On July 12, 2004, four female arrestees filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the Marin County Sheriff's policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of pre-arraignment strip and visual body cavity searches in Marin County Jails. Plaintiffs, who had been arrested for minor criminal infractions, alleged that officers routinely subjected detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion that the detainees possessed contraband. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that such practice violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as provisions of California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. Later in 2004, Defendants moved to dismiss the suit on grounds that (a) Plaintiffs' claims were time barred and (b) Defendants were immune from liability. The District Court (Judge Mark J. Jenkins), by order dated December 14, 2004, granted Defendants' motion in part and denied it in part. Although the Court dismissed some of Plaintiffs' state law claims for failure to comply with the California Tort Claims Act, all of their federal law claims as well as several of their state law claims survived the motion to dismiss. Discovery ensued. On January 1, 2006, the named defendants moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed opposition papers, and the Court thereafter issued an order requesting supplemental briefing on the issues. Chatoian v. County of Marin, 2006 WL 568312 (N.D.Cal. Mar 03, 2006). After further briefing, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of all named Defendants on all counts. The Court, however, did not enter summary judgment as to the unnamed individual defendants, who were identified as "Deputies for Does 1 through 25." On June 5, 2007, Plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint to substitute the names of individual deputies for the unnamed Doe defendants. The Doe defendants objected to the proposed amendment, arguing that it was barred by the statute of limitations. On December 21, 2007, the District Court found that, because Plaintiffs had failed to comply with California law requiring that they serve the individual defendants with the lawsuit within three years of its initial filing, Plaintiffs' claims against the Doe defendants were time barred. As such, the Court denied Plaintiffs' request to amend its complaint and entered final judgment in favor of the Doe defendants. Chatoian v. County of Marin, 2007 WL 4557792, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95438 (N.D.Cal. Dec 21, 2007). On January 18, 2008, Plaintiffs appealed the Court's final judgment. On September 2, 2008, the Ninth Circuit was informed that the parties had reached a tentative settlement, and ordered the appellant to submit a motion or stipulation to dismiss. On September 18, 2008, the Ninth Circuit deemed the appeal voluntarily dismissed because the appellant failed to obey that order.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in July 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, by four female arrestees challenging the Marin County Sheriff's practices concerning strip searches in Marin County Jails. Plaintiffs alleged that officers routinely subjected detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and without reasonable suspicion of contraband, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as provisions of California state law. On April 5, 2007, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of all named Defendants on all counts. On December 21, 2007, the District Court entered final judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. Chatoian v. County of Marin, 2007 WL 4557792, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95438 (N.D.Cal. Dec 21, 2007). Plaintiffs' appeal was eventually dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on September 18, 2008.


On July 30, 2014, nine African American employees with criminal records filed this lawsuit (on behalf of a putative class of similar employees) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA) and its contractors. The plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP, the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights, and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that the practices of the WMATA and its contractors were unlawful and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Actof 1964, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. They also requested a permanent injunction preventing the Defendants from engaging in the current employment practices regarding criminal history, an order that the Defendants carry out employment polices that would comply with guidance from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and back pay and compensatory damages for emotional distress. Specifically, the plaintiffs complained about WMATA's employment policies of denying employment based on past criminal records. They alleged that, because African Americans were more likely than the general population to have a criminal background, the policy discriminated against them. They argued that members of the proposed class had been unable to obtain employment they were qualified for, were terminated from employment even though they demonstrated their competence, were unable to apply for promotions for fear of being terminated, and were unable to take leave due to the fear that they would not be able to return to work. On January 26, 2015, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer entered an order staying the Plaintiffs' claims. The stay was entered based on a public hearing from January 23, during which Plaintiffs decided to limit the applicable case to applicants and contractor employees of the WMATA, not WMATA employees themselves. Judge Collyer stated that she could not grant a motion to dismiss some of the named Defendants because, as WMATA contractors, they were responsible for referring applicants to WMATA for hire. Defense made clear that it was the WMATA’s policy that was implemented by WMATA; the independent contractors hired by the WMATA were not prohibited from employing the applicants for other purposes. Despite the fact that named independent contractors influence was ultimately small, this referral process affected who got hired and who did not. Judge Collyer stated that without these Defendants, she would not have the jurisdiction to enter an order for a full remedy when the time came. Counsel for Plainiffs stated for the record that they were still in discovery process. On February 10 of that year, Judge Collyer ordered that Civil Case Number 14-1289 to be consolidated with Civil Case Number 15-98. These cases were merged because the factual issues and legal claims raised in No. 15-98 were related to those in No. 14-289. Specifically, the factual and legal issues raised by Plaintiff Pendergrass in 15-98 were related to Little v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Civil Case No. 14-1289. All pleadings were ordered to be filed in No. 14-1289. On October 31, 2016 the court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion to Modify the Protective Order, entered on July 13, 2015. The Protective Order was granted so parties could disclose information deemed “Confidential” by the WMATA to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. This information included “confidential, properitary, and highly sensitive information” related to the identities of Plaintiffs. See Protective Order. The Court found that the modification of the Protective Order was not appropriate because its nature weighed against modification, arguing that the modification would essentially negate the original order, to which both parties stipulated to the existence of good cause. The Court also found that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate good cause as to why the Protective Order should be modified, since WMATA responded to Plaintiffs were merely speculating, and thus, the EEOC was unlikely to reopen its investigation into WMATA. Lastly, the Court concluded that WMATA produced data that for this suit that was different from the data produced during its investigation because persons under different directions produced the data for limited periods, whereas the Plaintiffs’ discovery request, made under the Protective Order, covered a longer period of time. These differences, the Court argued, resulted from different circumstances and not ill intent. On March 31 2017, District Court Judge Rosemary M. Collyer issued an order granting approval of a class settlement. The court certified three distinct classes: Appendix A Class: All African-American persons who, since February 23, 2012, have been denied employment with WMATA, or terminated or otherwise permanently separated from their positions, suspended with or without pay, and/or denied employment with any third-party contractor or subcontractor as a result of Appendix A. Appendix C Class: All African-American persons who, since February 23, 2012, have been denied employment with WMATA, or terminated or otherwise permanently separated from their positions, suspended with or without pay, and/or denied employment with any third-party contractor or subcontractor as a result of Appendix C. Appendix F Class/MetroAccess Class: All African-American persons who, since February 23, 2012, have been denied employment with WMATA, or terminated or otherwise permanently separated from their positions, suspended with or without pay, and/or denied employment with any third-party contractor or subcontractor as a result of Appendix F. On November 22, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement approval. On December 7, 2017, Judge Collyer granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, a Class Claims Fund would be established. The total amount available for distribution in the Class Claims Fund would be the balance of $6.5 million that remained after deduction for attorneys’ fees and expenses approved by the Court. The programmatic relief granted by the settlement would require WMATA to adopt a new background screening policy, which would include an individualized assessment procedure. The parties filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Proposed Class Action Settlement on November 22, 2017. On December 7, 2017, the Court scheduled a Settlement Fairness Hearing for April 18, 2018, to determine whether the proposed Settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate and determine whether the Order and Final Judgment as provided under the Settlement Agreement should be entered. Pending the Hearing, all deadlines were stayed. On April 27, 2018, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of the Proposed Class Action Settlement and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Service Payments. The Court awarded $1,625,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs incurred by representatives of the Settlement Class. Class Claims Fund were distributed in the following manners: Long Form Claimants could receive up to $40,000 and short form claimants could receive a flat payment of $2,000. All other known and unknown claims, suits, demands and causes of action by class representatives were dismissed with prejudice. Class representatives received $7,500 as compensation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 30, 2014, African Americans with a criminal background filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. §2000e against the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority and its contractors. The plaintiffs allege that the practice of denying employment based on a criminal background violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 due to its disparate impact on African Americans. Class certification is still pending.


In June 2001, the Miami District Office of the EEOC represented an employee in this suit in U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, against Federated Financial Services alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and state law. According to the complaint, female employees of the defendant were subjected to crude sexual remarks, and some of them were terminated when they complained. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, lost wages and backpay, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to judge Wilkie D. Ferguson. The employees intervened as plaintiffs, and the case was also consolidated as the lead case with EEOC v. Federated Financial, 0:01-cv-07542 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2001). The defendant moved for summary judgment as to all of the plaintiffs on August 16, 2001. On March 2, 2002, the motion was denied. On January 3, 2003, the defendant refiled for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's Title VII claims. The EEOC cross-filed for summary judgment on January 27. Meanwhile, the parties unsuccessfully attended mediation proceedings and the case was reassigned to Judge Joan A. Lenard. On November 6, 2003, the court granted summary judgment in part for the defendant. The court granted as to the named plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies because she had filed her suit three days before the expiration of the mandatory 180-day waiting period after filing a charge with the EEOC. However, the court denied the defendant's motion as to the EEOC: the defendant had charged that the EEOC had improperly filed paperwork, but the court held for the EEOC that the agency had properly verified the claimants' documents. The parties continued to vigorously litigate, and again, on February 4, 2004, the defendant moved to dismiss and for sanctions against the plaintiffs. He claimed that the employees fabricated their allegations of harassment in the workplace. However, after three futile referrals to ADR and a number of contested discovery motions, the parties filed a settlement with the court in July 2004 and the court denied the outstanding motions as moot. On August 5, the court entered a consent decree in which the defendant was ordered to pay a total of $240,000, to implement a new anti-discrimination policy, and to train its employees in antidiscrimination law. The parties agreed that the EEOC would continue to monitor defendant through its reporting. And the court would retain jurisdiction over the decree for three years. In April 2007, the EEOC alleged that the defendant had not fully complied with the consent decree and moved for the court to enforce the decree. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that the defendant had failed to comply with injunctive relief by not providing adequate documentation of trainings, and that the defendant still owed $100,000 in payments. The defendant subsequently moved to modify the decree, arguing that it made a good faith efforts to comply despite financial difficulties in its business and that the decree should be modified to reflect its financial status. The court extended its jurisdiction by six months until February 29, 2008, in order to resolve the issues. The court's jurisdiction continued, and on October 6, 2009, Magistrate Judge Torres recommended that the court grant the plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant had violated the decree. On February 25, 2010, the court adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation. The court found that the defendant was clearly in violation of its obligation to pay over $110,000 as ordered by the decree. The issue of enforcing injunctive relief had become moot, however, and so the court opted not to use its equitable authority to hold the defendant in contempt. Rather, the court extended the decree by an additional sixty days. 2010 WL 11590869; 2010 WL 680836. On June 30, 2010, the parties entered a settlement with the court. The defendant had entered bankruptcy proceedings that year. Instead, the parties settled that the defendant would pay the remainder of the judgment in 18 monthly installments via his creditors. On January 11, 2012, the court entered a satisfaction of judgment that the defendant had completed his payments. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2001, the Miami District Office of the EEOC represented an employee in this suit in U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, against Federated Financial Services alleging sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and state law. According to the complaint, female employees of the defendant were subjected to crude sexual remarks, and some of them were terminated when they complained. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, lost wages and backpay, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. After lengthy and vigorous litigation, the parties entered into a three-year consent decree. However, the defendant failed to complete his payments and the plaintiffs moved to enforce the decree. This resulted in a second settlement extending the decree. The defendant eventually went bankrupt but satisfied the judgment in early 2012. The case is now closed.


On December 4, 2012, a family of Mennonite Christian business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Independence Law Center, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their company's group health insurance plans. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the ACA rules requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiffs considered an abortifacient. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene their Christian faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On December 28, 2012, the District Court (Judge Berle M. Schiller) issued an order temporarily restraining the defendants from enforcing the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs, for a period of fourteen days. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 7055773, slip op. (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2012). Judge Schiller found that, as the plaintiffs did not qualify for any exemptions and were required to comply with the mandate by January 1, 2013, they had demonstrated a threat of imminent, irreparable harm sufficient to justify temporary relief pending a preliminary injunction hearing. On January 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Mitchell S. Goldberg) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that secular, for-profit corporations such as Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. did not have a constitutional right to religious freedom, and that the individual plaintiffs were not likely to prevail because the mandate was a neutral law of general applicability that was reasonably related to a legitimate government purpose. The Court further found that indirect financial support of subjectively objectionable conduct was not a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 140110 (E.D. Pa. Jan 11, 2013). The plaintiffs appealed the injunction denial to the Third Circuit (Case No. 13-1144). On January 16, 2013, District Court Judge Goldberg granted the defendants' joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the Third Circuit appeal. On February 8, 2013, the Court of Appeals (Judge Marjorie O. Rendell and Judge Leonard I. Garth, with Judge Kent A. Jordan dissenting) denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal on the same grounds as the District Court's injunction denial. Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 1277419 (3d Cir. Feb. 8, 2013). The case was argued before a Third Circuit panel (Judges Kent A. Jordan, Thomas I. Vanaskie, and Robert E. Cowen) on May 30, 2013. On August 13, 2013, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment and denied the motion to stay enforcement of the mandate until the Supreme Court ruled on the case. On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated this case with Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, a similar case before the Western District of Oklahoma. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit. In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. To quote the syllabus (which summarizes the opinion), "the Government could, e.g., assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives to women unable to obtain coverage due to their employers' religious objections. Or it could extend the accommodation that HHS has already established for religious nonprofit organizations to non-profit employers with religious objections to the contraceptive mandate. That accommodation does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious beliefs that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion and it still serves HHS's stated interests." In addition, the Court insisted that its opinion was narrow: "This decision concerns only the contraceptive mandate and should not be understood to hold that all insurance-coverage mandates, e.g., for vaccinations or blood transfusions, must necessarily fall if they conflict with an employer's religious beliefs. Nor does it provide a shield for employers who might cloak illegal discrimination as a religious practice." Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan (although Breyer and Kagan did not sign on to a few pages of the dissent that argued that for-profit corporations lacked rights under RFRA; they said this issue need not yet be decided). On August 14, 2014, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision while the parties responded to the court's proposed permanent injunction. On October 2, 2014 the Court entered a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing the contraceptive services mandate against the plaintiffs and their health plan. On January 23, 2015, plaintiffs filed notice that their attorney fees and costs had been settled.

Summary: In 2012, Mennonite Christian business owners filed this RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their company's group health insurance plan. In January 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the contraception mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom. The plaintiffs have appealed that order to the Third Circuit. On August 13, 2013, the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment and denied the motion to stay enforcement of the mandate until the Supreme Court ruled on the case. On November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and consolidated this case with Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, a similar case before the Western District of Oklahoma. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, holding that the ACA contraception mandate violated the RFRA rights of for-profit closely held corporations. The Court said other ways were open to the government to reach its asserted interest of ensuring the availability of contraception coverage. On October 2, 2014, the District Court entered a permanent injunction in line with the Supreme Court's ruling, permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing the contraceptive services mandate against plaintiffs.


This class action suit is about the legality of Connecticut’s age limitations in special education. On July 15, 2016, a 21-year-old individual with a disability filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the Connecticut State Board of Education (the Board) under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Represented by Disability Rights Connecticut, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. The plaintiff alleged that Connecticut’s laws violated his right to free and appropriate public education (FAPE) guaranteed under the IDEA. States that receive funding for public special education under the IDEA are required to offer FAPE to individuals with disabilities until they turn 22 years of age unless the state maintains a maximum age limitation across all public education. Connecticut’s laws (Conn. Gen. Stat § 10-76d(b) and Conn. Agencies Reg. § 10-76d-1(a)(4)) limit special education in public schools to children under the age of 21 or to those who have not received a high school diploma, whichever occurs first; however, the state does not establish an age limitation for general education. The case was assigned to Judge Charles S. Haight. After numerous extensions, the Board responded to the plaintiff's compliant in February 2017, and on September 1, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify a class. On September 14, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgement, and on November 8, 2017, the Board cross-moved for summary judgement. On July 20, 2018, the court denied the pending motions in order to first address the plaintiff’s standing (the individual had graduated prior to filing the suit). To address the jurisdictional issue, on April 5, 2019, counsel for the proposed plaintiff class filed an amended complaint and a renewed motion to certify a class with a new plaintiff, a 19-year-old individual who received FAPE under IDEA and had not graduated from high school. On May 1, 2020, the court certified a class for injunctive and declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and for compensatory education under Rule 23(b)(3) defined as “all individuals who were over 21 and under 22 within two years before the filing of this action or will turn 21 during the pendency of this action who are provided or were provided a FAPE under the IDEA by any [Local Education Agency (LEA)] in the State of Connecticut and who, but for turning 21, would otherwise qualify or would have qualified for a FAPE until age 22 because they have not or had not yet earned a regular high school diploma.” 2020 WL 2092650. On June 10, 2019, the court granted the individual’s motion for summary judgement and denied the Board’s cross motion, stating that the Board’s systemic denial of FAPE to individuals with disabilities between 21 and 22 years of age constituted a gross violation of the IDEA. 2020 WL 3086032. On July 9, 2020, the Board requested a stay, and on July 10, 2020, the court denied the stay and enjoined the termination of FAPE to members of the class prior to them turning 22 years of age. The Board appealed on July 10, 2020. On July 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees and on July 31, 2020, the Board filed a motion to stay the fees motion. On August 4, 2020, the court granted a stay pending the appeal. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-2255 and is ongoing.

Summary: In July 2016, a class of individuals with disabilities under the age of 21 sued the Connecticut State Board of Education in the District of Connecticut under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Represented by Disability Rights Connecticut, the class sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. The class alleged that the Board violated their right to free and appropriate public education (FAPE) guaranteed under the IDEA by terminating their special education services once they turned 21 years old. The plaintiff class contended that they were entitled to FAPE until age 22. On June 10, 2019, the court issued a ruling that granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement and denied the Board’s cross-motion. On July 10, 2020, the court enjoined the termination of FAPE to members of the class prior to them turning 22 years of age. The Board appealed on July 10, 2020 and on August 4, 2020, the court granted the Board’s motion to stay the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees pending appeal. The appeal is ongoing.


On June 3, 2009, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of disabled employees of United Airlines against United Airlines, under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) and (b)(5)(A). The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and its costs in bringing the case. Specifically the plaintiff claimed that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against its employees with disabilities by requiring those seeking to transfer to compete for vacant positions that they where qualified for and needed to transfer into to accommodate their respective disabilities. The result was that employees with disabilities were denied equal employment opportunities in a way that the plaintiff claimed was willful or reckless. On December 3, 2009 the District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) granted a defendant's motion to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Judge Hamilton decided that the Northern District of Illinois was a superior venue as it was the location of defendant's headquarters and thus where most of the relevant evidence and witnesses where to be found thereby reducing the defendant's expenses during the trial. On March 10, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected plaintiff's appeal for a writ of mandamus to stop Judge Hamilton from transferring the case. On October 26, 2010, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint which reflected the change of venue to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and provided slightly more detail about defendant's allegedly discriminatory policy. On February 3, 2011, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber) granted defendant's motion to dismiss. In proceedings that day (but with no written opinion) Judge Leinenweber explained that he was dismissing the case to follow the control Seventh Circuit precedent of EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., (2000) 227 F.3d 1024,  EE-IL-0113 . The plaintiff appealed the judgment. On March 7, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling finding that it was bound by Seventh Circuit precedent to dismiss the case under Humiston-Keeling, Inc.. However, the court noted the possibility of review by the entire Seventh Circuit to consider reversing  Humiston-Keeling. EEOC v. United Airlines 673 F.3d 543 (7th Cir., 2011). On September 7, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in a panel decision (a procedure where a new written opinion is circulated among all the judges of the Seventh Circuit and they vote on the opinion without rehearing it en banc), overruled its previous Humiston-Keeling decision due to the United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court ordering that the court determine (1) if mandatory reassignment is a reasonable accommodation under the ADA and (2) if mandatory is a reasonable accommodation generally then the Court must determine if mandatory reassignment is reasonable in this case. EEOC v. United Airlines 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012). On May 30, 2013, the United States Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for review. The Seventh Circuit's decision was thus left intact and the case was remanded to the District Court for proceedings consistent with the decision. After several status hearings, Judge Harry D. Leinenweber signed a consent decree on June 8, 2015. The consent decree enjoined United Airlines from unlawfully failing to provide reasonable accommodation to a qualified individual with a disability or retaliating against any person because he or she made a request for a reasonable accommodation, opposed discriminatory practices made unlawful by the ADA, files or filed a charge of discrimination or assists, assisted, participates, or participated in the filing of a charge of discrimination, or assists, assisted, participates, or participated in an investigation or proceeding brought under federal laws prohibiting discrimination or retaliation. United agreed to revise its policies with regard to reassignment as a reasonable accommodation for disabled employees and to train all human resources employees with reasonable accommodation responsibilities about reassignment as a reasonable accommodation within 120 days of the entry of the Consent Decree. The court was to retain jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree and stipulated that the case would be dismissed with prejudice one year after the approval of the consent decree. The consent decree lasted for thirty months from the date of entry, expiring on December 8, 2017. As of March 2019, no further docket activity occurred and so this case is presumably closed.

Summary: On June 3, 2010, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed a lawsuit on behalf of disabled employees of United Airlines in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against United Airlines, under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a) and (b)(5)(A). The plaintiff alleged that the defendant violated the ADA by require employees with disabilities to compete for positions that they where qualified for when those transfers where necessary to accommodate the employees' disabilities. The case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, which dismissed the case. The District Court was reversed by an in the panel decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to grant a request for review of the Seventh Circuit's decision. The case was remanded to the District Court, and the parties entered into a consent decree on June 8, 2015. United Air Lines revised their policies about reassignment as a reasonable accommodation. The consent decree expired in December 2017.


In July 2005, the EEOC district Office in Denver, Colorado brought this suit against the Hertz Corporation, a national car/van/truck rental firm, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The complaint alleged race discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as a result of a manager calling a black male "ape" and "monkey" on two separate occasions while in the presence of at least six coworkers. The complaint was filed on 14 July 2005 and a consent decree was entered on 28 July 2005. The consent decree stated that the defendant must (1) pay the aggrieved employee $8,500 in satisfaction of all claims relating to this litigation; (2) post notices of its commitment to all aspects of Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, and the EPA; (3) not discriminate or retaliate against an employee on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, age, or disability; (4) publish an anti-discrimination policy that is to be conspicuously posted in each of the defendant's facilities; (5) provide Title VII training to non-managerial employees, managerial employees and HR employees for two, eight and 20 hours, respectively; and (6) establish a discrimination complaint system that will report the name, address, position of the complainant, and a brief summary of the oral or written complaint to the local office of the EEOC. The term of the decree was two years.


On August 1, 2005, a female inmate at the Hardin County Detention Center (HCDC) filed a civil rights class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that she and other inmates of the Jail contracted Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) because of inadequate policies and practices to diagnose, treat, isolate, and prevent the spread of MRSA. The plaintiff sought monetary relief, as well as class certification. On May 15, 2006, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint to add claims of additional individual plaintiffs over the objection of defendants that some claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Chapman v. Hardin County, 2006 WL 1382272 (W.D.Ky. 2006). The complaint was amended a second time on July 28, 2006. On July 30, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. Magistrate Judge Dave Whalin denied the motion in February 2009, holding there was no single set of operative facts from which all of their claims arose. Whether the HCDC failed to protect Chapman was determined to be "an inquiry complete unto itself." For the same reasons, would-be class members' motion to intervene was denied in May 2009. The case was dismissed in December 2010, as the plaintiff's counsel withdrew from the case due to an adverse decision by the Sixth Circuit in a separate case against defendant involving a prisoner with MRSA. Wooler v. Hickman County, et al., 377 Fed. Appx. 502 (6th Cir. May 14, 2010). The grant of summary judgment to the HCDC was upheld because the sheriff, physicians, and nurses were not "deliberately indifferent" to the plight of the prisoner.

Summary: Prisoners in the Hardin County (KY) Detention Center sued the jail under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for exposing them to, and failing to adequately treat, Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus ("MRSA"). The case was dismissed in December 2010 after Plaintiffs' counsel withdrew due to an adverse decision by the Sixth Circuit in a parallel case against the jail involving exposure to MRSA. A grant of summary judgment was upheld because the sheriff, physicians, and nurses were not "deliberately indifferent" to the plight of the prisoner.


On October 13, 2000, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the "USDA ha[d] maintained, and continue[d] to maintain, a system of administering its farm credit and non-credit benefit programs that gives virtually unfettered discretion to local officials to enforce highly subjective eligibility criteria that, in turn, give vent to hostility to minority farmers which deprives them of an equal fair opportunity to participate in such programs." Some of the discriminatory practices that Plaintiffs complained of included: discouraging Hispanics from applying for loans, long delays in processing applications, high denial rates, prejudicial delays in providing loans and providing less amount than was requested, and failing to provide loan servicing assistance. Additionally, Plaintiffs claimed it was virtually impossible for them to secure redress through the USDA appeals process, because its Civil Rights Office was so severely limited by lack of funding and interest that there it was incapable of investigating discrimination claims. The statute of limitations for such claims had run, but Plaintiffs cited the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1999, 7 U.S.C. §2279, which waived the statute of limitations for such claims. Plaintiffs filed under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. §1691, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201, and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq., requesting the following relief: (1) declaratory judgment that the practices, policies, patterns and procedures described above were unlawful, (2) a permanent injunction requiring USDA to adopt lending practice in conformity with ECOA and the APA, (3) a permanent injunction prohibiting USDA from engaging in discrimination in the administration of their loan programs and services, (4) an order mandating USDA to remedy its discriminatory practices by taking affirmative action to advertise to Hispanics, adopt a receipt system for all contacts with potential lendees, provide full and equal assistance to all farmers, provide Spanish versions of all application and explanation paperwork, employ fluent Spanish speakers, provide expedited review via independent mediators, and provide semi-annual reports to the Department Secretary, (5) redesign the computerized data collection system in order to ensure that full transparency is achieved, and (6) compensatory damages to deserving plaintiffs. On December 22, 2000, the U.S. moved to dismiss all claims in Plaintiffs' complaint. On March 20, 2002, District Court Judge James Robertson granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss, dismissing the failure to investigate counts because, he found, they did not state a claim under ECOA or the APA. 2002 WL 33004124 (D.D.C. 2002). On December 22, 2000, Plaintiffs moved to certify the class. This proposed class was described as: "Hispanics who farmed or ranched, or attempted to farm or ranch, during the period January 1, 1981, to the present and who were discriminated against by the USDA on the basis of national origin when they sought to participate on equal terms in farm loan and disaster benefit programs and who complained to the USDA about such discrimination." Subclasses were also proposed, defined by the phase of lending process in which the discrimination took place. Judge Robertson denied this motion on December 2, 2002, holding that the Plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a common question of law or fact. 211 F.R.D. 15 (D.D.C. 2002). Plaintiffs entered a renewed motion for class certification, attempting to remedy the commonality issue. However, Judge Robertson denied the renewed motion on September 10, 2004, stating that claims still lacked sufficient commonality. 224 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2004). Plaintiffs appealed this decision and the March 20, 2002 dismissal order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. On March 31, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals (Judge Karen L. Henderson) affirmed the District Court's denial of class certification and dismissal of the ECOA failure-to-investigate claim. 444 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2006). However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal regarding the APA failure-to-investigate claim, remanding to the District Court to investigate the claim further. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs had sought a temporary restraining order on March 23, 2001, but on March 27, 2001, District Court Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer denied the motion. Plaintiffs then entered an emergency motion for preliminary injunction to the District Court on November 1, 2004, asking the court to order Defendant to adhere to the USDA policy that prohibits adverse actions against farmers who have filed civil rights complaints. However, Judge Robertson denied this motion on November 18, 2004, ruling that foreclosures were not necessarily prohibited by the policy. Plaintiffs filed their third amended complain on June 30, 2006. On November 30, 2007, Judge Robertson, after reconsidering the APA failure-to-investigate claim, dismissed the claim, citing his reasoning in a similar opinion in Love v. Vilsack (see 525 F. Supp. 2d 155). Plaintiffs appealed this decision again to the Court of Appeals. On April 24, 2009, the Court of Appeals (Judge Judith W. Rogers) affirmed the District Court dismissal of the APA claim. 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Plaintiffs petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but it was denied on January 19, 2010. 558 U.S. 1158 (2010). In late September 2010, the defendants, seemingly without the support of the plaintiffs, submitted a proposed settlement agreement. On October 6, the Plaintiffs moved for settlement class certification, arguing that the Defendants were attempting to settle the case while preventing the Plaintiffs from the protection of Rule 23 (governing class actions and class settlement). On October 20, 2010, District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton denied the Plaintiffs' motion. The proposed settlement agreement appeared to go no further. For the next several months, little happened in the case, although the parties presented status reports to the judge regularly. On January 20, 2012, Defendant submitted its eighth status report, which included the latest proposed settlement agreement framework. The proposal created three tracks of payment claims: Tier 2 ($50,000 reward, requires "substantial evidence" of discrimination), Tier 1(a) ($50,000 reward and debt relief, requires substantial evidence of discrimination), and Tier 1(b) (up to $250,000 reward, required a preponderance of the evidence of discrimination). Plaintiffs complained, however, that this framework lacked the "procedural safeguards" that had existed in similar settlements such as Pigford v. Glickman and Keepseagle v. Vilsack. On April 4, 2013, the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc., which had been removed as a party by the District Court in In re Black Farmers Discrimination Litigation, moved to intervene in this matter. Both parties opposed this motion. The motion was denied. In 2014, all but 4 named plaintiffs agreed to participate in an alternative dispute resolution program (ADR). The plaintiffs that elected to participate dismissed their claims with prejudice. On September 18, 2014 two of the remaining plaintiffs filed motions to sever their claims and for leave to file an amended complaint, and a third plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice. These motions were granted. The new docket number was 2:15-cv-00116. On September 2, 2016 this case was dismissed. On February 16, 2016 the remaining named plaintiff's case was severed and transferred to the Eastern District of California. The new docket number was 1:16-cv-00282. On December 6, 2017 this case was dismissed for lack of standing. This case is now closed.

Summary: On October 13, 2000, a group of Hispanic farmers and ranchers filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, asserting that the USDA had engaged, and continued to engage, in anti-Hispanic lending and assistance practices. The case is now closed, with most of the plaintiffs entering an alternative dispute resolution process, three plaintiffs severing and transferring their claims, and one voluntarily dismissing.


On March 10, 2015, a collective of organizations interested in privacy, led by the Wikimedia Foundation, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Department of Justice under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court to declare “Upstream Surveillance” by the government to be unconstitutional, and to purge all records on the plaintiffs obtained through this practice. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the NSA’s surveillance programs, including “PRISM,” implement the unconstitutional method of upstream surveillance. They claimed that these programs made copies of nearly all digital communications, and that the government made no effort to limit the scope of this surveillance. The plaintiffs alleged these practices violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights. After the passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Amendments Act (FAA) in 2008, the NSA was granted authority to conduct warrantless surveillance of all US persons’ international communications. The act included no requirement for justifying the surveillance or for attempting to limit those affected by the surveillance. In 2011 under the FAA, the NSA began its upstream surveillance program, which, the complaint, alleges “involves the surveillance of essentially everyone’s communications." The plaintiffs claim this NSA surveillance program hindered their work, along with violating their constitutional rights. On October 23rd, 2015, Judge T.S. Ellis granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because the complaint did not allege a harm directly attributable to the government’s upstream surveillance, so the suit did not have proper standing. 143 F.Supp.3d 344. Underlying this ruling was the relative speculativeness of each plaintiff's claim. Wikimedia asserted that it conducted over a <i>trillion</i> internet communications every year with people in virtually every country on the planet. There were a very limited number of pathways in which an internet communication could exit the United States, and the NSA's upstream monitoring program monitored at least one of these pathways in order to obtain and review communications. The gist of Wikimedia's complaint was that, due to the sheer volume of their communications, and due to the limited number of places in which the government could monitor communications, there was no way that the government had not obtained and reviewed Wikimedia's communications with persons abroad. The government in response had countered that Wikimedia was speculating as to the breadth of the U.S. Upstream monitoring program. However, the court ruled that Wikimedia's assertion was sufficiently plausible at least as to the Motion to Dismiss phase of trial. The plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit. Oral argument occurred on December 8th, 2016 and on May 23, 2017, the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court's decision as to Wikimedia, the first and largest plaintiff, ruling that it had standing to pursue the injunction. 857 F.3d 193. However, the court affirmed as to all other plaintiffs in the suit and upheld the lower court's judgment, finding that their claims did not rise to the same level of certainty as Wikimedia's. Instead of claiming that it was virtually impossible for the government to use Upstream monitoring and avoid reviewing their internet communications, the other plaintiffs claimed that the government was “intercepting, copying, and reviewing substantially all" text-based communications entering and leaving the United States. In a dissent, Judge Davis agreed with the court's ruling that Wikimedia had standing to continue the case, but would have held that the other plaintiffs had made plausible allegations and should have had standing as well. Back in the district court, on September 25, 2017, the Court granted a five-month period for jurisdictional discovery. On March 12, 2018, the parties jointly moved for a continuance of the discovery deadline in order to submit a new proposed schedule for the completion of jurisdictional discovery. The Court denied this motion on March 15, 2018, but granted one additional month of discovery beginning March 17, 2018. For the next six months, the parties engaged in discovery. The main issue during this time was the plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery responses and deposition testimony, submitted on March 26. The motion to compel was in response to the defendants’ objections to the plaintiff’s 84 discovery requests. The defendants asserted common law state privilege and national security purposes under 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(l) as the basis to refuse the discovery requests. The plaintiffs contended that where a party moves to discover material relating to electronic surveillance, the court must follow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s (FISA) procedures and conduct an ex parte and in camera review of materials relating to electronic surveillance. The defendants responded that FISA did not apply, as the plaintiff had not established themselves as the target of electronic surveillance. The plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery responses and deposition testimony were denied on August 20, 2018, in favor of the defendants. The court decided that the defendants had satisfied procedural requirements to invoke state secrets privilege and that the information sought to be protected fell under the state secrets doctrine. The court also agreed that the plaintiff had not yet established that they were the subject of electronic surveillance. Therefore, FISA did not apply and jurisdictional discovery was limited to information not protected by state secrets privilege. 335 F.Supp.3d 772. The defendants moved for summary judgment on November 13, 2018, alleging that the plaintiff lacked standing to contest the legality of the NSA’s upstream surveillance program. The defendants also stated there was no issue of material fact, and that the state secrets privilege precluded further litigation. The same day, the defendants also requested to seal their motion on an interim basis, which was granted on December 11. The plaintiffs submitted a response in opposition to the defendants’ summary judgment motion on December 18, 2018, claiming that it had presented sufficient evidence and that it has third-party standing. In the next months, the parties continued to submit arguments regarding the summary judgment. The defendants then submitted a motion to stay proceedings due to a funding issues on December 26, 2018, which was granted on January 2, 2019. After the issue was resolved, the defendants filed a restoration of appropriations on January 28, 2019. On December 16, 2019, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, holding that Wikimedia did not have the standing to proceed with its claims as it had not presented sufficient evidence that the NSA was monitoring Wikimedia communications. The court additionally stated that even if Wikimedia were able to demonstrate such monitoring, the state secrets privilege would require dismissal. 427 F.Supp.3d 582. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on February 14, 2020, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: The plaintiffs, a collection of mostly privacy/human rights non-profit organizations, sued the National Security Agency and Department of Justice for violating their constitutional rights by maintaining widespread, warrantless "Upstream Surveillance" programs of digital communications. The case was dismissed, but plaintiffs appealed. The 4th Circuit vacated and remanded the dismissal as to Wikimedia, but affirmed as to all other plaintiffs on May 23, 2017. On remand, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted on December 16, 2019. The plaintiffs appealed on February 14, 2020. The case is ongoing.


On July 8, 2015, 12 registered Democratic voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs sued the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, claiming violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Represented by the Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the districting plan created by Wisconsin Act 43 was unconstitutional, an injunction prohibiting state and local elections officials from using the districting plan in any election. They requested that if the Legislature and Governor did not pass a constitutional districting plan in a timely manner, that the court create a plan that would meet the requirements of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. The case was assigned to Judge Barbara B. Crabb. Because 28 U.S.C. § 2284 requires that federal court challenges to state legislative apportionment be heard before a three-judge panel, Judge Crabb was joined by Judge Kenneth F. Ripple of the Seventh Circuit, and Judge William Griesbach of the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs alleged that the 2012 districting plan, created by Wisconsin Act 43, created partisan gerrymandered districts for the purpose of helping the Republican Party win a majority of seats in the State Assembly. Although Republican candidates received less than 49% of votes in the next election, they won nearly 61% of seats in the Legislature. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Republican leadership in the Legislature had created the districting plan in complete secrecy: they created the plan away from the State Capital, they allowed only Republican legislators to participate in the process, and they required all legislators who participated to sign secrecy agreements. Until the plan was presented to the entire Legislature and quickly passed into law, the only members of the Legislature who were aware of its contents were Republican legislators and the private counsel who had been contracted (paid by State funds) to create the plan. On July 8, 2015, the plaintiffs sought an order enjoining the implementation of the gerrymandered districts for the 2016 election. The defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint was denied by the three-judge panel on December 17, 2015. The panel found that although the plaintiffs faced “significant challenges in prevailing on their claims,” the complaint was nonetheless sufficient to state a claim and that under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Davis v. Bandemer, the claim was justiciable. 151 F.Supp.3d 918. The defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment, which the panel denied on April 7, 2016, because there were “factual disputes regarding the validity of plaintiffs’ proposed measurement for determining the existence of constitutional violation.” 180 F.Supp.3d 583. On November 21, 2016, in a 116-page 2-1 decision, the panel held that Wisconsin Act 43 was unconstitutional. It found that Act 43 was passed with an intent to dilute the electoral strength of Democractic voters, and that it had achieved its intended discriminatory effect, unexplained by any geographical or other rational consideration. Under the plan, it would be difficult for Democratic voters “to translate their votes into legislative seats”; the plan ensured a Republican majority in the Assembly (the lower house of the Wisconsin Legislature). Judge Griesbach dissented, disagreeing that proof of intent to act for a political purpose was a significant part of any gerrymandering test; similarly, he disagreed that the plaintiffs’ proposed “efficiency gap” concept was a judicially manageable standard. 218 F.Supp.3d 837. In its November 2016 ruling, the court deferred ruling on an appropriate remedy and asked parties to brief the issue. After the parties submitted their briefs, the court ordered the following remedial plan on January 27, 2017: the court ordered the Legislature to enact a new redistricting map that the Governor would be charged with approving by November 1, 2017. It found that contrary to the plaintiffs’ request, it was unnecessary for the court to involve itself in creating a districting map. Further, in anticipation of the defendants’ appeal to the Supreme Court, the court found that the proposed remedy afforded “the Legislature ample time to enact a plan contingent on the Supreme Court’s affirmance of our judgment. While it allows the defendants and the candidates to make plans for the November 2018 election only on a contingent basis, at least they will be able to prepare for that contingency in the context of a concrete alternate map.” The court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs that day and ordered the case dismissed. On February 22, 2017, the court amended its judgment to retain jurisdiction as to the remedial plan, so that it could grant an adequate remedy in the event of legislative impasse. On February 24, 2017 the defendants appealed to the United States Supreme Court. At issue before the Supreme Court was:

Whether the district court had the authority to consider a statewide challenge to Wisconsin’s redistricting plan rather than requiring a district-by-district analysis;
whether Wisconsin’s redistricting plan was impermissible partisan gerrymandering despite complying with standard redistricting principles;
whether the district court’s partisan gerrymandering test was proper;
whether the defendants could present additional evidence showing that they would have prevailed under the district court’s test after the court announced the test; and
whether partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable.
On June 19, the Supreme Court stayed the judgment of the district court, pending appeal. After the parties and numerous parties submitted amicus briefs, the Court heard oral arguments on October 3, 2017. On June 18, 2018, the Court vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 138 S.Ct. 1916. The Court found that the plaintiffs’ allegations that the redistricting plan caused them to suffer statewide harm to their interests in their collective representation in the state legislature and in influencing the legislature’s overall composition and policymaking did not support Article III standing. Further, the Court found that evidence of an efficiency gap did not address the effect that a gerrymander had on the votes of particular citizens (which is also required for Article III standing). The Court remanded to the district court to allow the plaintiffs to present evidence of a “burden on their individual votes.” Judge Crabb withdrew without explanation on August 2, 2018, and was replaced by Judge James D. Peterson. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 14, 2018. On October 4, 2018 the Wisconsin State Assembly filed a motion to intervene as defendants; the motion was granted on November 13, 2018. Shortly after, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to stay the case because of two ongoing partisan gerrymandering cases, Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek in the Supreme Court. The motion to dismiss was denied without prejudice, but the stay was granted on January 23, 2019. The court allowed discovery to proceed, but it delayed trial and any decision on the merits until after the Supreme Court reached a decision in the two other cases. On May 3, 2019, the district court granted a motion to compel discovery, ordering the Wisconsin State Assembly Speaker to attend a scheduled deposition. 331 F.R.D. 375. The Speaker appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which stayed the district court’s order pending resolution of the appeal. The Court decided Lamone and Rucho on June 27, 2019, holding that legislative redistricting is a political question that is not justiciable in federal courts. This ruling made it clear that the district court in this case did not have jurisdiction to hear the Wisconsin voters’ claims; the plaintiffs therefore moved to dismiss their claims the following day, on June 28. The court dismissed the case without prejudice on July 2, 2019, awarding statutory costs to the defendants. However, the court reversed the award of costs on August 22, also denying the defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees. 402 F. Supp. 3d 529. Because the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and it clearly had not been a frivolous lawsuit (the court had originally ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court had allowed the litigation to proceed before later foreclosing the district court’s subject-matter jurisdiction), the court found that it would be most just for each party to bear its own costs. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2015, Democratic voters in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The plaintiffs alleged that their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated by Act 43, Wisconsin’s redistricting plan. In 2016, the district court held that the redistricting plan was developed to ensure a Republican majority in the Wisconsin State Assembly, and was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court vacated this decision in the summer of 2018, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, and remanded to the district court to allow the plaintiffs to properly plead standing. In June 2019, the Supreme Court ruled in a pair of parallel cases (Rucho v. Common Cause and Lamone v. Benisek) that legislative redistricting is a non-justiciable political question. The district court therefore no longer had jurisdiction to hear this case, and the case was dismissed on July 2, 2019.


On July 31, 2013, Prison Legal News, represented by private and in-house counsel, filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia. PLN sued the Virginia Beach Correctional Center (VBCC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. PLN claimed that VBCC has been censoring the monthly publication, books, and other correspondence that the plaintiff has sent to prisoners. PLN alleged violations of the first and fourteenth amendments for failure to provide timely notification and adequate reasons for disapproval decisions, loss of rights to communicate with willing recipients, and failure to conduct an independent review of censorship decisions. PLN claimed that since August 2011, it had sent prisoners in custody of VBCC sample and monthly issues of Prison Legal News, information brochure packets, a book titled Protecting Your Health, and copies of Clement v. California Department of Corrections. Prior to April 2012, the prisoners were permitted to receive these publications from PLN. However, starting in April 2012, PLN began receiving returned items it had mailed to prisoners at VBCC stamped or handwritten with "Return to Sender," "Not Here," or "Refused." According to the Mail Restriction Forms given to the inmates, the items had been censored because the advertisements contained "sexually explicit material" and ordering forms with prices, which are not permitted at VBCC. On December 8, 2014, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of banning ordering forms with prices. The court took the challenge to sexually explicit materials ban under advisement and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment related to PLN's alleged due process violations. Additionally, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on PLN's claims seeking money damages due to the defendant's qualified immunity. 2014 WL 6982470. During the litigation, the defendants revised their policies on banning "sexually explicit" publications and the appeals process regarding censorship decisions. On March 31, 2015, the court granted PLN's original motion for summary judgment regarding the defendant's former policy of banning "sexually explicit" publications. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from reverting to their former policy. The court also granted PLN's second motion for summary judgment regarding the claim the defendant's former publication review policies failed to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard as to censorship decisions. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from reverting to these former policies as well. 2015 WL 1487190. On May 4, 2015, the parties settled and the court approved the joint consent order. The parties settled all issues except attorney's fees, which they asked the court to resolve. On September 8, 2015, the court awarded $85,189 in attorney's fees and $8,731.10 in litigation expenses. 129 F.Supp.3d 390. The court arrived at this award by estimating the total attorney's fees and reducing them by 45% to account for plaintiff's failure to obtain money damages. Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by reducing plaintiff's attorney's fees by 45%. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiff's claim. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not abuse its discretion because it "explained in detail" how it arrived at the fee award based on the plaintiff's failure to obtain money damages. 2017 WL 888234.

Summary: The plaintiff Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and money damages against the Virginia Beach Correctional Center (VBCC). The plaintiffs claim that the defendants censored the monthly publications, brochures, and other materials that they sent to inmates at VBCC because they contained "sexually explicit material" and ordering forms with prices, which were not permitted at VBCC. The plaintiffs claim that these actions violated their first and fourteenth amendment rights for failure to provide timely notification and adequate reasons for disapproval decisions, loss of rights to communicate with willing recipients, and failure to conduct an independent review of censorship decisions. The court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment on the issue of ordering forms with prices and their qualified immunity from the plaintiff seeking money damages. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment challenging the defendant's former policy of banning "sexually explicit" publications as well as the plaintiff's motion claiming their due process rights were violated. The defendants were enjoined from returning to their former policies. The court also granted the plaintiff attorney's fees in the amount of $85,189 and litigation expenses in the amount of $8,731.10.


On August 28, 2015, Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. (PPSE) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. PPSE sued the Governor of Alabama and the Alabama Medicaid Agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from terminating PPSE's Medicaid provider agreement. Specifically, PPSE claimed that on August 6, 2015, Alabama Governor Robert Bentley notified the plaintiff that the state would soon terminate PPSE's Medicaid provider agreement. While the letter did not give a reason for this termination, Governor Bentley released a press statement the same day referencing a heavily edited video produced by anti-choice advocates that misleadingly indicated other Planned Parenthood clinics had sold fetal body parts. The plaintiff claimed that such allegations were irrelevant to PPSE's ability to offer services to Medicaid patients. Further, PPSE claimed that termination of its Medicaid provider agreements violated the Medicaid Act by denying PPSE patients the right to choose the willing and qualified health care provider of their choice; the First and Fourteenth Amendment by penalizing the plaintiff for its constitutionally protected association with abortion providers; and the Equal Protection Clause by singling PPSE out for unfavorable treatment. On September 16, 2015, PPSE submitted an amended complaint including a Jane Doe plaintiff. The Jane Doe plaintiff was an Alabama Medicaid patient who preferred to receive health services from PPSE. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint and a motion to certify class. The plaintiffs asked for class certification to cover all Alabama Medicaid beneficiaries who obtained or sought to obtain health care services from PPSE. On October 28, 2015, U.S. District Judge Myron Thompson granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. He found that Governor Bentley's termination of PPSE's provider agreement likely violated the Medicaid Act because it failed to provide a reason for such termination. The preliminary injunction required that the State reinstate its Medicaid provider agreement with PPSE. The parties then began settlement discussions. On November 30, 2015, the parties jointly moved the court to enter a final order. The proposed order permanently enjoined the state from terminating PPSE's Medicaid provider agreements based on any allegations from the misleading video previously mentioned by the Governor or from terminating the agreement on an at-will basis. The order further required the State to cover the plaintiffs' attorney fees. Judge Thompson entered the final order as requested. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 28, 2015, Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. (PPSE) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiff sued the Governor of Alabama and the Alabama Medicaid Agency under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from terminating PPSE's Medicaid provider agreement. On October 16, 2015 the plaintiffs submitted a motion to certify class. The plaintiffs asked for class certification to cover all Alabama Medicaid beneficiaries who obtained or sought to obtain health care services from PPSE. On November 30, 2015 Judge Thompson ordered a motion submitted jointly by the two parties. The order permanently enjoined the state from terminating PPSE's Medicaid provider agreements based on any allegations from the misleading video previously mentioned by the Governor or from terminating the agreement on an at-will basis. It further required the state to cover the plaintiffs' attorney fees. The case is now closed.


On September 26, 2017, a former immigrant detainee of the Northwest Detention Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The case was assigned to Judge Robert J. Bryan. The plaintiff sued The GEO Group, Inc. (GEO), the for-profit corporation that operated the detention center, under state law, claiming that GEO’s policy of paying immigrant detainees involved in the federal Voluntary Work Program only $1 per day for their labor violated the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA). The MWA set the minimum wage at $11 per hour. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought damages for lost wages. On October 9, 2017, GEO filed a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. GEO alleged that federal law, which allowed for immigrant detainees to be paid $1 per day, preempted the MWA, a state law. The defendant also alleged that immigrant detainees did not count as employees under the MWA. On December 6, 2017, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that federal law did not conflict with the MWA, so it did not preempt it. The MWA also stated only that state detainees were not employees; it said nothing about federal detainees, so the court reasoned that immigrant detainees may be employees. 287 F.Supp.3d 1158. On December 20, 2017, the defendant served an answer to the complaint that contained several counterclaims and affirmative defenses. GEO claimed that the plaintiff would be unjustly enriched if paid minimum wage, as his costs of living during his detainment were paid for by the detention center, so it sought the costs and expenses it incurred in providing for the plaintiff during his detainment. It also sought declaratory relief. The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss or strike most of the counterclaims and affirmative defenses on January 10, 2018. On February 28, 2018, the court denied most of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, although it did strike five of the defendant’s fifteen affirmative defenses. 297 F.Supp.3d 1130. On March 29, 2018, GEO filed another motion to dismiss the case, this one for failure to join required parties. GEO had a contract with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that controlled how it managed the detention center. It alleged that paying minimum wage when the standard for ICE’s Voluntary Work Program was $1 per day would violate that contract. Because they had a stake in the case’s outcome, GEO alleged that DHS and ICE needed to be joined as parties. However, the defendant also alleged that DHS and ICE could not be joined because they had immunity. So, GEO concluded that the case should be dismissed. On April 26, 2018, the court denied this motion to dismiss and held that DHS and ICE were not necessary parties because the contract did not directly conflict with the MWA. 2018 WL 1963669. The plaintiff sought class certification on March 23, 2018. The proposed class would consist of all civil immigration detainees who participated in the Voluntary Work Program at the Northwest Detention Center at any time between September 26, 2014, and the date of final judgment in the case. However, after being deposed by the defendant, the plaintiff decided that it was not in his best interests to serve as a class representative; in his deposition, the plaintiff admitted to having a history of violent crime, which could prejudice the rest of the class. On April 30, 2018, GEO filed a motion to deny class certification with prejudice, and the plaintiff withdrew his motion for class certification the next day. On June 13, 2018, two new plaintiffs who could more adequately represent the class were added, and the original plaintiff was terminated as a plaintiff (but remained a counter defendant to GEO's counterclaims). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to reflect this change. Eight days later, they filed a new motion for class certification. On June 27, 2018, GEO moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to join parties. On August 6, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, reasoning that issues remained to be solved regarding the defendant's possible immunity as a contractor providing services to the federal government. The court further held that the defendant's other grounds for dismissal (preemption, failure to state a claim based on the inapplicability of the MWA, and failure to join required government parties) were unpersuasive. 2018 BL 278967 On the same day, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court declined to make the finding that the class representatives cannot represent the proposed class of detainees seeking for lost wages under the (MWA) because they lack work authorization and are thus "unemployable." The court further found that the proposed class satisfied the requirements for certification and thus certification was appropriate. On August 23, 2018, the defendant filed a petition to appeal the order to certify class to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The defendant also appealed to the Ninth Circuit the August 6, 2018 order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. On November 8, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant's petition to appeal the order granting class certification. On December 7, 2018, the defendant-appellant filed a motion with the Ninth Circuit to voluntarily dismiss its appeal of the district court's order denying the defendant's motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit granted this motion on December 10, 2018, and the appeal was dismissed. For the first few months of 2019, activity in this suit consisted of litigation relating to various deadlines for trial dates and giving notice to class members. On May 2, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, stay, or consolidate related litigation. The defendant argued that the suit should be dismissed or stayed because "the harm plaintiffs seek to remedy is entirely duplicative of the State of Washington’s companion case, State of Washington v. The GEO Group, Inc., resulting in wasted time, effort, and costs. The defendant contended that without dismissal or staying of the suit or at least consolidating the two suits, it would be prejudiced by having to litigate the issues and incur costs twice. In a May 28, 2019, oral hearing, the court denied the portion of the defendant's motion to dismiss or stay, and granted in part the motion for consolidation. The court ordered that the suits be consolidated on the issues of liability only. The issue of damages would remain separate. On August 22, 2019, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in the State of Washington case, where it argued that the suit, seeking to impose the state minimum wage for individuals in federal immigration detention, violated intergovernmental immunity principles. The United States urged "the Court to find that the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity bars the State of Washington from enforcing the MWA against GEO," even though the court had earlier rejected the intergovernmental immunity argument. On January 2, 2020, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court held an oral hearing on January 21, 2020, where a jury trial was set for April 13, 2020, and the motions were renoted. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In September 2017, a former immigrant detainee of the Northwest Detention Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff alleged that GEO's policy of paying $1 per day for immigrant detainees' labor violated Washington's Minimum Wage Act. A class consisting of all civil immigration detainees who participated in the Voluntary Work Program at the Northwest Detention Center was certified. This suit was consolidated with State of Washington v. The GEO Group, Inc. on the issue of liability. A jury trial is set for April 2020.


On September 23, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Simran Investments, Inc. d/b/a Only $1.00 and Nothing Over $1.00. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to a sexually hostile work environment because of her sex, female, and then fired her in retaliation for complaining of sexual harassment. On December 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Barbara M. G. Lynn) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $20,000.


On April 11, 2012, seven family planning providers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC). The Plaintiffs, represented by private and in-house counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Plaintiffs challenged the federal constitutionality of Texas Admin. Code §§ 354.1361-64, which bars Plaintiffs from participating in Texas's Women's Health Program (WHP) because Plaintiffs either publicly advocate to protect access to safe and legal abortion or are affiliated with organizations that engage in advocacy, even though Plaintiffs do not themselves provide any abortion services. In 2005, the Texas legislature established the WHP to expand access to preventive health and family planning services. The WHP provides well-women services to low-income individuals, including physical examinations, breast and cervical cancer screenings, sexually transmitted infection screenings, and counseling regarding contraception. WHP does not pay for abortions. The legislation authorizing the WHP directed the Texas HHSC not to contract with any entities affiliated with those that perform or promote abortions. In implementing the statute and administering the WHP, the HHSC took the position that Plaintiffs could not be constitutionally excluded from participation as long as they maintained legal and financial separation from affiliated entities providing abortion services. On February 23, 2012, however, the HHSC adopted a new rule prohibiting Plaintiffs from participating in the WHP, and calling for Plaintiffs' removal from the WHP after April 30, 2012. On April 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (Judge Lee Yeakel) granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the rules against Plaintiffs. The Court (Judge Yeakel) found that the government is entitled to define the limits of a publicly funded program, but cannot condition participation in a government funded program on an applicant's exercise of protected rights. Here, the Court (Judge Yeakel) found the Plaintiffs First Amendment Rights to free speech are unconstitutionally infringed, and enforcement of the HHSC rule prohibiting Plaintiffs from participating in the WHP will hurt the public interest by resulting in a significant reduction in family-planning services to uninsured women. The record establishes Plaintiffs together have provided more than 40 percent of the WHP services statewide in FY 2010. On April 30, 2012, Texas filed its notice of appeal of the District Court grant enjoining the enforcement of the HHSC rules. The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (Justice E. Grady Jolly) vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case. The 5th Circuit Court (Justice E. Grady Jolly) found that although the HHSC rule functions as a speech-based funding condition, it is also a direct regulation of the content of a state based program and is therefore constitutional. On November 27, 2012, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss without prejudice because they also filed an action in state court.

Summary: On April 11, 2012, seven family planning providers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against the Executive Commissioner of the Texas Health and Human Services Commission (HHSC). The Plaintiffs challenged the federal constitutionality of Texas Admin. Code §§ 354.1361-64, which bars Plaintiffs from participating in Texas's Women's Health Program (WHP) because Plaintiffs either publicly advocate to protect access to safe and legal abortion or are affiliated with organizations that engage in advocacy, even though Plaintiffs do not themselves provide any abortion services. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 30, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas (Judge Lee Yeakel) granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the rules against Plaintiffs. Texas appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit (Justice E. Grady Jolly) vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case finding that although the HHSC rule functions as a speech-based funding condition, it is also a direct regulation of the content of a state based program and is therefore constitutional. On November 27, 2012, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss without prejudice because they also filed an action in state court.


Plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for New Jersey to challenge the constitutionality of the Town of Riverside Ordinance 2006-16 ("Illegal Immigration Relief Act"), which forbid housing and employment of undocumented immigrants. Plaintiffs alleged that the Ordinance was an improper attempt by local government to enforce federal immigration laws in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution and that it caused national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as class certification. This case was one of two lawsuits challenging the Ordinance. The other case, Riverside Coalition of Business Persons and Landlords v. Township of Riverside, cause # L-2965-06. [IM-NJ-1], was filed in New Jersey state court and challenged the Ordinance as violating the New Jersey Constitution. Riverside initially agreed to suspend enforcement of the Ordinance or any amendments while the legality of the Ordinance was litigated. Riverside's agreement resulted in a Consent Order being entered in the state court case on October 25, 2006. Despite that agreement, the Riverside Township Council introduced a revised version of the Ordinance at its council meeting on the evening of October 25, 2006. On November 22, 2006, the Township approved and enacted Revised Ordinance 2006-26 which was patterned on a similar ordinance enacted in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. (The Hazleton Ordinance was the subject of federal court litigation - see Lozano v. City of Hazleton, IM-PA-1). On January 5, 2007, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to reflect that the Ordinance had been amended by Revised Ordinance 2006-26. Plaintiffs also voluntarily dismissed the Riverside mayor as a party defendant. The District Court entered a scheduling order which set deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions. Citing escalating legal costs and an adverse ruling in the Lozano v. City of Hazleton case, the Township introduced a measure in August 2007 to repeal the Revised Ordinance 2006-26. On September 17, 2007, the Township Council repealed Revised Ordinance 2006-26 by a 3 to 1 vote. On September 21, 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and motion for attorneys' fees. Defendants opposed plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees, citing the fact that the Township voluntarily repealed the Revised Ordinance. The court dismissed the pending motions and closed the case on November 30, 2007.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this 2006 class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for New Jersey to challenge the constitutionality of the Town of Riverside Ordinance 2006-16 ("Illegal Immigration Relief Act"), which forbid housing and employment of undocumented immigrants. The Township Council repealed the ordinance and the case was closed.