The County of Santa Clara commenced this lawsuit on February 3, 2017 to challenge President Trump's January 25, 2017 Executive Order (EO), Executive Order 13768. The EO denied federal funding to sanctuary jurisdictions that resist enforcing the federal government’s immigration enforcement policies. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiff filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. According to the complaint, the EO purported to allow the federal government to deny the plaintiff federal funding without stipulating qualifications for being a "sanctuary jurisdiction." Further, the EO did not grant the right for judicial review or require the federal government to issue notice to such jurisdiction. Thus, the plaintiff alleged that the EO violated constitutional separation of powers, the Fifth Amendment due process right, and the Tenth Amendment. The case was reassigned on February 8 to Magistrate Judge Nathanael M. Cousins. However, on Feb. 10, Judge William H. Orrick signed a related case order, connecting this case with a similar one brought by the County and City of San Francisco, IM-CA-0085 in this Clearinghouse; both were assigned to him going forward. On February 23, Santa Clara moved for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from: 1) enforcing Section 9 of the January 25 Executive Order; 2) taking any action in furtherance of any withholding or conditioning of federal funds pursuant to the EO; and 3) taking any action pursuant to the EO to declare any jurisdiction ineligible for federal funds or deprive any jurisdiction of funds already appropriated or allocated by Congress. On March 22, many entities moved to file amici briefs in support of the plaintiff. These included the State of California; cities and counties in California and nationwide; individual sheriffs and police chiefs nationwide; technology companies in California; social service, labor, and civil rights organizations, including the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Anti-Defamation League, and local organizations in Santa Clara County; and legal scholars. The superintendent of California's public schools also filed an amicus brief. On March 23, the defendants moved to combine oral arguments on the preliminary injunction motions in this case and in the related case City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, requesting an April 12 combined hearing. Plaintiff opposed this motion on March 24. The plaintiff then asked the court for permission to attach four exhibits to its motion for preliminary injunction. These exhibits included recent comments by the White House Press Secretary and recently published detainer reports from ICE, all of which the plaintiff argued contained threats and policies penalizing sanctuary cities. Because of this threat, the plaintiff alleged it had standing and its case was ripe. Substantively, the plaintiffs argued that the power to condition funds on specified action by local government employees is Congress's, not the President's. An existing statute, 8 U.S.C. §1373, forbids local and state governments from imposing a "gag rule" on their employees that purports to forbid the employees from speaking with federal immigration authorities about the immigration status of any individual. In 2016, the Obama administration had announced that several small immigration-related grant programs would, going forward, be available only to jurisdictions that certified their compliance with §1373; on April 21, 2017, the Trump Administration Attorney General Jeff Sessions confirmed this approach in a letter. On April 25, 2017 the court entered a nationwide injunction against the EO. The court explained that the federal government had disavowed a robust reading of the EO: It explained for the first time at oral argument that the Order is merely an exercise of the President’s “bully pulpit” to highlight a changed approach to immigration enforcement. Under this interpretation, Section 9(a) applies only to three federal grants in the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security that already have conditions requiring compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373. This interpretation renders the Order toothless; the Government can already enforce these three grants by the terms of those grants and can enforce 8 U.S.C. §1373 to the extent legally possible under the terms of existing law. Counsel disavowed any right through the Order for the Government to affect any other part of the billions of dollars in federal funds the Counties receive every year. The court held, however, that the EO "is not reasonably susceptible to the new, narrow interpretation offered at the hearing." Yet a broader reading was, Judge Orrick explained, unconstitutional: "The Constitution vests the spending powers in Congress, not the President, so the Order cannot constitutionally place new conditions on federal funds. Further, the Tenth Amendment requires that conditions on federal funds be unambiguous and timely made; that they bear some relation to the funds at issue; and that the total financial incentive not be coercive. Federal funding that bears no meaningful relationship to immigration enforcement cannot be threatened merely because a jurisdiction chooses an immigration enforcement strategy of which the President disapproves." Accordingly, the court granted a preliminary injunction against any broader implementation of the order, although it emphasized that the preliminary injunction "does not affect the ability of the Attorney General or the Secretary to enforce existing conditions of federal grants or 8 U.S.C. §1373, nor does it impact the Secretary’s ability to develop regulations or other guidance defining what a sanctuary jurisdiction is or designating a jurisdiction as such." County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017). On May 22, 2017 the defendants moved for leave to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's April 25 injunction. According to the defendants, the Attorney General had issued a memorandum on the EO, specifying that the EO's Section 9(a) could only revoke federal grants administered by DOJ or DHS with grant-eligibility terms that expressly conditioned the funding on compliance with 8 U.S.C. §1373. Thus, the defendants argued that in light of this new authority, the court should reconsider the preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs' claims were not justiciable and its success on the merits was unlikely. The next day, Judge Orrick granted leave to file the motion for reconsideration, which the defendants immediately did. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 7. They argued that the plaintiff lacked standing and its claims were unripe or non-justiciable. On June 16, the states of West Virginia, Louisiana, Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Texas moved for leave to file an amicus brief in support of defendants' motion to dismiss. On June 28, many organizations, including labor unions, civil rights groups, public schools, and technology companies, as well as individual sheriffs and police chiefs, moved to file amici briefs on behalf of the plaintiff. Additionally, various California cities and counties as well as various states (California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, and Washington) moved to file amici briefs on behalf of the plaintiff. On July 20, Judge Orrick denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss. Finally, he concluded that the plaintiff had adequately stated a claim for declaratory relief. 2017 WL 3086064. On August 25, Judge Orrick found State of California v. Sessions to be a related case and reassigned it to himself. That case also challenged DOJ's immigration-related conditions on law enforcement funding. On August 30, Santa Clara and San Francisco moved for summary judgment. Santa Clara argued that EO Section 9(a) was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Consequently, Santa Clara argued, the court should permanently enjoin Section 9(a)'s implementation. The defendants, in their September 27 response, argued that the Constitution authorized their broad immigration enforcement powers as implemented in the EO and §1373. The plaintiffs replied on October 4. On September 18, the defendants appealed, to the Ninth Circuit, Judge Orrick's April 25 preliminary injunction and July 20 order denying defendants' motions to dismiss and motion for reconsideration. In the district court, Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on November 20, permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as "sanctuary jurisdictions." On December 14, the defendants appealed this permanent injunction, asking the Ninth Circuit to consolidate this appeal with the other two appeals in process. The plaintiffs, for their part, asked the Ninth Circuit to dismiss the consolidated appeals as moot because they challenged a preliminary injunction that the permanent injunction had superseded. Eleven states filed amicus briefs supporting the defendants. However, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' request on January 4, 2018, denying all pending motions as moot. On August 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, but vacated and remanded for reconsideration the nationwide injunction. The panel held that the executive branch could not refuse to disperse the federal grants without congressional authorization under the Separation of Powers principle and the Spending Clause. The panel found that Congress had not so authorized, and so summary judgment was proper, but that there were no findings to support an injunction with nationwide reach. 897 F.3d 1225. On August 23, 2019, Judge Orrick issued a Stipulation and Final Judgment and Order, entering Final Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, enjoining the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) in California, and prohibiting defendants from seeking further review of any final decision from this litigation. The plaintiffs withdrew their request for an injunction that would enjoin defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) outside the State of California. The case is closed.

Summary: On February 3, 2017, the County of Santa Clara challenged Trump's January 25, 2017 Executive Order in the Northern District of California. The EO denied federal funding to sanctuary jurisdictions that resist enforcing the federal government’s immigration enforcement policies. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On February 23, 2017 Santa Clara moved for a nationwide preliminary injunction prohibiting the government from: 1) enforcing Section 9 of the January 25 Executive Order; 2) taking any action in furtherance of any withholding or conditioning of federal funds pursuant to the EO; and 3) taking any action pursuant to the EO to declare any jurisdiction ineligible for federal funds or deprive any jurisdiction of funds already appropriated or allocated by Congress. The court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on April 25, 2017. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile in district court on August 30, Santa Clara and San Francisco moved for summary judgment. Santa Clara argued that EO Section 9(a) was unconstitutional because it violated the separation of powers, the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Judge Orrick granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on November 20, permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) of the EO against all jurisdictions deemed as "sanctuary jurisdictions." The defendants also appeal this to the Ninth Circuit. On August 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment, but vacated and remanded for reconsideration the nationwide injunction. The panel held that the executive branch could not refuse to disperse the federal grants without congressional authorization under the Separation of Powers principle and the Spending Clause. The panel found that Congress had not so authorized, and so summary judgment was proper, but that there were no findings to support an injunction with nationwide reach. On August 23, 2019, the court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and enjoined the defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) in California. The plaintiffs withdrew their request for an injunction that would enjoin defendants from enforcing Section 9(a) outside the State of California.


In March 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Lumpy, LLC, doing business as Chilly Bombers Bar & Grill, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of gender, female and pregnancy in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the individual complainants in the case alleged that they were paid less than their male counterparts because they were female and pregnant. On February 1, 2008, the District Court (Judge Susan Bolton) granted partial summary judgment for the defendants with regards to one of the named plaintiffs. This named plaintiff had complained based on a comparison to two male employees who were paid more despite having allegedly similar positions. Judge Bolton held that one of the male employees had a "substantially different" position, therefore there was no violation of the Equal Pay Act and the defendant's summary judgment motion should be granted in this respect. She held that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the other male employee had a substantially similar position, suggesting the possibility of an Equal Pay Act violation. She further denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the alleged Title VII violation based on the testimony offered by the plaintiff that she was told she could "renegotiate her salary after her pregnancy." 2008 WL 11339642. Following this, a jury trial was held in March 2008. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act claims. However, the jury did not award the plaintiff damages for lost wages or emotional pain with regard to the Title VII claim, and only awarded $200.00 in damages on the Equal Pay claim (the determined difference in pay). The plaintiff also proposed a final judgment that included requiring training, development of nondiscrimination policies, providing notice to employees, hiring and outside consultant to investigate discrimination claims, reporting, provision of a letter of reference and additional back pay. On May 6, 2008 this proposed judgment was rejected by the court and it was ordered that defendant pay $200.00 plus interest to the charging party. 2008 WL 11339641. On June 23, 2008, Chief Deputy Michael O'Brien, signed a bill of costs against the defendants totaling $3,518.22 to cover the plaintiffs' litigation expenses. The case is now closed.

Summary: In March 2006, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Lumpy, LLC, doing business as Chilly Bombers Bar & Grill, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of gender, female and pregnancy in violation of the Equal Pay Act of 1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A jury found in favor of the plaintiff and Judge Susan Bolton ordered the defendant to pay $200.00 in damages.


On May 13, 2013, a woman filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the city, the Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD), and the mayor of the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution. The plaintiff, represented by a public defender service, alleged that her due process rights were violated when her car was indefinitely seized by the MPD, without providing her with a prompt, neutral hearing to challenge the seizure of her property. The plaintiff further alleged that others similarly situated suffer from the defendant's failure to provide a prompt, neutral test for the validity of the seizure. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that indigent vehicles owners suffer because a "penal sum" that many indigent vehicle owners cannot afford is required to challenge the police seizure. On April 4, 2013, the plaintiff's car was seized after police officers allegedly found two empty firearm magazines inside a pocketbook that was inside of the car. The plaintiff received a letter on April 22, 2013, stating that her car would be forfeited unless she paid a "penal sum" of $1,962 to challenge the police seizure in court. If the penal sum is not paid the police are allowed to sell seized vehicles and retain the proceeds. Thus, the plaintiff argued, D.C.'s profitable and self-interested civil forfeiture scheme denies persons in plaintiff's position their right to procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment. On August 16, 2013, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle granted the defendants' motion to stay the proceeding. The motion was entered after the plaintiff's car was returned to her and the parties agreed to work together through informal channels to return seized vehicles to the owners of other vehicles seized by the MPD. By this time, legislation was pending that addressed the constitutional problems that the plaintiff alleged in her complaint, and the parties agreed to suspend litigation until the bill passes (or fails to pass). On June 29, 2015, defendants filed a consent motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on the fact that the Congressional review period ended for pending legislation. The Civil Asset Forfeiture Amendment Act of 2014 provides prompt post-deprivation retention hearings, eliminates cost bonds, and all money from civil forfeitures will now go the D.C. General Fund instead of MPD, rendering the plaintiff's allegations of constitutional violations moot. On June 29, 2015, Judge Ellen S. Huvelle signed the order and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: A woman brought a class action suit against the District of Columbia and its officials for its improper forfeiture proceedings after an unconstitutional seizure of her vehicle. The woman's vehicle was returned and the defendants moved for a motion to stay pending legislative action by the city council to amend existing civil forfeiture laws. Because legislation was passed that addressed the constitutional problems, the case was dismissed with prejudice.


This is the second case filed in the Signal International cases. On Apr. 20, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against defendant Signal International, LLC, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The EEOC alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC's allegations of unlawful employment practices and a hostile workplace on the basis of national origin, immigration status, and race stem from a related case, David v. Signal International, brought against Signal by the guestworkers themselves. The EEOC alleged that the terms and conditions of the Indian guestworkers' employment were less favorable than their non-Indian counterparts', and that Signal engaged in a pattern or practice of subjecting the Indian workers to a hostile environment and disparate terms and conditions of employment based on their race and national origin. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and monetary awards, including damages for emotional pain and suffering, punitive damages for malicious and reckless conduct, and attorneys' fees. On Jan. 24, 2012, the Court (Magistrate Judge Robert Walker) granted a motion to intervene by three private plaintiffs who had been subjected to the allegedly unlawful treatment. The plaintiffs then filed a class action complaint, defining the proposed class as "all Indian Workers who paid recruitment fees and/or other amounts to the Recruiters, and who were employed by Signal at any time in 2006, 2007, and/or 2008." On Feb. 29, 2012, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola) granted Signal's motion to transfer the case to the Eastern District of Louisiana on the grounds that this case and David arose from the same conduct, and that the substantive issues and the parties were similar. District Judge Jay Zainey of the Eastern District of Louisiana then denied Signal's motion to consolidate the cases, noting that since the EEOC was a party to this case, it was statutorily entitled to expedited consideration. On Sept. 10, 2013, Magistrate Judge Daniel Knowles granted the EEOC's motion for a protective order for information related to the immigration history or status of individuals involved in the case. Signal argued it needed the information for impeachment purposes; the court noted that it had already rejected this argument in the David case, and once again barred discovery on the matter. On Sept. 26, 2013, the Court dismissed the Intervenors' (guestworkers') claim for recovery of recruitment fees. The alleged discriminatory conduct in connection with the recruitment related only to events that occurred outside of the United States and before the Intervenors began to work at Signal's facilities, and the court found that Congress intended to exclude non-citizens located outside the United States from the protection of Title VII. As such, the Intervenors were not covered when they paid the recruitment fee because they were non-citizens and were not working within the United States at the time. On July 12, 2014, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied Signal's motion to transfer all of the cases pending against it to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 14, 2014, the Court denied Signal's motion for interlocutory appeal of the Court's prohibition of discovery on plaintiffs' post-Signal information including immigration status. Although the Court set a trial date of June 1, 2015, on May 7, 2015, the trial was delayed indefinitely until an appeal on a separate EEOC case, EEOC v. Bass Pro Outdoor World, LLC, could be resolved. Shortly after, on July 12, 2015, Signal filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy, putting a further halt on the case proceedings. In Dec. 2015, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. This case is now closed.

Summary: On Apr. 20, 2011, the EEOC filed suit against Defendant Signal International, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In December 2015, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all 11 cases. Signal was to pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers harmed by its conduct.


This is one of a pair of lawsuits filed by state affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), each relating to two separate Freedom of Information Act requests seeking agency records on immigration enforcement practices in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. (The other case is IM-ME-0002, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.) Both cases were brought in U.S. District Court for the District of Maine; the ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief—specifically, the release of documents responsive to each request—as well as attorneys' fees and costs. This particular action was filed on May 1, 2018 against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agency U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). (The other was filed seven days later and also included another DHS sub-agency as a defendant.) Both cases were partially coordinated and assigned to District Judge John D. Levy. The FOIA request at issue in this case, submitted on January 18, 2018, sought for information relating to CBP's citizenship checkpoints, bus searches, and coordination within local, state, and federal law enforcement within the state of Maine only. (The request in the other case sought information involving two more states and was aimed at more agencies.) It came after Border Patrol agents stopped a Concord Coach bus four days earlier allegedly in order to ask each passenger about their citizenship status. According to the ACLU, after 20 business days, CBP had still not issued any notification about whether it would comply with the request, in breach of FOIA-mandated deadlines. CBP filed its answer on June 18, 2018. It admitted that it had not communicated with the ACLU regarding its request, but otherwise denied most of the complaint's remaining allegations. On July 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge John H. Rich III granted the parties' joint motion allowing for CBP to review and produce documents responsive to the ACLU's request, subject to a joint status report to be filed on August 17. In that status report, the parties notified the court that CBP had provided the ACLU with four partially redacted documents totaling 34 pages; however, the parties still differed as to whether these documents covered all those potentially responsive to the request. CBP agreed to provide any additional responsive documents by September 28. A status report filed in October indicated that CBP had produced additional documents and that ACLU was reviewing the production for followup. Between October and December of 2018, the parties continued to work together in releasing the desired documents. In November the plaintiffs submitted a status report which said that significant progress had been made and that they didn't expect to need judicial relief, but that they reserved that right. However, on December 17, 2018, the plaintiffs' status report said that there were some redacted materials that the defendants did not want to give up, and the plaintiffs asked Judge Levy to adjudicate the matter in camera. In February and March of 2019, parties submitted briefs to Judge Levy regarding disclosure of the redacted materials. The particular documents in question included an officer training presentation (the "Trans Check Presentation"), daily unit assignment log summaries (the "Shift Logs"), and agency email correspondence ("Bus Check E-Mails"). On May 8, 2019, Judge Levy ordered that some, but not all, of the requested documents were protected by Exception 7(E), covering law enforcement information that "would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law." The Trans Check Presentation was not covered by Exemption 7(E), because they did not discuss investigative techniques which are not commonly known to the public. However, the Shift Logs were protected, because the had information relevant to current patrolling and enforcement activity. With regard to the Bus Check E-Mails, the court disclosed some, while keeping others redacted. 2019 WL 2028512. After the adjudication, the only things left in dispute between the two parties were attorney's fees and costs. Subsequent docket entries discussed attorney's fees and costs, but the docket does not indicate any resolution on the topic. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on July 15, 2019, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This was one of a pair of lawsuits filed by the ACLU of Maine in May 2018 after its FOIA requests concerning federal immigration enforcement practices in Maine and neighboring states went unanswered. The ACLU filed both lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. The particular FOIA request in this case related to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)'s citizenship checkpoints, bus searches, and cooperation with local, state, and federal law enforcement. In July 2018, upon the parties' joint motion, CBP agreed to review and produce documents responsive to the ACLU's request; according to a status report filed in August, it further agreed to review and produce any additional documents by September. By December of 2018, the parties could not agree what to do with several documents that plaintiffs had requested, and they asked the court to adjudicate the matter <i>in camera</i>. Judge Levy found that some documents were covered under Exemption 7(E) of FOIA, while others were not. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the case in July of 2019, and the case is now closed.


This is a case about allegations of civil rights deprivations at Guadalupe County Correctional Facility’s (GCCF). The plaintiff, a prisoner of GCCF, alleged that GCCF’s negligently operated a medical facility and a correctional facility, denied prisoners due process, subjected them to inhumane conditions of confinement, and unlawfully inflicted cruel and/or unusual punishment. On September 2, 2016, a prisoner of GCCF filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiff sued the State of New Mexico under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Representing himself, the plaintiff sought injunctive relief regarding the allegedly flawed architectural design and faulty construction at all private “for-profit” prison facilities operating in New Mexico as well as declaratory relief mandating structural alterations of the prisons’ structural flaws, legal termination and/or dissolution of all State contracts with all private ‘for-profit’ prison companies operating in New Mexico. He also sought compensatory, punitive, and hedonic damages. The plaintiff claimed numerous instances of carbon monoxide exposure/poisoning of state prisoners occurred at GCCF and other similar facilities on December 28, 2012; January 4, 2013; January 19, 2013; January 21, 2013; and February 6, 2014. He further alleged that he filed grievances after the December 28, 2012 incident, and the February 6, 2014 incident, but obtained no relief. Judge Kenneth J. Gonzales was assigned to this case. Initially, Magistrate Judge William P Lynch was assigned to this case, but it was later reassigned to Magistrate Judge Jerry H. Ritter. The same day he filed the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel. Magistrate Judge Lynch denied this motion. Later in the case, the plaintiff again filed a motion to appoint counsel, but the court declined to appoint counsel. Thus, the plaintiff proceeded pro se throughout the case. Three months after the plaintiff filed his complaint, he filed a motion for summary judgment, but on September 15, 2017, Judge Gonzales denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff’s civil rights complaint with prejudice. 2017 WL 4142572. Judge Gonzalez explained that the plaintiff failed to state a claim because there must be a connection between the official conduct of government officials and a violation of a constitutional right. Conduct that is not connected to a constitutional violation is not actionable under § 1983. Judge Gonzalez also wrote that the plaintiff may not litigate other prisoner’s claims, and since he was barred by the statute of limitations, an opportunity for the plaintiff to amend the complaint would be futile. That same day, he entered judgment against the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration, as well as, a notice of appeal. On October 12, 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit abated the appeal until the District Court resolved the motion for reconsideration. While the motion for reconsideration was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint on October 24, 2017. However, on October 30, 2017, Judge Gonzales denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration writing that the motion does not rely on any intervening change in the controlling law or new evidence that was previously unavailable. 2017 WL 5001983. Judge Gonzales granted the plaintiff’s motion to proceed on appeal. On June 13, 2018, the Tenth Circuit (Circuit Judge Monroe G. McKay) affirmed the denial of summary judgment and dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims. 737 Fed. Appx. 882. Though the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s conclusion regarding the untimeliness of plaintiff’s claims, they allowed the plaintiff to amend his claims against the individual state officials and prison employees for the February 2014 incident and related grievance proceeding that were not currently alleged with sufficient individual specificity. Accordingly, on July 26, 2018, Judge Gonzales granted the plaintiff leave to file one amended complaint but cautioned that plaintiff that this complaint should be a short and plain pleading and not reassert previously dismissed claims. After objecting to this order’s requirement of a short and plain pleading, on September 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On May 28, 2020, Judge Gonzales dismissed the plaintiff’s amended complaint because the plaintiff failed to comply with the court’s requirement that the amended complaint be limited to the plaintiff’s claims against individual state officials and prison employees for an alleged February 2014 incident and related grievance proceeding, and that he may not reassert any other claims previously dismissed by the court. 2020 WL 2768974. Judge Gonzales explained that instead of following the court's requirement for the amended complaint, the plaintiff filed a 144 page long amended complaint naming in excess of 300 defendants and asserting 39 claims covering a 10-year period. The court noted that the plaintiff had a pattern of making “grossly overbroad and unsupported claims.” Judge Gonzalez also denied the plaintiff’s application to proceed without prepaying fees or costs because the appeal was not taken in good faith. That same day, Judge Gonzalez entered judgment dismissing the amended complaint without prejudice. On June 30, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the amended complaint. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, a prisoner filed a complaint under § 1983 alleging exposure to carbon monoxide incidents in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiff alleged negligent operations of the prison and medical facilities as well as denial of Fifth Amendment due process claim and an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied due to failing to state a connection between the official conduct of government officials and a violation of a constitutional right. The plaintiff’s appeal was denied pending judgment on his amended complaint. In 2020, the court denied the plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismissed the case without prejudice. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on June 30, 2020 and the case is ongoing.


In May 2010, individuals with mental illness filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California to challenge the County of Sacramento's proposed reductions in mental health services. The plaintiffs alleged that the County's plan to eliminate funding for Regional Support Team (RST) programs and the Transitional Community Opportunities for Recovery and Engagement (TCORE) program would put the plaintiffs at risk of institutionalization, as they would no longer have access to the services that ensure their successful placement in the community. Although the County had indicated a desire to open new clinics to meet their needs, no plans had been announced. Thus, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the County from closing the clinics. On June 9, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to immediately prevent the closure of the clinics and a motion for class certification. The County filed its opposition to this motion on July 14, and on July 19, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest supporting the plaintiffs' motion. On July 21, Judge John A. Mendez granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, but denied their motion for class certification as premature. After a period of discovery and negotiations, the parties entered a settlement agreement in January 2012. The consent decree gave the County one year to develop a new plan that would preserve adequate outpatient mental health care while cutting costs. The agreement outlined a number of factors that the County would consider in developing its new continuum of care plan: peer-staffed clinics, help lines, intake procedures, etc. The agreement also provided that the County would hold public meetings to provide mechanisms for public input into the process. The consent decree expired in 2013, and the case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs with mental illness challenged a planned reduction of adult outpatient mental health services in the County of Sacramento. The plaintiffs alleged that the proposed closure of clinics and elimination of other programs would place them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization, in violation of the ADA. After the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the parties negotiated a settlement. The County has agreed to develop a new plan to reduce costs while maintaining adequate mental health care services by the end of 2012. The consent decree is set to expire on January 31, 2013. As of November 2014, nothing new has been added to this case.


On July 15, 2010 An inmate serving a life sentence for crimes committed as a juvenile filed this lawsuit on behalf of himself against the North Carolina Post-Release Supervision and Parole Commission ("the Parole Commission") in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The case was assigned to District Judge Terrence W. Boyle. The initial complaint was unclear, and Judge Boyle ordered the plaintiff to clarify whether the case should proceed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus. The original case, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was dismissed without prejudice, and the case was to be continued under habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The court directed that North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services (NCPLS) represent the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against the Parole Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff had become eligible for parole in 2002, after serving a term of twenty years, and alleged that the defendant failed to offer him a meaningful opportunity for parole in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On Sept. 11, 2013, Judge Boyle authorized the filing of this complaint and dismissed the habeas corpus petition. On Nov. 3, 2014, the defendant and the plaintiff both moved for summary judgment. On Sept. 25, 2015, in a written opinion, Judge Boyle denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied without prejudice in part the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the parole review process employed by the Parole Commission for offenders convicted as juveniles and serving life sentences violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Judge Boyle cited the Supreme Court's decision in Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), which addressed the issue of parole for juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. In a 6-3 opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court had held that, when juveniles are sentenced to life imprisonment, the Constitution requires that they be granted a meaningful opportunity for parole so that they may have the chance to demonstrate their increased maturity and rehabilitation. On Oct. 21, 2015, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal of the Sept. 25, 2015, order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, and the district court entered a stay pending the Fourth Circuit's resolution of the appeal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the court's order was not a final order. The district court then lifted the stay and ordered that the parties had sixty days to present a "plan for the means and mechanism of compliance with the mandates of Graham to provide a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation to juvenile offenders convicted as adults." Hayden v. Keller, 134 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1011 (E.D.N.C. 2015). The parties did not reach agreement on a plan, and on Oct. 24, 2016, each party filed its respective proposed plans. Meanwhile, another inmate serving a life sentence with parole for an offense committed as a juvenile in the North Carolina prison system had moved to intervene as a plaintiff, but his motion was denied on July 5, 2017. On Nov. 2, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and adopted the defendant's proposed plan. The plan proposed a number of new hearing and pre- and post-hearing procedures, including (i) providing the eligible offenders with written notice at least 180 days in advance of any parole review hearing; (ii) a guaranteed 30-minute meeting slot for the offender's family members, advocates, attorneys, or other witnesses, to address one or more members of the Parole Commission in person; (iii) permitting the eligible offender to submit a written personal explanation of the circumstances of the underlying offense, or any other materials documenting his or her maturity, rehabilitation, and suitability for parole; and (iv) permitting the eligible offender to appear via videoconference before the commissioner(s) during the review hearing, among other changes. The court directed the defendant to implement its proposed plan within ninety days. On December 1, 2017, the defendant appealed the following judgments to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit: the order granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and the order granting the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief. (Appeal case number 17-7582). On the same day, the defendant filed a motion to stay proceedings pending appeal. On Jan. 8, 2018, the plaintiff's motion to stay ruling on his motion for costs, attorneys' fees, and related expenses was granted. The defendant's motion to stay the proceedings was denied, and the court gave the defendant until Mar. 30, 2018, to implement the proposed plan. The clerk was also directed to substitute Willis J. Fowler as a defendant in place of Paul Butler, Jr. On March 12, the plaintiff and the defendant jointly filed a motion to extend the deadline for the defendant to comply with the injunction for 120 days, until July 28, 2018. On March 19, this motion was granted, and Judge Boyle directed the defendant to implement the proposed plan by July 28, 2018. In addition, the court ordered the defendant to give juvenile offenders whose parole review is scheduled before July 28, 2018, the option to (1) go forward with their parole review as scheduled under the old procedures, (2) reschedule their parole review to a time when the new procedures are in effect, or (3) to proceed twice: once as scheduled under the old procedures and again after the new procedures go into effect. On March 22, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ordered that the case dismissed upon voluntary dismissal. Back to the District Court, on January 17, 2019, the parties filed a consent motion for attorneys’ fees and related expenses. On January 22, Judge Boyle granted the consent motion and awarded costs in the amount of $62,000 to plaintiff’s attorneys. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2010, an inmate serving a life sentence in North Carolina for a juvenile offense filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of a meaningful opportunity for parole in violation of <i>Graham v. Florida</i>, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court held that the parole review process employed by the Parole Commission for offenders convicted as juveniles and serving life sentences violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. Both parties submitted proposed plans to bring the parole review process into compliance. On Nov. 2, 2017, the court granted the plaintiff's request for injunctive relief and adopted the defendant's proposed plan. The defendant appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which was later voluntarily dismissed.


On September 13, 2006, a group of employees filed an amended class action complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 29 U.S.C. § 207 and § 216(b) against C.H. Robinson Worldwide in the United States District Court of Minnesota. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive, and declaratory relief, as well as actual, liquidated, and punitive damages, alleging that C.H. Robinson practiced sex discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that C.H. Robinson promoted a hostile work environment for women where they discriminated against in both compensation and promotions; and further, collective action was also taken on allegations that the defendant did not compensate salaried employees for overtime work. The action started on October 2, 2002, when the Carlson case was filed by a group of twelve female employees. The plaintiffs claimed gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000), including the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. They also alleged discrimination against salaried employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 29 U.S.C. § 207 and § 216(b). A similar suit brought by both female and male salaried employees under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 29 U.S.C. § 207 and § 216(b) in the case Johnson v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide. On November 27, 2002, the two cases were consolidated for discovery and pretrial with respect to the FLSA claims. On May 20, 2003, the Court (Judge Ericksen) granted a joint motion of both cases plaintiffs to maintain the FLSA claims as "collective actions" on behalf of all branch sales, operations and support employees. On June 6, 2003, notices were mailed to all branch sales, operations and support employees. The notices informed these individuals of their right to join the case in order to assert claims for unpaid overtime wages, and almost 300 women joined the Carlson case and over 400 men joined the Johnson case. After a lengthy and contested discovery period, the Court began to decide many of the claims. On March 31, 2005, the Court (Judge Ericksen) ruled on motions from both the plaintiffs and defendants. The Court dismissed many of the individual claims made from women in the Carlson suit, specifically dismissing claims of sexual harassment and a hostile work environment for the entire class of women. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 758602 WL 11 (D. Minn. 2005). The Court certified two classes of female employees. First, a compensation class, composed of full-time salaried female employees who worked at any CHR branch office at any time since August 17, 2000. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 758602 WL 47 (D. Minn. 2005). The second, a promotion class of women who were employed at any CHR office since August 17, 2000, and have more than two years' experience in a sales and/or operations position. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 758602 WL 47 (D. Minn. 2005). The Court, however, made it clear to sever the issues of liability and declaratory or injunctive relief from Plaintiffs' requests for monetary damages and certified only the issue of liability and request for declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court stated that if liability is established in either the compensation or promotion class, then the Court would consider Plaintiffs' motion to certify the damages phase as a class action. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 758602 WL 16 (D. Minn. 2005). On April 10, 2006, the day before the trial was supposed to take place, the two parties reached a tentative settlement agreement. With the help of Special Master John Borg acting as a mediator, the two parties settled on all of the claims in the second amended complaint, with the exception of the FLSA claims. At the parties' request the trial proceeded in the liability phase. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 2671105 WL 2 (D. Minn. 2006). On September 18th, 2006, the Court (Judge Ericksen) approved a joint consent decree. The settlement provided $15 million for damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Up to 1,500 women were eligible to receive compensation. Women who did not file claims still benefited from many aspects of the settlement, but the litigation did not end there as the FLSA claims still had to be addressed. On September 26, 2006, the Court (Judge Ericksen) ordered that the defendant's motion to decertify plaintiff's claims under the FLSA be granted. The Court, therefore, dismissed the opt-in plaintiffs without predjudice. The order was stayed for 30 days. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 2830015 WL 11 (D. Minn. 2005). According to the Court, the original collective action was allowed to proceed under a "conditional certification" of a representative class. If the District Court "conditionally certifies" the class, putative class members are given notice and the opportunity to "opt-in." The action proceeds as a representative action throughout discovery. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 2830015 WL 3 (D. Minn. 2005). The Court stated when a motion for "decertification" by the defendant usually filed after discovery is largely complete and the matter is ready for trial, at this stage, the Court has much more information on which to base its decision, and makes a factual determination on the similarly situated question. If the claimants are similarly situated, the District Court allows the representative action to proceed to trial. If the claimants are not similarly situated, the District Court decertifies the class, and the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice. The class representatives- i.e. the original plaintiffs-proceed to trial on their individual claims. Carlson et al v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, 2830015 WL 3 (D. Minn. 2005). In this case, the Court did not find plaintiffs to be similarly situated. Quickly after this decision by the court (Judge Ericksen), 171 women who joined the Carlson case for purposes of asserting their overtime pay claims re-filed separate lawsuits asserting those claims. An order of a multi-district litigation panel transferred all these cases back to the court. On July 3, 2007, the parties filed another joint settlement agreement on the FLSA claims and on July 5, 2007 the Court (Judge Ericksen) approved this agreement. Lastly, on February 20, 2008, the court approved a settlement agreement for the plaintiffs from the Johnson case. The case closed on 07/05/2007.

Summary: The case was brought by female employees of C.H. Robinson Worldwide against the company. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as actual, liquidated, and punitive damages. Plaintiffs alleged that C.H. Robinson had practiced sex discrimination as well as promoted a hostile work environment. The case was settled on September 18, 2006, and provided $15 million for damages, costs, and attorney's fees for plaintiffs. There was also injunctive relief awarded in the settlement.


On July 5, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act. More specifically, DOJ alleged that Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. discriminated against women on paid maternity leave by requiring the women to return to work before insuring their mortgages. This lawsuit originally arose after a loan applicant in Wexford, PA filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD referred the case to the DOJ after completing a thorough investigation of the complaint. In the months following the DOJ's initial filing of the suit's complaint, the two parties negotiated a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided $7500 in monetary damages to each woman impacted by Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp.'s previous policy as well as additional damages for the applicant in Wexford, PA who filed the initial complaint in Pennsylvania. The settlement agreement also required Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. to establish anti-discriminatory underwriting and practice policies. Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. agreed to train its managers and employees who underwrite mortgage insurance. Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. also agreed to a monitoring program designed to supervise compliance with the Order. The court (Judge Robert Mitchell) approved the consent order on April 30, 2012. The consent order resolved all claims set forth in the United States’ Complaint against the Defendants in this matter. It required eight semiannual reports on compliance with its terms, beginning October 2012, and was set to terminate in July 2016 unless the United States demonstrated good cause for extension. On March 14, 2013, the court approved the parties' joint motion for disbursement of funds. According to the consent order, defendant agreed to distribute any money remaining in the Settlement Fund to qualified organizations that conduct fair housing enforcement, fair lending enforcement, or educational activities addressing sex or familial status discrimination. The parties informed the Court that $30,000.00 plus accumulated interest remained in the Settlement Fund after the payments to the aggrieved persons who returned a release. The court approved the defendant's choices of two organizations that would receive the funds: The National Community Reinvestment Coalition and The Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council. The defendant was ordered to instruct each organization, as a condition of receiving the funds, that it must use the funds in a manner related to addressing sex and familial status discrimination in housing and lending. The terms also included that the organization submit a report to the defendant and the United States within one year after the funds are distributed detailing how it used the funds for such purposes. The docket shows no further activity after entry of the consent order, so presumably it closed according to schedule in July 2016.

Summary: On July 5, 2011, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed suit against Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corp. alleging that it had discriminated against women on paid maternity leave by requiring women on paid maternity leave to return to work before insuring their mortgages. In the months following DOJ's initial filing of the suit's complaint, the two parties negotiated a settlement agreement. The court [Judge Robert C. Mitchell] approved the consent order on April 30, 2012.


On April 8, 2013, pretrial detainees and unnamed members of the certified class in Schilling v. TransCor America, LLC, who did not settle with its named class members, filed this complaint in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Schilling is also available in this Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs sued TransCor and Does 1-100 (unnamed TransCor employees) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. TransCor is a company owned by Corrections Corporation of America which transports pretrial detainees and prisoners throughout the United States for federal, state, and local governments. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, had been transported by TransCor on behalf or local and/or state governments. The plaintiffs claimed that TransCor transported them sitting in vehicles, in full restraints including handcuffs, leg irons, waist chains, black boxes and connector chains for more that 59, 67, or 95 continuous hours, such that they were unable to sit down, stretch their limbs, or sleep. They were also deprived of exercise, hygiene, and medical care. The plaintiffs claimed that these conditions violated their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from unlawful conditions of confinement, use of excessive force, and cruel and unusual punishment, as well as other civil rights under the California Bane Civil Rights Act. They requested declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the plaintiff from transporting people in this way, certification as a class, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On May 24, 2013, Judge Susan Illston issued a notice that this suit was related to the Schilling case and would be reassigned to her. TransCor moved for a venue transfer to the Middle District of Tennessee. On August 27, 2013, Judge Illston granted that motion finding that while either venue was generally proper, Tennessee was more convenient as the location of TransCor's headquarters, non-party witnesses, and relevant documents. This case was transferred to the Middle District of Tennessee on August 29, 2013 and assigned to Judge Kevin H. Sharp. On October 31, 2013, TransCor filed a memorandum in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2013 WL 11429181. They argued that it would be inefficient for the court to hear this claim because it was brought by members of the Cedillo class, whose claim had arguably already been resolved to an extent, about issues that could or should have been brought in that case. They also argued that some of the individual class members' claims should be dismissed because they were barred by one-year statute of limitations applicable to federal civil rights claims heard in courts in Tennessee. The plaintiffs filed their response in opposition to the motion in November 2013. Almost two years later, on September 16, 2015, Judge Sharp granted in part and denied in part TransCor's motion for judgment on the pleadings. He dismissed the class claims, finding that they had already been litigated in the Schilling case in Judge Illston's partial grant for summary judgment. ("[A]llowing Plaintiffs a second bite at the apple would be inappropriate.") 2012 WL 3257659. Specifically, he reiterated Judge Illston's holding that while on a class-wide basis, the fact that class members were transported, restrained, and denied overnight sleep in a bed for 24 hours did not amount to a constitutional violation, she found that individual prisoners who were detained for longer periods or in different conditions with specific injuries could still seek relief. Judge Sharp held that that judgment was binding on all class members, even though the Schilling class was so broadly defined (detained for over 24 hours) so as to preclude the sub-classes in this litigation (detained for over 59, 67, or 95 hours) from obtaining relief as a class. With respect to the statute of limitations issue, he found that the applicable statute of limitations for each plaintiff’s claim was the law of the state in which the plaintiff’s trip with TransCor terminated and that the clock on these limitations had paused or tolled with the Schilling litigation. Under this analysis, he determined that all of the individual plaintiff's claims were not time-barred except for one plaintiff. Within a month of Judge Sharp's decision, that one plaintiff who had a time-barred claim appealed the court's dismissal of his individual claims to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On December 2, 2015, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the claim at his request. On January 22, 2016, the parties informed the court that they were discussing a possible settlement. On March 2, 2016, they informed the court that these settlement discussions had not been fruitful and requested the assistance of a magistrate judge. They also discussed potential limits on discovery if the litigation continued and remained sharply divided on whether discovery should be allowed with respect to identifying Does 1 -100, TransCor employees who were responsible for the named plaintiffs' care. On March 24, 2016, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Joe B. Brown. On March 31, 2016 and again on April 19, 2016, the parties held a conference with Judge Brown but were unable to come to an agreement. On June 9, 2016, Judge Brown issued a protective order to restrict information that pertained to specific business interests of TransCor. In June 2016, the parties began to share information with each other pursuant to their discovery agreement. On January 10, 2017, the parties filed a notice of settlement with the court. The parties did not file any settlement documents with the court, but instead later asked Judge Sharp to dismiss the case with prejudice. On March 13, 2017, Judge Sharp dismissed the case and it is now closed.

Summary: In April 2013, a group of pretrial detainees and prisoners filed this class action suit against a private prison transport company claiming the conditions under which detainees were transported were cruel and unusual; detainees were held, handcuffed and shackled, in cages too small to stand up or lie down in, denied adequate fluid, hygiene or medical care for as many as four days of travel. The plaintiffs were unnamed members of a previous class action which had been settled by the named plaintiffs only. The case was later settled between the company and plaintiffs.


On October 25, 2013, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program (ADAP) filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of Alabama. The plaintiff, which served as Alabama’s designated protection and advocacy program for people with disabilities, sued SafetyNet Youthcare, Inc. (SafetyNet) under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (PAIMI), the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (PADD Act), and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Program of 1993 (PAIR). The plaintiff alleged that SafetyNet had unlawfully failed to allow it, as Alabama’s Protection and Advocacy (P&A) provider, to monitor the defendant's facilities. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to grant ADAP access to facilities used for SafetyNet Academy, a program operated by the defendant for male youths with emotional or behavioral disabilities. The plaintiff claimed that, despite several attempts to explain to the staff at SafetyNet Academy why they were required by law to allow ADAP into all of the Academy's facilities for monitoring and investigation purposes, the defendant repeatedly refused to grant ADAP access to what it referred to as its Moderate Program. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction to compel the SafetyNet Academy to grant them reasonable access to the facilities. On December 2, 2013 – the same day the defendant filed an answer denying that it was required to allow the plaintiff access to its Moderate Program – it also filed a third-party complaint against the Alabama Department of Human Resources (DHR). SafetyNet claimed that, because it had acted on the advice and counsel of DHR, which served as its licensing authority, any potential violations on its own part were caused by DHR. On this basis, it sought indemnification from DHR for any recovery that may be received by the plaintiff against SafetyNet. Unable to agree on terms of a settlement, the parties proceeded with discovery. On September 19, 2014, all three parties moved for summary judgment. While the plaintiff held onto its position that it was allowed access to all of SafetyNet Academy’s programs, the defendants argued that because the individuals in the Moderate Program had moderate (rather than severe) mental illness, they were excluded from P&A protection. Shortly afterward, on October 14, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) submitted a statement of interest supporting the plaintiff’s position that summary judgment against the defendants was appropriate. The DOJ asserted that the defendant’s facilities at SafetyNet Academy fell squarely within the parameters of PAIMI regulations and, as such, the plaintiff must be granted reasonable unrestricted access to all of the academy’s programs. On December 12, 2014, Judge Callie V.S. Grande awarded summary judgment to the plaintiff, denying both defendants’ requests for summary judgment as well as SafetyNet’s request for indemnification and contribution against DHR. The judge found that, as a facility that provided residential treatment for individuals with mental illness and other disabilities, PAIMI, PADD, and PAIR applied to SafetyNet Academy. Rejecting defendants’ assertion that individuals with moderate mental illness may be excluded from P&A protection, she emphasized that the protections offered by these laws were intended to be broad in scope and did not define P&A access “one resident at a time.” Accordingly, Judge Grande held that ADAP was authorized to monitor all SafetyNet Academy programs and must be allowed reasonable access by law and awarded declaratory and permanent injunctive relief to the plaintiff. She also ordered ADAP and SafetyNet to meet and prepare a protocol for ADAP’s monitoring and investigation visits. Finally, the order denied SafetyNet’s request for indemnification against DHR and held that each party should bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs. 65 F.Supp.3d 1312. The parties met and submitted access protocol on January 30, 2015. In addition to describing ADAP’s scope of access to SafetyNet and its records, the protocol outlined procedures ADAP may follow should SafetyNet deny or delay access to its facilities in the future. Also following the grant of summary judgment, ADAP submitted a motion for reconsideration of the court’s denial of attorneys’ fees and costs. On February 11, 2015, Judge Grande issued an order awarding the plaintiff filing fees as the prevailing party. However, the order denied the plaintiff attorneys’ fees, citing a failure to raise an applicable exception to the American Rule stating that litigants are generally expected to bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs. 2015 WL 566946.

Summary: In the Southern District of Alabama in October 2013, the Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program brought this lawsuit against SafetyNet, Inc., claiming that the defendant had failed to allow the plaintiff access to its facilities as required by the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (PAIMI), the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 2000 (PADD Act), and the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Program of 1993 (PAIR). In December 2013, the defendant filed a third-party complaint against the Alabama Department of Human Resources. After all three parties moved for summary judgment, on December 12, 2014,the court granted the plaintiff’s motion, holding that the defendant was required to grant the plaintiff access to its facilities by law and awarding injunctive and declaratory relief to the plaintiff.


On June 1, 2004, The U.S. Department of Justice filed this federal lawsuit under Section 211 of Equal Education Opportunities Act and Section 407 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against the City of New York, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The Justice Department (the U.S. Attorneys Office and Civil Rights Division) filed its complaint and a settlement agreement simultaneously. The complaint alleged that there had been peer-on-peer harassment of Asian students and insufficient English Language Learner (ELL) programs to overcome language barriers. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that some students harassed Asian students based on their race and national origin and that Asian students who spoke English as a second language did not have equal access to educational opportunities because they could not understand English at the same level as their peers. Accordingly, the lawsuit sought an injunction against the City's failure to take appropriate action to help ELL students overcome language barriers that impeded their equal participation in the school's instructional programs. The Consent Decree was formally approved on June 22, 2004 and was set to last until August 30, 2007. This Consent Decree required defendants to develop a compliance and monitoring plan. Under its terms, the City agreed to change the ELL program to ensure students were placed in the appropriate classes and to increase the quality of the program itself. The defendants were also required to create a policy to prevent student-on-student harassment. The City filed the required compliance plan on October 15, 2004. On August 23, 2005, the District Court (Judge Carol B. Amon) agreed to a stipulated extension of the Decree's bilingual and ELL provisions for one year beyond the Consent Decree's original sunset date, till August 30, 2008. Nothing additional appears in the docket.

Summary: On June 1, 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York. The complaint claimed that there had been peer-on-peer harassment of Asian students and insufficient language programs to overcome language barriers. The parties entered into a Consent Decree on June 22, 2004 that lasted until August 30, 2008.


On December 1, 2011, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Divisions launched an investigation of the Meridian Police Department and the Lauderdale County Youth Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 14141 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. The DOJ expanded their investigation to include the Mississippi Division of Youth Services on June 29, 2012. On August 10, 2012, the DOJ published their findings that the agencies in question had violated the constitutional rights of the children under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The DOJ provided the agencies an opportunity to cure the offending behavior but no negotiations occurred. On October 24, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit against the agencies in the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. §14141. The government alleged that the defendants in the investigation collectively helped to operate a "school-to-prison pipeline." The government sought declaratory relief, an order permanently enjoining defendants from the alleged unlawful practices, an order requiring defendants to effectuate corrected polices, and other equitable relief. This was the first lawsuit brought under a "school-to-prison pipeline" legal theory. Under this theory, the government claimed that the defendants systematically incarcerated children in Meridian for allegedly committing minor offenses and punished children disproportionately without due process. The government alleged that the Meridian Police Department would automatically arrest students referred by the Meridian Public School District without assessing the nature of the referral and without probable cause. Students were not provided adequate information regarding their rights. Students were then commonly held for more than 48 hours while they awaited youth court "detention hearings" that did not meet the Due Process requirement of the Constitution. These acts violated the constitutional rights of the children under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. On December 7, 2012, defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on Younger abstention. On September 4, 2013, United States District Judge Henry T. Wingate denied the motion. Judge Wingate noted that the government's interest in eliminating a pattern or practice of constitutional violations was not necessarily identical to the interests of individual children facing delinquency proceedings in state court. Moreover, the government's interest was not so "intertwined" with such individuals so as to justify barring prospective relief to a person not a party to the challenged state actions. The government may have interests that transcends that of private state defendants. On December 26, 2013, the case was transferred to the Northern Division and assigned a new case number. During 2014 and early 2015, the parties engaged in discovery and negotiated out of court. The negotiations culminated in a March 4, 2015 telephone conference in which the parties, except for the defendant judges and Lauderdale County, announced that they had reached a settlement. After reviewing the settlements, Judge Wingate issued two opinions on September 18, 2015. The first granted a motion for settlement between the United States and the City of Meridian. The second granted a motion for settlement between the United States and the State of Mississippi, the Mississippi Department of Human Services, and the Mississippi Division of Youth Services. See DOJ 15-768 (D.O.J.), 2015 WL 3809399. Defendant Lauderdale County and the two individual defendants, judges of the Lauderdale County Youth Court, were not parties to either of the settlements. The first settlement focused on improving the conduct of the Meridian Police Department (MPD) in Meridian's public schools. It limited MPD's authority to arrest juveniles at school, required additional documentation of school-based arrests, and instituted reforms related to MPD training, complaint procedures, data collection, and coordination with the Meridian Public School District Police Department. The parties agreed that a Police Independent Auditor would supervise compliance and that the agreement would terminate after 12 consecutive months of "substantial compliance" by the City of Meridian. On March 18, 2016, the parties agreed on who should serve as Police Independent Auditor after a budget dispute, and Judge Wingate approved their choice on March 25, 2016. The second settlement focused on improving the conduct of the Mississippi Division of Youth Services (DYS), which managed probation for youths. It required DYS to inform youths on probation of the probation process and their rights within it, limited the ability of DYS to incarcerate youths for probation violations, increased procedural protections for youths on probation, and initiated training and community involvement programs. The parties agreed that a Probation Services Independent Auditor would supervise compliance and that the agreement would terminate after 12 consecutive months of "substantial compliance" by DYS. On January 5, 2016, the parties notified the court that they had agreed on the Probation Services Independent Auditor. Meanwhile, the case against defendant Youth Court judges continued. The judges had moved to dismiss the claims against them on November 25, 2014. The court finally granted their motions on September 30, 2017. The judges argued that they were protected by judicial immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents parties that lost in state courts from re-litigating their claims in federal court. Judge Wingate found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply because the United States did not seek to challenge a state court judgment against it. However, Judge Wingate granted defendants' motion under the theory of judicial immunity, which bars most claims against judges acting within their official capacities and jurisdiction, and declined the United States' invitation to apply 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to judges. The suit against Lauderdale County was dismissed as well, because it was "inextricably intertwined" with that against its judges. 2017 WL 6810621. On November 28, 2017, the United States appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. (Docket No. 17-60805). The Fifth Circuit finally issued an opinion on February 1, 2019, where it affirmed the district court. 914 F.3d 960. The case was subsequently dismissed. In the meantime, throughout 2016 and 2017, the independent auditors monitored compliance with the settlement agreements and submitted a number of status updates. On January 16, 2018, the Police Independent Auditor filed a final report which stated that the City of Meridian and the Meridian Police Department were in substantial compliance with all of the settlement's requirements. The parties agreed to transfer the responsibility for monitoring compliance from the independent monitor to the United States. The United States submitted its first compliance report on September 12, 2018, which found that the City of Meridian and its police remained in substantial compliance. In contrast, the Probation Services Independent Auditor's Fifth Report, filed on April 2, 2018, identified several areas in which the state was not in substantial compliance with the settlement agreement. While recognizing that the state had made progress, the Auditor found that the State had failed to fully meet its obligation to review its policies and procedures, draft new policies and procedures when necessary, and improve training as required by the agreement. The Auditor also noted that defendant Youth Court judges refused access to Youth Court files, possibly due to the continuing litigation against them. Both settlement agreements continued to be monitored. On May 23, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the first settlement, which governs MPD and Meridian public schools, on account of substantial compliance for 12 consecutive months. As of June 8, 2020, monitoring continues and the parties are awaiting a motion hearing on the motion to terminate.

Summary: On October 24, 2012, the United States filed a lawsuit against Meridian Police Department, the Lauderdale County Youth Court, and the Mississippi Division of Youth Services. The government alleged the novel theory that the defendants collectively helped to operate a "school-to-prison pipeline." Most of the defendants agreed to a settlement that continues to be monitored. Litigation against the remaining defendants was dismissed. Throughout 2016 and 2017 independent auditors monitored compliance with the settlement agreements. The independent auditor found the City of Meridian and its police department reached substantial compliance with their settlement agreement in January 2018. In May 2019, the parties moved to terminate this settlement agreement. This motion remains pending. In contrast to the City of Meridian and its police department, the independent auditors continued to note several areas in which the state was in noncompliance with its settlement agreement. Monitoring of the settlement with the state remains ongoing.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. This suit was filed on April 25, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The suit was brought by two individual plaintiffs, each blind, against Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson and Michigan Director of Elections Jonathan Brater. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The lawsuit argued that the system for administering absentee ballots was insufficient for blind people, especially regarding the lack of privacy and independence. This was especially important as Secretary of State Benson sent absentee ballot applications to all eligible Michigan voters amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. The suit alleged this insufficiency constituted a violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Moreover, a regulation pursuant to the ADA required any aid administered to protect the privacy and independence of people with disabilities. The plaintiffs also sued under Michigan state law, citing the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. This act prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities on the basis of that disability with regard to public services. They sought a preliminary and permanent injunction, requiring defendants to create a more accessible form of absentee voting, and declaratory relief. They also sought attorney's costs and fees. The plaintiffs simultaneously submitted a motion for a preliminary injunction. In addition to the claims made in the complaint, they also added that failure to provide adequate absentee voting systems would result in spread of the virus. The plaintiffs added that the balance of equities weighs in their favor and that they would suffer irreparable harm without the relief. The case was assigned to District Judge Gershwin A. Drain and Magistrate Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk. Three days later, on April 28, the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint, which left the claims more or less the same, but added the National Federation of the Blind of Michigan as a plaintiff. On May 1, in response to a motion for a temporary restraining order, the parties entered into a consent order which would make Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) ballots eligible to voters who swore to be blind or severely disabled. Voters were given until May 5 to register. However, by May 15, the parties agreed to a more comprehensive and longer-lasting consent order. The order required that defendants establish a remote accessible vote-by-mail system (RAVBM) by the August primary elections. If this were to become impracticable, defendants would have to inform the plaintiffs immediately and expand the (UOCAVA) system. The order lasted 30 months after the effective date. On June 29, the defendants submitted a status report which said that they found that implementing a RAVBM system by the time of the election would have been impracticable. Instead, they opted for expansion of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act system. However, this was not satisfactory to the plaintiffs. On the same day, they filed a motion to hold the defendants and their attorneys in civil contempt and to enforce the consent order. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had not made a good-faith effort to implement the RAVBM system, they failed to offer online absentee voting applications in an equal manner, and by failing to issue a timely press release. Regarding the failure to implement the RAVBM system, on July 13 the judge ordered defendants to continue with the UOCAVA system, to modify the online absentee ballot request system in order to make it more accessible, and to continue implementation of the RAVBM system. While the schedule for the last item would not make the RAVBM system ready by the primary election, it was to be fully implemented by September 10, 2020, well ahead of the November general election. The court did not rule on the motion to hold defendants in civil contempt in this order. The case is ongoing as of July 28, 2020.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed on April 25, 2020 amidst the COVID-19 outbreak. In response, Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson declared she would send absentee ballot applications to all eligible voters in the state. However, even with this expansion, the plaintiffs, two blind voters in Michigan, sued Benson and Michigan Director of Elections Jonathan Brater, arguing that the lack of private and independent vote-casting methods for the blind represented violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief, along with attorney's costs and fees. An amended complaint added the National Federation of the Blind of Michigan as a plaintiff. The parties came to an agreement by May 15, 2020 and entered into a consent order that would mandate the state to make voting more accessible to the blind and severely disabled. The case is ongoing as of July 28, 2020.


In this lawsuit, filed on August 15, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, two property owners challenged the Hazleton, Pennsylvania ordinance penalizing those who rent to or hire undocumented immigrants. This was the first city ordinance of its kind, and the lawsuit received a great deal of press. The ordinance, titled "Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance" (Immigration Ordinance), immediately served as a model for several dozen other cities' similar enactments. The brought the complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the ordinance violated the Supremacy Clause, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The complaint also argued that the ordinance exceeded Hazleton's police powers, and violated the fundamental right to contract conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. The same day that the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs sent a letter to the City requesting that it revoke the Immigration Ordinance at the council meeting that evening. The City declined and instead passed a companion ordinance titled "Tenant Registration Ordinance" (Registration Ordinance). Under threat of litigation, on September 1, 2006, the City entered a stipulation, filed with the District Court (Judge James M. Munley), to forego enforcement of the Immigration Ordinance until it gave the plaintiffs 20 days' notice and the plaintiffs agreed to forego seeking an injunction until there was an actual threat of enforcement. The City then began the process of passing a new version of the Immigration Ordinance; that new version was enacted on September 21, 2006, along with a third ordinance entitled the "Official English Ordinance." On October 30, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, challenging the amended ordinances (both the Immigration and the Registration Ordinances) and a motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The District Court granted plaintiffs' motion in part and entered a temporary restraining order on October 31, 2006. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 459 F.Supp.2d 332 (M.D. Pa. 2006). On November 1, 2006, the District Court entered a scheduling order setting the matter for a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and consolidated it with the trial on the merits. On November 11, 2006, the District Court extended the TRO for 120 days to allow the parties to conduct limited discovery and to fully brief the issues in advance of the Consolidated Trial, which would be set in January 2007. After discovery commenced, Plaintiffs moved for a protective order to allow plaintiffs to refrain from disclosing their identities and immigration status to defendants. The motion was granted over defendants' objection. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 239 F.R.D. 397 (M.D. Pa. 2006). On December 28, 2006, the City amended the Immigration Ordinance again, this time by adding an "implementation and process" section. Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, on January 12, 2007, to challenge the City's additional revisions to the Immigration and the Registration Ordinances. Defendant moved to dismiss and the plaintiffs in turn moved for summary judgment. The Court consolidated those motions with the trial. Several pre-trial rulings followed regarding contested evidentiary issues. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 241 F.R.D. 252 (M.D. Pa. 2007) and Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 3:06-cv-01586, 2007 WL 775589 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2007). The Court presided over the Consolidated Trial from March 12 through March 22, 2007. During the trial, the City again amended the Immigration Ordinance. The Court determined that it had jurisdiction to address only the new amended version, not prior versions. On July 26, 2007, the District Court (Judge Munley) issued a 206-page Decision and Verdict declaring the Immigration and the Registration Ordinances unconstitutional and permanently enjoining the City from enforcing the ordinances. Judge Munley found the ordinances were pre-empted by federal law and violated plaintiffs' due process rights. He concluded: "[t]he genius of our Constitution is that it provides rights even to those who evoke the least sympathy from the general public. In that way, all in this nation can be confident of equal justice under its laws. Hazleton, in its zeal to control the presence of a group deemed undesirable, violated the rights of such people, as well as others within the community. Since the United States Constitution protects even the disfavored, the ordinances cannot be enforced." Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F.Supp.2d 477, 555 (M.D. Pa. 2007). The City filed a notice of appeal on August 23, 2007. The notice was amended the next day. Plaintiffs moved for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. The District Court agreed to reserve ruling on the fee application pending defendant's appeal. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Judge Theodore McKee, Judge Richard Lowell Nygaard, and Judge Eugene Edward Siler) issued an opinion a full two years after hearing oral argument, on September 9, 2010. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the Immigration Ordinance's private cause of action, but did have standing to challenge the housing provisions of the Immigration and the Registration Ordinances. On the merits, the court found that the Act was preempted by federal law because the power "to effectively prohibit residency based on immigration status that is so clearly within the exclusive domain of the federal government." 620 F.3d. 170. Following the appellate court's ruling, the City petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear an appeal. On July 8, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and ordered the case remanded for further consideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, IM-AZ-0013. City of Hazleton, Pa. v. Lozano, 131 S. Ct. 2958 (2011). Following remand, the Third Circuit ordered further briefing in light of the Supreme Court's decision. On July 26, 2013, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the District Court's order, granted six years earlier to the day. The Third Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Theodore McKee, again concluded that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances were preempted by federal immigration law, and again affirmed the portion of the District Court's order enjoining enforcement of those provisions. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014). On remand to the District Court, the parties litigated the issue of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. The parties were ordered to participate in a settlement conference with a magistrate judge. On October 6, 2015, Judge James M. Munley of the District Court granted the Plaintiffs' petition for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $1,379,089.51 and $47,594.70 in costs. On January 4, 2016, the judgement was satisfied. The case is now closed.

Summary: In this 2006 case, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, a collection of public interest organizations challenged the Pennsylvania city of Hazleton's ordinance penalizing those who rent to or hire undocumented immigrants. This was the first city ordinance of its kind, and the suit received a great deal of press. The ordinance, titled "Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance" (Immigration Ordinance), immediately served as a model for several dozen other cities' similar enactments. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that found the Acts to be preempted by federal law and ordered reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting. The Third Circuit again found that portions of the Acts were preempted, and the Supreme Court refused to rehear the case.


On July 9, 2015, West Virginia residents with intellectual and developmental disabilities who participate in West Virginia's I/DD Waiver Program filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiffs sued the West Virginia Department of Heath and Human Resources (DHHR) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs, represented by Mountain State Justice, sought injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the West Virginia DHHR had not followed statutory guidance in determining the amount of waiver support they receive under the I/DD Waiver Program. Individuals under the I/DD waiver program receive waiver benefits which help them live outside institutions and be integrated into the community. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 28, 2015, alleging that in late September, DHHR changed the policy to appeal for additional benefits beyond a calculated level and began automatically or routinely denying efforts to move through the process to reinstate benefit levels above the calculations. They alleged they were at risk of being institutionalized or losing their placements in community-living settings. On October 13, 2015, DHHR filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under the ADA and Section 504. DHHR also moved to dismiss the claims of two plaintiffs as not ripe for judicial review. On November 12, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and a motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 13, 2016, District Judge Thomas E. Johnston granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to the extent that the requested preliminary injunction restored the named plaintiffs' individualized waiver benefits. 2016 WL 4870284. The Court found that each of the relevant factors weighed in favor of granting a preliminary injunction: (1) plaintiffs made a sufficient showing that they had a high likelihood of success in their claim that the defendant infringed on their procedural due process rights; (2) plaintiffs demonstrated that they were likely to suffer irreparable harm because the denial of funds could deprive them of needed services and potentially result in institutionalization; (3) given the fact that the plaintiffs were some of the most vulnerable members of society, the harm to them outweighed the state's budgetary considerations; and (4) plaintiffs demonstrated that a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. On September 30, 2016, Judge Johnston denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class was defined as "All persons who were or will be at any time on or after October 1, 2014, qualified individuals with disabilities resident in West Virginia who are eligible recipients of I/DD Home and Community-Based Waiver program services and subject to a benefit and service eligibility process utilizing APS’s proprietary budget-calculation algorithm." Following class certification, the plaintiffs filed a motion to extend the injunctive relief to class members. During the briefing period for the motion to extend, the defendant filed a motion to modify or vacate the preliminary injunction. The state had developed a new service authorization system, which it argued satisfied the Court’s concerns expressed when granting the preliminary injunction. Specifically, the new authorization system replaced the prior proprietary algorithm with a budget matrix employing a number of clearly identified variables based on a combination of a member’s living situation and answers to specific questions during the member’s annual assessment. Additionally, the state updated its budget letter, created an exceptions process to resolve disputes, and refined policies to make it clear that services in excess of the budget can be authorized when necessary to avoid a heightened risk of institutionalization. On September 20, 2017, Judge Johnston denied without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion to extend, finding that the plaintiffs failed to make an adequate preliminary injunction showing in light of DHHR's new authorization system. At that time, the Court declined to resolve DHHR's motion to vacate or modify because the defendant had indicated an intention of implementing the new authorization system, which would necessitate another round of briefing. On March 26, 2018, Judge Johnston granted the defendant's motion to modify or vacate to the extent that it requested that the Court modify the injunction to allow DHHR to implement the proposed service authorization system as to the named plaintiffs. 2018 WL 1513295. The Court found that the due process deficiencies present in the old system were not present in the new system. The new system involved budget determinations that were individualized and based on transparent and discernible standards, and it gave plaintiffs a way to challenge errors in budget calculations and appeal adverse decisions. DHHR filed a motion to dismiss, and in the alternative a motion for summary judgment, on July 2, 2018. On that same date, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. On September 25, 2018, Judge Johnston denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted in part DHHR's motion. The Court granted DHHR's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims as moot, but denied DHHR's motion insofar as it requested summary judgment. The Court found that the plaintiffs' claims against DHHR were moot because the system challenged in the complaint had been replaced. DHHR had met its burden of showing that there was no probability that it would return to the old system and it had overcome the voluntary cessation exception to mootness. The Court said that any challenges to the new system would be better addressed in a subsequent lawsuit. On January 17, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees and costs. In the next few months, the parties filed motions to extend the time to respond to the motion for attorneys' fees and cost, which were granted. Then on August 13, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw their motion for attorneys' fees and costs because the parties had resolved the issue privately. The next day, Judge Johnston granted the motion to withdraw the motion for attorneys' fees and denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. On August 19, 2019, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, and two days later Judge Johnston dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, West Virginia residents with intellectual and developmental disabilities who depend of the I/DD Waiver Program for support filed a class action suit against the Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). This suit asks for declaratory and injunctive relief. On September 13, 2016, the Court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Court then granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Around this time, DHHR developed a new authorization system to replace the prior challenged system. In March 2018, the Court granted DHHR's motion to modify or vacate the preliminary injunction so that DHHR could implement its new system. On September 25, 2018, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted DHHR's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs' claims against DHHR were moot given the new system. The parties privately resolved the matter of attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.