On January 15, 2015, an arrested individual who was unable to pay her bail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by the non-profit Equal Justice Under Law and by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the City of Clanton under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Her complaint alleged that she was jailed because she was too poor to pay a small amount of bail money as automatically required by the City's bail schedule. Those able to pay the amount of the bond always obtained immediate release. Those unable to pay were required to wait in jail until the next court date, typically held on Tuesday afternoons. The bail schedule required payment upfront and provided no option to secure release on recognizance or by an unsecured bond. The plaintiff claimed this violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; she sought declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief. The case was assigned to Judge Myron Thompson. On February 13, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in support of the plaintiff. The statement pointed out that the federal Bail Reform Act requires federal judges and magistrates to conduct an individualized analysis of each defendant prior to ordering pretrial detention. DOJ argued that this is constitutionally required--that fixed-sum bail systems are unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On April 3, 2015, the plaintiff filed her first amended class-action complaint. Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. However, before the court could rule on the motion, the parties settled the case, except for the issue of damages. The defendants agreed to a modified bail schedule and to hold a hearing within 48 hours for those unable to pay their bail. Accordingly, on May 14, 2015, the court denied all pending motions without prejudice and cancelled all pending hearings. On September 14, 2015, the court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) issued an opinion and order granting final judgment and adopting the settlement agreement as an order of the court. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to enforce the terms of the settlement and to resolve the matter of attorney's fees. 2015 WL 5387219 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015). There was no further activity on the docket during the three-year enforcement period, so the case is presumably now closed.

Summary: In 2015, an arrested individual who was unable to pay her bail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against the City of Clanton. The plaintiff claimed that she was jailed because she was too poor to pay a small amount of bail money as automatically required by the City's bail schedule in violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties settled in 2015 and the City agreed to change the bail schedule and speed up hearings for those who couldn't afford bail.


On May 4, 2017, a nonprofit created "to educate the public on matters of nontheism" (the Freedom From Religion Foundation, FFRF) filed this lawsuit against the U.S. federal government in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The case was assigned to District Judge James D. Peterson. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that Donald Trump’s “religious liberty” executive order unfairly allowed religious non-profit organizations to engage in political campaigning and retain their tax-exempt status but did not promise the same for non-religious non-profit organizations. As a non-religious organization with 501(c)3 status, the FFRF argued that Trump violated its equal protection rights and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Because the Johnson Amendment forbids any 501(c)3 organization from participating in political campaigns, the plaintiff argued that Trump was selectively enforcing the Johnson Amendment in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 29, 2017, a small group of Christian religious leaders sought to intervene as defendants. The FFRF did not oppose the intervention, but the government did, expressing that that it would be more appropriate for the religious leaders to participate by submitting amicus briefs in support of the executive order. On August 22, the government moved to dismiss the case. It alleged that FFRF had misunderstood the purpose of the executive order, that the executive order did not exempt religious organizations from the restrictions on political activity applicable to all tax-exempt organizations. The government alleged that the executive order merely served as an instruction for the IRS not to unfairly target religious organizations. Although the court had not ruled on their motion to intervene, the religious leaders also filed a motion to dismiss on the same day. The FFRF did not respond to the motions to dismiss. Eight days later, it declared victory on its website and through a press release because the court documents submitted by the government had stated that the executive order did not stop enforcement of the Johnson Amendment or give special privileges to religious organizations. These official court documents directly conflicted with the statements by President Trump that had motivated the plaintiff's complaint. On September 19, 2017, the FFRF filed an amended complaint that included allegations against the proposed intervening religious leaders. On November 9, 2017, both the government and the group of religious leaders filed motions to dismiss this amended complaint. The court never ruled on the religious leaders’ motions to intervene or any of the motions to dismiss. The FFRF voluntarily dismissed the case on December 13, 2017. The case is closed.

Summary: In May 2017, the Freedom From Religion Foundation filed thislawsuit against the U.S. federal government in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. The FFRF argued that Trump violated its equal protection rights and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The FFRF also argued that Trump was selectively enforcing the Johnson Amendment in violation of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The case closed after the FFRF voluntarily dismissed it in December 2017.


On September 7, 2011, an individual resident of Orange County, California, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article 1, § 2 of the California Constitution against Orange County. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, claimed that the Orange County Board of Supervisors (the Board) violated his federal and state constitutional rights by silencing him at a public meeting. He asked the court for injunctive relief, damages, and judgment that the Orange County rules regarding speech at county board meetings unconstitutionally limit speech under the United States and California Constitutions. On March 22, 2012, the Plaintiff amended the complaint to include a request for a declaration that the Orange County rules were unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiff. Plaintiff claimed that when he criticized the Board at several public meetings, he was forced to stop speaking in violation of his freedom of speech. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that at a meeting on July 27, 2010 he was forced to stop speaking prior to the completion of his allotted time and followed back to his seat by a member of the Board. Plaintiff also claimed that at a meeting on August 23, 2011 he was interrupted prior to the completion of his allotted time and escorted out of the meeting. Finally, Plaintiff claimed that because he has been silenced because the Board disagrees with his viewpoint in the past, his fear of being silenced in the future is preventing him from exercising his right to speak at public meetings of the Board. On July 20, 2012, the Court (Judge James Selna) entered an order denying the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and partially granting the Board's counter-motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the individual defendants were protected by qualified immunity and that the Orange County rules were constitutionally applied to Plaintiff, but that the broad constitutional challenge to the Orange County rules could proceed. The case proceeded to trial in August 2012, and the Court (Judge James Selna) entered judgment in favor of the Board on September 21, 2012, without opinion. The plaintiff appealed the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on September 25, 2012. On April 17, 2014, the Court of Appeals (Judges Morgan Christen, Sidney Thomas, and Milan Smith) upheld the District Court's decision in favor of the Board. The Court found that even though the District Court incorrectly granted summary judgment on the constitutional challenge, the challenge failed on the merits of Plaintiff's claim. 570 Fed.Appx. 653. This ended the case.

Summary: In 2011, a resident of Orange County, California filed suit against the County Board of Supervisors claiming violations of his federal and state First Amendment rights. The District Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Board in July 2012. The case then proceeded to trial in August 2012, and the Court found in favor of the Board on all counts in September 2012. The Plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit shortly thereafter, and that Court upheld the District Court's ruling on April 17, 2014.


On February 26, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a complaint against the City of Pittsburgh ["City"], the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police ["PBP"], and the Department of Public Safety pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to remedy an alleged pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct by officers of the PBP which included: using excessive force; making false arrests; lodging false charges; and conducting improper searches and seizures. This was the first lawsuit filed by the DOJ under 42 U.S.C. §14141. The filing followed nearly a year of DOJ investigation of the PBP, which was spurred on by the ACLU and NAACP's filing of the civil rights lawsuit Williams, et al. v. City of Pittsburgh, CA-96-560 (W.D.Pa., Cindrich, J.). Simultaneously with the filing of the government's complaint, the parties filed a joint application for the entry of the consent decree. The consent decree included the implementation of changes in: the use of force; officer training; internal affairs investigations; officer detention and arrest of subjects; and collection and retention of department information and data. On March 3, 1997, Allen Brunwasser filed a motion to intervene, which was denied by the District Court (Judge Robert J. Cindrich). The District Court, however, notified Brunwasser of the consent decree hearing, so as to give him an opportunity to be heard. Brunwasser's interest in the litigation is not clear from the record. The Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1 [FOP] filed a similar motion to intervene, and Judge Cindrich allowed the FOP to participate in the hearings on the joint motion to enter the consent decree. After a final hearing on April 16, 1997, the District Court entered the consent decree. The FOP's motion to intervene was denied as moot. In accordance with the consent decree, the parties selected James D. Ginger, Ph.D. to serve as auditor. The auditor was charged with oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the consent decree and with providing quarterly reports to the court. Throughout the duration of the consent decree, Dr. Ginger provided 29 quarterly reports to the court. The original terms of the consent decree called for a five year monitoring period. The District Court extended that period to allow for full compliance by the PBP. In September 2002, the parties filed a joint motion to modify the consent decree. The nature of the proposed modifications is not apparent from the docket. The ACLU and NAACP filed an amicus brief in opposition to the proposed modifications. After a hearing on the matter, the District Court approved the modifications. Monitoring continued until 2005. On April 7, 2005, the District Court granted the parties joint motion to terminate the consent decree and the case was dismissed.

Summary: On February 26, 1997, the U.S. Department of Justice ["DOJ"] filed a complaint against the City of Pittsburgh ["City"], the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police ["PBP"], and the Department of Public Safety pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The DOJ alleged that the PBP used excessive force and made false arrests. The parties entered a contemporaneous consent decree which lasted until 2005. In April 2005, the court granted the parties' joint motion to terminate, and the case was dismissed.


On September 30, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Republic Services, Inc. and Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The complaint alleged that the defendants discharged and/or did not allow employees over the age of 40 to transfer locations because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Judge David A. Ezra. The defendants moved for summary judgment on May 24, 2006, which was denied. The court consolidated this case with a private party suit, 2:04-cv-01479 (D.C. Nev. October 27, 2004) in October 2006. In that case, two individual plaintiffs brought ADEA claims against the defendants and sought monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. On September 10, 2007, the defendants again moved for summary judgment. Then, on May 13, 2008, the defendants moved for sanctions against the EEOC, reasoning that the EEOC was advocating meritless claims because they had no evidence backing its advocacy. The court denied the sanction and request for summary judgment on June 3, 2008. About a month later, the defendant moved yet again for summary judgment. This request was granted in part and denied in part on February 17, 2009. The court granted summary judgment for the defendant as to certain individual disparate treatment claims and the EEOC’s pattern and practice claims. On May 21, 2009, the court ordered the EEOC to pay $4,026 for the defendants’ attorney fees and costs. After four settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Eventually the parties drafted a consent decree, which the court approved on September 21, 2010. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure that the parties complied with the terms of the consent decree. This decree pertained to monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the defendants agreed to pay $2,975,000 to the plaintiffs. For the injunctive relief, the parties agreed to a series of terms. The parties agreed that the defendant would not engage in age discrimination or retaliation. The parties agreed that the defendants would be monitored by an Equal Employment Opportunity compliance officer. This officer would monitor that the defendant was complying with the ADEA and with terms in this decree. More specifically, the officer was required to monitor the defendants’ audits for age discrimination, review individual employment decisions made by the defendant, reform procedures and practices to track information on hiring, involuntary termination, transfers, and promotion, and ensure that complaints of age discrimination were thoroughly investigated. Moreover, the defendants agreed to post notices of the terms of this consent decree to be visible to their employees at the workplace. Defendants agreed to provide anti-age discrimination training to their supervisors, managers, and human resources managers. The defendant had to develop procedures that would allow for tracking of hiring, promotion, transfer, involuntary termination decisions, and complaints of age discrimination made to management. In addition, the defendant was required to report regularly to the Equal Employment Opportunity compliance officer. The court’s jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the consent decree ended in 2013, and the case’s docket shows no further activity. This case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Republic Services, Inc. and Republic Silver State Disposal, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The complaint alleged that the defendants discharged and/or did not allow employees over 40 to transfer because of their age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The court consolidated this case with a private party suit, 2:04-cv-01479 (D.C. Nev. October 27, 2004) in October 2006. And then in 2010, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. The decree pertained to monetary and injunctive relief. The defendant agreed to pay $2,975,000, and to have an Equal Employment Opportunity compliance officer to monitor the defendants’ procedures and practices to ensure that the defendant did not engage in age discrimination and/or retaliation. In addition, the decree required the defendants to provide anti-discrimination training for their employees and to post notices that detailed the terms of this decree to be visible to their employees. The decree had a duration of three years. The case is presumably closed.


On January 27, 2006, a Muslim woman, represented by pro bono counsel, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against multiple state and federal agencies, alleging Section 1983 claims, state law tort claims, and several constitutional claims based on the inclusion of her name on government terrorist watchlists, including the No Fly List. The federal government filed a motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff''s claims lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of Appeals under 49 U.S.C. § 46110, which gives the U.S. Court of Appeals exclusive jurisdiction over challenges to certain orders of the Transportation Security Administration. On August 16, 2006, the District Court (Judge William Alsup) agreed and held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality, maintenance, and implementation of the No Fly List. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 06-cv-00545, 2006 WL 2374645 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006). The plaintiff appealed the District Court's decision. On August 18, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. In an opinion by Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court had original subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief regarding inclusion of her name on the No Fly List. The Ninth Circuit agreed that the District Court, however, lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her claim for injunctive relief regarding the government's policies and procedures implementing the no-fly list. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge Smith dissented. On remand, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint that sought, among other things, limited relief relevant to the plaintiff's visa situation. Cash settlements with non-federal parties eventually reduced the question to prospective relief only against the federal government. Thereafter, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiff lacked standing to assert constitutional and statutory claims seeking prospective relief. The District Court agreed and held that while the plaintiff could seek damages for past injury at the San Francisco airport (and had successfully settled that part of the case), she had voluntarily left the United States and, as a nonimmigrant alien abroad, no longer had standing to assert constitutional and statutory claims to seek prospective relief. This holding was based on the ground that the development of federal constitutional law should not be controlled by nonimmigrant aliens overseas. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2009 WL 22746194 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2009). A second appeal followed. On February 8, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed as to prospective standing, holding that even a nonimmigrant alien who had voluntarily left the United States nonetheless had standing to litigate federal constitutional claims in district court in the United States as long as the alien had a "substantial voluntary connection" to the United States. In an opinion by Judge William Fletcher, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had such a connection because of her time at Stanford University, her continuing collaboration with professors in the United States, her membership in several professional organizations located in the United States, the invitations for her to return, and her network of close friends in the United States. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012). Judge Duffy dissented. On the second remand, the federal government filed a motion to dismiss that was denied by the District Court on December 20, 2012. Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2012 WL 6652362 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012). Discovery ensued, the District Court granted in limited part, but mostly denied, the federal government's motion for summary judgment, and a five-day bench trial began on December 2, 2013. Following trial, on January 14, 2014, the District Court issued an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as granting some of the relief sought. The court found that the plaintiff did not pose (and had not posed) a threat to national security. Indeed, the court found that the plaintiff was erroneously put on the No Fly List because a FBI agent misunderstood the directions on the form to nominate persons to the No Fly List, and thus, checked the wrong box. This error further propagated through various other federal agency databases that caused her visa to be revoked and to not be allowed back into the United States. The District Court held that due process entitled the plaintiff to a correction in the government's records to prevent the error of the FBI agent from further propagating through the various agency databases and from causing further injury to the plaintiff. The District Court further held that the federal government's DHS TRIP program was inadequate to satisfy procedural due process. The District Court, however, emphasized that it would be impractical and harmful to national security to routinely prove a pre-deprivation opportunity to be heard, and thus, until concrete, reviewable adverse action occurs against a nominee, the Executive Branch must be free to maintain its watchlists in secret. The following relief was ordered by the District Court:

 The federal government must search and trace all of its terrorist watchlists and records for entries identifying the plaintiff and remove all references to the mistaken designations by the FBI agent and/or add a correction in the same paragraph that said designations were erroneous and should not be relied upon for any purpose.
The federal government must inform the plaintiff of the specific subsection of Section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act that rendered her ineligible for a visa in 2009.
The federal government must inform the plaintiff that she is no longer on the no-fly list and has not been on it since 2005.
The government must inform the plaintiff that she is eligible to at least apply for a discretionary visa waiver.
 Later, the District Court awarded plaintiff's counsel their reasonable fees and expenses incurred for certain claims, including the procedural due process claim. 2014 WL 1493561 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 2014); 2014 WL 1493541 (N.D. Cal. April 16, 2014). The plaintiff appealed the decision on June 13 to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On July 11, 2014, Judge Alsup appointed a special master, who issued a report and recommendation regarding the amount of the award. On October 9, 2014, Judge Alsup adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety and awarded the plaintiff’s counsel $419,987.36 in attorney’s fees and $34,768.71 in expenses. 2014 WL 5073582. On January 2, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the award of attorneys’ fees, on the grounds that they were incorrectly reduced. It also remanded the case to allow the district court to make a bad faith determination under the correct legal standard and to re-determine the fee award. The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on May 31, 2019, asking the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether the Ninth Circuit erred in vacating the district court’s finding of no bad faith in the government’s conduct. The Supreme Court denied the petition on October 15, 2019, although Justice Alito noted that he would have granted the cert petition. 140 S.Ct. 424. On August 20, 2020, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for attorneys' fees. As of October 14, 2020, the fee litigation is ongoing, with a hearing on the motion scheduled for November 5, 2020.

Summary: On January 27, 2006, a Muslim woman filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against multiple state and federal agencies, alleging Section 1983 claims, state law tort claims, and several constitutional claims based on the inclusion of her name on government terrorist watchlists, including the No Fly List. The district court ultimately decided that the plaintiff was erroneously put on the list and granted her relief accordingly on January 14, 2014. Attorneys' fees litigation continues.


On December 19, 2019, three plaintiffs who were incarcerated in Massachusetts filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging discriminatory denial of adequate medical care. Their complaint asserted that this denial violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts represented the plaintiffs in conjunction with private counsel. The defendants were the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction, the Superintendents of MCI Cedar Junction, and the Superintendent of MCI Norfolk in their official capacities. The case was assigned to Judge Leo T. Sorokin. Prior to incarceration, the plaintiffs had each been in treatment for Opioid Use Disorder and had been prescribed buprenorphine as part of Medication-Assisted Treatment plans. Blanket policies in the Massachusetts Department of Correction automatically reduced prisoners’ buprenorphine dose to no more than 8 mg per day and forcibly removed individuals from buprenorphine after 90 days. Because of this policy, each of the plaintiffs had their treatment plans significantly altered and prematurely ended. They sought injunctive relief, declaratory judgement against the Massachusetts Department of Correction's policy, and attorney’s fees. On February 27, 2020, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. The settlement included 11 components: 1) Defendants must provide plaintiffs with the proper dose of buprenorphine consistent with an individualized treatment plan prescribed by a specialist; 2) Defendants must inform plaintiffs' counsel of a decrease in buprenorphine dosage within 48 hours; 3) Defendants will provide buprenorphine based on each plaintiff's individual need rather than a blanket policy; 4) Defendants must provide medical documentation to the plaintiffs regarding any decrease in their buprenorphine dosage; 5) Defendants will house the plaintiffs in units consistent with their custody levels; 6) One individual plaintiff would be entitled to reclassification review upon implementation of a buprenorphine maintenance treatment plan; 7) Defendants will allow that individual plaintiff access to work placements and programming while participating in his rehabilitation program; 8) Defendants will ensure that the plaintiffs' buprenorphine maintenance programs do not interfere with their access to services, programs, or activities; 9) The parties will file a joint motion to dismiss after execution of the settlement, allowing the court to retain jurisdiction until December 31, 2020; 10) Each party will bear its own attorney's fees and other costs; and 11) Modification of the agreement must be mutually agreed to in writing. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss on February 28, 2020, with the court to retain jurisdiction until December 31, 2020, when the settlement was set to expire.

Summary: The ACLU of Massachusetts represented three prisoners who sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction for discriminatory denial of adequate medical care related to the treatment of Opioid Use Disorder. State-wide MDOC policy forced each of the plaintiffs to significantly alter and prematurely end their treatment plans, contrary to the advice of their doctors. The plaintiffs alleged that this policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The parties settled in February 2020. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to provide buprenorphine based on individual need. The settlement was set to last until December 2020.


On June 20, 2013, a man who had been arrested and detained in Chicago’s Homan Square detention center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued the City of Chicago and Chicago police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by a private firm, the plaintiff asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiff claimed that the City of Chicago and the individual police officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He alleged that they subjected him to secret arrest and excessive force, tortured and sodomized him, and prevented from calling an attorney. The plaintiff claimed that after being questioned and detained without being able to contact an attorney, he was taken to Homan Square, a police warehouse that was not a normal police station, where he was threatened and tortured. On September 2, 2015, the court (Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland) granted the plaintiff's motion to file a second amended complaint. 2015 WL 5163165. On October 5, 2015, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint that included additional plaintiffs and a request for class certification. The plaintiffs asked for injunctive and declaratory relief in addition to monetary damages, bringing the same claims as the original complaint: they alleged that they had been subjected to unconstitutional police practices at Homan square. The class members claimed that the city of Chicago and the Chicago police department violated their Fourth and Fourteenth amendment rights by subjecting them to excessive force and secret arrests, without making a public record of their arrest or allowing them to contact an attorney. The plaintiffs alleged that the Chicago Police Department used Homan Square to hold citizens “incommunicado”—that is, without the formal processing procedures or acknowledgment of the detention—so that police could interrogate citizens and coerce them to cooperate with investigations. The class plaintiffs brought a § 1983 "secret arrest" class claim for alleged policies and practices—including secretly detaining citizens at places like Homan Square, interrogating citizens without advising them of their Miranda rights, attempting to coerce false confessions, denying contact with attorneys or family, and refusing access to food, water, and restrooms—that violated the First and Fourth Amendments. Two of the new named plaintiffs brought a claim for deprivations of adequate accommodations, alleging policies and practices of detaining citizens overnight without providing them minimally adequate accommodations for sleeping. The second amended complaint also included individual claims for excessive force, failure to intervene in excessive force, state law claims, and an indemnification claim against the City. On January 16, 2016, Magistrate Judge Rowland granted the discovery motion from the plaintiffs to inspect the Homan Square facilities where the detainees were kept. This area included detainee cells, bathrooms, bullpen holding cells and interview/interrogation rooms. The plaintiff was also permitted to perform testing in these areas on suspected blood and human excrement. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on December 18, 2015 on the basis that two of the plaintiffs were time-barred and another plaintiff failed to state a viable claim. On February 15, 2016, the intervenor plaintiff from Mann v. Ramaglia filed a motion to consolidate his case with this one. On March 24, 2016, Judge Mary M. Rowland granted part and denied part of the motion. She directed that pre-trial proceedings be coordinated in this case and Mann v. Ramaglia under her supervision. On August 26, 2016, Judge Rowland granted the City's motion to dismiss as to some of the named plaintiffs' claims, finding them time barred or failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 2016 WL 4493425. On February 1, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint with three named plaintiffs, which asserted the same substantive claims seeking to reform the procedures that allowed police to hold arrestees "incommunicado" and in inhumane conditions in order to "squeeze" information out of them. The parties engaged in consolidated discovery in this case and Mann v. Ramaglia for the next year-and-a-half. On September 8, 2017, Judge Rowland granted the plaintiffs' request to include Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel and members of his staff in the City's email search. 2017 WL 3970592. Following a July 17, 2018 status hearing, the court reported that the plaintiffs had submitted a settlement demand to the defendants. The parties agreed at an August 28, 2018 status hearing that a settlement conference could be productive, but it was unclear whether one of the named plaintiffs would participate, which the City and the court agreed would render settlement unproductive. At a September 28, 2018 status hearing, it was established that the named plaintiff would participate in a settlement conference tentatively set for November 14, 2018. While moving toward a settlement conference the parties were reportedly at odds over whether this would be a class-wide or individual settlement. After the November 2018 status hearing, Judge Rowland stayed class discovery until the class plaintiffs had filed a motion to certify class. For Perez, the individual plaintiff, Judge Rowland set February 28, 2019 as a non-negotiable and non-continuable date for the close of fact discovery. At this point, the judge's frustration with this plaintiff became apparent from her management of his case, including additional non-continuable deadlines and written admonition of his attorney. After the scheduled close of discovery for the individual plaintiff's case, the parties continued into a period of contentious expert discovery. The parties brought several disputes to the judge during this time, including: 1) Defendants' claiming that they had never agreed to a motion the plaintiff filed as an agreed motion; 2) Defendants' motions to bar plaintiff from disclosing any expert witnesses/strike individual experts; and 3) a motion for sanctions on the plaintiff for failing to comply with disclosure requirements. The class plaintiffs filed their motion to certify the class on March 5, 2019. They sought certification for two classes. Class I (Detainee and Arrestee Class) consisted of "All natural persons detained or arrested by a Chicago Police Officer where no public record of the detainment or arrest was created within a reasonable amount of time from the initial detainment (Plaintiffs suggest one hour from the initial detainment) and where no court order existed at the time of arrest or detainment sealing or otherwise making the detainment or arrest confidential, beginning on a date two years prior to the filing of this Complaint to the present." Class II (Future Detainees and Arrestees Class) consisted of "All persons who may in the future be subject to the secret arrests Described in Class One." The court denied the motion for class certification on December 27, 2019. 2019 WL 7290848. In an opinion that was critical of the plaintiff's briefing, Judge Robert Dow, Jr. held that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately state the constitutional right that was allegedly violated. Even if this right was properly alleged, though, Judge Dow found that the class failed the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements for class certification. After a status conference in January 2020, all of the involved parties agreed to participate in settlement conferences. An initial conference was scheduled for May 20, 2020, but due to the COVID-19 public health emergency this was postponed for an indeterminate amount of time. As of May 27, 2020, the parties have been encouraged to engage in settlement negotiations outside of court. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In June 2013 the plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging secret arrest and excessive force in Chicago's Homan Square detention center. The plaintiffs amended the complaint to bring class claims on October 5, 2015. On March 24, 2016, the Magistrate Judge ordered the coordination of discovery with this case and another Homan Square case. As of October 14, 2018, the parties are engaged in settlement discussions.


On December 26, 2013, three city employees married to same-sex partners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of Houston. The plaintiffs, represented by an attorney from the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the Texas state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage (Texas Marriage Amendment and the Texas DOMA) were unconstitutional, and to enjoin the City of Houston from withdrawing or denying spousal benefits for same-sex spouses of city employees. The case began after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Windsor v. United States (PB-NY-0017 in this Clearinghouse), when the City of Houston changed its benefits policy: same-sex spouses of city employees, who were legally married in another state, could now qualify for spousal benefits. Three city employees enrolled for these benefits. But on December 17, 2013, a state court, the District Court for Harris County, Texas, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the City to "cease and desist providing benefits to same-sex spouses of employees that have married in jurisdictions that recognize same-sex marriage." As a result, the City told the plaintiffs that the spousal benefits they currently had might be interrupted and terminated, while different-sex spouses would continue to receive their city benefits. In response, the plaintiffs brought this suit in federal district court arguing that the denial of benefits and the ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On August 29, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Judge Sim Lake) granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction and stay, thereby preventing the City from terminating same-sex spousal benefits until the case was resolved, and staying the proceedings pending the final decision on the constitutionality of the Texas marriage ban in De Leon v. Perry (PB-TX-0004 in this Clearinghouse). While De Leon was being considered by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court released its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges on June 26, 2015, holding that state bans on same-sex marriage violated the liberty and equality guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. On July 1, 2015, the Fifth Circuit released its decision in De Leon, applying the Obergefell decision and finding the Texas marriage ban unconstitutional. On July 6, 2015, Judge Sim Lake dismissed this case, finding Plaintiffs' claims moot in light of the recent decisions in both Obergefell and De Leon. Both parties were ordered to bear their own costs and fees. This case is now closed.

Summary: On December 26, 2013, three city employees married to same-sex partners, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the city of Houston. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the Texas state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage (Texas Marriage Amendment and the Texas DOMA) are unconstitutional and to temporarily and permanently enjoin the City of Houston from withdrawing or denying spousal benefits for same-sex spouses of city employees. On August 29, 2014, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Judge Sim Lake) entered a preliminary injunction, thereby preventing the City from terminating same-sex spousal benefits until the case was resolved, and stayed the proceedings pending a final decision on the constitutionality of the Texas marriage ban in De Leon v. Perry. Judge Lake dismissed the case on July 6, 2015, in light of the Obergefell and De Leon decisions released in June 2015. The case is now closed.


On September 26, 2008, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against the City of Dayton. The U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the United States Attorney's Office sought an injunction preventing the Dayton Police and Fire Departments from using discriminatory hiring practices and ordering relief to those affected in the past by the discriminatory practices. The claim was based on the disparate impact caused by two challenged practices: The first, operative beginning 2006, was that the City of Dayton Police Department used a written examination for hiring firefighters, with applicants who passed placed on an eligibility list in descending-rank order. The second, beginning in 2004, was that the Fire Department increased firefighter prerequisites to include various certifications not previously required. Both practices had a statistically significant discriminatory impact, decreasing the number of African-American candidates. The matter quickly settled, and on February 26, 2009, the parties jointly moved for the entry of a consent decree. On April 14, 2009 the Court (Judge Thomas M. Rose) granted the Fraternal Order of Police, Captain John C. Post Lodge 44, and the International Association of Firefighters Local 136 permission to intervene as defendants, who then objected to the consent decree. 2009 WL 996383. Their objections were overruled and the consent decree was approved by the Court on November 30, 2009. The consent decree ordered the city to cease using the stated discriminatory hiring practices and develop, with oversight by the United States, new, non-discriminatory hiring practices. The decree also required that the city identify, by fairness hearings, those applicants affected by the discriminatory hiring practices who were eligible to receive: monetary relief, from a fund of $450,000 from the city; placement on a priority hiring list; and the potential for retroactive seniority if hired. Multiple fairness hearings were held regarding the consent decree and individual relief, and on August 5, 2010, the Court approved an individual relief list submitted by the United States. On May 13, 2013, the Court granted a motion to extend the portions of the consent decree related to developing new hiring procedures for police officers and terminated the rest of the consent decree. On November 26, 2013 the consent decree was terminated and the action dismissed.

Summary: In 2008 the United States sued the City of Dayton for discriminatory practices with a discriminatory impact in their Police in Fire Departments. The parties settled in 2009 with a decree mandating changed hiring practices and relief for those affected in the past. The consent decree terminated in 2013.


This case is about the government's failure to adjudicate refugees' follow-to-join (FTJ) petitions that would allow their families to reunite in the U.S. in a timely manner. The plaintiffs are both Sudanese refugees from the Darfur region who fled the country in the early 2010s to escape the ethnic cleansing being carried out by President Omar al-Bashir. Since their arrival in the United States, both filed a "follow-to-join" petition through U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which would have allowed them to reunite in the U.S. with their spouses and children who were still in Sudan. The follow-to-join statute is part of the Refugee Act of 1980 and creates a non-discretionary entitlement to admission for spouses and unmarried children of refugees in the U.S. Several years passed since the plaintiffs filed their petitions and the government failed to adjudicate their FTJ applications, prolonging the separations of the plaintiffs from their family. On October 22, 2020, the two refugee fathers with family in Sudan men filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of United States Citizenship and Immigration Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus to compel the defendants to promptly adjudicate their FTJ petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and their Fifth Amendment due process rights. Because the defendants' duty to adjudicate the FTJ petitions is non-discretionary under the Immigration and Nationality Act and the APA obligates defendants to take non-discretionary actions within a “reasonable time,” the plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to timely adjudication of their petitions. The complaint further alleged that the Mandamus Act vests the court with authority to compel a government agent to perform a non-discretionary duty owed to the plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge Stephanie Gallagher. On February 5, 2021, the defendants requested extended time to file their response, which was granted that day. The case is ongoing as of March 3, 2021.

Summary: On October 20, 2020, the two Sudanese refugees filed suit alleging violations of the APA and the Fifth Amendment due process clause for failure to adjudicate their follow-to-join (FTJ) petitions in a reasonable time. The plaintiffs sought an order to compel the defendants to promptly adjudicate their FTJ petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. The case is ongoing as of March 3, 2021.


On December 16, 2013, a man whose same-sex spouse (married in the state of Massachusetts) died in an automobile accident in 2011 and who wished to be recognized as the surviving spouse, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama under 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 against the state of Alabama. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, asked the court to declare that Alabama's laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional and to allow the plaintiff to be recognized as the surviving spouse in any lawsuits surrounding the death of his husband. The plaintiff also requested that the court issue an injunction stating that Alabama must recognize same-sex marriages formalized in other jurisdictions and issue an injunction requiring the plaintiff's husband's death certificate be changed to indicate that he was married at the time of death. The Alabama Marriage Protection Act stated that the state would not recognize "any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as a result of the law of any jurisdiction." Similar language also later became part of the state's constitution when Alabama voters passed the Sanctity of Marriage Amendment. The plaintiff claimed that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage discriminated against same-sex couples for no rational reason and violated the plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. On January 23, 2015, in Searcy v. Bentley (PB-AL-0005 in this Clearinghouse), the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) ruled that Alabama's same sex marriage ban was unconstitutional. In accordance with the ruling, the Alabama Center for Health Statistics issued the plaintiff an amended death certificate recognizing him as a surviving spouse. The decedent's mother filed a motion to intervene seeking to block distribution of settlement funds from a wrongful death lawsuit. On February 24, 2015, the District Court (Judge William Keith Watkins) granted the motion to intervene. On March 10, 2015, the District Court (Judge Watkins) granted the governor's motion to dismiss only the count against him for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also stayed further proceedings pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held the right to marry was fundamental, and it demeaned gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a separate dissent. In light of this opinion, the defendants moved to dismiss the case on July 14, 2015, which the court granted the same day. On July 29, the courte ordered that the plaintiff receive $552,956.69 in settlement funds. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 16, 2014, a man whose same-sex spouse (married in the state of Massachusetts) died in an automobile accident in 2011 and who wished to be recognized as the surviving spouse filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama U.S. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202 against the state of Alabama. The plaintiff claimed that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage discriminated against same-sex couples for no rational reason and violated the plaintiff's rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution. On March 10, 2015 the District Court stayed further proceedings pending the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.


The State of California filed this suit on February 7, 2018, seeking to compel the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to produce records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The State sought records related to DOJ's recent decision to impose certain immigration enforcement related conditions that local jurisdictions must meet to receive federal funding. In requesting these records, the State argued that it sought to better understand how the new conditions related to Congressional intent behind the funding program, as well as the authority under which they were imposed. The State argued that the conditions could risk public safety in some local jurisdictions by undermining trust and cooperation between residents and law enforcement. The suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint stated that the State had requested records from the DOJ's Office of Justice Programs (OJP) records concerning: (1) OJP's process in adding conditions and certification requirements related to immigration enforcement for the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (JAG); and (2) OJP’s decision to require the California Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC) to submit a legal opinion verifying compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (Section 1373), which prohibited restrictions on sharing information related to immigration or citizenship status. Specifically, the State sought records related to the following conditions that OJP had recently added to the JAG program that must be met for a state to receive JAG funding: (1) a state must have statute, policy, or practice to ensure that federal agents have access to any state correctional facilities in order to determine if detainees are immigrants with a right to be in the U.S.; (2) a state must provide notice to DHS of a scheduled release date of a detainee who is also an immigrant if DHS requests such notice; and (3) a state must certify compliance with Section 1373. The complaint noted that all three of these conditions were separately challenged in State of California v. Sessions, No. 17-cv-4701, found here . The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero on Feb. 7, 2018. Over the next year-and-a-half, it appears the parties engaged in settlement negotiations. On August 13, 2019, the Magistrate Judge Spero issued an order approving the settlement agreement between the parties. In the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay $22,500 to satisfy plaintiff's claims for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses under the FOIA at issue within 60 days, and the plaintiff agreed to release and discharge the defendants from any and all claims and causes of action that the plaintiff asserted. The case is now closed.

Summary: The State of California filed this suit on February 7, 2018, seeking to compel the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to produce records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The State sought records related to DOJ's recent decision to impose certain immigration enforcement related conditions that local jurisdictions must meet to receive federal funding. On August 13, 2019, the case settled.


Parents, as next of friends of their minor daughters, and on behalf of similarly situated female students of Independent School District No. 38 of Osage County, also known as Hominy Public Schools, filed suit against the school district in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, alleging that the district had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C §1681 and the Equal Protect Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district denied female students an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic and school-sponsored activities and equal opportunity and treatment that accompanies the equal opportunity to participate in school activities based on gender. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the district had discriminated against female students with respect to equipment and supplies, scheduling of games and practice times, travel, opportunity to receive qualified coaching, assignment and compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms and practice facilities for both practice and competition, provision of medical and training facilities and services, and publicity. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all similarly situated female students at Hominy Public Schools and injunctive relief requiring the school district to provide female students equal treatment and benefits as male students. The plaintiffs also sought monetary relief for damages, including out-of-pocket expenses and those incurred as a result of unequal treatment. Judge Michael Burrage granted class certification. A settlement conference was held before Magistrate Judge Sam A. Joyner on June 19, 2000. Judge Burrage entered an order for a settlement agreement on November 11, 2000. In the agreement the school district agreed to add a 7th and 8th grade girls' fast-pitch softball team beginning with the 2000-2001 school year, and to conduct a survey in the Fall of 2000 to gauge the interest of female students in grades 6-11 for participation in volleyball, soccer and slow-pitch softball and to accommodate that interest. The school district also agreed to conduct a survey the following school year to determine the interest in sports not offered for female students and the potential to add a sport for the 2002-2003 school year. The district agreed to offer coaching salaries on a gender neutral basis, establish coaching offices outside of locker rooms, account for revenue and expenditure with respect to athletics, and establish a grievance system. The district also agreed to improve the softball facilities, increase fundraising for both male and female athletic programs, select coaches for male and female teams using the same criteria in a gender neutral manner, and schedule games and practices and improve access to facilities on a gender neutral basis.

Summary: Parents, as next of friends of female students of Independent School District 38 of Osage County, filed suit against the school district on behalf of their daughters, and all similarly situated female students, alleging that the district violated Title IX and the Fourteenth Amendment through the disparate treatment of female athletic teams. in a settlement agreement the school district agreed to take measures to remedy the violations and provide equal facilities and opportunities for female athletic teams.


On June 11, 2014, plaintiffs, a gay couple, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against the State of Michigan and Kent County, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that State's refusal to recognize their out-of-state marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Earlier, in DeBoer v. Snyder, PB-MI-0004 in this Clearinghouse, the case challenging Michigan's ban on same-sex marriage, on March 21, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge Bernard Friedman) had struck down the ban. DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014). The next day about three hundred same-sex couples wed across the state. Later that afternoon, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted a temporary stay in DeBoer; it was subsequently extended pending that case's final disposition in the Sixth Circuit. See Order, DeBoer v. Snyder, Case No. 14-1341 (6th Cir. March 25, 2014). The stay prevented any more same-sex couples in Michigan from marrying. On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Friedman's ruling and held the same-sex marriage ban constitutional. 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). Earlier yet, in December 2013, plaintiffs in this case, Michigan residents, had traveled to New York State in order to marry. New York recognized same-sex marriage--Michigan did not. Back home in Michigan, in April 2014, plaintiffs submitted a quit claim deed, for recording with the Kent County Register of Deeds, conveying their residence from themselves as tenants to themselves as tenants by the entirety; tenancy by the entirety requires a valid marriage. Plaintiffs attached a copy of their New York marriage license. The Register of Deeds refused to record their deed claiming that Michigan does not recognize same-sex marriage. Plaintiffs brought this suit. In plaintiffs' view, same-sex marriage was legal in Michigan for a brief time window after Judge Friedman's DeBoer ruling and before the Sixth Circuit's stay. Under the U.S. Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, plaintiffs say that Michigan is required to recognize the out-of-state same-sex marriages of its residents living in the state during that brief window. Their case was assigned to Judge Gordon Quist. On July 14, 2014, the state filed a motion to dismiss, as well as a motion to stay the case pending the decision in DeBoer, which was then pending before the Sixth Circuit. On August 11, 2014, Judge Quist granted the state's motion for a stay pending the decision in DeBoer. On December 23, 2014, Judge Quist denied the state's motion to dismiss and extended this stay following the Sixth Circuit's decision and any subsequent review by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review in DeBoer, and on January 16, 2015, consolidated the case with three others as Obergefell v. Hodges. In this case, the plaintiffs moved to lift the stay and enter judgment in their favor on April 2, 2015, citing the January 15, 2015 decision in Caspar v. Snyder in the Eastern District of Michigan, which held that the state could not refuse to recognize same-sex marriages that were performed in Michigan during the time between the district court’s ruling in DeBoer and the Sixth Circuit’s issuance of a temporary stay, 77 F. Supp. 3d 666 (E.D. Mich. 2015), and the declining health of one of the plaintiffs. Judge Quist denied the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay on April 21, 2015, noting that the court was still bound by the Sixth Circuit decision in DeBoers and that the Caspar decision was both non-binding and distinguishable. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held in a 5-4 decision in Obergefell that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states. 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). In an October 8, 2015 order, the court determined that the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell rendered the issues in this case moot. The plaintiffs moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. 1988. In a December 3, 2015 order, Judge Quist found that the plaintiffs were not a prevailing party for purposes of the fee-shifting statute because the Obergefell decision rendered the issues in the case moot. The plaintiffs appealed the order denying the motion for attorney's fees and costs to the Sixth Circuit on December 30, 2015. On April 13, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal pursuant to the voluntary dismissal of the parties.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a gay couple living in Michigan who were married in New York, sued in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claim that the State of Michigan and Kent County, Michigan's refusal to recognize their out-of-state marriage violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case was stayed following the Sixth Circuit's 2014 decision upholding Michigan's same-sex marriage ban, but rendered moot by the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges requiring all states to recognize same-sex marriages in other states.


On January 31, 2003, a group of disabled individuals who received or were going to receive Medicaid long-term care services in nursing facilities rather than in their own homes filed a lawsuit against the state of Georgia under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396v and the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that defendants' official practices and policies caused plaintiffs to be unnecessarily segregated in nursing homes. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants did not offer appropriate services to plaintiffs in their homes and communities but continue to provide plaintiffs with services only in nursing homes, and that among states with waiver programs, Georgia ranked close to the bottom in the percentage of Medicaid participants being served in community-based programs rather than in institutions. On August 20, 2004, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. However, on March 21, 2005, the Court (Judge Julie E. Carnes) denied the motion in the light of the settlement negotiations going on between the parties. According to the website of the plaintiffs' attorney, on June 28, 2006, the parties reached a settlement, whereby Georgia would reduce waiting lists for community-based services and allocate $4.3 million to accommodate 1,000 people in those programs over the next year.

Summary: This case was brought by a group of disabled individuals seeking to receive Medicaid services in their home against the state of Georgia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 28, 2006, the parties reached a settlement agreement in favor of the plaintiffs.


COVID 19 Summary: The federal district court denied an injunction blocking application of Illinois Governor Jay Pritzker's stay-at-home order against churches. The plaintiff church has appealed. <hr> In his COVID-19 “stay-at-home” executive orders, J. B. Pritzker, the governor of Illinois, required churches to discontinue all in-person services, including drive-in services. The Beloved Church of Lena, a church of 80 congregants, alleged that the governor’s orders violated the congregants’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and similar rights under the Illinois Constitution. Represented by the Thomas More Society, the Beloved Church and its pastor filed this Section 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on April 30, 2020, and, simultaneously, sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Complaint sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees . The defendants were the governor of Illinois; the sheriff of Stephenson County, Illinois; the Department of Public Health of Stephenson County; and the Chief of Police of the Village of Lena. The plaintiffs alleged that the governor’s stay-at-home orders in March and April, expected to extend at least through May, were unconstitutional both facially and as-applied. Facially, the orders did not protect the church’s constitutional rights of freedom of religion, speech, or assembly, nor its right to due process. They alleged that because establishments from liquor stores to dog groomers to golf courses were allowed to remain open under the executive orders, the governor discriminated against people of faith by prohibiting religious services. As applied, prominent government officials had violated the stay-at-home orders with no consequence, and many jurisdictions around the state had declined to enforce the orders at all. By contrast, the church had received cease-and-desist letters from the county sheriff and Department of Public Health, threatening civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance. In consequence of the cease-and-desist letters, the plaintiffs alleged in their motion for a temporary restraining order that in order to hold worship services on May 3, they needed emergency injunctive relief from the court. Additionally, they alleged that regardless of the constitutionality of the orders, the governor lacked statutory authority under the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Act to extend the state of emergency (at thus the stay-at-home order) past April 7. On April 30, the governor issued a new executive order which reclassified religious worship as "essential." The new executive order permitted religious gatherings, but limited the size of gatherings and required social distancing measures. On May 3, Judge John Z. Lee denied both the temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction, writing that the “societal and political debate about how to balance [COVID-related] interests is beyond the purview of this Court.” Cassell v. Snyders, 2020 WL 2112374 (May 3, 2020). The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, and on May 5 asked Judge Lee to issue an injunction against the defendants while the case was pending appeal. The following day, Judge Lee denied the motion for injunction pending appeal. On June 26, the defendant sought to stay proceedings pending the appeal. The appeal is ongoing.

Summary: An Illinois church sued the governor, alleging that his COVID-19 stay-at-home order violated the church members' First Amendment rights. The court ruled that the order passed minimal constitutional requirements. An appeal is pending in the Seventh Circuit.


This lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on June 11, 2020. The suit was in response to President Trump's June 1, 2020, decision to use chemical weapons against peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square Park, protesting the police killing of George Floyd. In order to clear the path for President Trump to walk to St. John's Church, the military and military police used tear gas, pepper balls, pepper spray, and other weapons to disperse the peaceful protesters. Plaintiffs were three protesters in Lafayette Square on June 1st, 2020. They were represented by attorneys from Gibson and Dunn. Defendants were President Trump, Attorney General Barr, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and various other leaders of federal agencies allegedly involved in the attack. Plaintiffs argued that the President's actions constituted a violation of the First Amendment in that it was retaliation for expressive conduct, a violation of their peaceful assembly rights, restriction to a traditional public forum, and viewpoint discrimination. They alleged that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the attack represented an illegal seizure. They also said their Fifth Amendment rights were violated in that the attack constituted excessive force violative of Due Process. They also included a Bivens claim and sued under the Posse Comitatus Act, which limits the capabilities of the President to use the military for domestic purposes. Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, declaratory relief, monetary damages (including punitive damages), and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. On August 19 2020, Judge Friedrich ordered the parties in this case and Black Lives Matter 5280 v. City and County of Denver to propose a consolidated briefing schedule or to explain why briefing should not be consolidated given the similar factual and legal questions in each case. The parties agreed that briefing on the motion to dismiss should proceed on the same schedule. However, the federal defendants reserved the right to seek modification to the briefing schedule because the plaintiffs indicated that they would be seeking leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs then sought leave to file an amended complaint and the Court granted leave on September 3, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs added several defendants, including the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the Chief of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, numerous Metropolitan Police Department officers, officials from the United States Park Police, and officers from the Arlington County Police Department. The factual allegations, causes of actions, and sought after relief remained largely the same. Each group of defendants proceeded to file motions to dismiss the claims asserted against them. On October 1, 2020, Attorney General William Barr and Acting Chief of the Park Police Gregory Monahan moved to dismiss the claims against them in their individual capacities. The same day the US filed a motion to dismiss the claims asserted against the federal defendants in their official capacities. The Arlington County Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss on October 2, 2020. Later on, on December 2, 2020, the Metropolitan Police Department defendants also filed a motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021 with all the motions to dismiss still pending.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in response to President Trump's use of chemical weapons on peaceful protesters in Lafayette Square Park. Plaintiffs sued the President, Attorney General William Barr, and other military and law enforcement officials under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. They also sued under Bivens and the Posse Comitatus Act. On September 3, 2020, the plaintiffs amended the complaint adding numerous officials and officers from the Metropolitan Police Department (the D.C. police), the United States Park Police, and the Arlington County Police Department as defendants. Each group of defendants then filed motions to dismiss the claims asserted against them. These motions remain pending as of January 2, 2021. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.


On 05/26/1977, the Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) and four members of the school board and their children (KCMSD students), brought this school desegregation lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the States of Kansas and Missouri, three federal agencies, and several suburban school districts in Kansas and Missouri. The Kansas-Missouri state border forms the western boundary of the KCMSD, so the districts surrounding KCMSD were in both states. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had created and perpetuated a system of racial segregation in the Kansas City metropolitan area schools, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Chief Judge John W. Oliver of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, then transferred to Judge Russell G. Clark after the defendants challenged Judge Oliver’s impartiality (due to his representation of KCMSD prior to his appointment to the bench fifteen years earlier). Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830, 832, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1977). The district court certified a plaintiff class of present and future KCMSD students, and the plaintiff class was represented by Arthur Benson and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. In 1978, the district court dismissed the claims against the State of Kansas and the Kansas suburban districts for want of personal jurisdiction, and “realigned” the school district as a defendant. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427–28 (W.D. Mo. 1978). Until Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Missouri Constitution mandated racially segregated schools. The plaintiffs argued that after 1954, Missouri failed to take the required affirmative steps to eliminate the vestiges of its prior racially segregated dual school system, and in fact perpetuated racial segregation through discriminatory housing practices. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488 (W.D. Mo. 1984). After a seven-month trial on liability, on Sept. 17, 1984, the district court found that the State of Missouri and KCMSD had unconstitutionally failed to eliminate the vestiges of the prior dual school system and thus had joint and several liability for desegregation expenses. Id. at 1493. The court made findings, in its liability decision and in a series of subsequent orders, that unlike most other desegregation cases, the most notable effect of KCMSD’s segregation was not racial imbalances in areas such as student and faculty assignments, rather, it was that “segregation had caused a system wide reduction in student achievement in the schools of the KCMSD.” Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 24 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court had also dismissed the claims against the suburban school districts and two of the federal defendants (Department of Transportation and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) during the trial, finding that none of those defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner that "substantially" caused racial segregation in KCMSD. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. at 1490, 1495. The claims against the third federal agency, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), went to trial, after which the court found that HUD was not liable. Id. at 1506. The defendants were ordered to submit a proposed plan to remove the vestiges of the dual school system to the court. Id. On June 14, 1985, the district court held that past segregation and need to attract and maintain white enrollment justified a remedy that included reduction in class sizes, implementation of summer school program, full-day kindergarten, before and after school tutoring, early childhood development programs, magnet school program, staff development program, volunteer interdistrict transfer program, and capital improvements. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 26, 32–41 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The court also ordered the formation of a monitoring committee to oversee the plan’s implementation. Id. at 41–42. This was the first court-ordered intradistrict remedy to be paid for by the State and KCMSD. Over the next several years, the district court ordered various other remedies, some of which were modified or vacated by the Eighth Circuit or Supreme Court. In total, the plans included $260 million in capital improvements and a magnet school plan costing over $200 million. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 816 (1987); Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989). One of the district court’s orders that was challenged had established a desegregation plan and the methods by which the plan would be funded. Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 672 F.Supp 400 (1987). The state, county, and taxpayers appealed, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. 855 F.2d 1295 (1988). The Eighth Circuit held, among other things, that the use of magnet schools to attract minority students was proper, and that the increase of property tax levy was appropriate; however, it reversed the state income tax surcharge, finding that the district court had exceeded its authority in ordering one. Id. at 1301–03, 1308–11, 1315–16. In 1990, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, affirmed in part and reversed in part. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). The court held that the order imposing an increase in property taxes levied by school district to insure funding for desegregation plan violated principles of federal and state comity, and that courts could require the school district to levy taxes above the limits set by state statute in order to fund the desegregation plan. Id. Litigation continued for several years on various other issues, including attorneys’ fees, the voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, and the State’s obligation to pay for salary increases and remedial education programs, among other costs. For services provided from 1979 to 1986, the district court awarded the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees in the amount of $4 million. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1988). On appeal, the Supreme Court also affirmed. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989). First, the Court affirmed the district court’s calculation of attorneys’ fees, which used current market rates—rather than those applicable at the time the services were rendered—in order to account for the years-long delay in payment. Id. at 274. The Court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit enhancement of a fee award under § 1988 against a State to compensate for a delay in payment. Id. Second, the Court upheld the district court’s compensation for the work of paralegals, law clerks, and recent law school graduates at the market rate for their services, rather than their cost to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. Id. The first remedy order provided for a voluntary interdistrict transfer plan, though the design and implementation of the plan was a “long, laborious process.” Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009, 1011 (8th Cir. 1992). Funding over the plan was disputed, and black KCMSD students unsuccessfully trying to enroll as non-residents in nearby suburban school districts, then sued those districts. Id.; see Naylor v. Lee's Summit Reorganized School District R–VII, 703 F. Supp. 803 (W.D. Mo. 1989). In 1993, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders for the State to fund salary increases and remedial education programs. Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993). However, the Supreme Court granted review and reversed in a 5-4 decision, finding that the orders sought goals which were beyond the scope of the constitutional violation and beyond the scope of the court’s remedial authority. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). The Court also held that whether students’ performance was at or below national norms was not the appropriate test to determine whether the district had achieved partially unitary status. Id. In 1996, the State of Missouri moved for a determination of unitary status and approval of a transition plan and settlement with KCMSD that would result in the State’s dismissal from the case. The plaintiffs were opposed. On Mar. 25, 1997, the district court denied the motion to declare the district unitary as to assignment of students and faculty, facilities, and transportation, but granted the motion as to extracurricular activities. Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1179–80 (W.D. Mo. 1997). The court nevertheless approved the settlement agreement permitting the State to satisfy any further obligations to the KCMSD by the payment of $320 million. Id. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997). Most recently, the district, students, and teachers’ union obtained an injunction against the state’s requirement that the district use property tax levy proceeds to fund charter schools. 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008). The most recent activity on the docket was in 2008, so the case appears to be closed, or at least long-dormant. Available Opinions Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 438 F. Supp. 830 (W.D. Mo. 1977). Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978). Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri v. Missouri, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979). Black v. Missouri, 492 F. Supp. 848 (W.D. Mo. 1980). Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986). Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987). Jenkins v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987) (denying certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1988). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988). Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 488 U.S. 888 (1988) (granting certiorari). Jenkins v. Missouri, 488 U.S. 889 (1988) (denying certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 862 F.2d 677 (8th Cir. 1988). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1989 WL 299246 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 3, 1989). Jenkins v. Missouri, 864 F.2d 1454 (8th Cir. 1989). Jenkins v. Missouri, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989) (denying certiorari). Missouri v. Jenkins by Agyei, 491 U.S. 274 (1989). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 890 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1989). Jenkins v. Missouri, 731 F. Supp. 1437 (W.D. Mo. 1990). Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 904 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1990). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1990 WL 515176 (W.D. Mo. June 26, 1990). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1990 WL 362044 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 1990). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470 (8th Cir. 1991). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273 (8th Cir. 1991). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1991 WL 346392 (W.D. Mo. May 28, 1991). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1991 WL 538841 (W.D. Mo. July 5, 1991). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1991). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 943 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1991). Missouri v. Jenkins, 502 U.S. 925 (1991) (denying certiorari). Missouri v. Jenkins, 502 U.S. 967 (1991) (denying certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1992). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 965 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1992). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1992 WL 551569 (W.D. Mo. June 17, 1992). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1992 WL 551568 (W.D. Mo. June 25, 1992). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 967 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1992). Clark v. Jenkins, 506 U.S. 915 (1992) (denying certiorari). Clark v. Jenkins, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992) (denying certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 981 F.2d 1009 (8th Cir. 1992). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1993 WL 546576 (W.D. Mo. June 30, 1993). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77–0420–CV–W–4, 1993 WL 566488 (W.D. Mo. July 30, 1993). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755 (8th Cir. 1993). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170 (8th Cir. 1993). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 19 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1994) (denying rehearing en banc). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 23 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994). Missouri v. Jenkins, 512 U.S. 1287 (1994) (granting certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 38 F.3d 960 (8th Cir. 1994). Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 1139 (1995) (granting certiorari). Jenkins by Agyei v. Missouri, 73 F.3d 201 (8th Cir. 1996). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 78 F.3d 1270 (8th Cir. 1996). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 103 F.3d 731 (8th Cir. 1997). Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151 (W.D. Mo. 1997). Jenkins v. Missouri, 965 F. Supp. 1295 (W.D. Mo. 1997). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997). Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 97-2626, 1997 WL 464173 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 1997). Jenkins v. Missouri, 124 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting petition for rehearing en banc). Jenkins v. Missouri, 133 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997) (granting petition for rehearing en banc). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1997). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 131 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 1997). Jenkins v. Missouri, 133 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1997). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 158 F.3d 980 (8th Cir. 1998). Jenkins by Jenkins v. Missouri, 158 F.3d 984 (8th Cir. 1998). Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri, 170 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 1999). Jenkins v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, Missouri, 73 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (W.D. Mo. 1999). Jenkins ex rel. Jenkins v. Missouri, 205 F.3d 361 (8th Cir. 2000). Jenkins v. Missouri, 216 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2000). Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., No. 77-0420-CV-W-DW, 2006 WL 3386563 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 21, 2006). Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 516 F.3d 1074 (8th Cir. 2008). Jenkins v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 525 F.3d 682 (8th Cir. 2008).

Summary: Kansas City School District, the school board, and its students sued the State of Missouri and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District of Western Missouri, for failing to eliminate vestiges of prior segregated school system. The court found for the plaintiffs and ordered various intradistrict remedies, including $260 million in capital improvements and a $200 million magnet school plan.


This is a case about disability access in public accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The plaintiff, a wheelchair user, filed this suit on July 28, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. She sued the Board of Commissioners of the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District and its chief executive, Kyle France; SMG; Live Nation; and Box Office Ticket Center, LLC under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights after attending a concert at the Mercedes-Benz Superdome in New Orleans, Louisiana. Despite purchasing a ticket for an accessible seat for herself and an adjoining seat for her companion, she alleged that she was made to sit in an ordinary seat without restroom access or a clear line of sight to the performance area and that her wheelchair was taken from her and stored out of sight for the duration of the concert, among other claims. The plaintiff asserted that defendants violated the ADA by failing to make reasonable accommodations to ensure persons with disabilities the equal opportunity to enjoy use of their facilities and services. The plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. On December 15, 2017, Live Nation was dismissed as a defendant and Box Office Ticket Center, LLC was likewise dismissed on February 6, 2018. Settlement talks began in early 2018, but no settlement agreement was reached. On January 9, 2019, the plaintiff and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In early March of 2019, Judge Morgan granted in part and denied in part each of the motions for summary judgment. The court held that the plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief under Title II of the ADA against the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District and Kyle France, in his official capacity as chief executive of the Board of Commissioners, and under Title III of the ADA against SMG. 371 F. Supp. 3d 313. However, it held that both the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District and France were entitled to sovereign immunity on the Title II damages claim and that the Louisiana Stadium and Exposition District was also entitled to sovereign immunity on the Title II claim for injunctive relief. 372 F. Supp. 3d 431. The court denied the remaining portions of the summary judgment motions with respect to liability. 2019 WL 1084705. A bench trial was held before Judge Morgan on March 11, 2019. On May 14, 2019, the court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover $20,000 in damages for emotional distress from defendant SMG and that she was entitled to injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs against SMG and France. 385 F. Supp. 3d 491. On July 11, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. SMG and France appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 30, 2019. That appeal remains pending. On October 1, 2019, SMG and France were ordered to pay the plaintiff $58,358.62 in attorneys’ fees and $1,307.75 in costs, for a total award of $59,666.37, based on recommendation by Magistrate Judge Wilkinson. 2019 WL 7580772.

Summary: Concertgoer with a disability filed suit against state entity that owned stadium, chairman of its board of commissioners, and stadium manager alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights based on the failure to make reasonable accommodations for her disability during the concert. A bench trial was held and the plaintiff was awarded damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs.


On January 25, 2006, a group of migrant forestry workers admitted to the U.S. under the H-2B foreign worker program filed suit against their employer, Superior Forestry Service, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et. seq., and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that Superior and its officers failed to pay plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage and overtime wages and failed to maintain complete information on the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' work as migrant workers as required by law. Attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Immigrant Justice Project, Farmworker Justice, the Virginia Justice Center for Farm and Immigrant Workers, and private firms represented the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs moved to proceed as a collective action and for class certification, but those motions were denied without prejudice by the Court pending further discovery. Later, on July 17, 2007, the District Court (Judge William J. Haynes, Jr.) ordered that the case could proceed as an FLSA collective action, and on July 30 it approved the collective action notice. Plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification on their claims under the AWPA on August 21, and on March 28, 2008, the Court (Judge Haynes) ordered class certification under both Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). Rosiles-Perez v. Superior Forestry Serv., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 332 (M.D. Tenn. 2008). Meanwhile, on May 23, 2006, the District Court (Judge Haynes) had granted a motion by plaintiffs for a protective order, barring defendants from communicating with plaintiffs and prospective class members about the lawsuit and forbidding any type of retaliatory conduct. A month later, plaintiffs had moved for sanctions, alleging that defendants had violated the protective order by failing to completely and accurately inform their supervisory personnel as to its contents. The Court (Judge Haynes) had instructed the defendants to provide its supervisors with a copy of the Court's protective order and ordered the defendants to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees for the motion. Rosiles-Perez v. Superior Forestry Serv., Inc., 2007 WL 325784, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8194 (M.D. Tenn. Jan 31, 2007). Over the course of the litigation, the Court went on to grant two more contempt motions by plaintiffs, accompanying each with progressively severe sanctions, including equitable tolling of the FLSA statute of limitations and two additional rounds of FLSA notice and extensions of the opt-in period, and culminating in a July 28, 2009 order that barred the defendants from contesting plaintiffs' proof of damages. The court also dealt with significant discovery disputes, at one point appointing an expert to remedy defendants' incomplete disclosure and requiring the defendants to pay for the expert's services. On February 10, 2010, the parties informed the court that they had come to a settlement and asked the court to approve their agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, defendants created a settlement fund totaling $2,200,000 plus interest to pay the claims of the named plaintiffs, the FLSA opt-in plaintiffs, and the AWPA class members. They also agreed to pay $550,000 plus interest in attorney's fees and $150,000 to cover the cost of administering the settlement fund. Defendants further agreed to abide by the AWPA and FLSA and to refrain from taking retaliatory action against plaintiffs. The Court (Judge Haynes) granted its final approval of the settlement on March 26, 2010, and issued its final judgment order on July 7, 2010.

Summary: This is a class action suit brought by a group of migrant forestry workers admitted to the U.S. under the H-2B foreign worker program against their employer, Superior Forestry Service, Inc., alleging that Superior and its officers failed to pay plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage and overtime wages and failed to maintain complete information on the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' work as migrant workers as required by law. The parties settled in 2010, with defendants agreeing to set up a $2,200,000 settlement fund to pay plaintiffs' claims.