On January 11, 2006, several inmates at the state prison at San Quentin filed lawsuits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, all of whom were scheduled to be executed by lethal injection, alleged that their constitutional rights were threatened, arguing that lethal injection was cruel and unusual punishment that violated the Eighth Amendment. They further argued that pancuronium bromide, a paralytic agent that acts as a chemical veil over the lethal injection process, disguises the pain and suffering to which a prisoner being executed is subjected, masking the constitutional violation. On February 13, 2006, these cases were consolidated, with Michael Angelo Morales being treated as the lead plaintiff. On February 14, 2006, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Jeremy Fogel) conditionally denied the plaintiff's request for a temporary stay of execution, stipulating that the stay would be granted unless the defendants certified in writing that they would either 1) use only sodium thiopental during the execution or 2) agree to obtain an independent verification by a medically qualified individual that the plaintiff is unconscious before he receives the lethal injection. Morales v. Hickman, 415 F.Supp.2d 1037 (N.D.Cal. 2006). The plaintiff appealed. On February 19, 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a per curiam denial of the appeal. Morales v. Hickman, 438 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court. On February 20, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Morales v. Hickman, 546 U.S. 1163 (2006). As the execution was about to commence on February 21, 2006, the two anesthesiologists designated by the defendants to certify that the plaintiff was unconscious declined to participate in the execution due to ethical concerns arising from their lack of understanding of certain language in the opinions that had been issued in the case. As a result of this hesitation, the execution did not go forward as scheduled. Later the same day, the District Court (Judge Fogel) again ordered the execution by lethal injection to go forward, using sodium thiopental. For reasons that are not specified in our documents, the execution was not carried out, the defendants were unwilling or unable to execute the plaintiff in accordance with the requirements of the District Court, and a stay of execution to permit an evidentiary hearing issued automatically pursuant to the District Court's order of February 14, 2006. From September 26-29, 2006, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue. On December 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Fogel) issued an opinion holding that it would be unconstitutional to inject a prisoner who was not unconscious and ordering the defendants to review and revise their execution procedures. On January 16, 2007, the defendants responded to the district court's order, advising the court of their intent to revise the state's execution procedures and asking the court for a protective order that would allow them to obtain accurate and candid information necessary to the revision. On March 6, 2007, the District Court denied the motion for a protective order, holding that it was unnecessary. On May 15, 2007, the State of California issued the Lethal Injection Protocol Review, a document that discussed the history and procedures involved in lethal injection, as well as necessary changes that would be made to the procedure. On July 2, 2007, the Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint alleging that the defendant's Lethal Injunction Protocol Review still created "a grave and substantial risk that Plaintiff will not be adequately unconscious during the execution process and, as a result, will experience an excruciatingly painful and protracted death." Accordingly, the Plaintiffs argued that the defendant's protocol represented an unconstitutional risk of severe pain. On April 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court decided Baze v. Rees. In that case, the Court upheld Kentucky's lethal injection protocol as constitutional. Significant to the case at hand, the Kentucky protocol utilized the same three-drug cocktail as California's amended protocol does. The Court established that to show an 8th amendment violation, a plaintiff must prove that a State's lethal injection protocol "creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain. [They] must show that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives." The Court found that Kentucky's protocol did not violate this standard. Moreover, the plurality opinion held that "a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this standard." On October 8, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint again alleging that the defendant's Lethal Injunction Protocol Review "will subject them to present demonstrated substantial risks of inflicting tortuous pain and suffering under the Eighth Amendment." Furthermore, the Plaintiffs contended that "Defendants' continued use of their three-drug procedure when tested, available alternatives exist establishes that the demonstrated risk of severe pain by Defendants' process is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives. Defendants have refused to adopt such alternatives in the face of these documented advantages, without any legitimate penological justification for their continued retention of the three-drug protocol." On October 25, 2010, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for a failure to state a claim. The defendants argued, "plaintiffs failed to state a claim for a facial challenge to California's regulations because the regulations are substantially similar to or exceed the regulations approved by the United States Supreme Court in Baze." Moreover, the motion argued, "Plaintiffs have not alleged facts sufficient to state a claim that, as written, California's regulations will necessarily subject Plaintiffs to a substantial risk of serious harm, where serious harm means severe pain." However, the defendants did not challenge the plaintiffs as applied challenge. On December 10, 2010, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. Given the defendants' burden at the motion to dismiss stage of the litigation, the court was unwilling to find that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim. However, the court made clear that it "intends to monitor closely the scope and pace of any additional discovery so that the merits of Plaintiffs' claims can be adjudicated promptly." On June 19, 2013, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to intervene and to stay execution for an additional plaintiff. On September 17, 2013, the Court granted another motion to intervene for two more plaintiffs. On November 7, 2014, the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit called Winchell & Alexander v. Beard against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) in Sacramento County Superior Court. The plaintiffs were two individuals whose family members had been murdered by inmates currently on death row who are plaintiffs in Morales v. Hickman. The plaintiffs in Winchell & Alexander argued that as relatives of the victims they had been denied justice by the continued delays of the executions. This case was settled on June 2, 2015, when CDCR agreed to promulgate a single-drug lethal injection regulation within 120 days after the U.S. Supreme Court issued its opinion in Glossip v. Gross. See the CJLF's website for more information. On June 29, 2015 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Glossip v. Gross that the sedative midazolam may be part of the lethal injection protocol. 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015). On October 27, 2015 CDCR submitted its notice of proposed adoption of lethal injection regulations to the Office of Administrative Law for publication in the California Regulatory Notice Register, pursuant to the settlement in Winchell & Alexander v. Beard. According to California's Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's website, the notice was published in the register on November 6, 2015. The proposed regulations would change the death penalty protocol from the three-drug cocktail to a single drug. In a new setback to efforts to restart executions in California, the state's Office of Administrative Law (OAL) has rejected the new lethal injection protocol proposed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. On December 28, 2016, the OAL, which is responsible for reviewing regulatory changes proposed in California, issued a 25-page decision of disapproval, citing inconsistencies, inadequate justification for certain parts of the proposal, and a failure to adequately respond to public comments. The agency gave the Department of Corrections four months to address problems in the protocol. See the Death Penalty Information Center website. On April 18, 2018, Judge Seeborg granted a motion to relate the case of Los Angeles Times Communications LLC v. Kernan to the Morales case. This suit was a First Amendment challenge to California's lethal injection protocol brought by Los Angeles Times Communications LLC and San Francisco Media Progressive Media Center. In response, defendants moved for reconsideration of the order relating the suits. Judge Seeborg denied the motion, arguing that it would be an "unduly burdensome duplication of labor" to have the cases tried separately. On May 14, 2018, Judge Seeborg granted a motion to intervene by an inmate at San Quentin State Prison. The order also stipulated that his execution be stayed until the litigation ended. On July 5, 2018, the San Mateo District Attorney moved to intervene in the case on the grounds that it was in their interests to protect the death judgement obtained for certain inmates. They sought intervention to vacate the stays of execution. Both the Riverside and San Bernardino District Attorneys moved to intervene on similar grounds. Judge Seeborg issued an order denying the motions to intervene on the grounds that the District Attorneys' interests were already being represented by the defendants in the case. In August of 2018, the San Mateo, Riverside, and San Bernardino District Attorney's appealed. The appeal was later denied in January of 2020 in light of the settlement negotiations. On October 31, 2018, an additional inmate moved to intervene and sought a stay of his execution. Two additional inmate moved to intervene and sought a stay of their executions in November of 2018. These motions were denied without prejudice for procedural reasons, leaving a possibility for them to intervene if they filed an amended complaint. On September 11, 2019, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, arguing that the executions violated the Eight Amendment. Two days later, plaintiffs moved to have their suit referred to a Settlement Conference with a Magistrate Judge following California Governor Newsom's Executive Order issued March 13, 2019, which placed a moratorium on the death penalty in California. Judge Seeborg granted this motion and the Settlement Conference was referred to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu. As of January 30, 2020, the parties were engaged in settlement talks. There is a settlement conference scheduled for April 23, 2020.

Summary: On January 11, 2006, several inmates at the California state prison at San Quentin filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs were all scheduled for execution by legal injection and alleged that the execution procedures violated their Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment. They further alleged that the paralytic agent pancuronium bromide disguises the pain and suffering the prisoner is subjected to during execution, which masks the constitutional violation. During the course of this lawsuit the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Baze v. Rees on April 16, 2008. In that case, the Court upheld Kentucky's lethal injection protocol, which uses the same three-drug combination as California's amended protocol. The Court further held that "a lethal injection protocol substantially similar to the protocol upheld [in this case] would not create a risk" that is "substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives." On December 10, 2010 the US District Court for the Northern District of California denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. However, the Court stated that it "intends to monitor closely the scope and pace of any additional discovery so that the merits of Plaintiff's claims can be adjudicated properly." On November 7, 2014 the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation filed a lawsuit in Sacramento County Superior Court against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) on behalf of two individuals whose family members had been murdered by current death row inmates who are plaintiffs in Morales v. Hickman. The case was called Winchell & Alexander v. Beard and the plaintiffs alleged that as relatives of the victims they had been denied justice by the continued delays of the executions. The case settled when the CDCR agreed to promulgate a single-drug lethal injection protocol in June 2015. On October 27, 2015 CDCR submitted its notice of proposed adoption of lethal injection regulations to the Office of Administrative law. The notice was published in the California Regulatory Notice Register on November 6, 2015. The death penalty will likely appear on the November 2016 ballot in California, as opponents have proposed measures to abolish it while proponents are proposing measures that would reform and speed up the death penalty process. After Governor Newsom's Executive Order Issued in March of 2019 placing a moratorium on the death penalty, the parties began settlement negotiations. As of January 2020 the parties were engaged in settlement talks.


On July 10, 2009, mental health patients at Minnesota Extended Treatment Options, a state facility, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Minnesota state law against the Minnesota Department of Human Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages. They alleged that Minnesota Extended Treatment Options frequently subjected patients with developmental disabilities to the improper and inhumane use of seclusion and mechanical restraints in violation of their Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs also claimed state law violations under the Constitution of the State of Minnesota, the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and under Minnesota statutes for negligence, false imprisonment, battery, assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. The plaintiffs' claim for declaratory relief alleged that the Minnesota state statutes referred to as "Rule 40" (Minn. Stat. § 245.825 and Minn. R. 9525.2700 - .2810), which govern the use of seclusion and mechanical restraints in licensed facilities serving persons with developmental disabilities, violate the Minnesota and United States Constitution. Specifically, patients were restrained with metal handcuffs, leg irons, shackles and/or nylon straps after committing insignificant conduct violations such as spitting, laughing, hand-washing, or touching a pizza box. The Minnesota State Ombudsman for Mental Health and Development Disabilities reviewed the Minnesota Extended Treatment Options facility in 2008 and released a report titled "Just Plain Wrong". The Ombudsman found that METO staff excessively used restraints and law enforcement-style devices and that 63% of METO residents at the time of the review had been restrained. One resident was restrained 299 times in 2006 and 230 times in 2007. On March 8, 2010, the District Court (Judge Donovan W. Frank) ordered the Defendants to submit a draft settlement agreement to the Plaintiffs by April 2, 2010. On July 19, 2010, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. That same day the Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify the class. On September 14, 2010, the parties reached a $3 million settlement agreement following two days of mediation. In the settlement, the parties agreed to work together to develop appropriate policies and procedures for implementation at METO and the Minnesota Department of Human Services. Additionally, the parties agreed to form a committee comprised of stakeholders within the developmental disabilities community. The committee's responsibilities included reviewing the Minnesota Department of Health Services rule (Rule 40), which governs and protects people with developmental disabilities. The committee would also modernize Rule 40 to reflect current best practices, including the use of positive and social behavioral supports, the development of placement plans consistent with the principles of the "most integrated setting" and "person-centered planning", and development of an "Olmstead Plan" consistent with the 1999 U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 582 (1999). On Dec. 5, 2011, Judge Frank approved the class settlement agreement. 2011 WL 6178845. On July 17, 2012, the Court appointed an independent advisor and monitor to oversee implementation of the Settlement Agreement and to provide status reports to the Court. The terms indicated that the court would retain jurisdiction for two years after the Agreement was approved of, or as the court deemed just and equitable. It contained an option for the court to extend its jurisdiction upon a motion by plaintiffs if defendants were in substantial non-compliance with certain terms of the Agreement regarding restraints. On Dec. 11, 2013, the Court accepted the monitor's suggestion to modify an aspect of the settlement agreement governing the emergency use of manual restraints and "Velcro soft cuffs and fabric ankle straps." The monitor suggested eliminating the soft cuffs and ankle-strap options and made other changes, including special staff training on the revised policy. On April 30, 2014, in response to another monitor update, Judge Frank issued an order expressing disappointment in the fact that "more than two years after the approval of the settlement agreement, for some [state] employees, safety is equated with a show of force, power and control in a legacy of the old institutional way and not the direction [DHS is] headed." (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court strongly encouraged the state to redouble its efforts at compliance with the settlement agreement. On Sept. 18, 2014, the Court declined to adopt the state's proposed Olmstead Plan and ordered that they submit a revised plan. The state then submitted another revised Olmstead Plan, for which Judge Frank gave his provisional approval on January 9, 2015. However, the court's order outlined a number deficiencies in the proposed Plan, particularly with respect to the state's plans for reaching its employment, housing, and healthcare goals. To address these deficiencies, Judge Frank ordered the state to include more specificity and concrete action steps in its plan. After the State submitted a revised plan in March of 2015, on April 14, the Independent Monitor submitted a special report to the court detailing his concerns about potential misrepresentations and inaccurate or unverified reporting on behalf of the State with respect to its progress. For instance, an April 2014 report filed by the State indicated that "mobile support teams" were actively supporting class members in their homes. However, when the Monitor asked DHS about the activities of these teams, he was told the teams did not exist. The State disputed knowingly or intentionally filing inaccurate information. Judge Frank declined to impose sanctions or hold the state in contempt of court, but did reject the state's revised Olmstead Plan on May 6, 2015. 2015 WL 2100942. He again ordered the state to submit a revised plan, this time by July 10. On May 27, 2015, DHS filed a motion for relief from judgment, asking the court to exempt the State from the provision of the Settlement Agreement that prohibited "transfers or placements of persons committed solely as a person with a developmental disability to the Minnesota Security Hospital." The State apparently did so in response to its decision to move a 16-year-old with developmental disabilities to the Minnesota Security Hospital. On June 24, Judge Frank denied the motion and ordered the defendants to create a discharge plan for the juvenile who had been moved to the hospital. (This individual was moved to a community placement, with approval of the court, in July of 2016.) On August 10, 2015, the State submitted another revised Olmstead Plan. The State's letter to the court indicates that it focused not only on what actions state parties would take to implement the Plan, but also on creating concrete and measurable goals. Although plaintiffs still disapproved of certain aspects of the proposed Olmstead Plan, the court approved it on September 29, 2015. Judge Frank found that three key changes influenced his decision to approve of the Plan: (1) the addition of concrete baseline data and specific timelines to establish measurable goals; (2) improvements to each goal that make the Olmstead Plan not only measurable, but strategically tailored to make a significant impact in the lives of individuals with disabilities across the state; and (3) added commitments to make the Olmstead Plan an evolving document that will continue to respond to the changing needs of individuals in the state over time. The plan included over 100 Evaluation Criteria (EC) through which the State could measure its progress. At this time, two areas - Assistive Technology and Preventing Abuse and Neglect - remained "under development." The court gave defendants another chance to develop these topic areas while it began to implement the overall Plan. On November 20, 2015, Judge Frank awarded $50,000 in additional attorneys' fees to Class Counsel. On February 22, 2016, the court issued two orders with respect to the State's reporting requirements. One required that DHS submit quarterly and annual reports regarding implementation of the newly-approved Olmstead Plan. That order also extended the court's jurisdiction through December of 2019. The second order required DHS to submit semi-annual and annual Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) reports regarding implementation of the Settlement Agreement. The orders temporarily stayed the reporting duties of the Court Monitor. On May 31, 2016, DHS submitted a revised Olmstead Plan, which incorporated developed plans for the areas of Assistive Technology and Preventing Abuse and Neglect. After DHS filed its next round of reports in August, the court ordered the Monitor to write an independent Compliance Report. The Compliance Report, dated November 29, 2016, indicated that defendants had improved in the thoroughness of their self-reporting. However, it noted several areas for improvement in reporting, including verification of outcomes related to quality-of-life, looking outside the scope of documents for sources of compliance information, and including information verifying how "best efforts" were made where that standard was required. Substantively, the Monitor noted that lack of community support services continued to hamper outcomes related to successful transitions into the community. It also noted areas of significant progress, including the cessation of the use of restraints in some facilities and the development of extensive community training. The annual CPA for the year 2016 was filed under seal on March 31, 2017, so its contents are not accessible. However, a quarterly report filed on February 28 indicated that the State had met certain annual goals, including increasing the number of individuals in integrated employment settings, increasing the number of students receiving education in the most integrated setting, and increasing the number of accessible pedestrian signals. It also highlighted areas for improvement, including increasing the number of students entering post-secondary education and decreasing the number of students experiencing the use of emergency restrictive procedures. In April of 2017, defendants objected - but did not formally make a motion - to the court's continuing jurisdiction, arguing that it could only extend its jurisdiction for one year beyond the original two-years that the court indicated it would retain jurisdiction after the Settlement Agreement was approved in 2011. Judge Frank denied defendants' objection on the basis that, while somewhat ambiguous, the Settlement Agreement's assertion that the court could retain jurisdiction as it "deem[ed] just and equitable" meant that continuing jurisdiction to ensure proper implementation of the Agreement was appropriate, especially in light of defendants' past non-compliance. Defendants submitted an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit regarding this decision on July 26, 2017. On October 20, they filed a motion asking the district court to stay their obligations under the Settlement Agreement while their appeal was pending. The district court denied the motion to stay based on the pending appeal on February 1, 2018, saying that the defendants did not sufficiently persuade the court that they would win on the merits and that harm would be irreparable if it was not granted. An Eighth Circuit panel of Circuit Judges Roger L. Wollman, Morris S. Arnold, and Jane L. Kelly confirmed the district court's suspicion and stated that the district court was correct to exercise jurisdiction over the continuing settlement agreement disputes on July 26, 2018. 897 F.3d 908. The panel wrote that while neither party's interpretation of the agreement made perfect sense, the fact that both sides continued to file motions past the settlement's expiration date as if the district court had jurisdiction was enough extrinsic evidence to determine that the court had jurisdiction over the matter. Reports and monitoring continued into 2019; the court was set to lose jurisdiction over the settlement agreement at the end of the year. However, in response to a plaintiff's motion, the district court extended jurisdiction over the matter through September 15, 2020 on June 17, 2019. 2019 WL 2499595. Judge Frank wrote that enough questions existed surrounding the use of restraints in certain care homes and staff training at covered facilities that further jurisdiction for monitoring the implementation of the settlement agreement was warranted. The defendants filed a motion to amend the order to remove jurisdiction from the court, but the district court denied the motion on August 28, 2019, referring to reasons discussed in the earlier motion. 2019 WL 4059852. Given the outstanding questions surrounding the use of restraints at covered facilities, the district court directed the parties to determine an external review of the Forensic Mental Health Program and Anoka Metro Regional Treatment Center. The parties were unable to reach an agreement, and on February 13, 2020, Judge Frank issued an order setting an external reviewer of the facilities. The defendants filed an appeal of this decision on February 20, 2020, arguing that the district court did not have the jurisdiction to name an external reviewer under the terms of the settlement agreement. They also filed a motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the appeal with the district court. The district court denied this motion on March 9, 2020, saying that success on the merits was unlikely and harm would not be irreparable. 2020 WL 1130671. The appellate court granted the plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal on April 7, 2020, and suggested that a full opinion was coming later; none has yet been filed. The case is ongoing, though discovery and reporting has slowed given the COVID-19 pandemic.

Summary: On July 10, 2009, mental health patients at Minnesota Extended Treatment Options, who were subjected to the improper and inhumane use of seclusion and mechanical restraints, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, §504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and Minnesota state law against the Minnesota Department of Human Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. On September 14, 2010, the parties reached a $3 million settlement agreement, which provided that the parties would work together to develop new policies and procedures for implementation at METO. A final settlement agreement was approved in December 2011. However, a final plan for implementation of the agreement was not approved until September 2015. During the interim period, the State made progress with respect to certain issues but was non-compliant with respect to many others, including self-reporting. The court maintains jurisdiction over the matter; concerns about the use of restraints at several covered facilities remain. The case is ongoing.


On May 7, 1993, a Wiccan prisoner incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections since 1979 filed a lawsuit against prison officials in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and California state law. The plaintiff, represented <pro se> and sometimes by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, claiming that the prison officials had violated his right to freedom of religion. Specifically, the prisoner claimed that officials failed to accommodate his practice of the Wiccan religion by denying him access to Tarot cards and his Witches Bible while in segregation. On March 31, 1995, the District Court (Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) granted the prisoner's motion for summary judgment as to his free exercise claim but denied the motion in all other respects. Also, Judge Karlton granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in all respects other than the claims regarding tarot cards and the denial of the Witches Bible while in administrative segregation. Judge Karlton issued a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to allow the prisoner to have tarot cards for religious rituals, but the prisoner's request for injunctive relief was denied in all other respects. The United States intervened for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and both the prisoner and the prison officials moved for summary judgment. The prisoner also moved for a preliminary injunction. On October 28, 1996, Judge Karlton denied the parties' motions for summary judgment and the prisoner's motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Karlton held that (1) even if the Act provided greater federal protection for exercise of religion than currently provided under First Amendment case law, its adoption fell within Congress' power to enact legislation to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore the Act was constitutional, and material issues of fact as to the sincerity of the prisoner's religious beliefs precluded summary judgment for either party. Rouser v. White, 944 F. Supp. 1447 (E.D. Cal. 1996). On February 12, 1997, the prisoner filed an amended complaint concerning his ability to practice his Wiccan religion from approximately 1990 to 1997 at California State Prison-Sacramento (CSP-Sac). On May 6, 1997, Judge Karlton dismissed the prisoner's claims for money damages under the California Constitution and denied the defendants' motions to dismiss. In November 1997, the parties settled. The terms of the settlement provided that the prisoner would have access to the Wiccan Bible and other religious materials even while housed in a Security Housing Unit or Administrative Segregation—which was consistent with policies and procedures regulating prisoners' access to religious articles. Additionally, the settlement agreed to permit a volunteer Wiccan spiritual advisor to conduct Wiccan services. On December 5, 1997, the court dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' private settlement. However, in 2003, the prisoner notified the court that the defendants were not honoring the terms of the settlement. Therefore, on May 8, 2003, Judge Karlton remanded the case to the magistrate judge. On December 17, 2003, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows found that the defendants were in compliance with the 1997 settlement agreement. However, on March 23, 2004, Judge Karlton adopted in part and rejected in part the magistrate judge's findings. Accordingly, Judge Karlton reopened the case pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which provides that the only way for courts to enforce private settlement agreements is to reinstate civil proceedings. The prisoner's prior counsel withdrew and then in 2006 the prisoner's substituted counsel also withdrew. On August 4, 2004, Magistrate Judge Hollows denied the defendants' motion to vacate the evidentiary hearing date set by the court. On August 17, 2004, Judge Karlton affirmed that decision. On January 30, 2006, proceeding pro se, the prisoner filed a supplemental complaint which included claims regarding his ability to practice his Wiccan religion occurring at CSP-Sac from 1999 until his transfer to Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP) as well as his ability to practice his religion while at MCSP. The supplemental complaint named 26 new defendants. The defendants moved moved to dismiss the claims regarding the events occurring at CSP-Sac after 1999. The defendants also moved to stay this action pending a determination of a class of Wiccan/Pagain prisoners in McCollum v. California Department of Corrections, No. C-04-3339 CRB (N.D.Cal.). On July 11, 2006, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows determined that it would be more efficient to sever the claims raised in the supplemental complaint, but for the injunctive relief claims regarding MCSP, and allow the plaintiff to proceed with these claims in a separate action. The jury trial in this action would then concern the plaintiff's claims for damages regarding the events occurring at CSP-Sac alleged in the operative amended complaint and his claims for injunctive relief regarding MCSP. Thus, the defendants' motion to dismiss the claims raised in the supplemental complaint was vacated. Magistrate Judge Hollows also found that the defendants' motion to stay was premature because the plaintiffs in McCollum had not yet moved for class certification. Rouser v. White, 2006 WL 1897125 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2006). On September 27, 2006, Judge Karlton adopted the Magistrate Judge's findings and recommendations in full and denied the defendants' March 14, 2006 motion to stay. Rouser v. White, 2006 WL 2790525 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2006). In June 2007, the prisoner was transferred to Pleasant Valley State Prison (PVSP). As a result, on June 20, 2007, Judge Karlton dismissed the prisoner's claim for injunctive relief as moot and ordered the jury trial date be rescheduled at the trial confirmation hearing. On October 16, 2007, Magistrate Judge Hollows recommended that the prisoner's request for preliminary injunctive relief be denied in light of the upcoming jury trial where the issues were already set to be litigated. Rouser v. White, 2007 WL 3026639 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2007). On November 19, 2007, Judge Karlton adopted the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge in full and denied the prisoner's September 26, 2007 motion for injunctive relief. Rouser v. White, 2007 WL 4149565 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2007). On April 4, 2008, Judge Karlton dismissed the claims against defendants Gomez and White because the prisoner's only allegations against them appeared to be based on a theory of respondeat superior liability, which could not create a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the case would proceed to a court trial on the prisoner's claims for injunctive relief regarding PVSP, but not for his claims for damages regarding his inability to practice his Wiccan religion while housed at CSP-Sac from 1990-1997. Rouser v. White, 2008 WL 926615 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2008). The prisoner objected to this order and moved for reconsideration. On June 30, 2008, Judge Karlton granted the prisoner's motion and the prisoner filed a second amended complaint with the assistance of counsel, which included the claims against White and Gomez. Rouser v. White, 2008 WL 2682687 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2008). On September 16, 2008, Judge Karlton denied the defendants' motion dismiss the prisoner's third and sixth causes of action. Rouser v. White, CIVS93-0767 LKK GGHP, 2008 WL 4283650 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2008). Shortly after, the prisoner filed a third amended complaint on September 23, 2008, bringing claims against four defendants: White and Gomez and, additionally, the Secretary of CDCR and the warden at PVSP. This complaint sued all defendants in their individual and official capacities, and the prisoner sought both damages and injunctive relief. On May 14, 2009, this court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The motion was denied insofar as the prisoner sought injunctive relief. Specifically, the court concluded that there was a pattern of Constitutional violations sufficient to call into question the permanence of any changes defendants had voluntarily made now. Rouser v. White, 630 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1180 (E.D. Cal. 2009). On December 10, 2009, Judge Karlton granted the prisoner's motion to supplement his complaint to include claims for conduct occurring after he filed his third amended complaint, specifically retaliation. The prisoner sought to add three defendants to his complaint. The prisoner alleged that correctional counselors retaliated against his filing of grievances and litigation of this case by placing him in administrative segregation and then transferred him from PVSP to California State Prison Los Angeles County (LAC). The prisoner also added the warden of LAC as a defendant. Rouser v. White, 2009 WL 4884264 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2009). On March 10, 2010, Judge Karlton denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim of retaliation asserted in the prisoner's fourth amended complaint. Judge Karlton held that the prisoner properly exhausted his administrative remedies and that the defendants were properly joined. Rouser v. White, 2010 WL 843764 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010). The prisoner then moved for a preliminary injunction and on April 15, 2010, Judge Karlton granted the motion as to most of the relief that the prisoner sought. The prisoner wanted to be allowed to obtain and maintain certain religious articles and to satisfy requirements with respect to his religious services. Rouser v. White, 707 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (E.D. Cal. 2010). On May 18, 2010, the members of the Spotted Eagle Circle at LAC moved to intervene as a defendant in this action. They argued that the prisoner's request for preliminary injunction infringed upon the Constitutional rights of the Native American members of the Spotted Eagle Circle because part of the relief included allowing the prisoner access to a sweat lodge and fire pit used by the Native American inmates. The prisoner's use of the site would desecrate the site for the Native Americans. On May 24, 2010, Judge Karlton granted the motion to intervene and stayed enforcement of the preliminary injunction as it applied to the sweat lodge and fire pit. On September 23, 2011, the parties submitted a joint notice and motion for an order approving settlement and transferring the venue to the Central District of California. The settlement agreement resolved the remaining claims and the change of venue to the transferee court would serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, as well as the interests of justice during the compliance and enforcement of the settlement since he had been transferred. On October 17, 2011, the Spotted Eagle Circle filed a statement of non-opposition to the settlement agreement and the transfer of venue. On October 18, 2011, Judge Karlton approved the settlement and the motion to transfer venue. On November 15, 2012, Judge R. Gary Klausner granted in part and denied in part the prisoner's motion to enforce the consent decree. Judge Klausner found support for only two of the prisoner's eight alleged violations: damage to his religious property when in the defendants' control and failure to follow proper prisoner appeals procedures. On November 28, 2012, Judge Klausner denied the prisoner's motion for an injunction, evidentiary hearing, and sanctions because the prisoner failed to comply with the appeals process required by the consent decree. On March 13, 2013, Judge Klausner granted the defendants' motion to vacate the October 18, 2011 order approving the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice because the defendants had shown that they had substantially complied with the terms of the settlement agreement. The prisoner appealed, to the 9th Circuit. On June 17, 2016, the 9th Circuit reversed the District Court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The 9th Circuit found that the District Court had committed numerous errors in vacating the consent decree and had abused its discretion. Specifically, the 9th Circuit cited the District Court's unwillingness to schedule evidentiary hearings, update the plaintiff's address in order to ensure he received the court's orders, and that they had employed the wrong legal standard in evaluating the consent decree. Additionally, the 9th Circuit found that the District Court had not provided meaningful relief after finding violations of the consent decree on the part of the defendant and as a result, encouraged non-compliance with the decree. 2016 WL 3361543. On December 8, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for recusal of Judge Klausner citing the findings of the 9th Circuit and that he had filed a complaint against Judge Klausner which could cause bias sufficient for recusal. On December 15, 2016 Judge Wu denied the motion and ruled that filing a complaint was not sufficient grounds for a finding of bias. Additionally, if the 9th Circuit's ruling contained sufficient implication of bias on behalf of Judge Klausner the 9th Circuit would not have remanded the plaintiff's case back to him. On March 26, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion citing further violations of the consent decree. On August 6, 2018 the plaintiff filed a motion to bring attention to the court's bias against him and to have the court administer a polygraph examination upon him. On August 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for breach of contract and demand for trial. On September 13, 2018, the plaintiff filed a request for rulings on the two previous filings and an additional notice of breach of contract. On October 3, 2018, the plaintiff filed a notice of denial of religious sabbaths. On January 28, 2019, the plaintiff filed a notice of denial of Wiccan Services. On February 19, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for further breach of contract, and on April 24, 2019 an additional notice of denial of Wiccan services. On April 30, 2019, Judge Klausner denied all motions filed by the plaintiff. The court found that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies within the prison system in accordance with the consent decree, and as a result his motions were denied. As of November 2019 the consent decree has not been vacated and this case is ongoing.

Summary: In 1993, a Wiccan prisoner incarcerated by the California Department of Corrections since 1979 filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and California state law against prison officials. The plaintiff claimed that the prison officials had violated his right to freedom of religion by failing to accommodate his practice of the Wiccan religion. In 1997 the parties settled, but in 2003 the prisoner renewed the action for failure to follow the settlement. The parties settled again in 2011 and the prisoner again renewed the action for failure to follow the settlement, which the district court dismissed. The plaintiff appealed to the 9th Circuit which found that the District Court had abused its discretion and reversed the vacation of the consent decree. As of November, 2019 the consent decree has not been vacated and this case is ongoing.


After conducting an investigation into the conditions at state-run Tennessee State Homes for Veterans (TSHVs), the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the State of Tennessee in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee on January 16, 2009. TSHVs served as care facilities for veterans in need of intermediate or long-term rehabilitation, medical, or nursing care. During the underlying investigation, which began in February 2007 and occurred with the full cooperation of the State, the DOJ conducted tours of TSHVs and consulted with experts in the fields of geriatric care and nursing home administration. Plaintiff found that a number of conditions in the facilities violated residents' federal rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff made a number of factual allegations about the inadequacy of the care provided at TSHVs, including that the State engaged in a pattern or practice of failing to provide adequate nutrition, psychiatric care, end-of-life care and pain management, and that the State did not maintain a safe environment in the TSHVs. Plaintiff brought claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. Acting under the Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S. § 1997), plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the DOJ made a report of its findings to the State, the parties agreed to settle pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement. Accordingly, after negotiations, the parties jointly filed a Stipulated Settlement Agreement on the same day plaintiff filed its Complaint. The parties indicated that since the DOJ made a report of its findings to the State, the State had already made significant efforts to improve the areas of concern. The terms of the Settlement Agreement provided that defendants would conduct assessments and create and implement protocols to ensure the following: 1) proper nutrition and hydration of TSVH residents; 2) safe feeding plans for those at risk of aspiration; 3) the provision of adequate and appropriate psychiatric and psychotropic care; 4) the provision of adequate end-of-life care and pain management; and 5) adequate fall prevention measures. The Settlement Agreement was to remain in effect for eighteen months, or until the State had achieved and maintained compliance for at least six months. Simultaneously, the parties moved for conditional dismissal. Judge Daniel Breen granted their motion to dismiss, with the Court reserving jurisdiction only for enforcement of the Agreement. The case closed in 2010 upon termination of the 18-month-long Agreement.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) entered into this Settlement Agreement with the State of Tennessee on January 9, 2009, after conducting an investigation into the conditions at Tennessee State Homes for Veterans (TSHVs). The DOJ found that the State had failed to provide adequate nutrition, psychiatric care, and safe conditions for residents at the TSHVs, and brought claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Social Security Act. The court immediately approved of the Settlement Agreement, which required the State to improve all conditions giving rise to the allegations and maintain adequate safety, healthcare, and nutrition for residents. Also on January 9, the court granted the parties' conditional motion to dismiss the case. The Agreement was in effect for 18 months, and the case is now closed. The case was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee.


This suit consolidates a number of challenges to a rule from the Federal Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) that allows healthcare providers to refuse medical treatment or services that conflict with their religious or moral beliefs. Based on an 2017 executive order by President Trump and a memorandum from then Attorney General Jeff Sessions, the rule promoted an expansive reading of religious discrimination law that could allow any entity involved with a medical procedure to object to the procedure on religious grounds. It also set up a comprehensive enforcement regime for compliance. This rule would have had a particular impact on abortion access and transgender procedures, especially in low-income communities. The two main sets of plaintiffs are State governments, represented by their attorney generals, and a number of health-related nonprofit organizations, including Planned Parenthood. The Government plaintiffs filed their complaint on May 21, 2019, and private plaintiffs filed two separate challenges on June 11, 2019, and June 14, 2019, before the three suits were consolidated. Plaintiffs alleged that the rule misinterpreted long-standing congressional statutes cabining the right to refuse to provide medical treatment and violated various sections of the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs contended that the rule conflicted with the establishment clause of the First Amendment by impermissibly promoting religious beliefs, with the Fifth Amendment on account of the rule’s vagueness and violation of plaintiff’s right to privacy, with the Spending Clause of the Constitution, with the Separation of Powers doctrine. Plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, and for the rule to be vacated. On August 2, 2019, the court (District Judge Paul A. Engelmayer) wrote an opinion allowing the intervention of the Christian Medical and Dental Association to argue in favor of the rule. However, on November 6, 2019, after ten amicus briefs, the court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, vacating the rule in full. The court found that the rule exceeded the scope of the so-called “conscience provisions,” congressional statutes that addressed moral and religious objections to abortion and other procedures. Much of the legislation around the healthcare industry over the past 40 years has contained these provisions so that healthcare entities will not be discriminated against for failing to assist in abortions and other procedures. The court found HHS, as an administrative agency, impermissibly expanded the scope of these provisions in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. The court also held that the regulatory scheme enacted by HHS also exceeded the agency’s legal authority. The holding went on to conclude that HHS’s rule conflicted with the traditional Title VII framework on discrimination and was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Protective Act. Finally, the court held that the rule was unconstitutional in violation of the Separation of Powers and the Spending Clause of the Constitution. 414 F.Supp.3d 475. Summary judgment was granted and the court vacated HHS’s rule, which is now up on appeal in the Second Circuit.

Summary: Planned Parenthood and various State governments mounted a successful legal challenge to a administrative agency's rule expanding the scope of the right to refuse to provide abortions for religious reasons. The ruling was promulgated on November 6, 2019 and is now being appealed by the Federal Government in the Second Circuit.


On November 20th, 2012, a class of plaintiffs who had been jailed in Spokane County, Washington for unpaid financial obligations filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued Spokane County for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Justice and private counsel, asked the court for monetary damages. The plaintiffs claimed that Spokane County violated their due process rights by jailing them for unpaid legal financial obligations (LFOs). They claim that the County's practice of using non-attorney employees in the County Clerk's office to make sentencing orders and provide legal advice violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Moreover, the plaintiffs claim their rights were violated by the County's practice of sentencing jail time for unpaid LFOs without a hearing. The parties exchanged Discovery and agreed to pursue a settlement agreement. On September 19th, 2014, the court (Judge Lonny R. Suko) certified the class and preliminarily approved of the proposed settlement agreement. The Defendant denied all allegations, but agreed to settle and pay damages of $349,967.68 to the class.

Summary: A class of plaintiffs who had been jailed for failure to pay legal debts sued Spokane County, Washington for violating their Constitutional due process rights. They successfully settled the case and obtained upwards of $300,000 in damages.


On May 21, 2010, two annual pass holders at Disneyland in Anaheim, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles, against Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., and related companies (Disney), under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12131, et seq. (ADA), the Unruh Civil Rights Act, California Civil Code §51, et seq., and the California Disabled Persons Act, California Civil Code §54 et seq. (CDPA). The initial complaint identified eight separate classes of blind and visually impaired plaintiffs it alleged that Disney had discriminated against in distinct ways, including: the Disney Character Class, who were patrons of a Disney Park and were allegedly denied an equal opportunity to interact with costumed Disney employees; the Signage Class, who were alleged discriminated against by Disney's failure to provide signage, menus, and schedules in an accessible format; the Map class, who were likewise denied maps in an accessible alternative format; the Kennel Class, who either had to pay a fee to kennel their service animals at a Disney Park or were deterred from visiting because they would have to pay a kennel fee; the Audio Description Device Class, who used or attempted to use an audio device provided by Disney at one of its parks and were denied full use and enjoyment of the device; the Companion Ticket Class, who had to pay an additional admission fee for a companion or aide; the Plaintiff Parade Class, who allegedly were excluded from preferential locations during parades at Disney Parks; and the Locker Class, who were allegedly unable to use the lockers provided at Disney Parks because of the lack of accommodations provided. On August 5, 2010, Disney filed a Notice of Removal, and the case was removed to United States District Court for the Central District of California. Because the case was brought under a federal cause of action, the ADA, the federal court had original subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On September 10, the court accepted a First Amended Complaint, which added Disney Online, Inc. as a defendant, and two additional classes of plaintiffs: the Website Class, allegedly discriminated against by Disney's failure to make websites it owned and operated accessible to the blind and visually impaired; and the Parking Class, alleging that Disney had failed to comply with ADA guidelines for parking accommodations. The complaint also expanded the membership of the Kennel Class to include patrons who were allegedly discriminated against by Disney's locating of kennels outside of park entrances, rather than at ride entrances, and its refusal, in the absence of such kennels, to allow patrons to tie service animals up at ride entrances. The complaint estimated that total membership of the various classes was at least in the thousands, and argued that class action was therefore necessary as joinder of all members would be impracticable. On April 15, 2011, Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott voluntarily recused himself from the case, citing personal knowledge of evidentiary facts at issue, after the Plaintiffs had filed a Motion to Disqualify him on the grounds that he had previously represented a key witness for the defense at trial. On April 22 the case was transferred to another Magistrate Judge for any discovery matters referred by the District Judge. On June 29, 2011, the court (Judge Dolly Gee) issued an Order, granting in part and denying in part the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification. Judge Gee held that several subclasses did not meet class action requirements: the proposed Disney Character, Parking, and Locker subclasses were insufficiently large in number; and the claims of members of the Audio Description Device subclass were not sufficiently similar to each other. For these subclasses, the Court dismissed the relevant portions of the complaint without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to amend and refile if they chose. The Order granted the Plaintiff's motion with respect to all other proposed classes, certifying them. It held that the named plaintiffs and class council adequately represented the class. Shields v. Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 529 (C.D. Cal. 2011). On May 4, 2012, the court granted preliminary approval for a proposed class action settlement and allowed the Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint, which consolidated the ten classes proposed in the previous complaint into four more broadly defined classes that were inclusive of all the prior allegations, thus reinstating the claims dismissed in the June 29, 2011 order. The court granted final approval to a Class Action Settlement, filed January 18, 2013. In that settlement, although Disney did not admit liability, it did agree to substantially modify its practices and to provide accommodations for the Plaintiff classes. The Settlement uses the class definitions from the Second Amended Complaint, and provides specific accommodations for each class:

The Website Class, composed of all individuals with visual impairments who have a disability as defined by the ADA, and who had been or will be of their visual disability. Disney agreed to make all the content it produces for the websites it owns and operates accessible to blind and visually impaired users by December 31 2015, with earlier deadlines for specific sites, and with certain narrow exceptions.
The Effective Communication Class, composed of all individuals with visual impairments who were or will be denied equal access to any of the Disney Parks because of the absence of maps, menus, and schedules available in an alternative format, or by the failure to be read in full the maps, menus, or schedules, or by inadequate and inconsistent operation of provided audio descriptions services, or due to Disney's refusal to provide a free or discounted pass to their sighted companion. Disney agreed to provide, by the effective date of the settlement, a telephone service to read current parade and show schedules and to answer questions from customers. Within 90 days of the Settlement, it agreed to have this number included in its "Services for Guests with Disabilities" sheet available at the Disney Parks, and posted on its websites. Disney agreed to provide a similar phone service for its menus. It agreed to provide menus, stationary maps, mobile maps, and other documents in braille. It agreed to train staff on the necessity of fully reading menus and schedules to visually impaired patrons on request. It agreed, in compensation for not providing companion tickets to earlier visitors, to give 200 tickets to specific Disney Parks to one or two 501(c)(3) organizations primarily benefiting blind individuals, to be specified from a provided list by the named plaintiffs. It agreed to enhance its audio description service to make it an effective aid and guide for blind and visually impaired patrons.
The Service Animal Class, consisting of all visually impaired individuals who had been or will be denied equal access to or enjoyment of the Disney Parks because of the fee charged for the use of a kennel for their service animal, or the absence of reasonably-designated service animal relief areas, or the absence of a location to kennel their service animal at attractions that do not allow service animals, or the lack of equal interaction with Disney employees who portray Disney characters because the individuals with visual impairments were accompanied by service animals. Disney agreed to create at least three "designated relief areas" where service animals may defecate at each Disney Park, and to continue to allow service animals to defecate freely anywhere in the parks. It agreed to add information about these areas to the audio description service. It agreed to provide temporary kennels at attractions where service animals cannot be permitted to ride. It agreed to instruct its costumed characters to interact with patrons accompanied by service animals as they would with patrons without service animals.
The Infrastructure Class, including all blind or visually impaired individuals who allegedly were or will be discriminated against by Disney because of physical barriers to access or the lack of reasonable modifications to Disney's policies and practices to permit equal access and enjoyment, including those individuals denied equal access to parade areas and public lockers. Disney agreed to provide, within 6 months of the Settlement date, updated guidelines for its parks providing disabled parade viewing areas to all guests with disabilities requiring preferential viewing as a result of their disability. It agreed to review the current designated areas to consider whether non-parade ambient noise might interfere with patrons' ability to experience the parade. Disney agreed to install five keyed lockers at each park, specifically for blind or visually impaired guests. It agreed to bring the "Pinocchio" parking lot at Disneyland into compliance with ADA guidelines and California law, and to create paths between that lot and an adjoining lot where a tram loading area exists.
 The settlement purports to release Disney from all future claims by members of its plaintiff class regarding discrimination and/or lack of equal access under the common law or any state or federal law, arising from Disney's practices or procedures as subsequently modified in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. The settlement allows each named Plaintiff a service payment. It granted the Class Council reasonable attorney's fees not to exceed $1,550,000. The final amounts awarded were $15,000 for each of the two named plaintiffs, attorneys' fees of $1,403,500, and costs of $146,500. These amounts were determined by the court. On January 29, 2013, the court granted final approval to the Class Action Settlement and, as required by the Settlement, dismissed the Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice. The settlement concluded in 2015 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 21, 2010 a class action lawsuit was filed against Walt Disney Parks and Resorts US, Inc., and related companies, in California state court, alleging discrimination against blind and visually impaired patrons at its parks and resorts, under the ADA and state law. Disney moved to have the court the case removed to federal court, and this motion was granted. Disney and the Plaintiffs entered into a court approved settled, with the company agreeing to substantial changes in its practices and procedures in order to better accommodate blind and visually impaired disabled patrons.


On June 21, 2017, a photojournalist, a practicing attorney, and two demonstrators filed this lawsuit against the District of Columbia, the individual police officers who committed the alleged acts, the police officers’ supervisors, and the chief of D.C. police in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. Another female demonstrator and her 10-year-old son joined the suit through an amended complaint on January 3, 2018. The plaintiffs claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that defendants violated their rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and various D.C. laws. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sought compensatory and punitive damages, plus costs. The case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. The plaintiffs alleged that on the morning of Inauguration Day, January 20, 2017, they traveled to DC to peacefully demonstrate and document the demonstrations protesting the inauguration of Donald Trump. After several acts of vandalism performed by third parties, the plaintiffs claim that the police took several illegal actions against them. Plaintiffs allege that defendants failed to give dispersal orders before firing chemical irritants on the crowd and chasing them toward an enclosed street corner. The plaintiffs claim defendants falsely imprisoned the plaintiffs, along with 200 other individuals, violating D.C.’s First Amendment Assemblies Act and their protected free speech. Defendants used a practice called “kettling” where plaintiffs claim they were kept up to 9-10 hours and were denied access to food, water, or toilet services. Plaintiffs claim defendants intentionally trapped plaintiffs before sealing off the kettle preventing escape and continued to use chemical irritants on plaintiffs after they were trapped in the "kettle." The plaintiff mother, son, and legal observer, who were outside of the “kettle” allege that they peaceably observed and protested the kettling of the other demonstrators. Plaintiffs stated that, without any dispersal order, defendants fired chemical irritants on the crowd, including the 10-year-old plaintiff, and knocked him to the ground. After being taken out of the kettle, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants physically injured their wrists, causing one plaintiff's wrist to bleed from the zip ties for several hours. Moreover, two plaintiffs claimed that the defendants subjected them to unreasonable searches via rectal probing with no just cause. On March 30, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. They based their motion on the grounds that they are entitled to qualified immunity against the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, there was probable cause to arrest certain plaintiffs, and other plaintiffs failed to state a claim for assault or battery, among others. On the same day, a defendant officer John Doe filed a motion to dismiss Claim 16 of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint, or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that certain plaintiffs’ allegations contradicted their prior allegations and their allegations were disproved by the evidence. On April 19, the plaintiffs filed a motion to strike the defendant's motions. However, on November 12, Judge Jackson ruled that the motion to strike is procedurally improper and treated the motion as an opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. In addition, Judge Jackson denied defendant John Doe’s motion to dismiss or for summary judgment without prejudice on the grounds that it is premature because the defendant was not yet named as a defendant in the lawsuit. On January 3, 2019, defendant officer John Doe renewed his motion to dismiss, which was then opposed by the plaintiffs. The defendants’ motion to dismiss filed on March 30, 2018 was pending at the same time. On September 27, 2019, Judge Jackson granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint as to claims 2 (arrest for protected speech), 4 (negligence per se for the violation of the protected assemblies act through kettling), 5 (negligence per se for the violation of the protected assemblies act through failure to provide a dispersal order), 8 (negligence per se for the violation of the protected assemblies act through use of chemical irritants), 9 (excessive force for knocking down a minor), 10 (assault for knocking down a minor), 13 (negligence per se for the violation of the protected assemblies act through failure to provide food), and 14 (negligence per se for the violation of the protected assemblies act through failure to process arrestees promptly). The motion was denied as to all other claims (arrest without probable cause, false arrest, excessive force and assault for use of chemical irritants, excessive force for zipties, unlawful pre-trial confinement, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unreasonable search). Defendant John Doe’s motion to dismiss, which was based on search practices, was denied in whole. Class certification litigation was stayed pending further order of the court. With the consent of the parties on October 18, the matter was referred to the court’s mediation program to commence on October 22, 2019. The parties filed a joint motion to extend time for mediation on December 16, which was granted by Judge Jackson the next day. It was ordered that mediation shall conclude by February 7, 2020, but the court granted extensions on the mediation deadline based on status reports. The court ordered mediation conclusion date was set at June 12, 2020. Throughout 2020, the court continued to stay the case and extend the deadline for the conclusion of mediation. The parties continued to negotiate attempts to reach an agreement, and in a January 25, 2021 status report, indicated that they had agreed on final terms of a settlement agreement, subject to Mayoral approval. The parties disputed over the next steps though. The defendants sought a 60 day stay for the Mayor to consider and approve the settlement. The plaintiffs argued that Mayoral approval was not required and that all was left to do was sign the agreement. The plaintiffs requested a status hearing to discuss if the defendants would be signing the agreement and if not, the next steps in the litigation. The court held a status hearing on February 26, 2021, and gave the defendants additional time to obtain approval. Still, April 2021 arrived and the agreement remained unsigned. The parties filed another status report on April 6, 2021. The defendants indicated that the Mayor approved the settlement except for one term. The plaintiffs, meanwhile, asserted that this was not true and that rather the Mayor flatly rejected the agreement. They expressed a desire to reach a settlement with the defendants but indicated that they also intend to move the litigation forward in the meantime. As of April 8, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiff photojournalist and demonstrators are suing the District of Columbia for violating their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 preventing them from peacefully assembling. Plaintiffs also allege that they were falsely imprisoned by defendant police who used a tactic called "kettling" to trap demonstrators, and further violated plaintiffs' rights to peaceably assemble by using chemical irritants before issuing dispersal orders. Plaintiffs also allege they were subjected to unjustified strip searches. The case is still ongoing.


This is a case about whether the United States Postal Service's postal delivery and ballot service policy changes relevant to the 2020 presidential election were implemented in violation of federal law. In July 2020, Louis DeJoy became Postmaster General of the the United States Postal Service (USPS). DeJoy implemented new policies for USPS which reportedly resulted in a backlog of postal deliveries for all types of mail, including electoral ballots cast via mail. On August 20, 2020, the the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The NAACP was represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (a separate organization) and Public Citizen; it sued USPS and the Postmaster General, alleging violations of agency responsibilities under the applicable USPS statutes. The plaintiff sought an injunction to reverse the USPS's recent policies and ensure that ballots for the upcoming 2020 elections would not be delayed. On September 9, 2020, fourteen US Senators filed amicus briefs in support of the NAACP. Later that month, the US House of Representatives filed a similar amicus in support of the NAACP. On October 10, 2020, District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted a preliminary injunction to the LDF, citing serious, immediate, and recurring harms to NAACP members and the organization itself should the injunction not be granted. 496 F. Supp. 3d 1. Later that month, the NAACP filed an emergency motion to enforce and monitor USPS's compliance with the preliminary injunction. This emergency motion was granted by Judge Sullivan on October 27 with explicit instructions that any USPS personnel informed of the July policy be informed that the policy had been rescinded, with further instructions that USPS inform its personnel that extra trips would be required to address the backlog of mail with special attention for electoral ballots. On December 9, 2020, the USPS appealed the decision on the preliminary injunction to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 5, 2021, the NAACP filed an amended complaint addressing the delivery and handling of ballots in future elections. The appeal is currently pending in the D.C. Circuit and the case is ongoing in both the district and appellate court.

Summary: The NAACP sued the United States Postal Service (USPS) and Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General, on August 20, 2020. The NAACP argued that rule changes implemented by DeJoy in July violated federal law by not allowing adequate time for public comment, and that resulting delays in mail delivery jeopardized the integrity of postal voting in the 2020 elections. Represented by the NAACP LDF and Public Citizen, the NAACP sought a reversal of the policies. Injunctive relief was granted on October 10. USPS appealed the decision on the preliminary injunction on December 9, 2020. The appeal is currently pending in the D.C. Circuit and the case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: Four inmates with underlying medical conditions filed a class action petition seeking habeas relief. The petitioners sought to represent a class of all current and future detainees in custody at the Metropolitan Detention Center during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied to grant a preliminary injunction on July 9, 2020. The case is now closed.<hr> On March 27, 2020, four inmates filed a class action petition seeking habeas relief. Due to underlying medical conditions, each of the petitioners is particularly vulnerable to the COVID-19 disease. The petitioners, represented by private counsel and the Cardozo Civil Rights Clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, sought to represent a class of all current and future detainees in custody at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic. The warden of the MDC was listed as the respondent. The petitioners alleged that their continued detainment amidst the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights to be free from degrading and inhuman conditions of confinement. The petitioners sought immediate release of medically vulnerable MDC detainees and for the respondent to implement mitigation measures to protect those still detained. The petitioners requested a Special Master be appointed to chair a Coronavirus Release Committee to evaluate vulnerable inmates and make recommendations accordingly. The case was assigned to Judge Rachel Kovner. The petitioners specifically alleged that the conditions of confinement made it impossible to practice recommended preventative care measures such as social distancing and frequent sanitation. They also alleged that, if an inmate were to contract COVID-19, the MDC does not have adequate medical resources to treat the disease. To support their release, they cited the U.S. Attorney General’s memo to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons at MDC directing him to prioritize the use of statutory authorities to grant home confinement for inmates seeking transfer in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 2, Judge Rachel Kovner issued an order referring the parties to Magistrate Judge Mann to explore settlement options. Judge Kovner specifically requested the parties to consider the compassionate-release provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). A number of courts have already used that provision to grant compassionate releases because the individual's health conditions placed them at grave risk while confined during the COVID-19 epidemic. In the settlement agreements, Judge Kovner noted, the Bureau of Prisons could agree to promptly review the petitioner's release requests. In the meantime, Judge Kovner stayed the decision on the request for a temporary restraining order. The parties engaged in negotiations over the next two days. Each plaintiff filed a request with Warden Edge seeking early release. The Warden subsequently denied the plaintiffs' requests. The plaintiffs also filed motions with their sentencing judges seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A); these proceedings are ongoing. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs failed additional information with the Court, including expert declarations stating that isolating and monitoring people with known risk factors is critical to mitigating their risk of death or serious illness (Declaration of Dr. Homer Venters), and that everyone who has COVID-19 symptoms must be tested to mitigate their risk (Declaration of Dr. Robert Cohen). On April 8, Judge Kovner denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary order. Six days later, Judge Kovner authorized limited expedited discovery in advance of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The authorized discovery requests were limited to the protocol governing when prisoners or staff request and receive COVID-19 testing, the amount of soap received at MDC since February 1, a list of sick-call requests for medical care submitted by MDC prisoners from March 13 through April 13, a deposition from a member of MDC management, and a site inspection. Regarding the site inspection, Judge Kovner ordered on April 15 that the site inspection was relevant to the petitioner's discovery in order to gain an understanding of the conditions there. 2020 WL 1872523. Specifically, Dr. Venters had testified earlier on the spread of COVID-19 and best practices for prevention, but an inspection would allow Dr. Venters to testify as to the conditions at MDC. The three-hour inspection was scheduled to take place on April 23, and include one housing unit not under quarantine, the intake unit, one quarantine unit, an appropriate isolation unit, the Special Housing Unit, and the Health Services Offices and Exam Rooms. Judge Kovner permitted Dr. Venters cell-front access to converse briefly with prisoners, subject to their own willingness to converse. On April 23, the plaintiffs filed an amended class-action petition for writ of habeas corpus. The amended petition included more recent information about the spread of COVID-19. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on April 24. In the alternative, the defendant asked for the Court to grant summary judgment. The defendant argued that two of the plaintiffs had already been mooted by their release, and the other claims were barred by res judicata. Furthermore, the defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because the Bureau of Prisons was taking steps to address the health risks posed by COVID-19. As discovery began, the plaintiffs filed a motion to quash the deposition of Dr. Venters. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were engaging in too broad of discovery requests given the expedited timeline for discovery. On April 25, Magistrate Judge Mann determined that the defendants were improperly pursuing full discovery on an expedited timeline, rather than tailoring their discovery demands to the necessities in advance of the preliminary injunction hearing. However, the Court found that it was premature to rule on the reasonableness of specific document demands or interrogatories, and therefore declined to quash the subpoena for Dr. Venters' deposition. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunctive relief on April 30. The motion argued that the defendants were violating the plaintiffs' Fifth and Eighth Amendment rights by continuing to incarcerate them despite their increased vulnerability to COVID-19, and sought the immediate release of elderly prisoners and prisoners with underlying health conditions. Among other relief measures, it also sought the screening of current and future detainees for COVID-19 symptoms, and daily evaluations of all prisoners suspected or confirmed to have COVID-19. The motion was supported in part by Dr. Venters' expert report which he prepared after having completed his inspection of the facility. His report detailed a lack of adequate preventative measures at the MDC, including a broken sick-call system in which prisoners' reported symptoms were not addressed. On May 12, the Court heard arguments for the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Subsequently, each party filed their proposed findings of fact. The Court also directed the parties to confer as to sanitation policies for the duration of the proceedings. On June 9, Judge Kovner denied the motion for preliminary injunction, stating the plaintiffs had not proved substantial likelihood of success on their claim of deliberate indifference, especially in light of the defendants' efforts to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. 2020 WL 3055669. On July 28, the defendants filed a letter with the court, informing Judge Kovner that the last named petitioner had been released from custody, stating that there was no longer a case or controversy before the court. Accordingly, on August 12, the court issued an order dismissing the case in light of the petitioners' notice of voluntary dismissal. This case is closed.


On 04/14/2003, plaintiffs filed suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) under the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs alleged that there was a disturbance on their flight during which TSA agents handcuffed them, and subsequently lead them off the plane and transported them to the Philadelphia Police Department station. They were detained for several hours and questioned. In June 2003, the parties settled. The defendants were required to notify the presiding judge about their policies and training procedures, as well to offer a written apology and $50,000 to the plaintiffs.

Summary: In April 2003, plaintiffs filed suit again the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments based on an unlawful detention and interrogation. In June 2003, the parties settled. The defendants were required to notify the presiding judge about their policies and training procedures, as well to offer a written apology and $50,000 to the plaintiffs.


On June 3, 2013, Utah State Prison prisoners who suffered from physical and mental health conditions filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The prisoners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prison's warden in his official capacity, a captain in his personal capacity, and a guard in his personal capacity. The prisoners, represented by the ACLU of Utah and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for damages, claiming violations of the both the Utah Constitution's and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clauses. The lawsuit arose out of an incident on August 3, 2011, when prison guards used ochlorobenzylidenemalononitrile gas (CS gas) against an inmate who refused to leave one of the recreation yards and return to his cell. The guards released the CS gas grenade near two air vents which distributed the gas to several cell blocks within the Olympus facility. Plaintiffs were inmates who were in their cells in the Olympus facility at the time the CS gas was released. The Olympus facility is a self-contained housing unit on the grounds of the Utah State Prison that houses medically fragile inmates, such as inmates requiring dialysis, and inmates with serious mental health issues. The prisoners sought class certification for two classes: (1) the Injunctive Class, defined as “all prisoners currently incarcerated in the Olympus wing of the Utah State Prison,” and (2) the Damages Class, defined as “all prisoners and former prisoners who were in their cells in the Olympus Wing of the Utah State Prison on August 3, 2011, and were thereby exposed to noxious CS gas.”On June 18, 2014, the court (Judge Dale A. Kimball) granted certification for both classes. 2014 WL 2765469 (D. Utah June 18, 2014). On January 29, 2015, the prisoners filed an amended complaint. This complaint contained: an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against each Defendant; an Eighth Amendment medical neglect claim against the officer who was both the captain assigned to the Olympus Facility and the head supervisor of the correctional staff on duty at the time of the incident; and a claim under Article I, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution for a permanent injunction against each Defendant. On June 23, 2016, the District Court granted the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2016 WL 3546292. It first addressed whether two of the defendants--captains at the prison at the time of the incident--were entitled to qualified immunity. The Court found that there were because there was no clearly established law that could have alerted these Defendants that their actions were unconstitutional. The Court explained that no Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit cases specifically held that accidentally exposing inmates to CS Gas while trying to restraint a resistant inmate is unconstitutional. The Court found that the evidence in this case was clear that the officers did not consider the air intake vents in the area. Additionally, the fact that the CS gas was distributed among the administrative areas of the facility showed that the gas exposure to plaintiffs was accidental. The Court then reasoned that the Plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims for secondary exposure to CS gas would have to be analyzed as excessive force claims, not as conditions of confinement claims. It looked to Tenth Circuit precedent where the Court of Appeals had reversed a District Court judgment that analyzed the use of pepper spray as a conditions of confinement claim. That Court found the use of force rubric appropriate because pepper spray was "an instrument with which prison officers wield their authority, or force". (Citing Despain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965 (10th Cir. 2001)) The District Court then looked to Ninth Circuit precedent which had recognized that secondary exposure claims could succeed if the force used on the intended target was excessive. After noting that the case law in the two circuits appeared to be at odds, meaning that qualified immunity was appropriate because there was no clearly established law on this point, the District Court went on to find that the force used in this case was not excessive anyway. The Court reiterated that deliberate indifference would not govern the excessive use of force and explained that the facts surrounding a disturbance do not determine which standard should apply, instead it was the type of force that determined the applicable standard. The Court also held that the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment medical neglect claim against one of the captains failed because that captain did not disregard the risk posed to the plaintiffs' health after they had accidentally been exposed to CS gas. The Court found that he immediately tried to find out where the gas was going, went to the roof to turn off the intake vents, made officers check on each inmate, evacuated the lower security inmates in a timely manner, brought in fans for the higher security inmates, and had medical personnel make contact with each inmate. Thus, there was no evidence that officials at the prison ignored the risk to inmates following the exposure. As for the Utah Constitutional Claim, the Court explained that the Utah Supreme Court had defined the protections of Utah's Unnecessary Rigor Clause in an identical way in medical treatment cases as the federal courts had defined the protections of the Eighth Amendment. Thus, the state law claim failed for the same reasons the Eighth Amendment claims had. Finally, the District Court denied the plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief because it found that the prison had changed their practices and procedures relating to the implementation of CS gas and that there was no cognizable danger that a similar incident would occur in the future. Without some cognizable danger of a future incident, the Court refused to grant a permanent injunction ordering Defendants to adopt and comply with written policies regarding the deployment of chemical agents in the Olympus facility. Following this, the plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but on February 9, 2018, the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. 882 F.3d 927. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the officers' conduct, at most, only accidentally exposed the prisoners to the CS gas, and that qualified immunity shielded government officials from liability for these kinds of mistakes. Specifically, the Court of Appeals found that the District Court was right to analyze the Eighth Amendment claims as excessive force claims rather than conditions of confinement claims. It went on to explain that no reasonable juror could have believed these officers intended to expose any of these plaintiffs to the gas. It also held that even if an excessive force claim could be transferred, that is, even if plaintiffs could succeed by showing that officers used excessive force against the individual they did intend to expose to the gas, the plaintiffs claim here would still fail because plaintiffs failed to show that the officers maliciously and sadistically deployed force against that individual. The Court then analyzed the plaintiffs claims that officers were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. These claims were based on the allegations that the officers: (1) did not allow prisoners to leave their cells to get fresh air or to shower; and (2) discouraged prisoners from seeking medical attention. The Court held that even if these were true, the claims again would fail on qualified immunity grounds. It also held that plaintiffs had forfeited any claim based on officers discouraging prisoners from seeking medical attention because those claims were inadequately briefed. It went on to reason that even if not forfeited, those claims would fail on qualified immunity grounds as well. Finally, the Court upheld the District Court's finding on the claims under the Utah Constitution, explaining that those claims failed for the same reasons as the Eighth Amendment claims. As of April 24, 2019, there is no indication that the plaintiffs have appealed that holding, and the case appears closed.

Summary: In 2013, Utah State Prison prisoners suffering from physical and mental health conditions filed this class-action lawsuit. The prisoners sued the warden and two prison employees, claiming that pumping tear gas into plaintiffs' cells violated the Utah Constitution's and the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clauses. In 2014, the court granted class certification. The District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the case and finding that the plaintiffs' claims failed on qualified immunity grounds. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court, and specifically found that it was right to analyze the claims under the excessive force rather than conditions of confinement framework.


On September 5, 2007, Plaintiffs, a group of inmates of the York County Jail, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against York County in the United State District Court for the District of Maine. The plaintiffs, represented by the Maine Civil Liberties Union, sought damages and injunctive relief, claiming that their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment had been violated. Specifically, they claimed that being forced to clean up large quantities of possibly infected human blood without appropriate protection constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The complaint was amended three times with no significant changes to the allegations. On November 7, 2006, the plaintiffs, who were assigned to a work release program, were ordered to clean up a four-by-four foot pool of blood in a cell where an inmate had attempted suicide. The inmate was known to be at risk for Hepatitis C. Plaintiffs were only given surgical gloves as protection. The brushes the prisoners were provided to scrub the blood from the floor, walls, and ceiling caused the blood to be flecked onto the prisoners' skin and into their eyes. On January 23, 2008, the Court (Judge D. Brock Hornby) entered a Consent Order dismissing the case. The Order set strict policies for blood and other biohazardous material cleanup in the York County Jail, prohibiting the jail from assigning any inmate to undertake clean-up of biohazardous material without express consent, appropriate training, and protective clothing. The Order is permanent. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs were inmates at the York County Jail assigned to clean up pools of blood and blood splatters from a fellow inmate's attempted suicide. They were not adequately equipped with protective gear. The plaintiffs were successful in settling with a permanent Consent Order that implemented protocol for biohazardous cleanup, including the requirement that any such work done by inmates is entirely voluntary and cannot be ordered without consent, training, and protective gear.


On March 12, 2014, a number of same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state's Department of Health Services and the Department of Revenue. The plaintiffs, represented both by private counsel and the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's refusal to grant marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and its refusal to recognize lawfully entered same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions, violated the plaintiffs' 14th Amendment equal protection and due process rights. The plaintiffs were divided into two groups: those who wished to marry in Arizona, but were denied, and those who had lawfully married elsewhere, but whose marriages the state refused to recognize. They claimed the state's statutory and constitutional ban on same sex marriage harmed them in the following ways: deprived them of certain legal protections; penalized the couples in their tax returns; prevented the couples from jointly adopting children; prevented the couples from receiving benefits afforded to families of armed service veterans. A number of plaintiffs claimed the specific harm that the state had refused to list them as spouses on the death certificates of their deceased husbands and wives. On Aug. 20, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the state with regard to one of the already-married couples: One of the spouses had just died, and the plaintiffs asked the court to require the state to prepare a death certificate recognizing the couple's marriage. On Sept. 12, 2014, the district court (Judge John W. Sedwick) granted the plaintiff's motion, determining that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the merits, and that he was likely to irreparably suffer both emotional and financial harm without the injunction. On Oct. 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judges Reinhardt, Gould, and Berzon) affirmed an Idaho district court's finding in Latta v. Otter, PB-ID-0001 in this clearinghouse, that that state's ban on same sex marriage was unconstitutional. At the same time, the 9th Circuit overturned a Nevada district court upholding its state's ban. On Oct. 16, 2014, Judge Sedwick granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147960. He based his decision on the recent 9th Circuit ruling that found bans on same sex marriage to violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. He also immediately enjoined the state from prohibiting same-sex marriages. The next day, Arizona's Attorney General (Thomas Horne) issued a letter instructing the clerks of all Arizona county courts to begin issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on October 17, 2014, finding the Arizona Constitutional Provision to deny same-sex couples equal protection under the law. The defendants appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit on November 18, 2014. The parties voluntarily dismissed the appeal on September 10, 2015. On December 18, 2015, the district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs for $302,140.11 in attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: On March 12, 2014, same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The plaintiffs claim that Arizona's statutory and constitutional bans on granting marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and on recognizing lawfully entered same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions, violates their 14th Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. The court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs, and plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees.