On March 29, 2009, a Muslim prisoner at the Gib Lewis Unit in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiff, bringing the case pro se, sued the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ). He sought a declaratory judgment that TDCJ's enforcement of grooming standards violated his First and Fourteenth amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction to enjoin TDCJ from enforcing these standards. Specifically, he asked the court to require TDCJ to permit him to grow his beard a full fist length and wear Islamic head gear (Kufi), in line with his religious beliefs. On June 4, 2009, District Judge Thad Heartfield put the case on hold pending a decision in Garner v. Morales, 2009 WL 577755 (5th Cir. 2009), which addressed the same issue in a different prison, and had recently been remanded by the Fifth Circuit back to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Judge Heartfield denied all pending motions, including the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. 2009 WL 1586691. On June 12, 2009, the plaintiff appealed Judge Heartfield's opinion to the Fifth Circuit. On appeal, the plaintiff also filed a motion asking the Fifth Circuit to compel the District Court to issue the preliminary injunction. The Fifth Circuit denied the motion to compel on December 29, 2009, but ultimately vacated the lower court's opinion. On May 28, 2010, the appeals court held that the lower court had erred in pausing the case without findings of fact or conclusions of law. It remanded the motion for preliminary injunction to the District Court. (J. E. Grady Jolly)607 F.3d 1046. Meanwhile, in District Court, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction on July 7th, 2009. Judge Heartfiled denied the motion. In response to the Fifth Circuit's May 28th ruling, the District Court reopened the case. The plaintiff moved for appointment of counsel, but Magistrate Judge Judith Guthrie denied the motion on July 7, 2010. Following an evidentiary hearing in District Court, Judge Heartfield dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to state a claim. Judge Heartfield noted that the Fifth Circuit had recently found in Gooden v. Crain, 353 Fed.Appx. 885 (5th Cir. 2009), that a District Court could credit prison officials' testimony that changing grooming codes could present a significant security concern. Judge Heartfield further held that the claim was moot because a temporary medical exemption had permitted the plaintiff to grow a beard. 2010 WL 3790823. The plaintiff appealed the judgment on October 8, 2010. The Fifth Circuit issued a per curiam decision on July 18, 2011 partially vacating and remanding the lower court's ruling. (J. Fortunato Benavides, J. Carl E. Stewart, J. Edith Brown Clement). The court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim challenging the head-covering policy, and its dismissal of the equal protection and first amendment claims. The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff's RLUIPA claim challenging the grooming policy. It held that the issue was not moot because the medical exemption had been temporary and had most likely expired in January 2011. 434 Fed.Appx. 322 (5th Cir. Tex.). Meanwhile, in District Court, the plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to permit him to grow a beard. Judge Ron Clark denied the motion on April 4, 2011, finding that the plaintiff was asking the Court to grant him relief on an issue on which he had already failed to prevail. That summer, on August 23, 2011, the case was officially reassigned to Judge Ron Clark. On October 24, 2011, the plaintiff filed another motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing that in a prior order, the Court had recognized that if Garner was successful in his case in the Southern District, the Plaintiff here could prevail as well. The plaintiff pointed to the Southern District's recent opinion granting declaratory relief to Garner, 2011 WL 2038581. Judge Clark denied the motion for a temporary restraining order on January 9, 2012 because the Garner case was stayed while on appeal. The next day, the plaintiff again moved for a preliminary injunction. On January 31, 2012, the plaintiff appealed Judge Clark's opinion on the temporary restraining order. The Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal and denied the motion on January 4, 2013. It held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on a temporary restraining order. The Court did remand the case, urging the lower court to reexamine the motion for a preliminary injunction. (per curiam decision, J. Judge Jerry E. Smith, J. Edward C. Prado, J. Stephen A. Higginson) 505 Fed.Appx. 369 (5th Cir. 2013). Meanwhile, in District Court, the defendant moved for summary judgment and the plaintiff again moved to appoint counsel. On March 29 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice appeared as Amicus Curiae stating that the United States believed TDCJ's "blanket prohibition on religious beards is not narrowly tailored to the generalized budgetary and security interests it asserts" and asking the court to deny TDCJ's motion for summary judgment. Without deciding on either motion, Magistrate Judge Guthrie stayed the proceedings pending the appeal on the temporary restraining order opinion on April 11, 2012. After the Fifth Circuit remanded the case, on June 3, 2013, the plaintiff brought an objection to the District Court's handling of the case. In particular, he complained that the Magistrate Judge had made so many of the rulings. He asked that the District Judge perform his duty. A month later, on July 2, 2013, he asked the Fifth Circuit to order the District Court to do its job. He alleged that the District Court had failed to decide on injunctive relief, even after the Fifth Circuit had urged it to reexamine the motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 12, 2013, the Fifth Circuit denied the plaintiff's request, but with the caveat that the plaintiff could reinstate it if the District Court had not ruled in 180 days. On December 19, 2013, two pro bono lawyers were appointed as counsel for the plaintiff, and on January 17, 2014, Judge Clark assigned the case to Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn. On February 4, 2014, Judge Hawthorn granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction enjoining TDCJ from enforcing a policy prohibiting the plaintiff from maintaining a quarter-inch beard. 2014 WL 495162. A bench trial was held in July 2014 before Magistrate Judge Hawthorn. On September 26, he granted declaratory and injunctive relief requiring TDCJ to allow the plaintiff to wear a fist-length beard and a Kufi. 69 F.Supp.3d 633. The state appealed the decision on October 16, 2014. The case was stayed for several months pending resolution in Holt v. Hobbs [135 S.Ct. 853], but after the Supreme Court found for the prisoner plaintiff in that case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment and permanent injunction on May 2, 2016. 822 F.3d 776. Meanwhile, on December 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn denied the defendant's motion to stay the judgment pending the appeal in the Fifth Circuit. On April 29, 2015, he order the defendant to pay the plaintiff $16,312.72 in costs and $214,160.44 in attorney's fees and expenses. The defendant appealed the ruling on May 18, 2015, but withdrew the appeal on May 16, 2016. There has been no significant activity since 2016, and the case appears closed.

Summary: On March 29, 2009, a Muslim inmate at the Gib Lewis Unit in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice filed this pro-se lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. He sought relief from a TDCJ policy prohibiting him from wearing his beard at a fist-length and from wearing a Kufi. The case went back and forth between the District Court and the Fifth Circuit for more than seven years, but the Plaintiff ultimately won a permanent injunction enjoining TDCJ from enforcing these grooming policies.


On June 1, 2017, former detainees at a private detention facility in Leavenworth, Kansas filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. The plaintiffs sued CoreCivic, Inc. (the facility's operator) and Securus Technologies, Inc. (its phone and video services provider) for violations of the Kansas, Missouri and federal (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, et seq.) wiretapping statutes. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and sought monetary relief and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that throughout the time they were detained, defendants improperly and without authorization recorded confidential phone calls and meetings between them and their attorneys. Magistrate Judge James P. O’Hara was assigned to the case. On November 13, 2017 an individual tried to join the case as a member of the class, but this motion was denied because class certification had not been granted. CoreCivic and Securus moved to dismiss Count I (the violation of the Missouri wiretapping statute), and this motion was granted because none of the allegedly unlawful interceptions took place Missouri. Securus also moved to dismiss Counts II and III (the violations of the Kansas and federal wiretapping statutes). The court granted in part and denied in part this motion. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged that any of their intercepted communications had been disclosed but had adequately alleged that their communications had been unlawfully intercepted and a statutory business use exception did not apply because intercepting conversations between detainees and their lawyers was not part of the defendants' ordinary course of business. 2018 WL 1175042 (Mar. 5, 2018). The parties began settlement negotiations in August, 2018. These negotiations continued until August 23, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved to certify the class and for preliminary approval of class action settlement. The court granted this motion on September 26, 2019. Five members of the class filed objections to the settlement, but the court overruled these objections and approved the settlement on January 28, 2020. The certified class included:
All detainees at Leavenworth Detention Center who, during the period of June 1, 2014 through June 19, 2017, had their attorney-client telephone calls recorded by Defendants: (a) after the detainee requested privatization of his or her attorney’s phone number (subclass A); (b) after his or her attorney requested privatization of the attorney’s phone number (subclass B); (c) after Judge Robinson’s cease and desist order on August 10, 2016, in the case styled U.S. v. Black, Case No. 2:16-CR-20032 (subclass C); or (d) after the detainee or his or her attorney otherwise notified one or more Defendants in writing of their attorney-client relationship and provided written notification of the attorney’s phone number at issue (subclass D).
The settlement agreement created a Settlement Fund of $1,450,000.00, of which CoreCivic agreed to fund $1,100,000.00 and Securua agreed to fund $350,000.00. The plaintiffs' attorneys received about $500,000 of the settlement funds. The settlement did not provide for relief besides damages. As of April 5, 2020, the court has retained jurisdiction for the administration of ongoing settlement payments.

Summary: Former detainees at a private detention facility filed this class action lawsuit alleging that the company that operated the detention facility and the company that provided phone and video conference services had violated Kansas, Missouri, and Federal wiretapping statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had recorded confidential phone calls and meetings between detainees and their attorneys. The defendant companies agreed to pay a total of $1.45 million to the class members and their attorneys in a settlement.


Plaintiffs--young undocumented immigrants residing in Arizona--filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act against the State of Arizona and the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on Nov. 29, 2012. Represented by the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, plaintiffs claimed that the state was invalidly denying them drivers' licenses, despite their eligibility under the federal Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona Executive Order that denied them drivers' licenses violated both the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause; they sought a declaration that the state action was invalid, and an injunction providing them drivers' licenses. Plaintiffs also petitioned for certification of a class in their complaint, including all young immigrants residing in Arizona who had been granted deferred action, or would be, pursuant to the DACA program and had (or would have) employment authorization documents (EADs) and Social Security Numbers, who were being denied drivers' licenses by the Arizona Motor Vehicles Division. On Dec. 14, 2012, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On Jan. 9, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. The District Court (Judge David Campbell) heard oral arguments for both motions on Mar. 22, 2013, and issued an order on May 16, 2013. Judge Campbell denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on the grounds that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Supremacy Clause claim, and that, although plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their Equal Protection claim, they did not show the likelihood of irreparable injury for the claim. Judge Campbell accordingly granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part as to the Supremacy Clause claim and denied in part as to the Equal Protection claim. 945 F.Supp.2d 1049 (D. Ariz. May 16, 2013). Plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on June 17, 2013. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Sept. 17, 2013, adding two individual plaintiffs and removing the class action claims. In all other respects, the amended complaint essentially reiterated the original complaint, alleging violations of the Supremacy Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. On Mar. 26, 2013, Judge Campbell issued an order dismissing one of the individual plaintiffs without prejudice. The case then spent a long time in discovery. On Apr. 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim and for a permanent injunction. On July 7, 2014, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Harry Pregerson) issued an opinion as to the interlocutory appeal, granting plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the District Court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction, prohibiting defendants from enforcing any policy by which the Arizona Department of Transportation refused to accept plaintiffs' EADs, issued under DACA, as proof that plaintiffs were authorized under federal law to be present in the United States. 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). On Nov. 24, 2014, the Ninth Circuit denied the state's petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, and on Dec. 9, 2014 denied a stay pending the state's petition to the Supreme Court for certiorari review. On Dec. 11, 2014, the state sought a stay from the Supreme Court, pending its cert. petition; the Court rejected that stay on Dec. 17, in an order issued without opinion. Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito noted that they would grant the stay. Following this, District Judge Campbell issued a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014. He then held a Jan. 7, 2015 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and summary judgment and on defendants' motion for summary judgment. On Jan. 22, 2015, Judge Campbell granted plaintiffs' motion and denied defendants'. The final judgment permanently enjoined defendants from refusing to issue drivers' licenses to DACA recipients by rejecting their EADs as proof of their authorization under federal law to be present in the United States. In his order, Judge Campbell held that for purposes of Equal Protection, defendants had classified DACA recipients differently from other holders of EADs who could obtain drivers' licenses and that such differential treatment of similarly situated persons did not survive rational-basis review. Plaintiffs had suffered irreparable harm by losing job opportunities because they lacked drivers' licenses. 81 F.Supp.3d 795 (D. Ariz. Jan. 22, 2015). Defendants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit. After oral argument on July 16, 2015, the panel (Circuit Judges Pregerson, Berzon, and Christen) asked the parties for further briefing on issues of preemption, the separation of powers doctrine, and the Take Care Clause. The United States, at the Court's invitation, submitted an amicus brief in support of plaintiffs on Aug. 28, 2015. The Ninth Circuit then issued an opinion on Apr. 5, 2016, affirming the District Court's order. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court's Equal Protection holding. But the Ninth Circuit chose to use the constitutional avoidance principle to reach the same result without finding a constitutional violation. The court thus held that defendants' classification policy for issuing drivers' licenses violated the INA by using an independent definition of "authorized presence," and it was thus preempted by exclusive federal authority to classify noncitizens. 818 F.3d 901 (9th Cir. 2016). Defendants requested an en banc rehearing, but the Court denied this request in a Feb. 2, 2017 order (Circuit Judges Kozinski and others dissenting). 855 F.3d 957 (9th Cir. 2017). Defendants then requested a stay while they petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for cert. The Ninth Circuit granted a stay on Feb. 13, 2017, and defendants filed the petition on Mar. 29, 2017. In the interim, on Sept. 5, 2017, the Trump administration announced plans to rescind DACA. But a district court in Regents of the University of California enjoined this move on Jan. 9, 2018, and the government sought cert from the U.S. Supreme Court. On Jan. 22, 2018, in this case, defendants notified the U.S. Supreme Court of the relation between the two cert. petitions. On Feb. 14, 2018, in the Supreme Court, the U.S. filed an amicus brief. On Mar. 19, the Supreme Court denied cert. in this case. On Apr. 6, the Ninth Circuit issued an order lifting the stay and causing its April 2016 judgment to take effect. The case is closed.

Summary: On Nov. 29, 2012, DACA-eligible plaintiffs sued Arizona for denying them drivers' licenses. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction on Dec. 18, 2014 and a permanent injunction on Jan. 22, 2015. The 9th Cir. upheld the injunction on Apr. 5, 2016, and denied an en banc rehearing. SCOTUS has denied cert.


On March 13, 2006, a group of former and current female employees filed their fourth amended complaint under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(f), et seq., against the Novartis Corporation in the United States District Court in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive relief, back pay and front pay, and compensatory and punitive damages, alleging sex discrimination, including pregnancy discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the defendant discriminated in compensation, promotion, personnel evaluations and treatment of women taking pregnancy leave. 244 F.R.D. 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). This action began on November 19th 2004, when a smaller group of plaintiffs filed their original complaint. The parties engaged in extensive discovery, specifically on the relationship between the parent company and its subordinate. There was also an early question about whether the Chairman of Novartis was being properly served notice on the case (see Order confirming proper service). On August 16, 2007, the Court (Judge Lynch) granted class certification and defendant's motion for summary judgment. This order granted a class of all women who are currently holding, or have held, a sales-related job position with [NPC] during the time period July 15, 2002 through the present, including those who have held positions as Sales Representatives, Sales Consultants, Senior Sales Consultants, Executive Sales Consultants, Sales Associates, Sales Specialists, Senior Sales Specialists, and District Managers I. 244 F.R.D. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Furthermore, included in this class were any women discriminated against on the basis if pregnancy with respect to the issue of incentive-based compensation. 244 F.R.D. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). While the Court (Judge Lynch) certified the class, he also granted a motion of summary judgment for the defense, holding that the corporation could not be liable for any Title VII violation by NPC. This judgment was based on lack of evidence from the plaintiff that the Corporation and NPC functioned as a single enterprise. 244 F.R.D. 254-255 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). A jury trial commenced on April 7, 2010. The jury delivered a verdict on behalf of the plaintiffs and awarded compensatory and punitive damages. The trial concluded on May 19, 2010, with equitable relief to be order by the Court at a later date. In light of this, the parties engaged in vigorous negotiations and entered into a Settlement Agreement in July 2010, according to which the defendant Novartis would pay $175 million in total and adopt other measures to reduce or eliminate discrimination against female workers. On July 14, 2010, the court (Judge Castel) preliminarily approved the settlement agreement. On November 30th, 2010, the court (Judge Colleen McMahon) finalized the judgment, certifying the class, approving the settlement agreement, and dismissing the case with prejudice. The defendant was required to pay $152,500,000 in backpay, damages to the class, and other charges related to the litigation. On April 8th, 2011, the court (Judge McMahon) approved of modifications to the list of class members and the claims administration process as laid out in the settlement agreement, in order to ensure that all class members receive accurate settlement awards. On September 23rd, 2013, the court (Judge McMahon) addressed a letter to all counsel to encourage continued compliance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed to a 3-year compliance period, however the appointed overseer to the compliance was unable to reach either party to ensure continued cooperation. On April 29, 2014, the court (Judge McMahon) ordered the monitoring period concluded and declared the settlement to have been carried out, thereby terminating Defendant's obligations to the class and concluding the case.

Summary: This case was brought by several female employees against defendant Novartis seeking monetary and equitable relief. On July 14, 2010, the Court preliminarily approved the settlement agreement, according to which defendant would pay $175 million and adopt other measures to reduce discrimination against female employees. The court found for the Plaintiff class and awarded about $150 million in damages.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition and a complaint for injunctive relief brought on behalf of three immigration detainees confined in detention centers in Texas. The petitioners alleged that as people who were particularly vulnerable to the virus due to their age and serious medical conditions, they were exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19. Plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal on December 24, 2020. We presume the case to be closed. <hr> On April 15, 2020, three immigration detainees filed this lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and various detention center officers. Represented by private counsel, the Texas Civil Rights Project, Texas RioGrande Legal Aid, and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the petitioners sought writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants were subjecting them to punishment in a way that violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights and violating the Rehabilitation Act by not taking into account their vulnerability to severe illness or death, denying them soap, hand sanitizer, and other hygiene products, failing to clean common items and surfaces, detaining them in crowded conditions that precluded social distancing, and failing to screen incoming detainees and officers for COVID-19 before entering the detention centers. The case was assigned to Judge Marina Garcia Marmolejo and Magistrate Judge John A. Kazen. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 24, arguing that the plaintiffs could not bring conditions of confinement claims in a habeas action, and that the alleged violations they had plead were not unconstitutional. Later, the Court granted the defendants motion to sever one of the plaintiffs from the case, as he was detained at a separate facility and therefore lacked any connection to the facility in question. On July 31, 2020, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, and on August 13, 2020, the defendants filed a response. On December 24, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal. However on February 3, 2021, the defendants filed a notice of binding authority. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these documents at this time, and presumes the case to be closed.

Summary: Detained immigrants in Texas sought writs of habeas corpus, requesting release from their detention centers because they were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to their age and medical conditions.


On December 17, 2014, two street musicians filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Saugatuck, Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages, claiming that the City's application of the Saugatuck Public Entertainment Ordinance (Ordinance) to the plaintiffs was unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that criminalizing the act of playing music on a public sidewalk without a permit is a prior restraint on expression that violates the First Amendment. The plaintiffs also claimed that the Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as it does not provide them with fair notice that the Ordinance, which prohibits performances on the streets of Saugatuck without a permit, applies to individual street musicians. On March 27, 2015, upon stipulation and consent of the parties, the Court (Judge Robert J. Jonker) entered an order:

Permanently enjoining the City from enforcing the Public Entertainment Ordinance against the plaintiffs and other individual street performers who wish to perform on the public sidewalks in Saugatuck, including against individual street performers who accept tips from passersby;
Permanently enjoining the City from requiring the plaintiffs or other individual street performers to obtain a permit if they wish to perform on the public sidewalks in Saugatuck;
Awarding each plaintiff $7,500; and
Reserving for resolution between the parties the issue of attorneys' fees to be paid to the plaintiffs.
On May 26, 2015, the Court entered an order granting the plaintiffs an extension until June 2, 2015 to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. On June 17, 2015, Judge Jonker ordered the defendants to pay attorneys’ fees and costs of $30,000 to the ACLU. The case is now closed.

Summary: In December 2014, two street musicians brought this suit seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages against the City of Saugatuck, Michigan, alleging that the City's prohibition against street musicians performing without a permit is unconstitutional. In March 2015, the District Court entered a Consent Judgment permanently enjoining the City from applying this prohibition and awarding each plaintiff $7,500.


On August 9, 2014, Michael Brown, an 18-year-old black man, was fatally shot by Darren Wilson, a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri, a small city in St. Louis County. The shooting sparked nationwide protests and attention to police use of force and police/African-American relations. The Prosecuting Attorney for St. Louis County, Missouri, brought the case in front of a grand jury to determine whether there was probable cause to indict Wilson for his actions. But on November 24, it was announced that the jury had declined to indict Wilson. A federal criminal investigation of Wilson also proceeded. As the criminal investigations were moving forward, on September 4, 2014, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened an investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD). The investigation was initiated under the pattern-or-practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3789d ("Safe Streets Act"), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d ("Title VI"). On March 4, 2014, the DOJ announced that there would be no federal criminal civil rights prosecution. It concluded that there was insufficient evidence to disprove Wilson's claim that he (reasonably or not) feared for his safety. Accordingly, it reported, "Wilson's actions do not constitute prosecutable violations" of federal civil rights law. That same day, the DOJ announced the opposite results in its civil investigation. The DOJ Report concludes:
"Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs. This emphasis on revenue has compromised the institutional character of Ferguson's police department, contributing to a pattern of unconstitutional policing, and has also shaped its municipal court, leading to procedures that raise due process concerns and inflict unnecessary harm on members of the Ferguson community. Further, Ferguson's police and municipal court practices both reflect and exacerbate existing racial bias, including racial stereotypes. Ferguson's own data establish clear racial disparities that adversely impact African Americans. The evidence shows that discriminatory intent is part of the reason for these disparities."
 The report explained that Ferguson's municipal court "operates as part of the police department. The court is supervised by the Ferguson Chief of Police, is considered part of the police department for City organizational purposes, and is physically located within the police station. Court staff report directly to the Chief of Police. Thus, if the City Manager or other City officials issue a court-related directive, it is typically sent to the Police Chief's attention." While the court Judge does not report to the police chief, the court clerk does, and the report explains that "the Court Clerk and assistant clerks routinely perform duties that are, for all practical purposes, judicial. For example, documents indicate that court clerks have disposed of charges without the Municipal Judge's involvement." The report devotes 80 pages to its investigative findings, which allege systemic constitutional violations of numerous types:

unlawful stops without reasonable suspicion, and arrests without probable cause

excessive force, particularly with the use of Tasers and canines, and against people with mental illness and intellectual disabilities

retaliation for First-Amendment protected speech and advocacy

illegal prevention of citizen recording of police encounters

violations of due process by punishing and even jailing people based on their opposition to the charges against them (for example, if they assert constitutional defenses) or on simple inability to pay fines

The report connects all of these policing failings to what it labels "FPD's weak systems of supervision, review, and accountability," which "have sent a potent message to officers that their violations of law and policy will be tolerated." With respect to the municipal court, the report highlighted "barriers to resolving a case that court practices impose, including: (1) a lack of transparency regarding rights and responsibilities; (2) requiring in-person appearance to resolve most municipal charges; (3) policies that exacerbate the harms of Missouri's law requiring license suspension where a person fails to appear on a moving violation charge; (4) basic access deficiencies that frustrate a person's ability to resolve even those charges that do not require in-court appearance; and (5) legally inadequate fine assessment methods that do not appropriately consider a person's ability to pay and do not provide alternatives to fines for those living in or near poverty. Together, these barriers impose considerable hardship." Moreover, it alleged, "Current bond practices are unclear and inconsistent. Information provided by the City reveals a haphazard bond system that results in people being erroneously arrested, and some people paying bond but not getting credit for having done so." The report attributed all of these policing/court problems to two overarching sources. First, the report argued, Ferguson used its police and municipal court process as revenue raisers: tickets and warrants are treated as sources of funding, not promoters of public safety or order. Second, the burdens imposed by this approach disproportionately harmed African Americans, and, the report argues, this stemmed in part from intentional discrimination in violation of the Constitution. The report devotes considerable attention to the disparate effects of police and court practices. E.g.: "African Americans experience disparate impact in nearly every aspect of Ferguson's law enforcement system. Despite making up 67% of the population, African Americans accounted for 85% of FPD's traffic stops, 90% of FPD's citations, and 93% of FPD's arrests from 2012 to 2014." And:

African Americans are 2.07 times more likely to be searched during a vehicular stop but are 26% less likely to have contraband found on them during a search. They are 2.00 times more likely to receive a citation and 2.37 times more likely to be arrested following a vehicular stop.

African Americans have force used against them at disproportionately high rates, accounting for 88% of all cases from 2010 to August 2014 in which an FPD officer reported using force. In all 14 uses of force involving a canine bite for which we have information about the race of the person bitten, the person was African American.

African Americans are 68% less likely than others to have their cases dismissed by the Municipal Judge, and in 2013 African Americans accounted for 92% of cases in which an arrest warrant was issued.

The report concludes that the racial skew remains even after various other factors are controlled for. This unnecessary disparate impact itself violates Title VI and the Safe Streets Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Moreover, the report states:
Racial bias and stereotyping is evident from the facts, taken together. This evidence includes: the consistency and magnitude of the racial disparities throughout Ferguson's police and court enforcement actions; the selection and execution of police and court practices that disproportionately harm African Americans and do little to promote public safety; the persistent exercise of discretion to the detriment of African Americans; the apparent consideration of race in assessing threat; and the historical opposition to having African Americans live in Ferguson, which lingers among some today. We have also found explicit racial bias in the communications of police and court supervisors and that some officials apply racial stereotypes, rather than facts, to explain the harm African Americans experience due to Ferguson's approach to law enforcement. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available." Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977). Based on this evidence as a whole, we have found that Ferguson's law enforcement activities stem in part from a discriminatory purpose and thus deny African Americans equal protection of the laws in violation of the Constitution."
 The DOJ concluded its report with 12 single space pages of recommendations for reform, covering essentially all the activities of the Ferguson police and municipal court. DOJ commented, as well, that "These recommendations should be closely evaluated and, as appropriate, implemented by other municipalities. We also recommend that the City and other municipalities work collaboratively with the state of Missouri on issues requiring statewide action, and further recommend: a. Reform of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.341.1, which requires the suspension of individuals' driving licenses in certain cases where they do not appear or timely pay traffic charges involving moving violations; b. Increased oversight of municipal courts in St. Louis County and throughout the state of Missouri to ensure that courts operate in a manner consistent with due process, equal protection, and other requirements of the Constitution and other laws." Negotiations towards a consent decree ensued, and the negotiating teams reached an agreement, which was made public on January 27, 2016. However, after several public hearings, the Ferguson City Council voted to accept the agreement only if it were changed in seven specified ways--(i) eliminate any requirement of salary increases for police officers; (ii) eliminate any requirements for staffing in the Ferguson Jail; (iii) extending agreement deadlines; (iv) eliminating the requirement that the terms of the agreement apply to any other governmental agency who, in the future, might take over Ferguson policing; (v) adding local preference for contracting with consultants, contractors and third parties providing services under the agreement; (vi) adding project goals for minority and women participation in consulting, oversight and third party services; and (vii) capping monitoring fees at $1 million over the first five years with no more than $250,000 in any single year. The DOJ rejected these attempts to reopen the negotiations, and promptly sued, filing this case on February 10, 2016. Acting AAG Vanita Gupta then wrote a letter to Ferguson, suggesting that the city’s projected costs of the agreement were overstated. On that assurance, Ferguson's City Council approved the settlement March 15, 2016; it was filed with the Court the next day. Judge Perry approved and entered the parties' jointly-filed the consent decree on April 19, 2016, after a public hearing to consider the community's input on the proposed consent decree. The consent decree created guidelines for training police officers and reorienting Ferguson's use-of-force policies toward de-escalation and avoiding force. It provided for community policing and engagement measures, reform of the Ferguson municipal code and municipal court system, bias-free police and court practices, and accountability measures, among other provisions. The agreement was set to remain in effect until Ferguson was in full and effective compliance for two years. On July 22, 2016, the court appointed the Squire Patton Boggs team, led by Clark Ervin, as the monitor of the consent decree, and the court has held quarterly status hearings since September 2016. After agreement by the parties and in consultation with the Court, Natashia Tidwell was appointed as the new Lead Monitor on December 12, 2017. The monitor submitted a status report on March 30, 2018. The status report noted that the defendants had made the most progress on the municipal court reform sections of the consent decree, while most other subject areas were still in the early phases of implementation. The report expressed the monitoring team's concerns about the defendants' ability to implement the provisions of the consent decree under the status quo:
Significant work remains to be done before the City will be able to claim full implementation of the Consent Decree. In particular, the Monitor is concerned that implementation may stall unless the City hires additional personnel to assist with compliance. Specifically, the Monitor recommends that the City hire the following individuals: (1) an outreach coordinator tasked with community engagement and implementation of the numerous Consent Decree provisions that require public education and collaboration with the Ferguson community; (2) an individual within the Municipal Court to assist with policy development and training; and (3) an FPD employee to support policy development, facilitate the conversion of policies into structured and organized trainings, and evaluate whether state and other external training programs comply with FPD’s implemented policies. These roles are critical to achieving compliance with the Consent Decree, and during the remaining quarter of Year Two, the City should prioritize identifying talented individuals to serve in these positions.
 On June 18, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to modify four provisions of the consent decree, claiming the proposed modifications were consistent with the intent and purpose of the original provisions and would allow for more effective and practical application of the provisions, particularly in providing greater clarity to FPD officers in the course of their duties. The court approved the minor modifications on June 21, 2018. The plaintiffs made minor amendments to the consent decree on November 15, 2018 in an uncontested motion. Monitoring and regular status conferences have continued, and are ongoing as of June 9th, 2020. Status conferences are made open to the public and have established procedures for public comment on compliance. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 9, 2014, 18-year-old black male, Michael Brown was shot by a white police officer in Ferguson, Missouri. The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice opened up an investigation into the Ferguson Police Department. The Justice Department did not find enough evidence to prosecute the officer in question but did find that the police department was violating the Constitution through various practices that invidiously discriminated against African Americans. The Justice Department and the City of Ferguson worked toward a consent decree that was eventually passed by the Ferguson City Council on March 15, 2016. The agreement will last until the Justice Department finds the city compliant for two years.


On September 16, 2015, the Florida Justice Institute filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of 2,000 inmates in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The complaint alleged that the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC), and their medical services contractor Corizon LLC, had denied hernia surgeries to prisoners to save money, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought both a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the defendants to immediately provide hernia surgery to all FDOC prisoners recommended for surgery. For prisoners who have not seen a surgeon, the plaintiffs requested that they be seen by a surgeon. The plaintiffs also requested monetary damages and attorneys' fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. On December 24, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class defined as "all current and future prisoners in the custody of FDOC who have presented, or will present, with a symptomatic hernia to prison staff." The plaintiffs also moved for certification of two subclasses. These were a surgery recommendation subclass, defined as "all class members who have received, or will in the future receive, a recommendation from a surgeon that they receive surgery" and a no consult subclass, consisting of "all class members who have not seen a surgeon, or will be denied a visit to a surgeon in the future, for a surgical consultation." On January 6, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the defendants to perform those hernia surgeries for those prisoners who have already received a recommendation. The plaintiffs also sought an order requiring the defendants to send class members to an independent surgeon for a surgical consultation, and then to abide by the surgeon's recommendation. On May 2, 2016, the plaintiffs and the defendants participated in settlement mediation and reached a settlement. On September 19, 2016, the plaintiffs and defendants filed a joint motion asking the court to conditionally certify two classes and to preliminarily approve the class settlement. On September 23, 2016, Judge Hinkle preliminarily approved the consent order and certified two classes. The injunctive class was defined as "[a]ll current and future prisoners in FDOC custody who, after September 16, 2011, have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with a hernia by a qualified medical provider." The damages class was defined as "[a]ll past and current prisoners in FDOC custody who were diagnosed with and/or treated for a hernia between September 8, 2013, and May 31, 2016, at an FDOC facility while Corizon was the medical provider for that FDOC facility." As part of the agreement, the defendants agreed to pay about $2.1 million to settle this lawsuit: FDOC would pay $150,000 and Corizon would pay $1,950,000. The consent order also required FDOC to amend its health care policy on hernias to ensure that prisoners are referred to doctors for consultations and receive the recommended care. The FDOC would adopt a new Health Service Bulletin dealing with hernias, provide notice to medical staff and comply with the new policy. On March 27, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for final approval of the class action settlement. In response, the court required that certain state and federal governmental officials be given notice and 100 days to file any objection prior to final approval in compliance with the Class Action Fairness Act. After all objections had been fully considered, Judge Hinkle ruled that none provided the basis to disapprove or alter the agreement. The court granted final approval of the class action settlement on September 11, 2017. 2017 WL 8780863. On November 16, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss with prejudice the defendant Corizon. The court granted it and removed Corizon from the action. On December 19, 2017, a class member filed a notice of a breach of the agreement, claiming that the defendants were not providing inmates hernia exams. Judge Hinkle treated this notice as a motion for relief and denied it without prejudice on December 31, 2017. On January 2, 2018, another class member filed a notice of their appeal of the order granting final approval to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Later, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his appeal. On April 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the consent order (from September 23, 2016), and the defendants answered on May 16, 2019. Oral argument on the motion was held on June 13, 2019. On August 15, 2019, the parties reached a joint agreement, and the court issued an order for the parties to comply. FDOC agreed to provide more complete and frequent reports. The parties also agreed that a delay of more than four months between diagnosis and surgical consult or between surgical consult and surgery would be considered an "undue delay." The motion to enforce was dismissed without prejudice as moot. There have been repeated efforts to reopen the case by prisoners who were not included within the class definition, but the court has denied these. As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.

Summary: In 2015, prisoners filed this class action in the U.S. District for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that they were denied medical treatment for hernia and sought an injunction requiring a new health policy to provide surgery for hernia. In 2016, parties reached a settlement that required such policy as well as monetary damages to the plaintiffs. In 2019, the parties reached an agreement that in addition to the settlement, more complete and frequent reports would be provided and a delay of more than four months would be considered an "undue delay." As of October 11, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring and enforcement purposes.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company based in Pascagoula, Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters approximately $15,000 for recruitment fees, as well as additional fees for skills and medical tests. The plaintiffs also named Malvern C. Burnett and Sachin Dewan, a New Orleans lawyer and India-based recruiter, respectively, as co-defendants for their involvement in the scheme. Upon arrival in the United States, plaintiffs discovered that they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, they were forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps under constant supervision of private security guards, and were subject to threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and (d)), Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. §1985), the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidential relationship. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) transferred this case and Achari, Chakkiyattil v. Signal International, and Devassy v. Signal International to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the Achari case. This case continues at the case page for Achari.

Summary: On Aug. 7, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case.


In September 2000, the New Orleans District Office and Houston Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commision (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, doing business as Rite Aid Corp., in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. Following four amendments of the complaint by the EEOC, one motion for summary judgment that was granted in part and another that was denied, and a $1,820 fine against the EEOC for excessive discovery that was upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the case was heard before the judge in July 2002. The judge held that the EEOC prevailed against the defendant for engaging in an unlawful employment practice but ordered that no relief be awarded since the EEOC failed to prove cognizable danger existed that Rite Aid would in the future take sex into account in making an employment decision. Both parties appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in September 2002, which affirmed the District Court's decision in October 2002.

Summary: The EEOC filed this lawsuit against drug store Rite Aid Corp. and K & B Louisiana Corp, (doing business as Rite Aid Corp.), alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the fourth amended complaint alleged that the defendant did not consider rehiring the complaining party when a new store opened since it believed a male would be better able to meet the physical demands of a Liquor Department Clerk. The Court found that the EEOC had proven Defendant had engaged in an unlawful employment practice but provided no relief, finding no cognizable danger that future wrongdoing would occur.


On March 25, 2013, three same-sex couples residing in Utah, one of which was legally married in Iowa, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Utah under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Utah. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a declaration that Amendment 3 to the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-2(5) violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause by denying same-sex couples the opportunity to marry or have Utah recognize marriages entered into in other states. The plaintiffs asked for a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing both the amendment and the law and compelling the defendants to recognize the Iowa marriage as legal in Utah. The plaintiffs also sought attorney's fees. Section 31-1-2 of the Utah Code was amended in 1977, to state that marriages "between persons of the same sex" were "prohibited and declared void." In 2004, the legislature passed section 30-1-4.1 of the Utah Code, which provides: (a) It is the policy of this state to recognize as marriage only the legal union of a man and a woman as provided in this chapter. (b) Except for the relationship of marriage between a man and a woman recognized pursuant to this chapter, this state will not recognize, enforce, or give legal effect to any law creating any legal status, rights, benefits, or duties that are substantially equivalent to those provided under Utah law to a man and woman because they are married. In addition, the Utah Constitution was amended by referendum on Nov. 2, 2004 (with 66% of the voters approving the amendment) to include the following text: (1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect. In this case, District Judge Robert Shelby, held on December 20, 2013, decided the case for the plaintiffs, declaring the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing the relevant sections of the Utah Code and Constitution. Given the Supreme Court's opinion in Windsor v. United States, the court held, "the important federalism concerns at issue here are nevertheless insufficient to save a state-law prohibition that denies the Plaintiffs their rights to due process and equal protection under the law." The plaintiffs had, Judge Shelby found, a fundamental right to marry, and an inability to "develop the type of intimate bond necessary to sustain a marriage with a person of the opposite sex." Moreover, neither Utah's law nor the constitutional amendment served a rational basis: two of the asserted justifications (promoting responsible procreation within marriage; promoting the ideal arrangement that children be raised by both a father and a mother in a stable family unit) were not served by the ban on same-sex marriage, and the justification of preserving the traditional definition of marriage was insufficiently weighty. The court observed that "The State's position appears to be based on an assumption that the availability of same-sex marriage will somehow cause opposite-sex couples to forego marriage," but found that view unsupported by evidence, whereas the harm experienced by same-sex couples was "undisputed." The court compared Utah's arguments to those made by Virginia in 1966, before the Supreme Court, defending the ban on interracial marriage. The state sought a stay and filed an appeal, but Judge Shelby denied the application, as did the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. While the stay applications (there were several, on different grounds) were pending, about 1300 Utah couples got married. The state applied to the Supreme Court for a stay, and on January 6, 2014, that was granted, "pending final disposition of the appeal" before the 10th Circuit. This raised the issue of the status of the 1300 marriages celebrated in the prior two weeks. On January 8, the Utah Attorney General, Sean Reyes, declined to state whether the marriages remained effective, but Governor Gary Herbert's child of staff that same day directed all state agencies that recognition of the marriages was "ON HOLD until further notice." That is, "For example, if a same-sex married couple previously changed their names on new drivers licenses, those licenses should not be revoked. If a same-sex couple seeks to change their names on drivers licenses now, the law does not allow the state agency to recognize the marriage therefore the new drivers licenses cannot be issued." U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder took a different position, however: he announced on January 10 that "for purposes of federal law, these marriages will be recognized as lawful and considered eligible for all relevant federal benefits on the same terms as other same-sex marriages." Several states have followed the same approach. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Utah's ban on same-sex marriage, the court held in an opinion by Judge Lucero, violated the fundamental right to marry, establish a family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state's marital laws, protected by the 14th Amendment under the doctrine of substantive due process. Kitchen v. Herbert, 2014 WL 2868044 (10th Circuit 2014). Judge Kelly dissented. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah clerks county began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

Summary: On December 20, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah found for the plaintiffs in this challenge (filed March 25, 2013) to Utah's same-sex marriage ban, and enjoined enforcement of that ban. Over a thousand marriages occurred in the next two weeks, at which time the Supreme Court stayed operation of the district court injunction pending disposition of the appeal in the 10th Circuit. On June 25, 2014, the 10th Circuit affirmed, agreeing with the District Court that Utah's ban on same-sex marriage is unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals stayed operation of its decision pending filing/disposition of a petition seeking Supreme Court review. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. As a result, the 10th Circuit lifted its stay and Utah county clerks began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.


This case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a "Certificate of Eligibility" pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1. Plaintiff alleged the practice and law violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Plaintiff requested that their claims be heard by a three-judge panel and be declared unconstitutional. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed.

Summary: his case is a companion suit to the state court case, Gooden v. Hunter [CJ-AL-0004]. In this action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the NAACP challenged the practice of the Alabama Secretary of State and state voter registrars refusing to register to vote those people with felony convictions not involving moral turpitude, unless they received a "Certificate of Eligibility" pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-22-36.1. On May 26, 2006, the three judge panel of the District Court (Judge Charles R. Wilson, Judge William M. Acker Jr. and Judge C. Lynwood Smith) denied plaintiff's request for declaratory relief and granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Costs were taxed against the plaintiff and the case was dismissed.


On September 12, 2008, two convicted felons filed a civil rights action under federal and state laws in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Jackson Division. Plaintiffs named the Secretary of the State of Mississippi, and various county election officials as Defendants. Plaintiffs allege that §241 of the Mississippi Constitution explicitly allows for individuals who have been convicted of a crime to vote for the U.S. President and Vice President. Plaintiffs assert that they meet all the requirements for an elector in the State of Mississippi and, despite their felony convictions, retain the right to vote for President and Vice President. Plaintiffs claim that Defendants' disfranchisement of Plaintiffs violates § 241 of the Mississippi Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the National Voter Registration Act. Represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union, Plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. On September 25, 2008, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) denied the motion for a preliminary injunction from the bench, stating that their interpretation of § 241 was not "fair or reasonable." The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit subsequently denied Plaintiffs' motion for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal. On October 02, 2008, the state officials filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6). On March 9, 2009, the District Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) granted Defendants' motion as to 12(b)(6), concluding that, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs' complaint was "without merit and should be dismissed with prejudice" because their interpretation of § 241 was "legally incorrect." The Court also concluded that "defendants have correctly construed this provision." Plaintiffs appealed to the Fifth Circuit. On February 25, 2010, in a published opinion by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision. Young v. Hoseman, 598 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2010)

Summary: This 2008 voting rights case was brought by convicted felons who claimed that Massachessetts Constitution permitted them to vote in presidential elections. The District Court disagreed, and the 5th Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.


On May 17, 2006, American citizens who use the telephone and internet filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the President of the United States of America, the National Security Agency and the Attorney General under the Declaratory Judgment Act and bivens. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged the government had engaged in a massive, indiscriminate, illegal dragnet of the phone calls and email of tens of millions of ordinary Americans since the September 11 terrorist attacks. Allegedly, the core component of the defendant's surveillance program was a nationwide network of sophisticated communication surveillance devices attached to the key facilities of various telecommunication companies carrying Americans' Internet and telephone communications. On February 2, 2007, this case was transferred to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The Multi District Litigation (MDL) Panel then consolidated the case as part of a multi-district litigation, In Re National Security Agency Telecommunications Records Litigation, NS-CA-11, in this Clearinghouse. For information about what happened while the case was a part of the consolidation see NS-CA-0004. After dismissals of almost all of the cases in the MDL, this case was one of only two cases remaining. The other case was Jewel v. NSA, see NS-CA-0002, in this Clearinghouse. On January 21, 2010, Judge Walker dismissed this case and Jewel v. NSA, holding the plaintiffs lacked standing. Jewel v. National Sec Agency, 2010 WL 235075 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21 2010). The plaintiffs appealed. On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit vacated that judgment. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge McKeown held that the plaintiffs did have standing and remanded the case back to district court "with instructions to consider, among other claims and defenses, whether the government's assertion that the state secrets privilege bars this litigation." Jewel v. NSA, 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011). Upon remand, the plaintiffs moved for partial summary adjudication, requesting that the district court dismiss the defendants' state secret defense. The defendants cross-moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity for the statutory claims and for summary judgment on the assertion of the state secrets privilege. On May 8, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint and demand for a jury trial against government defendants. Earlier in 2012, Judge Walker had retired, so the matter was reassigned to District Judge Jeffrey S. White on September 17, 2012. On July 23, 2013, Judge White granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary adjudication, rejecting the defendants' state secrets defense. However, the Judge White also granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for damages under FISA and all statutory claims for injunctive relief on the basis of sovereign immunity. Judge White reserved ruling on the Defendants' motions for summary judgment on remaining non-statutory claims (counts 1—4 of the Jewel Complaint and the fourth cause of action in the Shubert Complaint). Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2013). On March 10, 2014, Judge White entered a temporary restraining order requiring the preservation of relevant evidence pending the parties' further briefing and the Court's final determination of the preservation issues. In its restraining order, the Court required that the government refrain from "destroying any potential evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this action, including but not limited to prohibiting the destruction of any telephone metadata or 'call detail' records, pending further order of the Court." This order applied to this case, as well as Jewel v. NSA and First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, NS-CA-0003, in this Clearinghouse. This temporary restraining order directly conflicted with an order to destroy all metadata within five years of collection issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01, NS-DC-0051, in this Clearinghouse. As a result, the FISC granted temporary relief from the five-year destruction requirement but required that telephony metadata being preserved beyond the five-year limitation not be used by the NSA for any purpose. On February 10, 2015, the Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment with regard to Plaintiffs' claim that interception of their internet communications was a violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that the plaintiffs did not establish a sufficient factual basis to sue under the Fourth Amendment, and even if plaintiffs did establish sufficient facts, the claim would be dismissed because any defense would impermissibly disclose state secret information. 2015 WL 545925. On May 20, 2015, the Court ordered final judgment in favor on the defendants based on the February 10, 2015 order. The docket was last updated on March 5, 2018. The Court granted a Stipulated Protective Order with regard to Plaintiffs' personal information. Within 60 days of the final disposition of the action, the Defendants were required to return or destroy all protected material.

Summary: On May 17, 2006, plaintiffs sued the United States government in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claiming that the defendant's electronic surveillance program violated the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and the Fourth Amendment. The court dismissed each of plaintiffs' claims except the claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment and later dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim for lack of factual basis and alternatively because any defense would disclose state secret information.


This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. EPIC is a nonprofit organization that aims to expose new issues related to privacy and civil liberties. The complaint stated that ICE had a contract with Palantir Technologies, a data mining firm, to create and maintain information systems "designed to make determinations about specific, identifiable individuals." FALCON and ICM are two such information systems that ICE used. EPIC argued that Palantir's products provide "the basis for deportation determinations" by collecting "massive amounts of data on individuals and applying, secretive, proprietary techniques [to make] determinations about their fitness for employment, travel, and whether they should be targeted for further investigations." FALCON and ICM specifically enabled ICE to secretly collect personal data from numerous federal databases with information on individuals not suspected of any crimes. The complaint further asserted that ICE sought to make FALCON exempt from several Privacy Act safeguards, while ICM is already exempt from those safeguards. At an initial scheduling conference held on March 14, 2018, Judge Randal D. Moss directed the parties to file a joint status report every 60 days. Status reports filed in May through September 2018 indicated that the government was in the process of producing responsive records on a rolling basis. A November 2018 status report indicated the production was complete and that EPIC was reviewing the produced records. The August 2019 joint status update stated that EPIC had reviewed the document production and identified several issues in dispute, including the agency's withholdings under FOIA exemptions. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to these specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents the same day. EPIC reviewed the released documents and, on September 19, 2019, stated that there are no further issues concerning document production. The only issue left to be determined was attorneys' fees. On January 30, 2020, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, pursuant to the parties' settlement agreement, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. On January 31, the court ordered the dismissal. There have been no subsequent docket entries and the case has closed.

Summary: This Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint was filed on Dec. 15, 2017. The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for records pertaining to the data collection systems FALCON and Investigative Case Management (ICM). EPIC argued that ICE's use of these systems risked violating the Privacy Act of 1974 and the E-Government Act. ICE finished document production by November 2018. On July 25, 2019, EPIC raised challenges to specific withholdings of documents, and ICE released the withheld documents. On January 31, 2020, the parties settled, with EPIC receiving attorneys' fees. This case has finished.


In April 2019, the plaintiff applied to work for Whole Foods' Manhattan-area delivery service. As part of their hiring procedure, Whole Foods, which is owned by Amazon, conducted a background check. Upon learning about plaintiff's criminal history, Whole Foods denied plaintiff a job, despite there being no other issues with plaintiff's application. On June 6, 2020, the plaintiff brought a class action suit against Whole Foods and Amazon. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff brought suit under three state human rights laws that restrict employers' ability to deny employment on the basis of applicants' criminal histories. The plaintiff sought statutory damages, exemplary and punitive damages, injunctive and/or declaratory relief, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. In response to defendant Whole Food's September 4 motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The plaintiff was denied employment by Whole Foods due to prior criminal history, despite three New York/New York City statues that protect applicants with criminal histories. The plaintiff brought a class action suit and has until September 25, 2020 to file an amended complaint in response to Whole Food's motion to dismiss.


On June 14, 2006, the San Francisco District Office and Seattle Field Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Providence Health System, doing business as Providence Alaska Medical Center, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendant failed to rehire the complaining parties after a layoff based upon their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with the ADEA (a zero-tolerance policy), and to pay the Plaintiffs a lump sum of $220,000 to be divided as the Plaintiffs see fit. The Consent Decree also required the Defendants to implement a non-discrimination policy, which would specifically say that age-based discrimination may result in disciplinary action, and would define age-based discrimination clearly. The goal of this policy was to make it easier for workers to come forward with complaints of age-based discrimination, and to offer quicker solutions to these complaints. The Defendants also agreed to educate their employees on the requirements of ADEA, and to report their progress to the Plaintiffs. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012.

Summary: On June 14, 2006, the EEOC filed this ADEA case against Providence Health System in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska on behalf of employees who claimed to have been denied re-hire after lay-off due to their age. On June 3, 2009, the parties entered into a three year Consent Decree in which the Defendants promised to be fully compliant with ADEA, to implement a non-discrimination policy, and to pay the Plaintiffs $220,000. According to the terms of the Consent Decree, this case was closed and the agreement terminated on June 3, 2012.


On June 30, 2016 a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness (“GLAD”), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Ana under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ACA”) Title II, the California Disabled Persons Act, and Cal. Govt. Code § 11135, which at relevant parts provides that no person shall be unlawfully denied full and equal access to benefits on the basis of disability. Plaintiffs also sued the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) under Section 504, alleging discrimination based on disability in the Santa Ana City Jail against immigration detainees housed by ICE in the jail. Represented by private counsel, Plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing a total lack of communication services for inmates who are deaf and hard of hearing, such as ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids, Plaintiffs alleged that detainees with hearing disabilities were effectively denied access to the programming and services made available by the jail to the general public. Plaintiff resident alleged that, while ICE officials and the Santa Ana Jail knew she was not fluent in English and was deaf, they never provided her with auxiliary aids or language assistance during her five months of immigration detention at the jail. Because of this failure, she was unable to understand the jail’s procedures, had no means to communicate with people outside of the jail, received improper medical care, and was denied all access to the jail’s educational programming. Furthermore, because officials failed to communicate to her that she was eligible for bond in June 2015, she stayed an extra five months at the jail. Later, on December 5, 2016 Defendant City of Santa Ana submitted a request for stay of proceedings and early mediation through the court’s alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) program. Judge Manuel Real referred the case to the ADR program, and the Parties went before a Mediator on February 17, 2017. The case settled fully on the same date. While the terms of the settlement were not made public, an attorney for Plaintiffs made a statement shortly after mediation that Plaintiffs would receive damages in the amount of $140,000. He also referenced injunctive relief that would “prevent what happened to the plaintiffs in this case from happening to another deaf, hard-of-hearing person housed in the Santa Ana city jail.” After the terms of the settlement were carried out, the parties filed a joint stipulation to dismiss the action with prejudice on May 19, 2017, with each Party to pay their own attorneys’ fees and costs.

Summary: In June 2016, a deaf resident of California, together with the Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the City of Santa Ana's failure to provide ASL interpreters or auxiliary aids to deaf and hard of hearing immigration detainees at the city's jail violated Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. In February 2017, the parties reached a settlement requiring Defendants to pay $140,000 in damages to Plaintiffs and to develop measures to ensure that deaf and hard of hearing jail detainees would receive appropriate accommodations and services. The case closed in May 2017.


In 1992 and 1993, a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("RA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) ("RCW"). In the first suit filed on October 26, 1992, styled Duffy v. Riveland (92-01596), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at a July 30, 1992, prison disciplinary hearing. By order dated January 28, 1994, the District Court (Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) granted summary judgment to the defendants. Duffy appealed. In the second suit, styled Duffy v. Yost (93-637), Duffy challenged the defendants' failure to provide him with a qualified interpreter at two separate classification hearings. The District Court (Judge Coughenour) granted summary judgment to the defendants on April 19, 1994. Duffy appealed. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases on appeal and reversed the summary judgments in part (dismissal of ADA, RA, state law claims and § 1983 claims stemming from disciplinary hearing) and affirmed in part (dismissal of § 1983 claims stemming from classification hearings) and remanded the cases for further proceedings. Duffy v. Riveland. 98 F.3d 447 (1996). On remand, both cases were assigned to District Judge Rothstein. Duffy amended his complaint and then filed a motion for partial summary judgment on his state law claim. On January 14, 1998, the District Court (Judge Barbara Rothstein) granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and held that state law (RCW 2.42.120) required the defendants to provide hearing-impaired inmates with a qualified interpreter at quasi-judicial proceedings. The Court ordered that injunctive relief should be extended to all future disciplinary hearings. On February 10, 1998, a consolidated class action complaint was filed in the Duffy cases and the case Atkins v. Lehman, also pending in the District. A settlement of all claims followed. The settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters and TTY access to hearing impaired inmates. In addition to the new policy, the DOC agreed to pay plaintiffs' attorneys fees of $150,000. The District Court approved the class action settlement by order dated September 3, 1998. The settlement class included "All inmates incarcerated in Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC) facilities now or in the future who are deaf or whose hearing impairment substantially limits a major life activity." We have no further information on this matter.

Summary: In 1992 and 1993, Sean Duffy a deaf inmate incarcerated at the Washington State Reformatory at Monroe, Washington, filed two pro se suits in the U.S. District Court for the Western District Of Washington contending that prison officials failed to provide him with a qualified interpreter at prison proceedings in violation of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA"); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 ("RA"); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" § 1983"); and Revised Code of Washington Chapters 2.42.120(1), (2), and (4) ("RCW"). The parties eventually settled, and the settlement provided for the creation of a new Washington Department of Corrections policy governing treatment of disabled inmates, including provisions relating to providing certified interpreters to hearing impaired inmates.


On April 13, 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs asked for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to apply the relevant sections of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act to female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they apply the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendant to recognize both of them as legal parents of their child and to issue a birth certificate for the child that identifies them both as legal parents. On July 22, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from enforcing the sections of its Uniform Parentage Act at issue in a way that differentiates between male spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction with donor sperm and similarly situated female spouses of women. Roe v. Patton, No. 2:15-cv-00253-DB, 2015 WL 4476734, at *1 (D. Utah. July 22, 2015). The defendants complied with the injunction, including issuing a birth certificate for the plaintiffs' child listing them both as parents. On October 16, 2015, the plaintiffs and defendants submitted a joint stipulated proposed order granting a permanent injunction. On October 20, 2015, the District Court (Judge Dee Benson) converted the preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction and awarded $24,302 in attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiffs.

Summary: In 2015, a same-sex married couple filed this lawsuit against Utah in the District Court of the District of Utah. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs challenged Utah's application of the Utah Uniform Parentage Act. Utah did not treat female spouses of women who give birth through assisted reproduction using donor sperm in the same way they treated the assisted-reproduction statutes to male spouses in the same situation. The Court issued a preliminary injunction ordering Utah to apply the Act uniformly. Then, the parties settled and the preliminary injunction was made permanent.


On April 25, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three New York City residents who use wheelchairs filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The plaintiffs sought class-action certification; an order and judgment enjoining defendants from violating Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the NYCHRL; declaratory relief; an order requiring defendants to institute system-wide policies and practices necessary to ensure the subway system elevators regularly operate in a useable and sanitary condition and provision of adequate notice and alternative accommodations when outages occur; and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City’s subway system in violation of state and federal law. Specifically, they claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the subway elevators caused riders with mobility disabilities to routinely face frequent elevator outages occurring without notice and lasting as long as several months; that the defendants gave no warning of outages and did not provide alternate accommodations when they occur; and that as a result of defendants’ failure to provide proper maintenance, they have denied New Yorkers with mobile disabilities access to public transportation. The plaintiffs argued that the transit agency’s failure to provide an adequate number of elevators in the subway system violates the city’s human rights law, whose aim is to “eliminate and prevent discrimination from playing any role in actions relating to employment, public accommodations and housing and other real estate, and to take other actions against prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination and bias-related violence or harassment.” The plaintiffs' federal claims alleged that the transit agency’s failure to maintain operable elevators violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, which prohibits discriminating against people with disabilities in public facilities. On September 6, 2017, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice as against the City of New York on the ground that the lease between the City and the Transit Authority gives the Transit Authority full jurisdiction, control, possession, and supervision of New York transit facilities and limits the City’s right of reentry to the leased facilities to repair service facilities that are not used for transit purposes. On November 3, 2017, Judge Katherine B. Forrest issued an order certifying the action to proceed as a class action on behalf of all persons who use or seek to use the New York City subway system and have a disability that requires them to use an elevator to access the subway system. The parties proceeded to discovery and deposition in 2018 and the case was reassigned to Judge Robert W. Sweet on September 20, 2018. Discovery continued under Judge Sweet, until he passed away on March 24, 2019. The case was reassigned to Judge George B. Daniels on April 8, 2019. On May 28, 2019, Judge Daniels terminated a motion for extension of time to complete discovery, a motion to compel, and a motion for discovery pursuant to the May 2, 2019, status conference. Two more motions were resolved on June 4, 2019. On August 9, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. They moved the court to find that the defendant discriminated against individuals with mobility disabilities by systemically failing to implement adequate, programmatic subway system elevator maintenance in violation of Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law. Plaintiffs' experts also filed supporting statements. On the same day, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. They moved the court to find in favor of the defendant on all claims in the complaint and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. An oral argument was held on October 24, 2019. At the conclusion of oral argument, the court reserved decision on the motions and declined to set a trial date. On November 14, 2019, the plaintiffs filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. On November 18, the defendants briefly responded in a letter to the judge and asked that the plaintiffs’ filing be stricken from the docket because the filing was not solicited by the court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 25th, 2017, a group of New York City disability rights organizations and three individual disabled New York City residents who use wheelchairs and have frequently encountered subway outages filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the interim executive director of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the New York City Transit Authority, the acting president of the New York City Transit Authority, and the City of New York, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ failure to maintain the limited number of elevators in the subway caused the systematic discriminatory exclusion of hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers with mobility disabilities from New York City’s subway system in violation of state and federal law. After extensive discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment on August 9, 2019. An oral argument was held on October 24 but Judge George B. Daniels reserved a decision on the motions. The case is still ongoing.


On December 29, 2008, two men married in the state of California, filed suit against the United States, the State of California, and 'Does 1 through 1,000' alleging violations by the Federal Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA", 1 U.S.C. §7) of the Full Faith and Credit, Equal Protection, and Due Process clauses to the Constitution, as well as the rights to Privacy, Speech, Travel, and the Ninth Amendment to the Constitution. The case was originally filed in Superior Court of California for the County of Orange and removed to the US District Court for the Central District of California, Southern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that DOMA discriminated along lines of gender and sexual orientation by prohibiting any requirement that any state recognize same sex marriages conducted in another state, and in turn permitting the limitation of federal benefits tied to marital status that are due those couples on such grounds. Plaintiffs also complained that the California state constitutional prohibition of same-sex marriage ("Proposition 8") violated the same set of rights as DOMA. These allegations had been brought twice before by the couple, but were dismissed or withdrawn for jurisdictional and technical reasons. The portion of the case pursuing California law was dismissed as moot on July 25, 2009, since plaintiffs were already and continued to be legally married in the state of California. The Court, Judge David O. Carter, ultimately dismissed the portion of the case concerning DOMA on technical grounds on August 24, 2009, citing improper initial filing in state court (despite removal to proper federal court). The case is notable for the two different stances taken by the Department of Justice ("DOJ") during briefing. The DOJ initially defended the law substantively in briefing filed June 11, 2009, citing public policy considerations to validate DOMA's diminishment of the legal status of same-sex marriages in states where they are prohibited by law, and consequent limitation on the federal benefit rights afforded such couples whose marriages are not legal in all states. In later briefing filed on August 17, 2009, the DOJ withdrew support for the law, stating that it should be "repealed as a matter of policy" due to its "discriminatory" nature, but continued to defend it on the presumption of constitutionality afforded acts of Congress and its practice of defending federal statutes as long as reasonable arguments can be made in support of their constitutionality. This was an intermediate step towards the DOJ's later position that DOMA is unconstitutional.

Summary: Two married men in California brought suit alleging that DOMA and Proposition 8 violated their Equal Protection and Due Process Rights. The case, dismissed for jurisdictional reasons and withdrawn previously, was dismissed again because of improper filing. Smelt is significant because the DOJ began briefing by defending DOMA on substantive grounds, but changed its argument during defense of its dispositive summary judgment motion, stating that the law was "discriminatory" in nature and should be "repealed as a matter of policy."