On June 22, 2009, a group of civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health's ("DMH") Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services ("SORTS") facilities filed this class action lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the DMH and the Missouri Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Each of the plaintiffs had previously been found guilty of a sexually violent crime and have also been declared a sexually violent predator ("SVP") under Missouri's SVP Act, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 632.480-632.525. Prisoners found guilty of a sexually violent crime are declared SVPs when there is probable cause to believe that they are likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon their release. Individuals declared SVPs are civilly committed to a SORTS facility for rehabilitation. The plaintiffs alleged that the SORTS treatment program was ineffective and harmful, and that the true purpose of SORTS was institutionalization and indefinite detention. The plaintiffs claimed a violation of their Fifth Amendment rights against double jeopardy, their Eighth Amendment rights to be free of cruel and unusual punishment, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights of Equal Protection and Due Process. The plaintiffs requested that the court declare the Missouri SVP statute unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied, and require the DMH to reform SORTS as needed. Private counsel was appointed for the plaintiffs on September 2, 2009, but was replaced by attorneys from the ACLU of Missouri on March 23, 2010. On June 25, 2010, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On July 25, 2011, District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig denied that motion in large part, holding that many of plaintiffs' claims for prospective equitable relief for the allegedly unconstitutionally inadequate treatment were fact-intensive and required further factual development. 2011 WL 3099919. On September 30, 2011, Judge Fleissig certified the matter as a class action; she agreed to a "Treatment Class" of all persons who are or will be during the pendency of this action, residents of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and "Charging Class" of all persons who are or will be during the pendency of this action, residents and former residents, of SORTS as a result of civil commitment, and who have been, or will be, billed or charged for care, treatment, room or board by SORTS or by the SMMHC. 2011 WL 4600688. Judge Fleissig also granted the plaintiffs' proposal for notification to class members on November 7, 2011. The plaintiffs filed their fifth and final amended complaint on February 19, 2014, adding a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to their allegations. On March 28, 2014, the plaintiffs also moved for a preliminary injunction, but both parties reached a stipulation regarding the preliminary injunction on October 2, 2014, which made the motion moot. On April 22, 2014, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' fifth amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On October 17, 2014, Judge Fleissig granted the motion in part, dismissing the plaintiffs' Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims, but denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of the Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims on December 1, 2014, but this motion was denied by Judge Fleissig on February 10, 2015. The defendants moved for summary judgment on December 12, 2014. Judge Fleissig granted summary judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' Equal Protection claims, but denied summary judgment for their Due Process claims. On April 20, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss their ADA claim, leaving their Due Process claim as the only issue remaining for trial. On December 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an uncontested motion to bifurcate trial by first conducting a separate trial on the question of whether the defendants were liable, and if so, then conducting a second trial to determine the appropriate remedies and relief. Judge Fleissig granted the motion on December 19, 2014. The initial bench trial began on April 21, 2015, and ended on April 30, 2015. On September 11, 2015, Judge Fleissig ruled for the plaintiffs. Judge Fleissig held that the Missouri SVP statute was not unconstitutional on its face, but was indeed unconstitutional as applied. Judge Fleissig also held that it was now appropriate to move onto a second trial to determine appropriate remedies and relief. 129 F.Supp.3d 839. On October 20, 2016, the parties held Fairness Hearing proceedings before Judge Fleissig to review their proposed settlement agreement as to remedies. On November 23, 2016, Judge Fleissig rejected the proposed settlement and ordered the parties to prepare for trial on the remedies. The Judge noted "all of the class representatives and most of the class members oppose the settlement." As the parties progressed toward trial, the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion in Karsjens v. Piper holding that the plaintiff in an as-applied challenge must prove two things: “that the state defendants’ conduct was conscience-shocking, and that the state defendants violated one or more fundamental rights that are...implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” This court found that the new case law required the court to vacate its liability opinion and enter judgment for the defendants. The court held that the plaintiffs in this case had not demonstrated a fundamental liberty interest was violated. Further, the court found that, based on the facts in Karsjens, the defendants' behavior in this case could not be considered conscience-shocking. The plaintiffs filed notice of appeal on Sept. 18, 2017, but then moved to dismiss the appeal, which the Appellate Court granted on January 25, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2009, a group of civilly committed residents of the Missouri Department of Mental Health's ("DMH") Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services ("SORTS") facilities filed this class action lawsuit against the DMH and Missouri Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs were individuals previously found guilty of a sexually violent crime and were committed to a SORTS facility for rehabilitation. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged that the SORTS treatment program is ineffective and harmful. In 2017, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have a claim, and the case is now closed.


The plaintiff, an individual with a number of disabilities who requires at-home personal care services in order to remain in the community, filed this lawsuit after South Carolina reduced the number of personal care nursing hours available to her. The Plaintiff had been receiving 50 hours of at-home care through a Medicaid waiver program, but in late 2009, the state opted to cap the total number of available personal care hours at 28 for non-institutionalized persons. The Plaintiff claimed that this reduction put her at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. After filing a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on October 19, 2010, the Court (Judge Terry L. Wooten) granted the Plaintiff's motion to prevent the state from reducing her service hours during the course of the litigation on May 5, 2011. At the same time, the Plaintiff pursued an administrative appeal of her service reduction. The Plaintiff ultimately won her administrative appeal and was able to maintain her 50 hours of home care services. As a result, the parties agreed to dismiss the litigation as moot on November 29, 2011.

Summary: Plaintiff, an individual with disabilities who requires at-home nursing care to remain in the community, filed this challenge to the state's planned reduction of the nursing care hours available through a Medicaid waiver program. The Plaintiff succeeded in an administrative appeal. After the state agreed to maintain her services, her ADA and Section 504 claims were dismissed as moot.


On May 19, 2016, a 22-year-old detainee filed this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Harris County, Texas and the Harris County Sheriff's Department. The plaintiff, represented by Equal Justice Under Law, claimed that the bail system violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that after being arrested on May 18, 2016, for driving with an invalid license, she was detained in the Harris County Jail because she couldn't afford the $2,500 bail. This amount was set according to a predetermined bail schedule that did not consider the plaintiff's individualized circumstances. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that she was told by Harris County Sheriff's deputies to not speak at her 60-second hearing, and pursuant to Harris County’s policies and practices, no inquiry was made into her ability to pay when the hearing officer found probable cause for her arrest. The plaintiff sought declaratory and monetary relief, as well as an injunction preventing the defendants from using money bail to detain any person without procedures, including inquiry into the person's ability to pay the amount set. The plaintiff also sought a temporary restraining order for the release of herself and similarly situated individuals and requiring that they be given proper bail hearings. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Lee H. Rosenthal. On May 23, 2016, the plaintiff was released from Harris County custody, so she withdrew the motion for the temporary restraining order. Following a conference before Judge Lee H. Rosenthal on August 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 1, 2016, which joined her case with other plaintiffs who had initiated similar suits and added Harris County judges to the suit as defendants in both their personal and professional capacities. On December 16, Judge Rosenthal denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, and then denied rehearing on March 1, 2017. She granted the motion to dismiss the personal-capacity claims against the Sheriff and the County Judges. She also granted the motion to dismiss the official-capacity claims against the Hearing Officers. She denied the motions to dismiss the official-capacity claims against the Sheriff and the County Judges and the motion to dismiss the claims against Harris County. The court held that the Judges and Sheriff could be sued in their official capacities for the policies they promulgated in their positions. Moreover, the court found that the judges lacked immunity from injunctive and declaratory relief while acting administratively. 227 F. Supp. 3d 706, She set a preliminary injunction and class certification hearing for March 2017; the hearing lasted eight days, spread out between March 6 and March 23. On April 28, Judge Rosenthal certified a class consisting of "misdemeanor arrestees who are detained by Harris County . . . for whom a secured financial condition of release has been set and who cannot pay the amount necessary for release on the secured money bail because of indigence.” On the same day, Judge Rosenthal entered a preliminary injunction, holding that the plaintiffs had met their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that Harris County did not supply safeguards to protect the due process rights and equal protection rights of indigent misdemeanor arrestees. She held that Harris county had an essentially de facto policy of imposing bail in misdemeanor cases without regard to a defendant’s ability to pay or the likelihood of nonappearance or new arrests. She enjoined Harris County Judges and Sheriffs from detaining misdemeanor defendants who cannot afford bail and who would otherwise be eligible for release. She also set a maximum detention time of 24 hours between arrest and a hearing on a defendant’s ability to pay. Judge Rosenthal denied a stay pending appeal without prejudice that same day. 2017 WL 1735453 Harris County appealed to the Fifth Circuit on June 12, 2017. Several states, professional bondsmen, the Cato Institute, the ABA, Department of Justice and law enforcement officials, and a number of other organizations filed amicus curiae briefs. On February 14, the Fifth Circuit (Judge Edith B. Clement) issued an opinion largely affirming the district court’s decision. However, it disagreed as to three points. First, the Fifth Circuit determined that the district court’s definition of the plaintiff’s liberty interest protected by due process was too broad. Second, the Fifth Circuit found that the Sheriff could not be sued under § 1983 because the Sheriff lacked power over the bail system (Originally, the court had dismissed the claim against the Sheriff but this was overturned on panel rehearing because the defendants had not moved to dismiss). And third, the Fifth Circuit vacated the injunction as overly broad. Instead, the Fifth Circuit suggested that an appropriate equitable remedy would require the County to make case-by-case determinations and provide notice, an opportunity to be heard and submit evidence within 48 hours of arrest, and a reasoned decision by an impartial decision maker. 882 F.3d 528; 892 F.3d 147 On June 29, 2018, Judge Rosenthal granted an amended preliminary injunction, adopting the Fifth Circuit’s suggestion of a 48 hour window between arrest and an individual hearing. She also narrowed the scope of her original injunction, applying it only to misdemeanor detainees whom local law had already determined to be eligible for release on a personal bond and who are subject to no other basis for detention. 321 F. Supp. 3d 763. On August 14, the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. 900 F.3d 220, In November of 2018, 15 of the 16 Harris County judges who had been named in the original suit lost their reelection bids. In the election, a historic 17 African American women were elected as Harris County judges, including the first LGBTQ African American ever elected to a judgeship in Harris County. The new judges were substituted as parties in the suit. On January 7, 2019, all of the Harris County judges agreed to drop the appeal of the preliminary injunction and began to work with the plaintiffs to amend the law regarding bail schedules in Harris County. On February 1, the Court approved an amended rule submitted by both parties which required the prompt release of all misdemeanor arrestees on a personal bond except for certain more serious offenses and guaranteed a bail hearing within 48 hours for those not released on bond. The parties then proceeded to negotiate a settlement and consent decree, which they submitted to the court on July 25, 2019. Several parties, including the Harris County Deputies’ Organization (the police union), the Professional Bondsmen of Harris County and the Harris County District Attorney filed briefs opposing all or part of the consent decree. On November 21, 2019, Judge Rosenthal approved the consent decree and settlement. The consent decree required Harris County to make major reforms to its bail program, including implementation of and training on the amended hearing rules as well as a requirement that a Hearing Officer must find by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee can pay a bail amount before imposing it as a release condition. It also increased funding to provide representation for all misdemeanor arrestees at their bail hearings. And it required the development of a website that misdemeanor arrestees could use to access their court dates, times and location in order to reduce non-appearance. In addition, Harris County agreed to pay nearly $4 million in attorney’s fees to the plaintiff’s attorneys. 2019 WL 6219933. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree. The consent decree provided for supervision by an independent monitor set to last for a total of seven years, subject to extension if any defendants are unable to substantially comply with the consent decree during years six and seven. The consent decree remains in force.

Summary: In 2016, detainees in the Harris County Jail filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs were represented by Equal Justice Under Law and alleged that Harris County's wealth-based bail system released individuals charged with low-level offenses solely on their ability to pay a set monetary amount before trial and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. After many defendant judges lost their re-election bids, their successors agreed to a settlement in which they agreed to reforms including only imposing bail that detainees could afford.


On July 28, 2003, disabled athletes of the Paralympic Games and a marketing company sued the U.S. Olympic Committee in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, Judge John L. Kane, claiming that the USOC had a policy of giving grants, tuition assistance, and health insurance benefits only to Olympic and Pan American Games athletes but not to paralympic athletes. The USOC also allegedly denied paralympic athletes access to training facilities and did not give them cash rewards for winning medals, like olympic athletes. The plaintiffs claimed these practices violate Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Although the Court never specifically ordered consolidation, on June 14, 2006, an order regarding motions for summary judgment consolidated the Hollonbeck Case with Shepherd v. U.S. Olympic Committee, also filed in the District of Colorado under Judge Kane. The complaint was filed on October 26, 1999. The individual plaintiffs were all athletes with disabilities who competed in the Paralympic Games, an international competition similar to the Olympic Games. The marketing company was a Georgia Corporation owned and managed by one of the plaintiffs. It was founded for the purpose of obtaining sponsors for the Paralympics. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 22, 2003 adding claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel regarding a contract between the marketing company and USOC. The plaintiffs sought: a declaratory judgment that the defendants' actions violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and constituted a breach of contract; an injunction requiring the defendants to provide equal access to services and benefits to paralympic athletes; compensatory and other damages under state law and the Rehabilitation Act; and attorneys' fees and costs. On November 16, 2006, the District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts I and II. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 464 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Colo. 2006). The Court found many parts of the claims problematic; that the training facilities were not really "public accommodations" because they were limited to athletes preselected by the USOC; that the ASA separated the Olympics and Paralympics programs with their own governing bodies, thus plaintiffs had not been "excluded;" and that the plaintiffs' complaint asked for equal rather than equivalent accommodations, which is not required by the ADA. The docket indicates that on January 10, 2007, the clerk entered final judgment on Counts I and II against the plaintiffs. On July 12, 2007, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' remaining claims regarding the marketing contract and entered final judgment for the defendants. The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, consolidated the Shepherd and Hollonbeck cases for appeal. All plaintiffs appealed the District Court's grant of the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. The Court of Appeals upheld the District Court's dismissal, finding that although the USOC's policy resulted in disparate impact on disabled athletes, this did not state a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Judge Holloway dissented and would have reversed the District Court. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 513 F.3d 1191 (10th Cir. 2008). On October 6, 2008, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari. Hollonbeck v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 129 S. Ct. 114 (2008). The last entry on the docket, on October 14, 2008, notes the Supreme Court's order.

Summary: Disabled athletes of the Paralympic Games sued the U.S. Olympic Committee because it gave better training, benefits, and medal rewards to olympic athletes. The plaintiffs sued under the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and for breach of contract relating to a paralympic marketing campaign. The District Court dismissed all counts of the complaint for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court denied certiorari.


On April 10, 2015, five indigent probationers brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Red Hills Community Probation, its employees, and city police officers. Red Hills is a private probation company that contracts with local Georgia governments to supervise probation cases in municipal courts. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification, and damages, claiming that the defendants operate an unconstitutional and fraudulent probation system. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had a longstanding practice of detaining indigent probationers to coerce immediate payment of city court fines and probation supervision fees. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that Red Hills falsely represented to former probationers that they were required to continue to report to Red Hills personnel and continue to pay fines and fees even after the probationers' sentences were complete. On September 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for consent order, indicating they had reached an agreement with the defendants resolving all of their claims. On February 1, 2016, Judge Leslie J. Abrams issued the consent order. According to the consent order, the defendants were to ensure that (1) probation officers would not attempt to arrest probationers for failure to pay fines or fees without a good-faith and objective belief that the probationer had the ability to pay; (2) probation officers were to instruct probationer to request that his or her friends or family pay the probationer’s fines or fees; and (3) probation officers, the Court, and all City employees follow all laws regarding the treatment of probationers. The consent order also mandated training for the probation officers and that all probationers be advised of their rights. The consent order was to remain in place for four years. On March 1, 2016, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal. The case is now closed, though the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the consent order. As of April, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket.

Summary: On April 10, 2015, five indigent probationers filed this civil rights class action lawsuit against a private probation company operating in two Georgia municipal courts. The plaintiffs alleged that employees of Red Hills Community Probation routinely seize and detain indigent probationers in local courthouses until they or their family members make a payment on their fines and fees. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that Red Hills employees use threats and misrepresentations to coerce people to report and pay after their probation sentences are complete. This case is ongoing.


For twenty-five years, the Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS) maintained an integrated school system in and near Louisville, Kentucky, under a 1975 federal court decree. After release from that decree, the JCPS elected to continue its integrated schools through a "managed choice plan" that included broad racial guidelines (the 2001 Plan). Subsequently, several students and their parents alleged in a civil complaint on 10/21/2002 that the Board's student assignment plan violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, as well as under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1), the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and state constitutional and statutory provisions. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. District Judge John G. Heyburn grappled with resolving the plaintiffs' case in the wake of then-recent Supreme Court decisions upholding race-conscious admissions policies at a state law school while striking down different race-conscious admissions policies at an undergraduate school on the same campus. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) and Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Judge Heyburn observed that the Supreme Court cases set out a requirement that any use of race in a higher education admissions plan must further a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest, whereas the case before him involved the different context of an elementary and secondary school student assignment plan. After presiding over a five-day hearing in December 2003, and considering extensive stipulations and exhibits, the judge found on June 29, 2004, that JCPS' managed choice plan met the compelling interest requirement because the district had articulated some of the same reasons for integrated public schools that the Supreme Court upheld in Grutter. Moreover, the Board described other compelling interests and benefits of integrated schools (such as improved student education and community support for public schools) that were not relevant in the law school context but were relevant to public elementary and secondary schools. The court also found that, in most respects, the JCPS student assignment plan also met the narrow-tailoring requirement. The plan's broad racial guidelines did not constitute a quota and, in the judge's view, avoided the use of race in predominant and unnecessary ways that unduly harmed members of a particular racial group. The Board also used other race neutral means, such as geographic boundaries, special programs and student choice, to achieve racial integration. Judge Heyburn found, however, that the Board used a student assignment process for the "traditional" schools that it operated that was distinct from the process employed at all other programs and schools. In the traditional schools' assignment process, JCPS separated students into racial categories in a manner that the judge found was completely unnecessary to accomplish its objective of maintaining a fully integrated countywide system of schools. To the extent the 2001 Plan incorporated racial categorization procedures for assignments to traditional schools, the court concluded that it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The judge ruled that the Board could continue to administer the 2001 Plan in every respect in all of its schools, with the exception of its use of racial categories in the traditional school assignment process. McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, 330 F. Supp.2d 834 (W.D. Ky. 2004). (Footnote 8 of Judge Heyburn's order lists numerous reported decisions he regarded as legal predecessors of his opinion, including one--Hampton v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 72 F. Supp.2d 753 (W.D. Ky. 1999)--which provides a complete legal and historical background of the case.) One of the plaintiffs appealed and, on July 25, 2006, the district court's ruling was affirmed in a per curiam decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2006). That plaintiff, however, petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari in order to review the Sixth Circuit's affirmance. On June 5, 2006, the Supreme Court issued the writ and directed that the case and a similar appeal involving public schools in Seattle, WA. were to be considered together. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006). In June 2007, the Supreme Court issued its ruling addressing the issues raised in the two cases. Published as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (June 28, 2007), the ruling consists of several parts, with some mustering a 5-4 majority and others only a plurality. The majority framed the issue as whether a public school system that had not operated legally segregated schools (i.e., Seattle) or that had been found to be unitary (i.e., Jefferson County) may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. Although the appellate courts had upheld the school systems in each case, the Supreme Court reversed. After reviewing the operation of the racial classifications used by each school system and ruling that changed circumstances did not deprive it of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court set out the framework it used to evaluate the two cases. Its' prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, recognized two interests that qualified as compelling. The first was the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination. This factor could not apply to the Seattle system, which had never engaged in such discrimination, nor to the JCPS system, which had been found to be unitary. The second government interest recognized as compelling was the interest in diversity in higher education, but only where the racial component of the process is a part of an individualized, holistic consideration process. Because each system under review relied on racial classifications in a nonindividualized, mechanical way, and because of the different context presented by public elementary and secondary schools in comparison to higher education, the school systems' could not rely on race as they had; Grutter did not govern. In a portion of his opinion garnering three concurring votes, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the racial classifications employed by the districts were not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In his view of their design and operation, the plans were directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective he said that the Court had repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. He rejected use of racial balancing as an end in itself and rejected efforts to re-label the practice as racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, or racial integration. To the Chief Justice, the Constitution prohibited the states' use of means that treat students solely as members of a racial group, rather than as individuals. In the following part of his opinion, he noted that both districts asserted the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school enrollment, observing that the assertion casts doubt on the necessity component of assessing governmental use of racial classifications. Nor had either district shown they seriously considered other, race-neutral methods of achieving their educational goals. The opinion described what the Chief Justice considered flaws in a lengthy dissent authored by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion and Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The cases were remanded to the Courts of Appeals for further proceedings. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit returned the JCPS case to the district court for further proceedings. That court's docket sheet reflects that Judge Heyburn held a status conference in early August 2007, and concluded afterward that, based upon the School Board's then-expressed intentions, the Board was in compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling. The judge noted that plaintiff's counsel stated he would not be seeking any further equitable relief on behalf of plaintiff or any other persons. On August 29, 2007, the court responded to a motion for a specific student to be enrolled in the elementary school of the student's choice. Although JCPS had allowed for enrollment prior to the order, the issue had brought the practice of questioning of different attendance zones for black and white students to determine assignments at three traditional magnet elementary schools to the court's attention. The court determined that the practice did not meet the "narrow tailoring standard" issued by the Supreme Court in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). JCPS was ordered to discontinue the practice as a result. On November 9, 2007, Judge Heyburn ordered an award of $ 200,000 in attorney’s fees and $10,138.02 in expenses. JCPS provided notice of satisfaction of this judgment in December of 2007. Two months later, the plaintiffs requested that the case be reopened. On March 11, 2008, the court denied the plaintiff's motion, stating that the plaintiffs was not affected by the new plan and thus had no standing. This case is now closed.

Summary: For twenty-five years, the Jefferson County Public Schools ("JCPS" or "the Board") maintained an integrated school system in and near Louisville, Kentucky, under a 1975 federal court decree. After release from that decree, the JCPS elected to continue its integrated schools through a "managed choice plan" that included broad racial guidelines ("the 2001 Plan"). Subsequently, several students and their parents alleged in a civil complaint that the Board's student assignment plan violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause, as well as under Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1), the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and state constitutional and statutory provisions. District Judge John G. Heyburn found on June 29, 2004, that JCPS' managed choice plan was constitutional because the Board had a compelling interest in maintaining school integration. Judge Heyburn found, however, that the Board used a student assignment process for the "traditional" schools that it operated that was distinct from the process employed at all other programs and schools. The judge ruled that the Board could continue to administer the 2001 Plan in every respect in all of its schools, with the exception of its use of racial categories in the traditional school assignment process. One of the plaintiffs appealed and, on July 25, 2006, the district court's ruling was affirmed in a per curiam decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That plaintiff then petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari. On June 5, 2006, the Supreme Court issued the writ and directed that the case and a similar appeal involving public schools in Seattle, WA. were to be considered together. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006). In June 2007, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision, holding that a public school system that had not operated legally segregated schools (i.e., Seattle) or that had been found to be unitary (i.e., Jefferson County) cannot classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. The cases were remanded to the Courts of Appeals for further proceedings. Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit returned the JCPS case to the district court for further proceedings. Judge Heyburn held a status conference in early August 2007, and concluded that the Board was in compliance with the Supreme Court's ruling. This case is now closed.


This case was originally filed on July 14, 2020 in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, New York County. Plaintiffs were a collection of New York emergency services associations, including the Uniformed Fire Officers Association, the Uniformed Firefighters Association of Greater New York, the Correction Officers' Benevolent Association of the City of New York, the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York, the Sergeants Benevolent Association, the Lieutenants Benevolent Association, the Captains Endowment Association, and the Detectives' Endowment Association. They sued numerous New York City officials including Mayor Bill de Blasio, the City of New York, the Fire Department of New York, the New York City Department of Correction, Commissioner of New York City Department of Correction Cynthia Brann, Commissioner of New York City Police Department Dermot F. Shea, the Civilian Complaint Review Board, and Chair of the Civilian Complaint Review Board Frederick Davie. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. This case arose after city officials announced that they would disclose records concerning disciplinary proceedings and investigations into New York City police officers, firefighters, and corrections officers. This came after the New York state legislature repealed the controversial 50-a law. That law made confidential the disciplinary records of police officers, corrections officers, and other public servants. In particular, the plaintiffs objected to the disclosure of disciplinary allegations that were not "substantiated" or finalized. The plaintiffs argued that this would violate the terms of their Collective Bargaining Agreements, would constitute breach of contract, represented violations of Due Process and Equal Protection under the U.S. and New York constitutions, and that disclosure would violate New York statutory law (N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order on the same day. However, the defendants sought removal to federal court on July 15, citing original jurisdiction with respect to the alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution. Justice Carol Edmead approved the removal that day. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, where District Judge Katherine Polk Failla was assigned the case. Things appeared to get bungled somewhat in the removal process. At the state court, Justice Edmead had issued a stay that would prohibit the city from disclosing the documents until the court could hear arguments regarding a proper temporary restraining order. However, when the case was removed to the S.D.N.Y., the plaintiffs asserted that this stay was functionally a temporary restraining order itself, so there was no need to continue hearing defendants' arguments regarding a temporary restraining order. Defendants also argued against discovery requests by the plaintiffs, claiming that the entire question was a purely legal matter for which discovery was irrelevant. At a July 22, 2020 hearing, Judge Failla orally granted the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order. However, in addition to binding the various city defendants, the TRO applied to the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU): Earlier, the NYCLU had filed a request under New York's Freedom of Information Law for NYPD disciplinary records from the Civilian Complaint Review Board, a city agency that investigates allegations of police misconduct. Suspiciously quickly, in Judge Failla's opinion, the CCRB produced approximately 81,000 records to NYCLU. To prevent the case from being mooted by NYCLU's disclosure (and perhaps because she was concerned that NYCLU and the CCRB had been illicitly cooperating), Judge Failla applied the TRO to NYCLU. NYCLU, who was not a defendant in this case, submitted a letter to the court arguing that the July 22 TRO was a prior restraint on speech, and therefore violated the First Amendment, and that the court did not have the power to issue the TRO against them. On July 29 Judge Failla issued an order that modified the TRO as to no longer apply to NYCLU. However, the plaintiffs then issued a notice of interlocutory appeal. At the Second Circuit, the New York Times filed a motion to intervene against the emergency stay motion that the plaintiffs submitted. The Second Circuit (Judges Jon O. Newman, Rosemary S. Pooler, and Peter W. Hall) issued an order which stayed the District Court's July 29 order modifying the TRO to no longer include the NYCLU. Meanwhile, the parties engaged in a heated discovery battle. The court had set a deadline for document production for August, but the plaintiffs felt as though the defendants were not cooperating with their requests. On the other hand, the defendants argued that they were moving as fast as they could and that the plaintiffs' requests were overly broad. On July 28, the Legal Aid Society also requested to join as amicus curiae. The court granted that motion the next day. Additionally, an activist group called Communities United for Police Reform (CUPR) filed an emergency motion to intervene as a defendant in the case on July 29. They claimed they had right of intervention because they had substantial interests in the litigation, and those interests were not protected by any party. Alternatively, they argued that they should be granted permissive intervention. Throughout early August, numerous groups filed amicus curiae briefs, including the NYCLU. On August 20 and August 21, the plaintiffs were dealt two consecutive blows by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the District Court respectively. On August 20, the Second Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for stay of the District Court's July 29 order. (That order exempted NYCLU from the TRO prohibiting disclosure of the uniformed officers' records, despite the fact that they already had tens of thousands of complaints against uniformed officers.) The Second Circuit held that granting the stay would only be appropriate if the District Court did not have authority to exclude NYCLU from the order. However, since NYCLU was not operating "in active concert" with the city defendants, it was proper for the District Court to exclude them from the order. 2020 WL 5048477. On August 21, the District Court partially denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the motion was granted to the extent that the New York Police Department and Civilian Complaint Review Board may not disclose "schedule A" command discipline violations. In response, the plaintiffs made another interlocutory appeal. On August 27, the Second Circuit granted a stay to allow the parties to brief the issue. Meanwhile, by late August the District Court granted permissive intervention to CUPR. The court found that they could not intervene by right, as their interests were already sufficiently represented by defendants. However, since the court found their briefings useful, Judge Failla granted them permissive intervention. After Judge Failla granted them intervention, CUPR appealed the August 21 order that partially granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In early September the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, as did CUPR. The plaintiffs responded by filing an amended complaint on September 25, 2020, which consolidated two causes of action under New York state law and contained more detailed allegations about the manner in which the release of disciplinary records would harm the plaintiffs. The defendants, in turn, moved to dismiss the amended complaint on October 16, 2020. That motion remains pending. In a February 16, 2021 summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed the limited preliminary injunction that Judge Failla had issued on August 21, 2020. The Second Circuit also found that if the Schedule A infractions that the injunction was limited to encompassed anything other than "technical violations," modification of the injunction might be warranted. On March 17, 2021, CUPR took up the Second Circuit's invitation and wrote to Judge Failla arguing that Schedule A violations included more than "technical infractions." CUPR asked the court for discovery on the question of how Schedule A violations were used by city agencies to determine whether a modification of the preliminary injunction was warranted. Judge Failla scheduled a hearing on the matter for April 13, 2021. The case is ongoing as of March 31, 2021.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed in July of 2020, came as a result of the New York state legislature's decision to repeal "50-a," a law that protected officers from having their disciplinary records disclosed to the public. When the law was repealed, New York City issued proclamations to disclose those records to the public, after which several emergency services associations sued the city and senior level administrators. They argued that disclosure of these records would violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the New York State Constitution, New York statutory law, and would constitute breach of contract. The case was originally filed in state court, but the defendants removed it to federal court. The District Court partially granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction but wrote that it would only forbid disclosure of the "schedule A" command discipline violations by the NYPD and the CCRB. In February 2021, the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's preliminary injunction, but noted that Schedule A violations that were not "technical infractions" could be disclosed. After this order, an intervening defendant asked the District Court to allow discovery on the question of whether Schedule A violations included things other than technical infractions. The case is ongoing as of March 31, 2021.


On July 17th, 2007, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Robertson Fire Protection District (RFPD). The DOJ sought injunctive and remedial relief, alleging that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against two African-American employees on the basis of race. Specifically, the complaint stated that the discrimination took the form of demoting the two employees from the position of fire inspector to firefighter. Furthermore, the complaint alleges that the employees were retaliated against for filing charges of discrimination with the EEOC. The case was referred to alternative dispute resolution on February 1, 2008. The parties reached a settlement and the Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) entered a consent decree on May 23, 2008. Under the agreement, RFPD did not make admissions. The decree contained two general injunctions: 1) prohibition of discrimination on the basis of race; 2) prohibition of retaliation. The RFPD agreed to the following: 1) amend its written policies to prohibit discrimination, with description of complaints procedures, written or verbal;and identification of persons responsible for handling race discrimination complaints; 4) prompt and objective investigation of complaints, with results no later than 30 days after filing of a complaint; 5) designation of a person responsible for implementation of the policies; 6) distribution and publication of new policies; 7) mandatory nondiscrimination training. The two individuals both were to receive monetary awards (amounts unknown) and neutral references. The RFPD agreed to retain records pertinent to implementation of the decree. The United States retained a right to monitor compliance. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter for the duration of the decree. The decree would dissolve after two years from its entry without further order of the court.

Summary: On July 17th, 2007, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed an employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Robertson Fire Protection District (RFPD). Specifically, the complaint stated that the discrimination took the form of demoting the two employees from the position of fire inspector to firefighter. The parties reached a settlement and the Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) entered a consent decree on May 23, 2008. The RFPD agreed to implement new policies to deal with racial discrimination complaints and provide mandatory nondiscrimination training. The Decree would dissolve after two years from its entry.


In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program through policy statements by the Department of Homeland Security. The program offered work permits—and temporary protection from deportation—to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he would end the program in March 2018 unless Congress acted to provide statutory authorization for the program and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a memorandum on September 5, 2017 ending Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). This lawsuit, filed on September 18, 2017 in the US. District Court for the District of Columbia, was one of many cases challenging President Trump's revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood (DACA) program. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") initially filed this complaint, and later amended to add the American Federation of Teachers and United Food Commerical Workers International Union as plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, represented by the law firm Cohen Milstein, argued that the termination of DACA violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantees. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court held that DACA's recession was arbitrary and capricious and ordered the Department of Homeland Security to process new and renewal DACA applications. The defendants ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court, and on June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this case.
 In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that the Trump Administration, by ending DACA, had "unlawfully [reneged] on [its] promise to protect young, undocumented immigrants of color living in the United States." The plaintiff also noted that 95% of DACA recipients were people of color, including people of African, Latin American, Asian, and Middle Eastern descent. Some DACA recipients were also NAACP members. Thus, the NAACP brought the suit in its organizational capacity on behalf of its DACA-recipient members. The complaint asserted that DACA allowed children brought to the United States who met specific criteria to request deferred action for two years, subject to renewal. In addition to protecting grantees from being arrested solely due to their immigration status, DACA allowed its grantees to receive public benefits like social security, to enroll in higher education institutions, and to increase income and assets. All throughout the implementation process, the federal government enforcing DACA clearly represented that it would not use the information obtained in the application process to enforce immigration policy. Furthermore, the government promised that recipients would only lose their lawful presence for reasons of fraud, criminal conduct, national security, or public safety. The plaintiff argued that these recipients would now lose their protections and be at risk for deportation, especially since the grantees provided the federal government with sensitive information in their applications, and "termination of the DACA Program is accompanied by withdrawal of the guarantee that information provided by DACA applicants and registrants will not be used in deportation proceedings." The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had violated Fifth Amendment due process by rescinding DACA, and would do so again by using sensitive information in deportation proceedings. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), by carrying out government action without a "legitimate and reasoned basis." Specifically, the automatic DACA termination, with no notice or opportunity to respond, ran contrary to USCIS's DACA Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). Finally, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the Regulatory Flexibility Act, by carrying out regulatory action that would harm small organizations such as the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, as well as injunctive relief preventing defendants from withdrawing DACA and from using DACA recipients' application information in actions against them, their families, or their employers. The case was assigned to Judge Christopher R. Cooper on Sept. 19, 2017. On Oct. 24, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The complaint added as plaintiffs the American Federation of Teachers and the United Food and Commercial Workers' International Union. All organizational plaintiffs had DACA-registrant members. On Nov. 8, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint and a motion for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing (as they were not injured as organizations nor did they identify injured members); that the defendants' recession of DACA was a non-justiciable exercise of enforcement discretion; that a rational explanation supported the defendants' decision under the APA; and that the plaintiffs lacked a protected due process interest in DACA. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for summary judgment. On Dec. 15, the plaintiffs moved to submit declarations from nine pseudonymous DACA-recipient members of the organizational plaintiffs. On Jan. 3, 2018, the case was re-assigned to Judge John D. Bates. On Jan. 18, this case was consolidated with Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S.A., with NAACP v. Trump designated as the lead case. On April 24, 2018, Judge John D. Bates held that the district court had both jurisdiction and statutory authority to hear the plaintiffs' APA and constitutional claims. 298 F. Supp. 3d 209. The court concluded that under the APA, DHS’ September 5, 2017 decision to rescind DACA was arbitrary and capricious, for DHS failed to adequately explain why the program was unlawful: “Neither the meager legal reasoning nor the assessment of litigation risk provided by DHS to support its rescission decision is sufficient to sustain termination of the DACA program.” The Court thereby granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to the substantive APA claim, but denied their motion as to the procedural APA claim, and denied their motion for preliminary injunctive relief on their information-sharing claim. The decision to rescind DACA was vacated and remanded to DHS, which meant that DHS must accept and process new as well as renewal DACA applications. However, the Court stayed its vacatur order for 90 days to allow the agency an opportunity to better explain its rescission decision. On August 3, 2018, the Court denied the government’s motion to revise the April 2018 order. 315 F. Supp. 3d 457. The Court held that while the government had provided additional policy grounds concerning the decision to rescind DACA, “most of these simply repackage legal arguments previously made, and hence are ‘insufficiently independent from the agency’s evaluation of DACA’s legality’ to preclude judicial review or to support the agency’s decision.” The Court noted that it had already once given DHS the opportunity to provide explanations, so it would not do so again, though it did stay the order of vacatur for 20 days. In relation to the relief granted by the Court, it specifically noted that DHS does not lack the statutory or constitutional authority to rescind DACA, but rather, that DHS must give a rational explanation for its decision to rescind DACA. Several days later, the government appealed to the DC Circuit Court. On August 14, 2018, the government filed a motion for the district court to stay its April 24 decision, pending the appeal in the D.C. Circuit, and a motion to clarify that the August 3 order was a final, appealable judgment and that the plaintiffs’ remaining constitutional claims were moot. Three days later, the district court granted a limited stay of its April 24 order as it applies to initial DACA applications and applications for DACA-based advance parole so as to preserve the status quo pending the appeal (as suggested by the plaintiffs). 321 F. Supp. 3d 143. It also granted the motion to clarify. In November 2018, while the appeal was pending, the Government simultaneously filed three petitions for certiorari before judgment, in this case, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, also challenging the DACA rescission. In Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the district courts had granted a nationwide injunction to maintain the DACA program. All three cases were appealed to the Circuit Courts as well. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia heard oral argument on the appeal from NAACP on February 22, 2019. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted the petitions and consolidated NAACP v. Trump, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 139 S. Ct. 2779. The three consolidated cases were heard under the caption of Department of Homeland Security v. Regents of the University of California. 139 S.Ct. 2779. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy was judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA was lawful. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants did not follow proper APA procedures. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in all three cases, affirming the judgment of the district court in this case. 140 S. Ct. 1891. It held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. As a result, on July 23, 2020, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to remand to the Department of Homeland Security for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. The district court remanded the same day. The Department of Homeland Security then issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020. In this memo, Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In a joint status report on September 16, 2020, the plaintiffs indicated that they did not intend to challenge the July 28th Wolf Memorandum, but reserved the right to do so in the future or to challenge any future agency actions with respect to DACA. They asked the court to continue holding the cases in abeyance. Though the plaintiffs in this case declined to challenge the July 28th Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump challenged the memo, arguing that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully appointed to his position and did not have authority to issue the memo and that the memo was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The court in Batalla Vidal and State of New York found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary and did not have authority to issue the memo. On December 4, 2020, the court in Batalla Vidal and State of New York ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. In January 2021, President Biden took office and immediately shifted the executive's approach to DACA. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 18, 2017, the NAACP sued DHS for ending the DACA program, alleging that rescission violated due process and the APA. Several labor unions joined as co-plaintiffs. On January 18, 2018, the case was consolidated with Trustees of Princeton University v. U.S.A.. On April 24, 2018, the Court held that the DHS’ rescission of DACA was arbitrary and capricious, and vacated the DHS decision. In August 2018, the government appealed to the DC Circuit Court, and the District Court granted a limited stay of its April 24, 2018 order as it applied to initial DACA applications and applications for DACA-based advance parole. The defendants later sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in this and two other DACA cases. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The district court remanded the case to DHS for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. The plaintiffs in this case declined to challenge the July 28 memo, but the plaintiffs in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump challenged the memo and the court in those cases ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA." As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On Apr. 10, 2017, the ACLUs of Hawai'i, Northern California, and Utah filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's San Francisco Field Office, including Honolulu International Airport, Kona International Airport, Salt Lake City International Airport, San Francisco International Airport, and San Jose International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the Executive Orders. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders here in the San Francisco Field Office" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." On Apr. 10, the case was assigned to Hon. Saundra Brown Armstrong. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multi district litigation," effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For more information about the transfer motion, see this case. On May 10, the government moved to stay proceedings pending the decision by the judicial panel regarding the multi district litigation. On June 22, Judge Armstrong denied the motion to stay. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion. On Aug. 14, the Court granted the parties' motion to extend their ADR deadlines to Aug. 23. On that date, the parties filed a Joint Case Management Statement contending that the case was not presently well-suited to ADR resolution, and requested relief from any automatic referral to ADR. The court granted this request on Aug. 25. On Oct. 13, the parties filed a joint status report. On Oct. 26, the parties held a telephonic case management conference. The court requested that the government provide copies of production orders in parallel ACLU FOIA cases, which the government provided the following day. On Dec. 20, the ACLU filed a statement of a recent relevant decision, noting that a California district court had set aside a FOIA production order and required DHS to produce at least 1,000 documents per month in ACLU of Southern California v. DHS. On Jan. 22, 2018, Judge Armstrong issued a scheduling order. Defendants will process 200 pages of records by Feb. 28; 400 pages by Apr. 30; and will issue bimonthly rolling productions thereafter until finishing by Dec. 31. After each bimonthly production, the parties will issue joint status reports. The parties filed a status report on Mar. 15, 2018 noting that defendants had produced over 1200 pages. Status reports filed in May and September indicated the government continued to produce responsive records. A November status report indicated the government had completed processing records and that the ACLU was reviewing the production. The case was briefly stayed on Jan. 9, 2019 due to appropriations issues. It resumed on Jan. 28, 2019. As of May 20, 2020 the document production and periodic status reports have continued. This case is ongoing. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page.

Summary: On Apr. 10, 2017, the ACLUs of Hawai'i, Northern California, and Utah sued DHS under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at regional airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation, and this case is proceeding here.


In the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, a nonprofit corporation formed by a group of parents whose children were not, or may not be, assigned to a high school of their choice under the Seattle school district's assignment plan (which used a racial integration tiebreaker, described below) filed a civil lawsuit on July 18, 2000. Relying on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and represented by private counsel, the plaintiff organization claimed that use of the tiebreaker violated the Washington Civil Rights Act ("Initiative 200") (codified at RCW 49.60.400), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Title VI of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The defendants were the school district and certain of its officials. The plaintiff alleged that Seattle's public school system used a plan to assign students to its ten high schools that considered, for example, applicants' preferences, school proximity, and siblings' placement, but also considered race as a "tiebreaker" factor, along with other tiebreakers, to preclude over-populating high schools considered more desirable by applicants. When the race tiebreaker was used, the school district's object included selecting for placement students whose race would help mitigate what the district regarded as imbalance in the racial makeup of a particular school. The school district considered that a school was out of balance if it deviated by more than 15% from the overall racial breakdown of the students attending Seattle's public schools, which (at the time of the lawsuit) were approximately 40% white and 60% nonwhite. According to the docket sheet for the case, on July 28, 2000, the defendants filed a counterclaim against the plaintiff, along with an answer denying liability. We do not have a copy of the complaint, nor of the counterclaim, so we do not know specifics of the relief either party sought; however, the plaintiff plainly sought injunctive relief to preclude use by the defendants of the racial tiebreaker component of the district's "open choice" student assignment plan. After the initially-assigned district judge recused herself in December 2000, the case was assigned to District Judge Barbara J. Rothstein. The discovery and pre-trial motion process ensued, with the parties eventually filing cross-motions for summary judgment. In ruling on those motions, Judge Rothstein first found that the Seattle district's use of a racial tiebreaker did not offend Initiative 200, the then-recently-passed voter initiative barring state government, including school districts, from discriminating against or granting preferential treatment to any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public education. The judge interpreted that provision to mean that a school board's race-conscious assignment policy would not constitute a "preference" or "discrimination" when instituted to accomplish school integration, based on state court interpretations of those terms in the state constitution. Turning to the plaintiff's federal claims, Judge Rothstein found compelling the school board's purpose of mitigating the effects of de facto residential segregation which, otherwise, would impede benefits offered by racially diverse schools and would result in re-segregation of the city's public schools. The judge also viewed the plan as narrowly tailored to serve the established compelling interests. Accordingly, her view was that the policy did not violate federal law and, on April 6, 2001, she granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the state and federal law claims. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 137 F. Supp.2d 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2001). The defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. A panel of that court reviewed the school's policy and its' effect, concluding that the racial tiebreaker determines about 10% of student assignments in Seattle's public high schools, noting that those schools had never operated under laws requiring segregation. Following the urgings of the parties to not certify a question about the meaning of Initiative 200 to the state's Supreme Court, the panel interpreted the voter initiative differently than did the district court, saying that the interpretation that the state court would give it was clear: giving the provision its' plain meaning, as state law required, meant the racial tiebreaker did grant preferential treatment in violation of Initiative 200. The panel observed that use of the racial tiebreaker resulted, during one stage of the admissions process, in all decisions being made based solely on race. Thus, as support for its' state law interpretation, the court concluded that the racial tiebreaker at issue was "inherently invidious," under federal law. By granting some students preferential treatment over others on the basis of race, the school district violated state law as enacted by the initiative, in the panel's view. In April 2002, it reversed the district court's ruling. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 285 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) (Circuit Judge Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain). Additionally, the appellate panel granted the plaintiff's motion for an injunction pending the filing and disposition of any petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc. The injunction prevented the defendants from using the racial tiebreaker in making high school assignments pending further order of the court. The injunction, however, was short-lived, as the defendants' petition for rehearing was granted on June 17, 2002. That day, the appellate panel withdrew its' opinion and vacated the injunction. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002). Given that the pendency of the rehearing en banc petition precluded a final judgment before the upcoming school year began, and viewing it as a prudent step to seek the opinion of the state's highest court on a matter of interpreting state law, the panel on its own motion decided to certify to the Washington Supreme Court the question: "By using a racial tiebreaker to determine high school assignments, does Seattle School District Number 1 'discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, ...color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of ... public education' in violation of Initiative 200...?" Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 294 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2002). In these appellate proceedings, various amici curiae filings were made by the ACLU, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Center for Equal Opportunity, the American Civil Rights Institute, and the Urban League of Metropolitan Seattle. On June 26, 2003, the Washington Supreme Court issued its en banc opinion that the school district's "open choice" assignment plan did not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public education in violation of Washington's discrimination statute, because it used race neutrally and did not promote a less qualified minority applicant over a more qualified applicant. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 72 P.2d 151 (Wash. 2003). Having received the state court's ruling, the Ninth Circuit had the case re-argued in December 2003. A new panel opinion resulted, on July 27, 2004. In a 2-1 decision, Judge O'Scannlain wrote that racial diversity in education was a compelling governmental interest, but the school district's using race as tiebreaker in student assignments was not narrowly tailored to further that interest. Therefore, the panel ruled that the school district's use of the racial tiebreaker violated the equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 377 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2004). The defendants' application for rehearing en banc was granted on February 1, 2005. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 395 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2005) (Circuit Judge Mary M. Schroeder). Unlike most federal appellate courts, en banc review in the Ninth Circuit did not entail review by all sitting circuit judges, but by eleven assigned to the case. Judge O'Scannlain was not one of the eleven. On October 20, 2005, those who did provide en banc review decided, 7-4, that the use of the racial tiebreaker did not violate federal law. The majority opinion, by Circuit Judge Raymond C. Fisher, held that: (1) the school district had a compelling interest in securing educational and social benefits of racial and ethnic diversity and in ameliorating racial isolation or concentration in its high schools by ensuring that its assignments did not simply replicate Seattle's segregated housing patterns; (2) for purposes of determining whether the district's plan was narrowly tailored to meet its compelling interests, the district's fifteen percent plus or minus variance was not a "quota"; (3) the district made a good-faith effort to consider feasible race-neutral alternatives and permissibly rejected them in favor of a system involving sibling preference, the race-based tiebreaker, and proximity preference; (4) the racial tiebreaker imposed a minimal burden shared equally by all district's students and did not unduly harm members of any racial group; and (5) the plan included periodic reviews to determine whether racial preferences were still necessary to achieve student body diversity. As a result, the district court's decision was affirmed. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff, however, petitioned the Supreme Court to issue a writ of certiorari in order to review the Ninth Circuit's affirmance. On June 5, 2006, the Supreme Court issued the writ and directed that the case and a similar appeal involving public schools in Jefferson County (Louisville), Kentucky, were to be considered together. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 547 U.S. 1177 (2006). In June 2007, the Supreme Court issued its ruling addressing the issues raised in the two cases. Published as Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 168 L. Ed. 2d 508 (June 28, 2007) (John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief Justice), the ruling consists of several parts, with some mustering a 5-4 majority and others only a plurality. The majority framed the issue as whether a public school system that had not operated legally segregated schools (i.e., Seattle) or that had been found to be unitary (i.e., Jefferson County) may choose to classify students by race and rely upon that classification in making school assignments. Although the appellate courts had upheld the school systems in each case, the Supreme Court reversed. After reviewing the operation of the racial classifications used by each school system and ruling that changed circumstances did not deprive it of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court set out the framework it used to evaluate the two cases. Its prior cases, in evaluating the use of racial classifications in the school context, recognized two interests that qualified as compelling. The first was the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination. This factor could not apply to the Seattle system, which had never engaged in such discrimination, nor to the Louisville system, which had been found, earlier, to be unitary. The second government interest recognized as compelling was the interest in diversity in higher education, but only where the racial component of the process was a part of an individualized, holistic consideration process. Because each system under review relied on racial classifications in a nonindividualized, mechanical way, and because of the different context presented by public elementary and secondary schools in comparison to higher education, the school systems' could not rely on race as they had. In a portion of his opinion garnering three concurring votes, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that the racial classifications employed by the districts were not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. In his view of their design and operation, the plans were directed only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective he said that the Court had repeatedly condemned as illegitimate. He rejected use of racial balancing as an end in itself and rejected efforts to re-label the practice as racial diversity, avoidance of racial isolation, or racial integration. To the Chief Justice, the Constitution prohibited the states' use of means that treat students solely as members of a racial group, rather than as individuals. In the following part of his opinion, he noted that both districts asserted the minimal impact of the districts' racial classifications on school enrollment. To him, the assertion cast doubt on the "necessity" component employed in assessing governmental use of racial classifications. Nor had either district shown they seriously considered other, race-neutral methods of achieving their educational goals. The opinion described what the Chief Justice considered flaws in a lengthy dissent authored by Justice Stephen Breyer. Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion and Justice Kennedy filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The cases were remanded to the Courts of Appeals for further proceedings. On August 22, 2007, the Ninth Circuit vacated its 2005 opinion and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The plaintiff subsequently moved for entry of judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment, an injunction, as well as attorney's fees pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. §1988. In support of its request for an injunction, the plaintiff argued that there was a substantial risk that the District would adopt new impermissible racial classifications. The plaintiff also requested that the court retain jurisdiction to determine the amount of fees and costs, and to enforce the injunction if necessary. After an extended briefing schedule, the District Court (Judge Barbara Rothstein) entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on January 12, 2009. However, Judge Rothstein denied the plaintiff's requests for declaratory relief and an injunction. She denied the injunction on the basis that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the District was planning to implement a new admission policy which would run afoul of the Supreme Court's opinion. As to declaratory relief, Judge Rothstein denied this after finding that the plaintiff's proposed declaratory judgment was too broad in light of the Supreme Court's opinion. Judge Rothstein also found that the plaintiff was the prevailing party for purposes of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, but declined to declare it was entitled to attorney's fees until she had received a breakdown of the fees the plaintiff would be seeking. On February 5, 2009, the plaintiff appealed the denial of declaratory relief and a permanent injunction to the Ninth Circuit. One week later, the defendant cross appealed the same order. While both appeals were pending, the parties participated in the Ninth Circuit's Mediation Program. In July 2009, the plaintiff withdrew its motion for attorney's fees. The case closed on August 4, 2009, when the parties stipulated to the dismissal of both appeals. Materials and a summary of the Louisville case exist in this database as SD-KY-0001.

Summary: In July of 2000, a non-profit group formed by concerned parents sued the Seattle School District, alleging that the tiebreaker the District used in its student assignment plan violated, among other things, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. One factor this tiebreaker used was a racial factor intended to maintain racial diversity. The case eventually made it to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in a split decision by Chief Justice Roberts, struck down the student assignment plans because they were not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the District Court eventually entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.


On September 12, 2012, female prisoners at the Missoula County Detention Facility (MCDF), housed in Housing Unit 2 and the Juvenile Detention Center, filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana against Missoula County, the Sheriff of Missoula County and various persons employed at MCDF, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from ACLU of Montana and University of Montana Law School, sought declaratory relief, order of the Court and attorney's fees, alleging that Missoula County violated their constitutional rights and their rights under the Montana Constitution by not giving them access to fresh air and outdoor exercise. The plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the defendant to provide them with outdoor exercise and fresh air for one hour, five days per week. Moreover, the plaintiffs alleged gender discrimination, as Housing Unit 2 and the Juvenile Detention Center were the only facilities at MCDF that housed female prisoners and had no access to fresh air and outdoor exercise, while other housing units housed only male prisoners and they had access to fresh air and outdoor exercise. On October 17, 2012, the Court (Judge Donald Molloy) issued an order granting class certification. The Court certified the class consisting of all current and future prisoners housed in Housing Unit 2 and the Juvenile Detention Center for a period of one month or longer who claimed cruel and unusual punishment through denial of fresh air and outdoor exercise. The Court also certified a subclass consisting of all female prisoners housed in Housing Unit 2. On December 3, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleged mostly the same violations, but adding a plaintiff, who was a parent suing on behalf of a minor prisoner at the Juvenile Detention Center. On January 10, 2013, the Court (Judge Donald Molloy) issued an order denying the defendants' motion to set aside class certification, but modified the class as current and future prisoners in the Housing Unit and the Juvenile Detention Center incarcerated for a period of one month or longer whom the defendants denied fresh air and outdoor exercise, with subclass for female prisoners at the Housing Unit 2 and the Juvenile Detention Center. On February 27, 2013, the case was stayed as the parties entered settlement discussion. On October 31, 2013, the Court (Judge Donald Molloy) issued an order and a judgment, approving and adopting a Proposed Settlement Agreement (PSA) between the parties as a consent decree. The Court stated that the PSA was fair, adequate and reasonable, with no Class member objecting to it. Under the PSA, the defendants were to construct outdoor recreation areas for the prisoners at the Housing Unit 2 and the Juvenile Detention Center, and provide them with access to it. They were also to provide adequate staffing and policies for the usage of the areas. The Court retained jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation. The defendant, Missoula County was to make available for inspection written logs for outdoor recreation, and allow access for confidential interviews to plaintiffs' lawyers. The consent decree could be terminated after two years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The defendants also agreed to pay attorney's fees for the plaintiff. On November 15, 2013, the Court (Judge Donald Molloy) issued an order granting the unopposed motion by the plaintiffs for attorney's fees in the amount of $34,594.87 within 60 days, per the stipulation filed by the parties on November 14, 2013. On January 15, 2014, the defendants filed a status report on the construction of the outdoor recreation areas. Status reports were ongoing through 2015-2016 and on July 21, 2016 the defendants moved to terminate the consent decree on the grounds that they were fully compliant and the stipulated two years had expired. Judge Molloy granted the termination, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 12, 2012, female prisoners at the Missoula County Detention Facility filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana against Missoula County, the Sheriff of Missoula County and various employees at the MCDF, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by ACLU of Montana and University of Montana Law School attorneys, alleged cruel and unusual punishment as a result of denial to them of access to fresh air and outdoor exercise; and gender discrimination, as their housing units were the only ones with female prisoners and the only ones without access to fresh air and outdoor exercise. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, adopted as a consent decree by the Court on November 15, 2013, whereas the defendants are to construct and grant access to class members to an outdoor recreation areas. The defendants also paid the plaintiffs' attorney's fees.


This lawsuit was a challenge to New York's alleged practice of warehousing individuals with mental illness in nursing homes rather than in the community. The complaint, filed on March 8, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleged that New York frequently discharged individuals from psychiatric institutions to nursing homes instead of integrating them into their communities. The Plaintiffs claimed that New York's policies forced them to languish in sometimes prison-like nursing homes without receiving any effective treatment or services. The complaint raised legal claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Nursing Home Reform Act. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit, and after a few amendments of the complaint to address certain deficiencies (i.e. specificity of allegations), the court (on order from Judge Brian Cogan following a Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Steven Gold) denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court found that the Plaintiffs had effectively stated claims under the ADA, Section 504, and the NHRA. The parties then proceeded to discovery and trial preparation. Ultimately, the parties entered a settlement on September 7, 2011. The settlement provided for the transfer of all mentally ill individuals in nursing homes to community placements within three years. As part of the settlement, the state agreed to create 200 new units of supportive housing and to reform its assessment and placement system. The agreement was initially written to last until 2015, but was later extended until December 2016. The agreement ultimately terminated and the case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this challenge to New York's practice of warehousing individuals with mental illness in nursing homes. The District Court denied a motion to dismiss in May 2008. In September 2011, the parties settled, with the state agreeing to move all individuals with mental illness who were inappropriately placed into nursing homes to community placements.