On August 25, 2015, a woman jailed for her failure to pay an automatically set bail filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court of the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiff sued Ascension Parish under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center and Equal Justice Under Law, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Those who cannot pay an automatic bail amount are kept in jail for up to three days before a judicial hearing in which they can have a individually tailored bail set. In some cases, including this case, the court does not allow the defendant to obtain an individualized bail. On August 25, 2015, the plaintiff filed for class certification. While referred to as a class-action lawsuit in other documents, the motion was never acted on before the close of the case. On August 26, 2015, the plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendant. On August 27, 2015, the District Court (Judge Shelly D. Dick) granted the motion, ordering the release of the plaintiff from jail subject to a non-monetary, unsecured bond. On September 2, 2015, both parties filed a joint motion for a settlement agreement and dismissal. The defendant agreed to create a new policy to handle misdemeanor arrestees. The defendant also agreed to not hold misdemeanor arrestees in jail due to an unaffordable monetary bond. On September 3, 2015, the Court approved the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015 a mother of two filed suit against Ascension Parish in Louisiana for unlawful detainment for her inability to pay the predetermined bail bond for her two misdemeanor crimes. After the court granted a temporary retraining order and preliminary injunction against the defendants, the two parties soon reached a court-approved settlement in which the defendant agreed to change the bail policy.


On November 9, 2012, 8 inmates at the Idaho Correctional Center (ICC) filed a lawsuit in the District of Idaho. The plaintiffs sued Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the Idaho Correctional Center, under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the color of state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought compensatory damages and punitive damages. The plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief and an award of attorney’s fees and costs at the court's discretion. The plaintiffs claimed that they had been victims of a gang assault in which six members from the Aryan Knights and the Severely Violent Criminals hid in a closet in order to attack the plaintiffs with shivs and shanks. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant used gang violence as a way to gain control over the inmate population and decrease operating costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant purposefully housed members of the same gang in the same block (creating what prisoners called a gang-controlled walk); operated at or above maximum capacity; and maintained an insufficient numbers of guards, which created a substantial risk of gang violence, pressure to join gangs, and pressure to participate in gang activities in and outside of the prison. Pictures, video of the attack, and other documents can be found on the plaintiff's lawyers' website. This case was assigned to Judge Dee V. Benson and referred to Judge Mikel H. Williams for settlement negotiations. On January 14, 2013, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The defendant stated that (1) six of the eight plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies as required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA); (2) the Complaint failed to allege with factual specificity the basis for a policy or custom violation; and (3) the complaint contained numerous immaterial and improper allegations. On January 18, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as a result of an anonymous email from a member of the prison staff that alleged that the defendant had been falsifying its records to make it appear that the various blocks were fully staffed and in compliance with a settlement agreement from a previous case, Kelly v. CCA, PC-ID-0007. On June 4, 2013, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss because the warden had suggested that the plaintiffs had exhausted internal remedy procedures. For six plaintiffs, the court ruled that they could have reasonably believed that there were no additional steps for them to take in pursuing compensation within the prison system. The assistant warden had previously approved a decision that if the plaintiffs had wanted to pursue compensation, they could do so "utilizing outside sources." Therefore, the plaintiffs partial exhaustion of the grievance process was sufficient to meet PLRA requirements. The six plaintiffs were allowed to proceed and had stated a plausible claim for relief based on the ghost worker allegation and gang member placement. But two plaintiffs' claims were dismissed because they had not yet exhausted available grievance procedures, and the case became Knight v. CCA (however, because the case continued to be referred to by its previous name, we have retained the named plaintiff above). On June 21, 2013 a collection of media entities (referred to as the Media Coalition) filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings so that it could oppose the defendant’s proposed protective order on the grounds that it would interfere with the press's ability to gather and report news. On August 6, 2013, the Media Coalition’s motion to intervene was granted. The court held that the protective order was necessary to ensure both the defendant’s employees’ safety and the plaintiffs’ safety. The court deemed \ this information unhelpful to the plaintiffs in their lawsuit. The parties began extensive discovery negotiations. However, upon a finding that the parties “refused to interact with each other reasonably and civilly,” the court referred the case for discovery mediation. On November 15, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation on certain discovery issues. This stipulation did not resolve all of the parties’ discovery disputes. On February 7, 2014, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to compel for discovery requests related to the defendant’s wage data and incentive plans (such as bonus reports). The court concluded that the plaintiffs had access to this information and that the request was frivolous. The court threatened awarding the defendant its attorneys’ fees should the plaintiffs continue to engage in abusive discovery practices. The court also held that they would not consider any more motions to compel by either party unless the parties’ attorneys had met face-to-face in at least one conference lasting at least two hours where they genuinely attempted to resolve each aspect of the motion to compel. On March 10, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to stay discovery after the FBI announced its intention to institute a criminal investigation into the defendant’s alleged conduct. On March 19, 2014, the court denied this motion. The court held that the plaintiffs’ interests in avoiding delay on a case that is nearly two-years old was greater than the highly speculative burden the investigation would pose to the defendant. On September 2, 2014, the plaintiffs’ moved for partial summary judgment on the defendant’s widespread custom of gang clustering and understaffing mandatory posts, the defendant’s affirmative defenses, and the defendant’s failure to respond to the plaintiff’s contention interrogatories regarding these affirmative defenses. On September 15, 2014, the defendant moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgement in the alternative on the plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages. On June 29, 2015, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement. The court held that the plaintiffs’ request did not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On December 3, 2015, Magistrate Candy Dale issued a Report and Recommendation that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment be granted. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could conclude that the defendant was aware that its staffing or housing policy posed a risk to the plaintiffs. On December 21, 2015, the plaintiffs objected to the Report and Recommendation. And on July 7, 2016, the district court rejected portions of the reports that granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement with respect to the understaffing claim and municipal liability. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement on the plaintiffs’ “gang clustering theory.” On September 15, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order with respect to the plaintiffs’ understaffing claim. On November 10, 2016, the court denied reconsideration. The court found that the plaintiffs had adequately established Monell causation regarding the relationship between understaffing and their assault. The parties prepared for trial. Trial began on February 13, 2017 and continued through February 22, 2017. On February 22, 2017, the defendant moved for a directed verdict. The court denied the defendant’s motion and took under advisement their motion to dismiss for punitive damages. On February 23, 2017, the jury returned a special verdict. The jury found that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiffs. The defendant disregarded this risk by failing to take reasonable measures to address it, which violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The jury also found that the defendant had a widespread practice and custom of understaffing at ICC. However, the jury did not find that the practice of understaffing caused a deprivation of the plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights on the day of the assault. So, it did not award the plaintiffs compensatory or punitive damages. On June 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial. The next day, the defendant also filed motions to alter or amend the judgment and for a new trial. The court denied both of the plaintiffs’ motions. It held that the jury instructions correctly delineated the elements necessary to prove causation and that the plaintiffs failed to object to jury instructions, thereby waiving their right to appeal. Regarding the plaintiffs claim that the special verdict form was superfluous and inconsistent, the court disagreed. The court also found that the plaintiffs had failed to object to its inclusion and therefore had no right to object. The court granted the defendant’s motion to alter the judgement to state “Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant, with Plaintiffs to take nothing.” On November 2, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On May 18, 2018, this appeal was voluntarily dismissed for reasons unknown. This case is now closed.

Summary: Eight inmates at Idaho Correction Correctional Center filed a lawsuit against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which operates the facility. The plaintiffs had been the victims of a gang assault and alleged that CCA was using gang violence as way to gain control over the inmate population and decrease their operating costs. After a long litigation and a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of the defendant. This case is now closed.


On July 12, 2018, the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. COPAA sued the U.S. Department of Education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by the National Center for Youth Law and private attorneys, COPAA sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs to stop the Dept. of Education from delaying regulations intended to identify and eliminate bias against students with disabilities and students of color. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. In 2016, the Dept. of Education established Final Regulations that were aimed to help States fully comply with Section 618(b) of IDEA, which required states to implement measures that could address problems related to racial disproportionality. Section 618(b) was meant to capture whether significant disproportionality based on race and ethnicity was occurring in the States and local educational agencies of the States with respect to the identification, placement, and discipline of children with disabilities. Significantly, it also established a standard methodology for states to use to determine whether racial disproportionality was occurring. The Dept. of Education gave States until July 1, 2018 to implement the Final Regulations. On July 3, 2018, the Dept. of Education issued a notice in the Federal Register delaying by two years the requirement to comply with the 2016 Final Regulations. The plaintiffs alleged that this delay (the "Delay Regulation"), was an abuse of discretion and arbitrarily allowed states to delay their compliance with section 618(d) of the IDEA, in violation of the IDEA itself and also the APA. The Dept. of Education moved to dismiss the complaint on September 17, 2018. It claimed that the plaintiffs lacked standing for two main reasons. First, in defendants' view, plaintiffs' allegations of harm--that without the delay, more disproportionate school districts would have been identified--was speculative. The defendants also claimed that the plaintiff failed to identify people who actually had suffered or would imminently suffer harm due to the delay. On October 1, 2018, the plaintiffs filed both a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss, and their own motion for summary judgment. On November 12, 2018, the defendants also moved for summary judgment. On March 7, 2019, the court denied defendants' motion to dismiss, granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement, and denied defendants' cross-motion for summary judgement. First, the court held that plaintiffs had established 1) organizational standing, by demonstrating concrete injury resulting from the delay and showing a likelihood that vacating the delay would redress such injury; and 2) associational standing, by identifying two COPAA members with standing, demonstrating that the plaintiff's litigation goals were germane to its overall mission, and showing that this litigation pursued by plaintiff did not require participation by COPAA members. Second, the court held that the defendants had violated the APA. The court noted that the defendants failed to produce a reasoned explanation for the delay, instead offering inconsistent explanations that did not address the previous regulations' safeguards in an adequate or non-cursory manner. The court also found that the defendants' failure to consider the cost of the delay to states, society, and children alike connoted an arbitrary and capricious attitude to the possible disadvantages of the Delay Regulation. The court held that vacatur of the Delay Regulation was an appropriate remedy. On May 10th, 2019, the defendants filed a notice of appeal. On September 12, 2019, before the appellate court heard any oral arguments, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the appeal. The case returned to the district court, where litigation over attorneys’ fees is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Education's delays in implementing regulations violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), and also resulted in racial disparities in treatment of children with disabilities. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgement, and held that vacatur of the Delay Regulation was an appropriate remedy.


This is one of a pair of lawsuits filed by state affiliates of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), each relating to two separate Freedom of Information Act requests seeking agency records on immigration enforcement practices in Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont. (The other case is IM-ME-0001, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine Foundation v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security.) Both cases were brought in U.S. District Court for the District of Maine; the ACLU sought declaratory and injunctive relief—specifically, the release of documents responsive to each request—as well as attorneys' fees and costs. This action was filed on May 8, 2018 against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). (The other had been filed seven days prior and did not include ICE as a defendant.) Both cases were partially coordinated and assigned to District Judge John D. Levy. The ACLU sent the FOIA request that triggered this case on September 5, 2017 amid reports of substantially increased raids, arrests, and searches by federal immigration authorities in Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The request asked for records pertaining to each agency's immigration enforcement practices in the three states, including its communications with local businesses and law enforcement. Two weeks later, according to the ACLU's complaint, DHS delivered its "final response" that contained only one page of data and only responded to arrests made by ICE; the ACLU alleged that DHS failed to search CBP records or otherwise respond to any of the other items of the request, in violation of its legal duties under FOIA. The complaint also said that DHS acknowledged receiving the ACLU's subsequent appeal in February 2018, but failed to issue a notification within 20 days indicating whether it would comply, again in violation of FOIA. DHS filed its answer on June 18, 2018. It acknowledged receiving the ACLU's September 5 request, but otherwise effectively denied the remaining allegations. On July 5, 2018, Magistrate Judge John H. Rich III granted the parties' joint motion, in which DHS said that it was in the process of searching for possible additional responsive documents, subject to later status report to be filed by August 17. That report indicated that the defendants had agreed to identify and produce additional responsive documents according to search parameters jointly drafted by the parties. A November 2018 status report indicated the parties were unable to agree on a production schedule. Judge Levy granted that request and set a schedule, which had to be amended several times. Finally, on October 11, 2019, plaintiffs submitted a status briefing with a proposed scheduling to adjudicate the issue of several redacted materials. Four days later, the court set the schedule telling plaintiffs to submit a brief as to why they were entitled to the redacted material by December 16, 2019. Following this, the defendants were to submit a brief in response by January 10, 2020. The plaintiffs would then have a chance to reply to that response by January 24, 2020. This schedule proved difficult to maintain and was altered a few times, so ultimately the plaintiffs submitted their first brief by December 20, defendants responded on February 5, 2020, and the plaintiffs replied two weeks later. On July 6, 2020, the court issued its order regarding the redacted materials. Judge Levy ordered some of the contested documents to be unredacted, but most of the documents he found were covered by Exemption 7(E) of FOIA. This exemption protects information that might reveal law enforcement tactics which are not known to the general public. The court ordered that the defendants release any of the unprotected information by July 20, 2020. 2020 WL 3643126. The case is ongoing as of July 9, 2020.

Summary: On May 8, 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. The ACLU sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. By October of 2019, plaintiffs and defendants came to a dispute regarding certain redacted materials, and they asked Judge Levy to adjudicate the issue. In July of 2020, the court issued their findings. Most of the documents that plaintiffs had requested were protected by Exemption 7(E) of FOIA, but some were not covered. The court ordered that defendants release the unprotected documents by July 20, 2020.


On June 28, 2011, a devout Muslim prisoner at the Arkansas Department of Corrections' Cummins Unit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") against the Director of the Arkansas Department of Corrections and the Warden of the Cummins Unit. The plaintiff, proceeding without counsel, asked the court for a temporary and permanent injunction against the enforcement of the prison's grooming policy, claiming that the prison was substantially interfering with his right to practice religion in violation of RLUIPA and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the prison's refusal to allow him to grow a 1/2 inch beard was not the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in maintaining security in the prison. On July 6, 2011, United States Magistrate Judge Joe J. Volpe, relying heavily on Fegans v. Norris, 537 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2008), recommended that the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order be denied. On October 18, 2011, the District Court (Chief Judge Brian S. Miller), however, rejected the magistrate's proposed findings, noting that the defendants failed to satisfy their burden of proving that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means to achieve prison security as applied to the plaintiff's case. The District Court then granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, and remanded the case to the Magistrate Judge for further hearings on whether the grooming policy was the least restrictive means to maintain prison security. After an evidentiary hearing, on January 27 2012, Magistrate Judge Volpe recommended that the Court's October 18, 2011 order be vacated, that the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 11-cv-00164, 2012 WL 994481 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 27, 2012). Magistrate Judge Volpe noted that the state had brought forth credible evidence that a 1/2 inch beard presented security threats, notwithstanding the fact that under the policy a prisoner with a diagnosed skin condition was allowed to grow a 1/4 inch beard. For example, a 1/2 inch beard could conceal weapons and/or contraband; allowing a prisoner to keep a beard could allow him to disguise his identity (by shaving) in the event of an escape; and giving certain prisoners preferential treatment (allowing them to grow beards) could lead to other prisoners targeting them or seeing them as leaders. The plaintiff conceded that the government had a compelling interest in maintaining prison security, but argued that the policy was not the least restrictive means to do so. Specifically, the plaintiff referenced the procedures used by the New York Department of Corrections that maintain prison security by photographing inmates with and without a beard so that they may not disguise themselves in the event of an escape. Despite this evidence, Magistrate Judge Volpe declared that a high level of deference is owed to prison officials in judging the specific needs of their prison, and that policies of other prisons are not dispositive. Finally, the Magistrate Judge noted that because the plaintiff was already given several religious accommodations (a prayer rug, a list of distributors of Islamic material, correspondence with religious advisors, dietary accommodations, and unobstructed observance of religious holidays), the grooming policy did not "substantially burden" the plaintiff's religious exercise. The Magistrate Judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Moreover, he recommended that dismissal of the complaint count as a "strike" for purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which penalizes prisoners if they file more than three lawsuits that are frivolous or fail to state a claim. On March 23, 2012, the District Court (Chief Judge Brian S. Miller) adopted the Magistrate's recommendations in full, and dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Holt v. Hobbs, No. 11-cv-00164, 2012 WL 993403 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012). The plaintiff appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. On June 12, 2013, the Court (per curiam) held that the State met its burden under RLUIPA of establishing that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interest in prison security, and affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the case. The Court did, however, reverse the District Court's holding that the dismissal counted as a strike under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Holt v. Hobbs, 509 Fed.Appx. 561 (8th Cir. 2013); No. 12-3185, 2013 WL 2500568 (8th Cir. June 12, 2013). Still without counsel, the plaintiff then sought review in the Supreme Court of the United States; the Supreme Court granted certiorari, limited to the RLUIPA claims, and appointed counsel. Holt v. Hobbs, 134 S.Ct. 1512 (2014). On January 20, 2015, the Court reversed, unanimously. In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that Arkansas's grooming policy violates RLUIPA "insofar as it prevents petitioner from growing a 1⁄2-inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs." The opinion focused on the fact that the state's asserted security interest was undermined by the fact that it allowed prisoners to grow 1/4-inch beards for medical reasons, and also allowed prisoners to grow their hair longer than 1/2 inch. On March 12, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case as moot. Plaintiff then filed a motion for contempt on March 24, 2015, arguing that the Department of Corrections was misapplying the court ruling. The court denied this motion for contempt. On May 14, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion for permanent injunction, which was granted on June 4, 2015. The permanent injunction stated that prisoners can grow a 1/2 inch beard for religious reasons if they properly file for religious grooming accommodations. On June 9, 2015, the parties filed a joint notice stating that the Department of Corrections agreed to pay $134,000 to plaintiff's attorneys. On June 23, 2015, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. On November 3, 2015, plaintiff filed a motion to reopen the case, alleging that he was advised that he should not help other prisoners file for religious grooming accommodations and was told not to teach Islam beliefs in a religious group for prisoners. The court denied this motion on November 20, 2015, because plaintiff had already been granted relief and was adding new claims. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration on November 27, 2015, stating that he was impermissibly and wrongly discharged from the PAL (Principles and Applications for Life) program in retaliation for exercising his right to advise other inmates on how to file for accommodations and for educating fellow inmates. The court denied this motion for reconsideration, on the grounds that the claims brought in the motion for reconsideration were unrelated to whether he should be permitted to wear a half-inch beard. The court found that if plaintiff wanted to pursue his new claims, he had to file a new case. This case is now closed.

Summary: On June 28, 2011, a devout Muslim inmate at the Arkansas Department of Corrections' Cummins Unit filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA") alleging that the prison grooming policy interfered with his religious practices. The District Court held that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the government's compelling interest in prison security, and dismissed the case. The Eight Circuit affirmed, but the on Jan. 20, 2015, the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed, and held that the prisoners must be allowed to grow a 1/2 inch beard. Plaintiff attempted to reopen the case in November 2015, but the court denied plaintiff's motion to reopen the case because he brought forth new claims.


On September 12, 2005, three freight pickup and delivery drivers, who worked for EGL, Inc., filed this class action lawsuit under the California Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law against EGL in the Santa Clara Superior Court of California. On October 14, 2005, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court Northern District of California, San Jose on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and declaratory relief, claiming that EGL denied them certain employee benefits required under the California Labor Code by misclassifying them as independent contractors instead of employees. Specifically, the Plaintiff's alleged that EGL violated the California Unfair Competition Law (Cal. Business and Profession Code §17200-09) by misclassifying the Plaintiffs as independent contractors and thereby violating state laws requiring employers to pay overtime compensation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510 & 1194) and minimum wages (Cal. Lab. Code §1182.11 & 1182.12), prohibiting employers from making certain improper deductions from wages (Cal. Lab. Code § 221), requiring employers to reimburse employees for necessary business expenses (Cal. Lab. Code § 2802), requiring employers to provide accurate itemized wage statements to employees (Cal. Lab. Code §1174 & 1174.5), requiring employers to pay all compensation to employers that are discharged (Cal. Lab. Code §201, 202, & 203), and requiring employers to provide off-duty meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 226.7 & 512). EGL, Inc. is a global transportation, supply chain management and information services company incorporated under the laws of Texas and headquartered in California. One aspect of EGL's business is domestic delivery services. The plaintiffs were California residents who provided freight pick-up and delivery services for EGL in California. All three Plaintiffs signed agreements with EGL that expressly characterized the Plaintiffs as independent contractors and included a choice of law clause specifying Texas law as governing the agreement. On December 8, 2006, EGL moved for summary judgment arguing that the plaintiffs were independent contractors under the terms of the agreement, and therefore not entitled to employee benefits provided by the California Labor Code. The Plaintiffs argued that their claims fell outside the scope of the choice of law provision and that the application of Texas law is contrary to California law. U.S. District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte granted summary judgment for the defendant. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., No. C 05 04181, 2007 WL 2021809 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2007). On July 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Edward R. Korman, reversed the District Court's order granting summary judgment. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2010). The court reviewed the District Court's choice of law decision de novo, and held that Texas law applied only to the interpretation and enforcement of the contract itself. Id. at 899. Therefore, California law applied because the plaintiffs claimed benefits under the California Labor Code. Furthermore, the Court held that summary judgment was not appropriate under California's multi-faceted test of employment, because a reasonable jury could find the existence of an employee relationship between the Plaintiffs and EGL. Id. at 904. As a result of the 9th Circuit's reversal, the case was again before the District Court. As the parties discussed how to proceed with discovery and/or to settle the case, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on February 7, 2011, adding a cause of action for failure to pay minimum wage. Then on September 23, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. Seven days later in a joint report on Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), the parties discussed their failed attempts to reach a settlement. The plaintiffs wanted any settlement to be class-wide, and rejected the defendant's proposal to discuss settlement with only the named plaintiffs and other interested individuals. As such, though the plaintiffs believed mediation would be helpful in reaching a settlement, the defendants expressed doubt that mediation or any other form of ADR would be be beneficial unless the plaintiffs were willing to drop the class action. Over the next year, the plaintiffs submitted exhibits and declarations in support of their motion for class certification, while the defendants submitted exhibits and declarations supporting their opposition to the motion for class certification. The parties also deposed most of these declarants. A motion hearing held on March 30, 2012 before Judge Whyte. However, despite the plaintiffs calling the Court's attention to a recent decision, <i> Scovil v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc.</i>, 2012 WL 3308831 (D.Me.)., their Motion for Class Action was denied on September 7, 2012. 285 F.R.D. 473. The plaintiffs filed for permission to appeal that decision, but their petition for permission to appeal was denied on December 17, 2012. On August 11, 2014, M&G Truck Service filed a notice of lein against one of the named defendants, claiming that he owed $27,606.54. After the parties in that matter came to a settled agreement, a release of lien was filed on October 13, 2015. That matter is closed. On December 3, 2015, the parties in this matter settled, agreeing to dismissal of the claims by three of the named plaintiffs, with prejudice. Each side was to bear its own costs of the suit except otherwise provided for in the parties' settlement agreement, and the settlement agreement is not available. This stipulation did not affect the claims by the fourth named plaintiff, who, pending resolution of his proposed bankruptcy resolution, maintained all of his causes of action in this case. This stipulation was granted on December 4, 2015. In February 2016, the parties filed a stipulation with proposed order to dismiss all of the claims by the remaining named plaintiff, with prejudice, against the defendants. This settlement agreement is likewise unavailable. The stipulation was granted on February 25, 2016 by Judge White. This case is closed.

Summary: On September 12, 2005, three freight pickup and delivery drivers, who worked for EGL, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit under the California Labor Code and the California Unfair Competition Law claiming that EGL denied them certain employee benefits required under the California Labor Code by misclassifying them as independent contractors instead of employees. On December 8, 2006, the District Court (Judge Ronald M. Whyte) granted summary judgment for the Defendant. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., No. C 05 04181, 2007 WL 2021809 (N.D.Cal. July 10, 2007). On July 13, 2010, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (Judge Edward R. Korman) reversed the District Court order granting summary judgment. Narayan v. EGL, Inc., 616 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2010). After the plaintiff's motion for class action was denied, and their appeal rejected, the parties ultimately came to an agreement and all the claims were settled by February 25, 2016. This case is closed.


On June 24, 2008, several sex offender plaintiffs brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against several state defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada, alleged violation of several constitutional protections. Speficially plaintiffs' argued that new sex offender laws could not be applied retroactively, and that they resulted in excessive punishments to plaintiffs, thus seeking injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against the new state laws. On June 30, 2008, the District Court (Hon. James C. Mahan) denied a temporary restraining order but granted a preliminary injunction, postponing the enforcement of the new sex offender laws against plaintiffs. After obtaining the preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include new parties and a jury demand against all defendants, and to remove Washoe County and all law enforcement defendants. The Court also denied third parties' motions to intervene and a motion to file an amicus curiae brief, holding that no new legal issues were being presented and that affected persons were being adequately represented. On October 7, 2008, the Court held that because the retroactive application of the laws meant imposing a new punishment for an old crime, it violated the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and Contracts clauses, and that because there was no procedural safeguard for the plaintiffs, it also violated the Due Process clause. Thus, the Court granted plaintiffs' revised order requesting permanent injunction against enforcing Nevada's new sex offender laws. In January of 2009, the Court also granted plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees in the amount of $145,823.50. The defendants appealed the District Court's decision, and requested that the court stay the order of attorney fees pending appeal, though the Court denied the motion to stay. On February 10, 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed the injunction against retroactive application of Nevada's New Sex Offender laws regarding recategorization of sex offenders, citing to previous 9th Circuit decisions holding that retroactive application of similar laws was constitutional. The Court of Appeals also dismissed as moot the defendants' appeal regarding the district court's injunction against retroactive application of new laws restricting movement and residency of sex offenders, basing their decision on the defendants' admission that such laws were not meant to be interpreted as retroactively applicable; the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to create consent decree to be signed by the District Court. The injunction against the movement and residency laws was to remain in force until such a decree was signed. The case remained open, with the parties resolving the matter and the Court conducting status checks, and handling a new issue regarding the scope of the injunction on the movement and residency laws. Further, the Court of Appeals held that the outcome regarding movement and residence laws was considered a ruling for the plaintiffs, and thus affirmed the District Court's grant of attorney fees to the plaintiffs; however, the amount to be paid by defendants was later settled by the parties, though the amount was not indicated in the record. No consent decree appears to have been filed, though it appears the parties resolved the matter. On June 10, 2015, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, which the court granted two days later. There is little information available about the conclusion of the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 24, 2008, plaintiff sex offender sought injunctive and declaratory judgment against the state of Nevada's new sex offender laws that would result in excessive punishment and retroactive enforcement. As of May 31, 2014, the case is ongoing, with the most recent holding by the 9th Circuit holding that new law resulting in recategorizing of sex offenders is enforceable, and that parties should submit a consent degree with respect to nonenforcement of new law that restricts movement and residency.


On June 12, 2013, a private citizen Verizon Wireless subscriber filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Constitution, against the President, the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the government's search and seizure of her telephone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act violated the First and Fourth Amendment and 5 U.S.C. § 706. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the NSA was monitoring and searching her telephone records without showing first that there was probable cause to believe that she was engaged in criminal behavior. On November 7, 2013, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On December 20, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 24, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. On June 3, 2014, Judge B. Lynn Winmill granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief. Judge Winmill wrote that there was no Fourth Amendment violation in this case based on precedent, citing the Supreme Court case of Smith v Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), in which the Supreme Court held that a person has no expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers that she dials. Smith v. Obama, 2014 WL 2506421 (D. Idaho June 3, 2014). Although the NSA's data gathering goes beyond the telephone numbers dialed, this is still not a violation of the Fourth Amendment because the Ninth Circuit had extended Smith v. Maryland's holding to cover call length and call time, as well. The Court noted, too, that other courts had already found that the NSA was not violating the Fourth Amendment. See A.C.L.U. v Clapper, NS-NY-0003 and U.S. v. Moalin, U.S. v. Moalin, 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D.Cal. 2013). Plaintiffs appealed the decision on July 1, 2014. On March 22, 2016, the Ninth Circuit determined that the plaintiff’s claims pertaining to injunctive relief were moot as the USA Freedom Act of 2015 prohibited further bulk collection of metadata. Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to the data that the government had already collected were remanded to the district court and eventually voluntarily dismissed. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013, a Verizon Wireless subscriber filed a federal lawsuit in the District of Idaho challenging the National Security Agency's search and seizure of her telephone records under Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1861, claiming that it violated the Fourth Amendment. and 5 U.S.C. § 706. In 2014, the court dismissed the case holding that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the injunctive relief was determined to be moot given that the USA Freedom Act of 2015 prohibited further bulk collection of metadata. The case is now closed.


On September 14, 2016, a Mexican citizen who had been previously detained at the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, WA, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiff sued the local Field Office Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director of ICE, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the warden of the Northwest Detention Center under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.) (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.), the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2241), and the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1361, and 1651). Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiff sought a writ of habeas corpus, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants denied him his due process rights and violated the INA by detaining plaintiff class members for more than six months and by not offering individualized custody redetermination hearings (also known as bond hearings) before an Immigration Judge after having been found by asylum officers to have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. Specifically, the defendants had previously determined that Immigration Judges do not have jurisdiction over custody hearings for persons fleeing persecution and torture and placed in "withholding only" proceedings under the Procedures for Asylum and Withholding Removal (8 C.F.R. § 1208). However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that persons in immigration proceedings facing detention of six months or longer are entitled to a custody hearing. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015). An Immigration Judge could issue a custody redetermination on whether the person presents a flight risk or threat to the community, or whether the noncitizen is entitled to be released during the immigration proceedings. As a result of the defendants' determination, persons in withholding only proceedings remained incarcerated in federal facilities and private prisons (e.g. the Northwest Detention Center) often for more than a year, and sometimes for multiple years. The case was assigned to Judge James L. Robart. On October 19, 2016, the defendants moved to stay the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The next day, the plaintiff moved to certify the following class definition: "All individuals detained in the Western District of Washington who are placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) who, (1) are thereafter denied an individualized custody determination before an Immigration Judge or, (2) on or before six months of civil immigration detention, are not provided automatic individualized custody hearings where Defendants must justify their continued detention." The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on November 7, 2016. Regarding their previous motion to stay, the district court denied it on November 29, 2016. Two days later, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on January 31, 2017. The changes included adding more named plaintiffs and revising the class definition so as to remove any ambiguity that the named plaintiffs belonged to the plaintiff class. On February 8, the plaintiffs amended the motion to certify the plaintiff class with the new class definition, which removed the first definition's specificity around denied custody hearings: "All individuals who are placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) in the Western District of Washington who are detained or subject to an order of detention." On February 27, 2017, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss for the newly-added named plaintiffs. The district court ruled on both motions to dismiss on July 11, 2017. It granted the first motion, which was directed at the claims of the original named plaintiff, and denied the second motion. For the first motion, the district court held that the plaintiff lacked standing because he was already released from detention and failed to show "a sufficient likelihood" of the defendants detaining him again. On August 4, 2017, the defendants filed an amended motion to dismiss. On September 13, 2017, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, in part with prejudice and in part without. Because the original named plaintiff's claims were dismissed, his request for injunctive relief was denied with prejudice. The district court also denied with prejudice preliminary injunctive relief regarding immediate custody hearings after being placed in withholding only proceedings because the Ninth Circuit recently held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to those immediate hearings. Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 862 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2017). For the issue of custody hearings after a prolonged detention, the district court denied without prejudice preliminary relief because of the pending motions for dismissal and class certification. The district court certified the following version of the plaintiff class definition on December 11, 2017: "All individuals who (1) were placed in withholding only proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e) in the Western District of Washington after having a removal order reinstated, and (2) have been detained for 180 days (a) without a custody hearing or (b) since receiving a custody hearing." This version added back elements regarding custody hearings and the length of detention that the first amended complaint had dropped. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on December 14, 2017, asking the district court to declare the defendants' actions unlawful and to order the defendants to provide all class members with individualized custody hearings. They argued that the defendants, by asserting that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the individualized hearings, had agreed that it was their policy to deny these hearings. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment on January 8, 2018. On April 4, 2018, the district court granted in part and denied in part both summary judgment motions and granted injunctive relief. It granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs—they were entitled to automatic custody hearings after six months of detention. It also granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs for their due process claim as a result. On the other hand, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants for the due process claim. It also enjoined the defendants from enforcing the policy of not providing individualized custody hearings every six months, holding that the defendants violated the INA by failing to provide those hearings. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit on May 30, 2018. Meanwhile, back in the trial court on April 4, 2019, the defendants moved for relief from the district court's order. The district court deferred its ruling on June 4, 2019, pending the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on November 13, 2019. On April 7, 2020, it remanded the case, affirming in part and reversing and vacating in part the district court's opinion. The Ninth Circuit applied its holding in Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions (IM-CA-0120 in this Clearinghouse) and affirmed the parts of the injunction (from April 4, 2018) that required the defendants to provide individualized hearings after six months when the class member's release was not imminent and to justified continued detention with clear and convincing evidence. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed and vacated the judgment that the defendants hold additional hearings every six months because no such requirement was explicitly found in previous cases or statutes. Because the district court had used this finding of requiring additional hearings to rule on the plaintiffs' due process claim, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for reconsideration of the due process claim. 955 F.3d 762 (9th Cir. 2020). On June 24, 2020, the parties moved to stay proceedings, which the district court granted on June 25, because the defendants were deciding whether to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Supreme Court had extended the time to file a petition, and so case proceedings were stayed until September 5, 2020. The defendants filed a petition to the Supreme Court on September 4, 2020, for both this case and Aleman Gonzalez v. Sessions. The petition and briefs were distributed on January 8, 2021. As of April 15, 2021, the case is pending the Court's decision on whether to grant a writ of certiorari.

Summary: This is a case about individualized custody redetermination hearings for individuals placed in "withholding only" proceedings for prolonged detentions under the Procedures for Asylum and Withholding Removal. On September 14, 2016, a Mexican citizen who had been previously detained filed this class action lawsuit against the local Field Office Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Director of ICE, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, the Attorney General of the U.S., and the warden of the Northwest Detention Center under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act, the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Habeas Corpus, and the All Writs Act. Represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants denied due process rights and violated the INA by detaining plaintiff class members for more than six months and by not offering individualized hearings. The district court granted injunctive relief on April 4, 2018, requiring the defendants to provide hearings every six months. On April 7, 2020, the Ninth Circuit reversed the requirement to provide additional hearings after the first six-month hearing. The defendants have filed a petition with the Supreme Court, and the case is ongoing.


On March 31, 2014, Disability Rights Montana (DRM), a not-for-profit advocating for individuals with serious mental illness incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of mentally ill prisoners' Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff also brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff brought this lawsuit against the officials running various Montana governmental entities, including the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services (DPHHS), the Montana State Hospital, and the Montana Department of Corrections (DOC). The plaintiff was represented by the ACLU of Montana and private attorneys, and asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the Montana State Prison violated the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners with serious mental illness by, among other things, withholding medication, misdiagnosing prisoners with a long history of mental illness, and punishing prisoners for behavior caused by their mental illness. The complaint further alleged that prisoners with mental illness were routinely subjected to years of solitary confinement or so-called "behavior modification plans" that deprived them of clothing, working toilets, and proper food, all of which needlessly magnified the harms these prisoners suffered. With regard to a subset of prisoners—individuals who had been sentenced as "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI)—the plaintiff also alleged violations of their due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that these individuals sentenced as GBMI were being transferred to the Montana State Prison, either because the Hospital wanted to open up bed space, or because it wanted to avoid treating prisoners who were disliked by staff. The plaintiff claimed these transfers would occur without giving patients any real opportunity to challenge them. On July 24, 2014, United States District Judge Sam E. Haddon dismissed parts of the case against the defendant officers who represented the DPHHS and the Montana State Hospital. The court found that the complaint did not contain any allegations of conduct that could be traced to those defendants because neither had been working there at the time these underlying events occurred. The court also found that the allegations related to the GBMI transfers failed to provide the necessary specificity mandated by pleading standards. Following a status conference, DRM was ordered to file the action as a separate case with a separate case number. The second case is available on the Clearinghouse as Disability Rights Montana v. Batista. The plaintiff responded by filing two rounds of amended complaints, which named new individual officers as representatives of the defendants. The Montana DPHHS and Montana State Hospital defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim but the district court summarily denied it on September 3, 2015. However, on March 31, 2016, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice with regard to the DPHHS and the Montana State Hospital defendants. As such, the case is closed.

Summary: Disability Rights Montana filed this lawsuit against the Montana Department of Corrections, the Montana State Prison, the Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services, and the Montana State Hospital, in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff alleged that the Prison and the Department of Corrections were violating the Eighth Amendment rights of seriously mentally ill prisoners by, among other things, putting prisoners with serious mental illnesses in solitary confinement. As for the hospital and the DPHHS, the plaintiff alleged that both were violating the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights of prisoners who had been sentenced as "guilty but mentally ill" (GBMI) by transferring them from the hospital to the state prison. This second claim was eventually dropped by the plaintiffs in a stipulated dismissal and the claims against the prison and the Department of Corrections were refiled under a different case number (available on the Clearinghouse under PC-MT-0010).


On February 16, 2016 two California organizations—the California Council of the Blind and the Lighthouse for the Blind and Visually Impaired—and four individuals with visual impairments filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that AMC Entertainment violated Title III of the ADA (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) by not providing the proper headsets to accommodate its blind patrons. Some plaintiffs claimed they had been denied access to any audio description equipment. Other plaintiffs claimed that when they were provided audio description equipment, the equipment would fail during the movie, preventing the plaintiffs from enjoying the film. Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction requiring the defendants to provide properly functioning audio description equipment and services for individuals who are blind or visually impaired. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Elizabeth D. Lapotre. On May 31, 2016 the case was reassigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers, who presided over the rest of the proceedings. Starting on May 11, 2016 a mediator led settlement discussions between the parties out of court. They reached a settlement in April 2017 and filed a motion to dismiss the case. Judge Rogers granted the order on April 27, 2017. The settlement required that the defendant make reasonable and diligent efforts to maintain Descriptive Narration Equipment in its theaters and replace any malfunctioning equipment. The defendants were also required to train employees on availability of Descriptive Narration Equipment, including step by step guidelines for setting up the equipment and instruction to test the equipment weekly. The plaintiffs were also awarded attorneys' fees and costs. The court continued to monitor the terms of the agreement until April 21, 2019. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiffs represented blind individuals seeking accommodation from a movie theater chain. The case settled through mediation in favor of the plaintiffs. The defendants had to provide reasonable accommodation, employee training, and attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs.


In September 2005, the Los Angeles District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Prospect Airport Services, Inc. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff alleged that a male employee was sexually harassed by a female co-worker, and that the defendant company did not take steps to remedy the situation. The defendant moved for summary judgment, and on September 27, 2007 Judge Kent J. Dawson granted the motion. The court reasoned that the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive enough to constitute sexual harassment under Title VII, and that the employer could not be held responsible because the male employee had specified to supervisors that he did not wish to bring a charge of sexual harassment. The EEOC appealed the court's ruling. Three years later, on September 3, 2010, Judge Andrew J. Kleinfield of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion reversing the district court’s decision to grant judgment to the defendant. Judge Kleinfield held that the case was incorrectly withheld from a jury since the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence regarding sexual harassment and hostile work environment. Even though the plaintiff conceded that the male employee did not feel abused by his co-worker's first advances, the Court of Appeals found that the plaintiff had introduced evidence showing that the case should have been sent to a jury due to the frequency and pervasiveness of the continued advances. The Court of Appeals then stayed the reversal of the district court’s decision pending the defendant’s appeal to the United States Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to the defendant, the mandate reversing the lower court’s decision went into effect on February 9, 2011. The case was remanded to Judge Dawson. During discovery, parties went back and forth moving to exclude testimonial evidence. In December 6, 2011, Judge Dawson granted defendant’s contested motion to bifurcate the case into two trials: one for liability and one for punitive damages. But ten days later, the parties notified the court that they reached a settlement. The defendant agreed to pay $75,000.00 by January 6, 2012 and the plaintiff had until January 10, 2012 to move for injunctive or other forms of non-monetary relief. On January 10, 2012, the plaintiff exercised its discretion and moved for an injunction requiring defendant to implement effective employment policies and practices to comply with anti-discrimination law. Judge Dawson granted only part of the plaintiff’s motion in July 2012. The court found that the defendant company had already taken steps to ensure compliance with the sexual harassment provision of Title VII and both employees had since left the company. The granted portion of the injunction enjoined the defendant from violating the sexual harassment provision of Title VII for five years and required the company to implement a stronger anti-harassment policy and investigative procedure, including extensive employee trainings. In addition, the defendant had to submit monitoring reports once every six months for a period of three years. The case administratively closed in 2014 and is now closed.

Summary: In September 2005, the EEOC filed suit in the District of Nevada on behalf of a male employee against his employer, Prospect Airport Services, Inc. for failing to address sexual harassment by a female co-worker. EEOC brought the complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, but on appeal the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case. In December 2011, the parties settled before trial and the defendant company agreed to pay $75,000.00. EEOC later moved for injunctive relief in January 2012. The court granted the motion in part, enjoining the defendant from violating the sexual harassment provision of Title VII for five years and requiring the company to implement a stronger anti-harassment policy and investigative procedure including extensive employee trainings. The case is now closed.


On July 23, 2010, a prisoner at Stateville Correction Center filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Wexford Health Services and the Illinois Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, representing himself pro se, asked the court for monetary damages and injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs resulting from Type 1 Diabetes, violating Stateville Correction Center's medical policy and depriving the plaintiff of his rights under the Eighth Amendment. Later in an amended complaint, the plaintiffs requested class certification and cited chronic understaffing as a root cause of the systemic problems with medical care, and that when prisoners were seen by clinicians, the care was substandard. The case was assigned to Judge Ruben Castillo. On August 10, 2010, the court appointed private counsel to represent the plaintiff, and on November 10, the plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. On October 7, 2011, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint with counsel from Uptown People's Law Center joining the case. The plaintiffs sought class certification for a class of all people who were or will be confined in Illinois adult correctional centers that had not received adequate medical treatment due to misconduct of Wexford or its staff. The complaint included two subclasses: first for those who required but were not receiving a medically necessary diet, and second for those who were not receiving prescribed medical treatment in a timely manner. The complaint also added claims for violations of Illinois state law, including the state fraud and deceptive trade practices act and breach of contract. On January 9, 2012, the defendants filed motions to dismiss all counts against them. They claimed that the plaintiffs presented a "mishmash" of claims against unrelated defendants, that the plaintiffs class claims were overbroad, and that sovereign immunity protected the defendants from suit on the claims under state law. In December 2011, the case had been referred to Judge Morton Denlow for settlement conferences. But in light of the motion to dismiss, the parties indicated they were no longer interested in settlement until the issue of class certification had been decided. After acquiring multiple extensions for time and compelling discovery from the defendants, on October 31, 2012, plaintiffs filed a third amendment complaint. They requested certification of a new class of all present and future prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections. Moreover, they cited Wexford's private contract for flat payment to provide medical care for the entire Illinois prison population as the company's economic incentive to take short cuts on medical care. The plaintiffs removed the state law claims, leaving only the class-wide and individual claims of deliberate indifference under § 1983. By this complaint, the Roger Baldwin Foundation of the ACLU had joined as counsel for the plaintiffs. On December 20, 2012, defendants filed another motion to dismiss all counts for failure to comply with the PLRA. That same day, the parties filed an agreement to assure compliance with HIPAA. On January 10, 2013, the court denied the motion in open court without an order or opinion. Subsequently, the parties began settlement discussions. But in October 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge Sarah Ellis, which vacated all of the previously set dates to confer and hearings on discovery issues. In November 2013, the parties agreed to appoint an independent medical expert to evaluate the constitutionality of the medical care provided in the Illinois correctional system. On December 18, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the class-wide claims against Wexford without prejudice, leaving remaining claims against individual officers. In June and July 2014, the expert completed site visits. While waiting for the expert's reports, the defendants moved for summary judgment. In January 2015, the case was again reassigned to Judge Jorge Luis Alonso. In March 2015, the parties were unable to reach a settlement after multiple conferences. On May 19, 2015, the court-appointed expert's final report was filed with the court, describing that the health care program for prisoners in the State of Illinois was not meeting the minimal constitutional standard. On June 16, 2015, the court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgement. The court found that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward the plaintiff's serious medical needs—in particular when the defendants knew that the plaintiff was an insulin-dependent diabetic but still ignored his requests for insulin (in one case, while the plaintiff was lying on the floor of his cell). 2015 WL 3777551. One of the defendants requested reconsideration of the decision, which the court subsequently denied in August. On December 7, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amendment complaint, requested to bifurcate class claims from individual claims, and filed a new motion to certify class. The new alleged class was all prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) with serious medical or dental needs. On January 19, 2016, the court denied the plaintiffs' request to bifurcate the claims. On April 18, 2016, a plaintiff in another case about Wexford's medical care services filed to relate to this case (Everett v. Hardy, Docket No. 1:13-cv-04697). But because that case had been ongoing for three years, Judge Alonso denied the motion to relate the cases. The parties continued discovery as they waited on the court's decision as to class certification. On January 26, 2017, the court held a hearing on the motion to certify the class, and granted the motion on April 28, 2017. The court certified an injunctive relief class of all prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections with serious medical or dental needs. 2017 WL 1545672. In July, the individual plaintiff again requested to bifurcate his claims from the class claim, which the court this time granted. In August, the defendants and the individual plaintiff reached a private settlement. On March 24, 2017, the plaintiff dismissed the individual damages claims, which dismissed a handful of named defendants with prejudice. In December 2017, the court appointed another expert to determine whether any of the systemic deficiencies identified in the first expert’s report from 2014 existed within IDOC. Throughout 2018, the parties continued to vigorously litigate discovery issues, including motions for sanctions against the defendants. In the fall of 2018, the parties began submitting pretrial motions and documents, as well as settlement conferences. On November 14, 2018, the second expert filed a report with the court. The expert found that overall, conditions had not improved since the first expert's report. Staff vacancies continued to be high and Wexford had not hired credentialed physicians, in both the medical and dental departments. And outdated systems like paper filings contributed to substandard care, in addition to poorly sanitized clinical areas. On November 16, 2018, the plaintiffs submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the court. On December 6, 2018, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction to create a staffing plan with the expert. But on January 3, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of a class action settlement and consent decree (mooting the motion for preliminary injunction). The settlement included provisions for minimum qualifications for staff and employ new healthcare administrators. The defendants also agreed to provide sanitary clinical spaces and to revise and improve the dental program. The settlement also appointed a monitor to implement and oversee the staffing plan. The defendants also agreed to provide detailed reports to the monitor and to plaintiffs' counsel every six months for the first two years, and then every year thereafter. The court would retain jurisdiction over the agreement for a minimum of three years and a maximum of ten years after its approval. Hundreds of class members subsequently filed objections to the settlement with the court. On March 29, 2019, the court appointed a third-party monitor. On May 9, the court approval the final consent decree. On November 24, 2019, the expert drafted the first report per the decree's terms, which was filed with the court in January 2019. Reporting and compliance with the decree is ongoing.

Summary: In 2010, a prisoner from the Stateville Correction Center filed this case in the US District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The case certified a class of all prisoners in Illinois who receive medical or dental care. The plaintiffs alleged long-standing, systemic violations of Eighth Amendment rights in the failure to properly follow prescribe procedures for prisoners' medical treatment. After lengthy litigation, the parties settled on the eve of trial in 2019. The defendants are currently under a consent decree to reform medical care in the Illinois prisons. The case is ongoing.


On May 21, 2012, an inmate who suffered from severe mental illness and had a developmental disability filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff, representing himself, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC), claiming that the DOC's failure to provide him with adequate psychotropic medication was cruel and unusual punishment. On November 19, 2012, now represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, asking the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief. He alleged that the defendant subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. More specifically, that the defendants placed him in administrative segregation, also known as solitary confinement, because of his disability. After the plaintiff's amended complaint survived a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to appoint a judicial officer for settlement conference. The plaintiff’s motion was granted in an April 2, 2014 order, and a settlement conference was set to be held before Magistrate Judge Craig Shaffer for April 7, 2014. After the settlement conference, the parties were ordered to file a stipulated motion to administratively close the case and a further settlement conference was set. The parties complied with the order, and their motion to administratively close the case for six months was granted on April 9, 2014. After the Court granted the motion to administratively close the case, the parties began negotiations for settlement. In a settlement agreement dated July 24, 2015, the parties negotiated a private settlement agreement, which is not publicly available. The claims against the defendant were dismissed with prejudice by Judge Jackson on July 27, 2015. This case is closed.

Summary: The plaintiff, an inmate who suffers from severe mental illness and has a mental disability, sued the Colorado Department of Corrections <i>pro se</i>. Later, while represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement center, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, by placing him in solitary confinement, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. In April 2014, the parties began negotiations for settlement, and on July 24, 2015, they agreed to a private settlement. On July 27, 2015, District Court Judge R. Brooke Jackson dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice. This case is closed.


On October 5, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a customer service representative ("CSR"), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("AEA"), against Port Elizabeth Terminal and Warehouse. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief, claiming that the defendant treated the complainant less favorably than younger, non-black CSRs, eventually resulting in her discharge after she complained about the disparate treatment. On June 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge William J. Martini) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $28,500.

Summary: On October 5, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a customer service representative ("CSR"), filed a lawsuit in the District Court of New Jersey, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("AEA"), against Port Elizabeth Terminal and Warehouse. The EEOC claimed that the defendant treated the complainant less favorably than younger, non-black CSRs, eventually resulting in her discharge after she complained about the disparate treatment. The parties entered into a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $28,500.


On February 12, 2015, the National Association of the Deaf (NAD), on behalf of its members (including four named in the complaint) and a proposed class, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs sued Harvard University under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Disability Law Center, Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, the National Association of the Deaf Law and Advocacy Center, and private council. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction that would require Harvard to provide accurate captioning on its online content along with declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. The parties claimed that Harvard had willfully violated the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act by not providing captioned video and audio content on its platforms and therefore excluding deaf and hard of hearing individuals from benefiting from said content. The plaintiffs alleged that Harvard did not have administrative procedures or policies in place to ensure that its online content had accurate captioning, whether or not that content had been created or produced by Harvard itself. This issue extended back to 2010, when the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Education issued a joint letter to university colleges and presidents to make clear that the requirements of § 504 and ADA include technological devices when used by places of public accommodation. The following year, the Department of Education released an FAQ explaining the letter, indicating that its contents were predicated on legal precedents and that the letter would apply to all forms of emerging technology, including online content. Despite this and repeated requests from the NAD, Harvard had not accurately captioned much of its online content. After the initial filing of the complaint on February 12, 2015, Harvard filed a motion to dismiss on May 11, 2015, citing issues of jurisdiction and a failure to state a cause of action. There were a number of responses to Harvard's motion, including the filing of an Amicus Brief by a representative from the U.S. Department of Justice, who agreed with the plaintiffs on this issue. On September 10, 2015, there was a hearing on the motion to dismiss held before Magistrate Judge Katherine A. Robertson. On February 9, 2016, Judge Robertson recommended that the court deny the defendant’s motion to stay or dismiss in its entirety. 2016 WL 3561622. Judge Mark G. Mastroianni adopted Judge Robertson’s recommendation, officially denying the motion on November 3, 2016. The parties then elected to try to settle the dispute using a private mediator. The parties met with the mediator several times, but on February 22, 2018 both parties declared that they were unable to come to an agreement. Judge Robertson set a trial date for 2019. On June 29, 2019, Harvard filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The parties agreed that Magistrate Judge Robertson could conduct this proceeding, and all subsequent proceedings. She granted in part and denied in part Harvard's motion. 377 F.Supp.3d 49. After receiving this order, the parties agreed to re-enter settlement negotiations. The parties mediated the case and reached a proposed settlement that they submitted to the court for approval. The proposed settlement included a consent decree whereby Harvard would caption all of its new online content created after December 1, 2019, caption content created prior to December 1, 2019 at the request of an individual who cannot access the content, establish and implement a "cure process" by which any member of the public can inform Harvard that content has not been captioned or has been inaccurately captioned, report on its compliance with the consent decree every six months, and give the court 42 months of jurisdiction to ensure compliance and enforcement of the settlement. In addition, Harvard pledged not to oppose the plaintiffs' motion for $1,575,000 in attorneys' fees. On December 9, 2019, Magistrate Judge Robertson granted the motion, thereby certifying the settlement class and preliminarily approving the consent decree. 2019 WL 6699449. The court conducted a fairness hearing on the content of the proposed settlement on February 25, 2020. Judge Robertson approved the consent decree and entered final judgment in favor of the National Association of the Deaf. Judge Robertson also also awarded the plaintiffs $1,575,000 in attorneys' fees. The effective date of the consent decree was February 26, 2020, set for expiration in August of 2023.

Summary: In February 2015, the National Association of the Deaf filed a class action complaint against Harvard University in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Filed under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the complaint claimed that Harvard has harmed the plaintiffs and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals by not providing accurate captioning on much of its online audio and video content. The parties reached a settlement agreement whereby Harvard would caption all of its new online content and individuals could request captions for previously posted content. The court approved the settlement agreement in February 2020.