On October 27, 2014, twenty-five former prisoners forced to enroll in Kansas's Sexual Predator Treatment Program after their release from prison filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued directors of the Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP), Larned State Hospital, the Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services, and the State of Kansas under 42 U.S.C § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Kansas state law. Representing themselves, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief along with monetary damages. In their claim for relief, they cited violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, along with the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Kansas state law (K.S.A. § 59-29a22(b)(3)). More specifically, the plaintiffs argued in a 314-page complaint that the SPTP is, in both design and in application, a source of punishment rather than therapy, and that it violated laws designed to protect recipients of therapy and constitutional prohibitions against ex post facto punishment and double jeopardy. They alleged that the program was in many ways equivalent to or in some instances worse than prison in the restrictions that it imposed and in the conditions to which it subjected enrollees. The case was initially assigned to District Judge Sam A. Crow. On January 27, 2015, the case was reassigned to District Judge Eric F. Melgren. The next day, it was again reassigned, this time to Chief Judge J. Thomas Marten. The plaintiffs sought appointment of counsel. Magistrate Judge Karen Humphreys granted the motion on February 9, 2015 but deferred selection of counsel until the court could learn more about what sorts of experience appointed counsel would need. In particular, Judge Humphreys noted that similar litigation was underway in Illinois (Hargett v. Adams), Minnesota (Karsjens v. Jesson), Missouri (Van Orden v. Healthlink), New Jersey (Alves v. Main), and Washington (Turay v. Seling) and consulted lawyers involved in the Missouri case for advice. Judge Humphreys retired in June 2015 while the stay was still in place and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Kenneth G. Gale on June 11, 2015. On November 12, 2015, one of the plaintiffs wrote a letter to Judge Marten and Judge Gale. The letter noted that trials in both the Minnesota and Missouri cases had ended, and their respective SVP programs had been found unconstitutional. Because the trials had ended and Judge Humphreys had retired, the plaintiff argued, the stay should be lifted and the case allowed to proceed. On January 7, 2016, another plaintiff sent the court clerk a handwritten note and attached the Missouri court decision to encourage the court to lift the stay. On March 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for stay to be lifted, but Judge Gale denied the motion on April 4, 2016. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45574. Judge Gale emphasized that he was actively working to find counsel but had not been successful because of the large amount of uncompensated work that would be required of any appointed counsel. Judge Gale reiterated that the Plaintiffs could not adequately represent themselves and asked for their patience while the search continued. On August 2, 2016, the Court appointed seven pro bono lawyers to represent the plaintiffs and lifted the stay. Judge Gale ordered the plaintiffs to stop communicating with the Court or the defendants unless done through counsel. The original complaint and summons had not been served on defendants at the time counsel was appointed. On December 5, 2016, the plaintiffs (now through counsel) filed an amended complaint with substantial changes. The plaintiffs re-alleged that the Kansas SPTP was an unconstitutional punishment system, rather than a therapy program. Specifically, they alleged that there was no realistic possibility of ever completing the program and being released from its requirements - of the hundreds committed under SPTP, only three had successfully completed the program. The program was alleged to be inadequate because it failed to tailor treatment to the needs of the detainees. The plaintiffs also alleged that treatment hours had been cut, the facilities were overcrowded, and the employee turnover was so high as to compromise the treatment of detainees. The move from one phase of the program to another was often based on arbitrary or non-therapeutic considerations, like bed availability. The facilities were also managed like a prison, using Kansas Department of Corrections protocols. All of these factors, when combined, made SPTP an essentially lifelong commitment in a secure facility. The plaintiffs alleged that these conditions meant SPTP violated the 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause. On December 29, 2016, one plaintiff moved to separate from the class. Judge Gale granted his motion and declared the case would be treated as a consolidated case, with the original complaint applying to this plaintiff and the amended complaint applying to the class action. The separate plaintiff then moved to certify the class under the original complaint and asked for separate counsel to be appointed for his case on February 23, 2017. He expressed that appointed counsel for the amended complaint did not have the “best interests” of the class in mind. On March 2, 2017, Judge Gale denied the motion to appoint replacement counsel, citing the fact that able and competent counsel had already been appointed. On February 24, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The defendants argued that the state has discretion to design treatment programs for sexually violent predators and had not abused that discretion in creating the SPTP. The plaintiffs disagreed with the treatment they had received, the defendants argued, but that treatment was within the bounds of professional judgment and not enough to make out a constitutional violation. On July 17, 2017, the Court granted the motion to dismiss. Specifically, Judge Marten found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege how the SPTP program deviated from accepted standards of treatment in a way that violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights. Judge Marten also ruled that the conditions of the SPTP facilities were related to the reasons for detaining the plaintiffs and, thus, did not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights. Because of this dismissal, the separate plaintiff’s motion to certify the original complaint class was denied as moot. On August 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal, arguing that the court had committed legal error by failing to take judicial notice of a 2015 Kansas report on SPTP. In the alternative, the plaintiffs asked for leave to file an amended complaint that did state a claim. Two months later, on November 14, 2017, Judge Marten denied this motion. Judge Marten found that consideration of the 2015 Report would not have changed his ruling that the complaint did not state a claim. The plaintiffs attached a proposed second amended complaint to their motion for reconsideration, which Judge Marten reviewed and found similarly deficient. Judge Marten decided that amending the complaint would be futile and dismissed the case with prejudice. For a discussion of SPTP, written after the complaint in this case was filed, see this Kansas City Star article.

Summary: In 2014, various former prisoners who were forced to enroll in Kansas’s Sexual Predator Treatment Program (SPTP) after their release filed this Lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the District of Kansas. The Plaintiffs alleged that the program is punitive rather than therapeutic, and that it thus violates constitutional rights against ex post facto punishment and double jeopardy in addition to rights guaranteed under the American's Disability Act (ADA), the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (PAIR), Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act), and Kansas state law. After counsel was appointed for the plaintiffs, an amended complaint was filed that alleged due process violations under SPTP. On July 17, 2017, Judge Thomas Marten dismissed the case for failure to state a claim and denied a motion to certify the class as moot. On November 14, 2017, Judge Marten denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and dismissed the case with prejudice.


On September 21, 2006, the Chicago office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois following a complaint by a former employee of Integrity Financial Services ("Integrity"). The plaintiff sued Integrity under 42 USC §2000 (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964) and 42 USC §1981a (Title I of the Civil Right Act of 1991). The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction enjoining the defendant from engaging in any employment practice that discriminated on the basis of race; requiring the defendant to institute and carry out equal employment opportunities for its employees; ordering the defendant to reinstate the individual employee. The plaintiff further sought back pay, non- and pecuniary losses, and punitive damages. The complaint was based on an allegation that Integrity intentionally discriminated against a black female employee on the basis of her race by terminating her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. After many status conferences, the case was settled when the District Court Judge Mark Filip entered a consent decree on May 29, 2007. The two-year consent decree included non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses. It required Integrity to post notice of the decree, maintain and make available to the EEOC records of complaints made about race discrimination, submit written reports to the EEOC every six months, and conduct annual training sessions for all employees. The decree also included a dispute resolution clause requiring each party to notify the other party of alleged non-compliance and a chance to remedy. Integrity agreed to pay a total of $9,000, all of which was awarded to the charging party. On August 7, 2007, the EEOC made a motion to reopen the case and a motion for order to show cause why Integrity should not be held in contempt of the consent decree as the defendant did not pay $9,000. The defendants alleged an inability to pay. Both motions were stricken without prejudice. On May 20, 2008, the case was re-assigned to Judge John W. Darrah. On June 5, 2008, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion to show cause why defendant should not be held in contempt. This was withdrawn on June 9, 2008 because the defendant was no longer in business and the owner of the defendant was deceased. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois following a complaint by a former employee of Integrity Financial Services ("Integrity"). The complaint was based on an allegation that Integrity intentionally discriminated against a black female employee on the basis of her race by terminating her employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The case was settled on May 29, 2007. However, the defendant did not pay follow the decree. In 2008 the defendant was no longer in business and the owner of the defendant was deceased. The case is closed.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Washington, Montana, and North Dakota filed this suit against the United States under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Seattle Field Office, including Seattle-Tacoma International Airport and Fargo-Hector International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The case was assigned to Judge Robert S. Lasnik. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. The ACLU filed an opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that "[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice." On Aug. 3, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that although the thirteen FOIA cases share "a limited number of factual issues," these issues "appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." The case was reassigned to Judge Marsha J. Pechman on Aug. 31. Litigation continued over a possible production schedule and appropriate search parameters for the government to use in responding to the FOIA request. In proceedings held on Oct. 17, 2017, and in an order issued on Jan. 12, 2018, the court directed the government to turn over documents responsive to the ACLU's FOIA requests. As of a status report filed on Mar. 2, 2018, the government finished processing and producing all records responsive to the FOIA request. The May 1, 2018, status report indicated the parties were in discussions to streamline final resolution of the case. The parties requested a discovery deadline of Nov. 1, 2018, and for dispositive motions to be filed by Jan. 31, 2019. On February 25, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order for dismissal, which Judge Pechman signed on February 26, 2019, dismissing all claims with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Washington, Montana, and North Dakota filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The case was dismissed voluntarily by the parties on Feb. 26, 2019.


On October 2, 2007, a detained alien who obtained entry into the U.S. through an illegal smuggling operation brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, challenging Department of Homeland Security regulations which governed issuance of U-visas. The "U-visa" was a new non-immigrant visa classification created by the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act. U-visas granted temporary immigration benefits to certain alien victims of crimes who assisted government officials in investigating or prosecuting the criminal activity. To be processed, the application for a U-Visa had to be accompanied a law enforcement certification (LEC). Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(a)(14)(iii), a Homeland Security regulation that set out the parameters for the issuance of a LEC. Plaintiff claimed that plaintiff and his brother left Guatemala in March 2007 with the assistance of an alien smuggling operation that brought them from Guatemala to Mexico and then to the U.S. border near Falfurrias, Texas. Once near the border, the smugglers deserted plaintiff and his brother, leaving them without food, water, shelter or navigational devices. The two men wandered in the desert area for days until plaintiff's brother died. Plaintiff then contacted U.S. border agents, where he cooperated with authorities, gave them information about the smugglers and was taken into custody. Plaintiff then sought to apply for a U-visa, but was not issued a LEC by the investigating authorities. He claimed that his denial of a LEC, which was apparently done per new Homeland Security regulations, violated due process and equal protection. He asserted claims under Habeas Corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241; the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 et seq.; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification on behalf of all aliens who were crime victims and denied LECs for use in U-visa applications. On February 25, 2008, defendant moved to dismiss, and on December 8 the District Court (Judge Andrew S. Hanen) granted defendant's motion. Ordoñez Orozco v. Chertoff, No. 1:07-cv-00153, 2008 WL 5155728, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98800 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 8, 2008). The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to review the issuance of LECs, which it determined was the type of discretionary action withdrawn from its purview by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). It further found that the discretionary nature of the issuance of LECs defeated plaintiff's constitutional claims, his claims under the APA and his petition for mandamus. The Fifth Circuit (Judge William L. Garwood) affirmed on March 2, 2010, Ordoñez Orosco v. Napolitano, 598 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2010), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 4, 2010.

Summary: On October 2, 2007, a detained alien who obtained entry into the U.S. through an illegal smuggling operation brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, challenging Department of Homeland Security regulations which governed the issuance of law enforcement certifications (LECs), which applicants must submit in order to obtain a U-visa. On December 8, 2008, the District Court dismissed plaintiff's claims, finding that the discretionary nature of the issuance of LECs defeated them. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari.


On August 30, 2010, a Tennessee resident who had been detained several months brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office, the Rutherford County Sheriff, and the Sheriff's Chief Deputy. The plaintiff claimed he was unlawfully detained pursuant to an ICE detainer for four months after he was otherwise eligible for release. He alleged that his prolonged detention violated his constitutional rights (4th, 5th, 8th and 14th Amendments) as well as state law against negligence, false imprisonment, and failure to train. The plaintiff also brought a 1983 claim alleging that the Sheriff's Office had failed to adequately train its employees. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought to represent a class that included prisoners of Rutherford County Jail who were detained unlawfully pursuant to detainers. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff's claims arose out of his detention following his arrest for driving on a suspended license. He was sentenced to five days in jail. ICE then issued an immigration detainer, which would allow the Sheriff to hold the plaintiff for 48 additional hours. The plaintiff, however, was held for an additional four months. On March 2, 2011, the District Court (Judge William J. Hayes, Jr.) dismissed plaintiff's federal and state law claims against the sheriff and his chief deputy and denied class certification. Ramos-Macario v. Jones, No. 3:10-00813, 2011 WL 831678 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2011). The Court also denied defendants' motions to dismiss or in the alternative, for summary judgment as to the federal claims against Rutherford County and allowed the false imprisonment claim to go forward against the county. In March 2012, the court set a status conference for the parties to present their provisional settlement agreement. The docket does not reflect that the conference ever took place, but on April 20, 2012, the parties moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit with prejudice. It is therefore unclear whether the parties reached a settlement agreement.

Summary: In 2010, a Tennessee resident who had been detained in jail for several months brought a lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee against the Rutherford County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff was detained for four months pursuant to an ICE detainer after his five-day sentence expired. Plaintiff alleged that his prolonged detention had violated the Constitution and state law. The court dismissed plaintiff's state and federal law claims against the sheriff and his deputy, but denied defendants' motion to dismiss as to the federal claims against the county. The parties had requested to present a provisional settlement in March 2012 and in April 2012, the parties moved to voluntarily dismiss the suit.


On August 4, 2014, a mother of three minor daughters, those minor daughters (ages 7, 11, and 13 at the time of the incident), and her brother filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by a public interest attorney, sought compensatory relief, claiming that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated during a "violent nighttime home invasion" by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, in response to a traffic stop of an individual not living in their home that occurred thirteen days prior, twenty heavily armed MPD officers stormed their home brandishing shields, machine guns, handguns, and body armor in a military-style raid. This incident happened on April 5, 2013 when MPD officers conducted a traffic stop and found contraband on the biological father of one of the daughters whose license stated that he lived at the plaintiffs' address. The complaint alleges that despite the MPD being told that the suspect did not live at the address and that there was no evidence of the suspect being a drug dealer, the police obtained a search warrant based on those causes. There were no facts connecting the home to the drug activity that was claimed to be occurring there. The complaint claims that obtaining a warrant in this case is reflective of systematic problems with the police procedures for obtaining search warrants that allow police to obtain warrants based on vague statements of their "training" and "expertise," even in the absence of facts. On April 18, 2013, shortly after 10:00 p.m., the police conducted the raid of the plaintiffs' home. The plaintiffs claim that the police burst into the home with shields and weapons and that the mother and two daughters were kept on a couch downstairs. The police handcuffed the younger brother of the mother and pointed guns at his head even though nothing illegal was found on his person or in his room. The police also threw open the shower curtain while the third daughter, an 11-year-old, was showering and pointed a gun at her. Nothing illegal was found in the home. On September 15, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, in which they asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 25, 2014, in which they added several named officers and a lieutenant as defendants. On September 16, 2017, District Judge Randolph D. Moss issued a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. 270 F. Supp. 3d 260 (D.D.C. 2017). Although the defendants asked the court to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint in its entirety, they only addressed the following issues in their brief: issues relating to the warrant; execution of the search; negligence per se; and municipal liability. Thus, the court only focused on these issues. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to count two (alleging that an officer secured the warrant only by knowingly and recklessly misleading the Superior Court judge who issued it); count three (alleging that the warrant was clearly overbroad such that no reasonable officer could have executed it in good faith); count six (alleging excessive use of force and unreasonable seizures in the execution of the warrant); and counts five and eight (alleging municipal liability). The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss count seven (alleging negligence per se) to the extent that it relied on D.C. Code §§ 23-522 and 523, but denied the motion to dismiss count seven to the extent that it relied on the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the court dismissed count four (alleging that the warrant application was obtained in an unconstitutional manner) and dismissed count one except as against Officer Volpe. On April 4, 2018, Judge Moss approved the parties' settlement agreement, under which the parties agreed to settle the plaintiffs' remaining claims for $75,000. Under the agreement, $10,500 went to the brother and $42,000 went to the mother. Attorneys' fees were deducted from the settlement in the amount of $22,500. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs alleged that the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) conducted a nighttime raid of plaintiffs' home based on minimal connections to a traffic stop where contraband was discovered. The plaintiffs claimed that the search violated their rights and privacy and ask for compensatory damages as a result. After dismissing several of the plaintiffs' claims in September 2017 in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court approved the parties' settlement agreement in April 2018. The parties agreed to settle the remaining claims for $75,000.


On October 9, 2012, a family of Catholic business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. They alleged that rules under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Providing contraceptive coverage would contravene their Catholic faith, so the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Center for Law & Justice, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. On October 10, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment and filed for a preliminary injunction. On December 14, 2012, District Court Judge Michael J. Reagan denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that indirect financial support of subjectively objectionable conduct was not a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. 2012 WL 6553996. The plaintiffs appealed this denial to the Seventh Circuit (Docket No. 12-03841). On December 28, 2012, a three-judge panel granted the plaintiffs' emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, finding that the coerced coverage of contraception imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. Korte v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 6757353 (Judges Joel M. Flaum, Ilana Diamond Rovner, and Diane S. Sykes). On January 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit consolidated the case with Grote v. Sebelius (FA-IN-0004) The same three-judge panel heard arguments in the case on May 22, 2013. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs and their companies could challenge the mandate and state a valid claim under RFRA. The Court remanded the case with instructions to the District Court to enter preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs. Grote v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654. The defendant agencies sought review in the Supreme Court, and on November 27, 2013, the case was stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby LobbyBurwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius) and Conestoga Wood Specialities Corps. The Hobby Lobby decision was issued on June 30, 2014. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. 134 S.Ct. 2751. The next day, the Supreme Court denied the government's certiorari petition for review in this case. 134 S.Ct. 2902. On July 28, 2014, the district court lifted the stay. On August 12, 2014, the Seventh Circuit awarded the plaintiffs $578.80 in costs. On November 7, 2014, the Court granted the joint motion for summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, entered a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraception services mandate, and dismissed all other claims against the defendants. Finally, on February 26, 2015, the district court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and noted that the parties had reached an independent settlement on attorneys' fees and costs. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2012, Catholic business owners filed this RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The plaintiffs argued that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their business's group health insurance plan. In December 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the contraception mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for an emergency injunction pending appeal and consolidated the case with Grote v. Sebelius. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded with instructions to enter preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the mandate. The government sought review in the Supreme Court, but its petition was denied on July 1, 2014, the day after the Supreme Court issued its Hobby Lobby decision on a similar question. On November 7, 2014, the Court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive services mandate against the plaintiffs.


On May 21, 2014, four same-sex couples -- three female couples and one male couple -- filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment, against the Attorney General of Montana, the Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, and the Clerk of Court of Cascade County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint challenged the validity of Art. XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions that bar marriage between same-sex couples or preclude recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into in another state. Art. XIII, Section 7 provides that "[o]nly a marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in this state." The plaintiffs also challenged all Montana statutes that refer to marriage as a relationship between the opposite sexes, to the extent that those provisions operate as a ban on same-sex marriage. On November 19, 2014, District Judge Brian Morris granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227 (D. Mont. 2014). The order also declared that Montana's ban on same-sex marriage violated plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Judge Morris permanently enjoined the state from enforcing Article XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions, to the extent that they prohibit same-sex marriage and do not recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted outside of Montana. The injunction took effect immediately. On November 20, 2014, the defendants filed for appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Following the Supreme Court's 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), which held that the 14th Amendment requires all states to grant same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages granted in other states, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: In May 2014, four same-sex couples -- three female couples and one male couple -- filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, under Section 1983 and the 14th Amendment, against the Attorney General of Montana, the Director of the Montana Department of Revenue, and the Clerk of Court of Cascade County. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Their complaint challenged the validity of Art. XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions that bar marriage between same-sex couples or preclude recognition of same-sex marriages validly entered into in another state. In November 2014, the court (Judge Brian Morris) granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, declared that Montana's ban on same-sex marriage violated plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing Article XIII, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution and related statutory provisions. The injunction took effect immediately. The defendants immediately filed for appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. However, following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.


On June 16, 2011, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1691-1691f, against the Midwest Bankcentre. The DOJ alleged that the defendant engaged in lending discrimination on the basis of race in the St. Louis metropolitan area. The case had been referred to the Department of Justice by the Federal Reserve Bank, in St. Louis, which had found statistical signs of discrimination. More specifically, the DOJ alleged that the defendant's choice of locations for branch offices was designed to serve the banking and credit needs of residents of majority-white census tracts, but not those of residents of majority-black census tracts. Similarly, the DOJ alleged that the defendant made loans for residential real estate in predominantly white residential census tracts but avoided serving the similar credit needs of majority-black census tracts. In total, the complaint asserted, the result was illegal redlining: "defendant's policies and practices are intended to deny and discourage, or have the effect of denying or discouraging, an equal opportunity to the residents of the majority-black neighborhoods of the St. Louis MSA, on account of the racial composition of those neighborhoods, to obtain residential real estate-related loans." In 2000, 76% of the Missouri portion of the St. Louis metro area was non-Hispanic white, and 19% was African-American; the African-American population was mostly concentrated in the northern part of the City of St. Louis and the neighboring northeastern portion of St. Louis County. But the defendant's had drawn an assessment area (as required by the Community Reinvestment Act) that excluded both majority-black areas: the northern part of St. Louis city and the northeast corner of St. Louis County. In fact, the Midwest's CRA assessment area excluded 47 of the 60 majority-black census tracts in the City of St. Louis, and drew a virtual horseshoe around the majority-black census tracts. Settlement negotiations preceded filing in this case, and on June 28, 2011, Magistrate Judge Frederick R. Buckles approved a detailed consent decree that had been submitted simultaneously with the complaint. The consent decree included both injunctive and monetary relief, described as "designed to expand opportunities to meet the credit needs of residents located in majority-black census tracts in the Missouri portion of the St. Louis MSA [Metropolitan Statistical Area]. Midwest will ensure that its lending products and services are made available and marketed in majority-black census tracts on no less favorable a basis than in majority-white tracts. Midwest commits itself to take all reasonable, practicable actions, consistent with safety and soundness, to increase the level of its residential lending in majority-black census tracts. with the ultimate objective that Midwest offers mortgage lending services on an equal basis as it offers such services in majority-white census tracts." Among the injunctive measures in the decree were: <ul> <li> a general prohibition on discrimination <li> a redrawn CRA assessment area, including all of the city of St. Louis, as well as St. Louis, Jefferson, and St. Charles Counties <li> at least one new full-service branch office in a majority-black census tract, with an on-site residential mortgage officer <li> continued full-time employment of a Director of Community Development, with primary responsibilities to include overseeing the continued development of the Bank's lending in majority-black census tracts <li> continued full-time employment of a Director of Compliance, with responsibilities to include overseeing compliance with the decree itself <li> a credit needs assessment of the Missouri majority-black census tracts, to be shared with the United States <li> fair lending training, African-American outreach and advertising <li> $900,000 for a special credit program directed at the majority black census tracts, to reduce closing costs <li> $300,000 for consumer financial education and other related relief <li> $25,000 for the Metropolitan St. Louis Equal Housing Opportunity Council, whose complaint got the case underway. </ul> The decree also included a variety of record retention and reporting provisions, and a sunset period of five years. On April 11, 2013, the parties jointly moved to amend the decree, specifically with respect to the $900,000 for special credit programs. The parties stated that the defendant would be "unable to offer the specified forms of financial assistance at a volume that would exhaust the requisite subsidy for the special financing program during the five-year term of the Agreed Order." Therefore, they amended the agreement to provide the defendant "with additional instruments for providing financial assistance intended to facilitate its ability to expend the subsidy through the special financing program." The court approved the amendment on April 15. The sunset period has passed, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In this fair lending case, the U.S. Department of Justice settled a case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, against the Midwest Bankcentre, a St. Louis bank. Under the consent decree, signed in June 2011 and scheduled to last five years, Midwest included both majority white and majority black census tracts in its Community Reinvestment Act assessment area, agreed to open at least one full service branch in the underserved black neighborhoods of St. Louis, undertook a credit needs assessment of the majority black census tracts, and pledged about $1.2 million for a special debt program (to reduce closing costs), consumer financial education, and other related initiatives. Midwest also agreed to provide its employees with fair lending training and to conduct substantial community outreach and advertising.


On August 10, 1994, after conducting a comprehensive investigation, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The U.S. sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the governor, various executive officials, and the directors of several juvenile facilities under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. The U.S., represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Attorney's Office, asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The U.S. claimed that the defendants failed to protect incarcerated juveniles in detention facilities and training schools from harm. Specifically, the U.S. alleged that the policies, procedures, and conditions at the juvenile facilities in Puerto Rico violated statutory rights and the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The United States filed a proposed consent order simultaneously with the complaint, which was entered by the District Court (Judge Carmen Cerezo) as a partial judgment on October 6, 1994. The purpose of the consent order was to address the immediate issues of psychiatric care and overcrowding. The order provided deadlines for the establishment of a mental health care program at the juvenile facilities. The defendants were required to transfer all juveniles who were in need of in-patient mental health treatment to an in-patient facility, to develop a suicide prevention and intervention program, to train the staff that supervised the juveniles in suicidal and self-mutilating behaviors. Regarding the crowding issue, the defendants were required to take steps to reduce the number of juveniles confined in the facilities so that capacity was not exceeded 180 days after the consent decree was entered. The court appointed Orlando Martinez as the monitor to oversee compliance with the order. On October 7, 1994, the United States submitted a comprehensive settlement agreement and filed a motion to enter the settlement agreement as an additional order. The agreement provided that the defendant would construct new facilities and remodel the existing facilities, develop a manual of the policies and procedures that govern the operation of the institutions, develop a handbook for the juveniles advising them of their rights and the rules of conduct, and ensure that the juvenile institutions were adequately staffed. It further provided for the development and implementation of a classification system to ensure that juveniles were placed in the least restrictive setting possible, for the development of an efficient and effective mental healthcare program, which would include a substance abuse program, and for the development of an adequate education program. Finally, the agreement provided that physical force was only to be used in justifiable self-defense, for the protection of others, or for the prevention of escape. Isolation was only deemed appropriate when a juvenile posed immediate threat to themselves or others. On the same day, the District Court (Judge Cerezo) granted the United States' motion to enter the settlement agreement as an order. The court retained jurisdiction to monitor implementation of the settlement agreement. On March 12, 1997, the parties informed the Court that Congress had enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and that the statute required the Court make certain findings regarding its previous orders. The parties also advised the Court that they would continue to meet with the Court Monitor and arrive at an agreed upon motion with regard to the current conditions in the facilities and the need for continued judicial oversight. And on October 7, 1997, the United States filed a Motion to Enter Settlement Agreement as an Order of the Court and for a Finding of Compliance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. By Order dated December 12, 1997, the District Court approved the Settlement Agreement. Remediation continued from 1997 to 2007. On March 8, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to terminate the prospective relief order entered by the Court on December 12, 1997, pursuant to the PLRA. Under the PLRA, ordinarily such a motion is the basis for a stay of pending remediation after 30 days, but on April 10, the Court found good cause for postponement of the automatic stay until June 6, 2007 and set an evidentiary hearing for May 7, 2008. Defendants appealed this finding. The day before the hearing, the parties settled, and filed a motion setting out which parts of the prior settlement agreements would remain in effect and which would be terminated. The hearing then supplied the basis for approval of the remaining provisions. In addition to leaving in place a number of the provisions of the existing agreement, the parties implemented new requirements of sufficient direct care staffing to supervise in recreational, leisure and treatment activities with the juveniles; and new regulation of the response to allegations of abuse and mistreatment. On April 28, 2008, the United States filed a Motion for Specific Performance and Supplemental Relief in an effort to protect youth from staffing shortages. The U.S. agreed to defer enforcement while the defendants pursued alternative measures. When the alternative measures proved ineffective, the two parties entered into a stipulation that required the hiring and training of additional staff and subsequent monitoring of the remedy. The Court approved the stipulation on January 8, 2009. After the United States determined that the defendants failed to adequately implement the remediation steps, the United States filed a Motion for Contempt on July 2, 2009. The Court denied the motion, stating that the defendants showed reasonable diligence in attempting to fulfill the Stipulated Order. The United States appealed on May 21, 2010; the First Circuit dismissed the appeal. U.S. v. Puerto Rico, 642 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 2011). The defendants moved to terminate particular relief provisions of the parties’ Settlement Agreement in May 2010, August 2011, October 2012, May 2016, March 2018, and June 2019. The Court granted the first five motions to terminate their respective relief provisions, and the sixth motion is pending. The parties filed a joint motion to terminate two additional provisions in July 2014 because the defendants were in compliance per the monitoring report for the first quarter of 2014. From 2009 until 2018, Warren F. Benton acted as the monitor issuing quarterly reports. In the second quarter of 2018, Kimberly B. Tandy assumed monitoring duties. The case was reassigned to Judge Gustavo Gelpi on December 19, 2019. After years of status reports, the court issued an order on November 11, 2020 to convene a three-judge panel to determine whether to release prisoners from the juvenile facilities subject to the consent decree in light of "a most appalling and disturbing predicament which jeopardizes the mental and physical well-being of their population." 2020 WL 6948174. The order was issued in response to a monitoring report that found that one quarter of the juvenile population at these facilities was hospitalized between July 1 and September 30, 2020 due to suicide or mutilation attempts. During that same period, one third of the juvenile population engaged in suicidal ideation, gestures of intent (including serious attempts by hanging), or self-mutilation. The court reprimanded the Commonwealth for "fail[ing] to remedy the juveniles' inexcusable deprivation of constitutional rights" and concluded that the court was obligated to intervene to protect the mental health and safety of the juvenile prisoners. The court elected to convene a three-judge panel to determine whether a prisoner release was appropriate, citing the facilities' lack of capacity. Four days later, on November 16, 2020, the court issued another order enforcing a previous order that directed the Commonwealth to identify the personnel and contractors who were essential to the Commonwealth's efforts to comply with the settlement agreement and subsequent orders, which the Commonwealth had failed to do. In the November 16th order, the court threatened to hold the Commonwealth in contempt and subject it to sanctions for continued noncompliance and asserted that it would "do all that is in its power to address the drastic and noncompliant posture of the Commonwealth." The Commonwealth complied the following day. In response, the court issued an order preventing essential personnel from being transferred, removed, or terminated without the court's permission. The order also required essential contractors to continue providing services (with compensation) even after their contracts expired unless the court permitted them to cease. The court continued to express its impatience with the Commonwealth in subsequent orders, noting in one that "[t]he Commonwealth's self-serving characterization of its compliance efforts is its own." On December 9, 2020, the court designated First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge David J. Barron, District of Puerto Rico Judge Francisco A. Besosa, and District of Puerto Rico Chief Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi to serve on the three-judge panel. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 10, 1994, after conducting a comprehensive investigation, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The U.S. sued the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the governor, various executive officials, and the directors of several juvenile facilities under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. The U.S., represented by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Attorney's Office, asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The U.S. claimed that the defendants failed to protect incarcerated juveniles in detention facilities and training schools from harm. Specifically, the U.S. alleged that the policies, procedures, and conditions at the juvenile facilities in Puerto Rico violated statutory rights, and the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. The U.S. filed a proposed consent order simultaneously with the complaint, which was entered by the District Court (Judge Carmen Cerezo) as a partial judgment on October 6, 1994. On October 7, 1994, the U.S. submitted a comprehensive settlement agreement and filed a motion to enter the settlement agreement as an additional order which was approved by the court on December 12, 1997. The District Court (Judge Cerezo) granted the motion and in accordance with the stipulation of the parties, ordered that certain provisions of the 1997 Settlement Agreement be terminated, while others remained in effect. After months of routine compliance, the court issued an order on November 11, 2020 to convene a three-judge panel to determine whether to release prisoners from the juvenile facilities subject to the consent decree in light of "a most appalling and disturbing predicament which jeopardizes the mental and physical well-being of their population." On December 9, 2020, the court designated First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge David J. Barron, District of Puerto Rico Judge Francisco A. Besosa, and District of Puerto Rico Chief Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi to serve on the three-judge panel. The case is ongoing.


This is a case about asylum seekers' right to counsel in refoulment interviews conducted by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services which determine whether an asylum seeker can remain in the United States during their immigration proceedings. On November 5, 2019, asylum seekers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Southern District of California (in San Diego). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of San Diego, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551), the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101), and Plaintiffs’ rights to procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment and their right to free speech under the First Amendment. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Federal Government unlawfully deprived them of access to counsel to prepare for hearings that could result in immediate deportation under the Migrant Protection Protocols (also called the "Remain in Mexico Policy") along with an injunction allowing access to counsel (or habeas relief if access to counsel would be impractical) and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs are parents who fled from Guatemala to the United States through Mexico, where they alleged they were robbed and assaulted. They were detained in the United States and faced deportation to Mexico under the Migrant Protection Protocols while their asylum claims were pending in the United States. However, they could avoid deportation if they could establish that their life or freedom would be threatened in Mexico at a "non-refoulement" interview. But the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants prevented them from retaining counsel to help them prepare for and represent them in their impending non-refoulement interviews. On the same day they filed suit, the plaintiffs asked the Court for a temporary restraining order to allow them access to retained counsel and filed a motion for class certification. Judge Dana M. Sabraw granted a temporary restraining order to enjoin the government from denying the plaintiffs' access to legal counsel before and during their non-refoulement interview on November 12, 2019. Judge Sabraw also certified a class consisting of “all individuals who are detained in CBP custody in California awaiting or undergoing non-refoulement interviews pursuant to what the government calls the 'Migrant Protection Protocols' program and who have retained lawyers” on January 14, 2020. . On the same day, Judge Sabraw issued a class-wide preliminary injunction in the Plaintiffs' favor. 415 F. Supp. 3d 971. In March of 2020, Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The appeal in this case was stayed pending the outcome of a separate Supreme Court case on the same issue, Wolf [or Pekoske] v. Innovation Law Lab. As the <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=17118">Clearinghouse summary </a>of that case explains, the new Biden administration altered the policy in question and has sought dismissal. This case remains pending until Innovation Law Lab is resolved in the Supreme Court.

Summary: Asylum seekers sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the U.S. District Court of Southern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants forbid them from seeking and retaining legal counsel for their non-refoulement interview, which would determine whether they must stay in Mexico while their immigration proceedings are ongoing. The plaintiffs argued that the denial of access to counsel violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, procedural and substantive due process, and the First Amendment. The district judge granted a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction was appealed by the government to the Ninth Circuit in March 2020. The Ninth Circuit stayed the appeal in this case pending the outcome of a separate Supreme Court case on the same issue, Wolf [or Pekoske] v. Innovation Law Lab. This case remains pending until Innovation Law Lab is resolved in the Supreme Court.


On October 18, 2001, pretrial detainees represented by attorney Barry Litt initiated a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the conditions of confinement at the Orange County Jail (the "Jail"). Plaintiffs alleged that they were detained for unreasonable periods of time following the order for their release, denied rights under Stewart v. Gates (e.g., holding cell seats, outdoor exercise, dayroom and phone access) [See JC-CA-0054], and denied reasonable accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The District Court (Judge Gary L. Taylor) certified two classes, one for equitable relief and one for injunctive relief, on October 15, 2003. The injunctive relief class was later decertified on March 1, 2004. In response to various motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs filed several amended complaints, culminating in the final operative pleading, the Fifth Amended Complaint. The claims that survived dismissal involved meals, overcrowded holding cells, outdoor exercise, dayroom access, religious services, and access for people with disabilities. On March 10, 2004, Judge Taylor sua sponte consolidated this action with Stewart v. Gates, 450 F.Supp. 583 (C.D.Cal. 1978), for the December 2004 trial. The Stewart case involved an injunction against the Jail that had been in effect since the mid-1970s. [See JC-CA-0054]. One plaintiff's personal injury claim was bifurcated from the main case and settled in December 2005. On April 27, 2005, Judge Taylor entered judgment for the defendants on all claims. Plaintiffs appealed. On March 24, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed much of the District Court's decision modifying and terminating portions of prior injunctive decrees. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision regarding the plaintiffs' right-to-worship, cruel and unusual punishment, and ADA claims. The appellate ruling stated that the religious services portion of the Stewart injunction was both narrowly drawn and needed to protect the freedom of these pretrial detainees to worship, so it should not have been modified by the District Court. The Ninth Circuit also held that providing only ninety minutes per week (about thirteen minutes per day) of out-of-cell exercise for pretrial prisoners in administrative segregation did not meet constitutional standards. Likewise, failure to provide accommodations for mobility- and dexterity-impaired pretrial prisoners did not comply with ADA requirements. The defendants' failure to remove certain physical barriers or make accommodations for disabled prisoners to navigate these barriers, as well as the Jail's inadequate accommodations of disabled prisoners' educational, recreational, and vocational programming needs, constituted ADA non-compliance. The Ninth Circuit also restored one disabled plaintiff's claims for damages based upon alleged mental and emotional harms, finding that these harms allegedly resulted from the ADA violations and should not have been dismissed by the District Court. Pierce v. County of Orange, 519 F.3d 985 (9th Cir. 2008). This order was amended on May 15, 2008 as part of the denial of rehearing en banc. Pierce v. County of Orange, 526 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2008). The case was remanded to the District Court for further fact-finding on the state of physical barriers to adequate access to bathrooms, showers, exercise areas, dayrooms, dining rooms, cells and all other areas to which disabled persons should have access, and to order remedial remedies as required. On January 7, 2011, after another six-day bench trial, the District Court (Judge Audrey B. Collins) confirmed the ADA sub-class as pretrial detainees with either a mobility or dexterity impairment, and made detailed findings of fact as to the conditions in the various facilities. Judge Collins found ADA violations including physical barriers for disabled inmates, disparate access to services, recreation and programming, and noncompliant bathroom, shower, and living facilities. Judge Collins ordered the defendants to draft a comprehensive plan to correct these deficiencies. Pierce v. County of Orange, 761 F. Supp. 2d 915 (C.D. Cal. 2011). On February 18, 2011, defendants submitted a Proposed Plan for addressing the issues presented in the January 7 ruling. After plaintiffs submitted their reply on March 11, 2011, the Proposed Plan was amended. On June 28, 2011, the District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and accepted the defendant's final proposed plan for addressing the physical barriers identified in the factual findings and ensuring that disabled detainees are provided with equal access to programs, services, and activities as discussed therein. The Court's order also called for the appointment of a Monitor. Over the next year, the parties litigated attorneys' fees and issues regarding the Jail's compliance with the judgment. On February 1, 2012, Judge Collins noted that while defendants had made substantial progress on the required physical modifications during the first six months following the Court's Order, they had not complied with several significant parts of the Order, including the housing of class members and the implementing of programmatic changes, as indicated in the Monitor's January 2012 report. The parties then resolved many of these issues. After receiving another quarterly report, on August 27, 2012, Judge Collins again noted that there were still key areas of noncompliance with the Order, particularly with regard to the programmatic aspects such as outdoor recreation. On March 8, 2012, Judge Collins ordered defendants to pay approximately $2.99 million in attorneys' fees and $225,147.52 in litigation expenses. Pierce v. Cnty. of Orange, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (C.D. Cal. 2012). The injunction was due to expire on June 27, 2013. On June 3, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the termination of the injunction and extend injunctive relief for two more years. Plaintiffs claimed that while defendants had made limited progress, the Jail remained largely out of compliance with the Court's Order in key respects, particularly with regard to 1) the classification and booking of class members, 2) the Department's policies and procedures, and 3) physical modifications. Defendants filed an opposition to plaintiffs' motion, but the parties agreed that briefing should not proceed further until the Monitor issued his Eighth Quarterly Report in July 2013. On August 12, 2013, defendants filed a motion to terminate the injunction under the Prison Litigation Reform Act on the grounds that there were no current and ongoing violations of prisoners' federal rights. Briefing on the cross-motions to extend and terminate injunctive relief was delayed as a result of a discovery issue regarding inmate medical records and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. On February 10, 2014, Judge Collins denied plaintiffs' motion to extend injunctive relief and granted defendant's motion to terminate the injunction. Judge Collins held that none of the three areas in which plaintiffs sought to extend the injunction presented current or ongoing violations of prisoners' federal rights. On August 6, 2014, the District Court (Chief Judge George H. King) ordered that, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, defendant would pay plaintiffs' attorneys $115,000 to fully resolve all remaining fees and costs.

Summary: In October 2001, pretrial detainees filed a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the conditions of the Orange County Jail. Plaintiffs alleged over detention, denial of rights under Stewart v. Gates (e.g., holding cell seats, outdoor exercise, dayroom and phone access), and denial of reasonable accommodations under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA). Plaintiffs amended their complaint several times; the surviving claims involved meals, overcrowding, outdoor exercise, dayroom access, religious services, and disability access. In April 2005, the District Court entered judgment for the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed significant parts of the decision. On remand, the District Court confirmed the ADA sub-class as pretrial detainees with either a mobility or dexterity impairment, and detailed factual findings as to the conditions in the various facilities. In June 2011, the District Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and accepted the defendant's proposed remedial plan. On March 8, 2012, the District Court ordered defendants to pay approximately $2.99 million in attorneys' fees and $225,147.52 in litigation expenses. Throughout 2012, upon reviewing reports from the appointed Monitor regarding compliance with the plan, the District Court noted that defendants had made some progress, but that there were still significant areas of noncompliance. On February 10, 2014, the District Court granted defendant's motion to terminate the injunction, holding that none of the areas in which plaintiffs sought to extend the injunction presented current or ongoing violations of prisoners' federal rights. On August 6, 2014, the District Court ordered that, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, defendant would pay plaintiffs' attorneys $115,000 to fully resolve all remaining fees and costs.


Several individuals who use wheelchairs and the Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition ("CCDC") (an organization representing individuals with disabilities) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on November 24, 2009. The plaintiffs claimed that Hollister stores (owned by Abercrombie & Fitch Co.) were inaccessible in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and the Colorado Civil Rights Act. The main entrances of Hollister stores typically have "raised porches" (featuring stairs), and thus forced individuals in wheelchairs to use separate entrances or not enter at all. The plaintiffs also alleged several architectural barriers in the set-up and design of the stores. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. (A&F) moved to dismiss the complaint in May 2010, alleging that the plaintiffs in the case did not have standing to assert their claims. A&F argued that the individual plaintiffs did not have standing to demand compliance in Hollister stores nationwide, but rather, could only make claims in reference to those stores that each individual plaintiff was likely to visit again. A&F also argued that the CCDC did not have adequate organizational standing to bring these claims on behalf of its members. The court (Judge Wiley Y. Daniel) rejected this motion in May 2011. Judge Daniel found that the individual plaintiffs could assert claims in reference to Hollister stores across the country because the stores share a common plan or design that plaintiffs allege violates the ADA. The court also found that CCDC had satisfied the requirements for organizational standing. 2011 WL 1930643. Judge Daniel affirmed this holding on June 2, 2011 in responds to a renewed motion to dismiss by the defendants. 2011 WL 2173713. On March 16, 2011, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment with respect to two Hollister stores, arguing that the raised porch design violated Title III. Title III and its accompanying regulations require that all buildings erected after 1993 comply with the Department of Justice Standards for Accessible Design ("DOJ Standards"). The 1991 DOJ Standards state that, where feasible, the accessible entryway should be near the entrance that is used by the majority of people. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a brief supporting the plaintiffs' interpretation and recommending that the court grant summary judgment. The court granted this motion on August 31, 2011. 835 F.Supp.2d 1077. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on October 21, 2011, and the court certified the class on April 20, 2012. The class was defined as: "all people with disabilities who use wheelchairs for mobility who, during the two years prior to the filing of the Complaint in this case, were denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any Hollister Co. Store in the United States on the basis of disability because of the presence of an Elevated Entrance." The named plaintiffs in the case were thereby certified to represent the interests of all individuals who used wheelchairs who wished to enter Hollister stores across the country. 2012 WL 1378531. In light of this, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment as to the 249 Hollister stores across the country on April 27, 2012. A&F filed its own motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative to vacate the August 31, 2011 order, on May 3, 2012. In that motion, they alleged that the two stores that were subject to the August 31, 2011 order were no longer in violation of the ADA (one closed, the other made modifications). A&F also claimed that, regardless of the changes, Hollister stores complied with the 2010 DOJ Standards. The defendants argued that the 2010 standards on entrances were more flexible than the earlier 1991 version. In response to this claim, DOJ filed a brief again siding with the plaintiffs. The DOJ brief explained that although the language of the 2010 DOJ Standards was slightly different from the 1991 DOJ Standards, this difference of language was not meaningful. The DOJ referenced the regulatory history to argue that the language of the standards was not intended to change the requirement from the 1991 version. After a hearing on January 24, 2013, Judge Daniel granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. In an order issued on March 7, 2013, he found that the named plaintiffs could raise claims on behalf of a nationwide class and that the raised porch design violated both the 2010 and 1991 standards, which demanded the same accessibility of entrances. 957 F.Supp.2d 1272. On August 20, 2013, the court ordered a permanent injunction requiring the defendant to make architectural changes to bring all Hollister stores into comply with the ADA standards. The order required the defendant meet certain benchmarks (including bringing at least 77 stores into compliance per year) and report to the court every six months from January 1, 2014 to January 1, 2017. On September 5, 2013, the court entered final judgement for the plaintiff. On September 9, 2013, the defendant filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On November 15, 2013, Judge Wiley denied the defendants' motion to stay injunctive relief pending appeal. 2012 WL 1378531. On February 10, 2014, the United States filed an amicus brief, arguing that the defendant’s store entrances were in violation of Title III of the ADA. On March 31, 2014, the circuit court held oral arguments. Meanwhile, in District Court, Judge Daniel issued an order granting attorney's fees for the plaintiffs on February 26, 2014. He held that the initial amount requested by the plaintiffs was unreasonable, but ordered the defendants to pay a reduced rate of $384,852.57 in attorneys fees and $20,342.51 in costs. 2014 WL 793363 On September 2, 2014, the Circuit Court issued an opinion (authored by Judge Paul Kelly) that reversed on the question of the whether the defendant violated the ADA. The court held that the defendants’ stores' elevated entrances were not a violation of Title III of the ADA because the stores had alternative accessible entrances and because the majority of people do not use the elevated entrances. 765 F.3d 1205. The judgements of the District Court was vacated and remanded. The plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing en banc on October 16, 2014. The United States filed an amicus brief supporting the plaintiffs’ petition on November 14, 2014. The circuit court denied the petition on November 14, 2014. On remand, the district court approved a settlement agreement between the parties for injunctive relief and attorney’s fees on September 25, 2015. As a part of the settlement agreement, the defendant agreed to alter the entrances of at least 92 Hollister stores with elevated entrances and to construct future stores without elevated entrances. The defendant also agreed to pay $190,000 in attorney’s fees and costs. 2015 WL 5695890. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, individuals who use wheelchairs and an organization representing their interests filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to challenge the inaccessible design of elevated entrances in Hollister stores. The District Court initially held for the plaintiffs, but in 2015, the U.S. Circuit Court for the 10th Circuit reversed, holding that the defendant's stores did not violate the ADA. On remand, the parties came tp a settlement agreement that included injunctive relief and attorney's fees for the plaintiff.


On July 18, 2017, a woman who had been recommended to Wyoming’s rehabilitative boot camp program filed this putative class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. The case was assigned to Judge Scott W. Skavdahl. The plaintiff sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections (“WDOC”) and the Wyoming Women’s Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under Wyoming’s Youthful Offender Act, all persons under twenty-five years old who were serving a prison sentence for any offense other than a felony punishable by death or life imprisonment were eligible to participate in a boot camp program through which they could gain new skills and shave time off of their sentences. However, the boot camp facilities in Wyoming were only open to men. As a woman, the plaintiff could not attend them. The plaintiff alleged that this violated her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by the ACLU and private counsel, she sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On August 12, 2017, the plaintiff moved for class certification. The putative class would consist of all present and future female prisoners under the age of twenty-five and in the custody of the WDOC and/or the Wyoming Women’s Center who are or will be otherwise eligible to participate in Wyoming’s boot camp program, but who have been or will be denied participation due to their gender or not considered by WDOC due to their gender. On August 29, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit because the defendants had sent her to a comparable boot camp program in Florida. The plaintiff argued that the boot camp program in Florida was not comparable. On October 3, 2017, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction, seeking to be placed in a Wyoming program of the same quality as that of the men’s program. She sought the same for all of the incarcerated women eligible for boot camp under the Youthful Offender Act. On October 19, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that contained new allegations regarding the Florida program. She alleged that her trip to Florida was long and traumatic and that the Florida program was inferior to the Wyoming program. On November 2, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. On November 9, 2017, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that that the plaintiff’s equal protection claims were not strong enough to meet the heightened scrutiny needed for a preliminary injunction. 2017 WL 10350606. Four days later, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification as well, holding that there were too few women in the Wyoming Women’s Center who were eligible for the boot camp program for class certification to be appropriate. On January 3, 2018, the court denied the defendants’ November 2017 motion to dismiss, holding that the adequacy of the Florida program was an issue of material fact to be addressed at trial. 2018 WL 4760521. By this point, however, the plaintiff was nearly finished with the Florida boot camp program, and she would be ineligible to attend another. So, the week prior to the court’s denial, on December 28, 2017, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss alleging mootness. On January 18, 2018, the plaintiff completed the Florida boot camp program and was subsequently recommended for probation rather than prison time. She sought leave to file an amended complaint in light of this development, but the defendants opposed it, arguing that her case was now moot because she had completed a boot camp program and received a reduced sentence as a result. The court agreed with the defendants. On February 20, 2017, the court granted the defendants’ December 2017 motion to dismiss. 2018 WL 4760520. The next day, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On March 8, 2018, the plaintiff appealed the court’s judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On August 3, 2020, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 822 Fed.Appx. 811. The Court found that the plaintiff was no longer incarcerated when the district court dismissed her case then, because she sought relief which depended on her incarceration, her case was moot. The case is now closed.

Summary: In July 2017, a woman who had been recommended to Wyoming’s rehabilitative boot camp program filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming. The plaintiff sued the Wyoming Department of Corrections and the Wyoming Women’s Center because the only boot camps in Wyoming were for men, which violated her equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff was sent to a boot camp in Florida, and the court dismissed the case for mootness after she finished the program there. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, where it is ongoing.


On March 10, 2014, three same-sex couples filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against the State of Indiana and Boone, Porter, and Lake Counties, in Indiana. The plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal and a number of private attorneys, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought declaratory relief and both temporary and permanent injunctive relief. They claimed that Indiana's laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriage, and the manner in which those statutes have been interpreted and enforced, violate the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, because they deny plaintiffs the right to the most important relationship in life and make them second-class citizens due to the range of benefits that require marriage. On March 31, 2014, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add two plaintiff couples and additional defendants, including the Indiana Department of Health and Hamilton County. One of the added plaintiffs was suffering from ovarian cancer; plaintiffs stated that Indiana's refusal to recognize her marriage impeded her ability to obtain needed medical care close to home. As such, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling immediate recognition of that couple's Massachusetts marriage in Indiana. On April 10, 2014, at a motion hearing, Judge Richard Young granted the requested temporary restraining order, without a written order, for a month. While this order was in effect, the Court held a hearing on the pending motions for summary judgment and preliminary injunction, and on May 8, 2014, the Court granted a preliminary injunction, based on the plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits and irreparable harm absent relief. The Court required the State of Indiana to recognize the plaintiffs' out-of-state marriage, including, if need arises, by issuing a death certificate that records their marital status as "married" and lists the surviving spouse. Baskin v. Bogan, 2014 WL 1814064 (S.D. Ind. 2014). The defendants filed a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal on May 8, 2014. However, on June 25, the motion was denied as moot when the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The decision declared that the Indiana same-sex marriage ban violated the Fourteenth Amendment and permanently enjoined the state from enforcing it. Baskin v. Bogan, 2014 WL 2884868 (S. D. Indiana). As of June 25, 2014, same-sex marriages were legal in the state of Indiana. The defendants sought a stay in the district court, and filed an appeal. The district court did not rule on the stay motion for two days, so on June 27, the State filed an emergency stay motion in the Seventh Circuit, which granted that motion that same evening. The Seventh Circuit also consolidated this case with the two other pending Indiana same-sex cases, Fujii and Lee (see "related cases", below), and expedited briefing. On July 10, 2014, the state appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals combined the case for briefing and oral argument with a similar Indiana case, Wolf v. Walker. On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, and joined by Judges Williams and Hamilton, found in favor of the plaintiffs and affirmed the district court's judgments invalidating and enjoining these two states' prohibitions of same-sex marriage. The opinion primarily addressed the question of equal protection and said that the states of Indiana and Wisconsin have no rational basis behind the prohibition of same-sex marriage. The Court also suggested that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has all the hallmarks of a 'suspect class.' 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). The defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit stayed its mandate pending the outcome of that petition. When the Supreme Court denied review on October 6, 2014, the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate. The parties subsequently reached an agreement on attorneys' fees that was not disclosed to the Court. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 10, 2014, same-sex couples filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other federal statutes against the State of Indiana and Boone, Porter, and Lake Counties, in Indiana. The plaintiffs challenge as unconstitutional Indiana's refusal to recognize same-sex marriages. One of the plaintiffs has cancer and she and her wife (married in Massachusetts) claimed that the recognition ban was impeding her access to medical care. They sought immediate relief. On April 10th, at a motion hearing, Judge Richard Young granted the requested month-long temporary restraining order; no written order/opinion was issued at that time, but on May 8th, the court granted a preliminary injunction requiring state recognition of the plaintiffs' marriage, including on a death certificate if the need arises. On June 25th, 2014, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and ruled that Indiana's same-sex marriage ban violated the U.S. Constitution. On June 27, however, the 7th Circuit granted an emergency motion for a stay, consolidated the case with two other similar cases, and set an expedited briefing schedule . The plaintiffs won in district court; and on September 4, the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision which declared Wisconsin's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied the defendants' petition for writ of certiorari and the case is now closed.


On May 21, 2018, Alabama and a representative from its Fifth Congressional District filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The case was assigned to District Judge R. David Proctor. The plaintiffs sued the United States Department of Commerce and the United States Census Bureau under the Actual Enumeration Clause of Article I Section 2 of the Constitution, the Congressional Apportionment and Electoral College Apportionment Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Declaratory Judgments Act. Represented by the Alabama Attorney General, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that the Census Bureau’s policy of including all U.S. residents in the census count totals used for apportioning congressional seats and electoral votes, regardless of residents' citizenship status, was unconstitutional. They specifically alleged that including undocumented individuals in the population count deprived Alabama of its “rightful share of political representation,” because it had fewer undocumented immigrants relative to other states. The state also alleged that counting undocumented individuals violated the Constitution’s provisions governing congressional apportionment and the electoral college, as well as the federal government’s constitutional duty to conduct an “actual enumeration” of the population. The plaintiff claimed that it was harmed when it received less federal funding than other states because of its relatively low level of undocumented immigrants, and further argued that the Bureau’s policy of counting undocumented individuals was “arbitrary and capricious” and “contrary to law” under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Over three dozen entities intervened as defendants, including 15 states, 6 counties, 9 cities, 2 organizations, 6 individuals, and the District of Columbia. The Census Bureau moved to dismiss for lack of standing. The court, concluding that Alabama had adequately alleged Article III standing, dismissed the Bureau’s motion on June 5, 2019. 396 F.Supp.3d 1044. On September 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, omitting its original claim that “the defendant’s decision to include illegal aliens in the census enumeration will likely cause the State of Alabama to lose federal and private funding.” On October 1, intervenor defendant Chicanos Por La Causa and six individuals filed a cross-claim against the federal government defendants, seeking a declaration that it would be unconstitutional for the Census Bureau to omit undocumented immigrants in the population totals it reports to the President and Congress for purposes of apportionment; an injunction barring the Census Bureau from reporting a tabulation omitting undocumented immigrants; and attorneys’ fees and costs. As of June 23, 2020, dispositive motions are due by October 21, 2020.

Summary: On May 21, 2018, the State of Alabama sued United States Department of Commerce, and its agency the Bureau of the Census, claiming that its policy of including all U.S. residents, regardless of their citizenship status, in the census count totals used for apportioning congressional seats and electoral college votes, was unconstitutional and violated federal law. On September 10, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint; on October 1, 2019, seven intervenor defendants filed a cross-claim against the federal government defendants. As of June 2020, the litigation is ongoing.


On December 17, 2013, prisoners currently or previously incarcerated in solitary confinement at Colorado State Penitentiary ("CSP") filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Colorado. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center and student attorneys from the Civil Rights Clinic at the University of Denver College of Law, asked the Court to declare that CSP conditions violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the Court issue an injunction ordering the state to provide solitary confinement prisoners with regular access to outdoor exercise. At the time the case was bought, prisoners in administrative segregation at CSP spent a minimum of 23 hours per day alone in a cell. The prisoners in administrative segregation had access to a recreation room for a maximum of one hour per day, five days per week. The exercise area was essentially another cell and was not outdoors. The small room contained only a pull-up bar and there was no opportunity for inmates to run. Plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered mental and physical harm as a result of being denied access to outdoor exercise. On July 10, 2014, Judge William Martinez granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying a class of "[a]ll inmates who are now or will in the future be housed in administrative segregation at the Colorado State Penitentiary and who are now or will in the future be subjected to the policy and practice of refusing to provide such inmates access to outdoor exercise." In the same order, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate this class action with a prior-filed pro se damage action. 2014 WL 3373670, 304 F.R.D. 683 (D. Colo. 2014). The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to redefine their class by excluding the limitation of administrative segregation housing in April 2015. On October 2, 2015, the parties filed a stipulated notice of settlement agreement. After a fairness hearing, on July 6, 2016, the court approved the settlement agreement and granted the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. The settlement agreement provided that inmates would be transferred from CSP to Sterling Correctional Facility, where there were outdoor cages available for exercise that had at least 180 square feet of space. These inmates would be permitted to use this space for one hour per day, three days per week. Further, pending the completion of new outdoor yards at CSP, inmates would be able to exercise in these yards for one hour per day, three days per week. The parties also laid out a dispute resolution process, whereby they agreed to attempt informal resolutions first before seeking out judicial resolution. The agreement also included a provision requiring that notice be provided to class members of the settlement. Further, the agreement provided a process for concluding the case: This case was to be administratively closed once the settlement was approved, and upon completion and inspection of the agreement's requirements, the parties were to file a stipulation to dismiss the case. The plaintiffs were awarded $410,000 in attorneys' fees. The settlement agreement provided for an October 2016 checkpoint if it appeared construction would not be completed by December 2016. The defendants were to file a status report with the court. However, the docket shows no activity after the settlement agreement. The case is now administratively closed, though the court retained jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising under the agreement. According to news articles, Colorado ended long-term solitary confinement in October 2017.

Summary: In December 2013, plaintiffs brought a suit challenging the living conditions and exercise facilities at the Colorado State Penitentiary. Plaintiffs, inmates in administrative segregation, spend a minimum of 23 hours per day alone in a cell and have access to a small recreation room for a maximum of one hour per day. The Court's most recent order denied the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On July 6, 2016, the Court approved a settlement agreement requiring regular outdoor exercise for CSP inmates, and awarding $410,000 in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs.


On February 12, 2019, seven immigrants, Brooklyn Defender Services, and Legal Aid filed this class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York alleging they had a constitutional and statutory right to attend immigration court and removal proceedings in person, instead of by video teleconference hearings (VTC). The plaintiffs sued defendants U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), and associated officials. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that their protections guaranteed by the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the Rehabilitation Act had been violated. The plaintiffs claimed that they were denied the right to have an in person hearing in front of Immigration Court. According to the complaint, VTC-only hearing have had disastrous effects on detailed immigrants, the ability of their attorneys to effectively represent them, and the efficiency of the immigration court. The named plaintiffs in this case are seven immigrants who were detained in jails outside of New York City and required to appear for removal proceedings through VTC. Prior to June 2018, detained immigrants had their removal proceedings in person. On June 27, 2018 ICE’s New York Field Office announced that the majority of future proceedings would be conducted through VTC. Issues such as the plaintiffs feeling discouraged to testify about sensitive personal information vital to their case via VTC while in the presence of ICE agents and delays due to foreign language interpretation services or accommodations added to the difficulty of testifying. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the VTC policy has had numerous technological and scheduling challenges, including poor connections, technological failures, over-scheduling, and a limited number VTC lines, resulting in adjourned and delayed hearings and correspondingly increasing immigrants’ time in detention. Prior to this lawsuit, the New York Immigrant Family Unity Program ("NYIFUP"), New York City's first-in-the-nation appointed counsel program for detained immigrants who cannot afford an attorney, was able to screen and identify clients in on-site intake interviews at the Varick Street Immigration Court on the day of clients' initial appearances. NYIFUP has increased the rate of successful outcomes by 1,100 percent since 2013. This service reduced unnecessary detention and illegal deportation, representing approximately 35 percent of immigrants in proceedings before the Varick Street Immigration Court. Without the in-person hearings, NYIFUP is unable to identify potential clients. On February 15, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify their class, and on February 26, 2019, they filed a motion for preliminary injunction to produce detainees to their removal proceedings in person. On April 15, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On June 21, 2019, Judge Andrew L. Carter filed an opinion and order denying the plaintiff’s motions for class certification and for preliminary injunction and approving the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2019 WL 2568648. Though Judge Carter noted he was “sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims,” he dismissed the case because under § 1252(b)(9) of the INA he was jurisdictionally barred from hearing the action. Under § 1252(b)(9) of the INA, judicial review, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from actions to remove a noncitizen was only available in judicial review of a <i>final</i> order of removal. In this case, because the plaintiffs were challenging part of the process by which removability will be determined, the court did not have jurisdiction. On July 22, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a motion to alter the judgment. The court ordered on July 23, 2019 a schedule for the defendant's opposition and the plaintiff's reply. The motion has not been ordered. At this time, the Clearinghouse does not have access to the documents regarding the substance of the motion to alter judgement. The motion has not been ordered on as of November 8, 2019. The case is still in progress as of November 8, 2019.

Summary: The plaintiffs in this case are seven immigrants who were detained in jails outside of New York City and required to appear for removal proceedings through VTC. Prior to June 2018, detained immigrants had their removal proceedings in person. On June 27, 2018 ICE’s New York Field Office announced that the majority of future proceedings would be conducted through VTC. Issues such as the plaintiffs feeling discouraged to testify about sensitive personal information vital to their case via VTC while in the presence of ICE agents and delays due to foreign language interpretation services or accommodations added to the difficulty of testifying.