COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class action filed by individuals who completed prison sentences for sex offenses, but were prevented from being released under an Illinois statute. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit after the COVID-19 pandemic began to spread to an Illinois correctional facility. In April 2020, the court held the statute unconstitutional as it applied to the plaintiffs and over the next few months, ordered the release of dozens of individuals. On April 28, more than a dozen additional class members filed an amended complaint, adding a Fourteenth Amendment claim that alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Yet another group of plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on May 26; their release was ordered on June 3. The court then granted class certification on July 1 and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment the same day. The motion for summary judgment is still pending.
 Under Illinois law, most sex offenders must complete an indefinite term of “Mandatory Supervised Release” following their prison term. This “MSR” must be completed while living at an approved host site. If a person cannot find a qualifying host site for their MSR, they remains in prison until he can find qualifying housing; for many indigent inmates, this becomes a de facto life sentence. Hundreds of Illinois prisoners have had their proposed host sites rejected solely because of a statute which bars them from serving their MSR at the same address where another sex offender lives. Many of these individuals have been in prison for years beyond their release date. On January 15, 2020, in Murphy v. Raoul, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that holding people in prison past the completion of their prison term violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and ordered the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) to release all such prisoners by January 2021. Six months later, IDOC had released only three people as a result of that order. Each of them had been in prison more than eight years past their release date and there were still nearly 300 people who had not been released. On April 5, 2020, as the COVID-19 pandemic appeared to spread among IDOC staff and inmates, an inmate filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff was a member of the Murphy class, but although he had completed his prison sentence in December 2018, he had not yet been released to begin his term of Mandatory Supervised Release. IDOC had rejected every proposed host site he had submitted. His most recent proposal was denied because of the presence of another sex offender at the same address. The plaintiff sought to represent a class of inmates who had completed their prison sentence but remained incarcerated because their host sites were denied under the “One Per Address” statute. He sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and alleged that IDOC’s One Per Address statute (and the resulting de facto life sentences) violated the Eighth Amendment. He further sought a permanent injunction prohibiting IDOC from continuing to enforce the One Per Address statute, declaratory relief that the statute as it applied to the class violated the Eighth Amendment, and sought attorneys’ fees and costs. Due to the urgent threat of COVID-19, the plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order his immediate release to his proposed host site. The plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and a motion to certify the class. The case was originally assigned to Judge Manish S. Shah, but reassigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall, the presiding judge in Murphy. The court ordered the plaintiff released to MSR on April 8, 2020, ruling that he was “clearly suffering a constitutional harm each day he [was] detained past his release date,” and that the harm "can only be remedied by release.” The court held that defendants were unable to justify the One Per Address provision with penological or rehabilitative support and that the "public's interest in only hav[ing] one sex offender live at one residence is not supported by any testimony, expert opinion, or evidence." Therefore the court held the statute unconstitutional as it applied to the named plaintiff and enjoined the defendants from prohibiting his release. On April 8, the case was reassigned to Judge Virginia M. Kendall for all further proceedings. On April 28, more than a dozen additional Murphy class members filed an amended complaint, adding a Fourteenth Amendment claim that alleged a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They sought to represent the same class that the original plaintiff had proposed. The plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing the statute and an amended motion to certify the class. The court ordered their release to MSR on May 13, 2020. Yet another group of plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on May 26, 2020; their release was ordered on June 3, 2020. The court then granted class certification on July 1, 2020 and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment the same day. Over the next few months, the court continued to grant plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunctions and order releases. As of March 12, 2021, the summary judgment motion is still pending.

Summary: Dozens of Murphy v. Raoul class members, still waiting to be released from prison years after their release dates, brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, they sought court orders compelling the Illinois Department of Corrections to release them from custody. In seven successive orders from April–November 2020, the court ordered the release of the named plaintiffs. On July 1, 2020, the court granted class certification, and the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. As of November 12, 2021, their summary judgment motion is pending.


On November 19, 2013, an African-American school teacher filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued under the Declaratory Judgment Act against a Pittsburgh police officer on the grounds of an unlawful arrest and detainment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the officer violated his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights when the officer detained the plaintiff for 12 hours and pursued false charges against the plaintiff because the plaintiff criticized the officer's unsafe driving. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the officer violated his First Amendment right to be from retaliation of expressive conduct when the officer placed the plaintiff and another observer in handcuffs when they attempted to record the interaction with the officer. The charges that were brought against the plaintiff were dropped and the city of Pittsburgh reached a settlement, acknowledging the improper actions of the officer. According to the ACLU, the settlement included the police acknowledging the public's right to video tape police officers, regular meetings between police and members of the community, and damages awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $52,500.

Summary: In 2013 an African-American schoolteacher filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Pennsylvania against a Pittsburgh police officer, alleging that the officer violated his constitutional rights to be free from unlawful arrests and detainments. During the interaction the plaintiff and another observer were put in handcuffs for attempting to record the police officer during their interaction with him. The city of Pittsburgh acknowledged the officer's misconduct and dropped the charges against the plaintiff. In addition, the parties reached a settlement agreement that included the police acknowledging the public's right to video tape police officers, regular meetings between police and members of the community, and damages awarded to the plaintiff in the amount of $52,500.


On February 16, 2000, private attorneys, a public defender, and counsel from the D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project filed this § 1983 class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of incarcerated persons, their family members, legal counsel, and other recipients of telephone calls from prisoners housed in prison facilities operated by the defendant private corporation, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA -- the largest operator of private prison facilities). The ACLU and the Washington Lawyers Committee represented the plaintiffs. The case was assigned to District Judge Gladys Kessler. The affected facilities were in numerous locations around the U.S., including in the District of Columbia. Other named defendants were companies providing telephone services to these facilities. The telephone service companies had entered into "exclusive dealing contracts" with the prison corporation. In return for granting this exclusivity, CCA received a commission for each call made. Under the contracts, only one company per prison provided telephone service for its prisoners, and the only service provided was to allow collect outgoing calls. Alleging that the collect calls resulted in the highest charges and that the represented class members were unable to choose any different, less-expensive service, the plaintiffs alleged they were entitled to damages and injunctive relief under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151, and District of Columbia law. On August 22, 2001, Judge Kessler granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, relying upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and directed the parties to file pleadings raising the case's issues with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Later, the judge stayed the dismissal, pending the outcome of the FCC proceedings which ensued. On October 8, 2003, the case returned to Judge Kessler, although the FCC proceedings had not concluded. On that day, she issued her memorandum opinion granting a defendant telephone company's motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction over the company, which had no presence in the District of Columbia nor substantial business or other ties to it. On July 7, 2004, another telephone company defendant was dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction. The docket notes a termination date for the case of January 31, 2005 without further explanation. The FCC proceedings, docketed as 96-128 and 12-375, continued and on August 19, 2013, the FCC issued an order requiring interstate inmate calling service rates to be capped. See PC-DC-0027 and PC-DC-0028, in this collection. On October 27, 2014, plaintiffs moved to reopen the case and Judge Kessler granted the motion on April 30, 2015. On May 15, 2015, plaintiffs moved to amend the initial complaint, as it was limited to those CCA facilities to which Securus provided ICS. The new complaint expanded the scope to all correctional facilities in the country served by Securus. In an opinion granting the motion issued January 21, 2016, Judge Kessler held that, while the new complaint greatly increased the proposed class size, a mere increase in class size is neither complex nor inherently prejudicial, and that the amendment would neither cause undue delay nor is prejudicial. 2016 WL 264907, at *3. The court again stayed the case as of January 21, because the stay was lifted temporarily for the purpose of amending the complaint. On Sept. 14, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly. The case remains stayed as of April 2021.

Summary: Private attorneys, a public defender, and counsel from the D.C. Prisoners' Legal Services Project filed this class action against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and various telephone service companies on behalf of incarcerated persons, their family members, legal counsel and other recipients of prison telephone calls. The telephone companies held exclusive dealing contracts with CCA under which they provided only outgoing collect call service (the most expensive service) with a per-call commission for the CCA. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sherman Antitrust Act (15 U.S.C. § 1), the Communications Act (47 U.S.C. § 151), and District of Columbia law. The Court stayed dismissal pending FCC proceedings, but dismissed two phone companies before the conclusion of those proceedings. On April 30, 2015 the court reopened the case and granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to expand the scope to all correctional facilities in the country served by Securus. The case was put back on stay after the amended complaint was filed on January 21, 2016.


On February 6, 2013, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Washington indicted five defendants on six counts: conspiracy to manufacture 100 or more marijuana plants, manufacture of 100 or more marijuana plants, possession with the intent to distribute more than 50 marijuana plants, distribution of marijuana, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug crime, and maintaining a place for the manufacture and distribution of marijuana. The Federal Public Defender was appointed to represent the five defendants. Defendants were released on bond on February 20, 2013. Discovery and motions continued for most of the year. On November 14, 2013, defendants filed a number of motions to dismiss for Tenth Amendment violations, specifically that the United States was forcing the state of Washington to enforce federal law, and violation of Due Process and Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment. One of the defendants also filed motions to suppress evidence. On April 30, 2014, Judge Sickle issued a series of opinions responding to motions. He denied the claim, that because Congress allowed DC to have medical marijuana, prosecution for marijuana use in Washington was unconstitutional under the Due Process clause or the Equal Protection clause. On the motion to suppress claims, Ms. Firestack-Harvey's statements made under interrogation after she asked to speak to an attorney but statements she made prior to that point were held to be admissible. Judge Sickle also rejected defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground that local marijuana use was permitted by the Controlled Substances Act and rejected the their Tenth Amendment challenge, holding that the Court did not have the authority to dismiss under the Tenth Amendment. Finally, Judge Sickle rejected motions to dismiss based on the government's failure to preserve evidence, holding that the fifth defendant, Jason Zucker, did not show bad faith on the government's part. On May 6, 2014, the government issued a superseding indictment dropping one of the marijuana charges. Defendants subsequently plead not guilty. Pretrial conferences and preparation continued through 2014. On November 12, 2014, Judge Sickle issued an order granting the government's motion to exclude certain defense witnesses who were going to testify to the medical benefits of marijuana. On November 14, 2014, the case was reassigned to Judge Thomas O. Rice. On February 2, 2015, the defendants jointly submitted a motion to dismiss, arguing that Congress had prohibited the use of federal resources to prosecute users of medical marijuana in California, among other states. On February 12, Judge Rice denied the motion, holding that the recent passage of an appropriations bill did not repeal by implication the Controlled Substances Act. On February 18, Judge Rice granted the government's motion to dismiss charges against Larry Harvey, one of the five defendants, due to his serious health issues. The trial began on February 23. On February 24, one of the five defendants, Jason Zucker, changed his plea and pleaded guilty to Count 1. The Court accepted his plea on March 4. On March 2, 2015, the jury convicted all three remaining defendants on Count 2 of the indictment, intentionally and knowingly manufacturing 100 or more marijuana plants, but acquitted on all other charges. On April 17, Judge Rice denied defendants' motion for a new trial and acquittal, holding that the evidence at trial was sufficient to prove Count 2 beyond a reasonable doubt and that there was no serious risk of a miscarriage of justice. On June 4, 2015, Judge Rice ruled on defendants' motion to enjoin further prosecution based on the appropriations rider from Congress and acquittal. He rejected that claim again but stayed sentencing to allow the parties to prepare. On June 19, Judge Rice denied Jason Zucker's motion to join the other defendants' motion to dismiss and stay his sentencing. On July 24, 2015, judgment was entered for Zucker. He was sentenced to 16 months in prison and a $5000 fine with four years of supervised release. On October 2, Firestack-Harvey and Michelle Gregg were sentenced to one year and one day in prison. Ms. Firestack-Harvey had her fine waived while Ms. Gregg was assessed a $2000 fine. Rolland Gregg was sentenced to 33 months in prison and assessed a $7500 fine. All three were given three years of supervised release post-sentence. The case appears to be closed.

Summary: Five criminal defendants challenged the constitutionality of enforcing the federal Controlled Substances Act in the state of Washington, where marijuana use is legalized through state statute. The defendants were eventually convicted and sentenced from 16 to 33 months.


On December 15, 2011, five asylum seekers filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The complaint challenged the practices of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). While awaiting determination on their asylum applications, asylum seekers could not legally work and support themselves. As a result, those asylum seekers still awaiting a decision after 180 days could obtain Employment Authorization Documents. However, the defendants' control of the time-calculation lacked transparency, according to the plaintiffs, and denied them of notice or opportunity to challenge the time calculations. This effectively denied them work authorization. The complaint claimed violations of the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the governing regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought class and subclass certification, declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Jones. On June 5, 2012, plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint with a different list of ten asylum-seekers (all non-citizens living in different cities in the US). The parties began mediation proceedings in July 2012. Extended settlement discussions ensued, and on April 12, 2013, the parties submitted a comprehensive settlement agreement that included a stipulation of class certification. On April 17, 2013, the court granted parties' joint motion for class certification, establishing a 'general notice and review' class of individuals that met the following criteria: 1) all non-citizens in the US who have filed or will file a complete asylum application 2) which has neither been approved nor subjected to a denial for which no rights of review or appeal remain 3) whose applications for employment authorization based on their status as asylum applications had been or will be denied 4) whose eligibility for employment authorization based on pending asylum application will be determined in a manner alleged to provide insufficient notice/opportunity for review, and 5) who fall in one or more of the designated subclasses:
hearing
prolonged tolling
missed asylum interview,
remand On May 8, 2013, the court preliminarily approved the parties' settlement agreement; and on November 4, 2013, it approved the final settlement and granted class counsel's attorneys' fees. The court also granted defendants' motion for an extension of the implementation date due to the government shutdown. 2013 WL 5913323. Under the settlement:
 An applicant would be able to "lodge" an asylum application with an immigration court clerk at a time other than a hearing. The "lodged" date started the asylum EAD clock. (The asylum application still needed to be "filed" in a hearing before an Immigration Judge [IJ].)
 IJs had to offer each non-detained asylum applicant whose case was on the expedited docket a hearing date at least 45 days out. If the applicant accepted that hearing date, the asylum EAD clock continued to run during the period before the hearing.
If the IJ had denied an application, but the Board of Immigration Appeals remanded a case to the IJ for reconsideration, the asylum clock would restart on the date of the remand, and would credit the number of days that the case was pending on appeal since the IJ denial.
Instead of definitively stopping the clock when an applicant missed a meeting, USCIS would mail a letter to asylum applicants who missed an asylum interview informing them of how missing an interview affects work authorization eligibility, and giving them 45 days to show good cause for having missed the interview.
When there was a preliminary hearing, the Immigration Court would provide written notice to asylum seekers and their counsel about the asylum clock, including the impact of the different hearing adjournment codes on employment authorization. IJs were instructed to state clearly on the record the reason for adjournment. USCIS considered ways to make its letters denying EAD applications clearer and made changes to these letters. On December 18, 2014, Defendant Executive Office for Immigration Review submitted a report to the court regarding its order granting final approval of the class action settlement. The last activity on the docket was on April 21, 2017, when an individual filed notice to the court regarding status as a member of the class. Otherwise, as of October 2018 the case is closed.

Summary: In 2011, asylum applicants in removal proceedings filed a lawsuit against EOIR and USCIS challenging their practices for administering the asylum clock in removal proceedings. Plaintiffs alleged that the government's practices violated the U.S. Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the governing regulations, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). On November 4, 2013, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement, which required USCIS and EOIR to make several changes to the method by which they calculated the 180-day waiting period for EAD eligibility for asylum applicants (often referred to as the "asylum clock").


On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Archbishop of Miami, on behalf of his diocese, along with several affiliated Catholic organizations, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), the First Amendment, and separation of powers. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On March 4, 2013, Judge Donald L. Graham granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Archbishops of Miami, on behalf of his respective diocese, along with several affiliated Catholic organizations, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On March 4, 2013, Judge Donald L. Graham granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness.


The plaintiff in this case is a professional musician playing a musical instrument in public. Police officers of the South Eastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA) arrested the plaintiff twice while he was performing on the transit property. The first arrest took place on February 6, 2001. The SEPTA police officers arrested and detained the plaintiff for obstructing a public way. The plaintiff's criminal charge was later dismissed in court. On May 2, 2001, the plaintiff filed a civil lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against SEPTA. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought monetary damages. He alleged false arrest and malicious prosecution by the SEPTA police officers, and that his rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated. On February 13, 2002, SEPTA filed an offer of judgment and the plaintiff accepted, and subsequently the District Court (Judge Berle M. Schiller) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This ended the first case. On July 26, 2002, the SEPTA police officer arrested and detained the plaintiff for producing noise when he was playing his instrument on a pedestrian concourse. The criminal charge was later too dismissed. On October 21, 2002, the plaintiff filed a second lawsuit in the same district court against SEPTA for false arrest. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the Court (Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter) approved the settlement on April 10, 2003. This ended the second case. According to an Associated Press article, the settlements together included damages of $33,000 ($15,000 and $18,000) and a policy change. The AP explains "The settlement says SEPTA police may not arrest any street musician unless there is probable cause to show the musician is obstructing a highway, being disorderly or violating a noise ordinance or other criminal statute." It quotes the settlement as including a provision that "Under no circumstances shall a street musician be arrested or told to leave a location merely because that individual is playing a musical instrument or singing." In addition, SEPTA agreed that it would train police officers about the new policy.

Summary: The plaintiff in this case was a professional musician who played a musical instrument in public. Police officers of the South Eastern Pennsylvania Transit Authority (SEPTA) arrested the plaintiff twice while he was performing on transit property. The plaintiff filed lawsuits after each of the arrests and claimed false arrest, detention, and malicious prosecution. In the first lawsuit, SEPTA offered a judgment to the plaintiff; and in the second lawsuit, SEPTA reached a settlement agreement with the plaintiff. According to an Associated Press article, the settlements together included damages of $33,000 and a policy change regarding street musicians performing on the transit property.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a longstanding class action filed over conditions in the Nebraska state prison system. In addition to the underlying litigation, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion on April 10, 2020 seeking disclosure of the defendants' plan for the prevention, management, and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic. The motion was denied on June 8. The case was voluntarily dismissed on December 1, 2020. <hr> On August 15, 2017, eleven prisoners filed a putative class action complaint against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS) and the Nebraska Board of Parole (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU's National Prison Project, the National Association of the Deaf, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees, claiming that the prison conditions in Nebraska endangered the health, safety, and lives of prisoners and staff on a daily basis. The complaint alleged chronic overcrowding and under-staffing, a lack of staff training, a flawed parole system, overreliance on isolation, and inadequate health care. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed violations of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to Judge Robert F. Rossiter, Jr. and referred to Magistrate Judge Michael Nelson. On November 6, 2017, the Department of Correctional Services and the Board of Parole moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. They sought to have all claims against the Board dismissed entirely, and to dismiss all §1983 claims against both the Department and the Board. On January 16, 2018, the court denied the motion to dismiss the Board as defendant, but dismissed all §1983 claims, against the Board and the Department, with prejudice. On July 27, 2018, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. A few months later, the defendants moved to dismiss an individual plaintiff who had been released from prison, and also moved for summary judgment on the claims against one individual defendant (the Director of Supervision and Services of the Division of Parole Supervision). The plaintiffs sought class certification on February 19, 2019. They sought to represent a class of "all persons who are now, or will in the future, be subjected to the health care (including medical, mental health and dental care) policies and practices of NDCS [the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services]." They also sought to certify two subclasses: an Isolation Subclass (“all NDCS prisoners who are now, or will in the future be, subject to conditions of confinement that provide limited contact with other prisoners, strictly controlled movement while out of cell, and out-of-cell time of less than twenty-four hours per week") and a Disability Subclass ("“all persons with disabilities who are now, or will in the future be, confined at any NDCS facility”). On April 18, 2019, the defendants again sought summary judgment. Between November and December 2019, defendants moved to dismiss two other individual plaintiffs who had been released from prison. Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion on April 10, 2020 seeking disclosure of the defendants' plan for the prevention, management, and treatment of the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiffs argued that the discovery request was relevant to the case because their “class action already concerns issues of life and death for incarcerated individuals in NDCS facilities” and the COVID-19 crisis has placed purported class members at “a real and immediate risk of suffering or dying." On June 8, 2020, the court issued a series of orders. First, the court denied the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding exhaustion of administrative remedies. Second, defendants' motion for partial summary judgment regarding life sentences and Eighth Amendment claims were granted as to some defendants but not others. Third, an individual defendant was dismissed on summary judgment. Fourth, the plaintiff's request for class certification was denied in full. 2020 WL 3047479. The court also stated that discovery about COVID-19 was irrelevant to the plaintiff's claims about the medical care system. With the case thus narrowed, some discovery disputes proceeded -- but on December 1, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal without prejudice, concluding the case. No settlement terms are public. The court issued a judgment dismissing the case without prejudice.

Summary: On August 15, 2017, the eleven prisoners filed this class action lawsuit against the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services (NDCS) and the Nebraska Board of Parole (BOP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, claiming violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Eighth Amendment. The case was voluntarily dismissed on December 1, 2020.


On September 23, 2008 a group of disabled individuals who were receiving home-based care filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration and the Bureau of TennCare in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. They alleged that the defendants were violating that Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by moving to reduce or eliminate their home-based nursing services. They claimed that these reductions were being made without regard for their health needs and would deprive them of needed nursing services and force them into institutionalized care, even though they had been approved for home care and institutionalized care would be detrimental to their health and well-being. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would preserve their current home-based care until the new program for providing home-based care was made fully available to them. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on September 23, 2008. On December 19, 2008 the court (Judge William J. Haynes Jr.) entered a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to refrain from cutting the current home-based services provided to plaintiffs, conduct an individualized assessment of the needs of each plaintiff, and then determine whether nursing homes would provide the services the plaintiffs required. Subsequently additional plaintiffs intervened in order to receive similar relief and the parties engaged in litigation regarding cuts to the home-based care of individual plaintiffs. The case concluded on January 22, 2010 when the court (Judge Haynes) entered an agreed order of dismissal pursuant to a settlement agreement reached by the parties. The details of the settlement are not known.

Summary: On September 23, 2008 a group of disabled individuals receiving home-based care filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration and the Bureau of TennCare in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. They alleged that the defendants were violating that Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act by moving to reduce or eliminate their home-based nursing services. On December 19, 2008 the court entered a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to refrain from cutting their current care, conduct an individualized assessment of each plaintiff, and determine whether nursing homes would provide the services the plaintiffs required. The case concluded on January 22, 2010 when the case was dismissed after the parties reached a settlement.


On July 22, 2002, a former pretrial detainee at Oahu Community Correctional Center (OCCC) who was denied his constitutional right to vote in the November 2000 election filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. The Clearinghouse was unable to access documents from the court, but was able to gather the following information based on an August 15, 2005 notice published in Prison Legal News and a 2004 ACLU of Hawaii Litigation report. The plaintiff sued the state chief elections officer, the director of the Department of Public Safety, and other Public Safety employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for disenfranchisement. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that despite himself and other detainees following OCCC instructions to sign up to have a ballot provided to them on Election Day and being registered voters, ballots were never provided and individuals who expressed concern regarding when they would be allowed to vote were either ignored or rebuffed by guards. The case was assigned to Judge David A. Ezra. Despite having been released already, plaintiff sought injunctive relief to require OCCC to implement a plan to prevent future disenfranchisement, claiming that the issue was not moot because it was “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Finding that the likelihood of recurrence as to the plaintiff was too remote because it would require him to commit a new crime, the court dismissed the claim for injunctive relief as moot. That said, the court certified the complaint as a class action because there were 44 similarly situated potential claimants. On October 28, 2002, the court distinguished OCCC employees from election officials. Specifically, because OCCC reasonably did its part by providing a sign-up sheet to detainees, the court found that it was the failure of election officials to monitor OCCC and provide the absentee ballots that actually injured the class. Accordingly, the court dismissed the OCCC defendants and permitted damage claims to proceed against the election officials. On November 4, 2004, the parties settled for $15,000 in damages. After $10,000 was deducted for attorneys, an award of $833 was approved for each of the six prisoners who submitted valid claims. The case was dismissed on December 13, 2004.

Summary: On July 22, 2002, a former pretrial detainee at Oahu Community Correctional Center (OCCC) filed a lawsuit because he was denied his constitutional right to vote in the November 2000 election. The plaintiff sued the state chief elections officer, the director of the Department of Public Safety, and other Public Safety employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for disenfranchisement. The plaintiff sought monetary damages and injunctive relief. The court certified the class of 44 similarly situated potential claimants and dismissed the claim for injunctive relief as moot because the plaintiff was no longer in custody. Finding that the violation was a result of the election officials actions and not the Department of Public Safety, the court dismissed the OCCC defendants and permitted damage claims to proceed against the election officials. On November 4, 2004, the parties settled for $15,000 in damages. After $10,000 was deducted for attorneys, an award of $833 was approved for each of the six prisoners who submitted valid claims. The case was dismissed on December 13, 2004.


On April 15, 2008, American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a complaint in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff sought immediate processing and release of the records previously requested from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The plaintiff alleged that the FBI failed to timely process and produce documents in response to the FOIA request. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that they were entitled to expedited processing of the request and to a waiver or limitation of processing fees. Specifically, on November 29, 2007, the plaintiff alleged that it submitted the FOIA request to the FBI after the Department of Defense released records to the ACLU in response to a separate FOIA lawsuit that suggested the FBI may be issuing National Security Letters for the military. The plaintiff sought expedited processing of the request on the grounds that the records were urgently needed by an organization "primarily engaged in disseminating information" in order to "inform the public about actual or alleged Federal Government activity" and because the records related to a "matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about the government's integrity which affect public confidence." On August 18, 2008, the parties stipulated and agreed that defendant will complete its processing of the request and that plaintiff's rights under FOIA to challenge the adequacy of any search would not be affected. On September 16, 2008, the Court (Judge Victor Marrero) ordered the case to be conditionally discontinued provided in furtherance of the terms of the parties' stipulation and order dated August 18, 2008. On November 21, 2008, the processing of plaintiffs' FOIA request was completed and documents were released to the plaintiffs by the FBI. Thus, on December 19, 2008, both parties agreed to settle.

Summary: On April 15, 2008, American Civil Liberties Union filed a complaint in federal court for the Southern District of New York under the Freedom of Information Act seeking immediate processing and release of records plaintiffs requested from defendant Federal Bureau ofInvestigation. Both parties agreed to settle after FOIA request was completed.


COVID-19 Summary: This class-action injunctive and habeas case against the State of Connecticut sought release and improved conditions at two inpatient psychiatric facilities. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for improved conditions on June 8, 2020, and the defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 11. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction on July 16. After the Court dismissed the habeas portion of the lawsuit in January 2021, the parties agreed to withdraw the action.<hr> On April 30, 2020, five individuals hospitalized at the Connecticut Valley Hospital (CVH) and the Whiting Forensic Hospital (WFH) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the State of Connecticut, seeking improved conditions and release because of the threat posed by the COVID pandemic. Represented by the Connecticut Legal Rights Project, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They asserted claims on behalf of all patients admitted or to be admitted by the CVH and WFH during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged failure to timely isolate patients and staff, which resulted in or substantially contributed to infections and outbreaks; they complaint alleged that conditions violated their rights under the Due Process Clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiffs sought immediate temporary and conditional release of all patients who could be safely discharged. The plaintiffs also requested implementation of COVID-19 testing and social distancing measures, and appointment of an independent court monitor to enforce court orders. The case was assigned to Judge Janet C. Hall. On May 7, the complaint was amended, dismissing several defendants. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on June 8. They sought COVID-19 testing protocols in line with CDC standards, improved hygiene and protective equipment, maximum social distancing possible, and clinical review that would allow accelerated discharges. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 11, claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust state court remedies. The defendants opposed the preliminary injunction on July 9, pointing to the low number of positive cases and deaths at the facilities. According to the defendants, as of July 9, the date that a patient at CVH last tested positive for COVID-19 was on May 16, 2020, while the date that a patient at Whiting last tested positive was on April 21, 2020. The plaintiffs sought continued hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and a discovery period of 60 days on July 15. A hearing was held on July 16 and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction the same day. On August 19, 2020, the case was referred to Judge Robert A. Richardson for pretrial case management. Discovery was ongoing through January 2021. On December 18, 2020, the court granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was denied in part as to the defendants' arguments concerning primary jurisdiction doctrine. The court agreed to continue to hear this case rather than referring it to state court. The motion was granted in part as to the defendants' arguments concerning habeas corpus, and the portion of the Amended Complaint petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed. On January 14, 2021, the court granted a stipulation of all parties to dismiss all claims without prejudice.

Summary: This federal class-action injunctive and habeas case against the State of Connecticut sought release and improved conditions at two inpatient psychiatric facilities in Connecticut. It was filed April 30, 2020, in the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for improved conditions on June 8, and the defendants moved to dismiss the case on June 11. The dismissal was granted in part on December 18, 2020. On Janurary 14, 2021 the case was dismissed without prejudice.


This is a case about the indefinite detention of immigrants pending their removal proceedings by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). On November 15, 2018, a 43-year-old New York resident who had been arrested and detained in a New York detention center filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, a husband and father of two, sued the U.S. government, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Represented by the Bronx Defenders, the New York Civil Liberties Union, the Cardozo Immigration Justice Clinic, and Make the Road New York, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief for the class of plaintiffs who had been arrested and detained by ICE without probable cause and without a date of hearing. The plaintiff claimed that the U.S. government’s “practice of failing to provide first appearances before a judge for nearly three months after an arrest” violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief and preliminary declaratory relief on December 5, 2018. District Judge Alison J. Nathan denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief for lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which prohibits any court (other than the Supreme Court) from enjoining or restraining the operations of 8 U.S.C. § 1229 on a class-wide basis. Section 1229, in turn, “prescribes a floor but no ceiling with respect to the timing of initial master calendar hearings.” Since the plaintiff asked the Court to impose a ceiling, Judge Nathan concluded that granting relief would impermissibly restrain § 1229's operations. Judge Nathan also denied plaintiff’s motion for preliminary declaratory relief, concluding that no such relief existed. In response, the plaintiff and the defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment on November 1, 2019. 2019 WL 4784950. Judge Nathan granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion for class certification, filed with the original complaint, on November 30, 2020. The Court defined the class as:
All individuals who have been, or will be, arrested by ICE’s New York Field Office and detained under Section 1226 of Title 8 of the United States Code for removal proceedings and who have not been provided an initial hearing before an immigration judge.
On the same day, Judge Nathan granted in part and denied in part both the plaintiff’s and the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. Judge Nathan granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on their procedural due process claim, finding that that the government’s practice of holding detainees for more than ten days before an initial hearing exceeded the 10-day limit established in Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40. But Judge Nathan granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s substantive due process and APA claims. Judge Nathan cited Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, in which detention periods of up to six months were held to be reasonable, and concluded that the detention period at issue did not violate the plaintiff’s right to due process. Judge Nathan dismissed the plaintiff’s claim under the APA because granting relief under the APA would effectively allow the plaintiff to obtain preliminary injunctive relief, even though it had been denied pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f). 2020 WL 7028637. As of January 29, 2021, the defendants have filed an appeal.

Summary: In 2018, a New York resident filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, who had been arrested and detained by ICE in October 2018, alleged that the government’s practice of detaining individuals for up to three months without scheduling an initial hearing violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights. On November 30, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment. The defendants have appealed as of January 29, 2021.


COVID-19 Summary: Thirteen individuals and a local NGO, Disability Rights Florida, alleged in this class action lawsuit that the Broward Sheriff's Office (BSO) provided inadequate safety measures to protect its prisoners from the COVID-19 virus. After an abbreviated discovery process, BSO entered into a class settlement with the plaintiffs, which was subsequently approved by the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida.<hr>This is a class action lawsuit about the sufficiency of COVID-19 safety protocols at Broward County Jails, administered by the Broward Sheriff's Office (BSO). On June 5, 2020, thirteen named plaintiffs and a local NGO, Disability Rights Florida, represented by the ACLU, filed the case seeking a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the BSO knowingly failed to adopt and implement adequate policies and procedures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. These alleged failures included hazardous intake processes, insufficient social distancing, insufficient testing, and a lack of PPE and cleaning supplies for prisoners. In addition to claims that these alleged failures constituted violations of the 8th Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as well as the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause, plaintiffs claimed that BSO was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, as these policies were potentially especially harmful to the medically vulnerable and to those with disabilities. The case was assigned to U.S. District Court Judge William P. Dimitrouleas, sitting in Fort Lauderdale, FL. On June 25, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking release of medically vulnerable and disabled individuals, as well as implementation of COVID-19 education programs, stricter social distancing protocols, regular testing, and the provision of PPE to prisoners and staff. BSO did not respond, and the case was instead stayed until December 15 when both parties motioned for a preliminary approval of class settlement and class certification. The settlement agreement granted plaintiffs most of what they had sought, with the notable exception of release for medically vulnerable and disabled incarcerated persons. Notwithstanding that exception, the settlement ordered BSO to comply with CDC recommendations on matters such as social distancing, PPE and sanitization supplies, and the availability and prominence of health information. Between December 15, 2021 and May 13, 2021, when the settlement was ultimately approved, the court received twenty-four written objections from class members opposing the settlement. However, the bulk of these letters addressed ongoing safety violations in spite of the settlement, which was already in effect, as opposed to opposing the settlement itself. The court approved the settlement, pointing out that plaintiffs may conduct reasonable monitoring of the jail's compliance, including inspections, review of relevant documents, and interviewing staff and class members. The court retained jurisdiction for the length of this order, which will be 12-15 months, depending on when Emergency Orders are lifted in Broward County and the state of Florida.

Summary: In June 2020, thirteen named plaintiffs and Disability Rights Florida, represented by the ACLU, sought a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiffs alleged that the Sherrif's Office knowingly failed to adopt and implement adequate policies and procedures to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 at Broward County jails and prisons. The parties settled December 2020, and the settlement was approved May 2021. The settlement agreement requires the Sherrif's Office to comply with CDC recommendations on matters such as social distancing, PPE and sanitization supplies, and the availability and prominence of health information.


The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights, filed this class action suit against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) in February 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The complaint alleged violations of the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., and Oklahoma state law. The complaint alleged that DHS placed children in dangerous and inappropriate placements, including extended stays in emergency shelters; failed to monitor the safety of children in DHS custody due to excessive case worker caseloads; failed to provide mental health and other behavioral services; and failed to provide legal representation. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from subjecting plaintiffs to practices that violate their constitutional rights. In April 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the case and several Oklahoma-based children's agencies filed amici curiae briefs in response. In January 2009, Judge Gregory K. Frizzell granted the motion to dismiss claims under federal common law and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, but denied the motion with regard to the other claims. D.G. v. Henry, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1273 (N.D. Okl. 2009). On May 5, 2009, the court certified the class of the plaintiffs as all children who are or will be in the legal custody of the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (1) due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect; or (2) who are or will be adjudicated deprived due to abuse or neglect. The defendants appealed the ruling to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, but in February 2010, the appellate court upheld the class certification. The parties then engaged in extensive and contested discovery. The plaintiffs provided five expert reports and filed numerous motions to compel the defendants to produce various items. The defendants again moved to dismiss the case and to decertify the class. In November and December 2011, the court denied the motion to decertify and granted the motions to dismiss only as to claims pertaining to rights of familial association and procedural due process. The case proceeded towards a trial scheduled for February 2012. Meanwhile, the parties engaged in court-supervised settlement conferences. By January 2012, they negotiated an agreement providing for structural reorganization of DHS and appointed experts to oversee the development and implementation of the Compromise Settlement Agreement (CSA). After a series of fairness hearings, the court approved the CSA on February 29, 2012. The CSA implementation plans provided that the defendant DHS would restructure its agency; improve screening, investigating, and reporting of abuse; reduce the use of emergency shelters; and reduce workloads and improve training for caseworkers. The parties agreed to designate three individuals as Co-Neutrals to act as arbiters of any dispute arising out of the CSA and to evaluate and render judgments about DHS's ongoing compliance efforts. The implementation of the CSA would take at least five years. Additionally, on March 31, 2013, the Court ordered the defendants to pay attorneys' fees and expenses in the amount of about $6 million. Although DHS originally planned to exit from the CSA in December 2016, it was unable to do so for failure to adequately comply with its terms. In their August 2018 report, the Co-Neutrals noted that although DHS had made important advancements over the course of its reform, those advances were not yet fully instituted, particularly with respect to manageable caseloads and an adequate array of placements for children. The report noted that in some areas, most critically safety for children in the care and custody of DHS, the department’s efforts had been inadequate. In May 2018, the Co-Neutrals requested that the Court suspend the operations of a particular children's center for failure to comply with the CSA. The Court granted this request and DHS complied by relocating the children from that center. The Co-Neutrals' monitoring of DHS's compliance with the CSA is still ongoing, but as of May 22, 2020, the case has been dormant since mid-2018.

Summary: The plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights, filed this class action suit against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (DHS) in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in February 2008, alleging violations of the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, and the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, and Oklahoma state law. The parties reached a court-approved settlement agreement in February 2012 that required restructure of the DHS and improvements to the system. The implementation of the settlement agreement is still ongoing.


On May 6, 2013, a prisoner with limited mobility disability filed this class action lawsuit in the US Federal District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued California Forensic Medical Group and Shasta County Sheriff's Department under the American with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. This case was assigned to Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr., and Magistrate Judge Allison Claire. This petition began as a <I>pro se</I> civil complaint, where the plaintiff claimed that he was mistreated while he was an inmate at Shasta County Jail. As an inmate with a documented mobility disability, he was not placed in areas that accommodated his needs. He complained of being placed on a top bunk six feet off the ground and on the second floor of a cell block that required him to go up and down stairs. In an attempt to help prisoners with a medical disability, the defendant placed the plaintiff in administrative segregation, which prevented him and other medical inmates from using a dayroom, going to religious services, and engaging in other prison activities. Furthermore, whenever he would submit written complaints about this grievance, there was no judicial process for reviewing—the requests were simply denied. While in prison the plaintiff filed this civil complaint, and subsequent first, second, and third amended complaints. After filing the third amended complaint in March 2014, the plaintiff was released from prison and obtained counsel to represent him, submitting a fourth amended complaint. Plaintiff also acquired counsel from the Disability Rights Legal Center. The parties moved to discovery, after which the plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint. Then, on January 27, 2017, the plaintiff moved to certify a class defined as “[a]ll current and future detainees and prisoners at Shasta County Jail with mobility disabilities who, because of their disabilities, need appropriate accommodations, modifications, services, and and/or physical access in accordance with federal and state disability laws." On March 13, 2017, Magistrate Judge Claire recommended that this motion be granted. Adopting this recommendation in full, Judge England granted class certification on April 5, 2017. Over the summer, the parties reached a settlement. On August 11, 2017, the parties filed a memorandum with the court outlining the settlement agreement. Principally, the agreement required that the defendants and class counsel to agree on reforms to jail conditions for prisoners with mobility disabilities. This would include reforming the prisoners' access to grievance forms and daily living. These policies were to be offered by experts in the area of disability and accessibility. In addition, the defendants were to be monitored during the two year term of the agreement to ensure compliance and were required to adopt an improved grievance/dispute resolution process, disclose these new policies to relevant class members, train jail staff in the administration of the new policies, and provide their own reports on the matter. On January 23, 2018, the parties jointly moved for preliminary approval of the class action settlement and for certification of the settlement class. On August 6, 2018, the court entered an order approving the class action settlement. Following a settlement conference where the parties negotiated on the plaintiffs initial motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of $1,778,254.65, the parties agreed to a settlement amount of $850,000 in fees and expenses. This agreement was approved by the court on December 29, 2018. Two weeks later, the defendants filed a stipulation and proposed order of dismissal, which was signed into effect on January 22, 2019 by Judge England. As of July 2020, the court retains jurisdiction to supervise the implementation of the settlement agreement. Progress reporting by the county is ongoing.

Summary: This case was filed in 2013 by an inmate at Shasta County Jail claiming that the prison had infringed on his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation act as a prisoner with a mobility disability. The parties reached a settlement agreement in January 2018 that required the defendant Jail to reform jail conditions and policies as to improve prisoners' daily lives and their access to grievance forms. Further, the court awarded the plaintiffs $850,000 in fees and expenses.


On May 23, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey Helmick. The plaintiff sued the Management and Training Corporation (MTC), doing business as North Central Correctional Complex, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. MTC’s mail policy prohibited prisoners from receiving books through the mail if the books had not been pre-approved by MTC or if the sender was not on a pre-approved vendor list. HRDC alleged that MTC censored HRDC’s publications in violation of HRDC’s free speech rights under the First Amendment, as well as HRDC’s rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys’ fees. On the same day that it filed the complaint, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the MTC from enforcing its pre-approval mail policy. The case settled, however, before the court could rule on this motion. On July 24, 2017, the parties reached a nationwide settlement agreement that resolved the issues both in this case and in <i>Prison Legal News v. Management & Training Corporation</i> (Case No. 2:16-cv-01174) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. MTC agreed to modify its mail policy to allow the delivery of publications to prisoners without using an approved vendors list and discontinue bans on publications on the basis of sender. MTC also agreed to pay HRDC $150,000 in damages and attorneys’ costs. The settlement terms applied to all of MTC’s facilities throughout the country. The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 17, 2017. In the event of a breach of the settlement agreement, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement does not state a time period for which the terms of the agreement will be in effect.

Summary: In May 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. HRDC alleged that the Management and Training Corporation (MTC) censored HRDC’s prisoners' rights publications in violation of HRDC’s free speech rights and HRDC’s rights to due process and equal protection. The case was resolved through a nationwide settlement requiring MTC to eliminate its pre-approval policy. The case was dismissed in August 2017 and the settlement remains in effect.


On May 31, 2011, prisoners incarcerated in the Special Confinement Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Indiana Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, claimed that they were not being provided with the minimally adequate diet required by the Eighth Amendment. They asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs complained that they were routinely served meals that failed to meet minimum caloric requirements. While the contract between the DOC and its food services provider stated that meals must be prepared according to menus approved by dietitians, food was frequently missing from the plaintiffs' meals. As a result, the plaintiffs received insufficient amounts of food and calories and experienced significant weight loss and various other health problems. On November 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore issued an order approving the parties' private settlement agreement. The agreement specified certain monitoring measures requiring the DOC to ensure adequate diets, including the requirement that one or more correctional officers randomly check a number of the food trays before meal delivery. The agreement also mandated that prison officials correct and record any food deficiencies or shortages. The parties agreed that absent an order from the Court, the agreement would remain in effect for six months after its effective date, at which point the case would be automatically dismissed without prejudice. The docket as of January 17, 2020 shows no further filings, so presumably the case is closed.

Summary: In May 2011, prisoners incarcerated by the Indiana Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit claiming that they were not being provided with the minimally adequate diet required by the Eighth Amendment. The parties reached a private settlement agreement in November 2013 mandating that the DOC follow certain monitoring measures to ensure adequate diets.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a preexisting class action addressing issues in Harris County Jail with indigent felony detainees who remain detained solely because they cannot pay the amount necessary for release on secured money bail. On March 27, 2020, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order because they are in extreme danger of being exposed to COVID-19 while they are in jail only because they cannot pay enough to be released. The motion for a TRO was denied on April 14. <hr> On January 21, 2019, indigent pretrial detainees in Harris County Jail filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Harris County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Civil Rights Corps sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that their 14th Amendment rights to Equal Protection and their substantive due process rights were being violated. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants were operating a system of wealth-based detention that kept them in jail simply because they could not afford to pay the bail amounts, without appropriate findings about the necessity of pretrial detention or the plaintiff's ability to pay. The March 27, 2020 motion for a temporary restraining order discussed the plaintiff's concerns over COVID-19, namely the inability of the jail's limited services to care for the 8,000 individuals in the tight quarters of the jail if members of the population started getting sick. The plaintiffs argued that subjecting them to a heightened risk of contracting the virus, separating them from their families, interrupting medications and medical care, and taking them from their homes was not necessary to serve the government's interest in preventing flight or assuring public safety. They also argued that the pandemic had made it more difficult for them to receive constitutional protections, specifically because their court appearances were cancelled and visits with lawyers have been postponed. Ultimately, the plaintiffs sought an emergency order requiring the defendants to not to enforce existing pretrial detention orders, and asked for their request to be heard as quickly as possible to prevent further irreparable harm to the plaintiffs. On March 29, 2020, the State of Texas, the Governor of Texas, and the Attorney General filed a motion to intervene to defend the bail procedures. They argued that the defendants in this case "do not contest" any of the plaintiffs' arguments." They noted that on March 27, the Court ordered the Attorney General--a non-party--"to respond to the plaintiffs motion" requesting a temporary restraining order. The noted that the Attorney General intended to respond, but asked that the Court grant the motion to intervene to allow full participation as a party. The plaintiffs replied the next day. They did not oppose the intervention of the Texas Attorney General, but noted that "many of the factual claims and legal principles cited in the memorandum are not correct." Chief Judge Lee H. Rosenthal granted the State of Texas, Governor of Texas, and the Attorney General's motion to intervene. The defendants and the Texas Attorney General responded to the plaintiffs' motion on April 1. That same day, the plaintiffs filed another motion for a temporary restraining order, this time against Governor Abbott's Executive Order GA 13. The executive order, issued in light of COVID-19, allowed pretrial detainees to be released if they paid bail regardless of any individualized proceedings or findings by a state court judge, but halted individualized determinations. The plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of Executive Order GA 13 to the extent that it bars such individualized bail determinations. On April 6, the state intervenors filed their response to the temporary restraining order regarding Executive Order GA 13. They argued that plaintiffs the plaintiffs did not have standing because they had not received an injury from the executive order, and that sovereign immunity barred the court from awarding relief against them as the State Intervenors. On April 11, the plaintiffs notified the court that a Texas district court had issued a temporary restraining order that found Executive Order GA 13 to be unconstitutional under Texas law and enjoined Executive Order GA 13 from being enforced against judges. On April 14, Judge Rosenthal denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The opinion stated that the plaintiffs were likely to show a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, but that they had not met their burden of showing that their release would be in the public interest. Furthermore, the county had implemented plans to identify those who were deemed safe for release, which had resulted in 372 releases as of April 13. The opinion allowed the plaintiffs to restate their claims if the county's efforts failed, or to move for class certification and motion for a preliminary injunction as to their underlying case, which could prove their entitlement to relief on a fuller record. On May 6, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which added two named plaintiffs as well as additional details regarding Governor Abbott's Executive Order GA-13. They also filed a motion to lift the stay on the case. Judge Rosenthal granted the motion to lift the stay on May 16, as it was no longer opposed by the defendants. On June 26 the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, adding additional facts to the complaint regarding several judges who had moved to intervene in the case. On July 10, the state intervenor-defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs had received the constitutionally-required bail process and thus could not adequately plead their procedural due process or equal protection claims. The County defendants also filed a motion to dismiss on July 30. The plaintiffs responded to the state intervenors' motion on August 27. The case is still ongoing.

Summary: COVID-19 Summary: This is a preexisting class action addressing issues in Harris County Jail with indigent felony detainees who remain detained solely because they cannot pay the amount necessary for release on secured money bail. On March 27, 2020, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order because they are in extreme danger of being exposed to COVID-19 while they are in jail only because they cannot pay enough to be released. The plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order was denied on April 17. The case is still ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action brought by five detainees at New York City's Metropolitan Correctional Center. The plaintiffs are at special risk from COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions and seek release from detention and enforcement of preventative measures. On July 2, the court denied both the defendants' motion to partially dismiss the case and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 13, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition, narrowing the injunctive relief being sought to a permanent injunction. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this case on July 19, 2021 on the condition that the defendants continued to file status reports with the court while the jail remained on modified operations due to COVID-19. <hr> On April 28, 2020, five individuals detained in the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) petitioned for the release or transfer of detainees as well as enforcement of proper distancing, hygiene, and testing in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Specifically, they alleged that their continued detention violated their Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting them to a serious risk of contracting COVID-19 by failing to keep social distancing, maintain hygiene, and to provide adequate testing and medical care for those suffering from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions that would require increased monitoring and testing, provide treatment and improve hygiene and the release or transfer of detainees to another facility where appropriate preventive measures were possible. The plaintiffs also sought an independent monitor to ensure compliance. The case was assigned to Judge Edgardo Ramos and Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave. The plaintiffs are at increased risk from COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions such as chronic asthma, obesity, pulmonary disease, and hypertension. They proposed a class of all current and future detainees in custody at the MCC during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on May 20, claiming that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) precludes the court from granting such releases and that the PLRA specifies that the Bureau of Prisons' home confinement decisions are not judicially reviewable. On May 26, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for immediate testing, quarantine, isolation, and treatment, as well as access to protective equipment and sanitation supplies. They further sought a reduction of the population by 50% and implementation of a policy for release. Oral argument was held regarding the preliminary injunction on June 2, 2020. On July 2, the court denied both the defendants' motion to partially dismiss the case and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3618941. While the court found that the inmates were likely to show that the defendant's response to the pandemic was "ad-hoc and overlooked many gaps in its scheme to identify and isolate infected inmates — creating conditions that posed a substantial risk to the health of all inmates," the court concluded that the plaintiffs were not substantially likely to show that the MCC’s failures were a result of deliberate indifference. The defendant's motion to partially dismiss the case was denied because the court found that that there were no statutory or equitable bars prohibiting the court from considering release as a remedy for inmates. The defendants filed a response to the petition on July 23, and in August, the plaintiffs moved for a conference regarding the update on conditions at MCC, which was subsequently denied. The court directed the parties to meet and confer regarding discovery. On January 13, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition, adding named petitioners, removing named petitioners who were no longer incarcerated, and updating factual allegations based on events occurring since the original petition was filed. No new claims or requests for relief were added. The defendants continue to routinely file status reports with the court. After over a year of litigation, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on July 19, 2021. At the request of the parties, Judge Ramos dismissed the case without prejudice, provided that the defendants continued to provide routine status reports as long as the MCC continued under modified operations due to COVID-19. As of July 19, 2019, the reporting aspects of this case remains pending. The case remains ongoing for just that reporting.

Summary: On April 28, 2020, five individuals detained in Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) petitioned for the release or transfer of detainees as well as enforcement of proper distancing, hygiene and testing. The plaintiffs sought temporary, preliminary and permanent injunction to increase monitoring and testing, provide treatment and improve hygiene, and the release or transfer of detainees to another facility where appropriate preventive measure is possible. The plaintiffs also sought an independent monitor to ensure compliance. On July 2, the court denied both the defendants' motion to partially dismiss the case and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 13, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended petition, narrowing the injunctive relief being sought to a permanent injunction. On July 19, 2021, the court voluntarily dismissed the case at the request of the parties, provided that the defendants continued to provide routine status reports as long as the jail continued modified operations due to COVID-19. The reporting portion of the case remains open.


On January 28, 2004, residents of adult family homes and community-based residential services who received Family Care services from Milwaukee County filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act against Milwaukee County in the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Defendants removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on February 25, 2004. Plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Milwaukee County pays Plaintiffs' facilities less than other counties pay for comparable services and less than Milwaukee County pays for services for persons not enrolled in Family Care. On February 7, 2006, the Court (Lynn Adelman) granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss. Specifically, Defendants' motions with respect to claims seeking damages for past conduct were granted. The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on October 13, 2006. Bzdawka v. Milwaukee County, 238 FRD 469 (E.D. Wis. 2006). The class consisted of disabled Milwaukee County residents who are now or will in the future be eligible to reside in a Family Care facility. On March 27, 2007, the Court (Magistrate Judge Patricia J. Gorence) issued a stay pending possible settlement negotiations. The Court issued an order preliminarily approving the proposed settlement agreement on August 21, 2007. The Court executed the Settlement Agreement on October 19, 2007. Among other things, the agreement required Defendants to modify and improve staff training, review, needs assessments, and collaboration. The case has been closed.

Summary: This case was brought by residents of adult family homes and community-based residential services who received Family Care services from Milwaukee County seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged that Milwaukee County failed to adequately compensate providers of Family Care services. The case was settled on October 19, 2007, resulting in some injunctive relief for Plaintiffs.


This is a case about due process violation under the 14th amendment based on a judge potentially steering defendants towards using ankle monitors by a company he has financial and political ties to. On May 14, 2020, two criminal defendants who were ordered to wear ankle monitors in Judge Paul A. Bonin’s court, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs, represented by Institute for Justice, sued Judge Bonin and the ankle monitoring company, ETOH Monitoring, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by not disclosing his financial and political ties to the ankle monitoring company. The plaintiffs sought class-action certification, attorney fees and costs, and declaratory and injunctive relief that would make Judge Bonin disclose his relationship with ETOH monitoring to defendants when ordering their use, stop ETOH Monitoring from providing services to Judge Bonin without their relationship being disclosed, and to have ETOH disgorge and return or cancel fees collected. The case was assigned to Judge Carl J. Barbier. The plaintiffs claimed that Judge Bonin unconstitutionally required or steered defendants in his court house into ankle monitoring service agreements and their significant fees with ETOH monitoring service. They claimed that Judge Bonin maintained a private and professional relationship with the two owners of ETOH monitoring. The plaintiffs claimed that the owners of ETOH monitoring donated or loaned $10,000 to Judge Bonin’s various judicial electoral campaigns. According to the plaintiffs, since 2017, Judge Bonin required the use of ETOH monitoring for those ordered to have an ankle monitor, and required fees paid before release from probation or as precondition to not being jailed. They further contend that ETOH regularly sent Judge Bonin a status report highlighting individuals to check in on, not because they violated their probation, but because they were behind on payments. A 2018 report from Court Watch NOLA found that Judge Bonin, out of the five New Orleans Judges who received a financial campaign contribution from an ankle monitoring company, was the only one who required a defendant to wear an ankle monitor. On July 14, 2020, both Judge Bonin and defendant ETOH filed a motion to dismiss the case against them for failure to state a claim that could be remedied as they are not a state actor. On August 23, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claims against Judge Bonin. On September 4, 2020, Presiding Judge Barbier denied the ETOH's remaining motion on the basis that ETOH Monitoring is a state actor under the “public function” test which makes their action remediable. 2020 WL 5311351. As of October 9, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In May of 2020 two plaintiffs who were criminal defendants ordered to use ETOH ankle monitoring services in Judge Bonin’s court, represented by the Institute for Justice, filed this lawsuit against Judge Paul Bonin and ETOH Monitoring service in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs alleged 14th Amendment and due process violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs claimed that Judge Bonin violated criminal defendants rights by not disclosing his political and financial ties to ETOH Monitoring service when ordering defendants to nearly exclusively use ETOH Monitoring and then making their parol or incarceration dependent on all fees and dues being resolved with ETOH Monitoring.


COVID-19 Summary: This was a preexisting lawsuit addressing conditions of confinement in the Sacramento County Jail. On March 18, 2020, class counsel wrote the county to urge significant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter requested population reductions and a variety of other steps (increasing education, access to cleaning supplies, free communications methods, and the like). On June 24, the parties reported that while on-site monitoring was feasible, some court experts who resided out of state indicated that they may be unable to travel to the Jail depending on the circumstances of COVID-19. The parties jointly sought modification of the terms of the consent decree and stipulated to remote access of records, virtual tour and timeline modifications. The court approved ongoing modifications. Between September and October, the court received letters from individuals in the Jail that alleged violations of the consent decree.
 On July 31, 2018, prisoners in the County of Sacramento jail system, with the assistance of counsel from Disability Rights California, Prison Law Office, and Cooley LLP, filed this suit against the County of Sacramento. The plaintiffs alleged a series of problems with the County of Sacramento Jail system, including understaffing, prolonged and harmful isolation, lack of minimally adequate mental health care, lack of minimally adequate medical care, and discrimination on the basis of disability. The plaintiffs claimed that these violate the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, cruel and unusual conditions under the Fourteenth Amendment, procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Americans' with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and California state law. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. The case was randomly assigned to Magistrate Judge Kendall J. Newman, however, the plaintiffs declined to consent to a Magistrate Judge and requested a random assignment to a United States District Judge. The case was then assigned to both District Judge Troy L. Nunley and Magistrate Judge Newman on September 4, 2018. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the lack of staffing led to problems with cleanliness, transportation, and security. The plaintiffs claimed that the County of Sacramento was aware of these problems because they had been notified by both internal and external reports. The plaintiffs also alleged that people were kept in cells for at least 23 1/2 hours per day in solitary confinement (called "total separation" or "T-Sep). Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that prisoners were placed in solitary confinement for no reason—even those with intellectual disabilities or suicidal prisoners were regularly placed in solitary confinement. The County of Sacramento jails did not meet minimally adequate mental health care standards according to the plaintiffs, as evidenced by the inadequate screening at intake, failure to create treatment plans, and lack of staff. The plaintiffs also noted that the rate of suicide deaths at defendant's jails was twice the national average. The plaintiffs additionally took issue with medical screenings, which were conducted in crowded intake areas that compromised the plaintiffs' privacy. Moreover, patients would not be seen for multiple issues at once and prisoners who are unable to fill out medical requests on their own were left without care. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that prisoners with disabilities were discriminated against on the basis of their disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant's jails failed to identify or track persons with disabilities and provide people with necessary walking aids. The main jail housing was not ADA accessible, which placed inmates with disabilities in separate housing simply because of their disability. They further claimed that this denied them access to the same programming. On October 18, 2018, the parties jointly moved for class certification. On December 28, 2018, the court certified the class of "all people who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in Sacramento County jails." The court also certified a subclass of "all qualified individuals with disabilities [...] who are, or will be in the future, incarcerated in the Sacramento County jails." On June 10, 2019, the parties submitted a joint notice of settlement in the form of a proposed Consent Decree, which involved a Remedial Plan requiring the County to expand its mental health programs and services, provide constitutionally-adequate medical care, provide additional safeguards to reduce suicides by people in custody, identify people with disabilities and ensure that they receive appropriate accommodations, and expand mental health input into the jail's disciplinary and use of force practices. Under the proposed Consent Decree, the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the Consent Decree and the agreement would last for six years from the date it is entered by the court. On August 13, 2019, Judge Nunley issued an order preliminarily approving the Consent Decree and finding the Consent Decree met the requirements of 18 U.S.C. 3262(a)(1), the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 2019 WL 3804192. Judge Nunley also laid out a schedule for posting the Notice of Class Action Settlement and set a fairness hearing for December 5, 2019. On September 4, 2019, Judge Nunley released an order regarding the revised Notice of Class Action settlement, which was revised to note that plaintiffs asked for $2.1 million in attorney's fees and an annual cap of $250,000 per year to monitor compliance with the Consent Decree. On Nov 12, 2019, the plaintiffs and defendants sought final approval of the Consent Decree and Magistrate Judge Newman recommended it for approval on December 9. 2019 WL 6696667. The Consent Decree was finally approved on January 8, 2020, with the $2.1 million in attorney fees to be paid in two installments of $1.05 million, dated January 31 and July 31, 2020. 2019 WL 6696668. On March 4, the parties agreed on three court experts, each specializing in the field of medical health, mental health, and suicide prevention. The experts were approved on March 10. On March 18, 2020, class counsel wrote defendants an urgent letter about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the safety of jail inmates, urging development of a response plan and releases of as many inmates as possible:
We were pleased to see that the Sheriff’s Department received authorization from the Sacramento Superior Court to grant accelerated release of prisoners, up to thirty days early on a person’s sentence, effective through May 31, 2020. . . . We strongly encourage the County to explore and implement other mechanisms to safely reduce the jail population, including through (1) a broader early release order, (2) work release arrangements . . . and (3) expanded pretrial release.
 In light of the pandemic, the parties stipulated to the postponement of all scheduled site visits by the Court Experts and Plaintiffs’ counsel and sought extension of the deadlines for the 180-Day Reports by the Court Experts. Instead, the parties requested leave to file a status report on or before June 24, 2020, providing further information to the Court about the status of their monitoring and proposing a modification to deadlines described in the Consent Decree. The parties also agreed that the compliance with the provisions of the Remedial Plan in the Consent Decree had not been reached. They told the court that they continued to work collaboratively to review and revise the jail’s operational policies to reflect the requirements of the Remedial Plan. On April 30, the court granted the request and extended the deadline. The parties were ordered to submit a status report about the status of monitoring compliance with the Consent Decree and potential modifications to the reporting deadlines. On June 24, the parties reported that while on-site monitoring was feasible, some court experts who reside out of state indicated that they may be unable to travel to the jail depending on the circumstances of COVID-19. The parties jointly sought modification of the order and stipulated to remote access of records, a virtual tour, and timeline modifications. Two days later, the court approved the modifications. On September 3, the court received seven letters from individuals, claiming that they have been housed in solitary confinement at the Sacramento County Main Jail for periods ranging from 10.5 to 22 months, allegedly violating the consent decree. On October 7, the court adopted further modifications to the reporting timeline after one court expert resigned. On November 16, the court received a letter from five individuals who claimed that since August, despite filing grievances and raising issues with various authorities, they had been held in restrictive housing. The court directed class counsel to respond. Both parties have submitted periodic monitoring reports to update the court on defendant’s compliance with the restrictive housing and ADA/disability provisions of the Remedial Plan. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Prisoners in Sacramento County jails filed suit against the County of Sacramento alleging a series of issues present in Sacramento County Jails. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that there was understaffing, a lack of adequate mental health care and physical health care, and discrimination on the basis of disability. The plaintiffs argued that the conditions in the jails violated the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and California State law. In June 10, 2019, the parties submitted a joint notice of settlement, submitting a proposed Consent Decree and Notice of Class Action Settlement. The Consent Decree was finally approved on January 8, 2020, with the $2.1 million in attorney fees to be paid in two installments of $1.05 million, dated January 31 and July 31, 2020. On March 18, 2020, class counsel wrote the county to urge significant responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. The letter requested population reductions and a variety of other steps (increasing education, access to cleaning supplies, free communications methods, and the like). On June 24, the parties reported that while on-site monitoring was feasible, some court experts who resided out of state indicated that they may be unable to travel to the Jail depending on the circumstances of COVID-19. The parties jointly sought modification of the terms of the consent decree and stipulated to remote access of records, virtual tour and timeline modifications. The court approved ongoing modifications. Between September and October, the court received letters from individuals in the Jail that alleged violations of the consent decree.