COVID Summary: The Illinois Republican party sued Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker, alleging that his executive order prohibiting gatherings over ten people did not make constitutionally-required exceptions for political activity.
 This suit was brought on June 15, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs were the the Illinois Republican Party, the Will County Republican Central Committee, Schaumberg Township Republican Organization, and Northwest Side GOP Club. Represented by the Liberty Justice Center. They brought suit against Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker after he issued an executive order that banned most gatherings of over ten people in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. While the order provided for some exceptions (like religious meetings), it did not grant those same exceptions to political activity. The plaintiffs argued that the order violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. They claimed that the state's enforcement of this order against them and refusal to enforce that policy against churches represented violations of free speech contrary to the First Amendment. They also argued that the order violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause for the same reason. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the state's executive order was without legal authority -- they claimed that the Governor's emergency power was capped at thirty days. After that, he was powerless to issue these orders under the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the state from enforcing the executive order against them specifically, and declaratory and injunctive relief that would prohibit the state from enforcing the order in general. They also sought costs and attorney's fees. Simultaneously, they filed a motion requesting a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to District Judge Sara L. Ellis and referred to Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert. On July 2, the court issued an order an opinion declining to grant the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction. Judge Ellis held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits and that the balance of harms weighed heavily against them. 2020 WL 3604106. The plaintiffs immediately appealed the decision to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals. A month later, the defendant filed a motion to stay all proceedings in the district court until an opinion was rendered from the 7th Circuit. On September 3, 2020, the 7th Circuit upheld the district court's denial of a TRO and preliminary injunction.

Summary: Various Illinois GOP groups sued Illinois Governor J.B. Pritzker over his executive order in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. The executive order banned meetings of more than 10 people, but allowed for certain exemptions such as religious meetings. The plaintiffs argued that this violated the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment. They also argued that the Governor was superseding his power, because the emergency powers that he held only lasted for 30 days. After that he needed Congress to pass laws. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. On July 2, the judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. She held that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits and that the balance of harms weighed heavily against them. The plaintiffs appealed that same day. The case is ongoing as of August 24, 2020.


On November 1, 2018, a group of citizens from Honduras who had been traveling with their children to the United States to seek asylum filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, on behalf of themselves and their children. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. The plaintiffs, represented by Nexus Derechos Humanos Attorneys and private counsel, sued President Trump and all federal agencies associated with immigration under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The Plaintiffs sought class certification as “All persons (1) who are Mexican, Central American, or South American citizens (2) who are traveling to the United States or have attempted entry into the United States, whether at a designated port of entry or not, since October 31, 2018, and (3) who are seeking asylum or intending to seek asylum within the United States.” The Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgement that the Defendants had violated the Plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and that the Defendants had violated the Administrative Procedure Act by disregarding federal law, federal directives, and the Flores Settlement Agreement, as well as injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of Trump’s immigration policy. While asserting without evidence that the migrant caravan contained “many criminals” and “many gang members” and labeling the caravan “an invasion of our Country,” President Trump implemented a policy that would permanently detain the thousands of caravaners planning to seek asylum in the United States. Generally there are three possible designation for an aliens in the United States:
1. “You are an arriving alien” upon entering the United States. 2. “You are an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled.” 3. “You have been admitted to the United States, but are removable for the reasons stated below.”
Under the second and third designations, asylum seekers may be released on bond. While an immigrant designated as an "arriving alien" may be detained without a bond hearing; each of these designated persons may challenge his or her designation and seek to be re-categorized. The complaint alleged that under Trump’s policy, every immigrant arriving with the caravan would be designated as an "arriving alien," subject mandatory detention, and unable to challenge his or her designation. These immigrants would be detained and housed in tents and tent cities, with no promises by the President that such facilities would comply with laws intended to protect immigrant alien children. All immigrants would be detained indefinitely until they were sent back to Central America. The Plaintiffs argued that this “no release” policy was being used to deter asylum seekers, and that the use of detention as a deterrent to asylum seekers violated their Due Process rights. Furthermore, the Plaintiffs argued that denying immigrants any opportunity to challenge their inclusion in an immigrant category that prohibits them from seeking bond and release from detention violated their Due Process rights. Lastly, the Plaintiffs claimed that Trump and the federal agencies violated the Administrative Procedures Act by disregarding several laws and an agreement related to immigration, including the following:
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1225, which requires that applicants applying for asylum must be referred for a “credible fear interview,” and will likely be granted asylum if an asylum officer determines that the asylum seeker has a “credible fear of persecution” 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1182, which gives discretion to the Attorney General to provide bond and release asylum seekers temporarily, and ICE Directive No. 11002.1, which requires that “[e]ach alien’s eligibility for parole should be considered and analyzed on its own merits and based on the facts of the individual aliens case.” 3. The Flores Settlement Agreement, which requires that minors must be held in facilities run by licensed programs that are “safe and sanitary and are consistent with [Defendants’] concern for the particular vulnerability of minors” and must “provide access to toilets and sinks, drinking water … adequate temperature control and ventilation, adequate supervision to protect minors from others, and contact with family.”
 On January 16, 2019, the parties jointly requested that the Court stay proceedings because the appropriations act that had been funding the Department of Justice expired and the required appropriations lapsed. Absent an appropriation, the Department attorneys, including the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case, were prohibited from working on substantive matters. The lapse occurred because of a government shutdown that lasted from December 22, 2018-January 25, 2019. The Court granted the motion on January 17, 2019 and gave the Defendants an extension to file their answer. On February 7, 2019, the Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntarily dismissal without prejudice. The case is closed. Although the notice does not give a reason for Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal, it was likely because on January 25, 2019, the Department of Homeland Security issued a memorandum indicating that it would begin a process of implementing Section 235(b)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. In this process, all non-Mexican nationals who arrive on land seeking to enter the United States from Mexico illegally or without proper documentation would be returned to Mexico for the duration of their Section 240 removal proceedings and could only return to the United States as necessary and appropriate to attend their immigration court proceedings. (see the resource titled "Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols")

Summary: In 2018, a group of citizens of Honduras traveling with a migrant caravan to the United States to seek asylum filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs claimed that President Trump's plan to house all immigrants arriving with the caravan in tents until they were returned to Central America violated their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and disregarded several federal laws in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. The court stayed the case during the government shutdown, and the Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice shortly after the shutdown ended, likely in response to a memorandum issued by the Department of Homeland Security.


On October 13, 2006, the Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Centier Bank under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The DOJ alleged that Centier Bank had engaged in a practice called redlining by unlawfully failing to market and provide its lending products and services on an equal basis to majority-minority census tracts in northwestern Indiana. The DOJ specifically alleged that Centier Bank intentionally failed to serve heavily African-American and Hispanic communities in the cities of Gary, East-Chicago, and Hammond. The two parties entered a settlement agreement that was agreed to by the court on October 16, 2006. Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant-lender agreed to open branch offices during the three year term of the settlement agreement. Centier Bank will also invest $3.5 million in a special financing program and spend at least $875,000 for consumer financial education and outreach purposes. On January 5, 2010 both parties and the court (Judge Lozano) agreed to an order amending the original settlement by extending the deadline for Centier Bank to open its new branch in Hammond, Indiana. Similar cases brought forth by the Department of Justice against lenders under allegations of redlining include United States v. Old Kent Financial Corporation, United States v. First American Bank, and United States v. Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc..

Summary: The Department of Justice filed suit on October 13, 2006 against Centier Bank of Whiting, Ind., alleging that the Defendant-lender engaged in a practice called redlining. More specifically, the DOJ alleged that Centier Bank unlawfully failed to market and provide lending products and services to majority-minority census tracts in northwestern Indiana. The two parties entered a settlement agreement that was agreed to by the court on October 16, 2006. The agreement requires Centier Bank to invest more than $4.3 million and open new branches in minority neighborhoods in the northwestern portion of the state, to resolve allegations that it engaged in a pattern of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin.


On December 3, 2015, U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow) authorized a search and seizure warrant of an iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters who killed 14 people in California in 2015. However, despite the search warrant, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) was unable to access the iPhone. The encrypted iPhone was protected by a passcode that had security protocols that erased the phone’s data after ten tries. On February 16, 2016, U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles asked the district court to order Apple to assist the FBI in the investigation of the iPhone pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. That same day, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym ordered Apple to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with accessing the iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters. The order required Apple to remove the auto-erase function and the limit on the number of passwords one can enter on the iPhone. The order also indicated that Apple could be asked to write custom software to access the iPhone. See 2016 WL 618401 This case received enormous public attention as Apple formally opposed the district court’s order. In order to manage litigation, the district court decided to split this issue to its own case and reassigned the case 5:15-MJ-00451 to a new docket number 5:16-CM-00010. On February 19, 2016, the government filed a motion to compel Apple to comply with the court’s February 16 order to access the iPhone. On February 25, 2016, Apple filed a motion to vacate the order and opposition to government’s motion to compel assistance. Apple countered that government’s request for a code to access the iPhone would create a backdoor to all such devices that would be exploitable by other entities. Technology companies such as Facebook, Twitter, Yahoo, Google, Microsoft and others filed amicus briefs supporting Apple’s position in March 2016. On March 21, 2016, the government asked the court to delay the scheduled hearing, claiming that an “outside party” might be able to unlock the iPhone without Apple’s help. On March 28, 2016, the government notified the court that it had successfully accessed data stored on the iPhone and no longer required the assistance from Apple. The government officially withdrew its legal action against Apple. On March 29, 2016, Judge Pym vacated the February 16 order compelling Apple to assist agents in search. This case is closed. See this Order.

Summary: On February 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym ordered Apple to assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) with accessing the iPhone owned by one of the San Bernardino shooters. The order required Apple to remove the auto-erase function and the limit on the number of passwords one can enter on the iPhone. The order also indicated that Apple could be asked to write custom software to access the iPhone. 2016 WL 618401. On February 25, 2016, Apple filed a motion to vacate the order and opposition to government’s motion to compel assistance. On March 28, 2016, the government notified the court that it has successfully accessed data stored on the iPhone and no longer required the assistance from Apple. The government officially withdrew its legal action against Apple. The case is closed.


On 04/06/2004, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the ACLU Foundation filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of a John Doe plaintiff against the United States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Plaintiff was an internet access and consulting corporation that received a National Security Letter (NSL) from the FBI directing it to disclose names, addresses, and records of communications relating to one of its clients. Plaintiff also received a gag order forbidding it from disclosing to anyone that the FBI sought or obtained information. Plaintiff claimed that 18 U.S.C. § 2709, which authorizes issuance of NSLs and attendant gag orders, violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting the FBI from enforcing the requests in the NSL issued to plaintiff and enjoining the FBI from further use of § 2709. Many documents in the public docket are redacted pursuant to a May 2004 order. Doe v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). In July 2004, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment, and the United States moved to dismiss the complaint. In September of that year, the District Court (Judge Victor Marrero) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that § 2709 as applied violated the Fourth Amendment by effectively barring judicial challenge to the NSL request. Additionally, the nondisclosure requirement under § 2709(c) was a violation of the First Amendment as an unjustified prior restraint and content-based restriction on speech. The Court enjoined the United States and the FBI from issuing NSLs and enforcing gag orders under § 2709. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Further proceedings were stayed pending the appeal of the United States to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Meanwhile, Congress amended the nondisclosure prohibition under § 2709(c) to require nondisclosure only upon certification by senior FBI officials that certain enumerated harms may occur. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2709(c), as amended in 2008. Congress also provided for judicial review to permit NSL recipients to petition to modify or set aside the NSL. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3511(a). In May 2006, the Second Circuit vacated the decision of the District Court and remanded the case in light of the amendments. Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F. 3d 415 (2d Cir. 2006). The United States subsequently informed the District Court that it no longer sought to enforce the NSL. The District Court ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment in September 2007, finding that § 2709(c) and § 3511(b) were facially unconstitutional, notwithstanding the amendments. The District Court found that the nondisclosure requirement violated the First Amendment under a strict scrutiny standard of review. Because it found the various subsections inseverable, the District Court invalidated the entirety of § 2709(c) and § 3511(b). Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F. Supp. 2d 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). The United States again appealed to the Second Circuit. That court construed the newly amended statutes to permit nondisclosure only upon certification and to place the burden on government to demonstrate risk of an enumerated harm upon disclosure. Section 2709(c) and § 3511(b) are unconstitutional to the extent that a District Court must treat the certification as conclusive, and to the extent that they impose a nondisclosure requirement without requiring the government to initiate judicial review of the requirement. Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2009). Upon remand, in October 2009 the District Court ruled that the United States and the FBI were permitted to enforce the nondisclosure provisions § 2709(c) § 3511(b) as applied to the NSL issued to plaintiff. The plaintiff moved the District Court for partial reconsideration, and in March 2010, the Court amended its order enforcing nondisclosure. The Court directed the United States to lift the nondisclosure requirement as applied to two categories of information: material that the NSL statute identifies as permissible for the FBI to collect, and material that the FBI has publicly acknowledged it has previously requested by means of NSLs. The plaintiff appealed to the Second Circuit in May 2010, but later withdrew the appeal. On July 30, 2010, the District Court entered a stipulation and order of dismissal. The FBI stipulated that the John Doe listed on the complaint could disclose his identity and show a redacted version of the letter sent to him demanding information (document NS-NY-0004-0001 in this Clearinghouse). The FBI further stipulated that the ACLU could publish the information on their website (press release NS-NY-0004-0017 in this Clearinghouse). In return, the ACLU agreed to withdraw the appeal pending before the Second Circuit. On November 10, 2010, the ACLU motioned for attorney's fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. After several motions between the parties, the United States stipulated and agreed to pay $225,000 in attorney's fees and litigation costs to the plaintiff. The court retained jurisdiction over this case for four additional years with no activity on the docket. On April 15, 2014, the Court entered a modified stipulation and order of dismissal. The modified stipulation held that any remaining nondisclosure obligations set forth in 18 U.S.C § 2709 as pertaining to the plaintiff were lifted, except for the redacted information in the initial letter and attachment. This stipulation did not affect Doe's rights to pursue future claims under 18 U.S.C. § 3511(b). This case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2004, an internet access and consulting corporation filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the United States and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) after the FBI directed it to disclose names, addresses, and records of communications relating to one of its clients pursuant to a National Security Letter (NSL). The complaint claimed that NSLs issued under 18 U.S.C. § 2709 violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The District Court ordered the United States to alter several portions of the NSL and in July 2010, dismissed the lawsuit.


On July 17, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. HRDC sued both the former and current commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC), as well as many agents of the KDOC, all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. HRDC, a charitable organization and publisher of <i>Prison Legal News</i>, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs claimed that KDOC's policy of banning books sent to prisoners violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More specifically, HRDC alleged that KDOC prohibited prisoners from receiving books that were not directly purchased by prisoners and also prohibited them if the sender was not on a pre-approved vendors list. The complaint alleged that dozens of books sent to prisoners were censored, and that on several occasions, HRDC received notices indicating the books were rejected for a variety of reasons. On March 6 and July 17, 2018, HRDC filed a first and second amended complaint adding several defendants but making few substantive changes to the allegations or claims. After several months of discovery, the parties reached a settlement agreement and HRDC moved for the approval of this agreement on January 28, 2019. The defendants agreed to deliver all HRDC publications sent to people incarcerated in their facilities, so long as the publications were consistent with legitimate penological interests. The defendants also agreed not to reject books simply because they were not on a list of approved senders or for because they were mailed in colored envelopes. Judge Gregory F. Van Tatenhove issued an order on March 26, 2019 approving the settlement agreement of injunctive claims; retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement; and dismissing the injunctive claims against the defendants with prejudice. On July 15, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case. The court issued an order on July 17, 2019 asserting its retained jurisdiction over the execution of the settlement agreement and adjudication of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses. It dismissed with prejudice all other claims for damages and declaratory relief. After the defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and costs by arguing that it was unreasonable, Judge Van Tatenhove reduced the award slightly but largely granted the plaintiff's counsel their full requested fees and costs. 2020 WL 2513822. The final amounts awarded were $102,660 in attorneys' fees, and $2,051.37 in costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the HRDC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. HRDC the the commissioner of the Kentucky Department of Corrections (KDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. HRDC claimed that KDOC's policy of banning books sent to prisoners violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case has settled but litigation of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses is ongoing.


On December 5, 2019, Doc Society and the International Documentary Associate, U.S.-based documentary film organizations that host screenings and discussions with international partners, filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves as well as their members and partners. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. State Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Administrative Procedure Act. They objected to the State Department's new “registration requirement” that required applicants for U.S. visas from abroad to register their social media identifiers from a host of platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter. The U.S. government additionally claimed the authority to disseminate the handles abroad. The plaintiffs claimed this requirement exceeded the Secretary of State’s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act and violated their free speech and association rights. Represented by the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, and the law firm Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to declare the registration requirement to be unlawful and to enjoin the government from enforcing or relying on them. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the "registration requirement," which compels disclosure of even pseudonymous social media accounts, has chilled their freedom of expression by causing applicants to use social media less freely than they otherwise would, or refrain from using it entirely. For pseudonymous users in particular, who seek to speak anonymously about controversial issues in order to protect themselves or their families from retaliation, the plaintiffs claimed that the requirement conditioned their eligibility for U.S. visas on their readiness to surrender their online anonymity. As of January 2020, the defendants have not filed an answer and no motions were pending. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, two U.S.-based documentary film organizations filed this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedures Act against the U.S. State Department in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs objected to the State Department's new “registration requirement” that required applicants for U.S. visas from abroad to register their social media identifiers from a host of platforms. The policy also gave the Department authority to disseminate the handles abroad. Plaintiffs argued that the requirement exceeded the exceeded the Secretary of State’s authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act and violated their free speech and association rights. This case is ongoing.


On August 3, 2015, two minor children with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued the Kenton County Sheriff's Office, the Sheriff for Kenton County (in only his official capacity), and the Sheriff's Office's School Resource Officer (in his official and individual capacities) under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief and damages, claiming the defendant used unnecessary and excessive physical restraint and handcuffs on schoolchildren with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions constituted unreasonable seizure and excessive force in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs based on their disabilities and failed to accommodate their disabilities. On September 9, 2015, the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On September 30, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for judgment on the pleadings. On December 28, 2015, Judge William O. Bertelsman denied the defendants' motion to dismiss without prejudice. The Court found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded a constitutional violation in order to make out a § 1983 claim. The plaintiffs also adequately pleaded plausible claims for discrimination under Title II. In October 2016, both parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment. Additionally, the defendants filed a motion to sever the claims of the two students on September 14, 2017. Judge Bertelsman denied the defendants' motion to sever because of the substantial factual similarities between the two handcuffing situations and the existence of a common question of law: whether the elbow-cuffing of these children was unconstitutional. On October 11, 2017, Judge Bertelsman ruled on the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment. Judge Bertelsman held for the plaintiffs on their claims of unlawful seizure and excessive use of force and municipal liability against Kenton County for those violations. The Court applied the Graham factors and found that although the severity of the crime weighed in favor of the defendants, the other factors -- whether the children posed an immediate threat to themselves or others; the age and stature of the children; and the method of handcuffing -- weighed in favor of the plaintiffs. However, Judge Bertelsman ruled against the plaintiffs on their ADA discrimination and reasonable accommodation claims. The Court found that no reasonable jury could find that the defendants' handcuffing of the plaintiffs would not have occurred "but for" their alleged disabilities, as opposed to their behavior on the days in question. Additionally, Judge Bertelsman held for the defendants on the issue of qualified immunity. Although the Court said it was a close call, it found that the plaintiffs failed to show that it was clearly established that the handcuffing was unconstitutional. The Court found that the Supreme Court precedent that the plaintiffs relied on was too generalized and that the plaintiffs failed to cite to any Sixth Circuit precedent. On February 7, 2018, the defendants (in their official capacities) filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' constitutional claims under § 1983 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Before hearing oral argument on the issue of damages, the Court noted that it would take the defendants' motion to dismiss under advisement. However, following a settlement conference on April 13, 2018, the parties privately reached an agreement whereby the defendants agreed to pay more than $337,000 in damages. The Court dismissed the action with prejudice on November 1, 2018, ordering that each party must pay their own costs.

Summary: In August 2015, two minor children with disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued under to 42 U.S.C § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act against the Kenton County Sheriff's Office and the Office's School Resource Officer claiming use of unnecessary and excessive physical restraint and handcuffing on the children. In October 2017, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' ADA claims, held in favor of the plaintiffs on their excessive force claims, and held that the officers in their individual capacities were entitled to qualified immunity. In 2018, the parties agreed to privately settle the case and the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs more than $337,000 in damages.


This lawsuit grew out of Kentucky’s attempts to impose Medicaid work requirements. On August 24, 2016, the Governor of Kentucky, Matt Bevin, submitted an application under Section 1115 of the Medicaid Act to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). He requested a waiver of various Medicaid Act requirements to implement the “Kentucky HEALTH” project, which required Medicaid enrollees to work in order to receive health insurance. Kentucky also sought to increase premiums and impose other eligibility restrictions. HHS approved the waiver. In response, several Kentucky residents enrolled in the Kentucky Medicaid Program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 24, 2018. The plaintiffs sued HHS for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The plaintiffs, represented by the National Health Law Program, the Kentucky Equal Justice Center, and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs claimed the defendant’s waiver constituted an unauthorized attempt to rewrite the Medicaid Act and violated the APA. On March 29, 2018, Governor Bevin filed an unopposed motion to intervene to defend his Section 1115 waiver. The court granted this intervention and the Commonwealth of Kentucky intervened as a defendant. On March 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that the defendant lacked the authority to fundamentally restructure Medicaid through the approval of Kentucky HEALTH. The plaintiffs further argued that the defendant’s approval of the Kentucky HEALTH provisions exceeded statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious. On April 25, 2018, the defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. The Commonwealth argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that their arguments about the scope of Section 1115 and Medicaid’s objectives were demonstrably wrong, and that HHS's approval of Kentucky HEALTH’s provisions was valid. HHS argued that Section 1115 of the Social Security Act conferred broad discretion to approve state projects and that it complied with all APA standards. HHS further argued that both the plaintiffs’ challenge to the individual components of Kentucky HEALTH and their challenge to HHS’s approval letter were non-justiciable and failed on their merits. On June 29, 2018, the court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted plaintiffs’ partial summary judgment motion and denied both defendants’ motions for summary judgment. In so doing, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing, the court had the ability to review the waiver approval, and that HHS’s waiver approval violated the APA. The court reasoned that the defendants’ “signal omission” was that it failed to “adequately consider [] whether Kentucky HEALTH would in fact help the state furnish medical assistance to its citizens.” In an attempt to cure the deficiencies that the court had identified, HHS conducted further review and re-approved Kentucky HEALTH. That prompted another plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, which was filed on January 17, 2019. The defendants responded with separately filed motions for summary judgment on February 4, 2019. On March 27, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and denied both defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court again held that the Commonwealth had failed to adequately consider whether the program would help to provide adequate medical assistance to its citizens. On April 10, the defendants appealed to D.C. Circuit, which heard oral arguments on October 11, 2019. But Kentucky abandoned the Kentucky HEALTH project on December 16. The D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot but declined to vacate the district court’s judgment. That allowed the plaintiffs to seek attorney’s fees, although they have not done so as of January 2020. The case remains open to the extent that the plaintiffs can pursue attorney’s fees. This is one of a number of cases challenging Medicaid work requirements. In Philbrick v. Azar, a New Hampshire case, the court vacated the Trump administration’s approval of New Hampshire’s demand for work or community service from "able-bodied" adults enrolled in its Medicaid Program. In Gresham v. Azar and Rose v. Azar, from Arkansas and Indiana, respectively, courts similarly forbade the states from conditioning Medicaid eligibility on compliance with work requirements.

Summary: In 2018, several Kentucky residents enrolled in the Kentucky Medicaid Program sued the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs argued that HHS violated the Administrative Procedure Act in approving the Kentucky HEALTH program, which required recipients of Medicaid to work in order to receive insurance. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and the case was dismissed after Kentucky abandoned the Kentucky HEALTH program.


On May 17, 2007, attorneys who represented detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, against the National Security Agency ("NSA") and Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Center of Constitutional Rights as well as private counsel, asked the court to compel defendants to comply with requests to turn over all records of NSA's wiretapping of the plaintiffs, claiming that the plaintiffs had a statutory right to such records, and that there was no legal basis for the defendants' refusal to disclose them. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government began to intercept electronic communications, including telephone and email, of thousands of individuals, including U.S. citizens, both within and outside the United States. The surveillance was conducted without warrants, and without oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"). The surveillance program was conducted in secret until media reports in December 2005, and subsequent U.S. government acknowledgement. By separate letters to the NSA and DOJ dated January 18, 2006, plaintiffs submitted FOIA requests seeking seven categories of records. FOIA Request No. 1 sought "records obtained or relating to ongoing or completed warrantless electronic surveillance or physical searches regarding, referencing or concerning any of the plaintiffs." The defendants refused to confirm or deny whether they possessed records responsive to the request--a non-informative response known as a "Glomar Response." The other six FOIA requests did not become at issue in the litigation as the parties voluntarily dismissed claims relating to those requests on July 12, 2010. Thus, the only issue before the court was plaintiffs' FOIA Request No. 1 and the Glomar response issued by defendants. On June 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Denise Cote), granted summary judgment to the defendants as to FOIA Request No. 1. The court held that defendants' Glomar Response was lawful. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Judges Jose A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, and Edward R. Korman) affirmed the district court's opinion in all respects on December 30, 2009. The Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari on October 4, 2010.

Summary: On May 17, 2007, attorneys who currently represent or have represented detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, against the National Security Agency ("NSA") and Department of Justice ("DOJ"), to compel the product of agency records alleged to be improperly withheld despite being subject to a FOIA request. The court held that the defendants' response to the plaintiffs' FOIA request was lawful. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed and the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' perdition for certioari.


On April 9, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this complaint against defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). EPIC alleged that ICE had failed to timely respond to its FOIA request for records concerning "ICE’s purchase and use of mobile forensics devices and technology." EPIC sought injunctive relief under FOIA so as to have the responsive records released. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. EPIC argued that one of ICE's law enforcement activities was "conducting warrantless electronic device searches 'without individualized suspicion,'" and that such searches have increased at the border. EPIC contended that such searches included text messages, private emails, contact lists, photographs, and other personal information. In order to conduct such searches, the complaint stated that ICE entered into contracts with mobile forensic technology providers, such as Cellebrite, which provided the technology for accessing the desired information on electronic devices. EPIC argued that "ICE’s data retrieval techniques for mobile devices pose significant threats to privacy" by allowing ICE to gather personal information without suspicion or a warrant. Further, EPIC argued, it was not clear what happens to this gathered information after it was in ICE's possession. A joint status report filed on July 12, 2018 indicated that the government would start producing records on a rolling basis within a month. A September status report indicated that the production and its review were ongoing. A November status report indicated the production was complete and that EPIC was reviewing it. The March 2019 joint status report stated that EPIC had identified several issues in dispute, to which ICE agreed to review the withholdings to resolve or narrow the issues in dispute. After ICE provided the requested documents, EPIC notified it that there were still issues in dispute. As of the November 2019 status report, ICE had provided EPIC with 60 pages of reprocessed documents that were representative of the issues in dispute. The parties continued to work to resolve issues in the document production without court intervention. In February 2020, the parties notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues with the document production and were working towards a settlement on attorneys' fees and costs. The parties reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs in early June 2020. On June 23, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, and the court dismissed the case. The documents produced by ICE can be found on EPIC's site, here. This case is closed.

Summary: On April 9, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed this complaint against defendant U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). EPIC alleged that ICE had failed to timely respond to its FOIA request for records concerning "ICE’s purchase and use of mobile forensics devices and technology." EPIC sought injunctive relief under FOIA so as to have the responsive records released. ICE began producing documents in July 2018, and the parties continued to work out issues with the productions without court intervention through 2018 and 2019. In February 2020, the parties notified the court that they had resolved all outstanding issues with the document production. They then settled attorneys' fees and costs and stipulated to dismissal on June 23, 2020. This case is closed.


In September 2004, the Charlotte District Office of the EEOC (with participation from the Raleigh Area Office), brought this suit against Triad Clinical Laboratory, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the defendant terminated the charging party, a female employee, because of: her association with an individual who had filed a charge of discrimination against the defendant, her participation in the EEOC's investigation of the charge, and her complaints of sexual harassment. After some scheduling orders and discovery, the parties reached a tentative settlement in mid October 2005 and entered into a final settlement agreement about two weeks later. The two-year decree prohibited the defendant from discriminating or retaliating. In addition, the defendant agreed to pay the charging party $10,300. In the event the defendant resumes business operations, the decree also required the defendant to: adopt and distribute an anti-discrimination policy, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, and provide Title VII training for all its employees. The decree was entered in 2005 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: In 2004, the Charlotte District Office of the EEOC, brought this suit against Triad Clinical Laboratory, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties reached a settlement in 2005, which provided for monetary and injunctive relief.


On September 7, 2005, plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq., (ERISA) against his employer, Dun & Bradstreet Corp., in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that when the defendant switched his pension plan from a defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan on January 1, 1997 it had violated ERISA and engaged in age discrimination because his benefits were reduced compared to those awarded to younger employees because of how interest accrued in the new plan. He also alleged that the defendant had provided false and misleading information about the change. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as monetary damages. He also sought to have a class certified consisting of all other employees similarly situated. On March 30, 2006, the district court (Judge Plunkett) ordered that the case be transferred to the District of New Jersey. The defendant's principle place of business was in New Jersey and of the 5,000 putative class members only 4% resided in Illinois while most of the rest resided in or near New Jersey. The case continued in New Jersey as Finley v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp. Subsequent developments can be found in EE-NJ-0126.

Summary: On September 7, 2005, plaintiff filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) against his employer, Dun & Bradstreet Corp., in United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that modifications to his pension plan violated ERISA and age discrimination and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary damages. On March 30, 2006, the district court ordered that the case be transferred to the District of New Jersey since the defendant and most putative class members resided in or near New Jersey. Subsequent developments can be found in EE-NJ-0126.


On July 2, 2007, plaintiffs who had voluntarily dismissed their claims in a prior lawsuit styled Zhang v. Gonzales [IM-CA-0055 of this collection] refiled their claims in a new case in the U.S. District Court California Northern District. The refiled case was styled Ahmadi v. Chertoff, 07-3455-WHA. Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on August 10, 2007. The Ahamdi amended complaint alleged that plaintiffs were all long-time lawful permanent residents of the United States whose naturalization applications had been pending for over two years with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, awaiting the results of an "FBI name check." Plaintiffs asserted that the unreasonable delays caused by the FBI name check process violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought a judicial determination of naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), as well as other declaratory and injunctive relief. Attorneys with the Asian Law Caucus, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation Immigrants Rights Project, the ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Inc. and the Council on American-Islamic Relations represented the plaintiffs. Several of the plaintiffs subsequently dismissed their claims because their naturalization applications had been accepted or their FBI name checks were finally completed. The U.S. denied the plaintiffs' allegations and moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs moved for class certification on September 5, 2007. Ruling on that motion was deferred until the Court ruled on the government's motions to dismiss. On October 15, 2007, the District Court (Judge William H. Alsup) granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss. The Court refused to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction, but dismissed plaintiffs' claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment for failure to state a claim. Ahmadi v. Chertoff, 2007 WL 3022573 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2007). In April 2008, the court granted the Plaintiffs permission to file a Third Amended Complaint, and denied class action status. On July 20, 2008, in response to Third Amended Complaint and upon Plaintiffs' motion, relief was granted in the form an Order for Voluntary Dismissal, Remand, and Dismissal of Claims. USCIS had failed to adjudicate Plaintiffs' applications with the 120-day time line, which, the Court found, began to run after their naturalization interviews, contrary to the government's contention that the 120 window for adjudication did not being until after the name-check was completed. One Plaintiff was dismissed as his claim had become moot, his application was accepted, and dismissal was necessary for him to take his oath of citizenship. Remand, the effective remedy, was granted to two Plaintiffs to USCIS for instructions do adjudicate their applications within the 120 day limit. The case was to remain open until such action was certified to the court, and required to be done so by August 18, 2008. Their applications were accepted the next day. Claims regarding the APA and a writ of mandamus compelling completion of background checks were dismissed as moot per Plaintiff's argument. The case was closed on August 4, 2008, after certification of adjudication of Plaintiffs' applications.

Summary: On July 2, 2007, plaintiffs refiled previously dismissed claims with the U.S. District Court California - Northern District. Plaintiffs sought class action status, and complained of unreasonable delays in the adjudication of their applications for citizenship, particularly as regards waiting times for the FBI name-check requirement. The government had failed to adjudicate Plaintiff's applications with the 120-day time line that, the Court found, began to run after their naturalization interviews, contrary to the government's contention that the 120 window for adjudication did not being until after the name-check was completed. The Court denied class action status, but granted relief was granted in the form of remand of several plaintiff's claims to USCIS with instructions to complete the adjudication of their applications in a timely fashion, not to exceed one month. Their applications were granted the next day.


On November 19, 2013, the Department of Justice notified Mohamed Osman Mohamud, the criminal defendant in this case, that it had used evidence from a FISA warrantless wiretap in the proceedings leading to Mr. Mohamud's conviction. This was the second time the DOJ notified a criminal defendant of this information, following a new, broader interpretation of when the government was using evidence “derived from” warrantless wiretapping. These new notifications provide standing for defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the 2008 FISA Amendments Act. All the cases are available in the Criminal cases challenging FISA surveillance special collection. Prior to his arrest, the FBI had been had been investigating Mohamud for over a year after Mohamud's father had called the FBI to report his son's intent to travel to Yemen to study and his fear of radical recruiters overseas. The FBI began monitoring Mohamud's emails, particularly e-mails he was exchanging with an Islamic extremist who promoted international terrorism and violent jihad. The FBI had even interrogated Mohamud when he was prevented from flying to Alaska from the Portland airport because he was on the No-Fly list. The government claimed that during the FBI's sting operation the undercover agents proposed other, less lethal ways Mohamud could help his radical cause, but that Mohamud was steadfast. One of the main defenses that Mohamud argued was that he was entrapped. The government initiated the criminal prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on November 19, 2010. The Oregon U.S. Attorney's Office and the Department of Justice charged Mohamud with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction, against a person or property within the U.S., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332a(a)(2)(A). Mohamud, a naturalized American from Somalia, allegedly tried to detonate what he thought was a car-bomb at a Christmas tree lighting event in Portland. The bomb was a fake supplied to the 19-year-old by federal agents as part of a sting operation. On November 26, 2010, the FBI arrested Mohamud. At the start of the proceedings, the government filed a FISA notification which gave Mohamud notice that the government intended to use information obtained and derived from electronic surveillance and a physical search conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), specifically Title I and Title III. On May 7, 2012, Judge Garr King denied Mohamud's motion to disclose FISA-related material necessary to litigate the motions for discovery and for suppression of the fruit of the FISA activity. On January 31, 2013, the jury found Mohamud guilty of attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction against a person or property within the United States. Judge King rejected Mohamud's motion for a judgment of acquittal and for a new trial on April 22, 2014. On November 19, 2013, while sentencing was pending, the government filed a supplemental FISA notification informing the court that the government had used information collected under FISA section 702, a part of Title VII, a different title from what the government indicated at the beginning of the trial. Prosecutors had only just discovered that the information might have been derived from prior Title VII FISA collection. In particular, the information might have been derived from § 1881a of Title VII, which does not require the government to demonstrate probable cause that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. Unlike traditional FISA, § 1881a does not require the government to specify the nature and location of each of the particular facilities or places at which the electronic surveillance will occur. The government had based their interpretations on the Supreme Court's ruling in Clapper v. Amnesty International, NS-NY-0006 in this Clearinghouse. In light of that revelation, and in anticipation of the defendants' FISA-related motions, Judge King canceled Mohamud's sentencing. Mohamud then challenged both the government's compliance with provisions of the FISA and those provisions' very legality. In order to do so, Mohamud moved for full discovery regarding the facts and circumstances underlying surveillance and to compel immediate production to the court of classified documents related to the pending post-trial discovery motion. On March 19, 2014, Judge King denied Mohamud's motions, finding that there was no need to go beyond the procedures outlined in FISA § 1806. On June 25, 2014, Judge King issued the first district court opinion on the constitutionality of FISA section 702, upholding the constitutionality of the statute and the legality of the disclosure provided to the defendant. The court denied Mohamud's motion for vacation of conviction and alternative remedies of dismissal of the indictment, suppression of evidence, and new trial for the government's violation of the Pretrial Notice Statute. Judge King also denied the defendant's alternative motion for suppression of evidence and a new trial based on the government's introduction of evidence at trial and other uses of information derived from unlawful electronic surveillance, and the defendant's second motion for a new trial. 2014 WL 2866749. After the court convicted Mohamud for a criminal charge--an attempted use of a weapon for mass destruction--on October 3, 2014, Mohamud appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on October 14, 2014. On September 6, 2016, the Ninth Circuit (per an opinion by Judge Owens) allowed the ACLU, the ACLU of Oregon, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (collectively, "Amici") to file supplemental briefs relating to Mohamud’s constitutional challenge to FISA § 702 and the applicability, if any, of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. On October 3, 2016, Amici filed a supplemental brief in support of Mohamud and argued that the court should hold the surveillance of Mohamud as unconstitutional. However, on December 5, 2016, the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth Amendment was not violated. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the government’s acquisition of the defendant’s e-mail communications did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights and warrantless search of foreign national’s e-mails pursuant to FISA was reasonable. Thus, the court held that the government’s monitoring of the overseas foreign national’s emails fell outside the Fourth Amendment. The court also applied the incidental-overhear approach and found that “the fact that government knew some U.S. persons’ communications would be swept up during foreign intelligence gathering does not make such collection any more unlawful in this context than in the Title III or traditional FISA context.” As a result, it ruled that incidental collections occurring as a result of constitutionally permissible acquisition did not render those acquisitions unlawful. Aside from these decisions, the court also held that there was sufficient evidence of Mohamud’s predisposition to engage in criminal activity and agreed with the jury’s rejection of Mohamud’s entrapment defense, and held that government’s post-trial notification of its use of evidence obtained from electronic surveillance pursuant to FISA did not mandate suppression of evidence. Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision that held that government surveillance, investigation, and prosecution of Mohamud were constitutional, Mohamud filed to petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc, followed by the Amici's brief on February 27, 2017, which supported Mohamud’s petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. On March 16, 2017, however, the Ninth Circuit’s panel denied Mohamud’s petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc. In December 2010, shortly after the Mohamud was arrested, Attorney General Eric Holder made statements on the merits of the case to the media. As a result, Mohamud asked the court to direct the government to cease and desist from making inappropriate pretrial comments. Mohamud was concerned that these comments had compromised his ability to obtain a fair trial by unbiased jurors. On February 23, 2011, Judge King denied Mohamud's motion because there was already an applicable standard that the DOJ had to adhere set forth in the Release of Information by Personnel of the Department of Justice Relating to Criminal Civil Proceedings. Judge King made it clear that the Attorney General should not have made his comments since according to the Statement of Policy, it is inappropriate for DOJ personnel to give personal opinions regarding the supposed facts of the case or to make available a defendant's statements that could be construed as an indication of guilt. 2011 WL 654964. Previously in 2011 and 2012, the government had moved for rulings that certain classified materials potentially discoverable by Mohamud either failed to meet the standard for disclosure because they were not relevant to the defense or were otherwise subject to deletion or substitution under the Classified Information Procedures Act. Judge King ruled on the motions ex parte by filing classified orders but did not file any public orders. Mohamud then asked the court to also enter public orders that were as specific as possible in the event that appellate review was required. The government did not oppose the public filing orders but did oppose Mohamud's request for specificity in the orders preferring more general terms. On October 2, 2012, Judge King granted Mohamud's motion but with less specificity than Mohamud requested. Judge King explained that the orders were specific enough to allow Mohamud to appeal them, if necessary. 2012 WL 4594746. Next, Mohamud moved to suppress the evidence seized during an investigation by the Oregon State Police (OSP) after a student accused him of date rape. The FBI was also involved in the investigation. The evidence included statements he made and information from his computer and cell phone. Mohamud claimed that his consent for the search was not freely and voluntarily given, and the searches and seizures went beyond the scope of his consent. Mohamud also moved to suppress all evidence collected by the government in its parallel national security investigation because he claimed all evidence obtained after the OSP investigation is the fruit of evidence obtained illegally in the OSP investigation. On October 22, 2012, Judge King denied Mohamud's motion to suppress because the information that FBI learned from the OSP investigation did not taint the evidence gathered later and the that evidence gathered later had an independent source. Thus, Judge King concluded that there was no need to address the alleged constitutional violation. Judge King also found that Mohamud made the statements at the Portland airport voluntarily. 2012 WL 5208173. On January 4, 2013, after both parties objected to certain expert witnesses that the other party planned to use, Judge King ruled that he would allow all of the expert witnesses to testify at trial, but he would limit their testimony in ways explained in the opinion. 2013 WL 71806. After Mohamud's Jan. 31, 2013 conviction, Judge King denied Mohamud's motions for acquittal or new trial. Judge King held that (1) sufficient evidence negated Mohamud's entrapment defense; (2) the District Court's response to the jury note seeking clarification on the entrapment instruction did not unfairly favor the prosecution's evidence; (3) the prosecutor did not impermissibly shift the burden of proof during closing argument; (4) the District Court's admission of the Interpol notice into evidence identifying a fugitive wanted for prosecution with whom Mohamud was in contact with did not result in miscarriage of justice; (5) the recordings of meetings between Mohamud and undercover government agents were not testimonial evidence; (6) the District Court's deletion of undercover government employees' true names from discovery did not deprive Mohamud of fair opportunity to cross-examine employees; and (7) the denial of the true identity of the government operative who exchanged e-mails with Mohamud did not violate Mohamud's right to confrontation. 941 F. Supp. 2d 1303. On October 3, 2014, the court found Mohamud guilty on a criminal charge of attempt to use a weapon of deadly destruction. Mohamud appealed his conviction and sentence to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On March 24, 2017, the Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s arguments and affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding Mohamad's conviction. On July 14, 2017, Mohamud petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari; the petition was denied in mid 2018. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Marco Hernandez on June 8, 2018. Mohamud filed a motion for a writ of habeas corpus on November 8, 2018. The writ of habeas corpus was vacated in a court order dated January 28, 2020 and a copy of the order was sent to the U.S. Marshalls. On June 1, 2020, Mohamud moved to vacate or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. §2255. The parties have since engaged in a series of back-and-forth motions for extension of time to answer; thus, Mohamud's motion to vacate or correct the sentence has yet to be ruled on. The case remains open.

Summary: In 2010, the government initiated criminal prosecution of Mohamed Osman Mohamud in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon charging him with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. At the start of the proceedings, the government filed a FISA notification which gave Mohamud notice that the government intended to use information obtained and derived from electronic surveillance and a physical search conducted pursuant to FISA. When Mohamud challenged the government's compliance with the notification procedures and their legality, the district court upheld the statute and scope of required notification of surveillance under FISA Section 702. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari. Mohamud filed a motion to vacate or correct his sentence in June of 2020; the motion has yet to be ruled on and the case remains ongoing.


On August 9, 2002, an individual brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Kentucky Fried Chicken of America ("KFC") alleging unlawful discrimination in violation of Title I of the American Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. Plaintiff was hired by KFC through the Illinois Mental Program. Plaintiff alleged he was subjected to a continuous course of threats, comments, insults, ridicule, and harassment, including mistreatment at work and phone calls and personal threats to him and his family while plaintiff was at home. According to the complaint, the plaintiff notified the store's regional manager of the threats and misconduct but he local managers and employees continued to make threatening comments. On June 25, 2002, the plaintiff alleged he was forced to quit due to the harassing conditions at the restaurant and KFC's failure to correct the harassment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission issued a Notice of Right to Sue on July 11, 2002. The plaintiff brought suit and sought a permanent injunction restraining KFC from engaging in unlawful discrimination based on disability. On December 16 2002, Judge George W. Lindberg dismissed the action on plaintiff's voluntary motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(1), with prejudice.

Summary: In August of 2002, a mentally handicapped employee filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against his restaurant employer alleging harassing work conditions. The case was was voluntary dismissed, with prejudice, by the plaintiff.


On February 4, 2019, the plaintiff, a nonprofit legal aid organization providing public defense services for indigent clients in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after fire damage at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), a major pre-trial detention facility in Brooklyn, limited access to the plaintiff's clients. The plaintiff also alleged that the fire worsened living conditions at the facility. Represented by private counsel, plaintiff made its claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and invoked the Sixth Amendment right to access counsel. It sought declaratory judgment, a preliminary and permanent injunction, a hearing, a Special Master inspection of the MDC, and costs. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, after a fire at MDC on January 27, 2019, all visits were suspended for five days. The complaint alleged that visits resumed on February 3, but were again suspended indefinitely the day after. It also alleged that a temporary procedure to use different rooms for visits was not implemented. The plaintiff also wrote that the power outage resulting from the fire led to heating issues in the prison during winter. On the same day the complaint was filed, Judge LaShann DeArcy Hall granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order requiring MDC to resume normal visitation hours immediately. She added that, if the defendant could show cause that visiting hours impacted MDC security and would lead to two hours or more of interruption, the plaintiff would have at least 24 hours notice before suspension of visits occurred. 416 F.Supp.3d 249. Discovery continued on the case under the supervision of Judge Margo K. Brodie. At a March 1, 2019 hearing, Judge Brodie denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, saying that it did not have a cause of action, since Sixth Amendment claims must be brought by the person being denied counsel, and a group of attorneys is not within the "zone of interest" permitted by the APA. She offered the plaintiff an opportunity to amend its complaint, but the plaintiff declined to do so. On May 20, 2019, she dismissed the case sua sponte. The clerk filed the dismissal on June 4. Upon dismissal of the complaint, the plaintiff filed an appeal on June 18, 2019. On March 20, 2020, a Second Circuit panel composed of Judges John M. Walker, Barrington D. Parker, and Susan L. Carney vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings on the merits. They stated that the District Court failed to consider the impact of BOP regulations on attorneys accessing clients in its APA zone of interest analysis. 954 F.3d 118. The appellate panel urged the parties and the District Court to refer this case to mediation. During a March 23, 2020 telephonic hearing, the parties agreed to mediation under the guidance of former U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch. Mediation is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, the plaintiff, a nonprofit legal aid organization providing public defense services for indigent clients in federal cases, filed this suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) after fire damage at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), a major pre-trial detention facility in Brooklyn, limited access to its clients. The case was initially dismissed sua sponte after the District Court Judge found no cause of action under the Sixth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, and the Second Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Second Circuit recommended mediation, and mediation is proceeding under the guidance of former U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch.


On May 19, 2004, inmates at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the Georgia Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The class action suit, brought on behalf of inmates who were currently or would be incarcerated in the future at the Fulton County Jail facilities in Atlanta, sought compensatory and punitive damages along with declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the inmates were confined in unconstitutional living conditions due to an excessive number of inmates in the jail, an inadequate number of detention officers to ensure their safety, the breakdown of the ventilation, plumbing and laundry systems, and other circumstances. The plaintiff class was represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and additional private counsel. The conditions at the jail were described in a report of Dr. Robert Griefinger dated May 31, 2004. Dr. Greifinger was a consultant with regard to health care at the jail, initially for the United States District Court and then for Fulton County. The parties agreed that Dr. Greifinger's report accurately described the conditions at the jail. Pursuant to the Consent Order of the District Court (Judge Marvin H. Shoob) on July 7, 2004, the parties agreed to the appointment of a Receiver by the Court. On July 14, the Court appointed a Receiver to take charge of the jail. On December 21, 2005, the Court entered a Consent Order which provided the terms and conditions necessary to ensure constitutional compliance by the jail. The terms of the Consent Order set minimum staffing levels, staff training procedures, inmate population limits, inmate processing requirements and other inmate housing requirements. The Consent Order also covered inmate visitation, medical care (including prescription medication, mental health care and dental care requirements), inmates with physical disabilities, safety and emergency procedures and inmate grievance procedures. The Consent Order also appointed a Court Monitor. In December 2005, Georgia Public Defenders challenged the transfer of inmates at the jail to distant locations in a separate case filed originally in state court: Georgia Public Defender Standards Council v. Freeman, 1:05-cv-03286-MHS (N.D. Ga) (JC-GA-0024 in this Clearinghouse). That case was removed to federal court where a separate Consent Order was entered on February 28, 2006, after it was consolidated with the this case (Harper v. Bennett). The Court Monitor filed his First Quarterly Report on May 15, 2006. After the Monitor's Fourth Quarterly Report, the plaintiffs filed a Memorandum on Compliance on June 22, 2007. In the Memorandum, the plaintiffs commended the Sheriff and the County for the progress that had been achieved in many areas covered by the Consent Order. However, the plaintiffs stated that in some areas, especially in areas related to the safety and security of inmates and staff, full compliance with the Order had not been achieved. After the Seventh Quarterly Report, the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on July 10, 2008. The Court mentioned that nearly two-and-a-half years after the Consent Order, the Sheriff was still not in compliance with many of its mandates, including requirements in such critical areas as staffing and security, population limits and housing, provision of medical services, and timely release of inmates. The Court ordered that the Sheriff appear in Court and show cause why he should not be held in contempt. On August 22, 2008, the Sheriff filed a Status Report Pursuant to Court Order. In his Report, the Sheriff Freeman acknowledged his failure to comply with the Consent Order in the critical areas of jail staffing and population. However, the Sheriff contended that his efforts have been hampered by Fulton County's failure to authorize funding for all the staff positions needed and for outsourcing pretrial inmates to other jails. Fulton County denied any lack of adequate funding. On January 26, 2009, the Court issued an Order concerning the County's decision to cut the Sheriff's FY09 budget, stating that if the necessary funding was not provided, the County defendants might be held in contempt. On January 4, 2010, the Sheriff filed a Status Report Pursuant to Court Order describing the steps he was taking to eliminate inmate outsourcing and to provide adequate space for all Fulton County inmates. The monitor continued to file quarterly reports. On January 29, 2013, the Court denied the defendant's motion for prospective relief on the grounds that the jail had yet to address two pressing issues within the jail: the understaffing and the malfunctioning locks. And stated that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of plaintiffs' federal rights, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation. On October 10, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a class motion for the defendants to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. The motion supported this point by discussing how the appointed monitor, Mr. Calvin Lightfoot, plainly stated in his reports to the Court that the defendants have violated the Consent Order by forcing detainees to sleep on the floor of their housing units, by failing to staff all mandated posts in the Jail, and by continuing to detain people in cells whose locks are broken or compromised. The plaintiffs sought an order imposing monetary sanctions until compliance with the Consent Order was achieved, and requiring the defendants to submit a plan to the Court to bring themselves into compliance with the Consent Order. On November 25, 2013, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion that the defendants must show cause as to why they should not be held in contempt. The court found that the defendants were clearly in violation of the Consent Decree as overcrowding, understaffing, and poor facility maintenance continued to be the norm at the jail. A show cause hearing was to be scheduled for the near future, wherein the Chairman of the Fulton County Commission and the Sheriff of Fulton County will be required to attend the hearing in person. On February 3, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion to remove the show cause hearing from the calendar and decided to hold a status conference in its place. This joint motion was granted in an order on February 4, 2014. On May 12, 2015, the Court issued an order granting the defendants' motion that all prospective relief be terminated. Based on the evidence of the jail conditions presented by the defendants and the testimony of the Court Monitor the Court found that the defendants were in compliance with the Consent Decree. Based upon the evidentiary record, the Court could not find that there were current and ongoing violations of the plaintiffs’ federal rights. As such the civil case against the defendants was terminated. Plaintiffs did not appeal.

Summary: In 2004, inmates at the Fulton County Jail in Atlanta, Georgia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued Fulton County and the Georgia Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. §1983 challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged unconstitutional living conditions. In 2005, the court entered a consent order which remained in effect until 2015, when the court terminated the case.


On July 28, 2004, female police officers filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, against the police chief, the Wichita Police Department, and the City of Wichita in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs alleged that they were discriminated against and asked the court for relief in the form of damages and an injunction against future discriminatory actions. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, denied promotions or the ability and opportunity to be meaningfully considered for promotions, denied proper training opportunities, and denied terms and conditions of employment that are commonly granted to similarly situated or less qualified males. In October of 2004, the court (Judge Monti L. Belot) dismissed claims against the police chief in his official capacity and claims against the Wichita Police Department. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30727 (D. Kan. 2004). The plaintiffs continued with their claims against the police chief personally and against the City of Wichita. According to the PACER docket, the court (Judge Belot) denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification on September 29, 2005. On April 27, 2007, the court (Judge Belot) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2007 WL 1246223 (D. Kan. 2007). On December 22, 2008, the appellate court reversed the trial court's summary judgement with respect to the hostile work environment and retaliation claims of one of the plaintiffs but upheld the judgement against the other plaintiffs. Semroth v. City of Wichita 304 Fed.Appx. 707 (10th Cir. 2008). The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice on June 1, 2009. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 28, 2004, female police officers filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, against the police chief, the Wichita Police Department, and the City of Wichita in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. the plaintiffs contended that they were subjected to a hostile work environment, denied promotions or the ability and opportunity to be meaningfully considered for promotions, denied proper training opportunities, and denied terms and conditions of employment that are commonly granted to similarly situated or less qualified males. In October of 2004, the court (Judge Monti L. Belot) dismissed claims against the police chief in his official capacity and claims against the Wichita Police Department. On April 27, 2007, the court (Judge Belot) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 2007 WL 1246223 (D. Kan. 2007). After the appellate court reversed the summary judgement with respect to one of the plaintiffs, that parties jointly stipulated to dismissal of the case with prejudice. The case is now closed.


On October 10, 2001, the plaintiff, an inmate at the Oneida Correctional Facility in New York, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. The plaintiff filed pro se (though counsel began representing the plaintiff in 2004) and brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a number of defendants, including the commissioner of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") as well as other DOCS officials. The case was before Judge David Hurd. The plaintiff claimed that these officials violated his First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights by requiring him to participate in a Sex Offenders Rehabilitation Program that required him to give a detailed account of his sexual history and to admit responsibility for the instant offense. The plaintiff first alleged that requiring him to admit responsibility and disclose their entire sexual history as a condition of the program violated the Fifth Amendment because it could incriminate him and subject him to further criminal charges. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that his refusal to participate in the program would lead to additional consequences, including: higher classification status under Megan's Law, a loss of good time credits, denial of his parole consideration, and other loss of privileges such as organizations and programs and transfers to other facilities with better trade programs. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order prohibiting DOCS from mandating a detailed written disclosure of a participant's instant offense and sexual autobiography. The plaintiff also alleged that this practice violated a Fourth Amendment right to privacy. On April 15, 2004, after almost three years of litigation over procedural questions such as the form of the complaint and various discovery disputes, the Court granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's second amended complaint. The Court dismissed the plaintiff's privacy claim, Equal Protection claim, Due Process claim, and Fifth Amendment claim to the extent that it relates to the denial of parole. However, the Court did not dismiss the plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claim related to the loss of good time credits. The defendant argued that because participation in the program was not part of the plaintiff's sentence, but instead was only recommended, there was no compelled self-incrimination. The Court rejected this argument with respect to the Fifth Amendment claim based on the threatened loss of good time credits, explaining that labeling the program "recommended" or "voluntary" did not necessarily determine if the plaintiff was compelled for Fifth Amendment purposes. That same day, the Court granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction on that Fifth Amendment claim, holding that while the plaintiff was not entitled to a preliminary injunction restoring his lost good time credits, the plaintiff was entitled to an order enjoining defendants from requiring participants, as part of the SOCP, to divulge a history of sexual conduct, including illegal acts for which no criminal charges had been filed. On April 23, the Court amended that to issue a system-wide preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from denying any prisoner good time credits based on a refusal to provide his sexual history so as to be eligible for SOCP. The defendants appealed, and in June 2004, the Second Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending the defendant's appeal of the District Court's order. Around this time, the plaintiff moved to certify a class, which was held in abeyance for some time pending a determination of the appeal before the Second Circuit. However, that stay on the motion for class certification was lifted on February 1, 2005, after plaintiff filed to lift the stay and defendants did not oppose. The District Court went on to grant the motion for class certification, this time over opposition from the defendants, on February 15, 2005. The Class was defined as "Current or former New York State prisoners who have lost or been denied good time credits or have been threatened with the loss or denial of good time credits because of a refusal to admit guilt to criminal sexual conduct as part of the Sexual Offender Counseling Program." On March 22, 2006, the Second Circuit ruled on the appeal regarding the district court's system-wide preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from denying good time credits based on a refusal to provide his sexual history so as to be eligible for SOCP. The Circuit Court vacated and remanded on the grounds that the district court had not complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)'s requirement that a trial court state its findings and conclusions explicitly when granting or denying a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the Circuit Court held that the district court's findings were not clear with respect to whether DOCS denied good time credit as an automatic and direct result of a prisoner's refusal to provide the requested sexual history. Donhauser v. Goord, 181 Fed.Appx. 11, 2006 WL 1525720 (2nd Cir. Mar. 22, 2006). Some years of further litigation, which focused largely on discovery and other procedural matters, passed before the parties proposed a class action settlement agreement on March 13, 2008. Objections to the agreement were filed under seal with the Court, and on September 23, 2008, the Court directed the parties to submit a revised Private Settlement Agreement. The parties did so on October 3, 2008. Two weeks later, the Court approved the October 3 revised private settlement agreement as "fair, reasonable, and adequate," and dismissed the class action with prejudice. In the settlement agreement, defendants denied all allegations regarding any violations of the class member's Fifth Amendment rights, but agreed to provide inmates admitted to the SOCP program with a "Limits of Confidentiality, Partial Waiver of Confidentiality and Acknowledgment" form that set forward the program's policy with respect to confidentiality and reporting requirements. Significantly, this form would disclose to inmates that they were not required to admit the commission of a particular crime, whether that crime resulted in the present commitment or not. Instead, inmates could successfully complete the program by discussing behavior in general terms without: providing the full names of victims; disclosing the exact dates, times, or places of the sexual offending behavior; or admitting to any specific crime or the violation of any specific section of the penal law. However, successful completion of the program did require inmates to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for the conduct that resulted in conviction and demonstrate an understanding of their sexual offending behavior and cycle of abuse. The form also informed inmates that no written or oral statements made by them in conjunction with treatment services rendered in connection with the SOCP could be used against them in any subsequent criminal proceeding. Finally, it forbade inmates from revealing in any subsequent criminal proceeding any information disclosed by another inmate in a group therapy session or otherwise disclosed in conjunction with treatment services rendered as part of the SOCP program. The agreement also provided for compliance monitoring by plaintiff's counsel, and for defendants to pay plaintiff's counsel $28,920 in attorney's fees. Finally, the agreement was set to remain in effect for a period of 2 years from the date it was signed by the parties. After that, consistent with provisions of 18 USCA § 3626(b)(2), the terms and conditions of the agreement would automatically cease to bind the parties, and all claims on behalf of the plaintiffs would be discontinued and dismissed with prejudice. In 2009, a class member filed a motion to reopen the case and alleged that the defendants violated the preliminary injunction issued in 2004. However, because that injunction had been vacated by the Second Circuit, the District Court treated the motion as a request under the settlement agreement, and denied the motion to reopen the case, finding that the request was premature because the settlement's requirement that class members give defendants notice before bringing a claim had not been met. As the agreement was positioned to automatically cease in 2010, the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2001, the plaintiff, an inmate at a New York State correctional facility who was denied good time credits based on a failure to participate in a sex offender rehabilitation program, filed this lawsuit challenging the facility's practice of requiring inmates to admit guilt regarding their sexual offenses and divulge a complete sexual history. The plaintiff alleged that this compelled disclosure violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In 2005, the litigation became a class action, with the class defined as: "Current or former New York State prisoners who have lost or been denied good time credits or have been threatened with the loss or denial of good time credits because of a refusal to admit guilt to criminal sexual conduct as part of the Sexual Offender Counseling Program." The parties eventually settled in 2008. The settlement provided for, among other things, notice to any inmates that wished to participate in the program that would inform them that they could do so without admitting to the commission of any particular crime. This notice would also inform inmates that any information they disclosed during the program would not be used against them in any subsequent criminal proceedings. The settlement was set to expire after two years, and there is no reason to think that it has been extended.


On February 2, 2016, a class of St. Louis County residents, primarily impoverished and African-American, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ArchCity Defenders and the Center for Constitutional Rights, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that St. Louis County Police maintained a practice of issuing arrest warrants excessively and without judicial oversight. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that police officers issued arrest warrants, referred to as “Wanteds,” without seeking any judicial determination on probable cause. The “Wanteds” were visible to law enforcement throughout the state and beyond, and remained active indefinitely. The complaint alleged that this was an unaccountable exercise of police power that was particularly devastating to the largely impoverished black residents of St. Louis County. The case was initially assigned to Judge Carol E. Jackson. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on July 8, 2016, naming two additional plaintiffs. The parties engaged in discovery throughout 2016 and 2017. On July 28, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge John A. Ross. On August 25, 2017, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs moved to certify a class, requesting certification of two classes: Class 1, consisting of "all persons who, since February 24, 2011, have been arrested pursuant to a Wanted issued by Defendants without a judicial determination of probable cause either prior to or promptly after their arrest, including those persons who were arrested without probable cause; and Class 2, consisting of "all persons who, since February 24, 2011, have been the subject of a Wanted issued by Defendant St. Louis County and have been denied procedural remedies to quash the Wanted." Oral argument on the motions for summary judgment and class certification was held on February 28, 2018. On March 9, 2018, Judge Ross entered an order of recusal, stating that "on the Court’s own motion and after further review of the case, I have determined that I should disqualify myself to avoid any potential appearance of impropriety." The case was reassigned to Judge Henry Edward Autrey that day. Judge Autrey ruled in favor of the defendants on the earlier cross-motions for summary judgment on October 15, 2018. He found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for their actions, and, since all claims against the officers were dismissed, the claims against the city were dismissed alongside them. He did not provide an opinion on the class certification, since all complaints were dismissed. He allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, which they did on November 5, 2018. The plaintiffs maintained claims against a series of officers and the city on similar facts as the initial claim. They also maintained a request for class certification. However, they brought new claims, including a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claim of unlawful seizure, a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claim of retaliation, and a Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of liberty without due process claim. After this new complaint was filed, some of the defendants filed for summary judgment for their individual actions in January. Judge Autrey granted in part and denied in part the motion on March 15, 2019 (2019 WL 1227460). He disposed of the Fifth Amendment claims against all defendants, because he stated that there was no evidence of the plaintiffs invoking the Fifth Amendment in the complaint or in discovery. Judge Autrey dismissed some of the unlawful seizure complaints as it related to defendants that could prove probable cause, but maintained the complaints against others that could not. Finally, he maintained the deprivation of liberty claim against all defendants. Litigation is ongoing in the case. The parties filed a joint status report with the District Court on May 29, 2020.

Summary: On February 2, 2016, a class of St. Louis County residents, primarily impoverished and African-American, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued St. Louis County and the St. Louis County Police Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments and asking the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages. The case is ongoing.