This is a case about Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) policies for detaining immigrants after they turned 18 who had entered the U.S. as unaccompanied minors. On March 5, 2018 two individual plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, where it was assigned to District Judge Rudolph Contreras. They brought suit on behalf of a class of unaccompanied alien children who had been placed in the custody of the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refuge Resettlement (ORR) when they arrived in the U.S. However, on their 18th birthdays, members of the plaintiff's class were transferred to ICE custody, where many of them were placed in adult detention, allegedly without consideration of alternative, less restrictive options, as required by law. The plaintiffs sued ICE, its parent agency the Department of Homeland Security, and both organizations' leaders. Represented by counsel from the National Immigrant Justice Center and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought class certification for a group of similarly situated immigrants, declarations that ICE had violated the law, injunctive orders that ICE comply in the future, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated two sections of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)(5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2), 701(1)) and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA). That act requires that ICE "shall consider placement in the least restrictive setting available after taking into account the alien’s danger to self, danger to the community, and risk of flight" when it receives custody of an immigrant who arrived in the U.S. as an unaccompanied minor and was placed in the custody of ORR. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B). The plaintiffs alleged that ICE was systematically failing to comply with its obligations under this statute by automatically, or nearly automatically, placing these individuals in adult detention. According to the plaintiffs, ICE's failure to comply with this requirement was arbitrary and capricious, in violation of §706(2)(A) of the APA. As such, the plaintiffs requested that the court "compel agency action." The plaintiffs also added a third named plaintiff in an amended complaint on March 30, 2018, though the allegations in that complaint were identical to the first. A year later on April 5, 2019, however, the parties stipulated to this plaintiff's voluntary dismissal from the case. After the case was filed, the plaintiffs immediately moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, applying only to the two named plaintiffs. Judge Contreras denied the temporary restraining order during a hearing on March 8, 2018. However, on April 18, 2018, he issued an opinion granting a preliminary injunction ordering ICE to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(B) in the named plaintiff's placement, effectively considering the least restrictive alternative to detention. 310 F.Supp.3d 7. As a result, ICE released the plaintiffs from custody. On March 6, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification, defined as: "All former unaccompanied alien children who are detained or will be detained by ICE after being transferred by ORR because they have turned 18 years of age and as to whom ICE did not consider placement in the least restrictive setting available, including alternative to detention programs, as required by 8 U.S.C.§ 1232(c)(2)(B)." Meanwhile, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on May 7, 2018. Judge Contreras resolved both of those motions in an August 30, 2018 order. 338 F.Supp.3d 1. At the request of the plaintiffs, he certified the class. Judge Contreras also denied the defendants motion to dismiss. After Judge Contreras' August 2018 opinion, the parties wrangled over discovery for close to a year and a half. While this was going on, the defendants filed a motion to decertify the plaintiffs' class on April 1, 2019, but eventually asked the court to hold their motion in abeyance on July 8, 2019 due to issues with ICE data that formed the motion's basis. The defendants also filed a partial motion for summary judgment on September 13, 2018. Judge Contreras denied that motion on November 7, 2019, finding that the case contained disputes of fact that would have to be litigated a trial. 2019 WL 7370368. The case proceeded to trial. Between December 2, 2019 and January 15, 2020 Judge Contreras conducted an 18-day bench trial. On July 2, 2020, he issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of the plaintiffs. 471 F.Supp.3d 88. Judge Contreras found that ICE did not comply with its statutory obligations to place immigrants who arrived in the U.S. as unaccompanied minors in the least restrictive setting available. Due to poor training and non-existent guidance from ICE headquarters, many ICE field offices detained these individuals on a nearly automatic basis (above 95% in certain field offices), and in some cases refused to release immigrants to their parents or organizations who volunteered to take care of them. Judge Contreras deferred the issue of remedy for further consideration. After a July 21, 2020 conference, the parties began working together to select a monitor for the case and also draft training materials to help ICE employees comply with the findings. On December 16, 2020, Judge Contreras referred the case to Magistrate Judge Michael Harvey for mediation. As of February 4, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, two immigrants who entered the U.S. as unaccompanied minors and were placed in ICE detention on their 18th birthdays filed this class action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE did not fulfill its statutory obligations when choosing whether to detain young them, in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act. in 2020, after a bench trial, the court sided with the plaintiffs and found that ICE systematically did not consider placing members of the plaintiffs' class in the least restrictive setting available. The parties are in the process of determining an appropriate remedy for ICE's violations of the law.


On July 14, 2008, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of Indiana under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601-3619, against a condominium association and its Board of Directors. The plaintiff brought the suit on behalf of an African American couple and their two minor children. Specifically, the plaintiff challenged the defendants' "no minors" restriction as violative of the Fair Housing Act, and claimed the defendant refused to sell a unit to the family on the basis of race and familial status. On October 28, 2010, the Court (Judge Simon) entered a four-year consent order agreed to by the parties. The order contains gereral prohibitions against discrimination of the basis of familial status or race, requires the Board to amend its policies as to minors and to provide training to all officers and directors on the Board, permanently removed and replaced the Board President, and required payment of $106,500 in damages, and a $13,500 civil penalty.

Summary: This 2008 race and familial status discrimination case was brought by the United State in the United States District Court of Indiana on behalf of an African American couple and their children against a condo association. The Board had a "no minors" policy, and no African americans had EVER lived in the condo. A consent decree required the Board president to step down permanently, in addition to requiring amendment of the policy, training, compliance testing, training, and payment of of $106,500 in damages, and a $13,500 civil penalty.


On June 28, 2013, the United States Department of Health and Human Service issued final regulations--"the Mandate"--concerning the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The regulations required health insurance plans to provide coverage of contraception and abortifacients, with an exemption for employee health plans offered by churches and their integrated auxiliaries, as well as an accommodation for employee health plans by certain qualified religious organizations. Plaintiffs in this case were a non-profit, non-religious pro-life organization and its employees who shared the same opposition to abortion and coverage of contraception and abortifacients in the employee health plans. Some of the employees held a religious belief against the use of contraception and abortifacients. The exemption promulgated by the Health Department did not extend to the plaintiff organization for its non-church, non-religious nature. As a result, the organization was unable to provide non-abortifacient health plans to employees without violating the Mandate. As it was also reluctant to drop all health insurance coverage for its employees, the plaintiffs commenced a lawsuit. On July 7, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against three government agencies, namely the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the United States Department of Labor, and the United States Department of the Treasury, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq., the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys from Alliance Defending Freedom, sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the Court. They alleged that the Mandate unconstitutionally discriminated against the organization in light of the exemption and accommodation of certain similarly situated entities, and deprived its religious employees of the ability to choose non-abortifacient health plans. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as the Equal Protection and Free Exercise clauses in the Constitution of the United States. On September 23, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. On August 31, 2015, Judge Richard J. Leon granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection under the Fifth Amendment claim, Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, and Administrative Procedure Act claim. He dismissed their Free Exercise claim. Judge Leon found that the Mandate violated the plaintiffs’ right to Equal Protection because it permitted accommodation to some groups but not theirs, although they had the same anti-abortionist beliefs. Turning to the plaintiffs' RFRA claim, Judge Leon found that, although the plaintiffs were a non-religious group, they still opposed the Mandate on religious grounds. He found the Mandate placed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ ability to exercise their religion and that the government’s interest was not sufficiently compelling and the mandate was not narrowly tailored. Judge Leon also dismissed the plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim because the Mandate was generally neutrally applicable. 128 F.Supp.3d 116. On October 28, 2015, the defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit. On February 24, 2016, the case was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court’s decision in Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding Zubik and other consolidated cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. On June 17, 2016, this case was ordered to remain in abeyance pending the D.C. Court of Appeals decision in Priests for Life v. HHS See Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse summary. Parties filed joint status reports on January 5, 2018, February 5, 2018, and March 7, 2018 stating the case remained in abeyance while the parties discussed the resolution of the appeal. On September 17, 2018, the D.C. Circuit granted the parties motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeal. 2018 WL 4871092.

Summary: On July 7, 2014, a non-religious pro-life organization filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor and Department of the Treasury. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the regulations issued by the Health Department concerning coverage of abortifacients in employee health plans unconstitutionally discriminated against the organization and deprived its religious employees of the ability to choose non-abortifacient health plans, in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as well as the Equal Protection and Free Exercise clauses of the Constitution. On August 31, 2015, the court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs' Equal Protection, RFRA, and APA claim and dismissed the Free Exercise claim. Defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit, but the case was held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's ruling in Zubik v. Bruwell. In September of 2018, the D.C. Circuit granted the parties motion for voluntary dismissal of the appeal.


On October 26, 2005, two African-Americans brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against their employer, Ikon Office Solutions. Plaintiffs alleged that Ikon followed discriminatory employment practices by refusing African-American employees equal pay, promotion opportunities, and hiring opportunities, creating a hostile work environment, and retaliating against African-Americans for complaining about such discrimination. Plaintiffs claimed that as a result, Ikon violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act as well as state anti-discrimination laws. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees. On August 3, 2006, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include more detailed allegations and two additional plaintiffs. On July 26, 2007, the parties drafted and submitted a settlement agreement to the Court. On October 30, 2007, the Court (Judge Paul A. Crotty) granted preliminary approval of the agreement. Following a fairness hearing on the agreement, the Court granted final approval of the settlement agreement. The agreement defined the class as all African-American individuals employed by Ikon's Legal Document or Management Services in New York, between January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2005. Upon approval of the agreement and by its terms, the Court ordered Ikon to pay a total of $175,000 to the named plaintiffs, and awarded plaintiffs' class counsel $436,500 in attorney fees and costs. The agreement further required Ikon to set up a fund to pay settlement checks to any class members that qualified for a claim, including the named plaintiffs. The agreement also addressed a charge filed by an individual with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, dismissing it and awarding the individual $35,000, in addition to a settlement check. Though the amount paid in settlement checks is unknown, Ikon paid at least $646,500 to the named plaintiffs and their counsel.

Summary: On October 26, 2005, two African-Americans brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against their employer, Ikon Office Solutions, alleging that Ikon followed discriminatory employment practices. The parties settled and Ikon agreed to pay at least $646,500 in damages and attorney fees to the named plaintiffs, with qualified class members (including the named plaintiffs) potentially receiving further damages awards from settlement checks in an agreed-upon claims process.


On March 23, 2010, a private Christian university and individual citizens filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the First, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, Justice, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their constitutional freedoms by requiring them to provide or purchase health insurance coverage. Claiming that providing or purchasing health insurance would contravene their Christian faith, violate their freedom of association, and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA for themselves and other institutions and individuals with similar religious objections. On August 13, 2010, the defendant federal departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. First, the defendants argued that the Anti-Injunction Act barred a pre-enforcement challenge to the ACA because the law's key provisions would not take effect until 2014. Second, the defendants asserted that the ACA's provisions were authorized by Congress's enumerated powers. Third, the defendants argued that the ACA did not violate the plaintiffs' freedoms of speech, association, or religion. On November 30, 2010, the District Court (Judge Norman K. Moon) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Moon found that, while the plaintiffs had standing to sue and were not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, the ACA was authorized by Congress's enumerated powers and did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional freedoms. Liberty University v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010). The plaintiffs appealed this dismissal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals (Appeal No. 10-2347). On September 8, 2011, the Fourth Circuit panel (Judge Motz, with Judge Wynn concurring) vacated the original dismissal and sent the case back to the District Court for dismissal on different grounds: the panel reasoned that the Anti-Injunction Act prevented the court from having jurisdiction over a pre-enforcement challenge to the ACA. Judge Davis dissented, arguing that, while the Anti-Injunction Act did not bar the plaintiffs' claims, the ACA was valid legislation under Congress's commerce authority and thus that the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim was proper. 671 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2011). The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari on October 12, 2011 (S.Ct. Case No. 11-438). On June 29, 2012, one day after deciding similar questions in NFIB v. Sebelius, the Supreme Court denied the cert petition. Liberty University v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 60 (2012). The plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB invalidated the Fourth Circuit's finding that the Anti-Injunction Act barred their claims. In a single order on November 26, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the petition for rehearing, granted the cert petition, and entered a judgment vacating the Fourth Circuit's judgment and sending the case back to the Fourth Circuit for further consideration in light of NFIB. Liberty University v. Geithner, 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012). Fourth Circuit Judges Motz, Davis, and Wynn heard a second round of arguments in the case on May 16, 2013. On July 11, 2013, the Fourth Circuit (Judges Motz, Davis, and Wynn) affirmed the judgment of the District Court, holding that the ACA was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce authority and dismissing the case for failure to state a claim. Liberty University v. Lew, 733 F.3d. 72 (4th Cir.). The Fourth Circuit further found the plaintiffs' speech, association, and religious freedom claims meritless. On September 10, 2013, the plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. On December 2, 2013, the Supreme Court denied the petition.

Summary: In 2010, a private Christian university and various individual citizens filed a constitutional challenge to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the ACA infringed on their constitutional freedoms by requiring them to provide or purchase health insurance. In November 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that the ACA was constitutionally valid legislation. The plaintiffs appealed that order to the Fourth Circuit, which ordered the District Court to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction instead. After the U.S. Supreme Court decided similar questions in NFIB v. Sebelius, it first denied, then granted, the plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, immediately sending the case back to the Fourth Circuit for reconsideration in light of NFIB. In July 2013, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's original decision, holding that the ACA was a valid exercise of Congress's commerce authority and dismissing the case for failure to state a claim.


In 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") conducted investigations, aided by expert consultants in juvenile justice administration, psychology, medicine, education, and sanitation, at two military-style juvenile facilities ("Oakley" and "Columbia") operated by the state of Mississippi. In June 2003, DOJ notified the state in a findings letter that the investigations revealed that the facilities deprived the resident juveniles of rights under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1401, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. DOJ found that youth confined at Oakley and Columbia suffered harm or the risk of harm from deficiencies in the facilities' provision of (1) mental health and medical care, (2) protection of juveniles from harm (including physical harm from staff), and (3) juvenile justice management (lack of due process and adequate grievance procedures, untrained staff, mail/telephone/visitation inadequacies, and limited exercise opportunities). DOJ also found sanitation deficiencies at Oakley. In addition, both facilities failed to provide required general education services, as well as education to eligible youth as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The First Amendment violations were rooted in both facilities' requiring youth to engage in religious activities. The findings letter proposed a number of remedial measures for the state to adopt, offered to negotiate with the state to reach a resolution of the allegations, and stated that a federal lawsuit could soon be filed against the state if a negotiated settlement could not be reached. On December 18, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the state (and relevant juvenile justice-related state officials and agencies). Among the allegations were the defendants' failure to adequately protect youth from harm and the risk of harm (including staff abuse) at these facilities, unreasonable isolation and restraint use, failure to provide adequate mental and medical health care and rehabilitative treatment, inadequate educational services, and failure to provide adequate special education services to disabled youth (mentally ill, those with intellectual disabilities, and learning disabled youth). The DOJ sought declaratory and equitable relief, relying upon authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 14141. In the meantime, in an originally-separate class action case filed April 13, 2004, against the state and involving these two juvenile facilities, a settlement had been reached to remedy the facilities' limits on juvenile residents' contacts with their attorneys. By the time the settlement was reached on January 12, 2005, that case had been consolidated with the DOJ's case pursuant to an unpublished July 12, 2004, order of Magistrate Judge James C. Sumner. Lawyers from the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Mississippi Center for Justice had represented the juvenile plaintiff in the 2004 case, K.L.W. v. James. Later in 2005, separate agreements were reached between the DOJ and the state to address the shortcomings at the juvenile facilities that were alleged in the 2003 DOJ lawsuit. In a May 4, 2005, memorandum of agreement, the parties detailed means of remedying deficiencies in mental health care, rehabilitative services, and special education. On June 9, 2005, the parties filed an agreement setting out remedial measures to address protection from harm, suicide prevention, and medical and dental care issues. Both agreements included provisions for compliance and quality assurance, for monitoring and enforcement, imposed reporting requirements and rights of access, and set out implementation and termination procedures. District Judge Henry T. Wingate approved the settlement and received the subsequently-filed periodic monitor's reports. An Amendment to Consent Decree was filed with the court on February 26, 2008, which extended its provisions to May 31, 2010, appointed two court monitors, set out deadlines for receiving detailed action plans from those monitors, and addressed compliance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a). In 2010, the court ordered the Consent Decree amended to dismiss certain provisions and modify others. The court required the defendant to develop a comprehensive action plan for the substantive remedial areas of the Agreement. This Action Plan was filed with the court on September 16, 2010. Monitoring continued, and on April 12, 2013, parties advised the court that the state has satisfied the requirements in the major substantive areas of the Consent Decree. The only remaining action at that point was implementation of the Quality Assurance program. On September 17, 2013, the court (Judge Wingate) signed an Agreed Order Terminating Specific Provisions of the Amended Consent Decree, in which parties agreed that the state had met its burden of remaining in substantial compliance for a period of six months with regards to all remaining provisions of the Consent Decree. Following the twenty-first Monitor’s Report, Judge Wingate terminated the Consent Decree and its associated Orders and finally dismissed the case with prejudice

Summary: On December 18, 2003, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Mississippi (and relevant juvenile justice-related state officials and agencies) alleging defendants' failure to adequately protect youth from harm and the risk of harm (including staff abuse) at two military-style juvenile facilities ("Oakley" and "Columbia"). The DOJ sought declaratory and equitable relief, relying upon authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 14141. In 2005, the parties filed an agreement setting out remedial measures to address protection from harm, suicide prevention, and medical and dental care issues. An amendment in 2008 appointed two court monitors and set out deadlines for receiving monitor reports. After gradual and continuous improvement and twenty-one Monitor's Reports, the parties agreed that the state had met its burden, and the court (Judge Wingate) finally dismissed the case with prejudice.


COVID-19 Summary: This case originated as a jail conditions case in Hinds County, Mississippi in 2015. In March of 2020, the monitor’s report noted that the novel coronavirus had the potential to become a serious problem at the facilities. The monitor’s report in August 2020 reported that several detainees had tested positive, and that Hinds County was inadequately addressing the issue. The case is ongoing. <hr> On May 21, 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the United State Department of Justice (DOJ) completed an investigation into Hinds County, Mississippi, over conditions at the Hinds County Adult Detention Facility and Work Center in Raymond and the Jackson Detention Center in Jackson. The DOJ found that the facilities were chronically understaffed, that staff were not adequately trained or supervised, and that the facilities were poorly designed and ill-maintained. Those staff in turn failed to supervise detainees with a history of violence, mental illness, or suicide attempts, and routinely subjected detainees to excessive force. They further failed to adequately separate high-risk detainees from young detainees, female detainees, mentally disabled detainees, and other vulnerable detainees. As a result, detainees faced serious harm or risk of harm from other detainees and staff, including three riots, as well as unjustified use of TASERs, canines, and corporal punishment against detainees by staff. Additionally, Hinds County failed to provide detainees with timely access to exercise, treatment programs, and legal services. The lack of access to legal services, along with Hinds County's failure to keep accurate records for detainees, in turn resulted in many detainees being held without adequate legal justification. On June 23, 2016, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against Hinds County based on the findings in its report in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The DOJ alleged that Hinds County had violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the detainees housed in the Hinds County Adult Detention Facility, the Hinds County Work Center, and the Jackson Detention Center. The DOJ asked the court (Judge William Henry Barbour Jr.) for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 1997). Specifically, the DOJ asked Judge Barbour to declare that Hinds County's practices and policies violated the constitutional rights of detainees at the facilities that the DOJ had investigated, and to issue a permanent injunction ordering Hinds County to amend its practices and policies to avoid violating the constitutional rights of detainees at those facilities in the future. The parties had already negotiated a settlement during the DOJ investigation; on the same day as the complaint was filed, the DOJ and Hinds County filed a joint settlement motion. In the settlement agreement, Hinds County admitted that its policies and practices had violated the rights of detainees and agreed to change those practices and policies to prevent violations of detainees' rights in the future. To that end, Hinds County agreed to implement a comprehensive list of reforms, including: increased supervision of prison staff and detainees; improved training for prison staff, particularly in regards to appropriate use of force; improved incident reporting and investigation; no longer detaining detainees without adequate legal justification, particularly in regards to detention for failing to pay fines; and notifying mental health professionals of the release of detainees with mental illness to facilitate their transitions back into society. Hinds County also agreed to create a Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, which would be charged with exploring ways to keep youth and mentally ill persons in Hinds County out of the Hinds County legal system. The Committee would include representatives from the Hinds County Board of Supervisors and Hinds County Sheriff's office. Hinds County was also to seek additional representation from the Jackson Police Department and other Jackson City officials; the Mississippi Department of Mental Health; the Mississippi Department of Health and Human Services, Division of Youth Services; Hinds County judges; the Hinds County District Attorney's Office; the Hinds County Public Defender's Office; and private advocates or other interested community member. The settlement agreement required that Hinds County implement all of its provisions within a year of the effective date of the agreement. Compliance with the settlement agreement would be monitored by a third-party monitor agreed upon by the DOJ and Hinds County. The monitor was to have full access to facilities, records, and detainees of the Hinds County Adult Detention Center, Hinds County Work Center, and Jackson Detention Center, along with the full cooperation of Hinds County employees, contractors, and Agents at those facilities. Hinds County was also required to designate a full-time Compliance Coordinator to work with the monitor. In the event of non-compliance with the agreement, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement at the request of the aggrieved party. After the parties jointly stipulated that the defendant had substantially complied with the settlement agreement for two years, the court could order termination of the agreement. Alternatively, the defendant could unilaterally move for dismissal, but had the burden of showing substantial implementation of the agreement. The court approved the settlement agreement on July 19, 2016. On February 17, 2017, the court determined that significant progress had been made toward compliance, but that certain requirements had not been met. On August 1, 2018, the monitor filed their fifth status report. Though the monitor noted meaningful progress, particularly with the medical and mental health evaluation processes, the detention facilities were still non-compliant with the settlement agreement. The case was reassigned to District Judge Carlton Reeves on December 17, 2018. Status reports and compliance updates continued. On June 24, 2019, a monitoring report was submitted that demonstrated that defendants were still lacking in the area of corrections operations. In all other areas, the court monitor found that there had been improvement, but that defendants still had lots to accomplish before they would be in compliance. On December 16, 2019, both parties moved for entry of a new settlement; the Court agreed on January 16, 2020, modifying the prior settlement agreement to include additional, more specific, relief in five areas: Safety and security of the physical plant, safety and security of staffing, the development and implementation of policies and procedures, and population management. Around the same time, COVID-19 began to spread throughout the world. The 10th Status Report dated March 26, 2020, noted that lack of staffing and impractical policies would hinder an effective respond to the virus in Hinds County detention facilities. The Report also noted other deficiencies including physical security (detainees were often able to let themselves out of their cells and housing units), fire code noncompliance, and lack of mental health workers. So, it concluded, “progress toward substantial compliance in most of the areas of the Agreement is best described as being ‘on hold’.” But the report did point out that more judges were available for first appearances and the bail schedule had been eliminated. The 11th Status Report, dated August 4, 2020, identified additional problems with the defendants' COVID-19 response. Based on conference and Zoom calls rather than in-person visits, the report cited failures of the jail administration, senior security staff, and the mental and medical health provider to regularly meet together, leading to misinformation. In addition, there was at first a lack of testing. And when testing was finally conducted, it took place on a voluntary basis, leading to only 60% of detainees being tested. Several of these tests were positive, and the monitor expressed concern that there might be additional infected detainees in the non-tested population. These problems were compounded by ineffective quarantine procedures, inadequate staffing, and inadequate testing of staff. On the other hand, the Report also noted that a reduction in the jail population over the last four years had improved conditions. A 12th Status Report was submitted on December 4, 2020. A copy of this document is not currently available to the Clearinghouse. A status conference was set for April 9, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: The United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, sued Hinds County in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi after conducting an investigation that found that Hinds County's practices in the Hinds County Detention Facility, the Hinds County Work Center, and the Jackson Detention Facility violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of detainees housed there. On the same day that the DOJ filed the complaint, it entered a joint motion for settlement with Hinds County, in which Hinds County agreed to a comprehensive list of reforms to better protect detainees from other detainees and staff, and to prevent detainees from being detained without adequate legal justification. The settlement was approved in July 2016, and monitoring of progress is ongoing. COVID-19 has posed a new challenge for Hinds County's correctional facilities.


This Clearinghouse entry describes two consolidated lawsuits challenging the Trump Administration's new asylum rule, which reversed longstanding asylum laws that allow individuals to seek asylum in the U.S. regardless of how they arrive in the country. The first one was filed in July 2019 by Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition (CAIR) and Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), represented by Human Rights First and private counsel; the second was filed in August 2019 by eight asylum seekers and the Tahirih Justice Center, represented by the ACLU Immigrant Rights Project. They were immediately consolidated and adjudication covered both together. The first case was filed on July 16, 2019 by two immigrant advocacy organizations, Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition (CAIR) and Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES). Proceeding in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated federal law and the Fifth Amendment by issuing an interim final rule barring asylum eligibility for individuals entering the U.S. via the southern border without first applying for protection in a third country through which they had traveled. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Mandamus Act. The case was assigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly. In their complaint, the plaintiffs emphasized that the defendants’ rule was promulgated absent a notice-and-comment period (in violation of the APA, they argued) and would deny asylum seekers access to the asylum procedures to which they are entitled under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Specifically, the rule would create an assumption of ineligibility for asylum for all individuals entering the U.S. via the southern border after transiting through a third country, unless the individual can demonstrate that they applied for and were denied protection in a third country, or that they are a “victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons." The plaintiffs alleged that the rule was intentionally crafted to strip asylum eligibility from migrants fleeing persecution and violence across the southern border--namely, women, children, and other vulnerable populations. As organizations that provide services to asylum seekers, the plaintiffs claimed that the rule posed irreparable harm to their organizational missions. On July 24, 2019, Judge Kelly made an oral ruling on the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order. Finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the irreparable harm requirement, Judge Kelly denied the plaintiffs’ motion. 2019 WL 3436501. On the same day, in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, another case challenging the government’s new asylum rule, Judge Jon S. Tigar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining the rule nationwide. 385 F.Supp.3d 922. After some back-and-forth litigation, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction. 140 S.Ct. 3. Details of that ongoing case can be found here. Meanwhile, in the present case, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 18, 2019. The amended complaint added individual plaintiffs ineligible for asylum under the rule, as well as the organization Human Rights First. The parties also had agreed to hold the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction in abeyance while the injunction entered in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr remained in effect. However, once that injunction was stayed by the Supreme Court, the parties requested that the district court treat their briefs concerning the plaintiffs' motions for preliminary injunction as briefs in support of cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court heard oral argument on the motions on November 7, 2019. On June 30, 2020, Judge Kelley granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment, denied defendants’ cross-motions for summary judgment and vacated the interim rule. 2020 WL 3542481. In his opinion, Judge Kelley held that the defendants failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment requirements and did not qualify for “good cause” or “foreign affairs function” exceptions to that requirement. Judge Kelley emphasized that the evidence the defendants’ relied on was exceedingly thin: “a single newspaper article that [did] not even directly address the key predictive judgment in question.” The defendants appealed the decision to the D.C. Court of Appeals. Although the Interim final rule was vacated, it was superseded by a Final Rule issued through the notice-and-comment procedure with an effective date of January 19, 2021. 8 C.F.R. § 1208. Unless there additional litigation or the stay is lifted in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, the Final Rule would have the same effect as the Interim Rule that Judge Kelley vacated—in order for immigrants traveling through a third country en route to the United States to be granted asylum in the United States, they must demonstrate that they applied for protection from that third country and were denied. As of December 22, 2020, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: On July 16, 2019, two non-profits representing asylum seekers brought this suit against the Trump Administration, challenging an interim final rule barring asylum eligibility for individuals crossing the southern border without first requesting protection in a third country. Claiming the rule violated federal law and the Fifth Amendment, the plaintiffs requested declaratory judgment and a nationwide injunction. The Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the Trump Administration violated the Administrative Procedure Act by failing to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures. The Trump Administration appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, where the case is pending.


On September 26, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a nursing assistant with a back injury, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of New York under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), against the Silvercrest Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant: 1) refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to its employee by denying her request for medical leave after she had a back injury; and 2) denied her access to an interactive process required by the ADA by denying her the opportunity to communicate with her union. The defendant hired the employee in this case as a nursing assistant in November 2009. In August 2010 she suffered a back injury as a result of a car accident. As a result, she was unable to lift, and therefore work, from August 2010 to December 1, 2010. She requested and was granted medical leave for this time period. After returning to work, she re-injured her back while on the job on December 25, 2010. As a result, she was unable to lift, and therefore work, until March 25, 2011. She tried to request medical leave and said she wanted to speak to her union but was terminated instead on January 24, 2011. On July 9, 2013 and on August 12, 2013, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Roanne L. Mann) issued a protective order. On January 7, 2014, the District Court (Judge Nina Gershon) issued a consent decree where, among other things, the defendant had to pay the employee $25,000.

Summary: On September 26, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, on behalf of a nursing assistant with a back injury, filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of New York under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, against the Silvercrest Center for Nursing and Rehabilitation. The EEOC alleged that the defendant: 1) refused to provide a reasonable accommodation to its employee by denying her request for medical leave after she had a back injury; and 2) denied her access to an interactive process required by the ADA by denying her the opportunity to communicate with her union. On January 7, 2014, the District Court issued a consent decree where, among other things, the defendant had to pay the employee $25,000.


On September 19, 2019, five asylum-seeking parents, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the National Immigrant Justice Center, and the American Immigration Council, sought monetary relief and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the United States government caused intentional infliction of emotional distress through its child-separation policy. The government separated the asylum-seeking parents from their children, delayed providing parents and children information of each other’s whereabouts and well-being, failed to facilitate adequate communication between the parents and their children while separated, and failed to implement a system to ensure families could be reunited. The government did this deliberately, plaintiffs alleged, to deter other parents with children from seeking asylum in the United States. The case was assigned to Judge Susan Bolton. On December 23, 2019, the United States moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, citing sovereign immunity not waived by the FTCA. The district court denied the United States's motion on March 30, 2020, holding (1) the family separation alleged in the suit was a persuasive analogy to private conduct such that plaintiffs had established subject-matter jurisdiction under the FTCA and (2) neither the due care nor the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applied because the United States was not enforcing federal law when it separated plaintiffs and their children. 2020 WL 1698191. The United States moved for leave to appeal the district court's order on May 29, 2020, which was denied by the Judge Bolton on July 6, 2020 because the United States failed to present exceptional circumstances such that interlocutory review would be appropriate. 2020 WL 5232560. The United States filed its answer to the complaint on May 13, 2020 and the parties commenced discovery in July 2020. Discovery continued throughout the end of 2020 into early 2021. On April 19, 2021, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings while they explored a possible settlement. The court stayed proceedings until June 2, 2021, at which time the parties will notify the court if additional abeyance is needed to facilitate settlement. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, five asylum-seeking parents filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act over the government’s family separation policy. The plaintiffs alleged the U.S. government inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs and their minor children in order to deter other parents with children from seeking asylum in the United States. This case is ongoing.


In June 2006, the Memphis District Office of the EEOC filed suit in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against Athletes Building Better Communities, dba Athletes Foot. The complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by subjecting female employees to sexual harassment, and retaliated against them when they complained. In July of 2007, the defendant notified the court that it had filed for bankruptcy. Upon the EEOC's motion, the case was dismissed without prejudice in October 2007; the EEOC reserved the right to re-file the case if bankruptcy proceedings turned up any property with which a judgment might be paid.


In March 2009, Quinnipiac University announced plans to cut its women's volleyball team, men's golf team, and men's outdoor track team. At the same time, the University pledged to create a new varsity sport, competitive cheerleading, for the 2009-10 season. Plaintiffs, who were five current Quinnipiac women's varsity volleyball players and their coach, filed this lawsuit against Quinnipiac in response, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, on April 16, 2009. They were represented by the ACLU, and their complaint alleged that Quinnipiac's decision to eliminate its volleyball team violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 162, et seq.) and its regulations (34 C.F.R. Part 106). On May 22, 2009, the District Court (Judge Stefan Underhill) granted a preliminary injunction, preventing Quinnipiac from eliminating women's volleyball as a varsity sport. The court held that Quinnipiac's "roster management" deprived women students of equal participation opportunities in varsity sports. This worked as follows, Judge Underhill explained: Quinnipiac insisted that various women's sports have a "roster floor" -- a team count padded by athletes not actually needed for the team. The result was that a number of purported players actually had as their "principal role" "to provide a gender statistic rather than a meaningful contribution to the team." Conversely, as is common in competitive sports, male teams had a roster <i>cap</i>, so that some men interested and able to play were not afforded the chance. Accordingly, even though the gender split among varsity student athletes at Quinnipiac seemed to track the student gender demographics more generally, the Court held that this proportionality was actually illusory. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009) About a year later, on May 20, 2010, the district court certified the class of: "All present, prospective, and future female students at Quinnipiac University who are harmed by and want to end Quinnipiac University's sex discrimination in: (1) the allocation of athletic participation opportunities; (2) the allocation of athletic financial assistance; and (3) the allocation of benefits provided to varsity athletes." 2010 WL 2017773. A bench trial was then held from June 21 to June 25, 2010, on the Title IX theory that Quinnipiac discriminated in 2009 and 2010 on the basis of sex in its allocation of athletic participation opportunities. Judge Underhill found for the plaintiffs in a decision published July 21, 2010. Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, 728 F.Supp.2d 62 (2010). He held that the University's competitive cheerleading team did not qualify as a varsity sport for the purposes of Title IX and, therefore, its members could not be counted as athletic participants under the statute: "Competitive cheer may, some time in the future, qualify as a sport under Title IX; today, however, the activity is still too underdeveloped and disorganized to be treated as offering genuine varsity athletic participation opportunities for students." In addition, the Court held, Quinnipiac was impermissibly triple counting women cross-country runners, tallying them, as well, as participants in indoor and outdoor track, even when they did not in fact so participate. Finally, some of the problematic roster management continued. Cutting volleyball, the Court concluded, would only exacerbate the ongoing violation of Title IX. Accordingly, the Court prohibited the immediate elimination of women's volleyball, in 2010-2011, although it made clear that Quinnipiac could subsequently cancel that team, "so long as any decision to eliminate women's volleyball is accompanied by other changes that will bring the University into compliance with Title IX." The Court required Quinnipiac to submit a compliance plan within 60 days, which Quinnipiac did; plaintiffs opposed that plan as inadequate. Quinnipiac appealed the underlying finding of the district court while it continued to litigate about compliance. (The court stated its view that the compliance plan was likely adequate, and set the issue of Title IX compliance for a future hearing. On appeal, in an opinion dated August 7, 2012, by Judge Reena Raggi, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's findings and injunction in their entirety. A number of organizations joined the litigation as amici curiae -- the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division and the National Women's Law Center (joined on the brief by dozens of other women's organizations) supported the plaintiffs; the Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund supported Quinnipiac. Meanwhile, while the appeal was pending, in December 2011, Quinnipiac filed a motion to lift the injunction and terminate the Court's supervision; a hearing was held in June 2012. On March 4, 2013, the District Court denied the motion in a lengthy opinion including findings of fact and conclusions of law. Analyzing the men's and women's sports in question, Judge Underhill concluded that the university had "failed to demonstrate a significant change in the quantity and/or quality of athletic participation opportunities provided to its female students." 928 F.Supp.2d 414, 473 (D. Conn. 2013). The parties agreed to settle the case on April 26, 2013. The terms of the settlement required the University to develop a Title IX nondiscrimination policy and grievance procedure; to place restrictions on when and why the university could eliminate a women's varsity team and on creating new men's varsity teams without adding women's varsity teams; to upgrade facilities for women's athletics; to increase funding for coaches' salaries for women's athletics; to increase funding for scholarships for women's athletics; and to allow women's teams to participate in more tournaments and competitions. Additionally, the University agreed to pay $15,000 to each named plaintiff, $1.9 million in attorney's fees, and $50,000 to a scholarship fund. Finally, the settlement agreement will be monitored with yearly reports until June 30, 2016. The Court approved of the settlement on June 20, 2013. On October 2, 2013, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the plaintiffs' Title IX retaliation Claim. The Referee was to monitor the University's progress release yearly reports each July through 2016. As of October 2016, there is no further docket activity. The case is now closed.

Summary: In this District of Connecticut case, the District Court (Judge Stefan Underhill) found Quinnipiac University discriminated against its female students by denying them participation opportunities for varsity athletics equal to male students. In an opinion dated July 21, 2010, Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, 728 F.Supp.2d 62 (2010), Judge Underhill stopped the immediate dissolution of varsity women's volleyball. Quinnipiac appealed the underlying finding of the district court while it continued to litigate about compliance. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's findings and injunction in their entirety. On April 26, 2013 the parties settled the case. The University agreed to several policy changes that would strengthen women's athletics at the University, to pay damages to the named plaintiffs, and to pay $1.9 million in attorney's fees. The case is now closed.


On March 19, 2004, two plaintiffs represented by private attorneys from Albany, New York, filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that the Schoharie County Sheriff's Department ("SCSD") had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schoharie County Jail, including those charged with misdemeanors or held on civil matters, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion to believe that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. The named plaintiffs included an Albany County Jail corrections officer arrested for back child support and another man charged with DWI. They alleged that, pursuant to the Sheriff's policy, they were forced to strip naked and subjected to visual inspections in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs also alleged the constitutional violation stemmed from the Sheriff's deliberate indifference to constitutional rights by not adequately training individual officers he employed. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary and punitive damages and class certification for the thousands of individuals that suffered the same alleged indignities. The defendants, the County and the Sheriff, answered by generally denying all allegations. The case was assigned to District Judge Lawrence E. Kahn, who referred the case to Magistrate Judge David Homer to oversee scheduling and case discovery. A scheduling order was entered, which directed the parties to complete discovery by June 1, 2005. Discovery ensued. On the last day of discovery, the County moved to amend its answer to assert an affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (PLRA). The District Court (Magistrate Judge Homer) denied the County's request to answer, finding that the PLRA did not apply to the case, as neither plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the case was filed. Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 2005 WL 1972557 (N.D. N.Y. Aug 05, 2005) (NO. 04-CV-299). The plaintiffs moved for class certification, which the defendants opposed. Defendants, in turn, moved for summary judgment. Judge Kahn denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and certified the case as a class action. The class was defined as: All persons in the United States who have been, or will be, placed into the custody of the Schoharie County Jail after being charged with "misdemeanors, violations, or held on civil matters" and were, or will be, strip searched upon their entry into the Schoharie County Jail pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Schoharie County Sheriff's Department and the County of Schoharie. The class period commences on March 19, 2001, and extends to the date on which the Schoharie County Sheriff's Department and/or the County of Schoharie are enjoined from, or otherwise cease, enforcing their unconstitutional policy, practice and custom of conducting strip searches absent reasonable suspicion. Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 2007 WL 603406 (N.D. N.Y. Feb 21, 2007). Judge Kahn refused to certify his order for immediate appeal by defendants. On December 19, 2007, the Court (Judge Kahn) held a pre-trial conference where parties discussed the settlement but the matter did not settle and a trial date was set for June 16, 2008. During the pre-trial conference, the parties also discussed whether the case would be tried before a jury or Judge Kahn. On March 27, 2008, plaintiffs submitted a letter motion requesting waiver of the previously requested jury trial, followed by defendant's letter brief on April 3, 2008, objecting to plaintiffs' requests to waive a jury trial because withdrawing a jury trial after already submitting a request requires consent of both parties. On April 14, 2008, the Court (Judge Kahn) ordered the case to go forward as a jury trial and adjourned the trial date to September 16, 2008. Thereafter, the jury trial was adjourned three times, notably due to defendants awaiting the Court of Appeals decision on the issue of qualified immunity for two individual defendants. On October 14, 2009, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the the District Court’s previous decision and order that denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and defense of qualified immunity (with Judge Sotomayor dissenting). The Second Circuit found that the incidental observation of the body of an arrestee during required clothing exchange, as described by the plaintiffs, was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. It also decided that plaintiffs did not identify any constitutional violation on the parts of individual defendants. As a result, the Second Circuit remanded the case back with instructions to dismiss the action (with Judge Sotomayor dissenting). Following the Second Circuit’s decision, on October 16, 2009, the District Court (Judge Kahn) granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment that was previously filed in 2005, entered judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the case in its entirety. The court also granted the defendants’ application for attorneys fees and ordered the plaintiffs to pay that fee of $1,662.60. Later on February 23, 2010, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the total bill of costs, including the previously ordered attorneys fees, that totaled $3,487.20. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 19, 2004, two plaintiffs filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that the Schoharie County Sheriff's Department ("SCSD") had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Schoharie County Jail. On October 16, 2009, judgment was entered against the plaintiffs after the Court found no constitutional violation on the parts of individual defendants. The case was dismissed and the Court ordered the plaintiffs to pay $3,487.20 for the bill of costs.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 summary: On May 8, 2020, two voters and a non-profit organization sued the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia State Election Board, and the Board of Registration and Elections of various counties to enjoin various absentee voting laws during COVID-19. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They also submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction for the upcoming November 3 election. No outcome yet.
 On May 8, 2020, two voters and a non-profit organization seeking to improve voter education filed a suit against the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia State Election Board, and the Board of Registration and Elections of various counties to enjoin various absentee voting laws during COVID-19. Filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, the plaintiffs brought this declaratory and injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 52 U.S.C. §§ 10301-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the lack of standards in the “Absentee Application Notification Process” governing the notification process for incomplete absentee ballot applications, the “Absentee Postage Tax,” which requires the voter to pay for postage to return an absentee ballot, the “Election Day Receipt Deadline,” requiring the mail-in ballots to be received by 7 pm on Election Day, as well as the “Voter Assistance Ban,” prohibiting third-party assistance for voters casting absentee ballots. The plaintiffs sought relief declaring the challenged voting laws as undue burdens on the right to vote. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Election Day deadline for ballots postmarked on Election Day which arrives at the county office within five business days after Election Day. Further, the plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the defendants to provide postage to their absentee ballots, allow any third parties to assist in the collection of absentee ballots, and to use a non-uniform standard to notify voters of application deficiencies. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was initially assigned to Judge Leigh Martin May, then reassigned to Judge Eleanor L. Ross. This suit was filed after the Georgia 2020 primary elections, as the plaintiffs anticipated higher rates of absentee voting, paired with an overburdened postal system for the November 2o2o general elections. The plaintiffs noted that given the majority of absentee voters will have no prior experience voting by mail prior to November and more likely to err in filing the vote, the current Notification Process must be improved. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the Election Day Receipt Deadline threatened to disenfranchise voters whose ballots, through no fault of their own, did not arrive by the deadline due to increased burdens to postal service during the pandemic. The plaintiffs further alleged that the current Absentee Applicant Notification Process and Election Day Receipt Deadline violated the due process clause and that requiring the voters to pay for postage unconstitutionally increased monetary transaction costs to voting in violation of the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. Lastly, the plaintiffs contended that the “Voter Assistance Ban” constituted an unreasonable restriction on speech in violation of the First Amendment for voters without family or household members. On June 3, 2020, the plaintiffs amended the complaint to add another plaintiff and to challenge the “Absentee Application Age Restriction,” which requires voters under the age of 65 to submit an absentee ballot application for each election cycle. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought to preliminarily and permanently allow voters to submit one application to vote by mail for the entire election cycle. The plaintiffs also argued that the “Voter Assistance Ban” was preempted by Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. On June 10, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction for the November 3, 2020 election. On June 26, the defendant submitted a motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim and to establish standing, claiming that the plaintiff’s purported injury is “no more than a fear that certain events may unfold at some ill-defined point in the future.” The case is ongoing.

Summary: Voters and a non-profit organization sued the Georgia Secretary of State, the Georgia State Election Board, and the Board of Registration and Elections of various counties to enjoin absentee voting laws during COVID-19. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They also moved for a preliminary injunction for the upcoming November 3, 2020 election. No outcome yet.


On February 3, 2005, inmates confined to the Secured Housing Unit ("SHU") at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in Indiana filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project and the ACLU of Indiana, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the confinement of certain mentally ill prisoners there was unconstitutional. On March 10, 2005, the District Court (Judge Larry J. McKinney) certified the case as a class action. The class was defined as all prisoners currently, and in the future, confined within the Secured Housing Unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility who were mentally ill. Following two years of litigation and several court-ordered settlement conferences, the parties reached a tentative settlement of the case in the form of a private settlement agreement ("Mast Agreement"). The Mast Agreement provided that it was inappropriate for the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC) to place seriously mentally ill prisoners into the SHU or into any correctional setting that features isolation and solitary confinement and the IDOC agreed to abandon that practice. The Mast Agreement further called for the IDOC to provide appropriate mental health treatment for seriously mentally ill prisoners, in a setting and settings other than the SHU. Monitoring of IDOC's implementation of the agreement provision was set for a two-year period. The parties submitted the agreement to Judge McKinney for approval. Class notices were sent and the matter was set for an approval hearing on March 30, 2007, before Judge McKinney. On November 26, 2007, Judge McKinney approved the settlement and ordered the case stayed for two years, thereafter to be dismissed without prejudice. On October 7, 2008, a mentally ill prisoner filed pro se a motion to hold the defendants in contempt of court for violating the settlement agreement and award of punitive damages for continuing to confine him in the SHU and then moving him to a facility that was similar to the SHU. On December 31, 2009, Judge McKinney closed and dismissed the case without prejudice pursuant to the terms in the Mast Agreement. In 2019, the case was reopened. On March 18, 2019, the parties stipulated to terminating the Mast Agreement because of the related settlement agreement in Indiana Protection and Advocacy Services Commission, et al. v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Correction ("IPAS Agreement"). Specifically, the IPAS agreement prohibited the placement of seriously mentally ill persons in segregation or segregation-like settings for more than 30 days. The IDOC interpreted the class affected by the IPAS Agreement to be slightly narrower than the class in this case. The IPAS Agreement was scheduled to expire on March 25, 2019, but IDOC agreed to extend it if the Mast Agreement was terminated. Because of the IPAS Agreement's immediate, concrete benefits to IDOC prisoners, the parties agreed to terminate the Mast Agreement and extend the IPAS Agreement. On March 19, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge James Patrick Hanlon, who approved the parties' stipulated agreement and closed the case on July 23, 2019.

Summary: In 2005, inmates confined to the Secured Housing Unit ("SHU") at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in Indiana filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the South District of Indiana, claiming that the confinement of certain mentally ill prisoners there was unconstitutional. Following two years of litigation and several court ordered settlement conferences, the parties reached a settlement in 2007 that required the Indiana Department of Corrections to change policies and practices relating to mentally ill prisoners. The case was dismissed without prejudice in 2009 pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. The case was reopened in 2019, when the parties stipulated to terminating the settlement agreement in order to extend a separate private settlement agreement in a different case affecting mentally ill prisoners in Indiana. The case was closed on July 23, 2019.


On August 2, 2007, a lawful permanent resident filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS )challenging their failure to provide documentation of residency. The plaintiff alleged that defendants imposed unlawful demands on her attempt to renew her green card. She claimed this practice deprived her of her liberty and violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1304(d) and 8 USC 1229a(c)(3)) and related regulations. The complaint sought habeas, mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief. In the first amended complaint, another plaintiff was added and the plaintiffs sought class certification. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were long-term lawful permanent residents (LPRs) with expired or missing registration cards (I-551s). They sought to renew or replace their I-551s by filing I-90s and complying with USCIS's application requirements. They alleged that USCIS had converted the process by which new green cards are issued into an enforcement procedure. Rather than provide plaintiffs with evidence of their LPR status, defendants interrogated the plaintiffs about past criminal conduct and/or old deportation proceedings and ordered plaintiffs to produce documents. On August 29, 2008, the parties came to a settlement agreement, and the court (Judge Randy Crane) dismissed the case on September 4, 2008. In the settlement, defendants agreed to pay $7,500 in attorneys fees. The parties agreed that with respect to the three named plaintiffs and interveners that defendants had satisfied all issues in the Second Amended Complaint and were making a good faith effort to resolve such issues with respect to member of the putative class. Plaintiffs agreed to dismiss their complaint and withdraw their motion for class certification.

Summary: In 2007, a lawful permanent resident filed a lawsuit against USCIS and DHS challenging their failure to provide documentation of residency. Plaintiffs alleged that USCIS had converted the process by which new green cards are issued into an enforcement procedure. On August 29, 2008, the parties came to a settlement agreement, and the court (Judge Randy Crane) dismissed the case on September 4, 2008. Plaintiffs received attorneys fees and agreed that defendants had satisfied their complaints.


On January 31, 2017, the Arab American Civil Rights League (ACLR) and seven of its individual members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (in Detroit). The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §5), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. They claimed that President Trump’s executive order (EO) of January 27, 2017, which banned entry into the US of refugees and nationals of seven predominantly Muslim countries violated these statutes as well as their Fifth Amendment rights to procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection. They also claimed the EO violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause by giving preference to Christian over Muslim refugees. The case was assigned to District Judge Victoria Roberts who referred proceedings to Magistrate Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis. On February 2, 2017, the same day that the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), the court entered a permanent injunction barring the United States from applying Sections 3(c) and 3(e) of the Jan. 27, 2017 EO against lawful permanent residents of the United States. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew their motion for a TRO, citing changed circumstances created by the entry of a nationwide TRO in State of Washington v. Trump. However, the plaintiffs continued to pursue a permanent injunction guaranteeing them the ability to travel outside the country and re-enter in the future. Following President Trump’s replacement of the January 27 EO with a narrower EO on March 6, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint arguing that this new EO was also discriminatory. Since the new EO definitively excluded lawful permanent residents from its scope, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on behalf of those plaintiffs who were lawful permanent residents. Because a third iteration of the EO was issued on September 24, 2017, the district court allowed the plaintiffs to file another amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on September 13, 2018, arguing that the third EO violated the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association, and the Fifth Amendment equal protection guarantee. In this complaint, the ACLR was joined by the ACLU of Michigan, the American Arab Chamber of Commerce, the Arab American and Chaldean Council, the Arab American Studies Association, and five named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all individuals in the US whose ability to reunify with family members who are citizens of the “designated countries” (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen) was interfered with by the renewed executive order. The amended complaint dropped the procedural and substantive due process claims, focusing instead on how the EO violated the Establishment Clause, equal protection, and the rights to freedom of speech and association. In addition to the defendants from the first complaint, the third amended complaint also named U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the State Department, the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence as defendants. The plaintiffs sought the following relief: 1) a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from implementing or enforcing the third EO against nationals of the designated countries; 2) a judgment declaring the third EO as unlawful and invalid; and 3) attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act. The government filed a motion to dismiss the third amended complaint on October 15, 2018. The plaintiffs filed a reply brief to this motion on November 19, 2018. More than half a year later, on July 10, 2019, District Judge Roberts issued an order and opinion denying the government’s motion to dismiss. Judge Roberts held that the complaint sufficiently pleaded a claim that the third EO violated the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment’s protections of speech and association, and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of Equal Protection. 399 F. Supp. 3d. 717. On July 23, 2019, the government moved for certification of the district court’s July 10 order so that the decision could be appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; the government also requested a stay of discovery pending resolution of the appeal. The government filed an answer to the third amended complaint on July 31, 2019. On August 6, 2019, the plaintiffs replied to the motion for certification, arguing that the government had not met the standard for a certificate of appealability and that a stay of discovery was not warranted. District Judge Roberts granted the defendant’s motion for certification but denied their motion to stay discovery on November 1, 2019. 2019 WL 5684371. With the denial of their motion to dismiss certified, the government filed an appeal in the Sixth Circuit and asked the court of appeals to order the district court to stay proceedings pending resolution of the interlocutory appeal. In a November 26, 2019, order issued by Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton and Circuit Judges Karen Nelson Moore and John Nalbandian, the court of appeals permitted an appeal on the denial of the motion to dismiss and ordered the district court to stay all proceedings, including discovery. In the Sixth Circuit, the government filed its brief for the appeal on March 20, 2020, and the plaintiffs filed their brief on July 24. The court of appeals scheduled oral arguments for November 17, 2020. But before this could take place, on November 13, the court granted a November 10 motion by the plaintiffs to hold the case in abeyance until February 2, 2021. While the November 10, 2020, motion is not available on PACER, it was likely prompted by the news that Joseph Biden had won the 2020 presidential election and was planning on undoing a large number of President Trump’s executive orders. In addition to granting the motion to hold the case in abeyance, the Sixth Circuit ordered the plaintiffs' counsel to file a status report on settlement negotiations between the parties due on February 21, 2021. Counsel for the plaintiffs filed the status report on February 1, 2021, and informed the Sixth Circuit that the parties agreed the appeal and the underlying lawsuit were moot because President Biden revoked the EO at issue on his first day in office, January 20, 2021. The parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal as moot without prejudice and to remand the case to the distinct court with instructions to dismiss on February 8. Two days later, on February 10, 2021, Circuit Judges Raymond Kethledge, Bernice Donald, and Joan Larsen entered an order granting the joint motion to dismiss the appeal and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss as moot. Additionally, the three-judge panel vacated the July 10, 2019 denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss stating that “mootness precludes us from reviewing the merits of that order.” The plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing on the order to vacate in front of the original Sixth Circuit panel of Sutton, Moore, and Nalbandian, but this was denied on March 11, 2021, by Kethledge, Donald, and Larsen. This ended the case.

Summary: In 2017, the Arab American Civil Rights League (ACLR) and seven of its individual members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), the Administrative Procedures Act (5 U.S.C. §5), and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. They claimed that President Trump’s Executive Order of January 27, 2017, violated these statutes as well as their Fifth Amendment procedural and substantive due process, and equal protection rights. From 2017 to 2018, the plaintiffs amended their complaint several times to address the updated versions of the travel ban executive order issued by President Trump. The third amended complaint was filed on September 13, 2018 and was joined by other Arab American civil rights groups and the ACLU of Michigan. The government filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which was denied on July 10, 2019. The government appealed this denial to the Sixth Circuit, but before oral arguments could be heard on the matter, Joe Biden won the 2020 election. On Inauguration Day, President Biden revoked the travel ban executive order. As a result, the parties agreed that this case was moot and proceedings were effectively ended by the Sixth Circuit on March 11, 2021.


On May 16, 2003, two developmentally delayed preschool students, through their parents, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The action was filed under the civil rights act 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against the New York City Board of Education. The plaintiff, represented by public interest attorneys asked the court for injunctive relief to provide the necessary education to the plaintiffs and also for compensatory relief for costs of remedial instruction necessitated by defendant's failure to provide the necessary education services to plaintiffs. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the school district had identified the plaintiffs as developmentally delayed and had created for them Individual Education Plans or "IEPs" which detailed the additional services to be provided to the plaintiffs by the school district. This procedure is in place to comply with the mandate in IDEA, which provides federal funding for special education to states who implement such plans. Plaintiff D.D. specifically was supposed to receive half day integrated classes with speech and occupational therapy as related services. The staffing ratio in the class was to be eight students to one teacher. The plan was to take effect on December 6, 2002, within two weeks of the IEP meeting. As of the date of the complaint, despite plaintiff's mother's repeated requests, D.D had not received any of the services listed in the IEP. Instead he was kept on a wait-list due to a lack of capacity by the school district. After the initial complaint was filed, a third plaintiff was added with an amended complaint. This complaint was sealed, however, the new plaintiff brought the action individually and on behalf of those similarly situated. After this plaintiff was added, class certification was sought. On March 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge David G. Trager) entered an order provding notice to the plaintiff class regarding an injunctive settlement. The settlement involved various steps the school district would take to expand special education programs at schools and training for staff. On December 28, 2007, the first two plaintiffs reached a monetary settlement with the district. The case was terminated at that time.

Summary: In May 2003, two developmentally delayed preschool students, along with those similarly situated, filed suit against the New York City Board of Education for failing to provide them the necessary special education services required by their Individual Education Plans. A class settlement for injunctive relief was reached in March of 2007 and a monetary settlement was reached for the two initial plaintiffs in December of 2007.


On June 2, 2014, several women who claimed they were unjustifiably forced to take pregnancy tests after they were arrested filled this lawsuit in Superior Court in Alameda County. The plaintiffs sued the Alameda County Sheriff’s Department under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by both private counsel and the ACLU, asked the court for injunctive relief. Specifically, they asked the court to eradicate the requirement that all female arrestees take a pregnancy test regardless of consent, a declaration stating that the defendant’s actions were in violation of the Fourth Amendment, nominal damages and payment of attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs alleged that on separate occasions, they were arrested by the Alameda county police and taken to either the Glen E. Dyer Detention Facility of Santa Rita County Jail. Upon arrival at these facilities all three plaintiffs claimed that they were ordered to take a pregnancy test. However, the results of these pregnancy tests were not disclosed. One plaintiff was above the age requirement for pregnancy tests stated within the facilities' policies and procedures. The plaintiffs claimed that the pregnancy tests were emotionally degrading as well as an invasion of their privacy. In July 2014, the defendants moved the case from state court to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. On October 14, 2014, Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand the case back to state court. After several case management conferences, the plaintiffs requested to amend their complaint. On April 28, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint requesting nominal damages. On May 8, 2015, during a settlement conference held in front of Magistrate Judge Kandis A. Westomore, the case was settled in principle and a partial settlement was put on record. By September 3, 2015 both parties submitted a joint status report explaining their near-final settlement agreement. The settlement was placed on hiatus until the defendant could provide the plaintiffs with a representative from the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office that had decision making authority to come discuss the concerns of the plaintiffs. The final settlement was reported in the second joint status report submitted on November 04, 2015. The Alameda County Sheriff’s office agreed to implement new and revised policies described in the revised inmate handbook, nominal damages, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the case. On May 5, 2016, Magistrate Judge Maria-Elena James ordered voluntary dismissal and retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. The agreement itself is not part of the docketed record, but the case is closed.

Summary: Several women alleged that on separate occasions they were arrested by the Alameda County police and were unjustifiably forced to take pregnancy tests upon admission to the detention and jail facilities. The plaintiffs amended their complaint after several case management conferences and on November 04, 2016 both parties agreed on a settlement. On May 5, 2016 the presiding judge agreed to the voluntary dismissal of the case.


On January 19, 2007, an Indiana county jail inmate, represented by the ACLU, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Grant County, Indiana, over overcrowding in the Grant County Jail. Plaintiff alleged that overcrowding in the jail had resulted in a substantial degradation of jail conditions, including frequent fighting among inmates, inadequate food, and lack of access to exercise and recreational facilities. He alleged that the result violated Indiana law, the Fourteenth Amendment (for pretrial detainees), and the Eighth Amendment (for convicted inmates). Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 28 U.S.C. §2201, and Indiana state law, the complaint sought class-certification, and declaratory relief, preliminary and injunctive relief requiring defendants to improve living conditions at the Grant County Jail; and costs and attorneys’ fees. On May 9, 2007, the judge assigned to the case, Judge Rudy Lozano, granted plaintiff's motion for class certification. The class was defined as all current and future prisoners of the facility. Judge Lozano also dismissed plaintiff’s state law claims, but left plaintiff’s constitutional claims open for further litigation. After slightly under a year, the parties notified the court of their intention to enter into a private settlement agreement on March 20, 2008. The judge to whom the case had been reassigned, Judge Joseph S. Van Bokkelen, approved the settlement agreement on July 30, 2008, after a fairness hearing and notification of the rest of plaintiff’s class. In the settlement agreement, the parties recognized that the Grant County Jail population had remained at or below its rated capacity for the last 90 days prior to the agreement. Going forwards, defendants agreed that if the population of the Grant County Jail exceeded a set amount for an agreed upon period, then they would take steps to notify interested parties (including plaintiffs’ counsel), and attempt to transfer Grant County inmates to other Indiana jails. Defendants also agreed to take other steps to keep down the Grant County Jail population, including limiting how many prisoners that they would accept from other Indiana jails and considering other locations to house low-security prisoners. Defendants further agreed to make a number of changes to improve living conditions in Grant County Jail, including a guarantee of least two hours of vigorous physical exercise a week, a guarantee of improved bedding in the event that Grant County ever exceeded its rated capacity, and additional corrections officers to better monitor inmates. Defendants also agreed to pay plaintiffs $7,500 in attorneys’ fees, and $2,570.12 in costs. The settlement agreement also included provisions to monitor and enforce Grant County’s compliance with its terms. Defendants agreed to provide plaintiffs’ counsel with a listing of the daily population in Grant County Jail every 30 days. The parties further agreed to file a joint report with the court every six months on the conditions at Grant County Jail, and on any changes or problems that may have arisen in the intervening period. As per the parties’ request, Judge Von Bokken agreed to keep the case open until December 31, 2012, to allow the parties to seek enforcement or modification of the agreement if needed. On January 4, 2013, Judge Bokkelen dismissed the case with prejudice. Over the 4 intervening years, the parties had periodically sent joint-status reports to the court, as per the terms of the agreement. Neither party ever moved to enforce or modify the agreement in court.

Summary: On January 19, 2007, a detainee of the Grant County Jail, located in Grant County, Indiana, brought an action for declearatory and injunctive releif in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Plaintiff argued that severe overcrowing at the Jail had resulted in conditions that violated the Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as Indiana Law. The case settled on March 20, 2008, with defendants agreeing to take steps to reduce population at the Jail and improve conditions.


COVID-19 Summary: An Illinois ballot initiative advocacy organization filed this case seeking injunctive relief requiring state and local officials to accept online signatures to authorize the addition of ballot referenda in light of public health measures adopted in response to COVID-19. <hr> The Committee for the Illinois Democracy Amendment (a ballot initiative organization) and several of its members filed this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on April 7, 2020. The complaint alleged that requiring the collection of in-person signatures to authorize ballot referenda during the COVID-19 public health emergency violated the plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They sought declaratory judgment as well as temporary and permanent injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued a group of state and local officials and members of the Illinois Board of Elections. The case was assigned to Judge Charles Norgle, Sr. Two days after filing the complaint, on April 9, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs requested an injunction requiring defendants to create an online forum for signing ballot referenda petitions so Illinois voters can participate in the democratic process while taking public health precautions. They also requested that the number of signatures required for the addition of ballot referenda under Article XIV and Article VII of the Illinois Constitution be reduced by 50%. The defendants filed a response to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on April 15, 2020. Around that time, several individual defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, lack of standing, and lack of jurisdiction. After a status hearing on April 17, the court denied the plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 27, 2020, adding a claim that contended that the Illinois state Constitution required uniform application of ballot access. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for reconsideration, but the court denied the motion shortly thereafter. 2020 WL 2526484. In an opinion written by Judge Rebecca Pallmeyer, the court expressed doubt about the plaintiffs' standing given that they had not demonstrated that their injury is traceable to any of the challenged actions by the defendant. Even if the plaintiffs had standing, Judge Pallmeyer thought it was unlikely that they would succeed on the merits given that the plaintiffs had sixteen months to circulate their petitions for signatures, extending well before the COVID pandemic began. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit, but on July 8 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. 964 F.3d 649. In a per curiam opinion, the Seventh Circuit also noted that the plaintiff failed to indicate interest in gathering signatures until a few weeks after the Governor of Illinois issued social-distancing orders. As such, the preliminary injunction was denied. On August 11, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims. The case is now closed.

Summary: An Illinois ballot initiative advocacy organization filed this case seeking injunctive relief to require state and local officials to accept online signatures to authorize the addition of ballot referenda in light of public health measures adopted in response to COVID-19. The district court denied granting a preliminary injunction, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.