On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated nonprofit charities revived their dismissed claim (Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Sebelius), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. Th plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the religious employer exemption and the accommodations put forth in the government's final rule as amended on June 28, 2013, arguing that the definition of religious employer was too narrow and the rule continued to burden their free exercise. They argued that the accommodations required nonexempt plaintiffs to provide self-certification to their insurance provider setting forth their religious objections, which in turn triggered an obligation on the part of the insurance provider to procure the services plaintiffs found objectionable. The plaintiffs argued that they were thus the but-for cause of providing contraception coverage and asked the court to grant a permanent injunction against enforcement of the relevant provisions of the ACA. On May 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. On June 30, 2014, Judge John Ross granted the preliminary injunction. 28 F.Supp.3d 944. The government appealed the order to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on August 28, 2014. On November 12, 2015, the Eighth Circuit decided that it would hold the appeal in abeyance in light of the pending Supreme Court decision in Zubik v. Burwell (See FA-PA-0016 in this Clearinghouse). In Zubik, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the merits of the case and instead held that the parties "should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates [plaintiffs'] religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by [plaintiffs'] health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage." The government requested that the Eighth Circuit issue an order like the one issued by the Supreme Court in Zubik, acknowledging that the plaintiffs believed they should be exempt from the government's final rule and staying the appeal to provide the government with an opportunity to resolve the plaintiffs' request for an exemption. On September 19, 2016, the Eighth Circuit issued this order. Afterwards, the parties continued to provide status updates regarding a resolution to the plaintiffs' challenge to the Eighth Circuit. In light of the continuing stay in the appeal of this matter, the district court dismissed without prejudice the government’s motion to dismiss on August 5, 2016. Since September 19, 2016, the parties have submitted multiple status reports to the Eight Circuit. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report asking the court not to take any action on the case as the parties continued discussions pursuant to the Supreme Court's Directive in Zubik. The report noted that the Trump administration had not yet determined its position on the issue. On July 14, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a status report stating discussions between parties were still ongoing. The report again noted the Trump administration had not determined its position, and as a result, the plaintiffs requested the case remain in abeyance. On September 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed another status report containing the same information. On October 6, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case with the plaintiffs' consent. The court granted the dismissal of the appeal on October 10, 2017. Also on October 6, 2017, the Trump Administration issued an order that would no longer require employers to provide contraception if they had religious objections. See New York Time article for more information On October 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. The court granted the motion the same day. This case is closed.

Summary: On November 14, 2013, the Archdiocese of St. Louis and its affiliated non-profit charities revived their dismissed claim in the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Missouri against the Federal Government challenging provisions of the Affordable Care Act, as amended on June 28, 2013, extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On June 30, 2014, plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction that prevents the government from enforcing the contraception mandate against them. The government appealed the injunction and as of March 2017. In October of 2017 when the Trump Administration removed the contraception required for employers with a religious objection, the parties moved to have the case dismissed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition brought on behalf of medically vulnerable immigration detainees confined in two detention centers in California. The plaintiffs were granted a temporary restraining order and released from detention on April 30, 2020. The motion for preliminary injunctions for both subclasses were denied on May 26 and July 22. The case remains ongoing. <hr> This is a class action lawsuit regarding the immediate release of medically vulnerable immigration detainees from two immigration detention centers during the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 21, 2020, numerous immigration detainees filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Acting Secretary for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the senior warden and an officer at Otay Mesa Detention Center (OMDC), Field Office Director at Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Calexico Assistant Field Office Director, Deputy Director of ICE, and Facility Administrator at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility (IRDF) for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C § 2241. Specifically, they alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment right to due process by subjecting them to heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. Represented by private counsel and the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, the plaintiff sought writs of habeas corpus for immediate release of medically vulnerable detainees, or alternatively injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order ordering the immediate release, as well as declaratory relief and attorneys' fees. The case was assigned to Judge Dana M. Sabraw. The plaintiffs alleged that in the Spring of 2020, outbreaks of COVID-19 at the detention facilities escalated and that ODMC had the highest number of confirmed cases out of any ICE facility in the country. They argued that the staff failed to take appropriate preventative measures, such as by failing to allow for social distancing in the barracks, dining, bathing, or recreation areas. On the same day the petition was filed, the plaintiffs also filed motions for a temporary restraining order and for class certification. The plaintiffs requested a class-wide temporary restraining order directing the defendants to immediately release the Otay Mesa Medically Vulnerable subclass from custody , which included "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center who are age 45 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." The plaintiffs also proposed an Imperial Class of "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility" and an Imperial Medically Vulnerable Subclass of "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility who are age 45 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19." On April 30, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order, declaring that the conditions of confinement at OMDC were unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The court provisionally granted the OMDC Subclass and ordered the defendants to identify subclass members and immediately release them in a manner that comported with public health guidelines. On May 1, the court issued an order granting in part the class certification, modifying and provisionally certifying the Otay Mesa Medically Vulnerable subclass as "all civil immigration detainees incarcerated at the Otay Mesa Detention Center who are age 60 or over or who have medical conditions that place them at heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 as determined by CDC guidelines." The court also confirmed its issuance of the temporary restraining order set forth in the April 30 order. On May 4, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to amend or correct the order granting the temporary restraining order, contending that the court addressed the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits after it declared that the conditions of confinement were unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and erred in provisionally granting the Subclass. They requested that the court correct the April 30 order to clarify that it did not issue a ruling on the merits but rather found a likelihood of success on the merits. The court granted the defendants' motion in part, specifically correcting the language of the April 30 order to state that it found a likelihood of success on the merits. In a May 11 supplemental briefing, the plaintiffs argued that, because they could continue to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their claim, the temporary restraining order should be converted to a preliminary injunction. However, on May 26, the court denied this request for a preliminary injunction, finding that the defendants instituted a number of new policies and practices to address the spread of COVID-19 at OMDC (such as suspending new admissions, screening all persons entering the facility, posting educational resources, increasing sanitation, providing masks to detainees, and requiring employees to wear personal protective equipment), had identified subclass members, and that most subclass members were being housed in units with no positive cases. The court thus found that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the due process claim. On June 12, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and writs of habeas corpus and to provisionally certify the IRDF class and subclass. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the court order the defendants to release all members of the IRDF subclass, reduce the population at the facility to allow for social distancing, and create a plan to protect those remaining (including implementing testing, social distancing, and cleaning protocols and providing personal hygiene and protective materials). On July 22, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and motion for class certification. The court held that IRDF had no active COVID-19 cases and thus, unlike OMDC, the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. On August 10, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a joint motion to decertify the OMDC subclass, both of which the court denied on October 19. On August 28, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from the May 26 order or, in the alternative, for preliminary injunction to establish a dispute resolution process regarding the OMDC subclass. The court denied this motion on November 12, stating that the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. The court stated that even though OMDC had resumed accepting new individuals, including individuals who had tested positive for COVID-19, that was not sufficient to warrant relief in light of the precautions being taken at OMDC. Furthermore, the court decided that although the plaintiffs' assertion that these new admissions were being housed with members of the OMDC subclass was potentially concerning, it was unclear whether it was actually happening. The parties are currently engaged in discovery. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2020, a group of medically vulnerable immigration detainees filed this lawsuit seeking writs of habeas corpus and their immediate release in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that their heightened risk of COVID-19 at the centers violated their Fifth Amendment right to due process. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order later that month, declaring that the conditions of confinement at one of the facilities was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs requested that the temporary restraining order be converted to a preliminary injunction, which the court denied on the grounds that the defendants had instituted a number of new policies and practices to address the spread of COVID-19 at the facility and therefore that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a likelihood of success of their due process claim. In June, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and writs of habeas corpus for detainees located in a second detention center. The court denied the plaintiffs' motions in July because the detention center had no active cases of COVID-19 cases. In August, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, which the court later denied, and later that month, the plaintiffs filed a motion for relief from the May 26 order or, in the alternative, for preliminary injunction to establish a dispute resolution process, which the court denied in November. The court continued to hold that, in light of the precautions being taken at the first detention center, a preliminary injunction was not justified. The parties are currently engaged in discovery. This case is ongoing.


For over 60 years, each Christmas, John Satawa and his family had displayed a nativity scene in the median strip of a county road in Warren, Michigan. In December 2008, the County Road Commission received a written complaint from the Freedom from Religion Foundation. The Road Commission acquiesced to the complaint and denied Mr. Satawa a permit for 2009, prompting the filing of this federal lawsuit. The case was filed on October 23, 2009, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Macomb County Road Commission. The plaintiff, represented by an attorney from the American Freedom law center and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. He alleged that the defendant's denial of his permit application to place a crèche on a median strip of a county road during the Christmas holiday season violated his rights under the Constitution's Free Speech clause, Establishment clause, and the Equal Protection clause. On December 28, 2009, the District Court (Judge Gerald E. Rosen) denied Mr. Satawa's motion for a preliminary injunction. On April 19, 2011, Judge Rosen granted the Road Commission's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety. The plaintiff appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit. On August 1, 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Danny J. Boggs) agreed with the District Court's Establishment Clause holding against the plaintiff. However, the Court reversed the District Court's rulings on the plaintiff's Free Speech and Equal Protection claims. The Court of Appeals found that the median area constituted a traditional public forum, and therefore any restrictions on speech there would have to be narrowly tailored; the denial of the permit was NOT narrowly tailored, the Court of Appeals held, and remanded the case to the District Court for further proceedings. The parties settled the matter on November 29, 2012, and stipulated to dismiss the lawsuit. According to his lawyers' press release, Mr. Satawa installed his nativity scene that season. The voluntary dismissal was agreed to by the district court; the case was dismissed as of January 3, 2013.

Summary: On October 23, 2009, a Catholic resident of Warren, Michigan filed this federal lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Macomb County Road Commission. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's denial of his permit application to place a nativity scene on a median strip of a county road during the Christmas holiday season was unconstitutional. District Judge Gerald Rosen first denied a preliminary injunction and then ruled for the defendant on all issues, in April 2011. But in August 2012, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the issues of Free Speech and Equal Protection, finding for the plaintiff. In 2012, the parties settled, and he reinstalled his nativity scene.


On September 5, 2014, a fourteen-year-old transgender boy filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against South Middle School and its administrators, Summit Academy Charter Public School and its administrators, Wilson Middle School and its administrators, and OW Best Middle School and its administrators. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, proceeded under Title IX, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He sought monetary damages claiming that defendants had discriminated against him because he was transgender. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he was consistently misgendered by school staff, forced to use the girls' restroom, harassed by school staff and other students, and that he was repeatedly outed by school staff. He also claimed that his mother made repeated attempts to meet with his teachers and school administrators to discuss the plaintiff's situation, but that they avoided her, and when they did meet with her, they were dismissive. On September 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, which contained no substantive changes but stated his reliance on their demand for a jury trial. On February 24, 2015, the United States submitted a statement of interest in the case. The United States stated its position that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, discrimination against transgender individuals is discrimination on the basis of sex and his prohibited by Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause and that the case should be allowed to proceed to discovery to resolve questions of fact. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on November 5, 2015. It included additional factual allegations pertaining to the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff. On February 23, 2016, all defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Before District Judge Avern Cohn could rule on the motion to dismiss, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement and obtained court approval on March 8, 2017. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $53,150.44 in damages and $44,349.56 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, a fourteen-year-old transgender boy filed a lawsuit against the four middle schools he had attended between 2011 and 2014. In February 2015, the United States submitted a statement of interest in the case, arguing that Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause prohibit discrimination against transgender individuals. Although the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss in February 2016, the parties were able to reach a settlement agreement in March 2017. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $53,150.44 in damages and $44,349.56 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.


Three children charged as adults who were being or had been held in solitary confinement in Palm Beach County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on June 21, 2018. They sued the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office and School Board under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") (20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq.) , Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12132), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the Human Rights Defense Center, the Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County Education Advocacy Project, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the ADA, IDEA, and the Rehabilitation Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged Palm Beach County's use of solitary confinement against minors, the conditions of the solitary confinement, and the lack of educational opportunities available to children in solitary confinement. The plaintiffs alleged that many of the children placed in solitary confinement had mental health issues or other disabilities, did not have access to any educational programs and services while in solitary confinement, and did not receive accommodations for their documented disabilities. The complaint also alleged poor treatment in general, including lack of access to clean drinking water, medical care, and recreational facilities. Many of the named plaintiffs alleged long-lasting repercussions from the conditions they experienced while in solitary confinement. In addition, the complaint alleged that some children were placed in solitary confinement without an explanation and did not have the ability to challenge their placement. This case was assigned to Judge William P. Dimitrouleas. On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs moved for class certification and for a preliminary injunction. Also on June 21, Judge Dimitrouleas denied the class certification motion as premature. The defendants moved to dismiss on July 20, which Judge Dimitrouleas denied as moot on August 3 after the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that dropped one named plaintiff. The defendants moved to dismiss again. The United States filed a statement of interest on October 1, 2018 that explained its view on the scope of IDEA’s protections, although the government did not take a position on whether the defendants had violated the IDEA in this case. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge William Matthewman on November 1. Meanwhile, the parties began to work toward a settlement. On November 16, 2018, Magistrate Judge Matthewman granted both the preliminary approval of a Settlement Agreement that the parties submitted and conditional certification of a class defined as “all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office." Additionally, there were 2 proposed settlement subclasses:
a) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office and are in need of special education evaluation, instruction, accommodations, and related services (“IDEA subclass”); and b) all present and future juveniles (i.e. individuals under the age of 18 and charged as adults) with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, who are now or will be incarcerated in segregated housing while in the custody of the Sheriff’s Office (“ADA and 504 Subclass”).
The proposed settlement required, among other things:
- Recreation and showers seven days a week, and no unreasonable withholding of phone or visitation privileges; - any juvenile classified into segregated housing for any reason, other than protective custody, shall be allowed out of their cells throughout the regular school day with other juveniles in general population so long as there are no co-defendants or keep-separates in the same housing pod; - On weekends and holidays the Sheriff’s Office shall utilize an expanded rotation schedule for co-defendants that allows for greater time in facility accommodations to minimize the duration of time spent in segregated housing; - the Sheriff’s Office and the School Board shall confer to determine how best to allow equal access, including any accommodations, to juvenile educational services and programming outside of the segregation cell; maintain notes and documentation of these conferences; and refer the juvenile to a mental health professional for an evaluation and to determine a need for any accommodations; - juveniles who refused educational services and programming shall be given another opportunity to participate prior to each period.
The agreement was set to last at least five years. The agreement also provided that experts would monitor compliance, and the defendants would provide documents and access to facilitate monitoring. For reasons that are unclear to the Clearinghouse, the monitoring was set to last for only two years despite the agreement's five-year term. On February 28, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement and certification of the class. Judge Matthewman approved the settlement after holding a Fairness Hearing and dismissed the case on March 6, 2019, but the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. 2019 WL 1051146. On April 19, 2019, the plaintiff moved for $606,526.00 in attorney’s fees and $39,296.78 in costs. The defendants responded that only $260,690.50 in fees and $131.33 in costs were appropriate. On October 10, 2019, Judge Matthewman issued an order granting $390,959.00 in fees and $29,724.53 in costs, for a total award of $420,683.53. 426 F. Supp. 3d. 1266. Judge Matthewman rejected the plaintiff’s use of a blended rate of $525 per hour for all attorneys on the case, and instead arrived at the $390,959.00 figure based on individualized calculations for each attorney and paralegal involved using rates ranging from $150 per hour to $400 per hour. On December 3, 2019 the court entered a satisfaction of judgment as to the attorneys' fees. Although monitoring concluded in December 2020, the settlement agreement remains in force as of April 15, 2021.

Summary: Plaintiffs, incarcerated children who are experiencing or have experienced solitary confinement in Palm Beach County Jail filed this putative class action lawsuit against the County School District, School Board, and Sheriff's Office, as well as related officials in their individual capacities, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida (West Palm Beach) on June 21, 2018. The claim was filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Plaintiffs alleged violations of the 8th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution, and are seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. In their complaint, the plaintiffs challenged Palm Beach County's use of solitary confinement against minors, the conditions of the solitary confinement, and the lack of educational opportunities available to children in solitary confinement. The case has settled and the settlement agreement continues to be enforced.


On May 6, 2010, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas under Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA") against the State of Arkansas. The Department of Justice asked the court to issue an injunction, claiming that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are the most appropriate for their needs. Specifically, the DOJ claimed that in administering developmental disability services, the State of Arkansas unnecessarily segregates and isolates persons with disabilities from the community. Previously, the DOJ had filed suit against the State of Arkansas (ID-AR-002) and the Conway Human Development Center ("CHDC") alleging that the manner in which the State provides services to persons with disabilities residing in the CHDC violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the ADA, and the Disabilities Education Act. The DOJ moved to dismiss Count II of the CHDC complaint in order to pursue the statewide action. The State moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements to bring suit under Title II of the ADA, as stated in the Code of Federal Regulations. The regulations set forth an administrative process, that prior to filing a lawsuit, that requires a complaint by an individual of discrimination to an agency with jurisdiction over the subject matter, an attempt at an informal resolution, issuance of a formal letter of compliance or noncompliance, and a referral by the federal agency to the Attorney General for enforcement. On January 24, 2011, the District Court (Judge J. Leon Holmes) dismissed the case without prejudice because the court found that the DOJ had not followed the administrative process set forth in the regulations.

Summary: The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a claim against the State of Arkansas alleging that the State discriminates against people with developmental disabilities by not providing programs that are appropriate for their needs and segregates persons with disabilities from the community. The court found that the DOJ did not fulfill the procedural requirements necessary to bring a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act and dismissed the case without prejudice.


On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump's March 6, 2017 Executive Order." Attorney from Davis Wright Tremaine LLP worked with the ACLU on the case. The request concerned implementation at international airports within the purview of CBP's San Diego Field Office, including San Diego International Airport and the San Diego port of entry. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the Executive Orders. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public's understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders here in the San Francisco Field Office" and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public's ability to hold the government accountable." On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multi-district litigation," effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion, see this case. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion (notice of the denial was filed on Aug. 15). On Aug. 3, Judge M. James Lorenz denied defendants' May 10 motion to stay. The parties met for a series of case management conferences in the fall of 2017. The case did not settle, so the parties continued with discovery. On October 15, 2018, the parties filed notice of settlement and subsequently jointly moved to dismiss the case. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. Litigation about attorneys' fees dragged on for several years. The parties ultimately agreed on a fee award and notified the court the case was closed on July 11, 2019. The Clearinghouse does not know the amount of the fee award.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of San Diego and Imperial Counties sued DHS under FOIA for information on the implementation of President Trump's travel ban at San Diego airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation and ultimately agreed to release documents to the ACLU.


The plaintiff in this case is a trans woman who was housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts for a nonviolent drug possession charge. Because of her gender presentation and identity, she faced degrading sexual harassment from both staff and other prisoners. She was forced to use communal showers and bathrooms without locks, and was subject to strip searches conducted by male staff in front of other prisoners. The living conditions and repeated sexual harassment during her time there prompted her to file suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts on November 15, 2017. She alleged that the conditions she faced in the prison amount to a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as several state constitution claims. The named defendants are the Massachusetts Department of Correction, Commissioner of the DOC, superintendent of the prison, ADA coordinator responsible for the facility, and Assistant Deputy Commissioner of Clinical Services responsible for the provision of health services to all DOC prisoners. GLAD is representing the plaintiff and the case has been assigned to Judge Richard G. Stearns. The plaintiff sought injunctive relief. Specifically, she asked that the DOC be required to transfer her to a women's facility, require and train all staff to use the correct name and pronouns for her, treat her as they would any cisgender woman in custody, make accommodations to assure she will not be harassed by male staff or other prisoners, and provide her access to gender-appropriate medical care. She also requested attorneys fees. On March 5, 2018, Judge Stearns issued a partial preliminary injunction instructing the defendants to do the following: require that female rather than male staff conduct strip searches of the plaintiff whenever feasible, continue to house the plaintiff in a single cell and allow her separate time to shower, and to the extent that it is reasonable, provide a staff member to ensure that other inmates do not enter the shower area while the plaintiff is showering. In September 2018, the DOC voluntarily transferred the plaintiff to a women's facility and in April 2019 she was released. Soon after, Judge Stearns dismissed the case as moot. Finally, on July 8, 2019, the court awarded the plaintiff $46,297.50 in attorneys fees and $11,740.94 in litigation expenses.

Summary: The plaintiff, a trans woman housed in a men's prison in Massachusetts, sued the Department of Correction (DOC) and several administrators in the department for mistreatment while in custody on account of her gender identity and presentation. She was represented by GLAD and brought the suit in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The complaint requested injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The judge granted a preliminary injunction regarding how prison staff were required to treat and accommodate the plaintiff while housed in the men's facility. After the plaintiff's transfer to a women's facility in 2018 and release in 2019, the judge dismissed the case as moot and awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiff.


On September 21, 2015, the City of Oakland filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued Wells Fargo & Co and Wells Fargo Bank NA under the Fair Housing Act, California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and California Government Code. The plaintiffs, represented by the Oakland City Attorney’s office, the Center for Constitutional Litigation, and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief as well as punitive damages and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had engaged in predatory mortgage strategies that disproportionately targeted minority communities. Specifically they claimed that the defendants had engaged in redlining and reverse redlining. This caused a disproportionate amount of foreclosures in minority communities and, as a result, reduced tax revenue for the City of Oakland, increased municipal expenditures, and neutralized the effectiveness of city fair-housing programs. On November 13, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the predatory sub-prime loans that the plaintiffs referred to had ceased in 2008, placing their conduct outside the two year limitation period in the Fair Housing Act. The Court directed Oakland “to amend its complaint in view of the language now in Miami and give it your best shot with as much specificity as possible in terms of the kinds of damages that you are asserting that you contend are proximately caused by the [] alleged FHA violation.” On August 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint claiming that Wells Fargo’s predatory activity had continued through the time of filing and therefore was within the limitations of the Fair Housing Act. On October 6, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, stating the plaintiffs had failed to properly show that the defendants had been the proximate cause of the injuries they alleged. On June 15, 2018, the Judge entered an order partially denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. Of the three injuries the plaintiffs alleged, the motion to dismiss was denied for injuries related to reduced tax revenue and increased municipal expenditures for the City of Oakland. However, for the second injury, the court held that only declaratory and injunctive relief could be pursued. The third injury—neutralization of the city’s fair-housing program—was dismissed without prejudice. On February 28, 2019 the defendants filed an interlocutory appeal. This case is ongoing pending appeal (USCA No. 19−15169).

Summary: The City of Oakland filed suit against Wells Fargo & Co and Wells Fargo Bank NA in the Northern District of California alleging predatory mortgage lending practices that disproportionately affected minority communities. These mortgages are alleged to have caused a loss of property tax revenue, increased municipal spending, and the neutralization of city fair-housing programs. The motion to dismiss was partially denied by the court and is currently on interlocutory appeal with the 9th Circuit.


On July 28, 2017, an asylum-seeker who had been held in federal detention for nine months sought habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. Three weeks later, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union and the International Refugee Assistance Project, he and a fellow asylum-seeker filed an amended petition and class action complaint against the Department of Homeland Security. They challenged the federal government’s authority to indefinitely detain arriving asylum-seekers who had been determined likely to win the right to remain in the United States. They asserted that such detention, without parole or bond hearing, was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and 8 C.F.R. §212.5. The case was assigned to Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford. The complaint sought to certify a class of “all arriving asylum-seekers who have passed a credible fear interview and who are or will be detained at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility and who have not been granted parole,” as well as a sub-class who “have been or will be detained for more than six months without a bond hearing before an immigration judge.” An overbroad plaintiffs’ discovery motion was denied in November 2017. 292 F.Supp.3d 592. On November 17, 2017, the court denied the government’s motion to dismiss the suit, simultaneously granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 280 F.Supp.3d 373. The injunction required the government to give detainees access to parole procedures as described in Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Directive 11002.1. Additionally, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Jennings v. Rodriguez, reasoning which was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court, the court found that 8 U.S.C. 1225(b) implicitly prohibits indefinite detention, and ordered the government to offer bond hearings to asylum-seekers within six months of their detention. For continued detention, the government must prove at the bond hearing that the asylum-seeker is a flight risk or a danger to the community. In February 2018, the court clarified the injunction, requiring that once “an [Immigration Judge] has determined that a detainee should be released on bond, he or she must consider the financial circumstances of each [detainee] and alternative conditions of release in setting the amount of bond.” 287 F.Supp.3d 327 at 345. Class certification was granted on December 19, 2017, and the preliminary injunction of November 17 was applied to the newly-certified class. 323 F.R.D. 131. In January 2018, the government appealed the November 17 orders (Second Circuit Docket No. 18-00094, Jan 12, 2018). In late February, the Supreme Court ruled in Jennings v. Rodriguez, effectively overturning the district court’s November order regarding the subclass (detainees held more than six months without a bond hearing). By consent of the parties, the Second Circuit remanded this issue to the district court on September 5, 2019. On September 24, 2019 the district court granted the government’s motion to decertify the subclass. 405 F.Supp.3d 467. There was no activity in the case for nearly a year, until on July 10, 2020, the court directed the parties to submit a joint status report indicating whether the case should be closed. The parties responded that they were in the process of meeting and conferring regarding a settlement that would resolve the case entirely. But then, on September 24, 2020, the parties informed the court that they were no longer intending to reach a settlement. The parties negotiated a discovery schedule and the court set a schedule for summary judgment motions. The petitioners' motion for summary judgment is due January 28, 2021, and the respondents' opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment is due February 25, 2021. As of December 23, 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: This suit was filed on July 28, 2017 as a habeas petition. According to the amended petition, which was a class action, plaintiffs sought to challenge the federal government’s ability to deny arriving asylum seekers parole and then incarcerate them. The Court granted a preliminary injunction on Nov. 17, 2017, and certified a class and a subclass in December 2017. In February 2018, the Supreme Court's ruling in a similar case effectively overturned the district court's certification of the subclass. The district court officially decertified the subclass on September 24, 2019, but the preliminary injunction pertaining to the broader class remained in effect. As of July 2020, the litigation is ongoing.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On August 23, 2012, Grace College and Seminary, and Biola University, Inc.—both religious non-profits—filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana. They raised their claims against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Department of Labor, and the Department of the Treasury under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First and Fifth Amendments. Represented by private counsel and the Alliance Defending Freedom, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On September 6, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint incorporating the government's newly announced accommodations for non-profit, religious organizations. The plaintiffs argued that even with an accommodation, the mandate violated its religious freedoms. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction along with the amended complaint. On September 27, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or, in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. On October 11, 2013, the plaintiff filed a separate motion for summary judgment. On December 27, 2013, the District Court (Judge Jon E. DeGuilio) granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction on the grounds that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm without it and their claims had merit under RFRA. On February 24, 2014, the defendant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (No. 14-1430). This case was consolidated on appeal with Roman Catholic Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend v. Sebelius. On September 4, 2015, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Ilana Diamond Rovener) reversed the District Court's preliminary injunction and remanded the case, noting that since the suit was filed, the contraception mandate accommodation had been expanded to allow qualifying religious employers to notify HHS directly about their objections. On November 5, 2015, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiffs' petition for a rehearing en banc. On November 12, 2015, the Seventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion to stay the suit pending petition for writ of certiorari. On February 3, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 16, 2016. The Supreme Court vacated the judgement and remanded the case, citing Zubik, which held that it was appropriate to vacate and remand so that the courts of appeals could address the arguments in response to the order for supplemental briefs. The supplement briefing request asked parties to address how contraceptive coverage could be obtained by employees through insurance companies that did not require any involvement by plaintiffs beyond their decision to provide health insurance without contraceptive coverage. The Supreme Court's order also resulted in dismissal of the defendants' consolidated interlocutory appeals. On remand, the Northern District of Indiana granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief on June 1, 2018. The injunction required that defendants be barred from any effort to enforce any requirements of the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate that violated the plaintiffs' religious consciences. The declaratory relief stated that the requirements of the contraceptive mandate violated the plaintiffs' rights protected by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. This order was issued in part due to defendant’s concession that they were no longer raising a substantive defense. The parties reached a settlement for attorneys' fees on September 18, 2018. The case is closed.

Summary: On August 23, 2012, Grace College and Seminary, and Biola University, Inc., filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Indiana against HHS, DOL, and Treasury. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. The District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. The government appealed to the 7th Circuit. In February of 2016, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, who vacated the judgement and remanded the case. On remand, the Northern District of Indiana granted plaintiff's motion for permanent injunction and declaratory relief in June of 2018. The case is now closed.


American Freedom Defense Initiative (AFDI) is a pro-Israeli advocacy organization, known for its provocative writing on Middle East affairs. AFDI submitted a pro-Israeli political ad to the local Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) for display on the exterior of MTA's vehicles. MTA later rejected the submission under its No-Demeaning Standard. The Standard allowed MTA to reject some but not all ads depending whether they demeaned certain disfavored individuals or groups. However, MTA permitted display of anti-Israeli ads, which allegedly contained demeaning content. In light of that, AFDI sued MTA in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The complaint was filed on September 27, 2011. AFDI, represented by public interest lawyers, claimed that MTA's censorship was unconstitutional, in violation of the Free Speech Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On July 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Engelmayer) held that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard was unconstitutional. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 880 F. Supp. 2d 456, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), appeal dismissed (Sept. 25, 2012). The Court further granted AFDI a preliminary injunction preventing MTA from enforcing its No-Demeaning Standard. The Court found that the exterior of the mass transit vehicles a public forum, and that the Standard overly differentiated speech based on its content and target, inconsistent with the First Amendment. MTA appealed this decision to the Second Circuit. On August 29, 2012, the Court (Judge Engelmayer) converted the existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction. Am. Freedom Def. Initiative v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 889 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). In addition, the Court granted a declaratory judgment that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard violated the First Amendment and nominal damages in sum of $1 to AFDI, unopposed by MTA. Subsequently, MTA voluntarily withdrew its appeal and reached an agreement with AFDI on attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The parties jointly informed the Court of their settlement on October 16, 2012. This ended the case.

Summary: Although it had permitted certain anti-Israeli ads for display on the outside of its vehicles, the MTA rejected AFDI's pro-Israeli ads under its No-Demeaning Standard. On September 27, 2011, AFDI sued MTA for unconstitutional censorship in the federal court in New York, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On July 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Paul A. Engelmayer) held that MTA's No-Demeaning Standard was unconstitutional and granted a preliminary injunction to AFDI prohibiting MTA' further enforcement of the Standard. On August 29, 2012, the Court converted the existing preliminary injunction to a permanent injunction. The Court also granted a declaratory judgment and nominal damages to AFDI. Then the parties settled the attorneys' fees and litigation costs and informed the Court of their agreement on October 16, 2012. This ended the case.


On May 31, 2006, two women brought suit against their former employer, Les Schwab Tire Centers of Washington, and other related corporations, alleging discrimination on the basis of their sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. The plaintiff's’ complaint, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Washington (Judge Ricardo Martinez), alleged that the plaintiffs and a class of similarly situated individuals employed by the defendant were denied promotions, training, and other employment opportunities because of their sex. The plaintiffs sought relief in the form of monetary damages. On July 7, 2006, this matter was consolidated with a lawsuit by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which received a filed discrimination charge by the named plaintiffs, alleging similar claims of a pattern and practice of sex-based employment discrimination. On July 18, 2006, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that provided additional factual detail and further clarified the plaintiffs’ allegations of discrimination on the basis of gender with respect to the defendants’ policies and practices that emphasized subjective gender based and/or arbitrary criteria in employment decisions, excluding women from management positions through the use of relocation requirements, and retaliating against female employees who complained of unequal treatment. The complaint alleged both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. On August 1, 2006, the EEOC filed a complaint against the defendants also alleging the defendants violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to train and promote the plaintiff and a class of women similarly situated for management positions and for discriminatory hiring practices based on the plaintiff’s charge filed with the EEOC. Around that time, the parties engaged in discovery and a protective order was ordered on December 11, 2006. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class on August 8, 2008 because the court found the plaintiffs failed to show that there were common questions of fact. On November 10, 2008, the court granted the EEOC’s motion to bifurcate the trial and discovery and severed the individual plaintiff’s claims from the EEOC’s claims. One of the defendants, Les Schwab Warehouse Center, moved for partial summary judgment because it was not included as an employer that could be liable under Title VII. On January 21, 2009, the court granted the motion in part, agreeing that it is not liable under Title VII, but denied it in part, finding that the entity could still be liable under the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Between May and June 2009, the defendants filed five motions for summary judgment on various claims brought by the plaintiff. On September 3, 2009, the court granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the promotion claim, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden in providing direct evidence to support the claim. On September 8, the court denied the remaining two motions for summary judgment, finding that there remained disputed issues of fact for a jury to determine on the plaintiffs’ remaining claims. Trial was held from November 3 to November 6, 2009 for the named individuals’ claims. On November 9, the jury returned a special verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded them $85,200 ($42,600 each) for past and future emotional distress and punitive damages totaling $200,000 ($100,000 each). The court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on November 13, 2009. On January 8, 2010, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial. On June 1, 2010, the court ordered the defendant to pay the individual plaintiffs $583,930 in attorney’s fees and $47,218 in expenses. Regarding the EEOC’s remaining claims, the court denied defendant’s motions for summary judgement on January 11 and 12, 2010 and set a date for trial in March 2010 following mediation. On the eve of trial, the EEOC and the defendants filed a notice of a proposed settlement and consent decree. The court approved the consent decree on March 10, 2010. The consent decree required the defendants to provide $2,000,000 to establish a settlement class fund, as well as injunctive relief in the form of a training program and policy changes regarding the defendant’s recruitment efforts and hiring, and annual reporting requirements for a four-year period.

Summary: In 2006, this lawsuit was filed against Les Schwab Centers of Washington by 2 former employees in the U.S. District Court for the District of Western Washington. The plaintiffs, two former employees of the defendant, alleged the defendant discriminated against them and others on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. This suit was later consolidated with a lawsuit filed by the EEOC alleging similar claims of a pattern and practice of sex discrimination. In 2008, the court denied class certification finding that there was insufficient commonality between members of the potential class. The court allowed the EEOC and private claims to be severed into two separate trials. In November 2009, a 5 day trial was held for the private plaintiffs' claims and the jury awarded the plaintiff's $285,200 in damages and $631,148 in attorney's fees and expenses. Regarding the EEOC's claims, the parties entered into a consent decree in 2010, which requires the defendant to provide $2,000,000 in damages and implement policy changes, training for employees, and reporting requirements for a four-year period.


On May 11, 2017, three Florida Department of Corrections prisoners who had chronic hepatitis C filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. Judge Mark E. Walker was assigned to the case. The plaintiffs sued the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act for failing to provide prisoners in its custody who had chronic hepatitis C with adequate medical treatment, even though the standard treatment for the deadly disease (direct-acting antivirals) cured 95% of hepatitis C patients. The plaintiffs alleged that the FDC’s deliberate indifference to prisoners’ serious medical needs violated the Eighth Amendment and that the FDC discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the Florida Justice Institute, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On May 23, 2017, the plaintiffs sought class certification and a preliminary injunction, arguing that many sick prisoners would become sicker and die if they had to wait until the end of the litigation to get relief. A few months later, on November 17, the court granted both of the plaintiffs’ requests. (The FDC had also sought to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim, but the court dismissed that motion without hearing it.) The class included all current and future prisoners in FDC custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic hepatitis C. 323 F.R.D. 694. The preliminary injunction required the FDC to come up with a plan to provide medical treatment to prisoners with hepatitis C and to put that plan into effect immediately after it was approved. On December 13, 2017, the court approved a plan that required the FDC to treat all prisoners with hepatitis C, giving priority to those whose conditions were most serious. The plan contained a timetable for the FDC’s goals; all would be fully implemented over the next year. On January 31, 2018, the court allowed the FDC to modify the preliminary injunction: the FDC began using different tests to determine which patients had the most serious conditions, and its timeline for treating patients with lower fibrosis scores was extended by twelve months. Nine days later, the court allowed the plaintiffs to modify the preliminary injunction as well: the FDC was required to initiate treatment for prisoners who were co-infected with hepatitis C and HIV by the end of the year, even if they had low fibrosis scores. On February 21, 2018, the court issued a second preliminary injunction because the first was about to expire. By the time the FDC’s preliminary injunction took effect, more than seven months had passed since the plaintiffs had filed their initial complaint. One plaintiff’s decompensated cirrhosis (liver scarring as a result of hepatitis C) had worsened considerably, and the plaintiffs sought an evaluation for a liver transplant for him on January 5, 2018. They alleged that the FDC had known about the severity of his condition for many months and should have referred him to the transplant center already. The court denied this motion for mootness, likely because the FDC’s timetable put January 31 as the date that the FDC needed to have evaluated all prisoners with decompensated cirrhosis. Less than three months later, the plaintiff died. On April 26, 2018, a prisoner in FDC custody (and, thus, a class member to this suit) filed a motion to intervene, citing his dissatisfaction with class counsel. The inmate alleged that class counsel had an ethical conflict in suing FDC and moved the court (a) to require counsel to amend the case and seek monetary damages or (b) to terminate and replace class counsel. On April 28, 2018, the court denied this motion on the basis that it failed to articulate a conflict that would warrant disqualifying class counsel. Additionally, the court noted this suit did not preclude the prisoner from separately seeking monetary damages from defendant. On May 7, 2018, the inmate filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion to supplement his original motion to intervene. Both motions were denied. On June 1, 2018, plaintiff appealed the court’s denial of his motion to intervene and later motion to supplement his motion to intervene (18-12292). On September 7, 2018, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that plaintiff’s appeal was frivolous and denied all pending motions as moot. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on December 11, 2018. Before the motion for reconsideration was denied, on September 12, 2018, this same prisoner filed a second motion to intervene in the trial court, alleging insufficient medical care. The court dismissed this motion after the defendant presented evidence that the prisoner received adequate medical care. On November 1, 2018 the same individual plaintiff filed another interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to intervene. One month later, this appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution because the plaintiff did not pay the filing and docketing fees (18-14652). On April 3, 2019, the plaintiff filed a third motion to intervene. The court found that the plaintiff had failed to state a basis on which to intervene and that the plaintiff had failed to state a violation of the preliminary injunction. On June 12, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis (to proceed without payment of fees). The next day, the court denied his motion, and held that his appeal was not taken in good faith. Meanwhile, on May 10, 2018, another individual plaintiff filed a motion alleging that his interest for economic and punitive damages was not being considered. The court denied this motion on the grounds that this suit is based on treatment, not damages. On May 23, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend his May 10th motion. The court again denied his motion, warning the plaintiff not to file another motion complaining about damages in this suit. On June 19, 2018, plaintiff appealed the court’s denial of his motion to amend (18-12571). On July 23, 2018 the appeal was dismissed because appellant did not pay the requisite filing fees. On May 24, 2018, the court granted the original plaintiffs’ motion for a third preliminary injunction with the same terms as the first two. On September 5, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion for a fourth preliminary injunction, proposing a permanent injunction as an alternative remedy. That same day the court only granted the fourth preliminary injunction with the same terms as the previous iterations. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment seeking both a permanent injunction as well as other forms of relief not currently required by the preliminary injunction. Though the proposed permanent injunction looked largely similar to the past preliminary injunctions, the plaintiffs sought to change some of the mechanisms by which the defendants tested for and treated hepatitis C in prisoners. On November 26, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed fifth motion for a preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, a permanent injunction. The next day, the court granted the motion for the preliminary injunction and it was was renewed. Another prisoner filed a motion to intervene on February 8, 2019. On the same day, this inmate filed a motion for joinder of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC) as a defendant because he was transferred from the FDC to the VDOC under an Interstate Corrections Compact. This individual also filed a motion for relief from judgment on the same day. Four days later, the court denied the petitioner's motion to intervene. Because the petitioner was originally incarcerated in the FDC and was then transferred to the VDOC, the court held that it was unclear if the petitioner was a member of the certified class. The court ordered the defendants to respond the petitioner's motion to clear up the confusion. Judge Walker also denied the petitioner's motion for joinder of the VDOC as a defendant. Judge Walker construed the petitioner's motion for relief from judgment as a motion to enforce the court's preliminary injunction. Additionally, the court ordered the defendants to respond to this motion and address whether the petitioner was wrongfully denied treatment in violation of the court's preliminary injunction. On March 5, 2019, the court denied the petitioner's motion for enforcement of the preliminary injunction. Judge Walker held that the injunction required the defendants to provide treatment for the petitioner by the end of December 2019, and so the deadline had not yet passed. Since the onset of the first preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs have filed motions both to enforce the preliminary injunctions and to compel defendant to treat other prisoners in compliance with the preliminary injunctions' terms. The court denied these motions without prejudice on the basis that the defendant was either complying with, or at least not in actionable violation of, the injunctions at the time the motions were considered. Individuals in FCD custody have also filed motions for civil contempt that alleged violations of the preliminary injunction, and the court denied them all on the basis that the defendants had not violated the injunction. Since the first preliminary injunction was issued, the FDC screened 55,348 prisoners for chronic hepatitis C, diagnosed 7,185 prisoners with hepatitis C, and began treatment for 4,901 prisoners using direct-acting antivirals (DAAs). On February 25, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a sixth preliminary injunction, or in the alternative, a permanent injunction. Judge Walker renewed the preliminary injunction the next day. Judge Walker issued a permanent injunction on April 18, 2019 and as such dissolved the preliminary injunction. The permanent injunction required defendants to modify the FDC's policy on managing prisoners with hepatitis C by May 20, 2019. The FDC had to provide medical staff with the option of elastography, which is a more accurate method of identifying hepatitis C and evaluating the severity. The injunction required the FDC to adopt either opt-out testing with an aggressive notice campaign or opt-in testing with peer education for all prisoners. The FDC was required to begin treating all prisoners with hepatitis C. Prisoners with the most severe hepatitis C infections (Priority Level 1) had to start receiving treatment within six months of diagnosis, those with Priority Level 2 hepatitis C must begin receiving treatment within twelve months of diagnosis, and those with less severe hepatitis C infections must begin receiving treatment within two years of diagnosis. Judge Walker made it clear that these treatment deadlines are absolutely mandatory. The court ordered that the FDC’s new policy must ensure that prisoners receive routine FibroSure and ultrasound testing every twelve months once diagnosed with hepatitis C of any severity. The agreement required that FDC’s new policy must make clear that "chronic disciplinary issues" were not a sufficient reason for an inmate to be ineligible for treatment. Starting in June 2019, the FDC had to file monthly status reports with the court to show its progress complying with the injunction. 382 F. Supp. 3d. 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2019). Twelve days after the court issued the permanent injunction, the plaintiffs filed a motion for modification of the injunction to ask that the defendants provide class counsel with spreadsheets containing the names of all prisoners diagnosed with HCV. Two weeks later, the court denied the motion because the spreadsheets at issue contained inaccurate information. The defendants filed an appeal of the order and final judgment (as well as all preliminary injunctions and the order granting class certification) in the Eleventh Circuit on May 17, 2019. On August 31, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's injunction and remanded back to the district court to make adequate findings on the record that its permanent injunction complied with the Prison Litigation Reform Act. 973 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2020). The Eleventh Circuit also reversed the part of the district court's order that mandated direct acting antiviral (DAA) treatment for low-fibrosis-scored HCV-positive inmates, and instructed the district court to grant defendants summary judgment on that issue. The Eleventh Circuit held that failure to provide DAA treatment does not violate the Eighth Amendment because, it found, such treatment was not medically necessary for HCV-positive inmates with low fibrosis scores. Thus, plaintiffs failed to prove that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. The Eleventh Circuit issued its mandate on November 2, 2020. As of April 2021, the case remains open.

Summary: In May 2018, three prisoners brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on behalf of all current and future prisoners in Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic hepatitis C. The plaintiffs alleged that the FDC's failure to provide treatment to inmates with hepatitis C violated their rights under the Eighth Amendment and the American with Disabilities Act. In 2019, the court issued a permanent injunction requiring the FDC to improve testing and treatment for chronic hepatitis C. The injunction also required the FDC to submit monthly reports to the court showing that it was complying with the terms of the injunction. The defendants appealed, and oral argument in the Eleventh Circuit is scheduled for June 10, 2020.


On September 28, 2018, the HuffingtonPost.com brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE had violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) act when it failed to adequately respond to an information request by Huffington Post. Represented by attorneys from American Oversight, the plaintiff filed the lawsuit under FOIA, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel compliance.The case was assigned to Judge Trevor N. McFadden. Specifically, HuffingtonPost filed this complaint after it had previously submitted a an expedited FOIA request to ICE for the arrest records of immigrants. ICE acknowledged receipt of the request, but failed to respond. Huffington Post therefore alleged that ICE had: <blockquote> (1) wrongfully denied expedited processing for information for which there was an urgent need to inform the public, (2) failed to conduct an adequate search for records, and (3) failed to provide records required to be disclosed under FOIA.</blockquote> On February 5, 2019, the parties filed a joint notice and stipulation of dismissal, stating that the issues of the case have been resolved. HuffingtonPost then voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 28, 2018, HuffingtonPost.com, brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement for alleged violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Specifically, HuffingtonPost alleged wrongful denial of expedited processing for information for which there is an urgent need to inform the public, failure to conduct an adequate search for records, and wrongful withholding of Non-Exempt Records. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief to compel compliance with the requirements of FOIA. On February 5, 2019, HuffingtonPost voluntarily dismissed the action, stating that the issues of the case have been resolved.


On October 15th, 2013, two same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Oregon. The plaintiffs, represented by both private and public counsel, sought a declaration that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violate the United States Constitution, a permanent injunction against the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and an award to the plaintiffs of the costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause had been violated by being denied the same access to marriage as different-sex couples. They further claim that the ban discriminated against gay and lesbian citizens of Oregon who wished to be married in their state of residence. On January 22nd, 2014, this case was consolidated with Rummel v. Kitzhaber because of its similar circumstances. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on February 18th, 2014. On February 20, Oregon's Attorney General, Ellen Rosenblum, announced that the state would not defend its ban on same-sex marriage. The State filed an answer in the case telling the court that it agreed with the plaintiffs that "the ban cannot withstand a federal constitutional challenge under any standard of review." The state stated, however, that "In the meantime, as the State Defendants are legally obligated to enforce the Oregon Constitution's ban on same-sex marriage, they will continue to do so unless and until this Court grants the relief sought by the plaintiffs." An anti-same-sex-marriage group, the National Organization for Marriage, then moved to intervene to defend the ban. The Court denied intervention and struck down the same-sex marriage ban on May 19th, 2014. The court's opinion declared that Oregon's ban of same-sex marriage violates the Equal Protection Clause and the court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the ban. Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 2014 WL 2054264 (D. Oregon 2014). The defendants declined to appeal and did not seek a stay of the injunction. However, the National Organization for Marriage appealed the denial of their intervention motion, and sought a stay of the injunction pending disposition of that appeal. That stay was denied, first by the District Court on May 19, 2014, then by the Court of Appeals that same day, and then by the Supreme Court on June 4, 2014. On August 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion that the National Organization for Marriage lacked Article III standing to appeal the District Court's final judgment. The Ninth Circuit also denied the National Organization for Marriage's petition for rehearing en banc on November 24, 2014. The Supreme Court denied the National Organization for Marriage's petition for certiorari on April 20, 2015. On August 19, 2014, the Court approved the parties' agreement over attorney's fees, by which the defendants agreed to pay $132,690 in total. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 15th, 2013, two same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the District of Oregon U.S. District Court against the state of Oregon. The plaintiff asked the court to declare that Oregon laws banning same-sex marriages violate the United States Constitution, issue a permanent injunction against the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees. Summary judgment was decided in the plaintiffs' favor, and Oregon's same-sex marriage ban was declared unconstitutional and the state was enjoined from enforcing the ban. The National Organization for Marriage's attempts to intervene were denied. The Court awarded the plaintiffs $132,690 in attorney's fees. The case is now closed.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This suit was filed on May 22, 2020, by two non-profit organizations and six individual plaintiffs against the state of North Carolina to challenge various election laws in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. No outcome yet.
 On May 22, 2020, Democracy North Carolina, the League of Women Voters of North Carolina, and six individual plaintiffs filed a suit against the North Carolina State Board of Elections, the North Carolina Department of Transportation, the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Health and Human Services, challenging various election laws in light of COVID-19. They alleged that the current voting regulations limited rights to vote, free speech and association, and procedural due process, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They further alleged that the defendants failed to accommodate for those with medical vulnerabilities and disabilities, and caused disparate impact. Represented by the Fair Elections Center and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 29 U.S.C. § 794. Specifically, they sought to enjoin enforcement of the Organizational Assistance an and Uniform Hours Requirement for the 2020 general elections. Further, the plaintiffs sought an order requiring the defendant to implement online voter registration portals and contactless boxes for absentee ballots among other remedies. The case was filed in the Middle District of North Carolina and assigned to Magistrate Judge Joe L. Webster. Under North Carolina law, voters werre subject to a 25 day mail-in or online voter registration deadline, and were required to submit the State Board’s Election form with acceptable residency documentation to request an absentee ballot. The plaintiffs alleged that such regulations governing absentee vote applications posed an undue burden to the fundamental right to vote. The plaintiffs also alleged that North Carolina’s Organizational Assistance ban, which prohibits assistance with and return of absentee ballots and the Uniform Hours Requirement, which requires uniform hours in all precincts, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They further alleged that current law does not accommodate those with medical vulnerabilities and disabilities, like the six individual plaintiffs. On June 5, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction amended the complaint to add two additional voter plaintiffs. On June 10, the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate and the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives moved to intervene as intervenor defendants, which was granted on June 12. Meanwhile, House Bill 1169 was passed on July 16 to reduce the requirement of two witnesses for absentee ballots to one witness. In response to the changes, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the complaint and preliminary injunction, and to request expedited briefing on June 18. The plaintiffs alleged that the newly implemented changes were inadequate to address the constitutional issues in the lawsuit as the House Bill still required a witness. The same day, the Republican National Committee (RNC) National Republican Senatorial Committee (NRSC), National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC), and North Carolina Republican Party (NCRP) moved to intervene as defendants, which was denied on June 24. On June 24, the RNC, NRSC, NRCC, and NCRP filed a motion for reconsideration and appealed the decision to the Fourth Circuit on July 2. Throughout July, each party submitted briefs in response to the preliminary injunction. On July 2, the plaintiffs filed additional declarations in support of their original declaration. Included in the submissions were various first hand evidence in support of the original motion, as well as evidence raising new issues. In response, the defendants filed a motion to strike the declarations or to take discovery on June 6. The plaintiffs, in opposing the defendants’ motion, argued that the defendants’ reply declarations were not proper because the defendants had adequate time to prepare a response. The parties disputed on whether the plaintiff’s declarations constituted new evidence in support of their motion for preliminary injunction. On July 20, the court held an evidentiary hearing and arguments on the plaintiff’s preliminary injunction. On July 27, the court granted the defendants’ motion to strike in part, and also partially granted the defendant’s request for pre hearing discovery. 2020 WL 4288103. In addressing the issue on whether the plaintiffs’ additional declarations submitted on July 2 constituted new evidence, the court found that the plaintiffs’ reply declarations presented new issues to which the opposing party would not have an opportunity to respond. On July 30, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The same day, the plaintiffs proposed the third amended complaint in response to Defendant Karen Brinson Bell’s emergency order on July 17 regarding early voting plans. The plaintiffs alleged that the emergency order did not alleviate the burden placed on voters because it added requirements for weekend hours without lifting the uniform hours requirement. The case is ongoing.


This FOIA suit was filed on October 20, 2017. The Immigrant Legal Resource Center ("ILRC") sought to compel the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") to release records related to sanctuary cities. Specifically, ILRC sought information related to "whether and to what extent city and county law enforcement agencies agree to assist in ICE’s detention and deportation efforts against immigrants living in the United States." ILRC is a nonprofit organization that promotes diversity in the United States and the rights of all people. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Northern District of California. ILRC previously wrote "a widely-cited report educating the public about the extent of local involvement in immigration enforcement, despite the fact that local jurisdictions have no legal obligation to assist with civil immigration enforcement." It filed this FOIA complaint to access records necessary for updating its report to reflect current practices regarding ICE detainers, detention contracts, and agreements. ILRC argued that in light of the Trump administration's directive to increase deportations with the assistance of local authorities, the public had an increased interest in understanding the extent of assistance local authorities provide. On October 23, the case was assigned to Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong and then reassigned to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu on February 6, 2018. On April 10, 2018, the parties filed a joint case management statement. According to the statement, the defendants, on December 15, 2017, produced 232 pages of documents and 10 spreadsheets to plaintiff, with portions withheld pursuant to FOIA exemptions. The defendants asserted that on January 8, 2018, they completed their production and provided plaintiff with a summary of the search. Plaintiff contended that the defendants had not conducted a reasonable and adequate search, citing "the use of limited search terms and questions about the extent to which defendants included field office records in their searches." The allegedly unreasonable and inadequate search was related to plaintiff's request for records, which had yet to be produced, regarding new or proposed detention facilities and probation departments that have agreed to cooperate with ICE. The plaintiff also contended that it was entitled to a Vaughn index detailing responsive records not produced and the respective reasons for not producing them. According to the statement, the plaintiff advised the defendants of these concerns and the parties were in good faith working to resolve the issues. On August 8, 2018, the parties filed another joint case management statement. According to the statement, defendants produced an “informal” Vaughn index in response to plaintiff’s request for information about redactions. Per the parties, the defendants agreed to provide additional documents and conduct a search of local field offices in response to plaintiff’s requests. During a July 13, 2018, call between the parties, the defendants stated that they had begun to conduct a search of field offices. On July 24, 2018, defendants estimated that documents resulting from this search would be ready for production in August. As of February 17, 2020, there have been no motions or additional joint case management statements filed. On multiple occasions, the parties stipulated to continue case management conferences, as the parties wished to conserve judicial resources while they engaged in cooperative meetings to narrow and resolve the issues. A case management conference is scheduled for May 6, 2020 and the parties are currently engaged in settlement discussions.

Summary: This FOIA suit was filed filed on October 20, 2017. The Immigrant Legal Resource Center (ILRC) sought the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to release records related to sanctuary cities. Specifically, ILRC wanted information related to "whether and to what extent city and county law enforcement agencies agree to assist in ICE’s detention and deportation efforts against immigrants living in the United States." The case is ongoing.


On September 13, 2001, seven students with disabilities, by and through their parents, filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the Milwaukee Public School System ("MPS") and the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction ("DPI"). The Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Disability Rights Wisconsin, claimed that MPS violated their right to a free, appropriate public education as guaranteed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that they were improperly denied special education services and Individualized Education Programs ("IEPs") designed to fit their needs. The Plaintiffs' original complaint defined the class as "all school age children with disabilities who reside in the Milwaukee Public School District boundaries and who are or may be eligible for special education and related services under IDEA and Wisconsin law." The court, however found this too broad, which prompted the Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint on May 3, 2004, redefining the class as "all students eligible to receive special education from MPS who are, have been or will be denied or delayed entry into or participation in the IEP process." Magistrate Judge Aaron Goodstein granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The district court eventually held a bench trial and found both the city and state Defendants liable for systemic violations of the IDEA. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 519 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Wis. 2007). At that point, DPI settled with the class, agreeing to order MPS to meet certain compliance benchmarks. The district court approved the settlement over MPS's objection. 2008 WL 2340362 (E.D. Wis. June 6, 2008). The settlement required that MPS conduct at least 95% of its initial evaluations within the required time period (or get proper extensions), that MPS make a reasonable effort to ensure that a parent or guardian was present at 95% of the initial IEP meetings, and that MPS make better efforts in identifying children with disabilities by monitoring school suspension patterns. The Court then appointed a monitor for a two-year period to track MPS's compliance, and imposed a comprehensive remedial scheme. 2009 WL 1615520 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2009). MPS appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Plaintiffs cross-appealed the denial of certification of their first proposed class. On February 3, 2012, the Seventh Circuit (Judge Diane S. Sykes) quickly dismissed the Plaintiffs cross-appeal, noting that it was neither timely nor within the Court's jurisdiction. Turning to MPS's appeal, the Court vacated the Settlement Agreement, holding that the class never should have been certified because the Plaintiffs' cases were "highly individualized and vastly diverse," thus making the case inappropriate for a class-action lawsuit. Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Public Schools, 668 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 2012). The 7th Circuit opinion stated: "What remains are the claims of the individual Plaintiffs; the district court did not find a denial of a free appropriate public education [FAPE] in any individual case. Furthermore, the court's reasons for excusing administrative exhaustion appear to have been tied to the class allegations, and it's not clear whether the court would have excused exhaustion for any of the individual claims. Finally, it's possible - perhaps likely - that some of the named Plaintiffs' individual circumstances have changed such that their claims are now moot. We leave it to the district court on remand the task of determining whether anything remains of this case and what, if anything, should happen next." Jamie S. v. Milwaukee Pub. Sch., 668 F.3d 481, 499-500 (7th Cir. 2012). On remand, the district court's Judge Rudolph Randa dismissed the action altogether on August 20, 2012. Judge Randa entered a judgment in favor of Defendant Milwaukee Public Schools and against Disability Rights of Wisconsin, and ordered the Disability Rights of Wisconsin to pay the Defendant's attorney fees of $459,123.96. In entering the judgment to dismiss, the court explained several reasons from the Seventh Circuit decision to remand:<blockquote>- A dispute over eligibility policies concerns that the Plaintiff raised--such as the Defendant's alleged failure to identify and evaluate individual disabled children--are in essence, disputes for which the Plaintiffs should have exhausted administrative remedies and utilized the formal administrative process. - The class should not have been certified in the first place. The reason is that while none of the Plaintiffs exhausted their administrative remedies, and the exception for systemic violations is essentially a "class action exception," the exception does not apply here because Wisconsin's procedures are capable of resolving child find disputes on a case-by-case, individual basis. In summary, administrative process can resolve individual child find disputes. - Plaintiffs' argument that exhaustion should be excused because their claims are "systemic" in nature is without merit because the Defendants cannot find safe harbor in the exception for systemic violations--each Plaintiff must offer an individual excuse for failing to exhaust the administrative process. </blockquote>In conclusion, none of the individual Plaintiffs had followed the formal process, and therefore, the court dismissed the case in favor of the Defendant. The plaintiffs appealed, but later withdrew the appeal. The case is closed.

Summary: This Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA") class action lawsuit was filed on September 13, 2001 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. Plaintiffs claimed that the Milwaukee Public School system improperly denied them special education services and Individualized Education Programs ("IEP") designed to fit their needs. Plaintiffs won at trial, but that victory was vacated by the 7th Circuit and the case was soon dismissed.