On July 12, 2000, fourteen developmentally disabled Alabama residents filed a lawsuit under the Medicaid Act (Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq.), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and 28 U.S.C. §§2201 et seq. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation (DMH/MR), its Commissioner, and the Alabama Governor in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants failed to ensure that (1) the development of appropriate residential placement services, day habilitation services, and/or other services; (2) Plaintiffs could apply for and receive these services with reasonable promptness; (3) these services were made available to the plaintiffs in the same manner as the services were provided to other similarly situated Medicaid assistance recipients in Alabama; and (4) Plaintiffs received these services. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on behalf of developmentally disabled persons who applied for services under Alabama's Home and Community Based Waiver Programs and (1) were found eligible for such services but either did not receive them with reasonable promptness or received services that were inadequate or inappropriate; (2) were deemed ineligible and not given notice or an opportunity for hearing; or (3) did not receive a claims determination with reasonable promptness. On October 24, 2008, the Court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as to the first subclass but granted it as to the second and third subclasses. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation agreed "to provide additional notices and procedures on a system-wide basis." Susan J. v. Riley, No. 2:00-cv-918-MEF, 2009 WL 2259524, at *1 (M.D. Ala July 29, 2009). As part of the settlement agreement, the parties filed a joint motion to decertify the two subclasses, which the Court granted on July 29, 2009. As the Court explains, "The combination of system-wide relief and decertification would have the effect of allowing the benefits of the settlement to reach all class members (and other persons who are not class members) without the otherwise attendant burdens of issue and claim preclusion." Id. Subsequent to the Settlement Agreement, the parties filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal With prejudice, and on August 10, 2009, the Court dismissed the case. The PACER docket does not reflect any further activity.

Summary: This case was brought by a class of developmentally disabled Alabama residents against the Alabama Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, its commissioner, and the Alabama governor. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with Medicaid services in violation of the Medicaid Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties reached a private settlement, in which the Department agreed to provide additional notices and procedures on a system-wide basis, and subsequently filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on August 3, 2009.


On September 1, 2000, developmentally disabled individuals who were eligible to receive Medicaid services, but who had not received such services, filed a lawsuit under the Medicaid Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, against various Illinois state officials. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that Defendants failed to provide Medicaid services with reasonable promptness. Plaintiffs lived with their parents in northern Illinois and were eligible for intermediate care facility/developmentally disabled (ICF/DD) level of care funding. Plaintiffs wished to move from their parents' homes and receive residential services, but there were no slots available in any facility in northern Illinois. To receive residential services, Plaintiffs would have had to move to a facility in southern Illinois. Living on the other side of the state would have imposed financial and time constraints on Plaintiffs' families. On May 2, 2001, the Court (John F. Grady) granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' ADA claim, but denied the motion as to the other Counts of the Complaint. On February 25, 2002, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing and denied the motion for class certification as moot. Boudreau v. Ryan, 2002 WL 314794 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2002). The Court held that Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring the case because Defendants had no obligation under the Medicaid statute to provide ICF/DD services in close proximity to Plaintiffs' family homes. The Court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act. On the same day, the Court entered final judgment for Defendants. On April 7, 2003, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Posner) held that Plaintiffs' Medicaid claims failed on the merits, even though the District Court had improperly characterized the dismissal as being because of a lack of standing. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003). The Court then set aside the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA and remanded to District Court. The Seventh Circuit directed the District Court to determine whether Illinois had a plan oriented towards preventing isolation and segregation of developmentally disabled adults. On June 30, 2004, the District Court granted the parties' motion to dismiss with prejudice. Each party was to bear its own costs. The case was closed, and there has been no further litigation.

Summary: This case was brought by developmentally disabled adults against various Illinois state officials alleging that Defendants failed to provide Medicaid services with reasonable promptness. The case was dismissed pursuant to a stipulation between the parties in June 2004; whether Plaintiffs received relief is unclear.


On February 2, 2011, two immigrant workers , represented by represented by public interest law firms and private counsel, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the sheriff of Orleans Parish. The plaintiffs were held in the Orleans Parish Prison for more than 160 and 90 days, respectively, because of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) hold requests, which were supposed to be limited to 48 hours according the federal agency's rules. On August 9, 2013, a consent judgment was entered by the District Court (Magistrate Judge Sally Sushan). Under the terms of the settlement, Orleans Parish Prison agreed to decline all ICE hold requests except on specific serious crimes. For individuals with those charges, the sheriff must defer to the recommendation of the criminal court. In addition, the Orleans Parish Sheriff agreed not to investigate an individual's immigration status. Finally, the terms prohibited ICE from conducting investigations into civil violations of immigration law in the jail, and instead required ICE to provide reasonable notice and opportunity for the individual's attorney to be present at any interview. The sheriff paid the plaintiffs $30,000 as compensation for physical pain and suffering and emotional distress, which made the plaintiffs the prevailing party for purposes of adjudicating attorney fees and costs. The parties began proceedings regarding attorney fees on September 9, 2013.

Summary: On February 2, 2011, two Louisiana residents filed a lawsuit alleging that the Orleans Parish Sheriff had held plaintiffs for approximately 164 and 91 days after the expiration of their respective ICE detainers, in violation of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and that they were falsely and negligently imprisoned in violation of state law. The parties reached a settlement whereby the Orleans Parish Prison agreed to adopt and implement a new policy on ICE procedures.


Parolees in custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) filed this class-action lawsuit against MDOC on August 14, 2017. They alleged that MDOC was failing to educate parolees about their right to a hearing; failing to screen parolees to determine whether they qualified for a court-appointed attorney; and failing to provide other procedural rights during the parole revocation process. The plaintiffs, alleging that these failures amounted to a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Represented by the MacArthur Justice Center, they sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen R. Bough. The lead plaintiff was eight months pregnant when parole officers arrested her for leaving her residential drug rehab program early. Her parole officer led her to believe that it was in her best interest to voluntarily waive her rights to all formal hearings, as a condition for early release. She was not informed of her right to an attorney when she signed a form waiving her final revocation hearing, and she believed that if she signed the waiver she would be released in time to deliver her baby outside of jail. Instead, she was sent to prison, where she remained until five months after her baby was born. On September 18, 2017, the plaintiffs sought class certification of all parolees that faced or would face parole revocation hearings in Missouri. They filed an amended complaint on October 12, 2017. MDOC moved to dismiss the amended complaint on October 26, 2017, claiming:

that the plaintiffs’ claims were speculative;
that MDOC had no authority to provide counsel for parolees;
that all claims were barred by judicial immunity;
that parole board orders could be directly reviewed, and that judicial review was therefore inappropriate;
that the Younger doctrine required the federal court to refrain from interfering with pending state judicial proceedings; and
that the Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity protected MDOC from damages claims.
On December 5, 2017, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class, holding that they had not met the commonality and typicality requirements for class certification. On December 15, 2017, the court denied MDOC’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs filed another motion for class certification on November 27, 2018; this motion was granted on January 4, 2019, defining the certified class as “All adult parolees in the state of Missouri who currently face, or who in the future will face, parole revocation proceedings.” Although the court had initially set a trial date for the spring of 2019, in December 2018 it instead ordered the case to mediation. Shortly after this order, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on December 27, 2018. They claimed that the undisputed facts demonstrated that MDOC was not providing counsel as required by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and that MDOC had failed to meet other minimal due process requirements set forth in prior Supreme Court rulings. In January 2019, the parties participated in mediation. MDOC admitted that its policies had not been in compliance with Gagnon v. Scarpelli at the time the plaintiffs filed their complaint; however, the Department had since taken corrective measures to remedy these shortcomings. MDOC requested a delayed ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, to allow further progress toward a settlement agreement. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on February 27, 2019; it is unclear whether a formal settlement agreement had been reached, or what type of remedy had been provided for class members. On May 15, 2019, a parolee moved pro se to join the class action and to proceed separately, in order to receive individual relief; the court granted this request on May 30, 2019. On November 1, 2019 MDOC sought to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The court denied this motion on December 19, 2019. The court stated, among other things, that “Defendants have failed to meet their heavy burden to establish it is ‘absolutely clear’ that Defendants’ current revised policies, procedures, and forms pass constitutional muster.” In April 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for emergency relief in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, requesting that the court issue a writ ordering MDOC to cease parole revocation proceedings. On April 15, 2020, the court held that such a write would “be beyond the scope of this case.” On August 5, 2020, the court denied MDOC’s motion to decertify the class. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, parolees in custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) filed this class action in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri. Plaintiffs alleged that MDOC’s failure to provide parolees with attorneys and other procedural rights during the parole revocation process was a violation of their right to Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2019, Judge Stephen R. Bough granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The case remains open.


On Mar. 27, 2017, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Represented by its own staff and the law firm Jenner & Block, plaintiff alleged that defendants had violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and requested injunctive relief. According to the complaint, plaintiff is a nonprofit working to safeguard freedoms of speech and of the press. Plaintiff alleged that DHS's component U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has since 2009 been authorized to conduct searches of individuals' electronic devices at the US borders, without individualized suspicion, and to detain indefinitely these devices. CBP has searched and seized thousands of devices, including those belonging to US citizens. Furthermore, plaintiff alleged, the number of such searches and seizures has risen sharply since 2015 and has especially increased since the beginning of 2017 under the new Presidential administration. The complaint explained that plaintiff was especially concerned with the effect of these searches and seizures on press freedom, because CBP has accessed sensitive information on journalists' devices. Furthermore, plaintiff was concerned that CBP was targeting Muslims for such searches. Overall, because of the general scope and effects of these searches, plaintiff believed that CBP's activity may violate the First and Fourth Amendments, and sought more information to disseminate to the public. To learn more about CBP's activity, plaintiff filed FOIA requests with DHS, CBP, and ICE, for records detailing the government's searches since 2012. Plaintiff made these requests on Mar. 15, 2017 and requested expedited processing. Plaintiff argued the topic was of urgent public interest, given the increase in border searches since early 2017, and reports of some CBP officers coercing travelers into surrendering their devices. As of the filing of the Mar. 27 complaint, none of the agencies had communicated any decision on the FOIA requests, thus failing to meet their 10-day statutory deadline to do so. Because no administrative remedies exist, plaintiff brought this injunctive lawsuit. On Mar. 28, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Apr. 19 with an update on its allegations and with the addition of CBP as another defendant. Although ICE had since granted plaintiff's expedited FOIA request, it had failed to produce any records. DHS had denied the expedited processing request with minimal explanation, and CBP had failed to respond. Defendants filed an answer on May 3. The parties submitted joint status reports on June 6, Aug. 14, and Oct. 16. Subsequent reports are due every 45 days after that. The Oct. 16 status report specified that the parties agreed that DHS' Office of Inspector General (OIG) had finished its search, and that CBP would conduct a preliminary responsiveness review by Oct. 31 and would start releasing non-exempt responsive records in mid-November. However, the parties disagreed on DHS's duty to determine the number of responsive records and to conduct a separate search for certain items, as well as how many items it could review per month. The parties also disagreed on the scope of certain ICE and CBP duties. The status report stated that, if the parties could not reach a resolution on disputed issues, plaintiff planned to move for summary judgment. The Nov. 30 status report specified that DHS would release all potentially-responsive and non-exempt records by approximately Dec. 1, and that CBP had released a first round and would release the next round by Dec. 22. The scope of ICE and CBP's obligations, as well as the general timeline for release, remained unresolved. Plaintiff requested a Court conference but defendants argued the parties could work out a production schedule themselves. The Jan. 16 status report stated that ICE would begin production in January and hoped to complete production by April. CBP and plaintiff were determining how many of the incident-level reports dealing with border searches CBP would process. As for DHS's search, the parties were discussing search terms and timeline. Plaintiff asked the Court for a status conference, whereas defendant asked to continue to file status reports. A joint status report filed on May 21, 2018 indicated that the government had processed and produced some records, and that the parties were in discussions about the scope of various requested searches. A status report filed in October indicated that production was underway and anticipated to be completed by March 2019. On July 17, 2018, Judge Chutkan ordered the parties to submit a joint report every 60 days as they negotiated the terms and timing of the plaintiffs’ FOIA request. Between June 2017 and November 2019, the parties submitted a total of fifteen joint status reports detailing the terms of the information release. On January 21, 2019, a motion to stay proceedings due to the lapse of appropriations was submitted by the defendants, which was granted the following day. Between December 2017 and May 2019, the defendants released 2,647 pages of responsive records to the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs claimed that many records were extensively redacted under the FOIA exemption, and thousands of pages were improperly withheld by the defendants. On December 2, 2019, the parties were ordered to submit cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue. On January 31, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued that the redacted information fell under the FOIA exemptions 5,6, 7(C) and (E), under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552. The plaintiffs submitted a cross-motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in opposition on March 2, claiming that the defendants had failed to provide adequate justification for withholding the documents under the FOIA exceptions and sought an order for all separable, non-exempt information to be released. After submitting three unopposed motions for extension of time, the defendants submitted a response to the cross-motion on June 12, 2020. The documents released by the government are available through this case page, below. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Mar. 27, 2017, a nonprofit organization sued DHS and CBP in D.D.C. under FOIA, for records relating to the government's searches of electronic devices of individuals stopped at the US borders since 2012. Since the litigation began, the parties have issued regular joint status reports on the progress of the FOIA disclosures. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2020 and the case remains ongoing.


On April 2, 2009, an imprisoned juvenile and a non-profit institution representing disabled persons filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Harrison County Juvenile Detention Center. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming dangerously unsafe and unsanitary conditions. Specifically, the juvenile prisoner claimed physical and psychological abuse from staff; mold, excrement and insect infestations; overcrowded facilities; excessive room confinement; as well as arbitrary and punitive discipline practices. The non-profit institution, Mississippi Protection & Advocacy System, Inc., claimed that they were denied all access to the juvenile prisoners who had a right to their services under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986. On April 20, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify class. On August 18th, 2009, a joint motion for settlement was filed. On October 13, 2009, the court (Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) granted the motion for approval of the settlement agreement, granted the certification of the class for settlement purposes, and dismissed the matter without prejudice.

Summary: On April 2, 2009 an imprisoned juvenile and Mississippi Protection & Advocacy System filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Mississippi against the Harrison County Juvenile Detention Center. The juvenile prisoner, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, claimed dangerously unsafe and unsanitary conditions. The Mississippi Protection & Advocacy System (MPAS) claimed the defendant unlawfully denied MPAS the right to exercise its federal authority and denied children with disabilities detained at the Juvenile Detention Center the right to access MPAS services. On October 13, 2009, the court (Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) granted the motion for approval of the settlement agreement and the matter was dismissed.


On July 11, 2003, the United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e, et seq. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against Town of West Terre Haute (the "Town"). The D.O.J. alleged that the defendant had violated Title VII by sexually harassing a female employee, resulting in a hostile work environment and her constructive discharge. The D.O.J asked the court to award compensatory damages for the individual employee and to require the defendant to implement an anti-discrimination program. The complaint alleges that the Town sexually harassed the defendant by: (1) making crude comments about her breasts, body and weight; (2) repeatedly suggesting that she was having sexual relations with her co-workers; (3) making threatening remarks; (4) creating, maintaining, and condoning sexual harassment and a sexually hostile work environment in the West Terre Haute Police Department; and (5) failing or refusing to promptly and effectively investigate, remedy or prevent the above conduct. A consent decree was entered and the case dismissed on March 9, 2004. The consent decree stated: (1) the Town shall not engage in any act or practice that discriminates against any employee or applicant for employment because of that employee's or applicant's sex; (2) the Town shall not retaliate against any person that has opposed any practice made unlawful by Title VII; (3) the Town shall submit a proposed written policy governing sexual harassment for the police department; (4) the Town shall adopt, implement, and publicize the agreed upon policy; and (5) the Town shall pay the individual employee compensatory damages. The court retained jurisdiction for twelve months following entry on decree. This case is closed.

Summary: On July 11, 2003, the United States Department of Justice filed this lawsuit against Town of West Terre Haute. The D.O.J. alleged that the defendant had violated Title VII by sexually harassing a female employee, resulting in a hostile work environment and her constructive discharge. A consent decree was entered forbidding the town from engaging in discriminatory practices and the case dismissed on March 9, 2004.


On April 7, 2010, the City of Memphis filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division under Tennessee state law and the Fair Housing Act against Wells Fargo Bank. The Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming that the Defendant's unlawful, irresponsible, unfair, deceptive, and discriminatory lending practices resulted in injuries to Memphis's minority neighborhoods. Two other cases -- Baltimore v. Wells Fargo and U.S. v. Wells Fargo made essentially equivalent allegations. The Plaintiffs alleged that since 2000, the Defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of targeting African-American neighborhoods in Memphis and Shelby County for deceptive, predatory, or otherwise unfair lending practices. In 2012, according to newspaper reports, the parties reached a settlement in which the Defendant agreed to pay $3 million to the city and county to support economic development and $4.5 million in grants for mortgage down payments and home renovations. The Defendant also set a lending goal of $425 million for residents of Memphis and Shelby County over the next five years. This figure included $125 million earmarked for low and moderate income borrowers. On July 3, 2012, the case was dismissed with prejudice on the plaintiffs' motion. The consent decree ran its course with no further activity in the court.

Summary: In this redlining case filed in 2012, the City of Memphis sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming that Wells Fargo Bank's discriminatory lending practices resulted in injuries to Memphis's minority neighborhoods in violation of state law and the Fair Housing Act. In July 2012 the parties reached a settlement in which Defendant agreed to pay $3 million to the city and county and $4.5 million in grants for mortgage down payments and home renovations. Defendant also set a lending goal of $425 million for residents of Memphis and Shelby County.


On May 4, 2006, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court, Western District of Wisconsin against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice, challenging the constitutionality of single-faith re-entry programs in federal penitentiaries. The Complaint alleged that the Bureau's ongoing 18-month Life Connections Program, and attempts to expand that program to include "single faith" programs, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. On September 13, 2006, the District Court (Judge John C. Shabaz) denied the defendants' motion to sever any claim relating to the Office of Management and Budget from the lawsuit. Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, the Bureau announced that it was canceling its plan to set up "single faith" programs in federal penitentiaries. The parties entered a stipulation to dismiss the case without prejudice on November 9, 2006.

Summary: On May 4, 2006, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court, Western District of Wisconsin against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Department of Justice, challenging the constitutionality of single-faith re-entry programs in federal penitentiaries. The Complaint alleged that the Bureau's ongoing 18-month Life Connections Program, and attempts to expand that program to include "single faith" programs, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Subsequent to the filing of the Complaint, the Bureau announced that it was canceling its plan to set up "single faith" programs in federal penitentiaries. The parties entered a stipulation to dismiss the case without prejudice on November 9, 2006.


On April 9, 2009, an inmate at the John J. Moran correctional facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island. He sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiff alleged that he had been retaliated against for issuing a statement in a local newspaper denouncing a Department of Corrections policy that limited publications available to inmates. Specifically, he asserted that administrators fired him from his job in the prison kitchen and destroyed his personal property. The plaintiff further claimed that, when he attempted to report the retaliation to prison authorities, administrators placed him in solitary confinement and revoked his good time and a recommendation for transfer to a less restrictive facility. Represented by the ACLU of Rhode Island and private counsel, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that these actions violated his First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He also asked for a permanent injunction to bar further violations and for monetary damages to compensate him for his harms. On April 28, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prohibit Department of Corrections employees from talking to him about the lawsuit and to enjoin the Department of Corrections from threatening and punishing him because of the lawsuit. But the temporary restraining order was denied by Judge William Smith on April 29. On May 29, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was denied as moot because on January 25, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that he had been transferred to a less safe cell block and placed in solitary confinement in retaliation for filing this lawsuit. The defendants filed a new motion to dismiss the amended complaint on March 16. On June 25, Judge Smith granted a protective order staying discovery until the motion to dismiss was ruled on. Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond issued a Report and Recommendations on the motion to dismiss on September 17, 2012. 2013 WL 773444. On February 28, 2013, Judge Smith adopted in part the Report and Recommendation. 2012 WL 7634322. Specifically, the court followed the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims because the plaintiff did not allege the "wanton infliction of [physical] pain" necessary to support such a claim. The court also followed the recommendation to deny the motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim, because the plaintiff had alleged retaliation for public speech protected by the First Amendment. Judge Smith rejected the magistrate judge's recommendation to dismiss the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim. While no single instance alleged by the plaintiff might have risen to the level of a due process issue, Judge Smith found that the incidents taken as a whole may have violated the plaintiff's rights. Following the ruling on the motion to dismiss, the parties engaged in discovery until February 13, 2015, when the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was never ruled on, because the case settled on October 27, 2015. The Department of Corrections agreed, while denying liability, to pay the plaintiff $7,500 in damages and attorney’s fees. The parties stipulated to a dismissal and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2009, an inmate of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections filed this lawsuit alleging he had been retaliated against for criticizing Department policy. In 2015, the parties reached a settlement where Rhode Island Department of Corrections, while denying liability, paid the plaintiff $7,500 in damages.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a pro se emergency action filed by an individual held at Orion Residential Reentry Centre for immediate release. The plaintiff, who is eligible for home confinement, alleged that continued confinement at Orion posed an unconstitutional risk to his life and health. On June 8, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. <hr> On May 11, an individual held at the Orion Residential Reentry Center filed a pro se action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff brought this action brought this action as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. under § 2241, an injunctive action, and as a declaratory action under § 2201-02. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that his Eighth Amendment rights had been violated because his continued confinement posed an unconstitutional risk on his life and health, and that the defendants failure to provide access to basic medical care and personal protective equipment amounted to cruel and unusual punishment due to lack of social distancing and reasonable precautions against COVID-19. The plaintiff requested immediate release with a reduction of his sentence to time-served with no modification in the term of supervised release, such that the plaintiff may be housed at his own residence. The case was assigned to District Judge Ronald S.W. Lew then referred to Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott. The following day, the case was reassigned to Judge Cormac J. Carney. On May 27, the defendants sought to dismiss the case. The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on June 8, holding that the plaintiff's claims were not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant the plaintiffs' request for compassionate release. The court found that the request could only be submitted to the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the original sentencing court.

Summary: On May 11, an individual held at the Orion Residential Reentry Centre filed a pro se action seeking release. The plaintiff alleged that his continued confinement at Orion poses an unconstitutional risk on his life and health, amounting to cruel and unusual punishment due to lack of social distancing and reasonable precautions against COVID-19. On June 8, the district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.


On April 28, 2008, inmates in the Philadelphia Prison System (PPS) filed a putative class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of Philadelphia and its Commissioner of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project and the Disabilities Law Project, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that PPS subjected inmates to dangerous, unsanitary, severely overcrowded, degrading, and cruel conditions of confinement. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that PPS's practice of housing three inmates in cells designed to hold only two--referred to as "triple-celling"--violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. On May 14, 2008 the District Attorney of the City and County of Philadelphia filed a motion to intervene, which was granted. On June 27, 2008, the City of Philadelphia filed a third-party complaint against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and against the Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, and Louis Presenza, President Judges of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas and Municipal Court, respectively. At the same time, the City of Philadelphia moved for a preliminary injunction and a motion to dismiss because the prisoners failed to join the Secretary and the judges, or alternatively a motion to join. The prisoners opposed the attempt to join the Secretary and the judges. On July 28, 2010, Judge Surrick granted the Secretary's and the judges' motion to dismiss the complaint against them and denied the City's motion to dismiss and motion for preliminary injunction as moot. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 08-1979, 2010 WL 2977485 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2010). On October 8, 2010, Judge Surrick granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, with the relevant class defined as "All persons who are or will in the future be confined in the Philadelphia Prison System, and who are or will in the future be subjected to the conditions of confinement, including triple celling, or placement in dormitories, without minimally adequate security, services or programs as set forth in plaintiffs’ Complaint." Williams v. City of Philadelphia, 270 F.R.D. 208 (E.D. Pa. 2010). On April 29, 2011, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Taking into consideration the reduction in the inmate population at the PPS that the defendants had achieved over the past two years, the settlement agreement essentially preserved the status quo and provided for monitoring of the situation by the plaintiffs' counsel for the next two years. The City defendants agreed to continue to implement the programs that haD reduced the inmate population in the PPS and to make reasonable efforts to reduce the triple-celling of inmates. The City defendants also agreed to make reasonable efforts to minimize the use of lockdowns and to provide inmates with medical and social services during lockdowns. Under the settlement, plaintiffs "reserve[d] the right to reinstate the[] proceedings during the pendency of the Settlement Agreement." On May 2, 2011, Judge Surrick preliminarily approved the settlement agreement and scheduled a fairness hearing for June 15, 2011. At the fairness hearing, counsel for all of the parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement was fair and reasonable, particularly in light of the steps the City Defendants have taken to reduce the prison population over the past two years. On August 8, 2011, Judge Surrick approved the settlement agreement. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, CIV.A. 08-1979, 2011 WL 3446954 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2011) (the approval order) and Williams v. City of Philadelphia, CIV.A. 08-1979, 2011 WL 3471261 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 8, 2011) (opinion explaining the approval). In the fall of 2012, the plaintiffs moved to reinstate the case, as was their right under the settlement, due to a rising inmate population in the Philadelphia Prison System. (Oddly, this motion does not appear in the PACER docket.) The court granted the motion on December 3, 2012, setting a period of time for discovery and directing the parties to proceed towards trial. After the reinstatement of the complaint, the parties engaged in extensive discovery. A fight over class counsel's access to members of the plaintiff class' mental health records led to an opinion granting such access, on Oct. 22, 2014. In April 2016, the City of Philadelphia received a MacArthur Foundation funding grant TAT would fund a project aimed at reducing jail population by approximately 30% over a two- to three-year period. Some of the measures funded by the grant include developing and implementing pre-arrest diversion programs for low-risk offenders, reducing cash bail amounts and increasing utilization of community-based alternatives to cash bail, providing continuity of services coordination for individuals with mental illness, and implementing administrative programs to help expedite plea offers and parole petition review. In light of developments including the MacArthur Foundation initiatives and a significant reduction in the PPS population over 2015, the parties again entered into settlement negotiations in early 2016. The court granted preliminary approval of a proposed settlement hearing on March 16, 2016, and ordered that the city defendants post the notice of class action settlement in every housing unit and in every law library in the Philadelphia Prison System. Approximately 18 inmates housed in the PPS filed objections to the proposed settlement, but most concerned conditions rather than the terms of the settlement. The parties agreed that the settlement was fair and reasonable in a May 5, 2016 fairness hearing, but the court raised a concern monitoring period. The parties submitted a revised settlement agreement extending the monitoring period during which the plaintiffs may reinstate the complaint from one year to two. Judge Surrick approved the settlement agreement on June 13, 2016. Williams v. City of Philadelphia, CIV.A. 08-1979, 2016 WL 3258377 (E.D. Pa. June 13, 2016). The settlement agreement provided that the defendants would continue making reasonable efforts to implement and operate programs, policies, and procedures designed to reduce the population at the PPS, to reduce the use of lockdowns and restricted movements, and to limit the use of triple-celling for seriously mental ill inmates and ensure that any inmates in triple cells are provide clean cells, adequate bedding, and adequate shower and toilet access. Plaintiffs' counsel had the right to inspect any PPS facilities if the population is significantly higher than that at the time of settlement, and monitored the prison population and use of triple-celling for two years. As two years have passed since approval of the settlement agreement and no further information appears on the docket, the case is now presumed closed.

Summary: In 2008, inmates in the Philadelphia Prison System (PPS) filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of Philadelphia and its Commissioner of Corrections. The plaintiffs claimed that PPS subjected inmates to dangerous, unsanitary, severely overcrowded, degrading, and cruel conditions of confinement. The parties settled in 2011, but the plaintiffs then reinstated the matter in 2012 due to concerns about a rising inmate population in the PPS. After further discovery, the parties settled in 2016 and the case is now closed after a two-year monitoring period.


On October 24, 2012, a prisoner on death row at Sussex I State Prison ("SISP") in Waverly, Virginia, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the director, deputy director and warden at SISP. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, claiming that the conditions of his confinement and the restrictive visitation policy of the prison violated the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, Due Process, and the VDOC rules and regulations. On November 2, 2012, Judge Leonie M. Brinkema dismissed the claim on the prison's visitation policy for failure to state a claim. The plaintiff appealed this decision, but the 4th Circuit dismissed the appeal on February 6, 2013, for failure to prosecute pursuant to Local Rule 45. On January 25, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment, which Judge Brinkema denied on February 20, 2013. Subsequently, both parties moved for summary judgment. On November 12, 2013, Judge Brinkema granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the Defendant's motion for summary judgment. 2013 WL 6019215. In the opinion, Judge Brinkema gave the State two options going forward: (1) provide the plaintiff with an individualized classification determination using procedures that are the same or substantially similar to the procedures used for all non-capital offenders, or (2) vary the basic conditions of confinement on death row, if only slightly, such that confinement there would no longer impose an atypical and significant hardship on the plaintiff. The State appealed this decision and moved to stay the order pending appeal. Judge Brinkema denied this motion on January 10, 2014. On December 13, 2013, Judge Brinkema ordered the State to pay attorney's fees and costs totaling $165,395.99. On March 10, 2015, the Fourth Circuit reversed both the injunctive order and the order granting fees. In an opinion by Judge Diana Motz, joined by Judge Shedd, the Court of Appeals held that the state procedure requiring all capital offenders to be housed on death row was constitutional. Although conditions were harsh, the Court said, the plaintiff had no entitlement to anything more -- and therefore no due-process-protected liberty interest in avoiding the harsh conditions. Judge Wynn dissented: Under Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005), he said, the plaintiff did indeed have a liberty interest and was therefore entitled to individualized process prior to confinement in the solitary conditions of Virginia's death row. 780 F.3d 245. The Fourth Circuit denied a request for a rehearing en banc on Apr. 7, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 24, 2012, a prisoner on death row at Sussex I State Prison ("SISP") in Waverly, Virginia, filed a lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the Eastern District of Virginia, against the director, deputy director and warden at SISP. Judge Leonie M. Brinkema ruled that that Virginia cannot automatically hold prisoners convicted of capital murder on "death row," where the harsh conditions and solitary confinement amount to an unconstitutional denial of due process. On March 10, 2015, however, the 4th Circuit reversed. There is, it held, no constitutional right to individualized process before a capital prisoner can be confined in the solitary conditions of Virginia's death row.


On August 3, 2020, the EEOC brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against Walmart alleging sex discrimination. Specifically, the complaint alleges that Walmart subjected two named plaintiffs and a class of female grocery workers to a physical ability test that disproportionately impacted female applications by denying them employment opportunities on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The lawsuit, though brought against Walmart, Inc., specifically references the conduct of the Walmart store located in London, Kentucky. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the plaintiffs filed their charges of discrimination with the EEOC. The EEOC found reasonable cause to determine that Walmart’s actions subjected a class of women to sex-based discrimination based on Walmart’s use of a physical ability test. The EEOC then issued Letters of Determination to Walmart with this finding and invited Walmart to join the EEOC in informal methods of resolution to remedy the discriminatory practices and provide appropriate relief to the plaintiffs. However, Walmart did not provide a resolution that the EEOC found acceptable, and the EEOC issued a Notice of Failure of Conciliation advising Walmart of the failed resolution. The EEOC then filed suit against Walmart. The complaint alleges that since 2010, Walmart used a selection procedure in grocery distribution centers nationwide that required grocery orderfiller applicants to achieve a competitive score on a physical abilities test. The physical abilities test was not necessary to the performance of the grocery orderfiller job function. Because women tended to receive less than competitive scores on the physical abilities test, Walmart’s use of this physical abilities test disparately and negatively affected women in the hiring process for grocery orderfillers. The EEOC asked the court for: (a) a permanent injunction preventing Walmart from using physical abilities tests to hire for grocery orderfiller positions; (b) a permanent injunction against any hiring practices, such as employment tests, that have a disparate and discriminatory impact on women; (c) an order requiring Walmart to institute new training, policies and programs that provide equal employment opportunities based on sex and that ensure that its operations are free from employment practices that discriminate on women based on sex; (d) an order requiring Walmart to compensate the plaintiffs to eradicate the effects of the discriminatory employment practices; (e) an order granting further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper; and (f) an order awarding EEOC costs for the lawsuit. By the time that the lawsuit was filed, the parties had already agreed on terms of a settlement. On August 3, 2020 the parties filed a joint motion for entry of a consent decree and on September 9, 2020, Judge Karen Caldwell granted the motion and approved the consent decree. The consent decree applies to all Walmart grocery distribution centers. The decree provides injunctive relief, including requiring Walmart to cease use and refrain from using for five years a physical abilities test for hiring orderfillers at grocery distribution centers. Walmart is also forbidden from engaging in employment practices that discriminate on the basis of sex and from engaging in employment practices that discriminate on the basis of involvement in the EEOC proceedings, the proceedings on the claim against Walmart, or any other proceeding under Title VII. The consent decree also provides significant monetary relief. The decree ordered Walmart to pay $20,000,000.00 into a Qualified Settlement Fund as part of the resolution, to be distributed to eligible claimants at the sole discretion of the EEOC. Eligible claimants include women who applied for the position of orderfiller at a Walmart grocery distribution center between February 1, 2020 and the time Walmart ceased use of the physical abilities test and who did not score competitively on the physical abilities test, and therefore did not move forward in the hiring process for the position of orderfiller. The decree also shifts the costs of a claims administrator up to $250,000.00 to Walmart, allowing a mutually agreed upon claims administrator to oversee the claims process and payments to eligible claimants. The consent decree does award the EEOC costs for the action. Further, the consent decree mandates certain training and notification requirements. The decree required Walmart to provide training to employees who have hiring or supervisory responsibilities for grocery orderfillers regarding the terms of the consent decree including the cessation of the physical abilities test, clear and accurate information about the grocery orderfiller job requirements and qualifications, and information on what constitutes unlawful employment practice under Title VII. Walmart was also required to certify compliance with certain aspects of the consent decree in writing to the EEOC. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky retains jurisdiction over the matter for two years, through September 9, 2022. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: On August 3, 2020, after an attempt to reach a settlement through a voluntary pre-litigation process, the EEOC brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky against Walmart alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleges that since 2010, in Walmart grocery distribution centers nationwide, Walmart used a physical abilities test in hiring for grocery orderfillers. Because women tended to receive less than competitive scores on the physical abilities test, Walmart’s use of this physical abilities test disparately and negatively affected women in the hiring process for grocery orderfillers. The EEOC asked the court for: (a) a permanent injunction preventing Walmart from using physical abilities tests to hire for grocery orderfiller positions; (b) a permanent injunction against any hiring practices, such as employment tests, that have a disparate and discriminatory impact on women; (c) an order requiring Walmart to institute new training, policies and programs that provide equal employment opportunities based on sex and that ensure that its operations are free from employment practices that discriminate on women based on sex; (d) an order requiring Walmart to compensate the plaintiffs to eradicate the effects of the discriminatory employment practices; (e) an order granting further relief as the Court deems necessary and proper; and (f) an order awarding EEOC costs for the lawsuit. By the time that the lawsuit was filed, the parties had already agreed on terms of a settlement. On August 3, 2020 the parties filed a joint motion for entry of a consent decree and on September 9, 2020, Judge Karen Caldwell granted the motion and approved the consent decree. All of the EEOC’s requests except for the awarding of costs to EEOC were granted by the court. The decree ordered Walmart to pay $20,000,000.00 into a Qualified Settlement Fund as part of the resolution, to be distributed to eligible claimants at the sole discretion of the EEOC. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky retains jurisdiction over the matter for two years, through September 9, 2022. The case remains ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action brought by five prisoners with high-risk medical issues held at the federal Central Arizona Florence Correctional Complex against the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s failure to implement basic social distancing and hygiene measures violated their Eighth and Fifth Amendment rights. The TRO and preliminary injunction were denied as they were sought without notice to the defendant on May 11, and again on June 2 for failure to satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement. The plaintiffs sought partial reconsideration on June 16 and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 11. The motion was granted as to the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims, but denied as to the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of the pretrial class.<hr> On May 8, 2020, five prisoners with high-risk medical conditions held at the Central Arizona Florence Correctional Complex (CAFCC)--a private facility run by CoreCivic--filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona and private attorneys, the plaintiffs brought this putative class action as both a group habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, an injunctive action, and a declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. § 2201-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged failure to implement basic social distancing and hygiene measures, failure to disclose positive cases of COVID-19, and denial of emergency grievance requests from detainees, and therefore that current confinement conditions exposed sentenced prisoners to unreasonable risks of contracting COVID-19 in violation of their constitutional rights under the cruel and unusual punishment clause. The CAFCC housed mostly pre-trial detainees, the plaintiffs also alleged that such denial of medical care subjected individuals not convicted of any crime to unconstitutional punishment against their Fifth Amendment rights. The case was assigned to Judge Diane J. Humetewa, then referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah M. Fine. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of everyone held or to be held by CAFCC. Identified in the class were the Pretrial Class, comprised of individuals pending trial or sentencing on federal criminal charges, as well as the Post-Conviction class, comprised of post-conviction prisoners. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and/or a writ of habeas corpus requiring social distancing and hygiene measures requiring an independent rule 706 expert to review existing health and safety policies at CoreCivic within 48 hours of Court’s order, and if needed, enforce expert-recommended safety procedures. They asked that if appropriate measures could not be achieved without reducing the detained population, the court issue writs of habeas corpus "on the ground that Plaintiffs’ continued detentions violate the Due Process Clause or the Eighth Amendment, and order Plaintiffs’ release." The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees. On May 11, the TRO and preliminary injunction were denied because there had been no notice to the defendants. On May 14, the defendants opposed the TRO and argued that the CAFCC had adequately responded to safeguard the health and well-being of detainees, consistent with CDC guidelines. The next day, the plaintiffs requested an independent expert inspection of the facility in light of the factual differences, and to expedite the ruling. A hearing was held for the TRO and preliminary injunction on May 22. On June 2, the plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction was denied because the plaintiffs had failed to prove deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. On June 16, the plaintiffs moved for partial reconsideration of the order, arguing that the legal standard used was meant for relief against state officials while the defendants in this case were federal officials. On July 6, the plaintiffs notified the court of thirty-nine additional confirmed COVID-19 cases at Corecivic. The defendants submitted a joint motion to dismiss on August 11. They argued that the plaintiff's claims are now moot because she has been released from custody, and that the conditions of confinement claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment should be dismissed because she has received a “formal adjudication of guilt,” and thus her rights are now derived from the Eighth Amendment. They further argued that the court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff's petition for writs of habeas corpus and that the Prison Litigation Reform Act bars the court from granting release. Lastly, they argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fifth or Eighth Amendments. On November 3, 2020, the court issued an order granting plaintiff's motion for class certification and created two certified classes: The pretrial class and the post-conviction class. On February 19, 2021, the motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The motion is granted in part as to plaintiff's claims seeking release, which were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims were also dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The motion was denied as to plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims on behalf of the pretrial class. The case is ongoing in the discovery phase.

Summary: On May 8, 2020, five detainees with high-risk medical conditions held at the Central Arizona Florence Correctional Complex (CAFCC) filed a class-action habeas action against the U.S. Marshals Service and the Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiffs alleged failure to implement basic social distancing and hygiene measures, failure to disclose positive cases of COVID-19, and denial of emergency grievance requests from detainees, and therefore that current confinement conditions exposed detainees to unreasonable risks of contracting COVID-19 in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and/or a writ of habeas corpus requiring social distancing and hygiene measures requiring an independent rule 706 expert to review existing health and safety policies at Corecivic within 48 hours of Court’s order, and if needed, enforce expert-recommended safety procedures. The TRO and preliminary injunction were denied as it was sought without notice to the defendant on May 11, and again on June 2 for failure to satisfy the deliberate indifference requirement. The plaintiffs sought partial reconsideration on June 16 and defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 11. The case is ongoing.


This is a lawsuit about whether the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) can ban individuals required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) from accessing social media and the internet. On March 12, 2020 six people required to register under SORA, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, where it was assigned to District Judge Raymond J. Dearie. The plaintiffs sued the Chairwoman of the New York State Board of Parole and the Acting Commissioner of DOCCS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, the Rutgers Constitutional Rights Clinic, and Prisoners Legal Services of New York, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs’ claimed that the defendants’ policies prohibiting them from accessing the internet and social media violated their First Amendment rights. DOCCS policy, and to a lesser extent, New York’s Electronic Security and Targeting of Online Predators Act (e-STOP), prohibits individuals required to register under SORA from accessing the internet and social media sites. These policies apply irrespective of whether the individual’s past offenses involved use of the internet or social media. In 2017, the Supreme Court struck down criminal statute that imposed similar restrictions on First Amendment grounds in Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), setting the stage for this lawsuit. After the case was filed in March 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2020, voluntarily dismissing the case with respect to one of the named plaintiffs. The legal claims, however, were identical to the original complaint. On August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On September 9, 2020, Judge Dearie granted the motion and enjoined DOCCS’s internet and social media policies with respect to individual who did not use the internet to facilitate the offense that resulted in their SORA registration. Citing Packingham, the court held that DOCCS’s blanket prohibitions denying SORA registrants access to the internet did not survive immediate scrutiny analysis. The injunction immediately went into effect with respect to the named plaintiffs. However, the defendants twice moved to temporarily stay the injunction's general application, citing the difficulty of creating a plan to implement the preliminary injunction and identifying a subset of SORA registrants who would be forbidden from accessing social media by New York's e-STOP law. Judge Dearie granted both stays on September 22 and October 9, 2020, but the second stay expired on October 16, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In the spring of 2020, several individuals under the supervision of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), who were required to register under the Sexual Offender Registration Act (SORA), filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that DOCCS's policies prohibiting SORA registrants under its supervision from accessing the internet and social media violated their First Amendment Rights. In Fall 2020, the Court issued a preliminary injunction against DOCCS's policies with respect to registrants whose offenses did not involve the internet. The case is ongoing.


On July 26, 2005, a group of current and former Boston Police Department (BPD) officers, an applicant to the BPD, and the Massachusetts Association of Minority Law Enforcement Officers filed this lawsuit in the Suffolk County Massachusetts Superior Court. The plaintiffs sued the City of Boston and the Boston Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and state law. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants engaged in discriminatory drug testing practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the hair test used to screen police officers and applicants for drug use disproportionately affected people of color, and that they were wrongly terminated, denied employment, or required to enter drug treatment programs as a result of errors in the test. The plaintiffs argued that hair tests were notorious for yielding false positives on hair samples from people of color specifically and were acknowledged by the Society of Forensic Toxicologists as being unreliable. In fact, the complaint stated, many of the candidates who were let go from BPD had alternative hair tests come up as “negative”. These flawed exams, the plaintiffs argued, were thus too imprecise, arbitrary and biased to be the basis for hiring and firing decisions. The plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction against the use of the hair test, to be reinstated with proper seniority, full back pay for the fired officers including sick leave and interest, attorneys’ fees, punitive and compensatory damages. On September 9, 2005, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts at the request of the defendants who stated the majority of the plaintiffs' claims rested in federal law. On October 7, 2005, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss. On November 4, 2005, Judge George A. O'Toole, Jr. denied their motions. Judge O'Toole granted the plaintiffs permission to amend their complaint to add two additional plaintiffs. Between 2006 and 2011, the parties engaged in numerous discovery disputes. Subsequently, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On September 28, 2012, Judge O'Toole granted summary judgment to the defendants on all counts. Judge O’Toole ruled that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of proof to show the hair test policy causes a disparate impact on the basis of race. The District Court focused on the fact that 97-99% of African Americans passed the test, while 99-100% of White officers passed. 2012 WL 4530594. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On May 7, 2014, the First Circuit ruled that there was enough evidence to show disparate impact on the basis of race under Title VII. The statistics from the use of the hair tests from 1999-2006 were analyzed by both courts. In response to the district court's conclusion that the hair test resulted in no disparate impact, the First Circuit highlighted the disparity in those who tested positive. Over the eight years evaluated in this case, 1.3% of black officers tested positive and .28% of white officers tested positive, so for this period a black officer was five times more likely to test positive than a white officer. The Circuit Court held that the statistics presented did constitute a disparate impact on the basis of race and remanded the case back to the District of Massachusetts. 752 F.3d 38. On July 21, 2014, the case was reassigned from Judge O'Toole to Judge Douglas P. Woodlock. On December 10, 2014, the defendants again requested summary judgment the District of Massachusetts. On August 6, 2015, Judge Woodlock again granted summary judgment for the defendants. He found that where a policy created a disparate impact under Title VII, the burden shifted to the employer to prove there is “Job Relatedness and Business Necessity” for the policy. Judge Woodlock found that the BPD met this burden. 118 F. Supp. 3d 425. On September 1, 2015, the plaintiffs again appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling that drug testing was necessary and related to the BPD. However, for the third prong of the test, the First Circuit vacated and remanded to the district court on to decide whether a reasonable fact finder could determine that an alternative drug testing method existed, that the alternative method would have a less disparate impact, and that the BPD refused to implement this policy. On remand, the parties reopened discovery. Judge Woodlock conducted a six-day bench trial that began on March 5, 2018 and concluded on April 28, 2018. As of April 13, 2020, Judge Woodlock has not yet ruled on the case. There has been no docket activity since November 6, 2019.

Summary: Ten plaintiffs sued the Boston Police Department under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 2005. They alleged that the hair test used to screen officers and applicants for drug use caused a disparate impact on people of color due to false positives occurring more often for African American hair. The District of Massachusetts granted summary judgement for the defendants in 2012; the First Circuit Court then overruled and remanded the case in 2014. In 2015, a new judge in the District of Massachusetts again granted summary judgement for the defendants. The plaintiffs again appealed to the First Circuit. The First Circuit affirmed the District Court in part and vacated and remanded in part. The District Court conducted a bench trial and the outcome of that trial is still pending.


This case is related to the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse's coverage of the Carter Page Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants. For more information on litigation to disclose the warrants that inspired this case, please see this link. For a summary of the warrants and information on ongoing efforts by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to protect the confidential information in them, see this link.
The FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On October 21, 2019, an informal advisor to the Trump 2016 presidential campaign filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552) and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The plaintiff, a target of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants during the campaign, asked the DOJ to release records containing information about him and the warrants against him, halt further dissemination of information about him or the warrants against him through an injunction, and refer DOJ officials responsible for "leaking" information about his warrants to the press for prosecution. Though the plaintiff got private counsel later in the case, he initially filed the case pro se, and it was assigned to Judge Kentaji Brown Jackson. The complaint stated that the plaintiff filed his initial FOIA request with the DOJ in May 2017, but he had not yet received all the relevant documents related to the request at the time of the complaint. He alleged that, instead of responding to his FOIA request, the defendant "leaked" information about his FISA warrants to The New York Times in 2018, which was "defamatory" because it was based on false claims about "collusion" with Russia. The defendants filed a motion to extend time to respond on November 25, 2019, noting that the Privacy Act and FOIA have different response timelines, and suggesting that the DOJ respond to both claims on December 23, before the Privacy Act deadline but after the FOIA deadline. Page contested this request in a motion filed four days later, alleging that the harm to his reputation as a result of the Privacy Act violations was ongoing and threatening to file for an emergency injunction if an amicable resolution was not found by December 2. The DOJ filed a responsive motion on December 2 by saying that, under this new timeline, the Privacy Act claims would be addressed before they normally would be, so the injunction was not necessary. Judge Jackson agreed with their logic, and approved the DOJ's motion to move the response date to December 23. On December 23, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss. On the FOIA claims, the DOJ argued that, because the plaintiff did not modify his FOIA request in response to DOJ questions on some of the requested documents, he had not yet exhausted administrative remedies, and therefore was ineligible to proceed with a FOIA claim as to those documents. The DOJ also alleged that the disclosure to The New York Times was not a violation of the Privacy Act, because it was done in response to the newspaper's own FOIA request and both The New York Times and the plaintiff received copies of the documents after careful consideration. For more information on efforts by The New York Times to get these documents through FOIA, please see NS-NY-0024 in this Clearinghouse. The DOJ added that the Privacy Act only allows for damages, not injunctive relief as the plaintiff was seeking. Finally, the DOJ argued that the plaintiff's broad statement that he "colluded with Russian officials" in the released FISA warrants was not a specific enough allegation of false information to constitute a Privacy Act violation. The plaintiff filed several motions to extend time to respond to this motion to dismiss in early 2020, which were all granted. The plaintiff engaged private counsel on March 25, 2020. The parties entered into settlement negotiations on May 26, 2020, which resulted in a stay of proceedings and temporarily absolved the plaintiff of any duty to respond to the motion to dismiss. A July 15, 2020 status report showed that the parties attempted to resolve their disputes, but were unsuccessful. With the settlement talks at a standstill, Judge Jackson required the plaintiff to respond anew to the DOJ motion to dismiss by September 11, 2020. The plaintiff's private counsel through the settlement negotiations were not admitted to the District of Columbia bar, and encouraged him to seek local counsel. The plaintiff's attorneys withdrew on August 11, noting in their motion that he was having difficulty in retaining local counsel on that date. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice on September 11, 2020, with each side bearing its own attorneys' fees and costs. The stipulation did not say why the parties agreed to dismiss the case, but it is possible that the plaintiff was unable to meet the court's deadline to respond to the government's motion to dismiss. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 21, 2019, an informal advisor to the Trump 2016 presidential campaign filed a complaint against the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Privacy Act seeking release of documents he requested in 2017 related to Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants against him and injunctive relief to halt the DOJ from releasing more private and untrue information about him. The DOJ filed a motion to dismiss in December 2019, noting that the plaintiff had not fully responded to questions surrounding his initial FOIA request and that releases of information about his FISA warrants were done in response to FOIA requests from <i>The New York Times</i>. The parties stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice on September 11, 2020.


On May 18, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Phoenix Industrial, Inc. and Phoenix Services. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to a racially hostile work environment because of his race, Black, and then discharged the complainant in retaliation for his opposition to the racially hostile work environment. On August 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Hayden Head) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $16,000.

Summary: On May 18, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Phoenix Industrial, Inc. and Phoenix Services. The EEOC claimed that the defendant subjected the complainant to a racially hostile work environment because of his race, Black, and then discharged the complainant in retaliation for his opposition to the racially hostile work environment. On August 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Hayden Head) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $16,000.


On November 12, 2013, a long-time legal permanent resident and Army veteran of the United States, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the FBI, under 5 USC § 551 et seq. and 28 USC §1361. The plaintiff, represented by counsel from Yale Law School's clinic, Jerome N. Frank Legal Services, sought adjudication of the plaintiff's naturalization application by USCIS, which succeeded INS; if necessary, direct the FBI to complete all required background checks; and attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that USCIS had a clear, nondiscretionary duty to timely adjudicate naturalization petitions and to notify petitioners of the disposition of their applications, and the failure to do so was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. Similarly, the plaintiff claimed that the FBI had a clear, non-discretionary duty to perform background checks on naturalization applicants. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint stated that he was brought to the United States from Italy in 1960 by his parents as a lawful permanent resident, enlisted in the Army in 1976, and after being honorably discharged, joined the National Guard and served from 1980-83. He filed a naturalization petition in 1982, which was delayed due to a pending criminal charge against him that was eventually dropped by the prosecutor. The plaintiff never received a letter requesting a copy of the certified disposition relating to the dropped charges, despite the fact that the Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) records indicate such a letter was drafted. The FBI contacted the INS, saying that it could find no record of the disposition of the 1981 charges. There was no contact between the plaintiff and INS after 1982 and INS never completed adjudication of the plaintiff's naturalization petition. The plaintiff served short sentences in 1997 and 1999 for shoplifting and was convicted of other minor, non-violent offenses. On May 14, 2011, he was arrested by ICE agents, detained, and eventually deported in November 2012. On September 17, 2014, U.S. District Court Judge Vanessa L. Bryant issued an order sua sponte dismissing the plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The dismissal was based on the court's interpretation of the plaintiff's complaint as a challenge to an order of removal and the Second Circuit ruling in Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2011), that District Courts were precluded from hearing direct and indirect challenges to removal orders (based on the REAL ID Act of 1995). The complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the court advised the plaintiff that he could file a motion to vacate the dismissal supported by a memorandum establishing that the District Court had jurisdiction. On September 17, 2014, Judge Bryant dismissed the defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgement as moot. On October 8, 2014, the plaintiff filed the Motion to Vacate invited by the district court, and on November 13, 2014, also filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (docket number 14-4362). On November 9, 2015, Judge Bryant granted the plaintiff's Motion to Vacate and the court retained the subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Upon a closer review of Delgado v. Quarantillo, 643 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2011), Judge Bryant found the case arguably distinguishable from the present matter, insofar as the plaintiff in that case was already deportable and subject to a "lifetime bar on admission" prior to her filing her Form I-212 application. In this lawsuit, the plaintiff's naturalization application long predated both the removal proceedings and the conduct underlying them, and the lifetime bar on admission to which the plaintiff in Delgado was subject was not applicable here. Judge Bryant found that it was not certain that any action taken with respect to the plaintiff's naturalization application would render the removal order "invalid," such that the application was inextricably linked to the removal order. On November 18, 2015, the plaintiff removed the appeal to the Second Circuit. In November of 2015, the defendants and the plaintiff filed cross motions for summary judgement and oppositions. On March 17, 2016, Judge Bryant denied the defendants' motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgement, granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgement and remanded the case to USCIS. She ordered USCIS review the plaintiff's application and to render a timely decision on the plaintiff's naturalization application. Judge Bryant held that the INS breached its duty to timely adjudicate the plaintiff's naturalization application and failed to comply with its statutory duty to notify the plaintiff of its denial of his request for a second interview. The defendants had violated the APA, be it by failing to render a disposition, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), or by failing to inform the plaintiff of its ultimate denial of his application, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 555(e). The plaintiff had standing and his requested relief was not clearly futile, as neither the statutes nor the regulation precluded the relief sought. The statute of limitations applicable to the plaintiff's action seeking to compel adjudication of his application had not yet commenced, and the doctrine of laches did not apply to bar the plaintiff's action seeking to compel adjudication of his application for naturalization. 170 F.Supp.3d 320. On March 22, 2016, the final judgment of the order of March 17, 2016 was entered. On May 12, 2016, the defendants filed an appeal. On October 25, 2016, the Second Circuit granted a voluntary dismissal of the appeal. Although the docket does not include the settlement, according to the plaintiff's attorney's website, the plaintiff reached a settlement with USCIS in early 2017. USCIS stipulated that the record failed to show that a particular larceny conviction on the plaintiff's record constituted an aggravated felony, under recent Supreme Court precedent, and the plaintiff agreed to submit a new naturalization application in lieu of proceeding on his 1982 application. The settlement agreement is not available. In July 2017, the plaintiff had a naturalization interview at the U.S. Embassy in Rome, where he was approved and sworn in during a military naturalization ceremony that same day. Ten days later, after almost five years away, he returned home to his family in Connecticut as a United States citizen. Giammarco v Johnson On March 27, 2017, Judge Bryant dismissed the case with prejudice. This Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 12, 2013, this lawsuit was filed by long-time legal permanent resident and Army veteran of the United States who was deported in 2012. The plaintiff sued the US Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the FBI. He sought adjudication of his naturalization application by USCIS, which succeeded INS; and if necessary, to direct the FBI to complete all required background checks. The plaintiff reached a settlement with USCIS in early 2017.


On September 27, 1993, juveniles detained at juvenile detention centers in Connecticut filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs filed under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 5633, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 29 U.S.C. § 794, against the state of Connecticut, in addition to various court administrators, detention centers and agencies. The class was composed of all present and future juveniles in the care, custody or supervision of the detention centers. The Jerome L. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Center for Children's Advocacy, Inc. at the University of Connecticut School of Law, and the Center for Public Representation represented the class. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment, alleging that the state failed to provide for juvenile detainees adequate living conditions, recreational opportunities, staffing, rehabilitative treatment, classification, evaluation, and alternative placements. Additionally, they alleged that the state failed to adopt and implement policies to provide adequate medical and mental health services, failed to provide students with an appropriate public education, and interfered with the juvenile detainees' access to their families and attorneys. They alleged that these conditions of confinement violated rights guaranteed by the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (Our copy of the complaint is missing alternate pages.) The juvenile detention centers in Connecticut were overcrowded and single occupancy rooms were often used to house several children, which in at least one instance resulted in the sexual assault of a handicapped child. The juveniles were subjected to excessive confinement often without access to bathroom facilities, which sometimes resulted in them urinating on themselves and being left in soiled clothing for extended periods of time. The juveniles were not provided with enough food and food was often withheld as punishment. There were inadequate medical and mental health services. The staff of the juvenile facilities were generally under-qualified, inexperienced, and had inappropriate training. The family and attorney visitation allowed was limited and insufficient. The education provided was generally inadequate in that the instruction time was insufficient, and there was insufficient space to accommodate a meaningful instruction program. Specifically, the education provided was inadequate for special needs children. The state also failed to seek alternative and less-restrictive placements for juveniles. Children were detained on minor charges simply because their families could not be located or were unwilling to care for the children. The detention centers were used as "warehouses" for children the Department of Children and Families could not find placement for, or to hold them until placement was found. On February 6, 1997, the District Court (Judge Robert N. Chatigny) approved a consent judgment, the details of which we have no information about. On April 15, 2002, an order extending the consent judgment to June 24, 2002, was entered by the District Court. On August 12, 2002, a stipulated agreement was substituted for the original consent judgment in recognition of the accomplishment of many of the original goals. We have no information about the specifics of the stipulated agreement regarding non-mental health issues. On June 24, 2004, the District Court ordered the parties to enter into a Joint Corrective Action Plan "to ensure that the constitutional rights of class members to adequate mental health services are safeguarded, and that the Defendants' obligations thereunder are fully satisfied." After a fairness hearing on July 8, 2005, the court approved a settlement agreement directed towards improving the provisions of mental health services to class members. The agreement is effective until September 30, 2007. The intent behind the agreement was to increase the number of class members diverted from residential placements. The settlement required the state to provide and fund multidimensional treatment foster care facilities. These placements would provide structured, individualized programs to help build on the class member's strengths, while providing clear rules, expectations, and limits. Furthermore, the settlement required access to discretionary funding, community-based services and programs, and the development of a 1.5 level group home, which provided therapeutic community living intended to serve adolescents with minimal-to-moderate behavioral disorders. On November 17, 2005, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs roughly $51,000 in attorneys fees. On December 6, 2006, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs an additional $18,500 in attorneys fees. On April 20, 2007, the plaintiffs sent a letter of non-compliance to the court monitor. On September 14, 2007, the plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their letter on the condition that the defendants signed a memorandum of agreement extending the settlement agreement to September 30, 2009. However, on September 30, 2007, the governor of Connecticut issued a press release stating that the case was closed by federal order. This order is not reflected on the case's docket sheet. However, there have been only two docket entries since September 28, 2007. In January 2008, the court ordered the defendants reimburse the monitor for work done through August 2007. And, on January 22, 2008, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs an additional $21,000 in attorneys fees. It would appear that the case is closed.

Summary: In 1993, juveniles detained at juvenile detention centers in Connecticut filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to provide for juvenile detainees adequate living conditions, recreational opportunities, staffing, rehabilitative treatment, classification, evaluation, and alternative placements. A consent decree was issued in 1997 and lasted until 2007.


On August 28, 2013, plaintiffs, a same-sex couple that resided in South Carolina but was legally married in the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Governor and Attorney General of South Carolina. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaration that South Carolina's prohibition of marriage for same-sex couples and its refusal to recognize same-sex marriages from other states violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and a permanent injunction directing the defendants to recognize the marriages of the plaintiffs and all same-sex couples married in other states. On April 22, 2014, the Court issued a stay pending the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bostic v. Rainey (PB-VA-0005 in this Clearinghouse). On October 7, 2014, the Court lifted the stay (after the Fourth Circuit found Virginia's ban of same-sex marriage unconstitutional in Bostic.) On November 10, 2014, the Court issued an Order and Opinion on Defendants' motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court found that the plaintiffs stated plausible allegations as to constitutional violations and that the defendant Attorney General Wilson was not shielded by the Eleventh Amendment; however, the Court granted defendant Haley's motion to dismiss on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, and dismissed her from the case. On November 18, 2014, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, granting summary judgment as to the claim that denial of recognition of the marriages of same-sex couples from other states violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. However, the Court denied the motion as to the claim that the refusal to recognize legal same-sex marriage violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause. On the same day the Court also denied the defendant's motion to stay pending appeal. On December 15, 2014, the defendant appealed this case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On January 6, 2015, the Court granted the defendant's motion for stay or continuance of appeal, holding the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in DeBoer v. Snyder (PB-MI-0004 in this Clearinghouse). On July 20, 2015, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The parties agreed that the defendants would pay the plaintiffs $80,000 for attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 28, 2013, plaintiffs, a same-sex couple that resided in South Carolina but was legally married in the District of Columbia, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the governor and attorney general of South Carolina, seeking a declaration against South Carolina's statues prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage and a permanent injunction directing the defendants to recognize the marriages of the plaintiffs and all same-sex couples entered into outside of South Carolina. The Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs in November 2014, and defendant Wilson appealed. On July 20, 2015, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $80,000 for attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.