On April 14, 2016, Microsoft filed this suit seeking declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgment Act against the U.S. Department of Justice. The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the government's use of gag orders to prevent the company from telling customers when the government requested their data was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that sections of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 allowing for the use of such gag orders, and absolving the government from notifying affected individuals facially violates the First Amendment right to free speech, and Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure.233 F.Supp.3d 887. On May 26, 2016, The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), with Microsoft's support, filed a motion to intervene as an affected organization that uses Microsoft's products. The complaint-in-intervention also alleged that the government's failure to provide notice to affected individuals was unconstitutional. This motion to intervene, along with one other by an unrelated individual, were dismissed in an opinion by Judge Robart on August 28, 2016. That opinion, however, did grant the ACLU amicus curiae status. 2016 WL 4506808. Many parties, including other technology firms and civil rights organizations, have been granted amicus curiae status for the case. On July 22, 2016, the Department of Justice filed a motion to dismiss the suit, alleging a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. A hearing on the motion was held on January 23, 2017. Following the motion hearing, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Department of Justice' motion to dismiss the claim on February 8, 2017. The Court found the plaintiff had sufficiently made out a claim for an alleged injury as well as a likelihood for future injury under the First Amendment that satisfied the Court's standing inquiry. Additionally, the plaintiff succeeded in persuading the Court that their First Amendment Rights had been violated by the statute even under a lower standard of review than strict scrutiny because the indefinite nondisclosure orders would burden the plaintiff's First Amendment Rights. The plaintiffs also argued the statute as applied was a violation of their First Amendment Rights. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's First Amendment claims. However, the Court concluded the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit had consistently held a plaintiff could not bring a third-party Fourth Amendment claim. Therefore, the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim on behalf of their customers was dismissed. The parties set a trial date for June 4, 2018. On October 24, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, which the Court granted on October 25, 2017. The plaintiffs filed this motion in response to the Deputy Attorney General's binding policy update issued on October 19, 2017. The new policy addressed many of the concerns the plaintiffs had with the old policy and prohibited the use of indefinite orders. As such, the plaintiffs felt they were comfortable requesting the court dismiss their claim without prejudice. This case is closed.

Summary: On April 14, 2016, Microsoft filed this suit seeking declaratory judgment under the Declaratory Judgement Act against the United States Department of Justice. The plaintiff alleged that the government's use of gag orders to prevent the company from telling customers when the government requested their data was unconstitutional. After a policy update within the DOJ in October 2017, the case was dismissed by the plaintiffs because their complaint was no longer relevant.


On May 22, 2009, two same-sex couples who had been denied marriage licenses in California filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of California in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that California, by amending its constitution in 2008 to once again limit marriage to opposite-sex couples, had violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. For a short while, same-sex marriage had been legal in California. In May 2008, the California Supreme Court held that state statutes limiting marriage to opposite-sex applicants violated the California Constitution, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (PB-CA-0001, in this collection) and for several months after that same-sex couples had been able to marry. In November 2008, however, California's electorate adopted Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment that reinstated the opposite-sex limitation on marriage. Several lawsuits were filed to challenge the validity of the amendment under various state constitutional provisions, but on May 26, 2009, the California Supreme Court held that while same-sex marriage contracted before its passage remained valid, Proposition 8 had been lawfully enacted. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). This case was filed three days prior to the Strauss decision. On July 2, 2009, the City and County of San Francisco moved to intervene, and on August 19, the District Court (Judge Vaughn R. Walker) allowed their intervention, albeit in a limited capacity. Because the governor and attorney general of California refused to defend Proposition 8, its official proponents moved to intervene, and their motion was also granted. On August 4, 2010, the Court (Judge Walker) held in favor of the plaintiffs, overturning Proposition 8 as a violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). It found that California had no rational basis for denying marriage licenses to same-sex couples and granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction barring enforcement of Proposition 8. On the day the District Court's ruling came down, the defendant-interveners appealed it to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and on August 12 they moved for a stay of the District Court's injunction. The Court of Appeals granted their motion on August 16. On February 7, 2012, a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel ruled 2-1 in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring Proposition 8 unconstitutional. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) found that it did not need to consider the rationale of the District Court, deciding instead on a narrower ground specific to the Californian context. Drawing heavily on the Supreme Court's language and reasoning in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), the Court held that because California had already offered same-sex couples the right to marry, and because it still offered them a status identical in all but name, Proposition 8 did nothing more than inflict dignitary harm on same-sex couples and thus had no rational basis. On February 21, 2012, the defendant-interveners requested en banc review of the panel's decision by the entire Ninth Circuit, but their request was denied on June 5, leaving them ninety days to file a petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court. Injunctive relief has been stayed pending appeal. On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, agreeing to review the case. The court ordered briefing on two questions on review: (1) whether the Equal Protection Clause makes unconstitutional California's definition of marriage as available only to different sex couples, and (2) whether the backers of Proposition 8 have standing to appeal the 9th Circuit decision striking it down. On June 26, 2013, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan), the Supreme Court found that nobody with standing to appeal had, in fact, appealed the district court ruling, and accordingly vacated that decision. This left in place the district court's decision striking Prop 8 down -- so same-sex marriage is legal is California.

Summary: On May 22, 2009, two same-sex couples who had been denied married licenses in California filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of California in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division. The plaintiffs claimed that California, by amending its constitution in 2008 to once again limit marriage to opposite-sex couples after opening the institution to same sex-couples earlier that year, had violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On August 4, 2010, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding no rational basis for the constitutional amendment. A three-member panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed on narrower grounds on February 12, 2012, and denied a request for en banc review on June 5. On December 7, 2012, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, agreeing to review the case. The questions on review are (1) whether the Equal Protection Clause makes unconstitutional California's definition of marriage as available only to different sex couples, and (2) whether the backers of Proposition 8 have standing to appeal the 9th Circuit decision striking it down. On June 26, 2013, the Court found that nobody with standing to appeal had appealed the District Court judgment, and accordingly vacated the 9th Circuit opinion. This left in place the district court's decision striking Prop 8 down -- so same-sex marriage is legal is California.


On Apr. 30, 2012, five members of the Occupy Wall Street movement filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, against the City of New York and individual New York City Police Department officers. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification, as well as injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that officers of the NYPD violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as their rights under the Constitution of the State of New York. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were unlawfully detained by NYPD officers during an Occupy Wall Street demonstration held in New York City on Nov. 8, 2011. The plaintiffs' claims arose from the NYPD's usage of barricades during the demonstration, when protesters gathered in Bryant Park. Their plan was to march toward a fundraising event attended by President Obama at the Sheraton Hotel and protest outside of the hotel. The plaintiffs alleged that they were illegally confined in a closed pen formed by police-erected barricades for nearly two hours. The plaintiffs alleged that they repeatedly asked to leave the enclosure, but the officers refused and threatened to arrest anyone who tried to leave, while tourists and journalists were permitted to leave the barricaded area. The plaintiffs were never arrested nor charged with any violation, misdemeanor, or crime. The plaintiffs alleged that this conduct amounted to false arrest, and violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, association, and assembly, as well as their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants subjected them to selective enforcement in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that the other NYPD officers had an affirmative duty to assess the constitutionality of their actions, and that their failure to intervene amounted to a separate and distinct violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The plaintiffs argued that the NYPD's conduct violated a Stipulation of Settlement and Order in another Southern District of New York case, Stauber v. City of New York, 1:03-cv-9163. That settlement amended Section 213-11, 21(h)(3) of the New York Police Department Patrol Guide to state the following:
 Barrier configuration for demonstrations should not unreasonably restrict access to and participation in the event. For example, attendees should be permitted to leave a barricaded area at any time. In addition, if crowd conditions and other circumstances permit, participants should be permitted to leave and return to the same area. Sufficient openings in the barricades should be maintained for purpose of permitted attendees to leave expeditiously and return to the event as described in this paragraph.
 In their complaint, the plaintiffs asked the court to issue an order compelling the NYPD to comply with this section. On Mar. 6, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for (1) failure to state a claim and (2) failure to fulfill conditions precedent to filing suit. The defendants argued that the barricades amounted to a reasonable time, place, manner restriction under the First Amendment, and that the need to ensure the President's security rendered the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claim non-actionable. The defendants also pointed to New York General Municipal Law § 50-i(1), which sets forth certain procedures for suing the City. The defendants claimed that plaintiffs' had failed to comply with § 50-i(1), and that their claims were therefore barred. On Nov. 21, 2013, District Judge Thomas P. Griesa for the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judge Griesa acknowledged that although it was "a close question as to whether [the complaint] states a valid cause of action for violation of constitutional rights . . . [t]he court believes that it is not appropriate at this stage to rule on the merits of the case." Berg v. Kelly, 12-cv-03391 TPG, 2013 WL 6153253, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2013). However, the court noted that "a summary judgment motion, or cross-summary judgment motions, may be appropriate in order to avoid a drawn-out litigation with full discovery and trial." Id. On Dec. 18, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On Jan. 21, 2016, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. On Aug. 10, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court denied the defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to the Fourth Amendment false-arrest claim, the First Amendment retaliation claim, the Fourteenth Amendment selective-enforcement claim, and the failure-to-intervene claim, finding that genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the defendants had failed to show that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court granted the motion to dismiss with respect to the plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the Commissioner of the NYPD and the Chief of Department of the NYPD, finding that they failed for lack of sufficient involvement in the alleged constitutional violations, as neither defendant was at the scene was at the scene of the protest. The court also dismissed the state constitutional claims, because as the plaintiffs had alternate remedies available under a federal statute such as § 1983, their state constitutional tort claims were "redundant and precluded" under Biswas v. City of New York, 973 F. Supp. 2d 504, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). On Sept. 9, 2016, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, from the district court's opinion dated Aug. 10, 2016. The case was assigned Docket No. 16-3146. On Nov. 18, 2016, several of the plaintiffs-appellees moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, but the Sixth Circuit denied the motion on Jan. 11, 2017. A Second Circuit panel of Judges Reena Raggi, Susan Carney, and Peter Hall ruled on the appeal on July 25, 2018 (897 F.3d 99). They noted that the officers did have a special need that could exempt them from the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement--the need to protect the President--but found that the ensuing detention procedure did not balance the competing interests of protecting the President, since the protesters were not allowed to leave at all while non-protesters successfully left the area in small groups without incident. However, they overturned the District Court's analysis that the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity because there was a question of material fact as to the mental state of the officers erecting the barricades. They stated that qualified immunity is analyzed through the lens of a reasonable officer, not the mental state of the officer at issue, and found that a reasonable officer protecting the President could think that this detention strategy did not violate any Constitutional rights. With this grant of qualified immunity, all the Constitutional complaints were invalidated, and the Second Circuit recommended that the District Court dismiss the case with prejudice. District Court Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, assigned to the case since 2018, took up the Second Circuit's recommendation and declined to reargue the case on April 22, 2019. The decision to decline to reargue was based on a November 30, 2018 recommendation from Magistrate Judge Gabriel Gorenstein (343 F.Supp.3d 419). In the same order, he noted that all claims were now dismissed, and ordered the plaintiffs to pay attorney's fees. The case is closed.

Summary: In May 2012, five members of Occupy Wall Street brought this putative class action against the City of New York. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged that officers of the New York City Police Department had violated their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as their rights under the Constitution of the State of New York. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were unlawfully detained by NYPD officers during an Occupy Wall Street demonstration held in New York City on Nov. 8, 2011. The defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of their motion for summary judgment to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit granted qualified immunity to the officers at issue, and dismissed all remaining Constitutional charges under this theory. The case is closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This constitutional claims action was filed by Pennsylvania counties, residents, and businesses on May 7, 2020, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief from the state's public safety orders. The court granted declaratory relief to the plaintiffs on September 14, 2020. <hr> The plaintiffs, four Pennsylvania counties and several Pennsylvania residents and business organizations, brought this action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on May 7, 2020 against the Governor of Pennsylvania and the Secretary of the state's Department of Health. The suit was in response to a March 19, 2020 order that prohibited the operation of non-"life sustaining" businesses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs claimed that the shutdown order violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Substantive and Procedural Due Process protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the First Amendment's right to free association. The plaintiffs sought an injunction preventing further enforcement of the business shutdown order and the elimination of the waiver system. They also sought a declaratory judgment that the issuance and enforcement of the order is unconstitutional. On May 28, 2020, the court allowed the case to continue, despite an ease in restrictions. 2020 WL 2769105. The court found that declaratory relief for the plaintiffs could still be awarded even if injunctive relief was now impossible under their claims. However, the court did set aside plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment takings clause claims and their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims regarding the state's waiver process. The court found that declaratory relief was not appropriate for either of these claims, but allowed the case to continue on all other claims. On September 14, 2020, the court dismissed the county plaintiffs from the case, finding. District Judge William Stickman IV found that the county plaintiffs were improper because they are not conferred constitutional rights under the U.S. Constitution. 2020 WL 5510690. Judge Stickman determined that the defendants' limits on gatherings violated the plaintiffs' right to free speech and their right of assembly because the limitations were not narrowly tailored to serve a government interest. The court also found that the defendants' orders violated the plaintiffs' substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that broad and population and business lockdowns are nearly impossible under the Constitution. In addition, the court found that the business lockdowns violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since large retailers largely remained open while small specialty stores were forced to close. On October 1, 2020, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted a motion by the appellants for stay of the district court's order pending appeal. USCA Case Number 20-2936. The appeal is ongoing.

Summary: In May 2020, Pennsylvania residents, counties, and businesses filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations regarding the state's COVID-19 shutdown orders. On September 14, 2020, the court granted declaratory judgment for the plaintiffs, finding violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. An appeal to the Third Circuit by the defendants is ongoing.


On May 16, 2007, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (the Protection and Advocacy organization for Alabama) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against Alabama Department of Youth Services. Though plaintiff later amended the complaint to include greater detail of the parties' conduct throughout the course of litigation, the plaintiff's allegation remained that defendant's refusal to disclose records and to allow plaintiff to privately speak with residents violated the Individuals with Mental Illness Act, the Developmental Disabilities and Bill of Rights Act, the Individual Rights Program, and 42 U.S.C. 1983. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees. On October 10, 2007, the parties were ordered by the District Court (Hon. Myron H. Thompson) to determine whether any issues remained, and if so, to submit a joint report describing those issues. The parties submitted and amended this report a number of times. The Court denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, but later, on April 30, 2008, the Court dismissed the case because the parties agreed to settle. On September 10, 2008, the Court signed a settlement agreement between the parties. The parties agreed on a plan for allowing plaintiff access to students and records in the Department of Youth Services, on a process for dispute resolution, and on allowing the court jurisdiction over the case until September 9, 2009. The agreement also required defendant to pay plaintiff's counsel the sum of $20,500.

Summary: On May 16, 2007, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama against Alabama Department of Youth Services. The plaintiff alleged violation of Protection and Advocacy laws, and the parties agreed on a court-signed settlement allowing plaintiff access to youth in the defendant's facilities, requiring defendant to pay plaintiff $20,500 in attorney fees, and requiring the parties to follow a dispute resolution process detailed in the agreement if issues arise. The agreement gave the court jurisdiction over the case until September 9, 2009.


This litigation involves two related cases filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The lead case was filed on June 22, 2012, by a number of unions, including Service Employees International Union Local 1 (SEIU), against the State of Ohio challenging several provisions of Ohio's election code. The related case, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted,  VR-OH-0081 had been filed in 2006 by the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless (NEOCH) and others, challenging numerous provisions of Ohio's comprehensive election reform bill, House Bill 3. Specifically, the NEOCH Plaintiffs alleged that Ohio's amended voter identification requirements violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The NEOCH lawsuit was partially resolved by an April 2010 Consent Decree, which barred rejection of a provisional ballot cast by a voter who uses only the last four digits of his or her social security number as identification (SSN-voters), if poll-worker error was the source of certain deficiencies in the ballot, including being cast in the wrong precinct though in the correct polling place. Early in 2012, the State sought to vacate the NEOCH Decree's terms. However, plaintiffs objected and the Court upheld the validity of the Decree. NEOCH, No. 06-CV-896, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94086 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2012). During the pendency of the Defendants' request to vacate the decree, on June 20, 2012, the NEOCH plaintiffs filed a motion to modify the Decree. On June 22, 2012, numerous organizations filed the SEIU litigation, seeking a statewide injunction requiring that registered voters' provisional ballots which are cast in the wrong precinct, or cast with technically deficient ballot envelopes, still be counted unless the poll worker who processed the deficient ballot affirms that the ballot deficiency is not the result of poll-worker error. The SEIU plaintiffs, here, simultaneously sought a preliminary injunction. The complaint alleged, inter alia, violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Ohio's complex voter identification requirements, provide thirteen different statutory reasons why an individual will be required to cast a provisional ballot on election day. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3505.181(A)(1)-(13). The result is a high rate of Ohio voters forced to cast provisional ballots rather than normal ballots--around three times the national average. The Ohio Supreme Court held in 2011 that provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct must be summarily disqualified, even if the voter was not at fault, and even if the Board determines that the voter is lawfully registered to vote. State ex rel. Painter v. Brunner, 941 N.E.2d 782, 794 (Ohio 2011). The current application of Ohio law voids the vote even of a person directed to the wrong precinct by a poll worker. The district court (Judge Algenon Marbley) held a hearing on SEIU's request for a preliminary injunction on June 30, 2012. On August 27, 2012, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and entered a preliminary injunction instructing the state to count provisional ballots that, due to poll-worker error, were cast (1) in the wrong precinct but correct polling place, or (2) with nonconforming or incomplete ballot affirmation. The district court relied heavily on an earlier 6th Circuit case, in which the Court of Appeals had upheld a preliminary injunction ordering the counting of provisional ballots that investigation had revealed were cast in the wrong precinct due to poll-worker error. Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 2011). The State appealed. On October 11, 2012, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction as to the provisional ballots cast at the right polling place but the wrong precinct, but reversed on the smaller issue of the provisional ballots whose voter's affirmation was somehow deficient. Ohio Coal. for Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012). It remanded the case to address the plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree in light of the equal protection issues created by the decree's provision for the counting of deficient-affirmation ballots by SSN-4 voters On October 26, 2012, District Court Judge Marbly granted plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree and order county boards of elections to count all provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct, irrespective of whether they are cast in the correct polling place or an incorrect polling place. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1 v. Husted, 906 F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D. Ohio 2012). The court further stated that to treat deficient affirmation ballots differently for SSN-4 voters would deny equal protection to those provisional voters using alternative forms of identification. On November 13, the District Court entered an order clarifying this ruling. On January 14, 2014, the parties entered into a confidential agreement that would lead to a complete settlement if the court were to vacate its clarifying ruling made on November 13, 2012. The District Court vacated the clarifying order on February 7, 2014. On September 29, 2014, the District Court granted with modification plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees. This was appealed to the 6th Circuit, which affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded the matter for further consideration of select issues on August 1st, 2016. 2016 WL 4073489. Judge Marbly awarded attorneys fees of $2,618,140.78 to the plaintiffs on October 12, 2016, settling and mooting any pending motions. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 22, 2012 plaintiffs, Service Employees International Union Local 1 and relate unions, filed a lawsuit under against the State of Ohio challenging the constitutionality of the State's voter identification laws. On August 27, 2012, District Judge Alegenon Marbley, of the Southern District of Ohio, granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction requiring Ohio's county Board of Elections to count provisional ballots cast in the wrong precincts, or with technical errors on the ballot envelopes, where the voters were duly registered and those errors were the fault of poll workers. On January 14, 2014, the parties entered a confidential settlement agreement that was approved on February 7, 2014. The case continued for another two years on issues related to attorneys fees, which were resolved in October 2016 for $2,618,140.78. The case is now closed.


This case was brought in September 2005 in U.S. District Court of Utah by a former employee of Stevens-Henager College who alleged that she was paid a lower salary because of her gender, in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint also alleged that the woman was fired in retaliation for complaining about the disparate treatment. The case was consolidated with another suit that was brought in the District of Utah against Stevens-Henager by the EEOC. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Stevens-Henager College, 1:05-cv-00122 (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2005). After the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the case proceeded to trial in March 2007. After a four-day trial, the jury found for the defendant on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, but they withdrew the appeal in July 2007. This ended the case.

Summary: This case was brought in September 2005 in U.S. District Court of Utah by a former employee of Stevens-Henager College who alleged that she was paid a lower salary because of her gender, in violation of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint also alleged that the woman was fired in retaliation for complaining about the disparate treatment. The case was consolidated with another suit that was brought in the District of Utah against Stevens-Henager by the EEOC. After the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied, the case proceeded to trial in March 2007. The jury found for the defendant on all claims. The plaintiffs appealed the decision, but they withdrew the appeal in July 2007. This ended the case.


On February 25, 1998, plaintiffs, consisting of over 500,000 Tennessee residents under the age of 21 who rely on the state's Medicaid Program ("TennCare") for essential medical and mental health services, brought this class action claim against Tennessee State officials in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division. The plaintiffs claimed "unlawful deprivation of medically necessary care results in the needless infliction of pain, the endangerment of young lives, and the stunting of children's chances to achieve their full potential" in violation of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§1396, the terms and conditions of Tennessee's conditions of risk agreements between the State of Tennessee, TennCare, managed care organizations (MCOs) and behavioral health organizations (BHOs). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. Tennessee participated in Medicaid from the 1960s until it received a five year waiver under Section 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1315, to implement a demonstration program called TennCare. TennCare has two major distinguishing features from the standard Medicaid program. First, TennCare beneficiaries were assigned to one of 11 managed care organizations (MCOs) who assigned primary care providers to serve as gatekeepers to medical services. Second, TennCare added coverage for state residents who lacked access to group health insurance and those who were "uninsurable" because of preexisting conditions. In July, 1996, a major amendment added behavioral health services to those provided through TennCare, funded with state and federal block grant money. These funds were disbursed to a new set of behavioral health organizations (BHOs), along with the existing budget for behavioral health services. TennCare's managed care organizations ceased to have any responsibility for behavioral health care, and the BHOs assumed responsibility for providing such services to TennCare's entire enrollment. Approximately 6,000 severely emotionally disturbed ("SED") TennCare children were considered members of the priority population. The program originally paid BHOs a single capitation rate for all TennCare children, regardless of whether they were members of the priority population classified as SED. However, after the implementation of the Partners Program, non-SED children were only entitled to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization and a limited number of outpatient mental health visits; while SED children were eligible for an "enhanced benefits package" of mental health services as needed. The definition of SED encompassed only children who scored up to fifty on the "Global Assessment Functioning" (GAF) test. Although the waiver amendment approved by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), and the contracts signed by the BHOs contained language that the behavioral health plans were to provide children all services required by the federal EPSDT mandate, the program did not emphasize the SED or non-SED distinctions to BHOs and the public. BHOs and providers have treated the designation as determinative of a child's access to services. Consequently, many medically necessary behavioral health services have been unavailable to children who did not meet the GAF score criteria for SED designation. In 1997, HCFA criticized the Partners Program's failure to adequately serve the needs of SED children, sparking the restructuring of the capitation payments for BHOs by TennCare so that SED enrollees now earn the BHOs markedly higher capitation payments than non-SED children. This reinforced the BHOs' perception that they did not need to provide the full array of mental health services a severely disturbed child needs unless the child has the required GAF score. In July 1996, Tennessee created the Department of Children's Services as the agency responsible for all children in state custody. TennCare allocated $129 million to the Department of Children's Services for EPSDT services for children in state custody, or at risk of becoming in state custody. While TennCare's MCOs were supposed to meet the medical/surgical needs of these children, DCS shared responsibility with the TennCare BHOs for the funding and management of behavioral health services for children in custody. DCS claimed to use this EPSDT allocation to pay for a range of "therapeutic interventions" that complement the health and behavioral health services covered by the managed care plans. The department administered the funds outside of the TennCare MCO/BHO care delivery system. The Department of Children Services was required to provide a basic benefits package to all children in custody, whether they met the SED qualification or not. However, the behavioral health plans had no obligation to provide enhanced services for SED children when those children entered state custody, at which point DCS became responsible. Aside from Tennessee's participation in Medicaid, Tennessee accepted federal funds under the Adoption Assistance Act. Federal statutory conditions relating to the state's administration of services for children in custody, or at risk of coming into custody, were attached to the receipt of the funds. Most of these conditions governed the provision of social and custodial services to such children, or were designed to achieve permanent placements for them, and were not at issue in this case. The Adoption Assistant Act's requirement of provision of necessary health services for children in custody, or at risk of coming into state custody, was at issue in these proceedings. The Act also required that health services for a child in custody, or at risk of entering custody, be coordinated with the other educational, social and custodial services which the child needs. The plaintiffs relied on the defendants for provision of critical EPSDT and services necessary to address children's health needs. Members of this class claimed to be subject to systemic deficiencies in TennCare that impaired their access to such services. On March 11, 1998, the parties entered a consent decree. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville (Judge William Haynes Jr.) certified the class and a subclass of consisting of children in custody or at risk of coming into custody of DCS. In the Consent Decree, the state agreed to achieve full compliance with EPSDT, related laws, and the substantive provisions of the agreed order within five years. It also agreed to immediately begin providing partial, and steadily increasing, benefits from the remedial plan as the totality of the terms were implemented. On December 19, 2001, Judge John Nixon found that, although the Defendants were well-intentioned in complying with the Court's 1998 Consent Decree, ultimately, they were not in compliance. John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786 (M.D. Tenn. 2001). The court appointed a special master to mediate and submit to the court an EPSDT-compliance plan. The defendants were again found to be non-compliant in 2004. In an order dated September 18, 2009, Judge Nixon denied the Defendants' motion to vacate the Consent Decree. F. Supp.2d 871 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). The Defendants appealed and in December 2010, the Sixth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals (Judge Julia Gibbons) vacated part of the Consent Decree. John B. v. Goetz, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 25589. The defendants argued that Medicaid 42 U.S.C. §1396(a)(30) was not privately enforceable. The Sixth Circuit vacated the consent decree's requirement that the Defendants ensure the availability of services was geographically comparable and any other provisions based on §1396a(a)(30). Because of concerns that the district court had developed a skewed view of the case, the Sixth Circuit also ordered that the case be reassigned to a new district judge, Thomas A. Wiseman. In March 2011, Judge Wiseman made preliminary findings that multiple paragraphs of the Consent Decree were subject to vacatur because they were based on statutory provisions or regulations that were themselves not enforceable under § 1983. John B. V. Emkes, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20399. (Motion to Vacate Granted in Part.) The Court vacated those paragraphs, but held that the decree as a whole was still enforceable. The state then filed a second motion to vacate the decree, this time on the grounds that it was in substantial compliance with the terms of the Decree. On February 14, 2012, the District Court concluded that the state was indeed in substantial compliance and granted the Defendant's motion to vacate both the Consent Decree and all injunctive relief that had been ordered in the case. Specifically, the court noted major improvements in the state's outreach to parents and families, communication efforts, screening processes, diagnostic and treatment processes, and compliance monitoring. The Court subsequently dismissed the case, but retained jurisdiction for the consideration of attorney's fees. In April of 2012, the Plaintiffs filed for and were granted leave to file a Sealed Notice of Appeal. Plaintiffs argued that the District Court had abused its discretion in vacating the Decree, and that the paragraphs the District Court had held were unenforceable were in fact enforceable. In March 2013, a panel of Sixth Circuit judges affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The Circuit Court found that that the District Court was correct that certain paragraphs of the Decree were unenforceable, and that it had used proper discretion in finding that the state was in substantial compliance with the remaining terms of the decree. The Circuit Court declined to award Plaintiffs attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 25, 1998, over 500,000 children in Tennessee who rely on "TennCare", the state's Medicaid program, for essential medical and mental health services brought a class action claim against the agencies responsible for administering TennCare in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, appointment of a special master, and to remedy systemic violations of federal and state laws that they claim resulted in the widespread denial of essential diagnostic and treatment services to Tennessee children. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that eligible children who were in, or who were at risk of entering state custody, were deprived of needed health and mental services, in violation of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396, and the terms and conditions of Tennessee's agreements with TennCare, managed care organizations (MCOs) and behavioral health organizations (BHOs). On March 11, 1998, the court (Judge William Haynes Jr.) entered a Consent Decree agreed to by the parties. After several findings that the defendants were failing to comply with the terms of the Consent Decree, and the appointment of a special master, on February 14, 2012, the District Court held that the Consent Decree had served its purpose, and granted the Defendant's motion to vacate both the Consent Decree and all injunctive relief that had been ordered in the case. The Court then dismissed the case, but retained jurisdiction for the consideration of attorney's fees. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.


Several young adults who were considered medically fragile (having severe disabilities and relying on technology for survival) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on May 20, 2010. The named plaintiffs were each 20 years old and were able to live in the community because they received care through a Medicaid waiver for medically fragile or technology dependent (MF/TD) individuals with disabilities. This waiver program was only available to those who were 21 or younger. Upon the 21st birthday of the recipient, the State had a policy of drastically reducing the services available to the recipient (an approximately 50% reduction) because of a change in funding source. Plaintiffs brought their complaint against the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (DHFS), alleging that the named policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs, represented by a private disability advocacy firm, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiffs moved for class certification on June 2, 2010. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief supporting this motion on July 16, 2010, and the court (Judge Ruben Castillo) certified the class on November 22, 2010, defining the class as all persons who are, were, or will be enrolled in Illinois' MF/TD program and are subjected to reduced Medicaid funding upon turning 21. Discovery proceeded. While waiting for potential class-wide relief to be granted, individual plaintiffs moved for and were granted injunctions preventing the reduction of their services at their 21st birthdays. In May 2012, Judge Castillo ordered the parties to submit a proposed consent decree to the court. When the parties were unable to come to a settlement agreement, on August 21, 2012, he ordered the parties to submit motions for summary judgment. In an order on January 8, 2013, Judge Castillo denied both parties' summary judgment motions, finding that issues of fact existed as to 1) whether the plaintiffs were qualified individuals with disabilities within the meaning of the ADA; and 2) whether the plaintiffs' requested accommodation was reasonable. 917 F.Supp.2d 805. In May 2013, the parties again met to negotiate a settlement agreement. On May 16, they came to a settlement regarding all issues. Finding the agreement fair and reasonable, Judge Castillo entered a Consent Decree on October 3, 2013. The Consent Decree established that a class member's need, level, and amount of services should be based upon medical need, not age. Each class member would have a service plan based on a holistic assessment of their needs and resources. The Decree also required any changes in service plans or case management to be discussed with families and patients. It also outlined when and how often class members must be assessed. It was to remain in effect until October 3, 2016. Finally, the Decree awarded attorneys' fees and litigation costs to the plaintiffs in the amount of $525,000. On August 26, 2015, the court awarded additional attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. Following September 2015, there was no further action on the docket, indicating the Consent Decree was completed without issue. The case now appears closed.

Summary: Several medically fragile young adults filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, challenging the State of Illinois' policy of drastically reducing community-based services upon the recipient's 21st birthday. A Consent Decree was entered in October 2013, requiring the State to continue providing services to class members who needed them beyond the age of 21.


Note: This case was later titled Abdulmutallab v. Barr. A Muslim prisoner in the custody of the United States Penitentiary-Adminstrative Maximum Prison in Florence, CO had gone on a hunger strike because he was denied a Halal diet in the course of his imprisonment. The prison he was housed in force fed him and, allegedly, did not intervene when other prisoners harassed him and other Muslim inmates during their Islamic prayer. The prison placed him under indefinite solitary confinement, and, under special administrative measures (SAMs), he endured extreme conditions of confinement, arbitrarily being denied any communication whatsoever with even his own sister. On October 18, 2017, he filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and various agents of the Department of Justice (DOJ) all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. He alleged that the defendants violated RFRA and his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya on October 23, 2017, and then reassigned again to Magistrate Judge Raymond P. Moore on December 4, 2017. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief to remove his SAMs status, to prohibit defendant Sessions from reimposing SAMs, to require defendant BOP to remove the plaintiff from solitary confinement, and to prohibit defendant BOP from force-feeding the plaintiff or interfering with his First Amendment-protected freedom to practice his religion. On February 2, 2018, defendant Sessions filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for partial summary judgment. In support of his motion to dismiss, Sessions argued that eleven of the plaintiff’s fourteen claims ought to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and failure to state a claim. The court, however, denied both motions for their failure to comply with civil practice standards. On February 5, 2018, Sessions refiled the same motions, but with additions to comply with the court’s request. On February 22, 2018, the plaintiff moved the court to deny the motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that it was premature because the plaintiff has not been able to conduct discovery. The plaintiff focused this discussion on the defendant's failure to exhaust remedies argument, saying that he wanted more information on that claim. On April 14, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On May 11, 2018, Sessions renewed his motions to dismiss using similar arguments. The plaintiff again asked the court to either dismiss the motion or defer it until further discovery was completed. In March of 2019, Magistrate Judge Kathleen M. Tafoya recommended that defendant's motion for summary judgment be partially or fully granted on every complaint. Judge Raymond P. Moore adopted those measures in September and closed the case. Plaintiff's claims were dismissed either due to lack of standing or because the plaintiff did not adequately exhaust his administrative remedies.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by a Muslim prisoner in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff alleged that, in denying him a Halal diet, allowing other prisoners to harass him during prayer, and placing him in indefinite solitary confinement, the defendants violated the RFRA and the plaintiffs First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights. In 2019 the court dismissed the claims based on standing problems and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.


On October 19, 2012, five named plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department’s (LASD) practice of holding individuals subject to immigration detainer beyond their release date solely on the basis of the detainer. The plaintiffs alleged that these practices violated state law, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and the California Constitution (Cal. Constitution, Art. 1, §§ 7, 13). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and other public interest organizations, sought an injunction enjoining the defendant from continuing its immigration detainer hold practice, a declaration that these practices were a violation of state and federal law, and monetary damages. Specifically, the complaint challenged the legality of two alleged practices in the LASD: (1) denying bail to people who wanted to post bail and had already obtained a court order setting bail on the ground that the federal government had filed an "immigration detainer" asking the LASD to hold them; and (2) denying such persons release from the Los Angeles County Jail for 48 hours or more on the basis of the immigration detainer, even though all charges against them had been dismissed, they had been acquitted of the charge for which they were being held, they were ordered released, or they had served their sentence. The plaintiffs argued that although immigration detainers were voluntary requests, as a matter of practice and policy, LASD held every person who was the subject of an immigration detainer beyond their release dates solely on the basis of the detainer. The complaint defined the putative class as all persons who were or would be (1) detained in the custody of the LASD, (2) had an immigration hold placed on them by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) while in LASD custody that was not supported by a lawful probable cause determination, (3) were entitled to release from LASD custody under applicable federal or state law (which created a liberty interest in such release), (4) due to LASD policy and practice were not released (to the extent that they were otherwise entitled to release) but held in LASD custody on the authority of ICE after they were eligible for release from LASD custody. The case was soon transferred to Judge Beverly Reid O’Connell. After failed attempts at mediation, the parties moved into discovery. In the meantime, one of the plaintiffs who had already been released from LASD custody had gone missing and apparently had been deported. On April 27, 2015, Judge O’Connell granted defendants’ motion to dismiss this plaintiff without prejudice. 2015 WL 12752555. On July 9, 2015, Judge O’Connell granted in part and denied in part LASD’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Judge O’Connell dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for money damages under provisions of the California state constitution (Art. I, §§ 7, 13), finding that these provisions did not confer private rights of action for damages. Further, Judge O’Connell dismissed plaintiffs’ claim under California’s Tom Bane Civil Rights Act for damages for threats, intimidation, or coercion interfering with U.S. or state constitutional rights, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown that LASD engaged in such wrongful conduct independent of the detentions. However, Judge O’Connell also denied LASD’s challenge to plaintiffs’ other state law claims. She found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently complied with the requirements of the California Tort Claims Act for suing a public entity, and were not barred by public entity immunity because they alleged they were unlawfully confined. She also let stand plaintiffs’ claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity as not duplicative of claims against the County. 114 F.Supp.3d 1030. On July 28, 2015, Judge O'Connell granted LASD's motion to consolidate this case with a related case, Gonzalez v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Both the plaintiffs and ICE had opposed LASD’s motion, arguing that the cases involved different defendants and substantially different legal issues and factual questions about defendants’ liability. Nevertheless, Judge O’Connell ordered the consolidation for pretrial purposes, finding the two cases to both concern the legality of ICE detainers, specifically whether they must be supported by individualized probable cause determinations. 2015 WL 12743601. On September 17, 2015, Judge O’Connell granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend the scheduling order and the pleadings. She allowed the plaintiffs to amend their California statutory claims for violations of their right to timely release and release on bail. However, she denied the plaintiffs leave to add equal protection claims under California statutes and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, finding that the plaintiffs had not shown diligence in requesting an amendment for these claims. 2015 WL 12752441. The plaintiffs then filed a First Amended Complaint on October 2, 2015. On November 20, 2015, Judge O’Connell granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, and granted the defendants’ motion to strike several paragraphs of the complaint pleading equal protection claims. For the latter, Judge O’Connell found that these pleadings were barred by her September 17, 2015 order. However, Judge O’Connell also ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on several points. First, she found that the defendants’ state statutory discretionary immunity did not bar the plaintiffs’ claims, as the plaintiffs did not allege that a public employee engaged in a discretionary act or omission causing injury. She also found that the plaintiffs stated a valid negligence per se claim under state law (though she also dismissed another negligence per se claim as duplicative). Finally, she found that the plaintiffs adequately pleaded an actionable coercive act independently of the detentions themselves, by alleging that LASD falsely recorded and treated ICE detainers as mandatory detentions. 2015 WL 12582637. On December 7, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, slightly modifying the claims in the initial complaint. They alleged violations of Fourth Amendment due process and unlawful seizure; and state law on false imprisonment, negligence per se, release on bail, and timely release. On September 9, 2016, Judge O’Connell granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motions for class certification. She certified most of the plaintiffs’ proposed classes and subclasses. For the Roy plaintiffs, the classes and subclasses certified included all LASD inmates held on the basis of ICE detainers beyond their scheduled time of release from custody, so long as they did not have final orders of removal. Some of these classes would have otherwise been eligible to post bail. For the Gonzalez plaintiffs, the classes certified included all persons in the Central District of California subject to an ICE detainer and held for at least 48 hours, but who were not in removal proceedings and had not been issued final orders of removal or ICE administrative warrants. 2016 WL 5219468. On June 12, 2017, Judge O'Connell denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, filed by two of the Gonzalez plaintiffs. They had asked the court to end ICE’s use of detainers for over 48 hours with no judicial determination of probable cause for this detention, which the plaintiffs alleged violated the Fourth Amendment. Judge O'Connell disagreed, holding that the Fourth Amendment did not require a judge to review ICE officers' probable-cause determinations, because these were civil and not criminal proceedings. Judge O'Connell thus granted summary judgment to the defendants on this issue. 2017 WL 2559616. As of November 2017, the parties were engaging in discovery, and a jury trial was set for May 22, 2018. The court scheduled several motion hearings: one on September 12, 2017 to address a large group of motions (Judge O'Connell held this hearing but did not issue an order before the case was transferred), and one on September 25, 2017 to consider law professors' request to file an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs. After the September 12 hearing, the defendants filed several notices of supplemental authority; one referred to El Cenizo v. Texas, in which the Fifth Circuit let stand a detainer provision of a Texas state statute requiring law enforcement agencies to “comply with, honor, and fulfill” any ICE detainer request. This case was transferred to Judge Percy Anderson on October 18, 2017, and then transferred again on November 1 to Judge Andre Birotte, Jr. On February 7, 2018, Judge Birotte issued an order. First, as to Gonzalez, he denied the Gonzalez defendants' motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, while granting in part and denying in part the Gonzalez plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. He held that the Court had subject-matter jurisdiction because the Gonzalez plaintiffs' claim did not arise from removal proceedings (under the jurisdiction of the Immigration Court). Rather, ICE issued the detainers to the plaintiffs independent of removal proceedings. Judge Birotte also denied summary judgment as to the Gonzalez probable-cause subclass, because a factual dispute existed as to whether ICE databases were complete and reliable enough to be a sufficient source for the probable-cause determination. Additionally, Judge Birotte held that several Gonzalez subclasses' claims—based on policies that ICE claimed to have ended—were not moot because ICE had not met its heavy burden of establishing it would not resume its practice of issuing warrantless detentions to these groups. Next, as to Roy, Judge Birotte granted in part and denied in part the Roy defendants' and plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. He denied summary judgment as to several Roy subclasses, because a factual dispute existed as to whether investigative detainers were based on probable cause and as to how LASD classified "no bail" holds. Next, Judge Birotte granted the Roy plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the post-48-hour subclass—individuals whom the LASD held in detention beyond their scheduled release date, solely for civil immigration violations, thus violating the Fourth Amendment. Judge Birotte also held that LASD's policy of booking individuals subject to immigration detainers, when those individuals would otherwise be subject to LASD's policy of not booking arrestees with a bail amount lower than $25,000, violated equal protection. As to the Roy plaintiffs' state law claims, Judge Birotte found that they were barred by state sovereign immunity. Finally, Judge Birotte noted that newly enacted California statutes prohibited the Roy defendants from engaging in the challenged conduct of detaining an individual on the basis of an immigration hold, and thus, the Roy plaintiffs' injunctive and declaratory relief claims were moot. 2018 WL 914773. On March 2, both the Roy and Gonzalez plaintiffs moved to modify the class definition. On March 30, defendant opposed this motion and also moved for class decertification; plaintiff replied on April 9. Defendant also, on March 13, moved for reconsideration of the court's order, but Judge Birotte denied this motion on April 18. On April 18, 2018, Judge Birotte denied the Gonzalez defendants' motion to reconsider the February motion for partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs' subclass. On July 18, 2018, Judge Birotte granted the Roy plaintiffs' motion to modify the class definition, which was amended such that the Post-48 Hour subclass included "All LASD inmates who were detained beyond the time they are due for release from criminal custody, solely on the basis of immigration detainers, excluding inmates who had a final order of removal or were subject to ongoing removal proceedings as indicated on the face of the detainer." From late-summer to the beginning of winter 2018, the parties litigated various filing deadlines, further consolidation of the cases, and timing of the trial, and the Roy case was undergoing mediation proceedings. The two cases were to remain consolidated until the conclusion of a trial in either case. In light of the Court’s April 18, 2018, decision, ICE cancelled all active detainers issued without a warrant by an ICE officer on November 9, 2018. After being rescheduled several times, the Gonzalez trial took place on May 7 through May 16, 2019. On June 21, 2019, the Gonzalez plaintiffs filed a motion for a permanent injunction as to the claims decided in the February 7, 2018, summary judgment. In that order, the court held that ICE violated the Fourth Amendment when it issued detainers based on no more than evidence of a person's foreign place of birth. The court also held that ICE violates its warrantless arrest authority when it issues detainers without determining that a person is likely to escape before an administrative ICE warrant can be obtained. The plaintiffs argued that a permanent injunction enjoining the detainer practice was appropriate because class members "continue[d] to be subject ... to arrests pursuant to detainers based solely on evidence of foreign birth and an absence of information in DHS databases and to warrantless arrest without any individualized assessment of flight risk." On September 27, 2019, Judge Birotte denied the motion for a permanent injunction. Judge Birotte held that "the Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs have provided support for their bare assertion that the Subclasses are still in threat of continuing violations." Judge Birotte reasoned that given its new detainer policy and the November 18, 2018, decision to cancel all active detainers, ICE has evidenced compliance with the summary judgment and that a permanent injunction is unnecessary. 416 F. Supp. 3d 995. On February 5, 2020, Judge Birotte issued a final judgment resolving all claims regarding the Gonzalez suit. Judge Birotte found in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause subclass on their claims that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by (1) issuing detainers based on probable-cause determinations from unreliable database searches alone and (2) by issuing detainers based on probable-cause determinations from evidence of foreign place of birth and no match in a federal immigration database. Judgment was also entered in favor of plaintiff and the Probable Cause Subclass on their claim that defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by issuing detainers to state and local law enforcement agencies in states that do not expressly authorize civil immigration arrests in state statutes. Judge Birotte found in favor of the plaintiff and the Statutory subclass on their claim that defendants violated 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) by issuing detainers without either issuing an administrative warrant or determining that a person "'is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained for [their] arrest.'" Judge Birotte permanently enjoined the defendants from issuing detainers to Probable Cause Subclass members based solely on unreliable database searches and from issuing detainers seeking the detention of Probable Cause Subclass members to law enforcement agencies not authorized to make arrests based on detainers only. On February 14, 2020, the defendants appealed the district court's final judgment to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 20-55175). On February 17, 2020, in the district court, defendants filed an emergency application to stay the final judgment and permanent injunction pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. Judge Birotte denied the defendants' application to stay on February 20, 2020. One day later, in the Ninth Circuit, defendants filed an emergency motion for immediate administrative stay and motion for stay pending appeal, citing irreparable harm to the government caused by the injunction and arguing that a brief stay of the injunction pending appeal would not harm the plaintiffs. A Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges William Canby, Ronald Gould, and Paul Watford) denied the immediate administrative stay on February 24, 2020. A week later, on March 2, 2020, the Ninth Circuit panel issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' emergency motion for stay pending appeal. The panel granted the motion to stay regarding the portion of the injunction enjoining defendants from “issuing detainers seeking the detention of Probable Cause Subclass members to law enforcement agencies in states that lack state law permitting state and local law enforcement agencies to make civil immigration arrests based on civil immigration detainers only.” The panel denied the motion to stay in all other respects. The parties stipulated to de-consolidate Roy and Gonzalez, and the district court ordered the cases de-consolidated on March 18, 2020. On May 13, 2020, the parties in the Roy suit filed a joint status report, stating that "the parties have negotiated the remaining aspects of the parties’ settlement, which is reflected in a settlement agreement jointly drafted by counsel." But they warned that it would take some time to finalize the settlement. On September 11, 2020, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision in Gonzalez. First, the Ninth Circuit upheld certification of the Probable Cause subclass. Second, the court reversed and vacated the injunction against issuing detainers to local law enforcement in states that lack laws allowing local law enforcement to make immigration arrests. It reasoned that the presence or absence of probable cause rather than state law determines whether issuance of a detainer violates the Fourth Amendment. Third, the court reversed and vacated the injunction against issuing detainers solely based on searches of electronic databases to make a probable cause determination because the district court erroneously concluded that databases not designed to establish probable cause were unreliable. Fourth, the court held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt probable cause determination before a neutral magistrate, reversing the district court's conclusion that this requirement did not apply to immigration detainers. 975 F.3d 788. On October 30, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. The court approved the settlement agreement on November 25. Per the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay $14,000,000 to class members. As determined by earlier class certifications decisions, the settlement agreement included three subclasses:

Fourth Amendment ("Gerstein") Class: People detained beyond their timely release due solely to immigration detainers during the time period of 10/19/2010 through 6/6/2014.

Equal Protection Class: Detainees on whom an immigration detainer had been lodged who otherwise would have subject to LASD's policy of not booking misdemeanor defendants with bail of less than $25,000.

No-Bail-Notation Class: Detainees on whom an immigration detainer had been lodged and record in LASD's database, and who were held on charges for which they would have been eligible to post bail.

 The Settlement Agreement stated that Gerstein and Equal Protection class members were entitled to $1,000 for each unlawful detention day, with a maximum award of $25,000. The No-Bail-Notation Class Members were entitled to a flat $250 if they attested to their financial ability to pay bail if they were allowed to do so. As of December 23, the case is proceeding in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Summary: In 2012, detained individuals otherwise releasable but with federal "immigration detainers," filed a class action against the Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department (LASD) for unlawful detention and denial of bail based on detainers. The Court certified most proposed classes. The suit was consolidated with a related case, Gonzalez v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The court ruled largely in favor of the plaintiffs in the Gonzalez suit on February 5, 2020. The defendants appealed the district court's final judgment to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed class certification but reversed and vacated two injunctions. The parties settled.


On June 16, 2010, an Egyptian national, who had resided in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident for over 30 years, filed a petition in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) and Department of Homeland Security, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The petitioner, represented by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California, asked the court for a de novo review of his application for naturalization along with costs. Specifically, Mr. Hamdi claimed that the respondents violated the INA in concluding that he made a false statements about his association with a charity to which he made a donation in 2000 and which was identified as a financier of terrorism in 2002. He claimed that their conclusion was an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act and that such a standard for "association" was so vague as to violate his 5th Amendment right to due process. The litigation of this case and subsequent Freedom of Information Act requests brought to public knowledge the USCIS "Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program" (CARRP), an agency-wide policy for identifying, processing, and adjudicating immigration applications that raise "national security concerns". Mr. Hamdi married an American citizen and made regular donations to charity pursuant to his sincere religious beliefs. In 2001 he applied for naturalization. In 2002 he passed his naturalization exam. In 2006 he was sent a notice scheduling him for a second interview, but due to a business trip he did not receive it until after the interview date had passed. His request to reschedule was ignored and his application was rejected. He reapplied in 2007, passed the test again in 2008, and in 2009 filed a mandamus action to compel USCIS to adjudicate his application. USCIS denied his application on the grounds that he gave false testimony by failing to reveal his association with Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and his current employment (which had begun after his application and interview). He appealed and was denied again based on his "association" with BIF, inferred from his one donation in 2000. Having exhausted administrative remedies, he sought review from the District Court under the INA. On December 14, 2011, the District Court for the Central District of California (Judge Virginia A. Phillips) dismissed the component of Mr. Hamdi's claim which argued that the naturalization application's "association" question is unconstitutionally vague. The court found that Mr. Hamdi requested no relief predicated on that question, and that the court could not offer an advisory opinion at that stage. On February 25, 2012, the District Court (Judge Phillips) found that Mr. Hamdi had satisfied his burden of showing his eligibility for citizenship. He had not given intentionally false testimony to obtain benefits, and as such was not precluded form demonstrating good moral character. On February 28, 2012, the Court ordered that USCIS grant his application for naturalization. On May 10, 2012, Mr. Hamdi was sworn in as an American Citizen. On August 29, 2012, the Court ordered that the respondents pay Mr. Hamdi's attorneys' fees.

Summary: Mr. Hamdi, having married an American citizen, resided in the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident alien for many years. In 2001 he applied for naturalization, but his application process was drawn out for nine years. This culminated with the USCIS rejecting his application because of a donation he had made in 2000 to an organization which in 2002 would be designated as a financier of terrorism. Mr. Hamdi requested a de novo review in the District Court for the Central District of California and was granted citizenship along with attorneys' fees. The Court found that Mr. Hamdi's failure to disclose the donation did not amount to a false testimony, and that as such he could meet the requirement that applicants for naturalization be "of good moral character". The case brought to public knowledge the USCIS "Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program" (CARRP), an agency-wide policy for identifying, processing, and adjudicating immigration applications that raise "national security concerns".


On July 18, 2013, two Virginia residents filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against the state of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief barring enforcement of Va. Code §§ 25-45.2 and 20-45.4 and Article I, § 15-A of the Virginia Constitution, alleging that these provisions are unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that these Virginia laws and constitutional provisions denying individuals the opportunity to marry a person of their same sex violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. On August 9, 2013, the state moved to dismiss the case on grounds of sovereign immunity. On September 3, 2013 plaintiffs amended their complaint to add two additional plaintiffs and two additional defendants to the lawsuit. The newly added plaintiffs were Virginia residents married under the laws of California who sought recognition of their marriage under Virginia law. The additional defendants included the Clerk of the Circuit Court for the City or Norfolk and the State Registrar of Vital Records. On January 23, 2014, the Office of the Attorney General submitted a formal change in position and relinquished her prior defense of Virginia's marriage laws. Prince William County Clerk was granted defendant intervenor status and continued to defend the marriage ban. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, and both sides sought summary judgment; a hearing was held on February 4. On February 13, 2014, the District Court (Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen) granted summary judgment and a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff and entered an order enjoining Virginia from continuing to enforce the marriage ban. The court held that these laws violate both Due Process and Equal Protection. However, Judge Allen stayed the injunction pending the final disposition of any appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. After the district court decision, a class action suit (also in this  Clearinghouse) intervened as a party in the Fourth Circuit to have its constitutional challenges decided as part of the Bostic litigation. On July 28, 2014 the Fourth Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the district court that the same-sex marriage ban violated the Constitution. The majority opinion, by Hudge Henry Floyd, found that the ban impermissibly infringed upon Virginians' fundamental right to marry. A dissent by Judge Paul Niemeyer said that the state had a right to define marriage as relationships between one man and one woman. 760 F.3d 352. The Supreme Court granted a stay to the Fourth Circuit's mandate on August 20, 2014 pending their decision on the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari. However, the Supreme Court later denied writ on October 4, 2014 and the stay was lifted. Same sex couples were then allowed to wed in Virginia. Back in district court the parties began litigation over attorneys fees, which continued for a few months with the parties eventually settling on the proper amount awarded to plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs' counsel.

Summary: This federal district court challenge, in the Eastern District of Virginia, to Virginia's same-sex-marriage ban led to an opinion striking down that ban on February 12, 2014, but staying operation of the resulting injunction pending appeal. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion on July 27, 2014. The Supreme Court denied writ on October 4, 2014.


On August 28, 2015, eleven men imprisoned in the Alabama Department of Correction's St. Clair Correctional Facility brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Represented by The Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, a non-profit public interest group, they argued that the Alabama Department of Correction’s practices and policies resulted in a prison environment that amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. They cited 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 as their causes of action, and they sought class action certification to represent all of the prisoners at St. Clair Correctional Facility. The plaintiffs asked the court both for a declaration that the prison’s policies are unconstitutional, and an injunction requiring the prison to change its policies and practices. In arguing that the Alabama Department of Correction’s actions at St. Clair’s constituted cruel and unusual punishment, plaintiffs argued that the Alabama Department of Corrections had allowed a pervasive culture of violence to develop in the prison. Partly, this allegedly stemmed from chronic overcrowding, under-staffing, and design flaws at the prison. Plaintiffs claimed that there were many blind spots in the prison where prison officials are unable to monitor prisoners’ activities, allowing prisoners to carry out assaults with impunity. They also claimed that prison employees failed to perform proper maintenance on the locks of individual cells, allowing prisoners to leave their own cells and enter other cells to commit assaults. Additionally, plaintiffs argued that prison officials didn't provide inmates with adequate therapeutic, educational, rehabilitative, and vocational services, and that this failure had further contributed to the violence. This was especially true with regard to the prison’s treatment of prisoners with drug addictions and mental illness. Plaintiffs argued that prison officials put those prisoners into punitive segregation rather than providing treatment. This served to exacerbate their conditions, resulting in even more violence when they were placed back into the general prison population. Plaintiffs claimed that the prison consistently failed to properly respond to sexual assaults. They alleged that prisoners known to be at risk of committing sexual assaults, and prisoners known to be at risk of being sexually assaulted, were often housed together. Plaintiffs also claimed that prison officials often failed to provide counseling to victims, failed to properly investigate crimes, and either failed to protect victims from retaliation or placed those victims in isolation. Plaintiffs further claimed that prison employees directly contributed to prison violence. They cited a number of incidents in which prison officials had used violence against inmates, often resulting in serious injuries requiring medical care. They also alleged that prison employees, in addition to failing to prevent inmates from smuggling in drugs, often sell drugs and other contraband themselves, exacerbating drug addiction problems and resulting in further violence. On February 17, 2015, the judge assigned to the case, District Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins, denied most of defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims; though she did grant their request to terminate one of the named plaintiffs because that plaintiff had been transferred to a different correctional facility. Defendants sought review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, by filing for a (discretionary) writ of mandamus, but on June 16, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit denied that petition without explanation. For the next several months, the parties engaged in discovery. On October 20, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgement, but on October 23, 2016, Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins issued an order referring the case to mediation and therefore staying the matter for 180 days so the mediation could be conducted. The stay to allow for mediation was extended twice until August 30, 2017. On December 1, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement and administrative closure of the case. The parties notified the court that they had reached a private settlement agreement, the terms of which were not disclosed, and requested that the administrative closure remained in effect for the term of agreement (2 years, until November 1, 2019) at which point the case would be dismissed unless, during this period, a motion for reinstatement was made and granted according to the procedures set forth in the settlement agreement. On December 5, 2017, Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins issued an order administratively closing the case as requested by the parties. In 2018, plaintiffs initiated the settlement agreement's dispute resolution process and engaged in extensive mediation with the state. Plaintiffs alleged that the State had failed to comply with the promises included in the settlement agreement. In June 2019, Alabama entered into a mediation process with the Department of Justice on issues that overlap with the issues raised in this case. The parties submitted a joint request to stay and retain jurisdiction on October 29, 2019. Plaintiffs agreed to stay reinstatement of the case pursuant to an agreement that provided a nine-month period for the parties to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues giving rise to the lawsuit. The agreement also provided for the case to be reinstated pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(c)(2). In accordance with the request of the parties, Magistrate Judge John E. Ott entered the order and stayed the case until August 1, 2020.

Summary: Prisoners at St. Clair Correctional Facility, Alabama, sued the Alabama Department of Corrections, arguing that by allowing a culture of pervasive violence to develop in the facility, they have subjected the prisoners to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the public interest group The Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, plaintiffs have asked the U..S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama to declare that the defendants' actions are unconstitutional, and to issue injunctive relief ordering them to change their policies and practices as needed to address the extensive violence problems at the prison. On December 1, 2017, the parties notified the court they had reached a private settlement agreement and requested the case's administrative closure until November 1, 2019, at which the case should be dismissed unless, during this period, a motion for reinstatement is made and granted according to the procedures set in the settlement agreement. On October 29, 2019, the parties submitted a joint request to stay. Plaintiffs agreed to stay reinstatement of the case for a nine month period to allow the parties to reach a mutually acceptable resolution of the case. Magistrate Judge John Ott accordingly stayed the case until August 1, 2020.


On May 2, 1994, a group of California parolees filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of California. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged California's parole revocation procedures under the Fourteenth Amendment and alleged that the state violated their due process rights. On December 1, 1994, the Court (Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton) certified a class defined as California parolees (1) who are at large; (2) who are in custody as alleged parole violators awaiting revocation of their parole status; or (3) who are in custody having been found in violation of parole. For the next several years, the parties engaged in prolonged discovery. On June 13, 2002, the Court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs, holding that California's parole revocation system failed to safeguard plaintiffs' due process rights under Morrissey, 408 U.S. 481, 487-90 (1972). The Court's order emphasized that, in order to ensure adequate due process, probable cause hearings must be both accurate and promptly-held. Valdivia v. Davis, 206 F.Supp. 2d 1068 (E.D. Cal. 2002). Four months later, on October 18, 2002, the Court ordered defendants to file a proposed remedial plan to address the identified due process violations. On March 17, 2003, defendants presented their proposed Valdivia Remedial Plan (VRP), which added a preliminary Probable Cause Hearing (PCH) to the parole revocation process. Plaintiffs filed objections to the VRP related to the timing and substance of the PCH. On July 23, 2003, the Court set forth the following minimum standards for hearing: that they be conducted by a neutral decision-maker, that parolees have an opportunity to present documentary evidence and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and that the hearing's results be documented in a written report. Valdivia v. Davis, July 23, 2003. In November 2003, the parties filed a stipulated order for permanent injunctive relief, which the Court approved in March 2004; this injunction included for alternative sanctions for minor parole violations, a PCH within 10 days after a parolee is notified of charges, a revocation hearing no later than 35 days after a parole hold is placed, and appointment of attorneys to represent all parolees facing revocation proceedings. The parties then fought for years over compliance issues:

Defendants moved, successfully, for the appointment of a Special Master, and on December 16, 2005, the Court appointed Chase Riveland to the position. The Special Master has subsequently filed thirteen reports with the court addressing the implementation of the VRP.
On June 9, 2005, the Court found defendants in violation of the permanent injunction by virtue of a policy decision to prohibit the consideration and use of electronic in-home detention (EID) and substance abuse treatment control units as sanctions in lieu of parole revocation.
On August 31, 2005, the Court ordered that parolees' counsel receive access to information in their client's parole field files without any limitations or restrictions on disclosing the information to the parolee based on perceived risk of harm to the parolee's mental health.
On September 15, 2006, the Court ordered the case related to L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 2:06-cv-02042-LKK-GGH (E.D. Cal.).
On November 13, 2006, the Court ordered implementation of the recommendations contained in the Special Master's 9/14/06 report, including improving their information systems and maintaining the infrastructure needed for self-monitoring. The Court noted that the information system changes should be coordinated with the changes already underway pursuant to a court order from Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 4:94-cv-02307-CW (N.D. Cal.).
On April 4, 2007, the Court entered a stipulated order requiring defendants to take certain steps to ensure timely compliance with the remedial sanctions provisions of the permanent injunction. These steps included, among others, adding more beds as part of the In Custody Drug Treatment Program (ICDTP), increasing the number of operational EID units, as well as distributing information regarding their updated policies and procedures.
On January 14, 2008, the Court ordered that defendants undertake, in consultation with plaintiff attorneys and the special master, efforts to afford due process to parolees who appear too mentally ill to participate in parole revocation proceedings.
On March 25, 2008, the Court adopted the report and recommendations of the Special Master, which held that use of hearsay evidence in parole revocation proceedings would be limited by parolee's confrontation rights as established by controlling law. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F.Supp.2d 852 (E.D. Cal. 2008). This decision was upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. 603 F.Supp.2d 1275 (E.D. Cal 2009).
On August 7, 2008, the Court ordered specific procedures for Defendants upon taking custody of parolees who may have mental health problems. This order was prompted by a motion submitted jointly by plaintiff classes in this case and Coleman v. Schwarzenegger (see PC-CA-0002).
On April 12, 2010, the district court found Defendants in substantial compliance with the injunction's requirements regarding designation of information as confidential, consideration of remedial sanctions at each step, remedial sanctions order requirements for female parolees, and out of county transfers.
On December 2, 2010 the district court held that the defendants had met the requirements of the court's April 4, 2007 order and the return to custody assessment step of the revocation process for all facilities, including Los Angeles County Jail. Moreover, the court found defendants in violation of the November 13, 2006 order concerning information system changes. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 2010 WL 4983396 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2010).
On May 13, 2011, the Court found the Defendants in substantial compliance with the injunction's requirements that Plaintiffs' counsel have access to the information reasonably necessary to monitor compliance and that Deputy Commissioners shall not have authority to increase the Return to Custody Assessment at the PCH.
 On November 4, 2008, California voters passed Proposition 9, which altered a number of the parameters for the parole revocation systems that had been mandated by the VRP. Plaintiffs moved to enjoin enforcement of portions of Proposition 9 as conflicting with the VRP; defendants cross-moved to modify the VRP to conform to the new law. After hearing, the Court denied the defendants' motion and granted plaintiffs' motion in substantial part. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 603 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (E.D. Cal. 2009). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the court erred by failing to make an express determination that Proposition 9 violated constitutional rights or that the injunction was necessary to remedy a constitutional violation. Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2010). On remand, the Court determined several aspects of Proposition 9 were unconstitutional and ultimately granted plaintiffs' motion to enforce the VRP, with some modifications. Valdivia v. Brown, 2012 WL 219342 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2012). In April of 2011, California transferred substantial responsibilities for the parole system to county authorities and state courts. On July 2, 2013, the Court found that the statutory realigned rendered this case moot and directed the parties to file their final motions for fees and costs. On December 17, 2013, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all pending appeals as moot. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 1994, a group of California parolees brought this §1983 action against various state officials, alleging that California's parole revocation system violated their 14th Amendment right to due process. The Court (Honorable Lawrence K. Karlton) certified the class and eventually granted summary judgement to plaintiffs. Defendants submitted a proposed remedial plan (PRP), which was contested by plaintiffs. Before the final hearing on the PRP, the parties settled and the Court approved a stipulated permanent injunction in 2004. For the next several years, the parties fought over compliance issues. In 2011, California transferred substantial parole system responsibilities to county authorities and state courts, rendering the injunction moot. This case is now closed.