COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action lawsuit brought by prisoners at a geriatric prison run by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to make reasonable accommodations to protect the plaintiffs from COVID-19. They won a district court order requiring compliance with CDC recommendations, but the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction on June 5, noting that the defendant had substantially complied with the measures required by the injunction. The court granted class certification on June 27 and denied to dismiss the case on July 2. The case proceeded to trial and on September 29, the district court granted ordered a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to take numerous safeguards, including, sufficient cleaning supplies, enforcement of social distancing, proper use of personal protective equipment by staff, testing measures, and creation of a contact tracing plan. On October 13, the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants' emergency motion to stay the injunction. Two prisoners filed an application to vacate the stay with the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied the request on November 16. On March 26, 2021, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment for the defendants.
 On March 30, 2020, two prisoners held at Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") Pack Unit filed this class-action lawsuit against the executive director of TDCJ, the warden of TDCJ Pack Unit, and TDCJ itself. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas; the case was assigned to Judge Keith Ellison. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under § 1983 for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights protecting them from cruel and unusual punishment. They also alleged that the defendants violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act by failing to provide reasonable accommodations to protect the plaintiffs from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees and declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order. The preliminary and permanent injunctive relief sought included unrestricted access to antibacterial hand soap and towels, access to hand sanitizer with at least 60% alcohol, and increased cleaning of common areas and surfaces. The plaintiffs also sought to prohibit new prisoners from entering Pack Unit, quarantining new prisoners for 14 days, or testing new prisoners for COVID-19 to prevent greater risk of contraction for current prisoners. Finally, the plaintiffs requested the defendant to post signage in common areas with updates about COVID-19 and recommendations to protect oneself. Pack Unit is a Type-I geriatric prison and houses a large number of prisoners over 50 years old or with serious pre-existing health conditions. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates who currently are, or who in the future will be, incarcerated at the Pack Unit, and who are subjected to the TDCJ’s policies and practices regarding COVID-19. The plaintiffs also proposed two subclasses: the “High-Risk Subclass,” and the “Disability Subclass.” The High-Risk Subclass intended to represent those who, according to the CDC, are most at risk of severe illness from COVID-19 due to old age or health conditions. The Disability Subclass consisted of those who suffer from a disability that substantially limits one or more of their major life activities and who are at increased risk of COVID-19 illness, injury, or death due to their disability or any medical treatment necessary to treat their disability. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ policies in response to the COVID-19 pandemic were woefully inadequate and did not comport with many of the CDC’s recommendations. These discrepancies include TDCJ’s prohibition on alcoholic hand sanitizer and the CDC’s recommendation to consider relaxing such protocols. The plaintiffs allege that these inadequate policies, combined with their vulnerability and the facility’s congregate nature, place prisoners and the surrounding communities at greater risk of contracting COVID-19. On April 16, after hearing oral arguments, Judge Ellison granted the plaintiff's application for a temporary restraining order as a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 1916883. The order enjoined the defendant as follows:

The defendant was required to provide class members with unrestricted access to hand soap and disposable hand towels to facilitate hand washing, and must also provide hand sanitizer containing at least 60% alcohol in common areas.

The defendant was required to provide prisoners and staff members with masks, and launder them regularly if needed.

The defendant was required to clean surfaces in common areas every 30 minutes during the day, and provide prisoners sufficient bleach-based cleaning agents to disinfect their own housing cubicles.

The defendant was required to either prohibit new prisoners from entering the Pack Unit for the duration of the pandemic, test new prisoners before entry, or quarantine new prisoners for 14 days upon entry.

The defendant was ordered to limit transportation of prisoners outside the prison, and maintain social distancing when transportation was necessary.

The defendant was required to post signage providing updates on COVID-19 and educate prisoners on prevention techniques.

 The following day, the defendants appealed the order to the Fifth Circuit and Judge Ellison granted a five-day stay of the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 1916883. On April 22, the Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending completion of appellate review of it. 956 F.3d 797. In a per curiam opinion by Judges Jones, Higginson, and Oldham, the court of appeals found that the plaintiffs had failed to show a “substantial risk of serious harm” that amounts to “cruel and unusual punishment,” "after accounting for the protective measures TDCJ has taken." In addition, the court criticized the district court's failure to "cite[] . . . evidence that [state officials] subjectively believe the measures they are taking are inadequate." The appellate court also found that plaintiffs had not yet exhausted the possibilities of the prison's internal grievance system and therefore that the case was premature, and that the preliminary relief was insufficiently narrow to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The plaintiffs filed an emergency application to the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the stay on May 4. The plaintiffs argued that the Fifth Circuit did not defer to the trial court's fact findings, and that the stay risked exactly the type of irreparable harm the the district court intended to prevent. The Supreme Court denied the application, but Justice Sotomayor wrote a statement in which Justice Ginsburg joined. Justice Sotomayor wrote, "It has long been said that a society’s worth can be judged by taking stock of its prisons. That is all the truer in this pandemic, where inmates everywhere have been rendered vulnerable and often powerless to protect themselves from harm. May we hope that our country’s facilities serve as models rather than cautionary tales.” 140 S.Ct. 1598. Back in the district court, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on April 22, 2020, making three different arguments. First, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing since they failed to demonstrate an actual or imminent injury, and therefore the complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under FRCP 12(b)(1). Second, the defendants argued that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), since the plaintiffs did not allege facts demonstrating that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' health or safety, thereby failing to state an Eighth Amendment claim. Third, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the ADA and RA because the ADA does not apply in exigent circumstances, and the plaintiffs have not alleged discrimination. After a second prisoner tested positive for COVID-19, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to identify the prisoner on April 24. The plaintiffs argued that the prisoner's identity could allow for contact tracing in lieu of comprehensive testing of all prisoners. The plaintiffs also sought the identification within 48 hours of all future prisoners confirmed to have COVID-19. The defendants opposed the motion, arguing that discovery was not open and therefore the Court had no authority to grant an order compelling production. With regards to the identification of future COVID-19 patients, the defendants argued that such preliminary injunctive relief was not warranted in light of the Fifth Circuit's finding that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits. The defendants filed a Motion to Stay Discovery on May 7. They argued that discovery was premature because the defendants' interlocutory appeal was still pending in the Fifth Circuit, and there were other pending preliminary issues including the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. On May 13, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Certify Class. They proposed a general class and a subclass, and identified a class period as the present day until protections against COVID-19 are no longer necessary. The general class consisted of all current and future inmates incarcerated in the Wallace Pack Unit who are subjected to TDCJ's policy of failing to provide protection from exposure to COVID-19 for the class period. The high-risk subclass included all current and future inmates incarcerated at Wallace Pack Unit who are subjected to TDCJ's policy of failing to provide protection from exposure to COVID-19 during the class period and who are, according to the CDC, most at risk of severe illness due to their age or health conditions. On June 5, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, finding that the defendant had substantially complied with the measures required by the injunction. 2020 WL 3026717. Judge Eugene Davis “reluctantly” concurred, noting that the lack of social distancing for the elderly and ill was “nothing short of a human tragedy.” A group of individuals in the custody of the TDCJ, but housed in a different unit, sought to intervene on June 10. On June 12, the defendants opposed the plaintiff's motion for class certification and argued that the TDCJ’s grievance process was available to the plaintiffs, and that the plaintiffs had substantially received their requested relief through the grievance process. The defendants argued that they provided hand sanitizer, mass testing for COVID-19, offender movement for those when medically necessary, and quarantine procedures. On June 25, three additional individuals sought to intervene. On June 27, the district court granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. 2020 WL 3491999. On June 30, the defendants sought to postpone the July 13 trial date to October 12, claiming that the current trial date is untenable due to the amount of discovery needed. However, the motion was denied on July 2. 2020 WL 3625730. The court noted that the COVID-19 crisis continued in the Pack Unit, Texas, and the United States, with the number of inmates in Pack Unit who have tested positive and who have died growing. The same day, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had plead facts that state a claim of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment, as well as claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. On July 6, the court addressed the three motions to intervene filed by individuals incarcerated at TDCJ prisons other than the Pack Unit and denied all three motions. 2020 WL 3666614. Although the court recognized that the intervenors shared common questions of law and fact with the plaintiffs of the case, the court also noted the lack of time for the defendants to engage in full discovery and briefing for the intervenors, the differences in issues of fact with the current plaintiffs, and the additional claims of relief raised by the intervenors. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 9, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the PLRA, and that the plaintiffs could not meet their burden under the ADA and their burden of showing the defendants' deliberate indifference. On July 21, the plaintiffs moved to certify two additional subclasses; a Disability Subclass and a Mobility-Impaired Subclass. A bench trial is being held between July 13 and mid-August. On July 27, an individual incarcerated at the W.J. Estelle Prison submitted a motion for joinder. The motion was denied on July 31, as he was not in the same unit as the plaintiffs of the case and therefore was not a party in this case. In a status report by the plaintiffs on August 31, the plaintiffs note that TDCJ’s website identifies 14 active cases within the Pack Unit, and at least four of the infected inmates were tested but were not advised of their status or removed from their dormitory for four days. On September, 29, 2020 the court granted the plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction. 2020 WL 5797881. In its opinion, the court first certified the Mobility-Impaired Sublcass, but not the Disability Subclass. The Mobility-Impaired Subclass included “[a]ll current and former inmates incarcerated at [TDCJ] Wallace Pack Unit who suffered from a disability that substantially limits one or more of their major life activities, are subjected to TDCJ and the Texas Correctional Managed Health Care Committee’s policy and practice of failing to provide exposure to Covid-19 during the class period, and who require the use of a walker, cane, or wheelchair to ambulate.” The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA and found that the plaintiffs demonstrated that the existing TDJC grievance process was incapable of responding to a rapidly spreading pandemic like COVID-19. The court found violations of the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, and the Rehab Act. It held that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference towards the plaintiffs in violation of the Eighth Amendment in two ways. First, it found that the defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to adopt a systematic approach to addressing COVID-19. Second, the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to plaintiffs’ medical needs by failing to take obvious precautionary public health measures on which all medical professionals would agree. On the ADA and Rehab Act claims, the court found that TDCJ’s decision to not issue hand sanitizer to the Mobility-Impaired Subclass violated the ADA and Rehab Act because it failed to reasonably accommodate their disabilities. Under the permanent injunction, the court ordered the defendants to provide unrestricted hand soap and clean towels, as well as hand sanitizer to the mobility impaired subclass. In addition, the court ordered numerous other safeguards, including sufficient cleaning supplies, training on additional cleaning practices, the creating of plans to allow for regular sanitizing, enforcement of social distancing, proper use of personal protective equipment by staff, testing measures, and creation of a contact tracing plan. That same day, TDCJ appealed the permanent injunction to the Fifth Circuit (docket no.: 20-20525). The district court denied TDCJ’s motion to stay the injunction, so TDCJ filed an emergency motion asking the Fifth Circuit to stay the injunction pending appeal and for a temporary administrative stay while the emergency motion was under consideration. On October 6, the Fifth Circuit administratively stayed the permanent injunction. The Fifth Circuit (Circuit Judges Don R. Willett, James C. Ho, Stuart Kyle Duncan) then granted the emergency motion to stay the injunction on October 13, 2020. 978 F.3d 154. The Fifth Circuit found that TDCJ was likely to succeed on the merits of its appeal because the plaintiffs failed to comply with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement by failing to use the prison’s internal grievance process before filing suit. In addition, even if the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was met, the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ likely fail on their Eighth Amendment claim as well because the district court did not focus on whether or not TDCJ responded reasonably to the risks of COVID-19 and instead focused on the impact of COVID-19. The Fifth Circuit found that TDCJ would be irreparably harmed absent a stay by hindering TDCJ’s flexibility to address an ever-changing situation. Finally, the Fifth Circuit found that the balance of the harms and the public interest favored the defendants because the COVID-19’s incidence at TDCJ was reduced without court intervention or oversight and the public interest favors having politically accountable officials—not federal judges—determine how to allocate resources. On October 21, two inmates filed an application with the Supreme Court to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the permanent injunction pending appeal. The Supreme Court denied the application to vacate on November 16. 592 U.S. ---. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented from the denial of application to vacate the stay. Justice Sotomayor would have found that the Fifth Circuit demonstrably erred in both their analysis of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims, noting that the Fifth Circuit substituted its own view of the facts for those of the District Court. Back in the District Court, numerous plaintiffs filed motions for leave to file amended complaints in late October. On November 10, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order. Judge Ellison denied the motions because the trial had concluded and the court had issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. On March 26, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's permanent injunction and rendered judgment for the defendants. In determining whether the the actions of the defendants constituted unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain and therefore deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the appellate court found that the record did not support a finding that either of the defendants' actions constituted deliberate indifference. The court found that the policy implemented by the TDJC was crafted by healthcare experts who were given that responsibility under state law. The court also found that the prison's policy went into effect in March 2020, when knowledge about the virus was unclear and before the Pack Unit had its first positive case. A second iteration of the prison's policy adopted CDC guidance four days after the guidance was released. The court concluded that it was not unreasonable for the defendants to rely on healthcare experts who were delegated the responsibility of crafting COVID-19 policies and that the policies adopted were reasonable since they were in accordance with the CDC's guidance. Despite the fact that the prison's testing plan and contract-tracing procedures were not documented in writing, the appellate court declined to hold that this showed that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference. The court also found that the lack of a compliance regime did not constitute deliberate indifference since state prisons are not required to implement additional layers of administration. The Fifth Circuit disagreed that the two month delay in mass testing of the Pack Unit constituted deliberate indifference, since defendant Collier gave the plausible reason that the prison's medical partner did not have sufficient testing supplies to test the entire Pack Unit in April 2020. While the district court found that the tests chosen by the prison took too long to obtain results, the appellate court found that defendant Collier's failure to explore faster options did not indicate deliberate indifference since the record did not indicate that Collier was personally able to secure quicker tests. Contrary to the district court's finding that the prison's inconsistent strike-team testing amounted to deliberate indifference, the appellate court found that the defendants did not respond recklessly in choosing and implementing their tests given the circumstances at the time. The appellate court also disagreed with the district court on its finding of deliberate indifference regarding social distancing. Despite the fact that defendant Herrera delayed in moving inmates into two empty dorms, the appellate court found that injunctive relief was not appropriate since the prison did start using those dorms one month after construction was completed. The appellate court also did not find that Herrera and Collier were reckless in their response to prisoner complaints about the prison officers' failure to wear masks since their complaints were too general. While evidence at trial supported a finding of lack of sinks, the appellate court noted that handwashing stations were installed by the defendants before and during trial. Overall, the appellate court noted that injunctive relief is forward looking, and that given the defendants' response over the course of the litigation, a permanent injunction was not warranted under the Eighth Amendment. On the plaintiffs ADA claims, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that they identified their disability, the disability's limitations, and the necessary accommodation they sought and therefore vacated the district court's injunction regarding hand sanitizer for the mobility-impaired subclass.

Summary: The district court granted a preliminary injunction for COVID-19 mitigating measures in a geriatric prison run by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, but the Fifth Circuit stayed that injunction as premature and overbroad. On June 5, the Fifth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, noting that the defendant had substantially complied with the measures required by the injunction. The court granted class certification on June 27 and denied to dismiss the case on July 2. The case proceeded to trial and on September 29, the district court granted a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to take numerous safeguards, including sufficient cleaning supplies, enforcement of social distancing, proper use of personal protective equipment by staff, testing measures, and creation of a contact tracing plan. On October 13, the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants' emergency motion to stay the injunction. Two prisoners filed an application to vacate the stay with the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied the request on November 16. On March 26, 2021, the Fifth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and rendered judgment for the defendants.


This case sprang from Riggs v. Rodriguez (docket #: 1:09-cv-00010-EJL), which Riggs filed pro se seeking compensatory and punitive damages for the Correction Corporation of America's (CCA) alleged failure to prevent his assault and provide adequate medical treatment. Lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) agreed to take his case and filed an amended complaint that added a class action lawsuit seeking only injunctive relief with several new named plaintiffs. After a series of disputes about whether the class action and Riggs' case should proceed together, the plaintiffs in the class action lawsuit moved to sever their case from the monetary claims. The court granted their motion on April 27, 2011 and allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that same day which serves as the basis for this lawsuit. This case was assigned to Judge Edward J. Lodge and referred to Judge David O. Carter for settlement negotiations. Eight inmates at Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho on behalf of all those who were or would be imprisoned at ICC. Claiming their 8th and 14th Amendment rights to be protected against assault from other prisoners had been violated in pursuit of profit, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that CCA created a substantial and unnecessary risk of assault and failed to protect inmates against assault because of the following practices: running the prison near or above full capacity, hiring inadequate numbers of staff to supervise and protect inmates, employing poor training, failing to investigate and provide a report for each incident, threatening to and intentionally placing inmates near particularly violent/predatory individuals (often to force an inmate to be an informant), ignoring inmates' requests to be moved, failing to discipline or refer for prosecution prisoners who assaulted other inmates, failing to investigate and discipline staff whose actions caused or contributed to assaults, and concealing institutional problems with violence by issuing disciplinary citations to victims of assault, and refusing to take x-rays or perform other medical tests that would reveal the extent of inmates' injuries. The parties came to a settlement agreement on September 16, 2011. The agreement was filed with the court and entered on September 20, 2011 along with a voluntary dismissal of all claims with prejudice. The agreement provided for a variety of reporting, investigating, training, and staffing requirements. Several of the provisions required CCA to meet the terms of its contract and follow Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) Standard Operating Procedures, though some provisions required CCA to exceed them. The terms also required CCA to make housing assignments based on all relevant safety considerations, to place inmates who claimed to be at risk of assault into appropriate housing, and refer all cases that appeared to be serious enough to qualify as aggravated battery to the county sheriff. Attorneys' fees and costs were confidential under the agreement, which was to last for 2 years. The court retained jurisdiction under the agreement as a last resort to resolve disputes. Between December 2012 and January 2013, CCA and IDOC received reports that staffing records at ICC had been falsified during the post-settlement period. IDOC initiated an audit of ICC’s staffing records and CCA hired an investigator. On April 11, 2013, IDOC issued a press release, stating that CCA’s employees had falsified staffing records to represent that correctional officers were staffing mandatory security posts when those posts had in fact been vacant for a total of nearly 4,800 hours during a seven-month period in 2012. That same day, CCA issued its own press release stating there were “some inaccuracies” in its staffing records. On February 21, 2013, the parties amended the stipulation. The court adopted the amendment on March 1, 2013. The amendment provided for the appointment of an independent investigator and shifted reviewing duties to the investigator. The amendment also required the investigator to examine at least 30% of the monthly reports and report on whether they were complete or deficient. In June 2013, the plaintiffs moved in the district court for an order to show cause as to why CCA should not be held in contempt for violating the court’s dismissal order. The district court referred the motion to Judge Carter, sitting by special designation in the District of Idaho. CCA opposed the motion, partly on the ground that the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court held it had jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and issued the requested order. On September 16, 2013, Judge Carter held the defendants in contempt for violating the settlement agreement and extended the settlement by two years. 979 F. Supp. 2d 1104. The defendants appealed. On February 20, 2014, the court approved the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys’ fees. 7 F. Supp. 3d 1069. The plaintiffs were awarded $349,018.52 in fees and costs. The defendants appealed this ruling as well. On May 23, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the contempt finding and the attorneys’ fees in a unanimous opinion by Judge William Fletcher (joined by Judges Fisher and Wilken). 822 F.3d 1085. The court reasoned that the contempt finding was warranted because CCA did not take all reasonable steps to comply with the order, as is required by well-established law, and because the contempt finding was civil in nature, and therefore did not require procedural safeguards applicable in criminal proceedings. The court deemed the extension of the settlement agreement within the district court’s power. The court further concluded that the attorneys’ fees award did not violate the PLRA. The defendants petitioned for a rehearing en banc. On July 7, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. On August 25, 2016, the appellee’s motion for attorneys’ fees was referred to Appellate Commissioner Peter L. Shaw. Appellants did not dispute appellee’s eligibility for fees, but did dispute the reasonableness of the requested hours and fees amount. On August 29, the motion for fees was referred to the Circuit Mediator. On October 24, 2016, the court issued an order stating that the parties informed the court that they had resolved the motion for attorneys’ fees. The order did not contain information about the fees amount. This case is now closed.

Summary: Eight inmates at Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) brought the class action on behalf of all those who were or would be imprisoned at ICC. Claiming their 8th and 14th Amendment rights to be protected against assault from other prisoners had been violated in pursuit of profit, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that Correction Corporation of America created a substantial and unnecessary risk of assault and failed to protect inmates against assault because of a variety of practices including: running the prison near or above full capacity, hiring inadequate numbers of staff to supervise and protect inmates, employing poor training, failing to investigate and provide a report for each incident, threatening to and intentionally placing inmates near particularly violent/predatory prisoners (often to force the inmate to be an informant), and ignoring inmates' requests to be moved. The parties came to a 2-year settlement agreement that provided for an array of reporting, investigating, training, and staffing requirements. As part of the settlement agreement the parties stipulated to the dismissal of all claims, which the court granted with prejudice. On September 16, 2013, the district court held the defendants in contempt for violating the settlement agreement and extended the settlement by two years. The defendants appealed. On February 20, 2014, the district court approved the plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees. The plaintiffs were awarded $349,018.52 in fees and costs. The defendants appealed this ruling as well. On May 23, 2016, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed both the contempt finding and the attorneys’ fees in a unanimous opinion by Judge William Fletcher (joined by Judges Fisher and Wilken). This case is now closed.


On March 28, 2011, a class of HIV-positive men and women imprisoned by the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, under the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Alabama, the national ACLU, the ACLU AIDS Project, and the ACLU National Prison Project, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the ADOC's policy of segregating HIV-positive prisoners from the rest of the general population violated the ADA. Specifically, they alleged that the ADOC did not provide those prisoners with equal treatment because they excluded them from certain housing units, substance abuse programs, jobs, certain medical treatment, and work release. Additionally, the plaintiffs challenged the ADOC policy of publicizing the prisoners' HIV-positive status by requiring them to wear white armbands, stigmatizing those with HIV. On August 30, 2012, the District Court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) approved the plaintiff's motion to certify the class, finding that the requirements for class certification had been met (289 F.R.D. 506). The class definition was "all present and future and future HIV positive inmates incarcerated in ADOC prisons." On September 5, 2012, Judge Thompson denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In this ruling, Judge Thompson found that the plaintiffs "plausibly alleged" that the prisoners' HIV status qualified as an impairment that substantially limited a major life ability, as required under the definition of disability under the ADA, because the immune system of the person diagnosed was impaired. He also found that the claim under the Rehabilitation Act was sufficient because HIV did not fall under the Act's contagious disease exception. Judge Thompson also held that the plaintiffs did not need to exhaust their administrative remedies, as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, because the prison did not provide appropriate forms for the prisoners to use to file administrative grievances. Finally, he held that sovereign immunity did not apply, and thus the ADOC could be sued. 891 F. Supp. 2d 1296. On December 21, 2012, Judge Thompson held that the policies of the ADOC did violate the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. After finding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue and that their claims were not moot, Judge Thompson held that the blanket policy of segregation violated the two acts and that housing HIV-positive inmates at other facilities would not pose an undue burden on the state. The court did not address the allegations regarding the work release policy. 2012 WL 6681773. On August 1, 2013, the parties reached a preliminary settlement. On August 6, the court preliminarily approved the proposed settlement agreement. Under the terms of the detailed agreement, the defendant agreed to the following: discontinuation of separate HIV housing and isolation at intake; revision of all HIV-specific policies and protocols; maintenance of an Acute Care Unit for inmate care; implementation of a detailed procedure before any HIV-positive inmate is transferred to defendant's facilities; adoption of new hiring and reporting requirements; and payment of $1.3 million in attorneys fees. A consent decree entering the final approval of the parties' settlement was issued on September 30, 2013, and the court retained jurisdiction over the case. This primary agreement covered 14 of the 29 facilities in the state, and was developed in addition to a private agreement on the other 15 facilities. Both settlements had June 30, 2015 as expiration date (the private agreement followed the date set for the primary agreement). On December 08, 2015, the defendants were ordered to pay $ 99,000.00 in additional attorney’s fees, regarding the work done since the entry of the consent decree. After the payment of the additional fees, the case was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice on January 8, 2016. On April 8, 2016, a motion to reopen the case was denied, and Judge Thompson reiterated that this litigation was over. The case is closed.

Summary: A group of HIV-positive prisoners brought a class action alleging the the Alabama Department of Corrections' policy of segregating HIV-positive prisoners from the general population and restricting their access to certain amenities violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. On September 30, 2013, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the defendant agreed to discontinue isolation of HIV-positive prisoners, revise all HIV-specific policies, adopt new hiring and reporting practices, and pay the plaintiffs $1.3 million in attorneys fees. An additional $ 99,000.00 in attorney's fees were aerates, and the case was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice on January 8, 2016.


On March 21, 2006, the United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against Municipio de Vega Alta (Municipality of Vega Alta). The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII, through its agency the Municipal Police, by discriminating against female officers on the basis of sex and by retaliating against a male officer for cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with its investigation of the discrimination against female officers. The complaint alleges that the Municipal Police discriminated on the basis of sex by: (1) excluding female officers from supervisory duties, regular shift work, driving patrol cars and other vehicles, and conducting investigations commensurate with their experience; (2) assigning female officers to clerical duties; and (3) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of the discriminatory treatment. The complaint further alleges that the Municipal Police retaliated against a male officer for his participation in the EEOC investigation of sex discrimination by: (1) excluding him from supervisory duties in a desirable area; (2) transferring him out of the desirable area; (3) denying him the opportunity to participate in relevant training sessions; (4) threatening him with suspension or termination; (5) denying him a letter of reference for employment with another municipality; and (6) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of the retaliatory treatment. The individual employees sought to intervene as plaintiffs. In the intervenor's complaint, the employees named as defendants the municipality as well as the mayor and the commissioner of police. The plaintiffs sought relief under Title VII for sex discrimination and retaliation and also sought relief under several local laws. The defendants moved the court to dismiss the intervenor complaint arguing that it had not been filed within the requisite ninety (90) day period following the receipt of a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. The mayor and the commissioner of police moved the court to dismiss the complaint arguing that as individuals, they could not be sued under Title VII. On May 15, 2007, the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico (Judge Juan Perez-Gimenez) granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the Title VII retaliation claims on the grounds that the plaintiff's had failed to file within the requisite ninety day period. The court declined to dismiss the Title VII sex discrimination claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs have an unqualified right to intervene in a suit brought on their behalf. All Title VII claims against the mayor and the commissioner of police were dismissed on the grounds that there is no individual liability under Title VII. On September 4, 2007, the parties submitted a motion to enter a consent decree, which was granted on September 10, 2007. Under the decree, parties made no admissions. With respect to four individual plaintiff-intervenors, the decree provided for monetary relief of varying amounts as damages and attorney's fees (adding up to $225,000.00). The defendant agreed to expunge their employment records of negative references, and in the case of one plaintiff, to provide neutral references. The plaintiffs in exchange released all of their claims. The decree also contained general injunctions on the following: 1) prohibition of gender discrimination with respect to compensation, terms and conditions of employment; 2) prohibition on retaliation. The defendant agreed to implement a clearly described complaints procedure with multiple and accessible venues with following features: 1) protection of confidentiality of complainants; 2) prompt, thorough, impartial investigation of gender discrimination complaints; 3) prompt actions, if discrimination or retaliation occurred; 4) distribution of the new policies and procedures. The municipality also agreed to provide training on gender discrimination and retaliation to all supervisors, lasting at least three hours. The United States retained a right to monitor compliance at any point. The Court retained jurisdiction over the implementation of the decree for three years. The decree would dissolve after 3 years without additional orders from the Court.

Summary: On March 21, 2006, the United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ("Title VII") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against Municipio de Vega Alta (Municipality of Vega Alta). The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant discriminated against female officers on the basis of sex and by retaliating against a male officer for cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") with its investigation of the discrimination against female officers. The parties settled in September of 2007.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Southern California and Nevada filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders (EO) that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Los Angeles Field Office, including Los Angeles International Airport and McCarran International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders in the Los Angeles Field Office" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The case was assigned to Judge Beverly Reid O'Connell. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. On May 17, the government moved to stay the proceedings pending the consolidation decision. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that "[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice." On Jun. 21, the court ordered proceedings stayed for 60 days. On Aug. 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that, although the thirteen FOIA cases shared "a limited number of factual issues," these issues "appear[ed] relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." Following the Panel's denial, Judge O'Connell lifted the stay and litigation continued. On Nov. 3, the case was reassigned to Judge Robert H. Whaley. On Dec. 13, 2017, the court set a production schedule ordering the government to review and produce responsive records in monthly batches through February 2018. The government completed its production by March 2018, and after the parties conferred, the ACLU stated in an August 2018 status report that it was satisfied with the production and would not pursue further litigation. Attorneys' fees and costs are the only outstanding issue the parties are currently working to resolve. By May 28, 2019, the parties had come to an agreement regarding attorneys' fees and costs. They therefore submitted a stipulation of dismissal on June 19, 2019, which was granted that same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Southern California and Nevada filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Defendants began producing documents in December of 2017 and finished the production in March of 2018. Attorneys' fees and costs were settled privately and the case is now closed.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of more than a dozen such suits; each aimed to access information on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders (EO) banning admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's College Park Field Office, including Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport, Charlotte Douglas International Airport, Charleston International Airport, and Yeager International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. On May 12, the defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings pending a decision on the motion to transfer, which the court granted on June 30. On Aug. 2, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. 261 F. Supp. 3d 1348. In its order, the Panel found that, although the thirteen FOIA cases share "a limited number of factual issues," these issues "appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." Later that week, Judge Story lifted the stay and litigation continued. On Dec. 13, 2017, the court ordered the government to process at least 1,000 pages of potentially responsive records, and to produce responsive records from that batch, by Jan. 16, 2018. The court also ordered the government to repeat this process every month. Status report filed in June and September indicated that the government had completed its production and the parties were in the process of discussing it with the goal of avoiding further litigation. On Oct. 30, 2018, the case was reassigned to Judge William M Ray, II. Besides a brief stay in the production of documents late in 2018 (due to the government shutdown), the parties seemed to work in good faith with one another on document production. On July 30, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal to end the case. The case is now closed. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. This case is closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The case is ongoing.


On February 22, 2019, two individuals who were in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC), Brooklyn, New York brought a putative class action lawsuit against the warden of the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The case was assigned to District Judge Margo K. Brodie. Suing under Bivens, the plaintiffs alleged that during the period from January 27, 2019 to February 3, 2019, MDC was plunged into darkness and cold, and those incarcerated at the MDC were consequently subjected to unconstitutional and inhumane conditions that amounted to constitutional violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that due to there being no heat or light, those in custody were were in complete and near-complete lockdown in cells, had limited medical care, had infrequent showers and limited hot water, no exercise, no clean laundry, no commissary, no hot meals, no access to counsel, no email, and no family visits. These conditions, they argued, amounted to unlawful punishment for the pretrial detainees, and thus was in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Regarding the post-conviction detainees, the plaintiffs argued that by failing to act on the condition issues, MDC was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ degrading and inhuman conditions of confinement in violation of their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Represented by private counsel and the civil rights clinic at Cardozo School of Law, the plaintiffs requested compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on November 15, 2019, adding the MDC facilities manager and the United States as defendants. Regarding the United States, the plaintiffs sued it under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and requested damages for negligence. On November 21, 2019, defendants sought an unopposed 45 day extension of their time allotted to file a motion to dismiss as well as a stay on discovery until then (which plaintiffs opposed). After a conference held on November 26, 2020, Judge Gold granted the extension and denied the stay. After continued discovery, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction on May 8, 2020. Meanwhile, discovery continued and the parties litigated a protective order. On October 21, 2020, the court held an oral argument before Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold on the defendants' motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on November 16, 2020, Judge Gold issued his report and recommendations on the motion to dismiss: he recommended that the motion be granted with respect to the Bivens claims against defendants warden and facilities manager and denied with respect to the FTCA claim brought against the United States. The United States filed a motion in opposition on December 7, 2020. Meanwhile, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Peggy Kuo and on February 16, 2021, it was reassigned to Judge Edward R. Korman. On March 22, 2021, Judge Korman adopted Judge Gold's report and recommendation on the motion to dismiss in its entirety. Discovery continued. On March 22, 2022, Judge Korman announced that he was considering consolidating this case with related matters Haskins v. United States BOP, 19-cv-2568, and O'Neal v. United States, 19-cv-5039, with which this case shared common questions of law and fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. He additionally ordered that any party opposing consolidation was ordered to show cause why the actions should not be consolidated by April 2, 2021. Accordingly, on April 2, he consolidated the cases. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On February 22, 2019, detainees of the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC"), in Brooklyn, New York brought a putative class action lawsuit against the Warden of Metropolitan Detention Center in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that during the period from January 27, 2019 to February 3, 2019, MDC was without heat or light, and those being held at the MDC were consequently subjected to unconstitutional and inhumane conditions. The case is ongoing.


The below summary is a condensed version. The full summary can be found here on the Clearinghouse website. Hawaii Attorney General Douglas S. Chin filed this lawsuit on February 3, 2017 against President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO-1) barring legal immigrants, visitors, and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The State filed a concurrent complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. The case was assigned to Judge Derrick K. Watson. The complaint argued that Hawaii has an interest in protecting “its residents, its employers, its educational institutions, and its sovereignty against illegal actions of President Donald J. Trump.” The complaint noted that Hawaii is the nation’s most ethnically diverse state, and that EO-1 was tearing apart families and wounding Hawaii’s economic institutions. The complaint alleged that EO-1 violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Hawaii sought declaratory and injunctive relief; it asked the court to enjoin defendants nationwide from barring entry to the US of immigrants and nonimmigrants pursuant to EO-1. On March 6, prompted by adverse developments in another case, Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). EO-2 departed from EO-1 in two significant ways: first, it removed Iraq from the list of countries covered by the order, and second it no longer barred entry to lawful permanent residents and existing visa holders. Additionally, for other would-be travelers and immigrants, it banned entry into the United States but set up a case-by-case waiver process. On March 8, the court allowed Hawaii to file a Second Amended Complaint and motion for TRO. The State of Hawaii's Second Amended Complaint alleged that "the second Executive Order is infected with the same legal problems as the first Order," namely, that it violated the First and Fifth Amendments along with the INA and APA. Later, a number of parties, including many civil rights advocacy groups, filed their appearance in the suit. A number of parties also filed amici briefs and appearances. On March 15, the District Court heard oral argument on Hawaii's motion for a temporary restraining order. The court granted the motion on the same day, enjoining the defendants nationwide from enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6 of EO-2. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs had met their burden of establishing a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim, that irreparable injury is likely if the requested relief is not issued, and that the balance of the equities and public interest counsel in favor of granting the requested relief. This was the first nationwide injunction of EO-2. 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119. Six days after winning the temporary restraining order, the plaintiffs filed a motion, along with accompanying declarations, to convert the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction. On March 29, the court heard oral arguments on the plaintiffs' motion to convert the TRO into a preliminary injunction. On the same day, the court granted the motion and enjoined Sections 2 and 6 of the EO across the nation. On March 30, the DOJ filed a notice of appeal. 245 F. Supp. 3d 1227. The parties filed a joint motion to suspend district court proceedings pending resolution of the DOJ's appeal at the Ninth Circuit. The court granted this motion and the matter thus moved entirely to the Ninth Circuit. On April 7, the DOJ moved in the Ninth Circuit for a stay of the district court's injunction pending the Ninth Circuit appeal. On June 1, the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion upholding the district court's preliminary injunction in major part. In an 86-page per curiam opinion by Judges Michael Daly Hawkins, Ronald M. Gould, and Richard A. Paez, the Court of Appeals addressed only the issues of justiciability and the statutory claims, finding the matter justiciable and holding that the Immigration and Nationality Act forbids nationality discrimination in visa-issuance (and therefore in categorical rules governing entry) and also forbids summary changes to the number of refugees admissible in a given year. The Court of Appeals narrowed the preliminary injunction to remove its direct applicability to President Trump (while affirming its coverage of the governmental actors who would carry out EO-2) and to allow the interagency consultation required by EO-2 to proceed unimpeded. On June 26, the Supreme Court agreed to hear this case and consolidated it with IRAP v. Trump, an analogous case from the District of Maryland. In addition to the issues identified in the petitions, the High Court directed the parties to address the following question: "Whether the challenges to §2(c) [the part of the EO that suspended entry to nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen for ninety days] became moot on June 14, 2017." The Supreme Court declined to stay most of the preliminary injunction, but did reverse that injunction's application to "foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." The Court noted that foreign nationals who do not have a close family tie or a formal, documented relationship with an entity (such as a school or employer) may have §2(c) enforced against them. The Supreme Court set an October 2017 hearing for the consolidated cases, but in the meantime it remained for the district court to adjudicate disputes over what remained of the preliminary injunction. From late June through July, the remaining issues in the case made their way through the district court and eventually back to the Ninth Circuit. On Sept 7, the Ninth Circuit issued a per curium opinion affirming, in its entirety, the district court's July 13 modification of its preliminary injunction, which prohibited the federal government from applying EO-2 to grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins of persons in the US. On September 11, the federal government moved to stay the Ninth Circuit's order, arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision rendered the Supreme Court's June 26 stay "functionally inoperative" in that it would "disrupt the status quo and frustrate orderly implementation of the [Executive Order's] refugee provisions that [SCOTUS] made clear months ago could take effect." That same day, the Supreme Court issued the following order: "It is ordered that the mandate of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, case No. 17-16426, is hereby stayed with respect to refugees covered by a formal assurance, pending receipt of a response, due on or before Tuesday, September 12, 2017, by 12p.m., and further order of the undersigned or of the Court." The Supreme Court was set to hear this case on the merits on October 10. However, the travel ban imposed by EO-2 expired on September 24. That same day, the Trump Administration signed a new proclamation (EO-3) indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. The Supreme Court cancelled the October 10 hearing, issuing the following order: "We granted certiorari in this case to resolve a challenge to the temporary suspension of entry of aliens abroad under Section 2(c) of Executive Order No. 13,780. Because that provision of the Order expired by its own terms on September 24, 2017, the appeal no longer presents a live case or controversy. Following our established practice in such cases, the judgment is therefore vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss as moot the challenge to Executive Order. No. 13,780. We express no view on the merits. Justice Sotomayor dissents from the order vacating the judgment below and would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted." Hawaii filed its third amended complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order. The Third Amended Complaint argued that EO-3, continued to target Muslim-majority countries and would continue to harm Hawaii’s economy and hinder the state’s efforts to assist refugees. Hawaii further moved for a TRO, to which the federal government responded with a motion to oppose on October 14. On October 17, District Judge Derrick K. Watson granted Hawaii's TRO motion and fully enjoined the federal government from enforcing or implementing Sections 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (g), and (h) of EO-3 across the nation. Judge Watson held that EO-3's aspirational policy goals of combatting terrorism and fostering cooperativeness in other countries are not tantamount to a finding by the President that the entry of any aliens into the US would be detrimental to US interests, as required by the INA: "[M]any of EO-3's structural provisions are unsupported by verifiable evidence, undermining any claim that its findings 'support the conclusion' to categorically ban the entry of millions." 265 F. Supp. 3d 1140. On October 24, the DOJ appealed the district court's preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit (Docket # 17-17168) and requested that the Ninth Circuit stay the district court's PI pending final disposition of the appeal on the merits. The Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the government's motion for an emergency stay of the district court's preliminary injunction pending hearing on November 13. The court of appeals stayed the injunction in its entirety except as to foreign nationals who have a credible claim of a bona fide relationship with a person or an entity in the United States. Citing the earlier Ninth Circuit decision, 871 F.3d 646, the court noted that persons with a "bona fide relationship" include grandparents, grandchildren, brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, and cousins. Regarding relationships with U.S. entities, the court noted that such relationships must be "formal, documented, and formed in the ordinary course, rather than for the purpose of evading [EO-3]." 2017 WL 5343014. On November 21, the DOJ asked the Supreme Court to stay the injunction. The Supreme Court did so on December 4, issuing the following order: "The application for a stay presented to Justice Kennedy and by him referred to the Court is granted, and the District Court's October 20, 2017 order granting a preliminary injunction is stayed pending disposition of the Government's appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of the Government's petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is sought. If a writ of certiorari is sought and the Court denies the petition, this order shall terminate automatically. If the Court grants the petition for a writ of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court enters its judgment. In light of its decision to consider the case on an expedited basis, we expect that the Court of Appeals will render its decision with appropriate dispatch. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor would deny the application." On December 6, the parties held oral argument before the Ninth Circuit on the DOJ's emergency stay motion. On December 22, the Ninth Circuit issued a per curium opinion affirming the district court's order enjoining EO-3's sections 2(a), (b), (c), (e), (g), and (h), but limiting the scope of the preliminary injunction to foreign nationals who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. 2018 Developments -- On January 5, 2018, the DOJ filed for cert. in the Supreme Court, No. 17-965. The Supreme Court granted cert on January 19. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on April 25 and a full recording of the arguments can be found here. On June 26, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit judgment, rejecting plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to EO-3. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a broad view of presidential power, holding that under the INA the President has "broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States” and that here the President "lawfully exercised that discretion.” The majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that the President must explain his findings, calling the argument “questionable” and writing that “the 12-page Proclamation—which thoroughly describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations underlying the President’s chosen restrictions—is more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under §1182(f).” As for plaintiff’s Establishment Clause argument, the Court first noted that EO-3's facially neutral policy towards religion forced the Court to take the extra step of probing "the sincerity of the stated justifications for the policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which were made before the President took the oath of office.” Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that “the Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says nothing about religion.” Notably, the Court did however use the opinion to officially repudiate Korematsu writing that the decision was "was gravely wrong the day it was decided.” In her powerful dissent, Justice Sotomayor opened by writing: "The United States of America is a Nation built upon the promise of religious liberty. Our Founders honored that core promise by embedding the principle of religious neutrality in the First Amendment. The Court’s decision today fails to safeguard that fundamental principle. It leaves undisturbed a policy first advertised openly and unequivocally as a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States” because the policy now masquerades behind a façade of national-security concerns. But this repackaging does little to cleanse Presidential Proclamation No. 9645 of the appearance of discrimination that the President’s words have created. Based on the evidence in the record, a reasonable observer would conclude that the Proclamation was motivated by anti-Muslim animus. That alone suffices to show that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. The majority holds otherwise by ignoring the facts, misconstruing our legal precedent, and turning a blind eye to the pain and suffering the Proclamation inflicts upon countless families and individuals, many of whom are United States citizens.” 137 S.Ct. 2080. On August 10, 2018, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings in light of the Supreme Court decision. The plaintiffs gave notice of voluntary dismissal in the district court three days later. On October 2, 2018, the district court issued a formal order that the case was dismissed without prejudice. This case is closed.

Summary: Hawaii Attorney General Douglas S. Chin filed this lawsuit on February 3,2017 against President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The State filed a complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. The complaint argued that the State has an interest in protecting its “its residents, its employers, its educational institutions, and its sovereignty against illegal actions of President Donald J. Trump.” The State went on to note that Hawaii is the nation’s most ethnically diverse state, and that the Executive Order is tearing apart families and wounding Hawaii’s economic institutions. The complaint alleged that the executive order violates the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On March 6, 2017, prompted by adverse developments in another case, Washington v. Trump case, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. Hawaii filed an amended complaint and sought a temporary restraining order of the new EO. The District Court granted the temporary restraining order. This was the first nationwide injunction of the new EO. The defendants challenged the injunction in the Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court was set to hear the case on the merits when the President issued its third Executive Order in late 2017. The Supreme Court remanded the case. Hawaii once again amended its complaint and sought a temporary restraining order, which the district court granted. The case made its way back to the Supreme Court and on June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court struck down the injunction. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a broad view of presidential power, holding that under the INA the President has "broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States” and that here the President "lawfully exercised that discretion.” As for plaintiff’s Establishment Clause argument, the Court first noted that EO-3's facially neutral policy towards religion forced the Court to take the extra step of probing "the sincerity of the stated justifications for the policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which were made before the President took the oath of office.” Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that “the Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes." Justice Sotomayor dissented. After the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court in light of the Supreme Court decision, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed. On October 2, 2018, the district court issued a formal order that the case was dismissed without prejudice. This case is closed.


On December 27, 2017, five detainees in California's Otay Mesa Detention Center ("the Facility"), a for-profit civil immigration detention facility, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, a multibillion-dollar corporation that owns and operates civil detention facilities across the United States, under the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act and California state law, including California's Minimum Wage and Unjust Enrichment laws. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Al Otro Lado, sought class-action certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant used the "free and nearly-free" labor of civil immigrant detainees to operate the facility and provide the essential services it was contractually required to provide. The plaintiffs claimed that this was forced labor and that the defendant maintained a corporate policy to withhold essential care and services to "ensure a ready supply of available labor needed to operate the Facility." The plaintiffs contended that this policy resulted in detainees performing labor, often for no more than $1.50 an hour, to buy basic necessities that were not provided by defendant, including food, water, and warm clothing. The plaintiffs alleged that if detainees did not participate in this labor scheme defendant would threaten to place them in solitary confinement and or report their actions to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The plaintiffs asserted that this practice of forced labor resulted in an economic windfall for defendant, as its costs of operating detention facilities were greatly reduced. The plaintiffs sought to certify four classes: (1) The Work Program Class: All civil immigration detainees who performed work for defendant at the Facility in the Work Program within the past ten years. (2) The Unlawful Inducement Class: All civil immigration detainees held at the Otay Mesa Facility within the past ten years who performed work for no compensation outside of their pods. (3) The Injured Worker Class: All civil immigration detainees held at the Facility within the past ten years who were injured while performing work through defendant's Work Program and denied access to California’s Worker’s Compensation benefits. (4) The Unpaid Cleaner Class: All civil immigration detainees held at the Facility who performed labor within their pods within the past ten years under threat of solitary confinement, and/or in exchange for basic necessities. The case was assigned to District Judge Anthony Battaglia and Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes. On January 2, 2018, the plaintiffs provided notice of a related case. The plaintiffs related this case with Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc., "because both actions involve common legal bases, similar legal claims, and an identical defendant." On January 5, 2018, this case was transferred to Judge Janis L. Sammartino to have the related cases assigned to the same judge. The related cases were not consolidated; pleadings were to be filed separately in each case. The plaintiffs sought to consolidate this action with the Owino case on January 22, 2018, claiming that "such consolidation will assist in the litigation, and appointment of lead counsel as proposed is in the best interests of the parties and will expedite the litigation." In addition to consolidation, the plaintiffs sought to assert themselves as interim lead class counsel in the event of a consolidated action. On February 23, 2018, the plaintiffs in the Owino case filed a motion for intervention, for the purpose of opposing the Gonzalez plaintiffs' motion to consolidate. The Owino plaintiffs argued that because the Gonzalez plaintiffs have different legal theories and objectives, consolidation of the cases would impair the Owino plaintiffs' ability to protect their interests. Furthermore, the Owino plaintiffs asserted that the Gonzalez plaintiffs would not adequately protect their interests in a consolidated action. Lastly, the Owino plaintiffs argued that the Gonzalez case should be dismissed because the case is duplicative. The court granted the motion to intervene on March 23, 2018. On April 4, 2018, Judge Sammartino issued an order denying consolidation and staying the case. Judge Sammartino concluded that the Gonzalez case is duplicative, as both cases arise from the same "transaction nucleus of fact;" both cases bring similar causes of actions and request similar relief and are based on similar factual allegations. However, Judge Sammartino declined to dismiss the Gonzalez case, despite the fact that these are "two nearly identical putative class actions", given the early stage of the Owino case and that its class has not been certified. The case appears to be dormant while resolution is pending in Owino; there has been no activity in this case since August 2018.

Summary: In December 2017, detainees in California's Otay Mesa Detention Center filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' practice of employing "free and nearly-free" labor civil immigrant detainees to maintain operations and provide services violated the federal Trafficking Victims Protection Act and California state minimum wage laws. As of February 2020, the case is stayed pending resolution of a nearly identical case, <i>Owino v. CoreCivic</i>.


On July 24, 2013, a group of Michigan residents who were denied Food Assistance Program (FAP) benefits under a "criminal justice disqualification" justification filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Michigan Department of Human Services (MDHS). The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Civil Justice and the ACLU of Michigan, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and federal SNAP law, alleging they were improperly denied food assistance. They sought declarative and injunctive relief, relief notice to members of the class, and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was initially assigned to Judge Bernard A. Friedman but was reassigned to Judge Judith E. Levy on March 13, 2014. The plaintiffs claimed that without specific information for the reasons or nature of the disqualification, they were not provided proper notice to understand the basis for the decision or a reasonable opportunity to be heard. The letters only instructed them to contact a law enforcement agency to resolve the issue. The plaintiffs alleged the "criminal justice disqualification" violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and that the substance and application of MDHS’s decision to deny benefits to all people with an outstanding felony warrant violated the “fleeing felon” standard set by the federal government. Michigan’s “fugitive felon” policy and practice disqualified people through a match program without confirming the person was actually sought by law enforcement. Federal SNAP law prohibited this by instead disqualifying only fleeing felons, and only if the government made a finding that law enforcement officials are actively seeking the individual and that the individual knew his or her apprehension was sought and was intentionally fleeing from justice. The plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to provide immediate relief to the requested class and subclass of individuals who relied on FAP benefits and would suffer irreparable harm while they waited for the resolution of the case without the food assistance. On September 25, 2013, Judge Friedman denied the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunction. On October 11, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and/or summary judgment. On October 28, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion for class certification. On November 21, 2013, the plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Hearings for the summary judgment motions were postponed after the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 27. On September 30, 2014, the defendants filed a responsive motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Hearings on the motion were set and held before the court on November 14, 2014. On January 9, 2015, Judge Levy ruled on all three motions. Judge Levy granted the class certification and ruled for the plaintiffs in summary judgment for all but one plaintiff, who was dismissed. 79 F. Supp. 3d 712. On January 23, 2015, the defendants moved for reconsideration and a stay pending the outcome of the reconsideration. On March 24, 2015, Judge Levy issued an order denying the defendant’s motion for reconsideration, stating their motion was more “petulance than substance” and that none of the defendant's four claims had a proper ground for reconsideration. 2015 WL 1322728. On March 31, 2015, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and requested a motion to stay pending the appeal. On April 7, the Sixth Circuit denied the stay pending appeal. On May 18, 2015, the plaintiffs motioned an order to show cause, suggesting the defendants should be held in contempt for failing to implement the changes ordered by the court. And on June 5, 2015, Judge Levy denied the defendant’s motion to stay pending the appeal. On July 1, 2015, the plaintiffs requested expedited post-judgment discovery in order to determine if the defendant had taken all reasonable steps to comply with the court’s January 9, March 30 and 31 orders. On September 1, 2015, Judge Levy granted the plaintiffs’ motion for post-judgment discovery and motion for an order to show cause. Judge Levy noted that the plaintiffs had established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant had not stopped the conduct declared unlawful and enjoined by the court. On September 23, 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to work with the plaintiff on implementing the court-ordered changes to their administration of FAP, and the plaintiffs agreed to stipulate the dismissal of their motion to show cause once the changes were implemented. On March 30, 2016, Judge Levy dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion to show cause upon the parties' agreement that the terms of the settlement agreement had been met. On August 25, 2016, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion and remanded the case for continued enforcement of the permanent injunction. On February 24, 2017, the parties jointly moved for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $910,908.83 for class counsel. On May 31, 2017, the court granted this award. As of April 21, 2020, this case is ongoing for compliance enforcement purposes.

Summary: On July 24, 2013, a group of individuals who had been denied Food Assistance without proper notification due to a "criminal justice disqualification," filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Michigan Department of Human Services (MDHS). On January 9, 2015, U.S. District Court Judge Judith Levy granted class certification and summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs continue to work with MDHS to implement all ordered changes to their administration of FAP benefits.


On December 28, 2018, four pre-trial detainees filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC), the Albany County Correctional Facility, and the Albany County Sheriff's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed assault and battery during their transfer from Rikers Island to the Albany County Correctional Facility. In separate instances, all four plaintiffs were detained at Rikers Island when they were transferred to the Albany County Correctional Facility. The correctional officers did not provide the plaintiffs with a reason for their transfer or notify their families or attorneys. The plaintiffs shared similar experiences upon arrival at the Albany County Correctional Facility. Plaintiffs alleged that the correctional officers at the facility severely beat and sexually assaulted them while they were being processed for intake. While shackled and handcuffed, several officers kicked and stomped on the plaintiffs until they were unconscious. After, the plaintiffs were forced to remove their clothing and follow a series of detailed instructions. If they did not properly comply, the defendants would assault them. The defendants accused all plaintiffs of carrying contraband in their rectums and an officer would then proceed to digitally assault them. In some instances, the plaintiffs were continually tasered and beaten after their strip searches. The plaintiffs claimed that the Albany County Correctional Facility reported each assault as a disciplinary infraction and accused each plaintiff of attacking staff members inside the booking cell. Afraid of retaliation, the plaintiffs did not testify during their disciplinary hearings and were sentenced to nine to ten months in punitive segregation. On January 28, 2019, plaintiffs' counsel filed a motion for preliminary injunction on behalf of one detainee who remained in the custody of the Albany County Correctional Facility. They requested: (1) for the court to transfer the plaintiff to a correctional facility in New York City operated by DOC while the case was pending and until his release; (2) in the alternative, to remove him from punitive segregation at the Albany County Correctional Facility; or (3) temporarily release him from punitive segregation, provide a new disciplinary hearing that has minimum due process standards, and give him access to unmonitored legal telephone calls with counsel throughout the pendency of the lawsuit. The next day, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that provided class allegations and requested class certification. The New York City Department of Corrections moved to dismiss and sought to join the State Commission of Corrections (SCOC) as a defendant. The City defendants argued that the lawsuit should be dismissed on grounds that: (1) the plaintiffs failed to exhaust in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) liability for any constitutional violations regarding transfers to Albany should be directed to the SCOC, thus, the case should be dismissed for failing to join a necessary party; (3) the plaintiff’s claim for permanent injunctive relief should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; and (4) the plaintiffs failed to state a claim on all twenty-two causes of action that implicated the City defendants. Shortly thereafter, the Albany County Sheriff’s Office defendants and a defendant who worked as a nurse in the Albany County Correctional Facility both filed motions to sever and transfer the claims directed against them from the claims against the City defendants to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. On March 28, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class that consisted of all pretrial detainees who were or would be detained at the Albany County Correctional Facility pursuant to substitute jail orders obtained by the City of New York. On April 4, 2019, Chief Judge Colleen McMahon explained that she would not be considering the issue of class certification any time soon, given the other motions. In Judge McMahon's decision and order on April 30, 2019, she denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the City defendant's motion to dismiss, and the Albany County defendants' motion to sever and order to transfer. 2019 WL 212052. On June 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint that addressed pending custody status of several plaintiffs who no longer were in custody at the Albany County Correctional Facility. On June 12, 2019, Judge McMahon issued an order that granted the Albany County defendants' request for a stay until August 31, 2019, for one of the correctional officers on military leave. On June 27, 2019 the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Stewart D. Aaron for settlement talks. The Corrections Officers Benevolent Association formally requested to participate on July 5, 2019. Its request was denied on July 9, 2019: it was not party to the case, and none of the parties consented to its participation. On July 16, 2019, a settlement conference was held. Settlement talks then continued, and the case was stayed. On October 18, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The City of New York agreed to pay three individual plaintiffs $75,000, plus their pro rata shares of attorneys' fees. The County of Albany did the same, in addition to paying a fourth plaintiff $220,000. The plaintiffs obtained a total of $310,000 in attorneys' fees. The settlement also specified that the City of New York would not seek substitute jail orders to transfer anyone in the NYC DOC to the Albany County Correctional Facility from the date of the agreement to December 31, 2021. Persons being transferred outside of the City of New York upon a substitute jail order would be given a notice stating:<blockquote>“a. Where the inmate is being transferred: b. That the transfer is pursuant to a substitute jail order; c. The reason for the transfer; d. That the inmate will be brought back to New York City for court dates; e. That the inmate will be subject to the rules and regulations of the new jail, including rules about visiting; f. That the new jail is governed by New York State’s Minimum Standards for Management of County Jails; g. That the inmate has the right to make phone calls to the inmate’s lawyer; and h. That if the inmate wants to talk to his lawyer to let them know where they are being moved the inmate, he/she should ask the staff at the new jail.”</blockquote>Additionally, from January 1, 2022 – December 31, 2023, any persons New York City DOC housed in Albany County Correctional Facility would be subject to the limits on punitive segregation contained in 40 R.C.N.Y §§ 1-17(a-g), including age restrictions and enhanced due process protections like the ability to call witnesses at infraction hearings. The case was dismissed with prejudice on October 21, 2019 pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, but the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement.

Summary: In 2018, four pre-trial detainees filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC), the Albany County Correctional Facility, and the Albany County Sheriff's Office. They alleged that the defendants violated their First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and committed assault and battery when they beat and sexually assaulted the plaintiffs during processing. Both New York City and Albany County settled: this included payments to the plaintiffs and changes in practice on the part of the defendants, including notices explaining reasons for transfers, and a ban on transferring NYC detainees to Albany until 2022. The case remains open for enforcement.


The four plaintiffs in this case are high school track athletes who alleged that having to compete against transgender female peers (consistently referred to as "biological males" in their briefs) has caused the plaintiffs to lose out on significant opportunities to win competitions and further advance in their track careers. They filed suit on February 12, 2020 in the District Court for the District of Connecticut against their school districts and the Connecticut Interschool Athletic Conference, represented by the nonprofit Alliance Defending Freedom. They alleged violations of Title IX and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with a preliminary injunction to prevent transgender female athletes from competing against other female athletes for the spring 2020 track season. Background Specifically, the student-athlete plaintiffs alleged that by allowing transgender female athletes to compete in girls' sporting events, the defendant school districts violate rights of other girls competing in high school sports under Title IX in two ways. First, the plaintiffs complain, they fail to provide effective accommodation for the interests and abilities of girls, by failing to provide an appropriate competitive environment for girls. Second, they fail to provide equal treatment, benefits, and opportunities for girls as compared to boys' sports. Procedural history This case was filed just as the novel coronavirus pandemic was beginning to affect the operations of public schools across the country. On April 8, 2020, plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was denied by Judge Robert N. Chatigny, who stated that it was highly unlikely that the spring track season would occur and that therefore plaintiffs had no need of preliminary relief. A more detailed scheduling order was filed, with settlement conferences and trial both scheduled for 2021. Several additional parties have taken an interest in this case. On February 21, 2020, two transgender female students who were repeatedly named in the complaint filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the court on April 22, 2020. They are represented by the ACLU and the ACLU of Connecticut. On March 24, 2020, the United States filed a statement of interest through the Department of Justice indicating support for the plaintiffs' position. On April 20, 2020, the school district defendants filed a motion to join the Department of Education (DOE) as a party to the case. They noted that the plaintiffs in this case had also filed a DOE Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaint, and they were worried about getting two different outcomes if DOE was involved in the OCR complaint, but not in this lawsuit. They also expressed confusion that the United States had indicated an interest in this case through its March 24 filing, but that the DOE, which is responsible for interpreting and enforcing Title IX, was not involved. The DOE submitted a memorandum in opposition to joinder on May 11, 2020. Current status On April 16, 2020, during a telephone hearing, Judge Chatigny instructed plaintiffs' counsel to refer to the intervenors as "transgender females" rather than as "males." On May 8, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify, alleging that this order indicates a lack of impartiality and rejects the core arguments of plaintiffs' lawsuit. The judge denied the motion on June 16, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs are four high school track athletes in Connecticut who allege that their schools and the Connecticut high school athletic association have discriminated against them under Title IX, specifically through their policies allowing transgender female athletes (who they refer to as "biological males") to compete in women's sports. Two specific transgender female high school athletes, who are referenced by name in plaintiff's complaint, filed a successful motion to intervene and are represented by the ACLU. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a preliminary injunction. Due to the coronavirus pandemic and the impending cancellation of spring sports, plaintiffs' preliminary injunction was denied. The United States filed a statement of interest on March 24, 2020. Defendants have attempted to join the Department of Education to the lawsuit. On April 16, 2020, Judge Chatigny ordered platintiffs' counsel to refer to the intervenors as "transgender females" rather than as "males." In response to this order, plaintiffs filed a motion to disqualify the judge. The case in ongoing.