On July 8, 1987, the Supporters of Developmentally Disabled New Mexicans, Inc. and twenty-one persons with developmental disabilities filed this class action in District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, challenging the institutionalization of developmentally disabled persons at two state-owned and operated institutions: 1) Fort Stanton Hospital and Training School (Fort Stanton) and 2) Los Lunas Hospital and Training School (Los Lunas). The New Mexico Human Services Department ran the institutions. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the defendants to allow developmentally disabled persons at Fort Stanton and Los Lunas to live in integrated, family-like settings within the community. In June 1988, the District Court (Judge James A. Parker) allowed more than 125 parents and guardians of residents of the facilities to intervene. The intervenors also wanted to bring the facilities into compliance with federal law, but opposed the plaintiffs' efforts to require the mandatory transfer of residents to community-based facilities. On May 23, 1989, the District Court certified the class. The class consisted of all persons who resided at either facility or who would become residents while the action remained pending, and all persons who had been transferred from these two institutions to other state facilities. The class was divided into two subclasses: (1) those who sought both closure of Fort Stanton and Los Lunas and community placement of the residents, and (2) those who sought to improve the conditions at the institutions, but opposed mandatory transfers of residents. Thirteen of the original plaintiffs were named class representatives. Trial began in October 1989 and continued for eight weeks through April 1990. Evidence was presented at trial by the original thirteen plaintiffs as to conditions at the institutions. Following the trial, the plaintiffs moved to disqualify District Judge Parker due to ex-parte communications with the court-appointed expert. The motion was denied. 757 F.Supp. 1231 (D.N.M.1990). On December 28, 1990, the District Court (Judge Parker) entered a comprehensive order in which it made detailed findings of fact based on the evidence presented at trial. 757 F.Supp. 1243 (D.N.M. 1990). The court found that the conditions at Fort Stanton and Los Lunas violated the plaintiffs' rights under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and under the substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties were ordered to submit a plan to correct the numerous deficiencies. The court set the deadline for correction for September 10, 1991. The order required the development of individual programs of treatment for the residents of the facilities, the prevention of abuse and reduction of accidents and injuries to the residents, better training and supervision of staff, and improvements in treatment, record keeping, and services in other areas. The defendants were also ordered to prepare a plan for transfer to a community setting for each resident of Fort Stanton and Los Lunas who had been recommended for transfer by an interdisciplinary treatment team (IDT). The IDTs were prohibited from considering the availability of community facilities when making their transfer evaluations. The intervenors appealed, but the defendants did not join in the appeal. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Tacha) reversed in part and remanded the case, holding that the District Court went too far when it ordered that the IDTs were prohibited from considering the availability of community facilities when making transfer decisions. 964 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1992). On January 27, 1994, the lower court granted plaintiffs leave to amend to include a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act in the complaint. Thereafter, the remedial stage of the litigation continued. In 1994, New Mexico elected to close Fort Stanton by 1995 and transfer all residents to community-based services. The parties filed a joint motion to modify portions of the District Court's December 1990 order and to terminate its Fort Stanton requirement upon closure. The court granted the motion, relieving the defendants from making further improvements to Fort Stanton. Los Lunas was eventually closed in 1997, and its residents were similarly moved into community-based care facilities. To ensure that the plaintiffs' rights were not being violated in the community settings going forward, and to "define the further actions and requirements which the defendants must complete and the services, supports, and benefits which must be provided," the parties filed their Joint Stipulation on Disengagement ("JSD"). After a fairness hearing on November 20, 1997, the District Court entered an Order Approving Stipulation on Disengagement on December 19, 1997. On April 2, 1999, the defendants filed a motion for relief from the court's December 19, 1997 order, based on the recent Supreme Court opinion in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1997). The defendants argued that Coeur d'Alene Tribe effectively narrowed an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, such that it was no longer applicable to the defendants in this case. The defendants requested that the Court vacate the JSD and dismiss the case. District Judge Parker denied the motion on September 7, 1999. 1999 WL 35808917. Remediation continued. As substantial compliance with certain provisions and requirements of the JSD was achieved, the defendants notified the Court and filed motions to terminate oversight of those specific JSD provisions. On October 31, 2003, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to vacate the JSD or to stay the proceedings while Frew v. Hawkins was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. Frew addressed issues of state immunity regarding enforcement of consent decrees. 540 U.S. 431 (2004). In May 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order to show cause and for further remedial relief to require the defendants to comply with the court's 1997 order approving the JSD. On May 20, 2005, the District Court adopted a joint stipulation of the parties which resolved disagreements over the defendants' compliance with certain JSD provisions. This created new obligations for the defendants, requiring them to address deficiencies in the following areas: case management; quality enhancement; incident management; behavior services; crisis services; sexuality services; supported employment services; vocational rehabilitation; and day services. The improvements required by the Joint Stipulation were supposed to be implemented by the end of fiscal year 2007. The defendants were not in full compliance with the Joint Stipulation by this point. So on December 21, 2007 the court entered an order appointing Dr. Sue Gant as a Rule 706 Expert, defining her role to be "to substantially assist the Court in the determination of compliance with the orders of the Court, including the Joint Stipulation[.]" Dr. Gant has issued several reports over the years as part of this role. On July 15, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for further remedial relief, alleging that the defendants were in substantial non-compliance with the JSD and the joint stipulation with respect to providing adequate health care, safe environments, and adequately supported employment for class members. On February 9, 2011, the court denied this motion without prejudice, as it pertained to issues that could not be resolved until after the results of an evidentiary hearing and thus would need to be rewritten. The evidentiary hearing occurred between June 13 and June 17, 2011. On November 14, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for further remedial relief, in light of the outcome of the hearing. On October 12, 2012, as a result of the June 2011 hearing, the court issued extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2012 WL 13076262. It found that the defendants had not substantially complied with the JSD or the joint stipulation in many areas and had failed to comply with recommendations made by the 706 Expert (Dr. Gant), which would have moved them closer to compliance with the stipulations. The defendants failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that their failure to comply fully with the JSD did not defeat essential purposes of the JSD, e.g., to provide class members with adequate health care and a safe environment, and to provide class members with the opportunity to engage in a supported employment. The court agreed to appoint a Compliance Administrator with the appropriate expertise "to prod Defendants into final substantial compliance." The court held that the defendants should be in compliance with the JSD and joint stipulation within 18 months of the appointment of the Administrator. Additionally, in the October 12, 2012 findings of fact and law, Judge Parker also granted the plaintiffs leave to file a motion under a claim of disparate treatment, arising from the allegation that the defendants denied services and opportunities to more severely disabled class members than it granted to less severely disabled members. By allowing this, the court elected not to follow the recent Tenth Circuit precedent case Cohon v. New Mexico Dept. of Health, 646 F.3d 717 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that the courts do not recognize disparate treatment between different degrees of disability to be prohibited discrimination), and finding the holding in that case to be contrary to the landmark Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). On January 1, 2013, Dr. Sue Gant was appointed Compliance Administrator, with the consent of the parties. She was scheduled to make progress reports every six months, beginning July 2013. From 2013-2016, the defendants periodically filed unopposed motions for partial disengagement from portions of the JSD and the Joint Stipulation. On November 21, 2014, the defendants filed "evaluative components" as directed by the court to assess its progress with meeting the goals and objectives of the Safety, Health, and Supported Employment Plans, all remaining obligations. The defendants continued to file occasional motions for partial disengagement. On April 3, 2015, the court determined that the defendants were not yet in complete compliance with the goals and objectives previously set out and directed the parties to continue to work together on compliance. In June 2015, the parties jointly filed a revised final list of objectives in the areas of health, safety, and supported employment with projected completion dates. In August 2015, the defendants moved to vacate all consent decrees and to terminate the court's oversight, arguing that changed factual circumstances warranted the requested relief. The court denied the motion in 2016 and the defendants appealed to the Tenth Circuit. On January 23, 2018, the Tenth Circuit vacated the District Court's 2016 order and remanded for the lower court to make up-to-date findings and determine whether the defendants were currently violating class members' rights. Jackson v. Los Lunas Cmty. Program, 880 F.3d 1176 (2018). After the Tenth Circuit remanded, the parties engaged in discovery. In 2018 and early 2019, the parties conducted discovery before determining that the most efficient and appropriate resolution was to enter a settlement agreement. Back in the district court, on April 17, 2019, the parties jointly filed a motion asking the Court to give preliminary approval to the settlement agreement. On April 18, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the motion. On April 19, 2020, the Court approved the preliminary settlement agreement and directed the parties to issue notice to all plaintiff class members and intervenors. On June 4, 2019, the parties filed their joint motion for final approval, joint memorandum, and final settlement agreement. The court held a hearing on June 12, 2019 on final approval of the settlement agreement. In a June 21, 2019 opinion, Judge Parker granted final approval of the settlement agreement. 2019 WL 2581629. Judge Parker explained that the settlement agreement was designed to eliminate the backlog of incident investigations and mortality reviews, as well as to implement procedures for timely investigation of incidents and timely mortality reviews. The settlement agreement required Defendants to provide health-related services, such as having new state-employed nurses reviewing and monitoring the health of class members and taking corrective action as necessary. The settlement agreement also outlined procedures to collect additional data on the healthcare needs of class members. On October 3, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for injunctive relief regarding the actions of the community monitor, and a motion to enforce the settlement agreement as to the operation of the individual quality review. Through these motions, the defendants asked the court to clarify the procedure for state employees going through the qualification process to become a reviewer for the Individual Quality Review (IQR). In a November 6, 2019 opinion, Judge Parker granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to enforce the settlement agreement as to the operation of the IQR and declare reviewer qualified. The defendants' motion for injunctive relief regarding the actions of the community monitor were denied as moot. 2019 WL 5789243. On April 5, 2020, Judge Parker issued an opinion on the Defendant's motion from December 2013 to disengage a paragraph of the settlement agreement. The Defendants contended that they had substantially complied with the agreement and therefore asked the court to terminate its oversight of those activities. In his opinion, Judge Parker found that the defendants had shown substantial compliance, as evidenced by the Defendants' scores on their quality assurance reviews, and he granted the motion. 2020 WL 1676648. In January of 2020, the defendants filed a motion to disengage another paragraph pertaining to the timeliness and adequacy of mortality reviews of death. The defendants again argued that they were in substantial compliance with the provision and asked the court to terminate its oversight of the activities. On May 19, 2020, Judge Parker issued an opinion that denied defendants' motion to disengage the provision. The defendants had said that an annual report meeting would occur in the near future, and this meeting would review the Mortality Review Committees (MCR) recommendations for systemic change. Judge Parker explained that this meeting is a required step of the settlement agreement, and a planned future event does not show substantial compliance with the settlement agreement. On those grounds, the court denied the defendants' motion. 2020 WL 2542021. As of July 2020, the court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of the settlement agreement, and the case remains open.

Summary: On July 8, 1987 a class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico, challenging the institutionalization of developmentally disabled individuals at two state-run facilities, and seeking to have the residents transferred into community living situations. In June of 1988, a group of parents and guardians of class members intervened, opposing the Plaintiffs' efforts to require the mandatory transfer, but seeking to improve the conditions at the facilities. In 1990, the Court ruled that the facilities were in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and required the parties to develop a plan for remediation. The two facilities both later closed, one in 1995, and the other in 1997, however the State of New Mexico still had remedial obligations arising from the 1990 decision. In 1997 the parties consented to a Joint Stipulation on Disengagement, wherein the defendants made extensive commitments relating to the services provided to the plaintiff class members. This agreement was modified by a 2005 Joint Stipulation, and in 2010 the plaintiffs filed a motion alleging non-compliance with the two joint stipulations. This led the court to conduct fact-finding hearings and, in October 2012, to release a 200-plus page Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, holding that the defendants were substantially non-compliant. In January 2013 the court appointed a Compliance Administrator, and stated that it expected the Defendants to come into full compliance within 18 months. As of 2020, the court retains jurisdiction over enforcement of the settlement agreement, and the case is ongoing.


On September 29, 2006, the Denver Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued Home Depot U.S.A. Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC, representing a former Home Depot employee, asked the court for a permanent injunction enjoining Home Depot from retaliating against employees who complain about discrimination and for monetary relief for the harm caused to the former employee. The EEOC claimed that Home Depot retaliated against the former employee when it terminated her employment five weeks after it issued her a settlement check for a previous suit resolving charges of discrimination. On July 11, 2008, U.S. District Judge Lewis T. Babcock denied Home Depot's motion for summary judgment. Home Depot argued that the EEOC did not establish a case for retaliation because it did not demonstrate that the former employee had engaged in protected activity beyond her initial charge of discrimination or that there was a causal connection between a protected activity and her termination. Judge Babcock rejected this argument because filing a charge of discrimination is in and of itself a protected activity. Judge Babcock further found that negotiating a settlement agreement against Home Depot further constituted a protected activity, and the agreement was negotiated sufficiently close to her termination to indicate a possible causal relationship. 2008 WL 2744968. On July 29, 2009, Judge Babcock approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. The agreement included injunctive and monetary relief. Specifically, agreement enjoined the defendant from reprisal or retaliation of any employee who complains about violations of Title VII or who serves as a party or witness in a lawsuit under Title VII. It further stipulated that the defendant must require trainings for managerial and supervisory staff and human resources staff. These trainings must address employees rights under Title VII, the defendant's anti-retaliation policy, and penalties for engaging in retaliation. The defendant was also required to submit reports of complaints of retaliation, trainings, and postings of notice. The monetary relief covered lost wages and compensatory damages totaling $84,750. The agreement's effective period was two years, and there is nothing further in the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.

Summary: On September 29, 2006, the Denver Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued Home Depot U.S.A. Inc. under Title VII. The plaintiff claimed that Home Depot retaliated against the former employee when it terminated her employment five weeks after it issued her a settlement check for a previous suit resolving charges of discrimination. On July 29, 2009, Judge Lewis T. Babcock approved a settlement agreement. The agreement included injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from retaliating against employees who complain about violations of Title VII and monetary relief of $84,750. The agreement's effective period was two years, and there is nothing further in the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.


Parents of female student-athletes at Florida High School Athletic Association (FHSAA) member schools filed suit on June 16, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the Athletic Association, alleging that the Association's "Policy 6" violated the students' rights under Title IX of the Education Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and State law. Policy 6 reduced the athletic schedules of all high school sports except boys' football and competitive cheerleading. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Policy 6 constituted illegal sex discrimination, a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the implementation of the new Policy 6 and any other scheduling cuts that would inequitably burden one sex over another, monetary damages, attorneys' fees and costs and any other remedies available at law. The plaintiffs alleged that Policy 6, which reduced the number of competitions that a school can schedule by 20% while excluding boys' football, discriminated against female athletic teams by inequitably reducing the scheduling of games and practice times in contravention to federal and state law. Although Policy 6 also excluded cheerleading, cheerleading was not recognized as a sport for purposes of Title IX in the state of Florida. The plaintiffs claimed that even if cheerleading were included, Policy 6 exempted nine times as many boys as girls from the scheduling requirement. The parties reached a settlement Agreement on October 7, 2009, in which FHSAA agreed not to make any changes to Policy 6 that treats one gender differently than the other. The Association agreed to evaluate the effects on each gender before implementing any changes, and to give two weeks-advanced notice before implementing any changes to the policy. The Association also agreed to provide training to all attendees of the Association's Assemblies and Seminars regarding the Association's obligations under Title IX and other applicable gender equity laws. The settlement was in effect until 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: Parents of female student athletes filed suit against the Florida High School Athletic Association, alleging that it violated Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it limited the number of athletic competitions that a school could schedule, but exempted boys' football. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Association agreed to review any changes to existing policies for potential disparate treatment before implementing them.


On March 7, 2008, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division issued a CRIPA/ADA findings letter to the State of Nebraska that detailed systemic conditions that violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the residents of the Beatrice State Developmental Center (BSDC), the State's largest facility for persons with developmental disabilities. At the time, BSDC housed close to 350 residents. The parties then swiftly concluded negotiations on a judicially enforceable remedial agreement. On June 30, 2008, the United States of America filed suit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Nebraska under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 against the State of Nebraska. The United States asked the court to require that the defendants comply with federal law and ensure that adequate protections, supports, and services are afforded to residents of the BSDC. Specifically, the United States claimed that the care at BSDC substantially departed from generally accepted professional standards of care, exposing residents to significant risks of harm and actual harm in the following respects: providing reasonable safe conditions; providing training to protect residents' liberty interests; providing adequate psychiatric, therapeutic, and health care services; and providing adequate nutritional and physical management. Additionally, the United States claimed that defendants failed to comply with ADA standards by excluding BDSC residents, by reason of their disability, from participating in and obtaining benefits from services, programs, or activities in an integrated setting appropriate to their needs. Further, the United States claimed that defendants failed to ensure that BSDC residents were evaluated for placement in the most integrated setting. On July 2, 2008, the U.S. District Court of the District of Nebraska (Judge Richard G. Kopf) issued an order stating that no hearing was required prior to the approval of a settlement agreement. On the same day, the parties and Judge Kopf signed a consent decree. The consent decree detailed the steps to be taken to ensure the health and safety of the residents, including protecting the residents from abuse and neglect, and taking effective steps to minimize or eliminate resident injuries and incidents that negatively impact their health, safety, and welfare. It also included provisions for ensuring compliance with the ADA standard of serving residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to meet each person's needs. The settlement agreement was intended to remain in place until the State implemented all of its provisions, which the parties anticipated would take four years. On August 3, 2015, seven years after the initial settlement agreement, Judge Kopf dismissed the case and terminated the settlement agreement responsive to motions from parties indicating that the State of Nebraska had fully complied with the settlement agreement.

Summary: On March 7, 2008, the Division issued a CRIPA/ADA findings letter to the State of Nebraska that detailed systemic conditions that violated the constitutional and statutory rights of the residents of the Beatrice State Development Center, the State's largest facility for persons with developmental disabilities. On June 30, 2008, the United States of America filed suit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 against the State of Nebraska. Specifically, the United States claimed that the protections, supports, and services at BSDC substantially departed from generally accepted professional standards of care and did not comply with ADA standards. On July 2, 2008, the U.S. District Court of the District of Nebraska (Judge Richard G. Kopf) and the parties signed a consent decree that detailed the steps to be taken to ensure the health and safety of the residents. In 2015, after the State fully complied with the agreement's terms, Judge Kopf dismissed the case.


On September 28, 2017, the New York Times Company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge John G. Koeltl and referred to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. Before bringing this action, the plaintiff had filed a FOIA request seeking records relating to the work of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division on affirmative action under the Trump administration. On August 1, 2017, the plaintiff reported in The New York Times that the DOJ had posted an announcement to the agency’s Civil Rights Division seeking lawyers for a new project involving “investigations and possible litigation related to intentional race-based discrimination in college and university admissions.” The plaintiff claimed that this announcement suggested that President Trump and his administration intended to use DOJ resources to investigate and sue universities over affirmative action admissions policies that allegedly discriminated against white applicants. After their FOIA request was denied, the plaintiff brought this action to obtain an order for the production of agency records from the DOJ and DOE. According to Charlie Savage of the New York Times' website, these documents were produced in November and December of 2017, after the complaint was filed. The produced DOJ documents and the DOE documents are both available through the same site. The parties filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal whereby they agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court accepted the stipulation on January 17, 2018. The case is closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the New York Times Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the Department of Justice and Department of Education had violated FOIA by failing to respond to the plaintiff's request for documents relating to the work of the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division on affirmative action under the Trump administration. The DOJ and DOE both produced the requested documents in late 2017, and the parties agreed to dismiss the case, which is now closed.


On March 31, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Eureka Marine Products Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The complaint alleged the the defendant had terminated all employees over the age of 40, in violation of the Age Discrimination of Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. Judge Francisco Besosa was assigned to this case. Over the next several months, the EEOC attempted to engage in discovery, but the defendant failed to respond to several discovery requests, even after the court ordered the defendant to comply. Therefore, on August 30, 2007, the EEOC moved for the defendant's pleadings to be stricken from the record and for a default judgment to be entered in favor of the plaintiff. On October 2, Judge Besosa granted the motion to strike pleadings. He gave the plaintiffs until October 16 to move for default judgment. On April 30, 2008, the court ordered the default judgment against the defendant, granting the plaintiffs monetary and injunctive relief. The defendant was to pay $398,330.19 in back pay to the four terminated employees. The injunctive relief ordered the defendant to refrain from age discrimination and retaliation at the workplace. The court concluded that the defendant violated the ADEA and that the claimants, identified by the EEOC, were entitled to monetary and injunctive relief. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Eureka Marine Products Co. of Puerto Rico, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The complaint alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination of Employment Act (ADEA). The defendant allegedly terminated all of its employees over the age of 60. In 2008, the court ordered a default judgment that awarded monetary and injunctive relief to the plaintiff. The court awarded $398,330.19 to the plaintiff, and prohibited the defendant from engaging in age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADEA.


On November 23, 2015, a former pre-trial detainee who had been confined for over 100 days at Rikers Island, a jail run by the New York City Department of Corrections (NYCDOC), filed this class action lawsuit. The case proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The complaint described the NYCDOC’s “Old Time Policy,” under which detainees who had been released prior to serving the entirety of a disciplinary sentence in solitary confinement served the remainder of their “old” time upon returning to jail. In some instances, this policy required people to serve time in solitary even if they had only received a disciplinary ticket many years earlier on a prior arrest. The complaint alleged that this policy violates substantive and procedural due process, under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff sought to bring the case as a class action, and asked for damages and attorneys’ fees. In the complaint, plaintiff defined the proposed class as all persons who have been pretrial detainees in the City’s custody held in punitive segregation to serve Old Time. On November 12, 2016, a new complaint was filed, naming additional plaintiffs similarly situated. Little more was changed. Settlement negotiations followed. On August 11, 2017, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Settlement after 18 months of negotiation, encompassing 15 conferences with the magistrate judge (Cheryl L. Pollak). The negotiations involved four main issues: 1) the overall amount of damages for the class; 2) the identification of class members; 3) the determination of compensation for each individual class member; and 4) the notice and claims process. At the end of the negotiations, parties agreed that each class member would receive $175 per day spent in punitive segregation (PSEG) while a pretrial detainee, as a result of the Old Time Policy. Class members diagnosed with a mental illness or who were under the age of 18 when they served PSEG time would receive $200 per day. The parties identified 470 class members. On average, class members received approximately $10,500 with an overall anticipated total amount paid of $4,963,175. The parties then created a procedure for locating and notifying class members. Plaintiffs therefore filed an unopposed motion for a class action settlement, conditional certification of the settlement class, and appointment of plaintiff’s counsel as Class Counsel on August 23, 2017. The court, on December 11, 2017, granted the motion, noting the procedural and substantive fairness in memorandum (Magistrate Judge Cheryl L. Pollak). 2017 WL 6375736. A Fairness Hearing was held on September 14, 2018, and the court issued a subsequent order giving final approval of the settlement on December 4, 2018. As of April 12, 2020, the case remains open for monitoring purposes and parties submit periodic status reports.

Summary: This case, filed in 2015 in the EDNY, alleged that the Rikers Island jail “Old Time Policy,” which requires that detainees released prior to serving the entirety of a disciplinary sentence in solitary confinement would serve the remainder of their “old” time upon returning, violates the substantive and procedural process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2017, the parties settled for $175-$200/day spent in solitary confinement. This case is ongoing


A faith-based women’s shelter in Anchorage filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska. The shelter, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, sued the Municipality of Anchorage and the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission for violating the organization’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. It alleged that Anchorage, acting in bad faith, had engaged in irrelevant, harassing, and overreaching investigations of the shelter, baselessly accusing the shelter of fair housing law violations and sex and gender identity discrimination. On November 1, 2018, the shelter sought a preliminary injunction prohibiting Anchorage from applying the city’s non-discrimination ordinance in a manner that violated the shelter’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, or its rights under Article 1 of the Alaska Constitution. The shelter alleged that as a homeless shelter, it was exempted from the non-discrimination ordinance by the explicit terms of the ordinance. The court granted the preliminary injunction on August 9, 2019. 406 F.Supp.3d 776. The following month, the parties presented a proposed consent decree to the court. Anchorage agreed not to enforce the non-discrimination ordinance against the shelter’s overnight living space policies, allowing the shelter to keep its overnight housing open only to persons who were determined to be female at birth. Anchorage also agreed to pay the shelter $1 in damages and $100,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The court issued the consent decree on October 2, 2019.

Summary: A faith-based women's shelter in Anchorage, Alaska filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Alaska. The shelter sued the Municipality of Anchorage and the Anchorage Equal Rights Commission, alleging that enforcement of the city's non-discrimination ordinance was a violation of the shelter's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The parties agreed to a consent decree in October 2019: Anchorage agreed not to enforce the non-discrimination ordinance against the shelter's overnight housing policies, and agreed to pay $1 in damages and $100,000 in attorneys' fees.


COVID 19 Summary: This case, filed in April 2020, rejected Kansas Governor Laura Kelley’s executive orders restricting mass gatherings at churches. The case ended in May 2020, when Governor Kelly’s new executive order allowed such gatherings. <hr> On April 7, 2020, Governor Kelly issued Executive Order 20-18, which explicitly forbade mass gatherings for churches and religious institutions while simultaneously allowing exemptions for certain secular activities. On the 15th, a Kansas church, First Baptist Church, sought permission to hold in-door services, following social distancing guidelines. The Governor’s office denied permission, but said that Governor Kelly would consider reviewing the order. Two churches and their pastors filed this lawsuit the next day in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Alliance Defending Freedom as well as private counsel. The complaint alleged that Kelly had violated plaintiffs' 1st Amendment rights of free exercise of religion, freedom of assembly, and freedom of speech. It also alleged violations of Kansas's Freedom of Religion Restoration Act. Central to each of these claims is the allegation that the order did not serve a compelling governmental interest and that it was not narrowly tailored, especially given the exemptions for some secular activities. The original complaint sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction prohibiting Kansas from enforcing Executive Order 20-18 against the plaintiffs, judgments declaring that the order violated the 1st Amendment and Kansas's Religious Freedom Restoration Act, attorney's fees, and any other relief to which they might be entitled. On April 17, 2020, plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order barring Governor Kelly from enforcing the executive order against them. Kelly filed a motion to dismiss the case on the same day. Also on the 17th, Governor Kelly issued Executive Order 20-25, which removed libraries and shopping malls from the list of exemptions to the order in 20-18. On April 18, the Court both denied Kelly's motion to dismiss and granted the churches' temporary restraining order, provided that they abide by social distancing guidelines. The order was set to expire on May 2nd, 2020. On April 22,, plaintiffs amended their original complaint, withdrawing the cause of action under Kansas's Religious Freedom Restoration Act and adding as defendants the Kansas Adjutant General, the Geary County Sheriff, and the Ford County Sheriff. By the parties’ agreement, the temporary restraining order was extended to May 16. On April 27, the Court denied Kelly's motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and denied modification of the temporary restraining order. 2020 WL 1984259. On April 30, Governor Kelly issued Executive Order 20-29, which replaced Executive Order 20-25. The new order allowed for religious services to open up to in-person worship as long as they followed social distancing guidelines. Citing the relaxed standards in the new order, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint without prejudice on May 4, 2020. This marked the end of the suit, and there are no further entries in the docket.

Summary: First Baptist Church and Calvary Baptist Church of Kansas sued Governor Laura Kelly after she issued a stay-at-home order in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. They alleged violations of free exercise, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. Plaintiffs argued that the restrictions were not narrowly tailored because they did not allow for church services even if social distancing guidelines were met. Furthermore, the relatively looser standards for some secular services like shopping malls and libraries evidenced a hostility towards religion, according to the plaintiffs. The Court issued a temporary restraining order, but plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case when Governor Kelly issued a new executive order allowing in-person church services to continue providing they follow social distancing guidelines.


On September 29, 2008, former prisoner in California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law, against the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and several of its officials. The plaintiff also sued WestCare California, Inc. and Mental Health Systems, Inc., corporations that contract with the state to provide treatment facilities for parolees with drug-related convictions. (Mental Health Systems was later voluntarily dismissed from the suit.) The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause when they forced him as a condition of his parole to participate in a residential treatment program that required him to acknowledge a higher power. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he was an atheist and that the defendants denied his requests to be placed in a secular rehabilitation program and then revoked his parole and incarcerated him when he refused to cooperate. The plaintiff also claimed that the state's religion-based treatment policies constituted an unlawful expenditure of state funds under California law. He sought an injunction to prevent California from using state funds in implementing and administering these policies. The plaintiff was incarcerated on drug-related charges at a California state prison in February 2006. A year later, he was released on parole on the condition that he participate in a twelve-step drug-treatment program. The program was religion based and required that participants acknowledge a supernatural power and engage in prayer as part of the recovery process. As an atheist, the plaintiff informed the defendants that such a program violated his beliefs, and he requested to be transferred to a secular program. The defendants responded that the state lacked secular treatment options, but they nevertheless invited the plaintiff to file an inmate/parolee appeal to ask for a change in his parole conditions. The plaintiff appealed on April 3, 2007. Three days later, state officials referred the plaintiff to the parole board for violating his parole by refusing to participate in the rehabilitation program. The plaintiff was arrested that day and incarcerated in a state prison for more than 100 days. On April 7, 2010, the Court (Judge Garland E. Burrell, Jr.) ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the state defendants on the Section 1983 claim, holding that the state violated the plaintiff's Establishment Clause rights by forcing him to participate in the religion-based rehabilitation program as a condition of his parole. 2010 WL 1407966 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 7, 2010). As to defendant WestCare, however, the Court determined that it was not liable for the Section 1983 violation because the plaintiff had failed to establish that WestCare caused the deprivation of his rights. The Court also rejected the plaintiff's state law claim against WestCare for injunctive relief. More specifically, it held that this taxpayer injunction claim was moot because the state had recently issued a directive mandating that individuals have the option of enrolling in secular treatment programs. On August 11, in an unpublished opinion, the Court (Judge Burrell) denied for similar reasons the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against the state defendants. After finding the state defendants liable for violating Section 1983, the Court (Judge Burrell) held a jury trial in June 2010 on the issue of damages. The jury awarded no damages to the plaintiff after a two-day trial, and the Court entered a judgment in accordance with this verdict. The plaintiff then asked for a new trial, claiming that the jury verdict was contrary to law and the weight of the evidence. On January 13, 2011, the Court (Judge Burrell) denied the plaintiff's request. 2011 WL 121643 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011). It held that the plaintiff had waived his right to challenge the verdict by failing to object to it before the jury was discharged and that the jury's verdict was consistent with its finding that none of the defendants caused the plaintiff's harms. The plaintiff appealed this ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on February 10, 2011. On August 23, 2013, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Dorothy W. Nelson, Judge Stephen Reinhardt, and Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.) reversed the district court's denial of a new trial and remanded the case for a determination of damages. Hazle v. Crofoot, 727 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2013). The Court began its opinion by noting that the plaintiff's failure to object to the jury's zero-damages verdict at trial did not constitute a waiver of his right to challenge that verdict. Turning to the validity of the verdict itself, the Court then held that because the district court found the state defendants liable for infringing the plaintiff's First Amendment rights the jury was not entitled to decline awarding the plaintiff compensatory damages. The Ninth Circuit also reversed the district court's holding that WestCare did not cause the plaintiff's injuries and therefore was not liable under Section 1983. Finally, the Court reversed and remanded the district court's determination that the plaintiff's state law injunction claim was moot, holding that undisputed evidence indicated that the mandate about secular treatment programs had yet to be meaningfully implemented. The parties then initiated settlement negotiations and eventually reached an agreement. On October 15, 2014, the district court dismissed the action with prejudice pursuant to the parties' stipulation for voluntary dismissal. According to the plaintiff's press release, reported in several newspapers, under the agreement, the plaintiff received $1.95 million ($1 million from the state and $925,000 from WestCare). This sum included attorneys' fees. The reports include no mention of any injunctive-like terms.

Summary: An atheist and former inmate in California filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law against the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and WestCare California, Inc., a private contractor that provides treatment facilities for parolees with drug-related convictions. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause when they forced him as a condition of his parole to participate in a residential treatment program that required him to acknowledge a higher power. After the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's judgment in favor of the defendants, the parties reached a settlement agreement under which the plaintiff received $1.95 million in damages.


On April 29, 2009, ten former foster children with special needs sued the City of New York and four private foster care agencies in the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs asserted a § 1983 claim for violation of their substantive due process rights and asserted a state law claim for negligence for allowing a foster parent family to fraudulently obtain foster care custody of children, adopt them, and subject them to abuse, neglect, torture, imprisonment, and deprivation of educational opportunities and medical care over course of more than 15 years. From 1986 to 1994, the plaintiffs were classified as special needs children by the agency, removed from their homes, and placed in the custody of the City. The agency defendants were private child care agencies that contracted with the City to provide foster care placement and other services for children in its custody. During this time, the private individual defendant, using at least four false identities, obtained foster care custody of plaintiffs and numerous other special needs children from the City and the agency defendants. She subsequently adopted each plaintiff. The defendant launched this scheme in order to collect subsidies provided by the City for the fostering and adoption of special needs children, which she used for her own purposes while neglecting to care for the plaintiffs. In 1998, the defendant transported the plaintiffs from New York to Florida, where she relocated them in various houses over the following years. With the exception of one child who left the house in which they lived sometime between May 2004 and May 2005, the plaintiffs remained with the defendant until July 2007, when Florida authorities searched the house in which they were then residing, discovered and removed the plaintiffs, and arrested the defendant. From the point when the defendant obtained custody of the plaintiffs until they were released, the defendant abused, tortured, neglected, and held the plaintiffs in captivity, first in New York and then in Florida. On December 19, 2012, the Court approved a settlement ("2012 Settlement") between the plaintiffs and the City in which the City agreed to pay the plaintiffs $9.7 million. Per the settlement, the City denied all allegation of wrongful conduct or liability and the plaintiffs agreed to fully and forever release any causes of action on claims arising from the action. Payment of the settlement was arranged to be made monthly for life, guaranteed for 30 years, beginning on March 1, 2013, with the last guaranteed payment on February 1, 2043. Following extensive litigation, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment. On January 17, 2014, the Court dismissed the claims against the foster agencies brought by plaintiffs L.J. and J.G., but the Court denied the motion as to the claims of all other plaintiffs. 46 F. Supp. 3d 176 (2014). On June 25, 2014, those eight plaintiffs and the private foster care agencies reached a settlement ("2014 Settlement") through mediation that awarded a total of $17.5 million to the plaintiffs. On September 19, 2014, the Court found that the June 2014 settlement was fair and was of the best interest of the plaintiffs. In particular, it approved allocating one-third of the settlement to attorneys' fees following New York custom. However, the Court referred the issue of costs to Magistrate Judge Go for a recommendation because the 2012 settlement called for reconsideration of costs in the event of another settlement. Plaintiffs subsequently reduced their cost request by 13.6%. On February 6, 2016, Judge Go recommended allowing $1.6 million in total costs along with a formula to equalize the costs across plaintiffs. After considering plaintiffs' objections, Judge Go issued minor updates to the February 6 report. The Court adopted Judge Go's modified report on July 17, 2017. Despite settlement of plaintiffs' original claims, litigation continued relating to defendants' cross-claims, including breach of contract, and third-party claims. On May 13, 2015, the City moved for a stay to avoid prejudice in National Union v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, a related state court suit involving defendants' insurance providers. The Court agreed to avoid actions that might affect the outcome of the state court suit but declined to stay the proceedings on February 7, 2017. Finally, the Court dismissed the remaining cross-claims and third-party claims on July 21, 2017. The case is now closed. In addition, the court in National Union found that payments by defendants' insurers must be allocated pro rata over the period of abuse subject to "self-insured retention" payments. 2017 NY Slip Op 30368(U).

Summary: Settlement of more than $27.2 million was granted to former foster children with special needs who sued under § 1983. City of New York and four foster care agencies were challenged for their negligence and violation of the children's substantive due process rights when they allegedly allowed foster parent to fraudulently obtain foster care custody of children, later adopt them, and subject them to abuse, neglect, torture, imprisonment, and deprivation of educational and medical care over course of more than 15 years.


On April 2, 2012, ten prisoners at the Orleans Parish Prison -- the New Orleans jail (NOJ) -- brought this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Orleans Parish Sheriff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that they suffered from abusive and unconstitutional treatment while confined at the NOJ. The case was assigned to Judge Lance M. Africk and Magistrate Judge Sally Shushan. The complaint alleged that the NOJ imposed endemic and egregious constitutional violations on its prisoners, detailing an incredible level of violence within the facility, both at the hands of staff and prisoners. It alleged that officials handled prisoners with mental health issues in an inhumane manner, including withholding medication from new inmates and taking inadequate steps to safeguard the lives of suicidal prisoners. The plaintiffs also alleged that the NOJ was inadequately staffed and supervised. Prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division had opened an investigation into conditions of confinement at the NOJ, filing a notice of investigation in 2008 and making formal public findings of egregiously dangerous conditions on September 11, 2009. The DOJ findings letter had, like the complaint in this lawsuit, detailed widespread excessive force and failures to protect prisoners, inadequate medical and mental health care, inadequate suicide prevention, and a dangerous physical plant. Just after this lawsuit was filed, the Justice Department sent an additional findings letter, setting out a list of deficiencies that necessitated emergency measures to address them. In September 2012, the United States, with the consent of the parties, intervened in this case under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Title VI claim was that the NOJ discriminated against Latino prisoners in failing to provide necessary language services to prisoners with limited English proficiency. The Sheriff then filed a third-party complaint against the City of New Orleans, alleging that NOJ deficiencies were caused by the City's refusal to provide adequate funding. In December 2012, the Sheriff, the private plaintiffs, and the DOJ reached a settlement. In addition to setting out substantive terms about improved conditions and provisions for monitoring and enforcement, the proposed consent judgment set forth a funding process: it required the court to "determine the initial funding needed to ensure constitutional conditions of confinement, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement," at a "funding trial" in which the City would participate. The City of New Orleans, however, objected to the settlement's expansive terms, which it argued far exceeded the constitutional minimum requirements, in violation of its rights and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The PLRA disallows any federal court enforceable jail or prison decree that isn't narrowly tailored to cure ongoing constitutional violations. The City pointed out that it would be required to fund the millions of dollars (perhaps as much as $35 million) the settlement would cost. Because it had just entered into an extremely expensive settlement of its own with the DOJ Civil Rights Division (to reform the scandal-ridden New Orleans Police Department), the City complained money for this settlement was simply unavailable. (This case, United States v. New Orleans, is in this Clearinghouse as PN-LA-0001). After briefing, Judge Africk on January 22, 2013, granted preliminary approval of the settlement and scheduled a fairness hearing, at which he would examine it more thoroughly. In the months leading up to the fairness hearing, the City sought appointment of a receiver to run the NOJ, arguing that what was needed was not additional money but rather a change in control; the City blamed poor conditions on the Sheriff and his management. The fairness hearing took four days, beginning April 1, 2013, with a good deal of additional briefing and discussion following. On June 6, 2013, Judge Africk rejected the City's arguments in a 103 page ruling, pointing out that elected Sheriffs frequently settle cases on their county or City's dime. He granted the motion for the consent judgment and the class certification, entering the proposed judgment. Judge Africk ruled that the NOJ was indeed imposing systemically unconstitutional conditions on its prisoners, describing a horrifying level of violence, untreated illness, and dysfunction. The consent judgment was a comprehensive reform document, requiring wholesale changes to NOJ operations, and a monitor to assist/ensure that changes happen. The parties agreed to new policies regarding protection from harm, mental health care, medical care, sanitation and environmental conditions, fire and life safety; language assistance, and youthful prisoners. Specific provisions of the agreement included improved documentation of abuse by prisoners and staff; review of prison conditions and officials, new policies regarding the use of force against prisoners, a mandated separation of teenaged and adult prisoners, and a revised staffing plan to ensure that enough officers are provided to protect prisoners. The injunction had no set end date; it was to be lifted after the NOJ has remained in substantial compliance with the settlement agreement for a period of two years. It was court-enforceable by the plaintiffs and the United States. The funding hearing was held in August 2013. On September 3, 2013, Judge Africk dismissed the City's motion to appoint a receiver without prejudice. On September 9, 2013, Judge Africk appointed Susan W. McCampbell as the lead monitor pursuant to the consent judgment, as well as sub-monitors. On September 12, 2013, Judge Africk also ordered the Sheriff and the City to each provide $105,000 for the purpose of paying the monitoring costs through the end of the year. On October 10, 2013, Judge Africk approved the consent judgment on attorneys' fees. The Sheriff had to pay $900,000 in full and final settlement of all fees and costs. On October 21, 2013, Judge Africk approved the settlement agreed to by all parties regarding the issue of funding between the Sheriff and the City. The City agreed to pay $1.8 million in interim funding for the fiscal year of 2013. The City did not agree to pay any specific level of funding for 2014 and beyond. On April 17, 2014, Judge Africk granted the joint motion for entry of a settlement agreement detailing more of the changes the Sheriff was to make and the uses for the funds provided by the City, including funds that had not yet been allocated. On August 13, 2014, the court approved the Sheriff's proposal for short-term housing of inmates with acute and subacute mental health problems and ordered the City to pay for it. Monitoring continued over the subsequent years, as did litigation concerning compliance as the parties worked out the details within the settlement framework. On April 25, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt. The plaintiffs argued that, in light of the assessments of appointed monitors "about the Sheriff’s inability to achieve compliance and OPSO’s leadership shortcomings," the court should appoint a receiver to implement the reforms needed for compliance at the Orleans Paris Jail. The parties stipulated to the following agreement on June 21, 2016: (1) the Sheriff would appoint an independent jail compliance director to implement the consent judgment, (2) provisions for transparency and information sharing as implementation progressed, (3) the monitor's continued evaluative role, and (4) specific duties of the compliance director. On December 2, 2016, the independent compliance director submitted a draft of the initial remedial action plan. He submitted his revised action plan a month later, as well as a supplemental action plan. Broadly, the director's action plan included strategies to (1) decrease the number of inmate and staff assaults, (2) accomplish sustainable hiring measures, (3) maintain a "positive, professionalized" jail staff culture, (4) ensure effective staff presence and deployment throughout the jail, (5) promote timely completion of critical policies and procedures related to compliance, (6) ensure staff are adequately trained, (7) ensure enforcement of direct supervision throughout the jail, (8) prevent undue reliance on cell confinement or lockdown, (9) timely return inmates housed outside of Orleans Parish, (10) ensure adequate support for inmates placed on suicide precautions, (11) reduce incidents of suicide and self-harm, (12) thorough and fair investigation of inmate grievances and incidents of harm, (13) ensure appropriate and recorded use of force by staff, (14) maintain acceptable sanitation and environmental conditions, (15) ensure the disciplinary system is effective and affords inmates due process, (16) ensure the implementation of budget control measures and competition in procurement, and (17) ensure effective staffing. Remediation and monitoring occurred over the next year. On January 18, 2018, the monitor submitted the eighth report to the court, informing the court that safety, medical and mental health care, and environmental conditions of inmates had marginally improved at both the OJC and the Temporary Detention Center. Another report was submitted on August 29, 2018, reporting marginal improvement compared to the January report. On July 27, 2018, the Jail Compliance Director filed a motion to clarify the stipulated order to determine whether the Jail Compliance Director "shares the absolute judicial immunity of the Court." On the recommendation of the magistrate judge, this motion was denied on October 15, 2018. On January 25, 2019, in response to periodic updates and status reports from the independent compliance director, the court ordered: 1) short-term action be taken in response to mental health-related issues at OJC; and 2) the city shall direct the architect chosen to design the permanent facility to begin the programming phase of the project. After the mid-March status conference and monitors' report, the court ordered further design and construction of the permanent facility. During a status conference in March 2020, the Sheriff expressed his desire to resume control of OJC by ending the court-appointed Jail Compliance Director's oversight of the facility. On May 26, 2020, a day after the deadline Judge Africk had given him, the Sheriff filed his motion to terminate the consent decree in its entirety. He argued that the defendants were in compliance with the consent decree based on the applicable constitutional minimum standard. According to the motion, continued enforcement of the decree would exceed the "narrowly drawn…least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation" standard required by the PLRA. As of this writing on May 28, 2020, the consent decree remains in effect as this motion is pending, and monitoring is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, a class of men, women and children imprisoned at Orleans Parish Prison brought forth a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the Orleans Parish Sheriff. Over the objection of the city of New Orleans, which would have to fund the reforms, the matter settled. The resulting court-enforced decree included new policies regarding protection from harm; mental health care; medical care; sanitation and environmental conditions; fire and life safety; language assistance; and youthful prisoners, and an independent monitor to assist and ensure that reforms are carried out. The case is ongoing for monitoring and compliance purposes.


On March 27, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Honda of America, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The EEOC's complaint alleged that an individual female employee at Honda had suffered from discriminatory employment practices because of her gender, and that she had subsequently been terminated from employment when she opposed the discriminatory treatment. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In July 2006, the complainant intervened, adding causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as various state law claims and additional discrimination claims under Title VII. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Judge Michael H. Watson. On June 12, 2006, the underlying plaintiff moved to intervene to join the EEOC as a second plaintiff. On July 6, 2006, the court granted the motion. The intervenor's complaint alleged essentially the same claims as the original plaintiff-gender discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment-and sought the same types of reliefs. Between June 2006 and May 2008, the parties engaged in discovery. Meanwhile, on January 18, 2008, Honda moved for summary judgment. On May 21, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The defendant also requested that the order for settlement be sealed. Judge Watson granted the motion to seal, but did not give a reason except that Honda had shown "good cause." We do not have any information about the contents of the settlement. The same day, Honda moved for enforcement of the settlement agreement, attorney fees, and dismissal of the case. On March 31, 2009, Judge Watson wrote a sealed opinion and order granting this motion to enforce Settlement. On June 2, 2008, EEOC asked the court to reconsider its previous approval of Honda's request to seal the settlement document. But, on October 27, 2008, Judge Watson denied EEOC's motion, thereby allowing Honda to keep confidential certain settlement terms. On September 10, 2008, the court denied the defendant's request for summary judgment (motion from January 18, 2008), explaining that the court had ceased work on the defendant's pending motion for summary judgment once the parties settled. On March 31, 2009, the court ordered a final judgment in favor of Honda and dismissed the case. The court also noted that it would retain jurisdiction to enforce the May 12, 2008 settlement agreement, and to reopen the case for good cause shown if the terms of the settlement agreements are not fulfilled. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Honda of America in the the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The EEOC's complaint alleged that the complainant had been retaliated against when Honda terminated her employment after she had opposed its discriminatory employment practices against women and minorities, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2008, the parties settled, and this agreement was sealed. A few weeks later, the defendant moved for enforcement of the agreement, and this request was granted. In 2009, the court ordered a final judgment in favor of Honda and dismissed the case. The case is closed.


The Plaintiffs are individuals with dual diagnoses of intellectual disabilities and mental illness who receive 24-hour in-home care through North Carolina Medicaid, administered in their county by Piedmont Behavioral Healthcare (PBH) (the local management entity). The Plaintiffs receive care through the state-funded "Supervised Living" service and the North Carolina "Innovations Waiver." In early 2010, PBH announced that it was reducing reimbursement rates for service providers. On February 11, 2010, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services of North Carolina and PBH, challenging these rate reductions and alleging that the reductions violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). According to the complaint, the rate reduction would ultimately reduce the services that allow the Plaintiffs to live in the community and receive community-based treatment. Without the option of community-based treatment, the Plaintiffs faced the risk of being institutionalized. The Plaintiffs argued that this risk of unnecessary institutionalization amounted to a violation of both the ADA (under the Supreme Court ruling in Olmstead v. L.C., which held that the unjustified institutionalization of individuals with disabilities is a form of discrimination under the ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, and the United States filed a statement of interest in support of this motion. On May 12, 2010, the court (Judge James A. Beaty) denied the motion in part (with respect to enjoining the rate reductions or otherwise setting specific reimbursement rates) but granted it in limited part, ordering the Defendants to ensure that all plaintiffs were provided with community-based care throughout the course of this litigation. The case proceeded to the discovery phase. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 16, 2010, arguing that the Plaintiffs lacked standing, that the case was not ripe for litigation, and that the Plaintiffs had failed to state a claim because there is no federal right to be served in a single-serve placement or by a particular provider. Ultimately, the court denied this motion in June 2011, and also denied the Plaintiffs' request to appoint a special master to oversee the allocation of services to the Plaintiffs. After several more months of discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in January 2012, claiming that although there had been some service changes, each plaintiff lives in the community and faces no risk of institutionalization due to the current reimbursement rates. On October 31, 2012, the court denied the motion for summary judgment, finding that issues of fact remained as to the risk of institutionalization that the Plaintiffs currently face. At the end of discovery, the Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint. While the original complaint alleged claims on behalf of a putative class, the final amended complaint alleged claims on behalf of six individual plaintiffs. The amended complaint also added a claim for one named plaintiff under ADA regulation 28 C.F.R. §35, alleging that the Defendants had violated the regulation by failing to take into account this plaintiff’s deafness and failing to provide appropriate auxiliary aids and services. On July 24, 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge N.C. Tilley, Jr. The case proceeded to a 39-day trial beginning on September 10, 2013. On August 28, 2014, the Court ruled in favor of the Defendants, finding that the Plaintiffs could not carry the burden of proof as to any of their claims. The court held that no plaintiff was able to show that (1) he or she was at a “serious risk of institutionalization” and that (2) the Defendants’ reimbursement rate reduction was “substantially related” to that serious risk of institutionalization. With respect to the ADA regulation claim, the court held that the Plaintiffs could not show that there was a discrepancy in the quality of care. The Court explained that this claim focused almost entirely on the discrepancy in American Sign Language (ASL) abilities between the patient and his staff as opposed to other deaf-oriented accommodations. Because the facility provided ASL training to the staff and they were able to sign basic communication as this particular patient needed, the Court found that there was insufficient evidence that discrepancies between the plaintiff’s ASL ability and staff’s resulted in unequal quality of care. 2014 WL 4274251. The Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)), arguing primarily that Fourth Circuit precedent ((Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2013)) only required plaintiffs to show a “significant” risk of institutionalization rather than a “serious” or “severe” one. On March 29, 2016, the Court denied the motion, reasoning that the court in Pashby did not intend to alter the existing standard espoused by the DOJ. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2010, a group of individuals with developmental disabilities and mental illness, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina against the state Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Plaintiffs' local healthcare management entity. The Plaintiffs sought to challenge the local entity's decision to reduce reimbursement rates for community-based services, arguing that this decision put the Plaintiffs at an unnecessary risk of institutionalization in violation of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Court granted a limited preliminary injunction that allowed the Plaintiffs to receive community-based services throughout the course of the litigation. However, after a lengthy trial, the Court ultimately found in favor of the Defendants, holding that the Plaintiffs could not show that they were at a serious risk of institutionalization or that the Defendants had caused such risk. The case is now closed.


On September 6, 2018, a female prisoner at Aroostook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. Represented by the ACLU of Maine and by private counsel, the plaintiff sued Aroostook County and its sheriff under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff suffered from opioid use disorder. For ten years, her doctor treated her disorder with medication-assisted treatment (MAT). After pleading guilty in a criminal case, the plaintiff was sentenced to 40 days in Aroostook County Jail. While detained in Aroostook County Jail, the plaintiff was prohibited from receiving her MAT medications due to the jail’s policy banning prisoners from using MAT. The plaintiff experienced a similar denial of her MAT medications when she was detained in York County Jail. The plaintiff accused the jail of violating her Eighth Amendment rights because of their deliberate indifference to her serious medical need and asserted that the jail’s refusal to make reasonable accommodations for her disability was in violation of the ADA. The plaintiff sought damages and declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the jail to provide her with necessary medical care and prevent further suffering. The case was assigned to Judge Nancy Torresen. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the jail from further denial of the plaintiff’s necessary medical treatment for her opioid use disorder. Both parties submitted additional briefs to support their claims in support and opposition of the plaintiff’s motion, and the case moved on to discovery. On February 7, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to conditionally consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits. Discovery continued as both parties determined who would testify at trial. On March 27, 2019, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered the jail to provide the plaintiff with the necessary medications for her treatment. 376 F. Supp. 3d 146. But the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with trial. The jail appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied a stay of the district court’s order and affirmed the preliminary injunction on April 30, 2019. 922 F.3d 41. The lawsuit returned to the district court, where a jury trial was scheduled for August 2019. However, the plaintiff moved on June 12, 2019 to dismiss her claims: the county, apparently in an effort to comply with the preliminary injunction without violating its non-MAT policy, had moved in the plaintiff’s sentencing court for a reduction of sentence. The state court reduced her sentence to a $100 fine, entirely eliminating her jail sentence, and thereby rendered her claims in this case moot. In her motion to dismiss, the plaintiff asked the court to retain jurisdiction to rule on a motion for attorneys’ fees. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on June 18, 2019. The plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs on June 19, but later retracted the motion after settling with the county for $175,000 in attorneys’ fees. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2018, a female prisoner at Aroostook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiff accused the defendants of violating her Eighth Amendment rights for their deliberate indifference to her serious medical need and asserted that their refusal to make reasonable accommodations for her disability was in violation of the ADA. The court ordered a preliminary injunction, requiring the jail to provide the plaintiff with necessary medications for her treatment; the First Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. The county later, in the plaintiff's sentencing court, moved for a reduction of her sentence; her sentence was reduced to a $100 fine, and this case was dismissed as moot.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit seeking to waive Arkansas’ Election Day Receipt deadline for the March runoff elections in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a temporary restraining order. On March 30, the emergency TRO was denied. On March 31, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. <hr> On March 26, 2020, the Christian Ministerial Alliance and two voters filed a suit against the Governor and Secretary of State of Arkansas against the Election Day receipt deadline. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, the plaintiffs sought declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 52 U.S.C. § 10301 enjoining the Election Day Receipt deadline. The plaintiffs alleged that the deadline posed significant risks for voters in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment, as well as Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The following day, the plaintiffs also submitted an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to accept ballots that are postmarked before or on election day that arrives within 10 days of election day. The case was assigned to Judge James M Mood Jr. and the plaintiffs were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. On March 20, the Governor of Arkansas issued an Executive Order declaring a state of emergency, suspending the prerequisites required to vote through an absentee ballot for the 2020 elections. Specifically, the March 24 deadline for absentee ballot applications to be submitted by email, fax, or mail was waived. However, the requirement that election officials receive absentee ballots by 7:30 PM on Election Day, or the Election Day Receipt deadline was not suspended. The plaintiffs alleged that the Executive Order loosening the absentee ballot requirement was insufficient to protect the fundamental right to vote for the March runoff elections, as the restrictions continued to pose a direct and severe obstacle to absentee voting. Further, the plaintiffs noted that barriers to voting disproportionately impacted Black voters, given the history of discrimination against Black people and socioeconomic disparity in Arkansas. On March 30, the defendants filed a response to the motion for TRO. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs did not have standing and the injury was not caused by the defendants, and even if the state had burdened the plaintiffs’ right to vote, the defendants had compelling interests to justify their actions. On the same day, the emergency TRO was denied. 2020 WL 1531359. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to articulate the injury suffered by the defendant and that the plaintiffs’ right to vote had already been made easier through the March 20 Executive Order. The same day, the Republican Party of Arkansas moved to intervene as defendants. On March 31, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.

Summary: This suit was filed against the State of Arkansas by two individual voters and a non-profit organization seeking to waive Arkansas’ Election Day Receipt deadline for the March runoff elections. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a temporary restraining order. On March 30, the emergency TRO was denied. On March 31, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.


On April 27, 2016, the plaintiff, a certified public accountant over the age of forty, filed this class and collective action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.) and California state law. The plaintiff, represented by Outten & Golden LLP, the AARP Foundation, and the Liu Law Firm, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming the defendant had wrongfully discriminated against people of the age of forty and older in their hiring practices. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant willfully utilized a biased recruiting system for entry-level positions that excluded and deterred workers aged forty and over, willfully implemented a mandatory early retirement policy that deterred and discriminated against applicants aged forty and over, and refused to hire applicants aged forty and over for certain positions. On December 1, 2016, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on the grounds that the ADEA does not permit job applicants, but only employees, to pursue disparate impact claims. This motion was denied by Judge Jon S. Tigar on February 17, 2017, with the court concluding that the ADEA does allow for job applicants to bring disparate impact claims. 236 F. Supp. 3d 1126. On March 8, 2017, the defendant moved for certification of an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1296(b) regarding the extension of the ADEA to job applications. This motion was denied by the court on April 17, 2017, on the grounds that the defendant failed to show that the subject of the motion was a controlling question of law or that the appeal would materially advance the litigation. On December 21, 2017, the plaintiff moved to certify a collective action on behalf of older applicants for employment at PwC and a hearing on the motion was held on February 27, 2018. On July 26, 2018, Judge Tigar denied the certification and concluded that the plaintiff was "not substantially similar either to unqualified applicants or to deterred applicants, both of which categories are party of the larger collective action they seek to certify." 2018 WL 3585143. On August 27, 2018, the plaintiff filed under seal a renewed motion for certification of a collective action, and a hearing was held on December 20, 2018. On March 28, 2019, the court granted the renewed motion for certification, finding that the plaintiffs' revised collective action definition cured the previously identified deficiencies. The new definition included "[a]ll individuals who, from October 18, 2013 forward, applied for a Covered Position (Associate, Experienced Associate, and Senior Associate) in PwC’s Tax or Assurance lines of service, met the minimum qualifications for the position to which they applied, were age 40 or older at the time of application, and were not hired." 2019 WL 9078785. The parties proceeded to provide notice to the collective action's members. On March 3, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary settlement approval. The proposed settlement would provide an $11,265,000 common fund for members and attorney's fees. It also provided for programmatic changes to PwC's employment practices, including:

Hiring an age inclusivity consultant;

Advertising jobs to older workers;

Removing job eligibility limits based on graduation year or age;

Modifying PwC's anti-discrimination policy to include age;

Allowing alumni to apply for jobs at on-campus recruiting events;

Publicly committing to non-discriminatory hiring, including by publishing age-diverse photographs;

Ensuring that complaint procedures address age discrimination claims;

Implementing the changes under the direction of PwC's Chief Purpose & Inclusion Officer;

Establishing a fifteen-month window immediately following adoption of the settlement during which aggrieved applicants could request compensation in excess of the settlement amount; and

Continuing jurisdiction by the Court.

 The programmatic relief was to last for two years following adoption of the settlement. The settlement also certified three classes for applicants who were aged 40 or older at the time of their application and denied a position: "California Class" for applicants in California who applied between September 8, 2013, and January 21, 2020; "Michigan Class" for applicants in Michigan who applied between September 8, 2013, and January 21, 2020; and "Settlement Collective" for applicants who applied after October 18, 2013, and opted into this lawsuit. The court granted preliminary approval of the settlement on August 19, 2020, and final approval on February 4, 2021. On February 8, the court granted the parties' stipulation for final judgment. As of April 7, 2021, this case has closed, and settlement payouts are expected to be distributed.

Summary: On April 27, 2016, the plaintiff, a certified public accountant over the age of forty, filed this class and collective action against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The defendant moved for a judgement on the pleadings and was denied; the plaintiff moved to certify a class and the motion was denied. The plaintiff filed a renewed motion for class certification on August 27, 2018, which was granted. The parties proposed an $11 million settlement that included changes to hiring practices, and the court approved the settlement on February 4, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On July 23, 2018, the Young Advocates for Fair Education (YAFFED) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff advocacy group sued the New York governor, the Chancellor of the Board of Regents of New York, and the Commissioner of the New York State Education Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the First Amendment. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The lawsuit challenged the Felder Amendment, which relaxed certain educational curriculum requirements for ultra-Orthodox Jewish schools in New York. YAFFED claimed that the Felder Amendment violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it favored a particular religion over other religious private schools and non-religious private schools. YAFFED filed a motion on August 24, 2018 asking the court for a preliminary injunction to stop the defendants from enforcing the Felder Amendment and to require New York to enforce the previous curriculum requirements for all private schools. A month and a half later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. They alleged that YAFFED lacked standing because it could not show that it was harmed by the Felder Amendment and that any harm that YAFFED alleged had yet to happen. On January 16, 2019, District Judge Israel Leo Glasser granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied YAFFED’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Glasser found that YAFFED lacked standing for two reasons. First, YAFFED’s advocacy focus meant that their injury was “no different from that of a concerned citizen.” Second, YAFFED did not convincingly explain how its other injuries were caused by the Felder Amendment or how those other injuries could be redressed if the Amendment was declared void. Additionally, Judge Glasser concluded that YAFFED’s claims were not ripe for judicial review because YAFFED had not yet been harmed by the effects of the Felder Amendment. He determined that YAFFED was essentially seeking an advisory opinion, which is not allowed under federal standing doctrine. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2018, the Young Advocates for Fair Education (YAFFED) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Felder Amendment to New York’s Compulsory Education Law violated the Establishment Clause of the Constitution by relaxing education standards solely on Jewish ultra-Orthodox schools. In January 2019, Judge Glasser dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing and ripeness.


This action, filed on February 6, 2018, challenged the Department of Justice's "sanctuary city" policy tying federal funding to immigration enforcement. The plaintiff, the city of West Palm Beach, Florida ("the City"), sued the DOJ after the DOJ threatened to subpoena the City for records out of suspicion that the City might be noncompliant with immigration law and therefore ineligible for federal funding. The City argued it was fully compliant with federal law, and that linking funding to particular immigration laws violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The City filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The City argued that with nearly 27% of its population consisting of foreign-born individuals, immigrants were "an integral part of the City’s" civic, academic, and labor communities, and that the City depended on its immigrant population. In March 2017, the complaint explained, the City adopted a resolution seeking to keep information related to one's immigration and citizenship status private while expressly providing that federal laws superseded the resolution. The City's goal was "to foster trust between the immigrant population and City officials and employees, and to encourage people of all backgrounds to take full advantage of the City’s resources and opportunities." Separately, the complaint explained that it had received nearly $400,000 in federal Byrne JAG funding since 2006. The City argued that starting November 2017, the DOJ began targeting it for alleged compliance issues with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits localities from interfering with certain federal immigration enforcement measures. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order tying federal funds to compliance with § 1373. The complaint stated that in a letter sent to the City in November 2017, the DOJ requested information addressing the status of the City's compliance with § 1373 and eligibility for Byrne JAG funding. The City responded to the letter to affirm its compliance and eligibility. In January 2018, the DOJ sent another letter indicating the City may be out of compliance and requesting that the City send documents relevant to the inquiry and that failure to do so would result in a subpoena. Ultimately, the City argued that the DOJ had no statutory authority for imposing such conditions on the Byrne JAG grant. Even if Congress did intend to so authorize the DOJ, requiring certification of compliance with § 1373 violated the Spending Clause. Moreover, the City argued that its Resolution and laws were fully compliant with federal law, and that it was not a "sanctuary city." On February 21, the City moved for preliminary injunction, seeking a declaration that it was compliant with § 1373. Shortly thereafter, the parties entered into mediation. On March 23, the parties indicated they had reached a settlement. The DOJ declared that the City was in compliance with federal law, and that it was therefore eligible for the federal grant. The City agreed to end the litigation and subsequently issued a memorandum to city employees clarifying that its laws did not preclude sharing information with federal immigration officials. The parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal on March 28, and the court ordered the case closed the next day. The case is now closed. The settlement agreement is not currently publicly available, though this page will be updated if becomes available.

Summary: This action, filed on Feb. 6, 2018, challenged the Department of Justice's "sanctuary city" policy tying federal funding to immigration enforcement. The plaintiff, the city of West Palm Beach, Florida ("the City"), sued the DOJ after the DOJ threatened to subpoena the City for records out of suspicion that the City may be noncompliant with immigration law and therefore ineligible for federal funding. The City argued it was fully compliant with federal law, and that linking funding to particular immigration laws violated the separation of powers, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The City sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 23, the parties indicated they had reached a settlement. The DOJ declared that the City was in compliance with federal law, and that it was therefore eligible for the federal grant. The City agreed to end the litigation and subsequently issued a memorandum to city employees clarifying that its laws did not preclude sharing information with federal immigration officials. The case is now closed.


On September 14, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The EEOC sued Kimball International, Inc., doing business as Flexcel, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC sought injunctive relief and back pay on behalf of a Flexcel employee alleging age discrimination. On June 29, 2006, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 1, 2007, District Judge Edward L. Lodge granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the case in its entirety. On March 30, 2007, the EEOC filed an appeal. The appeal was voluntarily dismissed on June 21, 2007. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 14, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The EEOC sued Kimball International, Inc., doing business as Flexcel, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). On February 1, 2007, the defendant’s motion for summary judgement was granted and the case was dismissed in its entirety. The case is now closed.


The EEOC's Chicago District Office sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store on August 11, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC's complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against female employees and creating a hostile work environment; by discriminating against African American employees and providing disparate terms of employment; by retaliating against employees for complaining about their treatment; and by constructively discharging numerous employees. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2006, but it was never resolved. The parties entered into a consent decree on March 10, 2006 that stipulated that the defendant would pay $2,000,000 in damages to the class of plaintiffs to be apportioned by the EEOC, post a notice of compliance with Title VII, provide Title VII compliance training to managers and all other employees in the affected stores, and report to the EEOC concerning discrimination and harassment complaints. The consent decree was set to last for two years. On April 13, 2006, a would-be claimant sought to amend the consent decree to include himself. The Court (Judge Charles R. Norgle Sr.) denied this motion on July 24, 2006 because the claimant worked at the restaurant five years before the time period considered in the suit, and he never file a Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC. There was no subsequent activity, and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: The EEOC's Chicago District Office sued Cracker Barrel Old Country Store on August 11, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging Title VII violations. The parties entered a consent decree on March 10, 2006. The case is now closed.