On December, 15, 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Trenton U.S District Court against Imclone Systems, Inc., on behalf of a black employee for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.). The EEOC alleged that Imclone Systems discriminated against the employee on account of his race and retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination. According to the complaint, the employee's white trainer made various racially derogatory statements, treated him more harshly, and made him perform menial duties that were not required of similarly situated white employees. Upon investigating the claims Imclone disciplined the white trainer but then demoted the employee to his previous position by discontinuing the training and eventually fired him. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including back pay, reinstatement, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr.) entered as a consent decree on May 25, 2005. Under the two-year decree the employee was entitled to receive $85,000 subject to the execution of a release, while Imclone was subject to a variety of injunctive provisions. The decree required Imclone to not engage in retaliation or racial discrimination, to post a notice about the case and its resolution, and to provide four hours of Title VII training with emphasis on racial discrimination and retaliation to all managers of the department in which the employee had worked and to the trainer who had been disciplined. The parties bore their own costs. As of this writing no further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII retaliation and racial discrimination suit against Imclone Systems, Inc., on behalf of a black employee. The EEOC alleged that Imclone Systems discriminated against the employee on account of his race and retaliated against him for complaining about the discrimination. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including back pay, reinstatement, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr.) entered as a consent decree. The two-year decree provided the employee with $85,000 and subjected Imclone to antidiscrimination, antiretaliation, training, and notice provisions. The case is now closed.


On June 30, 2005, a transgender inmate filed suit against the Idaho State Board of Corrections in the District Court for Idaho for failing to diagnose and provide treatment for her Gender Dysphoria (formerly known as Gender Identity Disorder and discussed as such in this case). Plaintiff, who was represented by National Center for Lesbian Rights and private attorneys, alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious mental health condition in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff named as additional defendants various individual medical personnel and Correctional Medical Services, Inc. a private company contracted to provide medical staffing at Idaho prisons. Plaintiff alleged that she assigned male at birth but identified as a woman and received hormone therapy prior to her incarceration. Following her incarceration, plaintiff made over 75 requests to prison officials for medical treatment for her condition. All treatment requests were denied. Plaintiff then attempted suicide and cut off her own genitals using a disposable razor, nearly bleeding to death. Over the next year, the parties engaged in discovery. On December 22, 2006, plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a court-ordered settlement conference did not result in a resolution of the case, a preliminary injunction hearing was held in July 2007. Following the hearing, the District Court (Judge Mikel Williams) ruled that plaintiff was entitled to female hormone therapy and psychotherapy pending a full trial on the merits. Judge Williams found that "gender identity disorder, left untreated, is a life-threatening mental health condition."  Gammett v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 2007 WL 2186896 (D. Idaho). Defendants' subsequent motions for reconsideration of the order granting preliminary injunctive relief to plaintiff and request to terminate the preliminary injunction were denied. Soon after, Judge Williams ordered the State to transport the plaintiff for treatment by an outside physician who specialized in the care of transgender patients and by a local psychologist.  Gammett v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 2007 WL 2684750 (D. Idaho). In September 2007, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. This motion was found moot on November 30, 2007 because of the pending Ninth Circuit appeal by a non-party. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the parties went through a voluntary in-person mediation on July 10, 2008. The parties were able to reach a tentative settlement of their dispute on May 18, 2009 following the mediation. The appeal to the Ninth Circuit was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to the stipulation of the parties on August 6, 2009. Additionally, the case in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho was dismissed in its entirety with prejudice on August 11, 2009 pursuant to the stipulation of the parties in light of their Ninth Circuit settlement agreement. The exact terms of the settlement agreement are not known, but according to a case summary by National Center for Lesbian Rights, "the case was settled to the satisfaction of all parties." The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 30, 2005, a transgender inmate filed suit against the Idaho State Board of Corrections in the District Court for Idaho for failing to diagnose and provide treatment for her gender identity disorder, a rare psychiatric condition characterized by a struggle between a person's physical sex and the person's psychological identity as male or female. Plaintiff alleged that defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious mental health condition in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleged that she was born as a biological male but identified herself as a female and received female hormone therapy prior to her incarceration for possession of a stolen car. Following her incarceration, plaintiff made over 75 requests to prison officials for medical treatment for her condition. All treatment requests were denied. Plaintiff then attempted suicide and cut off her own genitals using a disposable razor, nearly bleeding to death. Plaintiff was granted preliminary injunctive relief in July, 2007. Following an appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the parties participated in mediation which allowed them to reach a settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed in its entirety following this agreement on August 11, 2009.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by states, counties, and non-profit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. In the fall of 2019, district court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule. But after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The District Court in this case issued a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining implementation of the public charge rule. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction, but vacated its nationwide application. However, the order affirming the injunction is currently stayed pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for review from cases in the Second and Seventh Circuits. In addition, on February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. States Sue Over the Public Charge Rule On August 14, 2019, fourteen states, led by Washington, California, and New York, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The plaintiff states sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary, in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiff states sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Public Charge Rule or the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The states also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced. The case was assigned to District Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defined personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increased the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded non-cash health, nutrition, and housing benefits. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provided that if an immigration officer found that a person seeking a visa was likely to become a public charge, that person was “inadmissible.” The states alleged that the Rule redefined the term “public charge” in a manner contrary to congressional intent and agency interpretation. Since colonial times the term public charge was used to refer to someone permanently and primarily dependent on the government for subsistence. The states' complaint asserted that “the Rule departs from this original meaning by redefining a public charge as a noncitizen who receives common forms of federal and state public assistance, even in small amounts and for a short period of time.” The complaint further states that even though, on average, over 20% of the U.S. population participates in these programs each month, under the Rule, participation in these programs by legally present immigrants could block their path to citizenship. The states alleged that the Rule will deter lawfully present, legally eligible immigrants from participating in these programs, resulting in social and economic costs for the states. The states filed an amended complaint on September 5, adding an allegation that the Rule was "motivated by Administration officials' intent to discriminate on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin," in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The States Seek a Stay of the Rule and Preliminary Injunction On September 6, 2019, the plaintiff states filed a motion to stay the Rule pending final adjudication of their claims on the merits or, in the alternative, for preliminary injunction. The Rule, unless prohibited, was set to go into effect on October 15, 2019. The states asserted that the Rule should not take effect while the legal action was still pending. On September 20, 2019, defendants filed an opposition to the states’ motion, challenging the states’ standing to bring this action. Defendants also contended the Rule was long overdue after Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in 1996 to “expand the public charge ground of inadmissibility.” Defendants further asserted that the Rule simply defined the term “public charge” to reflect Congress’ legislated policy and its delegation of broad authority to the Executive Branch to set the definition. Lastly, they argued the Rule was a product of a “well-reasoned process” and was of limited scope. The District Court Grants a Nationwide Preliminary Injunction On October 11, 2019, District Judge Rosanna Malouf Peterson granted the states’ Motion for Stay Pending Judicial Review and Preliminary Injunction, finding that they “have shown that the status quo should be preserved pending resolution of this litigation.” Judge Peterson held that the plaintiff states demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their first cause of action under the APA because evidence showed that Congress already rejected key components of the Rule and that the DHS overstepped its authority. Judge Peterson also held that the states demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claim that defendants “acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in formulating the Public Charge Rule.” Furthermore, Judge Peterson held that there was a significant threat of irreparable injury, in the form of disenrollment from non-cash benefits, to the states and their residents if the Rule was to take effect as scheduled. Lastly, Judge Peterson found that “the balance of equities tips sharply in favor of the Plaintiff States” and that the threat of harm to the government was not enough to outweigh these other factors. Thus, the implementation of the Public Charge Rule was stayed in its entirety, pending entry of a final judgment in the suit, and DHS was enjoined from implementing or enforcing the Rule nationwide. 408 F.Supp.3d 1191. On October 25, 2019, defendants sought a stay of the preliminary injunction. The defendants informed the court that it would seek appellate relief if the court did not act by November 14. On October 30, 2019, the defendants appealed the Order Granting Stay and Preliminary Injunction to the Ninth Circuit. On November 15, 2019, the defendants filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, arguing that they are likely to prevail on appeal and that enjoining the implementation of the Rule will cause harm to the federal government and taxpayers. On December 3, 2019, Judge Peterson denied the Defendants' Motion for Stay of the Preliminary Injunction Pending Appeal. The Ninth Circuit Stays the Preliminary Injunction On December 5, 2019, Circuit Judges Bybee, Ikuta, and Owens of the Ninth Circuit issued an Order granting the defendants' Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, concluding that defendants have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of the equities and public interest favor a stay. Judge Bybee, writing for the court, concluded that defendants are likely to succeed on its claim that the Rule is not contrary to law, reasoning that defendants' "decision to consider the receipt of in-kind government assistance as part of its totality-of-the-circumstances test is a reasonable interpretation of the INA and does not violate the Rehabilitation Act." Judge Bybee further held that the Rule is not arbitrary and capricious; that the defendants sufficiently considered the costs and benefits of changing the Rule and adequately explained the reasons for the change to the Rule. Finally, Judge Bybee concluded that the defendants will suffer irreparable injury absent a stay because the preliminary injunctions will force defendants to grant status to those not legally entitled to it, contrary to its obligations as defined by the Rule. 944 F.3d 773. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on December 19, 2019. The Ninth Circuit panel denied this motion and petition for rehearing en banc in February 2020. The Supreme Court Stays All Nationwide Injunctions Enjoining Implementation of the Public Charge Rule On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, issued a stay on all nationwide injunctions enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. 140 S.Ct. 599. Following this decision, USCIS stated that the Rule is set to take effect on February 24, 2020. On April 17, Judge Peterson issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion to compel defendants to produce a privilege log and discovery regarding their equal protection claim. Judge Peterson found that defendants "sought and received input from other federal agencies, yet did not include those communications in the administrative record." Moreover, Judge Peterson concluded that "[g]iven the inquiry required to determine whether the relevant decisionmakers manifested a discriminatory purpose, the Court finds that reasonable discovery beyond the administrative record is appropriate." The defendants moved to stay the order on May 5. Judge Peterson denied the stay in part on May 13, though he granted them extended time to produce the privilege log. Defendants Move to Dismiss; District Court Mostly Denies On May 22, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Defendants asserted that the amended complaint should be dismissed in light of the Ninth Circuit's "opinion concluding that the Rule falls well within the Executive Branch’s discretion" under the INA and is not arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, defendants asserted that plaintiffs' claims are not justiciable and that "plaintiffs' allegations do not suggest that DHS issued the Rule 'because of' any alleged 'adverse effects upon an identifiable' racial or ethnic group." Judge Peterson granted the motion in part on September 14, 2020, dismissing the plaintiffs' ultra vires claim with leave to amend by October 16 because it lacked "plausible and detailed allegations that DHS acted outside of its legal authority." Judge Peterson then denied dismissal of the APA claims because all the Court had already ruled that were likely to succeed on the merits. She also held that the statements made by high-level officials combined with the acknowledgement of a discriminatory effect were sufficient grounds for denying dismissal of the equal protection claim. Defendants moved for reconsideration of the motion to dismiss on October 8. Citing a Ninth Circuit ruling decided on the same day as Judge Peterson's order, Ramos v. Wolf (975 F.3d 872), defendants argued that the controlling law for dismissal of equal protection claims had changed. Ninth Circuit Affirms the Preliminary Injunction, But Vacates Nationwide Application On September 15, 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard arguments for the district court's stayed preliminary injunction with a new panel of judges (Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder, William Fletcher, and Lawrence VanDyke). On December 2, 2020, citing recent other circuit court decisions, it issued an order and a 2-1 opinion affirming the preliminary injunction but vacating the nationwide application of it. The Court also affirmed the preliminary injunction of a related case, State of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 981 F.3d 742. Writing for the majority, Judge Schroeder first concluded that the plaintiff states had standing because they were suffering financial harm from immigrants shifting to state and local aid. Next, she found that the states demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Rule's definition of public charge was inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statute and was arbitrary and capricious. She also found that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the plaintiff states. Finally, she determined that the nationwide injunction was not appropriate because identical injunctions had been and were still being litigated in other federal district and circuit courts. Judge VanDyke dissented from the majority's analysis for the same reasons as the December 5, 2019 decision, citing the Supreme Court's stays from January, a dissenting opinion from a similar ruling in the Seventh Circuit (962 F.3d 208), and a contrary ruling from the Fourth Circuit (971 F.3d 220). On January 20, 2021, the Ninth Circuit granted a request by the government to stay its December 2, 2020 order affirming the preliminary injunctions, pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions for review from the Second and Seventh Circuits. The new public charge rule was to remain in effect until the Supreme Court ruled on the petitions. On January 22, 2021, the defendants filed a petition to the Supreme Court for review of the preliminary injunction. On February 1, 2021, Judge Peterson denied the government's motion to reconsider the Court's September 14 order granting in part and denying in part its motion to dismiss. The Court found that, even in light of the Ramos decision, there was sufficient evidence here of discriminatory intent to prevent dismissal. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. The following day, the government notified the Court that it would be engaging in discussion with the plaintiff states over how this would impact litigation. On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide from (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as similar petitions for the Ninth (City and County of San Francisco v. USCIS) and Second (New York v. DHS) Circuits. On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Ninth Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. On March 11, Judge Peterson stayed proceedings until April 12, 2021. On April 9, 2021 the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to deny the motion to intervene without an opinion. 2021 WL 1310846. However, Judge Vandyke wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the Biden administration was now colluding with the plaintiffs in the Public Charge lawsuits, making their interests at odds with the interests of the states who were seeking to intervene. He explained that this case was clearly still worth pursuing, since it had sufficient merit to warrant Supreme Court review and the government was circumventing APA requirements. Moreover, even though the Rule had been vacated, there was still a chance the Supreme Court may reverse that decision, making this lawsuit not yet moot. As of April 15, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The parties are currently conferring on how this will impact litigation. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In August of 2019, fourteen states filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The DHS' Public Charge Rule, enacted in August of 2019, increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. It is alleged that the Public Charge Rule will result in harm to the Plaintiff States and its residents because it will deter legal residents from enrolling in basic benefit programs, out of fear of being determined a "public charge," and thus inadmissible for citizenship. District Court Judge Rosanna Peterson granted the Plaintiff States' Motion to Stay Pending Judicial Review and Preliminary Injunction, resulting in the Rule not being implemented as planned. The Ninth Circuit then stayed the lower courts order. The preliminary injunction was subsequently affirmed in the Ninth Circuit in December 2020. However, the order was stayed a few weeks later, leaving the stay of the preliminary injunction in effect. Currently, the injunction is stayed pending petitions to the Supreme Court. The Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021 and vacated nationwide. As of April 15, 2021, the case is ongoing.


According to the press release issued by the Justice Department regarding this case, the facts were as follows: On December 7, 2007, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an investigation into the care and treatment of mental health patients at Kings County Hospital Center (KCHC)'s Behavioral Health Service (BHS). "The investigation uncovered systemic deficiencies that violated the constitutional and civil rights of patients with psychiatric disabilities. These violations included failure to protect patients from harm, failure to treat the psychiatric disabilities of patients, the use of drugs to sedate rather than treat patients, failure to provide adequate and individualized discharge planning and follow-up services, falsification of patient medical records, and failure to respond promptly to medical emergencies." These violations and others contributed to the death of at least one patient during the course of the investigation. The DOJ notified the defendants of their findings in a letter on January 30, 2009. The parties spent a year negotiating an agreement, with the understanding that that DOJ would file a lawsuit. The suit and the settlement were then filed together. The purpose of this was to memorialize the suit and allow the court to enforce the settlement. On January 7, 2010, the U.S. filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and the Kings County Hospital Center in Brooklyn, New York under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act and the Violent Crime and Law Enforcement Act. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief to improve conditions at KCHC and remedy the conduct alleged in the findings letter. The court assigned District Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto to the case. On January 8, 2010, the court issued a consent judgment. The judgment stated that in entering into the agreement, the defendants did not admit any violation of federal law, and that the agreement was not to be used as evidence of their liability in other legal proceedings. The agreement set out minimum remedial measures for the defendants to implement, including provisions for protection from harm, mental health care, behavioral management, medical and nursing care, quality assurance, fire and life safety, discharge and aftercare planning, KCHC hospital policies, and staff training and policy manuals and accountability. The agreement stated that the defendants would implement the necessary reforms immediately. It stipulated that the defendants appoint a Settlement Agreement Coordinator at KCHC to oversee compliance with the agreement, who would provide the DOJ with reports regarding compliance. Within 45 days of the consent judgment, the defendants would provide a plan for implementation. The agreement set out a termination date five years out, so long as the United States certified that the defendants had complied with all the provisions of the agreement for a year prior to termination. On February 23, 2010, the defendants alerted the Court that they had created a plan. The defendants filed an amended plan on December 16, 2010. The plaintiff sent expert compliance teams to evaluate KCHC's progress. These reports were filed twice a year for the first three years. The letter of December 23, 2013 noted some areas for improvement in most of the areas covered in the agreement. After the December 23 visit, the court ordered the defendant to provide a plan to comply with correcting the noted deficiencies. A similar letter was sent in July of 2014, and the court sent another order to the defendant requesting a plan to comply. The biannual visits resumed from 2014 to 2016. On January 10, 2017, the expert compliance team filed a report stating that the defendant had maintained compliance for one year, and requested that the case be closed. Judge Matsumoto closed the case on January 17, 2017.

Summary: In 2007, the DOJ opened an investigation of Kings County Hospital Center’s mental health facilities. After an on-site review, the DOJ issued a findings letter in 2008 concluding that the facilities were deficient in several areas including protection from harm, mental health care, medical care, quality assurance, and safety. The State of New York, the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, and KCHC worked with the DOJ to come up with an agreement to address the issues at KCHC. The DOJ filed a complaint in 2010 and a consent judgment was filed the following day with the terms of the agreement. KCHC was monitored by compliance experts twice a year until 2016. In 2017, the compliance team alerted the court that KCHC had been in compliance for one year, and requested that the case be closed. The case was subsequently closed.


On October, 17, 2017, eight residents of Louisiana who were victims of or witnesses to crimes filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, alleging that they had been jailed or threatened with jail by prosecutors in hopes of ensuring their testimony in court. They sued the District Attorney of Orleans Parish along with several assistant district attorneys under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and Civil Rights Corps, sought injunctive and monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Jane Triche Milazzo. The plaintiffs claimed that, pursuant to official policies, practices, and customs of the defendant Orleans Parish District Attorney, prosecutors routinely issued their own fabricated subpoenas, without any judicial approval or oversight, in order to coerce victims and witnesses into submitting to interrogations by prosecutors outside of court. According to the plaintiffs, if this unlawful coercion did not succeed, the defendants unlawfully arrested victims and witnesses and ensured that they would languish in jail by obtaining high secured money bonds. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ use of extrajudicial and unlawful means to coerce, arrest, and imprison crime victims and witnesses violated the plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and were tortious offenses for fraud and abuse of process under Lousianna state law. The plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint on December 21, 2017, and they filed their second amended complain on January 25, 2018. In the second amended complaint, the plaintiffs added one plaintiff and two defendants to the case. On March 1, 2018, the defendants together filed a joint motion to dismiss all claims against them, arguing that prosecutors were protected by absolute immunity with respect to actions taken as advocates of the state and by qualified immunity with respect to their official actions. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion on February 28, 2019. 372 F. Supp. 3d 389. The court first addressed the defendants’ absolute immunity arguments. The court determined that the defendants did not have absolute immunity for creating or distributing fake subpoenas to the plaintiffs because the subpoenas were not created in the prosecutors’ role of acting as advocate of the state. Similarly, the claims that the defendants failed to supervise or intervene in the creation of subpoenas would not be dismissed because the employees were not immune from using the fake subpoenas. However, the court found that absolute immunity protected prosecutors from claims of threats of imprisonment against the plaintiffs because the defendants acted within the bounds of their roles as advocates for the state. Next, the court evaluated the defendants’ qualified immunity claims with respect to the various constitutional claims raised by the plaintiffs. First, the court granted the defendants qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ First Amendment compelled speech and retaliation claims. The court found the plaintiffs failed to establish that witnesses possess a clearly established First Amendment right to refuse to speak to prosecutors about active criminal cases. The court also granted the defendants qualified immunity as to the Fourth Amendment unlawful seizure claims because the plaintiffs failed to establish that they had been unlawfully seized. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs needed to show they submitted to the assertion of authority. Two of the plaintiffs had not met with the prosecutors at all, so the court found they had acted in defiance, not in submission, of the defendants’ authority. The plaintiff who ultimately did meet with the defendants did so after receiving both the fake subpoena and a lawful court order, but still did not specify that the plaintiff had unlawfully submitted. Finally, the court granted the defendants qualified immunity as to the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claims because the plaintiffs did not provide any cases that suggest the defendants violated a clearly established constitutional right. On March 12, 2019, the defendants appealed the court’s order partially dismissing the motion to dismiss. Two days later, on March 14, the defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings in the district court until the Fifth Circuit ruled on the defendants' appeal. The plaintiffs jointly filed their opposition to defendants' motion to stay on April 2, 2019. Plaintiffs argued that, since the defendants' appeal did not contain a central issue or the bulk of plaintiffs' complaint, the court should allow the suit to proceed on all unappealable claims. The court ordered the defendants to file a brief specifying which elements of the court's February 28 order were being appealed to the Fifth Circuit. Defendants submitted this brief on May 2, 2019. In this brief, the defendants argued that, because of the complexities of the case and the intertwined nature of the issues, most of the claims in the case were encompassed within the appeal. Defendants clarified that they were appealing the partial denials of absolute immunity as well as the court's decision to allow multiple claims to move forward. On July 2, 2019, the court denied the defendants' stay motion. 397 F. Supp. 3d 840. While Judge Milazzo recognized that the defendants were entitled to an appeal of the order denying absolute immunity in part, she ruled that the appealable issue was not sufficient to divest the court of jurisdiction to proceed on plaintiffs' remaining claims. Defendants jointly filed their answer on July 16, 2019. In addition to responding to plaintiff's claims, defendants advanced eleven affirmative defenses. Five of these defenses were based on various immunity claims. On September 6, 2019, plaintiffs jointly filed a motion for leave to file a third amended complaint. Plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint by withdrawing the individual damages claims against defendants Cannizzaro, Martin, and Pipes based on failure to supervise and failure to intervene. Defendants, in their individual capacities, filed a motion for partial summary judgment on November 14, 2019 to dismiss all requests for injunctive relief filed against them on the grounds that all of the criminal cases in which the plaintiffs were victims or witnesses had been resolved. The following month, the District Attorney and two Supervising Prosecutors filed a motion to dismiss the constitutional damages claims against them on the grounds of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs agreed that, based on the court's fact-finding until this point, it would be appropriate to grant qualified immunity. The court dismissed these claims on December 31, 2019. On April 21, 2020, the Fifth Circuit (Judges Catharina Haynes, Jennifer W. Elrod, and Leslie H. Southwick) ruled on defendants' appeal from March 2019 denying their motion to dismiss. 956 F.3d 773. The Fifth Circuit rejected defendants' claim that they were entitled to absolute immunity for plaintiffs' subpoena-related state-law claims. The court also rejected defendants' claim that plaintiffs' remaining claims should be dismissed on the merits. Back in the district court, Judge Milazzo granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief on June 8, 2020. 2020 WL 3047453. Plaintiffs partially opposed defendants' motion and sought to preserve the injunctive relief claims against the District Attorney for retaliation prohibited by the First Amendment and against the Supervising Prosecutors for failure to supervise prosecutors and for substantive due process violations arising out of the creation of fake subpoenas. The court found insufficient evidence to support those claims and granted the defendants' motion in its entirety. Following this order, the only remaining claims against the defendants were state law tort claims for fraud and abuse of process. A few weeks later, the Court also dismissed claims against the District Attorney and four of the prosecutors. The defendants filed a motion for separate trials on June 16, 2020. After oral argument, the court denied this motion. 2020 WL 4038979. Plaintiffs and Defendants held a formal settlement conference on August 20, 2020. The parties agreed on a schedule and began series of settlement discussions. Over the course of these discussions, various individual defendants filed motions for summary judgment. As of February 5, 2021, five plaintiffs had privately settled their claims for monetary damages and voluntarily dismissed their claims. Three plaintiffs remained. Following a settlement, on March 3, 2021, plaintiff Lazonia Baham withdrew her claims against the individual defendants but maintained the claims against the District Attorney in his official capacity. On March 11, 2021, plaintiff Tiffany LaCroix filed for summary judgment against one of the individual defendants and that defendant and two other individual defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against LaCroix’s claims. While discovery was originally set to be completed in June 2021, the remaining plaintiffs filed a motion on June 15, 2021, to compel the defendants to produce documents from the Orleans Parish District Attorney criminal case files. Aside from LaCroix and Baham’s claims, only Renata Singleton’s claims against the District Attorney in his official capacity and two individual defendants are pending as of June 15, 2021.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by eight crime victims and witnesses who were threatened, arrested, and imprisoned in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs alleged that the District Attorney of Orleans Parish and many agents of the state violated the plaintiffs' First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by creating and distributing doctored subpoenas to coerce them into submitting to interrogations. Five of the eight plaintiffs have settled their claims for monetary damages. The remaining three continue discovery on their way to trial as of June 15, 2021. Of the remaining three plaintiffs, one has settled against the individual defendants but maintains her claims against the DA. The other two have pending claims against both the DA in his official capacity and assistant DAs in their individual capacities.


On April 12, 2006, the Savannah-Chatham County Fair Housing Council, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act 42 U.S.C. §3604(f)(3)(C), against the Defendants, owners, operators, designers, homeowners association, and builders of two condominium developments, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, claimed the Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of disability in its design, construction, sale and operation of the two multi-family housing developments. The Plaintiff sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief. On September 26, 2008, the United States Department of Justice filed its own case against the same defendants, adding as defendants an engineering firm, a construction firm, and a property owners association, in the same court. The United States similarly claimed the Defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of disability in the design, construction, sale and operation of the covered multi-family dwellings and asked the Court for the same relief as the Savannah-Chatham County Fair Housing Council, Inc. On November 11, 2008, the two cases were consolidated for all purposes. Plaintiffs claim that the multi-family dwellings were designed, built and operated in such a way as to be inaccessible to persons with disabilities in their common and public use areas, passage in and out of the premises, and in the interiors of the units, all in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (the "Fair Housing Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 - 3619. At some point, several of the Defendants went out of business. During the last two weeks of June 2011, the Court (Judge William T. Moore) approved five-year Partial Consent Orders between the United States and these Defendants, requiring Defendants to notify the Department of Justice within 15 days of re-entering the business of designing and constructing multi-family house. On June 13, 2011, the Court entered a Consent Order between the United States and the designers. On June 22, 2011, the Court entered a Consent Order between the Plaintiffs and the construction company. On June 30, 2011, the Court entered a Consent Order between the Plaintiffs and the real estate group, and on July 5, 2011, the Court entered a Consent Order between SCFHC and other individual defendants. In the orders, these Defendants were not required to pay any money for retrofits or penalties, due to their insolvency. As of October 26, 2011, the civil engineering firm was the only original defendant still operating as a viable entity, but the ownership and operation of the two housing developments had been transferred to new entities. These entities were brought into the lawsuits as necessary parties. On October 26, 2011, after five years of litigation and negotiation, the plaintiffs entered and the Court approved a Consent Order between the plaintiffs, the engineering firm and the current owner/operators. The Decree required extensive retrofits to the subject properties' common areas and to the 194 ground-floor units covered by the Fair Housing Act, along with training and education requirements, strict time frames, and monitoring by an independent inspector. The Decree also provided for a $227,000 "retrofit" fund, a $50,000 settlement fund, and $158,375.00 in damages, including attorney fees to the fair housing council. The Consent Order extended to 2014. On December 24, 2014, the Defendants entered a final report claiming compliance with the Consent Order and asking the court to dismiss the case with prejudice. The court never issued an order official closing the case, but there has been no further activity as of the writing of this summary on January 31, 2018. The case is presumably now closed.

Summary: This fair housing case was brought against two housing developments in 2006 in federal court in Georgia, first by a local fair housing council, then consolidated with a case brought against the same and additional defendants by the United States. The subect properties had been designed, and built such that their common use areas, and their 194 ground floor units were inaccessible to persons with disabilities. Everyone involved in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of the developments were named as defendants, though by the end of the litigation, only the engineeering firm remained in business. The new owners and the engineers entered a Consent Decree with the Plaintiff to retrofit the inaccessible areas and to correct their policies concerning modification and construction of covered multi-family dwellings. The Decree also provided for a $227,000 "retrofit" fund, a $50,000 settlement fund, and $158,375.00 in damages, including attorney fees, to the fair housing council.


On July 13, 2004, the Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against First American Bank under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The DOJ alleged that the bank engaged in a practice called redlining by unlawfully failing to market and provide its lending products and services on an equal basis to minority neighborhoods in Chicago and Kankakee, Illinois. The DOJ specifically alleged that First American Bank intentionally failed to serve heavily African-American and Hispanic communities. The parties entered a settlement agreement that was approved by the court (Judge Der−Yeghiayan) on July 16, 2004. Under the settlement agreement terms, First American Bank is enjoined from engaging in any practice which discriminates on the basis of race, color, or national origin in any aspect of a residential real estate-related or credit transaction. First American Bank agreed to open four new branch offices in minority communities within a three year-term. First American Bank will also invest $5 million in a special financing program for home mortgage lending, $400,000 in marketing and outreach, and $300,000 in consumer education and financial literacy programs. The order is designed to last five years. However, both parties agreed that if the Defendant-lender fulfilled all requirements of the order within four years, it has the option to terminate the order. On February 13, 2009, both parties filed an agreement to terminate the consent order, which was agreed to by the court (Judge Der−Yeghiayan) on February 19, 2009. Similar cases brought forth by the Department of Justice against lenders due to allegations of redlining include United States v. Centier Bank, United States v. Citizens Republic Bancorp, Inc., and United States v. Old Kent Financial Corporation.

Summary: On July 13, 2004, the Department of Justice filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against First American Bank under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691. The DOJ specifically alleged that First American Bank intentionally failed to serve heavily African-American and Hispanic communities. The parties entered into a settlement agreement in 2009.


On August 22, 2012, Triune Health Group, Inc. filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against the US Department of Health and Human Services, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the Jubilee Campaign the Thomas More Society and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs under the First Amendment and state constitutional laws. On January 3, 2013, Judge Amy St. Eve granted a preliminary injunction stopping HHS from enforcing the contraception mandate until the court determined the merits of the plaintiffs' case and if further injunctive relief was needed. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Seventh Circuit (No. 13-1478). On March 14, 2013, Seventh Circuit Judge John Tinder stayed the appeal pending resolution of the appeal in a related case, Korte v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. On April 2, 2013, the District Court stayed its proceedings in this case until the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in Korte and Grote v. Sebelius. On September 4, 2014, the defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal of the preliminary injunction following the Supreme Court's ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. Shortly thereafter, the defendants' proposed a final injunction order in the District Court enjoining the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement against the plaintiffs. On July 22, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a response to this proposed order, objecting that the defendants' proposed order did not protect their religious liberty as thoroughly as the preliminary injunction had, and that the defendants had not sought their input in crafting the new proposed final order. The plaintiffs asked that the court issue a final injunction consistent with the preliminary injunction's broad exemption of the plaintiffs from providing any contraceptives or other health services they found morally objectionable. On March 30, 2016, Judge Andrea Wood denied the defendants' motion to enter a final injunction and dismiss the suit. The court requested that the parties brief several remaining issues, including whether the case would be stayed pending further litigation in other cases addressing the scope of the Hobby Lobby decision, and whether the plaintiffs' claims were mooted by new changes to the ACA regulations. On May 23, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting that the court issue "forceful guidance" to the defendants, directing them to agree to a final order with broad protections for their religious liberties. The defendants replied with a motion to dismiss on December 1, 2017, arguing their new regulations provided adequate procedures for the plaintiffs to maintain exemptions from contraceptive care requirements. The plaintiffs' counsel subsequently failed to appear for a scheduled hearing on May 10, 2018. The plaintiffs were then granted an extension to file a response to the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court finally granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on March 22, 2019. After the judgment was entered, the plaintiffs filed for an extension to file a fee petition on June 26, 2019. Plaintiffs counsel then failed to appear at two status conferences, one on August 7 and one on September 4. The plaintiff then filed another extension to file a fee petition as well as an amendment to their extension. Judge Wood took the motions under advisement but cancelled the upcoming motion hearing on December 11, 2019. Since then, there have been no additional entries in the docket and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: On August 22, 2012, Triune Health Group, Inc. and its owners filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against the Federal Government, contending that mandatory contraception coverage under the Affordable Care Act violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 3, 2013, Judge Amy St. Eve granted plaintiffs a preliminary injunction stopping the Federal Government from enforcing the contraception mandate. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the parties attempted to settle on language for a permanent injunction. This case is ongoing.


This case challenges section 177(b) of the Alabama Constitution, which disenfranchises individuals with convictions of felonies "involving moral turpitude." In 1985, the Supreme Court that the 1901 drafters of the Alabama disenfranchisement provision specifically selected the vague and arbitrary "moral turpitude" standard in order to disenfranchise blacks. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985). The provision was therefore unconstitutional and inoperative. But in 1996, Alabama put the exclusion back into its Constitution (though this time limiting it to felony convictions). The scope of the rule is unclear; in 2005, the state attorney general issued an opinion that did little to correct the ambiguity. A crime of “moral turpitude,” he wrote, is “an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general.” Whether to allow someone with a felony conviction to register to vote is up to each county's registrar. This lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, on September 26, 2016, to challenge the exclusion. The plaintiffs filed on behalf of a putative class of unregistered persons otherwise eligible to register to vote in Alabama who were, or who might be in the future, denied the right to vote because of their felony conviction. They were represented by a large consortium of lawyers, including private counsel in Alabama and South Carolina, Public Citizen, the Campaign Legal Center, the Washington DC office of Jenner & Block, voting rights expert and Stanford Professor Pam Karlan, and Georgetown Law's Institute for Public Representation. The defendant was the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama's exclusionary law and practices were racially discriminatory in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act; and that it abridged the fundamental right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment (fundamental rights equal protection doctrine), the First Amendment, Due Process, and the Ex Post Facto Clause, among other claims. The plaintiffs also complained that the provisions of Alabama law that allowed convicted felons to petition for restoration of their voting rights if they paid any ordered restitution constituted a poll tax. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. The case was assigned to Chief Judge William Keith Watkins. On November 16, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. While the motion to dismiss was pending, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on June 30, 2017. The plaintiffs relied on the fact that on May 25, 2017 the Governor signed the Felony Voter Disqualification Act, House Bill 282 (HB 282), which sought "to put an end to this unconstitutional system by establishing a comprehensive list of crimes that 'involve moral turpitude.'" The plaintiffs argued that HB 282 could enfranchise thousands of eligible voters currently denied the right to vote. As such, the plaintiffs asked the court to compel the defendant to implement HB 282, arguing that the defendant had not taken "any meaningful action to implement HB 282 and advise voters of their rights, including publicizing the new eligibility requirements on the Secretary of State’s website, updating voter registration forms, or issuing guidance to registrars." The court denied the preliminary injunction on July 28, 2017. The court held that HB 282 clarified whether convictions involved moral turpitude, mooting the plaintiffs' legal challenge of the vagueness § 177(b) and entitling the defendant to a rebuttable presumption that it would not resume unconstitutional activities. Further, the court held that the requested relief was unlike the relief sought in the lawsuit. The court found that the original lawsuit was not about HB 282, nor were the plaintiffs challenging any of HB 282's provisions as unconstitutional. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118606. Then, on September 28, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant' motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' contentions that Alabama law denied black voters equal opportunity to participate in the political process; denied plaintiffs franchise without a compelling state interest; restricted free speech and association, burdened the right to; disqualified voters without due process; was otherwise vague, arbitrary, and irrational; unconstitutionally imposed a poll tax by requiring plaintiffs to pay any ordered restitution; and disproportionately disenfranchised black citizens compared to white citizens with prior disqualifying convictions. The court allowed claims to stand that Alabama law was racially discriminatory; created retroactive punishment; imposed cruel and unusual punishment; and violated equal protection and required higher scrutiny as to the constitutionality of requiring convicted felons to pay ordered restitution as a condition of re-enfranchisement. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211512. On March 1, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint. This complaint asserted additional claims based on events that post-dated the original complaint. In response, the defendant filed a renewed motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment, as well as a motion to dismiss supplemental complaint on March 15, 2018. On April 5, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the case as a class action on May 10, 2018. This case was reassigned to Judge Emily C. Marks on August 8, 2018. The court denied the defendant' renewed motion to dismiss on Dec. 3, 2019. Stating that a renewed motion to dismiss is "generally granted only if there is newly-discovered evidence or a manifest error of law or fact," the court found that the defendant had established neither. On the same day, the court denied the plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment, finding the claim at issue--an allegation that the state form and the instructions for the federal form violate the NVRA because the forms must include eligibility information (count 18 of the complaint)--to be moot. For the same reason, the court granted in part the motion to dismiss the supplemental complaint. 428 F.Supp.3d 1296. On Jan. 24, 2020, the court denied the motion for class certification, holding that the proposed class was insufficiently ascertainable and that use of the class action device was not necessary to adjudicate the claim. 2020 WL 411985. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on May 27, 2020. Stating that the 11th Circuit decision about Florida felony enfranchisement, Jones v. Desantis, 950 F.3d 795 (11th Cir. 2020), squarely controls this case, the plaintiffs claimed that they are likely to succeed on their Equal Protection wealth discrimination claim. (For more on Jones v. Desantis see its Clearinghouse case summary. Absent the court’s order “enjoining the Board from enforcing the legal financial obligations requirement against those who are genuinely unable to pay”, plaintiffs here claimed, “citizens like plaintiffs ...who cannot afford to pay their legal financial obligations in full before the upcoming elections will suffer irreparable injury because they are unconstitutionally denied their right to vote on the basis of wealth.” This case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a longstanding action challenging Alabama's voting disqualification of people convicted of crimes of "moral turpitude." The case is in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, assigned to Chief Judge William Keith Watkins. Class certification has been denied, and some of the claims dismissed. The plaintiffs sought a motion for preliminary injunction, and this motion is pending.


On April 5, 2019, the United States House of Representatives, represented by their general counsel, filed this lawsuit against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Department of the Treasury, the Acting Secretary of the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior, and the Department of the Interior. The House claimed that the defendants violated the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Article 1, § 9, clause 7 of the Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act, for allocating $8.1 billion to build the border wall dividing the United States and Mexico when Congress had only approved $1.375 billion for barrier construction. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the Trump Administration from transferring non-Congressionally approved funds to fund the border wall. The suit was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and was presided over by Judge Trevor McFadden. On April 23, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, but the court denied their motion on June 3, 2019, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 379 F.Supp.3d 8. The plaintiffs appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit Court on June 10, 2019. Subsequently, the defendants provided notice to the plaintiffs and the court that they would be authorizing the funds necessary to continue the construction of the border wall. The case remains active in the D.C. Circuit Court under docket number 19-5176. The docket was last updated on November 8, 2019.

Summary: On April 5, 2019, the U.S. House of Representatives filed suit against the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of the Interior, and their respective departments, for allocating more funds than they were approved in order to build the Trump Administration's border wall. The House of Representatives sought a preliminary injunction but this was denied by the D.C. District Court and on appeal. The case continues in the appeals court and is still active as of November 8, 2019.


On April 23, 2003, nine plaintiffs, acting through private attorneys, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the strip search policy of the City and County of San Francisco ("CCSF"). Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that, under CCSF policy, all prisoners who were placed in the general jail population at the CCSF's jails were subjected to strip and visual body cavity searches, with those refusing to consent being placed naked in "cold rooms." Plaintiffs complained that this policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as several provisions of California state law. Although Defendants generally denied the allegations, the policy at issue was discontinued by the Sheriff on January 21, 2004. On June 10, 2004, the District Court certified a plaintiff class consisting of all persons who were arrested "on any charge not involving weapons, controlled substances, or a charge of violence, and not involving a violation of parole or a violation of probation (where consent to search is a condition of such probation), and who were subjected to a blanket visual body cavity strip search by defendants before arraignment at a San Francisco County jail facility without any individualized reasonable suspicion that they were concealing contraband." Discovery followed and the Court was called upon to resolve several discovery disputes. See Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 2003 WL 23857823 (N.D.Cal. Oct 27, 2003); Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 2005 WL 40072 (N.D.Cal. Jan 05, 2005). On June 24, 2005, Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment with respect to the issue of whether the Sheriff's blanket policy of subjecting certain categories of plaintiff-arrestees to pre-arraignment strip searches, violated the Fourth Amendment. Defendants opposed Plaintiffs' motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, in part, that the Sheriff was entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. The District Court issued a September 22, 2005 Memorandum and Order, which it subsequently amended on February 23, 2006, in order to grant in part and deny in part both parties' motions for summary judgment. Specifically, the Court found that Defendants' former blanket policy of conducting strip searches without regard to individualized suspicion was unconstitutional as applied to members of the plaintiff-class who were (a) classified for housing in the general jail population; (b) probation violators for whom consent to search was not a condition of probation; or (c) certain categories of safety-cell detainees. With regard to the Defendants' former policy of strip searching (a) arrestees with a criminal history relating to drugs, weapons or violence; (b) arrestees who were transferred to or from other jurisdictions; or (c) certain other types of safety-cell detainees, however, the Court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that such searches were justified under the reasonable suspicion standard. The court also granted the Sheriff's motion for qualified immunity with regard to safety cell searches, criminal history searches, and consent searches but denied the motion with regard to classification searches. The Court also dismissed the claims of named plaintiffs Jonah Zern and Marcie Corneau, because it determined that the violent nature of their crimes provided reasonable suspicion for their strip searches. Bull v. City & County of San Francisco, 2006 WL 449148 (N.D.Cal. Feb 23, 2006). The defendants filed an appeal, but lost in the 9th Circuit in an opinion by Circuit Judge Sydney Thomas. 539 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008). Judge Tallman dissented; Judge Ikuta concurred, noting his "grave concern" that the holding, though compelled by prior 9th Circuit case law, stood in tension with Supreme Court precedent and might endanger the safety of people in the jail system subject to harm by jail contraband. On a petition for rehearing, the Court vacated the panel's decision and set the case for reargument before 11 judges. 558 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2009). Argument occurred in March 2009. On February 9, 2010, the 9th Circuit issued its opinion en banc, holding that the San Francisco strip search policy was reasonable and did not violate the class members' Fourth Amendment rights. The case was held in abeyance, pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. County of Burlington (posted in the Clearinghouse as JC-NJ-0022.) On April 2, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court in Florence held that a blanket policy of strip searching detainees does not violate the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, whether or not there is reasonable suspicion that the detainee is concealing contraband, and regardless of the severity of the charges under which he or she is being held. Florence v. Burlington County, 132 S.Ct. 1510 (2012). In their April 19th Joint Case Management Statement, the parties debated the scope of this decision's impact on the present case. After a status conference, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero for settlement on April 20, 2012. On June 14, 2012, the Court approved a stipulation to extend the plaintiff's deadline for filing a motion to redefine the class until September 15, 2012. After deciding that the Supreme Court's decision in Florence was not applicable to this case, the parties settled, and on June 28, 2013, the Court dismissed the case and approved the settlement agreement. The agreement required defendants to pay $450,000 to plaintiffs and to pay for the cost of notifying the class of the dismissal. Though one member of the class objected to the settlement, as of January 31, 2018, there has been no other activity after the dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2003, plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that San Francisco's jail strip-search policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as several provisions of California state law. In February 2010, the 9th Circuit, in an en banc decision, upheld the strip search policy. The case was held in abeyance, pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Florence v. County of Burlington - in that case, the Supreme Court upheld the strip search policy. However, the parties in this case decided that the Florence decision was not applicable to this case, and on June 28, 2013, the Court approved their settlement agreement that required the defendants to pay to plaintiffs $450,000 plus the cost of notifying the class of dismissal.


On November 9, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Washington under the Declaratory Judgment Act and § 1983 against Chelan County Sheriff's Office. Represented by the Human Rights Defense Center and private counsel, PLN noted that specific individuals had asked to receive PLN materials and had been denied them by the Sheriff's Office once the books and publications had arrived. There was no opportunity for PLN to appeal these decisions or to receive further information about them. PLN claimed that their right to freedom of expression had been denied as well as their right to due process once the books were returned. The plaintiff requested declaratory relief, a preliminary and permanent injunction, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On December 1, 2011, the District Court Judge approved a consent decree submitted by the parties, who agreed that defendants' mail policy was a violation of the First Amendment and due process. The order enjoined the defendants from rejecting books simply based on whether they were subscriptions or paperback books and without due process notice of rejection. The defendants were also ordered to pay $180,000 in damages, fees, and costs. The parties agreed to a permanent injunction and nothing has been filed in this case since December 1, 2011.

Summary: On November 9, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Washington against Chelan County and the Chelan County Sheriff's Office. Planitiffs noted specific individuals that had asked to receive PLN materials and had been denied by the Sheriff's Office, thus violating PLN's right to freedom of expression and due process. On December 1, 2011, the District Court Judge ordered in a consent decree requiring defendants to change their mail policy so it was no longer violating righst to free speech and due process. The defendants were also ordered to pay $180,000 in damages.


On December 20, 2012, following a two-year investigation, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The US sued the Sheriff of Alamance County, North Carolina. The US, represented by the Department of Justice, brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and asked the court for declaratory judgment that the Alamance County Sheriff's Office had engaged in conduct infringing rights protected by the United States Constitution. The United States additionally requested an order that the Sheriff's Office (1) cease its unlawful conduct, (2) implement remedial policies to prevent unlawful conduct, and (3) adopt systems to identify and correct unlawful conduct. (Prior to this action and as part of its investigation, the United States filed a complaint against Alamance County and Sheriff Johnson, seeking a declaration that North Carolina Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2 does not prohibit the United States from conducting interviews with current and former Sheriff's Office personnel without Defendants' counsel present. While the case was pending, the United States continued and concluded its investigation and found that the Sheriff's Office intentionally and illegally discriminates against Latinos in Alamance County on the basis of their ethnicity. The Court [Judge Thomas D. Schroeder] dismissed the case with prejudice upon the United States' subsequent unopposed motion to dismiss.) In its complaint, the United States alleged that Sheriff Johnson orders enforcement activities specifically targeting Latinos, that he and the Sheriff's Office make and tolerate racially-biased statements, and that the Sheriff's Office targets Latinos in traffic stops that are often done absent reasonable suspicion. The Sheriff's Office was further accused of arresting Latinos for traffic violations where others similarly situated receive citations or warnings; stopping Latinos at checkpoints, which disproportionately set up in Latino neighborhoods, while allowing others similarly situated to proceed; and, finally, notifying ICE investigators of Latino arrestees, though not of others similarly situated. The Sheriff's Office, in sum, was charged with having deficient policies, training, and oversight, resulting in discriminatory enforcement against Latinos. The U.S. claimed such activities violated the Fourth Amendment bar on unreasonable seizures and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 20, 2013, the Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the Court (Judge Schroeder) denied on April 29, 2013, finding res judicata as to the Rule 4.2 case did not apply and holding a single change in the Sheriff's Office's practices (brought about by the Department of Homeland Security's termination of Sheriff Johnson's authority to make referrals to ICE) did not make moot the United States' claims. 2013 WL 12136503. Discovery in the case began in March 2013. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on March 2, 2013, and the United States filed a cross-motion for summary judgment the following day. On June 20, 2014, the court (Judge Schroeder) denied the government's motion and granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion. 28 F.Supp.3d 499. The defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted as to the government's Fourth Amendment claims regarding the pattern of individual traffic stops and the use of checkpoints for general law enforcement purposes unrelated to any alleged targeting of Latinos. The parties' motions for summary judgment were denied in all other respects, and the government's remaining claims pursuant to § 14141 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments proceeded to trial. The bench trial for this case began on August 12, 2014 and concluded on August 22, 2014. On August 7, 2015, Judge Schroeder issued an opinion and order holding that the United States failed to meet its burden of proving that the Sherriff's Office had engaged in a "pattern or practice" of discriminatory law enforcement. 122 F.Supp.3d 272. Judge Schroeder noted specifically that the United States presented no evidence that any individual was unconstitutionally deprived of his or her rights under the Fourth or Fourteenth Amendments, and that the United States' case rested largely on vague, isolated statements and statistical analyses. As such, Judge Schroeder denied the United States' claims and entered judgment for the Sheriff's Office, dismissing this case with prejudice. The United States appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on October 2, 2015. On December 8, 2015, Judge Schroeder ruled on pending motions related to costs and fees in the district court. 2015 WL 8346676. The court denied the government's motion to stay the defendant's motion for fees and costs following the trial, and awarded the defendant $23,297 in costs. The court denied the defendant's motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, finding that the government's claims had a reasonable basis in law and fact. Before the Fourth Circuit made a decision on the appeal, the parties reached a settlement agreement, with the United States agreeing to dismiss the appeal and accept the district court's judgment. The parties reached the settlement agreement on August 17, 2016. The agreement included the Alamance County Sheriff's Office developing a new Bias-Free Initiative, including a bias-free policing policy, a revised complaint policy including increased Spanish-language access, and data collection and analysis on traffic enforcement operations. The agreement also provided for training for Sheriff's Office employees. Under the settlement, the United States agreed that the findings letter and judgment would not provide a basis for denial of federal financial assistance to the Alamance County Sheriff's Office. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case on the parties' agreement on August 18, 2016. The agreement was to be effective for five years, and will automatically terminate in 2021.

Summary: The United States, following an investigation that began in June 2010, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina alleging that the Zlmance County Sheriff's Office intentionally and illegally discriminates against Latinos on the basis of their ethnicity. In August 2015, U.S. District Judge Thomas Schroeder found for the defendant. The United States appealed to the Fourth Circuit, but the parties settled before the circuit court issued its opinion. The settlement agreement, which provides for bias-free policing policies and training, is in effect through 2020.


On April 9th, 2008, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sued the Marion Superior Court, which was responsible for operating the Marion Superior Court Juvenile Detention Center (MSCJDC), under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. §14141, the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504 of 29 U.S.C. §701, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400, for depriving youths detained in MSCJDC of their federal statutory and constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiff alleged that MSCJDC failed to ensure that youths were adequately protected from other youths, self-harm, unreasonable isolation practices, and unsafe and unsanitary conditions, and that youths with disabilities did not have access to required special education programs. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The lawsuit was borne out of an investigation of the MSCJDC by the Department of Justice (DOJ) pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. In a findings letter, the DOJ reported that MSCJDC was deficient in safeguarding the rights of its youths in several ways. First, MSCJDC was inadequately protecting its youths from violence due to inadequate staffing and training on how to de-escalate violence, inadequate youth programming leading to increased boredom and violent tendencies, an inadequate behavior management program to reward positive behavior, and inadequate housing classification to separate youths based on levels of hostility or predatory behavior. Second, MSCJDC was excessively using isolation tactics as a form of punishment and behavior management. MSCJDC staff did not distinguish in their use of isolation to address serious, violent infractions or harmless disruptive behavior, did not provide youths in isolation with essential services such as medical care, education, or programming, and failed to exercise oversight of isolation, such as requiring supervisor review or giving notice to the youth. Third, MSCJDC was inadequately protecting its youths from suicide risks through inadequate mental health care, inadequate screening for suicidal tendencies, and inadequate staff training. Fourth, MSCJDC had inadequate systems of reporting and accountability, such as for reporting grievances, investigating child abuse allegations or staff misconduct, and maintaining accurate records of reports and investigations. Fifth, MSCJDC’s facilities were insufficiently safe for the youths, subjecting them to increased risks of fire hazards, lack of sanitation, chemical exposure, and injury. Finally, MSCJDC did not provide adequate special education support, both in screening for special education needs and providing programming and staffing. The same day that the plaintiff filed the lawsuit, the plaintiff and defendants filed a joint motion for conditional dismissal. The parties agreed to a settlement agreement, laying out provisions for how to implement needed improvements in MSCJDC’s operation on each of the issues detailed in the findings letter. Specifically, to address protection of youths from violence, MSCJDC agreed to:
(1) ensure reasonably safe premises;

(2) increase staffing;

(3) develop and implement a training curriculum for staff on behavior management, de-escalation, use of force, communication, crisis intervention, child abuse reporting, and suicide prevention before working with youth;

(4) implement an annual staff training on use of force, suicide prevention, and child abuse reporting;

(5) minimize youth idle time by providing sufficient structured programming;

(6) create a behavior management program to reward positive social behavior; and

 (7) create a housing classification system. For excessive use of isolation tactics, MSCDJC agreed to, first, develop oversight procedures regarding the use of isolation, such as ensuring supervision and notice to youths, and second, ensure that youths in isolation have access to essential medical services and programming. For suicide prevention, MSCJDC agreed to (1) conduct timely and accurate suicide risk assessments, (2) implement a gradual step-down suicide watch program, (3) provide mental health services and emergency equipment to prevent suicides, and (4) document all suicide precautions and attempts. For systems of reporting and accountability, MSCJDC agreed to create and implement systems for child abuse reporting, internal investigations of staff misconduct allegations, and youths filing grievances. For the conditions of the facilities, MSCJDC agreed to implement a fire safety program and to develop and implement chemical, general safety, and sanitation measures. Finally, for special education, MSCJDC agreed to screen and identify youths with special education needs, provide individualized education programs, and ensure access to educational services. Judge Larry J. McKinney granted this motion on April 11th, 2008. On May 28th, 2008, the parties appointed an Agreement Coordinator to enforce the settlement agreement. On April 9th, 2011, the settlement agreement expired after the agreed upon three-year period. On April 19th, 2011, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the lawsuit, stating that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with 25 out of 30 of the substantive provisions of the settlement agreement, and that the parties planned to continue working to resolve the remaining provisions in the next months. Because the parties agreed that judicial oversight was no longer required, the judge dismissed the lawsuit on May 2nd, 2011. This case is now closed.

Summary: On April 9th, 2013, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Enforcement Act against the Marion Superior Court, which was responsible for operating the Marion Superior Court Juvenile Detention Center (MSCJDC), for violating the federal statutory and constitutional rights of youths detained at MSCJDC. The plaintiff alleged that MSCJDC failed to protect youths from harm and did not provide required special education programs for youths with disabilities. The parties agreed to a three-year joint settlement agreement to improve MSCJDC's operation. After the three-year period, the parties agreed that the defendant had substantially complied with the provisions of the settlement agreement, so Judge Larry J. Mckinney dismissed the lawsuit on May 2nd, 2011. The case has now ended.


On May 9, 2006, a group of Latino voters filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the state of Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, MALDEF, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and the ACLU Voting Rights Project, brought suit under the Voting Rights Act, the NVRA, the Civil Rights Act of 1957/1960, 42 U.S. §1983, and state law and asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged that they were denied the right to vote by Arizona's Proposition 200 after they did not provide adequate documentary proof that they were U.S. citizens. Plaintiffs' argument mainly focused on their claim that the NVRA preempted Proposition 200 because, under the NVRA, individuals need not present proof of citizenship at the time they register to vote using the federal form. On June 19, 2006, the District Court (Judge Roslyn Silver) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that it was unlikely that the plaintiffs would win on the merits (435 F.Supp.2d 997). On August 2, 2006, Judge Silver granted a motion to consolidate the case with the case of Navajo Nation v. Brewer (3:06-cv-01575) (2006 WL 2246365). Navajo Nation dealt with similar issues, with the plaintiffs being Native Americans who were similarly denied the right to vote under Proposition 200. Earlier, on June 6, 2006, the case Inter Tribal Council of Arizona v. Brewer (3:06-cv-01362) had also been consolidated with this case. On September 11, 2006, Judge Silver again denied a motion for a preliminary injunction filed by each of the three sets of plaintiffs (2006 WL 3627297). This time, the plaintiffs attempted to argue that the additional material required by Proposition 200 amounted to a poll tax and violated Equal Protection. Judge Silver was unmoved by this argument as well. This decisions was upheld by the Ninth Circuit (485 F.3d 1041). After the 2006 election, the case moved beyond the preliminary injunction phase. Judge Silver granted summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, but that grant was overturned by the Ninth Circuit. Although the Ninth Circuit upheld that the law did not constitute a poll tax and did not violate the Voting Rights Act, it did hold that Congress' authority under the NVRA did supersede Arizona's authority under Proposition 200 and the plaintiffs should be successful in their challenge to the law (624 F.3d 1162). Therefore, Arizona's requirement that prospective voters show additional identification could not stand. A request to rehear the case en banc was granted (649 F.3d 953), but the rehearing en banc produced the same holdings (677 F.3d 383). The Supreme Court granted certiorari (133 S.Ct. 476). On June 17, 2013, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's decision, holding that the Motor Voter Act preempted Arizona's identification requirements (570 U.S. 1). The Court upheld earlier decisions that the "Time, Place and Manner" clause of the Constitution also applied to registration for Congressional elections. On July 22, 2013, the district court ordered the parties to submit a joint proposed final judgment. A month later, the parties indicated they were not able to come to an agreement. The court issued its final judgment on Sept. 11, 2013, declaring that Arizona had to accept and use the federal form, and that Arizona could not require applicants using the federal form to provide information beyond what the form required. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from implementing the law in question with respect to individuals applying to register to vote in elections for federal office using the federal form. The defendants were ordered to make the federal form "available through all reasonable channels." The court awarded the plaintiffs $1,940,000 in attorney's fees. The court retains jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the injunction. As of May 2020, there were no new entries on the docket.

Summary: On May 9, 2006, a group of Latino voters filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the state of Arizona, alleging that Arizona Proposition 200's requirement to show additional identification contradicted the NVRA. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit held en banc that Congress' authority under the NVRA superseded Arizona's authority under Proposition 200, so the additional requirements could not stand. The Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit. On September 11, 2013, the court issued its final judgement, declaring that Arizona had to accept and use the federal form, and that Arizona could not require applicants using the federal form to provide information beyond what the form required.


On November 19, 2018, three U.S. Senators, Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Mazie Hirono (D-HI), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued President Donald Trump and Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The senators alleged that the defendants violated the Appointments Clause (Articles II, §2) of the U.S. Constitution and the Department of Justice Succession Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 508(a). The plaintiffs were represented by the Constitutional Accountability Center and the Protect Democracy Project. The case was assigned to Judge Trevor McFadden, but randomly reassigned to Judge Randolph Moss shortly after the complaint was filed. Specifically, the Senators alleged that by designating Matthew Whitaker to succeed Jeff Sessions as the Acting Attorney General, the plaintiffs were denied their right as Senators to vote on whether to consent to his appointment. The plaintiffs claimed that unlawfully denying legislators their right to cast an effective vote robs them of one of their core powers and responsibilities. The plaintiffs pointed to the Appointments Clause, which requires that provides principal federal officers be appointed only with the advice and consent of the Senate. The plaintiffs further alleged that President Trump's action also violated the the DOJ Succession Statute. This statute provides that if the Attorney General's office is vacant, the Deputy Attorney General "may exercise all the duties of that office." The Deputy Attorney General had been available to exercise the functions and duties of the Office of Attorney General, and therefore, he should have been appointed as the Attorney General with the Senate's approval. The case was briefly stayed at the end of 2018 and the beginning of 2019 due to a lapse in federal appropriations. The government sought and received leave to delay in filing a response to the complaint. Before the defendants could file a response, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on February 19, 2019. Though no reasoning was given in the notice of dismissal, it likely was due to the nomination of William Barr to be United States Attorney General; he was confirmed by the typical appointment process and sworn into the position on February 14, and Whitaker left the Justice Department to go to the private sector. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 19, 2018, three U.S. Senators (Richard Blumenthal, Sheldon Whitehouse, and Mazie Hirono) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia contesting the nomination of Matthew Whitaker to be acting U.S. Attorney General. They alleged that President Trump's unilateral appointment of Whitaker to serve as acting Attorney General after the resignation of Jeff Sessions without a vote in Congress violated the Constitution's Appointments Clause. The plaintiffs withdrew their suit after William Barr was sworn in as Attorney General on February 14, 2019 through the normal appointment process.


On May 20, 1996, a group of female employees filed this lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against Smith Barney Inc. in the United States District Court of the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive and compensatory relief alleging that Smith Barney discriminated against its female employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that Smith Barney committed gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and pregnancy discrimination; and further paid women lower wages, retaliated against complainants, and violated several state, city and common law statutes in these practices. The evidence was so overwhelmingly against Smith Barney, that the Court (Judge Constance Baker Motley) never officially certified the class of female employees. Yet, the case itself is much more complex than it first appears. As the trial proceeded, more female employees joined the plaintiffs, and Smith Barney's motion to dismiss the complaint was never decided as a preliminary settlement was reached on November 18, 1997. After many fairness hearings, where objections to the settlement were stated, on July 28, 1998 (Docket #113--listed as July 24th), the Court approved a final settlement agreement. Martens v. Smith Barney, 1661385 WL 2 (S.D.N.Y 1998). The agreement approved the class of female employees working for Smith Barney in the retail sales, investment banking or capital markets divisions. It affected an estimated 23,000 women. Smith Barney was ordered to pay for all costs associated with notifying the class of the three part dispute resolution process. The resolution process was run by a unit from the Duke Law School, whereby women could pursue individual claims, or join in claims arising from actions in a single branch office. In addition to individual relief, the settlement stipulated that Smith Barney spend $15 million toward diversity initiatives and training. In total, the firm paid $150 million to women who filed claims through its dispute resolution system. Many plaintiffs were still unsatisfied with the settlement and chose to opt out. It is estimated that around 1,900 women filed complaints, but the damages awarded were all confidential according to the agreement. This is the procedure many plaintiffs had issue with from the start. Normally, because of contracts signed by brokers with the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), any employment lawsuit is to be settled through a mandatory arbitration process separate from the courts. The one exemption to this contract being class action lawsuits. Thus, on the complaint the NYSE and NASD were listed as defendants as the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief against these parties for violating their rights to a court hearing under Title VII and the United States Constitution. In an opinion on these claims given on December 2, 1999, the Court (Judge Motley) dismissed these charges, and gave the plaintiffs an opportunity to opt back into the settlement. Martens v. Smith Barney, 190 F.R.D. 136 (S.D.N.Y 1999). Two of the original plaintiffs opted out of the settlement because they did not believe that it was fair in any manner. While the Court (Judge Motley) gave them the option of opting back into the settlement, the plaintiffs chose to continue their litigation on their own terms. However, in doing so, the statutes on limitations came into play. While these plaintiffs were still working out new representation, having been dissatisfied with the class counsel, the Court took action. On January 31, 2000, the plaintiff's new lawyers were chastised by the Court (Judge Motely). The Court ordered that the plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement be denied. The Court further ordered that the plaintiff's counsel, back up alleged improprieties with facts, and that pro hac vice status be clarified. Martens v. Smith Barney, 108831 WL 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). On May 15, 2000, according to the docket, the Court (Judge Motley) dismissed the remaining opt out plaintiffs from the case, with prejudice. Then, on May 17, 2000, according to the docket, the Court (Judge Motley) imposed sanctions on the counsel of the dismissed plaintiffs, and further denied the motion to enforce the settlement. The plaintiffs then appealed. On November 20, 2001, the United States Court of Appeals of the 2nd Circuit (Judge Calabresi, Judge Sotomayor) handed down its decision. The Court first ordered that the District Court's judgment denying the motion to enforce be vacated, and that this be remanded back to the District Court. The order removing pro hac vice and sanctioning the plaintiff's counsel was vacated. The District Court's judgment dismissing the individual plaintiffs was vacated. And finally, the plaintiff's motion to reassign the case to another District Court was denied. Martens v. Smith Barney, 273 F.3d 183 (2nd Cir. 2001). Thus, most of the decision went for the plaintiffs, and things seemed to take a turn for them. Back in the District Court, the case was reassigned to Judge John Koeltl. On July 9, 2003, he denied the plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Martens v. Smith Barney, 21543506 WL 19 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court stated that there is in fact, no actual motion to enforce a settlement in any sort of rule or civil litigation procedure guide. There were, according to the Court, many ways to appeal the enforcement of a settlement, and all were clearly laid out before the plaintiff's counsel, who disregarded these facts. Martens v. Smith Barney, 21543506 WL 2 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court further argued that the small number of plaintiffs moving to enforce do not represent a large enough body to consider action against a settlement that was a great cost to achieve, despite the merits of the individual claims Martens v. Smith Barney, 21543506 WL 6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Thus, for the most part the plaintiffs objections were dismissed. While there was more action, resulting in appeals by the plaintiffs, no information regarding these motions or their appeals is made available except on the docket. For all intents, the case was closed by the end of 2004. However, a motion by the defendants reopened the case temporarily in 2005. On October 7, 2005, the Court (Judge Koeltl) denied defendants' motion to reopen the action and enjoin certain plaintiffs involved in a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The defendants alleged that this other case, Amochaev v. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., d/b/a Smith Barney, involve actions that were stipulated under the settlement of Martens v. Smith Barney. Martens v. Smith Barney, 2649023 WL 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The case was officially closed with the last entry on the docket dated September 29, 2006. Susan Antilla's 2002 book about the case is titled "Tales From the Boom Boom Room: Women vs. Wall Street."

Summary: This action was brought by a group of female employees against Smith Barney, Inc. seeking injunctive and compensatory relief. The case was settled on July 28, 1998 in favor of the plaintiffs, but later the district court denied a request to enforce the settlement agreement.