On August 29, 2017, the state of Illinois filed this lawsuit against the City of Chicago in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, and the Illinois Human Rights Act. The state brought this action on behalf of the people of Illinois to ensure that the City enacted comprehensive, lasting reform of the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA), and the Chicago Police Board (Police Board). It sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Jeffrey T. Gilbert. The state claimed that, through acts and omissions, the City and its agents maintained policies, customs, or practices of police officers that violated the Fourth Amendment. The complaint alleged that some of these policies, customs, or practices had a disparate impact on African Americans and Latinos in violation of the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003 and the Illinois Human Rights Act. It further contended that these policies, customs, or practices were reflected in, and caused by, the City’s failure to effectively train, supervise, and support law enforcement officers, and the City’s failure to establish reliable programs to detect officer misconduct and administer effective discipline. On August 31, 2017, two days after the lawsuit was filed, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings in order to continue settlement negotiations. The parties stipulated that, if successful, the result of the negotiations would take the form of a consent decree. On September 5, 2017, the court granted the joint motion. On June 6, 2018, the Fraternal Order of Police Chicago Lodge No. 7 (FOP), Chicago’s police union, filed a motion to intervene in the action. The FOP argued that it had a substantial interest in the subject of the litigation, as the litigation could impair or impede the union’s ability to protect the collective bargaining interests of Chicago police officers. Both the State and the City opposed intervention. Meanwhile, the parties engaged in extensive settlement negotiations from June through August of 2018 to draft the terms of a consent decree. On July 27, 2018, the State and the City released a draft consent decree for public review, inviting comments prior to submitting a proposed consent decree to the court. The parties received more than 1,700 comments and suggestions. The draft consent decree covered a broad range of topics, including:

community policing;
impartial policing;
crisis intervention;
use of force;
recruitment;
hiring and promotion;
training;
supervision;
officer wellness and support;
accountability and transparency;
data collection, analysis and management; and
implementation, enforcement and monitoring.
 The FOP opposed the draft consent decree, worried that certain provisions of the agreement interfered with statutory collective bargaining rights. However, on August 16, 2018, the court denied the FOP's motion to intervene as untimely, because the FOP had waited nearly a year to intervene. The court also noted that intervention would be prejudicial to the existing parties and that FOP’s concerns regarding the litigation’s impact on collective bargaining rights were only speculative. 2018 WL 3920816. The FOP appealed this decision to the Seventh Circuit, which upheld the ruling on January 2, 2019. 912 F.3d 979. On September 13, 2018, the State and the City reached an agreement on a final consent decree and filed a joint motion for the court's approval. The court set a public fairness hearing for the end of October 2018 and opened a written comment period which elicited dozens of written submissions from the public. On October 12, 2018, the Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a statement of interest opposing the proposed consent decree. The DOJ argued that the consent decree would function like an earlier settlement agreement between CPD and the ACLU (November 2015). That agreement was intended to reduce stop-and-frisk abuses, but the DOJ argued that it had instead restrained Chicago police excessively, and had thus contributed to a rise in homicides and other violent crime from 2015 to 2016. The DOJ cited four main problems with the consent decree:

it went beyond remedying specific violations of federal law cognizable in federal court, and micromanaged police department procedures and policies;
it stripped the superintendent of his duty and ability to administer the CPD;
it turned over long-term budgetary control of the CPD to the federal court and the monitor through vague mandates that there must be sufficient funding and staff to fulfill the consent decree and implement programs; and
it said that the court would retain jurisdiction until the City had fully complied with the consent decree for two consecutive years, but did not give clear guidelines as to what constituted compliance.
The DOJ expressed concern that such consent decrees stripped local government officials of the flexibility required in addressing evolving law enforcement issues and deprived citizens of their ability to control policies through the democratic process. To this end, the DOJ expressed concern that the consent decree would be signed by an outgoing mayor who was not seeking reelection. In this statement of interest, the DOJ further announced that it would send five additional federal prosecutors to Chicago to establish a new Gun Crimes Prosecution Team. The court held a fairness hearing on the proposed consent decree on October 24 and 25, 2018. After the fairness hearing, the court received and reviewed additional briefing from the parties and from the FOP, addressing the oral and written comments submitted in connection with the fairness hearing. On January 31, 2019, the court approved and signed the proposed consent decree. 2019 WL 398703. Although the parties made some changes in response to comments from various entities, the consent decree largely covered the same areas of reform as the agreement originally proposed. Under the terms of the consent decree, the City would endeavor to achieve full and effective compliance within five years of the effective date (March 1, 2019). The agreement would terminate once the City had maintained compliance in each area of reform for a designated period of time:

One year: recruitment, hiring, and promotions; training; and officer wellness and support;
Two years: accountability and transparency; community policing; impartial policing; crisis intervention; use of force; supervision; and data collection, analysis, and management.
 On March 1, 2019, the Court appointed Ms. Maggie Hickey to serve as independent monitor. On the same day, the FOP moved to amend the consent decree, arguing that it conflicted with established statutes and ordinances in a number of ways:

Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) was not certified for the required investigations under the Consent Decree even though certification was required by the Police and Community Relations Improvement Act (PCRIA).
There was no distinction between a criminal investigation and an administrative one. COPA was not a law enforcement agency and therefore did not have a right to perform any kind of investigation of officer-involved death cases under the PCRIA.
The Consent Decree violated a state statute requiring that videos recorded by body-worn cameras be retained for no longer than 90 days unless they were flagged for particular reasons stated in the law.
Two municipal ordinances were compromised by the Consent Decree.
 The motion asked the court to amend the Consent Decree to bar the use of non-state-certified COPA investigators in the investigation of officer-involved deaths, to prohibit the CPD from reviewing unflagged videos that had been stored for more than ninety days, to bar the use of anonymous complaints in non-criminal matters that did not involve residency allegations or medical roll abuse, and to require the City to reveal to officers the name of complainants prior to investigation of an officer. On April 1, 2019, the court appointed the Honorable David H. Coar (ret.) to serve as a Special Master, with duties complementary to the independent monitor’s. On January 7, 2020, the court denied a motion to intervene by the Second Vice President of the FOP. He had argued that despite the court’s earlier ruling against the FOP intervening, Mayor Lori Lightfoot’s election had changed the city’s position in the litigation, and that his motion to intervene was therefore appropriate. On June 5, 2020, the Monitor informed the court of her intention to publish a special report, “to promote transparency,” regarding the City’s and CPD’s response to protests in the wake of George Floyd’s death in May. On January 13, 2021, a coalition of attorneys brought together by the MacArthur Justice Center (“The Coalition”) filed a motion to enforce the terms of the consent decree. In its complaint, The Coalition alleged yet another violation of a Black Chicago resident’s rights. The complaint stated that the CPD raided the home of a Black social worker with no criminal record, pointed guns at her, and handcuffed her. The motion stated that the CPD officers involved in the incident were in the wrong place, and it claimed that the CPD had violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights as well as the consent decree. The Coalition requested that the Court immediately convene a structured settlement process to remedy these actions. A hearing is scheduled for April 26, 2021. As of April 19, 2021, the City and the Monitor are submitting regular reports, and the court retains jurisdiction.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the State of Illinois against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The state brought the suit seeking comprehensive, lasting reform of Chicago law enforcement. After extensive settlement negotiations, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree to the court on September 13, 2018. Following a fairness hearing and additional briefing and comments, the court approved the consent decree on January 31, 2019. Margaret Hickey was appointed monitor; the decree provided for the court to retain jurisdiction for 5 years. Monitoring of the decree is ongoing.


On January 28, 2017, lawful permanent residents of the United States, represented by the Legal Aid Justice Center and Mayer Brown, filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. They brought the action as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and they simultaneously filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs were 50 to 60 lawful permanent residents of the United States who were detained at Dulles International Airport pursuant to the January 27, 2017 Executive Order issued by President Donald Trump to ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, and denied access to counsel. The original named plaintiffs--the Aziz brothers--are Yemeni citizens, legal permanent residents of the U.S. who were denied admission at Dulles. The complaint argued that detaining the plaintiffs solely pursuant to the Executive Order violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs also argued that they would suffer irreparable harm if they continued to be denied counsel and if they were deported. They sought a temporary restraining order to compel the defendants to allow them access to counsel and to prohibit the defendants from deporting them for seven days. On January 28, 2017, Judge Leonie Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' motion and issued a seven-day temporary restraining order granting detainees at Dulles International Airport access to counsel and prohibiting deportation of detainees. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 30, 2017, clarifying the class. The plaintiffs defined the class as: "individuals with legal permanent resident status or who are traveling on valid U.S. immigrant visas who have been or will be either detained and/or coerced into signing a Form I-407." The complaint asserted that CBP had refused to follow the court's TRO by claiming that the affected individuals were not in "detention," but were rather undergoing "processing." The Aziz brothers in particular had been deported and were stranded in the airport in Addis Ababa, without their passports or green cards, both of which had been confiscated. The amended complaint sought an injunction ordering respondents to invalidate the improperly coerced I-407 forms, reinstate the petitioners’ immigrant visas and/or LPR status, return the petitioners to Dulles Airport, and admit them into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations existing prior to January 27, 2017. The Commonwealth of Virginia moved to intervene in the case on Jan. 31, 2017. The Commonwealth's stated interest was in protecting its universities from the disruption created by the Executive Order. Virginia also filed a motion in which it stated:
Contemporary news reports and first-hand accounts indicate that officials of respondent Customs and Border Protection (CBP) did not comply with the Court’s directive in paragraph (a) that “respondents shall permit lawyers access to all legal permanent residents being detained at Dulles International Airport.” Moreover, because such access was not provided and respondents have not disclosed, despite request, whether any such persons were removed from the United States after they knew of the TRO, it cannot be determined whether respondents complied with the prohibition on such removal in paragraph (b). The Commonwealth has attempted since Sunday, January 29, to obtain that information, but respondents have not answered. Under these circumstances, the Court should require that respondents demonstrate their compliance with the TRO and show cause why they are not in contempt.
 On Feb. 1, the parties jointly moved to put the case briefly on hold while they tried to work out what would happen to the Aziz brothers. In addition, Virginia moved for a preliminary injunction. Oral arguments took place, and Judge Brinkema eventually extended the TRO until Friday Feb. 10. She also allowed two individuals (a Somali citizen deported from Dulles under the Executive Order and his U.S. citizen fiance) and the Commonwealth of Virginia to intervene in the case. In addition, the court ordered the U.S. to provide the Commonwealth, by close of business Thursday Feb. 9, with "a list of all persons who have been denied entry to or removed from the United States since the Executive Order . . . who, as of 8:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, on Friday, January 27, 2017, had a residence in the Commonwealth of Virginia and had lawful permanent resident status, an immigrant visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa), a valid student visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa), or a valid work visa (or accompanying family or spousal visa)." On February 7, the Aziz brothers and John Does 1-50 moved to voluntarily dismiss their part of the case. That motion was granted, leaving only the Commonwealth of Virginia as a plaintiff. On February 13, Judge Brinkema granted the Commonwealth of Virginia's motion for a preliminary injunction, with an accompanying memorandum order. This enjoined the defendants from enforcing the section 3(c) enforcement clause of the Executive Order against any person who was a Virginia resident or an employee or student of a Virginia public educational institution; and who, as of the time that the Executive Order was issued, had LPR status, an immigrant visa entitling the person to LPR status upon admission, a nonimmigrant student visa, a nonimmigrant work visa, or was a derivative of one of the latter two visas. In the accompanying memorandum order to the preliminary injunction, the court noted that the Executive Order presented a risk to the status of LPRs from the seven covered countries; that the Executive Order had injured the Commonwealth of Virginia and its residents by disrupting the functioning of its public higher education institutions; and that the defendants had offered no evidence to prove that the Executive Order was necessary for national security concerns -- but instead had made statements suggesting that animus was the motivating reason for the "Muslim ban." The court held that the plaintiff's claim was justiciable because the plaintiff had alleged constitutional violations; and that the plaintiff had established all elements of its preliminary injunction showing (it was likely to succeed on the merits of its Establishment Clause claim, it was likely to suffer irreparable harm without injunctive relief, the balance of equities tipped in its favor, and an injunction would be in the public interest). However, the court also declined the plaintiff's request for a nationwide preliminary injunction, instead limiting the injunction to affected Virginia parties, pointing to the nationwide temporary restraining order from State of Washington v. Trump, deferring to other circuits to make their own decisions on the matter, and wishing to avoid challenges to the preliminary injunction as over broad. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, DOJ filed notice of the new EO in this case. On Mar. 30, 2017, the court ordered the U.S. to respond to Virginia's intervention complaint by May 1, 2017, and commented that the parties were discussing amicable resolution of the case. That deadline was extended to June 1, 2017. On June 1, 2017, the case was dismissed without prejudice, dissolving the preliminary injunction. After this court's preliminary injunction order as to the first EO, that EO was revoked and other nationwide preliminary injunctions were put in place in IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump as to the second EO. This case is closed.

Summary: On Jan. 28, 2017, lawful permanent residents of the United States filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs were detained at Dulles International Airport pursuant to the Jan. 27, 2017 executive order (EO) issued by President Donald Trump to ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, and denied access to counsel. The original named plaintiffs--the Aziz brothers--are Yemeni citizens, legal permanent residents of the U.S. who were denied admission at Dulles. They brought the action as a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, and they simultaneously filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) to compel the defendants to allow them access to counsel and to prohibit the defendants from deporting them for seven days. The complaint argued that detaining the plaintiffs solely pursuant to the executive order violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs also argued that they would suffer irreparable harm if they continued to be denied counsel and if they were deported. On Jan. 28, 2017, Judge Leonie Brinkema granted the plaintiffs' motion and issued a seven-day TRO granting detainees at Dulles International Airport access to counsel and prohibiting deportation of detainees. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 30, 2017, clarifying the class as: "individuals with legal permanent resident status or who are traveling on valid U.S. immigrant visas who have been or will be either detained and/or coerced into signing a Form I-407." The amended complaint sought an injunction ordering respondents to invalidate the improperly coerced I-407 forms, reinstate the petitioners’ immigrant visas and/or LPR status, return the petitioners (who had been deported to Addis Ababa) to Dulles Airport, and admit them into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations existing prior to Jan. 27, 2017. The Commonwealth of Virginia moved to intervene in the case on Jan. 31, with its stated interest being protection of its universities from the disruption created by the EO. The Commonwealth moved for a preliminary injunction. On February 7, the Aziz brothers and John Does 1-50 moved to voluntarily dismiss their part of the case. That motion was granted, leaving only the Commonwealth of Virginia as a plaintiff. On February 13, Judge Brinkema granted the Commonwealth of Virginia's motion for a preliminary injunction, with an accompanying memorandum order. This enjoined the defendants from enforcing the section 3(c) enforcement clause of the Executive Order against any person who was a Virginia resident or an employee or student of a Virginia public educational institution; and who, as of the time that the Executive Order was issued, had LPR status, an immigrant visa entitling the person to LPR status upon admission, a nonimmigrant student visa, a nonimmigrant work visa, or was a derivative of one of the latter two visas. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On June 1, the case was dismissed without prejudice, dissolving the preliminary injunction. After this court's preliminary injunction order as to the first EO, that EO was revoked and other nationwide preliminary injunctions were put in place in IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump as to the second EO. This case is closed.


On December 3, 2013, the University of Notre Dame, a religious nonprofit university, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Notre Dame alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for nonprofit religious organizations, violated the Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Notre Dame sought preliminary and permanent injunctions barring the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate to avoid a violation of Notre Dame's deeply held religious beliefs. On December 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Philip P. Simon) denied Notre Dame's motion for preliminary injunction. The Court found that the ACA's insurance accommodation, which allowed the head of an eligible organization to provide self-certification which in turn triggered a third-party administrator to provide contraception coverage to the organization's employees, did not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of the religion. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 988 F.Supp.2d 912 (N.D. IN. 2013) The same day, Notre Dame filed an interlocutory appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 13-3853) and a motion for preliminary injunction with the District Court pending their appeal. On December 23, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for injunction pending appeal and on December 30, 2013, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff's emergency motion for injunction pending appeal. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Richard Posner) affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals found that the ACA's insurance accommodation was consistent with the balancing act required by RFRA and therefore it did not substantially burden the free exercise of plaintiffs. University of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (N.D. IN. 2014). On May 7, 2014, the Seventh Circuit denied plaintiffs' April 4, 2014, motion for rehearing. Notre Dame sought review in the Supreme Court, and on March 9, 2015, the Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for further consideration in light of its decision (after the Seventh Circuit's decision) in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 135 U.S. 1258 (2015) (cert. granted). In Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court had held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. On remand, after hearing oral arguments on April 22, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction on May 19, 2015, holding that Notre Dame had still not met its burden of establishing an entitlement to a preliminary injunction. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 786 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2015). On June 17, 2016, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to Seventh Circuit in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. ––– (2016). Univ. of Notre Dame v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 2007 (2016). The Supreme Court explained that through the Zubik litigation, the petitioners made the Government aware of their view that they met requirements for exemption from the contraceptive coverage requirement on religious grounds, and nothing precluded the Government from relying on this notice. As it appeared that proceedings in the Seventh Circuit would continue for some time, in district court the case was administratively closed on March 2, 2017, until the appellate proceedings concluded. Meanwhile, in circuit court the parties engaged in settlement negotiations and were required to file status reports. On October 7, 2017, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a new rule offering an exemption to any employer that objects to covering contraception services on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions. Thus, on October 17, 2017, the Seventh Circuit closed the case after the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the appeal.

Summary: On December 3, 2013, a non-profit religious university filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff alleged that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate violated the establishment clause and free speech clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and sought preliminary and permanent injunction On December 20, 2013, U.S. District Court denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction, which the plaintiff appealed. On February 21, 2014, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's December 20, 2013, order. On March 9, 2015, the Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, vacating the Judgment and remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit. On May 19, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of preliminary injunction. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing for En Banc or Panel was filed on July 2nd but it was remanded back to the Circuit Court. The case was voluntarily dismissed from the Seventh Circuit on October 17, 2017, after the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a new rule offering an exemption to any employer that objects to covering contraception services on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions.


On December 5, 2005, several former and current employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., against the agency in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and compensation for litigation costs, alleging that the agency had illegally discriminated against them on the basis of age. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that, through the defendant's design and implementation of its Reduction in Force (RIF) in 2005, their employment was either terminated or else reduced in grade because of their age. The FDIC is a U.S. government agency responsible for insuring money deposits at banks and savings associations. In the 1980s and 1990s, the FDIC was handling the fallout from failed financial institutions during the savings and loan crisis. As the banking crisis eased, so too did the FDIC's workload, and this spurred the 2005 RIF. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 7-8 (D.D.C. 2006). The defendant offered a buyout to division employees not eligible for full retirement. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). The plaintiffs who did not accept the buyout were placed on a re-employment priority list, but the defendant allegedly filled the spots with younger and less senior employees who had no better qualifications. The remaining plaintiffs took a demotion in a different division to avoid being laid off. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). On October 31, 2005, the plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) notifying it that a group of plaintiffs intended to file suit against the FDIC pursuant to the ADEA. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 8 (D.D.C. 2006). While the defendant argued that the plaintiffs did not notify the EEOC that this would be a class action, the Court (Judge Ricardo M. Urbina) stated that an explicit mention was not necessary. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 9 (D.D.C. 2006). Thus, on July 25, 2006, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class consisted of former or current employees of the FDIC's DRR who were born on or before September 30, 1955 and who, as a result of the 2005 RIF, either accepted a buyout or reduction in grade or else were terminated from their positions in the DRR. Aliotta v. Gruenberg, 237 F.R.D. 13 (D.D.C. 2006). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and on September 18, 2008, the Court issued an opinion granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Aliotta v. Bair, 576 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). The court held that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate (1) that the buyouts or transfers were involuntary and (2) that the 2005 RIF, when considered independently, had a discriminatory effect on older employees. Aliotta v. Bair, 576 F.Supp.2d 113 (D.D.C. 2008). The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision, but on August 13, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the district court's decision. Aliotta v. Bair, 2010 WL 3190828 (D.C. Cir. 2010). The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by a class of former or current employees of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's Division of Resolutions and Receiverships against the FDIC. The plaintiffs alleged that their employment was either terminated or was reduced in grade as a result of illegal age discrimination, and the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and compensation for litigation costs. On September 18, 2008, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.


On November 10, 2011, Belmont Abbey College, a Catholic liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On February 16, 2012, the government moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The government argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because it had not alleged that its insurance plan would be ineligible for the regulations' grandfathering provision; because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014; and because the defendants were in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because its plan was ineligible for the grandfathering provision, because it might not qualify for the enforcement safe harbor, and because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the emergency contraception coverage requirement. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on March 30, 2012, detailing why its insurance plan was ineligible for grandfathering, and explaining that the plan might not be eligible for the enforcement safe harbor because it may have supplied hormonal birth control to enrollees for non-contraceptive medical purposes (e.g., treating ovarian cysts). On April 5, 2012, the government filed again moved to dismiss this amended complaint, arguing that, as before, the plaintiff had not alleged any imminent harm. The plaintiff opposed this motion on the same grounds as the first motion to dismiss. On July 18, 2012, the district court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Judge Boasberg found that, in light of the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim was not yet ripe for review. Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012). On September 5, 2012, Judge Boasberg denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 3861255 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2012). The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Case No. 12-5291). The case was consolidated with Wheaton College v. Sebelius (Case No. 12-5273) on appeal. On December 18, 2012, the D.C. Circuit (Judges Merrick B. Garland, Thomas B. Griffith, and A. Raymond Randolph) affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of ripeness, and ordered that the lawsuit be held in abeyance pending the issuance of the amended contraceptive coverage regulations. The defendants were directed to file status reports with the court every 60 days from the date of the abeyance order. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). On August 13, 2013, D.C. Circuit ordered that the consolidated cases be remanded to the district court for the complaints to be dismissed as moot. This case was refiled, however, on November 20, 2013, under the same caption. That case can be found at FA-DC-0019 in this Clearinghouse.

Summary: In 2011, a Catholic liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. In July 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, which was affirmed on appeal. This case was refiled on November 20, 2013, under the same caption.


On July 12, 2007, four named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of all black consumers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries, under under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA") and the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"). The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black consumers in their home financing policies and practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on black home mortgage loans applicants, making them more likely to pay higher interest rates and charges than similarly situated white applicants. The plaintiffs sought injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. On September 10, 2007, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 30, 2008, the Court (Judge Nancy Gertner) issued an order denying the motion. In 2008, the plaintiffs have moved for consolidated or coordinated pre-trial proceedings of the present litigation with two other class-wide actions against Countrywide and its subsidiaries (Garcia v. Countrywide Financial Corp., C.A. No. 5:07-1161 (C.D. Cal.); Jenkins v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., C.A. No. 1:08-2935 (N.D. Ill.)). The U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation issued a transfer order and centralized the three cases in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Judge John G. Heyburn II was assigned to the case. The cases were associated under a docket 3:08-MD-1974. The case then proceeded into discovery. On June 13, 2011, the case was stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court case, Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). On October 13, 2011, the Court (Judge John G. Heyburn II) issued an order that, in light of the decision in Wal-Mart, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the commonality requirement. The plaintiffs had not identified the common method of exercising discretion that would discriminate against the class members in a similar fashion. The plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Sixth Circuit issued its decision on January 15, 2013. The District Court's denial of class certification was affirmed. On August 9, 2013, the four named plaintiffs entered separate stipulations to dismiss the case with prejudice, without costs and right of appeal. On August 12, 2013, the Court issued an order granting the stipulations and dismissing the case with prejudice.

Summary: On July 12, 2007, four named plaintiffs filed a lawsuit on behalf of all black consumers in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Countrywide Bank and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on black consumers in their home financing policies and practices. On August 12, 2013, the case was dismissed with prejudice.


On July 15, 2014, the plaintiff, a New York City resident, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleges that the New York Police Department's ("NYPD") policy and practice of interfering with the right of individuals to film, photograph, videotape or record NYPD officers performing their official duties in public places violates the First Amendment. Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that her detention violates her Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff sought monetary damages, a declaratory judgment that plaintiff's First and Fourth Amendment rights were violated, and a permanent injunction preventing the City of New York from retaliating against anyone who, without interfering with police activity, records police officers performing official duties in public. Plaintiff also alleged that the defendants used excessive force during arrest. Plaintiff's claims arise out of a September 25, 2013 incident in which she was allegedly arrested by NYPD officers after filming NYPD and paramedics' interactions with an apparently homeless person. She alleges that after she began filming the incident, NYPD officers began filming her, at which point she informed them they had no right to film her. The NYPD officers arrested her subsequent to a "verbal exchange." In support of the proposition that the NYPD maintains such a policy of interfering with the public recording them performing their official duties, the complaint cites numerous documented instances of such interference, letters of concern to the NYPD from major media outlets, and the allegation that the NYPD has failed to adequately respond to those incidents. On February 18, 2015, plaintiff's claims for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and First Amendment retaliation were dismissed due to the defendant's qualified immunity. This left only the excessive force allegation for litigation. On March 11, 2015, the plaintiff filed an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit on these dismissed claims, but shortly after withdrew it because on April 20, 2015, a private settlement agreement was reached between the parties and the case was dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: On July 15, 2014, plaintiff, a New York City resident, filed a lawsuit against the City of New York and the NYPD alleging that it maintains a policy of interfering with the rights of individuals to film or photograph NYPD officers performing their official duties in public places in violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, she alleges that her detention subsequent to filming NYPD officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiff was arrested subsequent to a September 25, 2013 incident in which she filmed NYPD officers and paramedics performing their official duties, however the charges were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff is seeking declaratory judgment that the NYPD's practice in regards to individuals filming NYPD officers performing their official duties violate the First Amendment, a permanent injunction preventing the City of New York from retaliating against anyone who records NYPD officers, and compensatory damages. The case is currently ongoing.


On July 11, 2019, a group of organizations dedicated to helping immigrant families and children including Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project, Central American Resource Center – LA, Immigrant Defenders Law Center, and Public Counsel filed this lawsuit, pro se, in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, sued Attorney General William Barr, the directors of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other U.S. officials under <i> Ex Parte Young </i> and the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated the due process of the Fifth Amendment by entering removal orders without first affording unrepresented immigrant families proper notice of a hearing or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the refugee-protection provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and its prohibition on removal to a country where the individual would face persecution or torture. Represented by the ACLU of Southern California, New York Civil Liberties Union, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. They sought a declaration and corresponding injunctive order that, under the due process clause, “all currently unrepresented families and children who were ordered removed <i> in absentia </i> on or after May 1, 2014 are entitled, prior to their physical removal, to . . . a hearing before an immigration judge” and, in advance of the hearing, to access to their immigration files and certain related records. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that thousands of immigrant families, mostly from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, were in danger of deportation during rumored en masse arrests in the summer of 2019. These families had all arrived to the United States within the past 5 years and claimed asylum, but never had their claims for asylum and related relief heard by an immigration judge. Instead, they were ordered deported <i> in absentia </i> for failing to appear at their hearings. The plaintiffs claimed that these orders violated the refugees’ due process rights as they had little to no notice of the hearings. According to the plaintiffs, hearing notices were frequently sent to the wrong address, sent with no date or time specified, or specified for dates and times (including weekends) when no hearings could actually take place, or dates that did not exist, such as September 31. When notices were sent to the right address for the right time, the plaintiffs alleged the notices were sent too late and for locations far from the immigrants’ homes. This meant that immigrants received the notice days after the hearings, or were forced to travel across the country on only a few days’ notice. Finally, deportation <i> in absentia </i> was ordered on multiple children, who could not read English had no control over whether they could attend their own hearings. The plaintiffs argue that the process by which unrepresented immigrants may challenge the removal orders, by filing a written motion to reopen, is effectively unavailable to those who speak limited English and lack the capacity to read, understand, and comply with the requirements for writing and filing a motion to reopen. On July 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for an expedited discovery process due to the imminent harm that could come to the immigrant families. District Judge Jesse M. Furman granted the motion and ordered counsel for all parties to meet on July 18th. Judge Furman issued an opinion on July 17, 2019 lifting the usual limitations on remote electronic access to the court docket for actions related to an order of removal. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on July 24, 2019. The defendants claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). The defendants argued the claims should be dismissed because under the IIRIRA, all challenges of immigration proceedings and removal orders must be channeled to the courts of appeals. They also argued that 8 U.S.C. section 1252(g) eliminated the court’s jurisdiction because it barred review of claims arising from the decision or action to execute removal orders. Finally, they argued the injunctive relief that the plaintiffs sought was impossible due to immigration regulations that only allow injunctive relief for individual plaintiffs, not groups (8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)). On September 5, 2019, Judge Furman agreed with the defendants’ arguments and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 409 F. Supp. 3d 221. Judge Furman was troubled by the plaintiffs’ allegations but found that any remedy for these circumstances lied elsewhere: in immigration court (by way of a motion to reopen), in the Court of Appeals (by way of a petition for review), or in Congress (by way of changing the law). The court clerk issued final judgment and dismissed the complaint the next day. On November 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the 2nd Circuit. However, the plaintiffs withdrew their appeal on November 21, 2019, and the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2019, multiple non-profit organizations filed a suit against Attorney General William Barr, the directors of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and other U.S. officials. The plaintiffs sought declaratory injunctive relief to prevent the deportation of thousands of immigrants seeking asylum. The court dismissed the complaint in August 2019 for lack of jurisdiction.


This is a case about an Interim Final Rule concerning how federal COVID relief CARES Act funding is allocated to private and public schools. On August 10, 2020, The Council Parent Attorneys and Advocates (Parent Advocates) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in District of Maryland. Parent Advocates sued the Secretary of Education, Betsy Devos, and the U.S. Department of Education. Represented by The National Center for Youth Law and private counsel, Parent Advocates sought declaratory and injunctive relief to disallow the enforcement of the Department of Education’s Interim Final Rule regarding school funding under the CARES act, as well as attorney’s fees. The case was assigned to Judge George Levi Russell. Parents Advocates claimed that the Department of Education and Devos in her official role as Secretary of Education violated the Administrative Procedure Act. Parent Advocates claimed the Administrative Procedure Act was violated because the new interim final rule was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion that exceeded their statutory authority. Parent Advocates argued that the interim rule would restrict and reduce CARES Act funding to public schools, and would narrow the permitted uses of the CARES Act funding. Parent Advocates contended that the interim final rule would divert funding from public schools in several ways. The rule changed how funding is allocated by moving from a poverty-based formula to an enrollment-based formula. Previously, funding was allocated under a poverty-based formula only. The new rule added an enrollment-based formula option in addition to new restrictions that would be imposed if a school district continued to use a poverty-based formula. Parent Advocates argued that the impact of the new enrollment-based formula paired with the poverty-based formula restrictions would result in public school funding being negatively impacted. The plaintiffs contended that if a school district chooses the poverty-based formula for funding, none of their non-Title 1 schools would receive CARES Act funding despite serving disabled, poverty-level children. If they chose the enrollment-based formula, the plaintiffs argued that they would be allocated a greater amount of money would but more will be diverted to private schools in the district. Parent Advocates argued that this new interim rule would end up pushing schools into the enrollment-based option to try and have their non-Title 1 schools receive a fraction of the necessary CARES Act funding they need to serve students. On September 3, 2020, Parent Advocates filed a motion for summary judgement. Judge Russel initially stayed the proceedings in this case because summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs in NAACP v. DeVos, resulting in the interim final rule being vacated nationwide. More information about NAACP v. DeVos can be found here. The defendants announced that they would not appeal the NAACP v. DeVos ruling, thereby ensuring that the decision would stand. On December 18, after it was clear that the summary judgment from NAACP v. DeVos would stand, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this case. The case is now closed.

Summary: In August 2020, the National Center for Youth Law on behalf of Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that the interim final rules changing CARES Act school funding stipulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act. After NAACP v. Devos resulted in the rule being vacated, this case was voluntarily dismissed.


On Dec. 19, 2017, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) and one of its journalists brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Represented by its own counsel, the plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The organizational plaintiff is a national nonprofit investigative news organization. The individual plaintiff is one of its staff reporters. Plaintiffs sought information on expedited removal, a process by which an immigration enforcement official may remove a noncitizen from the United States, without a hearing before an Immigration Judge or review by the Board of Immigration Appeals. Expedited removal currently applies to noncitizens who entered without inspection and who were apprehended within 100 miles of the border and within two weeks of arrival in the country. Plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration's Jan. 25, 2017  Executive Order 13767, which instructed the DHS Secretary to apply expedited removal to the fullest extent of the law, had raised public concern about the fairness of the procedure. The plaintiffs sought to produce news reports on the topic. The complaint alleged that on June 14, 2017, plaintiffs had submitted a FOIA request to defendant seeking materials since 2012 instructing U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on the following procedures: 1. Issuing expedited removal orders; 2. Reviewing expedited removal orders; 3. Identifying individuals with facially-valid visas who may receive an expedited removal order because they intend to immigrate; 4. Identifying asylum seekers; 5. Identifying individuals who have not been continuously physically present in the United States for at least two weeks; 6. Understanding evidence that individuals may introduce to demonstrate they should not be subject to expedited removal; 7. Identifying lawful permanent residents (LPR), U.S. citizens, or individuals admitted as refugees or previously granted asylum; 8. Handling cases of suspected asylum fraud; 9. Handling cases of suspected fraud in claiming LPR, U.S. citizen, refugee, or asylee status; 10. Rescinding an expedited removal order; 11. Allowing withdrawal of a request for admission; 12. Using prosecutorial discretion in expedited removal; 13. Handling claims of U.S. citizenship; and 14. Handling individuals' requests to contact attorneys or consulates. The complaint further alleged that at the time of filing, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendant. Plaintiffs sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On Dec. 19, 2017, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Laporte. A case management statement was due by Mar. 13, 2018, with a case management conference scheduled for Mar. 20. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Jan. 23. The organization reported that since it filed the suit, the defendant had located but had still not released responsive documents. On Mar. 13, the parties filed a joint case management statement, in which the defendant maintained it had already complied with the request in full but would meet with the plaintiff about the requested additional documents. The parties entered into alternative dispute resolution. On September 18, 2018, the parties filed stipulation of dismissal. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claim with prejudice. Each party bore its own costs and fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On Dec. 19, 2017, the Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) and one of its journalists brought this suit in N.D.Cal, suing DHS under FOIA. Plaintiffs sought information on expedited removal of noncitizens since the Trump Administration's Jan. 25, 2017 EO 13767. The parties disagreed whether the defendant complied had complied with the plaintiff's FOIA request, but the case was voluntarily dismissed in 2018. The case is now closed.


On October 15, 2002, undergraduates and law students at Georgetown University who had been arrested at a protest in September 2002, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. police department, the Fairfax, Virginia sheriff's department, and several individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens. Represented by a private firm, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief as well as for damages for the injuries that occurred when they were arrested. The plaintiffs claimed that the District of Columbia violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the ‘trap and arrest’ method of policing, where police surrounded people and arrested them without giving them an order to disperse, violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights while acting as student journalists and legal observers. They further claimed that the police had not warned them of their Miranda rights or their right to counsel and that they had been subjected to false arrest and false imprisonment. Several other civil cases were filed at the same time as Chang v. United States. The most important of these was the Barham v. Ramsey class action suit. That lawsuit finally settled in 2015. The plaintiffs in Chang declined to join that class. On January 15, 2008, Judge Emmet J. Sullivan ordered that the plaintiffs’ arrest records be expunged. On January 30, 2008, the case was stayed as the parties were ordered to engage in the mediation process. On January 7, 2009, the stay was lifted and the pre-trial proceedings continued. There was a great deal of contention over discovery; the plaintiffs filed multiple motions to compel the defendants to release information and two motions to impose sanctions on the defendants for discovery abuses. Judge Sullivan appointed Magistrate Judge John Facciola as Special Master on May 5, 2010, to determine if the defendants had engaged in the destruction of evidence in both this case and the Barham case. On September 19, 2010, Judge Sullivan released an order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgement on the plaintiff’s claims for equitable relief, saying that the plaintiffs did not have standing to ask for declaratory and injunctive relief. 738 F.Supp.2d 83. After this order, the trial went on only for damages. Contentious discovery continued until April 2012. After the completion of discovery, the proceedings before Magistrate Judge Facciola continued. Judge Sullivan stayed the proceedings on December 24, 2013 and the parties returned to mediation on June 4, 2014. On November 4, 2014, Magistrate Judge Facciola released his Report and Recommendation of Law, denying all of the plaintiffs’ motions for sanctions. He called the loss of the evidence on the part of the District of Columbia negligent but not malicious, and denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees. On December 30, 2015, the parties once more returned to mediation. On April 7, 2016, the parties finally settled. The overall settlement amount was $2,810,000. The plaintiffs were awarded $110k each from the District of Columbia and $5000 each from the federal government; the plaintiffs’ attorneys were awarded $2.35 million to be paid by the District of Columbia.

Summary: Students arrested in a trap-and-arrest action in World Bank/IMF protests in 2002 filed this lawsuit in October 2002 alleging violations of their constitutional rights by the District of Columbia. Discovery was a long and contentious process and included the appointment of a Special Master to determine if there had been any spoliation of electronic data. The parties finally settled on April 7, 2016 for $400,000 for the plaintiffs and $2.5 million for their attorneys.


On December 13, 2007, the United Farm Workers and Farmworker Justice, two worker advocacy groups, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL). They filed under the Freedom of Information Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and the case was assigned to Judge Henry H. Kennedy. The plaintiffs, represented by the Public Citizen Litigation Group and Farmworker Justice sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they requested that their document requests be fulfilled without delay or cost and that the defendant's failure to produce these documents previously be declared as unlawful. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOL failed to release public information about employers who had used the H-2A visa program to hire foreign guest workers instead of U.S. workers. The plaintiffs wrote that they had made 7 separate FOIA requests, some nearly a year ago, which the DOL had either ignored or responded to in a deficient manner. The plaintiffs alleged that the FOIA requests were made in order to uncover documents which they believe will show employer abuses in the H-2A program. On February 8, 2008, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint after the DOL identified 32,809 documents that would fulfill the plaintiffs sixth and seventh FOIA requests but refused to produce them without reproduction costs of $723.50. The amended complaint reiterated their request for the documents without cost. On March 10, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, which was answered by the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on April 11, 2008. Before the court decided on these motions, the plaintiffs filed a status report on July 18, 2008. The report stated that the DOL had produced documents in response to all 7 FOIA requests to the plaintiffs' satisfaction, and also granted fee waivers for all requests. The report concluded that all matters had settled except for attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants entered a stipulation of settlement paying attorneys' fees and voluntary dismissal on September 5, 2008, which was accepted by the Court on September 11, 2008. The case is now closed.

Summary: United Farm Workers and Farmworker Justice filed suit against the U.S. Department of Labor due to 7 separate ignored or deficient FOIA requests. The parties agreed to settle after the defendants fulfilled all 7 FOIA requests at no cost. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case with the defendants paying the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.


On September 2, 2019, 18 prisoners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York Department of Corrections and a group of its doctors under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violations of the Eighth Amendment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages, attorneys' fees, and an injunction against the defendants' practices and conditions for which this suit was brought. The plaintiffs also requested certification of a class of all present and future patients who require medications with abuse potential. The case was eventually assigned to Judge Preska. In 2017, the New York Department of Corrections instituted the Medications With Abuse Potential (“MWAP”) Policy in response to the opioid epidemic, which intended to reduce the amount of pain medications in the New York prison system. After medical providers prescribed pain medications, the policy required an additional approval from either a Regional Medical Director or the Chief Medical Officer before giving the pain medication to prisoners. The plaintiffs claimed that the policy prevented prisoners from receiving pain medications needed for legitimate medical purposes. They alleged that the administrators that provided the extra approval invariably denied the pain medications. As a result, patients with medical issues including severe spinal and neurological issues, phantom pain from amputations, and multiple sclerosis, were denied pain medication. On September 11, this case was related to another case involving a prisoner denied pain medication, captioned Medina v. Buther (7:15-cv-01955-LAP). This case is ongoing.

Summary: In September 2019, 18 prisoners sued the New York Department of Corrections alleging that a medications policy violated the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought compensation for pain and suffering, as well as an injunctions against the prison's practices. The case is ongoing.


On February 15, 2019, President Trump issued an executive order, Proclamation 9844, declaring a national emergency concerning the southern border of the United States. Following Proclamation 9844, Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition filed this suit on February 28, 2020 against President Trump and his administration on its own behalf and on behalf of its 825,000 members in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Sierra Club is a national nonprofit organization that advocates for environmental education and wildlife protection. Southern Border Communities Coalition is a nonprofit public benefit corporation that brings together 60 organizations from California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas to promote policies and solutions that improve the quality of life in border communities. Represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Northern California, ACLU of Texas, and the Sierra Club Environmental Law Program, the plaintiffs alleged that President Trump’s administration sought to unlawfully divert billions of dollars appropriated for the military towards the border wall project, despite Congress having appropriated only $1.375 billion on any border barrier construction in fiscal year 2020, per Congress’s Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020. The plaintiffs sued the President, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and the acting U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §4332), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§701–706), the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. §1651), and the Declaratory Judgments Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs argued that the President unlawfully declared a national emergency in an attempt to circumvent Congress’s exclusive control over appropriation, following Congress’s consideration and rejection of the President’s requests for billions of dollars in wall funding with the passing of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2020. In doing so, the plaintiffs argued that the President violated the separation of powers, given that the Constitution vests all powers of appropriations exclusively in Congress. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the National Environmental Policy Act, because they failed to review the environmental impacts of the border wall construction project, per the regulations required and outlined in NEPA. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants' decisions to transfer military funds to wall construction constitute a violation of the Administrative Procedures Act because it was contrary to the Constitution and in excess of statutory authority. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beele, but quickly reassigned to Judge Haywood S. Gilliam. Jr. Judge Gilliam ordered the case related to Sierra Club v. Trump, a similar case challenging 2019 appropriations. On April 13, 2020, the Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition filed a partial motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Trump administration's use of 10 U.S.C. § 284 to divert military funding to the construction of the border wall was unlawful. The motion detailed that, similar to the court's holding in Sierra Club v. Trumpi, 379 F. Supp. 3d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2019), the President's administration could not use transfer authorities to fund a border wall that Congress considered and rejected. The defendants responded with a partial motion for summary judgment in opposition to the Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition, arguing that the plaintiffs' recreational and aesthetic interests fall outside the zone of interests of §8005 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act. Furthermore, the defendants' motion argued that §8005 authorized the transfer of funds by the Department of Defense and that the administration's use of 10 U.S.C. § 284 to divert funding for Counter-Drug purposes was lawful. Meanwhile, on April 16, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives submitted an amicus brief outlining their compelling interest in this case. The brief was filed in support of the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and requested that the court enjoin the President's administration from spending billions more than Congress appropriated for border wall construction. While the cross-motions for summary judgment were still pending, the nation elected a new President in November 2020. Upon taking office on January 20, 2021, President Biden issued an executive order, Proclamation 10142, terminating the national emergency declared by Proclamation 9844. President Biden’s order further directed that officials pause work on the construction of the southern border wall and develop a plan to redirect funds and repurpose contracts. In light of Proclamation 10142, on January 21, 2021, Judge Haywood S. Gilliam, Jr. directed both parties in this suit to file a joint status report regarding the effect President Biden's executive order has on the case and the pending motions for summary judgment. The joint status report was due February 16, 2021. As of February 5, 2021, the case is pending further updates.

Summary: Sierra Club and Southern Border Communities Coalition brought suit against the Trump administration over funds diverted towards the construction of the border wall project, after President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency in 2019. This suit is pending further updates following President Biden’s executive order terminating the national emergency concerning the southern border of the US and pausing the construction of the border wall.


[The following summary is adapted with some additions from the Background section of the District Court's Order of March 30, 2007. See Ali v. Gonzales, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1199-1202 (W.D. Wash. 2007).] On November 13, 2002, five Somali nationals detained pending execution of a final order of removal to Somalia filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington challenging respondent federal government's deportation methods and post-removal-order detention. Petitioners, represented by private counsel, claimed that removal to Somalia would violate 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) because Somalia had no government which could accept deportees, and therefore asked the court to enjoin their removal and order their release. Prior to the initiation of this lawsuit, each of the petitioners had been detained for many months while the Government tried to achieve their removal, and were released from post-removal-order detention only in the wake of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (holding that an alien may not be held in confinement once it is determined that there is no likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future). Petitioner Mohamud was re-detained in July 2002 upon revocation of his order of supervision, and petitioners Ali, Hundiye and Aweys were re-detained in November 2002 because the local immigration authorities were informed that their removal to Somalia was imminent. All the petitioners were informed that they would soon be removed to Somalia. Petitioners filed this action shortly after their re-detention. The Court (Judge Marsha J. Pechman) issued a stay preventing petitioners' removal on the day their petition was filed. After petitioners filed an amended petition on Novermber 26, 2002, seeking certification of a nation-wide class, the stay was extended to a class of all individuals with final orders of removal to Somalia. On December 10, 2002, the Court granted petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order pending a hearing on the merits. Following a hearing on January 13, 2003, on January 17 the Court granted petitioners' request for a class-wide permanent injunction preventing the removals to Somalia, finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) allowed deportation to a country only if its government could accept the deportees. Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390 (W.D. Wash. 2003). On the ground that there was no likelihood that petitioners would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Court also ordered that three of the petitioners (Ali, Hundiye and Aweys) be released from detention pursuant to Zadvydas. (Petitioner Mohamud had a separate habeas proceeding pending before Judge Barbara Rothstein (Mohamud v. INS, No. 2:02-cv-01686-BJR (W.D. Wash.)) and was thereafter ordered released by Judge Rothstein.) The Government appealed the District Court's order, and on September 19, 2003, the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003). Earlier that year, however, the Eight Circuit had decided the issue differently, holding that the United States immigration authorities did not have to obtain the acceptance of the removal country's government before the United States could repatriate an alien. See Jama v. INS, 329 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003). The Government's request for rehearing was thus held in abeyance pending the appeal of the Eight Circuit decision to the Supreme Court. On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Government had authority to remove individuals to Somalia without the necessity of obtaining the acceptance of the removal country's government. Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005). In light of this ruling, the Government moved to vacate the panel decision of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions that the District Court vacate the injunction, de-certify the class and reverse the order releasing the Petitioners from detention. On August 26, 2005, the Ninth Circuit granted the unopposed request to vacate the injunction, but, citing the long history of logistical difficulties in deporting Jama himself, remanded to the District Court the issue of whether or not petitioners could be re-detained. Ali v. Ashcroft, 421 F.3d 795 (9th Cir. 2005). Upon returning to the District Court, the parties submitted a joint report in which they agreed that the injunction should be dissolved, the class decertified, and the detention claims of Petitioners dismissed without prejudice. The Court (Judge Pechman) entered an order adopting the parties' requests on April 27, 2006. Meanwhile, following the District Court's granting of relief on the merits in January 2003, petitioners had moved for an award of attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for work billed through January 2003. With the exception of some paralegal fees, the Court granted the motion on May 27, 2003, awarding petitioners a total of $129,449.46. An appeal to the Ninth Circuit was stayed while the decision on the appeal on the merits proceeded forward. After briefing on the EAJA appeal following their order vacating the injunction, on November 30, 2006, the Court of Appeals remanded to the District Court to determine whether petitioners were still prevailing parties. Ali v. Gonzales, 237 Fed.Appx. 128 (9th Cir. 2006). On March 30, 2007, the District Court (Judge Pechman) found that petitioners were prevailing parties only to the extent that they had secured their release from detention, and thus reduced the award of attorney's fees to $54,468.25 to exclude work done on the class action portion of the suit. (The court also imposed a $1,000 fine on the Government for submitting an overlong brief; this fine was reversed by the Ninth Circuit as an abuse of discretion on May 9, 2008. Ali v. Mukasey, 277 Fed. Appx. 741 (9th Cir. 2008).)

Summary: On November 13, 2002, four immigration detainees facing a final order of removal to Somalia filed a petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, Seattle Division, challenging respondent federal government's deportation methods and post-removal-order detention. Petitioners, represented by private counsel, claimed that removal to Somalia would violate 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(2) because Somalia had no government which could accept deportees, and therefore asked the court to enjoin their removal and order their release. While the District Court issued a permanent injunction and the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, the Supreme Court's decision in Jama v. Immigration & Customs Enforcement subsequently forced the lower courts to vacate the injunction. Petitioners were still awarded attorney's fees under the EAJA.


On September 20, 2017, two same-sex couples and one former foster child brought this lawsuit against the state of Michigan in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman. The plaintiffs alleged that Michigan contracted with and funded private child placing agencies, some of which were religious organizations that refused to place children with same-sex couples. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that allowing state-funded child placing agencies to turn families away on the basis of sexual orientation violated the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sued the state under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees. On December 15, 2017, the state filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because there was no constitutional right to adopt children and that the agencies' actions were private rather than state actions. On December 18, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (SVCC) and three individuals who had had successful adoptions through SVCC moved to intervene as defendants. SVCC was a religious non-profit child placing agency that refused to work with same-sex couples, and it claimed that it would lose funding and have to close if the plaintiffs were granted injunctive relief. The next day, the proposed intervening defendants filed a motion to dismiss that contained many of the same arguments as the state's. On January 30, 2018, State Senator Arlan Meekhof, on behalf of 53 Michigan legislators, sought leave to file an amicus brief in support of the defendants. The court granted this request on February 26, 2018. In this brief, Senator Meekhof agreed with the arguments made by the state and the intervenor-defendants in their motions to dismiss, as well as emphasized the "key roles" that religious agencies had played in adoption and foster care in Michigan. On March 5, 2018, the Court granted the intervenor-defendants' motion to intervene as to SVCC. A hearing was held two days later as to the individual intervenor-defendants' ability to intervene, and on March 22, the Court granted the motion to intervene as to them as well. On September 14, 2018, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part. 341 F.Supp.3d 706. Judge Borman dismissed one plaintiff's claims due to lack of standing but declined to dismiss the other claims. The defendants filed a motion seeking an interlocutory appeal of the court's decision on the motion to dismiss. Judge Borman denied the motion, explaining that the questions the defendants wanted certified for appeal were not issues that the plaintiffs actually raised. 2018 WL 5292022. The parties subsequently began engaging in settlement discussions. On March 22, 2019, the parties reached a settlement and filed a motion for voluntary dismissal. 2018 WL 8807229. As a part of the settlement, the Department of Health and Human Services agreed to enforce the nondiscrimination provision against all child placement agencies and made a public statement saying as much. The Department also promised to provide ongoing training to its employees regarding their obligations under the settlement agreement. Finally, it created a grievance process for families. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. On February 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen proceedings for the purpose of enforcing the settlement agreement. The plaintiffs alleged that they knew of a state-funded child placing agency refused to place children with same-sex couples. The motion is currently pending.

Summary: In September 2017, two same-sex couples and one former foster child brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the state of Michigan because the state funded child placing agencies that discriminated against same-sex couples. The plaintiffs alleged that this violated the Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties reached a settlement in which the State agreed to enforce nondiscrimination provisions against child placement agencies.


On November 14, 2018, immigrants detained at the Cibola County Correctional Center filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. (Although the facility in question is located in New Mexico, the operator is organized as a Maryland corporation.) They sued the operator of the facility, CoreCivic, under the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219), the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act, and the common law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The suit alleged that CoreCivic was using immigrant detainees’ labor but paying them less than the federally mandated rate of $7.25 per hour (sometimes as little as $1 per day). Represented by private counsel, they sought to recover underpaid wages and attorneys’ fees and require CoreCivic to treat all current and future Cibola detainees as employees so that they would be entitled to minimum wage. The case was assigned to Judge Richard D. Bennett. CoreCivic filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on January 11, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs’ custodial detention prevented them from assuming an employee/employer relationship. As such, CoreCivic argued, the plaintiffs were not eligible for the minimum wage under the statutes, and the unjust enrichment claim should therefore fail as well. On February 26, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to conditionally certify a class consisting of "all civilly detained immigrants who performed work for CoreCivic at Cibola through its work program at any time during the period beginning November 14, 2016, and continuing to the date on which notice is issued." The plaintiffs argued that their detention and working conditions at Cibola are sufficient conditions to meet the “similarly-situated” threshold required to file a class action lawsuit. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice on September 27, 2019. It held that the plaintiffs were not employees of CoreCivic and therefore not entitled to minimum wage. Because CoreCivic was not in violation of any statute, the unjust enrichment claim was also dismissed. 2019 WL 4735428 The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit in October 2019; as of August 2020, that appeal is pending.

Summary: In November 2018, immigrants at a detention facility in New Mexico brought this suit against the facility's operator, CoreCivic, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New Mexico Minimum Wage Act. They claimed that CoreCivic had employed them to work at the facility but paid them as little as $1 per day. The case was dismissed in September 2019, when the court held that the plaintiffs were not employees of CoreCivic and were therefore not entitled to the minimum wage. As of August 2020, the plaintiffs’ appeal is pending in the Fourth Circuit.


This is a case about a Memphis Police Department (MPD) policy that resulted in the use of excessive force and unlawful arrests. On February 25, 2013, an officer of the MPD and a special agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Memphis and six MPD police officers in the District Court for the Western District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves and similarly situated persons for violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as for negligence under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, fees and costs, and injunctive relief to stop Memphis from continuing this practice. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Jon McCalla. The "Beale Street Sweep" The MPD had a practice known as the "Beale Street Sweep," where it would order all persons to immediately leave the sidewalks of Beale Street, even though there was nothing threatening the safety of the public or MPD police officers. This was typically early on Saturday and Sunday mornings, or during weekday entertainment events. The complaint stated that Memphis knew this incited hostile behavior among its police officers. The complaint additionally alleged that in the course of implementing this policy, the MPD assaulted, employed excessive force against, unlawfully detained and arrested, and fabricated criminal charges against numerous innocent people in an attempt to conceal their own unlawful conduct. The first plaintiff, an off-duty MPD officer, alleges that he was assaulted by the MPD while eating pizza outside of a club. Several MPD officers approached him, shouting "didn't we tell you to get off the street?" (the complaint claims he was not previously told this). The complaint goes on to say the police "viciously attack[ed]" him, slamming his body into a police vehicle with enough force to dent it, arresting him, and preparing fabricated charges against him. The MPD dismissed the charges shortly after. The other plaintiff, an off-duty ATF agent, was arrested after failing to gain entry to a club. The MPD confronted him and a family member after they were turned away, then arrested him for public intoxication. The complaint emphasizes that he was at no point intoxicated, and he was released immediately after his supervisor arrived on the scene. Both of these events occurred during Beale Street Sweeps. Plaintiffs claimed the sweeps violated their Fourteenth Amendment right to "to remain in a public place with no apparent purpose and to travel locally through public spaces and roadways," as well as their Fourth Amendment right against excessive force and unreasonable seizure. On April 4, 2013, two of the defendant officers moved to dismiss. Another followed suit on May 16, and another on May 31. On June 4, 2013, Judge McCalla granted the first motion in part, dismissing the Fourteenth Amendment claim against the defendant on the grounds that his actions would more properly be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. The Court denied, however, that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. He granted the other two motions on the same grounds on June 6 and July 10. The Court Grants Class Certification On November 27, 2013, plaintiffs moved for class certification. After 10 months of heated discovery, the Court granted class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) on September 29, 2014. He allowed plaintiffs' definition of the class as "[a]ll persons who have been unlawfully removed from Beale Street and/or adjacent sidewalks by City of Memphis police officers pursuant to the custom, policy and practice known as the Beale Street Sweep." 2014 WL 8508560. The Court Mostly Denies Summary Judgment for the Defendants Both parties subsequently moved for summary judgment on October 27, 2014. That same day, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the individual MPD officers, leaving the City of Memphis as the lone defendant. Judge McCalla granted in part the city's motion for summary judgment on January 18, 2015. 97 F.Supp.3d 947 (2015 WL 1567824). The plaintiffs had previously conceded that the record and case law did not support their claims for failure to train, investigate or discipline; negligence under the Governmental Tort Liability Act; and punitive damages. Consequently, Judge McCalla granted the motion for the defendant on those claims. However, he denied summary judgment against the plaintiffs on their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims as well as their municipal liability claims. He found that the plaintiffs had a Fourteenth Amendment right to travel that was potentially violated prior to their seizure. Additionally, genuine questions of fact remained on whether their Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and on whether the city was generally liable. A Jury Returns a Verdict for the Plaintiffs A jury trial began two days later on January 20, 2015. The jury returned a verdict for one of the individual plaintiffs (the MPD officer) but not the other (the ATF agent). In regards to the class, the jury found that: (1) Memphis had “through its police officers, carried out a custom and/or well-established practice...of preventing persons from standing and/or walking on the sidewalk or street of Beale Street;" (2) this well-established practice “occur[ed] without consideration to whether conditions throughout the Beale Street area pose an existing, imminent or immediate threat to public safety;” (3) this was “the cause of persons being prevented from standing and/or walking on the sidewalk or street of Beale Street;” and (4) “since at least 2007, thousands of persons were cleared off of Beale Street pursuant to” that practice. On February 13, 2015, Memphis moved to decertify the class on the basis that class membership was "unascertainable without a full adjudication on the merits of each potential member's claim." The Court denied this motion on May 28, though it granted a modification to the class definition by defining what the "Beale Street Sweep" was. 2015 WL 3442277. Simultaneously, it denied plaintiffs' October 27 motion for summary judgment. The Court Enters Judgment for the Plaintiffs and Grants the Injunction On June 3, 2015, Judge McCalla entered judgment for the plaintiffs and granted declaratory and injunctive relief. 108 F.Supp.3d 593 (2015 WL 3507110). The Court declared that "since at least 2007, the City of Memphis violated the constitutional rights of thousands of persons who were subjected to 'the Beale Street Sweep,' that is, 'the policy, procedure, custom, or practice by which police officers of the Memphis Police Department order all persons to immediately leave the sidewalks and street on Beale Street without consideration to whether conditions throughout the Beale Street area pose an existing, imminent or immediate threat to public safety.'" The Court also permanently enjoined the city from engaging in the Beale Street Sweep, issuing several instructions as orders to ensure it would not happen. The Court further determined that a monitor would be appointed to observe and report on the MPD's progress for one year after appointment. Memphis Appeals and the Court Grants Fees to Plaintiffs On July 6, 2015, Memphis appealed the Court's injunctive order, as well as the jury's verdict, the Court's earlier ruling on summary judgment, and the Court's granting of class certification, to the Sixth Circuit. On August 27, 2015, Judge McCalla granted attorneys' fees, reimbursement of expenses, entry of judgment, and post-judgment interest to the plaintiffs. 2015 WL 5076974. Memphis Appeals Again and the Court Stays the Judgment On September 11, 2015, Memphis filed notice of a new appeal to the Sixth Circuit of the August order and judgment. It also moved to stay the injunction, declaratory order, judgment, and monetary relief pending resolution by the Sixth Circuit. The court granted the motion in part on October 28, allowing a stay of the judgment and monetary damages, but denying a stay of the injunctive and declaratory relief. The Sixth Circuit Denies the Appeals A Sixth Circuit panel consisting of Circuit Judges Julia Gibbons, Bernice Donald, and Richard Griffin heard oral arguments for both appeals concurrently on June 14, 2016. On October 17, 2016, Judge Gibbons delivered an opinion joined by Judge Donald and joined in part by Judge Griffin (who also filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). She first held that plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment right was violated, and that it should be subject to intermediate scrutiny. Even though it was subject to strict scrutiny in the District Court, that was a "harmless error" (this was the only part on which the dissenting in part opinion disagreed). Next, Judge Gibbons found that there was no abuse of discretion in certifying the class of people subject to the Beale Street Sweep. Although Memphis had claimed "ascertainability" was a requirement for class certification, Judge Gibbons held that, in this case, the "precise identity of each class member need not be ascertained." Finally, she addressed the City's claim that there was "insufficient evidence" that the Beale Street Sweep was the "moving force" behind the plaintiffs' arrest. She pointed out that Memphis had failed to preserve this issue procedurally, but even if it had, it would fail on the merits because there was sufficient evidence. 839 F.3d 530 (2016 WL 6068911). On October 31, 2016, Memphis petitioned for a rehearing by the Sixth Circuit en banc. The petition was denied on January 4, 2017, and the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate on January 12. The District Court Lifts the Stay of the Judgment Back in the District Court, the plaintiffs moved to lift the stay of judgment and moved for additional attorneys' fees and post-judgment interest on January 25, 2017. The Court granted the motion to lift the stay on February 28, 2017, holding that it lacked the authority to stay the mandate of the Court of Appeals. But it held off on granting the motion for supplemental fees, instead ordering Memphis to file a response. 2017 WL 782929. Memphis Appeals Yet Again, Unsuccessfully Undeterred, Memphis appealed the District Court's order on March 16, 2017. It also filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court on April 7, 2017, hoping to obtain review of the Sixth Circuit's October 17 decision affirming the District Court's judgment. The Supreme Court denied the City's petition on June 7, 2017. Memphis then voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Sixth Circuit on June 13. The Court Grants Supplemental Fees On July 31, 2017, the Court entered an order taxing costs, indicating that the parties had come to an agreement on expenses. On August 4, 2017, Judge McCalla issued an order and judgment granting attorneys' fees, enhancements of those fees, and post-judgment interest to the plaintiffs. As of April 10, 2021, there is no indication that Memphis has not adhered to the injunction or paid the fees. The case is likely not ongoing.

Summary: A police officer and ATF agent filed this class action lawsuit against the City of Memphis, Tennessee for a police practice known as the "Beale Street Sweep." This practice led to abusive behavior and unlawful arrests by the MPD in violation of the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Court granted class certification for the plaintiffs and denied summary judgment for the City. A jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs, and the Court granted monetary and injunctive relief. Memphis tried to appeal to the Sixth Circuit, which affirmed the District Court's judgment. Memphis also unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. It was subsequently ordered to pay supplemental fees to the plaintiffs.


On February 19, 2009, the plaintiff, a New York resident of South Asian ethnicity, filed a lawsuit against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the City of New York's policing practices violated the Equal Protection Clause, and for injunctive relief mandating training, supervision, and monitoring to ensure that people are selected for searches without bias. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that in 2005 the City of New York established a subway-bag search program that encouraged racial profiling by officers, because officers do not need to report any demographic data on selected persons, and because allegedly officers have total discretion to set what fraction of passengers they search and may change that number at will. The plaintiff claimed that officers selected him twenty-one times over three years, a very disproportionate number. Officers stopped his partner, who is white, only once during the same three-year period. He alleged that this was based on his race, pointing out that officers stopped him in his work scrubs, in a suit, and while he was wearing casual clothing. The complaint explained that the plaintiff had reported these searches to the Civilian Complaint Review Board ("CCRB") eight times, but nothing was done to address his complaints. On May 20, 2009, the Court entered an order of dismissal after the parties reached a settlement. On June 30, 2009, the Court entered the stipulation and order of settlement. The settlement stipulated that the City of New York would pay the plaintiff $10,000, plus $15,000 in attorneys' fees/expenses. In return, he agreed to dismiss his claims and release the defendants from any liability resulting from the events alleged in the complaint.

Summary: On February 19, 2009, the plaintiff, an occupational therapist of South Asian ethnicity, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under § 1983 against the City of New York. He alleged that officers selected him for a bag search when entering the subway a disproportionate twenty-one times over three years, on the basis of his South Asian appearance. On June 30, 2009, the parties agreed to settle for ten thousand dollars, plus reasonable attorneys' fees, expenses, and costs.