Rehabilitation Act, because they unlawfully discriminate against the individual plaintiffs (who have disabilities under the Act) by failing to provide them with a reasonable accommodation and/or excluding them from the asylum process altogether; (5) the Directives violate the First Amendment because they unduly impede communication and association between the individual plaintiffs and their counsel, as well as between RAICES and its clients; and (6) the Directives were issued in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and the Appointments Clause, because Mr. Cuccinelli’s service as Acting Director of USCIS is not in accordance with the Act, nor was he nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.</blockquote>On September 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed the administrative record on October 21, and on January 9 the parties agreed to treat the plaintiffs’ motion as a motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants also filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On March 1, 2020, the district court granted in part and denied in part the summary judgment motions of both the plaintiffs and defendants. 2020 WL 985376. First, Judge Moss concluded that the court only had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ challenges to the directives reducing consultation time and prohibiting extensions. Next, he found that Mr. Cuccinelli was not lawfully appointed to serve as Acting Director of USCIS, thereby requiring that those two directives be set aside. He also set aside the individual plaintiffs’ negative credible-fear determinations and removal orders and remanded to USCIS for further proceedings. Judge Moss did not reach the plaintiffs’ other legal challenges. The case is ongoing.

Summary: A legal services provider and seven detained asylum seekers filed this lawsuit in the D.C. District Court on September 6, 2019, challenging the Trump Administration's new asylum directives, which gave asylum seekers only 24 hours to prepare for their credible fear interviews. The plaintiffs alleged that the directives violated IIRIRA, the APA, the First Amendment, the Appointments Clause, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. In March 2020, the district court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding that Acting USCIS Director Ken Cuccinelli was unlawfully appointed and setting aside two of the challenged directives. The case is ongoing.


This case is one of a pair of lawsuits filed against the Arizona Attorney General to challenge his practice of seizing money wire transferred to Mexico through Western Union. In an attempt to curtail the smuggling of undocumented immigrants by trafficking organizations (known as "coyotes") from Mexico to Arizona, the Arizona Attorney General had obtained warrants and seized millions of dollars of money that was wire transferred to Mexico. The Attorney General focused on amounts over $500 which were believed to have been sent as payments to Mexican smugglers who have transported people or drugs into Arizona. Western Union filed this lawsuit on September 19, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the Arizona Attorney General of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico, even if such transfers were not sent from or received in Arizona. The seizures were to occur pursuant to a seizure warrant sought by the Arizona Attorney General in the Arizona Superior Court, Maricopa County. Western Union alleged that the seizures violated violate the Commerce Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt the seizures. The District Court (Judge Stephen M. McNamee) ordered that the Western Union case be consolidated with the related class action case, Torres v. Goddard [IM-AZ-6]. On September 20, 2006, the Court (Judge McNamee) denied the motion for temporary injunctive relief, in part, due to parallel proceedings in Arizona state court raising the same or similar issues. On September 25, 2007, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. For several years, the court granted extensions of time. On March 10, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice per the parties' agreement to settle and stipulation to dismiss the case. The settlement was approved on February 24, 2010 in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services, Inc. [CV2010-005807.] In that case, the parties agreed to a $94 million settlement where as much as $50 million will go to support law enforcement agencies working to crack down on drug and human smuggling. Under the agreement, the state will receive $21 million and Western Union will devote $19 million to improve its own efforts to stop money laundering and $4 million to an independent monitor. Western Union also agreed to provide border state prosecutors access to wire transfer records.

Summary: On September 19, 2006, Western Union filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the Arizona Attorney General in an attempt to block threatened seizures by the state of Western Union wire transfers from 28 states to Mexico. The Arizona Attorney General believed that millions of dollars were being sent as payment to Mexican smugglers who had transported people or drugs into Arizona. The parties ultimately stipulated to dismiss the case in 2010 after entering into a settlement agreement in a separate case, Arizona v. Western Union Financial Services [CV2010-005807].


This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids in the Atlanta area. The complaint stated that, in response to a 2015 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) directive titled "Operation Border Resolve," U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) targeted families from El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala living in nine major U.S. cities, including Atlanta. As part of the directive, the complaint alleged, ICE agents were to be trained on the Fourth Amendment: "[I]f they claim to be a member of local law enforcement during a ruse, the agents must notify the local law enforcement agency beforehand." The complaint argued that, in Jan. 2016, ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of noncitizens, then arrested and detained them without probable cause or search warrants. The plaintiffs argued that ICE violated the Fourth Amendment and committed false imprisonment, trespass, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, under Georgia state law and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). They sought damages and declaratory relief. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. After Judge Clarence Cooper was recused, the case was reassigned to Judge Steve C. Jones on Dec. 13. The plaintiffs, first represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and later by private counsel, were three families with members who were citizens of various Central American countries. In one instance, ICE officers pulled over one named plaintiff while he was driving, without citing any traffic violation. The officers indicated that the plaintiff had to let them search his home, as they believed a criminal suspect was located there, or else the plaintiff risked obstructing a criminal investigation. The officers claimed to have a warrant but did not show it, and repeatedly threatened the plaintiff. Fearing arrest, but denying any such criminal suspect was in his home, the plaintiff went back to his home with them but agreed they would wait outside while he obtained identification cards of the people residing inside. The ICE officers then forcefully entered the home and eventually arrested the plaintiff's wife for missing an immigration court date, which the family claimed had not happened. ICE detained her and some of her children for a month. In the case of another family, ICE officers once again attempted to enter into the home by claiming there was a criminal suspect there. The agents did not have a warrant, nor did they make clear they were ICE officers. Upon entering the house, they arrested and detained members of the family. Additionally, in the case of the third family, ICE officers once again gained entry into the home with no search warrant by claiming there was a criminal suspect. In each case, the plaintiffs suffered significant emotional distress after they were released from custody. On Feb. 16, the defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) because the alleged conduct arose from removal proceedings and lay within the Immigration Courts' jurisdiction. The defendants also disputed that the FTCA applied because the removal orders, arrests, and detentions were lawful. On Aug. 6, 2018, the court (Judge Steve C. Jones) granted the motion to dismiss as to the alien plaintiffs and denied it without prejudice as to the citizen plaintiffs (three minor children). The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) and the INA barred it from adjudicating the merits of alien removal orders, but not from adjudicating citizen removal orders. The court found that the alien plaintiffs' claims that they were detained through misrepresentations and disregard for policy ultimately challenged detention methods in the execution of removal orders, and so § 1252(g)'s jurisdictional limits applied. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 4, 2018. On Sept. 18, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for relief and that punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, and declaratory relief are not available under the FTCA. On Aug. 28, 2019, Judge Steve Jones granted the motion to dismiss with regard to plaintiffs' claims for trespass, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress along with the claims for punitive damages, attorney's fees, and declaratory relief. Unable to conclude that removal orders are essentially equivalent to arrest warrants, however, Judge Jones denied the motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' claim for false imprisonment. In March 2020, the parties had a dispute about an offer of judgment. Defendants claimed that they made an offer for judgment of $15,000 total while plaintiffs believed they had accepted an offer of judgment for $15,000 for each of nine plaintiffs. On March 23, Judge Jones directed the clerk to strike plaintiffs' acceptance and the case is now in discovery. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This suit, filed on Dec. 11, 2017, challenged the legality of a series of immigration raids on Central American families in the Atlanta area. The complaint argued that ICE officers used ruses to gain entry into the homes of immigrant families, then arresting and detaining them without probable cause or search warrants. Only the minor plaintiffs' claims for false imprisonment survived the motion to dismiss. The case is now in discovery.


On July 14, 2006, Western Watersheds Project, an Idaho environmental non-profit organization, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The plaintiff sought reversal of a January 2005 agency determination that a bird species known as the Greater Sage Grouse did not warrant inclusion as an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA). The plaintiff also brought the claim under the Administrative Procedure and Declaratory Judgment Acts, arguing that the organization's continued interest in studying the bird in its wild habitat was threatened by the bird’s substantially declining population and the defendant’s decision to deny the species protection was arbitrary and politically motivated. The plaintiff sought an order to remand the matter to the defendant agency for reconsideration. The case was assigned to Chief District U.S. Judge B. Lynn Winmill. According to the complaint, the plaintiff petitioned the defendant in 2003 to list the Sage Grouse as a threatened or endangered species, citing “over one hundred peer-review scientific publications” detailing the destruction of the Sage Grouse’s habitat due to livestock grazing and oil and gas development. In 2005, the defendant responded to the petition with a finding that Sage Grouse would be listed as an endangered species. The complaint alleged that this finding violated the ESA's requirement that such determinations be based on the best available scientific information. The plaintiff asked the court to order that the defendant conduct a new review of Sage Grouse’s status. Beginning on September 19, 2006, fourteen corporate and government entities began efforts to intervene in the suit on the defendant’s behalf, including the State of Wyoming, the Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, and the Petroleum Association of Wyoming. The intervenors argued that new federal regulations protecting the Sage Grouse would burden them with costs of compliance. On March 9, 2007, Judge Winmill denied the motions to intervene in part, ruling that the would-be intervenors could not claim any interest in the litigation given that the plaintiff sought only an administrative re-assessment of the Greater Sage Grouse’s status. However, Judge Winmill granted the motion in part in the event that the plaintiff might pursue a remedy beyond a remand of the administrative decision. Because that could adversely effect the intervenors, they were granted the right to intervene to the extent of challenging a possible proposed remedy. This decision was unsuccessfully appealed to the Ninth Circuit by the intervenors. On April 9, 2007 and May 21, 2007, the plaintiff and defendant respectively filed cross motions for summary judgment. On December 4, 2007, following a hearing on motions, the court granted summary judgement for the plaintiff, reversing the defendant’s decision to not list the Sage Grouse, and directing defendant agency to further consider whether to list the Sage Grouse pursuant the ESA. In his opinion, Judge Winmill found that the defendant's review of the Sage Grouse's status had failed to consider the findings of its own scientific experts. Furthermore, a Deputy Assistant Director at the defendant agency had used “intimidation tactics” to influence the results of the agency's scientific inquiries. Judge Winmill therefore found that the agency’s decision had not been based on sound scientific analysis as required by the ESA. 535 F.Supp.2d 1173. The opinion also noted that the same Director had already been found in a separate case to have improperly interfered in an ESA listing determination in <i>Center for Biological Diversity v. FWS</i>, 2005 WL 2000928 (N.D.Cal. 2005). The court declared the defendant's prior determination invalid and remanded the issue to the agency for further consideration in compliance with the ESA. On January 30, 2008, the parties stipulated to a 90-day deadline (from the date of the court's order) for the defendant's completion of the new review of the Sage Grouse's status. However, the defendant subsequently asked the court for additional time to comply with the court's order, and ultimately obtained several extensions from court. On December 12, 2008, the parties agreed to a settlement covering plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs, amounting to $135,000, which the court approved. On March 8, 2010, after receiving several extensions, the defendant reported to the court that it had determined that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, despite this finding, the defendant placed the Sage Grouse on its list of "precluded" species, meaning that a bureaucratic backlog and a lack of resources prevented the agency from protecting the species regardless of the threats it faced. Thus the defendant avoided needing to protect the Sage Grouse while conceding the plaintiff’s scientific arguments. The plaintiff asked for leave to file a supplemental complaint to explain that the defendant’s new determination had been arbitrary and politicized, saying that it placed the Sage Grouse in a “black hole from which few species ever emerge, and under which they receive no ESA protection.” The plaintiff asked the court to order the defendant to review the Sage Grouse's status yet again and requested leave to file an amended supplemental complaint. But on April 27, 2010, Judge Winmill denied the motion. The plaintiff had not alleged that the defendant violated the earlier order or that their second determination was not in compliance with the ESA. The plaintiff would be required to file a new action if they wanted to bring this new claim and the case closed.

Summary: In 2006, an environmental non-profit filed this action seeking reversal of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's determination not to list the Greater Sage Grouse under the Endangered Species Act. The court found that the defendant's decision not to list the species had been tainted by political considerations and inattention to scientific analysis. The defendant was ordered to conduct a new review of the Sage Grouse's status, the result of which was a new determination in 2010 that listing the Sage Grouse under the ESA was warranted. However, the defendant claimed it could not actually add the species to the endangered species list, due to a bureaucratic backlog and lack of resources. The plaintiff's request to file a supplemental brief was denied by the court, and the case closed.


On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. Attorneys with Legal Momentum, Farmworkers Legal Services of New York (FLSNY), and other social justice organizations and private firms represented the plaintiff. Plaintiff sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Defendants moved to dismiss, and/or for summary judgment on various grounds, including a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and argued that Title VII did not protect workers recruited outside of the U.S. In June 2004, the District Court (Chief Judge Norman A. Mordue) denied defendants' motions. Olvera-Morales v. Sterling Onions, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2004). On June 15, 2005, following the dismissal of the New York defendants, the case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The Court reconsidered the transfer order but reaffirmed its decision. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 5:02-CV-1589, 2006 WL 931752, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17923 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2006). Plaintiff moved for class certification on February 15, 2007, proposing a class consisting of "[a]ll female H-2B workers recruited, procured or referred for employment by the Defendants or their agents, or whose H-2B employment opportunity was procured by Defendants or their agents, from 1999 to the present." On November 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.) granted class certification. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., 246 F.R.D. 250 (M.D.N.C. 2007). On December 18, 2007, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Defendants International Labor Management Corporation (ILMC) and Del-Al Associates summary judgment on Plaintiffs' Title VII claims. However, the Court denied summary judgment to the North Carolina Grower's Association (NCGA) on the Title VII claims. The Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims Plaintiffs asserted under New York Human Rights Law, dismissing them without prejudice. The Court issued its memorandum opinion on January 1, 2008. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 53293 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 1, 2008). Both Plaintiffs and Defendant NGCA moved for reconsideration. On February 20, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) granted Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and reinstated the Title VII claim against ILMC. The Court stated that it had dismissed ILMC as an "employment agency," when ILMC had only contested that it was not an "employer." The Court thus held that, as the issue of whether ILMC was not an "employment agency" was not before the Court at the summary judgment stage, it had erred in dismissing the claim. Olvera-Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 506090 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 20, 2008). On April 4, 2008, the Court (Judge Tilley) also granted Defendant NGCA's motion for reconsideration and dismissed the Title VII claim against it. The Court held that, since Plaintiff was represented by counsel at the time of her initial EEOC complaint, the "identity of interest" exception--which the Court had applied to Plaintiff--should actually not apply to her on summary judgment. Morales v. Int'l Labor Mgmt. Corp., No. 1:05CV00559, 2008 WL 939180 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 4, 2008). On April 16, 2008, less than a week before trial was scheduled to begin, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds. On August 4, 2009, the Court granted the parties' motion for final approval of the class settlement.

Summary: On December 23, 2002, a Mexican woman who worked in the U.S. as a non-immigrant guest worker filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that various labor recruiters engaged in sex discrimination against women who they were placing as non-immigrant guest workers at various U.S. farms. Specifically, plaintiff alleged a systematic practice by recruiters of denying women the opportunity to obtain seasonal work (agricultural work, such as harvesting crops) under the H-2A visa guest worker program and instead deliberately steering them to less lucrative jobs in the H-2B visa guest worker program (work classified as nonagricultural, such as packing produce), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law. The case eventually settled just prior to trial. The settlement called for Defendants to provide data to Plaintiffs' counsel for three years on the H-2A and H-2B workers hired by Defendants, for Defendants to adopt anti-sex discrimination policies and implement training to that effect, and for $100,000 in settlement funds.


In 1955, the Supreme Court ordered school districts to desegregate “with all deliberate speed.” 349 U.S. 294. But the city of Columbus, MS did not allow black students to attend schools previously reserved for whites until 1965, a decade later. Even by 1970, no white students attended a historically black school, and less than 5% of black students attended historically white schools. The United States brought this action on July 13, 1970 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. It sued both of the public school systems in Lowndes County: the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the Lowndes County School District. The Department of Justice brought the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 and sought immediate desegregation of both districts. District Judge Orma R. Smith entered a consent decree on August 10, followed by a permanent injunction on September 5. The injunction ordered the districts to operate unitary, non-racial school systems that did not discriminate on the basis of race. It also established a biracial advisory committee and governed how the districts assigned students to schools, hired faculty and staff, transported students, built new facilities, and decided which extracurricular activities to offer. The Columbus Municipal Separate School District’s original remedial measures focused on its middle and high schools. In July 1975, the United States sought additional relief to desegregate the District’s elementary schools. Originally, the District claimed that its existing policies were constitutional despite the fact that half its elementary schools were either over 90% black or 90% white. It later proposed minor attendance zone changes based on a neighborhood schools concept. In contrast, the United States proposed an ambitious pairing system. When two schools were paired, their attendance zones would be merged. Then, all students would attend one school for certain grades (e.g., 1st to 3rd grade) and the other school for the others (e.g., 4th to 6th grade). By pairing historically black schools with historically white schools, the United States’ plan promised quick desegregation. The district court adopted the United States’ pairing plan. The District appealed, arguing that its more limited plan should have been adopted instead. In an August 9, 1977 opinion, Fifth Circuit Judge Irving L. Goldberg upheld the district court’s determination. Judge Goldberg observed that the District’s plan would leave several schools entirely segregated and that the pairing plan would produce “much greater desegregation.” Therefore, Judge Goldberg held that the pairing plan was appropriate despite a small increase in the District’s transportation costs. 558 F.2d 228. Over the next decades, the districts filed reports with the court. The court also implemented adjustments to the student assignment plan, authorized the construction and sale of schools, and supervised the appointment of new members to the biracial advisory committee. In 2007, the Columbus Municipal Separate School District and the United States filed a joint motion for a declaration of unitary status. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case as to Columbus on August 9. In contrast, Lowndes County parents’ groups concluded that the Lowndes County School District was not adhering to its obligations under the consent decree. They filed cases in 2002 and 2003 to enforce the districts’ desegregation obligations. The Court merged these two lawsuits with this case in 2004. The parents’ groups, Lowndes County, and the United States agreed to a new consent decree in 2006, which declared the District unitary with respect to student assignment, faculty and staff assignment, and transportation only. It also provided a pathway towards a declaration of full unitary status. On August 21, 2008, the District moved for unitary status. The United States opposed the motion because of inadequate facilities and a lack of advanced courses in one of the District’s high schools together with complaints of harassment of and discrimination against black students in majority white schools. The parties then agreed to a modified consent order under which the District would remedy these problems. The District again moved for unitary status on May 15, 2012. This time, the United States did not oppose the motion, but the parents’ groups did. At a fairness hearing, few residents opposed the plan. The court found that the District had made the required facilities improvements and implemented an AP program. It also found that the District had formulated and implemented an anti-discrimination policy. District Judge Michael P. Mills wrote that the court had “seriously considered” denying unitary status because Caledonia High School continued to use “Confederates” as its nickname and play “Dixie” at sporting events. But the court ultimately concluded that the lack of complaints from the community suggested that these “troubling” activities were “not vestiges of segregation” of sufficient magnitude to justify a denial of unitary status. The Lowndes County School District was declared unitary on October 24, 2012. 900 F. Supp. 2d 703. The case is now closed. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 558 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1977). 900 F. Supp. 2d 703 (N.D. Miss. 2012).

Summary: In the 1970s, the United States sued two Mississippi school districts to dismantle de jure racial segregation. Both districts operated under permanent injunctions for about forty years and obtained declarations of unitary status early in the 21st Century. The case is now closed.


On July 9, 2017, thirteen protesters and two reporters who were arrested during a protest in Baton Rouge filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the City of Baton Rouge, as well as numerous agents of the Sheriff’s Department and of the state, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 306 of the State of Louisiana Children's code. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well and monetary relief and attorneys’ fees. After a Baton Rouge police officer shot and killed Alton Sterling, people gathered in Baton Rouge to speak out against the pattern of police misconduct in the area and, more generally, in the United States. In July 2016, a peaceful, youth-led protest gathered at the State Capitol building where participants spoke, sang, and prayed. Participants then marched around the area in the same fashion. Eventually, law enforcement officers gathered. The officers ordered the protesters out of the streets. Most complied with the dispersal order. The officers ordered the protesters to disperse – an impossible order to comply with, since the police blocked off most of the surrounding streets, had already ordered the protesters to stay off the sidewalks, and were arresting people who stepped into the streets to leave. Shortly thereafter, the officers swept through the crowd, violently grabbing people and binding their wrists with plastic zipties. The officers arrested a mix of protesters, reporters, and legal observers. One of the plaintiffs was a 17-year-old girl put in an adult prison with male inmates in violation of the Children’s Code. Another plaintiff was separated from her children, including a five-year-old who was taken from her and put into child protective services. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants’ First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The plaintiffs also claimed excessive force, unreasonable search and seizure, and civil conspiracy. The original complaint and some of the exhibits contained many photographic images depicting the actions of both protesters and law enforcement officers. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to end their practices and policies as described above. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction to require the defendants to expunge the plaintiffs’ arrests at the defendants’ cost and bar the defendants from reporting the plaintiffs’ arrests to any law enforcement agency, database, employer, or credit agency. They further asked that a permanent injunction be granted for the above. On July 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a notice of related cases. The plaintiffs listed six cases that all involved damages lawsuits on behalf of people who were wrongfully arrested during the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. One of these cases was McKesson v. City of Baton Rouge, one with common questions of law and fact with the present case. The case was originally assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. On July 12, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge James J. Brady. Then, in light of the plaintiff’s notice of related cases, the court reassigned the case to Judge John W. deGravelles and Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes, the judges who presided over the McKesson case mentioned above. On July 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adding an exhibit to the complaint listing the names and charges of all persons arrested during the protest. On September 11, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to strike the plaintiffs’ complaint and first amended complaint. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ failed to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) in their use of illustrative pictures in a petition and a “Photographic Timeline” as one of the exhibits. The defendants considered these to be unconventional and unprofessional. Then, on September 28, 2017, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the first amended complaint. The defendants made similar arguments to the motion above. On October 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal of some of the defendants, namely, the defendants associated with the Louisiana Sheriff’s Association. Judge deGravelles approved this the next day. On January 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, removing some of the unconventional exhibits complained about in prior motions to dismiss. The amended complaint retained, however, much of the photographic imagery in the complaint itself. On January 11, 2018, the defendants, in response to the plaintiffs’ filing a second amended complaint, withdrew their September 11, 2017 and September 28, 2017 motions to dismiss. In the following weeks, the defendants filed two motions to strike and four motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. In support of the motions to strike, the defendants argued again that the second amended complaint violated FRCP Rule 8. Additionally, the defendants claimed that the complaint contained redundant, immaterial, impertinent, and scandalous allegations. In support of the motions to dismiss, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Moreover, the defendants claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over some of the defendants because Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to them. Lastly, the defendants argued that this case was ripe for dismissal on the grounds that the outcome of the case might influence the claims that had already been or had yet been filed. On February 20, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery. Then, on February 26, 2018, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss and, in the alternative, a motion to strike the second amended complaint. The defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed and/or stricken because the 82d page, 333 paragraph complaint, with its attached 64 pages of exhibits, violated the provision of FRCP Rule 8 that requires that a properly pled complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” On May, 14, 2018, Judge deGravelles granted in part the defendants’ motion to stay discovery. With the exception of written discovery, discovery was stayed pending resolution of the issues raised in the motions to dismiss. On September 7, 2018, pending motions to dismiss and motions to strike were decided. All motions were granted in part and denied in part; after the motions, the claims against an officer in question in his personal capacity, failure to intervene, and state law claims remained, while claims against the officer in his official capacity and certain claims against other officers were dismissed. In response to these rulings and further discovery, on November 6, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss so that the plaintiffs could file a new complaint that includes only the officers against whom the plaintiffs had valid claims. The new complaint was filed a week later; it changed the list of defendants, removing the ones already mentioned and adding new defendants identified during discovery. Different sets of defendants filed for summary judgment and motions to dismiss in early 2020, though no ruling on either has been made as of June 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by thirteen protesters ad two reporters who were arrested for their participation in the July 2016 Alton Sterling protests in Baton Rouge. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Children's Code Article 306, and state law. They alleged that the defendants had, in ordering the dispersal of a peaceful protest and unlawfully arresting participants, violated participants’ First Amendment rights to speech, assembly, and free press. The case is ongoing.


On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) changed its longstanding policy for determining unlawful presence of students and exchange visitors. Under the old policy, students and exchange visitors were deemed unlawfully present only after an official determination. However, the new policy deemed students as unlawfully present immediately after any unauthorized activity. The unauthorized activity could be as minor as a failure to report a change of address. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against USCIS and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel including Mayer Brown. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide notice and comment and comply with other requirements of the APA. Further, the new policy allegedly imposed three- and ten-year bars on individuals without notice or opportunity to cure and thus violated the protections guaranteed by the due process clause. Finally, plaintiffs alleged the new policy violated provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). On December 14, 2018, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. The plaintiffs also filed motions for a preliminary injunction and partial summary judgement on some of their claims involving the APA and the INA. On January 10, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On May 3, 2019, the court agreed with plaintiffs and issued a nationwide preliminary injunction against the new policy, noting the APA directed courts to "set aside agency action" found unlawful. However, it denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment without prejudice because the parties failed to file the relevant administrative record. The plaintiffs again filed a motion for partial summary judgment in late May, 2019. At the same time, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the new policy was exempt from notice and comment requirements of the APA. On July 3, 2019, the judge denied both motions for summary judgement without prejudice, again stating that the parties failed to provide a sufficient administrative record. The parties subsequently renewed their summary judgment motions. On February 6, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment on two grounds. First, Judge Biggs found that the new rule was subject to notice and comment rulemaking under the APA that had not taken place. Second, Judge Biggs found that the rule conflicted with the INA's plain text because the INA defined "unlawful presence" to mean more than mere participation in unauthorized activity. The Court remedied this violation by entering a nationwide injunction against the policy. 389 F. Supp. 3d 377. The government appealed the decision and injunction to the Fourth Circuit on April 3, 2020. However, on August 3, 2020, the government voluntarily dismissed that appeal, leaving the underlying injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal.

Summary: On August 9, 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) issued a new policy that made it easier to declare the presence of students and visitors to the United States unlawful. On October 23, 2018, Guilford College and other universities challenged that policy under the Administrative Procedure Act. They alleged that the new policy violated statutory and due process rights. The District Court entered a nationwide preliminary injunction against the policy but denied summary judgment because the parties had not submitted a complete administrative record. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals but then the government dropped that appeal, leaving the injunction in place. It is unclear why the government chose to drop the appeal.


On June 30, 2016, asylum seekers in this case, represented by the American Immigration Council and partners, filed this lawsuit against the Attorney General of the United States as well as the directors of the Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Immigration Services, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The plaintiffs argued that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed members the opportunity to timely submit these applications. The plaintiffs argued that these actions violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, governing regulations, and their due process rights. They sought class certification, injunctive and declaratory relief, mandamus, and attorneys' fees. On July 21, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to certify their class. However, the court granted a stipulated motion to stay the case until after the 2016 presidential election. The case was restored to active docket on November 7, 2016. In January 2017, the court issued an order certifying the class. 2017 WL 1397749. The court certified the following classes and subclasses: • CLASS A (“Credible Fear Class”): All individuals who have been released or will be released from DHS custody after they have been found to have a credible fear of persecution within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). • A.I.: All individuals in Class A who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • A.II.: All individuals in Class A who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • CLASS B (“Other Entrants Class”): All individuals who have been or will be detained upon entry; express a fear of return to their country of origin; are released or will be released from DHS custody without a credible fear determination; are issued a Notice to Appear (NTA); and did not receive notice from DHS of the one-year deadline to file an asylum application set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). • B.I.: All individuals in Class B who are not in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. • B.II.: All individuals in Class B who are in removal proceedings and who either (a) have not yet applied for asylum or (b) applied for asylum after one year of their last arrival. The day after class certification, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the motion in March 2017. 2017 WL 1153856. On October 30, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and that neither Congress nor the Constitution required the notice that the plaintiffs were seeking. The court disagreed, and granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. On March 29, 2018, the court found that Congress, in adopting the one-year application deadline, expressed concern about foreclosing legitimate claims and intended to monitor administration of the deadline to make sure it was implemented fairly. Failure to provide notice to class members, then, violated Congressional intent. The court also found that the defendants had not taken steps that were “reasonably calculated” to provide notice to class members and that consequently, it had not met its procedural due process obligations. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit on May 25, 2018. According to the American Immigration Council, the parties agreed to a joint interim stay agreement that requires the Executive Office for Immigration Review and USCIS to treat as timely all pending and newly filed asylum applications adjudicated during the stay that are filed by class members without final orders of removal. See the Council's website for additional information. Since the defendants filed the appeal, the parties have been participating the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. As of this writing, this process is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, asylum seekers filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS had failed to notify them of its one-year asylum application deadline and failed to implement mechanisms that guaranteed them the opportunity to timely submit asylum applications. In March 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit in May 2018, and the parties have since been participating in the Ninth Circuit's mediation program which facilitates settlement. This process is ongoing.


On October 4, 2004, a practicing lawyer and his family members filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under Bivens and 50 U.S.C §§ 1804 and 1823 (electronic surveillance and physical searches under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the defendants conducted unlawful arrest, imprisonment, searches and seizures. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants violated the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a by illegally leaking information and that portions of the Patriot Act are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs sought return of improperly seized property. This case is based on the following background. On March 11, 2004, terrorists' bombs exploded on commuter trains in Madrid, Spain. The FBI obtained photographs of fingerprints from the bombing incident. The FBI made a wrongful match of a fingerprint taken from near the Madrid bombing site to that of the plaintiff, supposedly in part because the plaintiff was a Muslim. Despite numerous signs that the match was erroneous, the FBI arrested and imprisoned the plaintiff from May 6, 2004, through May 20, 2004. After news reports revealed that the Madrid fingerprint matched an Algerian citizen, the plaintiff was released from prison. On November 29, 2006, the District Court (Judge Aiken) signed a stipulated settlement agreement reached by the parties. The agreement limited plaintiffs' remaining claims to a facial challenge to FISA, in which the relief available was a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of these statues. On December 6, 2006, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment and sought removal of all illegally seized materials under government possession. Defendants argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory relief. On September 26, 2007, the District Court (Judge Aiken) found that the plaintiffs' claims alleging an on-going 'case' or 'controversy' provided the Court jurisdiction. The Court concluded that 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804 and 1824 of FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, are unconstitutional as they violate the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment for declaratory relief was granted. On October 9, 2007, defendants filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. On March 24, 2010, the Appeals Court vacated the District Court's summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the only relief that would address the alleged Fourth Amendment violation would be injunctive relief. However, the plaintiffs were only entitled to declaratory judgment pursuant to the settlement agreement. On November 1, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Summary: On October 4, 2004, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Government alleging that portions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), as amended by the Patriot Act was unconstitutional. On September 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon (Judge Aiken) concluded so and ordered summary judgment. On March 24, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit vacated the order based on that the plaintiffs lacked standing due in part to the settlement agreement.


On July 19, 2017, death-row inmates in Florida filed this lawsuit alleging that the practice of placing death-row inmates in solitary confinement indefinitely violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they claimed that the permanent solitary confinement posed a serious risk of harm to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against employees of the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by themselves, sought injunctive and monetary relief. Lastly, they sought to represent a class of all Florida inmates on death row and in FDOC custody at one of two state correctional facilities. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia Morales Howard. The defendants moved to dismiss the claim on October 6, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for lack of jurisdiction. On October 25, 2017, the case was referred to mediation. On November 17, 2017, the Florida DOC filed initial discovery disclosures. On September 10, 2018, parties stipulated to both a protective order and a confidentiality order. On March 28, 2018, the complaint was amended. On April 23, 2018, the motion to certify the class was denied as moot. On December 5, 2018, a memorandum denying the presence of a third-party observer at mental health examinations was filed stating that the presence of a third party is not necessary or proper. On May 28, 2019, both parties filed a joint status report to schedule mediation before Senior United States District Judge Harvey Schlesinger and stipulating to a non-jury trial. On June 12, 2019, Judge Howard issued an order setting the terms of the settlement proceedings in front of Judge Schlesinger. The court directed the clerk to administratively close the case, to be reopened when the settlement efforts have concluded. Judge Howard directed the clerk to open a new case, <i>In re: Davis v. Inch Settlement Conference</i>, Case No. 3:19-mc-17, and assign it to Judge Schlesinger. On October 30, 2019, the parties notified the court that discussions are continuing and the parties request more time for mediation. A mediation session was held in January 2020 and is ongoing as of May 11, 2020.

Summary: In 2017, death row inmates from Florida filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy of placing death row inmates in indefinite solitary confinement violates their eighth and fourteenth amendment rights. In 2019 the parties entered into settlement discussions. This case is ongoing.


This action, filed on May 26, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, was brought by three adopted children placed in an abusive and neglectful home by the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and Children's Rights, Inc.; they sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the state violated their federal and state civil rights by placing them in a foster-turned-adoptive home (approved and monitored by the DYFS) that systematically starved and otherwise neglected them. Not long after the case was filed, a guardian ad litem from Children's Rights was named for the plaintiffs. In 2003, B.J. (the plaintiffs' oldest brother) was found looking for food in his neighbor's trash. B.J. was 19 years old but weighed only 45 pounds. Shortly thereafter, the police entered his home and discovered 3 other adopted boys, the plaintiffs in this case, all of whom were extremely underdeveloped (K.J., age 14, weighed 40 pounds; T.J., age 10, weighed 28 pounds; M.J., age 9, weighed 23 pounds). Upon the police's discovery, DYFS removed the plaintiffs from the home that day. (note: the DYFS had visited the home over 38 times within the past 4 years and were aware of the plaintiffs' living conditions) The complaint alleged that the defendants, having placed the plaintiffs in their foster care custody, had a special relationship with the plaintiffs that imposed upon the state an affirmative duty to care for and protect the plaintiffs from harm; that the defendants failed to adequately screen, approve, and monitor the foster home in order to ensure the plaintiffs' safety and welfare, despite the repeated signs and observations indicating that the plaintiffs were not receiving adequate care; that the acts and omissions of the defendants were a substantial departure from the exercise of reasonable professional standard and amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' welfare; that the defendants did not adequately train or supervise employees handling such cases; that the defendants' conduct placed the plaintiffs in state-created dangers; that the defendants failed to regularly visit the plaintiffs; that the defendants failed to conduct a pre-adoptive and post-adoptive home study; that the defendants failed to investigate suspected child abuse reports regarding the plaintiffs; and that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their perceived handicaps. All this, the plaintiffs said, violated federal Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, state Substantive Due Process and Procedural Due Process, the state's Violation of Child Placement Bill of Rights Act, the state's Tort Claims Act, the state's Law Against Discrimination, and various state adoption and regulation laws. The requested relief included compensatory damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, and prejudgment interest. On April 6, 2005, the court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss with respect to counts under Section 1983, the New Jersey Child Placement Bill of Rights, and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. However, plaintiffs' counts under the New Jersey Constitution, the New Jersey statutes and regulations, and the Law Against Discrimination were dismissed for failure to state a claim. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 30, 2005, awarding a sum of $7,500,000 to the plaintiffs, without any admission of liability by any party. The settlement amount was inclusive of attorneys' fees. The settlement also ensured that the guardian ad litem (GAL) would attempt to obtain educational services from the children's local school districts for the plaintiffs (including 10 hours per month of cognitive remediation therapy, 1 hour per week of vocational therapy, 1 hour per week of occupational therapy, and 4 hours per week of one-on-one academic tutoring), and that until the plaintiffs exited the custody of DYFS, the state would provide the GAL, on a bi-monthly basis, with updated records regarding each plaintiff. The defendants also agreed to provide each plaintiff with a Medicaid card entitling them to benefits under Medicaid "Family Care Plan A," from the date of the settlement agreement to the date each plaintiff reaches age 21, and to waive any and all Medicare liens. The court approved this settlement in its entirety on November 30, 2005. While the settlement agreement was pending in early November, B.J., the oldest brother who was not a party to the case, filed a Motion to Intervene. The Motion was granted in mid-November. On November 29, 2005, the court approved the settlement B.J. and the state reached in mid-November, which awarded B.J. a sum of $5,000,000, continued his medical care via Medicaid, and in which the state waived any and all Medicaid liens. The plaintiff's attorney fees were also waived, though the costs were not.

Summary: Plaintiffs, three minor children, sought compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that defendants placed them in a foster-turned-adoptive home that systematically starved them. This case was filed in 2004, and the parties agreed to settle in September 2005. The court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in November 2005, which awarded plaintiffs a lump sum of $7,500,000.


On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the county and the county sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The prisoners, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their rights under the Eight Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that the county jails were overcrowded and, among other things, provided inadequate access to law libraries and to medical, dental and mental health care. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 12, 1990, the plaintiffs moved the District Court for a preliminary injunction, and on February 27, 1991, following discovery, the Court (Chief Judge Robert E. Coyle) adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds and granted a limited injunction, prohibiting prisoners from being bedded on the floor, prohibiting the addition of more beds to the prison during the case, and authorizing the Sheriff to release prisoners when the jail was 90% full. The Court also certified the case as a class action. The parties began negotiations to settle the case in 1991, and in March 1992 they came to an agreement. Like the preliminary injunction, the settlement enjoined the County from bedding prisoners on the floor and allowed the Sheriff to deny new prisoners and release current prisoners when the jail came within ten percent of its maximum capacity; in addition, it settlement also addressed issued with law library access and medical, dental and mental health care. It applied to the Men's Jail, the Public Safety Center, the Men's Honor Farm, and the Female Facility (closed in 1993). The Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) approved the settlement and terminated the case on May 4, 1992. Three days later, the Court (Magistrate Judge Moulds) ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. In 2008, a class member filed a motion seeking enforcement of the settlement, but the Court referred the movant to class counsel. The settlement was still in effect in 2012, and played a part in the County's application for state funds to finance an expansion of its jail facilities.

Summary: On September 26, 1990, prisoners in the Stanislaus County jail system filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County and the County Sheriff, challenging their conditions of confinement. The District Court issued a preliminary injunction in 1990, and the parties settled in 1992.


On July 25, 2014, a former pre-trial detainee of the Montgomery County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Montgomery County, its sheriff, and its jail administrator under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff alleged that the jail did not provide adequate food and nutrition, which caused him and other inmates to experience dramatic weight loss, hair loss, skin conditions, and other medical conditions, including scurvy. The plaintiff sought to represent a class of inmates who, like himself, had been denied proper nutrition at the Montgomery County Jail. On September 29, 2017, District Judge Brenda K. Sannes denied the motion for class certification, without prejudice, ruling that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the typicality and adequacy requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). On May 29, 2018, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those claims were moot because he had filed his complaint four months after he was released from the jail. He filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2018. A second former inmate of the jail joined as plaintiff in this amended complaint. The new plaintiff had been detained at the jail for several months both before and after conviction. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought again to represent a class. The court granted class certification on August 20, 2018, defining the class as all detainees, from July 24, 2011 onward, who had been detained at the jail for at least two consecutive weeks. The class was divided into two sub-classes: pre-trial detainees and post-trial detainees. On November 7, 2019, the court denied the county’s motion for summary judgment. However, the court did strike the demand for declaratory and injunctive relief, as those claims had been dismissed on May 29, 2018, before the plaintiffs re-asserted them in the amended complaint. 2019 WL 5842822. The parties set three different trial dates before agreeing to a settlement in late February. On July 8, 2020, the plaintiffs informed the court that they were ready to finalize the settlement agreement, except for one detail: the county was insisting that the plaintiffs’ attorneys agree not to publicly share information about the settlement, though the settlement would be a matter of public record. On July 15, 2020, the county informed the court that the parties had resolved the issue, and the settlement is pending.

Summary: In 2014, a former pre-trial detainee at the Montgomery County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged the facility failed to provide adequate food and nutrition, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 2018, the class was certified. The class was divided into two subclasses of pre-trial and post-trial detainees and was generally defined as all detainees who have been or will be placed into the custody of the jail and were detained for at least two consecutive weeks since July 24, 2011. As of July 13, 2020, a settlement agreement is pending.