On November 4, 2010, a devout and practicing Muslim filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma against the Oklahoma State Election Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court to issue a preliminary injunction against the Board certifying the election results of SQ 755's amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution. SQ 755 is a state initiative passed by the citizens of Oklahoma which, in relevant part, forbids judges from "considering or using Sharia Law" when deciding cases. Specifically, plaintiff claimed that the amendment violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. On November 29, 2010, Chief District Court Judge Vicki Miles-LaGrange granted plaintiff a preliminary injunction against certifying SQ 755. 754 F.Supp.2d 1298 (2010). The court found that plaintiff showed a substantial likelihood of success in demonstrating that SQ 755 had the primary effect of inhibiting religion and that the amendment fostered an excessive government entanglement with religion. The court also noted that the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, constitutes irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the loss of plaintiff's First Amendment freedoms outweighed any injury that would occur from delaying the will of the voters being carried out by certifying the election results. The preliminary injunction was ordered until a decision could be made on the merits. On December 1, 2010, the defendant appealed the district court's decision granting the preliminary injunction. On January 10, 2012, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 670 F.3d 1111 (2010). On July 29, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint added new plaintiffs to the case, retained those challenges made to SQ 755 articulated in the original complaint, and asked the court to permanently enjoin Defendants from certifying the election results of SQ 755. On February 8, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. On August 15, 2013, Chief District Court Judge Miles-LaGrange granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and permanently enjoined defendants from certifying the election results for SQ 755.966 F.Supp.2d 1198 (2013). The court found that SQ 755's explicit and deliberate distinctions among religions warranted strict scrutiny. The court found that Oklahoma's articulated interest "in determining what law is applied in Oklahoma courts" was not compelling. Because the case failed the first step of the scrutiny analysis, there was no need to analyze tailoring. The court then found that the unconstitutional aspect of SQ 755 could not be severed, and declared the law unconstitutional. On April 25, 2014, Chief District Court Judge Miles-LaGrange awarded plaintiff attorney fees and non-taxable expenses in the amount of $303,333.49. 2014 WL 1660650.

Summary: On November 4, 2010, a practicing Muslim, filed a lawsuit against the Oklahoma State Election Board asking the court to issue a preliminary injunction against certifying the election results of SQ 755's amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution, which in relevant part, forbid judges from "considering or using Sharia Law" when deciding cases. On August 15, 2013, the district court found that the law violated the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and permanently enjoined defendants from certifying the election results for SQ 755.


In July 2007, a special education student who was sexually assaulted and harassed by other students sued the Board of Education for the Metropolitan Nashville Public Schools ("MNPS") in Tennessee state court. The plaintiff later added Genesis Learning Center, the school he attended, as a defendant. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for punitive damages and attorneys' fees, claiming that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tennessee state law due to their deliberate indifference towards the plaintiff's special needs and the harassment he experienced; failure to train and supervise bus drivers; retaliation against the plaintiff based on his exercise of constitutional and statutory rights; breach of special custodial arrangement; a state-created danger; and violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants' failure to properly perform their respective duties to provide for him with appropriate transportation violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and their indifference to sexual conduct based on the plaintiff's sex violated Title IX. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee on August 2, 2007. In his complaint, the plaintiff sought class certification on behalf of similarly situated special education students, but this request was denied on April 1, 2008 (Judge Robert L. Echols). On September 14, 2007, the Board of Education was dismissed from the action and replaced with the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County ("Metro"). After almost a year of discovery, the United States moved to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff on September 10, 2008 and the Court (Magistrate Judge Juliet E. Griffin) granted the motion on November 4. See Lopez v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., No. 3-07-0799, 2008 WL4831318, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Nov. 4, 2008). On January 15, 2009, all parties cross-moved for summary judgment. On July 7, 2009, the Court (Judge Robert L. Echols) denied the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment. Lopez v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 646 F. Supp. 2d 891, 922 (M.D. Tenn. 2009). The Court also denied in part and granted in part the defendants' motions for summary judgment. See id. The Court granted Genesis' Motion regarding plaintiff's § 1983, Americans With Disabilities Act, and Rehabilitation Act claims, leaving plaintiff's Title IX and state negligence claims standing against them. See id. As for Metro, the Court granted its motion regarding plaintiff's Equal Protection, failure to train, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims, but denied the motion in regard to plaintiff's state law negligence and state-created danger claims under § 1983, and his Title IX claims. See id. On February 9, 2010, the Court entered a consent decree and settlement negotiated between the United States and Metro, dismissing Metro from the case. The decree required Metro, overseen by the United States, to eliminate unreasonable risks of sexual harassment to students with disabilities attending MNPS schools and to establish reporting requirements and bus monitors. The settlement required Metro to pay the plaintiff $1,475,000, attorneys' fees amounting to $85,618.13; a contribution of no more than $139,539.18 to the plaintiff's insurance company; and $25,000 to the plaintiff's mother for travel and time spent away from work. On February 23, 2010, the United States was dismissed from the case, as its claims were dealt with in the decree. After continued discovery, Genesis and the plaintiff went to trial, and the jury returned a judgment in favor of Genesis on March 17, 2010. On June 3, 2010, Genesis' motion for costs was dismissed without prejudice, and their motion for attorney's fees was denied. The Court also denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial and his motion for oral argument. On June 16, 2010, the plaintiff appealed the court's order granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment (July 7, 2009) and the court's order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial (June 3, 2010) to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On June 30, 2010, Genesis cross-appealed. On July 12, 2010, the Court taxed costs against the plaintiff in favor of Genesis for $10,263.06. On September 7, 2010, the case was remanded from the Court of Appeals to the District Court, based on an agreement reached in the parties' settlement discussions. On September 8, the Court (Judge Juliet E. Griffin) entered the parties' settlement, which required Genesis to pay the plaintiff $25,000 and for the parties' appeals to be dismissed with prejudice. On November 15, 2010, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice, constituting the final judgment in the case.

Summary: In July 2007, a special education student who was sexually assaulted and harassed by other students sued his school and the board of education. The United States Department of Justice intervened, and negotiated a consent agreement with the board of education in February 2010. The decree required the board of education to eliminate unreasonable risks of sexual harassment to students with disabilities attending MNPS schools and to establish reporting requirements and bus monitors. The settlement required Metro to pay the plaintiff $1,475,000, attorneys' fees amounting to $85,618.13; a contribution of no more than $139,539.18 to the plaintiff's insurance company; and $25,000 to the plaintiff's mother for travel and time spent away from work. The plaintiff and the school defendant went to trial, and the jury returned judgment in favor of the school in March 2010. Both parties appealed to the Sixth Circuit, but eventually settled, resulting in the school defendant's payment of $25,000 to the plaintiff in September 2010.


Consolidation of Three Lawsuits This class-action lawsuit is the consolidation of three distinct cases against the United States Navy:

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. Danzig, filed November 5, 1999 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (docket number 1:99-cv-02945-RMU)
Adair v. Danzig, filed March 17, 2000 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (docket number 1:00-cv-00566-RMU)
Gibson v. U.S. Navy, filed April 28, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida (docket number 3:06-cv-00187-MCR-MD), transferred to the D.C. District on September 29, 2006 (docket number 1:06-cv-01696-RMU)
 The cases were consolidated as In re Navy Chaplaincy on June 18, 2007, and assigned to Judge Ricardo M. Urbina. In order to serve the spiritual needs of its personnel and their families, the Navy maintains a chaplain corps, divided into four broad categories: Roman Catholic, Liturgical Protestant, Non-Liturgical Protestant, and Special Worship. The principal plaintiffs in this case are several current and former chaplains identifying as Non-Liturgical Protestant. Represented by the Rutherford Institute, these plaintiffs alleged that the Navy discriminated against them on the basis of religion, in violation of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000-bb et seq. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Navy unconstitutionally established and maintained a discriminatory system for the promotion, assignment, and retention of chaplains in a manner that disadvantaged chaplains of non-liturgical Protestant faiths. The plaintiffs’ primary claim was that until 2002, the Navy maintained an unconstitutional policy of placing at least one Roman Catholic chaplain on every selection board, which resulted in Catholic chaplains being promoted at a disproportionately high rate compared to other religious groups (they also challenged a number of other selection board policies and procedures). Finally, they challenged a statute that protects selection board deliberations from disclosure in litigation, arguing that it was unconstitutional as applied to their case because it denied them access to information that they needed to prove their constitutional claims. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the challenged policies were unlawful, and an injunction directing the Navy to cease those challenged policies that were still in place and to develop a monitoring system. Dismissal of Two Claims On February 1, 2000, the Navy moved to dismiss the Adair complaint. Nearly two years later, on January 10, 2002, the court dismissed two of the claims, which pertained to the composition of selection boards and the promotion process. Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31. The plaintiffs moved for the court to reconsider the dismissal of these two claims, but their motion was denied on August 5, 2002. 209 F.R.D. 1. In response to this denial, the plaintiffs moved for the court to certify the dismissals as final judgments for the purpose of appeal; the court denied this motion as well, on May 6, 2004. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 221 F.R.D. 255. Years later, the plaintiffs again moved for reconsideration of the January 10, 2002 ruling, arguing that the reconsideration was warranted due to evidence obtained during the discovery process. But on March 21, 2012, the court again denied the motion. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 850 F. Supp. 2d 86. Discoverability of Chaplain Selection Boards’ Deliberations On October 29, 2002, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the Navy to release members of its various selection boards from their oaths of confidentiality, thereby allowing them to be deposed about board proceedings. On September 2, 2003, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. Johnson, 217 F.R.D. 250. However, on July 27, 2004, the D.C. Circuit Court (Judges Douglas H. Ginsburg, Merrick B. Garland, and John G. Roberts, Jr.) reversed the district court’s decision in part, holding that 10 U.S.C. §618(f) barred the disclosure of selection board deliberations. In re England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a constitutional challenge to §618(f), arguing that the provision, as applied to them, denied them an opportunity for meaningful judicial review because the evidence barred by §618(f) was essential to their claims. On September 11, 2006, the district court rejected this argument and denied the plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment. Adair v. Winter, 451 F. Supp. 2d 210. Notably, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion regarding the discoverability of selection board deliberations was limited to promotion boards only. Since the court had not analyzed whether 10 U.S.C. §618(f) barred disclosure for each type of selection board independently, the D.C. Circuit vacated the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further consideration with respect to selective early retirement selection boards and active duty continuation selection boards. The district court subsequently held on March 7, 2006 that the statute did not bar discovery of selective early retirement board proceedings. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 234 F.R.D. 7. The Navy moved for reconsideration, which the district court initially denied on September 11, 2006. Adair v. Winter, 451 F. Supp. 2d 202. However, the National Defense Authorization Act of October 17, 2006 struck §618(f), and replaced it with language granting explicit immunity for all selection boards. Their “discussions and deliberations” could not be admitted as evidence or used in a lawsuit without the consent of the Secretary of the Navy. Therefore the district court, on October 1, 2007, revisited and granted the Navy’s motion for reconsideration. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 512 F. Supp. 2d 58. Standing and Discriminatory Intent Throughout the lawsuit, the plaintiffs frequently sought preliminary injunctions that would prevent the Navy from carrying out particular policies. The plaintiffs filed one such motion on June 5, 2003, seeking an injunction to prevent the Navy from allowing Catholic chaplains to remain on active duty past the statutory separation age in order to qualify for retirement pay. The court denied this motion on February 7, 2005. The plaintiffs appealed, and on July 7, 2006, the D.C. Circuit Court (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Judith W. Rogers, and Janice Rogers Brown) affirmed the district court’s denial of the structural injunction, but vacated its denial of a preliminary injunction. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290. The district court had wrongly concluded that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the irreparable injury prong of the preliminary injunction framework. As a result, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case for the district court to rule on whether the plaintiffs met the remaining elements necessary for a preliminary injunction. On October 15, 2007, the district court again denied the plaintiffs’ motion, this time holding that they lacked standing to challenge the policy in question. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 516 F. Supp. 2d 119. The D.C. Circuit (Judges Judith W. Rogers, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Laurence H. Silberman) affirmed this decision on August 1, 2008. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 534 F.3d 756. On July 22, 2011, the plaintiffs again filed for a preliminary injunction, this time with respect to three chaplain selection board policies:

staffing the seven-member selection boards with two chaplains,
enabling board members to keep their votes secret, and
allowing the Chief of Chaplains or his deputy to serve as the selection board’s president.
 The district court again denied the preliminary injunction, on January 30, 2012. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 841 F. Supp. 2d 336. The plaintiffs appealed, and on November 2, 2012, the D.C. Circuit (Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Judith W. Rogers, and David S. Tatel) vacated the denial and remanded for the district court to clarify its reasoning on the plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits of their claim. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 697 F.3d 1171. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit was unsure whether the district court viewed the insufficiency of the plaintiffs’ claims to be legal or factual. On February 28, 2013 the district court (now Judge Gladys Kessler) again denied the preliminary injunction. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F. Supp. 2d 26. Although the plaintiffs had offered evidence that non-liturgical Protestant chaplains were less likely to be promoted than other chaplains, the discrepancy was only 10 percentage points; the court’s ruling reflected its conclusion that the statistics failed to show discriminatory intent in the policies or their implementation. The D.C. Circuit (Judges David S. Tatel, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Stephen F. Williams) affirmed this decision on December 27, 2013, emphasizing that the statistical study had failed to include any controls (for experience, etc.), and therefore did not suggest that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 738 F.3d 425. When Judge Gladys Kessler received the case in 2012, she had extended a stay of discovery imposed by Judge Urbina in 2009. In November 2012, she issued an order reiterating that stay. 287 F.R.D. 100. Class Certification The court denied class certification on September 4, 2014. 306 F.R.D. 33. The opinion addressed, as a threshold matter, whether the court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the complaint regarding the Navy’s chaplain promotion policies. As the promotion policy had been discontinued in 2001, and as there was no evidence that the Navy planned to reenact the policy, the plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. The court also held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the policy: they had failed to establish that their alleged injury (increased workload) was redressable by the relief sought, because they had not demonstrated that their past workloads had any lasting adverse effects that could be remedied. Thus, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ promotion policy claims. Regarding class certification, the plaintiffs had sought to certify a class of up to 2500 “present and former non-liturgical Navy chaplains, active duty and Reserve, who were in the Navy or have served in the Navy” between 1976 and the present. While the numerosity requirement was met, the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the commonality, typicality, and adequacy-of-representation requirements. Regarding commonality, the court drew heavily on the analysis in Walmart v. Dukes and held that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the existence of a common answer to the question of why each individual plaintiff was disfavored. With respect to typicality, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims arose “from the same course of events” or were otherwise typical of the absent class members’ claims. Finally, regarding adequacy of representation, the court found that there was a conflict of interest between the class representatives and the class members, as the former’s interest in wide-ranging institutional reform was likely in conflict with the latter’s interest in obtaining individualized monetary relief. The court also noted that the class representatives were willing to draw divisions among members of the proposed class, which strongly indicated that they could not be fair and impartial representatives of the class as a whole. Additionally, the court held that even if the plaintiffs had met the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), they failed to establish that the class was maintainable under one of the subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment On September 26, 2014, the court granted the Navy’s motion for partial summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment. 69 F.Supp.3d 249. The Navy had relied on the six-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. §2401(a) to argue that many of the plaintiffs’ claims were barred, as they were filed more than six years after finalization of the policies and personnel actions on which the claims were based. The plaintiffs had argued that their claims had not accrued until the plaintiffs had discovered the discriminatory nature of the Navy’s practices. In the alternative, they had argued that the court should apply equitable tolling doctrines to permit the claims to proceed. The court held that the plaintiffs’ claim was time-barred and the equitable tolling doctrine did not apply. The Navy’s Motion to Dismiss On February 27, 2015, the Navy filed a motion to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds. The motion addressed challenges to the plaintiffs’ remaining claims in three categories:

as-applied challenges to personnel policies or practices;
as-applied challenges to conditions of hostility and bias; and
challenges to ad hoc actions against certain plaintiffs.
 On March 16, 2016, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. With respect to the first category, the court found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the injury-in-fact or redressability prongs of standing to challenge alleged personnel policies or practices. Regarding the second category, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing to challenge the alleged cultures of bias and hostility. Finally, the court found that the plaintiffs had alleged injury-in-fact and redressability sufficient to support standing to challenge the defendants’ alleged ad hoc actions against certain plaintiffs. In re Navy Chaplaincy, 170 F. Supp. 3d 21. Cross Motions for Summary Judgment In 2017, both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The plaintiffs also filed several motions to lift the stay on discovery that was then in place. On August 30, 2018, the district court (now Judge John D. Bates) denied the plaintiffs’ motions for additional discovery and for summary judgment, instead granting the Navy’s summary judgment motion on six of the nine claims still remaining (calling those six claims the “systemic claims”). Specifically, the court held that because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the Navy’s board-staffing policies lacked a rational basis, they failed to make out their constitutional challenge to the Navy’s alleged policy of placing one Catholic chaplain on every chaplain selection board. Further, the court held that the plaintiffs’ challenges to the selection board policies at issue failed for essentially the same reason that they had previously failed to secure a preliminary injunction against those policies: they had failed to demonstrate that the challenged policies either were facially discriminatory, were adopted with discriminatory intent, or had a stark enough disparate impact on non-liturgical Protestant chaplains that discriminatory intent could be inferred. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ challenge to the constitutionality of 10 U.S.C. §613a (the ban on the disclosure of selection board proceedings). In re Navy Chaplaincy, 323 F. Supp. 3d 25. The plaintiffs’ three remaining claims, which the court referred to as the “ad hoc claims,” asserted constructive discharge, retaliation, and interference with prayer, on behalf of certain individual plaintiffs. The parties sought to sever these remaining claims, arguing that they lacked sufficient commonality to be asserted together in a single action. On November 8, 2018, the court granted the motion to sever the ad hoc claims. The court gave any plaintiff in the action the opportunity to refile his or her individual ad hoc claims (constructive discharge, retaliation, interference with the form of prayer) within 90 days of the severance order, or the claims would be dismissed with prejudice. The court then entered final judgment on April 25, 2019, dismissing all “systemic claims” and, by consent of the plaintiffs, dismissing the severed “ad hoc claims” without prejudice. Several of the district court’s judgments were appealed to the D.C. Circuit in July 2019 (docket numbers 19-5204 and 19-5206). As of July 3, 2020, the parties’ final briefs are due on July 10, 2020. 27 individual plaintiffs (all Adair plaintiffs, all Gibson plaintiffs, and Martha Carson, Denise Merritt, and Daniel Roysden) jointly re-filed their severed ad hoc complaints as a new lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on March 1, 2019, under the caption Lancaster v. Secretary of the Navy (docket number 19-cv-95). Senior Judge Henry Coke Morgan, Jr. transferred the case back to the D.C. District: in their motion to sever their claims in the D.C. District, the plaintiffs had represented to the court that their individual ad hoc claims involved different incidents, different people, and different places, and therefore would be more appropriately litigated individually. It was therefore inappropriate for the severed claims to be tried jointly before a judge in another district. However, Judge Morgan ruled that two individual plaintiffs, who resided in the Eastern District of Virginia, could maintain their claims in that court. Those two plaintiffs re-filed their claims individually; one ultimately had his claims dismissed on January 21, 2020, and the other’s claims are pending as of July 3, 2020. Again before Judge John D. Bates in the D.C. District, the remaining 25 plaintiffs attempted to re-litigate the systemic claims that the court had dismissed in November 2018. The court again dismissed all of those claims, and ruled that individual plaintiffs could have one final opportunity to re-file their claims, individually, within 30 days of the April 1, 2020 ruling. The re-filings must be by leave of the court. The court on May 18, 2020 denied the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. No individuals have sought leave of the court to refile as of July 3, 2020.

Summary: The principal plaintiffs in this case are current and former non-liturgical Protestant chaplains in the United States Navy. These plaintiffs sued the U.S. Navy in several separate suits in 1999 and 2000, consolidated here, alleging that several of its personnel policies discriminated against them on the basis of religion by favoring chaplains who identify as Catholic or liturgical Protestant at the expense of chaplains with non-liturgical denominations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2019, the court dismissed all of the plaintiffs' "systemic claims," and dismissed their individual "ad hoc claims" with leave to re-file individually in a court of their choosing. They filed a joint lawsuit in the Eastern District of Virginia; their joint complaint was transferred back to the D.C. District, where their claims were dismissed. As of July 2020, a single plaintiff has active claims remaining, pending in the Eastern District of Virginia.


On November 18, 2009, female inmates of the North Carolina Department of Correction (DOC) filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual employees and supervisors. The plaintiffs, represented by the North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants violated their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that various DOC employees had sexually assaulted, abused, or harassed them during their confinement and that certain supervisory defendants did nothing to prevent the abuse. On September 10, 2010, Judge James C. Dever denied the plaintiffs' class certification motion without prejudice. On March 16, 2011, Judge Dever granted in part a motion by several defendants for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed two plaintiffs and four defendants, and dismissed the remaining plaintiffs' First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court also denied the plaintiffs' second motion for class certification. Etters v. Bennett, 2011 WL 976472 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 16, 2011). The plaintiffs appealed, and on August 30, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion per curiam dismissing one of the plaintiff's appeals when her claim was dismissed by the district court. King v. Bennett, 444 F. App'x 686 (4th Cir. 2011). On August 1, 2011, Judge Dever denied one of the defendant's motion for appointment of counsel (because he failed to fill out the necessary form) and denied a motion to intervene by another inmate. Etters v. Bennett, 2011 WL 3320489 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 1, 2011). On May 18, 2012, plaintiff Deven Deal and defendants Keller, Bennett, Kimble, Harvey, and Blalock filed a joint stipulation of dismissal, seeking dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff Deal's claims against these defendants. On May 21, 2012, Deal filed a second notice of voluntary dismissal, seeking dismissal with prejudice of her claims against defendant Barbosa. On the same date, plaintiff Sandra Etters and defendants Young, Lancaster, and Harvey filed a joint motion to expedite the entry of an order based on their proposed settlement agreement, and Etters filed a motion for entry of default judgment against defendant Simms. The defendants agreed to improve sexual safety through policies, training practices, changes to physical facilities, and other measures for the prevention of sexual abuse. On May 30, 2012, the court approved the two voluntary dismissals and approved the settlement by the parties providing for changes to state policies concerning reporting and investigating claims of sexual abuse by inmates. The court also approved a default judgment for Etters against Simms, the only remaining claims. Etters v. Young, 2012 WL 1950415 (E.D.N.C. May 30, 2012). On February 6, 2013, Magistrate Judge James E. Gates issued a memorandum and recommendation that Etters be awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, for a total damages award of $200,000 from defendant Charlie Cortez Simms. No party filed any objections. Etters v. Shanahan, 2013 WL 787344 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2013). Etters v. Shanahan, 2013 WL 787344 (E.D.N.C. Feb. 6, 2013). On March 4, 2013, Judge Dever dismissed the claims of two of the plaintiffs and dismissed four of the defendants. The court also dismissed the six of the defendants as to the third plaintiff. Judge Dever also accepted the memorandum and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Gates. Etters v. Shanahan, 2013 WL 792834 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2013).

Summary: In 2009, female inmates of the North Carolina Department of Correction (DOC) filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual employees and supervisors. The plaintiffs, represented by the North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, claimed that the defendants violated their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights through sexual abuse by DOC employees.


On January 9, 2001, inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP), represented by the ACLU, filed a Section 1983 class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against officials of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs complained of inadequate medical and mental health services, improper classification and transfer procedures, and inadequate suicide prevention procedures. Following discovery, the District Court (Judge James S. Gwin) granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction preventing defendants from returning seriously mentally ill inmates to OSP and set trial for January 2002. Prior to the trial, the parties agreed to a limited settlement agreement that addressed the classification of inmates, and the inadequacy of the medical and mental health services. In April 2002, following a fairness hearing, the court approved the settlement agreement. Following the trial, Judge Gwin held that defendants had violated the plaintiff class's right to due process by denying the plaintiffs adequate notice, adequate hearing, and sufficiently detailed decisions regarding transfer. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Following receipt of the parties' proposed injunctive orders, Judge Gwin issued an injunction directing defendants to correct each of the deficiencies the court had found. Austin v. Wilkinson, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (N.D. Ohio 2002). Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court lacked the power to modify substantive prison regulations. Austin v. Wilkinson, 372 F.3d 346 (2004). Prison officials applied for certiorari which was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that although the inmates had a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in avoiding assignment to the supermax prison, the State's new policy and procedures were sufficient to satisfy due process. Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005). On August 3, 2006, the District Court (Judge Gwin) granted the defendants' motion to terminate the medical provisions of the injunctive order. On September 27, 2007, Judge Gwin granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for order directing defendants to modify their proposed prison administration policies. Judge Gwin ordered defendants to 1) consider and communicate in sufficient detail inmates' positive behavior during the annual review process; 2) provide more justification for security assessments; and 3) revise the election form to better communicate the consequences of choosing to remain at OSP and thereby waiving certain rights. 2007 WL 2840352. On October 18, 2007, Judge Gwin denied plaintiffs' motion to vacate the previous judgment and reopen mental health claims, which they brought over five years ago and which they agreed as resolved through the Court's earlier findings and orders. 2007 WL 3047157. Defendants appealed the September 27, 2007, order and moved to stay that order pending appeal. On January 10, 2008, Judge Gwin denied defendants' motion to stay pending appeal because 1) defendants were unlikely to prevail on their appeal; 2) defendants were unlikely to suffer irreparable harm absent a stay; 3) others faced harm if the Court granted the stay; and 4) the stay was not in the public interest. 2008 WL 115094. On March 12, 2008, Judge Gwin denied plaintiffs' motion to extend the jurisdiction of the Court over this case for another year and granted defendants' motion to terminate the prospective relief provided by the Court's previous orders because defendants were no longer committing ongoing constitutional violations. 2008 WL 697679. On July 16, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement and agreed to terminate the case. Defendants agreed to pay $59,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. As such, on August 4, 2008, the appeal to the Sixth Circuit was dismissed.

Summary: On January 9, 2001, inmates at the Ohio State Penitentiary (OSP) filed a class action suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of Ohio against officials of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. Plaintiffs alleged inadequate medical and mental health services, improper classification and transfer procedures, and inadequate suicide prevention procedures violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge Gwin approved a limited settlement agreement that the parties had reached prior to the trial and issued an injunction directing defendants to correct each of the deficiencies the court had found in policies regarding transfer. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court lacked the power to modify substantive prison regulations. Prison officials applied for certiorari which was granted. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that the State's new policy and procedures were sufficient to satisfy due process. On September 27, 2007, Judge Gwin ordered defendants to change policies regarding the annual review process, security assessments, and the election form to stay at OSP. Defendants appealed. However, on July 16, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement and agreed to terminate the case. Defendants agreed to pay $59,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, and the defendants appeal was dismissed.


On August 13, 2004, employees of the Ontario Police Department filed suit against the City of Ontario, CA and the Ontario Police Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the 4th Amendment, California Constitution Article 1 § 1, and the common law tort of invasion of privacy. The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, and both private counsel and the ACLU of Southern California represented the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that the Police Department's installation of a video camera in the men's locker room violated their privacy rights, and sought compensatory and punitive damages. On April 14, 2005, the District Court (Judge Virginia Phillips) certified a class of all employees or volunteers at the Ontario Police Department who used the men's locker room during the time the video camera was installed and were recorded by the equipment. A year later, Judge Phillips ruled that the video camera installation violated the 4th amendment, and that issues of fact remained on the other two causes of action. 428 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2006). The defendants appealed the trial court's refusal to grant the officers qualified immunity, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of qualified immunity. 270 Fed. Appx. 518 (9th Cir. 2008). The case was set to proceed to trial. On the morning of the scheduled first day of trial, the parties announced they had reached a settlement. On March 16, 2009 the plaintiffs moved for preliminary approval of the class action settlement; two months later, the court granted preliminary approval, pending consideration of any objections by class members.. Under the settlement Ontario paid $1.54 million to class members, and $1.21 million in attorneys' fees and costs. The settlement was "non-reversionary," meaning that even if only a few class members actually claimed the damages they were promised, Ontario was still obligated to pay the entire agreed-upon amount. On August 24, 2009, the court granted final approval of the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: This case concerns a video surveillance camera that was set up in 2004 in the Ontario (Cal.) Police Department locker room in response to a flashlight being stolen from one of the lockers. Police officers who used the locker room during the time of the surveillance filed a class action suit for invasion of privacy and unlawful search and seizure. The officers ultimately reached a settlement agreement with the Department, which agreed to pay $1.5 million to them and $1.2 million to their lawyers.


On June 5, 2013, thirty-five adult individuals with disabilities filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), and the Social Security Act (Medicaid) - as well as a § 1983 constitutional due process claim against the State of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, represented through their legal guardians by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the closing of two residential care facilities where the plaintiffs resided. The claims argued that the planned closures would violate the plaintiffs' rights or result in situations where violation of those rights would occur. Specifically, in regard to the ADA claims, the plaintiffs claimed that discharges or transfers from their current residences were being forced without their consent and without appropriate recommendation from treating professionals. This, they argued, violated the plaintiffs' rights under the ADA and entitled them to the relief sought. The plaintiffs claimed that their discharge or transfer from their current residence would violate the RA's integration requirement. Further, that the State utilized criteria and methods of administration that subjected the plaintiffs to discrimination based on their disability. In regards to the Medicaid claim made through the Social Security Act, the plaintiffs claimed the State failed to ensure the plaintiffs needs and preferences were being met in their multidisciplinary plan. The plaintiffs claim that the discharge process, and its lack of safeguards to prevent harm to the plaintiffs, violated plaintiffs' rights not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law. On September 9, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The United States of America additionally filed a statement of interest arguing that plaintiffs failed to state a cause under the ADA and RA. On December 13, 2013, the District Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court found that each claim either did not meet the factual standard required in pleading or that, in the case of the Medicaid claim, the cited statues did not apply to private actions. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of the order on motion to dismiss on January 10, 2014. Following appellate arguments before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on the motion to dismiss, Circuit Court Judge Thomas M. Hardiman (joined by Circuit Judges Fisher and Jordon) entered an order determining the case to be moot. All plaintiffs at the facilities in question were transferred to alternative care facilities, making the issues presented in this case no longer live.

Summary: On June 5, 2013, 35 adult disabled individuals filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in Newark under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), and the Social Security Act (Medicaid) - as well as a § 1983 constitutional due process claim against the State of New Jersey. The defendants motioned to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Judge Stanley R. Chesler dismissed the case after granting the defendant's motion in an opinion on December 13, 2013. The plaintiffs gave notice of appeal on January 10, 2014.


On November 20, 2012, the CNS International Ministries filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare as unconstitutional and permanently enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, CNS International Ministries contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On November 27, 2012, the CNS International Ministries voluntarily dismissed all claims without prejudice. On November 28, 2012, the court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) ordered the dismissal. On June 14, 2013, CNS International Ministries were added as plaintiffs in Sharpe Holding, Inc. v. Sebeliusk (2:12-cv-00092-DDN).

Summary: On November 20, 2012, the CNS International Ministries filed a U.S. District Court lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government seeking the court to declare as unconstitutional and permanently enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The case was voluntarily dismissed. On June 14, 2013, CNS International Ministries were added as plaintiffs in Sharpe Holding, Inc. v. Sebelius.


On April 20, 2006, a severely physically disabled individual requiring hospital-level care filed a lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against various Illinois state officials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Plaintiff, represented by Equip for Equality, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the state to provide nursing and home services at the level he received before turning twenty-one years old. Because he turned twenty-one, Plaintiff's in-home care was funded by the Medically Fragile Technology Dependent Children's (MFTDC) waiver. However, once he turned twenty-one, Plaintiff's care was funded by the PWD waiver, which provided drastically fewer hours of in-home care. Despite this reduction in benefits, Plaintiff has remained at home in the care of his parents. However, Plaintiff's parents are not able to continue to care for him around-the-clock. The case was originally set for a bench trial in October 2007. However, it became clear after opening statements that the only disputed issue was the applicability of the integration mandate - a pure question of law - so the court ordered summary judgment briefing. Defendant argued that the state was under no obligation to fund hospital-level care for Plaintiff under the PWD waiver. Plaintiff claimed that HFS is indeed obligated to provide adequate funding for home care as long as home care is appropriate and cost-neutral. On May 30, 2008, the Court (Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer) denied Defendant Maram's motion for summary judgment. Grooms v. Maram, 563 F.Supp.2d 840 (N.D. Ill. 2008). The Court issued a permanent injunction order and entered final judgment on June 13, 2008. The injunction provided: (1) Defendant was to restore skilled nursing services provided to Plaintiff to the amount he received before his twenty-first birthday; (2) Plaintiff was awarded attorneys' fees, costs, and litigation expenses; (3) the Court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the order. The case was closed in 2008, and there has been no further litigation.

Summary: This case was brought by a physically disabled individual living at home requiring hospital-level care against various Illinois state officials seeking injunctive relief to compel the state to fund hospital-level home care. The case was decided for Plaintiff in June 2008, resulting in a permanent injunction.


On December 15, 2015, two African-American students in Connecticut public schools filed this lawsuit in Connecticut Superior Court. On January 14, 2016, the case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued the Bloomfield Board of Education, the Manchester Board of Education, the Hartford Board of Education, the State Board of Education, and the State Department of Education under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging violations of the Constitution of Connecticut, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Title VI. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that, after their expulsion from Connecticut public schools, they were given inadequate alternative education, thus depriving them of their fundamental right to an education. They argued that Black students were particularly affected by these inadequacies because Black students were disproportionately expelled as a result of selective enforcement of neutral discipline policies. One plaintiff brought claims against the Manchester and Bloomfield Boards of Education. Both plaintiffs brought claims against the Hartford Board of Education. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Center for Children’s Advocacy, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to improve the insufficient education provided to students who had been expelled. The plaintiffs also requested reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On August 11, 2016, Manchester Board of Education defendants settled with one of the plaintiffs. This settlement is sealed. On August 16, 2016, the Bloomfield Board of Education also settled with the same plaintiff. The settlement agreement stipulated the Bloomfield BOE would provide $14,400 for education costs to be used until the 2019-2020 school year, would expunge the record of the plaintiff, would amend Board policies related to the expulsion of students, would define “individualized learning plan” to provided definition, would train administrators, teachers, and staff on changed policies and expelled students' rights, would provide plaintiff's counsel data about the District's progress in implementing this agreement, would acknowledge all allegations and that the District violated plaintiff's education rights, and would pay $20,000 in attorney fees. On December 22, 2016, Hartford Board of Education settled with both plaintiffs. That settlement agreement is also sealed. This left only the plaintiffs’ claims against State defendants. On July 16, 2018, State defendants settled with both plaintiffs. The settlement provided that the State Department of Education would provide guidance to the local education agencies about the expulsion-related provisions of Connecticut Public Act 16-147, addressing the process and timeline for district adoption of a prior expulsion hearing decision for students who transfer school districts during periods of expulsion. The State Department of Education also agreed to issue guidelines about best practices for the education the student should receive if expelled, and to circulate these guidelines to the local education agencies, boards of education and school districts at the same time, no longer than September 1, 2018. Moreover, the State Department of Education agreed to submit to the State Board of Education a proposed Board Policy Statement concerning the importance of reducing expulsions and disproportionality in expulsions, among other points, in Connecticut for consideration by the State Board no later than its December 2018 regular meeting. According to the settlement agreement, within 15 days after such time as the State Board issued a final Policy Statement, the State Department of Education should circulate it to local education agencies, boards of education and school districts. Additionally, the State Department of Education, no later than September 1, 2018, would facilitate state oversight of alternative educational opportunities by publishing on its website, in a manner easily accessible to students and families, materials providing information for students and parents about student rights to education during periods of expulsion. These materials would also be published as part of the guidelines mentioned above, and would be sent by the State Department of Education via electronic mail to a list of agreed-upon community and legal organizations. The State Department of Education agreed to consider recommendations from the Plaintiffs' attorney in these resources, although the decision about their content would be made solely by the State Department. The State Department of Education agreed to analyze suspension and expulsion data on an annual basis, to identify districts with meaningful disparities in the rates of these punishments and racial disparities in suspensions/expulsions. The methodology of this analysis would be determined by the State Department of Education and shared with the plaintiffs and their counsel within 30 days of the execution of the settlement agreement, whose considerations, if made within 15 days, would be taken into account before a final decision was reached. Besides that, the State Department of Education agreed to develop a tiered monitoring and recommended remediation approach of progressive intervention generally consisting of guidance for all districts, including sharing of resources pertaining to restorative and culturally responsive practices, and, as justified by the particular circumstances it defined, more significant interventions for some districts, to be defined by the Department. Beginning in December 2020, the State Department of Education would annually determine the tiers of intervention, publish the results on its website and report the tiers annually to the State Board of Education. Beginning no later than December 2021, the State Department of Education would include in its annual reporting on the website and to the State Board of Education information concerning the progress of districts in Tier 3 toward improvement. Finally, the State defendants agreed to pay $50,000 in fees and costs, and the plaintiffs waived any rights to apply for any additional fees and expenses in connection with all claims and potential claims resolved through the settlement agreement. The parties agreed the Court would retain jurisdiction until March 31, 2022 to enforce the provisions of the agreement. On July 18, 2018, Judge Stefan R. Underhill approved the settlement agreement and stipulation of dismissal. The settlement agreement is ongoing.

Summary: Two Connecticut plaintiffs are suing their respective public schools board of education and the State Board of Education for inadequate alternative education provided to expelled students. The Boards of Education and the State defendants have settled individually with the Plaintiffs. The State Department of Education agreed to develop and disclose several guidelines, as well as to implement and monitor the execution of several measures about the issues raised by the complaint.


On August 14, 2014, a detainee in the Cook County jail who used a wheelchair filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Cook County, Illinois under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act, and two Cook County correctional officers in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff claimed the County deprived him of rights secured under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, and alleged excessive force by the correctional officers. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff, now joined by three additional wheelchair-using detainees, filed an amended complaint. A fifth named plaintiff was later added. The plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of a putative class of Cook County detainees, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and damages. The plaintiffs complained that during their monthly trips from the jail to one of the six local courthouses, the County subjected them to numerous ADA and Rehabilitation Act violations, including inadequate van transport and holding cell accommodations, severely limited and unequal access to lavatory facilities, and non-ADA compliant wheelchair ramps. On September 17, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, on which Judge Robert W. Gettleman did not immediately rule. Over the next five months, the Court conducted extensive evidentiary hearings in which the County introduced status reports detailing their efforts and plans to achieve compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs contended that these plans were incomplete, and therefore not sufficient to overcome the need for injunctive relief. On April 30, 2015, Judge Gettleman granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, defining the class as all Cook County Jail detainees who have been assigned and currently use a wheelchair. 2015 WL 1995576. Judge Gettleman denied the defendants' motion to sever the excessive force claim by the original plaintiff against the two correctional officers on May 27, 2015. The plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment on July 8, and the defendants followed suit on September 4 and likewise moved for summary judgment. Additionally, the parties filed a stipulated dismissal on September 24 of four of the individual defendants, leaving the Sheriff and Cook County as the defendants. On October 8, 2015, Judge Gettleman granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, though he treated the injunction as a permanent one in light of procedural developments. The plaintiffs' rights under the ADA had been violated in the past with respect to courthouse ramps and bathrooms. However, the defendants were given the opportunity to propose changes that accorded with the specific circumstances at issue. Judge Gettleman also denied the plaintiffs' request for declaratory judgment, finding that evidence of past ADA violations did not entitle them to a declaration of present violations. 2015 WL 5921810. On November 19, Judge Gettleman granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. He found that the defendants had been "on notice of the need to provide accommodations for wheelchair-using detainees attending court at the six courthouses as early as 1999." He held that not providing the requisite aid was a "deliberate decision" that constituted the "intentional discrimination" necessary to recover damages for discrimination under the ADA. 2015 WL 7351752. The plaintiffs moved for supplemental injunctive relief twice. On January 7, 2016, they requested that the Maywood Courthouse bathrooms be brought into compliance with the ADA. On May 4, they made the same request for the Bridgeview Courthouse. The parties progressed toward trial. On May 12, 2016, Judge Gettleman severed and dismissed without prejudice the plaintiffs' claims alleging statutory violations other than those pertaining "to transportation, ramps, and bathroom facilities before during and after court appearances at the Cook County Jail." On May 2, 2017, Judge Gettleman granted supplemental injunctive relief as to the Maywood Courthouse, but denied it as to the Bridgeview Courthouse. The privacy screens in the Maywood bathrooms were inappropriately spaced, and as such the defendants had to adjust the screens to make them compliant. The Bridgeview bathrooms, however, had been appropriately set up in all but one aspect, but full compliance was technically infeasible, and consequently the defendants had provided reasonable accommodations in light of the technical difficulty, rendering them compliant with the ADA. The defendants appealed the injunctions on May 31, 2017, and the plaintiffs cross-appealed the supplemental injunction on June 9, 2017. Judge Gettleman then stayed further proceedings pending the appeal. On July 30, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the defendant’s challenges to four of the District Court’s orders: 1) the grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, 2) the jury verdict and $600 damage award in favor of an individual plaintiff, 3) the certification of the class, and 4) the grant of the permanent injunction regarding Maywood’s privacy screens. Each party won part of the appeal. For the defendants, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment, finding that the lower court improperly relied on findings of fact from a prior decision. Because the court’s decision on partial summary judgment tainted the jury trial, the jury verdict and damage awards were vacated. The court remanded the question for a repeat, proper jury trial. However, for the plaintiffs, the Court of Appeals affirmed class certification. Similarly, the appellate court found that the District Court had not abused its discretion in granting the permanent injunction regarding Maywood’s privacy screens. 897 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2018). Following the appellate court’s decision, the parties entered into a hotly contested period of discovery. However, on July 11, 2019, the parties met to discuss a settlement before Magistrate Judge David Weisman and outlined the timeframe for remediating deficiencies at the Maywood and Leighton Courthouses. On October 30, 2019, the parties reached a settlement. The Maywood courthouse was projected to be renovated in accordance with ADA regulations by April 2021, while the Leighton courthouse was scheduled to be modified by May 2020. On February 18, 2020 Judge Gettleman determined that the terms of the settlement had been satisfied, and dismissed the case with prejudice and without costs in accordance with settlement agreements executed by all parties. The case is closed.

Summary: In August 2014, wheelchair-using prisoners filed this federal suit against Cook County, Illinois, alleging violations of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and seeking class certification, injunctive relief, and damages. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that during their monthly trips from the jail to local courthouses the County subjected them to inadequate van transport and holding cell accommodations, severely limited and unequal access to lavatory facilities, and non-ADA compliant wheelchair ramps. The district court granted partial summary judgment for plaintiffs, granted a permanent injunction, and held a jury trial for damages for plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the injunction and class certification but reversed the grant of partial summary judgment and related jury trial. The parties settled on remand, with the defendants agreeing to make courthouses more accessible.


This class action, filed January 30, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs were represented by the Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the American Immigration Council. The case was assigned to Judge James Robart. The plaintiffs are a U.S. citizen and her six year old son--who is a Somali citizen with a pending immigrant visa application; a U.S. citizen and his 12 year old daughter--who is a Yemeni citizen with an approved immigrant visa application; and a lawful permanent resident and her 16 year old son--who is a Syrian citizen with a pending immigrant visa application. In each case, plaintiffs sought to be reunited as families living in the U.S. But pursuant to the EO, review of the pending visa applications was suspended and the plaintiff with the approved visa application was not allowed to board a flight to the U.S. The complaint also sought inclusion of a class of "all nationals of countries designated by Section 3(c) of the Executive Order signed by President Trump on January 27, 2017 (currently Iraq, Syria, Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen), who have applied for or will apply for an immigrant visa and the visa petitioners for those nationals, whose visa applications have been or will be suspended or denied, or whose immigrant visas have been or will be revoked, or who have been or will be denied the ability to travel to the United States, on the basis of the January 27, 2017 Executive Order." The complaint argued that the EO violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus), and Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. The complaint sought class certification, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief. On Feb. 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, with supporting declarations. Plaintiffs then filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. However, on Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On Mar. 7, the government filed notice of the new EO in this case. On Mar. 10, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in response to the second EO, arguing that it did "not remedy the unlawful discrimination against Plaintiffs and proposed class members on these bases, but rather continues it." The plaintiffs represented by the new complaint were two U.S. citizens and two U.S. legal permanent residents and their family members who are citizens of Syria, Somalia, or Iran. The complaint sought to certify a class consisting of "all nationals of countries designated by Section 2 of Executive Order 13780 (currently Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen), who have applied for or will apply for an immigrant visa and the visa petitioners for those nationals; whose visa application adjudication has been or will be suspended or denied, or who have been or will be denied the ability to seek entry into and/or enter the United States, on the basis of Executive Order 13780." The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, and the Establishment Clause. In conjunction, the plaintiffs filed a second motion to certify a class. That day, the plaintiffs also filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief, as well as four accompanying declarations. The motion argued that pending the court's decision in Washington v. Trump to clarify if its nationwide injunction applies to the new EO, "Plaintiffs and proposed class members face immediate irreparable harm on March 16, 2017, the order’s effective date" if that court does not extend the nationwide injunction to the new EO. However, on Mar. 17, the Court stayed the emergency motion in light of the nationwide preliminary injunction granted in Hawaii v. Trump, so as to "conserve its resources and to benefit from any Ninth Circuit rulings in Hawaii v. Trump regarding [the second EO]." On Mar. 30, the defendants then moved to stay district court proceedings in this case pending the resolution of defendant's appeal of the preliminary injunction granted in Hawaii v. Trump. The court stayed the proceedings on May 22, 2017 pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the appeal in Hawaii v. Trump and further review by the Supreme Court. In September 2017, the Trump Administration issued its third Executive Order banning immigration from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Yemen, Somalia, and certain groups of non-immigrants from these countries. In light of the new EO, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments in Hawaii v. Trump enjoining the second EO and remanded the case in October 2017. The district court in Hawaii then quickly enjoyed the third ban. But following appeals, the Supreme Court upheld the ban in June 2018. The district court in this (Ali v. Trump) case continued to stay the case throughout the Hawaii litigation. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Hawaii case, the parties then filed a status report in July 2018 indicating their pending motions for class certification and injunctive relief were moot, and that the Supreme Court's ruling resolved most of their claims. On Sept. 17, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed notice for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: This class action, filed January 30, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Plaintiffs were represented by the Northwest Immigrants Rights Project, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the American Immigration Council. The complaint argued that the EO violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (mandamus), and Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights. This case was largely stayed after the district court in Hawaii v. Trump issued a nationwide injunction. President Trump would issue two more Executive Orders banning travel and the Supreme Court ultimately upheld his third EO, banning immigration from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Yemen, Somalia, and certain groups of non-immigrants from these countries in Hawaii v. Trump. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in the Hawaii case, the plaintiffs in this (Ali v. Trump) case filed an unopposed notice for voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.


On March 12, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm Thomas More Law Center, sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage for contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage for specific forms of contraception, including the morning-after pill and the intrauterine device (IUD), would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. The plaintiff also asked that the court declare the contraception insurance mandate unconstitutional. On March 13, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The defendant opposed this motion on the grounds that the plaintiff had not suffered harm upon which relief could be granted. The defendant argued that the plaintiff, as a corporation, could not exercise religion and could not suffer a violation of its religious beliefs. Oral argument took place on June 17, 2013. On June 25, 2013, Judge Elizabeth A. Kovachevich granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 960 F.Supp.2d 1328. On August 22, 2013, the defendant appealed this order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The following day, the defendants moved to stay the district court proceedings pending the resolution of the appeal, and Judge Kovachevich granted this motion on August 26, 2013. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. Presumably based on this decision, the defendants moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, and this motion was granted on September 4, 2014. Also in light of the decision, on February 9, 2015, the parties jointly submitted a Joint Motion for Entry of Injunction and Judgment, which stated that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim, that a permanent injunction should be entered, and that all other claims against the defendants should be dismissed. On February 10, 2015, Judge Kovachevich issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission, and on February 11, 2015, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs. On July 22, 2015, the parties notified the court that they reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs, the terms of which are unknown. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 12, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, and upon the joint stipulation of the parties, the court ordered that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement.


On March 31, 2011, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation of the Seattle Police Department (SPD) pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (then codified at 42 U.S.C. § 14141; then recodified to 34 U.S.C. § 12601), the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following a comprehensive investigation, on December 16, 2011, the DOJ announced its findings that SPD engaged in a pattern or practice of excessive force that violated the Constitution and federal law. On July 27, 2012, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against the City of Seattle in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. DOJ sought an order requiring the Seattle Police Department to adopt certain training and supervision accountability to prevent further excessive use of force. The complaint was filed concurrently with a settlement and proposed order of resolution on behalf of both parties that provided guidance on procedures the Seattle Police Department must implement. U.S. District Judge James L. Robart provisionally entered the settlement August 30th of that year, pending later modifications to increase monitor and court oversight. These changes were made, and Judge Robart approved Merrick Bobb as the police monitor for the City of Seattle on October 30, 2012. On November 28, 2012, the first status conference for implementation of the consent decree was held before Judge Robart. On March 12, 2013, Judge Robart approved the monitoring plan for the first year. On October 24, 2013, the Seattle Community Police Commission (CPC) moved to intervene. On November 26, 2013, Judge Robart denied the motion, finding that the motion was not timely submitted and that CPC was already adequately represented in the action. However, Judge Robart granted CPC amicus curiae status in order to allow CPC to express its views on issues raised by the parties in this action. CPC submitted its amicus brief on December 3, 2013. On November 27, 2013, the monitor submitted a consensus use of force policy to guard against discriminatory policing and unlawful stops and searches. This policy was reviewed and approved by Judge Robart on January 17, 2014. On March 3, 2014, the monitor submitted a consensus performance mentoring policy to establish a proactive risk management strategy for identifying and correcting possible problematic behavior. Judge Robart reviewed and approved this policy on March 20, 2014. On May 24, 2014, Judge Robart approved the monitoring plan for the second year. In accordance with the plan, the monitor submitted Force Investigation Team training curriculum and materials, which set forth the training the independent FIT would receive to investigate high level uses of force. In addition, the monitor also submitted crisis intervention and comprehensive use of force training materials to the court. These materials were approved by Judge Robart on June 13, 2014. On July 10, 2014, Judge Robart also approved the monitor's submitted operations and training manual for the SPD Office of Professional Accountability. An additional consensus use of force curriculum was approved by Judge Robart on August 14, 2014. On September 22, 2014, Judge Robart approved the monitor's search and seizure and bias-free policing training materials as well as the monitor's consensus advanced crisis intervention training curriculum and strategy. In 2015, Judge Robart approved a number of submissions by the Monitor: February 20: 2015 training plan March 19: third-year monitoring plan May 11: revised early intervention system policy June 4: revised crisis intervention policy June 11: policies for bias-free policing July 20: update to the third-year monitoring plan adjusting the training schedule and some relevant milestones October 1: deadlines in the monitoring plan Judge Robart approved the following submissions in 2016: January 20: newly revised Office of Professional Accountability manual and two related SPD policies July 14: fourth-year monitoring plan September 19: deadlines in the monitoring plan December 1: deadline extensions December 13: Procedural Manual for SPD's Force Investigation Unit The monitor filed a progress report on September 26, 2016, indicating that SPD might be fully compliant by fall 2017 based on the progress made to date. The report indicated that "many officers have come to understand that the Consent Decree encapsulates best practice" and "that the necessary cultural change has begun to at least some meaningful extent" though work remained to be done to ensure this change was not temporary. The report noted a decrease in incidents involving moderate or higher levels of force. The report indicated that areas of improvement necessary for compliance include "better and sustained trust of the SPD in all the various and diverse communities it serves." Judge Robart approved the following submissions in 2017: January 3: 2017 SPD Training Plan February 7: Seattle Police Department's Crowd Management Policy May 3: SPD's draft body-worn video policy On January 10, 2018, the court declared the City of Seattle to be in full and effective compliance with the consent decree. The court ordered the commencement of the Phase II sustainment period plan that same day. "During Phase II, the Monitor will ... assist the City and SPD in evaluating the changes they have implemented, considering whether those new policies need any tweaks or modifications to be most effective." On March 2, 2018 the City of Seattle submitted its Sustainment Period Plan for Phase II. It was approved on March 13. The City agreed to provide seven quarterly reports addressing the City’s sustained compliance with the Consent Decree. The Sustainment Plan required that each quarterly report include recent data on use-of-force and crisis intervention practices, an update on the activities of the Seattle Police Department’s Force Review Board and Unit, and a discussion of relevant activities of the accountability organizations. The City filed its first quarterly report on July 31, 2018. According to the report, data on use of force and crisis intervention practices demonstrated that the City had continued to comply with the Consent Decree. On December 3, 2018, the court requested the parties to show cause whether the court should find that the City of Seattle has failed to maintain full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree. Specifically, two considerations formed the basis of the court's order to show cause: (1) the City’s completion of its collective bargaining with the Seattle Police Officer's Guild and the impact of that bargaining on the Accountability Ordinance; and (2) the Disciplinary Review Board decision to overturn the former police chief's decision to terminate a SPD Officer who punched a hand-cuffed subject who was sitting in a patrol car. On May 15, 2019, the court held a hearing on its order to show cause in which the parties and the CPC participated. On May 21, 2019, the court found that the City had fallen partially out of full and effective compliance with the Consent Decree. The court did not find any compliance issues with respect to the areas listed in the Phase II Sustainment Plan, but noted that a number of key assessments needed to be completed within the remainder of the sustainment period. With respect to accountability, the court found that the City was out of compliance due to changes in the Accountability Ordinance that occurred following implementation of the collective bargaining agreement with the Seattle Police Officer's Guild and the City’s reversion to an arbitration system that is materially unchanged from the old, inadequate accountability regime. The court noted that once the City achieved full and effective compliance with its accountability responsibilities, the City would need to maintain that compliance for two years. Bizarrely, the DoJ responded to this order by saying that the accountability concerns expressed by the court were not included in the consent decree. This was probably in pursuit of a November 2018 memo from Attorney General Jeff Sessions limiting use of consent decrees. In August of 2019 the defendants submitted a motion to approve new accountability methodologies, which the court accepted in October of that year. On October 31, 2019, defendants filed their 6th quarterly report and at the end of December filed their 7th quarterly report. On May 7, 2020, the parties submitted a joint motion stipulating that large portions of the consent decree be terminated, as the city had been in full compliance with those provisions for two years. However, by the next month the defendants had to withdraw that motion. In response to the large scale protests that broke out following the killing of George Floyd, the SPD used crowd control tactics and force that were potentially in violation of the consent decree. Therefore, the city withdrew the joint motion in order hear more about the propriety and legality of those tactics before moving forward. Facing public backlash to the crackdown, Seattle City Council passed a new ordinance that prohibited use of "crowd control weapons" on protesters. The ordinance was to take effect on July 26, 2020. The City filed a notice of the ordinance with the court on July 17. The City noted a concern that the ordinance may conflict with the Consent Decree and asked the court to enjoin the effective date of the ordinance. Construing the notice as a motion for a TRO, the court denied the motion without prejudice because the City's notice failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and failed to address any of the other required elements for a TRO. 2020 WL 4207379. Nonetheless, the court recognized that it would eventually need to analyze the effect of the ordinance on the Consent Decree and requested the City to submit a copy of analysis on the ordinance being prepared by the Seattle Office of Police Accountability and the Seattle Office of Inspector General. In addition, the court requested each party to submit memoranda on the interaction of the ordinance and the Consent Decree and any SDP policies governed by the Consent Decree. Prior to the completion of the report or memoranda, the SPD issued a directive to SPD officers to ensure compliance with the ordinance. The DOJ moved for a TRO against enforcing this directive, claiming that it was a change to policies of the SPD that must be reviewed by the U.S. and the monitor. The court granted that motion on July 25, 2020 and enjoined implementation of the directive and the implementation date of the ordinance. --- F.Supp.3d ----; 2020 WL 4275515. The parties later stipulated and the court approved that the TRO be converted into a preliminary injunction in order to facilitate the policy review process set forth in the Consent Decree. The parties also agreed that the preliminary injunction would terminate only by court order or by joint motion of the parties and approval of the court. In mid-August, the City filed the reports from the Seattle Office of Police Accountability and the Seattle Office of Inspector General analyzing the ordinance. The policy review process of the ordinance is still in process, and the case is ongoing as of January 5, 2021.

Summary: In July 2012, the Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Washington under USC § 14141 against the City of Seattle. The plaintiff asked the court to order the Seattle Police Department to adopt certain training and supervision accountability to prevent further excessive use of force. The lawsuit was submitted with a settlement and proposed order of resolution that provided guidance on procedures the Seattle Police Department must implement. The monitoring is ongoing, with continued supervision by the court.


This suit, filed October 4, 2017, sought to compel the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) to release certain records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University, a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting freedom of speech and press, sought "records concerning the exclusion or removal of individuals from the United States based on their speech, beliefs, or associations." The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff argued that pursuant to President Trump's immigration policies, DHS and DOS created new policies with which to vet visa applicants and refugees. In particular, the Knight Institute pointed to the development of a questionnaire that asked for "any social media platforms and handles used during the last five years," as well as a new policy proposal slated to go into effect October 18, 2017 to have DHS' immigration records "include the 'social media handles, aliases, [and] associated identifiable information,' as well as 'publicly available information obtained from the internet,...and information obtained and disclosed pursuant to information sharing agreements.'" The Knight Institute argued that these changes would have an expansive effect, reaching visa applicants, naturalized U.S. citizens, and lawful permanent residents. The Knight Institute submitted a FOIA request to DHS and DOS seeking information on these new vetting policies as well as the government's rationale that it can "base immigration decisions on individuals’ speech, beliefs, or associations." ICE released only one document in response to this request, prompting the plaintiff to bring this suit. The case was assigned to Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. on Oct. 5, 2017. On Dec. 28, 2017, the government filed a letter seeking to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Knight Institute had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. On Jan. 16, 2018, the parties stipulated their voluntary dismissal as to ICE. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Mar. 14, 2018. Through a series of orders, the court ordered the various components of the government to complete production of responsive records between June and July of 2018. A status report filed on Oct. 5, 2018 indicated that the government had completed much but not all of the production request, and that the parties were continuing to work together to complete it. On November 9, 2018, the plaintiff and the defendant proposed the briefing schedule for partial summary judgment. Several defendants and the plaintiff separately sought summary judgment in February and March 2019. On September 13, 2019, the court (Judge Carter) granted in part the defendants' partial motion for summary judgment. The court found that the Office of Legal Counsel satisfied its burden in demonstrating that it conducted an adequate search of the records it possessed. On the same day, the court also granted in part the plaintiff's cross motion for partial summary judgment. The court found that ICE did not conduct an adequate search for documents responsive to the plaintiff’s FOIA request, and ordered ICE to conduct new searches and the parties to file a joint status report within 21 days. 407 F.Supp.3d 311. On September 23, 2019, the court granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. But the court held that ICE improperly invoked FOIA Exemption 5 to withhold certain records, and that such records must be released. For the same reason, the court also granted in part the plaintiff's cross partial motion for summary judgment on the same day. 407 F.Supp.3d 334. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's September 16 and 23 orders on September 30, 2019. Following these orders, the parties filed a series of several status reports. Status reports filed on October 4 and October 11 stated that the parties had reached agreement regarding the offices and components that ICE will search and the search terms that will be used. The status report filed on December 6, 2019 claimed that after reaching agreement with the plaintiff on search terms and scope, DHS completed its document searches. The joint status report filed on December 20, 2019 stated that the parties are still finalizing details of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's search. The joint status report filed on February 24, 2020 outlined details of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's search. The latest status report, filed on May 14, 2020, further outlined document search agreements among the plaintiff and various government agencies. Judge Carter denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration on September 13, 2020. Defendants filed a notice of appeal of the court's September 16 & 23, 2019 and September 13, 2020 orders on November 11, 2020. The parties are currently briefing the appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, case number 20-3837. As of April 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: This suit seeks to compel the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of State (DOS) to release certain records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff - a nonprofit organization dedicated to protecting freedom of speech and press - sought "records concerning the exclusion or removal of individuals from the United States based on their speech, beliefs, or associations." The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The parties have reached record search agreements, and the record search is ongoing.


On March 26, 2013, Hart Electric, a for-profit corporation filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the American Center for Law and Justice, sought a judgment that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate violated the First Amendment, RFRA and APA. Specifically, the plaintiff asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them because it violates the owners' deeply held religious beliefs. They also sought declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees. Under the government Mandate, which went into effect on August 1, 2012, all non-exempt employers that offer non-grandfathered group health plans were required to provide coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization, and education and counseling, despite their religious beliefs. While nonprofits were granted a “temporary safe-harbor,” for religious reasons, the plaintiffs did not qualify as they were for-profit employers. The plaintiff filed moved for a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing the health insurance requirement until the resolution of two similar cases before the Seventh Circuit. On April 18, the U.S. District Court (Judge Ruben Castillo) granted the motion and stayed proceedings until thirty days after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issues a decision in the consolidated cases of Korte v. Sebelius and Grote Industry, LLC v. Sebelius. On November 8, 2013, the Seventh Circuit ruled for the two cases that the contraception mandate substantially burdens religious exercise under the Religious Freedom Act. 735 F.3d 654. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit had granted preliminary injunctive relief for the same mandate for for-profit employers. On January 10, 2014, the plaintiffs moved to extend the preliminary injunction and stay of proceedings until forty-five days after Supreme Court addresses analogous cases in  Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, which was granted on January 21, 2014. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled for the consolidated case of Conestoga Woods and Hobby Lobby that the Mandate imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion under the statute. 573 U.S. 682. Subsequently, Judge Castillo granted the plaintiff’s request for a 30 day extension of the preliminary injunction during the time the government determined an appropriate course of action in light of the Supreme Court’s decision. In light of the decisions above, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment in their favor on their RFRA claim and the entry of a permanent injunction. On September 23, 2014, the Court granted the plaintiff’s unopposed motion to extend the preliminary injunction for additional time to consider the defendants’ proposal of injunction. On November 3, 2014, the Court ordered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Contraceptive Coverage Requirement against plaintiffs and anyone in connection with their health plans. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 26, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate is unconstitutional. On April 18, the U.S. District Court (Judge Ruben Castillo) granted the plaintiff's unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction and stayed proceedings. On January 21, 2014, the Court granted an unopposed motion to extend the preliminary injunction and stay the case until forty-five days after the Supreme Court issues a decision in  Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and  Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius. On August 1, 2014, the consolidated case of Conestoga Woods and Hobby Lobby ruled that the Mandate imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ exercise of religion under the statute. In light of the decisions above, on November 3, 2014, the Court ordered a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Contraceptive Coverage Requirement against plaintiffs and anyone in connection with their health plans.


On April 2, 2015, a pretrial detainee imprisoned in Velda City, Missouri because she could not afford to post bail filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff sued Velda City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by Equal Justice Under Law and ArchCity Defenders, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief. The plaintiff claimed that the City's fixed “bail schedule” was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the City's policy and practice of detaining arrestees for at least three days unless they paid a generically set bond amount violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This case was assigned to Judge Henry Edward Autrey. That same day, the plaintiff sought a preliminary order enjoining the City from keeping her and those similarly situated in jail without offering release on unsecured bond or recognizance. The plaintiff also moved to certify a class of all arrestees unable to pay for their release pursuant to Velda City's fixed bail schedule who were or would become in the custody of the City. Within two months, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the City agreed to end the use of the challenged cash bond system. Instead, the City agreed to release from its custody any arrestee on personal recognizance or on an unsecured bond as long as that person was not deemed a danger to the community. The City also agreed to release on unsecured bond any person arrested for failing to appear in court two times in a row. After the third nonappearance, the City was allowed to hold someone for up to 48 hours without bond. The City was also prohibited from holding an arrestee charged with ordinance violations in another municipality for more than four hours. The parties asked the court to issue an injunction effectuating the terms of the agreement. The parties also asked the court to enter a declaratory judgment affirming that holding an arrestee in custody because that person is too poor to post a monetary bond violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court signed the proposed order on June 3, 2015. 2015 WL 10013006. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the injunction. This case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2015, a pretrial detainee filed this class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiff alleged that Velda City's cash bail system violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment because an arrestee's release was conditioned on his or her ability to pay. The parties settled the case in June 2015. Under the settlement, the City agreed to end the use of the challenged system. Upon motion of the parties, the District Court entered an injunction effectuating the terms of the settlement agreement and a declaratory judgement affirming that keeping detained an arrestee who is too poor to pay a monetary bond violates the equal protection clause.


In 1988, plaintiff filed a section 1983 suit pro se against the Warden of Montgomery County Detention Center. In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant housed plaintiff in an administrative segregation unit because she tested positive for H.I.V. Plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that defendant's policies are unconstitutional and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting defendants from segregating plaintiff based on her medical condition. After the District Court in Maryland (Judge Frederick Motz) consolidated plaintiff's case with two similar cases, the Detention Center addressed plaintiff's concerns and revised its policy regarding housing of inmates with H.I.V. As a result of this new policy, the parties agreed that further proceedings were unnecessary, and the court entered a consent decree in 1990. The docket for this case is essentially empty.

Summary: A District Court in Maryland (Judge Frederick Motz) found the Montgomery County Detention Center's separate housing of inmates with H.I.V. addressed by the County's new policy and entered a consent decree.