On June 1, 2015, a young man with cerebral palsy and his caretaker filed this suit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued Prince George's County, Maryland and the District of Columbia as well as their respective police departments under 42 U.S.C. §1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1231 (Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. § 701, and various state laws. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, asked the court for compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and appropriate injunctive relief. Along with other Fourth Amendment violations, the plaintiffs claimed that the force used by the Prince George's County Police Department was excessive. The plaintiffs also claimed that the police departments had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act for not having training and protocols in place for arrests of individuals with disabilities. The events that precipitated the lawsuits were alleged as follows. The plaintiff was waiting at a bus stop on his way to run errands. Members of the Prince George's County Police Department had made their way into the District of Columbia to search for car thieves. The officers noticed the plaintiffs sitting at the bus stop and gave him unfriendly looks. The officers claim this was because he matched the subject's description. Because the stares of the police officers made him uncomfortable, the plaintiff began to head back towards his house. The police then confronted the plaintiff. The officer asked for the plaintiff's identification and the plaintiff presented the officer with his disability identification card. The officer eventually followed the plaintiff into his apartment complex. From there, the complaint alleges that neighbors and the plaintiff's caretaker got involved. The caretaker first entered the scene seeing the plaintiff sprawled on the steps, the much larger officer standing above him, TASER in hand. The plaintiff was able to get free of the officer and fled into his apartment. The officer drew his firearm, waving it at the neighbors who had congregated and proceeded to call for backup instead of attempting to deescalate the situation. All the while, the plaintiff's caretaker and neighbor tried to explain to the officer that the plaintiff was disabled, and was, in fact, not capable of driving a car, let alone stealing a car. Eventually there were 29 police vehicles parked on the plaintiffs' block. The officers, some from the Prince George's County Sheriff's Office, the Prince George's County Police Department, and the District of Columbia's Metropolitan Police Department, entered the plaintiff's apartment without a warrant, with firearms drawn. When they found the plaintiff in his bathroom, they allegedly beat him. The plaintiff was marched outside in handcuffs, sent to the hospital-with heavy bruising, lacerations, and a TASER spike lodged in his back. The hospital remanded him to the Metropolitan Police Department, and he was detained overnight. According to the complaint, no attempt was made to contact the plaintiff's family when the sole charge against him, misdemeanor assault of a police officer, was not prosecuted. The plaintiff's uncle found the plaintiff wandering, scared and confused, around the outside of the courthouse. After the complaint was filed, the different parties each filed motions to dismiss. Prince George's County filed their motion on November 19, 2015 and the District of Columbia filed their motion to dismiss on December 1, 2015. Two of the officers of the Prince George's County Police Department were served in September of 2015 but failed to respond to the claims. On January 13, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for default judgment against the officers, who, a day later, filed a joint answer in the hopes that it would be accepted. The court (Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson) allowed the answer, saying in a minute order on January 14, 2016, that though neither officer sought leave to file the late answer, the court had a preference for deciding cases on the merits instead of on technicalities. The officers, also on January 14, 2016, filed their own motion to dismiss. On May 11, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, which dropped the official-capacity charges against the officers. Therefore, the motion to dismiss filed by the two Prince George's County officers was denied as moot. In the same minute order that denied the motion to dismiss, Judge Jackson issued a stay on the obligation of individual defendants to respond to the second amended complaint. The second amended complaint also added charges against a new defendant: the state of Maryland. Specifically, Maryland was charged with violating the ADA. On May 16, 2016, the state of Maryland filed a motion to dismiss, and the case against Maryland was voluntarily dismissed on May 27, 2016. On June 20, 2016, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest in the case. In the statement, the DOJ asserted that arrest procedures were specifically considered during the drafting process of the ADA, and that the DOJ had in interest in the case not being dismissed. On July 27, 2016, Judge Jackson denied Prince George's County and the District of Columbia's motions to dismiss and lifted the stay on the individual officer's obligations to respond to the second amended complaint, setting a due date in September. However, five days later on August 1, 2016, Prince George's County and its Police Officers filed a motion to bifurcate the case, hoping to separate the Monell claims from the individual claims. The defendants argued that the individual claims should be tried first, for convenience's sake. If the jury found that the plaintiff's rights had not been violated, then there could be no claim against the county or the district. Additionally, the defendants made the argument that even if the jury found against the individual officers, the monetary damages received would "obviate the need for a second trial." Finally, the defendants argued that the discovery information obtained and presented in arguing the custom of police brutality and disregard of the ADA that would be needed for the court or jury to find against Prince George's County would unfairly prejudice the jury or court against the individual officers. On August 26, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition of the motion to bifurcate. They argued that the efficiency cited by the defendants was purely speculative and that staying discovery for the Monell claims until the possible second trial would be unfairly prejudicial against the plaintiffs. In the introduction, the plaintiffs implicitly asserted that in combination with the motions to dismiss, the bifurcation was simply a continuation of a pattern of attempts to prevent any discovery on the discriminatory practices of Prince George's County. On September 14, 2016, Judge Jackson denied the motion for bifurcation without prejudice. Specifically, she stated that because the individual answers to the second amended complaint had not been filed, and because there was yet no discovery schedule set for the trial, the motion was premature. She stated that she would consider any motions for stays of discovery or bifurcation at a more appropriate time. The officers answered the second amended complaint, and on October 7, 2016, the charged officers of the MPD filed a motion to dismiss. This time, the officers asserted that the charges against them were too vague to know whether or not they could claim qualified immunity. On October 13, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint. As compared to the first complaint, it dropped the original due process claims and the claim based on the DC Human Rights Act Violation. Meanwhile, it added unlawful entry claims and negligent infliction of emotional distress in addition to the original intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The third amended complaint also added a claim under section of 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and added a section on the administrative notice the plaintiffs gave to both the District of Columbia and Prince George's County. The court initially refused to rule on the defendant's qualified immunity claim because it found neither party had developed the argument sufficiently. After several months of supplemental briefing, the court held a motion hearing on the issue in April of 2017, and denied the motion to dismiss on September 1, 2017. 264 F. Supp. 3d 154. The court found that the complaint sufficiently stated a claim against the officers even though it did not allege exactly what actions each particular officer took. The defendants filed a second motion to bifurcate and stay discovery on November 16, 2017, which the court granted in part and denied in part on January 16, 2018. Specifically, the court concluded that bifurcation of the Monell claims was appropriate for the purposes of trial, but that to avoid undue prejudice to the plaintiffs, the existing discovery schedule would proceed as to all claims. It went on to explain that after summary judgment, any surviving non-Monell claims would proceed to trial. After the initial trial, if there was reason to proceed on the Monell claims, a second trial addressing those would follow. Since then, litigation has continued over various discovery disputes and the parties appear to have engaged in some settlement efforts. On September 24, 2018, the parties filed a joint consent to mediation by Magistrate Judge, and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Deborah A. Robinson for mediation. While a settlement conference was initially scheduled for November of 2018, was rescheduled a number of times and was never actually held. On April 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preservation order for Prince George County defendants regarding the preservation of evidence. A discovery hearing was held before Judge Meriweather on May 20, 2019. The same day, at the request of the court, the plaintiffs filed a notice of discovery. The plaintiffs requested production of documents. On October 29, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case against the Prince George County defendants because the parties had reached a private settlement. The claims against the D.C. defendants had not been resolved and were still subject to ongoing litigation. Three days layer, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Robin M. Meriweather for full case management. The case was administratively stayed on March 11, 2020 by Judge Meriweather because of the pending settlement. On May 28, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal against all defendants because the parties had settled the matter privately. As of July 16, 2020, the court had not yet issued an order to dismiss the case with prejudice.

Summary: A young man with cerebral palsy filed this suit in the District Court of the District of Columbia on June 1, 2015. After an encounter with Prince George's County police left him physically injured, emotionally scarred, and without any criminal charges, he alleged that the DC Metropolitan Police Department and the Prince George's County Police Department had violated his Fourth Amendment constitutional rights, common law, and had failed to adapt their arrest practices in compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2019, the plaintiffs settled with the Prince George County defendants, and in 2020, the plaintiffs settled with the D.C. defendants. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.


On April 11, 1996, prisoners of the state of New Jersey filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Social Justice at the Seton Hall University School of Law, were a class of mentally ill inmates who alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by the denial of treatment and medication for their mental disorders. On July 30, 1999, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey (Judge Anne E. Thompson) approved a settlement agreement in the case. The agreement consisted of five major parts: 1) amendments to the DOC disciplinary regulations, 2) a mental health treatment plan, 3) a statement on new policies and procedures by the DOC, 4) the funding, monitoring, and enforcement of the settlement, and 5) the liability of the defendants. D.M. v. Terhune, 67 F.Supp.2d 401 (D.N.J. 1999). On August 3, 1999, the district court (Judge Thompson) closed the case.

Summary: Mentally ill inmates in the state of New Jersey,represented by the Center for Social Justice at the Seton Hall University School of Law, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against the New Jersey Department of Corrections (DOC) alleging their Constitutional rights had been violated by the denial of treatment and medication. The parties reached a court-approved settlement amending policies and addressing treatment plans, funding, monitoring, and liability. The case is closed.


On September 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a class of non-Latter Day Saints employees, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Arizona, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against the University of Phoenix, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against a class of employees who were not members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints by treating them less favorably with regard to their terms and conditions of employment and retaliating against them for their complaint of discrimination. On April 18, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint adding Apollo Group, Inc. as a defendant. On May 2, 2008, the District Court (Judge Mary H. Murguia) granted and denied in part the plaintiff-intervenors' motions to intervene. On May 20, 2008, the District Court (Judge Murguia), among other things, granted the plaintiffs' motion for certification (text entry only; no PDF available). On May 21, 2008, the District Court (Judge Murguia) denied the defendant's motion for reconsideration. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges William Cameron Canby, Jr. and Edward Leavy) but its petition for permission to appeal was denied on August 14, 2008. Then, on September 19, 2008, the District Court (Judge Murguia) permitted the plaintiffs to construct their case as one involving a pattern or practice of discrimination. On November 7, 2008, the District Court (Judge Mary H. Murguia) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to issue letters of apology, pay the class members $1,875,000, and pay private counsel fees in the amount of $100,000.

Summary: On September 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a class of non-Latter Day Saints employees, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Arizona, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against the University of Phoenix, Inc. and Apollo Group, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendants engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against a class of employees who were not members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints by treating them less favorably with regard to their terms and conditions of employment and retaliating against them for their complaint of discrimination. On November 7, 2008, the District Court (Judge Mary H. Murguia) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to issue letters of apology, pay the class members $1,875,000, and pay private counsel fees in the amount of $100,000.


On January 30, 2014, a three year-old child was killed by her mother and her mother’s boyfriend. In the week leading up to the child’s death, her grandmother had contacted both the Napa Police Department and the Napa County Child Welfare Services, informing individual defendants of the dangerous environment that the child was in living with her mother and mother’s boyfriend. On May 29, 2015, the child’s father, on his own behalf and also as the decedent’s successor in interest, along with her grandmother and grandfather filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The parties were represented by private counsel. They brought suit against the City of Napa and Napa County, as well as against a number of individual employees of the Napa Police Department and Napa County Child Welfare Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state tort law causes of action. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants, by their violation of mandatory duties to investigate and/or report child abuse and/or neglect, in part caused the death of three year-old plaintiff, violating their Fourteenth Amendment substantive and procedural due process rights. The plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. The injunctive relief sought included policies and procedures for compliance with mandatory duties for handling reports and investigations of child abuse and/or neglect, prohibition of the “code of silence” among law enforcement officers, and changes to law enforcement officer training surrounding mandatory duties. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero but was reassigned to Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong on June 3, 2015. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 1, 2015, further developing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims. In response, the defendants moved to dismiss the case on September 4. On December 12, 2015, the judge issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The order dismissed the substantive and procedural due process claims, among others, with leave to amend, and allowed the plaintiffs’ state law claims to proceed. In response to the order, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on January 7, 2016 in attempts to remedy the deficiencies of the earlier complaint. The defendants again moved to dismiss on April 20, 2016 and filed a motion to stay the action. Judge Armstrong denied the motion to stay on June 9, 2016, but granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss on December 7, 2016. The latter order dismissed all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, without further leave to amend. In response to the December 7 order, plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on December 14, 2016, appealing the dismissal of their federal claims. USCA 16-17304. While the appeal was pending, parties began settlement negotiations in the fall of 2017, which culminated with the finalization of a settlement agreement on December 6, 2018. The case was settled for $5,000,000, as well as non-monetary relief in the form of policy and training changes. These changes included instituting explicit cross-reporting requirements and clarifying mandatory reporting duties. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their pending appeal on December 20, 2018. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2014, the father and grandparents of a deceased child filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, [seeking damages and injunctive relief]. The plaintiffs alleged that, by their failure to report and investigate, defendants, in part, caused the death of the three year-old child. In 2018, the parties came to a settlement that included both policy changes and monetary damages.


On August 11, 2016, the non-profit, Girls Rock, and four students of South Carolina public schools, filed this lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of South Carolina and the heads of twelve South Carolina Police Departments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for a declaratory judgement that two South Carolina codes, commonly referred to as the "Disturbing Schools" statute and the “Disorderly Conduct” statute violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They further asked for injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the statutes. The plaintiffs claimed that the statutes set an impossible standard for students to follow and made it next to impossible for students to speak out against mistreatment or unfair punishment. The plaintiffs also claimed that the statutes violated due process because they were unjustifiably vague. Further, the plaintiffs pointed to evidence that the statutes disproportionately affected black students. One named plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old African American girl, was a former student of a South Carolina public school. While in math class one day, she and other students watched as a School Resource Officer flipped a classmate onto the floor in her desk, yanked her from the overturned desk, dragged her across the floor, and handcuffed her. (She had been caught texting in class and refused to leave her seat.) The plaintiff called out for someone to stop the violence and began documenting the event; she was then herself arrested under the Disturbing Schools statute and held in an adult detention center for several hours. With the complaint, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to certify class and a motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 8, 2016, U.S. District Judge C. Weston Houck held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction, and on the defendants’ motion to strike class action certification. On March 3, 2017, the court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 20, 2017, the defendants moved for attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal to the Fourth Circuit on this order to dismiss on March 22, 2017. Shortly after, the district court granted a motion to stay proceedings on the defendants’ fees and expenses motion pending resolution of the appeal. On April 6, 2018, the Fourth Circuit overturned the dismissal, finding the plaintiffs’ allegations sufficient to allege injury in fact. 885 F.3d 280. The court held that students faced a credible threat of future arrest or prosecution under the challenged laws, and so the Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the decision of the district court. The case was reassigned to Judge Margaret B. Seymour. The defendants again moved to dismiss the complaints. The plaintiffs and the police department defendants entered into a consent agreement to stay proceedings on May 15, 2018, recognizing that a bill in the South Carolina Legislature, if passed, would make changes to the current Disturbing Schools law. The police department defendants withdrew all pending renewed motions to dismiss and objections to the plaintiffs’ class certification, and the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss all claims against the police department defendants with prejudice upon a final judgment on claims against the remaining defendants. The plaintiffs further agreed to seek attorneys’ fees and costs from the other defendants should the plaintiffs prevail in the litigation, and the police department defendants agreed to not seek fees from the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs continued to pursue claims against the Attorney General of South Carolina. They filed an amended complaint on May 16, 2019, adding another individual plaintiff. In addition, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as well as a motion to dismiss or strike class action allegations on June 6, 2019. The court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss on March 30, 2020. The court reasoned, among other things, that although one of the plaintiffs was no longer in school, her claims, being of a transitory nature, were not moot. In addition, the court found that as no pleadings had made clear that the class in this matter cannot be certified, it would be premature to rule on the validity of the class allegations at this time. As of August 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 11, 2016, the nonprofit Girls Rock, together with four students of South Carolina public schools, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Attorney General of South Carolina and the heads of 12 South Carolina police departments under U.S. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court for a declaratory judgement that two South Carolina codes, commonly referred to as the “Disturbing Schools” statute and the “Disorderly Conduct” statute, were unconstitutional. The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the decision. The plaintiffs and law enforcement defendants reached a consent agreement on May 15, 2018. The claims against the South Carolina Attorney General are ongoing as of August 11, 2020.


On May 4, 2017, two residents of Detroit, Michigan, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of State for the State of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs, represented by the Sugar Law Center and Equal Justice Under Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to District Judge Linda V. Parker. The plaintiffs claimed that, in automatically and indefinitely suspending the driver’s licenses of people who owe court-ordered fines, costs, fees, and assessments, even if they simply cannot afford pay, the defendants had violated their equal protection and substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. On the same day as filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the defendant from suspending the driver’s licenses of people who are unable to pay their court debts. On July 17, 2017, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, or, alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The defendant asked the court to dismiss all claims, arguing that the claims lacked subject matter jurisdiction and lacked merit as a matter of law. On December 14, 2017, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Parker reasoned that, while the plaintiffs were unlikely to establish equal protection or substantive due process violations, the court found a strong likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed in establishing a procedural due process violation. 2017 WL 6379676. The defendant appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The defendant also filed an emergency motion to stay court proceedings pending the appeal, arguing that the preliminary injunction is substantively improper where the defendant, not the plaintiffs, will suffer irreparable harm, and that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits. On December 21, 2017, disagreeing, Judge Parker denied the motion to stay noting the defendants failed to establish irreparable harm. 2017 WL 6540926. In response to this denial, the Sixth Circuit entered an order on December 28, 2017, granting a thirty day stay of the preliminary injunction. The Sixth Circuit concluded that the injunction was too broad in scope and provided too little direction as to what specific actions should have been taken to comply with the constitutional due process requirements. As such, the appeals court remanded to the district court for the limited purpose of modifying the injunctive relief granted, after any necessary briefings or evidentiary hearings, to provide direction to the defendant as to the type of process required by the district court’s order. In light of the Sixth Circuit order to stay the injunction, Judge Parker gave an order amending the preliminary injunction and scheduling a hearing so that the parties may raise any questions or concerns they have regarding the district court’s intended modification of the injunctive relief. After the hearing, reasoning that the Sixth Circuit’s December 2017 remand order did not invite it to revisit the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, Judge Parker gave specific instruction as to what was required by the preliminary injunction on January 24, 2018. The district court enjoined the defendant from suspending any further driver’s licenses of individuals because of nonpayment and required the defendant to (1) offer drivers the option to request a hearing where they have the opportunity to demonstrate their inability to pay a fine, cost, fee and/or assessment; (2) provide a hearing when requested; (3) provides reasonable notice to drivers of the hearing opportunity; and (4) institutes alternatives to full payment for those unable to pay (e.g., realistic payment plans or volunteer service). In response to this decision, the defendants filed another appeal. On February 7, 2018, the Sixth Circuit entered an order granting a stay of the amended preliminary injunction and, finding that the district court’s jurisdiction over this case was unclear, remanded to the district court to address the plaintiffs’ standing. The judges were Circuit judges Judge Ralph B. Guy, Jr. and Ronald Lee Gilman and District Judge Joseph M. Hood sitting my designation. On April 11, 2018, the district court issued an opinion and order to address the plaintiffs’ standing and ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion seeking leave to filed an amended complaint and a motion for class certification. 2018 WL 1737122. Ultimately, the district court found that the plaintiffs had standing. With regard to the plaintiff’s motion, however, Judge Parker found that the motion to certify class was premature. While the district court found that at least one of the plaintiffs had standing to pursue this lawsuit on behalf of the putative class, that finding undoubtedly will be included as an issue for review by the Sixth Circuit in the pending appeal. As such, the court found it would make little sense for it to decide whether that plaintiff was typical of the putative class and whether she was an adequate class representative. Additionally, the district court found that it would be futile for the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint to add plaintiffs because the parties the plaintiffs seek to add would lack standing. On May 8, 2019, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s order enjoining the driver’s license suspension law. In her opinion, Circuit Judge Alice Batchelder (joined by Circuit Judge Amul Thapar) held that the policy does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Batchelder admitted that the plaintiffs' argument had some merit as a matter of policy but fell short as a constitutional argument because the court's review of state legislative choices is deferential. In her dissent, Circuit Judge Bernice Bouie Donald contended that the plaintiffs had a protected property interest in continued possession of a driver's license. In balancing the relevant interests, Judge Donald argued that the license-suspension scheme violated the plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights. On December 3, 2019, the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for a rehearing en banc. In the district court, Judge Parker ordered that the case be dismissed on February 24, 2020, pursuant to a settlement agreement stipulated to by the parties. The case was dismissed without prejudice and without costs or attorney fees to any party. As of March 2, 2020, the Clearinghouse does not have access to the terms of the settlement agreement.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by two Detroit, Michigan residents, whose driver's licenses were taken away because they could not pay parking fines, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had violated the plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process as well as equal protection rights. The Sixth Circuit held that the license-suspension law did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the State of Michigan from enforcing its in-person signature requirement in order for candidates to be placed on the ballot. The District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, which the defendants appealed. The Sixth Circuit granted a stay of part of the preliminary injunction. The election was held on August 4, and the case was dismissed on September 2.
 On March 31, 2020, a candidate for the United States House of Representatives in Michigan's 11th District filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff sued the Governor, Secretary of State, and other state officials for an injunction barring the defendants from enforcing the April 21 deadline for candidates to submit a certain number of signatures in order to have their names placed on the ballot. The case was assigned to Judge Terrence G. Berg. On April 14, 2020, a Michigan resident seeking a nomination to the 47th District Court Judge incumbent position filed a motion to intervene. On April 15, 2020, a Michigan resident who is an independent candidate for President filed a pro se motion to intervene as a plaintiff. On April 20, 2020, Judge Berg granted the motion for the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 1910154. He found that the State's decision to enforce both the stay-at-home order and the statutory ballot-access requirements violated both the First and Fourteenth Amendments and imposed a severe burden on the plaintiff's ability to seek elected office. As a part of the injunction, Judge Berg ordered that candidates who submitted fifty percent of the required signatures could appear on the ballot. On April 21, 2020, the defendant appealed the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The defendant requested that the district court stay enforcement of the preliminary injunction until the Sixth Circuit could rule on the appeal. On April 25, 2020, Judge Berg denied the defendants' motion, finding that the new evidence the defendants presented would not have changed the court's decision to reduce the signature requirement by fifty percent. On May 5, 2020, the Sixth Circuit granted the motion in part to stay the preliminary injunction. Judges Alice M. Batchelder, Jane B. Stranch, and John K. Bush found that the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ballot-access initiative was acceptable. However, they found that Judge Berg's remedy--reducing Michigan's signature requirement by 50%, counting electronic signatures, and extending the filing deadline--usurped Michigan's right to conduct its own elections and stayed that portion of the preliminary injunction. Judge Stranch also dissented in part, arguing that only the question of whether the district court could reduce Michigan's signature requirement by 50% was before the court. 2020 WL 2185553. Shakira Hawkins, a judicial candidate, filed a motion to intervene on May 11 and a motion for TRO and preliminary injunction on May 12. She sought to prevent the defendants from enforcing their March 10 cutoff for forming a candidate committee, claiming that the Sixth Circuit had previously rejected such actions as unconstitutional. Her motion to intervene was granted on May 13. In a response to the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on May 15, the defendants requested that any injunctive relief should be limited to Ms. Hawkins alone. On May 18, Lynn M. Maison, another judicial candidate, also filed a motion to intervene. As of May 18, three judicial candidates - Matt Savich, Deana Beard, and Shakira Hawkins – have successfully intervened in this action. Armand Velardo, a Macomb County Probate Court Judge candidate, also submitted an amicus brief on May 19 in support of the defendant, claiming that ruling for the plaintiff would allow circumvention of the law requiring timely disclosure, while penalizing others who had followed it. On May 20, the District Court granted the preliminary injunction, noting that that the exclusion of candidates from the accommodations offered by the State based on the March 10th deadline was not narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling state interest. They also noted that limiting relief to Ms. Hawkins alone would not be in the public interest as there would be other candidates in substantially the same position, and enjoined the defendants from enforcing its ballot-access provisions. Lynn M. Maison's motion to intervene was also granted. 2020 WL 2556754. On July 27, Brenda K. Sanders, who was seeking nomination as an Independent Candidate for U.S. Congress, sought to intervene. The court denied the motion on July 30, finding that Sanders sought to extend the filing deadline or decrease the number of requisite signatures for the November 3, 2020 general election ballot, which was a different remedy than the plaintiff's originally sought, which was for the August 4th primary. They further noted that allowing intervention would potentially delay the adjudication of the original parties’ claims. Michigan adopted a series of accommodations regarding ballot access for the August 4 ballot as per preliminary injunction, including extended filing deadline and reduced signature requirement, and the primary was held as scheduled. In August, the court issued a show-cause order explaining why this case should not be dismissed as moot, given that the focus of the requested relief had now passed. The plaintiff did not submit a response, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice on September 2. The court noted that the plaintiff-intervenors qualified as "prevailing parties" and were therefore eligible to apply for attorney's fees, since the court had granted their preliminary injunction and granted them relief which allowed them to appear on the ballot. On September 9, the Sixth Circuit directed the district court to dismiss the case. The plaintiffs sought attorney fees.

Summary: This is a lawsuit seeking to enjoin the State of Michigan from enforcing its in-person signature requirement in order for candidates to be placed on the ballot. The District Court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the challenged voting laws and replacing them with new rules, which the defendants appealed. The Sixth Circuit upheld the injunction against enforcement of Michigan's in-person signature requirement but stayed the district court's new rules, arguing that the judge lacked the power to re-write Michigan's election laws. The election was held on August 4, and the case was dismissed on September 2.


On October 20, 2014, the Campaign for Southern Equality and two same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of Mississippi. The Campaign for Southern Equality is a non-profit organization based in North Carolina that works to promote the legalization of same-sex marriage. The two couples lived in Mississippi. One couple sought to get married in the state and the other sought to have their marriage, performed in another part of the country, legally recognized in the state. The plaintiffs asked the court to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the state from enforcing Mississippi Code Section 93-1-1(2) and Section 236A of Article 14 of the Constitution of Mississippi, claiming that by defining marriage as only between a man and a woman, the laws deprived same-sex couples of the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also sought the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees related to the lawsuit. On November 25, 2014, the United States District Court (Judge Carlton W. Reeves) entered an order enjoining the enforcement of Mississippi Code Section 93-1-1(2) and Section 236A of Article 14 of the Constitution of Mississippi. The court (Judge Reeves) found that Mississippi's ban on same-sex marriage did violate the couples' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court stayed its decision for 14 days, to allow the state a chance to appeal. Campaign for S. Equality v. Brant, 64 F. Supp. 3d 906, (S.D. Miss. 2014). On November 26, 2014, the State of Mississippi filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The Court of Appeals stayed Judge Reeves' injunction pending resolution of the appeal. Campaign for S. Equality v. Bryant, 773 F.3d 55 (5th Cir. 2014). Oral arguments were heard on January 9, 2015. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), holding that state bans on same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. That same day, the plaintiffs in this case filed a motion with the Court of Appeals seeking to have the stay lifted and the district court order summarily affirmed. The motion noted: "Defendant-Appellant Jim Hood, in his official capacity as Mississippi Attorney General, does not oppose this motion. Defendant-Appellant Phil Bryant, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Mississippi, opposes this motion." On July 1, 2015, the Fifth Circuit issued a mandate affirming the preliminary injunction, remanding the the case for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, and vacating the stay entered by the Fifth Circuit. 791 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2015). The same day, the District Court (Judge Reeves) issued a permanent injunction in this case, enjoining the enforcement of Mississippi's same-sex marriage ban in light of the Obergefell decision and the issuance of the mandate from the Fifth Circuit. The court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants that same day. On May 10, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen the judgment and modify the permanent injunction. The plaintiffs were concerned about the newly-enacted House Bill 1523, the "Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act," which was to go into effect July 1, 2016. The plaintiffs claimed HB 1523 not only authorized but encouraged discrimination against Mississippians based on "sincerely held religious beliefs." The plaintiffs' motion concerned a section of HB 1523 which permitted "any person employed or acting on behalf of the state government who has authority to authorize or license marriages" to "recuse" themselves from doing so for gay couples based on "sincerely held religious beliefs," with recusals filed with the State Registrar of Vital Records of the Mississippi Department of of Health. Miss. HB 1528 3(8). The plaintiffs sought to reopen the case to, among other things, file a supplemental complaint naming the State Registrar of Vital Records as a defendant, and to modify the permanent injunction to require: (a) that the state not impede or delay the authorization and licensing of any legally valid marriage to same-sex couples; (b) notice of any recusal to the plaintiffs' counsel and court; (c) any individuals recusing themselves to submit a detailed plan submitted to the plaintiffs' counsel and the court identifying steps they will take to ensure authorization and licensing of marriages to same-sex couples will not be impeded or delayed as a result of the recusal; (d) posting of all recusals in a prominent place on the Department of Health website; and (e) that all people recusing themselves must treat all couples equally and therefore desist from issuing marriage licenses to any other couples. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion in limited part on June 27, 2016. 197 F. Supp. 3d 905 (S.D. Miss. 2016). The court found that HB 1523 would "significantly change the landscape of Mississippi's marriage licensing laws" and reopened the case to address that change. The case was reopened for the parties to confer about how to provide clerks with actual notice of the permanent injunction and how to appropriately amend the permanent injunction. The court denied the plaintiffs' request to file a supplemental complaint against the Registrar. On June 30, 2016, the court entered an order enjoining the enforcement of HB 1523 in Barber v. Bryant, 3:16-cv-442. 193 F. Supp. 3d 677 (S.D. Miss. 2016). The issuance of the preliminary injunction was appealed to the Fifth Circuit in the consolidated case No. 16-60477. On September 1, 2016, Judge Reeves entered a stay in this case pending resolution of the consolidated Fifth Circuit case on HB 1523. The Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction order on June 22, 2017, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing, because they plaintiffs failed to demonstrate personal confrontation or taxpayer standing and the alleged stigmatic injury alone was insufficient to establish injury-in-fact for purposes of the Equal Protection claim. 800 F.3d 345 (5th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court denied certiorari review of the reversal of the HB 1523 injunction on January 8, 2018. 138 S.Ct. 671 (2018). On October 27, 2017, Judge Reeves lifted the stay in this action after the Fifth Circuit reversed the injunction and HB 1523 went into effect throughout Mississippi. The parties engaged in discovery until December 4, 2017. After then, there are no further entries in the docket until January 3, 2019, when the court administratively closed the case. The order states that the administrative closing has no effect on the substantive or procedural rights of the parties. As of April 18, 2020, the case has been dormant since then but could resume if one of the partied decided to reopen it.

Summary: In 2014, the Campaign for Southern Equality filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi seeking an order enjoining the state from enforcing its laws banning same-sex marriage. One month after the case was filed the court issued a preliminary injunction, overturning the ban. Enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban was permanently enjoined in July 2015 in light of the <i>Obergefell</i> Supreme Court decision holding state bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The case was reopened in June 2016 following enactment of 2016 Mississippi House Bill 1523 which allowing recusal from authorizing or licensing same-sex marriages based on sincerely held religious beliefs. Discovery in the case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This action, initially being tracked by  the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project, was filed on June 3, 2020 by the Alaska Libertarian Party, seeking lowered signature requirements to appear on the ballot for the 2020 Presidential Election. The court issued an order on July 10 stating that it was unlikely to grant the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on July 13, 2020.
 The Alaska Libertarian Party filed this case on June 3, 2020 against the Alaska Director of Elections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking a waiver of the signature requirements to appear on the ballot for the 2020 Presidential Election, in light of COVID-19. The state's requirements provide that one method for obtaining ballot access is submitting a petition with signatures equal to 1% of the votes cast in the preceding Presidential election in Alaska at least 90 days prior to the general election. The plaintiffs argued that this signature requirements violated their First Amendment Rights to free speech, expression, and association, which are incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In their complaint, the plaintiffs requested declaratory relief that the ballot access laws in the state were unconstitutional. They also requested an injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the ballot access laws and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge John W. Sedwick. On June 11, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. They requested that the court either reduce or eliminate the petition requirement, or extend the 90 day deadline. In their motion, the plaintiffs suggested a signature threshold of 20% of the normal threshold, or equal to 0.2% of the votes cast in the 2016 Presidential Election. On July 10, 2020, Judge Sedwick submitted an order that he was likely to deny the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court remarked that the purpose of this order was to give the plaintiffs an opportunity to increase their signature gathering efforts and noted that signature gathering efforts had not been made in many highly populated areas or had been targeted to registered Libertarian voters. On July 13, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: This action was filed 2020 Presidential Election cycle by the Alaska Libertarian Party against the Director of Elections in the District Court for the District of Alaska. The plaintiffs alleged that the signature requirements to gain access to the ballot violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. On July 13, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case.


Three named plaintiffs (each a minor, acting through their parents) were African American and Latino students who had attended, but had been expelled or indefinitely excluded from, comprehensive middle school or high school in the Berkeley Unified School District. Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs brought litigation in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 13, 2004, against the Berkeley Unified School District (the "District"), the Berkeley Board of Education, Superintendent, and Director of the Offices of Student Services. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and attorneys from Legal Services for Children and the Youth and Education Law Clinic. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, pursuant to a policy and practice of unlawfully infringing upon the constitutional due process and statutory rights of plaintiffs, wrongfully and arbitrarily excluded them from school or wrongfully and arbitrarily reassigned them from comprehensive school programs to county community schools, continuation schools, home-hospital instruction programs, and independent study programs for the alleged violations of student conduct rules. These policies, according to plaintiffs, had a disparate negative impact and arbitrarily and discriminatorily excluded African American and Latino students from comprehensive school programs by assigning them to non-comprehensive alternative programs. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' policies and practices denied plaintiffs their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States, as well as denying plaintiffs' state constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, class action status for their case, and payment of attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiff class was defined as African Americans and Latinos self-identified as such in official records who have been students in the Berkeley Unified School District and who have been involuntarily excluded from comprehensive school or involuntarily reassigned from comprehensive school programs to non-comprehensive alternative programs for alleged violations of the District's student conduct rules without having received appropriate due process of law. By December 2004, a mediator had been assigned to the case and subsequent settlement discussions resulted in a March 2005 proposed consent decree and provisional certification of a settlement class. Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil preliminarily approved the settlement and class certification on May 17, 2005. After a final fairness hearing, Magistrate Judge Brazil signed the stipulated judgment and order certifying the class, designating class representatives, and appointing class counsel on August 17, 2005. The settlement provided for means of identifying and contacting potential class members and offering them immediate reinstatement in the district's schools, if they remained otherwise eligible. Each individual class member would receive an individualized education plan setting out how the district would aid the student in earning credits and provide compensatory educational services to the student. Students found to have been unlawfully excluded from the district's school would have their records expunged or modified to reflect the exclusion was unlawful. A monitoring committee would ensure that policies, practices and training programs were adopted to prevent unlawful exclusion of students in the future, and would be provided data by the district to enable addressing racial or ethnic disproportionality in school discipline. A dispute resolution process and a students' rights monitoring committee were established by the settlement. The agreement called for the monitoring committee to make quarterly reports to the court on district compliance. The agreement set out a three-year time frame, after which the district could move for termination of the decree if it believed it had complied sufficiently. A compliance hearing by the court would independently assess compliance, however. Finally, the consent decree called for defendants to make payment of $50,000 as plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. On March 4, 2011 the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion to lift the Consent Decree and terminate the litigation.

Summary:
This §1983 case was filed on August 13th, 2004 against the Berkeley Unified School District and its officers. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants arbitrarily excluded them from schools and/or reassigned them from comprehensive school programs to county community schools (among other alternatives) without due process and that these policies had a disparate impact on African American and Latino Students. The parties signed a Consent Decree on August 17, 2005 which required defendants to reinstate those students who were wrongfully expelled, to be monitored by a committee to ensure that they stopped the practice of arbitrarily dismissing African American and Latino students, and to pay $50,000 in legal fees.

On March 4, 2011 the Court granted the parties' Joint Motion to lift the Consent Decree and terminate the litigation.


This case involves the effects of the Trump administration’s efforts to increase scrutiny of private United States citizens working on behalf of migrants and refugees along the U.S.-Mexico border. On October 16, 2019, the plaintiffs, three humanitarian activists, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), the FBI, and each of their respective directors in their official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights as well as violations of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. They sought injunctive and compensatory relief in addition to a declaratory judgment. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU Foundation of Southern California and the law firm Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants unlawfully detained, investigated, interrogated, surveilled, and collected information about them in absence of any reasonable criminal activity, and solely because the Trump administration was targeting individuals involved in humanitarian efforts to help migrants and refugees in the United States and Mexico. For example, one plaintiff, a journalist whose work focused on international human rights, migration, and refugees, was detained at the Arizona border as she accompanied a migrant presenting an asylum claim. This plaintiff was held in a cold, windowless cell for four hours, and was told by a border official that “[t]he Fourth Amendment doesn’t apply here.” Another plaintiff, a photographer, was shackled to a bench for hours by border officials, after which he was interrogated about his volunteer work and political beliefs. The last plaintiff was referred for secondary inspection on twenty-six of his twenty-eight times crossing from Mexico into the U.S., and was repeatedly detained, searched, and interrogated, even though there was no indication of criminal activity on his part. As of February 7, 2020, the defendant had not answered the complaint and the case was ongoing.

Summary: Three private United States citizens, all involved in humanitarian efforts regarding migrants and refugees coming to the U.S. border through Mexico, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against CBP, ICE, and the FBI, alleging violations of the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Privacy Act.


On May 8, 2001, plaintiff students, by guardians ad litem and on behalf of all others similarly situated, and the Learning Disabilities Association of California, filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Education ("CDE") and Fremont Unified School District ("FUSD"). The case proceeded under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ("the ADA"), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq., the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. ("IDEA"), and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; it sought to halt the administration of the CDE's High School Exit Exam ("the Exam"). Plaintiffs, represented by the Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief to prevent the examinations from being administered, claiming that the Exam discriminated against students with disabilities because, inter alia, there was no alternate assessment procedure for requesting accommodations on the Exam or procedure for appealing denials of accommodation requests, and the Exam tested disabled students on material they had never been taught. On December 10, 2001, plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint; at this time, a different plaintiff was named as lead. The District Court (District Judge Charles A. Breyer) granted plaintiffs' class certification on January 6, 2002. On Feb. 6, 2002, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen) granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion to compel. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Ed., No. 01-1780, 2002 WL 32854376 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2002). On February 21, 2002, the District Court (Judge Charles R. Breyer) granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Breyer held that disabled students had standing to challenge the Exam under IDEA and the Rehabilitation Act; there was private right of action under IDEA; students were not required to exhaust administrative remedies; the likelihood of prevailing on merits requirement was satisfied; students satisfied irreparable injury requirement; and the state would be required to honor testing accommodations and alternate assessment provisions contained in student's Individualized Education Programs prepared under IDEA and plans under the Rehabilitation Act. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Ed., 229 F.Supp.2d 981 (N.D. Cal Feb. 21, 2002). On March 19, 2002, CDE filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (On April 3, 2002, the District Court granted the parties' stipulation to dismiss without prejudice defendants Fremont Unified School District (FUSD); more claims were dismissed by the District Court on May 3 and May 7 2002.) On Sept. 4, 2002, the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Cynthia Holcomb Hall, M. Margaret McKeown, and Richard R. Clifton) reversed in part and remanded with directions to dissolve certain portions of the preliminary injunction, with each party to bear its own costs on appeal. Smiley v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 45 Fed. Appx. 780 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 2002). The Court amended and reaffirmed this order on December 19, 2002. Smiley v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 53 Fed.Appx. 474 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2002). On December 20, 2002, plaintiffs filed their second (final) amended complaint, asking the court to determine that their action could be maintained as a class action; to grant a declaratory judgment that CDE had violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, IDEA, and the United States Constitution; to issue a preliminary injunction to stay the administration of the Exam during Spring, 2002; to issue a permanent injunction requiring CDE to develop appropriate policies for handling requests for accommodation; and to award attorneys' fees and costs. Instead, the District Court (District Judge Breyer) ordered dismissed as unripe all of plaintiffs' claims with the exception of plaintiffs' challenges under the IDEA, the ADA, and the Declaratory Judgment Act to the process for obtaining a waiver of the exit exam requirement on March 12, 2003. Then, on July 9, 2003, the nine members of the state Board of Education voted unanimously to eliminate the Exam as a graduation requirement for the class of 2004 but to reinstate it for the class of 2006. On Sept. 5, 2003, Judge Breyer held that students no longer had standing to challenge the process for obtaining a waiver of the test and ordered the matter dismissed without prejudice. Chapman v. Cal. Dep't of Educ., 2003 WL 22114264 (N.D. Cal Sept. 5, 2003). The case mostly concluded on September 8, 2003. On April 7, 2004 Judge Breyer awarded plaintiffs $129,827.46 in attorneys' fees and costs, because they had substantially prevailed. In July 2005, they parties met for an additional settlement conference. Defendants were instructed to draft additional settlement documents, to be submitted to Magistrate Judge Spero with plaintiffs’ comments. Per the docket, no further action was taken, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: This class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California sought relief under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehab Act, the IDEA, and the Due Process Clause against the California Department of Education, seeking to halt the administration of CDE's High School Exit Exam. On February 21, 2002, the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, which was partially affirmed by the 9th Circuit. On July 9, 2003, the state Board of Education eliminated the Exam as a graduation requirement for the class of 2004, and the case was ended. (Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees as prevailing parties.)


On January 15, 2015, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC), along with several individuals, brought this action against RLJ Hospitality Trust, Inc. RLJ operates twelve hotels in the state of California, as well as many hotels elsewhere in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that RLJ violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act by failing to provide wheelchair accessible vehicles at its hotels. The three individual plaintiffs each require wheelchairs for mobility. Each alleged that he or she was deterred from staying at RLJ's hotels in Northern California by RLJ's lack of wheelchair-accessible shuttle services. The three plaintiffs explained that they hoped to stay at RLJ's hotels in the future and that they would do so if they learned that RLJ provides wheelchair-accessible vehicles. Plaintiffs brought the action on behalf of a class defined as individuals who rely on wheelchairs or scooters for mobility and have been, or will be, denied full and equal enjoyment of RLJ's services because of the lack of accessible transportation services at RLJ's hotels. They requested a permanent injunction requiring RLJ to comply with the two aforementioned statutes. The case was assigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers. On May 1, 2015, the parties agreed to resolve the dispute by using a private mediator. The parties met on June 30, 2015 for an all-day settlement conference and agreed to continue the negotiations in good faith, though no settlement had been reached by the initial case management conference before Judge Gonzalez Rogers on September 21, 2015, where the Judge set a date for a bench trial in May, 2016. On November 2, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint. On November 5, 2015, the parties reached an agreement and proposed a settlement. The settlement ensured that the hotels currently owned by RLJ that provide transportation to guests in the future will also provide equivalent wheelchair accessible transportation, with third party and plaintiff attorney monitoring of RLJ's compliance for a default of two years and up to three years if RLJ fails to comply within those first two years. The plaintiffs asked the court to certify the class in order to approve the class action settlement. Judge Gonzalez Rogers granted the preliminary approval of the class action settlement and the certification of the settlement class on January 25, 2016, and final approval on May 3, 2016. The class was defined as "all individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, from January 15, 2013, to the date of the preliminary approval of the Settlement [January 25, 2016], have been denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at Hotels owned and/or operated by RLJ because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at those Hotels." The plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs on March 7, 2016, which Judge Gonzalez Rogers also granted on May 3, 2016. The case is now closed. 2016 WL 314400.

Summary: Three individual plaintiffs, both of whom require wheelchairs for mobility, as well as the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against RLJ Hospitality Trust, Inc. Plaintiffs alleged that RLJ violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and Unruh Civil Rights Act by failing to provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles to its disabled guests.


On March 18, 2008, sixteen current and former female employees of Sterling Jewelers, Inc., filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Sterling, a large jewelry retailer. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued under under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), the Equal Pay Act (29 U.S.C. § 206(d)), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.), seeking injunctive relief and monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had engaged in a pattern and practice of sex and age discrimination in its promotion and compensation decisions. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that Sterling promoted and compensated male employees at a higher rate than similarly situated female employees. The plaintiffs pointed to Sterling's failure to publicize advancement opportunities and the company's "tap on the shoulder" promotion system that allowed Sterling managers to promote without any merit-based considerations. Managers were also permitted broad discretion in setting compensation and did not have to comply with any merit-based criteria. The plaintiffs further alleged that female employees had been subjected to sexual harassment and retaliation. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs also filed a complaint with American Arbitration Association in March 2008 challenging the same practices. Pursuant to their employment contract, the plaintiffs were required to initiate alternative dispute resolution through Sterling's "RESOLVE" program. Sterling moved to stay the federal court litigation in favor of arbitration through RESOLVE. In June 2008, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to stay the litigation and refer the matter to arbitration to determine whether RESOLVE permitted class-action arbitration. In June 2009, the arbitrator determined that RESOLVE did permit class action arbitration and allowed the plaintiffs to proceed with their class claim. Sterling then filed a motion in the district court to vacate the arbitrator's determination. In December 2009, the district court (Judge Jed Rakoff) denied Sterling's motion. 677 F. Supp. 2d 661 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Sterling appealed the district court's order in January 2010. Meanwhile, arbitration continued. In May 2010, Sterling asked the district court for relief from the court's previous ruling on the arbitration determination, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Stolt-Nielsen v. Animalfeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010), which held that when a parties' contract is silent on the issue of class arbitration, agreement to allow class arbitration should not be implied in the contract without other supporting evidence of such an agreement. The defendants' appeal was suspended pending the district court's decision on this motion. The district court concluded that it would vacate the arbitration award if jurisdiction were restored to it. 725 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The Second Circuit issued a limited remand of the appeal, and the district court granted Sterling's motion to vacate the arbitration determination that permitted class arbitration on August 9, 2010. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling on August 10, 2010. The Second Circuit, noting that the Supreme Court had declined to hold in Stolt-Nielsen that an arbitration agreement must expressly state that the parties agree to class arbitration and that there is a strong presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration awards, reversed the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to allow the plaintiffs to proceed as a class. 646 F.3d 113 (2nd Cir. 2011). After the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, the district court affirmed the award on October 26, 2011. Extensive proceedings before the arbitrator continued for years, and on February 2, 2015, the arbitrator certified a class for the adjudication of the plaintiffs' declaratory and injunctive relief claims under Title VII disparate impact claims, but not for monetary damages. This allowed current and former female sales employees to pursue their Title VII claims together in a class action. The arbitrator denied class certification for plaintiffs' Title VII disparate treatment claims because the evidence of Sterling’s alleged intentional general policy of discrimination failed to satisfy the high standard for class certification that Supreme Court had recently announced in Wal-Mart v. Dukes (see here for more). In addition to certifying the Title VII class, the arbitrator permitted class members to opt out of the putative declaratory and injunctive relief. Sterling filed a motion to vacate the arbitrator's class certification decision for two reasons. First, Sterling argued that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by purporting to bind absent class members who did not express their consent to be bound. Second, the defendants argued that the arbitrator erred by permitting opt-outs in a class action that sought injunctive relief. On November 15, 2015, the Judge Rakoff denied the first argument by finding that it was foreclosed by earlier proceedings. But Judge Rakoff agreed with the defendant's second argument; injunctive class-actions do not allow for opt-outs. As such, Judge Rakoff vacated the class certification insofar as it allowed for opt-outs, but kept intact all other determinations. 143 F. Supp. 3d 127. Defendants appealed the district court's holding. On July 24, 2017, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case, holding that the issue of whether the arbitrator had the power to bind absent class members to class arbitration lacking their consent had not been previously decided. 703 Fed. App'x 15. Back in the district court, on January 15, 2018 Judge Rakoff held that an arbitrator may not bind non-parties to a class action after a court has determined that an arbitration agreement does not permit class action procedures. 284 F. Supp. 3d. As such, the court vacated the February 2, 2015 order that certified a class of individuals that had not opted into the arbitral proceedings. However, it left intact the class of individuals that had opted in. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2008, current and former female employees of Sterling Jewelers, Inc. filed a class action lawsuit against Sterling in the Southern District of New York claiming sex and age discrimination. Pursuant to their employment contract, Plaintiffs were required to initiate alternative dispute resolution through Sterling's "RESOLVE" program. In June 2009, an arbitrator determined that Plaintiffs could pursue class action arbitration. After a lengthy appeals process, the Second Circuit ordered the district court to confirm the arbitration award in October 2011. The arbitrator allowed current and former female employees to pursue together in a class action for Title VII claims and denied class certification for Title VII disparate treatment claims per the standard for class certification set by Wal-Mart v. Dukes. The defendant continues to challenge the arbitrator's decision in court.


On February 14, 2014, the plaintiff, a prisoner in California's Mule Creek State Prison, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff was transgender and suffered from gender dysphoria. In her complaint, she requested injunctive relief against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). She alleged that the state failed to provide her with medically necessary surgery in violation of the Eighth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause. She also requested injunctive relief against the defendants for allegedly failing to allow her to pursue a legal name change, also in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments. On April 15, 2014, the District Court (Judge Jon S. Tigar) dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, with leave to amend; the court also referred the matter for appointment of counsel. Norsworthy v. Beard 2014 WL 1477401 (N.D.Cal). The Transgender Law Center and a private firm agreed to represent her, and she filed an amended complaint on July 2, 2014. In it, she relied on the World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards of Care, which explained that some individuals are unable to obtain relief from gender dysphoria without surgical intervention, and described sex reassignment surgery (SRS) as "essential and medically necessary" for this group of patients. The plaintiff alleged that she was part of this group. The State argued that (1) a preliminary injunction was inappropriate in part because the plaintiff did not meet the WPATH eligibility criteria and that (2) the hormone therapy and mental health treatment provided to her since 2000 had alleviated her distress. The defendants further argued that the plaintiff had failed to identify a state policy or custom that denied name change requests to transgender women. On November 18, 2014, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff's name-change claim without leave to amend. However, the Court concluded that transgender status independently qualified as a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court therefore held that the plaintiff's allegations, if true, would describe an Equal Protection violation. It accordingly denied the State's motion to dismiss. Norsworthy v. Beard, 2014 WL 6842935 (N.D.Cal) (slightly amended, March 31, 2015, 2015 WL 1478264). On April 2, 2015, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and ordered the defendants to provide the plaintiff with access to adequate medical care, including sex reassignment surgery. In effect, the Court's ruling created new precedent in holding that sex reassignment surgery was medically necessary, and that to deny a prisoner access of it was cruel and unusual, and thus a violation of her constitutional rights. The Court did not rule on plaintiff's claim under Equal Protection, reasoning that plaintiff was already likely to succeed on the merits relying on the Eighth Amendment. Norsworthy v. Beard, 2015 WL 1500971 (N.D.Cal). On April 2015, the defendants filed a notice of appeal to the 9th Circuit from the preliminary injunction order, and further, sought a stay of the injunction from the District Court. The District Court denied the stay motion on April 27, 2015. However, while the appeal was pending - one day prior to oral argument - the plaintiff was released on parole from the California prison system. The defendants thus stated that the case became moot once CDCR released the plaintiff. The appeal was dismissed as moot on October 5, 2015, and the appellate court instructed the district court to consider on remand whether to vacate its prior preliminary injunction order. On February 23, 2016, plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint stipulation for voluntary dismissal with prejudice, stating that they agreed to a settlement of this action. This agreement is not available, and the case appears closed.

Summary: In this federal civil rights action in the Northern District of California, a transgender prisoner sought sex reassignment surgery, alleging that failure to provide it constituted Cruel and Unusual Punishment and violated her Equal Protection rights. The District Court ordered the prison to provide the surgery on April 2, 2015. Defendants filed a notice of appeal, and while this appeal was pending - one day prior to oral argument - the plaintiff was released on parole from the California prison system. As such, the appeal was dismissed. Before the district court could issue a final decision on remand whether to vacate its prior preliminary injunction order, which would have rendered the precedent moot, plaintiff and defendant settled.


On July 13, 2015, a documentary film-maker and journalist who focuses on post-9/11 United States filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff alleged that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Defendants) improperly withheld documents requested under FOIA relating to the systematic, targeted treatment experienced by Plaintiff in airport security between 2006 and 2012. During this time period, the Plaintiff claimed to have been detained and questioned on every re-entrance into the U.S. after traveling internationally. Plaintiff was additionally subjected to Secondary Security Screening Selection (increased security selection) on some domestic flights. Plaintiff alleged that the treatment stems from Plaintiff's journalistic and documentary work, which documents and examines U.S. security and military conduct post-9/11. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that the pattern of airport detainment, questioning, and increased security screening began with Plaintiff's promotion of the documentary "My Country, My Country" (2006) in July 2006 and continued until a fellow journalist reported on the repeated detainments in April 2012. The documentary was about the U.S. military occupation of Iraq. On January 24, 2014, the Plaintiff filed FOIA requests with the Defendants and constituent agencies requesting all agency records pertaining to the Plaintiff. When the Defendants did not comply, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit to compel a response to the FOIA requests. On July 13, 2015, the Plaintiff filed this lawsuit for injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking compliance with the Plaintiff's earlier FOIA requests. Judge Kentanji Brown Jackson was assigned the case. On September 18, 2020, the Court ordered the parties to confer and file a joint proposed schedule for briefing or disclosure. The parties filed a joint status report on October 1, 2015, agreeing that the defendants would begin producing non-exempt records requested by November 13, 2015. After about a year of various releases, preliminary motions, and time extensions, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in June 2016. The Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment in August 2016. On March 21, 2017, the Court denied without prejudice the Plaintiff's cross motion and granted in part and denied in part without prejudice Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court found that general declarations about categories of withholdings in support of the Defendants' invoked FOIA exemptions were insufficient to allow the Court to determine whether such exemptions were properly invoked. Because of this, the Court ordered the parties file a proposed schedule with due dates for (1) a Vaughn Index of the FBI's withholdings and (2) renewed motions for summary judgment for remaining issues. On April 25, 2017, the parties submitted a new proposed briefing schedule, which was approved on May 10, 2017. On July 24, 2017, the Defendants filed their second motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiff filed her second cross motion on August 21, 2017. The briefing schedule was temporarily suspended on September 18, 2017 after the Defendant FBI identified additional documents that were unintentionally withheld and the Plaintiff needed to review those records to determine any challenges against the new FBI withholdings. A new briefing schedule was adopted in October. On October 24, 2017, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell. On February 15, 2018, the Plaintiff filed a reply to opposition of her cross motion for summary judgment. On March 29, 2018, Chief Judge Howell granted defendants’ second motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s second cross-motion for summary judgment because the court found that the FBI’s withholdings were appropriate under exemptions 5 and 7 of FOIA, and the CBP’s search of the New York field office was adequate. Additionally, the court held that both the FBI and the CBP satisfied their segregability obligations. 303 F.Supp.3d 136. On October 1, 2018, the Plaintiff moved for an award of $63,130 in attorneys’ fees and costs as a substantially prevailing party. The Defendants opposed the Plaintiff's motion on November 19. On April 11, 2019, the court denied Plaintiff’s motion for an award of attorneys’ fees, finding that the Plaintiff's purpose of the FOIA request was self-interested and that Defendants' reasons for withholdings were reasonable. 2019 WL 1569561.

Summary: On July 13, 2015, Plaintiff--a documentary film-maker and journalist who focuses on post-9/11 United States--filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff alleges that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (Defendants) improperly withheld documents requested under FOIA relating to the systematic, targeted treatment experienced by Plaintiff in airport security between 2006 and 2012. The parties twice moved for summary judgement and cross summary judgment. On March 29, 2018, Chief Judge Howell granted defendants second motion for summary judgment. On April 11, 2019, the court denied plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees.


On December 7, 2000, current and former female employees of Alabama's Department of Veterans Affairs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the state's Department of Veterans Affairs discriminated against them on the basis of sex, in violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. The plaintiffs also filed the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of their rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. For these violations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and attorney fees. On March 3, 2006, the court (Judge Mark E. Fuller) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Prewett v. State of Alabama Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 419 F. Supp. 2d 1338 (M.D. Ala. 2006) opinion vacated on reconsideration sub nom. Prewett v. Alabama Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (M.D. Ala. 2007). Then, on December 27, 2007, the court (Judge R. David Proctor) vacated its earlier decision denying in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the remainder of it. Prewett v. Alabama Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 533 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (M.D. Ala. 2007). The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by current and former female employees of Alabama's Department of Veterans Affairs against the Department. Plaintiffs alleged that the Department discriminated against them on the basis of sex and sought, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, and attorney fees. On March 3, 2006, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Then, on December 27, 2007, the court vacated its earlier decision denying in part Defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted the remainder of it.


On September 7, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN), a publisher that publishes magazines and other material concerning criminal justice issues, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District of Arizona against Pinal County, the Sheriff of Pinal County in his official capacity, and twenty unknown county agents in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arizona Constitution. Plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, claimed that defendants had adopted and implemented mail policies and practices that restricted the right to free expression held by PLN and its subscribers as protected by the United States and Arizona Constitutions. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and damages. Specifically, PLN argued that, on dozens of occasions, defendants had prohibited subscribers and correspondents from receiving mail sent by PLN. PLN argued that defendants had undertaken this suppression of speech without any reference to, or justification in, safety concerns or other correctional necessities. These actions violated PLN's freedom of speech, press, and association under the First Amendment and its right to due process of law and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article II, Sections 4 and 6 of the Arizona Constitution. On March 11, 2012, PLN filed an amended complaint naming as defendants numerous county agents who had engaged in handling and processing inmate mail. These agents were variably named in their individual or individual and official capacities as Pinal County sergeants. On July 6, 2012, PLN filed a motion for partial summary judgment, permanent injunction, and declaratory judgment. On August 15, 2012, defendants filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On March 20, 2013, District Court Judge G. Murray Snow granted in part, denied in part, and deferred in part all pending motions. Prison Legal News v. Babeu, 933 F. Supp. 2d 1188 (D. Ariz. 2013). The court denied PLN's request for a permanent injunction that it may send materials into jail and have it received by addressees because of the deference to which prison officials are entitled. The court noted that PLN could easily change their materials in a way that they might come to pose security or management concerns. The court also ruled that the defendants' following policies violated the due process clause: (1) banning newspapers or magazines, (2) allowing publications only from four specific retailers, and (3) failing to provide notice of rejection and an opportunity to appeal. It did not address defendants' publisher-only rule at this time. On May 1, 2013, District Court Judge Snow addressed the remaining portion of PLN's motion for permanent injunction on the issue of the jail's publisher-only rule. Under this rule, the jail would only admit materials that came directly from a recognized publisher, distributor, or authorized retailers that could be independently verified. The court ruled that because the jail was no longer applying this rule on an ad hoc basis but rather had established a written policy, as well as a training and review process for mailroom staff, PLN had failed to show that its materials were likely to be denied. On September 19, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment for nominal damages. The parties further stipulated that they would attempt to resolve PLN's claims for attorney's fees and costs under 42 USC §1988, and Defendants' claims for taxable costs pursuant to Rule 68 Fed.R.Civ.P. by stipulation. On September 23, 2014, District Court Judge Snow granted the parties' stipulation and awarded PLN nominal damages in the amount of $243. On December 16, 2014, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice after the parties informally reached an undisclosed agreement with respect to attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 7, 2011, Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit against Pinal County, the sheriff of Pinal County, and twenty other county agents, claiming that defendants had adopted and implemented mail policies and practices that prohibited subscribers in prison from receiving mail sent by PLN and thereby violating rights protected by the United States and Arizona Constitutions. On September 19, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment for nominal damages. The parties further stipulated that they would attempt to resolve PLN's claims for attorney's fees and costs under 42 USC §1988, and Defendants' claims for taxable costs pursuant to Rule 68 Fed.R.Civ.P. by stipulation. On September 23, 2014, District Court Judge Snow granted the parties' stipulation and awarded PLN nominal damages in the amount of $243. The case is now closed.


On September 29, 2006, the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs sued Tanami Trading Corporation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs asked the court for back pay, compensatory damages, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants subjected three Black workers to racially hostile work environments and constructively discharged two of these workers. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that managers at Tanami Trading Corporation made graphic racial comments and threats of a racist nature directed towards the three Black employees. The plaintiffs argued that these comments were intentional, and they adversely affected their status as employees. On June 13, 2008, Judge J. Leon Holmes ordered a consent decree for both injunctive and individual relief. The injunctive relief included a requirement for the defendant to participate in trainings on racial harassment and constructive discharge, a requirement for the defendant to post a notice pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and a requirement for the defendant to report to the Commission on complaints of racial discrimination received. The individual relief requires the defendant to pay $70,000 to be split among the three plaintiffs. No attorney fees were granted. The consent decree's effective period was three years, and there's nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.

Summary: In 2006 the EEOC filed this in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged a racially hostile work environment and constructive discharge. In 2008, a consent decree granted individual and injunctive damages to the defendants. Its effective period was three years, and there's nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.