On November 10, 2009, a Muslim American citizen who was detained and tortured while traveling abroad filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under Bivens and the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, against several supervising agents and two unknown agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU and a human rights clinic at the Yale Law School, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other relief as necessary, claiming that he had been deprived of his Constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiff claimed that while he was traveling in the Horn of Africa, he was detained, interrogated, and tortured at the direction of and by officials in the American government. After four months of mistreatment, detained in handcuffs in an underground room, with no windows or toilets, he was returned home to New Jersey. He was never charged with a crime. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed “defendants detained him in secret, denied him access to counsel and the courts, and threatened him with torture and death. He sa[id] he was threatened with extradition to Israel and with rendition to Egypt.” The plaintiff was told by defendants that he “would suffer the same fate as the protagonist in the movie Midnight Express—a movie where a foreign prisoner is brutally beaten and confined in horrid conditions in a Turkish prison for refusing to cooperate.” The plaintiff was promised that if he confessed his connection to “al Qaeda, he would be returned to the United States to face civilian courts.” The plaintiff alleged that this was done to “extract a confession to terrorist activity as a prelude to prosecution.” 804 F.3d 417, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The federal government moved to dismiss the case on April 19, 2010, alleging that even if the plaintiff's allegations were true, he had no right to hold federal officials personally liable for their roles in his detention by foreign governments on foreign soil. On May 10, 2010, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint and soon after, the government filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. For the next several months, the parties responded to the motion to dismiss, with numerous extensions and continuances of the hearing on the motion to dismiss granted. On February 21, 2012, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. The defendants renewed their motion to dismiss against this second amended complaint. Throughout the remainder of 2012, numerous circuit court decisions were issued in other cases which had the potential to impact the parties’ arguments and the Court’s consideration of the motion. Accordingly, the court held a supplemental hearing on the motion to dismiss on December 12, 2013. On June 13, 2014, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Sullivan wrote that the facts alleged in this case and the legal questions presented were deeply troubling. Judge Sullivan found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, and described his treatment as “appalling” and “embarrassing.” Nevertheless, Judge Sullivan wrote that the court was constrained by precedent that expressly rejected a Bivens remedy for citizens who allege that they have been mistreated, and even tortured, by the United States of America in the name of intelligence gathering, national security, or military affairs. 2014 WL 2648032 (D.D.C. June 13, 2014). On August 7, 2014, the plaintiff appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court regarding the motion to dismiss. The appeal was assigned USCA no. 14-5194. On October 23, 2015, the D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the judgement of the District Court in a 2-1 decision. (Hon. Janice Rogers Brown, Hon. Brett M. Kavanaugh concurring, Hon. Cornelia T. L. Pillard dissenting). The higher court echoed the District Court’s opinion that the allegations of federal agents abusing an American citizen abroad were quite troubling, yet also dismissed the suit, finding a Bivens action unavailable. 804 F.3d 417, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The plaintiff’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied on February 2, 2016. On June 6, 2016, a petition for writ of certiorari was filed to the Supreme Court, to resolve the question over whether a federal agent’s assertion of national security considerations justifies dismissal of a Bivens actions for Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations. The case was docketed 15-1461. Briefs were submitted in favor of the plaintiff by the U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Commonwealth Lawyers Association, Constitution Project, and by law professors. On June 27, 2017, the petition for the writ of certiorari was denied. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2009, a Muslim American citizen who was detained and tortured while traveling abroad filed a federal lawsuit in the District for the District of Columbia against the FBI agents who had been involved in his detainment and torture which lasted four months in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. In 2014, the case was dismissed. The dismissal was affirmed by the appellate court. The writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied in 2017 and the case is closed.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed April 7, 2020, after the COVID-19 outbreak, 65 civil immigration detainees at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility requested habeas and injunctive relief in the form of immediate interim release from detention. A class was certified on June 8. No outcome yet.<hr> On April 7, 2020, 65 individuals detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (ICE) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the Superintendent of the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF). The plaintiffs claimed that the health and safety measures being taken by PCCF were insufficient to curb the spread of the virus and protect the health and safety of detainees within the facility. Initially the lawsuit was filed pro se, and plaintiffs sought emergency release under under 8 U.S.C. § 1226. The plaintiffs were later represented as a putative class by the ACLU National Prison Project, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, Boston University School of Law's Immigrants' Rights and Human Trafficking Program, and private counsel, plaintiffs sued under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas jurisdiction), and Article I, Section 9, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (the Suspension Clause) for habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief, including release from custody. Judge Allison D. Burroughs was assigned to the case. An emergency amended petition was filed on April 13 by the ACLU on behalf of only one of the plaintiffs, Wilmer Ruben Espinal Alvarado, however ACLU counsel stated in a notice that the legal evidence and argument submitted could aid in the court's consideration of the other 64 claims. The defendant filed motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for both petitions on April 15 and 16. In a separate action, on April 29, Espinal Alvarado was ordered to be released unless he received a bond hearing in seven days. Docket No. 1:20-cv-10309-PBS. Espinal Alvarado subsequently filed a stipulation of dismissal for his individual claims. On May 5, Judge Burroughs dismissed 20 plaintiffs from the action and denied defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that habeas relief was available to plaintiffs because they were seeking release from confinement. On May 5, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the petition and to certify the class. The following day, Judge Burroughs issued an order that required defendants to notify the court when a named plaintiffs was removed, transferred, or released from PCCF. On May 26, the ACLU filed an amended class action complaint on behalf of a putative class requesting habeas and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of civil detention during COVID-19 at PCCF exposed them to a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of their due process rights and requested immediate interim release pending resolution of the litigation. On June 8, Judge Burroughs certified the class as "all civil immigration detainees who are Petitioners in this action (i.e., who signed the original petition) or are otherwise presently detained in Unit C-3 at the PCCF." 2020 WL 3051778. Since the filing of the original petition, several named plaintiffs were released or transferred from PCCF, new plaintiffs have joined the case, and some have individually obtained counsel. Altogether, there were forty petitioners actively seeking relief under two separate petitions: the original petition, which was filed pro se, and the second class action petition filed by the ACLU with two identified class representatives. Hours after the court certified the class, ICE informed several detainees in Unit C-3 that they would be transferred to a different facility in Alabama. Plaintiffs filed a motion to halt the transfer of eight of the class members which was granted by the court that day. With the exception of three detainees who were already slated for removal, the court prohibited defendants from transferring detainees without advance notice and justification to plaintiffs' counsel. The following day, Judge Burroughs issued an order requiring defendants to give the court 48 hours notice before removing a plaintiff or class member. ICE later withdrew its plans to transfer class members out of PCCF. On June 12, plaintiffs moved for expedited bail hearings for class members and defendants again moved to dismiss the amended class petition. Between July and December, Judge Burroughs added members to the class to include new detainees that were moved into Unit C-3 and the parties continued to file status reports and discovery motions. Parties met for a status conference on February 23, 2021, and on March 9, filed a joint status report indicating their intention to file a joint motion to dismiss. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: In this case filed April 7, 2020, after the COVID-19 outbreak, civil immigration detainees at the Plymouth County Correctional Facility (PCCF) requested habeas and injunctive relief in the form of immediate interim release from detention. The plaintiffs claimed that the health and safety measures being taken by PCCF were insufficient to curb the spread of the virus and protect the health and safety of detainees within the facility. On June 8, the court certified a class of "all civil immigration detainees who are Petitioners in this action (i.e., who signed the original petition) or are otherwise presently detained in Unit C-3 at the PCCF." The case is ongoing.


On October 5, 2011, the New York Times Company, an American media company, and Charlie Savage, one of its reporters, filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiffs sought the release of a report received by congressional intelligence committees from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence on the intelligence collection authorities that had been authorized under the US Patriot Act and had been subject to expire before their renewal without amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were lawfully entitled to this report under FOIA, that the defendant had wrongfully withheld the entirety of this document for reasons of national security, and that they had exhausted their administrative remedies to obtain this report. On February 27, 2012, the DOJ filed a motion for summary judgement, arguing that: 1. It had properly withheld the report for reasons of national security under FOIA because public disclosure of the requested report would harm national security by exposing sensitive intelligence sources and methods to adversaries of the United States. 2. It also had properly withheld the report under FOIA as material specifically exempted by certain statutes because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, protected intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. On March 26, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment. They argued that: 1. FOIA required the court to engage in a fresh review of the defendant’s decision to withhold the report in its entirety. 2. The defendant had failed to prove that the report was properly classified and thus able to be withheld under FOIA. 3. The possibility that the defendant may be resorting to “secret law” and acting in bad faith, as raised by public statements from two US Senators, Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon and Senator Mark Udall of Colorado, that the executive branch had misled Congress and the American public about its interpretation of US Patriot Act Section 215, justified the court’s close scrutiny of the defendant’s withholding. 4. The court, at a minimum, should conduct a private review of an unredacted version of the report and order the defendant to release segregable portions of it that describe the defendant’s legal interpretation of US Patriot Action Section 215. On March 26, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which had previously filed a suit against the Federal Bureau of Investigation to receive this and other reports, filed a motion for partial summary judgment with respect to this report. ACLU v. FBI. On May 17, 2012, Judge William H. Pauley, having conducted a private review of the requested report, granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied the motions of the plaintiffs and the ACLU for summary judgment and partial summary judgment respectively. He held that the defendant had acted in good faith and properly withheld the report in its entirety because: 1. The report contained “specific descriptions of the manner and means by which the United States Government acquires tangible things for certain authorized investigations pursuant to [US Patriot Act] Section 215” and its disclosure could enable America's adversaries to develop means to degrade and evade the nation's foreign intelligence collection capabilities. 2. Disclosing the reports would reveal and potentially compromise intelligence sources and methods and therefore was barred by the National Security Act of 1947 that protects intelligence sources and methods. 3. There were no segregable portions of the report that the defendant could release because all potentially non-exempt portions of the report are inextricably intertwined with exempt portions. (872 F.Supp. 2d. 309). The case is closed and is cross referenced to ACLU v. FBI, which is also closed.

Summary: In October 2011, the New York Times Company (NYT) and one of its reporters filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The NYT and its reporter sought the release of a report received by congressional intelligence committees from the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence on the intelligence collection authorities that had been authorized under USA Patriot Act Section 215 and had been subject to expire under USA Patriot Act Section 224 before their renewal without amendment. In May 2012, the District Court held that the DOJ had properly withheld the report in its entirety under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).


COVID-19 Summary: This is a 18 U.S.C. § 1983/habeas corpus class action lawsuit brought on behalf of inmates in the Cook County Jail in Chicago in light of over 200 positive cases of COVID-19 in the Jail. Plaintiffs seek release for detainees who are vulnerable because of their underlying medical conditions or age, and transfer to a safer place for detainees exposed to COVID-19. The court issued a temporary restraining order on April 9, 2020. On April 14, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction which the court granted on April 27, requiring the defendant to implement COVID-19 measures. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit and sought to stay the injunction. On June 19, the Seventh Circuit granted in part the motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The injunction was stayed only to the extent that it requires the defendants to put into effect a policy "precluding group housing or double celling of detained persons."<hr> As of April 3, 2020, at least 167 detainees and 46 staff members at Cook County Jail ("the Jail") in Chicago had tested positive for the novel coronavirus that causes COVID-19. In response, the plaintiffs filed this class action complaint under 18 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of the class of persons who are detained in the Jail and are facing unreasonable and unnecessary risks of exposure to the coronavirus. The plaintiffs alleged that despite being aware of the substantial risk of harm that COVID-19 poses, the defendant continues to place the plaintiffs in inherently congregate and unclean settings in the Jail and the defendant fails to take reasonable measures to mitigate the dangers spread by the novel coronavirus. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that class members are deprived of their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonably safe living conditions. They sought an order on behalf of all class members requiring the Cook County Sheriff to implement constitutionally sufficient procedures to protect their health and safety that are consistent with CDC guidelines and the expert judgment of correctional health specialists. The plaintiffs were represented by a team of lawyers from the civil rights firm Loevy & Loevy, the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, and the Civil Rights Corps, a criminal justice advocacy organization in Washington DC. The proposed class included two subclasses. Subclass A consisted of people in custody who had vulnerabilities that place them in heightened risk of contracting serious COVID-19, including persons over the age of 65 and persons with underlying medical conditions that put them at particular risk of serious harm or death from COVID-19, including but not limited to people with respiratory conditions including chronic lung disease or moderate to severe asthma; people with heart disease or other heart conditions; people who are immunocompromised as a result of cancer, HIV/AIDS, or any other condition or related to treatment for a medical condition; people with chronic liver or kidney disease or renal failure (including hepatitis and dialysis patients); people with diabetes, epilepsy, hypertension, blood disorders (including sickle cell disease), inherited metabolic disorders; people who have had or are at risk of stroke; and people with any other condition specifically identified by CDC either now or in the future as being a particular risk for severe illness and/or death caused by COVID-19. The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on behalf of Subclass A members, alleging that petitioners were held in custody in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and seeking immediate release of these Subclass A petitioners. Subclass B consisted of all people who are currently housed on a tier where someone has already tested positive for the coronavirus. The plaintiffs sought transfer of these inmates to a safe facility or some other form of custody. The same day, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary injunction, as well as a motion for an expedited hearing. On April 9, 2020, Judge Matthew F. Kennelly granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO. The court addressed the plaintiffs' likelihood of success with respect to each of their claims. Ultimately, the court issued narrower temporary relief than sought by the plaintiffs. Specifically, the court directed the defendant to implement a policy requiring "prompt coronavirus testing" of symptomatic detainees, and to the extent feasible based on the acquisition of sufficient testing materials, detainees who had been exposed to the virus. The court also directed the defendant to implement social distancing during the new detainee intake process, including suspending the use of bullpens to hold new detainees awaiting intake. The court further ordered the provision of sanitation products and implementation of a sanitation policy. The court declined the plaintiffs' request for an order requiring the Sheriff to provide all detainees with PPE, instead ordering the defendant to provide masks to only those detainees in quarantine—i.e., those who have been exposed to a detainee who is symptomatic. The court declined the plaintiffs' request to order the defendant to provide adequate medical staff to monitor all detainees within the Jail, and to immediately identify or segregate all medically vulnerable detainees. Finally, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for an order requiring the transfer of Subclass B members to a safe facility or other forms of custody. With respect to the plaintiffs' habeas corpus action, the court found that because the plaintiffs had not sought emergency bond reductions for at-risk detainees, the habeas corpus claim on the part of the representatives of subclass A was barred due to failure to exhaust available state court remedies. On April 14, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and limited expedited discovery. On April 27, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the court entered a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to implement a COVID-19 testing policy, enforce social distancing, provide soap or hand sanitizer to all detainees, implement a sanitization policy, provide face masks to quarantined detainees, and establish a policy precluding group housing or double celling of detained persons in the absence of specific exemptions. On May 11, 2020, the defendant provided notice of appeal to the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit to challenge the district court's class certification and preliminary injunction orders. The defendants moved to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal on May 19, and also asked the Seventh Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction. On May 29, the district court denied the defendant's motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On June 2, the court granted the motion to intervene by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 700 (the Union), which was filed May 1. The next day, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Weisman for settlement conference and discovery. On June 19, the Seventh Circuit granted in part the motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The injunction was stayed only to the extent that it required the defendants to put into effect a policy "precluding group housing or double celling of detained persons." On July 7, the parties jointly sought to extend the preliminary injunction and stay discovery pending appeal, which was granted on July 9. On September 8, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of the preliminary injunction for all forms of relief except for the double celling and group housing. The Seventh Circuit determined that the district court failed to afford the Sheriff sufficient deference in his determination of the need for double celling, but for all other claims the Court determined that the district court had made detailed factual findings and properly considered the Sheriff's conduct in its totality in granting closely-tailored relief in accordance with CDC guidelines. In January 2021, the court granted the parties' joint motion to extend the Preliminary Injunction and to stay discovery pending Petition for Certiorari. Defendant Dart filed a petition for a writ of certiorari on January 15, 2021.

Summary: This is a 18 U.S.C. § 1983/habeas corpus class action lawsuit brought on behalf of inmates in the Cook County Jail in Chicago in light of over 200 positive cases of COVID-19 in the Jail. Plaintiffs seek release for detainees who are vulnerable because of their underlying medical conditions or age, and transfer to a safer place for detainees exposed to COVID-19. The court issued a temporary restraining order on April 9, 2020. On April 14, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction which the court granted on April 27, requiring the defendant to implement COVID-19 measures. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit and sought to stay the injunction. On June 19, the Seventh Circuit granted in part the motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The injunction was stayed only to the extent that it requires the defendants to put into effect a policy "precluding group housing or double celling of detained persons." The case is ongoing.


On March 3, 2009, several citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who were or had been married to same-sex partners under Massachusetts law filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706, against several agencies of the federal government. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a review of administrative action, alleging equal protection violations. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates Equal Protection by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages for purposes of the laws governing benefits for federal employees and retirees, the Internal Revenue Code, and the Social Security laws, thereby denying plaintiffs protections and benefits that would be available to them were their spouses of the opposite sex. On July 8, 2010, the Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F.Supp.2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010). (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on federalism grounds, in Massachusetts v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0005, and the two cases were consolidated on appeal.) The court found that there was no rational justification for denying benefits and protections to married same-sex couples that were provided to their opposite-sex counterparts, and thus held that the federal government violated the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment by doing so. The next month, the court issued an injunction barring the federal government from applying DOMA against plaintiffs, but on motion by the defendants agreed to stay the injunction for the duration of the appeals process. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the Court of Appeals that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. (It would later file a brief in support of the plaintiffs' case on September 22.) In response, the "Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives" intervened to defend the act. On August 23, 2011, the plaintiffs moved for an initial en banc hearing to expedite the case, but despite a supporting brief from the Department of Justice, the Court of Appeals (Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch) denied the motion. After hearing arguments on April 4, 2012, on May 31 a three-judge panel of the First Circuit (Chief Judge Lynch, Judge Michael Boudin, and Judge Juan R. Torruella) unanimously affirmed the District Court's judgment in an opinion by Judge Boudin. Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, No. 10-2204, 2012 WL 1948017 (1st Cir. May 31, 2012). While the Court of Appeals refrained from applying heightened scrutiny, it also declined to employ hyper-deferential rational basis review; instead, the Court held that Supreme Court precedent in cases implicating the interests of historically disadvantaged minority groups (e.g. United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)) and cases considering federal action in areas of traditional state concern (e.g. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) suggested a more searching form of rational basis inquiry (so-called 'rational basis with bite'), and that the rationales given for DOMA did not hold up under this closer scrutiny. Injunctive relief has been stayed pending likely review by the Supreme Court; both the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives and the Department of Justice filed for certiorari review on June 29 and July 3, respectively. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition for certiorari. 133 S. Ct. 2884 (2013). On July 1, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued a mandate making the May 31, 2012 judgment the formal mandate of the Court.

Summary: On March 3, 2009, several citizens of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts who were or had been married to same-sex partners under Massachusetts law filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against several agencies of the federal government, alleging equal protection violations. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) violates the Fifth Amendment by refusing to recognize lawful same-sex marriages and thereby denying plaintiffs protections and benefits that would be available to them were their spouses of the opposite sex. The District Court (Judge Joseph L. Tauro) substantively agreed with the plaintiffs, granting them summary judgment on July 8, 2010, and enjoining the federal government from applying DOMA against them. (The decision was issued the same day as Judge Tauro's decision striking down DOMA on federalism grounds, in Mass. v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 698 F.Supp.2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010), PB-MA-0005.) The defendants appealed to the First Circuit, and the Court's order was stayed for the duration of the appeal. On February 24, 2011, the Department of Justice indicated to the court that it had come to the conclusion that DOMA is unconstitutional and would cease defending it. In response, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives intervened to defend the act. The case was argued before a three-judge panel of the First Circuit on April 4, 2012, and on May 31, 2012, the Court affirmed the District Court's judgment. Injunctive relief was stayed pending review by the Supreme Court; both the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives and the Department of Justice filed for certiorari review on June 29 and July 3, respectively. On June 27, 2013 the Supreme Court denied the petitions for certiorari, and the May 31, 2012 judgment became final.


In August 2005, the Seattle Field Office of the EEOC brought this suit against The Burrito Shoppe LLC and Allied Foodservice, Inc. (both doing business as Squeezers Giant Burgers) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Idaho. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant was alleged to have been sexually harassed and constructively discharged because she was female. The Idaho Human Rights Commission intervened in the suit on behalf of the complainant. The employer made motions for judgment on the pleadings, to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and for summary judgment. The court denied all of these motions. After a series of motions to postpone the trial, the parties reached settlement. In August 2008, Judge Larry Boyle signed a consent decree. Squeezers agreed to pay the complainant $40,000 ($10,000 the following month, then $1250 per month for the next 23 months), to adopt and post a written equal opportunity policy, and to retain an independent consultant to review and audit the workplace. It agreed to expunge from its records material related to this claim, and committed to annual reporting. The decree was to be in effect for four years. On October 15, 2008, the Idaho Human Rights Commission submitted an application for a writ of execution because the defendants failed to make payments required by the consent decree. The defendants moved to stay the writ of execution, but Judge Boyle denied their motion and issued the writ on November 25, 2008. In January 2009, the Idaho Human Rights Commission served interrogatories and requests for production of documents, with which the defendants failed to comply. The Commission filed a motion to compel these responses on March 3, 2009, which Judge Boyle granted on April 27, 2009. Judge Boyle required the defendants to submit the responses by May 19 or appear in court the next day. The parties appeared in court, and in early June filed a stipulated May 2009 Consent Order in an effort to resolve the disputes. The order provided for an initial payment of $5,000, then subsequent monthly payments of $1,500 until the balance was paid. The defendants’ president agreed to sell his 1978 Corvette in order to obtain funds for the necessary payments. The defendants also agreed to pay reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees related to enforcing the consent order. Judge Boyle approved the order on July 15, 2009. On March 15, 2012, Judge Boyle granted another writ of execution for the defendants’ nonexempt property in order to satisfy the outstanding debt of $12,899.90. No additional information has been entered on the docket since the March 2012 writ of execution.

Summary: The EEOC brought this suit against a burger restaurant, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties settled, but the defendants failed to make the required payments in a timely fashion. The court issued two writs of execution to enforce the consent order. No information has been entered on the docket since March 2012.


On January 14, 2005, the Chicago District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff sued the law firm Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP under 29 U.S.C. §621, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”). The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant implemented an age-based retirement policy that discriminated against employees forty and older and downgraded or expelled attorneys on account of their age. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in any employment practice that discriminates on the basis of age against individuals 40 years of age and older; to order the defendant to institute and carry out policies that provide equal employment opportunities for individuals 40 years of age and older; to order the defendant to reinstate of a class of employees over the age of 40 to the status of partner which they previously occupied or in the alternative provide front pay, back pay, prejudgment interest, the value of lost benefits and liquidated damages. On June 9, 2005, U.S. District Judge James B Zagel denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgement involving individual relief for persons who failed to file charges under the ADEA and were therefore, according to the defendants, barred from bringing their own individual suits. Judge Zagel ordered that concerns over brining stale claims did not override the EEOC’s right to advance the interests of the public by seeking individual relief for at least some individuals in this case. On December 20, 2005, Judge Zagel decided that the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgement on reconsideration on claims for individual relief was denied and the defendant’s motion of certification for interlocutory appeal was granted. The flowing questions of law was certified by Judge Zagel: “in the circumstances of this case, whether the EEOC may pursue individual relief for persons who did not file charges under the ADEA and are now barred from bringing their own individual suits?” On February 17, 2006, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgement of the District Court. Following some discovery, the parties settled the lawsuit on October 4, 2007 through a consent decree. The consent decree contained anti-discrimination and retaliation clauses, and required the defendant to: keep records, hire an internal monitor, post notice of employee rights, distribute copies of the consent decree to all partners, and pay $27,500,000 to eligible claimants according to the EEOC's discretion pursuant to a confidential document. The term of the decree was from October 2007 until December 31, 2009 and as there is no further enforcement action on the docket, the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2005, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated on the basis of age. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant implemented an age-based retirement policy that discriminated against employees forty and older and downgraded or expelled attorneys on account of their age. In 2007, the parties settled through a consent decree that contained anti-discrimination and retaliation clauses, and required the defendant to: keep records, hire an internal monitor, post notice of employee rights, distribute copies of the consent decree to all partners, and pay $27,500,000 to eligible claimants according to the EEOC's discretion pursuant to a confidential document. This case is now closed.


The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On July 22, 2015, the New York Times and reporter Charlie Savage filed this suit against the United States Department of Treasury (Treasury) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. According to their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Savage had submitted a FOIA request to the Treasury on September 30, 2014, seeking disclosure of "documents showing the legal conclusions accepted by the Treasury Department as the governing legal protocol for under what circumstances, if any, and at what stage of the process, FISA's notice provision applies to the Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctioning decisions and challenges to them." The Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers sanction programs against foreign individuals and entities; among these programs are the Counter Terrorism Sanctions, which are aimed at those individuals and entities associated with terrorism. Because FISA contains a notice provision that requires the Government to disclose when it uses information from its surveillance in any "proceeding" against people, there had been questions of whether this notice provision applied to OFAC terrorism sanctions. On April 13, 2015, the Treasury denied Mr. Savage's FOIA request, stating that OFAC had located only one document responsive to the FOIA request, but that this document was exempt from disclosure due to attorney-client privilege and deliberative law privilege. After unsuccessfully filing an appeal with the Treasury, the plaintiffs alleged in this lawsuit that the Treasury had no lawful basis under FOIA for withholding the requested document, which the plaintiffs viewed as the agency's "working law." Accordingly, the plaintiffs requested that the court order the Treasury to provide the requested documents. On December 23, 2015, the Treasury filed a motion for summary judgment. It argued that the document was properly withheld and that the document could not be considered "working law" since the document's legal analysis had not been adopted by the Treasury and was not being used as a reference document by OFAC. The Treasury further argued that the document was protected by attorney-client privilege because the document memorialized preliminary advice that Treasury attorneys developed and communicated to OFAC officials regarding their obligations under FISA. Moreover, the document was protected by "deliberative process" or "executive" privilege, which protects the decisionmaking processes of the executive branch, because it was prepared "as part of the Treasury's decisionmaking process regarding OFAC's legal obligations under FISA." On August 2, 2016, United States District Judge Edgardo Ramos partially granted the Treasury's motion for summary judgment as to the withholding of the document in question. However, Judge Ramos directed the Treasury to submit affidavits or declarations describing the adequacy of its initial search for documents responsive to Mr. Savage's FOIA initial FOIA request. On September 22, 2016, the Treasury submitted two declarations. The first declaration was by M. William Schisa, Senior Counsel in the Office of the Chief Counsel, Foreign Assets Control at the Treasury. Mr. Schisa stated that he had identified the document in question as the only potentially responsive document in his possession or control and that he was confident that there were no other potentially responsive documents in his possession or control. He detailed the search terms he used and the locations he searched, both physical and electronic. The second declaration was by Marshall H. Fields, Jr., Assistant Director, Information Disclosure and Records Management Division of OFAC. He summarized the steps his office took in responding to Mr. Savage's FOIA request, provided an overview of OFAC's record system, and outlined additional searches his office conducted during the course of this litigation. He concluded that the search methods utilized by his office would have located additional records if any additional records responsive to Mr. Savage's FOIA request existed. On October 20, 2016, the parties stipulated to settle their claims. The plaintiffs stated that they no longer wished to further contest the adequacy of the Treasury's search. Judge Ramos approved the stipulation.

Summary: In July 2015, the New York Times and reporter Charlie Savage filed this FOIA suit against the U.S. Department of Treasury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs had submitted a FOIA request for documents relating to the Treasury's protocol for dealing with FISA's notice provision when its Office of Foreign Assets Control administers sanction programs against individuals and entities associated with terrorism. The Treasury had identified only one document responsive to this FOIA request, but had refused to produce it, citing attorney-client privilege and deliberative law privilege. The plaintiffs sought to compel the Treasury to release the document, but the Treasury successfully withheld it from disclosure because it was a draft document, rather than a final, "working law" document. After the Treasury submitted declarations explaining its search procedures and declaring that no other responsive documents existed, the parties reached a settlement in October 2016. The case closed in October 2016.


On October 14, 2009, Millicorp, a Florida corporation, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida under the Communications Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., and various state Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, against four corporations providing telecommunications services to correctional facilities in Florida. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for punitive and compensatory damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct to prevent competition by blocking the telephone calls of plaintiff's customers. Millicorp is a nationwide voice over Internet protocol ("VOIP") provider. VOIP is used to transmit voice communications over an Internet connection rather than a landline. Millicorp provides its services to correctional facility inmates in many states. The defendants provide phone services to correctional facilities via pay phones. Millicorp alleged that defendants programmed their pay phones to block Millicorp's services. As a result, Millicorp claimed it lost revenue and a significant percentage of its customer base. On April 14, 2010, the District Court (Judge Donald Graham) granted defendants' motion to dismiss. Pursuant to the Communications Act, any person claiming damage under the Act may either make a complaint to the FCC or bring suit in a federal district court, but may not pursue both remedies. The Court found that Millicorp's previous informal request that the FCC investigate the unlawful call blocking practices of the defendants barred it from bringing its claims in federal district court. The Court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state law claims.

Summary: Plaintiff corporation brought a suit claiming that defendants engaged in unlawful conduct by blocking its telecommunications services to correctional facility prisoners. The Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss finding that plaintiff had already requested that the FCC investigate the claims, thus barring the plaintiff from bringing suit in federal district court.


COVID-19 Summary: This constitutional action was filed on July 29, 2020 by inmates in Tulare County in California seeking improved safety and health conditions in light of COVID-19. The court granted part of the plaintiffs' temporary restraining order and provisional class certification on September 2, 2020. However, on December 23, 2020 the court denied to certify the class and enter a preliminary injunction. <hr> On July 29, 2020, plaintiffs, four incarcerated individuals in custody of the Tulare County Sheriff's Office and criminal defense advocacy nonprofit, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, filed this case against Sheriff Michael Boudreaux in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff's Office violated the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and California Civil Code § 52.1(b), known as the "Bane Act", in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The case was assigned to Judge Dale A. Drozd. Specifically, under the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiffs alleged that Boudreaux violated their right to be free from punitive conditions of confinement by recklessly failing to mitigate the risk of COVID-19, with deliberate indifference toward inmates' health. Under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions in the jail posed an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their health and that jail officials acted with deliberate indifference to these risks. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants' COVID-19 response violated their First Amendment Right to petition the government for redress of grievances, Fourteenth Amendment right to access courts, and Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel. Finally, under the Bane Act, Plaintiffs argued that Sheriff Boudreaux interfered or attempted to interfere, unlawfully, with the rights of the Plaintiffs to access courts and defense counsel. Plaintiffs brought their action as a proposed class consisting of all people, at the time of the complaint and from then onward, incarcerated in Tulare County Jails. They divided the class into subclasses: (i) persons confined pre-trial, (ii) persons confined pursuant to a judgment of conviction, and (iii) Medically Vulnerable persons confined pre-trial and pursuant to a judgment of conviction. Plaintiffs claimed that the number of people in the proposed class (at least 1,900), the commonality of the issues of the sheriff's COVID-19 response, and the fact that the Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the rest of the class supported certification. On August 12, Plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction or writ of habeas corpus. As part of the proposed injunctive relief, plaintiffs requested that Boudreaux take action to release "Medically Vulnerable" people that did not pose serious flight risk or danger to others. Plaintiffs also requested that an expert be appointed to make recommendations about which inmates should be released and to ensure that the remaining inmates were able to be housed safely under CDC guidelines. The plaintiffs also requested comprehensive COVID-19 testing and tracing, as well as access to remote counsel and court. To combat hygiene problems at the jail, plaintiffs requested access to hand soap and washing, face coverings, paper towels, toilet paper, running water, facial tissue, hand sanitizer, daily showers, temperature checks, and non-punitive quarantine settings. They also requested improved cleaning of surfaces, prompt medical attention for emergencies, and access to clean laundry. On September 2, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' application for provisional class certification and part of their requested temporary restraining order. 2020 WL 5235675. The court found that the plaintiffs' proposed class was sufficiently numerous, that the conduct of the defendants alleged in the complaint was sufficiently common to all of the proposed class members, and that the representative plaintiffs' claims were sufficiently typical to the rest of the proposed class members. In granting part of the plaintiffs' requested temporary restraining order, the court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of each of their constitutional claims, as well as their claim under the Bane Act. The court concluded that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief and that the balance of the equities and public interest weighed in their interest against the defendant. Although the court granted the plaintiffs' requested temporary restraining order, the injunctive relief did not include a requirement that all inmates and staff be immediately tested for COVID-19. Instead, the court required that the defendant develop written policies of COVID-19 related issues. These required policies included a plan to limit contact between incarcerated people in common areas, the provision and requirement of masks in the jails, and a report of COVID-19 testing to date. The injunctive relief also required that plaintiffs have the ability to promptly and confidentially communicate with counsel over video calls, that the legal visitation policy be revised, and that no retaliation happen against plaintiffs who speak with counsel at the jails. On October 6, 2020, Magistrate Judge Stanley A. Boone ordered that the defendant file a responsive pleading within ten days. On November 2, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, and on November 3, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to enforce necessary COVID precautions such as testing and appropriate social distancing. A hearing was held on December 2, 2020, to discuss the motion for preliminary injunction, and on December 23, 2020 both the motions for class certification and for preliminary injunction were denied. Discovery continues and the case is ongoing.

Summary: In July 2020, incarcerated individuals and a criminal defense advocacy nonprofit filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the Tulare County Sheriff's Office violated their First, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendment rights in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Provisional class certification and a temporary restraining order was granted in part on September 2, 2020. The case is ongoing.


This complaint was filed on July 27, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were a group of women and women-founded organizations that were protesting in solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement in Portland, Oregon. They were represented by private counsel. After the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020, the country saw large-scale civil unrest and demands for racial justice and police accountability. In Portland, the protests continued longer than in most other cities. In response, President Trump sent federal law enforcement agencies into the city to quell the protests in mid-July. Local PPB officers had already been accused of using excessive force against peaceful protesters, and the dispersal of federal law enforcement, who allegedly were not in uniform and arrested residents by throwing them into unmarked vehicles, only added fuel to the fire. The plaintiffs sued several federal agencies and their heads including: 1) the Department of Homeland Security, Acting Secretary of DHS Chad Wolf, and Acting Deputy Secretary Ken Cuccinelli; 2) U.S. Customs and Border Protection and CPB Commissioner Mark Morgan; 3) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Deputy Director of ICE Matthew Albence; 4) the Federal Protective Services and Director of FPS L. Eric Patterson; 5) the U.S. Marshals Service and USMS Director Donald Washington; and 6) the Department of Justice and Attorney General William Barr. This complaint alleged that such tactics were in violation of numerous federal laws. Plaintiffs argued that the federal agents broke the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution by infringing on protesters' right to free speech, by using excessive force, and by detaining people without due process of law. They also argued that the actions represented violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, because the federal agents went beyond their authorization to use force to protect federal buildings. Furthermore, the violations of the Constitution made the defendants liable under the Administrative Procedure Act, because that Act does not allow agency actions contrary to constitutional rights. Finally, with regard to Defendant Chad Wolf, the plaintiffs argued that he was never Senate-confirmed, making his actions illegal under the Appointments Clause and contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary and permanent injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper. On October 15, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss due to lack of standing and for failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the complaint's focus on past experiences failed to suggest that harm was certainly impending. Regarding the plaintiffs' APA claims, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to point to any final agency action as required for review under the APA. With respect to the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the defendants claimed that the plaintiffs failed to identify a pattern or practice of unlawful use of force that would stifle speech or a policy of unlawful arrests in violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment. Finally, they argued that defendant Wolf was lawfully serving as Acting Secretary and regardless had ratified his previous actions to remove any question as to their legality. Shortly after, current and former prosecutors, Attorneys General, law enforcement leaders, and former United States Attorneys and Department of Justice Officials sought leave from the court to file an amicus brief to share their concerns about how the deployment of federal law enforcement in Portland and elsewhere undermined vital law enforcement objectives by damaging fragile bonds between peaceful protestors and law enforcement. The court granted leave and the group filed an amicus brief on October 30. The Constitutional Accountability Center also sought and the court granted leave to file an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs in the case. Their brief discussed the history, structure, and purpose of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act and how it interacted with the Homeland Securities Act and the APA. They argued that defendant Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary of Homeland Security when he adopted the actions in this case and explained why the conduct could not be ratified after the fact. Throughout October and November, the parties continued to brief the motion to dismiss. Then, on December 17, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint dropped one plaintiff (Wall of Moms) but the factual allegations, causes of action, and sought after relief remained largely the same. A few days later the court granted the motion to file an amended complaint and denied the motion to dismiss as moot. The court also noted the possibility for expedited briefing on any motion to dismiss the amended complaint because the parties had already briefed many issues in the case. The case is ongoing as of January 5, 2021.

Summary: This lawsuit arose out of President Trump's decision to send federal agents to Portland, Oregon in order to quell protests there in July of 2020. The decision came following months of protest against racial inequality and policing, largely in response to the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleged that federal police were illegally stopping protests, using excessive force, and foregoing due process in an attempt to quell the unrest. The plaintiffs, two activist organizations and several individual plaintiffs, sued six federal agencies and their heads, demanding declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 15, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. A group of current and former prosecutors, Attorney Generals, and former attorneys for the federal government filed an amicus brief expressing concerns about the deployment of federal law enforcement in Portland and elsewhere. The Constitutional Accountability Center also filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. Then, on December 17, the plaintiffs requested to file an amended complaint. The court granted them leave to do so and denied the motion to dismiss as moot. The case is ongoing as of January 5, 2021.


On September 30, 2010, the United States Department of Justice (U.S. Attorney's Office) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601-3619, against the developer and designer/builder of the Melar, a large apartment building on the Upper West Side of New York City. The U.S. alleged the defendants designed and constructed the Melar to be inaccessible to persons with disabilities, especially people who use wheelchairs, both in its common areas and in individual apartments. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment, injunction, money damages, and civil penalties. The United States submitted two consent decrees a few days apart in September 2010, one with the architect and the other the developer. The consent decree with the architect included education/training for all employees; payment of a $40,000 penalty to the United States; and an injunction from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. The consent decree with the developer was more comprehensive. It not only enjoined the defendant from discriminating on the basis of disability, it required substantial modifications and retrofitting of the Melar--both in common and other areas--at the builder's expense. It also directed notification of all residents of the property to ensure that they would be aware of the modifications being made to the property, provided for the payment of $180,000 to individuals impacted by the building's inaccessibility by the developer; and required the developer to create an Accessibility Payment Fund of $288,300. On October 22, 2010, the Court (Judge Richard Berman) filed an administrative order requesting additional information about the proposed consent decree between the United States and Defendant L&M 93rd Street LLC. Judge Berman explained his concern that the consent decree would create unnecessary expense to the Developer-Defendant. He expressed skepticism about the appropriateness of numerous provisions of the decree: the Developer-Defendant's agreement to compensate individuals affected by the building defects of the Melar; the Accessibility Project Fund; the list of names and addresses of buildings constructed by the Developer-Defendant; training; and the three-year compliance period. The Court requested that the parties respond to the administrative order by October 29, 2010. The U.S. response was to urge the Court to approve the decree as submitted; the U.S. filing focused on the fact that the decree was an arms' length agreement resulting from two years of negotiations. Beginning with filings in early November 2010, the defendants' response (unsurprisingly) was to express misgivings about the Decree it had previously signed, agreeing with the Court that the decree was probably too onerous. Several additional entities then weighed in: The Real Estate Board of New York (REBNY) filed a letter with the Court arguing against the agreed-upon consent decree out of concern that this settlement would create heightened building requirements for the real estate industry in New York City. In addition, the defendant provided the Court with a letter written by the Corporation Counsel for New York City, Michael Cardozo, to the U.S. Attorney, expressing the view that compliance with the relevant local law constituted compliance with the Fair Housing Act. The U.S. disagreed, but to resolve this part of the dispute, the City contacted the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development to discuss the interrelationship between New York City's current local accessibility code and the FHA. HUD offered to provide technical assistance to the City upon request. The parties reopened negotiations, but were, at least at first, unable to come to a different agreement. Judge Berman expressed the view that a private settlement agreement--entirely outside the Court's enforcement--might be an appropriate way to proceed, and the government then proposed to split the settlement into an enforceable consent decree and a private settlement agreement that contained just the provisions of concern to the Court. It appears that this approach was either unsatisfactory to the Court or to the developer. According to a motion filed by the U.S. in July 2011, what happened next is that In March 2011, the Developer informally sought leave to withdraw its consent to the Original Developer Decree. In addition, REBNY filed a motion to intervene as a defendant to this case because of its extensive presence and wide membership in the real estate industry. The motion was opposed by the U.S., and on April 5, 2011, Judge Berman denied intervention. Both the Developer and the Architect then filed motions seeking to withdraw their consent to the still-unapproved decrees. While this motion was pending, settlement negotiations resumed. The parties then agreed on a revised consent decree. The revisions each made the decree slightly more favorable to the developer. For example, where the original Decree required the Developer to pay to a disability rights organization any portion of the Aggrieved Persons Fund not distributed to aggrieved persons by the end of that decree's term, the revised decree returned the unpaid money to the developer. Similarly, the rules governing the Accessibility Project Fund gave the developer more control over the expenditure of that $288,000. The retrofits required were also scaled back in some particulars. In total, though, it does not appear that the Decree was scaled back very much. On July 22, 2011, Judge Berman approved the revised decree, and on July 25, 2011, Judge Berman approved the architect decree as well. In February 2012, some of the deadlines in the Decree were extended by 150 days. The docket does not include any other post-decree activity. The decree was scheduled to expire in July 2014. The extended deadline passed without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 30, 2010, the United States filed a Fair Housing Act lawsuit against Defendant L&M 93rd Street LLC and Defendant architects, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. (Judge Richard M. Berman). After considerable drama, in July 2011, the Court entered a three-year consent decree ordering the Defendant to modify its building, the Melar, to be accessible to persons with disabilities and to pay an additional $288,300 to fund additional modifications, $40,000 as a penalty, and $180,000 for particular aggrieved residents. The architect, too, agreed to a consent decree enjoining it to make future dwellings accessible to persons with disabilities and to pay a $40,000 civil penalty.


On October 21, 2015, a group of persons incarcerated for unpaid fines and fees stemming from traffic violations and misdemeanors filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the City of Biloxi, including the Chief of the Biloxi Police Department, a part-time judge of the Biloxi Municipal Court, and Judicial Correction Services (JCS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the ACLU and local counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that by incarcerating them for unpaid fines, the defendants in effect operated a "modern-day debtors’ prison," in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and Fourth Amendment rights to freedom from unreasonable seizure. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Almost immediately, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings to concentrate on settlement negotiations. On November 3, 2015, the court granted this motion. Settlement negotiations continued into 2016 until the parties reached an agreement in March 2016. Judge Halil S. Ozerden entered a final judgment of dismissal on March 7, 2016, with the court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the private settlement agreement. As part of this settlement, the City of Biloxi adopted sweeping reforms and policy changes. These included termination of contracts with for-profit probation companies; adoption of new court procedures and a "bench card” to guide judges on how to avoid sending people to jail because they are unable to pay court fines and fees; and training for city officials; establishment of a public defender office to represent indigent people; and judicial consideration of a person's ability to pay fines at sentencing. The defendants also agreed to pay $75,000 in damages and attorney's fees. The parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction over implementation of the settlement for three years. On September 13, 2016, the City of Biloxi filed the required 60-day status report on the implementation of the settlement agreement. It stated that the City had ceased issuing warrants or incarcerating people for failure to pay fines. Shortly after, on September 27, 2016, the plaintiffs and the City of Biloxi agreed to a supplement to the settlement agreement to help improve the implementation of the initial agreement. The supplement included improved advisement of rights for people who owe fines and fees and a revised bench card for judges. As of May 20, 2020 there has been no further action in the docket, and the settlement agreement is presumed to have ended. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, a group of persons charged and jailed for unpaid fines and fees filed this class action lawsuit in US District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Biloxi, Mississippi and its policymakers engaged in policies that amounted to a modern-day debtors' prison. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement that required the City of Biloxi to enact sweeping reforms. The parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction over implementation of the settlement for three years. As of May 20, 2020 there has been no further action in the docket, and the settlement agreement is presumed to have ended. This case is now closed.


On December 3, 2012, a female partner in a law firm filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against her law firm on behalf of herself and a class of females employees of her law firm similarly situated under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et. seq, and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 as amended by the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendant discriminated against female attorneys in the law firm and specifically retaliated against plaintiff for filing this class action. The plaintiff asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief; back pay, front pay, and pre-judgment interest; compensatory damages; nominal, liquidated and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically plaintiff alleged that defendant engaged in discrimination against female partners by: [1] assigning them to lower positions in the company than similarly situated males and [2] establishing a system where women were paid less, less able to gain origination credit for new clients due to males sharing credit among other males but not with females, and less access to opportunity to pitch to new clients than similarly situated males. Further plaintiff alleged that defendant retaliated against her for filling an EEOC action by first reducing plaintiff's opportunities within the company and the creating an "intolerable work environment" and eventually by wrongfully firing plaintiff from her job in the firm. On January 15, 2013, plaintiff filed an amended complaint noting that on January 11, she was granted the right to sue by the EEOC. On May 24, 2013, the District Court (Judge William H. Pauley, III) entered a stipulation to dismiss the case. The parties agreed to a private settlement and the terms of that settlement have not been disclosed.

Summary: On December 3, 2012, A female partner at a law firm brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of herself and a class of female law partners in her firm similarly situated against her law firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et. seq, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Plaintiff claimed that defendant discriminated against female partners on the basis of their gender and retaliated against her for complaining and filling suit. On May 24, 2013, the parties stipulated to dismissing the case and entered a private, undisclosed settlement


Plaintiffs filed a complaint on June 24, 2015, challenging the policies and practices of the Illinois Department of Corrections relating to solitary confinement. It alleged that Illinois uses extreme isolation for even the most minor offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class and systemic injunctive relief. The case was filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It was assigned to Judge James Zagel. On August 14, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. This motion was granted on February 11, 2016, and the complaint was dismissed without prejudice. It is presumably closed.

Summary: This case, filed June 24, 2015, challenged the policies and practices of the Illinois Department of Corrections relating to solitary confinement. It alleged that Illinois uses extreme isolation for even the most minor offenses, in violation of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Plaintiffs sought certification of a class and systemic injunctive relief. The case was dismissed without prejudice on February 11, 2016, and is presumably closed.


On November 23, 2011, the United States filed this lawsuit in this U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska on behalf of a college student with disabilities. The U.S. sued the University of Nebraska at Kearney for violations of the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988. The plaintiff, represented by the Department of Justice, asked the court to declare that the defendant had violated the Fair Housing Act and to enjoin the defendant from pursuing discriminatory practices in the future. The plaintiff also sought monetary damages and civil penalties against the defendant. The plaintiff claimed that a student had been denied reasonable accommodation for her service animal through university housing. The student, who suffered from anxiety and depression, lived with a small dog that helped her manage her panic attacks. Despite numerous oral and written requests for reasonable accommodation, the student was denied permission to live with her service animal in the university's housing. On April 19, 2013, the Court (Judge John M. Gerrard) ruled on the plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. The Court ruled that the Fair Housing Act did apply to the University of Nebraska at Kearney, even though the university's housing could be considered temporary for most residents. 940 F. Supp. 2d 974 (D. Neb. 2013). The parties settled the case, and on September 4, 2015, the Court (Judge John M. Gerrard) approved the consent order. In the settlement, the defendant did not concede liability, but agreed to discontinue its discriminatory housing practices against students with disabilities. The university adopted a "University Housing Reasonable Accommodation Policy" and agreed to pay $140,000 to a settlement fund for effected students. The court retained jurisdiction of the case for two years to enforce the settlement. The consent order lasted two years. There has been no activity on the docket subsequent to the entry of the consent order. Accordingly, the case is presumed closed.

Summary: The United States brought a suit against the University of Nebraska at Kearney for violating the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff claimed that the university had refused to provide reasonable accommodation for students with service animals, specifically animals trained to provide emotional support to students with mental disabilities. The case settled, and the university adopted a new anti-discrimination policy and paid $140,000 to a settlement fund. The court retained jurisdiction of the case for two years to enforce the settlement. The consent order lasted two years. There has been no activity on the docket subsequent to the entry of the consent order. Accordingly, the case is presumed closed.


COVID-19 Summary: Two individuals incarcerated at Terre Haute Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit on behalf of all individuals who were or would be incarcerated at Terre Haute during the COVID-19 pandemic. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendants from conducting federal executions, which drew hundreds of individuals from all over the country and therefore threatened the plaintiffs' safety. The court denied the plaintiffs' first motion for preliminary injunction but granted the second motion, prohibiting the defendants from executing any additional inmates without first taking specific precautions. In March 2021, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as there were no more pending executions. <hr> This is a class action lawsuit regarding the potential threat posed by executions at a federal prison during the COVID-19 pandemic. On November 25, 2020, two individuals incarcerated at the Terre Haute Federal Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit on behalf of all those "currently or who will in the future be incarcerated at [Terre Haute] during the COVID-19 pandemic" in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Attorney General, Director of Federal Bureau of Prisons, and the Warden of Terre Haute Federal Correctional Complex (Terre Haute) under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C 2201, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that by conducting executions during the COVID-19 pandemic and allowing an estimated 200 people from all over the U.S. to visit the prison for each execution, the defendants showed deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs' health and safety. The case was assigned to Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson and Magistrate Judge Doris L. Pryor. On November 30, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for preliminary injunction and a request for expedited consideration. The plaintiffs requested that the court enjoin the defendants from conducting further executions at Terre Haute during the COVID-19 pandemic. After several hearings on the motion, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction on December 8, holding that the U.S. Attorney General has near limitless discretion to conduct federal executions, subject only to the Eighth Amendment. The court stated that the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment rights were not violated, since the increased risk of COVID-19 would only result in more COVID-19 cases for those involved in the executions, and not the plaintiffs themselves. The court thus held that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of showing their constitutional claim was likely to succeed on the merits. 2020 WL 7239527. After multiple executions were conducted at Terre Haute, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for preliminary injunction on December 28, seeking a prohibition on future executions until inmates no longer faced an unreasonable risk of contracting COVID-19 as a result of the executions. The plaintiffs proposed vaccinating the inmate population at Terre Haute or taking extensive preventative measures, including quarantining and testing execution team members and implementing contact tracing protocols. On January 7, 2021, the court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part, assenting to the fact that the previous executions did create a substantial risk that the plaintiffs would contract COVID-19 and suffer serious health consequences. 2021 WL 71168. Although not as extensive as the plaintiffs requested, the court prohibited the defendants from carrying out executions unless they took certain precautions, including enforcing face masks, maintaining contact logs, and implementing testing and contact tracing protocols. A few days later, the plaintiffs moved for pre- and post-compliance reports, which the court granted on on January 11. The court ordered the defendants to provide the court with a sworn affidavit or declaration attesting their compliance with the preliminary injunction within 15 days of each execution. This motion was later denied as moot after the defendants moved for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction on February 22. Because there were no more executions scheduled in the near future, the court granted the motion to dismiss on March 16, 2021, and the case was closed.

Summary: Two individuals incarcerated at Terre Haute Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit in November 2020 in the Souther District of Indiana on behalf of all individuals who were or would be incarcerated at Terre Haute during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from conducting federal executions, which drew hundreds of individuals from all over the country and therefore threatened the plaintiffs' safety during the pandemic. In December 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' first motion for preliminary injunction, stating that, while those involved in the execution were at increased risk of COVID-19, the plaintiffs themselves were not. However, after numerous executions and a demonstrated increased risk to the plaintiffs, the court granted the second motion for preliminary injunction in January 2021. This injunction prohibited the defendants from executing any additional inmates without first taking specific precautions, including enforcing face masks, maintaining contact logs, and implementing testing and contact tracing protocols. In March 2021, the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as there were no more pending executions.


On August 13, 2003, employees of the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") filed a lawsuit against their employer in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and asked the court to restore them to their old positions, with back pay, benefits, and interest. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that TSA, when laying off employees, had discriminated against older employees who should have had veteran status. On August 21, 2006, the court (Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. AFGE TSA Local v. Hawley, 481 F. Supp.2d 72 (D.D.C. 2006). According to the PACER docket, on October 17, 2006, the court (Judge Kollar-Kotelly) approved the defendant's motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of New York. In New York, the case was dismissed by stipulation.

Summary: On August 13, 2003, employees of the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA") filed a lawsuit against their employer in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and asked the court to restore them to their old positions, with back pay, benefits, and interest. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that TSA, when laying off employees, had discriminated against older employees and those who should have had veteran status. The case was transferred to the Northern District of New York, where for unknown reasons it was voluntarily dismissed by stipulation.


On July 12, 2016, two legal permanent residents filed this lawsuit against Orange County, New York and its officials in the U.S. District for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, who both had serious mental illnesses, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that county officials discharged them from civil immigration detention at Orange County Detention Center without providing discharge planning for the continuity of their life-sustaining mental health care. At their civil detention center, the plaintiffs had interacted regularly with psychiatric professionals and received medication to target the symptoms of their illnesses. When they left without discharge plans, their care stopped abruptly, and they were left without access to basic mental health resources. Represented by the New York Lawyers for the Public Interest (NYLPI), the plaintiffs claimed that the county’s failure to provide the most basic aspect of mental health care endangered their lives, thereby depriving them of due process. They sought compensatory damages. Defendants filed motions to dismiss on January 30, 2017. On September 29, 2017, Judge Nelson Stephen Román granted the motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 2017 WL 4402576. The court first examined whether the state had an ongoing and affirmative duty to plaintiffs to provide continuing care upon discharge. Judge Román found that, given the circumstances of the case and the plaintiffs' inability to find care immediately upon discharge, the state did owe them a limited duty of protection. However, the court also found that the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants engaged in the type of deliberate indifference that would "shock the conscience" as required to make a due process claim under a failure to protect theory. Because the plaintiffs had not shown that the defendants committed a constitutional violation, Judge Román ended his inquiry there. On October 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. From November 2017 through February 2018, dozens of mental health professional associations, public defender agencies, and immigrant rights organizations moved to file amicus briefs, appeared as amicus counsel, or be joined as parties. On May 24, 2019, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. 925 F.3d 73. Specifically, the Second Circuit held that Judge Román should have applied the standard for in-custody medical care, rather than treat the allegations as post-custody medical care. The Second Circuit instructed the District Court to reconsider the motion to dismiss in accordance with the in-custody medical care standard. On November 11, 2019, the parties reached a private settlement agreement of $900,000 and voluntarily dismissed the case. The United States, in a separate lawsuit, also agreed to a settlement of $825,000. The case is now closed.

Summary: Two plaintiffs with serious mental illness were discharged from immigration detention center without discharge planning. On July 12, 2016, Plaintiffs sued in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs brought claims under § 1983, alleging that defendants' failure to provide basic ongoing care violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss on September 29, 2017. Plaintiffs filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit on October 30, 2017, which vacated the district court's order and instructed the district court to apply a more lenient standard to the plaintiffs' claims. The parties then reached a confidential settlement agreement.


On September 13, 2017, a middle-aged man with a disability, a single mother of five children, and middle-aged man who lived with his ailing father filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The case was assigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security (TDSHS) and various county and city clerks under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for alleged violations of the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is second of two cases challenging Tennessee’s practice of rescinding the driver’s licenses of Tennessee drivers who were unable to pay the fines without consideration of their indigence. The initial case, Thomas v. Haslam (in this Clearinghouse) ended with the judge granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and finding that there was no rational basis for revoking the driver’s license of an indigent debtor. The court prohibited TDSHS from revoking drivers’ licenses for unpaid court fines and fees unless and until the State lawfully provided an exception for the inability to pay. In this case, plaintiffs were represented by the National Center for Law and Economic Justice, the Civil Rights Corps, Just City, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sought class action status for a statewide class of those whose driver’s licenses were suspended under Tennessee state law because they could not afford to pay their traffic fines. They also sought subclass status for members within Wilson and Rutherford Counties and those who had their licenses revoked statewide under the Tennessee state laws. Moreover, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from revoking or suspending licenses without due process in the future, and preliminary relief reinstating licenses that had been suspended or revoked under current policy with all reinstatement fees waived, and cost of litigation paid for. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants did not allow them to set up payment plans to pay off traffic fines, making it impossible for low income plaintiffs to pay their debts. This resulted in county and city clerks imposing additional fees and penalties that plaintiffs were further unable to pay. Upon default of payment of fines, clerks would forward the plaintiff information to the Commissioner of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, who would suspend or revoke plaintiffs' licenses. Plaintiffs also alleged that they often received no notice when their licenses were suspended or revoked, resulting in them facing additional penalties when they unknowingly drove without a valid license. One plaintiff served jail time, and the plaintiffs alleged that others across the state had also been imprisoned under similar circumstances. In addition, suspension and revocation of driver's licenses limited the plaintiffs’ ability to maintain employment, care for their children, or receive critical medical care because they were unable to drive to their destinations. This created a vicious cycle by making it more difficult for the plaintiffs to pay their fees, reinstate their licenses, and pay for other basic living expenses such as rent. On October 5, 2017, the court issued an opinion granting a temporary restraining order restoring the driver’s licenses for two of the plaintiffs. The Court concluded that the two plaintiffs' claims were both likely to succeed, and recognized that a driver’s license was “crucial” to “economic self-sufficiency” and necessary for the plaintiffs to pay back their traffic debt. In addition, the facts that the plaintiffs needed their driver’s licenses to get vital medical care and to support themselves economically factored into the judge’s decision. 2017 WL 4418134. The order was extended on October 17, 2017, pending a hearing to resolve whether to convert the order into a preliminary injunction. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on November 15, 2017. A month later, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint adding a single mother of two who allegedly lost her job after losing her license due to the policies of the Bristol City Court Clerk, who was also added as a defendant the same day as the amended complaint. On June 11, 2018, Judge Trauger resolved many of the outstanding issues in the case. Although the defendants alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim, the court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that there was an actionable constitutional violation. However, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims alleging violation of procedural due process where the plaintiffs had actual notice of the suspension of their licenses more than one year before the filing of this case. Judge Trauger granted certification of a statewide class defined as, “[a]ll persons whose Tennessee driver’s licenses have been or will be suspended under Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-50-502(a)(1)(H) or (I) for nonpayment of traffic debt and who cannot now and could not at the time of suspension afford to pay such debt.” She also granted three subclasses for plaintiffs whose licenses had been suspended by (1) Wilson County, (2) Rutherford County, (3) or under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(b) (described as the Multi-Barrier Subclass). 326 F.R.D. 105. On October 16, 2018, the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction was granted in part. The court ordered Tennessee to immediately cease suspending driver’s licenses for failure to pay fines, costs or litigation taxes related to traffic violations. The court further ordered the state to reinstate licenses that had been suspended solely because the driver had failed to pay fines, costs or litigation taxes related to traffic violations. 2018 WL 5023330. The State appealed the preliminary injunction on October 18, 2018. The State also filed a Motion for Partial Stay Pending Appeal; it argued that if the preliminary injunction went into effect but was later vacated on appeal, that would unnecessarily disrupt TDSHS’s functioning and revenues. On November 5, 2018, the district court granted a temporary stay, to allow the Court of Appeals time to consider a full stay. Judge Trauger also clarified her prior injunction by explaining that the State was only required to waive requirements related to the suspension of driver’s license for failure to pay fines, costs, or litigation taxes but not requirements or fees required for renewal of a driver’s license that would have expired naturally during the suspension of their license. Meanwhile, the appeal proceeded; the State sought a say pending completion of the appeal. 2018 WL 5786236. On May 20, 2020, a Sixth Circuit panel composed of Chief Judge Ransey Guy Cole and Judges Danny Julian Boggs and Jeffrey Sutton reversed the grant of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the District Court. 2020 WL 2551889. The opinion centered on the Circuit's recent decision in Fowler v. Benson (924 F.3d 247, 252 (6th Cir. 2019)), which found that a similar driver's license suspension scheme in Michigan did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Since that case showed that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits, the preliminary injunction was suspended. The case is ongoing in the District Court.

Summary: On September 13, 2017, low income plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging defendant officials of Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security, officials at Wilson and Rutherford County Circuit Court, and officials at Lebanon and Mt. Juliet City Courts violated plaintiffs' rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C § 1983. Plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and for similar plaintiffs who were not given the ability to pay their fines through affordable payment plans or notice that their licenses had been suspended or revoked as a result of not making payment of their traffic fine in full. Plaintiffs are also seeking a preliminary injunction to restore class member suspended and revoked licenses. The court granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction request on October 18, 2018; the defendants appealed. The outcome is pending.


On April 11, 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN), a non-profit publication of the Human Rights Defense Center, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against Lewis County. The complaint alleged that Lewis County's mail policy, which restricted incoming and outgoing correspondence at the county jail to postcards only, violated PLN's First Amendment rights. Additionally, PLN alleged that the jail's failure to provide notice to the sender when mail was censored or rejected violated the Fourteenth Amendment due process rights of senders and prisoners. The plaintiffs asked the Court to order the county to cease practicing the postcard-only rule and to require that the jail provide prisoners notice of and opportunity to appeal decisions to reject personal mail. On September 10, 2014, the District Court (Magistrate Judge J. Richard Creatura) issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the jail from restricting mail to postcards only. The court ordered the jail to provide notices of rejection to prisoners and non-prisoner correspondents. It also ordered that all appeals be directed at an official other than the official who originally ordered the rejection of mail. Just a few weeks later, the parties motioned for the court to convert the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction with some modifications. On October 28, 2014, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Creatura) granted the parties stipulated motion. The permanent injunction requires the court to (1) permanently enjoin defendants from restricting mail to postcards only; (2) permanently enjoin defendants from rejecting mail to or from prisoners without providing notice to the prisoner; (3) permanently enjoin defendants from rejecting mail from non-prisoner correspondents without providing notice to the non-prisoner correspondent; and (4) permanently enjoin defendants to give notice to the non-prisoner correspondent addressee of rejected outgoing mail whenever Constitutionally required. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction for an unspecified amount of time. On November 5, 2014, accepted the parties proposed order, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Creatura) dismissed with prejudice plaintiff’s claim for damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. The case is closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs allege that county jail's postcard-only mail rule violates its First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also complain that under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, prisoners have a right to notice and opportunity to appeal any rejection of personal mail by jail officials. Magistrate Judge granted injunctions against the County to cease practicing the postcard-only policy and provide notice and appeal opportunity to prisoners for the remainder of lawsuit. On November 5, 2014, the parties voluntarily dismissed the case.