On January 4, 1974, the Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, together with certain named individuals, for themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, against the City of Birmingham, the members of the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, and the Personnel Director of that Board, alleging that the defendants engaged in discriminatory hiring practices against Black people. A suit raising the same constitutional and statutory allegations was filed on January 7, 1974, by John W. Martin and other named plaintiffs [the "Martin class"] against the City of Birmingham, Jefferson County, and the Personnel Board of Jefferson County. On May 27, 1975, the United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Jefferson County Personnel Board, and the municipal and other governmental jurisdictions within Jefferson County. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief alleging a pattern or practice of discriminatory employment practices against Black people and women. On February 20, 1976, Lucy Walker filed suit challenging the employment practices of the Jefferson County nursing home. All four cases were consolidated for trial. On December 20-22, 1976, trial was held on the merits of the limited issue of whether the two tests used by the Personnel Board to screen and rank applicants for positions as police officers and firefighters [were] discriminatory and a violation of the constitutional or statutory rights of Black people. All other issues under the complaints were reserved until a later date. The District Court (Judge Sam C. Pointer Jr.) found that the police officer and firefighter tests violated Title VII. The court noted that both tests had a significant adverse impact on black applicants, a phenomenon defined as a passing rate "less than four-fifths . . . of the rate for [whites]." The judge ruled that the tests could be used only if, despite their adverse impact, they were sufficiently "job related" to predict effectively test takers' future job performance. The Judge Pointer concluded that the tests failed to meet this standard and found no statistically significant correlation between the applicants' scores on the firefighter test and their later job performance. A similar conclusion was made in regards to the police officer exam. The District Court ordered race-conscious relief "pending adoption of some selection procedure which either has no adverse effect upon black applicants or is sufficiently job-related. The original plaintiffs' claims against the City never reached trial, and the following two cases deal directly with the Personnel Board of Jefferson County. The Board appealed the District Court's decision that the police and firefighter exams violated Title VII to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In doing so, the Board did not contest the district court's finding that the two tests had an adverse impact, but contended that the tests were in fact job-related. The United States and the Martin class of black plaintiffs jointly cross-appealed the district court's holding that use of the tests did not begin to violate Title VII until the dates on which the negative results of the test validation studies were reported to the Board. The District Court had reasoned that, until the final results were reported, the Board was justified in using the tests in anticipation of favorable results from the validation studies. The Court of Appeals remanded the case back to the District Court for additional fact finding. While the first appeal was pending, the District Court conducted a second trial. That trial involved challenges to other Board practices, including: written tests for eighteen more positions; various rules affecting promotional opportunities; the imposition of height, weight, and educational requirements for certain jobs; and the restriction of some job announcements and certifications to persons of a particular sex. While the first proceeding was on remand and the second was at trial, the parties entered settlement talks that eventually suspended both proceedings. The plaintiffs, in all the cases, entered into extensive negotiations with the Board and the City which culminated in two proposed consent decrees, one with the Board and one with the City. The parties submitted proposed consent decrees that settled all claims against the City and the Board, including allegations of gender discrimination raised by the United States. Although these decrees provided retrospective monetary relief such as back pay for some individuals, their keystone was an extensive regime of affirmative action for Black people and women. The Personnel Board of Jefferson County decree had various stipulations that had to be met, specifically: (1) subject to the availability of qualified applicants, that the Board annually certify Black people and women either according to racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree or in proportion to their representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher. The decree's minimum certification rates ranged from ten to fifty percent, depending on the position involved and whether the goal applied to Black people or women. This stipulation would continue until the proportion of Black people and women employed by the City in any given job classification approximated the respective percentages [of Black people and women] in the civilian labor force of Jefferson County; (2) the Personnel Board must periodically review its hiring and promotion procedures to ensure that the procedures either had no adverse impact or were sufficiently job-related to pass muster under Title VII; (3) as long as the Board's procedures -- whether job related or not -- had a disparate impact on Black people or women, the Board must make a good faith effort to determine whether there are any alternative testing procedures which would reduce any adverse impact; (4) the decree prohibited the Board's prior practice of restricting job announcements on the basis of gender; (5) the decree mandated continued aggressive recruitment of Black people and women. The decree that the City of Birmingham entered into was similar to the Personnel Board decree. The city decree stipulated: (1) annual "goals" for hiring and promoting Black people and women and a "long term goal" of parity between the proportion of Black people and women in any City job classification and the proportion of Black people and women in the civilian labor force, specifically the city must hire and promote Black people and women according to either racial and gender quotas set forth in the decree, or at the rate of Black and female representation in the applicant pool, whichever was higher; (2) the City also agreed to request the Board selectively to certify qualified Black people and females whenever necessary to provide the City with a certification list that contains sufficient numbers of Black people and females to meet the decree's goals. During all the years of litigation involving the City and the Personnel Board, the defendant Jefferson County avoided the same scrutiny. Their original consent decree did not come until a year later than the consent decrees involving the City and the Personnel Board. The Court (Judge Sam C. Pointer Jr.) entered it on December 29, 1982, and it was signed by the Jefferson County, United States and one of the private class of plaintiffs. The County's consent ordered differed from the ones with the City and the Board. Its major purpose was to ensure that Black people and women are considered on equal basis with whites and males for employment. The County was enjoined from engaging in practice or pattern of racial and gender discrimination. The County was required to hire the percentage of Black people and females as linked to the number of qualified applicants, as determined under the nondiscriminatory procedures of both the Board's decree and the County's decree. Unlike the other two decrees, it has not been modified since. In August 1981 the court held a fairness hearing to consider the objections of all interested parties. Several interested non-parties soon appeared to challenge the decrees, claiming that the decrees would adversely affect their employment opportunities. Chief among the objectors was the Birmingham Firefighters' Association ("B.F.A."), a labor association representing a majority of City firefighters, most of whom were white males. The B.F.A. contended that the proposed consent decrees would have a substantial adverse impact upon them. The court reasoned that the decrees did not preclude the hiring or promotion of whites or males and that the city's hiring goals were expressly made subject to the caveat that the city decree was not to be interpreted as requiring the hiring or promotion of a person who is not qualified or of a person who is demonstrably less qualified according to a job-related selection procedure. Subsequently, the court denied their motions as untimely, and approved, and entered, both consent decrees. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the dismissal of the intervenr's cases. The District Court's approval of the consent decrees, and the Eleventh Circuit Appeals Court's refusal to allow the B.F.A. to intervene, brought forth a collection of cases that has come to be known as the "Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation." In these cases, a number of male, non-Black City employees collaterally attacked the decrees and the "affirmative action" programs adopted under them. The United States, despite its status as a signatory of the consent decrees, also brought suit against the City, lodging allegations similar to those of the individual plaintiffs. The court dismissed for lack of evidence all claims against the Personnel Board leaving only the claims against the city standing. At trial, the plaintiffs claimed that some Black people were promoted over more-qualified non-Black people despite the fact that the City decree specifically did not require the City to promote a less qualified person, in preference to a person who is demonstrably better qualified based upon the results of a job related selection procedure. The district court found for the City, holding that the City had shown that its employment actions were required by the decrees. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision finding that this limitation was unfair to the male, non-Black plaintiffs, because they had not participated in the negotiation or signing of the consent decrees. The Appeals Court directed the District Court to re-examine the legality of the decrees under the heightened scrutiny applicable to voluntary government affirmative actions plans. The Appeals Court decisions also allowed the Wilks class (non-Black, male city employees) to intervene in challenging the legality of the decrees. This decision was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). The District Court on remand once again found for the city, finding significant evidence of past discrimination to support its affirmative action program and that the affirmative action provisions were narrowly tailored because the City had first tried alternative measures. The United States could not collaterally challenge the decrees but was able to seek modifications to them. After holding a hearing on these issues, the district court ordered several modifications to the decrees acknowledging that the decrees have impaired some employment or promotional opportunities of whites and males. Furthermore, the court stated that forty-five percent of the City's full-time employees were Black and twenty-three percent were female as of September 1990 fulfilling to some extent the original long term goal of the decrees. The modifications to the City of Birmingham decree were as follows: (1) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the long-term goal for that classification is met; (2) The City must stop using annual goals for any promotional position once the long-term goal is met for the position from which the promotional candidates are normally chosen, except that the City should continue to promote Black people and women to high-level police and fire positions in proportion to those groups' representation in the position from which promotions are normally made until the long-term goal is reached with respect to the high-level positions; (3) The City must stop using annual goals for any particular job classification once the Board develops lawful screening procedures for that job; (4) The City should group similar jobs together for the purpose of determining whether a particular goal has been met; (5) The district court will, in 1996, reconsider the appropriateness of continuing the City decree. The District Court made only one modification to the Personnel Board decree, the modification requires that, until the Board develops a lawful test for a particular position, it must, at the City's request and subject to the availability of qualified applicants, certify Black and female candidates for that position in proportion to their representation among applicants -- even after the City has met its long-term goal for that position. In 1994 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Edward Earl Carnes) rendered a decision that required the District Court to modify the original decree so that the City would be ordered to implement valid job selection procedures forthwith. On December 19, 1995, the decrees were modified again pursuant to instructions given by the court. The City's consent decree was modified to require the City to remove all race and gender conscious selection procedures from its employment policies. After the remand in Ensley v. Branch, the parties clarified their differences, narrowing to fourteen the number of positions that some or all parties contended were being filled by selection procedures that had an adverse impact. The City decree was modified yet again in December 18, 2000 to direct the City to provide data as to the impact of its selection procedures upon hiring for those jobs. At the same time, the decree was extended until June 2002. On June 19th, 2002 the consent decrees were once again extended. On July 8th, 2002 Judge C. Lynwood Smith, Jr. appointed Ronald R. Sims as receiver of the Jefferson County Personnel Board whose duties are chiefly to ensure that the Personnel Board complies fully in a timely and cost efficient manner to the 1981 and 1995 modified consent decrees. The City's initial motion to terminate its consent decree was filed on July 6, 2004. On December 2, 2004 the parties entered into a joint stipulation regarding selection procedures for the city in seven distinct job classifications. On December 9, 2004 the consent decrees were extended pending a motion to dismiss. On July 12, 2005 the District Court concluded that with the sole exception of one job classification had "substantially achieved the basic purposes of paragraph 5 of its 1995 Modification Order," and had shown that its employment selection procedures do not result in an unjustifiable, discriminatory impact on the basis of race or sex. Therefore, the City's motion to terminate was granted with respect to all job classifications except one, and judicial supervision of the City was retained. The District Court subsequently directed the City: (1) to revise its selection procedure for the Fire Apparatus Operator classification; (2) await a certification of eligible applicants from the Personnel Board of Jefferson County ("Personnel Board"); 3) administer the revised selection procedure; and (4) deliver the results of the administration of the revised procedure and a validation study to the parties and Special Master for their consideration and objections, if any. The City of Birmingham complied and delivered the results of its administration of a revised selection procedure and a validity study to the parties on September 20, 2006. On August 20, 2007 Judge C Lynwood Smith, Jr. denied the City's motion to terminate the remaining portion of the consent decree and to be dismissed as a party. In December of 2007, defendants filed a motion for final relief from the 1981 Consent Decree, subsequently followed by a series of negotiations surrounding the inclusion of various plaintiff subclasses. In May, 2008, private plaintiffs moved for permanent injunction barring implementation of the Race-based Provisions of Act No. 2008-408 of the Regular Session of the Alabama Legislature, and were joined by the Board. In June, 2008, the city of Birmingham filed a motion to dismiss the city as a party of the case and to terminate the City of Birmingham Consent Decree. In the following months, responses were filed to both of these motions, as well as a series of status conferences and evidentiary hearings. On September 12, 2008, the Court (Judge C. Lynwood Smith Jr.) issued an opinion, granting the Board and private plaintiff's motion for injunctive and declaratory relief from the Alabama Act No. 2008-408. The Act was declared void ab initio, as violating the Supremacy Clause. On November 20, 2008, the court ordered that the 1981 Consent Decree with the Personnel Board of Jefferson County be immediately and unconditionally terminated, however the City of Birmingham Consent Decree still remains in effect. On May 14, 2009, the court awarded attorney's fees in the amount of $2,500,000.00 to the two private classes of plaintiffs against the Personnel Board. On March 1, 2011, the City filed its fourth motion to terminate its consent decree, and following a hearing at which no party objected, federal supervision of the City of Birmingham ceased on January 27, 2012, and the City was dismissed as a party. The court found full and satisfactory compliance with the City's consent decree. On March 16, 2012, the court approved a consent decree for attorneys fees in which the City agreed to pay the two private classes of plaintiff $350,000. In 2006, the private plaintiffs started gathering evidence on the compliance of the County with the consent decree. On October 3, 2007, they filed a motion to hold the County in contempt and to modify the consent order. The County admitted it disobeyed the decree in various ways, including among others, failure to follow the recruitment procedures, failure to instruct personnel of the need to follow the decree, and failure to file reports. The matter, however, spent a long on discovery and on the matters involving the City. In the interim, the court (Judge C Lynwood Smith Jr.) granted several hiring orders to allow the County to fill vacancies. It also issued several temporary orders holding the County in contempt until final resolution of the matter, with instructions on recruitment and hiring to the County. On August 20, 2013, the court issued an opinion, holding the County in contempt. It rejected the reasons for noncompliance and ordered the parties to confer on the identity of the receiver and the modifications to the original 1982 decree. On October 16, 2013, the court entered a modified consent decree. The decree included general prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race, color or sex, and retaliation. The decree provided that the County had to implement following procedures: accelerated recruitment of black and female applicants, corresponding to the percentage of qualified Black people and women given by the Board's lists; recruitment into certain departments; affirmative recruitment procedures aimed at Black people and women; and other various procedures aimed at preventing racial and gender discrimination. Any failure to meet the objectives required a showing of good effort. The County also agreed to pay $298,000 in settlement of individual claims. It also included the recordkeeping and reporting requirement to be followed by the County. On November 12, 2013, the Court entered a modified decree, to address errors and omissions of the October 16, 2013 decree. On October 25, 2013, the court appointed Ronald R. Sims as receiver to ensure the County's full compliance with the modified consent decree. Lorren Oliver was appointed as a replacement reporter beginning on June 11, 2015. On December 19, 2013, the court granted defendants' unopposed motion to Terminate the Temporary Orders governing Jefferson County's hiring procedures. On March 16, 2017, the parties submitted a joint motion to terminate the consent decree with respect to the Sheriff of Jefferson County and requested approval of a settlement agreement. That motion was granted in part by the Court on March 23 with recording and reporting requirements kept in place. On June 21, 2017, the court also granted plaintiffs motion for attorney's fees, and the final settlement was approved. Judgment was entered in favor of Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP, John W. Martin, et al, and Gwendolyn Bryant, et al, jointly and severally and against the Sheriff in the amount of $150,000.00. On June 6, 2018, the court adopted the proposal by the receiver to transition authorities back to the County and allow various departments to re-assume responsibilities for tasks like hiring employees and reporting compliance. On September 1, 2020, the parties jointly moved to terminate the consent decree against Jefferson County. On December 21, 2020, the court granted the joint motion for termination subject to an additional 18-month window where recording and reporting requirements were kept. The court further awarded $7,289,532.90 in attorneys' fees on April 2, 2021. As of April 8, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 27, 1975 The United States Department of Justice ("D.O.J.") filed this lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the Jefferson County Personnel Board, and the municipal and other governmental jurisdictions within Jefferson County. The Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had discriminatory employment practices against Black people and women, and demanded monetary and injunctive relief. The parties entered several Consent Decrees aimed at correcting these practices, which were monitored closely by the courts for several decades. All of the consent decree were eventually modified. The County and the Board were both held in contempt for noncompliance, and were subject to receivership.The consent decrees against the Board, City, and County have all been dismissed. The case is ongoing.


On April 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Mexico, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Brink's, Incorporated. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant denied the complainant a promotion to an Assistant Manager position because of her sex. On May 10, 2001, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On December 5, 2002, the District Court (Judge M. Christina Armijo) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $58,750.

Summary: On April 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Mexico, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Brink's, Incorporated. The complaint claimed that the defendant denied the complainant a promotion to an Assistant Manager position because of her sex. The parties entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $58,750.


On February 12, 2015, a prisoner in the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (GDCP) filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued Georgia prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that by holding him in solitary confinement for five years in poor conditions they had violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process as well as state regulations. He sought injunctive relief enjoining the state from keeping him solitary confinement, declaratory relief, damages for physical, mental, and emotional consequences stemming from his confinement, and court fees. The plaintiff’s problems at GDCP began in 2010 when, while incarcerated, he was charged with attempting to escape and destruction of state property. Investigating officers recommended that the charges be dropped, but the plaintiff was nonetheless brought to disciplinary court and was found guilty of both charges. On administrative appeal, the convictions were expunged from the plaintiff's record. For the next five years, however, he was kept in a Special Management Unit (SMU, solitary confinement) and segregated from the general prison population. Despite a prison policy enacted in 2013 stating that inmates in the SMU should be returned to the general population after four consecutive status reviews showing good behavior, after eight status reviews recommending and approving of transfer out of the SMU, he remained in solitary confinement without explanation; the grievances he submitted to prison officials regarding his placement were not addressed. The complaint also detailed substandard conditions and mistreatment in the Unit, including inadequate food and medical care and a total lack of recreational or educational opportunities. At the time the plaintiff filed his complaint, he remained in the Special Management Unit with his status there marked "indefinite." Procedural History On May 18, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The motion indicated that prison officials had temporarily eliminated access to legal services for his unit due to budget restrictions; it asked that defendants be compelled to allow him the same access to legal research services that the general prison population received. On June 16, U.S. District Judge Marc T. Treadwell adopted Magistrate Judge Charles H. Weigle’s recommendation to deny the motion because the plaintiff failed to show he faced irreparable injury or was likely to succeed on the merits. 2015 WL 13869065. In the meantime, on June 4, defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations had passed, that plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative procedures, that he failed to state a claim, and that defendants were immune from liability. The court stayed discovery while it considered the motion. On March 31, 2016, Judge Treadwell denied the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims regarding plaintiffs' confinement in the period after August 2013, when GDCP made policy changes requiring inmates to be removed from the SMU after four positive status hearings. However, Judge Treadwell granted the motion to dismiss with respect to all claims regarding plaintiffs' confinement prior to that period. Judge Treadwell also granted plaintiff leave to amend his complaint from February 2015 to include additional due process and Eighth Amendment claims. 2016 WL 1266950. On September 1, 2016, the court briefly stayed this case along with a number of other cases relating to SMU placement that were also filed pro se in order to determine whether the cases should be consolidated. The court appointed the plaintiff counsel from the Southern Center for Human Rights (SCHR) on October 17, 2016, and discovery commenced in December 2016. On March 11, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, this time represented by counsel from SCHR. The amended complaint greatly expanded the scope of the case, seeking class certification covering not just the named plainitff but everyone in the SMU and providing more detail about the extremely restrictive and isolating nature of GDCP's SMU. It alleged not only that the prison had failed to meaningfully assess the plaintiff's status in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment but also that the conditions of confinement in the unit violated the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, the Complaint claimed that the use of solitary confinement, grossly disproportionate punishment, and inadequate food constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint sought to certify a class of all inmates who were in or would be placed in GDCP's SMU. On March 20, 2017 another prisoner moved to intervene in the case. The prisoner had been in solitary confinement at GDCP and was then moved to a similar unit at Georgia State Prison ("GSP"). Judge Treadwell denied the motion to intervene on September 15, 2017 because the other prisoner was ineligible for "in forma pauperis" status under the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s Three Strikes provision and in any event had no right to intervene. 2017 WL 4102742. On October 2, the prisoner appealed the denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to pay filing fees. The plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction on July 5, 2018, asking the court to order GDCP to allow all prisoners in SMU at least three hours of out-of-cell time daily, and to establish within thirty days plans to meaningfully increase programming for prisoners in SMU and to identify and move prisoners in SMU who suffered from mental illness. Plaintffs also amended the motion for class certification on July 13, 2018. The court took no action on these motions, but the parties entered settlement negotiations alongside continued discovery. On December 21, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the class and a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement proposed various measures to improve the confinement conditions at the GDCP, including regular opportunities for outdoor and indoor out-of-cell time, as well as access to the library and other educational resources. On January 17, 2019, Judge Treadwell granted preliminary approval of the settlement. A fairness hearing was set for April 30, 2019. 2019 WL 479506. On February 5, 2019, Judge Treadwell denied the pending motions for preliminary injunction and class certification because the final approval of the settlement agreement would make these motions moot. Judge Treadwell also stated that if the settlement agreement were not approved, the plaintiffs could reinstate these motions. Settlement On May 7, 2019, Judge Treadwell issued an order certifying the settlement class and adopting the settlement agreement, which will remain in force for three years. The settlement agreement contains a range of provisions: a minimum of four hours outside cells each day Monday - Friday; access to tablet devices with games, books, and other educational materials; ability to request materials from the prison library and mobile book carts; out-of-cell programming and classes; and access to the same food, hygiene items, laundry and barbering services as the general prison population. The settlement also establishes a 24-month limit on confinement in the SMU and revised procedures for determining assignment to the SMU. The agreement provides for monitoring meetings every nine months, limited access to SMU records, yearly visits to SMU by class counsel, training for staff at GDCP, and confidential communications and meetings between class members and class counsel. Defendants agreed to pay $425,000 in attorneys' fees, which were granted by the court in a separate order on July 30, 2019. The court retains jurisdiction until the agreement expires on May 7, 2022. 2019 WL 2017497. Current Status The court granted $425,000 in attorneys' fees on July 30, 2019. Supervision is ongoing.

Summary: In 2015, a prisoner in Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison (GDCP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Georgia against various prison officials at the GDCP. Held in solitary confinement for many years, plaintiff alleged due process and Eighth Amendment violations and moved for class certification. On May 7, 2019, parties reached a settlement that applied to the class of all inmates who are or will be placed in GDCP's solitary confinement unit. The settlement required GDCP to make signification changes to out-of-cell time, access to educational materials and programming, and living conditions for individuals in solitary confinement. Additionally, the maximum time an individual can be placed in solitary is now 24 months.


On March 15, 2007, the EEOC filed this sex/pregnancy discrimination case against Zale Corporation in U.S. District Court in Alaska. The complaint was filed on behalf of an employee who claimed she had been denied promotion to a mangement postion because she was pregnant. The parties quickly settled the case with a Consent Decree entered by U.S. District Judge John W. Sedwick on July 9, 2007, to last for two years, covering all employees at Zales Jewelers stores in the State of Alaska. The employer agreed to pay the claimant $55,000.00 in damages. The Decree prevents the employer from discriminating against its employees on the basis of sex/pregnancy. The Decree provides for evaluation and implementation of anti-discrimination policies, procedures and training, requires posting and distribution of those policies, requires anti-discrimination training for managers and supervisors and discipline of any supervisor or manager who violates the policies. It also requires the company to include the handling of EEO matters in its hiring and evaluation of managers and supervisors. The Decree was in effect for two years from the date of its entry, July 9, 2007; it expired on July 9, 2009.

Summary: In this sex/pregnancy discrimination case, the EEOC settled with Zale Corporation on behalf of a female employee who claimed she was denied a promotion because she was pregnant. The Decree covers all employees of all Zales Jewelers stores in the State of Alaska. It prohibits sex/pregnancy discrimination and calls for training and evaluation of managers and supervisors to ensure they provide a workplace free of sex/pregnancy-based discrimination. Te Decree requires EEO policy posting and distribution and expungement of the employee's file. The employer paid the claimant $55,000.00 in damages and agreed to a two-year duration for the Decree. It expired on July 9, 2009.


On April 2, 2014, three immigrant detainees incarcerated in the Northwest Detention Center (NDC) filed a lawsuit in the District Court in the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the United States Department of Homeland Security. The three detainees, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order prohibiting the placement of prisoners in solitary confinement for exercising their freedom of speech and freedom to protest, as well as a declaratory judgment that the defendants' actions were in violation of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs' claim that they were incarcerated in solitary confinement for the sole reason that they exercised their First Amendment right of speech and petition. On March 7, 2014, several detainees in the Northwestern Detention Center (NWDC) went on a peaceful hunger strike to protest immigration policies and to raise awareness of the conditions of the NWDC facilities. Officers claimed to be taking detainees to a "meeting" with the assistant warden. When they were escorted out of the unit, the detainees were placed in handcuffs and put in solitary confinement spending 23 hours a day in a cell. ICE's policy does not permit NWDC to place detainees in solitary confinement for any reason other than medical observation. On May 13, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal because ICE had released the detainees from solitary confinement.

Summary: Three immigrant detainees go on a hunger strike and as a result are put in solitary confinement by wardens of the detention center.


This case concerns the legality of the United States Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) June 19th, 2020 implementation of a rule under Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (commonly known as the Affordable Care Act or Obamacare), that (1) removed “sexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity” from the definition of sex discrimination, (2) included a religious exemption, and (3) redefined the scope of entities covered under the rule. On July 16th, 2020 the state of Washington filed this lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706) against the HHS and its Secretary in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Washington sought an injunction against, and vacatur of, the rule as well as declaratory relief. Washington alleged that the rule exceeded HHS’s statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, Washington alleged that the rule violated the equal protection and substantive due process clauses of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. After the Affordable Care Act was passed in 2010, the HHS in 2016 issued a rule under Section 1557 that included sexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity as part of its definition of sex discrimination and lacked a religious exemption. However, as a result of a lawsuit filed in August 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas vacated that rule's definition of sex discrimination on October 15, 2019 (Franciscan Alliance, LLC v. Burwell). The HHS’ 2020 rule tracked the result of Franciscan Alliance. However, as Washington’s initial complaint pointed out, on June 15, 2020 the United States Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County that sex discrimination under Title VII included discrimination because of sexual orientation and gender identity. Along with its complaint, Washington filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on the grounds that its claims were likely to succeed, the rule would “irreparably harm” the state and its residents, and that an injunction would promote fairness and serve the public interest. Several amicus briefs were filed in support of the injunction. Before ruling on the preliminary injunction, on August 18, 2020, the HHS gave notice of the decision in Walker v. Azar against the HHS (E.D.N.Y. No. 20-cv-02834). The case was substantially similar to this case, and the Walker court had decided to grant a preliminary injunction against the HHS. Following the notice, the court in this case (Judge James L. Robart) ordered each party to show cause regarding the impact of Walker. Both parties did so. On August 28th, the court issued an order denying Washington’s preliminary injunction. Judge Robart ruled that before considering the merits of Washington’s claim, he had to consider Washington’s standing. Washington claimed it had standing because the rule would cause: (1) “additional costs or other economic harms . . . resulting from an increase in discrimination against Washingtonians or decreased healthcare coverage for Washingtonians; and (2) increased administrative costs.” Particularly in light of the protections afforded by Bostock, Judge Robart found that Washington lacked “sufficient evidence to show that the 2020 Rule’s decision not to define on the basis of sex will yield an increase in discrimination against LGBTQ individuals or a decrease in available healthcare or health insurance coverage for that population,” and therefore ruled that all of Washington’s arguments concerning potential direct harm were insufficient. Moreover, the “administrative costs” raised by Washington also failed to support standing as they would be “self-inflicted.” Judge Robart also found Washington lacked standing to challenge the rule’s religious exceptions for “many of the same reasons.” 2020 WL 5095467. He then ordered Washington to show cause in 10 days as to why the case should not be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 8th, Washington gave notice of its voluntary dismissal of the case, and on September 9th, 2020 the case was closed.

Summary: The state of Washington filed this suit on June 19th, 2020 against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services seeking to vacate three sections of a 2020 rule promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The disputed sections removed “sexual orientation, sex stereotyping, and gender identity” from the definition of sex discrimination, added a religious exemption, and redefined of the scope of covered entities. Washington filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. It was denied. The court also found that Washington lacked standing to sue. As a result, Washington voluntarily dismissed its case.


In 2004, Google and several major universities announced a project to scan and digitize the collections of the universities' research libraries. Google has since scanned more than 12 million books. The libraries retained digital copies of the books (see Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, in related cases). Google also kept copies of the books, which it added to its Google Books database. The content of these books was made available for online searching, with the full content of out-of-copyright works made available online, and with copyrighted works searchable, but visible to users only in "snippets" showing the search terms in context. Millions of the books scanned by Google were under copyright and Google did not obtain permission to scan the books from the Rightsholders. In 2005, the Authors Guild, together with several national and international organizations purporting to represent the interest of authors and publishers, as well as certain authors and publishers, brought a class action lawsuit against Google. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement. The authors sought both damages and injunctive relief, and the publishers sought injunctive relief. Google's principal defense was fair use under § 107 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107. The case is included in the Clearinghouse because the proposed settlement agreement makes significant accommodations allowing access to the digitized works by blind or otherwise print-disabled individuals, and because important disability advocacy groups expressed their support of the settlement. In the fall of 2006 the parties began settlement negotiations, and on October 28, 2008 the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement. Preliminary approval of the proposed settlement was granted by Judge John E. Sprizzo on November 17, 2008. Hundreds of objections were received in response to the proposed settlement, and so the parties reentered discussions for possible modifications to the proposed settlement. On November 13, 2009, the parties filed an Amended Settlement Agreement. The Court, (Judge Denny Chin) granted preliminary approval to the Amended Settlement on November 19, 2009. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 2009 WL 5576331 (S.D.N.Y 2009). The Amended Settlement Agreement was 166 pages long, not including attachments. The Class addressed by the settlement consisted of all persons who, as of January 5, 2009, owned a U.S. copyright interest in one or more books implicated by a use authorized by the Amended Settlement Agreement. There were two subclasses, the Author Sub-Class and the Publisher Sub-Class. Under the Amended Settlement, Google would be authorized to continue digitizing books, and to beginning selling subscriptions to an electronic book database, to sell online access to individual books, and to sell advertising which would be placed on pages from books. The rights granted to Google in the settlement would be non-exclusive. Rightsholders could exclude their books from some or all of the uses listed above, or elect to remove their books from the database completely. Rightsholders could also demand that Google not digitize any of their books not yet digitized. Under the settlement Google would establish a Registry which would be required to make a reasonable effort to locate Rightsholders. The Registry would receive payments from Google on behalf of Rightsholders and would in turn distribute funds to registered Rightsholders. Unclaimed funds would, after five years, be used to cover the expense of locating owners of unclaimed works, and after ten years, any additional unclaimed funds would be distributed to literary charities. Under the settlement, Google would not display in-print books unless it received express authorization from the Rightsholders, however the agreement would grant Google the right to make non-display use of in-print books, including making the content of books searchable by Google Books users. The agreement would have allowed Google to display out-of-print books until they received a request from the Rightsholder directing them to stop. The Amended Settlement Agreement would have granted special access to academic and public libraries wishing to participate. Google would provide the library a digital copy of any book in the library's collection, either by scanning the library's copy or by giving them access to a copy of the title already in Google's database. The participating libraries would make these digital copies of their collections available to blind patrons and those with other print disabilities. In addition, certain other rights would have been granted to participating libraries under the Amended Settlement Agreement. The Amended Settlement would also have required Google to ensure that the books made available through its own services would be provided in formats accessible to people with print disabilities. The Court received approximately 500 submissions commenting on the settlement, the overwhelming majority objecting to it. Additionally, around 6800 class members opted out. The major arguments of the objectors were that: the proposed class notice was inadequate; that the interests of certain class members including foreign authors and academic authors were inadequately represented by the representative plaintiffs; that the settlement terms were overly broad, reaching issues not within the scope of the pleadings, and releasing future claims not before the court; that the settlement was at odds with federal copyright law and that it functioned to make Google the de facto copyright holder for "orphaned works"; antitrust concerns, including that the settlement would effectively give Google a monopoly over digital books and especially over unclaimed works (while its competitors, who had been carefully obtaining permission to digitize each work rather than copying everything without authorization would be pushed out), that the proposed pricing mechanisms violated the Sherman Act, and that the settlement would unfairly entrench Google's position as the dominant online search engine; privacy concerns about Google's ability to monitor the reading patterns of users, and about its use of information provided by Rightsholders; and concerns that settlement was at odds with international law and that it placed an unfair burden on foreign copyright holders. Among the relatively few submissions from supporters of the settlement were letters from the National Federation of the Blind (the NFB) and from the American Association of People with Disabilities. The NFB argued in its letter that the settlement should be allowed to proceed because of its terms granting access and accommodations for disabled users. The settlement would for the first time make almost all books in the collections of public libraries accessible to blind readers and to an estimated another 30,000,000 Americans unable to read printed text due to other disabilities. The NFB would later become an intervening defendant in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust (see related cases), which was the suit filed by The Authors Guild against the academic libraries that were Google's original partners in the book scanning project. That suit was decided on its merits in favor of the defendants, with the court finding that the libraries' use of the digitized works was permissible under the fair use provisions of the Copyright Act and that to the extent that digitization provided a unique degree of access to information for the blind and to individuals with other print disabilities, such digitization was allowed under the ADA. The Court (Judge Denny Chin) shared many of the objectors' concerns, and so in an extensive opinion dated March 22, 2011, it rejected the Amended Settlement Agreement, stipulating that it would likely approve a second amended settlement if the parties modified it so that it was an opt-in, rather than an opt-out, agreement. The opinion does not address the merits of the NFB's arguments in favor of the settlement. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc. 770 F.Supp.2d 666 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The parties appear to have decided against an opt-in settlement, and it seems likely that the case will proceed and will eventually be decided on its merits. On October 14, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint, which appears substantially similar to the earlier complaints, except with minor rewording and with the substitution of certain named plaintiffs. On May 31, 2012, the Judge Chin denied a motion by Google to have the claims of the associational plaintiffs (The Authors Guild and other non-individual plaintiffs) dismissed. In the same decision, the court granted class certification to the plaintiffs. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 384 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Google filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals (USCA) for the Second Circuit, contesting the grant of class certification. Proceedings in the District Court were stayed pending the outcome of this appeal. On July 1, 2013, the USCA for the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's order on the grounds that class certification was premature in the absence of a determination of the merits of Google's "fair use" defense. The case was remanded without prejudice to any renewal of the motion for class certification. On November 14, 2013, the District Court (Judge Chin) granted Google's motion for summary judgment. Judge Chin found that Google's actions were protected by fair use. It was noted that Google's actions brought significant public benefits including enabling libraries to make copies available to print-disabled individuals. The plaintiff's complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On December 23, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to grant summary judgment for Google on November 17, 2015, finding that Google's actions constituted fair use. The Court found that Google's making of a digital copy to provide both a search function and a snippet function were transformative uses, as they augmented public knowledge by making available information about the plaintiffs' books without providing the public with a substantial substitute for matter protected by the plaintiffs' copyright interests in the original works or derivatives of them. Additionally, the Court found that Google's profit motivation did not justify denial of fair use. Finally, the Court found that Google's program did not expose the plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of loss of copyright value through incursions of hackers. The case is now closed.

Summary: Google scanned millions of books without the permissions of the copyright holders, and made the content of these books searchable online. In 2005, the Authors Guild, together with several national and international organizations purporting to represent the interest of authors and publishers, as well as certain authors and publishers, brought a class action lawsuit against Google. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging copyright infringement. The parties attempted to enter a settlement which, among many other things, would have provided participating libraries full digital copies of the books in their collections. These libraries would then make these digital copies available to their blind or otherwise print-disabled patrons. Hundreds of copyright holders and other interested parties including foreign governments opposed the settlement on grounds unrelated to the accessibility issue. The District Court declined final approval of the settlement, and further settlement negotiations were unsuccessful. On May 31, 2012, the District Court granted class certification, but this order was vacated by the United States of Appeals (USCA) for the Second Circuit on the grounds that certification was premature because Google's "fair use" defense should be considered. On November 14, 2013, the District Court opinioned that Google's actions constituted fair use and granted Google's motion for summary judgment. On November 17, 2015, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. The case is now closed.


On April 4, 2008, immigrant detainees in Maricopa County filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the County of Maricopa and head staff. The plaintiffs claimed that the Count of Maricopa violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and MALDEF, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting an immediate bail hearing and declaration that Proposition 100 violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Proposition 100 did not limit pretrial incarceration or provide procedural protections for the criminal defendants. Plaintiffs also alleged that Proposition 100 violated their constitutional rights at several stages of the criminal proceedings, including allowing police to forego advising detainees of their Miranda rights and allowing the County of Maricopa to hold immigrant detainees categorically ineligible for bail and legal counsel. On March 29, 2011, the Court (Judge Susan R. Bolton) granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all charges but the one. On May 13, 2011, the Court dismissed the remaining count without prejudice. On June 10, 2011 the plaintiffs appealed the summary judgment order to the 9th Circuit. The plaintiffs stated at this time they were unsure as to whether they would refile their claim challenging Proposition 100. The case has been inactive since September 19, 2011.

Summary: In 2008, immigrant detainees of Maricopa County jail filed a suit against Maricopa County, claiming it violated their constitutional rights by allowing the police to forego reading immigrant detainees their Miranda rights and allowing the county to deny immigrant detainees bail and legal counsel. All claims were dismissed by the Court and the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The case has been inactive since September 19, 2011.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule. Maryland Coalition Sues Over the Public Charge Rule On September 27, 2019, a coalition "comprised by local governments, an elected representative, and a number of non-profit and faith-based agencies providing legal and social services to immigrant populations and their families," filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the City of Baltimore Department of Law, sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought declaration that the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Rule) violates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment and an order setting it aside. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The case was assigned to Judge Peter J. Messitte. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the APA, because the defendants failed to provide adequate justification for the change, utilized a "patently inadequate cost-benefit analysis" in promulgating the Rule, and disregarded facts and evidence. The plaintiffs also asserted that the Rule denied the constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because a discriminatory purpose was the motivating factor in promulgating the Rule. Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the Rule will cause actual suffering by producing a chilling effect that discourages eligible members from utilizing public benefits and requiring plaintiffs to allocate significant resources to combat this chilling effect. Case is Deferred, Related to Another Case, then Reassigned On October 15, 2019, Judge Messitte entered an order deferring ruling on the complaint. Judge Messitte considered the nationwide preliminary injunctions enjoining defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule instituted by district courts in New York (State of New York v. DHS) and Washington (State of Washington v. DHS) and concluded that there was not a "need at present to enter into yet another consideration of the relief sought by Plaintiffs in this case." On December 3, 2019, the parties filed a joint notice of related case, asserting that the current case is related to (Casa de Maryland v. Trump) and requesting that the case be transferred to Judge Paul J. Grimm for concurrent adjudication. The parties contended that that "the two cases 'arise from the same or identical transaction, happenings, or events,' that they involve identical defendants, and that hearing them separately 'would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges.'” In that case, Judge Grimm had issued an order for a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing or enforcing the Rule. The cases were ordered related and the current case reassigned to Judge Grimm on December 6. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 3, 2020, in which they asserted the same causes of actions, claims for relief, and requests for relief. However, the amended complaint removed the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore as a plaintiff. On the same day, the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was added as a plaintiff in an amended complaint in Casa de Maryland. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court issued orders staying a nationwide injunction in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security and an injunction for the State of Illinois in Cook County, Illinois v. Wolf. Following these decisions, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. District Court Stays Discovery Pending Motion to Dismiss On March 17, 2020, Judge Grimm issued an order granting the defendants' motion to stay "proceedings related to discovery and completion of the administrative record," but ordered the parties to continue with the motion to dismiss briefing. On May 27, defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants asserted that the complaint should be dismissed in full "[i]n light of the Supreme Court’s repeated stays of injunction, the Ninth Circuit’s detailed opinion on the Rule’s legality," and because the Rule does not violate the due process or equal protection clauses. The Fourth Circuit Reverses Judge Grimm's October 15, 2019 Nationwide Preliminary Injunction On August 5, a split Fourth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Harvie Wilkinson III, Paul Niemeyer, and Robert King) issued an order and opinion denying the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction from the related case Casa de Maryland v. Trump. 971 F.3d 220. Writing for the majority, Judge Wilkinson held that Casa lacked standing; that the plaintiffs were unlikely to win on the merits of their claims because the Rule was a permissible interpretation of "public charge;" and that a nationwide injunction was an overly broad remedy. Judge King dissented. Citing a decision of the Seventh Circuit two months prior (962 F.3d 208), he disagreed on all points. He would have held that plaintiffs did have standing; that the plaintiffs were likely to win on the merits because the Rule was not a permissible interpretation of "public charge" given the statute and history; and that a nationwide injunction was an appropriate remedy given the circumstances. In light of this decision, back in the district court, Judge Grimm back issued an order on August 7, directing the parties to supplement their briefings on the pending motion to dismiss. The Reversal is Stayed Pending a Rehearing en banc On September 15, the Fourth Circuit's order was stayed pending ruling on a petition to rehear the case en banc. That petition was granted on December 3, 2020, and oral arguments were scheduled to begin in March 2021. President Biden Issues Executive Order to Review the Public Charge Rule On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. The parties began conferring to determine how this would impact the litigation. On March 1, 2021, the District Court denied the government's motion to dismiss without prejudice, noting that the motion would be subject to reinstatement once the administration reviewed the rule. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision that vacates the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 11, the Fourth Circuit issued an order granting the government's voluntary dismissal of its appeal. That same day, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants. They also moved to reconsider the dismissal. They filed similar intervention motions in the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, as well as an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. The Fourth Circuit denied the motion to intervene, as well as the motion to reconsider, on March 18. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 27, 2019, two city governments, a U.S. Senator, and a number of non-profit organizations providing services to immigrant communities filed this suit in the United States District Court For The District Of Maryland. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case was related early to Casa de Maryland v. Trump. A preliminary injunction was initially denied by the Fourth Circuit on August 5, 2020, but is pending rehearing en banc. However, the Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.


On June 29, 2004, two females who, earlier, had been arrested for misdemeanors and now were represented, for civil case purposes, by private attorneys from Washington, D.C. and New York, filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the North District of New York. They alleged that the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schenectady County Jail, including those charged with misdemeanors or held on civil matters, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and class certification for the thousands of individuals that suffered the same alleged indignities. Defendants, the County and the Sheriff, answered by generally denying all allegations. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Gary L. Sharpe. A settlement conference was held on May 17, 2005 before Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece. The case was not immediately settled and discovery continued. Defendants moved to dismiss the claims of one of the named plaintiffs, Nichole McDaniel, alleging that she failed to appear for scheduled depositions on numerous occasions. Magistrate Judge Treece recommended that her claims be dismissed and that, should the case settle, the Court would decide whether to forfeit any class claim she had. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 2005 WL 1745566 (N.D. N.Y. Jul 21, 2005). In November 2005, the Court (Judge Gary L. Sharpe) entered an order staying all activity in the case pending ongoing settlement negotiations. The stay order was continued several times until the case was ultimately settled. On November 29, 2006, the Court preliminarily approved the parties' Settlement Agreement and, later, set the matter for a fairness hearing on August 14, 2007. Final approval was granted on November 5, 2007, on all issues except attorneys' fees. Instead of awarding 26% of the settlement as fees, the Court awarded class counsel payment for the time spent at the hourly rates traditionally charged in their native jurisdiction. McDaniel v. County of Schenectady, 2007 WL 3274798 (N.D. N.Y. Nov 05, 2007). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, as approved, Schenectady County agreed to institute an appropriate strip search policy and pay $2.5 million into a settlement fund to resolve all class claims. From the fund, the Court awarded class counsel attorneys' fees in the amount of $343,744.50 and reimbursement of pre-settlement litigation expenses of $10,053.31. The sum of $296,202.19 (the disputed amount of attorneys' fees) was ordered to be placed into an escrow account by the Settlement Administrator, pending further litigation. The Court approved $12,000 and $1,500 to class representatives for a total of $13,500 in incentive awards. Administration expenses and costs in the amount of $107,233.40 were granted.

Summary: On June 29, 2004, two females plaintiffs filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the North District of New York. They alleged that the Schenectady County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schenectady County Jail, including those charged with misdemeanors or held on civil matters, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. The parties reach a court-approved settlement that stipulated that Schenectady County institute an appropriate strip search policy and pay $2.5 million into a settlement fund to resolve all class claims.


On February 1, 2013, disabled seniors in Loveland and Ironton Ohio filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs sued the Ohio Department of Jobs and Family Services and the Ohio Department of Aging under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and state law. Represented initially by private counsel and in later stages also by the public interest group Justice In Aging, the plaintiffs sought class-action certification and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violation of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C § 1396) and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that Ohio unduly delayed enrolling eligible plaintiffs in the Medicaid Assisted Living Waiver Program, and also failed to either provide them with the opportunity to apply to state funded assisted living programs or to give them a written denial notice and opportunity for fair hearing. On January 16, 2015, plaintiffs sought summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the state violated federal law by failing to provide retroactive assisted living benefits for three months prior to their enrollment. On February 20, 2015, defendants countered with their own summary judgment motion, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit. One of defendants’ main arguments was based on the Medicaid requirement that assisted living benefits were only available for treatment that was, “pursuant to a written plan of care to individuals who, but for such services, would require the level of care provided in a hospital or nursing facility.” Ohio argued that this provision required that a written plan of care be created before an individual would be eligible for assisted living benefits, and that plaintiffs lacked standing since they hadn’t had written plan of care prior to the period that they were claiming retroactive benefits for. Another major argument by defendants was that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they were seeking retroactive relief from state officials, which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Defendants also made a series of more technical arguments for why the plaintiffs lacked standing. They claimed that the Supreme Court had barred notice relief or declarations that a state was violating federal law when the federal law had been changed before the case was brought. They argued that one of the plaintiffs had died before the suit and her claim hadn’t survived her death. And they argued that the other plaintiff lacked standing because she had moved to a nursing home and stopped being potentially eligible for assisted living benefits before the claim was brought. On September 1, 2015, Magistrate Judge Karen L. Likovitz granted the plaintiffs’ motions for class-action certification and for summary judgment. The certified class included all Ohio individuals who meet the eligibility standards for the assisted living Medicaid waiver for the months occurring no earlier than three months prior to the month of application, but who are denied coverage under the assisted living Medicaid waiver for all or some of those months. 381 F.R.D. 345 (S.D. Ohio 2015). Judge Litkovitz dismissed all of the defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs lacked standing. She found that the requirement that treatment be pursuant to a written plan should be read in the context of the rest of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34), which requires that benefits be provided retroactively to individuals who would have been eligible for said benefits if they had applied earlier. She found that the plaintiffs were asking for prospective injunctive relief, and thus weren’t barred from suing the state by the Fourteenth Amendment. She found that the federal law hadn’t been amended prior to the case and there was thus an ongoing violation of federal law. She found that death did not preclude standing under Ohio Law, which allows intangible property interest like those in Medicaid benefits to survive an individual’s death. And she found that the fact that Mrs. Saunders was no longer eligible for assisted living waiver benefits at the time of bringing suit didn’t preclude standing because a favorable ruling would allow her to sue for retroactive benefits. Id. at 358-359. Judge Litkovitz then issued the plaintiffs declaratory relief under her analysis of the state plan section of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396a). She held that the Ohio regulations prohibiting assisted living waiver benefits for up to three months prior to the month of application for individuals who were eligible for coverage at the time those services were furnished violated the retroactivity provision of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34). She also held that defendants' failure to notify applicants for assisted living waiver benefits that they were being denied coverage for months in which they met the eligibility requirements and the reasons for such action violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) and the Due Process Clause. She further held that defendants' failure to provide plaintiffs and the class with retroactive Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage to which they were otherwise entitled violated the reasonable promptness requirement of 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(8). Id. at 381. Magistrate Judge Likovitz then granted plaintiffs injunctive relief. She enjoined the state from denying plaintiffs and the class eligibility for Medicaid assisted living waiver benefits for months in which they are determined to meet eligibility standards, for as early as three months prior to the month in which application is made, and required the state to modify its policies and practices to achieve this relief. She also issued an injunction requiring the state to identify and provide written notice to plaintiffs and all class members that their Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage would begin on the first day of the month in which they meet all eligibility criteria, up to three months prior to the month of application, with a notice advising them of the state administrative procedure, compliant with due process requirements, available if they desire to have the state determine whether or not they may be eligible for additional days of Medicaid assisted living waiver coverage. Id. On September 30, 2015, the defendants appealed the court's ruling to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and asked for a stay in the ruling pending that appeal. The state argued that the ruling undermined the Medicaid assisted waiver program's requirement that assisted living waiver services be provided pursuant to a written plan of care, without which individuals would require a similar level of care in a hospital or nursing home. Judge Likovitz denied a stay, holding that any damage to the defendants was outweighed by potential damage to plaintiff class members. On January 22, 2016, plaintiffs asked the Sixth Circuit for a limited remand of the case to clarify an oversight in defining the class for class certification. On appeal, defendants had argued that the certified class was over broad because it didn’t incorporate the two-year statute of limitations in Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10. Plaintiffs wanted the Sixth Circuit to remand the class definition to Magistrate Judge Litkovitz so she could change the defined class to clarify that plaintiffs had filed the suit on behalf of individuals who were denied coverage on or after February 1, 2011. However, on January 29, the Sixth Circuit denied this request without explanation. On March 23, 2016, the U.S. DOJ filed a statement of interest in support of the defendants. The DOJ argued that the district court’s ruling was contrary to the interpretation of the statute by the Secretary of Health and Human Services, would defeat the core purpose of the plan of care requirement, and undermined overall scheme of the state-provided Medicaid waiver system, which was intended to allow states to craft their own plans without excessive and unanticipated costs. In addition to the Statement of Interest by the DOJ, amicus briefs were filed in favor of the plaintiffs by public interest groups the Ohio Centers for Assisted Living and the Ohio chapter of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys. On February 1, 2016, the district court stayed briefing on the plaintiffs' pending motion for attorney fees and costs until after the Sixth Circuit's ruling on the defendants' appeal. Oral arguments were heard on April 28, 2016. On September 30, 2016, the Sixth Circuit reversed Judge Litkovitz's order of September 1, 2015. (Circuit Judge Raymond Kethledge, Danny J. Boggs, and District Judge William H. Stafford, Senior United States District Judge for the Northern District of Florida, sitting by designation). The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue only their February 2013 claim that the defendants failed to comply with federal law by refusing to award retroactive assisted-living benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(34). However, the Sixth Circuit found that § 1396a(a)(34) did not require Ohio to pay for assisted living services rendered before the approval of a Medicaid beneficiary’s service plan, and that the district court erred in interpreting § 1396a(a)(34) to find that it required retroactive benefits. 838 F.3d 739 (6th Cir. 2016). The Sixth Circuit issued its mandate on October 25, 2016. Under the Sixth Circuit's order and mandate, Judge Litkovitz entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims on October 31, 2016. The order also stated that because the plaintiffs were no longer prevailing parties, their motion for attorney's fees and costs was denied. The case is now closed.

Summary: Ohio seniors eligible for assisted living waiver benefits sue the Ohio agencies responsible for administering the program for failing to provide them with retroactive benefits and for failing to provide them with the opportunity to apply to state funded assisted living programs or to give them a written denial notice and opportunity for fair hearing. Magistrate Judge Karen Likovitz ruled that the program violates the SSA and the Due Process clause of the Constitution and enjoined the defendants from denying retroactive benefits and also enjoined them to better notify and inform eligible seniors. The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the lower court decision, and summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants on October 31, 2016 according to the Sixth Circuit's mandate.


On 02/10/2010, a 22-year-old college student majoring in Middle Eastern studies filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI officials with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the Philadelphia Police Department (PDP) based on civil rights intrusions at the Philadelphia International Airport. Upon discovering English-Arabic flashcards (including several listing words like "kidnap" and "bomb") and materials critical of U.S. foreign policy during routine airport security screening, TSA briefly detained and searched the plaintiff; he was then taken into custody by Philadelphia police officers and held for several hours. Eventually, two FBI agents came and interrogated him for a half hour; he was then released without charges. Represented by private attorneys, the national American Civil Liberties Union, and the Pennsylvania ACLU chapter, the plaintiff alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under Bivens, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The federal government defendants moved to dismiss the complaint because of their qualified immunity from suit. The district court denied the motion and proceeded to discovery. The federal defendants appealed the denial of their 12(b)(6) motion to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit [11-04292]. On December 24, 2013, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded back to the District Court with instructions to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the Fourth and First Amendment claims. In an opinion by Judge McKee [738 F.3d 562], TSA personnel's brief detention of the plaintiff was held lawful. The FBI's brief interrogation was likewise not unconstitutional. The local police's actions taking the plaintiff into custody and holding him for several hours may have been unlawful, but was not before the court; the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the local law enforcement had served as mere agents for federal agencies. On May 8, 2014, the District Court ordered a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Caracappa. A pre-trial hearing was then conducted on October 30, 2014. Finally, on January 22, 2015 the court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. The plaintiff received $25,000 in compensatory damages and attorney's fees up to $6,250. The defendants also agreed to, on a quarterly basis, instruct all police officers assigned to the airport that "investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause" and that a referral from a TSA agent does not, in itself, constitute probable cause. The court retained jurisdiction to supervise the injunction for eighteen months (until July 2016). As of December 2018, no further docket activity occurred, and so the case is now closed.

Summary: In February 2010, plaintiff, a 22-year-old college student majoring in Middle Eastern studies, filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), FBI officials with the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the Philadelphia Police Department (PDP) based on his detention and interrogation at the Philadelphia International Airport. The district court denied the federal defendants' claim of qualified immunity, but on December 24, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, and held that the federal defendants had not violated the plaintiffs' rights, and that the local police were not before the court. On May 8, 2014, the District Court ordered a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Caracappa. On January 22, 2015 the court approved a settlement agreement and dismissed the case. The plaintiff received $25,000 in compensatory damages and attorney's fees up to $6,250. The defendants also agreed to, on a quarterly basis, instruct all police officers assigned to the airport that "investigative detentions may be made only on reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and any arrest must be based on probable cause" and that a referral from a TSA agent does not, in itself, constitute probable cause. The court retained jurisdiction to supervise the injunction for eighteen months. The case is now closed.


A pro-life organization and its members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on July 11, 2006. The plaintiffs alleged that police officers from the City of Jackson (City) had infringed on their free speech rights and threatened false arrest in violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs contended these actions were illegal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various Mississippi state laws. The plaintiffs argued that the City restricted their free speech at rallies hosted by the plaintiffs outside the Jackson Women's Health Organization, an abortion clinic. At this rally, the plaintiffs claimed they expressed their views about abortion and "offer[ed] literature and sidewalk counseling" outside of the clinic. The City allegedly came to a 2005 rally and told participants they were violating a noise ordinance and needed a permit for their activities. In February 2006, another rally was held. This time, rally participants were allegedly threatened with arrest. Some of the pro-life supporters were arrested. In other protests outside of the clinic, the plaintiffs' private property was seized and never returned. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prohibit the City from infringing on the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights on July 17, 2006. District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr., denied that order on July 20, 2006. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Barbour on July 21, 2006. Two of the defendants, City police officers, filed motions to dismiss on July 31, 2006, claiming that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The case was stayed pending the motions to dismiss. On November 6, 2006, Judge Barbour denied both defendants' motions to dismiss, but allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint clarifying the allegations against one of the defendants. If the plaintiffs failed to file an amended complaint clarifying these allegations, the case would have been dismissed against that particular defendant. An amended complaint was filed on November 22, 2006 and, as a result, the case was not dismissed based on qualified immunity. Five status/settlement conferences were held on May 11, 2007, June 26, 2007, July 9, 2007, September 13, 2007, and February 15, 2008. An additional status conference scheduled for March 2008 was cancelled because the parties reached a settlement agreement. Judge Barbour approved a consent decree on March 14, 2008. The consent decree stated that the City was not to engage in any practice that would violate any person's First Amendment rights on sidewalks and rights of way. The City also agreed to enforce all laws, ordinances, and statutes in an even-handed manner and could not threaten to use its noise ordinance unless decibel measuring machines were used. Additionally, the City had to amend its special events ordinance and its sign ordinance. The City was barred from seizing expressive materials from people exercising their First Amendment rights unless all other means were first exhausted. First Amendment training was required for all law enforcement officers in the City. Finally, the City was obligated to pay $15,000 in damages to various plaintiffs and return all fines/expunge all of their criminal records stemming from the events outside the Jackson Women's Health Organization. The parties were to resolve any disputes on their own and, if those conversations proved futile, were to submit issues to the court for resolution. The court retained jurisdiction of the consent decree through March 2009. The case is now closed.

Summary: Pro-life group receives settlement for First and Fourteenth Amendment violations stemming from their protests outside of an abortion clinic.


On October 1, 2015, a group of indigent Rutherford County, Tennessee residents who received sanctions for failing to pay probation fees, filed a class action suit against the county and Providence Community Corrections, Inc. (PCC), a private contractor overseeing probation. The plaintiffs alleged that: 1) the arrangement between PCC and Rutherford County constituted racketeering; 2) PCC's personal financial interest in the outcome of judicial proceedings violated the plaintiffs' due process rights; 3) the contract between PCC and the county was void under Tennessee law; 4) PCC's threats to jail plaintiffs over nonpayment of debts are unduly harsh and punitive; 5) PCC's further actions of placing debts, issuing arrest warrants, and jailing individuals solely based on wealth status or nonpayment of debts was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and 8) Rutherford County and PCC’s actions were a general abuse of the legal process. On the same day that plaintiffs filed their complaint, they moved the court for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Kevin Sharp. The action arose under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO), and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because of alleged violations of the plaintiff’s Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments rights. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Defendants' conduct was unlawful, an injunction against enforcing the illegal policies on their proposed class, which consisted of “[a]ll persons who currently owe or who will incur debts to Rutherford County from fines, feed, costs, or surcharges arising from traffic and misdemeanor cases in the County Court and who have been placed on probation with PCC Inc. pursuant to the Contract between defendants Rutherford County and PCC, Inc.” The plaintiffs also requested treble damages, and attorneys’ fees. Specifically, the complaint arose because Rutherford County had entered into a contract with the private company (PCC) to provide probation services. According to the contract, PCC had to earn its profit solely and directly from the people that it supervised by operating a “user funded” model in which probationers were ordered to pay, under threat of arrest and revocation of their probation, a variety of fees and surcharges to PCC in addition to their court costs. The county did not provide any compensation for PCC's services. If probationers could not pay their fees in full, they would be placed on “supervised probation.” This supervision agreement required probationers to, among other things, pay additional supervision fees to PCC, obey all orders of PCC officers, and allow warrantless property searches. Any violation of these “conditions,” notwithstanding the individual's history or the nature of the offense, would result in PCC petitioning for their probation to be revoked and for the issuing of a warrant for their arrest. The Plaintiffs had two primary civil rights contentions with this model. First, Plaintiffs alleged that PCC did not consider whether the probationer was indigent when making recommendations based on unpaid fees, and second, that the under policy, it was possible to be arrested and jailed solely for failure to pay a debt. In many cases, PCC officers did not inform eligible applicants about the available indigency waiver, or officers gave out misinformation that some fees had to be paid before an individual could apply for the indigency waiver. This led to indigent probationers failing to comply with the supervised probation conditions, which often resulted in jail time. On October 1, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for both a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Preliminary Injunction (“PI”) enjoining Defendants from “serving and executing any warrant sought and issued on the basis of violation of probation.” On October 13, 2015 the court converted the TRO into a PI. On October 21, 2015, Plaintiffs moved for second PI to “prevent their imminent and unlawful jailing by the defendants.” On December 2, 2015, defendants moved for the court to dismiss the claim based on their alleged qualified immunity as probation officers. On December 17, 2015, Judge Kevin Sharp granted the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction required Rutherford County through PCC to inquire into indigency whenever setting the amount of bond during supervised probation. It also mandated that an individual could not serve jail time if the only probation violation is a nonpayment of funds. The judge called the Defendants' actions towards the indigent Plaintiffs an “extraordinary” injustice. On January 15, 2016, Defendants filed an appeal of the preliminary injunction and requested a stay of the order before a ruling on the appeal. However, on March 15, 2016, both parties filed for voluntary dismissal of the appeal because defendants terminated the contract under which PCC has supervised misdemeanor probationers in Rutherford County. On June 9, 2016, the district court granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion to dismiss, filed on December 2, 2015. On June 28, 2016 the court stayed any remaining motions so that the parties could continue to mediate their case. On July 11, 2016, Defendants appealed the parts of the motion to dismiss that were denied to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In the meantime, the parties continued to work toward a settlement agreement. On October 5, 2017, the parties submitted a settlement agreement to the court. Part of that settlement agreement requested a settlement with a class, specifically “all persons who, at any time from October 1, 2011 to [October 5, 2017], (1) incurred court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Rutherford County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) were supervised on probation in that case by Providence Community Corrections, Inc. or Rutherford County’s Probation Department. Part of that settlement agreement was approved on October 5, 2017, and allowed for the payment of $14,300,000 to the class, with attorneys’ fees coming out of that payment as well. $14,000,000 WAS to be paid by PCC while the remaining $300,000 is to be paid by Rutherford county (though PCC agreed to pay Rutherford County 350,000 to supply this amount). The court certified the class, but, due to missing information about the amount of money each member of the class had incurred as a result of their probation, denied the settlement. The court then allowed the parties to file a new settlement agreement on or before October 18, 2017. On October 18, 2017 the parties filed a second settlement agreement with the court. This was approved on July 18, 2018 by Judge David Lawson approved the final settlement agreement. Each named plaintiff received $10,000. Class members whose probation ended prior to October 1, 2014 was to receive 125% of the amount they paid to PCC from October 1, 2011 to October 1, 2014. Class members whose probation ended after October 1, 2014 were to receive 125% of fees actually paid and an additional $50 per month for each month on probation after October 1, 2014. The agreement also called for payments to the settlement fund administrator, and for attorneys fees and costs amounting to $1,395,761.39. Any remaining funds were to be distributed on a pro rata basis to class members. The county also agreed to the issuance of a permanent inunction that prohibited an individual from being "held in jail for nonpayment of fines, fees, costs or a pre-probation revocation money bond imposed by a court without a determination, following a meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay, that the the individual has the ability to pay such that any nonpayment is willful. The meaningful inquiry into the individual's ability to pay includes, but is not limited to, notice, an opportunity to present evidence, and assistance of appointed counsel." The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcement. The case is now closed.

Summary: A group of indigent probationers sued Rutherford County (TN) and its private probation contractor Providence Community Corrections, alleged that the contract arrangement constituted racketeering and that its penalties for underpayment violated civil rights. On December 2015, Judge Sharp granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The injunction stopped the practice of jail time after an arrest for individuals who only failed to pay the requisite fees. It also required the County and PCC to inquire whether the probationer is indigent when setting bond during supervised probation. On July 18, 2018 Judge David Lawson approved the final settlement agreement.