On February 22nd, 2006, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Langston University in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The DOJ sought injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant violating Title VII by discriminating against a white female professor on the basis of her race. The DOJ alleged that the discrimination against the employee took the form of paying her lower wages than other similarly situated African and African-American employees and failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the effects of the discriminatory treatment. On February 27th, 2006, the Court (Judge David L. Russell) entered a Consent Decree, which ordered general injunctive relief, such as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation, as well as specific injunctive relief including an increase in salary, and a fair, objective, non-retaliatory and nondiscriminatory consideration for positions. The Court retained jurisdiction of the matters covered by the Consent Decree for two years. The decree would expire within one year of its entry without further order of the Court. It appears, however, that the intervenor found the terms of the Consent Decree inadequate. On the same day of the entry of the decree, the action was terminated without prejudice. Having then been granted the motion to intervene, the complainant filed her own complaint on April 14, 2006, which recapitulates in further detail the alleged discrimination. These grievances include the defendant's failure to advertise the position of Chair of the Department of English, the appointment of a lesser qualified African-American to Chair from outside the English Department, requesting the intervenor to perform the majority of the Chair's duties and responsibilities, retaliating against the intervenor by removing her from the office space she had occupied for fourteen years, the withholding, without justification or good cause, of the intervenor's compensation earned for summer teaching responsibilities, and lower compensation in comparison to African-Americans. The intervenor complaint also states that the plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer emotional and mental distress, harm to professional reputation, humiliation, embarrassment, economic loss, and loss of enjoyment of life. On April 16th, 2007, an amended complaint alleged all of the above, and additionally, detailed another charge of retaliation. The complaint stated that the intervenor was continually discriminated against as a result of filing a Charge of Discrimination, i.e. objectionable and offensive treatment by the President, Vice-Presidents, and the Office of Human Resources, a prolonged and bureaucratic delay in obtaining the approval of the donation of medical leave to her husband, and the omission of her salary and salary schedules from the budget for fiscal years 2003-2007. On August 9th, 2007, the court ordered a settlement conference set for September 11, 2007, at which an apparent settlement was reached. The settlement agreement resulting from the conference is unavailable. However, the action was administratively terminated without prejudice to the rights of the parties to reopen for entry of any stipulation or order, and terminated with prejudice if not reopened within 45 days. On October 25, 2007, the intervenor filed a motion to clarify and/or strike the settlement agreement, and further moved the court to extend the time of the administrative closing order. In the motion, the intervenor states that she had received incorrect information about the unused leave she had accumulated throughout her tenure at Langston University, which she relied upon in settling the matter. On December 26, 2007, the court (Judge David L. Russell) granted the motion for extension of administrative closing order. The parties reached a settlement agreement in which the plaintiff was to receive $183,240.00 in lump sum payments, of which $69,376.36 would go the plaintiff's attorneys. She would continue to work for 2007-08 academic year with the same pay as before, and then provided with a paid sabbatical. Her unusued sick leave would be exhausted, but she still could use up to five, and possibly five more, sick leaves for 2007-08 year. The university also agreed to pay short-term disability payments to the plaintiff's husband, also employed at the university. On April 22, 2008, the defendant filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement but the parties reached a private settlement before the motion was argued. This case is now closed.

Summary: On February 22nd, 2006, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Langston University. The DOJ alleged that the university discriminated against a white female professor by paying her less that similarly situated African American employees. On February 27th, 2006, the Court (Judge David L. Russell) entered a Consent Decree, which ordered general injunctive relief, such as the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race and retaliation, as well as specific injunctive relief including an increase in salary, and a fair, objective, non-retaliatory and nondiscriminatory consideration for positions. It appears, however, that the intervenor found the terms of the Consent Decree inadequate and filed her own complaint on April 14, 2006, alleging continuous discrimination, such as retaliation and offensive treatment. The parties held several settlement conferences, and seem to have reached a final settlement on May 7, 2008. Under an older settlement, the plaintiff was to receive $183,240.00 in monetary damages.


On October 22, 2014, current and former civil immigration detainees housed at the Aurora Detention Facility filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued The GEO Group, Inc., a private company that provides detention and correction services under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) 18 U.S.C. § 1589, and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by several public interest law firms, sought monetary damages. The plaintiffs alleged that GEO violated Colorado's Minimum Wage Order (CMWO) when the company paid its detained employees a dollar a day for their labor and violated 18 U.S.C. § 1589 by forcing the detainees to clean the "pods" where they were housed without compensation. They further alleged that GEO threatened to put those who refused to work (for no pay) in "the hole" (solitary confinement). The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Craig B. Shaffer. On November 14, 2014, the case was re-assigned to Senior U.S. District Judge John L. Kane. On November 14, 2014, GEO filed a motion to dismiss all three claims. On July 6, 2015, Judge Kane dismissed the CMWO claim but not the federal forced labor/unjust enrichment claims. 113 F.Supp.3d 1125. The CMWO applied to employers and employees in four industries: (1) Retail and Service; (2) Commercial Support Service; (3) Food and Beverage; and (4) Health and Medical. 7 Colo. Code Regs. 1103-1:1. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was a "Health and Medical" employer, a "Food and Beverage" employer, and a "Retail and Service" employer. Although it was not necessary to reach the question of whether the defendant was an "employer" under the CMWO, Judge Kane concluded that the plaintiffs were not employees. Because enforcing Colorado's minimum wage laws was consistent with the purpose and the text of the Service Contract Act ("SCA"), Judge Kane decided that the SCA did not preempt the plaintiff's claim under the Colorado Minimum Wage Order. Also, Judge Kane did not dismiss the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim. Although the claim appeared to be largely based on the plaintiffs' CMWO claim, and therefore the plaintiffs would have had an adequate remedy at law, the CMWO claim was dismissed and not available. The plaintiffs were permitted to plead in the alternative. 113 F.Supp.3d 1125 (D. Colo. 2015). On March 17, 2016, Judge Kane denied the defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal with respect to the plaintiffs' TVPA claim because the defendant did not identify any split in authority or any cases conflicting with the application of the statute by Judge Kane. Judge Kane denied the defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal with respect to the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim as the defendant raised this issue for the first time in its motion for reconsideration. Judge Kane denied the defendant's motion for interlocutory appeal with respect to the defendant's government contractor defense. Judge Kane also denied the request for a stay pending appeal as moot. On May 6, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for class certification (2016 WL 2727839), which was granted on February 27, 2017. 320 F.R.D. 258. The classes were certified as follows: 1. all persons detained in defendant's aurora detention facility in the ten years prior to the filing of this action (for TVPA's forced labor claim); 2. all people who performed work defendant's aurora detention facility under defendant's voluntary work program "VWP" policy in the three years prior to the filing of this action (unjust enrichment claim). On February 27, 2017, Judge Kane granted the Motion for Class Certification. On March 13, 2017, the defendant filed a petition for permission to appeal the District Court's grant of class certification. After the Tenth Circuit granted this petition, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal on April 14, 2017 (case number 17-1125). In the appellate court, on August 11, 2017, several immigrant rights and civil rights groups (including the Southern Poverty Law Center, Public Citizen, Inc., National Employment Law Project, American Immigrants for Justice, Asian Americans Advancing Justice, Detention Watch Network, Human Rights Defense Center, Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, Justice Strategies, Legal Aid at Work, National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd, National Guestworker Alliance, National Immigrant Justice Center, National Immigration Law Center and Pangea Legal Services among others) filed amicus curiae briefs. On November 15, 2017, the appeal was argued in front of Circuit Judges Matheson, Bacharach and McHugh. On February 9, 2018, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court certification of both classes. 882 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2018). The Appellate Court held that the lower court reasonably determined that the class members could show causation through class-wide inference and that individual damage assessments would not predominate over the class's common issues. The defendant asked for re-hearing but the 10th circuit denied the request on March 5, 2018. Back in district court, on February 12, 2018, District Judge Kane referred the case to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty for settlement proceedings. On June 4, 2018, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. That petition was denied on October 1, 2018. As of November 2019, the parties are engaged in the discovery process and the case is ongoing.

Summary: This class action lawsuit was brought by current and former civil immigration detainees against the GEO Group, Inc., a for-profit corporation that provides detention and correction services. The plaintiffs allege that GEO violated Colorado's Minimum Wage Order by paying its detained employees one dollar per day for their labor and that GEO violated federal law by forcing its detainees to clean the "pods" where they were housed for no pay. The plaintiffs seek monetary damages for themselves and those similarly situated.


On January 10, 2013, several Catholic business owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury as well as those agencies' secretaries in their official capacities. The plaintiffs, represented by the private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. Plaintiffs, shareholders and operators of an environmental contractor that employed 70 people, maintained a health insurance plan that provided medical coverage to all of its employees. In accordance with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, the healthcare plan specifically excluded abortifacient drugs, contraception, and sterilization. However, the ACA required employers with over 50 full-time employees to provide health insurance coverage that included contraception and surgical sterilization, as well as education and counseling for such services. Failure to comply with the ACA mandate resulted in a monetary penalties. The complaint alleged that the defendants' actions in implementing the ACA coerced the plaintiffs and thousands of other individuals to engage in acts against their religious beliefs. Specifically, as Catholics, the plaintiffs opposed paying for, providing, facilitating, or otherwise supporting abortifacient drugs, contraception, or elective sterilization, which they claimed was compulsory under the health coverage requirements of the ACA. Plaintiffs alleged this violated their right to freely practice their religion and violated their rights under the RFRA and the APA. On May 8, 2013, the District Court (Judge Robert J. Jonker) stayed all proceedings until the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the appeals in Autocam Corporation v. Sebelius, No. 1:12-cv-1096 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 8, 2012), a case raising similar issues. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in Autocam, affirming the denial of injunctive relief and ordering the dismissal of the case. On September 30, 2013, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims under the APA with prejudice. The District Court dismissed the remaining claims were dismissed for lack of standing. This case is now closed.

Summary: On January 10, 2013, Catholic business owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury as well as those agencies' secretaries in their official capacities. The plaintiffs, represented by the private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On September 30, 2013, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims and entered judgment for the defendants.


On March 1st, 2006, a group of former employees of Guidant Corporation filed a lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 against Guidant Corporation in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory judgment that the Severance Agreement and Release of Claims was invalid under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA"). The plaintiffs claimed that employment Releases given by Guidant Corporation failed to comply with the OWBPA and were invalid. Plaintiffs also asked the Court for summary judgment on Guidant's counterclaims in the case, which were for declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 that the employment Release was valid under OWBPA. Guidant also made counterclaims for unjust enrichment, restitution, recoupment, and setoff, and breach of contract. In 2004, Guidant Corporation began developing "Project Apple," which was a codename for a Reduction in Force (RIF). Guidant began selecting employees at the local level whose employment would be terminated. Ultimately, over 700 employees were informed their employment would be terminated. As part of the "RIF," these employees were given notice for eligibility of benefits. Each terminated employee received a package of documents including a cover letter, a copy of the Severance Agreement and Release of Claims (the "Release"), a statement of Severance Pay and Benefits, along with a Severance Eligibility Disclosure. One plaintiff, Joseph Pagliolo, ultimately used information in the Severance Eligibility Disclosure to perform an analysis that led to his choice in not signing the Release. His calculations showed that a disproportionate number of employees ages 40 and older had been affected by the RIF. This information led to forming the case at hand in which employees claim Guidant had engaged in age discrimination when terminating the 700 employees. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Exhibit B, the employment Release form, violated the OWBPA. Within an employment release form, there are certain statutory requirements that must be met or else it is ineffective under the law. On June 11th, 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and the Court approved the class on September 28th, 2007. The Court (Judge Donovan W. Frank) found that Guidant Corporation did not meet statutory requirements for various parts of the employment Release form that was part of employees' severance packages. First, the Court held that the Release form contained material misrepresentations that failed to satisfy OWBPA. The form included a list of employees who were redeployed for employment as part of the group of employees eligible for severance benefits. This material misrepresentation had the effect of making it appear that there were 10% fewer terminations of employees ages 40 and older. The Court also found that the Release form did not disclose the decisional unit for the RIF and did not give employees a document that explained the eligibility factors for the RIF. Lastly, the Court found that Guidant did not satisfactorily fulfill the age and job formatting requirements. Guidant failed to provide the age on the Project Apple Spreadsheet, but rather only included birthdates. On September 28th, 2007, the Court ordered that the Releases signed by plaintiffs under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act were void, with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The Court dismissed defendants' counterclaims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract. The Court also denied defendants' motion for partial summary judgment.

Summary: The case was brought by former employees of Guidant Corporation against Guidant Corporation. Plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment that the Severance Agreement and Release of Claims offered by Guidant be ruled invalid under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA"). Plaintiffs alleged that Guidant had engaged in age discrimination in terminating over 700 employees that included a disproportionate number of employees ages 40 and older. The case was settled on September 28th, 2007, when the Court ordered that the employment Releases signed by plaintiffs were void under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act. The Court also dismissed defendants' counterclaims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.


On May 14, 2019, a female employee of Western Digital Corporation filed this class-action lawsuit in the Central District of California. The plaintiff, on behalf of herself and approximately 1,370 female employees, sued Western Digital Corporation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, and state law. Western Digital, the defendant, is a major computer data storage company. The plaintiff, represented by private plaintiff firms, sought injunctive relief and nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant engaged in discriminatory pay, promotion, and job placement policies based on gender. Specifically, she alleged that her employer paid her less than her male coworkers who performed substantially similar work, and refused to promote her despite promoting less qualified male employees. On May 29, the plaintiff filed a motion for approval of a class settlement agreement, unopposed by the defendant. The parties reached the settlement agreement before they filed formal litigation. The settlement class contained two sub-classes: a California Sub-Class and a Nationwide Sub-Class. The California Sub-Class included women directly employed by Western Digital in California in a senior manager level or below at any time from November 1, 2012 through the date of the Order Granting Preliminary Approval. The Nationwide Sub-Class included women directly employed by Western Digital as regular employees in the senior manager position or below in the United States at any time from November 1, 2013 through the date of the Order Granting Preliminary Approval. The proposed agreement contained two central components: programmatic relief aimed at eliminating gender disparities and generating equal employment opportunities and a $7.75 million settlement fund. The proposed programmatic relief focused on initiatives to remedy the alleged discriminatory practices based on gender and to foster an equitable work environment. According to the settlement, Western Digital agreed to develop initiatives to evaluate, promote, and compensate women equitably, conduct statistical analyses regarding pay and promotion, design leadership initiatives for women, and improve its policies regarding flexible work arrangements and parental leave. Further, the company agreed to keep records relevant to their compliance with this agreement and to enhance investigation procedures for managing internal complaints of gender discrimination. The proposed settlement included the appointment of a compliance monitor by Western Digital to determine their ongoing adherence to the agreement. Out of the fund, the proposed settlement granted each class member on average $3,615 in damages. Attorneys' fees comprised 33.33 percent, or $2,583,333. Defendants agreed to dedicate any unused funds to Legal Aid at Work and Legal Aid Society of Orange County. The proposed settlement did not specify an end date. The judge had yet to approve the settlement agreement as of September 26, 2019. The case is still ongoing.

Summary: In May 2019, female employees of Western Digital, a major computer data storage company, filed this class action complaint in the Central District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant engaged in discriminatory pay, promotion, and job placement policies based on gender, violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act. The plaintiff filed a proposed settlement agreement, unopposed by the defendants, that granted damages to members of the class and programmatic relief to remedy the alleged discriminatory practices. The case is ongoing.


The San Antonio district office of the EEOC brought this suit against Builders Gypsum Supply LLP and three individual defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in September 2005. The complaint filed by the EEOC alleged harassment based on the complainant's sex, female, and retaliation against the complainant for complaining of this sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant was allowed to file a complaint as an intervenor plaintiff. The EEOC and Builders Gypsum Supply entered a consent decree that was not binding on the intervenor plaintiff in May 2006. The decree included non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses, required the development of an anti-discrimination policy, and required that the policy would be posted. The decree also required Builders Gypsum LLP to provide a minimum of 8 hours of EEO training to all employees, officials, managers, and supervisors. The injunctive parts of the decree had a four year term. If the EEOC found non-compliance, the decree called for court enforcement and an indefinite extension of the decree. Builders Gypsum Supply agreed to issue a check for $200,000 to the intervenor plaintiff in exchange for the intervenor plaintiff signing an indemnity agreement; the intervenor plaintiff did not sign such an agreement. After some court proceedings, the suit between the intervenor plaintiff and Builders Gypsum LLP was dismissed jointly with prejudice against the defendant on July 21, 2008. This ended the case.

Summary: The San Antonio district office of the EEOC brought a lawsuit against Builders Gypsum Supply LLP and three individual defendants in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas in September 2005, alleging sexual harassment and retaliation against the complainant, who later intervened as a plaintiff. The EEOC and Builders Gypsum Supply LLP entered a consent decree that was not binding on the intervenor plaintiff in May 2006. The decree required development of anti-discrimination policy and EEO training of the defendant's employees. The suit between the intervenor plaintiff and Builders Gypsum Supply LLP was later dismissed jointly on July 21, 2008. This ended the case.


On Oct. 5, 2017, the organizations Muslim Advocates, Southern Poverty Law Center, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sued the Department of State (DOS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the latter's component U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations promoting civil rights and civil liberties. According to their complaint, they seek information on persons affected by the Trump administration's travel ban, so that they may advise and assist travelers. Plaintiffs noted that, according to both the Executive Orders and the latest Proclamation, CBP is authorized to grant case-by-case waivers for people whom the travel ban would otherwise exclude. The complaint alleged that on June 27, 2017, plaintiffs had submitted a FOIA request to defendants seeking records created on or after Jan. 27, 2017, concerning the waiver provisions, including:
1. Policies, practices, and procedures that went into effect on or after Jan. 27, 2017, relating to criteria for evaluating individual waiver requests; 2. Policies, practices, and procedures that went into effect on or after Jan. 27, 2017, concerning how officers should determine when a waiver request should be granted; 3. Internal guidance on how to assess when denying an individual's entry "would cause undue hardship" or when "his or her entry would not pose a threat to national security and would be in the national interest"; 4. Processes for accepting and adjudicating waiver requests; 5. The person or office to whom waiver requests should be directed; 6. The number of waiver requests received by defendants or any other DHS component agency; 7. The number of waiver requests granted by defendants or any other DHS component agency, and the reasoning for the grants; 8. The number of waiver requests denied by defendants or any other DHS component agency, and the reasoning for the denials; 9. Any guidance provided to defendants' field personnel regarding the waiver provisions of the Second EO; 10. Any memoranda providing guidance for defendants or any other DHS component agency, on enforcement of the waiver provisions of the Second EO in light of federal court decisions granting preliminary injunctions against the implementation of the EO.
The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendants. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Oct. 6, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. The parties filed a status report on Feb. 20, 2018, stating that all defendant agencies had initiated searches. Status reports filed in June and October indicated that the government had produced some responsive records and that the review and production of additional records was ongoing. Document production continued largely without incident in ensuing status reports. However, in early 2020, the State Department reported significant delays in document production due to an inability to access files because of in-person work restrictions due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Department disclosed this in a June 2, 2020 status report, and the plaintiffs were concerned at the lack of ability to remotely access documents. Another status report is due on August 3, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On Oct. 5, 2017, Muslim Advocates, SPLC, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State, sued DOS, DHS, and CBP under FOIA, seeking records on how the government grants waivers to people whom the EO travel ban would otherwise exclude. This case is ongoing.


On May 7, 2012, (1) Legatus, an organization of Catholic business persons and their spouses, together with (2) Weingartz Supply Co., a for-profit business and (3) its owner, Daniel Weingartz, also a Legatus member, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the federal government under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Thomas More Law Center, a Catholic non-profit legal service, claimed that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate that required employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception violated the owners' religious beliefs. The plaintiffs sought both declaratory and injunctive relief, specifically an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. The case was assigned to District Judge Robert H. Cleland. On Oct. 31, 2012, the court granted a preliminary injunction as to Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner, but denied without prejudice Legatus's injunction motion, finding that as a Catholic non-profit organization, Legatus did not have standing to challenge the contraceptive mandate because it was protected by a temporary safe harbor while the Government amended the final regulations regarding the religious employer exemption. The court also instructed the Government to file monthly reports on the status of the amendment process. Legatus v. Sebelius, 901 F. Supp. 2d 980 (E.D. Mich. 2012). The defendants appealed the Weingartz Supply Co. preliminary injunction order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Docket No. 13-01092), and Legatus appealed the denial of its motion for an injunction (Docket No. 13-01093). The Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals. On Jan. 28, 2013, all of the defendants jointly moved to stay the district court proceedings pending the appeals, and Judge Cleland granted the motion three days later. The Government published the amended final regulations of the ACA on July 2, 2013. Legatus voluntarily dismissed its appeal and moved to lift the stay. On Aug. 9, 2013, the district court lifted the stay and reopened the case only with respect to Legatus and the defendants. On Aug. 30, 2013, Legatus amended its complaint to challenge the updated regulations. Legatus argued that the accommodations put forth in the amended regulation required the plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn would trigger an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the disputed services. On Sept. 20, 2013, Legatus moved for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA under the RFRA. On Oct. 1, 2013, the Sixth Circuit granted the defendants-appellants' motion to waive oral argument. The panel requested that the parties file supplemental briefs by Oct. 15, 2013, addressing the effect of Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), a recent Sixth Circuit decision, on the appeal. On Dec. 20, 2013, Judge Cleland granted Legatus' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the defendant's stated interests of promoting public health generally and promoting gender equality, while compelling, were not directly related to promoting the specific interests asserted in this litigation. Likewise, the contraception mandate was not the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Finally, the court found that a failure to grant a preliminary injunction would result in irreparable harm to Legatus. On Feb. 12, 2014, the defendants moved for an interlocutory appeal of the district court's ruling. On Apr. 7, 2014, the defendants moved to consolidate the two new appeals with Ave Maria Foundation v. Sebelius and to hold briefing in abeyance pending the resolution of Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, No. 13-6440, and Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, No. 13-2373, two appeals presenting substantially the same questions of law already pending before the Sixth Circuit and scheduled for oral argument on May 8, 2013. On May 5, 2014, the Sixth Circuit granted the motion. The Sixth Circuit issued a decision in Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius on June 11, 2014. In an opinion by Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore, the court affirmed the district judge's denial of a preliminary injunction to all plaintiffs. The opinion found that organizations exempt from the contraception mandate faced no burden on their exercise of their religion, and therefore were unlikely to succeed in proving a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. And organizations eligible to receive an "accommodation" under the law needed only to provide a "self-certification" that documented that they had a religious objection. This self-certification did not constitute an unlawful religious burden. For similar reasons, the law did not violate the First Amendment's free speech, free exercise, or establishment clauses. Michigan Catholic Conference v. Burwell, 755 F.3d 372 (6th Cir. 2014). However, on June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on Dec. 31, 2014, the District Court entered an injunction and judgment in favor of Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner. The injunction prevented the government from enforcing the contraceptive coverage mandate as it existed on June 30, 2014, against the corporate entity and its owner, and directed the parties to come to an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs. The ruling did not impact Legatus' claims. On Apr. 15, 2015, Weingartz Supply Co. and its owner notified the district court that they had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs - they did not specify the details of the agreement - and that no further proceedings were necessary. In the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs in the consolidated appeal moved for voluntary dismissal of their appeals, which the Sixth Circuit panel granted on Nov. 9, 2017. On Feb. 2, 2018, all plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal in district court, and it appears the case is now closed.

Summary: In the Eastern District of Michigan, a for-profit company, its owner, and a Catholic business organization objected to the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds. The court initially granted a preliminary injunction to the business and its owner, but not the organization, and the case was appealed to the Sixth Circuit. After Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, the government was enjoined from enforcing the contraception mandate, and the parties voluntarily dismissed the case.


On October 16, 2018, the ACLU of Southern California filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552, seeking the release of records related to U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents’ practice of misrepresenting or concealing their identity when conducting enforcement actions. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to order the defendant to produce the public records requested on February 12, 2019, without further delay and to declare that the defendant failed to comply with FOIA. Judge John A. Kronstadt approved the defendant’s Ex Parte Application to Stay Case due to the lapse in appropriations to the Department of Justice on January 11, 2019. The stay was lifted on February 5, 2019. In an August 15, 2019, status update, the defendant stated that it had produced records to the plaintiff on several occasions since litigation commenced and that the parties were continuing to discuss a possible resolution to the case without the need for further litigation. On February 3, 2020, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case. The plaintiff stated that it was satisfied with the documents the defendant had produced in response to the FOIA request. On February 4, Judge Kronstadt issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice. The parties were to bear their own costs, fees, and expenses. The case is closed.

Summary: On October 16, 2018, the ACLU of Southern California filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security in the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) seeking the release of records related to Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE) agents’ practice of misrepresenting or concealing their identity when conducting enforcement actions. After the defendant made several document productions to the plaintiff the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the case on February 3, 2020. The court issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice on February 4. The parties were to bear their own costs, fees, and expenses. The case is closed.


This case is a response to the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A-B-, issued in June 2018, and updated guidelines for asylum officers the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a month later, instructing them to apply Matter of A-B-'s holding to credible fear screenings. On August 7, 2018, this suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by asylum applicants plaintiffs all ordered removed following the rejection of their asylum claims at the credible fear assessment stage. They alleged that the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A-B- articulated new, unlawful standards for adjudicating asylum claims relating to domestic and gang violence. The defendants were the Attorney General, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). The plaintiffs filed these claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the Refugee Act of 1980. Represented by the ACLU and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. They claimed that the defendants unlawfully implemented this new screening standard for asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings, effectively depriving all applicants of their right to pursue asylum. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet Sullivan. The plaintiffs claimed that as a result of these new policies most credible fear claims connected to domestic or gang violence were categorically denied; applicants were required to show that their home government "condones or is completely helpless" to protect them from feared persecution (as opposed to the prior "unable or unwilling" standard). This placed a higher burden on individuals seeking asylum based on membership in a particular social group. Moreover, asylum adjudicators were instructed to ignore any federal court of appeals decisions that conflicted with these new credible fear policies. On August 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction and an emergency motion for stay of removal because two of the plaintiffs were subject to imminent removal. At an emergency hearing on August 8, the defendants agreed that the two plaintiffs would not be removed prior to 11:59 pm on August 9. However, following a hearing on the motions on the morning of August 9, the court learned that the two plaintiffs had in fact been removed from detention and placed on a flight to El Salvador during the hearing. The Court issued an oral order requiring the defendants to return the two plaintiffs to the U.S. as soon as possible. On August 9, 2018, the court also granted a temporary stay of removal for all the plaintiffs pending the Court's determination of whether it had jurisdiction to enter a stay of removal in the case. 2018 WL 3812445. On September 12 the defendants filed for summary judgment, claiming that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claims, and furthermore, that all of the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law. The plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment on September 26, alleging that their claims were justiciable and that they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits. Four parties filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on October 2 and 3, 2018. The amici were filed by Tahrih Justice Center; a group of 10 law professors specializing in administrative law; the attorneys general of California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington; and the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees. The District Court heard arguments on the cross motions on November 19, 2018. Judge Sullivan partially granted and partially denied the motions for summary judgment in a December 19, 2018 opinion. He found several parts of the DHS's policies and rules based off of Matter of A-B- to be in violation of the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard:
the general rule against credible fear claims relating to domestic and gang violence. . . the requirement that a noncitizen whose credible fear claim involves non-governmental persecutors “show the government condoned the private actions or at least demonstrated a complete helplessness to protect the victim”. . . the Policy Memorandum’s rule that domestic violence based particular social group definitions that include “inability to leave” a relationship are impermissibly circular. . . the Policy Memorandum’s requirement that, during the credible fear stage, individuals claiming credible fear must delineate or identify any particular social group in order to satisfy credible fear based on the particular social group protected ground. . . the Policy Memorandum’s directive that asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews should apply federal circuit court case law only “to the extent that those cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-”. . . [and] the Policy Memorandum’s directive that asylum officers conducting credible fear interviews should apply only the case law of “the circuit where the alien is physically located during the credible fear interview.”
 He vacated all of these policies and permanently enjoined the defendants from using them going forward. In addition, he ordered the defendants to bring back any plaintiffs who had been removed from the United States under the now-enjoined policies and to give them a new creditable fear evaluation. He granted the defendant's summary judgment motion with respect to due process and nexus and discretion claims. 344 F.Supp.3d 96. The defendants appealed the summary judgment decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals on January 17, 2019. They also filed a motion to stay district court proceedings, but Judge Sullivan denied the motion on January 25; this left the injunction in place and forced the defendants to continue reporting on compliance with the injunction during the appeal. 2019 WL 329572. The appellate court has not ruled on the defendant's appeal as of June 2020. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the state attorneys general from the district court amicus briefs, among others, filed amici for the appeal as well.

Summary: In 2018, a group of asylum applicants filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the Administration had unlawfully implemented a new, heightened, screening standard for asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Refugee Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, separation of powers, and due process. Judge Emmet Sullivan granted partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining DHS from participating in several controversial practices surrounding creditable fear evaluations. The defendants appealed the case to the D.C. Court of Appeals; the case is ongoing.


On August 29, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Atlanta U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Boca Chica, Inc., (doing business as Loca Luna Restaurant) to enforce an agreement the parties had reached to settle a sexual harassment charge a female employee had filed with the EEOC. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief, including specific performance of the requirements of the settlement, the employee's legal fees and costs in attempting to collect the amount owed, compensation for losses resulting from breach of the settlement, and punitive damages. Before the EEOC investigates charges it sometimes has the parties participate in mediation. The settlement agreement had been reached during one such mediation session and required Boca Chica to pay the employee $50,000 and provide a neutral reference. The parties had also agreed to a non-disparagement clause. At the end of the mediation session, the employee said something to the effect of "I hope you guys have learned a lesson." The defendant subsequently claimed that the comment violated the non-disparagement clause and refused to comply with the agreement. The parties eventually reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on September 29, 2004. The 13-month decree provided monetary relief and subjected Boca Chica to a variety of injunctive provisions. Boca Chica was required to pay the employee $50,000 and supply a neutral reference, just as the original agreement provided. However, Boca Chica was further required to post an equal employment notice and to appoint a compliance official to oversee compliance with the decree. The parties bore their own costs and fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 29, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Atlanta U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Boca Chica, Inc., (doing business as Loca Luna Restaurant) to enforce an agreement the parties had reached to settle a sexual harassment charge a female employee had filed with the EEOC. Boca Chica had refused to comply with the agreement, claiming that the employees comment to the effect of "I hope you guys have learned a lesson." violated the non-disparagement clause of their agreement. The parties entered into a 13-month consent decree that required Boca Chica to pay the employee $50,000 and supply a neutral reference, just as the original agreement provided, as well as to post an equal employment notice and appoint an official to oversee compliance with the agreement. The case is now closed.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on January 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to Defendant Signal International at its Orange, Texas site. Signal is based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and is in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleges that plaintiffs paid defendant Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees to live in racially segregated labor camps ($1050 per month), and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Plaintiffs also alleged that the fear and coercion plaintiffs they experienced were exacerbated upon learning of abuses occurring at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. The amended complaint, filed on behalf of 47 individuals, asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by a private law firm. In February 2014, Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Additionally, the plaintiffs in this case sued based on events at Signal's Orange, Texas site, whereas plaintiffs in cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana sued based on events at Signal's Pascagoula, Mississippi site. Although the Court declined to transfer this case, in May 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn entered a consent order that discovery from the cases in the Eastern District of Louisiana would be allowed to be used here. Additionally, in Dec. 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana. In Oct. 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn granted Signal's motion to compel production of plaintiffs' T- and U-visas and applications for such visas. Although a similar motion had already been denied for the cases pending in the Eastern District of Louisiana, the court found that the materials' relevance outweighed any potential in terrorem effect. The Court warned that it would reconsider if Signal sought discovery that was clearly aimed at harassment. Plaintiffs did not comply with this order until Mar. 4, 2015, but the court denied Signal's motion for sanctions, saying its lack of diligence in pursuing the documents rendered it ineligible for relief. In March 2015, the Court held that Texas laws should apply in the breach of contract and fraud claims, because it did not find that a true conflict existed between Texas and other jurisdictions. In July 2015, the court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual Chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA, with a liquidation trust for distribution of settlement proceeds, became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, Joseph, the parties are updating the court every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. As of the parties' most recent Feb. 27, 2020 update to the Court, this settlement process remains ongoing. The stay remains effective in light of Signal's ongoing bankruptcy case.

Summary: On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed suit in E.D. Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In July 2015, the Court ordered to stay the case due to Signal's bankruptcy, with status reports on the proceedings due every 120 days.


On September 30, 2011, the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against C&F Mortgage Corporation. The suit was brought on behalf of African-American and Hispanic borrowers against C&F Mortgage Corporation, alleging that it had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and/or national origin against black and Hispanic borrowers. Specifically, the complaint alleged that C&F Mortgage Corporation, on average, charged both black and Hispanic borrowers approximately 20 basis points more than it charged to similarly-situated whites. The plaintiff also filed a motion for approval of a consent order on September 30, 2011. The Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) entered a final consent order on October 4, 2011 and maintained that it would retain jurisdiction over the case to enforce the terms of the Order. Under the provisions of the order, C&F agreed to implement policies and procedures designed to ensure that the prices charged for C&F's residential loan products, including the portion of the price that reflects the discretion of the loan officer or any other employee, are set in a nondiscriminatory manner consistent with the requirements of the FHA and the ECOA. In addition, C&F agreed to compensate certain black and Hispanic borrowers. The terms of the Order ended on January 17, 2014 and the Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On September 30, 2011 the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division filed a complaint and consent order on September 30, 2011 on behalf of African-American and Hispanic borrowers against CFMortgage Corporation alleging discriminatory lending practices. The Court entered a final order on October 4, 2011.


On May 1, 2018, Texas and six other states brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States and various officials in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs, represented by the Office of the Attorney General of Texas, claimed that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, created by a 2012 executive action by the Obama Administration, violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs claimed that the DACA program granted lawful presence to millions of unlawfully present aliens without congressional authorization. They sought to preliminarily enjoin the government from issuing or renewing any DACA permits in the future and to declare that DACA violated the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA. On May 8, 2018, DACA recipients and state of New Jersey moved to intervene as defendants and Judge Andrew S. Hanen granted the motion on May 15. The defendant then moved to dismiss the case on May 29 without prejudice or transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, where a similar case was being litigated. Judge Hanen denied the motion to dismiss on May 30. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on June 25, 2018 and added the state of Kansas and two governors as plaintiffs. The amended complaint maintained the identical allegations and sought the identical reliefs as the original complaint. On July 5, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On August 31, Judge Hanen denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. The court found that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim related to both the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA and that they had made a clear showing of irreparable injury. However, the court denied the injunction because it found that the plaintiffs had delayed seeking this relief for years, the balance of private interests fell in favor of denying of the relief, and implementing the relief was contrary to the public interest. The court did not rule on the whether the DACA program violated the Constitution’s Take Care Clause. 328 F. Supp. 3d 662, 740 (S.D. Tex. 2018). On February 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on all counts. In the defendants’ reply, they agreed that the plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their substantive claim under the APA. However, the defendant opposed summary judgment on the procedural claim under the APA and the Take Care Clause claim. On November 22, 2019, Judge Hanen issued an order staying the motion until the Supreme Court ruled on cases involving the rescinding of DACA (Regents of Univ. of California v. DHS, NAACP v. Trump, and Wolf v. Vidal). These cases had been heard at oral argument three days prior on November 19. Even though they had been focused on the question of DACA's rescission, the Justices had touched on issues relevant to its issuance. Judge Hanen therefore agreed with the defendant-intervenors that the Supreme Court's opinion could potentially resolve this case. 2019 WL 6255351. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court issued its opinion for Regents of Univ. of California v. DHS, holding that DHS's 2017 order rescinding DACA was arbitrary and capricious. Judge Hanen ordered the parties to compile a joint status report on how this would affect the case by July 24. On August 21, 2020, Judge Hanen denied plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Although he dismissed the defendant-intervenors' arguments that the Regents decision implied the need for additional discovery and supplemental briefings, he did hold that it may impact the legal issues here and that a "clean slate" would be the best way to proceed. Consequently, he denied the motion without prejudice and gave the plaintiff states leave to file a new motion for summary judgment. 2020 WL 6440497. The plaintiff states filed their new motion on October 9, 2020, essentially reiterating their original motion. The defendant-intervenors also moved for summary judgment on November 6, 2020, claiming that plaintiffs lack standing. The Court heard oral arguments for these motions on December 22, 2020. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” Two days later, defendant-intervenors notified the court that the federal defendants would be taking steps related to the DACA memorandum and shifting their position on the case. The defendant-intervenors requested a status conference to discuss how President Biden’s memorandum would impact the substantive and procedural aspects of this litigation. Considering both the Presidential memorandum and that the House of Representatives passed the American Dream and Promise Act—an act that would create a pathway to citizenship for DACA recipients--, Judge Hanen granted defendant-intervenors request for a status conference. The parties discussed the possible impact of the American Dream and Promise Act on the litigation at a status conference on March 30. 2021. Both parties filed supplemental briefs on April 9, 2021. As of May 14, 2021, Judge Hanen had yet to rule on motions for summary judgment.

Summary: On May 1, 2018, seven states brought actions for declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States in the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs claimed that the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, created by a 2012 executive action by the Obama Administration, violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs sought to preliminarily enjoin the government from issuing or renewing any DACA permits in the future and to declare that DACA violated the procedural and substantive aspects of the APA. The preliminary injunction was denied in August 2018. In October and November of 2020, both parties filed for summary judgment. The case is ongoing.


On September 19, 2005, an African American employee, on behalf of other African American employees, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff sued Tobacco Superstores Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, represented by the EEOC, asked the court for injunctive and individual relief, claiming that she and other African American employees were denied promotions because of their race, and that she was constructively discharged because of her race. The defendant filed two motions for summary judgment requesting that the court deny thirty-four individual class members from joining the case. The court granted and denied in part the defendants motion. On August 4, 2008, District Judge William R. Wilson approved a consent decree. The decree enjoined the defendant from discrimination or retaliation; required the defendant to create and distribute non-discrimination and promotion policies; and required management at Tobacco Superstores to participate in anti-discrimination trainings. The defendant also agreed to pay $425,000 in monetary relief to resolve the lawsuit. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.

Summary: On September 19, 2005, an African American employee, on behalf of other African American employees, filed this lawsuit against Tobacco Superstores Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff, represented by the EEOC, alleged that she and other were denied promotions because of their race. She also alleged that Tobacco Superstores Inc. constructively discharged her because of her race. In 2008, District Judge William R. Wilson approved a consent decree granting injunctive and monetary relief. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.


On October 10, 2013 a female African-American victim of domestic violence filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued under the Federal Fair Housing Act, the Violence Against Women Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Borough of Norristown. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Women's Rights Project, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages for violation of the plaintiff's first, fourth, and fourteenth amendment rights. The plaintiff specifically alleged that she risked eviction from her home and bodily injury due to the enforcement of two consecutive ordinances that permitted landlords to evict tenants where tenants have required the assistance of law enforcement for repeated incidents of "disorderly behavior," including instances of domestic violence. Between April and September 2012, the defendants enforced the Old Ordinance against the plaintiff's landlord and attempted to remove the plaintiff from her home because police were called too many times. The plaintiff was placed on a 30-day probationary period, during which she was attacked and almost killed by her former boyfriend, but did not call police for fear that she would lose her home. The defendants continued to take steps to remove the plaintiff from her home until the plaintiff's counsel interceded and demonstrated how the enforcement of the Old Ordinance violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The defendants proceeded to enact a nearly identical replacement ordinance (the "New Ordinance") in December 2012, with the addition of enforcement of criminal fines against the landlords. On October 30, 2014, the parties settled. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $495,000 in damages and to repeal the Ordinance. Further, in the future the defendants agreed not adopt an ordinance that would penalize a resident, tenant, or landlord as a result of requests for police or emergency assistance made by or on behalf of a victim of abuse.

Summary: In 2013, a female victim of domestic violence filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Borough of Norristown. The plaintiff alleged that she risked eviction from her home and bodily injury due to the enforcement of two consecutive ordinances that permitted landlords to evict tenants where tenants have required the assistance of law enforcement for repeated incidents of "disorderly behavior," including instances of domestic violence. The parties settled with the defendant agreeing to pay damages and to repeal the ordinance.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action complaint brought by six detainees in Wayne County Jail, seeking injunctive, declaratory and habeas relief. The petitioners sought the release or transfers to home confinement of medically vulnerable inmates in light of the virus, as well as an injunction requiring COVID-19 mitigation measures. The case was almost immediately stayed and the issues moved to a longstanding state-court litigation about the jail's conditions, Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff
 On May 4, 2020, six detainees in Wayne County filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Represented by the Advancement Project, Civil Rights Corps, Detroit Justice Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. under § 2241, as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Specifically, they alleged that their detention violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to a serious risk of contracting COVID-19. The petitioners sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), injunctive relief, and a writ of habeas corpus requiring defendants to immediately release all subclass members who are medically vulnerable or transfer them to home confinement. They also sought adequate measures for safety and hygiene. The case was assigned to Judge Mark A. Goldsmith. The same day, the plaintiffs moved to certify the matter as a class action with a proposed class and three subclasses. The “Jail Class” consisted of “all current and future persons detained at the Wayne County Jail during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The subclasses included the “Pre-trial Subclass,” the “Post-conviction Subclass,” and the “Medically Vulnerable Subclass,” defined as: “All members of the Jail Class who are also over the age of fifty, or who, regardless of age, experience an underlying medical condition.” The plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion to expedite the motion for TRO, stressing that Wayne County Jail had 29 confirmed positive cases amongst detainees and almost 200 amongst staff as of April 30, 2020. At the time of filing, COVID-19 had already killed two jail physicians and two deputies. The Court suggested the parties discuss whether relief could be sought in state court, where the defendant was a party to a consent decree that monitored the quality of conditions in the jail. Wayne County Jail Inmates v. Wayne County Sheriff. On May 27, the parties agreed to reopen the case underlying the state consent decree and began actively litigating the case in state court. As such, on June 4, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the federal court proceedings, and the defendants filed a motion stating they did not object to the stay on June 24. The court granted the motion to stay on December 28, 2020; this same order also dismissed the plaintiff's TRO motion and motion to certify class. Further information on the state proceedings can be found in the state court summary, linked above.

Summary: On May 4, 2020, six detainees in Wayne County petitioned for the release of all medically-vulnerable detainees and the implementation of coronavirus-related measures for safety and hygiene. Represented by the Advancement Project, Civil Rights Corps, Detroit Justice Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that their detention violates their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to a serious risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, a TRO (temporary restraining order), injunctive relief, and a writ of habeas corpus. The case was stayed because the parties reopened underlying state court litigation where the defendant was already under consent decree, the litigation continued in state court only.


On October 15, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, under the Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631, against the owner of a 48 unit apartment complex and its property managers. The U.S. sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief and civil penalties, alleging that the managers frequently used the n-word and other slurs to refer to black tenants, threatened tenants with eviction without cause, filed false police reports, turned off heat, threatened assault, and retaliated when complainants took complaints to the owners and to the Housing Commission. The complaint alleged that the owners knew of the managers' behavior and did nothing to stop it. On July 8, 2010, the District Court (Chief Judge Karen Schreier) entered a default judgment of liability against the property managers, and on August 17, 2010, the remaining parties reached a mediated agreement. The Court approved a three-year consent decree on December 21, 2010. The decree contained general prohibitions against race discrimination, prohibited the owners from ever employing the managers again, and required: <ul> <li>adoption of a non-discrimination policy, to be posted at every property in which defendants had any financial interest <li> posting of the Equal Housing Opportunity logo in all advertising and at all properties <li> training all agents and employees in the requirements of the Fair Housing Act, <li> recordkeeping and reporting. </ul> The Defendants also agreed to pay $26,000 in compensatory damages to the complainants and $4,000 in civil penalties to the United States. On March 9, 2011, the Court ordered the defaulting property managers each to pay $15,000 in civil penalties to the United States Treasury, and entered injunctive relief prohibiting them for three years from operating, consulting, managing, staffing, participating in, working in paid or unpaid positions, or otherwise having any involvement in the management, rental, or maintenance of any dwelling, as defined by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §802(b). The three-year period has ended and the case is now closed.

Summary: The United States filed a lawsuit in the District of South Dakota on October 15, 2009 under the Fair Housing Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631, against the owner of a 48 unit apartment complex and its property managers. The U.S. sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief and civil penalties, alleging that the managers frequently used racial slurs to refer to black tenants, threatened them with eviction without cause, filed false police reports, turned off heat, threatened assault, and retaliated when complainants took their complaint to the owners and to the Housing Commission. The Complaint alleged that the owners knew of the managers' behavior and did nothing to stop it. On December 21, 2010, the parties settled the claim against the owners resulting in a three-year injunction with anti-discrimination policy, advertising, training, and monitoring provisions, as well as $30,000 in damages and penalties. The manager defendants defaulted and were ordered to pay $15,000 each in penalties, and prohibited from operating any housing entity covered by the Fair Housing Act.


This is a case about alleged wrongful retaliation and wrongful discharge of a public defender as a result of an amicus brief that was critical of Montgomery County’s money bail system. A former Montgomery County chief public defender filed this suit against Montgomery Country on March 17th, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She sued the County for First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and for wrongful discharge under the common law of Pennsylvania. Represented by the Civil Rights Corps and Kairys, Rudovsky, Messing, Feinberg & Lin, she sought injunctive relief, reinstatement, and compensatory damages. Before she was fired, the plaintiff became aware of a class-action mandamus petition filed by the ACLU of Pennsylvania in March 2019: Philadelphia Community Bail Fund v. Arraignment Court Magistrates. In the petition, the Bail Fund alleged that the bail system in Philadelphia County violated both the federal and state constitutions in three ways: 1) lack of consideration of the ability of defendants to pay, 2) purposeful imposition of higher monetary conditions to ensure pretrial incarceration, and 3) lack of due process in its preliminary arraignments. To highlight the existence of similar violations in Montgomery County and throughout Pennsylvania, the plaintiff “directed the filing of” an amicus brief in support of the Bail Fund in early February 2020. She was fired on February 26, 2020, she alleged, as a result. On May 18th, 2020, Montgomery County moved to dismiss the case. Montgomery County asserted that the speech at issue was not in fact the plaintiff’s own speech because she did not draft, file, or sign the amicus brief in question, and therefore she lacked standing to seek protections under the First Amendment. Moreover, the County argued that the speech in question was not citizen speech since it was prepared as part of the professional duties and with the specialized knowledge of the Montgomery County Office of Public Defender. Finally, the County argued that the wrongful discharge claim should be dismissed because the County had immunity for a claim of wrongful discharge. The plaintiff filed a response to the motion on June 8th, 2020, and on June 16th, 2020 the defendants filed their reply. Judge Joshua Wolson has not yet ruled on the motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 17th, 2020 a former chief public defender of Montgomery County filed a suit against the county for wrongful retaliation and wrongful discharge. She alleged that she was fired because she directed her office to file an amicus brief critical of the County's money bail system. She claimed that this violated her rights protected by the First Amendment and the common law of Pennsylvania. Montgomery County moved to dismiss the case, and the judge has not yet ruled on the motion.


On July 15, 2016, four African-American New York City homeowners filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the United States Department of Housing and Development (“HUD”) and Caliber Home Loans, Inc. under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C § 1692 et seq., and New York state law. They claimed HUD’s Note Sale program violated homeowner participants’ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and had a disparate impact on both African-American homeowners and predominately African-American neighborhoods in New York City. The plaintiffs, represented by Mobilization for Justice and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages. HUD’s Federal Housing Administration’s (“FHA”) mortgage program was designed to support homeownership for low- and moderate-income Americans, providing benefits to help ensure that homeowners can maintain homeownership. Participants pay to receive these benefits. Beginning in 2010, HUD began selling delinquent FHA-insured mortgages to private investors without notice to the homeowners, who were then removed from the FHA mortgage program without notice. The plaintiffs claimed that these sales happened disproportionately in predominately African-American neighborhoods. They claimed the private investors, such as defendant Caliber Home Loans, then offered fewer protections to homeowners, and even pushed them into predatory mortgage modifications. This led to higher foreclosure rates for these participants, adversely impacting African Americans and destabilizing African-American neighborhoods in New York City. On December 9, 2016, the case was reassigned from Judge Carol Bagley Amon to Judge Eric N. Vitaliano. On July 12, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On July 29, 2019, Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold recommended that HUD's motion to dismiss be granted, finding issues with both standing and the plaintiffs' failure to state a claim. Before Judge Vitaliano made a decision on whether to adopt Judge Gold's findings, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement on November 15, 2019. The court closed the case on November 20, 2019.

Summary: In 2016, four African-American New York City homeowners filed this class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs claimed that the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)'s sale of federally-insured mortgages to private investors had a disparate impact on African-American homeowners and violated homeowner participants' due process rights. Before the court ruled on any motions, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement. The court closed the case on November 20, 2019.


On September 7, 2018, five Oregon residents filed this class-action lawsuit against members of the Oregon Department of Transportation, the Oregon Transportation Commission, and the Oregon Department of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiffs, represented by the Oregon Law Center, sued the defendants under 42 U.S.C. §1983. They alleged that Oregon’s statewide policy of suspending drivers licenses of Oregon residents who accrued unpaid traffic fines without allowing those individuals the opportunity to demonstrate an inability to pay was a violation of those individuals’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to due process and equal protection. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and attorney’s fees. This case was initially assigned to Judge Anna Brown on September 10, 2018, but was re-assigned to Judge Marco Hernandez on September 14, 2018. In the first complaint, the plaintiffs consisted of five Oregon residents who had their licenses suspended as a result of unpaid traffic debt. All alleged they were unable to pay these fines because of their individual economic situations. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 6, 2018. In this complaint, they added a new plaintiff: a Washington resident who had his license suspended in Oregon. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on September 7, 2018. In their motion, they asked for the plaintiffs and all others in their class to have their license suspensions for nonpayment removed. They also asked that plaintiffs and everyone else in their class receive the opportunity to demonstrate inability to pay before the defendants suspend their licenses again. Judge Hernandez rejected this motion on December 12, 2018, stating in his opinion that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on their claims. 358 F.Supp.3d 1145 Although the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit as a class action suit, for unknown reasons the plaintiffs submitted an unopposed motion to withdraw their class certification request on January 11, 2019. This motion was granted on January 14, 2019. The plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint on February 25, 2019, adding another Oregon resident as a plaintiff. On March 1, 2019, the defendants sought to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Holding that the court had jurisdiction but the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, the court granted the motion to dismiss on May 16, 2019. Relying on the same legal analysis and discussion found in the opinion denying preliminary injunction, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim “because as a matter of law, the challenged statutes do not implicate a fundamental constitutional right, do not implicate a suspect classification, and are rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” 2019 WL 2251290. The plaintiffs appealed this case on June 11, 2019 (docket number 19-35506); this case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, a group of indigent drivers in Oregon filed this class action suit against various departments of the State of Oregon. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy of suspending drivers licenses for drivers who have accrued unpaid traffic violation fines is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth amendment absent a way for those individuals to demonstrate an inability to pay. On May 16, 2019, Judge Hernandez granted the defendants' request for motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed; this case is ongoing.


On February 15, 2012, a non-profit Catholic-based organization of priests united in ideology against the practice of abortion filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs, represented by the American Freedom Law Center and private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their religious foundation. On May 14, 2012, the Priests amended their complaint raising the same issues but emphasizing that their health care plan is not a grandfather plan under the ACA and is therefore not entitled under the regulation to a temporary exemption from the mandate. On September 12, 2012, the U.S. moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it was unripe, since the regulations were in the process of being amended; and on November 9, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. On December 21, the parties entered a stipulation, under which the U.S. would not enforce the contraception mandate at least through December 2013. Plaintiff's counsel explained that the plaintiff was not, in its own view, entitled under the applicable regulations to a temporary exemption from the mandate; the U.S. argued otherwise, explaining that the plaintiff met the temporary enforcement safe harbor criteria. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Frederic Bock) granted the Government's motion to dismiss because the Priests' claims were not yet ripe. The court found that that Government was in the process of amending the regulation. These amendments would take effect prior to the end of the safe harbor period such that the regulation in its current form would never be enforced against the Priests or similarly situated entities. And because the rules the contents of the new rules are yet to be determined, the Priests dissatisfaction with the new rules is purely speculative. The case was dismissed without prejudice. On August 13, 2013, this case was refiled in the District for the District of Columbia - Priests for Life v. Sebelius.

Summary: In 2012, Priests for Life filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On April 12, 2013, the District Court (Judge Frederic Bock) found that the relevant regulation was in the process of being amended and granted the Government's motion to dismiss for want of ripeness. On August 13, 2013, this case was refiled in the District for the District of Columbia - Priests for Life v. Sebelius.


On September 30, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against defendant First Wireless Groups, Inc. The case was assigned to Judge Joanna Seybert. The EEOC alleged discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and retaliation for participating in protected activities. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants paid Hispanic employees less than Asian employees even though the Asian employees were less productive. In addition, the complaint alleged that Asian employees retaliated against Hispanic employees and management following their opposition of the discrimination via intimidation, removal of privileges, banning the speaking of Spanish and terminating or constructively discharging a number of employees who signed a petition. On October 23, 2003, thirteen plaintiffs filed a motion to intervene on the lawsuit; all were represented by the same (private) attorney. Judge Seybert granted the motion in August 2004. The intervenors filed their own complaint in November 2003 where they made nearly identical allegations to those of the EEOC. Again in 2005, another plaintiff moved to intervene with very similar allegations. Her motion was granted, too bringing the total number of claimants (whose claims underlay the EEOC lawsuit) and intervenors to several dozen. After several years of discovery, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in March 2007. The defendant argued that evidence from discovery showed that, even assuming all of plaintiffs’ evidence was true, no discrimination took place. In February 2008, Judge Seybert granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion; she found that the disparate pay claim turned on contested factual issues, and therefore should proceed to trial. The Court found, also, that there were disputed facts relating to whether two particular individuals faced retaliation. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the retaliation claim for two claimants but granted the motion for everyone else. On October 30, 2008, the EEOC and plaintiff-intervenors entered into a consent decree with First Wireless. While the defendant did not admit fault, it agreed to pay $435,000 in back pay and compensatory damages, inclusive of attorneys fees. In addition, First Wireless agreed to post a notice of the settlement in a space visible to employees, provide neutral references for aggrieved employees, require all supervisory employees to undergo eight hours of equal employment training, and provide reports to the EEOC every six months for four years, the duration of the consent decree. No further action is noted on the docket of this case and it is presumably closed.

Summary: In October 2003, on behalf of Hispanic employees, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against First Wireless Groups, Inc. The complaint alleged that First Wireless, a private employer, discriminated against Hispanic employees. Several weeks later, thirteen current and former Hispanic employees successfully intervened in the lawsuit. In 2008, First Wireless entered into a consent decree with the EEOC and the 34 claimants where the company agreed to pay $435,000.