On December 21, 2012, after a thorough investigation, the United States, represented by the Department of Justice (DOJ), filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its police department pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. § 14141). The Government alleged that the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRDP) violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in unlawful patterns and practices. Filed along with the complaint was a joint motion for the Court to approve a comprehensive settlement agreement between the parties and also a motion to stay the proceedings. Specifically, the Government claimed the PRDP engaged in the following practices: using excessive force during routine police activities; relying on unreasonable force in response to public demonstrations; conducting unlawful searches and seizures; and engaging in discriminatory police practices against those who are or appear to be of Dominican origin. The Government further alleged that those practices were the result of longstanding, widespread failures of the department, including inadequate and ineffective investigation and discipline procedures, supervision, and training, as well as officer violence and corruption. On December 27, 2012, the Court (Judge Gustavo A. Gelpi) granted the motion to stay the proceedings in order to allow the recently elected government to familiarize itself with the agreement and make modifications. And, on January 18, 2013, the Government filed an amended complaint that removed reference to Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory of the United States. This was because, under an old line of Supreme Court cases that established what is known as the Incorporation Doctrine, acquired territories were not necessarily protected by the Constitution and were considered not to be a part of the United States: Congress had the power to decide when/whether to incorporate the territory, which would bestow certain Constitutional status upon the territory. On April 1, 2013, the ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the proposed settlement agreement, explaining the results of its own investigations in Puerto Rico, endorsing the comprehensive approach of the agreement, and suggesting a few possible improvements. Puerto Rico's Attorney Gregorio Igartua also filed an amicus brief, except he failed to take up the issue of whether Puerto Rico was an incorporated territory. He argued that the Court could not render a decision in the case without declaring Puerto Rico to be an incorporated territory because the United States was imposing upon Puerto Rico the burdens of full obligation to the Constitution while selectively withholding Constitutional rights, such as representation and voting power in Congress and greater ability to claim access to federal funds, such as federal funding for anti-crime policies. On July 17, 2013, the parties filed a modified settlement agreement along with a joint motion for dismissal. On the same day, the court (Deputy Clerk Carlos Rodriguez) conditionally dismissed the case while retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The 101-page agreement provides a comprehensive set of provisions touching on nearly every aspect of the police department ( PN-PR-0001-0007). It calls for the development of policies on, among other things, the use of force, crowd control and public demonstrations, searches and seizures, and equal protection. It requires better pre-service training and education as well as continued training once recruits become police officers. It contains an array of investigatory, supervisory, and discipline obligations, as well as auditing procedures. To address community concerns, the Agreement establishes a commitment to more appropriate community policing and establishes joint boards of police officers and community representatives. In an effort to obtain nondiscriminatory policing, it also requires PRPD to establish the information systems and collect all information necessary to accomplish the goals of the agreement. Under the Agreement, Puerto Rico is required to hire a Technical Compliance Advisor (TCA) to monitor and report on the department's progress in meeting the goals and requirements of the agreement. The Agreement entailed a four year capacity-building period, subject to the development of Action Plans in each of the substantive areas of the Agreement. The Agreement would last at least 10 years, after which time either party could file for termination of the agreement. However, if Puerto Rico filed for termination, it would have the burden of demonstrating that it had fully and effectively complied with the agreement for at least two consecutive years. On October 30, 2013, upon joint motion of the parties, the court appointed Juan Mattos, Jr. as the Technical Compliance Advisor. However, he did not last very long on the job. Citing personal reasons, he resigned in February of 2014. In his stead, the parties selected Claudio Arnaldo to be monitor. The first compliance report was filed with the court on August 1, 2014 and was ordered to be made public on August 8, 2014. The report noted positive developments. From 2014 to 2016, the TCA filed status reports every six months assessing the PRDP's progress in implementing the Agreement. Additionally, the PRDP has filed period status reports until the present, delineating the steps taken to implement the Agreement, assessing the status of its progress, and addressing any concerns raised in TCA reports. On August 1, 2016, the court issued a Transition Order in light of the upcoming presidential election to prevent a transfer of critical personnel that would jeopardize the reform process. The TCA submitted its fifth biannual report on January 13, 2017. In the report, the TCA noted that the PRDP had made excellent progress in drafting 48 new policies and completed implementation of all 11 substantive areas of the Agreement. The PRDP submitted its Action Plans for each substantive area to the court on June 22, 2017. The report also noted that the PRDP had made important progress in training. However, the report noted three key areas of the Agreement that had not been adequately implemented: promotions, the human resource staffing study, and the reorganization of the Drugs, Vice, and Illegal Firearms Bureau. The Agreement's capacity-building period ended on October 7, 2018, at which point the compliance period began. In its eighth biannual report covering the period of April through October 7, 2018, the TCA noted several deficiencies relating to the PRDP's implementation of the Agreement. However, in its most recent status report submitted in March 23, 2019, the PRDP countered these allegations of deficiencies and claimed that it has the capacity, power, discipline, and determination to make police reform sustainable. Specifically, the report noted that during the capacity-building period, the PRDP had made significant strides in revising policies and procedures, conducting trainings, acquiring equipment, promoting safety, and providing personnel with the necessary tools to achieve the Agreement's objectives. On May 4th, 2019, Judge Gelpi filed an order that simply stated that the monitor, Arnaldo Claudio, had resigned from his position.  Subsequent interviews in the press  indicate that Claudio lost faith in the reform process, claiming that the federal government was insufficiently concerned about the process and that millions of dollars were being misspent on private lawyers, rather than reforming the police departments. Three months later, on August 8th, 2019, the parties informed Judge Gelpi that Claudio had publicly disclosed confidential and/or work-product information. This may have constituted a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Judge Gelpi announced that further proceedings would be necessary to address the issue. In March of 2020, the court appointed John Romero as the monitor. Romero had been Acting Monitor since Claudio left. Meanwhile, in January of 2020, the defendants began submitting motions to restrict public access to certain documents created in keeping with the consent decree. For example, defendants wanted to limit public access to community surveys mandated by the consent decree. The judge granted these motions. However, by April of 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic had taken precedence. The court ordered the immediate development of a COVID Protocol that would be consistent with the consent decree. The outbreak delayed the filing of the status report that was to be submitted in the spring. As of June 17th, 2020 the report has not been submitted and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On December 21, 2012, the United States filed suit against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its police department under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The Government alleged that the Puerto Rico Police Department (PRDP) violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments by engaging in unlawful patterns or practices. On July 17, 2013, the parties filed a settlement agreement along with a joint motion for dismissal which the court approved. Under the agreement, Puerto Rico is required to hire a Technical Compliance advisor to monitor and report on the departments progress in meeting the goals and requirements of the agreement. The agreement is set to last at least 10 years. On October 7, 2018, the capacity-building period ended and the compliance period began. In August of 2019 the monitor resigned, citing exasperation with the DoJ's lack of care and accusing the defendants of using money meant for police reforms on private attorneys. A new monitor was appointed and he released his first report in March of 2020. Monitoring is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: On May 1, 2020, Self Advocacy Solutions N.D., League of Women Voters of North Dakota, and an individual plaintiff filed a complaint against the Secretary of State of North Dakota and the County Auditor of Grand Forks County to challenge the absence of notice and cure procedures for the state’s signature matching requirement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on May 11, which the court granted on June 3. On August 28, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction.<hr> On May 1, 2020, Self Advocacy Solutions N.D., League of Women Voters of North Dakota, and an individual plaintiff filed a complaint against the Secretary of State of North Dakota and the County Auditor of Grand Forks County to challenge the absence of notice and cure procedures for the state’s signature matching requirement. The plaintiffs brought this as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the signature verification procedures, and to afford voters notice and opportunity to confirm the validity of their ballots prior to rejection based on the signature match. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and were represented by the Campaign Legal Center and private attorneys. The case was filed at the District Court for the District of North Dakota and assigned to Chief Judge Peter D. Welte and referred to Magistrate Judge Alice R. Senechal. On March 26, Governor Burgum announced that all voters in North Dakota were required to vote by mail for the June 9 primaries. To authenticate the ballots, Dakota voting law required election officials to match the signature on the voter’s mail-in ballot to the signature the voter provided in their absentee voting applications. If the election officials determined a discrepancy, the ballot was rejected with no opportunity for the voter to verify their ballot. The plaintiffs alleged that North Dakota’s failure to provide mail-in voters with notice and opportunity to cure posed an undue burden on the fundamental right to vote and violated due process against the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On May 11, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction and also filed a motion to expedite the briefing schedule the following day, which was granted. The defendants submitted a motion in opposition to the preliminary injunction on May 22. They argued that the court should not interfere with the election last-minute, as it is already in progress. They also argued that the plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim because they lack standing, have no injury-in-fact and cannot mount a successful facial challenge. On June 1, a hearing was held on the preliminary motion. The court granted the preliminary injunction on June 3, finding that the signature-matching requirement is likely facially unconstitutional, and therefore the plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their procedural due process claim. 2020 WL 2951012. On August 27, the plaintiffs moved to consolidate the preliminary injunction hearing with the trial on the merits and moved for a permanent injunction and final judgment on the merits. The plaintiffs asked that all absentee ballots with mismatched signatures received before or on election day be given six days to be cured by voters in-person or over the phone. The plaintiffs also requested that all absentee ballots received after election day but postmarked before election day be given the same amount of time to be cured. The plaintiffs also requested that all recipients of absentee ballots be notified that their signatures will be subject to signature matching. On August 28, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions from the previous day. The court permanently enjoined the defendants from rejecting any mail-in ballot on the basis of a signature mismatch absent notice and cure procedures. The court provided that the proposed injunction by the plaintiffs would remain in effect as long as North Dakota relies on signature matching for absentee ballot verification unless legislation is enacted to change the notice and curing procedures. On October 23, 2020, the court ordered the defendants to pay $97,500 to the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 1, 2020, Self Advocacy Solutions N.D., League of Women Voters of North Dakota, and an individual plaintiff filed a complaint against the Secretary of State of North Dakota and the County Auditor of Grand Forks County to challenge the absence of notice and cure procedures for the state’s signature matching requirement. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction on May 11, which the court granted on June 3. On August 28, the court granted the plaintiffs' requested permanent injunction. The case is now closed.


In 1993, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) notified the State of Wisconsin, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §1997, that it was commencing an investigation into conditions at the Southern Wisconsin Center for the Developmentally Disabled ("SWC"), in Union Grove, and the Central Wisconsin Center for the Developmentally Disabled ("CWC"), in Madison, Wisconsin. Following investigative tours of both facilities by the DOJ and its experts, the DOJ sent its initial findings letter on to the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) on July 16, 1993. The DOJ re-toured the facilities in April of 1994 and submitted it supplemental finds letter in September 1994. In that letter, the DOJ detailed the deficiencies it found in both institutions, which included: 1. Dangerously deficient medical care 2. Inadequate administration and monitoring of psychotropic medications and psychiatric services 3. Inadequate supervision resulting in harm and injuries to residents 4. Psychology services which deviated from Accepted Professional Standards 5. Institutional environments that failed to meet the needs of the residents. Negotiations followed between the DOJ and the DHSS, which resulted in an agreed resolution of the deficiencies uncovered by the DOJ at both institutions. On April 4, 1997, the DOJ filed a lawsuit pursuant to CRIPA in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, along with a proposed Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties. On April 10, 1997, the District Court (Judge Barbara B. Crabb) approved the Settlement Agreement. The Agreement called for monitoring of defendants' compliance by a panel of joint experts in the fields of psychology/habilitation, developmental medicine (with expertise in neurology) and psychiatry. By its terms, the Agreement was set to terminate after the third annual inspection tour of the joint experts, if the experts determined that the defendants were in compliance. In 1998, the U.S. apparently found non-compliance, and filed a motion on February 18 to enforce the settlement agreement. The state opposed that motion, but the Court granted it on April 13, 1998. In November, the parties entered a joint stipulation scheduling their experts' annual evaluatino of compliance. There's nothing else in the docket until a joint motion to dismiss the matter in February 2006, which was granted by the Court.

Summary: DOJ investigated facilities for the developmentally disabled. On April 4, 1997 the DOJ filed a lawsuit pursuant to CRIPA. A settlement allowed experts to continue monitoring until they saw fit. On April 13, 1998 the Court enforced plaintiff's motion to enforce terms of the settlement agreement. On February 13, 2006, a joint motion to dismiss was granted


On May 28, 2014, a private plaintiff with mental disabilities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiff sued the Louisiana Department of Safety and Corrections and the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals under the American Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants violated his rights under those statutes and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiff, represented by the Advocacy Center of Louisiana and the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, sought compensatory and punitive damages, permanent injunctive relief, attorneys fees, and declaratory relief that defendant's policies, procedures, and practices, as well as Louisiana Criminal Code articles 658(B) and 899 were unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, in 2008, he was charged with possession of a firearm as a felon based upon two prior convictions. Before standing trial, he was found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI), and was ordered to be conditionally released for five years provided he receive adequate treatment and monitoring. He was ordered to reside in a group home, living with other male individuals with mental disabilities. In July 2013, about six months before the five-year term was complete, the plaintiff was hospitalized and deprived of needed medicine for his mental illness; and as a consequence yelled threatening outbursts to other individuals in the group home when he returned. He was then arrested for violating his conditional release, where he spent a month in prison, only being released after his attorney filed a habeas corpus petition. There were never any criminal charges filed, and he was not informed of his rights. The plaintiff filed this complaint in 2014 for the above actions in 2013. In December 2013, however, the forensic coordinator at the Department of Health and Hospitals recommended the plaintiff's conditional release be extended an additional year. During this extension, he was involuntarily committed to a mental health hospital. On July 1, 2014, while hospitalized, hospital staff determined his probation should be revoked, and he was again arrested and incarcerated without any criminal charges filed. Both times he was incarcerated, he was deprived of his needed medication and neither given opportunity to post bail nor informed of his rights. While incarcerated, he was placed in lockdown for mental reasons. These lockdowns limited his use of the canteen and gave him no exercise time. The plaintiff was released on August 25, 2014, again after his attorney filed for habeas corpus relief. After his second incarceration, the plaintiff filed amended complaints to include the new allegations and to add defendant Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals to the suit. During the pretrial phase, both the plaintiff and the defendants filed separate motions for summary judgement, both of which were denied by U.S. Judge John W. deGravelles. On June 24, 2016, the defendants appealed the district court's denial of motion for summary judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The defendants moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal on June 26; the Fifth Circuit granted the defendants' motion July 8, 2016. From June 27 to 29, 2016, the district court held a jury trial as to the Americans with Disabilities Act claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, finding neither of them to had violated the ADA. At the judge's request, both parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In July 2017, Judge deGravelles set dates for oral argument for the remaining claims and the plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law. Oral arguments took place on September 20. The court published an opinion on September 29 entering judgment in favor of the defendants. Applying the <i>Youngberg</i> balancing test and substantive due process analysis, the court held the statutory scheme was facially constitutional. The arrests were reasonably related to a legitimate government objective, and the two instances of the plaintiff's arrest were insufficient to establish a policy, procedure, or practice. The court held that a reasonable jury could have found that the care the plaintiff received was not discriminatory and a reasonable accommodation under the circumstances. Judge deGravelles dismissed all the plaintiff's claims with prejudice, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This case was filed in 2014 by a private plaintiff previously incarcerated with a mental disability claiming two state agencies violated his right to due process and discriminated against him as an individual with a mental disability. After a jury verdict on the ADA claim, the plaintiff moved for judgment as a matter of law for that and his remaining claims to be heard in federal court. The court held in favor of the defendants and dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.


On July 24, 2006, pre-trial detainees in the Philadelphia Prison System [PPS] filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), challenging the conditions of their confinement. Plaintiffs, represented by the Institutional Law Project and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. Plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by severe prison overcrowding and dangerous, unhealthy, and degrading conditions at local Police Districts, the Police Administration Building ("PAB") and at the intake unit of the Philadelphia Prison System ("PPS"). Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction immediately after their complaint was filed. The Bowers lawsuit followed 30 years of litigation over conditions of the PPS and came six years after the final settlement of another federal class action lawsuit against the PPS. See Harris v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ. A. 82-1847, 2000 WL 1239948, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 30, 2000). See also Jackson v.Hendricks, 764 A.2d 1139, 1141 (Pa.Commw.Ct.2001). On September 8, 2006, the District Court (Judge R. Barclay Surrick) granted District Attorney Lynne Abraham's motion to intervene pursuant to The Prison Litigation Reform Act [PLRA]. Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, 2006 WL 2601604 (E.D.Pa. Sept. 8, 2006). The Act grants an unconditional right to intervene to state or local officials whose jurisdiction may be affected by the prison litigation. An evidentiary hearing was held October 3 through 6, 2006 on plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In addition, on December 12, 2006, the District Court toured the intake unit at the Curran Fromhold Correctional Facility ("CFCF"), the holding cells at the PAB, and the holding cells in the 9th Police District. On January 25, 2007, the District Court (Judge Surrick) granted plaintiffs' motion and entered a preliminary injunction. Defendants' motions to dismiss was denied. The District Court's order delineated specific affirmative steps for the City to immediately redress the unconstitutional conditions at PPC. District Attorney Abraham filed a notice of appeal on the ruling. On February 6, 2007, plaintiffs filed a motion for a permanent injunction, and on August 30, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion to terminate the preliminary injunction that had been issued by the court so that the parties could enter into a private settlement agreement that was not monitored by the court. On October 10, 2007, the district court terminated the preliminary injunction and dismissed the class claims. At this point, the only remaining claims in the lawsuit were the individual claims by the named plaintiff Bowers. On September 16, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on these claims. On December 12, 2008, the district court issued an opinion denying the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims. The court granted the defendants' motion with respect to the plaintiff's state constitutional claims and state law claims for negligence, recklessness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, 2008 WL 5210256 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 12, 2008). The court also denied the plaintiff's claim for partial summary judgment. Bowers v. City of Philadelphia, 2008 WL 5234357 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 12, 2008). On December 19, 2008, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's claims with prejudice.

Summary: On July 24, 2006, pre-trial detainees in the Philadelphia Prison System [PPS] filed a class action lawsuit alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by severe prison overcrowding and concomitant dangerous, unhealthy, and degrading conditions at local Police Districts, the Police Administration Building ("PAB") and at the intake unit of the Philadelphia Prison System ("PPS"). Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction immediately after their complaint was filed. After various motions for injunctive relief and summary judgment, parties entered into a settlement agreement regarding the class claims, and the district court dismissed the individual plaintiff's claims with prejudice.


This case grew out of the criminal misconduct of two state court juvenile judges who sent hundreds of children to juvenile detention facilities because of bribes paid by the companies that ran those detention facilities. On February 13, 2009, the plaintiffs--children who had been adjudicated delinquent found to have violated their probation and parents of those children--brought this class action lawsuit against the judges. The plaintiffs, represented by multiple firms, sought damages against the defendants for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, and assigned to Judge Richard Caputo. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the two judges ("Judge Defendants") received compensation from privately-owned juvenile detention facilities ("Provider Defendants") by agreeing to place children into care of those facilities instead of the county juvenile detention facility. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Judge Defendants received payments from construction companies that built the private juvenile detention facilities ("Construction Defendants"). The plaintiffs further alleged that the Defendant Judges removed funding from the County budget for the county juvenile detention centers. Other defendants who were allegedly involved in the financial transactions were the spouses of the Judge Defendants, the owner of the privately owned juvenile detention facilities, his holding company, and his law firm ("Powell Defendants"). The plaintiffs also filed suit against the County itself and several county employees. Over the next several months, the complaint was amended with additional plaintiffs and was consolidated with two putative class actions, Conway v. Conahan and H.T. v. Ciavarella. The case was also consolidated with five other civil actions. Various defendants filed motions to dismiss throughout 2009. On November 20, 2009, the Court granted the Defendant Judges' motions to dismiss claims related to their courtroom conduct on the basis of judicial immunity and denied their motion for all other claims. The Court denied a defendant psychologist's motion to dismiss on the grounds of judicial immunity because his behavior was administrative and not quasi-judicial. Next, the Court granted in part a motion to dismiss for the Provider Defendants on the basis that they were complying with a court order, but denied the motion for claims related to allegations of abuse. The Court also denied the county's motion to dismiss finding that the county was not subject to the immunity doctrines that applied to its judges or commissioners. 2009 WL 4051974. The plaintiffs continued to amend their complaints with additional parties and information, and the parties continued to engage in arguments on several motions to dismiss over the next two years. The Provider Defendants sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and its agents from enforcing orders directing the defendants to expunge records related to this case, which was granted by the Court on June 9, 2010. 2010 WL 2367672. Over the next year and a half, most of the defendants were dismissed, leaving the Judge Defendants, Provider Defendants, Construction Defendants, Powell Defendants, the county, and several county employees. On July 9, 2010, the Court dismissed the claim against the County because the plaintiffs failed to allege a policy or custom that created a cause of action for municipal liability. 2010 WL 2746394. On August 24, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims against the spouses of the Judge Defendants because the plaintiffs failed to allege actual participation in the conspiracy. The Court dismissed the substantive due process claim against the Provider Defendants and Construction Defendants because the plaintiffs did not allege deliberate conduct that the Defendants sought to harm the parent-child relationship; however, the Court found that the plaintiffs sufficiently stated all other claims against them. 2010 WL 3398995. On August 24, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims against the defendant county psychologist because the plaintiffs failed to allege facts that supported a finding that he violated their rights. 2010 WL 3398992. On November 30, 2011, the Court dismissed additional § 1983 claims on interference with familial relations against the Provider Defendants and Construction Defendants because the plaintiffs failed to allege facts supporting their claim that the defendants deliberately directed their conduct to interfere the parent-child relationships. The Court dismissed § 1985 claims because the plaintiffs were not a discrete and insular minority. The Court also dismissed the Sixth and Eighth Amendment claims, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the §§ 1985 and 1986 claims, and the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act claim of the parents against the Chief Probation Officer. While it granted dismissal of all claims related to sentencing recommendations against the Defendant Chief Probation Officer on the grounds of qualified-judicial immunity, it denied dismissal of the claims related to her investigative role. Finally, the Court dismissed all claims against the County, the County Department of Juvenile Probation, and County officials. 2011 WL 6003916. However, what was left was the core of the case: the Court denied dismissal of the punitive damage claims and the remaining § 1983 claims against the defendants. On December 16, 2011, the plaintiffs and the Construction Defendants moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement. The Court approved the settlement on December 14, 2012. 2012 WL 6552134. For the purposes of the settlement, the classes were certified as:
1. all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella ("Juvenile Settlement Class"); and 2. all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child's appearance: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties assessed against them or their child; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity ("Parent Settlement Class").
The Construction Defendants established a cash settlement fund of $17,750,000. Class Counsel were allowed to apply for up to 30% of the settlement amount in addition to litigation expenses. After payment of the above, taxes, and payment to the escrow agent, the Cash Settlement Fund was distributed to class members who turned in a proof of claim. Following this settlement, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Construction Defendants on December 26, 2012. 2012 WL 6552134. Throughout 2012, the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants, Judge Defendants, and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery. On March 21, 2012, the Court denied the Provider Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings that argued several of the plaintiffs' claims were untimely. Instead, the Court found that the statute of limitations was tolled because the Court was still deciding on the validity of class certification. In July 2012, the Court also denied several motions and cross-motions for partial summary judgment by the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants because disputed facts remained. On February 1, 2013, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class, and the Court granted their motion on May 14, 2013. There were two classes based on which violations the children experienced, Class A and Class B. Class A included a class for the Violation of Right to Impartial Tribunal:
 "All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008, whose adjudications were vacated, expunged, and dismissed with prejudice by orders of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dated October 29, 2009 or March 29, 2010. See in re Expungement of Juvenile Records and Vacatur of Luzerne County Juvenile Court Consent Decrees or Adjudications from 2003-2008, No. 81-MM-2008 (Pa.)"
Class A also included two sub-classes. Subclass A.1 for Violations of Right to Counsel:
"All children in Class A who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella without counsel and/or without colloquies on the record that informed them of their rights and the consequences of waiving those rights, before either waiving counsel and/or pleading guilty, during the time between 2003 and May 2008."
Subclass A.2 for False Imprisonment:
"All children in Class A who were referred to placement at PA Child Care and/or Western PA Child Care by Ciavarella between 2003 and May 2008."
Class B included children who experienced Violations of the RICO Act:
 "All children who were adjudicated delinquent or referred to placement by Ciavarella who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their adjudications and/or placements during the time period between 2003 and May 2008, as well as all children's parents or guardians who paid fees, costs, fines, restitution, or any other monetary charges associated with their children's adjudications and/or placements during the same time period."
2013 WL 2042369. The Plaintiffs, Judge Defendants, and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery throughout 2013. The Court granted default judgment against one of the Judge Defendants and several companies alleged to have participated in the wire transfers. The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs against the other Judge Defendant on January 9, 2014, finding him liable for all issues that were not protected by judicial immunity. 2014 WL 70092. On May 30, 2014, the plaintiffs and Provider Defendants moved for settlement and class certification. The Court granted final approval of the settlement on July 7, 2014. For the purposes of settlement, the classes were settled as:
 "a. all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated or placed by Ciavarella (the "Juvenile Settlement Class")' and b. all parents and/or guardians of all juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 and who, in connection with their child's adjudication or placement: (i) made payments or had wages, social security or other entitlements garnished or withdrawn; (ii) paid costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own names; (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity (the "Parent Settlement Class"), and (iv) who were not fully reimbursed as a result of claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement, defined in the MSA."
The Provider Defendants established a $2,500,000 settlement fund. Following payment of court-approved costs and fees, the remaining amount was separated into a juvenile fund (70% of remaining funds), parent fund (15% of remaining funds), and holdback fund (15% of remaining funds). The holdback fund was to be held back and used to pay costs of appeals until all final accounting was complete for the cash settlement fund. 2014 WL 12638876. The Plaintiffs and Powell Defendants continued to engage in discovery. On March 10, 2015, the parties moved for settlement, which the Court approved on December 21, 2015. The classes were defined as:
 A. All juveniles who appeared before former Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas Judge Mark A. Ciavarella Jr. between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008 who were adjudicated delinquent or placed by Ciavarella ("Juvenile Settlement Class"). B. All parents and/or guardians of all juveniles in paragraph (A) who, as a result of their child's adjudication of delinquency or placement by Judge Ciavarella between January 1, 2003 and May 28, 2008: (i) made payments in their own names or had wages, social security or other entitlements in their own names garnished or withdrawn; (ii) had costs, fees, interest and/or penalties in their own names assessed against them or their child; and/or (iii) suffered any loss of companionship and/or familial integrity ("Parent Settlement Class") and were not fully reimbursed as a result of claims made in connection with the Mericle Settlement and/or the Provider Settlement, defined in the Agreement.
The Powell Defendants agreed to establish a cash settlement fund of $4,750,000. The Powell Defendants also agreed to make an additional payment of up to $2,750,000 based on Powell's net worth. The fund was established first to pay attorneys' fees and costs awarded by the Court, next to pay all settlement administration costs and costs of notice related to the settlement, and lastly, to distribute all remaining funds to the settlement class members who submitted a proof of claim form. 2015 WL 9268445. At this point, the case was fully litigated: all the parties either were dismissed or settled. However, the Court retained jurisdiction for the enforcement and interpretation of the settlement. On December 7, 2017, the Court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to interpret the Powell settlement agreement in order to determine the amount of time necessary to complete an evaluation of Powell's net worth and ordered the evaluation be completed by February 6, 2018. On June 6, 2018, the Court granted in part plaintiffs' motion to interpret the Powell settlement agreement, again related to the completion of the net worth evaluation. The Court required that the evaluator provide missing, relevant financial information within twenty-one days. Litigation over the net worth professional fees continued until January, 2019, when they were finally resolved. On May 25, 2020, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Christopher C. Conner. He issued an order on April 13, 2020 requiring the parties to file a joint status report apprising the court of which claims had settled and which remained open. The parties filed this report on April 24, 2020, stating that the Mericle, Provider, and Powell settlements had all been completed. The outstanding claims were those that plaintiffs intended to pursue against former Judges Michael T. Conahan and Mark A. Ciavarella for damages associated with existing judgments against the two. The court ordered plaintiffs to file the appropriate motion to proceed with the remaining claims by June 1, 2020. As of May 27, 2020, the case remains open and ongoing.

Summary: In February 2009, children and parents of children whose cases had been heard by judges who accepted payments from private detention facilities and construction companies to place the children into those facilities brought this class action under RICO and § 1983. The case was consolidated with two other class actions and several other civil actions. The parties settled with various defendants over the following six years. The case remains open as the plaintiffs pursue satisfaction of judgments against the defendant judges.


On June 7, 2005, Plaintiff, a Jewish former prisoner, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act against five employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections (DOC) in their official and individual capacities. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the employees of the DOC denied or limited his ability to practice his Jewish faith during the time he was incarcerated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the employees denied him minor modifications that would allow the plaintiff to observe his Jewish religion in a meaningful manner and denied his requests for certain food and religious items to celebrate Jewish holidays. The defendants moved for summary judgment claiming that sovereign immunity protects the employees of the DOC from being sued in their official capacities and that injunctive relief was moot because the plaintiff was no longer incarcerated. On November 28, 2007, the District Court (Magistrate Judge Jerome J. Niedermeier) filed a report recommending that summary judgment be denied in part and granted in part. Judge Niedermeier agreed with the defendants that the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot and that the defendants were protected under the 11th Amendment in their official capacities. However, the report stated that the plaintiff produced enough evidence to make a reasonable inference of malice to support his claims for punitive damages against certain defendants in their individual capacities. A settlement agreement was filed with the court and approved on March 21, 2008. The plaintiff agreed to release all claims against the State of Vermont and each of the named defendants in the present case in exchange for $25,000 and the acknowledgement that certain providers of religious food and articles are appropriate pursuant to the DOC's policies on religious observances. The parties agreed to dismiss the action with prejudice.

Summary: The plaintiff, a Jewish former prisoner, filed a complaint against employees of the Vermont Department of Corrections in their official and individual capacities, alleging that the employees denied him minor modifications that would allow him to observe his Jewish religion in a meaningful manner. Defendants moved for summary judgment which the court denied in part and granted in part. The court stated that the defendants were protected by the 11th Amendment from being sued in their official capacities, but that the plaintiff produced enough evidence of malice to allow him to proceed against the defendants in their individual capacities. The parties agreed to dismiss the case with prejudice in exchange for a $25,000 settlement.


On August 3, 2007, a person held in Cook County Jail (CCJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2201 against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by civil rights attorneys, asked the court for compensatory damages, claiming that the jail's policies and procedures that denied prescribed medications to prisoners violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendant's policy allowed medical technicians to deny medications to detainees solely on the basis of a brief and cursory interview. Technicians failed to inquire about detainees' medical histories and made their decisions without consulting a physician. With respect to psychotropic medications, the plaintiffs alleged that CCJ routinely provided antidepressants to individuals as a less expensive replacement of their medically-required psychotropic medications, which lead to behavioral problems including suicide attempts. With respect to non-psychotropic medications, the plaintiffs alleged that the county's policy permitted technicians to cut off drug treatments for a wide range of conditions, including enlarged prostate, heart disease, acid reflux, congestive heart failure, asthma, hepatitis C, chronic pain and surgical wounds. As a result, the plaintiffs suffered a wide range of adverse medical consequences. On August 16, 2007, the plaintiffs filed the first amended complaint requesting class certification. On March 31, 2008, the plaintiffs filed the second amended complaint. On May 21, 2008, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the second amended complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege that a policy, custom, or practice for the Sheriff of Cook County was responsible was a cause or contributing cause for their alleged constitutional injury. On October 24, 2008, Judge Matthew F. Kennelly granted class certification to current and former inmates confined to the Cook County Jail who were denied prescribed drug therapies within 24 hours by the facility, rejecting the defendant's adequacy-of-representation argument that asserted felons cannot serve as class representatives. Parish v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 07 4369, 2008 WL 4812875 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 2008). The court reassigned the case to Judge John Lee on June 1, 2012. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on July 2, 2012, and the defendants moved to decertify the previously certified class on July 5, 2012. The defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment one month later. After several hearings on the motion and supplemental briefing, the court denied the defendants' motion to decertify the class on March 31, 2016, concluding that there were no material changes in circumstance or the law requiring decertification. 2016 WL 1270400. On April 17, 2018, the court denied a motion by defendants to bar the testimony of four of the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. 2018 WL 1811330. On May 30, 2019, Judge John Lee addressed the parties’ motions for summary judgment. He granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions and denied the plaintiffs’ motion. The court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Cook County, finding that it was not directly liable for the allegedly unconstitutional intake policies at the jail. However, the court held that Cook County remained an indispensable party to the litigation because of their statutory role of funding the sheriff’s office. Addressing the claims against the Sheriff, the court granted the defendant’s motion as to claims asserting constitutional violations prior to 2008 and claims based on medical conditions other than asthma, diabetes, depression, and other various illnesses. The court permitted the plaintiffs’ remaining claims against the Sheriff to proceed. 2019 WL 2297464. Beginning in summer 2019, the parties began settlement discussions. The lead plaintiffs submitted a preliminary settlement agreement on December 20, 2019. The agreement directs the defendants to pay $7,500,000. Judge Lee granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement on December 17, 2019. Upon notification, several members of the class filed objections to the settlement agreement. However, proceedings were delayed in early 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic; no final certification has been granted. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 3, 2007, a prisoner confined in the Cook County Jail (CCJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 and 2201 against Cook County. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory damages, claiming that the jail's policies and procedures that denied prescribed medications to prisoners violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendant's policy allowed medical technicians to deny medications resulting in a wide range of adverse medical consequences. The court granted in part and denied in part cross-motions for summary judgment. The case moved into settlement negotiations in late 2019, and the Judge approved a preliminary agreement in December of that year. The case is ongoing.


This case concerns the "Improvement Standard," a rule of thumb that required many beneficiaries to show a likelihood of medical or functional improvement before Medicare would pay for skilled nursing and therapy services. As a result, some people are forced into nursing homes or suffer other adverse medical outcomes. The complaint, with five beneficiary plaintiffs and five national organization plaintiffs, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, along with a motion for certification of a nationwide class, on January 18, 2011. On March 3, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two more organization plaintiffs and one beneficiary plaintiff. The parties completed briefing of the class motion in early May 2011. Oral argument on the government's motion to dismiss was held on July 14, 2011. On October 25, 2011, the court largely denied the motion to dismiss. 2011 WL 5104355. After the Secretary filed an Answer on November 8, 2011, discovery was stayed for settlement discussions. On July 20, 2012, the parties reported to the court that they had reached an agreement in principle. In October 2012, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by the court (Chief Judge Christina C. Reiss) on January 24, 2013. The agreement significantly changes Medicare coverage rules; Medicare will pay for services if they are needed to "maintain the patient's current condition or prevent or slow further deterioration," regardless of whether the patient's condition is expected to improve. The Court will monitor compliance for four years. In the settlement, the government agreed to pay an unspecified amount for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs.

Summary: This case concerns the "Improvement Standard," a rule of thumb that required many beneficiaries to show a likelihood of medical or functional improvement before Medicare would pay for skilled nursing and therapy services. As a result, some people are forced into nursing homes or suffer other adverse medical outcomes. The complaint, with five beneficiary plaintiffs and five national organization plaintiffs, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Vermont, along with a motion for certification of a nationwide class, on January 18, 2011. In October 2012, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Court (Chief Judge Christina C. Reiss) on January 24, 2013. The agreement will significantly change Medicare coverage rules; Medicare will pay for services if they are needed to "maintain the patient's current condition or prevent or slow further deterioration," regardless of whether the patient's condition is expected to improve. The Court will monitor compliance for four years.


On February 25, 2008, the plaintiff, a pre-arraignment detainee in the Santa Cruz County Jail, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States Court for the District of Arizona, Tucson Division against Santa Cruz County. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and compensatory relief, claiming violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the blanket policy of strip-searching and cavity searching all pre-arraignment detainees without reasonable suspicion was a violation of the plaintiff's right to due process and to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, and violated established Supreme Court precedent in Bell v. Wolfish. Between 2006 and 2008, the plaintiff, the putative class representative, was arrested several times in Santa Cruz County on various minor offenses. Each time, when he was detained in the Santa Cruz County Jail, he was, in the company of other detainees and in full view of others, required to stand naked, lift his genitals, and expose his anus for visual inspection. This was a routine procedure that all detainees at the jail were compelled to undergo. The class was never certified because the case settled before the defendants and plaintiffs litigated class certification. On January 15, 2009, the Court (Judge Raner C. Collins) entered an unpublished order approving a stipulated settlement that would dismiss the case with prejudice, after a fairness hearing. In the Stipulated Settlement Agreement, the County agreed to pay 3.2 million dollars to a fund from which class members could claim damages. The class was described as people who had been subjected to strip and cavity searches without reasonable suspicion in the Santa Cruz County Jail, with the named plaintiff to receive $50,000. Attorney fees were awarded in the amount of $725,000. No injunctive-like provisions were included in the Stipulated Settlement. The fairness hearing was held on July 13, 2009, and the Court approved the settlement, and dismissed the case the same day. The case has been closed.

Summary: A class of pre-arraignment detainees who had been subjected to strip and cavity searches in the Santa Cruz County Jail were successful in settling their case against the county for 3.2 million dollars. The Court approved the settlement agreement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice in July 2009.


On February 25, 2011, four former job applicants of Howard Industries filed a lawsuit against the company in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on behalf of themselves and a class of non-Latino (Caucasian and African-American) applicants who were harmed by the company's alleged discriminatory practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Howard Industries denied their job applications on the basis of their race or national origin, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.). The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On October 5, 2012, the District Court (Judge Keith Starrett) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The court certified the class as "All black and non-Hispanic white persons who applied for a bargaining unit position at Howard Industries' Laurel, Mississippi transformer facility between January 1, 2003, and August 25, 2008, and were not hired." The parties reached a settlement, and the court issued a consent decree on March 11, 2013, resulting in injunctive and monetary relief. Cook v. Howard Indus., 2:11-cv-00041-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 943664 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 11, 2013). Specifically, the settlement required Howard Industries (1) to create a settlement fund of $1,300,000 to be paid to class members and (2) to offer seventy of the class members a bargaining unit position at its Laurel transformer plant. The class members who qualified for these positions "must initially choose between the Individual Settlement Benefit and the Employment Benefit, but any Qualified Class Member not selected for employment will receive an Individual Settlement Benefit." Lastly, the consent decree provided that Howard Industries pay plaintiffs' attorney fees in the amount of $457,500. The settlement agreement, not including the payment of attorney fees, was valued by the parties at $3,050,000.00. This case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by a class of non-Latino (Caucasian and African-American) job applicants against Howard Industries. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that they were not hired by Howard Industries due to their race. The parties reached a settlement, and the court issued a consent decree on March 11, 2013, resulting in injunctive and monetary relief.


On July 11, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the City of Indianapolis in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The DOJ sought injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against employees on the basis of race (white) and sex (male). The defendant city maintains a police department, the Metropolitan Law Enforcement Agency aka the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD), and is responsible for establishing the terms, conditions, and other practices which bear upon the employment and promotion of police officers in the IMPD. The defendant city maintained competitive promotions processes by which applicants for promotion and appointment to the merit ranks of Sergeant and Lieutenant in the IMPD are screened, ranked, and selected. The allegations listed in the complaint are separated into two sections. In the first, the DOJ alleged that the defendant discriminated against a number of white males on the basis of race and/or sex by failing or refusing to promote or timely promote such individuals to the merit rank of Sergeant, instead promoting other lower ranking black and/or female candidates to this position. The second section contains allegations of discrimination on the basis of sex (male), which took the form of failing or refusing to promote or timely promote such individuals to the merit rank of Lieutenant, and instead promoting lower ranking female candidates. On July 31, 2007, the court granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate, and ordered that the case be consolidated with Lawrence Wheeler v. City of Indianapolis (1:05-CV-1220-LJM-JMS) and United States v. City of Indianapolis (1:78-CV-388-RLY-WTL) and the case proceeded under the number 1:78-CV-388-RLY-WTL. Following the consolidation, an Intervenor Complaint was filed on October 22, 2007. The complaint makes factual allegations regarding the discrimination on the basis of sex and race, and claims that the plaintiff-intervenors have been damaged through the loss of pay, reputation, professional opportunities and experience, collegiality with fellow officers, and consortium with family members, and have suffered stress and emotional distress. The plaintiff-intervenors sought remedial relief, including back pay, front pay, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and compensatory and punitive damages. A motion to amend the Intervenor's Complaint was filed on October 24, 2007, which included the charge of violation of the First Amendment. The parties then entered into settlement negotiations and filed a joint motion to enter a consent decree. on August 22, 2008. The Court (Judge David Frank Hamilton) provisionally entered the decree on August 28, 2008. The decree contains two general injunctions: 1) the City was enjoined from engaging in acts or practice of racial or gender discrimination with respect to promotions within the Police Department; 2) prohibition on retaliation. The decree also provided individual relief to various employees of the Police Department, who were denied promotion because of their race or gender. The decree contained several uncontested allegations, whereas female or minority police officers were promoted instead of higher ranked male or white applicants. Those individuals received promotions, retroactive seniority, and varying payments as backpay and frontpay. The City agreed to keep records and submit reports to the United States. The latter had a right to monitor compliance. The decree was to dissolve within two years, or within ninety days of certification of full compliance. The decree was subject to a fairness hearing. The Court received objections from NAACP, alleging that the proposed consent decree would have a disparate impact on African Americans. On February 12, 2009, the Court entered the consent decree which was slightly modified, such as allowing the City to continue to lawfully pursue diversity within its employees. On November 29, 2009, the case was reassigned to Judge Sarah Evan Baker. On February 19, 2010, the parties filed a joint status report, stating that they propose no modifications to the decree, and that the city was in compliance with its reporting obligations and continues to improve its selection policies. On February 23, 2010, the case was administratively closed by the Court, subject to the Court's ongoing jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree. There has been no further activity on the docket. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 11, 2007, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against the City of Indianapolis in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The DOJ sought injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against employees on the basis of race (white) and sex (male). The parties settled, and the Court entered their consent decree on February 12, 2009. The decree provided for injunctions against racial and gender discrimination, and individual relief to various persons consisting of promotion, retroactive seniority and monetary relief. The case is ongoing, although it is administratively closed.


On September 21, 2000, the Raleigh Area Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Georgia Pacific Corporation, one of the world's largest manufacturers of packaging and building materials. The EEOC, who brought this action on behalf of several of the company's male African-American employees and a male Hispanic employee, sought monetary and injunctive relief, claiming that Georgia Pacific's Butler, N.C. branch had engaged in discrimination based on race and national origin, sex discrimination, and retaliation against those who complained of the company's discriminatory practices. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the company's African-American employees were subjected to a hostile work environment that included racially derogatory comments, graffiti, and name-calling, and that many were fired or constructively discharged due to their complaints about the discriminatory practices. Additionally, the EEOC claimed that a Hispanic employee was subjected to national origin discrimination, primarily through derogatory comments, and sexual harassment, which included explicit comments and gestures and unwelcome touching. This employee was constructively discharged in retaliation for his complaints about the work environment. On December 20, 2000, the court granted four former Georgia Pacific employees' motion to intervene in the lawsuit. In addition to a Title VII claim, the plaintiff-intervenors (who included the discrimination victims named in the original EEOC complaint) brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The complaint in intervention further detailed Georgia Pacific's discriminatory practices, which included KKK, swastika, and confederate flag graffiti, and discriminatory work policies such as not letting African-American employees use the bathroom when needed. One of the plaintiff-intervenors also claimed that he was denied the opportunity to pursue a promotion due to his national origin. On February 1, 2001, the EEOC and Georgia Pacific signed a settlement agreement, which set forth that the Hispanic plaintiff-intervenor had received a monetary settlement embodied in a separate agreement and that he agreed to dismiss his claim with prejudice, and that if a satisfactory Consent Decree was entered or if the EEOC prevailed at trial, Georgia Pacific would have to provide training to its management and employees on Title VII and the company's anti-discrimination policy, report to the EEOC semi-annually, and would submit to EEOC oversight. The Consent Decree was entered on March 30, 2001, and was effective for two years. The class of African-American employees who were working or who had worked at Georgia Pacific's Butler, N.C. facility were awarded $198,417.05. One of the named African-American plaintiff-intervenors was further awarded $1,582.95. The Consent Decree additionally set forth the requirements discussed in the settlement agreement, including mandatory training, reporting, and EEOC oversight, and included a prohibition against discrimination.

Summary: In 2000, the the EEOC brought this suit in the Eastern District of North Carolina under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Georgia Pacific Corporation, one of the world's largest manufacturers of packaging and building materials. The complaint alleged Georgia Pacific had engaged in discrimination based on race and national origin, sex discrimination, and retaliation against those employees who complained about discriminatory practices. A consent decree was entered in 2001; a class of African-American current and former employees was awarded $198,417.05, while a named plaintiff-intervenor was awarded an additional $1,582.95. The Decree, which was effective for two years, also provided for mandatory training, reporting, and EEOC oversight, as well as injunctive relief against discrimination.


On October 24, 2008, plaintiff non-emergency medical transportation service filed this claim in the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 2201. The Defendant submitted an ex parte application for an order staying this action and two related cases. In an order filed on November 3, 2008, the Central District of California (Judge Christina A. Snyder) granted the order staying the instant action and two related cases. The Court stayed this case as well as California Association for Health Services at Home v. Shewry (CV 08-07045) and Independent Living et al v. Shewry (CV 08-3315) until further order of the Court. On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the active list of cases. The Judge ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action is reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal is filed. This is the last entry on the docket as of July 17, 2013.

Summary: On October 24, 2008, plaintiff non-emergency medical transportation service filed this claim in the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiff sought to enjoin the Director from implementing state legislation reducing payments to medical service providers under California's Medi-Cal program by ten percent. Plaintiff argued that the ten percent rate reduction violated Title XIX of the federal Social Security Act (the Medicaid Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and was therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiff sought declaratory judgment under 42 U.S.C. § 2201. The Defendant submitted an ex parte application for an order staying this action. On November 3, 2008, the Court issued an order staying the action until further order of the Court. On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the active list of cases. The Judge ordered that counsel file a joint report detailing the status of the case every quarter until the action is reactivated or a stipulation for dismissal is filed. This is the last entry on the docket as of July 17, 2013.


This case is about Chicago's Gang Database and its constitutionality given Chicago Police Department's unlimited discretion to add names to the database without consistent guidelines or approval requirements. On June 19, 2018, a coalition of four individuals and community organizations filed a federal class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department (CPD) alleging that the city’s Gang Database is unconstitutional and seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They filed the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The four individual plaintiffs, three Black and one Latino, were falsely identified as gang members and placed in the database. The putative class consisted of all individuals included in the database and within that class a subclass of all Black and Latino individuals in the database. As of the date that the complaint was filed, the database included around 128,000 adults, 95% of whom were Black or Latino. CPD officers had unlimited discretion to designate someone as a gang member; this discretion was often wielded disproportionately against Black and Latino individuals. Individuals also lack the ability to challenge the gang member designation or be removed. This created the potential for lifelong false designations as a gang member, which could have serious repercussions, especially because CPD shares this information with third party agencies. CPD also relied on the Database in its work, which could lead to false arrests and imprisonment of individuals on the Database. The complaint alleged that the city’s Gang Database and its usage violated individuals’ rights to due process, the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unlawful search and seizure, and Illinois state law. The case was assigned to Judge Andrea Wood. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on September 14, 2018. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification on November 19, 2018, with leave to refile upon the conclusion of class discovery. In light of a number of developments outside of court, namely the Chicago Office of the Inspector General's audit of the Gang Database and CPD's responding new policy draft, the parties jointly filed a motion to stay to evaluate these developments and determine how CPD's anticipated new policy would affect the litigation. The court granted the motion on April 23, 2019. After the duration of the stay, the parties agreed to a several additional extensions of the timeline. The case was also pushed back several times due to the COVID-19 pandemic. On August 20, 2020, the parties reported to the court that they had reached an agreement to resolve the case. The individual plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their complaint on September 2, 2020, and the organizational plaintiffs also voluntarily withdrew on September 4. The primary initiative that seems to have motivated the case's resolution is the Criminal Enterprise Information System (CEIS), which would be the new tool by which CPD vets, maintains, and utilizes criminal enterprise and street gang membership information. In addition to the implementation of CEIS, the old gang database would be unavailable, there would be disclaimers to those accessing CEIS regarding potential inaccuracies and appropriate uses of the information, and user agreements for those assessing CEIS prohibiting disclosing the information to other agencies. Furthermore, CEIS would be subject to an annual review. The notice of initiatives filed by the City of Chicago expressed that the document was not a settlement agreement and did not create binding obligations. In their voluntary withdrawal, the plaintiffs clarified that they did not endorse the initiatives, but rather a choice to terminate the litigation in order to "focus their efforts on the ultimate relief they seek—a complete abolition of CPD’s gang database." The organizational plaintiffs asserted that they maintained their rights to and would not hesitate to file another lawsuit if CPD continued to designate people as gang members in a discriminatory and unconstitutional manner. As such, on September 10, 2020, Judge Wood dismissed the case without prejudice to the organizational plaintiffs and with prejudice to the individuals. Each party was ordered to bear its own fees and costs. The case is closed.

Summary: A coalition of individuals and community organizations filed a federal class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department in 2018 alleging that the city’s Gang Database was unconstitutional. The case was settled by the parties in 2020. Chicago announced a new process for designating individuals as gang members, among other initiatives.


On October 4, 2006, a death-sentenced inmate of the Riverbend Maximum Security Prison in Nashville, Davidson County, Tennessee, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Tennessee Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The State of Tennessee allows death-sentenced prisoners who committed their crimes prior to 1999 to choose their method of execution - lethal injection or the electric chair. Plaintiff complained to the Court that both methods of execution used in Tennessee were unconstitutional because they would torture the executed prisoner. Plaintiff objected to the use of the state's electric chair (which was nicknamed "Old Sparky") during his execution by arguing that it had been modified and would not work properly because it would not deliver an adequate current. He quoted the manufacturer, who responded to the news of the chair's modifications by saying that the changes would make it an "instrument of torture" that is "tantamount to somebody being burned at the stake." Plaintiff also referred to allegedly botched executions involving electric chairs in other states. Plaintiff also objected to the defendants' lethal injection protocol, arguing that it led to an unconstitutional risk of torture because it 1) did not specify the required credentials of the medical personnel involved, 2) involved the use of an anesthetic that would work only for a very short duration, therefore allowing the plaintiff to feel pain, 3) involved the use of a paralytic agent that would render the condemned unable to express the pain that he was feeling and unable to breathe, and 4) involved a dose of potassium chloride that was high enough to cause extreme pain but not high enough to arrest the heart and cause death. Plaintiff alleged that this combination of chemicals would render him conscious, paralyzed, and in extreme pain while he suffocated to death. On October 10, 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint and motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that Plaintiff had not shown any likelihood of success on the merits and that he had brought the complaint only to delay his execution. Nine days later, the District Court (Judge Todd J. Campbell) denied Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the motion to dismiss, finding that Plaintiff was unlikely to succeed at trial and that he had brought the case only to delay the execution. Plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted motions to stay and consolidate the case with a similar death-row case, Harbison v. Little (07-6225). In that case, the District Court ruled that the lethal injection method was unconstitutional, and the defendants appealed. These two consolidated cases were stayed until the United States Supreme Court decided a Kentucky case, Baze v. Rees, CJ-KY-0002. In Baze, the Supreme Court of the United States decided that the Kentucky legal injection method, which was similar to the method used in Tennessee, was constitutional. Following that decision, the parties in this case set an oral argument date in December 5, 2013. However, on December 3, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted a joint motion to dismiss the appeals as moot, following the implementation of a new lethal injection protocol by the state of Tennessee.

Summary: This 2006 challenge to Tennesee's execution methods was dismissed at the Circuit Court level. The Plaintiff claimed that both execution methods (electrocution by "Old Sparky" and lethal injection - the choices offered condemned inmates) amount to torture. The District Court granted the state's motion to dismiss the case, and on appeal, on December 3, 2013, the Court of Appeals granted a motion to dismiss the case as moot after the state implemented a new lethal injection protocol.


Plaintiffs were a group of ''Immigrant Investors'' who participated in the ''EB-5'' program, which granted lawful permanent resident (''LPR'') status in the United States to those who made qualifying investments that created jobs for United States workers under the Immigrant Investor Law (''IIL''), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(b)(5). On August 24, 1999, Plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) improperly applied its current interpretation of EB-5 retroactively to their applications. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case and then refiled it in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (Los Angeles), where it was assigned case # 2:99-cv-10518-GHK-AJW. The refiled suit was brought by more than two hundred immigrant investors and their family members. To pare down the case, the lawsuit was later amended as a class action, with seven named investor plaintiffs acting as class representatives. The plaintiff class alleged that they had submitted investment proposals and business plans which were preliminarily approved under the ''EB-5'' program. Class members and their families then moved to the U.S. In 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service changed the rules of the EB-5 program, which plaintiffs alleged were retroactively applied to them, causing their EB-5 applications to be rejected. Plaintiffs contended that by changing the EB-5 rules and retroactively applying them to the plaintiffs, the government violated the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. and due process and equal protection. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 27, 2000, the government moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court (Judge George H. King) granted it in part and dismissed the claims of six of the seven named plaintiffs as unripe. As to the claims of plaintiff Chiang, who had received a decision terminating his residency in the U.S., the Court held that he failed to state a claim under the Administrative Procedures Act. The Court remanded Chiang's retroactivity claim to the INS for further consideration in light of the retroactivity analysis in Montgomery Ward v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1982). Plaintiffs appealed. On April 29, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Betty B. Fletcher) affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims of six plaintiffs as being not ripe. The Court also found that the INS impermissibly and retroactively applied its EB-5 rule changes to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded with instructions that the district court should determine whether class certification was appropriate. Chang v. U.S., 327 F.3d 911 (9th Cir. 2003). On remand, plaintiffs moved several times to amend their complaint and for class certification. On August 29, 2005, the District Court granted plaintiffs leave to file a second amended complaint. The Court also indicated that it was inclined to certify the case as a class action and ordered the parties to submit a joint definition of the proposed class. The Court also ordered that the case Ahn v. U.S.A., CV-01-7382 be consolidated with the Chang case. On July 17, 2007, the Court (Judge King) conducted a settlement conference with the parties. In the settlement conference, the parties came to preliminary agreement on the terms of the plaintiffs relief, specifically that the amount of additional money the plaintiffs would have to invest and how many jobs they would have to create in order for their I-829 applications to be approved. He ordered the parties to file a status report 130 days, updating the progress of settlement negotiations. On February 6, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion requesting sanctions on the defendants, claiming that they had started implementing contacts with the class members and regional immigration centers on good faith of the defendants verbal agreements in settlement conference and that the defendants had now impermissibly changed their position in negotiations. The plaintiffs alleged that they were unable to negotiate towards a settlement with the defendants any longer. As a result, the parties continued to file motions to amend the complaint and motions to dismiss. In March of 2012, the parties began formally informing the court of settlement negotiations, and, in August the parties submitted a joint status report, which included a settlement agreement. In September 2012, the court conditionally certified a class for settlement. The class consisted of all aliens who invested in one of the AIS Partnerships, who had an I-526 petition approved by the Attorney General after January 1, 1995, and before August 31, 1998, and were granted conditional resident status pursuant to the INA and who timely filed an I-829 petition requesting the removal of such conditional basis, and who have received or will receive a denial of their permanent residency because they are unable to comply with the INA's investment and employment requirements. The court then also preliminary approved the settlement agreement. Per the settlement, defendant agreed to favorably adjudicate each plaintiff's Petition to Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions ("Form I-829") subject to numerous conditions, including that the petition could be denied if it was determined that the petitioner made a willful material misrepresentation in his form or that the petitioner's investment was knowingly made solely as a means of evading the immigration laws. On February 13, 2013, the court granted final approval of the settlement. In March, the court granted plaintiffs' unopposed motion to order adjudication of plaintiffs' I-829 petitions. The case appears to be closed.

Summary: A group of "Immigrant Investors" participating in the EB-5 program sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on August 24, 1999 for improperly applying its most recent interpretation of EB-5 retroactively to their applications. EB-5 granted lawful permanent resident status to those who made qualifying investments that created jobs for U.S. workers under the Immigrant Investor Law. The plaintiffs alleged that after submitting investment proposals and business plans, which were preliminarily approved, the INS changed the rules of the EB-5 program. In retroactively applying the rules to the plaintiffs' proposals and plans, the INS rejected them. After the District Court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred in dismissing the claims of six plaintiffs as being not ripe, and also found that the INS impermissibly and retroactively applied its EB-5 rule changes to the plaintiffs. The case was remanded with instructions that the district court should determine whether class certification was appropriate. After years of litigation, the court conditionally certified a class for settlement in September 2012, and later granted final approval of the parties' settlement on February 13, 2013. Per the settlement, the defendant agreed to favorably adjudicate each plaintiff's Petition to Entrepreneur to Remove Conditions ("Form I-829") subject to numerous conditions.


On April 26, 2018, the non-profit, Big House Books, along with two prisoners at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Judge Daniel P. Jordan, III was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued SMCI and the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that the MDOC’s new policy of barring prisoners from receiving free books, unless they are religious books, was unconstitutional. More specifically, they brought this case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that this new policy was discriminatory on the basis of religious content and violated the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the Mississippi Center for Justice and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the plaintiffs filed the complaint, there was little activity in the case, so the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute on December 3, 2018. The plaintiffs responded by filing a stipulation of dismissal on December 19, 2018. The plaintiffs explained that shortly after the complaint was filed, the parties met and reached an agreement to change the policies and practices that led to this lawsuit. The defendants stopped their practice of only allowing prisoners to receive free books if they were religious. In the summer of 2018, MDOC clarified their policy to make clear that free books from distributors, like Big House Books, could be sent to prisoners. The plaintiffs monitored the shipments to prisoners to ensure that the practice changed and found prompt and ongoing compliance. The parties then agreed that the plaintiffs would be paid attorneys’ fees of $6,000 for their work. The case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2018, two prisoners at the South Mississippi Correctional Institution (SMCI) and non-profit Big House Books filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued SMCI and the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that the MDOC’s new policy of barring prisoners from receiving free books unless they are religious books violates the First and the Fourteenth Amendments. After little activity in the case, the court issued an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The parties then filed a stipulated of dismissal on December 19, 2018, indicating that earlier in the year the parties reached an agreement to settle the case. The defendants changed their policies and practices so that prisoners could receive free books from distributors like the plaintiff whether or not they were religious. The defendants also agreed to pay the plaintiffs $6,000 in attorney fees. This case is now closed.


Romero I On August 01, 2001, thirty-two employees of Allstate Insurance filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Allstate under the Age Employment in Discrimination Act of 1967 (AEDA) and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). The plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The case was initially assigned to Judge John P. Fullham. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged three legal issues. First, plaintiffs alleged that Allstate Insurance, under the guise of cost reduction, forced all of its benefits-receiving, salaried insurance agents into independent contractor positions contrary to Section 510 of ERISA. Second, plaintiffs alleged that Allstate Insurance changed their benefits because the company wanted to hire younger staff who they could pay less, contrary to the AEDA. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the company violated its fiduciary duties by requiring the employees to either sign an agreement that converted their position to a contract or be fired. Allstate had terminated the employment contracts of more than 6,200 employees, 90 percent of whom were  over the age of . Therefore, the plaintiffs sought to represent a class which includes the 6,200 former employees, to nullify the releases, and pursued a wide range of claims: for breach of contract, for violations of the ADEA, ADA, Title VII, and ERISA.  Romero II About four months later, the Romero I plaintiffs and four others brought a separate ERISA action against Allstate. The plaintiffs in Romero II sought to represent a class of persons whose rights under ERISA were allegedly violated by the changes in the pension plan. The defendant responded that the claims were barred because they had the affirmative defense of release. They also counterclaimed against the plaintiffs for unjust enrichment, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing based on state law. On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EOCC) brought its  own action  against the defendant (EEOC v. Allstate), alleging that they unlawfully retaliated against the agents, in violation of the ADEA and other federal employment statutes, by refusing to permit them to continue as Allstate employees unless they signed the release. They sought declaratory judgment that the release was invalid.  Romero III On December 20, 2003, twenty-five employees filed a separate suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs alleged retaliation by Allstate Insurance, alleging frivolous counterclaims against the plaintiffs in Romero I. Lastly, on October 7, 2004, the EEOC filed a  suit against Allstate . Additionally, it filed a motion to intervene and to oppose Allstate's motion for summary judgment in Romero. This case would letter settle for $4,500,000 in September 2009. In 2004, the district court dismissed Romero II claims, finding the complaints to be time-barred, and declared that the releases signed by former employees were voidable. 2004 WL 692231. The court additionally certified a class of agents who had signed the release for this purpose. However, in 2005 the Circuit reversed the opinion and remanded it back to the district court. 404 F.3d 212. The district court stated its intent to grant summary judgment in favor of Allstate in March 2007. 2007 WL 906158. The court also advised the parties that it was rethinking its previous ruling that the releases were voidable and that it believed the order should be vacated. On June 20, 2007, the district court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss for Romero II and motion for summary judgment for Romero I and found the previous declaration voiding the releases moot. 344 Fed.Appx. 785. However, this order was vacated and remanded by the Third Circuit in 2009. 344 Fed.Appx. 785. On remand, the two cases were consolidated for administrative purposes (see the links below for notes on consolidation). Discovery followed for the next three years, and an amended complaint was filed in 2010. On January 29, 2010, the case was reassigned from Judge John P. Fullham to Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter. On September 12, 2012, the Court consolidated Romero I, Romero II, and EEOC v. Allstate for administrative purposes. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss that year, which the court denied. 2010 WL 4670172. At the same time, the district court granted summary judgment to Allstate regarding the claims of retaliation in 2007, but the order was subsequently vacated on appeal and remanded back to a different district judge in 2009. 2007 WL 1811197; 344 Fed. Appx. 785. In a separate opinion on March 13, 2014, the District Court granted Allstate summary judgment in EEOC retaliation suit, holding that Allstate's claims were not facially retaliatory. 3 F Supp. 3d 313. EEOC appealed, and the Third Circuit affirmed on February 13, 2015. 778 F.3d 444. On February 27, 2014, the court denied both parties' motions for summary judgment and directed that the issue regarding the validity of the release be decided by a jury. 1 F. Supp. 3d 319. Subsequently, on March 13, 2014, the court granted the defendant summary judgment on the EEOC's claim and dismissed that action in its entirety. 3 F. Supp. 3d 313. The decision was affirmed by the Third Circuit on March 26, 2015. Accordingly, the court granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment against the plaintiffs' ADEA disparate impact claims as well as against their ERISA Section 510 claims. 2017 WL 1508879; 251 F.Supp.3d 867. Thereafter, class certification was sought for the issue of the validity of release on May 23, 2014, which was denied on October 04, 2014, stating that individual factors must be considered to determine whether each release signer entered into the release knowingly and voluntarily. 52 F.Supp.3d 715. By 2015, after two appeals, over 400 additional agents intervened or became named plaintiffs in Romero I, and they filed a third amended complaint. The defendants attempted to dismiss the case again, and on November 15, 2015, the motion was denied. 143 F.Supp.3d 271. The case continued, and on June 17, 2015, the jury found that some plaintiffs signed their releases knowingly and voluntarily and while others did not sign their releases knowingly and voluntarily. On January 26, 2016, the court found that the releases were not procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. 158 F.Supp.3d 369. The case was reassigned to Judge Gerald J. Pappert, and then to Judge Mark A. Kearney three months later. As there were 499 plaintiffs involved by this time, the court ordered the consolidation of the cases on May 05, 2016, and the parties filed a consolidated amended complaint maintaining their ADEA and ERISA retaliation claims. The court also created a schedule for the resolution of all claims: a non-jury trial in December 2016 regarding plan amendments under ERISA in phase I, and a second trial in May 2017 to resolve employee benefits under ERISA and ADEA in phase II and the disparate treatment claims under ADEA at a later date. On July 06, 2016, Judge Kearney reviewed the final consolidated complaint and dismissed the plaintiffs' retaliation claims under ADEA and ERISA, and state law claims. 2016 WL 3654265. On December 5-6, 2016, the judge held bench trial for phase I. After the bench trial and before a ruling was to be issued, the vast majority of plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed in favor of private settlements. On April 27, 2017, the district court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor as to the ADEA disparate impact claim and ERISA section 510 claims. 251 F.Supp.3d 867. On September 05, 2017, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant regarding the retaliation claims, finding that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of showing that the counterclaims were baseless. 2017 WL 3881217; 2017 WL 3881219. The same day, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which argued breach of contract and fiduciary duty based on the release signed. 2017 WL 3881215. On January 29, 2018, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's claims that the counterclaims violated the ADEA and ERISA and denied the defendant's summary judgment on the additional claims of retaliation. 2018 WL 627116. At this point, most of the plaintiffs involved settled privately except 31 individuals. Settlement talks continued for the remaining plaintiffs. Although the defendant attempted to argue that the statute of limitations had passed since the initial complaint, the court tolled the statute of limitations on May 08, 2018. The defendant then moved for partial summary judgment on the state law claims of twelve employees who did not bring their state law claims until 2010 or 2015, arguing that they were barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. On May 22, 2018, the district court denied the defendant's statute of limitations argument and the motion for summary judgment. 2018 WL 2325405. According to the status report dated October 31, 2018, all but three plaintiffs had privately settled. That same the same day, the court granted complete dismissal of the case upon agreement of counsel.

Summary: On August 1st, 2001, several employees of Allstate Insurance filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued Allstate under the Age Employment in Discrimination Act of 1967 (“AEDA”) and the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). In September 2009, the EEOC settled the age discrimination claim for $9,000,000. Between December 2016 and October 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaints for private settlements. On October 31st, 2018, the court granted complete dismissal of the case upon agreement of counsel.