On July 1, 2014, the Catholic Benefits Association and the Catholic Insurance Company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The Catholic Benefits Association is an association of Catholic nonprofits and closely held for-profit employers that provide health benefits to their employees, and the Catholic Insurance Company, Inc. sells stop-loss insurance to some of these employers who self-fund their insurance plans. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and related agencies' enforcement of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) contraceptive services mandate ('mandate') violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and violated the Administrative Procedures Act. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that notifying HHS of their religious objection to contraception started a chain of events that ended with their employees receiving contraceptive services. The plaintiffs claimed this violates their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech clauses of the First Amendment, and the Administrative Procedures Act. The same plaintiffs had filed an earlier suit, The Catholic Benefits Ass'n v. Sebelius, No. 5:14-cv-00240-R (W.D. Okla. June 4, 2014), which had resulted in an injunction for their nonprofit and closely held for-profit member employers at the time. They filed an additional motion to add employers who joined the association following that date, but it was denied. The current suit is to add those members to the injunction. The court in the preceding case also ruled that the Catholic Insurance Company did not have standing to sue in its own right. On December 29, 2014, the court granted the Catholic Benefits Association a preliminary injunction against federal enforcement of the mandate for their current members who were nonprofit religious employers and for current members who were non-exempt closely held for-profit employers. 81 F.Supp.3d. 1269 (W.D. Oka. 2014). The court did not provide preliminary injunctive relief for future members of the association, for employers that met the ACA definition of religious employer and are exempt from mandate, or for the Catholic Insurance Company. In early 2015, both parties cross appealed the court's decision to grant in part and deny in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On March 17, 2015, however, the Tenth Circuit granted the government's unopposed motion to hold this case and related appeals in abeyance pending resolution of Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell (FA-CO-0006), Southern Nazarene University v. Burwell (FA-OK-0005), and Reaching Souls International v. Burwell (FA-OK-0002). On October 23, 2017, the Tenth Circuit dismissed both appeals pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory judgment on November 1, 2017. They argued that although there was a circuit split over whether the accommodation under the mandate substantially burdened religious exercise, the government changed its position once the issue was before the Supreme Court in 2016. Zubik v. Burwell (FA-PA-0010). In Interim Final Rules issued in October 2017, the government admitted that the accommodation did substantially burden religious exercise and was illegal under RFRA. On March 7, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction. The Court permanently enjoined the government from enforcing the mandate against CBA members, their health plans, their health insurance issuers, or third-party administrators in connection with their health plans, to the extent that it required CBA members to contract, arrange, pay, or refer for religiously-objectionable medical care. The Court also declared that the mandate violated RFRA. In August, 2018, the Court awarded the plaintiffs $699,725.95 in attorneys' fees and $18,881.41 in expenses not recoverable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. The case is now closed.

Summary: This suit was filed in the Western District of Oklahoma in July of 2014. It was brought by an association of Catholic employers, the Catholic Benefits Association, to add additional member employers, both religious nonprofits and closely-held for profits, to preliminary injunctive relief the Association had secured for earlier members from the contraceptive services mandate. In March, 2018, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction and declared that the mandate violated RFRA. The Court awarded the plaintiffs $699,725.95 in attorneys' fees and $18,881.41 in expenses. The case is now closed.


On December 12, 2011, two former inmates of the Warren County Jail (“Jail”) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sued Warren County (“County”) and the South Central Bank of Bowling Green (“Bank”) under 42 U.S.C §1983 and Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs argue that the Warren County Jail had a policy of taking checks and cash from the inmates during their admission and, without their knowledge or consent, presenting the checks and cash to the Bank, which accepted them for deposit into Jail’s accounts at the Bank. The plaintiffs also alleged that the Jail retained proceeds of such checks and cash without plaintiff’s consent, and in excess of the amounts authorized by the state law (KRS 441.265) to cover the charges and fees the Jail was entitled to receive. The plaintiffs proposed three classes: <blockquote>(a) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail taken, endorsed and deposited by the County Defendants in the Jail’s account or accounts with the Bank or other financial institutions; (b) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by the County Defendants without their written consent, and/or in violation of and/or in excess of sums permitted under KRS § 441.265; and (c) all persons incarcerated in the Jail who were not sentenced prisoners who have had the cash and checks in their possession when admitted to the Jail retained by the County Defendants without giving an accounting to such persons upon release from the Jail.</blockquote> The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint on January 20, 2012. It alleged the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C §1983, because (i) the Bank did not act under color of state law, and (ii) the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were not infringed. Moreover, it argued that the plaintiffs' complaint did not contain plausible violations of Kentucky Law. In the alternative, the Bank stated that the state law claims should not be examined by the court. The County filed a motion for summary judgment on the same day. It argued that (i) part of the claims related to a 2003 incarceration of one of the plaintiffs and, thus, were barred by the statute of limitations; and (ii) the plaintiffs could not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 because the Jail policy did not violate plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and there was no state law violation. Additionally, the County stated that the state law claims failed, and that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies established by Kentucky before bringing the suit. On April 16, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, in order to (i) add a new plaintiff and class representative, (ii) specify that the Bank was a state actor and its conduct was taken under color of state law, and (iii) add a claim for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. On May 29, 2012, Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss and the County’s motion for summary judgment as to the 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim. The opinion stated (i) the jail policy was not an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment, provided the provision of KRS § 441.265 were followed; (ii) a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim was not the appropriate remedy for the plaintiffs, thus their allegations concerning their Fourteenth Amendment rights should be dismissed; and (iii) the Bank was not acting under the color of state law for purposes of a §1983 claim. The opinion also denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended class action complaint, stating that the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was not applicable to the case and, therefore, the amendment was futile. Finally, Judge Joseph H. McKinley, Jr. declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, dismissing them without prejudice. The case was then closed.

Summary: In 2011, two former inmates of the Warren County Jail filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs argued that their Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments’ rights were violated by the Warren County Jail’s policy of taking checks and cash from the inmates during their admission and, without their knowledge or consent, presenting the checks to the Bank, which accepted them for deposit into Jail’s accounts at the Bank. The plaintiffs also allege that the Jail retained proceeds of such checks and cash without plaintiff’s consent, and in excess of the amounts authorized by the state law (KRS 441.265) to cover the charges and fees the Jail is entitled to receive. In 2012, the court dismissed the case, stating that the Jail’s policy did not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. The case was closed in May 2012.


On December 21, 2011, patients civilly committed to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program filed this lawsuit pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Minnesota Department of Health & Human Services (DHS) and the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Seeking injunctive and monetary relief, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fourteenth, First, and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that recent amendments to the Minnesota sex offender treatment statutes and replacements in DHS and MSOP administration had caused a drastic change in the program. Despite being classified as civilly committed patients, the plaintiffs were now placed in a maximum security facility and repeatedly experienced violations of their personal liberty and dignity. They were provided limited access to the outside world: no access to the internet, exorbitant rates for telephone communications, and harsh and limited policies for in-person visits, including a pat-down of the visitor. The patients further alleged that they were no longer able to have much of their previously allowed personal property and that any incoming property was systematically destroyed by the administration. The patients alleged negligent staff and negligent medical care, resulting in deaths of patients. The sex offender treatment was alleged to be grossly inadequate, resulting in a de facto inability to graduate out of the program and reintegrate into society. The plaintiffs also alleged that the administration deliberately spent the money provided for the sex offender program on the staff, and then unreasonably charges the patients for the inadequately provided basic necessities. The plaintiffs also allege inadequate grievance procedures. The plaintiffs sought to proceed as a class and were provided representation by the state bar's Pro Se Project. On January 25, 2012, and February 6, 2012, Chief Judge Michael J. Davis stayed all other MSOP cases, pending the resolution of the class certification in this lawsuit. The case was also assigned to Magistrate Judge Jeffery J. Keyes on February 6, 2012. The first amended complaint was filed on March 15, 2012. In it, the plaintiffs incorporated their previous allegations and added that their treatment also violated the Minnesota state Constitution and the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act. The plaintiffs' complaint relied heavily on a March 2011 Evaluation Report on the Civil Commitment of Sex Offender issued by the Office of the Legislative Auditor for the State of Minnesota. According to the complaint, several years before, a new Executive Director of the MSOP program had been hired and substantially altered program policies. The plaintiffs alleged that the result was vague treatment plans, a lack of qualified clinical staff, and a denial of proper medications and treatments. The plaintiffs also alleged that punishments included solitary confinement, denial of group therapy, denial of exercise, denial of employment opportunities and denial of treatment. In addition, the double-bunking of individuals had led to increased physical and sexual assaults. The plaintiffs alleged they were subjected to intrusive searches without reasonable suspicion, and that their correspondence was searched. Finally, there was no way to leave the program: only one patient had been released without revocation of discharge. On April 30, 2012, all parties stipulated to the defendants' motion for an extended time to answer. This was presumably due to settlement negotiations, as preliminary settlement conferences were scheduled the following week. On July 24, 2012, the defendants additionally stipulated to a temporary restraining order, and Judge Donovan W. Frank certified the plaintiff class of "[a]ll patients currently civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program pursuant to Min. Stat. § 253B." 283 F.R.D. 514 (D. Minn. 2012). Because of these developments, on July 26, 2012, Judge Frank held that the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was moot. 2012 WL 3061863. On August 15, 2012, Chief Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan found that further study was necessary to address these issues. The court ordered the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to create a Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force for two years. The court ordered the Task Force to provide the Commissioner with recommendations on less restrictive alternatives and other recommended legislative reforms. On October 5, 2012, Chief Magistrate Judge Boylan issued an order affirming the appointment of specific individuals to the Task Force. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey J. Keyes approved five more appointments to the Task Force on December 13, 2012, Between August and September 2012, several individuals or groups of individuals committed to MSOP filed motions to intervene, to consolidate, to create a sub-class, or for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. These were filed without the assistance or approval of the class counsel. On December 5, 2012, Judge Frank denied each such motion. 2012 WL 6044652. Over the next two years, the parties continued to concurrently participate in settlement negotiations and file motions against each other in court. The commissioner also proceeded with his court-ordered evaluation of the program. On August 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On December 6, 2013, Judge Frank appointed experts under Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. On February 20, 2014, Judge Frank granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the equal protection claim raised in the second amended complaint and denied all plaintiffs' and defendants' other motions. In the opinion, Judge Frank warned that he might ultimately find the program to be unconstitutional and urged the legislature to take action. 6 F. Supp. 3d 916. Having received expert recommendations, on June 2, 2014, Judge Frank ordered the defendants to show cause as to why the continued confinement of E.T. (one of the patients at MSOP) did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and why E.T. should not be immediately and unconditionally released from MSOP. On June 9, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for the immediate transfer of an individual the court identifies as R.B., on the basis of the same report. On June 11, 2014, the defendants issued a response to the court's order to show cause regarding E.T.'s continued confinement. On June 19, 2014, the Hennepin County Attorney filed an amicus memorandum on the applicable standard for discharge of persons committed as sexually dangerous persons under current Minnesota law as interpreted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. On June 27, 2014, the matter of E.T. and R.B were assigned to Judge Frank and Magistrate Judge Keyes following the show cause hearing in this class action and petitions for habeas corpus filed by E.T. and R.B. On August 11, 2014, Judge Frank declined to declare that confinement of E.T and R.B in MSOP was unconstitutional and refused to order the immediate discharge of E.T and immediate transfer of R.B. 6 F. Supp. 3d 958. On September 9, 2014, Judge Frank denied the defendants' request for a jury trial and granted the plaintiffs' request for a bench trial. 2014 WL 4446270. On October 27, 2014, Judge Davis stayed all “current and future civil rights cases brought by an individual or group of individuals who has or have been civilly committed to the MSOP that are sufficiently related to [Karsjens] . . . pending resolution of the [Karsjens] litigation.” On October 28, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. On November 6, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants' petition for review. On February 2, 2015, Judge Frank denied defendants' partial motion to dismiss the third amended complaint as well as the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 2015 WL 420013. Then, on February 9, 2015, the bench trial commenced before Judge Frank. After the six-week bench trial, on June 17, 2015, Judge Frank granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief with respect to counts I and II of their third amended complaint. Judge Frank found that Minnesota's civil commitment statutory scheme was unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied. Applying the strict scrutiny standard, the court concluded that Minnesota's civil commitment statutory scheme was not narrowly tailored and was punitive without the criminal justice system's safeguards. The court also held that the determination that the MSOP and its governing civil commitment statutes were unconstitutional, concluding phase one of the trial. Judge Frank ordered that counts VIII, IX, and X, would be tried in the second phase of trial. 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139. Judge Frank also issued an opinion granting the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss counts IV, XI, XII, and XIII of the third amended complaint on the condition that the motion to dismiss be with prejudice. The order gave the plaintiffs the option to withdraw their motion if they did not wish to accept the condition of prejudice. 2015 WL 3755930. He had previously deferred ruling on the matter in an April 24, 2015 order. 2015 WL 1893191. On July 22, 2015 Judge Frank denied the defendants' request for certification of appeal. 2015 WL 4478972. The next day, Judge Frank designated former Chief Justice Eric J. Magnuson as Special Master to oversee the injunctive relief imposed by the court. The special master would have “authority to monitor compliance with the remedies” and “authority to implement and enforce the injunctive relief imposed by the court and to mediate any dispute between the parties with regard to the implementation of the remedies.” On August 7, 2015 Judge Frank denied various news agencies their request to obtain court records to intervene for the limited purpose of asserting public access to court proceedings. 2015 BL 254617. On August 10, 2015, Judge Frank granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss counts IV, XI, XII, and XIII of the third amended complaint with prejudice, and overruled objections filed by plaintiff class members. On August 20, 2015, a further amended stay order was entered, staying all current and future civil rights cases sufficiently related to this case, pending resolution of the appeal. On October 29, 2015, Judge Frank entered an interim injunctive relief order, requiring the defendants to conduct independent risk and phase placement reevaluation of all current patients at the MSOP. These independent risk assessments aimed to determine whether each patient (1) continued to meet the constitutional standard for commitment as set forth in Call v. Gomez, 535 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1995); (2) could be appropriately transferred or provisionally discharged; (3) could be housed in or monitored by a less restrictive alternative; and (4) was in the proper treatment phase. The defendants were required to complete these assessments within 30 days. 2015 WL 6561712. On October 29, 2015, the defendants filed an appeal to the Eighth Circuit regarding the interim relief order. Accordingly, on November 23, 2015, Judge Frank denied defendants' motion to stay or suspend the interim order, pending the Eighth Circuit appeal. 2015 WL 7432333. The Eighth Circuit granted the defendants' motion for a temporary administrative stay on December 2, 2015. The Circuit Court heard oral argument on April 12, 2016. Back in the district court, on April 14, 2016, the Court Chief Judge John R. Tunheim lifted the 2012 stays 16 individual cases. He held that these cases “were not integral” to the relief orders in Karjsens. All other cases not identified remained stayed under previous district-wide stay orders. On January 3, 2017, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and vacated the injunctive relief order from October 2015. It found that the district court applied an incorrect standard of scrutiny when it considered the plaintiffs’ due process claims. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit posited that a proper standard was whether MCTA bared a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose and not the strict scrutiny standard that the district court applied. 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017). It remanded the case to district court “for further proceedings on the remaining claims in the Third Amended Complaint.” Id. As a result of this ruling, the plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing en banc on January 31, 2017. This motion was denied on February 22, 2017. On March 14, 2017, the District Court Judge Donovan W. Frank ordered a temporary stay pending the parties’ submission on whether the case and other stayed cases with similar claims should remain stayed pending further appeal, and the next steps in this case if the claims are not stayed. On May 3, 2017, Judge Frank again stayed the case pending the plaintiffs’ motion for certiorari in the Supreme Court as to the Eight Circuit's January 3rd ruling. At that point, the following claims remained open in the case: - Fourteenth Amendment Failure to Provide Treatment - Fourteenth Amendment Freedom from Punishment - Fourteenth Amendment Denial of Less Restrictive Alternatives - Fourteenth Amendment Freedom from Inhumane Treatment - First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom - First Amendment Free Speech and Association - Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure 2017 WL 1743511. Judge Frank stayed the case for an additional 60 days on August 16, 2017. On October 2, 2017, the Supreme Court denied certiorari, refusing to hear the case. 2017 WL 2266349. In light of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, on December 8, 2017, the defendant's filed a motion for summary judgment as to the following claims contained in the plaintiffs' third amended complaint: First Amendment Free Speech and Association, First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom, Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure. On August 23, 2018, Judge Frank addressed the remaining claims as a result of the Eighth Circuit’s decision and the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment. The court ultimately granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing the surviving claims from the Third Amended Complaint without prejudice, as well as dismissing the remaining four remaining earlier claims, also without prejudice. The court dismissed the early claims (Fourteenth Amendment failure to provide treatment, freedom from punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment). The district court did so in accordance with the Eighth Circuit's opinion and the rational basis standard for liability they articulated: conduct must be conscience-shocking to support substantive due process liability. Additionally, the district court was bound by the Eighth Circuit’s decision to conclude that the defendants were not liable under the Fourteenth Amendment for failing to provide less restrictive alternatives to the plaintiff class. Regarding the surviving claims from the Third Amended Complaint, the district court dismissed them due to several factors. For the First and Fourteenth Amendment Religious Freedom claim, the court concluded that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment due to the fact that even if the plaintiffs could establish that the defendants’ policies respecting religion impose a substantial burden on the class members’ religious practices, the plaintiffs failed to identify record evidence by which a jury could conclude that the MSOP’s policies applied to the class as a whole are not reasonably related to legitimate therapeutic and institutional interests. In evaluating the plaintiff's First Amendment freedom of speech and association claim, the court reasoned defendants were entitled to summary judgment because the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute over whether the defendants’ policies implicating speech and association are an unreasonable restriction on plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights as applied to the class as a whole. Furthermore, the court granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment search and seizure claim because the record lacked substantial evidence showing that MSOP’s policies were unnecessary or unjustified responses to problems of institutional security, and thus the court was bound to defer to defendants’ institutional judgment regarding the need for particular search policies. As a result of this district court order, the plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit on October 24, 2018. The appeal was limited to the court's dismissal of the following Fourteenth Amendment claims: failure to provide treatment, freedom from punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment. On December 20, 2018, Judge John R. Tunheim issued a stay pending the outcome of the plaintiff's appeal to the Eighth Circuit. The appeals court issued their opinion on February 24, 2021, affirming in part and vacating in part the district court's judgment. 988 F.3d 1047. In the opinion written by Judge Shepherd, the appeals court concluded that the district court employed the wrong legal standard in evaluating some of these claims. First, however, the appeals court approved the district court's dismissal of the claim of constitutionally inadequate treatment, holding that the trial court correctly applied the "shocks the conscious" standard. The court next addressed the three remaining conditions of confinement claims — punishment, denial of less restrictive alternatives, and freedom from inhumane treatment. The court held that the district court should have applied the deliberate indifference standard to the inadequate medical care claim. Regarding the other conditions of confinement claims, the court held that they should be evaluated under the Bell standard which typically applies to pretrial detainees. Here, the court held that it should be applied to civil confinement and the trial court must review the totality of circumstances of plaintiffs class' confinement. The Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, where it is ongoing as of March 31, 2021.

Summary: Patients currently civilly committed in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP) filed a lawsuit against the Minnesota Department of Health & Human Services and MSOP seeking injunctive relief and damages. They alleged that defendants violated the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota Constitution, and the Minnesota Civil Commitment and Treatment Act. The Court certified this group as a class. On August 15, 2012, the Court ordered that the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services create a Sex Offender Civil Commitment Advisory Task Force. On June 17, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief, but on January 3, 2017 the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. After the district court issued a new order in light of that remand, the plaintiffs appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and denied in part that judgment on February 24, 2021. The appeals court remanded the case and it is ongoing.


On October 12, 2017, nine passengers of a domestic flight sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) after Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers asked to see every passenger’s identification prior to deplaning. The plaintiffs brought this challenge pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Declaratory Judgment Act, and alleged that the defendants violated the passengers’ Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure, as well as the APA. Represented by the ACLU and the private law firm Covington & Burling, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, as well as an injunction restraining the defendants from further such searches and seizures. The suit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The complaint asserted that on February 22, 2017, at the request of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), CBP officers stopped and searched every passenger on the domestic Delta Airlines flight. Prior to deplaning at New York City’s JFK Airport, CBP officers required all passengers to provide identification. The plaintiffs—all of who were passengers from the flight—stated that the passengers understood they had no option but to comply. Indeed, CBP officers blocked the airplane exit. The plaintiffs argued that the officers had no warrant for the search, nor probable cause that any passenger had committed a crime or reasonable suspicion to justify investigation. The plaintiffs did not consent to any search or seizure. The plaintiffs described the search as frightening and upsetting, and described the officers’ behavior as coercive. According to the complaint, CBP officers asserted that the incident was part of their routine practice. After media reports on the incident, the complaint indicated that CBP further added that the investigation was part of a search for a particular individual subject to removal from the U.S. The plaintiffs argued, however, that CBP still had not provided a reason for searching every passenger on the flight, especially considering it could have just relied on the flight manifest (passenger list). The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis on October 12, 2017. On January 16, 2018, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending their anticipated motion to dismiss, a request which Magistrate Judge Vera M. Scanlon denied on January 25. On March 9, the defendants filed their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Though the court ordered the defendants to comply with discovery orders, that fall, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending the motion to dismiss, among other discovery disputes litigated that year. On December 13, 2018, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to sue because the defendants' conduct was part of an alleged widespread practice, which increased the plaintiffs' chances of being searched on a future domestic flight. The court also found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the final agency action requirement to bring an APA claim. The parties continued to litigate discovery through the first half of 2019 until the parties notified the court that they had reach a settlement in July and would file for dismissal by September. On September 30, 2019, the parties filed for dismissal and agreed to settle the case. Under the terms of the agreement, CBP circulated a new policy directive to ports of entry nationwide clarifying that CBP does not have a policy or practice of checking the identification of deplaning domestic passengers. If CBP officers do seek to conduct document checks of deplaning domestic passengers in the future, they were required to make clear through their words and actions that participation is voluntary and request that airline personnel announce over the airplane’s public address system that participation is voluntary. The officers were also required to provide an unimpeded path for passengers to exit the airplane and explain, if asked, that passengers who decline to participate will face no law enforcement consequences as a result. The settlement also allocated $10,000 in attorneys' fees to the ACLU and $30,000 in fees to Covington & Burling. The court entered judgment dismissing the case on October 10, 2019. The case is now closed.

Summary: On Oct. 12, 2017, nine passengers of a domestic flight sued the DHS after CBP officers asked to see every passenger’s identification prior to deplaning. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the APA and Fourth Amendment, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss in December 2018. After continuing to litigate various discovery issues, the parties reached a settlement in summer 2019 and dismissed the case voluntarily in September 2019. The settlement ensures that CBP communicates in the future that any document checks conducted are truly voluntary. The case is now closed.


On October 29, 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The Plaintiff sued the County of Tulare under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the Human Rights Defense Center and Rosen Bien Galvan & Grunfeld, the Plaintiff asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as damages. PLN claimed that the County of Tulare violated its free speech, due process, and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the establishment clause of the First Amendment. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that the County of Tulare censored its publication by adopting and implementing mail policies that prohibited delivery of the PLN mail, and the County failed to provide due process notice or opportunity to challenge the censorship. The Plaintiff requested declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages. Four days later, the Plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction. On December 16, 2015, Judge John A. Mendez, granted in part the Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The court denied the request that the prison be barred from censoring mail because it contained staples. Because the Defendants already ceased this policy and implemented a new one that allowed delivery of the Plaintiff's publications to jail inmates after staff removed any staples and tapes, the court held that the Plaintiff did not have a likelihood of current irreparable harm. But the court granted the Plaintiff's request that Defendants provide adequate written notice and an administrative appeal process to both prisoners and senders when Defendants refuse to deliver publications to prisoners at the County jails. The court found sufficient likelihood of success on this due process claim, that the Plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm, and that the preliminary injunction was in the public's interest. In February 2016, the parties began settlement negotiations and the court appointed Magistrate Judge Edmund F. Brennan to mediate the settlement. The parties reached an agreement and on July 6, 2016, Judge Mendez entered a consent decree. Under the agreement, the Defendants agreed to deliver publications, correspondence, or documents sent by any publisher to prisoners and not refuse them because they contain staples, provided that the Defendants may remove the staples. Additionally, the Defendants agreed to provide adequate written notice and an administrative review process of decisions to refuse any publication, correspondence, or document sent from the publisher. The Defendants agreed to include an explanation of the new mail policy in its handbook and website and pay $15,000 in damages and an additional amount for attorneys' fees and costs. The court retained jurisdiction for the consent decree to remain in effect until a motion for termination by either party. However, the court found that the case concerned the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of a publisher and therefore, was not a case concerning prison conditions under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On August 8, 2016, the court ordered the Defendants to pay $140,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. As of March 21, 2020, there has been no additional activity on this case, but it is still ongoing since the consent decree is still in effect.

Summary: Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit against the County of Tulare under § 1983 claiming the County Jail refused to deliver its publication without notice or opportunity for appeal. On December 16, 2015, the Court signed a preliminary injunction ordering the Tulare County Jail to provide Prison Legal News adequate notice and opportunity for appeal when the jail refused to deliver PLN's publication. On July 6, 2016 the parties reached a settlement. The Defendants agreed not to refuse to deliver publications, correspondence, or documents sent by any publisher to prisoners because the items contained staples, provided that the Defendants may remove the staples. They also paid $15,000 in damages and $140,000 in fees and costs.


This summary is based on the documents available on the U.S. Dept. of Justice (DOJ) website. On March 24, 2000, a former high school student filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Judge Thomas G. Hull) against the Sullivan County Board of Education (SCBE) and several students (student defendants), under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. On September 24, 2000, an amended complaint was filed to add another former student as a plaintiff. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that they were subject to racial harassment while attending Sullivan East High School. The plaintiffs alleged that the harassment (including a barrage of racial slurs, derogatory graffiti, and paraphernalia) were known or should have been known to school officials, but they failed to take appropriate steps to address the problems in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages resulting from the SCBE's deliberate indifference to the verbal and physical racial harassment committed by students under the SCBE's disciplinary authority. On November 28, 2000, the DOJ filed a complaint-in-intervention to seek relief to ensure that the SCBE will operate a school system free of racial harassment for its students. On July 27, 2002, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss claims against the student defendants. The docket indicates that there was a settlement with at least one student defendant. On October 16, 2002, the District Court (Judge Hull) entered a consent decree settling the lawsuit. The SCBE agreed to, among other things: (1) hire an expert to evaluate its policies for preventing and remedying discrimination; (2) conduct school climate assessments; (3) develop comprehensive plans and education programs to prevent discrimination; and (4) maintain records of harassment allegations. The SCBE agreed to submit quarterly reports to the DOJ. The consent decree was to remain in effective for four years. Monetary damages for the plaintiff were set forth in a separate confidential agreement. The consent decree ended in 2006 without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2000, former high school students filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee against the Sullivan County Board of Education (SCBE) for deliberately being indifferent to racial harassments committed by other students under its disciplinary authority. On November 28, 2000, the U.S. Dept. of Justice filed a complaint-in-intervention to ensure that the SCBE complied with federal rules for non-discrimination. On October 16, 2002, the District Court (Judge Hull) issued a consent order which settled the lawsuit and dismissed the action.


On August 12, 2012, the Hawaii Defense Foundation and two of its members filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. The plaintiffs sued the City and County of Honolulu, an employee of the Honolulu Police Department (HPD), and ten anonymous administrators of the Honolulu Police Department Facebook page under 42 U.S.C §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiffs alleged that the Honolulu Police Department banned members of the public from participating in the public forum of their Facebook page. Specifically, the named plaintiffs in this case had their comments and posts criticizing the HPD deleted from the Official Honolulu Police Department Facebook Page and were subsequently banned from the Facebook page. The plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to restore their own posts, allow them to continue posting, and prohibit defendants from banning people or removing political posts. Following several status conferences, defendants agreed to work with the American Civil Liberties Union alongside the plaintiffs to develop a policy governing public posting on the Official Hawaii Police Department Facebook page. The court subsequently deemed the motions for the Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction moot. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on October 23, 2013 after settlement negotiations failed due to disagreements over the forms of dismissal and attorneys’ fees. Defendants filed for Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on claims against the employee of the Hawaii Police Department. The parties then reached a settlement on all issues except attorneys’ fees on January 16, 2014 and the pending motions were terminated. Although the private settlement is not available, the stipulation for dismissal states that the plaintiffs had their posting privileges restored, and the HPD changed their policies and procedures regarding the administration of their Facebook page. Plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees of $64,690.29. On April 12, 2014 Magistrate Judge Richard L. Puglisi recommended attorneys’ fees of $22,064.39, believing that the requested hourly rates were not based on Hawaiian market rates, the attorneys billed for excessive time and duplicative work, and that a reduction of 25% was appropriate to offset the attorneys’ practice of billing in half-hour increments. 2014 WL 2804445. Plaintiffs filed an objection to the reductions. On June 19, 2014, Judge J. Michael Seabright adopted in part and modified in part the recommended fees. He affirmed that the hourly rate was not in line with Hawaiian market rates, that the billed hours were excessive and duplicative, and that the magistrate judge’s recommendation was within a reasonable fee range but recommended an upward adjustment on hourly fees to ensure lawyers continue to represent novel civil rights cases. Judge Seabright awarded $31,610.56 in attorneys’ fees. 2014 WL 2804448. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, the Hawaii Defense Foundation filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii. Plaintiffs alleged that the policy of deleting critical or political posts and comments on the Official Honolulu Police Department Facebook page violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2014, the parties reached a private settlement and the plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' feeds. The case closed in June 2014.


On August 8, 2012, two Missouri prisoners filed this class-action lawsuit under § 1983 against the Missouri Department of Corrections. The prisoners, represented by the ACLU, asked the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri for declaratory relief that a state constitutional amendment, voted on by the public on August 7, 2012, was unconstitutional and for injunctive relief against the enforcement or implementation of that amendment. Under Missouri's constitution, freedom of religion, the plaintiffs explained, had long been broader than under the federal First Amendment. Amendment 2 would strengthen religious rights still further -- except for prisoners. For prisoners, Amendment 2 <i>shrank</i> religious rights, providing that the Missouri freedom-of-religion section "shall not be construed to expand the rights of prisoners in state or local custody beyond those afforded by the laws of the United States." The prisoners claimed that the voter-approved amendment to the Missouri Constitution would, if enforced, deprive prisoners of the additional protections of religious liberty guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution (the prisoners claimed Missouri's Constitution was more protective of an individual's right to religious liberty and expression than federal law). essentially sought to limit Missouri prisoners' religious liberty to that protected by federal law, while providing even greater protection to non-prisoner Missouri citizens. The prisoners claimed this violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. They sought to define a class of all current and future prisoners in the custody of the Missouri Department of Corrections. On September 10, 2012, the state moved to dismiss the case. On February 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Howard F. Sachs) agreed with the state that the prisoners had not identified any specific endangered exercise of religious liberty, and thus, the case was a "moot dispute over abstract, hypothetical concepts, unripe for judicial resolution." 2013 WL 684189. In dismissing the prisoners' claim, Judge Sachs said that the prisoners did not offer any reason or cite any cases to support a claim that the Missouri Constitution, prior to Amendment 2, provided prisoners any greater protection of religious liberty than federal law. Thus, there was no change in the law for prisoners, and absent a concrete injury, or even a hypothetical situation where religious liberty would be altered by the new amendment, the court had no controversy before it. The docket shows no sign of an appeal, so the opinion is presumably final.

Summary: Missouri prisoners filed a class-action lawsuit against the Missouri Department of Corrections challenging a state constitutional amendment. The challenged provision, Amendment 2, sought to limit Missouri prisoners' religious liberty to that protected by federal law. Judge Sachs dismissed the prisoners' complaint as moot and unripe because there was no change in the law for prisoners, and therefore, the court had no controversy before it.


On May 28, 2019, the County of Santa Clara, CA and various healthcare providers sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and various constitutional clauses in a Final Rule published on May 21, 2019. The Rule, which plaintiffs called the “Denial-of-Care” Rule, changed the way healthcare institutions must protect and accommodate healthcare providers’ religious objections to providing certain medical services. Represented by Lambda Legal, the Center for Reproductive Rights, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and Mayer Brown LLP, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to strike down the Rule as unlawful and unconstitutional, and enjoin Defendants from implementing and enforcing it. They also sought attorneys fees. This case was first assigned to Judge Nathanael M. Cousins and later reassigned to Judge William Alsup. Plaintiffs included the County of Santa Clara (as an owner of healthcare facilities); five private healthcare facilities that provided reproductive-health services and healthcare services for LGBT individuals; four individual physicians and a licensed counselor who worked for these entities; three national associations of medical professionals; and two organizations that provided a wide range of services to the LGBT community. They alleged that the rule endangered patients’ health in the name of advancing the religious beliefs of those who are entrusted with caring for them, elevating religious objections over all other interests and values. They noted that the rule expanded the types of healthcare workers that can decline to serve patients based on religious objections, expanded the types of activities that may be objected to, and failed to reconcile the objections with the needs and rights of patients. Their complaint contained ten separate causes of action, including three different APA violations (arbitrary and capricious, in excess of statutory authority, and not in accordance with other federal laws), as well as constitutional violations (Establishment Clause, Substantive Due Process/Right to Privacy and Personal Autonomy, Free Speech, and Equal Protection) brought by the non-County plaintiffs. Santa Clara County also alleged two violations independent from the other plaintiffs under the Spending Clause and Separation of Powers. On June 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction to enjoin the Rule. On June 13, 2019, the court issued an order relating two other Ninth Circuit cases challenging the same HHS rule to this case; the plaintiffs in both of the related cases had also filed motions for preliminary relief. Because one or more of the parties in these cases declined to consent to have a magistrate judge hear their cases, all three were randomly reassigned to District Court Judge William Alsup. On July 1, 2019, the court issued an order approving a stipulated request made by the parties. The order postponed the effective date of the Final Rule to November 22, 2019, and suspended the preliminary injunction motions. It also scheduled a summary judgment hearing for October 30, 2019. On July 8, the court issued an order granting all three cases’ parties’ Joint Administrative Motion for Relief from Automatic Referral to the Alternative Dispute Resolution Multi-Option Program, excusing them from mandatory participation. On August 21, 2019, HSS filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment. Following the hearing on October 30, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion of summary judgment and denied HHS's motion to dismiss on November 19, 2019. The court vacated the Rule for its discriminatory and unconstitutional scope. Specifically, the court found that some of the Rule's definitions extended the scope of its religious exemption beyond the text of underlying federal statutes that authorized conscience objections by healthcare workers. Final judgment was entered on January 8, 2020. 411 F.Supp. 3d 1001. HHS appealed the decision on March 6, 2020. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-15399 and is ongoing.

Summary: The County of Santa Clara and various healthcare providers sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on the grounds that HHS's Final Rule (published on May 21, 2019), violated the Administrative Procedure Act and various Constitutional clauses. The Rule changed the way healthcare institutions must protect and accommodate healthcare providers’ religious objections to providing certain medical services. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to strike down the Rule as unlawful and unconstitutional, and enjoin Defendants from implementing and enforcing it. On June 11, 2019, plaintiffs filed a motion for a nationwide preliminary injunction to enjoin the Rule and on August 21, 2019, HHS filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. After a hearing on October 30, 2019, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied HHS's motion to dismiss on November 19, 2019. The court vacated the Rule for its discriminatory and unconstitutional scope, and final judgment was entered on January 8, 2020. HHS appealed the decision on March 6, 2020. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-15399 and is ongoing.


On September 5, 2008, a non-profit immigrants rights organization and individual Latino residents of Sonoma County filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California, under § 1983, Bivens, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal Tort Claims Act and state tort law against the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging a violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Sheriff's Department and ICE had been illegally collaborating to stop and search people who appeared to be of Latino origin, interrogate them about their immigration status, and detain them in the county jail without informing them of what charges they were being held on, providing them with access to legal or consular services, or notifying them of their right to a hearing. On January 28, 2009, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, and on July 31 the Court (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) partly granted and partly denied their motion. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, 644 F.Supp.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The Court held that plaintiffs' Bivens claims were not subject to dismissal based on sovereign immunity and that plaintiffs had stated a claim under federal and state law for discrimination in programs that receive government funding, but also held that the regulations authorizing immigration officers to issue detainers to other law enforcement agencies were not invalid, that plaintiffs' claims for unlawful withholding and unreasonable delay of hearings was not cognizable under the APA, that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for conspiracy and that plaintiff's failure to comply with state law requirements precluded state tort claims. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on August 28, 2009 and again on September 14 to include federal tort claims. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on October 29. On March 10, 2010, the Court (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, C 08-4220 PJH, 2010 WL 841372 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2010). The Court held that ICE's interpretation of regulations allowing it to issue immigration detainers to initiate local custody of immigration detainers was reasonable, but withheld judgment on whether the defendants' implementation of those regulations and their use of immigration detainers violated the law, and did not dismiss any of plaintiffs' claims. On March 18, 2010, the case was reassigned to Judge Richard Seeborg, and defendants moved for reconsideration of Judge Hamilton's March 10 order. The Court (Judge Richard Seeborg) reaffirmed the order in all respects on June 11 and allowed the parties to proceed with discovery. Comm. for Immigrant Rights of Sonoma County v. County of Sonoma, C 08-4220 RS, 2010 WL 2465030 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2010). On July 15, 2011, plaintiffs came to a private settlement with the Sheriff's Department. The terms of the settlement required the Sheriff's Department to (1) pay damages ($3000 to one of the remaining individual plaintiffs and $5000 to the other), (2) change its policies on immigrations violations to, among other things, prohibit independent sweeps for such violations and not to alert ICE concerning people arrested for low level traffic violations unless the law so required, (3) change its booking procedures to include, among other things, alerting the consulates of non-citizens who had been arrested, (4) post information on the rights of non-citizens in its jails, and (5) give notice to plaintiffs of any changes to the above policies and procedures during over the following three years. Plaintiffs concluded a private settlement with ICE about six months later, on December 5, 2011. Under the settlement, ICE (1) affirmed its interim policy governing the use of immigration detainers, adopted in August 2010, which only allowed the use of detainers after another law enforcement agency had independently arrested a non-citizen for a criminal violation, (2) agreed to distribute the above policy to all of its agents, and three (3) agreed to post information on free legal counsel and on the rights and procedures of the immigration system in Sonoma County jails for a period of three years.

Summary: On September 5, 2008, a non-profit immigrants rights organization and three Latino residents of Sonoma County filed a lawsuit against the Sonoma County Sheriff's Department and the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), claiming that the Sheriff's Department and ICE had been illegally collaborating to stop, search, interrogate and detain people who appeared to be of Latino origin. The suit was settled in 2011, with one agreement requiring the Sheriff's Department to pay damages to individual plaintiffs and to change its policy on immigration violations and its booking procedure, and another agreement requiring ICE to affirm its amended policy limiting the use of immigration detainers.


This is a case brought by eight same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their marriages recognized by the State of Nevada. Represented by Lambda Legal and private counsel, they brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, suing the Governor and several clerks/recorders. The Nevada Constitution prohibited official recognition of same-sex marriages. See Nev. Const. art. I, § 21 ("Only a marriage between a male and female person shall be recognized and given effect in [Nevada]."). There was, however, a law offering "domestic partnership" status to two persons of any gender. Under Nev. Rev. Stat. ch. 122A, Nevada recognizes both out-of-state same-sex marriages and out-of-state same-sex marriage-like relationships as "domestic partnerships." A couple not having the status on the basis of an out-of-state partnership/marriage can enter into a Nevada domestic partnership after satisfying marriage-like eligibility requirements and filing with the Secretary of State a form declaring their decision "to share one another's lives in an intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring." By statute, Nevada gives domestic partners the same rights and responsibilities as spouses, except, most notably, that it "do[es] not require a public or private employer in this State to provide health care benefits to or for the domestic partner of an officer or employee." On November 26, 2012, Judge Robert Jones, of the District of Nevada, held the Nevada scheme constitutional. 911 F.Supp.2d 996. The Court first held that the Supreme Court's summary disposition in Baker v. Nelson was largely dispositive; in that case, the Supreme Court summarily dismissed an equal protection challenge to Minnesota's marriage laws for lack of a substantial federal question. In case the Court of Appeals disagreed with this approach, however, the District Court continued to address the issues on the merits. It found that the appropriate constitutional analysis was rational basis scrutiny, because the "homosexual-rights lobby" "has great political power." And applying rational basis review, the court held that Nevada's ban on same-sex marriage was rationally related to its legitimate goal of nurturing heterosexual marriage and families:
Should [marriage] be expanded to include same-sex couples with the state's imprimatur, it is conceivable that a meaningful percentage of heterosexual persons would cease to value the civil institution as highly as they previously had and hence enter into it less frequently, opting for purely private ceremonies, if any, whether religious or secular, but in any case without civil sanction, because they no longer wish to be associated with the civil institution as redefined, leading to an increased percentage of out-of-wedlock children, single-parent families, difficulties in property disputes after the dissolution of what amount to common law marriages in a state where such marriages are not recognized, or other unforeseen consequences."
 Accordingly, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit on December 4th, 2012. The 9th Circuit stayed the appeal while the DOMA and Perry cases were pending before the U.S. Supreme Court. On February 10, 2014, the Nevada Attorney General withdrew the state's brief defending the state's same-sex marriage ban because of a recent 9th Circuit case, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbot Laboratories, which established that laws making distinctions on sexual orientation faced heightened scrutiny. The state did not believe that the ban could survive this level of review. The 9th Circuit heard oral arguments, on September 8, 2014, before Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Ronald M. Gould, and Marsha S. Berzon. On October 7, the 9th Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Nevada's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional. The next day, the Supreme Court (Justice Anthony Kennedy) initially stayed the 9th Circuit's decision. Later in the day, Justice Kennedy reversed himself and lifted the stay as it applied to the state of Nevada. On October 9, 2014, the Nevada District Court (Judge James Mahan) granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction preventing the state from enforcing its same-sex marriage ban in light of the 9th Circuit's decision, and the state began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. On October 13, 2014, appellee Coalition for the Protection of Marriage filed a petition for an en banc rehearing, and on January 9, 2015 the court issued an order denying rehearing. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is a case brought by eight same-sex couples seeking to marry or have their marriages recognized by the State of Nevada. On November 26, 2012, Judge Robert Jones rejected their claim. On Oct. 7, the 9th Circuit overturned the district court's decision and held that Nevada's denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples was unconstitutional.


On August 7, 2013, several residents of New York City filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment Constitutional violations. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief in addition to compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the New York Police Department ("NYPD") operation known as "Operation Lucky Bag" resulted in systematic unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the U.S. Constitution and other state laws. Operation Lucky Bag involved NYPD officers leaving bags containing valuable items unattended and in plain sight. The officers waited for individuals to pick up the bag or valuable item and then arrest those individuals under the assumption that they intended to keep the items. The plaintiffs alleged that these incidents represented arrest without probable cause in violation of their right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. On December 24, 2013, the City filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in their complaint. They raised that the officers would be protected by qualified immunity and, in the alternative, the municipality would not be liable under <i>Monell</i> without proof of an official pattern or practice. The plaintiffs pursued court-supervised discovery to prove that Operation Lucky Bag was an official custom within the department. Meanwhile, settlement discussions ensued such that the court never ruled on the motion to dismiss. On September 16, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement. In the agreement, the defendants agreed to amend Operation Lucky Bag so that arrests would only be made in the following instances: (i) when the valuables are separated from the other property and that remaining property is discarded, (ii) where property is removed from someone else's belongings, or (iii) an individual, having taken property and been confronted by a police officer, lies about having taken the property. The defendants further agreed to train NYPD officers on these criteria and report to the plaintiffs' counsel on compliance while subject to the District Court's jurisdiction for one year. In addition, the defendants agreed to pay the named plaintiffs $50,000 and to pay all attorneys' fees and costs associated with the action (it is unclear from the docket how much the defendants paid in attorneys' fees and costs). In return, the plaintiffs released the defendants from all liability arising from the facts of the lawsuit. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 7, 2013, several residents of New York City filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the City of New York alleging that a NYPD operation known as Operation Lucky Bag violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Operation Lucky Bag consisted of leaving valuable items unattended and in plain sight, waiting for individuals to pick up the items, and then arresting them under the belief that the individual intended to keep the items. On September 16, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement providing for amendments to Operation Lucky Bag procedures, regular compliance reports to plaintiffs' counsel, attorneys' fees, and damages to named plaintiffs totalling $50,000.00.


On September 30, 2004, the United States Department of Justice (D.O.J.) filed a lawsuit under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. (Title VII) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York City Transit Authority. The D.O.J. asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants had violated Title VII by discriminating against Muslim and Sikh employees because of their religion. Muslim and Sikh individuals are required by their religion to wear head coverings. The defendants demanded that Muslim and Sikh employees remove their head coverings or cover them with an employer issued hat. The uniform policy provided that employer-issued hats were optional or that non-employer issued hats were prohibited. When the Muslim and Sikh employees refused to cover or remove their head coverings, they were transferred to assignments with no passenger contact. The complaint alleges that the defendants discriminated because of religion by (1) selectively enforcing uniform policies regarding employer issued hats to target Muslim and Sikh employees who are required by their religion to wear head coverings; (2) taking adverse employment action against Muslim and Sikh employees because of their religious obligation to wear head coverings; (3) failing or refusing to reasonably accommodate sincerely held religious beliefs; and (4) failing or refusing to take appropriate action to remedy the discriminatory effects of the policies and practices. This case has been consolidated with five other lawsuits filed by individual employees of the defendants alleging discrimination because of religion. Those cases are: (1) Small v. New York City Transit Authority (1:03-cv-02139), (2) Muhammad v. New York City Transit Authority (1:04-cv-02294), (3) Lewis v. New York City Transit Authority (1:04-cv-02331), (4) Harrington v. Reuter (1:05-cv-03341), and (5) Singh v. New York City Transit Authority (1:05-cv-05477). The individual employees in each of these cases are Sikh or Muslim and allege discrimination because of their refusal to cover their religious head coverings with an employer issued hat, remove their religious head coverings, or emblazon their religious head coverings with the employer logo. The plaintiffs in Small, Muhammad, and Lewis are Muslim women further allege discrimination because of gender. (The defendants permitted Muslim men to wear their religious head coverings uncovered and un-emblazoned.) The parties engaged in protracted discovery disputes, but on May 30, 2012 entered into a settlement agreement. Under it, the MTA will permit any religious headgear, so long as it is blue, and that it will pay $184,500 to eight current or former employees who had been denied religious accommodations under the old policy.

Summary:
This is the lead case of a number of consolidated cases in which Muslim and Sikh employees of the New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority and the New York City Transit Authority claimed they were being discriminated against because the Authority refused to allow them to wear their religious head coverings without also wearing an MTA logo or hat. Employees who refused were reassigned to positions in which they would have no contact with the public.

After years of litigation, the parties settled the case on May 30, 2012 with the defendants agreeing to change their policy, and to pay eight plaintiffs $184,500.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 24, 2020, nine detainees at the Los Angeles County detention centers and a coalition of activists filed a class-action seeking adequate safety conditions at the Los Angeles County detention centers. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus, declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a temporary restraining order. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, without stating a reason; the case is presumed closed. <hr> On April 24, 2020, nine detainees at the Los Angeles County detention centers and a coalition of activists filed this putative class-action addressing the conditions of confinement at the Los Angeles County (LACJ) in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a declaratory action under § 2201, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they alleged that the Los Angeles County jails lacked reasonable safety precautions necessary to mitigate heightened health risks posed by COVID-19 in violation of the detainees’ Fourteenth and Eight Amendment rights, including some limited releases. The plaintiffs further alleged that the respondents’ failure to accommodate was discriminatory, which violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Disabled Persons Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and a writ of habeas corpus mandating the immediate release of all individuals older than 55 and those with medical conditions. Additionally, the petitioners sought class-wide relief requiring compliance with the safety guidelines by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the California Department of Public Health. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and an expedited review of the petition. The plaintiffs were represented by the Civil Rights Corps, a UCLA Law clinic, the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, and private attorneys. The case was assigned to Judge Dean D. Pregerson, then reassigned to Judge Dolly M Gee, who self-recused. On April 25, the case was reassigned to Judge R. Gary Klausner for further proceedings. The plaintiff’s proposed class of those currently and to be held by the LACJ during the pandemic included the “Pretrial Equitable Relief Class” and “Post-Conviction Equitable Relief Class.” They were further subdivided into the “Pretrial Medically Vulnerable Subclass” and “Post-Conviction Medically Vulnerable Subclass,” both identified as medically vulnerable due to age or underlying health conditions. Concurrently, the plaintiffs sought a TRO (temporary restraining order) and preliminary injunction requesting the release of the medically vulnerable subclass on non-monetary bail conditions. On April 27, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiff’s motion for TRO, because the inmates had not exhausted other avenues available to them, which they claimed was required under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. That same day, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, with no further details available from the docket. The case is presumed closed.

Summary: On April 24, 2020, nine detainees at the Los Angeles County detention centers filed this federal class-action in the Central District of California seeking improved safety conditions at the Los Angeles County detention centers, and some releases. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, without stating a reason; the case is presumed closed.


This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge the City's anti-immigrant housing law, Ordinance 2892. See IM-TX-0001, IM-TX-0003 and IM-TX-0004. This case and two others filed in federal court, Vazquez v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0001) and Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0003), were assigned to District Court Judge Sam A. Lindsay, and on April 18, 2007, were consolidated under lead case Villas at Parkside Partners (IM-TX-0003). Note that during the course of the litigation for the consolidated action, Farmers Branch moved to dismiss the claims of the Barrientos plaintiffs. On June 1, 2007, the District Court (Judge Lindsay) granted Farmers Branch's motion and dismissed the Barrientos plaintiffs' complaint for lack of standing. The Court reasoned that since the Barrientos plaintiffs operated retail businesses in Farmers Branch and were not tenants or property owners, the Ordinance didn't have any direct effect on them. As such, they had no standing to challenge the Ordinance. Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 245 F.R.D. 551 (N.D. Tex. 2007). Litigation on the claims of the other plaintiffs continued, and on August 29, 2008, the Court issued a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of Ordinance 2903, the law's second iteration. See IM-TX-0003 for a more detailed accounting of developments following the consolidation. As of November 2018, nothing further has happened in this docket and this case is presumably closed.

Summary: This case is one of four lawsuits filed against the City of Farmers Branch, Texas, to challenge the City's anti-immigrant housing law, Ordinance 2892. See IM-TX-0001, IM-TX-0003 and IM-TX-0004. This case and two others filed in federal court, Vazquez v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0001) and Villas at Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch (IM-TX-0003), were assigned to District Court Judge Sam A. Lindsay, and on April 18, 2007, were consolidated under lead case Villas at Parkside Partners (IM-TX-0003). See IM-TX-0003 for subsequent developments.


This case was about U.S. immigration and family reunification policies. A group of Honduran and Guatemalan minors, guardians, and sponsors filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on July 20, 2018. Plaintiffs sued the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (SVJC), Youth for Tomorrow, and other contractors supporting immigration enforcement under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), 8 U.S.C. § 1232, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551. Plaintiffs also petitioned for writs of habeas corpus. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ separation of children from their families for extended periods of time violated their statutory and constitutional rights. This was based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by ORR and CBP on April 13, 2021. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the Legal Aid Justice Center, Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel. Relief sought included declaratory relief and the immediate release of unlawfully detained children. District Judge Leonie M. Brinkema was assigned. Plaintiffs raised six claims against the defendants. The first three claims related to the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s procedures regarding family reunification applications. These procedures allegedly violated plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, procedural due process rights, and the TVPRA. The next two claims related to ORR’s policy of requesting biological and biometric information from family members seeking reunification. This allegedly violated the APA for failure to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking and for being arbitrary and capricious. The final claim was seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241(c). Minor plaintiffs had all fled their home countries for fear of persecution or after the death of a family member. They were apprehended by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. Two of the four minor plaintiffs were separated from siblings who had fled with them. The other two plaintiffs were placed in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement; one was sent to Youth for Tomorrow and one was transferred to the Wal-Mart-turned-detention-center SVJC. All plaintiffs were held for six months or more before being reunited with their families. Plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint and a motion to seal on August 16, 2018. This motion was granted, which means that many of the files related to this case, including the initial complaint, additional complaints, and several motions, are unavailable for public access. The information in this summary comes from those filings that are publicly available. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim on September 21, 2018. This was granted in part and denied in part on November 15, 2018. The court dismissed as moot the claims of three individual plaintiffs who had, at the time of the motion, been released from ORR’s custody, and also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss regarding the substantive due process claims. However, the court denied defendants’ motion with regards to the APA claims, the TVPRA claim, and their procedural due process claims. 352 F. Supp. 3d 559. On February 22, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint, and on March 4, filed a motion for class certification. On March 14, the defendants again filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted five days later regarding the “individual” claims of all the plaintiffs. The docket did not specify exactly which claims were “individual,” but at least some claims were not individual claims because the case continued. The court certified two classes on April 26, 2019. The first class was for minors (including all children designated as unaccompanied undocumented minors in ORR’s custody). The second class was for sponsors (including those who had applied to sponsor a minor to whom the minor had not been released). The parties conducted discovery over the following months. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment on September 16 and October 16, 2019, respectively. Plaintiffs then moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) on May 6, 2020. Two days later, the proposed TRO was denied without prejudice. (The court’s reasons for the denial were not presented in the order. Instead, the court’s reasoning was stated during a telephone conference with parties. Unfortunately, both the transcript for this conference and other materials concerning the TRO were either sealed or otherwise not publicly available.) The court ordered that both the plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment be held in abeyance on March 17, 2021. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security had replaced the April 2018 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of which ORR and CBP were signatories. This MOA was the central part of this case. The court paused the motions so parties had time to respond. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, individual minor plaintiffs from Honduras and Guatemala sued the Office of Refugee Resettlement, US Customs and Border Protection, and the directors of two juvenile detention centers. They filed writs of habeas corpus and alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and due process rights. The claims of individual plaintiffs were dismissed as they were released from custody. However, the court certified two classes of detained minors and sponsors. This case is ongoing.