The initial plaintiffs in this case were a group of twenty-two individuals who were arrested in September 2002 at a mass political demonstration in Washington, D.C. On November 19, 2002, they filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 28 U.S.C §§ 1331 and 1343 against a number of municipal and federal defendants, including the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), Chief of Police Charles Ramsey of the Metropolitan Police Department, the District of Columbia, the Mayor D.C. Anthony Williams, Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton, Attorney General John Ashcroft, the U.S., and other unidentified officers and law enforcement agencies. Represented by the Partnership for Civil Justice and the National Lawyers Guild Mass Defense Committee, the plaintiffs claimed they were falsely arrested and imprisoned without probable cause, depriving them of their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. The plaintiffs further alleged the defendants--in violation of the Equal Protection Clause--processed and treated them differently than others arrested for minor offenses. Finally, the plaintiffs accused the arresting officials of negligence, as well as negligent supervision on the part of their supervisors. This case was one of a number filed or pending around that time against the Metropolitan Police Department and relating to its handling of mass demonstrations. The plaintiffs amended their complaint three times to include a charge of deliberate indifference to constitutional rights against the arresting officers' supervisors and to propose a class of plaintiffs consisting of all persons--about 400 in total--who were arrested in Pershing Park September 27, 2002. In amending their complaint, the plaintiffs also added a new municipal defendant, Peter Newsham, Assistant Chief of Police, as well as a new federal defendant, Richard Murphy, who was the acting Commander of the Special Forces Branch of the U.S. Park Police. The MPD, according to the complaint, had a practice of of deploying its Civil Disturbance Units for the purpose of disturbing and disrupting protests and demonstrations. And the CDU was successful doing so, though by means of allegedly unconstitutional tactics, resulting in false arrest and imprisonment. One tactic of note was the CDU's "box-in" technique, in which CDU officers (clad in full riot gear) trap individuals--protestors and civilians alike--by surrounding them on all sides, foreclosing any chance of escape, then arresting them. In this manner the CPD not only curtailed but also deterred the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. The second aspect of the MPD's allegedly unconstitutional practices ensued after the arrests. The plaintiffs claimed the MPD disparately treated individuals arrested for minor offenses in connection with mass demonstrations. Those arrested simply for minor offenses (i.e., not in connection with any demonstration) were given the "post and trial" option, receiving quick release from jail in exchange for offering up collateral, and for which they also received a trial date for challenging the legality of their arrest. On the other hand, those individuals arrested for minor offenses in connection with demonstrations were released instead by "posting and forfeiting." In exchange for their release, they were instructed they had to forfeit their chance to challenge the legality of their arrest. As a result, they faced a longer confinement solely because they wished to challenge the legality of their arrest. This disparate treatment, the plaintiffs claimed, was the denial of equal protection under the law. The plaintiffs alleged that the FBI used the mass arrests as a mass intelligence gathering operation, with the MPD soliciting--then providing the FBI--identification information from those it falsely arrested as a condition of their release. Thus the FBI compiled intelligence on political activists, their activities, and others who either associated with them or simply happened to be in their proximity. The plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment that the MPD's practice of disrupting and preventing political protests without justification violated the plaintiffs' rights under First and Fourth Amendments and the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction prohibiting such tactics. Among other forms of relief--including compensatory and punitive damages--the plaintiffs requested the Court mandate the MPD treat those arrested for minor offenses in connection with mass demonstrations just as it does those arrested simply for minor offenses, by enjoining it from (1) subjecting them to a harsher period of processing and confinement, (2) threatening or instituting longer periods of confinement for those who wish to challenge the legality of their arrest, and (3) offering them the "post and forfeit" option instead of the customary "post and trial" option. As to the federal defendants, the plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction barring the Department of Justice from accessing information relating to arrests at mass demonstrations made by local law enforcement authorities. On September 24, 2003, the Court (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) approved certification of the plaintiffs' proposed class, finding their circumstances of their arrest were virtually identical, all resulting from a single action in which the arrestees were treated as a single group by law enforcement. The individual municipal defendants moved for dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court ruled Williams was entitled to qualified immunity on the false arrest and excessive force claims, as was Ramsey with respect to the latter. 338 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52. Because there was an issue of fact regarding if Ramsey knew whether a dispersal order had been given before the plaintiffs at Pershing Park were arrested, the court determined qualified immunity for Ramsey for the false arrest claims was inappropriate. Id. at 62. The court also found Newsham was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 57. Finally, the court held the MPD's failure to offer arrestees post and trial did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, explaining there was no evidence that the plaintiffs were treated differently than other groups of arrestees regarding the availability of the "post and trial" option. Id. at 70. The federal defendants also moved for dismissal on the grounds of qualified immunity, arguing in addition that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their claims for injunctive relief. The Court denied the defendants' standing argument, finding the plaintiffs had shown injury, causation, and redressability--and explaining that the U.S. Park Police not only participated in the arrests at Pershing Park but also could have reasonably understood there was no probable cause for arresting every person in the park. 2007 WL 2007335 at * 6. The Court next determined that defendant Murphy was not entitled to qualified immunity because his alleged conduct--participating in a mass-arrest undertaken without probable cause--violated a clearly established constitutional right. Id. at *10. Defendant Murphy also challenged the § 1983 claim against him, arguing there was no evidence he was acting under color of state law at the time of the mass arrest. The court rejected this argument, too, finding evidence that state and federal officials acted in concert to carry out the mass arrest and noting Murphy and the Park Police acted with the encouragement and at the request of the MPD. Id. at *11. The Court also found the FBI's motion for summary judgment was premature because not enough discovery had been performed. Id. at *11. In March 2010 the plaintiffs and municipal defendants filed a motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement. The parties observed that, as a result of this and similar contemporaneous lawsuits, the Council of the District of Columbia had enacted the "First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004," which was specifically crafted to provide the relief plaintiffs sought, thus eliminating their need for equitable relief from the Court. No recurrence of "box in" mass arrests of protestors had taken place since the Act took effect. In addition, there had been favorable developments for the plaintiffs as a result of settlements from similar cases targeting the MPD's practices. See, Becker v. District of Columbia, Docket No. 1:01-cv-00811 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2001); Int'l Action Ctr. v. United States, Docket No. 1:01-cv-00072 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2001). The plaintiffs noted their satisfaction at having implicitly received declaratory judgment from Judge Sullivan's opinions. E.g., 338 F. Supp. 2d 48, 58 (identifying the "'bright line rule' that 'where a group contains persons who have not been violent or obstructive, police may not mass arrest the demonstration as a group without fair warning or notice and the opportunity to come into compliance and disperse'"); 434 F. 3d 565, 575 (holding, under the Fourth Amendment, only "when compelling circumstances are present, the police may be justified in detaining an undifferentiated crowd of protestors, but only after providing a lawful order to disperse followed by a reasonable opportunity to comply with that order"). And by a previous order of Judge Sullivan, the class had received expungement of the arrest from their records. The District agreed to allocate $8.25 million from its Judgment and Settlement Fund for the class settlement. Under the settlement, each enrolled member would receive $16,000, and attorneys fees and costs were also included, totaling about $2.5 million. The District additionally agreed to allocate funds for implementing a document management system to prevent evidence loss or destruction, which apparently had occurred during this case. Under its new system, the agreement stipulated, the MPD would preserve and index records relating to mass demonstrations and protests, and the MPD would report to plaintiffs' representatives and the Court every six months during the three-year enforcement period of three years, during which time the Court retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance. The Court approved the parties' motion on September 22, 2010. Following the fairness hearing, in September 2010 the parties submitted--and the court approved--the final settlement agreement. Over the next several year, the parties engaged in enforcement activities, provided status reports, and moved for attorneys fees. Negotiations between the plaintiffs and the federal defendants continued. On May 10, 2015, the plaintiffs and the federal defendants jointly moved for preliminary approval of a proposed class settlement. The following day the court granted the motion. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendants were required to pay a class-wide monetary settlement totaling $2,208,000 and to changes the U.S. Park Police policies and practices regarding mass arrest. The agreement was set to expire three years after the latest occurrence of either the grant of final approval, the disposition of all appeals, or the denial or all appeals. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. On July 1, 2015, the parties moved for final approval of the agreement following the fairness hearing. After the court granted final approval on July 8, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal as to the defendant FBI. The court dismissed the FBI as a defendant on July 28, 2015. As of July 10, 2018, there is no indication of non-compliance following final approval. As such the settlement terminated on July 8, 2018, three years after the grant of final approval. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: This case was one of several against the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department relating to its Civil Disturbance Unit's practice of disrupting mass demonstrations. The plaintiffs were a class of individuals-numbering about 400-who were arrested in September 2002 at a mass political demonstration in Washington, D.C.; there were various federal defendants, as well. The plaintiffs claimed they were falsely arrested and imprisoned without probable cause, in deprivation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. While the case was pending, the Council of the District of Columbia enacted the "First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act of 2004," which was specifically crafted to provide the relief plaintiffs sought, thus eliminating their need for equitable relief from the Court. The claims against the municipal defendants ended in settlement totaling about $8.25 million, with the District additionally agreeing to allocate funds to implement a document management system to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence relating to mass demonstrations and protests. The settlement agreement terminated in July 2018. The case is closed.


On December 4, 1989, detainees at the Plumas County Jail filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Plumas. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and by private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. Specifically, they alleged problems with overcrowding, unequal access to programs and work opportunities for women detainees, lack of exercise, inadequate access to medical, dental and mental health treatment, lack of law library access, and lack of adequate visiting time and other contact with people in the outside world, and claimed that these problems constituted violations of the First, Fourth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The PACER docket begins on September 12, 1990, when the Court (Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) ordered the County not to hold any warrantless arrestee who had not been provided with a determination of probable cause before a judge within 36 hours of his or her arrest. There are several multiple-month gaps between entries over the following two years, but the principal developments are clear. On January 21, 1992, the Court (Judge John F. Moulds) certified the proposed class of detainees, and on February 10, the parties submitted a consent decree for the Court's approval. Under the terms of the decree, the County agreed to maintain all housing units at the jail at or below their rated capacities; to provide detainees with sufficient storage space for their personal belongings and with adequate clothing and food; to allow detainees one hour of exercise per day five days a week; to provide regular access to adequate medical, dental, and mental health care services; to allow visits of at least a half an hour each at least two days per week; to provide women detainees with equal access to programs and work opportunities and to always have at least one female guard working each shift; to provide prompt physical access to the law library; to provide access to a pay phone, a television and non-legal reading material; and to allow inspection by the fire marshal and comply with any recommendations the fire marshal makes. The County also agreed to develop, implement and make known to the detainee rules of conduct, a grievance procedure, disciplinary procedures, and visitation policies and procedures. Finally, the County agreed to allow plaintiffs' counsel to make reasonable inspections to ascertain its compliance with the decree. The Court (Judge Moulds) approved the consent decree on April 21, 1992, and ordered the County to pay the plaintiffs $65,000 in attorneys' fees on June 12, 1992. Since the decree was entered, several detainees at the jail, representing themselves, have petitioned the Court for enforcement of the decree, most recently in 2006. Each time, the Court has directed them to contact plaintiffs' counsel to seek enforcement. No action has been taken on these petitions, though on April 1, 2013, the Court signed a joint stipulation modifying the consent decree as to the population cap and staffing provisions. On March 27, 2015, plaintiffs filed a request for a status conference, alleging noncompliance with the Consent Decree. On April 17, 2015, the Court (Magistrate Judge Kendall Newman) ordered the County to file a response two weeks later, "setting forth the status of compliance with the Consent Decree." After the County filed its response, the Court found that the defendants might not be in compliance with the sections of the Consent Decree addressing mental health care and the law library. In June 2015, the parties attended a settlement conference, where they discussed ongoing deficiencies in compliance with the Consent Decree. The parties provided status reports to the Court for several months. On October 28, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the Consent Decree after reaching an impasse regarding one particular provision: the agreement to provide prosthetic dentures to detainees. On November 23, 2016, the County filed a motion to modify the consent decree so that dentures would be provided to detainees based solely on the standard of “medical necessity,” rather than the to allow detainees to eat solid food. Following these motions, the parties met over a series of months to discuss the denture policy. On October 9, 2018, the parties submitted a joint status report to the court. Although the plaintiffs observed progress by the County and did not observe violations of the Consent Decree upon their most recent visit, they did note several concerns related to staffing, the law library, nursing, medical care, mental health care, and dental care. On October 15, 2018, the parties engaged in another settlement conference. The Court ordered the County to submit a report addressing the status of its compliance with the Consent Decree and scheduled a status conference for February 22, 2019. The joint status report was submitted on February 15, 2019. At the February 22, 2019 status conference, the court ordered that "By noon on 4/26/2019, the County is to provide a detailed report to the Court and plaintiff's counsel, regarding its compliance with outstanding issues in this litigation as well as steps toward IMQ or NCCHC accreditation." On May 29, 2019, Judge Newman issued orders detailing that: (1) the County must apply for NCCHC accreditation on or before January 2020; (2) Plaintiff’s counsel must submit a proposal for the length of a monitoring period under an amended consent decree within 60 days; and (3) the County must pay plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees. Nothing was reported in the docket until January 29, 2020 when both parties submitted a new Joint Status Report requesting a postponement of the status meeting because the COVID-19 pandemic had prevented the NCCHC accreditation team from visiting the jail. The status meeting was postponed until May 29, 2020; then again on May 26, 2020 until September 18, 2020; and then again on September 17, 2020 until December 12, 2020. As of October 13, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a class action brought by detainees at the Plumas County Jail challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. After the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California certified the proposed class, the parties settled in 1992, and the County agreed to, among other things, a population cap at the jail; access to the law library, non-legal reading material, a pay phone, a television, and dental, medical care and mental health care; regular opportunities to exercise; minimum visitation rights; and equal access for women detainees to programs and work opportunities. The decree was modified in 2013, and in March 2015, the court began to examine the status of decree compliance. After engaging in further settlement discussions and providing status reports to the court, in October 2016 the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the Consent Decree with respect to the denture policy and the County filed a motion to modify the consent decree. After two years of status reports and settlement discussions, as of October 2020 the parties are still examining the County's compliance.


On October 8, 2020, former civil servants at the U.S. Agency for Global Media (the Agency) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The former employees sued the Agency under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and further alleged that the Agency violated the First Amendment rights of the Agency's journalists. Finally, they alleged that the Agency violated 22 U.S.C. § 6204 and 22 C.F.R. 531.3, rules that are aimed at protecting the professional independence of the Agency's broadcasting networks. Represented by private counsel, the former civil servants sought injunctive relief. They claimed that several new administrators installed by the Trump administration had breached statutory and regulatory firewalls in order to impermissibly chill the speech of the Agency's various overseas news networks. Specifically, they claimed that the Agency's newly-installed CEO and other political appointees had violated a statutorily-enshrined practice of separating business activities from the newsroom. They alleged that the CEO was coercing the Agency's broadcast networks into dropping news coverage that was seen as critical of former-President Trump. The former civil servants claimed that this coercion was accomplished by removing senior editors at the broadcasting networks, refusing to sponsor J-1 visas for foreign reporters, and meddling in newsroom meetings, among other actions. The former civil servants filed an amended complaint on November 4, 2020. They added another claim under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Agency's rescission of 22 C.F.R. 531.3 on October 26, 2020 was arbitrary and capricious. They also added a claim that alleged the Agency had taken actions outside its statutorily delegated authority. Judge Beryl A. Howell granted the former employee's request for a preliminary injunction on November 20, 2020. The injunction barred the Agency and the named defendants from interfering with personnel decisions, communicating with journalists, and conducting investigations into journalistic content except as provided by statute and internal procedures. 2020 WL 6822780. The Agency appealed the injunction on December 17, 2020. The last action in the case was an order to terminate one of the plaintiffs due to their voluntary dismissal on January 21, 2021. This case is ongoing pending the appeal of the preliminary injunction.

Summary: In 2020, former civil servants at the U.S. Agency for Global Media filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that recently appointed administrators of the Agency were violating statutory firewalls in order to push the Trump Administration's agenda and viewpoint across the Agency's overseas broadcast networks. Judge Beryl A. Howell granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. This case is ongoing pending defendants' appeal of the preliminary injunction order.


This is an access to courts case to stop U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from making arrests at courthouses without warrants. More information about a similar challenge to ICE’s courthouse arrest policy is available here. A dual Venezuelan-Spanish citizen who had lived in New York City for four years without lawful immigration status together with immigrant advocacy organizations including Make the Road New York, the Urban Justice Center, the Sanctuary for Families, The Door, and New York Immigration Coalition filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 25, 2019. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued ICE, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and several executive branch officials under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq.) and state law. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE’s policy of surveilling and arresting individuals without judicial warrants at courthouses was arbitrary and capricious and violated the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as state common law. They sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction against the policy, and an order setting aside the policy. Specifically, the individual plaintiff alleged that he needed a protective order against a former abusive partner but had not filed in family court because he feared arrest by ICE when appearing in court. The organizational plaintiffs claimed they had to expend time and resources training staff on how to manage ICE's courthouse arrests that could have been spent addressing substantive legal issues. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, and Judge Alison J. Nathan heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss on February 12, 2020. On September 28, 2020, Judge Nathan denied the defendants' motion to dismiss except as to the plaintiff's Sixth Amendment claim. 490 F.Supp.3d 672. Notably, Judge Nathan held that both the individual and organizational plaintiffs had standing and that the agency decision was ripe for action. Judge Nathan also held that a common law privilege against civil courthouse arrests exists at New York common law and that the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) did not preempt this common law privilege. Judge Nathan dismissed the Sixth Amendment claim because the right of access to the courts that the plaintiffs were asserting is not grounded in the Sixth Amendment; it is grounded in the First and Fifth Amendments. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This is an access to courts claim to stop U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from making arrests at courthouses without warrants. An undocumented immigrant and several advocacy organizations alleged that ICE's courthouse arrest policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act, several provisions of the U.S. Constitution, and New York common law. The individual plaintiff specifically claimed that he was too fearful of arrest to go to court to secure a restraining order against an abusive partner. The case is ongoing.


On June 6, 2010, a coalition of medical transportation providers filed this action against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, challenging Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), the California state budget bill for the fiscal year of 2009-2010. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought their suit under the Supremacy Clause; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396, claiming that the rate freeze on medical transportation imposed by AB 5 was unlawful. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the rate freeze was preempted by the Medicaid Act, an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment, and a violation of equal protection and procedural and substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. This suit was one of many filed challenging the State of California's reduction in Medicaid reimbursement rates due to its budgetary crisis. Other cases in the Clearinghouse include Douglas v. Independent Living Center, No. 2:08−cv−03315 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0016]; California Association For Health Services At Home v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-07045 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0017]; California Medical Transportation Association, Inc. v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-07046 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0018]; Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-00382 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0019]; California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-00722 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0020]; California Medical Association v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-03363 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0021]; California Hospital Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-03694 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0022]; National Association of Chain Drug Stores v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:09-cv-07097 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0024]; California Hospital Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-08642 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0025]; Development Services Network v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:10-cv-03284 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0026]; California Association of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:10-cv-03259 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0027]; California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-08200 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0028]. On June 4, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to enjoin application of the rate freeze. Rather than deciding on this motion, however, on July 16, 2010, the Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) stayed the case, finding that pending actions in the Supreme Court could be dispositive of some of plaintiffs' claims, and ordered the parties to file quarterly status reports until the case was reactivated or dismissed. In a status report, dated May 2, 2012, the parties noted that all of the cases before the Supreme Court had been decided. Plaintiffs stated their intent to once again move for a lifting of the stay, while defendants believed the stay should be continued, citing key issues still pending before the Ninth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court. On September 11, 2012, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint, lifted the stay, and placed the case on the court's active list. Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on September 20, 2012. The complaint made essentially the same claims as the original complaint, including unconstitutional takings without just compensation, procedural due process violations, equal protection violations, and violations of the Contract and Interstate Commerce Clauses. The plaintiffs again sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages. On October 25, 2013, the state moved for summary judgment. After the court ordered and then later lifted another temporary stay, it (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted the state's motion for summary judgment on August 11, 2014. The court held that the takings and due process claims failed because plaintiffs did not have a property interest in the reimbursement rates set by the California Code of Regulations. The Contracts Clause claim failed because plaintiffs did not show that the state's failure to increase the reimbursement rates has substantially impaired their contracts with the cities and special districts they contracted with. Finally, the Commerce Clause claim failed because all plaintiffs could show was that the new reimbursement rates burdened them "by not compensating them as well as they would prefer." On September 10, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. There is no docket activity after June 10, 2015, when the docket indicated that the appeal was still pending. However, the case is likely closed because of a settlement reached in the related cases ending their suits.

Summary: On June 6, 2010, a coalition of medical transportation providers filed this action against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, challenging the medical transportation rate freeze in Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), the California state budget bill for the fiscal year of 2009-2010. The court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted the state's motion for summary judgment on July 28, 2014. On Sept. 10, 2014, plaintiffs appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit.


On July 31st, 2012, a resident of New York who was arrested while participating in a the Occupy Wall Street protest filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York United States District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of New York. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages, lawyers fees, and injunctive relief requiring that the city of New York create and implement a policy regarding the use of force upon persons involved in public demonstrations that conforms with federal constitutional standards and to create and implement reporting systems to record all uses of force by NYPD officers during public demonstrations on 7/31/2012. He claimed that his first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights were violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was sprayed with pepper spray by a New York City police officer while compliantly demonstrating with the Occupy Wall Street protest group. He said that the pepper spray hit his right eye and burned his face, arms, hands, and lungs. He claimed that he had to miss three days of work as a result of this incident, and still experienced some blurry vision and nervousness and increased heart rate around police officers. On November 13th, 2012, the District Court (Judge Robert W. Sweet) consolidated this case with several others filed with regards to the same incident including Lawler v. City of New York and Elliot v. City of New York. Following multiple settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement on July 8, 2015. The court entered the stipulation and dismissed the case on July 23, 2015, retaining jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of enforcing the agreement for an undisclosed amount of time. The details of the settlement are not publicly available. According to The New York Times, the defendant paid a total of $332,500 in damages (between $52,000 to $60,000 to each plaintiff). Additionally, the New York Times reported that the NYPD released a statement saying that the NYPD has not altered its pepper spray guidelines.

Summary: In 2012, a resident of New York who was arrested while participating in a the Occupy Wall Street protest filed a lawsuit against the city of New York. The plaintiff alleged that his first, fourth, and fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when a New York City police officer peppersprayed him while he was protesting. The parties reached a settlement in 2015.


The plaintiff in this action brought suit on 03/15/2005 against former Attorney General John Ashcroft and several other federal officials in their individual and official capacities, claiming that he was unlawfully detained and his freedom was otherwise infringed by the federal government. On March 16, 2003, the plaintiff, Al-Kidd, was arrested and detained as a material witness in a terrorism case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho. The underlying case was against another person, for visa fraud and false statements to U.S. Officials. Al-Kidd was held for 15 days in several different detention centers and treated as a terrorist suspect. On March 31, 2003, the Court ordered the plaintiff released on the condition that he live with his wife at her parents' home in Nevada. The Court confiscated his passport, barred him from applying for a new one and limited his travel to four states. He was required to report to probation officers and subjected to home visits. The plaintiff's material witness warrant was only dismissed 15 months later, when the defendant in the terrorist trial was acquitted of all major charges. In a complaint filed in the District of Idaho on March 14, 2005, the plaintiff alleged that his treatment was part of a policy of the United States government in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 to use the federal material witness statute in an unlawful manner. The plaintiff stated that individuals were arrested on material witness warrants without probable cause that they had information germane to a criminal proceeding, and were unnecessarily detained for long periods of time in poor conditions. The material witness statute was used to hold suspected terrorists when the government had not established probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime. The plaintiff claimed that his treatment violated the Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C. § 3144), the Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendments of the US Constitution, and constituted unlawful arrest and detention under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, expungement of all records relating to his unlawful arrest, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel and the ACLU. On January 23, 2006, the defendants filed three separate motions to dismiss. In his motion to dismiss, the Alexandria, Virginia, sheriff responsible for the plaintiff while in custody at the Alexandria Detention Center, alleged lack of personal jurisdiction in the Idaho District Court. On July 19, 2006, the claims against the sheriff were severed and transferred to the Eastern District of Virginia and his motion was subsequently denied as moot. The United States filed a motion to dismiss that was denied except as to the plaintiff's claim of false imprisonment based upon the delay in his transfer. The court found there was no basis for the false imprisonment claim because the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a lawfully issued material witness warrant and because constitutional claims are not cognizable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Former Attorney General John Ashcroft, the former warden of the Oklahoma Federal Transfer Center, and several FBI agents (known collectively as the "Federal Defendants") filed a separate motion to dismiss. The Federal Defendants argued that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over Ashcroft and the warden, that Ashcroft was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to plaintiff's arrest under the material witness warrant, that the Federal Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, and that there was no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3144. The District Court of Idaho (Judge Edward J. Lodge) denied this motion to dismiss. On November 27, 2006, John Ashcroft appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss. Ashcroft argued that he was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity as to the §3144 and Fourth Amendment claims and that he was entitled to qualified immunity from liability from all three claims. In a September 4, 2009, opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the District of Idaho's ruling. The Ninth Circuit reversed the ruling as to the plaintiff's Conditions of Confinement claim, holding that the plaintiff had not alleged adequate facts to render plausible Ashcroft's personal involvement in setting the harsh conditions of his confinement. On all other claims the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court order denying Ashcroft's motion to dismiss. 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009) The U.S. Supreme Court then granted certiorari and, in a May 31, 2011, opinion written by Justice Scalia, reversed. The Supreme Court found that the Ninth Circuit erred in considering Attorney General Ashcroft's subjective intent for detaining Al-Kidd under the material witness statute. The Supreme Court held that Ashcroft had not violated clearly established law and thus was entitled to qualified immunity. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court decision. 131 S.Ct. 2074. On remand, on August 3, 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of Ashcroft's motion to dismiss and remanded the matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's Opinion. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 653 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2011). On remand, both the plaintiff and the two FBI agent moved for summary judgment. On June 18, 2012, Magistrate Judge Mikel Williams of the District of Idaho issued a report and recommendation on the cross motions for summary judgment. Judge Williams recommended that the plaintiff's motion be granted with respect to the first FBI agent and that the defendant's motion be denied. With respect to the second FBI agent, Judge Williams concluded that additional factual review need to occur before he could decide if the second FBI agent was not entitled to qualified immunity. Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-00093-EJL, 2012 WL 4470852 (D. Idaho June 18, 2012). The plaintiff and the US also cross-moved for summary judgment on the claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. On June 26, 2012, Judge Williams issued a report and recommendation that the plaintiff's motion be granted in part and denied in part. Judge Williams granted the motion for his false imprisonment claims, but denied the motion for his abuse of process claim. Judge Williams denied the US's motion completely. Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-00093-EJL, 2012 WL 4470860 (D. Idaho June 26, 2012). On September 27, 2012, District Judge Edward Lopez reviewed Judge Williams's report and recommendations for the claims against the two FBI agents. Judge Lopez granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as to the first FBI agent, but denied the plaintiff's motion as to the second FBI agent. Judge Lopez granted the second FBI agent's motion for summary judgment. Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL 4470776 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012). Judge Lopez also reviewed Judge Williams's report and recommendations for the claim against the U.S. Judge Lopez affirmed Judge Williams's recommendation, granting in part and denying in part the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Al-Kidd v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-CV-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL 4470782, at *6 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012). The first FBI agent appealed the denial of qualified immunity. However, the parties reached a settlement agreement on December 30, 2014. On January 6, 2015, the parties entered a joint motion to dismiss the appeal. On January 13, 2015, the parties a entered a joint motion to dismiss all remaining claims and stipulated that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The agreement itself was not shared with the court. According to an ACLU press release, the government agreed to pay Al-Kidd $385,000.

Summary: This post-9/11 case was brought by an individual seized and detained as a material witness in a terrorism case. He challenged his treatment by the U.S. government. The U.S. Supreme Court held the U.S. Attorney John Ashcroft had qualified immunity. The parties settled the remaining claims against the FBI agents involved and the U.S. government; the government paid Al-Kidd $385,000.


The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") initiated an investigation of the Newark Police Department ("NPD") in May 2011, after receiving serious allegations of civil rights violations by the NPD. Such allegations included that the NPD subjected Newark residents to excessive force, unwarranted stops and arrests, and discriminatory police actions. The investigation was conducted jointly by the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ("Section 14141"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d ("Safe Streets Act"). Section 14141 prohibits government authorities from engaging in a pattern or practice of law enforcement misconduct that violates individuals' constitutional or federal statutory rights. Title VI and the Safe Streets Act together prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin by the recipients of certain federal funds. On July 22, 2014, the DOJ issued its findings. Its report "identified a pattern or practice of constitutional violations in the NPD's stop and arrest practices, its response to individuals' exercise of their rights under the First Amendment, the Department's use of force, and theft by officers. The investigation also revealed deficiencies in the NPD's systems that are designed to prevent and detect misconduct, including its systems for reviewing force and investigating complaints regarding officer conduct. The investigation also identified concerns that do not appear to amount to patterns of constitutional misconduct, but which nonetheless are significant and warrant consideration by the NPD. These concerns relate to the NPD's practices in dealing with potentially suicidal detainees, the NPD's sexual assault investigations, and the impact of the NPD's policing on the LGBT community." Simultaneously with issuing the findings, the DOJ and Newark announced an "Agreement in Principle"--a partial settlement that would serve as the foundation of a more comprehensive, judicially enforceable agreement. The Agreement required the City to: implement civilian oversight for the NPD; review and revise NPD policies, training, and internal oversight mechanisms, particularly regarding the use of force and stop, search and arrest practices; to train officers about the First Amendment; improve accountability and supervisory practices; revise internal affairs practices; and enhance data collection and analysis. On March 30, 2016, the United States filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The United States brought the action against the City of Newark for declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 14141. The complaint reiterated findings from the 2014 Findings Report and alleged that the defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of conduct depriving people of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments. More specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants engaged in unreasonable stops, searches, and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment; violated the rights of individuals to engaged in protected speech in violation of the First Amendment; used unreasonable force against individuals in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and stole property from individuals in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The same day, the parties submitted notice of a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. On May 5, 2016 the court (Judge Madeline C. Arleo) issued an order approving the consent decree. The consent decree details action steps the NPD will take regarding policy review and revision; training; community engagement and civilian oversight; stops, searches, and arrests; bias-free policing; use of force; in-car and body-worn cameras; theft; complaint intake and investigation; compliance reviews and integrity audits; discipline; data systems improvement; and transparency and oversight. More specifically, the action steps include: improving officer training; revising policies, training, and supervision to ensure that stops, searches, and arrests are carried out constitutionally in a manner that takes account of community priorities; integrating bias-free policing principles; reforming use of force policies; and conducting objective, thorough, timely investigations of complaints. The court will retain jurisdiction until the court determines that the City and the NPD have achieved full and effective compliance with the consent decree and have maintained compliance for no less than two consecutive years. The City and the NPD will aim to reach full and effective compliance within five years of the effective date of the consent decree. The consent decree also provided for an independent monitor, paid for by the City, to assess the City's progress in implementing and achieving compliance with the agreement. On February 2, 2018, the court issued a stipulated order amending certain paragraphs of the Consent Decree. Since then, the monitor has been filing quarterly reports pursuant to the agreement. In the most recent report, filed with the court on April 16, 2019, the monitoring team found that NPD had nearly completed writing all of its Consent Decree-related policies. It also found that NPD had begun training officers on two of the most critical Consent Decree policies that it had adopted: Use of Force; and Stops, Searches, and Arrests. More specifically, NPD had begun to proactively assess its officers' deployment of in-car and body-worn cameras and to mandate additional training for supervisors who did not carry out their responsibilities consistent with NPD's policies. Still, the monitoring team found that NPD's data systems were still inadequate to meet Consent Decree requirements and noted that the data systems were not capable of producing the information required for the independent monitor to conduct certain audits required by the consent decree. The independent monitor continues to file quarterly reports, most recently publishing the 12th quarterly report on April 27th, 2020. This report found that officers were still not in full compliance with policies regarding use of body cameras, although they were nearing compliance. This case is ongoing as of June 10th, 2020.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") initiated an investigation of the Newark Police Department ("NPD") in May 2011, after receiving serious allegations of civil rights violations by the NPD. Such allegations included that the NPD subjected Newark residents to excessive force, unwarranted stops and arrests, and discriminatory police actions. The investigation was conducted jointly by the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ("Section 14141"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"), and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d ("Safe Streets Act"). On July 22, 2014, the DOJ issued a findings report, and the parties announced an "Agreement in Principle" -- a partial settlement that would serve as the foundation of a more comprehensive, judicially enforceable agreement. On March 30, 2016, the United States filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The United States brought the action against the City of Newark for declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 14141. The complaint reiterated findings from the 2014 Findings Report and alleged that the defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of conduct depriving people of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Fourth, First, and Fourteenth Amendments. The same day, the parties submitted notice of a joint motion for entry of a consent decree. On May 5, the court (Judge Madeline C. Arleo) issued an order approving the consent decree. Monitoring is ongoing.


On Jan. 3, 2018, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Represented by its own counsel, plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff was a national nonprofit investigative news organization. It sought information on the United States' land acquisition and expenses at the southern border for construction of a wall. According to plaintiff, the federal government had, over more than a decade, acquired land at the southern border through eminent domain cases and purchases. In particular, the Trump administration's Jan. 25, 2017  Executive Order 13767 demanded new construction of a wall along parts of the border. The plaintiff maintained that the federal government's funding of the border wall was a matter of national concern, and sought to produce news reports on the topic. The complaint alleged that on Mar. 21, 2017, the plaintiff had submitted a FOIA request to defendant's component agency Customs and Border Protection (CBP), seeking documents on land acquisition and real estate costs at the southern U.S. border, specifically the following items related to border wall construction: 1. The amount the defendant had paid to private landowners in non-condemnation real estate transactions to acquire private property; 2. The amount defendant had paid to the Department of the Interior in environmental mitigation fees and costs; 3. The amount defendant had paid to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in litigation fees and costs related to border wall condemnation suits; 4. The amount defendant had paid to property owners for land condemned and taken through eminent domain; 5. The number of pending condemnation suits; 6. The location of all acquisitions; 7. The total amount of real estate costs. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from defendants. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Jan. 3, 2018, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore. A joint case management statement filed in June indicated that the government was in the process of producing responsive records. An August status report indicated the same. On Mar. 29, 2019, the DHS filed a stipulation with a proposed order of settlement and dismissal. The settlement indicated that the FOIA request had been completed to the satisfaction of both parties and $5,000 in attorneys' fees would be paid to the plaintiff. Judge Westmore granted the stipulation of settlement, dismissing the case with prejudice on Apr. 1, 2019. The case is now closed.

Summary: On Jan. 3, 2018, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) and brought this suit in N.D.Cal, suing DHS under FOIA. Plaintiff sought information on on the United States' land acquisition and expenses at the southern border for construction of a wall. The FOIA request was completed and on Mar. 29, 2019, the case was settled with the defendant paying plaintiff's attorney fees. The case is now closed.


On December 3, 2013, a pre-trial detainee in the Sacramento County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, an individual officer in the Sheriff's Department, the County of Sacramento, the University of California, and the University of California Health System (UCDHS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff attempted to commit suicide while he was a pre-trial detainee in the jail and suffered a spinal injury that left him paralyzed and cognitively impaired for the rest of his life. Prior to the suicide attempt, the plaintiff had also been assaulted by Jail correctional officers and sexually assaulted by other inmates. The plaintiff alleged that despite knowledge his history of assaults and mental illness, the defendants failed to provide him with appropriate mental health care and failed to take adequate steps to protect him from harm. The University of California moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. On September 10, 2015, Judge John A. Mendez granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. Judge Mendez held that the University is an arm of the state and immune from state law claims in federal court. Judge Mendez also struck the plaintiff's prayer for restitution and punitive damages against UCHDS. On June 20, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint so as to state claims previously asserted by a plaintiff who had died through the conservator of his estate and to dismiss an individual defendant from the case. In November 2016, the defendants filed three separate motions for summary judgment: one by the University of California and UCDHS, one by the individual officer in the Sheriff's Department, and one by the County of Sacramento and county officials. Around the same time, the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions and reasonable expenses. On March 31, 2017, the Court issued decisions on the remaining motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part each of the defendants' motions. Shortly before the Court issued its decisions on the motions for summary judgment, however, the University of California, UCDHS, and two doctors filed a notice of settlement with the court. Those defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $2,500,000 in exchange for a general release and dismissal of this action with prejudice. However, this settlement proposal was withdrawn pending perfection of another more expansive settlement agreement. On the first day of trial, May 1, 2017, a plaintiff raised a Batson motion during jury selection after the defense counsel used peremptory challenges to strike the only two prospective black jurors in the jury venire. Judge Mendez granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that the defense counsel's race-neutral explanations for striking the two jurors were pretextual. By May 8, 2017, however, the parties reported that they had reached a global settlement agreement and the remainder of the jury trial was vacated. On August 29, 2017, the parties sought court approval of their settlement agreement. The parties agreed to a universal settlement of $5,000,000 to resolve all claims in the case. The plaintiff would receive 85% of the total settlement and his parents would receive the remaining 15%. Based on their agreement at the start of representation, plaintiffs' counsel will receive $2,000,000 in attorneys' fees, which is 40% of the total settlement. On November 6, 2017, Judge Mendez approved the settlement agreement with some alterations. Instead of receiving 15% of the total recovery, the plaintiffs' parents would only receive 5%. Plaintiff's counsel received 40% of the total recovery, as well as $388,721.34 in costs. The case was voluntarily dismissed on December 27, 2017.

Summary: In 2013, a pre-trial detainee in the Sacramento County Jail, who attempted to commit suicide while in Jail, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department and the University of California Health System under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution. Specifically, the defendants failed to provide him with appropriate mental health care and failed to take adequate steps to protect him from harm. On March 31, 2017, the Court dismissed several of the plaintiff's claims on various motions for summary judgment. After the start of a jury trial, the parties reached a global settlement agreement, which the Court approved on November 6, 2017. The defendants agreed to pay $5,000,000 to resolve all claims. The case is now closed.


Plaintiffs -- four same-sex Illinois couples who wished to marry--filed this case on December 6, 2013, in the U.S. district court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sued the Cook County Clerk; the state attorney general intervened. Plaintiffs brought the suit just a month after the Illinois legislature enacted Senate Bill 10, which amends the Illinois Marriage Act to allow same-sex couples to be legally married in Illinois. S.B. 10, Ill. 98th Gen. Assemb., First Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). This amendment, however, was set to become effective months later, on June 1, 2014. Some of the plaintiffs explained that they had an immediate need to marry because of life-threatening illness. On December 10, 2013, their motion for emergency relief for all Sam-sex couples facing this situation was granted by Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman. Two weeks later, plaintiffs sought summary judgment more broadly, asserting that the continuation of the ban on same-sex marriage violated their due process and equal protection rights. The defendant and intervenor agreed that the court should find for the plaintiffs, and on February 21, 2014, the court accordingly granted summary judgment in their favor, holding that the Illinois ban on same-sex marriage frustrates the individual and class plaintiffs' desire to marry in their home state by denying them equal protection under the law and infringing on their fundamental right to marry. The court held unconstitutional the same-sex marriage ban of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/201.

Summary: Plaintiffs -- four same-sex Illinois couples who wished to marry--filed this case on December 6, 2013, in the U.S. district court for the Northern District of Illinois. They sued the Cook County Clerk; the state attorney general intervened. Some of the plaintiffs asserted that they had an immediate need to marry because of life-threatening illness. They also said that the continuation of the ban on same-sex marriage violated their due process and equal protection rights. On February 21, 2014, the court accordingly granted summary judgment in their favor, holding that the Illinois ban on same-sex marriage frustrates the individual and class plaintiffs' desire to marry in their home state by denying them equal protection under the law and infringing on their fundamental right to marry.


This case was initiated by two female South Carolina residents who wanted to marry. On October 15, 2014, they brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, represented by attorneys from Lambda Legal and a private firm. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Carolina. Specifically, they alleged that the state violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection through enforcement of a South Carolina constitutional amendment and statutes that expressly denied same-sex couples the freedom to marry. The District Judge Richard Gergel was assigned to this case. On October 22, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on November 7, 2014. On November 12, 2014, Judge Gergel granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction enjoining the state from enforcing any state laws or policies that prohibited the marriage of same-sex couples. Judge Gergel denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed the governor (Haley) as a defendant pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment Immunity on the basis that there was little evidence that the governor has taken enforcement action or engaged in other affirmative acts to obstruct the plaintiff’s fundamental right to marry.  Condon v. Haley  21 F.Supp.3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014). Recognizing that the defendants would file an appeal, the court issued a one-week stay of the enforcement of the injunction to give the Fourth Circuit time to receive the defendant's petition for appeal and to consider that request. On November 12, 2014, the defendants appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which denied their request for a stay. On November 20, 2014, the permanent injunction took effect. The defendants asked the Supreme Court for a stay on December 15, 2014. However, on December 15, 2014, the Fourth Circuit granted the defendants a stay until the Supreme Court decided the defendants' request for a stay or decided Deboer v. Snyder,  PB-MI-0004  in this Clearinghouse. The Fourth Circuit also consolidated this case with Bradacs v. Haley,  PB-SC-0003  in this Clearinghouse. On December 10, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees. Five days later, the defendants moved to stay the motion for attorney’s fees. On January 5, 2015, the district court denied the defendant’s motion to deny or defer attorney’s fees. However, the defendant filed a renewed motion to deny or defer attorney’s fees on January 23, 2015. The district court delayed action on this motion pending the outcome of the Supreme Court’s decision in  Obergefell  in this Clearinghouse. This resolved all the same-sex marriage cases on appeal to the Supreme Court. The defendants voluntarily dismissed the appeal to the Fourth Circuit. On August 10, 2015, the district court awarded $135,275.98 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. By October 6, 2015, the defendant notified the court that the plaintiffs had been paid in full.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case were two female South Carolina residents who wanted to marry. On August 10th, 2015, they brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division, represented by attorneys from Lambda Legal and a private firm. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the State of South Carolina. Specifically, they alleged that the state violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection through enforcement of a South Carolina constitutional amendment and statutes that expressly denied same-sex couples the freedom to marry. On November 12th, 2014, the District Court of South Carolina (Judge Richard Gergel) granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and issued a permanent injunction enjoining the state from enforcing any state laws or policies that prohibited the marriage of same-sex couples. Condon v. Haley, 21 F.Supp.3d 572 (D.S.C. 2014). The injunction took effect on November 20, 2014. After extensive litigation regarding attorneys' fees, on August 10th, 2015, the District Court awarded $135,275.98 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. By October 6, 2015, the defendant notified the court that the plaintiffs had been paid in full.


The plaintiffs in this class action are 12 inmates in the Michigan Department of Corrections who were incarcerated in adult jails and prisons when they were younger than 18. Each of the plaintiffs participated in litigation against the MDOC in cases in Washtenaw Circuit Court, Case No. 13-1196-CZ and in Federal Court in the Eastern District of Michigan, Case No. 13-14356. These cases can be found in the Clearinghouse--they are PC-MI-0039 (state) and PC-MI-0033 (federal). In those cases, they alleged that the policy and practice of placing juveniles in adult prisons without taking adequate steps to protect them from known harm constituted deliberate indifference to their safety in violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and various international treaties. The cases settled (on February 28, 2020) for $80 million and injunctive relief. In this case, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on Nov. 2, 2015, the complaint alleged that because the plaintiffs participated in the initial two cases they were subjected to retaliation from prison staff and administration, in violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs are represented by the same group of private counsel who are litigating the other cases; it has been assigned to Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. The allegations in more detail are that, after filing the earlier two lawsuits against the MDOC, each of the plaintiffs here faced repercussions for engaging in protected activity at the hands of prison staff and administration. This retaliatory action included verbal harassment, disclosure of their identities despite a court order not to disclose the plaintiffs' identities, and verbal threats. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants target them with ongoing unwarranted disciplinary action including solitary confinement and harsher terms of confinement. The complaint alleged that defendants also refused to allow plaintiffs confidential communication with their attorneys, read confidential legal material aloud in front of staff and inmates, and impermissibly questioned the plaintiffs about their case. The plaintiffs were seeking damages and injunctive relief, as well as a court order for the MDOC to revise its policy and procedure for reporting and reviewing staff misconduct. The court made several decisions in plaintiffs' favor: first, on Mar 4, 2016, it declined to sever (2016 WL 852808); then, on Jun 13, 2016, it denied defendants' motion for protective order to stay discovery (2016 WL 3230679), then, on Mar 31, 2017 it denied summary judgment (2017 WL 1209102); then, on Oct 18, 2017 it granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration (2017 WL 4682291); then, on Nov 1, 2017, it granted several of the plaintiffs' motions to compel (2017 WL 4941467); and finally, on Nov 3, 2017, it denied defendants' motion for reconsideration (2017 WL 5080516). While defendants' second motion for summary judgment was pending, the parties reached a private settlement agreement, on June 15, 2018. Under the agreement, plaintiffs dismissed their case. Defendants paid $350,000, and agreed to review all prior disciplinary charges to ensure none were retaliatory.

Summary: 12 plaintiffs incarcerated in Michigan filed a law suit on November 2, 2015 in the Eastern District of Michigan alleging that prison staff and administration impermissibly retaliated against them for participating in litigation against the Michigan Department of Corrections. Each of the plaintiffs had been sentenced to time in adult prison while they were under the age of 18, and had faced physical and sexual assault while incarcerated. Each had participated in two class action law suits against MDOC. In this case, they allege that their participation in these law suits resulted in impermissible retaliation from prison staff and officials. The parties reached a private settlement agreement on June 15, 2018.


On October 13, 2016, pretrial detainees in the Vigo County jail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana and private counsel, sued the sheriff and other officials of Vigo County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. They sought a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunction, and damages, claiming violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause. The plaintiffs alleged that overcrowding had created unconstitutional conditions within the jail. Specifically, they alleged that they had been forced to sleep on the unsanitary floor; transported to other jails, depriving them of the opportunity to see their visitors and attorneys; and been denied necessary medical treatment. For example, one of the named plaintiffs was badly injured because he was sleeping on the floor when another inmate fell from the upper bunk and crashed onto him. Another named plaintiff was forced to sleep on the floor for seven months. According to the complaint, a similar class action had been brought in 2000 to address overcrowding (Costa v. Harris). Although that case resulted in a private settlement agreement, the defendants failed to make substantial progress in addressing the problems. After 11 years with little change in conditions, the original plaintiffs filed a complaint about breach of contract, to no avail. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 17, 2016, in which some plaintiffs were added, and a second amended complaint on November 22, 2016. There were no significant changes between the first and the second amended complaint. On November 17, 2016, the plaintiffs sought class certification. On May 19, 2018, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson granted the plaintiffs’ motion, defining the class as: “All individuals in the care and custody of Vigo County, Indiana, including the current and future inmates who are or will be incarcerated in the Vigo County Jail and all current and future individuals who were transported to other county jails as a result of the overcrowding in the Vigo County Jail.” 2017 WL 2198632. On November 21, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the defendant from the unconstitutional practice of overcrowding the jail and to compel the defendant to implement a concrete plan for construction of a new jail. On June 22, 2018, plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. On October 10, 2018, Judge Magnus-Stinson granted this motion and awarded injunctive relief. The injunction ordered the defendants to make a periodic report of the ongoing constitutional violations at the jail, to file a detailed report explaining how many staff-people they would add to improve the jail’s living environment, and to submit a concrete plan to construct and open a new jail. The court noted that the plaintiffs requested-- and the defendants did not respond to this request-- that the court retain jurisdiction over this matter even after the damages actions are resolved. This would end once a new facility is opened and there is agreement that constitutional requirements are satisfied. 2018 WL 4922038. On December 19, 2018, the court ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs $75,000 for attorney's fees and costs.The defendants' first report filed on November 6, 2018, mentioned that the council voted to fund for hiring jail personnel and the commissioner selected the proposed site for a new jail. This report also mentioned that a plan to construct a new jail on the original proposed site failed because of the zoning restriction. The defendants' report filed on January 14, 2019, mentioned that the commissioner worked on deciding the alternative site for a new jail. A settlement conference was held on February 25, 2019. Claims as to one individual plaintiff were resolved. All pending motions regarding this plaintiff were denied as moot and and all dates regarding this plaintiff were vacated. The same day, the parties filed a stipulation for the court to enter final judgment as to all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 54(b). Three days later the judge issued an order that granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and declared that the conditions at Vigo County Jail violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The court ordered that the defendants appear before the court at least every three months to report on the action being taken to address the constitutional violations. Prior to each hearing before the court, the defendants must file a report with the court that states the number of staff necessary to comply with the injunctive relief granted and how and when the new staff will be added. Additionally, prior to each hearing before the court, the defendants are also required to submit a plan in writing to the court that details the progress and specifications for the new jail that will be opening. The court also ordered that defendants were required to provide prisoners with at least three hours per week of recreation outside of their cells, and the defendants must provide sufficient staff to ensure that the health and safety of the prisoners is safeguarded. On March 12, 2019, the defendants filed a status report with the court. This report said that the defendants are considering three locations for a new Vigo County Jail, that defendants had interviewed six applicants but hiring new staff was delayed due to the resignation of 10 other correctional officers, that all prisoners were getting at least one hour of recreation three times per week, and that the staff was doing wellness checks on prisoners every hour, and for prisoners on suicide watch, the wellness checks were every 15 minutes. On April 12, the defendants filed another status report with the court which was very similar to the March status report. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys fees on April 8, 2019. The parties filed a stipulation regarding attorneys fees in May, and on May 30, 2019 the court issued an order consistent with the stipulation. The defendants were required to pay a total of $10,130.85 in attorneys fees and costs. On April 15, 2019, the court issued an order that addressed the topics the defendants would include in their monthly status reports. The plaintiffs had filed a motion in March asking for additional information in the defendants' monthly reports, including the status of the property for the new Vigo County Jail, information on the frequency of recreation outside cell areas, incident reports involving prisoner violence, the number of jail employees and any progress in hiring more staff, and the number of prisoners in Vigo County Jail and their status (awaiting transfer, completing sentence at Vigo County Jail, or other). In May of 2019, the defendants notified the court that they had found a location for the new Vigo County Jail and would be purchasing the property later that month. In July 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation to delay ruling on attorneys fees because the parties were negotiating. The court granted the request and deferred ruling on the matter. On August 8, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation for attorneys fees regarding the personal injuries of one of the plaintiffs. The court approved this stipulation the next day and ordered the defendants to pay $16,000 in attorneys fees on this claim. Over the next seven months, the defendants filed monthly status reports with the court that were all similar in content to the first status report. In February of 2020, the Court issued an entry stating that the parties had reported a settlement of Plaintiffs’ individual personal injury claims, that counsel advised that there were unresolved issues with two Plaintiffs, and that “[i]f dismissal documents are not submitted by March 24, 2020, the Court will dismiss the personal injury claims with prejudice.” The parties did not file any dismissal documents, so on March 20, 2020, the court dismissed the plaintiff's personal injury claims, but the court dismissed the claims without prejudice to "re-open them for purposes of effectuating settlement only." The same day, the court entered final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court entered final judgment against the plaintiffs and for the defendants on the plaintiff's individual personal injury claims. Since then, the defendants have continued to file monthly status reports with the court. As of July 2020, the new Vigo County Jail was under construction, additional officer had been hired, interviews were scheduled in order to hire more staff, recreation was being offered 6-8 times per week to most housing cell blocks. Wellness checks were conducted every 60 minutes, and every 15 minutes for prisoners on suicide watch, and the guards were checking for symptoms of COVID-19. As of July 2020, the defendants continue to file monthly status reports with the court.

Summary: In 2016, Vigo County jail's detainees filed a class action lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Plaintiffs sued the sheriff of Vigo County, the County commissioners and the County council under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, and damages, claiming a violation of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause and Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection clause. The court certified the class and later granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and ordered injunctive relief obliging defendants to create and implement a concrete plan to open new jail. The case has settled, and the defendants continue to file monthly status reports with the court to detail the progress of finding a site for and constructing a new county jail, the number of staff employed and any hiring progress, the amount of recreation prisoners were receiving, and what actions the jail was taking to ensure the health and safety of the prisoners.


On May 22, 2009, a trade association representing the interests of hospitals in the State of California filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, brought suit under the Supremacy Clause; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; Title XIX of the Social Security (Medicaid) Act, 42 U.S.C §1396; and the state constitution, claiming that California had illegally enacted payment rates from Medi-Cal managed care plans for emergency and poststabilization services provided by hospitals that do not contract with those plans. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the rates, as enacted by Assembly Bill 1183 and implemented by All Plan Letters 08-008 and 08-010 of the Department of Health Care Services, were unlawful as preempted under federal Medicaid law because they were not consistent with efficiency, economy, quality of care and sufficiency of access, did not represent an accurate average of the rates received by hospitals under their Medi-Cal contracts, and had not been subjected to public process; under California law because they attempted to establish rates lower than what the law allows and because they attempt to establish regulations outside the bounds of formal rulemaking; and under the Fifth Amendment and California Constitution because they constituted an uncompensated taking. Plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and mandamus relief. This suit was one of many filed challenging the State of California's reduction in Medicaid reimbursement rates due to its budgetary crisis. Other cases in the Clearinghouse include Douglas v. Independent Living Center, No. 2:08−cv−03315 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0016]; California Association For Health Services At Home v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-07045 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0017]; California Medical Transportation Association, Inc. v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-07046 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0018]; Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-00382 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0019]; California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-00722 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0020]; California Medical Association v. Shewry, No. 2:08-cv-03363 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0021]; Sierra Medical Services Alliance v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:10-cv-04182 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0023]; National Association of Chain Drug Stores v. Schwarzenegger, No. 2:09-cv-07097 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0024]; California Hospital Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-08642 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0025]; Development Services Network v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:10-cv-03284 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0026]; California Association of Health Facilities v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:10-cv-03259 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0027]; California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 2:09-cv-08200 (C.D. Cal.) [PB-CA-0028]. On October 30, 2009, the California Association of Health Plans (CAHP) moved to intervene as a third party defendant. The District Court (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted CAHP's motion on November 23, finding that its members' interest in not having to pay more to non-contracting hospitals was sufficiently incongruous with that of the Department of Health Care Services as to make it inadequately represented by the latter party. Cal. Hosp. Ass'n v. Maxwell-Jolly, No. 09-cv-03694, 2009 WL 4120725, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118036 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2009). Over the following year, proceedings were repeatedly postponed as parties attempted to reach a settlement agreement. (While the Court notes at docket entry 70 that parties informed it that they had come to a settlement on December 10, 2010, no further reference to the settlement is made, perhaps due to the stay described below.) On September 2, 2010, the state defendant moved to stay the case until the Supreme Court resolved petitions for certiorari in Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc., No. 09-958 [PB-CA-0016], Maxwell-Jolly v. California Pharmacists Ass'n, No. 09-115 [PB-CA-0028], and Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital, No. 10-283, all of which dealt with similar Supremacy Clause issues in Medi-Cal reimbursement rate cases. The District Court (Judge Snyder) granted the motion on September 7, staying the case pending resolution of the Supreme Court proceedings. On June 11, 2011, the court removed the case from its active caseload and ordered the parties to file a quarterly joint status report until the case was reactivated or dismissed. One such report, dated May 18, 2012, noted that the Supreme Court issued a decision in Maxwell-Jolly v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. (restyled Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc.), No. 09-958 [PB-CA-0016], remanding to the Ninth Circuit and calling into question the Supremacy Clause cause of action in this group of cases. Plaintiff urges that the stay be lifted, while defendants argued it should be continued pending the outcome of the cases remanded to the Ninth Circuit. There was little subsequent activity on the docket. On April 17, 2015, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the case, indicating that they were part of a settlement reached in the Maxwell-Jolly case, available here. The court granted the motion on April 23. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 22, 2009, a trade association representing the interests of hospitals in the State of California filed a lawsuit against the California Department of Health Care Services in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division, challenging the State's mandated payment rates from Medi-Cal managed care plans for emergency and poststabilization services provided by hospitals that do not contract with those plans. The case has been stayed pending Supreme Court decisions in three similar actions.


On July 21 2020, President Trump issued a memorandum titled “Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census.” This memorandum included instructions to exclude undocumented immigrants from the state-population totals in the 2020 Census, and therefore exclude them from being counted when apportioning seats in the US House of Representatives and votes in the Electoral College. Two days later, on July 23, Common Cause, Partnership for the Advancement of New Americans, the cities of Atlanta, Georgia and Paterson, New Jersey, and several individuals from New York and Florida filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of the Census and various government officials (Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of the Census) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the memorandum violated Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against implementation of the memorandum, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. In addition, they requested a preliminary injunction to halt the implementation of the memorandum and to require the President to include all people, regardless of immigration status, when counting people for the purposes of congressional apportionment. The case was to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the memorandum violated Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution which requires “counting the whole number of persons in each state” and violated their right to Equal Protection by diminishing the representation of the plaintiffs and discriminating against those racial groups who have a higher number of immigrants within their voting population. The plaintiffs further contended that this memorandum violated the statutes which dictating how the census should operate. 13 U.S.C. § 141(b) and States 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a) requires the Secretary of Commerce to transmit to the President and requires the President to transmit to Congress “a statement showing the whole number of persons in each State”. The plaintiffs alleged they will suffer injury due to vote dilution, diminished representation, racial discrimination, census undercount, loss of government funds, and harm to the organizational missions of the advocacy groups if this memorandum is allowed to be implemented. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on August 11 and again on September 18 to add additional cities, advocacy groups, and individuals as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs requested a three judge panel and their motion was granted on August 20. Circuit Judge Gregory G. Katsas and District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich were designated to serve with District Judge Christopher R. Cooper to hear and determine this case. Judge Katsas presided. On August 19, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, or in the alternative to expedite the trial. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on September 2. As of September 25 the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement and the defendants’ motion to dismiss were still pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, with a hearing scheduled for September 29. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 21 2020, President Trump issued a memorandum titled “Excluding Illegal Aliens From the Apportionment Base Following the 2020 Census.” Two days later, on July 23, the nonprofit Common Cause, along with cities, citizens and organizations from across America, filed a complaint for declaratory judgement and injunctive relief against implementation of the memorandum, which describes President Trump’s intent to use the data gathered in the 2020 census to exclude undocumented immigrants from being counted when apportioning seats in the US House of Representative and votes in the Electoral College. The plaintiffs claimed that the memorandum violated Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction but as of now, the case is still pending.


This is the case in which, on June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional, because it stigmatizes same sex couples and violates the Equal Protection Clause. On November 9, 2010, a woman serving as the executor of the estate of her late same-sex spouse filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 26 U.S.C. § 7422 against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by the national and state ACLU and by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, alleging a violation of equal protection. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that operation of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to require her to pay federal estate tax, a tax from which opposite-sex spouses are exempt, on the estate of her same-sex spouse violated the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff first met her late spouse in 1963, in New York City, and entered into a committed relationship with her shortly thereafter. On 1993, the couple registered as domestic partners in New York City, and in 2007, with the late spouse's health failing, the couple decided to marry in Canada, where same-sex marriage was legal. In 2009, plaintiff's late-spouse passed away, and plaintiff was forced to pay $363,053 in federal estate tax, because under DOMA she did not qualify for the unqualified marital deduction. Plaintiff decided to commence a suit seeking to enjoin DOMA and to receive a refund of the tax she had been made to pay under it. On February 25, 2011, the Department of Justice, representing the defendant, notified the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and that it would thus cease defending it. In response, on April 18, 2011, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (BLAG) moved to intervene in defense of the act, and the Court (Magistrate Judge James C. Francis) granted its motion on June 2, 2011. On June 24, 2011, plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and on August 1, BLAG moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. On June 6, 2012, the Court (Judge Barbara S. Jones) addressed both motions, denying BLAG's motion to dismiss and granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Windsor v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-08435, 2012 WL 2019716 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012). The Court found as a threshold matter that plaintiff had standing to pursue the suit because the State of New York recognized same-sex marriages legally conducted in other jurisdictions in 2009, and thus plaintiff's Canadian marriage was recognized under New York law. It went on to find that there was no rational basis for Section 3 of DOMA, and declared that section unconstitutional and awarded plaintiff the $363,053 refund she sought. BLAG appealed the District Court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on June 8, 2012, and the Department of Justice appealed on June 14. The plaintiff filed a motion to expedite the appeal, and on June 22, 2012 the Court of Appeals granted the motion and scheduled oral argument for the week of September 24, 2012. On July 16, 2012, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court before judgment in the Court of Appeals, citing her age and failing health and the number of other petitions before the Court on the same issue (e.g. Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives v. Gill , No. 12-13 [PB-MA-0006], Department of Health & Human Services v. Massachusetts, No. 12-15 [PB-MA-0005], Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski, No. 12-16 [PB-CA-0031]) as considerations. On October 18, 2012, a three-judge panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment in a 2-to-1 decision. Windsor v. United States, No. 12-2335 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012). The majority, in an opinion penned by Chief Judge Dennis G. Jacobs, held that classifications based on sexual orientation should be subject to intermediate scrutiny, and that Section 3 of DOMA could not withstand that standard of review. They declined to address whether Section 3 would pass muster under a lower standard. Judge Chester J. Straub, in dissent, would have held that rational basis review was the appropriate level of scrutiny and that DOMA passed it. On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review, ordering briefing on the questions (1) whether DOMA was constitutional, under the Equal Protection Clause, (2) whether the Executive Branch's agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and (3) whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case. Argument is scheduled for March 27, 2013. On December 11, the Supreme Court appointed Vicki Jackson, a professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School, as an amicus curiae to argue questions (2) and (3). (On December 27, BLAG sought certiorari in its own right to ensure that the Supreme Court can still rule on Section 3 of DOMA in the event that the Supreme Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to rule due to the DOJ's agreement with the 2nd Circuit.) On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held that the case was justiciable, and struck down DOMA as an affront to the Equal Protection rights of same-sex couples. Justice Kennedy wrote for the 5-person majority, and explained: "The Constitution's guarantee of equality 'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate treatment of that group. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U. S. 528, 534-535 (1973). In determining whether a law is motived by animproper animus or purpose, '[d]iscriminations of an unusual character'" especially require careful consideration. Supra, at 19 (quoting Romer, supra, at 633). DOMA cannot survive under these principles." "DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset of state sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal purpose is to impose inequality." The Court emphasized that it was NOT holding that states had to allow same-sex marriages: "This opinion and its holding are confined to . . . lawful marriages," it said. Chief Justice Roberts wrote separately to emphasize that the decision rested on federalism principles, and did not entail the unconstitutionality of state bans on same-sex marriage. Justice Scalia wrote separately (joined by Justice Thomas and by the Chief Justice in part) to opine that the Court lacked Article III jurisdiction over the case, and that DOMA was constitutional. Justice Alito wrote separately (joined on the merits by Justice Thomas), taking the position that "BLAG" (the House Republicans) had standing, and that DOMA was constitutional. On May 30, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an order affirming the District Court's judgment.

Summary: On November 9, 2010, a woman serving as the executor of the estate of her late same-sex spouse filed a lawsuit against the United States claiming that operation of Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to require her to pay federal estate tax, a tax from which opposite-sex spouses are exempt, on the estate of her same-sex spouse violated the equal protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On June 6, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Barbara S. Jones) granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding no rational basis for Section 3 of DOMA. A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit, applying intermediate scrutiny, affirmed on October 18, 2012. On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review, on the questions (1) whether DOMA was constitutional, under the Equal Protection Clause, (2) whether the Executive Branch's agreement with the court below that DOMA is unconstitutional deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide this case; and (2) whether the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives has Article III standing in this case. On June 26, 2013, the Supreme Court held that DOMA violated same-sex couples' rights under the Equal Protection Clause. On May 30, 2014, the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued an order affirming the District Court's judgment.