On October 3, 2005, the Council for Disability Rights, in Chicago, brought this class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. §12101. Plaintiffs also included individuals with visual or mobility impairments who live, work and for travel in Chicago, Illinois. Represented by private counsel, they sought injunctive relief to require the city to properly install and maintain sidewalks, curb cuts and ramps necessary for the mobility of persons with disabilities. Plaintiffs alleged the Chicago violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq. (the "ADA"), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability "under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. 794(a). Plaintiffs challenge the Chicago's pattern and practice of: (1) failing to properly install or maintain curb cuts and ramps when resurfacing streets and altering or installing city sidewalks; (2) failing to install all necessary curb cuts and ramps at a particular intersection when resurfacing streets and altering or installing city sidewalks; and (3) failing to properly install, repair or maintain city sidewalks. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In September 2007, the parties settled. The settlement agreement provided: (1) The city of Chicago will install only curb ramps and sidewalks that meet or exceed the specifications of the Federal ADA guidelines; (2) For the next 5 years the city will spend $50,000,000 ($10,000,000 per year) in new money to repair and replace curb ramps and sidewalks in high traffic areas which are not on the city's schedule for repair or replacement. The city will also continue to spend approximately eighteen million dollars ($18,000,000) each year installing curb ramps and sidewalks as a part of the City's annual resurfacing work; (3) The city shall install curb ramps into intersections of each cross street at its intersection with the alteration or resurfacing, so that the altered or resurfaced intersections are fully accessible to mobility-impaired persons with disabilities. The Court entered the settlement as a final order, retaining jurisdiction to enforce its terms. At the time it was entered, this was the largest ADA settlement ever. The settlement finished in 2011, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This is the largest Title II ADA settlement ever. It started with a lawsuit filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on October 3, 2005, by plaintiffs with visual or mobility impairments who live, work and for travel in Chicago. They sought injunctive relief to require the City of Chicago to properly install and maintain sidewalks, curb cuts and ramps necessary for mobility of persons with disabilities. In September 2007, the parties settled. The settlement agreement provided: (1) The City of Chicago will install only curb ramps and sidewalks that meet or exceed the specifications of the Federal ADA guidelines; (2) For the next 5 years $10 million per year in new money to repair and replace curb ramps and sidewalks in high traffic areas not on the city's schedule for repair or replacement. The city will also continue to spend approximately $18 million each year installing curb ramps and sidewalks as a part of the City's annual resurfacing work; (3) The city shall install curb ramps into intersections of each cross street at its intersection with the alteration or resurfacing, so that the altered or resurfaced intersections are fully accessible to mobility-impaired persons with disabilities. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement terms.


On July 25, 1989, prisoners at the old Lassen County Jail ("Old Jail") filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Lassen and the Sheriff of the County of Lassen. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that conditions in the Old Jail violated the First, Fourth and Eighth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Among other things, they alleged overcrowding, inadequate clothing, inadequate medical, dental and mental health care, inadequate privacy for conversations with attorneys, and unequal access to programs for women prisoners. Plaintiffs sought a broad set of injunctive remedies. When the suit was filed, Lassen County was developing and implementing plans for construction of a new, much larger jail ("New Jail"). On October 17, 1989, the District Court approved a stipulated order preliminarily enjoining certain Old Jail conditions. Pursuant to the stipulated order, the County agreed to: (1) limit inmate population at the Old Jail to forty-one inmates; (2) limit the temporary holding cell's population to the rated capacity; (3) limit time spent in the temporary holding cell to eight hours; (4) comply with California law in its use of the detoxification facility; (5) provide all prisoners with a permanent bed appropriate to his/her classification; and (6) provide all prisoners with daily access to the "program room" and outdoor recreation. Beginning on July 16, 1990, the case was tried before Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds. The trial concluded in September 1990. On July 1, 1991, the New Jail opened and the County ceased using the Old Jail. On August 1, 1991, Magistrate Judge Moulds entered his 129-page findings and recommendations. On September 17, 1991, District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton entered an order adopting the findings and recommendations, with one minor modification. The order granted the following relief: (1) For a period of one year, the County was prohibited from exceeding the established inmate capacities at the Old Jail or the New Jail; (2) The County was required to "modify" and follow written policies regarding access to the jail law library; (3) The County was required to clarify the procedures for staff handling of prisoners demonstrating a mental disorder; (4) The County was required to develop a procedure for ensuring a timely response to an inmate's request for mental health care. All further requests for relief were denied. On October 9, 1991, Judge Karlton entered a judgment. On November 7, 1991, the defendants filed their notice of appeal from the judgment. The attorney's fees litigation then commenced, with both sides seeking attorney's fees. On March 30, 1993, Magistrate Judge Moulds filed findings and recommendations on the attorney's fees issue. On April 20, 1993, Judge Karlton filed an order adopting the finding and recommendations in full. This order granted the plaintiffs some of the attorney's fees they had sought, for a total of $219,027.61, and denied the defendants' request for fees. On April 27, 1993, Judge Karlton entered his Judgment pursuant to the attorney's fees order. On April 28, 1993, the appellants filed their notice of appeal from the attorney's fees order, and the award was stayed pending appeal. On October 6, 1994, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Arthur L. Alarcon and Ferdinand F. Fernandez and District Judge Stephen V. Wilson, sitting by designation) reversed the District Court's decision to grant permanent injunctive relief but affirmed its decision that attorney's fees were appropriate. Doty v. Cnty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540 (9th Cir. 1994). The panel, in an opinion by Judge Wilson, found that the injunction as a whole was erroneous because there was no evidence of constitutional violation at the New Jail. It also found, however, that since the plaintiffs had succeeded in obtaining a preliminary injunction and had catalyzed other reforms at the jails, they were "prevailing parties" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and could be awarded reasonable attorney's fees; it therefore vacated the District Court's award and remanded for redetermination in light of plaintiffs' limited success. On remand, Magistrate Judge Moulds filed findings and recommendations on the attorney's fees issue on July 26, 1995, and Judge Karlton adopted them in full on September 19, awarding plaintiffs a total of $83,616.75. On the same day, Judge Karlton entered judgment in favor of the defendants per the order of the Court of Appeals. (This summary is adapted in part from the Appeals Court's discussion of the background of the case. See Doty, 37 F.3d at 542.)

Summary: This is a class action brought by prisoners at the Lassen County jails challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a limited permanent injunction, but it was reversed by the Ninth Circuit, as a new jail had been built in the interim and there was no evidence of constitutional violations at the new facility.


On April 24, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent a findings letter to Arkansas's governor, advising him of the results of the Spring 2003, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the Conway Human Development Center ("CHDC"), a facility housing developmentally disabled persons, including those with intellectual disabilities, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, and/or autism. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended CHDC staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for resident well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found deficiencies in resident care at CHDC, in that conditions and services at CDHC substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care. Constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents at CHDC were violated in several respects, according to the DOJ. DOJ concluded that deficiencies in conditions of resident care and treatment at CHDC existed as to multiple topic areas, including CDHC's causing residents significant harm or risk of harm through inadequate: (1) health care (termed "grossly deficient," with particular problems in "terribly inadequate" medical and neurological care, physical and nutritional management and therapy services, and infection control and medication administration practices); (2) habilitative treatment services (e.g., "grossly deficient" and unreviewed restraint practices; "critically inadequate" activity programming and psychiatric services; inadequately trained and supervised staff; ineffective behavior programs; invalid data collection and recording practices; poor medication management); and (3) protection from harm policies (e.g., failure to conduct mortality reviews after resident deaths, meager investigation of abuse or neglect incidents, inadequacies in residents' rights and consent policies); as well as CHDC's (4) failure to provide required special education and related services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401; and (5) failure to provide services to individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting appropriate to individual residents' needs, pursuant to statutory obligations imposed by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all five of these categories. Minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of the five categories were outlined in the letter, which concluded by inviting continued further collaboration in implementing the remediation. The letter also provided notice that, absent a resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at CHDC. On January 16, 2009, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The complaint mirrored the findings letter. The State filed an answer on February 17, 2009. Over a year later, the U.S. filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction on March 9, 2010. Arkansas opposed the motion, and on April 7, 2010, the court (Judge J. Leon Holmes) denied the motion. Both parties then filed Motions for Partial Summary Judgment, which were denied by the court on July 30, 2010. On August 27, 2010, a group of parents and guardians of residents of CHDC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the state. A six-week bench trial was held in September 2010. The court allowed the parties to extend the filing period for post-trial briefs to provide time for the transcripts to be prepared. The court issued its findings on June 8, 2011. The court found that the U.S. had not met its burden under the first claim for relief, that the practices at CHDC departed from generally accepted professional standards. The court also found the U.S. failed to meet its burden for the second claim for relief, that CHDC was not in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). On the U.S.'s third claim for relief, the court found that DOJ had shown that CHDC was not providing free appropriate public education for resident children. However, because CHDC had submitted a proposal for changing their education policy to the appropriate state agency (Arkansas Department of Education) at the time of trial, the court did not find it necessary to take any action. Accordingly, the court dismissed the action with prejudice. The court denied, however, the state's later request for attorneys' fees and only awarded costs in the amount of $150,580. Although the U.S. did not prove its case during the bench trial, the court found that CHDC had made certain changes in policies and practices, most likely as a result of the DOJ investigation. Apparently, the court did not want to find the DOJ's claims frivolous or groundless and have to grant attorney's fees to the defendants. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 16, 2009, following a CRIPA investigation, the DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the state of Arkansas regarding the Conway Human Development Center (CHDC), a facility housing developmentally disabled persons. The court found for the defendants and the case is now closed.


On December 17, 2012 a Brooklyn resident filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York. The plaintiff brought this complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of the First and Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as violations of Article 1 Sections 8 and 12 of the New York Constitution. The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the NYPD unlawfully arrested her for filming a stop and frisk in her neighborhood. The complaint explains that it challenged the NYPD's practice of interfering with the right of individuals to film police activity in public areas. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that on June 5, 2012, after leaving the subway and on the walk to her house, she witnessed two NYPD officers questioning and frisking three youths she recognized from the neighborhood. To the plaintiff, it appeared the youths were only fixing an upturned bicycle. The youths repeatedly protested to the officers that they were only fixing the bicycle and that they had done nothing wrong. She asked the officers what they were doing, and when they brushed off her question, she began to film the event on her cellphone. The officers repeatedly told her to stop filming and to step further back. After repeatedly requesting that the plaintiff stop filming, one of the officers shoved her. The officers' sergeant was then called to the scene. Subsequently, the plaintiff informed the sergeant that she wished to file a formal complaint. Directly after voicing her desire to file a complaint, she was arrested and transported to the precinct where she was held for about an hour and a half. Her phone and purse were confiscated and the officers repeatedly asked her if she still wished to file a complaint. After issuing her a summons for disorderly conduct and receiving verbal confirmation from her that she did not intend to file a complaint, the officers released the plaintiff on her own cognizance. No criminal charges were filed against her. On March 11, 2013, the plaintiff moved to file an amended compliant, noting that the parties had conferred and reached resolution of the defendants’ concerns regarding the claims for declaratory relief, which the defendants had moved to dismiss in their answer. Magistrate Judge Steven M. Gold granted the motion and the plaintiff filed an amended complaint excluding the declaratory relief claims and identifying a "John Doe" New York City police officer defendant. The plaintiffs engaged in discovery between 2013 and 2017. There were ongoing disputes regarding the video the plaintiff took of the officers' stop. The plaintiff's video of the incident went missing days after her arrest, and the defendants sought dismissal of a spoliation sanction. On October 8, 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment on three grounds: 1) that the officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff; 2) that the plaintiff's retaliation claim required proof that the arrest was motivated by the videotaping and was unavailable when the arrest and subsequent prosecution was supported by probable cause; and 3) that the officers are protected by qualified immunity. The defendants also moved for dismissal of the plaintiff's claims against them for spoliation sanctions as a result of what they alleged was the plaintiff's destruction of the video she took of the subject incident. On February 8, 2017, the court (Judge Sandra L. Townes) denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and denied the motion for spoliation sanctions, without prejudice to renewal if the evidence at trial should establish that the video of the incident was likely to favor the defendants. After further discovery, the parties stipulated to a settlement and order of dismissal on June 7, 2017. The settlement agreement provided for $10,000 in compensation to the plaintiff and $35,000 for the plaintiff's attorney fees and costs for the dismissal of all claims against the defendants. The court ordered the dismissal on June 9, 2017.

Summary: On December 17, 2012 a Brooklyn resident filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. She claimed that the NYPD unlawfully detained her because she attempted to film a stop and frisk of three youths. The parties settled for monetary compensation and attorney fees in June 2017 and the case against the defendants was dismissed.


On August 21, 2007, two inmates in federal custody filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) "Standardized Chapel Library Project." Plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to this project, the Bureau banned and removed hundreds of religious books and materials not appearing on a pre-approved standardized list from chapel libraries across the country. Plaintiffs alleged that Bureau's actions were in response to a 2004 report by the Inspector General that examined the selection process of prison chaplains and warned of potential security risks created by inmates who were practicing extreme forms of religion, specifically Islam. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedures Act and the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. On September 26, 2007, the New York Times reported that the Federal Bureau of Prison had decided to alter its planned course of action with respect to the "Standardized Chapel Library Project." On November 27, 2007, after receiving a letter from plaintiffs' counsel, the Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) granted a stipulation to dismiss the case and confirmed that the project had been canceled, following the filing of this class action suit.

Summary: On August 21, 2007, two inmates in federal custody filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York challenging the Federal Bureau of Prison's (BOP) "Standardized Chapel Library Project." Plaintiffs alleged that pursuant to this project, the Bureau banned and removed hundreds of religious books and materials not appearing on a pre-approved standardized list. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that this removal violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Administrative Procedures Act and the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. On November 27, 2007, after receiving a letter from plaintiffs' counsel, the Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) granted a stipulation to dismiss the case and confirmed that the project had been canceled, following the filing of this class action suit.


On June 30, 2014, women civilly committed to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham (MCI Framingham) under Chapter 123, section 35 of Massachusetts law, filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court in the District of Massachusetts. They sued the Massachusetts Department of Correction, under 42 U.S.C § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Represented by Prisoners Legal Services Inc., the ACLU of Massachusetts, and private counsel, they sought a preliminary and permanent injunction preventing the Massachusetts Department of Correction from placing civilly committed women in MCI Framingham instead of an in-patient treatment facility. They sought to represent a class of others like them--women civilly committed because of drug and alcohol dependence who were placed in MCI Framingham alongside criminal inmates and without the facilities necessary for proper treatment of their disorders. On January 13, 2015, plaintiff’s certification motion was granted. the class was defined as “all women who are now or will be civilly held at MCI-Framingham based solely on an order under Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 123, Section 35." Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on January 27, 2015 to include the complaints of seven other “Jane Does” and to drop allegations of violations of parts of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On January 21, 2016 the Massachusetts legislature passed a bill to amend Section 35 practices. Four days later, Governor Baker signed the bill into law, enacting the Women's Recovery from Addictions Program. The law provided civilly committed women with alternative treatment options outside of prison. On May 2, 2016, that year, the state moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the controversy and class no longer existed. On June 10, the court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis that the court was not in the position to determine mootness because the plaintiff requested injunctive relief. The court suggested the plaintiffs amend their complaint again to request declaratory judgment as the preferred remedy. On July 15, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted a reply to the court's order to amend and expressed an intention to file a motion for summary judgment based on the amended statute. The parties did not agree on what the next steps should be, but nothing more was filed for about two years. On March 31, 2018, Judge Woodlock entered an order, in which he explained: <blockquote>"The landscape of this certified class action was transformed by the amendment of Mass. Gen Laws ch. 123, sec. 35, which the plaintiffs had challenged to the degree it provided a basis for civil commitments to MCI-Framingham. The defendants take the position that in the wake of the amendment all such commitments have ceased and that there are no plans to make such commitments in the future. The parties, however, have continued to circle each other suspiciously. The defendants seek dismissal of the case based upon their statement of present intention; the plaintiffs seek a judgment interpreting sec. 35 as amended to prevent civil commitments to MCI-Framingham as a matter of law irrespective of the stated present intentions of the relevant state actors. There have been no submissions in almost two years to suggest that there is any foreseeable circumstance in which civil commitments to MCI-Framingham may be undertaken. This case lacks the type of foreseeable concrete injury that would support any relief the plaintiffs might successfully seek. It is plainly moot. Nevertheless, given the defendants' studied refusal to concede that sec. 35 categorically bars any civil commitments to MCI-Framingham, prudence - not to mention this court's duty to protect the inchoate interests of class members - requires making explicit that this dismissal is without prejudice to any future litigation challenging civil commitments to MCI-Framingham should they ever resume. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed to enter a judgment dismissing this case without prejudice.:</blockquote>

Summary: On June 30, 2014, women civilly committed under chapter 123, section 35 of the Massachusetts general laws, to the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Framingham, for drug and alcohol dependence, sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections. They alleged that by being sent to Framingham, as opposed of an in-patient rehabilitation facility, they would not receive the treatment they needed which violated the Americans with Disabilities act. Class certification was granted on January 13, 2015.


On March 14, 2014, three lesbian women filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the State of Indiana. The plaintiffs, two of whom are married to each other, represented by private attorneys, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and asked the court for declaratory relief and both temporary and permanent injunctive relief. They claimed that Indiana's laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage, and the manner in which those statutes have been interpreted and enforced, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses because they deny plaintiffs the right to the most important relationship in life and make them second-class citizens due to the range of benefits that the legal recognition of marriage allows. In addition, one of the plaintiffs wished to obtain a legal separation from her same-sex partner and was unable to legally to do so in Indiana. On August 19, 2014, Judge Richard L. Young entered a judgment on both plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment. Bowling v. Pence, 2014 WL 4104814 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2014). The court ordered defendants permanently enjoined from: denying a marriage license to same-sex applicants, enforcing the same-sex marriage ban; and to administer the same services and benefits to all married couples regardless if they are same-sex or different-sex. In an interesting turn of events, Judge Young held that Governor Pence was a proper defendant in this case (Governor Pence was dismissed from the other same-sex marriage cases). On August 20, 2014, defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The Court of Appeals stayed briefing in this case pending its decision in Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), another same-sex marriage case from Indiana. On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued its opinion in Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), holding the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional (although staying operation of that opinion while the defendants sought review in the Supreme Court). On October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court denied review, and the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate from Baskin v. Bogan. The state declined to further litigate this case and it was dismissed. The parties subsequently reached an agreement on attorneys' fees that was not disclosed to the Court. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is one of the federal district court cases challenging the same-sex marriage ban in Indiana. The District Court enjoined Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the decision in three other same-sex marriage cases. The Court accordingly dismissed this case and it is now closed.


On September 20, 2019, two nonprofit organizations, alongside nine individuals (six of whom were also representing their minor children) filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director and Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the Attorney General of the United States. The suit challenged new federal expedited-removal immigration policies. The non-profits were Centro Presente--a state-wide Latin American immigrant membership organization dedicated to the self-determination and self-sufficiency of the Latin American population of Massachusetts; and Pioneer Valley Workers Center--an organization aimed at improving the lives of low-wage and immigrant workers in Western Massachusetts. The nine individual plaintiffs were all asylum-seekers who were threatened with expedited removal. The plaintiffs claimed that the new policy violated the due process and equal protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)(5 U.S.C. §§551), the Suspension Clause (Habeas Corpus), the Appointments Clause, and the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§1101). The plaintiffs sought to enjoin defendants from continuing this policy and also requested attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights and a private law firm. The case was heard in the District Court for Washington D.C. and was presided over by Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. The new expedited removal rule allowed any foreign citizen who had lived anywhere in the United States for less than two years to be submitted for expedited deportation proceedings. Previously, expedited deportation only applied to those located within 100 miles of a U.S. international land border and had only been in the United States for two weeks or less. On October 9, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause for why the case at hand should not be stayed until a separate case (Make the Road New York v. McAleenan) had been resolved. Make the Road New York was a class-action suit filed in the same court by the ACLU which also challenged the legality of the new expedited-removal rule. More information on that case is available here. The plaintiffs responded to the order to show cause on October 22, 2019; however this document was not available to the Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs filed a motion to proceed pseudonymously which District Judge Jackson granted on July 8, 2020. The case then remained in the pleading stage for most of 2020 and 2021 as the government asked the court to reset the deadline for their answer on numerous occasions. As of August 1, 2021, the government has yet to file an answer to the complaint. Judge Jackson was elevated to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit by President Biden in mid-2021; a new judge has yet to be assigned the case. As of August, 2021, many of the documents included on the docket are inaccessible because the case is classified as a private immigration matter. It is unclear if the case will be settled given the inauguration of the Biden Administration, but for now the case remains open.

Summary: A group of asylum-seekers and two immigration nonprofits filed suit on September 20, 2019 against the U.S. Attorney General, ICE, and DHS to stop the implementation of an expedited deportation rule that would have greatly expanded who could be swept into fast-tracked deportation proceedings. The district court granted a motion by the plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously on July 8, 2020. The case has remained in the pleading stage for over a year, with multiple motions for extensions of time by the government to answer the initial complaint by the plaintiffs. The case remains open.


This class-action suit was brought in the state court on June 4th, 2020. That same day, the case was removed by the defendants to the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The complaint was filed in response to police tactics used against protesters in Denver following the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, MN. Plaintiffs were individuals who participated in, observed, or wanted to participate in or observe the protests; they were represented by private counsel. The complaint alleged that Denver police used chemical agents (including tear gas and pepper spray) as well as Kinetic Impact Projectiles (KIPs) against peaceful protesters. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that these tactics represented violations of the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, they argued that DPD's tactics constituted an infringement on plaintiffs' free speech and free assembly rights under the First Amendment, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought class certification and several forms of relief including a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, declaratory relief, monetary damages for those injured by the police, and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Brook Jackson and Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. On June 5th, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order against the police; it was granted in part on that same day. The order enjoined the Denver Police Department from using chemical weapons or projectiles unless an on-scene supervisor (ranking Captain or above) specifically authorized it in order to prevent destruction of property that the Captain personally witnessed. In addition, the judge ordered that KIPs not be discharged at protesters' heads, pelvises, or backs and also prohibited them from being shot into crowds. The judge also enjoined the DPD from allowing non-Denver officers to use force in excess of what DPD used, made body cameras mandatory at all times, and said that chemical agents/irritants could only be used after an order to disperse had been given and adequate time to leave was granted. 2020 WL 3034161. Unhappy with this order, the defendants asked for two changes to the order. First, they asked for a change to the ruling regarding only using chemicals upon authorization of a Captain. Second, they requested a change to the body camera rule. Judge Jackson granted the first change, but denied the DPD's request with regard to the body cameras. On June 16, 2020, plaintiffs asked for an extension of the TRO, but Judge Jackson denied this request the following day, telling the parties to try to reach an agreement amongst themselves first. Several days later, Judge Jackson temporarily extended the TRO while negotiations continued. Then, on June 26, 2020, the parties agreed that while the lawsuit was pending, in response to a protest or demonstration, the Denver Police Department and any person acting on behalf of DPD would not:

Discharge KIPs and all other non- or less-lethal projectiles in a manner that targets the head, pelvis, or back;

Discharge KIPs indiscriminately into a crowd;

Use chemical agents or irritants, including pepper spray and tear gas, prior to issuing an order to disperse in a sufficient manner to ensure the order is heard and repeated if necessary, followed by sufficient time and space to allow compliance with the order.

Use chemical agents or KIPs unless an on-scene supervisor at the rank of Sergeant or above specifically authorized such use of force in response to specific acts of violence or destruction of property that the Sergeant had personally witnessed or learned about from a fellow officer, absent exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances included but were not limited to situations where the Sergeant could not be immediately present and delay would be unreasonable.

All officers deployed to the demonstrations or engaged in the demonstrations must have their body-worn cameras recording any and all acts of confrontation between police officers and others. Officers were not to intentionally obstruct the camera or recording.

Non-Denver officers were not to use any weapon beyond what Denver itself authorizes for its own officers. All non-Denver officers were to comply with Colorado law regarding the use of force and responses to protests or demonstrations.

The Court approved the stipulation the next day. As the protests continued, plaintiffs filed a motion for order to show cause on July 27 alleging that DPD officers were not complying with the court-approved stipulation. In the motion, plaintiffs highlighted two protests on July 1 and July 19. At the July 1st protest, the plaintiffs alleged that numerous officers failed to wear body cameras and that DPD targeted medics' and protestors' heads with pepper ball bullets. Similarly, at the July 19th protest, the plaintiffs alleged that officers again failed to wear body cameras and that an officer sprayed approximately fifteen protestors without any preceding act of violence or property destruction in violation of the court-approved stipulation. Together, the plaintiffs alleged that more than twenty violations of the stipulation occurred in these two incidents. On November 23, 2020, Judge Jackson issued an order directing Denver to file a substantive response to plaintiff's order to show cause. Denver did so on December 15, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Alleging violations of the Fourth and First Amendments, plaintiffs brought this class-action lawsuit in response to police tactics used during the spring and summer protests of 2020 following the police killing of George Floyd. Plaintiffs sought class certification as well as injunctive and monetary relief from the City of Denver. They claimed that the city police used excessive force and violated their rights to free speech and free assembly. Judge R. Brook Jackson granted an initial TRO, but also encouraged the parties to work together to form an agreement. On June 19th, Judge Jackson extended the TRO except insofar as it conflicted with anything that the parties worked out amongst themselves. The parties reached an agreement that limited DPD's use of less-lethal weapons and pepper spray and required body cameras to be worn by officers at demonstrations while the lawsuit was pending. The court approved the stipulation. As the protests continued, plaintiffs filed a motion for order to show cause on July 27 alleging that DPD officers were not complying with the court-approved stipulation by not always wearing body cameras and following the use of force provisions. The case is ongoing as of February 25, 2020.


On April 22, 2014, three same-sex couples and one individual filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Two couples wished to marry in Georgia, one couple sought recognition of their marriage celebrated in Connecticut, and the widow of a couple married in New York sought recognition of that marriage. Represented by Lambda Legal, the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit against the State of Georgia. They sought class certification, injunctive relief, and attorneys fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia ban on celebration or recognition of same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, depriving them of due process and equal protection. They argued that the ban passed no level of judicial scrutiny and that it discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and sex. On August 4, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint. The State moved to dismiss the complaint, and the court denied their motion on Jan. 8, 2015. Using rational basis review, the court held that the State did "not address how Georgia’s asserted interests in child welfare and procreation are advanced by the State’s prohibition on same-sex marriages, and the State’s refusal to recognize lawful marriages performed in other States." The court also found that the plaintiffs had presented evidence to the contrary, alleging that same-sex marriage prohibition in fact harms child welfare. 80 F.Supp.3d 1335. The State moved to stay proceedings pending the resolution of Obergefell v. Hodges in the Supreme Court. The court ordered, on January 29, 2015, that the motion was granted in part and denied in part. It was granted with respect to discovery in this action, but denied with respect to non-discovery pleadings. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court in Obergefell held that the right to marry is fundamental, and that it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2015, the court enjoined the defendants from excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions of different-sex couples. The court found that Obergefell was binding precedent and that it required entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The court enjoined the State from excluding same-sex couples from marriage on the same terms as opposite-sex couples, and from refusing to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the grounds of that marriage's same-sex character. The case is now closed.

Summary: This marriage equality lawsuit was filed on April 22nd, 2014 by three same-sex couples in Georgia. Two couples wished to marry in Georgia, one couple sought recognition of their marriage in Connecticut, and the widow of a couple married in New York, sought recognition of that marriage. The plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, depriving them of due process and equal protection. The case was ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs. On October 7, 2015, the court ordered that the defendants are enjoined from excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions of different-sex couples. They are also enjoined from refusing to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another state on the grounds of that marriage's same-sex character.


In 1982, a labor union, businesses, and individuals filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. They challenged immigration raids which occurred during the week of April 16, 1982, as part of "Project Jobs," a nation-wide enforcement action conducted by the INS and Border Patrol agents. The plaintiffs alleged that the workplace raids, which the government called "surveys" or "control operations," resulted in U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens being unlawfully detained, interrogated, harassed, assaulted, transported, and falsely arrested solely because of their race, national origin, ancestry, and/or language, in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. Attorneys with the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, California Rural Legal Assistance, the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., the National Lawyers Guild, the Employment Law Center, and private law firms represented the plaintiffs. The District Court (Judge Robert P. Aguilar) certified the case as a class action, over objection of the defendants. International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 102 F.R.D. 457 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 19, 1983). Then, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prohibit raids of factories absent either voluntary employer consent, unprovoked exigent circumstances, or a valid and specific search warrant. Judge Aguilar issued the requested preliminary injunction and refused to stay the order pending appeal. International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F.Supp. 884 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The government appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Eugene A. Wright, Circuit Judge) remanded the case with instructions to modify the scope of the injunction. International Molders' and Allied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986). On remand, both parties moved for partial summary judgment. The District Court (Judge Aguilar) granted partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, finding that the search warrant used at the raid of the Petaluma Poultry plant was invalid. The defendants' cross-motion was denied. International Molders v. Nelson, 674 F.Supp. 294 (N.D. Cal. 1987). Subsequently, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to assert an additional claim that as a pattern and practice, the INS employs general warrants to gain entry to businesses and seize unnamed "others." The case then proceeded to trial. At trial, the plaintiffs presented evidence for four months before resting their case-in-chief. The evidence included testimony and documents regarding the INS' use of general warrants at thirty-one different businesses. The defendants moved for a dismissal at the close of the plaintiffs' evidence. The Court denied the motion, finding that "the individually named plaintiffs and the plaintiff class have presented evidence in their case-in-chief to prove each of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Through the evidence of INS conduct at businesses other than those of the named employers, plaintiffs have shown the existence of a pattern and practice of unconstitutional entries into workplaces." Pearl Meadows Mushroom Farm, Inc. v. Nelson, 723 F.Supp. 432 (N.D.Cal.,1989). The exact progression of the case thereafter is unclear, as there is no docket available. We do know that the case was eventually settled. On December 11, 1991, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Edward A. Infante) entered a declaratory judgment approving the parties' settlement agreement. The judgment set parameters for (1) entry by immigration officials into workplaces during workplace surveys (valid warrant, consent and exigent circumstances) (2) detentions during workplace surveys (arrests, persons detained, use of force).

Summary: In 1982, a labor union, businesses, and individuals sued the INS and U.S. Border Patrol for unlawful immigration raids conducted under "Project Jobs." Their complaint alleged counts of unlawful detention, interrogation, harassment, assault, transport, and false arrest. In 1991, the parties settled the case and the court issued a declaratory judgment approving the settlement.


On March 6, 2007, attorneys with the national ACLU Foundation, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, the ACLU National Prison project, the ACLU of Texas, the University of Texas School of Law Immigration Clinic, and private counsel filed ten separate lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas challenging the conditions of confinement for immigrant children and their families who were detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas. Additional lawsuits were subsequently filed, and eventually twenty such suits were consolidated by the District Court (Judge Sam Sparks) as In re Hutto Family Detention Center, No. 1:07-cv-00164-SS. Plaintiffs asserted claims for alleged violations of the 1997 Settlement Agreement in Flores v. Meese, No. 85-cv-4544 (C.D. Cal.). In Flores, the U.S. Department of Justice settled a class action lawsuit brought by minor immigrant detainees by agreeing to establish minimum standards and conditions for the housing and release of all minors in federal immigration custody. The Agreement provided that: (1) children would generally be released promptly to their parents or designated family members, or, if necessary, to shelters and unrelated custodians; (2) those class members who remained in ICE's custody must be placed in the least restrictive setting possible, generally a facility or home licensed for the care of dependent, non-delinquent minors; and (3) regardless of where they were housed, detained minors were to be guaranteed a range of basic educational, health, social, and other benefits and rights. The Agreement also explicitly provided at Paragraph 24 that any minor in federal immigration custody who believed that the conditions of his/her detention failed to meet the established minimum standard of care could file suit in federal court to seek redress. The lawsuits filed by the Hutto detainees all invoked Paragraph 24 of the Flores Agreement and alleged that conditions at Hutto violated virtually every single provision of the Flores Settlement Agreement. Plaintiffs alleged that Hutto was operated as a medium security prison, where children were: (1) required to wear prison uniforms; (2) confined to small cells; (3) denied access to adequate medical, dental, and mental health treatment; (4) denied adequate educational opportunities; and (5) frequently disciplined by guards who threatened to permanently separate them from their parents. The lawsuits sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, requesting the release of the detained children and their families under reasonable conditions of supervision, and for an order prohibiting the government from separating the children from their parents. The government denied the allegations and opposed injunctive relief. On April 9, 2007, the District Court (Judge Sparks) held a hearing on plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. The Court granted plaintiffs' request in part and denied it in part, denying the request for the children's immediate release, but finding that the conditions at Hutto violated the Flores Agreement and that plaintiffs were likely to prevail at trial. 2007 WL 1074070. Judge Sparks determined that a full evidentiary hearing was necessary to determine the extent of the violations and the appropriate remedy. The case was set for trial in August 2007. On April 18, 2007, the government moved to dismiss the case, or in the alternative, to stay proceedings to allow settlement talks to proceed. Judge Sparks denied the motion on May 10. Settlement negotiations ensued and the case was submitted to mediation, where it was ultimately resolved in July 2007. A formal Settlement Agreement was reached and approved by the Court on August 29, 2007. The Agreement called for a number of substantial reforms, including changes in the areas of recreation, educational programming, guard training, improved medical care, visitation, food service and privacy, and elimination of 12-hour-a-day cell lock-down. Compliance was to be monitored by federal Magistrate Judge Andrew W. Austin, who was to conduct periodic inspections of the Hutto facility. The agreement was set to terminate at the first of three events: the publication in the federal register of final regulations implementing the Flores Agreement, the discontinuance of use of Hutto as a family residential center, and the passage of two years. On July 2, 2009, Magistrate Judge Austin issued his final compliance report, finding that Hutto had made significant progress in many areas, and especially in mental health services, but that food, communication between residents and staff, and staff behavior toward residents continued to be areas of concern, and that the facility, which was originally constructed as a jail, was ultimately ill-suited to its current use. On August 6, 2009, the federal government announced that it would cease housing families in the Hutto center, and by September 17, 2009, the last families had been transferred to a smaller facility in Pennsylvania or released subject to home or electronic monitoring. The Court (Judge Sparks) dismissed the case on October 6.

Summary: On March 6, 2007, immigrant children and their families detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas, filed a number of lawsuits challenging their conditions of confinement as violating a 1997 Settlement Agreement in Flores v. Meese, No. 85-cv-4544 (C.D. Cal.), which set out minimal standards for family detention facilities. These suits and others were eventually consolidated by the District Court (Judge Sam Sparks) as In re Hutto Family Detention Center, No. 1:07-cv-00164-SS. A settlement was reached in August 29, 2007, providing for the substantial reforms and compliance monitoring by the court. In September 2009, the facility ceased to be used to house families, and this case was dismissed that October.


On June 12, 2017, the District of Columbia (the District) and the State of Maryland (Maryland) filed this lawsuit in The United States District Court for the State of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States (Donald Trump) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2201. The plaintiffs, represented by the Maryland and District of Columbia Attorney Generals, Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief ordering the defendant to stop violating the Foreign and Domestic Emoluments Clauses. The plaintiffs claimed that the president’s continued ownership of private companies and acceptance of foreign gifts violated the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged they were hurt by the president’s ownership of businesses due to a real or perceived notion that the Trump companies should be given special treatment. The plaintiffs further alleged citizens of Maryland and Washington, D.C. were hurt as customers were diverted away from their businesses and towards the president’s in an effort to gain favor. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that President Trump's violation of the Emoluments Clause especially hurt Maryland, as the state was an original approver of the Constitution and had previously given up a similar clause in its own state declaration (prior to the Constitution). On September 5, 2017 a third party moved for intervention in the lawsuit and requested preliminary injunctive relief due to personal grievances. The court denied the motion on September 7, 2017 because the grievances had nothing to do with the original suit. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on September 29, 2017 arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing, lacked a cause of action against the President under the Emoluments Clause, and failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under the Emoluments Clauses. The parties continued to file amicus briefs for the next six months. The plaintiffs then submitted an amended complaint on March 12, 2018 to include the President in his individual capacity. On March 28, 2018, District Judge Peter J. Messitte granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion as it related to their standing arguments. He deferred a decision on the remaining arguments regarding the meaning of the Emoluments Clause. 291 F. Supp. 3d 725. He held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged injury for certain relief because it was plausible that the District and Maryland could feel pressured to give the Trump Organization special concessions, such as tax benefits and land grants. In addition, he found the plaintiffs adequately alleged injury because competing hotels owned by the plaintiffs and their citizens could also be injured by foreign officials choosing the Trump International Hotel instead of any direct competitors. However, he granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss claims relating to Maryland’s historical support of the Emoluments Clauses, general declines in tax revenues and any hotels outside of the Trump International Hotel in Washington, D.C. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss in his individual capacity for failure to state a claim due to the unavailability of injunctive relief on May 1, 2018. The defendant argued that the court did not have venue and personal jurisdiction over him in his individual capacity because he had no affiliation with Maryland. Furthermore, the defendant argued that there was no cause of action against a government official in his individual capacity under the Emoluments Clause. Finally, the defendant argued that he had absolute immunity against all court action because absolute immunity bars individual-capacity lawsuits against the President for actions taken upon assumption of office. Judge Messitte published a second opinion on July 25, 2018 denying the remainder of defendant’s initial motion to dismiss and speaking on the breadth of the Emoluments Clauses. He held that the definition of “emoluments” was broad and covered any non-trivial payment or advantage that the president received from government customers’ use of his hotel. 315 F. Supp. 3d 875. The defendant filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal and a stay of action pending appeal on August 17, 2018. Judge Messitte denied these motions on November 2, 2018 on the grounds that the defendant had failed to raise any substantive question of law with enough grounds for differences of opinion to justify an appeal. 344 F. Supp. 3d 828. Judge Messitte then ordered that parties meet to plan discovery and issued a scheduling order for discovery on December 3, 2018. The defendant appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on December 14, 2018 asking for a writ of mandamus to require the circuit court to approve an interlocutory appeal or dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaints outright. The appeal was separated into two cases, one to manage the issues surrounding defendant’s official capacity and one to address the issues surrounding the defendant’s individual capacity, and assigned the docket numbers 18-2488 and 18-2486. The defendant claimed that the failure of the court to dismiss the complaints was a “clear legal error,” and the refusal to certify an interlocutory appeal an abuse of discretion. This appeal also asked for a motion to stay during the appeal. Following the appeal, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the complaints against the defendant in his individual capacity on December 19, 2018. The Court of Appeals approved the motion to stay during appeal on December 20, 2018, and heard the appeal during its March session. In two separate opinions on July 10, 2019, Circuit Judges Paul V. Niemeyer and A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr. and Senior Circuit Judge Dennis Shedd remanded the District Court’s decision and dismissed the case with prejudice on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III of the Constitution. 928 F.3d 360. Under Article III, allegations must show a threat of concrete injury with “particularity.” Because the plaintiffs could not show evidence of customers choosing the President’s hotel over others in order to gain favor, there was no concrete injury and the Court held that the allegations were too general to comply. On August 26, 2019 the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing. As of October 2019, this petition remained pending and the case was ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, Maryland and the District of Columbia filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the State of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that President Donald Trump’s continued ownership of and involvement in the Trump Organization violated the Emoluments Clauses of the Constitution. In 2019, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing under Article III of the Constitution. The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing in August 2019. As of October 2019, this petition remained pending and the case was ongoing.


On April 11, 2011, Media Research Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that it qualified as an eligible organization under the religious organization exception to the Affordable Care Act's contraception mandate. The Plaintiff also asked for a declaration that the contraception mandate violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and for an injunction preventing HHS from enforcing the contraception mandate against it. On August 1, 2014, the Court (Judge Gerald Lee) denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed Plaintiff's claim of entitlement to a declaration that it qualified as an eligible organization for lack of standing. Specifically, the Court held that Plaintiff was not likely to succeed in proving that the contraception mandate violated the Establishment Clause, and that Plaintiff did not allege facts sufficient to prove that it was imminently likely that the government was going to enforce penalties for violation of the contraception mandate against Plaintiff. On October 14, 2014, the Court (Judge Gerald Lee) accepted Plaintiff's stipulation of dismissal of the remainder of the suit without prejudice.

Summary: In 2011, Media Research Center filed a suit attempting to preempt the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from enforcing the contraception mandate of the Affordable Care Act against it. The Plaintiff argued that it qualified as a religious organization eligible for the exemption to the mandate. In 2014, the Court denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed one claim for lack of standing. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the remainder of the case.


On April 20, 2008, Families for Freedom and the National Immigration Project filed a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedures Act against the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had failed to promulgate regulations governing facilities in which DHS detains immigrants, despite the fact that the plaintiffs had previously petitioned them to establish such regulations. Plaintiffs alleged that DHS' failure to respond to the petition violated § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), requiring a reasoned and timely response to the petition and that the constructive denial of the petition was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion under § 706(2) of the APA. On June 25, 2009, the court (Judge Denny Chin) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs properly stated a claim that DHS violated the APA. Further, the court found that the defendants' delay in responding to the petition was unreasonable. Because it held that the defendants had not yet responded to plaintiffs' petition within the meaning of the APA, the court dismissed plaintiffs' constructive denial claim as moot. The court ordered the agency to decide plaintiffs' petition within 30 days and closed the case.

Summary:
On April 20, 2008, Families for Freedom and the National Immigration Project filed a lawsuit complaining that the Department of Homeland Security had failed to promulgate regulations governing facilities in which DHS detains immigrants.

On June 25, 2009, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and found that the defendants' delay in responding to the petition was unreasonable. The court also dismissed plaintiffs' constructive denial claim as moot. The court ordered the agency to decide plaintiffs' petition within 30 days and closed the case.


On August 30, 2006, a group of ten children in the Nevada foster system, seeking class action certification for all children in or at risk of entering the Clark County, NV foster system, filed this class-action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiffs filed under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), the Child the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), the Medicaid Act, and state law. The plaintiffs sued a number of parties, including the state of Nevada, the Nevada Department of Health and Human Services, the Nevada Bureau of Services for Child Care of the Division of Child and Family Services, the Clark County Department of Family Services, the Clark County Board of County Commissioners, and Clark County. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Center for Youth Law and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the defendants had not met their obligations to children in the Clark County foster system, issue a permanent injunction against the foster system, provide for remedial relief to ensure that the defendants complied with their legal obligations toward foster children in the future, and award attorneys fees. Under federal law, the plaintiffs alleged that Nevada had not placed children in quality placements that comply with national standards, had not provided safe settings that were most family-like, and had not provided adequate health and education records to foster parents or providers at the time of placement. The plaintiffs further alleged that Nevada violated CAPTA by not providing each abused or neglected child with a guardian ad litem in judicial proceedings, and violated the Medicaid Act by failing to provide mandatory Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment services so children would be diagnosed with health conditions and receive necessary treatment. The plaintiffs further alleged that the Clark County foster system had violated substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment regarding protection from harm while in government custody, right to living environments that protect safety, and other causes. Major causes of action under state law included placing children for extended periods of time in a group facility that was overcrowded and unlicensed, leaving children in dangerous placements with inadequate supervision, and putting children back in homes where they had been harmed. On September 29, 2006, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Division of Child and Family Services filed a motion to dismiss. On December 11, 2006, the governor of Arizona also filed a motion to dismiss. On January 3, 2007, the Clark County defendants also filed a motion to dismiss. On May 14, 2007, the District Court (Judge Robert C. Jones) granted the governor's motion to dismiss and dismissed the State of Nevada and the Department of Family Services from the action. The court held that there was not enough of a connection between the office of the Governor and the harms to foster children, so the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the Governor as the representative of the State of Nevada. The court denied the motion to dismiss by the Department of Health and Human Services and the Division of Child and Family Services. The court also granted in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss by the Clark County defendants. The order upheld the plaintiffs' federal claims based on The Federal Adoption Assistance Act with respect to timely case plans, health and educational records, and notice of hearings, CAPTA with respect to providing guardians ad litem, screening and treatment requirements of the Medicaid Act. The court also deferred ruling on class certification. 2007 WL 1435428. On June 14, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint seeking class action certification on behalf of children in or at risk of entering the Clark County foster system against the above-named parties, excluding the governor, State of Nevada, and Department of Family Services. The plaintiffs alleged violations under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, CAPTA, the Medicaid Act, and state law, and asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. On September 4, 2007, Judge Jones granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under § 1983 that Nevada had failed to enforce state statutes providing for the plaintiff's welfare, noting that even if state law says a service is mandatory, that is not a constitutionally protected interest. Judge Jones also dismissed plaintiff's claim that by failing to follow to its state plan under CAPTA and the Adoption Assistance Act, the state programs using federal funding breached a contract with the federal government. The court noted that while plaintiffs may be third-party beneficiaries to the state plan agreement, they have failed to establish that agreements are contracts. 616 F. Supp. 2d 1038. On March 12, 2008, Judge Robert Johnston, the magistrate judge, ordered the defendants to disclose plaintiffs' foster system case files to plaintiffs' attorneys for the purposes of the trial. The court required the parties to enter a protective order to maintain the privacy of the case file information, and determined that the county was not required to provide documents that were not in its possession as part of discovery. On March 28, 2008, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. On July 10, 2008, Judge Jones issued an order dismissing the motion, which said that the plaintiffs had enough members to make a class (numerosity), but did not show enough commonality of interest, typicality of plaintiff type, or meet the adequacy of representation requirement by showing sufficient evidence of a pattern or practice of systemwide violations. The plaintiffs appealed this decision on class certification to the Ninth Circuit. On October 24, 2008, Judge Jones denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration of the magistrate judge's order allowing discovery to include non-privileged information in the case files of children who have been abused, neglected, or died while in custody of Clark County. Judge Jones stated that this information was appropriate for the plaintiffs to have in the process of trying to certify the class. On October 27, 2009, the parties jointly moved for dismissal with prejudice and withdrew all motions and appeals, including the pending appeal with the Ninth Circuit for class certification. The plaintiffs and defendants agreed each would pay its own attorney fees and costs. The foster children plaintiffs had all aged out of the system or were adopted. This has been a challenge for attempts to reform the foster system in Nevada through litigation, as cases are often challenged by lengthy delays in proceedings.

Summary: In 2006, a group of ten children in the Nevada foster system filed suit in the U.S. District Court for Nevada. The plaintiffs sought class action certification for children in at or risk of entering the Nevada foster system, and alleged that Nevada was failing these children under both federal and state law, not providing safe environments, consistent placements, or appropriate access to education or medical care. In 2009, all named plaintiffs aged out of the foster system or were adopted, and class certification had not been granted, so the plaintiffs withdrew the suit.


On September 30, 2016, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff sued the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (DOC), the Bureau of Health Care Services of the DOC, and members of the Health Bureau Hepatitis C Treatment Committee for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff first sued these defendants in a separate case in 2015. For the full factual account, see <i> Abu-Jamal v. Wetzel </i>. Here, the plaintiff, represented by a criminal defense attorney and the Abolitionist Law Center, sought relief for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, he sought a preliminary and permanent injunction ordering the DOC to provide the plaintiff with anti-viral medication to treat his disease. Judge Robert D. Mariani was assigned to the case. The defendants responded with a motion to dismiss on October 25, 2016. They argued that this case was “a subset” of the first case, so it should have been excluded under the first-filed rule. Second, the defendants argued the plaintiff could not prove Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” because other courts had already held monitoring and treatment sufficient. The plaintiff filed a response brief on November 22, arguing that the rule against duplicative proceedings is narrow and intended to prevent litigation of the same claim in different courts. Here, the two suits arrived before the same court, involved only one common defendant, and addressed different legal issues. On the merits, the plaintiff argued the dispute was more than a “mere disagreement” on proper treatment. Rather, the defendants refused to cure the plaintiff’s hepatitis C for no reason other than the cost of treatment, and the president in other jurisdictions was distinguishable. The parties agreed a new evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, and the court adopted the factual findings from the 2015 case. On January 3, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction and denied the motion to dismiss, finding the first-filed rule inapplicable. The court found relief appropriate because the defendants chose, for non-medical reasons, to monitor rather than treat the plaintiff’s condition to the detriment of his health, meaning there was a reasonable likelihood of plaintiff’s success on the merits. The defendants appealed this decision to the Third Circuit on January 12, 2017 (Appeal Docket No. 17-01156 consolidated with Appeal Docket No. 17-01125) and filed a motion to stay the preliminary injunction. On February 7, the plaintiff filed a motion to hold the defendants in contempt for failure to comply with the injunction. On March 27, the Third Circuit denied the defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal of the injunction order. Pursuant to the defendant’s motion, the court then dismissed the appeal on April 14. 2017 WL 3160959. Two days later, the plaintiff underwent sonogram and hepatic elastography testing that revealed his condition had deteriorated to grade 4 liver cirrhosis. As a result, on March 31, 2017, the defendants informed the court that the plaintiff would receive Hepatitis C medication. The defendants confirmed that the plaintiff would begin taking the antiviral drug Harvoni on April 6, and this would continue for twelve consecutive weeks. The court accepted this arrangement, and ordered on April 5 the defendants to file confirmation with the court once treatment began and to regularly communicate with the plaintiff’s counsel. The court held the remaining motions moot. On May 4, 2017, the parties jointly moved to consolidate this case with the plaintiff’s first suit. The court granted this motion the same day, and the consolidated case has continued under the docket number of the first case. See <i> Abu-Jamal v. Kerestes </i> for an accounting of the subsequent events.

Summary: In 2016, a prisoner at the Mahanoy State Correctional Institute filed a second complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants denied him necessary medical treatment, in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff received a preliminary injunction ordering the medical treatment. This case has now been consolidated with the plaintiff's first complaint.


The plaintiffs in this case were a Christian student organization at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill - Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity (AIO) - and two of its members. As a prerequisite to receive official recognition from the University, student organizations had to agree with the University's Non-Discrimination Policy, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of the student's religion or sexual orientation. The Policy conflicted with AIO's own policy that required its members and officers to be Christian and heterosexual. AIO refused to sign the Policy, and as a result, the University denied AIO official recognition and accompanying benefits. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Policy, filing a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the University on August 25, 2004. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. They alleged that the University's policy was unconstitutional both facially and as applied, in violation of their rights to Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Association and Free Exercise of Religion. At the February 16, 2005 hearing, the District Court (Judge Frank W. Bullock, Jr.) denied the University's motion to dismiss the case. On March 2, 2005, Judge Bullock granted a preliminary injunction motion to the plaintiffs, prohibiting the University from applying the Policy to student organizations that sought official recognition. Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity v. Moeser, 2005 WL 1720903 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 2, 2005). On March 23, 2005, the University voluntarily changed the Policy, offering official recognition to student organizations that select their members on the basis of commitment to a set of beliefs. In September, 2005, the plaintiffs applied for and received recognition. The University filed a second motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the recent developments had resolved the plaintiffs' claims. On May 4, 2006, Judge Bullock granted the University's motion to dismiss the case and denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. Alpha Iota Omega Christian Fraternity v. Moeser, 2006 WL 1286186 (M.D.N.C. May 4, 2006). Judge Bullock rejected the plaintiffs' fear that without a court-issued injunction, the University would in bad faith revert to the old policy and deprive them of the official recognition after the lawsuit ended. The Court also refused to award attorneys' fees and litigation costs to the plaintiffs, because they did not qualify as prevailing parties under the current case law. This ended the case.

Summary: A Christian student organization was denied official recognition from the University due to their refusal to comply with the University's non-discrimination policy. The Policy at issue forbade student groups to discriminate on the basis of religion and sexual orientation during membership selection. The Christian student organization sued to challenge the constitutionality of the Policy and filed a complaint in the federal court on August 25, 2004 against the University, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. On March 2, 2005, the District Court (Judge Frank W. Bullock, Jr.) granted a preliminary injunction motion to the plaintiffs, prohibiting the University from applying the Policy. The University changed its policy voluntarily and the plaintiffs successfully received official recognition under the new policy. On May 4, 2006, the Court granted the University's motion to dismiss the case, as the litigation-provoked change had resolved the plaintiffs' claims. This ended the case.


On October 11, 2017, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania brought this suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case is a challenge to administrative rules promulgated by the federal government that interpret the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in a way that gives employers broad discretion to deny women access to contraceptives. As such, the suit was brought against the President of the United States, acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Treasury, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Labor, and their undersigned departments. The ACA specifically enumerated a contraceptive mandate, which required employer-sponsored health plans to cover contraception. Defendants issued two administrative rules that expanded the ability of employers to opt out of these requirements based on moral or religious objections to providing these specific items. The plaintiff alleged that these rules were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, discriminatory against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and contravened the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiff contended that the rule conflicted with the establishment clause of the First Amendment by impermissibly promoting religious beliefs and with Fifth Amendment equal protection requirements enshrined in the Due Process Clause. It sought declaratory relief, attorney’s fees, and for the two administrative rules in question to be vacated. It also immediately moved for a preliminary and permanent injunction against the two rules. On December 15, 2017, the court (District Judge Wendy J. Beetlestone) initially granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, requiring the federal government to refrain from enforcing either the religious or moral exemptions rule pending the final ruling of the court. The court found that the rules were likely to have violated both substantive and procedural portions of the Administrative Procedure Act and because the rules would immediately take effect, the preliminary injunction was granted. 281 F.Supp.3d 553. The federal government appealed the injunction and the court granted a stay pending the appeal on February 9, 2018, with the preliminary injunction conditionally still in place. While the case was being litigated, the federal government amended the two rules that the court had enjoined them from enforcing. By amending these two rules, the federal government essentially circumvented the injunction. The court then lifted the stay on proceedings on December 14, 2018. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on the same day, incorporating the federal government’s amended rules and including most of the same allegations as the original complaint. The amended complaint also joined the Attorney General of New Jersey as a plaintiff. On January 14, 2019, the day that the proposed federal exemption rules were to go into effect, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction against nationwide enforcement of both rules. 351 F.Supp.3d 791. The federal government again appealed, arguing that the states both lacked standing to stay the two rules on a nationwide basis and that the agencies had discretion to interpret the ACA in the way they did. On July 12, 2019, the Third Circuit Court (Circuit Judges Shwartz, McKee, and Fuentes) affirmed the District Court’s grant of preliminary injunctions. The court found that the states had standing to seek an injunction based on the significant and imminent loss for tens of thousands of Pennsylvania and New Jersey residents of access to contraceptive care. They also found that plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction because they had established a reasonable chance of winning the case on its merits and that they would suffer immediate harm without relief. The circuit court found that the proposed rules likely violated substantive and procedural constraints in the Administrative Procedure Act. 930 F.3d 543. The Federal Government sought certiorari from the Supreme Court, which was granted on January 17, 2020. Oral Argument is scheduled for April 29, 2020. Defendants had filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 28, 2019, and both parties filed summary judgment motions on the merits of the case: the plaintiffs on May 15, 2019, and the defendants on June 14, 2019. These three motions were all held in abeyance pending the resolution of the Supreme Court ruling on the court’s preliminary injunction.

Summary: Eastern District of Pennsylvania Court allowed the Attorney Generals of Pennsylvania and New Jersey to temporarily put on hold federal rules granting employers substantial latitude to deny employees access to contraceptives based on religious and moral beliefs. The injunction was affirmed by the Third Circuit and is now scheduled to go before the Supreme Court in late April.


The National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty represented the Plaintiffs, homeless children and their parents living in Suffolk County. The Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied or deprived of access to a free and appropriate public school education and that the Defendants had violated the McKinney-Vento Homeless Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435; New York Education Law § 3209; and other applicable laws and regulations promulgated thereunder. They also alleged that the Defendants deprived the Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of two Plaintiff classes, a children class and a parent class. On February 20, 2004, the Plaintiffs filed suit against the following Defendants: the State Defendants (the New York State Education Department (“NYSED”), its employees, and the New York State Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (“OTDA”)); the County Defendants (Suffolk County Department of Social Services (“SCDSS”) and its employees); and the School District Defendants (fourteen districts were named, and the Plaintiffs also listed John Doe School Districts 1-10 to represent additional still-unnamed school districts who allegedly committed similar violations of laws and regulations). The Plaintiffs alleged that homeless children in Suffolk County were often turned away at the schoolhouse door, experienced significant delays in enrolling in public school, or were denied access to transportation or other basic services that formed the basic prerequisite for them to receive a public school education. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief asking the court to enter an order (a) declaring that the Defendants were in violation of the aforementioned statutes and the laws and regulations promulgated thereunder, and (b) requiring the Defendants to comply promptly with all such laws and regulations and do so on an ongoing basis. Many of the Plaintiffs spent each night of the week in a different location, or moved from place to place seeking temporary shelter. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants failed to take steps to ensure that children remained in their schools of origin if possible, nor did they assist families to ensure that the children received consistent, uninterrupted transportation to enable them to attend the schools designated for them by their parents. The Plaintiffs alleged that it took five days, sometimes longer, to obtain transportation to get children back to school after moving. Some Plaintiffs also allege that they were forced multiple times to transfer to different school districts during the school year. These children allegedly missed school because the School District Defendants insisted on enrollment paperwork – documentation of residency and immunization records – and refused to enroll them, without informing the Plaintiffs that they had the right to register children for school regardless of ability to provide this paperwork. At the relevant time, SCDSS’ policy required that, to request emergency housing, all members of a homeless family, including school-aged children and employed adults, had to appear at one of its centers to be screened and to await placement. SCDSS’ policy required families wishing to be placed in emergency housing to return to their local center the next day with all members of the family to await placement again for that evening. This could involve waiting all day, and caused homeless children to miss school. On October 23, 2004, Judge Arthur D. Spatt for the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted class certification and denied the Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The classes were defined as follows: Class A: All school-aged children (as defined by New York State Education Law) who, on or after September 1, 2001:(1) have lived, are living or will live in Suffolk County, New York; and (2) during such period have been, are, or will be “homeless” as defined in the McKinney–Vento Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11434A. Class B: All parents, guardians or persons in a parental relationship for children in Class A, who, on or after September 1, 2001:(1) have lived, are living or will live in Suffolk County, New York; and (2) during such period have been, are, or will be “homeless” as defined in the McKinney–Vento Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11434A. 224 F.R.D. 314. From the docket it is unclear when settlement discussions began, but on June 25, 2004, eleven of the School District Defendants and the Plaintiffs notified the court that they had agreed in principle to settle the case and requested that the court suspend all deadlines related to the School District Defendants. On October 7, 2004, Judge Spatt approved the Plaintiffs’ and School District Defendants’ Settlement Agreement and Consent Order. The School District Defendants denied the Plaintiffs’ allegations, but nevertheless agreed to substantially comply with the terms, which involved (1) providing information to homeless children and families, (2) identification of homeless children, (3) transportation of homeless children, (4) coordination with the State Defendants and Social Services Defendants, (5) appeals and dispute resolution, (6) training of school personnel, (7) evaluation and assessment, (8) provision of Compliance Reports, at least semi-annually, by each School District Defendant, and (9) revision of any policies that served as barriers to the enrollment and retention of homeless children in school. The Plaintiffs waived their claims to attorneys’ fees or costs up until the date of the order, but reserved the right to seek them after the date should further litigation be required to enforce the provisions of the order. The order was effective for three years, and the case would be dismissed upon three years’ substantial compliance. On March 31, 2006, Judge Spatt approved the Plaintiffs’ and State (OTDA and NYSED) Defendants’ Settlement Agreement and a Consent Order, and closed the case. The State Defendants agreed to pay Plaintiffs’ attorneys fees (in the amount of $378,291.33). The order obligated both the OTDA and NYSED to (1) collaborate with other Defendants, (2) revise any of their policies as necessary to comply with the Order, and (3) submit written Compliance Reports biannually for the first year and once annually thereafter. Additionally, the OTDA was required to (1) issue and/or revise administrative guidance to SCDSS and other social services agencies, (2) monitor SCDSS’ provision of school transportation to homeless children and develop a Corrective Action Plan, if necessary and (2) provide training to SCDSS staff. The NYSED was also obligated to (1) revise its appeals process to eliminate barriers to appealing, (2) implement data collection and analysis initiatives, (3) monitor the fourteen School District Defendants and sixteen other districts with significant homeless populations (i.e., more than 25 homeless students at any one time), (4) enforce compliance within the school districts, and (5) train all school district or local social services agency personnel likely to have contact with homeless children and their families. The order was to remain in effect through and including October 1, 2008, when it would be dismissed upon substantial compliance. Also on March 31, 2006, Judge Spatt approved the Plaintiffs’ and County (SCDSS and its employees) Defendants’ Settlement Agreement and Consent Order. The Defendants denied wrongdoing, but the parties agree that the Plaintiffs would receive attorneys’ fees (amount unspecified). The Order’s requirements for the County Defendants involved (1) providing information to homeless children and families, (2) making all reasonable efforts to provide homeless children with transportation to and from school, (3) discontinuing their policy of requiring homeless children to be physically present with their families to obtain emergency housing, (4) monitoring (to be conducted by OTDA and an SCDSS personnel member designated as a Compliance Officer) and data collection (5) coordinating with the other Defendants to ensure that homeless children enroll in and stay in school, (6) appeals and dispute resolution, (7) providing Compliance Reports semi-annually in the first year and once annually thereafter, and (8) revising any policies necessary to comply with the Order. The Order was to remain in effect through and including March 1, 2008, when it would be dismissed upon substantial compliance. The case is now closed.

Summary: Homeless children and their parents living in Suffolk County, New York, filed suit against various State and County agencies and fourteen school districts, alleging that they had been denied access to a free and appropriate public school education in violation of the McKinney Vento-Homelessness Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11431-11435; New York Education Law § 3209; and various other laws and regulations thereunder. The Plaintiffs alleged that homeless children in Suffolk County were often turned away at the schoolhouse door, experienced significant delays in enrolling in public school, or were denied access to transportation or other basic services. The Plaintiffs reached three settlement agreements with the school district defendants, New York State defendants, and Suffolk County defendants, respectively.


This is a class-action lawsuit challenging the detention of indigent individuals awaiting trial who are unable to post bail in exchange for their freedom. On November 12, 2019, three confined individuals in the Alamance County Detention Center, North Carolina, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Chief Alamance County District Court Judge, District Court Magistrates, the Senior Resident Superior Court Judge, and the Sheriff under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. They alleged violations of their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, their Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive and procedural due process, and their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Judge N. Carlton Tilley, Jr. was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina (ACLU) and the Civil Rights Corps, sought a declaratory judgment that would require the defendants to make individualized determinations of conditions of release based on the plaintiffs’ proposed bail-setting procedure. The procedure would require the defendants to:

assess each individual’s ability to pay bail and the amount of money he/she can afford;

provide a hearing at the first opportunity on the individual’s ability to afford bail;

provide the individual with free counsel at the hearing; and

 determine whether continued detention is warranted based on substantive findings on the record by clear and convincing evidence.
 In addition, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order requiring their release if they are not provided this procedure. They also sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of pretrial detention in the absence of the defendants’ written notice that the procedure is followed in each arrested individual’s case. Lastly, the plaintiffs requested that the court certify the class as “all people who are arrested and charged with non-domestic violence offenses who are or will be detained in the Alamance County Detention Center because they are unable to pay monetary conditions of pretrial release." The judge denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temporary restraining order and scheduled a December 2, 2019 hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. Before the hearing, the parties moved for an extension and requested that the hearing be rescheduled to allow them more time to reach an agreement. The judge granted the request and reset the hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to March 16, 2020. On March 2, the parties filed a joint status report and motion to stay indicating that they no longer need a preliminary injunction hearing. They indicated they were working towards finalization of an interim agreement and a consent preliminary injunction. The parties requested that filing deadlines be delayed to April 30, 2020. The judge granted the joint motion to stay. The parties reached an agreement and requested court approval of a consent order for preliminary injunction on May 1, 2020. Shortly after, Judge Tilley, Jr. approved the consent order for a preliminary injunction. Under the consent order, the judicial defendants agreed to put into place administrative orders and provide training to ensure that individuals in custody have their hearing within 48 hours of arrest or the next available court session and receive notice of federal constitutional rights at issue and about the significance of financial information to be collected prior to the individualized bail hearing. In addition, the order required judicial officers to conduct an inquiry into an individual’s ability to pay the full amount of bail and set forth a number of rebuttable presumptions establishing that an individual was unable to afford bail. The defendants agreed to reporting on compliance and to implement the order by July 1, 2020. The court retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with the order. According to the consent order for a preliminary injunction, the parties also continued to make efforts to reach a final resolution in the case. Since May 8, 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket. The court retains jurisdiction over the preliminary injunction, but the case is stayed. As of April 8, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 12, 2019, three indigent individuals awaiting trial and confined in the Alamance County jail in North Carolina filed a class-action lawsuit to challenge Alamance County’s wealth-based bail-setting and detention system. This lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Represented by the ACLU and the Civil Rights Corps, the plaintiffs argued that they, unlike wealthier individuals awaiting trial, remain detained and have been denied their fundamental constitutional rights and basic procedural protections simply as a result of their inability to pay bail. The parties are in the process of reaching a settlement. On March 2, 2020, they filed a joint status report and motion to stay indicating that they no longer need a preliminary injunction hearing and requesting that filing deadlines be delayed to April 30, 2020 to allow finalization of their interim agreement and consent preliminary injunction. The judge granted the joint motion to stay. As of March 12, 2020, this case is going.