This class action lawsuit was filed on June 11, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs were the Anti-Police Terror Project, Community Ready Corps, and several individuals. Defendants were the City of Oakland, the Oakland Police Department (OPD) Police Chief, an OPD Sergeant, and two OPD officers. The suit followed police actions to quell protests that arose after the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and counsel from the National Lawyers Guild, alleged that Oakland police used tear gas, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets to disperse peaceful protests. Their suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they claimed that the actions of the OPD in quelling the protests were in violation of their:

 First Amendment rights to free speech, free assembly, and free association;

Fourth Amendment rights against excessive force and unlawful seizure;

Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process.

They also said that the city was liable for failure to select, train, and supervise the police department. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order which would prohibit the use of pepper spray, flash-bang grenades, rubber bullets, and non-lethal weapons. They also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to prohibit the alleged constitutional violations in the future. They also sought declaratory relief and money damages to be determined at a later date. On June 12, 2020 the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. Through the next week, plaintiffs submitted proposals for temporary restraining orders, and on June 18, 2020 Judge Spero granted the order. It prohibited use of tear gas and chemical irritants, flash-bang grenades, and rubber bullets except upon decision of an Operations Commander or Incident Commander in the OPD. After a series of hearings on the matter, on July 29 the court entered a preliminary injunction against the defendants to prohibit the OPD from using "less-lethal" weapons except in very limited settings, mandating that they wear body cameras, and requiring further training. 2020 WL 4346828. The provisions in the injunction were largely agreed upon by both parties during the hearings. However, the parties disagreed about the extent to which "mutual aid partners" would be bound by the preliminary injunction. During protests, the OPD had used mutual aid from other police departments and municipalities. The Court's subsequent opinion explained that because no mutual aid partners were defendants, the Court could not issue injunctive relief binding on mutual aid partners. 2020 WL 4584185. However, because under California law OPD officers were to remain in charge when using mutual aid, the Court included provisions in the preliminary injunction to ensure OPD officers remain in charge and that OPD would ensure that mutual aid partners do not use tactics inconsistent with the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce and modify the preliminary injunction and for sanctions on October 7, 2020. The plaintiffs alleged that the City violated the preliminary injunction by deploying chemical agents and projectiles in a prohibited way, kettling peaceful protestors, and failing to maintain social distance during protests that followed the shooting of Jacob Black by a Kenosha police officer on August 23 and the failure to indict any police officers for the death of Breonna Taylor on September 25. At the Court's order, the plaintiffs submitted a proposed order on October 21 explaining their requested changes to the preliminary injunction. In their proposed order, the plaintiffs sought $100,000 in sanctions and several modifications to the list of items prohibited from use by the OPD and corresponding changes in training. The City responded with a cross-motion to modify the preliminary injunction. The City disputed that it violated the injunction and sought changes to the mutual aid section of the injunction. The City said that after OPD informed its mutual aid partners of the preliminary injunction, many of its partners responded that they would no longer provide mutual aid. The City argued that it expected significant, extended protests with the upcoming presidential election and asked the Court to suspend the mutual aid section of the preliminary injunction and clarify that the injunction did not bind mutual aid partners. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the preliminary injunction and instead granted the defendants' motion to modify the injunction on October 28, 2020. 2020 WL 6381358. The Court acknowledged the concern of large-scale demonstrations with the presidential election and the potential challenges the OPD would face in policing such large-scale demonstrations without mutual aid. It found that the combination of the lack of mutual aid and the potential demonstrations was a significant change in the facts meriting a change in the injunction to properly balance the equities of the parties and the public interest. OPD officers still were required to ensure that mutual aid partners were briefed on OPD's prohibited weapons and force to the extent possible. The plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint on October 20. In the amended complaint, they added numerous individual plaintiffs. In addition, they added claims alleging assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, and violations of their rights under the California Constitution. The factual allegations and sought after relief remained largely the same. This case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.

Summary: This class-action lawsuit claims that Oakland, California police tactics used to quell protests following the killing of George Floyd were violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments and also represented a Monell violation on the part the City of Oakland. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from the National Lawyers Guild. They brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On July 29 the court entered a preliminary injunction against the defendants, which limited the OPD's use of "less-lethal" weapons, mandated body cameras, and required further training. The parties both sought modifications to the injunction in October 2020. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the preliminary injunction and instead granted the defendants' motion to modify the injunction on October 28, 2020. The Court acknowledged the defendants' concern about demonstrations in relation to the upcoming presidential election and how OPD's mutual aid partners had largely withdrawn support after the preliminary injunction. It found that the combination of the lack of mutual aid and the potential demonstrations was a significant change in the facts meriting a change in the injunction to properly balance the equities of the parties and the public interest. OPD officers still were required to ensure that mutual aid partners were briefed on OPD's prohibited weapons and force to the extent possible. This case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.


On October 27, 1999, disabled plaintiffs who use wheelchairs for accessibility brought a class action lawsuit against Conoco, Inc., an owner/operator of gas stations and convenience stores, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs charged that Conoco had violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and Colorado law because its stores had many features that obstructed accessibility, in violation of Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182 and the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, C.R.S. § 24-34-601. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that when they attempted to use the businesses, they encountered several obstacles, including inaccessible parking, tables, sidewalks, entrances, restrooms, aisles, and "pay-at-the-pump" controls. Both plaintiffs experienced great delay during their stops at Conoco, as employees had to rearrange fixtures and assist the plaintiffs. They sought injunctive relief, and damages pursuant to the state law. On August 22, 2000, the court certified a class of "all persons with disabilities who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, within four years of the filing of the Complaint in this case, have been denied, or are currently being denied, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any service station or convenience store owned by Conoco, Inc." On September 11, 2002, the court approved a five-year consent decree. The decree applied to Conoco's 124 existing corporate stores and newly acquired stores. Conoco's agreed to bring all stores into compliance with ADA regulations. The decree would begin with a pilot program for six stores, three chosen by each side. If the pilot program was successful, Conoco would begin renovating its other stores, one fourth of the total stores every nine months. An independent expert would evaluate the stores. Conoco agreed to pay the expert's fees of $1000 per store visit plus costs. Conoco also agreed to develop personnel training policies, do its own periodic checks for disabled access, to allow customers to submit comment cards, and to forward these cards to class counsel. Additionally, Conoco paid $8,000 each to the two named plaintiffs and $150,000 in attorney's fees. On November 14, 2008, the court approved a stipulated order of dismissal.

Summary: This was a case brought in 1999 by plaintiffs who used wheelchairs; they sued Conoco, an owner/operator of gas stations and convenience stores, in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. They argued that Conoco systematically violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Colorado law by its inaccessible parking, tables, sidewalks, entrances, restrooms, aisles, and "pay-at-the-pump" controls. On September 11, 2002, the court approved a five-year consent decree. The decree applied to Conoco's 124 existing corporate stores and newly acquired stores. Conoco's agreed to bring all stores into compliance with ADA regulations. The decree would begin with a pilot program for six stores, three chosen by each side. If the pilot program was successful, Conoco would begin renovating its other stores, one-fourth of the total stores every nine months. An independent expert would evaluate the stores. Conoco agreed to pay the expert's fees of $1000 per store visit plus costs. Conoco also agreed to develop personnel training policies, do its own periodic checks for disabled access, to allow customers to submit comment cards, and to forward these cards to class counsel. Additionally, Conoco paid $8,000 each to the two named plaintiffs and $150,000 in attorney's fees.


The plaintiffs in this case were a group of medical services and medical professionals associations in the state of California. On May 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandate and a class action complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, against the Director of the California Department of Health Services. The Department is charged with the administration of California's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal. The plaintiffs alleged that Assembly Bill X3 5 ("AB 5"), which reduced by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program, violated various state and federal laws, and therefore could not lawfully be implemented. They sought declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On May 21, 2008, the State removed the action to the Central District of California, because it raised a question under federal law. The plaintiffs asked the court to remand the case back to the Los Angeles Superior Court, and on June 23, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder agreed. Judge Snyder found that since a state law equivalent existed for all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, the case could not be said to be "arising under" federal law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. The case was then remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court as case number CV BC 390126. The Clearinghouse has acquired the State Court case summary, which shows ongoing activity on the case through to at least May 2013, but it is unclear from this document whether the case has lead to any substantial orders in favor of either party, or if it is approaching a settlement. The summary of this case on the California Medical Association's own website provides little information, and focuses mostly on Douglas v. Independent Living Center (in the Clearinghouse as PB-CA-16), a related suit in federal court that reached the Supreme Court. This summary is up-to-date as of July 2013.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case were a group of medical services and medical professionals associations in the state of California. On May 5, 2008, plaintiffs filed a petition for writ mandate and a class action complaint in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles against the Director of the California Department of Health Services. The Department is charged with the administration of California's Medicaid program, Medi-Cal. The plaintiffs alleged that Assembly Bill X3 5 ("AB 5"), which reduced by ten percent payments under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program, violated various state and federal laws, and therefore, could not be implemented. They sought a writ of mandate for violation of federal law and California's Medicaid plan, declaratory relief, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. On May 21, 2008, the defendant removed the action to the Central District of California, asserting federal question jurisdictionOn June 23, 2008, Judge Christina A. Snyder issued an order remanding the case back to the Los Angeles Superior Court, finding that since a state law equivalent existed for all of the plaintiff's federal law claims, the case could not be said to be "arising under" federal law for the purposes of federal question jurisdiction. The case was then remanded to Los Angeles Superior Court as case number CV BC 390126. The Clearinghouse has no information about what happened to this case on remand at the State Court.


On June 26, 2020, three private individuals filed this class-action lawsuit against the City of New York, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Governor Andrew Cuomo, and fifty police officers of unknown identities. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, and plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The case arose out of the curfews that were imposed on New York City residents amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. The three plaintiffs were residents of New York City who were taken into custody for violating the curfew, although the complaint did not allege that they were arrested at any of the protests. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the curfews were violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs requested declaratory and money damages, including punitive damages, as well as costs and attorney's fees. The case is ongoing as of August 5, 2020.

Summary: This class action lawsuit arose out of the curfews imposed in New York City amidst the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd. Plaintiffs were three individuals who had been taken into custody during the curfew, though not when they were at protests. They sued the City of New York, Mayor Bill de Blasio, Governor Andrew Cuomo, and fifty unnamed police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and monetary relief. The case is ongoing as of August 5, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: In response to the COVID-19 crisis, on March 27, 2020 the State Public Health Officer issued an emergency order restricting any medical or surgical procedure except those necessary to treat an “emergency medical condition,” including abortion. On March 30, the plaintiffs challenged the Order and requested an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction to block enforcement. The court granted a limited TRO. On April 12, the court granted the preliminary injunction in part. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. The parties agreed that the preliminary injunction had become moot as it was tied to the "medical restrictions" language, which had since been lifted. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18.
 On May 24, 2019, all abortion providers in Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on behalf of themselves and their patients. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Attorney General, the State Health Officer of the Alabama Department of Public Health (ADPH), the District Attorneys of Madison, Jefferson, Mobile, Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa counties, the Chairman of the AL Board of Medical Examiners, and the Chairman of the Medical Licensure Commission of Alabama in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Alabama, and Planned Parenthood sought to enjoin enforcement of H.B. 314, a bill that banned nearly all abortions in the state, and to have the bill declared unconstitutional. The plaintiffs claimed that H.B. 314 violated the rights of liberty and privacy secured to their patients by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that enforcement of the law would effectively prevent plaintiffs’ patients from obtaining legal abortion in Alabama, in violation Roe v. Wade and more than four decades of Supreme Court precedent affirming its central holding. The case was assigned to District Court Judge Myron H. Thompson. On June 21, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect in November. Judge Thompson granted the motion for a preliminary injunction on October 29, 2019 and ordered the injunction to remain in effect until the district court resolved the case in full. 415 F.Supp.3d 1053. In response to the COVID-19 crisis, the State Public Health Officer began issuing a series of emergency orders restricting “elective” medical procedures on March 19, 2020. On March 27, the State Public Health Officer issued another order prohibiting any medical or surgical procedure except those necessary to treat an “emergency medical condition” or to “avoid serious harm from an underlying condition.” Each medical or surgical procedure performed in violation of the March 27 Order was considered a misdemeanor. The Attorney General issued guidance encouraging prosecution of violations and took the position that the order prohibits some unknown quantity of pre-viability abortions. To avoid risk of criminal and licensure penalties, the plaintiffs stopped performing pre-viability abortions. As a result, the actions of the Attorney General and ADPH effectively nullified the relief granted by the October 2019 preliminary injunction. On March 30, 2020, the plaintiffs moved to supplement their complaint to challenge the March 27 Order and also moved for an emergency temporary restraining order (TRO) blocking enforcement of the March 27 order. Judge Thompson granted the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, and the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint the same day. Judge Thompson also granted the TRO, enjoining enforcement of the order, but promised to reconsider upon the submission of defendants’ written arguments. 2020 WL 1520243. On April 1, the defendants moved to dissolve the TRO and on April 2, they appealed the order granting the TRO to the Eleventh Circuit and moved to stay the TRO pending appeal. After a telephone conference, Judge Thompson limited the TRO in part on April 3, 2020. 2020 WL 1659700. The defendants clarified in the hearing that the order allowed providers to exercise their reasonable medical judgment to protect the right to terminate a pregnancy and the safety of their patients, while also “acknowledg[ing] that abortion providers and their patients must share the societal burden caused by COVID-19.” Specifically, providers should determine if the abortion can be delayed in a healthy way during the enforcement of the order. Consistent with these clarifications, Judge Thompson determined that the initial TRO was too sweeping and granted the stay to the extent that these clarifications are adopted. On April 5, Judge Thompson ordered each party to file and share with opposing counsel a list of witnesses (along with a brief summary of anticipated testimony), and a list of exhibits they intended to have admitted. The next day, Judge Thompson held a motion hearing regarding the TRO and the preliminary injunction. The defendants’ appeal was also dismissed that day pursuant to the parties’ joint motion for voluntary dismissal. Judge Thompson granted the preliminary injunction in part on April 12, after finding that it was substantially likely that the medical restrictions--when interpreted to allow only those abortions necessary to protect the life and health of the mother--were unconstitutional because they posed a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion for many women in Alabama. Rather than enjoin the medical restrictions in full, the court enjoined them only to prevent those applications of medical restrictions that are inconsistent with the Constitution. To the extent that the restriction is read to allow a provider to consider whether a patient’s abortion must proceed as scheduled, it would not constitute an unlawful prohibition. Essentially, the then-most recent representation made by the defendants were reduced to an order and the State Health Order was enjoined only to the extent that it is applied in a fashion inconsistent with those representations. 2020 WL 1847128. The same day, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On April 16th, the district court overruled the objections to the order granting the motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint. 2020 WL 1892578. The defendants moved for an emergency stay pending appeal in the Eleventh Circuit and on April 17th, moved to expedite the merits appeal. On April 23rd, Judge Jordan for the Eleventh Circuit (Circuit Judges Martin, Jordan, and Rosenbaum) denied the motion for a stay. 2020 WL 1952370. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. In a joint status report on May 15, the parties agreed that the preliminary injunction has become moot as it was tied to the "medical restrictions" language, which had since been lifted. The defendants represented that they had no intention to impose restrictions on dental, medical, or surgical procedures in future emergency orders. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18. The parties submitted a notice of stipulated partial dismissal relating to the "medical restrictions" language on May 21, and the court dismissed that portion of the complaint on May 22. The partial motion to dismiss was also denied as moot. On June 2, the parties submitted a joint motion to dismiss the State Health Officer, on the condition that he and his employees, agents, and successors in the office agree to be bound by the terms of any injunctive or declaratory and/or other relief issued against the other defendants in the case, but not for any monetary relief. The motion was granted on June 8. The plaintiffs were then directed by the court to identifying outstanding issues relating to their challenge on July 6. The plaintiffs responded on August 3 and argued that (1) the Act’s pre- and post-viability applications were not severable; (2) the Act’s post-viability application was constitutionally infirm and, (3) the plaintiffs had standing to assert the constitutional rights of their patients. On August 11, the parties submitted a joint motion for entry of order concerning costs and attorney's fees, after coming to an agreement that the State of Alabama would pay the plaintiffs' attorneys $451,351.60. The motion was granted the same day. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In May 2019, Alabama abortion providers filed a § 1983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that H.B. 314 violated their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by effectively preventing plaintiffs' patients from obtaining a legal abortion in Alabama. In October, the court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the law from going into effect. In March 2020 to respond to COVID-19, the State issued an emergency order restricting "elective" medical procedures, which they interpreted to include most abortions. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and moved for a temporary restraining order, which was granted. The court then granted a preliminary injunction, limiting the enforcement of the emergency order to prevent unconstitutional application. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Eleventh Circuit. On May 5, the parties submitted a joint motion to the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss the appeal of the preliminary injunction, which was granted the same day. The court ordered the preliminary injunction to be dissolved as moot on May 18.


On March 14, 2017, Twitter received an administrative summons from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to provide records involving the specific identities of those operating under the @ALT_USCIS user account. In response, Twitter filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on April 6, 2017, stating that the summons both exceeded CBP authority under 19 U.S.C. § 1509 and violated the First Amendment. Specifically, Twitter claimed that disclosing the requested information to CBP would likely unmask the person or persons using the @ALT_USCIS account, thereby violating the constitutional protections for anonymous and pseudonymous political speech. Twitter sought both injunctive relief and damages. In the wake of the inauguration, several “alternative” rogue government agency accounts were created on Twitter. Spurred on by the unauthorized Badlands National Park tweets and social media limitations set by the Trump administration, some of this wave of new users identified themselves as current and past employees of the agencies they exemplified, and others as fans or supporters. The @ALT_USCIS account was created in late January 2017 and portrays the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a unit within the Defendant DHS. @ALT_USCIS has tens of thousands of followers and frequently tweets critically against the Administration’s immigration policies and enforcement actions. On April 7, 2017, CBP withdrew its summons. Twitter responded by voluntarily dismissing all claims against the Defendants. Shortly thereafter, the DHS Office of Inspector General opened an investigation into: (1) whether the @ALT_USCIS investigation by the CBP’s Office of Professional Responsibility was in any way improper, (2) whether CBP abused its authority in issuing the March 14, 2017 summons to Twitter, and (3) if there is broader misuse of summons authority at the DHS and/or its components. DHS’s Office of Inspector General released the report on November 16, 2017. According to the report, "lack of clear guidance on the proper use of Section 1509 Summons has resulted in inconsistent—and in some cases, improper—use of such summonses." The report provided recommendations to ensure that CBP personnel are trained on the appropriate exercise of CBP’s examination and summons authority. This case is now closed, though Twitter since filed a related challenge pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking "records concerning demands from CBP and/or DHS that Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) provide them with information to identify the one or more persons using the Twitter account @ALT_uscis, an anonymous account critical of CBP." That case is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, No. 18-cv-00155.

Summary: On March 14, 2017, Twitter received a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) summons to disclose identifying information of the user(s) operating a rogue “alternative” government agency account. Twitter did not comply and instead filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging a violation of First Amendment anonymity of political speech. On April 7, Twitter dismissed the suit when CBP withdrew its summons. The DHS Office of Inspector General is now investigating CBP on the matter.


On August 31, 2020, 52 black McDonald’s franchisees filed this lawsuit against McDonald’s in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs claimed that McDonald’s racially discriminated against them in its management policies and set the franchisees up to fail by placing them in economically depressed locations and high-crime areas. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S. § 1981 (part of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guaranteeing equal rights under the law), alleging that McDonald’s knowingly discriminated against Plaintiffs by denying equal advancement opportunities to them as compared to white counterparts. Additionally, the plaintiffs sued under state law, alleging that McDonald’s engaged in disproportionately harsh enforcement of the Franchise Agreement that amounted to a breach of contract and fraudulent omission of requirements that were more stringent for them as well as of opportunities that were available to white franchisees. Represented by the Ferraro Law Firm based in Florida, the franchisees sought between $4 and $ 5 million per restaurant in compensatory damages, consequential damages, and punitive damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs. Judge Steve C. Seeger was assigned to the case. McDonald’s moved twice to dismiss the franchisees’ complaint for failure to state a valid claim. Following the first motion, the franchisees amended their complaint on November 16, 2020, to include 25 more plaintiffs, add details regarding McDonald’s Franchise Agreement, and remove an explicit cause of action for punitive damages, though Plaintiffs still seek punitive damages. McDonald’s filed the second motion to dismiss on December 21, 2020, after which franchisees responded. On February 2, 2021, McDonalds filed a reply both to the franchisees' amended complaint and in support of defendant's motion to dismiss. This reply alleged plaintiffs' claims failed because they were conclusory, failed to use facts particular enough to support their claims, and were time-barred under the statute of limitations of 42 U.S. § 1981. As of July 6, 2021, no further significant actions have occurred. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, former black McDonald's franchisees filed suit against the parent corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that McDonald's racially discriminated against them by denying opportunities to manage more viable franchises that were available to white franchisees and by more strictly enforcing standards for inspections and quality against them. McDonald's filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on December 21, 2020; it has not yet been adjudicated. The case is ongoing.


On March 23, 2016, a resident of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims on behalf of her child and all other children in Flint who suffered brain damage from drinking unsafe tap water during the Flint water crisis. The plaintiff sued numerous state officials, including the Governor and Flint emergency managers. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought class certification, declaratory relief, compensatory and exemplary damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were grossly negligent because they continued to “falsely reassure the public” that the water was safe despite evidence to the contrary. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, shortly after Flint officials began using water from the Flint River in 2013, the defendants began to receive complaints from residents about the color, taste, and odor of the water. By August 2014, Flint water tested positive for E. coli. and several “boil water” advisories were issued by the city of Flint through September 2014. But the water also contained lead, and boiling the water increased its lead concentration. The plaintiffs also emphasized the dangers of children consuming lead. According to the plaintiffs, children absorb forty to fifty percent of an oral dose of lead compared with three to ten percent absorption for adults. The defendants removed the case on May 31, 2016. They gave two reasons: first, that they acted under color of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and second, that the plaintiffs’ negligence claims required construction of the Safe Drinking Water Act and the EPA’s Lead and Copper Rule; these federal questions, they said, justified removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. On March 31, 2017, Judge Gordon J. Quist ruled that the defendants were not “acting under any federal officer or agency” when they took the actions that formed the basis of the plaintiffs’ claims, so they were not entitled to removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1442. In addition, Judge Quist concluded that the court did not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because their negligence claims did not “implicate an important federal interest.” Accordingly, the case was remanded to Michigan Court of Claims. On April 6, 2017, the defendants appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed the district court’s decision on April 16, 2018. Judge White described the relationship between the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality and the EPA as “cooperative federalism, not an agency relationship” and concluded that the defendants were not eligible for federal-officer removal. The Court of Appeals also determined that federal question jurisdiction did not exist, relying on Mays v. Flint, a similar case also arising from the Flint water crisis. The defendants against appealed again, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the case on October 1, 2018. The case returned to the Michigan Court of Claims. (In fact, litigation in the Court of Claims had already resumed because the federal district court declined to stay its order remanding the case while the federal appeals proceeded.) The Court of Claims granted summary disposition in favor of some, but not all defendants in a series of orders beginning in 2017. Three governmental employees appealed, claiming governmental immunity. On March 14, 2019, the Michigan Court of Appeals determined that their liability depended on whether the defendants’ conduct was a proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injury, which was not a suitable topic for summary disposition. 2019 WL 1211469. The defendants appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. On July 2, 2019 the Michigan Supreme Court ordered the appeal to be held in abeyance pending the decision in Mays v. Flint, as it could resolve issues raised in this case. 2019 WL 2872282. Subsequently, following the July 29, 2020 decision in Mays v. Flint, the Michigan Supreme Court denied the application for appeal. 2020 WL 6301869. The case returned once again to the Court of Claims, and on December 3, 2020, the case was stayed pending the finalization of a settlement. As of February 5, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 23, 2016, a resident of Flint, Michigan filed this class action lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims against state officials involved with the Flint water crisis. The plaintiffs alleged the defendants were grossly negligent because they continued to “falsely reassure the public” that the water was safe despite evidence to the contrary. The defendants removed the case, but the district court and Sixth Circuit found that neither federal officer nor federal question jurisdiction existed. The case returned to state court, where litigation over the scope of an officer's governmental immunity continues.


On June 23, 2009, a openly gay former prisoner at Washtenaw County Jail filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Washtenaw County, corrections officers of Washtenaw County Jail, a jail physician, and SecureCare, in the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division. The plaintiff, represented by the University of Michigan Clinical Law Program, asked the court for injunctive relief, a declaration that the plaintiff's rights were violated, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys fees, claiming that he was sexually assaulted and abused by guards and other prisoners, was not properly treated for his medical needs, and suffered inhumane conditions while in the jail. Specifically, the plaintiff was sexually assaulted by another prisoner just days after entering the jail. Although he reported this abuse to a guard, nothing was done to remedy the situation. Approximately one week later, the plaintiff was sexually harassed and raped by a deputy in the jail. During his time at the jail, he was continually harassed by prisoners and guards. Some prisoners went so far as to contaminate his food with human feces and doused him with cups of urine. Although guards were aware of this abuse, they often encouraged and were complicit in this behavior and blamed the plaintiff's homosexuality for provoking these attacks. On December 9, 2009, the physician and SecureCare filed a Motion to Dismiss. On April 12, 2010, the Court (Judge Arthur J. Tarnow) denied the motion without prejudice. They sought summary judgment on Feb. 25, 2011, but on May 4, the court denied that motion "for the reasons stated on the record and in the briefs." Plaintiff then filed a new complaint, adding several defendants, on Jan. 19, 2012. The case was dismissed, on stipulation (presumably after some monetary settlement), on Nov. 28, 2012.

Summary: On June 23, 2009, an openly gay former prisoner of Washtenaw County jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, against Washtenaw County, corrections officers of Washtenaw County Jail, a jail physician, and SecureCare, claiming he was sexually harassed and raped by both guards and other prisoners, not properly treated for his medical needs, and forced to suffer other inhumane conditions while in the jail. On April 12, 2010, the Court denied the physician and SecureCare's Motion to Dismiss without prejudice. The case is ongoing.


On March 5, 2010, two female former inmates who were imprisoned in the Century Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF"), a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD") facility, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by a civil rights law firm, the plaintiffs sued the LASD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as their equivalents under the California Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that CRDF female inmates were routinely subjected to degrading strip and body cavity searches at the CRDF without probable cause or individualized suspicion. On October 22, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. On February 28, 2011, the LASD moved to dismiss this suit, claiming that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their claims as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The complaint was amended on January 28, 2011, to add five additional former and current CRDF inmates as named plaintiffs. However, on December 27, 2011, District Judge Stephen V. Wilson moved this case to the inactive calendar, pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County of Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012), another case involving strip searches, which Judge Wilson believed could affect the viability of relevant precedent (JC-NJ-0022 in this Clearinghouse) On April 2, 2012, the Supreme Court decided in Florence that if a prisoner was about to be housed in a jail's general population, no individualized suspicion was required, no matter how minor the arrest offense. Following this decision, on December 19, 2012, Judge Wilson issued an order moving this case back to the active calendar. In addition, Judge Wilson denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the LASD did not demonstrate sufficient grievance procedures as required by the PLRA. Judge Wilson also determined that the court would rule on the plaintiffs' motion to certify class after the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. 2012 WL 12878313, C.D. Cal. However, on January 9, 2013, after the plaintiffs requested the court reconsider its decision to defer ruling on the pending motion to certify class, Judge Wilson issued a new order allowing the plaintiffs to re-file their motion to certify class in light of evidence gathered during discovery. On June 10, 2013, the plaintiffs re-filed their motion to certify class. On March 12, 2014, Judge Wilson granted the plaintiff's request for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), but denied their request for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3) (299 F.R.D. 618). The court also allowed the plaintiffs to file a renewed motion to certify a damages class on the issue on liability pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4). On May 19, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion to certify class, requesting that the court certify a Rule 23(c)(4) liability class. In addition, the plaintiffs requested that the court reconsider its denial of the plaintiffs' request for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification. As an alternative to this Rule 23(b)(3) reconsideration, the plaintiffs requested that the court certify subclasses under Rule 23(c)(4) on the basis of differing conditions of abuse, privacy, sanitation, and weather during the alleged illegal strip searches. On December 18, 2014, Judge Wilson issued an order granting a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class for the purpose of liability, as well as subclass certification. However, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for Rule 23(b)(3) class certification and all other subclass certifications. 2014 WL 10044904. On November 18, 2016 (2016 WL 8904537, C.D. Cal.), the court certified an additional two classes as (c)(4) issue classes, despite not certifying the (c)(4) classes in a July 26, 2016 order (2016 WL 6804910, C.D.Cal.). These new classes consisted of a class consisting of women who experienced simultaneous searches and a class consisting of women who experienced one-line-at-a-time searches. 2016 WL 8904537, C.D. Cal. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on December 2, 2016, and a fourth amended complaint on December 19. On June 7, 2017, the court issued an order regarding summary judgment motions from both parties. The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing claims of liability against individual defendants acting as individuals due to qualified immunity. The court also granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that because the defendants had not provided evidence to establish why they conducted searches in the manner that they did when alternatives existed, the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights were violated. 2017 WL 9472901, C.D. Cal. The parties then engaged in mediation. The plaintiffs submitted a preliminary settlement agreement for $53 million on July 16, 2019, but Judge Wilson did not approve this settlement in a September 23, 2019 hearing. His objection to the settlement centered on the creation of a $3 million fund to finance contracts with Los Angeles-based nonprofit organizations and for-profit groups to “develop a strengthened model of gender-responsive policy and operational practice at all LASD facilities that house female inmates.” He said that since there was a potential for many claimants to come forward demanding compensation in this case, such a fund should not be established unless there is money left over once all members of the class seeking compensation come forward. The plaintiffs submitted an amended settlement agreement for the same amount, but removing the fund, on October 31, 2019. Judge Wilson granted preliminary approval to this settlement on November 7, and set a fairness hearing for July 20, 2020, once class members could reasonably be notified. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2010, two former female inmates who were imprisoned in the Century Regional Detention Facility ("CRDF"), a Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department ("LASD") facility, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the LASD under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fourth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that CRDF female inmates were routinely subjected to degrading strip and body cavity searches at the CRDF without probable cause or individualized suspicion. Settlement negotiations are ongoing in the District Court.


On February 11, 2016, six students with behavior-related disabilities residing in Pasadena brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, though their guardians, sued the Pasadena Unified School District for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 <i>et seq.</i>) and state disability statutes. The plaintiffs, represented by Mental Health Advocacy Services, the Judge L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief and attorney's fee. The plaintiffs claimed that the Pasadena Unified School District was systematically segregating students with behavioral issues in an alternative "therapeutic environment" in which students were subjected to arrests, forced isolations, suspension threats, and an inferior education overall. They sought a behavioral-service program within neighborhood schools to provide students with disabilities an equal education. For the several years, the parties engaged in discovery and settlement negotiations. On October 27, 2017, the case was transferred from Judge Beverly Reid O'Connell to Judge Virginia A. Phillips. On October 31, 2019, the court approved a settlement agreement and consent decree. The parties agreed to the appointment of neutral expert to evaluate the District's capacity, resources, and needs in several areas, including the transition of students with behavioral and mental disabilities out of segregated settings to general education campuses and the implementation of early response programs and academic support to identify and prevent behavioral problems. After the evaluation of the expert, the parties would agree on a Strategic Plan subject to a dispute resolution mechanism included within the settlement agreement. Once the parties agreed on the Strategic Plan, the neutral expert would oversee its implementation for five years, during which time the District Court would retain jurisdiction. Additionally, the District agreed to pay each plaintiff $8,500 in compensatory damages and plaintiff's counsel $425,000 in attorney's fees. The consent decree remains in force.

Summary: Class action lawsuit brought against the Pasadena Unified School District by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law and private counsel on behalf of middle school students described as having behavioral issues, who were forced to attend an alternative institution deemed a "therapeutic environment." In this secondary scholastic environment, students said they were subjected to an inferior level of education and arrested by law enforcement, threatened by school administration, and isolated from their peers. Plaintiffs claimed this segregational policy violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, in addition to state disability statutes. The parties agreed to appoint a subject matter expert to recommend reforms that the District would implement over a five-year window.


On February 18, 2004, three former employees brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, against the Canadian National Railroad Company and its subsidiaries. The plaintiffs, represented by several private attorneys, sought a declaration that defendants engaged in company-wide systemic racial discrimination when they continually failed to notify African-American employees of job announcements, and continually failed to post or make announcements readily accessible to African-American employees, for all positions that might lead to promotions and/or advancement to higher and better paying positions. Plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction and other equitable relief necessary to eliminate the effects of the defendants' past and present racial discrimination and to prevent such discrimination from continuing to adversely affect their lives and careers in the future. Finally, plaintiffs sought back-pay, other equitable remedies, and damages necessary to make them and the members of the class whole. On January 7, 2010, the District Court (Judge James B. Zagel) conditionally certified a class of "all African-American employees of the Railroad from February 18, 2000 to October 21, 2009" and approved a consent decree. Under the specific injunctive provisions of the consent decree, which remained in effect for three years, the defendants were required to implement policies, practices, and procedures to prevent discrimination in training and advancement. Such policies and practices included: a Training Catalog and electronically-available instructions on how employees may obtain the training needed to enhance their abilities and qualifications; on-line courses in the subjects of basic computer software skills, supervisory skills, and railroad-related topics; educational financial assistance, including, but not necessarily limited to, reimbursement for education relating to craft, technical, and vocational skills reasonably related to the railroad environment; EEO training for HR personnel, supervisors and managers, and employees; enhanced posting of available positions; nondiscriminatory selection procedures for available positions; a diversity counsel; semi-annual adverse impact analyses; and internal monitoring and compliance procedures. Additionally, the consent decree required the defendants to establish a settlement fund in the gross amount of $3,000,000 for the purpose of providing individual awards to the named plaintiffs, monetary awards to the eligible members of the settlement class, and the payment of attorneys' fees and costs to class counsel.

Summary: Three former employees brought a class action lawsuit against the Canadian National Railroad Company and its subsidiaries in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that defendants have engaged in company-wide systemic racial discrimination and seeking a monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.


On October 4, 2013, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Sheriff of Cook County and the Cook County Department of Corrections. The inmate sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that the jail had prevented him from receiving a newspaper based on a formal written policy prohibiting newspapers. The Cook County Department of Correction's General Order 9.7.1 lists all "newspapers" as a form of "institutional contraband." A friend had sent him the newspaper, and the jail returned it to the friend without notifying the inmate. The inmate alleged that the Cook County Department of Correction's policy of banning inmates from obtaining newspapers was overbroad, and violated his First Amendment rights. The inmate alleged that this policy unreasonably and irrationally censored and restricted his ability to read a large and important body of First-Amendment protected speech. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On March 3, 2013, Judge Kennelly denied the motion to dismiss. Then, both parties moved for summary judgment. In an opinion, the court partly granted and partly denied both motions. On July 6, 2015, the court ruled that the inmate's request for injunctive relief was moot. Although the inmate filed suit while he was still incarcerated at the jail, and he had Article III standing to seek injunctive relief at that time, because he was released shortly thereafter, there was no evidence that he would suffer from the jail's newpaper policy in the future. The court held that the jail's ban on newspapers violated the First Amendment. The court awarded the inmate $1.00 in nominal damages. Outside of court, the parties settled the amount of attorneys fees, and that amount is not disclosed. With the resolution of the attorneys fees, the case was closed.

Summary: In 2013, an inmate at the Cook County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The inmate sought injunctive and monetary relief for violations of his First Amendment rights because the jail denied him possession of a newspaper. The court held that the jail's ban on newspapers was unconstitutional and awarded the inmate a declaratory judgment, and $1.00 in nominal damages. Outside of court, the parties settled the amount of attorneys fees, and that amount is not disclosed. With the resolution of the attorneys fees, the case was closed.


On October 12, 2005, plaintiff filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Corrections [DOC], challenging the DOC's refusal to transport plaintiff to an off-site medical clinic so that she could receive a nontherapeutic abortion. The complaint alleged that that the prison's policy that female prisoners would not be sent out of their institutions for abortions that were not medically necessary deprived plaintiff of her Fourteenth Amendment right to reproductive choice. The complaint further alleged that by forcing her to carry her an unwanted pregnancy to term, the prison was deliberately indifferent to her serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. An emergency motion for a TRO was filed simultaneously with the complaint. On October 13, 2005, the District Court (Judge Dean Whipple) granted Plaintiff's motion for TRO and ordered Defendant to transport Plaintiff to Reproductive Health Services of Planned Parenthood of St. Louis (RHS) in St. Louis, Missouri to receive medical services to terminate her pregnancy. Defendant filed a notice of appeal and moved for a stay of the TRO pending appeal. The Court denied the request on October 14, 2005 and entered an Order and Modified Judgment of Preliminary Injunction. Roe v. Crawford, 396 F.Supp.2d 1041 (W.D.Mo. 2005). On October 14, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered that the Modified Judgment of October 14, 2005 be stayed pending further order by Justice Thomas. On October 17, 2005, U.S. Supreme Court vacated the temporary stay entered on October 14, 2005 and denied the application for stay. Crawford v. Roe, 126 S.Ct. 477 (U.S. 2005). The District Court then entered another Modified Judgment of Preliminary Injunction, again ordering the DOC to transport Plaintiff to an outside facility for the purpose of receiving medical services to terminate her pregnancy. The DOC complied with the order and Plaintiff was so transported on October 20, 2005. Plaintiff amended her complaint on October 19, 2005 and moved to certify the action as a class action. On November 28, 2005, the District Court certified a class defined as "All pregnant women who are seeking or may in the future seek non-therapeutic abortions and who are in the custody of Defendants at the time Plaintiff Roe filed her Verified Complaint in this case or who will be placed in the custody of Defendants in the future and may while in the custody of Defendants seek a non-therapeutic abortion." The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On July 18, 20016, Judge Whipple granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied defendants' motion, finding that the DOC policy prohibiting transportation of female inmates for abortion procedures violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Roe v. Crawford, 439 F.Supp.2d 942 (W.D.Mo. 2006). On November 29, the court awarded the Plaintiffs $87,908.00 for attorneys fees and $7,379.05 for costs to the Plaintiffs. On November 29, 2006, the Court granted Defendants' unopposed motion to amend the judgment and stay payment of fees and costs pending resolution of Defendants' appeal. On January 22, 2008, Judge William J. Riley, writing for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirmed the judgment. Although he found that the District Court erred in its finding that the DOC policy was invalid under the Eighth Amendment, he determined that the DOC policy could not be maintained under the Fourteenth Amendment in light of <i>Turner v. Safley</i>, 482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987). The Eight Circuit denied the Defendant's motion to rehear the case en banc. The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on November 17, 2008, ending the case.

Summary: Plaintiff filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections [DOC], challenging the DOC's refusal to transport plaintiff to an off-site medical clinic so that she could receive a nontherapeutic abortion. The District Court found that the DOC policy prohibiting transportation of female inmates for abortion procedures violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, but found that the District Court erred in its finding that the DOC policy was invalid under the Eighth Amendment.


On April 7, 2011, indigent lawful permanent residents in Washington filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Northwest Health Law Advocates and the Public Interest Law Group, as well as private counsel, alleged that HCA had violated the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. Plaintiffs, including five named members, sought class certification, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. Prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the state passed a bill that restricted immigrants' eligibility for the Washington Basic Health Program, which provided state-subsidized health insurance to indigent residents and, on the same day, sent plaintiffs letters notifying them that they would be de-enrolled from the program in ten days. Plaintiffs argued that the termination notices did not provide the adequate, meaningful, and timely notice required by the Due Process Clause. According to the amended complaint, HCA did not have enough information to determine immigration status prior to sending these notices. The notices failed to inform plaintiffs why they were ineligible for their benefits or to provide any individualized explanation for the HCA's determination that plaintiffs were not legal residents. Plaintiffs also assert that HCA violated the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against plaintiffs based on their immigration status. On September 28, 2011, the District Court (Judge James Robart) granted plaintiffs' motion to certify the Due Process class as defined by plaintiffs, with some minor revisions. Unthaksinkun v. Porter, C11-0588JLR, 2011 WL 4502050 (W.D. Wash. 2011). The Court also granted plaintiffs' motion to certify an Equal Protection class that includes individuals who were de-enrolled from Basic Health, but denied plaintiffs' request that the class also include future class members. On October 24, 2011, the court issued a preliminary injunction, which incorporated the parties' agreed proposal for a preliminary injunction. The order required the defendant to review class member lists and identify additional members of the Equal Protection class; send notice of reenrollment rights to known class members; reinstate coverage for class members who pay premiums; follow specific protocols before seeking to de-enroll any class member based on immigration status; provide individual termination notification including specific information to any re-enrolled class member; and post information on the Basic Health web site. On January 3, 2012, a mediator was appointed for the case. By March 15, 2013, the HCA had fully complied with the terms of the preliminary injunction and the members of the Due Process class had received their remedy according to the terms of the injunction. The parties agreed that the claim for the Equal Protection class members would become moot in 2014 when funding for Basic Health would be eliminated, and lawfully present immigrants, currently enrolled in Basic Health, would be eligible to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act. The parties therefore requested to continue the trial from August 2013 to August 2014, with the expectation that the claims of the Equal Protection class would become irrelevant. On February 13, 2014, the parties reached a final settlement, agreeing that since the protected class had already received appropriate relief through the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs’ due process claim need not be litigated further. The defendants also agreed to pay $264,000 in attorneys’ fees. The court approved the settlement on March 6, 2014. On July 8, 2014, the court dismissed the remaining equal protection claim with prejudice.

Summary: On April 7, 2011, indigent lawful permanent residents in Washington filed a lawsuit against the Washington State Health Care Authority (HCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the HCA had violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by failing to provide adequate notice of their disenrollment from state-subsidized health insurance and by discriminating on the basis of immigration status. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification in part and issued a preliminary injunction. Defendant complied with the terms of the injunction and paid $264,000 in attorneys’ fees. On July 8, 2014, the court dismissed the remaining equal protection claims because they had become moot under the advent of the Affordable Care Act.


On March 28th, 2012, five former and current Jewish students filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the Pine Bush School District. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declarative judgment, injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the school district had responded with deliberate indifference to the rampant anti-Semitic discrimination and harassment directed at the plaintiffs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the students had been harassed from elementary school to high school, and had been physically and psychologically injured. These included anti-Semitic slurs, anti-Semitic graffiti, Hitler salutes and celebrations, direct threats of harm, and physical attacks. The plaintiffs claimed that the school district has been made repeatedly aware of the various acts of discrimination and has consistently ignored, minimized or dismissed the harassment. The New York Times reported on the case on November 8th, 2013. On December 6th, 2013, the school district moved for summary judgment. Judge Kenneth M. Karas heard oral arguments from both parties regarding summary judgment on July 14th. On November 3, 2014, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims against the individuals, holding they were redundant with the claims against the school district. The rest of the motion was denied. The defendants appealed the partial denial of summary judgment on November 24, 2014. On May 1, 2015, a Second Circuit panel dismissed the appeal, determining it lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been issued by the district court per 28 U.S.C. § 1291. On July 10, 2015, Judge Karas approved the parties' settlement agreement. Total damages amounted to $4.48 million: $3 million for compensatory damages and $1.48 million for attorney's fees. The injunctive part of the settlement required Pine Bush School District to revise and install policies to prevent or swiftly respond to incidents of anti-Semitism [see Exhibit 1 of the Settlement Agreement]. Additional measures included the continuance of a "No Place for Hate Committee," curriculum revisions to promote diversity and prevent bullying, professional development, and the appointment of an internal Title VI Coordinator.

Summary: On March 28th, 2012, five former and current Jewish students filed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their Southern New York school district. The plaintiffs claimed that they had suffered rampant anti-Semitic discrimination and harassment from elementary school to high school, and that the defendants had ignored, dismissed and minimized the harassment. After the plaintiffs' claims against the individual were dismissed in summary judgment for being redundant to the claims against the District, the parties reached a settlement in July 2015. It awarded the plaintiffs $4.48 million ($3 million for compensatory damages, the rest for attorney's fees). The District further agreed to implement policies to celebrate diversity and work against bullying.


On June 12, 2017, M.B., five minors in the Missouri foster care system (through their "Next Friends") filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri. The Plaintiffs sued the Interim Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services (DSS) and the Director of the Children’s Division (CD) of DSS, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for alleged substantive due process rights violations, procedural due process rights violations, and a violation of the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (CWA). Represented by Children’s Rights, Inc., National Center for Youth Law, St. Louis University Legal Clinic, and private council, plaintiffs sued on behalf of a putative class of children under eighteen who are or will be placed in the custody of the state of Missouri due to abuse or neglect by their legal guardians. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the Defendants from subjecting class members to allegedly abusive policies and practices. Background The lawsuit brought three claims: first, violation of the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; second, violation of the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment; and third, a violation of the plaintiffs’ rights under the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., 670 et seq. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Defendants’ failures to maintain a minimally adequate oversight system or to institute procedures to ensure the appropriate administration of medication violated the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The Plaintiffs also ask that the Defendants’ failure to maintain and deliver the Plaintiffs’ complete and updated medical records to foster caretakers violated the Plaintiffs’ statutory rights under the CWA. The Plaintiffs also sought permanent injunctive relief requiring the Defendants to revise its practices related to medical records, promulgate an effective informed consent policy, and develop a secondary review system. Class action allegations were included in the first and amended complaints. Specifically, the complaint argued that, while the children were in the state’s custody and with foster parents, the state administered or instructed the foster parents to administer to the plaintiffs one or more psychotropic and/or anti-psychotic drugs and failed to ensure that medications were appropriate, safe, and adequately monitored. Because of this, the class had suffered or would suffer substantial and often irreversible harm to their physical, emotional, and/or mental health. Specific example of abused alleged The named plaintiff M.B., who had been in the foster care custody of CD for more than three years, was placed on more than six psychotropic drugs at one time under the supervision of CD. While in CD’s custody, his medications fluctuated wildly while he was moved between eight different placements, including two psychiatric institutions. When M.B. was placed with a licensed therapeutic foster parent, CD did not discuss M.B.’s medications with him, the proper methods to administer the medication, nor its adverse effects. His foster parent was not given an opportunity to ask questions about M.B.’s medication plan nor given information from his medical records or history. Instead, she had to rely on pill bottle label’s and M.B.’s instructions. She began noticing severe adverse effects; M.B. was afraid to go to sleep, would twitch, and was observed with his eyes rolling back in his head. After three weeks in the placement, M.B. threatened his foster parent’s life and was hospitalized. Despite his foster parent’s wish to care for M.B. as his foster parent and her continued involvement in ensuring M.B. receives the care he needs, he was not returned to her home. After leaving his foster parent’s home, M.B.’s medications steadily increased, and by January 2017, he was taking seven psychotropic medications, including three antipsychotics at the same time. In early 2017, M.B. was moved hundreds of miles away from his foster parent, the only constant adult presence in his life, because the prior facility reportedly couldn’t accommodate his needs. His foster parent visited in April 2017 and observed a completely changed child – once hyperactive, he was now lethargic, slurring, and falling asleep in broad daylight. These are all documented adverse effects of high dosage of different psychotropic drugs. As of filing, M.B. had been moved to a psychiatric hospital. The other named plaintiffs had similar stories of experiencing adverse effects, likely resulting from poorly administered medication. Procedural timeline On July 3, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On August 21, 2017, the state filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, arguing the court did not have jurisdiction because the case should be heard in Missouri’s juvenile courts, that the due process claims were insufficient, and that plaintiffs had no private right of action under the Child Welfare Act based on Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent. On January 8, 2018, Judge Nanette K. Laughrey denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim and procedural due process claim. Judge Laughrey granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice regarding Plaintiffs’ CWA violation claim and without prejudice the Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claims relating to informed consent. 2018 WL 327767. For several months, the parties engaged in discovery and depositions. On March 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. On July 19, 2018, Judge Laughrey certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of "all children in Children's Division foster care custody who presently are, or in the future will be, prescribed or administered one or more psychotropic medications while in state care." 327 F.R.D. 271. The defendants appealed the order granting class certification to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 22, 2018 (case number 18-2798). Since the original defendant retired in July 2018, the appellant replaced him with Ms. Lester. On October 29, 2018, the defendant’s motion to stay the lawsuit pending appeal was denied by Judge Laughrey under seal. 2018 WL 5504178. Several months of mediation and negotiations followed. On May 30, 2019, the parties reported having reached a settlement. On July 8, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. Parties also separately notified the Eighth Circuit of the potential settlement, and the Eighth Circuit issued an order on July 9 staying the August 2018 appeal of class certification until the settlement was resolved. On July 15, Judge Laughrey granted preliminary approval of settlement. On November 6, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for final approval of class action settlement, with relevant documents regarding discovery and plaintiffs' private information kept under seal. A fairness hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Lajuana M. Counts on November 20, 2019 and the judge issued a Report and Recommendation on December 4 indicating that the settlement should be approved and the case be dismissed with prejudice. The settlement agreement included policy and procedural commitments relating to the defendant’s (a) training of case management staff and resource provider, (b) providing medication monitoring, mental health assessment, medical examinations, and concurrent non-pharmacological treatment, (c) maintaining medical records, including efforts to build system and reporting capabilities and to comply with CD policy on record collection and distribution, (d) secondary review of designated prescription of psychotropic medications by a child and adolescent psychiatrist, (e) obtaining informed consent to the administration of psychotropic medications, (f) appointing a Psychotropic Mediation Advisory Committee to provide professional and technical consultation and policy advice on issues related to psychotropic medication, and (g) developing excessive dosage guidelines based on advice from and consultation with medical and clinical experts. On December 5, Judge Laughrey adopted the Report and Recommendations and granted the parties’ motion for final approval of the class action settlement. The Court retained jurisdiction for purpose of enforcement. The settlement agreement defined specific exit criteria, and the state is entitled to exit the agreement once exit criteria have been met for three consecutive six-month reporting periods. The parties agreed to jointly seek an order terminating court jurisdiction over the agreement when appropriate, though the state can also do so on its own motion. Plaintiffs filed a motion for $4,027,882.78 in attorneys' fees and costs. The parties disputed as to the hourly rate used to calculate attorneys' fees. On April 3, 2020, the court issued an order granting in part and denying in part the original request, adjusting some of the attorneys' billing rates and hours tracked to arrive at a final award of $3,386,558.81. 2020 WL 1666159. Current status There is nothing in the district court docket showing any disputes over enforcement. After the settlement was approved, the Eighth Circuit signed off on the state's voluntary dismissal of the (previously stayed) appeal. On April 28, 2020, Defendants filed a new appeal of the attorneys' fees award. It is pending.

Summary: On June 12, 2017, five children filed this class action lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri against Missouri's Department of Social Services and the Children's Division (CD) for substantive due process rights violations, procedural due process rights violations, and violations of the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. Plaintiffs argued that the class has suffered or will suffer substantial and often irreversible harm to their physical, emotional, and/or mental health because of defendant's improper administration of medication to the plaintiffs. On March 16, 2018, plaintiffs moved for class certification. On July 19, 2018, Judge Nanette K. Laughrey certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of "all children in Children's Division foster care custody who presently are, or in the future will be, prescribed or administered one or more psychotropic medications while in state care." The defendants appealed the order granting class certification to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 22, 2018 (case number 18-2798). In May 2019, the parties reached a settlement and the court approved the settlement agreement in December. The court retained jurisdiction. Attorneys' fees and costs were awarded in April 2020. Defendants appealed the class certification ruling to the Eighth Circuit in April 2020.


On May 13, 2011, David House, a U.S. citizen, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. House, represented by counsel from the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that federal agents' search of his electronic devices at the border and prolonged seizure of the devices without reasonable suspicion violated the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, House claimed that the government seized his electronic devices, including his laptop computer, at the border when he was coming home from vacation. The plaintiff claimed that the government targeted the plaintiff solely on the basis of his lawful association with the Bradley Manning Support Network, an organization created to raise funds and support for the legal defense of Pfc. Bradley Manning (now Chelsea Manning, after a name change), a soldier charged with leaking a video and documents relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the WikiLeaks website. The government then kept the devices for forty-nine days, retained the information from them indefinitely, and disseminated the information to other government agencies and possibly foreign governments. In addition, the materials seized by the government contained confidential information identifying members and supporters of the Bradley Manning Support Network, and that the defendants' review, retention, and disclosure of that information intruded on the right of associational privacy protected by the First Amendment. According to an ACLU press release, the search and seizure of the plaintiff's laptop had a chilling effect on the activities of the Bradley Manning Support Network, by "silencing once-outspoken supports and causing donors to retreat." On July 28, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. The defendants argued that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that searches of electronic devices at the border should be subjected to a different standard than that for other closed containers. The defendants also argued that there was no basis for the Court to conclude that the plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated by the routine search and detention of his devices at the border. Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's "associational privacy" claims should be dismissed, because the government is not prohibited from examining any items at the border simply because they may be related to the work of an organization; nor, the government argued, were there any factual allegations showing how Plaintiff's organization has been targeted by the government, or that the routine search of Plaintiff's electronic devices disclosure may impede the future activities of the organization. On March 28, 2012, Judge Denise J. Casper denied the U.S.'s motion to dismiss. The court ruled that even if the government does not need suspicion or a warrant to search a laptop at the border, that power is not unlimited and First Amendment rights remain intact. House v. Napolitano, 11-10852-DJC, 2012 WL 1038816 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2012). On May 23, 2013, the matter settled. All of the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice with each party bearing his or her own costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. The government agreed to destroy all copies of the plaintiff's devices and to turn over documents related to its investigation of him and his devices. The government also admitted that the plaintiff was on the Department of Homeland Security's "Lookout" list used by agents at border checkpoints, which is why he was stopped and searched in the first place. The government further agreed to release reports on DHS agents' questioning of House, which included inquiries about whether he knew anything about Manning giving classified information to WikiLeaks.

Summary: In 2011, a private individual filed a lawsuit in the District of Massachusetts under the First and Fourth Amendments against the U.S. government for unlawfully searching and seizing his electronic devices at the border solely based on his connection with the Bradley Manning Support Network. The government settled with the plaintiff in 2013 and agreed to destroy all copies of the plaintiff's devices and to turn over documents related to its investigation of him and his devices.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The court granted a preliminary injunction on May 19, which was stayed by the Sixth Circuit on May 26. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the stay on June 25. The case is ongoing.
 On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the existing requirements for remote signature gathering for ballot initiatives violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the COVID pandemic and resulting state of emergency restrictions on public gatherings made it impossible for proponents of ballot measures to comply with Ohio’s ballot-access signature requirements. They said that applying the ballot requirements to the 2020 election without adjustment in light of the pandemic violated their equal protection and due process rights. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring the defendants to immediately place the plaintiff’s marijuana decriminalization initiatives on the November 3 election ballot directly without the need for supporting signatures from voters or, alternatively, suspend prohibitions against remote signature collection, extend filing deadlines for signature submission, develop timely, efficient and realistic procedures and practices for gathering and submitting signatures from voters, and reduce the number of voters' signatures required to ten percent of the number currently prescribed for the November 3, 2020 election. This lawsuit was filed at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, and assigned to Judge Edmund A. Sargus. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Competitive Democracy and private attorneys. Concurrently, on April 27, 2020, the plaintiffs also submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order. The Ohioans for Secure and Fair Elections and Ohioans for Raising the Wage each sought to intervene on April 30 and May 1, respectively. Both motions were granted on May 4. On May 19, 2020, the district court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ink signature and witness requirements and the current deadline as applied to the plaintiffs and the intervening plaintiffs for the November 3 general election, and directing them to update the court by May 26 regarding adjustments to the enjoined requirements “so as to reduce the burden on ballot access.” They further ordered the defendants to accept electronically-signed and witnessed petitions from the intervening plaintiffs collected through the on-line signature collection plans and to meet and confer regarding any technical or security issues regarding those plans by May 26. 2020 WL 2557064. The court noted that in light of the COVID-19 pandemic “the state’s strict enforcement of the signature requirements for local initiatives and constitutional amendments severely burden plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights as applied here.” The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit the next day asked the district court to stay its own order, pending appeal. The district court refused. 2020 WL 2614447. On May 26, the Sixth Circuit granted the stay pending appeal, finding that the defendants were likely to succeed on the merits of their appeal and that they would suffer serious and irreparable harm if the court enjoined them from conducting the election in accordance with lawfully enacted ballot-access regulations. 959 F.3d 804. The court explained: “[w]hether this intermediate burden on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights passes constitutional muster depends on whether the state has legitimate interests to impose the burden that outweigh it. Here they offer two. Defendants claim the witness and ink requirements help prevent fraud by ensuring that the signatures are authentic. And the deadlines allow them time to verify signatures in an orderly and fair fashion, while also providing initiative proponents time to challenge any adverse decision in court. These interests are not only legitimate, they are compelling.” The plaintiffs submitted an initial hearing en banc, petition for rehearing en banc, motion for reconsideration, and motion to vacate the stay pending appeal, all of which were denied on June 16, 2020. The same day, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate the stay and the Supreme Court denied the application on June 25. 2020 WL 3456705. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 27, 2020, ballot petition circulators and three Ohio voters filed this lawsuit against the Director of Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s in-person signature and witness requirements for ballot initiatives in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, as well as a temporary restraining order. The court granted preliminary injunction on May 19, which was stayed by the Sixth Circuit on May 26. The U.S. Supreme Court denied the plaintiff’s application to vacate the stay on June 25. The case is ongoing.


On January 7, 2011, a natural-born United States citizen of Latino ethnicity filed a lawsuit in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, under various state laws against the Davidson County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff"). The plaintiff, initially represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (the "Metro Government") had violated the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County (the "Metro Charter"); that his due process rights under the Tennessee Constitution were violated; that he was maliciously harassed due to his race and ethnicity; and that he was falsely imprisoned. Plaintiff's principal claim was that the Metro Government had violated the Metro Charter by allowing the Sheriff to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. government, which permitted the Sheriff to perform federal immigration law enforcement functions, even though the Metro Charter conferred all law enforcement duties upon the Nashville Police Department, and even though a prior Tennessee Supreme Court decision, Metro Government v. Poe, held that the Metro Charter took from the Sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace and vested that duty in the Nashville Police Department. Plaintiff also brought several other claims, including a due process claim and a false imprisonment claim, which would subsequently be dismissed. On February 28, 2011, the Chancery Court ordered that the United States was an indispensible party to the lawsuit, and granted plaintiff thirty days to amend his complaint. An amended complaint was filed, which added a second plaintiff, added the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") as a defendant, and dropped all claims except for the violation of the Metro Charter. The case was subsequently removed to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On June 21, 2011, the District Court (Judge Kevin H. Sharp) granted plaintiffs permission to again amend their complaint. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 796 F. Supp. 2d 900 (M.D. Tenn. 2011). The court denied as moot the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add another defendant and ICE subsequently moved to dismiss this latest iteration of the complaint. On September 12, 2011, the District Court (Judge Sharp) granted in part and denied in part ICE's motion to dismiss, dismissing plaintiff's due process claim against it. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3:11-00218, 2011 WL 4048523 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 12, 2011). The District Court refused to dismiss plaintiff's claim that the 287(g) agreement violated the Metro Charter, and instead chose to certify that question to the Tennessee Supreme Court for determination. The case was stayed pending the resolution of that question of law. Over a year later, on October 19, 2012, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that the 287(g) agreement did not violate the Metro Charter or any other state law cited by the Plaintiffs. Renteria-Villegas v. Metro. Gov.'t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 382 S.W.3d 318 (Tenn. 2012). The Tennessee Supreme Court held that, "[w]hile the Charter makes the Police Chief the 'principal conservator of the peace,' it does not expressly prohibit the Sheriff from engaging in all activities that could conceivably be considered 'law enforcement.'" Following the resolution of this question, in December of 2012, two of the three plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all of their claims against all defendants. The remaining plaintiff dismissed his claims against ICE, but proceeded against Metro Government with constitutional claims under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and with a claim of false imprisonment. In April of 2013, plaintiff's counsel filed a sealed motion asking the Court for leave to withdraw from representation of plaintiff. The District Court granted the motion for the reasons stated in the sealed motion. The Court allowed plaintiff thirty days to either find new counsel or notify the court that he intended to proceed pro se. Plaintiff did neither. The Court deemed the case abandoned, and dismissed it with prejudice.

Summary: On January 7, 2011, plaintiff sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, arguing they had violated the Charter of Metropolitan Nashville and Davidson County by allowing the Davidson County Sheriff's Office to enter into a 287(g) agreement with the U.S. government. The agreement permitted the Sheriff to perform federal immigration law enforcement functions, even though the Charter conferred all law enforcement duties upon the Nashville Police Department, and even though a prior Tennessee Supreme Court decision, Metro Government v. Poe, held that the Charter took from the Sheriff the responsibility for the preservation of the public peace and vested that duty in the Nashville Police Department. The Tennessee Supreme Court, answering a certified question from the U.S. District Court, held that the 287(g) agreement did not violate the Metro Charter or any other state law cited by the Plaintiffs. This effectively ended the case.