On September 16, 2010, three women who were previously employed at Goldman Sachs filed a lawsuit against the company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a pattern of gender discrimination in violation of state law and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Specifically, they alleged that the company discriminated against them through its evaluation, compensation, and promotion policies. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of female financial-services employees of Goldman Sachs who were at the Associate, Vice President, and Managing Director corporate level. On November 22, 2010, Goldman Sachs filed a motion to stay the claims of one of the three plaintiffs and compel arbitration on the grounds that her claims were subject to an arbitration clause that she signed as part of her employment agreement. The Court (Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV) denied the motion on April 28, 2011, concluding that, "because an arbitration clause may not be enforced if it precludes the vindication of substantive rights, and because a pattern or practice claim under Title VII can only be brought in the context of a class action, [the plaintiff]'s Title VII claim cannot be committed to arbitration . . . ." Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 394, 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) rev'd sub nom. Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483 (2nd Cir. 2013). However, on March 21, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (before Judges Barrington D. Parker, Reena Raggi, and Gerard E. Lynch) reversed the District Court's ruling. Parisi v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 710 F.3d 483, 488 (2nd Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit rejected the view that a preclusion of a pattern-or-practice claim amounts to a deprivation of the plaintiff's substantive rights since "pattern-or-practice simply refers to a method of proof and does not constitute a freestanding cause of action." Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted). On October 15, 2012, the case was reassigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman. Judge Analisa Torres replaced Judge Furman on May 24, 2013. The parties proceeded to the issue of class certification. Both sides moved to exclude portions of the other's expert testimony for failure to meet the standards in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In a March 3, 2015 order, Mag. Judge Francis noted that courts disagree on whether to apply Daubert to motions for class certification. While noting that a full investigation into expert qualifications during class certification would be "premature," Mag. Judge Francis concluded that precedent applying Daubert to class certification was "more persuasive." After a review of the challenged experts' methods, Mag. Judge Francis excluded the defendant's matched pairs analysis and report on the financial services industry in general and declared evidence from plaintiff's "rebuttal expert" to be inappropriate so early in the proceedings. On the same day, Mag. Judge Francis issued a report on plaintiff's motion for certification of a class of female associates and vice presidents who worked in Goldman Sachs' Investment Banking, Investment Management, and/or Securities Divisions in the United States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, parts (b)(2) (for injunctive relief) and (b)(3) (for damages). Relying on Judge Sand's prior, reluctant ruling in this case that injunctive relief is not available to plaintiffs no longer employed by defendant (877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121), Mag. Judge Francis recommended that plaintiff's (b)(2) motion be denied. Mag. Judge Francis also advised against certifying under (b)(3) because "countless individualized factors" prevented common claims from predominating in the case. Nevertheless, Mag. Judge Francis remarked that this "is a close case" and hinted that injunctive relief should not have been foreclosed. Mag. Judge Francis declined plaintiff's invitation to reconsider the report advising against class certification in an August 3, 2015 order. However, Mag. Judge Francis did grant permissive intervention of two additional plaintiffs whose claims "present the same core legal and factual issues" as those of the existing plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on the same day, adding the two intervenors as plaintiffs and removing the plaintiff consigned to arbitration. One June 6, 2016, Judge Torres denied defendant's appeal of Mag. Judge Francis' order allowing intervention, finding no clear error in Mag. Judge Francis' decision that intervention was timely and non-prejudicial. In addition, Judge Torres declined to treat the motion to intervene as dispositive, which would have triggered a heightened standard of review. Defendants moved for dismissal of intervenors' claims on the grounds that they, as former employees, did not have standing to obtain an injunction. In an April 12, 2017 opinion, Judge Torres rejected Judge Sand's expansive reading of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes that favored defendant's position. Instead, Judge Torres ruled that former employees may seek injunctive and declaratory relief. In particular, Judge Torres decided that one intervenor had standing because she was employed on the date she intervened, and the other intervenor's claims were not moot because she might be eligible for reinstatement. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental amended complaint alleging retaliation by defendants as a result of the lawsuit. Meanwhile, the court certified the defendants' interlocutory appeal on the propriety of intervention on June 14, 2017. The Second Circuit denied the petition for leave to appeal on August 29, 2017. The defendants did obtain an order allowing them to file documents with "sensitive business information" relating to salaries under seal on July 28, 2017. Judge Torres' decision that plaintiffs could seek injunctive relief removed the basis of Mag. Judge Francis' recommendation against class certification. Consequently, Judge Torres re-opened the question of whether (b)(2) class certification would be appropriate in an August 30, 2017 order. Mag. Judge Francis was replaced by Mag. Judge Lehrburger on October 31, 2017. In a March 30, 2018 opinion, Judge Torres rejected the parties' objections to Mag. Judge Francis' decisions on expert testimony. Judge Torres deferred judgment on (b)(2) certification due to the delays caused by the numerous conflicting decisions on its applicability thus far in the litigation. In addition, Judge Torres denied (b)(3) certification on plaintiff's claims of a "boy's club" culture since "individualized proof" would "overwhelm" common issues. However, Judge Torres granted (b)(3) certification on plaintiff's other disparate impact and disparate treatment claims. Defendants asked the Second Circuit to review (b)(3) certification, and Mag. Judge Lehrburger denied defendant's motion to stay proceedings pending the appeal in an April 16, 2018 order. On July 24, 2018, Mag. Judge Lehrburger ordered defendants to produce class contact information "without delay," largely adopting the defendants' wording of the opt-out form. The Second Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal of (b)(3) certification as "unwarranted" on September 4, 2018. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs submitted a letter to the court withdrawing their motion for (b)(2) certification. They noted that injunctive relief would be available to a (b)(3) class, expressed concern that the lawsuit had "gone off the tracks" with respect to the class certification issue (defendants had requested en banc review of (b)(3) certification), and expressed a desire to proceed quickly to the merits. In response, the court dismissed all pending motions relating to (b)(2) certification on October 3, 2018. On April 12, 2019, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration, stay the claims of certain class members, and exclude them from the class. On that same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking to void arbitration agreements that were executed after the commencement of this lawsuit. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants' failure to notify class members that signing the agreement would waive their right to continue participating in the suit. The parties continued to engage in extensive discovery disputes while the motion was pending. On March 26, 2020, the court granted in part and conditionally granted in part the motion to compel arbitration. Further, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to void the arbitration clauses in agreements executed after the commencement of this lawsuit. As a result of this decision, over 1,000 members of the class had their claims dismissed and were ordered to pursue them in individual arbitration. Discovery is set to conclude in June 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This case was brought against Goldman Sachs by three female former employees of the company. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in a pattern of gender discrimination through its evaluation, compensation, and promotion policies. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of female financial-services employees of Goldman-Sachs who are at the Associate, Vice President, and Managing Director corporate level. The case is ongoing as of May 2020.


On April 5, 2001, attorneys with the Southern Center for Human Rights and private counsel filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama, challenging the conditions of confinement at the Morgan County Jail. The jail, which was alleged to have been old, antiquated, and structurally unfit for human habitation, housed both pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners. Plaintiffs alleged that the Jail was severely overcrowded and that inmates were subjected to uncivilized and hazardous conditions, which included inadequate medical care, poor sanitation and lack of fire safety. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the First, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Concurrent with the complaint, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction. After a hearing, on April 17, 2001, the District Court (Chief Judge U. W. Clemon) certified the case as a class action and entered a preliminary injunction. The Court noted the deplorable conditions at the Jail and found that the principle cause of the overcrowding was the State's failure to transfer "state [prison] ready'' inmates (convicted inmates that should have been serving sentences in State prisons). To rectify that failure, Judge Clemon ordered the State to present a plan to the Court for removal of all state ready inmates from the Jail. Maynor v. Morgan County, Ala. 147 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1186 (N.D. Ala. 2001). On September 25, 2001, the District Court (Judge Clemon) made the injunction permanent and also approved a Consent Decree that was reached by the parties. The Decree provided for changes in housing and living conditions, health care and diet, security and fire safety and access to the courts. Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees in the amount of $79,043.09 and also committed to pursue construction of a new jail facility. The Court amended the Consent Decree on December 8, 2005, to require the development of a "Transition Plan," to address budget and staffing issues for the new Jail, which was under construction. In 2006, with the new Jail set to open, the Sheriff petitioned the Court to settle a dispute over the number of staff required for the new facility. By order dated, March 21, 2006, Judge Clemon interpreted the Consent Decree, as amended, to require a minimum staff of 88 officers. On January 7, 2009, the Court entered a Civil Contempt Order based on evidence that the Sheriff had knowingly and willfully violated certain provisions of the Consent Decree. Violations included the consistent failure to provide nutritionally adequate meals to class members, and the failure to make available to class members legal materials specifically required by the Decree. On January 27, 2009, the Court entered an order granting a motion to modify and clarify the Consent Decree. Paragraph 33 was amended to clarify which legal materials be made available to inmates and detainees. Paragraph 22 was also amended, further clarifying the nutritional guidelines to be used by Defendant in the feeding of inmates and detainees. On December 7, 2009, the Sheriff sought review of the District Court's modification of the Consent Decree in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, arguing that the Decree as modified imposed upon him personal liability for feeding prisoners. The Court dismissed the appeal, citing a lack of jurisdiction. There was no further activity for several years. Then, on Feb. 22, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for order requiring the Sheriff to show cause why she should not be held in contempt. The plaintiffs argued that the Sheriff violated certain provisions of the consent decree. They argued that the Sheriff "removed $160,000 from the Jail Food Account" in January 2017 and did not provide adequate documentation to explain why. The court granted this motion on June 8, 2017. The Sheriff then moved to terminate the consent decree on June 27, 2017, arguing that "there is no current and ongoing violation of any Federal rights of the inmates...covered by said prospective relief and said prospective relief extends further than necessary to correct a violation of any such Federal right." A hearing was held in front of Judge Abdul Kallon on November 27, 2017. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 5, 2001, attorneys with the Southern Center for Human Rights and private counsel filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Northern District of Alabama, challenging the conditions of confinement at the Morgan County Jail. Plaintiffs alleged that the Jail was severely overcrowded and that inmates were subjected to uncivilized and hazardous conditions. The District Court certified the case as a class action and ordered the State to present a plan to the Court for removal of all state ready inmates from the Jail. Maynor v. Morgan County, Ala.147 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1186 (N.D.Ala. 2001). On September 25, 2001, the District Court made the injunction permanent and also approved a Consent Decree that provided for changes in housing and living conditions, health care and diet, security and fire safety, and access to the courts. Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys fees in the amount of $79,043.09 and also committed to pursue construction of a new jail facility.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 13, 2020, medically vulnerable individuals incarcerated at the federal prison FCI Elkton sought release in light of the threat of COVID-19. On April 22, the court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering the prison to identify all such prisoners and evaluate each for transfer by any means (compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, or nontransfer furlough). For anyone ineligible for transfer to a community setting, the Court ordered transfer to another prison facility that would enable social distancing or testing/single cell placement. After numerous appeals to the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court of the United States, the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in July 2020 and between September 2020 and March 2021, the court granted numerous joint motions to stay all proceedings . The defendants continue to file daily status reports and, as of March 19, 2021, the case is currently stayed. <hr> As of April 13, 2020, the state of Ohio reported 6,975 total cases of COVID-19. By that time, at least three individuals incarcerated in the Elkton Federal Prison, located south of Youngstown, Ohio, had died of the disease. On April 13, 2020, the plaintiffs, a group of incarcerated individuals at Elkton and its adjacent low-security facility, brought this lawsuit against the Warden of Elkton and the Director of the Federal Bureau of prisons, seeking habeas relief in the form of expedited consideration and immediate release of the putative class. The plaintiffs sought class action certification for all current and future individuals in custody at Elkton, including a medically-vulnerable subclass, representing a total of approximately 2,417 individuals. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the prison failed to "provide meaningful protection" against the spread of the disease, citing experts who stated that social distancing within the prison was "impossible" and that the close proximity of showers, phones, and sinks made transmission even more likely. The plaintiffs also alleged a total lack of soap or hand sanitizer dispensers, and stated that Elkton "does nothing to protect high-risk prisoners." The plaintiffs sought expedited release of the Medically-Vulnerable subclass and judicial supervision of a prevention and mitigation plan. The case was assigned to Judge James S. Gwin, who, on April 14, granted the plaintiffs' motion to expedite. On April 17, the defendants filed an answer. On the same day, the court ordered the defendants to submit a list of individuals who were immunocompromised. The defendants argued that steps taken at Elkton--including screening, quarantine procedures, and staff education--were sufficient, and that the plaintiffs were not suffering constitutional harm as a result of their incarceration during the COVID-19 crisis. On April 22, the Court granted a preliminary injunction, granting in part and denying in part the plaintiff's request for relief. The Court ordered that, within one day, the defendants must identify all members of the subclass and, within two weeks, evaluate each member’s eligibility for transfer out of Elkton, such as through compassionate release, parole or community supervision, transfer furlough, nontransfer furlough, or transfer to another facility where appropriate measures (such as testing, single-cell placement, social distancing) were being taken. 455 F.Supp.3d 467. The defendants failed to provide a list of class members and instead appealed the preliminary injunction to the Sixth Circuit on April 27. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-3447. In the Circuit Court, the defendants moved to stay pending appeal, which the court denied on May 4, 2020 on the grounds that the defendants’ time to comply with the April 22 order was about to expire, rendering any remaining harm slight. On April 29, the defendants also moved for the Sixth Circuit to stay the District Court's order, which the Sixth Circuit denied the following day. Back in the District Court, on April 28, the defendants moved to stay pending appeal. The plaintiffs then filed an emergency motion to compel the list of potential class members, which the court granted on April 29. The plaintiffs also moved to certify a class that would include all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Elkton, and a subclass of vulnerable people either over the age of 50 or with an underlying condition. On April 30, the defendants provided a list of class members. On May 6, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the preliminary injunction, claiming that the defendants failed to conduct the required evaluations and transfers. On May 8, the District Court denied the defendant's motion to stay pending appeal on the grounds that the Sixth Circuit decided the legal issues underpinning a stay determination, a decision that was likely binding on the District Court. 2020 WL 2308441. The court also order the defendants to provide a specific reason as to why each class member was deemed ineligible for release or transfer. As of May 19, approximately one in four inmates (24%) at Elkton had been infected with COVID-19. On May 19, the court noted that such a number was "unacceptable" and that the defendants had made only limited efforts to reduce the COVID-19 risks despite the preliminary injunction, and granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 2542131. Specifically, the court ordered the defendants to file daily reports, indicating the number of COVID-19 tests performed and the results. On May 21, the defendants applied for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending appeal of the Sixth Circuit decision to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court denied the application for stay on May 26. 140 S.Ct. 2800. They stated that the defendant was only seeking a stay of the April 22 preliminary injunction, which had been superseded by a newly issued order from the District Court enforcing the preliminary injunction and imposing additional measures. The Court noted that the defendant had not yet sought Sixth Circuit review of the May 19 order. 2020 WL 2644305. On May 27, the defendants appealed the May 19 order enforcing the preliminary injunction to the Sixth Circuit. This second Sixth Circuit appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-3547. The Sixth Circuit refused to stay the order on June 1, but stated that the first appeal (USCA 20-3447) would be expedited on the schedule suggested by the parties. 2020 WL 2904706. Back in the District Court, the defendants filed an emergency order to stay the May 19 order, which the court denied on June 4. 2020 WL 3000464. That same day, the defendants submitted a reply to the U.S. Supreme Court, stating that they expected to begin the transfer of the first group of individuals to other facilities on June 5, even before the oral argument scheduled on the same day. In light of this, they sought to stay injunction until a decision is made by the Sixth Circuit, or by the Supreme Court, if necessary. That same day, the Supreme Court suspended the April 22 and May 19 orders pending the defendants' appeal for the Sixth Circuit. 2020 WL 2988458. On June 9, the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction on appeal in USCA 20-3447. 961 F.3d 829. The Sixth Circuit first found that jurisdiction was proper as the PLRA does not apply in habeas challenges. However, they ruled that the defendant, by implementing a six-phase plan to mitigate the risk of COVID-19, had responded reasonably to the risk and therefore defendants actions were not deliberately indifferent. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit found that “while the harm imposed by COVID-19 on inmates at Elkton ultimately [is] not averted,” the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights had not been violated. On June 5, George Winkleman, an individual housed at FCI Elkton, sought to intervene. On June 10, Eric Henderson, an immunosuppressed individual currently housed at FCI Elkton, also sought to intervene. Both motions were denied on July 23. On July 2, the plaintiffs moved for expedited discovery, compelling the defendants to respond within 14 days due to the time-sensitivity of the case on July 2. The court granted the motion on August 6. On July 19, the Sixth Circuit in USCA 20-3447 denied the defendants' motion to expedited the issuance of a mandate regarding the appeal. On July 27, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs did not have a habeas claim because they did not seek release from prison custody and their claims could be remedied through means other than release. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state an Eighth Amendment violation because they could not establish deliberate indifference. On August 20, the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaint and substitute class representatives. After the defendants moved for summary vacatur, on September 17, in USCA 20-3547, the Sixth Circuit vacated the District Court's May 19 order and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings. From September 2020 through March 2021, the court granted numerous motions to stay all proceedings filed by the defendants. The defendants continue to file daily status reports and, as of March 19, 2021, the case is currently stayed.

Summary: Individuals incarcerated in a northern Ohio prison seek relief from exposure to COVID-19. Preliminary injunctive relief was granted, and the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal and a motion for a stay pending appeal. The Sixth Circuit denied the defendant's request for a stay. On May 21, the defendants applied for a stay of the preliminary injunction to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied on May 26, noting that the defendants had not yet appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit and moved to stay the order pending appeal scheduled the next day, which was granted by the Supreme Court on June 4. On June 9, the Sixth Circuit vacated the injunction. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim in July and, between September 2020 and March 2021, the defendants filed joint motions to stay all proceedings. The defendants continue to file daily status reports and, as of March 19, 2021, the case is currently stayed.


On August 28, 2012, three Alabama residents filed a federal class lawsuit against the city of Childersburg, Alabama and the private, for-profit law enforcement company the city used to collect law-enforcement related fines, costs, and fees. The plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction. They asserted claims under both federal and state law. Public Justice, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, and private counsel represented the plaintiffs. The residents' allegations were as follows: The defendant, Judicial Corrections Services (JCS) offered an "offender paid system" free of charge to the city government. At times, the defendant had acted under the color of state law in collecting fines, costs, and fees. In addition, it had acted as a quasi-judicial agency of the city at times. The company officers had the appearance of state authority and were referred to as "probation officers," although they had no such authority under Alabama statutes. The employees of the private company constructed documents that appeared to be court orders, holding them out as having the force of court orders. The city knew this, but allowed the company employees to collect fines, threaten members of the plaintiff class with incarceration, and incarcerate persons who had not paid the fines. Further, members of the plaintiff class had been placed on "probation" by the private company's employees, leading to payment of fines, costs, and fees. Moreover, the defendants had increased the amount of these fines from the amounts printed on the "probation" papers. The defendants did not have due process protections or procedures in place. The lawsuit, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged denial of due process in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and the Alabama Constitution. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants imposed incarceration for failure to pay fines and costs without a hearing to determine indigency. They also alleged that defendants imposed terms of incarceration and other costs and fines beyond the statutory maximum allowed under Alabama law. The suit further alleged denial of equal protection. The plaintiffs claimed that defendants, acting under color of state law, automatically imposed incarceration upon those unable to pay fines and costs without a hearing to determine indigency. Further, the suit alleged that defendants unlawfully arrested, prosecuted, and detained people when they had no jurisdiction or authority under Alabama law. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the enterprise itself was unconstitutional and illegal, because the city allowed a private company to operate a quasi-judicial system for private profit. On April 26, 2013, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint preserving and expounding upon their allegations against JCS and Childersburg. The complaint sought the certification of two classes: 1) past and future individuals who received fines from JCS that were or could be converted to probation, and 2) all individuals who were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration for failure to pay charges and fees without consideration of their indigency. JCS and Childersburg moved separately to dismiss the second amended complaint. On September 26, 2013, Judge R. David Proctor issued opinions granting in part and denying in part defendants' motions to dismiss. Judge Proctor sustained all of the plaintiffs' allegations and claims for relief, except for the plaintiffs' request that any currently incarcerated indigent persons jailed for nonpayment of fines be released. He found that federal habeas corpus law was the only avenue for this form of relief. Following this opinion, the parties began discovery. Over the next several years, discovery proceeded, as did various discovery disputes. Childersburg moved for summary judgment on July 28, 2016. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs moved to certify two classes consisting of the following on August 11, 2016: "All individuals who, as of August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were assigned by municipal courts in Alabama to 'probation' with JCS for the collection of fines, fees and costs. A subclass of this class would include those individuals within the above class who received, such treatment before the Childersburg Municipal Court" and also "[a]ll individuals who, after being assigned to JCS by August 28, 2010 or thereafter, were incarcerated, or may be subject to incarceration, without consideration of their indigency for failure to pay fines, fees and costs." The plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment on September 19, 2016 to declare Childersburg's probation practice an unconstitutional denial of equal protection as well as to declare void the contract between the city and JCS. Over the next several months, the parties submitted various motions for summary judgment as to particular claims. On October 28, 2016, the court terminated the motion for class certification, though it allowed it to be re-filed subject to its resolution of the summary judgment motions. On February 17, 2017, the court granted the city's motions for summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the city. The court found that "no City policy or custom is at issue in this case because Plaintiffs complain of judicial acts for which the Municipal Court is responsible." The court found that city police officers were "entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for executing facially valid court orders" and that the plaintiffs had not identified a final decision-maker from the city who was ultimately "responsible for issuing a policy or custom directing officers to arrest probationers." The court also did not find a causal link between the city's policies the plaintiffs' constitutional violation claims. Finally, the court held that some of the plaintiffs' claims were barred by a two-year statute of limitations. 2017 WL 660842. On September 12, 2017, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, granted defendant Correctional Healthcare summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part summary judgment for defendant JCS. 270 F.Supp.3d 1262. Specifically, the court denied the plaintiffs' request that it declare (1) the defendants' probation practices unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the contract between JCS and the city void, and (3) void probation sentences "initiated by a blank order or premised upon an offense that was not adjudicated by the Municipal Court’s judge." The court found insufficient evidence "that the City agreed with JCS (or anyone else) to violate probationers’ constitutional rights." The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot because JCS was no longer conducting business in Alabama, subject to re-pleading if that should change. The court granted the defendants' summary judgment motion on some due process claims as well as claims relating to the Fourth Amendment, Sixth Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and excessive fines. The defendants were denied summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' due process challenge to JCS's extension of their probation sentences beyond the statutory maximum because "a reasonable jury could find that JCS's case handling customs and policies—rather than the conduct of its employees—was the moving force behind the procedural due process violations." 2017 WL 4012933. On June 15, 2018, the court granted limited reconsideration to plaintiffs’ equal protection claim. According to the court, the claim could go forward on a § 1983 conspiracy theory because a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that there was a conspiracy to imprison plaintiffs based solely on their inability to pay fines and fees to JCS. 2018 WL 3012276. On July 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against JCS, seeking class certification for two classes: all individuals who were arrested or incarcerated after failing to pay fees, fines or costs to JCS statewide, and by Childersburg Municipal Court specifically. Plaintiffs brought three counts against JCS. First, they levied a due process challenge against JCS both as an independent actor and in conspiracy with Childersburg Municipal Court. Plaintiffs alleged that the imprisonment of plaintiffs who were unable to pay fees, fines, or costs to JCS and threats of arrest for nonpayment without any determination of willfulness or indigency constituted a deprivation of constitutional due process rights. Under JCS’s system, plaintiffs also alleged violation of Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Plaintiffs unable to pay JCS’s fines, fees, and costs were threatened with jail and actually imprisoned without access to counsel. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed denial of the right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment because plaintiffs were deprived of their rights solely based on their wealth without any determination of willfulness or ability to pay. On September 26, 2019, the court denied the plaintiffs' class certification. According the court, it would not be administratively feasible or ascertainable to certify either of the classes proposed by plaintiffs. Additionally, the court found that class concerns did not predominate over individual legal questions for the putative class members. According to the court, many of the putative class members would have been placed on probation for reasons other than JCS’s unilateral action. Determination of this issue would require substantial individualized fact-finding and render the class unmanageable. 333 F.R.D. 552. After class certification was denied, the two parties entered into settlement discussions. Judge Proctor periodically required the parties to provide status reports on settlement negotiations in this and a group of similar cases also filed in the Northern District of Alabama: Woods (2:15-cv-00493), Hall (4:15-cv-01656), Moore (4:16-cv-00914), Foshee (1:16-cv-01030), and Hamilton (2:18-cv-00933). Following a year of settlement discussions, the parties entered into a stipulation to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against the single remaining defendant JCS with each party to bear their own costs. The stipulation did not indicate that the parties reached a settlement, and presumably, they did not. Thus, on September 29, 2020, the case was dismissed with prejudice. This case is closed.

Summary: Alabama residents alleged that an Alabama town had been using a private for-profit company to collect fines, costs, and fees. The company employees were called "probation officers," constructed documents that appeared to be court orders, and imprisoned people who could not pay the fines or fees. The plaintiffs in this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama alleged that the defendants were violating both due process and equal protection (among other violations) because they incarcerated people for inability to pay fines due to indigency, because they did not provide proper notice or lawyers, and because they imposed terms of incarceration and costs that exceeded the statutory maximum allowed under state law. The case was dismissed with prejudice.


This is a large tort claim case pertaining to sexual abuse in the federal prison system. On December 3, 2019, fourteen female prisoners, all of whom had been in federal custody for at least five years and nearly all first-time offenders for non-violent offenses, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida. Seven of the plaintiffs were still incarcerated. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Torts Claim Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) maintained “a sanctuary for male correctional officers to sexually assault and abuse female inmates.” The plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to sexual harassment and assault at Coleman Prison Camp. The complaint goes into stark, chilling detail on the pervasive abuse. The prisoners were frightened to report out of fear of retaliation and threats to their families including their young children. Some of the prisoners were forced to act as “look out” for guards as they had sex with other prisoners – and then were later sexually assaulted and raped themselves. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the BOP maintained a policy which protected male correctional officers some of whom were known sexual predators. They claimed that Coleman Prison Camp employed at least eight known “sexual predators” and maintained a policy where if a prisoner complained she would be transferred to a local detention center in order to suppress such complaints. Correctional officers would use phone monitoring and restricted access to counsel to additionally suppress the women’s ability to report the misconduct. As of January 2020, the defendant had not answered and the case was ongoing.

Summary: Six female prisoners allege that they were sexually abused while in the custody of the federal prison system. They allege that the facility knowingly retained correctional officers who had a history of sexual assault and created a culture which made it almost impossible to report their abuse.


On October 15, 1990, inmates confined in the protective custody units of the Maine State Prison in Thomaston, Maine, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Maine Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiffs, represented by the Maine Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU National Prison Project, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by overcrowding, double celling, poor ventilation, inadequate recreation, broken plumbing, lack of mental health care, fire safety violations, lack of medical care, lack of personal safety, deafening noise, lack of sanitation, insects, and lack of access to legal supplies. Much of this case predates PACER, so many documents are unavailable. According to the docket, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine (Judge Gene Carter) closed this case on July 31, 1991, though the reason is unavailable. Later docket entries refer to a class settlement, which is unavailable to the Clearinghouse. Plaintiffs moved to reopen the case on January 22, 1996, and Defendants reported that the prison was taking steps to remedy the situation. The Court denied the motion to reopen the case, finding that the recent complaints were outside the scope of the class settlement. We have no further information on the proceedings, and the case remains closed as of March 6, 2018.

Summary: Inmates confined in the protective custody units of the Maine State Prison in Thomaston, Maine, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Maine Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by overcrowding, double celling, poor ventilation, inadequate recreation, broken plumbing, lack of mental health care, fire safety violations, lack of medical care, lack of personal safety, deafening noise, lack of sanitation, insects, and lack of access to legal supplies. At some point the parties reached a class settlement. The Court closed the case for some reason on July 31, 1991. Plaintiffs' 1996 attempt to reopen the case was denied by the Court for dealing with issues outside the scope of the class settlement.


On November 21, 2006, a coalition of immigration rights groups, Arizona state representatives, Arizona taxpayers, and a group of immigrant criminal defendants filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for Arizona, challenging enforcement of the “Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy” by the Maricopa County Sheriff and other County officials and officers. The policy allegedly consisted of arresting and prosecuting non-smuggler aliens for conspiring to transport themselves across the border in violation of a state “anti-coyote” law, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319, which made it a felony to smuggle undocumented immigrants for money. The plaintiffs alleged that instead of going after the professional smugglers (“coyotes”), local law enforcement targeted aliens who paid others to guide them across the border into Arizona and charged them under a criminal conspiracy theory. Specifically, the complaint asserted that the practice was preempted by federal immigration law and violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and certification of a class consisting of all individuals arrested and prosecuted for conspiring to transport themselves, and themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-2319. Attorneys for the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, the LULAC National Legal Advisor, and private counsel represented the plaintiffs. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on standing and abstention grounds. The defendants argued that the federal court should not hear the case as there were already state criminal cases underway in which plaintiffs’ challenges could be made. Senior Judge Robert C. Bloomfield granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Bloomfield decided that abstention in deference to the state courts may be required, writing that Younger abstention is appropriate when (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide the plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims. Judge Bloomfield gave the plaintiffs the opportunity to write a brief addressing the applicability of the preemption test in response. Specifically, the court was interested in deciding if the second prong of the test in De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976) was applicable. De Canas held that federal preemption may be applicable to state law or policy that does not regulate immigration if Congress intended to “occupy the field” of the subject matter the state had attempted to regulate. The plaintiffs’ request for class certification was denied without prejudice. 2007 WL 2775134 (D. Ariz. Sept. 21, 2007). The plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief and then amended their complaint on October 12, 2007. The amended complaint asserted that the Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy is preempted because the Immigration and Nationality Act fully occupies the field of regulating the transportation of immigrants, and therefore the the local regulation is duplicating and thus intruding on a federal scheme. This conflict intrudes on federal laws and policies which allow application for lawful status despite having entered without inspection. On January 12, 2009, Judge Broomfield granted defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, holding that all of the elements for Younger abstention were present: (1) state proceedings were underway before the commencement of this federal action, (2) the parties’ interests are sufficiently intertwined with parties in state court, (3) plaintiffs’ preemption argument is unavailing, and (4) there is unquestionable interference with the ongoing state proceeding. 594 F.Supp.2d 1104 (D. Ariz. 2009). The plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the order of dismissal and the judgment. On February 9, 2009, the Ninth Circuit (Hon. Judge Alex Kozinski, Judge Alfred T. Goodwin, and Judge Sandra S. Ikuta) granted the plaintiffs' petition. On July 12, 2010, the Ninth Circuit issued a memorandum, finding that the Younger doctrine prohibited the district court from asserting jurisdiction over the national Mexican plaintiffs, and those claims had been properly dismissed. The Ninth Circuit held, however, that the claims of the organizations and taxpayers were sufficiently unrelated to the state claims that the court had jurisdiction. It remanded the case to the district court to determine if the remaining plaintiffs had standing to pursue their claims. 386 F. App'x 726 (9th Cir. 2010). In response to the remand to the district court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case due to lack of standing or lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs responded to the motion on Nov. 22, 2010. On April 11, 2011, Judge Broomfield determined that, as it had been three and a half years since the complaint was originally filed, the case may be moot. Judge Broomfield requested that the parties file supplemental briefs to address this question. As a result of this briefing, Judge Broomfield dismissed the claims of League of United Latin American Citizens and individual Steve Gallardo. The remaining plaintiffs and defendants proceeded with discovery. In October of 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second motion to certify class and a motion for summary judgment. The defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 27, 2013, Judge Broomfield issued several orders. He denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. He granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was defined as “All individuals who pay taxes to Maricopa County and object to the use of county tax revenues to stop, detain, arrest, incarcerate, prosecute, or penalize individuals for conspiring to transport themselves, and themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. State § 13-2319.” He granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their claim of federal preemption. Judge Broomfield dismissed with prejudice the plaintiffs claims unlawful search and seizure, denial of due process, as well as the pendent state claim. Finally, Judge Broomfield held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that federal law preempts and renders invalid the Maricopa County Migrant Policy and permanently enjoined Sheriff Arpaio and County Attorney Montgomery and their agents, employees, successors in office, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with the Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy from implementing the Maricopa migrant Conspiracy Policy including detaining, arresting, and prosecuting persons for conspiring to transport themselves, and no one else. This was followed on October 4, 2013 by a clerk’s judgment stating that the plaintiffs were entitled to the above declarations. On October 25, 2013, the defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit against the district court’s order on the motion for summary judgment, as well as the order on motion to certify class. On November 4, 2013, the plaintiffs cross-appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit regarding the Orders on September 27, 2013 and October 4, 2013. The parties then continued to litigate regarding attorney’s fees. On August 22, 2014, the parties advised the court that they would be dismissing this action upon defendants’ formal execution of the settlement agreement. On September 11, 2014, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for attorney's fees, stating that the parties settled plaintiffs’ claim for attorney’s fees and non-taxable costs outside of court. As of October 21, 2014, the defendants still had not provided such a stipulation of dismissal. On that date, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a mandate that the parties submit a stipulation to voluntarily dismiss this action in its entirety. The plaintiffs filed a statement that included the settlement agreement on November 4, 2014 and the defendants submitted notice of agreement. The agreement states that the injunction provided by the court will remain permanently in effect, and the defendants agree to pay $675,000 for attorney's fees and costs. The case is closed.

Summary: On November 21, 2006, a coalition of immigration rights groups filed a class action lawsuit under §1983 in the U.S. District Court for Arizona, challenging the enforcement of the "Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy" by the Maricopa county officials. The plaintiffs argued that this practice was preempted by federal immigration law and violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that the county officials had a policy of targeting aliens instead of going after the professional smugglers, and asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on standing and abstention. The court, Judge Robert C. Bloomfield, issued an opinion denying the class certification without prejudice and invited the plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief addressing the abstention issue. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a supplemental brief and amended their complaint, asserting that the Immigration and Nationality Act preempted the Maricopa Migrant Conspiracy Policy. On January 12, 2009, Judge Bloomfield granted defendant’s motion to dismiss in its entirety, holding that Younger abstention is inappropriate. Plaintiffs petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and on February 18, 2010, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs. Judge Broomfield granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for plaintiffs League of United Latin American Citizens and Steve Gallardo on November 8, 2010. On September 27, 2013, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to federal preemption, held that Plaintiffs were entitled to a declaration that federal law preempts the County’s Policy, and dismissed with prejudice their other claims for relief. The Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, certifying a class defined as “all individuals who pay taxes to Maricopa County and object to the use of county tax revenues to stop, detain, arrest, incarcerate, prosecute, or penalize individuals for conspiring to transport themselves, and themselves only, in violation of Ariz. Rev. State § 13-2319.” Parties then continued to litigate regarding attorneys’ fees and other costs, and that issue was settled on September 11, 2014. Plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal on November 4, 2014. The plaintiffs alleged that the county officials had a policy of targeting aliens instead of going after the professional smugglers, and asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on standing and abstention. The court, Judge Robert C. Bloomfield, issued an opinion denying the class certification without prejudice and invited the plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief addressing the abstention issue. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a supplemental brief and amended their complaint.


On May 1, 2007, detainees confined in the Cook County Jail filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages, claiming that they were unconstitutionally held after posting bond violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that they had posted bond, but still went through the intake process at the Cook County Jail, which involved assigning an identification number, taking a picture and fingerprints, collecting personal property, undergoing a medical and psychiatric evaluation, and a strip search. On May 29, 2008, the Court (Judge John W. Darrah) granted class action certification. 2008 WL 4686148 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2008). The Defendants appealed this decision, and on September 8, 2009, Judge William J. Bauer of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed class certification and remanded the case. Judge Bauer held that whether the length of delay for release was reasonable would be an individualized issue. Harper v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 581 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 2009) The parties settled the case for undisclosed terms, and on August 10, 2010, Judge Darrah dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On May 1, 2007, detainees confined in the Cook County Jail filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages, claiming that they were unconstitutionally held after posting bond violating the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. On May 29, 2008, Judge John W. Darrah granted class action certification, but on September 8, 2009, Judge William J. Bauer of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed class certification and remanded the case. On August 10, 2010, Judge Darrah dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs pursuant to the stipulation of dismissal that the parties filed.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed by Alabama voters to temporarily enjoin Alabama’s voting law provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs challenged the witness and photo ID requirement, requiring absentee voters to obtain witness or notary signatures, and submit a photocopy of their ID with their ballot. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the Witness and ID requirement and to allow curbside voting during the primary, municipal, and general election in 2020. On June 15, the preliminary injunction was granted in part in favor of the plaintiffs, pertaining to the July 14 primary runoff. The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit; the court denied the defendant’s motion for stay pending appeal on June 25. The defendants then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which granted the stay on July 2.
 On May 1, 2020, five voters and three organizations filed this class-action lawsuit against the State of Alabama to temporarily enjoin its voting law provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged Alabama’s witness requirement requiring absentee voters to sign their vote before a notary or two witnesses, and the ID application requirement, requiring absentee voters to submit a copy of their photo ID. The plaintiffs noted that Alabama is one of the only three states to require the absentee ballot to be notarized and one of the only 12 states that require an individual to submit an absentee ballot to have it witnessed. The plaintiffs also challenged Alabama’s prohibition curbside voting, which allows voters to cast their ballots in person without leaving their vehicles. Filled in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the Witness and ID requirement and to allow curbside voting during the primary, municipal, and general election in 2020 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301, 10302(b) and 10501. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction requiring the defendants to accept otherwise valid absentee ballots missing a notary or two witnesses, and modify election materials accordingly to reflect the elimination of the challenged provisions. The plaintiffs were represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program. The case was assigned to District Judge Abdul K. Kallon. The plaintiffs alleged that the challenged provisions constituted an unreasonable burden on the fundamental right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Sections 2, 3(b), and 201 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Witness and ID requirements exposed voters to additional risk of infection by posing additional barriers to voting, which threatened to disenfranchise voters adhering to social distancing guidelines. On June 15, the preliminary injunction was granted in part, enjoining the defendants from enforcing the witness requirement for voters who cannot safely meet the requirements due to underlying medical conditions identified by the CDC to increase the risk of COVID-19. 2020 WL 3207824. The photo ID requirement was also enjoined for voters over the age of 65 or those who could not safely obtain a copy of their photo ID, and the defendants were also enjoined from prohibiting curbside voting. The injunction was granted only part, granting relief as to the July 14 primary runoff, instead of all elections to be held in 2020, as requested by the plaintiffs. On June 17, the Alabama Secretary of State filed an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, contending that the challenged laws were necessary to preserve the legitimacy of upcoming elections by preventing voter fraud and safeguarding voter confidence. On the same day, the defendant filed an emergency motion to stay the June 15 order pending the appeal. On June 25, the emergency motion for stay pending appeal was denied. 2020 WL 3478093. The defendants appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 30, the parties entered into a settlement agreement as to defendant Circuit Clerk of Lee County -- the parties agreed to dismiss the case as to the Circuit Clerk, in exchange for the defendant's will compliance with the orders of the court regarding this lawsuit. The settlement agreement was approved the same day. On July 2, in a 5-4 split decision, the Supreme Court granted a stay of the preliminary injunction pending the Eleventh Circuit appeal. 2020 WL 3604049. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed by Alabama voters to temporarily enjoin Alabama’s voting law provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs challenged the witness and photo ID requirement, requiring absentee voters to obtain witness or notary signatures, and submit a photocopy of their ID with their ballot. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of the Witness and ID requirement and to allow curbside voting during the primary, municipal, and general election in 2020. On June 15, the preliminary injunction was granted in part in favor of the plaintiffs, pertaining to the July 14 primary runoff. The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit; the court denied the defendant’s motion for stay pending appeal on June 25. The defendants then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which granted the stay on July 2. The case is ongoing.


This action, filed on Feb. 1, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed as a complaint on behalf of Unite Oregon, a nonprofit organization "led by people of color, immigrants and refugees, rural communities, and people experiencing poverty who work across Oregon to build a unified intercultural movement for justice." Unite Oregon's membership consists of "lawful permanent residents, nonimmigrants, and refugees from each of the enumerated countries." The complaint was filed on behalf of the plaintiff as well as in its associational capacity. Counsel for the plaintiff were the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Oregon and private counsel. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The case was assigned to Judge Allison D. Burroughs. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief for "lawful immigrants, nonimmigrants, or refugees who seek to return to their homes or jobs or reunite with their families in Oregon" but were prevented from doing so as a result of the EO. The complaint stated it was also filed on behalf of those similarly situated, though it is unclear if class action status was sought. The individuals sought to be covered were detained at Portland International Airport and were denied access to legal counsel. The complaint argued that detention pursuant to the EO violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (access to counsel), the Immigration and Nationality Act, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Paul Papak on Feb. 2, 2017 . Prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump, another case challenging the Executive Order, on Mar. 6, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. In the subsequent months, it was hard to tell what was going on with this litigation; some summonses are listed in the docket, but nothing else. However, on June 15, the parties filed a joint motion to administratively close until resolution of IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump, or filing by either party. The next day, Magistrate Judge Papak ordered the case administratively closed unless one of the parties moves to reopen it. If this happens and plaintiff amends the complaint, defendant will have 60 days to answer or otherwise respond to the amended complaint. This case is administratively closed.

Summary: This action, filed on Feb. 1, 2017, challenged President Trump’s travel ban EO. The plaintiff was Unite Oregon, a nonprofit organization with immigrant and refugee members from the enumerated countries; ACLU Oregon was counsel. This case was administratively stayed in June 2017.


On February 18, 2014, Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky and non-profit organization FreedomWorks filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. government, including the NSA and FBI, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory relief, claiming that the NSA’s Mass Associational Tracking Program (MATP) was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment, and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants' use of MATP and to order the purge of all information collected by MATP. The plaintiffs also hoped to make this case a class action suit, with the class defined as any citizen or permanent resident of the United States who uses private telephone services. According to the complaint, there were 300 million mobile phone subscribers in the United States, in addition to 100 million landline subscribers. The NSA’s MATP collects and stores telephony metadata from major telecommunications companies. This metadata seems to include telephone numbers, persons called, and possibly even location data from anyone who has a telephone. The plaintiffs asserted on their own behalf and on behalf of class members that this violated their expectations of privacy. On April 23, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to stay pending the result of their appeal in Klayman v. Obama. Klayman is a similar case also seeking to enjoin the NSA from using telephony metadata. Judge Richard J. Leon granted the plaintiffs in Klayman a preliminary injunction enjoining the use of MATP, and the defendants appealed the decision. Ultimately, Klayman was dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing. On March 5, 2018, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause within thirty days as to the why this action should not be dismissed for the same reasons that Klayman was dismissed. The plaintiffs failed to show cause, and the case was accordingly dismissed without prejudice on February 7, 2019.

Summary: In 2014, Senator Rand Paul and FreedomWorks filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the NSA's Mass Associational Tracking Program was unconstitutional and injunctive relief enjoining its use. The case was ultimately dismissed after the plaintiffs failed to show they had standing to sue.


On October 29, 2012, Grote Industries and its owners filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Alliance Defending Freedom, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On December 27, 2012, the District Court (Judge Sarah Evans Barker) denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, and denied reconsideration of that motion on January 3, 2013. On January 9, 2013, plaintiffs appealed the issue to the Seventh Circuit, which granted a preliminary injunction as the appeal pended and consolidated the case with Korte v. United States Department of Health and Human Services (FA-IL-0006).The 7th Circuit (Judges Flaum, Sykes, and Rovner) heard arguments in the case on May 22, 2013. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Sykes) reversed and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the contraception mandate. The court emphasized that both the business owners and their companies may challenge the mandate, and that compelling plaintiffs to cover contraception services impermissibly burdened their religious-exercise rights under the RFRA's strict scrutiny test. Grote v. Sebelius, No. 12-3841, 2013 WL 5960692 (7th Cir. Nov. 8, 2013). On February 20, 2014, the District Court issued a stay pending the Supreme Courts' decision in Hobby Lobby. On August 12, 2014, following the Supreme Court's ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that held that closely-held religious for-profit corporations could be eligible for the contraceptive services mandate accommodation, the Seventh Circuit awarded the plaintiffs $845.16 in costs. On April 30, 2015, the District Court issued a permanent injunction against the defendants, enjoining them from enforcing the requirements of the contraceptive services mandate against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs and the defendant agreed to a settlement on attorneys' fees and costs on September 28, 2015. This case is now closed.

Summary: On October 29, 2012, Grote Industries and its owners filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Indiana against the Federal Government. Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), contending that mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On December 27, 2012, Judge Sarah Evans Barker denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. On January 9, 2013, plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which granted a preliminary injunction on November 8, 2013. On April 30, 3015, following the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the District Court issued a permanent injunction, preventing defendants from enforcing the contraception services mandate agains the plaintiffs.


In September 2005, the EEOC district office in Houston, Texas brought this case against Geoscience Engineering & Testing, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The complaint states that two females were constructively discharged after being sexually harassed by supervisors, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although both women complained, nothing was done and the harassment continued. After the court granted in part an EEOC motion for partial summary judgment, the parties settled and a consent decree was entered in May 2007. In the consent decree, the parties agreed that the defendant would refrain from retaliating and discriminating on the basis of sex, not recruit 19-year old students wishing to fulfill credit requirements, issue only neutral references, not created employee files referencing this litigation, provide two hours of EEO training annually, implement complaint procedures, implement a sexual harassment policy, post an EEO notice, pay the women a total of $15,000, and make annual compliance reports. No fees or costs were awarded. The terms of the decree ran for four years, during which no significant documents were filed. Presumably the case closed in May 2011.

Summary: In September 2005, the EEOC district office in Houston, Texas brought this case against Geoscience Engineering & Testing, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The complaint states that two females were constructively discharged after being sexually harassed by supervisors, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties settled in May 2007 and a consent decree was entered. The terms of the decree ran for four years, during which no significant documents were filed. Presumably the case closed in May 2011.


On March 27, 2018, four nonprofit fair housing organizations filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Facebook under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613; two of the plaintiffs also sued under the New York City Human Rights Law. Represented by private and in-house counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Facebook created categories on its advertising platform that facilitated unlawful housing discrimination in housing ads and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Facebook’s advertising tools allowed users to target ads based on sex, family status, disability, national origin, and other protected characteristics in violation of the Fair Housing Act and New York City’s anti-discrimination laws. This case developed from a series of investigations into Facebook’s advertising tools by the plaintiffs (the National Fair Housing Alliance, the Fair Housing Justice Center, Inc., the Housing Opportunities Project for Excellence, Inc., and the Fair Housing Council of Greater San Antonio). The plaintiffs created and submitted their own ads to Facebook in New York, Washington, D.C., Miami, and San Antonio. According to the plaintiffs, their experiments showed that Facebook allowed advertisers to exclude families with children, women, and users with interests based on disability and national origin. For example, the National Fair Housing Alliance posted ads for a fictional real estate company and requested it not be shown to “parents with toddlers,” “parents with preschoolers,” “parents with early school-age children,” “moms of grade school kids,” and “moms of high school kids;” the Alliance claimed that by combining these exclusions, advertisers could discriminate against people with children. The plaintiffs then conducted similar experiments in other jurisdictions using other protected criteria. (Facebook had previously removed certain race-based targeting methods because of an earlier controversy about “affinity marketing.”) On June 4, 2018, the defendants motioned to transfer the case to the Northern District of California or, alternatively, to dismiss the case. Facebook argued that, by agreeing to its terms of use when creating their Facebook accounts, the plaintiffs agreed to have their suits litigated in California. Facebook also argued under the first-filed rule that Onuoha v. Facebook, a pending suit in California, had priority over the plaintiffs’ suit. In addition, Facebook argued that the court did not have personal jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs did not have standing. Finally, Facebook argued that it was immune from suit under the Communications Decency Act and that the plaintiffs failed to allege discriminatory conduct by Facebook itself. On June 25, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The plaintiffs clarified their original complaint by alleging that Facebook provides a service related to "the business of selling or renting dwellings" under the Fair Housing Act and that its creation of categories was discriminatory. The court (Judge John G. Koeltl) denied Facebook’s motion to transfer or dismiss as moot on July 2, 2018, likely because of the plaintiffs’ amendment. Later that month, Facebook again moved to transfer or dismiss. Over the course of the fall, the parties briefed the pending motions. They also engaged in settlement talks that yielded a motion to dismiss by the plaintiffs on February 6, 2019, and a motion to re-open the case to enter the settlement on March 16. In March 2019, Facebook reached settlements in three civil rights cases and two complaints before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission over ad discrimination on its platform. The settlement included National Fair Housing Alliance v. Facebook (S.D.N.Y), Communications Workers of America v. Facebook (EEOC), Spees v. Facebook (EEOC), Mobley v. Facebook (N.D. Cal.), and Riddick v. Facebook (N.D. Cal.), all available on the Clearinghouse. Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg commented on the settlement in a blog post: “There is a long history of discrimination in the areas of housing, employment, and credit, and this harmful behavior should not happen through Facebook ads…We can do better.” Sandburg attributed the civil rights audit in Facebook’s decision to settle. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, specific to National Fair Housing Alliance, Facebook agreed to pay $1,950,000 to plaintiffs for alleged damages. Additionally, Facebook agreed to provide $500,000 in credit for advertising on Facebook to the plaintiffs. Facebook also agreed to create and administer to certain employees a training program on federal housing law in consultation with the National Fair Housing Alliance. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs could continue to run test ads on Facebook to monitor the efficacy of Facebook’s policy changes. And Facebook agreed to meet with the National Fair Housing Alliance at least once every six months to review Facebook’s ad targeting policies. The parties agreed that Hunter Hughes III or another mutually agreeable mediator would resolve disputes about implementing the settlement agreement before the parties would return to court. The duration of the settlement was defined as a three-year period from the date that Facebook implemented certain reforms about ad creation specified in the agreement. The court approved the settlement on March 29, 2019 and retained jurisdiction to enforce it. The terms of the settlement included promises by Facebook to make significant changes to their advertising tools to curb the availability of advertisers to target users based on protected characteristics. The changes will affect Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger. Facebook agreed to create a separate portal for ads in areas of housing, employment and credit. The parties agreed to monitor the changes for three years and to study the potential that the algorithm creates unintended bias. Finally, Facebook promised to change how it targets audiences for advertisements without using protected classes like race and gender to generate an audience. As of April 2020, the settlement was being enforced.

Summary: Four nonprofit organizations sued Facebook, alleging the facilitation of discriminatory action under the Fair Housing Act and under New York City Human Rights Law due to Facebook's creation of preset categories on its advertising platform. Facebook agreed to pay $1,950,000 and change its advertising practices in a settlement agreement.


On November 20, 2019, detainees and prisoners confined in the Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Alameda, its sheriff, Aramark Correctional Services, LLC, and ten unnamed defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, while incarcerated, alleged they were forced to provide uncompensated labor for Aramark Correctional Services, a private, for-profit company. The plaintiffs claimed that Aramark’s failure to provide compensation for their labor and offer equal working conditions to men and women violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 1589), the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, and state law. Represented by a private law firm, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and declaratory and injunctive relief. Aramark is a private, for-profit company that hired the plaintiffs to perform industrial food preparation and cleaning services. The plaintiffs alleged that the County coerced them to work for Aramark without pay by threatening to extend their sentences, impose solitary confinement, and withhold meals if they refused. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that male prisoners were assigned to longer, daytime work shifts, and female plaintiffs were assigned to shorter, nighttime work shifts. That, the plaintiffs claimed, deprived women of equal opportunities to leave their cells and earn money. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on December 13, 2019. The hearing on the motion was held on March 4, 2020; the court (Judge Jon S. Tigar) has not yet issued an opinion. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Detainees and prisoners confined in Santa Rita Jail in Alameda County filed this class-action lawsuit against Alameda County and Aramark Correctional Services, LLC under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, while incarcerated, performed uncompensated labor for Aramark Correctional Services, a private, for-profit company. The plaintiffs claimed that the County coerced them to work and that Aramark’s failure to provide compensation for their labor and offer equal working conditions to men and women violated the Thirteenth Amendment, the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 1589), the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, and state law. Represented by a private law firm, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and declaratory and injunctive relief.


On August 25, 2015, Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast (PPGC) and three Louisiana Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from terminating PPGC’s Medicaid provider agreements. On August 3, 2015, the governor of Louisiana and DHH chose to terminate PPGC's Medicaid provider agreement in response to a misleading video that falsely alleged Planned Parenthood clinics around the country had sold fetal body parts. The plaintiffs claimed that DHH's actions could lead to a critical lack of health care for Louisiana's Medicaid patients such as the three Jane Does plaintiffs in this case. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant's actions violated the Medicaid Act by denying Medicaid patients the right to choose any willing, qualified healthcare provider in the Medicaid program, and First and Fourteenth Amendment by penalizing the plaintiffs for their constitutionally protected connection to Planned Parenthood and/or abortion. After commencement of this case, DHH rescinded the first termination of PPGC's Medicaid provider agreement and replaced it with a second termination. In their October 7, 2015 amended complaint, the plaintiffs outlined DHH's stated reasoning for the second termination attempt. Specifically, DHH alleged that PPGC was in violation of Louisiana Administration Code, had failed to follow Medicaid program policies, and had made misrepresentations following the release of the misleading videos. The plaintiffs argued that none of these reasons related to PPGC's competence as a Louisiana Medicaid provider program. In this amended complaint, the plaintiffs further filed for class certification. On October 18, 2015, Judge DeGravelles denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the case, granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and deferred the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge DeGravelles enjoined the defendant from terminating PPGC's Medicaid provider agreement for fourteen days until the court could rule on the preliminary injunction. On October 29, 2015, Judge DeGravelles granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and indefinitely enjoined the defendant from terminating its Medicaid provider agreement with PPGC. On November 4, 2015, the defendant appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On September 14, 2016 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 25, 2015, Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast (PPGC) and three Louisiana Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals (DHH) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the federal Medicaid Act, and the first and fourteenth amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from terminating PPGC’s Medicaid provider agreements. On October 29, 2015, Judge DeGravelles granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and indefinitely enjoined the defendant from terminating its Medicaid provider agreement with PPGC.


On July 8, 2009, a class made up of owners and residents of Ryderwood, an area of Cowlitz County, Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Western Washington against Ryderwood Improvement and Service Association, Inc. (RISA), alleging that RISA violated the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The FHA prohibits discrimination based on "familial status," which refers to families having one or more persons who have not attained the age of 18 years. Ryderwood consists of approximately 270 single family homes that here devised by deeds and subject to identical covenants and restrictions. RISA's rules required that the owner or purchaser must be "a bona-fide recipient of an annuity or a pension;" that such person "must not be less than fifty-five years of age"; and that there must be "no additional, permanent occupants of the home (other than the spouse) who do not meet the above requirements." The plaintiffs claimed that RISA's rules violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) by limiting sales to persons who are 55 years of age or older and have no family members under the age of 18. An exemption existed for the compliance with certain aspects of the Fair Housing Act based on the Housing for Older Persons Amendment ("HOPA"), as stated in 42 U.S.C. § 3607. In order for a 55 and older community to qualify for the HOPA exemption, it must adopt, publish, and adhere to policies and procedures that demonstrate the intent required under HOPA. Once a housing facility or community adopted rules and regulations consistent with HOPA, the facility or community must regularly audit its members to ensure it was complying with the age requirement. The plaintiffs sought relief for violations of the FHA, for fraudulent concealment by RISA in failing to disclose that RISA was not HOPA compliant, and for violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act in misleading a large portion of the consuming public about the legality of its occupancy restrictions. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering RISA to rescind its occupancy restrictions. On November 11, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that no longer included the fraudulent concealment or Washington Consumer Protection Act charges. On June 4, 2010, Judge Benjamin H. Settle denied RISA's motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. He held that RISA was not entitled to the HOPA exception because it had not shown compliance with the regulations governing the HOPA. 2010 WL 2292825. On August 11, 2010, Judge Settle granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction requiring RISA to cease any enforcement of age-restrictions at its homes. He denied the motion for attorneys' fees, holding that the issue should be decided at the conclusion of the case. 2010 WL 3211701. RISA moved to appeal these orders and to stay the case pending the appeal on August 13. Judge Settle granted the motion to file a discretionary appeal and in part granted the motion to stay the proceedings on August 14th. 2010 WL 3490191. On January 14, 2011, the Ninth Circuit (Susan P. Graber, Raymond C. Fisher, and Consuelo B. Marshall) heard oral argument on the appeal. On April 27, the Circuit Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the district court's grant of partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The court found that RISA had been HOPA compliant since 2007. However, this compliance did not shield the community from liability for discrimination occurring before compliance was achieved. The court remanded to the district court to determine whether RISA's 2007 survey satisfied the HOPA statutory and regulatory criteria. Back in the district court, the parties filed a joint status report on June 14, 2011, indicating they wanted the court to determine if RISA became HOPA compliant beginning or after September 2007 and if the 2007 survey was adequate. The plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment on April 12, 2012, arguing that the 2007 survey was inadequate as a matter of law. The defendants also moved for summary judgment that day, arguing that the claim regarding the survey's adequacy should be dismissed. The court denied both motions on July 20, 2012. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on November 2, 2012, adding new language to its claim, stating that the defendants had violated 42 U.S.C. § 3617 by coercing, threatening, or intimidating the plaintiffs. The parties then issued a series of motions for summary judgment. On April 18, 2013, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the claims of retaliation, which the court granted in part and denied in part as to various alleged actions on May 28, 2013. The next day, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the the issue of the plaintiffs' unpaid dues, asking the court to enter judgment against the plaintiffs for these dues. The court denied the motion on July 9, 2013. On November 7, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment for the outstanding retaliation claims, which the court granted on March 4, 2014. On December 19, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' punitive damages claims, which the court denied on March 4, 2014. On January 2, 2014, the defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment as to the unpaid dues, which the court denied on March 4, 2014. Finally, on January 15, 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claims that they were currently not compliant with HOPE, which the court granted on March 4, 2014. On April 22, 2014, the parties stipulated that they had settled all claims except for those pertaining to two individual plaintiffs while they were in bankruptcy proceedings. The parties therefore jointly moved to dismiss the settled claims, which the court granted on July 7, 2014. The court dismissed the claims as to the two remaining plaintiffs on August 28, 2014. Any private settlement agreement does not appear to be publicly available at this time. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 8, 2009, a class made up of owners and residents of Ryderwood, an area of Cowlitz County, Washington filed a complaint against Ryderwood Improvement and Service Association, Inc. (RISA), alleging that RISA violated the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. The plaintiffs claimed that RISA's rules violated the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) by limiting sales to persons who are 55 years of age or older and have no family members less than 18 years old. On January 14, 2011, the Ninth Circuit found that RISA had been HOPA compliant since 2007. However, this compliance did not shield the community from liability for discrimination occurring before compliance was achieved. The court remanded to the district court to determine whether RISA's 2007 survey satisfied the HOPA statutory and regulatory criteria. All claims were dismissed through summary judgment or private settlement. The case is now closed.


On August 17, 2016, an individual plaintiff and her minor child filed this civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, refugees from Honduras, alleged that they were wrongfully detained and subjected to inhumane treatment and unlawful conditions of confinement pursuant to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies and practices. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the tortious acts of its employees (specifically, employees of DHS and its constituent units). Represented by private counsel, the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, Morningside Heights Legal Services, and the Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages. The case was assigned to Judge Madeline C. Arleo and Magistrate Judge Michael A. Hammer. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that they fled Honduras after facing threats and abuse from the police due to their political activity. After crossing into the U.S., the plaintiffs stated that they were quickly apprehended by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents and placed in a holding facility, known as an “icebox" because of its cold temperatures. The plaintiffs alleged that the conditions in the holding facilities were inhumane--they were asked to sleep on the wet and cold floor in a crowded place, despite the minor child's asthma; the only food they were provided were cold sandwiches; and their sleep was constantly interrupted by agents. The plaintiffs also claimed that during their stay, despite the fact that the mother informed CBP that she feared returning to Honduras, the agents pressured and threatened her to get her to sign papers accepting a removal order. Furthermore, she claimed that ICE attempted to separate her from her minor child. Despite passing their credible fear interviews, the plaintiffs alleged that they were detained from January to May 2015, even though they posed no danger or flight risk and both were eligible for immediate release. The plaintiffs also alleged that this practice violated the <i>Flores</i> consent decree, which requires ICE to expeditiously place minors in licensed facilities and prioritizes the prompt release of minors held in immigration detention. The plaintiffs eventually were granted withholding of removal by an immigration judge and released. The plaintiffs made the following legal claims in their complaint: abuse of process, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and negligence. On November 18, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case or have the case transferred to what it believed to be a proper venue--either the Southern or Western District of Texas, as the plaintiffs had been detained in Texas. On December 16, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Steven C. Mannion. On May 25, 2017, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer, finding the venue was proper in New Jersey. 2017 WL 2303758. The parties then engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations for many months. On August 3, 2018, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle to settle all of the plaintiffs' claims. And on October 24, the parties participated in a settlement hearing before Magistrate Judge Mannion. In the proposed settlement agreement, the United States did not admit liability but agreed to pay $125,000 in full satisfaction of all the plaintiffs' claims, with 75 percent going to the minor child and the remaining 25 percent to the mother. The parties were to bear their own costs, fees and expenses, and any attorneys' fees owed by the plaintiffs were to be paid out of the settlement amount. The plaintiffs then moved for the court's approval of the settlement and voluntary dismissal of the case. On December 17, 2018, the court issued a letter order-opinion, finding the settlement to be fair and reasonable, but disagreeing with the plaintiffs regarding the disposition of the minor child's portion of the settlement proceeds. The plaintiffs had requested that the funds be placed in a private trust to be used for the child's maintenance until he turned twenty-one, but the court denied the request and instructed that the funds be deposited with the Surrogate's Court for Hudson County, New Jersey. On December 22, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for partial reconsideration, or in the alternative partial relief, from the court's judgment as to the denial of the plaintiffs' motion to deposit the minor child's settlement funds into a private trust. The plaintiffs also moved for a partial stay of the judgment to prevent the funds from being deposited with the Surrogate's Court while the court reconsidered its judgment. On February 21, 2019, the parties jointly filed a proposed consent order. The court approved the settlement on February 22, dismissing the action and vacating its earlier judgment. Thus, the terms of the parties' initially proposed agreement were approved. The plaintiffs were awarded $125,000, with $93,750 to be deposited into a trust in the name of the minor child. The case is closed.

Summary: On August 17, 2016, an individual plaintiff and her minor child filed this civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, refugees from Honduras, alleged that they were wrongfully detained and subjected to inhumane treatment and unlawful conditions of confinement pursuant to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) policies and practices. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the tortious acts of its employees (specifically, employees of DHS and its constituent units). The parties settled their claims and the plaintiffs were awarded $125,000. The court dismissed the case on February 22, 2019.