Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson filed this federal lawsuit on January 30, 2017 against President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the U.S. and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The State filed a complaint and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The State of Minnesota also signed on as a plaintiff. The complaint argued that the state had an interest in protecting the “health, safety, and well-being of its residents” as well as “ensuring that its residents are not excluded from the benefits that flow from participation in the federal system.” A series of declarations also filed that day from officials at Washington State University, Amazon.com, Expedia, and the University of Washington all articulated the negative impact their students and employees, as well as the overall institutions, would experience as a result of the EO. The complaint alleged that the EO violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief; the plaintiffs also sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin defendants, nationwide, from barring entry into the U.S. of immigrants and nonimmigrants pursuant to the EO. The case was assigned to Judge James Robart, who held a hearing on Feb. 3, and granted the temporary restraining order in a written order, posted here. By its explicit terms, that order applied nationwide, and operated against the 7-country travel limits, the 120-day stay on the U.S. refugee program, and the indefinite ban on Syrian refugees. As a result, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) began to let people on planes and into the country. Late in the evening on Feb. 4, the Department of Justice sought a stay of Judge Robart's TRO pending appeal in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied an immediate ("administrative") stay, and set a quick briefing schedule, with the plaintiffs' opposition and the government's reply both due Feb. 6. The plaintiffs' opposition included a remarkable sworn declaration by 10 former national security officials (Madeleine K. Albright, Avril D. Haines, Michael V. Hayden, John F. Kerry, John E. Mclaughlin, Lisa O. Monaco, Michael J. Morell, Janet A. Napolitano, Leon E. Panetta, Susan E. Rice) arguing that no particular threat justified the EO, and that the Order undermined rather than assisted national security. Through Feb. 6, additional organizations filed amicus briefs, and the federal government filed its reply brief. Back in the District Court, the parties additionally submitted a joint status report proposing a briefing schedule for the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. On Feb. 7, the Ninth Circuit (Judge William Canby, Jr., Judge Richard Clifton, and Judge Michelle Friedland) heard oral argument on the federal government's motion to stay the TRO. Special Counsel at the U.S. Department of Justice August Fientje argued on behalf of the federal government, and Washington State Solicitor General Noah Purcell argued on behalf of the states. On Feb. 9, the Ninth Circuit denied the stay. The court rejected the government's argument that the EO was unreviewable, and found that the Department of Justice had not demonstrated that it was likely to win the case. Accordingly, the district court's temporary injunction, which the Ninth Circuit deemed a preliminary injunction in operation (notwithstanding that Judge Robart had labeled it a Temporary Restraining Order) would remain in effect. The court set an expedited briefing schedule for the appeal of the preliminary injunction, over the course of March 2017. After the decision was announced, the President immediately tweeted "SEE YOU IN COURT, THE SECURITY OF OUR NATION IS AT STAKE!" However, on Feb. 10, news reports first stated that the federal government had decided not to seek immediate review in the Supreme Court, and then stated the opposite. That same day, a judge on the Ninth Circuit requested (without prompting by a party) that the 24 judges of the Circuit vote whether or not to review the matter "en banc" -- that is, using a larger panel of 11 judges, rather than the initial three. The Ninth Circuit gave the parties until Feb. 16 to file simultaneous briefs with their views about en banc review. Back in the district court, also on Feb. 10, 2017, Judge Robart directed the parties to file a joint status update by Feb. 12, 2017. A telephone conference took place on Monday, Feb. 13, 2017 to discuss how the case would proceed in the district court. DOJ explained that it planned to pursue further review in the Ninth Circuit, and sought to postpone any further proceedings in the district court. The states, by contrast, urged the district court to "proceed directly to discovery." Both parties agreed that no further preliminary injunction briefing was necessary. On Feb. 14, 2017, Judge Robart ordered the parties to proceed with litigation. In his opinion, Judge Robart agreed with the states that litigation should continue while the defendant's appeal of the preliminary injunction was pending, and ordered the parties to proceed directly to discovery. In a Feb. 15 order, the court specified that the parties' joint status report was due Mar. 22, 2017. Just a day later, however, the U.S. changed its mind about its plans. In a filing in the Ninth Circuit, the DOJ explained that
"Rather than continuing this litigation, the President intends in the near future to rescind the Order and replace it with a new, substantially revised Executive Order to eliminate what the panel erroneously thought were constitutional concerns. In so doing, the President will clear the way for immediately protecting the country rather than pursuing further, potentially time-consuming litigation. Under the unusual circumstances presented here—including the extraordinarily expedited proceedings and limited briefing to the panel, the complexity and constitutional magnitude of the issues, the Court’s sua sponte consideration of rehearing en banc, and respect for the President’s constitutional responsibilities—the government respectfully submits that the most appropriate course would be for the Court to hold its consideration of the case until the President issues the new Order and then vacate the panel’s preliminary decision."
 En banc proceedings before the court were then stayed pending further orders. Meanwhile, the State of Oregon filed a motion to intervene in the district court on Feb. 22, along with a series of declarations in support of the motion. The motion argued that "the States of Washington and Minnesota are not in a position to speak to the injuries suffered in Oregon," and that "[i]f Washington and Minnesota prevail in this case, as they should, it is possible that this Court may craft a more limited remedy, short of a nationwide injunction, that will not address the harm to Oregon’s unique sovereign interests." On Feb. 24, the government filed a motion in the Ninth Circuit to hold proceedings in abeyance pending further order of the court. The government argued that the court's Feb. 16 order staying en banc proceedings "reflects the appropriateness of awaiting further developments before committing further resources of the parties or the Court to appellate litigation." The plaintiffs immediately countered that the motion to hold proceedings in abeyance should be denied: "[a]lthough Defendants contend that this case presents urgent national security issues, they now request indefinite delay of the Ninth Circuit proceedings." The plaintiffs also noted that "there appears to have been a lack of communication between the Department of Justice and the White House" regarding whether the government plans to repeal the existing EO or defend it on appeal. The plaintiffs further argued that, given that the government's motion does not make new representations about whether the President intends to rescind the EO, and given that the White House has "repeatedly stated that the Executive Order will not be rescinded," there is no justification for the abeyance request. For these reasons, plaintiffs said, appellate briefing on the merits of the preliminary injunction should continue as planned. On Feb. 27, the Ninth Circuit denied the motion to hold proceedings in abeyance. However, on its own motion, the court extended the appellate briefing schedule, so that the opening brief would be due on Mar. 10; the answering brief on Mar. 31; and an optional reply brief on Apr. 5. Back in the district court, on Feb. 28, the parties held a telephone conference regarding the defendants' request to extend disclosure and status report deadlines. The FRCP 26(f) Conference Deadline was extended to Mar. 15; the Initial Disclosure Deadline to Mar. 29; and the Joint Status Report to Apr. 5. On Mar. 6, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, the government filed court notice of the new EO in this case. On Mar. 7, the government, with the plaintiffs' consent, moved to dismiss its Ninth Circuit appeal. The court granted this motion on Mar. 8. On Mar. 15, the Court denied en banc review, and also (explaining that no party had formally moved for vacatur) retained the opinion rejecting a stay as a precedential, published opinion. There were several separate opinions filed: Three dissents, by Judge Bybee, Judge Kozinski, Judge Bea (each joined by each other and by Judge Callahan and Judge Ikuta), expressing the view that the panel opinion was wrong. Judge Reinhardt and Judge Berzon each filed concurrences emphasizing that the dissents were addressing issues not before the court, since the appeal had been withdrawn. (The formal mandate ending appellate jurisdiction issued on Mar. 24.) Back in the district court, on Mar. 9, the court granted the State of Oregon's Motion to Intervene. Also on Mar. 9, both the plaintiff State of Washington and the plaintiff State of Minnesota filed a Response to the government's new EO. The State of Washington argued that the President could not evade an injunction by simply withdrawing the enjoined EO and issuing a new one. More specifically, Washington argued that two of the second EO's provisions, (1) the 90-day ban on entry of persons from several Muslim-majority countries; and (2) the 120-day suspension of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, were simply reinstated versions of the provisions that the court had already enjoined. Washington argued that the court should confirm that its original injunction continues to apply to the reissued provisions. The plaintiff State of Minnesota noted in its Response that the government could not unilaterally modify a preliminary injunction by issuing a new EO. On Mar. 10, Judge Robart issued an "Order Regarding Defendants' Notice of the Filing of a New Executive Order and Plaintiffs' Response." In it, the court noted that, though the parties had respectively filed a "notice" and a "response" regarding the new EO, neither party had filed a motion to either modify or enforce the injunction. The court declined to decide any of the issues raised in the parties' filings until a motion was filed. The court further declined to resolve the parties' dispute regarding the applicability of the prior injunction to the new EO until the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Following those instructions, on Mar. 13, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint, along with an emergency motion to enforce the court's Feb. 3 preliminary injunction. The proposed second amended complaint was on behalf of Washington, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon. In the amended complaint, plaintiffs contended that the new EO violated the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the defendants be enjoined from implementing or enforcing Sections 2(c), 3(c), 5(a)-(c), 5(d), 5(e), 6(b), and 6(a) of the EO, which they asserted would otherwise have a detrimental economic impact on state operations, specifically with regard to tourism and to hospital and university recruiting. The court ordered the U.S. to file a response to the plaintiffs' emergency enforcement motion by the end of the day on Mar. 14. In that Mar. 14 response, the U.S. argued that the court's injunction was specific to the first EO, and that the policies in the new EO were "substantially different" from the previously-enjoined policies, such that the injunction no longer had any effect. On Mar. 15, as a backup should the court decline to rule on its Mar. 13 Emergency Motion to Enforce Preliminary Injunction, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. A similar request had been filed a few days earlier in Ali v. Trump, a related case also pending before Judge Robart. In this case, the states explained, "To avoid any prejudice to Defendants, the States present no new substantive arguments in this motion, instead joining in full the arguments for emergency relief advanced by the plaintiffs in Ali v. Trump, in which Defendants have had an opportunity to respond in writing and this Court has scheduled a hearing at 2pm today.". In another case about the second EO, Hawaii v. Trump, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii, on March 15, the District Court granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the U.S., nationwide, from enforcing or implementing Sections 2 and 6 of the new EO. This was the first nationwide injunction of EO 13780. On Mar. 16, in this case, the district court allowed the filing of the Second Amendment Complaint described above, but denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion to enforce the court's prior preliminary injunction against Sections 2(c) and 6(a) of the second EO. The court referenced the "substantial distinctions" between the first and second EOs, namely the second EO's delayed implementation, exclusion of Iraq in the list of banned countries, and elimination of the religious minority preference. On Mar. 17, the court stayed, sua sponte, the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO so long as the TRO entered in Hawaii v. Trump or a preliminary injunction of equal scope remained in effect. The court noted that, should circumstances change such that lifting the stay is warranted, either party could move to do so. On Mar. 30, the federal government appealed Hawaii v. Trump to the Ninth Circuit, and in this case filed a motion to extend response time and stay district court proceedings pending resolution of that appeal. On Apr. 5, the parties filed a joint status report and proposed discovery plan. The U.S. continued to seek a stay of all proceedings in this case; the plaintiffs disagreed, asking for a discovery plan and briefing deadlines. Judge Robart did not rule on the stay motion, but did extend the U.S.'s time to respond to the second amended complaint to seven days after the court's disposition of the government's motion to stay the entire case. Briefing concluded on that stay motion on Apr. 14. On May 17, Judge Robart granted defendants' motion to stay all proceedings in the case, pending resolution of the Hawaii v. Trump appeal. Any party could move to lift the stay should circumstances warrant it. On Oct. 10, the Supreme Court was set to hear the Hawaii v. Trump case on the merits. However, the travel ban imposed by the second EO expired on Sept. 24. That same day, the Trump Administration signed a proclamation ("EO-3") indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. The Supreme Court cancelled the Oct. 10 hearing and asked the Hawaii and IRAP parties to file new briefs in light of the government's new order. On Oct. 11, the states in this case filed a motion requesting that the district court lift the May 17 stay and allow the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and seek emergency relief against EO-3. The states simultaneously filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining order and a motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint. On Oct. 12, the federal government filed a notice of its intent to oppose the TRO. That same day, Judge Robart granted the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay and to amend their complaint. The court scheduled a hearing for Oct. 30 on the TRO motion. The court directed the defendants to submit their response by Oct. 23, and the plaintiffs to reply by Oct. 26. On Oct. 16, the states filed their third amended complaint. The states argued that EO-3 will prevent state residents -- including U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents -- from seeing spouses, parents, or other family members; will cause the states' colleges and universities to lose students, tuition revenue, and faculty/staff; will cause the states to lose tourism revenue; will deny states' hospitals the opportunity to compete for top medical residents and physicians; will cost the states' businesses talented job applicants and revenue; will cause the states to lose tax revenue; and will undermine the states' sovereign interest in maintaining the separation between church and state, in upholding the states' non-discrimination policies, and in remaining "welcoming place[s] for immigrants." On Oct. 17, the states filed a notice with the court. In light of the Hawaii v. Trump district court's Oct. 17 order granting a nationwide temporary restraining order against EO-3, the states asked the court to (1) maintain the Oct. 30 hearing date and issue a ruling on the states' motion even though preliminary relief had been granted in Hawaii; and (2) to treat the states' motion for a TRO as a motion for a PI. The states emphasized the number of people the states represent who are harmed by EO-3, and argued that their harms are different in both degree and kind from those presented in other cases. The states filed additional declarations in support of the Amended Complaint on Oct. 19. On Oct. 23, the DOJ filed its response brief arguing that the plaintiffs' challenges are not justiciable, that EO-3 fits within the President's broad constitutional and statutory authority to suspend the entry of aliens abroad, and that EO-3 is constitutional because it provides a facially legitimate and bona fide reason for excluding aliens and does not violate the Establishment and Equal Protection clauses. The plaintiffs replied on Oct. 26. On Oct. 27, the district court stayed its decision on the plaintiffs' TRO motion so long as the PI in Hawaii v. Trump "or a [PI] of identical or broader scope" concerning EO-3 remains in place. On Nov. 21, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' Feb. 11 petition for a writ of certiorari. After very little activity, on Nov. 5, 2018, Washington gave notice of voluntary dismissal, though other states remain parties. The remaining states voluntarily dismissed the case on Nov. 9.

Summary: In January 2017, Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the U.S. and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. Washington was joined by the State of Minnesota. The complaint alleged that the EO violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 3, 2017, District Judge Robart granted a nationwide temporary restraining order (later deemed a preliminary injunction), barring implementation of the EO. The U.S. appealed and sought a stay of the TRO pending that appeal, but the Ninth Circuit denied the stay on February 9, finding that the government had no demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits or that a stay was necessary to prevent irreparable injury. That same day, however, the Ninth Circuit decided to review, sua sponte, the matter "en banc." On March 6, 2017, however, the President rescinded the January 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one. The Ninth Circuit granted the government's motion to dismiss its appeal and denied en banc review as well. On March 13, the states filed a motion to amend their complaint (joining California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Oregon as plaintiffs) and an emergency motion to enforce the court's February 3 preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, in another case about the second EO, Hawaii v. Trump, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide injunction against enforcement and implementation of Sections 2 and 6 of the new EO. On March 30, the U.S. appealed Hawaii v. Trump to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Robart then granted the government's motion to stay all proceedings in this case pending resolution of the Hawaii v. Trump appeal. In June 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Hawaii v. Trump, consolidated with IRAP v. Trump, the analogous case from the District of Maryland. In September 2017, however, the travel ban imposed by the second EO expired and the Trump Administration signed a third EO indefinitely restricting travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Yemen. Although the plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO and amended their complaint accordingly, the court stayed its decision on that motion so long as the preliminary junction in Hawaii v. Trump "or a [PI] of identical or broader scope" concerning EO-3 remains in place. On November 21, 2017, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' February 11 petition for a writ of certiorari. After little activity for nearly a year, all states gave notice of voluntary dismissal in November 2018.


On May 2, 2008, the Parents' League for Effective Autism Services (PLEAS), along with three autistic children with autism who received medically necessary services funded by Medicaid, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against the Director of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and the Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Health. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of plaintiffs' rights under federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the loss or reduction of medically necessary services. The plaintiffs claimed that amendments to Ohio administrative rules (O.A.C. §§ 5101:3-27-02 and 5122-29-17, which were scheduled to be effective July 1, 2008) promulgated by the defendants would deprive the plaintiffs of services required by the federal Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program. The federal requirements for EPSDT require states to provide "such other necessary health care, diagnostic services, treatment, and other measures to correct or to ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered by the screening services, whether or not such services are covered under the State plan." 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5). Further, the Medicaid Act required states to fund "preventive and rehabilitative services, including any medical or remedial services recommended by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional level[.]" 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13). Plaintiffs received physician-recommended services including "full day center-based applied behavior analysis, psychological assessments and diagnosis, parent advocacy and resource information and home outreach services including one-to-one services," which plaintiffs characterized as rehabilitative and resulting in the "maximum reduction of physical and mental disabilities and restoration to the best possible functional level." Under the new rules promulgated by the defendants, only services that were rehabilitative, rather than services that were ameliorative or that prevented deterioration, would available to Medicaid recipients. The rules also would restrict the definition of certain rehabilitative services, including applied behavioral analysis, so that they would only to patients whose diagnoses were categorized as "mental illness," a grouping that did not include autism and related diagnoses. Plaintiffs sought injunctions ordering the defendants to continue or begin providing 35-40 hours of applied behavioral analysis services to the plaintiff children. They sought orders enjoining the defendants from enforcing the new rules, and requiring them to develop new rules that complied with federal Medicaid law. That sought declarations that the rules violated the plaintiff's rights and that they were unlawful. Plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees and legal costs. On June 20, 2008, the Court (Judge James L. Graham) ordered that, pursuant a motion filed by the defendants and to Fed. R. Civ. 19(a), the plaintiffs file an amended complaint, adding as a necessary defendant the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, the federal agency responsible for approving state Medicaid plans. The amended complaint was filed on June 24, 2008. On June 30, 2008, the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit and denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the case. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 565 F. Supp. 2d 895 (S.D. Ohio 2008). On the same day, the Court issued a separate opinion granting the plaintiffs' motions for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the State from implementing the amendments to O.A.C. §§ 5101:3-27-02 and 5122-29-17, finding that the plaintiffs case had a strong likelihood of success on the merits, and that the plaintiffs would likely suffer irrevocable harm if the rules were to go into effect. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 565 F.Supp.2d 905 (S.D.Ohio 2008). The defendants appealed this decision and filed a motion for stay of the proceedings before the District Court and a stay of the preliminary injunction, pending the outcome of the appeal. On July 17, 2008, Judge Graham granted the motion to stay proceedings, but left the preliminary injunction in place. Parents League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 2008 WL 2796744 (S.D. Ohio 2008). On July 29, 2009, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge John M. Rogers) affirmed the District Court's grant of the preliminary injunction. Parents' League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 339 F. App'x 542 (6th Cir. 2009). On September 18, 2009, the District Court referred the case to mediation. Two years later, on September 14, 2011, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement, and requested that the preliminary injunction and restraining order be lifted. The Court dissolved the restraining order and injunction the next day. On December 15, 2011, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the dismissal of the case with prejudice, which specified that the defendants had fulfilled their obligations under the settlement. The court dismissed the case. The terms of the settlement do not appear to have been made public. According to the Ohio Disability Rights Law and Policy Center (Disability Rights Ohio) website, the settlement "[r]equires maintaining [the prior rules] that [do] not restrict services based on cognitive ability or recovery of lost skills; Authorizes [the filing of] a new rule that implements a prior authorization process for more than 104 hours of CPST services per year; Exempts 123 PLEAS member children and settlement beneficiaries from the prior authorization process for CPST services until those children reach age 21, and; Reimburses plaintiffs' attorneys' fees." See their summary of the case at http://www.disabilityrightsohio.org/legal-library/pleas for more information.

Summary: The Parents' League for Effective Autism Services (PLEAS), along with three children with autism and their guardians, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against two officers of the State of Ohio. Plaintiffs claimed violations of their rights under federal Medicaid law. The Plaintiffs claimed that amendments to Ohio administrative rules promulgated by the Defendants would deprive the Plaintiffs of services required by the federal Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) program. Plaintiffs sought injunctions ordering the State to continue or begin providing 35-40 hours of applied behavioral analysis services to the plaintiff children. They sought an injunction preventing the State from enforcing the new rules. A preliminary injunction was granted. On December 15, 2011, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the dismissal of the case with prejudice. They had apparently reached a settlement that resolved the issues in a manner satisfactory to the plaintiffs.


On May 4, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (PPGP), Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region (PPSLR), current and former employees of Planned Parenthood, and Kansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued the Kansas Department of Health and Environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from terminating provider-plaintiffs from Kansas Medicaid. The plaintiffs claimed that on May 3, 2016, the defendant issued a decision to terminate Planned Parenthood and current and former Planned Parenthood employees from their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the state made the decision to terminate in response to unfounded and irrelevant allegations made about Planned Parenthood's activities. In particular, the state noted a highly misleading YouTube video created by antichoice activists alleging that Planned Parenthood had sold fetal body parts. The plaintiffs claimed that a termination of their Kansas Medicaid provider agreements would irreparably harm Kansas Medicaid patients by denying them access to their health care providers of choice. On July 5, 2016, Judge Julie Robinson denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification but granted their motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendant from terminating their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. 2016 WL 3597457. On August 3, 2016, the defendant appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit. On February 21, 2018, a panel of the Tenth Circuit (Circuit Judges Robert E. Bacharach, Gregory A. Phillips, and Carolyn B. McHugh) affirmed the district court’s order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to PPGP, thus restraining Kansas from terminating PPGP’s Medicaid provider agreement. The appeals court, however, vacated the district court’s order as to PPSLR, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet standing requirements. Since there were no affidavits from any persons receiving or expecting to receive medical care at PPSLR, the plaintiffs had failed to establish any injury they would suffer from the termination of PPSLR. The court remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether PPSLR itself had sufficiently alleged standing to proceed and whether it was entitled to a preliminary injunction. 882 F.3d 1205. On March 21, 2018, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition; Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch dissented from the denial of certiorari. Shortly after cert was denied, the defendants rescinded the terminations of both PPGP and PPSLR from the Kansas Medicaid program. The case was remanded to district court. The parties jointly stipulated to dismissal on April 12, 2019, and the civil case was terminated on April 16. The parties continued to litigate attorneys fees. The parties reached an agreement on August 12, 2019 that the defendants would pay $464,366.28 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. There has been no further action in the docket as of April 2021, and the case is closed.

Summary: On May 4, 2016, Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri, Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, current and former employees of Planned Parenthood, and Kansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Health and Environment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from terminating provider plaintiffs from Kansas Medicaid. On July 5, 2016, Judge Julie Robinson denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification but granted their motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from terminating their Kansas Medicaid Provider agreements. On August 3, 2016, the defendant appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the district court's order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as to Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri. However, the court vacated the district court’s order as to Planned Parenthood of the St. Louis Region, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to meet standing requirements. On March 21, 2018, the defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. On December 10, 2018, the Supreme Court denied the petition. Shortly after cert was denied, the defendants rescinded the terminations of both PPGP and PPSLR from the Kansas Medicaid program. Back in the district court, the parties jointly stipulated to the case's dismissal in April 2019; the defendants paid $464,366.28 in fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The case is closed.


On March 23, 1993, plaintiffs, a class of prisoners incarcerated at the Fresno County Jail, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by the Fresno County Jail. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the overcrowding due to construction and simple overcrowding made the conditions in the jail unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, and led to deprivation of their other constitutional rights. The Fresno County Jail is split into three parts: The Main Jail, the North Annex, and the South Annex. At the time plaintiffs made their complaint, the third and fourth floors of the South Annex were being remodeled, requiring jail staff to relocate 434 inmates that were housed there to the North Annex and the Main Jail, leading to severe overcrowding. As a result, the prison also restricted access to exercise, recreation, religious activities, and the law library. Prisoners were allowed one hour per week for legal research, and two trips per week to a facility that doubled as a space for religious activities. The exercise space was also alleged to not contain enough equipment or room for plaintiffs to adequately exercise. The plaintiffs alleged that the South Annex, rated for 511 prisoners, was housing over 700. The plaintiffs also alleged that 300 prisoners were sleeping on the floor in the Main Jail, in the common areas, and that the solitary confinement unit had 3 prisoners per cell. They also alleged that the North Annex had 200 prisoners that slept on the floor. On February 25, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would require the defendants to add beds and ensure that no prisoner slept on the floor, and allow compliance monitoring. On March 9, 1993, the defendants admitted the class status of the plaintiffs and agreed that they currently were exceeding their capacity in the jail system, but denied that it was unconstitutionally overcrowded. However, before the Court could rule on the TRO and the certification motion, the parties reached a consent decree. On May 25, 1993, the consent decree was modified to give more detail concerning the exact number of beds in each cell block in each facility, and to give the Sheriff the power to release or to refuse to house prisoners when the jail system was at 90% capacity. On November 3, 1993, the consent decree was again modified to reflect transition of the housing in the jail under a state pilot program into a triple-bunked "general population," double-bunked "special population," and single-bunked "administrative segregation" scheme. The consent decree specifically reserved the issues of law library access and adequacy of exercise for trial. On February 25, 1994, the parties settled the outstanding recreational issues, providing for one-hour of exercise a day, and up to 20 hours a month, with 1.5 hours being roof-recreation. A few months later, the Court entered a final order approving the settlement agreement and placing the Fresno County Jail under a permanent injunction. On July 14, 2011, the Fresno County Superior Court filed a motion to intervene in the case. The state court system alleged that, because the Fresno County Jail had closed two floors, the consent decree could not be maintained, and the ability to sentence defendants consistent with California law had been adversely affected. On December 5, 2011, the defendants and plaintiffs reached another consent decree clarifying the meaning of the word "capacity" in the original consent decree rendering the defendant-intervenor's contentions moot. The Court thereafter denied the State Court's motion to intervene as moot. This case is still open because of the permanent injunction running against the Fresno County Jail. The plaintiffs also moved for attorney fees, though the Court denied the motion on May 31, 2012. As of January 31, 2018, there has not been any new meaningful litigation.

Summary: The plaintiffs were a class of prisoners at the Fresno County Jail. Hundreds had been forced to sleep on the floor of the jail, in the common areas, and had virtually no access to exercise or a law library. The plaintiffs settled with Defendant county Fresno in a series of Consent Decrees that established a population and bed cap in the jail, and guaranteed consistent access to exercise facilities. A permanent injunction now runs against the Fresno County Jail.


On November 15, 2018, seven female students in Dartmouth's Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences filed this putative class action suit against the Trustees of Dartmouth College under Title IX and New Hampshire common law in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire. The plaintiffs claimed a hostile educational environment, gender discrimination, quid pro quo sexual harassment, and retaliation in violation of Title IX. Additionally, the plaintiff class claimed that the Trustees of Dartmouth College breached their fiduciary duties and negligently supervised and retained professors in violation of New Hampshire common law. The plaintiff class, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiff class claimed that three professors in the Department of Psychology and Brain Sciences leered at, groped, "sexted," intoxicated, and raped female students. The plaintiffs further alleged that though they had contacted Dartmouth’s Title IX office in April 2017, Dartmouth failed to take action. Twenty days after the plaintiffs had contacted Dartmouth’s Title IX office—after Dartmouth’s inaction—one plaintiff was sexually assaulted. At least 27 complainants came forward to participate in the Title IX investigation. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that when Dartmouth finally did take action by beginning an investigation, it was unilaterally stopped in July and the three professors in question were allowed to resign or retire. In the complaint, the plaintiffs defined the class as "every current and former female graduate and undergraduate student who has matriculated or will matriculate at Dartmouth in the Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences between March 31, 2015 and the date of judgment." The case was assigned to District Judge Landya B. McCafferty. On May 1, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint, adding two more Jane Does and their factual allegations to the record. The defendants contested these two additional Jane Does proceeding under pseudonyms, but Judge McCafferty approved the plaintiffs' motions to proceed under pseudonym on January 29, 2020. The parties quickly moved to settlement negotiations. On September 10, 2019, the parties jointly proposed a settlement agreement. The parties modified the definition of the class slightly in this settlement agreement. The class include any female undergraduate or graduate student at Dartmouth that satisfies any of the following criteria: were graduate advisors or research assistants of the three former professors in the complaint, were graduate assistants in the Psychological and Brain Sciences Department that co-authored at least one paper based on lab research they conducted with the professors or co-authored three papers with the professors without lab work, were graduate students in the Department that do not fall into these categories but can attest to emotional and psychological harm, or undergraduate student research assistants of the three professors. The parties did not include a specified monetary amount in the settlement agreement. Instead, they wrote that the defendant must pay a base amount of $1,000 for any class member that comes forward, that amount can increase based on an Independent Claim Expert's assessment of the severity of the claims, and that the defendant will pay the plaintiff's attorney fees. Judge McCafferty preliminarily approved this settlement agreement on September 25, 2019. As of June 17, 2020, she has not granted final approval to the agreement, and notifications to the class are ongoing.

Summary: Seven plaintiffs filed this Title IX class action alleging that Dartmouth employed and retained three professors that the institution knew had sexually harassed and assaulted students. They requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The parties released a preliminary settlement agreement guaranteeing compensation to any class member on September 10, 2019, and it was preliminarily approved on September 25. The final settlement has yet to be approved, and notification of the class is ongoing.


This lawsuit stems from Searcy v. Strange, (PB-AL-0005 in this Clearinghouse), in which a federal district court held that Alabama's same-sex marriage ban violated the U.S. Constitution. That case involved a same-sex couple, legally married in California, whose adoption petition was denied in Alabama because they were not considered "spouses" under a state law, which allowed a non-biological parent to adopt the spouse's child. On February 9, 2015, the Searcy v. Strange order went into effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. The same-sex couple re-filed their adoption petition in Mobile County, Alabama. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis issued an initial adoption decree but he added language saying "that this Decree is qualified in nature, and the Court will not issue a final adoption order until a final ruling is issued in the United States Supreme Court on the Marriage Act cases before it." On February 24, 2015, the non-biological parent filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Probate Judge Davis, claiming that he violated her rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order the probate judge to vacate his qualified adoption order and to issue a new order without the added language. On March 26, 2015, Judge Callie V. S. Granade granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss. After the complaint was filed, Probate Judge Davis had removed the qualified language from the adoption decree, giving the couple what they wanted.

Summary: On February 24, 2015, the plaintiff, a member of a same-sex couple seeking to adopt her spouse's child, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to order the probate judge to vacate his earlier qualified adoption order and to issue a new order. The case was dismissed after Judge Davis issued the requested adoption decree.


On October 4, 2017, five organizations serving Black and Latino communities in Chicago (the ACLU of Illinois, Communities United, Community Renewal Society, Next Steps, and ONE Northside), filed this lawsuit in the United States Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois state law, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Based on findings from a Department of Justice investigation, the plaintiffs claimed that the Chicago Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of unreasonable force, particularly against Black individuals, Latinos, and individuals with disabilities. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that a lack of policy, guidance, and oversight of foot pursuits continued to encourage the unnecessary use of force. They argued that these practices violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Illinois Civil Rights Law. This lawsuit resulted from a Department of Justice investigation that was opened in 2015 and that concluded with a published report in January 2017. The investigation's purpose was to determine if the Chicago Police Department was engaging in a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct and, if so, what systemic deficiencies or practices might be causing this pattern or practice. The investigation was jointly conducted by the Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section, and the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. The investigation was opened in the aftermath of the release of a video showing a White Chicago officer fatally shooting a Black teenager, Laquan McDonald, that caused protests around the city. Relatedly, Chicago experienced a surge in shootings and homicides in the year following the killing. According to the report, ninety-six percent of CPD’s shooting victims and 97% of those tased were Black or Latino. People with disabilities were acutely affected. This included individuals with mental illness or intellectual or developmental disabilities, and also deaf individuals. Black and Latino people with disabilities face an overwhelming risk. The investigation concluded that CPD officers were inadequately trained and did not know how to de-escalate situations. The case was assigned to Elaine Bucklo. On January 24, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case, that the claims were moot because the defendants had changed their policies, and that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On March 20, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings and discovery in light of ongoing negotiation of a consent decree in Illinois v. City of Chicago. After the proceedings were stayed, the parties filed two status reports with the court regarding progress in negotiation, one on September 12, 2018 and one on November 7, 2018. After the parties reached a settlement agreement in Illinois v. City of Chicago, they stipulated to dismissal in this case on May 17, 2019. The case was officially dismissed without prejudice on May 22, 2019, although the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement detailed that if the parties had not moved to reinstate the action or enforce the agreement by August 21, 2019, the dismissal without prejudice would convert to a dismissal with prejudice. There are no further entries in the docket as of May 26, 2020, so this case is presumed to be closed.

Summary: ACLU of Illinois sued City of Chicago for the unreasonable use of force of its police officers. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Illinois state law. These claims were informed by a Department of Justice report that confirmed that "CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable." The plaintiffs, represented by public counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the Chicago Police Department engaged in a pattern and practice of unreasonable force, particularly against black, Latino, and disabled individuals.


On April 2, 2019, five former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, represented by the ACLU and Knight First Amendment Institute, brought this suit challenging a system of prepublication review instituted by these agencies. Specifically, these agencies require that former employees who seek to write or speak about their government service must get approval from the agency prior to doing so or risk facing sanction. Plaintiffs argued that the regimes violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights in granting executive officers sweeping discretion to suppress publications and speech. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining defendants from continuing to enforce the prepublication review regimes against plaintiffs or any other person. The case was assigned to Judge Jarrod Hazel. In their complaint, plaintiffs recognized that the agencies had a legitimate government interest in protecting bona fide national security secrets but argued that prior restraint is an extreme measure justifiable only in circumstances involving a compelling government interest, where procedural safeguards against censorship would be necessary. Plaintiffs argued that to meet First Amendment standards, systems of prepublication review would need to contain certain features, including but not limited to strict and definite time limits for completion of review, explanations of censors’ decisions, and clear notice of the application of standards. At the time the case was initiated, none of the defendants’ prepublication review regimes contained these features. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 14, 2019, to which plaintiffs responded with a request for a hearing with oral argument on the motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 2, 2019, five former employees of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense, brought this suit challenging the agencies’ system of pre-publication review. Plaintiffs alleged the regimes of review violated their First Amendment rights in granting executive officers sweeping discretion to suppress publications and speech. The case was assigned to Judge Jarrod Hazel. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the case is ongoing.


In 2018, President Donald Trump asked Congress to appropriate $5.7 billion for construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. On February 14, 2019, Congress denied that request and instead appropriated only $1.375 billion. Although President Trump signed this appropriations bill, he simultaneously declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, and directed the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury to reallocate military and other funds in order to build the border wall. Five days later, the Sierra Club and the Southern Border Communities Coalition responded by filing this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking to prevent construction of the wall. They sued the president, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of the Treasury under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4332), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§701–706), the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. §1651), and the Declaratory Judgments Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Northern California, and ACLU of Texas, argued that the president’s attempt to fund the wall using the National Emergencies Act was a constitutional violation. The Constitution grants Congress exclusive authority to control appropriations. Although Congress has given the president some authority under the National Emergencies Act, the plaintiffs argued that the Act was never intended to allow the president to circumvent explicit appropriations decisions of Congress. His actions were therefore a violation of the constitutional principle of separation of powers. Statutorily, the plaintiffs argued that funding the wall was an inappropriate use of the National Emergencies Act because (a) there was no national emergency, (b) the border wall was not a military construction project, as required by the Act, and (c) the border wall was not “necessary to support…the armed forces.” Finally, they alleged that the president and the defendant departments were in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act, because they had failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project. The case was assigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr., who ordered it related to Sierra Club v. Trump on March 6, 2019. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 18, 2019. On April 4, they moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent construction along certain stretches of the border (Yuma Sector Projects 1 and 2, and El Paso Sector Project 1). The United States House of Representatives filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, and was permitted to present arguments at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on May 17, 2019. On May 24, 2019, the court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury from taking any action to build the wall using certain reallocated military funds. The injunction applied only to two of the three sectors requested by the plaintiffs (Yuma Sector Project 1 and El Paso Sector Project 1). 379 F. Supp. 3d 883. On May 29, 2019, the government appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, and moved for the district court to stay the injunction pending appeal (a motion that the district court denied the following day). Also on May 29, the plaintiffs moved for a supplemental preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent construction along four additional stretches of the border (El Centro Project 1 and Tucson Sector Projects 1, 2, and 3). In June 2019, both parties moved for partial summary judgment. On June 28, the court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, and partially granted the plaintiffs’. It declared that the government’s use of certain military funds to build the wall in the disputed sectors was unlawful, and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the government from using those funds to build in those sectors. The court certified its judgment for immediate appeal, but declined to stay the injunction pending appeal. 2019 WL 2715422. The following week, on July 3, the Ninth Circuit similarly denied the government’s motion for stay. 929 F.3d 670. Later that month, on July 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled the district court and the Ninth Circuit, granting a stay of the injunction pending completion of the appeal in the Ninth Circuit. 140 S.Ct. 1. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on some issues on October 11, 2019. Like the June 28, 2019 ruling, the issues in dispute here regarded the legality of reallocating funds for wall construction; however, this motion dealt with a different source of funds, and covered more segments of the border. The government similarly moved for summary judgment on October 25, 2019. The House of Representatives again filed a brief in support of the plaintiffs, and was again allowed to present argument. A hearing on summary judgment took place on November 20, 2019, after which the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs on December 11, 2019, denying the government’s motion. Like on June 28, 2019, it ruled that it was unlawful for the government to use certain reallocated funds for construction on the disputed border segments, and issued a permanent injunction. However, unlike in June, the district court immediately stayed its injunction pending appeal, citing the Supreme Court’s July 26 ruling. On December 30, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ motion to lift the stay, also citing the Supreme Court’s ruling. It further explained that since the Western District of Texas had issued a nationwide injunction on December 10, which covered the sections of wall at issue in this case, lifting the stay would have no practical effect. On February 5, 2020, the plaintiffs dismissed their claims regarding border wall funding reallocated from yet another source (the Treasury Forfeiture Fund). In light of this dismissal, the court sought to close the case, since all of the plaintiffs’ claims had been resolved by summary judgment or voluntary dismissal. The parties jointly requested that the case remain open: although the claims regarding fiscal year 2019’s appropriations had been resolved, they expected that similar disputes would arise regarding fiscal year 2020’s budget. The fiscal year 2020 dispute, however, was assigned to another case, Sierra v. Trump, filed by the plaintiffs on February 28, 2020 (docket number 4:20-cv-01494). The two cases were ordered related on March 2, 2020. On June 26, 2020, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s June 28, 2019 ruling, including the permanent injunction. However, due to the Supreme Court’s July 26, 2019 order, the injunction remains stayed until the government’s appeal to the Supreme Court is either decided or rejected.

Summary: In February 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency in an effort to redirect funding from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and the Treasury to the construction of a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. The Sierra Club and the Southwest Border Communities Coalition filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of California, seeking to prevent construction of the wall. They argued that the president’s use of a national emergency declaration to fund the border wall was unconstitutional and illegal under the National Emergencies Act and the National Environmental Policy Act. The district court issued preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the use of reallocated funds for construction of the wall; the Ninth Circuit upheld those injunctions. However, on July 26, 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States stayed the injunctions; that stay remains in effect until the government’s appeal to the Supreme Court is either decided or rejected. As of July 11, 2020, the government has yet to appeal to the Supreme Court.


On August 29, 2011, plaintiff, a male Muslim prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by public interest lawyers, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages on behalf of himself and an injunction preventing defendants from continuing their unconstitutional housing, recreation, and restraint patterns, practices and policies on behalf of all current and future United States Penitentiary (USP) Lewisburg prisoners. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by placing him with cellmates with whom he had a documented hostile relationship, placing him in restraints on multiple occasions as punishment for refusing dangerous cell assignments, and failing to react in a timely manner to stop assaults. Plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in a pattern, practice, or policy of carrying out these actions. In 2008, the Bureau of Prisons created the Special Management Unit (SMU) at USP Lewisburg to serve prisoners who present unique security and management concerns including prisoners who participated in or led group/gang-related activity. Plaintiff was incarcerated at USP Lewisburg in 2005 and 2006, and returned to join to the SMU in 2009, at which time he had an intake review and expressed his separation needs. On October 24, 2012, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) issued an order denying the plaintiff's motion to certify the class and an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all claims. On November 20, 2012, plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal. On March 2, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated the district court's order denying class certification and grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the Eighth Amendment claim. The Court of Appeals upheld the district court's judgment dismissing the plaintiff's FTCA claim. The case was reopened in the district court on March 5, 2015. The parties reached a settlement and the case was dismissed without prejudice to either party on July 20, 2017. Judge Nealon left open the possibility that the case could be reopened if the terms of the settlement agreement were not consummated within 60 days. The exact terms of the settlement agreement are not available. Since the case has not been reopened, it is presumably closed.

Summary: On August 29, 2011, plaintiff, a male Muslim prisoner, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Middle District of Pennsylvania under Bivens against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated plaintiff's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution by placing him with cellmates with whom he had a documented hostile relationship, placing him in restraints on multiple occasions as punishment for refusing dangerous cell assignments, and failing to react in a timely manner to stop assaults. On October 24, 2012, the U.S. District Court (Judge William B. Nealon) issued an order denying motion to certify the class and an order granting defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, directing the Clerk of Court to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on all claims, and on November 20, 2012, plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal. The Third Circuit reversed the findings of the district court in part. The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement and the district court case was dismissed without prejudice on July 20, 2017.


On February 20, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Central New York Psychiatric Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The pro se plaintiff sued the Director of the Sex Offender Treatment Program, the New York State Office of Health Commissioner, and the Executive Director of the Central New York Psychiatric Center under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff alleged that his facility, the Central New York Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) did not allow him to properly participate in Al-Jumu’ah prayer services, forced him to attend classes on Fridays in violation of Muslim practice, and denied him food in compliance with Halal. On March 17, 2010, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment. He argued there was clear evidence the CNYPC misunderstood the requirements for Al-Jumu’ah prayer and in doing so deprived him of Free Exercise. On April 14, 2010, the defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing (1) that the reason Al-Jumu’ah prayer has not been provided is that there are no Imams in the area who are available to facilitate, (2) the food offered in the cafeteria allows those following a Halal diet to sustain good health without violating their dietary laws, and (3) the utensils are sufficiently washed so as to be in compliance with Halal. On December 23, 2010, Magistrate Judge George Lowe issued a report and recommendation to Judge David Hurd, (2010 WL 5620908), which Judge Hurd then adopted in full on January 20, 2011. Judge Hurd denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment while granting in part and denying in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The surviving claims included the Free Exercise and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claims regarding the lack of Al-Jumu’ah services, the lack of a Halal-compliant menu, the denial of access to sacred food on religious holidays, and the requirement to attend classes on Fridays. The court dismissed the Free Exercise claims regarding bowls, utensils, and serving fish on Fridays; the Establishment Clause claim regarding serving fish on Fridays; the Due Process Claims; the Eighth Amendment claim; and the claim against the New York State Office of Health Commissioner. 2011 WL 195648. After the appointment of pro bono counsel on September 29, 2011, parties moved to settle the lawsuit. On November 14, 2011, the parties consented to have Magistrate Judge Lowe oversee the negotiations and final resolution of the case. On February 7, 2012, the parties settled and Magistrate Judge Lowe signed off on the settlement the next day. According to the settlement, the defendants would pay the plaintiff $15,000, which included all damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, and the defendants further agreed to have a Halal menu in place and retain an Imam to lead Al-Jumu’ah services on Fridays. As no action has been taken on this case since, it is likely this case is closed.

Summary: On February 20, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Central New York Psychiatric Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. The pro se plaintiff sued affiliates of CNYPC under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for various constitutional violations which he alleged denied him of freedom to freely practice his faith. After both parties were denied summary judgment, the parties settled on February 7, 2012, agreeing that the defendants would take measures to ensure the inmate’s religious requirements were met.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an ongoing case to challenge the constitutionality of the NYPD's stop and frisk practices, in which the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion calling for a moratorium and investigation of NYPD's alleged discriminatory enforcement of social distancing policy. No outcome yet on plaintiffs' motion.
 This is one of four ongoing cases challenging the constitutionality of the New York Police Department's "Stop and Frisk" program. See Ligon v. City of New York (PN-NY-0014); Daniels v. City of New York (PN-NY-0010); Davis v. City of New York  (PN-NY-0013). On January 31, 2008, four African-American men who had been stopped and frisked in the City of New York brought this class § 1983 suit against the City in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights ("CCR") and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the City had engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City had implemented and was continuing to enforce, encourage and sanction a policy and practice of unconstitutional "stop and frisks" by the New York Police Department ("NYPD"), targeting black and Latino residents without the reasonable articulable suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge Shira A. Scheindlin. The CCR previously litigated the same issue in Daniels v. City of New York, No. 1:99-cv-01695 (PN-NY-0010), eventually reaching a settlement agreement with the City in 2003 that required the NYPD to establish a written policy against racial profiling and to submit data on its stop-and-frisks quarterly to the CCR until 2007. When the CCR came to the conclusion that the data demonstrated a continued unconstitutional use of race in deciding whom to stop and frisk, it filed this action. On the same day that the complaint was filed, the court granted an expedited motion by the plaintiffs to retain documentation that the City had produced as defendant in Daniels and that they still held. On June 2, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery of other City documents with information on stop-and-frisks, including documents that plaintiffs had returned to the City under the terms of the Daniels settlement. The court granted the motion on September 10, compelling the disclosure of all documentation desired by the plaintiffs except for the names or individuals stopped by the police and the names of reporting or reviewing officers. Floyd v. City of N.Y., No. 1:08-cv-01034, 2008 WL 4179210, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68798 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2008). Discovery disputes continued over the course of the next three years. On May 21, 2009, the City requested sanctions against one of the plaintiffs for spoliation and perjury, and on March 15, 2010, the plaintiffs moved for sanctions against the defendants for failing to comply with the Court's discovery orders. (No resolution to the City's request appears on the docket, and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for sanctions without prejudice to renewal on June 24.) On June 25, 2010, the court ordered the City to continue making disclosures on ongoing Internal Affairs Bureau investigations of claims of racial quotas being used by the NYPD. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 739 F. Supp. 2d 376 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). On February 24, 2011, the City moved for summary judgment, and on August 31 the court granted in part and denied in part the City's motion. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F. Supp. 2d 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). It held that the City was entitled to summary judgment on one of the plaintiff's individual claims, but not on the claims made by other plaintiffs or on the class claims of racial profiling under Title VI and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, and on November 23, 2011, the court found that new evidence presented by plaintiffs created a dispute of fact that called into question the reasonableness of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk, and thus reinstated the plaintiff's individual claims. Floyd v. City of N.Y., 813 F.Supp.2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Discovery disputes continued, and the City moved to exclude the testimony of Columbia professor Jeffrey Fagan. The Court for the most part denied the City's motion on April 16, 2012, admitting Fagan's disparate treatment analysis, much of his reasonable suspicion analysis, a modified version of his classification system, and his opinion regarding the results of the NYPD's stop-and-frisk policy. Floyd v. City of N.Y., No. 1:08-cv-01034, 2012 WL 1344514, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53249 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2012). On May 16, 2012, the court granted class certification. Floyd v. City of N.Y., No. 1:08-cv-01034, 2012 WL 1868637, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68676 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012). On October 10, 2012, a three-judge panel in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge John M. Walker, Jr. and Judge Christopher F. Droney) denied the City's motion to appeal the District Court's grant of class certification. The case headed to bench trial before Judge Scheindlin. On January 22, 2013, the court granted the City's request for a stay pending a final decision regarding the appropriate scope of preliminary injunctive relief in Ligon, but denied postponement of the trial. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their individual damage claims, so trial proceeded on the class-based injunctive issues, only. That trial began in March 2013; proceedings took over 30 days, and concluded in May 2013. In July, the U.S. Department of Justice appeared in the case by filing a "Statement of Interest". Represented by the Civil Rights Division (not the U.S. Attorney, which ordinarily represents the U.S. in the Southern District of New York). The DOJ took no position on whether the NYPD should be held liable, but opined that a monitorship-type remedy was often useful and certainly authorized, in systemic police misconduct cases. On August 12, 2013, following the nine-week trial, Judge Scheindlin held that the City of New York violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Scheindlin issued two opinions finding the NYPD liable, ordering changes to the department's stop and frisk procedures, and appointing a monitor to oversee the changes. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F.Supp.2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) and 959 F.Supp.2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Judge Scheindlin held that the NYPD violated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights, due to the department officials' deliberate indifference regarding the officers' clearly unconstitutional searches and the fact that the searches were so widespread that they held the force of law. Further, the NYPD violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to the indirectly racially-targeted searches and by displaying deliberate indifference to the discriminatory nature of these searches. In other words, Judge Scheindlin found that the searches violated the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights regardless of whether the disparate result of the search policy was intentional. Beyond the findings of law, Judge Scheindlin also issued an order setting forth the procedures that the NYPD must adopt to remedy the situation. The order mandated that a monitor would be appointed to oversee reforms and consult with the parties to develop "a set of reforms of the NYPD's policies, training, supervision, monitoring, and discipline regarding stop and frisk." As a monitor, she chose a former New York Corporation Counsel and former First Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan. On October 31, 2013, the Second Circuit granted the City’s motion for a stay and ordered that the cases be reassigned from Judge Scheindlin to another district judge. The Second Circuit wrote that the "District Judge ran afoul of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges" in (a) speaking to the press and (b) encouraging the plaintiffs' counsel in Daniels to file the Floyd litigation, separately, rather than litigating racial profiling as part of Daniels—particularly in stating that she would treat the new case as related. 538 F. App'x 101 (2d Cir. 2013). After the Second Circuit ruled, both Floyd and Ligon were reassigned (as related) to District Judge Analisa Torres. On November 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals rejected Judge Scheindlin's motion asking to be heard on the disqualification issue and clarified the reason for reassigning the case. The Second Circuit held that the rationale for the reassignment was an appearance of impropriety, not its actual presence. 736 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2013). In the meantime, NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio was elected, and took a very different approach to these cases. The city moved for limited remand from the Second Circuit to the district court for the purpose of exploring settlement. On February 21, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City’s motion to remand to the district court to explore settlement for 45 days. The Second Circuit declined to decide the police unions' motion to intervene, preferring to let the district court decide that motion first. 743 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2014). On March 4, 2014, the parties informed Judge Torres that they had “reached an agreement in principle for resolving the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon. The City agreed to substantially comply with the injunctive relief set forth in Judge Scheindlin's August 12, 2013, remedial order, subject to the parties' application to Judge Torres to limit the term of the court-appointed monitor to three years. When the monitor’s term ended, the City agreed to authorize the Inspector General of the NYPD to take over monitoring and reporting responsibilities. The parties agreed that the agreement could be terminated once the City had maintained compliance for two years. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres granted the parties' joint motion to modify the remedial order and to enter it as an embodiment of their agreements. On July 30, 2014, Judge Torres also issued an order denying the police unions' motions to intervene, finding, inter alia, that the motions were untimely and that the police unions did not assert a legally protectable interest. 302 F.R.D. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The police unions appealed. However, on August 6, 2014, with the consent of the plaintiffs in Floyd and Ligon, the City moved to voluntarily dismiss its remaining appeals, with prejudice, stating that the parties had reached an agreement that resolved all the issues raised by the City's appeals in both Floyd and Ligon, and cleared the way for the parties to begin the remedial process and settlement negotiations. On October 31, 2014, the Second Circuit granted the City’s request to voluntarily dismiss all appeals, with prejudice. In addition, the Second Circuit held that the unions’ motions to intervene were untimely and that the unions failed to establish legally protectable interests, as required to allow intervention. 770 F.3d 1051 (2d Cir. 2014). The parties continued to work with the monitor on developing appropriate reforms. On February 3, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order regarding the procedure for the monitor to develop and the City to implement the reforms of NYPD’s stop-and-frisk activities. The monitor would consult with the parties to create a final recommendations for the implementation of remedies. Then, the court would approve or deny the final recommendations. First, on February 23, 2015, the monitor submitted and Judge Torres approved, a memo that was read by the NYPD at 10 consecutive roll calls in all precincts detailing the reforms ordered by Judge Scheindlin in Floyd. The memo was also posted in police stations and provided to all officers. The document detailed the constitutional standards governing stop and frisks, explicitly prohibited racial profiling by police, ordered officers to include a narrative explanation for stops in their UF250 forms, and ordered the start of a pilot program outfitting police officers with body cameras. Meanwhile, on March 18, 2015, the City suggested a way for all five police unions to participate in the remedial process. Under the City's approach, the City would share proposals with the unions before providing them to the monitor and the plaintiffs. The unions could then offer their comments, which the City would convey to the monitor. This approach would afford the unions an opportunity to inform the monitor of their viewpoints before the monitor reached conclusions and submitted the final recommendations to the Court. On March 19, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order approving this framework. On August 7, 2015, the monitor submitted his final recommendations for reforms on racial profiling and street encounters. The new racial profiling policy imposed a categorical prohibition on racial and national origin profiling; it also prohibited other forms of biased policing not covered in the NYPD’s current policy, such as profiling on the basis of religion, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, and housing status. The new street encounters policy regarding placed clearer legal limits on stops and frisks. It required supervisory review of officer conduct to ensure compliance with the Constitution. On August 24, 2015, Judge Torres approved the final recommendations. On December 8, 2015, Judge Torres issued an order modifying the remedial order’s requirement that NYPD institute a pilot project in which body-worn cameras would be used for a one-year period. Judge Torres modified the order so that the NYPD would use a randomized experimental design for the body-worn camera pilot program. On January 24, 2017, the parties reached a settlement of attorneys' fees and costs. The City paid $10,430,000.00 for plaintiffs' counsel fees and $820,000.000 for costs and expenses to class counsel for the period from the beginning of the case to October 31, 2014. The City was ordered to continue to pay counsel fees, costs, and expenses accrued from November 1, 2014 until the Court's jurisdiction in the matter had terminated. The input process under the Joint Remedial Order ended in April 2017, at which the parties and community stakeholders began discussion of Joint Remedial Process reform proposals. On January 10, 2018, stating that the parties had reached an impasse regarding the Joint Remedial Process, the plaintiffs requested a status conference. Judge Torres ordered on January 29, 2018, that the Facilitator of the Joint Remedial Process submit a draft of his Final Report to the parties. The parties did not reach a consensus on the Joint Process Reforms. On April 18, the New York Times published an op-ed previously submitted by Plaintiff's counsel which stated that “The problem is the police department suggested that it might oppose reforms that black and Latino New Yorkers are asking for. As much as the department wants to be seen as listening to community members, it doesn’t actually want to be responsive to their needs.” On May 15, 2018, the Facilitator of the Joint Remedial Process issued the Final Report and Recommendations on the Joint Remedial Process pursuant to the Court's Remedial Order. The Facilitator made fourteen reform recommendations, including: creation of permanent structures for officer conduct feedback; preparation of a monthly NYPD discipline report and increased transparency around police disciplinary processes; body-worn camera use; recording of Level 1 and Level 2 encounters; improved citizen access to stop reports; community engagement; development of a public education campaign; implementation of annual community surveys; adherence to policies regarding youth interactions and cultivation of confidential informants; mental health and disability training; LGBTQ-specific training and community engagement; and extension of the Criminal Justice Reform Act of 2016 to allow civil summons to be the primary trespass enforcement tool; and trauma-informed training. In their June 8, 2018 comment on the joint remedial process reforms, the plaintiffs requested that the court enter an order requiring the City to implement the Facilitator’s recommendations with certain modifications. On July 19, 2018, the court ordered the parties to submit a proposal for a pilot program, overseen by the Monitor, to study the electronic recording of first-and second-level police-citizen encounters and record findings on low-level police-citizen encounters. In August, the court further ordered that the proposed program study the use of body-worn cameras (BWCs) in first-level encounters. On November 20, 2018, Judge Torres issued an order requiring the NYPD to, after consultation with the monitor, "submit for approval a plan to implement 'a program for systematically receiving, assessing, and acting on information regarding adverse findings on the conduct of police officers involving illegal stops or illegal trespass enforcements'" by January 7, 2019. On January 14, 2019, the City submitted a plan to comply with the court's November 20 order. The proposed plan included gathering information in five categories:

Declinations to Prosecute

Suppression Decisions

Adverse Credibility Findings

Law Department Refusals to Indemnify

Civil Judgments Due to Malfeasance

The City stated that the information gathered in these categories would be weighted "as part of a buildup to thresholds which, when crossed, will trigger a broader review of an individual officer at the Risk Management Bureau level with a view toward imposing any additional necessary remedial action." Plaintiffs submitted a response to the submitted plan, highlighting several concerns with the proposal. First, plaintiffs asserted that the proposal did not provide an effective early intervention mechanism; "The City’s proposal fails to present a feedback mechanism to focus resources toward at-risk officers before a problem has major impact on the community." Moreover, plaintiffs contended that the proposed plan lacked the required "community input and perspectives as part of an early intervention system." Finally, plaintiffs asserted that the data should be available to the public. After the Monitor submitted a proposed pilot program on January 29, 2019, the court approved the pilot program on February 7. The proposed study was "designed to study how electronic documentation and the use of BWCs affect the legality of police-citizen encounters . . . The pilot program will study the effects of observer presence by comparing the behavior of officers while under observation with their behavior while unobserved." On May 6, the court approved a fee stipulation for the period between February 24, 2017, and May 31, 2018, by which the City agreed to pay attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $1,186,194.54. On June 14, the Monitor requested the court to enter a confidentiality order, shielding aspects of the pilot program from plaintiffs and the public. Plaintiffs objected to the confidentiality order, stating that the "pilot documents a fundamentally public activity for the purposes of this litigation" and that "Plaintiffs and stakeholders require access to the underlying data." The City and several District Attorney’s Offices, as amici curiae, noted that the confidentiality order presented grave constitutional and statutory concerns. On August 12, the court ordered the Monitor's proposed confidentiality order without modification and without addressing legal or factual issues raised by any of the plaintiffs or amici. On September 9, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's confidentiality order, stating that the "Court overlooked relevant facts, controlling law, and the likelihood of a manifest injustice in summarily granting the Monitor’s request for an additional confidentiality order." The court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration on October 25, 2019. On May 26, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for relief, alleging that the NYPD's discriminatory social-distancing enforcement practices in response to the COVID-19 outbreak in New York City violated the court's orders, the NYPD’s Court-approved racial profiling policy, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs asserted that 81% of social distancing summonses were issued to black and latinx people - "a rate nearly identical to the racial disparity in stops that led to this Court’s 2013 finding that the NYPD engaged in widespread and systemic Equal Protection – and for which there does not appear to be any plausible race-neutral explanation." Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that NYPD had generally not enforced social distancing in white neighborhoods, "despite large gatherings and persistently crowded parks, bars, and religious schools or ceremonies." Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that NYPD refused to share information about its policies or practices and did not respond to plaintiffs' requests. Plaintiffs requested that the Monitor to conduct an investigation into the NYPD's social-distancing enforcement practices, an order compelling discovery concerning social distancing enforcements, and an order to show cause why an order should not be issued finding defendants in violation of the court's orders. The plaintiffs also requested "temporarily enjoining any further social distancing enforcement actions by the NYPD pending further order of this Court." Defendant is scheduled to file a response to the emergency motion by June 8. Following several meetings held in February 2020, on May 28 the parties submitted their plans to implement the early intervention program ordered by the court in November 2018. While the parties agreed on many aspects of the program, there remained some disagreements. On June 2, the court issued an order laying out the details of the program, the manner and scope of information to be collected by the NYPD, and the assessment and intervention mechanisms to be implemented. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2008, four African-American men who had been stopped and frisked in New York City brought a class action §1983 suit against the City, claiming that the City was stopping individuals of color based on their race and without the reasonable articulable suspicion required under the Fourth Amendment. In 2014, the parties settled the case and the NYPD agreed to implement reforms to the stop-and-frisk practice. Implementation of the reforms is ongoing.


In 1969, this lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado seeking desegregation of the Denver Public Schools. The Congress of Hispanic Educators and individually named Mexican American parents of minor children attending the Denver Public Schools intervened in 1974. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 576 F. Supp. 1503 (1983). On November 3, 1980, these intervenor-plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint in intervention on behalf of Limited English Proficiency ("LEP") students. It alleged that the school district did not have adequate programs for students who were limited in their English proficiency. We do not have a copy of the complaint, the complaint in intervention, or the court docket sheets from that era, but the intervening plaintiffs' attorneys evidently were from the Mexican American Legal Defense Fund and Multicultural Education, Training and Advocacy (META), Inc.-California. This entry describes the litigation that arose from the intervention. For more information on the underlying desegregation lawsuit, see here in the Clearinghouse. In a December 1983 unpublished order, District Judge Richard P. Matsch found that there were deficiencies in the defendant's school program for students of limited English-speaking abilities and ordered that they be remedied. Representatives of the plaintiffs and the school district negotiated to develop a remedy for the deficiencies found by the court. They negotiated a settlement which (a) provided a procedure for identifying and assessing needy students, (b) established standards for teachers and aides, and (c) established programmatic standards. Before the settlement went into effect, parents of students who attend the Denver Public Schools and who were "Limited English Proficient" (LEP) could review the settlement and file any objection they had to its contents. They further had a right to appear in court to voice their objections. A hearing to approve the settlement was set for August 1984 and resulted in a language rights order issued by Judge Matsch on August 7, 1984, in Keyes v. School District No. 1. Subsequently, the District was found to have attained unitary status and the desegregation component of the action was dismissed by order of September 12, 1995; the outstanding issues pertaining to LEP students were at that time split off from the original action and assigned a new civil docket number. The settlement led to dismissal of the original case. Judge Matsch was still assigned the matter when, on March 3, 1995, the school district filed a motion to modify the language rights order. The Congress of Hispanic Educators, as plaintiffs, responded on March 24, 1995, prompting Judge Matsch to order a scheduling conference for the case, later in the year. That conference was the prelude to a number of status conferences and reports to the court over the next four years. A February 1999 status report indicated that, with the participation of the United States, an English Language Acquisition Program had been developed for implementation in the upcoming school year. The continued talks culminated in an April 1999 proposed settlement of the case. The day after the settlement proposal was submitted to the court, the United States moved to intervene in the case as an additional plaintiff, citing the Educational Opportunities Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, as well as these statutes' implementing regulations. The intervention motion was granted on April 21, 1999. The United States' complaint noted a 1997 findings letter in which the District was found by the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of Education (DOE) to be in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, due to the District's failure to provide equal educational opportunity to LEP students. Unable to obtain voluntary compliance with these statutes and the August 1984 order, DOE had referred the matter to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), resulting in its subsequent intervention. The intervention, however, came after the DOJ and the parties had reached a negotiated settlement. Accordingly, documents regarding the English Language Acquisition Program (ELAP) and compliance monitoring (for a three-year period by an agreed-upon monitor, Dr. Ernest House) were submitted for court approval. Padres Unidos, Inc., a group consisting of parents of Denver Public School students, filed objections to the proposed settlement and unsuccessfully voiced those to the court at a hearing in June 1999. On June 16, 1999, Judge Matsch approved the ELAP and monitoring plans, substituting these plans for the August 1984, order. In August of that year, the judge directed administrative closure of the case, retaining jurisdiction to review compliance issues brought to his attention. Periodic monitoring reports were subsequently filed with the court. The case was dormant until September 2012, when the parties filed a joint motion for an order to approve a new consent decree. On April 16, 2013, Judge Matsch issued an order approving the consent decree, which provided extensive accountability measures to ensure compliance with its terms. The consent degree included provisions requiring annual and semi-annual reporting by the Denver Public Schools to the U.S. Department of Justice and to the Congress of Hispanic Educators, annual multi-day visits to DPS schools by the U.S. and counsel for the CHE to monitor compliance. It further required DPS to conduct its own monitoring to assess its compliance with the consent decree. The consent decree did not have a set duration. The consent decree further provided for the appointment of an independent monitor to ascertain compliance. On a joint motion, the court appointed Dr. Paul Martinez as the Court's monitor. Dr. Martinez has entered six status reports dated February 25, 2014; October 24, 2014; June 8, 2015; February 26, 2016; June 5, 2017; May 11, 2018; and July 17, 2019. According to the latest status report, the school district has made significant progress in several of the main areas that had been identified as points of concern. These included, among other things, the availability of Spanish language material, which Dr. Martinez reported had increased significantly, particularly in the areas of math, science and library sciences, and a implementation of a comparable Spanish language Common Core aligned curriculum for elementary students. On September 12, 2018, Judge Matsch approved the parties' joint motion to appoint Dr. Christopher Nelson, Ph.D. as the Court's Monitor of the Consent Decree to suceed Dr. Martinez. On July 18th, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard Jackson. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 1995, the Denver Public School district moved to modify a language rights order that had been the product of a 1969 school desegregation case. The Congress of Hispanic Educators, which had been a party in the original case, responded. A proposed settlement was submitted in April 1999, at which point the United States Department of Justice moved to intervene as it had participated in the development of the English Language Acquisition Program that formed part of the settlement of the case. Padres Unidos, Inc., a group of parents of Denver Public school students, filed objections to the proposed settlement and unsuccessfully voiced them to the court at a hearing in June 1999. On June 16, 1999, Judge Matsch approved the ELAP and monitoring plans, substituting these plans for the August 1984, order. In August of that year, the judge directed administrative closure of the case, retaining jurisdiction to review compliance issues brought to his attention.