On June 30, 2016, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District Court of Illinois against Cook County Jail under section §1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants prohibited delivery of written speech from PLN and other related publications, failing to provide due process via notice and opportunity to challenge the censorship and denying Plaintiff equal protection as required under the Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the censorship practices, as well as compensation for damages and legal fees. On July 1, 2016, the plaintiff motioned for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the Jail's mailroom policies and practice of allowing some newsprint while barring PLN violate the plaintiff's right under the First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution. On November 21, 2016, the court (Judge Joan Gottschall) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, stating preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. The court noted that the regulations were at least rationally related to prison security and that it could not grant such extraordinary relief on the indeterminate factual record plaintiffs had provided at that time. The parties appear to have been engaged in settlement talks after the denial. On March 30, 2017, the court referred the matter to Magistrate Judge Marie Valdez for a settlement conference. Initially that proved unsuccessful, and on January 24, 2018, the parties informed the court that settlement discussions had been unsuccessful, leading the court to set a schedule for discovery. However, in the months that followed the parties returned to negotiating a settlement, and appear to have reached one that will resolve the case. On December 12, 2018, the parties informed the court that the settlement they reached called for the court to resolve the dispute over plaintiff's fees. The court set a date for a hearing on the motion for fees, but on March 11, 2019, the court granted a joint motion to stay that hearing in light of the parties' representation that they have agreed in principle to settle their dispute over costs and fees. On June 25, 2019, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement and the case was dismissed. The settlement agreement stipulated that the defendants would establish, implement, and enforce policies that will ensure the delivery of Human Rights Defense Center Publications. The settlement also stipulated that the defendants would pay $75,000 in attorneys’ fees and $35,000 in damages. In addition, if any HRDC publications are withheld from prisoners, jail officials will provide written notice within five business days. Copies of the policies were made available to both jail staff and prisoners within 60 days after the settlement, and they will be included in the Prisoner Handbook. The parties agreed that, with the Court's finding, this case was only concerning the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a publisher, and therefore was not a case concerning prison conditions that are defined in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996. The case was dismissed without prejudice with the right to refile prior to June 27, 2022. If no such refiling occurs, the case will become dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On June 30, 2016, PLN filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Cooks County against Cook County Jail, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The case was settled on June 25, 2019 with the defendants agreeing to implement policies to ensure the delivery of Human Rights Defense Center Publications.


On September 12, 2011, the Authors Guild and several other national and international organizations representing the interest of authors filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the HathiTrust, the President and Regents of the University of Michigan (the lead institution behind the HathiTrust), and the presidents, trustees, and regents of several other universities participating in the HathiTrust. The HathiTrust runs the HathiTrust Digital Library (HDL), a digital archive reproducing and making available online a substantial part of the collections of the libraries of the defendant universities. The HDL was produced in cooperation with Google, Inc.; in exchange for providing the digital scanning service and related services, the HathiTrust allowed Google to retain digital copies of all books. Google made these books searchable via its Google Books service, where non-copyrighted works are available for viewing and downloading in their entirety to any Google user. Users can search for terms even in copyrighted works, seeing an index of each occurrence of the term, with a small "snippet" of the text immediately surrounding it to provide context. A separate suit was filed by the Plaintiffs against Google. That case can be found at DR-NY-0006 in this Clearinghouse. The books digitized by the HathiTrust, numbering close to ten million volumes at the time of the suit, are all scanned by Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software so that their full text can be searched and so that they are accessible to blind and visually impaired readers by way of text-to-speech software and/or braille displays. The HDL makes out-of-copyright books in its collection fully available to its users. The HDL has an initiative called the "Orphan Works Project", which identifies works likely to be under copyright and seeks attempts to locate the copyright holder; if the copyright holder cannot be identified through the HDL's procedures, HDL then makes the work available to its users. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Orphan Works Project and the HDL more generally were in violation of the United States Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq., and sought a declaration to this effect and an injunction that would effectively stop the HathiTrust from operating the HDL. Neither the original complaint nor an Amended Complaint addressed the issue of accessibility for blind users. On December 12, 2011, the National Federation of the Blind and several related individuals (NFB) filed a motion to intervene as defendants. This motion was granted with the consent of the plaintiffs on January 24, 2012. On June 29, 2012, the NFB and related intervenor defendants moved for summary judgment. In their motion the NFB argued that under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act Extension of 1976, universities are required to afford equal access to their libraries and that prior to the HDL, blind patrons did not have such access. They further argued that the legislative history of § 107 of the Copyright Act showed that Congress specifically considered making copies of works available to the blind to be an example of fair use. Prior to the creation of the HDL, the NFB argued, it was impossible for blind students and scholars to use effectively university libraries for research, even when the libraries offered scanning services for blind patrons, which would make specific works available to the blind, because this service was usually reserved for books assigned on class syllabi, and because the libraries often lacked indexes of the portions of their collections available to blind patrons. The NFB cited the Chafee Amendment to the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 121, which specifically authorizes the reproduction of copyrighted material when "information access needs of blind or other persons with disabilities" are "a primary mission" of a institution making the material available. They documented that the University of Michigan did consider the accessibility to be one of their primary goals motivating the HDL project. On the same day the NFB's motion was filed, the original defendants separately filed two additional motions for summary judgment, arguing that the activities of the HDL were permissible under the fair use exception of the Copyright Act, and that the plaintiffs lacked the necessary standing under the Act to bring the case. On October 10, 2012, U.S. District Judge Harold Baer granted the Defendants and intervening defendants motions for summary judgment, finding that specifically that the University of Michigan's participation was authorized under the ADA and the Chafee Amendment, and also that the HDL as a whole was authorized more broadly under the general fair use provisions of the Copyright Act. 902 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The defendants and intervening defendants filed motions to recover costs and attorneys' fees from the plaintiffs. On February 15, 2013, these motions were denied. The court reasoned that although the court found for the defendant intervenors regarding the larger question of how copyright should account for the advance of technology, the plaintiffs acted reasonably. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On June 10, 2014, the Second Circuit entered its decision. Going through a classic four-factor analysis under the fair use doctrine, the Circuit held that the doctrine of fair use allowed defendants to create a full‐text searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in formats accessible to those with disabilities. Plus, the Circuit concluded and that claims predicated upon the Orphan Works Project are not ripe for adjudication. The Second Circuit remanded in part to the district court, however, on the issue that whether the remaining plaintiffs had standing to challenge the defendants making replacement copies of books that have been lost, destroyed, or stolen. On December 30, 2014, the district court entered a stipulation on this remanding issue and dismissed the this case. Specifically, the parties stipulated that defendants would only make copies when the original copy was damaged, deteriorating, lost, or stolen and that an unused replacement could not be obtained at a fair price. Within a five-year term, the defendants agreed to promptly notify plaintiffs if the policies were changed.

Summary: A group of universities, led by the University of Michigan, organized the HathiTrust, which collaborated with Google to digitally scan the contents of their libraries and make their collections available online to researchers and library patrons. On September 12, 2011, the Authors Guild and several other groups representing the interests of publishers and authors filed a civil suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, against the HathiTrust and several affiliated universities, alleging copyright violation. The National Federation for the Blind joined the case as an intervening defendant, arguing that the HathiTrust provided a resource essential to making libraries accessible to blind patrons, and that its actions were permissible under the fair use exceptions of the Copyright Act and under the ADA. The court ruled in favor of the defendants and intervening defendants on summary judgment, but denied their motions for attorneys' fees.


COVID-19 Summary: On March 31, 2020, the Women’s Health Center of West Virginia and its patients brought this suit against West Virginia to enjoin the state enforcing the Governor's Executive Order which prevents people from obtaining abortion care during COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order. On April 28, the defendant announced a new Executive Order which allowed the plaintiffs to resume its operations. With the new order, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on May 6, which the court approved the next day. The case is now closed. <hr> On March 31, 2020, West Virginia Governor Jim Justice issued Executive Order (EO) 16-20 due to the COVID-19 outbreak. The EO was intended to promote public health and safety by limiting movement throughout the state and conserving limited medical resources and personnel. The Order indefinitely banned all "elective medical procedures". EO 16-20 prevented the plaintiff, Women’s Health Center (WHC) of West Virginia, from performing abortions except under extremely narrow circumstances. WHC is the only outpatient healthcare facility in West Virginia that provides abortions. On April 24, 2020, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiff sued West Virginia, the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the West Virginia Board of Medicine, and the prosecuting attorney for Kanawha County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of West Virginia and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief claiming violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause. The complain alleged that West Virginia Executive Order 16-20 violated patients’ constitutional rights by prohibiting "elective medical procedures.” Specifically, the way the defendants interpreted the Order prevented the plaintiff from providing abortions unless the patient is at or near the legal limit for medication abortion or the patient is at or near the point after which she could not obtain any abortion. Over 90% of the abortions the plaintiff had scheduled before the Order went into effect had to be cancelled or rescheduled. On April 20, 2020 the Governor issued Executive Order 28-20, which amended Executive Order 16-20 to allow hospitals and ambulatory surgical centers regulated by the Office of Health Facilities Licensure and Certification (OHFLAC) to submit a plan asking permission to resume urgent elective medical procedures. The plaintiff was not a hospital or ambulatory surgical center and was not eligible to submit a plan. On April 24, 2020 the plaintiff filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from enforcing Executive Order 16-20. On April 28, 2020, the defendant notified the court of yet another Executive Order 30-20, with an effective date of April 30, 2020. Executive Order 30-20 terminated Executive Order 16-20 for all facilities and health care providers except for hospitals and surgical centers regulated by OHFLAC. Executive Order 30-20 allowed clinics, offices and other facilities operated by or with licensed medical or health care professionals to resume all operations and procedures, including elective procedures. This Order allowed the plaintiff to resume its daily operations and continue to provide abortions. Because EO 30-20 solved the plaintiff's problem, on May 6, 2020, the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. On May 7, 2020 Chief Judge Thomas E. Johnston entered a dismissal order and the case was dismissed without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: Due to the COVID-19 outbreak, West Virginia Governor Jim Justice enacted Executive Order 16-20 that indefinitely prohibited all "elective medical procedures." EO 16-20 prevented the plaintiff, Women's Health Center of West Virginia, from performing abortions in most circumstances. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit and sought a temporary restraining order to prevent enforcement of the Order. Four days after this action was filed, the Governor issued Executive Order 30-20 that allowed healthcare facilities to reopen and resume all operations and procedures. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case. As of May 2020 the case is closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action brought by inmates in the Philadelphia Department of Prisons (Philadelphia's jail system), alleging that the conditions within the facility were unconstitutional, due to the plaintiffs' heightened risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. The parties entered into a partial settlement agreement as to protective equipment, disinfectant, and monitoring, which was approved by the court on June 3. This case is ongoing. <hr> On April 20, 2020, ten individuals held at the Philadelphia Department of Prisons brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Represented by the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, the ACLU of Pennsylvania, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia and the Philadelphia Department of Prisons under 22 U.S.C. § 2241, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, seeking relief based on deprivations of their Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that because the plaintiffs were at higher risk for serious illness or death from COVID-19 due to their medical conditions or ages, the conditions of the facilities and their continued detention was unconstitutional. The case was assigned to Judge Berle M. Schiller. Simultaneous with their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, seeking to certify a class of "all people held in custody within PDP," which included 2 subclasses: (1) Medically Vulnerable Subclass, (2) Disability Subclass. On April 23, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and restraining order. The defendants opposed the motion on May 1, seeking to secure conditions that complied with the health and safety standards necessary to protect them. In the alternative, if such conditions were not possible, they requested the court issue a writ of habeas corpus to release a sufficient number of inmates so that the facilities could adhere appropriately to the health and safety standards suggested. The defendants also opposed class certification on May 4. After various telephone conferences held throughout the month of May, Judge Schiller entered a consent order of partial settlement on June 3. The settlement agreement includes terms regarding protective equipment, disinfectant, monitoring and reporting. The agreement also stated that the parties would continue to discuss and work towards a separate settlement agreement regarding issues of social distancing and cohorting upon the completion of COVID-19 testing. WL 2020 7549880. The parties continued to have telephone conferences with the court and submit joint status reports. On December 18, the Court ordered that the June 3 partial settlement remained in full effect, adding an order for one-time testing of all staff by January 15, 2021 and to begin testing all inmates with a goal of finishing testing by the same date. WL 2020 7549941. Judge Schiller also ordered the defendants to provide weekly certifications regarding compliance with the June 3 order. On December 28, the defendants moved for reconsideration of the December 18 order. On December 30, the court ordered that the defendants prepare and submit to the court and plaintiffs an operations and management plan to improve out-of-cell time and also ordered inmate testing to be completed by January 13, 2021. On January 12, the parties attended a hearing before Judge Schiller, and on January 13, the court ordered that the cohort size for out-of-cell time could be increased to allow for more out-of-cell time for inmates. On January 28, the court issued another order, stating that the prison must steadily increase its cohort sizes to provide additional out-of-cell time to the inmates, increasing to 2 hours per day by February 24. The court also dismissed the defendants' motion for reconsideration as moot. The parties continue to file joint status reports and the settlement monitoring is ongoing.

Summary: This action, brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sought to secure better conditions for inmates in the Philadelphia Department of Prisons (PDP), in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of all those within PDP through a TRO and preliminary injunction, but before the court ruled on these motions, the parties entered into a partial settlement agreement. This case is ongoing.


On November 16, 2010, thirteen boys and young men incarcerated at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility ("WGYCF") in Leakes County, Mississippi, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, against the city entity responsible for operating WGYCF (the Walnut Grove Correctional Authority), the for-profit corporations under contract to manage the facility (GEO Group, Inc.) and provide medical care for the prisoners (Health Assurance, L.L.C.), several officials at WGYCF, and the Mississippi Departments of Corrections and Education. The plaintiffs, represented by the Mississippi Youth Justice Project, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Prison Project of the ACLU, and private counsel, challenged what they referred to as the "barbaric, unconstitutional conditions" of confinement at WGYCF. The case was assigned to Judge Carlton W. Reeves. The plaintiffs alleged that staff and officials at WGYCF (1) instigated or were complicit in prisoner-on-prisoner violence and sexual assaults; (2) dealt and allowed the dealing of drugs within the facility; (3) engaged in sexual misconduct with the prisoners; (4) used excessive force (including chemical restraints) on the prisoners; (5) placed prisoners in punitive isolation with no penological justification; (6) failed to provide urgently needed medical and mental health care to prisoners, all in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (7) failed to provide education for prisoners of school age and special education for prisoners with disabilities in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, §§ 1400 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq., and state law. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Counsel for the plaintiffs had begun investigating the conditions at the WGYCF in 2006, and in fact had already begun settlement negotiations with the defendants prior to filing suit. As the parties were negotiating throughout the course of the action, very little appears on the docket other than extensions of deadlines. Notably, however, all defendants but the Mississippi Departments of Corrections and Education were released by the plaintiffs on November 15, 2011, with the understanding that the Departments could provide the plaintiffs with the complete relief sought. Negotiations continued until February 3, 2012, when the parties submitted their proposed settlement agreement to the District Court. The agreement consisted of two consent decrees, one pertaining to present and future prisoners at WGYCF and one pertaining to all prisoners in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections ("MDOC") who were ages 17 or under or who were ages 18 or 19 and will be housed in the Youthful Offender Unit. Under the terms of the first consent decree, MDOC agreed (1) to limit the use of force at WGYCF to that necessary to safely contain prisoners, to get the Warden's approval for the use of force, and to document any use of force with audio-visual recordings and in writing; (2) to limit and document the use of chemical restraints; (3) to limit the use of long-term cell confinement and isolation to certain specific circumstances; (4) to guarantee disciplinary due process and an create an adequate grievance procedure; (5) to implement an adequate and humane suicide prevention policy; and (6) to provide "adequate, appropriate, and timely" medical, dental and mental health care. The decree also arranged for the appointment of monitors to work with MDOC to create appropriate policies and enforce compliance, and it gave the monitors and plaintiffs' counsel complete access to the WGYCF facility and records. If the plaintiffs believed the defendants were not in compliance with the decree, they could seek enforcement by the Court after fulfilling notice and cure requirements. No class member was barred by the decree from bringing individual suit against the defendants. The decree was to last for five years, but could end sooner if the Court found the WGYCF had been in compliance for two years and could be extended up to two years if the Court found that MDOC had failed to substantially comply. The second consent decree arranged for the creation of a Youthful Offender Unit ("YOU") at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility to house all prisoners ages 17 or under who are in MDOC custody and certain prisoners ages 18 and 19. That is, the WGYCF will no longer house youths who are ages 17 and under. The terms for YOU are similar to those for WGYCF, with the notable differences that solitary confinement is prohibited entirely, a focus is placed on rehabilitative programming, and a visitation policy is specifically addressed. After fairness hearings on March 22, 2012, the District Court granted final approval for the consent decrees on March 26 and certified the two classes for the purpose of the settlements. The classes were:
All individuals who are now or who in the future will be housed WGYCF and who live with a serious mental illness, referred to in this MOA as "Plaintiffs" or "prisoners."
 And:
1) All male youth who are ages 17 and under and who are now or in the future will be housed in a Mississippi Department of Corrections prison and who live with a serious mental illness, and 2) all male youth who are ages 18 and 19 and who will be housed in the YOU who live with a serious mental illness, referred to in this MOA as "Plaintiffs," "prisoners," or "youth."
 While this case was ongoing, the Department of Justice was conducting a separate investigation of the facility. The Department of Justice released its findings on March 20, 2012. Although the DOJ investigation and this case are very separate, the plaintiffs in this case entered the DOJ's findings into the record on March 21, 2012 for the court to take judicial notice of. On May 29, 2012, the Court held an emergency hearing, requested by the plaintiffs in light of two incidents, a rape and a stabbing, that had occurred after the consent decrees went into effect. The parties agreed that the defendants would alert the plaintiffs' counsel if there were any further incidents of violence at the facility, and that they would work together to keep further incidents from occurring as the consent decrees took effect and changes began to be made. On July 10, 2014, a riot took place at WGYCF, more extreme than a previous riot that took place six months earlier. These riots prompted the plaintiffs to file a motion for enforcement and modification of consent decree on August 6, 2014, in which they requested an evidentiary hearing in order to take testimony on whether additional remedial measures were required to provide reasonably safe living conditions and freedom from violence at WGYCF. No hearing was immediately set, as the Court allowed for the parties to pursue their mediation obligations between themselves and through the magistrate judge. On March 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to terminate prospective relief granted and ordered by the Court’s approval of the consent decree. A hearing on both motions was held in April 2015. On June 11, 2015, the Court issued an order denying the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to modify the consent decree and granted in part the motion to enforce the consent decree's substantive provisions of regrading classification and housing system and protection from harm. The court found that, while the defendants had improved upon the conditions that existed at the time of the riots and a majority of the consent decree's provisions were no longer necessary, ongoing violations of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights remained. The Court continued to enforce the consent decree. 2015 WL 3795020. On July 13, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal from the denial of the defendants' motion to terminate the consent decree with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Before the Fifth Circuit could render an opinion, Walnut Grove was closed. On September 27, 2016, the Fifth Circuit found that the closing mooted the appeal and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, but held that the District Court retained jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees and costs. 669 F. App'x 209. On September 22, 2017, Judge Reeves ordered the defendants to pay $496,859.25 in attorney's fees and costs. Judge Reeves also entered a final judgment in the case that day, with all the plaintiffs' claims dismissed with prejudice. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney fees on fees litigation. On April 25, 2018, the Court ordered the defendants to pay $35,343.15 in fees on fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is a class action suit filed by boys and young men imprisoned at the Walnut Grove Youth Correctional Facility in Mississippi to challenge conditions of confinement that investigators for the federal government referred to as "among the worst that [they] have seen in any facility anywhere in the nation." The parties reached a settlement agreement providing plaintiffs with injunctive relief in 2012. After the District Court declined to terminate the consent decree in 2015 and the defendants appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit, the Walnut Grove facility closed in 2016 and the case is now closed.


On May 23, 2012, two women officers in the U.S. Army Reserve, sued the Department of Defense and the Army in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that their Fifth Amendment rights had been violated by the Department of Defense. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the policy of excluding women from 'direct combat' operations violated the Administrative Procedures Act and the plaintiffs' equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. As part of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) was required to submit a report reviewing its combat exclusion policies for women. The DoD had, since 1994, a specific policy of excluding women from being part of units, from the battalion-level down, that engaged in direct combat. The Army had a similar policy. On February 9, 2012, the DoD submitted the report to Congress, detailing how the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be given the power to place women into 'direct combat' units, and that the results of this practice would inform future policymaking. The plaintiffs claimed that the DoD policy still permits the exclusion of women from any position where 'job related physical requirements would necessarily exclude the vast majority of women Service members.' Plaintiffs claim that (1) the policy violates their equal protection rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; (2) that Army officers are already circumventing the DoD policy by 'attaching' women to combat brigades, calling them "Cultural Support Teams."; and (3) that the policy of excluding women is futile. The complaint points out that warfare has become non-linear, and that women who are not given weapons and combat training are ill-suited and endangered when the units to which they are assigned come under attack. On November 4, 2013, the parties submitted a notice of voluntary dismissal. The next day, the Court approved the notice and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: Plaintiffs, two female Army Reserve officers, sued the Department of Defense, alleging that the exclusion of women from direct combat units violates their equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment. This is an ongoing case.


A Seattle resident who had been terminated from the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program brought this class action suit on 02/20/2009, alleging that the administration of the Program in Seattle discriminated against residents with disabilities. The named defendants were the Seattle Housing Authority (SHA) and the Executive Director of SHA in his official capacity. Colombia Legal Services represented the plaintiff, and the case was assigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The Fourth Amended Complaint alleged that SHA’s Section 8 voucher termination process prior to August 1, 2008 did not meet constitutional standards; SHA discriminated against voucher holders with disabilities by failing to provide them with reasonable accommodations; and SHA discriminated against voucher holders by not permitting them to live with closely related family members. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq.), and a collection of state and federal anti-discrimination statutes and their accompanying regulations. They also alleged that the defendants' conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment's and Washington State Constitution's Due Process Clauses. The plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on March 25, 2010, requesting that her Title 8 voucher be reinstated. On May 13, 2010, after five additional filings from the parties and oral argument, Judge Pechman denied the motion (2010 WL 1945740). She found that it was not clear that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits, making preliminary relief inappropriate. Over the course of the litigation, Judge Pechman ruled in favor of the plaintiff on three issues. First, on April 22, 2010, she denied defendants' motion to dismiss (2010 WL 1945740). Second, on February 3, 2011, she granted the plaintiff's motion for discovery sanctions (2011 WL 338793). Finally, on April 21, 2011, she granted the plaintiff's motion for a protective order (2011 WL 1561791). She also ruled in favor of the defendants once. The initial complaint had included claims against the Department of Housing and Urban Development, but the court granted summary judgment for the Department on March 29, 2011 (2011 WL 1213168). The parties filed a joint motion for a class action settlement on September 8, 2011. The settlement class included all 82 SHA Section 8 voucher holders who had a termination hearing on or after February 20, 2006 and before August 1, 2008, and whose Section 8 vouchers were terminated as a result of the hearing. The settlement had five main terms: 1) the SHA agreed to make substantive changes and clarifications in its policy regarding individuals with disabilities, 2) the SHA agreed to amend the list of documents it will accept as proof that a household is a primary residence of a minor, 3) the SHA agreed to amend its Administrative Plan to provide for discretionary extension of the time individuals may be allowed to remain in a subsidized residence, 4) addition of requirements that SHA hearing officers include written notice of the availability of judicial review in the termination of Section 8 vouchers, and 5) the SHA agreed to provide a new termination hearing to each class member who requests one. In addition to institutional reforms, the settlement awarded $15,000 in relief to named plaintiffs and $180,000 in attorney's fees. Judge Pechman issued her final order and judgement granting approval of the class action settlement on January 10, 2012. As part of the settlement, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The Clearinghouse does not know if the court continues to enforce the settlement, but there has been no docket activity since the parties filed a redacted status report on March 11, 2013.

Summary: On January 1, 2011, a plaintiff in Seattle, WA filed a class action complaint alleging that the Seattle Housing Authority's Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program impermissibly discriminated against residents with disabilities. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the program's termination proceedings, failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and policy regarding the inclusion of family members violated the rights of residents with disabilities under the Due Process Clause, Fair Housing Act, and federal and state anti-discrimination legislation. The parties came to a settlement agreement in which the SHA agreed to amend its policies and grant class members new hearings. The settlement was approved on January 10, 2012.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas action brought on behalf of classes of pre-trial and post-trial detainees at the Oakland County Jail, seeking release in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction that would require the defendants to take concrete steps towards protecting those in the jail from COVID-19. On May 21, the judge conditionally certified the class and granted the preliminary injunction, requiring the jail to take certain safety and hygiene measures. This was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on July 9. The district court denied defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss the case and set discovery and settlement deadlines for summer 2021.
 On April 17, 2020, classes of pre-trial and post-trial detainees filed this lawsuit against the sheriff of Oakland County and the Commander of Corrective Services of Oakland County. Represented by private counsel, the ACLU of Michigan, the Advancement Project, and the Civil Rights Corps, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they alleged that defendants were violating their Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights by continuing to confine them in the Oakland County Jail, exposing them to COVID-19. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a motion to certify the class. The plaintiffs defined the class as all detainees of the Oakland County Jail during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was broken into three subclasses: (1) pre-trial subclass: detainees who had not been convicted, (2) post-conviction subclass: sentenced detainees, and (3) medically-vulnerable subclass: detainees over the age of fifty who also have underlying medical conditions that placed them at a particular risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. The motion for a Temporary Restraining Order requested the release of the members of the medically-vulnerable subclass and asked for certain measures to improve the hygiene and safety at the jail. That same day, Judge Linda V. Parker, who had been assigned to the case, entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a Temporary Restraining Order only as to the request to improve hygiene and safety. 2020 WL 1929876. The order required:

provision, at no cost, of hand soap, paper towels, and disinfectant wipes or products;
access to hand sanitizer;
access to showers and clean laundry at a minimum weekly basis;
jail staff wear personal protective equipment when interacting with detainees or touching surfaces in cells or common areas;
establish a protocol to self-report COVID-19 symptoms;
conduct immediate testing for those displaying symptoms;
provide adequate spacing of six feet for social distancing;
ensure adequate medical care for individuals with symptoms or exposure to COVID-19 and quarantine those individuals in a non-punitive setting;
respond to COVID-19 related emergencies within an hour;
waive charges for medical grievances;
train all staff on COVID-19 detection and prevention;
cease and desist from punitive transfers or threats of transfers to areas of the jail with higher infection rates, and all other retaliation against concerns raised about the health and safety conditions in the jail.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 23, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available state remedies, that the PLRA precluded the release of inmates from the jail, and that the plaintiffs could not establish an underlying constitutional violation. The defendants also argued that the claims against Bouchard and Childs, in their official capacity, were redundant because the complaint made the same substantive claims against the county, and should be dismissed. On May 1, Judge Parker extended the temporary restraining order for an additional fourteen days. On May 21, Judge Parker entered an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, conditionally certifying the class as well as the three subclasses. 2020 WL 2569868. The order denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in all respects except that the Bouchard and Childs were dismissed as parties, and granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction required the defendants to provide access to cleaning products and access to masks, to establish better cleaning and sanitization protocols, to produce a plan for continued testing of all inmates for COVID-19, to allow for social distancing and proper quarantine measures for those with the virus, establish a policy suspending the use of multi-person cells wherever possible, and to provide a list of members in the medically-vulnerable subclass so that the court could implement a system for considering release. The defendants appealed to Sixth Circuit and filed an emergency motion to stay on May 21. Simultaneously, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial reconsideration, regarding the dismissal of Sheriff Bouchard. The court granted the motion for reconsideration, reinstating defendant Bouchard, on May 22. 2020 WL 2615740. The district court began orchestrating the process for granting bail for members of the medically vulnerable subclass. In response, the defendants filed a renewed motion to stay, in light of the Sixth Circuit's decision to vacate a similar preliminary injunction in  Wilson v. Williams. On June 4, Judge Parker denied the defendants motion to stay the case pending appeal. 2020 WL 2988921. But on June 11, the Sixth Circuit granted the renewed emergency motion to stay pending resolution of the appeal. 2020 WL 3100187. The change, the court explained, was because of the intervening precedent in Wilson v. Williams, 2020 WL 3056217 (6th Cir. 2020). On July 9, the Sixth Circuit vacated the May 21 preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs' evidence was insufficient to prove "reckless disregard to the serious risk COVID-19 poses;" a showing which would be required for a preliminary injunction. 815 Fed. Appx. 978. On August 19, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were moot and lacked standing, and that the court lacked jurisdiction. On December 3, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the stipulated agreement. Following a hearing on December 14, 2020, the court issued an opinion and order denying the defendants' motion to vacate and motion to dismiss. The court stated that the Sixth Circuit's vacatur of the preliminary injunction did not preclude a permanent injunction and thus did not require vacatur of the orders, and that the court retained jurisdiction during the pendency of the litigation. 2020 WL 7353472. On December 30, the court issued an order setting a deadline of August 6, 2021 for discovery and a deadline of September 20, 2021 to file a dispositive motion. A settlement conference was scheduled for August 17, 2021 with Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Classes of detainees in the Oakland County Jail sought writs of habeas corpus and an injunction against the jail, seeking to improve the hygiene and safety of the jail and secure the release of certain medically vulnerable detainees. On April 17, the judge granted a temporary restraining order requiring the defendants to implement a number of measures in light of COVID-19 to improve the safety of those confined in the jail. Then, on May 21, the judge conditionally certified the class and granted the motion for a preliminary injunction, requiring the jail to implement protocols for increased hygiene and safety. This was reversed by the Sixth Circuit on July 9. The district court denied defendants' subsequent motion to dismiss the case and set discovery and settlement deadlines for August 2021.


On September 21, 2006, the Chicago office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Mediterranean Partners under 42 USC §2000 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 USC §1981a (Title I of the Civil Right Act of 1991). The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in any employment practices that discriminated on the basis of sex; institute and carry out equal employment opportunities for its employees regardless of sex; back pay; non- and pecuniary losses; and punitive damages. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against four female employees ("CD", "RF", "PQ", "DS") and a class of female employees on the basis of their sex, by subjecting them to sexual harassment, failing to correct the sexually hostile work environment, and constructively discharging them. On October 12 and October 31 two of the former employees named in the complaint ("DS" and "CD") separately moved to intervene as plaintiffs. Judge John A. Nordberg granted these motions on October 18 and November 8, respectively. CD's complaint also named the individual owners of Mediterranean Partners as defendants, and claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The individual owners moved to dismiss on November 29. Judge Nordberg orally granted this motion on February 13, 2007. After settlement negotiations, the EEOC and the defendant resolved the lawsuit by entry of a consent decree on February 27, 2008. Neither party admitted to any of the claims or defenses raised or asserted by the other in the case. The defendant was permanently enjoined from discriminating against any employee at the Oak Brook, IL facility on the basis of sex and from retaliating against any person at its Oak Brook, IL facility. The defendant was required to pay a total of $35,000 to six (6) employees and to implement anti-discrimination training for its employees. The defendant was further required to document, maintain and make available records of each sexual harassment complaint received by them, and file reports with EEOC for a period of two (2) years. The decree was in effect for two (2) years and the court retained the jurisdiction to enforce the decree. Having resolved the matter, the EEOC withdrew from the case in March 2008. Nonetheless, litigation continued between the defendant and the individual plaintiffs, DS and CD. CD voluntarily dismissed the case on April 14, but DS continued with discovery. On March 26, 2008, the defendant filed an initial status report that indicated that it intended to file a Motion for Summary Judgment. The defendant argued that it was not an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII because it had not employed fifteen (15) or more employees for twenty (20) weeks of the current or preceding calendar year. On April 30, 2008, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown for discovery and settlement. On May 20, 2008 the defendant filed a motion for summary judgement as per the initial status report of March 26, 2008. On July 1, 2008, District Judge Nordberg dismissed the case with prejudice. The EEOC consent decree terminated as expected in 2010, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Plaintiff") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against four female employees ("CD", "RF", "PQ", "DS") and a class of female employees on the basis of their sex, by subjecting them to sexual harassment, failing to correct the sexually hostile work environment, and constrictively discharging them. On July 1, 2008, District Judge Nordberg dismissed the case with prejudice, and in a hearing before Magistrate Judge Brown on the same day, the case was concluded. The case appears to be closed.


This case is a response to efforts by the Trump administration to strip law enforcement funding from “sanctuary” cities and states. The State of Oregon and the City of Portland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon on November 9, 2018. Represented by the Oregon Attorney General and the Portland City Attorney’s Office, they sued President Trump and the U.S. Attorney General under the United States Constitution and the Declaratory Judgment Act. They claimed that immigration-related conditions on federal funding for law enforcement violated the Spending Clause and the Tenth Amendment. They sought declaratory relief, a writ of mandamus, and an injunction, prohibiting the federal government from imposing immigration-related conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (Byrne JAG) program, which provides support for local law enforcement. The case was assigned to Judge Michael McShane. The plaintiffs stated that they were unlawfully deprived of more than $2 million of federal funding for fiscal year 2017 due to their non-acquiescence in the immigration conditions imposed on the Byrne JAG program. They expected to be similarly deprived in FY 2018. They alleged that the federal government had imposed three unlawful conditions on FY 2017 Byrne JAG funds, requiring grant recipients to:

comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (which requires local governments to allow their employees to share their citizenship and immigration status information with federal authorities);
give the federal government 48 hours’ notice prior to releasing arrestees; and
permit federal immigration officials to access any correctional or detention facility to meet with suspected undocumented immigrants.
The plaintiffs further alleged that the Trump administration had imposed similar but more intrusive conditions on FY 2018 funding: local governments were additionally required to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1644; were required to answer questions regarding their compliance with the two statutes; and were required to certify that they would not violate 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a), which forbids the harboring or concealment of undocumented immigrants. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Nov. 21, 2018, adding information related to another sanctuary city case that Oregon was involved in. As a result of a preliminary injunction in that case (City of Evanston et al. v. Sessions), Oregon was provided with an award notice for FY 2017’s Byrne JAG program. However, the plaintiffs pointed out in the amended complaint that the federal government had yet to process that award or disburse any funds, and the plaintiffs still believed that they would be deprived of FY 2018 funds. On March 5, 2019, the Trump administration filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction; the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on April 8, 2019. On August 7, the court denied the federal government’s motion to dismiss, and partly granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. It held that Sections 1373 and 1644 violated the Tenth Amendment, such that the federal government could not withhold funds based on those statutes. The plaintiffs were “therefore entitled to a writ of mandamus compelling distribution of their FY 2017 and FY 2018 funds.” 406 F. Supp. 3d 940. The writ of mandamus and accompanying injunction were issued on August 29, 2019. The court also awarded costs to the plaintiffs, in the amount of $420, on October 24, 2019. On October 4, 2019, the federal government appealed the case (Ninth Circuit docket number 19-35843). The Ninth Circuit ordered mediation and stayed the appeal in October 2019. As of December 2020, the appeal is still stayed and mediation continues.

Summary: Mini-summary: The State of Oregon and the City of Portland filed this lawsuit on November 9, 2018, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, challenging the federal government’s imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the state through the Byrne JAG program. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. The district court issued a writ of mandamus on August 7, 2019, ordering the federal government to distribute funding to the plaintiffs for fiscal years 2017 and 2018. As of July 2020, the federal government’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit is pending.


On January 14, 2013, several Catholic business owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alliance Defense Fund, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Claiming that providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. Plaintiffs, shareholders and operators of a manufacturing company that employed 370 people, maintained a health insurance plan that provided medical coverage to all of its employees. In accordance with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, the healthcare plan specifically excluded abortifacient drugs, contraception, and sterilization. However, the ACA required employers with more than 50 full-time employees to provide health insurance coverage that included contraception and surgical sterilization, as well as education and counseling for such services. Failure to comply with the ACA mandate resulted in a monetary penalties. The complaint alleged that the defendants' actions in implementing the ACA coerced the plaintiffs and thousands of other individuals to engage in acts against their religious beliefs. Specifically, as Catholics, the plaintiffs opposed paying for, providing, facilitating, or otherwise supporting abortifacient drugs, contraception, or elective sterilization, which they claimed was compulsory under the health coverage requirements of the ACA. Plaintiffs alleged this violated their right to freely practice their religion, required them to fund government-dictated speech, and violated their rights under the RFRA and the APA. On February 27, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to stay enforcement of DHS's regulations that required plaintiffs to provide insurance coverage for contraception and sterilization. Defendants did not oppose this motion, pending Eight Circuit Court of Appeals rulings on two similar cases, (1) O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012) or (2) Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12–2804 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn. Jan. 8, 2013), whichever was decided first. On February 28, 2013, the District Court (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) granted the plaintiffs' motion and stayed all proceedings until the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the appeals in Annex or O'Brien, or until the Supreme Court issued a ruling in a substantially similar case. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on July 15, 2014, Judge Smith issued an order lifting the stay and directing the parties to file a Joint Status Report, which the parties filed on August 18, 2014. On September 19, 2014, Judge Smith issued an order continuing the preliminary injunction and directing the parties to file a proposed injunction and judgment. On October 1, 2014, both parties filed their responses, and on October 15, 2014, each party filed its suggestions to the other party's respective response. On November 12, 2014, Judge Smith issued an order permanently enjoining the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On January 28, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees, but they withdrew the motion on February 11, 2015. There has been no further action and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On January 14, 2013, Catholic business owners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury as well as those agencies' secretaries in their official capacities. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the court enjoined the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.


This case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York was brought by the class of immigrants granted asylum in the United States who are seeking to bring their spouses and children to this country. Represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group, they filed a complaint on May 5, 2010, to challenge a policy of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), a component of the Department of Homeland Security. Plaintiffs argued that the USCIS policy was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.) and the Immigration Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.). Federal law enables asylees to petition the government to allow their spouses and unmarried children to join them in this country. Once the petitions are approved, relatives living abroad must appear at a U.S. consulate to obtain authorization to travel to the United States. Before the challenged policy was implemented, if a relative did not appear at a consulate or did not bring the requested documents, the approved petition was held until the relative could appear with the documents. Then USCIS changed the policy so that when a relative did not appear at the consulate or bring the requested documents, USCIS automatically reopened and denied the petition that it had previously approved. This lawsuit charged the agency with acting in violation of its own regulations, taking actions that are arbitrary and capricious, and implementing a new policy without providing proper notice to the public. On November 7, 2012, the parties submitted a stipulation agreement to the Court. On March 1, 2013, Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis approved the order of class action settlement and judgment. The stipulation agreement stated that USCIS would no reopen and deny approved I-730 petitions solely because the beneficiary did not appear for the interview. Instead, the petitions will only be administratively closed, to be reopened at a later time. In future I-730 petitions, USCIS agreed that if the spouse or child ("beneficiary") does not show for the interview at the consulate, the petition will be administratively closed, and a letter will be sent to the petitioner. If the petitioner responds stating that the beneficiary can appear within six months, the petition will be reopened; if the petitioned responds stating that the beneficiary cannot appear within six months, the petition will remain closed and will be reopened upon a later notification from the petitioner that the beneficiary can appear within six months. Regarding previous petitions that have been denied solely due to the failure of the beneficiary to appear at the consulate, USCIS agreed to send a letter to the petitioner describing the outcome of this lawsuit. The petitioner would then follow the same process as future petitions (described above), depending on the ability of the beneficiary to appear at the consulate within six months. Additionally, USCIS agreed to distribute a Public Service Announcement targeting potential members of the class. Finally, USCIS agreed to pay $25,000 in attorney's fees. USCIS did not admit any liability in this stipulation agreement.

Summary: A class of immigrants granted asylum who are seeking to bring their spouses and children to the country but were denied because of the spouse or child's failure to appear for an administrative interview at the proper consulate brought suit against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York on May 5, 2010. On March 1, 2013, Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis approved a stipulated agreement between the parties, in which USCIS agreed not to deny petitions, previous and future, due only to the spouse or child's failure to appear for an administrative interview, and to pay attorney's fees.


On June 15, 2016, Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. (PPSE), Planned Parenthood Greater Memphis Region, Inc. (PPGMR), and a Mississippi Medicaid patient filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Division of Medicaid under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from disqualifying the provider plaintiffs from the Medicaid programs. On July 6, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a final amended complaint. The amended complaint added Jane Doe #2 as a fourth plaintiff. Both Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2 were Mississippi residents and Medicaid patients who received reproductive care from Planned Parenthood. The plaintiffs claimed that on May 10, 2016, Mississippi's Governor signed into law an act that would disqualify any entity that performs abortions from participation in Medicaid programs. The plaintiffs claimed that the act would irreparably harm Mississippi men and women, such as the two Jane Does, who rely on Planned Parenthood for critical health services. They argued that the act violated the Medicaid Free Choice Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23)), which guarantees patients the right to choose any willing and qualified provider within the Medicaid Program. They further argued that it violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by singling out Planned Parenthood for unfavorable treatment and imposing unconstitutional conditions on Planned Parenthood's eligibility to participate in the Medicaid Program. On October 20, 2016, Judge Daniel P. Jordan III granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court found that virtually every court that had ruled on similar laws had found the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23). Specifically, Judge Jordan noted that the Fifth Circuit had reached a similar result in Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee. He therefore issued a permanent injunction to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the law in question. 2016 WL 6127980. On November 18, 2016, the defendant appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit because the defendant in Planned Parenthood of Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee had petitioned for a rehearing and later asked the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene. This case was stayed pending the resolution of Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Gee. Briefing resumed in the Fifth Circuit on January 11, 2019. Shortly after, on February 15, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the case again, this time pending the result of Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas v. Phillips. The stay was approved on February 20. As of April, 2020, this case is ongoing but stayed.

Summary: On June 15, 2016, Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. (PPSE), Planned Parenthood Greater Memphis Region, Inc. (PPGMR), and a Mississippi Medicaid patient filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Mississippi Division of Medicaid under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by Planned Parenthood Federation of America, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from disqualifying the provider plaintiffs from the Medicaid programs. On October 20, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment to permanently enjoin the defendant from enforcing the law in question. On November 18, 2016, the defendant appealed the ruling to the Fifth Circuit. The appeal remains pending.


On June 28, 2010, a non-profit religious organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Minneapolis Special School District No. 1. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from Liberty Counsel and private counsel, sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. The plaintiff alleged that the school district's removal of it from the district's after-school program was unconstitutional, in violation of its federal constitutional rights to freedom of speech, equal protection, free exercise of religion, and due process. The plaintiff also claimed that the defendant's application of the statute which governed its selection process for the official after-school activities was discriminatory. On September 30, 2011, the District Court (Judge John R. Tunheim) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota v. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 822 F. Supp. 2d 878 (D. Minn. 2011). The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit. On August 29, 2012, the Eighth Circuit Court (Judge Clarence A. Beam) held that the District Court abused its discretion in denying the preliminary injunction. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota v. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 690 F.3d 996 (8th Cir. 2012). The Court reversed the lower court's findings that the defendant's removal of the plaintiff from the after-school program was viewpoint-neutral, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its constitutional claims or irreparable harm. The case was remanded. On remand, the parties settled. On October 10, 2012, they jointly filed a stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice in the District Court. The defendant agreed to permanently refrain from denying the plaintiff's participation in the after-school program by discriminatorily applying the selection statute. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiff attorneys' fees and litigation costs in sum of $100,621.90. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice. On January 25, 2013, the District Court (Judge Tunheim) approved the stipulated permanent injunction and dismissed the case. However, on March 12, 2013, Judge Tunheim vacated his January 25, 2013 order and denied the parties' October 10, 2012 stipulation. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota v. Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2013 WL 951405 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 2013). In his opinion, Judge Tunheim found that the parties failed to demonstrate that the permanent injunction was either necessary or warranted. Judge Tunheim further ruled that the parties' stipulation did not bind the Court to exercise continuing jurisdiction over this case, and that it was simply a private settlement agreement. Neither party filed an objection to the March 12, 2013 order, and the Court (Judge Tunheim) dismissed the lawsuit on April 25, 2013. This ended the case.

Summary: On June 28, 2010, a non-profit religious organization, Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minnesota, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota against Minneapolis Special School District No. 1. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's removal of it from the after-school program of the school district was unconstitutional, and that its application of the selection statute was discriminatory. On September 30, 2011, the District Court (Judge John R. Tunheim) denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Eighth Circuit. On August 29, 2012, the Eighth Circuit Court (Judge Clarence A. Beam) reversed the lower court's rulings and remanded the case to the District Court. On October 10, 2012, the plaintiff and the defendant jointly filed a stipulation for entry of permanent injunction and dismissal with prejudice in the District Court. The District Court (Judge Tunheim) refused to adopt the stipulation for court enforcement, instead declaring the resolution a private settlement agreement. Judge Tunheim dismissed the lawsuit on April 25, 2013. This ended the case.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action lawsuit brought on April 20, 2020, by seven individuals in immigration detention at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility (MVDF) and the Yuba County Jail (YCJ), seeking immediate release from unsafe conditions of the jail in light of the global coronavirus pandemic. The court granted the request for TRO on April 29, requiring ICE to provide information and access to detainees to facilitate a process of considering bail requests. On June 9, the court granted the motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the defendants to maintain the status quo while the case was pending. On August 5, the plaintiffs sought a TRO, claiming that the defendants' actions were insufficient and it was granted the next day. After the parties agreed to implement testing and other public safety protocols, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs responded with an amended class-action complaint. The case is ongoing.
 On April 20, 2020, seven noncitizens detained at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility (MVDF) and the Yuba County Jail (YCJ) filed this class-action lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), seeking immediate release from what they said were unsafe jail conditions in light of the global coronavirus pandemic. Represented by the ACLU of Northern California and Southern California, the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and private attorneys, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. under § 2241, and as a declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. § 2201-02. They alleged that their detention violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and their First and Fifth Amendment rights by subjecting them to a serious risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for the release of detainees in order to maintain a number of detainees for social distancing and prohibition against placing plaintiff class members into solitary confinement as a means of achieving social distancing, as well as attorney fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim, then reassigned to Judge Vince Chhabria. Concurrent with the complaint, plaintiffs sought class certification and a temporary restraining order to release a sufficient number of putative class members in order to allow for social distancing. The proposed class consisted of all civil immigration detainees at Mesa Verde and YCJ, with two subclasses: the “YCJ Subclass” and the “Mesa Verde Subclass.” Plaintiffs were detainees in custody of ICE, many of whom with a high risk of COVID-19 due to underlying medical conditions. However, the conditions they faced during detention had become so dire that detainees at Mesa Verde organized a hunger strike to call attention to the lack of hygiene products, proper testing, and continued foot traffic in and out of the facility. In response to the hunger strike, GEO Group, the ICE contractor that ran the facility, threatened to revoke their access to purchases from the commissary. On April 25, the defendants moved to stay these proceedings in light of a separate case, Fraihat v. ICE (here in the Clearinghouse) in which a federal judge had just certified a nationwide class of immigration detainees challenging ICE’s overall response to the pandemic. In this case, the court denied the defendant’s motion to stay on April 29, and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring ICE to provide information and access to detainees to facilitate a process of considering bail requests. 2020 WL 2059848. On May 27, the defendants sought an order that would: -Confirm the TRO had expired; -End the ongoing bail process; -Vacate all bail orders; and, -Deny the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Two days later, the plaintiffs filed a brief opposing the expiration of the TRO. On June 9, the district court granted the motion for preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3055449. The court found that although significant improvements had been made since the TRO, ICE had only made the safety improvements because it was ordered to do so. Therefore, the court found a preliminary injunction necessary to lock in place the safety improvements made. The defendants were ordered to maintain the status quo while the case was pending. A status conference was held on June 19, and the court ordered the defendant to file a status report by June 22, regarding their planned response to the discovery that a member of the medical staff at Mesa Verde tested positive for COVID-19. ICE was ordered to respond to the plaintiff's discovery requests on an expedited basis by June 26. The defendant submitted status reports on June 22 and 25, reporting that the nurse is in self-isolation. Detainees who had exposure to the nurse tested negative. On June 29, the defendants reported that they would be implementing COVID-19 testing for all new arrivals on or about June 29 with a new Rapid RNA test that allowed for same-day results. They further reported that training for the medical staff and testing of the new equipment began the week of June 22. The same day, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit ordered mediation on July 8. On August 5, the plaintiffs moved for a TRO directing defendants to conduct rapid testing of all class members, clear a dorm to isolate all class members who tested positive for COVID-19, and to observe the limits on increased population in the remaining dorms as set out by the preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to take meaningful steps to halt an outbreak of COVID-19, and added more class members to MVDF than they released, increasing the density while the outbreak spread. They pointed out that the defendants also left symptomatic class members in their dorms to potentially infect other people, leading to more positive cases. In the motion, the plaintiffs alleged that "MVDF has failed to implement widespread testing of detainees and staff not because the facility lacks the resources to do so but precisely because MVDF has not developed a workable strategy for facilitating the isolation and cohorting that appropriately responding to many test results would require . . . In other words, widespread testing has not been done because Defendants fear they would not be able to handle the truths that it would reveal." On August 6, the court granted the TRO, stating that "[t]he defendants, having responded to the health crisis in such a cavalier fashion (even in the face of litigation and a string of court orders), have lost the credibility to complain that the relief requested by the plaintiffs is too rigid or burdensome. The defendants have also lost the right to be trusted that they will accomplish on their own what the plaintiffs contend requires a court order to ensure." 2020 WL 4554646. The defendants were ordered to administer a COVID-19 test that returns rapid results to all detainees at the facility for each week at a minimum, maintain the current practice of not admitting new class members to the facility, maintain a dormitory to segregate detainees who test positive for COVID-19, and file daily reports about the status of the facility and the defendants’ efforts to manage COVID-19 risk. The plaintiffs’ request to impose a rigid cap of 35 detainees per dormitory was denied and the defendants were ordered to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue requiring the defendants to meet some or all of the above requirements on an ongoing basis pending final resolution of this case. After the status conference held on August 11, the parties agreed that the defendants can exercise discretion regarding how frequently to re-test people who have already tested positive. The court ordered the defendants to provide more detailed information in their daily reports under threat of attorney sanction. GEO was ordered to submit a declaration explaining the current status of testing capacity and speed at Mesa Verde, and the defendants were ordered to enable class counsel to communicate with detainees who refused testing by both written communication to the Mesa Verde population as a whole, as well as real-time communication with the individual detainees who refused testing. The court also ordered that class members must agree to be tested prior to release, and that defendants are required to inform class counsel if any class member tests positive upon or after release. The parties were ordered to file briefs on the issue of whether it would be legally appropriate and practical for the court to issue an order requiring regular testing of all staff at Mesa Verde. On August 14, the court ordered the defendants to administer point-of-care tests to everyone at Mesa Verde facility who has not already tested positive, and to file a submission answering the question of how it can be sufficient from a medical standpoint to check on people known to be infected with COVID only two times per day, considering the ongoing outbreak at the facility. The court denied the plaintiffs request to release everyone in the facility who has tested negative. The Court ordered that each staff member entering the facility be tested and that they be subsequently tested once a week until further notice. If a staff member declines testing, they are not to enter the facility. The court further ordered the parties to file briefs discussing the appropriate level of care and monitoring necessary for a dorm full of people who have tested positive, the level of monitoring necessary to ensure that detainees are hospitalized promptly when needed, the assertion that people with COVID-19 are at greater risk of complications or death in the facility than if released, and who should pay for hospitalization and whether there are any financial disincentives to hospitalizing detainees. In the briefs, the plaintiffs criticized that the "[d]efendant's responses are not based on credible expert testimony[.]" On August 21, the court ordered the defendants to create a written plan to improve their system of monitoring, caring for, and responding to medical assistance requests from detainees who had tested positive and who had health conditions that the CDC identified as creating an elevated risk of complications. During the course of the litigation, the court granted several bail requests, which the defendant appealed to the Ninth Circuit on August 31. The defendants submitted a written plan based on CDC guidelines on August 31. They argued that no further court order was warranted and that the court should specify "in objective terms what the constitutional requirements are for treating COVID-19 patients" that was “narrowly tailored” to constitutional requirements. They argued that the plaintiffs' request of "acceptable standards” or otherwise to release additional detainees was too vague. On September 2, the plaintiffs objected to the defendants' written plan which they considered "outdated" and "incomplete" and merely defended its current practices and alleged that the defendants failed to meet and confer with them, contrary to the court's order. The defendants objected to this characterization of their written plan, and claimed that as of September 4, all of the detainees at Mesa Verde who tested positive for COVID-19 had recovered under the criteria set out by the CDC. On September 21, the defendants submitted a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. They argued that the plaintiffs did not have a viable First Amendment retaliation claim, as a hunger strike is not a First Amendment protected conduct, and that their action in curbing such conduct had a legitimate goal in seeking to prevent civil detainees from harming themselves. The court continued to grant bail requests and requested briefing on the matter of likelihood of reinfection, finding that it was sufficiently unlikely to warrant heightened concern. The plaintiffs filed an amended class-action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and habeas petition on October 30 that requested certification for two subclasses, confined their claims for relief to the due process claims, and argued that it was defendants’ resistance to testing and quarantine led to the massive outbreak in Mesa Verde between June and August. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 20, 2020, seven individuals detained at the Mesa Verde Detention Facility (MVDF) and the Yuba County Jail (YCJ) filed a class-action lawsuit against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), seeking immediate release from unsafe conditions of the jail in light of the global coronavirus pandemic. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief for release of detainees in order to maintain a number of detainees for social distancing and prohibition against placing plaintiff class members into solitary confinement as a means of achieving social distancing. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and motion for a temporary restraining order, requiring ICE to provide information and access to detainees to facilitate a process of considering bail requests. On June 9, the court granted the motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the defendants to maintain the status quo while the case is pending. On August 5, the plaintiffs sought a TRO, claiming that the defendants' actions are insufficient, which was granted the next day. After the parties agreed to implement testing and other public safety protocols, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs responded with an amended class-action complaint. The case is ongoing.


On August 5, 2003, parents, as next friends of their three minor, student daughters, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. against Gadsden City School District and its superintendent. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Gadsden City Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 by denying plaintiffs' daughters' an equal opportunity to participate in interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics and the equal treatment and benefits that must necessarily accompany them. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Gadsden City Schools discriminated against plaintiffs' daughters in the accommodation of student interests and abilities; the funding of athletics; access to equipment and supplies; the scheduling of games and practice times; travel; the assignment and compensation of coaches; and the provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition and training facilities and services. On October 15, 2003, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Judge Robert B. Propst) dismissed with prejudice all claims against the superintendent. On May 7, 2004, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, settling all issues except the payment of attorneys' fees. On November 2, 2004, the Court dismissed with prejudice all claims in accordance with the parties' settlement agreement. On November 5, 2004, the parties entered into another settlement agreement settling the issue of attorneys' fees for $43,000. The case was closed on November 2, 2004.

Summary: In 2003, plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Gadsden City Schools had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying plaintiffs' daughters' equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The parties reached a settlement agreement on May 7, 2004 and the case was closed on November 2, 2004. The parties reached another settlement agreement awarding attorneys' fees and costs on November 5, 2004.


On May 1, 2012, the Special Litigation Section of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Montana announced the opening of an investigation into the Missoula County Attorney's Office ("MCAO"), focusing on allegations that the MCAO failed to adequately investigate and prosecute alleged sexual assaults against women. (The DOJ also launched a companion investigation of the University of Montana-Missoula and its Office of Public Safety and a simultaneous investigation of the City of Missoula Police Department. These are listed as related cases, below. The DOJ reached agreements with these agencies on May 9, 2013.) As the investigation neared a close, on February 11, 2014, Missoula County Attorney brought a declaratory judgment action against the United States in the U.S. District Court for the District of Missouri, arguing that the DOJ lacked the authority to investigate or sue the County Attorney's Office under 42 U.S.C. § 3789d and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The complaint and docket sheet are included in this case record. On February 14, 2014, the DOJ issued its findings letter describing the problems found in the MCAO's response to sexual assault, concluding that there was substantial evidence that the County Attorney's response to sexual assault unconstitutionally discriminated against women. The Department's investigation - with which the MCAO did not cooperate - uncovered evidence indicating that the MCAO engaged in gender discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as relevant federal laws. In particular, the investigation found evidence that the decisions of the MCAO regarding the investigation and prosecution of sexual assaults and rape, particularly non-stranger assaults and rapes, were influenced by gender bias and gender stereotyping thereby adversely affecting women in Missoula. The investigation found that the following, taken together, strongly suggested gender discrimination: 1. despite their prevalence in the community, sexual assaults of adult women were given low priority in the MCAO; 2. the MCAO did not provide Deputy County Attorneys with the basic knowledge and training about sexual assault necessary to effectively and impartially investigate and prosecute these cases, nor did it generally develop evidence in support of sexual assault prosecutions, either on its own or in cooperation with other law enforcement agencies; 3. adult women victims, particularly victims of non-stranger sexual assault and rape, were often treated with disrespect, not informed of the status of their case and revictimized by the process; and 4. the MCAO routinely failed to engage in the most basic communication about its cases of sexual assault with law enforcement and advocacy partners. The matter settled on June 10, 2014, with an out-of-court settlement agreement between the MCAO and the DOJ, and a separate Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the MCAO and the Montana Attorney General, assigning a substantial oversight role to the Montana AG. Under the agreement, the USDOJ agreed not to sue the MCAO and Missoula County. The MOU gave the Montana Attorney General the sole authority to supervise the MCAO in the handling of any case. It provided for hiring a "Technical Advisor" (at a maximum cost of $150,000 for a period of at least one year). The Technical Advisor would train prosecuting attorneys as well as MCAO's supervisors to meet standards set by the Montana Attorney General for the handling of sexual assault cases. Further, the MCAO agreed to develop sexual assault case policies consistent with the National District Attorneys Association policies and to provide training to appropriate officials regarding the handling of sexual assault cases for every year that the MOU was in effect. The MOU required prosecutors to make "reasonable efforts" to meet with sexual assault complainants and to provide information regarding decisions to charge or not to charge; it also required the MCAO to coordinate with other agencies to reduce the likelihood of discrimination in the handling of sexual assault cases, and to seek funding to provide resources such as expert witnesses to promote prosecution of sexual assault cases. Additionally, the MCAO was required to provide information to the public regarding the criminal justice process. The Montana Attorney General agreed to supervise the MCAO's policies and compliance with this MOU, including the review of sexual assault cases for which the MCAO declined prosecution for the year following this MOU. The Montana Attorney General was to consult with the USDOJ to select the Technical Advisor, to review and approve MCAO's policies and guidelines for handling sexual assault cases, and to review and approve the MCAO's sexual assault training program. The Montana Attorney General agreed to also obtain and provide, after every six months for a period of two years after the date of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), copies of policies implemented by the MCAO regarding sexual assault cases, as well as general data on sexual assault cases. Lastly, as part of the settlement, MCAO agreed to dismiss its district court lawsuit against the United States. The case was dismissed with prejudice on June 11, 2014. On May 11, 2015, the DOJ issued a press release that announced that the Missoula Police Department had fully implemented its agreement to improve its response to reports of sexual assault. The release stated that the agreement between MCAO and DOJ in 2014 had been implemented and had improved MCAO's response to sexual assaults. The settlement is now complete.

Summary: This DOJ pattern or practice investigation into the Missoula County Attorney's Office found that the MCAO failed to adequately investigate and prosecute alleged sexual assaults against women, due to gender discrimination in violation of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 and the anti-discrimination provisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The matter led to an out-of-court settlement on June 10, 2014, setting out substantial reforms for the County Attorney's Office, with an oversight role played chiefly by the Montana Attorney General's office.


COVID-19 Summary: In light of COVID-19, the Governor of Tennessee issued an executive order limiting "non-emergency" health care procedures, including all abortions except for medication abortion. The plaintiffs amended supplemented their complaint to address the order. The district court enjoined the defendants from enforcing the order on April 17, 2020, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction on April 24.
 This case was filed on June 25, 2015 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee by three reproductive healthcare providers on behalf of their patients. The complaint alleged that several state restrictions on abortion providers violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The named defendants were the state Attorney General, the Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Health, and the President of the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Reproductive Rights, and the case was assigned to Judge Jeffery S. Frensley. The restrictions in question were 1) the "ASTC Requirement," which required all facilities where abortions are performed to be licensed as ambulatory surgical centers; 2) the "Admitting Privileges Requirement," which required all doctors providing abortions to have hospital admitting privileges, and; 3) the “Delay Requirement,” which required an abortion patient to attend an in-person meeting with a doctor to receive information that could be provided by phone and then delay the abortion for 48 hours after the meeting. The plaintiffs argued that these requirements were medically unnecessary attempts to shutter abortion providers and create unconstitutional barriers to patients seeking abortion care. On June 26, 2015, the day after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent the state from enforcing the restrictions. The court temporarily enjoined the state from enforcing the restrictions that same day. After a hearing on the motion, the court issued a preliminary injunction on August 14, 2015. On December 16, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the case pending the outcome in Whole Woman's Health v. Cole (a case challenging similar restrictions in Texas) in the Supreme Court. The court granted the motion the following day, and the case was stayed until April 17, 2017. After the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Whole Woman's Health striking down similar restrictions in Texas, the State agreed to drop its defense of the admitting privileges and ASTC requirements and the court permanently blocked the requirements on April 14, 2017. Litigation continued over the waiting period requirement. After discovery, the case went to trial on September 24, 2019. As of May 13, 2020, the parties are awaiting a ruling. In response to the COVID-19 public health emergency, Tennessee Governor Bill Lee issued an executive order on April 8, 2020 (EO-25) limiting "non-emergency" health care procedures. This ban included all abortions except for medication abortion, which is only available for people 11 weeks pregnant or fewer. The ACLU, Planned Parenthood, and the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a request on behalf of the plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint and a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminary injunction on April 13, 2020. They requested a temporary restraining order blocking implementation of EO-25 as it relates to abortion care. They also requested that the state be blocked from enforcing the delay requirement in light of COVID-19 and alleged that EO-25 violated the plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted the TRO on April 17, 2020, immediately enjoining the defendants from enforcing the order. 2020 WL 1905147. The defendants appealed (docketed no. 20-5408) and requested a stay of the injunction pending appeal. The court denied the stay on April 21, 2020. On April 24, 2020, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. 2020 WL 1982210. The defendants then petitioned the court for a rehearing en banc. The court denied rehearing on May 14, 2020. As of May 15, 2020 the defendants have not sought Supreme Court review. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Abortion providers in Tennessee filed this case on June 5, 2015 challenging state restrictions that make it more difficult for providers to remain open and for patients to access abortion care. After the Supreme Court's decision in Whole Woman's Health, the state voluntarily dropped two of the three challenged restrictions. Litigation is ongoing regarding the final restriction, which requires patients to wait 48 hours between their consultation and the abortion procedure. In light of COVID-19, the Governor of Tennessee issued an executive order limiting "non-emergency" health care procedures, including all abortions except for medication abortion. The plaintiffs amended supplemented their complaint to address the order. The district court enjoined the defendants from enforcing the order on April 17, 2020, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the injunction on April 24.