On February 17, 2016, two women on probation in White County, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, sued the private probation company Sentinel Offender Services (Sentinel) in a class action in the U.S. Northern District of Georgia pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia law. The plaintiffs claimed that they were forced by Sentinel to submit to, and pay for, unauthorized urine sample drug tests in violation of their due process and privacy rights, and in violation of their right against unreasonable seizure. The plaintiffs also challenged Sentinel’s practice of coercing payments with false threats of immediate incarceration, charging that this practice constituted conversion under state law, fraud, and tortious coercion. They requested monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. Both of the plaintiffs had pled guilty to traffic violations in White County Probate Court and were placed on probation. In neither case did the judge order drug testing. When the county’s probation contractor Sentinel drug tested the plaintiffs, it did not go back to the judge and obtain an order for any of the nine tests conducted. To complete the tests, the women were required to urinate in plain view of a Sentinel officer. The plaintiff claimed that she did not have the available funds ($60 in total) to pay for the drug tests, but was forced to borrow money from relatives after a Sentinel officer threatened that she would report the plaintiff to the County to have her incarcerated. Another plaintiff similarly refused to submit to the tests initially, but eventually submitted to five tests ($95) after a similar threat from the defendant's employee. At no point were the plaintiffs able to challenge the legality of paying for and submitting to the tests. The complaint sought to certify the following class: "all persons with criminal charges requiring them to appear in the White County Probate Court who are, were, or in the future will be subject to the Defendants’ practice of requiring probationers to submit to and pay for drug tests, in the absence of any court order authorizing such drug tests." On February 26, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendants from requiring the probationers to take unauthorized drug tests while the case was pending. That same day, they also moved to certify the class defined above. The case was assigned to Judge Richard W. Story on February 29, 2016. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 1, 2016. On June 8, 2016, the court stayed further proceedings pending mediation. The court also denied the motion for certification as moot on July 15, but allowed the parties to refile it pending the outcome of mediation. On August 14, 2017, the court issued a consent order resolving the plaintiffs' injunctive relief claims. The consent order created the following requirements: (1) the defendants could not require probationers to submit to a drug screening that was not specifically authorized by a written order of the court; (2) the defendants could not "threaten probationers with jail solely for failure to pay fines, supervision fees, or other monetary obligations;" (3) the defendants were forbidden from directing probationers to borrow money to pay monetary obligations and from impeding probation modifications in general; and (4) the defendants were to verbally and in writing inform probationers that their probation may be modified to accommodate hardships. The consent order also provided for probation officer training and protocol in the event of the possibility of probation modification. The court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of the consent order, though no end date was provided. On August 21, 2017, the court granted final approval of the class settlement after conducting a fairness hearing as to the plaintiffs' damages claims. The settlement applied to the following class of individuals who meet the following requirements: "(1) the person was sentenced to probation by the Probate Court of White County, Georgia; (2) the person's sentencing order did not specifically authorize drug testing; (3) the person was subjected to drug testing by Defendants on or after February 17, 2012; and (4) the person was not under a written order by another court specifically requiring the person to submit to drug testing by Defendants." This class, consisting of 276 individuals, was the group of people eligible to receive damages. The Settlement required the defendants to make available an $80,000 fund to reimburse these class members both restitution in the form of interest and damages of up to $90 per unauthorized drug test. The agreement also provided that defendants were to pay attorneys' fees of $25,000. The case is now closed.

Summary: Two women on probation in White County, Georgia were drug tested by private contractor Sentinel Offender Services without a court order to so. Though the plaintiffs initially resisted, an officer at Sentinel told the plaintiffs that they would be incarcerated if they did not submit to, and pay for, the urine sample drug tests. The plaintiffs sued Sentinel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia law for violation of constitutional rights, conversion, fraud, and coercion.


On October 14, 2003, the Ohio Justice & Policy Center filed a class action lawsuit against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on behalf of three prisoners who claimed that their health care was unconstitutionally inadequate. In particular, they cited staffing shortages, long delays in the provision of routine and emergency care, problems ordering and obtaining results of diagnostic tests, and inadequate control measures. On January 23, 2004, the court certified the case as a class action, naming Ohio Justice and Policy Center (formerly the Prison Reform Advocacy Center) as class counsel. On April 2, 2004, the parties jointly approved of a Medical Investigation Team (MIT), composed of leading correctional health care experts, to conduct an audit of Ohio's prison healthcare system. The MIT released its report in February 2005, and the parties accepted the Report's findings in March 2005. Parties subsequently began negotiations and in October 2005 agreed upon a five-year settlement. The settlement, preliminarily approved by the court (Judge Sandra Beckwith) on October 6, 2005, and finally approved on November 22, 2005, after a hearing on November 16, 2005, created major reforms in a variety of areas of Ohio's prison healthcare, including: medical staffing, implementation, training, access to care, reception and screening, health assessments, transfer screening, chronic care, consultations, medication, consent, emergency services, sick call, infectious diseases, infection control, infirmary, medical equipment, medical records, mortality reviews, credentialing, physician leadership, special populations, dental, grievance, emergency response plan, privacy, diet, discharge planning, compliance and a variety of other administrative policies to secure enforcement. The parties also agreed that a five-year period was required in order to achieve the core goals set forth in the stipulation, while also recognizing that the Prison Litigation Reform Act states that prospective injunctive relief is terminable after two years. Fussell v. Wilkinson, 1:03-CV-704, 2005 WL 3132321 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2005). Later, on February 26, 2007, the parties filed a stipulation regarding provision of dental services with the court. During the period of the stipulation, the Medical Oversight Committee (MOC) provided the court with regular reports that detailed both the progress being made and continuing problems encountered at the various state institutions. The monitor and counsel also willingly assisted the court from time to time in investigating and responding to individual complaints about medical care. On August 21, 2008, a plaintiff (Daniel Wilson) filed a motion seeking enforcement of the agreed upon stipulation or, in the alternative, holding the defendants in contempt of court for failing to provide the plaintiff with unimpeded, timely, and professional acceptable and efficient medical care for his serious medical needs and pain management. However, on January 15, 2009, Judge Beckwith found the plaintiff's motion seeking hip surgery as moot since the surgery occurred in November 2008. On March 12, 2009, dissatisfied with the court's rulings and the class counsel's handling of the case, an interested party (William E. Martin) filed motions to intervene as a party in this case, for appointment of counsel, to grant a hearing on his motion and to order several other inmates to be brought to court to testify, to hold in contempt numerous state officials for violations of the Consent Decree, to order the release of 25,500 inmates from Ohio prisons, and to award him sanctions for every day he was denied proper medical treatment. On June 1, 2009, Judge Beckwith denied all the interested party's motions, who then filed a motion for recusal. On July 21, 2009, Judge Beckwith denied the interested party's motion for recusal. On June 10, 2009, the interested party then filed a motion for relief from judgment. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Timothy S. Black, who recommended that the interested party's motion for relief from judgment be denied. On September 21, 2009, Judge Beckwith adopted Magistrate Judge Black's recommendation, denying the interested party's motion for relief from judgment. Fussell v. Wilkinson, 1:03-CV-704, 2009 WL 3010850 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2009). The interested party appealed, but on August 10, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. On November 2, 2010, Judge Beckwith approved modification to the original settlement that both parties had agreed to. ODRC was in the process of converting all of the medical staff positions to the civil service, and it agreed to extend the stipulation to complete that process. The parties agreed to extend the stipulation for an additional eighteen months, to June 22, 2012, at which time it would expire by its terms. They also agreed that the stipulation with regard to dental services would expire on June 30, 2011. On April 11, 2012, Judge Beckwith dismissed a different case, Greene v. Kasich, 1:12-cv-144, (S.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 2012), because the plaintiffs in that case violated the terms of this case's consent decree by not using the remedies and procedures outlined in the consent decree. If the plaintiffs had a legitimate complaint about systemic deficiencies in Ohio's medical care system, they had to use those remedies and procedures prior to instituting any legal action of their own. On June 6, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for extension of the stipulation for relief and to stay the termination of the stipulatio pending ruling on this motion. The defendants opposed the motion but conceded that a stay of the termination date would be appropriate pending the submission of the final report from the MOC. Thus, on June 13, 2012, Judge Beckwith stayed the termination date (which had been June 22, 2012) to permit the parties and the court to review the anticipated report granted the plaintiffs. On July 16, 2012, the MOC submitted the final report. The findings stated that there were no current and ongoing violations of the Eighth Amendment and that the stipulation was no longer necessary. The MOC did identify remaining problems in medical care, but nothing that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. The ODRC had also agreed to continue working with the members of the MOC for two more years to improve quality assurance programs and procedures. On September 24, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, agreeing that the 2005 stipulation should expire as scheduled and that the court would no longer have jurisdiction of that stipulation. The private settlement agreement stated that during the two-year period of ongoing oversight and consultation services provided by members of the MOC, the ODRC agreed to pay additional sums to class counsel to cover some of OJPC's costs attendant to OJPC's ongoing involvement with the consultants' services. As a result, on October 2, 2012, Judge Beckwith terminated the November 2005 stipulation for injunctive relief and all modifications. Fussell v. Wilkinson, 1:03-CV-704, 2012 WL 4506231 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2012).

Summary: In 2003, a class action lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio on behalf of Ohio prisoners who alleged inadequate health care. On April 2, 2004, the parties jointly approved of a Medical Investigation Team to conduct an audit of Ohio's prison health care system. The MIT released its report in February 2005, and in October 2005 the parties agreed upon a five-year settlement. A stipulation and order approving the settlement was signed by Judge Beckwith on Nov. 22, 2005. On February 26, 2007, the parties filed a stipulation regarding provision of dental services with the court. The case closed in 2012 after the stipulation expired and the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.


On November 26, 2018, a group of federal prisoners and advocacy groups filed this lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and its director, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs challenged the BOP’s March 3, 2018 decision to issue a Record of Decision in support of its proposed plan to build what they said was an unneeded new United States Penitentiary (“USP”) in Letcher County, Kentucky, at the cost of at least $444 million. The plaintiffs, represented by the Abolitionist Law Center and others, claimed that the defendants violated the National Environmental Protection Act and the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to properly provide the plaintiffs notice and opportunities to comment on BOP’s proposed action, failing to identify a legitimate purpose and need in its Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for the action, and failing to conduct an environmental analysis and take a hard look at the action’s environmental impacts. The Complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney’s fees. The defendant BOP filed a motion to dismiss on March 11, 2019, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. BOP argued that the plaintiffs did not have Article III standing because they failed to allege a cognizable injury from the future construction of a prison. On April 23, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint and Judge James E. Boasberg denied the motion to dismiss because it was no longer addressed to the most recent complaint. This new complaint alleged additional facts and added an additional claim that the defendants violated the National Environmental Protection Act and the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to issue a supplemental EIS in light of important new information. On June 5, 2019, the Director of BOP withdrew the Record of Decision regarding the proposal to build this prison. The withdrawal was, BOP said, based upon new information relevant to the environmental analysis for the proposed action. Following the withdrawal, the parties conferred and agreed that it would not be appropriate for the defendants to file an answer to the second amended complaint, so the parties filed a joint motion to stay the case for thirty days. On July 18, 2019, Judge Boasberg granted the motion and stayed the case until August 19, 2019. On August 19, the parties filed a status report and indicated that they would like to dismiss the complaint. On September 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal. On the next day, the court ordered that the case was dismissed with prejudice. Upon a motion by the plaintiffs, the court amended the order on September 11, 2019 and instead ordered that the case was dismissed without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2018, federal prisoners filed this lawsuit against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the BOP's proposed plan to build a new prison in Kentucky violated the National Environmental Protection Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. In 2019, the BOP withdrew its plan and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit. The case closed in September 2019.


On September 7, 2009, U.S. citizens who were detained when crossing from Mexico into Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), challenging the procedures used by the Customs and Border Protections (CBP). Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Refugio del Rio Grande and Jones & Crane, claimed that the procedures violated their due process rights. Plaintiffs initially filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. The original claims arose from the detention of a family at the border. Two female members of the family were born in the United States. Their mother, a Mexican citizen, later took them to Mexico and registered them as born in Mexico so that the girls could attend school in Mexico. When the women attempted to cross the border 20 years later with a U.S. passport and U.S. birth certificate respectively, they were detained and interrogated. The case was filed while they were still being held at the port of entry. In the course of several amended complaints, plaintiffs added six additional plaintiffs and multiple additional claims challenging the policies of both DOS and CBP. The third amended complaint by ten individuals included habeas claims, requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, requests for declaration of citizenship, and claims of violations of the Federal Torts Claims Act. Plaintiffs also added a Bivens claim for monetary damages on behalf of the original plaintiffs. On April 26, 2011, the court (Judge Hilda G. Tagle) severed the FTCA and Bivens claims from the rest of the case. The court also severed plaintiffs' citizenship claims to be separate cases. In the April 26 order, the court ruled on several other motions. It dismissed plaintiffs' claims for unreasonable delay in adjudication. It also dismissed plaintiffs' claims for relief under 8 USC §1503 where plaintiffs had already received their passports. The court also denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification as moot, but allowed leave to refile. On June 11, 2011 plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint. The claims were: (1) violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the APA in conjunction with jurisdiction under the Mandamus Act for improperly applying the preponderance of the evidence standard in adjudicating passport applications; (2) violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in failing to provide due process in adjudicating passport applications, revoking passports based on non-nationality, hearings for passports denied or revoked; (3) violations of the Equal Protection Clause for denying and revoking passports based on non-nationality; and (4) violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the U.N. Convention Against Torture and the Federal Detainee Act of 2005 due to mistreatment of persons at the border claiming to be U.S. citizens as well as (5) their parents. Later on June 27, 2011, the plaintiffs re-filed their motion to certify a class requesting that the court certify two classes. On November 22, 2011, the court ruled on defendants' motion to dismiss. Most claims were dismissed. The only claims that remained were claims 1 pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and Mandamus Act and claim 4 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment. The court, therefore, denied the motion for class certification as moot. On December 7, 2012, the court ruled on defendants' motions to dismiss the remaining claims. The court granted in part, and denied in part, allowing the claims to go forward with respect to certain named plaintiffs. On March 13, 2013, the plaintiffs filed another motion for class certification. On September 30, 2013, plaintiffs filed their fifth and final amended complaint. At that point, the case centered on the standard of proof applied by DOS in adjudicating U.S. citizenship claims and the agency's failure to afford U.S. citizenship claimants any meaningful opportunity to challenge its decisions to deny a U.S. passport application or revoke an existing passport. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that DOS made arbitrary requests for documents and asked for irrelevant personal information when deciding whether to issue passports. Plaintiffs argued that DOS's practices violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. The complaint requested class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 26, 2014, the court denied plaintiffs’ fifth amended class action complaint. Judge Tagle found that the plaintiffs had not raised an issue common to the class, capable of class-wide resolution. This was because even if the court found that the DOS systematically misapplied the standard of proof when adjudicating U.S. citizenship claims, each individual’s claims would need to be considered separately. Therefore, while the plaintiffs’ class complaint did raise common questions, there could be no one common answer to the questions raised. On May 2, 2014, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim that the DOS improperly applied the standard of proof when revoking U.S. passports, and further agreed not to initiate any litigation for attorney’s fees. Three days later, the parties filed a joint status report stating that there were no other claims pending in this case. On May 8, 2014, the Judge Tagle ordered the case closed.

Summary: On September 7, 2009, U.S. citizens who were detained when crossing from Mexico into Texas filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas against the Department of State (DOS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) challenging the procedures used by the Customs and Border Protections (CBP). As the case has developed it has come to center on challenging DOS procedures with regards to denying and revoking passports. Plaintiffs argue that these practices violate their right to due process. In March 2014, the court denied plaintiffs’ request for class certification. In May 2014, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims and agreed not to initiate litigation for attorney’s fees, and the case closed on May 8 2014.


On June 11, 2013, the ACLU and the New York Civil Liberties Union filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency ("NSA"). The organizations served as both plaintiff and counsel, and sought an injunction permanently enjoining the government's mass call-tracking program and requiring the government to purge from its possession all of the plaintiffs' call records already collected, claiming that the NSA's ongoing tracking of their phone calls exceeded statutory authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") and violated the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the NSA's surveillance invaded their privacy, threatened to dissuade potential clients and others from contacting them, and compromised their ability to serve their institutional missions and their clients' interests. The plaintiffs contended that the government's program violated the Fourth Amendment because the surveillance carried out was warrantless and unreasonable, and violated the First Amendment by substantially and unjustifiably burdening the plaintiffs' rights to associate when more narrow methods could have been used to achieve the government's ends. On August 26, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to (1) bar the government from collecting their call records under the government's mass call-tracking program, (2) require the government to quarantine all of their call records already collected under the program, and (3) prohibit the government from querying metadata obtained through the program using any phone number or other identifier associated with them. On the same day, the NSA moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. The NSA contended that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claims, and the plaintiffs failed in any event to state claims on which relief may be granted. Specifically, the NSA claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing, that Congress impliedly precluded judicial review of the mass call-tracking program, that the program was authorized under the FISA, and that the program did not violate the First and Fourth Amendments. On December 27, 2013, the District Court denied the ACLU's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the case. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Judge Pauley found that the ACLU had standing to bring its constitutional challenge even though no statutory cause of action allowed the ACLU to challenge the telephony metadata program as beyond statutory authorization. According to the court, the government's argument that the ACLU had no privacy interest unless someone at NSA actually looked at its telephony metadata went to the merits, not to standing. On the merits, however, Judge Pauley held that the telephony metadata program was lawful, disagreeing with the decision of Judge Leon, in a D.C. District case just 11 days earlier. Judge Pauley found that the U.S. Supreme Court precedent Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), was controlling. Judge Pauley also emphasized the reasonableness and limited nature of the access to and use of the massive telephony metadata collection, as well as its importance in terrorism prevention. The plaintiffs appealed, and on May 7, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision. In an opinion by Judge Gerard Lynch, the court found that Section 215 and FISA more generally do not preclude judicial review, and that the bulk telephony metadata program is not authorized by Section 215. 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015). Because Section 215 was scheduled to sunset on June 1, however, this Court declined to enjoin the surveillance; writing that it would be "prudent to pause to allow an opportunity for debate in Congress that may (or may not) profoundly alter the legal landscape." On June 1, the authority that had been granted by Section 215 of the Patriot Act expired after the Senate declined to pass a bill that would have temporarily extended the authority without modification. However, on June 2, President Obama signed into law the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. 114-23, (2015). The legislation provided that, after a period of 180 days, the government would be permitted to collect particular call detail records (not in bulk) under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, if it met certain "additional requirements," with particularized suspicion, through targeted demands. For an initial 180-day period, however, the legislation left in place--unaltered--the prior Section 215. That same day, the government asked the FISA Court to allow it to continue (or resurrect, since it had expired the day before) the bulk call-records program for that 180 day period. See FISA BR 15-75, NS-DC-0086 in this Clearinghouse. The government argued that Congress's decision to delay by 180 days the imposition of the new requirements relating to the collection of call records constituted an implicit endorsement of bulk collection during that period and reflected a legislative intent to "allow for the orderly termination" of that collection. The government argued, before the FISC, against the Second Circuit's conclusion that the bulk records program was unlawful. On June 29, 2014, a FISC judge agreed and granted the June 2 application. On July 14, 2014, the plaintiffs returned to the Second Circuit and renewed their request for injunctive relief. They sought a preliminary injunction to (1) bar the government, during the pendency of this suit, from collecting plaintiffs' call records under the NSA's call-records program; (2) require the government, during the pendency of this suit, to quarantine all of the plaintiffs' call records already collected under the program; and (3) prohibit the government, during the pendency of this suit, from querying metadata obtained through the program using any phone number or other identifier associated with them. The plaintiffs also asked the Second Circuit, after the entry of preliminary relief, to remand the case to the district court to adjudicate the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction requiring the government to end the program and purge records collected under it. On October 29, 2015, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Second Circuit held that Congress intended to authorize the continuation of the bulk telephone metadata collection program for the 180 days before the requirements under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 took effect. As such, the Second Circuit declined to grant the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, and also declined to rule on any constitutional issues. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. 804 F.3d 617. On December 4, 2015, the judgment mandate was officially issued. Following the judgment from the Second Circuit, the parties filed a joint letter on January 7, 2016, stating to the court that the parties wished to wait to come to a resolution in the case until after completion of the proceedings in FISC regarding the government's preservation obligation with records relevant to the plaintiff's claim. The parties requested the court allow them to submit a status report following the FISC decision. The court granted this request on January 19, 2016. On May 4, 2016, the parties filed another joint letter stating to the court that although FISC had made the decision to not require any further action from the government, Electronic Frontier Foundation had petitioned the NSA to modify their preservation orders to allow for destruction of records collected under the program. The parties stated the government's consideration of the proposal was relevant to this case and requested the parties submit a status request following the governments determination. The court granted permission on May 6, 2016. There was very little action in the docket throughout the remainder of 2016 through the beginning of 2018. All entries in the docket during this time relate to withdrawals of attorneys from the action. After both parties stipulates to a voluntary dismissal, this case was officially terminated on May 14, 2018. It is now closed.

Summary: On June 11, 2013, the ACLU filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency ("NSA"), claiming that the government's mass telephone call tracking program exceeds statutory authority and violates the First and Fourth Amendments. The plaintiffs requests for preliminary relief have been denied thus far. The parties are waiting to come to resolution of the case until after the the Government finishes considering the proposal of the Electronic Frontier Foundation to modify their preservation orders and document destruction. The case is ongoing in the U.S. District Court.


On May 16, 2007, an immigration detainee who had been held for more than six months without a bond hearing while in removal proceedings petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for a writ of habeas corpus. The plaintiff claimed that, without a bond hearing, detention over six months violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the statutory requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Southern California, and the ACLU Immigrants Rights Project, the plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as a court order requiring that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provide him with an individual hearing before an immigration judge at which DHS would bear the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that prolonged detention was warranted. The case was assigned to Judge Virginia A. Phillips and referred to Magistrate Judge Charles F. Eick. On May 29, 2007, the plaintiff filed an amended petition. On June 25, the plaintiff moved for class certification, seeking to certify a class of "all people who (1) are or will be detained for longer than six months pursuant to the general immigration detention statutes pending completion of removal proceedings, including judicial review, (2) are not detained pursuant to one of the national security detention statutes, and (3) have not been afforded a hearing to determine whether their prolonged detention is justified." On August 8, 2007, the case was reassigned to Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. and referred to Magistrate Judge Robert N. Block. On March 19, 2008, the District Court denied the motion for class certification without explanation. The plaintiffs then appealed this denial to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On August 20, 2009, the Court of Appeals (Judge Betty Fletcher) reversed the District Court's decision, stating that the defendants failed to provide any valid reason for denying class certification. 591 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2009). Subsequently, Judge Hatter certified the class on April 5, 2010. On October 15, 2010, the plaintiffs petitioned the District Court to certify subclasses determined by the specific INA section that authorized the class member's detention. These subclasses were certified by Judge Hatter on March 8, 2011. On November 22, 2010, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On January 27, 2011, Judge Hatter denied this motion, finding that the INA can be interpreted to require a bond hearing after a certain amount of time to avoid constitutional concerns. 2011 WL 13180220 (C.D. Cal. 2011). On April 16, 2012, this case was consolidated with Ngaywa v. Holder (11-cv-01287) (the docket sheet is included in this case record, but the complaint is under seal and therefore unavailable). On June 25, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, requiring the defendants to begin providing members of the class with bond hearings. Judge Hatter granted this motion on September 13, 2012, requiring the defendants to identify all members of the subclasses according to INA sections 1225(b) and 1226(c), and to provide bond hearings in front of an immigration judge. 2012 WL 7653016 (C.D. Cal. 2012). The defendants moved for an emergency stay of the preliminary injunction, which Judge Hatter denied on September 28, 2012. The defendants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's denial of the emergency stay on April 16, 2013 (Judge Kim Wardlaw). 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013). In February and March of 2013, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On August 6, 2013, Judge Hatter granted the plaintiffs' motion, ruling all class members were entitled to a bond hearing by their 181st day of detention. The order permanently enjoined the defendants, requiring them to provide at least seven-day notice of an individual's hearing, hold a bond hearing for all class members who have been detained for more than 6 months within 30 days of the order, and submit a status report within 60 days describing all steps taken to timely identify all current and future class members to ensure that they would receive a proper bond hearing. The defendants appealed the summary judgment and injunction to the Ninth Circuit on September 30, 2013. On October 28, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion largely affirming the injunction. They reversed and remanded to the District Court, requiring the Court to exclude non-citizens who had been ordered removed from the injunction as they were not members of the certified class (non-citizens detained pending removal proceedings). The defendants appealed, and on June 20, 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. On July 20, 2016, both parties issued a Joint Status Report. According to the report, the parties continued to negotiate on a proposed draft of a modified permanent injunction order but reached an impasse on a number of issues. However, the parties agreed to defer briefing pending the Supreme Court's decision in this case, which was scheduled for argument during the October 2016 Term. The parties would submit a joint status report within 30 days of the Supreme Court's decision. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 30, 2016. After the oral argument, the Court asked for further briefing on the constitutionality of the detention of immigrants. On June 29, 2017, the parties issued a Joint Status Report. According to the report, on June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court issued an order setting this case for re-argument in the October 2017 Term. As a result, the parties submitted that no further action was required by the Court at that time. The Supreme Court heard reargument on October 3, 2017. On February 27, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a decision in this case. 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225, 1226(a), and 1226(c) required bond hearings after six months of immigration detention as a matter of statutory construction. The Supreme Court declined to decide the constitutional claims in the first instance and remanded the case for further consideration of those claims. On remand, the Supreme Court directed the Ninth Circuit to first "reexamine whether respondents could continue litigating their claims as a class" in light of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), and Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U. S. 338 (2011), which created a higher standard for class certification. The parties filed a Joint Status Report on March 5, 2018, agreeing that in light of the Supreme Court decision, the District Court did not need to take any action at this time. The mandate would be issued no sooner than March 26, 2018. At that point, the Ninth Circuit would determine whether any of the remaining issues required further action by this Court. In the meantime, the parties agreed that the permanent injunction would remain in place in the Central District of California until it was vacated by some further action by this Court or the Ninth Circuit. On November 19, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion, remanding the case back to the District Court for consideration of the plaintiffs' constitutional arguments in the first instance. The Court also remanded the issue of reexamining class certification to the District Court. The Court did find that it had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims and declined to vacate the permanent injunction pending the District Court's consideration of these issues. 909 F.3d 252. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2019. The plaintiffs added a new plaintiff, reasserted a statutory claim that had not been appealed previously, and added an Eighth Amendment claim. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on August 22. On November 7, 2019, the District Court issued an order granting the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to the newly added plaintiff and the revived statutory claim, but denying it with respect to the new Eighth Amendment Claim. 2019 WL 7840673. On November 18, the plaintiffs moved for clarification or reconsideration of that order. The District Court later clarified that the permanent injunction remained in place. On November 27, 2019, the defendants moved to vacate the injunction and decertify the plaintiff class. On March 9, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and issued an order amending the order from November 7, 2019. The amended order added that the Ninth Circuit had left the permanent injunction in place when it remanded the case and removed mention of the Supreme Court implicitly vacating the permanent injunction. On April 7, 2020, the defendants moved to reconsider the order. On May 28, 2020, the court denied the motion, denying both the motion to vacate the injunction and the motion to decertify the plaintiff class. The defendants appealed the district court's May 28 order to the Ninth Circuit on July 27, 2020. In the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs had filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Subsequently, on October 28, the Ninth Circuit denied this motion and the appeal proceeded. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 16, 2007, an immigration detainee who had been held for more than six months without a bond hearing while in removal proceedings petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the Department of Homeland Security was violating his Due Process rights and the INA. A class of detainees was eventually certified. On September 13, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order granting a preliminary injunction that requires the government to provide bond hearings to those detained according to INA sections 1225(b) and 1226(c). On February 8, 2013, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, requiring the government to hold bond hearings for all current and future class members by their 181st day of detention. The Ninth Circuit largely affirmed the District Court, except with respect to non-citizens who had been ordered removed, as they were not class members. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case and issue an opinion on February 27, 2018, reversing the Ninth Circuit's ruling as to the plaintiffs' claims that the INA required bond hearings after six months. The Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims and for a reexamination of whether class certification continues to be proper. The Ninth Circuit then remanded those issues to the District Court. On July 11, 2019, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a new plaintiff, reassert a statutory claim that had not been appealed previously, and add an Eighth Amendment claim. In November, the District Court dismissed the newly-added plaintiff and revived statutory claim. The case is ongoing.


On August 29, 2000 plaintiff filed suit against her employer, John Knox Village (a retirement community), in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Plaintiff alleged that John Knox Village had engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination against African Americans. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the defendant fostered a hostile work environment, gave African Americans less desirable assignments, failed to promote qualified African Americans, and retaliated against African Americans who complained about the intolerant work environment. The suit was joined by other African American employees and became a class action on behalf of all current and former employees of John Knox Village. The parties pursued a settlement and filed a consent decree with the court on March 15, 2002. The consent decree created a $3,750,000 fund to cover attorney's fees and compensate all class members. It also provided that defendant would prohibit discrimination, educate residents regarding diversity, post EEOC guidelines and provide EEOC training, create a diversity committee, and take steps to creating a diverse workforce and a tolerant atmosphere. The court approved the consent decree on May 31, 2002. It applied to defendant for three years with an annual obligation to report to the court regarding the steps being taken. The final report was filed on January 14, 2005.

Summary: On August 29, 2000 plaintiff filed suit against her employer, John Knox Village (a retirement community), in the Federal District Court for the Western District of Missouri alleging that John Knox Village had engaged in a pattern or practice of racial discrimination against African Americans. The parties pursued a settlement and filed a consent decree providing for monetary and injunctive relief on March 15, 2002. The court approved the consent decree on May 31, 2002.


On December 10, 2019, Freedom for Immigrants, a nonprofit organization that supports persons held in immigration detention facilities, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), its acting director in his official capacity, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and its acting director and acting deputy director in their official capacities, alleging First Amendment violations. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants' shutdown of plaintiff's National Immigration Detention Hotline (the “Hotline”) was a retaliatory measure for engaging in protected speech with persons in immigration detention and bringing attention to detention facility conditions, in violation of plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The plaintiff further asserted that the shutdown of the Hotline prohibited persons in immigration detention from contacting plaintiff to report abuse or find resources unless they paid "exorbitant" fees to make a call, violating the detainee's First Amendment rights. In 2013, plaintiff created the free and confidential Hotline for persons in immigration detention to allow detainees to "report abuse, find resources, and bridge the divide between detained persons and their family and loved ones." Plaintiff stated that it received 600-14,000 calls from around the country per month via the Hotline, allowing plaintiff "to draw attention to the physical and verbal abuse of detained persons, as well as ICE’s failure to ensure the provision of necessary medical treatments." The Hotline was prominently featured on Orange is the New Black, a show about life in U.S. prisons and immigration detention. The Hotline's feature brought national prominence to the plaintiff after the show's season premiere during July 2019, giving plaintiff a platform to speak about poor conditions and abuse occurring in immigration detention facilities. The plaintiff asserted that within two weeks of the show's season premiere the plaintiff stopped receiving calls on the Hotline. According to the plaintiff, the defendants explained that the Hotline was removed from defendants' system because the plaintiff was not an approved organization. In an article in The Washington Post, a spokesperson for the defendants stated that the Hotline had been terminated because the “'group engaged in prohibited conduct' by permitting three-way calls and call forwarding." The plaintiff claimed that this statement was made without detailing the specific rules that were allegedly violated or providing any evidence of violations. The plaintiff also claimed that this interference was part of a broader trend of defendants' retaliatory measures against the plaintiff. In the absence of the Hotline, plaintiff asserted that it has been forced to incur additional expenses to continue its mission. Plaintiff had to create new phone lines, which are no longer confidential, and deposit money into these accounts to allow immigrant detainees to continue to contact plaintiff at no cost. Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on the same day that the complaint was filed. The plaintiff sought an order to enjoin the defendants from further interference with the Hotline, to restore operation of the Hotline at all facilities operated by defendants, and to restrain the defendants from further retaliatory measures. The plaintiff asserted that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because it was likely to succeed on the merits and because absent an injunction, plaintiff's and immigration detainees' First Amendment rights would continue to be violated. On December 11, 2019, District Court Judge Andre Birotte Jr. was assigned to this case. On January 8, 2020, defendants filed an opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction. Defendants asserted that the plaintiff was an "unapproved non-profit organization" that took over an unmonitored extension phone number to facilitate phone calls with immigrant detainees. Defendants also claimed that plaintiff lacked standing because the Hotline number was not under plaintiff's control and plaintiff had other means of continuing its mission and activities. Finally, defendants argued that its conduct did not violate the plaintiff's First Amendment rights and that plaintiff cannot prove necessary causation to show that defendants' conduct was retaliatory. On February 11, 2020, Judge Birotte issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Birotte found that plaintiff established a likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that defendants retaliated against plaintiff for its exercise of First Amendment rights. Judge Birotte also concluded that the four-month period between the shutdown of the Hotline and the filing of the suit, during which the plaintiff was likely deprived of its First Amendment rights, is sufficient to satisfy the irreparable harm requirement for preliminary injunctive relief. Judge Birotte ordered that the defendants are enjoined from further interference with the Hotline and that the Hotline must be restored in all detention facilities operated by defendants until final judgment in this matter is rendered. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In December 2019, a non-profit organization dedicated to helping persons in immigration detention facilities filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plainitff operated a free and confiential hotline in immigration detention facilities that allowed detainees to contact the plaintiff to report abuse, find resources, and connect with family members. The plaintiff alleged that the government agency defendants shutdown this hotline as a retaliatory measure for plaintiff's repeated criticism of immigration detention facility conditions. In February 2020, a district court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, ordering that the hotline is restored and enjoining the defendant's from further interference with the hotline. The case is ongoing.


On November 17, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. More specifically, the defendant allegedly subjected African American employees to a racially hostile work environment that was so severe as to affect the terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. The case was assigned to District Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III. After two settlement conferences, the parties settled the case in October 2007, by entry of a consent decree. The decree included non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the development of an anti-discrimination policy and required the defendant to post and distribute the policy. The decree also required the defendant to train all of its managers, superintendents, tool pushers, drillers, crane operators, and human resource personnel with direct responsibility for its offshore platform rigs in the Gulf of Mexico on race, discrimination, harassment, and retaliation annually. The decree also called for the implementation of a complaint resolution process in which an aggrieved employee could notify the Director of Human Resources if a supervisor did not address a complaint of racial harassment. The defendant was required to submit biannual narrative summaries of each complaint of racial harassment made by aggrieved employees with the Director of Human Resources along with a statement regarding the resolution of each such complaint. The EEOC maintained the ability to enter and inspect the defendant's offshore platform rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. The injunctive parts of the decree had a two year term. If the EEOC found non-compliance, the decree allowed for court enforcement. In addition, the defendant agreed to pay $290,000 to be distributed among seven individual employees. The claimant's attorney moved for an attorney lien on September 26, 2007. This attorney explained that he conducted research and represented the claimants in conciliation/settlement conferences in regard to this lawsuit before the EEOC got involved, so he should be granted a portion of the settlement fund. The court ordered the claimants to address the attorney’s fees. On July 1, 2008, the court granted in part and denied in part the attorney’s fees. 2008 WL 2690365. This attorney initially sought attorney fees from the claimants through contingency fees. But the claimants objected this request, and the attorney abandoned it to instead move for the full amount of fees reflected in his time sheets. He calculated that he worked for 113.9 hours and was entitled to $45,560 from the settlement fund. Although the court agreed that the attorney should be awarded attorney fees, the court did not agree with the amount nor the hours calculated. The court concluded that the hours calculated by the attorney was not credible. After the court reviewed and analyzed the attorney’s time sheets and explanation, the court concluded that the attorney provided 36 hours of service and should be awarded $7,200.00. Two weeks later, the court ordered a disbursement of the settlement fund. The duration of the consent decree has lapsed and there has been no indication of non-compliance found in the case docket, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit against Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged discrimination based on race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case ended in a consent decree and is now closed.


On July 7, 2009, a member of the Illinois bar who sought to join the Indiana bar filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 <i>et seq.</i>), against members of the Indiana State Board of Law Examiners. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the ACLU of Indiana, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state agency violated their rights by making unnecessary inquiries into mental health history and placing additional burdens on individuals with disabilities during the process of admission to the bar. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the application to the Indiana bar asks a number of intrusive questions concerning each applicant's mental health. If an applicant answers affirmatively to any of the questions, the applicant must disclose information about his or her mental health treatment and submit to further evaluation. The named plaintiff ("Jane Doe") had applied for admission to the Indiana bar. As part of her application, she disclosed that she had been diagnosed with an emotional disorder and was undergoing treatment. She provided further information at the request of the state bar, including a statement from an expert that the disability would have no relevance to her ability to practice law. She later withdrew her application before any determination was made by the state bar. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction. On December 8, 2009, the court (Judge William T. Lawrence) denied the motion, finding the court to have jurisdiction over the claim. 2009 WL 4841113. Although the plaintiff had initially filed the lawsuit under a pseudonym, the court denied her request to proceed with a pseudonym. 2009 WL 2448468. On January 27, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, in which the ACLU of Indiana and the now named plaintiff sought to represent a class of similarly situated individuals. On January 29, 2010, the court entered an order regarding class certification. The court granted class certification with the individual plaintiff as class representative but denied the ACLU's request to act as class representative on the grounds that the court could not determine whether the ACLU had standing. 266 F.R.D. 215. On March 25, 2010, the court determined that the ACLU did have standing, and therefore granted a renewed request to be appointed class representative. On June 25, 2010, the case was reassigned to Judge Tanya Walton Pratt. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On September 20, 2011, Judge Pratt granted in part and denied in part the motions. 2011 WL 4387470. Specifically, she found that there was no dispute of fact that one of the three questions on the bar application violated the ADA. The parties agreed that in light of the summary judgment decision, that a final judgment from the court was appropriate. On October 6, 2011, Judge Pratt entered a judgment permanently enjoining defendants from inquiring whether applicants had been diagnosed with or treated for "any mental, emotional, or nervous disorders." On June 21, 2012, Judge Pratt ordered the case to be closed after the parties filed a Joint Notice Concerning Settlement of Attorneys' Fee and Costs Claims. The Clearinghouse does not know how much the plaintiffs obtained in fees. There was sporadic subsequent docket activity. In 2014 and 2018, an individual asked the court for relief from Indiana's alleged violations of the injunction. The court denied both motions, stating that in no circumstance could the individual be entitled to the relief requested. 2015 WL 5316967. There has been no docket activity since May 9, 2019.

Summary: In July 2009, a member of the Illinois bar filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, against members of the Indiana State Board of Law Examiners. The plaintiffs alleged that the state agency violated their rights by making unnecessary inquiries into mental health history and placing additional burdens on individuals with disabilities during the process of admission to the bar. In October 2011, the court entered a judgment enjoining defendants from inquiring about bar applicants' diagnoses of mental, emotional, or nervous disorders. In June 2012 the court ordered the case to be closed after the parties filed a Joint Notice Concerning Settlement of Attorneys' Fee and Costs Claims, but the injunction remains in force.


In March 2006, the EEOC's San Francisco District Office filed suit in United States District Court, District of Hawaii, against Chaminade University, alleging that the university violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when it refused to hire a female job applicant because she was pregnant. The parties made cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendant alleged plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages and asserted five defenses; both motions were denied. The EEOC's motion for partial summary judgment was granted. In June 2007, the case was resolved by a consent decree. Under the terms of the consent decree, the charging party was awarded $50,000, and the defendant was ordered to develop an anti-discrimination policy, to implement training for its employees, and to establish a procedure for investigating complaints of discrimination. The consent decree was set to last for four years from the date of entry on June 19, 2007. However, on March 12, 2010, the court removed the case from its docket and closed the action without prejudice, with terms and conditions of the decree remaining in effect. The court cited no material change in the status of the action or consent decree, and decided an administrative closing would be appropriate. The full length of the consent decree has now passed, and the case is presumed officially closed.

Summary: In March 2006, the EEOC's San Francisco District Office filed suit in United States District Court, District of Hawaii, against Chaminade University, alleging that the university violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when it refused to hire a female job applicant because she was pregnant. The case settled out of court by a consent decree.


On January 21, 2018, eight arrestees who could not afford to post bail filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County, the Dallas County Sheriff, the Dallas County Magistrate Judges, the Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges, and the Dallas County District Court Judges, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Texas, the ACLU Criminal Law Reform Project, the Civil Rights Corps, and the Texas Fair Defense Project, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to Judge David C. Godbey. According to the plaintiffs, arrestees like the named plaintiffs languished in jail cells because they could not afford to pay the amount of money required for their release. They claimed that it was the policy and practice of Dallas County to require a generic, predetermined amount for bail without first considering the person’s ability to pay, and without making the substantive findings or providing the procedural due process safeguards that the Constitution required. The plaintiffs claimed that in operating a wealth-based detention system, the County had violated their equal protection and due process rights. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiff moved for class certification and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked that the court enjoin the County from enforcing its wealth-based pretrial detention system and order the County to provide procedural safeguards and substantive findings before detaining any presumptively innocent individuals. Later that month, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding Faith in Texas and the Texas Organizing Project as plaintiffs. During the weeks between the filing of the initial and amended complaints, Faith in Texas and the Texas Organizing Project had paid the bond of the individuals named in the original complaints. On March 12, 2018, the County filed a motion to stay while awaiting guidance from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the threshold issue of the which parties were proper defendants. On May 2, 2018, the district court denied this motion because the County did not present a “clear case of hardship or inequity” as required to justify a stay. In April 2018, each of the defendant entities filed separate motions to dismiss. The County argued that because the Fifth Circuit had recently confirmed that a sheriff could not incur liability by following judicial bail orders, Dallas County could not be liable for the actions of the District Judges or the County Criminal Court at Law Judges. The County claimed that this case was fundamentally about the judicial system of the State of Texas, over which Dallas County had absolutely no control. The Dallas County Sheriff and the Dallas County Magistrate Judges, in their respective motions, argued that they were not proper parties to this action because neither of them controlled the relevant practices and policies. The Dallas County Criminal Court at Law Judges argued that the claims against them should be dismissed because the plaintiffs had not exhausted state law claims for redress and because the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims were improperly brought under the Fourteenth Amendment as opposed to the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. The Dallas County District Court Judges argued that the claims against them should be dismissed because they lacked subject matter jurisdiction. On September 20, 2018, Judge Godbey issued orders granting the plaintiffs’ motions for class certification and for a preliminary injunction. 341 F.Supp.3d 688. The class was certified as “all arrestees who are or will be detained in Dallas County custody because they are unable to pay a secured financial condition of release.” The preliminary injunction instructed the defendants to have every arrestee fill out an affidavit with information about how much the detainee could reasonably post in bail. The defendants were to use that information to determine bail amounts rather than the prescheduled amounts at issue. In the same opinion, the court specified that Dallas County and the Magistrate Judges, as employees of Dallas County, were proper defendants for the purpose of the injunction based on O’Donnell v. Harris County. The court also held that the injunction bound the Criminal Court at Law Judges because they promulgated the official policy set by the county. The court found that the Dallas County Sheriff, however, was not a proper defendant and was not bound by the injunction because she did not in any way act as a policymaker with respect to setting bail, and merely followed the instructions of the magistrate judges. While the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction because they had shown a substantial likelihood of success on their equal protection and procedural due process claims, the court found that they had failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on their substantive due process claim. Specifically, under the recent Fifth Circuit precedent cited in the case, the plaintiffs had not shown that indigent plaintiffs who could not afford bail would automatically be released unless a compelling reason existed to detain them. The plaintiffs appealed this ruling, as well as the holding that the Sheriff was not bound by the preliminary injunction, to the Fifth Circuit. The Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments on November 4, 2019. As of August 8, 2020, a ruling on the appeal is pending.

Summary: This 2018 lawsuit was filed by eight Texas residents in poverty in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued Dallas County, Texas, the Dallas County Sheriff, and many judges within Dallas County, alleging that by operating a wealth-based detention system, the defendants had violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted a preliminary injunction but certain issues granted in favor of the defendants were appealed to the Fifth Circuit. As of August 8, 2020, the appeal is pending.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed by two inmates on behalf of all those housed in the Hope Village halfway house in D.C., seeking release and appropriate hygiene and social-distancing measures in light of COVID-19. The case was voluntarily dismissed on April 28, after the defendants significantly reduced the population of the halfway house. <hr> On April 2, 2020, two inmates filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of D.C. on behalf of all inmates housed in the Hope Village halfway house. Represented by the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the D.C. Department of Corrections, and Hope Village under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment and negligence. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants had failed to provide adequate protections and conditions that adhered to CDC guidelines, which left the plaintiffs unprotected from COVID-19. The case was initially assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, but was randomly reassigned to Judge Rudolph Contreras. The plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order that same day, requesting that the court require the defendants to address the inadequate conditions at Hope Village by: (1) releasing enough residents so that remaining residents could be housed safely, per CDC guidelines; (2) taking appropriate sanitary measures, including reducing the number of residents sharing bedrooms and bathrooms and hygiene products; (3) refraining from admitting new residents, (4) providing an on-site medical team; (5) screen staff and persons with COVID-19 symptoms; (6) implementing isolations and quarantines where necessary. On April 3, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class and appoint class counsel, proposing a class of all persons detained or who would be detained at Hope Village. The defendants filed briefs in opposition to the motion for temporary restraining order on April 6, arguing that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits. On April 7, Judge Contreras denied the motion for temporary restraining order, but requested the defendants to provide daily updates, under seal, regarding the overall population, the number of individuals tested, and the number of confirmed positive and negative results. The order also required Hope Village to submit a roster with information for each resident, including medical history, their sentence, and eligibility for home confinement. On April 28, the plaintiffs filed a notice of dismissal, alerting the court that the declaratory and injunctive relief they sought was moot, due to mitigation efforts made by Hope Village. They stated that now only three federal prisoners remained at Hope Village, the total population had been reduced to less than 15 people, and that the facility would be closing soon.

Summary: Inmates in a D.C. halfway house filed this class action, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement due to inadequate protection from COVID-19. They sought release and improved social-distancing and hygiene measures. The case was voluntarily dismissed after the defendants significantly reduced the population of the halfway house.


On February 7, 2017, five immigrant advocacy organizations and fifteen individual immigrants filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (in Greenbelt). Represented by the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center, the plaintiffs challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017, executive order (EO). The order restricted admission to the U.S. for nationals of seven majority-Muslim countries and suspended the U.S. refugee program. The plaintiffs alleged that the order violated the First and Fifth Amendments, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Refugee Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They sought a declaration that the EO was unlawful; they also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants (the President, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence) from implementing the order. The complaint focused on the order’s disproportionate impact on Muslims, arguing that its chaotic and irregular policy changes indicated that it was intended to discriminate against members of the religious group. The plaintiff organizations were:

The International Refugee Assistance Project;
The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS, Inc.);
The Middle East Studies Association of North America;
The Arab American Association of New York; and
he Yemeni American Merchants Association.
In addition, the plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all persons “in the United States for whom the EO either interferes with family reunification or the ability to travel internationally and return to the United States.” The case was assigned to District Judge Theodore Chuang. On February 22, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to bar the government from enforcing Section 5(d) of the Executive Order (which reduced the number of refugees who could be admitted to the United States in 2017 by more than fifty percent). The plaintiffs argued that without the injunction, “no additional refugees [could] be approved and admitted for resettlement” during fiscal year 2017, and that thousands of refugees already approved for admission would not be allowed to enter the United States. On March 6, 2017, prompted by developments in a similar case in the Ninth Circuit, the President rescinded his January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. The same day, the government filed notice in this case of the new EO. After the updated EO was signed by the President, plaintiffs moved forward with their preliminary injunction motion because, they claimed, the new EO would still substantially reduce refugee admission. They also filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged that the March 6 order was motivated by the same anti-Muslim animus that had motivated the January 27 order. The plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, and moved to expedite discovery “so that the Court may have the benefit of additional evidence bearing on the central question of the March 6 Order’s discriminatory intent.” On March 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion for a temporary restraining order. The government responded two days later, arguing that no emergency existed. The government also filed a brief in opposition to the plaintiffs’ motion for expedited discovery. On March 13, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a response in support of the temporary restraining order motion. They argued that they had standing because the revised EO directly harmed organizations that serve refugees. The EO, plaintiffs argued, had forced the plaintiff organizations to divert substantial resources away from their core missions of providing free legal services to refugees as well as scale back the number of new clients they could take on. Additionally, they argued that they met the requirements for asserting third-party legal standing on behalf of the thousands of refugee clients they were currently serving. On March 15, the court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against the travel ban portion of the second EO. 241 F. Supp. 3d 539. The government appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and moved for an expedited hearing, citing national security concerns; the court agreed to an expedited schedule. The government also filed a motion for a stay pending the appeal. All parties agreed that an initial en banc hearing was appropriate (a hearing before the entire court, rather than the typical three-judge panel). The district court denied without prejudice the plaintiffs’ outstanding motions for relief, due to the pending appeal and the nationwide injunction that had been issued in Hawaii v. Trump. The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, heard oral arguments on May 8, 2017. On May 25, it upheld the district court’s preliminary injunction (however, it held that President Trump could not be personally enjoined). 857 F.3d 554. (The court of appeals noted that presidential action remained unreviewable in lawsuits against the officers assigned to enforce the President’s directives: “Even though the President is not ‘directly bound’ by the injunction, we ‘assume it is substantially likely that the President . . . would abide by an authoritative interpretation’ of Section 2(c) of the Second Executive Order.”) On June 1, 2017, the government sought Supreme Court review with expedited briefing so that the case could be argued in October. It also sought a stay of the preliminary injunction, pending adjudication by the Supreme Court. On June 26, the Supreme Court agreed to hear this case and Hawaii v. Trump. Like the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court declined to stay the preliminary injunction; however, it did reverse the injunction’s application to “foreign nationals who lack any bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States.” For example, foreign nationals who did not have a close family tie or a formal, documented relationship with an entity (such as a school or employer), were subject to §2(c). Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented, writing that the preliminary injunction should be held invalid in its entirety. 137 S.Ct. 2080 On July 27, the district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against Section 5 of the order (the refugee admission cap). The Supreme Court scheduled oral arguments for October 10, 2017, but the second Executive Order was set to expire before that date. On September 24—the same day the ninety-day ban of the second Executive Order was set to expire—the President issued a proclamation indefinitely restricting travel from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. The Supreme Court canceled the October 10 hearing and asked the parties to file new briefs in light of the government's new order. On October 4, the government filed a brief arguing that the case was moot because the March 6 order had expired. The plaintiffs’ reply argued that the case was not moot despite the new proclamation (referred to as EO-3). Instead, plaintiffs argued, the religious discrimination that was apparent in the earlier orders was present in EO-3, which continued to discriminate against Muslims. They asked the Supreme Court to again schedule oral arguments. They also filed a third amended complaint, and a new motion for a preliminary injunction, in the district court. Despite the plaintiffs’ insistence that the case was not moot, the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s May 25 ruling on October 11, 2017. 138 S. Ct. 353. Given the lapse of the travel ban, the Supreme Court found that the case no longer presented a “live case in controversy.” As such, it remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit with instructions to dismiss the challenge as moot. On October 17, 2017, the district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their third amended complaint and granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against parts of EO-3. Specifically, the injunction prohibited the government from enforcing EO-3 Section 2, which suspended the entry of nationals from eight specified countries. However, the injunction only applied to individuals who had a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. The government appealed to the Fourth Circuit on October 20, sought an emergency stay of the new injunction, and moved to expedite the merits briefing, arguing that there was still a possibility that the Supreme Court could review the case during the current term. The plaintiffs, along with the plaintiffs from Iranian Alliances Across Border v. Trump and Zakzok v. Trump, cross-appealed on October 23. The Fourth Circuit on November 6 granted initial hearing en banc. Meanwhile, in Hawaii v. Trump, the government asked the Supreme Court for a stay of the injunction. The Court granted that stay in a 7-2 decision on December 4, 2017. That order lifted all of the injunctions that the lower courts had put on EO-3, pending appellate litigation. Also on December 4, the plaintiffs, in this case, moved to have the Fourth Circuit take note of a series of videos that President Trump tweeted in early December. The videos were first posted by a far-right British party that expressly opposed Islam. The plaintiffs argued that they proved the President held an animus against Muslims. See here for more details on the videos. On February 15, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction against EO-3. In its nearly 300-page opinion (including concurrences and dissents), the court found that the plaintiffs had standing and that they were likely to succeed on the merits of at least some of their claims including those based in the Establishment Clause. In particular, the court found that plaintiffs offered “undisputed evidence” that EO-3 was driven by anti-Muslim bias. That undisputed evidence included “President Trump’s disparaging comments and tweets regarding Muslims; [and] his repeated proposals to ban Muslims from entering the United States.” The court went on to write that EO-3 “denies the possibility of a complete, intact family to tens of thousands of Americans…and second-guesses our nation’s dedication to religious freedom and tolerance.” Although the court found primarily in favor of the plaintiffs, it also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the injunction to individuals with a bona fide relationship to a person or entity in the United States. Several judges dissented on the grounds that plaintiffs did not have standing. On February 23, following the Fourth Circuit’s decision, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking to have the case heard consolidated with Hawaii v. Trump. They argued that the preliminary injunction should not have been limited to individuals with a bona fide relationship with the United States, and asserted that granting review would “ensure that the Court has before it the best vehicle for resolving the [underlying] Establishment Clause question.” On April 24, 2018, the district court granted the government’s motion to stay this case, Iranian Alliances Across Borders v. Trump, and Zakzok v. Trump, pending the Supreme Court’s resolution of Hawaii v. Trump. On June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Trump reversed the Ninth Circuit’s injunction against EO-3. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts endorsed a broad view of presidential power, holding that under the Immigration and Naturalization Act, the President has “broad discretion to suspend the entry of aliens into the United States,” and that here the President “lawfully exercised that discretion.” The majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims that the President must explain his findings, calling that argument “questionable” and writing that “the 12-page Proclamation—which thoroughly describes the process, agency evaluations, and recommendations underlying the President’s chosen restrictions—is more detailed than any prior order a President has issued under §1182(f).” As for the plaintiffs’ Establishment Clause argument, the Court first noted that EO-3’s facially neutral policy towards religion forced the Court to take the extra step of probing “the sincerity of the stated justifications for the policy by reference to extrinsic statements—many of which were made before the President took the oath of office.” Applying a rational basis test, the Court found that “the Proclamation is expressly premised on legitimate purposes: preventing entry of nationals who cannot be adequately vetted and inducing other nations to improve their practices. The text says nothing about religion.” Notably, however, the Court did use the opinion to officially repudiate Korematsu v. United States, writing that the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was decided.” On October 2, 2018, the Fourth Circuit remanded this case back to the district court for disposition in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling. The following day, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their Immigration and Nationality Act claims (foreclosed by Hawaii v. Trump), as well as claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Refugee Act. They then filed an amended complaint that included constitutional claims and statutory claims under the Administrative Procedure Act. The government filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on February 12, 2019. On May 2, 2019, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims but denied the motion to dismiss as to the plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment claims. The court reasoned that Hawaii v. Trump did not establish that EO-3 had a rational basis, and found that the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficed at the motion to dismiss stage to show that EO-3 was motivated “only by an illegitimate hostility to Muslims.” 373 F. Supp. 3d 650. On June 20, 2019, the government moved to appeal the denial of its motion to dismiss the constitutional claims and to stay discovery. On August 20, 2019, the district court issued an opinion granting the motion for interlocutory appeal and denying the motion to stay discovery. 404 F. Supp. 3d 946. Oral arguments were held before the Fourth Circuit on January 28, 2020. On June 8, 2020, the court of appeals issued an order reversing the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanding the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaints with prejudice. Stating that “the district court misunderstood the import of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hawaii v. Trump and the legal principles it applied,” the court held that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, in this case, lacked the plausibility necessary to survive the government’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). 961 F.3d 635. The court of appeals denied a motion by the plaintiffs for an en banc rehearing of the motion to dismiss on August 21, 2020. Ten days later on August 31, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On February 7, 2017, five immigrant organizations and 15 individual immigrants filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Represented by the ACLU and the National Immigration Law Center, the plaintiffs challenged the legitimacy of President Trump’s “travel ban,” arguing that his executive order was motivated by anti-Muslim animus. In the following months, President Trump issued two revised, narrowed versions of the original executive order and the plaintiffs filed amended complaints that corresponded to the updated EOs. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the President had the authority to issue the travel restrictions in a June 2018 decision, Hawaii v. Trump . Following that holding, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to only include claims that argued that the third version of the travel ban (EO-3) violated the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §5) and the First and Fifth Amendments. The government moved to dismiss the amended complaint and on May 2, 2019, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ Administrative Procedure Act claims but denied the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment claims. The government appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss the constitutional claims to the Fourth Circuit. On June 8, 2020, the Fourth Circuit issued an order reversing the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. After the court of appeals denied a motion by the plaintiffs for an en banc rehearing of the case, the district court dismissed the case with prejudice on August 31, 2020.


On October 30, 2015, the plaintiff, a job applicant with a criminal record, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Represented by Outten & Golden LLP, the complaint named two defendants--a company specializing in privatized corrections and the consumer reporting agency that supplied consumer reports to the company, under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The plaintiff alleged that the company routinely rejected job applicants based on information contained in background check reports in violation of the FCRA. Specifically, the company had taken adverse action against the plaintiff based on information in his consumer report, but prior to their decision and thus in violation of the FCRA, the defendants did not provide the plaintiff with a copy of the report and a description of the plaintiff's rights under the FCRA. On December 17, 2015, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include an additional plaintiff. In early March of 2016, the parties began settlement discussions. On May 19, 2016, the defendant consumer reporting agency filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On July 14, 2016, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the consumer reporting agency. On October 5, 2016, plaintiffs motioned for preliminary approval of class action settlement, conditional certification of the settlement class, and approval of plaintiffs' proposed notice of settlement. On September 30, 2017, the Court (Judge Carol Bagley Amon) approved the settlement. The class was certified, for settlement purposes only, as: "All persons for whom GEO obtained a Consumer Report, from October 30, 2010 through the date of entry of this Order, as part of the GEO hiring or employee retention process, and at some point later in time either were not hired or were terminated, and by virtue of being provided with notice, have the opportunity to potentially become a member of the proposed class." In exchange for class members releasing any and all claims related to this litigation, the defendants agreed to establish a settlement amount of $900,000.00 to cover payment to class members, plaintiffs' counsel's attorneys' fees and costs, settlement administrator's fees and costs, and service awards. Class members were able to claim $100.00 if they had a consumer report that was completed and returned to the defendant on or between October 30, 2010 through October 29, 2013, or $200.00 if they had a consumer a consumer report completed and returned do the defendant on October 30, 2013 through the date of the final order. $300,000.00 of the settlement was allotted for Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs. Named plaintiffs were allowed to apply for a service awards up to $5000.00. Defendants also agreed to revise their policies and implement a background check policy to ensure FCRA compliance. The defendant agreed to affirmative obligations of: (1) consolidating background check vendors; (2) contracting with vendors to assume the administration process for sending adverse action notices and engaging in periodic compliance audits; (3) performing FCRA training for HR employees; (4) transferring the responsibility of initiating the adverse action notice process to the regional or corporate level; (5) standardizing FCRA-related forms; (6) making copies of periodic background check reports available to employees upon request and inform employees of this right; and (7) conducting periodic audits of this process. On February 6, 2018, the parties' motions for settlement were referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold. On February 23, 2018, Judge Gold approved the parties' motion for settlement. The settlement agreement required GEO to pay the maximum settlement amount of $900,000 to cover payment to class members and court-approved costs and fees, including plaintiffs' counsel's attorneys' fees and costs. Under the agreement, GEO was also required to make significant changes to its policies and business practices, such as implementing a formal background check policy to codify the procedures it uses to ensure FCRA compliance. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 30, 2015, the plaintiff, a job applicant with a criminal record, filed this class action lawsuit against two defendants, a company specializing in privatized corrections and the consumer reporting agency that supplied consumer reports to the company, under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681. The plaintiff alleged that the company routinely rejected job applicants based on information contained in background check reports in violation of the FCRA. On February 23, 2018, Judge Gold approved the parties’ motion for settlement. The settlement agreement required GEO to pay the maximum settlement amount of $900,000 to cover payment to class members and court-approved costs and fees, including plaintiffs’ counsel’s attorneys’ fees and costs. Under the agreement, GEO was also required to make significant changes to its policies and business practices, such as implementing a formal background check policy to codify the procedures it uses to ensure FCRA compliance. The case is now closed.


On April 7, 2011, DOJ conducted an investigation of the New Hampshire Mental Health System pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The DOJ concluded that the State of New Hampshire failed to provide sufficient community services to qualified individuals with mental illness in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs, in violation of the ADA. The DOJ claimed in their findings letter that this violation had led to the needless and prolonged institutionalization of individuals with disabilities who could be served in more integrated settings in the community with adequate services and supports. This investigation led to the following lawsuit. Filed in 2012, this class-action lawsuit challenged New Hampshire's mental health system, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The plaintiffs, individuals with mental illness, alleged that the State's inadequate services led to unnecessary institutionalization primarily in two state psychiatric hospitals, New Hampshire Hospital and the Glencliff Home. They claimed that the inadequacies in mental health services amounted to violations of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Nursing Home Reform Act. The plaintiffs were represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the Center for Public Representation, the New Hampshire Disabilities Rights Center, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Steven J. McAuliffe. The U.S. Department of Justice had earlier investigated the issues raised by this lawsuit and detailed its findings in an April 2011 letter. The DOJ found that the state lacked community-based services that would allow individuals with mental illness to avoid institutionalization. It found that many individuals who could live in the community resided in institutions or stayed much longer than they needed to because the support available upon discharge was insufficient. After this lawsuit was filed, the United States received the court's permission to intervene and filed its complaint in intervention on April 4, 2012. On June 11, 2012, Judge McAuliffe declined to grant the Plaintiffs' first motion for class certification, instead recommending that the parties proceed to discovery in order to gather the facts necessary to certify the class. The parties then proceeded with discovery. The plaintiffs submitted a renewed motion for class certification on January 29, 2013. On September 17, 2013, Judge McAuliffe granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification with respect to their ADA and Section 504 claims but denied the motion with respect to their PASSAR claim. 293 F.R.D. 254. The court defined the class as all persons with mental illness who were unnecessarily institutionalized in New Hampshire Hospital or Glencliff or who were at serious risk of being unnecessarily institutionalized at one of those hospitals. In October 2013, the parties initiated settlement negotiations. On December 19, 2013, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement. The agreement stipulated specific measures the State would take to improve its services to persons with mental illness, including providing mobile crisis response units, expanding on community treatment services, increasing supported housing for those with serious mental illness, expanding supported employment services, developing a transition planning service for those currently institutionalized, and developing systems for monitoring and reviewing the quality of community support services. The agreement further provided that an expert reviewer would be appointed to monitor implementation of its terms and that the court should maintain its jurisdiction over the matter until the State had achieved and maintained compliance for at least one year. On January 2, 2014, the district court granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement and ordered the State to notify class members of the proposed settlement. On February 12, Judge McAuliffe granted final approval of the agreement, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class. In accordance with the agreement, he awarded a total of $2.4 million to the Plaintiffs in attorneys' fees, costs, and monitoring. As of October 29, 2017, status reports indicated that the State had made continual progress toward compliance with the terms of the settlement, but had not yet achieved full compliance. The State continued to be monitored by the expert reviewer requiring status reports twice a year, with the court maintaining jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the settlement. On January 12, 2018, the parties jointly filed a status report with the court, reporting that the defendants were still working toward compliance with the settlement agreement. Additional status reports were filed on July 30, 2018, January 23, 2019, and September 12, 2019, complying with the requirement for the expert reviewer to provide status reports twice a year. The September 12, 2019 status report concluded that “ the State continues to be far from compliant with [Community Mental Health Center (CMHA)] requirements for [Assertive Community Treatment (ACT)]” and that “the State has made minimal progress in meeting CMHA ACT requirements over the past four reporting periods.” As of January 2020, the defendants were still working toward compliance with the settlement agreement. In the 13th expert report filed on February 1, 2021, the expert reviewer took note of the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the State of New Hampshire as well as on mental health facilities. The pandemic also impacted the reviewer's activities: beginning in January 2020, the expert reviewer was unable to conduct on-site visits or observations of compliance. The reviewer did participate in conference calls with State officials and representatives of the plaintiffs but conceded that the report was limited by the absence of face-to-face contact with administrators and participants. The report highlighted several positive improvements in the nearly seven years since the settlement was reached, including implementing a Quality Service Reviews program and contracting with the Dartmouth-Hitchcock center to conduct fidelity reviews. But the reviewer acknowledged that the pandemic had delayed the State's efforts to complete the terms of the settlement agreement and the State would require an extension to fulfill its obligations. The implementation of the settlement continues.

Summary: Individuals with mental illness brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire, challenging New Hampshire's inadequate provision of community-based mental health services and resulting unnecessary institutionalization in state psychiatric hospitals. The parties settled in early 2014. Since then, the court has been monitoring the State's progress toward compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.