Prior to this case, five Native American petitioners brought an administrative complaint seeking the cancellation of the Washington Redskins’ (Pro-Football) trademarks containing the word “Redskins” because, they said, the word disparaged Native Americans and violated Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1520(a). The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“TTAB”) ruled in the petitioners’ favor and cancelled six federal trademark registrations containing the word “Redskin” as connected to the Washington D.C. professional football team, on the ground that these trademarks “may disparage” Native Americans. On August 14, 2014, Pro-Football Inc., owner and operator of the Washington Redskins football club, filed this complaint appealing the administrative outcome in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff also sought declaratory relief. More specifically, the plaintiff asked the court to declare that: Pro-Football had not disparaged Native Americans; Pro-Football had not brought contempt or disrepute to Native Americans; if there was a violation of the Lanham Act, then Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated the First Amendment; the Act was void for vagueness; and the Act violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; TTAB’s order violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment; the defendants were barred by the doctrine of laches (meaning that the defendants waited too long to bring the administrative complaint, and therefore the defendants’ petition should have been void). On September 14, 2014, the plaintiff served a notice of their constitutional challenges on the United States. The notice argued that section 2(a) of the Lanham Act violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment and the Fifth Amendment. In response, on January 9, 2015, the U.S. answered the plaintiff’s challenge and gave the court notice that the U.S. would intervene as a defendant. Shortly afterward, the United States became an interested party and defendant in the lawsuit. All parties involved proceeded to move for summary judgment and cross summary judgment for various claims. On February 23, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the constitutional claims of the Lanham Act. On February 26, 2015, the defendants also moved for summary judgment to dismiss some of the plaintiff’s claims. These claims were count one (TTAB erred in ruling that the trademarks “may disparage” Native Americans), count two (TTAB erred in ruling that the trademarks may bring Native Americans into “contempt or disrepute,” and count seven (the plaintiff’s laches claim). On March 23, 2015, the United States moved for summary judgment in defense of the constitutionality of the statute. The United States argument was that Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1520(a) did not violate the First or the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On July 8, 2015, the court denied the plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment. 112 F.Supp.3d 439. The court, however, granted the individual defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment in defense of the constitutional claims. Plaintiffs appealed. On January 18, 2018, the Fourth Circuit vacated the district court opinion and remanded. The per curiam appellate decision noted that while this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court in Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, determined that §1052(a) violated the free speech clause of the First Amendment. Therefore, here, the district court’s decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with Matal v. Tam. In response, on March 20, 2018, the district court remanded the matter to the TTAB for further proceedings consistent with Matal. This court case is closed; the administrative matter is pending.

Summary: In 2014, Plaintiff, Pro-Football, Inc. owner and operator of the Washington Redskins football club, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit to appeal an earlier decision that cancelled six federal trademark registrations containing the word “Redskin” as connected to the Washington D.C. professional football team.. In 2015, this court ruled in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff appeals later that year to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals observed that the Supreme Court of the United States declared Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act unconstitutional. Therefore, the district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling. In response, the district court in turn on March 20, 2018, remanded the matter to the TTAB for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's ruling. This court case is closed; the administrative matter is pending.


After eleven years of litigation and five failed consent decrees, Camden County, New Jersey corrections officials have finally agreed to pay $160,000 to settle a federal civil rights suit that alleged severe overcrowding, sanitation, poor nutrition, and environmental violations of prisoners’ rights. On January 6, 2005, plaintiffs filed pro se action alleging that severe overcrowding at the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) has caused serious deprivations of their health and safety in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 2005 WL 6022128. CCCF housed inmates awaiting trial or sentenced to less than one year in prison. The complaint sought court-ordered improvements for the CCCF, rather than monetary awards for all inmates. Magistrate Judge Rosen appointed pro bono counsel for the plaintiffs, and upon the appointment of counsel, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that CCCF was constructed in 1988 and designed to house 1,267 prisoners. By March 2004, the population exceeded 1,800 prisoners and at other points, exceeded 2,000 prisoners, which resulted in an extremely overpopulated and understaffed facility which creating an unsafe, unhealthy, and unsanitary environment for people incarcerated therein. 2005 WL 6022128. On July 31, 2007, the court granted the defendants' motion for class certification, certifying a class of all individuals incarcerated at CCCF from the inception of the lawsuit to January 6, 2005, including pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners. 2005 WL 6022128. In January 2009, the parties entered into a consent decree (“First Consent Decree”) which authorized the retention of a criminal justice planning firm, which provided a number of recommendations for the improvement of conditions at CCCF. Chief among those conditions was the creation by the County of a “Jail Population Manager.” This manager would be responsible for monitoring, coordinating, and ensuring the efficient processing of the jail population and would serve as a liaison to the Superior Court of New Jersey, the municipal courts, the prosecutor, the defense bar, and other community corrections programs. 2005 WL 6022128. In August 2009, the parties entered into another consent decree (“Second Consent Decree”) which the court approved. The Second Consent Decree authorized the implementation of many of the criminal justice planning firm’s recommendations. In April 2011, the parties entered into another consent decree (“Third Consent Decree”). At that time, a full-time jail population manager was hired. Subsequently, the court awarded attorneys' fees on October 5, 2009. 2005 WL 6022128. Ultimately, on June 30, 2017, U.S. District Court Judge Jerome Simandle approved a final consent decree. The final consent decree created a system whereby population levels at the CCCF will be maintained at lower levels, more efficient jail-management practices instituted, and conditions of confinement substantially improved. Under the terms of the consent decree, in addition to improvements at CCCF, attorneys representing the prisoners received $155,000 in legal fees, two of the four named plaintiffs were each paid $1,500 and the other two were paid $1,000 each. The case is now closed.

Summary: After eleven years of litigation and five failed consent decrees, Camden County, New Jersey corrections officials have finally agreed to pay $160,000 to settle a federal civil rights class action that alleged severe overcrowding, sanitation, poor nutrition, and environmental violations of prisoners’ rights. Ultimately, on June 30, 2017, U.S. District Court Judge Jerome Simandle approved a final consent decree. The final consent decree created a system whereby population levels at the CCCF will be maintained at lower levels, more efficient jail-management practices instituted, and conditions of confinement substantially improved.


On August 2, 2018, various cities and city officials across the country and one married couple from Charlottesville, Virginia, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Donald J. Trump (in his official capacity as President of the United States), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act and Take Care Clause regarding various executive actions related to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that a final rule promulgated by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in April 2018 undermined many of the ACA’s safeguards and requirements. Plaintiffs also pointed to a variety of other executive actions they claim demonstrate Defendants’ violation of their constitutional duty to faithfully execute the ACA. Plaintiffs are represented by their respective legal departments and Democracy Forward Foundation. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the rule and other executive behaviors, as well as an order for Defendants to take various steps to comply with their constitutional obligation to take care to faithfully execute the ACA. They also request costs and attorney’s fees. This case was assigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow. Plaintiffs include cities (and/or city officials) from Columbus, Ohio; Baltimore, Maryland; Cincinnati, Ohio; Chicago, Illinois; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (added through an amended complaint filed January 25, 2019); and a married couple who resides in Charlottesville, Virginia. They alleged that the Final Rule would eliminate protections guaranteed by the ACA, deter Americans from enrolling in quality health insurance plans, and drive up insurance costs. They further alleged that the Executive branch has directed agencies to “sabotage” the ACA, committed various actions in an attempt to destabilize the exchanges, has strategically worked to decrease enrollment, has arbitrarily driven up premiums, and has refused to defend the ACA. They claim that these actions have caused premiums to rise and the uninsured to increase, harming Government Plaintiffs by forcing them to spend more on uncompensated care. They also alleged that Defendant’s actions harm Individual Plaintiffs by making insurance coverage harder and more expensive to procure. The complaint stated two causes of action, first under the Administrative Procedure Act (alleging that the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious) and second under the Take Care clause (U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3). After the complaint was initially filed in August 2018, the court granted Defendants two time extensions to respond. On December 25, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. On January 25, 2019, Plaintiffs amended their complaint, adding Philadelphia as a plaintiff and including recent executive actions that allegedly constitute part of a systematic attack on health law. Defendants were granted three additional time extensions to respond to Plaintiff’s complaint in January and February, 2019, then they filed an updated motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs filed a memo in opposition to the motion to dismiss in June, and the U.S. House of Representatives along with thirteen counties and cities filed amicus "friend-of-the-court" briefs in support of plaintiffs. On April 10, 2020, Judge Chasanow granted the defendants' motion in part and denied it in part. 453 F. Supp. 3d 770. After finding that the plaintiff's claims were justiciable, Judge Chasanow denied the motion to dismiss for the APA claims because the record was not sufficient to evaluate that claim, but granted the defendants' motion for the Take Care claim because "judicial intervention here would impinge on the discretion that Congress has afforded to the President." Three days later, the defendants moved for summary judgment. As of January 21, 2021, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Five cities and a married couple sued President Trump, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services regarding a Final Rule published in April 2018. Plaintiffs alleged that the rule, as well as various actions taken by the Executive branch related to the Affordable Care Act (ACA), violated the Administrative Procedure Act and Take Care Clause. The Take Care claims were dismissed, but the APA claims proceed.


On April 22, 2013, an inmate of the Nebraska Department of Corrections and his intended spouse filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Nebraska Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs represented themselves pro se and claimed that their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause had been violated. They asked the court to allow the transgender plaintiff to change the sex listed on her birth certificate, to allow her to marry the male plaintiff, for the free plaintiff to gain visitation rights to the incarcerated plaintiff, and for the plaintiffs to be allowed to wear hats during Quaker religious ceremonies. One half of the plaintiff couple is an inmate who wished to marry the other half the couple, who is a transgender woman and a former inmate in the facility in which the other plaint still resides. This prison does not allow former inmates to visit those that are still incarcerated for a period three years after their release unless there is an immediate family relationship. The plaintiffs claim that this restriction on visitation interferes with their First Amendment right to freedom of association, and that Nebraska's ban on same-sex marriage violated their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. They further allege that their inability to marry denies the couple many benefits that married couples enjoy. On April 17, 2014, the court (Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf) ordered that all the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed except the one alleging interference of First Amendment rights, which was allowed to proceed to service of process. Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf stated that the plaintiffs' motion to allow the wearing of hats for religious reasons was unrelated to the to the claims alleged in the complaint, and that the plaintiffs must address this claim in a separate action. On November 3, 2014, plaintiffs' complaint and amended complaint were dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs appealed, but the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined their appeal to be untimely on January 15, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 22, 2013, an inmate of the Nebraska Department of Corrections and his intended spouse filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court in the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Nebraska Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs represented themselves pro se and claimed that their constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, Due Process Clause, and Equal Protection Clause have been violated. They asked the court to allow the transgender plaintiff to change the sex listed on her birth certificate, to allow her to marry the male plaintiff, for the free plaintiff to gain visitation rights to the incarcerated plaintiff, and for the plaintiffs to be allowed to wear hats during Quaker religious ceremonies. On April 17, 2014, the court (Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf) ordered that all the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed except the one alleging interference of First Amendment rights, which was allowed to proceed to service of process. Senior Judge Richard G. Kopf stated that the plaintiffs' movement to allow the wearing of hats for religious reasons was unrelated to the to the claims alleged in the complaint, and that the plaintiffs must address this claim in a separate action. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice, and the case is now closed.


On March 16, 2007, an employee of a poultry plant in Alabama, filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and other hourly wage employees. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against two managers at the Pilgrim's Pride poultry plant in Russellville, Alabama. The plaintiff alleged that Pilgrim's Pride, one of the largest poultry operations in the country, and its predecessor, Gold Kist, engaged in a massive scheme to hire undocumented immigrants for the express purpose of depressing employee wages. The complaint argued that the defendants' scheme violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq. and the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), et seq. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel. The complaint argued that, in furtherance of their scheme, the defendants recruited scores of undocumented immigrants to work in their plants, provided free temporary housing at hotels, provided them transportation to and from work, turned a blind eye to obviously fake work papers, and reprimanded employees for "looking at the papers too closely." The plaintiff further alleged that after the defendants were notified of workers using false social security numbers, the undocumented workers would then simply assume new bogus identities and continue working. The representative plaintiff herself was an hourly employee of the Russellville Facility, and stated that her wages were depressed as a result of hiring scheme. The complaint sought to define a class of "all other persons legally authorized to be employed in the U.S. who have been employed at Gold Kist and Pilgrim's Pride Facilities nationwide, as hourly wage earners in the last four years." The defendants moved to dismiss the case on May 7, 2007 and then moved for summary judgment later that month on May 31. On June 22, the Court dismissed without prejudice the latter motion and stayed discovery pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss. The Court denied this motion on March 11, 2008, ordering the plaintiff to amend her complaint to assert injury as a result of RICO violations rather than a "conspiracy to hire unauthorized aliens." The plaintiff filed the amended complaint on March 20, and then a second amended complaint on May 2, 2008. On July 28, 2008, one of the two managers was dismissed as a defendant pursuant to a stipulation. On November 29, 2010, the Court (Lynwood Smith) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed with prejudice all of the plaintiff's claims. Specifically, the had plaintiff sought to introduce an expert witness who was going to demonstrate that the plaintiff's wages were depressed due to the defendants' alleged employment of legally ineligible workers. The Court stated that the plaintiff did not contest that it was their only evidence regarding causation between wage depression and RICO violations. In the same order, the Court denied the admission of the expert witness because the plaintiff did not demonstrate his testimony would be necessarily helpful nor that his methodology was reliable. In the absence of necessary causation evidence, the Court deemed summary judgment appropriate. 753 F.Supp.2d 1113. On December 24, 2010, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, which was dismissed with prejudice on February 14, 2011. The plaintiff was directed to pay costs in the amount of $56,607.02. This case is closed.

Summary: On March 16, 2007, an employee of a poultry plant in Alabama, filed this class action on behalf of herself and other hourly wage employees. The plaintiff alleged that her employer had engaged in a scheme of intentionally hiring undocumented immigrants to suppress wages. The court dismissed the case for a lack of causation evidence.


On March 11, 2013, a prisoner in the Pennsylvania state prison system filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The prisoner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials and correctional officers of the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution in Greene County, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Greene"). The prisoner, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as attorneys' fees and costs, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Specifically, the prisoner claimed that one of the defendant correctional officers beat him, causing permanent injury. He claimed other correctional officers who witnessed the beating failed to intervene and then conspired with the first correctional officer to cover up the excessive use of force. The prisoner also brought a claim against the officials for a failure to supervise the correctional officer who used excessive force. Originally filed pro se, the prisoner retained counsel on July 3, 2013 and filed an amended complaint on August 12, 2013. On March 26, 2014, the prisoner filed a second amended complaint. In October 2014, the parties settled the case with a private settlement agreement whose terms are not public. The court closed the case but did not dismiss it. Either party can initiate further proceedings. As of February 27, 2016, no new proceedings have been initiated.

Summary: In 2013, prisoner in the Pennsylvania state prison system filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The prisoner sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials and correctional officers of the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution in Greene County, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Greene"), claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The parties settled in 2014.


On October 12, 2005, an inmate in the Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), its executive director, and the warden of the Eastham Unit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §2000, and Texas State Code §110.001. The plaintiff alleged that the TDCJ and specifically the Eastham Unit denied him access to a kosher diet, which he required as part of his sincere religious belief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. This case was assigned to Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. On December 19, 2005, this case was consolidated with a similar case also regarding the rights of a Jewish inmate under RLUIPA. On April 6, 2006, both parties moved to stay the litigation pending settlement negotiations to address both plaintiffs’ claims. This was approved on April 12, 2006. The court requested progress reports at the beginning of each month regarding the status of settlement negotiations. In September of 2006, the second plaintiff who joined the case passed away. The consolidation order was withdrawn on October 16, 2006. The parties continued to file status reports on settlement negotiations, but on June 1, 2007 the plaintiff was transferred to the Stringfellow unit where a kosher kitchen was recently put in operation. On November 20, 2007, this case was transferred to the Southern District of Texas because the court determined that was a more proper venue as the Stringfellow unit was located in the Southern District. Based upon this transfer, on August 22, 2008, the defendants moved to dismiss the case and, in the alternative, moved for summary judgment. They argued that the plaintiff received the relief sought. However, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 11, 2008 claiming that the defendants refused to guarantee that he would receive kosher meals if transferred to another unit. On March 26, 2009, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff received the relief sought. Further, the court ruled that the plaintiff’s amended complaint regarding the defendant’s future actions was inconsequential on the grounds that he could always file another suit and that government actors should be “accorded a presumption of good faith because they are public servants.” The plaintiff appealed the judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on April 10, 2009. While the appeal was pending, the plaintiff was transferred to the Stiles Unit for disciplinary reasons. There, kosher meals were available for purchase but not provided. The Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court on February 5, 2010. The Fifth Circuit found that this case was no longer moot since the conditions the plaintiff complained of about had substantially changed following his transfer. 364 Fed. Appx. 110. On December 10, 2010, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. Their motions were fully briefed and the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) filed a brief arguing that the defendants had not met their burden of demonstrating a compelling government interest to justify the substantial burden placed on the plaintiff given the refusal to provide him with a kosher diet. Further, the defendants did not show that this refusal was the least restrictive means of furthering the defendants’ interest. On September 20, 2011, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on two grounds: (1) that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement and (2) that the defendants established the plaintiff’s “lack of sincerity regarding [his] kosher practice as a matter of law.” 2011 WL 4376482. Since RLUIPA required the inmate show a substantial burden on his religious belief, a necessary component of this burden was to establish that his religious belief was sincere. The court found that the plaintiff only offered a conclusory declaration that his religious dietary needs were sincere, and rather “his personal desire to harass defendants with an unnecessary lawsuit took precedence…” Id. The plaintiff filed an appeal on October 14, 2011 and on December 21, 2012 the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded to the district court. The Fifth Circuit disagreed that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement. The Court held, contra the district court, that the plaintiff did not need to “re-exhaust” his grievance due to the changed circumstances in the case. The Fifth Circuit also found that the defendants had not proved the plaintiff’s lack of sincerity and that religious lapses were not equal to insincerity. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit found that there was a remaining factual question: whether there was a less restrictive means for minimizing costs and maintaining security than to force the plaintiff to pay for his kosher meal. The court said that if there was a less restrictive means, then RLUIPA commands that the defendants adopt it. 2012 WL 6635226. This case went back to the district court where the discovery process continued until April 4, 2014 when the parties again moved to stay the case in order to negotiate a settlement. The parties ultimately reached a private settlement agreement. According to a court-mandated status report, the plaintiff had been moved from the Stiles Unit back to the Stringfellow Unit on April 18, 2013 where he was participating in the Jewish dietary program and receiving kosher meals. On January 8, 2016, both parties issued a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, which was granted on March 31, 2017. This case is now closed.

Summary: On October 12, 2005, an inmate of Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), its executive director and the warden of the Eastham Unit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000, and Texas State Code §110.001. The plaintiff alleged that the TDCJ and specifically the Eastham Unit denied him access to a kosher diet, which he required as part of his sincere religious belief. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. After a number of motions to dismiss and subsequent appeals, the parties eventually reached a private settlement agreement which was granted on March 31, 2017 wherein the plaintiff was transferred to a prison with access to a Jewish dietary program. This case is now closed.


On March 13, 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of Georgia under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 14141. The Complaint, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleged that the State failed to protect the constitutional rights of juveniles incarcerated in the State's correctional facilities. Specifically, the State denied the youths adequate special educational services and medical and mental health care, and facilities staff used excessive force and arbitrary disciplinary policies. In addition, the facilities lacked sufficient living space, sufficient numbers of trained staff, and recreational activities. The government sought an injunction against these practices. The government's lawsuit was prompted by its 1997 investigation of Georgia's juvenile facilities. On February 13, 1998, the Department reported to the State its findings, gathered from documents, interviews, and on-site visits to juvenile facilities. The report described extensive inadequacies in medical care, education and rehabilitation, and staff supervision. The report also included instances of abuse, overcrowding, and the use of chemical restraints. The parties reached an out-of-court settlement agreement, which called for the defendants to make changes in the practices described in the complaint, including improving medical and mental health care, access to educational and recreational activities, and refraining from the use of excessive force. The agreement provided for enforcement by a monitor, who would submit reports on the State's progress every six months. The parties submitted a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal, which the court (Judge Julie E. Carnes) approved on March 31, 1998. The court closed the case the same day. On July 22, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen the case, which was granted by the court. The parties entered a joint modification of the 1998 agreement with the court. This new stipulation stated that the defendants had reached substantial compliance with all terms of the agreement. On May 5, 2009, the case was again closed.

Summary: On March 13, 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of Georgia under 20 U.S.C. § 14141 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs alleged that the State failed to protect the constitutional rights of juveniles incarcerated in the State's correctional facilities. On March 13, The parties submitted a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal, which the court (Judge Julie E. Carnes) approved on March 31, 1998. The court closed the case the same day. On July 22, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen the case, which was granted by the court. The parties entered a joint modification of the 1998 agreement with the court. This new stipulation stated that the defendants had reached substantial compliance with all terms of the agreement. On May 5, 2009, the case was again terminated.


This case is the third time the government notified a criminal defendant that the evidence used against him was from a FISA warrantless wiretap. These notifications are eventually expected to reach the Supreme Court for a determination of whether or not the 2008 FISA Amendments Act is constitutional. All the cases regarding criminal challenges to warrantless wiretapping are available in the Criminal cases challenging FISA surveillance special collection. On September 6, 2011, Agron Hasbajrami, an Albanian citizen and a lawful U.S. permanent resident, was arrested boarding a flight to Istanbul, Turkey, on a one-way ticket. He was indicted two days later by a federal grand jury for providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists. The government alleged that Hasbajrami provided funds to jihadist groups in Pakistan who had fought American forces in Afghanistan and intended to fly to Pakistan to assist those groups in that fight. On September 9, 2011, the government moved for Hasbajrami's permanent detention given the seriousness of his crime, the danger he posed to the community, and the risk that he would flee the country using his international connections. The Court granted the motion that same day. On January 26, 2012, a superseding indictment was issued, charging him with four counts of provisions or attempting to provision material support to terrorists. On April 12, 2012, Hasbajrami pleaded guilty to Count 2 of the indictment. The trial scheduled for July was cancelled and sentencing was set for September 14, 2012; however, a number of extensions were granted and final judgment was entered on January 16, 2013. Counts 1, 3, and 4 were dismissed and Hasbajrami was sentenced to 15 years in prison for Count 2 with a $100 special assessment fee. On October 23, 2013, Hasbajrami sent a letter to Judge Gleeson, requesting a copy of the sentencing hearing minutes, docket sheets, grand jury transcripts, and criminal complaint. Judge Gleeson ruled that because Hasbajrami was convicted and had given no notice that he intended to appeal his conviction, his right to criminal discovery was "extinguished" and he was not entitled to the grand jury transcripts or complaint. On December 3, 2013, the Court received a letter from Hasbajrami indicating that he had moved to have his sentence and conviction vacated. A new docket for his collateral motion was opened under no. 1:13-cv-06852-JG . After discovery, Judge Gleeson granted Hasbajrami's motion on October 3, 2014, allowing Hasbajrami to withdraw his guilty plea and open further proceedings. Judge Gleeson noted that Hasbajrami's pro se filing only indicated that he believed the statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague and that the government disclosed new information that changed his case. In September 2011, before the guilty plea, the government indicated that it would use electronic surveillance evidence against Hasbajrami pursuant to FISA. In February 2014, the government disclosed that some of the information it would have used against Hasbajrami in trial, which included foreign intelligence, was obtained by warrantless wire-tapping. Judge Gleeson allowed Hasbajrami to revoke his guilty plea because he was not sufficiently informed about the facts of his case and thus could not make an intelligent decision about his plea. The government failed to give him proper notice during the plea negotiations of the evidence it intended to use under the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA). By failing to give such notice, the government effectively implied that it would not use FAA-acquired evidence against him when that is exactly what it intended to do. On November 26, 2014, Hasbajrami moved to suppress the fruits of FAA surveillance because of the statute's per se unconstitutionality and the government's "outrageous conduct" and his post-arrest statements. He also requested the Court's ruling on whether the government violated his Fifth Amendment right to Due Process, an order directing the government to reveal the witnesses it learned of during Hasbajrami's interrogation, an order directing the government to disclose the evidence that is subject to suppression, notice of the expert witnesses it intends to rely upon at trial, and disclosure of Brady/Giglio material and other evidence it intends to use at trial. On December 23, 2014, the government responded. On February 20, 2015, Judge Gleeson denied Hasbajrami's motion to suppress the fruits of FAA surveillance and said he would issue a full opinion later. The government indicated that it would disclose some of Hasbajrami's requested information. Judge Gleeson set a status conference for February 27 to see if the government would offer the same plea bargain to Hasbajrami as it did back in 2012. The conference was rescheduled and Judge Gleeson denied Hasbajrami's request for discovery. At the status conference on April 14, 2015, the government indicated that it would not offer the same plea bargain to Hasbajrami and go to trial, which was set for July 13, 2015. However, the parties began plea negotiations anyway, which were apparently successful. On June 26, 2015, the government issued a superseding information, charging Hasbajrami with one count of provisioning or attempting provision material support to terrorists and one count of conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. Hasbajrami pleaded guilty to both counts. On July 15, 2015, Hasbajrami filed a sentencing memorandum requesting 60 months in prison. However, just five days later, Hasbajrami again moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his attorney forced him into it. On August 6, 2015, Judge Gleeson denied his motion to withdraw his plea and his request for new counsel. On August 17, 2015, final judgment was entered. Hasbajrami was sentenced to 15 years in prison for Count 1 and one year in prison for Count 2, to run consecutively, for a total of 16 years in prison. He was also charged a $200 special assessment fee and a judicial order for removal to Albania was issued. On August 21, 2015, Hasbajrami appealed his conviction and sentence. On March 8, 2016, Judge Gleeson released his opinion as to his denial of Hasbajrami's motion to suppress. Judge Gleeson refused to examine Hasbajrami's facial challenge to the FAA and instead focused on Hasbajrami's as-applied challenge. He held that warrantless surveillance against non-U.S. persons is lawful and does not violate the Fourth Amendment and the incidental collection of U.S.-based persons' information in the lawful targeting of foreign individuals does not trigger the warrant requirement. Further, Judge Gleeson held that the collection of this information was reasonable and that the collection of traditional FISA surveillance was lawfully acquired based on a warrant supported by probable cause. On August 3, 2016, Hasbajrami's case was reassigned to Judge Irizarry. On April 6, 2017, Judge Irizarry denied Hasbajrami's request for Judge Gleeson's Unredacted Opinion. 2017 WL 3610595. In response, Hasbajrami moved for reconsideration of the denial of his request for the Unredacted Opinion on April 17, 2017. On August 22, 2017, Judge Irizarry denied the motion for reconsideration. 2017 WL 3610518. On August 25, 2017, Hasbajrami appealed. Arguments were heard by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on August 27, 2018. On December 19, 2019, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals released their opinion. Judge Gerard E. Lynch remanded the proceedings to the district court because there was insufficient information (both in the classified and public record) to determine whether the querying had been reasonable. The court also denied Hasbajrami's request for the unredacted opinion because the limited redacted information "could not have substantially affected [his] due process rights" in the appeal. 945 F.3d 641. On January 29, 2020, the government filed a motion for the ex parte (meaning only the government would receive the document) disclosure of the unredacted opinion. They argued that the unredacted opinion was necessary so that the government could fully understand the Court's reasoning and thus be better able to comply with implementing Section 702 in the future. Oral arguments were scheduled for February 26, 2020. As of March 4, 2020, the case was ongoing.

Summary: Agron Hasbajrami was convicted of provisioning or attempting to provision material support to terrorists as well as conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists. Though he was allowed to revoke his initial guilty plea and challenge the government's use of evidence obtained through the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, his motion to suppress and constitutional claim against the FAA were denied. He subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 16 years in prison as well as removal from the United States.


On November 7, 2007, mentally ill prisoners incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, against the state of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by the Uptown People's Law Center, Equip for Equality, and private counsel, claimed that their lack of access to adequate mental health treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. They asked the Court for a judgment declaring defendants' conduct unconstitutional and an injunction against defendants' unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs were incarcerated in various correctional centers of the IDOC. Most incoming prisoners at these facilities did not receive a meaningful mental health screening upon arrival. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that care of those prisoners who were identified as needing mental health care was grossly substandard. What limited care was available was provided chiefly by medication and prisoners are only infrequently able to consult with mental health professionals. Only four of the IDOC's correctional facilities offered some form of specialized mental health services. As a result of defendants' failure to reasonably accommodate plaintiffs' disabilities, the plaintiffs alleged that they experienced mental and physical pain and, in many cases, the exacerbation of existing mental illnesses. On May 8, 2013, Judge Michael Mihm entered an interim order to facilitate a consent decree. The order requires the parties to assess and negotiate the number of additional mental health staff and bed and treatment space needed, and mandates that the IDOC develop policies related to the segregation, protective custody, and discipline of mentally ill prisoners. On December 22, 2015, the case settled. Under the terms of the settlement:

For the first time ever, Illinois would provide both long-term and acute care in residential treatment centers for prisoners who are so seriously mentally ill that they require hospitalization. Previously, these very ill people were housed in isolation.
More than 300 new clinical staff would be hired to treat prisoners with serious mental illnesses, along with over 400 new security staff to work at the new residential treatment units. This would allow the state to provide group therapy and one-on-one therapy for prisoners.
IDOC agreed to review the mental health of all prisoners with more than 60 days left in solitary, to determine if they should be given early release. IDOC also agreed to release from solitary all prisoners with serious mental illnesses who are confined there for minor, non-violent offenses, and in the future to consider mental health before sentencing someone to segregation.
Prisoners with mental illnesses who are in solitary confinement for over 60 days would have their out-of-cell time increased from less than an hour a day to 20 hours a week.
Construction costs for the new facilities were estimated to be $40 million and the new personnel costs were expected to be approximately $40 million annually. On May 10, 2016, parties filed a settlement agreement with the court. On May 23, 2016, the judge accepted the settlement with an amended settlement agreement. The agreement required IDOC to hire more mental health professionals, renovate 1258 beds, update health records to better indicate mental health problems and medication, provided staff with training in recognition and dealing with common mental disorders, provide mental health screenings for all prisoners upon, admission, conduct bimonthly review of prisoner mental health, conduct monthly review of prison mental health for those in segregation, provide for an initial mental health review within 7 days of putting a prison in segregation, and establish a referral program to all prisoners, staff, and those close to prisoners to refer prison for a mental health checkup. The settlement also provided that plaintiffs would be awarded attorney's fees, that the court retained jurisdiction for three years after the acceptance of the settlement, and that parties would try to resolve issues before taking the issue to the court. Plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees of $3.8 million, with half paid immediately on February 10, 2017. Multiple prisoners filed complaints alleging that the settlement was not being properly followed throughout 2017. The court indicated that complaints should be handled by the Department of Corrections grievance process. A monitor was appointed: forensic psychiatrist Pablo Stewart. On June 5, 2017, Dr. Stewart submitted his first annual report. The report noted that although the defendants made many significant improvements to the mental health care delivery system during the first year of the settlement, the defendants continued to have challenges in meeting the first-year requirements. Specifically, the report noted the grossly insufficient and extremely poor quality of psychiatric services, which negatively impacted all aspects of the settlement and contributed to the defendants being non-compliant in the vast majority of areas. On October 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in light of the defendants' alleged violations of the settlement terms. The court held an evidentiary hearing on December 12, 2017, which it continued in February and March 2018. On May 25, 2018, the court issued a preliminary injunction enforcing the settlement agreement and imposing additional requirements and deadlines to bring the defendants into constitutional compliance. The court found that there had been a systemic constitutional deficiency in addressing the psychiatric and mental health professional staffing shortage. The preliminary injunction was set to expire after 90 days. On June 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a permanent injunction, which the court granted on October 30. The court found that the defendants had been deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of the plaintiffs in medication management, mental health treatment in segregation, mental health treatment on crisis watch, mental health evaluations, and mental health treatment plans within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Further, the court found that the plaintiffs have suffered or will suffer irreparable injury if a permanent injunction was not issued. The court deferred entering specific injunctive relief, and instead allowed the defendants to submit a proposal to address their constitutional deficiencies, which they submitted on November 13, 2018. The court approved the content of the permanent injunction on December 20, 2018. The permanent injunction contained staffing requirements, parameters for class members placed on mental health crisis watch, parameters for class members placed in segregation, parameters for class members prescribed psychotropic medication, and provisions on treatment plans. The injunction required the defendants to submit quarterly status reports, as well as quality assurance audits at least every 90 days. The injunction is to remain in place for two years. The defendants appealed the permanent injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on January 23, 2019. On April 15, the court of appeals remanded the case to the district court for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to modify the preliminary injunction in order to conform to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. On February 26, 2019, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' request to modify the injunction (making limited changes to three provisions of the injunction), denying the defendants’ motion for the court to reconsider its injunction orders, denying the defendants’ motion for partial stay, and granting the plaintiffs’ § 1988 petition for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $841,137.98 in fees and $31,864.77 in expenses. On May 22, 2019, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit the district court's October 30 and December 20 interlocutory orders, as well as the court's February 26 order. On May 28, 2019, the Monitor submitted his third annual report. The report noted that although IDOC had greatly improved its ability to care for mentally ill offenders and was found to be in substantial compliance in eleven areas, a major problem preventing IDOC from being substantially compliant with the entire settlement agreement was inadequate staffing. The report also noted that IDOC still has much work to do with mental health evaluations and referrals, treatment planning, medication, segregation, confidentiality, use of force, and discipline. As of February, 2020, monitoring of compliance with the settlement agreement and the subsequent permanent injunction is still ongoing and the defendants' appeal to the Seventh Circuit is pending.

Summary: In November 2007, mentally ill prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit against the State of Illinois claiming inadequate access to mental health treatment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The case settled in December 2015 and on May 23, 2016, the court accepted the settlement with an amended settlement agreement. After months of substantial compliance issues, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement on October 10, 2017. After issuing a preliminary injunction on May 25, 2018 to enforce the settlement, the court granted a permanent injunction on October 30, 2018. The court approved the content of the permanent injunction on December 20, 2018. On February 26, 2019, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' request to modify the injunction (making limited changes to three provisions of the injunction), denying the defendants’ motion for the court to reconsider its injunction orders, denying the defendants’ motion for partial stay, and granting the plaintiffs’ § 1988 petition for attorneys’ fees and costs. Currently, monitoring of compliance with the settlement agreement and the subsequent permanent injunction is still ongoing.


On October 1, 2013, an American Muslim man who was repeatedly denied boarding flights in the United States because of his alleged inclusion on the federal No Fly List, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), which created and maintained the No Fly List. On April 22, 2014, an amended complaint was filed, adding three additional American Muslim men that had been denied boarding on flights originating in or destined for the United States because of their alleged inclusion on the No Fly List. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights as well as private counsel, alleged that the defendants had used the No Fly List to punish and retaliate against them for declining to act as informants, and to spy on others, for the FBI. The plaintiffs were opposed to doing so for religious, moral, and political reasons. More specifically, some plaintiffs found themselves on the No Fly List shortly after refusing to become informants for the FBI. Later, the FBI told these plaintiffs that they could get off the No Fly List only if they agreed to work for the FBI. Other plaintiffs were approached by the FBI shortly after being denied boarding on flights and were told they would be removed from the No Fly List if they agreed to work for the FBI. The plaintiffs alleged that their inclusion on the No Fly List constituted: (1) retaliation in violation of their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and religion; (2) violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA); (3) denial of procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment because the defendants failed to give the plaintiffs any meaningful notice or opportunity to see or challenge the asserted reasons for their inclusion; and (4) unlawful agency action in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. More specifically, the plaintiffs sought removal of their names from the No Fly List; declaratory and injunctive relief stating that they were kept on the No Fly List without cause and in retaliation for their assertion of constitutional rights in refusing to work for the FBI; and declaratory and injunctive relief stating that the No Fly List lacks due process and permits misuse. The parties entered into discovery, during which the defendants filed two separate motions to dismiss on July 28, 2014. The first, on behalf of the Government, sought to dismiss all official capacity claims. The second, on behalf of the Agents, sought to dismiss all personal capacity claims. On June 1, 2015, the Government moved to stay the official capacity claims. The government had revised the redress procedures available through administrative procedures as a result of the decision in Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1134 (D. Or. 2014), which held various aspects of the process inadequate under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the APA. The plaintiffs had elected to use these revised procedures, so the government argued for a stay of the plaintiffs' official capacity claims while the administrative process occurred. The government argued that the claims were likely to become moot in light of the revised procedures. Initially, the plaintiffs opposed the motion to stay. But, after the government advised the plaintiffs that it knew of "no reason" why they would be unable to fly in the future, the plaintiffs agreed and voluntarily stayed their official capacity claims on June 10, 2015. The parties continued to litigate the monetary claims against the defendants in their personal capacities. On September 3, 2015, the court (Judge Ronnie Abrams) dismissed all of the plaintiffs' personal capacity claims against the federal employees. The court held that the plaintiffs were not permitted to seek damages against the federal employees under either Bivens or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 128 F. Supp. 3d 756 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The order did not address the plaintiffs' official capacity claims regarding the manner in which individuals are added to the No Fly List or the procedures for challenging such inclusion. The court directed the plaintiffs to advise the court whether they wished to proceed on the official capacity claims. Responding to the court, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismiss those remaining claims. Accordingly, on December 28, 2015, the court dismissed the remaining claims. Final judgment in favor of the defendants was entered on February 17, 2016. The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision holding that the RFRA did not permit the recovery of money damages against federal officers sued in their individual capacities. On May 2, 2018, the Second Circuit Court reversed this opinion, and on June 25, 2018, the opinion was amended. The court found that the RFRA permits individual capacity suits against government officers acting under color of law, and that money damages are an appropriate remedy. The case was remanded for further proceedings. The Solicitor General of the United States petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 22, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the petition. After a slight delay due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court heard oral argument on October 6, 2020. The Court issued its opinion on December 10, 2020. In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit and held that RFRA permits litigants to obtain money damages from federal officials in their individual capacities. Justice Thomas noted that RFRA permits plaintiffs to obtain relief "against a government," and that Congress defined "government" to include "official[s] (or other person acting under color of law)." Justice Thomas determined that appropriate relief against government officials may include money damages, especially when damages are the only remedy that could cure a RFRA violation. Although there has been no further action on the district court docket as of January 14, 2021, this case presumably is ongoing because the money damages were not determined in the initial proceedings.

Summary: The plaintiffs, four American Muslim men that have been denied boarding on flights originating in or destined for the U.S. because of their alleged inclusion on the No Fly List of the federal government, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that their inclusion on the No Fly List is because they refused to forfeit their constitutional rights by serving as FBI informants. The Second Circuit held that RFRA permits individual capacity suits against government officers for money damages. The Supreme Court then granted cert, and affirmed the Second Circuit's decision.


On September 20, 2012, Tonn and Blank Construction filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to issue an injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement is a substantial burden on plaintiff's religious exercise. On September 20, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On February 11, 2013, after a series of responses, the Federal Government issued a notice of non-opposition to the the motion for preliminary injunction and a motion to stay proceedings. The Government made this determination in recognition of recent Seventh Circuit rulings of a motion panel granting injunctions pending appeal in substantially similar cases. On April 1, 2013, the court (Judge Jon E. DeGuilo) granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction, staying the case until thirty days after the Seventh Circuit had issued an opinion on the consolidated Korte v. Sebelius and Grote v. Sebelius appeal. On August 16, 2013, the court granted the Federal Governments' motion to stay proceedings until that time as well. On December 6, 2013, the District Court lifted the stay following the Seventh Circuit's decision that Korte and Grote presented valid claims under the RFRA. Judge DeGulio extended the preliminary injunction for a period not to exceed sixty days, and ordered the parties to file a joint status report indicating their intentions with respect to proceeding in the lawsuit. The parties filed a joint status report requesting the court to continue to stay the case with the preliminary injunction in place until the United States Supreme Court resolved Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius). On December 18, 2013, the court granted the parties' request. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito issued on June 30, 2014, the Court held in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate the RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The parties in this case agreed that the plaintiff qualified under the Hobby Lobby standard as a closely-held for-profit corporation owned by individuals with deeply held religious beliefs. On November 6, 2014, the court entered a final judgment and order containing a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had requested an injunction of any regulation related to the ACA's contraception mandate, but the court limited the injunction to the regulations implementing the mandate that were at issue in Hobby Lobby and the plaintiffs' complaint. On May 26, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had come to an agreement on the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to the plaintiff.

Summary: On September 20, 2012, a limited liability corporation that provides health insurance for its employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, asking the court to issue an injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the District Court granted a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs against the version of the mandate challenged in that case, which would have required them to include contraception as part of their insurance package for their employees.


On December 26, 2006 the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas (ACLU), along with the ACLU's National Immigrants' Rights Project, filed a civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Farmers Branch, challenging the City's recently adopted Ordinance 2892. The Ordinance required landlords to verify the U.S. Citizenship or "eligible immigration status" of prospective tenants prior to renting them apartments. This case is one of four lawsuits filed against Farmers Branch in response to its anti-immigrant housing law. See IM-TX-0002, IM-TX-0003 and IM-TX-0004. Plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief. On January 11, 2007, the District Court (Judge Sam Lindsay) temporarily denied plaintiffs' motion as moot in light of a TRO being issued against the City in the state court case Ramos v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0004). On January 18, 2007, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein defendant's counsel agreed to review and reconsider Ordinance 2892. Pending that review, defendant agreed not to attempt to enforce Ordinance 2892 or any like ordinance without first giving plaintiffs notice to allow them to renew their motion for a TRO. Plaintiffs filed their status report on January 24, 2007, advising the District Court that defendant had repealed Ordinance 2892 but enacted Ordinance 2903, which imposed similar stringent citizenship requirements. The parties were to meet and confer on January 25, 2007 to discuss the new Ordinance and thereafter advise the District Court of further planned action. On March 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the City challenging the new ordinance. On April 18, 2007, this case was consolidated with lead case Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0003) and Barrietos v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0002). See IM-TX-0003 for all subsequent developments.

Summary: On December 26, 2006 the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Texas (ACLU), along with the ACLU's National Immigrants' Rights Project, filed a civil rights suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas against the City of Farmers Branch, challenging the City's recently adopted Ordinance 2892. The Ordinance required landlords to verify the U.S. Citizenship or "eligible immigration status" of prospective tenants prior to renting them apartments. On April 18, 2007, this case was consolidated with Barrietos v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0002) and lead case Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0003). See IM-TX-0003 for subsequent developments.


On May 5, 2006, an individual who had been arrested on a minor criminal charge filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging that the Mercer County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Mercer County Jail, regardless of the criminal charge or absence of reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs claimed that the practice violated the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary and punitive damages, and class certification on behalf of thousands of similarly situated individuals. The County and the Sheriff answered by generally denying the allegations. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., who referred the case to Magistrate Judge Tonianne J. Bongiovanni to oversee discovery. On August 2, 2007, Magistrate Judge Bongiovanni referred the case to mediation and stayed all proceedings. In November 2008, a settlement agreement was finalized between the parties and given preliminary approval by Judge Bongiovanni. On April 20, 2009, Judge Bongiovanni released an order granting final approval of the class action settlement. The settlement provided that the case be dismissed with prejudice and the claims against the defendants be dropped in exchange for a settlement amount of $1.8 million for plaintiff and those of his class. Plaintiff himself was to receive $20,000 for the trouble he took to bring the lawsuit; the rest of his class was to receive a pro rata share of the settlement fund; plaintiff attorneys received $540,000 in attorney fees. Additionally, Mercer County asserted that it changed its policy on strip searches on August 17, 2006, as a result of this litigation. The new policy ended the practice of strip searching detainees on a blanket basis, as well as the practice of strip searching non-indictable detainees in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Mercer County further asserted that beginning on August 17, 2006, all corrections officers had been trained in the new policy.

Summary: In May 2006, plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court of New Jersey for unlawful strip searches of those arrested for minor crimes. In August 2007, the Magistrate judge stayed proceedings and referred the case to mediation. On April 20, 2009, Magistrate Judge Bongiovanni released an order granting approval of the settlement agreement, which provided a $1.8 million settlement amount in exchange for dismissing the claims against the defendants.


On October 13, 2005, current and former female prisoners filed a class-action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). Plaintiffs were originally members of a certified class-action suit pending in Michigan state court, Neal v. MDOC, LC No. 96-006986-CZ. [See PC-MI-0021 of this collection for a summary of the Neal case]. The Neal plaintiffs alleged violations of their state civil rights under the Michigan Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA") for sexual abuse, discrimination and other gender-based degrading treatment by MDOC staff. During the Neal litigation, an amendment to ELCRA was passed that excluded prisoners from the Act's protection against discrimination. M.C.L. §37.2102(1). On February 10, 2005, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the claims of the Neal plaintiffs that arose after the effective date of the ELCRA amendment were no longer viable, as the amendment excluded prisoner claims from the Act's protection. Plaintiffs filed this action to challenge the constitutionality of the ELCRA amendment and to reassert their claims, now under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, monetary damages and class certification. Following the filing of a first amended complaint, defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a more definite statement. The District Court (John Corbett O'Meara) denied those motions on May 15, 2006. On July 14, 2006, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, on the issue of the constitutionality of the ELCRA amendment. Defendants countered by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 23, 2007, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the ELCRA amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied. Mason v. Granholm, 2007 WL 201008. The Court denied a stay pending appeal, 2007 WL 734990 (Mar. 07, 2007). The Defendants filed a notice of appeal, however, on July 26, 2007 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, because the District Court had only granted partial, and not total, summary judgment. On August 31, 2007, the District Court denied class certification, holding that both liability and damages were too individuated to be appropriate for class resolution. 2007 WL 2541769. The same day, the Court also granted two individual Defendants' motions for summary judgment, and dismissed them from the case, one because no named plaintiff had been housed at the facility he worked for, and another on statute of limitations grounds. 2007 WL 2541431. (The Court denied reconsideration two months later, 2007 WL 3121570 (Oct. 23, 2007).) On June 20, 2008, the court dismissed several other Defendants because the claims against them were barred by the statute of limitations. 2008 WL 2513904. In a similar ruling on September 25, 2008, the Court dismissed several plaintiffs for the same reason. 2008 WL 4387940. On Defendants' motion, the Plaintiffs's claims under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment (CAT), were both dismissed on August 12, 2008: the District Court held that since neither was self-executing, and no implementing statute had been enacted, neither was "binding on this court." 2008 WL 3538981. The case was set for trial in early 2009, but then that date was shifted to October 2009. Before that trial could be held, the matter settled. The settlement was entered in Neal v. Mich. Department of Corrections--it was for $100 million. In this case, on September 28, 2009, the parties agreed that the District Court's January 23, 2007 Opinion and Order declaring the amendment to ELCRA unconstitutional would be the final declaratory judgment, and that the parties would bear their own costs.

Summary: After the state legislature amended Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act ("ELCRA") to exclude prisoners, plaintiffs, women prisoners who claimed they had faced systemic sexual abuse, discrimination, and other gender-based degrading treatment by MDOC staff, brought this federal lawsuit, in 2005. On January 23, 2007, the District Court declared that the amendment violated the 14th Amendment, and declared it unconstitutional. The case proceeded towards trial, until in 2009 it was settled, part of a $100 million settlement, in Neal v. Mich. Department of Corrections.


This case is about the federal law enforcement mission “Operation Diligent Valor” directed by the Department of Homeland Security against protestors during the widespread racial justice protests in Portland, Oregon in the summer of 2020. Individual Oregon residents along with Black Millennial Movement and Rose City Justice, Inc. brought this lawsuit on August 26, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against President Donald Trump, Chad Wolf, the Department of Homeland Security, and the U.S. Marshals Service. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as unlawful action exceeding authority by federal agencies under 40 U.S.C § 1315. Plaintiffs also raised claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, alleging a conspiracy by the defendants to deprive the plaintiffs of their civil rights. Represented by the ACLU of Oregon and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including declarations that the acts of federal law enforcement agencies were unlawful and ultra vires, as well as expungement of all records and information of unlawful arrests. Plaintiffs also sought compensatory and punitive damages to be proven at trial. In July of 2020, the federal government deployed more than 100 federal law enforcement officers or agents in an alleged effort to quell the widespread protests against systemic racial injustice and police violence near the Mark O. Hatfield Federal Courthouse in downtown Portland, in which the plaintiffs participated. The plaintiffs alleged that heavily-armed, militarized law enforcement officials indiscriminately used excessive force against protestors and that a number of protestors were unlawfully detained or arrested by federal agents. They asserted that the defendants’ actions in support of “Operation Diligent Valor” violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly and their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure. In addition, they claimed that the actions undertaken by federal officials were not legally authorized because Chad Wolf was not properly serving as Acting Secretary of DHS under the requirement of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the deployed officers were not properly designated, and the deployed officers acted outside of the scope of their authority by acting off federal property and making warrantless arrests, among other acts. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Youlee Yim You on August 26, 2020. On January 8, 2021, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that, for the most part, maintained the core aspects of the original. As of February 19, 2021, the case remains pending in District Court and defendants’ motions to dismiss are due by Friday, February 26, 2021.

Summary: Individual Portland protestors along with Black Millennial Movement and Rose City Justice, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs alleged that federal law enforcement violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and acted outside of their statutory authority during “Operation Diligent Valor,” an alleged effort to quell the widespread racial justice protests in Portland in July 2020. As of February 19, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court.


On July 17, 2008, the United State filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District Court of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, against Defendants, rental property owners and their property manager. The U.S. Department of Justice alleged the Defendants discriminated in their rental business against women. Specifically, DOJ claimed that beginning in 2005 or earlier, the defendants' property manager subjected actual and prospective female tenants to unwanted verbal sexual advances, unwanted sexual touching, and adverse action when they refused or objected to his sexual advances. (For example, he would, the DOJ claimed, send false notices of rent owed to tenants who spurned his advances.) The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief and an assessment of civil penalties. The property manager's request for a stay due to a pending bankruptcy was denied (after the bankruptcy was dismissed), and he eventually sought summary judgment. The court denied that motion on November 23, 2009. Additional litigation led to a motion for summary judgment by another individual defendant, which was largely denied on September 9, 2010. (The court did note that this individual would not be held vicariously liable for any punitive damages related to the property manager.) Considerable discovery and other disputes followed, and the case was eventually set for trial on May 23, 2011. In the meantime, however, the property manager whose conduct was at the center of the case had died. Between May 12, 2011, and July 20, 2011, the Court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) approved separate five-year Consent Decrees agreed to by the Plaintiff and the various Defendants. The decrees generally enjoined the Defendants from discriminating in their housing rental practices on the basis of sex, and required them to pay monetary damages into a fund established for the persons aggrieved by their conduct and civil penalties. Each of the Consent Decrees required non-discrimination in advertising, rental showing, employee EEO training, reporting and recordkeeping. On August 16, 2011, the Court entered a default judgment against the remaining defendants, after an extensive evidentiary hearing on damages and civil penalties. But after that hearing, the chief remaining defendant -- the owner of two apartment buildings -- sought relief from its default judgment of $27,000. This the Court denied, finally closing out the case, on April 19, 2012.

Summary: On July 17, 2008, the United State filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District Court of Alabama under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, against Defendants, numerous rental property owners and their shared property manager. DOJ claimed that beginning in 2005 or earlier, the defendants' property manager subjected actual and prospective female tenants to unwanted verbal sexual advances, unwanted sexual touching, and adverse action when they refused or objected to his sexual advances. (For example, he would, the DOJ claimed, send false notices of rent owed to tenants who spurned his advances.) The complaint sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief and an assessment of civil penalties. After the property manager died, the case settled against most of the defendants, who agreed to pay damages and to entry of injunctive relef forbidding discrimination going forward. One defendant did not settle, and declined to participate further; DOJ won entry of a default judgment of $27,000 against that defendant. Afterwards, however, that defendant sought relief from the default, which the Court denied, finally closing out the case, in April 2012.


On November 12, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to New Jersey's governor, advising him of the results of the June 2003, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Woodbridge Developmental Center ("WDC"), which houses developmentally disabled persons, including those with intellectual disabilities, cerebral palsy, autism, and spina bifida. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility and reviewed a wide array of documents there. The investigators also conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended WDC staff and state officials for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation and noted that many staff persons exhibited genuine concern for residents' well-being. The DOJ advised that its investigation uncovered continuing deficiencies in resident care at WDC, in that conditions and services there substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at WDC were violated in several respects. According to the DOJ, deficiencies in conditions of resident care and treatment at WDC existed as to four topic areas causing residents significant harm or risk of harm through WDC's failure to: (1) keep residents safe (e.g., inadequate supervision of residents, who also were subjected to staff neglect and abuse; disproportionate number of unexplained injuries; confirmed abusers on staff reassigned to client care without supervision; inadequate incident management, reporting and tracking); (2) provide residents with adequate behavioral services, freedom from restraint, and habilitation (e.g., inadequate, non-updated behavior programs lacking useful functional analysis of problem behaviors; inconsistent and incorrect program implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and follow-up; failure to train staff adequately to implement plans; unreasonable and excessive use on residents of restraints, padded helmets, and medications for staff convenience; poorly-trained staff which seldom engaged residents; insufficient vocational and activity programming for residents who would benefit from such services); (3) provide adequate health care (failure to meet needs of residents for psychiatric services and for nutritional and physical management; deficient and dated psychiatric assessments and diagnoses; infrequent interaction between psychiatrists and medicated residents; inadequate monitoring of medications; insufficient availability of neurological services and anti-convulsant medication monitoring; substandard mealtime, positioning, alignment, mobility, and seating assistance and assessments; staff untrained in safe physical support and transfer techniques; occupational and physical therapy inadequacies); and (4) provide services to WDC residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to the residents' individual needs, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d). As to this latter category, DOJ observed an inappropriately low number of transitions resulting from a deficient WDC discharge planning process, inadequate to identify appropriate individuals for community placement. Further, DOJ noted that the process failed to provide sufficient information to residents' family members to enable informed decision-making. Available state resources allowed for more community placements than WDC made, as well. For all four categories, the DOJ letter provided details of the identified deficiencies. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of the four categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter also provided notice that, absent a resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at WDC. On November 9, 2005, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against New Jersey and its officials responsible for operation of the WDC and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter setting out numerous remedial measures to be taken by the state in response to the deficiencies existing at WDC. The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, set out that the state had violated WDC violated residents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically report upon its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facilities up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The agreement provided that Elin Howe would be appointed as Compliance Monitor, able to use independent consultants funded by the state. The monitor position would also be state-funded, with total monitor-and-consultant costs capped at $200,000 per year, except added funds would be available for abuse, neglect, or death-related monitoring/reporting). She was required to periodically report upon the state's compliance with obligations imposed by the agreement. After four years, the agreement would automatically terminate, unless extended through agreement of the parties or terminated earlier due to substantial compliance being achieved. The settlement also allowed for the United States, if it had cause to believe conditions threatened the immediate health and safety of WDC residents (and at any time in the final six months of the agreement) to conduct compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., approved the settlement on November 22, 2005, and issued an unpublished order which granted the parties' request to conditionally dismiss the case. The settlement was set to expire in 2011, and there has been no further activity since that time.

Summary: On November 9, 2005, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against New Jersey and its officials and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter setting out numerous remedial measures to be taken by the state in response to the deficiencies existing at Woodbridge Developmental Center. The settlement was set to expire in 2011 and there has been no further activity since that time.


On July 31, 2012, a New York resident who was arrested while participating in the Occupy Wall Street protests filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and alleged violations of the 1st, 4th and 14th amendments. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction requiring the City to comply with federal standards regarding the use of force by police. Specifically, the New York resident alleged that while participating in a march near Union Square Park, New York Police Department officers deployed nets to surround participants, and used pepper spray and unreasonable force against them. On November 13, 2012, the defendant requested that cases stemming from the same September 24, 2011 incident be consolidated. On November 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Robert W. Sweet) ordered that the cases be granted the motion and consolidated href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13708">Lawler v. City of New York and Elliot v. City of New York. The parties reached a settlement agreement on July 8, 2015. The court entered the stipulation and dismissed the case on July 23, 2015, retaining jurisdiction over the matter for the purpose of enforcing the agreement for an undisclosed amount of time. The details of the settlement are not publicly available. According to The New York Times, the defendant paid a total of $332,500 in damages (between $52,000 to $60,000 to each plaintiff). Additionally, the New York Times reports that the NYPD released a statement saying that the NYPD has not altered its pepper spray guidelines. The case is now closed.

Summary: In July 2012, a New York resident filed a complaint alleging that New York Police Department officers violated her constitutional and commonlaw rights by use of unreasonable force. On November 30, 2012, the case was consolidated with other "Occupy Wall Street" cases arising from the same incident. The parties reached a settlement in 2015.


The Department of Justice filed this suit against the State of Utah on November 22, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, challenging Utah's recently passed immigration bill, HB 497. It claimed that Sections 3, 10 and 11 of the law were preempted under the Supremacy Clause as an intrusion into the exclusively federal sphere of immigration, and preempted specifically by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was immediately consolidated on November 28, 2011 with a challenge brought earlier in the month by private plaintiffs, Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert [IM-UT-0002]. See the entry on that case for all subsequent developments.

Summary: The Department of Justice filed this suit against the State of Utah on November 22, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division, challenging Utah's recently passed immigration bill, HB 497. It claimed that Sections 3, 10 and 11 of the law were preempted under the Supremacy Clause as an intrusion into the exclusively federal sphere of immigration, and preempted specifically by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was immediately consolidated with a challenge brought earlier in the month by private plaintiffs, Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert [IM-UT-0002]. See the entry on that case for all subsequent developments.


On January 12, 2012, a registered sex offender living in Marion County, Indiana filed this class action in the Southern District of Indiana under 42 USC § 1983. The plaintiffs claimed that an Indiana law violated his First Amendment rights because it made it a crime for a registered sex offender to knowingly use a social networking website or instant messaging chatroom if persons under the age of eighteen had access to the platform or website. Represented by the ACLU of Indiana, the plaintiffs requested injunctive and declaratory relief against the City of Indianapolis and the Marion County prosecutor to enjoin them from enforcing this law. The class also requested attorney’s fees and the plaintiff was allowed to proceed anonymously. The City of Indianapolis was dismissed as a defendant on February 27, 2012 because all parties agreed that the City was not necessary to adjudication of the matter. The City agreed to abide by any later rulings by the court about the statute and the parties paid their own fees and costs. On March 6, 2012, the court certified a class for the purpose of the claim that the Indiana statute was unconstitutional. Class members included: "all Marion County residents required to register as sex or violent offenders pursuant to Indiana law who are not subject to any form of supervised release and who are sexually violent predators under Indiana law or who have been convicted of one or more of the offenses noted in Indiana Code § 35-42-4-12(b)(2) and who are not within the statutory exceptions noted in Indiana Code § 35-42-4-12(a)." Shortly after class certification was granted, the plaintiff class moved for a preliminary injunction on March 14. The parties filed trial briefs pending hearings on the motion and ultimately agreed to merge the hearing on the preliminary injunction motion with the bench trial. Therefore, the hearing would decide whether the plaintiffs were entitled to declaratory relief and a permanent injunction that would enjoin the State's enforcement of the statute. On June 22, 2012, the court denied the motion. Because the statute was content neutral, the court found the statute passed the test as narrowly tailored to protect a government interest and left open alternative channels for communication. The opinion noted that the vastness of the internet allowed the plaintiff sufficient opportunity to exercise his rights: for example, the plaintiff was not barred from using websites like LinkedIn. In an era of advancing technology, the court acknowledged the government's interest in protecting the "virtual playground" of social networking sites from "sexual predators" and the statute was narrowly tailored to that interest. On June 26, 2012, the plaintiff appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded the decision in a 3-0 opinion (Judges Joel Flaum, Tinder, Tharp). 705 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2013). The three-judge panel found that the statute was overly-broad and restricted too much innocent speech. The Court declared the Indiana statute unconstitutional as violating the First Amendment and reversed and remanded with instructions to enter the injunction. On remand, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff class on March 28, 2013. The permanent injunction prevented the defendant from enforcing the law against any member of the class. The parties settled on an unknown amount of attorneys’ fees and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, the plaintiff, a registered sex offender living in Marion County, Illinois, filed this class action seeking to strike down an Indiana law that barred registered sex offenders from using social media. After losing on the merits, the plaintiff was successful on appeal in 2013, when the Seven Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to award a permanent injunction against the state. The case is now closed.