On April 3, 2008, twelve individual plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Represented by private counsel and attorneys from the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and officers of the Penns Grove, N.J., Police Department, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the New Jersey Constitution. On May 22, 2008, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the course of committing unlawful entries and dragnet searches of homes “in which the agents only loosely suspect immigrant families may reside.” The plaintiffs further argued that the defendants “detained the occupants without judicial warrant or other legal justification.” The defendants' conduct was allegedly part of an enforcement effort called "Operation Return to Sender," designed to apprehend persons subject to outstanding deportation orders whom ICE regarded as "fugitives." In addition to claims based upon Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure and the use of excessive force, the plaintiffs cited the Fifth Amendment's due process clause as a basis for their allegations that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights to be free from abusive governmental conduct that shocks the conscience, from prevention of consultation with counsel regarding immigration proceedings, and from denial of equal protection of the laws based upon race and ethnicity. According to the plaintiffs, much of the illegal conduct followed agency imposition of increased arrest quotas on understaffed and ill-trained ICE Fugitive Operations Teams. The Teams subsequently conducted fugitive searches as pretext to arrest undocumented immigrants and relied upon outdated, inaccurate, and incomplete information in ICE databases. Eight of the plaintiffs were named, while four remained anonymous due to fear of retaliation. The plaintiffs include U.S. citizens and lawful residents. On the same date as the filing of their amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions. The defendants filed two motions to dismiss on June 26, 2008 and July 8, 2008. The Court partially granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the request for preliminary injunction without prejudice, but denied the motion to dismiss the request for permanent injunction on September 8, 2008. On May 7, 2009, the court issued a subsequent order on this motion, denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, except with regard to the claims asserted by the anonymous plaintiffs. The court argued that they could amend the complaint to include their identity as they had demonstrated why the need for anonymity outweighed the need for fairness. 2009 WL 1307236. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint identifying one of the anonymous plaintiffs on June 8, 2009, which the individual federal defendants moved to dismiss on June 18 on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court denied the motion on January 27, 2010, arguing that the defendants’ conduct plausibly could have violated a clearly established constitutional right of which they were aware existed. In short, the defendants failed to meet the test for qualified immunity. 2010 WL 398839. Defendants who were higher-ranking ICE officers (rather than the ones carrying out the raids) appealed both of these orders. While the case was pending in the Third Circuit, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint in the district court on April 16, 2010. In response, three of the defendants, who were municipal officers, sought to dismiss the claims against them on June 24 and July 27, 2010. The court granted the motions on Nov. 29, 2010. Meanwhile, on Aug. 9, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. On Feb. 3, 2011, the court dismissed plaintiff Guzman’s substantive due process claim, but sustained her subject matter jurisdiction claim (stating that the Fifth amendment claim should be dismissed because the facts stated were properly already used under the Fourth amendment claim). On June 14, 2011, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s order from Jan. 27, 2010 denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss and remanded it for further proceedings. The Third Circuit concluded that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction, but reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit argued that the ICE officers “specifically charged with enforcing federal immigration law” occupied relatively high-ranking positions and acted lawfully by increasing arrest goals. Indeed, “qualified immunity doctrine exists to encourage vigorous and unflinching enforcement of the law.” 643 F.3d 60. On September 21, 2012, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds that the plaintiffs and the ICE Agent defendants “amicably resolved the matter.” The plaintiffs were awarded $295,000 as part of the settlement. The settlement agreement does not appear to be publicly available at this time. The case was left open for 90 days, but as the plaintiffs did not motion to re-open the case, the matter is now closed.

Summary: Twelve plaintiffs filed a complaint against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and officers of the Penns Grove, N.J., Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights on April 3, 2008. After over two years of litigation, the defendants received judgment on the pleadings on November 29, 2010. Rather than go through the appeals process, the parties reached a settlement at the end of 2012. This case is now closed.


On September 19, 2014, two physically disabled individuals filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against the Wayne County Airport Authority ("WCAA"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that WCAA was violating the ADA in relocating certain buses at Detroit Metro Airport to the ground transportation center, which Plaintiffs allege is congested and unsafe for persons with disabilities. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction to enjoin the relocation of the buses until such time as the ground transportation center could be made accessible to disabled individuals. With their complaint, the Plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") and a preliminary injunction. The District Court (Judge David M. Lawson) denied Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO, but set a schedule for the exchange of expert reports, further briefing, and an evidentiary hearing on the request for a preliminary injunction. On October 17, 2014, the day before the evidentiary hearing was to take place, the parties reached a settlement agreement. As part of the agreement, the buses would remain at their new location at the ground transportation center. However, WCAA must make improvements to the center, including the addition of personal assistance services, improvements to the indoor waiting area, and the removal of obstacles to make the location safer for seniors and disabled individuals. The District Court (Judge Lawson) dismissed the case without prejudice, but retained jurisdiction until September 1, 2015 to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. On February 3, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, claiming that the defendant had refused to comply with several terms of the agreement relating to the condition and architectural configuration of the transportation center. The motion requested that the court provide relief by enforcing the agreement and awarding attorney’s fees. Following an unsuccessful attempt at mediation and after reviewing declarations and affidavits of the parties, the court issued an opinion and order denying the plaintiff’s motion to enforce the agreement on July 27, 2015. The court found that, although there remained conditions that could present difficulties for users with disabilities at the transportation center, the defendant had not violated the settlement agreement. 2015 WL 4611376. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on December 21, 2015. It is now closed.

Summary: On September 19, 2014, two physically disabled individuals filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") against the Wayne County Airport Authority ("WCAA") alleging that WCAA was violating the ADA in relocating several buses to an inaccessible and dangerously congested transportation center. On October 17, 2014, the parties reached a settlement agreement that would make the transportation center safer for disabled individuals. In 2015, the plaintiffs alleged WCAA had not met the terms of the settlement agreement and filed a motion to enforce the agreement. The court, finding that the defendant had not violated the agreement, denied the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. 2015 WL 4611376.


On June 19, 2018, Immigrant Defenders Law Center (IDLC) and private plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued to challenge policies relating to immigrant detainees held at the FCI Victorville Medium Security Prison. They alleged that the detainees had been denied the ability to visit, consult with, or contact an attorney since their incarceration at the prison. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought a writ of habeas corpus, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause, and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs also requested a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) to allow detainees to consult with attorneys and attend “know your rights” trainings. The case was assigned to Judge Otis Wright. Judge Wright granted the plaintiffs' request for a TRO on June 21, 2018, finding that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief were not granted. The TRO required the defendants to permit detainees to communicate with immigration attorneys, to conduct “know your rights” trainings for the detainees, and to halt any proceedings until the detainees had an opportunity to consult with an attorney or attend such a training. Judge Wright also ordered the defendants to show cause why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction. Judge Wright extended the TRO multiple times in August 2018. On August 28, Judge Wright extended the TRO again pending determination of whether a preliminary injunction should be issued. On October 16, 2018, the plaintiffs withdrew their request for a preliminary injunction. On December 14, the court asked the parties to file a joint report explaining why this case should not be dismissed since neither party had taken subsequent steps to prosecute the matter. The parties subsequently filed a sealed joint status report. On October 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case. On November 21, they filed a motion for attorneys fees. On December 2, 2019, Judge Wright ordered the case dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to seek attorneys fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. On January 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a supplement to their motion for attorneys fees. The case remains open to resolve attorneys fees.

Summary: On June 19, 2018, immigrant detainees filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security and applied for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that immigrant detainees held at FCI Victorville Medium Security Prison were denied the ability to consult with an attorney. District Judge Otis Wright granted a TRO on June 21, 2018 but the plaintiffs withdrew their request for a preliminary injunction on October 16, 2018. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation to dismiss the case in October 30, 2019, and on December 2 Judge Wright ordered the case dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiffs' right to seek attorneys fees. The case is closed except for the issue of attorneys fees.


On May 15, 1981, a prisoner at the Idaho State Correctional Institution ("ISCI") filed a class action lawsuit against the Idaho State Board of Corrections in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as numerous state claims. The allegations included: (1) the prison was overcrowded and understaffed, increasing the likelihood of violence; (2) the classification system at the prison, which placed new prisoners in "close custody" until they proved by their behavior they should be moved, subjected prisoners to physical and sexual assault; (3) medical care was deficient and resulted in deliberate indifference to the serious needs of the prisoners; (4) the food was inadequate in terms of both quality and quantity; (5) significant disparities existed between the way protective custody (high threat) and medium custody (low threat) prisoners were treated especially in terms of clothing and food portions; and (6) the manner in which the prison staff conducted both reclassification and parole hearings violated the prisoners' rights to due process. After being represented by a lay prisoner, plaintiffs were subsequently represented by the ACLU and private counsel. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunction, and damages. After a thirteen day trial, the District Court (Judge Harold Ryan) ordered that (1) if prisoners were to be double celled, then the prison would have to employ twice the security personnel; (2) the classification scheme must be altered to protect younger prisoners; (3) 24-hour emergency medical care should be made available and the prison must develop a plan to improve its medical care services within 180 days; (4) the prison must improve its food services including taking into account special dietary needs of prisoners; (5) protective custody prisoners must be given insulated underwear to augment their inadequate clothing or be given clothing equal to that of prisoners in medium custody; and (6) the prison administration shall develop a procedure prior to prisoner disciplinary hearings that will ensure prisoners' due process rights are protected. Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr. (Balla I), 595 F.Supp. 1558 (D. Idaho 1984). Plaintiffs moved for an order holding the defendants in contempt, which the court subsequently denied. Then, after a series of compliance hearings, the court decided to have an expert examine the facility to determine whether the overcrowding amounted to a constitutional violation. After the inspection, the court (Judge Ryan) determined that the overcrowded conditions of the prison violated the prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights. The court ordered a permanent injunction against the prison and placed occupancy limits on several of the cell units, enjoined defendants from housing prisoners in day rooms or rooms not designed to for cell purposes, and ordered that plumbing malfunctions in the prison be remedied within forty-eight hours. Balla v. Bd. of Corr. (Balla II), 656 F.Supp. 1108 (D. Idaho 1987). On March 3, 1989, with defendants still failing to solve overcrowding problems in cell units, plaintiffs appealed the court's denial of the motion for contempt and defendants requested an extension of time to meet the occupancy limits set by Balla II. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge John Wallace) denied both the appeal and the request for a time extension. The court also found that the prison was not required to establish a special psychological treatment program for sex offenders. Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corr., 869 F.2d 461 (9th Cir. 1989). In 2003, defendants, still out of compliance with the court's injunctions, filed a motion to terminate injunctive relief pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which limits prospective relief in certain circumstances, seeking to terminate the injunctions set forth in Balla I and Balla II. A hearing was held in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, and the court (Judge James Fitzgerald) denied defendants' motion finding that there were current and ongoing violations of the injunctive order, and it ordered that overcrowding and plumbing issues currently plaguing the prison be addressed immediately. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corrections, No. CV81-1165, 2005 WL 2403817 (D. Idaho Sept. 26, 2005). The prison population had grown from approximately 750 in 1987 to 1,416 prisoners in 2005. The court noted that "[s]eventeen years after the injunctive orders . . . conditions . . . are worse . . . than when the original injunctive orders were put in place." The court (Judge Fitzgerald) subsequently denied defendants' motion to reconsider and awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees totaling over $150,000. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corrections, No. CV81-1165, 2005 WL 3412806 (D. Idaho Dec. 9, 2005). In response to the decision, Idaho prison officials transferred more than 300 prisoners to a Corrections Corporation of America prison in Appleton, Minnesota, at a cost of $1.1 million. According to news reports, prison officials plan to ask the state legislature for $160 million to construct three new prisons, and for an additional $7.9 million to cover the cost of housing overflow prisoners both out-of-state and in county jail cells. In January of 2006, plaintiffs moved for a TRO, a preliminary injunction, and for a finding of contempt, arguing that defendants' planned construction work on plumbing at ISCI deprived them of regular access to showers in violation of the permanent injunction in Balla II and their constitutional rights. In June, the District Court (Judge Edward J. Lodge) denied plaintiffs' motions, holding that plaintiffs "fail[ed] to state a cognizable constitutional claim" and that nothing in the record links the allegations to dangerous hygienic conditions from the lack of showers. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV81-1165, 2006 WL 1793555 (D. Idaho June 28, 2006). In February of 2007, less than eighteen months after the court denied the defendants' motion to terminate prospective relief, the defendants again asked the court to free them from their obligations, specifically with regard to the prisoner population cap. On March 16, 2007, the court (Judge B. Lynn Winmill) granted the plaintiffs' motion to postpone the automatic stay that would result from defendants' motion. The court also issued show cause orders, stating that it intended to reappoint a Federal Rule of Evidence 706 expert to assess defendants' compliance with the population cap; that defendants would be responsible for paying his fees; that the court would be appointing counsel to represent plaintiffs; and that the defendants would be responsible for paying their attorneys' fees on a monthly basis. Ten days later, the defendants withdrew their motion to terminate. Despite the withdrawal of defendants' motion, plaintiffs continued to seek appointment of new class representatives. Plaintiffs' counsel, appointed by the court, argued that this would facilitate consultation with prisoner about prison conditions and reduce the number of individual claims that may arise from alleged overcrowding. The court (Judge Winmill) agreed, appointed new class representatives, and ordered that defendants provide plaintiffs' counsel thirty days' notice in the event they decide to refile a motion to terminate the injunctive orders. The court also granted the plaintiffs' counsel attorneys' fees totaling just under $18,000 for their work on defendants' withdrawn motion. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV-81-1165, 2007 WL 4531304 (D. Idaho Dec. 18, 2007). In January of 2009, a riot broke out at ISCI that destroyed a nearly-completed new prisoner housing unit. As a result of the riot, defendants were forced to house prisoners at ISCI in excess of the population caps imposed by the court. The plaintiffs asked the court for an order holding defendants in contempt of the Balla injunctions. On May 28, 2009, the court (Judge Winmill) denied plaintiffs' motion. The court found that "no good choices were open to [defendants] for managing the increased population in the immediate aftermath of the riot," short of exceeding the population caps. The court also noted that defendants had returned the prison population to pre-riot levels in about three-and-a-half weeks. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV 81-1165, 2009 WL 1513182 (D. Idaho May 28, 2009). On the same day, the court resolved a lingering dispute as to whether the Balla I and Balla II injunctions could be enforced through contempt motions, finding that they could. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV81-1165, 2009 WL 1574454 (D. Idaho May 28, 2009). On March 30, 2010, the court granted plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in the amount of $76,185.60 and costs in the amount of $1,249.20 for monitoring work during the period of December 11, 2007 through June 22, 2009. The court also indicated it would schedule a status conference to discuss monitoring of the case going forward. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV 81-1165, 2010 WL 1338065 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2010). The state appealed this order, and the District Court (Judge Winmill) denied a stay pending appeal. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV 81-1165, 2010 WL 3001442 (D. Idaho July 28, 2010). The Ninth Circuit subsequently affirmed the award of fees. Balla v. Idaho, 677 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2012). On January 6, 2011, the court (Judge Winmill) ordered the parties to submit names of candidates to serve as special master. In speaking of the need for a special master, the Court stated that evidence supported "colorable allegations of continuing class-wide Eighth Amendment violations with respect to inadequate medical and psychiatric care," convincing the court that it could not close the case under the present circumstances. The court remarked that "[i]n its current posture . . . the case languishes in a sort of no man's land, with neither side apparently ready or willing to take the offensive, which does not further the Court's goal of moving the case in a positive direction, decreasing oversight, and protecting the rights of the prisoner class. In short, the Court and the parties need assistance [from a special master] in breaking this stalemate and moving toward finality." Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. 81-cv-1165, 2011 WL 108727 (D. Idaho Jan. 6, 2011). Six months later, the court appointed Dr. Marc F. Stern as special master. On March 19, 2012, the special master issued a report in which he reviewed the state of healthcare at ISCI. The master noted that there were "serious problems" with delivery of medical and mental healthcare services. He also noted that defendants' willingness to entertain change is "very positive and commendable." Following the issuance of the special master's report, the case was referred to District Judge David O. Carter (C.D. Cal.) for the purpose of conducting a settlement conference. Settlement discussions took place over a number of days in April and May 2012. In May of 2012, the parties stipulated to modify the injunctive relief sought in the case. The stipulation set forth a framework for continued monitoring, including the formulation of modified compliance plans; monitoring meetings; and a compliance audit with the National Commission on Correctional Health Care. On February 8, 2013, the court (Judge Winmill) again awarded interim attorneys' fees to Plaintiffs' counsel. It awarded $172,917.10 in fees and $1,994.29 in costs. Balla v. Idaho Bd. of Corr., No. CV81-1165, 2013 WL 501646 (D. Idaho Feb. 8, 2013). Settlement conferences continued in May and August 2013 and April 2014. A hearing took place on January 29, 2015, but the contents of the meeting are sealed. Plaintiffs moved for sanctions on June 22, 2015. This motion was granted in part on August 11, 2015. The court determined that the defendants acted with improper purpose to withhold information from the court's special master, specifically related to inadequate record-keeping regarding mental healthcare and excessive use of "dry cells," cells that lacked beds and running water, to punish prisoners. The court found that the plaintiff met the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants harmed the integrity of the judicial process by their destruction of relevant evidence. The court additionally granted plaintiffs further attorneys' fees and costs on November 20, 2015. The state of Idaho appealed to the Ninth Circuit on December 29, 2015, and the case was referred to Judge David O. Carter in the Central District of California on January 5, 2016, who was to help implement the settlement. On April 4, 2016, Judge Carter ordered interim attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs, as well as costs to reimbursed to certain class members directly. On October 25, 2016, the Ninth Circuit granted appellant's voluntary motion to dismiss its appeal. On March 20, 2017, plaintiffs moved for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt, a hearing, and sanctions. After a hearing on July 28, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for contempt on September 28. The court found that defendants were in contempt of the court's June 2014 order between June 2014 and July 2016, but that the plaintiffs did not adequately show contempt after July 2016. The court denied compensatory damages, however, because plaintiffs did not show that they were harmed by the violation. Judge Carter referred the case back to the District of Idaho to determine the most appropriate remedy. On October 13, 2017, the District of Idaho (Judge Winmill) ordered no relief as a result of the contempt. Throughout 2018, there was significant infighting within the plaintiff class regarding the appointment of class representative. Following multiple competing motions filed by individual members of the class, the court approved the substitution of two new class representatives on May 1, 2018. The defendants filed a motion to terminate prospective relief on March 1, 2019. The court issued an automatic stay of the injunctive relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3). On April 4, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of the stay. The court granted this motion on April 18, 2019 and the parties jointly stipulated to the voluntary termination of certain injunctive relief the next day. The parties engaged in extensive litigation in preparation for the evidentiary hearing on the defendants' motion for termination of relief scheduled for January 2020, but later rescheduled to February 3, 2020. During the course of the litigation, the plaintiffs moved for an emergency injunction for medical treatment on September 4, 2019 and for a temporary restraining order on September 24, 2019. Judge Winmill denied both motions on November 5, 2019. The eleven-day evidentiary hearing began on February 3, 2019. As of April 10, 2020, the parties are awaiting a ruling. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 15, 1981, a prisoner at the Idaho State Correctional Institution filed a class action lawsuit against the Idaho State Board of Corrections alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. After a thirteen day trial, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. The parties have continued to litigate issues of compliance with the court's order, and are working toward resolution of this long-pending case.


On January 31, 2006 a group of participants in J.P. Morgan Chase's Retirement Plan filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq, in United Stated District Court of the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief alleging that the defendant used cash balance formulas in a discriminatory manner based on age and for other violations of ERISA. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that the defendant's cash balance plan helps their corporation save money and the older workers shoulder the burden; thus such a practice is discriminatory as it systemically harms a particular group. (Consolidated class-action complaint, page 1). On October 30, 2006, the Court (Judge Baer) granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court distinguished cash balance and "regular" pension plans. The major difference is the flexibility between the plans. A cash balance system allows the participant to take a lump sum after five years in the program. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 460 F.Supp.2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). This type of information is valuable to know as a participant in the plan, but this points to another problem with JP Morgan's version: there was not good publicity for these changes. In fact, counts IV-VI of the complaint alleged that failure to provide notice. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 460 F.Supp.2d 480 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). The Court did not dismiss those parts of the complaint, nor the parts about age discrimination. Thus, the plaintiffs continued to press in Court for class certification. On May 30, 2007, the Court (Judge Baer) certified a class. The class was comprised of all plan participants, whether active, inactive or retired, their beneficiaries and Estates, whose accrued benefits or pension benefits are based in whole or in part on the Plan's cash balance formulas, from January 1, 2002 to present. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 242 F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). In essence, the class claim said more about what the plaintiffs failed to do, than what they did. The age discriminations through ERISA was being reviewed by a higher court, and the notices part of the complaint could only be certified from 2002 onwards. This according to the Court was a result of JP Morgan being such a large company; It was the factual diversity of the notice claims that posed an insurmountable hurdle to class certification of the notice claims. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 242 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). On July 31, 2007, the Court (Judge Baer) denied the plaintiffs motion to reconsider. Not only was the motion denied, but the opinion was written in a clearly frustrated tone. In the opinion, the Court accused the class counsel of not knowing the difference between confusion and hardship. In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 2177019 WL 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). And at the end of the opinion, the Court States, that "the Clerk of the Court is instructed to close this motion and remove it from my docket." In re J.P. Morgan Chase Cash Balance Litigation, 2177019 WL 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Thus, not only is the litigation going poorly for the plaintiffs, but they are getting on the wrong side of the Court. In light of this, on January 30, 2009, the parties entered into a Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal of Certified Claims, according to which the Certified Claims would be dismissed with prejudice, and each party should bear its own costs and fees. On October 19, 2009, the Court (Judge Cote) approved the parties' motion to dismiss the certified claims. On July 15, 2010, the Court (Judge Cote) approved the parties' Settlement Agreement, according to which the plaintiffs' counsel was awarded $600,000 as reimbursement of costs and expenses.

Summary: This action was brought by a group of participants in J.P. Morgan Chase's Retirement Plan seeking declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief. On July 15, 2010, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement, resulting in dismissal of the case.


On February 12, 1993, Robert L. Wilkins, an African-American attorney, and three of his relatives filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the State of Maryland and the Maryland State Police [MSP] under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, alleged that defendants violated their constitutional rights by stopping, detaining and searching them pursuant to a racial profile used by defendants as part of their drug interdiction efforts. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as class certification. On January 5, 1995, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the MSP was to prohibit the use of race-based drug-courier profiling, to re-train all police officers on this new policy and to maintain computer records of all vehicle stops made on Maryland roadways in which drug-detecting dogs were used. Defendants also agreed to pay each plaintiff $12,500 in compensatory damages and to pay attorneys' fees of $45,600. Data from vehicle stops was to be forwarded to plaintiffs and the court in order to assure that the MSP was in compliance with the agreement. On November 14, 1996, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, alleging that the traffic stop data provided by the MSP showed that the MSP was engaged in a continuing pattern and practice of race discrimination in its drug interdiction activities carried out along the I-95 corridor. On April 22, 1997, the District Court (Judge Catherine Blake) ordered that its jurisdiction over the settlement agreement be extended as it found that plaintiffs made a reasonable showing that the MSP was in violation of the agreement. The District Court also ordered the MSP to collect and disclose additional data and information regarding traffic stops for further evaluation of the compliance issue. In June 1998, the case was consolidated with the related case Maryland State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, PP-MD-1, for discovery purposes. Litigation and discovery on the issue of MSP's compliance with the settlement agreement continued for years. On April 22, 2003 the parties entered into a Consent Decree, which formally resolved all disputed issues in the case and replaced the terms of the settlement agreement. The Consent Decree also served to resolve the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief in the related case Maryland State Conf. of NAACP Branches v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, PP-MD-1. The Consent Decree provided for a new MSP policy that included: the prohibition of racial profiling in traffic stops, retraining of all MSP officers, audio-visual taping of all traffic stops and searches, creation of a citizen complaint process, maintenance of statistics regarding traffic stops, development of a Police-Citizen Advisory Committee to promote mutual understanding between the police force and the community, and use of consent forms for vehicle searches. Defendants also agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $325,000. On May 23, 2003, the District Court approved the Consent Decree. As of the date of this summary, it is believed that monitoring of the Consent Decree continues.

Summary: On February 12, 1993, Robert L. Wilkins, an African-American attorney, and three of his relatives filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the State of Maryland and the Maryland State Police [MSP] under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their constitutional rights by stopping, detaining and searching them pursuant to a racial profile used by defendants as part of their drug interdiction efforts. On May 23, 2003, after noncompliance with a previous settlement agreement, the District Court (Judge Catherine Blake) approved a new Consent Decree that required a new MSP policy, as well as payment of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of $325,000. On May 23, 2003, the District Court approved the Consent Decree. The defendants paid a total of $408,100 in damages and attorney fees.


On September 1, 2009, 32 Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for Minnesota, against the City of St. Paul and six police officers employed by the City of St. Paul, Ramsey County, and Minneapolis. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked for $50,000 in damages and injunctive relief, claiming Defendants violated their First Amendment right to free speech and Fourth Amendment rights by arresting them without probable cause and using excessive force. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that on September 1, 2008, the first day of the Republican National Convention (RNC), law enforcement officers trapped 200 people, including plaintiffs, in downtown St. Paul. Officers deployed chemical irritants and non-lethal ammunition against these people, herding them into a park. Officers did not give a dispersal order or allow people to leave. An officer announced that everyone was under arrest, officers handcuffed everyone they thought were protesters, and allowed everyone else to leave. Seven plaintiffs were detained and then released, and the other plaintiffs were taken into custody and released within 72 hours, all charges were eventually dismissed. Plaintiffs sued on behalf of everyone arrested in the Park and on behalf of the sub-class of people subjected to chemical irritants and concussion grenades while being herded toward the Park. Plaintiffs styled their complaint as a class action but did not seek class certification. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of St. Paul designed and implemented a policy of isolation and containment of protesters during the RNC and authorized officers to arrest protesters without probable cause and use excessive force against protesters. Plaintiffs alleged some Defendant officers ordered the mass arrest, other defendants authorized and directed the use of excessive force against plaintiffs and others, and one defendant officer allegedly used excessive force against plaintiffs and others. Police arrested all of the plaintiffs and used force including chemical irritants and batons on some of the plaintiffs. On September 29, 2010, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Magnuson) dismissed the claims against one officer after the parties stipulated to the dismissal. On October 28, 2010, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Magnuson) granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found that (1) defendant officers did not falsely arrest Plaintiffs because detaining everyone in the park for a short period was necessary given the behavior of the group and Defendants attempted to separate innocent individuals and only booked those they believed had engaged in illegal activity, (2) Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights because violent protest, including throwing rocks and feces, is not protected speech and Plaintiffs did not establish that police were retaliating against them for their speech, (3) even if Defendants fired smoke bombs, they did not use excessive force because the officers thought the crowd was turning into a riot, (4) the City of St. Paul was not vicariously liable for the officers' actions because the officers did not violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights and the City's decision to clear the downtown of all civilians was constitutional. Bernini v. St. Paul, No. 09-02312, 2010 WL 4386888 at *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2010). On January 13, 2012, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Steven M. Colloton, Raymond C. Clevenger, III, and William Duane Benton) affirmed summary judgment against all defendants. The court found that the police did not violate the rights of: (1) the sixteen plaintiffs present at the intersection who police arrested at the park, (2) the seven plaintiffs the police detained and then released at the park, and (3) the nine plaintiffs not present at the intersection who were arrested at the park:
Defendants reasonably could have concluded the group had committed crimes including third degree riot and unlawful assembly, the group was acting as a unit, and the group intended to break through the police line in order to access downtown St. Paul.
The officers directed the protesters to the park because they could not arrest the people at the intersection. During this walk, additional people became intermingled with the original group, some of whom were detained or arrested. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity for seizures of these people as well. The officers released 200 people, including seven plaintiffs, because the officers thought they were not part of the original group. The court held the officers did not violate the rights of the seven plaintiffs they released.
The police acted reasonably toward the nine remaining plaintiffs who were arrested even though the plaintiffs alleged they were not present at the intersection. The court held the police acted reasonably because the police believed these plaintiffs had been part of a unit gathered to enter downtown.
 Furthermore, the court held the officers' use of force was reasonable because the officers believed the crowd intended to penetrate a police line and access downtown St. Paul. According to video footage, some people would not leave the roadway, so the officers' use of non-lethal munitions was reasonable. Moreover, plaintiffs did not identify any defendant who used gratuitous force. The court found that although protesters were engaged in protected speech, when protesters moved toward the police in a threatening manner and began to block traffic, their actions were no longer protected under the First Amendment. Finally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment against the City because Defendant East Area Commander did not have final policymaking authority. Bernini v. St. Paul, 665 F.3d 997 (8th Cir. 2012).

Summary: In this Section 1983 suit filed in 2009 in the District of Minnesota, plaintiffs alleged that on the first day of the 2008 Republican National Convention (RNC), law enforcement officers trapped 200 people, including plaintiffs, in downtown St. Paul; deployed chemical irritants and non-lethal ammunition against these people, herding them into a park; and handcuffed everyone thought to be protesters. The district court rejected the lawsuit, granting summary judgment in October 2010 for the defendants; this outcome was affirmed by the 8th Circuit in 2012.


COVID-19 Summary: This putative class action was filed on December 20, 2020 by a group of medically vulnerable detainees at the El Paso County Jail in Colorado, seeking reasonable COVID-19 safety measures. The Court granted a stipulated preliminary injunction on January 4, 2021. <hr> This case is about the detainment conditions of individuals with a high vulnerability to COVID-19 within the El Paso County Jail in Colorado. On December 13, 2020, six detainees of the El Paso County Jail who are particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 filed this putative class action against El Paso County Sheriff Bill Elder in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment violations, as well as violations of the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiffs sought to include all current and future persons held in custody at the El Paso County Jail as class members and also sought the certification of three subclasses: (1) those held in pretrial detention; (2) those held in connection with a criminal conviction; and (3) those who were medically vulnerable with respect to COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief requiring the jail to take measures to mitigate the risks of COVID-19, including: mask requirements, testing, quarantining, and medical treatment. They also sought declaratory relief that the jail's policies violated the U.S. Constitution and the Colorado Constitution. The plaintiffs argued that the lack of reasonable COVID-19 precautions in the jail amounted to a violation of the Due Process rights of the pre-trial detainees, since the lack of COVID-19 protections demonstrates deliberate indifference by the defendant and puts detainees at a serious risk of harm. The plaintiffs also argued that the disregard for the serious risks of harm to post-conviction detainees amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Christine M. Arguello; however, Judge Arguello recused herself and the case was randomly reassigned to Judge Richard Brooke Jackson. On December 31, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulated motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Jackson granted the injunction on January 4, 2021. As a result of the preliminary injunction, the defendant was ordered to require all staff, contractors, and inmates to wear masks. The defendant also agreed to continue COVID-19 testing protocols and to require medical staff to screen and identify at-risk individuals vulnerable to the effects of COVID-19. The order also required the jail to provide inmates access to clean drinking water and for the staff to check all inmates' temperatures twice per day. For the duration of the preliminary injunction, the order provided that the jail is required to house all COVID-19 positive inmates in isolation and to ensure that such inmates are housed in a non-punitive environment with access to personal items. The jail is required to take measures to allow for social distancing of at-risk inmates and to screen COVID-19 positive inmates for symptoms and vital signs. For the duration of the injunction, the jail was required to provide plaintiff's counsel with a roster of inmates, the total number of COVID-19 positive inmates, the number of COVID tests conducted during the prior week, and the number of inmates who tested positive over the prior week. The preliminary injunction was set to expire after 90 days. The case is ongoing as of January 20, 2021.

Summary: In December 2020, six detainees in the El Paso County Jail in Colorado filed this putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs alleged that the jail's lack of measures to mitigate the risks of COVID-19 amounted to a violation of the Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court granted a stipulated preliminary injunction on January 4, 2021. The case is ongoing as of January 20, 2021.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought by medically vulnerable detainees in the Etowah County Detention Center, seeking release due to COVID-19 and lack of protection from the virus in the facility. On May 15, the court denied entry of a TRO and a month later, the plaintiffs dismissed the case voluntarily.
 The Initial Lawsuit: This case was originally filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus on March 5, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. It was assigned to Judge Abdul K. Kallon and given the docket number 4:20-cv-00596. The petitioner challenged his detention by ICE as being in violation of his substantive and procedural due process rights and contrary to the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Zadvydas. Then, on April 29, 2020, the petitioner and seventeen other detainees in the Etowah County Detention Center filed amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. The claims were drastically different, and with seventeen new plaintiffs involved, the court felt that the petitioners were simply trying to avoid randomization of assignments to judges by adding unrelated claims and new petitioners to the original complaint. Therefore, the court ordered the clerk to open a new case for this new complaint. It was assigned to Judge R. David Proctor and referred to Magistrate Judge John H. England III, and its new docket number was 4:20-cv-00304. Regarding the original case, Judge Kallon gave the petitioner until May 7 to file respond the the defendants' answer in that case. That docket is not available online, so the Clearinghouse does not know whether it was dismissed or continued on. The New Lawsuit: Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers' Guild, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Etowah County, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the New Orleans ICE Field Office. Suing under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, they alleged that their underlying medical conditions made them more vulnerable to COVID-19 and that their continued detention was unconstitutional. Simultaneous with the petition, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order, arguing that the court had the authority to do so, that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without it, that they were likely to succeed on the merits, and that the balance of equities weighed in their favor. The defendants filed a response in opposition on May 4, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction, that the plaintiffs had not shown irreparable harm, nor had they proved deliberate indifference. For petitioners to succeed. defendants argued, they had to show that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the petitioners' rights. Over the next few weeks, one petitioner was granted release by ICE, and his habeas petition and motion for temporary restraining order were dismissed as moot. On May 15, Judge Proctor denied the TRO, stating that the plaintiffs could not modify their conditions of confinement through § 2241, and that the release order they sought had not been granted by other courts, even where the risk posed to detainees was even more prevalent. According to Judge Proctor, habeas corpus is a vehicle by which petitioners are to challenge that they are imprisoned or the length of their imprisonment, but not the conditions of their imprisonment. 2020 WL 2513648. On June 19, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss the case, which was granted three days later. The case is now closed.

Summary: After a rough start, this petition for habeas corpus was filed by 18 petitioners on April 29, 2020. Petitioners were non-citizen detainees who argued that being held in custody by ICE amidst the 2020 COVID pandemic represented violations of their due process rights and federal statutory law. The petitioners had medical problems which rendered them particularly vulnerable to COVID. The petitioners also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order, holding that habeas corpus was only a vehicle to challenge the fact of a detainee's detention or its length, but not the conditions of confinement. Petitioners voluntarily dismissed the suit on June 19, 2020. The case is now closed.


On June 7, 2012, the American Immigration Council (AIC), a pro-immigration non-profit organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The AIC sued the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). On September 9, 2011, AIC had filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA, 5 U.SC. §1552) request with CBP to disclose all materials "prepared, received, transmitted, collected, and/or maintained" regarding their "voluntary return program," in which non-citizens can voluntarily return to their native country instead of being deported by CBP. AIC alleged that CBP had failed to inform prospective participants of the consequences of participation in the program, and even compelled individuals to participate. In response to the FOIA request, CBP had disclosed two documents, totaling four pages. Citing previous FOIA disclosures and publicly released documents that show additional available documents that CBP had failed to disclose, AIC sought a declaration that CBP violated FOIA and an order that CBP and any of its departments conduct a reasonable search for records of the voluntary return program. Beginning on August 10, 2012, CBP began to and continued to provided the AIC with additional documents to supplement the original FOIA request. On April 21, 2014, the AIC agreed not to produce any further challenges and the parties entered into negotiations regarding attorneys' fees. The parties informed the Court (Judge Tanya S. Chutkan) on September 5, 2014, that they had reached a settlement, and the Court filed an Order of Dismissal to dismiss the action with prejudice. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, the American Immigration Council filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP). AIC seeks a declaration that CBP failed to adequately respond to a FOIA request regarding their "voluntary return" program, and order to conduct a reasonable search for all records regarding the program. CBP produced additional documents, AIC agreed to drop further challenges, and the parties reached an agreement regarding attorneys' fees on September 5, 2014, closing the case.


On July 14, 2016, two health care clinics, an Arizona obstetrician-gynecologist, and five Arizona Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Health Care Containment System under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the federal Medicaid statute and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from enforcing H.B. 2599. H.B. 2599 was signed into law on May 17, 2016. The Act empowered the defendant to exclude any entity that "failed to segregate taxpayer dollars from abortions, including the use of taxpayer dollars for any overhead expenses attributable to abortions" from participation in Arizona's Medicaid program. The plaintiffs claimed that the Act violated the Medicaid Act by denying Medicaid patients their right to receive care from a willing and qualified Medicaid provider of their choice. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Act further violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was impermissibly vague and retaliated against abortion providers. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by singling out health care providers who exercise their constitutionally protected right of offering abortion services. On August 11, 2016, the defendant advised the plaintiffs that the defendant would put H.B. 2599 into effect only after the proper rulemaking process, which would likely take one to two years. The defendant would not enforce the rule until this process was complete. In response to the defendant's assurances, the plaintiff entered a stipulation of dismissal to the court on September 1, 2016. On September 7, 2016, Judge Roslyn Silver granted the dismissal without prejudice.

Summary: On July 14, 2016, two health care clinics, an Arizona obstetrician-gynecologist, and five Arizona Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Health Care Containment System under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the federal Medicaid statute and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from enforcing H.B. 2599. On August 11, 2016, the defendant advised the plaintiffs that the defendant would put H.B. 2599 into effect only after the proper rule making process, which would likely take 1-2 years. In response to the defendant's assurances, the plaintiff entered a stipulation of dismissal to the court on September 1, 2016. On September 7, 2016 Judge Roslyn Silver granted the dismissal without prejudice.


In 2010, the United States Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division, Disability Rights Section) began an investigation into the provision of services to individuals with mental illness in North Carolina. On July 28, 2011, the DOJ issued a letter of findings to the State Attorney General detailing violations of the ADA, Section 504, and the Olmstead v. L.C. integration mandate. The DOJ found that North Carolina unnecessarily placed individuals with mental illness in "adult care homes" rather than in community-based settings, and that the state's policies cause individuals with mental illness who receive some services outside of institutions to face a risk of unnecessary institutionalization. After a year of negotiations, the DOJ concurrently filed a complaint and settlement agreement on August 23, 2012. Through this court-enforceable settlement agreement, North Carolina promised to increase its community-based services available to individuals with mental illness and to offer additional supports so that these individuals can stay out of institutions. Specifically, North Carolina was required to put transition programs in place to move individuals out of adult care homes and divert individuals from those placements where possible. The State also agreed to create additional opportunities for individuals with mental illness to live in supported housing, and to put programs in place to expand employment opportunities. The settlement also mandated that the State improve its community-based mental health services, with an emphasis on "Assertive Community Treatment" teams and crisis services. The parties selected an independent reviewer to monitor the State's progress in complying with the agreement. The Court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the settlement. For the next five years, the parties monitored North Carolina's progress toward the terms of the settlement agreement. On January 9, 2017, the United States submitted a motion for the court to enforce the settlement agreement. The DOJ alleged that the State had repeatedly failed to comply with the agreement's housing and employment provisions, and had redefined ways to measure its own compliance with those provisions without the agreement of the DOJ. Specifically, the DOJ found that the State was far below the housing and employment services benchmarks that had been set for the year 2016, and that, because of its shortcomings, had decided to reevaluate the way it measured its progress toward those benchmarks to artificially boost the number of individuals who had received services. The DOJ stated that because of these failures, hundreds of mentally ill North Carolinians remained needlessly segregated in adult care homes. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the DOJ's motion for court enforcement violated terms of the settlement agreement that called for collaborative dispute resolution. It also argued that its means of evaluating progress were consistent with the terms of the agreement. On June 22, 2017, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge James C. Dever. On September 21, 2017, Judge Dever granted the DOJ's motion in part. Finding that the United States had satisfied its dispute resolution obligations under the settlement agreement and that its interpretation of the State's obligations was correct, he ordered the parties to meet and negotiate a modified timeline for the State's compliance obligations. 2017 WL 4238866. The parties met and agreed to extend the term of the agreement from July 2020 to July 2021, finding the State needed additional time to meet its obligations. The court granted an order approving of this modification on November 1, 2017. The parties entered into a consent protective order on June 6, 2018. The order governs the confidential information exchanged during the course of compliance with the settlement. As of April 18, 2020, the only other entry in the docket since then has been a substitution of counsel on January 17, 2020. This case is ongoing for enforcement purposes.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice negotiated a settlement with the State of North Carolina to reform its provision of services to individuals with mental illness to comply with the ADA. The settlement, enforceable by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, will allow individuals with mental illness to live in community-based placements rather than adult care homes (institutional placements).


On November 9, 2007, three named plaintiffs with mobility impairments limiting their ability to walk filed this class action against Walt Disney World. They requested certification of a class of individuals who 1) suffered from a mobility disability, 2) relied upon a Segway PT for assistance with their mobility, and 3) had visited or intended to visit a Disney theme park. They brought suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, alleging that Disney’s policy against allowing Segway PT two-wheeled, self-balancing vehicles into the Disney World Resort was discrimination in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs argued that an estimated 4,000 to 7,000 individuals with disabilities within the United States relied on Segways for mobility. Disney offered rental wheelchairs and power scooters at an additional expense, but no mobility devices that permitted the user to ride upright. The plaintiffs alleged that the option to rent a seated mobility device was inadequate for three reasons: 1) it cost the plaintiffs an additional expense, 2) wheelchair users were permitted to bring in their own mobility devices, and 3) a standing position was safer. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to discontinue the policy and require Disney to allow the use of Segway PT devices by guests with disabilities . They also asked for a declaratory judgment that the prohibition violated Title III of the ADA as well as for attorneys' fees and costs. On February 20, 2008 the court (J. Gregory A. Presnell) dismissed the suit on a motion from the defendant. The court held that under the initial complaint, the plaintiffs lacked standing because by failing to show concrete plans for future visits to Disney World, they could not show that they would experience future discrimination. The order gave the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 2008 WL 490581. The plaintiffs refiled on April 1, 2008. On December 26, 2008, the parties filed a simultaneous Joint Motion for Conditional Class Certification and for Preliminary Approval of Joint Stipulation of Settlement. 2008 WL 5452909. The plaintiff submitted a Second Amended Complaint on the same day to expand the complaint to explicitly include the Disneyland Resort in California—an addition that the proposed settlement hinged on. On January 5, 2009, Judge Presnell granted these motions, conditional on the outcome of a fairness hearing. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 254 F.R.D. 680 (M.D. Fla. 2009). However, on October 6, 2009, the court vacated the order that had conditionally certified the class, preliminarily approved the settlement, and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint. The court found that the evidence showed that the plaintiffs still lacked standing to represent and bind the class of Segway users with disabilities, specifically because many of them would not accept the settlement terms. The court quoted two objectors in particular, who rejected the terms of the settlement because the alternative four-wheeled device Disney proposed to provide resembled a scooter and would make their disabilities more obvious. The objectors argued that the proposed settlement actually increased stigmatization. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 2009 WL 3242028 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6). The plaintiffs appealed this decision, and on December 14, 2010, the federal Court of Appeals (Judges Charles R. Wilson, William H. Pryor, and R. Lanier Anderson) for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal and remanded. The Court of Appeals found that the named plaintiffs did have standing as representatives of the proposed class. The appellate court reinstated the December 26, 2008 motions and the Second Amended Complaint. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 405 F. App'x 401 (11th Cir. 2010). On remand, the court issued an order approving the Class Action Settlement, and on April 25, 2011, the court issued a final judgment approving the settlement. Disney agreed to develop its own four-wheeled electric vehicle operated by a standing rider and to provide at least fifteen of these devices at the Disney Resorts. Disney also agreed to pay each of the three named plaintiffs $4,000 and to allow the named plaintiff's complimentary use of the special electric vehicles during one visit to Disney World. The court-approved settlement awared attorneys' fees and costs totaling $60,000 to the firms representing two of the named plaintiffs. The third named plaintiff's attorneys were awarded $40,000 in a separate order. On April 29, 2011, the objectors appealed the approval of the settlement and the grant of final judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently representative of the class. The Eleventh Circuit (Judge Joel F. Dubina) denied this appeal in an opinion dated August 30, 2012, holding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class and approving the settlement. Ault v. Walt Disney World Co., 692 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2012). The objectors sought review from the Supreme Court but were denied in 2013. Miller v. Walt Disney World Co., 569 U.S. 918 (2013). Disney introduced its Electric Standing Vehicles on May 2, 2013, charging a daily rental fee. The case is now closed.

Summary: A class of individuals with disabilities who relied on Segway PT devices and were not allowed to bring these devices into Disney World brought a lawsuit against Walt Disney World in alleging discrimination under Title III of the ADA. The parties entered a court-approved Class Action Settlement, with Disney agreeing to design and make available for rent to disabled guests an alternative, four-wheeled upright mobility device based on a power scooter platform. The case is now closed.


On December 2, 2011, a private individual filed this lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, against the City of Montgomery Police Department, the Chief of Police, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, and the Alabama Department of Public Safety. Represented by Equal Justice Under Law and local private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the application of Alabama's sex offender registration law violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and denied him equal protection; subjected him to ex post facto laws, in violation of Article I Section 10; subjected him to illegal search and false imprisonment, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; subjected him to false imprisonment and false arrest, in violation of Alabama law; and tortiously intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him. The Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA") applied to adult offenders convicted of one of thirty-one offenses defined as a sex offense under Alabama law, as well as those convicted in another jurisdiction of a crime that, "if it had been committed in [Alabama] under the current provisions of law, would constitute" one of the enumerated offenses. The entire scheme is retroactive, capturing any enumerated or similar offense regardless of when it was committed. ASORCNA restricts where a registrant may live and work, requires the distribution of community-notification flyers to those living near a registrant's residence, and provides for a "public registry website maintained by the Department of Public Safety." The website was required to include specific information regarding each registrant. Registrants must "appear in person to verify all required registration information" quarterly; homeless registrants who reside in municipalities ("in-town registrants"), such as the plaintiff in this case, must also register weekly - and in person - with both the local police and county sheriff. Additionally, ASORCNA required registrants who intended to be away from their county of residence for three or more consecutive days to "report such information in person immediately prior to leaving" and to complete a travel permit form providing "the dates of travel and temporary lodging information." When a registrant obtained a permit, the registrant's local sheriff must "immediately notify local law enforcement" in the registrant's destination. Importantly, in-town registrants were required to obtain travel permits from both the local police and county sheriff, despite the fact that the forms for obtaining travel permits were virtually identical for both jurisdictions. ASORCNA's provisions applied for life and without regard to the nature of the offense, the age of the victim, or the passage of time since the underlying sex offense. On January 17, 2012, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed all claims against the City of Montgomery Police Department, the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department, and various named individuals. On March 16, 2012, the plaintiff dismissed all claims against the Alabama Department of Public Safety. On March 29, 2012, the District Court (Chief Judge William Keith Watkins) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to all but Claim IV, which alleged that the retroactive application of Alabama's sex offender registration law violated the plaintiff's rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. That claim was heard at trial by Chief Judge William Keith Watkins in March and April of 2014. At trial, the plaintiff argued that the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act ("ASORCNA") retroactively applied a set of restrictions that was "so punitive in its cumulative effects that it violates the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution." The plaintiff alleged that ASORCNA caused him to be homeless by banishing him from his mom's home, his brother's home, his wife's home, and over 80% of the housing stock in Montgomery. He further alleged that ASORCNA contributed to, if not directly caused, the homelessness of dozens of other registrants across the state, and that it contributed to, if not directly caused, a 50% unemployment rate (over eight times the statewide average) amongst registrants. He described the ways in which ASORCNA imposed direct barriers on intra- and interstate travel, publicly branded all registrants, and created crushingly burdensome reporting obligations. He further argued that, under the United States Constitution, such extreme punishments could not be applied retroactively. On February 5, 2015, the District Court issued an order declaring that, with respect to sex offenders convicted before the passage of ASORCNA in 2011, ASORCNA was unconstitutional under the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution to the extent that it required (1) in-town homeless registrants to register on a weekly basis with two separate law-enforcement jurisdictions, and (2) all in-town registrants to complete travel permit applications with two separate law-enforcement jurisdictions. The court explained that the issue in the case centered on the question of whether ASORCNA could fairly be characterized as criminal, imposing a retroactive punishment, or if it was more properly categorized as civil and non-punitive. Although he concluded that the plaintiff did not show by the clearest proof that ASORCNA's scheme <i>as a whole</i> was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate the Legislature's stated non-punitive intent, Judge Watkins reasoned that the two dual-jurisdiction requirements "are so punitive in their effect as to negate the Alabama Legislature's stated non-punitive intent by the clearest proof." Judge Watkins declined to enjoin enforcement of the law, stating that he "is confident that state officials will abide by the judgment of this court declaring that [certain provisions of] ASORCNA [are] unconstitutional." Because the the Alabama Legislature expressed its intention that ASORCNA's provisions be severable and because the Act could be given effect absent the unconstitutional requirements, the remainder of ASORCNA remains "intact and in force." 83 F.Supp.3d 1231. Both parties appealed. Oral argument was held on Feb. 26, 2016. The court remanded the case on the limited issue of determining if the plaintiff was still homeless or if the issue was moot. The plaintiff confirmed his ongoing homeless status on April 6, 2016. Meanwhile, in the district court, the parties argued over attorney's fees. As of April 18, 2020, the case is still pending in the Eleventh Circuit.

Summary: This lawsuit was brought to challenge the constitutionality of Alabama's sex offender registration law. The plaintiff was convicted of sexual assault in Colorado in 1986 and served a prison sentence there. When he moved back to his hometown of Montgomery, AL, in 2010, he was subjected to the onerous restrictions of the Alabama Sex Offender Registration and Community Notification Act (ASORCNA), which he now challenges as violating the Constitution's ex post facto provision. On February 5, 2015, the District Court held two provisions of ASORCNA unconstitutional.


The plaintiffs are five trans women housed in a men's prison in Illinois. On Jan 31, 2018, they filed a complaint against the governor of Illinois, the director of the Illinois Department of Correction, the Chief of Health Services for IDOC, the statewide Mental Health Supervisor for IDOC, and two members of the Gender Identity Disorder Committee for IDOC. (Note: "Gender Identity Disorder" is now clinically referred to as Gender Dysphoria). The plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Illinois. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged that the placement of these women in the men's prison and the conditions they faced in these placements amount to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. They sought class certification, preliminary and permanent injunction, development of revised policies to eliminate substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs and members of the class, and attorneys' fees. The complaint also requested that the court retain jurisdiction pending full compliance. While incarcerated in IDOC facilities, the plaintiffs experienced long wait times for approval for hormone replacement therapy despite unquestioned Gender Dysphoria diagnoses, resulting in mental health crises including self harm and suicide attempts. For plaintiffs who, after prolonged waits, had received HRT treatment plans, the dosage provided was too low and not therapeutically appropriate in light of WPATH standards. One plaintiff was housed in administrative segregation for a prolonged period, and was only allowed contact with general population after ceasing HRT. The women had also been denied clothing and grooming articles consistent with their gender identity, appropriate mental health care, appropriate bloodwork and laboratory testing, social transition, and gender affirming surgery. On Nov 30, 2018, the court granted the governor of Illinois's motion to dismiss the claims against him (2018 WL 6259248), leaving all claims against the remaining plaintiffs intact. On Dec 19, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction (2019 WL 6918474), and later amended the contents of this injunction on March 4, 2020. The final preliminary injunction required IDOC to create a new policy regarding the provision of medical care to trans prisoners. Specifically, it required them to change their practice of having a board of non-experts, "the GID Committee," make decisions on behalf of incarcerated trans people. The court further required IDOC to propose a plan that provides access to clinicians who are qualified to treat Gender Dysphoria, access to basic care including HRT, and to allow prisoners access to items to facilitate social transition. Finally, IDOC was required to advise the court of any steps taken to train staff on transgender issues. On March 4, 2020, the same day the amended preliminary injunction was issued, the court also granted the plaintiffs' class certification. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Five trans women incarcerated in men's prisons in Illinois filed this class action case against the director of the Illinois Department of Correction and several other IDOC employees on Jan 31, 2018. The plaintiffs are represented by the ACLU of Illinois. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs asserted that IDOC policy regarding the provision of medical care to trans inmates results in inadequate care, amounting to a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Since filing, the court has issued a preliminary injunction requiring an overhaul of IDOC policy and has granted class certification. This case is ongoing.


On December 4, 1989, a class action lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of all present and future prisoners of the Nevada County Jail and Nevada County Detention Center against Nevada County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. Plaintiff prisoners alleged violations of their First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In particular, prisoners alleged that they were deprived of beds, seating at meals, clothing, medical, dental, and mental health care, safety, access to attorneys, reasonable visitation, prompt determination of probable cause for detention, and prompt bail determinations. The prisoners were represented by several counsel, including the Prisoner Rights Union in Sacramento, California. Declarations filed in the case indicated that prisoners were eating and sleeping on the hallway floors at the Nevada County Jail, and on March 6, 1990, the parties agreed to a stipulated injunction which was submitted to the District Court (Judge John Moulds). The District Court (Judge Moulds) entered the injunction on October 31, 1990. The injunction imposed a strict population cap on the county jails and required the County to remove all beds from the hallways, to provide each prisoner with a bed, to provide dental care according to accepted community standards, and to provide prompt judicial probable cause hearings. Prisoners' attorneys were also allowed unlimited and unannounced access for the purpose of monitoring compliance. In March 1992, prisoners of the Nevada County jails were moved to a new facility, and the County sought to dismiss the prisoners' action. The District Court dismissed the action on February 26, 1993. There was a subsequent dispute regarding the District Court's award of attorney's fees. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Herbert Young Cho Choy) ultimately vacated the award and remanded the case to the District Court to calculate a reasonable fee. <i>McGrath v. Cnty. of Nevada</i>, 67 F.3d 248 (9th Cir. 1995). The parties subsequently agreed to settle the issue of attorney's fees.

Summary: On December 4, 1989, a class action lawsuit was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of the prisoners of Nevada County Jail. A preliminary injunction was granted by Judge John Moulds on October 31, 1990. In March 1992, prisoners of the Nevada County jails were moved to a new facility, and the County sought to dismiss the prisoners' action. The District Court dismissed the action on February 26, 1993. There was an appeal regarding the amount of attorney's fees charged to the defendant. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Herbert Young Cho Choy) ultimately vacated the award and remanded the case to the District Court to calculate a reasonable fee.


On December 9, 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of all children detained at the Phillip B. Gilliam Youth Services Center (Gilliam) in Denver, Colorado, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, against the State of Colorado. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the ACLU of Colorado, the Youth Law Center, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. On February 2, 1995, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, in which they alleged that overcrowding and conditions at Gilliam violated their constitutional and statutory rights. According to the complaint, Gilliam was so overcrowded that five juveniles were simultaneously confined to a single-occupancy cell for up to twenty hours in a day. Overcrowding and understaffing also led to inadequate access to functioning toilets, monitoring of at-risk or isolated detainees, educational opportunities, recreation, rehabilitation programming, and access to confidential legal counsel. Because detainees were inadequately classified and separated, older and more violent juveniles were housed with younger and non-violent detainees. While confined at Gilliam, children were physically and sexually assaulted and bullied into giving their meals by bigger children. Gilliam staff disciplined children with isolation and mechanical restraints, without hearing or notice. On January 3, 1995, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (Judge Edward W. Nottingham) ordered the parties to engage in settlement discussions before a magistrate (Judge Donald E. Abram) and, on March 23, 1995, the court (Judge Nottingham) stayed the proceedings to facilitate settlement. On May 26, 1995, the parties entered a settlement agreement, which was amended on May 30, 1995, to accommodate pending federal legislation, the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act." H.R. 667, Title III. The settlement agreement was intended to ensure that conditions of detention were constitutional, safe, sanitary, humane, individualized, and rehabilitative. As such, the settlement agreement required the State to eliminate overcrowding, classify and separate detainees, hire enough employees to satisfy specific staff-to-juvenile ratios, screen all children for disabilities, provide all detainees with a bed (not a mattress on the floor), build a library, and implement disciplinary procedures that did not involve prolonged isolation and mechanical restraints. Other provisions of the settlement agreement addressed prompt and expert medical and mental health care, access to toilets, allowing children to decorate their walls, education, recreation, and individualized rehabilitation programming. The State agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. On September 15, 1995, the court approved the class action settlement. The Court retained enforcement authority and actively monitored the State's compliance for three years. The court appointed two Court Monitors (Russ Van Vleet and Robert B. Rutherford Jr.) to monitor compliance. The settlement agreement was amended again on September 1, 1999, and then on July 26, 2001, but we do not have copies of either document. The docket ends wtih the July 2001 entry concerning the third amended settlement agreement; thus we have no information on any subsequent proceedings.

Summary: On December 9, 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed on behalf of all children detained at the Phillip B. Gilliam Youth Services Center (Gilliam) in Denver, Colorado, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, against the State of Colorado. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the ACLU of Colorado, the Youth Law Center, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. According to the complaint, Gilliam was so overcrowded that five juveniles were simultaneously confined to a single-occupancy cell for up to twenty hours in a day. Overcrowding and understaffing also led to inadequate access to functioning toilets, monitoring of at-risk or isolated detainees, educational opportunities, recreation, rehabilitation programming, and access to confidential legal counsel. On September 15, 1995, the court approved a class action settlement. The court appointed two Court Monitors (Russ Van Vleet and Robert B. Rutherford Jr.) to monitor compliance. The settlement agreement was amended again on September 1, 1999, and then on July 26, 2001, but we do not have copies of either document.


On April 18, 2012, two African-American men who had unsuccessfully applied to be cast as The Bachelor in the ABC television program of the same name filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, under § 1981 and Cal. Civ. §§ 51, 51.5 against ABC. The complaint was filed as a class action, with plaintiffs seeking to sue on behalf of the class of all people of color who had unsuccessfully applied to star as either The Bachelor or The Bachelorette. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that they were the victims of ABC's racial discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ABC has intentionally and as a matter of corporate policy refused to cast people of color in the role of the Bachelor and Bachelorette for all 23 seasons of the two programs. On October 15, 2012, the Court (Judge Trauger) dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds that applying anti-discrimination provisions to casting decisions would threaten the content of various television networks and their ability to target certain demographic groups and that it would chill protected speech. On November 11, 2012, the plaintiffs moved to alter the judgment and to file an amended complaint. On April 4, 2013, both motions were denied.

Summary: On April 18, 2012, two African American men who had unsuccessfully applied to be cast as The Bachelor in the ABC television program of the same name filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division, under § 1981 and Cal. Civ. §§ 51, 51.5 against American Broadcasting Companies. The complaint was filed as a class action, with plaintiffs suing on behalf of the class of all people of color who had unsuccessfully applied to star as either The Bachelor or The Bachelorette. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that they were the victims of ABC's racial discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that ABC has knowingly, intentionally, and as a matter of corporate policy refused to cast people of color in the role of the Bachelor and Bachelorette for all 23 seasons of the two programs. The case in ongoing.


On February 17, 2004, the Dallas District Office of the EEOC filed this suit in the Northern District of Texas under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Jack of All Trades Personnel Services, Inc. The EEOC, who brought this action on behalf of a class of job-seekers who applied for positions with Jack of All Trades, asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, alleging that the Defendant company had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that Jack of All Trades forced prospective employees to submit to an unlawful chiropractic examination and relied on the results of that exam as a basis to deny hire. On April 14, 2004, Jack of All Trades moved to have the matter dismissed due to improper venue, and alternatively requested a change of venue. On June 1, 2004, Judge Barefoot Sanders denied the motion to dismiss but granted the Defendant's motion for change of venue. EEOC v. Jack of All Trades Personnel Services, Inc., 2004 WL 1217943. The case was subsequently transferred to the Western District of Texas. After participating in alternative dispute resolution, the parties entered a Consent Decree on February 9, 2005. The Decree, which was for a term of three years, provided for a prohibition of disability discrimination, mandatory reporting to the EEOC, and a monetary award of $154,224 to be distributed among identified individuals who had been subjected to Jack of All Trade's discriminatory hiring practices.

Summary: In February 2004, the EEOC filed this suit in the Northern District of Texas under Title I of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Jack of All Trades Personnel Services, Inc. The EEOC alleged that Jack of All Trades had engaged in discriminatory hiring practices; specifically, the company required prospective employees to undergo an unlawful medical examination and based its hiring decisions on the outcome of that exam. The case was transferred to the Western District of Texas in April 2004, and a Consent Decree was entered in February of 2005. The Decree provided for a monetary award of $154,224 for the class of individuals affected by Jack of All Trade's hiring practices as well as injunctive relief.


On September 3, 2008, several lessors and lessees of residential accommodations in Farmers Branch, Texas, filed a lawsuit against the city in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, under the Supremacy Clause; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et. seq.; and the Texas Equal Rights Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the city's recently adopted Ordinance 2952 violated both the federal and state constitutions and the FHA. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance's requirement that anyone wishing to rent a home or apartment prove U.S. citizenship or lawful residence and its requirement that landlords evict all tenants that cannot produce such proof were preempted by federal immigration law, in violation of the due process clause of the federal constitution, and in violation of equal protection measures in the federal and state constitutions and the FHA. The Northern District had already permanently enjoined a substantially similar law, Ordinance 2903, on May 28, 2008. (See IM-TX-0003, and the two cases consolidated with it, IM-TX-0001 and IM-TX-0002, for more information; see also IM-TX-0004, a case on the ordinance brought in Texas state court.) Ordinance 2952 was passed in response to this injunction, and differed from its predecessor in two main ways: (1) it did not incorporate the HUD (Housing and Urban Development) classification system for non-citizen eligibility for housing, and (2) it reserved all determinations of immigration status to the federal government instead of deputizing landlords or local officials. On September 12, 2008, the Court (Judge Jane J. Boyle) entered a temporary restraining order against Ordinance 2952, and on September 22 it granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. After a series of disputes over discovery and admissible evidence in 2009, on March 24, 2010, the Court (Judge Boyle) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied that of the defendant. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Tex. 2010). It held that the ordinance was preempted by the Supremacy Clause, in that it was an attempt to regulate in the exclusively federal sphere of immigration, and that it was further preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, et seq., which was meant to be the only means of adjudicating the status of non-citizens and the uniform enforcement of which the ordinance undermined. On March 24, the Court issued an order permanently enjoining the ordinance from being enforced. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and after hearing arguments (October 4, 2011), a three-judge panel (Judge Thomas M. Reavley, Judge Jennifer W. Elrod and Judge James E. Graves Jr.) affirmed the lower court's decision on March 21, 2012. Villas at Parkside Partner v. City of Farmers Branch, 675 F.3d 802 (5th Cir. 2012). In an opinion by Judge Reavley, the panel held that the ordinance was not, as the city maintained, a residential housing regulation, but an impermissible attempt to regulate immigration that impeded the federal government's ability to uniformly enforce its immigration laws and threatened to interfere with its handling of foreign affairs. Judge Elrod, dissenting in part, would have held that the ordinance merely attached consequences to a federal determination of immigration status and did not attempt to regulate immigration per se, but that it was nonetheless preempted in part because the ordinance granted jurisdiction to state courts to review the immigration status of individuals, thus interfering with federal enforcement. After the appellate ruling, Farmers Branch petitioned for a rehearing of the case en banc, which a majority of the Fifth Circuit appellate court judges approved on July 31, 2012. Then on July 22, 2013, in a 9-5 judgment, the 14-judge en banc panel struck down the ordinance. The 5-judge plurality opinion (Judge Stephen A. Higginson) held the criminal provisions of the ordinance to be conflict-preempted for presenting an obstacle to the purposes of federal anti-harboring law and federal authority to arrest and detain for possible unlawful presence, while the judicial review section of the ordinance was held to be explicitly preempted because federal law reserves the power to classify non-citizens to the federal government. The plurality proceeded to invalidate the entire law because they found the impermissible portions to be unseverable. The Reavely and Dennis opinions held the entirety of the ordinance conflict-preempted on broader grounds. In her partial concurrence/partial dissent, Judge Owen found only subsection (E)(4) and a sentence of (E)(5) from the judicial review section to be preempted, holding the rest of the ordinance not to be in conflict with federal law. The 5-judge dissent (Judges Edith H. Jones and Jennifer Walker Elrod) found an even narrower portion of the ordinance's judicial review provisions to have been preempted, maintaining that the rest of the ordinance was not in conflict with federal law. The dissent further found that the plurality's severability analysis was flawed, explaining that the ordinance could stand on its own, even divested of criminal penalties, because of the presence of the civil penalties. Farmers Branch then appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied cert on Mar. 7, 2014. The parties then settled on an attorneys' fees in meditation. This case is now closed.

Summary: On September 3, 2008, several lessors and lessees of residential accommodations in Farmers Branch, Texas, filed a lawsuit against that city, alleging that its newly adopted ordinance requiring that anyone wishing to rent a home or apartment prove U.S. citizenship or lawful residence and that landlords evict all tenants that cannot produce such proof was preempted by federal immigration law, in violation of the due process clause of the federal constitution, and in violation of equal protection measures in the federal and state constitutions and the FHA. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas permanently enjoined enforcement of the ordinance on March 24, 2010, and the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed on March 21, 2012. On July 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals agreed to rehear the case en banc. The judgement of the en banc panel (July 22, 2013) was to strike down the ordinance (9-5). Farmers Branch then appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied cert on Mar. 7, 2014. This case is now closed.