COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was brought on May 19 by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and an individual voter to challenge Minnesota’s absentee voting laws requiring the physical presence of a witness. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the defendant to waive the witness requirement for the August 2020 primaries and the November 2020 general elections. Two of the plaintiffs' three claims were dismissed on March 29, 2021. <hr> On May 19, 2020, the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and a registered voter filed a complaint against the Secretary of State of Minnesota to challenge Minnesota’s absentee voting laws. The plaintiffs alleged that Minnesota’s witness requirement and restrictive witness qualifications posed an undue burden on the right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also alleged that requiring a witness to be a registered voter with U.S. citizenship discriminated between U.S. citizens and non-U.S. citizens by posing burdens to individuals living in mixed immigration status households. The plaintiffs brought the lawsuit as an injunctive and declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendant to waive the witness requirement for the August 2020 primaries and the November 2020 general elections. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from passing any statute or regulations that would directly or indirectly require any voter to obtain a witness signature in 2020. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested an order for the defendant to temporarily modify election materials to avoid instructing any voter to interact with a witness for the purpose of casting an absentee ballot. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota, and the plaintiffs were represented by the Campaign Legal Center and private attorneys. The case was assigned to Judge Eric C. Tostrud and referred to Magistrate Judge Tony N. Leung. Under Minnesota voting laws, an absentee ballot requires the physical presence of a witness who is either a registered Minnesota voter, a notary, or an individual authorized to administer oaths. The plaintiffs argued that the challenged provisions were contrary to social distancing guidelines, as it would require the voter to interact closely with individuals who do not live in their households. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that it would be difficult for the voter and witness to maintain six feet distance throughout the voting process and because they would be required to touch the same Signature Envelope. On May 29, the plaintiffs also submitted a motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants submitted an answer on June 9, which alleged that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. On June 16, the parties proposed partial consent judgment and decree enjoining the defendant from enforcing the witness requirement for the August primaries, and to inform the public and modify instructions accordingly. The same day, the court ordered a fairness hearing to be held on the proposal. On June 18, the Republican Party of Minnesota filed an emergency motion to continue the hearing, as they wished to intervene. The motion was granted the same day, and on June 20, the Republican Party of Minnesota filed a motion to intervene as defendants. The motion was granted on June 23. On November 9, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' May 29 motion for a preliminary injunction as moot. On December 30, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which added the intervening defendants and broadened the scope of the original complaint from elections in 2020 to all elections held during the pandemic. The intervening defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim on January 13, 2021. The defendants stated that plaintiffs' challenge to the enforcement of Minnesota's witness requirements was not justiciable and that the court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. The defendants also sought a dismissal of the plaintiffs' undue burden challenge to all witness requirements, based on Eighth Circuit precedent. Lastly, the defendants challenged the plaintiffs' equal protection and citizenship status claims regarding witness requirements on both jurisdictional and merits grounds. On March 29, 2021, Judge Tostrud granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied in part. The court found that it did have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' first claim regarding witness requirements during COVID-19 because they alleged a substantial risk of future injury. On the plaintiffs' second count that the limits on who may witness an absentee ballot impose an undue burden on the right to vote and violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the court found that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted and dismissed this count entirely. The court found that Eighth Circuit precedent required a dismissal of this count because the plaintiffs only showed that the election procedures excessively burdened some voters, rather than Minnesota voters generally. On the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, the court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim because the plaintiffs failed to establish third-party standing over the claim. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit was brought on May 19 by the League of Women Voters of Minnesota Education Fund and an individual voter to challenge Minnesota’s absentee voting laws requiring the physical presence of a witness. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the defendant to waive the witness requirement for the August 2020 primaries and the November 2020 general elections. The court dismissed two of the plaintiffs' three claims on March 29, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On September 20, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female stone mason (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Dan Lepore & Sons Co. and L.F. Driscoll Co. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. On February 9, 2004, the plaintiff-intervenor filed a complaint. On February 25, 2005, the District Court (Judge Legrome D. Davis) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the plaintiff-intervenor $75,000, reinstate her in one of the projects she was working on, and guarantee her at least one year's work as a stone mason.

Summary: On September 20, 2003, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a female stone mason (plaintiff-intervenor), filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Dan Lepore & Sons Co. and L.F. Driscoll Co. The EEOC claimed that the defendant subjected the plaintiff-intervenor to a sexually hostile work environment and retaliated against her after she complained about sexual harassment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay $75,000, reinstate her in one of the projects she was working on, and guarantee her at least one year's work as a stone mason.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case, federal district judge Allison Nathan (SDNY) granted emergency relief on March 27, 2020, requiring ICE to release seven at-risk detainees from immigration detention in light of the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the COVID-19 pandemic.
 On March 20, 2020, seven persons held in civil immigration detention centers in the New York City area -- who because of serious and chronic medical conditions face a significant risk of severe illness or death if they catch COVID-19 -- filed this habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the Bronx Defenders and the Legal Aid Society, the plaintiffs sued the director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) New York City field office, the director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States Attorney General, and the directors of three New York City area civil immigration detention facilities. The plaintiffs claimed that the risk posed to them by continued detention during an outbreak of COVID-19 in New York City that reached a New York City ICE facility violated their procedural and substantive due process rights. They sought an order "directing Defendants to immediately release Plaintiffs from custody on their own recognizance or on reasonable conditions of supervision" or, in the alternative, "an order requiring Defendants to provide Plaintiffs with constitutionally adequate, individualized hearings within 48 hours" and prove that continued detention is justified in light of plaintiffs' vulnerability to COVID-19. The plaintiffs also sought attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein. The New York City metropolitan area was an epicenter of the global COVID-19 pandemic; at the time the complaint was filed, there were "over 7,800 confirmed cases in New York and New Jersey and 44 virus-related deaths." To contain the outbreak, officials in New York took unprecedented measures to emphasize and enforce social distancing, ordering workers to stay home, banning gatherings of over 50 people, and shutting down schools, restaurants, and bars. However, immigration detention facilities, where detainees are "packed in close quarters" and "forced to share necessities like showers, telephones, toilets and sinks with dozens of others" make the practice of adequate social distancing difficult. If COVID-19 were introduced into these detention centers its spread would be difficult to contain. The spread of COVID-19 (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees with serious medical conditions such as congestive heart failure, diabetes, hypertension, and kidney malfunction. Medical health experts have concluded that reducing jail populations is a "necessary component of risk mitigation during widespread COVID-19 outbreak, and that officials should first focus on vulnerable populations to reduce harm to the entire population." The plaintiffs claimed that "the continued imprisonment of these high-risk individuals violates their due process rights both by constituting deliberate indifference to serious medical harm and by failing to provide procedural safeguards commensurate with the serious deprivation of life and liberty that they face." Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that ICE has the authority to release individuals like the plaintiffs but that ICE has not responded to plaintiffs' request for bond or release, despite the evidence that plaintiffs are neither dangerous nor flight risks. Under normal circumstances, the plaintiffs would be able to seek bond hearings in immigration courts to prove that they are not a danger or flight risk. However, plaintiffs claimed that due to the COVID-19 outbreak, immigration courts in the New York City area "no longer provide an effective venue for detainees to vindicate their right to review their detention through bond hearings." Thus, the plaintiffs argued that they were unable to "promptly access any meaningful administrative remedy" and that bringing this suit was their only recourse. The plaintiffs requested that this case be filed as related to Velesaca v. Decker (IM-NY-0072 in this Clearinghouse), a case in which the plaintiffs' requested relief of individualized custody determinations for civil immigration detainees was made more urgent by the risk of COVID-19 spreading in ICE facilities. On March 23, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking an "order directing their immediate release while this case proceeds in order to prevent potentially irreversible injury, in a situation where the 'magnitude of risk [] grow[s] exponentially' by the day and even the hour." At the time this motion was filed, plaintiffs stated that COVID-19 had spread to at least two of the jails where ICE held five of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs asserted that they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a TRO, that they would succeed on the merits of their claims of deliberate indifference and lack of procedural safeguards, and that the balance of equities and public interest weigh in their favor; thus, a TRO granting their immediate release was appropriate. The case was reassigned to Judge Alison J. Nathan on March 25. After holding oral argument before the court on March 26, Judge Nathan issued an opinion and order granting the plaintiffs' motion for TRO, requiring defendants to release the plaintiffs from immigration detention "on reasonable conditions." Judge Nathan held that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable injury absent a TRO, considering the increased risk of severe injury or death if they catch COVID-19 due to their underlying health conditions. Judge Nathan also concluded that continued detention in immigration detention "places Petitioners at significantly higher risk of contracting COVID-19" and that "jails will struggle to contain any eventual outbreak of COVID-19." Judge Nathan further found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their substantive due process claim that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs, noting that "the record contains no evidence that the Government took any specific action to prevent the spread of COVID-19 to high-risk individuals, like the Petitioners, currently being held in civil detention." Moreover, Judge Nathan concluded that plaintiffs "have demonstrated a likelihood of success on their claim that the Due Process Clause entitles Petitioners to an expeditious bond hearing that considers the individualized risk that COVID-19 poses to their health." Lastly, Judge Nathan held that, because this was a "rare case of extraordinary circumstances," "release is therefore necessary to 'make the habeas remedy effective.'" The same day, after conferring with the parties, Judge Nathan issued an order clarifying the conditions for the release of four of the plaintiffs. Two of the plaintiffs were to be released on conditions the parties agreed to: "on their own recognizance and enrolled in the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) subject to the following conditions: that they not violate any laws or ordinances; that they surrender for removal, if so ordered, and that they keep ICE and EOIR advised of any changes in address." As to the two remaining plaintiffs to be released, Judge Nathan ordered that they be released subject to the same agreed-upon conditions, as well as electronic monitoring. According to Judge Nathan's order, the four plaintiffs were released from immigration detention at 5 PM on March 27. Following the court's grant of TRO, the plaintiffs filed a first amended petition for habeas relief on April 30, in which they joined four new plaintiffs. Defendants subsequently filed a letter to the court requesting that the court resolve threshold questions of severance and any related issues of joinder and amendment. After expedited briefing on these issues, Judge Nathan issued an order on April 1 prohibiting the joinder of the four new plaintiffs. Judge Nathan stated that joinder of the new plaintiffs was inappropriate because it would create the appearance of forum shopping. On May 13, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' petition for writ of habeas corpus. Defendants filed several exhibits and declarations in support of their opposition. However, because the Clearinghouse does not have access to the opposition or supplemental filings, the arguments raised by defendants are not available. With no recent docket entires, the case is now presumed closed.

Summary: In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in the New York City area, persons critically vulnerable to the infectious disease and held in immigration detention facilities in the New York City area filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs filed a habeas petition, suing the director of ICE's New York City field office, the wardens of three immigration detention facilities, and others for violation of their constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due process. The plaintiffs argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility, which would expose the plaintiffs to substantial harm, amounted to deliberate indifference and that there was a lack of procedural safeguards that plaintifffs could access. The plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking their immediate release. On March 27, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for TRO, concluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their due process claims and that ordering their immediate release was an appropriate remedy in this extraordinary circumstance to avoid irreparable harm.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a representative habeas action filed by prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections, seeking various forms of relief for six subclasses of prisoners in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that they were particularly vulnerable to the virus, either due to medical conditions or their age. The petitioners were denied habeas relief on April 10. On July 8, a pro se intervenor filed a motion for emergency relief. On September 25, the parties submitted a status report stating that settlement discussions were ongoing in a related case and the court stayed the case, with the exception of the outstanding intervenor's motion. No outcome yet.
 On April 2, 2020, a group of prisoners filed this lawsuit against the Illinois Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center, Equip for Equality, the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University, the Illinois Prison Project, and Loevy & Loevy, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Specifically, they sought different kinds of relief for different subclasses of prisoners as follows: -subclass 1 (those with underlying medical conditions): immediate medical furlough -subclass 2 (those who were medically vulnerable because they were over 55 years old and eligible for medical furlough): immediate medical furlough -subclass 3 (those over 55 with less than one year remaining in their sentence, who were eligible for home detention): immediate transfer to home detention -subclass 4 (those in custody for Class 2, 3, or 4 offenses who were eligible for home detention): immediate transfer to home detention -subclass 5 (those in custody for Class 1 or Class X offenses with less than 90 days remaining on their sentence who were eligible for home detention): immediate transfer to home detention -subclass 6 (those in custody scheduled to be released within 180 days who were eligible to receive sentencing credit): immediate award of 180 days of sentencing credit. The same plaintiffs filed a similar case, Money v. Pritzker, for injunctive relief. For more details, see here in the Clearinghouse. The parties submitted briefing on April 6 specifically addressing how the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") applied to the relief sought for subclasses 1 and 2. The plaintiffs argued that the PLRA had no application to petitions for writs of habeas corpus. The defendants argued that habeas was not the appropriate vehicle for the plaintiff's claims and that even if it was, relief under habeas was unwarranted. On April 10, Judge Dow denied the petitioners' habeas petition, finding that the requirement for exhausting relief in state courts prior to filing in federal court had not been met. On July 8, a pro se intervenor filed a motion for emergency relief and on September 10, Judge John F. Kness directed the parties to submit a concise joint status report. He also ordered the respondents to respond to the intervenor's motion by October 2. On September 25, the parties submitted a status report stating that settlement discussions were ongoing in Money v. Pritzker and the court stayed the case, with the exception of the outstanding intervenor's motion. Further status reports were submitted on November 18 and February 22. Parties anticipated finalizing a settlement agreement by March 5, 2021, and a status hearing was set for March 29, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections sought writs of habeas corpus, requesting the release of particularly vulnerable individuals in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The petition for habeas corpus was denied on April 10. On July 8, a pro se intervenor filed a motion for emergency relief and on September 10, Judge Kness directed the parties to submit a concise joint status report. He also ordered the respondents to respond to the intervenor's motion by October 2. On September 25, the parties submitted a status report stating that settlement discussions were ongoing in a related case and the court stayed the case, with the exception of the outstanding intervenor's motion.


On December 15, 2011, the League of Women Voters of Florida, Florida Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, and Rock the Vote brought this lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They sued relevant Florida officials to prevent the enforcement of a Florida Statutes § 97.0575, as amended in 2011, and an implementing rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.042, which they claimed unconstitutionally and unlawfully burdens their efforts to encourage civil engagement and democratic participation by assisting Florida citizens in registering to vote and exercising their fundamental right to vote. The plaintiffs had all conducted and wish to continue to conduct voter-registration drives in Florida. The statute and rule regulate organizations that conduct voter-registration drives. Through their attorneys the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law, the plaintiffs alleged that the statutes violate the National Voter Registration Act of 1993, and their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of association. In their first amended complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged a violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. On May 31, 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Robert Hinkle granted a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute. Judge Hinkle explained: <blockquote>"Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, an election-code provision of this kind must serve a legitimate purpose that is sufficient to warrant the burden it imposes on the right to vote. And under the National Voting Rights Act, an organization has a federal right to conduct a voter-registration drive, collect voter-registration applications, and mail in the applications to a state voter-registration office. But § 97.0575 and Rule 1S-2.042 severely restrict an organization's ability to do this. The statute and rule impose a harsh and impractical 48-hour deadline for an organization to deliver applications to a voterregistration office and effectively prohibit an organization from mailing applications in. And the statute and rule impose burdensome record-keeping and reporting requirements that serve little if any purpose, thus rendering them unconstitutional even to the extent they do not violate the NVRA." </blockquote> The defendants filed an appeal to this order on July 2, 2012, but after the parties jointly moved for permanent injunction, the appeal was dismissed with prejudice. On August 30, 2012, Judge Hinkle granted the joint motion for permanent injunction, which enjoined the named Florida officials from taking any step to demand compliance with or enforce certain provisions of the statute in question. This case is closed.

Summary: On December 15, 2011, the League of Women Voters of Florida, Florida Public Interest Research Group Education Fund, and Rock the Vote brought this lawsuit in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. They sued relevant Florida officials to prevent the enforcement of a Florida Statutes § 97.0575, as amended in 2011, and an implementing rule, Florida Administrative Code Rule 1S-2.042, which they claimed unconstitutionally and unlawfully burdens their efforts to encourage civil engagement and democratic participation by assisting Florida citizens in registering to vote and exercising their fundamental right to vote. The plaintiffs had all conducted and wish to continue to conduct voter-registration drives in Florida. The statute and rule regulate organizations that conduct voter-registration drives. After U.S. District Court Judge Robert L. Hinkle granted the parties' joint motion for permanent injunction, the case was closed.


On November 5, 2011, hundreds of people rallied in downtown Oakland to protest what they considered to be the inadequate sentence given to former police officer, Johannes Mehserle, for the killing of unarmed BART passenger, Oscar Grant. After the rally, a group of the demonstrators began to march to the BART station where Grant had been killed. The Oakland Police and other law enforcement agencies forced this group of marchers onto a side street, where they announced that the demonstration had been declared an unlawful assembly. The demonstrators were then detained, prevented from dispersing, and arrested. This class-action lawsuit was filed on behalf of the nearly 150 demonstrators who allegedly were never ordered to disperse or given an opportunity to do so, and who allegedly were arrested without probable cause or legal basis. One of the named plaintiffs informed the police that he was there as a legal observer with the National Lawyers Guild and asked to be allowed to leave. He was arrested nonetheless. The demonstrators were held in buses and vans for several hours with their hands handcuffed behind their backs. Many class members alleged that they were denied bathroom access and were thus forced to urinate on themselves in the crowded vehicles. Almost all of the class members were then imprisoned in the Alameda County Jail overnight in overcrowded holding cells without room to lie down. All of the female class members were forced to submit to pregnancy tests under threat of transfer to the Santa Rita Jail in Dublin, CA, where they would be held for a longer period. Some class members were forced to submit to oral DNA swabbing. None of the class members were ever charged with crimes relating to these arrests. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against the City of Oakland, Alameda County, and related individual defendants (the Chief of Police, various officers, etc.) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleged that the Oakland Police Department actions violated multiple provisions of the Oakland Crowd Management/Crowd Control Policy established in accordance with the settlement agreement in Local 10 ILWU et al. v. City of Oakland. The Crowd Control Policy restricted the City's power to declare an assembly unlawful only to those circumstances where demonstrators had already acted illegally or where they posed a clear and present danger of imminent violence. It also forbade the City from dispersing demonstrations that had not been declared unlawful, and required the City to provide an opportunity for demonstrators to disperse prior to arrest. Plaintiffs also alleged that the mass arrest was the result of unlawful and unconstitutional policies and practices of Oakland, its Police Department, and Alameda and its Sheriff's Department. The Complaint specifically alleged that the defendants had violated the plaintiff class members' constitutionally guaranteed rights to freedom of speech and association, their right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, their rights to equal protection and due process, their right to be free from the use of excessive and arbitrary force, and their right to privacy. The case was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows private actions to be brought against States for violations of rights guaranteed by federal constitutional and statutory law. The plaintiffs sought class certification, and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from engaging in the alleged unconstitutional and unlawful practices in the future. They sought an injunction ordering the sealing and destruction of all records of the arrests of the class members, including fingerprints, DNA samples, and photographs, as well as the disclosure of any agencies and entities to whom such information had been relayed. They also sought compensatory, punitive, and exemplary damages, and legal costs. On March 23, 2012, the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to certify a class of, "the approximately 150 people who were arrested in the mass arrest on 6th Avenue between East 17th and 18th Streets in Oakland on November 5, 2010, and who were never charged with any crime related to this arrest. (2012 WL 994644). The parties spent the next several months discussing a settlement, which the Court preliminarily approved on June 13, 2013. The proposed agreement would result in the a payment of $1,025,000 to the class members, of which $350,000 would be paid to the plaintiffs' attorneys for fees and costs. The four plaintiffs acting as class representatives would receive $9,000 each for serving in that role. The remaining money would be distributed between the class members. The settlement also would require the sealing and destruction of the arrest records and related documents and information arising from the incident. The agreement would also require systemic changes. It would authorize the parties to amend certain sections of the Local 10 Settlement, in consultation with the National Lawyers Guild - SF Bay Area Chapter. The Oakland Police Department and the Alameda Sheriff's Department would, in compliance with state law, be required to cite and release qualifying individuals accused of misdemeanors. Other provisions regarding the treatment of detained demonstrators, for instance, guaranteeing access to bathrooms and forbidding the taking of fingerprints and DNA samples of demonstrators facing only misdemeanor citations, were also included in the settlement. On September 9, 2013, the Court approved the settlement and ordered sealing and destruction of arrest records for those found factually innocent of the charges for which the arrests were made. The agreement was set to last for four years, with the option of extending for an additional three if requested by either party. The initial four-year timeline passed without request for extension, and so the case is now presumed closed.

Summary: Demonstrators brought this class action suit on behalf of 150 individuals who had been illegally detained by Oakland police. The case ended in a settlement granting monetary and injunctive relief.


On January 28, 2017, two lawful permanent residents of the United States who were detained at Boston Logan Airport as they were trying to return home to Massachusetts from abroad filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiffs sued the United States under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs claimed that they were detained pursuant to an executive order (the “Executive Order”) issued by President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017 suspending entry into the United States of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The plaintiffs alleged that denying lawful permanent residents entry back home after a brief visit abroad violated equal protection and due process rights protected by the Fifth Amendment, the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The complaint was filed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (to seek immediate release of plaintiffs from detention) and a civil complaint seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs were Iranian nationals, Muslims, and employed as associate professors at the University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth. They were detained at Logan Airport upon returning home from an academic conference. Counsel for the plaintiffs attempted to contact them at Logan Airport but could not because of the detention. The plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the Executive Order, and Judge Allison Burroughs held a hearing on the TRO on January 28, 2017. On January 29, 2017, Judge Burroughs granted a seven-day TRO and ordered the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Per the TRO, the defendants were to comply with airport screening protocols in effect prior to the Executive Order. Further, they were prohibited from detaining or removing individuals from Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen who had lawful visas to enter the United States. The scope of the TRO was unclear—it referenced people "similarly situated" to the plaintiffs but did not explain whether that meant just in the District of Massachusetts or nationwide. On Monday, January 30, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Nathaniel Gorton. The next day, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the University of Massachusetts moved to intervene; Judge Gorton granted the motion on February 2. On February 1, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on behalf of all "noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States after being thoroughly vetted by the U.S. government" as well as Oxfam America, Inc., "a U.S. organization dedicated to reducing poverty around the world." The amended complaint included allegations that the executive order significantly hampered Oxfam's humanitarian mission. It also claimed that the Executive Order continued to be enforced despite the TRO. To secure effective relief, the plaintiffs requested an order requiring defendants to immediately notify airlines about the relief granted. They also added claims that the Executive Order violated free speech, association, and petitioning rights secured by the First Amendment. On February 3, Judge Gorton held a hearing to determine if the TRO should be extended. In an opinion issued that same day, Judge Gorton began by noting that the Executive Order's use of the word "entry" was best read to indicate that lawful permanent residents (LPRs) were not affected by the travel ban. In light of this reading, plus the Administration's disavowal of coverage of LPRs, he held that the plaintiffs' claim seeking to enjoin the application of the Executive Order to LPRs was moot—there was "no ongoing conduct to enjoin." On the remaining claims, the court held either that the claim was unlikely to succeed or that the remaining plaintiffs lacked standing to assert it. Accordingly, the court declined to extend the TRO. On March 6, 2017, President Trump rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. Shortly afterwards, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the University of Massachusetts filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. And the named plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on March 20. This case is now closed. More information about this case is available at the ACLU of Massachusetts' website, here.

Summary: On Jan. 28, 2017, two lawful permanent residents of the United States, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint alleged that in denying lawful permanent residents entry back home after a brief visit abroad, the executive order violated Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. While the plaintiffs secured temporary relief, the court eventually determined that they were not subject to the travel ban, which in any event President Trump soon withdrew and replaced with a new version. The plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed the case.


On February 22, 2018, four noncitizens, on behalf of a proposed class of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenging the defendants’ denial of their applications for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Secretary of Homeland Security may find that a country’s conditions temporarily prevent its nationals from returning safely, or that the country is unable to adequately handle the return of nationals. Temporary Protected Status allows recipients to remain and work legally in the United States. During the Trump administration, the defendants had announced the termination, phasing-out, or review of TPS for nationals of various countries. Following years of residence in the United States, TPS recipients from those countries then faced an uncertain future. Some applied for Legal Permanent Resident status on an independent basis through sponsorship by a family member or employer. The plaintiffs in this case, however, alleged that the defendants had denied their LPR applications based on an erroneous interpretation of the INA. To adjust to lawful permanent resident status, a noncitizen must demonstrate to USCIS that she was inspected and admitted to the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a), (k). A TPS holder, for purposes of adjustment of status, is “considered as being in, and maintaining, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(f)(4). In the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, courts have held that a TPS holder is deemed to have been inspected and admitted because she is deemed to be in “lawful nonimmigrant status,” and an individual in such status necessarily has been inspected and admitted. But, plaintiffs alleged, in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the defendants had a policy of denying the LPR applications of TPS holders who initially entered without inspection and admission, refusing to give effect to 8 U.S.C. § 1245a(f)(4) and refusing to acknowledge that a grant of TPS constitutes the inspection and admission required to adjust status. The plaintiffs challenged the defendants' policy under the INA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) as contrary to law and exceeding the defendants’ statutory authority. The plaintiffs sought mandamus (for the defendants to lawfully adjudicate the LPR applications) and declaratory and injunctive relief. In their class certification motion, the plaintiffs also proposed a class of all TPS recipients in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, who initially entered the United States without inspection, who had applied or would apply for LPR status, and whose applications had been or would be denied on the basis of USCIS’s policy that TPS does not constitute an “admission” for purposes of adjusting status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255. On February 22, 2018 this case was assigned to Judge Roslynn R. Mauskopf. On March 26, 2018 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. In May, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the group Asian Americans Advancing Justice offered amicus curiae briefs. The parties submitted letters to the court ahead of a May 30 conference. In their letter, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and the court ordered the plaintiffs to respond to this motion and to the defendants’ opposition to class certification. The court heard oral arguments on the outstanding motions at the May 30 conference. On June 12, 2018 the defendants then filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment a little over a month later. On July 20, 2018 the plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification. While these motions were still outstanding, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on November 16, 2018. The parties both submitted reply briefs. With the government shutdown, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings due to a lapse in funding on January 23, 2019. The plaintiffs opposed the stay. Shortly after, the defendants moved to withdraw the motion to stay. On January 24, 2019, the plaintiffs filed and the defendants opposed a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction in the alternative. One of the plaintiffs sought an order directing the defendants to reopen and re-adjudicate his application for adjustment of status before March 30, 2019, when his employer and visa petitioner would cease operations. The defendants sought to stay his motion until the government reopened. Once funding was restored, the defendants responded to the motion for a temporary restraining order. On February 15, 2019 the court denied the plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order, and directed him to provide further information on whether he had standing to challenge the defendants’ “inspected and admitted” policy described above. 2019 WL 653139. Within the month, both parties filed reply briefs in support and in opposition to the plaintiff’s request for relief. The plaintiffs November 16, 2018 motion for a preliminary injunction also remained pending. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction on May 18, 2020. 460 F. Supp. 3d 291. The court found that although the plaintiffs “must make a ‘strong showing’ of irreparable harm” in order to obtain injunctive relief, they had failed to do so. The court noted that a preliminary injunction in another case Ramos v. Nielsen  already enjoined the defendants “from engaging in, committing, or performing, directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever, implementation and/or enforcement of the decisions to terminate TPS for Sudan, Haiti, El Salvador, and Nicaragua” and ordered defendants to take “all steps needed to ensure the continued validity of documents that prove lawful status and employment authorization” for these TPS holders “pending completion of discovery and a ruling on the merits of the action.” Ramos v. Nielsen, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1108-09 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court found that this injunction, combined with a Federal Register notice that assured TPS would not be terminated immediately regardless of the outcome of the appeal in Ramos, the plaintiffs' argument of imminent harm was unpersuasive. On January 8, 2021, the Supreme Court granted review in a parallel case, Santos v. Wolf, proceeding in the Third Circuit. In Sanchez, the plaintiff and his wife were citizens of El Salvador who had applied for and received TPS, but had been denied adjustment of status when they sought to become lawful permanent residents because they had not been admitted to the United States. The district court in Sanchez granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and found that TPS met § 1255(a)’s requirement of inspection and admittance or parole. The Third Circuit reversed though and found that TPS could not serve as admission. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Feb. 22, 2018, four noncitizens, on behalf of a proposed class of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) recipients, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Council and the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, challenging the defendants' denial of their applications for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status.


This entry describes the consolidated federal class action lawsuits arising out of complaints about the treatment of prisoners in Montana State Penitentiary. The Initial Class Action Suit On January 28, 1992, inmates at the Montana State Penitentiary filed a pro se lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Montana Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by poor medical care, dental care, and mental health care, overcrowding, fire hazards, environmental hazards, and security hazards, programming of prisoners, classification procedures, access to the prison for disabled inmates, and physical abuse by prison guards resulting in injury and death of inmates. In May 1992, the Defendants twice moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Magistrate Judge Leif Erickson held the Defendants' motion in abeyance until the Plaintiffs could file their amended complaint. On September 4, 1992, attorneys from the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union entered the case to represent the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed multiple amended complaints, and the plaintiffs also moved for class certification on October 7, 1992. On July 23, 1993, the plaintiffs were granted certification. Judge Erickson also denied the Defendants' motion to dismiss on August 12. The Consolidation On September 10, 1993, Magistrate Judge Leif Erickson consolidated this case with several other suits stemming from poor conditions at Montana State Prison (In re: Conditions at MSP, 6:93-cv-00046. On July 23, 1993, the district court certified the plaintiffs as a class, consisting of the current plaintiffs and other similarly situated inmates in the Maximum Security Unit since July 1, 1988 and in the future. Over the next few years, the court added 63 other lawsuits to the consolidation. The Clearinghouse has a list of the docket numbers for each of those suits, along with the names of the suits and the dates they were filed for most of them. Settlement Agreement and Early Litigation On October 28, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana (Magistrate Judge Erickson) granted preliminary approval. The agreement covered the areas of medical staffing, tuberculosis screening for inmates, intake medical screening, sick call, access to medication, annual physicals for prisoners, eye care, dental care, mental health care, out of cell recreation, preventive maintenance for prison buildings, compliance with public health and fire codes, objective classification, development of a disciplinary handbook, priority for treatment programs, maximum security procedures, staff supervision and training procedures, a prison-wide intercom system, procedures for use of force, population caps, revision of good time statutes, additional administrative staff, annual review of treatment plans, coordination with the parole board, and compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. On November 28, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice filed notice of objections to the settlement agreement. On November 29, 1994, the district court (Judge Erickson) approved the settlement agreement. On March 30, 1995, the plaintiffs asked the court to award them attorneys' fees and expenses. On November 9, 1995, the district court (Judge Erickson) ordered the defendants to pay $232,131.44 in attorneys' fees and expenses. Both the plaintiffs and the defendants appealed the award. On April 29, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and affirmed the district court's decision, ordering both parties to pay their own costs on appeal. Early Efforts Toward Reaching Compliance On June 25, 1997, the defendants asked the court to dismiss the portions of the complaint dealing with the areas where they had already substantially complied with the settlement agreement. On August 1, 1997, the district court (Judge Erickson) found the defendants partially substantially compliant and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in the areas of out of cell time, coordination with the parole board, annual review of treatment plans, priority for treatment programs, creation of a disciplinary handbook, use of force, revision of good time statutes, and additional administrative staff. On October 9, 1998, the plaintiffs asked the court to award them reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses for the litigation period following the first award of attorneys' fees. On September 30, 1999, the district court (Judge Erickson) granted the plaintiffs' second request for attorneys' fees and expenses. The court ordered the plaintiffs to advise the court on how much additional billable time they had spent on the litigation. Langford v. Racicot, 1999 WL 33208662 (D.Mont. Sept. 30, 1999). On February 29, 2000, the parties advised the court that the motion for attorneys' fees had been resolved privately, and that all plaintiff parties had been paid. Earlier, on January 27, 1999, the district court (Judge Erickson) held that the defendants were substantially compliant in several areas except the tuberculosis screening, and the court dismissed those complaints accordingly. On September 9, 1999, the tuberculosis issue was dismissed as well. Later Efforts Toward Compliance Most of what happened in the early 2000's were just fights about attorney's fees. A September 30, 1999 order determined that defendants did have to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, 1999 WL 33208662, and the precise amount in question was solved privately in early 2000. By June of 2005, however, Judge Erickson ordered the parties to submit a report summarizing the current status of the case and giving a timeline as to when the court could expect resolution. That report was due later that month, but it was not publicly available. On August 18, 2005, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the rest of the settlement agreement. In October of that year, Judge Erickson granted dismissal of one section, saying that defendants were substantially compliant, but then in January of the following year denied dismissal of the settlement agreement as a whole, instead granting the appointment of an expert to supervise. Unhappy with this result, defendants appealed, and the court stayed all other proceedings in the case until the appeals court ruled. On May 15, 2007, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal in part and affirmed the lower court's decision in part. Defendants were stuck with the district court's decision after all. In the meantime, Judge Leif Erickson retired from the bench in June of 2006, and Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch was assigned the case. In December of that year, Judge Lynch was assigned as the referral judge on pretrial matters, while Judge Donald W. Molloy would be the presiding judge. By May of 2008, attention shifted to the ADA provisions of the case, which represented the final step for Montana to become compliant. The court appointed an ADA expert, Peter Robertson, but he was fired in July of that year, "based upon his utter inability or refusal to complete the assigned tasks." Doc. 1470. The case then dragged on for several years as defendants continued to submit status reports and make improvements to the prison in an effort to become compliant. On April 11, 2012, the court ordered parties to engage in good faith talks to appoint an expert that would evaluate whether defendants were ADA compliant. On July 12, the court appointed Ralph Frazier and Paul Bishop as experts, ordering the parties to split the costs. They made the inspections in September and were given November 1 as the deadline for their report. We do not have the report, but plaintiffs' June 24, 2013 motion for specific performance indicates that the experts found that defendants were still not substantially compliant. The court denied this request, however, asking that the parties first try to work it out amongst themselves. On November 11, 2013, the court granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period. Defendants agreed to begin a tracking system for disabled inmates, and the parties were to submit a final list of remaining issues by March 2014. On February 12, 2016, the court again granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period until August 12, 2016. However, the day before that deadline the court granted one more extension (although warning that it would be the last) until February 12, 2017. Final Settlement Agreements The parties jointly moved for class action settlement on March 2, 2017. This Settlement Agreement was intended to resolve the parties' only remaining dispute from the 1994 Settlement Agreement, the integration of disabled prisoners into housing, facilities, programs, and services as required by the ADA. However, for unknown reasons this agreement was never addressed by Judge Lynch. The parties moved jointly for a separate Settlement Agreement regarding prison conditions on January 19, 2018. The court denied this Settlement Agreement on January 24, 2018. Although the court generally accepted the terms of the agreement, it did not wish to retain jurisdiction over the matter, and requested that the parties revise their motion to include an alternative procedure for dispute resolution, such as binding arbitration. The parties jointly moved for the court to approve their revised Settlement Agreement on February 23, 2018, and the court approved the Settlement Agreement on February 27, 2018. The parties acknowledged that the defendant had moved significantly toward compliance in two major areas: barrier removal and policy change, and reached a resolution toward full compliance in the remaining disputed areas. On June 19, 2018, the court entered judgment in accordance with the February 23, 2018, Class Action Settlement Agreement, and gave the Agreement final approval. The agreement revised the 2017 settlement to reflect that defendants had made substantial improvements in providing access and had very few issues left to solve. The dispute resolution provision in the new agreement required that any disputes first go through an arbitrator before going back to the court as a forum of last resort. The court left open the possibility of appointing a Special Master if future disagreements arise from the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In February of the next year, the judge ordered the defendants to pay a sum total of $950,000 in attorney's fees to plaintiffs, pursuant to the 2018 Settlement Agreement.

Summary: In 1992, inmates at the Montana State Penitentiary filed a class-action lawsuit against the Montana Department of Corrections alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by means of numerous health and safety violations. On October 28, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana (Judge Erickson) granted preliminary approval, but the court retained jurisdiction. Over the years the state complied with the vast majority of provisions. However, on November 11, 2013, Magistrate Judge Jeremiah C. Lynch, now monitoring the case, granted the parties' stipulated motion to extend the monitoring period because there is still one provision of the settlement agreement, compliance with the American Disabilities act, that still requires monitoring.


This was the lead case before the Supreme Court in 2020 when it held that "[a]n employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender violates Title VII [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]." District Court On May 5, 2016, a male county employee filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, against his employer, the Clayton County Board of Commissioners. He sued for damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, claiming that the defendants, as his employer, had violated Title VII by discriminating against him on the basis of sexual orientation. Specifically, he claimed that his employer had terminated him, despite 10 years of positive past performance evaluations, from his position as the Child Welfare Services Coordinator assigned to the Juvenile Court of Clayton County after finding out that he was participating in a gay recreational softball league. He also alleged other incidents of harassment at work. The case was assigned to Judge Orinda D. Evans on May 9, 2016. On August 2, 2016, the plaintiff had acquired the assistance of private counsel and filed a first amended complaint, in which he sought declaratory judgment, a permanent injunction to prevent his employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices in violation of Title VII, full backpay from his termination date, reinstatement to his former position, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. On August 23, 2016, the employer filed a motion to dismiss claiming that Title VII does not encompass discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and because the Board of Commissioners was not capable of being sued. The plaintiff requested leave to file a second amended complaint on September 9, 2016. On September 12, 2016, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint. In the complaint, the plaintiff changed the defendant to be Clayton County and amended the allegations to discuss his discrimination as based on sexual orientation and failure to conform to a gender stereotype. On September 26, 2016, the employer filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim. It argued that Title VII does not include claims on the basis of sexual orientation. In November 2016, Magistrate Judge Walter E. Johnson recommended to grant the employer's motion. 2016 WL 9753356. However, the district court deferred decision until the 11th Circuit gave a decision in Evans v. Georgia Regional Hospital, another Title VII case regarding discrimination based on sexual orientation. On July 21, 2017, Judge Evans adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation and granted the County's motion to dismiss the case. The court found (1) that the 11th Circuit had foreclosed claims under Title VII for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and (2) the plaintiff had not adequately pleaded facts of gender stereotyping. 2017 WL 4456898. Court of Appeals The plaintiff appealed to the 11th Circuit on August 11, 2017 (docket no. 17-1380). In May 2018, the 11th Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court. 723 Fed. App'x 964 (Mem), reh'g denied, 894 F.3d 1335. U.S. Supreme Court On June 1, 2018, the plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was granted on April 22, 2019. 139 S.Ct. 1599. The case was consolidated with Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. and EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. for briefing and oral argument. In the other cases, plaintiffs' counsel was the ACLU and the Stanford Law School Supreme Court Clinic; those lawyers did the oral argument here, as well. Oral argument occurred on October 8, 2019 and the Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 15, 2020. Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch wrote that Title VII prohibits employers from engaging in discrimination "because of" sex. Justice Gorsuch stated that the statutory language "because of" implies a but-for causation analysis, meaning that "so long as the plaintiff's sex was one but-for cause of that decision [to fire], that is enough to trigger the law." The opinion stated that "if an employer would not have discharged an employee but for that individual's sex, the statute's causation standard is met and liability may attach." LGBT discrimination against employees met this test, because "an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions it would not have question in members of a different sex. Sex plays a necessary and undisguisable role in the decision, exactly what Title VII forbids." 590 U.S. ___. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit and remanded for further proceedings. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: This case addresses the scope of Title VII's ban on sex discrimination. A gay man filed this suit on May 5, 2016 against Clayton County, arguing that he was terminated from his employment there on the basis of his sexual orientation. In so doing, the plaintiff argued that the defendants discriminated against him on the basis of sexual orientation and so violated Title VII. The complaint was dismissed in the district court for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The 11th Circuit affirmed and refused to hear the case en banc. The case was taken up by the Supreme Court of the United States on April 22, 2019 and the Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit on June 15, 2020, holding that firing an employe for being gay or transgender violates Title VII.


On February 1, 2012, a military veteran with multiple sclerosis who married her wife in California in 2008 filed suit challenging DOMA and other laws governing the Department of Veterans Affairs. The plaintiff, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the ACLU of Southern California, and private counsel, alleged that the laws violated her equal protection rights, because she would be entitled to larger monthly disability payments if she were recognized as a legally married person. She sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2202. The House Republican-appointed "Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group" (BLAG) appeared to defend the constitutionality of the challenged statutes. BLAG sought a stay of proceedings while similar issues were resolved in Golinski v. OPM, a DOMA case in the 9th Circuit. On August 3, 2012, Judge Consuelo B. Marshall, the district court judge in this case, denied the stay. In December, after the Supreme Court granted review on the issue in United States v. Windsor, BLAG renewed its motion for a stay, pending the outcome in the Supreme Court. The U.S. has declined to defend the constitutionality of the statutes in question, but it filed a motion to dismiss, on the grounds that the Veterans' Judicial Review Act confers exclusive jurisdiction on the VA Secretary over benefits claims, depriving the district court here of jurisdiction to order an award of benefits. The U.S. noted that this plaintiff had already initiated proceedings before the VA (though those proceedings were stalled). On August 29, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. On March 12, 2014, Judge Marshall declared that DOMA was unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court ruled against sections within DOMA that required a "spouse" or "surviving spouse" to be a member of the opposite sex. The defendants were enjoined from using DOMA to deny recognition of the plaintiff's same-sex marriage, which had been recognized by the State of California. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiff is a military veteran with multiple sclerosis who married her wife in California in 2008. On February 1, 2012, the plaintiff filed suit challenging DOMA and other laws governing the Department of Veterans Affairs. The plaintiff alleged that the laws violate her equal protection rights, since she would have been entitled to larger monthly disability payments if she had been recognized as a legally married person. The U.S. sought to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, although it did not defend the statutes' constitutionality. The dismissal was denied, and, on March 12, 2014, the court declared that DOMA was unconstitutional under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.


On November 2, 2017, individuals facing arrest because of their inability to pay their court fines and costs filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Oklahoma Sheriff’s Association, every Oklahoma county sheriff, and Aberdeen Enterprises, a private collections company. The plaintiffs sued under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Oklahoma state law. The plaintiff, represented by Civil Rights Corps, the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown Law, and private counsel, sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiffs also asked the court to certify the class as all people living in poverty, found to be indigent by the Courts of Oklahoma Counties, who were victims of an extortion scheme by defendants. Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that Aberdeen Enterprise on behalf of, and in concert with, the Oklahoma Sheriff's Association, violated RICO by operating an extortion scheme targeting indigent individuals who have been assessed fines in criminal and traffic court in Oklahoma. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants, motivated by a desire to extort, threatened plaintiffs that if they did not pay money to Aberdeen, they would have a warrant issued, be arrested, face testimony from Aberdeen about non-payment, face additional fees, and be sent to jail. According to the complaint, collected fines were then split between Aberdeen and the Sheriff's Association, and this scheme made the Sheriff's Association $829,075 in 2016 alone. In addition, the plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of defendants’ actions, arguing violations of their rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and Fourth Amendment. Plaintiffs claimed that the policies of keeping debtors in jail and placing them on onerous probation supervision solely because of their wealth status and inability to pay violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged abuse of process by Aberdeen in using the justice system to accomplish ulterior motives in the form of profiting at the expense of these individuals. Aberdeen Enterprises filed a motion to dismiss on January 8, 2018, but the motion was denied as moot, when shortly after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 1, 2018. In the amended complaint, six new plaintiffs joined the suit, some county sheriffs were dropped as defendants, and the additional allegations focused on the collections systems in Tulsa and Rogers counties. Two of the plaintiffs also sought preliminary injunctions to prevent Tulsa and Rogers Counties from jailing them for unpaid court debts. By the end of March 2018, all defendants filed motions to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded by seeking leave to amend the complaint for a second time. On March 26, 2018, the court found good cause to delay starting discovery until the motions for preliminary injunctions and motions to dismiss were resolved. On September 20, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint and denied the motions to dismiss as moot. The second amended complaint clarified certain allegations in response to the motions to dismiss, added the allegation that Tulsa County stopped using Aberdeen when the lawsuit was filed, and added an additional plaintiff. The defendants subsequently filed new motions to dismiss. Throughout the end of 2018 and 2019, the parties engaged in briefing on the motions to dismiss and for preliminary injunctions. On August 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion to open discovery. In response, the defendants urged the court to delay the opening of discovery pending the resolution of the plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctions and future motions to dismiss by the defendants. On August 26, 2020, the court lifted the stay on discovery, but on September 11, 2020, the court granted the defendant's motion to reconsider. The court then referred the motions for a preliminary injunction to Magistrate Judge Jodi F. Jayne on September 26, 2020. On September 30, 2020, a motion hearing was held for the plaintiff's seeking preliminary injunctions. As of February 5, 2020, the motions for preliminary injunctions are still pending and no discovery has taken place. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of indigent individuals who were assessed fines in criminal and traffic court in Oklahoma, filed a suit against Aberdeen Enterprises II Inc., a private collections company, and the Oklahoma Sheriff's Association over Aberdeen's debt collection practices. Plaintiffs alleged that Aberdeen and the Sheriff's Association ran an illegal extortion scheme and threaten poor Oklahomans with arrest and jail time unless they pay their court fees and assessing new fines when these individuals are unable to pay. The plaintiffs have twice amended their complaint and have pending motions for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed motions to dismiss in later 2018 and the parties engaged in briefing on these motions for much of 2019. Discovery is currently stayed pending resolution of the motions for a preliminary injunction and motions to dismiss. This case is ongoing.


On August 23, 2010, several individuals with incontinence caused by disability filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri to challenge Missouri Medicaid's (MO HealthNet) policy of only covering incontinence briefs for those individuals residing in institutions. Each plaintiffs requires incontinence briefs to prevent skin deterioration and infections, which can pose serious health risks. Without access to the briefs, the plaintiffs risk institutionalization so that all of their needs could be met. The plaintiffs alleged that this policy reflected a preference for institutionalization, which violates the ADA (under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs also claimed that this policy violated several provisions of the federal Medicaid act. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction along with their plaintiff, and the United States (DOJ) filed a statement of interest supporting the motion. The defendants opposed this motion and claimed that incontinence briefs for non-institutionalized adults are personal hygiene items rather than medical supplies. Judge Nanette K. Laughrey granted a preliminary injunction on December 27, 2010. The December 27 order found that plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits, and on February 17, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. The United States also supported this motion. After oral arguments, Judge Laughrey granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on June 24, 2011, finding that MO HealthNet's policy of excluding adult incontinence briefs from home health services coverage violated the federal Medicaid act, the ADA, and Section 504. The court ordered the state to change its policy to cover incontinence briefs. The parties then briefed the issue of attorney's fees, and the court ultimately granted attorney's fees and closed the case in October 2011.

Summary: Adults with disabilities who were incontinent challenged Missouri Medicaid's exclusion of adult incontinence briefs from its home health services coverage. The state Medicaid authority had a policy of providing incontinence briefs to institutionalized adults, but not to adults with disabilities living in the community. This policy placed the plaintiffs at risk of skin deterioration, infection, and ultimately, placement in an institution so that their medical needs could be met. Judge Nanette K. Laughrey granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, who had successfully demonstrated that the state's policies violated the federal Medicaid Act, the ADA (under Olmstead), and Section 504. The state was ordered to include adult incontinence briefs among its covered medical supplies for home health care services.


On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of race pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their employer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification, an order declaring liability, injunctive and equitable relief, back and front pay, lost benefits, compensatory damages, emotional distress damages, pain and suffering damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process by the predominantly Caucasian managerial staff. They also alleged that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought to intervene, but on January 29, 2001 the district court (Judge Forrester) denied this motion. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and the plaintiffs thereafter were ordered to proceed individually. On August 1, 2003 the district court (Judge Forrester) dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

Summary: On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit against their employer alleging discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process, that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training, and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and on August 1, 2003 the case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution.


On June 30, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in the Philadelphia U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Ross Stores, Inc. on behalf of a Russian employee. The EEOC alleged that Ross Stores had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.) by discriminating against the employee on the basis of her national origin. According to the EEOC, the employee was denied the pay increase she was entitled to receive upon promotion to Area Supervisor because of her Russian accent. The EEOC sought its costs and monetary and injunctive relief for the employee, including policy reform, anti-discrimination training, back pay, and compensation for emotional harm. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge William H. Yohn Jr.) entered as a consent decree on January 3, 2007. The two-year decree provided the employee with $20,000, and contained a variety of injunctive provisions. Under the decree Ross was prohibited from retaliating and from discrimination, and was required not to disclosure the details of the case to potential employers, to expunge the employee's personnel file, to change its policies, to implement a complaint procedure, to investigate claims promptly, to distribute policies to employees, to provided biennial antidiscrimination training for supervisors, and to post an EEOC notice. The parties bore their own costs. No further activity appears on the docket and the case is now closed. The decree was to last for two years. The docket sheet doesn't show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2009.

Summary: On June 30, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Title VII national-origin-discrimination suit in the Philadelphia U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Ross Stores, Inc. on behalf of a Russian employee. According to the EEOC, the employee was denied the pay increase she was entitled to receive upon promotion to Area Supervisor because of her Russian accent. The parties reached a settlement, which the Court (Judge William H. Yohn Jr.) entered as a consent decree on January 3, 2007. The decree provided the employee $20,000 and included a variety of injunctive povisions. The case is now closed.


On February 9, 2012, a former prisoner filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), claiming violations of the First, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Uptown People's Law Center, the plaintiff asked the court for monetary damages,. The complaint alleged that the IDOC employees were never disciplined for their role in his rape investigation. The plaintiff began serving a term of imprisonment with the Illinois Department of Corrections in February 2011. At a prison, his cellmate made physical contact with him. The plaintiff reported the incident to officer in charge and was moved to Health Care Unit. The plaintiff received a disciplinary ticket for providing false information about his alleged sexual assault. His cellmate passed the lie detector test and the plaintiff claimed he was threatened into recanting his allegation and the investigation was conducted in a retaliatory manner. The parties scheduled discovery. On April 16, 2012, the IDOC moved to dismiss part of the complaint, claiming state sovereign immunity. On June 27, 2012, the court (Judge Sue E. Myerscough) denied the motion, determining that a factual record needed to be more fully developed. 2012 WL 2459399. On July 12, 2013, Judge Sue E. Myerscough granted a motion to compel discovery. 2013 WL 3712406. After more than two years of discovery, on March 23, 2015, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On March 28, 2016, Judge Sue E. Myerscough denied the motion; the case went to jury trial in June 2016. In the middle of the third day of trial, the parties reported to the Court that they had settled. On September 2016, the plaintiff and the defendants submitted a stipulation of settlement and request for dismissal to the court. The settlement itself is not part of the public court record. But according to the Chicago Tribune, the IDOC agreed to pay the plaintiff $450,000. On September 8, 2016, Judge Myerscough dismissed this case with prejudice, each party to bear their own costs.

Summary: In 2012, a former prisoner in the Logan Correctional Facility in Lincoln, Illinois, filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that he was sexually assaulted by his cellmate during his time in Logan. The plaintiff sought monetary damages. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement of $450,000.


On Oct. 17, 2017, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the District of Columbia, and the States of California, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Washington filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its components U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). All plaintiffs were represented by their respective Attorneys General. The plaintiffs sought disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) of agency records that would shed light on federal immigration enforcement activities within their respective States. Due to a significant increase in such enforcement in 2017, the plaintiffs asserted that they had an urgent need for this information. The complaint alleged that on June 29, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a FOIA request to ICE, USCIS, and CBP seeking copies of records relating to: 1. the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA); 2. arrests and/or detentions of individuals at certain locations; and 3. ICE or CBP detainer requests and databases. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from ICE. The plaintiffs sought an expedited disclosure order under FOIA and sought legal fees. The case was assigned to Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV. On Feb. 15, 2018, the parties filed a joint statement. The plaintiffs sought production of all responsive documents by Aug. 1, whereas the defendants anticipated production by Sept. 30 for CBP and USCIS and Nov. 30 for ICE. The defendants completed their productions at the end of November 2018, with the exception of a subset of records that were referred to other agencies for review and production. On Sept. 10, 2019, the plaintiffs requested that the district court set a deadline for the defendants' completion of remaining document production; the court set the date of Oct. 7, 2019. On Oct. 1, 2019, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. The parties explained that the defendants had made a final production of records responsive to their FOIA requests on Sept. 12, and thus they had agreed to dismiss this case, with each party to bear its own costs, attorneys fees, and expenses. This case is closed.

Summary: On Oct. 17, 2017, Massachusetts, DC, California, Hawai'i, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Washington, sued DHS, ICE, USCIS, and CBP under FOIA, seeking agency records on federal immigration enforcement activities within the respective States. The defendants produced all records responsive to the plaintiffs' FOIA requests on September 12, 2019. The parties then agreed to dismiss the case.


On May 14, 2003, deaf and hard-of-hearing employees of the United States Postal Service, on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of people similarly situated, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service in his official capacity, under The Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. § 791 et. seq. after beginning an action with the EEOC that stalled for about seven months. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations as required by the Rehabilitation Act and thereby caused the plaintiffs and their putative class to suffer harm of frustration, anxiety, fear and distress conditions particularly exacerbated by the anthrax threat in 2001. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiffs and their putative class by failing to provide licensed sign language interpreters to its deaf and hard-of-hearing employees during important staff meetings that discussed safety, work place practices, and Postal Service policies. On May 26, 2004, the District Court (Judge Richard J. Leon) granted the defendant's motion to strike and dismiss the class action portions of the plaintiffs' complaint because the plaintiffs failed to show that their claims were common and typical of their class as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a). However, the Court granted in part the plaintiff's motion to compel and denied the defendants's motion for a protective order. The parties proceeded to discovery. During the next six years, the parties engaged in various discovery disputes and plaintiffs entered several amended complaints. In 2010, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations and mediation. On October 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for class certification and court approval of attached Global Settlement Agreement among the parties. On October 19, 2012, in an order, the District Court (Judge Leon) certified the class for purposes of settlement and granted leave for the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, a hearing for the final settlement agreement, and preliminary approval. In compliance with Judge Leon's order, the plaintiffs filed their third amended class action compliant alleging the defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations and that failure "impeded [plaintiffs'] ability to perform an essential job function." The plaintiff also added plaintiffs from a parallel action against the defendant then being litigated in front of the EEOC whose added allegations where incorporated into the class definition quoted above. On July 31, 2013, the District Court (Judge Leon) approved the Global Settlement Agreement that awarded the plaintiffs $4.33 million, including $1,550,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys fees and expenses, and $3,525,783 in compensatory damages. The Court also granted an injunction that, among other things, required: the to defendant provide alternative means of communication to their deaf and hard-of-hearing employees for "important workplace communications" upon request; the defendant to create the Postal Service Reasonable Accommodation Assistance Center to monitor provision of reasonable accommodations in the postal service; and both parties to appoint a independent ombudsmen for three years to enforce the agreement. The District Court stayed dismissal of the case for a period of three years in order to retain jurisdiction with respect to enforcement of the terms of the agreement. The period of enforcement ran from August 30, 2013-August 30, 2016 without further litigation or conflict. The parties completed their respective obligations pursuant the settlement agreement and the case was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice on September 8, 2016.

Summary: On May 14, 2003, plaintiffs, deaf and hearing impaired employees of the United States Postal Service, brought a class action lawsuit against the United States Postal Service in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia alleging the defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodation to allow plaintiffs to communicate during important work meetings. On July 31, 2013, the parties entered a Global Settlement Agreement that awarded the plaintiffs $4.33 million, required the defendants to adopt assistive communication technology to allow for better communication, required enforcement by an independent ombudsmen for three years, and gave the Court continuing jurisdiction over disputes over the Agreement for three years.


This suit was filed by eleven New York residents against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department on October 26, 2020 in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, as well as retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs also brought claims under the New York State Constitution on the same facts. The complaint sought declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers, with the approval of their supervisors, regularly used excessive force against and falsely arrested peaceful protesters during the widespread racial justice protests that took place in the summer of 2020. Two of the plaintiffs attended protests as journalists and one as a medic. The complaint specifically alleged that on different occasions, officers responded to the plaintiffs’ peaceful participation in the protests with violence, including: striking plaintiffs repeatedly with batons; tackling plaintiffs to the ground and pinning them with their bodies; indiscriminately pepper spraying plaintiffs; threatening plaintiffs with tasers; punching and kicking plaintiffs; tightly zip-tying or handcuffing plaintiffs’ wrists for extended periods of time, causing significant pain; and kettling plaintiffs to prevent their compliance with curfew. According to the complaint, the actions taken by officers resulted in lacerations, fractures, nerve damage, bruising, abrasions, head injuries, debilitating pain, and emotional distress to the plaintiffs and other protesters. In addition, the complaint alleged that several of the plaintiffs were arrested and held without cause in unclean, overcrowded cells, without any medical assistance to treat their injuries. Plaintiffs further alleged that, despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, police officers responding to protests frequently failed to wear masks or to assist detained protesters in covering their noses and mouths, exposing protesters to a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. One plaintiff also alleged that NYPD officers intentionally humiliated the plaintiff by repeatedly misgendering them. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon. In January 2021, Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three later-filed police conduct cases (People of New York v. New York, Sow v. City of New York, and Wood v. De Blasio) for pre-trial purposes. On February 4, 2021, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. In early March, the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York and the Detectives Endowment Association of New York City moved to intervene in the case. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 5, adding a request for injunctive relief ordering the defendants to take appropriate steps to refrain from using the unconstitutional policies and practices alleged in the complaint. As of March 16, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court.

Summary: Eleven New York City residents filed this lawsuit against the City of New York and the NYPD on December 14, 2020. The suit alleged that the NYPD falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as the New York State Constitution. It further alleged that the plaintiffs suffered physical and mental injuries as a result of the NYPD's practice of using excessive force against peaceful protesters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper.


On December 3, 2010, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana against Lake County, Indiana, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C § 1997. The plaintiffs, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, sought permanent injunctive relief, alleging that the County's actions and omissions in maintaining the Lake County Jail exhibited deliberate indifference to the health and safety of detainees at the Jail. The case was assigned to Judge Theresa Springmann. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant failed to appropriately screen for suicide risk, failed to provide sufficient and adequate staffing, failed to provide intake and referral process for persons with serious psychiatric needs, failed to provide sufficient medical staffing and adequate access to medical care for persons with serious medical needs, failed to provide adequate fire safety, and maintained a physical environment at the Jail that caused harm and posed an unreasonable risk to health and safety. On September 12, 2008, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice notified the County of its intention to investigate conditions of confinement at the Jail. On December 15-18, 2008, DOJ consultants in the fields of correctional suicide prevention, mental health care, medical care, fire safety and environmental health toured the Jail. On December 7, 2009, the plaintiff issued a "Findings Letter", where it concluded that certain conditions at the Jail violated the constitutional rights of the detainees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement on August 18, 2010. On December 3, 2010, the plaintiffs and the defendants filed a joint motion to enter the settlement. On December 20, 2010, Judge Springmann issued an order approving the settlement agreement in its entirety. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case to ensure timely and proper implementation of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement provided that the County did not admit any fault or liability. Under the agreement, the County had to use its best efforts to establish a suicide prevention program, to develop and implement a comprehensive fire safety program and ensure compliance with it, to revise and implement written housekeeping and sanitation plans for proper cleaning of housing, shower and medical areas, and to implement comprehensive and contemporary policies and procedures related to the use of force. Under the agreement, the Jail had to submit bi-annual compliance reports to the U.S. Department of Justice. The plaintiff agreed to have a Liaison whose duty is to supervise the implementation of the agreement and file the reports with the Court. The agreement was set to terminate when the Jail achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the agreement and maintained such compliance for one year. If the plaintiff believed that the County had failed to substantially comply with any of the obligations under the agreement, it would, prior to seeking judicial enforcement of the agreement, give written notice of failure to the County, and the parties were to attempt good-faith resolution of the dispute. In the event of the failure of mutual resolution, the parties could submit the dispute to mediation or invoke the jurisdiction of the Court. On January 18, 2012, a compliance report was filed with the Court. The report indicated non-compliance and partial compliance with the provisions of the agreement. Status and compliance reports continued to be provided over the next two years. On September 17, 2015, the parties jointly moved to terminate Subsection D (Fire Safety) of the settlement agreement, noting that the defendants had reached and maintained compliance with Subsection D for one year. The Court granted this motion on October 6, 2015. Then, by the same reasoning, the parties moved to terminate Subsection A (Medical Care) and Subsection C (Suicide Prevention) on August 10, 2017. The Court granted this motion on August 31, 2017. The parties continued to provide status reports through December 8, 2019, when they submitted their eighteenth and final report. On December 17, 2019, the parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement agreement and for final dismissal. Judge Springmann granted the motion the following day, December 18, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: The United States of America filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C § 1997, on December 3, 2010. It alleged violations of constitutional rights of detainees at the Lake County Jail through acts and omission of Lake County, Indiana. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, approved by the Court, under which the Lake County provided bi-annual compliance reports with the obligations to improve Jail conditions. The Court retained jurisdiction over the matter to ensure timely and proper implementation of the settlement agreement. On December 17, 2019, the parties jointly moved to terminate the settlement agreement. The motion was granted, and the case was closed the following day.