On November 20, 1987, prisoners incarcerated at the California Medical Facility at Vacaville (CMF) and at the Northern Reception Center (NRC) filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CMF, NRC and the State of California in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Sacramento Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prison Law Office, the American Civil Liberties Union, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging constitutionally deficient medical and psychiatric care at CMF and NRC. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of confinement, including overcrowding and lack of wheelchair access, were unconstitutional, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. A two month trial began on September 11, 1989. On October 24, 1989, the United States filed a complaint in intervention, alleging many of the same deficiencies. And, in November, the parties began serious settlement negotiations. The negotiations resulted in a consent decree in which the defendants agreed to make many changes in the care and treatment of prisoners, including the AIDS subclass, without admission of wrongdoing or a court determination that changes were legally required. Specifically, the consent decree contained provisions respecting medical care issues, medical disability issues, mental health issues, AIDS, and general conditions issues including, among other things, law library access, housing assignments, sanitation, staffing, and exercise and emergency procedures. The consent decree also provided for its implementation. The Court approved the decree in Jan. 1990, and awarded the plaintiffs significant attorneys' fees. The defendants appealed the fee award. On October 6, 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Herbert Young Cho Choy) affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's attorneys' fees award. Gates v. Deukmejian, 977 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir. 1992). The Court held that certain methods the District Court used to calculate attorneys' fees constituted an abuse of discretion. On March 2, 1993, the Court amended on denial of rehearing. Gates v. Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1993). After the defendants appealed the District Court's order interpreting the consent decree, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed, on November 4, 1994, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Procter Hug, Jr.) affirmed in part and reversed in part. Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1440 (9th Cir. 1994). Specifically, the Court held that staffing adequacy should be determined from a correctional perspective, that denying HIV+ inmates access to food service jobs did not violate the Rehabilitation Act, and that the District Court's award of attorneys' fees was not an abuse of discretion. On August 3, 1995, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Hug) held that the District Court had jurisdiction to issue various enforcement orders, did not abuse its discretion with respect to medical enforcement orders, and was warranted in granting attorneys' fees; however, the Court held that the District Court did abuse its discretion with respect to its rejection of the use of gun to prevent imminent substantial property damages. Gates v. Gomez, 60 F.3d 525 (9th Cir. 1995). On April 8, 1996, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Mary M. Schroeder) affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's award of attorneys' fees. Gates v. Shinn, 82 F.3d 422 (9th Cir. 1996). On July 22, 1996, the District Court (Judge Karlton) denied the defendants' motion to terminate relief the Court had previously ordered. After the defendants appealed the District Court's entrance of a civil contempt order against them for failing to provide sufficient medical evaluation and treatment for all inmates, on October 16, 1996, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Kleinfeld) vacated and remanded, finding that the consent decree was too vague with respect to the appropriate level of treatment to warrant a contempt order. Gates v. Shinn, 98 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 1996). As described in Coleman v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 2695344 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 11, 2007), in December 1998, the parties entered a stipulation to dismiss this action, and to transition remaining issues into Coleman v. Wilson, PC-CA-0002 in this Clearinghouse. See Stipulation and Order Amending Plaintiff Class and Application of Remedy in Coleman, filed December 24, 1998.

Summary: This longstanding California prisoners' class action, dealing with medical and psychiatric care, was filed in 1987; in 1998, the compliance issues remaining were folded in with the (slightly) newer Coleman litigation, PC-CA-0002 in this Clearinghouse.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed on behalf of all individuals incarcerated at FCI Butner, seeking release as well as mitigation measures due to COVID-19. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and writ of habeas corpus on June 11, 2020. On June 29, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.
 On May 26, 2020, eleven people incarcerated in the Federal Corrections Institute Butner Low (FCI Butner) filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the ACLU of North Carolina, the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs, and private counsel, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, they alleged that their continued detention and the defendants' failure to provide adequate protections from COVID-19 was cruel and unusual punishment. The case was assigned to Judge Louise Wood Flanagan. In their complaint, plaintiffs asserted that "hundreds of incarcerated people and staff have been infected and eight people housed at Butner have already died from COVID-19." Plaintiffs further contended that the facility was severely overcrowded, with "4,438 men . . . crammed into a space meant for no more than 3,998." The plaintiffs sued on behalf of all those who were or would be incarcerated at FCI Butner during the COVID-19 pandemic. They also included subclasses for those who were over the age of 50 or who were medically vulnerable due to underlying health conditions. On May 28, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and writ of habeas corpus, requesting the release of inmates deemed appropriate for release and a mitigation plan that included testing, medical isolation, social distancing, and proper hygiene. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment on June 3, arguing that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. They also argued that the claims failed on the merits, citing the 2.1% COVID-19 morbidity rate for FCI Butner, which is lower than both the state and national rates of death, and that the purported class did not meet the requirements for class certification. On June 11, Judge Flanagan denied the plaintiffs motion for temporary restraining order preliminary injunction, and writ of habeas corpus. 2020 WL 3105094. Judge Flanagan stated that while the plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable injury, they had not shown they were likely to succeed on the merits and that the defendants had made reasonable efforts to prevent unnecessary illness and death. Judge Flanagan also determined that habeas claims concerning confinement conditions were not cognizable. On June 29, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal; this case ended. However, the plaintiffs then filed a new case with the same title; see its Clearinghouse entry for further developments.

Summary: Individuals incarcerated at FCI Butner filed this class action, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement due to inadequate protection from COVID-19. They sought release and improved social-distancing and hygiene measures. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and writ of habeas corpus on June 11, 2020. On June 29, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal.


On September 29, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a lawsuit in the Middle District Court of Florida, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against CNC Developments, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant terminated the complainant's employment after its management found out she was married to an African American. On March 30, 2007, after little substantive litigation, the District Court (Judge Susan Bucklew) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $27,500.

Summary: On September 29, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed a lawsuit in the Middle District Court of Florida, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, against CNC Developments, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant terminated the complainant's employment after its management found out she was married to an African American. On March 30, 2007, after little substantive litigation, the District Court entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $27,500.


On June 28, 2018, Muslim Advocates and the Center for Constitutional Rights (non-profit legal advocacy organizations) filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, raising claims under the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, asking the court to compel the defendants to immediately process and release to the plaintiffs all documents relevant to a FOIA request they had submitted in January 2018. They also sought reasonable costs and attorney's fees. The organizations had requested materials concerning guidance, interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of the waiver provision that was included included in the third iteration of the Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats (Proclamation 9645): the so-called “Muslim Ban.” They also sought a fee waiver, as their request was made in the public interest. The plaintiffs argued that no information about the waiver process had been made available to the public, even though the Supreme Court held in <a href=https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15626Trump v. Hawaii that the transparency and effectiveness of the waiver program was critical to assessing the ban’s legality. On November 19, 2018, the parties filed a Joint Status Report detailing progress in the process of producing documents responsive to plaintiffs' FOIA request. The Joint Status Report stated that on October 24, 2018, the State Department provided plaintiffs 51 pages of responsive documents consisting of emails and agency guidance on Proclamation 9645. USCIS stated that it had located 345 pages of documents that were potentially responsive to plaintiffs’ requests; it anticipated that production of the documents would begin in December 2018 and end by mid-January 2019. CPB had found three responsive documents. Finally, DHS reported that it located 3,675 potentially responsive documents, and that it anticipated production to being by December 15, 2018. While the filing of the December 20 Joint Status Report was delayed owing to extensions ordered by the Court at the request of the parties, three subsequent reports of this nature were filed on February 11, 2019, March 11, 2019, and July 9, 2019. According to the March 11 Joint Status Report, the State Department indicated that it had begun rolling production of responsive documents, and would continue to make such productions on a monthly basis. USCIS stated that it would begin rolling production of 2,700 responsive pages it located in April 2019. CBP reported that production of its responsive documents was complete, and that the agency had provided plaintiffs an explanatory memorandum describing the context and nature of the outcome of the agency’s search for responsive documents. Last, DHS indicated that its review of the 3,709 pages of its responsive documents was ongoing but that it was unable to provide an estimate as to when production would begin. Additional Joint Status Reports were filed on September 9, 2019, November 8, 2019, and January 8, 2020. According to the reports, USCIS finished its search and review of potentially responsive records, having processed 304 pages itself and referred over 2000 pages to DHS for review, which remained pending. Furthermore, DHS claimed that it had referred parts of the 3,709 pages of responsive documents to the Office of Inspector General for review and ICE and the State Department for consultation, from whom DHS was waiting for a response. DHS was also processing 2000 pages of documents referred by ICE, and would begin review of the documents in February 2020. Finally, per plaintiffs’ request, DHS considered producing a Vaughn index for documents that had been withheld or redacted. (A Vaughn index is a document that identifies withheld documents, states the claimed statutory exemptions, and explains how disclosure of documents would damage interests protected by the claimed exemption.) DHS said it was willing to consider a Vaughn index in a more limited form, and it asked plaintiffs to see if they would challenge any specific withholdings to which a Vaughn index could respond. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Muslim Advocates and the Center for Constitutional Rights sued the State Department, Department of Homeland Security, and Customs and Border Protection in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for violating FOIA. The third iteration of the "Muslim Ban", promulgated by the defendants, contained certain waiver provisions about which the plaintiffs argued no information was made public. According to status reports, the defendants are in the process of releasing information to the plaintiffs.


On May 8, 2006, disabled patrons of Denver's Center For The Performing Arts filed a lawsuit against the City and County of Denver and others in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law, alleging discrimination in seating and other facilities. Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed that disabled patrons of the Performing Arts Center faced many obstacles, including: "a. being told wheelchair seats are unavailable, when, in fact, they are; b. being sold tickets for seats that don't exist or are blocked by equipment; c. being sold wheelchair seats that are inaccessible; d. being subjected to lengthy delays getting to their seats or not being able to get there at all due to malfunctioning wheelchair lifts" and that individuals with hearing and visual impairments faced discrimination when the defendants failed "to provide interpreters for certain performances [and] make their web sites accessible" all in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADC), Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-601 et seq; the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-112(1). The plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. On October 3, 2008, Plaintiffs moved the court to certify a class of "all persons with disabilities who are currently or have been in the past four years residents of the State of Colorado who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint in this lawsuit, were denied or are being denied, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Ellie Caulkins Opera House." On March 13, 2008, the defendant City and County of Denver filed a cross complaint against the design company hired to renovate the complex, seeking indemnification. The parties appear to have settled. On October 22, 2008, the District Court: certified a class of: "[a]ll persons with disabilities who are currently or have been in the past four years residents of the State of Colorado who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, within four years prior to the filing of the complaint in this Lawsuit, were denied or are being denied, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of the Ellie Caulkins Opera House;" and preliminarily approved a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the City. The settlement agreement required the City to install wheelchair lifts, accessible seating, modify restrooms, and assign staff to operate the lifts. The plaintiffs' counsel would inspect the changes after 30 days. The City agreed to pay $10,500.00 in damages. On February 23, 2009, the District Court granted the joint motion for final approval of the class action settlement agreement.

Summary: Disabled patrons of Denver's Center For The Performing Arts sued the City And County Of Denver for violations of the Americans With Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and state law, alleging discrimination in seating and other facilities. The plaintiffs added a class action claim. The parties settled, with the City agreeing to modify its facilities and pay $305,000 in damages and attorneys' fees and costs.


On April 28th, 2014, representatives of the United Church of Christ, ministers of various faiths, and congregants all filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of North Carolina. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court to enjoin and declare unconstitutional all North Carolina laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, claiming that they denied the plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal protection. Specifically, the plaintiffs consisted of three different groups: the Religious Denomination Plaintiff, Clergy Plaintiffs or Minister Plaintiffs, and Couple Plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that by denying same-sex couples the right to marry and prohibiting the couples and clergy to have religious marriage ceremonies, the state was treating same-sex couples as second-class citizens and interfering with the plaintiffs' religious beliefs of marriage equality. On August 12, 2014, the court ordered that the defendants' motion for a stay be granted, pending the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bostic v. Schaefer (PB-VA-0005 in this Clearinghouse). On October 10, 2014, the Court issued a permanent injunction that, in keeping with the decision in Bostic, permanently enjoined the State of North Carolina from enforcing laws banning same-sex marriage or punishing clergy for solemnizing same-sex marriage and refusing to recognize same-sex marriage. On October 9, 2014, Thom Tillis (North Carolina Speaker of the House of Representatives) and Phil Berger (President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate) filed a motion to intervene on their own behalf and that of their constituents. On October 10, 2014, the Court denied their motion, finding their interests adequately represented by the Attorney General, and in their order issuing the injunction noted that, "...in the hours preceding this Order there have been a number of last minute motions filed by interested parties. The issue before this court is neither a political issue nor a moral issue. It is a legal issue and it is clear as a matter of what is now settled law in the Fourth Circuit that North Carolina laws prohibiting same sex marriage... are unconstitutional." 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 2014 WL 5092288, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144383. On November 7, 2014, Tillis and Berger appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit the District Court's orders denying their motion to intervene as well as the judgment of the Court. On December 8, 2014, the Fourth Circuit consolidated this case together with four other cases. On February 10, 2015, the Court of Appeals placed this case in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse.) which was decided in June 2015. After the Obergefell decision, the Supreme Court on June 30, 2015 denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. On August 11, 2015, the district court clerk granted the motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeals, and denied the motion to remand to the district court for further proceedings. There was no discussion of attorneys’ fees and costs. As of December 2018, there has been no further docket activity and so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: On April 28th, 2014, representatives of the United Church of Christ, ministry of various faiths, and congregants all filed a lawsuit in the Western District of North Carolina U.S. District Court against the State of North Carolina. The plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin and declare unconstitutional all North Carolina laws that prohibit same-sex marriage, claiming that they denied the plaintiffs' rights to due process and equal protection. On October 10, 2014, the court granted the plaintiff a permanent injunction, prohibiting the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage or punishing clergy for solemnizing said marriages in the State of North Carolina. The case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit on November 7, 2014, but is being held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse.) After the Obergefell decision, the Supreme Court clerk on June 30, 2015 denied the petition for a writ of certiorari before judgment. On August 11, 2015, the district court clerk granted the motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeals, and denied the motion to remand to the district court for further proceedings. There was no discussion of attorneys’ fees and costs. As of December 2018, there has been no further action.


On July 12, 2011, a prisoner subjected to long-term solitary confinement filed this pro se complaint against various officials at the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. He sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1986 for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights forbidding cruel and unusual punishment and violations of his substantive due process rights. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. Judge Joseph Van Bokkelen struck the plaintiff's initial complaint on October 21, 2011 (2011 WL 13365780) because it brought as a single suit separate claims that occurred in different IDOC facilities. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint in response on November 16, but Judge Van Bokkelen struck this complaint on similar grounds on February 2, 2012. The plaintiff's second amended complaint, which Judge Van Bokkelen eventually allowed in part, was filed on March 7, 2012. This complaint alleged that staff at the Michigan City, Indiana State Prison unlawfully moved him to an isolation unit at that prison after the plaintiff refused to answer questions regarding an escape of prisoners with whom the plaintiff socialized regularly. The plaintiff alleged that he did not participate in the escape, and that this punitive conduct violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He next wrote that, because of this non-cooperation, the staff conspired to transfer him to the Westville Control Unit (WCU), a Supermax isolation facility, where he stayed for over 900 days and continued to be held. He described difficult conditions in the WCU, including extreme cold, lack of access to religious services and outside contact, and unlawful searches of his mail; this tied into state law tort claims for taking his possessions while in prison. He alleged that WCU staff refused to reconsider his detention at the facility, despite 30-day review plans. In a May 8, 2012 order (2012 WL 13189032), Judge Van Bokkelen issued an order on the new complaint, saying that it still involved multiple defendants across multiple prisons. He dismissed conspiracy claims against the defendants involved in his transfer, saying that the plaintiff did not sufficiently plead facts surrounding their motivations and could only speculate on the existence of a conspiracy. However, he allowed claims to proceed against Michigan City prison staff that arranged the transfer to the WCU without allowing the plaintiff to defend himself, saying that this may be a violation of his due process rights. Discovery on the remaining claim began. On October 7, 2013, the defendants moved for summary judgment on the claim, asserting an affirmative defense that the plaintiff did not exhaust all administrative avenues available to him before going to the court system. Judge Van Bokkelen approved this motion on March 19, 2014 (2014 WL 1116888), stating that, even though the plaintiff never received written notice of his transfer, he had an opportunity to contest the transfer within ten days of arriving at the new facility. Judge Van Bokkelen dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed the judgment on June 16, 2014. On March 5, 2015, a Seventh Circuit panel composed of Chief Judge Diane Wood and Judges Ilana Rovner and Diane Sykes vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded it for further review (604 F. App'x 508). They wrote that the IDOC's manual stipulated that the prisoners must file an appeal only after receiving a classification decision, which he never received. The Seventh Circuit added that more defendants could be added to his complaint, saying that the plaintiff plausibly described a conspiracy after he invoked his Fifth Amendment right to end questioning. The panel noted that the District Court improperly dismissed the state law tort claims as well. The panel recommended that this case move to the Southern District of Indiana, since the plaintiff was then housed in a facility there. The case was transferred the following day. The plaintiff, now represented by pro bono counsel from private law firms and the MacArthur Justice Center, filed a final amended complaint on May 8, 2015. This complaint reiterated the allegations that the plaintiff was unfairly incarcerated in a separate lockdown facility after refusing to answer questions regarding the break-out, transferred to the WCU after inadequate process, and continued to be held there and denied access to basic necessities after insufficient review. Discovery began on this complaint in the Southern District, and the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on January 26, 2018. On May 22, 2018, Judge Richard Young, now presiding over this case, granted the motion in part and denied it in part. Judge Young dismissed the conspiracy claim to separate the plaintiff before transfer to the WCU, saying that the decision to separate him was based not on his willingness to answer questions, but rather to separate him pending an internal affairs investigation into the jailbreak situation, which was reasonable. He also granted the motion regarding mail, saying that prisons have the right to inspect mail to ensure it doesn't contain contraband. He partially dismissed due process claims for his expedited transfer to WCU, removing certain defendants that played less of a role in the transfer, but declined to dismiss the claim in regards to other defendants. The Judge completely upheld the cruel and unusual punishment claim for detention in WCU, saying that the plaintiff's continued detention there was not justified by continued disciplinary infractions. After this motion was filed, the parties transitioned to settlement negotiations. On October 18, 2019, the parties came to a settlement agreement. The judge dismissed the case at this point, and no other docket activity is present. The terms of the settlement agreement were not in the docket, but press reports detailed that the state agreed to pay $425,000 to the plaintiff, $100,000 for each year he was in solitary confinement.

Summary: On July 12, 2011, a prisoner subjected to long-term solitary confinement filed an initial pro se complaint against various officials at the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging violations of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights from long-term detention in solitary confinement without cause and without valid process putting him there. The case was transferred to the Southern District of Indiana due to the prisoner's transfer to another facility, and a settlement agreement was reached to award the plaintiff $100,000 for each year he was held in solitary confinement for unjust reasons, totaling $425,000.


This case successfully challenged county-level statutes restricting roadside solicitation. A homeless man filed suit against St. Louis County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri on June 5, 2019. Plaintiff was represented by private counsel. Plaintiff was a self-described “poor, homeless, unemployed single man” who frequently solicited donations from drivers in St. Louis County. At the time of filing, the plaintiff had a valid county solicitor license—that is, he could solicit cash donations from others but only at certain intersections and only three days per year. Because the plaintiff solicited cash donations outside of these three scheduled days, he was cited by county police 39 times. The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of multiple sections of the St. Louis County Code: Section 804, which regulates and licenses who may solicit for financial assistance; Section 1209.090, which prohibits pedestrians from soliciting for certain purposes in the roadway; and Sections 716.080 and 716.090, which prohibit vagrancy. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff alleged that Sections 804 and 1209.090 violated his First Amendment right to free speech, and alleged that Sections 716.080 and 716.090 violated his Equal Protection and Due Process Clause rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from enforcing these provisions. Additionally, the plaintiff sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his First Amendment right to free speech in a public place, violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free form unlawful seizures, and subjected the plaintiff to malicious prosecution. The plaintiff also sought attorneys’ fees. The plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction the following day based on the same allegations. Although the case was initially assigned to District Judge Jean C. Hamilton, it was reassigned to District Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh on August 22, 2019. Both parties consented to the granting of the preliminary injunction as to Sections 716.080 and 716.090, and Judge Limbaugh granted the motion on October 10, 2019. The plaintiff renewed his motion for preliminary injunction as to the other two sections a month later after the Eighth Circuit held that Arkansas’ anti-loitering laws violated First Amendment rights of citizens in Rodgers v. Bryant, 942 F.3d 451. St. Louis County moved for judgment on the pleadings on February 10, 2020. The plaintiffs first argued that the challenges against 716.080 and 716.090 were moot because both laws were already enjoined and the defendant planned to repeal or replace both. Second, the defendant argued that the plaintiff could not challenge 1209.090 as it was already upheld in ACORN v. St. Louis County, 726 F. Supp. 747. Finally, the defendant contended that plaintiff’s challenge of chapter 804 failed as he was unable to plead with probable cause that he was maliciously prosecuted for First Amendment activities. The defendant’s motion was denied on May 18, 2020. For 1209.090, the court distinguished Acorn v. St. Louis County by citing Thayer v. Worcester, 744 F.3d 60, where a similar ordinance was deemed to not be “content neutral.” The ordinance there was held unconstitutional “because it target[ed] anyone seeking to engage in a specific type of speech, i.e. solicitation of donations.” For chapter 804, the court said defendants failed to tie together the ordinance and defendant’s stated interest in promoting traffic safety. 461 F.Supp.3d 894. Plaintiff’s renewed motion for a preliminary injunction was denied as moot on October 13, 2020. Because the case had been submitted for trial, Judge Limbaugh stated that the motion was moot as preliminary injunctions merely “preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial.” On May 11, 2021, Judge Limbaugh entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on four of the six remaining claims. 2021 WL 1889914. Judge Limbaugh held that Sections 804, 1209.090, 716.080, and 716.090 violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and therefore voided the provision that prohibited soliciting financial assistance. Judge Limbaugh also held in favor of the plaintiff on his First Amendment claim for damages and awarded $150,000, as well as $138,515.00 in attorneys’ fees. However, the defendants prevailed on the Fourth Amendment and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiff filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment on June 17, 2021, and paid his court fees the following day. This case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiff, a homeless man, brought suit against St. Louis County on June 5, 2019. He frequently solicited to drivers on St. Louis County roads. He challenged various sections of the St. Louis County Code regulating roadside solicitation. He argued many provisions were not content neutral and overly vague allowing for unequal enforcement. Allegations also included violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Attorney’s fees, injunctive, declaratory, and damages relief were sought. On May 11, 2021, the court ordered that the challenged provisions be prohibited. Defendant was also ordered to pay plaintiff attorney’s fees and damages totaling $228,515.


The parents of transgender minors who sought, are seeking, or intend to legally change their names pursuant to Ohio law brought this suit. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against an Ohio probate judge, in his official capacity, in the Southern District of Ohio on August 3, 2018. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendant treated transgender minors differently from other applicants who sought name changes in the probate court. They sought declaratory relief and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge William O. Bertselman. The child of the first named plaintiff petitioned the court for a name change in April, 2018, and both of his parents consented to the name change. The plaintiff desired a name change because his school records and college applications could not be changed to reflect his chosen name until the name change was legal. The complaint alleged that, at his hearing, the judge asked him personal and irrelevant questions, and denied the motion for the name change until the minor became an adult. The second plaintiff's child had also filed for a name change in front of the same probate judge, which had been scheduled for August 14, 2018. Both of his parents consented, and he wanted his name to be reflected on all legal documents, including his school records, driver's license, and college applications. The third plaintiff's child had plans to file for a name change application, but had not yet, because he feared unequal and embarrassing treatment by the defendant. The complaint alleged that the defendant had a pattern and practice of treating transgender adolescents differently than other name change applicants. For instance, he made them have a name change hearing, whereas other name change applicants were assigned to a magistrate judge and were not required to have a hearing. The complaint also alleged that the defendant denied every application for a name change by a transgender adolescent, and that his decisions were based on preconceived notions about transgender people. To legally change one's name in Ohio, one must first petition the probate court, which has jurisdiction over name changes. Parents, legal guardians, and guardians ad litem can petition on the behalf of minors. Ohio law requires the court to consider the best interest of the child in determining whether reasonable and proper cause had been established. On August 31, 2018, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, citing judicial immunity and abstention issues. The court granted defendant's motion to dismiss on October 30, 2018. The court found that the defendant had judicial immunity because he had no personal stake in the matter, but was "performing his judicial duty to decide whether the name change was in the best interest of the child." Whitaker v. Kirby, 2018 WL 5622040 at *2. The court determined that, because judicial immunity required the case to be dismissed, it did not need to address the abstention issues, but that there were three that were relevant. First, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine barred the federal court from reviewing the results of state court judgments. Second, the denial of the name change was still on appeal in state court, which eliminated the need to reach a federal question. Third, the state issues were substantially parallel to the federal issues, that the court had discretion to dismiss. The case is now closed.

Summary: The parents of transgender minors who sought, are seeking, or intend to legally change their names pursuant to Ohio law brought this suit. The plaintiffs filed a complaint against an Ohio probate judge, in his official capacity, in the Southern District of Ohio on August 3, 2018. The complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint specifically alleged that the defendant treated transgender minors differently from other applicants who sought name changes in the probate court. They sought declaratory relief and attorney's fees. The court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim, finding that the defendant had judicial immunity. The case is now closed.


On August 8, 2013, several noncitizens being held in mandatory detention filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and various county sheriffs in Massachusetts. The plaintiffs argued that their detention in deportation proceedings -- without any chance for release on bail when they were released from criminal custody months or years before -- violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. § 1226). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and Lutheran Social Services, sought class certification and injunctive and declaratory relief. They also brought a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking individualized bond hearings to challenge their immigration detentions. The plaintiffs were lawful permanent residents (LPRs) who were convicted of crimes and were released from criminal custody long before they were detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of DHS. ICE had determined that they were subject to mandatory detention under the INA. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE misapplied the mandatory detention statute (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)) to individuals like them, who had been living in the United States for years after their release without incident. That statute required the government to detain certain noncitizens "when the alien is released." The plaintiffs argued that the statute only allowed mandatory detention for people who were convicted of certain crimes and who were taken into immigration custody at the time they were released from the criminal justice system for such a crime. On October 23, 2013, following proceedings on the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the Court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) ordered the defendants to grant the plaintiffs individualized bond hearings within thirty days while the Court prepared its memorandum opinion. The Court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In its order, the Court accepted the plaintiffs' interpretation of the INA provision at issue. The Court also directed the parties to file briefs within thirty days on the question of whether it was proper for the Court to retain the case to resolve the class-wide allegations. Gordon v. Johnson, 991 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. Mass. 2013). On December 16, the defendants appealed the order. On December 19, 2013, the District Court held a hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Court granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint, adding three further petitioners seeking individualized bond hearings. On February 7, 2014, the Court ordered these petitioners to be provided with individualized bond hearings. On April 7, the defendants appealed this order. Over the next few months, several motions were filed: a renewed motion for certification of the plaintiff class; the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment; and the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs also filed a second amended complaint, adding an additional petitioner seeking an individualized bond hearing. On March 27, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, granted the new petitioner an individualized bond hearing, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Gordon v. Johnson, 300 F.R.D. 28 (D. Mass. 2014). On May 23, the defendants appealed this order. The class was certified as: "all aliens who are or will be detained in Massachusetts under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), whom the government alleges to be subject to a ground of removability as described in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D), and who were not taken into immigration custody within forty-eight hours (or, if a weekend or holiday intervenes, within no more than five days) of release from the relevant predicate custody." On May 21, 2014, the District Court (Judge Ponsor) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, and scheduled a hearing to review the defendants' compliance with the order, and to discuss entry of final judgment. Gordon v. Johnson, 300 F.R.D. 31 (D. Mass. 2014). On July 2, the defendants appealed this order. The defendants' first appeal, from the October 23 order, was consolidated with Castañeda v. Souza, another case in the same Court before Judge William G. Young. Both cases involved the same legal issue: whether mandatory immigration detention applies only to noncitizens being detained by immigration authorities "when . . . released" from some predicate criminal custody. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's order, holding that the plaintiffs were not detained within a "reasonable time" after being released from state criminal custody, and that ICE's failure to detain them within a "reasonable time" mandated individualized bond hearings for the plaintiffs. Castañeda v. Souza, 769 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. Oct. 6, 2014). The defendants' remaining three appeals were all consolidated in the First Circuit, and were held in abeyance until the Court of Appeals adjudicated the first appeal. With the Court's decision in Castañeda, the Court of Appeals lifted the stay and set a briefing schedule on the consolidated appeal. However, the defendants requested an en banc rehearing of Castañeda, which the First Circuit granted. After oral argument on April 7, 2015, the First Circuit's en banc panel issued a December 23, 2015 opinion and order, affirming the District Court's judgment by a divided vote. The First Circuit then granted the parties' request to dismiss several pending appeals. Meanwhile, the First Circuit had been considering the defendants' appeal of the District Court's May 21, 2014 order granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs in the Gordon case. On November 21, 2016, the First Circuit (Case No. 14-01729) vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief, as inconsistent with Castañeda, and asked the District Court to determine how to proceed on remand in light of Castañeda. Back in the District Court, after discussing next steps, the parties proceeded with the case, engaging in discovery. On March 22, the defendants moved to stay proceedings pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Nielsen v. Preap (a case addressing the same legal issue); Judge Ponsor granted defendants' motion on Apr. 18. This case was reassigned to Chief Judge Patti B. Saris on July 10, 2018. The U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in Nielsen v. Preap on March 19, 2019. The Court reversed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that the mandatory-detention requirement applied only if a covered noncitizen is arrested by immigration officials as soon as he is released from jail. The Court held that regardless of when a noncitizen is detained by ICE following release, what determines whether they are subject to mandatory detention under the INA is whether they have committed one of the predicate offenses listed in the statute. 139 S. Ct. 954. Judge Saris requested a joint status report from the parties to this case in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Preap. On June 26, 2019, Judge Saris ordered that this case be dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new civil action challenging on constitutional grounds the application of mandatory detention to noncitizens who are not taken into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody. This case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, noncitizen detainees sued DHS, DOJ, and local sheriffs, claiming that the government was misapplying the INA's mandatory detention provision. The court ordered the defendants to grant the plaintiffs individualized bond hearings and adopted plaintiffs' statutory interpretation of the INA provision at issue. On March 19, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision in <i>Nielsen v. Preap</i>, addressing the proper interpretation of the INA's mandatory detention provision, and coming to a conclusion contrary to that of the plaintiffs and the District Court in this case. Consequently, this case was dismissed without prejudice.


On June 16, 2003, employees filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act against Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, restoration of jobs or front pay benefits, back pay, exemplary and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees, alleging that Abercrombie & Fitch Management Co. had racially discriminated against potential and active employees. The plaintiffs also sought to represent a class of such employees. Specifically, they contended that Abercrombie was systematically discriminatory, subjective, and arbitrary with respect to hiring, firing, job assignment, compensation, promotion to in-store managerial positions, and conditions of employment. They alleged that Abercrombie enforced a nationwide corporate policy of preferring white employees for in-store sales and management positions, desirable job assignments, and favorable work schedules. The EEOC, engaged in a concurrent civil action against Abercrombie, also concluded that Abercrombie was in violation of Title VII. According to the PACER docket, on November 12, 2004, the case was consolidated with two EEOC cases: EEOC v. Abercrombie and Fitch and West v. Abercrombie and Fitch. This expanded the complaint to include charges of discrimination against women as well as minorities. The case was initially assigned to Judge Maria-Elena James, who then signed the order re-assigning the case to Judge Susan Illston for all further proceedings. The plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint on August 18, 2003, alleging the same substantial facts and claims but adding three named plaintiffs and three defendants. They filed a second amended complaint on January 9, 2004 to include Title VII claims. The third amended complaint, filed on May 17, 2004, added individual gender discrimination claims on behalf of two of the named plaintiffs. The fourth amended complaint was filed on November 8, 2004. According to the fourth amended complaint, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of people applying to and working within Abercrombie & Fitch who faced discrimination due to their race, color, and/or national origin since February 24, 1999. After negotiations during court-ordered mediation, on November 16, 2004, the court certified a settlement class. And on April 14, 2005 the court (Judge Susan Illston) approved the consent decree. In this settlement agreement, Abercrombie was required to pay $40 million to class members, to pay attorney fees, and to implement extensive new policies and programs that promoted equal employment and diversity amongst employees, subject to the approval of a court-appointed monitor. In exchange, the plaintiffs agreed to release Abercrombie from all related claims. The parties stipulated that the consent decree did not constitute an admission of liability. The consent decree was to remain in effect for a period of six years until April 14, 2011. In addition, the parties agreed to the appointment of a Special Master in charge of dispute resolution and enforcement procedures under the consent decree. On August 28, 2009, the plaintiffs initiated dispute resolution proceedings to assert that Abercrombie had failed to comply with its hiring obligations under the decree. The Special Master made a decision on April 15, 2011 that ordered Abercrombie to make an adverse impact review and assessment of its selection criteria, but denied the plaintiff’s request that Abercrombie implement alternative selection criteria and extend the consent decree. The plaintiffs challenged the Special Master’s decision. Judge Illston affirmed on June 23, 2011 and ordered Abercrombie to submit a report of the adverse impact review to the plaintiffs and the Court after completion. 2011 WL 2516621. As of April 2011, the period of the consent decree ended and the case is now closed

Summary: This case was brought by multiple employees against their employer, Abercrombie & Fitch Inc., seeking injunctive relief, restoration of jobs or front pay benefits, back pay, exemplary and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that Abercrombie discriminated against women and minorities through a variety of policies and practices. The case was settled by consent decree on April 14, 2005, resulting in relief granted.


The U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division initiated a civil investigation of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department on August 19, 2011. The investigation focused on allegations of unconstitutional conduct by deputies at two stations located in the Antelope Valley cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, California. The DOJ proceeded under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. § 14141 (Section 14141), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI). These laws authorize the United States to file a legal action when it has reasonable cause to believe that a law enforcement agency engages in a pattern or practice of violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. In addition, the investigation was also founded on the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631. On June 28, 2013, the Civil Rights Division issued a findings letter to the LASD. The letter explained that the DOJ found that LASD's Antelope Valley stations engaged in a pattern or practice of discriminatory and otherwise unlawful searches and seizures, including the use of unreasonable force, in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Title VI. The DOJ found, as well, that deputies assigned to these stations had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against African Americans in violation of the Fair Housing Act, by targeting certain residents who possessed housing vouchers. Although the County denied the allegation of unconstitutional conduct, simultaneous to the findings letter being made public, the parties entered a "statement of intent" to reach a comprehensive settlement agreement to be negotiated between the County of Los Angeles and the U.S. The statement of intent explained that "[t]he Agreement to be negotiated is intended to ensure that: 1) LASD personnel in the Antelope Valley engage in practices that comply with the Constitution and laws of the United States; and 2) the objectives of LASD's Core Values and Trust-Based Policing program are realized in the Antelope Valley community." The "statement of intent" indicated that the parties intended to reach a final settlement agreement by August 30, 2013. Settlement negotiations took quite a bit longer. It was not until April 28, 2015, that the Department of Justice filed this lawsuit and its proposed settlement agreement. The case was filed in the U.S. Federal District Court for the Central District of California. Per the complaint, the DOJ brought this action under the Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act (42 U.S.C. § 14141) and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act as amended by the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601). The DOJ alleged that the County violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act by engaging in the conduct described in its June 2013 letter. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the County: (a) detained individuals without legal authority (b) engaged in a pattern of unreasonable force in violation of the 14th amendment (c) stopped and searched African American and Latino residents on impermissible considerations of race and ethnicity in violation of the 14th amendment (d) violated the Fair Housing Act by targeting African American residents participating in the Housing Choice Voucher Program (e) failed to create adequate accountability systems to curb unlawful policing The DOJ requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. Under the terms of the settlement, filed the same day, within four years the County would: (a) create procedures to stop the practice of and detect discriminatory stops, searches, and seizures, as well as training on appropriate practices and the terms of the Settlement Agreement (b) ensure bias-free policing through training and monitoring of its practices across the County (c) create and implement a housing non-discrimination policy, as well as a mechanism for documenting all incidents involving voucher holders (d) enhance its data collection, analysis, and reporting methods to better assess its programs and improvement (e) enhance community engagement through increased transparency and community feedback mechanisms (f) revise its policies on use of force to encourage alternatives and de-escalation, prohibit certain actions, promote reporting on all incidents of use of force, and provide for supervision, training, and analysis (g) create and implement policies to ensure accountability through personnel complaint review procedures, analysis of personnel data, and mentorship; and (h) comply with stipulated monitoring requirements and assessment procedures. Further, the Settlement required the County to pay $700,000 to those harmed by its violations of the Fair Housing Act and $25,000 in civil penalties. It created two categories of individuals harmed. Individuals within Category 1 could receive between $1000 and $10,000 in damages. Those within Category 2 could receive between $5000 and $20,000. The Court approved the settlement agreement on May 1, 2015 and a supplemental settlement agreement on July 21, 2015. The supplemental agreement established the terms and schedule for awarding damages to individuals harmed by the County's violation of the Fair Housing Act. On May 24, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation to amend the settlement order. After searching for individuals who fell within the two categories created by the settlement, they determined that more individuals would qualify under Category 2. The amendment reduced the low end of the range of potential damages awarded to $3000 to ensure that more individuals would receive damages. The court approved the amendment on May 25. The Court retains jurisdiction over the settlement's enforcement. The case will be closed with prejudice once the settlement is fully executed. Monitoring continues every six months, with the ninth report filed on January 24, 2020. This report says that the LASD has yet to reach full implementation of the settlement agreement, after which it must maintain full implementation for one year before the agreement is completed. The case is ongoing as of June 9, 2020.

Summary: The DOJ investigated complaints of alleged constitutional violations by two stations in Antelope Valley in the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, California. On June 28, 2013, the DOJ issued a findings letter to the LASD indicating that the stations under investigation demonstrated patterns or practices of illegal activity. On May 1, 2015, the parties entered into a court-approved settlement to curb the discriminatory practices in policing and housing, enhance community engagement, and create mechanisms for analyzing and monitoring the County's improvements. The case is ongoing pending closure of the settlement period.


On June 24, 2005, a job applicant who was rejected by defendant because she did not have two years heavy industrial experience, filed a class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981a against United States Steel Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Southern Division. On June 19, 2008, other named plaintiffs joined the suit and amended the complaint to include additional class action allegations. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory judgment, equitable relief and money damages, claiming that defendant's reliance upon "heavy industrial experience" and other selection criteria had disparate impact on female applicants and that defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of discriminating against females on the basis of their sex with respect to production positions. On January 13, 2009, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement. On March 2, 2009, the Court (Judge Virginia Emerson Hopkins) approved the settlement. According to the settlement agreement, the company agreed to implement a new hiring process and to pay up to $580,000.00 to the Class Fund, along with plaintiffs' attorney fees and costs.

Summary: This case was brought by rejected female job applicants rejected against defendant United States Steel Corporation seeking declaratory judgment, equitable relief and money damages. The case ended with a court-approved class settlement on March 2, 2009.


The Los Angeles and Honolulu offices of the EEOC brought this suit against L & T International Corporation, L & T Group of Companies, Ltd., Tan Holdings Corporation, Tan Holdings Overseas Incorporated, Concorde Garment Manufacturing Corporation, Micro Pacific, Inc. and Seasonal Incorporated in the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands in September 2006. The complaint alleged discrimination based on national origin and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. More specifically, in the complaint, the EEOC alleged the defendants discriminated against Filipino and Bangladeshi employees by terminating their employment or refusing to renew their employment contracts in retaliation for filing discrimination charges against the defendants. Judge Alex R. Munson was assigned to this case. While originally scheduled for March 2008, the trial date was rescheduled for August 2008. Afterward, the pre-trial and trial dates were continually extended until the parties finally agreed to settle. On March 19, 2009, the court ordered an approval of the parties’ consent decree. The parties agreed that the defendants would pay $210,910 in monetary relief, and that the terms of the settlement would be reached at a later date. On July 28, 2009, the court approved the parties’ second consent decree. This decree had a duration of three years and included monetary and injunctive relief. The decree reiterated the parties’ agreed upon monetary relief amount from March 19, 2009. As to the injunctive relief, the decree had nine parts: 1) The defendants were prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and retaliation. 2) The defendants were required to review, implement, and revise their policies to align with Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 3) The defendants were required to distribute this policy to all employees, forty-five days after the consent decree was ordered. 4) The defendants were required to distribute the notice of the consent decree and settlement to all employees, thirty days after the consent decree was ordered. 5) The defendants were required to retain an Equal Employment Opportunity Consultant. This consultant would be responsible for monitoring the defendants in the areas of retaliation and employment discrimination. The EEOC had to approve of the consultant retained. 6) This decree required the defendants to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all employees. 7) The defendants were required to maintain and make available to the EEOC materials relevant to employment discrimination. The materials required included any employment discrimination complaints made, documentation of the employees that attended the anti-discrimination training, documents generated during monitoring and counseling of employees suspected of discriminating against other employees, documentation of employees that suspected they were retaliated against, and documentation of any employee that became pregnant during the time they were employed by the defendants. 8) Every six months within the duration of this decree, the defendants had to provide reports to the EEOC. These reports had to contain information on the employees that attended training, copies of all discrimination and retaliation complaints, results of each investigation of discrimination and retaliation, and acknowledgement that all employees received anti-discrimination/retaliation policies. 9) The EEOC had the ability to inspect the defendants’ premises to ensure compliance with Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. The case is presumably closed, as there are no further activity on the case docket and the duration of the consent decree has lapsed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), on behalf of employees with the national origin of Filipino and Bangladeshi, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mariana Islands. The plaintiffs alleged the several companies named as defendants had engaged in national origin discrimination. The case ended in a consent decree with monetary and injunctive relief.


On December 8, 2014, residents of St. Louis and Ferguson, MO, filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the co-directors of the Unified Command, which was responsible for oversight and control of all the law enforcement response to demonstrations following the killing of Michael Brown. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from ArchCity Defenders, Saint Louis University Legal Clinic, Advancement Project, Saint Louis Law School, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sought damages, a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief, alleging that their First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of unreasonable and unnecessary force during organized protests. On November 24, 2014, following the announcement of the Grand Jury's decision to not indict Officer Darren Wilson, the police officer who killed African-American teenager Michael Brown, citizens began to protest and voice their opinions about the frequency of unarmed African-American men being shot by police officers and the lack of police accountability. These demonstrations were met with a militarized response by police officers, including appearing in tanks and riot gear and shooting peaceful demonstrators with tear gas, pepper spray, and rubber bullets. Because of the law enforcement's response to the demonstrations, several members of the community were harmed and prevented from exercising their constitutional rights. On December 11, 2014, District Court Judge Carol E. Jackson granted the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the defendants. Judge Jackson ordered the defendants to refrain from using chemical agents to assist in the dispersing of groups engaged in non-criminal activities without issuing a clear warning that such steps would be taken and allowing individuals a sufficient opportunity to leave the area. On January 5, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the TRO. The defendants argued that the TRO was against them acting in their capacities as directors of Unified Command, an entity created by the governor on November 17, 2014, in response to the protests stemming from the killing of Michael Brown. Since the executive order expired December 17, 2014, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims were moot and should be dismissed. Judge Jackson denied their motion, noting that the complaint was brought against the defendants not only in their capacities as directors of Unified Command, but also in their official capacities as police officers and as officials of Missouri Highway control. On January 5, 2015, Judge Jackson also dismissed the defendants' request for expedited discovery on the grounds that the request was not sufficiently supported. On March 25, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss and a settlement agreement. The defendants agreed to command their law enforcement to prohibit the use of tear gas, pepper spray, and other chemical agents, and the payment of the plaintiff's attorney fees and costs from the defendant totaling $7,500, with each defendant contributing $2,500 to the total amount. On March 26, 2015, Judge Jackson granted the parties' motion to dismiss, retaining jurisdiction for the sole purpose of determining whether the settlement shall be enforced upon any motion of any party.

Summary: In 2014, residents of St. Louis and Ferguson, MO filed a lawsuit against the co-directors of the Unified Command, which was responsible for oversight and control of all the law enforcement response to demonstrations following the killing of Michael Brown. The plaintiffs sought damages, a temporary restraining order and injunctive relief, alleging that their First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated as a result of unreasonable and unnecessary force from police officers during organized protests. In 2015, the parties settled the case.


Parents, as next of friend of female students of Midlothian Public School District, filed suit against the school district under Title IX of the Education Amendment, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on April 18, 2001 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district had violated Title IX by discriminating against female students as to the sports and opportunities offered. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants discriminated against female students in the funding of athletics, equipment and supplies, travel and/or meals, opportunity to receive qualified coaching, assignment and/or compensation of coaches, provision of locker rooms and facilities for practice and competition, and the provision of training facilities and services. Plaintiffs sought class certification for all female students in the Midlothian School District. On May 21, 2002, Judge Sam Lindsay held that plaintiffs lacked standing to assert effective accommodation claims. Because the plaintiffs already participated in interscholastic athletics, they could not demonstrate an "injury in fact" with respect to effective accommodations. The court held that plaintiffs did have standing to pursue their unequal treatment claims. In the same opinion, the court certified the class of female students at Midlothian schools. On September 11, 2002, the court entered a consent decree, absent any admission of wrong-doing by the defendants, based on a joint stipulation of the parties. Among other things, the parties agreed that the school district would continue to encourage participation in school-sponsored sports via notification to all students of sports offered, maintain accurate accounting records of expenditures for male and female sports, maintain a commitment to providing off-season training to all female sports on a basis equivalent with that provided for male sports, publish a policy in the school handbook of the district's policy of equal treatment for male and female athletes, provide coach to athlete ratios for female sports equal to that of male sports, and avoid cancellation of games for gender reasons. The district also agreed to provide summer camps for female sports, provide trainers to female athletes, provide comparable athletic facilities for male and female students in facilities built after January 1, 2002, and to provide spectator facilities for the softball competition field equivalent to those of the baseball field. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 22, 2003.

Summary: Parents of female students brought suit against the school district, alleging unequal treatment for female athletes and inadequate accommodations in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. After mediation, the parties agreed to a joint stipulation. The court entered a consent decree in which the school district agreed to improve facilities for female athletics and increase the publicity of athletics offered for both males and females. The case was dismissed on January 22, 2003.


On June 5, 2008, several U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the Attorney General's Office, under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The plaintiffs, represented by the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center and private counsel, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and approval of all of the plaintiffs' naturalization applications, alleging that the defendants had unlawfully and unreasonably delayed rendering a decision on the plaintiffs' naturalization applications. The plaintiffs all had applications for naturalization (citizenship) that had been delayed for 2-4 years after they had completed their citizenship interviews. The plaintiffs argued that they met all of the statutory requirements of becoming a U.S. citizen and that federal law dictated that naturalization applications should be decided within 120 days. They also argued that federal law provided that where applicants met all legal requirements for naturalization, USCIS "shall grant" the application. As a result of the long delays in the adjudication of their applications, the plaintiffs claimed that they suffered hardship, such as anxiety over their immigration applications, prolonged family separations, ineligibility for certain employment opportunities or public benefits, and the exclusion from the political process due to their inability to vote. On October 1, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On November 28, 2008, the District Court (Judge Federico A. Moreno) granted the defendants' motion to remand the plaintiffs' application back down to USCIS for adjudication. If the defendants failed to adjudicate the plaintiffs' applications within 90 days, then the plaintiffs would be able to refile their claim. The District Court also denied the motions for class certification and denied all other motions as moot.

Summary: On June 5, 2008, several U.S. Lawful Permanent Residents filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"), the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), and the Attorney General's Office, under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). The plaintiffs, represented by the Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center and private counsel, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and approval of all of the plaintiffs' naturalization applications, alleging that the defendants had unlawfully and unreasonably delayed rendering a decision on the plaintiffs' naturalization applications. On November 28, 2008, the District Court (Judge Federico A. Moreno) granted the defendants' motion to remand the plaintiffs' application back down to USCIS for adjudication. If the defendants failed to adjudicate the plaintiffs' applications within 90 days, then the plaintiffs would be able to refile their claim. The District Court also denied the motions for class certification and denied all other motions as moot.


Plaintiffs, individuals with dual diagnoses of mental illness (MI) and developmental disabilities (DD), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina to challenge North Carolina's termination of state funding for their community-based services. Each plaintiff received home-based care through federal Medicaid waiver services and supplemental state funds for those with MI/DD dual diagnoses. When the state announced that it would end the supplemental state-funded services, the plaintiffs challenged this determination as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiffs filed a complaint on December 11, 2009, along with a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The court (Judge Terrence W. Boyle) granted the temporary restraining order on December 14th. The United States (Department of Justice) filed a brief supporting the Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on December 23, 2009. After a hearing held on December 28, 2009, the court granted a preliminary injunction that prevented the state from reducing Plaintiffs' services. On January 14, 2010, Judge Boyle issued a written opinion granting the preliminary injunction, explaining that the Plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable harm and are likely to succeed on the merits of their claim of an ADA violation in these service reductions. The parties continued with discovery and mediation until the spring of 2011. At that time, the parties entered into a private settlement agreement, likely continuing the services that the Plaintiffs were receiving. The parties agreed to dismiss the case on June 13, 2011.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals with mental illness and developmental disabilities, challenged North Carolina's decision to discontinue state-level supplements to federal Medicaid waiver funding. The community-based services offered through this program allowed the Plaintiffs to remain in their homes and out of institutions. The court granted a preliminary injunction that prevented the state from reducing services. The parties later settled.


Plaintiffs, individuals held in the Hamblen County (TN) jail pre-trial due to an inability to pay bail, filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, on February 16, 2020, on behalf of themselves and all other past and future detainees in the jail unable to make bail. They sued officials in the Hamblen County Court system and the Hamblen County Sheriff for what they alleged were unconstitutional bail practices. The plaintiffs were represented by the Civil Rights Corps, the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection (ICAP) at the Georgetown University Law Center, and private counsel. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that because they were unable to make bail they were forced to remain in a jail that consistently operates at over 150 percent capacity. They claimed that this creates a two-tier system of justice between the rich and poor in the county, saying that some of the county's poorest residents are shackled to the jail's walls and door handles or forced to sleep in closets with an inability to regularly access legal counsel before trial. The Hamblen County Sheriff himself described the facility as a "cesspool of a dungeon" in a December 2019 New York Times article. The plaintiffs made their claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201. They claimed a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection and due process rights to not be detained pre-trial based on their inability to access money, procedural due process, and the Sixth Amendment's right to access counsel. They sought class certification, a temporary restraining order releasing the named plaintiffs, injunctive relief from future pre-trial detention solely on the basis of wealth, attorney's fees, and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Clifton L. Corker and is ongoing. No class certification or order on injunctive relief has yet been made. A motion seeking a temporary restraining order was dismissed as moot on March 2, 2020, perhaps because the named plaintiffs were able to leave the jail for other reasons.

Summary: Individuals in the Hamblen County (TN) jail sued the county court and sheriff in the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee in 2020 due to their inability to make bail violated their Fourteenth and Sixth Amendment Rights to equal protection, due process, and access to counsel. They filed the case is a class action on behalf of all current and future detainees in the jail unable to make bail. The jail in question received national media attention for unsanitary and overcrowded conditions. The case is ongoing; no class certification or grant of injunctive relief has yet been made.


On October 25, 2019, detainees with serious and persistent mental illness who were held in solitary confinement—many for prolonged periods of time—filed this lawsuit along with Disability Rights Rhode Island, the state Protection and Advocacy Agency, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections and its officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Rhode Island and the ACLU National Prison Project, sought class certification and injunctive relief to stop defendants from subjecting them to unconstitutional policies and conditions. The plaintiffs claimed that subjecting hundreds of people to prolonged solitary confinement in tiny, frequently filthy cells where they are kept locked down for 22-24 hours a day for weeks, months, and even years at a time exacerbate prisoners’ mental illness, deprive them of basic human needs, and put them at a substantial risk of serious harm and injury in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that prisoners with disabilities do not have access to or are otherwise denied the benefits of defendants’ programs, services, and activities in violation of the ADA because the are placed into unnecessary solitary confinement—thereby foreclosing their ability to participate. By incarcerating prisoners and detainees with serious and persistent mental illness in solitary confinement, plaintiffs also claimed that defendants failed to meet their obligations under the Rehabilitation Act to provide the most integrated setting appropriate. On October 28, the case was assigned to Chief Judge William E. Smith. On January 3, 2020, defendants filed their answer along with numerous affirmative defenses, including arguments that the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim, that defendants were immune under the Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity, and that some or all plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their claims. On February 10, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge John R. McConnell Jr., who replaced Judge Smith as Chief Judge in December of 2019. The case ongoing.

Summary: On October 25, 2019, detainees with serious and persistent mental illness who were held in solitary confinement filed this lawsuit along with Disability Rights Rhode Island in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs sued the Rhode Island Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs claimed that subjecting hundreds of people to prolonged solitary confinement exacerbate prisoners’ mental illness, deprive them of basic human needs, and put them at a substantial risk of serious harm and injury in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Additionally, plaintiffs claimed that prisoners with disabilities do not have access to or are otherwise denied the benefits of defendants’ programs, services, and activities in violation of the ADA. The case ongoing.


In this case, ten private citizens of Charlottesville, Virginia, sued a host of individuals identified as organizers and promoters of the far-right “Unite the Right” rally held in the city on August 11-12, 2017. The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 11, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs invoked state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a Reconstruction Era federal statute creating a cause of action against those who conspire to deprive another citizen of their civil rights, and alleged that the defendant organizers were responsible for the damage their rally caused. This rally, widely covered in the media, precipitated violent and emotionally distressing events such as antisemitic chanting in the streets and at least one death. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants' actions deprived them of their equal rights; injunctive relief enjoining defendants from future violations; and compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages. This case was assigned to Judge Norman K. Moon and referred to Magistrate Judge Joel C. Hoppe. The four years this case has spent in pre-trial have been eventful. After failing to respond, five defendants had default judgments placed against them in early 2018. On July 9, 2018, the court largely denied a motion to dismiss the charges, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the defendants had formed a conspiracy to hurt Black and Jewish people. Though Judge Moon dismissed one defendant – later added back after the complaint was amended – and pared down several of the claims, "the Plaintiffs’ claims largely survive[d]." 324 F. Supp. 3d 765. Following this failed attempt to dissolve the case, many of the defendants proved to be uncooperative. In April 2019, defendant Jeff Schoep was sanctioned for failing to turn over evidence. In August 2019, the court granted two motions for sanctions against defendants Elliot Kline, Matthew Heimbach, and Vanguard America and awarded the plaintiffs reasonable attorney’s fees, which were determined in May 2020, to be $41,300. On December 23, 2019, the court found defendant Elliott Kline in civil contempt, and in January 2020, he was briefly held in jail for failure to comply with discovery orders. The court similarly found Robert Ray in civil contempt on September 16, 2020. As a result of this discovery abuse, the court granted adverse evidentiary inferences against three of the defendants. A group of defendants under the League of the South umbrella and defendant Richard Spencer separately filed for summary judgment. The former motion was denied on March 31, 2021, because the court found there to be material conflicts in the evidence. The latter was struck on May 19, 2021, as untimely. After delays due to COVID-19 and the impeded discovery process, a trial date has been set for October 25 through November 19, 2021.

Summary: Ten private citizens of Charlottesville, Virginia, sued a host of individuals identified as organizers and proponents of the far-right “Unite the Right” rally held in Charlottesville. Invoking state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1985, the plaintiffs sought to hold defendants liable for the damages caused by their event. This case moved slowly through the discovery process, with a number of sanctions against the defendants, and is now set for trial in October 2021.


On February 25, 2008, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Nashville Division. Plaintiffs are all Tennessee residents and convicted felons. Plaintiffs sought to invalidate those portions of Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-29-202 that condition the restoration of voting rights for people previously convicted of "infamous crimes" upon their payment of certain legal financial obligations, namely restitution and child support. Plaintiffs assert that this statute, by denying the vote to those who have not satisfied certain legal financial obligations, violates their fundamental right to vote and discriminates among citizens on the basis of wealth. More specifically, Plaintiffs claim that the statute at issue violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Ex Post-Facto Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, and the Due Process Clauses of the United States and Tennessee Constitutions. Plaintiffs named as Defendants those state and county officials, in their official capacity, responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the state statutory scheme as it pertains to voter eligibility and registration. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, attorney's fees and costs. On June 23, 2008, the District Court (Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.) denied the county officials' motions to dismiss. On July 28, 2008, Plaintiffs amended their complaint. Thereafter, both parties filed motions for judgment on the pleadings. On September 22, 2008, the District Court (Judge Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr.) granted Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to the constitutional challenges contained in the Amended Complaint, finding that Plaintiffs' constitutional challenges lacked merit. Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On October 28, 2010, in a published opinion, the Court of Appeals (Judge Deborah L. Cook) affirmed the District Court's decision. On May 24, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States denied cert.

Summary: This 2008 case challenged a Tennessee law which conditioned restoration of voting rights to persons convicted of "infamous crimes" on the payment of their legal financial obligations, namely restitution and child support payments. The District Court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit upheld the dismissal. Plaintiffs' motions for rehearing en banc and for writ of certiorari were denied.


On December 6, 2010, juvenile inmates housed at the Washington County Juvenile Center (WCJC), filed a class action suit in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that while at the center they had endured abusive conditions of confinement, including a lack of education and programming, denial of medication, lack of privacy, lack of exercise and lack of mental health care. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' actions were deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs' constitutional rights and were a substantial departure from the accepted professional judgment, practices, and standards. The plaintiffs brought this action for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12132), violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), violation of the Ohio Civil Rights Act (Ohio Revised Code § 4112.99), violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2933.32, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent retention and supervision, and medical malpractice. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the continued implementation of these policies and ensuring that the Center meet minimum constitutional standards in the treatment and confinement of current and future juvenile detainees housed in the Center, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On March 3, 2011 the Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. issued an order certifying the plaintiff class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The class was defined as "all persons under twenty-two years of age as of the date on which this lawsuit is filed (and others for whom the statute of limitations is legally tolled) who have been, are now, or in the future, held in custody at the Washington County, Ohio Juvenile Center." Named plaintiffs K.M., D.D., N.B., B.M., C.M., W.G., J.L., and J.R. were appointed as class representatives. On June 28, 2011 the parties met for a settlement conference before Magistrate Judge Terrence P. Kemp. Negotiations continued for several months. As part of the settlement process, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to decertify part of the class, restricting the class to all persons under twenty of years of age. This motion was ordered by Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. on October 17, 2011. On November 22, 2011, the Court granted an order approving the class action settlement and claims process. The class action settlement and consent decree provided, amongst other provisions, that WCJC would appoint a physician to serve as medical director of the facility, that the WCJC would continue to train staff and hired medical professionals to identify mental health concerns, including youth at risk for suicide, and that the WCJC would continue behavioral treatment and rehabilitations programs. The agreement appointed Mr. Steve Martin as a monitor of the agreement. The agreement further stipulated that a one year period was required to implement the terms of the agreement, and that a six month extension may be acceptable. Finally, the agreement settled the claims for damages of the named plaintiffs. In the subsequent years, the defendants implemented the terms of the agreement pursuant to supervision by the appointed monitor. On October 9, 2014, the Court granted an order terminating the consent decree and closing the case.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case are juveniles housed at the Washington County Juvenile Center (WCJC). In a complaint filed on December 6, 2010, the plaintiffs alleged that while at the Center, they had endured abusive, inhumane, and illegal conditions of confinement, assaults on their person and outrageous indignities. The conditions of confinement included lack of education and programming, denial of medication, lack of privacy, lack of exercise and lack of mental health care.The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief barring the continued implementation of these policies and ensuring that the Center meet minimum constitutional standards in the treatment and confinement of current and future juvenile detainees housed in the Center, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Plaintiffs and defendants in this action were both represented by private counsel.On November 22, 2011, the Court granted an order approving the class action settlement and claims process. The class action settlement and consent decree provided, amongst other provisions, that WCJC would appoint a physician to serve as medical director of the facility, that the WCJC would continue to train staff and hired medical professionals to identify mental health concerns, including youth at risk for suicide, and that the WCJC would continue behavioral treatment and rehabilitations programs. On October 9, 2014, the Court granted an order terminating the consent decree and closing the case.


On May 4, 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this action in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation. The EEOC, who brought suit on behalf of a female electrician and other similarly situated employees who worked for Amelco, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that Amelco had subjected its employees to disparate treatment, a hostile work environment, and termination because of their sex, race, and/or national origin. The EEOC filed a similar action on behalf of different Amelco employees on June 20, 2005 (see EEOC v. Amelco Electric Company, Inc, EE-CA-0012 on this site). Though the cases were not consolidated, the parties agreed to settle both matters simultaneously. The Settlement Agreement, filed August 28, 2006, bound Amelco to not retaliate against the individuals who complained of discrimination the EEOC, and awarded the EEOC $125,000 to be distributed among the charging parties and other class members at the discretion of the EEOC.

Summary: In May 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this suit in the Northern District of California under Title VII against Amelco Electric S.F., Inc. and Amelco Corporation, claiming Amelco had discriminated against its employees because of the sex, race, and/or national origin. The parties settled on August 28, 2006, and plaintiffs were awarded $125,000.