COVID-19 summary: This is an action brought on March 24, 2020 by 13 immigration detainees in California, seeking release from ICE detention in light of the grave threat of infection. Six plaintiffs with underlying medical conditions were granted a TRO, and were later granted preliminary injunctive relief. <hr> On March 24, 2020, thirteen immigrants detained in California at the Mesa Verde Detention Center and at the Yuba County Jail sued ICE, alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment rights to substantive due process by subjecting them to a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees, declaratory judgment that the detention conditions posed an unreasonable risk of contracting illness, and a writ of habeas corpus for their immediate release or, in the alternative, injunctive relief ordering the plaintiff’s immediate release. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Maxine Chesney. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants cannot justify subjecting the plaintiffs to this increased risk of illness with any legitimate government objective, and therefore their detention violates their constitutional right to safety in government custody. Each of the plaintiffs’ age or underlying health conditions make them particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that their detainment with the general population without CDC-recommended “social distancing” practices increases their risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendants exacerbated the risk by conducting pre-dawn raids and adding new detainees to the facilities without quarantine. Other jails around the country, including multiple within California, have released prisoners in the interest of protecting individual and public health. Concurrently, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. They claimed that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim since the increased risk of COVID-19 contraction amounts to a punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. They contended that the court’s authority to order the plaintiffs’ release is the sole effective remedy for this constitutional violation since it is impossible to implement preventative measures like social distancing and frequent disinfection in the detention centers. They argued that the alleged violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights constitutes irreparable harm and also tips the balance of equities in their favor. The plaintiffs also argued that their release would support the broader public interest by reducing the health and economic burden on the surrounding community. Of the thirteen plaintiffs originally included in the suit, two were released and one was voluntarily dismissed. On April 8, 2020, Judge Chesney ruled on eight of the remaining ten petitioner's motion for temporary restraining order. 2020 WL 1701724. Adjudication of two plaintiffs was deferred in order for the parties to file additional relevant information. For the other eighth plaintiffs, Judge Chesney rejected the defendant's claim that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. Although the defendants argued that no plaintiffs were alleged to have contracted COVID-19, Judge Chesney found that the confined nature of the jail made the risk of contraction sufficient to support standing. Turning to the factors considered in a TRO motion, Judge Chesney found four plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claim because the record lacked evidence of a medical condition placing them at a higher risk for severe illness from COVID-19. Four other plaintiffs, however, were found to have met this standard. These plaintiffs had underlying medical conditions, such as asthma or diabetes, that put them at higher risk of severe illness given the inability to effectively social distance in the detention facility. Judge Chesney found that these detainment conditions were excessive to their purpose, and therefore the four plaintiffs with sufficient evidence supporting their medical conditions were found likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. For many of the same reasons, Judge Chesney found that these four plaintiffs likely to suffer irreparable harm if the TRO were not granted. The balance of hardships also tipped in the four plaintiffs' favor, and the "highly unusual circumstances" presented by the global pandemic supported a finding that the public interest was served by the TRO. Therefore, Judge Chesney granted the TRO for the four plaintiffs who presented sufficient evidence of underlying medical conditions elevating their risk of severe illness if they contracted COVID-19, and denied the TRO for the other four. Judge Chesney ordered the plaintiffs to be transported to an alternative residence and to remain their except to receive medical care, to appear at immigration court proceedings, or to obey an order issued by the Department of Homeland Security. In addition to these conditions, Judge Chesney added two more on April 13 as requested by the defendants. In addition to the conditions stated above, the released petitioners would also be subject to ICE's usual orders of release, and the petitioners would be subject to GPS monitoring if elected by ICE. For three of the petitioners denied relief in the April 8 order, plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration. The plaintiffs provided a declaration from a physician for each petitioner demonstrating that each had at least one health condition that placed them at an increased risk of contracting a severe illness if infected by COVID-19. On April 20, though, Judge Chesney denied the motion. She found that the evidence did not show that the medical records did not exist prior to the original motion, nor did it show that plaintiffs could not have obtained the evidence before filing their original motion. Therefore, Judge Chesney denied the motion for reconsideration without prejudice as to the filing of a motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 14, Judge Chesney granted the motion for TRO for the two deferred petitioners as well. 2020 WL 1866122. Those two plaintiffs presented evidence documenting their hypertension, a condition that the CDC had recognized as putting individuals at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19. Judge Chesney imposed the same conditions noted above on the release of these two petitioners as the other four. After granting the aforementioned TRO relief, Judge Chesney directed the respondents to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be ordered for the six petitioners. The respondents asserted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief, and argued that the increased provision of soap and cleaning supplies weighed against granting injunctive relief. The Court found that it had jurisdiction since the defendant (Acting Field Director for the San Francisco Field Office of ICE) was within the Court's territorial jurisdiction. The Court also determined that the additional sanitation measures may alleviate some of the concerns, but the plaintiffs' medical conditions still place them at an increased risk of contracting a severe illness if they were to be detained. Therefore, on March 7, the Court granted the preliminary injunctive relief. 2020 WL 2218965. The Court did not specify a date on which the injunction would expire. The defendants appealed the TRO relief to the Ninth Circuit on July 5, 2020. As of October 26, the case remains ongoing. The Ninth Circuit Court granted a motion by the appellants to voluntarily dismiss the appeal on November 18, 2020.

Summary: Thirteen ICE detainees in California--each with health conditions that place them at greater risk for COVID-19 harm--sued ICE and moved for a temporary restraining order seeking immediate release from detention. They argued that their health conditions, combined with the impossibility of social distancing and frequent disinfection in the detention center, make their continued detention a Due Process violation.


This case challenged President Trump's use of presidential emergency powers to allocate funds to build a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. On February 20, 2019, El Paso County of Texas and Border Network for Human Rights, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued President Trump and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Interior, and Treasury for unlawfully funding barriers at the U.S.-Mexico border. The plaintiffs, represented by The Protect Democracy Project, Niskanen Center, Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP, and others, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the defendants from taking any action under the President’s Proclamation of February 15, 2019, which declared a national emergency on the U.S.-Mexico border. Specifically, the complaint alleged that President Trump exerted power beyond constitutional and statutory limits by seeking to allocate funds for a border wall that Congress did not appropriate. On February 2019, Congress passed the 2019 Consolidated Appropriations Act, which allocated $1.375 billion in funding for fencing in specific locations along the southern border. President Trump then issued the Proclamation in order to access additional funds for the construction of a border wall under the National Emergencies Act (“NEA”), 50 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq., citing 10 U.S.C. § 2808, the military construction statute, as a funding source. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated the Constitution by usurping Congress' exclusive power to appropriate funds, the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 <i>et seq.</i>) by implementing the Proclamation in an arbitrary and capricious manner, and the NEA itself because no national emergency existed. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 25, 2019, which emphasized the plaintiffs' allegations that the Proclamation would harm El Paso County's tourism and economic development. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction. The defendants also filed a motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2019, claiming, among other things, that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to satisfy APA requirements for review of agency action. The court (Judge David Briones) granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, a preliminary injunction and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on October 11, 2019. The court determined that the plaintiffs had standing and the Proclamation was invalid as a matter of law; it also asked the plaintiffs to submit a proposal for injunctive relief. 408 F. Supp 3d 840. On December 10, 2019, Judge Briones granted a permanent injunction against the use of funds appropriated for “military construction” under 10 U.S.C. § 2808 for border wall construction. The Court also declared the Proclamation unlawful. 407 F. Supp. 3d 655. On the same day, the defendants filed a notice of appeal. The defendants filed a motion to stay the permanent injunction, pending appeal, on December 16, 2019. Judge Briones denied the motion the next day. This case is ongoing.

Summary: El Paso County of Texas and the Border Network for Human Rights, Inc. sued President Trump and the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Interior, and Treasury for unlawfully funding barriers at the U.S.-Mexico border. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the defendants from taking any action under the President’s Proclamation of February 15, 2019, which declared a national emergency on the U.S.-Mexico border, to transfer military funds to border wall construction. They claimed that reallocating the funds under the National Emergencies Act violated the Constitution, APA, and Act itself.


On September 7, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this action in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Eastern Engineered Wood Products (EEWP). The charging party (who had complained to the EEOC) was the Vice President of EEWP. The EEOC asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that the defendant's employees had engaged in sexual harassment and retaliation. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the charging party was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances from one of company's owners, and when he complained of sexual harassment, he was harassed by co-workers. Because of the hostile work environment, the Vice President was constructively discharged. On November 9, 2005, the court granted the former Vice President's motion to intervene in the suit. A separate action filed by the EEOC against EEWP on behalf of the company's former President, who was discharged after he investigated the discrimination claims discussed in the present action, was consolidated with this case on February 10, 2006 for trial purposes. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 24, 2006 as parties had reached a settlement agreement. The Consent Decree, which took effect on May 26, 2006, resolved both the case brought by the EEOC on behalf of the EEWP's former Vice President and the consolidated case brought on behalf of the EEWP's former President. The settlement stipulated that EEWP would be enjoined from violating Title VII and from retaliating against any person because of their cooperation with the EEOC's investigation. EEWP was also required to implement a sexual harassment and retaliation training program for its employees. EEWP's former President was awarded $1,900,000 and EEWP's former Vice President was awarded $1,200,000. The settlement term was two years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2008.

Summary: In September 2005, the EEOC filed this suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title VII against Eastern Engineered Wood Products (EEWP). The EEOC alleged that the co-owner of EEWP had sexually harassed the company's Vice President, who, due to the hostile work environment, was constructively discharged. This case was later consolidated with an action filed by the EEOC on behalf of EEWP's former President, who was discharged after he investigated the Vice President's sexual harassment complaints. In May 2006, the parties reached a settlement agreement. EEWP's former President was awarded $1,900,000 while EEWP's former Vice President was awarded $1,200,000.


On 09/26/1990, the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund (LDF) filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the Southern District of California under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), on behalf of more than 100 minority residents of Lynwood, a South-Central Los Angeles neighborhood. The suit sought monetary and injunctive relief and alleged that deputies of the Lynwood station of the LASD systematically engaged in racial abuse, beatings, unjustified shootings and other unlawful conduct. It further alleged that some of the Lynwood deputies were members of a neo-Nazi, white supremacist gang known as the "Vikings." In September 1991, federal district judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against the LASD and ordered that the LASD adhere to its own policies and guidelines regarding the use of force and searches, and submit copies of all reports alleging the use of excessive force by LASD deputies to the court for in camera on the first of every month. Judge Hatter stayed the injunction pending appeal by the LASD. On February 12, 1993 the court of appeals issued its amended opinion reversing the granting of the preliminary junction on the basis that it was overbroad in scope and not supported by the record, which contained unresolved factual disputes. Plaintiffs' claims proceeded to trial and after over three weeks of testimony, which included evidence regarding the Kolts Report, the jury returned a multi-million dollar verdict in favor of the plaintiffs. The case was settled post verdict for $6 million dollars payable to the plaintiffs, and the allocation of $1.5 million for use of force training by the LASD in accordance with the recommendations made by the Kolts Report. The court approved the class action settlement and directed that certain settlement documents be filed under seal. The court then terminated the case with prejudice on February 2, 2006. On June 14, 2006, Freddie Fuiava filed a motion to intervene in the case and sought to modify any protective order or stipulation entered. The district court denied that motion and Fuiava filed a notice of appeal. On May 16, 2008, the court of appeals vacated and remanded the district court's decision because the district court did not state a reason for its denial of the motion. Fuiava renewed his motion, but on February 11, 2009, the district court again denied the motion, finding that Fuiava's request was not relevant to his collateral litigation. Fuiava appealed again, and on April 30, 2010, the court of appeals again vacated and remanded the district court's decision. The court of appeals found that Fuiava's motion was moot, since the protective order's scope was smaller than Fuiava believed, and no modification was necessary.

Summary: In 1991 the NAACP Legal and Educational Defense Fund (LDF) filed a class action civil rights lawsuit in the Southern District of California under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 against the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), on behalf of more than 100 minority of a Los Angeles neighborhood. The NAACP LDF alleged that deputies of the Lynwood station of the LASD systematically engaged in racial abuse, beatings, unjustified shootings and other unlawful conduct. Plaintiffs won a jury verdict, but the parties later settled for $6 million dollars payable to the plaintiffs, and the allocation of $1.5 million for use of force training by the LASD in accordance with the recommendations made by the Kolts Report. The case was terminated in 2006, though there was litigation until 2010 regarding discovery of materials from this case.


This entry is a combination of two cases (Owino v. CoreCivic, Inc. and Gonzalez v. CoreCivic, Inc.), which have been effectively combined into one class action. Owino was filed by former immigration detainees on May 31, 2017 as a putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc. under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that CoreCivic had a practice of paying detainees at the Otay Mesa Detention Center only one dollar a day if they volunteered to perform certain jobs and services. The plaintiffs also alleged that, in other instances, CoreCivic forced detainees to perform various forms of manual labor for no compensation at all. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on August 11, 2017. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim under the TVPA for which relief could be granted, and alleged that the plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by federal law. Pending resolution of a motion to consolidate Gonzalez with Owino, the judge stayed proceedings on February 16, 2018 and deferred ruling on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In Gonzalez, immigration detainees sued CoreCivic on December 27, 2017 under the TVPA and state law, alleging substantially the same facts as the plaintiffs in Owino. The plaintiffs, represented by Al Otro Lado and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On January 22, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate the two cases due to legal and factual similarities between them. On February 23, 2018, the plaintiffs in Owino moved to intervene in order to oppose consolidation. The court granted the motion to intervene. On April 4, 2018, the court denied the Gonzalez plaintiffs’ motion to consolidate and stayed the case on grounds that the facts were duplicative of those alleged in Owino. Over a year later, the case is presumably still ongoing pending resolution in Owino. On May 14, 2018, the judge in Owino lifted the stay and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss in part, and granted it in part. The plaintiffs’ TVPA claim remained largely intact, and was dismissed only to the extent that it alleged violations of a particular amendment to the TVPA that occurred prior to the amendment’s enactment in December 2008. While the parties litigated various discovery issues, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on October 12, 2018, asserting additional claims of negligence and unjust enrichment against CoreCivic. On April 15, 2019, the plaintiff's requested to certify a class. On June 5, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on its claims under the California Labor Code. But on July 11, 2019, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. On April 1, 2020, Judge Janis Sammartino issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, denying the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and granting in part the motion for class certification. Judge Sammartino concluded that summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was inappropriate because class certification had not yet been granting and "the one-way intervention rule typically precludes a court from ruling on a merits-based motion before the class is certified and notified." Furthermore, Judge Sammartino denied the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings because defendant failed to assert its personal jurisdiction defense in its first responsive pleadings, thus waiving the right to that defense. Judge Sammartino granted certification to three classes: (1) The California Forced Labor Class, comprised of ICE detainees who were detained at a CoreCivic facility located in California after January 1, 2006 and cleaned areas of the facilities above and beyond personal housekeeping standards and performed such work under threat of discipline irrespective of whether the work was paid or unpaid; (2) The National Forced Labor Class, comprised of ICE detainees in CoreCivic facilities after December 23, 2008 who cleaned areas of the facilities above and beyond personal housekeeping standards and performed such work under threat of discipline irrespective of whether the work was paid or unpaid; and (3) The California Labor Law Class, "comprised of '[a]ll ICE detainees who (i) were detained at a CoreCivic facility located in California between May 31, 2013 and the present, and (ii) worked through CoreCivic's Voluntary Work Program during their period of detention in California." 2020 WL 1550218. The parties are to provide a joint status report by April 15. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In May 2017, former detainees at the Otay Mesa Detention Center filed this this class action lawsuit against CoreCivic, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been forced to work for $1 per day and sometimes for no pay at all. Plaintiffs in Gonzalez alleged similar facts, and the case was stayed pending resolution in Owino. In April 2020, the Court denied the plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment and the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The case is ongoing.


On May 29, 2019, a group of female Intelligence Analyst and Agent Trainees at the FBI’s Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves and a class of more than 125 female Agent and Analyst Trainees who had been subjected to similar gender-based harassment, discrimination, and retaliation. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of the United States in his official capacity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification, declaratory relief, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the FBI, its officers, agents, employees and successors, from engaging in the discriminatory employment practices against women. Additionally, they sought back pay, damages up to $300,000 for emotional distress for each member of the class, additional compensatory damages, and attorneys’ fees. The female Trainees accused the FBI of running the Training Academy as a “Good Old Boy Network.” The plaintiffs claimed that they had been sexually harassed, subjected to a hostile work environment and outdated gender stereotypes, terminated, constructively discharged, forced to resign under pressure (or perceived that continuing in the training would be a futile gesture), suffered retaliation, and/or suffered other types of harassment in whole or in part because of their gender since April 10, 2015. The plaintiffs alleged that these violations where magnified when the trainee was a woman of color or had a disability. The plaintiffs with disabilities claimed they were denied reasonable accommodations and publicly humiliated for their disability. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that the FBI discriminated against them on the basis of sex during training by issuing notations of violations for perceived practical skills deficiencies and subsequent review measures to female Agent and Analyst Trainees at a rate higher than their male counterparts. The plaintiffs further alleged that the training instructors assumed that male Trainees had better tactical instincts due to gender-based stereotypes and that female Trainees were often singled out in class because they were perceived as being weak and prone to failure. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged they received far more notations than their male counterparts who were not singled out. At the same time as the filing of the complaint, eleven of the sixteen plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed under pseudonyms for two reasons: first, the plaintiffs wanted to preserve their privacy due to the sensitive and highly personal nature of the allegations in the complaint and second, the plaintiffs feared a risk of retaliatory physical or emotional harm in their law enforcement work. On June 6, 2019, Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell granted in part and denied in part this motion. Chief Howell granted the motion to conceal the home addresses of the plaintiffs. However, Chief Howell denied the motion to proceed under pseudonyms because discrepancies between their original and amended complaint created confusion regarding which person would be associated with which pseudonym. Chief Howell further stated that the plaintiffs did not individually give sufficient proof that their privacy interests outweighed the public’s interest in disclosure. The plaintiffs filed for reconsideration, and on July 3, 2019, Chief Judge Howell permitted ten of the plaintiffs to proceed under pseudonyms due to the risks posed to their safety as well as the potential threat to their careers in law enforcement. 2019 WL 2870234. The case was then assigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson on July 8, 2019. The plaintiffs subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction for protection from FBI retaliation. They argued that since the filing of the lawsuit plaintiffs and witnesses faced explicit threats of termination and other retaliatory actions for involvement in the lawsuit. On September 10, 2019, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction because the retaliatory events were not included in the complaint. In response, on September 12, 2019, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include allegations of retaliation taken against one of the plaintiffs as a result of her involvement in the lawsuit in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and Rehabilitation Act. They also added requests to certify the proposed class and recognize Analyst Trainees and Agent Trainees as subclasses. Additionally, the amended complaint modified the requested relief. It removed the $300,000 cap on compensatory damages for each member of the class for emotional distress. The amended complaint included specific compensatory requests for four individuals in addition to the compensatory requests for the members of the class. On September 25, 2019, the plaintiffs once again moved for a preliminary injunction for protection from FBI retaliation. A hearing on the motion was held on December 23, 2019, with the court denying the motion on July 23, 2020. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction claiming that they lacked the jurisdiction to order the FBI to refrain from generally retaliating against plaintiffs and witnesses. The court held that plaintiffs were trying to enjoin FBI retaliation, not the action that the complaint alleged was unlawful--the sex discrimination that occurred during plaintiffs' FBI training. The court also denied the injunction request with regard to specific retaliation claims of one plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff had not established that they have a likelihood of success on the merits of that legal claim, nor had they demonstrated that the plaintiff in question was at imminent risk of irreparable harm. On January 31, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and, in response, the defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiffs again filed an amended complaint on March 16, 2020. The third amended complaint added an additional plaintiff and adjusted arguments accordingly. The defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the third amended complaint for a lack of jurisdiction on April 6, 2020. As of November 20, 2020, the motion to dismiss was pending. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In May of 2019, a group of female Intelligence Analyst and Agent Trainees at the FBI’s Training Academy in Quantico, Virginia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on behalf of themselves and a class of those similarly situated. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of the United States in his official capacity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They claimed that they had been sexually harassed, subjected to a hostile work environment and outdated gender stereotypes, terminated, constructively discharged, forced to resign under pressure (or perceived that continuing in the training would be a futile gesture), suffered retaliation, and/or suffered other types of harassment because of their gender since April 10, 2015. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction for protection from retaliation which was denied on July 23, 2020. Defendant filed a partial motion to dismiss the third amended complaint, which is still pending. This case is ongoing.


On February 4, 2015, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC), on behalf of its members, and an individual plaintiff, on behalf of herself and a proposed class of individuals with mobility disabilities, filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. Under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant, a hotel operator that allegedly failed to provide accessible transportation services to disabled guests, as required by the ADA. The requested class certification consisted of "individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned and/or operated by Sage because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at those hotels. The plaintiffs sought reasonable accommodation under the ADA though wheelchair-accessible transportation services equivalent to the transportation services provided to non-disabled guests at the defendant's hotels. The case was assigned to Judge Robert E. Blackburn and referred to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. This case was one of four class actions filed by CREEC against major hotel owner/operators (including RLJ Lodging Trust, Hospitality Properties Trust, and Ashford Hospitality Trust) for disability discrimination with respect to hotel shuttle transportation. On March 24, 2015, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that this case was one of four "cookie cutter" complaints filed by the plaintiff's counsel and that the complaint should fail for referencing the wrong entity as a defendant. Additionally, the defendants argued that the plaintiff's complaint was based on "pure speculation and guesswork," relied on conclusory allegations insufficient to establish any credible threat of immediate future harm, and did not plead a plausible basis for nationwide class relief. The judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, but granted one individual defendant's motion to dismiss himself as a named defendant from the case. 222 F.Supp.3d 934. The parties entered into a confidential settlement agreement, within which the defendant agreed to direct its hotel-operating subsidiaries to comply with the requirements of Title III of the ADA concerning transportation services. However, the parties could not agree on the amount to be awarded to the plaintiffs for reasonable attorney fees and costs. The court granted the plaintiffs 242,049.37 in attorneys fees and dismissed the case with retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The case was closed on March 26, 2018. The defendant was scheduled to pay the plaintiffs the required amount by April 20, 2018, but it never paid. Over the course of the following month, the plaintiffs made numerous unsuccessful attempts to obtain payment from the defendant. On May 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the court’s order for attorneys' fees. After the plaintiffs finally received the awarded amount on June 5, they withdrew their motion to enforce the order. The case remains closed.

Summary: This case was one of four class action lawsuits filed in 2015 by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, alleging that four major hotel owners and operators discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities in the provision of hotel shuttle transportation. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on February 4, 2015, under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, in which the defendant agreed to direct its hotel-operating subsidiaries to comply with the requirements of Title III of the ADA concerning transportation services.


On March 26, 2010, the ACLU filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus and class action complaint, representing several named plaintiffs with serious mental disorders or disabilities who had been detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and denied provision of legal counsel. The plaintiffs filed in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, against the federal Government. Many of the documents filed in this case are under seal or otherwise unavailable to the Clearinghouse, including the initial habeas petition. But a third amended complaint from October 25, 2011, is available and included in our collection. The third amended complaint lists the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, a collection of federal immigration laws, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as causes of action under which the suit was brought. The Third Amended Complaint alleged that the plaintiffs, due to their mental disabilities, were incompetent to defend themselves but had been forced to do so by the immigration courts. It alleged that many class members would be pushed through these proceedings without any comprehension of their meaning and then deported, regardless of whether they had been in the United States legally. The plaintiffs estimated that the size of the plaintiff class was at least several hundred individuals, and that two to five percent of all immigrant detainees would have a qualifying serious mental illness. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the Government had violated federal law, and injunctions ordering the Government to implement meaningful adequate competency evaluations for detainees where appropriate and ordering the appointment of counsel for individuals found to be incompetent to represent themselves. They also sought attorneys' fees under the fee-shifting provisions of the statutes under which the case was brought. Congress had mandated that immigration and deportation proceedings must be fundamentally fair and had directed the Attorney General to develop and promulgate meaningful safeguards for detainees lacking competence to represent themselves. The plaintiff alleged the Government had failed to do this, implementing no system to identify such individuals and failing to ensure fair hearings for mentally incompetent detainees. The complaint contended that the Government had not even established procedures defining competence or whether a person was mentally incompetent. No system was in place for assigning counsel to incompetent individuals. According to the complaint, the few regulations that had been established as "safeguards" were actually functioning as barriers to the appointment of counsel, making it easier to deport incompetent individuals without regard to their legal immigration status. One of the named plaintiffs, Mr. Franco-Gonzalez, who had been previously diagnosed with a moderate intellectual disability (characterized by an IQ between 35 and 55), was identified by the Government as incompetent in 2005, but was not provided with counsel. Instead, the Immigration Judge administratively closed his case because of his lack of counsel and his mental condition. The plaintiff remained in detention by the Government for four and a half years without a hearing. He was released three days after the lawsuit was filed, apparently in response to the filing, with the Government retaining the right to detain him again at will. The other named plaintiffs had all been diagnosed with schizophrenia or other mental conditions involving psychosis and included several lawful permanent residents of the United States. Most of these men were forced to represent themselves in immigration court despite their established mental health diagnoses and their symptoms of psychosis. Most or all of them never had their competency evaluated while their cases were before the immigration courts. The complaint argued that the Rehabilitation Act required the appointment of counsel and prompt custody hearings as a reasonable accommodation for disabled individuals who are discriminated against in regards to their access to immigration courts. It also argued that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution required the appointment of counsel for mentally incompetent individuals, because without counsel they could not have full and fair immigration hearings. They also argued that the same clause prevents prolonged detention without a custody hearing to determine whether detention is necessary. Prior to the filing of the third amended complaint described above, the court had already issued several rulings. On December 27, 2010, the court (Judge Dolly Gee) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, which enjoined the Government, pending the outcome of a trial on the merits of the case, from pursuing further immigration proceedings against the named plaintiffs unless they were first appointed qualified counsel. The court also ordered the release from detention of two of the named plaintiffs. 767 F.Supp.2d 1034 (C.D. Cal 2010). On May 4, 2011, and October 2, 2011, the court granted two additional preliminary injunctions, each in response to a motion filed by a named plaintiff, ordering the Government to either hold a bond hearing within 45 days to determine whether their ongoing detention was justified, or to release them from detention on conditions of supervision. The two men were released. 828 F.Supp.2d 1133 (C.D. Cal 2011). On November 21, 2011, the court granted class certification, allowing the suit to move forward as a class action. The court certified the following class and sub-classes:

Plaintiff Class: All individuals who are or will be in DHS custody for removal proceedings in California, Arizona, and Washington who have been identified by or to medical personnel, DHS, or an Immigration Judge, as having a serious mental disorder or defect that may render them incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings, and who presently lack counsel in their detention or removal proceedings.
Plaintiff Sub-Class 1: Individuals in the above-named Plaintiff Class who have a serious mental disorder or defect that renders them incompetent to represent themselves in detention or removal proceedings.
Plaintiff Sub-Class 2: Individuals in the above-named Plaintiff Class who have been detained for more than six months.
 On April 23, 2013, the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, finding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act required the Government to provide qualified representatives to represent class members in all aspects of their removal and detention proceedings. She also found that the Government was in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which forbids detentions longer than 180 days without a custody hearing. The court granted a permanent injunction requiring the Government to provide class members with counsel, and to provide timely custody hearings in accordance with the INA. The day prior to this ruling (but in response to this case), the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security announced a new nationwide policy to require that immigration detention facilities perform screenings for serious mental disorders or conditions where appropriate, and to ensure the availability of competency hearings and independent psychological and psychiatric examinations. Detainees found to be incompetent who are unrepresented by counsel will, by this new policy, be provided with qualified representation. On March 14, 2014, the parties reached a partial settlement agreement that dismissed causes of action six and seven (violation of the right to release under INA and the Due Process Clause, respectively). The court dismissed the remaining causes of action on September 25, 2015, when the parties reached a final settlement agreement. The settlement addressed individuals in Arizona, California, and Washington who had been given final orders of removal on or after November 21, 2011, and had qualifying mental conditions. It allowed them to file a motion to reopen their cases with the Board of Immigration Appeals or the Immigration Court. For individuals who had already been removed from the country, ICE agreed to assist their return to the United States by processing their paperwork, restoring their previous immigration status, and partially paying for their travel expenses. Additionally, on October 29, 2014, the court issued an order further implementing the permanent injunction, outlining the screening process that the Government needed to implement to identify individuals with serious mental disorders and assign them qualified representation. On October 8, 2015, the parties reached an agreement to pay $9,500,000 in attorneys' fees. During the following years, the parties and the court worked to ensure the injunctions and monitoring orders were being complied with. On April 30, 2018, the court confirmed that the monitoring period had ended, and terminated the monitoring. In that order, the court also included recommendations from a retained expert, Dr. Melissa Piasecki, regarding future opportunities for improvement. On April 2, 2019, the court issued an order awarding the plaintiffs $35,500 in attorneys' fees. This award was apportioned among the counsel organizations as follows: $29,978.90 for the ACLU of Southern California; $4,896.45 for the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project; and $624.65 for Public Counsel. On November 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for Order for Reopening Limited Discovery to Establish Non-Compliance with Court Orders, stating that there appears to be a pattern of violations of the court's comprehensive Immigration Plan Order issued five years ago. A few weeks later, the court agreed that good cause was shown in the parties' stipulation regarding the plaintiff's motion, and set a briefing schedule; the Government was to submit its response by November 20, 2019, and the plaintiffs' reply was due on November 27, 2019. Since then, the parties have consulted with one another to set schedule and terms for discovery; the schedule and terms were laid out on the joint status report filed on March 24, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2010, the ACLU filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus and class-action complaint, on behalf of plaintiffs with serious mental disorders or disabilities who had been or would be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and denied access to legal counsel. As of June 2020, the case is still ongoing. The court granted partial summary judgment, finding that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act required the Government to provide qualified representatives to represent Class members in all aspects of their removal and detention proceedings. It also found that the Government was in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which forbids detentions longer than 180 days without a custody hearing. The court granted a permanent injunction requiring the Government to provide class members with counsel, and to provide timely custody hearings in accordance with the INA. The parties reached a settlement to allow individuals who had been placed in detention proceedings on or after November 21, 2011, to reopen their cases. Defendants paid plaintiffs $9,500,000 in attorneys' fees. In 2018, the court terminated the monitoring. The case is still ongoing to determine attorney's fees.


COVID-19 Summary: 16 medically vulnerable noncitizens in immigration detention centers in Louisiana filed this case in light of the certainty of an outbreak of COVID-19 in their detention facilities. They argued that their continued detention was a violation of the Due Process Clause and the Rehabilitation Act, and sought immediate release. The court granted release of 14 detainees on May 22, 2020; the case is now closed.
 This case arose out of  earlier litigation. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On April 14, 2020, 16 medically vulnerable immigrant detainees in Louisiana filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Represented by the Loyola Law Clinic, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and private counsel, the petitioners sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officials and wardens of the detention centers under the federal habeas statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2241, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. The petitioners alleged that their continued detention violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause and the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, given their known medical risk and ICE's historical pattern of overcrowding and unsanitary facilities, continued detention for civil infractions was a potential death sentence. The plaintiffs sought immediate release, either through a writ of habeas corpus or an injunction, and a declaration that the continued civil detention of individuals at risk for severe illness violated the Due Process Clause or the Rehabilitation Act. The case was assigned to Judge Dee Drell and Magistrate Judge Joseph Perez-Montes. Simultaneously with the complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO), arguing that given the conditions of confinement in the detention facilities, it would be impossible for ICE or the detention facility to comply with CDC guidelines for social distancing. They stated that ICE officials at the facilities where plaintiffs were detained had provided them with little information about the pandemic, that detainees continued to be housed in open dorms and in close proximity to others, that detainees were not given consistent access to soap, and that staff did not wear masks or gloves. Plaintiffs argued that the imposition of these condition on medically vulnerable people amounted to deliberate indifference to their known medical risks. On April 30, 2020, Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes recommended that the plaintiffs' motion for a TRO be granted in part, recommending that the court issue a preliminary injunction that would require the immediate release of 13 of the 16 petitioners. The recommendation noted that one petitioner had already been released, so their request for release was moot. Additionally, he recommended the court not require any of the petitioners to post a bond or other security. On May 4, 2020, both parties filed objections to the April 30 recommendation of the magistrate judge. The petitioners argued for the release of the remaining two petitioners, while the respondents argued that the court lacked jurisdiction, the plaintiffs had not stated a constitutional violation or demonstrated irreparable harm, the public interest was not served by release, and that an order of release was not narrowly tailored. On May 22, 2020, the court adopted in part and denied in part the magistrate judge's recommendations. 2020 WL 2614616. Judge Drell ordered the release of 14 of the petitioners, including one petitioner who Magistrate Judge Perez-Montes had recommended not be released. The defendants were given 14 days to release the detainees. On June 8, 2020, the respondents appealed the court's May 22 order. On June 9, 2020, the respondents moved to withdraw the appeal, which was granted the next day. On June 23, the remaining petitioners filed an emergency motion to compel compliance and for immediate release. The court denied the motion on June 24 and on August 14, the court dismissed the suit, since all claims for relief sought had been considered and judgments on each claim had been rendered. The case is now closed.

Summary: 16 medically vulnerable people in immigration detention centers in Louisiana filed this suit against U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement. They alleged that the near-certainty of an outbreak of COVID-19 in these facilities made their continued detention a Due Process violation and sought immediate release. The court granted the release of 14 individuals on May 22, 2020 and the court dismissed the suit since all issues in the case had been considered and judgments on each had been rendered. The case is now closed.


On November 22, 2013, two women in a long term relationship filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the ACLU, and Lambda Legal, asked the Court to prohibit the County from enforcing the state marriage ban and to require the County to issue them a marriage license. The plaintiffs contended that failure to do so would constitute a violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of the United States Constitution. One of the plaintiffs suffers from terminal breast cancer and she and her longtime partner wish to be married in Illinois before she passes away. An immediate injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Illinois marriage ban would be the only way to ensure that plaintiffs' hope of being legally married would be realized during their lifetimes. Although the Illinois legislature enacted a law that would allow same-sex couples to marry, that law was not scheduled to go into effect until June 1, 2014 (about six months after the complaint was filed). The plaintiffs feared that the terminally ill plaintiff would not live until the expiration of the marriage ban and asked the court to prohibit the County from enforcing the marriage ban in their specific case. On December 5, 2013, Judge Thomas Durkin issued an opinion granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The Court found that given the compelling circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's medical condition and her potentially imminent death, the injury she and her partner would suffer by denying injunctive relief would be irreparably great. The court noted that the relief granted was limited and extended no further than to the specific plaintiffs. The Court ultimately ordered the County not to enforce the marriage ban and to issue the plaintiffs a marriage license. 2013 WL 6355918, __ F. Supp. 2d __ (N.D. Ill. 2013).

Summary: In November 2013, two women in a long term relationship brought a suit challenging the Illinois marriage ban. One plaintiff was terminally ill and the couple feared they would not be able to legally marry before the expiration of the marriage ban. The Court granted injunctive relief and mandated that the County issue the plaintiffs a marriage license.


On July 8th, 2004, several firefighters employed by the City of New Haven filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 against the mayor and other governmental workers. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees, claiming that they were unfairly discriminated against because of their race and political affiliations. Specifically the plaintiffs alleged that, while employed as firefighters for the City of New Haven, the defendants conspired to promote employees of other minority races over the plaintiffs. On September 29, 2006, the Court (Judge Janet Bond Arterton) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 554 F.Supp.2d 142. On February 15, 2008, the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. That order was reversed and remanded by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 29, 2009. On August 1, 2011 the Court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff.

Summary: In a suit against the City of New Haven's Mayor and various city officials, several firefighters claimed discrimination based on race and political affiliations when they were denied promotions that they alleged they meritoriously deserved. Trial court entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded, and upon remand, one plaintiff firefighter prevailed.


On March 7, 2002, a local Fair Housing Council and tenants sued the owners and managers of an apartment complex under the Fair Housing Act in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, after some tenants were evicted due to the behavior of their children. On September 16, 2002, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, alleging that the defendants' curfew policy for individuals under age 18 constituted discrimination based on familial status in violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 3601 et seq. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. > On May 27, 2003, in an unpublished order, the Court denied the defendants motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to liability. On October 24, 2003, the plaintiffs accepted the defendants' offers to settle, although the settlement agreement is not publicly available. On November 24, 2003, the court dismissed the case by stipulation.

Summary: Tenants sued the owners and managers of an apartment complex for violation of the Fair Housing Act's prohibition against discrimination against persons based on familial status. The parties reached a settlement agreement, although it is not publicly available.


On August 18, 2003, several employees of Valley Hospitality Services filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged race and age discrimination by the defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they were discharged for being African-American and for being over the age of forty, claiming that defendant, as a result, violated 42 U.S.C. 1981, the Age Discrimination Employment Act (29 U.S.C. 623), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.). The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief. The case was transferred to the Middle District of Georgia for the convenience of the parties. On June 10, 2004, the Court dismissed the Title VII class action claims because they were not included in the original charge to the EEOC. The Court also dismissed one of the plaintiff's ADEA claims. On April 25, 2005, the Court granted the defendant's motions for summary judgment as to all of plaintiffs' claims except as to one plaintiff's individual disparate treatment claims, stating that it was the only one that alleged enough facts to suggest discrimination. The Court held that the other plaintiffs did not have a prima facie case, and ordered them to pay court costs to the defendant. Both parties appealed this decision. On January 4, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's dismissal and, findng that the one remaining plaintiff did not make a prima facie case for hiring discrimination, overturned the District Court and granted summary judgment to the defendant. Later that year, the Court issued a notice of filing settlement and payment by the plaintiffs of $3,500 to defendants as payment in full.

Summary: In 2003, several employees brought suit in the Middle District of Georgia against Valley Hospitality Services, alleging that they were fired on the basis of their race and age. After amending the complaint to add a plaintiff as well as a class of plaintiffs, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed all but one plaintiff's claims. The defendant appealed this decision, and on January 4, 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision so as to dismiss all of the plaintiffs' claims and ordering the plaintiffs to pay court costs to the defendant - plaintiff paid $3,500 to the defendant.


On January 28, 2003, seventeen current and former female inmates at the New York State Department of Correctional Services filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against two classes of defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the prison correctional staff engaged in repeated acts of sexual abuse and harassment against female inmates in New York state prisons. These alleged acts ranged in severity from verbal harassment to unwanted touching to coerced sexual intercourse to forcible rape. Further, plaintiffs alleged that the supervisory staff was aware of the sexual misconduct of the correctional staff but failed to stop it. The inmates, represented by counsel from the Prisoner's Rights Project as well as by private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment that the policies, practices, actions, and omissions of the supervisory staff violated their constitutional rights protected under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction enjoining the supervisory staff from subjecting the female inmates to the sexual misconduct of the correctional staff, and they requested an order compelling the defendants to formulate a plan to end this abuse. Plaintiffs also sought damages. Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and a request for entry of default judgment. Additionally, both sets of defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. On September 13, 2005, the District Court (Judge Kevin Duffy) dismissed, for lack of standing, the claims for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment of plaintiffs who had been released from custody. The Court also ordered the parties to address whether plaintiffs' individual claims for damages were properly joined with one another and with the class claims for injunctive relief. Amador v. Dep't of Correctional Serv., No. 1:03CV650, 2005 U.S. Dist. WL 2234050 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2005). On December 4, 2007, Judge Duffy dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims, with the exception of the claims of plaintiff Shenyell Smith against Delroy Thorpe, for failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. In addition, Judge Duffy held that two of the plaintiff's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief had become moot, as they had both since been released. The Court also denied the motion for class certification. Amador v. Superintendents of Dept. of Correctional Services, 2007 WL 4326747 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 04, 2007). On April 23, 2008, the plaintiffs appealed this decision. Regarding the claims of Shenyell Smith against defendant Thorpe, on June 10, 2010, Judge Duffy granted Shenyell Smith's motion for summary judgment. Officer Hudson had the opportunity to offer evidence contesting Smith's allegations that he violated her Eighth Amendment rights when he forcibly sodomized her on two separate occasion, but chose not to do so. On December 6, 2010, Judge Duffy granted defendant Thorpe's motion to sever the claims asserted against him from all other plaintiffs, as well as defendants Smith and Gilbert's for severance to transfer the case to the Western District of New York. Regarding the appeal, on August 19, 2011, Judge Ralph K. Winter of the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that three appellants had exhausted administrative remedies while the remaining ten had not. In addition, Judge Winter held that it was error for the district court to dismiss as moot the claims of the three individual plaintiffs even though they had been released from prison after the filing of the amended complaint. As a result, Judge Winter vacated the judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings for those three defendants. 655 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2011). On July 26, 2012, plaintiff Shenyell Smith settled all of her claims against the defendants, who agreed to pay a total of $15,000 to Smith's attorney. September 13, 2010 plaintiff Shantelle Smith moved to voluntarily dismiss all of her claims with prejudice because she reached a settlement with the Supervisory Defendants, the State of New York, and defendant James Hudson for all of her claims in this action and all claims she asserted against the State of New York in the New York Court of Claims, Claim No. 110268. The terms of the agreed settlement were set forth on March 27, 2012, and so ordered by Judge Scuccimarra in the New York Court of Claims, Claim No. 110268. On July 1, 2015 the sole remaining plaintiff in this case, plaintiff Stephanie Dawson, reached a settlement agreement with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. In the settlement none of the defendants admitted fault or liability. Plaintiff Stephanie Dawson settled with the defendants for the amount of $10,000.

Summary: On January 28, 2003, current and former female inmates in New York prisons filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against prison correctional staff and prison supervisors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for sexually abusing and harassing the inmates. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. Judge Kevin Duffy dismissed all claims for lack of standing and failure to exhaust administrative remedies, with the exception of the claims of plaintiff Shenyell Smith against Delroy Thorpe. On April 23, 2008, the plaintiffs appealed this decision. Regarding the claims of Shenyell Smith against defendant Thorpe, on June 10, 2010, Judge Duffy granted Shenyell Smith's motion for summary judgment. Regarding the appeal, on August 19, 2011, Judge Ralph K. Winter of the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, held that three appellants had exhausted administrative remedies while the remaining ten had not. In addition, Judge Winter held that it was error for the district court to dismiss as moot the claims of the three individual plaintiffs even though they had been released from prison after the filing of the amended complaint. As a result, Judge Winter vacated the judgment in part and remanded for further proceedings for those three defendants. On July 26, 2012, plaintiff Shenyell Smith settled all of her claims against the defendants, who agreed to pay a total of $15,000 to Smith's attorney. On September 13, 2010 plaintiff Shantelle Smith settled all of her claims against the defendants through a separate action in the New York Court of Claims, Claim No. 110268.


On March 3, 2015, two women affected by various disabilities filed this lawsuit in the District Court of Colorado under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601. The plaintiffs sued Katchen and Company, a real estate management company. The plaintiffs, represented by legal services counsel, asked the court for a declaration that Katchen had violated the Federal Housing Act and appropriate equitable relief, claiming that Katchen had discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of their respective disabilities. Both plaintiffs had rented apartments from Katchen, only to be threatened with eviction because of their use of service dogs. Both plaintiffs suffered from various physical and mental disabilities, including post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, severe diabetes, fibromyalgia and bipolar disorder. Upon renting from Katchen, both had supplied requested documentation concerning their service animals. Months after they had occupied their respective apartments, the plaintiffs each received a "Notice to Quite for Substantial Violation," citing the building's policy against pets. On April 30, 2015, both parties filed a notice of settlement. On June 1, 2015, the Court (Judge R. Brooke Jackson) dismissed the case, ordering each party to pay their own attorney's fees. Under the settlement, both plaintiffs were allowed to remain in their apartments with their service animals, without threat of future eviction. The settlement is confidential.

Summary: In 2015, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Katchen and Company, a private real estate management company, for violating the Fair Housing Act. Both plaintiffs suffered from various disabilities, and had been threatened with eviction for living with service animals in their apartments. The case settled, with both plaintiffs remaining in their apartments with their service animals.


This is one of several federal lawsuits addressing North Carolina Session Law 2016-3, House Bill 2 (HB2), which was passed on March 23, 2016. For the others, see the case collection. On May 9, 2016, North Carolina Governor Patrick McCrory and the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, filed this complaint in the Eastern District of North Carolina against the Attorney General of the United States, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Education. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgement that NC House Bill 2 (known as “HB2”) did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act or the Violence Against Women Act. HB2 required individuals to use the bathroom and changing facilities that corresponded to the biological sex listed on their birth certificates while in government buildings. It also prohibited municipalities in North Carolina from enacting anti-discrimination policies and removed the common-law and statutory right of action to enforce state anti-discrimination statutes in state courts. This action was brought shortly after the plaintiff received a letter from the Justice Department, dated May 4, 2016, informing him that HB2 violated federal law. The letter stated that HB2 specifically violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, which forbids sex discrimination in employment; Title IX of the Educational Amendments Act of 1972, which forbids sex discrimination in education; and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 (“VAWA”). The letter requested the plaintiff respond, stating he would remedy the violation and confirm that North Carolina would implement HB2. His response was due on May 9, 2016. In lieu of a response, this suit seeking declaratory judgement was filed. That same day, the United States filed suit in the Middle District of North Carolina, naming Governor McCrory, the North Carolina Department of Public Safety, and the University of North Carolina and its Board of Governor as defendants. This complaint requested a declaratory judgment that HB2 was discriminatory under Title VII, VAWA, and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. In his complaint, the plaintiff argued that transgendered individuals weren’t a protected class under Title VII. In the alternative, even if the VAWA included gender identity as a protected class, he argued that HB2 wasn’t discriminatory, as it allowed accommodations for special circumstances that would include accommodations for transgender individuals. For context, many people who identify as transgender either cannot afford or do not want to undergo sex reassignment surgery. In North Carolina, only those who undergo sex reassignment surgery can change the biological sex written on their birth certificates. At the time of HB2, the state legislation had changed the definition of sex in the state's anti-discrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate.” This limited definition of sex prevented transgendered North Carolinians from being legally viewed as a class of people vulnerable to sex discrimination. On February 22, 2016, the Charlotte City Council had passed Ordinance 7056, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity in public accommodations, passenger vehicles for hire, and city contractors. Trans citizens would be protected from discrimination under this ordinance. The ordinance was set to take effect on April 1, 2016. HB2 was passed and signed by the Governor between the passage of Ordinance 7056 and its intended date of effect. HB2’s passage meant that Charlotte’s city ordinance could not go into effect and that future municipal ordinances designed to protect trans citizens would also be prohibited from overriding state law. In this case, on May 17, the plaintiff asked the court to transfer the case to the Middle District of North Carolina, where cases challenging HB2 had been filed by the ACLU and the DOJ. Those cases were Carcano v. McCrory and United States v. State of North Carolina. The court denied this motion to transfer on June 7, 2016, citing the rules of federal procedure and the case proceeded. Two other cases were brought in this district by private parties against the DOJ on the same topic—Berger v. United States Department of Justice and North Carolinians for Privacy v. United States Department of Justice. The plaintiffs in these related cases, seeking to uphold the legal validity of HB2, filed motions for consolidation with this case, on May 23 and May 24, respectively. On June 13, Judge Terrence Boyle issued an order indicating that he would allow this case to be consolidated with Berger and, on June 29, the court also ordered North Carolinians for Privacy consolidated. This latter consolidation was done after the plaintiff wrote in opposition to North Carolinians for Privacy consolidation with his. In his opposition, the plaintiff argued that their complaint dealt with Title IX, which pertained to the use of sex-segregated facilities by transgender students, which the plaintiffs claimed violated the constitutional rights of parents and children. In his opposition, the plaintiff opposed consolidation, arguing that his complaint was focused on the validity of HB2 as it pertained to changing facilities and restroom use in government facilities. On September 16, 2016, plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of their claims, without prejudice, as to all defendants. In their notice of dismissal, they argued that the claims made in this lawsuit were now being asserted as counterclaims in the lawsuit brought by the United States in the Middle District Court of North Carolina. This counterclaim, the plaintiffs argued, also sought a declaratory judgement on the validity of HB2 and would sufficiently protect the State’s interest. The case is now closed.

Summary: After North Carolina passed a bill called HB2, which restricts the rights of transgender individuals to access public restrooms and changing facilities that are in accordance with their gender identities, the U.S. DOJ informed Governor Pat McCRoy of North Carolina that it considered the law in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, Title IX of the Education Amendment, and the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA). The DOJ asked Governor McCroy to indicate that he wouldn't enforce the law, but he declined to do so, and instead brought suit against the DOJ in the Eastern District Court of North Carolina asking to court for declaratory relief against the DOJ.


On January 21, 2005, the EEOC filed this sexual harassment and retaliation case against a New Orleans auto parts company. The claimant, who intervened, had complained to her Human Resources director that she was sexually harassed by her immediate supervisor, and by one of his subordinate employees. The harassment included innappropriate sexual statements, requests for dates, offers of money in exchange for sexual favors and innapropriate touching. As a result of her complaints, the employer transferred Ms. Harris to a less desirable work location. After the Court denied the EEOC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the parties entered a Consent Decree which required the defendant to pay the employee $75,000.00 and prohibited the Defendant from engaging in discrimination based on sex and retaliation for complaints of such discrimination. The employer agreed to provide the EEOC with three written reports at six-month intervals setting forth all complaints of harassment at its New Orleans facility and describing and documenting its responses to those complaints. The Defendant futher agreed to fire the two men who were the subjects of the complaints and to put in place mechanisms to assure that neither of them will ever be hired by the Defendant to work in any capacity ever again. The Consent Decree also required the Defendant to provide non-discrimination training for all its supervisory and managerial employees and to review its policies concerning sexual harassment and retaliation one year from entry of the Order to determine if any changes are warranted and, if so, to make those changes.

Summary: This sex harassment and retaliation case was brought by the EEOC against a New Orleans auto parts company on behalf of a female employee. The case was resolved by Consent Decree in November 2006 and requires anti-discrimination training, policy review, three six-month reports, and firing of the individual harassers as well as $75,000.00 in damages.


COVID-19 Summary: 1,600-plus detainees at the D.C. jail and its adjacent custodial treatment facility sought immediate relief due to the risk of COVID-19. The plaintiffs seek the release of nearly 100 individuals sentenced for misdemeanors, immediate appointment of an expert to recommend further releases, and the implementation of 18 precautionary measures in the D.C. Jail. On June 18, the district court granted the preliminary injunction in part but refused to order releases. On July 16, the defendants moved to vacate the preliminary injunction, which the court denied on January 26. The defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit. <hr> In the final week of March 2020, the District of Columbia Department of Corrections (“DOC”) announced five COVID-19 cases from different units in its facilities. On March 30, 2020, individuals detained in D.C. jails filed this class action lawsuit on behalf of all such individuals in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the ACLU-DC and the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, the plaintiffs challenged the DOC's response to the COVID-19 outbreak in the D.C. jail and sought immediate relief for all 1,600-plus individuals housed there. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 2241, and 2201, alleging that these conditions violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishment," and the plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Among other allegations, the plaintiffs claimed that the DOC failed to provide soap or hand sanitizers for residents to clean hands, denied COVID-19 tests to residents with symptoms, and withheld adequate cleaning supplies. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, injunctive relief, and/or writs of habeas corpus. In particular, the plaintiffs requested that the Court order the DOC to exercise its authority under the D.C. Council’s COVID-19 Response Emergency Amendment Act of 2020 to release individuals sentenced for misdemeanors, who number nearly 100. They asked the Court to immediately appoint an expert, require the defendants to immediately implement 18 new procedures that would bring the DOC in compliance with expert guidance, and appoint an independent monitor to ensure such compliance. At the same time as the filing of the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. On April 1, 2020, the court issued a minute order requiring the defendants to provide a list of the names of the approximately 94 persons who had been sentenced to misdemeanors and who defendants were considering for release; the number of people who had been tested for COVID-19 and a break-down of the identities of those individuals (such as inmates, visitors, etc.) and the results of those tests; the date on which defendants began testing people coming into the jails; the number and a breakdown of the results of COVID-19 tests which had been done on those who were incarcerated prior to the date on which defendants began testing all incoming inmates; all relevant written procedures and practices concerning COVID-19; and the process that was or would be put in place to allow legal counsel to communicate with their clients electronically or by other means. On April 19, 2020, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and suffer irreparable harm, but did not grant the totality of the relief requested. Specifically, the court did not order the release of any persons currently detained in DOC facilities. Instead, it ordered the defendants to ensure that the triage process associated with sick call requests on the non-quarantine units was expedited and reflected appropriate sensitivity to the wide variety of symptoms associated with COVID-19. The court also ordered the defendants to implement additional procedures and safeguards to follow medical recommendations, including social distancing practices, personal protective equipment distribution, and staff training. During a teleconference on April 22, 2020, Plaintiffs indicated that they requested release of individuals under only the federal habeas statute, not under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On April 15, 2020, the defendants moved to join the United States as a necessary party to the litigation. The United States also requested joinder, arguing that it had an interest in this case due to the potential for the release of persons who were under the authority of the United States Attorney General’s office. On May 1, 2020, the court granted the defendants' motion for joinder but with a limited interest in issues involving the release of persons under the plaintiffs' claims for writs of habeas corpus. On May 15, the plaintiffs submitted an amended motion for preliminary injunction, as the number of positive COVID-19 cases increased from 5 to 180 since the initial motion. The plaintiffs claimed that although nearly a month has passed since the court's TRO, conditions remained substantially unchanged. The Fraternal Order of Police for the District of Columbia Department of Corrections Labor Committee submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs on June 8. On June 18, the district court granted the preliminary injunction in part, ordering the defendants to provide a detailed plan for the review and possible reduction of the DOC population by July 1. They further ordered the defendants to implement a medical care system that ensured care within 24 hours, social distancing, proper sanitation, non-punitive isolation, access to confidential legal calls, and increased testing for COVID-19. The court declined to appoint an expert or release detainees. On July 16, the defendants filed a motion to alter and vacate the preliminary injunction, claiming that injunctive relief was no longer warranted as there had been no positive cases at the facilities since June 15, and conditions had been improved by the DOJ, curtailing the risks of COVID-19. The same day, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-5216 and was held in abeyance pending the district court's decision. The plaintiffs opposed the defendants' motion to alter and vacate the preliminary injunction on August 14, arguing that there are additional positive cases and that expert opinion concludes that it is “gravely misguided and dangerous for the D.C. Jail to claim to have ‘halted’ or ‘stopped’ the spread of COVID-19.” In September and October, the court ordered for <i>amici curiae<i> to provide oral reports to the judge on November 9 and file by written reports by December 11. In light of <i>amicus curiae<i> to be filed, the plaintiffs moved to file a supplemental brief in response to defendants' motion. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion and ordered both parties to file supplemental briefs by December 18. On January 26, 2021, the Court denied the defendants' motion to alter and vacate the preliminary injunction. 2021 WL 260112. In its opinion, the court noted appreciation for the defendants' efforts to improve facility conditions, but stated that the defendants "have not established a significant or controlling change" in sick call, social distancing, health and environmental safety procedures, confidential legal calls, and testing procedures. The court further noted that "many of these improvements appear to be in response to the issues raised in earlier TRO and PI proceedings." On February 3, the defendants filed a second notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit Court and the appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 21-5033. On February 19, the two appeals (20-5216 and 21-5033) were consolidated. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 30, 2020, detainees in D.C. jails filed this lawsuit on behalf of all the detainees in D.C. jails in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought immediate relief for 1,600-plus detainees at the D.C. jail and its adjacent custodial treatment facility in light of the COVID-19 outbreak. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested the immediate release of individuals sentenced for misdemeanors, who number nearly 100, immediate appointment of an expert to recommend further releases, and the implementation of 18 precautionary measures in the D.C. Jail. On June 18, the district court granted in part the preliminary injunction and ordered defendants to provide a detailed plan for the review and possible reductions of the DOC population by July 1. On June 18, the district court granted the preliminary injunction in part but refused to order releases. On July 16, the defendants moved to vacate the preliminary injunction, which the court denied on January 26. The defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit.


On April 12, 2006, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York ("ADC") filed this lawsuit under the False Claims Act against Westchester County in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. In False Claims Act cases, sometimes called "qui tam" actions, the private instigator of the case is called the "relator"; the plaintiff is the United States, and the relator seeks damages because of harm caused to the United States; by statute, those damages go mostly the federal government with the relator keeping a share. Represented by the law firm Relman & Dane, ADC asked the Court for monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that Westchester County, in violation of the False Claims Act, falsely certified that it was in compliance with certain provisions of the Fair Housing and Community Development Acts, resulting in over $45 million in damages to the United States. As normally occurs in False Claims Act cases, the complaint was filed under seal, to give the U.S. time to review it and decide whether to join in the litigation. This was the first case ever in which fair housing litigation was conducted via a False Claims Act case. The U.S. initially declined to intervene, and the complaint was unsealed and served on Westchester in January 2007. ADC claimed that between 2000 and 2006, the County falsely certified that the County had affirmatively furthered fair housing. The suit alleged that the County failed to analyze impediments to fair housing choice based on race or municipal resistance, and chose not to take appropriate steps to overcome such impediments. The County moved to dismiss, but the Court (Judge Denise L. Cote) rejected that motion in July 2007. 495 F.Supp.2d 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). After discovery, in February 2009, Judge Cote granted partial summary judgment for ADC, 668 F.Supp.2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The Court found that the County had not analyzed the racial impact of various practices as it claimed it had, and had thereby submitted false certifications to the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). Since the County had submitted false certifications to receive approximately $52 million from HUD, it was liable for over $150 million in damages pursuant to the treble damages provision of the FCA. A trial was scheduled to determine whether the violation had been willful. In April 2009 (under the new Obama administration) the U.S reconsidered its decision not to intervene and elected to proceed with this action, filing its own complaint on August 10, 2009. The Government's complaint alleged violations of the FCA and of the Housing and Community Development Act. Simultaneously, the Government submitted an executed settlement of the litigation, agreeable to all parties. Under the settlement, the County agreed to spend $52 million to develop new affordable housing in white municipalities of the County, and also to pay $7.5 million as a relator's share to the ADC, and $2.5 million in attorney's fees. In addition, the settlement required Westchester to: 1) adopt as its policy the elimination of residential segregation, and to implement the settlement in a way that develops housing on those Census blocks that currently have the lowest concentrations of African‐Americans and Latinos, 2) take legal action against resistant municipalities where needed to fulfill the affirmatively furthering fair housing purposes of the settlement, and 3) conduct a new analysis of impediments to fair housing choice that examines barriers based on race or on municipal resistance. The agreement included penalty provisions for non‐compliance. In addition, performance of the obligations was to be done by an independent monitor, and the parties agreed that the Court would retain jurisdiction over the case. Specific remedial plans were to be implemented through 2016. On July 13, 2011, HUD notified the County that it had failed to meet a consent decree requirement when the County Executive vetoed legislation to incorporate corrective actions to promote source-of-income legislation and plans to overcome exclusionary zoning practices. On November 17, 2011, the Monitor submitted a report stating that the County breached its obligation in the consent decree. The County formally objected to this determination on December 7, 2011. Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein sustained the County's objection, concluding that it did not violate its duty to promote source-of-income legislation. The U.S. then filed an objection with the district court, seeking review of the Magistrate Judge's decision. On May 3, 2012, Judge Cote overruled the Magistrate Judge's opinion, and adopted all sections of the Monitor's original report. 2012 WL 1574819 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On May 15, 2012, the County filed a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of Appeals. Defendant moved for a stay during appeal, but Judge Cote denied that motion on May 17, 2012. On May 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals (Judge Rosemary S. Pooler) affirmed the District Court decision, agreeing that the County violated the terms of the consent decree, and allowing the full adoption of the Monitor's Report. 712 F.3d 761 (2nd Cir. 2013). Over the next several years, the monitor found instances of noncompliance, which were addressed in court. In particular, the monitor found that the county breached § 33(c) by not timely creating, funding, and implementing sufficient public information campaigns to "broaden support for fair housing and to promote the fair and equitable distribution of affordable housing in all communities, including public outreach specifically addressing the benefits of mixed-income housing and racially and ethnically integrated communities." The monitor found these breaches to be in bad faith. The court contended that as a result of this breach, the county hindered itself from meeting one of its chief settlement obligations - ensuring the development of at least 750 new affordable housing units. On June 27, 2016, the court ordered the release of videotapes of depositions taken from County officials in 2015 in response to this noncompliance, and that the tapes be made available to the public. The County appealed the order, but the Second Circuit affirmed the order on March 10, 2017. The monitor also found the County to be in noncompliance with § 32 of the Settlement, which required it to complete "an analysis of impediments to fair housing choice within its jurisdiction (AI)." Accordingly, on July 18, 2016, the court ordered the County to "retain a consultant to prepare an AI that is acceptable to HUD." The County appealed this order as well, but the Second Circuit again affirmed the district court's decision on June 21, 2017. 689 F. App'x 71 (2d Cir. 2017). However, according to a news article on July 14, 2017 the Trump Administration HUD accepted a version of the county's AI that the county legislature's majority leader described as "essentially the same" as the previous version which had been rejected by HUD the year prior. Since the settlement required the County to take actions only through 2016, after HUD's position changed, there were no more issues remaining in the case. On November 20, 2017, the defendants submitted their final monthly status report and there has been no substantive docket activity since November 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Anti-Discrimination Center of Metro New York ("ADC") filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under the False Claim Act against Westchester County, alleging that they falsely certified that it was in compliance with certain provisions of the Fair Housing and Community Development Acts. In April 2009, the United Stated intervened in the lawsuit, which led to a settlement submitted on August 10, 2009, in which the County agreed to spend $52 million in development efforts, $7.5 million to ADC, and anti-discrimination policy changes.


On June 2, 2014, a private individual filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the National Security Agency under the Declaratory Judgment Act and FISA Title V. The plaintiff alleged violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights and requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that both metadata and content of his Gmail, Facebook, and Dropbox accounts were compromised under the PRISM program as revealed in the documents leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden to The Guardian in an article published on June 6, 2013. On December 11, 2014, the NSA filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and the plaintiff failed in any event to state claims on which relief may be granted. On January 7, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction with the District Court, requesting that the court bar the NSA from continuing to collect the plaintiff's metadata and content, direct the NSA to destroy the plaintiff's data, and prohibit the NSA from querying the data currently in its possession. On January 8, 2015, Judge Cathy Bisson denied the plaintiff's motion because of the plaintiff's inability to establish sufficient imminent and irreparable harm. The District Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss on September 30, 2015. 2015 WL 5732117. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the case on October 5, 2016, finding that the injuries allegedly sustained by the plaintiff were sufficiently personal to support standing, and that his claim was sufficiently plausible to proceed. Schuchardt v. President of the United States, 839 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2016). A private third party moved to intervene in the case on December 13, 2016, and Judge Bisson denied his motion as frivolous on December 27. The third party appealed on January 27, 2017. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for failure to pay the filing fee on February 23, 2017. On March 15, 2017, the defendants filed a renewed motion to dismiss. The case was administratively closed from March 16, 2017 through July 6, 2017, on the grounds that plaintiff was given an extended amount of time to respond to the motion to dismiss. The plaintiff filed their opposition on July 10. The defendants filed their reply on August 16, 2017. During this time, The Third Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the appeal of the third party to be reopened, and then dismissed the third party's case on September 6, 2017 for failure to pay the filing fee for the notice of appeal. On February 4, 2019, the court granted the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss, noting that “they have shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the government did not engage in dragnet-type collection activity . . . thereby establishing a plausible claim that Plaintiff’s data was captured.” 2019 WL 426482. The plaintiffs appealed to the Third Circuit on February 12, and the Third Circuit affirmed on March 2, 2020. 802 F. App'x 69. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, a private individual filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the National Security Agency, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights as a part of the NSA's PRISM program. The plaintiff requested declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The defendant's motion to dismiss was granted on September 30, 2015. The plaintiff appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated and remanded the case on October 5, 2016. However, the court granted the defendant's renewed motion to dismiss on February 4, 2019, and the Third Circuit affirmed on March 2, 2020.


On February 9, 2015, the federal court orders in Searcy v. Strange (PB-AL-0005 in this Clearinghouse) and Strawser v. Strange (PB-AL-0010 in this Clearinghouse) took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama. On Feb 16, 2015, a same-sex couple who were denied a marriage license after the Searcy and Strawser orders took effect, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a Blount County, Alabama Probate Judge. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that the defendant's prohibition on issuing same-sex marriage licenses violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and an injunction ordering the defendant to issue the couple a marriage license. On March 18, 2015, Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn recused herself from hearing this case. The case was reassigned to Judge William A. Acker, Jr. On March 26, 2015, Judge Acker dismissed the case without prejudice, construing the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss as a notice of dismissal. The couple's attorneys said the motion to dismiss was filed for personal reasons.

Summary: On Feb 16, 2015, a same-sex couple who were denied a marriage license after the Searcy and Strawser orders took effect, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a Blount County, Alabama Probate Judge. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that the defendant's prohibition on issuing same-sex marriage licenses violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and an injunction ordering the defendant to issue the couple a marriage license. On March 26, 2015, Judge William A. Acker, Jr, dismissed the case without prejudice, construing the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss as a notice of dismissal. The couple's attorneys said the motion to dismiss was filed for personal reasons.