On October 13, 1999, a group of African American employees filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1981 and 42 U.S.C. §2000 against Dillard's, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, Kansas City Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, then filed First and Second Amended Class Action Complaints on February 3, 2000, and June 1, 2000, respectively. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant discriminated against African American employees in compensation, promotions, training, job requirements, and other terms and conditions of employment. Plaintiffs also claimed to have been subject to hostile work environments and were retaliated against for asserting their civil rights. On July 7, 2001, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement. On July 17, 2001, the Court (Hon. Ortrie D. Smith) responded with an order expressing preliminary views of the parties' settlement agreement, but granted preliminary approval of the Class Action Settlement on July 31, 2001. On December 7, 2001, the Court issued a Conditional Final Order Approving the Settlement contingent upon the parties' revising the terms concerning the amount of monetary relief awarded to the Class Representatives. After further negotiation, on January 16, 2002, the court granted final approval of the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. Plaintiffs were awarded monetary relief and injunctive relief, with awards totaling $5,600,000, and the enforcement of promulgating and publishing Equal Employment Opportunity policies, implementing a new complaint and dispute resolution process, and making job opportunities available to all interested individuals.

Summary: This class action case was brought by a group of African American former and current employees against employer Dillard's Inc., seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for racial discrimination. The case was settled in 2001, resulting in monetary and injunctive relief.


On Nov. 21, 2017, the organization Government Accountability Project brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the civil rights law firm Loevy & Lovey, the plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff is a nonprofit organization "serving the public by protecting government and corporate whistleblowers who expose wrongdoing." The complaint alleged that on Apr. 4, 2017, the plaintiff had submitted a FOIA request to the defendant seeking records concerning: 1. All non-exempt correspondence between White House staff and defendant concerning ideological tests at the U.S. border; 2. All correspondence concerning searches of citizens and non-citizens at the U.S. border, including searches of cellphones, the protocols, information about who was searched (with identifying information redacted), search rates, and protocols if a search is refused; 3. Any records generated in connection with topics listed above that raised or were responding to compliance of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) (a whistleblower protection statute for federal employees). The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from defendants. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Nov. 22, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. The parties filed their first joint status report on Feb. 27, 2018, and their next on Apr. 3, specifying that DHS still needed to provide an estimated production schedule. According to a status report filed on May 8, DHS had completed processing the request and determined it had no responsive records. Litigation continued, and the government moved for summary judgment. The court (Judge Christopher R. Cooper) denied the motion on Oct. 12, 2018. 335 F.Supp.3d 7. The court held that the government "unreasonably omitted additional search terms that quite likely would have generated a more robust return." The court held that "FOIA requests are not a game of Battleship [and t]he requester should not have to score a direct hit on the records sought based on the precise phrasing of his request. Rather, the agency must liberally interpret the request and frame its search accordingly." Accordingly, the court ordered the government to search for responsive records again pending the parties conferring over the search terms. On November 16, 2018, the parties submitted a status report regarding their agreement with the search terms. The court reviewed the disagreements the plaintiff and the defendants had and concluded that the plaintiff's additional requests were beyond the scope of the original FOIA request. Therefore, the court ordered that the defendants need only conduct the additional search agreed upon in their status report, but that they must use the date of that search as the cut-off date for search returns. In a status report dated September 13, 2019, the defendants stated that they had inadvertently utilized the cut-off date for the original search. In the subsequent two joint reports, the parties stated that DHS had completed its supplemental search and review of the returned records, and that none of the records were responsive to the FOIA request. The plaintiff stated that additional time was needed to determine whether any issues remained outstanding in this case. On the status reports dated January 7-8, 2020, the parties stated that the only outstanding issue was the payment of attorney fees, which they were unable to reach an agreement on. The plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees on February 21, 2020, which was denied by Judge Cooper on June 2, 2020. The case was dismissed.

Summary: On Nov. 21, 2017, the nonprofit Government Accountability Project sued DHS under FOIA, seeking records on ideological tests at the U.S. border and searches of citizens and noncitizens at the border. On October 12, 2018, the court dismissed the defendant's motion for summary judgment and accordingly ordered them to search for responsive records again pending the parties conferring over the search terms. Subsequently, the parties submitted various status reports regarding the search terms, and the court ordered the defendants to conduct the additional search agreed upon in their status report. The plaintiff sought attorney fees but was denied on June 2, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: On May 7, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order in response to COVID-19, directing the defendants to remove access barriers and ameliorate dangerously punitive conditions at the detention facilities at issue, such as providing detainees with access to free and private phone calls. They claimed that the defendants had restricted access to legal visitations due to COVID-19, but failed to accommodate remote communications. The court granted in part the temporary restraining order on June 17, ordering the defendants to provide plaintiffs adequate telephone access, ensure that phones are in proper working order, ensure attorney-client confidentiality on all phone calls, among other things. The defendants appealed the TRO on August 14. No outcome yet. <hr> This suit, filed on April 4, 2018, challenged the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policy and practice of deliberately keeping detainees in immigration prisons from access to legal resources. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) brought the suit, arguing that DHS created and maintained substantial barriers for detainees in immigration prisons to meaningfully access and communicate with attorneys. SPLC argued that in so doing, DHS violated Fifth Amendment due process with respect to SPLC's clients as well as SPLC's First Amendment right to represent civil detainees. SPLC sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar−Kotelly on the same day. The SPLC brought this on behalf of itself and its clients detained in three detention facilities located in Louisiana and Georgia. The SPLC is a nonprofit organization that litigates and advocates on behalf of vulnerable populations. The SPLC specifically argued that "[t]he totality of barriers to accessing and communicating with attorneys endured by detainees in these prisons deprives SPLC’s clients of their constitutional rights to access courts, to access counsel, and to obtain full and fair hearings," as well as "SPLC’s rights to represent civil detainees." The complaint stated that noncitizens in these prisons were detained for civil and not criminal reasons, and that many had claims that would lead to release on bond or parole if they were granted removal proceedings, while many others had claims that would allow them to remain in the United States. The complaint further stated that these detainees were over 10 times more likely to win their cases, almost seven times more likely to obtain bond, and almost 20 times more likely to win their cases after release if they had legal representation during their detention. The problem, the SPLC argued, was that these prisons were in geographically remote and isolated areas, making it "often...impossible to secure counsel." Even if a detainee could secure counsel, DHS prevented meaningful communication in various ways, including by restricting access to interpreters. Moreover, the prisons were so crowded that effective attorney-client meetings were often near impossible, and DHS permitted the prison operators to "enjoy virtual impunity in engaging in [unjustified] obstructive conduct." The SPLC also argued that attorneys trying to visit their clients often faced harassment, including facing verbal harassment for supporting "illegal immigration," forcing attorneys to remove their undergarments before entering the prison, and keeping them confined to locked areas of the prison for hours. On May 4, 2018, the SPLC moved for preliminary injunction. On July 26, 2018 the parties filed a status report indicating that they had negotiated a full resolution of the motion and that a corresponding settlement agreement would be forthcoming. The parties filed their notice of settlement on September 5, 2018 regarding the LaSalle detention facility. Per the settlement, the defendants were to stop limiting confidential legal calls to under two hours and stop preventing or interrupting legal in-person visits or phone calls. The defendants were also to provide an adequate attorney consultation room, game room, Skype room, and pre-hearing room. The settlement provided for alternative dispute resolution should any issue arise over its implementation. Litigation continued. On October 31, 2018, SPLC filed an amended complaint. SPLC added a count alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act for ICE's failure to comply with its own agency rules. On August 28, 2019, SPLC filed a second amended complaint, replacing several government defendants with new government defendants. On March 18, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for mediation, also requesting to stay discovery pending mediation. SPLC agreed to mediate, but objected to staying discovery, arguing that SPLC needed some of the requested information from the defendants for the mediation to be effective. SPLC also requested that the court grant limited and expedited discovery for the purpose of mediation. On March 19, 2020, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the motion for mediation, referring the case to circuit court mediators for settlement proceedings from March 20, 2020 through June 1, 2020. In addition, the court denied a further stay of discovery pending mediation as well as request for limited discovery on April 7, 2020, stating that the limited discovery could take weeks if not months. On May 1, 2020, the parties filed a joint status report stating that the mediation has been put off until the discovery disputes are resolved. On May 7, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order in response to COVID-19, directing the defendants to remove access barriers and ameliorate dangerously punitive conditions at the detention facilities at issue, such as providing detainees with access to free and private phone calls. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had restricted access to legal visitations due to COVID-19, but failed to accommodate remote communications. The defendants responded that they have implemented COVID-19 protocols necessary to reduce the risk of COVID-19, such as providing protective equipment, expanded hours for video teleconferencing attorney-client visits. They further claimed that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant the TRO. The court granted in part the temporary restraining order on June 17, 2020. Specifically, the court ordered the defendants to provide plaintiffs adequate telephone access, ensure that phones are in proper working order, ensure attorney-client confidentiality on all phone calls, among other things. 2020 WL 3265533. On July 14, the defendants again moved to partially dismiss the second amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 7, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the Court's June 17 temporary restraining order concerning the COVID-19 mitigations and the Court requested an updated compliance report from the defendants on August 10, which was filed by defendants on August 21. Meanwhile, on August 14, the defendants appealed the June 17 temporary restraining order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The case remains ongoing in the appellate court.

Summary: This suit, filed on April 4, 2018, challenged the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) policy and practice of deliberately keeping detainees in immigration prisons from access to legal resources. The Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) brought the suit, arguing that DHS created and maintained substantial barriers for detainees in immigration prisons to meaningful access to and communication with attorneys. SPLC argued that in so doing, DHS violated Fifth Amendment due process with respect to SPLC's clients as well as SPLC's First Amendment right to represent civil detainees. SPLC sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 7, 2020, SPLC sought a temporary restraining order in response to COVID-19, and the court partly granted this motion. Defendants have appealed the grant of the temporary restraining order to the D.C. Circuit and litigation remains ongoing in the district court.


This employment discrimination class action involving women employed at the Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Normal, Illinois' facility was filed on April 9, 1996, in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois (Peoria). The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), sought declaratory, monetary and injunctive relief, on behalf of the women, claiming that Mitsubishi violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, by engaging in a pattern and practice of sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge against female employees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that, since at least 1990, Mitsubishi had engaged in various unlawful discriminatory and retaliatory conduct, including but not limited to, (1) sexual harassment towards female employees by way of a hostile and abusive work environment based on unwelcome verbal and physical sexual conduct, including sexual graffiti, sexually derogatory comments, and unwanted groping and touching; (2) sexual harassment towards female employees by conditioning their employment (including benefits and/or the terms and/or conditions of their employment) "on their acquiesce in sexual harassment and/or sexual relationships;" (3) the failure to take immediate and appropriate corrective action in response to complaints; (4) retaliation against female employees who have opposed such unlawful practices; and (5) constructively discharging female employees by causing them to resign due to complaints of sexual harassment and retaliation. The EEOC requested a permanent injunction forbidding discrimination or retaliation and requiring Mitsubishi to implement polices protecting equal employment opportunities for women; monetary damages; punitive damages; and costs. On September 13, 1996, the EEOC sent a letter to all current and former female employees of the defendant, stating that such employees "should know that [they] are not required to discuss any issues relating to this lawsuit with Mitsubishi's Human Resource Department." A month later, Mitsubishi complained that the letter was potentially misleading and filed a motion for clarification of the letter. Additionally, Mitsubishi argued that the letter undermined its policy of addressing and correcting sexual harassment issues, thereby making sexual harassment more difficult to prevent. In November of 1996, the court ordered the EEOC to send a corrective letter. The EEOC appealed, and sought a stay from the 7th Circuit. In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, the Court of Appeals refused the stay, and held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal, which dealt with an issue that was managerial and was unlikely to cause substantial and irreversible damage. 102 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 1996). Soon afterwards, Mitsubishi's human resources department began to conduct "scripted interviews" of its employees on topics relating to "claims of sexual harassment that had not previously been brought to the Company's attention," when such claims were revealed through Mitsubishi's litigation-related discovery of the EEOC's administrative files. Mitsubishi stated that the purpose of the interviews was to ensure "no ongoing harassment" in the workplace. Upon the conclusion of each interview, the interviewers would type notes from the interviews and then ask the interviewees to review and sign the notes. Once the EEOC found out about these interviews, they demanded that they stop immediatly. Mitsubishi agreed in January 1997 "not to engage in any ex parte contacts" with current or former employees who have presented complaints regarding sexual harassment and/or retaliation to the EEOC "prior to the filing of the lawsuit." A month later, instead, the parties came up with a mutually agreeable "mini-deposition" approach regarding information gathering: the EEOC attorneys were to be present and the interviews would be conducted as "notice depositions" according to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further contests about communications with employees led to another opinion in January 2008. 960 F.Supp. 164 (C.D.Ill. 1997). Shortly thereafter, a Consent Decree ("Decree") was entered on June 23, 1998, which also settled two private actions, Evans v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. (1:94-cv-1545) and Aeschelman v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc. (1:96-cv-1212), filed against Mitsubishi alleging sex discrimination and harassment. In the Decree, Mitsubishi agreed to pay $34 million to the individuals who had suffered sexual harassment at Mitsubishi's facility in Normal, Illinois; and to comprehensive injunctive relief. The injunction forbade discriminatory acts on the basis of sex and policies or practices that have the effect of harassing or intimidating women on the basis of their sex; and Title VII related retaliation. It required revised sexual harassment policy, training procedures, and complaint procedures and policies designed to promote supervisor accountability and policies reflecting sensitivity to women's needs. And it set up a panel of consent decree monitors and a complaint monitor. The Decree was, in accordance with its plan, in effect for three years, from 1998 to 2001. According to a press release from the EEOC, the $34 million monetary relief awarded by the Decree, which was distributed among more than 400 women, was "the largest sexual harassment settlement in the history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964" as of the late 1990s.

Summary: On behalf of female employees of Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., Normal, Illinois' facility, the EEOC claimed that Mitsubishi engaged in a pattern and practice of sexual harassment, retaliation, and constructive discharge. The EEOC filed its lawsuit in 1996 in the Central District of Illinois and the parties reached a court-approved consent decree on June 23, 1998, which awarded the plaintiffs a lump sum of $34 million, and a set of policy prescriptions enforceable in court and by court monitors.


On July 6, 2016, indigent Virginia residents brought this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia because they had suffered indefinite suspension of their driver's licenses for failure to pay court costs and fines that they could not afford. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and class certification. They claimed that the Commonwealth's scheme of suspending licenses to coerce payment of money owed to the courts unfairly punished people for being poor, and that suspending their licenses was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On November 4, 2016, Magistrate Judge Joel C. Hoppe granted the NAACP's motion for leave to file an amicus brief. On November 20, 2016, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest urging the Court to conclude that the plaintiffs had set forth a plausible claim for relief that the alleged driver's license suspension practices used by the defendant violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The DOJ argued that suspension of a person's driver's license in response to the failure to pay court debt without providing a person with adequate notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard constitutes a deprivation of a protected interest without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, the DOJ argued that suspending the driver's licenses of those who fail to pay fines without inquiring into whether the failure to pay was willful or instead the result of an inability to pay may result in penalizing indigent individuals solely because of their poverty, in violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On October 3, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the suit for failure to state a claim. On March 13, 2017, U.S. District Judge Norman K. Moon dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. He found that "Congress and the Constitution have not granted federal district courts the authority to hear appeals from state courts." Furthermore, a federal court could only hear a case if it could grant some sort of remedy to the plaintiffs. In this case, because state courts rather than the Commissioner had suspended the licenses, a court order against the Commissioner would not provide such a remedy and so the court held the plaintiffs had no standing. Finally, Judge Moon found that the court was barred from hearing the case by the Eleventh Amendment bar on federal lawsuits filed by citizens against a nonconsenting state. 2017 WL 963234. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On May 23, 2018, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. Circuit Judge Henry F. Floyd wrote the majority opinion, in which Circuit Judge Allyson K. Duncan joined. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' appeal because the district court's dismissal without prejudice was not a final order and because the plaintiffs might still be able to cure the deficiencies identified by the district court by amending their complaint. Chief Judge Roger L. Gregory wrote a dissenting opinion because he would have found that the district court's dismissal was an appealable final order. 734 Fed.Appx. 858. After the case was returned to the district court, on June 22, 2018, Judge Moon granted leave to the plaintiffs to amend or clarify their complaint. On September 11, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction. They asked the court to enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing the statutes against the plaintiffs and future suspended class members without notice and determination of ability to pay, to remove any current suspensions of the plaintiffs' driver's licenses imposed under the statute, and to enjoin the Commissioner from charging a fee to reinstate the plaintiffs' licenses if there are no other restrictions on their licenses. On December 21, 2018, Judge Moon granted the plaintiffs' motion for the preliminary injunction, finding it likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on establishing that the Virginia statute violated procedural due process and that the remaining factors relevant to the issuance of a preliminary injunction weighed in favor of plaintiffs. 355 F. Supp. 3d 514. On April 23, 2019, the defendant moved to dismiss the case as moot, or in the alternative sought a stay of the proceedings. They argued that a budget amendment by Governor Northam Virginia that reinstated driver’s licenses that had been revoked for failure to pay any fines ended any harm against the plaintiffs. Both the defendant and plaintiffs then moved for summary judgement on June 3, 2019. On June 28, 2019, Judge Norman K. Moon issued an order granting the motion to stay and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court found that the budget amendment only halted the enforcement of the law, and thus there was a reasonable expectation the plaintiffs would be subjected to the same harm. But the court also granted the motion to stay the proceedings pending the 2020 session of Virginia’s General Assembly, citing the possibility that the Virginia General Assembly would repeal the law. The stay was ordered through March 21, 2020. The court set a status conference for March 20, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 6, 2016, indigent Virginia residents who had suffered indefinite suspension of their driver's licenses for failure to pay court costs and fines that they could not afford, brought this class action lawsuit in the Western District of Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the Commonwealth's scheme of suspending licenses to coerce payment of money owed to the courts unfairly punishes poor people for being poor, and that suspending their licenses was a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In March 2017, Senior U.S. District Judge Norman K. Moon dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In May 2018, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint. In September 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint and a motion for preliminary injunction, which Judge Moon granted in December 2018, finding it likely that the plaintiffs would succeed on establishing that the Virginia statute violates procedural due process. In 2019, the District Court issued an order staying the proceedings until 2020, citing a budget amendment by Governor Northam that reinstated the driver's licenses that had been revoked for failure to pay fines.


COVID-19 Summary: This putative class action was filed on June 16, 2020 by medically vulnerable prisoners in New York's Adirondack Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs sought extra protections from COVID-19. A magistrate judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on March 1, 2021.<hr>This is a case about COVID-19 precautions for older and vulnerable prisoners in New York State prisons. Three incarcerated plaintiffs and the Release Aging People in Prison Campaign (RAPP) filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on January 8, 2021. They sued the governor of New York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) and its commissioner and chief medical officer, and the superintendent of the Adirondack Correctional Facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA ) (42 U.S.C. § 12101), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794). Represented by lawyers from Relman Colfax PLLC and the Legal Aid Society's Prisoners' Rights Project, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated their Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference towards the serious risk posed by COVID-19, as well as violating several statutes. In April 2020, during the height of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, New York began implementing a policy of moving some of its elderly and vulnerable prisoners to the Adirondack Correctional Facility in Ray Brook, New York. Adirondack is an aging facility that had most recently been used to incarcerate about a dozen teenagers. The plaintiffs alleged that DOCCS put them at risk by transferring them from other facilities throughout the state, some of which had COVID-19 outbreaks at the time, without proper testing and quarantine protocols. The plaintiffs also claimed that the conditions at Adirondack, like cells without doors and a communal dining hall, placed prisoners there at risk of contracting COVID-19. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation act by discriminating against them based on their disabilities. The plaintiffs asked the court to certify a class of all prisoners incarcerated at Adirondack during the governor's declaration of a COVID-19 emergency and a subclass of those prisoners with disabilities that put them at a higher risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19. The case was assigned to United States District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn, sitting in Albany, New York. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on January 11, 2021. On January 21, 2021, Judge Kahn referred the preliminary injunction motion to United States Magistrate Judge Miroslav Lovric. Between February 8 and 16, 2021, Judge Lovric presided over a six-day evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion at which twelve witnesses testified. On March 1, 2021 he issued a report and recommendation recommending that the preliminary injunction be denied. Judge Lovric found that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits as they did not show that they faced a substantial risk of harm while incarcerated at Adirondack. Objections to the report and recommendation are due on March, 15, 2021, while the defendants' answer to the complaint is due March 11, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On August 15, 2011, civil immigration detainees filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California. The plaintiffs filed under the Declaratory Judgment Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") and the Executive Office of Immigration Review ("EOIR") for violating the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys at the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California (ACLU), the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and private counsel, challenged ICE's blanket policy of shackling all adult detainees for the duration of immigration court proceedings in San Francisco. They claimed the policy violated the Fifth Amendment and sought class certification and declaratory and injunctive relief. According to the complaint, ICE adopted a practice of shackling all immigration detainees in its custody, in court, without conducting an individualized review of the need for restraints. The complaint further noted that during master calendar hearings, immigration detainees are often chained to each another in a “daisy chain.” The plaintiffs alleged that the restraints caused physical and emotional pain and discomfort and also impaired their ability to participate fully in their immigration proceedings. When “daisy-chained,” the attorney-client relationship could be impaired because plaintiffs were forced to choose between disclosing personal facts within hearing distance of other detainees or withholding information from counsel that could be critical to their case. On December 23, 2011, the District Court (Judge Richard Seeborg) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. De Abadia-Peixoto v. DHS, 277 F.R.D. 572 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The court certified the class as “all current and future adult immigration detainees who have or will have proceedings in immigration court in San Francisco.” The court rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs' claims were not ripe, holding that "while the plaintiffs' particular hearings may not yet have occurred, they have sufficiently alleged facts showing a concrete threat of imminent conduct presenting a ripe controversy that can be adjudicated." The court also rejected the defendants' argument that the claims were foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Howard, 480 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2007), which held that a different shackling policy was legal. The court found that Howard did not stand for the rule that blanket shackling is always allowed if no jury is present. In the same order, the court denied the motion of the Asian Law Caucus, Centro Legal De La Raza, and Dolores Street Community Services for leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of opposition to the motion to dismiss. The court found that as the motion to dismiss presented purely legal issues, proposed amici’s perspectives were not especially relevant at this stage of the proceedings. On March 20, 2012, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for settlement. While settlement conferences proceeded with Magistrate Judge Beeler, the case was also referred to Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westmore for discovery, who ruled on a number of discovery disputes throughout 2012 and 2013. In late December 2013, the parties moved for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement, and on January 23, 2014, Judge Seeborg preliminarily approved the settlement. After a fairness hearing, Judge Seeborg approved the settlement agreement on April 10, 2014. The agreement stipulated that the defendants would no longer restrain all detainees and instead only shackle those who demonstrated “combative, disruptive, violent, or threatening” behavior. Detainees who were restrained would also be allowed to request that the restraints be removed or lessened. The defendants agreed to monitor their officers to ensure that these terms would be followed. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $350,000 in attorneys’ fees. On April 10, 2014, the court approved the settlement agreement and dismissed the case but retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement for three years. The court's jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement has lapsed, and there has been no activity on the case's docket since this agreement was accepted. Therefore, this case is closed.

Summary: In 2011, civil immigration detainees filed this lawsuit against the Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Executive Office of Immigration Review for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by shackling adult detainees. The court approved a settlement on April 10, 2014, with defendants agreeing to only restrain violent or combative detainees, with the detainees retaining the right to appeal their restraint. The defendanst also paid $350,000 in attorneys' fees. This case is closed.


When a new President is elected, a “transition team” is formed to begin the process of handing over power from the old administration to the new. As part of this process, members of the transition team interact with the staffs of federal agencies. In early December 2016, a member of the presidential transition team contacted the Department of Energy staff with questions on a variety of topics (“Questionnaire”), including a request for the names of DOE employees who had attended certain meetings regarding climate change. After versions of the Questionnaire leaked to the press, the transition team disavowed it. On April 27, 2017, plaintiff, the Protect Democracy Project, Inc. filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Energy in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief compelling compliance with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff is a nonpartisan nonprofit organization whose focus is on informing the public of operations and activities of the government by gathering and disseminating information likely to contribute significantly to the public understanding of executive branch operations and activities. On February 15, 2017, the plaintiff sent a FOIA request to the defendant seeking (1) records between employees of the defendant regarding the Presidential Transition Team Questionnaire about climate change, and (2) records regarding personnel changes, new personnel assignments and related policies by or between Department of Energy employees and the Executive Office or Presidential Transition Team. Pursuant to FOIA, the defendant was required to determine whether they would be able to comply with the request and notify the plaintiff as such within 20 days of receiving the request (March 17, 2017). By the date the plaintiff filed the complaint, no such determination had been made. On October 12, 2017, District Judge Timothy J. Kelly ordered the parties to confer and propose a schedule for proceeding in the matter, including address the status of the plaintiff’s FOIA request and the anticipated dates for release of the requested documents. On October 26, 2017, the parties submitted a joint status report to the court. According to the report, the defendant had completed three partial productions, one on June 23, 2017, one on August 31, 2017, and one on October 26, 2017. The defendant anticipated a final release of responsive records on or before December 1, 2017. On December 15, 2017, the parties filed a second joint status report. The defendant had completed its release to the plaintiff of all responsive, non-exempt records subject to FOIA; however, the plaintiff intended to challenge the adequacy of the defendant’s search and its withholding of information under exemptions to FOIA. The parties agreed to resolve these issues through dispositive motions. On February 16, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, and on March 20, 2018, the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On September 17, 2018, Judge Kelly granted in part and denied in part each party’s motions for summary judgment. 330 F.Supp.3d 515. He agreed with the plaintiffs that the defendant had not undertaken an adequate search in response to the plaintiff’s first request (relating to the Questionnaire) because the defendant had searched the files of only one custodian. Therefore, he ordered the defendant to conduct an additional search that encompassed the files of additional custodians. Judge Kelly also found that the defendant’s withholdings under FOIA exemptions were properly invoked, except as to the defendant’s response to the Transition Team’s Questionnaire. He ordered the parties to file status reports as they conferred about the renewed searches and disclosures. Between September 2018 and June 2019, the defendants produced some documents and the parties negotiated a settlement agreement. On June 27, 2019, the plaintiffs informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement, and stipulated to dismissal of their claims.

Summary: In 2017, a nonprofit organization filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff requested FOIA compliance from the U.S. Department of Energy to produce records concerning Presidential Transition Team questionnaires about climate change, and personnel changes, assignments, and related policies. The parties have since filed four joint status reports, with the most recent one being filed on February 22, 2019. According to the report, the defendant released six responsive, non-exempt records to the plaintiff from a supplemental search of the plaintiff’s first FOIA request (relating to the Questionnaire) on January 7, 2019. The report also stated that the defendant was preparing to make a discretionary, supplemental release of certain previously withheld information by March 8, 2019. Judge Kelly, in light of this status report, ordered the parties to file another joint status report by March 25, 2019. The case is still ongoing.


On February 13, 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Kovacevich 5 Farms for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1946. The EEOC represented six female applicants who alleged that Kovavevich 5 Farms had refused to hire them because of their sex. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and financial compensation. On August 23, 2006, the six female applicants filed a complaint in intervention to be interveners in the EEOC’s suit. The defendant moved to dismiss the intervenors' suit for failure to state a claim, which was denied. 2006 WL 3050149 (E.D. Cal. 2006). The defendant also moved for summary judgment on the intervenors' claims, and the intervenors moved to certify a class. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, and the intervenors' motion to certify a class was deferred. 2007 WL 1174444 (E.D. Cal. 2007). On November 26, 2008, District Court Judge Oliver W. Wagner approved the proposed consent decree. The consent decree was set to last for five years and included $1,680,000 in monetary relief for the six female applicants and the class of workers represented. The decree also included injunctive relief. It enjoined the defendant from future discrimination or retaliation; required the defendant revise its EEO, hiring, and complaint policies; required anti-discrimination trainings for all current and new employees; and required hiring goals for female employees. Its effective period was five years, and there is nothing further on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2013.

Summary: On February 13, 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Kovacevich 5 farms for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1946. The EEOC represented six female applicants who alleged that Kovavevich 5 Farms had refused to hire them because of their sex. On November 26, 2008 District Court Judge Oliver W. Wagner approved the proposed consent decree. The consent decree was set to last for five years and included both injunctive relief and $1,680,000 in monetary relief. Its effective period was five years, and there is nothing further on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2013.


On March 24, 2017, the Universal Muslim Association of America (UMAA) and two individual Yemenis filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in a challenge to President Trump’s March 6, 2017, Executive Order barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The March 6 order was the second of four 2017 executive orders issued by President Trump that placed restrictions on people who sought to travel from a number of majority Muslim countries into the U.S. and is referred to as EO-2 below and in other entries in this collection. According to the complaint, UMAA is a nonprofit organization whose membership constitutes the largest organization of Shi'a Muslims in the US. UMAA seeks to build mutual understanding between Shi'a Muslims and their fellow Americans, while encouraging its members to be active in their communities. The complaint alleged that EO-2 prevented the organization from conducting its activities. Specifically, UMAA complained that it was unable to bring speakers and paying attendees from abroad for its national convention. Moreover, UMAA's members were harmed in various ways, including in their ability to visit their countries of origin or obtain visas for their family members living in one of the nations targeted by EO-2. The two individual plaintiffs were Yemeni nationals residing in the U.S. under asylum status. In the wake of the civil war in Yemen resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, the plaintiffs, who are a family, came to the U.S. on visas. However, they could not afford to bring two of their five children. While in the US, the plaintiffs applied for visas for their two children, who fled to Djibouti for safety while awaiting their visa interviews. Without further financing, the children would be forced to return to Yemen in the absence of visas. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that EO-2 subjected the plaintiffs and all Muslims residing in the U.S. to "hostile treatment under the law and...stigma upon them based on their religious affiliation." In addition to the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs were represented by counsel from Muslim Advocates, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and a private law firm. The complaint named President Trump (in his official capacity), the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, the State Department, and the Department of Justice as defendants. Specifically, the complaint argued that EO-2 discriminated on the basis of religion and national origin, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause and Fifth Amendment equal protection rights. UMAA further argued that the EO violated the First Amendment Free Speech clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan and marked as related to Pars Equality Center v. Trump (No. 1:17-cv-00255). The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 11, 2017. District Judge Chutkan heard arguments on the preliminary injunction between April 18 and 21, 2017. After additional briefing, on May 11, 2017, Judge Chutkan stayed resolution of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that plaintiffs could not show that they faced the kind of “imminent and certain” irreparable harm necessary for a court to grant a preliminary injunction because of the fact that the two nationwide injunctions were already in effect as a result of related litigation in Hawaii v. Trump and IRAP v. Trump . However, on June 2, the government filed an emergency motion to stay the proceedings pending Supreme Court review of Hawaii and IRAP . The court granted the stay and denied, without prejudice, the motion for preliminary injunction on June 20. On May 1, 2017, the two individual plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims after their children were able to travel to the United States, leaving only UMAA's claim pending. On June 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings pending the Supreme Court's decision to grant a writ of certiorari in IRAP. On June 20, 2017, Judge Chutkan entered an order staying the proceedings until the Supreme Court reached a final decision. While the Supreme Court dismissed that appeal as moot on October 10, 2017, see IRAP, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017), litigation continued in the lower courts. On April 5, 2018, the court administratively closed this case, noting that the parties could file a motion following the resolution of other cases addressing President Trump's executive orders. Joe Biden won the 2020 Presidential election and revoked the executive orders at issue in this case on Inauguration Day (January 20, 2021). As a result, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on March 29, 2021. District Judge Chutkan ordered the case dismissed without prejudice on April 1, 2021.

Summary: On March 24, 2017, the Universal Muslim Association of America (UMAA) and two individual Yemenis filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against President Donald Trump in a challenge to his March 6, 2017, Executive Order (EO) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that EO-2 discriminated on the basis of religion and national origin, in violation of the First Amendment Establishment Clause and Fifth Amendment equal protection rights. UMAA further argued that the EO violated the First Amendment Free Speech clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). In addition to the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan and marked as related to Pars Equality Center v. Trump (No. 1:17-cv-00255). On May 11, 2017, Judge Chutkan stayed resolution of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that plaintiffs could not show that they faced irreparable harm that a preliminary injunction would remedy, citing the two nationwide injunctions that were already in effect. On June 2, the government filed an emergency motion to stay the proceedings pending Supreme Court review of Hawaii v. Trump and IRAP v. Trump . The court granted the motion to stay and denied without prejudice the motion for a preliminary injunction on June 20. On April 5, 2018, the court administratively closed this case, noting that the parties could file a motion following the resolution of other cases addressing President Trump's executive orders. Joe Biden won the 2020 Presidential election and revoked the executive orders at issue in this case on Inauguration Day (January 20, 2021). As a result, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on March 29, 2021. District Judge Chutkan ordered the case dismissed without prejudice on April 1, 2021.


The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Area Erectors, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin in September 2006. The complaint alleged the defendant engaged in racial discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. More specifically, the complaint alleged the defendant terminated the claimant's employment in retaliation for his complaints about discrimination against Black employees and in retaliation for his filing charges with the EEOC. The complaint sought injunctive relief ordering the defendant to stop its discriminatory practices and to change its policies, as well as monetary damages for the plaintiffs. The claimant was allowed to enter the case as an intervenor plaintiff and the case was subsequently transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (The new docket number was 1:07-cv-02339). On July 25, 2007 the court granted the defendant's motion to join the International Union of Operating Engineers Locals as a non-aligned party because reinstatement of the plaintiffs would implicate the union's contractual interests in the defendant's hiring practices. Subsequently, the EEOC filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2007 including various unions and non-aligned parties. Between September 2007 and May 2009, the parties engaged in discovery and held multiple settlement conferences. On May 22, 2009 the parties entered into a consent decree that required the plaintiff to develop and implement antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation policies and procedures, establish new complaint procedures, provide training to employees, reinstate certain claimants, comply with bi-annual reporting requirements, and provide $630,000 to claimants. The consent decree, which had a 3 year duration, was approved by the court on May 27, 2009. There was no further litigation and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the EEOC filed this suit against Area Erectors, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin alleging that the defendant discriminated and retaliated against the complainant on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The parties entered a consent decree in 2009.


On June 6, 2003, a group of African American and Latino employees filed this class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12900 et seq., against their employer, FedEx, in Alameda County Superior Court. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that FedEx discriminated against its African American and Latino employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that FedEx's promotions, compensation, and discipline practices were discriminatory. FedEx removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit on June 19, 2003, Caldwell v. FedEx Express, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. In Caldwell, the plaintiffs alleged disparate impact and disparate treatment concerning minority employees and minority lower-level managers with regards to promotions, training, job assignments, compensation, and discipline. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that FedEx disproportionately assigned minority employees to part-time and casual positions, provided them with fewer promotions than non-minority employees, granted less compensation for minority employees than similarly situated non-minorities, and disciplined minority employees more harshly. The two cases were related on September 23, 2003, and consolidated on November 13, 2003 before Judge Susan Illston. On September 11, 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and just over a year later, on September 28, 2005, the District Court certified two classes, a "Minority Employee Class" and an "African American Lower-Level Manager Class." 2005 WL 2397522, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37354 (N.D. Cal.). The "Minority Employee Class" was comprised of handlers, drivers, sorters, auditors, and dispatchers working in the Western region (Washington, Oregon, California, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, New Mexico, Alaska, and Hawaii) during the class period. African American operations officers in the western region made up the "African-American Lower Manager Class." For the Minority Employee Class, the court certified claims relating to promotions, compensation, and discipline, and for the African-American Lower Manager Class, the court certified claims relating to compensation and discipline. The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on October 12, 2005, reincorporating their allegations in accordance with the two certified classes and alleging both class and individual claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. On January 17, 2007, Judge Illston dismissed the class claims certified under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. On April 13, 2007, the District Court provisionally certified settlement classes and preliminarily approved a class settlement. The court included directions on distribution of notice of the settlement and set a schedule for the final settlement approval process. 2007 WL 1114010 (N.D. Cal.). The settlement included a monetary award for the plaintiffs for more than $50 million; the plaintiffs also secured injunctive relief related to hiring, promotion, discipline, and reporting. This included training for those in charge of promotions and specific guidelines that would limit managerial discretion. The defendant also agreed to adjust discipline guidelines to make them more evenhanded and to require more detailed written documentation of the facts supporting their disciplinary actions. Finally, the agreement required FedEx to update the plaintiffs and their counsel throughout all four years of the consent decree. On August 14, 2007, the District Court granted final approval to the consent decree and confirmed the final certification of the classes. 2007 WL 2343904. On the same day, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. On July 9, 2008, the District Court granted the defendant's motion for counterclaim and the parties agreed to dismiss the plaintiff's non-class claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs’ counsel disputed the amount of attorneys' fees they were entitled to for representing named plaintiffs on non-class claims. The court granted the defendant's motion to interplead 40% of the settlement funds to protect against paying duplicate attorney’s fees. 2008 WL 2705402. Pursuant to a stipulation between the parties, the District Court dismissed all non-class claims on July 11, 2008. On December 29, 2008, the District Court awarded the plaintiffs' attorney’s fees related to their motion for declaratory relief. 2008 WL 5411470. Shortly after, the District Court denied the defendant’s motion for reconsideration of the award. They appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the award of attorney’s fees but vacated the imposition of sanctions on June 16, 2010. On August 11, 2011 the Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court’s decision to grant the plaintiffs' counsel $46,605.87 in attorney’s fees and costs after the defendant challenged the amount. 439 Fed. App'x 644 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court of Appeals awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs’ counsel on November 17, 2011. On February 22, 2012, the plaintiffs' counsel notified the court that they had reached a settlement on how the attorney’s fees were to be distributed and requested that the court dismiss the action and the pending petition for rehearing before the Ninth Circuit. The court dismissed the case and it is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought employees of color within FedEx Corporation against their employer seeking compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. The case settled on April 13, 2007, resulting in more than $50 million and injunctive relief for the plaintiffs. After a series of appeals contesting attorneys' fees, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the court dismissed the case on February 22, 2012.


On August 6, 2001, individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility filed a class action in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against a home builders Trade Association, claiming its annual exhibition of model homes presented numerous barriers to disabled access. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' "Parade Of Homes," an annual exhibition of six newly constructed model homes open to the public, presented numerous barriers, including parking at the event, traveling from the parking to the homes, and viewing the homes themselves. The defendant charged admission to the event. The plaintiffs purchased tickets but were unable to view some the homes because of barriers to accessibility. The complaint contained a single count under the Americans With Disabilities Act, .42 U.S.C. §12181 et seq. The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On November 26, 2001, the court approved a consent decree and certified the class. On March 10, 2003, the parties entered into an amended consent decree. Defendants agreed in future Parade of Homes events to provide one accessible entrance to the event and to each home, to provide accessible restrooms, concessions stands, parking, and exhibit booths. The plaintiffs agreed not to picket or protest future events. The consent decree lasted until 2006. The case is now closed.

Summary: Disabled individuals in Colorado, representing a class of similarly situated plaintiffs, sued a home builders Trade Association because its annual exhibition of model homes presented numerous barriers to disabled access. The association agreed, in a consent decree, to remedy the problems with accessibility and pay $75,000 in attorneys' fees.


On November 9, 2018, several nonprofit organizations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the federal government's latest asylum policy prohibiting people who enter the U.S. along the southern border somewhere other than a designated port of entry from obtaining asylum. Specifically, East Bay Sanctuary Covenant (EBSC), Al Otro Lado, Innovation Law Lab, and Central American Resource Center (CARECEN), challenged an interim final rule promulgated on November 8, 2018, declaring all those subject to a presidential proclamation concerning the southern border ineligible for asylum. The proclamation, “Presidential Proclamation Addressing Mass Migration Through the Southern Border of the United States,” blocked the entry of all people entering the U.S. without inspection at the southern border. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. The complaint stated that the plaintiff organizations assisted refugees fleeing political persecution, terror, war, intolerance, exploitation, and other violence by providing sanctuary, support, community organizing assistance, advocacy, and legal services. The plaintiffs argued that under existing federal law, "manner of entry cannot constitute a categorical asylum bar." The complaint stated that federal law expressly provides that "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival . . . ), . . . may apply for asylum.” The plaintiffs further argued that in proclaiming its new policy, the Department of Homeland Security did not follow necessary procedural steps - like providing a notice and comment period - nor did it have good cause for failing to do so. The case was reassigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar on November 13, 2018. On Nov. 19, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order and ordered the government to show cause why it should not be permanently enjoined from putting in place its latest asylum policy. 349 F. Supp. 3d 838. Judge Tigar held that the government's new rule and proclamation "irreconcilably conflict[ed] with the INA and the expressed intent of Congress" and that "[w]hatever the scope of the President’s authority, he may not rewrite the immigration laws to impose a condition that Congress has expressly forbidden." The court concluded that the plaintiff organizations and the immigrants they represented would suffer irreparable injury without the TRO because asylum seekers would face a greater risk of violence and other harms at the border, and many would be unable to make meritorious asylum claims. The court ordered the TRO to remain in effect until Dec. 19, 2018, at which point the government was to show cause why it should not be permanently enjoined from implementing the new rule and proclamation. On November 27, 2018, the defendants appealed the TRO to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and requested a stay of the TRO pending the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The district court denied the government's request for a stay pending appeal on November 30, 2018. 354 F. Supp. 3d 1085. The defendants also filed an emergency motion in the Ninth Circuit for stay of the TRO pending appeal. On December 7, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the government's emergency stay request, agreeing with the district court that the new asylum rule was likely inconsistent with existing federal law. 932 F.3d 742. The defendants also sought a stay from the U.S. Supreme Court, but that request was denied on December 21, 2018. 139 S. Ct. 782. Meanwhile, on December 4, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the district court. On December 19, 2018, the district court granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, ordering the defendants to return to pre-rule practices for processing asylum applications and preventing them from taking any action continuing to implement the rule pending further decisions. 354 F.Supp.3d 1094. Judge Tigar found that the plaintiff organizations had organizational standing, were likely to succeed on the merits of their INA claim, and that a nationwide injunction was warranted. The defendants again appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal of the preliminary injunction was consolidated with the defendants' appeal of the TRO. On February 11, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the Ninth Circuit appeal, and on March 5, 2019, that motion was granted. On February 28, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's nationwide injunction. 950 F.3d 1242. The Court found that the rule violated the INA, which supports eligibility for asylum seekers regardless of where they enter the U.S. Thus, the Court also found that the rule was an arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the relevant INA provisions, and ran afoul of the U.S.'s non-refoulement obligations under the International Refugee Convention. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 9, 2018, several nonprofit organizations challenged the federal government's latest asylum policy prohibiting people who enter the U.S. along the southern border somewhere other than a designated port of entry from obtaining asylum. The plaintiffs claimed the rule violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted a nationwide preliminary injunction of the rule, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in February 2020.


On March 5, 2013, a company with Christian owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District of Colorado under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the secretaries of the Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, and Department of the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom-Greenwood Village, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA) violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On March 28, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 10, 2013, Judge Richard Brooke Jackson denied the motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 16, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed and a hearing was held on May 21. On May 31, 2013, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay district court proceedings pending the appeal. The order to stay was granted on June 3, 2013. On August 1, 2013, the court ordered parties to answer questions in light of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius. On August 19, 2013, the Court issued an order stating it would reconsider its decision regarding the preliminary injunction if plaintiffs suspended their appeal and defendants did not oppose or if the 10th Circuit remanded the case in light of Hobby Lobby. On September 17, 2013, the court preliminarily enjoined defendants from enforcing preventative services requirements against plaintiffs. On October 17, 2013, the defendants moved to stay proceedings pending the Supreme Court's disposition of Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, and Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius. October 18, 2013, U.S. District Judge R. Brooke Jackson granted defendants' motion. On November 15, 2013, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction. On September 4, 2014, the defendants withdrew their appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. The Supreme Court ruled that closely-held for-profit corporations could object to the contraception mandate. On October 7, 2014, the District Court entered an amended final judgement finding for the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, and entering a permanent injunction against the defendants from "any further effort to enforce the 'contraceptive mandate.'" The plaintiffs were also awarded costs.

Summary: The Christian owners of a company filed a challenge on March 5, 2013 to the ACA's contraception mandate, seeking an exemption under the APA, RFRA, and First and Fifth Amendments. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the District Court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting any further enforcement efforts of the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs.


On March 13, 2001, female sales associates and managers working for MetLife Insurance Company filed a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Judge William H. Pauley III alleging systemic gender discrimination in hiring, pay, promotion, and benefits, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., as amended, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a; the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 290 et seq; and Title 8 of the Administrative Code of the City of New York. Specifically the plaintiffs alleged that MetLife consistently discriminated against women in promotions to certain management and vice president positions and that while 25 percent of account representatives were female, only 7 percent of managing directors were female. All seventeen regional and zonal vice presidents were male. The complaint also alleged that MetLife discriminated in compensation, working conditions, privileges, and other aspects of employment, such as paying women less than men in comparable positions and retaliating for reports of discrimination. The complaint alleged ths discrimination was systemic. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of "all female past, present, and future employees who have been employed within the Insurance and Financial Services Division of MetLife or its successor group, if any, since August 27, 1999, or who will be so employed between the date of the filing of this complaint and the date of judgment in this action, and all female applicants for those positions with MetLife who have been, continue to be, or in the future may be, denied employment opportunities or were deterred from applying for those positions during this same time period (the 'Class')." They also also sought to certify a subclass of plaintiffs who had worked for MetLife in New York. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. On August 20, 2003, the court granted a conditional certification of the settlement class and preliminary approval of a proposed consent decree and attorneys' fees and costs. It also scheduled a fairness hearing for November 6, 2003. On November 6, 2003, the court approved a classwide consent decree agreed to by the parties, and awarded $3.4 million in attorneys fees. Mitchell v. Metro. Life Insurance Co., 01-2112, 2003 WL 25914312 (S.D.N.Y. August 20, 2003). The settlement class consisted of "all women who have been employed in a Sales Position or Sales Management Position in MLFS at any time on or after August 27, 1999 through the Preliminary Approval Date." Disputes were to be handled by Michael D. Young, Esq., a Special Master, whom MetLife agreed to pay $50,000. The three-year consent decree required MetLife to appoint a monitor to oversee compliance with benchmarks, review complaints of gender discrimination, meet with managers regularly, meet with class counsel, and submit all information pertaining to class counsel. MetLife agreed to pay all expenses of the monitor, estimated to be $750,000. MetLife agreed to create a written complaint procedure for cases of gender discrimination and to hire at least six "HR generalists" to track complaints. MetLife agreed to create a new anti-discrimination policy and to train all employees, spending an estimated $1.6m. MetLife also agreed to meet or use best efforts to meet benchmarks of certain percentages of women in management positions. MetLife also agreed to pay an estimated $600,000 for agency management training and $600,000 to recruit female employees and to spend $350,000 on a management development program for high potential sales personnel. MetLIfe agreed to pay $5m into a settlement fund, $25,000 to a reserve fund to pay claims of inadvertently omitted qualified claimants, fees of the Claims Administrator up to $150,000; a minimum payment of $1000 to each claimant and additional funds based on a point system that considered the position the claimant held and the time spent in the positions. The docket notes that the case closed on November 6, 2003. One calss member opted out of the settlement and on December 31, 2003 filed an individual complaint in the same court. This case appears in this database as EE-NY-0256. The docket in that case indicates a private settlement, the terms of which are not publicly available.

Summary: Female employees of MetLife Insurance Company filed a class action alleging systemic gender discrimination in hiring, pay, promotion, and benefits. MetLife agreed in a consent decree to make numerous changes in its recruitment and employment policies and to pay $5m in damages and $3.5m in attorneys' fees and costs.


On July 29, 2013, a same-sex couple who was denied a marriage license brought suit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Texas against the state of Texas. The plaintiffs represented themselves pro se, and sought a declaration that any Texas statutes and state constitutional amendments that prohibited same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. They also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the defendants from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban. The plaintiffs claimed that Texas' ban on same-sex marriage violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. They further claimed that the ban interfered with their ability to be recognized as a family and obstructed the flow of social and administrative benefits that a different-sex married couple would enjoy. The defendants filed a motion to consolidate this case with Zahrn v. Perry and De Leon v. Perry, which was denied on January 10, 2014. Subsequently, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for summary judgment to the court (Judge Sam Sparks) on January 12, 2014. On March 12, 2014, the defendants moved to stay the case. In the interest of judicial efficiency, the motion asked that the current case not to proceed until a similar case, De Leon v. Perry, was decided. On September 10, 2014, the court granted the defendants' motion to stay the case and dismissed all pending motions without prejudice to refile after the Fifth Circuit opinion issued their opinion. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), (PB-OH-0003 in the Clearinghouse), which held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit in De Leon v. Abbott, 791 F.3d 619 (5th Cir. 2015), (PB-TX-0004 in the Clearinghouse), applied Obergefell to the Texas case. In light of these developments, the parties here agreed to a voluntary dismissal and the court dismissed the case on August 21, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 29, 2013, a couple who were denied a marriage license because they were both members of the same sex brought suit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Texas against the state of Texas. The plaintiffs represented themselves pro se, and sought a declaration that any Texas statutes and state constitutional amendments that prohibited same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, as well as preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the defendants from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the court approved a voluntary dismissal.


On December 12, 2000, a transgender inmate at the Massachusetts Correction Institute in Norfolk filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Filing pro se, the plaintiff sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, the Correctional Medical Services, and the University of Massachusetts Medical School under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The inmate sought injunctive relief and damages to be determined by the jury, alleging violations of her constitutional rights and immunities due to, among others, failure to provide her with adequate medical treatment for her serious medical need, which was severe Gender Dysphoria (GD). Specifically, the inmate sought injunctive relief to require the DOC to provide appropriate medical care in accordance with the standards of care for GD, which could include hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery. The case is essentially a continuation of Kosilek v. Nelson. This case can be found in the Clearinghouse here. In Kosilek v. Nelson, the same plaintiff filed pro se a lawsuit against the Sheriff of the Bristol County and the Commissioner of Massachusetts Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the same allegations of failure to provide medical services for the inmate's GD. The Court in Kosilek v. Nelson (Judge Mark Wolf) ruled that the plaintiff's GD constituted serious medical need, which was not adequately treated, but nevertheless stated that the Commissioner of the DOC was not liable for constitutional violations because there was no deliberate indifference to the medical needs of the plaintiff, but said that the Commissioner was then on notice and will provide adequate treatment for the plaintiff's need. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Mass. 2002). No injunction, or any other action by the DOC was ordered. The decision in that case bears substantial influence on the outcome of the present case. The present case was stayed August 7, 2001, until the resolution of the aforementioned case. The Court (Judge Mark Wolf) then issued several other orders, maintaining stay and requesting the parties to inform the court if the stay should be lifted and why. Subsequently, over several years, the plaintiff and the defendants filed several status reports on whether the claim should be dismissed. On June 6, 2005, the plaintiff and the Correctional Medical Services entered a stipulation of dismissal, dismissing the claims against them without prejudice and costs and waiving right of appeal. On July 1, 2005, the University of Massachusetts Medical School and its medical officers entered into a similar stipulation of dismissal with the plaintiff, dismissing all the claims without prejudice and costs and waiving right of appeal. On July 15, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging inadequate medical care for the plaintiff's GD, against the Commissioner of the DOC and various employees and officers of the DOC. The complaint specified that after the decision in Kosilek v. Nelson, the plaintiff had received treatment for GD from medical practitioners, including hormone therapy, and had been evaluated and recommended for sex reassignment surgery, but the DOC had interfered with the treatment by denying her the surgery and hiring its own medical practitioners, who did not recommend the surgery. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, enjoining the defendants to provide her with adequate medical care for her GD based on the recommendations of medical practitioners, including sex reassignment surgery. The plaintiff was now represented by private counsel and also sought an award of attorney's fees. The non-jury trial, presided over by Judge Mark Wolf, began on May 30, 2006. The trial ended in May 2008 and the court did not hear anymore testimony. However, the court continued to hear arguments of the parties over the next three years. Finally, the Court (Judge Mark Wolf) issued its decision, finding a violation of the Eight Amendment by the defendant, on September 4, 2012. The Court pointed out that it expressed that it expected that adequate care will be provided to the plaintiff after the DOC was on notice in Kosilek v. Nelson. The Court ruled that the plaintiff still has a severe GD that was not adequately treated, and posed severe risk of harm to the plaintiff. The reasons for inadequate treatment served no legitimate purpose, and the Commissioner claims of security concerns were pretextual. The plaintiff had been living as a woman in the prison for some time without any security issues. The court stated that the Commissioner was motivated by concerns of controversy and criticism. Therefore, based on the testimony of the medical experts, the Court concluded that the only adequate treatment was sex reassignment surgery and issued an injunction to provide the plaintiff with the surgery. Kosilek v. Spencer. 889 F.Supp.2d 190 (D. Mass 2012). The possible award of attorney's fees was reserved for future consideration. On September 16, 2012, the Court issued an order that the parties must meet at least once to discuss a resolution of the question of the award of attorney's fees. Kosilek v. Spencer, 891 F.Supp.2d 226 (D. Mass. 2012). The motion for attorney's fees was filed by the plaintiff on October 10, 2012. The defendant appealed to the First Circuit Court of Appeals on October 2, 2012. He also filed a motion for the stay of execution of the final judgment, which was granted on November 20, 2012, under conditions of reporting of the progress in preparation for the sex reassignment surgery. On December 19, 2012, the Court (Judge Mark Wolf) held a hearing on the motion of attorney's fees. The First Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Ojetta Thompson) issued its decision on January 17, 2014, affirming the decision of the District Court and the injunction to provide the plaintiff with the sex reassignment surgery. However, on February 12, 2014, the Court of Appeals entered an order to rehear the case en banc after the majority of judges voted to do so, withdrawing and vacating its judgment on January 17, 2014. On May 8, 2014, the Court of Appeals reheard the case. On December 16, 2014, the court decided that, given the positive effects resulting from the DOC's current treatment method and the DOC's plan to treat suicidal ideation if it arose, the DOC's decision not to provide SRS did not illustrate disregard of Plaintiff's medical needs. The court found that the medical care provided to Plaintiff by the DOC met society's minimum standards of decency, that the security concerns the DOC highlighted were reasonable, that the DOC was entitled to deference, and that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation. On May 18, 2015, the Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. On June 4, 2015, Judge Mark L. Wolf ordered that the case be dismissed.

Summary: On December 12, 2000, a transgender inmate filed a pro se lawsuit against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections, Correctional Medical Services, University of Massachusetts Medical school and various medical officers, under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She alleged violation of her constitutional rights because she was not provided sexual reassignment surgery for her Gender Dysphoria, which was recommended by medical practitioners, and sought an injunction to require the DOC to do so. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, unlike in the previous case filed by the same plaintiff (Kosilek v. Nelson, PC-MA-0039), granted the injunction and ordered the DOC to provide the sex reassignment surgery to the plaintiff, on September 4, 2012. The First Circuit Court of Appeals originally affirmed the judgment on January 17, 2014, but the case will be reheard en banc following the vote of the judges. The court sitting en banc found that the medical care provided by the DOC were adequate and the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a violation of her rights under the Eighth Amendment.


This was one of the LGBT discrimination cases before the Supreme Court in 2020 when it held that "[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]." District Court This case addresses the scope of the ban on sex discrimination in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 -- which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex -- asking if the statute bars employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their sexual orientation. On September 25, 2014, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this case on behalf of a transgender woman who was fired from her job at the defendant's funeral home after notifying her employers that she was "undergoing a gender transition from male to female and intended to dress in appropriate business attire at work as a woman." The EEOC argued that by firing her, the employers had discriminated against her because of her sex, which violated Title VII. The complaint requested an injunction against discriminatory employment practices and an order requiring the employer to implement policies, practices, and programs which provided equal employment opportunities, as well as backpay and other damages. The case was assigned to Judge Sean F. Cox. The employer filed a motion to dismiss on November 19, 2014, arguing that transgender people were not a protected class under Title VII, and that the EEOC's positions clearly "demonstrate[d] their incoherence and their failure to state a claim." On April 21, 2015, Judge Cox denied the employer's motion to dismiss, finding that while transgender status was "currently not a protected class under Title VII," the EEOC had sufficiently plead a sex-stereotyping gender-discrimination claim. 100 F. Supp. 3d 594. The EEOC filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2015 and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. On April 7, 2016, both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and on April 19, the ACLU filed an amicus brief. After a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the court denied the EEOC's motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the employer as to the wrongful termination claim on August 18, 2016, concluding that the employer was entitled to an exemption from Title VII under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 201 F. Supp. 3d 387. Court of Appeals The EEOC appealed to the Sixth Circuit, and the transgender woman the EEOC was representing, moved to intervene, which was granted on March 27, 2017. Many parties filed amicus briefs in support of the EEOC, some of whom included: Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Equality Ohio, Public Rights/Private Conscience Project, Human Rights Campaign, Service Employees International Union, the Unitarian Universalist Association, and the Anti-Defamation League. A Sixth Circuit panel of three judges reversed the lower court judgment and remanded the case back to the district court on March 7, 2018. 884 F.3d 560. U.S. Supreme Court The employer filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on June 24, 2018 and a motion to stay the district court proceedings pending resolution of the writ on July 26, 2018. Judge Cox granted the motion to stay on August 15, 2018. Oral argument occurred on October 8, 2019, with the ACLU and the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Clinic arguing for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 15, 2020. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination "because of" sex. Justice Gorsuch stated that the statutory language "because of" implies a but-for causation analysis, meaning "so long as the plaintiff's sex was one but-for cause of that decision [to fire], that is enough to trigger the law." The opinion stated that "if an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual's sex, the statute's causation standard is met and liability may attach." LGBT discrimination against employees met this test, because "an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have question in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids." 590 U.S. ___. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was affirmed. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: This case addresses the scope of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. The EEOC filed this suit on behalf of a transgender woman who had been fired from her job after notifying her employer that she was transitioning and intended to dress as a woman at work. Initially, the District Court granted summary judgment for the employer, stating that RFRA was an exception to Title VII's ban. This was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on March 7, 2018, and in response, the employer filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States. On June 15, 2020, affirmed the Sixth Circuit, holding that firing an employe for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.