On February 9, 2015, three individuals whose disability benefits had allegedly been denied or terminated based on examinations performed by a now-disqualified doctor filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Acting Commissioner of Social Security for alleged violations of the Social Security Act and the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the Commissioner wrongfully relied on examinations performed by a physician who, at the time of this complaint, had been disqualified, in denying or terminating their disability benefits. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s policy and practice of relying on this disqualified doctor’s defective examination reports in denying or terminating disability benefits was in violation of a requirement that such determinations be based on evidence from acceptable medical sources. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged that they, and the class members, were never notified that the doctor had been disqualified, nor were they provided copies of his reports at the time of their denial or termination. Represented by the National Senior Citizens Law Center, Legal Aid of San Mateo County, and private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification, and costs and attorneys’ fees. According to the Social Security Act and its implementing regulations, the Social Security Administration “need[s] evidence from acceptable medical sources to establish whether [an individual has] a medically determinable impairment.” The Social Security Administration also mandated that in order to obtain adequate medical evidence of an individual’s disabilities, it was necessary to procure a consultative examination from a qualified medical source. The physician now in question had performed many such examinations in San Francisco and surrounding cities, and had issued reports that he knew were “incorrect or incomplete, including statements that he performed tests he did not in fact perform, and conclusions that were inconsistent with medical evidence already in the record, with no explanation or even acknowledgement of the inconsistency.” After numerous complaints over a period of years, this doctor was disqualified from continuing to provide consultative examinations as of December 30, 2013. However, his prior examination reports continued to be used as competent evidence by the Social Security Administration, and were used in denying and terminating SSI and SSDI benefits. After the plaintiffs filed this complaint, the case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. On February 10, 2015, the court ordered alternative dispute resolution. On March 30, 2015, the case was reassigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar for all further proceedings. On April 20, 2015, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust all administrative remedies available to them, and the court therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction. On June 25, 2015, the court held a hearing on the defendant’ motion to dismiss, which was denied on July 17, 2015. The court held that while the plaintiffs had not exhausted all administrative remedies, a waiver should be granted because “requiring plaintiffs to exhaust administrative remedies would not serve the policies underlying exhaustion.” On August 6, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The case management conference set for August 19 was continued to November 19, 2015 because the court set a class-certification briefing schedule and referred the case to a magistrate judge for settlement, which was set for November 17, 2015. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification on October 14, 2015. 310 F.R.D. 427. Following a series of settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James, the parties came to an agreement on September 19, 2016, and submitted their proposed class action settlement agreement to the court. The agreement provided relief to class members through procedural mechanisms that varied depending on the status of their claims and the amount of time since their examination by the disqualified doctor: Class members with open claims (individuals who had received an unfavorable but not-yet-final determination of their claim) were to be notified that their consultative examination reports were flawed, and that they had the option to have the report excluded from consideration in a forthcoming adjudication. However, the adjudicator had the discretion in each case to consider whether ordering an additional consultative examination would be appropriate. Class members with closed claims (individuals who had received a final unfavorable determination fo their claim) would be eligible for relief through a readjudication process which would not consider the reports created by the disqualified doctor. The individual would also have the opportunity to submit supplemental evidence relating to the previously-adjudicated period. If found to have been disabled for part or all of the period, they would be eligible to receive back payments for missed benefits. This relief would not be granted to individuals in “current pay status” (individuals who were receiving benefits), nor would it be available for individuals whose claims were denied by an adjudication which had afforded no weight to the disqualified doctor’s report. The defendant agreed to begin a study of the processes through which it monitors California’s Disability Determination Services office (and its engagement, review, and retention of consultative examiners), in order to identify mechanisms to improve the monitoring process. The defendant also agree to “issue a document setting out processes for notifying adjudicators when an individual [consultative examination] provider previously engaged by the California [Disability Determination Services] has been disqualified for conduct determined to undermine the credibility of that provider’s reports.” The defendant agreed to pay attorneys’ fees in the amount of $490,000, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice. After preliminarily approving the settlement on November 9, 2016, the court held a final hearing on the settlement on March 16, 2017. On March 17, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, subject to the terms of the settlement agreement. The court granted final approval of the class action settlement on April 17, 2017. The parties requested, and the court ordered, that the parties provide public notice. Since class members would have to take some affirmative steps to reopen their claims, the court ordered the defendant to publish a notice in newspapers, and ordered the plaintiffs’ counsel to provide notice to organizations that were likely to interact with class members. The court maintained jurisdiction over the case to ensure implementation and enforcement of the settlement. On April 25, 2017, the court granted an order amending the settlement. Specifically, the amended settlement:

Replaced the term “Administrative Law Judges” with “Social Security Administration”;
Extended the deadline for mailing request forms;
Clarified language concerning enforcement mechanisms; and
Defined the class as “all persons whose SSI or SSDI benefits were either denied or terminated and for whom a consultative examination was prepared by Dr. Frank Chen, and all persons who received a partially favorable decision or determination on their claim for SSI or SSDI benefits and for whom a consultative examination was prepared by Dr. Chen.”
The court reserved exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the settlement for the purposes of supervising its implementation, enforcement, and construction; the duration of jurisdiction was unspecified. In April 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for enforcement of the settlement agreement, alleging that the Social Security Administration was not complying with the agreement. As required by the agreement, the parties scheduled a series of settlement conferences; however, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, those conferences were postponed by joint stipulation of the parties. As of August 2020, the conferences are pending.

Summary: On February 9, 2015, three individuals whose disability benefits had been denied or terminated based on consultative examinations performed by a now-disqualified doctor filed this class action lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Acting Commissioner of Social Security in her official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she wrongfully relied on consultative examinations performed by a physician, who at the time of this complaint had been disqualified, in denying or terminating their disability benefits. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's policy and practice of relying on this disqualified doctor’s defective consultative examination reports in denying or terminating disability benefits was in violation of requirement that these determinations be based on evidence from acceptable medical sources. After the defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied on July 17, 2015, the court set a number of settlement conferences. For months these conferences were unsuccessful, but the parties reached an agreement on September 19, 2016, in which the defendant agreed to provide various forms of relief to class members, depending on their claim status and the amount of time since their examination by the disqualified doctor. The defendant also agree to pay $490,000 in attorneys’ fees. On April 17, 2017, the court granted final approval of the class action settlement. In April 2020, alleging that the Social Security Administration was not complying with the agreement, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement. As of August 2020, further proceedings are pending (delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic).


On May 8, 2013, a private individual who was previously denied boarding on commercial airline flights filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff brought this action against the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Specifically, the plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, claimed that he was previously denied boarding of flights to and from the United States to his home country of Lebanon. The plaintiff claimed that he was listed on the Transportation Security Administration's No Fly List, which is maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a division of the FBI. Individuals who are listed on the No Fly List are able to complain via the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP) to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiff claimed to have filed three TRIP inquiries with the DHS, to no avail. As such, he had been unable to visit his family members in Lebanon or be present in Lebanon for an ongoing civil suit that he was a participant in. The plaintiff claimed the government's actions violated his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment and his rights under the Administrative Procedures Act to adequate redress regarding his placement on the No Fly List. The plaintiff requested declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and litigation costs. On July 22, 2013, the government moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110. This statute limits jurisdiction of TSA orders to U.S. Courts of Appeal. On December 5, U.S. District Judge Victoria Roberts granted the government's motion and dismissed this case. 2013 WL 8840322. On January 24, 2014, the plaintiff appealed the District Court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The plaintiff argued § 46110 did not apply because he was contesting his placement on the No Fly List by the TSC, which is not part of the TSA. The plaintiff relied on Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, 538 F.3d 1250 (9th Cir. 2008) (NS-CA-0009 in this Clearinghouse), which held that the TSC was not covered by § 46110. On October 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit issued a decision reversing the District Court's dismissal. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit, holding that the plaintiff was indeed challenging a TSC order, not a TSA order. However, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's challenges to the adequacy of the redress process because the TSA was not joined as a defendant. The Sixth Circuit remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings on plaintiff's "Challenge to his alleged placement on the No Fly List by TSC." 2015 WL 6444668. On May 18, 2015, the defendants moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Court granted the motion on August 10, 2016. The Court found that since the defendants issued a letter stating the plaintiff was not on the No Fly List, plaintiff's claim regarding his inclusion on the No Fly List was moot, no live controversy remained, and the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to continue to hear the case. 2016 WL 4205909. The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision on October 17, 2016. On November 13, 2017, the Sixth Circuit Court (Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, Judge Alice Moore Batchelder, and Judge Ronald Lee Gilman) affirmed the district court's August 10 decision. As the issue on remand was narrowly plaintiff's challenge to his placement on the No Fly List by TSC, and the defendant stipulated that the plaintiff was not on that list, the issue before the court was resolved. Although the plaintiff alleged placement on other watch lists, the district court could not resolve those claims as it was not within the issue before the court, the plaintiff could not identify those lists, and the district court was given no basis for relief regarding those lists. 876 F.3d 167. As of March 25, 2018, there has been no action on the docket since November 21, 2017.

Summary: In May 2013, a private individual who claimed he was listed on the TSA's No Fly List filed this lawsuit against the DOJ and FBI. The plaintiff claimed his placement on the No Fly List violated his Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment, and that there was inadequate redress process regarding his placement on the No Fly List. The defendants issued a letter stating the plaintiff was not on the no fly list, because of this letter, the case was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed this decision and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The case is closed.


This case is a response to efforts by the Trump Administration to strip law enforcement funding from “sanctuary” cities and states unless their governments agree to participate in federal immigration enforcement. The City of Chicago previously sued the Department of Justice over these conditions in 2017; details of that ongoing case can be found here. The City of Chicago filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on October 12, 2018. The plaintiff, represented by its Department of Law and private attorneys, sued the U.S. Attorney General under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The plaintiff claimed that immigration-related conditions imposed by the government on federal funding to the city were unauthorized by Congress, ultra vires, and in violation of principles of federalism. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as an injunction to prevent the government from imposing the conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) program, which provided support for Chicago law enforcement. The case was assigned to Judge Harry D. Leinenweber. In its complaint, the plaintiff pointed out that this court had recently struck down many of the same conditions at issue here, referring to a permanent injunction that had been entered to prevent the conditions from being applied to Byrne JAG grants in the prior fiscal year. The plaintiff alleged that despite this injunction, the government was again attempting to impose unlawful immigration-related conditions on the Byrne JAG grants for fiscal year 2018. The plaintiff stated that three of the FY2018 conditions were materially identical to FY2017 conditions which had already been set aside by the court. These conditions required grant recipients to: give the federal government 48-hour notice prior to an arrestee’s release; give federal immigration officials unlimited access to local police stations and law enforcement facilities; and comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which bars local governments from restricting their employees from sharing citizenship and immigration status information with federal immigration authorities. The plaintiff also alleged that the government added an additional unlawful condition for FY2018: requiring cities to certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1644, meaning they would not publicly disclose federal law enforcement information in an attempt to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection fugitives from justice or undocumented immigrants. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 17, 2018, addressing the issue of Attorney General Sessions’s resignation, which occurred in November. The plaintiff alleged that Matthew Whitaker’s assumption of Sessions’s duties violated federal law and the Appointments Clause. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that since the city received an award letter for its FY2018 Byrne JAG grant shortly after Whitaker took over, Whitaker could not impose the challenged grant conditions on Chicago, because he could not lawfully exercise the powers of the Attorney General. The plaintiff later abandoned this claim because Whitaker was appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate in February 2019. The government filed a motion for partial dismissal on March 1, 2019, with regard to the plaintiff's claims not already covered by the district court's ruling in the 2017 case. On April 3, 2019, Chicago filed a motion for partial summary judgment on its claims that the conditions imposed on FY2018 Byrne JAG awards were ultra vires, violated the separation of powers and the Spending Clause, and were contrary to law and arbitrary and capricious. On September 19, 2019, Judge Leinenweber granted in part and denied in part both parties' motions. First, he held that Chicago had sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact to establish standing. Next, he found that DOJ's proposed placement of these conditions was final agency action subject to judicial review, and that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to place the conditions on the city's receipt of Byrne JAG funding; thus, the DOJ's imposition of the conditions violated the separation of powers and was ultra vires. He also held that § 1644 violated the Tenth Amendment because it prevented state or local government entities/officials from prohibiting disclosure of immigration statute to or from federal immigration authorities (he noted that § 1644's language was essentially identical to § 1373, which had been found unconstitutional in the 2017 case). Finally, he decided that a permanent injunction was warranted. Judge Leinenweber noted that the district court's last injunction, in the 2017 litigation, was limited to the FY2017 Byrne JAG program in the hope that the DOJ would not reimpose its unlawful conditions. But, because the DOJ did impose the conditions again in FY2018, the Judge found it appropriate to enter a permanent injunction covering all future years of the Byrne JAG program. However, because the nationwide scope of the injunction in the 2017 case was currently stayed pending decision from the Seventh Circuit, the Judge stayed the nationwide scope of the injunction in this case, pending the outcome of that appeal. 405 F.Supp.3d 748. On November 18, 2019, the government filed an appeal to the Seventh Circuit (docket no. 19-3290). On November 20, 2019, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeal of the injunction in this case with the appeal of the injunction in the 2017 case, City of Chicago v. Sessions. On March 6, 2020, Chicago filed a motion for attorney fees with the district court. On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Judge Leinenweber's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide. The Court found that while the executive branch has significant powers in the realm of immigration, it does not have Congress' power of the purse and thus cannot withhold Byrne JAG grants in order to force Chicago to alter its behavior. The Court affirmed the district court's grants of declaratory relief to Chicago, finding that the Attorney General exceeded the authority delegated to him by Congress in imposing the challenged conditions to the FY2017 and FY2018 grants, and that the Attorney General's decision to impose the conditions in both years violated the separation of powers. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutionality of § 1373 under the anti-commandeering doctrine. The government had relied on language in 34 U.S.C. § 10153 to support its imposition of the compliance condition. § 10153 stated that in a request for a grant, the application shall include a certification that the applicant "will comply with all provisions of this part and all other applicable Federal laws." The government had argued that the reference to "all other applicable Federal laws" allowed it to require that applicants certify compliance with § 1373. However, the Seventh Circuit disagreed with this interpretation and instead found that the phrase could not be construed so broadly as to encompass all federal laws that applied to states or localities, including federal immigration statutes. The Court also held that a nationwide injunction was proper due to the interconnected nature of applicants for the Byrne JAG grants. In order for the grant amounts to be properly calculated for Chicago, the Court held that the unlawful conditions could not be imposed elsewhere. Finally, the Court remanded for the district court to determine whether any other injunctive relief was appropriate in light of its determination that § 10153 could not be used to incorporate laws unrelated to the grants or grantees. 957 F.3d 772. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On October 12, 2018, Chicago sued the Attorney General for imposing immigration-related conditions on federal funding for law enforcement (specifically, FY2018 Byrne JAG grants). The city requested an injunction to prevent the government from imposing the conditions moving forward. On September 19, 2019, the district court granted summary judgment for the city and issued a permanent injunction covering all future years of Byrne JAG funding. The government appealed, and the Seventh Circuit consolidated the appeal with the appeal of an injunction issued in the related case, City of Chicago v. Sessions (which challenged the same funding restrictions, but for FY2017 Byrne JAG grants). On April 30, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of injunctive relief to Chicago and extended it nationwide.


On May 13, 2005, attorneys for the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law and Los Angeles Center for Law and Justice instituted a nationwide class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, on behalf of immigrant youth who were formerly dependents of state courts because they had been abused, abandoned, or neglected, and who petitioned for classification as "special immigrant juveniles" (SIJ) under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(27)(J) & 1255(a). To qualify for SIJ classification, a noncitizen first had to receive a "predicate order" from a state juvenile court finding that 1) the child was dependent on the court or a state agency; 2) the child was eligible for long-term foster care due to abuse, neglect or abandonment; and 3) it would not be in the child's best interest to be returned to his or her home country. After receiving the predicate order, the juvenile could apply for SIJ status, and if granted, could then apply for adjustment to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status under 8 U.S.C. §1255. Certain restrictions affected minors applying for SIJ classification. The SIJ statute contained a provision, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(27)(J)(iii)(I), that limited state court jurisdiction with respect to immigrant children in federal custody ("in-custody minors"). The provision stated that a state court could not "determine the custody status or placement" of in-custody minors unless Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") specifically consented to state court jurisdiction. In addition to that "specific consent" restriction, the government also implemented "age-out" regulations, see 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.11(c)(1), 204.11(c)(5),205.1(a)(3)(iv)(A, C, & D), under which a minor would "age-out" of eligibility if the child turned 21 years old before being granted SIJ status or SIJ-based adjustment. Another restriction provided that any SIJ-classified juvenile who was in removal proceedings could only seek adjustment of status from a Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") or immigration judge. Plaintiffs' class action lawsuit challenged those restrictions ("specific consent" provision, the "age-out" regulations and removal restriction) as unlawfully interfering with the abused minors' access to the courts, denying them due process and unreasonably delaying or restricting the adjudications of the minors' SIJ applications. The government denied that the restrictions were unlawful and moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and standing. The District Court (Judge Dean D. Pregerson) granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their complaint, filing the fourth amended version in September 2006. (This document is not available via PACER.) Plaintiffs then moved for a TRO, a preliminary injunction and class certification. The government opposed the motions. At the request of the court, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment on certain questions of law raised by the case. On January 8, 2008, Judge Pregerson certified the case as a class action, creating two subclasses: (1) a specific consent subclass (minors whose requests for specific consent to state court jurisdiction were denied or ignored by the government prior to their attaining 18 years of age) and (2) an age-out sub-class (minors whose petitions for SIJ classification were denied because of age-out regulations). He denied creation of a removal subclass for minors whose applications for SIJ-based adjustment of status were not adjudicated because they were in removal proceedings. Judge Pregerson also considered the parties' partial summary judgment submissions and made several conclusions of law. On the challenge to the "specific consent" requirement, he found that where an SIJ-predicate order from a state juvenile court only made a determination regarding the welfare and best interests of the child, and made no recommendations as to the custody or status, no specific consent was required. Judge Pregerson issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining the government from requiring specific consent before an immigrant minor in federal custody could seek an SIJ-predicate order in state court. Judge Pregerson declined to enjoin the government's application of the "age-out" restrictions and the removal regulations. The Judge, however, noted that the plaintiffs could still raise claims that the government unreasonably delayed adjudication of the SIJ applications of immigrant minors subject to the age-out regulations and that it abused its discretion in the application of the removal regulations. 248 F.R.D. 248 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2008). After Judge Pregerson declined defendants' request for a stay of the injunction, 2008 WL 11336794 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2008), defendants filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on February 5, 2008 (Case No. 08-55195). On February 19, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal. Following negotiations under the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program, the parties concluded a class-wide settlement agreement. On August 11, 2010, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal without prejudice to reinstatement pending the district court's determination of whether to approve the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement (2010 WL 9594539, C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2010) provides relief to the certified sub-classes as well as the removal sub-class that the court had declined to certify. Benefiting the specific consent subclass, the Settlement Agreement provides that defendants will not require specific consent except when a juvenile is in the custody of HHS and the juvenile seeks a state court order determining or altering the juvenile's custody status or placement. In cases where specific consent is required, the Agreement sets standards and procedures for the disposition of specific consent requests. Benefiting the age-out subclass, defendants have agreed that USCIS will not deny or revoke a class member's SIJ status petition or SIJ-based adjustment of status application on account of age or dependency status if, at the time the class member files the petition or application, he or she is under 21 years of age or is the subject of a valid dependency order even if that dependency order is thereafter terminated on the basis of age. Additionally, USCIS will not deny or revoke a class member's SIJ status petition or SIJ-based adjustment of status application on account of ineligibility for long-term foster care. And for the removal subclass, defendants agree that ICE will join motions to reopen removal proceedings when the juvenile (i) requests such joinder within 60 days of being notified by USCIS that it has granted him or her SIJ status; and (ii) is not inadmissible or removal grounds that disqualify him or her from adjustment of status. The agreement became effective when it was approved by the court on December 15, 2010, and was to be in force for 6 years. On January 14, 2011, plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act. On June 19, 2012 the parties submitted a joint stipulation for settlement of attorneys' fees and litigation costs. Defendants agreed to pay plaintiffs $1,109,441. The court approved the stipulated attorneys' fees on July 3, 2012. On July 21, 2014, plaintiffs moved for class-wide enforcement of the settlement. Plaintiffs alleged that after two-and-a-half years of compliance (granting SIJ status to class members who filed under age 21 even if they were no longer subjects of valid dependency orders), defendants now demanded that applicants still were subjects of valid dependency orders. After settlement talks, on Apr. 8, 2015 Judge Pregerson ordered defendants to pay plaintiffs $105,000 for expenses related to the motion for enforcement, under the Equal Access to Justice Act. After the agreement had ended, on June 9, 2017, plaintiffs again moved to enforce the settlement. In this instance, plaintiffs alleged that four children who had been detained for 18 months despite having received SIJ status in 2016 were "absent class members." Defendants denied that the agreement applied to these children because ICE had issued expedited removal orders before they received SIJ status. Plaintiffs sought the Court to order ICE to join in the children's request to reopen their removal proceedings, and plaintiffs then planned to seek adjustment of status for them. Judge Pregerson held a motion hearing on July 10, 2017. One news source describes the hearing. On July 13, 2017, plaintiffs moved to supplement the motion. They argued that the Central District of California's recently-issued order on the Flores agreement should also guide the court's interpretation of this agreement. Specifically, plaintiffs read the Flores agreement to require that children in expedited removal proceedings be treated the same as other class members. Defendants responded on July 20, arguing that the Flores agreement was not relevant here; plaintiffs replied on July 22. Plaintiffs updated the court on Sept. 15 that an Immigration Judge had released the children from detention, but that they risked being re-detained if they could not request that an Immigration Judge grant them LPR status. The court did not respond to this supplement, and the case has been closed.

Summary: On May 13, 2005, this nationwide class action suit was filed on behalf of immigrant youth who petitioned for classification as "special immigrant juveniles" (SIJ). A class-wide settlement agreement lasted from 2010-16, but plaintiffs moved to enforce it again in 2017 on behalf of absent class members. The case is now closed.


Plaintiff, Disability Rights Mississippi ("DRMS"), filed this lawsuit against CARES, Inc. (initially identified in Complaint as Mississippi Children's Home Services) on September 6, 2013, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Defendant, a non-profit organization, operated CARES Center, a residential treatment facility for children with severe emotional or behavioral disabilities. Plaintiff asserted that, as Mississippi's designated Protection & Advocacy organization for individuals with disabilities, it had monitoring authority over the CARES Center under federal P&A Acts. Plaintiff alleged that between July and August of 2013, defendant had denied both DRMS and the Southern Poverty Law Center ("SPLC") - which had contracted with DRMS to conduct monitoring visits - access to its facilities despite numerous attempts to explain DRMS's and SPLC's authority to conduct such visits under federal law. After defendant wrote a letter formally denying plaintiff access to its facilities, plaintiff filed this lawsuit. Plaintiff brought claims under the federal P&A Acts and their accompanying regulations (42 U.S.C §§ 10805(a)(3), 15043 (a)(2)(H); 42 C.F.R. § 51.42(c); 45 C.F.R. §1386.22(g). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring it and SPLC access to the CARES Center. Plaintiff filed the Complaint along with a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 13, 2013, Defendant filed an Answer and Counterclaim. Defendant sought a declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C §2201 stating that DRMS's authority to access the facility did not extend to unlimited and general operational investigations, but only to limited investigations of abuse or neglect. On January 2, 2014, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss this counterclaim. On February 5, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in the case. The statement asserted that the PAIMI Act was intended to provide P&A organizations with broad access to facilities like CARES, even in the absence of allegations of abuse or neglect. It also stated that monitoring is an important part of P&A organizations' mandate to protect vulnerable populations. Accordingly, the statement argued that plaintiff should have reasonable unaccompanied access to the CARES facilities. On September 24, 2014, after the parties notified the court that they had reached a tentative working agreement, the court placed all pending motions - including plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction - on its inactive docket. On September 28, 2015, the parties jointly filed a stipulation of dismissal along with a sealed Settlement Agreement. While there is no formal dismissal on the record, there has been no action in the case since September of 2015.

Summary: Plaintiff, Disability Rights Mississippi, brought this suit against CARES, Inc., a home for children with severe emotional and behavioral disabilities, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia on September 6, 2013. As Mississippi's designated Protection & Advocacy organization, plaintiff argued that defendant was required to grant its staff members access to CARES facilities for monitoring purposes, but that defendant had denied plaintiff access. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief granting it reasonable monitoring access under federal P&A laws. After the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest supporting plaintiff's claims, the parties reached a private settlement agreement in September of 2014.


The plaintiff is a Pennsylvania-based law firm who employed the (female) decedent, Ellyn Farley, who married her wife, Jennifer Tobits, in Toronto in 2006. Farley died in 2010. The issue in this case is who should get Farley's death benefits, under an ERISA-covered plan, payable by her former employer, Cozen O'Connor. Cozen filed this action on January 4, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, naming both Farley's parents and Tobits as defendants and seeking court guidance on which of those claimants should receive the benefits. Cozen has asked to court to allow it to pay the contested benefits into some kind of registry or escrow account, and then exit the dispute while the claimants either settled or litigated the matter. (It also sought attorney's fees.) While it has taken no position on the constitutionality of DOMA, it has argued in court that its plan does not define spouse to mean something different than the federal definition--which, under DOMA, means that only opposite-sex spouses are included. (A different definition was possible, Cozen says, but its plan did not take that approach.) Thus, Cozen has argued, if DOMA is constitutional, the benefits should go to Farley's parents. Tobits is represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights; she takes the position that Tobits meets the definition of Farley's "spouse" in the firm's benefits plan, that the federal Defense of Marriage Act does not prevent private employers from respecting the marriages of same-sex couples, and that if DOMA did apply, it would be unconstitutional to deny plan benefits on that basis. Both the United States and the "Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group" (which has been designated by the Speaker of the House to defend the constitutionality of DOMA, given the U.S.'s position that the statute is not, in fact, constitutional) have entered the case. On September 25, 2012, the Court ordered that the case be put on hold while the U.S. Supreme Court decided whether to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in other cases challenging DOMA. According to NCLR's website, in November 2012, Tobits won the related issue in Pennsylvania Probate Court, and was recognized as the sole heir and legal representative of Farley's estate. On July 8, 2013, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group submitted a consent motion to withdraw as an intervenor-defendant, following the Supreme Court's holding in Windsor that § 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional. The motion was granted by the Court on July 11, 2013. On July 29, 2013, the Court found that pursuant to the benefits plan, meant to be governed by ERISA, designated benefits go to any surviving spouse, with no further definition of spouse. Following the outcome of Windsor, Tobits was the legally recognized spouse and was awarded Ms. Farley's death benefits. The Court also ordered that Cozen O'Connor deposit all money due under the plan into the registry of the court, and relieved it of any further liability to Tobits or the Farleys, but did not grant it attorneys' fees. On August 23, 2013, the Farleys appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. On August 30, 2013, the Farleys moved to voluntarily dismiss their appeal, which was granted by the Court on September 23, 2013.

Summary: The plaintiff is a Pennsylvania-based law firm who employed the (female) decedent, Ellyn Farley, who married her wife, Jennifer Tobits, in Toronto in 2006. Farley died in 2010. The issue in this case is who should get Farley's death benefits, payable by her former employer, Cozen O'Connor. Cozen filed this action on January 4, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) prevents the firm from paying the benefits to Tobits, who claimed them. Tobits is represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights; she takes the position that Tobits meets the definition of "spouse" in the firm's benefits plan, that DOMA does not prevent private employers from respecting the marriages of same-sex couples, and that if DOMA did apply, it would be unconstitutional to deny plan benefits on that basis. On September 25, 2012, the Court ordered that the case be put on hold while the U.S. Supreme Court decides whether to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari in other cases challenging DOMA. Following the Supreme Court's decision in DOMA, the Court found on July 29, 2013, that Tobits should receive all death benefits as Ms. Farley's surviving spouse. Cozen O'Connor paid all benefits due into a court registry and was relieved of any further liability to Tobits or the Farleys. The Farleys appealed the decision to the Third Circuit, but moved to dismiss their appeal on August 30, 2013. Their motion was granted and the case closed on September 23, 2013.


On November 10, 2003, a group of 17 undocumented immigrant workers, who provided janitorial services at Wal-Mart stores nationwide, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Wal-Mart Stores Inc., alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.; the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. §§201 et seq.; and conspiracy to violate civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1985(3). Plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart Inc. was engaged in a criminal racketeering enterprise through which it conspired with various cleaning contractors to hire illegal labor to clean its thousands of stores throughout the country, thereby saving millions of dollars in labor costs. Plaintiffs' complaint, as amended, provided a detailed litany of alleged acts committed by Wal-Mart employees and others in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy to violate federal immigration law and to commit money laundering. Plaintiffs alleged that they and other class members were denied proper wages, overtime, and benefits. They sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. In early 2004, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which included factual allegations concerning immigration raids that had been recently conducted at Wal-Mart stores. Plaintiffs noted that on October 23, 2003, federal officers with the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raided Wal-Mart retail stores in 21 states as part of "Operation Rollback." Hundreds of janitors were arrested, including 12 of the named plaintiffs. Federal agents also raided Wal-Mart's Bentonville, Arkansas headquarters. Following the filing of the Amended Complaint, the parties notified the District Court that in March 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice had reached an $11 million global civil settlement with Wal-Mart in connection with its immigration investigation. Several of Wal-Mart's janitorial contractors also agreed to a $4 million criminal forfeiture. Wal-Mart denied all allegations and moved to dismiss the entire case. By order dated October 7, 2005, the District Court (Judge Joseph A. Greenway Jr.) granted Wal-Mart's motion to dismiss in part, dismissing plaintiffs' RICO claims. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F.Supp.2d 295 (D.N.J.2005). Plaintiff was granted leave to amend its complaint again to restate its claims. Following the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, Wal-Mart moved to dismiss the realleged RICO claims. On August 28, 2006, the District Court dismissed two RICO related counts of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 447 F.Supp.2d 379, 383-84 (D.N.J.2006). Plaintiffs' request for certifying the August 28, 2006 Order as a final judgment for immediate appeal was denied. Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007 WL 1134110 (D.N.J.). In 2004, the Court granted conditional class certification for any undocumented immigrants who were working for Wal-Mart as contract janitors, and 200 additional plaintiffs joined the case as a result. However, when the plaintiffs filed for final certification of the conditional class in 2009, the Court denied their motion. Under 29 U.S.C. §216(b), class certification can be granted under the FLSA for other employees “similarly situated.” Although the plaintiffs argued that they should be granted certification because they all had similar job-related duties, the Court reasoned that there was too much variation in geographic location, salaries, and supervision for the motion to be granted. In March 2011, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which Wal-Mart paid damages to seven of the ten remaining plaintiffs for the amount of overtime that they had worked but had not been compensated for, plus $20,000 in attorneys’ fees. Wal-Mart settled with two of the other plaintiffs in April 2011 for $13,000 apiece plus attorneys’ fees. The Court dismissed the claims of the remaining plaintiff with prejudice because he failed to participate in court proceedings and could not be reached by his attorneys. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2003, undocumented janitors filed a class action lawsuit against Wal-Mart, alleging that the company was engaged in a criminal racketeering enterprise through which it conspired with various cleaning contractors to hire illegal labor to clean its thousands of stores throughout the country, thereby saving millions of dollars in labor costs. The plaintiffs sought damages for unpaid overtime and injunctive and declaratory relief. The Court denied them class certification, reasoning that the situations of the plaintiffs were too diverse in terms of geography, duties, and supervision, but Wal-Mart settled with nine of the plaintiffs in 2011, paying them for their overtime and reasonable attorneys' fees. This case is now closed.


On February 4, 2013, the Christian owners of a nursing home and assisted-living corporation and the corporation itself filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance Defending Freedom-DC and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring the corporation to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene both their Christian faith and compel speech and association contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 15, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On July 3, 2013, U.S. District Judge Daniel issued an order deferring all motions in this case pending resolution upon remand of the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius. On September 6, 2013, the court issued an order granting a preliminary injunction. On October 21, 2013, the court issued an order staying the action pending the Supreme Court's disposition of the Government's petition for writ of certiorari in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius. On November 5, 2013, the defendants filed a notice of appeal of the preliminary injunction to the Tenth Circuit. On November 7, 2013, the Tenth Circuit granted the defendant's motion to abate the case pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. On September 4, 2014, following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, the Tenth Circuit granted government's motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal. On January 27, 2015, the District Court ordered an injunction against the government, prohibiting it from enforcing against the plaintiffs the version of the contraception mandate challenged in Hobby Lobby. The district court also ordered the parties to come to an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: The Christian owners of a closely-held corporation filed a lawsuit on February 4, 2013, seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and First Amendment. On January 27, 2015, following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby, the district court granted a permanent injunction against the government, prohibiting it from enforcing the version of the contraceptive mandate challenged in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs.


On September 30, 2015, Yahya Farooq Mohammad, Ibrahim Zubair Mohammad, Asif Ahmed Salim, and Sultane Roome Salim were indicted in U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Ohio for conspiracy to provide and conceal material support and resources to terrorists, for providing material support and resources to terrorists and for conspiracy to obstruct justice. Farooq Mohammad and Ibrahim Mohammad were additionally indicted for conspiracy to commit bank fraud. The defendants were appointed federal public defenders and retained private counsel. The case was assigned to District Judge Jack Zouhary. On December 21, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice notified the criminal defendants in this case that some of the evidence the government intended to use against them came from a FISA warrantless wiretap, pursuant to Sec. 702 of the FISA Amendment Acts of 2008. This notice allows criminal defendants to challenge the constitutionality of the government's surveillance techniques. All cases challenging this provision are available in the Foreign Targeting (702, 703, 704) special collection. On July 6, 2016, Yahya Mohammad was indicted in another case (3:16-cr-00222) in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Ohio for attempted first degree murder of a federal officer, solicitation to commit a crime of violence, and use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of a murder-for-hire. While Yahya Mohammad was detained and housed at the Lucas County Corrections Center in Toledo, Ohio, pending resolution of this case, he had told another inmate that he wanted to hire someone to kill Judge Zouhary. The inmate reported Mohammad to the FBI and introduced Mohammad to an FBI undercover employee, who posed as someone willing to kill Judge Zouhary for money. On July 12, 2016, Judge Zouhary ordered recusal of himself from the case due to Yahya Mohammad's attempt to murder him. Chief Judge Solomon Oliver of the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of Ohio had requested that Chief Judge Guy Cole of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals appoint an out-of-district judge to hear both cases due to their close relation with each other. The cases were transferred to Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. from the Southern District of Ohio. On September 30, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for disclosure of FISA-related materials and to suppress the fruits or derivatives obtained from warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. On November 18, 2016, the government filed an ex parte in camera motion for a protective order pursuant to Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedures Act and Rule 16(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The government filed a supplemental motion on February 16, 2018. Both motions were submitted under seal with the Classified Information Security Officer. On July 18, 2017, Chief Judge Cole of the Sixth Circuit reassigned Yahya Mohammad's three co-defendants, Ibrahim Mohammad, Asif Salim, and Sultane Salim, to District Judge Jeffrey J. Helmick. However, Judge Sargas was to continue hearing the cases in regard to Yahya Mohammad. On November 8, 2017, after Yahya Mohammad pled guilty to one count of providing material support to terrorists in this case (count 1) and one count of solicitation to commit a crime of violence (against Judge Zouhary) in case 3:16-cr-222 (count 2), Judge Sargus sentenced Mohammad to 180 months (minus time served) for count 1 and 240 months for count 2, with 90 of those months to run concurrently with count 1. The remaining 150 months were to run consecutively with count 1 for a total of 330 months; 10 years supervised released; and a $200 special assessment fee. No fines or restitution were imposed. On March 20, 2018, Judge Helmick granted the government's motion for a protective order (originally filed on November 18, 2016) under Section 4 of the Classified Information Procedure's Act (CIPA). Judge Helmick denied the defendants' motions to suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA, to suppress fruits or derivatives of electronic surveillance, to compel discovery, and for disclosure related to FISA amendments. He noted that he had provided classified versions of his opinion to the Classified Information Security Officer for service to the relevant agencies for classification review. On September 11, 2018, an unclassified version of Judge Helmick's opinion on the government's classified, ex parte, in camera motion for a protective order was released. 339 F.Supp.3d 724. Although even the unclassified version of the opinion is heavily redacted, it shows Judge Helmick finding that the defendants' objections to an ex parte, in camera review of the government's Section 4 filing without merit because none of the government's surveillance had been deemed unlawful. He further noted that nothing he had seen in his review of the classified documents in this case suggested that the government was using CIPA to conceal unlawful surveillance techniques. Furthermore, although he acknowledged that he was "not in an optimal position to act as surrogate defense counsel," Judge Helmick maintained that he had sufficient knowledge of the case and the defendants' theories of the case to determine whether the government's Section 4 filings discussed information that would be relevant and helpful to the defense. On September 11, 2018, Judge Helmick released an unclassified memorandum opinion denying the defendants' several motions regarding the government's FISA evidence. First, he denied the defendants' request for disclosure of the FISA materials because he concluded that the challenged FISA collection was lawful. Therefore, Judge Helmick believed that disclosure to the defendants was not necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the surveillance. He rejected the defendants' argument that disclosure of FISA materials are permitted to the extent that due process requires it; the Sixth Circuit had already rejected an argument similar to the defendants', holding that "FISA's requirement that the district court conduct an ex parte, in camera review of FISA materials does not deprive a defendant of due process." Second, Judge Helmick denied the defendants' motion for suppression of the evidence obtained or derived from FISA surveillance and physical searches because he found that the surveillance and searches were conducted in compliance with the FISC's orders, which had properly found the existence of probable cause. Meanwhile, the government negotiated plea agreements with the remaining defendants. On April 11, 2018 the government filed informations in separate cases charging all three defendants with financing terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339C. All three defendants immediately pleaded guilty to the new charges. The case against Ibrahim Zubair Mohammad was docketed as 3:18-cr-165 and Asif Ahmed Salim and Sultane Roome Salim's cases were docketed as 3:18-cr-186. Judge Helmick continued to preside over the new cases. According to a DOJ press release the basis for these charges was providing money to the radical cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, who was later killed by an American drone strike in Yemen. All three were sentenced between November 9, 2018 and January 22, 2019. Ibrahim Zubair Mohammad and Sultane Roome Saslim received sentences of 60 months incarceration and Asif Ahmed Salim received a sentence of 72 months incarceration. At the sentencing, the government moved to dismiss the original 2015 charges cases against them the three defendants. Judge Helmick granted all these requests. None of these defendants appealed their convictions or sentences and all their cases are presumably closed, though Sultane Roome Salime filed a motion for compassionate release in February of 2021. Two years after his sentencing on September 9, 2019, Yahya Farooq Mohammad filed a notice of appeal to the United States Court of Appeals to the Sixth Circuit. That case was docketed as 19-3870. The Sixth Circuit denied Mohammed a certificate of appealability on August 11, 2020. There has been no action in Mohammed's case since that date and it is presumably closed.

Summary: In September 2015, the U.S. government brought a criminal case against four defendants charged with providing and attempting to provide material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization, bank fraud, and obstruction of justice. The defendants were subject to surveillance under FISA. One of the defendants--whose case was delayed and transferred after he tried to hire an undercover FBI operative to kill the presiding judge--pled guilty and was sentenced. The other three codefendants plead guilty after the court denied their motion to suppress the FISA evidence against them.


On July 22, 2005, a detainee at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station, by his next friend, filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by attorneys from a civil rights firm and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiff also brought suit under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The petitioner alleged violations of the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment; the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Article II of the U.S. Constitution; the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); and customary international humanitarian and human rights law. Specifically, the petitioner claimed he was subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse while in custody, including beatings, threats of rendition to countries which practice torture, sexual humiliation, exposure to extreme temperatures, deprivation of medical care, and solitary confinement. The petitioner requested that the court grant a writ of habeas corpus, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. However, Guantánamo Bay detainees are not permitted to meet with an attorney without a court-issued protective order and the petitioner's original counsel failed to move for entry of such an order. A new attorney from the Equal Justice Initiative appeared on behalf of the petitioner on December 17, 2007 and moved for a protective order to allow the petitioner to meet with his attorney. U.S. District Judge Gladys Kessler granted the motion on April 14, 2008. On January 28, 2009, the petitioner filed an unopposed motion to stay this action because he was still unable to meet with counsel in a meaningful way. The petitioner requested that the action be stayed until he was able to meet with his counsel. Judge Kessler granted the motion. On June 30, 2013, the petitioner, along with three other similar detainees, filed an application for a preliminary injunction with the District Court to prevent the government from force-feeding them. These petitioners undertook a hunger strike in protest of their prolonged detentions at Guantánamo Bay. In response, the government began force-feeding them by using nasogastric tube feeding (whereby a tube is passed through the nose to the stomach) in order to provide enough sustenance to continue the petitioners' detentions. The petitioners also requested an expeditious hearing because this force-feeding would deprive the petitioners of the ability to participate in the upcoming Ramadan fast. On July 8, 2013, Judge Kessler denied the application. 952 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2013). Judge Kessler noted that it was "perfectly clear . . . that force-feeding is a painful, humiliating, and degrading process." However, she held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, based on a prior decision by the District Court, Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F. Supp. 2d 111 (D.D.C. 2009). The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on July 11, arguing that Al-Adahi was incorrectly decided, based on legal authorities not previously presented. However, Judge Kessler denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration on August 29, and the petitioners appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on September 3. The D.C. Circuit affirmed Judge Kessler's decision on on February 11, 2014. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The D.C. Circuit held that while federal courts did have habeas jurisdiction to hear challenges to the conditions of confinement at Guantánamo Bay, the petitioners had not made a sufficient showing of a likelihood of success on the merits for preliminary relief because force-feeding served a "legitimate penological interest." However, the D.C. Circuit left open the possibility that the District Court could allow "petitioners a 'meaningful opportunity' to make" an adequate showing. Based on this holding, the petitioner, as an individual, again moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the government's force-feeding on April 18, 2014, now represented by attorneys from a civil rights firm and Reprieve, a U.K.-based human rights organization. The petitioner also filed an emergency motion compelling the preservation of evidence and limited discovery on May 13, to allow the petitioner to gather evidence of forcible cell extractions and force-feedings for the hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. On May 16, 2014, Judge Kessler converted the upcoming motion hearing into a status conference and also entered a Temporary Restraining Order to prevent any cell extractions and force-feeding until a hearing could be held on the issue. A bench conference regarding the motion for preliminary injunction was held on May 21, 2014, and on May 22 Judge Kessler entered an order denying a re-issuance of the TRO. The petitioner had indicated that he was willing to be enterally fed (directly into the stomach through the skin) if the feeding "could be done at the hospital in Guantánamo Bay, if he could be spared the agony of having the feeding tubes inserted and removed for each feeding, and if he could be spared the pain and discomfort of the restraint chair." However, the government refused to make these compromises. Judge Kessler noted that the court was as a result faced with an "anguishing" choice: either re-issue the TRO preventing force-feeding which would likely result in the petitioner's death by starvation, or refuse to re-issue the TRO and allowing force-feeding to continue. Judge Kessler could not let the petitioner die, and thus refused to re-issue the TRO. On May 23, Judge Kessler issued another order granting the petitioner's motion for limited discovery. On June 20, 2014, a group of 16 news media organizations filed a motion to intervene to enforce the public's right of access to the video evidence being gathered for this action. On August 8, 2014, the court granted a government motion to for an interim protective order against the release of the video evidence by plaintiff's counsel. 2014 WL 4057054. The news media organizations requested that the video evidence be unsealed for publishing. Judge Kessler granted this motion on October 3, 2014. 2014 WL 5100602. On December 3, 2014, the government appealed this result to the D.C. Circuit. Judge Kessler held a hearing on the petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction from October 6 to 8, 2014. Judge Kessler denied a motion from the government to close the hearing to the public. 70 F. Supp. 3d 465. On November 7, Judge Kessler denied the petitioner's motion for preliminary injunction, holding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate the "deliberate indifference" standard set forth in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). On November 10, the petitioner appealed the decision to the D.C. Circuit. On December 8, 2014, the government notified the District Court that the petitioner had been transferred from Guantánamo Bay Naval Station to the government of Uruguay. On December 19, the petitioner moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. The D.C. Circuit granted the motion on March 9, 2015. Although the petitioner was no longer a Guantánamo Bay detainee, the government's appeal of Judge Kessler's order to unseal video evidence of force-feeding proceeded. On May 29, 2015, the D.C. Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide on the government's appeal of the unsealing of video evidence of force-feeding. 787 F.3d 563 (D.C. Cir. 2015). On July 10, 2015, Judge Kessler ordered the government to complete redaction of the video evidence for the intervenors. The government filed a motion to reconsider on July 22. Judge Kessler denied the motion on October 27, 2015. Additional motions were argued and ruled upon regarding the exact extent of the redactions, with the result that Judge Kessler ordered all audio and visual information identifying government personnel redacted from the tapes. (151 F.Supp.3d 28 and 70 F.Supp.3d 486). The parties cross appealed from Judge Kessler's ruling, with the plaintiff and press intervenors seeking narrower redactions and the government seeking to withhold the tape entirely. On March 31, 2017, a D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel (consisting of Judges Randolph, Rogers, and Williams) issued an opinion reversing the District Court and forbidding the release of the tapes. 852 F.3d 1087. The court highlighted that the tapes could be used as propaganda against the United States, and that images showing the interior of the Guantanamo facility posed a security risk to the facility. The case is now closed.

Summary: In July 2005, a detainee at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The petitioner claimed he was subjected to severe physical and psychological abuse while in custody, and requested that the court grant the writ of habeas corpus, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. In June 2013, the petitioner, along with three other similar detainees, began challenging the government's policy of force-feeding them during hunger strikes protesting conditions at Guantánamo Bay. The petitioner was released in December 2014 rendering the action moot. However, a group of news media organizations have intervened to obtain video evidence of the force-feedings of the petitioner. On March 31, 2017, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion forbidding release of the video. The case is closed.


In November 2005, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Dallas County Jail in Dallas, Texas. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Jail violated the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. On December 8, 2006, the DOJ issued a letter advising Dallas County of minimum reform measures it should implement in order to remedy the unconstitutional practices. The suggested reforms related to the areas of: (1) medical care, (2) mental health care, and (3) environmental health and safety. On September 12, 2007, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging the same violations that were detailed in the findings letter. The parties entered a consent decree with the court shortly thereafter, and the court approved it on November 6, 2007. Under the terms of the consent decree, the defendants agreed to institute changes in the following areas: medical intake screening, acute medical care, chronic medical care, communicable disease treatment and management, follow-up care, record-keeping, facilities, administration of medication, specialty care, staffing, training, supervision, dental care, mental health care evaluation, mental health care treatment, suicide prevention, laundry, sanitation, environmental control, and fire safety. On July 15, 2008, the first independent monitor's report was filed; subsequent reports appear in the docket every six months. The parties agreed in 2011 that the Defendant had complied with the requirements of the consent decree, and the case was terminated on November 4, 2011.

Summary: On September 12, 2007, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, alleging violations of the constitutional rights of convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees in the areas of medical care, mental health care, and environmental health and safety. The parties entered a consent decree with the court shortly thereafter, and the court approved it on November 6, 2007. The decree provides for a wide array of changes. The decree was adhered to and the case was terminated on November 4, 2011.


In 2018, President Trump repeatedly requested Congress appropriate 5.7 billion dollars for the construction of a southern border wall. On February 14th, 2019, Congress denied this request and appropriated only 1.375 billion dollars for the construction of a strip of border fencing. While President Trump signed this appropriations bill the following day, he simultaneously declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA) and directed the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to reallocate funds already appropriated by Congress for military operations and projects to the construction of the southern border wall. The plaintiffs sued under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332; the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706; the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651; and the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Sierra Club and the Southern Border Communities Coalition are nonprofit organizations who, along with their members, derive benefits from the land along the southern border. They claim the construction of a border wall will impede their enjoyment of these benefits and cause them to divert resources. In light of these harms, these organizations brought a joint lawsuit against President Trump, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen, and Secretary of Treasury Steven Mnuchin, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs lawsuit consists of both constitutional and statutory arguments. Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds. While the President has authority to reallocate funding originally appropriated for military construction under the NEA, the plaintiffs argue this is an inappropriate exercise of this authority because (1) this is not a national emergency, (2) the construction of a border wall is not a military construction project and (3) the construction of the border wall is not “necessary to support such use of the armed forces.” Therefore, the plaintiffs argue the President’s declaration and subsequent direction to DHS and DOD to reallocate funds violates constitutional and statutory law. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because they failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project at the earliest possible time in the planning process and to involve the public in this decision-making process. On March 6, 2019, this case was related to California v. Trump. All further proceedings are documented in the California v. Trump page.

Summary: On February 14th, 2019, Congress denied President Trump's request for 5.7 billion dollars for the construction of a southern border all and, instead, appropriated only 1.375 billion dollars for the construction of a strip of border fencing. The following day, on February 15th, 2019, President Trump signed the appropriations bill and simultaneously declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act (NEA). Pursuant to NEA and other statutory authority, President Trump directed the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security to reallocate funds already appropriated by Congress for military operations and projects to the construction of the southern border wall. Two non-profit organizations who derive benefits from the land along the southern border, Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition, filed a lawsuit against President Trump, Acting Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan, Secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen, and Secretary of Treasury Steven Mnuchin, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs argue that President Trump's declaration and subsequent direction to DHS and DOD to reallocate funds violates constitutional and statutory law because this situation does not meet the statutory requirements of NEA: this is not a national emergency, the construction of the border wall is not a military construction project, and the construction of the border wall is not "necessary to support such use of the armed forces." Additionally, the plaintiffs allege the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because they failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project at the earliest possible time in the planning process and to involve the public in this decision-making process. This case is ongoing.


On January 9, 2007, a female African-American employee of defendant filed a suit on her own behalf against defendant Steelcase, Inc. under the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and 42 U.S.C. § 1981in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a First Amended Complaint on January 24, 2008, adding class allegations. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that defendant demoted her because of her race or her sex, and defendant has engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminating against African-Americans on the basis of their race with respect to promotions. On October 6, 2008, the Court certified a class consisting of black Americans employed by defendant who, between January 5, 2005, to the present were/are employed by Steelcase, Incorporated in Production Technician positions and who were qualified but not selected for vacancies in permanent positions of Quality Specialists and Quality Control Technicians, Zone Leaders and Temporary Supervisors, and Production Specialists. On November 26, 2008, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval of a Class Action Settlement. On December 10, 2008, the Court (Judge U.W. Clemon) issued an Order approving the proposed settlement. The Class Settlement Agreement provided declaratory and injunctive relief, implementation of a new selection process for higher level employees, monitoring, reporting. and training requirements, monetary relief for the named plaintiff and class members, a promotion for the named plaintiff, and attorney's fees and costs. On January 28, 2009, the court dismissed the case.

Summary: This case was brought by a female African-American employee of defendant agsint defendant Steelcase, Inc. seeking declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The case was setted December 10, 2008, resulting in relief in favor of plaintiff class.


On March 14, 2014, a female student filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas against The Law School Admission Council (LSAC) and The American Bar Association (ABA). The student sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title IX, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Representing herself, the student asked for injunctive relief and monetary damages for the alleged discrimination. Specifically, the student alleged that the defendants delayed and denied accommodation requests by the plaintiff, causing her to incur numerous fees and to miss administration of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT). She claimed this violated the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment as well as the other federal statutes she sued under. The student claimed that she submitted numerous medical documents that attested to her Inattentive Type of ADHD and that both defendants failed to review the documentation so as to provide her with testing accommodation. She also claimed that her denial of accommodation was based on a test (the Woodcock Johnson assessment) that was not the preferred instrument listed in the LSAC guidelines. The student also alleged that the defendants' denial of necessary services and accommodations constituted discrimination based on sex as well as disability. She claimed that her male counterparts were given accommodations due to their Hyperactivity Type of ADHD, which can be diagnosed at a younger age and therefore provide more medical documentation. The ABA filed a motion to dismiss due to a failure to state a claim. The ABA claimed no part in developing or administering the LSAT, nor involvement in the offer of accommodations for the test. As such, the ABA could not have been subject to the court's jurisdiction or able to provide redress. The LSAC also filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It stated that the plaintiff did not follow through on her claim under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; that the LSAC is not a state actor and therefore not subject to the Equal Protection Clause; that her allegations are insufficient for relief under Title IX, in part because LSAC was not alleged to be an educational program or a recipient of federal aid; and that Title III of the ADA does not provide for monetary damages. On September 3, 2014, the Court (Judge Melinda Harmon) granted the LSAC's motion to dismiss. On September 22, 2014, the Court granted the ABA's motion to dismiss. These orders were both granted pursuant to joint stipulations of dismissal from the plaintiff and each defendant.

Summary: In 2014, a female student filed this lawsuit against the LSAC and the ABA for discrimination based on sex and disability. The student claimed that she was not allowed accommodation for her Inattentive Type of ADHD for the LSAT. The case was dismissed pursuant to a joint stipulation from the plaintiff and defendants.


On March 18, 2003, plaintiffs, a group of active duty service members, National Guardsmen and Department of Defense civilian contract employees who had been ordered, or were imminently to be ordered, to take Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA) filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration. The plaintiffs alleged that they were ordered to submit to inoculation with AVA and were not provided with the opportunity to exercise informed consent, despite the fact that the vaccination was still under review by the FDA, in violation of 10 U.S.C § 1107, the Presidential Executive Order 13139 and the Department of Defense's own directive 6200.2. The plaintiffs asked that the court enjoin the Department of Defense from inoculating them without their informed consent. The plaintiffs also filed a contemporaneous motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On December 22, 2003, the Court (Judge Emmet G. Sullivan) granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, and enjoined the defendants from inoculating service members without their consent. On January 2, 2004 the defendants filed an emergency motion asking for a stay of the preliminary injunction, based on the FDA's publishing of its final ruling on AVA. On January 7, 2004, the court (Judge Sullivan) ordered the stay of the court's preliminary injunction pending further orders of the court. On March 3, 2004, both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs additionally asked for permanent injunctive relief. On October 27, 2004 the Court (Judge Sullivan) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the FDA's final rule and order be vacated and remanded to the agency for reconsideration. The court also ruled that unless and until the FDA classifies AVA as a safe and effective drug for its intended use, the injunction shall remain in effect. The court ruled that the involuntary anthrax vaccination program is illegal absent informed consent or a Presidential waiver under 10 U.S.C. § 1107. On April 6, 2005, the court also modified the injunction at the request of Defendants to include a provision that the AVA may be administered on a voluntary basis, pursuant to the terms of a lawful emergency use authorization. On February 9, 2006, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia denied defendant Department of Defense's appeal and remanded the case to the district court because they held that the case was moot.

Summary: On March 18, 2003, a group of active duty service members, National Guardsmen and Department of Defense civilian contract employees filed a complaint in the District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Defense, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug Administration. The plaintiffs alleged that they were ordered to submit to inoculation with Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed and were not provided with the opportunity to exercise informed consent, despite the fact that the vaccination was still under review by the FDA, in violation of 10 U.S.C § 1107, the Presidential Executive Order 13139 and the Department of Defense's own directive 6200.2. On October 27, 2004 the Court (Judge Sullivan) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the FDA's final rule and order be vacated and remanded to the agency for reconsideration. The court also ruled that unless and until the FDA classifies AVA as a safe and effective drug for its intended use, the injunction shall remain in effect. The court ruled that the involuntary anthrax vaccination program is illegal absent informed consent or a Presidential waiver.


On March 3, 2017, this suit was filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by the James Madison Project and Politico. The suit aimed to shed light on how the Department of Homeland Security implemented President Trump's January 27 Executive Order (EO) 13769, the ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information about how the Department of Homeland Security coordinated with private and commercial airlines following EO 13769's rollout. The complaint sought an order for the defendants to disclose the requested records in their entirety. Private counsel represented the plaintiffs. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and was assigned to Judge Amit Mehta. In the complaint, plaintiffs cited the initial chaos caused by the EO 13769 and alleged that, despite the issuance of emergency stays, Customs and Border Protection agents often refused to comply with court orders. Plaintiffs previously submitted FOIA requests to TSA, CBP, ICE, USCIS, and DHS, but had not received a substantive response from any of the agencies. Plaintiffs alleged that they had a legal right to the information sought and that they had exhausted all administrative remedies for obtaining it. Separately, that same day, the James Madison Project and the executive editor of the Daily Beast filed another FOIA lawsuit seeking intra- and inter-agency communications relating to the scope and operation of the EO. That lawsuit is described here. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. According to a joint status report filed on Jun. 16, the government was in the process of conducting the requisite search pursuant to FOIA request as of that date. The report stated that DHS, USCIS, and ICE had no responsive records. The report further stated that TSA released some records, and that TSA and CBP may have additional responsive records. On January 19, 2018, the parties submitted a joint status report stating that "agency components have now completed their processing of Plaintiffs' requests. DHS, USCIS, and ICE located no records responsive to Plaintiffs' FOIA requests. TSA produced 53 pages of responsive records, and CBP produced 29 pages of responsive records. TSA referred certain information from its 53 pages of records to DHS, and that information has now been fully processed." The parties sought further time to decide on whether further issues required briefing. A status report filed on March 20 indicated that DHS was still in the process of fulfilling the request, and that it anticipated completing production of responsive records by August 2018. A status report filed on May 21, 2018 noted that DHS completed processing the FOIA request and that the parties sought to resolve the matter without further litigation. The plaintiffs stated that they would not challenge the adequacy of DHS' searches. On July 23, the parties filed a status report indicating they were close to finalizing a settlement agreement. On July 31, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 3, 2017, this suit was filed under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by the James Madison Project and Politico. The suit aimed to shed light on how the Department of Homeland Security implemented President Trump's January 27 Executive Order 13769, the ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information about how the Department of Homeland Security coordinated with private and commercial airlines following EO 13769's rollout. The complaint sought an order for the defendants to disclose the requested records in their entirety. The parties stipulated to dismissal after the government disclosed documents.


This case was the first sexual harassment case brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., which bans sex discrimination in education by institutions that receive federal funding. On July 3, 1977, several female students enrolled at Yale College and a faculty member filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against Yale University. They alleged that Yale was violating Title IX and H.E.W.'s Title IX regulations, claiming that the university's "failure to combat sexual harassment of female students and its refusal to institute mechanisms and procedures to address complaints and make investigations of such harassment interferes with the educational process and denies equal opportunity in education." The plaintiff sought injunctive relief in the form of a court to order requiring Yale to set up a Grievance Procedure for students who felt they had been sexually harassed, designed and implemented under the court supervision. Plaintiffs were represented by a feminist law firm, the New Haven Law Collective; it was founded by several lawyers and then-Yale Law student Catharine MacKinnon. MacKinnon was working out the theory of sexual harassment that soon became the 1979 book "Sexual Harassment of Working Women"--that “the unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power" constituted actionable sex discrimination. That theory became the theory of the case. Plaintiffs sought relief for themselves and a class of Yale students and faculty members "who are disadvantaged and obstructed in their educational relations" by Yale's failure to combat sexual harassment. More specifically, they sued on behalf of (1) female students who have had to choose between tolerating sexual demands from "men in positions of authority at Yale" or sacrificing "any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally;" (2) female students who "are subject to the discriminatory atmosphere adverse to their educational development created by the practice of such sexual harassment;" and (3) all faculty members "whose professional effectiveness in teaching and in engaging in the pursuit of knowledge with students is seriously impaired by that contamination of the faculty/student relationship created by defendant's tolerance of said sexual pressures." Although the court did not rule on the class action claim, plaintiffs were on December 7, 1977 allowed to add two additional plaintiffs. The Women's Equity Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund and the National Organization for Women Legal Defense Fund appeared as amici curiae on the plaintiffs' side of the case. On December 21, 1977, District Court Magistrate, Arthur H. Latimer, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the claims of all but one plaintiff because the court found their claims "tenuous," "conclusory," and "untenable on their face." For two of the plaintiffs, the court held that they had not asserted claims "of personal exclusion from a federally funded education program or activity, or of the personal denial of full participation in the benefits of such a program or activity in any measurable sense." Believing that "(n)o judicial enforcement of Title IX could properly extend to such imponderables as atmosphere or vicariously experienced wrong," the court held that these two plaintiffs "advance(d) no persuasive claim that they have been deprived of cognizable Title IX rights." The court dismissed another plaintiff, although she alleged a "personal experience of sexual harassment," on the ground that her graduation mooted her claim for equitable relief absent the "sheer conjecture" that she might someday wish to resume her study of the flute. The court dismissed a fourth plaintiff, although she too alleged a personal experience of sexual harassment, because she had not complained to anyone at Yale. This left just one plaintiff, Pamela Price; she claimed that she'd been given a lower grade when she declined the sexual advances of a teacher. As to her, the court held that "academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education," and it therefore allowed her claim to proceed to trial. 459 F.Supp. 1 (1977) (Appendix A). Then-District Judge Jon Newman adopted the opinion as the decision of the District Court. 459 F.Supp. 1. As the Court of Appeals explained later,
Price subsequently sought class certification for female students at Yale who are discriminated against on the basis of sex by Yale's policies and practices "with respect to the sexual harassment of women students by men in positions of authority, in particular by male faculty members and administrators, specifically by having to choose between toleration of, or compliance with, sexual demands and pressures by such men and any educational opportunity, benefit or chance to grow or advance educationally." Up to this time, the district court had not passed judgment upon the plaintiffs' request for class certification. Price also sought discovery aimed, in addition to adducing evidence supporting her personal claim, at adducing evidence supporting the claims of the class. Magistrate Latimer denied both the class certification and the extensive discovery request. In an unreported opinion, Magistrate Latimer found "no compelling reason to certify a class, there being no reasonable probability that plaintiff's individual claim will become moot in the near future ... and any equitable relief to which she may be possibly entitled being obviously such as to inure to the benefit of all." He then narrowed Price's discovery request correspondingly."
 In addition, on June 30, 1978, Magistrate Judge Latimer denied a renewed motion to dismiss; Yale argued that because Price had been admitted to law school, her allegedly lowered grade was no longer affecting her in any way. Judge Latimer denied the motion because Price was still interested in pursuing other graduate school possibilities. The case proceeded to trial before District Judge Ellen Burns. After a seven day trial Judge Burns found that "the grade of 'C' which she received in his course did not reflect consideration of any factor other than academic achievement." Nonetheless, Judge Burns proceeded to consider the adequacy of Yale's procedures for handling complaints of sexual harassment, and found that they were inadequate:
This court is in agreement that the procedures set forth above give no real guidance to students or to faculty as to procedure. . . . The suggestion that one first approach the offending faculty member seems particularly inappropriate in such a case.
 However, given its factual findings about the grade allegations, Judge Burns refused to enjoin Yale to establish a different procedure, concluding, "(I)t does not follow that, if Yale University failed to articulate appropriate procedures to deal with such a claim, a plaintiff who can show neither an improper advance nor the injury she claimed has a grievance to be redressed by this court." The district court therefore entered judgment for Yale on July 3, 1979. Although the plaintiffs lost on the facts, they had won an important--and landmark--legal victory; the district court held both that "academic advancement conditioned upon submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education," and that Yale's investigatory and remedial processes were inadequate. This was years before the Supreme Court endorsed the legal theory that conditioning employment on submission to sexual advances similarly constitutes sex discrimination. Meritor v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeal; on September 22, 1980, in an opinion by Judge Edward Lumbard, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980). It agreed with the District Court that--since plaintiffs sought only injunctive relief, not damages--plaintiffs' claims were mooted by their graduation. The Court noted, as well:
 "It is perhaps more important to note that, as Yale's counsel has assured us in brief and oral argument, Yale in fact has adopted a set of procedures for hearing such complaints. The procedures were proposed by a committee consisting of faculty, administrators and students, in a report published March 1979, following a year of careful study specifically limited to the problems involved in structuring procedures appropriate for consideration of student complaints of sexual harassment. Furthermore, Yale's counsel has also assured us that although the procedures were originally designed only to receive and consider claims of sexual harassment occurring at Yale College, their jurisdiction has since been expanded to afford consideration of claims by those who suffer harassment while participating in any program sponsored by the University. We have no reason to doubt that the procedures now in effect will tend to alleviate the "atmosphere of inequality" alleged by plaintiffs in this suit. Thus, it appears that the major relief sought in this suit has already been granted."
 The Court of Appeals agreed, as well, with the District Court that if the plaintiff had failed to prove the incident she claimed, she was not entitled to injunctive relief just because the procedures were inadequate. The case was therefore done.

Summary: This case was the first sexual harassment case brought under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., which bans sex discrimination in education by institutions that receive federal funding. It further established that sexual harassment of female students could be considered sex discrimination, and was thus illegal.