On June 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Virginia, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Olver, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the complainant because of her race (black) and national origin (Virgin Islands). On July 24, 2006, the District Court (Judge Samuel G. Wilson) denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. On November 6, 2006, the District Court (Judge Wilson) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $15,000.

Summary: On June 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female employee, filed a lawsuit in the Western District Court of Virginia, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Olver, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant discharged the complainant because of her race, Black, and national origin, Virgin Islands. On November 6, 2006, the District Court (Judge Wilson) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $15,000.


This is the third case filed in the Signal International cases. On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. The case was filed after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in the related case David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. Plaintiffs were brought to the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a Mississippi company in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs, including rigs in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 each for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) consolidated this case and Chakkiyattil v. Signal International, Krishnakutty v. Signal International, and Devassy v. Signal International, and then transferred the consolidated case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. Achari was the lead case. The second amended complaint of Mar. 3, 2014, filed on behalf of 47 guestworkers, alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. With consolidation, additional defendants were added, including attorneys, labor brokers, and recruiters involved in the trafficking scheme. In Apr. 2014, the Court also consolidated Singh v. Signal International into Achari. On July 12, 2014, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied Signal's motion to transfer all of the cases pending against it to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Aug. 13-14, 2014, the Court (District Judge Susie Morgan) denied defendants' motions for partial dismissal, finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently pleaded factual allegations to support their claims. On Oct. 14, 2014, Judge Morgan ordered Signal to refine its subpoena for bank records of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs argued that the request was not reasonably tailored so as to result in the discovery of admissible evidence, but the court disagreed since the plaintiffs were alleging financial coercion. However, the court found that since the litigation was in a late stage, Signal should be required to narrow its request from all affected persons to the named plaintiffs in the consolidated cases. Also on Oct. 14, 2014, Judge Morgan denied Signal's motion for interlocutory appeal of the Court's prohibition of discovery on plaintiffs' post-Signal information including immigration status, or alternatively to stay pending application for mandamus relief. Judge Morgan found that the criteria for interlocutory appeal were not present and that a discretionary stay pending the outcome of a petition for mandamus relief was not warranted. 37 F. Supp. 3d 836. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On Jan. 6, 2015, Judge Morgan denied Signal's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim for relief under TVPA. 2015 WL 75276. On June 4, 2015, Judge Morgan issued an opinion determining the choice of law governing plaintiffs' common law claims. She found that the law of India governed plaintiffs' claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and the law of Mississippi governed their claims of breach of contract and agency. A one-month jury trial was scheduled for July 2015, but the parties began settlement talks instead. By this time, the only remaining defendants were Signal, Burnett (immigration lawyer), and Dewan (recruiters). The other co-defendants were in bankruptcy proceedings, which stayed judgment against them. During the end of 2015, the parties entered into settlement negotiations, and on Oct. 2, 2015, the Achari (plaintiff), Chakkiyattil (plaintiff), and Burnett (defendant) parties filed a joint motion for dismissal contingent on their reaching a final agreement. In Dec. 2015, the Achari (plaintiff) and Dewan (defendant) parties filed another joint motion for conditional dismissal, and the court vacated the scheduled pre-trial and trial dates for all of the parties. Also in Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. On Apr. 7, 2017 in the <href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14377">David case, the parties settled the matter of attorneys' fees. The same day in Achari, Judge Morgan dismissed the Dewan (recruiters) and Burnett (lawyer) defendants without prejudice, though the plaintiffs could, by Aug. 1, 2018, reopen the action if the settlement was not consummated. On Apr. 18, 2017 in both David and Achari Judge Morgan entered a sealed stipulated judgment as to the Dewan defendants, though this document is not publicly available. The Court closed Achari on May 26, 2017, without prejudice. The Court shall retain jurisdiction. Any party may reopen the case if any of the unlocated plaintiffs are located so that they may be paid pursuant to the settlement agreement.

Summary: On May 21, 2013, 33 Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. After consolidation with other cases, a jury trial was scheduled for July 2015, but the parties settled. The Court closed this case in May 2017, without prejudice.


On September 18, 2014, a number of juvenile prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Multi-County Juvenile Detention Facility. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the state-run facility used restraint techniques and solitary confinement in a way that violated the 8th Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the prisoners' 14th Amendment substantive due process rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the facility placed the prisoners in restraint chairs for up to 20 hours at a time, long after any need to restrain them had ended. They also claimed that the facility arbitrarily placed the juvenile prisoners in solitary confinement without adequate clothing or blankets for lengthy periods of time. In the isolation cells, the temperatures regularly dropped to 50 degrees Fahrenheit. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on December 10, 2014, another one on January 9, 2015, and a third one on January 30. The parties then entered private mediation. On March 9, the plaintiffs gave notice of voluntarily dismissing three individual county commissioner defendants. The docket indicates the parties progressed toward settlement. On November 17, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice because they had finalized a private settlement, which is not publicly available. The case is now closed.

Summary: A number of juvenile prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Multi-County Juvenile Detention Facility. The plaintiffs claimed that the state-run facility used restraint techniques and solitary confinement in a way that violated the 8th Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the prisoners' 14th Amendment substantive due process rights. The parties reached a private settlement agreement and the case is now closed.


On June 25, 2003, blind individuals unable to use ATMs operated by the defendants filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relif. On February 22, 2005, in an unpublished opinion, the court denied the defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, holding that the fact that Department of Justice regulations did not expressly require installation of voice guidance technology did not defeat plaintiffs' claim. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., No. 03-11206, 2005 WL 2511059 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2005). On February 21, 2006, the court considered both partes' motions for partial summary judgment. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., 464 F.Supp.2d 52 (D. Mass. 2006). The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Count V, which alleged a violation of the ADA's New Facilities Mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 12183(a)(1), because the plaintiffs only showed 12 ATMs were inaccessible; thus a genuine issue of fact existed as to the thousands of other machines. The court also denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count V because, contrary to the defendants' assertion, this provision applied to more than just buildings and architectural structures. Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. E*Trade Access, Inc., No. 03-11206, 2005 WL 2511059 (D. Mass. Feb. 22, 2005).The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II, finding an issue of material fact. As to the defendant's motion for summary judgment on Count III, the court granted the plaintiffs 90 days to identify an auxiliary aid or service list. If they could not, it would grant the defendants' motion. Similarly, on Count IV, the court gave the plaintiff 90 days to specify how communications barriers could be removed. If they could not, the court would grant summary judgment to the defendants on this count. The parties entered a settlement agreement on June 21, 2007, which required one of the defendants to modify its ATM machines, making them all accessible within a year, with a few exceptions for certain machines. Another defendant agreed to install only voice guidance technology, and to offer merchants who owned or leased ATMs an upgrade at no cost and report to class counsel. Cardtronics also agreed to pay $900,000 in attorneys' fees to the NFB and make gift of 100,000 to Mass Consumer Aid Fund. This agreement superceded previous agreements between E*Trade and the parties because Cardtronics had purchased E*Trade's ATMs. The court approved the settlement and issued final judgment on December 4, 2007. On April 30, 2010, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of a remediation plan which contained more precise requirements and deadlines. One of the defendants admitted it was not able to meet the targets in the settlement agreement. There were numerous problems with the voice technology. The new plan extended the deadlines and required payment of $60,000 to the National Federation of the Blind for testing the machines and $145,000 for its failure to comply with the settlement. The proposed remediation plan would last 8 years from the date of approval. On July 29, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt, claiming the defendants had failed to meet all the requirements of the remediation plan. The Court granted the motion in part, finding that the defendants knew that they were subject to the Remediation Plan, which provided clear instructions for compliance, and they failed to comply fully with most of its requirements on or before the self-imposed deadlines, and that they had not "substantially" complied with the Remediation Plan or demonstrated that they have made all reasonable efforts to do so. The Court ordered the defendants to achieve full compliance on or before March 15, 2012, including: a) the installation of enhanced scripts to enable voice guidance, tactilely discernable controls and appropriate signage on all Cardtronic-owned ATMs not located in 7-Eleven stores, and b) the inspection of all such ATMs to ensure that the newly installed features are in working condition. On August 17, 2012, plaintiffs filed a second motion for contempt, claiming that although four months had elapsed since the court's deadline for compliance, the defendants still had not fully complied with the requirements of the remediation plan. The motion also argued that the defendants violated the plan's prohibition against entering into new contracts with merchants whose ATMs were not voice-guided and placing into service newly-acquired ATMs that it did not demonstrate were voice-guided. The motion requested that the court impose four sanctions: (1) a fine of $50 per ATM per month, (2) appointment of a special master to monitor enforcement, (3) extension of the monthly reporting requirements through March 31, 2014, and (4) attorneys’ fees and costs. On March 21, 2013, the court granted the motion with regard to the first three requests and reserved how much to award in attorneys' fees and costs for a later hearing. The court appointed a special master on May 22, 2013. The parties filed a joint motion for an amended settlement agreement on Nov. 24, 2014. The amended agreement required Cardtronics to develop and install enhanced voice-guidance software for its ATMs on or before March 31, 2017, and to ensure that its current fleet had NFB-approved signage. The amended agreement also provided for a field inspection and testing program and compliance reporting. The special master was responsible for determining if the enhanced software satisfied the agreed-upon voice-guidance standards, as well as for deciding any future disputes between the parties. The court approved the preliminary agreement on Dec. 2, 2014, and granted final approval on May 7, 2015. With the final approval, the plaintiffs were awarded $397,536.70 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is closed, though the court retains jurisdiction over enforcement.

Summary: Blind individuals filed a class action, alleging several companies that operate ATMs failed to install accessible ATMs. The parties settled, with the defendants agreeing to upgrade or replace their machines so that they all had voice-prompting technology, and to pay damages. However, the defendants were unable to complete the terms of the settlement. A modified remediation plan was approved by the district court on October 2, 2010. Since that time, the plaintiffs have filed two Motions for Contempt; the first was granted in part and the second is pending.


On June 7, 2000 plaintiffs, three formerly incarcerated residents of Pennsylvania denied the right to vote filed a lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and City of Philadelphia arguing that the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act (PVRA) was unconstitutional in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and the plaintiffs were represented by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Philadelphia and other public interest organizations. The case was assigned to Judge Louis Bechtle. The complaint asserted that, without a rational basis, the PVRA prohibits some ex-felons from voting during the five year period following their release from prison, while permitting other ex-felons to vote during the same period. The law, plaintiffs argued, was irrational and arbitrary because it distinguished between ex-felons who registered to vote before incarceration and those who did not, as well as between ex-felons who changed residences after incarceration and those who did not. Consequently, plaintiffs alleged that the law violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 14th Amendment. Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the defendants from enforcing the provisions of the PVRA that bar all convicted felons from being entitled to be registered to vote if they were released from prison within the last five years and eliminate the forms used to register a person requiring an applicant to confirm that they have “not been confined in a penal institution for a conviction of a felony within the last five years.” The defendants countered that the PVRA does not unconstitutionally distinguish between groups of ex-felons because no ex-felons are entitled to be registered or to vote during the five year period following their release from prison. Ultimately the parties stipulated to consolidate Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction with the merits determination for a permanent injunction. Procedural history On August 14, 2020, Judge Bechtle denied the motion for a permanent injunction. 2000 WL 1146619. The Court held that at least one of the individual plaintiffs had standing to bring the lawsuit, and also that the NAACP had organizational standing. The standing of other plaintiffs was unclear, but assumed for the purposes of the opinion. Judge Bechtel found that it was appropriate for the court to invoke the Pullman abstention doctrine to avoid reaching a decision on the constitutional question. The Pullman doctrine applies when a federal constitutional issue "might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court" which could construe the statute in a manner that "might avoid in whole or in part the necessity for federal constitutional adjudication, or at least materially change the nature of the problem." To abstain from deciding a case under Pullman, a court must find "(1) uncertain issues of state law underlying the federal constitutional claim; (2) state law issues subject to state court interpretation that could obviate the need to adjudicate or substantially narrow the scope of the federal constitutional claim; and (3) the possibility that an erroneous construction of state law by the federal court would disrupt important state policies." Judge Bechtle found that Pullman doctrine applied in this case because both the defendants' and plaintiffs' construction of the statute were plausible, rendering the statute ambiguous, and because Pennsylvania state courts had not yet evaluated the constitutionality of the statute in light of that ambiguity. The court agreed with the defendant's argument that if they were to do so, they might find that the statute had a narrower, constitutional meaning, and that voting regulations implicate important state policies that an erroneous construction of the PVRA would disrupt state policy goals. The court retained jurisdiction over the case in case the federal constitutional issue were to arise again. The plaintiffs appealed on August 23, 2000. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an order on on January 29, 2001 vacating Judge Bechtle's August 14, 2000 order and instructing the district court to dismiss the case. The district court issued an order dismissing the case on February 5, 2001.

Summary: On June 7, 2000 plaintiffs, three formerly incarcerated residents of Pennsylvania denied by statute the right to vote filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and City of Philadelphia arguing that the Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act (PVRA) was unconstitutional. The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and the plaintiffs were represented by National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Philadelphia and other public interest organizations. The case was stayed in August 2000 because the Court invoked the <i>Pullman</i> abstention doctrine, declining to reach a decision on the constitutional question. The case was then appealed to the Third Circuit, which vacated the district court order and instructed the district court to dismiss the case. It was dismissed on February 5, 2001.


On June 10, 2015, inmates of the Massachusetts Department of Correction filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare LLC (“MPCH”) and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had repeatedly shown deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of plaintiffs and the members of the class, who are infected with the Hepatitis C virus. The plaintiffs alleged that over 1,500 state prisoners in Massachusetts have Hepatitis C, but at the time only three were being treated for it, despite major advances in treatment of Hepatitis C made in 2014. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and Prisoners' Legal Services, sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On September 17, 2015, the defendants answered and asserted the affirmative defense that the plaintiffs failed to state claim upon which relief could be granted, and that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. 1993e(a); they also objected to class certification. On May 16, 2016, plaintiffs moved for class certification, and on July 22, 2016 Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton granted class certification, certifying a class of all current and future Massachusetts Department of Correction prisoners who have or will have Hepatitis C. Sadly, one of the original plaintiffs passed away due to complications with his Hepatitis C and was removed from the litigation by an amended complaint filed with the court on July 29, 2016. On January 11, 2017, the parties entered a joint motion to extend discovery until May 1, 2017. Since that date, the parties underwent discovery, with a trial date set for April 30, 2018. On March 9, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion requesting the court approve their settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, MPCH had to implement a new protocol to govern the testing, evaluation, and treatment of Hepatitis C; the DOC would hire a third party to monitor the progress of MPCH in implementing its protocol; and all class members and future prisoners with Hepatitis C were to be assigned priority levels, with corresponding treatment based on their priority level. On June 28, 2019, the parties appeared before Judge Gorton, who, finding that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, approved the settlement. On June 29, 2018, Judge Gorton filed an electronic order awarding the class counsel $270,000 for attorneys’ fees and $1,500 for expenses. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 10,2015, inmates of the Massachusetts Department of Correction filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued the Massachusetts Partnership for Correctional Healthcare LLC (“MPCH”) and the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Correction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants have repeatedly shown deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of plaintiffs and the members of the class also infected with the Hepatitis C virus. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. On March 9, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion requesting the court approve their settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, MPCH had to implement a new protocol to govern the testing, evaluation, and treatment of Hepatitis C; the DOC would hire a third party to monitor the progress of MPCH in implementing its protocol; and all class members and future prisoners with Hepatitis C were to be assigned priority levels, with corresponding treatment based on their priority level. On June 28, 2019, Judge Gorton, finding that the settlement was fair, reasonable, and adequate, approved the settlement. On June 29, 2018, Judge Gorton filed an electronic order awarding the class counsel $270,000 for attorneys’ fees and $1,500 for expenses. The case is now closed.


On October 15, 2012, five black Detroit residents and Michigan Legal Services filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against Morgan Stanley under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, the National Consumer Law Center, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, damages, and disgorgement, claiming that Morgan Stanley discriminated against black homeowners in the secondary mortgage market. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley encouraged originating subprime lender New Century to issue large volumes of high-cost and high-risk residential mortgage loans. Morgan Stanley then packaged these loans for investors through securitization. Morgan Stanley's aggressive development of these loan pools, the suit alleged, disparately impacted African American borrowers, who were more likely to receive these harmful loans than white borrowers because New Century targeted communities of color. In December 2012, Morgan Stanley filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court (Judge Harold Baer) granted in part and denied in part on July 25, 2013. The District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' ECOA and state law claims as untimely. However, the court allowed the plaintiffs' FHA claim to proceed, reasoning that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the plaintiffs first consulted with attorneys in 2012, rather than when New Century stopped originating loans in 2007. The court also found that the plaintiffs had successfully alleged a disparate impact discrimination claim under the FHA. Morgan Stanley sought immediate review of this decision by the Second Circuit, but the District Court denied their motion to certify for immediate appeal. On June 10, 2014, this case was reassigned to Judge Valerie E. Caproni, following the death of Judge Harold Baer. On May 14, 2015, the District Court (Judge Caproni) denied the plaintiffs' motion for certification of a class of all African Americans residing in Detroit between 2004 and 2007 who received a loan from New Century. In a 50-page opinion, the court deemed the class to be unworkable, concluding that there existed too much variation within the proposed class to satisfy the typicality, predominance, or superiority requirements for certifying the class. The plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit, which affirmed on July 14, 2016. 656 Fed.Appx. 555. On September 26, 2016, plaintiff Michigan Legal Services voluntarily dismissed its claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on October 7, 2016. The remaining plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on July 19, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: In October 2012, five black Detroit residents and Michigan Legal Services filed this class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Morgan Stanley under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), and state law. The plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley discriminated against black homeowners by encouraging a subprime lender to originate mortgages that were likely to be foreclosed on. In July 2013, the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs' ECOA and state law claims, but allowed their FHA claim to proceed. On May 14, 2015, the District Court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The case is ongoing, as of June 29, 2015.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 29, 2020, three individuals sued the Fresno County Sheriff’s Office and Fresno Police Department, claiming that the defendant’s requirement of in-person registration for sex offenders violates COVID-19 related orders by the Governor of California. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in September. <hr> On April 28, 2020, three individuals vulnerable to COVID-19 due to age and/or underlying medical conditions sued the Fresno County Sheriff’s Office and Fresno Police Department, claiming that the defendant’s requirement of in-person registration for sex offenders violate COVID-19 related orders. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an injunctive action, and a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Plaintiffs alleged that the requirement violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment as their 30-day, 90-day or annual in-person registration exposed them to a risk of contracting COVID-19 when the California Sex Offender Registration Act did not require in-person updates. The plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that the California law did not require in-person registrations, injunctive relief to halt the practice during the pandemic, and attorneys’ fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California and assigned to Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 4, with an additional plaintiff. On May 13, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting the defendants from requiring in-person registration for periodic updates until a hearing on the preliminary injunction could be held. On May 27, the district court denied the TRO, finding that the plaintiffs' request for a TRO was based on facts prior to the COVID-19 outbreak and before implementation of social distancing and other public health measures. 2020 WL 2745718. In rejecting the request, the court noted that the defendants' response outlined the changes made to the personal presentment process, which requires no contact, is socially-distanced and takes place outdoors. On September 14, the plaintiffs stipulated to dismiss entire action with prejudice and Judge Peterson issued an order closing the case.

Summary: On April 28, 2020, three individuals who are vulnerable to COVID-19 due to age and/or underlying medical conditions sued the Fresno County Sheriff’s Office and Fresno Police Department, claiming that the defendant’s requirement of in-person registration for sex offenders violate COVID-19 related orders. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the California law does not require in-person registrations and injunctive relief to halt the practice during the pandemic, and attorneys’ fees. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in September.


On March 3rd, 2006, two New York City public high school teachers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York Police Department, alleging violations of the United States and New York state constitutions and common law torts. The plaintiff, represented by the New York ACLU and private attorneys, asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs they were arrested after police officers were called to the high school due to a student fight. The plaintiffs were then taken to the local police station where they remained for over two hours before being released. Though the plaintiffs were charged with disorderly conduct, those charges were dismissed at the initial court hearing. After the hearing, plaintiffs received a threatening letter, allegedly from members of the police department, warning them to leave town. Plaintiffs turned the letter over to the police, who allegedly ignored the threat and the initial wrongful arrests. On March 13th, 2007, the District Court (Judge Denny Chin) entered a Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal. The plaintiffs received $60,002.00 in damages in exchange for dropping their suit and releasing the defendants from all liability, and the defendants did not admit any violations, liability, or fault.

Summary: On March 3rd, 2006, two New York City public high school teachers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York Police Department, alleging violations of the United States and New York state constitutions and common law torts. The ase settled for $60,000 in 2007.


On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Indianapolis U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against Mer Corporation (doing business as Dancers Show Club) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, Mer had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) by forcing the employee to take early maternity leave, which resulted in loss of her position as a bartender. The EEOC sought its costs, monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, back pay, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages. The employee intervened in the case with the Court's approval (Judge Larry J. McKinney) on October 27, 2006. The employee proceeded on the same grounds as the EEOC and sought substantially the same relief, though the employee's complaint contained greater factual detail. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court entered as a consent decree on November 20, 2007. The decree provided monetary relief ($6,000 in back pay and $30,500 in compensatory damages) for the employee and contained a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the decree Mer was required not to discriminate or retaliate, to post an EEOC notice, to expunge all references to the discrimination charge from the employee's file and make no mention of it in references, to notify all current and future employees with hiring/firing authority that pregnancy is not a factor to be considered in employment decisions, to provide all managers and supervisors with sex discrimination training, and to report annually to the EEOC the reasons for discharge when a pregnant employee has been fired. The parties bore their own costs. No further court activity appears on the docket, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 29, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Indianapolis U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana against Mer Corporation (doing business as Dancers Show Club) on behalf of a female employee. According to the EEOC, Mer had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) by forcing the employee to take early maternity leave, which resulted in loss of her position as a bartender. The parties entered into a consent decree, which provided the employee with monetary relief ($6,000 in back pay and $30,500 in compensatory damages) and subjected Mer to an array of antidiscrimination, notice, training, and reporting provisions. The case is now closed.


Allegations of sexual abuse and mistreatment of female prisoners have been frequently made against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), especially during the 1990s. The MDOC faced harsh public criticism and two high-profile lawsuits involving sexual misconduct claims of female inmates in that period: Nunn v. Michigan Department of Corrections by a group of female inmates in 1996, and United States v. Michigan (the USA Lawsuit) by the Civil Rights Division of the United States Department of Justice in 1997, linked below (Clearinghouse codes: PC-MI-0017 and PC-MI-0009). In response, the MDOC barred male employees from working in certain positions at its female correctional facilities, and made a number of the Correctional Officer (CO) and Residential Unit Officer (RUO) positions in housing, segregation, and intake units at those facilities open to female only. On July 12, 2000, several corrections officers, both males and females, from three female correctional facilities filed a lawsuit against the MDOC and its director, in both his official and individual capacities, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. They brought this class action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state laws, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated corrections officers and related employees employed by the MDOC who had been or would be adversely affected by the gender-based assignments at the state female correctional facilities. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the gender-specific assignments constituted sex discrimination, in violation of their rights under Title VII, the Equal Protection Clause, and state laws. They sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiffs amended their complaint on September 27, 2000. On September 28, 2000, the District Court (Judge Avern Cohn) issued a temporary restraining order, which prevented the MDOC and the director from making gender-specific assignments to allow only female staff to hold the CO and RUO positions in housing, segregation, and intake units at the three facilities where the named plaintiffs worked. The specific order is not available, but it is fully outlined in the defendants' February 25, 2002 Second Motion for Clarification or Modification of Temporary Restraining Order and the order the Court issued in response on March 11, 2002. On October 13, 2000, the Court granted a motion for intervention filed by a group of female inmates, composed of the certified class from the Nunn Lawsuit and the certified class in Neal v. Michigan Department of Corrections, linked below (Clearinghouse codes: PC-MI-0021). The Neal lawsuit is another class action by female inmates against the MDOC for sexual misconduct by male staff. These two classes of female inmates joined this action as intervenor-defendants. The case went to a bench trial from February 13, 2001 to March 7, 2001. On July 11, 2002, the Court entered a decision and a declaratory judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002). The Court declared that the implementation of the gender-based assignments violated Title VII and state laws. Judge Cohn reasoned that the policy would have an adverse employment effect on the plaintiffs and that gender was not a bona fide occupational qualification in this case. On August 8, 2002, the Court entered a final judgment, turning the temporary restraining order to a permanent injunction. Judge Cohn noted that the banning of the gender-based assignments, which designated certain positions to female staff only, did not prohibit the MDOC from making gender-specific task assignments. He further dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim filed against the director with prejudice. The female inmates and the MDOC appealed the decision to the 6th Circuit. On December 3, 2004, the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's decision on both the Title VII and state law claims, in an opinion by Judge John M. Rogers, and remanded to dismiss the lawsuit. Everson v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 391 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 2004). The Court found that gender was a bona fide occupational qualification for the positions at issues in this case. The opinion began with a detailed history of the sexual misconduct problem at the MDOC's female correctional facilities and the MDOC's subsequent efforts to cure the defect before its implementation of the gender-specific assignment policy. The Court agreed that the MDOC's policy change in question would significantly promote its safety interests at the female facilities and noted that the District Court failed to accord due deference to the decision of a state political actor, the MDOC, in lawsuits brought by individuals challenging that decision in federal courts rather than through the political process. After a rehearing and a petition for a writ of certiorari were denied, the case ended.

Summary: The Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) faced harsh public criticism and two high-profile lawsuits due to its male staff's sexual misconduct towards female inmates at its female correctional facilities in the 1990s. In response, the MDOC barred male employees from working in certain positions at female facilities, and made a number of positions open to female only. On July 12, 2000, several corrections officers from three female correctional facilities, both males and females, filed a lawsuit against the MDOC and its director, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. They brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state laws. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged sex discrimination and sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The District Court issued a temporary restraining order, and turned it to a permanent injunction after the Court entered judgment in the plaintiffs' favor on both their Title VII and state law claims following a bench trial. The injunction prohibited the MDOC from implementing the gender-based assignment policy. The 6th Circuit disagreed with the District Court's rejection of the bona fide occupational qualification defense raised by the MDOC, and ordered the dismissal of the lawsuit in the defendants' favor. The plaintiffs' petition of a writ of certiorari was later denied and this ended the case.


Fire protection inspectors (FPIs) and associate fire protection inspectors brought this class-action suit against the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), alleging that the Department engaged in racial discrimination by compensating FPIs and Building Inspectors (BIs) at different rates. FPIs and BIs tend to perform similar duties and have similar education levels, but a larger percentage of FPIs are non-white (70%) than BIs (50%). The plaintiffs argued that FDNY racially discriminates against Black and other non-white FPIs by under-compensating them, in terms of their salaries as well as their retirement packages and overtime pay. The plaintiffs further contended that FDNY's discrimination against FPIs is part of a larger pattern racial discrimination within the FDNY, including the disparate treatment of sub-groups within the department that tend to be composed of a larger proportion of white people like fire fighters and emergency medicine technicians as compared to FPIs, who tend to be people of color. The suit was brought on behalf of one main class and an additional subclass. The main class included all FPIs and associate FPIs who had worked for the Department at any time between three years prior to time between when the complaint was filed and when the class is certified. The plaintiffs also brought claims on behalf of a sub-class of individuals who do not self-identify as white and who have been employed by the City as FPIs or associate FPIs any time between three years prior to the time the complaint was filed and the date the subclass is certified. The plaintiffs filed suit for disparate impact on behalf of the class under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and disparate treatment under Title VII and under the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiffs also brought disparate impact claims for the subclass under Title VII and the New York City Human Rights Law. The case was assigned to U.S. District Court Judge Analisa Torres. The City of New York filed a motion to dismiss on September 21, 2020, but the parties began the early stages of discovery soon after. As of November 8, the case remains open.

Summary: Fire protection inspectors (FPIs) and associate fire protection inspectors brought this class action suit against the Fire Department of New York (FDNY), alleging racial discrimination. The plaintiffs argued that FDNY racially discriminates against FPIs and associate fire protection inspectors by compensating them less than building inspectors (BIs), who perform similar tasks to fire protection inspectors. BIs are 50% white, while 30% of FPIs are white. The plaintiffs filed suit for disparate impact under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 and disparate treatment under Title VII and under the New York City Human Rights Law. The plaintiffs also brought disparate impact claims for the subclass under Title VII and the New York city Human Rights Law. The case is currently in discovery, with a case management conference set for 3/15/2021.


At the commencement of this lawsuit, the City and County of San Francisco did not release arrestees from jail unless they paid a generic “bond” amount. That amount was determined by a fixed bail schedule set by San Francisco under direction of state law. Because this sum was set by reference to the alleged offense of arrest, no individualized factors were considered, and anyone who couldn't afford to pay was held in jail for at least two days before any court appearance. On October 28, 2015, arrestees in San Francisco who were unable to afford the bond set by the fixed bail schedule filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City and County of San Francisco and the State of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiffs claimed that this wealth-based pretrial detention scheme violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by adhering to the generic “bond” schedule set by state law, San Francisco’s system jailed some of its poorest residents prior to a first court appearance solely because they could not pay an arbitrary amount of money. The plaintiffs, represented by Equal Justice Under Law, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, damages suffered as a result of defendants’ conduct, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers. Both the State of California and San Francisco filed motions to dismiss; California’s motion was granted under sovereign immunity, but San Francisco’s was denied. The court did grant San Francisco’s motion for a more definite statement because the court was unable to identify the precise legal challenge being made by the plaintiffs or the precise relief they sought against the City (especially in light of the State's dismissal). The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction and to certify the class because these could not be properly ruled on without a clearly articulated legal theory in the complaint. On February 5, 2016, the defendants filed a notice of pendency of another action, Welchen v. Harris & County of Sacramento (No. 2:16-cv-00185-TLN-KJN), which asserted similar, potentially identical claims to this case. The plaintiff in that case contended that Sacramento’s bail schedule, set by the judges of the Superior Court as required by California law, violated his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. The plaintiffs filed a series of amended complaints, which added as defendants the San Francisco Sheriff in her official capacity and Kamala Harris in her official capacity as the California Attorney General. The third and most recent amended complaint was filed on May 27, 2016. It sought, among other things, a declaratory judgment that the City and County of San Francisco and the Sheriff violated the named plaintiffs’ and proposed class members’ constitutional rights by keeping them in jail solely because they could not make a monetary payment. It also requested an order declaring that the California Penal Code section on bail and any other state statutory or constitutional provisions requiring the use of secured money bail to detain without an inquiry into ability to pay were unconstitutional. Lastly, the plaintiffs sought another injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing their unconstitutional wealth-based detention policies and practices. For monetary relief, the plaintiffs sought compensation for the damages they suffered as a result of the defendants’ unconstitutional and unlawful conduct, including damages resulting from their confinement in jail, and attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which the court granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the court dismissed claims against the Sheriff as to money damages because the Sheriff’s actions on behalf of the state—detaining individuals for inability to pay bail as prescribed in the schedule set by the Superior Court—were protected by the Eleventh Amendment. The court also dismissed the claim against the County, finding that "[t]he State is the relevant actor when the Sheriff detains a person who does not pay bail and plaintiffs have not alleged a municipal policy or practice for which the County may be held liable." 2016 WL 6025486. The court denied the motion to dismiss with respect to declaratory or injunctive relief sought against the Sheriff for alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. The California Bail Agents Association (CBAA) was granted permissive intervention. Both the CBAA and the plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment, which were both denied: the court found that strict scrutiny applied to the plaintiffs' claims since they alleged invidious discrimination that risked depriving individuals of the fundamental right to liberty. And the court held that CBAA's claim—that rational basis review applied because there was no constitutional right to pre-arraignment release—could not stand. Separately, the court held that the factual record was insufficient to support the plaintiffs’ allegations of Fourteenth Amendment violations. Two additional named plaintiffs in another case, Dupree v. Hennessy (No. 18-cv-00310) filed a motion to relate that case to Buffin on January 27, 2018, because both cases concerned substantially similar putative classes and events, and had significant overlap in parties, legal issues, claims, and relief sought. In both cases, the named plaintiffs were pre-arraignment arrestees in the custody of the City and County of San Francisco, who were unable to meet a secured financial condition of release determined without regard for their ability to pay. Both cases claimed that the defendant San Francisco Sheriff had violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Constitution with the wealth-based detention scheme tying pretrial freedom to the ability to make a monetary payment. Since the Sheriff’s wealth-based detention scheme was the focus of both cases, the judge granted the motion to relate Buffin and Dupree on January 22, 2018. On February 26, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class with modifications. The class was defined as “All pre-arraignment arrestees (i) who are, or will be, in the custody of the San Francisco Sheriff; (ii) whose bail amount is determined by the Felony and Misdemeanor Bail Schedule as established by the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco; (iii) whose terms of pretrial release have not received an individualized determination by a judicial officer; and (iv) who remain in custody for any amount of time because they cannot afford to pay their set bail amount.” 2018 WL 1070892. On September 28, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction enjoining the sheriff from using any form of the Bail Schedule against any member of the class, a permanent injunction prohibiting the sheriff from detaining new arrestees unconstitutionally, a plan submitted by the sheriff detailing new release options, and reasonable attorneys’ fees. The defendants moved for summary judgment on November 1, 2018. On March 4, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiffs were deprived of their fundamental rights to liberty solely because they were indigent. The plaintiffs had shown that an individualized inquiry into the risk an arrestee has to public safety and failure to appear is less restrictive and at least as effective at serving the state’s interest as the use of a Bail Schedule. Last, the court found the CBAA failed to show that the plaintiffs’ proposed alternative for an individualized inquiry would be less effective or more restrictive than the use of a Bail Schedule. The court delayed issuing an injunction enjoining the sheriff from using the Bail Schedule pending briefing by the parties. 2019 WL 1017537. The parties subsequently submitted proposed language for the injunction. The case was referred to settlement conferences to develop the language. In July 2019, the court ordered final briefing on the language. On September 3, 2019, the court issued the final judgement and injunction in which a timeline was established for injunctive relief to go into effect. The court scheduled a compliance hearing for November 22, 2019. The parties agreed to an injunction prohibiting the use of the Bail Schedule, detailing modifications to the procedures for pretrial release as an alternative to the current use of the Bail Schedule, and monitoring for an effective period of eighteen months. Throughout the monitoring period, the defendants would provide reports to the plaintiffs every three months in order for them to monitor compliance. The reports include significant data on pretrial release procedures so as to measure compliance and reduction of the constitutional harms. The issue of attorneys' fees was not yet resolved at the time of this writing. On November 15, 2019, the parties filed a joint statement regarding compliance with the settlement. The settlement had been conditioned on the defendants obtaining legislative approval for the costs associated with implementing the injunctive relief. Because of the time that would take to obtain final approval, plus to collect data, the parties requested that the first compliance hearing be held in May 2020. The court continued the compliance hearing per their request. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In October 2015, arrestees in San Francisco filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that San Francisco's fixed bail schedule violated their constitutional rights of due process and equal protection and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. In March 2019, the court held that the use of a Bail Schedule was unconstitutional and entered final injunctive relief in September that year. This case is ongoing as the defendants comply with the injunction.


The plaintiff in this case became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 1994 after immigrating to the United States from Trinidad and Tobago. After a conviction in 2001 for wire fraud, he served a prison sentence, was placed in immigration removal proceedings, and was held in immigration detention from 2006 to 2008. For a time, ICE had allowed the plaintiff to remain in the United States under an order of supervision and four successive stays of removal, accompanied by work authorization. Over the following decade, he became a nationally-known immigrants' rights activist based in New York. He checked in with ICE regularly as specified under the terms of his order of supervision. The plaintiff was later arrested by immigration authorities, who sought to effectuate his removal from the United States. Three separate proceedings in both the Second and Third Circuits had important implications in determining his removability. For the sake of clarity, each will be addressed in turn. Habeas Corpus Petition—Southern District of New York (1:18-cv-00236) and Second Circuit (18-01595) The plaintiff was arrested by immigration authorities on January 11, 2018. The same day, the plaintiff filed a habeas corpus petition against the U.S. government for alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Represented by NYU Law School's Immigrant Rights Clinic, the plaintiff filed the petition in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The case was assigned to Judge Katherine B. Forrest. In his habeas petition, the plaintiff alleged he was detained unlawfully. First, he argued that his detention was contrary to the INA, which does not permit re-detention without cause, notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an adequate post-custody review process. Additionally, he alleged that the detention was unconstitutional as a violation of his property and liberty rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, his right to a bond hearing, and his right not to be indefinitely detained while removal was not foreseeable. He asked the Court to order the government either to release him or to hold a bond hearing. On the same day the plaintiff filed the petition, Judge Forrest ordered the government not to transfer the plaintiff out of ICE's New York jurisdiction. The plaintiff moved to enforce the order. The government moved to oppose it, arguing that it had already sent the plaintiff to a detention center in Miami, Florida. On January 17, 2018 after the Court's hearing, the government informed the Court that it would exercise its discretion and transfer the plaintiff back to New York. Judge Forrest also ordered the government to file proof of a "travel document" that it had mentioned during the hearing. The government's reply stated that the plaintiff's country of citizenship had issued him a travel document that had been valid until Jan. 14. (Later, in a Jan. 29 order, Judge Forrest explained that the government had argued that the plaintiff's status was always subject to revocation once the government had obtained this document, unbeknownst to the plaintiff.) The plaintiff filed an amended habeas petition on January 17, 2018. The government response argued that it had validly revoked the plaintiff's stay of removal and permissibly detained him while seeking to execute his final removal order. In his reply, the plaintiff alleged that the government had failed to permit adjudication of his removal order. Rather, the government "arbitrarily arrested [him] . . . handcuffed him in front of his wife and attorney, hastily shuttled him to Miami for detention, without any assertion that he was a flight risk or danger." On January 29, 2018, Judge Forrest granted the plaintiff's habeas petition. She wrote:
The Court in fact agrees with the Government that the statutory scheme . . . allows them to do what was done here. But there are times when statutory schemes may be implemented in ways that tread on rights that are larger, more fundamental. Rights that define who we are as a country, what we demand of ourselves, and what we have guaranteed to each other: our constitutional rights. That has occurred here. In sum, the Court finds that when this country allowed petitioner to become a part of our community fabric, allowed him to build a life with and among us and to enjoy the liberties and freedom that come with that, it committed itself to allowance of an orderly departure when the time came, and it committed itself to avoidance of unnecessary cruelty when the time came. By denying petitioner these rights, the Government has acted wrongly. . . . Petitioner is entitled to the freedom to say goodbye.
2018 WL 623557. On January 30, the plaintiff, now freed from detention, asked the Court to retain jurisdiction. The government had asked the plaintiff to report for deportation on February 30, but the plaintiff was concerned that the timing was premature. However, Judge Forrest responded that the Court's jurisdiction had been premised only on habeas, no longer applicable after the plaintiff's release. On May 28, 2018, the government appealed the District Court’s order to the Second Circuit. On September 10, the government filed a motion to vacate the District Court’s order and dismiss the case as moot. In its supporting memo, the government argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to review the plaintiff’s habeas petition. Further, the government claimed that the District Court’s holding as to its purported violations of the plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fifth Amendment was unsupported by persuasive legal reasoning or precedent. Since the plaintiff had already been granted the relief sought, the government would not be able to obtain any redress on appeal. But, the government asserted, since it had been deprived of the opportunity to obtain review of the District Court’s order (due to the plaintiff’s release before review could be granted) the decision of the District Court should be vacated. On September 17, the plaintiff responded, contending that the risk of future re-detention in the event that his habeas relief was overturned sufficed to prevent his case from becoming moot. Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that the government should be prevented from, “making conclusory allegations about mootness in an attempt to simply erase the record of a decision it dislikes,” and that its motion should be denied. On July 30, 2019, the Second Circuit granted the government’s motion, dismissing the case as moot and ordering the District Court to vacate its order. Though the plaintiff sought a rehearing en banc, the Court denied his motion on November 1. The Second Circuit’s order was carried into effect by the District Court on November 4. This case is now closed. First Amendment Challenge—Southern District of New York (1:18-cv-01159) and Second Circuit (18-01597) On February 9, 2018 the plaintiff filed another complaint in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New York, claiming that he was targeted by immigration authorities on account of his political advocacy in violation of the First Amendment. This complaint was brought as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The complaint was filed against ICE leadership, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security. The case was heard by Judge Kevin Castel, and the plaintiff was represented by private counsel alongside co-plaintiffs from the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild and other immigration advocacy organizations. According to the complaint, U.S. immigration authorities engaged in a pattern and practice of targeting immigration rights activists on the basis of protected political speech. Further, it alleged that the plaintiff was targeted specifically in retaliation for his criticism of U.S. immigration policy. The complaint sought a declaration from the Court that the defendants’ retaliatory enforcement of the immigration laws against the plaintiff and other immigration activists amounted to a violation of the First Amendment. Further, the plaintiff requested that the Court issue a preliminary and permanent injunction (1) restraining the defendants from removing the plaintiff from the U.S. unless they were able to demonstrate that the action was “untainted by unlawful retaliation or discrimination against protected speech;” and (2) restraining the defendant from “selectively enforcing the immigration laws against any individual . . . based on the individual’s protected political speech about U.S. immigration law and policy.” The same day that the complaint was filed, the Court issued a stay to prevent the plaintiff’s removal from the U.S. by immigration authorities while his motion for a preliminary injunction remained pending. On February 12, 2018, the plaintiff filed a separate motion for a preliminary injunction, reiterating the injunctive requests articulated in the complaint. On May 23, 2018, the District Court dismissed the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2018 WL 2338792. According to the Court, provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated federal court jurisdiction to review a challenge to the execution of an order of removal. Section 1252(g) provides that, “no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” The Court held that this provision foreclosed subject matter jurisdiction over any claim, including those alleging constitutional violations. Further, the Court concluded that since the plaintiff’s First Amendment challenge itself was not adequately supported, it was not necessary to determine whether this statutory limitation on subject matter jurisdiction was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff. On May 25, the plaintiff appealed the District Court’s dismissal to the Second Circuit. Though the plaintiff requested on June 1, 2018, that the District Court maintain its stay on his removal pending the outcome of this appeal, the Court denied his motion on June 19. 2018 WL 3038494. On July 3, the plaintiff again sought a stay to prevent his removal, this time from the Second Circuit. The defendants moved to dismiss in the district court after the first request to stay was denied, but on July 19, the Second Circuit granted the plaintiff's second motion and stayed proceedings in the district court. The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's holding on the First Amendment claim on April 25, 2019. 923 F.3d 53. According to the Second Circuit, the plaintiff’s advocacy constituted “core political speech” entitling it to the most vigilant protection available under First Amendment jurisprudence. Further, the Court held that the plaintiff’s claims, if true as to the retaliatory measures taken by the government, amounted to egregious misconduct. Finding that the plaintiff raised a valid First Amendment claim, the Court concluded that Section 1252(g) unconstitutionally restricted the plaintiff’s ability to have a court hear this claim as a habeas petition. The Second Circuit directed the District Court to reconsider the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in light of its holding. Further, it ordered the District Court to prevent the plaintiff’s removal until the District Court had the opportunity to assess whether a stay should remain in effect until reconsideration of the injunction, or through final adjudication of the merits. The government’s motion for a rehearing before the Second Circuit was denied on September 26, 2019. The government filed a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court appealing the Second Circuit's decision on December 23, 2019. The Supreme Court granted the petition for the writ of certiorari. On October 5, 2020, the Court issued an opinion vacating the Second Circuit's judgment and remanded the case to the Second Circuit for further consideration in light of its holding in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam (140 S.Ct. 1959). The case is ongoing as of November 17, 2020. Coram Nobis Petition—District of New Jersey (2:17-cv-01256) and Third Circuit (19-01282) On February 22, 2017, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of Coram Nobis in the U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey. A writ of Coram Nobis seeks to correct a final judgment issued by a court in light of subsequently discovered fundamental errors. Through his petition, the plaintiff sought to have his 2001 criminal conviction overturned. Private counsel represented the plaintiff before Judge Kevin McNulty, who heard the petition. The plaintiff claimed that overly broad jury instructions enabled the jury to convict the plaintiff on the basis of conduct that was not fraudulent or otherwise criminal. Further, the plaintiff alleged that he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel both during his trial and appellate proceedings. On the day of the plaintiff’s January 11, 2018 arrest, the District Court stayed the plaintiff’s removal from the United States, pending final adjudication of this collateral challenge to his criminal conviction. This stay was litigated by the parties, and ultimately upheld on March 23, 2018. 2018 WL 1446407. On January 25, 2019, the plaintiff’s Coram Nobis petition was dismissed by the District Court. Concerning the allegedly faulty jury instructions, the Court held that errors such as these cannot be considered sufficiently “fundamental” as to justify application of the writ. According to the court, since these errors were of the kind that could be corrected by a new trial, their existence could not sustain a collateral attack on a finalized judgment. Addressing the plaintiff’s claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, the court held that plaintiff’s counsel was either not deficient on the bases alleged, or the errors were not significant enough to warrant relief. Last, the Court held that the plaintiff’s failure to adequately justify the numerous intervening years between the filing of this petition and his conviction was also a ground to foreclose the relief sought. On January 30, the plaintiff appealed the district court’s order to the Third Circuit, and submitted a motion to the trial court requesting that it maintain its stay blocking his removal pending appeal. On February 4, the district court denied the stay, stating that the court's authority to maintain the stay expired when it decided the Coram Nobis petition. The same day, the plaintiff filed a motion for an emergency stay before the Third Circuit. On February 27, the Third Circuit denied the plaintiff’s motion for a stay of his removal. This appeal remains ongoing.

Summary: On Jan. 11, 2018, an LPR held in immigration detention filed this habeas corpus petition against the U.S. government. The plaintiff had been suddenly arrested and detained after many years in the U.S. on a stay of removal. On Jan. 29, 2018, the Court granted his petition and ordered his release so that he would have time for an orderly departure before removal.


On February 10, 2016, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of Education. The ACLU sought the release of records related to the federal government’s “Countering Violent Extremism” programs under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA). The ACLU alleged that the agencies did not “make a reasonable effort to search for records in electronic forms or format responsive to Plaintiff’s Request,” in violation of FOIA. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. The ACLU alleged that these initiatives likely posed a risk to the right of equal protection and the freedoms of speech, religion and association. It submitted the original FOIA requests on May 13, 2015. Five of the seven agencies did not respond to the request, or released only a small number of documents. The documents pertained to the 2011 “Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.” The plan identified three areas of priority action for the agencies in “building resistance to violent extremism”: “enhancing Federal engagement with and support to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists....Building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism”; and “countering violent extremism propaganda while promoting our ideals.” The pilot program was implemented in Los Angeles, Boston, and Minneapolis in September 2014. In February 2015, the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice participated in a summit where it was announced that the Department of Justice had already awarded “nearly $3.5 million in grants ‘to address domestic radicalization to violent extremism.’” In July 2015, the House Homeland Security Committee recommended passage a bill that would allocate $10 million to create a Countering Violent Extremism Office within the Department of Homeland Security. The Department of Justice also launched the “Strong Cities Network,” which is a platform to “strengthen community resilience against violent extremism” with members New York, Atlanta, Denver and Minneapolis. Despite the strong governmental commitment to this initiative, the ACLU alleged that agencies had not released basic information on the Countering Violent Extremism programs including policy guidelines, training for officials, criteria for receiving funding or grants, or research and assessments justifying the need for and implementation of these projects. After the ACLU filed this lawsuit, the court ordered that the agencies issue joint status reports reporting their progress in fulfilling the FOIA requests. The agencies have filed 19 such Joint Status Reports as of August 3, 2020. The ACLU has reported receiving the documents listed here.

Summary: The American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services and Department of Education seeking the release of records related to the federal government’s “Countering Violent Extremism” programs under the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. § 552 (FOIA). The court ordered the release of records; as of August 3, 2020, the agencies have submitted 19 status reports to the court.


On January 28, 2000, a former high school student who experienced persistent physical and verbal harassment at the hands of peers, sued the Washoe County School District in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Lambda Legal, requested injunctive relief, attorneys' fees and costs, and compensatory and punitive damages for the District's content and viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment, and for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause based on sexual orientation and sex discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; sex-based discrimination in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, under 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and violations of Nevada tort law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the District's failure to respond to persistent complaints of student harassment and abuse while he attended school in the District from 1994 until 1997 constituted intentional discrimination based on his sex and sexual orientation. These actions and omissions resulted in the plaintiff's physical and emotional harms and prevented him from obtaining a high school diploma, as the persistent abuse caused him to drop out of high school. The plaintiff also claimed that school officials required him to stay quiet about his sexual orientation, resulting in First Amendment violations. On February 28, 2001, the Court (Magistrate Judge Robert A. McQuaid, Jr.) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's 1st, 2nd, 3nd, 4th, 7th, and 8th claims for relief. Henkle v. Gregory, 150 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1078 (D. Nev. 2001). The Court granted the defendant's motion as to the plaintiff's equal protection claims and the Title IX claims brought under Section 1983, as there was a separate enforcement mechanism under Title IX that covered the substance of both claims under Section 1681. See id. at 1072-74. The Court also granted the defendant's motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment punitive damages claim in so far as it related to one of the defendants acting in an official capacity. See id. at 1077-78. However, the Court denied the motion as to the plaintiff's First Amendment claim generally and in relation to his request for punitive damages against the defendants acting in their individual capacities, and his Title IX (§ 1681) claims against the School District. See id. at 1074-78. On May 22, 2001, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, reinstating his equal protection claim based on sexual orientation discrimination in light of a recent Ninth Circuit decision. The Court denied the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory appeal and the defendant's qualified immunity defense. The Court entered a stipulation of dismissal of one of the individually named defendants without prejudice on September 9, 2002, due to a settlement agreement reached between the parties. On September 13, the Court entered a stipulation of dismissal as to the remaining defendants with prejudice due to a separate settlement agreement. According to Lambda Legal, the settlement resulted in the award of $451,000 in damages to the plaintiff and required the School District to implement new employee training and discrimination policies, and to explicitly recognize freedom of expression in relation to sexual orientation in schools. On January 17, 2013, the Court dismissed the claims against the remaining defendant, as she completed training required as part of the settlement agreement, closing the case.

Summary: On January 28, 2000, a former high school student who experienced persistent physical and verbal harassment at the hands of peers, sued his school district in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. The plaintiff claimed that the school district's failure to respond to persistent complaints of harassment and abuse constituted violation of state tort law and intentional discrimination based on his sex and sexual orientation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and Title IX, and that school officials' prohibitions against discussion of his sexual orientation resulted in First Amendment violations. The parties settled the case out of court, resulting in the award of $451,000 in damages to the plaintiff. The agreement also required the school district to implement new employee training and discrimination policies, and to explicitly recognize freedom of expression in relation to sexual orientation in schools. The case was closed on January 17, 2013.


In Kitchen v. Herbert, on December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found Utah's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. About 1,300 same-sex marriages took place in Utah between that order and January 6, 2014, when the Supreme Court granted the state an emergency stay of order in Kitchen. Although these marriages were recognized as legal by U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder, the State declined to recognize them. Instead, on January 8th, 2014, the Governor's office issued a directive stating that "[b]ased on counsel from the Attorney General's Office regarding the Supreme Court decision, state recognition of same-sex marital status is ON HOLD until further notice." This case reflects litigation on that issue. On January 28th, 2014, four same-sex couples married in Utah between December 20th, 2013 and January 6th, 2014 brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the State of Utah in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union. They sought recognition of their marriages and costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that they had valid marriages under Utah Code Title 30 Chapter 1, and argued that by putting their marriages "on hold", the defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights to due process of law under the United States and Utah constitutions. On February 4, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit Utah from applying state marriage bans retroactively to same-sex couples who were married in Utah between December 20th, 2013, and January 6th, 2014. On May 19, 2014, the District Court (Judge Dale A. Kimball) granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. 2014 WL 2048343 (D. Utah, 2014). However, in the same ruling, the District Court stayed the preliminary injunction order for twenty-one days to allow the defendants to seek an emergency stay of case pending their interlocutory appeal to the Tenth Circuit. The state's interlocutory appeal was granted by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 4, 2014. Two days later the Tenth Circuit granted the defendant's motion for temporary stay of the district court's preliminary injunction order, pending its fuller consideration of a stay motion. On July 11, the Court of Appeals held that the state had not met the criteria for a longer-lived stay. However, it left the stay in effect until July 21, so that the state would have time to seek an emergency stay from the Supreme Court. On July 18, the Supreme Court granted such a stay, operative until resolution of the case by the Court of Appeals. The case mentioned earlier, Kitchen v. Herbert, which declared Utah's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, was denied review by the Supreme Court on October 6, 2014. By denying review of the decision in this case, the Supreme Court removed the stay, solidifying the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in Utah. With the stay of that decision removed, the defendants were now legally required to recognize the marriages of the plaintiffs in this case, and those similarly situated. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the appeal in the Tenth Circuit, which was granted by the Court of Appeals on October 8, 2014. The case was remanded back to District Court. On November 24, 2014, the parties filed a stipulation and joint motion to convert the District Court's preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. The District Court (Judge Dale A. Kimball) granted this motion on the same day and awarded the plaintiffs $95,000.00 in attorney's fees and costs for the District Court as well as Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals litigation. This case is now closed.

Summary: On January 28th, 2014, four same-sex couples who were legally married in Utah between December 20th, 2013, and January 6th, 2014 brought suit against the State of Utah in the District of Utah U.S. District Court under the Due Process Clause.They asked the court for an injunction ordering the State of Utah to withdraw any of its officials' instructions not to recognize the marriages by same-sex couples entered into during the time it was legal, a declaratory judgment stating that any statute preventing same sex couples from marrying does not retroactively strip recognition from the marriages by same-sex couples , to immediately recognize the marriages by same-sex couples entered into between December 20, 2013, and January 6, 2014 (including plaintiffs' marriages) as valid marriages, and costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on May 19, 2014 and, after the preliminary injunction was upheld by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, it was converted into a permanent injunction by the District Court on November 24, 2014. This case is now closed.


On August 5, 1965, students of the Monroe City School System (MCSS), on behalf of black students and parents in the City of Monroe, filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging racial segregation and discrimination in the operation of the schools. On September 17, 1965, a permanent injunction prohibiting the continued operation of a segregated school system was signed. After another decree was signed on February 11, 1970, the United States joined the action. In February of 1970, the Court also vacated the previous order and adopted a new plan that was eventually overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for failure to establish a unitary system. On August 5th, 1970, the Court entered a decree in accordance with the Fifth Circuit mandate that was approved on June 30, 1971. This decree established a neighborhood school plan and oversight committee. There was subsequent litigation in the 1970s and 1980s brought by intervenors who challenged the validity of the plan, resulting in an appeal consolidating the intervention connected with this case with an appeal of another school desegregation case, Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 513 F. Supp. 375  (SD-LA-0021). The appeal attempted to consolidate the geographically overlapping school districts and relieve the MCSS of its desegregation plan. This litigation resulted in an order to eliminate the overlapping area between the two school districts and that MCSS devise a new desegregation plan that would ensure there was no discrimination in reassigning students to one of the two school systems (MCSS or Ouachita Parish schools). On July 6, 1992, the Court granted, in part, a motion for unitary status (that is, a motion declaring that vestiges of past segregation had been eliminated), stating that the MCSS was unitary in the area of facilities, extracurricular activities, and hiring and retention of teachers and administrators, but was not unitary in the area of teacher and principal assignments, student assignments, and transportation. On August 14, 2008, the District Court (Judge Robert G. James) issued an order clarifying the reporting requirements of the decree and amending it to state that the school district must report on its enrollment by grade and race for each school for the current year and the name and race of each teacher employed for the current year by October 15th of each year. On March 26, 2010, the Court amended the decree to allow the district to offer, in good faith, certain AP and honors courses and continue magnet, scholarship, and research programs, reporting the enrollment numbers of those courses and programs by race at the end of each year, with the rest of the decree remaining in effect. The Court also stated that the decree would be in force for five years, and that on June 30, 2014, the district would undergo a full evaluation and be given the chance to be declared a unitary district. On June 20th, 2012, the Court approved a change in attendance zones in the school district, saying that it would not affect the ongoing desegregation efforts. On August 15, 2014, the School Board submitted a status report stating that it has not communicated a desire to its legal counsel to have the Court declare the district unitary. Thus the litigation continues.

Summary: In 1965, African American students of the City of Monroe sued the school district, alleging racial segregation, which resulted in various decrees to desegregate the school district. In 1992, the district was declared unitary in some aspects (extracurriculars, facilities, hiring and retention) but not in others (student and teacher assignments, transportation). In 2000, a judge was assigned to the case to continue monitoring the desegregation efforts, and the Court set a deadline of July 30, 2014 for the school district to submit a report for the Court to declare it unitary; the school district, however, did not choose to petition for unitary status by that deadline.


On May 8, 2002, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility in Boscobel, Wisconsin filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The plaintiff asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated his constitutional rights by taking away his clothes, forcing him to sleep on a concrete slab, denying him human contact, feeding him only "nutri-loaf," and giving him only four squares of toilet paper at a time. He also alleged that his constitutional rights had been violated by a lack of due process, improper classification procedures, deprivation of heat in winter, inadequate health care, inadequate mental health care, deprivation of medication, and deprivation of soap, as well as denial of mail, visitors, phone privileges, canteen items, writing materials, and time with the law library. On March 31, 2005, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin (Judge William C. Griesbach) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff appealed. On November 14, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Terence Thomas Evans) vacated the District Court's order of summary judgment and remanded the case to the District Court. Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488 (7th Cir. 2006). After remand, the parties entered a private settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 31, 2007. The terms of the settlement are unknown.

Summary: This pro se prisoner 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on May 8, 2002 against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections. The plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights and demanded declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 31, 2005, the Court (Judge William C. Griesbach) granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. However, on November 14, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Terence Thomas Evans) vacated the order and remanded the case to the District Court. After remand, the parties entered a private settlement agreement, whose terms are not available to us, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 31, 2007.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent infection of those confined in Philadelphia’s Federal Detention Center (“FDC”), as well as writs of habeas corpus to achieve temporary release from FDC for the named petitioners and other detainees at an elevated risk from COVID-19. No outcome yet. <hr> On April 15, 2020, three inmates filed a class-action complaint and petition for writs of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The petitioners, represented by the Public Interest Law Center and private counsel, sued under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging Fifth and Eighth Amendment violations. Petitioners sought to represent a class consisting of all current and future pretrial detainees, presentenced detainees, and sentenced inmates in custody at Philadelphia's Federal Detention Center ("FDC") during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. The case was assigned to Judge Anita B. Brody. According to the petition, there were approximately 1,030 people detained at the FDC, the majority being pretrial detainees. While the FDC had halted social visits and most attorney visitation on March 13, 2020, petitioners alleged that correctional officers came in and out every day without adequate medical screening. Petitioners further alleged that the sporadic use of masks and gloves was insufficient to prevent the spread of the virus, especially because detainees had only limited access to personal hygiene products. The three named petitioners claimed that they were particularly vulnerable because they suffered from underlying conditions that could cause complications if they contracted COVID-19. Petitioners sought immediate release of vulnerable persons to home confinement, with appropriate precautionary public health and safety measures, and an order requiring respondent to mitigate the serious risk of illness, death, and harm from COVID-19 to those who remained confined at the FDC. Additionally, they sought the appointment of a Special Master to chair a Coronavirus Release Committee, which would make recommendations on release decisions and mitigation of prison conditions. The Bureau of Prisons, which runs FDC, filed a motion to dismiss on April 20, 2020, claiming that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over pretrial detainees to entertain the petition and that the petition was meritless. The court authorized the petitioners to engage in limited jurisdictional discovery, which did not include an on-site inspection, to evaluate whether “extraordinary circumstances” justified exercising habeas jurisdiction over the pretrial detainees at the FDC. 2020 WL 1975064. On May 2, 2020, in light of respondent’s letters stating that FDC staff members had tested positive for COVID-19, Judge Brody entered an order requiring that similar updates be immediately docketed. On May 14, 2020, Judge Brody ordered that if respondent learned that any inmate or staff member had tested positive for COVID-19, respondent had to immediately report that fact to the court. The Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on September 15, 2020. The Court relied on Third Circuit precedent in holding that the COVID-19 pandemic satisfied the "extraordinary circumstances" necessary to seek habeas relief. The Court approved a joint inspection protocol for experts from either side to conduct an inspection of the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia on October 8, 2020. The inspectors were authorized to inspect the staff entryway, the receiving and discharge areas, and various housing units. As of February 2021, the parties continue to engage in discovery with defendants supplying updates on ongoing COVID-19 testing and cases among staff members. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Petitioners filed a class action complaint and petitioned for writs of habeas corpus seeking temporary release from Philadelphia's Federal Detention Center ("FDC") for themselves and other detainees at an elevated risk from COVID-19. Petitioners also sought mitigation to prevent the risk of infection to those who will remain confined. The court authorized limited jurisdictional discovery to determine whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain the petition.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed on May 6, 2020 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a TRO prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Exclusion Provision. On June 12, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in seven different U.S. District Courts. This case was dismissed in August 2020.
 On May 6, 2020, an individual married to a spouse without a social security number (SSN) filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiffs alleged that 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (the Exclusion Provision), as enacted by Section 2101 of the CARES Act, violated due process, equal protection, and the penumbra of privacy rights under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs filed this action at the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin as a declaratory and injunctive action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiff’s proposed class sought to include all U.S. citizens married to a spouse without an SSN, and who filed joint tax returns with immigrants who would otherwise qualify. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of the Exclusion Provision and an order requiring the defendants to hold in escrow or earmark sufficient funds to issue Stimulus Checks to the proposed class. The plaintiff also sought attorney fees and class certification, and also requested a jury trial. The case was assigned to District Judge James D. Peterson and Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker. On March 27, President Trump announced the CARES Act aimed to provide emergency assistance and health care response to individuals and families affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act authorized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute $1200.00 to each eligible individual who is U.S. citizens, permanent residents, or qualifying residing aliens with a valid SSN. Under Section 6428, or the Exclusion Provision, the applicant was also required to provide a “valid identification number,” or, an SSN of their spouse on their tax returns. The plaintiff, married to an immigrant with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) but without an SSN, did not qualify for the Advance Payment. The plaintiff argued that her exclusion from eligibility on the basis of her choice to marry a non-citizen was a violation of her First Amendment rights. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the Exclusion clause was against the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as it infringed her fundamental choice to marry whom she wished. The plaintiff also argued that Section 6428 was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest, no rationally related to any legitimate government interest. On June 12, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in several other U.S. District Courts. On August 7, the plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation to stay the case, and on August 10, the court dismissed the case without prejudice on the grounds that one or more of  Does v. Trump (PB-WI-0004),  Doe v. Trump (PB-IL-0014), or  Doe v. Trump (PB-CA-0055), could be dispositive. PB-CA-0055 and PB-IL-0014 only PB-WI-004 were voluntarily dismissed, and only PB-WI-0004 is believed to be ongoing.

Summary: This is a class action filed on May 6 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a TRO prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Exclusion Provision. On June 12, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in seven different U.S. District Courts. This case was dismissed in August 2020.