On June 8, 2001, a female Wal-Mart employee filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against her employer claiming gender discrimination. Although the original complaint was filed pro se, on June 19, 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint with counsel. Dozens of lawyers have worked on this case, but the lead counsel is Brad Seligman of the Impact Fund, a nonprofit advocacy group. Plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on September 12, 2002. The named plaintiffs represented a class consisting of "all women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26, 1998 who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay and management track promotions policies and practices." Estimates of the size of this class range from 700,000 to 1.5 million women. Plaintiffs alleged gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Specifically, they argued that Wal-Mart's corporate culture fostered ideals of male superiority, which resulted in fewer raises and promotions for female employees. Those women who did receive raises and promotions, the plaintiffs alleged, received them on a smaller scale and more slowly than male employees. The plaintiff class brought gender discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two of the named plaintiffs, both black, also brought claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act for racial discrimination. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of back pay, front pay, lost compensation and benefits, and punitive damages. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief prohibiting discriminatory practices, restoring employees who quit or who Wal-Mart fired to their previous positions, and adjusting wage rates of current employees to what they would have been had Wal-Mart not discriminated. The issue of class certification dominated early proceedings. Wal-Mart vigorously contested certification of such a large and broad class. The district court certified the class on June 21, 2004. 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Wal-Mart appealed the order for class certification. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order in part on February 6, 2007, but then withdrew its opinion. 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit then issued a new opinion, affirming in part the district court's order, on December 11, 2007. 509 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld its prior decision after a rehearing en banc. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010). The Ninth Circuit decisions were docketed under 04-16688 and 04-16720, the latter covering a cross-appeal by the plaintiffs. The Ninth Circuit affirmed most of the district court's order but remanded to determine whether the class could be certified as to punitive damages. Additionally, the Circuit limited the ability of some of the named Plaintiffs to receive back pay for expected promotions if there was no "objective data" on hand to prove they were in a position to receive a promotion and that the court would not rely on speculation. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit indicated that putative class members who were no longer employed at the time the complaint was filed could not participate in the injunctive or declaratory relief of the suit, although they could be entitled to damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The Ninth Circuit indicated that although the plaintiffs sought to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2), which is for claims seeking injunctive relief, the district court on remand could certify some claims under Rule 23(b)(3), such as the punitive damage claims. Overall, the potentially large monetary award of this case did not prevent certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The class certification litigation did touch upon the merits of Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence of discrimination through the testimony of the named Plaintiffs and other employees. Plaintiffs also presented expert testimony of statisticians and sociologists to demonstrate that Wal-Mart's corporate structure encouraged a culture of gender discrimination. Wal-Mart countered with its own statistician, but the district and appellate courts found them less persuasive. But the Ninth Circuit noted that in this preliminary stage, it was not in fact evaluating the credibility of this testimony, but was rather attempting to determine if there were issues of commonality between class members that warranted certification. Because of the split in the circuits regarding the standard by which to evaluate class certification, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari on December 06, 2010. The case was argued before the Supreme Court on March 29, 2011 and decided on June 20, 2011. In a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court ruled that Wal-Mart's policy of granting local supervisors discretion in pay and promotion decisions, which allegedly has a disparate impact on female employees, did not provide a common question of fact, as required for class certification under Rule 23(a)(2). 31 S.Ct. 2541 (2011). Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Kennedy, and Alito. Justice Ginsburg wrote an opinion dissenting on the Rule 23(a)(2) question and was joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. All justices agreed that the back pay claims in the case were improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2). The Court concluded that the evidence presented of Wal-Mart's alleged discriminatory policies was insufficient to warrant class certification. Relying on General Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, it found that the plaintiffs needed to show "[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated under a general policy of discrimination." Because the expert that the plaintiffs relied was not able to specify the extent to which stereotypes affected employment decisions, the Court deemed that his testimony did not meet this standard. Apart from this rejected evidence, the majority found that the plaintiffs did "not identif[y] a common mode of exercising discretion that pervades the entire company," citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust to declare that the plaintiffs needed to "identify[] the specific employment practice that is challenged." Based on this principle, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' statistical and anecdotal evidence for failing to identify particular practices that affected the entire class. The statistical evidence, said the Court, pointed only to the existence of disparities rather than to any common practice, and the anecdotal evidence was too little and not sufficiently representative for the size of class certified. As a result, the Court concluded that "there is [not] even a single common question" that ties the class together. Justice Ginsburg dissented from this conclusion. After questioning the majority's scrutiny of the District Court's discretion regarding Rule 23(a), she focused on Watson's conclusion that practices not motivated by discriminatory intent, but that produce discriminatory results, do give rise to Title VII claims. For the instant case, Justice Ginsburg noted that managers may be susceptible to unconscious biases, and that Wal-Mart's uniform policy of discretion does nothing to combat such biases. Thus, she argued, there was sufficient basis for class certification and the majority had mistakenly imported Rule 23(b)(3)'s requirements into 23(a)(2), effectively requiring the common questions of law or fact to predominate over individual questions. (Justice Ginsburg's opinion also dismisses Falcon, which dealt with intentional discrimination, as irrelevant, since the instant case, which involves disparate treatment, involved Wal-Mart's companywide policies affecting all female workers.) The Court unanimously agreed that the back pay claims in the case could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because "the monetary relief is not incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief." It characterized the back pay claims as individualized relief against which a defendant could provide defenses against specific plaintiffs. It also noted that only Rule 23(b)(3) would be appropriate for back pay claims, since that provision, and not (b)(2), offers procedural protections like mandatory notice and the ability to opt out. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on October 27, 2011, seeking class certification in line with different standards since the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the case. The class was newly defined to include "present and former female Wal-Mart retail store employees who have been subjected to gender discrimination as a result of specific policies and practices in Wal-Mart’s regions located in whole or in part in California." The court denied class certification in August 2013, and the plaintiffs' subsequent appeal to the Ninth Circuit was denied. After two more years of discovery, six new women moved to intervene as plaintiffs. The next day, the parties moved to voluntarily and jointly dismiss the case as they had reached a confidential settlement agreement, leading the Court to order the intervenor's motion moot. On August 16, 2016, the parties wishing to intervene appealed the mootness of their motion to the Ninth Circuit. However, on November 16, 2016, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal of the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2001, a female Wal-Mart employee filed a class action complaint in the Northern District of California under Title VII, specifically alleging gender discrimination. Two named Plaintiffs also brought claims under California's Fair Employment and Housing Act for racial discrimination. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 2010 to determine the class certification standard. The Court ruled that the Plaintiffs had not shown a common question of fact, as required for class certification under Rule 23(a)(2), and further that the evidence presented of Wal-Mart's alleged discriminatory policies was insufficient to warrant class certification. The court enunciated a "significant proof" standard that it held the Plaintiffs had not met. The majority additionally held that Plaintiffs' statistical and anecdotal evidence did not point to a "single common question." The aggrieved female employees may sue Wal-Mart individually if they so choose. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint on October 27, 2011, seeking class certification in line with different standards since the Supreme Court did not rule on the merits of the case. The court denied class certification, and the plaintiffs' subsequent appeal to the Ninth Circuit was denied. After two more years of discovery, six new women moved to intervene as plaintiffs. The next day, the parties moved to voluntarily and jointly dismiss the case as they had reached a confidential settlement agreement, leading the Court to order the intervenor's motion moot. On August 16, 2016, the parties wishing to intervene appealed to the Ninth Circuit. On November 16, 2016, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal of the case. The case is now closed.


On August 23, 2016, five individuals incarcerated due to bounced checks filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. They proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sherwood and Pulaski Counties, and various officials including the Sherwood District Court Judge, court clerks, and other administrative personnel. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Arkansas, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and private counsel, claimed that the defendants created and operated an unlawful system of debtors' prisons that convicted plaintiffs who had bounced checks, sometimes for amount as little as $10 to $15, through "hot check convictions,” in violation of the Due Process clause and Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that at their hearings, Sherwood District Court Judges would threaten to jail the arrestee if he or she did not make the payments and would direct the arrestee either to arrange for payments or to contact family members who could make the payment on the person's behalf. If the individual was sent to jail in order to coerce payment, that individual was handcuffed and transported to the Pulaski County Jail (the "Jail") for 60, 90, or 120 days until the outstanding court costs, fines, and fees were paid. The plaintiffs alleged that this practice was unconstitutional because it led to weeks or months in the Jail due to their inability to pay, and because it trapped the city's poorest and most disadvantaged individuals in a cycle of ever-increasing court costs, fines, and fees owed to Sherwood beyond their ability to pay. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge James M. Moody. On September 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that sought to add the prosecuting attorney for the Sixth Judicial District as an additional defendant. On October 19, 2016, the defendants sought to dismiss that additional defendant. On January 24, 2017, Magistrate Judge Joe J. Volpe issued proposed findings and recommendations that granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. He found that it was appropriate for the federal court to "abstain," under the Younger abstention doctrine. Younger abstention bars federal intervention in (1) ongoing state proceedings that (2) evidence important state interests and provide an (3) adequate opportunity to raise any relevant federal questions. Judge Volpe found all three factors to be met, and therefore recommended that the district court decline to interfere in the "hot check" hearings. Judge J. Volpe recommended that Judge Moody dismiss all claims. 2017 WL 2486087. On June 8, 2017, Judge Moody accepted the recommendation and ordered that all claims be dismissed without prejudice. 2017 WL 2486078. On July 5, the plaintiffs moved to amend or alter the judgment of dismissal. On November 14, 2017, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal, indicating that they had reached a settlement. The settlement mandated that the Sherwood court would cease jailing individuals who could not afford court fines and fees due to bounced checks. Specifically, the Sherwood court was to: (1) conduct individualized inquiries into each defendant's ability to pay; (2) give defendants unable to pay the option of a community service sentence; (3) advise defendants of their right to counsel prior to entering a plea; (4) follow particular procedures for Orders to Show Cause and accompanying hearings; (5) stop revoking drivers' licenses for defendants who could not pay; (6) provide an adjustment or waiver of remaining payments for defendants who fall behind in payments. The court retained jurisdiction over the settlement for 2 years. There has been no docket activity since 2019, and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: In 2016, individuals brought suit against two Arkansas counties and administrative personal over the counties' "hot check convictions," which they said resulted in the jailing of defendants who were too poor to pay for restitution and court costs. The case ended in a settlement. The defendants agreed to conduct individualized inquiries into defendants' ability to pay and institute other reforms to protect indigent defendants.


On July 12, 2017, a group of Honduran and Mexican asylum seekers and Al Otro Lado, a legal service organization which supports indigent deportees, refugees, and migrants, filed this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The pseudonymous plaintiffs fled gang-related and/or severe domestic violence and presented themselves at a Port of Entry (POE) at the U.S.-Mexico border to seek protection; they alleged that they were wrongfully denied access to an asylum screening. Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the American Immigration Council, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and two of its component agencies: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Non-Refoulement Doctrine under international law. They brought this class action suit pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act and the APA. The suit arose from Al Otro Lado's Refugee Program in Tijuana, Mexico, by which it assisted individuals seeking protection from persecution in the U.S. The program included large-scale clinics in Tijuana to provide a general overview of asylum law and procedure to asylum seekers before they presented themselves at POEs. The plaintiffs claimed that since the summer of 2016, CBP officials systematically prevented asylum seekers arriving at POEs along the U.S.-Mexico border from accessing the asylum process. They claimed that in furtherance of this policy, immigration officials used misrepresentations, threats, intimidation, verbal and physical abuse, and coercion to deny the plaintiffs asylum access. For example, CBP officials were alleged to have turned away asylum seekers by falsely informing them that the U.S. was no longer providing asylum, that President Trump signed a new law ending asylum, that a law providing asylum to Central Americans ended, and that the U.S. was no longer accepting mothers with children for asylum. CBP officials were also alleged to intimidate asylum seekers by threatening to take away their children if they did not renounce a claim for asylum and to deport the asylum seekers. The defendant's agents allegedly forced asylum seekers to sign forms in English, without translation, in which the asylum seekers recanted their fears of persecution. The plaintiffs sought to end these government practices and alleged that they formed a part of an official government policy to arbitrarily deny asylum access. Additionally, Al Otro Lado claimed that it was forced to divert substantial resources away from its Los Angeles practice and non-refugee programs to counteract the government's unlawful practices, by sending its representatives to Tijuana to accompany asylum seekers to POEs, training pro bono attorneys to provide more individualized representation, and providing more in-depth presentations to large groups. In the days following the filing of the complaint, the government agreed to allow the class representatives and their children to present themselves at the San Ysidro and Laredo ports of entry and access an asylum screening to initiate the asylum process. They subsequently informed the court that the plaintiffs all passed these screenings and were referred to the Immigration Court for removal proceedings in which they were free to submit asylum applications. Notwithstanding this development, the case continued on and was assigned to Judge John F. Walter and the Magistrate Judge Jean P. Rosenbluth. On October 12, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, for inadequate statutory standing of Al Otro Lado, and for mootness of the plaintiff's claims brought under the APA. Specifically, they argued that because the class representatives were given the opportunity to be properly processed under the INA in the days following the filing of this suit, they received all the court could have offered. They also argued that the alleged violation under the APA was inadequate to sustain a cause of action because it did not involve a final government agency decision. On October 23, 2017, Al Otro Lado filed their opposition to the government's motion to dismiss and the government replied. That same month, Al Otro Lado moved to compel the government to produce requested documents and video to corroborate their claims that the government unlawfully instructed asylum seekers to recant their fears of persecution without an interpreter. Judge Walter ordered the parties to engage in private mediation to resolve this discovery matter. Al Otro Lado moved for class certification on November 13, 2017. The proposed class was defined as: all noncitizens who (i) have since June 2016 presented themselves, or will in the future present themselves, at a port of entry along the U.S.–Mexico border (ii) have asserted or will assert an intention to seek asylum or have expressed or will express a fear of persecution in their home countries, and (iii) have been or will in the future be denied access to the U.S. asylum process by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers. On November 21, 2017, Judge Walter issued a written decision transferring the case to the District Court for the Southern District of California. 2017 WL 10592130. He found that the Southern District was the more proper forum because of its location along the U.S.–Mexico border and none of the events at issue occurred in the Central District. He also found that the Southern District would provide the easiest access to the evidence necessary to defend this action because the overwhelming majority of witnesses resided in that district and five of the six named plaintiffs sought entry at POEs there. He denied the outstanding motions filed by both parties, who he noted were free to refile them in the proper venue. Upon transfer, the case was assigned to Judge Cynthia Bashant and Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford. On December 8, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for resolution of the outstanding discovery dispute and, in response, the government moved to stay discovery on December 18, 2017. The government filed a second motion to dismiss on December 14, 2017. Judge Bashant granted the plaintiff's motion for the asylum seekers to proceed pseudonymously on December 20, 2017. 2017 WL 6541446. She found that the severity of the harm alleged if they were returned to their home countries without the opportunity to seek asylum was substantial. She also found that their fears about this potential harm were objectively reasonable and that they were vulnerable to retaliation by the U.S. government if their true names were revealed. On January 31, 2018, Judge Bashant issued a written decision granting the government's motion to stay discovery until adjudication of the motion to dismiss, and vacating a discovery scheduling order issued by Judge Walter. She reasoned that the motion to dismiss involved questions of law and that evidence that could be uncovered in discovery was irrelevant to that issue. On February 28, 2018, Magistrate Judge Crawford ordered the government to postpone the March 5, 2018 transition of the San Ysidro POE surveillance system to the Centralized Video Surveillance System ("CAVSS") until the court ruled on the parties' joint motion for a protective order. Judge Bashant entered the protective order to keep information confidential between the parties regarding the U.S. government's surveillance capacities and infrastructure at POEs and potential vulnerabilities related to their cybersecurity, as well as details of CBP contracts and contacts with private vendors. On August 20, 2018, the court denied in part and granted in part the government’s motion to dismiss, allowing the majority of plaintiffs’ claims to go forward. Judge Bashant found that Al Otro Lado had an interest in the case which was not mooted by the government's post-complaint conduct (i.e. their processing of the class representatives) and that they could not be dismissed as a plaintiff. She also found that the complaint plausibly showed the existence of a pattern or practice of denials faced by some asylum seekers; therefore, the government's post-complaint conduct did not moot these claims. However, Judge Bashant also found that the complaint failed to show the existence of a categorical policy of refusing asylum access and dismissed the portion of their cause of action pursuant to APA 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) without prejudice. She pointed to a Human Rights First report cited by the plaintiffs of at least 125 occasions between December 2016 and March 2017 in which applicants for admission were denied access, which coincided with CBP agents referring some 8,000 asylum seekers at POEs along the U.S-Mexico border for asylum screenings during the same period. She concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations on this issue and available statistics cited in support of this claim did not support an inference that there was an unwritten policy to systematically deny asylum access, or a final agency policy or plan to this effect. On September 17, 2018, Judge Bashant granted in part and denied in part the government's motion for a protective order. She ordered the government to retain all electronically stored information (ESI) already preserved relating to the plaintiffs' interactions with immigration officials at POEs, as well as those relating to any other asylum seekers withdrawing their asylum applications, if identified by plaintiffs within 45 days of those interactions. She also required the government to retain ESI surveillance of individuals attempting to enter the San Ysidro POE during a two week period in December 2017, to the extent that they had not already been overwritten. On October 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, and then a second amended complaint a month later. The second complaint asserted that CBP was limiting non-citizens’ access to the asylum process by adopting a formal policy to “restrict” the flow of asylum seekers without travel documents who can cross the border into POEs to apply for asylum in the United States. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which the court could grant relief. On November 29, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Alien Tort statute had no bearing on the case and that there had been no violation of §706(1) or (2) of the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was stayed for about a month in January as a result of the government shutdown. Over 70 members of Congress, 19 states (including California and New York) and Washington D.C., immigration and refugee law scholars, and Amnesty International filed amicus briefs in February 2019 in support of Al Otro Lado's opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. Congresspeople argued that the INA's Congressional intent was to ensure prompt processing of asylum seekers at the border. Scholars argued that U.S. asylum law applies to asylum seekers who are stopped mere steps from the border. The states, which collectively accept over 70% of asylees in the country, explained that they were prepared to divert resources to support immigrants settled there. Amnesty International argued that the United States was obligated under international law to ensure the prompt processing of asylees and described a humanitarian crisis in Mexico that they attributed to the policy at issue. Judge Crawford denied Al Otro Lado's motion for expedited discovery on March 6, 2019. 2019 WL 1057387. The plaintiffs' motion discussed how their Legal Director, Litigation and Policy Director, and Refugee Program Director had had their travel restricted by U.S. and Mexican immigration authorities, including being detained at airports. They sought expedited discovery to determine whether these actions constituted retaliation for prosecuting this lawsuit or whether they were an attempt to deny Al Otro Lado access to asylum seekers in Mexico. Judge Crawford found that the requested material was beyond the scope of the second amended complaint and that the plaintiffs had not adequately articulated how expedited discovery would help to advance a timely adjudication of this lawsuit. She also noted that they had not moved for injunctive relief, so their arguments concerning the court's broad equitable powers could not be fully considered. On July 29, 2019, Judge Bashant released an order partially granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The portion of the complaint alleged under APA §706(1) was dismissed without leave to amend, as well as the plaintiff's claims that the Alien Tort Statute gave the court subject matter jurisdiction. With regard to the rest of the second amended complaint, the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied. On September 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for provisional class certifications with portions of the motion filed under seal and redacted. The plaintiffs sought provisional class certification to pursue preliminary injunctive relief for "all non-Mexican noncitizens who were denied access to the U.S. asylum process before July 16, 2019 as a result of the Government's metering policy and continue to seek access to the U.S. asylum process." Oral argument was held and on November 19, 2019, Judge Bashant granted the plaintiff's motion for provisional class certification and their motion for preliminary injunction. This order enjoined defendants from applying the Asylum Ban to members of the provisionally certified class and ordered them to return to pre-Asylum Ban practices for processing the asylum applications of members of the certified class. 2019 WL 6134601. On December 4, 2019, the defendants appealed the order granting the motion for preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The defendants also filed an emergency motion to stay the district court's November 19, 2019 order. On December 20, 2019, 9th Circuit granted that motion for an emergency stay pending the appeal in order to preserve the status quo and avoid complications at the border. However, the Circuit Court on March 5, 2020, ultimately denied the government's motion for a stay pending a decision on the merits, reasoning that the government did not carry its burden of demonstrating why a stay is warranted. As of April 15, 2021, the appeal is ongoing because it has been held in abeyance pending decisions in both East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr and Capital Area Immigrants Rights Coalition v. Trump. On December 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to prohibit defendants from applying a new rule, “Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act” (“ACA Rule”), to provisional class members. This rule added an exception to asylum in the Immigration and Nationality Act known as the “Safe third country” provision. Under the ACA Rule, the Attorney General can remove a non-citizen, otherwise eligible for asylum, to a country that the U.S. has entered into a bilateral or multilateral agreement with ("third-party country"). At the time, the U.S. had recently entered into bilateral or multilateral agreements with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The ACA Rule also created a bar that restricts “whether an alien may even apply for asylum” by establishing a screening mechanism to evaluate a noncitizen's likelihood of torture or persecution if removed to a third-party country. The plaintiffs alleged that the application of the ACA Rule and the subsequent removal of class members to third-party countries will extinguish their ability to obtain relief in this action, resulting in irreparable injury. On January 6, 2020, Judge Bashant issued an order denying without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. Judge Bashant concluded that the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden for a temporary restraining order because they did not establish that the defendants are likely to apply the ACA Rule to the provisional class members. On January 14, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. Plaintiffs sought certification with respect to the class of "all noncitizens who seek or will seek to access the U.S. asylum process by presenting themselves at a Class A [POE] on the U.S.-Mexico border, and were or will be denied access to the U.S. asylum process by or at the instruction of [CBP] officials on or after January 1, 2016." Additionally, the plaintiffs sought certification of a subclass consisting of "all noncitizens who were or will be denied access to the asylum process at a Class A POE on the U.S.-Mexico border as a result of Defendants’ metering policy on or after January 1, 2016." On August 6, 2020, the court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification, thus certifying both the broad class as well as the subclass. The plaintiffs moved on July 17, 2020, to clarify the preliminary injunction in order to define its scope as applying retroactively to asylum seekers whose claims were fully evaluated prior to the court's November 19 granting of a preliminary injunction. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for clarification on October 30, 2020. On December 2, 2020, the defendants appealed. On December 18, 2020, the Circuit Court granted a temporary stay regarding the clarified preliminary injunction pending a decision on the motion for a stay on the merits. This, however, was lifted on January 14, 2021. On September 4, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On September 25, 2020, the defendants cross-moved for summary judgment. On January 6, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order regarding the defendants' "Final Transit Rule," which seeks to circumvent the court's ruling that temporarily enjoined defendants from executing their metering policy. On January 18, 2021, the court granted a temporary restraining order regarding the Final Transit Rule, reasoning that it amounted to attempts to evade the court's ruling. Following the government transition, the incoming Biden Administration jointly moved with the plaintiffs on January 22, 2021 to withdraw the motion to stay the order on the plaintiffs' motion to clarify. Further, the parties jointly moved to convert the January 18 TRO into a preliminary injunction on January 29, 2021. The court converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction on February 1, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, asylum seekers from Mexico and Honduras filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that they arrived at a port of entry at the U.S.-Mexico border seeking asylum but were prevented from accessing the U.S. asylum process by CBP officials. On November 19, 2019, the court granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined the defendants from applying the Asylum Ban to members of the then-provisionally certified class. Following extensive discovery, on January 14, 2020, the court granted class certification. After the Biden Administration took office in January 2021, the parties have since withdrawn motions to dispute the preliminary injunction. This case is ongoing.


On February 14, 2013, the Catholic managing partner of a law firm and the law firm itself filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violation of plaintiff's First Amendment rights to free speech, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Center for Law and Justice, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring the corporation to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would require them to violate their religious beliefs and moral values, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 28, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On March 5, 2013, defendants entered a notice of non-opposition to the preliminary injunction and moved to stay proceedings. On March 7, 2013, the Honorable Sheila Finnegan remanded proceedings to U.S. District Judge Ronald A. Guzman in light of defendants' non-opposition. On March 20, 2013, Judge Guzman granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending resolution of Korte v. Sebelius and Grote v. Sebelius, two cases before the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals that also dealt with parties seeking exemption from the ACA on religious grounds. The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals decided Korte and Grote on November 9, 2013. The court held that the contraception mandate substantially burdened the religious exercise of plaintiff corporations and their owners under the Religious Freedom Act, the mandate did not serve a compelling government interest, and was not the least restrictive means of advancing such an interest. On January 10, 2014, Judge Guzman granted plaintiffs’ unopposed motion to extend both the preliminary injunction and the stay of proceedings until forty-five days after the resolution of Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, two cases in which the Supreme Court granted cert that also dealt with parties seeking exemption from the ACA on religious grounds. After the Supreme Court issued its decisions in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius (FA-OK-0001) and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius (FA-PA-0007) on June 30, 2014, holding that the contraceptive mandate did substantially burden the exercise of religion under the RFRA for for-profit corporations, the defendants made multiple motions to stay the proceedings and extend the preliminary injunction while they re-evaluated how they wanted to proceed in the case. Finally, on October 15, 2014, the parties reached a joint agreement that, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim. Judge Guzman signed the injunction and judgment on December 3, 2014, permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Contraceptive Coverage Requirement, requiring the plaintiffs to provide their employees with health coverage for contraceptive methods. Plaintiffs did not submit a petition for attorneys’ fees or costs, which thereby concluded the case.

Summary: On February 14, 2013, the Catholic managing partner of a law firm and the law firm itself filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. After the Supreme Court's decisions in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga on June 30, 2014, which also involved parties seeking religious exemption from the Affordable Care Act's ("ACA") contraceptive requirement, the parties in this case reached a joint agreement that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their RFPA claim. The defendants were permanently enjoined from requiring the plaintiffs to provide their employees with health coverage for contraceptive methods.


In 2018, children in the Kansas foster care system filed a class-action suit against the Governor of Kansas, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF), the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, and the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services. The named plaintiffs allegedly experienced great hardship while involved in the Kansas foster care system, including dozens or even hundreds of moves, night-to-night changes, and starkly inadequate mental and behavioral diagnosis and treatment. The children involved in the foster care system often suffered from PTSD and other disorders that resulted from their housing displacement and did not receive the care they needed to cope with their conditions. One ten-year-old child was moved 70 times, including one three-month period where he was relocated to a new placement every night. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Medicaid Act. Plaintiffs argued that their rights to substantive due process were being abridged by the Governor and the DCF secretary. Additionally, they argued that the defendants had failed to provide plaintiffs and class members with diagnostic screening and treatment for trauma-related disorders and mental and behavioral health conditions as required under the Medicaid Act. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide medically necessary behavioral and mental health services for members of the plaintiff class who required treatment for mental health conditions. The case was initially assigned to Judge John W. Lungstrum, but he later recused himself and was replaced by Judge Daniel D. Crabtree. On July 3, Judge Crabtree granted a motion to dismiss Governor Laura Kelly, holding that she was protected from litigation under 11th amendment immunity. After trying but failing initially to reach an agreement through alternative dispute resolution process, the parties reached a settlement agreement in July 2020. The settlement included goals for practice improvements with changes that the state agencies would be required to meet during a 12-month-period and hold for a further 2-month period to exit court supervision. Under the agreement, the state will be required to end the practice of housing children in offices and hotels, the use of night-to-night and temporary placements, overcrowding at placements, and stop delays related to housing in the provision of mental healthcare. The settlement has federal court enforceability, requires a neutral expert to validate performance and compliance, and will implement a new community accountability structure. Judge Crabtree signed a preliminary order approving the settlement and class status on September 9, 2020. The certified class consisted of "all children who are now, or in the future will be, in the protective custody of the Department for Children and families pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2242(c)(1)." As of October 25, the case remains open.

Summary: In 2018, children in the foster care system of Kansas filed a class action suit against the Governor, the Kansas Department for Children and Families (DCF), the Kansas Department of Health and Environment, and the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services. The children had experienced dozens and even hundreds of moves during their time in the system, and the state had failed to fulfill its requirements to provide screening and treatment for mental and behavioral conditions. The plaintiffs filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Medicaid Act. The parties reached a settlement in July 2020, which offered comprehensive relief for class members and required the state to take systemic action to end practices harming children's health. The court issued preliminary approval of the settlement in September, 2020. The final approval hearing is set for January 2021.


On February 10, 2014, four same-sex couples and one of the couples' adopted children filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Ohio's ban on same sex marriage and the manner in which that ban was applied were unconstitutional under the Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the United States Constitution. Specifically, several of the couples were expecting children and under Ohio law at the time, only one parent would be recorded on the birth certificate of the children. Plaintiffs requested that the court declare the relevant sections of the Ohio Constitution unconstitutional and issue injunctive relief ensuring that the couples be permitted to record both parents' names on the birth certificates of their children. On April 14, 2014, Judge Timothy Black issued a ruling holding unconstitutional Ohio's ban on recognition of same-sex marriages from other states, and requiring Ohio to recognize all such marriages. The defendants moved for a stay against the injunction the next day. On April 16th, Judge Black granted in part the defendants' motion for stay of injunction pending appeal; he stayed the application of the unconstitutionality to non-plaintiff same-sex couples but did not stay the injunctive relief provided to the named plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals on May 9, 2014. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and along with cases from four other states: DeBoer v. Snyder (PB-MI-0004), Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003), Love v. Beshear (PB-KY-0001), and Tanco v. Haslam (PB-TN-0005). The Sixth Circuit was unwilling to find a constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither ban was in violation of the Constitution or unlawful due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that "[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries." (DeBoer v. Snyder). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review of all the Sixth Circuit cases on January 16, 2015, in Overgefell v. Hodges. The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, the Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. The right to marry is fundamental, the Court held, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The Fourteenth Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters—Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—wrote separately. After the Supreme Court’s decision, the District Court lifted the stay off the injunction, requiring Ohio to recognize same-sex marriages. On November 2, 2015, the District Court entered a final judgment. The court declared that Ohio’s marriage recognition statutes violated the Fourteenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing those statutes or denying same-sex couples the all of the rights, protections, and benefits of marriage provided by Ohio law. The court also ordered defendants to issue birth certificates listing both same-sex parents on their child’s birth certificates, as well as to provide instructions on how to complete the forms to allow parents to choose their title (mother, father, parent) and gender (male, female). The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 10, 2014, four same-sex couples and an adopted child filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs argued that the ban on same-sex marriage in Ohio, the application of which allows only one partner's name to be recorded on birth certificates of couples' children, is unconstitutional. On April 14, 2014, a permanent injunction and declaratory relief order was issued. It required Ohio to begin recognizing same-sex marriages from other states. However, on the state's request, Judge Timothy Black stayed his order as applied to all individuals other than named Plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which upheld bans on same-sex marriage and reversed the order that Ohio must recognize same-sex marriages from other states. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court determined the statutes to violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The permanent injunction was entered and enforced in Ohio and the case is now closed.


On October 1, 1999 several disabled plaintiffs brought a national class action in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against Kmart for violating the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged Kmart provided "insufficient parking for persons with disabilities, has counters that are too high for persons who use wheelchairs, fails to provide accessible check-out aisles to persons who use wheelchairs, fails to provide accessible fitting rooms and blocks access to merchandise aisles for persons who use wheelchairs" all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq. (ADA) and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S. § 24-34-601 et seq. (CADA). A Second Amended Complaint, filed on March 22, 2006, added additional individuals to represent a sub-class of persons similarly situated who resided in states with statutory damages statutes, adding claims for damamges under these state laws, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51(b) & 54.1, Hawaii's Chapter 489, Haw. Rev. Stat. § 489 et seq., the Texas Human Resource Code, Tex Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 121.001 et seq., the Massachusetts Anti-discrimination law, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, §§ 98 and 92A, the New York Civil Rights Law, N.Y. Civ. Rights § 40 et seq., and N.Y. Exec § 296(2)(a), and the Oregon Unlawful Discrimination against Disabled People, Or. Rev. Stat. § 659A.142(3). The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief ordering Kmart to bring its stores into compliance with the ADA They also requested statutory damages under the state statutes and attorneys' fees and costs. In January, 2002, Kmart sought bankruptcy protection in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Chief Judge Susan Pierson Sonderby. Although this action temporarily halted the plaintiffs claim, the District of Colorado allowed the action to continue after Kmart emerged from Bankruptcy in May 2003. On July 13, 2005, the court certified a settlement class consisting of "[a]ll persons who, at any time from May 6, 2003 through the Term of this Agreement, used, use or will use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and who shopped or shop at any Kmart Store or any Closed Kmart Store or who allege they would shop or would have shopped at one or more Kmart Stores or Closed Kmart Stores but for allegedly being denied on the basis of disability the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of such Kmart Store(s) or Closed Kmart Store(s)." On February 9, 2006, the parties reached a settlement that required Kmart to bring all its stores into compliance with Department of Justice standards for accessibility, increase aisle space, widen aisles, improve restrooms, and many other changes. Monitoring would be done by mystery shoppers, customer feedback, and comment forms. The settlement created a $13 million dollar damages pool ($5m in gift cards, $8m in cash) from which statutory damages would be deducted. Kmart was also obliged to pay $10,000 each to the original three plaintiffs and $1000 to the five additional plaintiffs who were added, as well as $3.25 million in attorney's fees and costs, and additional costs of administering the settlement. On March 22, 2006, the Court certified a "Damages Settlement Sub-Class" consisting of the class members residing in states with damages statutes and who shopped or would have shopped but for lack of accommodations in Kmarts in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon or Texas. The $13 million damages pool was to go to members of the sub class, who could recover for a maximum of two visits to Kmart, for amounts under state law. On June 29, 2009, the Court granted a joint motion to amend the settlement. The parties amended the agreement to permit Kmart to reduce the number of stores to be retroffitted during the period between May 8, 2009 and May 8, 2010 from 215 to 150.

Summary: In 1999, several disabled plaintiffs brought a class action against Kmart for violating the Americans With Disabilities Act and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act. The case settled in early 2006, with Kmart agreeing to implement changes and paying $13 million in damages and $3.25 million in attorneys' fees and costs.


On November 16, 2005, a group of visually impaired recipients of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and/or Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), along with a national nonprofit comprised of the visually impaired, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment under <i> Bivens</i>. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant, the Social Security Administration ("SSA"), consistently refused to communicate with visually impaired beneficiaries through reasonably accessible means. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that such conduct deprived blind people of equal access to information necessary to maintaining benefits and therefore constituted unlawful discrimination. On April 23, 2008, U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and requested further briefing regarding how the court should proceed. 2008 WL 1858928. Holding that §504 of the Rehabilitation Act trumped the special-notice provisions, the court found that Congress intended to improve notice to blind recipients when it passed the special notice provision. Both parties requested to continue litigating the claims on a class-wide basis, as opposed to staying the case to give the SSA time to amend its rules and policies to conform with that holding. In a May 13, 2008 order, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ due process claims. 2008 WL 2050852. On September 11, 2008, the court certified two classes. Though both of these classes consisted of individuals with visual impairments who needed materials in an accessible format to participate in Social Security programs, one class was comprised of applicants and beneficiaries, and the other was comprised of representative payees. On October 20, 2009, the court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs after a bench trial, finding that the plaintiffs had not proven a class-wide violation of due process, but had proven a class-wide violation of the Rehabilitation Act's §504 and §85.51. Because the SSA had earlier spurned the opportunity for a stay pending rule-making, the Court found that the agency had effectively consented to resolve the case by litigating on a class-wide basis and therefore ordered a class-wide injunction. This order mandated that SSA develop and offer a Braille and a navigable Microsoft Word CD alternative, notify all known visually impaired recipients of these new alternatives, announce these alternatives on their website, train employees to orally communicate this news to the blind, comply in good faith with §85.51 requirements regarding further individual accommodations, and cease limiting benefits to visually impaired recipients without first providing the notice prescribed above. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce this order. 2009 WL 3400686. On January 22, 2010, the Court amended the compliance schedule to allow the SSA more time to implement the aforementioned order. On April 16, 2012, the Court informed both parties' counsel that it had received a lengthy letter from a class member regarding alleged violations of the 2009 order; the Court ordered counsel to meet, confer, and advise on how the letter should be addressed. On April 30, 2012, counsel submitted a joint statement identifying most of the class member's complaints as outside the scope of the Court's order or outside the Court's jurisdiction, excepting one standard-print letter that should have been sent in Braille. The SSA agreed to resend that particular letter in Braille, and the class member was instructed to inform class counsel if further violations of the Court's order occurred. The docket does not show any subsequent activity. The case is presumed closed.

Summary: On November 16, 2005, a group of visually impaired recipients of Social Security benefits, along with a national nonprofit comprised of the visually impaired, filed a class action lawsuit under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment against the Social Security Administration ("SSA") in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division. The plaintiff claimed that the SSA's refusal to communicate with visually impaired beneficiaries through reasonably accessible means deprived plaintiffs of meaningful access to Social Security benefits. After a bench trial, U.S. District Court Judge William Alsup ordered declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis of plaintiff's Rehabilitation Act claims, requiring SSA to, among other things, provide Braille and navigable Microsoft Word CD alternatives to standard-print communications to visually impaired beneficiaries. The Court retained jurisdiction of this matter to ensure SSA's compliance.


On July 10, 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation filed this lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the District of Columbia. The Plaintiffs are non-profit, nationwide organizations focused on ensuring the principles of liberty and equality embodied in the Constitution and the nation’s civil rights laws, including laws protecting access to the rights to vote. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief against Defendants President Trump, Vice President Pence, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (the "Commission”) under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA”), 5 U.S.C. app. 2 §§ 1-16. On May 11, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13,799, establishing the Commission. The stated mission of the Commission was to “study the registration and voting process used in Federal elections” and its ultimate function was to submit a report to the President that identifies various elements that enhance or undermine the nation’s confidence in the integrity of the voting system. Exec. Order No. 13,799 § 3. The Plaintiffs argued that the Commission is an advisory committee, and as such is subject to the disclosure, notice, and reporting requirements of the FACA. The Commission, however, had not followed certain procedures required by FACA, such as having a meeting without holding it open to the public, failing to create detailed minutes of their meetings, failing to provide a transcript of telephonic meetings, and failing other non-discretionary openness requirements. Furthermore, at the time the complaint was filed, the Committee had scheduled a future meeting to take place in a building closed to the public without advanced screening, in violation of the non-discretionary open meeting requirement of FACA § 10(a)(1). Along with their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requesting the court to enforce FACA’s requirement’s (1) that any telephonic meeting be noticed and available to the public, (2) that all minutes, agendas, reports, studies and documentary material made available to or prepared for or by Commission member be made available for public inspection and copying at a single, publicly accessible location, and (3) that the July 19th meeting be moved, with public notice, to a publicly accessible location. On July 18, 2017, District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly denied this motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction without prejudice, reasoning that the court lacked jurisdiction to give relief in the form of mandamus because the Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the three requirements for mandamus: (1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists. Because the Plaintiffs had argued that mandamus relief was the only available remedy, the motion was denied for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 266 F.Supp.3d 133. On September 8, 2017, District Judge Randolph D. Moss approved an unopposed motion to stay the case in anticipation of receiving and reviewing materials provided by the Defendants in a related case,  Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, also in this Clearinghouse. On January 3, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint, in addition to all previous allegation, expanded the allegations of FACA violations to include meetings held in July and September 2017. The defendants had continued to conduct telephone meetings without public access, while failing to take detailed minutes, and while failing to make public any records or reports prepared for those meetings. The amended complaint sought declaratory judgement with respect to all FACA violations in 2017 and mandamus relief requiring the Commission to perform all non-discretionary FACA requirements. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the defendants to:
1. make all records, reports, transcripts, minutes, appendixes, working papers, drafts, studies, agenda, or other documents which were made available to or prepared for or by the Pence-Kobach Commission open for public inspection; 2. hold all meetings of the Commission, including meetings conducted by telephone or other electronic medium, open to the public; 3. cease all activities that have no reasoned basis and/or are not provided for in the Executive Order establishing the parameters under which the Pence-Kobach Commission can operate, including ceasing all activity aimed at investigating particular voters; 4. make provisions to “require the membership of the advisory committee to be fairly balanced in terms of the points of view represented and the functions to be performed by the advisory committee,” and “to assure that the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee will not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing authority or any special interest”; and 5. cease all action by the Commission until it is properly constituted.
The same day, President Trump issued an executive order terminating the Commission. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in September 2018, arguing that the case was moot due to the Commission’s dissolution, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim, or that mandamus was either unavailable or should not be exercised. A week later the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings in light of similar case, Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, (17-2361). The plaintiffs moved to stay the case because the result of Dunlap might otherwise cause them to voluntarily dismiss the case. On July 20, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed notice of voluntary dismissal. According to their motion, the court had resolved Dunlap; the documents that the plaintiffs sought were released. Accordingly, on July 22, the court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2017 the ACLU filed this suit for injunctive, mandamus, and declaratory relief against President Trump, Vice-President Pence, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The court denied the Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, claiming that jurisdiction for mandamus relief did not exist. President Trump ultimately dissolved the Commission, and the case is stayed pending the outcome of a related case, <i>Dunlap v. Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity</i>.


Nearly three years after applying for naturalization, plaintiff had still not received an appointment to be interviewed for citizenship, the next step in his naturalization process. On February 1, 2007, represented by private counsel, plaintiff petitioned the U.S. District Court for the district of Pennsylvania to compel U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) to schedule him for an interview and to render a decision on his citizenship application within thirty days. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Michael M. Baylson. Administratively, plaintiff was in a complicated position: under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et. seq, naturalization applicants have a right to petition the district courts if their application is denied or if they do not receive a response within 120 days of their interview. Here, as the plaintiff had never actually received an interview, he met neither requirement, leaving him in an application limbo. Therefore, plaintiff asked the courts to consider the extended delay a constructive denial of his application and to invoke its right to review under the INA. Alternatively, plaintiff suggested that the court might invoke either the Administrative Procedure Act or its mandamus powers to compel USCIS to perform its duty of conducting citizenship appointments. In January 2018, the court became aware that it had six nearly identical cases, including this one, and held a hearing on all cases simultaneously. In a following memorandum and order, the court suggested that the government, "overwhelmed by these applications, ha(d) adopted a strategy of favoring delay by litigation, instead of developing an orderly and transparent administrative resolution." The court recommended that all six plaintiffs cross-file for summary judgment and enjoined the USCIS from preemptively resolving any of their immigration cases, thus mooting the cases, before a final judgment could be filed. One month later, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, finding that the FBI name check procedure which had delayed their applications was not authorized by statute and was thus reviewable as an administrative procedure. USCIS filed an emergency motion to stay the order and was denied. Plaintiff was naturalized on March 12, 2008, at which point the parties agreed to dismiss the case as moot. The court entered the stipulated order of dismissal on March 20, 2008. The case is closed.

Summary: After waiting nearly three years for his naturalization application to be fully processed, plaintiff petitioned the court to compel U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services to grant him a citizenship interview and render a decision on his application. The court concluded that, "overwhelmed by these applications, (the government had) adopted a strategy of favoring delay by litigation" and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff.


On May 18, 2014, inmates at the Clackamas County Jail (CCJ) filed this class action lawsuit against Clackamas County and one of its senior Department officials. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for strip and visual cavity searches conducted on pre-trial detainees and convicted inmates at the CCJ beginning in May 2012. The plaintiffs sought compensatory damages on both individual and class-wide basis, as well as punitive damages. They also sought a declaratory judgment that the strip search practices of the County were unconstitutional. Lastly, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Clackamas County and its officials from continuing to implement the strip and visual cavity searches in group and public fashion without adequate privacy and reasonable suspicion. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on May 4, 2015 to add plaintiffs and claims. They then sought to amend the complaint again on February 27, 2017. The motion was denied by Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You on April 6, 2017 and that recommendation adopted by Judge Michael Simon on April 21, 2017. The defendants moved for summary judgment on November 2, 2016. They alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, and that the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue claims of unconstitutional searches on behalf of female inmates and future inmates, among others. On May 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge You granted the motion as to all claims under the Eighth Amendment and plaintiffs’ claims for constitutional violations based on the emergency search of October 10, 2012. Otherwise, the defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied. Judge Simon confirmed the order on July 23, 2018. The plaintiffs sought to certify three classes and moved for partial summary judgment on February 27, 2017. Class One included everyone who had undergone unjustified strip searches at CCJ since May 19, 2012. The two subclasses included persons undergone group and public strip searches since September 25, 2012 as well as a group of inmates searched on October 10, 2012, respectively. On May 2, 2018, Magistrate Judge You certified Class One, but only as to “the Fourth Amendment claims of male inmates at the CCJ who underwent return-from-court visual strip searches between September 25, 2012, and the date in May 2013 on which the County installed privacy panels in CCJ’s hallway.” As for the partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs’ motion was denied. The recommendations were confirmed by Judge Simon on July 23, 2018. On September 7, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. They alleged that the plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because some plaintiffs made no showing of a physical injury as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. As for the remaining named plaintiffs, the defendants alleged that none of them were in custody at the CCJ when the second amended complaint was filed. In addition, Article III of the Constitution prevented the current plaintiffs from pursuing this case on behalf of the female CCJ inmates. This motion was denied on July 23, 2018 by Magistrate Judge You. On April 10, 2019, the defendants moved to decertify the class, and on May 21, 2019, the defendants moved for imposition of sanctions. Oral argument was held on May 21, 2019 on the motion to decertify the class. On August 6, 2019 Magistrate Judge You recommended that the motion to decertify the class be granted. Magistrate Judge You also denied the defendants' motion for sanctions on the same day. The plaintiffs filed objections to the recommendation. 2019 WL 6709545 (D.Or. Aug. 06, 2019). On December 9, 2019, District Judge Simon adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations and granted the defendant's motion to decertify the class. 2019 WL 6709381 (D.Or. Dec. 09, 2019). Eight days after the order was issued, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 19-36084). On December 23, 2019, the deputy clerk of the Ninth Circuit filed an order stating that the Ninth Circuit may not have jurisdiction over the appeal because the district court's decision to decertify the class may not be final or appealable. The court ordered that within 21 days, the appellants must move for voluntary dismissal of the appeal or show cause as to why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On January 13, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a response to the order to show cause, but the Ninth Circuit (Judges William C. Canby, Ronald M. Gould, and Paul J. Watford) dismissed the appeal in a February 25, 2020 order. 2020 WL 1290290 (9th. Cir. 2020). Meanwhile, back in the district court, on October 1, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. On April 20, 2020, Magistrate Judge You issued a recommendation on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge You recommended that the motion for summary judgment should be granted in full, stating that: "1) the § 1983 claims against Sheriff Roberts should dismissed; 2) the Fourth Amendment claim against the County should be dismissed; and 3) the state claim against defendants should be dismissed." 2020 WL 2544781 (D.Or. Apr. 20, 2020) Two weeks later, the plaintiffs filed an objection to the magistrate judge's recommendations. In May 2020, District Judge Simon adopted the recommendations of Magistrate Judge You, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case with prejudice. 2020 WL 2545312 (D.Or. May 19, 2020) On June 16, 2020, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit (Appeal Docket No. 20-35544). Six days later, the plaintiffs filed a Mediation Questionnaire briefly describing the issues in the case, and the next day, the Ninth Circuit filed a mediation order saying that this case had not been selected for inclusion in the court's mediation program. As of July 2020, the appeal is ongoing.

Summary: On May 18, 2014, inmates at the Clackamas County Jail sued the county and the sheriff over their strip search policy in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments for strip and visual cavity searches conducted on pre-trial detainees and convicted inmates at the CCJ beginning in May 2012. The court granted class certification in 2018, but upon a motion by the defendants to decertify the class, the court decertified the class in 2019. The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, but the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims in October 2019. In May 2020, the court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs have appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal is ongoing.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations and individuals who opposed contraception on moral grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On October 9, 2012, two Baptist universities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. They alleged violations of their rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.) by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated their religious freedom and free speech rights by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would both defy their Baptist faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other organizations with similar religious objections. On March 8, 2013, Westminster Theological Seminary filed a motion to intervene, and the court allowed intervention. On December 27, 2013, the District Court (Judge Lee H. Rosenthal) granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim and enjoined the government from enforcing the ACA contraception insurance mandate against the plaintiffs. 988 F.Supp.2d 743. On February 24, 2014, the government appealed the case to the Fifth Circuit. On April 28, 2014, the Fifth Circuit consolidated this case with University of Texas v. Sebelius and Roman Catholic Diocese of Beaumont v. Sebelius. On January 19, 2015, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ request for hearing en banc. On June 22, 2015, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Jerry E. Smith) reversed the relevant district court holdings that the requirement to notify the government of their religious objection to the contraceptive services mandate violated RFRA. 793 F.3d 449. On July 2, 2015, the court denied the request of plaintiff Westminster Theological Seminary to stay the mandate or rehear the case. On September 30, 2015, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for rehearing en banc, but granted the plaintiffs’ motion to stay on October 7, 2015, pending filing of a petition for writ of certiorari. 807 F.3d 630. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constituted the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell. This case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. Back in the Fifth Circuit, the parties submitted a series of status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On Oct. 16, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, which the court granted on Oct. 19. Despite granting the joint motion, the parties continued to submit a series of status reports through 2018. On January 2, 2019, Secretary Azar filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. It was granted by the Court the following day. On January 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to lift the case’s stay and to amend the December 2013 order that enjoined the government from requiring them to cover certain contraceptives under the Affordable Care Act. They wanted the Court to clarify that the injunction applied to the current and ensuing versions of the regulations at issue and that it applied only to the extent that the regulations would require Plaintiffs to violate their beliefs. This motion was prompted by developments regarding the regulations at issue. In late 2017, the government issued Interim Final Rules (IFR) revising its stance on the accommodation granted to religious employers regarding contraception. Two courts have since issued nationwide preliminary injunctions against the expanded religious exemption under the APA: Pennsylvania v. Trump, 2017 WL 6398465 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2017); California v. HHS, 2017 WL 6524627 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2017). To avoid creating confusion or conflicting obligations, the Court deferred ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion, pending developments in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Third Circuit. On August 2, 2019, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion without prejudice, which would give the plaintiffs the opportunity to renew their motion as long as they could explain the impact of any opinions from several identified, related cases. As of May 14, 2020, there has been no docket activity subsequent to this order.

Summary: In 2012, two Baptist universities filed this RFRA challenge to rules adopted under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom and free speech rights by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their group health insurance plans. The district court enjoined the rule, and the defendants appealed. The appeal eventually reached the Supreme Court as part of Zubik v. Burwell, deciding whether the exception to the contraceptive services mandate for nonprofit religious organizations violated RFRA. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases consolidated in Zubik to their respective courts of appeals, and it ordered that the parties be given time to come to an agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. 136 S.Ct 1557. In this case, the parties agreed to dismiss the appeal, but the trial court expressed reluctance to conclude the case until separate challenges to the current versions of the ACA's rules are resolved.


On January 12, 2017, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Alleging a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers in deprivation of people's rights under the United States Constitution and federal laws, the United States brought this action against the Police Department of Baltimore City and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12134. The action was brought following an investigation by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). In May 2015, the DOJ opened an investigation into the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) after Baltimore city officials and community members voiced concerns about possible unlawful police practices. On August 10, 2016, the DOJ released its findings. The DOJ concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that BPD engaged in patterns and practices that violated individuals' rights under the First and Fourth Amendments and federal anti-discrimination laws, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the DOJ noted BPD’s use of excessive force, retaliation, and unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests. The DOJ also summarized how BPD’s policies and procedures disparately impacted African Americans. Additionally, the report highlighted how BPD infringed on individuals’ First Amendment right to free expression, engaged in gender-biased policing when investigating sexual assaults, and used unreasonable force against those with mental health disabilities in violation of the ADA. These problems developed from poor training, policies, supervision, and accountability measures. The report emphasized the importance of rebuilding trust within the community and including Baltimore citizens in the reform process. In response to the DOJ’s findings, BPD and the City of Baltimore entered into an Agreement in Principle to work on creating a judicially-enforced consent decree that would help resolve the problems uncovered during the DOJ investigation. The Agreement in Principle outlined several key areas that the future consent decree should address, including: policies, training, data collection, and analysis; technology and infrastructure; officer support; and community policing strategies. On January 12, 2017, the same day that the United States filed its complaint with the district court, the parties filed a proposed consent decree and a joint motion for settlement and entry of the agreement. The court (Judge James K. Bredar) provided an opportunity for public comment on the proposed consent decree and held a fairness hearing. During the hearing, held on February 1, 2017, the government asked for more time to consider the proposed consent decree, presumably in light of the change in administration, requesting additional time to “assess whether and how the provisions of the proposed consent decree interact with [certain post-agreement] directives of the President and the Attorney General." The Trump Administration did not want to continue enforcing many consent decrees, a stance that was made official by Attorney General Sessions' November 2018 memo. Judge Bredar's order entering the consent decree found this "problematic," stating that it:
 "would be extraordinary for the Court to permit one side to unilaterally amend an agreement already jointly reached and signed. Moreover, early in the Court's review of the joint motion, but after the new administration was in office in Washington, the Government affirmed its commitment to this draft and urged the Court to sign it. The Defendants, for their part, continue to urge entry of the proposed decree, consistent with the earlier joint submission. As between the parties, this case is settled."
 The court entered and approved the consent decree on April 7, 2017, retaining jurisdiction over the consent decree until its termination. 249 F.Supp.3d 816. According to the consent decree's terms, it terminates upon the court's determination that the defendants have achieved full and effective compliance, and have (a) maintained such compliance for one year in the areas of the community oversight task force; interactions with youth; transportation; First Amendment; technology; and coordination with school police; and (b) have maintained such compliance for two years in the areas of community policing and engagement; stops, searches, arrests, and voluntary police-community interactions; impartial policing; responding to and interacting with people with behavioral health disabilities or in crisis; use of force; handling of reports of sexual assault; supervision; misconduct investigations and discipline; and recruitment, hiring, and retention. On October 3, 2017, the court approved the appointment of Kenneth Thompson as the independent monitor of the consent decree. 282 F.Supp.3d 897. Over the next year, the monitoring team worked with the parties to develop a monitoring plan, and the court held quarterly public hearings and approved certain minor modifications to the consent decree, mostly in respect to deadlines. See, e.g., 290 F.Supp.3d 420 (D. Md. 2018). The first public hearing to review progress toward “full and effective compliance” with the Consent Decree was held on April 13, 2018. The monitoring team submitted its first semiannual report on July 18, 2018, the contents of which were discussed during a July 26, 2018 quarterly hearing. Much of the first year under the consent decree was devoted to establishing an implementation plan, so the monitor's first semiannual report found that it was too early in the reform process to gauge BPD’s progress toward satisfying the vast majority of the Consent Decree’s requirements, because BPD was still in the preliminary, preparatory stage of reform. For example, BPD had not yet finished revising its policies, much less implementing and training officers on them. The monitor did express a primary concern that, "although BPD and City leadership are, to their credit, fully committed to reform, it is not yet apparent whether BPD has the capacity to implement the linchpin requirements of the Consent Decree." Notable elements of the report included its emphasis on the need for structural reform of BPD's Office of Professional Responsibility, finding that BPD needed to revamp OPR's basic operational model to improve the fairness, objectivity, thoroughness, and timeliness of its investigations. The monitor also highlighted the pressing need for a disciplinary system, finding BPD’s system for holding officers accountable for misconduct to be "broken." The report also outlined BPD's response in the aftermath of the shooting of a BPD detective, who was found dead in the Harlem Park neighborhood of Baltimore. The monitoring team conducted an independent review of the BPD's response to the shooting, noting that while it was too early to be a reflection on compliance, the BPD's actions did raise some serious concerns and would provide a vital learning opportunity to the BPD going forward. In evaluating the BPD's conduct in establishing and enforcing a perimeter around the neighborhood, the monitoring team had concerns about whether BPD command staff and supervisory officers were adequately ensuring adherence to Fourth Amendment requirements and corresponding consent decree provisions. The monitor found the response to the shooting to confirm the need for a culture change within BPD around stops, searches, and arrests.

Summary: On January 12, 2017, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers in deprivation of people's rights under the United States Constitution and federal laws. The complaint was filed at the same time as a joint motion for entry of a proposed consent decree, both the result of a DOJ investigation beginning in 2015. The consent decree was approved on April 7, 2017, and monitoring and implementation of the consent decree's provisions is ongoing.


On November 1, 2005, non-union employees who paid compulsory union fees, filed this class-action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the California State Employees Association (CSEA) in the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation and private counsel, sought immediate injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages, claiming that the defendant violated public employees' rights, privileges, and immunities under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant violated the constitutional safeguards compelled by Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986) by failing to properly notify employees of a temporary dues increase to fund political activities through the “Emergency Temporary Assessment to Build a Political Fight Back Fund.” On November 2, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion to set a date for a preliminary injunction hearing and for a temporary restraining order to stop the defendant from taking money from the plaintiffs' fees for political use and to place that money into a separate escrow account. Judge Morrison C. England granted the plaintiffs' motion for the temporary restraining order on November 8, 2005, recognizing that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the restraining order was not granted, and granted a hearing on their motion for preliminary injunction. 2005 WL 3031622. Because Judge England granted the temporary restraining order, he denied further relief through a preliminary injunction on November 8, 2005. 2005 WL 3031622. On October 31, 2006, Judge England granted the plaintiffs' class certification request, deeming the plaintiffs adequate representation of the class. The certified class consisted of individuals who pay compulsory fees to CSEA who are not members and who have, at one time or another, specifically objected to the use of their agency fees for politics or other non-bargaining activities. The plaintiffs represented two classes of nonunion employees: those who objected to the Union's notification to deduct money for non-bargaining purposes and those who did not. On February 12, 2007, Judge England denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment filed on September 29, 2006 on the grounds that CSEA’s evidence of its notification and procedure of using the non-members fees for political purposes did not meet the constitutional safeguards laid out by Hudson, and therefore did not warrant judgment as a matter of law. 2007 WL 516263. The plaintiffs’ filed a motion for summary judgment on July 13, 2007, arguing that the evidence proved the defendant failed to comply with the constitutional standards of Hudson. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on July 17, 2007, alleging that the class of plaintiffs who did not object to the use of their money for political purposes should be precluded from bringing suit because they failed to make a timely objection to the defendant’s notice of this procedure, which constituted, as a matter of law, their consent to the procedure. Judge England denied the defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment as to the non-objector class, but granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on March 27, 2008. Judge England stated that the first notice the defendant’s referred to could not possibly have supplied the essential information with which nonmembers could make an informed choice of whether or not to object to the deduction. The Union was ordered to issue a proper notice as to the deductions for political purposes, with a renewed opportunity for nonmembers to object to paying the non-chargeable portion of the fee and to issue appropriate refund with interest. Judge England ordered this second notice not because the first notice could not conceivably cover any assessment or dues increase, but because the actual notice in this case was inadequate to provide the essential information regarding the specific deduction for political purposes. 2005 WL 3031622. The defendant submitted its amended notice of appeal of the District Court’s denial of summary adjudication as to the class of non-objectors on August 26, 2008. The Ninth Circuit (David R. Thompson, Sidney R. Thomas, Clifford Wallace) reversed the District Court’s ruling on the motions for summary judgment on December 10, 2010, concluding that the union’s notification complied with the Hudson procedural requirements. 628 F.3d 1115. Back in District Court, on February 15, 2011 Judge England ordered, in accordance with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, reversal and denial of the defendant’s partial motion for summary judgment, the granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the reversal of the award of nominal damages to the plaintiff. However, the plaintiffs appealed the Ninth Circuit decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 27, 2011. Writing for the majority, Justice Alito reversed the Ninth Circuit decision and remanded the case back to the Ninth Circuit on June 21, 2012. Justice Alito held that <i>Hudson<i> requires that any fee-collection procedure be tailored to minimize the infringement on First Amendment rights and the defendant in this case failed to meet this standard. The notice was insufficient and charging nonmembers fees to be used for “electoral purposes,” even if they would be paid back had they chosen to opt out after the relevant period, was a violation of the First Amendment. 567 U.S. 298. On remand, the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court opinion and remanded the case back to the District Court for further proceedings. On December 4, 2012 the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and ordered the defendant to refund the plaintiffs all money extracted from the assessment period with interest, as well as pay nominal damages in the amount of one dollar within 120 days of the order. The defendant was required to check in with the court every thirty days to update on its progress. The plaintiffs’ moved for attorney’s fees on January 2, 2013, which Judge England granted on June 5, 2013. The plaintiffs were awarded $ 1,201,176.00 in attorney’s fees and $15,412.93 in expenses. A supplemental motion for attorney’s fees was denied by Judge England on April 16, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by California state employees against the California State Employees Association, Local 1000, Service Employees International Union, AFL-CIO, CLC claiming unlawful deduction of membership fees for political use. After an appeal to the US Supreme Court, the case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were awarded a refund of the money inappropriately used for political purposes, with interest, as well as nominal damages and attorney's fees.