In 2003 a coalition of immigration rights organizations, represented by the ACLU Immigration Rights Project, brought suit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to compel production of internal DOJ policy memorandum relating to state and local police agency authority to enforce the federal immigration laws. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York and brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. Until 2002, the DOJ's official position was that state and local police lacked inherent authority to enforce non-criminal immigration laws. That position changed in 2002 and was announced to the public in a press conference in June 2002 by then Attorney General John Ashcroft. During the press conference, the Attorney General referred to an unpublished DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum issued in April 2002. Plaintiffs sought production of the April 2002 OCL Memorandum and documents associated with it. The DOJ resisted disclosure and the litigation ensued. The District Court (Judge Lewis A. Kaplan) granted the organizations' motion to compel disclosure of the April 2002 OCL Memorandum, with certain redactions, but denied disclosure of documents leading up to the formulation of that Memorandum. National Council of La Raza v. Department of Justice, 337 F.Supp.2d 524 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) and National Council, 345 F.Supp.2d 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The DOJ appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Circuit Judge Katzmann) affirmed, overruling claims of deliberative process exemption and attorney-client privilege. National Council of La Raza v. Department of Justice, 411 F.3d 350 (2nd Cir. 2005) No further case activity is noted. A redacted version of the April 2002 OCL Memorandum that was produced appears as part of our document collection for this case.

Summary: In 2003 a coalition of immigration rights organizations, represented by the ACLU Immigration Rights Project, brought suit against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to compel production of internal DOJ policy memorandum relating to state and local police agency authority to enforce the federal immigration laws. The District Court (Judge Lewis A. Kaplan) granted the organizations' motion to compel disclosure of the April 2002 OCL Memorandum, with certain redactions, but denied disclosure of documents leading up to the formulation of that Memorandum. The Court of Appeals affirmed. A redacted version of the April 2002 OCL Memorandum that was produced appears as part of our document collection for this case.


This lawsuit was brought by several homeless people with mental and physical disabilities against the City of Laguna Beach in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern California chapter of the ACLU and private counsel, accused the city and the Laguna Beach Police Department (LBPD) of violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12132), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794), and Article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution by targeting disabled homeless people under laws restricting camping in public spaces. The plaintiffs argued that the Alternative Sleeping Location (ASL), a small emergency shelter created by the county as part of the settlement of a previous lawsuit, did not provide adequate accommodations for homeless persons with disabilities, leaving them with no viable alternative to camping in public spaces. The plaintiffs brought their suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Declaratory Judgement Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), and California law. They sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees. More specifically, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the city was violating the law and an injunction preventing the city from enforcing anti-camping laws and requiring that the city provide new accommodations suitable for housing homeless people with disabilities. On November 23, 2015, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction that would prevent the LBPD from enforcing anti-camping laws against disabled homeless people pending the final outcome of the suit. Judge Andrew J. Guilford denied the plaintiffs' motion on February 10, 2016, finding that the plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief were unlikely to succeed at trial. On May 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in order to introduce additional plaintiffs. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. On October 31, 2016, both parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment to establish that the defendants violated (1) the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and analogous provisions of the California Constitution, and (2) Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the RA. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all of the plaintiffs’ claims. On June 25, 2017, Judge Guilford granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claims and the substantive due process claims. Judge Guilford denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on the ADA and RA claims. On June 23, 2017, Judge Guilford granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification in part, only with respect to the plaintiffs' remaining ADA and RA claims. The named plaintiffs represented a class consisting of "[a]ll homeless persons who reside or will reside in the geographic area of Laguna Beach who have a mental and/or physical disability as defined under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act and who have been, or are likely to be, cited for violations of California Penal Code section 647(e), Laguna Beach Municipal Code section 8.30.030 and/or Laguna Beach Municipal Code section 18.05.020." Following nearly a year of settlement negotiations, during which the parties exchanged voluminous discovery and engaged multiple experts, the parties agreed to settle all claims in the lawsuit and filed a motion for preliminary approval of their proposed settlement agreement with the court on June 6, 2018. Under the terms of the Class Claims Settlement Agreement, the Laguna Beach City Council will adopt a resolution affirming its commitment to end homelessness in the City of Laguna Beach. Additionally, the City agreed to a number of measures designed to accommodate disabled persons experiencing homelessness in Laguna Beach. Such measures include, for instance, the continued designation of a full-time City employee to serve as the City’s “ADA Coordinator;” the adaptation of existing grievance procedures to more directly address the needs of ASL guests; the permanent posting of a Reasonable Accommodations Notice at the ASL explaining the process for requesting and obtaining reasonable accommodations; and more. The plaintiffs' counsel did not seek attorneys' fees. On October 23, 2018, the parties filed a motion for final approval of their settlement agreement. Judge Guilford approved the motion on November 5, 2020. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.

Summary: Several disabled homeless persons sue the City of Luguna Beach, California, in the U.S. District Court of Central California, alleging that the Laguna Beach Police Department enforces anti-camping laws against them despite the city's failure to provide alternative housing that can accommodate their disabilities, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 706, 794), and Article I, sections 7 and 17 of the California Constitution. Judge Andrew J. Guilford granted the plaintiffs' motion for class-certification. After Judge Guilford ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment, the only remaining issues were the plaintiffs' ADA and RA claims. After extensive settlement negotiations, the parties agreed to a settlement, which the court continues to enforce.


On March 1, 2006, plaintiff, a disabled veteran, brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under 38 U.S.C. §§4311, 4312, and 4313 of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA) against Roadway Express, Inc. The plaintiff, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice, ask the court for declaratory relief and injunctive relief reinstating the plaintiff to an equivalent position as he would have occupied had he remained employed at Roadway, as well as damages equal to lost wages, claiming that his discharge by Roadway violated USERRA. The plaintiff began working for Roadway, Inc. as a truck driver in 1998. In 1999, the plaintiff informed Roadway that he had enlisted in the U.S. Army. Immediately after being informed, Roadway demanded the plaintiff's resignation, which he did not give. Plaintiff went on active duty in 1999. In 2000, the plaintiff received a flu shot while on active duty, after which he contracted a staph infection, endocarditis, and a vertebral bone infection rendering him disabled. As a result of his disability, the Army honorably discharged him in 2001. Upon the plaintiff's return to Roadway from active duty, he was falsely informed that only reservists were protected under USERRA. Plaintiff underwent a fit-for-duty medical examination, which found that, while he could not work in his previous position as a result of his disability, he could adequately fill several other positions at Roadway. Nevertheless, Roadway informed the plaintiff that, because he could not return to his duties as a truck driver, Roadway would not return him to work. Roadway never discussed with the plaintiff any other position of equal seniority, status, and pay as required by USERRA. In November of 2006, the parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the case.

Summary: Plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued Roadway, Inc., after the company refused to offer him the same or similar position upon return from active duty as required by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA). The case was dismissed pursuant to a confidential settlement agreement.


On August 28, 2007, three deaf individuals and two deaf advocacy groups filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against the City and County of Denver, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, the Center for the Rights of Parents with Disabilities, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, money damages, and attorney's fees and costs, claiming that Denver violated the plaintiffs' rights when it denied them access to American Sign Language (ASL) interpreters, or other effective forms of communication, resulting in the death of one plaintiff and injury to the others. The complaint alleged that each plaintiff, on separate occasions, was arrested and processed without the assistance of an ASL interpreter or provided an alternative means of communication during and after booking, resulting in harm. The first listed plaintiffs, a mother and the Estate of her son, claimed that the detention facility and jail where the decedent was held negligently caused the decedent's suicide. The Order on Pending Motions, 742 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Colo. 2010) explains that the decedent was arrested on felony charges and subsequently processed and screened for mental health issues, with no noted concerns. After being held in the local jail for about a month, segregated from the general population and without access to a TTD phone, closed captioning television, or an ASL interpreter, the decedent hung himself. Nurse rounds note no concerns for depression or other possible mental illnesses, but these were not conducted through an interpreter. The second listed individual on the complaint, hereinafter referred to as "K," was arrested at a Greyhound station after he got into a scuffle with a security guard. After being treated for a broken ankle, plaintiff K was processed and placed in a segregated cell at the local detention facility. He was arraigned the same day and pled guilty to three charges, without the assistance of counsel or an interpreter, and via handwritten notes. The final plaintiff listed on the complaint, hereinafter referred to as "B," was arrested in her home on a bench warrant. According to the Order on Pending Motions, the police used her daughter and notes to communicate the reason for her arrest. Plaintiff B tried to communicate her diabetic condition and need for meds, but the officer refused to accept her medications. While waiting at the police station, her blood sugar became dangerously low but she remained unable to communicate her status to the police. was not given food or an interpreter to further discuss her medical needs. The jail released Plaintiff B at 2:00am, without affording her access to a functioning TTD phone to arrange transportation, and she returned home via train at 5:30am. She narrowly escaped an attempted sexual assault on her way home. On September 30, 2010, the District Court (Judge Walker Miller) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted the motion for summary judgment on the constitutional claims, and on the claims against the individual defendants in their personal capacity, but denied in part the defendants' motion as to plaintiffs' claims based on the Rehabilitation Act and the American with Disabilities Act, and denied the motions for summary judgment as to the state negligence and wrongful death claims. On September 7, 2012, the parties reached a private settlement. The defendants, City and County of Denver, agreed to pay the sum of $695,000 to the plaintiffs in order to settle any and all claims. The plaintiffs agreed to release the defendants from all claims arising out of the alleged incidents. On October 4th, 2012, the District Court (Judge Miller)dismissed the case with prejudice after having been informed of the parties' settlement agreement. This ended the case.

Summary: Deaf individuals sued the City and County of Denver for its treatment of deaf arrestees, alleging discrimination under the Americans With Disabilities Act, civil rights violations, and negligence under state law, for failure to provide interpreters and other accommodations during the plaintiffs time in custody. The parties settled the case privately for $695,000 and subsequently, the District Court dismissed the case with prejudice.


On February 24, 2009, a prisoner serving her sentence in a facility operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison's refusal to provide medical care for plaintiff's Gender Dysphoria (GD) constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff was diagnosed with GD in 2005 by mental health providers employed by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Despite knowledge of the diagnosis, the prison refused to provide medical treatment. Following a suicide attempt and self-mutilation by the plaintiff, the prison transferred the plaintiff to an inpatient mental health unit. At the mental health unit, the plaintiff was still denied sufficient treatment, even being disciplined for continued attempts at self-mutilation. The plaintiff's complaint alleged that the prison promulgated and enforced a policy that denies prisoners with GD, including the plaintiff, individualized evaluation and constitutionally adequate treatment. Furthermore, she alleged that the prison's medical director and psychiatrist failed and refused to treat her GD. On July 10, 2009, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. After a motion to dismiss the amended complaint was denied, the parties entered into mediation and settlement talks. As part of the parties' settlement agreement, the Federal Bureau of Prisons agreed to issue guidance relating to the treatment of prisoners with GD. The defendant also agreed to: note in plaintiff's medical file to address her as "she", sign a declaration indicating it has no opposition to a name change, continue to provide the plaintiff with appropriate hormone treatment unless medically contraindicated, provide the plaintiff access to female commissary items, provide hair removal treatment, consult with the plaintiff regarding vocal therapy, and evaluate treatment after eighteen months. On September 29, 2011, the court (Judge Joseph Tauro) approved the parties' stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice.

Summary: In February 2009, a prisoner in the Federal Bureau of Prisons filed a civil rights action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison's refusal to provide medical care for plaintiff's Gender Identity Disorder (GID) constituted a violation of the Eighth Amendment. In September 2011, the parties entered into a settlement under which the defendant agreed to make a number of accommodations and provide treatment to the plaintiff in response to her GID.


In February 2007, fifteen current and former employees of SimplexGrinnell LP, who performed electrical and sprinkler work, including installation, maintenance, inspection, testing, repairs, and replacement of fire alarms and security systems on various public works projects throughout New York, filed this class action lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. They claimed that SimplexGrinnell failed to pay its employees in accordance with the Prevailing Wage Act, New York Labor Law § 220. Pursuant to the Prevailing Wage Act, New York Labor Law § 220, public works contracts -- i.e., contracts with state or local governmental agencies to perform construction, maintenance and repair of public buildings -- which provide that all laborers will be paid prevailing wages. The plaintiffs filed the case in state court, but on March 7, 2007, SimplexGrinnell moved the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn Division. Chief Magistrate Steven M. Gold was assigned to the case. In 2008, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint adding further specification to claim relating to sprinkler and suppression work, and added a named plaintiff. After nearly three years of discovery, the plaintiffs filed motions for class certification and summary judgment on March 18, 2010. The plaintiffs sought certification of a class defined as follows: "[A]ll laborers, workmen and mechanics who furnished labor to SimplexGrinnell on non-federal public works projects in the State of New York at any time from February 6, 2001[, or from July 14, 2001 for sprinkler work] until the final judgment in this matter, and who . . . have not been paid prevailing wages and benefits as required by law." The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for the class and damages in the total sum of $16 million. On March 25, 2010, the defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On June 21, 2011, in a published Memorandum & Order, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 796 F.Supp.2d 346. The Court expressly held that the Supreme Court's recent decision in <i>Wal-Mart v. Dukes</i> did not warrant a different result. The court also granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment with respect to fire alarm testing and inspection work and plaintiffs' fifth cause of action. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration or a second motion for summary judgment, but that motion was denied on October 4, 2011. Shortly thereafter, the parties agreed to engage in private mediation through November 15, 2011 and to suspend the litigation schedule during that time. Over the next few months, even after the November deadline, the parties continued to work on a settlement and reported regularly to the Court on their progress. On June 29, 2012, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation and Agreement Regarding Class Action Settlement of Claims Other Than "Testing and Inspection Claims." The Agreement set the settlement amount at $5,525,000 and the amount of the employer's share of payroll taxes to be paid on the settlement shares. The Agreement also allowed for deductions from the settlement amount with court approval for fees and other expenses. The Agreement provided that each class member, excluding the eighteen individuals who previously opted out of the class, receive a share of the settlement proceeds based on the conclusions of David L. Crawford's Expert Report allocating damages. A settlement administrator was to notify all class members of this settlement agreement. Shortly thereafter, the Clerk issued a judgment explaining that the settlement had been accepted. As it states in its title, the settlement did not cover the testing and inspection claims, and on December 7, 2012, the plaintiffs appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on those claims. In a December 4, 2014 Opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated the June 21 memorandum and order in part and remanded the case. 773 F.3d 394. The Court certified two questions on this appeal: (1) “whether a court should give deference not only to an agency’s substantive interpretation of a statute arising from an unrelated proceeding but also to its decision to enforce that interpretation only prospectively”; and (2) “whether contracts committing parties to pay prevailing wages pursuant to section 220 of the New York Labor Law (‘NYLL’) need to specify—when the scope of the statute’s coverage is unclear to the parties—what particular work the prevailing wages will be paid for." The Court of Appeals answered the first question narrowly, holding that it "will not give the agency more deference than it claims for itself" and based on the fact that the agency had renounced any claim to deference in this litigation, the agency's decision to construe section 220 to cover testing and inspection work only prospectively deserved no deference. As to the second question, the Court of Appeals held that "[a]n agreement to comply with a statute is an agreement to comply with it as correctly interpreted, whether or not the interpretation was known to the parties at the time of the contracting." 21 N.E.3d 237 (N.Y. 2014) Back in the Second Circuit, based on these answers, the district court's decision granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims relating to testing and inspection work were vacated and the case was remanded to District Court. Following this decision, the parties reported that they again intended to pursue private mediation. They were ordered to submit a joint report on the status of their efforts to reach a settlement by April 1, 2015, or promptly upon the completion of mediation, whichever came first. The parties finally reached a settlement on February 27, 2015, which was formally approved by the Court on April 24, 2015. This Agreement included a provision providing that the defendant would make changes to its payment practices and, to the extent it has not paid prevailing wages to its workers for testing and inspection work, would commence paying such wages to all its workers for all testing and inspection work done on fire alarms or sprinkler systems in NY on "public works." This change was to be implemented within 15 days of the primary approval of this agreement, and payment to be made retroactive to May 1, 2015, for all testing and inspection work not paid from that date to the implementation of this agreement. The settlement amount was set at $9,500,000, plus the amount of the employer's share of the payroll taxes, and allowed for deductions from the settlement amount for fees and other expenses. A settlement administrator was to notify all class members of this settlement agreement. On April 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the time allowed to locate class members with uncashed settlement checks--there were 59 such class members, who had failed to cash checks totaling $176,000. Because the settlement agreement explicitly provided that any unclaimed money would revert to the defendant, the Magistrate Judge Gold denied this motion on June 17, 2016. The case is closed.

Summary: In February 2007, fifteen current and former employees of SimplexGrinnell LP, who performed electrical and sprinkler work on various public works projects throughout New York, filed this class action lawsuit in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Kings County. They claimed that SimplexGrinnell failed to pay its employees in accordance with the Prevailing Wage Act, New York Labor Law § 220 which requires that public works contracts must provide that all laborers will be paid prevailing wages. On March 7, 2007, SimplexGrinnell moved the case to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn Division and Chief Magistrate Steven M. Gold was assigned to the case. Using the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in <i>Wal-Mart v. Dukes</i>, the district court granted the class of laborers here class certification. After years of discovery, negotiations, and appeals, the parties came to an agreement in 2015 that provided for changes to the defendant's payment practices, and awarded the class $9,500,000 is damages, subject to deductions for fees and other expenses. On April 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the time allowed to locate class members with uncashed settlement checks--there were 59 such class members, who had failed to cash checks totaling $176,000. However, because the settlement agreement explicitly provided that any unclaimed money would revert to the defendant, the Magistrate Judge Gold denied this motion on June 17, 2016. The case is closed.


A homeless resident and a veteran with disabilities, who had both been arrested and prosecuted under a Michigan anti-begging statute, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, against the City of Grand Rapids and its police department on Sept. 13, 2011. The law that the plaintiffs were arrested under criminalized all begging in public places. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, challenged the constitutionality of the statute, both on its face and as applied, and sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the enforcement of the statute violated their rights under the First Amendment, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause. They further alleged that the defendants failed to train, supervise, and discipline their personnel and officers to act in accordance with the Constitution. On Aug. 24, 2012, District Judge Robert J. Jonker granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Speet v. Schuette, 889 F. Supp. 2d 969 (W.D. Mich. 2012). The court found that the statute, on its face, violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the statute was a content-based restriction on protected speech in a public forum, and that it caused disparate treatment. The court found that the defendants failed to demonstrate that the statute was narrowly tailored to its purported purpose of preventing fraudulent or dishonest panhandling. The statute was therefore held unconstitutional. The defendants appealed the decision, and on Aug. 14, 2013, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court (726 F.3d 867), holding that soliciting alms was protected under the First Amendment and that the Michigan statute was unconstitutional. In 2013, following the appeal, the ACLU reached settlement agreements with the State of Michigan and the City of Grand Rapids regarding damages and attorney's fees. The City of Grand Rapids approved a $48,000 settlement on October 8, 2013. The terms of the settlement agreements were not otherwise made public and the case closed shortly after. The ACLU subsequently identified approximately 80 local ordinances in Michigan similar to the state law held unconstitutional by the Sixth Circuit, and sent letters to the municipalities requesting changes to the ordinances. This effort led to an additional suit, Cuthrell v. Charter Township of Waterford, which also settled after the township revised its statute.

Summary: A homeless resident and a veteran with disabilities who had been arrested and prosecuted under a Michigan anti-begging statute sued the City of Grand Rapids and its police department, challenging the constitutionality of the statute. The district court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, and later issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the statute. The defendants appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed.


On March 13, 2017, individuals disenfranchised because of their felony convictions filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. The plaintiffs sued the governor of Florida, members of his cabinet, and the other members of the Florida Executive Clemency Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by lawyers from Fair Elections Legal Network, sought certification as a class, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. They argued that Florida's re-enfranchisement scheme in which the Executive Clemency Board exercised "unfettered discretion" regarding the re-enfranchisement of felons violated the plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process clause. The defendants' moved to dismiss the complaint on June 13, 2017, citing a failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for which relief can be granted. Defendants' claimed that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment affirmatively authorizes states to permanently disenfranchise convicted felons, and that authority was not circumvented by right to vote claims in the First Amendment or in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. They contended that the Florida re-enfranchisement scheme is more generous than what is required under the Constitution. For the next year, the parties engaged in discovery. the cross-motions for summary judgment were delivered on February 1, 2018. On March 27, 2018, Judge Mark E. Walker granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment challenge to the board's discretion over re-enfranchisement, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenge to the arbitrary allocation of re-enfranchisement by the board, and the First Amendment challenge to the lack of timelines for re-enfranchisement which could result in viewpoint discrimination. He denied the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth amendment challenges to Florida's five-to-seven year waiting periods before felons can begin the re-enfranchisement process. This last count was the basis for the plaintiffs seeking class certification, so the plaintiffs then withdrew their motion for class certification following the ruling. Judge Walker permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the unconstitutional voter registration scheme. Additionally, he ruled that defendants must promulgate specific and neutral criteria to direct vote-restoration decisions before April 26, 2018. The court additionally retained jurisdiction to monitor defendants' compliance, as well as to entertain motions for attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants appealed the judgment to the 11th Circuit on April 4, 2018. 315 F. Supp. 3d 1244. On April 25, 2018 the 11th Circuit stayed injunctions granted by the district court, pending the resolution of the appeal. (Circuit Judge Stanley Marcus, William H. Pryor, and Beverly B. Martin). 888 F.3d 1206. The court expedited the appeal and heard oral arguments on July 25, 2018. On November 6, 2018, Florida voters amended their state constitution regarding the re-enfranchisement of convicted felons by referendum vote. On July 1, 2019, the Florida legislature revised its statutory scheme for re-enfranchisement, setting into motion a new system for vote restoration. Plaintiffs became eligible to seek restoration of their voting rights under the new system. Finding that no plaintiff required relief under Florida's former re-enfranchisement system, the 11th Circuit held that the case was moot. 946 F.3d 1272 (Chief Judge Ed Carnes, Circuit Judge Elizabeth L. Branch, and District Judge Darrin P. Gayles, sitting by designation). On January 30, 2020, Chief Judge Walker dismissed the case as moot.

Summary: In 2017, disenfranchised ex-felons in Florida filed a claim in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Plaintiffs alleged that Florida's felon re-enfranchisement scheme violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2018, the court found the Defendant's policy unconstitutional, enjoined them from continuing its implementation, and required the promulgation of a new policy complying with the ruling. Defendants appealed, and the 11th Circuit stayed the district courts injunctions pending resolution of appeal. Oral arguments were held later in 2018, and the case remains open. In November of 2018, Florida voters amended their state constitution regarding the re-enfranchisement of convicted felons by referendum. Because of the changes to the re-enfranchisement system, the 11th Circuit found the case to be moot. Chief Judge Walker dismissed the case on January 30, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: Challenge to Arizona law requiring in-person signatures on ballot initiatives in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court found for the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. However, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the appeal on May 19. <hr> On April 2, 2020, two Arizona non-profit organizations and one Arizona elector filed this lawsuit against the Arizona Secretary of State and all Arizona County Recorders in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a state law governing the signature-gathering process for ballot initiative measures (Title 1, Chapter 19, Arizona Revised Statutes). Specifically, they argued that given the COVID-19 pandemic, the law's prohibition on use of the state's online signature-gathering platform violated the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. The plaintiffs requested declaratory relief and an injunction that would allow initiative petition proponents and supporters to use Arizona's secure online signature-collection system; they moved for a preliminary injunction to that effect. The case was assigned to Judge Dominic W. Lanza. On April 6, 2020, the State of Arizona filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. On April 9, the court granted the State of Arizona's motion, finding that the State needed to be made a party in order to adequately resolve the case. 2020 WL 1808667. On April 8, 2020, the Speaker of Arizona House of Representatives filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. On April 10, the court denied the motion, finding that the Speaker's participation was not necessary in order to fairly litigate the merits of the case. 2020 WL 1821991. Numerous amicus curiae filed briefs with the court regarding the motion for preliminary injunction. On April 16, 2020, the State of Arizona filed a motion to conditionally certify the question as to whether the plaintiffs have standing to bring the claim in light of unchallenged state constitutional requirements about in-person voting. Since the question of state law could be dispositive, the defendant argued that the district court should certify the question to the Arizona Supreme Court so that the state law question could be resolved. On April 17, 2020, Judge Lanza dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Specifically, he noted that the requested relief would be unlikely to redress the plaintiffs' injuries, that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, and that granting a temporary restraining order would not be in the public interest. 2020 WL 1905747. On April 20, 2020, the plaintiffs' appealed the district court's order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On May 5, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for injunctive relief, as the plaintiffs did not challenge the Arizona constitutional requirement of in-person signatures. On May 18, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal voluntarily, and the next day the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal and canceled the mediation.

Summary: Non-profits and electors in Arizona challenged state law that required in-person signature collection for ballot initiatives. They argued that the law unconstitutionally burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights given the COVID-19 pandemic and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the use of an online system to collect signatures. The district court dismissed the complaint and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal on May 19.


The Miami District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against BJ's Wholesale Club, a membership warehouse retail store, on behalf of several Puerto Rican and African American employees. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida on September 28, 2006, the complaint included claims of race and national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that Puerto Rican and African American employees were harassed and subject to a hostile work environment because of their national origin and/or race. The EEOC sought injunctive relief to halt unlawful practices and implement policies providing equal employment opportunities, as well as monetary damages to the employees for past and future losses, pain, and suffering, and punitive damages and costs. The case was referred by Judge Alan S. Gold to Magistrate Judge William S. Turnoff. Judge Turnoff oversaw discovery motions over the course of several months and ordered the parties to participate in mediation. The defendant moved for summary judgment on Novembeer 9, 2007. The motion was terminated when the parties notified the court that a settlement had been reached on March 20, 2008. On April 1, 2008, Judge Alan S. Gold approved a consent decree. The consent decree, to run for three years, enjoined the defendant from engaging in unlawful discriminatory behavior. It required the defendant to develop an anti-discrimination policy, post and distribute notices of equal employment opportunity rights, provide annual training on equal employment laws to its managers and supervisors, keep records of complaints of discrimination, and provide bi-annual reports to the EEOC of the progress. Additionally, the defendant agreed to pay $100,000 to the two charging parties. The decree stated that the EEOC would have independent authority to seek judicial enforcement of the decree. The time period for the decree expired in 2011 and the case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2008, the EEOC brought suit against BJ's Wholesale Club alleging the creation of a hostile work environment due to unlawful discrimination on the basis of national origin and race. In 2008, the parties reached a settlement that required the defendant to pay monetary damages to the plaintiff and to develop an anti-discrimination policy, post and distribute notices of equal employment opportunity rights, provide annual training on equal employment laws to its managers and supervisors, keep records of complaints of discrimination, and provide bi-annual reports to the EEOC of the progress. Additionally, the defendant agreed to pay $100,000 to the two charging parties. The case is closed.


On April 10, 1998, the United States notified Governor Pedro P. Tenorio of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (Commonwealth) of its intention to investigate conditions at the corrections and detention institutions on the Commonwealth pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. The United States investigated conditions at six facilities: the Saipan Prison Complex, the Saipan Detention Facility ("SDF"), the Kagman Youth Facility on Saipan, the Saipan Immigration Detention Facility, the Tinian Detention Facility, and the Rota Detention Facility. On August 5, 1998, the United States sent a findings letter to the Governor stating that conditions at these six facilities violated the constitutional rights of the inmates. The investigation was initiated after the Justice Department (DOJ) received reports that the prisons and jails had severe safety, health, sanitation, fire-safety and security deficiencies. Cells were locked with padlocks, fire alarms did not function, showers were caked with mold, buildings lacked artificial lighting, the facilities lacked any medical personnel or any health screenings, resulting in a tuberculosis epidemic, and buildings lacked ventilation and adequate staffing. After notifying the Commonwealth of its findings, the United States filed a lawsuit on February 23, 1999, in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands against the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to CRIPA and the Police Pattern and Practice of Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. §14141. The complaint alleged failure to provide adequate supervision, security, and medical and mental healthcare for both pre-trial detainees and post-conviction prisoners. The United States also alleged that the Commonwealth failed to ensure adequate environmental health, sanitation, and fire safety for the pre-trial detainees and post-conviction prisoners. This case was assigned to Chief Judge Ramona V. Manglona. Concurrent with the complaint, the parties filed a consent decree that provided for: facility population projections, space requirements, programming and services including medical care, mental health care, food service, and protection from harm, staffing and staff training, security and emergency planning, funding, fire safety measures, food sanitation provisions, hygiene and sanitation provisions, health screenings, and increased security. The district court approved the consent decree on February 25, 1999. On June 4, 2009, the district court held that after a "rocky" start, the Commonwealth, had made progress. The court noted that in 2003, the defendant had begun submitting quarterly reports outlining the status of operations at the Adult Correctional Facility, Immigration Detention, Juvenile Detention Unit, Rota Detention, and Tinian Detention. Coordination had been ongoing between the Commonwealth and the DOJ in the form of formal reports as well as frequent, informal exchanges of information between the parties. Substantial progress had been made by the Commonwealth including a collaborative, constructive relationship with the DOJ. Following the on-site visit to all of the governed facilities by counsel and retained experts on behalf of the DOJ, progress continued on the issues identified by the parties. The district court ordered the Commonwealth to provide information regarding their medical system to the DOJ for review to assess substantial compliance and the long-term sustainability of the medical system. On January 30, 2014, the district court deferred ruling on the joint motion to terminate the consent decree pending the parties' submission of a final report. The final status report was filed on April 30, 2014. After finding that the Commonwealth had substantially complied with the terms of the consent decree, the court granted the joint motion to terminate the consent decree on May 20, 2014. This case is now closed.

Summary: On February 23, 1999, following an investigation of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands’ (Commonwealth) prison system, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands against the Commonwealth pursuant to CRIPA and the Police Pattern and Practice of Misconduct Statute, 42 U.S.C. §14141. The complaint alleged failure to provide adequate supervision, security, and medical and mental healthcare for both pre-trial detainees and post-convicted prisoners. The United States also alleged that the Commonwealth failed to ensure adequate environmental health, sanitation, and fire safety for the pre-trial detainees and post-conviction prisoners. In 1999, the United States and the Commonwealth entered into a consent decree to ensure that the Commonwealth's correctional and detention facilities provided adequate health and safety conditions for inmates. The consent decree was terminated in 2014 after the court found that the Commonwealth had substantially complied with its terms. This case is now closed.


This suit, filed on September 20, 2017, challenged President Trump's authorization of the construction of a border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. The plaintiffs sued the federal government for failing to comply with existing laws and taking actions beyond the scope of its authority. President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13767 on Jan. 25, 2017; it directed DHS to "allocate all sources of Federal funds for the planning, designing and construction of a physical wall along the southern border." The EO cites as its authority the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). According to the complaint, IIRIRA "allows the Secretary of DHS to waive any law he or she deems necessary to expeditiously construct reinforced fencing authorized under that section." The complaint asserted that DHS twice attempted to exercise this waiver on Aug. 2 and Sept. 12, 2017 with respect to portions of the California border pursuant to the EO. According to the complaint, DHS seeks to enforce the EO through the "construction of a Border Wall, which includes but is not limited to the construction of prototype walls and fences, the construction of barriers and roads that are not in areas of high illegal entry, the construction of barriers that are not in areas where the fencing would be most practical and effective, and the replacement of existing walls and fencing along the United States-Mexico border." In so doing, the complaint argued that DHS violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Coastal Zone Management Act. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The complaint further argued that the IIRIRA waiver provision is "limited to the installation of 'additional barriers and roads...in areas of high illegal entry,'" and does not authorize replacement of existing barriers and roads, construction of temporary prototype walls, or the construction of barriers and roads in areas that are not "of high illegal entry into the United States." Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought declaration that the IIRIRA waiver provision does not apply to DHS' proposed activities pursuant to the EO, that the two California waivers do not comply with the IIRIRA waiver provision, and that both the California waivers and the IIRIRA provision itself violate Fifth Amendment due process, the separation of powers doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment. One plaintiff is the People of California, represented by the Attorney General. The suit sought to protect in particular California's natural resources, sovereign interests in enacting and enforcing state laws, and economic interests in trade and tourism with Mexico as well as property near the border. The other plaintiff is the California Coastal Commission, which is a state agency that implements the Coastal Zone Management Act in California. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas J. Whelan, then reassigned to Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on Oct. 5. The case was consolidated with two other cases on Oct. 24. The lead case, which will contain all future updates, is here. Since there was a final judgment, the case is now closed.

Summary: This suit, filed on September 20, 2017, challenged President Trumps authorization of the construction of a border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. The plaintiffs sued the federal government for failing to comply with existing laws and taking actions beyond the scope of its authority. President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) No. 13767 on Jan. 25, 2017, which directed DHS to "allocate all sources of Federal funds for the planning, designing and construction of a physical wall along the southern border." The EO cites as its authority the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The complaint argued that DHS violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, Fifth Amendment due process, the separation of powers doctrine, and the Tenth Amendment. The court in the lead case granted summary judgment for the defendant on Feb. 27, 2018. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: 6 immigrant detainees at the Adelanto Detention Center in San Bernadino County sought a temporary restraining order to secure their immediate release due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 2, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered the release of the six detainees. The case is currently stayed pending the resolution of a related class action.
 On March 30, 2020, six immigrant detainees filed a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by the ACLU of Southern California and the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, they alleged that their conditions of confinement in the detention centers violated their Fifth Amendment rights by being deliberately indifferent to their health and safety. The plaintiffs sought a writ of habeas corpus, or in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering the plaintiff's immediate release. The case was assigned to the Honorable District Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr and referred to Magistrate Judge Gail J. Standish. On April 2, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered the release of the six detainees. The court based its argument for release on the factual and legal grounds announced in the orders issued in  Castillo v. Barr and Hernandez v. Wolf. On April 3, the court filed an amended temporary restraining order and order to show cause under seal. On April 24, Judge Hatter, Jr., issued a stay order in light of the preliminary injunction issued in the resolution of the class action Roman v. Wolf -- until the class action is resolved, the detainees will remain released pursuant to the temporary restraining order. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Immigration detainees filed a writ of habeas corpus to secure a release from Adelanto Detention Center. On April 2, the court granted the release of the six detainees.


On October 7th, 2015, an inmate with Hepatitis C filed a civil rights action against the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The lawsuit was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The complaint asserted defendants' deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs violated his 8th and 14th Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants failed to provide appropriate care and treatment for plaintiff’s Hepatitis C. This practice had continued despite multiple requests by the plaintiff for medical care and substance evidence showed the plaintiff suffered from a severely damaged liver. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the DOCCS’ Hepatitis C Primary Care Practice Guidelines. The guidelines, which were heavily relied upon by facilities official in denying the treatment request, explicitly excluded from treatment any prisoner who is not drug or alcohol free for six months. Represented by Prisoners' Legal Services, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On October 9th, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunction. The next day, the court decided to reserve decision on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and impose an expedited briefing schedule on that motion. On November 30, 2015, defendants' council confirmed that the plaintiff began his 12-week course of treatment for Hepatitis C on November 25, 2015. Thus, plaintiff requested to withdraw the motion on injunction and the court granted it. On April 29, 2016, the parties informed the court a settlement had been reached. On May 6, 2016, Chief Judge Suddaby approved the stipulation and ordered that the case be dismissed. In the settlement, DOCCS agreed to pay the sum of $ 19,144.82 to plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel in settlement of all claims. In addition, the current DOCCS HCV Policy will be to amended to strike 6-month-free drug requirement as a per se exclusion for any care or treatment. Evidence of substance abuse will be considered as one factor among all others in evaluating each individual's need and suitability for care and treatment.

Summary: On October 7th, 2015, a prison inmate with Hepatitis C in the custody of New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) filed a civil rights action against several officials of different correctional facilities. The complaint asserted defendants' deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious medical needs violated his 8th and 14th Amendment rights. DPCCS had a policy that excluded from treatment any prisoner who is not drug or alcohol free for six months. The parties settled the case a year after it was filed. Besides paying monetary damage, DOCCS changed its HCV Policy to strike 6-month-free drug requirement as a per se exclusion for any care or treatment.


In this case, filed on 07/07/2005, as part of an ongoing criminal investigation in the Southern District of Texas, the government sought a court order compelling a cell phone company to disclose records of a customer's cell phone use. Among the records sought was "cell site data," which reveals the user's physical location when the cellphone is turned on. Following its standard practice for this district, the government combined its request for subscriber records with an application to install a pen register and trap/trace device on the target phone. The underlying order and application have been seals at the government's request, in order not to jeopardize the ongoing criminal investigation. However, the court did not seal a brief filed by the U.S. on August 23, 2005, and an opinion issued on October 14, 2005. These documents concerned a matter of statutory interpretation which did not hinge on the particulars of the underlying investigation. On August 23, 2005, the U.S. filed a brief on cell site information. The U.S. described how it traditionally used 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c) and (d) of the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell site information. However, in an unreleased memorandum date June 10, 2005, Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith raised two objections to that process. The U.S. addressed these objections by asserting a combined authority of both the pen/trap statute and § 2703 of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) to collect cell site information. On September 2, 2003, the Court granted the application in large part, authorizing the continued use of a pen register/trap and trace device and disclosure of certain customer records including historical cell site data. However, the order denied access to prospective cell site information. On October 14, 2005, Magistrate Judge Stephen Smith issued an opinion in which he again denied the government access to cell site locations. Judge Smith held that prospective cell site data qualifies as tracking device information under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and that the government could not obtain prospective cell site data under the statute governing authority for pen registers and trap devices. In addition, Judge Smith held that the government could not obtain cell site data pursuant to wiretap statute or provisions of the SCA authorizing disclosure of the contents of stored communications. Finally, Judge Smith held that the order authorizing the government's use of pen register/trap and trace devices could not be used in conjunction with an SCA order authorizing access to cellphone subscriber records to collect prospective cell site data without establishing probably cause required for tracking device. In re Application for Pen Register & Trap/Trace Device with Cell Site Location Auth., 396 F. Supp. 2d 747 (S.D. Tex. 2005). This all of the information available about the case. There were further orders in this case, but they remain under seal. In 2006, Judge Smith again addressed another U.S. request for cell site location in USA v. Pen Register, NS-TX-0001 in this Clearinghouse. Subsequently, in NS-DC-0062, the Foreign Intelligence Court ordered the U.S. to address the ongoing validity of the National Security Agency's internet metadata surveillance program in light of that 2006 decision in NS-TX-0001.

Summary: In 2005, the government applied to the Southern District of Texas to compel the cellphone company to disclose records of a customer's cellphone use, including cell site data, which reveals the user's physical location when the cellphone is turned on. The government combined its request for subscriber records with an application to install a pen register and trap/trace device on the target phone. The Court granted the order in part but denied access to prospective cell site information.


On April 22, 1996, two prisoners with developmental disabilities, incarcerated within facilities run by the California Department of Corrections (CDC), filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), against the State of California, its Governor, CDC and prison officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Law Office, the Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that the defendants violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants discriminated against them because of their disabilities, that their living conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and that the defendants had deprived them of due process. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ practice of confining prisoners with developmental disabilities in state prisons without offering sufficient protection from the general prison population was cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide accommodations required to allow the plaintiffs the same benefits and program participation opportunities afforded to non-developmentally disabled prisoners. On October 1, 1996, Judge Fern M. Smith denied the defendants' motions to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act, ADA, equal protection and Eighth Amendment claims and granted, in part, the defendants' motion to dismiss the due process claims, allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint with respect to the due process claim. The defendants appealed. Clark v. State, 1996 WL 628221 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 1996). On February 26, 1997, Judge Smith certified a class consisting of all present and future individuals with developmental disabilities under the control of the CDC. In January 1998, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional plaintiffs. Extensive discovery followed. On May 11, 1998, Judge Smith granted in part and denied in part the State defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judge Smith granted summary judgment on and dismissed the equal protection claims, and denied motions with respect to exhaustion of administrative and state remedies as well as for standing. Judge Smith also denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class. Clark v. State of Calif., 1998 WL 242688 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1998). Prior to the scheduled trial date, the parties engaged in negotiations under the supervision of Judge Eugene Lynch. The negotiations resulted in an interim agreement and stipulation that was filed on July 20, 1998. The interim agreement provided for, among other things, improved education, vocational programs, medical care, housing, and staff assistance for inmates with developmental disabilities. This plan was subject to negotiations between the parties and evaluation by court appointed experts. On August 18, 1998, Judge Smith appointed Peter Leone, Ph.D., and Melissa G. Warren, Ph.D. to be the court's experts to evaluate the defendants' compliance with the agreement, and filed a settlement agreement, implementing the interim agreement subject to monitoring by the plaintiffs' counsel and evaluation by the court's experts. On October 9, 1998, Judge Smith entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $2.8 million for attorneys' fees for all work performed before the execution of the interim agreement and stipulation. Between December 1999 and February 2002, other district court Judges Charles R. Breyer and Phyllis J. Hamilton approved various amendments to the settlement agreement. In March 2002, the CDC issued a comprehensive remedial plan which was adopted by the court. The remedial plan included detailed policies and procedures to assure identification, appropriate classification, housing, protection and nondiscrimination of prisoners/parolees with developmental disabilities. On December 3, 2001, the parties signed a settlement agreement granting relief to the plaintiff class. The defendants admitted "that they [had] violated the federal rights of plaintiffs in a manner sufficient to warrant the relief contained herein." Implementation and modifications to the 2002 remedial plan continued through 2007. In July 2009 the defendants filed a motion to terminate the settlement agreement, pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 60(b). The defendants declared that they were no longer violating the federal rights of prisoners with developmental disabilities, and that continued relief was no longer necessary because of these violations. On August 13, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce judgment. There was no dispute as to the utility of the settlement agreement and the Clark Remedial Plan. What was in dispute, however, was whether the order requiring compliance with the plan, including monitoring by the plaintiffs' counsel and the court's experts, was necessary. Investigating this issue, one of the court's experts conducted a review of the treatment of developmentally disabled prisoners and found that developmentally disabled inmates did not receive the protections and supports as described in the Clark Remedial Plan. On September 16, 2010, the District Court denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motion for relief. The court also granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for further relief. The court found termination of the entire settlement agreement unwarranted because ongoing violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights supported the continuation of relief. However, not all of the provisions of the settlement agreement were sufficiently narrowly drawn to meet the standards of the Prison Litigation Report Act (PLRA), so these provisions were terminated. In addition to upholding the majority of the settlement agreement, the court issued further remedial orders including staff training, better identification of class members by the defendants, and self-monitoring by the Defendants on their progress. Clark v. California, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2010). On December 29, 2010, the court granted the plaintiffs' attorneys an additional $2.3 million in fees. On December 16, 2015, the court agreed to a revision of the Remedial Plan. The revision eliminated the need for a post-rules violation consultation between the Chief Disciplinary Officer and the Developmental Disability Program clinician. Instead, the parties agreed to adopt the rules violation process developed in the case <i>Coleman v. Brown</i>. This process called for standardized mental health assessments. As of January 2020, the settlement agreement was still in place and monitoring was ongoing.

Summary: In 1996, two prisoners with developmental disabilities, incarcerated in California Department of Corrections (CDC) facilities, filed a class action lawsuit n the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA), against the CDC. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants discriminated against them because of their disabilities, that their living conditions constituted cruel and unusual punishment and that the defendants had deprived them of due process. The parties agreed to settlements in 1998 and 2002 in which the defendants agreed to improve conditions. The defendants are still working to comply with the settlement.


On June 18, 2014, Puente Arizona, an immigrant advocacy organization, along with two undocumented workers from the state of Arizona and a minister, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the state of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Arizona, the immigrant rights clinic of U.C. Irvine Law School, and the National Day Labor Organizing Network (NDLON), plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent further unconstitutional arrests and prosecutions, attorney’s fees as well as costs of suit, and the expungement of records for the two plaintiffs who, they alleged, had been improperly convicted. The plaintiffs challenged certain provisions of Arizona’s identity theft laws, which prohibit using a false identity to gain employment. The plaintiffs claimed that the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause mandates that federal law preempts that state law, because employment of immigrants is an area over which Congress has reserved exclusive authority. Arizona amended its identity theft laws to combat the “growing problem” of employment-related identity theft. H.B. 2779, also called the “Legal Arizona Workers Act” (“LAWA”), amended Arizona’s “aggravated identity theft” statute, A.R.S. § 13-2009. It defined aggravated identity theft as the use of information of any another person, real or fictitious person, with the intent of obtaining employment. H.B. 2745, titled “Employment of Unauthorized Aliens” (“EUA”), supplemented the Legal Arizona Workers Act by defining the offense of identity theft to include use of another’s information, real or fictitious, “with the intent to obtain or continue employment.” The bill specifically made this type of forgery, targeted at undocumented workers, a Class 3 felony, punishable by up to 7 years. These bills were passed, at least in part, in order to solve Arizona’s “illegal immigration problem.” The plaintiffs claimed that in enacting Section 1 of LAWA and Section 1 of EUA (“Section 1s”), Arizona impermissibly intruded on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate immigration, legislated in a field occupied by the federal government and imposed unauthorized burdens and penalties on noncitizens, all in violation of the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs claimed that Arizona’s worker identity provisions were therefore facially preempted and the defendants could not enforce them. The plaintiffs further claimed that Section 1s constitute impermissible discrimination against noncitizens on the basis of alienage, in violation of the federal Constitution's Equal Protection clause. The two undocumented plaintiffs in this case claimed to be personally affected by these laws. The plaintiffs, neither of whom had ever previously been charged with or convicted of a crime, were arrested at their respective places of employment by Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) deputies. Both were charged with using a false identity to work. Both plaintiffs pled guilty to their respective charges and were left with felony convictions that they believed would follow them for life, possibly impacting their chances for future immigration relief. On Aug. 7, 2014, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint and filed a motion for preliminary injunction the following day. On Sept. 10, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction along with a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. On Jan. 5, 2015, Judge Campbell granted plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from enforcing A.R.S. § 2009(A)(3) and the portion of A.R.S. § 13−2008(A) that addresses actions committed "with the intent to obtain or continue employment." 76 F.Supp.3d 833 (2015). All the defendants -- the State, the County, and the Sheriff -- appealed. While the appeal was being litigated in the 9th Circuit, the case continued in the District Court. On Mar.27, 2015 Judge Campbell denied reconsideration of the preliminary injunction. 2015 WL 1432674. On July 7, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. A month later Judge Campbell granted defendant’s motion that the matter not be conducted as a class action. In addition, Judge Campbell decided several discovery related matters: See 2016 WL 722949 (February 24, 2016); 2016 WL 2587991 (May 5, 2016). On May 2, 2016, the 9th Circuit completed its review of the preliminary injunction appeal, and reversed the district court. In an opinion by Judge Richard C. Tallman, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court erred in its ruling that Arizona’s employment-related identity theft laws were preempted in all applications. Therefore, the preliminary injunction was vacated and remanded for further proceedings to adjudicate the plaintiffs' remaining claims, including the "as-applied" preemption challenge. (The Court dismissed Maricopa County’s appeal, in particular, for lack of jurisdiction.) 2016 WL 1730588, 821 F.3d 1098. Back in District Court discovery proceeded. On July 1, 2016, defendants moved for summary judgment, and 5 days later plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. Judge Campbell heard oral argument on Oct. 13, 2016 and issued an order on Nov. 22. He granted in part both plaintiffs' and defendants' summary judgment motions on the preemption issue, and granted defendants' summary judgment motion on the equal protection issue. Judge Campbell held that federal immigration law demonstrated a clear Congressional intent to preempt only state prosecution of identity fraud in the employment eligibility process (the federal Form I-9), but not in other employment-related fraud (including Arizona's identity theft and forgery statutes). Further, Judge Campbell held that the Arizona statutes did not violate Equal Protection. Although the legislature enacted the laws to combat illegal immigration, it also did so to combat identity theft, a legitimate state interest. The statutes were also facially neutral, and thus survived rational-basis review. 2016 WL 6873294. Plaintiff then moved for injunctive relief on Dec. 16, 2016; Judge Campbell held a motion hearing on Mar. 9, 2017 and issued an order on Mar. 27. He entered judgment declaring that under the Supremacy Clause and ICRA, defendants were preempted from using information submitted solely for the federal employment verification process, in order to prosecute violations of A.R.S. § 13-2002, A.R.S § 13-2008(A), or A.R.S § 13-2009(A)(3). Judge Campbell enjoined MCSO from this practice, and ordered the Sheriff to create and distribute a written policy within 60 days. 2017 WL 1133012. On Oct. 25, 2017, Judge Campbell awarded $1,015,990 in attorneys' fees and $20,532.08 in non-taxable expenses to plaintiffs, against the Maricopa County Attorney in his official capacity, the Maricopa County Sheriff in his official capacity, and Maricopa County. Defendants could appeal by Jan. 26, 2018, but did not do so. On Jan. 26, 2018, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. The docket does not include the terms. This case is now closed.

Summary: This 2014 suit challenged Arizona laws affecting undocumented workers who used false identities to gain employment. In 2017, the court enjoined defendants from using information submitted solely for the federal employment verification process to enforce state identity-fraud statutes. The parties settled in 2018.


On Oct. 1, 2008, the Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission (IPAS) filed this lawsuit on behalf of a group of prisoners with serious mental illness in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. IPAS, represented by the ACLU, proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), asking the court for injunctive and declaratory relief. IPAS alleged that IDOC failed to adequately treat the prisoners in non-segregated and therapeutic environments, as required by the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, IPAS claimed that mentally ill prisoners were regularly held in isolation at multiple prisons throughout the state, and, for a number of them, the only contact they had with mental health staff was through brief conversations at their cell doors. The continued confinement of these mentally ill prisoners without adequate mental health care, IPAS argued, violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. Additionally, by placing these prisoners in segregated and isolated confinement, the state discriminated against them in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. IPAS is an agency created by Indiana state law pursuant to the federal Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act. It is charged with advocating for and protecting the rights and interests of, among other parties, individuals with mental illness. IPAS claimed in its complaint that, because of its unique role in protecting the interests of mentally ill adults in Indiana, it has standing to bring suit on their behalf. On December 15, 2008, IDOC filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and jurisdiction; the state argued that IPAS's complaint presented only an "intramural" dispute between two state agencies, and should be resolved by the governor. On July 21, 2009, the court (Judge David F. Hamilton) denied IDOC's motion. It held that the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act empowered IPAS to sue on behalf of its mentally ill constituents; and the organization also satisfied the constitutional criteria for standing. The court also held that IPAS was not a traditional state agency and was independent of the governor. 642 F.Supp.2d 872. On December 2, 2009, IPAS filed an amended complaint seeking class certification for all mentally ill prisoners in Indiana housed in settings that feature extended periods of isolation in cells. On April 27, 2010, the court (Magistrate Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson) granted IPAS's motion to certify the class. 2010 WL 1737821. On July 25, 2011, after some discovery disputes (see 603 F.3d 365), a bench trial commenced before Judge Tanya Walton Pratt; it lasted five days. On December 31, 2012, the court filed an entry following the bench trial. It found that segregation harms mentally ill prisoners in three ways: (1) the lack of social interaction itself creates problems associated with isolation; (2) the isolation involves significant sensory deprivation; and (3) the enforced idleness exacerbates the prisoners' symptoms of serious mental illness. The court went on to find that the mentally ill prisoners in IDOC segregation units do not receive minimally adequate mental health care and that IDOC has been deliberately indifferent regarding this care in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The court then scheduled a conference with both parties to establish an appropriate remedy to the constitutional violation. 2012e WL 6738517. From 2013-2016, the parties met to develop a plan for IDOC to remedy the constitutional violations found by the court. They entered status reports periodically throughout the years. On January 2, 2016, the parties proposed a settlement agreement that prohibited, with some exceptions, the confinement of seriously mentally ill prisoners in restrictive status housing or protective custody (i.e., solitary confinement). As a general rule, no prisoner who was seriously mentally ill would be placed into restrictive housing. The agreement defined severe mental illness to include people who entered solitary with less than severe mental illnesses but whose mental health deteriorated due to solitary. And, the agreement provided for "minimum adequate treatment" for these prisoners. IDOC also agreed to pay $585,000 in attorneys' fees. The agreement would last for three years. On March 24, 2016, Judge Pratt approved the settlement agreement finding that it was “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” The court was to retain jurisdiction over the case for three years at the conclusion of which the case will be dismissed without prejudice. On October 16, 2018, a class member filed a motion to order contempt of court, alleging that IDOC failed to comply with the settlement agreement. On October 18, 2018, Judge Pratt denied the motion, finding that no defendant was in contempt. In March 2019, a short time before the settlement was due to expire, the parties agreed to extend the settlement term. The state wanted to terminate the settlement in a different case about prisoners with serious mental illness at Indiana's Secured Housing Unit, Mast v. Commissioner, No. 2:05-cv-00037 (see related cases). The plaintiffs agreed to that termination if the settlement agreement in this case would be extended until one year after the Mast termination. The Court agreed to this approach. After a fairness hearing, the Mast district court terminated that case on July 23, 2019. Accordingly, this case's settlement term was extended until July 23, 2020. However, due to a 2018 fire in the Pendleton Treatment Unit and delays in repairs, plaintiffs reported that, as of March 2020, the group therapy requirements specified in the settlement agreement are not being met. Instead of the required 10 hours of of out-of-cell treatment a week, some inmates at Pendleton are only receiving 3-5 hours of group therapy each week. As a result, plaintiffs have proposed extending the settlement an additional one year, to July 23, 2021, to allow the IDOC to achieve and maintain full compliance with the terms of the settlement before its termination. The IDOC is considering this proposal, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2008, a federally-funded Protection and Advocacy organization filed this Southern District of Indiana lawsuit on behalf of prisoners with serious mental illness. After a bench trial, on Dec. 31, 2012, the court found that the Dept. of Corrections had violated the prisoners' 8th Amendment protections. In 2016, the parties reached a private settlement agreement, which was extended in March 2019 to last until July 2020. However, because the group therapy requirements prescribed by the settlement agreement are not currently being met, plaintiffs have proposed extending the settlement one additional year until July 2021.


On January 5, 2012, several same-sex couples in long-term, committed relationships filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the State of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the national and state ACLU and by private counsel, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, claiming that Michigan Public Act 297 of 2011 (the "Public Employee Domestic Partner Benefit Restriction Act"), violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that "by stripping family health care benefits only from the committed same-sex domestic partners of certain gay and lesbian public employees within the State of Michigan while allowing public employees' other family members access to such benefits, and by preventing public employers from offering such benefits to employees' same-sex domestic partners in the future," the State was in violation of the equal protection clause and the substantive component of the due process clause. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 2, 2012, the State moved to dismiss the complaint, and on March 7, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. A hearing on both motions was held on August 7. Almost a year later, and following the Supreme Court's ruling in U.S. v. Windsor, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (2013 WL 3285111). The court dismissed the plaintiffs' due process claim, but allowed their equal protection claim to proceed. The preliminary injunction forbade enforcement of Michigan Public Act 297 while the litigation was ongoing. In mid February 2014, both the State and the plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment. The court [Judge David M. Lawson] granted the plaintiff's request for summary judgment on November 12, 2014, and granted a permanent injunction of the Michigan Public Act 297 of 2011.

Summary: On January 5, 2012, several same-sex couples in long-term, committed relationships filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, against the State of Michigan, claiming that the State's denial of family health care benefits to same-sex domestic partners was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court granted the plaintiff's request for summary judgment on November 12, 2014, and granted a permanent injunction of the Michigan Public Act 297 of 2011.


On October 11, 2017, three indigent defendants convicted and sentenced to incarceration without the assistance of counsel filed this putative class action, in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Beaufort and the Town of Bluffton. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ policy, practice, and custom of denying counsel to indigent defendants in municipal courts violated their rights to counsel, equal protection, and procedural due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to contract with the Fourteenth Circuit Public Defender, Beaufort County Public Defender’s Office, or private attorneys for the provision of indigent defense in municipal courts and also failed to advise the plaintiffs of their rights to counsel. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (both the South Carolina affiliate and the national Criminal Law Reform Project), sought monetary damages to compensate for their wrongful confinement and additional injuries, including physical pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of income. In the complaint, the plaintiffs also sought class certification for all indigent individuals incarcerated in jail or prison upon conviction in Beaufort and Bluffton municipal courts without having been afforded their right to appointed counsel and advised of their right to appointed counsel, and who could not have sought habeas relief while in custody due to the brief period of actual confinement. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Gergel. On December 13, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The dismissal motion was based on three grounds: 1) the defendants, both of which are municipalities, had no authority under state law or duty under federal law to ensure that the plaintiffs were provided with counsel; 2) failure to make appropriation for appointed counsel under state law does not give rise to a federal cause of action; 3) the plaintiff’s claims were barred for lack of causation because a municipal judge was able to appoint counsel for indigent persons; and 4) the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the principles set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. On May 16, 2018, Judge Gergel denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and ruled that: 1) the defendants were required to provide counsel for the plaintiffs pursuant to Proviso 61.12 to the South Carolina 2017-2018 Appropriations Act, requiring the defendants to provide “adequate funds for representation of indigents;” 2) defendants’ failure to provide counsel for the plaintiffs is actionable under federal law due to violation of the Sixth Amendment; 3) it was foreseeable that the defendants’ failure to provide for indigent defense would result in a violation of the Sixth Amendment despite the ability of municipal judges to provide representation, among others. The case entered mediation, and on July 16, 2018, the Mediator (Judge Dutty) informed the court that the parties were making constructive progress in their settlement negotiations and requested a stay of the scheduling order. Judge Gergel granted the motion to stay. On September 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a consent motion for settlement, to resolve the plaintiffs’ claims for relief without certification of a settlement class. The settlement agreement stipulated the following agreements among the parties: 1. Mutual recognition of principles: the defendants shall not deprive indigent people of their constitutional right to counsel. 2. Policies and practices: the defendants will contract with the 14th Circuit Public Defender’s Office to provide defense attorneys in municipal court for indigent defendants facing possible incarceration; the defendants will appropriate sufficient funding to engage the Public Defender Office for legal service to indigent defendants; waiver of the right to counsel by indigent defendants must be made voluntarily, intelligently, and with full knowledge of the consequences. 3. Publication and dissemination of procedures: the defendant will publish and disseminate all policies, procedures, and guidelines to affect this agreement to all people involved in indigent defense and the public. 4. Training: municipals courts, public defenders, police officers, and other people who may process requests for counsel shall participate in training on the issue of right to counsel. 5. Payment: the defendants will pay a one-time total of $250,000 for all damages, attorneys’ fees, and expense. 6. Term & enforcement: the defendants shall comply with the agreement for 4 years, during which time the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina shall retain jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Judge Gergel granted the settlement agreement on October 7, 2019; it was to be enforced for four years, until 2023. The case is therefore open for enforcement of the agreement.

Summary: On October 11, 2017, three indigents convicted and sentenced to incarceration without the assistance of counsel filed this putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Beaufort and the Town of Bluffton in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ policy, practice, and custom of denying counsel to indigent defendants violated their rights to counsel, equal protection, and procedural due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. On October 7, 2019, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement, where the defendants will pay $250,000 and will implement policies to ensure indigent defendants' right to counsel. The settlement agreement has a term of 4 years.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On May 21, 2013, 17 Indian guestworkers filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012, in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International at its Orange, Texas site. Signal was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $20,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but, upon arrival in the United States, found that they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §201 et seq) as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by a private law firm. In December 2013, Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case sued based on events at Signal's Orange, Texas site, whereas plaintiffs in cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana sued based on events at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. 2013 WL 12138878. Although the Court declined to transfer this case, on May 30, 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn entered a consent order that discovery from the cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana would be allowed to be used here. Additionally, in December 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. In October 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn granted Signal's motion to compel production of plaintiffs' T- and U-visas and applications for such visas. 2014 WL 12597395. Although a similar motion had already been denied for the cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the court found that the materials' relevance outweighed any potential in terrorem effect. The Court warned that it would reconsider if Signal sought discovery that was clearly aimed at harassment. In July 2015, the court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, Samuel, the parties are updating the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. As of the parties' most recent update to the Court was on November 8, 2019. The update reported that the defendant Signal's bankruptcy proceedings closed on February 5, 2019, and that the distribution from the Signal Trust should occur in the next few months. As of November 22, 2019, the case is still ongoing.

Summary: On May 21, 2013, 17 Indian guestworkers filed suit in E.D. Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In July 2015, the Court ordered to stay the case due to Signal's bankruptcy, with status reports on the proceedings due every 120 days. On February 5, 2019, the bankruptcy proceedings closed and the parties are still submitting status reports as to when the funds will be disbursed.