On March 26, 2014, three individual plaintiffs and their wholly-owned family company filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Plaintiffs alleged that the provision of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") that mandated group health plans include coverage for "all [FDA] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity," posed a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 30, 2014, District Court Judge Patrick J. Schiltz granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction against enforcement of the contraception mandate until thirty days after the Eighth Circuit issued a decision in O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), or until thirty days after the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Tenth Cir. 2013) or Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (Third Cir. 2013). On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on November 14, 2014, the parties jointly submitted a Stipulation for Entry of Judgment and Injunction in Favor of Plaintiffs and Stipulation for Fee Motion Briefing Schedule, which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On November 18, 2014, Judge Schiltz issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. On December 30, 2014, the parties stipulated for an extension of time for the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. On December 31, 2014, Judge Schiltz granted this stipulation in an order extending the deadline to March 3, 2015. The docket shows no record of the plaintiffs moving for attorneys' fees, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On March 26, 2014, three individual plaintiffs and their wholly-owned family company filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court ordered that the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.


COVID-19: This is a habeas action filed by nine immigration detainees confined in the Caroline and Farmville Detention Centers, seeking either writs of habeas corpus for each petitioner, or in the alternative, injunctive relief. The petitioners alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus, either due to medical conditions or their age. The plaintiffs' TRO was denied on April 29. The decision was appealed, but the plaintiffs later dismissed the appeal and the underlying district court litigation. <hr> On April 9, 2020, nine immigration detainees filed this lawsuit against ICE, the warden of the Farmville Detention Center, the Superintendent of the Caroline Detention Center, and the Field Office Director of the ICE Washington Field Office. Represented by the Capital Area Immigrants' Rights Coalition, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the Legal Aid Justice Center, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under, or in the alternative injunctive and declaratory relief for violations of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to Judge Liam O'Grady and Magistrate Judge John F. Anderson. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction on April 13. On April 29, Judge O'Grady denied the motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden. The plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Fourth Circuit on May 8 (Docket No. 20-6695). On October 6, the plaintiffs filed a motino to dismiss the appeal, and back in the district court, on October 8, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. Judge O'Grady dismissed the case without prejudice on October 14.

Summary: Nine immigration detainees petitioned for writs of habeas corpus in light of their vulnerability to COVID-19, requesting release from the Farmville and Caroline Detention Centers. The plaintiffs' motion for TRO was denied on April 29. The plaintiffs initially appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal.


On September 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of female employees, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment and/or constructively discharged some female employees in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. On July 31, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's prima facie case. On August 12, 2009, the District Court (Judge Wanger) granted the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment regarding satisfying the conditions precedent for a Title VII sexual harassment claim and also granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's failure to satisfy the conditions precedent for a Title VII constructive discharge claim. On October 21, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the female employees $145,000.

Summary: On September 13, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of female employees, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of California, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against California Psychiatric Transitions, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected female employees to a sexually hostile work environment and/or constructively discharged some female employees in retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. On October 21, 2009, the District Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the female employees $145,000.


On June 17, 2009 juveniles detained in the Pierce County jails and their parents filed a lawsuit alleging violations of their civil rights in the Superior Court for the State of Washington, County of Pierce. The Plaintiffs, represented by a team of public interest attorneys from the Columbia Legal Service's Institutions project, sought declaratory and equitable relief and damages, claiming that the Defendant's failure to provide educational services to the juveniles detained in the adult jail violated their rights under the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that by failing to provide educational services in the adult jail, the Defendants had violated the State Constitution's requirement that a free public education be provided to all children in the state. Furthermore, the plaintiff's claimed that the Defendants' actions had violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution. On July 15, 2009 the defendants moved for removal from the Superior Court to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Tacoma Division. The District Court granted the removal and the case proceeded there. On March 29, 2010 the parties filled a settlement agreement. Defendants agreed to implement an educational program at the Jail that satisfies the state of Washington's legal requirements for educational programs. The defendants agreed to provide a written learning plan, individually crafted for the needs of each juvenile detained in the adult jail detailing the learning goals for the juvenile and a plan describing how to achieve such goals. The defendant school district agreed to provide certified instructional staff to conduct the program within the jail. While group instruction is not required under the agreement, each juvenile detained in the adult jail will be provided with individual instruction. Under the settlement agreement, the juveniles detained in the adult jail will be provided with the instruction in the subjects necessary under the law to earn credits towards graduation from the Tacoma public schools. In addition, the defendants agreed to provide special education offerings to juvenile's detained in the adult jail. Furthermore, under the agreement, the parents of the juvenile's detained must be given access to the written records regarding their child's education within the jail. All juvenile participants are expected under the agreement to comply with the rules of the Tacoma School District. However, the agreement holds that the juveniles detained in the adult jail cannot be disciplined by having their access to the program taken away. The one exception contemplated by the agreement is if the discipline is a result of an incident that took place during the juvenile's participation in the program. If this is the case, the agreement contemplates the jail being able to discipline the juvenile by taking away their access to the educational program. The parties agreed to appoint a settlement monitor, whose mandate is to monitor the implementation of the settlement for the first four semesters of the program's existence. Furthermore, the parties agreed that the court should retain jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. If after a good faith negotiation the parties cannot agree to continue the enforcement of the agreement, the court is to exercise its jurisdiction. The duration of the Consent decree is "six full semesters", which we read to be the equivalent of three years, during which compliance will be monitored.

Summary: Juveniles detained in Pierce County, Washington adult jail, and their parents, filed this case in 2009 to challenge the lack of educational and other services. The case was resolved by a Consent Decree entered in 2010 which required that individually designed educational programs would be provided which would allow the children to earn credits toward graduation from Tacoma schools.


On May 1, 2015, inmates of the Minnesota Department of Corrections (MDOC) suffering from hepatitis-C filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Corrections and Centene Corporation, a provider of healthcare for inmates, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Article I § 8 of the Minnesota Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive and equitable relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, Article I §§ 2, 5, and 7 of the Minnesota Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Specifically, they claimed that defendants refused to provide them with hepatitis-C drugs that met accepted medical standards. They claimed that defendants subjected them to less effective and more dangerous 48-week Interferon treatments for non-medical reasons that constituted “deliberate interference” to their serious medical needs. Prior to late 2013, hepatitis-C treatment consisted of 48-week Interferon injections. Interferon was not highly effective and caused serious side effects. In January, 2014, the American Association for the Study of Liver Disease and Association for the Study of Infectious Disease recognized the potential of a new 12-week treatment regimen consisting of a daily pill with a 95% cure rate. The Federal Bureau of Prisons and other federal agencies recognized the new drug as the standard of care by June 2014, and the FDA approved sales under multiple labels by the end of 2014. On June 3rd, 2015, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, adjusting the language of some of their claims and correcting the name of Centene Corporation to Centurion of Minnesota, LLC. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on October 29, 2015, which removed plaintiffs’ claims based on the Fifth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution. The second amended complaint also included voluminous medical reports on hepatitis-C. On February 23, 2016, Judge Patrick J. Schiltz dismissed all claims against one of plaintiffs’ treating physicians based on a joint stipulation by the parties. In addition, the plaintiffs reached a confidential settlement with Centurion and another of plaintiffs’ physicians, the existence of which was entered in the record on October 5, 2016. Litigation involving the remaining defendants dragged on for the next year; defendants moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs moved for class certification, a preliminary injunction, and partial summary judgment. On October 4, 2017, Judge Schiltz rejected these and other pending motions. Judge Schiltz did, however, grant plaintiff’s motion to file a third amended complaint and “encourage[d]” plaintiffs to drop all claims except for those under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs responded on December 1, 2017, with a drastic revision of their complaint. The third amended complaint added new named plaintiffs, removed unknown agents of the Minnesota Department of Corrections as defendants, and alleged violations of only the Eighth Amendment and the ADA. After unfruitful court-initiated settlement negotiations, plaintiffs moved to certify a class, and defendants moved for summary judgment. These motions were taken under advisement, and a trial was scheduled for February 2019. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify class on January 3, 2019. The opinion was filed under seal because of its discussion of the plaintiffs’ medical conditions and is not available. Of the plaintiffs' claims that were dismissed, all but one were dismissed without prejudice. Judge Schlitz certified the class as “all current and future inmates of Minnesota correctional facilities who have been diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C and have not received treatment with a direct‐acting antiviral medication.” On March 3, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to approve a class action settlement of the remaining claims. Judge Schiltz approved this settlement on June 24, 2019 and entered judgment that same day. The settlement had two main requirements: 1) the defendant must amend their 2018 Guidelines on the testing and treatment of HCV to comply with factors outlined in the settlement and; 2) the defendant must update policy to include education of prisoners with HCV who are released from MDOC facilities. The settlement was set to last for 24 months and required the MDOC to submit quarterly reports on their compliance. The court retained jurisdiction until the later of July 25, 2021 or two years after any appeals from the approval of the settlement were resolved. The defendants agreed to pay $325,000 in attorneys’ fees and $41,144 in costs. Because the court retained jurisdiction over the settlement, this case is ongoing for monitoring purposes.

Summary: In May 2015, inmates with Hepatits C filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Corrections under 42 USC § 1983, claiming violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment and injunctive relief alleging that the defendant, by denying them treatment of "breakthrough drugs" for the hepatitis-C virus, showed deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. The case ended in a settlement requiring that 1) the defendant must amend their 2018 Guidelines on the testing and treatment of HCV to comply with factors outlined in the settlement and; 2) the defendant must update policy to include education of prisoners with HCV who are released from MDOC facilities. The court retained jurisdiction until the later of July 25, 2021 or two years after any appeals from the approval of the settlement were resolved. This case is ongoing for settlement compliance.


This lawsuit was filed June 2, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The case arose out of the spring and summer protests in 2020 in response to the police killing of George Floyd. The case alleges that Minneapolis police targeted journalists covering the protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The original complaint had one class representative and sought class certification to cover all journalists covering the protests more generally. Defendants were various city and state officials and the City of Minneapolis. The complaint alleged that police actions against plaintiffs constituted retaliation in violation of the First Amendment, unlawful seizure and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrests were violations of procedural Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), a preliminary injunction, a permanent injunction, class certification, declaratory relief, money damages with interest, and attorney's fees and costs of the suit. They also submitted separate motions for class certification and an expedited motion for a temporary restraining order. The next day the case was assigned to Judge Wilhelmina M. Wright and referred to Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz. On June 5, 2020, defendants opposed plaintiff's motions for class certification and the TRO. Three days later plaintiffs amended their complaint to add an individual plaintiff and to add the Communications Workers of America as a plaintiff. The next day, Judge Wright issued an order denying class certification and denying the TRO. Regarding class certification she said that plaintiffs would need to wait for more discovery to happen. On the TRO she said that there was no evidence, nor did plaintiffs allege, that the behavior plaintiffs sought to enjoin was persistent beyond May 31, 2020. To grant the TRO, the behavior plaintiffs sought to enjoin must have been "imminent." 2020 WL 3056705. On June 22, 2020, one defendant asked for more time to respond to the complaint. One of those defendants was given until August 3 to respond. Before defendants could respond, however, plaintiffs then asked to file a second amended complaint. They filed the second amended complaint on July 30. The new complaint added charges of civil conspiracy to deprive rights, failure to intervene in defense of rights, violations of Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and another count of violating the First Amendment, this time via a theory on retaliation. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.

Summary: This case, filed on June 2nd, 2020, dealt with the tactics of Minneapolis police amidst the spring and summer protests that erupted nationwide after the police killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff was a freelance journalist who argued that police actions in response to these protests constituted violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff sought class certification that would cover other journalists covering the protests. An amended complaint filed soon after the original added another individual and the Communications Workers of America as plaintiffs, seeking class representative status for them as well. A second amended complaint added violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as conspiracy to deprive rights and failure to intervene in defense of plaintiffs' rights. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.


On November 24, 2009, Medicaid-eligible children with psychiatric and behavioral disorders living in Washington filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by Disability Rights Washington, the National Health Law Program, the National Center for Youth Law, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services under the Medicaid Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act to address the lack of community-based mental health services for Medicaid-eligible children in Washington State. The plaintiffs claimed that the state's system for providing Medicaid-funded services to children with mental health needs violated the Medicaid Act’s Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program, which required coverage of "medically necessary" healthcare services. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of the state's very limited mental health services, children with psychiatric disorders were often untreated or under-treated, which lead to consequences such as involvement in the child welfare system, juvenile detention, or academic failure. Because available services in the community were so limited, children often had to go to institutions to receive care. The plaintiffs alleged that such frequent institutionalization violated the integration mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act under Olmstead. On July 23, 2010, the court (Judge Thomas S. Zilly) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. After a period of mediation, the parties entered an interim settlement agreement on March 7, 2010. The interim agreement was scheduled to last through June 2013, but on June 28, 2013, the court agreed to a stipulation submitted by both parties to extend the interim agreement until the final Settlement Agreement was approved. The stipulation noted that both parties were cooperating and making good progress toward the final agreement. Under the interim agreement, the state began to restructure and expand mental health care programs for Medicaid-eligible children. The plaintiffs submitted a motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement on August 29, 2013. On December 19, 2013, the court granted the joint motion for final approval of the proposed settlement but retained jurisdiction to monitor compliance. Under the settlement, Washington agreed to create a new care coordination program known as Wraparound with Intensive Services (WISe) to connect children with home and community-based direct services, crisis intervention services, and intensive care coordination that puts the child and their caregiver at the center of decision-making. The state also agreed to increase the number of children who can access services over the next five years and submit a plan for fulfilling the rest of their obligations to the court. The state further agreed to give yearly status reports to the court and pay $3.1 million to the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and costs. The agreement was set to last until June 2018. On November 16, 2015, the defendants submitted a status report on their progress towards accomplishing the goals of their settlement. The report claimed that some children were already having some success in WISe or "WISe-like" programs but that the program has not yet reached the scope required under the settlement agreement. As of November 16, 2015, 19 Washington counties offered the program. The goal was to equip all 39 of the counties with WISe programs before the agreement would be terminated in June of 2018. On November 15, 2018, the defendants submitted another status report on their progress towards accomplishing the goals of their settlement, focusing on progress between 2017-18. The report noted that as of November 15, 2018, the state of Washington anticipated achieving substantial compliance by June 30, 2019, a delay from the original anticipated completion date of June 2018. As of June 2018, all of Washington’s 39 counties had started implementing WISe programs, and the state was meeting 88% of the monthly substantial compliance caseload target. But the state was still working to build sufficient provider capacity and to meet monthly caseload target numbers. In 2019, the parties agreed to a one-year extension to June 30, 2020, because Washington was struggling to meet the existing deadline. On September 12, 2019, the defendants agreed to pay an additional $310,000 in attorneys’ fees for costs incurred over the prior year. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Children with psychiatric and behavioral disorders filed a class action complaint alleging that Washington's system of mental health services for Medicaid-eligible children was inadequate. Parties reached a settlement agreement for expanded intensive home- and community-based services for all Medicaid-eligible children statewide. Implementation was expected to be complete by June 2018, but has been delayed to June 2020.


On July 28, 2005, nine individuals with developmental disabilities filed this lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the Illinois Department of Human Services, and the Illinois Department of Public Health in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that they were eligible for long term care through state administered Medicaid Services but were forced to reside in large congregate care institutions rather than community based facilities as a condition of receiving care in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. A group of developmentally disabled individuals who could receive community-based care but did not wish to do so sought to intervene. On December 22, 2005, the district court (Judge James F. Holderman) denied this petition on the grounds that their rights were not at issue in the case. This group appealed, but on February 15, 2007, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Easterbrook, Kanne, and Williams) affirmed the district court. On March 7, 2006, the district court (Judge Holderman) certified a class consisting of all persons in Illinois with developmental disabilities who qualified for long term care and were capable of being cared for in a community based facility but were either institutionalized in large congregate care facilities or at risk of being so institutionalized. The parties reached agreement on a consent decree and submitted it to the court on November 13, 2008. Numerous objections were filed by those who feared they would be forced into community based care or that institutionalized care would suffer because of the consent decree. On July 7, 2009, the court (Judge Holderman) refused to approve the consent decree and decertified the class on the grounds that the named plaintiffs did not represent class members who either were not eligible for community based treatment or did not wish to have such treatment. On August 31, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint narrowing the proposed class to only those individuals who had requested community based placements. On January 25, 2010, the parties filed a revised consent decree and motion for class certification. On January 26, 2010, the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of the revised consent decree. A number of previous objectors sought to intervene and on April 7, 2010, the court (Judge Holderman) granted their motion for limited intervention. The parties and the intervenors proceeded to negotiate and on January 11, 2011, the parties and intervenors filed a motion for class certification and preliminary approval of a new consent decree. The court (Judge Holderman) granted these motions on January 13, 2011. The consent decree provided for increased placement of developmentally disabled individuals into community based treatment programs should they desire it, a statewide database and waitlist, and the development of transition service plans. It also contained measures protecting institutionalized care, and called for various benchmarks and the appointment of a monitor. Judge Holderman approved the consent decree on June 15, 2011. Since monitoring began in 2011, the monitor, Tony Records, had filed three yearly reports, reporting one major instance of noncompliance in 2012 when an intermediate care facility serving 205 individuals closed quickly and residents were transitioned to new placements without the protected processes required by the consent decree. The 2013 report noted concerns about reimbursement to intermediate care facilities and other issues that would require additional efforts by the defendants. On June 17, 2015, the court Executive Committee reassigned the case to Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman because Judge Holderman retired. In June of 2015, the Illinois state legislature faced a budget crisis, so the court (Judge Coleman), approved the parties' Agreed Order on June 30, 2015, that even in the absence of an FY2016 budget, the state of Illinois would continue to pay all service providers covered under the consent decree. However, in an order issued August 18, 2015, Judge Coleman noted that in absence of a state budget, the State Comptroller had issued letters describing the state's intent to only pay for services provided to members of the class covered by the consent decree. Since many services providers work with both class members and non-class members across the population with developmental disabilities, this practice put the entire population at risk, and Judge Coleman ordered that the state continue timely payments for all service providers. In response to an emergency motion filed by plaintiffs and intervenors, Judge Coleman issued another order on September 1, 2015, again ordering the state to make timely payments for services to individuals with developmental disabilities in the interim until the state passed an FY 2016 budget. On June 22, 2016, Plaintiffs and Defendants submitted a proposed Agreed Order which would order the State to continue to pay for all services and personnel required by the consent decree during FY 2017. Judge Johnson Coleman granted the order on June 28, 2016, requiring the State to provide funding in the absence of a FY 2017 budget. The Monitor's Fourth Annual Report, submitted in January 2016, indicated several concerns over the State's financial status and its impact on resources available to implement the decree, particularly with respect to shortages staff members able to provide adequate services to class members in the community. This was true despite defendants' efforts to implement the terms of the decree. The Fifth Annual Report, filed in January of 2017, indicated that there had been no improvement with respect to direct service provider shortages over the past year. It also noted that, because of staffing shortages, the availability of small community assisted living homes was actually decreasing. Another concern noted was the availability of adequate day activity and employment programs. Citing the Monitor's findings, on April 7, 2017, plaintiffs and intervenors filed a joint motion to enforce the consent decree. They indicated that a major reason behind defendants' failure to properly implement the decree was the State's inadequate reimbursement rates. On August 11, 2017, Judge Coleman granted the motion, finding that defendants had failed to provide class members by failing to provide them with resources of sufficient quality, scope, and variety. On August 18, 2017, she ordered defendants to devise a plan to address the issues causing the reduction in services and to bring the State into substantial compliance. Defendants attempted to formulate a compliance plan that would meet the consent decree's standards and be practical given the State's budgetary constraints. On March 30, 2018, and April 11, 2018, defendants submitted status reports in which they described actions taken to bring the State into compliance. Judge Coleman found that the State's efforts did not bring it into compliance in a June 6, 2018, order. The order did recognize a "good faith effort" on the part of the defendants consisting of: <ul> <li> A pilot program to expand access to direct support professionals (DSPs). </li> <li> Funding increases for DSPs. </li> <li> Enhanced monitoring of service delivery. </li> <li> Additional programmatic improvements. </li> </ul> Judge Coleman directed defendants to "develop adequate solutions" to the continuing problems. A status hearing was held on July 10, 2018, where the parties reported on the progress addressing four primary areas to bring the State in compliance with the consent decree. On September 12, 2018, the monitor reported on the progress of the parties. A Rates Methodology Oversight Committee has been established and a meeting schedule has been set. A draft tool for a quality monitoring program has also been developed. As of November 15, the State of Illinois has not approved the implementation of the draft tool On May 10, 2019, the monitor reported that the parties have made progress on most issues, including implementing the monitoring compliance tool. However, concerns remain regarding the timeline for hiring the third-party vendor. On November 14, 2019, the monitor reported that federal CMS has approved the 3.5% increase for community-based providers, which will implement a rate increase to $13.00/hour, and that it expects the process for approval of the 3.5% rate increase for ICF-DD providers will continue into January 2020. The next status hearing is set for January 17, 2020 and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 28, 2005 plaintiffs, nine individuals with developmental disabilities, filed suit against the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services, the Illinois Department of Human Services, and the Illinois Department of Public Health in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that they were eligible for long term care through state administered Medicaid Services but were forced to reside in large congregate care institutions rather than community based facilities as a condition of receiving that care. After several years of litigation, on June 15, 2011, the court granted approval of a consent decree submitted by the parties and intervenors and granted class certification to the new class. The monitor found minimal noncompliance over the next three years, until the budget crisis in 2015 led to the state missing payments to providers. The court issued three orders between June and September 2015 compelling the state to pay providers in a timely manner. The State was also found to be in noncompliance in 2016 and 2017, and in August of 2017, the court issued an Order to enforce the decree. As of November 14, 2019, the monitor reported that federal CMS has approved the 3.5% increase for community-based providers, which will implement a rate increase to $13.00/hour, and that it expects the process for approval of the 3.5% rate increase for ICF-DD providers will continue into January 2020.


This case is another response to efforts by the Trump Administration to strip law enforcement funding from states and certain local jurisdictions unless their governments agree to participate in federal immigration enforcement. On August 23, 2018, the State of California filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by its attorney general, sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Attorney General under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Declaratory Judgment Act, and the Mandamus Statute. The plaintiff claimed that by unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the State, the government violated the spending clause and the APA. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment that the JAG certification requirements were unconstitutional, injunctive relief barring their use, and mandamus compelling the defendants to issue and disperse FY2018 funds, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. California had been receiving federal funding through the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) program, a criminal justice grant administered by the DOJ and the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). The plaintiff alleged that in 2017 the DOJ imposed unprecedented immigration enforcement conditions on recipients of JAG funding and that courts across the country had since struck those conditions as unconstitutional. The plaintiff also alleged that rather than change these conditions, the DOJ maintained a requirement for FY2018 grants that the chief law officer of the jurisdiction applying for the grant certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which prohibits local government entities from imposing restrictions on the exchange of information regarding an individual’s immigration or citizenship status, among other statutes. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore, but was later reassigned to Judge William Orrick after it was related to another case challenging the FY2018 funding conditions; that case can be found here. On November 1, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On December 3, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for partial summary judgment. They made the same arguments as the appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit regarding FY2017 conditions: basically, that the conditions were lawfully authorized by statute. The plaintiffs cross-filed for summary judgment in their response three weeks later. On March 4, 2019, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Judge Orrick found that the challenged conditions were ultra vires and violated the separation of powers; that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was unconstitutional; that the Attorney General exceeded the Spending Clause by imposing ambiguous conditions on Byrne JAG grants in FY2018; that the conditions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA; that California was entitled to mandamus relief; and that a nationwide injunction was warranted but stayed. On March 26, Judge Orrick issued a permanent injunction, enjoining the defendants from using the FY2018 Byrne JAG funding conditions for any California state entity, San Francisco, any California political subdivision, or any jurisdiction in the United States. The judge then stayed the nationwide aspect of the permanent injunction until further rulings from the Ninth Circuit (which had expressed concerns over the nationwide nature of the relief during the 2017 litigation over Byrne JAG funding conditions). On May 3, 2019, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 19-15950). The parties subsequently entered mediation conferences. In November 2019, the Ninth Circuit stayed the appeals. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the State of California filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the Department of Justice was again unlawfully imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the State in violation of the spending clause and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff in March 2019 and entered a permanent injunction. The defendants appealed and the case is ongoing.


On January 29, 2015, a nineteen-year-old man from Decatur, Georgia, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against DeKalb County and Judicial Correction Services, Inc. ("JCS"). The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and private practice, asked the court for damages, claiming that the defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights when they incarcerated him for five days in the county jail because he was unable to pay $838 in fines and fees stemming from a traffic ticket within thirty days of sentencing. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by revoking his probation and incarcerating him for failing to pay court-imposed fines without conducting a hearing to determine his ability to pay, the adequacy of his efforts to obtain the resources needed to pay, and any alternatives to incarceration. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants failed during the probation revocation proceedings to inform him of his right to request court-appointed legal assistance and that they failed to provide such assistance when it became apparent that the plaintiff was indigent. The plaintiff's traffic violation constituted the underlying offense in this case. On October 9, 2014, the plaintiff pled guilty to driving with a suspended license before the DeKalb County Recorder's Court. He was sentenced to an $810 fine. After the plaintiff said that he was unable to pay on that day, the judge ordered him to pay the fine and other court fees within thirty days and to serve twelve months of probation with JCS. The company eventually charged the plaintiff with violating his probation for failure to pay, and the plaintiff's probation was revoked and he was incarcerated after a brief hearing before the Recorder's Court. The plaintiff claimed that his jailing was a direct result of the county's "pay-only probation" policy. Under this policy, the plaintiff argued, the county imposed probation solely to earn revenue from indigent people who often cannot afford to pay the sentencing fines and fees stemming from their traffic offenses or county ordinance violations. The parties announced that they reached a private settlement agreement on March 18, 2015. Under the settlement, the defendants would pay a lump sum of $70,000 for damages and attorneys' fees. The chief judge of the DeKalb County Recorder's Court also agreed to take measures to ensure that the court's judges and personnel respect the rights of people who cannot afford the probation fines and fees. For example, the court adopted "bench cards" listing general policies to assist judges in avoiding incarcerating indigent people unable to pay the fines. The cards specify the legal alternatives to jail and provide that judges must conduct an "economic ability-to-pay hearing" before sending a probationer to jail for failing to pay fines and fees. The cards also inform judges about the specific procedures for protecting people's right to counsel during probation revocation proceedings. In addition to providing bench cards for each judge, the Recorder's Court also agreed to conduct training sessions for court personnel to explain probationers' right to counsel and their right to an indigency hearing. Finally, the court revised its petition revocation forms in order to better inform probationers of their right to court-appointed counsel in revocation proceedings and their right to request a waiver of the $50 fee for such counsel if they cannot afford it. On April 3, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, presumably due to the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 29, 2015, a nineteen-year-old man from Decatur, Georgia, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DeKalb County and Judicial Correction Services, Inc. He asked the court for damages, claiming that the defendants violated his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment when they incarcerated him for five days in the county jail because he was unable to pay $838 in fines and fees stemming from a traffic ticket. The parties reached a settlement agreement on March 18, 2015. Under the proposed settlement, the defendants will pay a lump sum of $70,000 for damages and attorneys' fees. The chief judge of the DeKalb County Recorder's Court also agreed to take measures to ensure that the court's judges and personnel respect the rights of people who cannot afford the probation fines and fees. Such measures include adopting "bench cards" to inform judges of probationers' rights and conducting trainings for court personnel. The case is now closed.


On June 9, 2005, a group of individuals whose applications for employment with the City and County of Honolulu had been rejected brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court District of Hawaii to challenge constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory pre-employment residency requirement for public employment. The law in question, Hawaii Revised Statute Section 78-1(c), provided: <blockquote>All persons seeking employment with the government of the State or in the service of any county shall be citizens, nationals, or permanent resident aliens of the United States, or eligible under federal law for unrestricted employment in the United States, and residents of the State at the time of their application for employment and as a condition of eligibility for continued employment. "Resident" means a person who is physically present in the State at the time the person claims to have established the person's domicile in the State and shows the person's intent is to make Hawaii the person's permanent residence. In determining this intent, the following factors shall be considered: (1) Maintenance of a domicile or permanent place of residence in the State; (2) Absence of residency in another state; and (3) Former residency in the State. </blockquote> Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Hawaii, argued that to be unconstitutional because it had the impermissible purpose of deterring migration into the State. They sought an injunction to bar enforcement of the law. The District Court (Judge David Alan Ezra) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 423 F.Supp.2d 1094 (D.Hawaii 2006). Plaintiffs then filed motions for summary judgment and for permanent injunction to enjoin enforcement of the law. Judge Ezra found the law to be unconstitutional and granted plaintiffs' motions. Defendants' counter motion for summary judgment was denied. Walsh v. City and County of Honolulu, 460 F.Supp.2d 1207 (D.Hawai'i 2006). Defendants appealed. While the appeal was pending, the challenged provisions of the law were repealed by 2007 Hawaii Laws Act 52 (H.B. 1750). The state then filed an unopposed motion to vacate the district court judgment, due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. The case was remanded to the District Court for closing. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs.

Summary: On June 9, 2005, a group of individuals whose applications for employment with the City and County of Honolulu had been rejected brought a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court District of Hawaii to challenge constitutionality of Hawaii's statutory pre-employment residency requirement for public employment. The law in question provided that any state employment seeker be a citizen, national, or LPR. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction. Both were granted. While on appeal, the unlawful provisions were repealed, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to vacate the judgment due to mootness, which was granted by the Ninth Circuit. Plaintiffs were awarded $135,801.24 in attorney's fees and costs.


On July 12, 2018, three mothers seeking asylum in the United States filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on behalf of all those similarly situated nationwide. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of the United States, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), along with their respective agency heads, for allegedly violating the plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Each of the three named plaintiffs had been separated from their minor children upon being detained in the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by the Immigrant Advocacy and Litigation Center, the University of Southern California, and public counsel, sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government’s immigrant family separation policy. See “How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice of Separating Migrant Families.” The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge John A. Kronstadt. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the following: Plaintiff Ms. P, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing a physically and sexually abusive relationship in her native Guatemala. Ms. P and her daughter were detained near the border and placed in a windowless room that lacked basic amenities alongside 150 other detainees. Here, Ms. P witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, whose distress was mocked by the detention officers. On May 20, after several days in these conditions, Ms. P’s daughter was taken away, with no indication given as to when, or if, Ms. P would see her again. About two weeks later, Ms. P received notice of her daughter’s location. They were not permitted contact with one another until June 22, when they were able to speak via telephone. According to licensed clinical social workers familiar with Ms. P and her daughter, they are both showing signs of trauma, anxiety, and depression as a result of the ongoing separation. Ms. P has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address these concerns. Plaintiff Ms. O, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 17, 2018 after fleeing gang violence in her native Honduras. Upon crossing the border, Ms. O and her daughter flagged down a patrol car. They were then processed and detained separately at a nearby facility. Ms. O was placed in a holding cell that resembled a chain-link dog kennel with 50 other women and no basic amenities. Here, Ms. O witnessed other children being forcibly taken from their parents, who were taunted by the detention officers. On May 21, Ms. O, along with 50 other detainees, was taken to court where she plead guilty to criminal illegal entry though she did not understand the consequences. After the proceeding, Ms. O was transferred to another facility without her daughter. Ms. O did not learn of her daughter’s whereabouts until May 30. She and her daughter have spoken over the phone only three times for less than five minutes since being separated. Ms. O has not received any mental health or counseling services from the government to address her trauma. Plaintiff Ms. M, along with her daughter, arrived in the United States on or around May 18, 2018 after fleeing domestic and gang violence in her native El Salvador. Upon crossing the border, Ms. M and her daughter flagged down a patrol car and were immediately taken to facility and separated for questioning. Ms. M was mocked by detention officers during this questioning. Ms. M was kept in a “cage” that lacked basic amenities with 40-50 other women. Food was scarce, and the guards would sometimes throw crackers on the floor of the cell and laugh as the hungry women scrambled to pick them up. From her cage, Ms. M could see her daughter crying in a separate cell. On May 21, Ms. M was taken to criminal proceedings with 50 other detainees where she believed she had to, and did, plead guilty though she did not understand the consequences. After these proceedings, Ms. M was transferred to another facility. She did not learn of her daughter’s location or condition until her mother, who is a permanent legal resident of the United States, provided her with this information on May 25. On June 22, Ms. M was able to speak with her daughter, who was crying uncontrollably, on the phone for about one minute. Ms. M was released on bond on July 12. On July 12, the plaintiffs sought to have their lawsuit declared “related” to the 1985 Flores case, which had resulted in an important and long-lasting immigration settlement agreement. Judge Dolly M. Gee declined to transfer the case to Flores because this action sought affirmative relief separate and apart from the Flores Settlement Agreement and did not call for a determination of the same questions of law or fact. On July 18, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to provide meaningful access to mental health care screening and treatment to the plaintiffs and other proposed class members. On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, proposing to define the class as all adult parents nationwide who (1) were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child. On September 18, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In January 2019 the parties entered settlement discussions and the court selected Senior District Judge James S. Otero to preside over settlement proceedings between the parties. Several settlement conferences were held but the case was eventually sent back to Judge Kronstadt in October 2019 after the parties failed to come to an agreement. On November 5, 2019, Judge Kronstadt granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. He certified the following class:
"All adult parents nationwide who entered the U.S. at or between designated ports of entry, who (1) on or after July 1, 2017, were, are, or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (2) have a minor child who has been, is, or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in DHS or ORR custody or foster care, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child."
 He also certified the following subclasses:
"(i) the Custody Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who are currently or will be detained in immigration custody by DHS; and (ii) the Released Subclass, which is defined as all members of the class who were previously detained in immigration custody by DHS, but who have since been release."
 Next, Judge Kronstadt found that the plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their due process claim with respect to both subclasses. 2019 WL 6723686. The court ordered that the defendants make available, to all members of the subclasses who elect to have them, medically appropriate initial mental health screenings, diagnoses, and treatment (if requested) by qualified professionals. On November 27, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket no. 19-56400). They also requested that the district court stay the case pending resolution of the appeal. On February 21, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their appeal. On March 24, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay the case, including pending discovery, through January 10, 2021. The parties reported that on March 11, 2020, defendant DHHS had finalized a contract with a non-profit organization to implement the preliminary injunction as to the Released Subclass. As to the Custody Subclass, defendant DHS would provide notice to class members of available services and the ICE Health Service Corps Behavioral Health Unit would provide screenings and any necessary treatment. Consequently, the parties requested a stay while this relief is provided. The district court granted the stay the same day, ordering the defendants to file status reports every sixty days, with the first report due on May 22, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 12, 2018, three mothers who came to the United States seeking asylum and who, upon being detained, were separated from their minor children, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the government to provide mental-health screenings and appropriate trauma-informed remedial medical and mental-health services to those parents and children who were separated as a result of the government’s immigrant family separation policy. On November 5, 2019, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motions for class certification and a preliminary injunction, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court ordered the defendants to begin providing class members with mental health screenings and any necessary treatment. The defendants initially appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit, but later voluntarily dismissed the appeal. The parties negotiated plans to implement the relief ordered by the district court and on March 24, they filed a joint stipulation to stay the case through January 10, 2021, while the relief is provided. The court granted the stay and ordered the defendants to file status reports every sixty days.


On December 9, 2009, the Native American Council of Tribes and current and former Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. Native American inmates in the South Dakota State Penitentiary were forbidden from using tobacco in their Native American rituals and ceremonies. Therefore, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of due process and their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. Plaintiffs alleged that there were other, less restrictive means that the South Dakota State Penitentiary could accomplish their goals. The United States filed a Statement of the Interest with the Court on July 16, 2012, stating that the defendant’s arguments were a request for the court to determine the importance and centrality of tobacco to Plaintiff’s religious practices. This was a problem because under common law and the RLUIPA, courts are forbidden from inquiring into the centrality of beliefs to religions. In response to a motion for summary judgment brought by the defendants on February 22, 2011, the Court (Judge Karen E. Schreier) decided that Plaintiffs did not have a cause of action under the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. Furthermore, the court stated that Plaintiffs did not have claims under international law, as they did not create an independent cause of action for Plaintiffs. This left the First, Fourteenth, and RLUIPA claims for the jury to decide at trial. The trial began on March 27, 2012. The Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs’ Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs’ beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco was part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an “essential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.” The Court also held that there was not a compelling government interest in the ban of tobacco and, even if there was, a total ban was not the least restrictive means as required by RLUIPA. 897 F. Supp. 2d 828. On January 25, 2013, the District Court ordered a remedial order that limited the amount of tobacco to be 1% of the total mixture used for religious ceremonies. This was in accordance with the statements of one of the plaintiffs who argued that it did not matter how much tobacco was in the mixture, but rather that tobacco was present in the mixture. 2013 WL 310633. The Plaintiffs were then granted attorneys’ fees in the amount of $75,350.87. The Defendants appealed the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on February 25, 2013. On April 24, 2014 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s decision for the same reasons asserted by the District Court. 750 F.3d 742. On January 7, 2016 the Eight Circuit denied the defendants’ petition for rehearing en banc. On July 5, 2016, the Court determined that Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the remedial order was an attempt to add claims to the case rather than amend. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ motions were denied. On August 9, 2017, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to modify the remedial order because there was not a significant change in the facts or law. The Court also denied Plaintiff's motion for TRO to prohibit defendants from banning tobacco in religious ceremonies, finding that the claim is moot because that relief was already included in the Court's original order. Finally, the Court denied the Plaintiff's motion to amend their complaint because the case was already decided on its merits. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 9, 2009, Native American inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. §1996, international law, and 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of due process and their first amendment right to free exercise of religion. On March 27, 2012, the Court concluded that the use of tobacco in Plaintiffs’ Native American ceremonies was protected by RLUIPA because Plaintiffs’ beliefs were sincerely held and because the practice of using tobacco is part of their religious tradition. Furthermore, the Court held that the ban on tobacco was a substantial burden to Plaintiffs because tobacco was an “essential and fundamental part of Plaintiffs’ religious exercise.”


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of 6,000 incarcerated individuals to challenge the inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons, alleging that the Mississippi Department of Corrections' response to the pandemic violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act and the Constitution. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order requiring defendants to implement remedial measures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. The parties jointly stayed all proceedings on September 15 and entered settlement talks on October 22. <hr> On May 14, 2020, nine named plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit to challenge the Mississippi Department of Corrections's ("MDOC") inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons: Central Mississippi Correctional Facility ("CMCF") and South Mississippi Correctional Institute ("SMCI"). The plaintiffs, represented by the Mississippi Center for Justice, the ACLU of Mississippi, and private counsel, sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that MDOC's failure to adequately implement baseline protection measures in response to COVID-19 at CMCF and SMCI violated the Eighth Amendment, the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, they alleged that overcrowding at CMCF and SMCI made social distancing infeasible; that inmates were not provided access to adequate disinfecting supplies; and that systemwide, MDOC had tested less than 0.5% of its prison population for COVID-19. The case was assigned to Judge Tom S. Lee. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of inmates who were currently incarcerated, or would be in the future, in CMCF or SMCI during the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought to certify a "disability subclass" of people who suffered from a disability that substantially limited one or more of their major life activities and who were at increased risk of contracting, becoming severely ill and/or dying from COVID-19 due to their disability or any medical treatment necessary to treat their disability. The § 1983 allegations were brought on behalf of the whole class, while the ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations were brought only on behalf of members of the disability subclass. The plaintiffs in the disability class alleged that the defendants had intentionally discriminated against members of the disability subclass in violation of the ADA Act and the Rehabilitation Act by denying them reasonable accommodations, including accommodations recommended by the CDC. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction requiring defendants to take steps to mitigate the transmission of COVID-19, including the following: (1) implementing facility-wide protocols for reporting, obtaining soap, etc.; (2) conducting immediate testing for anyone displaying symptoms; (3) implementing remedial measures like intensified cleaning procedures and social distancing; (4) informing inmates of reporting procedures for non-compliant staff members; and (5) providing incarcerated individuals with disinfecting supplies and personal hand soap. Plaintiffs also sought appointment of an independent monitor and attorneys' fees and costs. On May 25, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, requesting the court to require the defendants to implement efforts to mitigate and manage infection and the spread of COVID-19 at CMCF and SMCI. On August 3, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Robert P. Myers, Jr. On September 15, the plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw the previous motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and filed a joint motion with defendants to stay all proceedings. Judge Myers granted the motion on October 1. On October 22, the parties attended a status conference to initiate settlement negotiations and the case remains ongoing.

Summary: On May 14, 2020, plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit to challenge the Mississippi Department of Corrections's ("MDOC") inadequate response to the COVID-19 outbreak at Mississippi's two largest prisons: Central Mississippi Correctional Facility ("CMCF") and South Mississippi Correctional Institute ("SMCI"). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that MDOC's failure to adequately implement baseline protection measures at CMCF and SMCI violates the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including the implementation of mitigation measures to reduce the transmission of COVID-19 on May 25, but later withdrew the motion and moved to stay the proceedings on September 15. The parties then entered settlement negotiations and the next status conference was set for February 22, 2021.


On November 25, 2013, a Native Hawaiian resident of Hawaii filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii against the state. The plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asked the court to enjoin a recently enacted state law that allows same-sex couples to marry, claiming that that the beliefs and culture of Native Hawaiians were violated by the Hawaiian Marriage Equality Act of 2013. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Native Hawaiians had a special relationship with the state of Hawaii and the United States Federal Government. He alleged that this relationship was supported by the Hawaii Admission Act of 1959, the Native Hawaiian Education Act of 1994, the American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, and many others. He believes that Native Hawaiians have an express right to preserve their culture, value, languages, and religious customs, and that the practice of same-sex marriage was against the moral values of the majority of Native Hawaiians. He claimed that the state had breached its duty to the Hawaiian people, and that a court-ordered injunction of the Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013 was a necessary step towards repairing the breach. The district court (Judge Susan Oki Mollway) did not grant an injunction, and instead issued an order on February 19, 2014 denying as moot all pending orders. The court stated that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this claim as he was not able to present a particularized injury that he would suffer or any clear constitutional claims that were violated. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the decision on August 4, 2016. The Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiff's petition for rehearing en banc on October 24. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 25, 2013, a Native Hawaiian resident of Hawaii filed a lawsuit in the District of Hawaii U.S. District Court against the state. The plaintiff, who represented himself, asked the court to enjoin a recently enacted state law that allows same-sex couples to marry, claiming that that the beliefs and culture of Native Hawaiians were violated by the Hawaiian Marriage Equality Act of 2013. The district court did not grant an injunction, and stated that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The case is now closed.


This case is one of the many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from the ACA regulation's mandatory insurance coverage for contraception. The current regulatory accommodation allows religious organizations who object for religious reasons to providing contraceptive coverage for their employees to notify their insurer, or notify the government directly, of that objection. Then, the government will work with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure the employees have access to contraception. The religious employers claimed that this approach violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, because they see their action of notifying the government as starting a chain of events that results in their employees receiving contraception. This particular lawsuit was filed by Union University, a Baptist college, on Apr. 4, 2014, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) against the Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief and claimed that the ACA's contraception mandate violated its sincerely held religious beliefs, the First Amendment's establishment clause and freedom of speech, and the Fifth Amendment's equal protection clause. The university moved for a preliminary injunction blocking HHS from implementing the mandate. HHS did not oppose the motion. Though the agency did not believe the university would win on the merits, it agreed that the case should be stayed in light of two similar cases currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 6838707 (W.D. Mich.) and Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 5879796 (M.D. Tenn.). On Apr. 29, 2014, District Judge Daniel Breen granted the preliminary injunction and stayed the case until thirty days after the issuance of a mandate by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit pending resolution of either of the two aforementioned pending cases. The Court of Appeals consolidated Michigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Diocese of Nashville, and on June 11, 2014, affirmed the District Judges' denials of preliminary injunctions for all plaintiffs. The court found that organizations exempt from the contraception mandate experienced no burden on the exercise of their religion, and therefore were unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an "accommodation" under the law needed only to provide a "self-certification" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's free speech, free exercise, or establishment clauses. On Mar. 24, 2017, the present case was reassigned to Chief Judge Thomas S. Anderson. On Oct. 31, 2017, the Sixth Circuit dismissed bothMichigan Catholic Conference and Catholic Diocese of Nashville, which the defendants informed the court in a Nov. 3, 2017 status report. On Nov. 6, 2017, Judge Anderson granted the defendants' request to extend the injunction and stay, which had been scheduled to lift Nov. 30, 2017, until Dec. 4, 2017. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. On Nov. 16, 2017, the plaintiff stipulated to dismissal of the case, and on the same day, the Judge Anderson dismissed the case.

Summary: On April 4, 2014, Union University, a Baptist college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the First Amendment against the Department of Health and Human Services. The school claimed the contraceptive mandate in the Affordable Care Act violated its religious beliefs. The plaintiff sought and was granted a preliminary injunction against the mandate, and a stay of the case, until the resolution of similar, pending appeals before the Sixth Circuit.


On May 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of prisoners subjected to unconstitutional conditions in San Francisco county jails, more specifically, those having been confined in their cells for up to 23.5 hours per day with total denial of access to direct sunlight or outdoor recreation. Plaintiffs sued the San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department, the City and County of San Francisco, and four members of the Sheriff’s Department for being directly involved in designing and implementing the policies that led to deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants for acting under the color of law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The violative conduct, plaintiffs alleged, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and contravened the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged two violations of the California Constitution and brought two tort claims against the Sheriff’s Office, for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs, represented by a local civil rights lawyer, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the physical and emotional ailments incurred due to deprivation of sunlight. On June 27, 2019 plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and on August 30, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The court ruled on both motions on January 31, 2020, granting each in part and denying each in part. The preliminary injunction had challenged the sufficiency of the type of sunlight that prisoners received in their cells and the amount of time that inmates confined to their cells for 23.5 hours a day were allotted for outdoor exercise. The court found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove specific harm from degree or quality of sunlight and that the defendants’ denial of outdoor exercise did not warrant a preliminary injunction for convicted prisoners, with a partial exception for prisoners in administrative segregation units. These prisoners were held in cells too small for meaningful exercise for 23.5 hours a day. The court ordered that these prisoners be allowed exercise in the gym for at least one hour a day for five days a week. The court did not order the defendant to provide outdoor exercise for these persons. However, the court found that for pretrial detainees, denial of direct sunlight for four years constituted unconstitutional punishment. Pretrial detainees, as innocent persons, have the right to be free from punishment generally under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and not just cruel and unusual punishment vis a vis the Eighth Amendment. The court ordered that the defendant provide at least one hour of exposure to direct sunlight each week for pretrial detainees, absent disciplinary issues. The motion to dismiss was also granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all Eighth Amendment claims by pretrial detainees, deeming them redundant with respect to these plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Claims. The motion to dismiss the federal claims against individual defendants was also granted because the court found that the defendants could not have reasonably known that they were violating plaintiffs constitutional rights at the time of their acts and were therefore entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. However, qualified immunity does not extend to state law claims, like those leveled under the California Constitution and the common law. Therefore, most of these claims were sustained, although the court required plaintiffs to amend certain elements of their complaint and removed certain defendants for jurisdictional reasons. Both parties appealed the ruling and the court granted a stay on the preliminary injunction while the two parties engage in settlement discussions. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 20, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal court in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of prisoners subjected to unconstitutional conditions in San Francisco county jails, more specifically those having been confined in their cells for up to 23.5 hours per day with total denial of access to direct sunlight or outdoor recreation. Plaintiffs sued the San Francisco County Sheriff’s Department, the City and County of San Francisco, and four members of the Sheriff’s Department for being directly involved in designing and implementing the policies that led to deprivations of constitutional and statutory rights. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against defendants for acting under the color of law to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights. The violative conduct, plaintiffs alleged, constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and contravened the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged two violations of the California Constitution and brought two tort claims, for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs, represented by a local civil rights lawyer, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for the physical and emotional ailments incurred due to deprivation of sunlight.


COVID-19 Summary: Female dispatchers are seeking a temporary restraining order banning their employer's (the City of Warren) policy that requires female dispatcher to conduct pat downs, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. The plaintiffs alleged that they are being exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19 solely because of their sex. No outcome yet. <hr> On March 27, 2020, the six female dispatchers filed this lawsuit against their employer, the City of Warren, in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Warren Police Department requires them, but not their male counterparts, to pat-down, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. By requiring the plaintiffs to conduct these activities without adequate protective gear, the plaintiffs claimed that they were being exposed to to the risk of the COVID-19 virus at a considerable risk to their health. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued under § 1983 for violations of their 14th Amendment Equal Protection rights and under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. They alleged that the unlawfully adverse conditions of employment have now placed them in dire and immediate danger. The plaintiffs also filed a claim with the EEOC alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII and anticipate amending the complaint once the EEOC has conducted its responsibility. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order that would require the defendants to end their policy of directing female dispatchers to perform custodial searches of female prisoners. They also sought protection from retaliation, and a detailed report showing Defendant's steps to ensure that no female dispatchers are required to conduct these searches again. On April 1, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental notice of facts, informing the court that a City of Warren police officer had tested positive for COVID-19 and that nine other employees were in quarantine for possible exposure. They also documented their attempts to contact the defendants to secure protective measures themselves, which the defendants failed to respond to. The plaintiffs argued that this change of facts further demonstrated their need for the court to enter an order granting their emergency temporary restraining order and to provide injunctive relief. The plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint on April 10, adding additional plaintiffs. On April 15, two of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaints. On May 1, the defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint On August 14th, 2020 the parties each filed a motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held on November 12, 2020 and the court denied both plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and defendant's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on their finding that plaintiffs stated causes of action for which relief can be granted and that there are issues of fact that preclude the granting of summary judgment. On November 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, adding claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act which prohibits discrimination in employment based on sex. The case remains ongoing in the discovery phase.

Summary: 6 female dispatchers are seeking a temporary restraining order banning their employer's (the City of Warren) policy that requires female dispatcher to conduct pat downs, and occasionally strip search, female arrestees without adequate protective gear. The plaintiffs alleged that they are being exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19 solely because of their sex. No outcome yet.


On August 23, 2007, a Latino borrower filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Chase Bank USA and JP Morgan Chase & Co, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiff alleged racially discriminatory lending practices in connection with home mortgage loan he took out from Chase. Specifically, he alleged that Chase was engaged in both intentional and disparate impact discrimination through its development and implementation of mortgage pricing policies and procedures that resulted in less favorable loan conditions to non-white borrowers as compared to similarly situated white borrowers. The case then went into mediation. In August 14, 2008, the parties entered a joint stipulation to dismiss JP Morgan as a defendant. On August 15, 2008, the Court (Judge Andrew Guilford) ordered that JP Morgan was to be dismissed without prejudice, but the plaintiff reserved a right to conduct discovery with respect to it. On January 16, 2009, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The complaint was a class action allegation, adding another two named plaintiffs, against Chase Bank USA. The amended complaint alleged that Chase engaged in practices that had a disparate impact on minorities (defined as any non-Caucasian minority). It was alleged that Chase developed mortgage pricing policies that provided financial incentives to its authorized loan officers, mortgage brokers and corresponding lenders to make subjective decisions to increase interest rate and charge additional fees to minority borrowers. That allegedly led to minorities receiving higher interest rates and costs than non-minority borrowers in a similar situation. The plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory and equitable relief, and damages. The parties eventually settled on March 10, 2010. Under the agreement, the parties sought to certify following class: "All African-American and Hispanic borrowers who, since August 23,2005, obtained a mortgage loan originated through Chase's wholesale channel." The minority borrowers that paid off their loans could claim either a $300 credit towards the closing costs of his or her next loan with Chase, or a check for $70. Existing non-delinquent borrowers could receive either a $300 credit, or a $90 check. Above borrowers, and delinquent borrowers, were entitled to "red carpet access" for loan modification services with dedicated 800 numbers, and dedicated personnel with fair housing and lending training. The "red carpet access" was to be in effect for 2 years from the date of the agreement. The defendant had to submit quarterly reports during that period to class counsel, as well as maintain a settlement website. The defendant agreed to pay $1,95 million in attorney's fees. Each class representative received $5,000. On May 17, 2010, the Court ordered a preliminary approval of the settlement agreement, pending a fairness hearing. On November 9, 2010, the Court issued a final judgment, approving the settlement agreement. The court certified the class above as a settlement class. The Court retained jurisdiction over the agreement for its duration.

Summary: On August 23, 2007, a Latino borrower filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against Chase Bank USA and JP Morgan Chase & Co, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. On January 16, 2009, the plaintiff filed a first amended class action complaint, alleging hat Chase engaged in lending practices that had a disparate impact on minorities. On November 9, 2010, the Court approved a settlement agreement in which the defendant agreed to issue credit or a payment to its paid off or existing borrowers, and "red carpet access" to delinquent borrowers with trained personnel. The defendant also paid $1.95 million in attorney's fees.


On October 4, 2013, a death row inmate at the Connecticut Northern Correctional Institution (NCI) filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Corrections and six other state officials in their official and individual capacities under 42 USC § 1983 and the ADA. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a release from 23 hour-per-day solitary confinement, an end to universal use of restraints while outside of his cell, access to group religious services, visitation rights, a return of private property, and mental health care. The plaintiff also sought compensation and damages. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Article I Section 10 Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder clauses, and the 1949 Geneva Convention prohibition on collective punishment (this last charge and Fifth Amendment claims were dropped after he received legal representation). The plaintiff had originally been sentenced to death and served 21 years on death row. After the state abolished capital punishment in 2015, he was re-sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole in 2017 (during this litigation). Throughout the 23 years of his sentence prior to the time of filing, the plaintiff lived in a 12x7 foot concrete cell with only a three-inch wide window. He spent between 22 and 23 hours every day in this cell. He had extremely limited contact with other prisoners and was handcuffed or shackled whenever he left his cell. He sought injunctive relief to order the state to release him from solitary confinement and place him in the general prison population, to pay back wages, to allow group 7th Day Adventist religious services, to return all personal property, to stop the elevated uses of restraints, to improve mental health care, to provide better access to recreation and dining facilities, to restore his security levels and accompanying privileges to his pre-2017 status, to end collective punishments, and to end discrimination against life-term inmates. The case was assigned to Judge Stefan R. Underhill. In 2014, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge William I. Garfinkel for settlement conferences. On March 3, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants first claimed that they were immune in their official capacities from money damages under the Eleventh Amendment, and second that they were entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities. They also argued that the conditions on death row were constitutional and satisfied the Eighth Amendment. But before the court ruled on the motion or the plaintiff even replied, a clinical professor at Columbia University School of Law was appointed as pro bono counsel for the plaintiff. The motion was denied as moot and the plaintiff was given opportunity to amend with new counsel. After multiple extensions were granted, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 30, 2017. The plaintiff alleged in the amended complaint that state statutes that transferred former death row prisoners to solitary confinement unconstitutionally amounted to a bill of attainder and an ex post facto law. The complaint also dropped claims of fifth amendment and Geneva Convention violations. The plaintiff still sought a permanent injunction, requesting that the defendants submit a plan to the court to release him from solitary confinement, provide mental health care, and end his physical and social isolation, end his sensory deprivation. After over a year of discovery, the parties filed cross-motion for summary judgment in November 2018. On August 27, 2019, Judge Stefan Underhill granted the plaintiff’s motion and denied the defendants’ motion. Judge Underhill found that the conditions of confinement violated the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment because they were deliberately indifferent to the serious risks of the plaintiff's confinement. The court also found that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection. Furthermore, Judge Underhill found that the state's statute on death row was an unconstitutional bill of attainder in violation of Article I Section 10 of the constitution. Judge Underhill granted permanent injunctive relief to the plaintiff. In a separate injunctive and declaratory relief order, the court ordered the state to end plaintiff’s placement in the high security confinement, to allow the plaintiff to leave his cell for more than four hours per day, and to stop his segregation from other prisoners. The court also ordered that the state provide a “meaningful individualized classification determination“ for plaintiff's security level every six months. The Judge also ordered that the state stop enforcement of the death row "special circumstances" policy against any current or future prisoner. Finally, the court ordered the state to submit a status report to him within 30 days detailing how these orders would be effectuated. On September 4, 2019, Judge Underhill granted in part the defendants’ motion to stay his order. But the order denied a request to stay the requirement of a 30-day status report. On September 9, 2019, the defendants appealed Judge Underhill’s order granting summary judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Docket No. 19-2858). On September 20, the defendants submitted a motion for stay to the District Court pending their appeal to the Circuit Court. On September 25, another prisoner held under the state "special circumstances" statute on death row filed a motion to intervene. The intervenor sought to oppose the stay of the injunction. The defendants also filed the status report that same day. On October 16, the court granted the stay as to determining damages but denied the stay as to enforcing injunctive relief. The case is pending appeal in the Second Circuit.

Summary: On October 4, 2013, a prisoner held in solitary confinement filed this complaint in the U.S. District court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff alleged that the extreme conditions of his confinement violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that state statute placing him in solitary was an unconstitutional bill of attainder. In 2019, the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, ordering an end to his and other Connecticut prisoners' solitary isolation. The case is currently pending appeal to the Circuit Court.