On July 25, 2017, two minors, represented by Legal Services of Central New York, filed this putative class-action civil-rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, on behalf of all 16- and 17-year-old juveniles placed in solitary confinement in Broome County's jail, in Binghamton, NY. Both named plaintiffs were 17-year-old boys held in solitary confinement at the time of filing; each had multiple disciplinary isolation sanctions issued during their detention. They brought this action against the Broome County Sheriff, Chief Jail Administrator, and Deputy Jail Administrator, as well as the Chenango Valley School District, which lies within Broome County. The plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of solitary confinement and poor physical conditions increased their risk of future psychological harm. Plaintiffs with mental disabilities were alleged to be particularly at-risk members of the class. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants denied juveniles in solitary confinement educational instruction and therefore denied them their due process rights. The claim arose under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The complaint sought class certification of all present and future members, with subclasses of those members with mental and physical disabilities; declaratory relief that the defendants' actions violated the plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; all necessary and appropriate injunctive relief; and attorneys' fees and costs. On August 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to correct the school district. At the plaintiffs' request, the case was designated by the court as related to V.W. v Conway. Conway, also brought by Legal Services of Central New York, made substantially similar factual and legal claims. The complaint in that case challenged solitary confinement practices imposed on juveniles at the Onondaga Justice Center and alleged that the local school district failed to provide adequate educational instruction to juveniles held in solitary confinement. In November 2017, Magistrate Judge David E. Peebles ordered the case to mediation. He set a deadline for February 2018. By that time, the plaintiffs and the Chenango School District reached an interim settlement agreement. The District agreed to provide sufficient staff, special education teachers, and evaluations to juvenile students at the jail. The court (Judge David N. Hurd) then dismissed claims against the school district except as to attorneys' fees and costs (which were later resolved in March). Otherwise, the mandatory mediation did not bring resolution to the case. On April 4, 2018, Judge Hurd issued a decision and order granting a preliminary injunction against the Sheriff's office, and certified the requested class. The class certified was composed of all 16- and 17-year-olds who are now or will be incarcerated at Broome County Correctional Facility, with two additional subclasses: (1) a subclass of all 16-and 17-year-olds with disabilities as defined under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act who are now or will be incarcerated at the Broome County Correctional Facility, who are in need of special education services, and (2) a subclass of all 16- and 17-year-olds with psychiatric and/or intellectual disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated at the Broome County Correctional Facility, who are at risk of being placed in disciplinary segregation because of their disability. After dismissing claims against the Deputy Administrator, the court enjoined the remaining defendants by barring them from locking juveniles in cells unless they posed an immediate risk to the facility. Solitary confinement would be permitted only when other means of disciplinary action proved inadequate, and was limited to no more than four hours per day. The court also ordered that the defendants provide mental health and psychiatric services and a minimum of three hours of educational instruction per day. 298 F. Supp. 3d 391. In May 2018, the parties began settlement discussions. The filed a motion to approve their settlement agreement on July 9, 2018. The court granted final approval of the agreement on December 18, 2018. The settlement included 1) a section on behavior management that required defendants to significantly limit their use of solitary confinement and implement a comprehensive behavior management system with the goal of using the least restrictive sanctions on children; and 2) a guarantee that juveniles housed in the jail will have sufficient classroom space and access to education. The agreement also included details on reporting, monitoring, enforcement, and modification. The agreement was set to last until October 1, 2019, unless juveniles continued to be housed at the jail, in which case it would expire after the Sheriff's Office notified the court and plaintiffs confirmed that all juveniles have been permanently removed and will no longer be housed there. The defendants also agreed to pay $75,000 for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and costs. As of May 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket. The settlement has expired, unless juveniles continue to be housed at the jail.

Summary: On July 25, 2017, two minors filed this class-action civil-rights lawsuit in the Northern District of New York on behalf of all 16- and 17-year-old juveniles placed in solitary confinement in the Broome County jail. They brought this action against the Broome County Sheriff, Chief Jail Administrator, and Deputy Jail Administrator, as well as the Chenango Valley School District. The complaint alleged that the conditions of solitary confinement both created risk of psychological harm to juveniles and denied them state-standard levels of educational instruction. The court issued a preliminary injunction against the jail administrators in April 2018. The parties settled later in 2018, with the defendants agreeing to implement a behavior management system and provide juvenile detainees access to education. The agreement will terminate when no juveniles are housed in the jail.


This is a case about the legality of two rules issued by the Department of Homeland Security in June 2020 that would delay or eliminate employment authorization documents (EADs) for asylum seekers beginning in August 2020. On July 21, 2020, five nonprofit legal services organizations filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its Secretary in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The organizations sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. § 701) and sought injunctive relief and vacatur of the rules. During the lengthy application process for asylum in the U.S., the government does not provide any economic or legal support to refugee applicants. Instead, EADs are often the sole opportunity for a refugee to earn an income and the only form of government-issued photo identification. EADs are therefore crucial for securing basic needs—such as housing, food, medical care, or legal counsel—and proving an individual’s status as an asylum applicant. The organizations alleged that the new rules would complicate the EAD application process by repealing the requirement that DHS approve or deny EAD applications within 30 days of its filing, thereby delaying or eliminating some applicants’ access to work authorizations. The organizations further alleged that the two rules violated the APA by 1) failing to consider the Refugee Act of 1980, which allows refugees to apply for asylum in the U.S. 2) preventing the public from commenting on the proposed rules, 3) failing to reasonably explain the need for the new rules, and 4) acting through the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, who had not been confirmed by the Senate. This case was assigned to Judge Paula Xinis. On July 24, 2020, the legal services organizations filed motions for a preliminary injunction and to stay implementation of the rules. On September 11, 2020, the court filed a memorandum opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the organizations’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court preliminarily enjoined DHS from enforcing a subset of the rules, including the repeal of the 30-day processing requirement and other changes to the application process, against members of the organizations. But the court also declined to stay implementation of the rules while the case proceeded. 2020 WL 5500165. For more information on the preliminary injunction, see here. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In July 2020, five non-profit legal services organizations filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) on the grounds that two new rules unlawfully impaired the employment authorization document (EAD) application process by repealing the requirement that DHS resolve an EAD application within 30 days and delaying or eliminating some applicants’ access to work authorizations. The organizations sought injunctive relief and vacatur of the rules. On September 11, 2020, the court preliminarily enjoining DHS from enforcing a subset of the rules against members of the plaintiff organizations.


On May 17, 2016, an African American man whose request for accommodations through Airbnb was rejected because of his race, brought this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He sued Airbnb under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that he, and all others similarly situated, had been injured by the pertinent discriminatory acts or practices committed by Airbnb's host agents, representatives, and servants. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that while planning a trip to Philadelphia, PA, he tried to use the housing accommodation service known as Airbnb but was told by an agent of Airbnb that the accommodation he was interested in was no longer available. However, the plaintiff soon found out that the accommodation was in fact still available, and after creating two fake accounts, one of a black man and one of a white man, he found that the Airbnb host only offered the accommodation to the white individual. Represented by Emejuru & Nyomnbi L.L.C., the plaintiff asked for judgment and damages including compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. On May 20, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint that also alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff filed another amended complaint on June 27. On July 13, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration and dismiss the case. In a November 1, 2016 opinion, U.S. District Court Judge Christopher R. Cooper found that the plaintiff had entered into a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement with Airbnb, and therefore granted Airbnb's motion to compel arbitration and stay the case. On November 7, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for certification for interlocutory appeal, which the court denied on December 19. On February 2, 2017, the Circuit Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and subsequently denied rehearing en banc. 681 Fed.Appx. 1. The plaintiff then appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari on October 2, 2017. 138 S.Ct. 222. Arbitration continued for nearly two years. On May 30, 2019, the arbitrator granted the defendant's motion for summary judgement in full. The arbitrator said that the most troubling piece of the case was the defendant's requirement that potential renters submit a picture of themselves before renting. But because the defendant had ended this practice, the arbitrator found the case moot. The plaintiff moved to vacate arbitration, alleging that the arbitrator overstepped by denying the plaintiff's requests for depositions. Claiming that the plaintiff "has not shouldered the heavy burden required to vacate an arbitration decision", the judge denied the motion on Nov 27, 2019. The court found that the plaintiff did not request the depositions of Airbnb representatives in a timely manner; therefore, the arbitrator did not unreasonably deny a timely request for depositions. Even if he did, claimed the court, the plaintiff did not not met his burden to establish grounds to vacate the arbitrator's decision. The plaintiff appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia on December 24, 2019. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 17, 2016, an African American man whose request for accommodations through Airbnb was rejected because of his race, brought this lawsuit on his behalf, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. He sued Airbnb under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging that the defendant he, and all others similarly situated, had been injured by the pertinent discriminatory acts or practices committed by Airbnb's host agents, representatives, and servants. Represented by Emejuru & Nyomnbi L.L.C., he asked for judgment and damages including compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. On May 20, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint which also alleged a violation of the Fair Housing Act. After the Court granted the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, which eventually resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff moved to vacate the arbitration decision, and the case is ongoing.


On June 16, 2009, Arabic Christian Perspective (ACP), a nonprofit with a self-described mission of “proclaiming the Holy Gospel of Jesus Christ to Muslims”, filed this lawsuit against the City of Dearborn and its Chief of Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Earlier that year, the Dearborn police department instituted a leafleting restriction for the Arab International Festival that permitted leafleting at the Festival only from a stationary booth and not while walking around the Festival. Each year prior to this ordinance, the plaintiffs had passed out pamphlets while walking around the festival to promote Christianity in an effort to convert the Muslims. The plaintiffs alleged in the complaint that this leafleting restriction violated their First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, free exercise of religion, and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of the restriction, and nominal and compensatory damages. On June 18, 2009 Judge Nancy Edmunds of the District Court denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the restriction from going into effect before the 2009 Festival. Judge Edmunds concluded that the restriction was narrowly focused, still provided the plaintiffs’ access to the Festival to carry out their mission, and supported a legitimate government interest for crowd safety. Though only an order, without legal explanation, is available on the docket, reasoning for this decision can be found in 720 F.Supp.2d 817. On July 7, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint including several exhibits of pictures from the Festival. On January 15, 2010, one of the plaintiffs, Arabic Christian Perspective, voluntarily dismissed itself from the case, leaving its founder and director as the sole plaintiff. On March 15, 2010, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment and injunctive relief. The defendants also moved for summary judgment on April 9, 2010. At some point prior to the ruling on the motions, this case was transferred to District Court Judge Paul D. Borman. On June 7, 2010, Judge Borman dismissed the case, granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. Specifically, he granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff’s First Amendment free speech claim because the leafleting restriction was a valid time, place, and manner restriction of speech, as it was content neutral and served a government interest in safety. He also granted the defendants’ summary judgment motion as to the plaintiff’s freedom of association claim because the restriction did not force or prevent the plaintiff’s from organizing during the event, and as to the plaintiff’s free exercise claim because the plaintiff did not address this claim in his summary judgment motion. Lastly, Judge Borman granted summary judgment in favor the defendants as to the plaintiff’s equal protection claim because the restriction was based on a location, not based on a specific message or idea. 720 F.Supp.2d 817. Also on June 7, 2010, the plaintiff appealed to the Sixth Circuit. On June 17, 2010, the Court of Appeals (Judges Richard Suhrheinrich, Eugene Siler, and Eric Clay) granted the plaintiff’s motion for an injunction pending appeal., This order, pertaining only to the 2010 Festival, allowed the plaintiff to distribute leaflets from the outer sidewalks and roads, but not on the sidewalks that were directly adjacent to the Festival attractions. On May 26, 2011, in a published opinion, Judge Karen Nelson Moore for the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the free speech claim, thereby invalidating the leafleting restriction within both the inner and outer perimeters of the Festival. The Court of Appeals held that the restriction on the sidewalks directly adjacent to the Festival attractions did not serve a substantial government interest. The City kept those same sidewalks open for public traffic and permit sidewalk vendors, whose activity was more obstructive to sidewalk traffic flow than pedestrian leafleting. Moreover, the prohibition of pedestrian leafleting in the outer perimeter was not narrowly tailored to the goal of isolating inner areas from vehicular traffic. The City could be held liable because the Chief of Police, who instituted the leafleting restriction, created official municipal policy. 641 F.3d. 727. The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment for the defendants on all other claims. The case was remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 641 F.3d. 727. Back in the District Court, on June 14, 2010, Judge Borman entered a judgment in accordance with the Court of Appeals opinion. Judge Borman reversed his previous order, now granting the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to the First Amendment free speech claim and permanently enjoining the defendants and anyone in concert with the defendants from enforcing the leafleting restriction. A satisfaction of judgment was entered by Judge Borman on February 27, 2012 and on March 9, 2012, Judge Borman adopted the recommendations by Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen to award the plaintiff $1.00 in nominal damages and $103,401.96 in cost and attorney fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case was filed on June 16, 2006 against the City of Dearborn and its Chief of Police in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff alleged that by disallowing him from passing out leaflets at the Arab International Festival, the defendants violated is First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On June 7, 2010 the District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, however on May 26, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the restrictions on leafleting did not serve a substantial government interest, and even if it did, the plan was not narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest. On remand, the District Court judge granted an injunction and awarded the plaintiff nominal damages and attorney's fees.


On September 15, 2004, a Hollywood synagogue filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("Florida RFRA"), against the City of Hollywood, FL. in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Ft. Lauderdale division. The plaintiff, represented by private and public interest counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, punitive, and compensatory relief, claiming that the City unequally and selectively applied zoning ordinances. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that defendant's treatment of plaintiff's special exception applications and defendant's action to prevent organized religious services from taking place on the plaintiff's property constituted discrimination on the basis of religion. Plaintiff claimed that defendants treated its applications for special exemptions to local land use regulations differently because of its status as a religious institution. This alleged discrimination included,<i> inter alia</i>, adding unprecedented conditions to the granting of special exemptions, and seeking a permanent injunction in state court against defendants to prevent the use of the synagogue as a place of worship. On April 26, 2005, the United States filed a complaint against Defendant City of Hollywood, requesting declaratory and injunctive relief based up on the City's alleged violation of RLUIPA. On June 16, 2005, the Court (Judge Joan A. Lenard) consolidated both of the aforementioned cases, finding that they involved common questions of law and fact. On May 10, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint, dismissing plaintiffs' claims under Florida RFRA, along with some of the federal claims. The Court found that the City's alleged policy of harassment, selective enforcement, and retaliation was sufficient to constitute the moving force behind the plaintiff's injuries. Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F.Supp.2d 1296. On June 26, 2006, the Court granted in part plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, holding that the land ordinance was unconstitutional prior restraint on places of worship and that the City was liable under §1983. Hollywood Community Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 436 F.Supp.2d 1325. On June 27, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Court denied the motion in regards to all of the plaintiffs' claims, except for their Substantive Due Process claims as they relate to equitable estoppel. On July 6, 2006, additional individuals filed a motion to intervene claiming the future Consent Decree would violate their due process and enjoyment of property rights. The motion was denied on July 7, 2006 because the court found it was untimely and the parties lacked a significant legal interest in the matter. 2006 WL 8431503. On July 7, 2006, the court approved and entered a consent decree. The consent order barred the City from violating RLUIPA, decreed that future new procedures regarding religious land-use applications must be provided to the Department of Justice, and determined that each application will be reviewed de novo by the Developmental Review Board Hearing. The decree also ordered public and online signage declaring that the city does not discriminate against religious exercise in violation of RLUIPA. The City would also provide training to its employees on the requirements of RLUIPA. To remedy past actions in this case, the City agreed to allow the plaintiff to operate as a house of worship in perpetuity and make additional zoning concessions [PLEASE BE MORE SPECIFIC, SEE 380]. Additionally, the defendants were required to pay the plaintiffs $2,000,000 for all fees and costs. The duration of this order was 5 years after the date of its entry, or 3 years after the City's new special exception procedures take effect, whichever is later. The case was dismissed with prejudice and all pending motions were denied as moot. On August 4, 2006, the parties' whose motion to intervene was denied appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal. On January 18, 2008, the Eleventh Circuit found the District Court was correct in finding the appellant's motion for intervention was untimely. As such their appeal was dismissed with prejudice. 254 Fed.Appx. 769. On May 29, 2009, St. Gregorios Orthodox Church of India, Inc. filed a post judgment emergency motion to intervene. This motion was denied because of they were instructed to open a new claim against the defendants. The injunction has now run its course and there has been no further litigation. The case is presumed closed.

Summary: On September 15, 2004, a Hollywood synagogue filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §1983, and the Florida Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("Florida RFRA"), against the City of Hollywood, FL. in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Ft. Lauderdale division. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, punitive, and compensatory relief claiming that the City unequally and selectively applied zoning ordinances. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that defendant's treatment of plaintiff's special exception applications and defendant's action to prevent organized religious services on the plaintiff's property constituted discrimination on the basis of religion. The plaintiffs won partial summary judgment on the §1983 claim in late June 2006. On July 7, 2006, the Court approved and entered a consent order barring the City from violating RLUIPA, mandating new procedures for the special exception application process, and ordering the City to train its employees on RLUIPA. Also, the City agreed to allow Plaintiff to operate as a house of worship in perpetuity and make additional zoning concessions. On August 7, 2006, the appellant's motion to dismiss the appeal with prejudice was granted by the Eleventh Circuit, due to settlement.


COVID-19 Summary: A class action for emergency release by noncitizens in civil immigration detention in the Bristol County House of Corrections. Judge William Young provisionally certified five sub-classes, reviewed dozens of bail applications, and released several individuals. Then on May 12, he banned further admissions to the facility and ordered universal COVID-19 testing. The defendants moved to reconsider and appealed to the First Circuit. On June 3, the court declined to reconsider the preliminary injunction but modified it to make the testing of staff at the facility voluntary instead of mandatory. The defendant appealed.
 On March 27, 2020, a class of civil immigration detainees held in two Massachusetts detention centers (Bristol County House of Corrections and C. Carlos Carreiro Immigration Detention Center) filed this federal petition and complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Represented by Lawyers for Civil Rights and Yale Law School's Worker and Immigrant Rights Advocacy Clinic, the plaintiffs sued the supervisors of their detention center, the acting Director of the Boston Field Office for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the acting Deputy Director for ICE. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a writ of habeas corpus, or in the alternative, injunctive relief asking the court to order the immediate release of all immigration detainees held in their locations. Specifically, they argued that they were at high risk of contracting the highly contagious disease, stating that they were “unaware of any meaningful safety measures” put in place by the facilities. They claimed that this violated their Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. In addition, they claimed that by exposing the detainees with underlying medical conditions to a heightened risk of COVID-19, the defendants were preventing them from participating in the removal process because of their disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. In support of their motion, the plaintiffs pointed to other instances around the country where detainees and incarcerated individuals had been released in order to promote social distancing and self-isolation, including Los Angeles, New Jersey, Cleveland, Nashville, and San Antonio. The plaintiffs also requested that the court prohibit the placement of new detainees within in the detention centers until public health protocols were implemented. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, asking the court to order either the release of the putative class or the implementation of safety protocols within the detention system. As support for their motions, they included statements and declarations from various impacted individuals and detainees. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of all civil immigration detainees held in either the Bristol County House of Corrections or the C. Carlos Carreiro Immigration Detention Center. The case was originally assigned to Judge Patti B. Saris as connected with another case already before her; however, after Judge Saris determined that the two cases were unconnected, this case was reassigned to Judge William G. Young. A hearing on the temporary restraining order occurred on April 1, 2020 and April 2, 2020. Judge Young declined to certify the entire class action, but instead “provisionally certified” five individual subclasses based off a chart provided to him by the Bristol County Sheriff’s office: (1) 11 detainees without any previous criminal history who also didn't have any pending charges; (2) detainees with nonviolent charges against them who had underlying medical condition; (3) those with nonviolent crimes who didn't have underlying health conditions; (4) and (5) detainees with serious pending charges against them, 17 with serious convictions. Judge Young also indicated that he might order releases very soon, noting "The numerical evidence seems incontrovertible, that the fewer people that are in the center, the greater the chance for health and safety for the people who remain there,"  as reported by Commonwealth Magazine. On April 4, Judge Young granted bail to three individuals, and proposed to review petitions for bail at a rate of ten per day. The next day, he released a schedule of the order in which bail applications would be reviewed, starting on April 7 and continuing at a rate of ten per weekday until Monday, April 13, reviewing a total of fifty petitions. On April 7, Judge Young ordered the release of eight individuals. In the order, he expressed concern that the remaining individuals might not have enough space within the detention facility to socially distance, ordering that to be among the items discussed at a hearing scheduled for April 9. On April 8, Judge Young granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, certifying as a class all civil immigration detainees still held at the Bristol and Carreiro centers--some 148 detainees. The order noted that the Court was not ready to rule yet on the habeas petition or the preliminary injunction, but was willing to "expeditiously" consider bail petitions. 2020 WL 1703844. On April 9, fifteen additional detainees were released on bail. Ten more individuals were released on April 10. Judge Young issued an updated list of individuals to be considered for bail the same day, with 49 individuals slated to be released from April 14 to April 20. On April 14, the defendants filed a motion to stay further releases, which was promptly denied by the Court on April 15. The Court chided the defendants for the request: "Compelling issues of individual, institutional, and community health preclude the luxury of a stay so counsel can 'consider their appellate options.' The motion is denied." On April 17, Judge Young issued the next schedule of releases pending bail, with 29 individuals scheduled for release from April 21 to April 23. On May 12, the court granted preliminary relief and ordered that all immigration detainees at the detention center and staff who came into contact with them be tested for COVID-19. The court further ordered that no new immigration detainees be admitted. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83371. On May 18, the court followed up with an order, requiring defendants to furnish their plan for testing staff and detainees. The court noted that the Massachusetts Department of Corrections had implemented testing for all staff and inmates and that "since, under our Constitution, ICE power to lock a person up is limited by its obligation to care for that person, surely ICE can be expected to care for its civil detainees at least as well as Massachusetts cares for its convicted felons." On May 22, the defendants asked the court to reconsider, arguing that they had not acted with deliberate indifference. They further stated that many of their staff had shown reluctance to COVID-19 testing. The defendants also appealed to the First Circuit on June 1. This appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-1564, and it was later voluntarily dismissed on October 28. On June 22, the plaintiffs cross-appealed, and the case was assigned USCA Case Number 20-1626. On June 3, a hearing was held regarding the motion for reconsideration. The court requested both parties to report what acceptable population range could be safely held in the facility. The defendants were also ordered to report the names of immigration detainees at a heightened risk of COVID-19, so the court could determine who should be reviewed for potential release. The court also modified the preliminary injunction to make the testing of staff at the facility voluntary, with no adverse effects for staff who declined the test. In a memorandum dated June 18, the court gave an explanation to its denial of the defendant's motion for reconsideration of the preliminary injunction, writing: "just as 'the increased rate of infection' does not itself prove deliberate indifference, the absence of known infections does not disprove deliberate indifference." On June 30, the court noted that the (1) the population of detainees dropped from 80 detainees when the preliminary injunction was issued and that (2) all detainees, with the exception of a few who refused testing and so were quarantined, have tested negative for COVID-19. The court recognized the risk to public health resulting from transferring new detainees between facilities, including those outside the state. Therefore, the court modified the preliminary injunction to add the following: “New immigration detainees may, upon motion and leave from the Court, be admitted from the criminal wing of the facility, but only if they have (1) tested negative for COVID-19 and remained isolated since their test, (2) been evaluated for underlying medical conditions, and (3) been considered for release by ICE.” The defendant appealed to the First Circuit on August 3, and the case was assigned USCA Case Number 20-1768. On January 11, 2021, the judge referred parties to Alternative Dispute Resolution. On February 9, 2021, the judge requested briefing on the impact of the memorandum issued on January 20, 2021, from Acting Secretary Pekoske on Immigration Enforcement Policies, which paused removals for certain non-citizens. January 20, 2021 Memorandum on Immigration Enforcement Policies. On April 6, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for settlement and to modify bail conditions, which the court granted the following day; the court set a fairness hearing for May 3. The Settlement Agreement divided the class members into several groups, those to be released, those to be provided "other relief," and those currently released on bail. The agreement provided that 6 detainees were to be released immediately and that the 32 individuals already on bail would remain released with a removal of curfew, home confinement, or GPS monitoring restrictions. For the members of the class remaining in detention, the agreement allowed them the option to be transferred out of BCHOC to another ICE facility. The court's May 12 order, prohibiting the admission of new detainees, was to remain in place until the final approval of the Settlement Agreement, at which time the preliminary injunction would be dissolved. This case is ongoing.

Summary: A class action for emergency release by individuals in civil immigration detention in the Bristol County House of Corrections. On May 12, the court granted preliminary relief and ordered that all immigration detainees at the detention center and staff who came into contact with them be tested for COVID-19. The court further ordered that no new immigration detainees be admitted. The defendants moved to reconsider and appealed to the First Circuit. On June 3, the court declined to reconsider the preliminary injunction and also modified it to make the testing of staff at the facility voluntary. The case is ongoing.


On November 24, 2013, a prisoner detained at Cook County Jail (CCJ) filed a handwritten civil action against Cook County in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that violence and the deliberate indifference of staff at the jail deprived him of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case was assigned to the Honorable Virginia M. Kendall, who allowed the indigent plaintiff to proceed without payment of court fees. On February 27, 2014, the plaintiff, represented by the Roderick Macarthur Justice Center and Uptown People's Law Center, and joined by several other prisoner-plaintiffs, filed an amended class action complaint. The plaintiffs alleged a longstanding and systemic set of abuses performed by officials at CCJ. They claimed that CCJ officials implicitly authorized abusive conditions by refusing to promulgate adequate policies on overcrowding, use of force, and segregation. The plaintiffs alleged they were stomped, kicked, and punched by officers at the facility, often while handcuffed. When prisoners complained about the violence or made any effort to defend themselves from the officers' attacks, they were often retaliated against by placement in segregation for up to 23 hours per day, causing distress and violence in these units. Raw sewage frequently flooded these cells, creating serious risks to health and safety. The plaintiffs also sought certification as a class encompassing all residents of their section of the CCJ. On March 8, 2014, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, asking that the court impose a remedial plan against the defendants with respect to the ongoing violence at the facility. The defendants, meanwhile, filed a motion to dismiss on May 5, 2014, arguing that the plaintiffs had stated no constitutional claim. On May 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery. On May 21, 2014, the Honorable Young B. Kim granted the motion in part, ordering the defendants to produce documents and video footage from CCJ. The court also ordered that the defendants allow a joint tour of the facility by experts for the plaintiffs, accompanied by experts for the defendants. On June 10, 2014, the court granted the defendants' discovery request that plaintiffs produce forms filled out by additional prisoners containing information about conditions at the facility. The forms had been sent by the plaintiffs' attorneys to various prisoners for the purpose adding potential plaintiffs to the litigation's putative class. The court ruled the forms were not protected by attorney client privilege and should be provided to the defendant. 2014 WL 2598814. On March 31, 2015, Judge Kendall issued a 50-page opinion and order, denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, and also denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctions. 2013 WL 6858884. The motions to dismiss claims against defendants Cook County and Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle were denied, while claims against a CCJ officer were dismissed. Motions to dismiss were denied on the basis that the evidence showed a question of fact as to whether the defendants' had managed the CCJ with indifference to the plaintiffs' wellbeing. The plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction was denied because it failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as to their claim of deliberate indifference, and because jail officials had shown they were already working to address the problems alleged by the plaintiffs. This opinion was appealed to the Seventh Circuit by the plaintiffs on April 17, 2015 (15-1833). However, on August 20, 2015 the appeal was withdrawn and the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their injunctive claims. The motion explained that it was "sensible" to end the injunctive portion of the litigation because the District Court's opinion on the preliminary injunction had made it "clear that the Court agreed with Defendants’ assessment of the evidence." On November 16, 2015, plaintiff Hudson filed an amended complaint seeking monetary damages and attorneys' fees. The other plaintiffs were no longer named and retained only jail staff as defendants, rather than the County executives previously named. The amended complaint focused on allegations that CCJ staff had allowed or facilitated a gang attack on the plaintiff, in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments and federal civil rights law. On December 23, 2015, the defendants replied to the amended complaint seeking summary judgement in their favor. But by September 23, 2016, the suit was voluntarily dismissed by the parties pursuant to an undisclosed settlement, with each side bearing its own fees, three days before the trial was planned to begin. On September 26, 2016, the dismissal was changed to be dismissed with prejudice. The case was closed on September 26. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the details of the settlement as of November 16, 2019. Between October 28, 2018 and September 3, 2019, eleven prisoners wrote to the court seeking admission to the class. To each letter, the court declared that "the case has been closed for two years and there is no pending matter in which" the petitioners "can participate under this case number." As of November 16, 2019, the case remained closed.

Summary: In November 2013, prisoners detained in the Cook County Jail filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois alleging that living conditions at CCJ were inhumane and that CCJ staff used extreme physical violence against them, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Injunctive claims were abandoned by the plaintiffs and an undisclosed settlement was reached on individual damages. The case was closed.


On January 6, 2014, when several same-sex couples who were residents of Arizona filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare that all Arizona laws banning same-sex marriages are unconstitutional, to compel the defendants to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, to award the plaintiffs nominal damages as well as the costs of suit and attorneys' fees. In 1996, the state of Arizona banned same-sex marriage, and in 2008 this ban was added to the state constitution in The Marriage Protection Amendment. The plaintiffs claimed that Arizona's laws prohibiting the recognition of same-sex marriages targeted homosexuals for disfavored treatment and interfered with the flow of the plaintiffs' spousal benefits and their ability to build their families. They further allege that these laws violated their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. On July 29, 2014, the District court (Judge John W. Sedwick) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for nominal damages, ruling that the Eleventh Amendment bars such claims from being brought against state officials. On October 16, 2014, the District Court (Judge Sedwick) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The court ruled that Arizona's laws banning same sex marriage are unconstitutional in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Latta v. Otter, and entered a permanent injunction barring their enforcement. The defendants filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on November 17, 2014. The parties stipulated that the appellate proceedings will be stayed until the Supreme Court's decision in the DeBoer case. The DeBoer case was decided by the outcome of Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is fundamental, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. Following the decision in the Supreme Court, the parties jointly stipulated for an entry of judgement for the plaintiff's attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses. On September 29, 2015, the court entered a judgement of $200,000 for the plaintiffs.

Summary: On January 6, 2014, when several same-sex couples who were residents of Arizona filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Arizona. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that all Arizona laws banning same-sex marriages are unconstitutional, compel the defendants to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, and for the plaintiffs to be awarded costs of suit and attorneys' fees. On October 16, 2014 the District Court entered a permanent injunction barring Arizona from enforcing its laws against same-sex marriage. The case is on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals but is stayed pending the Supreme Court's decision in DeBoer. The DeBoer case was decided by the outcome of Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is fundamental, and it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. In September 2015, the court entered a judgement of $200,000 for the plaintiffs.


On January 28, 2015, a group of private citizens who were prevented from protesting, circulating petitions, and handing out political fliers in Downtown Detroit’s Campus Martius Park filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued Detroit 300 Conservancy, the private company managing the public park; Guardsmark, the company hired to provide park security; and a Detroit City Police officer, under § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by ACLU of Michigan, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ attempts to prevent political protests in the public park violated their First Amendment rights to free speech. On April 8, 2015, the city of Detroit agreed that it was a First Amendment issue and promulgated interim rules that would allow for people to exercise their free speech rights in city parks. Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint, which acknowledged the new interim rules and withdraw the initial request for a preliminary injunction. However, the amended complaint stated that since the interim rules were merely temporary and could be rescinded at any moment, the plaintiffs still required a permanent solution. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On July 22, 2015, Judge Bernard Friedman agreed with the plaintiffs and denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss. He ruled that because the plaintiff’s complaint had been amended after the motion to dismiss, the motion was moot; additionally, the rules were only temporary, and the complaint still contained a cause of action for which the plaintiffs could receive relief. On October 14, 2015, the case was moved before a Magistrate Judge and the parties ordered to conduct settlement conferences. The defendant then informed the court that the city of Detroit had planned some new ordinances that would address most of the relief that the plaintiffs sought in their complaint. On October 15, 2015, the court stayed the proceedings until a settlement conference could be had on or after November 24, 2015. The parties conducted their settlement conference on December 1, 2015. They came to an agreement and settled on January 16, 2016, contingent on the approval of Detroit City Council. The Detroit City Council issued its ordinance. The ordinance rules include the acknowledgement that leafleting and demonstrations are exercises of First Amendment rights; that demonstrations of 45 or fewer people can be held in the park without a permit; that if an activist shows that they cannot afford the permit fees, the fees can be waived. At Campus Martius Park, only demonstrations of 25 or fewer people will be allowed to protest without a permit, and activists cannot use any structure or businesses inside the park for leafleting or demonstration purposes. The city also agreed to train its officers and agents in these rules, as well as requiring the park’s private management company to also train its agents in proper implementation and enforcement of those rules. As of February 16, 2016, this case was closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs, protesters and activists who had been prevented from protesting in Detroit's Campus Martius Park, filed this lawsuit on January 28 2016, in the US District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan, claiming that the city of Detroit and the private management company of the park violated their right to free speech. In April, the defendants agreed that it was a First Amendment issue and promulgated interim rules about the treatment of and requirements for protesters in city parks in general and Campus Martius in particular. They then moved to dismiss. The court rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss; in October, the parties began settlement talks. On December 1, 2015, the parties had their settlement conference and came to an agreement that City Council approved. This case is now closed.


On January 4, 2007, plaintiffs, the owner and operator of multiple rental units and unnamed tenants, filed suit against Cherokee County, Georgia in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia to challenge County Ordinance No. 2006-003 which purported to establish penalties for "the harboring of illegal aliens" in the County. The Ordinance was similar to others recently passed by cities seeking to expel undocumented immigrants from their boundaries. Immediately following the filing, the District Court (Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr.) entered a TRO and preliminary injunction, with the consent of the parties, barring enforcement of the Ordinance pending the final outcome of similar cases - Reynolds v. City of Valley Park, Missouri [IM-MO-1] and Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania [IM-PA-1]. On August 28, 2007, the Court administratively close the case, advising the parties that if they wanted to reopen it, they needed to file a motion to that effect.

Summary: In this 2007 case, plaintiffs challenged a Cherokee County, Georgia ordinance that purported to establish penalties for "the harboring of illegal aliens" in the county. Immediately following the filing, the U.S. District Court issued a TRO and preliminary injunction to bar enforcement of the ordinance. The case was administratively closed in August 2007.


This case arose from a Syrian family's attempts to obtain immigration visas. In 2004, one of the family members filed a petition for an immigrant visa on behalf of her sister and her sister’s family. In 2017, the State Department approved the visas just as President Trump issued Executive Order 13780 (EO-2), which barred Syrian nationals from entering the United States. Following President Trump’s order, a series of legal challenges ensued, some of them ultimately making their way to the Supreme Court. In June 2017, the Supreme Court in International Refugee Assistance Program v. Trump partially lifted a nationwide injunction against the ban, permitting the government to apply it against anyone who did not have a “bona-fide” relationship with a person or organization in the United States. 137 S. Ct. 2080. On September 28, 2017, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that, despite having a bona-fide relationship to a person in the United States, the State Department had failed to issue visas to members of their family seeking to immigrate to the United States. In their complaint, plaintiffs argued that defendants (the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the State Department) wrongly applied EO-2 to them and sought a writ of mandamus compelling defendants to issue their visas under 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Plaintiffs also sought injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706) and declaratory relief. Two private law firms and Muslim Advocates represented the plaintiffs. Judge Royce C. Lamberth was assigned to the case. On November 27, 2017, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings for ninety days. In their motion, the parties suggested to the court that they may be able to resolve the case without further litigation. During the stay, the plaintiffs agreed to take any necessary steps to obtain their visas, and defendants agreed to expedite plaintiffs' visa requests. On December 20, Judge Lamberth granted the motion to stay. On February 15, 2018, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, which is now closed.

Summary: On September 28, 2017, members of a Syrian family filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged that the government had refused to issue them visas because they were Syrian under Executive Order 13780 even though they had a bona fide relationship with a person or organization in the United States and thus, under Supreme Court precedent, were excluded from Order's scope. The plaintiffs agreed to drop the case in exchange for expedited visa processing.


On June 28, 2007, ten named minor children in the legal custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families ("DCYF") filed this putative class action lawsuit (by their Next Friends) in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The named plaintiffs were represented by the advocacy organization Children's Rights, then-Rhode Island Child Advocate Jametta Alston, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sought certification of a class of all children who are or will be in the legal custody of the DCYF due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect. They asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging systemic deficiencies in the operation of DCYF subjected children in the state's care to harm or an unreasonable risk of harm. The alleged problems included: children staying in foster care for years; placement dictated by availability, not suitability; inadequate reimbursement rates for foster parents; decline in the numbers of licensed foster homes; unnecessary institutionalization of children; repeated moves between inappropriate DCYF placements; failure to meet federal standards; failures of caseworkers to make monthly visits; abuse in foster care; untenable caseloads of social workers; inadequate supervision; placements in unlicensed foster homes; lengthy application process for foster home licensing; separation from siblings; lack of timely reunification with families; pursuit of reunification with parents when not appropriate; failure to place children who cannot return home for adoption; and failure to meet children's medical, dental, and mental health needs. The plaintiffs also alleged that the state forfeited millions in federal matching funds by failing to meet its obligations. On October 2, 2007, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Specifically, the defendants argued that (1) the Next Friends lacked standing; (2) pursuant to the Younger and Rooker-Feldman doctrines, the Court should abstain from rendering a decision that would invade the province of the Rhode Island Family Court; (3) the plaintiffs did not have a private right of action under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act ("AACWA") of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., 670 et seq.; and (4) the claims of three of the named plaintiffs had become moot because they had been adopted and were no longer in DCYF custody. Following briefing on class certification and the defendants' motion to dismiss, the case idled for sixteen months while awaiting a decision on whether the case would proceed. On April 29, 2009, Senior District Judge Ronald R. Lagueux granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the Child Advocate and Next Friends had no authority or standing to proceed in the case. Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 610 F. Supp. 2d 171 (D.R.I. 2009). The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On June 18, 2010, in an opinion authored by Circuit Judge Juan R. Torruella, the First Circuit reversed the District Court's dismissal. The First Circuit held that the next friends were acting in good faith, and that "[i]mportant social interests are advanced by allowing minors access to a judicial forum to vindicate their constitutional rights through a Next Friend." The Court of Appeals remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the complaint and to allow the three individuals to proceed as the plaintiffs' Next Friends. Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Carcieri, 608 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2010). On remand, Judge Lagueux recused himself pursuant to D.R.I. Local Rule 105(b) ("Any case remanded to this Court for a new trial shall be reassigned to a judge other than the judge to whom the case previously was assigned"), and the case was reassigned to District Judge Mary M. Lisi. On November 1, 2010, the defendants filed a second motion to dismiss the amended complaint for (1) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Federal Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 20, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lisi) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed the claims of a number of the named plaintiffs because they had been mooted out by adoption or age since the filing of the complaint four years prior. The Court also announced that it would abstain (under the Younger doctrine) with respect to the requested relief of (1) decreasing the rate of institutionalization; (2) increasing the rate of adoptions; (3) decreasing the number of placements per child; and (4) decreasing the length of time in foster care. And it dismissed some claims under the federal adoption law. However, it declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim, as well as federal statutory claims based on (i) the right to case plans containing certain documentation, such as child specific recruitment efforts and steps taken to secure a permanent home for them, as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16); and (ii) the right to adequate foster care maintenance payments as provided in 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(1), (a)(11), 672(a)(1), and 675(4)(A). Sam M. ex rel. Elliott v. Chafee, 800 F. Supp. 2d 363 (D.R.I. 2011). Following the motion to dismiss, on August 11, 2011, the District Court set deadlines for new briefing on class certification. However, just four days later, the District Court changed course, ordered no new class certification briefing, and scheduled a pretrial conference. Although the record is unclear, at some point around this time, the District Court advised the parties that it would not take up class certification until after it had decided dispositive motions on the claims of the named plaintiffs. On February 21, 2012, the District Court entered a text order denying the original class certification motion as moot. On February 24, 2012, with only two of the original ten named plaintiffs remaining, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding five new named plaintiffs in an effort to prevent the case from mooting out. On October 23, 2012, following approximately seven months of discovery, the defendants moved for a protective order. The defendants argued that, since class certification was to be delayed, the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery only about the specific named plaintiffs, and that much of the systemic evidence sought by plaintiffs should be off limits. The plaintiffs countered that evidence of DCYF's policies and customs was essential evidence even to an individual section 1983 case, and that they required this discovery to meet their burden on summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Lincoln D. Almond granted the protective order, stating that, in light of the District Court's plan to address the individual named plaintiffs' claims before class certification, such broad discovery was inappropriate at that stage of the litigation. Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee, No. 07-241, slip op. (D.R.I. Dec. 17, 2012). Plaintiffs appealed this order to the District Court, where it was affirmed. The parties continued with limited discovery, frequently disagreeing as to the scope of the protective order. Magistrate Judge Almond later clarified in a subsequent discovery order that the protective order "effectively precluded [plaintiffs] from seeking policy or practice discovery." Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee, No. 07-241, 2013 WL 785621 (D.R.I. Mar. 1, 2013). As discovery continued on the claims of the seven named plaintiffs, several of the plaintiffs either turned 18 and left DCYF care or were adopted. As a result, their claims became moot. On February 26, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification, and asked the District Court for a "timely determination" of their motion in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A). In response, the District Court urged the parties to attempt to settle the case, and ordered a thirty-day stay of all activity in the case over plaintiffs' objection. When the parties were unable to settle the case, the District Court ordered the defendants to respond to the class certification motion fourteen days after any ruling on summary judgment. The plaintiffs, seeing this delayed response deadline as effectively denying their motion for class certification, attempted to seek interlocutory appeal. The plaintiffs argued that, pursuant to Rule 23(f) (allowing appeals from orders denying class certification), the First Circuit should review the District Court's decision; or, in the alternative, that the First Circuit should issue a writ of mandamus and compel the District Court to address class certification before summary judgment. In a brief unpublished decision dismissing the plaintiffs' petition, the First Circuit stated that the order delaying defendants' response was not appropriate for a Rule 23(f) appeal, and that there was no "judicial usurpation" evident to warrant mandamus relief. Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee, No. 13-8014, slip op. (1st Cir. Jun. 7, 2013). On July 24, 2013, the District Court ordered that dispositive motions be dispensed with, and that the case proceed directly to trial. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a number of motions related to this change. First, the plaintiffs asked the court to consider class certification prior to trial. The plaintiffs argued that they could find no precedent for holding a full trial over objection before considering a motion for class certification. Second, plaintiffs asked the Court to allow them to discover the policy and custom evidence that they had been denied. The plaintiffs repeated their arguments that this evidence was essential to prevail on their claims. The District Court rejected these motions. Plaintiffs then asked the Court to order the defendants to facilitate meetings between them and their counsel, so that their cases could properly be prepared for trial. The defendants objected to any such attorney/client meetings. The District Court denied plaintiffs the opportunity to meet with their counsel prior to trial, holding that the motion came after the fact discovery deadline and that, in any event, the children had been evaluated by their retained psychologist, which the Court held was an adequate substitute. Trial on the claims of the two remaining named plaintiffs commenced on November 12, 2013 and continued intermittently until January 9, 2014, when the defendants moved for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52. On April 30, 2014, the District Court (Judge Lisi) issued a memorandum and order granting defendants' motion for partial findings and entering judgment in their favor. The District Court held that plaintiffs had produced insufficient evidence that DCYF's policies and customs had harmed the named plaintiffs or subjected them to an unreasonable risk of harm, and that they had failed to meet their burdens on their statutory claims (concerning case plans and foster care maintenance payments). Cassie M. ex rel. Irons v. Chafee, 16 F. Supp. 3d 33 (D.R.I. 2014). On May 29, 2014, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, challenging (1) the District Court's refusal to rule on class certification before trial; (2) the protective order that foreclosed policy and custom discovery; (3) the Court's refusal to allow plaintiffs to meet with their next friends and counsel prior to trial; (4) the Court's failure to consider undisputed evidence at trial concerning case plans; and (5) the Court's failure to consider undisputed evidence at trial concerning foster care maintenance payments. On April 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the judgment of the District Court. The Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Bruce M. Selya) held that the District Court abused its discretion when it "totally denied plaintiffs' counsel access to their own clients," and "prevented the plaintiffs from seeking plainly relevant discovery." The Court stated that the "right to counsel is a right of the highest order of importance," and that when that right is restrained without substantial justification (of which there was none here), "prejudice can fairly be presumed." The Court also stated that "it is black letter law" that policy and custom evidence is required in a section 1983 suit, and that it was "nose-on-the-face plain that the adverse decision at trial rested in substantial part on the plaintiffs' failure to adduce precisely the sort of evidence that the protective order prevented them from discovering." Although the Court of Appeals did not need to address class certification, it did state its belief that summary judgment could properly precede class certification, but that "a full-blown trial on the merits" should not occur "without pausing to take up a timely motion for class certification." The Court counseled the District Court, on remand, that it may consider dispositive motions before class certification. Danny B. ex rel. Elliott v. Raimondo, 784 F.3d 825 (1st Cir. 2015). On remand, both Judge Lisi and Magistrate Judge Almond recused themselves pursuant to D.R.I. Local Rule 105(b), which requires recusal of the prior judge when a case is remanded for retrial. The case then went before Chief Judge William E. Smith. The Court (Chief Judge Smith) indicated it would consider class certification first, and directed plaintiffs to file a new motion. On October 2, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint, adding additional named plaintiffs and updating their legal claims. On October 15, 2015, plaintiffs filed their Third Motion for Class Certification. On October 22, 2015, plaintiffs filed their Fourth Amended Complaint, again adding new named plaintiffs. After extensive negotiations with a court-appointed mediator, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of their settlement agreement on January 8, 2018. The Court preliminarily approved of the parties' settlement agreement as fair, reasonable, and adequate. The Court also granted certification of the class for settlement purposes comprising "all children who are or will be in the legal custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect." Following a fairness hearing, the Court approved the settlement agreement on May 15, 2018. The settlement agreement provided for, among other things: (1) improved assessment guidelines and procedures for children entering DCFY care; (2) strict rules for placement of children in shelters and assessment and stabilization centers; (3) strict rules for placement of children in congregate care; (4) guidelines prioritizing the placement of siblings with one another; (5) enhanced licensing procedures; and (6) enhanced face-to-face visitation procedures. Additionally, the parties agreed that defendants would pay plaintiffs $3,400,000 in attorneys' fees. The agreement also provided for monitoring of DCFY's compliance with the terms of the agreement, requiring reports from the Monitoring Team every six months. The first reporting period started on July 1, 2018. Monitoring is ongoing.

Summary: On June 28, 2007, ten named minor plaintiffs filed a putative class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of children who are in the legal custody of the Rhode Island Department of Children, Youth and Families because of a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect. The case alleges violations of the children's substantive due process and federal statutory rights, and seeks declaratory and injunctive relief. In 2010, a judgment for defendants was vacated when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the next friends were suitable representatives for the named plaintiff children. In 2015, a second judgment for defendants was vacated when the First Circuit held that the District Court abused its discretion in totally denying plaintiff children access to their lawyers, and in denying plaintiffs essential discovery necessary to prove their claims. In January 2018, the court preliminarily approved the parties' settlement agreement and granted class certification for settlement purposes. The settlement agreement was approved on May 15, 2018, and monitoring of DCFY's compliance is ongoing.


On March 25, 2014, a same-sex couple filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The couple, legally married in another state, asked the District Court to enter an order ruling Article 68 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 L.P.R.A. § 221, unconstitutional. The law in question limits marriage to unions between one man and one woman. The plaintiffs argued it violates their rights to due process and equal protection in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. On July 25, 2014, the plaintiffs, now represented by counsel, filed an amended complaint adding four other same-sex couples and the organization Puerto Rico Para Tod@s to the litigation. Puerto Rico Para Tod@s is a non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of LGBT causes in Puerto Rico. Two of the couples joined were married in other states and sought to have their marriages recognized in Puerto Rico and two others sought to be married in Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs also sought the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees related to the lawsuit. On October 21, 2014, United States District Court (Judge Juan M. Pérez-Giménez) entered an order granting the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion, dismissing the case for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court ruled that it was bound by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). In Baker, the Supreme Court issued a one-sentence opinion dismissing a case, "for want of a federal question." The case involved a same-sex couple in Minnesota that challenged Minnesota's prohibition on same-sex marriage. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the state's prohibition on same-sex marriage and the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion allowed that decision to stand. The District Court (Judge Pérez-Giménez) reasoned that this decision forbid it from considering the case for lack of jurisdiction. On October 28, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. On July 8, 2014, the First Circuit vacated the district court ruling upholding the ban and sent it back to the district court for further consideration in light of  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). On March 8, 2016, the district court held that Obergefell did not incorporate the right for same-sex couples to marry against Puerto Rico through the Fourteenth Amendment or invalidate Article 68. The Court held that incorporation would require an express decision from the Supreme Court of the U.S., the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Congress, or the Puerto Rico Legislature. The plaintiffs then petitioned the First Circuit for the issuance of a writ of mandamus requiring the district court to deem the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional. The defendants moved to join the petition. The First Circuit granted both the petition and the motion in an opinion on April 7, 2016, ordering a clerk to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. That same day, the district court ordered the marriage ban unconstitutional, and on April 11, 2016, it entered declaratory judgment. On August 17, 2016, the district court approved the parties' private agreement regarding attorneys' fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, five same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico seeking an order enjoining the territory from enforcing its laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. The court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the ruling and remanded the case for consideration consistent with Obergefell v. Hodges. After the district court held that same-sex couples did not have a right to marry, the First Circuit granted a writ of mandamus requiring the district court to deem the same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional. The district court issued declaratory judgment.


In 2008 and 2009, the United States Department of Justice investigated Georgia’s seven state-operated psychiatric hospitals. The investigations found that the hospitals were violating patients’ constitutional and statutory rights in multiple ways, such as by:

failing to adequately protect patients from harm;
improperly utilizing seclusion and restraints;
providing inadequate nursing and health care;
failing to provide adequate services for populations with specialized needs; and
failing to discharge patients to placement “in the most integrated setting” as required by the Supreme Court in L.C. v. Olmsted.
As a result of these investigations, the DOJ filed a federal lawsuit under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act on January 15, 2009. That lawsuit was filed together with a proposed settlement agreement. A year later, the settlement agreement in that case was still awaiting final court approval, and the DOJ was concerned that Georgia continued to provide deficient services, exposing patients to serious harm. The DOJ filed this lawsuit seeking injunctive relief on January 28, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, on the same day that it filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in the other lawsuit. This case was assigned to Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr., who was also presiding over the other lawsuit. In this lawsuit, the DOJ alleged that Georgia was violating the Americans with Disabilities Act by unnecessarily institutionalizing people with disabilities. Georgia’s system had previously been the subject of a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case (L.C. v. Olmsted), but ten years after Olmsted, Georgia had still failed to adequately implement policies to prevent unnecessary institutionalization. The DOJ moved to consolidate this ADA-focused case with the 2009 CRIPA-focused case. The parties initially engaged in settlement negotiations, but those negotiations failed, and Georgia moved to dismiss the suit on July 1, 2010. On August 9, the court denied the motion, and ordered the parties to proceed to discovery. Negotiations resumed and the parties agreed to a settlement, which was approved by the court on October 29, 2010. (In the meantime, the court had denied the DOJ’s motion to consolidate the cases, and had given final approval to the settlement agreement in the 2009 case.) The October 2010 settlement provided for an increase in community-based services over a five-year period. Specifically, the state would:

discontinue admissions to state institutions for certain categories of patients, and instead provide community-based treatment services;
increase crisis support services and create new options for community living;
create new Medicaid waiver enrollment slots for individuals with developmental disabilities;
increase home-based services for individuals participating in the waiver program;
provide additional services to keep individuals with mental illness from being institutionalized;
increase assertive community treatment, crisis management, and other services in the community; and
provide for housing options and support services to allow individuals with mental illness to remain in the community.
 The parties agreed to the appointment of an independent reviewer. Her first annual report, issued in October 2011, documented substantial progress by the state. On August 29, 2012, the court approved a modification of the settlement agreement, which was focused on implementing assertive community treatment. The independent reviewer’s reports continued to note Georgia’s considerable efforts in attempting to reach the standards set out in the settlement agreement (including the closure of two of the seven state hospitals), but on September 18, 2015, reported that not all of the goals set by the settlement agreement had been met by the five-year deadline. Georgia had done an acceptable job of providing resources for the deinstitutionalization of adults with persistent serious mental illness, but had not complied with the standards for persons with developmental disabilities. The independent reviewer did note that there were acceptable plans on the horizon that had not yet been implemented, and that delays in implementation were not necessarily because of idleness on the part of the state. In January 2016, however, the DOJ moved to hold the state in contempt for its failure to comply with the settlement agreement. This motion was eventually dismissed as moot: the DOJ and the state filed a joint motion for extension of the settlement agreement. They sought to have the court maintain jurisdiction while the state worked toward a June 30, 2018 compliance deadline. The court approved this settlement extension on May 27, 2016. The extension was supported by a coalition of community stakeholders, including the Carter Center Mental Health Program, Mental Health America of Georgia, Georgia Mental Health Consumer Network, Georgia Parent Support Network, Georgia Council on Substance Abuse, Atlanta Legal Aid Society’s Disability Integration Project, and the National Alliance on Mental Illness–Georgia. Georgia did not achieve full compliance by the June 2018 deadline; however, the independent reviewer found that the state had continued to make progress. As of August 2020, the court maintains jurisdiction, and the independent reviewer continues to monitor the state’s progress.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit on behalf of individuals with mental illness, substance abuse disorders, and developmental disabilities. After a period of litigation, the parties entered into a settlement agreement through which Georgia agreed to provide additional services to keep individuals with disabilities in the community rather than in institutions. As of August 2020, the court has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement, and an independent reviewer continues to monitor the state’s progress.


This class action (previously, M.D. v. Perry) involving long-term foster care in Texas was filed on March 29, 2011, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff class of children in long-term foster care was represented by private counsel and Children's Rights, Inc.; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state failed to protect foster children from systemic harm. The complaint alleged that defendants' frequent moves of the foster care children between placements was harmful; that the state placed kids in inappropriate congregate settings, failed to protect them from abuse and neglect in state custody, denied them necessary services, separated them unnecessarily from their siblings and deprived them of family visitation, and generally failed to find them permanent families or to raise them appropriately so that they were equipped to live independently once they aged out of foster care. All this, the plaintiffs said, was due to understaffing and mismanagement, and violated Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, and the First Amendment associational rights of the plaintiff class. The requested relief included regulation of caseloads, imposition of professional licensing standards, and the like. The plaintiffs also sought appointment of a monitor. The plaintiffs filed their class certification motion a week after the complaint. On June 5, 2011, the District Court (Judge Janis Graham Jack) granted the motion for class certification. The state appealed. On March 23, 2012, citing the intervening Supreme Court precedent of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Garza, J.) held that the district court had erred by failing to conduct the "rigorous analysis" required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2), and that the district court abused its discretion by certifying a class that lacked cohesiveness under Rule 23(b)(2). The case was remanded for reconsideration of the class application under the appropriate standard. 675 F.3d 832 (5th Cir. 2012). The plaintiffs filed a second motion for class certification in October 2012. After a three-day hearing in January 2013, the Court found that the requirements of Rule 23(a), as explained in Dukes, were satisfied. On August 27, 2013, the court certified a general class (all children in the "permanent managing conservatorship" in Texas) and three subclasses (children in a licensed foster care placement; children in foster group homes; and children receiving basic childcare services). 294 F.R.D. 7 (S.D. Tex. 2013). The defendants appealed, but the Fifth Circuit dismissed their appeal as untimely on November 19, 2013, because the defendants filed a day too late. 547 F. App'x 543 (5th Cir. 2013). The case proceeded to trial in December 2014. For two weeks, the parties presented evidence to the district court. Following the trial, on December 17, 2015, the district court ruled for the plaintiffs, declaring that Texas must make targeted changes to its foster care system. The court found that the state put kids at risk because of high caseloads, dangerous foster group homes, inadequate investigations into abuse and neglect reports and a lack of placement options. The court mandated an immediate end to the "unsafe placement" of children, including ceasing assigning children to foster group homes that lacked 24-hour awake-night supervision. The court retained jurisdiction to issue orders as necessary to remedy the constitutional violations described in the order and opinion. 2015 WL 9244873 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2015). The State asked the court to stay the order, but the court denied this request. The state appealed to the Fifth Circuit, which also denied the state's request on March 21, 2016. Also on March 21, 2016, the district court appointed two experts as special masters, charged with overseeing the reform of Texas' foster care system. After receiving the special masters' recommendations and subsequent objections to those recommendations, the court entered an interim order on January 9, 2017. The court found that further research was needed before it could issue a final order. The interim order required the special masters to work with the state so as to implement plans relating to monthly visits between caseworkers and children, a centralized database with key information about the children, a 24-hour hotline for calls reporting child abuse or neglect, recommendations for children who age out of the system, appointment of attorneys for the children, the availability of children's healthcare records, a reduction in caseloads for caseworkers and in caseworker turnover, identifying single-child homes, reporting and monitoring child abuse and neglect, and placement. On January 19, 2018, the court adopted in part the special masters' implementation plan, finding that the state had done little to assist the special masters in devising recommendations or to reform the foster care system. The recommendations focused on the aforementioned categories, providing specific policies and practices for the state to implement. The state immediately appealed, and the Fifth Circuit granted an administrative stay while the appeal was pending. A three-judge panel consisting of Judges Higginbotham, Smith, and Clement heard the case for the Fifth Circuit. They issued an opinion on October 18, 2018 affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding. 907 F.3d 237. The central issue on remand stemmed from the district court's permanent injunction being overly broad, and they were instructed to modify it to be consistent with their opinion. On November 20, 2018, after parties had been given the opportunity to submit briefs addressing the issues on remand, the court issued its amended injunctive order. The state appealed the modified injunction to the Fifth Circuit on November 28, 2018. On appeal, the same three judge panel was assigned to the case. On July 8, 2019, after reviewing the modified injunction, they affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated the order. 929 F.3d 272. They provided their own modifications to the injunction, and remanded to the district court for implementation without further changes. Monitoring and reporting resumed in compliance with the amended injunction. The implementation of the injunction resulted in continuous litigation between the parties regarding monitoring requirements, attorneys' fees, and contempt of court. On November 5, 2019, the court ordered 24-hour awake-night supervision for placements with more than six children. After a clarification hearing on November 6, 2019, the court issued another order holding the defendant in civil contempt of court for violating this Court's order to provide 24-hour awake-night supervision, and that a sanction of $50,000 per day starting November 8, 2019 for seven business days, then $100,000 per day until defendants reach compliance. On December 5, 2019, the defendants appealed once more to the Fifth Circuit for review of the orders requiring 24-hour awake-night supervision and sanctions stemming from that order. As of April 17, 2020, the parties are preparing for argument on the most recent appeal while implementation continues in the district court. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2011, children in the Texas foster care system filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs claimed that the foster care system violated their constitutional rights and failed to protect them from harm. After a bench trial in 2014, the district court found for the plaintiffs and ordered Texas to reform the foster care system. The parties remain embroiled in disputes about how to implement reforms.


This case was one of two related actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York by plaintiffs who were investigated for suspected terrorist ties in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and were eventually deported or left the U.S. The other case was styled Turkmen v. Ashcroft [IM-NY-7]. Both cases were assigned to District Court Judge John Gleeson. The plaintiffs were Muslim aliens from Egypt and Pakistan that were arrested and detained in the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") in Brooklyn, New York after being classified as "high interest" subjects in the government's 9/11 terrorism investigation. They alleged a broad range of claims that fell into two categories: (1) that their initial detention for immigration violations was a pretext to detain them while the FBI investigated them for terrorist activity and (2) that the conditions of their confinement flagrantly violated the Constitution. They specifically alleged violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendments; international law; the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), 42 USC § 2000bb; the civil rights conspiracy statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. The first plaintiff was released and returned to his native Pakistan. The government moved to dismiss the case on various grounds, including that the individually named defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Judge Gleeson denied their motion on qualified immunity grounds. Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04 CV 1409, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). After Judge Gleeson's ruling on the motions to dismiss, the United States settled the second plaintiff's claims for the sum of $300,000. Defendants pursued an interlocutory appeal as to the denial of qualified immunity for the first plaintiff's claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the rejection of the defense of qualified immunity by the District Court, except as to the claim of violation of procedural due process rights. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2nd Cir. 2007). The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court on December 17, 2007. On May 18, 2009 the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that detainee's complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination. The first plaintiff's case was settled effective November 11, 2009.

Summary: Plaintiffs were Muslim aliens from Egypt and Pakistan who were arrested and detained in the Metropolitan Detention Center ("MDC") in Brooklyn, New York after being classified as "high interest" subjects in the government's 9/11 terrorism investigation. They alleged a broad range of claims that fell into two categories: (1) that their initial detention for immigration violations was a pretext to detain them while the FBI investigated them for terrorist activity and (2) that the conditions of their confinement flagrantly violated the Constitution. The court denied that government's motion to dismiss the case on various grounds, including that the individually named defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The United States settled the second plaintiff's claims for the sum of $300,000. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's rejection of the defense of qualified immunity for the first plaintiff's claims, except as to the claim of violation of procedural due process rights. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, holding that detainee's complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to state claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination. The first plaintiff's case was settled effective November 11, 2009.


This federal lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, in 1992, by six disabled prisoners who alleged that Colorado's prisons did not comply with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In 1996, the case became certified as a class-action lawsuit on behalf of all disabled state prisoners. In 2003, the state Department of Corrections agreed in a multimillion-dollar settlement known as the Remedial Plan to make changes by 2005. The court [Judge Edward Nottingham] approved this plan on August 27, 2003. The changes included making prisons handicapped-accessible, ending lower pay for so-called "handicapped" inmate jobs and ensuring that disabled inmates had access to sign language interpreters and Braille or large-print documents. The Remedial Plan also included a mechanism for individual inmates to file claims seeking damages, or some other remedy available in court, that would be sent to a team of two Special Masters to adjudicate and determine damages based on an agreed upon class system. In 2004, the Special Masters requested that the court authorize at least two additional masters to accommodate the ever-increasing case load. Although both parties to the case recognized the need to have additional Special Masters, neither party could agree on who should be able to become Special Master. This disagreement stymied future progress in the case. Between 2004 and 2005 alone, over 1300 individuals submitted claims to the Special Masters. The state did not meet the requirements of other elements of the Remedial Plan by 2005, so the deadline was extended to July 2007. By 2008, the Colorado prison system missed two court-ordered deadlines to improve facilities and services for disabled inmates, some of whom have gone without glasses, diabetes medication, wheelchairs or hearing aids for months or even years, according to court records. To cause further disarray, in 2008, Judge Edward Nottingham resigned from his commission as United States District Judge for the district of Colorado. Judge Christine Arguello replaced Judge Edward Nottingham. Since 2008 the settlement has faced a myriad of conflicts between the parties of the case, resignations and replacements of special masters for the case settlement as individual claims continue to be sorted out. One of the largest areas of dispute that has formed between the two parties of the case regards whether an inmate is able to seek appellate review of a decision made by a Special Master. This dispute arose after a claimant filed an individual claim for damages because, as a diabetic, his correctional facility forced him to wear a different color name tag than other inmates. The Special Masters denied this claim, stating that they did not have jurisdiction to address this issue. The claimant sought the ability to appeal this decision despite the fact that the consent decree specifically says that all decisions made by the Special Masters are final. This situation created a whirlwind of activity regarding the enforcement of the consent decree and eventually wound up in front of the Tenth Circuit. 307 Fed.Appx. 160 (2009). After years of litigation, on May 10, 2011, the Tenth Circuit held that even though the consent decree provided that the lower court's review would be final, an appeal could be made to the Tenth Circuit since the Court's jurisdiction is invoked by statute. Regardless, the Court affirmed the lower courts' decision to dismiss the officials' motion, and the claimant's motion for damages. 640 F.3d 1126 (2011). In January 2015, the Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of certiorari. Between 2015 and 2018, several interested parties filed appeals in the Tenth Circuit. One of these appeals was dismissed on June 7, 2019 after the appellant repeatedly failed to submit a timely brief. On January 22, 2018, another resulted in the award of $50 to one class member along with the dismissal of the remainder of his claims. As of April 11, 2020, there are no other pending appeals. The settlement for this case is ongoing in the district court.

Summary: The claims for this case stem from a federal lawsuit filed in 1992 [Montez v Colorado] by six disabled inmates who said Colorado prisons didn't comply with the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case later became a class-action lawsuit on behalf of all disabled state prisoners again then-Governor of Colorado Roy Romer and the Colorado Department of Corrections. The settlement for this case is still ongoing.


On December 9, 1999, a group of thirty-six African American employees filed a lawsuit, under 42 U.S.C. §1981, 42 U.S.C. §1981A, Title VII of U.S.C. §2000e, and 42 U.S.C. §1988, against Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. seeking monetary and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that they were victims of racial discrimination which created a hostile working environment. Debate over class certification ensued from 1999 to 2000. Ultimately, hearings on class certification halted, and plaintiffs withdrew their class allegations and moved to file an amended complaint. On October 12, 2000, the EEOC attempted to consolidate EEOC v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. (Case #00-cv-02762) with this case, and consolidation was granted in part (discovery only) and denied in part (trial judgment). Meanwhile, the plaintiffs filed Second and Third Amended Complaints on February 21, 2001, and July 10, 2001, respectively. On February 15, 2002, the EEOC made a second attempt to consolidate the two cases; however, the Court (Hon. William M. Acker, Jr.) denied the motion. Of the original thirty-six plaintiffs, only nine had claims remaining against the defendant. On July 1, 2002, the nine prevailing plaintiffs were awarded $10,501 each in damages. On October 16, 2002, they were awarded $225,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses to be divided among their counsel.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed by a group of African American employees against employer Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., seeking monetary and injunctive relief for racial discrimination. The case was tried in court and only nine of the plaintiffs prevailed, resulting in monetary relief.