COVID-19 Summary: Detained immigrants sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security alleging that the conditions of detention during the COVID-19 pandemic placed them at substantial risk of harm in violation of their due process rights. The court provisionally certified a class for the purpose of conducting bail hearings.
 Three immigration detainees filed this petition for habeas corpus and putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Hampshire on April 15, 2020. The putative class consisted of all civil immigration detainees held by the Strafford County Department of Corrections (SCDOC). Represented by private counsel, the Federal Defender's Office, and the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire, the plaintiffs sued the Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the Superintendent of the Strafford County Department of Corrections under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. The plaintiffs argued that the policies and practices at SCDOC put the class members at substantial risk of harm, thereby violating the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. These policies and practices included a failure to adequately address the spread of COVID-19 within the detention center. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Landya McCafferty. On May 1, 2020, the court held a hearing regarding several issues including class certification and bail hearings to allow temporary release while the litigation proceeded. Three days later, the court provisionally certified a class consisting of "all individuals who are now held in civil immigration detention at SCDOC." 2020 WL 2113642. The court also ruled that the defendants were being too conservative when deciding which detainees had serious medical conditions. Judge McCafferty ordered that the detainees suffering from an illness on the CDC's high-risk list would presumptively be treated as high-risk. Judge McCafferty held that civil immigration detainees at high risk of COVID-19 were entitled to bail hearings while the case proceeded in a May 14, 2020 opinion. She reasoned that detainees with serious medical needs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim. But she did not decide whether low-risk detainees were also entitled to a bail hearing. 2020 WL 2514541. On May 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that they could not seek relief via a habeas petition, that the alleged facts did not constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment, and that the plaintiffs failed to put them on notice of the allegations. During the May 1 hearings, the court had discovered that several inmates' medical records were incomplete. It turned out that ICE detention centers did not forward detainees' medical records when they were transferred. That meant some detainees struggled to establish that they suffered from illnesses that put them in a high-risk group. To remedy this problem, the court held that if no records were available from SCDOC, detainees could still establish they suffered from a serious medical problem by submitting credible testimony about it in a May 20, 2020 order. 2020 WL 2605762. On May 21, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and an emergency request to grant bail hearings for eight detainees before transferring them from SCDOC. Judge McCafferty reasoned that the plaintiffs had neither shown that the court had the power to stop all SCDOC transfers nor that enjoining the transfers was necessary. But the court was "hopeful that respondents will reassess the situation and decide to test . . . detainees before transferring them," after one detainee tested positive for COVID-19. 2020 WL 2598180. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on July 16, 2020. Judge McCafferty had "no trouble finding that petitioners have standing" because COVID-19 was spreading rapidly through detention centers and had already infected two putative class members. She then observed that whether the plaintiffs could use a petition for habeas corpus to secure a less restrictive form of custody (here, home confinement) presented a "difficult intermediate case" but concluded they could under First Circuit precedent. She also rejected the defendants' due process and fair notice arguments. 2020 WL 3258627. On July 1, 2020, Judge McCafferty found that low-risk detainees were not entitled to bail hearings before a ruling on the merits of their claims. She noted that the Supreme Court had not yet decided whether a willful indifference or objective standard applied to conditions-of-confinement claims by civil detainees. But it didn't matter: the detainees failed to meet even the objective test because COVID-19 did not pose a greater threat to the low-risk detainees than it did to "members of the society at large," and the defendants had taken reasonable steps to protect against it. 2020 WL 3577302. That summer, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an immigrant's request for an additional opportunity to seek asylum fell outside the traditional scope of the writ of habeas corpus in Thuraissigiam v. Department of Homeland Security. In response, the defendants sought reconsideration of the court's decision to deny their motion to dismiss. But Judge McCafferty found that Thuraissigiam "has little applicability" to this case because the plaintiffs did not seek review of asylum eligibility and denied the defendants' motion on September 28, 2020. 2020 WL 5769465. Throughout August and September, the court conducted bail hearings for individual detainees. The case is ongoing as of October 19, 2020.

Summary: A group of civil immigration detainees filed this class-action lawsuit and petition for a writ of habeas corpus in April 2020 in New Hampshire because of the COVID-19 outbreak. They argued that release was the only way to maintain the safety of detainees who were at an elevated risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. They sued the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and Strafford County Department of Corrections. The court provisionally certified a class and found that high-risk detainees (but not low-risk detainees) deserved bail hearings while the litigation proceeded. The court also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The case is ongoing as of October 19, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a representative habeas action filed by immigrant detainees in the Adelanto ICE Processing Center, seeking writs of habeas corpus in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that everyone at the detention center was particularly vulnerable to contracting the virus because the tight quarters in the detention center made it impossible to implement social distancing. The district court entered a preliminary injunction on April 23, which was stayed by the Ninth Circuit and later remanded to the district court on September 23. <hr> On April 13, 2020, a group of immigrant detainees filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and the warden of the Adelanto ICE Processing Center in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Represented by private counsel, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In combination with their habeas petition, they also filed a complaint seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, they alleged that their continued detention in Adelanto was a violation of their substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, which guaranteed them protections against exposure to infectious disease. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class as well as for temporary restraining orders as to why a preliminary injunction should not be issued regarding each of the three named plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a notice of related cases, requesting this action to be related to the following cases: 5:20-cv-00605, 5:20-cv-00590, 5:20-cv-00617, 5:20-cv-00626, 5:20-cv-00627, 5:20-cv-00646, 5:20-cv-00650, 5:20-cv-00653, 5:20-cv-00668. On April 14, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, requesting an order that would implement a system for class-wide relief or mandate that ICE implement social distancing measures necessary to protect the individuals in custody. The case was assigned to District Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Pedro V. Castillo. On April 16, Judge Hatter, Jr. entered a temporary restraining order for each of the named plaintiffs, authorizing their release from custody and ordered that the defendants must show cause as to why the court should not issue a preliminary injunction by April 24. On April 23, Judge Hatter, Jr. provisionally certified the class to include all those who were currently detained at Adelanto, or had been detained thereafter March 23, 2020, and appointed the ACLU of Southern California as the class counsel. Judge Hatter, Jr. also issued a preliminary injunction on April 23, requiring the defendants to: -Not accept any new detainees at Adelanto -Reduce the detainee population to a level that allows detainees to maintain social distancing of 6 feet from each other at all times by May 4 -Require staff and detainees to maintain 6 feet of distance whenever possible -Clean and disinfect common areas and shared items on a regular basis (multiple times throughout each 24 hour period) -Provide sufficient cleaning equipment and supplies for detainees to clean their own areas once a day -Limit sleeping rooms/cells that have toilets without integrated lids to single occupancy -Require all staff to wear masks and gloves at all times -Require all detainees to wear masks, and provide gloves to those who wish to wear them -Provide soap or hand sanitizer and paper towels to detainees -Propose a plan for population reduction and cleaning procedures that comply with the injunction Judge Hatter, Jr. stated that if the defendants failed to comply with any of the injunction's requirements, the court would consider the immediate release of class members. Regarding the related cases, the order stated that any class member who had been released from this order or a previously filed case would remain released, but that no additional injunctions would be entered for class members that had filed separate cases. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit on April 24, challenging the class certification order, preliminary injunction and related findings in the case (docket no. 20-55436). The Ninth Circuit issued an administrative stay, which temporarily stayed the lower court's preliminary injunction. On May 5, the Ninth Circuit stayed the lower court's preliminary injunction to the extent that it went beyond the Center for Disease Control and Prevention's guidelines for correctional and detention facilities for managing COVID-19. On June 5, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class-wide bail, which Judge Hatter granted on June 17, granting class-wide bail and stating that the court would make individualized bail determinations for each class member. 2020 WL 3481564. On June 19, Judge Hatter issued an order, implementing a process for individualized bail determinations for each class member, which required the defendants to create a spreadsheet including information about each detainee, weekly updates, and notice to class members. 2020 WL 3487632. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit (docket No. 20-55662), which granted an administrative stay of the June 17 bail order and June 19 bail process on July 1. However, on July 8, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant's motion, stating that the district court's individualized determinations were consistent with processes of other district courts. Back in the district court, Judge Hatter, Jr. continued the individualized bail process and granted bail for various class members. On August 10, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction's CDC Guidance provision and a separate motion for non-provisional class certification. In their motion for class certification, they relied on the provisional certification order, arguing that circumstances were still the same. That same day, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and on August 24, the defendants filed a motion in opposition to the plaintiffs' motion to enforce. On August 31, the defendants filed a motion in opposition to the non-provisional class certification motion, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish commonality, typicality and adequacy. On September 16, upon learning of a COVID-19 outbreak at the detention center, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for temporary restraining order in the district court, seeking the court to compel testing of all detainees and for isolation of all detainees with positive test results. The court denied the application and, separately, stated that any previous bail orders releasing detainees who were still in the detention center were stayed - so as not to release a COVID-positive detainee into the community. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on September 18. On September 22, Judge Hatter, Jr. entered 2 orders. The first, denied reconsideration of the September 17 order, stating that since "the Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction, the Court cannot, now, order the Government to isolate detainees in single occupant cells because such order would contravene the stay," despite the fact that the court "does not disagree that the Government's procedures were inadequate." The second order granted class certification. Judge Hatter, Jr. stated that the reasons each class member was being detained was immaterial to the certification decision -- ultimately, the question before the court for each class member was whether their conditions of confinement were in violation of their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights; the statutory authority for detention, bail status or other variances between class members did not destroy their ability to be certified as a class. On September 23, the Ninth Circuit issued a Memorandum Opinion regarding the provisional class certification and preliminary injunction issues that the defendants had appealed in April. The circuit court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a preliminary injunction and that the court had subject matter jurisdiction. However, since several months had passed and situations had evolved in the detention center, the Ninth Circuit vacated many of the preliminary injunction's provisions - including the CDC provision - and remanded the matter with instructions to issue an updated preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5683233. On September 25, Judge Hatter, Jr. issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Hatter, Jr. stated that given the Ninth Circuit's September 23 opinion, the plaintiffs' motion to enforce was now moot. Furthermore, the defendant's arguments in their motion to dismiss -- namely that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction and that the class had not been fully certified -- had now been foreclosed. Judge Hatter issued a modified preliminary injunction and additional findings of fact on September 29. 2020 WL 5797918. He ordered the government to provide a detailed population reduction plan to ensure detainees could maintain six feet of social distance at all times, and further ordered the government not to accept any new or transfer detainees in Adelanto. Judge Hatter also ordered the government to cease using HDQ Neutral, a toxic disinfectant, in housing units. Finally, the government was ordered to provide census data of all Adelanto detainees and update that report weekly. The defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit. On October 13, the Ninth Circuit in a per curiam opinion affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order. 2020 WL 6040125. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court had authority to issue the injunctive relief, but found that, due to the rapidly evolving circumstances, the reductions in detainee population must be reconsidered. On remand, the Ninth Circuit advised the district court to avoid micromanaging the administration of conditions at Adelanto and stated that "any new provisions of future injunctive relief should stem from medical evidence properly before the court." In addition to the census report, the district court also ordered the government to provide a daily status report that listed the number of COVID-positive and COVID-negative detainees in each housing unit. On October 15, Judge Hatter issued another order concerning the population reduction plan in which he expressed frustration with the defendants disregard for procedural rules. 2020 WL 6107069. Judge Hatter ordered the government to reduce the population of Adelanto by at least 50 detainees each day by either releasing or deporting detainees until the population is at most 475 people. Judge Hatter appointed Chief Magistrate Judge Patrick Walsh to act as a Special Master to monitor and enforce the government's compliance with with the injunctive relief. Throughout October, Judge Hatter routinely issued bail orders directing the defendants to release specific class members. As of November 3, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: Immigration detainees in the Adelanto Detention Center filed a class action to secure release from the detention center and improvement of sanitation and virus-prevention methods in light of COVID-19. The class was provisionally certified and a preliminary injunction was entered on April 23, requiring the defendants to release enough detainees so that the remaining detainees could maintain 6 feet of social distancing at all times, and to provide cleaning supplies and sanitization of common areas.


On March 19, 2020, Family Equality, True Colors United, and Services & Advocacy for LGBT Elders (SAGE) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs sued the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) under the Administrative Procedure Act, challenging the Notice of Nonenforcement of Health and Human Services Grants Regulation. The Notice, issued by HHS in November 2019, announced that HHS would not enforce 45 C.F.R. § 75.300, which prohibited discrimination based on age, disability, sex, race, color, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender identity in grant programs funded by HHS. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, asking the court to enjoin HHS from implementing the Notice of Nonenforcement and to vacate the Notice of Nonenforcement. Plaintiffs alleged that the Notice allowed "religion to be weaponized to discriminate against [LGBTQ] youth, families, and older people." As of March 20, 2020, the case was ongoing.

Summary: In March 2019, nonprofit organizations sued the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) challenging a Notice asserting that HHS would not enforce a statute prohibiting discrimination against LGBTQ persons in HHS grant programs. The case is ongoing.


On May 5, 2006, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their children, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Allentown School District ("ASD"), Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc. ("LVH"), and various other parties including a minor student. The plaintiffs alleged they were sexually harassed at school and that the district officials failed to provide the plaintiffs, six- and seven-year-old African American students, with the same adequate levels of protective services, procedures, and policies they provided to other students. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants' actions violated their Due Process and Equal Protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988, and various state law claims such as intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and injunctive relief. On September 21, 2007, the Court (Judge Thomas M. Golden) issued an opinion granting defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985, and 1986, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the plaintiffs' claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress as to the employees of Allentown School District and Lehigh Valley Hospital and intentional infliction of emotional distress as to Allentown School District. 2007 WL 2814587. The Court (Judge Thomas M. Golden) denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the previous dismissal of their Equal Protection Clause claims on September 23, 2008. 2008 WL 4427136. On April 21, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to include an additional minor plaintiff and a sex discrimination claim pursuant to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a motion for leave to intervene solely against ASD pursuant to Title IX on June 18, 2009, which the Court granted. 2009 WL 2058726. The DOJ alleged that sexual harassment occurred at ASD on at least five separate occasions, that ASD was made aware of each incident immediately after it occurred, and that despite this notice, ASD did not take appropriate action, and in some circumstances took no action, to prevent the harassment from recurring. The DOJ alleged, in addition, that, both before and after the sexual harassment of the students, ASD failed to adopt and implement adequate and effective sexual harassment policies and procedure as required by federal law and that, had ASD adopted and implemented such policies and procedures, ASD would have prevented the continued sexual harassment of students. Id. The plaintiffs filed their final amended complaint, adding another minor plaintiff as a party, on August 3, 2011. The Court (Judge Paul S. Diamond) dismissed LVH without prejudice on January 20, 2012 and severed plaintiffs' lawsuit from plaintiff-intervenors' lawsuit on March 13, 2012. The plaintiffs' claims against ASD were dismissed without prejudice in an order acknowledging, but not specifying, the terms of the parties' settlement by the Court (Judge Diamond) on July 16, 2012. On July 30, 2012, the court approved a consent decree between the DOJ and ASD providing for substantial systemic relief, including the creation and implementation of new sexual harassment policies and age-appropriate sexual harassment training for students, parents, and staff. Effective July 30, 2015, the consent decree was extended until July 30, 2016. The consent decree was extended for an additional year on August 17, 2016. There has been no additional activity, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On May 5, 2006, plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of their children, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under state and federal law against Allentown School District, Lehigh Valley Hospital, Inc. and various other parties including a minor student for sexual harassment and lack of adequate protective services. The Department of Justice eventually intervened, and on July 31, 2012, the court approved a consent decree providing for substantial systemic relief consisting of new sexual harassment policies and training within the district. The case has terminated.


This lawsuit by four (later three) same-sex couples legally married under the laws of other states was filed on October 21 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. It challenged Tennessee laws barring recognition of their marriages, alleging that those laws violate the federal Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, and the right to travel. Lawyers included private counsel and the National Center for Lesbian Rights. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 provides that, among other things, "[i]f another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for persons to marry, which marriages are prohibited in this state, any such marriage shall be void and unenforceable in this state." The statute further provides that "it is [] the public policy of this state that the historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of (1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in this state in order to provide the unique and exclusive rights and privileges to marriage." The Tennessee Constitution, as amended in 2006 to incorporate the "Tennessee Marriage Protection Amendment" following a referendum, contains essentially the same provisions. Plaintiffs in this case did not directly challenge Tennessee's ban on new same-sex marriages, only Tennessee's refusal to recognize marriages legally celebrated by same-sex couples in other states. On November 19, 2013, plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction requiring the state to recognize their marriages, pending a final decision on the merits. It sought individual relief for the six plaintiffs only. The district court granted the requested preliminary relief on March 14, 2014. Citing a "rising tide of persuasive post-Windsor federal caselaw," District Judge Aleta A. Trauger held that "it is no leap to conclude that the plaintiffs here are likely to succeed in their challenge to Tennessee's Anti-Recognition Laws." And the plaintiffs were being irreparably harmed by the Tennessee law: "Moreover, the evidence shows that the plaintiffs are suffering dignitary and practical harms that cannot be resolved through monetary relief. The state's refusal to recognize the plaintiffs' marriages de legitimizes their relationships, degrades them in their interactions with the state, causes them to suffer public indignity, and invites public and private discrimination and stigmatization." The court accordingly granted preliminary relief pending fuller adjudication. It commented, "At some point in the future, likely with the benefit of additional precedent from circuit courts and, perhaps, the Supreme Court, the court will be asked to make a final ruling on the plaintiffs' claims. At this point, all signs indicate that, in the eyes of the United States Constitution, the plaintiffs' marriages will be placed on an equal footing with those of heterosexual couples and that proscriptions against same-sex marriage will soon become a footnote in the annals of American history." On November 6, 2014, the Sixth Circuit ruled on this and other cases from four states. DeBoer v. Snyder (PB-MI-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). Henry v. Hodges (PB-OH-0004 in this Clearinghouse). Love v. Beshear (PB-KY-0001 in this Clearinghouse). It was unwilling to find a Constitutional basis to deny states' authority to define marriage. On the Due Process and Equal Protection claims raised in this case, the court found that it was bound by Supreme Court precedent in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), which it found not overruled by Windsor nor by "doctrinal developments". It found that the bans were plausibly rational, and neither in violation of the Constitution nor due to illegal animus or discrimination. It also held that "[i]f it is constitutional for a State to define marriage as a relationship between a man and a woman, it is also constitutional for the State to stand by that definition with respect to couples married in other States or countries." (DeBoer v. Snyder Page p. 38). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the same-sex marriage bans in Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee. 772 F.3d 388, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 21191, 2014 FED App. 0275P (6th Cir.), 2014 WL 5748990. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review of all the Sixth Circuit cases on January 16, 2015. The Court rephrased the questions presented as: 1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to license marriage between two people of the same sex? 2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-state? On June 26, 2015, the Court reversed in an opinion by Justice Kennedy. 135 S. Ct. 2071. The right to marry is fundamental, the Court held, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The Fourteenth Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. On August 24, 2015, District Judge Aleta A. Trauger issued an order stating that: (1) a State may not refuse to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples when such a marriage was lawfully entered into out of state; (2) Article XI, section 18, of the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-113 were invalid; (3) Defendants and their employees are permanently enjoined from enforcing the foregoing provision; and (4) costs are taxed to the Defendants. On March 25, 2016, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses would be granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiffs’ request of $2,333,095.63 was reduced by 15%, and the plaintiff was awarded $1,983.131.29 in attorney’s fees and $52,916.04 in costs and expenses. 2016 WL 1171058. The case is now closed.

Summary: This lawsuit by four same-sex couples legally married under the laws of other states was filed on October 21 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. It challenged Tennessee laws barring recognition of their marriages, alleging that those laws violate the federal Equal Protection and Due Process clauses, and the right to travel. Lawyers include private counsel and the National Center for Lesbian Rights. On March 14, 2014, the District Judge Aleta Trauger granted preliminary injunctive relief barring enforcement of the "Anti-recognition laws" against the 6 plaintiffs. The plaintiffs had not requested any broader relief. On November 6, 2014, the court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court, upholding Tennessee's prohibition of same-sex marriage. The case was brought before the Supreme Court, and in June 26, 2015, it was found that the 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. The district court issued an order declaring Article XI, section 18, of the Tennessee Constitution and Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-113 invalid. On March 25, 2016, the district court awarded the plaintiff $1,983.131.29 in attorney’s fees and $52,916.04 in costs and expenses. The case is now closed.


In March 2013, following a series of highly-publicized use-of-force incidents involving the Cleveland Division of Police (CDP), the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) opened an investigation pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, that focused on the CDP's use of force, including deadly force. This was the second investigation conducted by the DOJ into the CDP's practices in a little over ten years, as the DOJ had previously reached a memorandum of agreement with the City in 2004. (That investigation can be found at PN-OH-0007 in this Clearinghouse.) On December 4, 2014, the DOJ issued a findings letter revealing that the CDP was engaged in a pattern or practice of using excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that structural deficiencies and practices, including insufficient accountability, inadequate training and equipment, ineffective policies, and inadequate engagement with the community, contributed to the CDP's use of excessive force. As an initial step to address these findings, the DOJ and the City of Cleveland signed a statement of principles committing to developing a court-enforceable consent decree. On May 25, 2015, after the City agreed to the finalized terms of the consent decree, the DOJ filed the complaint for this action along with a joint motion for entry of the agreed upon consent decree. The consent decree outlined a series of reforms that the City of Cleveland and CDP would undertake:

Establish a Community Police Commission and District Police Committees, made up of community members, to increase community engagement and build trust.

Develop and implement a community and problem-oriented policing model.

Develop a bias-free policing policy and develop training to promote bias-free policing.

Revise, develop, and implement force policies, training, supervision, and accountability systems to ensure that force is lawfully used.

Ensure that investigatory stops, searches, and arrests were conducted lawfully.

Ensure that allegations of officer misconduct were adequately investigated and that officers who committed misconduct were held accountable through the establishment of the Office of Professional Responsibility and the Police Review Board.

 The parties agreed that a monitor would be appointed by the court to implement the consent decree. The parties also agreed that the consent decree would be terminated once the city was in "substantial and effective compliance" with the search and seizure provisions for one year and with all other provisions for two years. On June 12, 2015, U.S. District Judge Simon Oliver, Jr. granted the motion for entry of the consent decree, finding that the settlement was "fair, reasonable, and adequate." On June 29, 2015, various groups including the Cleveland Branch of the NAACP; the Collaborative for a Safe, Fair, and Just Cleveland; and the Ohio Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild moved to file amicus briefs in this action. The parties opposed the motions, indicating that there was no need for amicus assistance at this time, and that the focus should be directed at implementation of the consent decree. In addition, the DOJ noted that community groups were accorded a substantial opportunity to be heard on issues governed by the consent decree. On October 6, U.S. District Court Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. denied the motion, reiterating that the consent decree was sufficient and noting that these groups had other, more appropriate methods to communicate their views regarding implementation of the consent decree. On October 1, 2015, the parties jointly moved to appoint the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) as the independent monitor for the implementation of the consent decree. Judge Oliver granted the order. On December 1, 2015, the parties jointly moved to modify the consent decree to adjust the deadline for the Community Police Commission's recommendations and to fix a typographical error. Judge Oliver granted this motion on December 8. On December 9, 2015, the defendants filed their first status report, which discussed the steps taken in response to the consent decree. In addition to appointing a monitor, the defendants had appointed a community police commission and created district policing committees, and an office of professional standards and police review board. The defendants had also implemented crisis intervention training, and made changes to recruitment and hiring of police officers. The status report stated that the CDP would continue to work toward adopting all of the reforms addressed in the consent decree and correct any problems though the City was presently addressing the temporary restraining order entered by the Court of Common Please that delayed the start of training the new recruit class. On February 1, 2016, the monitor filed its proposed first-year monitoring plan with the court. Judge Oliver approved the plan on February 4. On February 16, 2016, the parties again jointly moved to modify certain deadlines in the consent decree. Judge Oliver granted this motion on February 22. In June 2016, the defendants filed their second status report. This report discussed the CDP's move to community and problem-oriented policing, which was codified in a new mission statement. It also mentioned the implementation of new polices and training in areas such as use of force and crisis intervention, as well as new equipment and resources to assist the CDP to fulfill its mission and satisfy the requirements of the consent decree. This status report also addressed issued raised by the monitor in a semiannual report about the Office of Professional Standards ("OPS"). The monitor was concerned about the efficiency of the office, especially pertaining to the small number of cases that were investigated. The defendants explained in their status report that they would continue to work closely with the monitor and the DOJ to address and resolve these concerns. As of August 16, 2018, the parties have worked to implement the terms of the consent decree. Upon the monitor's recommendations, there have been revisions of CDP's use of force policies, including revised use of the canine unit. Implementation of wearable camera systems is underway, and the parties have worked to develop new crisis intervention polices and trainings. CDP is developing revised search and seizure policies and implementing a community engagement framework for community and problem-oriented policing and bias-free policing. On January 1, 2018, the court approved minor modifications to the settlement agreement, removing the prohibition on current or retired law enforcement officers serving as the Superintendent of the CDP's Internal Affairs Unit (“IAU”). The City had identified a candidate who has prior experience as a prosecutor, and the parties agreed that the agreement's language should be change to permit the CDP to hire the individual so that implementation of the reforms to the IAU required by the consent decree could begin. On August 13, 2018, the parties jointly requested that Matthew Barge be appointed independent monitor in place of PARC. Matthew Barge had been the lead monitor for the PARC team, but upon his resignation from PARC in 2018, he wished to continue as independent monitor. On August 15, 2018, the monitoring team submitted its Fifth Semiannual Report and Comprehensive Reassessment, a more wide-ranging look at progress made and work yet to be done than the previous regular semiannual reports submitted to date. The report found that overall the CDP had made significant progress in a number of critical areas, particularly use of force, which had decreased under the new use of force policies. The report also noted the progress the CDP had made in partnering with the community, as well as its approach to interacting with individuals experiencing behavioral health crises. The report also found areas requiring substantial progress. It noted that the CDP's focus until 2018 had largely been on designing new policies, procedures, systems, and structures for compliance with the consent decree, and with substantial progress--most of the relevant policies or plans contemplated by the consent decree were "well on their way to being completed." However, the report noted that "paper is only relevant when it is put into practice." It identified the areas that will require the most work as being those related to how the CDP functions, manages its personnel, implements its strategic initiatives, and tracks its performance. Areas where work remains included the CDP's disciplinary process and accountability measures, including the investigation of civilian complaints. In subsequent reports, the monitoring team found that the defendants had some distance to go before all areas of the consent decree reached substantial and effective compliance, but highlighted the progress the CDP had made in its initial years under the consent decree. The court approved a fourth year monitoring plan on March 26, 2019. The parties filed a joint motion to restructure monitoring and approve the appointment of Hassan Aden as Independent Monitor, which was granted on July 17, 2019. As of April 14, 2020, the court continues to monitor defendants' progress towards compliance with the consent decree, although some things like the biennial community survey had to be postponed due to COVID-19. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In March 2013, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened an investigation under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 focusing on the Cleveland Division of Police's use of force. The DOJ found an unlawful pattern or practice of excessive force. In May 2015, the DOJ and the City of Cleveland agreed upon a consent decree. Implementation of the consent decree is ongoing in the district court, and the department has not yet reached full implementation of the consent decree.


On November 20, 2014, two residents of Arivaca, Arizona and volunteer members of a community organization called People Helping People (PHP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona against the U.S. Border Patrol and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs alleged that DHS interfered with their “checkpoint monitoring campaign” at a Border Patrol checkpoint approximately 35 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border in southern Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged violations of their First Amendment rights. The complaint stated that Border Patrol operated an interior checkpoint on Arivaca Road in Amado, Arizona. The plaintiffs and other members of PHP commenced a campaign near the checkpoint to protest it by observing, photographing, and videotaping Border Patrol agents’ actions at the checkpoint. The plaintiffs contended that the campaign was a reflection of the “local residents’ growing concern about Border Patrol activities in their community, including harassment and civil rights violations by federal agents at the checkpoint.” The complaint stated that in response to the campaign, Border Patrol agents barred the plaintiffs from the public area near the checkpoint, required them to conduct their campaign “at an unreasonably great distance from the checkpoint,” and threatened to arrest them. By consent of the parties, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Macdonald on February 12, 2015. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on January 6, 2015, which the court denied eight months later on September 14. The court held that the government's policy was “a valid time, place, and manner restriction on speech,” and the plaintiffs therefore could not meet their burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits. The court found that the government’s primary interest was “in protecting the safety and security of Border Patrol agents, canines, and the public,” and held that it was important not to jeopardize the purpose of checkpoint stops to conduct criminal investigations “so critical to the fair administration of justice.” On November 2, 2015, DHS moved to dismiss the case, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. On September 30, the court denied the motion to dismiss after finding that the plaintiffs had stated a First Amendment claim upon which relief could be granted. However, the court then granted summary judgment in favor of DHS, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any dispute as to the government’s assertion that the checkpoint was, in fact, a non-public forum. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit on November 29, 2016. Oral argument was held the following winter on December 5, 2017. On February 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for further consideration, finding that the record before the district court did not warrant its conclusion, as a matter of law, that the enforcement zone was a non-public forum or that the government had satisfied the requirements for excluding the plaintiffs from the area. The Ninth Circuit instructed that on remand, the parties should conduct discovery to allow the district court to make such determinations. On remand in the district court, the parties filed a series of several status reports indicating that while the parties had not discussed settlement since a July 24, 2018 conference, they remained willing to consider potential settlement options. On July 15, 2020, the plaintiffs sought sanctions against DHS. The motion was based on “(1) Defendants’ destruction of key documents and (2) Defendants’ submission to the Court of a declaration, on which the Court relied on multiple occasions, which lacked foundation for critical statements.” This motion is pending before the court.

Summary: Residents of southern Arizona filed this lawsuit on November 20, 2014, suing the Border Patrol for interfering with the plaintiffs’ observation campaign at a Border Patrol checkpoint approximately 35 miles north of the Arizona-Mexico border. The complaint argued that the government violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights, and it sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The court granted summary judgment on September 30, 2016. The plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which vacated and remanded for further consideration. As of August 2020, the case is on remand in the district court.


On September 14, 2005, the Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service (MPAS) filed this complaint on behalf of youths aged 22 and younger with mental illnesses incarcerated in the Michigan Youth Correctional Facility (MYCF). The MYCF, a maximum security prison for adolescent males convicted as adults, was privately operated by GEO Group, Inc. In October of 2005, approximately two weeks after the complaint was filed, the MYCF facility was closed and all the incarcerated youths were moved to other Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC) facilities. MPAS, however, claimed all the illegal conditions of confinement described below continued to exist. The complaint listed three areas of concern. First, because the MYC facility had the highest security level, there were fewer educational and rehabilitation programs available. After MYCF closed, MPAS claimed that the youths with mental illnesses still had limited access to appropriate educational programs, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 20 U.S.C. § 1401. Second, MPAS also claimed that the MDOC screening and treatment procedures for youths with mental illnesses were inadequate. MPAS argued that youths with diagnosed mental illnesses were instead classified as malingering and manipulative and were more likely to be placed in disciplinary and administrative segregation and to spend longer amounts of time there than the other youths in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 41 U.S.C. § 12132 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (504), 29 U.S.C. § 794. Finally, MPAS claimed that the social and sensory deprivation conditions of isolation exacerbated existing mental illnesses, and sometimes caused the development of mental illnesses in youths who were previously healthy. They claimed that this violated the youths' Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Lastly MPAS contends that MDOC violated the youths' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by imposing punishments without determining if they should be held accountable for their actions. MPAS sought declaratory judgment and permanent injunction to resolve the above issues. Starting in September of 2006, the the parties began developing an action plan based on a series of settlement talks mediated by Chief Judge Paul L. Maloney and in July of 2008 submitted a implementation plan to the Court which was not made public. As understood from the stipulation for stay document, one aspect of the plan was the implementation of monitors in 2007 to oversee the defendant’s resolution of the issues raised in the plaintiff’s complaint. These included better screening procedures to identify prisoners with mental illnesses, not placing prisoners in administrative segregation or placing them there for shorter periods, and training the staff on mental illnesses. In October, 2008, the Court granted the defendant's partial motion for summary judgment related to a question of providing special education. Federal law required MDOC to provide special education services to prisoners until they reached the age of 22. The Court granted the partial motion for summary judgment to clarify that the Michigan Mandatory Special Education Act, which would have extended access to special education until the age of 27, did not apply to prisoners because MDOC was not a "public agency" as understood by the Act. The matter was stayed until August 2009, then again until December 2010, and finally until June 2011 to allow time to implement the changes. In June, 2011, both parties agreed that the complaint should be dismissed as the issues had been resolved.

Summary: In 2005, the Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service (MPAS) filed this complaint on behalf of youths with mental illnesses incarcerated as adults in various Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) facilities. MPAS claimed that the conditions to which these youths were subjected violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the protection against cruel and unusual punishment and against their due process rights. Youths with mental illnesses in MDOC institutions were placed in administrative segregation more often and for longer periods because they were perceived to be acting out rather than having actual mental illnesses. Due to MDOC conditions, these youths also had limited access to appropriate education. MPAS sought permanent injunctions to alleviate these conditions. MDOC and MPAS engaged in a series of settlement talks to implement changes to the prisons. Two monitors were appointed to oversee MDOC changes, such as screening procedures for mental illnesses, not placing youths with mental illnesses in administrative segregation or placing them there for shorter periods, and training the staff on mental illnesses. The matter was then stayed for several years during this monitoring and implementing stage. In 2011 the changes upon which the parties agreed were satisfactorily implemented and the case was dismissed.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action lawsuit was filed on February 20, 2021 by detainees in the Chesapeake Detention Facility in Baltimore, Maryland, who sought extra protections from COVID-19 and, in some cases, release. After the parties negotiated a settlement regarding safety measures to be taken, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order on March 15, 2021.<hr>This is a lawsuit challenging the Chesapeake Detention Facility's response to COVID-19 and requesting the release of detainees and prisoners. On February 20, 2021 16, 2020, eight named plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit and habeas petition in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the warden of the facility and the secretary of the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, which operates the facility, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They also petitioned the court for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Represented by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, as well as Bryan Cave, the plaintiffs sought to certify two classes, one of pretrial detainees and one of convicted prisoners, as well as a subclass of medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. They also requested injunctive relief to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the facility, the release of members of the medically vulnerable pretrial subclass, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the defendants' response to COVID-19. The Chesapeake Detention Facility, located in Baltimore, is operated by the State of Maryland, but primarily houses people detained in connection with federal criminal cases on behalf of the United States Marshals Service. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants placed them at risk of contracting COVID-19 by moving individuals within units in the facility, inadequate cleaning and masking, and refusing to administer COVID-19 vaccines. According to the complaint, the plaintiffs' rights under the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments were violated by their exposure to COVID-19, the plaintiffs' placement in solitary confinement due to an indefinite lockdown, and the plaintiffs' inability to challenge their placement in solitary confinement. Additionally, the plaintiffs requested that the court issue writs of habeas corpus to release medically vulnerable pretrial detainees. The case was assigned to United States District Judge T.S. Ellis. Two days after filing their complaint, on February 20, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and the certification of a class. However, on March 15, 2021 Judge Ellis denied the motion for a temporary restraining order as moot, citing the parties' "significant points of agreement." Judge Ellis ordered the parties to submit joint statements outlining their agreements and disagreements. On March 19, 2021, the parties submitted joint statements of agreement and disagreement. The defendants agreed to numerous safety measures, including testing all facility residents on a weekly basis and on arrival, prioritizing single occupancy cells for medically vulnerable residents, ensuring that residents were able to leave their cells for at least 2 hours a day when possible, cohorting residents to prevent the spread of COVID-19, offering vaccinations to eligible residents, and cleaning the facility. The defendants also agreed to produce documents demonstrating their compliance with the agreement to the plaintiffs and allow them to depose facility staff. The agreement allowed the court to resolve disputes between the the parties. However, the parties did have a number of disagreements about the practical mechanics of many provisions of the agreement, including cohorting, testing, solitary confinement, and transfer to other facilities. As of March 24, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2021, individuals held at the Chesapeake Detention Facility filed this class action lawsuit and habeas petition which alleged numerous issues with the facility's response to COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that their rights under their Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments were violated by the risk they faced of contracting COVID-19 and by the defendants' policies of placing individuals in effective solitary confinement. They asked the court for a temporary restraining order governing conditions in the facility; however, prior to the resolution of that motion, they reached an agreement with the defendants regarding certain precautions to take. However, the case is still proceeding to determine whether the court should issue a preliminary or permanent injunction against the defendants.


On September 1, 1993, two indigent mothers brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on behalf of their children, and on behalf of all persons under the age of 21 in the state of Texas who were eligible for the Early, Periodic, Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment Program ("EPSDT" or "the Program"). The Program is a Medicaid program which provides regular physical and mental health screenings to indigent children. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Legal and Social Justice, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, and private counsel, sued the Texas Department of Health and the Texas Human Services Commission under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged that because of the state's failure to effectively advertise and efficiently administer EPSDT, their children's health suffered. The plaintiffs asked that the court certify their class, declare that Texas violated the federal Medicaid Act, and enjoin Texas from violating EPSDT standards, as well as order that Texas provide the plaintiffs with attorney's fees. According to the plaintiffs' complaint, EPSDT is one of Congress' most important initiatives to improve the health of indigent children. It is also a mandatory program. Because the Program is a mandatory Medicaid service, states must administer it in order to get Medicaid funding. As part of its Medicaid's minimum requirements, states must advertise and administer physical and mental health screens to a certain percentage of the indigent children in the state. The plaintiffs asserted that Texas did not appropriately administer the Program, failed to meet the minimum participation requirements prescribed by the statute, failed to inform eligible citizens about the availability of the Program as prescribed by statute, failed to appropriately provide mental health services and treatment, failed to provide case management services, and, finally, failed to ensure that EPSDT services were available across the state. Because of the statewide nature of the problem, the plaintiffs asked that the court certify a class of "present and future Texas Medicaid recipients who are eligible for EPSDT services because they have not reached the age of 21." Following the plaintiffs' complaint, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, motion for summary judgment on November 3, 1993. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs were not deprived of any right guaranteed by the constitution because citizen participation in EPSDT is voluntary. Second, the defendants argued that plaintiffs did not have a private right of action to enforce participation goals on the part of the defendants. Third, defendants argued that because an injunction would, in essence, force them to make state policy, an injunction was improper. Finally, the defendants asked that the two state agencies, the Texas Department of Health and the Texas Human Services Commission be dismissed because of Eleventh Amendment immunity. On June 7, 1994, the court granted the plaintiff's class. Approximately two months later, on August 10, 1994, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss, though most of it was denied. The court agreed that the state agencies had immunity from the lawsuit, but disagreed on everything else, stating that the plaintiffs had standing despite the voluntary nature of EPSDT, and that they had a private right of action because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 not only gives a plaintiff the ability to sue for a constitutional right, but also gives them an ability to enforce a right defined in a federal statute. The court agreed that the state agencies were immune from lawsuit, but asserted that it was completely appropriate to sue the heads of the agencies in their official capacity. Following the denial of the motion to dismiss, the parties were involved in extended negotiations until finally, on February 20, 1996, they arrived at and filed a consent decree. The decree stipulated that the state of Texas was to reorganize the department of health in order to more efficiently administer EPSDT and that departments were to do a better job at reaching out to eligible participants by making numerous written and oral communications, as well as making a conscious media effort to educate citizens about the availability of the Program. The settlement also stipulated that the defendants needed to keep close records of persons who missed appointments and checkups in order to keep indigent children in the Program. If participation in the Program was too low, or if statewide indicia of health were not met, the defendants were to make plans to fix those problems, which would ultimately be approved or rejected by plaintiffs. The records were to be presented quarterly. Another effort of the Program was to improve access by simplifying paperwork, providing accurate referral lists of Medicaid providers, and making the transportation assistance Program more user-friendly. Defendants were also required to create a plan that made case management available state-wide. For over two years, the case was relatively quiet-the docket was only active when defendants presented their quarterly reports on the success of the Program-but on November 10, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce the Consent Decree, restarting the entire litigation. This motion alleged that the defendants had not done a good enough job at meeting their outreach goals: though more children were enrolled in the Program, the plaintiffs still believed that participation was well below expected levels and many children were still not receiving the required medical and dental checkups. In fact, participation in a key demographic-young people aged 15-20-actually dropped following the consent decree. Defendants also failed to provide managed care to eligible participants. Though it was within the consent decree to contract the managed care to other companies, the plaintiffs argued that defendants still retained the ultimate responsibility in making sure that class members received the managed care to which they were entitled. Finally, defendants were tasked with creating "Corrective Action Plans" to help lagging counties keep up with improvements made in the rest of the states. Though there were plenty of lagging counties, the defendants only managed to create one corrective action plan in two and one half years. The defendants also failed in some of their record-keeping responsibilities. In light of the defendants' alleged failures, the plaintiffs asked the court to permit the plaintiffs to conduct discovery, and, after hearings and notice, find that the defendants had violated the decree and the relevant law. The plaintiffs also asked that the court enter remedial orders to resolve the problems associated with the violations, and also allow the defendants time to said problems. On August 14, 2000, the court published a memorandum opinion, finding that the court could force the state of Texas to comply with the consent decree. The lengthy opinion found that the defendants had violated numerous portions of the consent decree; the court found that (1) the outreach system was not effective, (2) portions of the reporting system regarding checkups were either nonexistent or ineffective, (3) the managed care system was unsatisfactory and was managed poorly, (4) the toll-free help line was not well-staffed, (5) case managers were underutilized, and (6) health care providers remained uneducated about the Program. 109 F. Supp. 2d. 579. On September 11, 2000, the defendants filed a notice of appeal in the district court. On September 25, 2000, the defendants filed a motion to stay all injunctive relief pending the outcome of their appeal. On October 10, 2000, the court denied the stay, citing the fact that many Texas children relied on the injunction to receive health care, and that the defendants "narrow, crabbed interpretation of the consent decree . . . would only serve to restrict and dilute the rights of the children covered by it." 2000 WL 33795091. However, on October 18, 2000, the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants' motion to stay, citing "public interest." On July 24, 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its judgement. The Fifth Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment. First, it stated that "violation of a federal statute, by itself, does not entitle a plaintiff to relief under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983." Instead, the plaintiffs needed to assert a "right," not simply the violation of a "law." The Fifth Circuit also cited Eleventh Amendment Immunity as a further limit on the ability of a federal circuit court to enforce anything that was not a federal "right." With the limitations of federal courts in mind, the Fifth Circuit said, "plaintiffs have not established any violations of the EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid statute which are actionable under § 1983 and the Ex Parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment. 300 F.3d 530. On October 2, 2002, the plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for appeal. On February 3, 2003, the district court ordered the plaintiffs to explain why the case should not be dismissed within 30 days. On March 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed their response. The plaintiffs asserted that their motion to appear before the Supreme Court was pending, and that, because the Fifth Circuit had not ordered the case dismissed, the District Court had leeway to hold on to the case. The district court agreed to hold onto the case. On March 23, 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions: first, whether states forfeit Eleventh Amendment protection when they enter into consent decrees, and, second, whether states must violate federal law and not simply a consent decree in order to be subject to federal court judgment. On January 14, 2004, the Supreme Court entered its judgment. In a unanimous decision, it decided that states do forfeit Eleventh Amendment protection when they enter into consent decrees, and that when states violate those consent decrees, they are subject to the federal court's judgment. The Fifth Circuit's decision was thereby reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. On July 2, 2004, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to settle what essentially had become a dispute about contract interpretation. 540 US 431. On October 29, 2004, the defendants filed a motion to set aside the judgment of the district court regarding the 1996 consent decree. They stated that the prospective nature of the consent decree was no longer appropriate considering that Texas already spent more money on the EPSDT Program than any other state. The defendants asserted that the ends of the Program had already been met. Following the entry of the motion to set aside judgment, the parties engaged in a flurry of briefs and reply briefs, and they entered into discovery at the beginning of 2005. On May 24, 2005, the defendants withdrew their motion to set aside judgment, just before a scheduled June 6 hearing on the subject. The defendants stated that the consent decree in 1996 was not "a final judgment," and therefore, the defendants did not need to comply with its orders. On May 29, 2005, after discovering that the Rule 60(b) motion was, in fact, appropriate following the Supreme Court's "instant action," the defendants filed a motion to reinstate their motion to set aside the judgment. The motion was granted on June 3, 2005. An evidentiary hearing was held between June 9 and June 15, 2005, and on August 22, 2005, the defendants' motion to set aside judgment was denied. The court painstakingly went through all of the provisions of the consent decree, deciding which ones could still be enforced by the court. The court concluded that the defendants "failed to prove significant changed factual circumstances warranting revision of the Consent Decree with respect to the [the Program]." 401 F. Supp. 2d 619. On August 24, 2005, the defendants appealed the district court's judgment. On April 17, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to stay the proceedings in the district court pending their appeal to the Fifth Circuit. On May 4, 2006, the district court granted the defendants' stay. On July 20, 2006, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, finding that the state's compliance with federal law did not confer automatic grounds for dissolving the consent decree and also holding that the district court's finding that there was not a material change in factual circumstances necessitating the dissolution of the consent decree was not an abuse of discretion. 457 F.3d 432. On September 7, 2006, the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for rehearing. The defendants filed a petition to appear before the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied the petition on January 17, 2007. On January 25, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion to enforce to consent decree. On August 10, 2007 after discovery and negotiations, the parties filed a Joint Memorandum outlining eleven Corrective Action plans that each party found reasonable. The eleven plans outlined the party's future actions on (1) Case Management, (2) Checkup Reports and Lagging Counties, (3) Checkups, (4) Health Outcomes and Dental Assessment, (5) Managed Care, (6) Outreach and Informing, (7) Prescription and Non-prescription Medicine and Supplies, (8) Provider Supply, (9) Provider Training, (10) Toll Free Numbers, and (11) the Transportation Program. On September 5, 2007, the court decided that the settlement between the parties was fair and adequate. 2007 WL 2667985. The case lay mostly dormant until May 27, 2010, when the defendants filed a "Motion to Modify the Health Outcomes Measures and Dental Assessment Corrective Action Order to Eliminate the Requirements that Defendants Implement a Corrective Action Plan and Conduct a Second Dental Assessment." Discovery began anew in August of 2010. On December 31, 2010, the parties agreed to allow the defendants to amend the part of the consent decree which involved check-up letters and when they were to be sent. The amendments to the consent decree were minor and, according to the court, "promoted the goals of the consent decree." The court granted the check-up letter amendments on January 13, 2011. 2011 WL 13157061. On March 30, 2011, the court denied the defendants' Motion to Modify the Health Outcomes Measures and Dental Assessment Corrective Action Order. The court noted that, though the defendants had made strides in achieving the objectives of the consent decree, under no circumstances had the objectives been met. Therefore, the motion to modify was denied. 775 F. Supp. 2d 930. On August 6, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Further Action regarding the "lagging counties" provisions of the corrective action order. On August 23, 2012, the defendants filed another Motion to Modify. This time, the defendants hoped to eliminate the portions of the consent decree that dealt with "lagging counties," or counties that were behind on their healthcare goals due to the sparseness of healthcare providers in the area. The defendants asserted that other decisions in Texas had alleviated of them to ensure equal Program participation in all parts of the state. (See Equal Access for El Paso v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585 W.D. Tex. 2006. On November 29, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a Motion to enforce the corrective action order on prescription and non-prescription medications. The motion was sealed. March 23, the plaintiffs filed a separate Motion to Enforce the Provider Supply Corrective Action Order. The motion was sealed. On March 28, 2013, after an extensive back and forth and evidentiary hearings, the court granted the defendants' Motion to Modify and denied the plaintiffs' Motion for Further Action. Though participation in the "lagging counties" was still low, the court noted that a specific percentage point for participation was never stipulated in the consent decree, and the court stated that it would not read into the consent decree more than was written. In regards to the defendants' Motion to Modify, the court stated that there were enough changed factual circumstances to allow the defendants to modify the consent decree. The court did not resolve the issue of the Provider Supply or Medication Corrective Action Orders, and hearings and discovery on this issue continued. 2013 WL 12177863. On December 18, 2013, the court denied the plaintiffs motion regarding the prescription and non-prescription medication corrective action order. The court dissolved the portions of the prescription and non-prescription medication corrective action order that both the plaintiffs and defendants deemed met, as well as two paragraphs that were in contention. The court and ordered that the defendants continue to adhere to the consent decree and remaining corrective action orders. 5 F. Supp. 3d. 845. On January 15, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an opposed motion for attorney's fees. The defendants had been paying attorneys' fees for a long period, but this time disputed the need to for attorneys' fees for the year 2012 because of their success in vacating some of the corrective action orders. On September 30, 2014, the court granted the motion for attorneys' fees. On October 28, 2014, the defendants appealed the issue of the attorneys' fees to the Fifth Circuit. On March 31, 2014, while the dispute over attorneys' fees continued, the defendants filed a Motion to Vacate the corrective action order on Health Care Provider training, even as litigation on the Provider Supply corrective action order continued. On August 25, 2014, the defendants filed another Motion to Vacate, this time hoping to vacate the portions on Dental Assessment in both the Health Outcomes corrective action order and the Dental Assessment corrective action order. On January 20, 2015, the court ruled on the Provider Supply corrective action order, denying the plaintiffs order and granting in part the defendants motion to dissolve the corrective action order. The court dissolved ten paragraphs of the corrective action order, and stated that the other paragraphs in contention were mostly background information, and therefore did not need to be modified. The court stipulated that the defendants were still required to comply with the remaining provisions of the consent decree and corrective action orders. 2015 WL 13357954. On February 17, 2015, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's ruling on the Provider Supply corrective action order. Meanwhile, on April 28, 2015, the defendants filed another Motion to Vacate, this time for the Outreach and Informing corrective action order. On March 5, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding on the Provider Supply corrective action order, thereby dissolving the paragraphs at issue. 780 F.3d 320. On January 22, 2016, the plaintiffs filed another Motion to Enforce Judgment. This time, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants failed to provide timely medical and dental check-ups, that when participants in the Program did receive check-ups, the check-ups were "incomplete," and that the defendants had failed to comply with the Managed Care corrective action order. On March 4, 2016, the defendants filed a Motion to Vacate the Managed Care corrective action order and the Check-Up corrective action order, as well as related portions of the consent decree. The parties continued litigating the portions of the consent decree that the court still had jurisdiction over. On January 10, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to modify the Case Management corrective order. On April 27, 2017, the Fifth Circuit decided the issue of the attorneys' fees, which had initially been broached in January of 2014. The Fifth Circuit vacated the judgment of the district court, stating that the plaintiffs were still entitled to attorneys' fees, but the district court had to modify the amount of attorneys' fees after determining the plaintiffs' actual "success." 2017 WL 1520865. On May 23, 2017 the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay the deadlines in the Health Outcomes corrective action order. That motion was granted on May 31, 2017. Litigation continued, when the defendants filed another motion to stay the deadlines in the Health Outcomes corrective action order on July 13, 2017. On December 3, 2018, the case was assigned to Senior District Judge Robert W. Schroeder, III. This docket is still active, and litigation continues on the necessity of the remaining corrective action orders, the consent decree, and attorneys' fees.

Summary: In 1993, two mothers began this lengthy class action suit against the state of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the state was not administering Medicaid's Early, Periodic, Screening Diagnosis and Treatment Program Adequately. Though the parties reached more than one consent decree, litigation continues well into 2019bover the necessity of corrective action orders drafted in 2007.


COVID-19 Summary: Prisoners at Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution filed this putative class action lawsuit seeking immediate release of high risk inmates and a plan outlining mitigation efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the prison. On April 26, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. <hr> On April 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit in United States District Court Western District of Louisiana seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and/or a writ of habeas corpus. The plaintiffs sued the warden of Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution and the Federal Bureau of Prisons Director under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (habeas corpus), 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (All Writs Act), and the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all current and future people held in post-conviction custody at Federal Correctional Complex-Oakdale (FCC Oakdale), including a subclass of persons who were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19. They alleged that continued incarceration violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiffs sought immediate release of all vulnerable subclass members, creation of a plan outlining mitigation efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 for class members not immediately released, housing for any released class members who lacked a place to self isolate, and declaratory relief. On April 10, 2020, the defendants provided information regarding the inmate review process at FCC Oakdale. They outlined ways in which they were addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, including the deployment of inmate orderlies on a 24-hour basis to disinfect all facilities after use. The defendants also asserted that they were continuing to consider the use of compassionate release for appropriate inmates. The Bureau of Prisons Central Office recommended review for home confinement place for inmates who meet the following criteria: <blockquote> 1) Primary Offense is not violent; 2) Primary Offense is not sex offense; 3) Primary Offense is not terrorism; 4) No detainer; 5) Mental Health Care Level is less than IV; 6) PATTERN (BOP’s new risk and needs assessment tool) score is MIN; 7) BRAVO (BOP’s existing risk evaluation tool) score is LOW or MIN; 8) Completed at least 50% of their sentence; and 9) No Incident Reports in the past 12 months. </blockquote> The defendants also asserted that they anticipated expanding the criteria for review. On April 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a Temporary Restraining Order including requirements: that the defendant identify all medically vulnerable subclass members and that defendant present evident as to why they are challenging the release of the person; that the court immediately release all members that defendants did not make a required showing as to why they should not be released; that defendant provide all persons with educational resources on COVID-19; that defendants report weekly on the population of persons in Oakdale who are medically vulnerable; and a declaration that Oakdale's policies do not violate the Eighth Amendment. On April 13, 2020, Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay issued an order denying as moot the motion for the Temporary Restraining Order and granting the plaintiffs' motion for emergency consideration of their motion for preliminary injunction. On April 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The defendants argued that the court was barred from reviewing defendants' decisions regarding classification and placement of inmates, and that plaintiffs had failed to assert sufficient facts to show that their confinement was unlawful or that the defendants had acted with deliberate indifference. On April 16, 2020, the defendants provided a second update regarding the prisoner review process at FCC Oakdale. They asserted that they continued to review individuals for release, preparing to release six prisoners. As of April 16, 2020, there were 32 active confirmed cases of COVID-19, fourteen prisoners who had recovered, and one death. On April 17, 2020, defendants moved to stay consideration of class certification pending adjudication of their motion to dismiss, "to preserve resources and advance the interest of judicial economy." On April 22, 2020, Judge Doughty granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that it was outside of the court's purview to direct BOP how to classify its inmates and thus the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. As of April 26, the case is closed.

Summary: Inmates at Oakdale Federal Correctional Institution filed this putative class action lawsuit seeking immediate release of high risk inmates and a plan outlining mitigation efforts to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the prison.


On April 17, 2007, a U.S. citizen and a citizen of Mexico, represented by the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to challenge the denial of their application for a marriage license. Luzerne County required persons seeking to obtain a marriage license to prove their lawful presence in the United States before their application for a marriage license would be accepted. Plaintiffs' § 1983 complaint alleged that this policy was unconstitutional in that it violated the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause. Plaintiffs moved for a TRO and/or a preliminary injunction the day after suit was filed. Following a hearing on the plaintiffs' motions, the District Court (Judge A. Richard Caputo) granted the plaintiffs' request for a TRO and enjoined the County from requiring the non-U.S. citizen plaintiff to produce a visa or other proof of his lawful presence in the United States as a condition of obtaining a marriage license. Judge Caputo reasoned that both the U.S. citizen plaintiff and the Mexican citizen possessed the same fundamental right to marry, that defendants' policy did not appear to be closely tailored enough to effectuate a sufficiently important state interest, and therefore, the plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable probability that the County policy violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After several months of negotiations, the court signed a consent order on February 11, 2008. The parties agreed that the defendant would no longer require any applicant to produce a visa or other proof of lawful presence in the United States and would post that policy publicly. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs, which the court granted on August 27, 2008.

Summary: In 2007, a U.S. citizen and a citizen of Mexico, represented by the ACLU Foundation, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and private attorneys, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania to challenge the denial of their application for a marriage license. Luzerne County law required persons seeking to obtain a marriage license to prove their lawful presence in the United States before their application for a marriage license would be accepted. The court entered a consent decree in February 2008 that prevented the defendant from continuing that policy.


On February 23, 1976, six residents of Forest Haven, an institution operated by the District of Columbia for developmentally disabled persons, filed this lawsuit against the District's mayor and its Department of Human Resources. The lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq.); and 32 D.C. Code § 601 et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief on behalf of past and present residents of Forest Haven who would benefit from individual treatment and educational programs appropriate to their needs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Forest Haven had not provided a level of habilitation consistent with the Constitution by failing to supply a setting that was the least restrictive of the residents' personal liberty. Shortly after the filing of the complaint, the United States was granted its motion to intervene as plaintiffs. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1978). Also, on June 3, 1976, the court (Judge John H. Pratt) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Evans v. Williams, 139 F. Supp. 2d 79, 84 (D.D.C. 2001). On June 14, 1978, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484 (D.D.C. 1978). The court held that the District had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which provided the plaintiff class with a constitutional right to habilitative care and treatment. Id. It then entered a decree governing virtually every aspect of the District's operation of Forest Haven. Id.; see also In re U.S., 925 F.2d 490, 1991 WL 17225, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1991). At its core, the decree required the deinstitutionalization of the residents and their placement in "community living arrangement[s] . . . together with such community-based day programs and services as are necessary to provide the resident[s] with minimally adequate habilitation." Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.D.C. 1978). In other words, for all intents and purposes, the judgment called for the closing of Forest Haven. Id.; see also Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1293 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The judgment also required that the defendants, inter alia, draft an individualized habilitation plan for each resident as well as create and maintain procedures to monitor the defendant's compliance with the injunction. Evans v. Washington, 459 F. Supp. 483, 484, 486 (D. D.C., 1978). In 1981 and 1983, the district court entered additional consent orders reaffirming its 1978 order and further mandating the placement of all Forest Haven residents in community living arrangements by the end of fiscal year 1988. In re United States, 925 F.2d 490, 1991 WL 17225, *1 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Forest Haven facility was permanently closed in the late 1980s, but the case has remained open and continually active, as disputes regarding the execution of the consent orders and the alleged ongoing failure of the District of Columbia to provide adequate care in an integrated, least restrictive setting. On October 11, 1996, the Court appointed a Special Master, Margaret G. Farrell, to monitor and report on the District's compliance and to make recommendations to the court. On March 14, 1999, The Washington Post ran an article characterizing the District's efforts to provide safe community-integrated group homes in a least-restrictive setting as having "fail[ed] completely." The article describes one of the group homes into which Forest Haven residents had been transferred as "roach-dappled," with broken furniture and doors hanging off their hinges, and where at least one resident known to be a sexual predator was roomed next door to one of his victims. (Washington Post, March 14, 1999). On January 30, 2001, Clarence J. Sundram was appointed co-Special Master. On March 30, 2001, the court (Judge Stanley S. Harris), pursuant to the recommendation of the Special Master in her "2001 Plan for Complainance and Conclusion of Evans v. Williams," entered a fourth consent order, in which the defendants agreed to create a nonprofit agency to, inter alia, provide independent monitoring of the services available to individuals with intellectual disabilities and developmental disabilities. The defendants agreed to fund this agency by paying $31.5 million over eleven years, and again made extensive commitments to improve its practices and the services and living conditions available to mentally disabled citizens of the District of Columbia. Evans v. Williams, 139 F.Supp.2d 79, 83 (D. D.C. 2001). On March 30, 2007, the Court found that there had been "systemic, continuous, and serious noncompliance with many of the Court's Orders," and held the District of Columbia to be in noncompliance. Evans v. Fenty, 480, F.Supp.2d 280, 325 (D.D.C.2007). The court again had the Special Master produce a report, 2009 Special Masters' Report, in which the Special Master also found the District in non-compliance, and recommended the appointment of an "Independent Compliance Administrator," who would bring the District into compliance. On April 7, 2010, the Court Issued an Memorandum Opinion, detailing extensively the prior history of the litigation and the various consent orders up until that point, and denying a motion by the District of Columbia to have the existing consent orders vacated and to have the case closed. Evans v. Fenty, 701 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.D.C. 2010). This was appealed, and the appeal was dismissed. 2010 WL 3447241 (D.C. Cir. 2010). On June 1, 2010, the Court adopted the 2009 Special Masters' Report's findings of fact and conclusions of law Evans v. Fenty, 714 F.Supp.2d 116 (D.D.C 2010). As a result of this decision, the Court approved on August 10, 2010, the Special Master's "2010 Revision to the 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion of Evans v. Fenty." On October 26, 2012, the court issued an order approving and adopting the Special Master's conclusion that the District of Columbia had achieved compliance in several areas, including the safe guarding of class member's person possessions, and some aspects of staff training. Evans v. Gray, 2012 WL 5305790, (D.D.C. 2012). From 2013-2015, the court approved in full the reports and recommendations of the Special Master regarding various aspects of the consent decrees. These areas included protection from harm, vocational, residential, and day programs, as well as many other areas. See the documents for this case for a complete list. On March 31, 2015, the court (Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle) approved and adopted in part the Special Master's report and recommendation regarding individualized habilitation plans. The court held that: 1) altering the 90% threshold for “high” compliance was unwarranted; 2) the defendants had complied with the occupational therapy services component of outcome criterion focused on implementation; but 3) the defendants failed to demonstrate compliance with the medical services component of outcome criterion focused on implementation; and 4) the defendants failed to demonstrate compliance with the criteria requiring assessment of residents' needs for services and mandating provision of certain adaptive equipment. 87 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2015) On May 10, 2017, the court terminated the case after compliance was achieved. Note: Among the several awards of attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs was a consent order and judgment, filed on May 16, 2011, wherein the court approved an award of $4,000,000, covering fees and costs from April 1, 2006, to June 30, 2010. Because of the age of the case and because the court docket is incomplete, the Clearinghouse has not attempted to calculate the total amount of attorneys' fees awarded.

Summary: This case was brought by developmentally disabled residents of Forest Haven, an institution run by the District of Columbia, against the District. Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief, alleging that D.C. had failed to supply them with the minimal level of habilitation, as required by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The case was decided for the plaintiff class on June 14, 1978, requiring that the defendants, inter alia, close Forest Haven and place the residents in community living arrangements. The court entered a series of consent orders concerning the transfer of the plaintiff class into such arrangements and the administration of services to the mentally disabled residents of D.C.. D.C. has repeatedly been found to be non-compliant with the terms of these orders, and Special Masters have been appointed to ensure compliance.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Oregon, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27, 2017 and March 6, 2017 Executive Orders (EO) that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order . . . as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's Portland Field Office, including Portland International Airport, Denver International Airport, Ted Stevens International Airport, Boise International Airport, and Casper/Natrona County International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding of how the defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." The case was assigned to Judge Marco A. Hernandez. On May 8, 2017, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion see this case. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that "[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice." On Aug. 3, 2017, the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government's consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that although the thirteen FOIA cases share "a limited number of factual issues," and these issues "appear relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings." The court approved multiple schedule extensions for discovery. The parties continued with discovery and court telephone conferences through January 11, 2019, at which point an order for a joint status report was stayed due to a “lapse in appropriations to the Department of Justice” until February 25. On February 25, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss with prejudice the case without award from the court. The dismissal was approved on February 26, 2019 and this case is closed. For the documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases see this case.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLUs Oregon, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, and Wyoming filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The parties filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and the court approved the dismissal on February 26, 2019. This case is closed.