On March 27, 2006, the New York District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Based on a complaint it received, UPS had failed to hire the complainant because he refused to shave his beard that he wears in observance of Rastafarianism. The complainant had applied for a driver helper position with UPS in November of 2004. UPS policy did not allow drivers or driver helpers to have facial hair below the lip. Despite the complainant informing UPS he wore the beard for religious reasons, they refused to consider him for the driver helper position. He alleged that instead, UPS advised him to apply for a lower-paying job that did not involve contact with the public. The EEOC claimed that UPS discriminated against him on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Joel A. Pisano. The complainant subsequently intervened and joined the suit. The parties engaged in multiple unsuccessful settlement conferences and filed discovery motions over the course of several years. The parties could not come to a settlement agreement and the case went to trial from January 22, 2009 to January 29, 2009. A jury found for the plaintiffs, awarding $10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress. On February 13, UPS filed for a judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict because UPS had presented an affirmative defense that it had offered the complainant a reasonable accommodation. In the alternative, the defendant requested a new trial because the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that the complainant had a sincerely held religious belief. After two settlement conferences regarding injunctive relief and attorney’s fees for the the complainant’s attorney, the defendant's motion was moot. The court granted $128,040.09 in attorney’s fees and $1,449.46 in expenses. Additionally, the parties entered into a one-year consent judgment on November 16, 2009. The judgment required UPS to: revise its electronic employment applications to notify applicants of their option to request accommodation for sincerely-held religious beliefs or practices; amend its appearance guidelines for driver helpers to specify that employees can request religious-belief accommodations; inform new applications of their ability to request exceptions through written request forms; and conduct training on religious accommodation policy and procedure. The consent judgment also included monetary damages of $2,000 for back pay and $8,000 for the EEOC. 2009 WL 3241550. The case is now closed.

Summary: The EEOC filed this lawsuit in federal court in New Jersey on behalf of a complainant alleging religious discrimination. A jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff, awarding compensatory damages, attorney's fees, and injunctive relief.


On June 30, 2017, the plaintiff, a private probation company operating in Craighead County, called the Justice Network, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiff sued, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, two district court judges, Craighead County, and the various cities that the judges had jurisdiction over in their capacity as a city judge. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Contracts Clause and Takings Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff alleged that the two defendant-judges instituted an “Amnesty Program” that forgave fees owed by probation clients to the plaintiff, which interfered with the contractual relationship that existed between the plaintiff and its probation clients. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant-judges used their judicial office and powers to unlawfully take plaintiff’s substantial property rights without due process of law. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on August 9, 2017. They alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. On October 24, 2017, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law filed an amicus brief in favor of the defendants. The Lawyers' Committee argued that the defendants were justified in ending local courts' relationship with Justice Network because it made money by trapping poor minorities who were consigned to probation for petty crimes into a cycle of debt to ensure their imprisonment. On November 28, 2017, District Judge James M. Moody Jr. granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and held that the two judges were entitled to absolute judicial immunity against all of the plaintiff’s claims. He further held that the County and City defendants were not liable because the two judges were not authorized policymakers of the City and County so that the actions of the defendant-judges should not be imputed to the City and County defendants. 2017 WL 5762397. On December 20, 2017, the plaintiff appealed Judge Moody Jr.’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On July 26, 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Chief Judge Smith, and Circuit Judges Kelly and Kobes) issued an opinion and affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the lawsuit. The Circuit Court held that the defendant-judges are entitled to judicial immunity on the plaintiff’s claims. In addition, the Court held that the judges were state government officials whose actions were not attributable to Craighead County or the City defendants. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court’s ruling. On August 21, a mandate in accordance with the Circuit Court’s opinion was issued. There has been no further docket activities, so the case is presumed to be closed.

Summary: In 2017, the plaintiff, a private probation company, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Plaintiff alleged that two defendant-judges unlawfully forgave fees owed by probation clients to the plaintiff. The district court granted each defendant’s motion to dismiss. The plaintiff appealed to the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case. The case is now presumed to be closed.


This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by the State of Texas on January 24, 2012, which sought judicial approval of its voter ID law. Texas was required by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to seek either U.S. Department of Justice or federal court "preclearance" of the law, prior to its implementation. The U.S. Department of Justice opposed preclearance. On August 30, 2012, a three-judge federal district court denied the necessary approval, because Texas had not demonstrated that the law would not harm the voting opportunities of minority voters. In an opinion by Justice Tatel, the court emphasized that not every voter ID would fail under Section 5. In fact, the court stated, "voter laws might well be precleared if they ensure (1) that all prospective voters can easily obtain free photo ID, and (2) that any underlying documents required to obtain that ID are truly free of charge." In Texas, however, this was not the case: "The State of Texas enacted a voter ID law that--at least to our knowledge--is the most stringent in the country. That law will almost certainly have retrogressive effect: it imposes strict, unforgiving burdens on the poor, and racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty. And crucially, the Texas legislature defeated several amendments that could have made this a far closer case." 888 F.Supp.2d 113. On December 17, 2012, the court entered judgment against Texas. The case was stayed until the United States Supreme Court issued a final ruling in Shelby County v. Holder. Two days later, Texas appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 2013, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, in which the Court had held that the Voting Rights Act's preclearance requirement was unconstitutional. Texas v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2886 (2013). On remand, the three-judge District Court dismissed all claims on August 27, 2013. Some defendant-intervenors sought award of attorney fees and costs. On August 11, 2014, the District Court (Rosemary M. Collyer) held that defendant-intervenors were not a prevailing party and were not entitled to attorney fees and costs. 63 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2014).

Summary: In 2012, a three-judge federal district court, in the District of Columbia, struck down Texas's voter ID law, under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, because Texas had not demonstrated that the law would not harm the voting opportunities of minority voters. After holding the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded this case for further consideration. On remand, the three-judge district court dismissed all claims.


The National Association of Chain Drug Stores and the National Community Pharmacists Association filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California on September 30, 2009. The suit was filed against California's Governor and the Secretary and Director of the Department of Healthcare Services, in their official capacities. The suit was one of several suits primarily filed in response to a series of California legislative acts that reduced the amount the State's Medicaid fee-for-service and medical product reimbursement rates. This legislation was passed without prior approval from the United States Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS"), which the plaintiffs in these suits argued was contrary to federal and state law. The California Legislature had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the level of access to and quality of care available to Medi-Cal recipients, contrary to the requirements of § 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act. For more information, see related cases, especially Douglas v. Independent Living Center (Clearinghouse code PB-CA-16) and Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger (PB-CA-16). The Plaintiffs in this suit specifically sought to enjoin the State from implementing what amounted to a 4% cut in the Medicaid reimbursement rate paid to pharmacies for prescription drugs, and declarations that its efforts to do so were unlawful. Unlike the rate reductions in most of the related cases, the reduction here was not the direct outcome of legislation, but resulted from changes to the Average Wholesale Prices (AWPs) for several thousand pharmaceuticals, as determined by data from First DataBank, Inc. California based its formula for calculating prescription drug reimbursement rates on these AWPs. A lawsuits filed against First DataBank alleging the company had set AWPs at artificially high levels had resulted in a consent decree wherein the company agreed to reduce the AWPs for more than 2000 drugs by five percent. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund et al v. First Databank, Inc., 582 F.3d 30 (1st. Cir. 2009). The Plaintiffs in the instant case alleged that First DataBank also reduced its AWPs for an additional 18,000 drugs. The Plaintiffs argued that California accepted the reduced reimbursement rates that resulted from the lowering of the AWPs without first considering the affects this would have on the "efficiency, economy, and quality of care," provided to Medicaid recipients as required by § 30(A). In addition, the Plaintiffs alleged that these rate reductions violated state law because the State failed to consult with interested parties regarding the effects of the reduced reimbursement rates; that the State violated federal law lowering the reimbursement rates to a level lower than the State's own estimates of pharmacies' actual acquisition costs; and that the cuts violated state law because they would reduce the quality of care delivered to the State's Medicaid recipients. On October 2, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which did not substantially change their allegations. On October 20, 2009, the suit was officially related to the case Douglas v. Independent Living Center and transferred to Judge Christina A. Snyder, who was the presiding over that case and many of the related cases. On November 2, 2009, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, which, on December 22, 2009, Judge Snyder denied, finding that the Plaintiffs' case did not have a high likelihood of succeeding on its merits because California's acceptance of the lowered AWPs did not constitute an affirmative act that created a new "'method or procedure' for establishing reimbursement rates." National Association of Chain Drug Stores v. Schwarzenegger, 678 F.Supp.2d 995 (C.D. Cal. 2009). On the same day, she denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss the suit. The Plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Nine Circuit Court of Appeals. While this appeal was pending, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction preventing the implementation of the rate reductions during the period before the Appellate Court issued a ruling. Judge Snyder denied this motion on February 22, 2010. On April 13, 2010, Judge Snyder stayed the case pending the outcome of the appeal. On April 15, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's denial of the preliminary injunction. National Association of Chain Drug Stores v. Schwarzenegger, 376 Fed.Appx. 674 (9th Cir. 2010). On May 5, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the case be dismissed without prejudice. Judge Snyder dismissed the case the following day. It is unclear from the record whether this dismissal occurred because of a private settlement between the parties or some other event that resolved the rate reduction issue, or if the Plaintiffs withdrew from the suit because success appeared unlikely after the Appellate Court decision.

Summary: The National Association of Chain Drug Stores and the National Community Pharmacists Association filed this lawsuit in federal court on September 30, 2009, against California's Governor and the Secretary of the Department of Healthcare Services, in their official capacities. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the State from implementing what amounted to a 4% cut in the Medicaid reimbursement rate paid to pharmacies for prescription drugs. The cuts resulted from changes to the Average Wholesale Price (AWP) for several thousand pharmaceuticals, as determined by data from First DataBank, Inc.. The Plaintiffs argued that California accepted the reduced reimbursement rates that resulted from the lowering of the AWPs without first considering the affects this would have on the "efficiency, economy, and quality of care," provided to Medicaid recipients as required by the Social Security Act. On December 22, 2009, the Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 15, 2010, the federal Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction. On May 5, 2010, the parties filed a joint stipulation requesting the case be dismissed without prejudice. The judge dismissed the case the following day.


On October 26, 2011, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit civil liberties organization, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). EFF, represented by its own lawyers, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that the DOJ was withholding agency records concerning the DOJ's interpretation and use of Section 215 of the Patriot Act without legitimate justification under any of the limited exemptions in the FOIA. Specifically, EFF claimed that the DOJ failed to expedite the processing of the requests (despite granting the request for expediting the process), denied the plaintiff's request for a public interest fee waiver, and failed to respond within the twenty-day deadline for the processing of a non-expedited FOIA request. On November 3, 2011, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint further detailing the government's withholding of records. On February 16, 2012, Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers granted the parties' proposed stipulation regarding the processing of the FOIA requests. The stipulation set a schedule for responding to the plaintiffs' FOIA request. (The schedule underwent several modifications during the litigation.) In addition, the Director of National Intelligence declassified and released to the public certain information related to the "business records" provision of FISA following the unauthorized disclosure of a top secret U.S. court document. As a result, the DOJ had to determine what effect, if any, this release of documents had on the classification of information in some of the withheld documents at issue in this case. On September 6, 2013, Judge Gonzalez Rogers denied the parties' respective motions for summary judgment, without prejudice. Judge Gonzalez Rogers also ordered the DOJ to release to the plaintiff non-exempt records responsive to the plaintiff's request for significant opinions or orders of the FISC and any significant documents, procedures, or legal analyses incorporated into FISC opinions or orders that the DOJ or NSA has treated as binding. Judge Gonzalez Rogers also ordered the DOJ to complete further re-review of the remaining responsive records. As a result of this September 2013 order, the government released hundreds of pages of previously secret FISA documents detailing the court's interpretation of Section 215, including an opinion excoriating the NSA for misusing its mass surveillance database for years. In October 2013, the government released a second batch of documents related to Section 215, which showed, among other things, that the NSA had collected cell site location without notifying its oversight committees in Congress or the FISA court. The EFF continued to argue for further disclosures of documents that the government was withholding. The government claimed that these documents were exempt from release. On June 13, 2014, Judge Gonzalez Rogers ordered the DOJ to produce the following documents for in camera inspection by the Court to assist the Court in making a responsible de novo determination whether the documents were clearly exempt from disclosure under the FOIA: (1) FISC opinion dated 8/20/2008 (6 pages); (2) FISC order dated 10/31/2006 (19 pages); (3) FISC orders dated 2/17/2006 (17 pages); (4) FISC orders dated 2/24/2006 (8 pages); and (5) FISC orders dated 12/16/2005 (16 pages). On July 24, 2014, Judge Gonzalez Rogers issued a second order for the DOJ to produce unredacted copies of (1) the Census Memorandum; and (2) the complete application of the DOJ in connection with which the Census Memorandum was submitted to the FISC to assist the Court in making a responsible de novo determination whether the withheld documents are clearly exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The DOJ had earlier argued that it was properly withholding a 2010 OLC memorandum which provided advice to the Department of Commerce regarding the interaction between disclosure provisions in the Patriot Act, and prohibitions on disclosure in the Census Act (‘Census Memorandum’). On August 11, 2014, the court granted in part and denied in part the cross-motions. It held that the DOJ had established a proper basis for withholding, in full, the FISC orders and opinions at issue, and for withholding all names of telecommunications providers participating in the Call Records Collection Program, under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. However, the court also found that DOJ had not established that the Census Memorandum was properly withheld under Exemption 5. 2014 WL 3945646, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110785. On August 15, 2015, the parties reached a settlement of plaintiff’s claim for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses pursuant to the FOIA without need for further litigation. The amount was not stipulated in the notice of settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2011, a nonprofit civil liberties organization filed a federal lawsuit in the Northern District of California under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The plaintiff asked the court to order the processing of a FOIA request submitted to the DOJ for documents concerning the DOJ's interpretation and use of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The DOJ had failed to respond to the FOIA request within the allotted amount of time. In August 2014, the court held that the DOJ had established a proper basis for withholding, in full, the FISC orders and opinions at issue, and for withholding all names of telecommunications providers participating in the Call Records Collection Program, under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. However, the court also found that DOJ had not established that the Census Memorandum was properly withheld under Exemption 5. The parties reached a settlement for attorney’s fees without need for further litigation in August 2015. The case is now closed.


On June 28, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female dump truck driver (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of North Carolina, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Blue Max Trucking, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment. On September 5, 2002, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint. On August 8, 2003, the District Court (Judge Graham Calder Mullen) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $57,500 and pay for the costs of the mediation.

Summary: On June 28, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female dump truck driver (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of North Carolina, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Blue Max Trucking, Inc. The EEOC claimed that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $57,500 and pay for the costs of the mediation.


On March 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee (plaintiff-intervenor) at a trucking company, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Alabama under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, against Ryder/ATE, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant, through the actions of one of its supervisors, was liable for sexual harassment. According to the complaint, starting in the fall of 2008 and continuing into 2009, the plaintiff-intervenor at defendant's Alabama worksite was subjected to offensive sexual comments and inappropriate touching of private body parts by her supervisor. In order to avoid this sexual harassment, the complainant transferred to another lesser paying job. She also took time off of work because of the emotional distress she experienced. The defendant acknowledged that, in January 1999, the complainant reported the sexual harassment to the General Manager. Nothing was done until she made a second report in July 1999. On July 23, 2002, the employee who suffered the sexual harassment filed a complaint as the plaintiff-intervenor. On October 10, 2002, the EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor filed an amended complaint. On September 9, 2003, the District Court (Judge U.W. Clemon) issued a consent decree where the defendant had to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $85,000 and reinstate her in her previous position, with seniority.

Summary: On March 29, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee (plaintiff-intervenor) at a corporation, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Alabama under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, against Ryder/ATE, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant, through the actions of one of its supervisors, was liable for sexual harassment. On October 10, 2002, the EEOC and plaintiff-intervenor filed an amended complaint. On September 9, 2003, the District Court (Judge U.W. Clemon) issued a consent decree where the defendant had to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $85,000 and reinstate her in her previous position, with seniority.


On March 27, 2012, a visitor to the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued jails employees and Los Angeles County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by private civil rights attorneys, the plaintiff asked the court for monetary damages. The plaintiff claimed that sheriff deputies severely beat him while he was visiting his brother in jail and then falsely accused him of attacking the deputies to cover up the beating. He filed this civil rights litigation after successfully defeating criminal charges. He claimed violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as California law. On August 6, 2012, the court referred the parties to a private mediator. For two years, the parties both conducted discovery and negotiated settlement. On August 29, 2014, the parties settled the case for $1,175,000. In addition, the plaintiff worked with federal prosecutors to initiate federal criminal prosecution against the defendant deputies. The settlement agreement is confidential.

Summary: In 2012, a visitor to a California jail filed a lawsuit U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and California law against jail employees and Los Angeles County. The plaintiff claimed Constitutional violations because sheriff deputies beat him while he was visiting his brother in jail and then falsely accused him of attacking the sheriffs. in 2014, the parties settled the case for $1,175,000.


On February 13, 2017, a recipient of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) -- and believed to be the first DACA recipient detained under the Trump administration -- filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Represented by the organization Public Counsel, and by private attorneys including constitutional scholars Laurence Tribe and Erwin Chemerinsky, he sought release from detention. Plaintiff alleged that he was a 23-year-old DACA recipient, had entered the United States from Mexico at the age of seven, and had no criminal record (as confirmed by his DACA background check). On February 10, 2017, plaintiff was apprehended by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents who came to arrest his father. In his father's home at the time, plaintiff was also arrested and then detained at the federal Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, Washington. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge James P. Donohue. On February 14, 2017, Magistrate Judge Donohue scheduled a February 17 status conference for the parties to discuss on what basis plaintiff was detained given his DACA grant; if he was in removal proceedings, the status of his processing; whether the court had authority to order an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to consider an expedited challenge to plaintiff's detention; and whether the court could hold a detention hearing before deciding the merits of the habeas case. On February 16, plaintiff filed a response brief. Plaintiff alleged that after his arrest, ICE agents questioned him about whether he had gang affiliations. He denied this, but ICE then told news media it took him into custody because he was a "self-admitted gang member." Plaintiff asserted that some of the documentation offered by the government in support of gang affiliation had been illicitly altered by ICE officials. After the status conference, on February 17, Magistrate Judge Donohue issued an order denying plaintiff's petition for immediate release from the ongoing removal proceedings, on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction and had to refer the initial inquiry to an Immigration Judge. Magistrate Judge Donohue ordered plaintiff to request a bond hearing from an Immigration Judge by February 21 and for the bond hearing to take place by February 24. However, if the Immigration Judge were to deny the request, at that point plaintiff could also ask the court to waive the general requirement that he appeal the determination to the BIA, so that he could instead appeal to the court. Magistrate Judge Donohue scheduled a hearing for March 8 on defendants' motion to dismiss based on jurisdiction, and set a briefing schedule. After that hearing, the court would schedule another hearing on the merits of the habeas petition. On February 21, plaintiff filed an amended petition for habeas and declaratory and injunctive relief, requesting plaintiff's immediate release and an order that all current and future DACA beneficiaries be free from unwarranted arrest. Plaintiff argued that the court had federal question jurisdiction over this habeas case, and that Immigration Court lacked jurisdiction because no removal proceeding had been initiated. This petition was followed by plaintiff's February 22 emergency motion for conditional release pending final determination. On February 23, Magistrate Judge Donohue extended the deadline for defendants' motion to dismiss to February 27, and ordered that this motion respond to plaintiffs' emergency motion. Defendants filed the motion on February 27. On February 24, plaintiff requested an immediate hearing on conditional release. However, on February 27, Magistrate Judge Donohue denied plaintiff's request for an immediate hearing, stating that plaintiff had already been granted an expedited briefing schedule on his federal habeas claim and that the hearing would take place as scheduled on March 8. Magistrate Judge Donohue, in a February 28 minute order, specified that plaintiff's response to the government's motion to dismiss was due on March 3 and should address the form of relief sought for the habeas petition; how a habeas petition could proceed on a parallel track alongside removal proceedings; and why J.E.F.M. v. Lynch did not preclude jurisdiction. On March 3, plaintiff filed a response to the government's motion to dismiss, and the government in turn filed a reply on March 7. On March 8, the court held a hearing, indicated it would issue a report and recommendation (R&R) the following week, and ordered plaintiff to reply to government's March 7 reply on the issue of standing. Plaintiff replied on March 10. On March 14, Magistrate Judge Donohue issued an R&R on plaintiff's February 22 emergency motion for conditional release pending final determination as well as defendants' motion to dismiss. 2017 WL 2954719 (W.D. Wash. Mar 14, 2017). On March 16, plaintiff raised objections and requested expedited consideration by District Judge Ricardo Martinez; defendants responded on March 21. Then, on March 24, Judge Ricardo Martinez adopted in part Magistrate Judge Donohue's March 14 R&R, and denied plaintiff's objections. 2017 WL 1101370 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2017). Judge Martinez stated that since plaintiff conceded he was not challenging his removal proceedings, and DHS had the statutory discretion to detain him during these proceedings, plaintiff was not entitled to immediate release through the court. Judge Martinez also specified that if plaintiff were to request a bond redetermination hearing, the government must schedule it within a week from that request. Oddly, the government didn't object to the March 14 R&R until a few days later, on March 29. At that point, defendants filed an argument that district courts lack jurisdiction over matter such as this one. By March 30, plaintiff had been released from custody, according to defendants. News reports confirmed the release, and indicated that plaintiff was released on bond and was still in immigration removal proceedings. On April 7, plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to delay his response; Judge Martinez granted the motion on April 10. Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 25. He sought relief to remedy his alleged unconstitutional arrest and detention, to restore his terminated DACA status, and to confirm the benefits he received under DACA were liberty and property interests protected by the Due Process Clause. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 26. They argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction because DHS's decision to place plaintiff in removal proceedings was an unreviewable exercise of agency discretion. Because DHS had initiated removal proceedings, plaintiff had to proceed through the immigration court system to challenge DHS's decision to terminate his DACA grant. Defendants also argued that plaintiff had no administrative or constitutionally protected claim to DACA benefits because DACA was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion and may be terminated at any time. On July 10, the parties and Judge Martinez agreed that the Second Amended Complaint had rendered moot any objections to the R&R, and that no further action on the R&R was necessary. On August 7, plaintiff responded to defendants' June 26 motion to dismiss. Plaintiff argued that defendants could not invoke the INA and agency discretion to assert that judicial review did not apply to their actions. Instead, plaintiff argued, his claim centered on defendants' violation of DHS procedures and due process in revoking his DACA status and work permit. Defendants replied on August 18. Individual defendants responded to plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint on August 10. They argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction over removal proceedings and that, in any event, plaintiff's Bivens claim against individual defendants was invalid because qualified immunity protected them. Plaintiff then, on September 20, filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of the individual defendants. The next day, in light of this, the court found moot defendants' August 10 response to plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. However, plaintiff did not dismiss his claims against the federal agency defendants. The court noted that it still needed to resolve these defendants' June 26 motion to dismiss. A motion hearing was scheduled for November 2. On October 11, plaintiff filed a supplemental authority in support of his opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. He argued that the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California's recent preliminary injunction in Gonzalez Torres v. DHS should apply to his case. In that injunction, that court had vacated a DACA revocation after concluding that it had jurisdiction over then plaintiff’s challenge to the termination of his DACA status, and that DHS's failure to follow the DACA SOP's termination proceedings was unlawful. On November 2, Judge Martinez held a motion hearing on defendants' June 26 motion to dismiss. He then issued a November 8 order denying defendants' motion. He found that the court had jurisdiction under the INA and APA, because plaintiff was not challenging the government's discretionary decision to terminate his DACA status, but rather defendants' alleged noncompliance with their own non-discretionary procedures when taking plaintiff into custody. Next, Judge Martinez found that plaintiff had stated plausible claims that the government violated the APA with conduct that was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and a due process violation. 2017 WL 5176720 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 8, 2017). On February 6, 2018, plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction to reinstate his DACA status and work authorization pending a decision on the merits of his claims. He noted the January 2018 injunction in Regents of the University of California v. DHS requiring the government to maintain the DACA program and allow DACA recipients to renew their status. Plaintiff, however, could not benefit from the Regents injunction because his DACA status was already invoked. He argued the Court should grant him a preliminary injunction because he was likely to succeed on the merits of his claims that defendants violated the APA and the Due Process Clause, and that he would suffer irreparable harm without relief, since he could not work or receive benefits. Defendant responded on February 26 and plaintiff replied on March 2, 2018. On April 12, 2018, plaintiff moved for an expedited decision on the preliminary injunction. Plaintiff explained that DHS had recently restored his DACA status (pursuant to a class-wide injunction in Inland Empire) but then immediately notified him of its intent to terminate his status again. Judge Martinez, on April 13, denied the expedite motion as moot and instead held a May 1 hearing, at which he requested additional briefing. On May 15, 2018, the court (Judge Martinez) granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining DHS from terminating his DACA status and work authorization pending merits adjudication, and also from accusing him of gang membership in further proceedings. The court found that the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of his APA claim, finding that DHS' assertion of gang affiliation had no evidentiary support and that it violated due process to revoke his DACA status on the basis of this assertion. On March 28, 2019, the plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Judge Martinez granted the motion on May 16. The plaintiffs then filed a third amended complaint on May 29. In the third amended complaint, the plaintiff plead additional factual allegations regarding DHS' denial of his DACA renewal application on December 19, 2018, after the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining DHS from terminating his benefits. The plaintiff also asserted an equitable estoppel claim based on DHS efforts to conceal the basis for denying his application and sought a declaration that DHS is estopped from terminating his DACA status and work authorization. Lastly, the plaintiff added an assertion that DHS' denial of his DACA application violated his rights under the First Amendment. On June 7, 2019, plaintiff filed a motion for a second preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin DHS from "denying, terminating, or otherwise interfering" with plaintiff's DACA status pending resolution of this case. The plaintiff also sought the court to order DHS to again restore his DACA and work authorization. The plaintiff claimed that in denying his DACA renewal in December 2018, a request that is approved more than 99% of the time, DHS violated the "letter and spirit" of the court's preliminary injunction and that denial based on plaintiff's alleged offense history was pretextual. In their July 1 response, defendants argued that plaintiff did not establish irreparable relief that warrants a preliminary injunction and that they exercised their discretion in a manner that bars discretion and was compliant with applicable law. On August 7, 2019, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint for lack of subject matter, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the claims set forth in the first two amended complaints are now moot or have been voluntarily dismissed, such that the court can no longer grant relief. With regard to the claims laid forth in the third amended complaint, the defendants contended that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of plaintiff's DACA application "because the decision represents an exercise of unreviewable agency discretion." In support of its alternative motion for summary judgment, the defendants asserted that the Administrative Record (AR) shows that they followed the applicable process in denying plaintiff's DACA application and that because plaintiff no longer has DACA authorization, he "lacks a constitutionally protected interest that would support his claims." In his response, the plaintiff argued that the court had already determined that it had jurisdiction to review USCIS decisions and that the defendants were simply rehashing prior unsuccessful arguments. Following a hearing on September 27, 2019, Judge Martinez issued an order on October 9, 2019, granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and denying the plaintiff's motion for a second preliminary injunction. Judge Martinez concluded that the court did not have jurisdiction to review USCIS' denial of plaintiff's DACA application and that the defendants had complied with the preliminary injunction. Judge Martinez did not come to this conclusion without chagrin; "the Court is left with the uneasy feeling that the Government did not honestly consider the facts of Mr. Ramirez’s case to arrive at a just conclusion." However, given the law as it stood, Judge Martinez could not intervene and "assur[e] equal justice under the law. In issuing this order, Judge Martinez called upon Congress to "fully address our nation’s much needed immigration reform," and stated that without reform, "there will continue to be cases like this in which courts are compelled to reach unjust, though legally correct, results." 408 F.Supp.3d 1224. On December 6, 2019, the plaintiff appealed the order granting the motion to dismiss to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 19-36034). As of March 16, 2020, plaintiff's appeal is pending resolution; plaintiff's brief is due on April 15 and defendants' brief is due on May 15.

Summary: On Feb. 13, 2017, this plaintiff -- believed to be the first DACA recipient detained under the Trump administration -- brought a habeas action against DHS. Plaintiff has been released though his DACA status has ended. After the court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from terminating the plaintiff's DACA authorization, the defendants denied the plaintiff's reapplication for DACA status in December 2018. In October 2019, the court dismissed the plaintiff's third amended complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, as the court could not review defendants' discretionary action. The plaintiff's appeal of that dismissal is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit.


On April 27, 2016, an applicant for a bus driving position with the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA) filed this class-action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, joined one month later by two other named plaintiffs, sued SEPTA under the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and under Pennsylvania’s Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA). The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and Philadelphia Lawyers for Social Equity, Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the Public Interest Law Center. They sought injunctive relief enjoining SEPTA from unlawful activity in violation of FCRA and CHRIA, declaratory relief, and reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed SEPTA violated the FCRA by failing to provide clear and conspicuous disclosure of its use of consumer reports for background checks as part of the hiring process. They further claimed SEPTA violated CHRIA by denying the plaintiffs employment based upon unrelated criminal convictions. The plaintiffs sought class certification for the following two classes: - FCRA Disclosure Class: “All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United States, within two years of the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment, about whom SEPTA procured a consumer report without providing a clear and conspicuous disclosure in writing, in a document that consisted solely of the disclosure, before procuring the consumer report, as required by 15 U.S.C. §1681b(b)(2)(A)(i).” - CHRIA Job Denial Class: “All applicants for employment with SEPTA in the United State within two years of the filing of this Complaint through the date of final judgment who were denied SEPTA employment involving the operation and/or maintenance of SEPTA non-paratransit vehicles based in whole or in part on a drug-related conviction dating back more than seven (7) years from the decision on their application to SEPTA.” However, the case was dismissed before either class could be certified. On June 24, 2016, SEPTA filed a motion to dismiss, alleging lack of standing and failure to state a claim. SEPTA claimed the plaintiffs lacked standing with respect to the FCRA claims because the plaintiffs lacked concrete and particularized injury stemming from the alleged FCRA violations, failed to establish a link between the revocation of their offers of employment and the alleged FCRA violations, and didn’t allege that the consumer reports were at all inaccurate. Judge Petrese B. Tucker granted SEPTA’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing on April 5, 2017. She found that the plaintiffs were able to allege a particularized harm, but not a concrete one as is required to establish standing under the FCRA per <i>Spokeo.</i> Having granted SEPTA’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, Judge Tucker did not address the state CHRIA claims, nor SEPTA’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The plaintiffs appealed Judge Tucker's order on April 18, 2017. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals heard arguments on December 12, 2017. Amici briefs were filed by Community Legal Services, the National Employment Law Project, Service Employees International Union Local 668, and the National Consumer Law Center. On October 16, 2018, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Fisher, Restrepo, and Chagares) affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with notice of their FCRA rights, and reversed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with copies of their consumer reports and remanded for further proceedings. 903 F.3d 312. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint to reflect this ruling and add an additional plaintiff. Judge Tucker ordered that the plaintiffs need to file a class certification motion and opening expert reports by July 31, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, three individuals who had applied for jobs at the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority filed this class action complaint in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (SEPTA). The plaintiffs alleged that SEPTA had violated federal fair credit law and state law regarding anti-discrimination in hiring. The case was dismissed for lack of standing, and the named parties appealed in 2017. On October 16, 2018, the third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with notice of their FCRA rights, but reversed the dismissal of the claim based on SEPTA’s failure to provide them with copies of their consumer reports and remanded for further proceedings. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint and the case is ongoing.


On November 12, 2008, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center and the National Fair Housing Alliance, along with African-American homeowners from Louisiana, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of more than 20,000 families, against the U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development ("HUD") and the Executive Director of the Louisiana Recovery Authority ("LRA") under 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3605(a), 3608(d), (e)(5) and 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2). The plaintiffs, represented by both private counsel and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, alleged that HUD's "Road Home" program has a discriminatory and disparate impact on African Americans. They asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the LRA to recalculate Road Home awards to homeowners in New Orleans using a formula that does not have a disparate impact on African Americans. In response to the devastation of Hurricane Katrina, HUD established the Road Home program, an $11 billion housing redevelopment program. Road Home was designed to compensate individuals whose homes were damaged by Hurricane Katrina. The Road Home Program was administered by the LRA. The LRA awarded grants to homeowners based on the <i>lesser</i> of the pre-Katrina value of a home or the cost to rebuild the home. It capped grant amounts at $150,000. A number of covenants, including a covenant to rebuild within a certain amount of time, accompanied the grants. Because home values in predominantly African-American neighborhoods are lower than the values of similar homes in white neighborhoods, Plaintiffs alleged that African-Americans homeowners were likely to receive grant amounts based on the pre-storm value of their homes rather than the cost of rebuilding. On the other hand, Plaintiffs alleged that white homeowners with higher-valued yet similar homes were likely to receive grants based on the cost to rebuild. Plaintiffs alleged this would result in disparate impact, because white homeowners would receive higher grants than African-American homeowners; in turn, the result would be an uneven recovery that harmed African-American residents of Louisiana. For example, one African-American homeowner had a home that the LRA estimated had a pre-storm value of $1,400 but would have cost over $150,000 to rebuild. According to the formula, she would have received an essentially useless grant of $1,400. On May 5, 2009, LRA filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint and also moved to transfer the matter to a district court in Louisiana. Co-defendant HUD opposed the motion. The District Court originally set a hearing on the motion for June 2010, but the hearing was continued. The District Court Judge (Judge Henry Kennedy) did not rule on the motion to dismiss until September 7, 2010, most likely because shortly after the defendants filed motions to dismiss, the plaintiffs filed two motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions, the results of which were appealed to the D.C. Circuit. On October 12, 2009, Louisiana provided low- and moderate-income homeowners who had received a Road Home grant based on the pre-storm value of their home with the opportunity to receive Additional Compensation Grants in an effort to provide grantees with grants based on the estimate cost of damage. On June 6, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the Louisiana from spending any remaining funds from the Road Home Program until the merits of the plaintiffs' case are resolved. Plaintiffs filed this motion because the LRA was set to sunset on June 30, 2010 and all remaining Road Home funds were scheduled to transfer to Louisiana's Office of Community Development, which would repurpose the funds for another program. On June 29, 2010, the District Court (Judge Henry Kennedy) found the plaintiffs were likely able to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination, but even so denied the plaintiffs' motion. He held that the Eleventh Amendment barred him from providing retroactive relief to African-American homeowners who had already received grants under the formula. On July 21, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a narrower motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction requesting only prospective relief. Judge Kennedy granted this motion, and prohibited Louisiana from disbursing funding based on the value of a person's home. The plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the District Court's denial of its first motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction on July 21, 2010. The LRA appealed the District Court's decision to grant the plaintiff's second preliminary injunction. On September 7, 2010, Judge Kennedy granted in part and denied in part the LRA's motion to dismiss and denied the LRA's motion to transfer. Judge Kennedy allowed plaintiffs claims against the LRA's executive director under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), but limited the claim to prospective relief. He dismissed all other claims against Louisiana. Louisiana appealed, but on December 30, 2010, the D.C. Circuit Court (per curiam) ordered that to the appeal held in abeyance until it resolved the pending appeals on the motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. On April 8, 2011, a D.C. Circuit Court panel (Judge Judith Rogers, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, and Judge Stephen Williams) determined that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of the case, and affirmed the District Court's denial of the plaintiffs' first motion and reversed the District Court's granting of the plaintiffs' second motion. In an opinion joined by Judge Kavanaugh, Judge Williams wrote that the plaintiffs failed to put forward convincing evidence of disparate impact. In July 2011, the parties reached a settlement in the matter. According to the settlement, the October 2009 program providing for additional compensation grants aided the majority of injured African-American homeowners. In addition, Louisiana agreed to reward approximately 1,300 homeowners in four parishes approximately $62 million in additional compensation. The parties reserved the additional funds for homeowners who received Road Home compensation based on the pre-storm value of their home. In order to qualify for additional funding, the homeowners who received grants based on the pre-storm value of their home must: (1) live in one of the four Louisiana parishes most impacted by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita; (2) have an original grant that was significantly constrained by their homes pre-storm value; (3) have a home in which the pre-storm value was at or below the fifty-fifth percentile of the parish. Further, eligible recipients must have been unable to complete repairs and return to their homes as of May 1, 2011, or must have returned without repairing the property, which must be uninhabitable according to local laws and ordinances. The agreement also provided recipients of this additional grant money additional time to comply with the rebuilding covenants that accompanied their original grants. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit, in light of the settlement, which does not provide for court enforcement.

Summary: In 2008, the Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, the National Fair Housing Alliance, and African-American homeowners from Louisiana filed a fair housing lawsuit against the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Louisiana Recovery Authority, alleging that Louisiana distributed federal hurricane recovery funds in a discriminatory way. Louisiana distributed $11 billion in federal housing funds to homeowners so they could rebuild their homes destroyed by Hurricane Katrina. Louisiana granted funds based on the lesser of the home's pre-storm value or the amount it would cost to rebuild the home. Because homes in African-American neighborhoods generally had a lower value than homes in white neighborhoods, the plaintiffs alleged this formula had a disparate impact on African American Homeowners. In July 2011, the parties reached a settlement and Louisiana agreed to provide a total of $62 million in supplemental grants to homeowners living in communities most impacted by the hurricane. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the suit, in light of the settlement, which does not provide for court enforcement.


On August 31, 2007, two plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio individually and on behalf of over 120 individuals who were arrested and detained several days earlier during an immigration enforcement raid conducted by the local sheriff and federal agents of the Immigration and Custom Enforcement at a chicken processing plant in Fairfield, Ohio. The Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Writ of Mandamus, Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and Motion for a Stay of Removal, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Plaintiffs alleged that the conduct of the local and federal officers was in violation of the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also sought relief under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1151, §1255; Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701, Mandamus Act 28 U.S.C. § 1361, Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 220 and the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. After the suit was filed, the parties reached an informal agreement that no detained workers would be immediately deported or moved to a jail outside of the Greater Cincinnati area. Koch Foods, the owner of the raided chicken plant, sought emergency intervention in the case and filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and preliminary injunction to prevent the government from removing or deporting any of the detained Koch Foods workers. Anticipating further legal exposure, Koch Foods asserted that it needed to interview the detained workers to aid in its defense against any potential criminal investigation and prosecution. Over the course of the next several months, many of the workers either left the country or opted to drop the charges. As a result, the Plaintiffs moved for, and were granted, dismissal of the case without prejudice on October 26, 2007.

Summary: On August 31, 2007, two plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio individually and on behalf of over 120 individuals who were arrested and detained several days earlier during an immigration enforcement raid conducted by the local sheriff and federal agents of the Immigration and Custom Enforcement at a chicken processing plant in Fairfield, Ohio. Specifically, they claimed that the conduct of the local and federal officers violated several federal laws and the United States Constitution. Over the course of the next several months, many of the workers either left the country or opted to drop the charges. As a result, the Plaintiffs moved for, and were granted, dismissal of the case without prejudice on October 26, 2007.


This voting registration case was filed on May 15, 2012, by a consortium of public interest lawyers, as part of a national campaign (other states listed below); private counsel from the Boston firm Ropes & Gray participated in this one, as well. They sued the state of Massachusetts in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged that Massachusetts was systematically failing to comply with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), section 7, 42 U.S.C. 1973gg-5(a), under which public assistance offices must provide voter registration services to assistance recipients, with each application, recertification, renewal, or change of address. The plaintiffs were an assistance recipient and two voter registration organizations. They sought an injunction requiring implementation and enforcement of appropriate practices and policies to ensure compliance with Section 7 of the NVRA, along with reporting and monitoring of that plan. According to a July 13, 2012, joint motion for a stay of discovery and other proceedings, the parties reached a partial out-of-court settlement on July 5, 2012, under which Massachusetts agreed to undertake "certain preliminary actions before the November elections," and to attempt to settle the case finally. The court granted the requested stay until December 31, 2012. The parties also agreed to a comprehensive protective order relating to discovery materials. According to press reports, as part of the settlement, the state then mailed out a letter informing benefits recipients of their right to register to vote, and giving them information on how to register. The letter was printed in the Boston Herald, and is posted here. This interim agreement yielded at least 39,000 voter registration applications from DTA’s low-income clients over a four-month period. In contrast, in the four years prior to this lawsuit, DTA clients had filled out only 3,100 voter registration applications. However, the parties did not reach a final settlement and discovery and other proceedings began again in 2013. On March 14, 2014, the District Court (Judge Denise J. Casper) granted the plaintiffs' motion to file an amended complaint and denied Massachusetts's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Three days later, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. On March 20, 2015, the District Court (Judge Casper) issued an order of final judgment dismissing only the claims asserted against defendant Massachusetts Department of Transitional Assistance as agreed to by the parties in a settlement agreement. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the DTA, but the parties explicitly agreed that it was not a consent decree. The agreement would last for three years. On June 17, 2015, the plaintiffs settled the remaining claims with the SOC and the EOHHS in two separate settlement agreements. The court issued a final judgment dismissing the claims, but retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlements. The agreements would remain in effect until July 31, 2018. The SOC agreed to review DTA and MassHealth voter registration policies and training materials, participate in training, and monitor registration activities of each of the public assistance agencies. The SOC agreed to post the resulting voter registration on the SOC’s website. EOHHS, which oversees DTA, MassHealth and several other agencies with voter registration responsibilities, agreed to send an annual notice to each such agency, reminding it of its NVRA responsibilities. MassHealth agreed to provide a voter registration application and offer assistance to each individual who applies, renews, or changes his or her address in connection with Medicaid benefits. MassHealth would also provide regular training for its employees and monitor NVRA compliance. The online health benefits application jointly used by MassHealth and the Massachusetts Health Connector would be re-programmed to provide voter registration opportunities. Nationally, a public interest organization, Demos, has filed similar lawsuits in nine states and settled with eight of those states: Ohio, Missouri, New Mexico, Indiana, Georgia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Nevada. As of the date of this summary, litigation is still pending in Louisiana. In addition, Alabama, California, Colorado, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Oregon, Virginia, and Washington all agreed to comply without being sued. The docket reflects no further activity as of January 2019. As the settlement terms have expired, the case is presumably closed.

Summary: This voting registration case was filed by a consortium of public interest lawyers, as part of a national campaign (other states listed below), alone with private counsel from the Boston firm, Ropes & Gray. They sued the state of Massachusetts in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, on May 15, 2012. The complaint alleged that Massachusetts was systematically failing to comply with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, under which public assistance offices must provide voter registration services to assistance recipients, with each application, recertification, renewal, or change of address. The matter reached an out-of-court preliminary settlement on July 5, under which the state mailed a letter informing benefits recipients of their right to register to vote, and giving them information on how to register. The letter was printed in the Boston Herald, and is posted here. The parties settled the case completely in 2015.


NOTE: This is one of three identically named cases in the Clearinghouse. For the 2005 case challenging New Jersey's overuse of Conditional Extension Pending Placement (CEPP), see PB-NJ-0003. For the 2008 case challenging the long waitlists for community-based waiver services, see PB-NJ-0004. Disability Rights New Jersey (DRNJ), the state Protection and Advocacy agency, filed this lawsuit to challenge New Jersey's pervasive over-institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities. In its complaint filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey on September 29, 2005, DRNJ alleged that the state's failure to provide community-based support services, housing, and appropriate assessment tools has lead to the unnecessary institutionalization of this population in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the federal Medicaid statute. After a long period of discovery and negotiation, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on March 25, 2010. Because the Defendants' summary judgment motion attacked the constitutionality of the ADA and Section 504, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a motion to intervene to defend the constitutionality of a federal statute. DOJ (Civil Rights Division) also separately filed a brief supporting the Plaintiffs on the merits of their motion for summary judgment. On September 24, 2010, Judge Anne E. Thompson denied the Plaintiffs' motion and most of the Defendants' motion. She granted summary judgment to the Defendants, however, on the Plaintiffs' Medicaid Act claims, finding that the Plaintiffs do not claim a right to access financial assistance under Medicaid, but rather, they wish to access certain medical services and thus cannot raise a claim under the statute. After this order, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on that issue on October 6, 2010. They argued that the financial assistance v. medical services distinction had been overturned by the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), and that the PPACA had resolved a circuit split and specifically overturned the cases from other circuits upon which Judge Thompson had relied in her decision. In light of this, the Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and reinstated the Plaintiffs' Medicaid claim on December 2, 2010. After more discovery and negotiation, the parties ultimately agreed to a settlement in December 2012, which was entered by the court upon the case's dismissal in March 2013. The settlement agreement resolved both this case and a case challenging the long waitlists for Medicaid-funded Home and Community Based Waiver Services (see PB-NJ-0004). Through this agreement, the State will discharge all community-eligible individuals from institutions by 2017 (about 600 people) and provide necessary services. The state will also increase screening and diversion services for those who are slated for placement in an institution. The agreement also includes funding for a consultant who will assist in implementing the agreement, and allows for Disability Rights New Jersey to serve as a monitor. The agreement ended in 2017, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Disability Rights New Jersey (DRNJ), the state Protection and Advocacy agency, filed this lawsuit to challenge New Jersey's pervasive over-institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities. The court denied cross-motions for summary judgment in the fall of 2010. The parties entered a settlement agreement in early 2013 which will provide for the integration of unnecessarily institutionalized individuals into community placements in New Jersey.


On December 7, 2012, a former detainee of Bucks County Correctional Facility filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff initially sued Bensalem Township, various Bensalem Township officials, and the company that operated as Mugshots.com, under Pennsylvania state law. The last amended complaint named defendants Bucks County and Bucks County Correctional Facility, along with Unpublish and Citizens Information Associates—the companies that operated mugshots.com, bustedmugshots.com, and mugshotsonline.com. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. The named plaintiff alleged that the defendants publicly disseminated his personal information and criminal history despite his completion of a plea deal diversion program that expunged his record. He claimed that this conduct violated the Pennsylvania Criminal History Records Information Act (CHRIA), Pennsylvania state tort law, and Pennsylvania common law. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief for Bucks County Correctional Facility to cease publishing online criminal histories of individuals who were arrested but not convicted. As to Unpublish and Citizen Information Associates, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to order the defendants to take down their websites. On February 5, 2013, Bensalem Township moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action under state law to bring an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. On February 28, 2013, Judge Timothy Savage denied the motion to dismiss. Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to seek class action status in order to represent those whose records were ordered expunged and whose criminal history information was still available and publicly accessible in the files and on Bucks County Correctional Facility's website. The amended complaint included the Pennsylvania State Police commissioner, Bucks County, the Bucks County records custodian, director of Bucks County Department of Corrections, the warden of the Bucks County jail, and Mugshots.com as defendants. Further, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a claim under § 1983 that the defendants violated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. On March 18, 2013, Bensalem Township filed another motion to dismiss and on April 11, 2013, the Director of Public Safety moved the court to dismiss the claims against him as well. He argued that the plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to allege he violated CHRIA or that the defendants’ conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The court denied Bensalem Township’s motion on April 17, 2013 and denied the motion from the Director of Public Safety on July 30, 2013. Various defendants continued to attempt to dismiss the case. On June 13, 2013, Bucks County, the warden, and the director of the Department of Corrections moved to dismiss the case. They alleged that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under § 1983 and argued that the defendants were entitled to immunity from the claims under CHRIA and state tort law. On June 14, the state police commissioner filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under both federal and state law and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Savage denied these motions on July 30, 2013. On July 19, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint to add Bucks County Correctional Facility and Citizen Information Associates as defendants, which operated as bustedmugshots.com and mugshotsonline.com. On August 8, 2013, Bucks County Correctional Facility and Bucks County moved the court to dismiss the case, alleging qualified immunity from the CHRIA claims and that the plaintiff lacked standing. Judge Felipe Restrepo denied the County and the County Correctional Facility’s motion on February 21, 2014. 2014 WL 695205. On November 27, 2013, Citizens Information Associates, bustedmugshots.com and mugshotsonline.com, filed motions to dismiss the state records law and state tort laws claims. On March 26, 2014, Judge Restrepo denied the dismissal of the tort law claim. Concurrently, he granted the dismissal of the claims under CHRIA, holding that it does not apply to private actors, and also dismissed other state claims. 9 F. Supp. 3d 490. On April 19, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, adding Unpublish LCC, which operated mugshots.com. On September 3, 2014, Citizens Information Associates filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining tort claim against it. Granting it on December 30, 2015, the court dismissed it as a defendant. On November 25, 2014, the defendants Bucks County and Bucks County Correctional Facility filed for summary judgment. On March 27, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgement. On March 28, 2016, Judge Wendy Beetlestone denied defendants’ motion and granted the plaintiff’s partial motion for judgment regarding liability, holding that the defendants wrongfully published state law-protected information on their website. She dismissed the plaintiff’s claim for “actual and real damages,” but allowed the question of punitive damages to proceed. 172 F. Supp. 3d 867. Judge Beetlestone granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification on May 4, 2016. 2016 WL 2345998. The class included about 66,799 individuals who had been incarcerated at the jail and whose information the jail publicly disseminated through their Inmate Lookup Tool. On May 6, 2016, Judge Beetlestone stayed the proceedings pending review of Bucks County and Bucks County Correctional Facility’s motion to certify an order for interlocutory appeal. She denied the motion on May 20, 2016. On June 6, 2016, the court entered a default order against defendant Unpublish LLC for failure to appear. On May 17, 2016, the County defendants appealed class certification to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and on May 2, 2016, they filed another motion to stay the proceedings. On June 8, 2016, the court entered an order to stay the proceedings and notification to the class, pending the Third Circuit decision on the appeal of class certification filed by the County defendants (USCA No. 16−3077). The Third Circuit affirmed class certification and denied the appeal on August 10, 2017. 862 F.3d 292. Later that month, the court lifted the stay. For the remainder of 2017 and through early 2018, the parties scheduled and subsequently cancelled multiple settlement conferences. On September 21, 2018, Bucks County Correctional Facility and Bucks County moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment as well. On February 14, 2019, the court denied both motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendants’ conduct was “willful,” a determinative question for granting punitive damages. 367 F. Supp. 3d 320. In late May 2019, a jury trial began. On July 2, 2019, the jury awarded plaintiffs $68 million, averaging $1000 in punitive damages per class member. The defendants moved for a judgment as a matter of law or motion for a new trial, which Judge Beetlestone denied on October 4, 2019. On July 29, 2019, defendants appealed to the Third Circuit (USCA No. 19-2761). The case is ongoing pending appeal as of October 23, 2019.

Summary: In 2012, a former detainee of Bucks County Correctional Facility filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged that the County's policy of publishing their personal information and criminal history violated Pennsylvania state law. In 2019, a jury awarded the plaintiffs $68 million in punitive damages. The case is ongoing pending appeal.


On May 20, 2008, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, against the managers and operators of a residential community in Haughton, Louisiana, in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The plaintiff filed the suit on behalf of a Caucasian couple who owned a town house located in the community and the couple who attempted to purchase the house from them. The plaintiff alleges the defendants prevented the sale of the complainants' home to the couple on the basis of race. The prospectives buyers were in fact white, but their real estate agent was black. The defendants believed that the agent's clients were also black and refused to permit the sale based on that belief. Specifically, defendant applied different criteria (background check), made discriminatory statements and threatened to refuse to provide services, and ultimately forced the buyers to back out of the sale. The Plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as civil penalties. After a September 2, 2009 bench trial, on September 28, 2010, the Court (Judge Stagg), entered a Memorandum Ruling and a Judgment, finding that defendant's actions were "a disingenuous scheme or device to exclude blacks ... and [are] additional evidence of a ... pattern or practice of racial discrimination." The court awarded the complainants $21,723.65 in damages, ordered the defendants to pay a $25,000 civil penalty to the United States, and enjoined the defendants from discriminating in their housing practices with respect to the sale or rental of dwellings on the basis of race. Judge Stagg ordered that the judgment to remain in effect for 5 years. In 2015, the order terminated and the case is now closed.

Summary: In this 2008 fair housing case filed in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, the United States sued the owners and operators of a residential community for refusing to permit the sale of property on the basis of race. Though the sellers and the prospective buyers were all white, the defendants believed that because the buyers' real estate agent was black, they were also black, and began a campaign to prevent them from purchasing the home. Considerable direct evidence of overt racism was brought out in the bench trial that ensued, and the trial judge (Judge Stagg) issued a memorandum and judgment that prohibits defendants from discriminating in the sale of real property on the basis of race, and ordered payment of $21,723.65 in damages to the sellers, $1,650 to the prospective buyers' real estate agents, $1,895 to the sellers' agent and a $25,000 civil penalty to the United States.


On January 10, 2018, two Philadelphia residents convicted for possession of small amounts of drugs filed this class lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued three secretaries of the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and the governor of Pennsylvania because they believed a criminal state statute was unconstitutional. This statute automatically suspended a person's drivers' licenses in tandem with the conviction of a drug offense. Represented by Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, they claimed that the statute targeted drug offenders as a disfavored class of persons without a rational basis; that the process of suspending their driver’s licenses was not sufficient to satisfy Due Process; and that the statute abridged their substantive Due Process rights to travel on interstate roadways. They also sought injunctive relief to enjoin state officials from implementing the statute. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all individuals whose Pennsylvania driver’s licenses were suspended or would be suspended due to conviction of a drug offense. They also sought preliminary injunctive relief to immediately stop the Pennsylvania government from enforcing the statute while the litigation proceeded. The plaintiffs filed both of these motions filed the day after this action was initiated. The defendants moved to dismiss the case, or in the alternative to strike the class action motion, on April 16, 2018. The court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss on September 25, 2018. The court dismissed the original complaint with prejudice, preventing the plaintiffs from amending their complaint. Judge Cynthia Rufe found that there was a rational basis for the Pennsylvania legislature’s discrimination against drug offenders by suspending their licenses, which negated the Equal Protection claim. She also ruled against the procedural and substantive Due Process claims, stating that the criminal process which convicted the plaintiffs was sufficient process. The statute did not deny the plaintiffs the right to interstate travel—just the right to a Pennsylvania driver’s license, which was not a fundamental right. Judge Rufe concluded that the plaintiffs had raised meritorious policy arguments against the statute, but that the court was limited to only striking down unconstitutional statutes, not unwise ones. This ended the action and the case is now closed.

Summary: In January 2018, two Philadelphia residents with drug convictions filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs alleged that a Pennsylvania statute automatically suspending the licenses of drug offenders upon conviction violated their Equal Protection and Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Nine months later, the judge presiding over the case granted a motion to dismiss, ending all of the plaintiffs' claims with prejudice. The plaintiffs did not appeal and the case was closed in 2018.


The California Pharmacists Association and several pharmacies filed this suit against David Maxwell-Jolly, then-Director of the California Department of Health Care Services. The suit was filed on November 11, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs brought the action under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that two provisions of a bill passed by the California Assembly on July 28, 2009 were contrary to and preempted by federal Medicaid law. Assembly Bill ("AB") X4 5, sections 38 and 39 would reduce the reimbursement rate paid to pharmacies for drugs provided to Medicaid recipients. This legislation was passed without prior approval from the United States Department of Health and Human Services' Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS"), which the plaintiffs argued was contrary to federal law. The California Legislature had also failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the level of access to and quality of care available to Medi-Cal recipients, contrary to the requirements of § 1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security Act. A related case between the same two parties was also filed and which eventually reached the Supreme Court (California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell Jolly, Clearinghouse code PB-CA-0020.) The plaintiffs also contested an additional 4% drop in the reimbursement rate, which was the result of changes to the Average Wholesale Prices (AWPs) for several thousand pharmaceuticals, as determined by data from First DataBank, Inc. California based its formula for calculating prescription drug reimbursement rates on these AWPs. A lawsuit filed against First DataBank alleging that the company set AWPs at artificially high levels resulted in a consent decree wherein the company agreed to reduce the AWPs for more than 2000 drugs by five percent. New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund et al v. First Databank, Inc., 582 F.3d 30 (1st. Cir. 2009). First DataBank had voluntarily reduced its AWP for many thousand more drugs. The plaintiffs argued that California accepted the reduced reimbursement rates that resulted from the lowering of the AWPs without first considering the affects this would have on the "efficiency, economy, and quality of care," provided to Medicaid recipients as required by § 30(A). Plaintiffs sought restraining orders and preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the contested provisions of AB X4 5 from being implemented and preventing the State from using the reduced AWPs as the basis for its reimbursement rates. They also sought declaratory judgments holding the contested rate reductions to be unlawful. On December 28, 2009 the Court declined to grant a temporary restraining order preventing the implementation of the rate reductions. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and then voluntarily dismissed the appeal when that Court found that it probably lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal while the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was still pending in the lower court. On May 5, 2010, the Court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, granting preliminary injunctions against the implementation of the contested effects of AB X4 5. Both parties filed appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeals were stayed pending the petitions for certiorari review by the Supreme Court of several related cases involving the question of whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce the Medicaid Act against a state. This stay was continued after review was granted in these cases and while they remained pending before the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California (Clearinghouse code PB-CA-0016), and the other California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly case, mentioned above (PB-CA-0020.) The District Court proceedings were also stayed pending the outcome of these Supreme Court cases. CMS approved most of the California Medicaid plan amendments while the Supreme Court cases were still awaiting adjudication. In light of this, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on the Supremacy Clause question. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision in the cases before it and remanded those cases to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2012). On July 1, 2016, the defendant (now represented by the next director of the California Department of Health and Human Services) filed a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court granted the request on July 5, 2016, with prejudice, ordering that each side bear its own costs and attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: The California Pharmacists Association and several pharmacies filed this suit against David Maxwell-Jolly, then-Director of the California Department of Health Care Services. The suit was filed on November 11, 2009 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs brought the action under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, arguing that two provisions a bill passed by the California Assembly on July 28, 2009 were contrary to and preempted by federal Medicaid law. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. On May 5, 2010, the Court granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Both parties appealed. The appeals were stayed pending the decision in a set of cases before the Supreme Court. Those cases were remanded. Apparently because those cases are still ongoing at the Appellate Court level, the instant case has not been reopened. This is up-to-date as of July 2013.


On April 19, 2006, the plaintiff, a death row inmate in Kentucky represented by private counsel, filed a lawsuit against the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, the medical director of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, and the governor of Kentucky in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order, injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and Thirteenth Amendment rights to protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants' current method of lethal injection was unconstitutional because it created an unnecessary risk that the plaintiff would be tortured to death. The plaintiff was at a heightened risk due to damaged and compromised veins that made it difficult and potentially impossible for an I.V. to be inserted in the traditional way. Additionally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to ensure that personnel administering the lethal injection were properly trained, they did not have the means to appropriately monitor consciousness, and did not have adequate equipment to maintain life if a last minute stay of execution was granted after the first or second of the three chemicals had been administered. The plaintiff asked the Court to bar the defendants from carrying out any execution until they had promulgated a rule officially detailing all aspects of the procedures used in the execution process. On April 26, 2006, the plaintiff filed a similar complaint in the Kentucky Circuit Court for Franklin County. After the case was filed, several other inmates intervened and joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs. The Franklin Circuit Court held a full trial in the case of Bowling and Baze, holding that the state's lethal injection method did not violate their Eighth Amendment rights. They appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court, who affirmed the decision on November 22, 2006. Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 2006 WL 3386544 (Ky. 2006). Baze and Bowling filed their motions to intervene in this action five days later. On March 30, 2007, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction barring the defendants from scheduling or carrying out their executions. The Court also denied the plaintiffs' motion requesting a deposition from the governor of Kentucky about how he would respond if the execution was postponed. The plaintiffs' motion to compel disclosure of the Kentucky Department of Corrections' electrocution protocol was denied as was their facial challenge to the constitutionality of electrocution. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for permission to depose the defendant execution team members. On October 13, 2015 the Court considered whether the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations under Cooey v. Strickland, whether their claims survived the Supreme Court decision in Baze v. Rees, and whether their claims were rendered moot by subsequent revisions to Kentucky's lethal injection protocol. First, the court concluded that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations. In Cooey v. Strickland the Sixth Circuit considered the accrual of method-of-execution claims and determined that the claim accrues upon the conclusion of direct review of the prisoner's underlying conviction and sentence in the state courts. The Court determined that the plaintiffs' claims accrued on March 31, 1998 and that the one-year statute of limitations for asserting personal injuries applied; thus, the plaintiffs needed to have filed their claims on or before March 31, 1999. Because the plaintiff's claim was time-barred, the Court did not reach a formal conclusion regarding whether the plaintiff's claims survived the Supreme Court decision in Baze v. Rees. Finally, the plaintiffs conceded that the adoption of an entirely-new lethal injection protocol over the course of several years between 2010 and 2013 rendered many aspects of their original claim moot. The Court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs' challenge to Kentucky's since-superseded lethal injection protocol was subject to dismissal on mootness grounds. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' case with prejudice on October 13, 2015.

Summary: On April 19, 2006, the plaintiff, a death row inmate in Kentucky represented by private counsel, filed a lawsuit against the Kentucky Department of Corrections, the warden of the Kentucky State Penitentiary, the medical director of the Kentucky Department of Corrections, and the governor of Kentucky in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order, injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his Eighth and Thirteenth Amendment rights to protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff claimed that Kentucky's current lethal injection method created an unnecessary risk that the plaintiff would be tortured to death because he was at a heightened risk due to compromised veins. The plaintiff also challenged the training of execution personnel and procedures to maintain life if a last-minute stay of execution was granted. A number of other death-row inmates intervened in the case. On October 13, 2015, the Court ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations as determined in Cooey v. Strickland and that due to significant changes to the Kentucky lethal injection protocol over the course of the case, the plaintiffs' claims had been rendered moot. The case was dismissed with prejudice.


On August 9, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Peoria filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the First Amendment against the Federal Government. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, the Diocese contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. The Diocese further argued that even though its current coverage had "grandfathered" status and so the Diocese did not face impending government enforcement action, it is unable to change its health care plans without losing grandfathered status. If the Diocese does make changes to its healthcare plans, the contraception mandate will impede budgetary planning as any non-compliance fines must be allocated within those budgets. On October 19, 2012, the Federal Government moved to dismiss the case pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction based on plaintiffs' standing and that the claim was not ripe for review. On January, 4, 2013, the court (Chief Judge James E. Shadid) granted the Federal Government's motion to dismiss. 2013 WL 74240 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2013). The court found that the Diocese had grandfather status and would only lose that status by adopting a new healthcare policy, a decision that is of the Diocese own choosing. Because the Diocese had not provided any specific and non-hypothetical changes that it was refraining from making to its healthcare plan, the court held that it lacked standing. Additionally, the court found the Diocese's claim was not ripe because the Federal Government had stated that it would not enforce the contraception mandate in its current form. The court recognized that forthcoming amendments to the mandate were intended to specifically address the Diocese concerns by establishing alternative means of providing contraceptive coverage. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Diocese claim rested upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or may not occur at all. The court dismissed the case without prejudice as premature, stating that the Diocese may bring the claim again once the harm is no longer contingent on future events and is less speculative.

Summary: On August 9, 2012, the Catholic Diocese of Peoria filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois against the Federal Government seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The court dismissed the case without prejudice for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, concluding that the Diocese lacked standing and that the claim was not ripe for review.


On July 19, 2011, a female firefighter applicant of the Chicago Fire Department filed a class action lawsuit against Chicago in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff was later joined by eight other female firefighter applicants. Together, they sued Chicago on behalf of themselves and a class of women who were denied employment with the city's Fire Department based on their failure to pass the required physical ability test. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the test was neither job related nor consistent with business necessity and that the city administered the test notwithstanding its disparate impact on women and the availability of less discriminatory alternatives. As a result, the plaintiffs claimed that the city's administration of the physical ability test constituted unlawful sex discrimination (in the form of both disparate impact and disparate treatment) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and back pay. On September 5, 2013, the parties filed a proposed settlement agreement, and on December 20, 2013, the Court (Magistrate Judge Maria Valdez) issued a Final Judgment and Order approving it. Per the parties' agreement, the Court granted certification of a class that consisted of female applicants to the Chicago Fire Department who had passed the written qualifying exam but who had failed the physical ability test between December 2007 and April 10, 2010 and were therefore denied employment. As part of the settlement, Chicago agreed to discontinue use of the physical ability test and administer instead an interim test. Additionally, the city agreed to pay $1,590,023, which was divided among the class of non-hired settlement class members. The city also agreed to provide each named plaintiff with a back pay award ranging from $10,000 to $73,000. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought against the City of Chicago by a putative class of female firefighter applicants who were denied employment with the city's Fire Department based on their failure to pass the required physical ability test. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the physical ability test constituted unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The parties reached a settlement, and the court issued a consent decree on December 20, 2013, resulting in injunctive and monetary relief. The case is now closed.