On December 4, 2007, lawful permanent residents whose naturalization applications were not timely processed filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the new regulatory requirement that the FBI name check every application had caused lengthy delays in adjudication of naturalization applications. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the National Immigration Law Center and the ACLU of Southern California as well as attorneys from the firm Munger Tolles & Olson. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as class certification. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants' failure to complete the adjudication of their applications violated the timeliness requirements of the APA. Plaintiffs who had completed their naturalization interviews alleged that defendants had violated 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) by failing to adjudicate the applications within 120 days of the date of the examinations. Plaintiffs also raised due process claims, alleging that defendants had violated their rights with a pattern, practice and policy of failing to timely complete FBI name checks and failing to make a final judgment on the application. Finally, plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA because defendants' 2002 expansion of the FBI name check constituted a "rule" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 551(4), but they did not provide a notice-and-comment period prior to implementing the rule. On November 6, 2009, the court (Judge David O. Carter) approved the parties' settlement agreement. The settlement applied to certain naturalization applicants who applied within USCIS District 23 (including Los Angeles, Santa Ana, and San Bernadino Field Offices), who have had an interview, and whose application remains pending for more than 180 days due to the noncompletion of the FBI name check. The settlement required the government to adjudicate seventy percent of the applications within ninety days and ninety percent of the applications within 180 days. The agreement also provided for three sets of limited reports by USCIS to plaintiffs' counsel regarding the status of the naturalization applications. On October 5, 2010, the court dismissed the case with prejudice in accordance with the settlement agreement where the parties had completed all obligations imposed by the agreement.

Summary: In 2007, lawful permanent residents whose naturalization applications were not timely processed filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the DOJ, DHS, FBI, and USCIS. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' delayed violated the APA, INA, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2009 and the case was closed in 2010 following compliance with all the settlement obligations.


On June 27, 2018, the American Immigration Council filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), the U.S. Customs & Border Protection ("CBP"), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") under 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). The plaintiff sought injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff sought to compel the disclosure of records regarding the separation of families who arrive at the U.S.-Mexico border. The statutory deadline for a response had expired, and the defendants had failed to make a determination on the requests as required by FOIA. This case was assigned to District Judge Royce C. Lamberth. The plaintiff claimed there was an urgent need for information regarding the defendants' current policies and practices regarding the treatment of noncitizens (many of them seeking asylum) who arrive as family units at the U.S.-Mexico border and, in many cases, have been prosecuted and separated. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants had been the primary decisionmakers in the implementation of this policy and in the initial separation of families. As such, the plaintiff claimed that records explaining the defendants' policies and practices were of vital importance to the public's understanding of the implementation of family separation. On August 29, 2018, Judge Lamberth ordered the defendants to produce a Vaughn Index with a supporting motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgement, as appropriate. A Vaughn Index is a document that agencies prepare in FOIA litigation to justify the withholding of information under a FOIA exemption. On September 21, 2018, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay the proceedings. None of the defendants had completed processing the plaintiff's FOIA requests. The defendants forwarded to the plaintiff proposed search terms to be used in completing the FOIA searches. The plaintiff stated that it would respond to the defendants' proposals on or before September 28, 2018. Judge Lamberth granted the motion and stayed the proceedings until October 15, 2018. Judge Lamberth also ordered the parties to file a proposed schedule for further proceedings on or before October 15, 2018. After this stay and another short stay due to a lapse in government appropriations in early 2019, the parties continued filing status reports. On August 30, 2019, the parties proposed a discovery schedule where DHS, ICE, and CBP would process 500 pages of material per month in response to the plaintiff's search requests. The parties promised to provide more status updates at the end of the year regarding the state of discovery on this schedule. The parties released a joint status report on December 3, 2019; ICE and CBP met their processing goals, and DHS largely transferred the work to its component offices when it found relevant records. The plaintiffs contested part of ICE's disclosure, saying the agency unnecessarily delayed in telling them that it would be unable to process certain subparts of the FOIA request due to the volume of documents involved. Both parties filed proposed orders with the status report; the plaintiff's proposed order asked for ICE to continue with 500 pages a month of discovery, while the defendants only asked for further joint status reports in early 2020. Questions over ICE's compliance with the discovery schedule continued into 2020; in a March 20, 2020 status report, the plaintiffs again questioned the delay in compliance and ICE reiterated that the volume of documents was greater than anticipated. The parties' proposed order from this status report reflects the positions from late 2019. The court sided with the plaintiff's view on March 23, 2020, ordering ICE to provide updates on processing in line with the proposed schedule from 2019 every six weeks. The next status report is due June 22, 2020.

Summary: On June 27, 2018, the American Immigration Council filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the U.S. Customs & Border Protection (“CBP”), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) under 5 U.S.C. § 552, the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). The plaintiff seeking injunctive relief, sought to compel the disclosure of records regarding the separation of families who arrive at the U.S.-Mexico border. The parties agreed to a discovery schedule and are regularly filing status reports. The case is ongoing.


On November 19, 2020, three noncitizens filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) on behalf of themselves and all individuals who had been or would be harmed by a USCIS policy that required applicants for immigration benefits to fill in every response field on their applications, even fields that did not apply to them. This “blank space” policy led USCIS to reject thousands of applications. Some rejected applications had only one blank response field. Others included the phrase “not applicable” in lieu of “N/A,” another policy violation. USCIS also failed to notify applicants when their applications were rejected. Consequently, many benefit seekers––including abandoned and abused children, survivors of domestic violence and human trafficking, and asylum seekers––missed deadlines and lost the ability to obtain benefits for themselves, their children, and other family members. Represented by National Immigration Litigation Alliance (NILA), Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP), and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued USCIS and DHS under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The government allegedly violated the APA by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for the blank space policy, failing to follow proper procedures when adopting the policy, and defying USCIS regulations. The plaintiffs argued that the policy served no legitimate purpose and was adopted only to prevent vulnerable immigrants from obtaining immigration benefits. Per the complaint, the plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting USCIS from enforcing the policy and requiring USCIS to notify individuals whose applications were rejected as a result of it. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification the same day that the complaint was filed. The case was assigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. As of December 20, 2020, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: On November 19, 2020, three noncitizens filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security on behalf of themselves and all individuals who had been or would be harmed by USCIS’s “blank space” policy, which required applicants for immigration benefits to fill in every response field on their applications, even fields that did not apply to them. Represented by National Immigration Litigation Alliance, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and the Van Der Hout law firm, the plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Mandamus and Venue Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, alleging that the government violated the APA by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for the policy, failing to follow proper procedures when adopting the policy, and defying USCIS regulations. The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting USCIS from enforcing the policy and requiring USCIS to notify individuals whose applications were rejected as a result of it. This case is ongoing.


On April 27, 2012, residents at a state-run facility for women with developmental disabilities filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of the women in their facility in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey under Section 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504") against the state of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for various forms of injunctive relief, claiming that the state was in violation of the ADA, Section 504, the Medicaid Act, and plaintiffs' substantive due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that discharges or transfers were being forced upon plaintiffs without their consent, or the consent of their guardians or families; that plaintiffs were being discharged from the Vineland Developmental Center to other settings in violation of Section 504's mandate that the state implement its services and programs in "the most integrated setting appropriate" to meet plaintiffs' needs; that defendants have not met plaintiffs' needs under their multidisciplinary plans according to the Medicaid Act; and that plaintiffs' substantive due process rights were being violated by placing plaintiffs in other settings, subjecting them to an increased likelihood of injury and death from abuse, neglect, error, and lack of appropriate services. On March 19, 2013, the Court (District Judge Renée Marie Bumb) granted the State's motion to dismiss, stating only that it was granting the motion for "the reasons stated at oral argument." No transcript of the proceeding is available. The Court allowed plaintiffs 45 days to file an amended complaint. However, on May 2, 2013, plaintiffs asked the Court to grant a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiffs stated that they would "wait until the inevitable harm by the State becomes more evident and imminent," and that they would "seek to restart or to revive this litigation when appropriate." The Court granted plaintiffs' request and dismissed the action on May 6, 2013.

Summary: In April of 2012, a group of developmentally disabled women residents of a state-run facility filed a class action lawsuit against the state of New Jersey alleging violations of their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, various Medicaid statutes, and their substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution. The action was dismissed in March of 2013, and rather than filing an amended complaint, plaintiffs sought voluntary dismissal, stating they would revive the litigation when the harms alleged became more evident and imminent. The request was granted and the case dismissed in May of 2013.


On December 17, 1992, twenty-three school-aged pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail in Illinois filed this class action lawsuit under the Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection Clause, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, on behalf of all current and future pretrial detainees confined in the divisions of the Cook County Jail who were or would be entitled under state or federal law to free regular or special education services (approximately 2274 students). The lawsuit was brought against the city of Chicago, Cook County, and the state of Illinois. Named defendants included the Illinois State Board of Education of the City of Chicago and the Superintendent of the Chicago Public Schools. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Northwestern University School of Law Legal Clinic and the Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, sought injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fees. They alleged that the defendants had denied the plaintiffs' rights to educational services by (1) completely denying special education to those educationally disabled plaintiffs whose needs for such services the defendants failed to identify; (2) denying special education needed by plaintiffs who had been identified as needing such services because of failure to provide sufficient teachers, programs and related services among the population; (3) denying appropriate, individualized special education services to disabled students; (4) denying regular education services to the majority of eligible plaintiffs; and (5) denying to those plaintiffs who were eligible and received regular education services, such services as were equal to eligible children who were not pretrial detainees. On August 20, 1993, the District Court (Judge John A. Nordberg) denied the state defendants' motion to dismiss, ruling that the plaintiffs had stated valid claims under both the Equal Protection clause and the substantive component of the Due Process clause. Donnell v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F.Supp. 1016 (N.D.Ill. 1993). In May 1994, the United States filed a Complaint in Intervention seeking to enforce a settlement agreement which had been entered into by the City Defendants and the U.S. Department of Education in August 1992. The City Defendants had failed to (1) make available free education to all detainees under 21 who did not have a high school diploma, were in need of special education services, and had been given permission to participate by prison officials; and (2) implement procedures for screening and evaluation. The United States and the plaintiffs apparently reached a tentative settlement agreement with the defendants regarding liability and attorney's fees and court costs. The State and Chicago defendants acknowledged liability for fees and costs, but the County Defendants asserted that they were not liable for fees and costs. The County defendants moved for partial summary judgement on the issue of monetary liability. On April 25, 1995, the District Court (Judge Nordberg) granted the County defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the County defendants were not liable for the plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs or for the cost of the court expert appointed to monitor the settlement. Donnell v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., No. 92 C. 8230, 1995 WL 248111 (N.D. Ill. April 25, 1995). On August 10, 1995, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. The agreement included a monitor who reported on the defendants' compliance with the settlement agreement. On November 8, 2000, Judge John A. Nordberg dismissed the case with leave to reinstate within thirteen months. In 2002, the plaintiffs and the US moved to reinstate the case. In 2003, the plaintiffs agreed to withdraw their motion for reinstatement and the parties reached a private settlement agreement. According to the terms of the agreement, the court retained jurisdiction for 14 months in case one of the plaintiffs moved to reinstate the case. None of the plaintiffs did, and on October 21, 2004, the court finally dismissed the case.

Summary: In 1992, school-aged pretrial detainees in the Cook County Jail in Illinois filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that the State, County, and City failed to provide free regular or special education services. In 1995 the parties settled the case. After years of implementation and monitoring, the case was dismissed in 2004.


On February 16, 2010 several students and pro-affirmative action groups filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California challenging Proposition 209. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Proposition 209 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claim that the harsh restrictions that Proposition 209 puts on affirmative action denies the Plaintiffs the chance for an equal and integrated education. On December 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Samuel Conti) granted the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, holding that Proposition 209 did not classify individuals based on race, but rather banned it, and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 5094278 (N.D. Cal. December 8, 2010). The Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 2, 2012, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Silverman) affirmed the District Court, noting that just because Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) allowed an affirmative action program doesn't mean that affirmative action programs may not be banned. Rehearing en banc was denied on May 11, 2012. It does not appear the Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. The case appears to be closed.

Summary: On February 16, 2010 several students and pro-affirmative action groups filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California challenging Proposition 209 under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. On December 8, 2010, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on April 2, 2012.


The plaintiffs in this action are Texas residents whose driver’s licenses had been suspended. They brought suit against the Chairman of the Texas Department of Public Safety Commission in his official capacity on December 5, 2018. The Commission suspended the plaintiffs’ licenses through a Driver Responsibility Program. The program had forced 1.4 million Texans to pay hundreds or thousands of dollars each year for up to three years after an offense. The plaintiffs filed the class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by Equal Justice Under Law and the Austin Community Law Center, the plaintiffs alleged that the Driver Responsibility Program discriminated against indigent Texans. They claimed that the program violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process and equal protection, and violated longstanding principles that a person should not be penalized for inability to pay. To address these violations, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. They asked the court to prevent the Texas Public Safety Commission from issuing or processing license suspensions for unpaid surcharges, and to order the commission to reinstate licenses that had been suspended for failure to pay fees associated with the Driver Responsibility Program. On March 6, 2019, the state filed a motion to dismiss the case. While the motion was pending, Governor Greg Abbott signed Texas House Bill 2048 into law, which repealed the Driver Responsibility Program. The court (Judge Xavier Rodriguez) declared the case moot on September 3, 2019.

Summary: The Texas Public Safety Commission suspended the plaintiffs' licenses after forcing them to pay expensive fees for a Driver Responsibility Program in addition to their court fees. The plaintiffs in this suit filed a class action to secure injunctive and declaratory relief. In March 2019, a new Texas law was enacted, repealing the Driver Responsibility Program and rendering the case moot.


On September 5, 2017, three named and two anonymous transgender service members and a transgender rights nonprofit filed this lawsuit against the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and other federal officials in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The case was transferred to the Eastern District that same day. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights and GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In June 2016, the Department of Defense (“DOD”) announced it would implement a new policy allowing transgender people to serve openly in the United States military. In reliance on this policy change, many transgender individuals came out to their chain of command without incident. On July 26, 2017, President Trump changed course, announcing on Twitter that the United States Government would no longer allow transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a directive issued by President Trump to the DOD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on August 25, 2017 that formalized this policy. The directive required the departments to exclude transgender people from federal military service, ban the accession of transgender people into the U.S. military, and prohibit the funding of sex reassignment surgical procedures as part of health care for transgender service members. The plaintiffs sought a court declaration that the directive was unconstitutional as well as an injunction on the enforcement of the directive; they also sought attorney’s fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ August 25, 2017 directive discriminated against the plaintiffs by excluding them from military service and denying them equal health benefits based on their sex and transgender status, in violation of the Equal Protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the discrimination was unconstitutional because it lacked a rational basis, was arbitrary, could not be justified by a rational government interest, and was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest. The plaintiffs also alleged that the directive would deprive the plaintiffs of their right to privacy and their protected interests in continued military service without any rational basis, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the directive violated the plaintiffs’ rights of free speech and expression under the First Amendment by impermissibly restricting, punishing, and chilling speech that would identify the plaintiffs as transgender people. On October 2, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on enforcement of the directive, alleging that enforcement would impose irreparable harm on the plaintiffs by violating their constitutional rights and by sending a damaging public message that transgender people are not fit to serve in the military. On October 23, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On December 22, 2017, Judge Jesus G. Bernal denied the motion to dismiss and granted the preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction enjoined the defendants from excluding individuals from military service on the basis that they are transgender; it also prohibited them from denying access to medically necessary treatment on a timely basis, or otherwise subjecting individuals to adverse treatment or differential terms of service on the basis that they are transgender. The President issued a new memorandum on March 23, 2018 to revoke his August 25, 2017 memorandum and allow the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to implement a new policy. In light of the changed circumstances, the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the same day. They claimed the challenge to the 2017 memorandum was moot because the new policy did not categorically exclude transgender individuals from military service, but only disqualified individuals with a certain medical condition. The plaintiffs filed an opposition on April 25, 2018 arguing that the new policy discriminated in the same way as its predecessor. On September 18, 2018, Judge Bernal denied the defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. 331 F. Supp. 3d 990, 993 (C.D. Cal. 2018). The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit on November 16, 2018. On December 19, 2018, the Ninth Circuit ordered that proceedings in the case be held in abeyance pending a decision in a related case, Karnoski v. Trump, also in this Clearinghouse. On December 28, 2018, the defendants filed an ex parte motion to continue with the oral argument scheduled for January 7, 2019 in light of lapse of appropriations to the DOJ. Three days later, Judge Bernal granted the motion and the hearing on defendant's motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending the appeal was continued until January 28, 2019. However, in Karnoski v. Trump, the Supreme Court voted 5-4 to grant a Trump administration request to lift injunctions blocking the policy while challenges continue in lower courts. 139 S.Ct. 950 (Jan 22, 2019). The same day, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari before judgment to the Ninth Circuit. 139 S.Ct. 946 (Jan 22, 2019). Because the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal, back in the district court, Judge Bernal denied the defendants' pending motion for stay as moot and cancelled the hearing scheduled for January 28, 2019. A new case schedule was set, but on May 23, 2019, Judge Bernal issued an order grating plaintiffs' motion to vacate the current case schedule and vacating the hearing set for June 3, 2019. 2019 WL 7840668 (C.D. Cal.). On July 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal as to defendant Donald Trump. The case continued against the defendants the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Acting Secretary of the Army, Acting Secretary of the Air Force, and Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The Ninth Circuit issued an order on August 26, 2019. This order discharged the December 19, 2018 order holding the case in abeyance. The order granted the joint motion to remand. The order also vacated the district court's order denying the defendant's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction pending any appeal. The preliminary injunction was stayed pending the district court’s reconsideration of defendants’ motion to dissolve the injunction. 2019 WL 6125075 (9th Circ. Aug 26, 2019). The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's decision in Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2019). On October 7, 2019, the court held a status conference before Judge Bernal. The December 22, 2017 preliminary injunction was dissolved, and it was agreed that the plaintiffs would file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs and the intervenors both filed their first amended complaints four days later. The amended complaint did not name Donald Trump as defendant, and the complaint addressed the Transgender Military ban that went into effect on April 12, 2019. The amended complaint asked the court to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the defendants from enforcing a policy that excludes transgender people from serving or enlisting in the military. Judge Bernal issued an order officially dissolving the preliminary injunction on October 23, 2019. The parties jointly filed a stipulation on February 28, 2020 for an order to suspend the case schedule and partially stay the case pending resolution of discovery issues in the related Karnoski case. Three days later, Judge Bernal approved the stipulation, suspended the case schedule and partially stayed the case pending the resolution of discovery issues in Karnoski. As of July 2020, the case remains partially stayed.

Summary: On September 5, 2017, transgender service members filed this complaint against the President of the United States, the Secretary of Defense, and other federal officials in the Central District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a directive issued by President Trump on August 25, 2017 to exclude transgender people from federal military services. A preliminary injunction was granted on December 22, 2017. After the President revoked the 2017 directive, the defendants moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction but the motion was denied on September 18, 2018. The defendants appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit on November 16, 2018 where a decision is pending. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court recently issued a relevant order in Karnoski v. Trump. 586 U.S. 18A625 (Jan. 22, 2019). In Karnoski, the Court voted 5-4 to grant a Trump administration request to lift injunctions blocking the policy while challenges continue in lower courts.


On July 16, 2008, the plaintiffs, US citizens who have filed a visa petition for a child in accordance to the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) but were denied or deferred due to significant delay, brought suit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) and Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief ordering USCIS officials to approve the immigrant visas in accordance with CSPA. Under the INA, children "age-out" at 21 years old, meaning they are no longer able to obtain immigrant visas with their family. CSPA provides relief to individuals who have applied for visas for a child that subsequently aged out before USCIS acted on the application by "freezing" the child's age on the date of application. The plaintiffs sought certification of two subclasses: (1) those denied a visa application for their child when he or she aged out, even though the child's age should have been frozen under CSPA, and (2) those facing separation from their children as a result of USCIS failing to act on the child's visa application. On July 16, 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Judge James V. Selna) certified both subclasses. 258 F.R.D. 600 (C.D. Cal. 2009). On September 9, 2009, the defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the statute was ambiguous under the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision in Matter of Wang, in which the BIA held that an aged-out child was barred from obtaining an immigrant visa through his or her parent. 25 I. & N. Dec. 28 (BIA 2009). On November 18, 2009, Judge Selna granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2009 WL 4030516 (C.D. Cal.). The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case was consolidated with <i>de Osorio v. Scharfen</i> (5:08-cv-840), in which the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Judge Selna) also granted summary judgment for the defendants under similar facts. The docket sheet and District Court order from the de Osorio case are included below, but the remaining case documents are currently under seal. On November 18, 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Richard C. Tallman) affirmed the decision of the District Court. de Osorio v. Myorkas, 656 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs subsequently petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was granted on April 10, 2012. On September 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judge Mary H. Murguia) reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment, and remanded for rehearing in accordance with the plaintiffs’ interpretation of CSPA. de Osorio v. Myorkas, 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012). On December 19, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Mary H. Murguia) granted the defendants' motion to stay the mandate upon a petition to the U.S. Supreme Court. The defendants filed that petition on January 25, 2013, and it was granted on June 4, 2013. The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Immigration Advocacy Organizations, and current and former members of Congress filed amicus briefs before the Supreme Court heard the case on December 10, 2013 in Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S.Ct. 2191 (2014). The Court decided in favor of the defendants, reasoning that as the CSPA does not speak unambiguously to the exact situation at issue, it must defer to the BIA’s reasonable interpretation of the statute. Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court on June 9, 2014, joined by Justices Ginsberg and Kennedy. Chief Justice Roberts filed a concurring opinion, which Justice Scalia joined, differentiating which part of the statute is ambiguous. Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Breyer, and Thomas dissented. The Court reversed and remanded to the 9th Circuit to reinstate the original summary judgment verdict in favor of the defendants. This case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed suit against the US Citizens and Immigration Services (USCIS) in 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, US citizens, claimed that the USCIS failed to freeze the date of their child's immigration visa petition by denying the application when the child breached the eligible age limit, in violation of the Child Status Protection Act. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs. In 2013, the defendants filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted. The Court heard the case on December 10, 2013 and decided in favor of defendants. The case was reversed and remanded and the original summary judgment reinstated.


On September 14, 2010, prisoners of the El Paso County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the El Paso County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the Jail's mail policy violated the free speech rights of inmates. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the Jail's new policy which limited the vast majority of outgoing prisoner correspondence to postcards. Under the challenged policy, prisoners' outgoing correspondence is restricted to small 4 x 6 inch postcards supplied by the jail. This new policy severely restricts prisoners' ability to communicate with persons outside the jail, in violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the Colorado Constitution. On the same day of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class and appoint class counsel. On November 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a hearing on that motion was set for December 22, 2010. However, on December 16, 2010, the defendant rescinded its postcard-only policy. The next day, the parties filed a joint motion to enter a stipulated preliminary injunction and for further relief. On December 20, 2010, Chief Judge Wiley Y. Daniel granted the joint motion for the preliminary injunction that enjoined the defendant from enforcing the postcard-only policy or any other policy that limits prisoners outgoing mail to postcards. On February 1, 2011, the parties filed a joint motion to hold case in abeyance pending finalization of settlement. That document outlined the terms of the resolution to which the parties had agreed. Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix granted the joint motion. On March 28, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for attorneys' fees requesting the court award $60,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On that same day, the parties filed a joint motion to approve resolution of class action and grant the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. . On March 31, 2011, Judge Wiley granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify class and set the fairness hearing for May 25, 2011, but deferred the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs. After the fairness hearing, on June 7, 2011, Judge Wiley approved the resolution and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the postcard-only policy or any other policy that limits prisoners' outgoing mail to postcards. Judge Wiley also awarded the plaintiffs $60,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. Accordingly, Judge Wiley dismissed the case. Martinez v. Maketa, 2011 WL 2222129 (D. Colo. June 7, 2011).

Summary: In 2010, prisoners of the El Paso County Jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the El Paso County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union National Prison Project, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the Jail's policy restricting outgoing mail to postcards only violated the free speech rights of inmates. The parties settled the case in 2011 and the defendants were permanently enjoined from enforcing a postcard-only policy.


On April 10, 1998, the Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches ("NAACP") and eighteen individuals filed this §1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the Maryland State Police (MSP) and twenty-four of its officers alleging racial profiling of minority motorists on Interstate 95 in Maryland. plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. In June 1998, an amended complaint was filed and the case was consolidated with the related case Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, Civil Case No. CCB-93-468 for discovery purposes. (See PN-MD-0003 of this collection for a summary of that case.) The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on October 8, 1998. The defendants responded by moving to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. On September 30, 1999, the District Court (Judge Catherine C. Blake) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' interstate travel claim. The District Court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims that were based on a stop that occurred before April 10, 1995. The motion was otherwise denied. 72 F.Supp.2d 560, 569 (D.Md.1999). On February 22, 2001, the District Court denied without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, pending further discovery. Thereafter, the parties engaged in settlement discussions and reached an agreement in principle in March 2002 on a partial settlement. On April 22, 2003 the parties entered into a Consent Decree, which formally resolved their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Consent Decree also served to resolve the issues in the related case Wilkins v. Maryland State Police, (PN-MD-0003). The District Court entered the Consent Decree and approved the selection of Mr. Eli Silverman to serve as the MSP consultant under the decree. The settlement did not dispose of the individual plaintiffs' damage claims, nor did it bar them from renewing their motion for class action certification on damages. On June 26, 2003, the plaintiffs advised the court that they were abandoning their class action and proceeding only on the individual damage claims. On April 15, 2004, plaintiffs moved to file a third amended complaint to add eighteen additional plaintiffs. The District Court denied the motion on statute of limitations grounds. The eighteen would-be plaintiffs filed a separate motion to reconsider but that was denied. The plaintiffs appealed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Bridges v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, 441 F.3d 197 (4th Cir. 2006). The defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining individual claims. On August 10, 2006, the court (Magistrate Judge James K. Bredar) granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss voluntarily all claims against fifteen defendants and certain claims against others. On September 29, 2006, Judge Bredar granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment. Maryland Conf. of NAACP v. Maryland Dep't of State Police, 454 F.Supp.2d 339 (D.Md. 2006). The remaining individual claims that survived summary judgment were still pending as of the date of this summary, with a status conference set for July 2007. On October 3, 2007, Magistrate Judge James K. Bredar recused himself from the case. Two sons of the US Marshal for the District of Maryland remained as defendants in actions still to be tried in this case. All of the judges of the District of Maryland had a significant working relationship with the Marshal. As a result, the Chief Judge concluded that in order to avoid any appearance of impropriety, a judge from outside the district should be appointed to preside during the trial phase of the case. 2007 WL 2914913 (D. Md. Oct. 3, 2007). On October 24, 2007, the case was transferred to Judge Frederick P. Stamp, Jr., of the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. On April 3, 2008, the remaining individual plaintiffs settled the case with the defendants with the exception of one matter, which is set forth in section 6.1 of the parties’ private settlement agreement. The defendants agreed to pay $300,000 in damages and attorneys fees to the plaintiffs. The MSP agreed to hire an independent consultant to review its accomplishment of the terms of the 2003 Consent Decree and report on those findings to the plaintiffs. The remaining issue in dispute was whether copies of complaints filed against individual Maryland State Police troopers are subject to production under the 2003 Consent Decree and, if so, whether in full or redacted form. The parties agreed to submit the matter to the court. On October 15, 2008, Judge Stamp ordered the MSP to turn over redacted copies of the complaints to the plaintiffs and dismissed the case.

Summary: In 1998, the Maryland State Conference of NAACP Branches ("NAACP") and eighteen individuals filed this §1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the Maryland State Police (MSP) and twenty-four of its officers alleging racial profiling of minority motorists on Interstate 95 in Maryland. In 2003, the parties entered into a Consent Decree. In 2008, the remaining individual plaintiffs entered into a private settlement agreement with the defendants closing the case.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an an equal protection action filed on August 8, 2020 by a group of Latino individuals and two limited liability companies, seeking an injunction of an emergency health order mandating all migrant agricultural workers be tested for COVID-19. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on August 14 and August 21, respectively. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. On September 8, the plaintiffs stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice and without costs or attorneys' fees to either party, which was approved by the district judge on September 9. <hr> This case is about the constitutionality of a series of emergency orders issued by the State of Michigan during the COVID-19 pandemic. On June 29, 2020, the Governor of Michigan, Gretchen Whitmer, signed an executive order requiring those who provide housing for Michigan's migrant agricultural workers to implement plans to prevent their employees from contracting COVID-19. On August 3, the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), Robert Gordon, issued an emergency order mandating COVID-19 testing for migrant agricultural workers. On August 8, a group of six Latino individuals and two limited liability companies filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Michigan, the Director of MDHHS, and the Director of the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (MDARD) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against the defendants' orders that all migrant agricultural workers be mandated to take a COVID-19 test (Emergency Order). The plaintiffs also sought compensatory damages, attorneys' fees, and a declaration that the defendants violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Finally, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Director of MDHHS exceeded the scope of his statutory authority and a declaration that the governor and the Director of MDHHS violated the separation of powers established in the Michigan Constitution. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 13, seeking class certification for all similarly situated plaintiffs. The plaintiffs outlined three classes that they sought to certify. Class 1 included all owners and operators of migrant housing camps licensed by MDARD, Class 2 included all residents of MDARD-licensed migrant housing camps, Class 3 included all agricultural employers in the state with over 20 workers on site at a time, and Class 4 included all workers of employed by Class 3. On August 14, District Judge Paul L. Maloney denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. In his order, the judge found that the plaintiffs did not establish likelihood of success on the merits. While the plaintiffs argued that the court should implement a strict scrutiny test to determine constitutionality because the Emergency Order disproportionately affected Latinos, the judge implemented a rational basis standard since the testing requirement applies to all agricultural workers in migrant housing camps, regardless of race. The judge then concluded that the plaintiffs did not rebut every conceivable basis for the Emergency Order. The judge also noted that the Emergency Order serves a legitimate public interest in its objective of slowing the spread of COVID-19. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151354 On August 21, Judge Maloney denied the plaintiffs' motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. The judge used similar reasoning in his denial of the injunction as the temporary restraining order, reiterating that the plaintiffs did not show an intent to discriminate on the part of state officials. The judge again concluded that the Emergency Order is facially neutral, in terms of race. 2020 WL 5029586 On August 24, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a preliminary injunction in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit denied the motion for a preliminary injunction on September 2. The court found that for a facially neutral action to be found unconstitutionally discriminatory, the plaintiffs must establish an improper racially motivated purpose. The court agreed with the district court judge in his conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to establish discriminatory intent. The court also noted that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate irreparable harm, in absence of a constitutional violation. 823 Fed.Appx. 413 On September 3, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. On September 8, plaintiffs stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice, which was approved by Judge Maloney on September 9. The stipulated dismissal provided that neither party was responsible for the other's costs or attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: In August 2020, a group of Latino agricultural migrant workers and two limited liability companies that employ agricultural migrant workers filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that one of the state's emergency health orders related to the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights by discriminating against Latino workers and their employers. The plaintiffs' requested injunctive relief was denied by the district court, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision. On September 9, the case was closed when the plaintiffs stipulated to a dismissal.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed on March 30 by two non-profit organizations and four voter plaintiffs against the Secretary of State of Ohio to challenge an election bill enacted in response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctive relief and a TRO, which were both denied on April 3. The parties stipulated to dismiss the case, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on April 20.
 On March 30, the League of Women Voters of Ohio, Ohio's A. Philip Randolph Institute, and four individual voters filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of State of Ohio to challenge the enactment of House Bill 197, including the refusal to extend voter registration deadline and the limitations of absentee voting. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 52 U.S.C. § 20507. Specifically, they sought injunctive relief requiring the defendant to extend the voter registration application to thirty days prior to the new election date, to mail absentee ballots to all registered voters at least twenty-one days before the closing of polls, and to allow in-person voting, among other requested remedies. The plaintiffs were represented by The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio Foundation, Lawyer’s Committee For Civil Rights Under Law, Demos, and private attorneys. The case was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and assigned to Judge Michael H. Watson. In March, Governor Mike DeWine declared a state of emergency in response to COVID-19 and the Ohio Department of Health ordered polling stations to be closed the day before the March primaries. On March 27, the defendant issued Directive 2020-06 under House Bill 197, which suspended in-person voting and imposed a multi-step mailing process for absentee voting. The House Bill also moved the primary election date to April 28. However, the plaintiffs noted that the defendant did not extend the voter registration deadline, which passed on February 18, although the date for the primary elections was moved. The plaintiffs alleged that the multi-step vote-by-mail process posed an unconstitutional burden on the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs argued that the vote-by-mail process was confusing and impossible for election officials and voters to complete in time before the election concluded, and therefore deprived the Ohio voters of their fundamental right to vote. The plaintiffs also alleged that by prohibiting the processing of voter registration applications after February 28, the directive violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which requires the registration to be available thirty days before any election for federal office. On March 31, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). The complaint was amended to fix small errors a few days later. The plaintiffs submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction on April 1, seeking to enjoin the defendants from enforcement of Ohio's February 18, 2020 registration deadline, require the defendants to set a registration deadline that is no more than 30 days before the date of the primary election and to conduct that election no later than May 12, 2020, as well as an order requiring the defendants to either bear the full costs associated with obtaining and voting ballots, or alternatively provide some reasonable alternative like "no excuse" in person voting before the close of the election to allow voters to cast their ballots at no cost. The same day, the State of Ohio and the Ohio Democratic Party moved to intervene defendants on April 1, which was granted that day. The next day, the Ohio Republication Party moved to intervene as a defendant and the Libertarian Party of Ohio moved to intervene as a plaintiff, both of which were granted. The Honest Elections Project and Disability Rights Ohio filed amicus briefs on April 2 and April 3 respectively. Disability Rights Ohio argued that those with disabilities face a unique challenge as they have a higher risk of contracting the virus and a higher risk for complications from the virus. They urged the court to grant the plaintiff’s motion for TRO, arguing that the Americans with Disabilities Act requires the defendants to conduct elections in a manner that allows equal access for those with disabilities. The defendants submitted a response to the emergency TRO, listing the many steps they had taken to try to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 and argued that the plaintiffs failed to show that Bill 197 violated the constitution or the NVRA and that their proposed remedies are unworkable. On April 3, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and TRO in favor of the defendants, reasoning that “[t]he Constitution does not require the best plan, just a lawful one . . . the Court will not declare the Ohio Legislature’s unanimous bill to be unconstitutional simply because other options may have been better.” The parties stipulated to dismiss the case, and the case was dismissed without prejudice on April 20 with each party bearing their own attorney fees.


According to a news report, in 2002, Urban Justice Center lawyers discovered that the New York City Human Resources Administration (HRA) was illegally terminating the food stamp benefits of thousands of low-income people with disabilities. The discovery led to the April 1, 2002, filing, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, of a civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by four named plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly-situated persons, all of whom were represented by attorneys from private firms and the Urban Justice Center. The defendants named were officials of the HRA and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (OTDA). According to the complaint, despite years of warnings from the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA"), which administers the Food Stamp program, the city's HRA and the state's OTDA employed a computer program that automatically terminated the food stamps of public assistance/welfare recipients when they were approved for SSI (supplemental security income), the federal benefit for people who are poor and severely disabled. The plaintiffs alleged that the terminated SSI recipients, however, were "categorically eligible" to receive food stamps under the Food Stamps Act and should not have been terminated from receiving this public benefit. The complaint alleged that the defendants' conduct violated: 1) the Food Stamps Act ("FSA"), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011, 2014, 2015, and 2020, and implementing federal and state regulations; 2) the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq. and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; and 3) the due process and equal protection clauses of the New York constitution and of the federal constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other state law provisions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification, and an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Over the ensuing months, discovery, confidentiality of records litigation, and conferences to update the court on the status of the litigation and settlement prospects occurred. In February 2006, a defendant filed an answer to the complaint. In an unpublished order the next month, Magistrate Judge Kevin Nathaniel Fox set a discovery cut-off date for September 21, 2006. The case's docket sheet reflects that settlement talks had been proceeding among the parties, as had been a review by the USDA of aspects of the dispute, resulting in extension of the discovery cut-off date. Subsequently, District Judge Richard M. Berman issued an unpublished order on February 7, 2007, discontinuing the action, subject to its restoration upon application of a party. By May 25, 2007, plaintiffs' counsel advised that the action should be restored for the limited purpose of approving and implementing a settlement. Settlement documents were submitted to the court and its preliminary approval of a class certification and of the settlement followed, in July 2007. Final approval awaited a fairness hearing the judge set for September 27, 2007. On that day, Judge Berman issued the court's judgment approving the class action settlement that had been negotiated. The settlement agreement noted that the city and state defendants had modified their prior practices, including the computerized welfare management system, so that automatic termination of food stamp benefits should no longer occur simply because a class member began receiving SSI benefits, after having had public assistance benefits terminated. Staff and administrative law judges, likewise, had been advised of this change in practice, according to the settlement document. The settlement obligated the state defendant (the OTDA) to write to the USDA seeking its' acquiescence to the terms of the stipulation. Without that acquiescence, the defendants had no obligations under the settlement. Absent USDA acquiescence within seven months of the stipulation, the parties would again meet to determine how to resolve the case, including by trial. The stipulation reflected that the parties had agreed upon a class certification to include "all residents of New York City who are: (1) SSI recipients living alone; or (2) SSI couples; or (3) SSI recipients living with others, described in ...[other portions of the stipulation], whose public assistance Food Stamps have been or will be discontinued by City defendant between April I, 1999 and the expiration date of this agreement due to receipt of SSI without making a separate determination of eligibility for non-public assistance food stamps." The settlement obligated the state to identify households eligible to receive food stamp benefits that had been wrongly denied them during the relevant period and, within 12 months, to perform a mass re-budgeting to restore the benefits to these households. The settlement set out details of this process and complexities of eligibility levels, as well as the notice obligations the settlement imposed upon the defendants to alert food stamps recipients of the settlement's terms. The city defendant had monitoring and tracking duties under the terms of the settlement, which described that court jurisdiction would terminate at the end of twenty-seven months from the court judgment adopting the settlement' terms, unless enforcement actions modified that period. Under the settlement, plaintiffs' attorneys were to receive payments for fees and costs from the state defendant in the aggregate amount of $117,500 and from the city defendant in the aggregate amount of $120,000. The docket does not show subsequent activity, but according to a New York Times article (Leslie Kaufman, A Surprise Bounty, Provided by a Food Stamp Lawsuit, in New York Times, Nov. 26, 2008) it took a year for the Department of Agriculture to approve the settlement, and the resulting awards totaled $12 million, distributed to nearly 9,500 households in the five boroughs in the form of credits to electronic benefit cards, to be used for food. The credits were capped at 21 months of benefits; the 18 largest reimbursements just top $5,000, and most plaintiffs received far less. The awards began to be distributed in October 2008.

Summary: In this case, 9500 households in New York City received credits for food stamps they should have gotten years earlier, when computer errors cut them off the food stamp rolls. The case was filed in 2002 and settled in 2006, but it took over a year for the federal district court and the U.S. Department of Agriculture to approve the settlement and awards began to go out in October 2008.


On January 8, 2008, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore ("the City") filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo Bank and Wells Fargo Financial Leasing("Wells Fargo") under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Baltimore Division. The plaintiffs, alleging that Wells Fargo had engaged in predatory and discriminatory lending practices that had led to foreclosures harming the city, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. Two other cases -- Memphis v. Wells Fargo and U.S. v. Wells Fargo made essentially equivalent allegations. The City filed its initial Complaint on January 8, 2008. On March 21, 2008, Wells Fargo moved to dismiss, challenging the City's standing and contending that the complaint failed to state a cognizable FHA violation under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. On June 1, 2009, the City moved to file an Amended Complaint with exhibits. Chief Judge Benson Everett Legg held a hearing on the initial Complaint where he denied the Motion to Dismiss and granted the City leave to file an amended complaint. City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, 631 F.Supp.2d 702, 703-04 (D. Md. July 2, 2009). The City filed an Amended Complaint. On August 6, 2009, the case was reassigned to Judge J. Frederick Motz. Judge Motz granted Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint. Judge Motz held that if the City desired to pursue a more limited claim, such as a claim for specific damages allegedly suffered by the City in regard to specific houses that became vacant allegedly because of Wells Fargo's lending activities or a claim for damages allegedly caused to a specific neighborhood in which Wells Fargo made enough allegedly improper loans that its activities had a plausible causal relationship to the destruction of that neighborhood, it could file a Second Amended Complaint. City of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, 677 F.Supp.2d 847, 851 (D. Md. January 6, 2010). The City filed a Second Amended Complaint. On September 8, 2010, Judge Motz held a hearing and granted Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, and granted the City leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. The City filed a Third Amended Complaint on October 21, 2010. In the Third Amended Complaint, the City sought redress for injuries caused by Wells Fargo's pattern or practice of illegal and discriminatory mortgage lending. Specifically, the City sought injunctive relief and damages for the injuries caused by foreclosures on Wells Fargo loans in minority neighborhoods and to minority borrowers that are the result of Wells Fargo's unlawful, irresponsible, unfair, deceptive, and discriminatory lending practices. Wells Fargo filed a Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint on December 3, 2010. On April 22, 2011, Judge Motz denied Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, concluding that the City had plausibly alleged injuries that were fairly traceable to Wells Fargo’s alleged conduct. On August 7, 2012, Judge Motz approved a settlement between the parties. Wells Fargo agreed to a $175 million settlement fund for disbursements to the Affected Class. Judge Motz then dismissed the case without prejudice. There was no further activity, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Mayor and City Council of Baltimore filed a lawsuit against Wells Fargo Bank under the Fair Housing Act. Plaintiffs, alleging that Wells Fargo's predatory and discriminatory lending practices have led to foreclosures that harm the City, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The parties reached a settlement for $175 million to be paid by Wells Fargo. This case is ongoing.


On July 16, 2010, the Libertarian Party of North Dakota and three LPND candidates filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota against the state of North Dakota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought a declaratory judgment, alleging that their exclusion from the general ballot after failing to gain a state-imposed threshold number of votes in the primary election violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On September 3, 2010, the District Court (Judge Ralph Erickson) granted the state's motion to dismiss, because a state may limit access to the general ballot to only those candidates who were able to gain a "substantial modicum" of support in the primary election. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision on appeal (659 F.3d 687) and the Supreme Court denied certiorari (132 S.Ct. 1932).

Summary: The Libertarian Party of North Dakota and three LPND candidates filed suit against the state of North Dakota, alleging that their exclusion from the general ballot after failing to gain a state-imposed threshold number of votes in the primary election violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On September 3, 2010, the District Court granted the state's motion to dismiss.


On June 8, 2005, juveniles at Contra Costa County's Juvenile Hall filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Contra Costa County and Contra Costa County Probation Department policy of subjecting juveniles to multiple strip and/or visual body cavity searches. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to the defendants' policies, juvenile detainees in their custody were subjected to strip and visual body cavity searches before they appeared at a detention hearing and without having any reasonable suspicion that the searches would be productive of contraband or weapons. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. The complaint was amended on September 16, 2005 and alleged claims for: 1) violation of Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; 2) violation of California's Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1(a) and Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code section 52.1(b), based on alleged use of coercion to deprive Plaintiffs of their rights under article I, section 1, of the California Constitution and California Penal Code section 4030; 3) violation of California Penal Code section 4030. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for class certification. The defendants opposed certification and moved for summary judgment. On December 5, 2007, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero) denied defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' federal claims, but dismissed the state law claims. Judge Spero certified the case as a class action, defining the class as: Class One: All juveniles admitted and housed at Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall during the class period who were strip-searched at intake pursuant to defendants' blanket policy and practice of strip-searching all such juveniles prior to their detention hearings, except for: 1) those who were strip-searched at intake after being admitted for an alleged violation (felony or misdemeanor) involving violence, drugs, or weapons; 2) those who were strip-searched at intake because of a reasonable suspicion that such strip search would be productive of contraband; 3) those who had a prior history of being booked on offenses involving drugs, weapons, or violence; 4) those who were subject to parole or probationary search conditions at the time of the strip search; and 5) those who were transferred from another detention facility and thus were not under the constant supervision of a Contra Costa County employee. Class Two: All juvenile arrestees in Class One who were strip-searched after visits or court appearances, prior to the detention hearing, during the class period. The class period for both classes was defined as "all persons who are currently juveniles or who reached the age of majority within two years of filing this action and who were subjected to a strip search at Contra Costa County Juvenile Hall before September 15, 2005." Moyle v. County of Contra Costa, 2007 WL 4287315 (N.D.Cal. Dec 05, 2007). In September 2009, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and on September 8, 2009, the court granted preliminary approval of the settlement. The defendants agreed to implement a revised search policy. The defendants agreed to pay $100,000 to the class representative and $800,000 in attorney's fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to pay a total of $700,000 for the claims of the class members in accordance with the claims processing procedure established in the settlement. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. In 2014, the parties negotiated and filed a motion to modify the order and judgment of dismissal regarding administration of the remaining funds for payments to class members. On April 29, 2014, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion. The court ordered the plaintiffs to file a status report in two years regarding their progress toward locating the remaining class members who had yet to be paid. The plaintiffs spent those two years searching for additional class members to be paid. On April 4, 2016, the plaintiffs filed the requested status report. The plaintiffs had been able to locate and make payments to five additional class members, but roughly $13,000 remained in the fund. On April 18, Judge Spero ordered the remaining funds be distributed to Loaves and Fishes, an organization that provided community based food programs and partner services. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2005, private attorneys filed this class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Contra Costa County and Contra Costa County Probation Department policy of subjecting juveniles to multiple strip and/or visual body cavity searches at Contra Costa County's Juvenile Hall. The parties settled in 2009 and the defendants agreed to a revise search policy and to pay damages and attorney's fees.


On October 1, 1993, a group of female prisoners of the District of Columbia filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by sexual abuse from prison staff, who they claimed had used physical force and threats of physical force to make them engage in sexual activity. They also alleged that the male prison staff invaded their privacy by entering their living areas without announcing their presence (which was against the defendants' internal policy), sexually harassed them, raped them, and created a "hostile, sexualized environment" that subjected to mental anguish and exacerbated the negative effects of the abuse that most of these women had suffered in their personal lives before they got to jail. They alleged that the Department of Corrections failed to properly investigate and handle reports of this nature, making them liable for the abuse that occurred. In addition, they complained of deprivation of obstetrical and gynecological care, basic sanitation needs, basic shelter needs, fire hazards, poor nutrition, lack of educational programs and work opportunities, lack of religious programs, lack of recreation, and lack of clean clothing. On December 1, 1993, the District Court (Judge June L. Green) certified the case as a class action, and the plaintiffs were allowed to proceed with their identities being kept a secret in order to protect them from retaliation in the prisons. The Court held a bench trial in mid-June 1994, and on December 13, 1994, the Court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs' rights had been violated by sexual harassment, inadequate living conditions, poor medical care, and a lack of educational, recreational, and religious opportunities (compared to those offered to men). The Court gave the defendants six months to bring their prison up to a constitutional standard in these areas. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. DC, 877 F.Supp. 634 (D.D.C. 1994). Shortly after this order was entered, the defendants announced a cost-saving plan premised on the closure of the Modular Facility at Lorton, Virginia, and the double-celling of the CTF, a facility that houses male and female prisoners. On January 26, 1995, the plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the defendants from implementing this plan until they had demonstrated that it would not threaten the safety and well-being of the women prisoners at the CTF, impede the implementation of the Court's previous order, or result in a violation of any consent decree. The parties agreed to have the Court's Special Officer evaluate the double-celling plan. When the Special Officer evaluated the defendants' plan, she found it unacceptable, concluding that the CTF could not safely accommodate double-celling and that it had substantial deficiencies in the conditions of confinement. On March 15, 1995, the Court ordered the defendants to institute mandatory training on sexual harassment for all staff members who worked with female prisoners, and five months later, the Court further ordered the prison to hire a health educator with appropriate training in obstetrics and gynecology in a half-time position to provide clinical and health services to the female prisoners, as well as a nurse practitioner, a physician's assistant, or a nurse midwife. The Court ordered the prison not to use any restraints on a woman in labor, during delivery, or in recover after a delivery, and the Court ordered them not to use restraints on a woman in her third trimester unless she has demonstrated a history of assaultive behavior or escape. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. DC, 899 F.Supp. 659 (D.D.C. 1995). The defendants appealed this order. On August 30, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Judge Buckley) partially vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case. The DC Circuit held that the availability of fewer programs to female inmates than male inmates did not violate equal protection, that the order setting the population cap was too broad, that the correctional officials could be ordered to comply with the inmate grievance procedures, and that officials could be ordered not to retaliate against inmates who complained of sexual harassment. Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of Corrections v. DC, 93 F.3d 910 (D.C.Cir. 1996). On June 22, 1998, the plaintiffs asked the District Court to hold the defendants in contempt for disobey the Court's orders, alleging that the defendants had not implemented the required remedies in the areas of sexual misconduct, environmental and fire safety, and programming. Seven days later, the parties met to discuss and resolve the plaintiffs' concerns. On October 1, 1998, the parties jointly submitted a status report regarding these negotiations. The report informed the court that they had made "considerable progress" resolving their disagreements, and that they intended to continue their discussion. The Pacer docket has a five-year gap at this point, but it picks back up on July 19, 2004, when the parties entered into a consent motion to dismiss the case with prejudice, which was granted by the District Court (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) on September 9, 2004.

Summary: On October 1, 1993, a group of female prisoners of the District of Columbia filed a class action lawsuit against the District of Columbia Department of Corrections, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by sexual abuse from prison staff, who they claimed had used physical force and threats of physical force to make them engage in sexual activity. The Court held a bench trial in mid-June 1994, and on December 13, 1994, the Court granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, holding that the plaintiffs' rights had been violated by sexual harassment, inadequate living conditions, poor medical care, and a lack of educational, recreational, and religious opportunities (compared to those offered to men). After further litigation about the specifics of the injunctive orders, the parties began filing status reports. On July 19, 2004, when the parties entered into a consent motion to dismiss the case with prejudice, which was granted by the District Court.


On February 17, 2005, the Milwaukee District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The EEOC sued V&J Foods, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 USC § 2000e <i>et seq</i>). It alleged that a manager at one of V&J’s stores sexually harassed a minor employee and created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Specifically, the complaint alleged that defendant V&J, which operates fast food franchises, engaged in unlawful employment practices at one of its Burger King franchises in Milwaukee. The EEOC alleged that one of the defendant’s managers sexually harassed a minor employee and created a hostile work environment in that store. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant knew or should have known of the situation and failed to correct it. The case was assigned to Judge Rudolph T. Randa. Judge Randa referred the parties to mediation under the supervision of Magistrate Judge William E. Callahan, Jr. on July 1, 2005. The mediation, which was conducted on August 15, 2005, did not result in a settlement, so the action was referred back to Judge Randa. The parties then commenced discovery proceedings. On June 30, 2006, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which they amended on July 14. Judge Randa granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on November 3, 2006, finding that the employee failed to fulfill her duty to avoid harm by notifying the defendant of her manager’s conduct and that, therefore, the defendant could not be held accountable under Title VII. 2006 WL 3203713. The EEOC appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case on November 7, 2007. Judge Posner found that V&J must create reporting procedures accessible to teenagers to satisfy Title VII’s requirements because it employed many teenagers. Judge Posner also found that Title VII protected the teenage employee from being fired for complaints her mother made to V&J about harassment of the employee. 507 F.3d 575. On remand, the parties proceeded to mediation. On May 12, 2008, the parties reached a settlement. Under the settlement, the defendant was forbidden from engaging in employment practices which condoned or allowed sexual harassment and was also forbidden from retaliating against anyone bringing Title VII claims. The defendant also agreed to create and issue a policy statement creating a procedure for addressing sexual harassment, and to provide training for its employees and managers at its franchise operations. The defendant was also required to report back to the EEOC every six months for two years with information about all complaints regarding sexual harassment or discrimination. Finally, the defendant was ordered to pay $42,500 (less deductions) to the employee who had been harassed. Judge Randa approved the settlement on June 10, 2008. The two-year period passed without any additional entries on the docket. The case is now closed.

Summary: The EEOC brought a suit against a franchise operator on behalf of a minor employee who had been sexually harassed by her manager. The district court ruled for the defendant but was reversed on appeal. The parties eventually settled, with the defendant instituting policies against sexual harassment and discrimination and paying $42,500.


On October 12, 2006, a prisoner in the Shelby County Detention Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shelby County and the Shelby County Detention Center. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought class-action certification and asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that conditions in the Kentucky jails violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleged that the habitually overcrowded condition of the Jail and the deliberate indifference of jail officials to prevent infectious disease caused his exposure to methicillin-resistant staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). The jail incarcerated inmates with infected persons without such inmates' knowledge, and failed to train Jail employees on policies to prevent conditions that foster the growth and spread of the disease. This is one of a pair of class action cases filed by inmates who claimed to have been infected with MRSA while incarcerated in Kentucky jails. MRSA is a flesh-eating bacteria that can cause debilitating open sores, pain and death. Discovery issues dominated the case for the first few years. On May 29, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, which had abandoned the claims for class action certification but added plaintiffs to the case. On May 25, 2010, Judge Karen K. Caldwell granted defendants' motion for dismissal of claims from one plaintiff. On January 7, 2011, Judge Caldwell dismissed the remainder of the claims and the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On October 12, 2006, a prisoner in the Shelby County Detention Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shelby County and the Shelby County Detention Center. The plaintiff sought class-action certification and asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that conditions in the Kentucky jails violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge Karen K. Caldwell dismissed all of the claims on January 7, 2011.


In 2002, the American Council of the Blind and two individuals with visual impairments filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer of the United States under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs challenged the Treasury Department's failure to make paper banknotes that are independently usable by persons who are blind or visually impaired and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Treasury knew about the need to make banknotes accessible for blind and visually impaired people, but had failed to take any steps to make any notes accessible in line with a 1995 National Academy of Sciences report the Department had commissioned. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the 1995 NAS report had recommended changes to banknotes, including making bills different sizes based on value, enlarging the value of the bill to at least one-half of the height of the bill, printing in high-contrast ink, and changing the color of the bills based on value. These kinds of features are present in the banknotes of at least 120 countries. Despite the 1995 NAS report, the Treasury redesigned banknotes in the late 1990s in ways that did not address any of the recommended accessibility features. The plaintiffs advocated for changes to the size of bills to help blind people independently use U.S. bills. Color changes, high-contrast ink, and the size of the number on the bill were all supported as changes for people with visual impairments. On August 30, 2002, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge James Robertson denied the motion on March 31, 2003, noting that the court lacked a factual record on which to base a decision so early in the case. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the relief requested was inappropriate because the Secretary had total discretion over currency design, the currency did not discriminate against visually impaired people, and the plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies. Judge Robertson denied the defendant’s motion on March 31, 2004, but did dismiss the Treasurer as a party. 311 F. Supp. 2d 86. On November 23, 2005, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to only list the Secretary as a defendant and to expand their claims. Under the amended complaint, the lack of each different kind of accessibility feature was an independent violation of the Rehabilitation Act. On November 28, 2006, the court held that the U.S. Treasury Department had failed to design, produce and issue paper currency that is readily distinguishable to blind and visually impaired people, violating §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Judge Robertson granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs, but did not give them the requested injunction. 2006 WL 3423799 (amended on December 1, 2006, 463 F. Supp. 2d 51). The government appealed the declaratory judgment decision, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed Judge Robertson's decision and sent the case back to him for a ruling on the request for an injunction. 525 F.3d 1256. The defendant argued that an injunction was inappropriate because the Department was already planning to make banknotes more accessible and because the design of banknotes is a matter of discretion for the Secretary. On October 3, 2008, Judge Robertson rejected both arguments and ordered the government to come up with a plan to make paper money readily accessible. 581 F. Supp. 2d 1. The judge did not give any specific instructions how to accomplish this, but ordered that appropriate changes in each type of paper bill (except the $1 bill, which is specially protected) must be made before any redesign of that denomination is approved by the Secretary of the Treasury. While Judge Robertson acknowledged the plaintiffs’ concern that the Department would use the broad language of the injunction to just give external bill readers to the visually impaired instead of redesigning currency, he did not foreclose that as an option for the Department to come into compliance with the law. On December 11, 2008, the parties settled on the question of attorneys fees and costs, with the Department agreeing to wire almost $700,000 as a one-time payment of such fees. Articles published about the injunction can be found here and here. Beginning on February 27, 2009, the defendants began to file a status report every six months. The reports indicated that progress was ongoing as the government developed the technology necessary to create accessible bills that would also be secure against counterfeiting risks. After Judge Robertson’s retirement, the case was randomly reassigned to Judge Beryl A. Howell on March 21, 2012. On August 15, 2012, Judge Howell denied the plaintiff’s first motion to amend the injunction to require a firmer deadline on making banknotes accessible. Judge Howell required the defendant to continue making semiannual reports, but required the defendant to be specific about expected timetables for the redesigns. The Bureau of Engraving and Printing's (BEP's) description of its accessibility program can be found here. The BEP started testing tactile features in 2015. On April 28, 2016, the National Council on Disability sent a letter to the Secretary, requesting that tactile features be incorporated into banknotes. After reports that rolling out accessible banknotes could be delayed until 2026, the American Council for the Blind sent a letter to Treasury expressing concern about the delays. On June 6, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to modify the court's 2008 order to adjust the timeframe so that all bills would be made accessible by the end of 2026 and the $10 would be made accessible by the end of 2020. The defendant initially indicated that redesigns of the $5, $10, $20, and $50 bills would be complete by 2018. The defendant then revised the time estimates, saying the redesign of the $10 would take at least until 2026 and not indicating when the other denominations would be done. The Department had also distributed iBill bill readers to visually impaired people, but the plaintiffs argued that these devices should not allow the defendant to delay redesigns. The bill reader required two hands to operate and was too inconvenient to use in public settings because of how long it took to read bills. The court denied the order on Jan. 6, 2017, holding that delays in making accessible bills did not constitute a significant public interest problem to warrant the court imposing a timeframe where it had intentionally avoided one in in 2008. 2017 WL 6271264. Specifically, Judge Howell worried that decoupling anti-counterfeiting design changes from accessibility-improving design changes for the sake of meeting hard deadlines could result in inefficient double-work for the Department. The plaintiffs appealed this order on Jan. 23, 2017. On December 26, 2017, the D.C. Circuit held that Judge Howell had not based her decision not to amend the injunction to impose hard deadlines on a sufficient factual record. 878 F.3d 360. The lack of sufficient evidence constituted an abuse of discretion, and the case was remanded for Judge Howell to expand the record on the costs of imposing strict deadlines and decide the plaintiff’s motion again. The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that it was improper for the court to consider the projected costs of meeting the proposed deadlines at all. But the Court of Appeals also rejected the defendant’s argument that supplying bill readers like the iBill was sufficient to bring the Government into compliance with the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs renewed their motion to modify the injunction on May 4, 2018. On January 4, 2019, Judge Howell directed the plaintiffs to submit a list of defense witnesses to testify as to the costs of meeting the proposed deadlines and what questions the plaintiffs intended to ask those witnesses. On the same day, the defendant moved to stay the proceedings due to a lapse of appropriations. On January 9, 2019, Judge Howell denied the motion to stay and, instead of requiring witnesses, directed both parties to submit written answers to a combined 28 questions proposed by the court. 2019 WL 503450. After receiving the parties responses, Judge Howell issued a 77-page order on August 22, 2019, denying the plaintiff’s third motion to modify the injunction. 396 F. Supp. 3d 147. Judge Howell acknowledged that the Department was not in compliance with the injunction and had been significantly delayed, but said that the Department was consistently working to come into compliance. While further acknowledging that circumstances had changed since the injunction was issued in 2008, Judge Howell considered the plaintiffs’ proposed deadlines to be too short and infeasible. The Department was working to incorporate Raised Tactile Features (RTF) into banknotes, but would not be ready to debut the RTF notes by the end of 2026 because of unexpected design problems. Judge Howell found that modifying the injunction as proposed by the plaintiffs would not be in the public interest and that the proposed changes would not resolve the problems the plaintiffs identified. On October 21, 2019, the plaintiffs appealed Judge Howell’s denial of their third motion to modify the injunction. As of December 5, 2019, the appeal is ongoing and no oral argument has been scheduled.

Summary: The American Council of the Blind sued the Treasury Department in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia in 2002 to get paper currency redesigned so that persons with visual impairments can recognize the denominations without having to rely on sighted people or scanners for help. In 2006, Judge James Robertson declared that the Department of the Treasury was violating section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to make banknotes accessible to the line and visually impaired. In 2008, the court also ordered the government to make prioritize accessibility design changes and to report on its progress towards full accessibility every six months until full compliance is reached. After Treasury indicated that full compliance would not be reached until sometime between 2026 and 2038 (instead of 2018, as initially projected), the plaintiffs moved to modify the 2008 injunction to require a hard deadline of 2026 for accessible $5, $10, $20, and $50 bills. Judge Beryl Howell denied this motion, leaving the deadline of the injunction open-ended. The plaintiffs appealed in 2017, and the DC Circuit Court of Appeals held that Judge Howell had not based her denial on a sufficient factual record. Judge Howell again denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify in 2019, and the plaintiffs again appealed the court's decision. As of December 5, 2019, the appeal is still ongoing and no oral argument has been scheduled. The case is ongoing.