This case challenged a Trump Administration decision by the United States Census Bureau to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census. This lawsuit was filed on April 11, 2018 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland by seven U.S. citizens who regularly use public services that receive federal funding -- funding, they explained, that could be negatively altered depending on the results of the decennial census count. The case was assigned to District Judge George Jarrod Hazel. The plaintiffs sued the Commerce Secretary, the Deputy Commerce Secretary, the United States Department of Commerce and its agency, the Bureau of the Census, the Bureau’s Director, and its Deputy Director. Represented by private counsel, they proceeded under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA” - 5 U.S.C. § 551) and the Declaratory Judgments Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201). Plaintiffs claimed the inclusion of the citizenship question violated the Census Clause of the Constitution (the "Actual Enumeration" clause of Article I, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment's "Apportionment Clause") because the question would cause a disproportionate undercount of immigrants, non-citizens, those with limited English proficiency, and individuals of Hispanic or Latino origin. This disproportionate undercount would deprive plaintiffs of representation in congressional, state, and local governing bodies, and access to social services whose funding is based on the Census. Plaintiffs also claimed the Census Bureau’s failure to provide independent justification for the position that the citizenship data was required to enforce the Voting Rights Act, coupled with the Bureau’s failure to investigate the impact the citizenship question could have on response rates, was “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to law” under the APA. The plaintiffs sought three forms of relief: (1) injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from asking a citizenship question on the 2020 Census; (2) a declaration that the addition of the citizenship question violated the Census Clause; and (3) attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs filed amended complaints on May 3, September 5, and December 28, 2018. The last amended complaint differed from the original complaint by adding several more plaintiffs and an allegation that the government’s inclusion of the citizenship question violated the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection guarantee because it was motivated by animus against Latinos, Asian-Americans, immigrant communities of color, and noncitizens. The government moved to dismiss this case on June 6, 2018, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing; that the political question doctrine barred claims regarding violations of the Actual Enumeration and Apportionment Clauses; and that courts could not review the Secretary’s decision under the APA. On August 22, 2018 Judge Hazel denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had standing, that the Secretary’s actions were reviewable, and that the political question doctrine did not bar the claims. 336 F.Supp.3d 545 (D. Md. 2018). In the same order denying the motion to dismiss, Judge Hazel granted plaintiffs’ motion for discovery, requiring that the defendants provide the same discovery as defendants were ordered to provide in another lawsuit over the 2020 Census, State of New York v. United States Department of Commerce (Docket No. 18-cv-2921). The Clearinghouse entry for the NY case can be found here. After Judge Hazel denied the government’s motion to dismiss, the government filed a motion for summary judgment on November 12, 2018. Judge Hazel denied this motion on December 19, 2018. 355 F. Supp. 3d 256. Ruling on a joint motion, Judge Hazel consolidated this case with a similar case, La Unión Del Pueblo Entero v. Ross (Docket No. 8:18-cv-1041), on December 19. Information about that case, is here. The bench trial in this matter began on January 22, 2019. On April 5, 2019, Judge Hazel issued a memorandum opinion containing the Court’s Finding of Facts and Conclusion of Law from the bench trial. Judge Hazel found that the decision to add the citizenship question by the Census Bureau was arbitrary and capricious under the APA, and that the government’s actions violated the constitution’s Enumeration Clause. However, Judge Hazel held that the Plaintiffs in this case did not meet the burden to show a Due Process Clause violation. Nonetheless, based on the harm to the Plaintiffs identified in the Enumeration Clause violation, the Judge issued a nationwide injunction precluding the citizenship question from being added to the census. 366 F. Supp. 3d 681. On April 8, 2019, the government appealed the final judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court heard arguments in another case challenging the citizenship question, Department of Commerce v. New York, on April 23, 2019 (more information on that case can be found via this link). On June 3, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking relief from the district court's April 5 decision with regards to the claims based on the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs contended that documents belonging to Thomas Hofeller, a Republican strategist, provided newfound evidence that the citizenship question was added in order to dilute the representation of Hispanics to the political advantage of Republicans and non-Hispanic whites. The plaintiffs believed this new evidence would bolster their previously lacking claims. On June 19, 2019, Judge Hazel granted the plaintiffs' motion and set aside the court's previous ruling on these two claims. 382 F. Supp. 3d 393. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit also granted a separate motion filed by the plaintiffs' and remanded the entire case back to the district court for the limited purpose of adjudicating the Fifth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 issues. 771 Fed. App'x 323. Back in the district court, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on June 26, 2019. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court ruled on June 27, 2019, in Department of Commerce v. New York that, while the secretary had the power to add the citizenship question to the census, the justifications provided for doing so appeared pretextual and thus were an apparent violation of the APA. The court remanded that case back down to the district court for further inquiry into the motives for adding the question, while letting the injunction issued by the district court in that case against the citizenship question stand. Judge Hazel permanently enjoined the government from asking the citizenship question on the 2020 census in an order dated July 16, 2019. The remaining issues pending in the Fourth Circuit were remanded back to the district court the same day after the government moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. A notice of settlement for attorneys’ fees was entered by the parties on September 30, 2019. Because the census is now complete, this case is closed.

Summary: On April 11, 2018, seven private plaintiffs sued United States Department of Commerce and its agency the Bureau of the Census, claiming its decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census was unconstitutional and violated federal law. The plaintiffs sued the defendants under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgments Act. Plaintiffs alleged that that the Census Bureau’s decision to include a citizenship question on the Census would violate the Census clauses because the question would cause a disproportionate undercount of immigrants, non-citizens, those with limited English proficiency, and individuals of Hispanic or Latino origin. This disproportionate undercount would deprive plaintiffs of representation in congressional, state, and local governing bodies, and access to social services whose funding is based on the Census. Defendants moved to dismiss this case on June 6, 2018, and on August 22, Judge Hazel denied this motion, finding that the plaintiffs had standing, that the Secretary’s actions were reviewable, and that the political question doctrine did not bar the claims. Judge Hazel denied the government’s motion for summary judgement and the case was consolidated with a similar case, La Unión Del Pueblo Entero v. Ross (Docket No. 8:18-cv-1041), on December 19. Following a bench trial, Judge Hazel found that the government violated the APA and issued a nationwide injunction on the citizenship question. Following an appeal to the Fourth Circuit which was later remanded to the district court, Judge Hazel permanently enjoined the Census Bureau from promulgating the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. The parties reached a settlement for attorneys’ fees in September, 2019; there has been no significant movement on the docket since then. Since the census is now complete, the case is closed.


This case is about the legality of the June 19, 2020 rule issued under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Act). On July 20, 2020, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia (States) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The states sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C § 706), alleging violations of rights protected under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The States sought vacatur of the rule, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. The States alleged that the 2020 rule arbitrarily and unlawfully denied health care rights guaranteed under Section 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (Section 1557 of the Act). Section 1557 prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, age, or disability in health services that received federal financial assistance, such as programs or insurance. The 2020 rule (1) restricted the definition of sex discrimination to exclude protections against discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, (2) narrowed the scope of protected health programs to exclude health insurance, (3) removed the language notifying individuals with limited English proficiency (LEP) of their rights to language services in healthcare settings, and (4) created a broad religious exemption. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge James L. Cott. The States filed a motion for partial summary judgement on September 10, 2020. On September 17, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives filed an <i>amicus curiae</i> brief in support of the States, asserting the House’s interest in the non-discriminatory implementation of the Act. On September 22, 2020, the court denied the States’ motion for partial summary, on the grounds that it was premature due to an incomplete administrative record. The court ordered HHS to provide the relevant administrative record by October 16, 2020 and scheduled a telephone conference for October 29, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In July 2020, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia (States) filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) on the grounds that the June 19, 2020 rule within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act arbitrarily and unlawfully denied health care rights guaranteed under Section 1557 of the Act. The States alleged the 2020 rule allowed for discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation, excluded health insurance from protected programs, removed notification of rights to individuals with limited English proficiency, and created a broad religious exemption. The States sought vacatur of the rule, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. The court ordered HHS to provide the relevant administrative record by October 16, 2020 and scheduled a telephone conference for October 29, 2020. The case is ongoing.


On September 29, 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against Crowley County Correctional Facility, a Colorado prison, and related corporate entities. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant allowed female employees to be sexually harassed by their co-workers, and that when some of them complained, the employer retaliated by subjecting them to increased scrutiny, by exposing them to the risk of physical harm at the hands of inmates, and by assigning them to work in isolated areas with their alleged harassers. The charging parties intervened as plaintiffs in the case. In March of 2008, one of the defendant companies moved for summary judgment on the entire case, and all of the defendants moved for partial summary judgment. On March 12, 2009, U.S. District Judge Robert E. Blackburn granted Dominion defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding there was no evidence that the defendant was an employer to any of the plaintiffs. On September 30, 2009, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss subject to the entry of a consent decree. U.S. District Judge Kathryn H. Vratil approved the consent decree on October 1, 2009 and dismissed the case. The decree required the defendant to pay $1,300,000 in backpay, compensation, and other monetary relief to claimants. It further enjoined the defendant from discriminating against employees through a gender-based hostile work environment or sexual harassment, and enjoined defendants from retaliating against employees for opposing such discrimination. The defendant was also required to create policies on sexual harassment, provide trainings on sexual harassment, file reports with the EEOC, and expunge the files of claimants in the case. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more in the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2012.

Summary: In September 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court, District of Colorado, against Crowley County Correctional Facility, a Colorado prison, and related corporate entities. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the defendant allowed female employees to be sexually harassed by their co-workers and retaliated against these employees when they complained. On October 1, 2009, Judge Kathryn H. Vratil ordered a consent decree. The decree granted plaintiffs $1,300,000 and enjoined the defendants from future discriminatory practices. The decree's effective period was three years, and there is nothing more in the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2012.


On August 18, 2011, a class of prisoners filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment against the New York City Department of Corrections (DOC). The plaintiffs, represented by the Legal Aid Society and Emery Celli, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that DOC officers routinely inflicted wanton physical violence on prisoners and deliberately falsified records to prevent discovery of their illegal actions. Claims against the New York City DOC have been numerous and often successful over the past twenty-five years (Fisher v. Koehler, Reynolds v. Ward, Jackson v. Montemango, Sheppard v. Phoenix, Ingles v. Toro). The plaintiffs claimed that former policies were re-instituted as soon as the injunctions expired, or that the injunctions were interpreted narrowly enough to provide room for explicit cruelty. The plaintiffs claimed that officers frequently took prisoners to areas without video cameras or other witnesses, and then beat them. The plaintiffs claimed to have suffered multiple injuries as a result of these abuses, including broken bones, concussions, and other emergency conditions requiring hospitalization and surgery. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants routinely falsified documents or fabricated disciplinary charges to cover up their own unlawful conduct or that of their colleagues. The city often would allegedly promote the worst offenders. On January 7, 2013, the Court (Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV) granted class certification to the plaintiffs, defining the class as: all present and future inmates confined in jails operated by the New York City DOC, except for the Elmhurst and Bellevue Prison Wards. Meanwhile, on January 12, 2012, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York informed the city that they were undertaking an investigation of the prison conditions on Rikers Island under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. The DOJ issued a findings letter in that matter, reporting the frequent use of excessive force, inadequate systematic supervision, and prolonged punitive solitary confinement on August 4, 2014. A press release is available on the Department of Justice's website. That is discussed in case JC-NY-0062 in this Clearinghouse. On December 18, 2014, the Department of Justice filed a motion seeking permission to intervene in this case and pursue its action under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. The Court granted the unopposed motion to intervene on December 23, 2014. Settlement negotiations were immediately initiated. On July 1, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to approve a consent settlement. The DOJ issued a statement on their website the same day. The consent settlement included provisions completely prohibiting certain types of force. The DOC also agreed to report all incidents where the staff used force on a prisoner. All Use of Force incidents resulting in major injuries to the prisoner resulted in a mandatory video-recorded interview of the injured prisoner and other witnesses, and referred for an investigation to the Investigation Division of the DOC. The DOC agreed to install 7,800 wall-mounted cameras and at least 100 body-worn or hand-held cameras to facilitate the investigations. Staff that violate the use of force guidelines will be disciplined, up to termination. Staff could not be promoted if they had a poor disciplinary use of force record or a pending disciplinary investigation. The DOC agreed to no longer put prisoners under 18 in any punitive isolation. Prisons housing youth were required to have certain staffing levels and routine examination of the premises to ensure security and safety of the prisoners. The DOC also agreed to begin searching for an alternative location, off Rikers Island, for prisoners under 18. Finally, the parties agreed to a monitor, who visited the prisons and wrote a progress report every four months, penologist Steve Martin. On October 21, 2015, the Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) approved the consent judgment and implementation began, enforced by the court. On December 4, 2019, Judge Swain issued an order and modified the consent judgment, adding "[a]ny Board employee who witnesses a Use of Force Incident must report the incident in writing directly to the area Tour Commander or to a supervisor who is responsible for investigating the incident. This shall include, but not be limited to, filling out the narrative section of any witness report." The monitor has filed nine reports; the most recent one was filed on May 29, 2020. The monitor's ninth report raised concerns about the defendants' efforts to advance reforms and the treatment of 16 and 17 year olds. The report raised non-compliance issues with " (1) implementing the Use of Force Directive; (2) addressing the backlog of investigations and improving use of force investigations going forward; (3) improving Staff discipline and accountability; and (4) addressing the high level of disorder at RNDC, where most of the 18-year-old inmates are housed." In response to the issues raised in the ninth monitor report, the court ordered the Monitoring Team to file a status report by July 2, 2020. This report from the monitor outlined the progress that the parties had made and indicated that the parties "are in a position to reach a joint agreement." In this report, the monitor noted that the parties have not decided how to treat 16 and 17 year olds in compliance with the terms of the consent judgment and new legislation in New York that created a new legal status for 16 and 17 year olds arrested of felonies. After the monitor filed this status report, and urged the parties to continue to work towards a finalized joint proposal. As of July 2020, implementation of the consent judgment is ongoing and the Monitoring Team is expected to file another status report on July 31, 2020.

Summary: In 2011, inmates filed a lawsuit alleging cruel and unusual punishment against the New York Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs requested and were granted class certification. In December 2014, the DOJ intervened after the conclusion of an investigation of the Rikers Island youth prison. After several months of negotiations, the parties submitted a settlement agreement, outlining changes to be made in the prison over the next three years. On October 21, 2015, the Court approved the settlement agreement, and implementation is ongoing. As of July 2020, an independent Monitoring Team has filed nine reports.


On November 19, 2019, a formerly incarcerated individual filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The case sought damages for alleged negligence by Microgenics Corporation and its parent company Thermo Fischer Scientific Corporation. Represented by Prisoners Legal Services and the civil rights firm Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, the complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to ensure that their urinalysis machines were providing accurate and reliable test results led to false positives on in-prison drug tests. Consequently, affected prisoners were wrongly punished, through solitary confinement, loss of visitation rights, and in some cases held "well-beyond their release dates." On March 5, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to explain in greater detail the alleged problems with the defendant's testing equipment that resulted in the plaintiff's injuries. Discovery in the case proceeded, though with significant delay caused by the coronavirus pandemic. The case is currently in discovery and is assigned to Magistrate Judge Vera Scanlon for all purposes. A pre-motion hearing is set for June 29, 2020.

Summary: On November 19, 2019, a formerly incarcerated individual filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Represented by Prisoners Legal Services and the civil rights firm Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady, the complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to ensure accurate and reliable test results from their urinalysis machines led to false positives on in-prison drug tests. The case was delayed significantly due to the coronavirus pandemic, and is still in discovery.


On December 22, 2009, four groups of foster parents and children directly receiving foster care maintenance payments or adoption assistance payments from the Indiana Department of Child Services ("DCS"), filed a law suit against DCS and its director ("Payne") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Indiana and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the DCS violated Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670, et seq. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked the District Court to enjoin DCS from implementing a 10% reduction in foster care and adoption assistance payments. The plaintiffs alleged that DCS unlawfully reduced foster care and adoption assistance payments. DCS receives money from the federal government through Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670, et seq., from which monthly payments are made to foster parents and adoptive parents. DCS had enacted a 10% reduction in these payments, effective in January of 2010. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(3), the amount of foster care and adoption assistance payments must be determined by considering the circumstances of the adopting parents and the needs of the child being adopted. The plaintiffs contended that the 10% reduction violated this provision because the reduction was motivated by budgetary constraints and not the individual assessments families receiving the payments or the general costs of providing care for the children in question. On December 22, 2009, the plaintiffs moved to certify as a class all foster parents and children directly receiving foster care maintenance payments or adoption assistance payments from DCS. On January 25, 2010, the District Court (Judge Sarah Evans Barker) granted the motion, certifying the claims of C.H. plaintiffs to proceed as a class action. On December 28, 2010, the Indiana Association of Residential Child Care Agencies ("IARCCA"), the plaintiff in a separate action against DCS seeking to enjoin the 10% payment reduction, made an unopposed motion to consolidate cases. On January 25, 2010, the district court granted the motion to consolidate the case filed by IARCCA. On January 20, 2010, the district court issued a preliminary injunction stopping the planned 10% reduction in foster care and adoption assistance payments. DCS appealed this preliminary injunction to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on February 18, 2010. This appeal was dismissed. On February 9, 2011, the parties executed a settlement agreement. The agreement stipulated that DCS would cease its effort to reduce foster care payments. Further, the agreement required DCS to continue to provide foster care maintenance payments of at least $25 a day until it established a method of computing the costs that satisfied the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 673(a)(3). DCS was not precluded by the settlement agreement from reducing foster care payments once it had established a new method of computing such payments. The agreement allowed foster parents to challenge the new rates once they were established through the application of the new method of payment calculation. The agreement further provided that DCS pay $104,812 in attorneys' fees and costs. On February 25, 2011, the the district court approved a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal, which dismissed with prejudice the claims made by C.H. against Payne and vacated the Court's Preliminary Injunction. On the same day, the court dismissed without prejudice the claim by IARCCA against Payne. The Joint Stipulation of Dismissal provided that the claims made in the Complaint could not be reopened unless DCS breached the Settlement Agreement or applicable law before 30 days after the new rates went into effect. On November 30, 2011, the plaintiffs filed notice of intent to reopen litigation, alleging that the defendants had violated provisions of the settlement agreement. Because DCS scheduled decreases to the rates at which it would reimburse service providers, overall coverage of treatment provided to children would decrease. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and an application for a preliminary injunction in December 2011. At the court's suggestion, the plaintiffs moved in May 2012 to enforce the settlement agreement along with a motion for a preliminary injunction. The parties held a series of pretrial settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Mark J. Dinsmore in May and June 2012. By late June, the parties agreed to stipulations to resolve the pending motions by agreeing to withdraw them. The parties officially reported a settlement and the case was officially dismissed in November 2012.

Summary: A class action of all foster parents that children brought an action against the Department of Child Services claiming it unlawfully reduced foster care and adoption assistance payments. DCS had enacted a 10% reduction in these payments. The plaintiffs contended that the 10% reduction violated a federal statute because the reduction was motivated by budgetary constraints and not the individual assessments families receiving the payments or the general costs of providing care for the children in question.


On March 6, 2008, prisoners confined in Ely State Prison ("ESP") filed a civil rights class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Nevada. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the ACLU, the ACLU of Nevada, and private counsel, alleged that the state provided inadequate medical care to prisoners at ESP. Plaintiffs claimed that a pervasive pattern of grossly inadequate medical care at ESP created a substantial risk of serious medical harm for each of the prison's 1,000 prisoners, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, they alleged that ESP lacked ready access to medical care, a medical staff competent to examine prisoners and diagnose illnesses, adequate and up-to-date medical record-keeping, and adequate procedures for responding to emergencies. As a result, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and class certification. Prior to filing suit, the National Prison Project retained Dr. William Noel to investigate the alleged deficiencies of medical care at ESP. Dr. Noel reviewed the medical records of 35 prisoners and was allowed to speak to some of the prisoners when he visited ESP to discuss his findings with the prison Medical Director. Dr. Noel issued a detailed report in which he called the pattern of medical abuse at ESP "the grossest possible medical malpractice, and the most shocking and callous disregard for human life and human suffering, that I have ever encountered in the medical profession in my thirty-five years of practice." In early December 2007, the ACLU sent the report to the Governor of Nevada and the Director of Nevada's Department of Corrections. The ACLU also proposed a Consent Decree to avoid litigation and to improve the health care administered to prisoners at ESP. Prison officials refused to enter into the Consent Decree and this lawsuit followed. On March 31, 2009, Judge Larry R. Hicks granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class. 2009 WL 910971. The class was defined as "all prisons who are now, or in the future will be, in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections at Ely State Prison in Ely, Nevada." Settlement discussions began in January 2010 before Magistrate Judge Valerie P. Cooke and the parties jointly moved to approve the proposed settlement agreement on July 15, 2010. The parties also submitted a proposed Class Notice of Settlement, which the court approved on July 28, 2010. The proposed settlement was extensive, addressing medications, chronic care, sick call, intra-system transfers and assessments, and scheduled off-site services and infirmary care. The agreement called for a two-year appointment of an expert medical monitor to inspect ESP three months after the agreement was finalized and every six months thereafter to evaluate defendants' compliance with the terms of the agreement. Judge Hicks approved the proposed settlement on October 27, 2010. 2010 WL 4366012. The plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs was also granted and the action was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On March 6, 2008, prisoners at Ely State Prison filed a civil rights class action lawsuit challenging the inadequate medical care provided to them. On October 27, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada approved the parties' settlement agreement, through which the state agreed to provide certain medical care and agreed to two years of oversight by a monitor.


On March 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, represented in part by the public interest firm Thomas More Law Center, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. On May 7, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of the mandate, which was to begin to apply to the plaintiff's group health plan on June 1, 2013. The ACLU of Michigan filed an amicus brief in support of the defendants' opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on May 23, 2013. On July 11, 2013, United States District Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 2013 WL 3546702. The same day, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (No. 13-1944). On July 17, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the appeal. The District Court granted that motion on July 31, 2013. On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, holding that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In this case in the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs had moved for an injunction pending appeal. In the week following the Hobby Lobby the parties met twice, and the government withdrew its opposition to the injunctive relief. On July 9, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Alice Batchelder, Danny Boggs, and Eric Clay) granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal: the contraceptive mandate would not apply to the plaintiffs pending the appeal. On January 28, 2015, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's July 11, 2013 denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings. The order noted that in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, the government agreed with the plaintiffs that the District Court's denial of the preliminary injunction should be reversed. 2015 WL 9850709. On February 4, 2015, Judge Borman reopened the case in the district court and, based on Hobby Lobby, entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their claim under RFRA, dismissing all other claims against the defendants, and enjoining the government from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs notified the court that the parties had reached agreement as to attorney's fees on May 12, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 22, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On May 7, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendant from enforcing the contraception mandate against them and preliminary injunction. On July 11, 2013, United States District Court (Judge Paul D. Borman) denied plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The denial of the injunction was reversed in light of the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores</i>, and judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs; the government was enjoined from enforcing the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs.


On July 14, 2017, Common Cause, a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting voter's rights, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity ("Commission"), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), the U.S. Social Security Administration ("SSA"), and the Vice Chair of the Commission under the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the methods the Commission used in investigating potential voter fraud violated the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, the Vice Chair of the Commission intended to assemble a national "voter file" by collecting states' data on their residents' voting and personal data. Then the Commission intended to compare the "voter file" against data maintained by the DHS and the SSA to discover the names of individuals the Commission deemed "ineligible to vote." The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and monetary relief. On July 28, 2017, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order stopping defendants from collecting, maintaining, using, or disseminating voters' voting history and party affiliation, and a motion for injunctive relief in the alternative. Judge Royce C. Lamberth heard oral argument regarding these motions on August 1, 2017, and denied the motion for the temporary restraining order. Judge Lamberth also reserved judgment on the motion for injunctive relief, advising plaintiffs to amend the complaint to include the transcript from a meeting where the Vice Chair specifically directed the Commission staff to obtain any data currently in the hands of the government. On September 13, 2017, plaintiffs amended the complaint to include the Vice Chair's directives to the Commission. On October 18, 2017, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction arguing that the plaintiffs lack representational standing. Defendants also moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim under the Privacy Act or the Administrative Procedure Act, arguing that the Commission was not considered an "agency" and the injunctive relief that the plaintiffs sought was not available under either Act. Before the court could rule on the defendants' motion to dismiss, President Trump signed an executive order on January 3, 2018, terminating the Commission. Following the termination of the commission, plaintiff and defendant counsel came to an agreement after conferring. Based on the status report filed August 3, 2018, defendants agreed to file a notice once the Director of White House Information Technology destroyed the state voter data that was already collected by the Commission. Plaintiffs agreed that after defendants filed that notice, they would voluntarily dismiss this case. On August 29, 2018 defendants filed the notice affirming the voter data had been deleted, and on that same day the plaintiffs dismissed this case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2017, Common Cause, a nonprofit dedicated to protecting voter's rights filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs alleged that creating the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity ("Commission") and its investigative methods violated the Privacy Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. In 2018, President Trump signed an order dissolving the Commission and the plaintiffs dismissed the case following confirmation that the Director of White House Information Technology destroyed the state voter data that had been collected prior to dissolution.


On April 1, 2008, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, two named plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the heads of the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and of Justice, the directors of the FBI and of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and the Philadelphia district's acting district director of USCIS. The plaintiffs alleged they were lawful permanent residents who applied to the USCIS to become naturalized U.S. citizens, but whose applications had not been adjudicated within six months of their submission because of governmental delay in completing, for each application, a background check referred to as an "FBI name check." According to plaintiffs, a USCIS policy change in November 2002 required, without statutory or regulatory authorization, completion of an expanded FBI name check on every application and the FBI's implementation of that expanded process caused systemic, unnecessary, and prolonged delays in the naturalization process, all without corresponding security or other public benefit. The complaint alleged that the needless delays deprived plaintiffs and their class of the privileges of citizenship in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and by attorneys from the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, HIAS & Council Migration Services of Philadelphia, and the National Services Center, Inc. Citing relevant federal statutes and regulations, the complaint described in detail the process triggered by a naturalization application, including the conduct of three types of government database searches: a "criminal background check," a name check through the Interagency Border Inspection System ("IBIS") database, and the FBI name check. Among the statutes cited, plaintiffs noted that 8 U.S.C. § 1571(b) stated, as the sense of Congress, that an application for naturalization should be completely processed no more than 180 days following its' submission. Applications not finally adjudicated within that time period, according to plaintiffs, were presumptively unreasonably delayed. The named plaintiffs alleged that, in addition to being precluded from participating in the electoral process, the delay in naturalization precluded their receipt of needed benefits to help address medical and age-related disabilities. The plaintiffs sought that the court certify a class described as "[a]ll lawful permanent residents who have submitted or will submit applications for naturalization to the USCIS District Office located within Pennsylvania, and whose applications for naturalization remain unadjudicated more than 180 days after the date of submission, because of pending FBI name checks." Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the complaint asked that the court (a) suspend FBI name checks until the defendants complied with the APA's notice and comment provisions, (b) set time deadlines for completion of FBI name checks (90 days) and adjudication of naturalization applications (180 days), and (c) have the defendants pay plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. The clerk assigned the case to District Judge Paul S. Diamond on April 18, 2008. An amended complaint, filed on April 22, 2008, added plaintiffs. In May 2008, the defendants filed both a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and a memorandum in opposition to the motion for class certification. In early June 2008, plaintiffs filed responsive pleadings to these defense efforts. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on October 8, 2008. On December 22, 2008, their motion to certify class was denied. After some discovery, in May 2009 the parties stipulated that the plaintiffs agree to dismiss their claims without prejudice.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and of Justice, the FBI, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), and the Philadelphia district's acting district director of USCIS. According to plaintiffs, a USCIS policy change in November 2002 required, without statutory or regulatory authorization, completion of an expanded FBI name check on every application and the FBI's implementation of that expanded process caused systemic, unnecessary, and prolonged delays in the naturalization process, all without corresponding security or other public benefit. The complaint alleged that the needless delays deprived plaintiffs and their class of the privileges of citizenship in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. An amended complaint, filed on April 22, 2008, added plaintiffs. In May 2008, the defendants filed both a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and a memorandum in opposition to the motion for class certification. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on October 8, 2008. On December 22, 2008 their motion to certify class was denied. After some discovery, in May 2009 the parties stipulated that the plaintiffs agree to dismiss their claims without prejudice.


On October 26, 2006, Plaintiff, a disabled former prisoner in the Washington State Department of Corrections, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington under the Americans With Disabilities Act , the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC). The Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for damages and for class certification for all similarly situated disabled prisoners, alleging that the DOC discriminates against prisoners with disabilities. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that a scoring system that the DOC used to determine whether a prisoner qualified for work release discriminated against prisoners with physical and mental disabilities by barring them from participating in the program because of their disability. On August 10, 2007, the court approved certification of the class. The class included all disabled prisoners or former prisoners of the DOC who, since October 30, 2003, have been partially or wholly denied participation in the work release program because of a disability, and whose claim is limited to no more than 180 days of lost wages from the alleged discrimination. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment stating that the DOC's systems of scoring inmates for work release based on disabilities violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. On January 8, 2008, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment stating that to the extent that the DOC utilizes a practice of scoring prisoners according to a numerical profiling system based on physical abilities and uses that score as a motivating factor to exclude otherwise eligible disabled prisoners from the work release program violates the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The court also amended the class to limit class members to disabled prisoners of the DOC who have been wholly or partially denied participation in the DOC work release program, provided a specific score was a motivating factor in determining the work release denial. A settlement agreement was filed with the court and approved on May 12, 2008. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss the action and that the settlement resolves any potential claims by class members relating to the allegation that they were denied the right to participate in work release because of a disability. The DOC denied any liability in discriminating against disabled prisoners, but as a result of the action, the DOC voluntarily underwent a significant effort to alter and revise various policies and procedures and has taken other steps designed to minimize the future potential for discriminating against disabled persons in connection with work release. The DOC agreed to pay named Plaintiff $30,000 for his contributions towards the action. The DOC also agreed to pay each class member $1,800 (for a total class settlement of $298,800) and to separately pay attorneys fees.

Summary: A disabled former prisoner in the Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) brought a class action suit against the DOC, claiming that the scoring system used by the DOC to determine qualification for work release discriminates against disabled prisoners. The claim was settled for $298,800 and the DOC voluntarily underwent significant efforts to minimize future potential for discriminating against disabled persons in connection with work release.


On July 24, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of D.C. under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act and the First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm the Thomas More Law Center, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the deeply held, religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On August 23, 2013, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case. The court ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. On November 1, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi that the ACA's contraception insurance mandate likely violates the free exercise clause of the Constitution and reversed the District Court's denial of a preliminary injunction against the defendant. Gilardi was held at the Supreme Court while the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. On June 30, 2014, the court held in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On October 27, 2014, the district court held that based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs in this case as a closely-held for-profit corporation, were entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate in place on June 30, 2014. The district court did not extend the ruling to future versions of the mandate, and directed the parties to come to an agreement on attorney's fees and costs. The parties requested technical corrections to the order by joint motion, which the court granted in a new order on October 31, 2014. On December 17, 2014, the parties submitted a Joint Status Report notifying the court that they reached an agreement on attorney's fees and costs, and there would be no need for further proceedings in this case.

Summary: A for-profit company sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. On August 23, 2013, the court granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the case until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services . Gilardi was held while the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. On October 27, 2014, the District Court held that based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs in this case, as a closely-held for-profit corporation, were entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate in place on June 30, 2014.


On July 7, 2014, plaintiff filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Idaho Division of Veterans Services. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, alleged that defendant had violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to recognize her out-of-state marriage. Specifically, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including an injunction directing defendant to approve her application to have her ashes interred with the ashes of her same-sex spouse at the Idaho State Veterans Cemetery. Plaintiff was a Navy veteran who married her longtime partner in California in 2008. Following her partner's death in 2012, the plaintiff developed a number of health problems. In December 2013, the plaintiff went to the Idaho State Veteran's Cemetery in Boise to make advanced arrangements for her ashes to be interred with her partner's ashes. The Cemetery declined her request, citing the Idaho Constitution and Idaho Code § 32-201, which provide that a "marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic union that shall be valid or recognized" in the state. On September 11, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, omitting her request for monetary relief. On October 29, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on July 9, 2015, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell. Taylor v. Brasuell, 2015 WL 4139470, at *4 (D. Idaho July 9, 2015). The court also awarded the plaintiff attorneys' fees of $70,000. The case is now closed.

Summary: In July 2014, plaintiff filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the administrator of the Idaho Division of Veterans Services. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the National Center for Lesbian Rights, alleged that defendant had violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights by refusing to recognize her out-of-state marriage. Specifically, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, including an injunction directing defendant to approve her application to have her ashes interred with the ashes of her same-sex spouse at the Idaho State Veterans Cemetery. The court awarded summary judgment and attorneys' costs to the plaintiff following the Supreme Court's decision in <i>Obergefell v. Hodges</i>.


On February 16, 2018, a minor child detained by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued ORR under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Declaratory Judgement Act, and petitioned for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus. The plaintiff, an immigrant represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged that federal officers had removed minor children from their parents in violation of due process, and that ORR had held children in “highly restrictive government-controlled facilities” indefinitely and with no explanation. Specifically, the named plaintiff in this case had been arrested for gang involvement. After a judge dismissed the claim, the plaintiff was moved to a facility reserved for children who do not present a danger, with no date for release despite having no disciplinary issues. The plaintiff also received no explanation for the extended detention. On May 9, 2018, the plaintiff moved for preliminary injunctive relief in the form of: (1) vacatur of the Director Review Policy, a new ORR policy that imposed procedural barriers to the release of children from detention; and (2) an order directing ORR to take all reasonable measures to expedite the processing of reunification requests. Meanwhile, the defendants moved to dismiss on May 15. Judge Paul A. Crotty issued an opinion and order on June 27, 2018 denying the defendants' motion to dismiss and vacating the Director Review Policy but declining to order ORR to expedite the reunification process. In denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, Judge Crotty noted that the plaintiffs had pleaded plausible statutory and constitutional violations and had adequately demonstrated irreparable injury and likelihood of success on numerous claims. In the order, Judge Crotty addressed evidence before the court that indicated that the Director Review Policy was instituted within hours of Lloyd’s appointment as the director of ORR, based on unidentified news reports about criminal activities involving immigrant minors. He noted that expedited discovery had not yielded any records showing a consideration of relevant law, agency documents, or the impact on unaccompanied undocumented children. Judge Crotty noted that this “unlawful agency behavior” was at the “zenith of impermissible agency actions” and that “the Court cannot turn a blind eye to Plaintiff’s suffering and irreparable injury.” As part of the same order, Judge Crotty certified a class defined as “[a]ll children who are or will be in the custody of ORR in New York State and who are currently housed in a staff-secure facility or have ever been housed in a staff-secure or secure facility.” 318 F. Supp. 3d 601. On November 5, 2018, the defendants informed the court that they conceded the illegality of the Director Review Policy while preserving the right to appeal pure legal issues and based on this concession moved for a protective order barring further discovery. Judge Crotty rejected this argument, noting that the Director Review Policy was not the only legal issue common to the class, that the certified class continued to have common legal claims against the defendants, and that the prolonged detention of minor children continued. The parties proceeded to engage in discovery, which (except for a brief stay caused by the government shutdown in December 2018 and January 2019) continued into the summer of 2019. However, between June 3, 2019 and April 7, 2021, there was no action in the case, which led Judge Crotty to issue an order dismissing the case. On April 12, 2021, one of the plaintiff's lawyers filed a sealed letter with the court in response to this order. So, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On February 16, 2018, a minor child detained by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by New York Civil Liberties Union, alleged that federal officers had removed minor children from their parents in violation of due process, and that ORR had held children in “highly restrictive government-controlled facilities” indefinitely and with no explanation. On June 27, 2018, the plaintiffs received preliminary injunctive relief that vacated a policy that ORR used to keep immigrant children in detention for extended periods of time. Two years later, the court issued an order dismissing the case, which led to a sealed reply from a plaintiff's attorney on April 12, 2021.


On July 8, 2005, a civilly committed individual with a diagnosed Gender Dysphoria (GD) in the Massachusetts Treatment Center (MTC) filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Massachusetts Department of Corrections and the University of Massachusetts Correctional Health Program. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Claus, Equal Protection Clause, and the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. In addition, the plaintiff claimed violations of state law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that for three years the defendants had withheld prescribed treatment for GD for security reasons. The prescribed treatment included psychotherapy, hormone treatment, laser hair removal, and access to feminine clothing and products from the DOC's canteen. The withholding of treatment caused the plaintiff emotional and physical pain. The plaintiff wanted declaratory and injunctive relief along with compensatory damages. On July 8, 2005, the plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order to get basic treatment while the case was ongoing. On March 22, 2006, Judge Douglas P. Woodlock appointing counsel to the plaintiff and denying the temporary restraining order; Judge Woodlock also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the University of Massachusetts Correctional Medical Health Program. 2006 WL 1581528. On January 10, 2008, Judge Woodlock ordered a separate and final judgment in favor of the University of Massachusetts Correctional Health Program. The same day, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. On August 6, 2008, the plaintiff again moved for a preliminary injunction, asking for treatment. On December 9, 2008, Judge Woodlock granted this request for preliminary injunction, requiring defendants to provide the plaintiff with a GD treatment plan set forth in the order to be implemented by the DOC's mental health service provider and medical service provider. He also issued a memorandum outlining resolution of certain issues in connection with the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. 2008 WL 11340291. On February 10, 2009 Judge Woodlock issued another opinion regarding preliminary injunction noting the "passive aggressive" nature of the defendants, and clarifying the requirement of the clinicians to use their best judgment for treatment. 2009 WL 10675279. A bench trial began on June 14, 2010. On August 23, 2010, Judge Woodlock issued a modified preliminary injunction order again requiring hormone therapy to begin shortly. 2010 WL 11527104. On August 26, 2010, defendants appealed this order, citing the security concerns that underpin its refusal to administer hormone therapy and contesting the finding of deliberate indifference on their part. On May 23, 2011, the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Massachusetts officials were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of civil detainee or exercised an unreasonable professional judgment by denying her female hormone therapy. 645 F.3d 449 (1st Cir., 2011). On July 11, 2011, Judge Woodlock issued the final judgment and order, replacing the preliminary injunctions, and the civil case was terminated. The order required the DOC to ensure that the medical and mental health services providers implemented the treatment provisions set out in the order, including providing the plaintiff with female hormone therapy, continued psychotherapy sessions, and access to feminine clothing and products from the DOC's canteen. In addition, the DOC had to continue to house the plaintiff in a single cell in the general population at the treatment center. The DOC was allowed to implement additional security measures deemed necessary to provide for Battista's personal safety within the general population. 2011 WL 3511037. On August 4, 2011, the plaintiff made a motion for attorneys' fees, which the defendants opposed. This motion was never ruled upon. The court was notified on March 28, 2014 that the plaintiff was released from the Department of Corrections custody on March 20, 2014. The plaintiff still has representation in the court, but there have been no other developments and the case seems to be closed.

Summary: On July 8, 2005, a prisoner with a diagnosed Gender Dysphoria (GD) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) for denial of prescribed treatment for GD, including psychotherapy, hormone treatment, and access to feminine clothing and products . On July 11, 2011, the court issued an order requiring the DOC to provide the plaintiff with female hormone therapy, continued psychotherapy sessions, and access to feminine clothing and products. In addition, the DOC had to continue to house the plaintiff in a single cell in the general population at the Treatment Center. The court was notified on March 28, 2014 that the plaintiff was released from the Department of Corrections custody on March 20, 2014. The plaintiff still has representation in the court, but there have been no other developments and the case seems to be closed.


On May 29, 2008, three prisoners with mobility impairments housed in Los Angeles County jail facilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They challenged alleged discrimination against people with disabilities in the Los Angeles County jail system. Represented by private counsel, the Disability Rights Legal Center, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees, on the grounds that the County of Los Angeles and the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department did not provide an acceptable level of access, services, or accommodations to inmates with disabilities. The plaintiffs specifically claimed that while being processed there were no accessible bathroom facilities, and that once they were housed in the jail, they were denied physical therapy and outdoor exercise, and were also denied the ability to participate in most jail programs. They alleged as well that the jails failed to provide access features in bathrooms such as grab bars in the showers or toilets. Wheelchairs were rarely provided for disabled inmates and, if they were provided, were in a state of disrepair. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that prisoners' required medications were given inconsistently. On June 9, 2008, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class and also moved for a preliminary injunction. On August 13, 2008, the parties agreed to stay the proceedings and enter into settlement negotiations. On December 12, 2008, due to the lack of response from the defendants, the plaintiffs filed a request for lift of stay. On June 8, 2009, the court ordered that the stipulated stay would automatically expire on July 9, 2009. On June 10, 2010, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On November 12, 2010, the plaintiffs refiled their motion for class certification. On May 5, 2011, the plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from disciplining class members for their failure or inability to get out of their wheelchairs. On May 12, 2011, Judge Pregerson denied the plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order. 2011 WL 1812746 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2011). On October 15, 2012, Judge Pregerson certified a class of "all detainees and inmates with mobility impairments who because of their disabilities, need appropriate accommodations, modifications, services, and/or physical access in accordance with federal and state disability laws." The parties again entered into settlement negotiations, and on October 31, 2014, settled the case. The defendants agreed to an enforceable injunction, under which they would provide: access to all programming despite mobility disabilities, physical therapy and outdoor recreation, physical accessibility to the jail, working wheelchairs and prostheses, ADA coordinators on staff, a new grievance form, and reasonable accommodations when requested. The Agreement provided that it would remain in effect for three years "after which time its provisions will automatically terminate [on April 22, 2018] unless the Court determines that, based on applicable law and specific findings of fact, that it is necessary to extend the duration of this Agreement." Monitoring was set to be performed by the Los Angeles Office of the Inspector General (OIG), an office which was created by the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors to monitor the County's Custody Services Division and jail facilities as of August 2014. The agreement was court-enforceable, but there were no stipulations relating the underlying facts. On November 24, 2014, Judge Dean Pregerson preliminarily approved the class settlement. On March 24, 2015, Judge Pregerson granted the plaintiffs' motion for $2,200,000 in attorney's fees and granted final approval of the class settlement. On June 8, 2015, Judge Pregerson dismissed the case, but retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement as needed. On August 24, 2016, the parties finalized compliance measures to evaluate, track, and report on the county's progress. On October 6, 2016, OIG filed its first implementation status report of the settlement agreement. It included the county's self-assessment regarding the settlement, indicating that they had completed specific provisions regarding housing expansion, improving accessibility of grievance procedures including an "ADA box," provided wheelchair training to medical professionals, among other changes. The report did not include OIG's analysis regarding whether it agreed that compliance was achieved on specific points. OIG filed its second report on June 30, 2017, finding substantial or sustained compliance on 18 matters, partial compliance on 17, and non-compliance on 2. The non-compliance issues involved the county's continuing practice of disqualifying class members from programming due to mobility impairments, and a failure to maintain and staff a physical therapy room. It noted that four county staff members' primary responsibilities dealt with compliance with this agreement and concluded that systemic reform was achievable. On December 14, 2017, at the parties' request, Judge Pregerson extended the settlement term by one year, to April 22, 2019. On April 30, 2018, OIG filed its third status report, finding completed, substantial, sustained or partial compliance on all provisions. OIG indicated that systemic issues remained due in large part to inadequate training for ADA coordinators and other custody personnel, and recommended that ADA coordinators take on an expanded role in order to more efficiently work towards compliance. OIG filed its fourth status report on April 26, 2019. The report found that defendants were in substantial compliance with 8 of the 49 provisions and sustained compliance with 22. They had only achieved partial compliance with the remaining 14 provisions. In light of this report, defendants stipulated to extending the settlement term another year, until April 22, 2020. Judge Pregerson granted this extension on May 14, 2019. OIG filed their fifth and most recent status report was filed on March 31, 2020. This report found that defendants remained in partial compliance with 10 provisions. Defendants again stipulated to extend the terms of the settlement. On April 27, 2020, Judge Pregerson extended the duration of the settlement for one year, until April 22, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2008, prisoners in the Los Angeles County Jail Complex who rely on the assistance of a wheelchair brought this class action against the Sheriff's Department alleging an unacceptable and illegal level of access, services, or accomodations to facilities at the jail. The case settled in 2014 with a court-enforceable agreement set to last three years, under which the defendants agreed to provide reasonable accommodation and services to disabled inmates.


On December 9, 2009, two prisoners at California's Pelican Bay prison who had been kept in solitary confinement for decades filed this § 1983 action against the State of California in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, originally proceeding pro se, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, claiming violations of their First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the "indefinite status" designation process for keeping them in solitary confinement on the basis of undisclosed informant information about gang affiliation, among other information, violated their constitutional rights. The Pelican Bay supermax facility was opened in 1989 as the most restrictive prison in the California state prison system. The Security Housing Unit ("SHU") was developed as an especially secure area of the prison, with 1,024 cells for solitary confinement. Prisoners placed there were alone for 22½ to 24 hours a day in a windowless cell with a concrete bed, a concrete desk, and a concrete stool. They were permitted a single book, 3 showers a week, and breaks for 'exercise,' court appearances, or emergency medical care, but no vocational or educational opportunities. Contact with other prisoners or outsiders was severely limited. One plaintiff claimed that he had only spoken with his mother twice in the past twenty-two years, once in 1998, and once in 2000. She had died since the filing of the action. The criteria for placing and keeping prisoners in the SHU was based mainly on real or perceived gang affiliation. After a landmark case, Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (see PC-CA-0017 in this Clearinghouse), the prison was required to develop standards and procedures for determining whether a particular person should remain in detention in the SHU. The new "indefinite status" procedure excluded the prisoners from these hearings, which are supposed to be conducted every six months. According to the plaintiffs, there were only three ways out of the SHU: expiration of sentence, death, and 'debriefing.' Debriefing was a process by which a SHU prisoner agreed to become a confidential informant for the prison administration in exchange for return to the general population. The plaintiffs claimed that this amounted to a death sentence: the assumption among the general population being that if a prisoner gets moved from SHU there must have been an agreement to become an informant. As a result, it puts into danger not only the prisoners' lives, but their family members' lives as well. Increasing the likelihood of indefinite detention in the SHU, the plaintiffs claimed, was that any speech, even a simple greeting, could be construed by prison officials as evidence of gang affiliation, warranting continued confinement in the SHU. Two prisoners in the SHU who had been incarcerated there since 1989 first filed a pro se lawsuit against the prison in 2004 (Docket No. 4:04-cv-01967 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2004)). Most of the claims were dismissed on June 2, 2005, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court also granted absolute and qualified immunity from the damages claims. The court did not dismiss the plaintiffs' First Amendment freedom of speech claim arising from the prison's policy of not allowing hardcover books in the SHU. On March 8, 2006, the court determined that the prison's prior policy on hardcover books was unconstitutional. The court, however, did not issue an injunction because the prison had revised its policy and no longer prohibited hardcover books with their covers removed. The court also granted qualified immunity to one of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed the qualified immunity decision, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision on July 30, 2009. The two plaintiffs filed a new pro se complaint in 2005 (Docket No. 4:05-cv-03286 (N.D. Cal. Aug 11, 2005)) raising claims, originally filed on May 19, 2004, that were previously dismissed without prejudice. On June 14, 2007, the court again dismissed most of the claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The court determined that four claims had been exhausted: (1) the First Amendment claim regarding access to certain magazines; (2) the due process claim based on the defendants' procedure for determining whether the plaintiffs were active or inactive gang members; (3) the negligence claim; and (4) the intentional tort claim. On March 25, 2009, the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to all remaining claims, except the claim for prospective injunctive relief for late delivery of incoming mail against the warden acting in his official capacity. The court also denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment and motion for preliminary injunction. On March 18, 2010, the court rule for the defendants on the First Amendment claim regarding late delivery of incoming mail. On January 11, 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions to dismiss and to grant summary judgment. On December 9, 2009, these two prisoners filed a new complaint, in this lawsuit, alleging that they were being deprived of due process of the laws through the secret review process that would "validate" them as gang members (both had been in SHU for more than a decade with no outside contact). They also claimed that a 'validation' could be based on secret evidence that they had associated with persons who may or may not have gang affiliation and that this violated the First Amendment. Lastly, they alleged that the conditions of confinement were in violation of international law and the Eighth Amendment. On February 16, 2010, the Court (Judge Claudia Wilken) screened the complaint, as required when prisoners file lawsuits against their jailers under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. She dismissed the complaint because out of the twenty-four named defendants, "it [was] not clear which actions proximately caused each constitutional violation." The Court also found that because one of the plaintiffs could afford the filing fee, the complaint would be dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs paid the filing fee and filed an amended complaint. On December 20, 2010, the Court granted leave for the plaintiffs to serve the defendants with the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The Court cautioned the defendants to not needlessly waste resources through insisting on formal service, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d). Still pro se, the Plaintiffs filed motions to enlist the help of the U.S. Marshals in serving the defendants (their own ability to serve the defendants was extremely limited in the SHU). The plaintiffs also moved to compel prison officials to cooperate in photocopying their legal documents, which the Court granted on October 11, 2011. In the summer of 2011, prisoners in the Pelican Bay SHU led two system-wide hunger strikes protesting indefinite solitary confinement and the notorious SHU conditions at Pelican Bay. The hunger strikes, each lasting three weeks, ended after California Department of Corrections agreed to negotiations with hunger strike representatives over their demands. In late 2012, CDCR implemented a pilot program to release those held in the SHU on gang charges. However, prisoners and their advocates denounced the program for keeping the most objectionable aspects of the old program and expanding qualifications for SHU placement. Meanwhile in court, on June 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for an Emergency Protective Order, alleging that defendants had begun confiscating key pieces of evidence of defendants' illegal acts. The District Court ordered further briefing on the issue on October 12, 2011. The Emergency Protective Order was denied without prejudice on March 13, 2012, in part due to the fact that plaintiffs had retained counsel from the Center for Constitutional Rights. Assisted by new counsel, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on September 10, 2012. The plaintiffs claimed that the psychological harm caused by the prolonged confinement was cruel and unusual under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. They also challenged the due process grounds for confining prisoners for decades in the SHU, and included class action allegations, thus naming eight additional plaintiffs. On December 6, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, claiming that in retaliation for this litigation, one of the individual plaintiffs was moved to a different cell block of the SHU. The transfer eliminated all communication between him and the other plaintiffs, separated him from his longtime writing assistant assigned by the California Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and allegedly frustrated counsels' ability to litigate the class action. Judge Wilken denied this motion on April 18, 2013. Judge Wilken found that plaintiffs had not satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction because retaliation was not a claim in the class action complaint, and a preliminary injunction would thus provide relief beyond that which would be granted if the plaintiffs prevailed in the suit. Judge Wilken also denied the motion under the All Writs Act because the evidence did not indicate that the individual plaintiff's transfer was motivated by retaliatory animus, and plaintiffs did not rebut defendants' non-retaliatory justification for the transfer (prisoner safety). On December 17, 2012, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Judge Wilken denied this motion on April 9, 2013. Judge Wilken found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot because the defendants' pilot program for gang management policies did not permanently cure the due process violations alleged, and that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded Eighth Amendment and due process claims. 2013 WL 1435148 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2013). In 2013, dissatisfied with CDCR's progress regarding the length of solitary confinement and conditions of confinement, prisoners began to call for another hunger strike. The strike began on July 8, 2013, and lasted for almost two months. More than 30,000 prisoners participated in the initial strike. The strike ended when two California state lawmakers announced that they would hold public hearings on the state's use of solitary confinement. However, most of the prisoners' demands had not been met and they vowed to continue fighting. For more information about this hunger strike, see this article from Mother Jones. On June 2, 2014, Judge Wilkens granted in part the plaintiffs' May 2, 2013, motion to certify the class. Judge Wilkens certified two classes. The Due Process Class consisted of all prisoners who were assigned to an indeterminate term at the Pelican Bay SHU on the basis of gang validation, under the policies and procedures in place as of September 10, 2012. The Eighth Amendment Class consisted of all prisoners who were or would be assigned to the Pelican Bay SHU for a period of more than ten continuous years. 2014 WL 2465191 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2014). The parties continued with discovery in 2014 and 2015. Many expert reports were filed in 2015 as part of discovery. In addition, on March 11, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint to cover prisoners who were held in the Pelican Bay SHU for over ten years, but then were transferred out to the Tehachapi SHU where conditions were similar. On September 1, 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement and submitted it to the court for approval. In the agreement, the CDC agreed to end indeterminate solitary confinement in prisons across California, stop the use of "gang affiliation" as a basis for placing people in isolation, dramatically reduce the number of people in solitary, and create a new step-down program designed to return those sent to the SHU to general population in two years or less. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement for two years, but the plaintiffs had the option to seek an extension at the end of the two years by presenting evidence of ongoing constitutional violations. On January 26, 2016, Judge Wilkens granted final approval of the class settlement. Plaintiffs moved for $4,550,000 in attorneys' fees and costs incurred from the start of the case to September 1, 2015. This amount was awarded on July 1, 2016, and underwent final approval on August 26, 2016. Plaintiffs continued to seek judgment on various dispositive matters, and attorneys' fees and costs for litigation throughout. On November 20, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for an extension of the settlement agreement based on systemic due process violations. They stated three grounds for the extension: first, the misuse of unreliable confidential information to return class members to solitary confinement; second, inadequate procedural protections related to placement and retention of class members in the Restricted Custody General Population Unit; and third, the retention of CDCR's old, constitutionally infirm gang validations, which were still being relied on to deny class members a fair opportunity for parole. On February 6, 2018, the district court ordered defendants to supplement their production of certain documents relevant to plaintiff's motion to extend the settlement agreement. On July 3, 2018, plaintiffs alleged that the subsequent documents produced by the CDCR demonstrated that the defendant had systematically violated due process rights regarding confidentiality of the information. Plaintiffs stated concerns regarding the systematic nature of these due process violations, and that CDCR's due process violations created a substantial risk of error of a prisoner being wrongfully sent to solitary for years and losing good time credits, which would prolong prison terms. On August 21, 2018, the parties met and conferred to present joint status reports. The parties disagreed whether defendants had a basis to stay further proceedings. On December 7, 2018, the court issued three orders, citing them as responses to defendants' violation of the settlement agreement on July 3, 2018. These orders stipulated that the court adopted the plaintiffs' Out-of-Cell Time remedial plan and the plaintiffs' walk-alone status remedial plan, ordering the defendants to take all steps necessary to implement these plans. The order also granted defendants' motion to stay the enforcement of the remedial plans pending appeal. The Out-of-Cell Time plan provided that: (1) all class members be accorded an amount of time out of their cells that is meaningfully greater than when they were in SHU; (2) the CDCR keep a documentation of their compliance and to make it readily available to the plaintiffs' counsel; (3) the parties meet every three months to discuss implementation and every six months with the Magistrate Judge to assess progress (this monitoring was to continue for one year with the plaintiffs retaining the right to seek an extension); (4) an expert be included as part of the plaintiffs' monitoring; and (5) defendants be prohibited from retaliating against any class representatives. The Walk-Alone status plan provided that: (1) the determination of whether a prisoner be classified as a walk-alone or allowed to exercise in a group was to be made by the Institution Classification Committee and the determination would be reassessed every two months; (2) the ICC would provide reasoning for its determination; (3) prisoners would have the right to waive their right to group activity; (4) walk-alone prisoners would be afforded adequate alternatives for social contact; and (5) plaintiffs' counsel would be entitled to monitor the group programming status of each prison for one year and the right to seek an extension. On December 19, 2018, the defendants appealed. On January 25, 2019, Magistrate Judge Robert M. Illlman granted plaintiffs' motion to extend the settlement for twelve months, citing continued due process violations, specifically the misuse of confidential information to return class members to solitary confinement and the use of unreliable gang validations to deny class members a fair opportunity to seek parole. In February 2019, the defendants moved to stay the January 25 order, arguing they would be irreparably harmed absent a stay. The court denied this motion on April 10, 2019, arguing that the court held jurisdiction to extend the agreement. On April 24, 2019, defendants moved for a de novo determination on the April 10th dismissal of defendants' motion. The court granted the motion on June 26, 2019, and reaffirmed the court's initial dismissal of the motion on April 10, 2019. On July 16, 2020, Judge Wilken moved the deadline for filing to extend the settlement agreement again to September 25, 2020 due to COVID-19. However, shortly after on August 3, 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed the court’s earlier July 3, 2018 ruling that the defendants had violated the settlement agreement. Writing for the court, Judge James Gwin disagreed with the plaintiffs’ claim that the settlement agreement implicitly required increased out-of-cell time for prisoners moved to the general population. Citing the plain text of the settlement agreement, he pointed out that the plaintiffs had defined out-of-cell time for SHU prisoners but not those moved back to the general population, leaving the latter to the discretion of the defendants. Secondly, the court found that contrary to the plaintiffs’ assertion, the settlement agreement did not require the defendant to provide group time and group activities to prisoners on “walk-alone” status. It reasoned that the paragraph discussing these purported requirements was “aspirational,” and that while it indicated prisoners should be moved to “small group yards,” it did not specify that more than one prisoner need occupy those yards. Moreover, the defendant had “substantially complied” with this section to the extent that it could. In reversing the decision, the court vacated the remedial plans set forth on December 7, 2018. 968 F.3d 939, 944-946. In response, the plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit on August 31, 2020 to rehear the case en banc. They also filed a new motion for extension of the settlement agreement on September 25, 2020 based on the same systemic due process violations that the appeals court had evaluated. The motion hearing was set for February 2, 2021 As of October 11, 2020, the petition to the Ninth Circuit is pending and the settlement is pending extension in the District Court.

Summary: In 2009, California prisoners in solitary confinement filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that being held in solitary confinement for more than a decade violates the Eighth Amendment, and that the assignment procedures lack sufficient due process. In 2015, the parties settled the case, and the CDC agreed to significant changes in solitary confinement policies. The settlement is ongoing with continued litigation over its extensions.


Plaintiff KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. (KindHearts), an Ohio non-profit corporation established in 2002, provides millions of dollars of humanitarian aid internationally, principally towards Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza, and refugee camps in Lebanon. On February 19, 2006, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Treasury Department notified KindHearts that all its property and assets were frozen pending an investigation into whether KindHearts provided material support to Hamas. The same day, federal agents executed a search warrant at the KindHearts headquarters and the residence of its president. Over a year later in May 2007, OFAC provisionally determined that KindHearts should be designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.D. § 1701 et seq. and Executive Order 13224 (E.O. 13224). On 10/09/2008, plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed suit in United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against OFAC, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., the IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a), and E.O. 13224. Plaintiff requested an injunction vacating the freeze order and declaratory judgment. The district court (Judge James Carr) issued a temporary restraining order blocking the SGDT designation pending judicial review. In November and December 2008, both parties moved for summary judgment and defendants moved to dismiss. Meanwhile, plaintiff had filed a motion under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(g) to recover some of the materials seized in February 2006. The district court ordered government to produce copies of the seized materials. In re Search of KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 855 (N.D. Ohio 2009). Following oral arguments on the issue of summary judgment, in August 2009 the district court partially granted the motion to dismiss with respect to some Fourth Amendment claims and OFAC's constitutional authority. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment was granted with respect to OFAC's violation of the Fourth Amendment, failure to provide notice an opportunity to be heard, and blocking plaintiff's funds to compensate its legal counsel. <i>KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development v. Geithner</i>, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. Ohio 2009). Plaintiff moved for, and the district court granted, a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants from proceeding with the SGDT designation process pending the court's adjudication of applicable remedies for the constitutional and statutory violations found in the August 2009 order. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Geithner, 676 F. Supp. 2d 649 (N.D. Ohio 2009). Following supplemental briefing on the issue of applicable remedies, in May 2010 the district court ordered government to show probable cause and provide plaintiff with notice of its basis for the freeze on its assets and the pending OFAC investigation. KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Development, Inc. v. Geithner, 710 F. Supp. 2d 637 (N.D. Ohio 2010). Defendants provided briefing on the issues, and the parties headed towards trial. However, in January 2012, the parties settled. Plaintiff was required to dissolve and cease operations, and defendants were required to remove Kindhearts from all lists of entities whose assets are blocked and to pay $330,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal and moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction pursuant to the fulfillment of their settlement agreement on July 15, 2014. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on July 17.

Summary: In October 2008, an Ohio non-profit corporation sued the Office of Foreign Assets Control after it froze its assets pending an investigation into whether the corporation assisted Hamas. In January 2012, the parties settled. Plaintiff was required to dissolve and cease operations, and defendants were required to remove plaintiff from all lists of entities whose assets are blocked and to pay $330,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action filed by immigrants in detention at the Aurora Contract Detention Facility in Colorado seeking release from detention in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to underlying medical conditions. The court denied the TRO and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus on May 27. The plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth Circuit, but the plaintiffs later moved to dismiss the appeal. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal on November 17. <hr> On April 14, 2020, a group of immigrants in detention filed a lawsuit against Immigrations and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), the warden of Aurora Contract Detention Facility, and two ICE officials in the U.S. District Court for the District Court of Colorado. Represented by Arnold & Porter, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The plaintiffs also sought, in the alternative, injunctive relief. They immediately filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix and Chief Judge Philip A. Brimmer. The defendants filed a response in opposition to the temporary restraining order on April 21, and the plaintiffs replied on April 23. However, the Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents. On May 27, Judge Brimmer denied the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and dismissed the case. Judge Brimmer stated that the plaintiffs could not make a conditions of confinement claim through a habeas petition, and that the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success of proving their claims. The plaintiffs appealed the denial of the temporary restraining order to the Tenth Circuit on July 21. On November 17, 2020, the Tenth Circuit granted a motion to dismiss made by the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.

Summary: Immigrants in detention in the Aurora Contract Detention Facility in Colorado sought writs of habeas corpus, requesting release from detention in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The case is now closed.