On November 8, 1996, a group of Black and Latinx teachers in the New York City Public School System filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Board of Education of the New York City School District (Board) and the New York State Education Department (Department). This action was filed on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated Black and Latinx teachers in the system who were adversely affected by either of two allegedly discriminatory tests developed and administered by the defendants: the National Teacher Examination Core Battery (NTE), and its successor, the Liberal Arts & Sciences Test of the New York State Teacher Certification Examination (LAST). Represented by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as class certification. The defendants had required teachers to pass one of the tests in order to receive their licenses and receive teaching appointments. The plaintiffs claimed that the tests were misused and not designed to measure whether the test-takers were qualified as teachers. They alleged that because Black and Latinx teachers disproportionately failed the tests in contrast to white test-takers, the use of these tests had a disparate impact on them and violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), and various state laws. Class Certification and Definition On July 13, 2001, the District Court (Judge Constance B. Motley) granted the plaintiffs' motion to certify this action as a class action on behalf of: "all African-American and Latino [teachers] in the System who were employed by the defendants on or after June 29, 1995, failed either the NTE or the LAST, and had suffered adverse employment consequences." 201 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). The Court certified the class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) for injunctive relief. The lawsuit continued for several years and in 2011 the Supreme Court issued an opinion in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 that overruled the Second Circuit's test for class certification. The Supreme Court held that for class members to obtain individualized monetary relief, the putative class must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) and could not avoid its additional requirements by seeking certification under Rule 23(b)(2). The defendants argued that because the plaintiffs had been certified under Rule 23(b)(2) but sought both monetary damages and individualized injunctive relief, the class certification was not valid and the class must be decertified. On December 4, 2012, the Court (Judge Kimba M. Wood) granted the decertification motion in part and denied it in part. Relying on Rule 23(c)(4), which allows the court to bifurcate proceedings, the court decertified the class with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for individual injunctive relief but maintained the class with respect to the declaratory judgment of the Board's liability under Title VII and injunctive relief benefiting the class as a whole. 907 F. Supp. 2d 492. The Board appealed the decision. On August 29, 2013, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to certify a damages class under Rule 23(b)(3). After administering the NTE exam, the Board had administered two iterations of the LAST exam, LAST-1 from 1993-2004 and LAST-2 from 2004-2012. The damages class, as amended on June 18, 2014, included those affected by the LAST-1 exam and was defined as: "all African-American and Latino individuals employed as New York City public school teachers by Defendant, on or after June 29, 1995, who failed to achieve a qualifying score on an administration of the LAST-1 given on or before February 13, 2004, and as a result either lost or were denied a permanent teaching appointment." 2013 WL 4647190. On February 25, 2014, the Circuit Court (Judges Robert A. Katzmann, Richard C. Wesley, and Raymond J. Lohier, Jr.) held that the Board's challenge to the District Court's class action decertification decision was moot because when the District Court certified the damages class, it had addressed the relief that the Board sought on appeal—namely, a determination of whether the predominance and superiority requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) were met. 555 F. App'x 37. The parties then litigated the validity of the LAST-2 test, and ultimately the Court held that the LAST-2 also violated Title VII. On October 7, 2016, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the damages class definition. The class definition was expanded to include:
"All African American and Latino individuals Employed as New York City public school teachers by Defendant, on or after June 29, 1995, who failed to achieve a qualifying score on any administration of the LAST, and as a result either last or were denied a permanent teaching appointment." 2016 WL 9777081.
 Defendant's Crossclaim On September 20, 2000, the Board of Education filed a crossclaim against the State Education Department for indemnification and contribution, arguing that because the Department had required the Board to administer the NTE and LAST, the Board should be indemnified. By 2003, all the plaintiffs' claims against the Department had been dismissed, but the Board's indemnification claims remained. On June 25, 2009, the District Court (Judge Kimba M. Wood) dismissed the crossclaim, finding that the cross-claim failed as a matter of law because there is no right to indemnification or contribution under Title VII. The District Court Summary Judgment Decisions On November 25, 2002, the Court (Judge Motley) granted the plaintiffs' and the defendants' summary judgment motions in part and denied them in part. Specifically, the court decided the following issues:

Procedural claims: The Court denied the defendant’s motions for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs' suit was not barred under res judicata, the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, the statute of limitations, or the plaintiffs’ failure to file a timely notice of claim.

Failure to state a claim: The court found that because prior to January 1, 1991, New York City was endowed with independent licensing authority, the plaintiffs could not state a claim against the Department for actions taken prior to that date. The court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment on this issue.

Lack of jurisdiction: The court denied the Department’s motion for summary judgment on the theory that the court lacked jurisdiction due to the plaintiffs' failure to sue the right party (the New York State Board of Regents). The Court found that the Board of Regents was not a necessary party and that the Department’s argument was a mistaken apprehension of the law.

Title VII employer liability: The court denied both defendants' motions for summary judgment that had sought a release from liability on the basis that they were not Title VII employers. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the issue and held that both defendants were employers under Title VII.

Title VI claims: The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding that there was no private right of action under Title VI.

Disparate impact claim: The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding that that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.

Misuse of the tests: Both parties had moved for summary judgment as to whether the tests were appropriately used to demote some of the plaintiffs. The court denied both motions, finding that there were issues of fact remaining.

 236 F. Supp. 2d 314. On November 27, 2002, the court denied the Education Department's request for certification of an interlocutory appeal with respect to the ruling that the Education Department could be liable as an employer under Title VII (issue 4 above). 234 F. Supp. 2d 324. On December 26, 2002, the court reversed its summary judgment ruling for the Department as to actions taken before January 1, 1992 (issue 2 above). The court found that an issue of fact still remained as to whether the Department played a significant role in the licensing of teachers before that date. 2002 WL 31887733. Trial Subsequently, the parties had a number of discovery disputes resolved in front of the court. The case went to a bench trial before Judge Motley beginning on December 11, 2002 to address the Title VII disparate impact claims and remaining issues of fact. The court recessed from January 27, 2002 until April 7, 2003, and the trial concluded on April 24, 2003. In total, the trial lasted over eight weeks. After the bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the defendants on September 4, 2003, and issued a judgment accordingly. The court held that, although the two tests in question had a disparate impact on the employment prospects of African-American and Latinx test-takers, the defendants had no Title VII liability because both tests were job-related, a defense to the plaintiffs' disparate impact showing. 2003 WL 25764041. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Education Department filed a cross-appeal, but the appeal was later dismissed in March 2004 for lack of standing (documents unavailable). Court of Appeals Decision On August 17, 2006, the Circuit Court (Circuit Judges Reena Raggi and Richard C. Wesley, and District Judge Christopher F. Droney) affirmed the lower court's ruling in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case back to the trial court. The Circuit Court held that the Department was not a Title VII employer and that the District Court had applied the wrong standard and erred in finding that the Department was subject to Title VII liability. The Circuit Court dismissed the Title VII claims against the Department accordingly. On the other hand, the Circuit Court affirmed that the Board was a proper Title VII employer and that its act of following state laws requiring teachers to pass the tests was not an act of business necessity that would exempt it from Title VII liability. 460 F.3d 361. The Circuit Court also found both legal and factual errors in the District Court's Title VII claim ruling in the defendants' favor. The Circuit Court agreed with the lower court that the NTE was properly validated and job-related. However, it found that the lower court had applied the wrong legal standard in its determination that the LAST was job-related. The Court vacated the lower court's ruling with respect to the LAST, and remanded the case. The Circuit Court noted that although it had found both legal and factual errors in the holding for the defendants, it was not convinced that judgement for the plaintiff appellants on the Title VII claim was warranted as a matter of law, either. 460 F.3d 361. The Board filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, but it was denied on June 23, 2008. Events after Remand Judge Motley passed away in 2005, and on remand, the case was reassigned to Judge Sidney H. Stein. The case was then reassigned to Judge Kimba M. Wood in February 2009 (pursuant to a memorandum issued by a case processing assistant). The remaining issues included: (1) whether the LAST was properly validated, and thus job related, and (2) whether the Board misused the NTE and the LAST exams to make decisions regarding the plaintiffs' employment. In the meantime, the Department, the New York State Board of Regents (the Regents) and the New York State Commissioner of Education (the Commissioner) sought to intervene in this action, seeking declaratory judgment from the Court against the plaintiffs under several theories. On September 17, 2009, the Court (Judge Wood) denied all three entities' motions but granted them the right to participate in the action as amici curiae. 2009 WL 2972997. The Department, the Regents, and the Commissioner appealed the denial to the Circuit Court, but later withdrew the appeal. On December 5, 2012, the court held that the Board did not misuse the NTE to make decisions regarding conditions of experienced teachers' employment. However, the court found that the Board violated Title VII by requiring the plaintiffs to pass the LAST as a condition to receive teaching licenses, because the LAST was not properly validated and thus it was not job-related. On January 28, 2013, the court granted the Board's motion for certification of an interlocutory appeal of the decision, finding that the issue of whether the Board's compliance with a facially neutral state licensing requirement that has a disparate impact on members of a protected class may be subject to Title VII liability met the requirements for an interlocutory appeal. However, the court declined to stay proceedings pending the appeal due to the age of the case. On July 2, 2013, the court ordered the Board to show cause why it should not issue an injunction enjoining the Board from further use of the LAST. On February 24 2014, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court judgment. Special Master and Injunction In May 2014, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee litigation and make reports and recommendations to the court. On November 24, 2014, the court issued an injunction enjoining the Board from using the LAST exam administered on or before February 13, 2004, as a benchmark for any employment decisions for the class members. The court also established criteria that would enable class members to be deemed certified by the State of New York to teach. The court appointed a neutral expert to evaluate whether the LAST-2 exam (administered from 2004-2012) also had a disparate impact on Black and Latinx test takers and whether it violated Title VII. The expert concluded that it did. The court held on June 5, 2015 that the Board violated Title VII by requiring the plaintiffs to pass the LAST-2 exam in order to receive a permanent teaching license. 113 F. Supp. 3d 663. The court subsequently granted a motion to amend the class definition to account for the holding. 2016 WL 9777081. However, by the time the court reached its decision regarding the LAST-2 exam, the State Education Department had retired the exam and implemented a new test called the Academic Literacy Skills Test (ALST). The parties litigated over the validity of the ALST, and on August 7, 2015, the court held that the Board’s administering of ALST and the State Education Department’s requirement that all licensed teachers pass the ALST did not violate Title VII. The Court found that the content of the exam was related to the job of teaching in state public schools, the content of the exam reflected the content of a teacher’s job, and the developers used reasonable competence in constructing the exam. 122 F. Supp. 3d 115. Individual Money Judgments The parties continued to litigate over the content of the injunction and over specific claimants' inclusion or dismissal from the class. In 2016, the court dismissed the case with respect to paraprofessionals employed by the defendants and claimants who had worked as per diem substitute teachers. On December 14, 2018, the court issued an order adopting the Special Master's Report on Classwide Conclusions of Law, Stipulation of Classwide Facts and Procedures, and Stipulation of the Admissibility of Exhibits. The Report provided a guide to compute damages for claimants. The court has issued monetary judgments for several individual claimants against the Board. Starting on April 11, 2019, the Board appealed all of the individual judgments to the Circuit Court. On April 29, 2019, the Board moved to stay enforcement of these judgments, both past and future. The court granted the motion for monetary relief and denied the motion for injunctive relief on June 12, 2019. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this stay applied only to past judgments and not future ones. Individual monetary judgments and appeals of those judgments continued through 2019 and into 2020. On March 26, 2020, the court extended the LAST injunction to March 31, 2021. Six months later, the injunction was further extended to July 30, 2021. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the injunction was once again extended, this time to August 26, 2022. On April 23, 2020, the court ordered an interim award of attorneys' fees for the plaintiffs amounting to $1,736,625.26. The court awarded another interim payment on December 12, 2020, this time for $2,241,902.82. The Circuit Court heard oral argument on January 14, 2021, on the appeal the defendants had filed on April 11, 2019. It issued a summary order two weeks later, affirming the District Court's judgments and holding that those final judgments were calculated properly. On March 15, 2021, the Board filed a petition for a rehearing with the Circuit Court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 1996, Black and Latinx teachers in the New York City Public School System filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, under Title VI, Title VII and state laws, against the Board of Education of the New York City School District of the City of New York and the New York State Education Department. They claimed that the defendants misused two discriminatory tests, requiring them to pass as a condition to receive teaching licenses and employment benefits. The District Court certified a (b)(2) and (b)(3) class and eventually dismissed the Title VI claims on a summary judgment motion. After a bench trial, the court found in favor of the defendants with regard to the plaintiffs' Title VII claims. The plaintiffs appealed. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded. Eventually, the court enjoined the defendants from using the LAST test as a condition to receive teaching licenses. The court also started issuing individual judgments for monetary relief, which the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit. The case is ongoing.


On October 4, 2017, a teenage unaccompanied minor in immigration detention (“Doe 1”) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the conditions of his confinement. Represented by the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs and by private counsel, he sued the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission. The Commission operated the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center, where he was detained in “brutal and inhumane conditions” which “shocked the conscience.” The plaintiff had fled to the United States to seek asylum after experiencing domestic abuse and other violence in Mexico. He claimed that his prolonged detention at various U.S. facilities had exacerbated his trauma, leading to self-harm involving cutting his wrists and banging his head against the wall and floor. Shenandoah Valley staff had responded with “callous indifference.” Doe 1 claimed that he and other Mexican and Central American unaccompanied immigrant minors at the facility were subject to violence by staff; abusive and excessive use of seclusion and restraints; and denial of adequate mental health care in spite of their suicidality. He sought class certification for all similarly-situated minors who were or would be detained at the same facility. He claimed that facility staff treated the Latino immigrant detainees (who were held for civil immigration offenses) more harshly than white criminal detainees. He alleged that the staff’s deliberate indifference, as well as discrimination based on race and national origin, violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. He sought injunctive relief and a declaration that Shenandoah Valley’s practices were unconstitutional. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth K. Dillon. In an amended complaint dated January 31, 2018, Doe 1 stated that in December, he had been transferred to another facility in Virginia, but remained in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement and could be transferred back to Shendandoah Valley at any time. His amended complaint also added two additional plaintiffs detained at Shenandoah Valley (“Doe 2” and “Doe 3”). The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on February 28, 2018, asking the Court to enjoin Shenandoah Valley from imposing excessive or injurious discipline on them, either by physical force or by denial of adequate mental health treatment. They asserted that their behavioral issues in detention were provoked (by abusive treatment from staff), or were manifestations of untreated mental health problems. On June 27, 2018, the court certified the following class:: “Latino unaccompanied alien children (UACs) who are currently detained or will be detained in the future at Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center who either: (i) have been, are, or will be subject to the disciplinary policies and practices used by [Shenandoah Valley] staff; or (ii) have needed, currently need, or will in the future need care and treatment for mental health problems while detained at [Shenandoah Valley].” The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on July 11, 2018, adding a fourth plaintiff (“Doe 4”). In August 2018, the plaintiffs, without explanation, withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction. On October 4, 2017, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to appoint Doe 4 class representative in place of Doe 1, who no longer wished to proceed with this case (for reasons not stated in court filings). Doe 2 and Doe 3, who had been deported to their countries of origin, were dismissed as plaintiffs. On December 13, 2018, the court granted partial summary judgment to Shenandoah Valley: while allowing the excessive force claim, the excessive confinement claim, and the excessive use of isolation claim, the court ruled in favor of the facility on the inadequate medical care claim. 355 F. Supp. 3d 454. The court noted that while the plaintiffs wanted the facility to implement a best practice approach regarding mental health care, the constitutional standard was lower. It found that the facility had satisfied the constitutional requirements: it had provided bilingual case managers and mental health clinicians to each detainee, had arranged for Doe 4 to meet with a clinician once a week, and had made reasonable attempts to have him transferred to a residential facility to treat his post-traumatic stress disorder. Following the summary judgment ruling, the plaintiffs and the defendant came to an agreement: the plaintiffs would try to find a “Doe 5” plaintiff that could represent the class on the inadequate medical care claim. If they found such a plaintiff, the litigation would continue; if they couldn’t find a suitable class representative, they would dismiss their remaining claims, but would retain their right to appeal the summary judgment ruling as to Doe 4. On March 19, 2019, having found no suitable class representative, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss their remaining claims. After a fairness hearing on July 16, the court granted the motion to dismiss on July 23, 2019. This order dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims “alleging Defendant’s use of excessive force, excessive imposition of restraints and excessive use of solitary confinement,” and entered judgment for the defendant with respect to the plaintiffs’ “claims alleging Defendant’s failure to provide the Plaintiff Class with constitutionally-adequate mental health treatment.” As previously agreed with the defendant, the plaintiffs appealed this ruling on August 21, 2019 (Fourth Circuit Docket Number 19-1910). As of July 28, 2020, that appeal is pending.

Summary: On October 4, 2017, a minor in immigration detention sued the detention facility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with claims of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. Alleging racial discrimination and harsh detention conditions, the plaintiff sought (and obtained) certification of a class of similarly-situated minors in immigration detention at that facility. After the court granted summary judgment to the defendants on one of the claims, the plaintiffs sought to find another plaintiff who could represent the class on all of the claims. Unable to do so, they moved to dismiss their claims. Following the court’s dismissal of the claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the Fourth Circuit in August 2019. As of July 28, 2020, that appeal is pending.


On October 19, 2015, three African American men who had been unlawfully arrested and detained in Chicago filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago and six individual police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the People’s Law Office, the plaintiffs asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Chicago and the individual police officers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the police officers falsely arrested them, illegally detained and coercively interrogated them in Homan Square, fabricated evidence, withheld exculpatory evidence, wrote false reports, and committed perjury during hearings and trials. On January 11, 2016, the defendants filed a partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs' complaint was insufficiently specific as to several counts, particularly the fabrication of evidence and the withholding of exculpatory evidence. On July 19, 2016, Judge Ronald A. Guzman granted in part and denied in part the defendants' partial motion to dismiss. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' Brady claim with prejudice, as well as one of the plaintiff's excessive force claims against one police officer. Additionally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ due process claim relating to the fabrication of evidence and their claim for civil conspiracy without prejudice. The court gave the plaintiffs 21 days to replead the two claims dismissed without prejudice. On August 9, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. Meanwhile, the case was consolidated with Perez v. Chicago, also in this Clearinghouse, for purposes of discovery. Following several months of discovery, defendants in this case filed a motion to bifurcate the plaintiffs' Monell claim from the other claims in the case and to stay discovery and trial on the other claims on January 31, 2017. On February 1, 2017, the Magistrate Judge Mary M. Rowland denied the motion with respect to bifurcating the Monell claims for discovery and denied without prejudice with respect to bifurcating the Monell claims for trial (holding that the decision about bifurcating for trial was for District Judge Guzman to make). Following more than a year of discovery, the parties began settlement discussions in August of 2018. On September 24, 2018, the court held a settlement conference and the parties reached an agreement. The agreement was not filed before the court and so the contents of it are unknown. On November 8, 2018, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice, which automatically converted to dismissal with prejudice after 75 days. Each party was responsible for its own costs and attorneys' fees. This case is now closed.

Summary: In October 2015 plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging wrongful detention in Chicago's Homan Square, unlawful interrogation and fabrication of evidence. In January 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the Court granted in part and denied in part. The parties reached a settlement agreement on September 24, 2018.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action seeking to enjoin certain Connecticut voting laws in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. No outcome yet.
 On May 6, 2020, two Connecticut voters brought this class action on behalf of all registered Connecticut voters in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the governor and secretary of state of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs challenged two Connecticut laws: the Ballot Access law, which required candidates to collect in-person signatures to access the ballot for the August 11, 2020 primary elections, and the Absentee Ballot law, which required in-person voting, allowing for mail-in absentee voting for few exceptions. The plaintiffs alleged that Connecticut's ballot access law ("Ballot Access") was unsafe and impossible amid a pandemic and that Connecticut's absentee ballot law ("Absentee Ballot") inappropriately restricted access to the voting process and treated similarly situated voters differently. The case was assigned to Judge Janet C. Hall. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 12, adding two named plaintiffs and including the governor's newly issued Executive Order No. 7LL, arguing that although the order addressed the Ballot Access claim, it did not solve the constitutional deficiencies. That same day, they filed a motion for preliminary or permanent injunction with respect to their Ballot Access claim. On May 18, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class as to the Ballot Access claim. The Democratic State Central Committee moved to intervene on June 1 and on June 2, the defendants and the proposed intervenors separately filed memoranda in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Connecticut voters challenged state law that required in-person signatures to access the ballot and the use of in-person ballots for the election with only few exceptions. They argued that the law unconstitutionally burdened their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights given the COVID-19 pandemic and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.


On September 18, 2008, AT&T customers filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and private counsel, claimed that the federal government's electronic surveillance program violated the Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, separation of powers, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or the Stored Communications Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the National Security Agency ("NSA") implemented a massive, indiscriminate, illegal dragnet of the phone calls and emails of tens of millions of ordinary Americans since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The core component of the defendants' surveillance program was a nationwide network of sophisticated communication surveillance devices attached to the key facilities of various telecommunication companies that carried Americans' Internet and telephone communications. On October 28, 2008, Judge Walker marked this case as formally related to Hepting v. AT&T (NS-CA-0004, in this Clearinghouse). The Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel then consolidated the case as part of a multi-district litigation consolidation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation (NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse). For information about what happened while this case was a part of that multi-district consolidated matter, see NS-CA-0004. After dismissals of almost all of the cases in the MDL, this case was one of only two cases remaining. The other case was Shubert v. Obama, see NS-CA-0006, in this Clearinghouse. But in January 21, 2010, Judge Walker dismissed both this case and Shubert v. Obama, because the plaintiffs failed to establish their standing to bring suit—that is, they failed to establish that they were personally affected by the alleged violation of law. Jewel v. NSA, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2010). The plaintiffs appealed. On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated Judge Walker's dismissal decision. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that the plaintiffs did have standing, and remanded "with instructions to consider, among other claims and defenses, whether the government's assertion that the state secrets privilege bars this litigation." Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011). In 2012, Judge Walker retired; the matter was reassigned to District Judge Jeffrey S. White on May 18, 2012. Upon remand, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment requesting that the district court dismiss the defendants' state secret defense. The U.S. cross-moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity for the statutory claims and for summary judgment on the assertion of the state secrets privilege. On July 23, 2013, Judge White granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, rejecting the government's state secrets defense. However, Judge White also granted the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages under FISA and all statutory claims for injunctive relief on the basis of sovereign immunity. Judge White reserved ruling on the government's motions for summary judgment on remaining non-statutory claims (counts 1-4 of the Jewel Complaint and the fourth cause of action in the Shubert Complaint). Jewel v. NSA, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013). On July 24, 2013, Judge White granted a motion to relate this case with First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA (NS-CA-0003 in this Clearinghouse). Under the "minimization" rules applicable to the Section 215 metadata program, the NSA had been required to destroy all metadata within five years of collection. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01, NS-DC-0051. In this case, the plaintiffs argued that this data destruction would interfere with their ability to establish the facts needed for their lawsuit. Accordingly, on their request, Judge White entered a temporary restraining order on March 10, 2014, requiring the preservation of relevant evidence pending the parties' further briefing and the Court's final determination of the preservation issues. In its restraining order, the Court required that the government refrain from "destroying any potential evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this action, including but not limited to prohibiting the destruction of any telephone metadata or 'call detail' records, pending further order of the Court." This order applied to this case; Shubert v. Obama; and First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA. This temporary restraining order directly conflicted with the standing Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court order in In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01 (NS-DC-0051 in this Clearinghouse). To eliminate the conflict, the FISC responded to Judge White's order by granting temporary relief from the five-year destruction requirement but required that telephony metadata being preserved beyond the five-year limitation not be used by the NSA for any purpose. In the summer of 2014, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment claim, and the defendants responded by also moving for partial summary judgment on the Fourth Amendment claim. On February 10, 2015, Judge White denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Judge White held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient factual basis to find that they had standing to sue under the Fourth Amendment regarding the possible interception of their Internet communications. Further, even if the plaintiffs could establish standing, they argued that the claim must be dismissed because any possible defenses would require impermissible disclosure of state secret information. Jewel v. NSA, 2015 WL 545925 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2015). On May 20, 2015, the Court held that its adjudication of this claim was a final determination and no just reason existed for delay in entering final judgment on this claim. The court entered partial judgment and dismissed the claim that the government defendants violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs by copying and searching the contents of the plaintiff’s internet communications. On June 4, 2015, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On December 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal did not meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The panel concluded that that the certification was not warranted because the question of whether the copying and searching of plaintiff’s Internet communications violated the Fourth Amendment, was intertwined with several other issues that remained pending in district court, and the interlocutory appeal would only have prolonged final resolution of the case. Each party was to bear its own costs on appeal. Jewel v. NSA, 810 F.3d 622. On February 19, 2016, Judge White found that in the absence of sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs could state claims under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act. The District Court thus granted plaintiffs’ motion to lift the stay of discovery on Counts 9, 12, and 15, and that any disputed materials that defendants contended that would potentially run the risk of impermissible disclosure of state secret information could be disclosed ex parte for in camera review. On December 16, 2016, the parties filed a joint discovery letter outlining their respective positions on disputed discovery issues. On April 26, 2017, the FISC issued an order approving changes to the Section 702 Upstream program, including revised minimization procedures which required the NSA to destroy, as quickly as practicable, all raw Upstream Internet communications data acquired on or before March 17, 2017, that existed in all of NSA’s institutionally managed repositories. At the May 19, 2017 case management conference, Judge White ordered the government defendants to marshal all of their evidence relating to plaintiffs’ standing and to present that evidence to the court, making as much of it public as possible. The defendants’ production of materials was completed on April 1, 2018. On May 7, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to obtain access to the classified materials, which was opposed by the government defendants, and subsequently denied by the court on June 13, 2018. On August 17, 2018, Judge White ordered the parties to file dispositive motions to resolve the threshold legal issues raised by the remaining statutory claims in this matter. On August 24, 2018, the parties submitted a joint discovery letter, and the plaintiffs argued that the court should order the government defendants to respond separately and individually to each request for admission. On September 7, 2018, the government defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They argued because of the state secrets privilege and of the statutory privileges established by 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1) and 50 U.S.C. § 3605(a), plaintiffs lacked admissible evidence to establish their standing to maintain their statutory claims. Consequently, the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider them. Moreover, they argued that dismissal was required because the case could not be litigated on the merits without creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets. On September 28, 2018, the plaintiffs responded, arguing that (1) the government defendant could not meet its summary judgment burden; (2) the public evidence demonstrated plaintiffs’ standing; (3) the undisclosed classified evidence also demonstrated plaintiffs’ standing; (4) section 2712(b)(4) required the use of classified evidence to decide standing; and (5) this lawsuit may not be dismissed on state secrets grounds. After the plaintiffs and defendants exchanged responses and replies on the above-mentioned points of contention for several months, the court held oral arguments for the summary judgement motions. On April 25, 2019, the court entered a judgement denying the plaintiffs' summary judgement cross-motion and ordered summary judgement for the defendants. The court found that the plaintiffs could not produce admissible evidence to show that the plaintiffs were harmed through surveillance. This was due to a lack of admissible evidence that the customers in question were among those affected by the defendants. Additionally, the classified information the court viewed could not be shared as it would constitute a grave danger to national security. The court found that it could not issue a judgement on whether or not there was redressability for the injury suffered by the plaintiffs without also endangering national security. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit on April 25, 2019. Their appeal included the February 10, 2015 order granting defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, the June 13, 2018 order denying plaintiffs’ motion for access to classified discovery materials, the August 28, 2018 order regarding parties’ joint discovery letter brief, the April 25, 2019 order granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ cross-motion to proceed to the merits, and the court’s April 25, 2019 Classified Order. On November 2, 2020 a panel of the Ninth Circuit consisting of Circuit Judges Ronald Gould, Margaret McKeown, and Carlos Bea heard argument from the parties. After oral argument, on December 24, 2020, the government filed a letter with the court notifying it that the government had sought certiorari from the Supreme Court in Fazaga v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, another case about the intersection of FISA and the state secrets privilege (NS-CA-0030 in this Clearinghouse). The court ordered the plaintiffs to file a response addressing the question of whether this case ought to be held until the Fazaga case was resolved because of the similar issues they presented on January 27, 2021. On February 4, 2021, the plaintiffs responded, and since then there has been no action in this case. This appeal is ongoing as of February 2021.

Summary: In 2008, AT&T residential telephone customers sued the United States, claiming that its electronic surveillance program violated the Fourth Amendment, First Amendment, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act or the Stored Communications Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the separation of powers. In 2013, the District Court dismissed the Plaintiffs' statutory claims; and in February 2015, the Court dismissed the Fourth Amendment Claim. In June 2015, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; in December 2015, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In February 2016, Judge White held that the plaintiffs stated claims under the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act, and in May 2017, Judge White ordered the government defendants to marshal all of their evidence relating to plaintiffs' standing and to present that evidence to the court. In September 2018, the government defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In April the court approved the defendants' summary judgement motion and denied the plaintiffs'. The plaintiffs appealed in April to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. As of February 2020, this appeal remains pending.


On July 26, 2010, a North Carolina prisoner filed this § 1983 lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina against officers and administrators at the state-run Central Prison. On February 14, 2012, the Court (Judge Terrence W. Boyle) denied the state's motion for summary judgment. Due to the pro se plaintiff's inability to procure discovery, and the complexity of the issues, the court appointed North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services (NCPLS) to represent the plaintiff. On May 1, 2013, NCPLS filed an amended complaint, adding seven similarly situated North Carolina prisoners. The prisoners asked the court for damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that the officers took advantage of a blind spot--one free from video surveillance--in one of the prison's hallways to commit malicious and sadistic assaults on the prisoners. For years, prisoners housed on Central Prison's Unit One repeatedly reported the abuses through letters and litigation. This lawsuit sought to end the problem, seeking an injunction mandating installation of video surveillance cameras in the blind spot, and policies regarding retention of video footage and procedures for the investigation of officers' use of force. Because of years of discovery disputes and the bifurcated posture of the case, Judge Boyle ordered the original case (No. 5:10-ct-03135) closed on August 26, 2013 and opened a new case Corbett v. Branker, No. 5:13-ct-03201, with a beginning date of May 1, 2013--the date of the filing of the amended complaint in the old case. On November 19, 2013, Judge Boyle appointed a special master to assist the court and the parties and to file reports with the court regarding the prison's compliance with future court orders. On March 17, 2014, Judge Boyle denied the state's motion to dismiss and dismissed the prisoners' motion for preliminary injunction. On March 27, 2014 the parties stipulated to several of the special master's findings. The court placed the prison on notice that if it did not comply and implement the initial recommendations, a preliminary injunction would issue. On May 7, 2014, Magistrate Judge Robert Jones granted the prisoners' motion for a protective order against the prison officials. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on September 11, 2015, and the plaintiff appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. <i>Corbett v. Branker</i>, 628 Fed. Appx. 185 (4th Cir. 2016). The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on January 7, 2016. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: North Carolina prisoners filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of North Carolina under § 1983 against officers and administers at the state-run Central Prison, who allegedly committed malicious and sadistic assaults on prisoners in an area free from video surveillance. The prisoners seek an injunction mandating installation of video surveillance cameras in the blind spot, and other relief. Judge Terrence Boyle ordered the original case closed due to procedural complexities but opened a new case Corbett v. Branker, No. 5:13-CT-3201, on August 26, 2013.


The lawsuit touches on the national controversy over whether local police should be involved in enforcement of federal immigration laws. On January 8, 2007, the ACLU of Rhode Island filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island against the Rhode Island State Police, alleging that its officers engaged in racial profiling when they stopped and detained 14 Guatemalans in a van on Interstate 95 and transferred them to immigration officials. The lawsuit alleged that a State Police officer pulled over the van because the driver failed to use his turn signal when changing lanes. After the officer confirmed that the driver's license and registration were valid and that he had no outstanding warrants, he demanded that the passengers produce documents "demonstrating their U.S. citizenship." When none of the occupants could produce citizenship papers, they were escorted to the federal Office of Immigration and Customs Enforcement in Providence. Plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' conduct violated their rights to be free from discrimination and from unreasonable searches and seizures as secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Rhode Island Constitution and the Racial Profiling Prevention Act of 2004. The State Police denied all allegations. After a year of discovery, the State Police filed a motion for summary judgment on May 22, 2008, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the reasonability of the search on the same day. On December 30, 2008, the District Court (Chief Judge Mary M. Lisi) denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted that of the State Police, finding that the police search was justified by reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that they had been discriminated against based on race. The plaintiffs appealed, and on February 4, 2010, a three-judge panel of the First Circuit (Chief Judge Sandra L. Lynch, Judge Juan R. Torruella and Judge Jeffrey R. Howard) affirmed. <i>Estrada v. Rhode Island</i>, 594 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2010). In an opinion by Judge Torruella, the panel held that the officer who made the stop was entitled to qualified immunity and thus declined to address the other issues. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 8, 2007, the ACLU of Rhode Island filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for Rhode Island against the Rhode Island State Police, alleging that its officers engaged in racial profiling and made an unreasonable search and seizure when they stopped and detained 14 Guatemalans in a van on Interstate 95 and transferred them to immigration officials. The District Court of Rhode Island granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the First Circuit affirmed.


A group of diversity visa lottery winners and their family members filed suit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia on August 3, 2017. Defendants included the US Secretary of State and consular officials. Plaintiffs were represented by the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, the ACLU, the National Immigration Law Center, and private counsel. Plaintiffs challenged the State Department’s practice of denying immigrant visas to diversity lottery winners from countries affected by President Trump's March 6 Executive Order (EO-2). EO-2 was the second iteration of four 2017 executive orders issued by President Trump that placed restrictions on travelers from numerous majority Muslim countries into the U.S. These orders spurred numerous lawsuits, many of which can be found in this collection. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. The Diversity Visa Program awards visas to nationals from countries that have historically sent low numbers of immigrants to the United States. On March 6, 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that barred entry to nationals from six majority-Muslim countries: Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen. Litigation ensued immediately, and the lower courts initially enjoined the government from implementing the order (see IRAP v. Trump and Hawaii v. Trump). But on June 26, 2017, in IRAP, the Supreme Court stayed the nationwide injunctions and allowed the order to become effective, except as it applied to immigrants who could establish a "bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States." 137 S.Ct. 2080. The plaintiffs were nationals from countries affected by EO-2 who had been selected as diversity visa lottery winners for the 2017 fiscal year (FY2017) but could not establish a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. By statute, the State Department was required to issue visas to the 2017 winners by September 30; winners whose visas were not issued by that deadline lost their slots in the program. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that "nevertheless, the State Department has adopted a policy directing consular officials to deny diversity visas to nationals from the countries barred from entry by the Executive Order." The complaint presented two main arguments. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the State Department’s practice violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and "statutes and regulations requiring the issuance of immigrant visas to diversity visa lottery winners who are statutorily eligible." Second, the practice allegedly conflated the travel ban’s prohibition on entry to the US for nationals from the targeted countries (originally set to expire in September 2017) with a total ban on the issuance of visas to individuals from these countries including visas issued pursuant to the diversity program. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a writ of mandamus requiring consular officials to issue plaintiffs' immigrant visas. Alternatively, the plaintiffs requested that the court order the State Department to reserve any unused FY2017 visa numbers for processing following any decision by the Supreme Court in IRAP. The same day that they filed their original complaint, the plaintiffs requested class certification. On August 18, 2017, the government responded to the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction (filed the same day as the original complaint). The State Department argued that plaintiffs' claims were precluded by the Supreme Court's stay in IRAP, which allowed the government to implement the EO. Plaintiffs filed both an amended petition for a writ of mandamus and an amended complaint on September 22, 2017. The amended complaint added eight plaintiffs. Judge Chutkan issued an order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and writ of mandamus on September 29, 2017. Judge Chutkan agreed with the government that the Supreme Court's June 26 decision in  IRAP  precluded the district court from issuing a preliminary injunction. However, the court did grant the plaintiffs' alternative request for relief. Consequently, the court ordered the State Department to report the number of unused visas for FY2017 by October 15, 2017, and to hold those visas for plaintiffs in the event that the Supreme Court struck down EO-2. 302 F. Supp. 3d 1. The Supreme Court issued another order in IRAP vacating the judgment of the district court in that case because the EO at issue expired on September 24, 2017, and expressed no view on the merits. 38 S.Ct. 353 Subsequently, in this case, the government filed a motion to dismiss on October 20, 2017, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision rendered the case moot. Plaintiffs filed their reply on November 13, 2017, arguing that the case was not moot because the district court could still provide them relief. The following month, plaintiffs submitted a series of status updates to the court. Following the court's request, plaintiffs submitted a status update on December 4 reporting the number of diversity visas issued in 2017. Defendants responded on December 5 contesting that number. Plaintiffs claimed that the State Department issued a total of 49,067 out of the available 50,000 diversity visas, while the government claimed that 49,976 were actually issued. Additionally, on January 5, 2018, plaintiffs filed another status update arguing that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hawaii v. Trump supported plaintiffs' claim that the case was not moot. Judge Chutkan dismissed this case with prejudice on March 27, 2018. He determined plaintiffs' claims were moot because the section of EO-2 at issue had expired. Plaintiffs appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (docket #18-5156) on May 24, 2018. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the case back to the district court on August 13, 2019. The Court reasoned that the case was not moot because whether the district court retained the authority to award plaintiffs any relief was a merits question. 933 F.3d 774. Defendants filed another motion to dismiss in the district court on April 13, 2020. The court did not address this motion until January 2021. Following the Inauguration of President Biden on January 20, 2021, the government filed an unopposed motion to hold the case in abeyance and a notice informing the district court of President Biden’s revocation of the travel ban executive orders on January 27, 2021. The government also informed the district court of President Biden’s proclamation (also issued on inauguration day) that the State Department provide him with a plan to expedite the reconsideration process for visa applications denied as a result of the executive orders at issue in this litigation. As a result of this motion, the district court made three orders on January 28, 2021. First, the district court granted the motion to hold the case in abeyance. Second, the parties were to file joint status reports, with the first to be submitted by April 27, 2021, and subsequent reports every 30 days after. Third, the district court denied without prejudice the government’s April 13, 2020, motion to dismiss. The parties have filed three status reports to the court including the first which they submitted on April 27, 2021. As of this writing, their most recent status report was submitted on June 28, 2021. In that filing, they reported to be in settlement discussions and to have exchanged drafts for a joint motion for clarification. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Numerous diversity visa lottery winners filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on August 3, 2017. They challenged the State Department’s practice of denying immigrant visas to diversity lottery winners from countries affected by President Trump’s March 6 Executive Order. Plaintiffs obtained some of the preliminary relief they sought. This included an order from the district court to the State Department to hold unused visas from 2016 for plaintiffs in the event Trump’s executive order was struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court. However, in March 2018, the case was dismissed by the district court as moot following the expiration of the executive order at issue. But, this dismissal was reversed on appeal by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in August 2019. Following the inauguration of President Joe Biden, the district court held the case in abeyance. As of this writing, the parties are in settlement negotiations. This case is ongoing


On December 3, 2018, the Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition (CAIR Coalition), the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), and two individual asylum seeking filed this class action lawsuit against the federal government in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit challenged the federal government's latest asylum policy prohibiting people who enter the U.S. along the southern border somewhere other than a designated port of entry from obtaining asylum. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged an interim final rule promulgated on Nov. 9, 2018 declaring all those subject to a presidential proclamation concerning the southern border ineligible for asylum, as well as President Trump’s proclamation signed the same day suspending entry of all people entering the U.S. without inspection at the southern border. The plaintiffs claimed the rule and proclamation violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. They sought declaratory relief, as well as a temporary restraining order followed by a nationwide preliminary injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the rule and proclamation. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of a proposed nationwide class under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(4), consisting of all noncitizen who have entered or will enter the U.S. through the southern border but outside ports of entry at any time on or after Nov. 9, 2018. The case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss and marked as related to O.A. v. Trump. On December 17, the court held a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction and consolidated the case with O.A. v. Trump, designating O.A. v. Trump as the lead case. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint listing seven additional asylum seekers as lead plaintiffs. The remainder of this case’s activity can be found at O.A. v. Trump.

Summary: On December 3, 2018, the Capital Area Immigrants’ Rights Coalition (CAIR Coalition), the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), and two individual asylum seeking filed this class action lawsuit against the federal government in the District Court for the District of Columbia. The lawsuit challenged the federal government's latest asylum policy prohibiting people who enter the U.S. along the southern border somewhere other than a designated port of entry from obtaining asylum. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. They sought declaratory relief, as well as a temporary restraining order followed by a nationwide preliminary injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the rule and proclamation. The plaintiffs also sought class certification on behalf of a proposed nationwide class. On December 17, the court consolidated the case with O.A. v. Trump, designating O.A. v. Trump as the lead case. On December 18, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint listing seven additional asylum seekers from O.A. v. Trump as lead plaintiffs. The remainder of this case’s activity can be found at O.A. v. Trump.


On October 9, 2017, the State of Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The State sued the President of the United States, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), and the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The State, represented by public counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief as well as attorney’s fees and costs, claiming violations of the APA and the First and Fifth Amendments. The case was assigned to Judge Ronald Leighton. The State challenged two sets of rules the Trump Administration introduced that expanded an employer’s ability to opt out of providing contraceptive coverage for female employees, which in turn greatly undercut contraceptive coverage introduced by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The first set of policies allowed any employer who asserted a religious objection to contraception—not just a church or religious order—to exempt itself from providing contraception coverage to its employees. The second set of policies allowed employers with moral objections to contraception to opt out of the ACA requirement. The State alleged these rules violated the APA because the Trump Administration did not provide public notice or an opportunity for comment before changing substantive rights and obligations springing from the ACA, as required by the APA. But the State argued that even if the Administration had acted in accordance with the APA, the First and Fifth Amendments would have still been implicated. Furthermore, the State alleged that the policies substantially harmed its female residents. On December 11, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss, and alternatively for summary judgment, arguing that the State lacked standing to bring this lawsuit. The defendants also argued that the new regulations did not violate the Constitution or the APA. On January 2, 2018 the State filed an amended complaint to bolster its claims for standing to sue. Two days later, the defendant moved again to dismiss and alternatively moved for summary judgment in response. The State moved to stay the lawsuit and the court granted this motion on January 19, 2018. The court ordered that all pending and forthcoming deadlines of this lawsuit would be stayed as long as either the December 21, 2017 injunction in California v. Hargan, or the December 15, 2017 injunction in Pennsylvania v. Trump remained in full force and effect. Since the injunctions remained in place the rest of the year, there was no further action in this case until December 18, 2018, when the parties submitted a stipulation to the court to dismiss the case without prejudice, with each side agreeing to bear their own attorneys' fees and other costs. The Court ordered that the case be dismissed on December 19, 2018. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2017, the State of Washington filed this complaint in the U.S. District for the Western District of Washington. The State alleged that two sets of rules introduced by the Trump Administration that expanded the ability of an employer to opt out of providing coverage for preventive health services violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the First and Fifth Amendments. In 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s request to stay the lawsuit. The court ordered that all pending and forthcoming deadlines of this lawsuit were stayed as long as either the injunction in California v. Hargan, et al., or the injunction in Pennsylvania v. Trump, et al remain in full force and effect. The parties agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice in December 2018. The case is now closed.


On July 14, 2016, an inmate at the Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, alleging that he had received inadequate medical care from the MDOC for a chronic Hepatitis C (HCV) viral infection. The inmate originally filed on his own, but the ACLU of Missouri and MacArthur Justice Center began representing this inmate and on December 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint seeking to proceed as a class action lawsuit. Plaintiffs sued the Missouri Department of Corrections and Corizon, LLC, the healthcare provider for all MDOC facilities, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiffs additionally sued the director of MDOC and individual medical practitioners at MDOC facilities. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by failing to provide the medically acceptable care to inmates with the Hepatitis C Virus (HCV). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed (a) that defendants failed to provide all inmates with HCV the direct-acting antiviral (DAA) drug treatment, which is approved by the FDA and has been shown to cure 90% of HCV cases; and (b) that defendants utilized outdated and ineffective diagnostic techniques in determining whether or not to treat a patient with symptoms of HCV. Plaintiffs further claimed that defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against inmates with HCV. The plaintiffs sought relief for members of a putative class comprising over 5,000 prisoners in custody of MDOC who have been or will be diagnosed with HCV but who are not provided treatment with DAA drugs. Plaintiffs wanted a declaration that the withholding of DAA drugs from defendants was unconstitutional and additionally sought an injunction to require defendants to formulate and implement a plan that meets the prevailing standard of care for HCV diagnosis and treatment. Plaintiffs further sought monetary relief in the form of the costs of the suit and attorney fees and litigation expenses. The case was before United States District Judge Nanette Laughrey. On February 21, 2017, MDOC defendants filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint. In their motion to dismiss, MDOC defendants claimed that plaintiffs had failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because they had no constitutional right to obtain the course of treatment demanded (DAAs). Additionally, defendants claimed that plaintiffs failed to state an ADA claim since ADA claims cannot be based on medical treatment decisions. On May 11, 2017, the Court issued an order granting in part and denying in part MDOC defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court denied defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims on the grounds that plaintiffs had demonstrated both a serious medical need for prompt treatment with DAAs and deliberate indifference on the part of defendants to plaintiffs’ serious need for medical treatment. It also denied defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to plaintiffs’ ADA claims, finding that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged claims under the ADA and that defendants had not shown adequate evidence to dismiss at that point. The Court did grant the motion to dismiss with respect to specific counts for individual MDOC employees on qualified immunity grounds, and also with respect to certain damages claims against state officials in their official capacity on Eleventh Amendment grounds. 2017 WL 1968317. On July 26, 2017, Judge Laughrey granted class certification, 2017 WL 3185155. The defendants sought permission to appeal under Rule 23(f) and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit granted permission in September 2017. The parties then moved to stay proceedings in the District Court pending the Circuit Court's resolution of the certification appeal, and the District Court stayed proceedings on October 27, 2017. On December 6, 2018, the Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Erickson, Wollman, and Kelly) affirmed the judgment of the District Court granting class certification. 910 F.3d 1030. Then, The Court of Appeals issued an order denying a motion to rehear the case en banc on January 11, 2019. On June 17, 2019, the plaintiffs sought a motion for a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to implement a policy that complied with the standard of care for inmates with chronic HCV infection, as set forth in the American Association for the Study of Liver Disease and the Infectious Diseases Society of America. From August 13, 2019 to August 16, 2019 the court held a hearing concerning the preliminary injunction. As of September 26, 2019, the parties are still waiting for an order from Judge Laughlin concerning the preliminary injunction and are still engaged in discovery.

Summary: On July 14, 2016, inmates at the Missouri Department of Corrections filed this class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri. Plaintiffs sued the MDOC under U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants failed to provide medically acceptable care to HCV+ inmates and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Defendants filed a motion to oppose class certification, but on May 11, 2017, Chief Judge Laughrey granted the plaintiffs class certification. MDOC defendants also filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint, but on May 11, Judge Laughrey denied defendant MDOC's motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs plausibly stated claims under both the Eighth Amendment and the American Disabilities Act.


On August 31, 2015, a group of minority New York City police officers who had been disciplined or fired filed a class action suit against the New York City Police Department (NYPD) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York for violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and of 42 USC §§ 1981, 1983, 1985. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that the NYPD's system of traffic violation quotas led to disparate treatment and impact on minority police officers. The case was presided over by Judge Laura Taylor Swain. On December 2015, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On January 11, 2016, the New York City Police Department moved to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that the complaint failed to properly state the claims alleged. On March 6, 2017, Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the Department's motion to dismiss, but allowed the Plaintiffs to make a motion for leave to replead the claims and requests for relief. On May 14, 2017, the Plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in support of their motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. On June 27, 2018, the plaintiffs’ motion to amend their complaint was granted and denied in part. Each plaintiff’s claims were reviewed individually. The court allowed individual plaintiffs' federal discrimination claims against various individual defendants, various plaintiffs’ retaliation claims, all plaintiffs’ state law claims, all plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims against one individual defendant, and various plaintiffs’ First Amendment retaliation claims against the City and additional individual defendants. On July 18, 2018 the plaintiffs submitted an amended complaint that abided by the District Court’s ruling. Discovery began August 18, 2018. On October 2, 2019, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Sarah L. Cave. After multiple discovery deadline extensions, with the final deadline being January 10, 2020, parties were required to submit a joint status report and they scheduled a settlement conference for December 4, 2019. The parties did not settle. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 31,2015, a group of minority New York City police officers who had been disciplined or fired filed a class action suit against the New York City Police Department in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs are alleging the police department mandates an unofficial quota policy and that minority officers within the department have been discriminated against for complaining about and not following this unofficial policy. After resubmitting a new complaint, discovery progressed and a settlement conference occurred on December 4, 2019. The parties did not settle. The case is ongoing.


On September 22, 2004, the Chicago office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit under Title VII against Compass International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of a class of complainants by subjecting them to a hostile work environment on the basis of their race and national origin. On December 9, 2005, the parties entered into a consent decree, which the court approved and adopted six days later. Under the terms of the decree, the defendants agreed to pay $85,000 in monetary damages to four named complainants. In addition, the defendants agreed to develop, post, and distribute among their employees an anti-discrimination policy that would be in effect at all times in their workplace. Defendants agreed to have all employees undergo annual nondiscrimination training during the three-year duration of the consent decree, and to keep a registry of all employees who attended the training. Defendants were required to file reports with the EEOC every 6 months during the life of the decree. These reports were to include any information regarding complaints of discrimination, as well as how those complaints were remedied. It appears that after the consent decree was entered, a document relating to another case was incorrectly added to this docket. The only additional activity on the docket is a notice of correction of this error. Since there is no subsequent enforcement activity, and presumably the matter closed in December 2008.

Summary: On September 22, 2004, the Chicago office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit under Title VII against Compass International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The EEOC alleged that the defendants had violated the rights of a class of complainants by subjecting them to a hostile work environment on the basis of their race and national origin. On December 9, 2005, the parties entered a consent decree for monetary damages ($85,000) and injunctive relief. The case is now closed.


In November 2004, California voters passed Proposition 69, also known the California DNA Fingerprint, Unsolved Crime, and Innocence Protection Act. The law required, in part, that any person who is arrested or charged with a felony submit to a DNA test, regardless of whether the arrest was valid or legal, and also that any person who had previously been convicted of a felony submit to a DNA test. Just over a month after the passage of the law, on December 7, 2004, a group of former arrestees and former prisoners, as well as two advocacy groups, brought this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California attorney general, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by various ACLU chapters and private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the law violated the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Within two months, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. On April 22, 2005, the District Court (Judge Fern Smith) granted the motion to dismiss (365 F.Supp.2d 1119). She held that the plaintiffs lacked standing and ripeness because the state of California had not yet implemented a program for the collection of DNA.

Summary: Following the passage of California Proposition 69, which mandated that all convicted felons and anybody arrested submit to a DNA test, a group of former arrestees and former prisoners, as well as two advocacy groups, brought this class action suit alleging that the law violated the plaintiffs' Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court dismissed for lack of standing and ripeness, because California had not yet implemented a program for the collection of DNA.


On August 30, 2002, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") notified State of Maryland officials of its intent to investigate conditions of confinement at the Cheltenham Youth Facility ("Cheltenham") in Cheltenham, Maryland and the Charles H. Hickey, Jr. School ("Hickey") in Baltimore, Maryland, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141 ("Section 14141"). Between April 28 and June 12, 2003, the DOJ toured Cheltenham and Hickey with consultants in the fields of juvenile justice, medical care, mental health care, education and sanitation. At the time of the tours and until April 1, 2004, Hickey was operated by a for-profit corporation. On April 9, 2004, the United States issued a findings letter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997(a)(1), which concluded that certain conditions at Cheltenham and Hickey violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights of juveniles confined there. The findings led to negotiations between state and federal authorities. The parties reached a settlement agreement made public in late June 2005, filing of the settlement and an associated complaint (to invoke the jurisdiction of the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland). The settlement describes a number of areas the state obligated itself to improve upon at Cheltenham and Hickey: protection of residents from violence and sexual abuse (via adequate reporting procedures, health care improvements, a use of force policy, staff training, behavior management program implementation, staffing improvements, security system installation (including individual door locks), appropriate and limited use of restraints and seclusion, access to toilets, due process for disciplinary matters, improved intake and classification, and screening of job applicants to ensure employment of persons fit to work with youth), suicide prevention, mental health and medical care, special education, and fire safety. In the months just following the settlement, the DOJ similarly toured the Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center ("BCJJC") as part of an investigation, invited by the state, of conditions of confinement at BCJJC. An August 7, 2006, DOJ findings letter also described rights violations, leading to a modification of the original settlement. The May 2007, modification added the BCJJC, so that the state's obligations to improve its juvenile justice housing would extend to all three facilities. The same categories of improvements were set out in the second agreement, with some minor variations between the improvements needed at Cheltenham and Hickey compared with the improvements required at BCJJC. Again, the Department of Justice filed an amended complaint to invoke the court's jurisdiction over the settlement. These complaints relied upon allegations of violation of Section 14141 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, of non-compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482, and of non-compliance with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 794. The settlements provide processes for compliance reporting and quality assurance, as well as for monitoring of and access to the facilities by the Department of Justice, to enable enforcement proceedings, if necessary. On July 19, 2005, the court (Judge Frederick Motz) placed the case on the court’s inactive docket, with a scheduled dismissal in three years from that date or upon the State’s substantial compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. On June 24, 2008, the parties submitted a Second Amended Settlement Agreement, releasing Cheltenham and Hickey from monitoring and terminating the Agreement with respect to those facilities. On June 26, 2008, the court (Judge Motz) signed a Second Modified Order of Conditional Dismissal, which stated that the interests of the remaining parties would be best served by extending the duration of certain provisions of the Settlement Agreement. In this Order, Judge Motz placed the case on the court’s inactive docket, to be dismissed on June 29, 2009 or earlier if the state reached substantial compliance with the terms of the Second Amended Settlement Agreement. On June 25, 2009, the parties submitted a Third Amended Settlement Agreement in which the parties agreed that BCJJC improved conditions relating to suicide prevention and special education services sufficiently but still needed monitoring in the area of protection of BCJJC youth from harm by other youth. On June 30, 2009, the court (Judge Motz) approved the Third Amended Settlement and again placed the case on the court’s inactive docket, to be dismissed on June 29, 2011, or earlier if the state reaches substantial compliance with the terms of the Third Amended Settlement Agreement. On August 19, 2010, the parties determined that the state had fulfilled all of its obligations and Judge Motz ordered that the case be finally dismissed with prejudice.

Summary: The Attorney General, on behalf of the United States, sought to enjoin the State of Maryland from depriving youth confined in the Cheltenham Youth Facility ("Cheltenham") in Cheltenham, Maryland and Charles H. Hickey, Jr. School ("Hickey") in Baltimore, Maryland of constitutional and federal statutory rights. The parties reached a settlement agreement in June 2005, describing a number of areas the state must improve, including protection of residents from violence and sexual abuse, suicide prevention, mental health and medical care, special education, and fire safety. In August 7, 2006, the DOJ found that similar rights were being violated at Baltimore City Juvenile Justice Center ("BCJJC") and in May 2007, modification added the BCJJC to the original settlement. After gradual improvement, and multiple Orders for Conditional Dismissal, the court (Judge Motz) determined that the state had fulfilled all of its obligations and ordered that the case be finally dismissed with prejudice on August 19, 2010.


On October 22, 2014, a class of prisoners from San Bernardino County Jail filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and various state laws, against the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department and San Bernardino County. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Southern California, sought damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, alleging "systematic discrimination and denial of equal treatment" experienced by gay, lesbian, and transgender prisoners from San Bernardino County Jail. More specifically, the inmates argued that inmates who identified as gay, lesbian, or transgender were transferred and isolated from the general population, where they were denied equal access to opportunities to reduce their sentences, services, and programs and facilities. The inmates also alleged that they were often treated in an abusive and neglectful manner, being subject to derogatory name-calling and severe disciplinary measures. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 14, 2015, and a second amended complaint on May 20. The plaintiffs sought to define the following four classes: The California Damages Class consisting of "individuals who currently are, were in the past (within six months prior to the filing of Veronica Pratt’s Govt. Code §910 claim), or will be in future (until such time as the unlawful policies and practices cease or judgment is entered in this case), GBT inmates housed in the ALT." The Federal Damages Class consisting of: "individuals who currently are, were in the past (within two years of the filing of this complaint) or will be in future (until such time as the unlawful policies and practices cease or judgment is entered in this case), GBT inmates housed in the ALT." The California Injunctive Relief Class consisting of "individuals who currently are, or in the future without the intervention of this Court will be, GBT inmates housed in the ALT and subject to the unlawful treatment set forth in this Complaint." The Federal Injunctive Relief Class consisting of "individuals who currently are, or in the future without the intervention of this court will be, GBT inmates housed in the ALT and subject to the unlawful treatment set forth in this Complaint." On March 23, 2015, defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claim, arguing that the plaintiffs did not allege facts sufficient to establish the elements required by state law and that governmental immunity shielded them from liability. On April 17, 2015, Judge Bernal granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged coercion and thus did not dismiss the state law claims, but dismissed their claim concerning the public entities' mandatory duty, finding that affirmative acts of a public entity were not required and thus did not qualify as a mandatory duty. 2015 WL 10382396. Litigation and discovery continued as the parties progressed toward trial. Then, on March 29, 2018, the parties filed a stipulation to vacate the trial based on a conditional settlement. The settlement had three prongs: (1) a damages pool to provide monetary compensation to the individual plaintiffs and the members of a damage class; (2) attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiff's counsel; and (3) "substantive changes to San Bernardino Sheriff's Department policies and practices." The parties stipulated that they hoped to finalize the Settlement Agreement by May 15, 2018. On March 30, 2018, Judge Jesus G. Bernal granted the motion and vacated the trial. On August 15, 2018, plaintiffs moved to certify class. There would be two categories: (1) the damages class composed of individuals who--between October 22, 2012, and March 31, 2018--were Gay, Bisexual, or Transgender (GBT) inmates housed in the Alternative Lifestyle Tank of the San Bernardino County Jail; and (2) the injunctive relief class composed of individuals who were or would be GBT inmates housed in the San Bernardino County jails. The parties also filed their settlement agreement with the court on August 15, 2018. The class fund was in the amount of $950,000 for class members. The plaintiffs' attorney's fees and costs amounted to $1,100,000. The settlement also stipulated an injunction spanning a three-year period starting when the court approved the settlement. The injunction established a committee to discuss housing, programming, education, and employment for inmates who identified as GBT. It also expanded resources for transgender inmates and allowed inmates to choose the gender of deputies performing searches and access to hormonal medication. It also ensured equal programming, work opportunities, and out-of-cell time for GBT inmates as compared to non-GBT inmates. On September 21, 2018, Judge Jesus G. Bernal preliminarily approved the settlement, pending a fairness hearing scheduled for February 11, 2019. On February 28, 2019, Judge Jesus G. Bernal approved the class-action settlement. It required the defendants to produce relevant documents for three years, concluding in February 2022, to ensure compliance with the injunction outlined above. 2019 WL 1109683. In April 2019, the parties discovered a supplemental class list of 406 bookings that fell within the class definition that were omitted from the original class list. The supplemental class list had 274 supplemental class members. In May 2019, the parties agreed to incorporate the 274 additional members. The agreement increased by $76,304.39 and the settlement payment date was pushed back. On May 10, 2019, Judge Bernal granted preliminary approval of the modified settlement, pending a final approval hearing for the supplemental class members. On July 30, 2019, Judge Bernal approved the amended class-action settlement, incorporating the supplemental class members into the settlement. Payment began August 9, 2019. The injunction is scheduled to end in February 2022.

Summary: In October 2014, inmates from San Bernardino County Jail filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and various state laws, against the San Bernardino County Sheriff's Department and the San Bernardino County. The plaintiffs sought damages, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees, alleging discrimination and unequal treatment towards prisoners who identify as gay, lesbian, and transgender. In July 2019 the parties finalized a settlement agreement. $1,176,304.39 was paid out to class members and a three year injunction, scheduled to end in February 2022, was agreed to to afford class members equal opportunities.


On December 14, 2006, attorneys and law student interns with the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School, filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking to compel the release of government records regarding an undercover sting operation targeting day laborers in Danbury, Connecticut. The sting, which was carried out by the Immigration and Custom Enforcement Division of the Department of Homeland Security on September 19, 2006, was the subject of a separate lawsuit styled Barrera v. Boughton, case no. 3:07-cv-01436-RNC (D.Conn.). See IM-CT-0006 of this collection. The Government eventually produced redacted versions of the requested alien files ("A files") for nine of the eleven day laborers arrested on September 19, 2006. The Government did not, however, produce records specifically relating to the September 19, 2006 raid and Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to compel production of those records. The District Court (Judge Robert N. Chatigny) denied Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on September 6, 2007. The case was then referred to Magistrate Judge Donna F. Martinez to supervise discovery. The Government informed Plaintiffs that it located only eight pages responsive to the FOIA request relating to the September 19, 2006 raid. Plaintiffs sought discovery to determine the reasonableness of the Government's search efforts and the Government moved for a protective order to block discovery. On November 27, 2007, Magistrate Judge Martinez granted the protective order, finding that discovery was premature at that point in the case. The Government then moved for summary judgment. Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay consideration of the Government's motion until it could conduct limited discovery. At the time of this summary, Plaintiffs' request for a stay was still pending before the court. On September 28, the Court (Robert N. Chatigny) approved a proposed order for settlement and dismissal, awarding Plaintiffs $16,000 and ending the case.

Summary: Attorneys and law student interns with the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization of the Yale Law School, filed a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act seeking to compel the release of government records regarding an undercover sting operation targeting day laborers in Danbury, Connecticut. The Court approved a proposed order for settlement and dismissal, awarding Plaintiffs $16,000 and ending the case.