COVID-19 Summary: This case, initially being tracked by the Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, was filed by plaintiffs who sought to place a constitutional amendment on the Arkansas ballot. They alleged that Arkansas’s ballot access requirements were unconstitutional as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic and sought injunctive relief. The district court granted a preliminary injunction for the in-person signature and notarization requirements, which it later made permanent. The defendants appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief.
 This is a case about the constitutionality of Arkansas’ ballot access requirements as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs were a registered Arkansas ballot access committee, a committee canvasser, and two registered Arkansas voters who sought to place a constitutional amendment on the Arkansas ballot. On April 22, 2020, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Arkansas. They sued Arkansas’ Secretary of State, alleging that enforcement of Arkansas’ ballot access provisions during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The challenged provisions included requirements that petition canvassers attach to the petition a notarized affidavit affirming that all the petition signatures were made in the presence of the canvasser. They sought injunctive relief to prohibit Arkansas from enforcing the in-person signature and notarization requirement and to change the ballot access deadline, the number of required signatures, and the permissibility of electronic signatures. The case was assigned to Judge Paul Kinloch Holmes III. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on the same day the suit was filed. Two days later, on April 24, 2020, they filed a motion to expedite briefing on the motion for preliminary injunction, which the court denied in part and granted it in part. On May 25, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction in part, enjoining the enforcement of the in-person signature and notarization requirements. The court held that the plaintiffs had made sufficient showing that these requirements substantially restricted political discussion; as such, that showing required the court to apply a heightened level of scrutiny. However, the court did not find that the plaintiffs had made the same showing with regard to the ballot access deadline and the other signature requirements. Because these claims did not trigger heightened scrutiny, they were not likely to succeed on the merits, as required for a preliminary injunction. 462 F.Supp.3d 930. Prior to the court granting the preliminary injunction, on May 12, 2020, the defendant moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. Subsequently, the court denied this motion as moot on May 29, 2020. On the same day, the court ordered that the preliminary injunction for the plaintiffs would be made permanent. 2020 WL 6603171. As a result of these judgments, the defendants appealed to the Eighth Circuit on June 1, 2020 (20-2095). Alongside the appeal, the defendants moved the court to stay the case pending the appeal, which the district court denied on June 2, 2020. 2020 WL 2850223. On July 23, 2020, the Eighth Circuit issued an opinion reversing the District Court’s grant of permanent injunctive relief. Judges Gruender, Wollman, and Grasz held that the in-person signature and notarization requirements did not substantially restrict political discussion or sufficiently burden the First Amendment. As a result, it found that the lower court erred in applying a heightened standard of review to these requirements and the plaintiffs’ claims failed on the merits. 967 F.3d 727. As of April 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2020, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Arkansas against the Secretary of State of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that the state’s ballot access provisions were unconstitutional as applied during the COVID-19 pandemic and violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary judgment in part, enjoining the in-person signature and notarization requirements. It later made this injunction permanent. The defendants appealed the case to the Eighth Circuit, which reversed the District Court’s judgment and grant of permanent injunctive relief.


On Aug. 11, 2011, one U.S. citizen and one lawful permanent resident, held by law enforcement agencies (LEAs), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by private counsel and the National Immigrant Justice Center, plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security, including its component, U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE). Both plaintiffs were detained by LEAs on criminal charges and held based on ICE detainers. Plaintiffs alleged that ICE did not have legal authority to issue immigration detainers in such circumstances. Plaintiffs argued that ICE’s assertion of authority to instruct federal, state, and local LEAs to continue the detention of individuals was a violation of ICE’s statutory authority under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Amendments. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge John Z. Lee. During the course of litigation, ICE had rescinded plaintiffs’ detainers. On Nov. 30, 2012, Judge Lee issued an order denying defendants’ motion to dismiss. Judge Lee found that plaintiffs had standing because detainers had been issued on them at the time they filed their complaint; and that plaintiffs’ claim was not moot when filed, because they did not know how long the detainers would last, and because plaintiff’s proposed class would likely be subject to the same uncertainty. Plaintiffs had moved for class certification, but Judge Lee denied the motion without prejudice on Feb. 14, 2013, on the grounds that the motion was premature. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 1, 2013. This complaint added a habeas petition. Plaintiffs then re-filed their class certification motion on June 21, 2013, and Judge Lee on Sept. 30, 2014 granted it in part, toward any current or future individual in the Chicago Area of Responsibility whom ICE ordered LEAs to detain in excess of their authority without presenting charging documents. On Aug. 2, 2013, defendants had filed a motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs’ INA and Tenth Amendment claims. On Sept. 29, 2014, Judge Lee granted the motion regarding the Tenth Amendment and denied it toward the INA claims. Some efforts were made to settle the case, but they didn't pan out. Instead, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the INA claims on Dec. 11, 2015, and defendants moved on Dec. 31, 2015 to decertify the plaintiff class. On Sept. 30, 2016, Judge Lee granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied defendants’ motion to decertify the plaintiff class. Judge Lee agreed with plaintiffs’ statutory claim that, under the INA and APA, ICE exceeded its authority by issuing detainers with no warrant and no determination that subjects were likely to escape before a warrant could be obtained. Judge Lee did not however reach plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Furthermore, Judge Lee ruled against decertifying the plaintiff class, because ICE continued to issue warrantless detainers on individuals in the class. Defendants then moved to stay Judge Lee’s Sept. 30, 2016 judgment pending its decision whether or not to appeal. Judge Lee granted this motion on Oct. 7. Apparently the government decided against appeal, however, and on Nov. 28, 2016, Judge Lee issued a judgment. First, Judge Lee declared null and void the detainers already issued on the plaintiffs and the plaintiff class. Next, Judge Lee ordered defendants to promptly provide notice of the judgment to every LEA that might have housed a member of the plaintiff class, and in 30 days to report to the court the status of defendants’ compliance. Finally, Judge Lee permanently enjoined defendants from issuing detainers from their Chicago Field Office (which oversees the area of responsibility consisting of Illinois, Indiana, Wisconsin, Missouri, Kentucky, and Kansas), except where defendants had probable cause that the individual was a removable noncitizen, as well as either had obtained a warrant or had reason to believe that the individual would escape before a warrant could be obtained. The court then terminated the case on Nov. 28, 2016. However, on Dec. 27, 2016, plaintiffs moved to alter or amend the judgment. Plaintiffs saw the judgment as too narrow to protect plaintiffs or the class from continued and future injury. Plaintiffs asked the court to expand the scope of injunction beyond just the Chicago Field Office, because ICE continued to issue detainers elsewhere. Additionally, plaintiffs asked the court to narrow the permitted exception to the injunction, requiring that defendants both obtain and serve (not simply obtain) a warrant in order to issue a detainer. Judge Lee held a Jan. 11, 2017 hearing on plaintiffs’ Dec. 27, 2016 motion. At the hearing, he denied plaintiffs’ request regarding class certification, though he explained his reasoning only in the hearing and not in a written opinion. Judge Lee then ordered defendants to respond to the other part of plaintiffs’ motion, which they did on Jan. 25, 2017. Finally, on Feb. 14, 2017, Judge Lee denied plaintiffs’ motion entirely. Addressing the second part of the motion, he rejected plaintiffs’ request to require ICE to serve warrants before issuing detainers, finding that no authority supported this service requirement. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2011, individuals being held by law enforcement agencies ("LEAs") filed a lawsuit against the Department of Homeland Security challenging ICE's authority to instruct LEAs to continue the detention of individuals in order to investigate their immigration status. Plaintiffs argued that this practice violates ICE's statutory authority under the APA and INA. In 2016, the court issued a judgment permanently enjoining ICE from issuing detainers from its Chicago Field Office, except where it has probable cause to believe an individual is a removable noncitizen as well as has obtained a warrant or has reason to believe the individual would escape before a warrant can be obtained. The court rejected plaintiffs' requests to broaden the scope of relief. This case was terminated on Nov. 28, 2016.


This is a case about a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request concerning the Department of Justice's role in requesting to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census. On December 12, 2018, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552, <i>et seq.</i>). Prior to the litigation, the plaintiff had sent a FOIA request seeking records to which the DOJ had not responded. The plaintiff then sought to compel the DOJ to disclose the requested records in addition to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the DOJ violated FOIA by failing to (1) conduct an adequate search for responsive records, (2) provide all non-exempt records responsive to the FOIA request, and (3) determine whether to comply with the request within 30 business days. The case was assigned to Judge Alison J. Nathan. On May 13, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on June 10. Regarding these two motions, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on May 29, 2020. The court found that the DOJ failed to show its search was adequate with respect to any subpart of the FOIA request, and ordered the DOJ to conduct an adequate search. On June 30, 2020, the court granted the plaintiff's request to keep the case open and require the parties to make status reports about the production of documents to the court every two months. This case is ongoing.

Summary: This is a case about a FOIA request concerning the Department of Justice's role in requesting to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census. On December 12, 2018, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against the Department of Justice. The plaintiff sought to compel the DOJ to disclose the requested records in addition to injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the DOJ violated FOIA by failing to adequately respond to the FOIA request. On May 29, 2020, the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and granted the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, ordering the DOJ to conduct an adequate search. This case is ongoing.


On June 13, 2012, three minors and one adult in the custody of the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice (OJJ) filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued OJJ and three OJJ detention centers (the Bridge City, Jetson, and Swanson Centers for Youth) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by Families and Friends of Louisiana's Incarcerated Children and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants denied them access to counsel in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that OJJ officials obstructed or prevented meetings and communications with counsel and intimidated the plaintiffs so they would not contact counsel. The plaintiffs in this case alleged that OJJ had failed to comply with the access to counsel terms of a prior settlement agreement from 2000. The prior settlement, entered on August 31, 2000 between a class of juvenile plaintiffs, the Department of Justice, and the State of Louisiana had required the OJJ to provide access to counsel for juveniles under its care. See United States v. Louisiana. Under the settlement, Louisiana agreed to provide meaningful access to methods for contacting counsel, such as telephone and mail access. The State agreed to maintain the confidentiality of these communications. Louisiana also agreed to fund three new staff attorney positions for the Louisiana Indigent Defense Assistance Board and to provide juveniles' records to the juveniles' attorneys in a timely fashion. The 2000 settlement agreement also mandated changes to staffing in OJJ facilities, reporting procedures for physical and sexual abuse, increased protections for detained juveniles' physical and mental health, and the creation of a Youth Programs Compliance Division. A later settlement agreement, signed in 2004, reaffirmed the importance of juveniles' access to attorneys, though it terminated other parts of the 2000 settlement agreement. In this case, the plaintiffs quickly moved for a preliminary injunction, but District Judge Carl Barbier decided not to consider the plaintiffs’ request until the defendants responded to the complaint. The defendants’ response consisted of a motion to dismiss or change venue; around the same time the plaintiffs moved for class certification. On October 31, 2012, District Judge Carl Barbier granted the defendants’ motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. Judge Barbier noted that the defendants and evidence were concentrated in the Middle District and that the case largely overlapped with Williams v. McKeithen, a case in the Middle District from 2000 raising similar claims. 2012 WL 13001042. (That case was later consolidated into United States v. Louisiana, which ended with the 2000 Settlement Agreement mentioned above.) The case was transferred and assigned to Chief District Judge Brian Jackson on October 31, 2012. Judge Brian Jackson dismissed the plaintiff's complaint for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction on April 8, 2013. Specifically, the court believed that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged that they would be able to pursue non-frivolous legal claims if barriers to court access were removed. The plaintiffs requested that Judge Jackson reconsider this dismissal, and the court reversed its prior judgment a little less than a year later, on March 31, 2014. The court found that the incorrect legal standard had been applied in its earlier analysis and that the court had incorrectly looked beyond the question of subject matter jurisdiction when it dismissed the complaint. 2014 WL 1328000. The defendants appealed Judge Jackson's ruling. On April 30, 2014 -- before the 5th Circuit had heard arguments on the motion to reconsider -- the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss, which was granted on May 1, 2014. The Clearinghouse does not know if the parties settled outside of court, but there has been no further activity on the docket, and the case is likely now closed.

Summary: Families and Friends of Louisiana's Incarcerated Children and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana brought this putative class action lawsuit on June 13, 2012 on behalf of children in custody of the Office of Juvenile Justice. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claimed they were systematically denied access to courts, their family and advocates. After the case was transferred to the Middle District of Louisiana and District Judge Brian Jackson found the court had subject matter jurisdiction over the claims, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss that was granted on May 1, 2014.


On October 31, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The U.S. sued the State of South Carolina under the Supremacy Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act, seeking an injunction barring the enforcement of South Carolina's recently passed immigration bill, Act 69. Specifically, the federal government challenged Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Act 69. These sections required state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stopped, detained, or arrested whenever they had a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual lacked immigration status. They further allowed law enforcement officers to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents and made it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported if one is an undocumented immigrant. The government also challenged Section 15, which made it a crime to create or repeatedly use a false identification. (In passing Act 69, South Carolina joined Utah, Indiana, Georgia and Alabama in enacting immigration laws similar to Arizona's Senate Bill 1070. For the case challenging the Arizona law, see United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015); for the case challenging Utah's HB 497, see Utah Coalition of La Raza v. Herbert (IM-UT-0002); for the case challenging Indiana's SEA 590, see Buquer v. City of Indianapolis (IM-IN-0002); for the case challenging Georgia's HB 87, see Georgia Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal (IM-GA-0007); and for cases challenging Alabama's HB 56, see United States v. Alabama (IM-AL-0005), Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Bentley (IM-AL-0006), and Parsley v. Bentley (IM-AL-0007).) After a joint hearing on motions for summary judgment by the Department of Justice and by private plaintiffs in Lowcountry Immigration Coalition v. Haley (IM-SC-0001), on December 22, 2011, United States District Judge Richard M. Gergel issued an order in large part granting both motions. United States v. South Carolina, No. 2:11-cv-02958, 2011 WL 6973241, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151549 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2011). The court enjoined Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Act, but declined to enjoin Section 15, as it found that the federal government had not made a clear showing it would suffer irreparable harm if the section were enforced. The State appealed to the Fourth Circuit, which stayed the case until the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Arizona (IM-AZ-0015), which dealt with a very similar statute in Arizona. In June 2012, the Supreme Court struck down much of the Arizona statute, but declined to facially review the "show me your papers" provision. 132 S.Ct. 2492 (2012). Shortly thereafter, the Court of Appeals issued a "limited remand" in this matter, directing the district court to decide in the first instance if its order should be adjusted in light of the Supreme Court's Arizona opinion. On November 26, 2012, the district court left in place most of its prior preliminary injunction, against the sections of the law that aimed to criminalize unlawful presence and giving a ride or renting an apartment to an undocumented immigrant. But the district court followed the Supreme Court's lead on the "show me your papers" provision. It noted: "This litigation is only at the preliminary injunction stage, and this Court's decision to dissolve the injunction regarding these status-checking provisions does not foreclose a future as-applied challenge based upon subsequent factual and legal developments. In the course of this litigation, the parties will have the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding the actual practices and procedures associated with the implementation of Sections 6(A) and 6(C)(1), and this Court can then address these issues with the benefit of a full record." On December 7, 2012, the State filed an interlocutory appeal of the District Court's preliminary injunction. On July 23, 3013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. Litigation then continued at the district court and the parties began settlement discussions. On March 4, 2015, Judge Gergel permanently enjoined the State from implementing Sections 4, 5, 6(B)(2), and 15 of South Carolina's Act 69. He further noted that the Department of Justice had agreed to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice their remaining claims as to Sections 6 and 7 based on the State's specified interpretations of these sections. The parties then began litigation over attorney's fees, but no further action has been taken since June 6, 2014. The case appears closed.

Summary: This is a challenge brought by the federal government to the constitutionality of a South Carolina immigration law which requires state and local law enforcement officers to investigate the immigration status of any individual they stop, detain, or arrest whenever they have a "reasonable suspicion" that the individual lacks immigration status, allows law enforcement officers to arrest individuals solely for failing to carry registration documents, makes it a crime to harbor or transport an undocumented immigrant or to be harbored or transported by others if one is an undocumented immigrant, and imposes civil liability on the police for failing to enforce its provisions to the maximum extent possible. The law was patterned after Arizona's SB 1070. In December 2011, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the law; this was reaffirmed in major part in November 2012, after the Supreme Court addressed the similar Arizona statute in United States v. Arizona. On March 4, 2015, Judge Gergel permanently enjoined the State from implementing Sections 4, 5, 6(B)(2), and 15 of South Carolina's Act 69.


On April 8, 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent a findings letter to New Jersey's governor, advising him of the results of a May-June 2002, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the New Lisbon Developmental Center (NLDC), which houses people with developmental disabilities, with intellectual disabilities that ranged from mild to profound. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. Based on a site visit and document review, and despite the state's recent efforts to improve, DOJ advised that its investigation found continuing deficiencies in resident care at NLDC; conditions and services there substantially departed from generally accepted standards of care, and violated both constitutional and federal statutory rights of residents. According to the findings letter, deficiencies existed in five topic areas, causing residents significant harm or risk of harm through NLDC's failure to: (1) keep residents safe (e.g., residents subjected to neglect, physical and verbal abuse; disproportionate number of unexplained injuries; facility's systematic reductions in penalties for abuse fostered atmosphere where abuse and neglect were tolerated); (2) provide residents with adequate psychological, behavioral, and psychiatric services (e.g., inadequate, non-individualized behavior programs and functional analysis of problem behaviors, including a failure to sufficiently incorporate positive reinforcement and health concerns in plans; inconsistent program implementation, monitoring, and follow-up; poor staff training and plan revision; unreasonable, excessive, and insufficiently-recorded use of restraints, padded helmets, and medications or manual contact for control; inadequate psychiatric staffing; failure to employ data-based decision-making; psychotropic polypharmacy without strong justification and intense oversight); (3) provide adequate habilitation services and supports to residents (e.g., lack of skills training objectives or of person-centered planning; plans that are not comprehensive, holistic, or the product of an interdisciplinary process, and which lack measurable outcomes or specificity in services; inconsistent plan implementation; poorly-trained staff which seldom engaged residents or collected/recorded adequate data to permit evaluation and improvement; insufficient training, vocational, and work opportunities for residents who would benefit from such services); (4) provide adequate health care (failure to meet needs of residents with bowel obstructions and nutritional and physical management concerns; inadequate neurological services for residents with seizure disorders; over-obligated physicians; substandard mealtime, positioning, and seating assistance and assessments; occupational, physical, and communication therapy inadequacies; unacceptable oral hygiene); and (5) provide services to NLDC residents in the most integrated setting appropriate to the residents' needs, as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; 28 C.F.R § 35.130(d). As to this latter category, DOJ observed slow and poorly-funded transitions resulting from a NLDC process inadequate to identify appropriate individuals for community placement. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all five of the categories, and outlined proposed remedial measures, and warned the state that, absent resolution of federal concerns, the DOJ would file a CRIPA lawsuit to compel correction of the identified deficiencies at NLDC. On August 2, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against New Jersey and its officials responsible for operation of the NLDC and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter setting out numerous remedial measures to be taken by the state in response to the deficiencies existing at NLDC. The lawsuit, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, set out that the state had violated NLDC violated residents' Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101 et seq., and the ADA's implementing regulations, 28 C.F.R. Part 35. The settlement obligated the state to ensure, and to periodically report upon its progress in ensuring, improvements that would bring the facilities up to generally accepted professional standards of care. The agreement provided that Elin Howe would be appointed as Compliance Monitor, with the ability to use independent consultants funded by the state. The monitor would also be state-funded, with total monitor-and-consultant costs capped at $200,000 per year, except added funds would be available for abuse, neglect, or death-related monitoring/reporting). She was required to periodically report, pursuant to an attached protocol, upon the state's compliance with obligations imposed by the agreement. After four years, the agreement would automatically terminate, unless extended through agreement of the parties or terminated earlier due to substantial compliance being achieved. The settlement also allowed for the United States, if it had cause to believe conditions threatened the immediate health and safety of NLDC residents (and at any time in the final six months of the agreement) to conduct compliance reviews, with facility inspections and interviews of staff and residents, and to fully access and review relevant documents. District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., approved the settlement on August 5, 2004, and issued an unpublished order which granted the parties' request to conditionally dismiss the case. On June 13, 2008, the parties agreed to a one-year extension of the settlement agreement. On August 21, 2009, the court signed an order of final dismissal in the case.

Summary: On August 2, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, DOJ simultaneously filed a CRIPA complaint against New Jersey and its officials responsible for operation of the NLDC and tendered a settlement agreement between the parties, the latter setting out numerous remedial measures to be taken by the state in response to the deficiencies existing at the New Lisbon Developmental Center. The settlement agreement was extended until 2009, when the case was closed.


This suit was filed on May 27, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. The suit was brought by several individual plaintiffs as well as the League of Women Voters of Kentucky, the Louisville Urban League, and the Kentucky Conference of NAACP Branches. They were represented by lawyers from ACLU National, ACLU of Kentucky Foundation, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private counsel. They brought this suit against Kentucky Secretary of State Michael Adams, Governor Andrew Beshear, and the Chairman of the Kentucky Board of Elections Albert Benjamin Chandler. The suit focused on two Kentucky election laws in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic. One was a requirement that to vote absentee a voter needed to have a valid excuse as to why they would not be able to get to the polls in person (the Excuse Requirement). The plaintiffs argued that for some voters, the risk of contracting the virus while at the polls would discourage them from exercising their right to vote. If they could vote absentee, that would grant them the power to vote while staying safe at home. The second election law that was challenged required Kentucky voters to present photo identification when voting, either in-person or absentee (the Photo ID Requirement). The complaint argued that this requirement was simply impossible for many would-be voters, given that many of the offices that issue ID's were closed due to the pandemic. Underlying the plaintiffs' argument with respect to both of these requirements was the claim that the laws would disproportionately disenfranchise black voters. The plaintiffs argued that, at least within the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the laws violated the right to vote guaranteed by the First Amendment ad the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief in the form of preliminary and permanent injunctions that would prohibit the defendants from enforcing the two laws, and also force defendants to administer the November 3 general election in the same way that they would administer the June 23 primary election. The case was assigned to Senior Judge Charles R. Simpson. On June 19, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the case as the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the plaintiffs had not submitted a claim upon which relief could be granted. They claimed that, while they sympathized with the plaintiffs' views, that the court should not be in the business of constraining the state's election laws, especially at a time where greater flexibility was required in addressing the pandemic. They also argued that there was no discriminatory intent behind either law, and that the plaintiffs had not suffered an injury in fact. Ten days later, the Secretary of State filed an answer, denying the plaintiffs' allegations and likewise arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and had failed to raise a claim upon which relief could be granted. He also argued that they failed to join indispensable parties and that the assertions raised in the complaint were political questions. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on July 10, 2020. In arguing for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs claimed that the Excuse Requirement and the Photo ID Requirement, while perhaps legitimate under normal conditions, unconstitutionally required voters to choose between their right to vote and their safety. On the same day, the Commonwealth of Kentucky ex rel. Attorney General Daniel Cameron filed a motion to intervene as a defendant. The case is ongoing as of August 10, 2020.

Summary: This case was brought by several individual plaintiffs, the League of Women Voters of Kentucky, the Louisville Urban League, and the Kentucky Conference of the NAACP Branches against Kentucky Governor Andrew Beshear, the Kentucky Secretary of State Michael Adams, and the Chairman of the Kentucky Board of Elections Albert Benjamin Chandler. They argued that two requirements to voting, a photo ID requirement and a requirement mandating a valid excuse to vote absentee, were unconstitutional at least within the context of the 2020 COVID pandemic. They argued that the election laws forced voters to choose between their health and their right to vote. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case is ongoing as of August 10, 2020


On February 25, 2011, plaintiff, an inmate at the California Men's Colony Correctional Facility ("CMC") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation in his official capacity and the Warden of the California Men's Colony, in her official and individual capacities. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing the CMC's grooming policy, claiming that the policy violated his rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLIUPA"). Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that as an individual who has practiced Sikhism his entire life, including adhering to the requirement of keeping Kesh by not shaving his beard or cutting his hair, the grooming policy and subsequent disciplinary sanctions violated his rights under RLIUPA. The plaintiff filed motion for a preliminary injunction on March 3, 2011, which was continued throughout the case until settlement. On March 15, 2011, the United States of American filed a motion to intervene, pursuant to RLIUPA, which granted the United States the authority to intervene in or bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to enforce RLIUPA. On May 15, 2013, the parties filed a stipulated agreement to dismiss the case. The stipulated agreement established that the defendants would not discipline plaintiff under Title 15 California Code of Regulations section 3062(h); that defendants would expunge the plaintiff's record of any discipline imposed for violations of this section, and that the defendants would eliminate the beard length restriction from section 3062(h). On June 5, 2011, the parties requested that the Court stay all proceedings until the defendants' counsel amended section 3062(h). On May 18, 2012, the District Court (Judge Stephen V. Wilson) dismissed the case with prejudice, as a result of a stipulated dismissal between the parties.

Summary: Plaintiff filed an action for a preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to bar the Defendants at California Men's Colony Correctional Facility from enforcing their Grooming Policy. Plaintiff claims that the policy violates his right under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. The United States intervened, and the parties settled contingent on Defendants' eliminating the beard length restriction from section 3062(h) of the Title 15 California Code of Regulations.


Six prisoners with mental or physical disorders from the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida on May 8, 2019. They sued the Secretary of the FDC and the agency itself. Plaintiffs alleged that the FDC had frequently, unnecessarily, and harmfully used solitary confinement against prisoners with physical and mental disabilities. They also alleged that the defendants were aware of the heightened risk that solitary confinement places on disabled individuals. Plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all in FDC custody who had been “locked in their cells, alone or with a cellmate, for an average of 22 hours or more per day[.]” Plaintiffs were represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, Florida Legal Services, and the Florida Justice Institute. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act), and Section 504 of 29 U.S.C. § 701 (Rehabilitation Act), the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. Remedies sought included injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from continuing the allegedly unlawful practices and to provide equal access to programs and services for people with disabilities in prison. On July 2, 2019, plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint adding a seventh plaintiff. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Mark E. Walker. Defendants moved to dismiss on August 6, 2019. They argued plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies, failed to demonstrate standing, and failed to show they were entitled to relief. The court denied the motion on October 24, 2019. 411 F.Supp.3d 1220. Plaintiffs filed two motions on December 20, 2019. The first motion, filed by all plaintiffs, sought to place limits on depositions. This included blocking the presence of FDC staff, denying use of “black box” restraints, and preventing of restraints for deponents in the general population. The second motion was filed by a single plaintiff (hereafter: Hill) to prevent retaliation from FDC staff. This would include prohibiting contact between Hill and one specific officer as well as transferring Hill to a different facility. Hill also alleged that he had already faced retaliation from FDC staff. The court granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a protective order regarding deposition conditions on January 7, 2020. First, the court allowed FDC staff to be present during depositions. However, their presence was allowed only if they did not have day-to-day involvement with any plaintiffs, were not subject to plaintiffs’ claims, and had no actual knowledge of the allegations of this suit. Second, the court allowed restraints to be used at their Warden’s judgment. Third, the court barred the use of “black box” restraints due to their highly restrictive nature and available alternatives. However, defendants could petition the court for their use, if necessary. 2020 WL 5650080. Defendants moved for a protective order on January 13, 2020. They requested that various information be accessible only by Plaintiffs’ counsel. This included technical manuals, video surveillance footage, and the facilities’ security policies. They cited both security needs and federal court’s general deference to officials in prison management. The court denied the motion on January 22, 2020. The court cited a refusal to assume bad faith from plaintiffs’ and defendants’ failure to plead specific facts. 2020 WL 5649635. The court granted in part plaintiff Hill’s motion for a protective order on January 28, 2020. The court stated that anyone retaliating against Hill would be held in contempt of court. The court also noted Hill’s “serious allegations of retaliation” by FDC officials. However, the court felt this limited injunction was sufficient and thus did not grant the other relief that Hill sought. Defendants filed a notice that they had appealed to the Eleventh Circuit regarding the denial of their protective order on February 21, 2020. The court denied defendants’ request to stay proceedings pending the appeal on March 2, 2020. 2020 WL 5649634. On March 30, 2020, the Eleventh Circuit granted the defendants’ writ of mandamus. 2020 WL 1933170. The Eleventh Circuit determined that the seriousness of the security risk warranted issuing the writ. As such, the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for a protective order was vacated. On April 3, 2020, this case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Martin Fitzpatrick for all further proceedings. Plaintiffs filed a new motion for protective order on November 23, 2020. They contended that the defendants were interfering with the adjudication of the case by threatening incarcerated individuals who worked with plaintiffs' counsel and retaliating against people who provided information. The issue was referred to Magistrate Judge Martin Fitzpatrick, who granted the motion and ordered the defendants to refrain from retaliatory conduct. However, Judge Mark Walker vacated the Magistrate Judge's order because it was too vague and did not provide clear instructions as to what conduct was unlawful. Judge Walker did note, however, that the plaintiffs could move for sanctions against the defendants if they interfered with the adjudication process. Plaintiffs filed a second amended class action complaint on March 30, 2021. Notably, this complaint added additional sub-classes. Earlier complaints had one broad class for all FDC prisoners locked in restrictive housing. This amended complaint added three subclasses for those placed in restrict housing: first, a youth subclass for all under 21 years old; second, prisoners with a serious mental illness; finally, prisoners with a federally recognized physical disabilities. Plaintiffs moved for class certification on May 28, 2021. This included the main plaintiff class which included people who were in FDC custody in restrictive housing. They also pursued the three subclasses introduced in the second amended complaint: youth, serious mental illness, and physical disability. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Incarcerated individuals in the Florida Department of Corrections filed a class action complaint seeking to enjoin defendants from violating their Eighth Amendment rights, as well as the ADA and Rehab Act, by using solitary confinement as a tool against people with disabilities. The parties engaged in various discovery disputes as the case remains ongoing.


On October 14, 2003, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of developmentally disabled adults under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment against the Arkansas Department of Human Services in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief and any other appropriate relief. Plaintiffs claimed that their rights had been violated because they were involuntarily committed to and detained in institutions without a hearing. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint when one of the plaintiffs was moved from an institutional setting. On February 12, 2004, the Court (Judge Susan Webber Wright) granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss, granted Family and Friends of Care Facility Residents' motion to intervene, and denied intervenors' motion to redact names of individual plaintiffs. Specifically, the Court found that Plaintiffs' equal protection claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, but held that Plaintiffs could proceed with their procedural due process claims. The Court granted in part and denied in part both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions for summary judgment on November 23, 2004. Specifically: the plaintiff who moved from the institutional setting was dismissed as a party to the action; Plaintiffs' equal protection claim was dismissed with prejudice; and, the Court determined that the challenged procedures violated the Due Process Clause because they did not provide adequate post-admission review of the continued need for institutional placement. On June 9, 2005, the Court adopted Defendants' post-admission review procedures. In light of its holding in the previous opinion, the Court had previously ordered Defendants to submit proposed post-admission review procedures that complied with Due Process requirements. The Court entered final judgment at the same time that it adopted Defendants' procedures. The Court ordered Defendants to pay over $5,000 in Plaintiffs' attorney's fees and about $2,600 in costs on September 16, 2005. There were cross-appeals of the Court's final judgment. On August 8th, 2006, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment. Porter v. Knickrehm, 457 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 2006).

Summary: This case was brought on behalf of developmentally disabled adult individuals against the Arkansas Department of Human Services seeking injunctive and declaratory relief; Plaintiffs alleged that their rights had been violated because they were involuntarily confined in an institutional setting without a hearing. The Court issued a final judgment in the case on June 9, 2005, after it adopted institutional admission review procedures proposed by Defendants.


On November 10, 2016, the plaintiff, a deaf Colorado woman, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued Kroenke Sports & Entertainment, LLC—the company which manages the Pepsi Center in Denver, CO—on behalf of herself and all Pepsi Center patrons who are deaf or hard of hearing. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief on the basis that the Pepsi Center, by failing to provide captioning or other communication services to deaf and hard-of-hearing patrons, had violated Title III of the ADA. The plaintiff filed an official motion for class certification on March 22, 2017. The complaint defined the class as "all Pepsi Center patrons who are deaf or hard of hearing and unable to hear using assistive listening devices, who have been since November 10, 2014, or in the future will be, denied full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, advantages or accommodations of the Pepsi Center based on Defendant's failure to provide close captioning of aural content. The defendants opposed this motion on April 20, 2017. On August 31, 2017, the Court (Judge Wiley Y. Daniel) ruled on the motion for certification in favor of the plaintiffs. The court adopted the plaintiff's proposed class definition and agreed that the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center would stay on as class counsel. 276 F. Supp. 3d 1077. After the certification of the class, the parties started negotiating a consent decree. On December 29, 2017, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of the class consent decree Less than two weeks later, the Court approved the preliminary consent decree, subject to a fairness hearing to be held on April 5, 2018. The court held that the preliminary consent decree was satisfactory because it (1) provided for open captioning; (2) ordered that a third-party consultant monitor the quality of that captioning; and (3) provided for notice of captioning services online. Approximately a week before the fairness hearing, the plaintiffs moved for final improvement of the class action settlement and for attorneys' fees and costs. The fairness hearing was held on April 5, 2018. The very same day, the court issued a minute order granting final approval of the class action settlement and the motion for attorneys' fees and costs. On April 13, 2018, the court issued more detailed orders. First, the plaintiffs' attorneys were to receive $156,104.00 in fees and $5,637.52 in costs. Second, all nonclass claims pertinent to the Pepsi Center's lack of aural services were dismissed. Finally, the consent decree was approved. Before the start of the Colorado Avalanche's first preseason game (September 19, 2018), the Pepsi Center was to provide captioning for all prerecorded lyrics and content, to be displayed on four LED screens in four corners of the arena. The Pepsi Center also needed to provide information regarding the new captioning services on signage around the center, in printed materials, and online. A third-party monitor was required to retained at the Pepsi Center's own expense in order to ensure the quality of the captioning—transcription accuracy was to be maintained at a minimum 90%. Monitoring was to last three years or until all disputes were terminated, whichever was later. Finally, the Pepsi Center was required to train its employees on and about these new services. The court retained jurisdiction to ensure the enforcement of the consent decree for the duration of the term.

Summary: On November 10, 2016, a deaf Colorado woman sued the Pepsi Center for violating Title III of the ADA, alleging that their failure to provide captioning and other communication services was discriminatory against deaf or hard-of-hearing patrons. The parties settled—the Pepsi Center was required to install LED screens to carry accurate captioning services starting before the preseason of the Colorado Avalanche, starting September 19, 2018


This class action suit challenged the medical care provided to Indiana prisoners with the Hepatitis C Virus (HCV). On January 27, 2017, three prisoners with HCV at Pendleton Correctional Facility filed this class-action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson was assigned. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and a professor from the Indiana University School of Law. Defendants included the Indiana Department of Corrections (IDOC), its Commissioner of Corrections, the Chief Medical Officer, and the Director of Health Services (collectively “the IDOC officials”). Additional defendants included treating physicians at Pendleton and Corizon Health (a for-profit foreign medical care provider contracted by IDOC). Relief sought included injunctive relief mandating Hepatitis C virus (HCV) treatment; compensatory damages; punitive damages for their claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and attorney fees, expenses, and costs. In their complaint, plaintiffs cited section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 701), Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101), 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs claimed the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide medical treatment for HCV that met the recognized standard of care in the United States. Without proper care, there was a substantial risk that these HCV infections would severely damage plaintiff’s kidneys or livers. Further, plaintiffs claimed defendants acted with deliberate indifference, arguing that due to their universal HIV and HCV screenings, the defendants were aware of the plaintiffs’ medical needs. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that prior to the filing of this lawsuit, they requested and were denied HCV treatment by the defendants. As a result, plaintiffs claimed discrimination in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act as their HCV disability could have reasonably been accommodated by defendants. On March 24, 2017, one defendant, Corizon Health, filed a motion to dismiss. On March 27, 2017, additional motions to dismiss were filed by two defendants, IDOC and its Commissioner of Corrections. On April 17, 2017, before the Court ruled on those motions, plaintiffs dismissed IDOC and amended their complaint to include a new defendant, Wexford of Indiana, LLC, a private healthcare services company contracted by IDOC. Plaintiffs alleged that Wexford violated the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA, and the plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment. On April 24, 2017, the court denied all the aforementioned motions to dismiss as moot in light of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint. On June 8, 2017, Wexford of Indiana filed a motion to dismiss the claims under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. The court denied the motion because Wexford of Indiana was a private entity offering public accommodations and it was alleged that Wexford had refused proper medical care as required by the ADA, 2017 WL 4517506. On September 15, 2017, plaintiffs moved to certify their class. On January 23, 2018, a settlement conference successfully brokered a settlement between plaintiffs, Wexford, and the treating physicians on “some claims.” The settlement agreement was conditional, requiring that the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification be granted as the settlement was with the entire class and not just the named plaintiffs. On February 21, 2018, the court certified the class. However, on March 2, 2018, the class was amended to include “[a]ll current and future prisoners in IDOC custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic HCV.” 2018 WL 4361639. On March 23, 2018, the plaintiffs, Corizon Health, and the treating physicians filed a stipulation of dismissal which the court granted. On the same day, defendants Wexford of Indiana and one of the treating physicians moved to approve the class action settlement agreement. The settlement agreement also contained a strict confidentiality provision, but generally provided a monetary settlement for release of plaintiffs’ claims, a non-monetary settlement agreement requiring Wexford’s compliance with new policies for the treatment of HCV, and further participation in discovery for the unresolved claims. On April 23, 2018, the court denied approval for the settlement agreement as it did not meet the required standard of being “fair, reasonable, and adequate.” The court determined the agreement was overbroad. As an example, the court cited the agreement’s requirement that class members agree to wide ranging releases on claims unrelated to the current suit. On April 13, 2018, plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on their Eighth Amendment claim against the IDOC officials and Wexford. In response, the IDOC officials filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 14, 2019. While these motions remained pending, Wexford of Indiana and the treating physician filed an amended motion for approval of the settlement agreement on June 11, 2018. On September 13, 2018, the court ruled on three matters. First, it approved the settlement agreement. Second, it decertified the class on the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims only. Third, it modified the class definition to include “all current and future prisoners in IDOC custody who have been diagnosed, or will be diagnosed, with chronic HCV, and for whom treatment with DAA medication is not medically contraindicated.” Fourth, it granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment for the Eighth Amendment claims. Finally, it denied the IDOC officials’ cross motion for summary judgment. 2018 WL 4361639. On March 26, 2019, plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction against the IDOC both modifying their policies governing medical care of inmates with chronic HCV and that defendants provide their medical contract vendor all that is necessary to implement proper treatment for the plaintiffs and class members. Prior to the IDOC official defendants filing their response to the plaintiffs’ motion for permanent injunction, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of Wexford of Indiana from the suit. On July 10, 2019, the plaintiffs and IDOC officials notified the Court that they reached a settlement agreement to resolve the matter. On January 2, 2020, the court approved the settlement agreement as "fair, reasonable, and adequate." The settlement agreement contained the following:

All class members with chronic HCV will receive treatment.
Those with more severe conditions will be treated first.
Prisoners with less than four months remaining in their sentence will not receive treatment at the prison. Instead, they will be covered via Medicaid, if eligible.
This agreement is contingent on funding from the Indiana General Assembly.
Defendants are expected to give plaintiffs regular updates on treatments.
The present case can be re-opened to enforce this agreement, if necessary.
 The above were set to remain in effect until July 1, 2025.In addition to the above settlement, the court granted plaintiffs' motion to cover attorney fees, overruled objections to the above settlement, and officially entered a final judgment. The case is ongoing for purposes of implementation of the settlement.

Summary: In 2017, prisoners of the Pendleton Correctional Facility filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs alleged that employees of the Indiana Department of Corrections denied inmates of life-saving medical treatment for the Hepatitis C virus in violation of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. Plaintiffs sought relief in the form of Hepatitis C virus (HCV) treatment; compensatory damages and punitive damages for claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and for attorney fees, expenses, and costs. In January 2020, a settlement agreement was approved by the court. Most notably, the settlement guarantees HCV treatment for all eligible prisoners. The case is ongoing for purposes of implementation of the settlement.


The Los Angeles district office of the EEOC filed this case in August 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii against NCL America, Inc., a major international cruise line, and three of its affiliated corporate entities. The complaint alleged that NCL had discharged the charging parties because of their Middle Eastern origin and their Muslim religion, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In November 2006, the charging parties intervened in the suit, adding claims for discrimination and emotional distress under Hawaii state law, as well as 42 U.S.C. ß 1981. In January 2007, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the EEOC and the plaintiff-intervenors' complaints, but these motions were denied in August 2007. In August 2007, the intervenors filed a motion to consolidate this case with a private lawsuit one of them had filed against the defendant (1:07-cv-00372-SOM-BMK). This motion was granted in September 2007, and the EEOC case became the lead case. In November 2007, the EEOC filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendants, which was eventually denied in February 2008. That same November, the defendants filed a flurry of summary judgment motions, four in total. These were responded too with one counter-motion for summary judgment by one of the intervenors in January 2008, two counter-motions for partial summary judgment by the EEOC in January 2008, and a counter-motion for summary judgment by the EEOC in January 2008. In February 2008 the court ruled on all the pending motions for summary judgment, denying all of them except for granting summary judgment to one of the defendants, NCL Corporation Ltd., and granting in part and denying in part the motions filed by another defendant, NCL America, Inc. That same February, the parties agreed by stipulation to dismiss the claims against another defendant, Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. The final defendant, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., filed a motion for summary judgment in February 2008. In March 2008, it was announced that the remaining parties in the lawsuit had settled and that a consent decree between the plaintiffs and the remaining defendants would be forthcoming. At the same time, NCL (Bahamas) Ltd.'s motion for summary judgment was terminated, having been mooted by the settlement proceedings. On May 15, 2008, the parties submitted a proposed consent decree and order, which the court approved on June 3, 2008 The agreement required NCL to pay $485,000, attorneys’ fees, and costs. NCL was also required to provide the plaintiffs with neutral job references, and to purge the plaintiffs’ personnel records of all information that reflected negatively on their job performance. The order prohibited defendants from discriminating on the basis of race or national origin, and from retaliation against anyone involved in a claim against them. NCL was required to hire an outside EEOC consultant to assist in reviewing and revising its policies and procedures, providing a revised policy on discrimination and retaliation to the EEOC within 60 days. The decree also mandated training for employees, record keeping, and regular reporting to the EEOC. The decree remained in effect for two years, and the matter is now presumed closed.

Summary: The EEOC filed this case in August 2006 against a major international cruise line, alleging that it had discharged employees because of their Middle Eastern origin and Muslim religion. In June 2008, the court approved a consent decree requiring monetary and injunctive relief, including monitoring, training, recording keeping, and reporting.


Nine current and former inmates at Roxbury Correctional Institute who are blind brought a discrimination lawsuit against the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. One individual inmate filed his complaint on March 30, 2016, and five days later this case was consolidated with eight other cases. The plaintiffs, represented by the National Federation of the Blind and Prisoner Rights Information System of Maryland, alleged that the defendants had violated the prisoners' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, that the defendants had violated Titles II and IV of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The plaintiffs, bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Richard D. Bennett. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 7, 2016. This complaint alleged that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiffs because they were blind. Specifically, the plaintiffs were denied access to the courts and grievances process. The complaint alleged that prison employees retaliated against inmates who assisted the blind inmates with he grievances process, which the plaintiffs alleged was also discrimination on the basis of the plaintiff's blindness. Additionally, the defendants did not provide the plaintiffs with reasonable auxiliary aids or services that would have allowed the plaintiffs to navigate through the prison and read and write independently. The defendants also discriminated against blind inmates by refusing to provide them with competent literacy instruction. The defendants failed to provide access to the services, benefits, activities, programs, and privileges available to other inmates. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered physical and sexual abuse as a result of the defendants discriminatory policies and practices. The complaint alleges that the defendants did not consider the safety concerns of blind inmates when double celling prisoners. The case was referred to Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher for Settlement on January 31, 2018. A number of settlement conferences were held in 2018, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. On December 21, 2018 the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Beth P. Gesner for all discovery. There were a number of discovery disputes and many of the documents in this case were filed under seal and inaccessible on PACER. On January 10, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On March 18, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The motions for summary judgment were filed under seal. A hearing was held before Judge Bennet on April 24, 2019 on these motions. Judge Bennett issued an opinion on May 13, 2019. Judge Bennett denied as moot the defendants' motion to dismiss, denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, and granted in part and denied in part the defendants motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the defendants as to Count I (denial of access to courts in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment) and Count II (subjecting the plaintiffs to serious harm and a risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment) of the plaintiff's amended complaint. Count III (discrimination against the plaintiffs on the basis of blindness in violation of the ADA) and Count IV (discrimination against the plaintiffs because of blindness in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act) survived and litigation would continue on these claims. 383 F.Supp.3d 519 (May 13, 2019, D. Md.). Judge Bennett also issued an order and judgment on the same day that reiterated the conclusions of the opinion. Back in March of 2019 the plaintiffs filed a motion and an amended motion for sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion hearing was held on the motion for sanctions before before Magistrate Judge Beth P. Gesner on March 11, 2019. The next day, Magistrate Judge Gesner issued an order denying the motion for sanctions. Between March and May of 2019, the plaintiffs filed numerous motions for a writ of habeas corpus. No decisions were made on these motions, and they were eventually withdrawn due to settlement negotiations. On May 20, 2019 the plaintiffs and the defendants filed a joint motion for stay because the parties had engaged in negotiations and reached a settlement agreement. The motion to stay was granted by Judge Bennett two days later. In May 2019, the parties reached a settlement agreement for $1.4 million in damages and attorneys fees. The settlement requires the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) will modify prison procedures and provide assistive technology for the blind to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and other applicable laws. DPSCS will implement several corrective measures, such as computers that convert text to voice, assigning blind prisoners to single cells, providing Braille instructors and other instruction that will allow blind prisoners to live and learn independently, making educational materials available on tape, and assigning counselors to assist blind inmates with legal materials, medical requests, and mail. On June 6, 2019 the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. Judge Bennett signed an order granting the dismissal the same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 30, 2016, nine current and former blind prisoners at Roxbury Correctional Institute brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS). The plaintiffs alleged that the DPSCS and its employees discriminated against the inmates on the because of their blindness in violation of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that they were not provided access to the courts and grievances producers, that they were not provided with reasonable accommodations and aids that would allow them to live and learn independently, and that they were subjected to serious harm including physical and sexual abuse. The parties reached a settlement agreement in May of 2019 whereby the defendants paid $1,400,000 in damages and attorneys fees and agreed to modify the prison and procedures to better accommodate blind inmates. DPSCS agreed to provide instructors and equipment to improve independence and opportunities for blind inmates. The parties voluntarily dismissed the case in June 2019 after reaching the settlement agreement.


On June 9, 2005, a resident of New York City who had been arrested and charged under NY Penal Law § 240.35(1) for engaging in peaceful begging, filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. The plaintiff sued the City of New York, the New York City Police Department, the Bronx District Attorney’s office, and three state defendants--the Chief Judge of the New York State Court of Appeals, the Chief Administrative Judge of the New York Unified Court system, and the Commissioner of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services--under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by The Bronx Defenders and private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that the continued enforcement of statute 240.35(1) was a violation of his rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief to end enforcement of § 240.35(1), as well as money damages for those wrongly arrested and prosecuted under the law. Section 240.35(1) provided that a person is guilty of loitering when he “loiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging.” In 1993, the Second Circuit declared this section of the law unconstitutional on First Amendment grounds. See Loper v. New York City Police Dept., 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993). On June 9, 2005, the case was assigned to Judge Shira A. Scheindlin. On June 23, 2005, Judge Scheindlin entered an order enforcing a stipulation by the individual city defendants agreed agreed to cease enforcement of § 240.35(1), dismiss all charges and summonses pending under the law, release those in custody solely for violating the law, and vacate all warrants relating to charges under it. The remaining parties began discovery in 2006. On November 22, 2006 the Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiff leave to amend the complaint. The original named plaintiff in the case had accepted the defendants' offer of judgment made on November 9, 2006. Prior to releasing his claims against the defendants, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add new named plaintiff and putative class representative. The first amended complaint was filed on November 27, 2006. On December 5, 2006, the court entered judgment in favor of the first named plaintiff according to the defendants' offer of judgment. The defendants agreed to pay the named plaintiff $100,001 plus reasonable attorneys' fees accrued to that date. The first named plaintiff's claims were thus released, though negotiation of attorneys' fees continued between him and the defendants until they were resolved, in the amount of $280,388.28 in February 2008. The case proceeded with the new named plaintiff. While this was occurring, there were concerns about the defendants' compliance with the court's order of June 23, 2005 that had directed the defendants once and for all to cease enforcing § 240.35(1). In light of the defendants' continuing failure to comply with court orders, the plaintiff requested leave to a file a contempt motion against the defendants on November 9, 2006. At a pre-motion conference held on November 29, 2006, the defendants promised to undertake a plan of action that would curb the continued enforcement of § 240.35(1). In reliance upon defendants' assurances that plaintiff was going to get the necessary relief, the Court denied plaintiff's request to move for a judgment of contempt. Soon thereafter, the Court entered an order on December 14, 2006 directing the defendants to take the additional remedial steps they had promised in order to halt the unconstitutional enforcement of § 240.35(1). These steps included sending letters to offending officers after they improperly issued a summons for a violation of § 240.35(1), warning officers that future enforcement of § 240.35(1) may lead to disciplinary action against them, and providing members of the NYPD with additional training to reinforce that § 240.35(1) was unconstitutional and not to be enforced. On February 2, 2007, the plaintiff moved to certify class and amend the complaint. The plaintiff sought certification of the following classes: 1) a plaintiff class consisting of "all persons who have been or will be arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of § 240.35(1) in the State of New York from October 7, 1992 onward;" 2) a plaintiff subclass of "all persons arrested, charged, or prosecuted for a violation of § 240.35(1) by employees, agents, or representatives of New York City from October 7, 1992 onward;" and 3) a defendant class of "all political sub-divisions and all law enforcement/prosecutorial policy-making officials in the State of New York with authority to arrest, charge, or prosecute a person with a violation under New York Penal Law." The proposed second amended class action complaint included five additional named plaintiffs. The parties engaged in discovery with respect to class certification, and reached a discovery dispute regarding production of the putative class representatives' medical records and other records reflecting any other disabilities (drug treatment records, social security records, etc.). Judge Scheindlin granted the plaintiff's motion for a protective order on April 16, 2007. 2007 WL 1138877. On February 26, 2007, the plaintiff informed the court that the December 14, 2006 order, an additional 23 unlawful bench warrants and 96 unlawful summonses had been issued to New Yorkers between November 1, 2006 and February 21, 2007. In light of this new information, the Court granted the plaintiffs leave to file a motion for a judgment of civil contempt and the imposition of coercive sanctions against the defendants. The motion outlined the continued unlawful enforcement of the statue: despite the clear command of the June 23, 2015 order, from July 2005 to January 2007, NYPD officers issued 772 summonses under § 240.35(1). From January 2007 through March 2007, members of the NYPD issued summonses under the statute at a rate of approximately one every other day. Since the June 23, 2005 order, the NYPD issued 51 arrests under the statute following the June 23, 2015 order, and the New York City District Attorneys' offices brought 55 prosecutions under the statute. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a judgment of civil contempt on May 31, 2007. Judge Scheindlin's opinion found that there was “no question that for a long period of time, from approximately July 2005 to December 2006, Defendants were in contempt of this Court’s June 23, 2005 Order.” 2007 WL 1573957, at *3. However, she found that during December 2006, the defendants had “turned their behavior around,” and while “this came approximately seventeen months late," punitive civil sanctions would “serve no purpose” in light of the defendants’ recent efforts to comply. Id. at *4-5. She stated that as the problem with continuing enforcement is that some individual patrol officers have “yet to grasp the idea,” the sanctions the plaintiffs requested would be “more of a fine than a deterrent” and would not likely prevent one of the outliers from issuing an unlawful summons. Id. at *5. Despite declining to issue a judgment of contempt, the court expressed its commitment to monitoring the issue and awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees in acknowledgment of the role that the plaintiffs' persistence and the “threat of contempt” played in changing the defendants’ behavior:
The steady rate of unlawful enforcement of section 240.35(1) that has persisted for almost thirteen years after Loper is simply unacceptable. Defendants' long-standing apathy towards this problem was offensive. Nevertheless, the Court is convinced that defendants have made avoiding contempt a top priority and are now striving to fully comply with the June 23, 2005 Order. Certainly, this includes treating the issuance of a single summons under section 240.35(1) as a serious problem deserving urgent attention. To this end, the Court is prepared to revisit the issue of defendants' diligence every two months, until every outstanding bench warrant has been vacated and no more summonses for violations of an unconstitutional statute are issued . . . Until December 2006, defendants' failure to comply was unreasonable and harmful; but for plaintiff's persistence in monitoring and investigating the continued enforcement of section 240.35(1), defendants' noncompliance would have continued indefinitely. It is also clear from the record that but for the specter of contempt—precipitated by plaintiff's repeated request to file this motion—defendants would not have taken the actions that saved them from coercive sanctions. Plaintiff is thus entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys' fees for its efforts with respect to this motion.
Id. at *6. On July 24, 2007, the court certified class, granting the plaintiffs' motion for certification of the state-wide injunctive class, the city-wide damages subclass, and the state-wide defendant class. 244 F.R.D. 222. The court also granted leave to amend the complaint. The second amended class action complaint added the six additional named plaintiffs and class representatives, added nine individual police officer defendants, supplemented the allegations against the defendants, and added a cause of action for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The defendants appealed the district court's order granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The named plaintiff was awarded attorney's fees in February 2008 on the motion for contempt in the amounts of $48,741. 620 F.Supp.2d 435. In June 2009, Judge Scheindlin ordered the City to release all records of those who were arrested/summonsed/charged under § 240.35(1). On March 11, 2008, Judge Scheindlin accepted the case Casale v. Kelly (08-cv-02173-SAS) as related to this lawsuit. The plaintiffs in Casale v. Kelly filed a putative class action complaint against the city for continuing to enforce loitering statutes § 240.35(3) and (7), after both were declared unconstitutional. These provisions dealt with loitering for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct and loitering in a transportation facility without sufficient reason. In an opinion issued jointly in this case and Casale v. Kelly on April 26, 2010, Judge Scheindlin held the City in contempt of court for failing to cooperate in ceasing the enforcement of § 240.35(1), (3), and (7):
The City of New York, operating principally through the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), has continuously enforced three unconstitutional loitering statutes for decades following judicial invalidation of those laws and despite numerous court orders to the contrary. While arrests, summonses, and prosecutions under the void statutes generally have diminished over time, the City’s description of its anti-enforcement efforts as “reasonably diligent and energetic” simply does not comport with reality. Over time, the City has implemented a variety of measures to half enforcement of the statutes. However, the City has done little on its own initiative or with reasonable conviction and speed to end the illegal enforcement; indeed, the City has actively dragged its feet. Year after year, the Court and plaintiffs have pushed and prodded the City into meaningful action. The City’s obstinance and uncooperativeness throughout the present actions is offensive to the rule of law. The human toll, of course, has been borne by the tens of thousands of individuals who have, at once, had their constitutional rights violated and been swept into the penal system. More disturbing still, it appears that the laws—which target panhandling, remaining in a bus or train station, and “cruising” for sex—have been enforced particularly against the poor and gay men.
710 F.Supp.2d 347, 350. The order subjected the City to a system of sanctions in which each future enforcement of the void laws would result in a progressively higher fine (beginning at $500). Finding that the contempt citation and monetary sanction should "furnish sufficient incentive" for the City not to enforce the statutes, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction that had accompanied their second motion for civil contempt on December 23, 2009. On July 7, 2010, the plaintiffs were awarded attorney's fees in connection with the second motion for civil contempt in the amount of $175,000. On June 24, 2010, the Second Circuit (Judges Robert D. Sack and Robert A. Katzmann) affirmed the district court's July 24, 2007 certification of the city-wide plaintiff class, but vacated and remanded the certification of the state-wide plaintiff and defendant classes, finding that the district court abused its discretion in certifying those classes. 609 F.3d 467 (2d Cir. 2010). The parties began settlement discussions in July 2010. On July 30, 2010, the New York State Legislature repealed N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.35(1), (3), and (7). A stipulation and order of settlement between the parties in this case and in Casale v. Kelly was entered on February 6, 2012. The settlement agreement created a $15 million class fund for those who were arrested, charged, or summonsed under the three void sections of the loitering statute. The fund also included attorney's fees and $25,000 to each of the named plaintiffs for services provided to the class. The City was also to vacate, dismiss, and seal all cases charging the statutes and to take continuing measures to cease the statutes' enforcement, including continuing to train police officers on the matter and investigating any attempt to charge the statutes. The settlement agreement was to be in effect and under the court's jurisdiction for two years following the effective date. Following a fairness hearing, the court entered final approval of the settlement agreement on December 21, 2012. On July 29, 2011, Judge Scheindlin accepted the case Long v. The City of New York as related to this action. The plaintiff in that case was an individual who begged in Times Square holding a sign that said, "Help! I Need Money for Weed!". He was arrested by the NYPD on multiple occasions under the same loitering statute, NY Penal Law § 240.35(1), and sued the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case settled for $45,000 and $85,000 in attorney's fees. A final judgment was entered in this case on January 3, 2012. Late claimants continued to seek settlement funds based on good cause through 2014. In April 2015, the remaining $160,000 in the Class Fund was given to four non-profit organizations dealing with issues of homelessness. The case is now closed.

Summary: The City of New York failed to stop enforcing three loitering statutes [NY Penal Law s. 240.35(1),(3),(7)] that were declared unconstitutional by the courts in 1983, 1988, and 1992. NYPD and the DA's office was held in contempt of court for its failure to follow court orders in ceasing to arrest, charge, and prosecute individuals under the statutes, subjecting it to escalating fines for any future enforcement. A Class Action Fund of $15 million was awarded to the plaintiffs in a settlement agreed to in 2012.


On July 21, 1993, eight prisoners housed at the Washington State Reformatory in Monroe who did not speak English filed a civil rights complaint pro se in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, seeking class certification, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. They filed their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that, contrary to a Department of Corrections directive from 1990 requiring that “[a]ll institutional rules, policies, and other relevant data shall be published in Spanish when they are issued in English,” the Reformatory had no resources available in Spanish. The failure to provide materials in Spanish, the plaintiffs claimed, violated their due process and equal protection rights. On August 9, 1993, Judge William L. Dwyer referred the case to Magistrate Judge David E. Wilson. The plaintiffs moved to have an attorney appointed for them. But Magistrate Judge Wilson denied their motion, reasoning that they had not met the criteria for the appointment of an attorney, and had seemed able to handle filing the complaint and affidavits on their own. On September 15, 1993, John B. Midgley appeared as an attorney for some of the plaintiffs. On January 11, 1994, the complaint was amended, removing two of the defendants, and adding the Director of the Division of Prisons of the Washington Department of prisons. One of the plaintiffs was also removed, and several more were added. Ultimately, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the Department of Corrections would develop materials, services, and programs in Spanish. Then, “[i]f the parties agree that DOC has provided the agreed materials,” the case would be dismissed with prejudice. The DOC agreed to provide information regarding its progress to plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as outside consultants and experts. The plaintiffs’ counsel also had a right to view translated materials and interview DOC employees. The agreement also specified which documents would be translated into Spanish, specified a timeframe, and provided for translation services and legal resources to be made available in Spanish. The settlement provided for an 18-month implementation window. The parties stipulated to stay the case while the settlement was implemented on January 23, 1995, and the court agreed to hold the case in abeyance while the parties implemented the settlement on January 30. The settlement agreement also provided for a 12-month enforcement window following implementation during which the plaintiffs could enforce the agreement's provisions. On October 10, 1996, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case with prejudice, and Judge Dwyer dismissed the case with prejudice that same day. The enforcement period ended in 1997 without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This § 1983 suit was filed in 1993 by Spanish-speaking prisoners at the Washington State Reformatory in Monroe, which, contrary to policy, did not have materials available in Spanish. The parties settled in 1995, and the defendants agreed to make materials in Spanish available over a period of 18 months, after which, their agreement would be enforced for 12 months. The enforcement period ran without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed.


On April 5, 2018, The Fortune Society, Inc., a not-for-profit whose mission is to support the successful reentry of formerly incarcerated individuals, and two former employees of the Target Corporation filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued Target under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Target utilized a job applicant screening process that systematically eliminated thousands of qualified African Americans and Latinos from jobs based on their race or national origin. The plaintiffs, represented by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund and Outten & Golden, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Deborah A. Batts and Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman. At issue in this case was Target’s use of criminal background checks to screen applicants for prior convictions, many of which are unrelated to the job sought or occurred long before the individual’s application for employment at Target. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s hiring practices and procedures were unlawful under Title VII because they had a significant adverse impact upon African Americans and Latinos and because these practices were neither job-related nor consistent with business necessity. On the same day the complaint was filed, the parties moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, conditional certification of a settlement class, and appointment of class counsel. The class was defined as, with some exceptions, all African-American and Latino applicants who were denied employment from a Target Stores Job due to a final adjudication on a pre-employment background check that did not clear the applicant to proceed based on their criminal history record, from the start of the class liability period on May 11, 2006, to the date of preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. The settlement agreed to a priority hiring process for members of the class. For class members who were hired but were terminated within six months of their employment due to no fault of their own, Target agreed to write them employment letters stating that they had hired the candidates with knowledge of their criminal record and that the candidates had been fired through no fault of their own. The agreement also required Target to retain two experts in the field of industrial and organizational psychology to design, develop, and implement properly validated adjudication guidelines for the hiring of job applicants with criminal histories for hourly jobs at Target stores. These experts were to monitor compliance for the one-year settlement term. Target agreed to establish a settlement fund of $3,742,500. Two named plaintiffs were to receive up to $20,000 each, one named plaintiff was to receive $2,500, and members of the class no longer eligible for the hiring process were to receive up to $1,000 each. Cash settlement payments were limited to $1,200,000 and $1,900,000 was reserved for attorneys’ fees and costs. Target agreed to give $600,000 in donations to non-profits focused on the re-entry of formerly incarcerated individuals. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the matter to assure compliance. The court conditionally approved the settlement agreement on October 29, 2019 pending and objections from class members who had been served notice late. No class members objected, and the court gave the settlement final approval on December 4. The monitoring period is in force as of March 2020.

Summary: This 2018 class action lawsuit was brought by The Fortune Society and two former employees of the Target Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that Target had violated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by using criminal background checks to screen applicants for prior convictions to the detriment of thousands of qualified African American and Latino job applicants. A settlement has been reached and the court currently retains jurisdiction to ensure compliance.


On February 11, 2013, a class of current and former female sales employees filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, the California Equal Pay Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Business and Professions Code against pharmaceutical manufacturer Daiichi Sankyo, Inc. ("DSI"). Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed disparate impact in pay, benefits and promotional opportunities as well as discrimination for pregnancy and family responsibilities. The class, represented by private counsel, asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, the implementation of programs that provide equal employment opportunities for female employees, and damages for gender discrimination in employment. On April 12, 2013, the defendant moved to transfer venue to the District of New Jersey where its corporate headquarters was located, arguing that since key evidence and witnesses were located there, it would serve the interests of convenience and efficiency. On June 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Claudia Wilken) denied the defendant's motion, stating that it failed "to meet its burden of establishing that the balance of inconvenience weighs heavily in favor of transfer." 2013 WL 3242294. On May 15, 2014, the Court granted plaintiff's April 28, 2015 motion for conditional certification of class. The court defined the class as: “Current, former, and future female sales employees in a sales representative and first level district manager role…who worked at any time in Defendant's sales organization in the United States during the applicable liability period.” 2014 WL 2126877. The parties reached a settlement agreement on October 16, 2015. The classes were settled as: California Settlement Class: All female sales force employees who were or would be employed in a sales representative and/or first level district manager role…in DSI's sales organization in California for at least one day between April 16, 2011 and October 16, 2015. Non–California Settlement Class: All female sales force employees who were or would be employed in a sales representative and/or first level district manager role…in DSI's sales organization in the United States for at least one day between April 16, 2011 and October 16, 2015. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the action and defendants agreed to make available a settlement fund of $8,200,000. $200,000 of that fund was set aside in order to implement changes to defendant’s employment policies and practices, $4,600,000 was paid into an interest-bearing class settlement fund, and the remaining $3,600,000 was used to reimburse costs and expenses of the litigation, pay class counsel's fees as awarded by the Court, pay service payments to class representatives and lawsuit participants, and pay for the administration of the settlement process. The interest-bearing class settlement fund was separated into two components. The core component consisted of $3,700,000 that was to be divided among all named plaintiffs and class members for back pay related to the claims asserted in the case. The calculation of individual shares was based on the total workweeks of all class members during the damages periods and workweeks worked by each class member. The claim form component consisting of $926,200 was proportionately divided among named plaintiffs and class members who submit a claim form for alleged gender, pregnancy, and caregiver discrimination related to denial of promotion to District Manager, harassment, retaliation, or emotional distress damages. In addition to the $8,200,000, the defendant agreed to programmatic relief which included: (1) providing all employees with written or electronic communication of commitment to equal employment opportunities and copies or links to policies addressing non-discrimination, anti-harassment, and anti-retaliation; (2) retaining an independent HR consultant to review its policies and practices and enhance its policies and practices in relation to the issues raised in this lawsuit; (3) posting all District Manager positions with clear posting of the requirements and qualifications for the role; (4) continuing to support the Women's Forum and continue to maintain DSI's mentoring program, including providing the opportunity for the Women's Forum to meet with the HR consultant for at least two hours; (5) working with the HR consultant to develop a training module that will provide guidance to all employees on the appropriate way to treat new mothers returning to work, and create a brief hand-out informing returning mothers of their rights and appropriate procedure to follow if they feel those rights have been violated; (6) establishing an internal compliance panel of senior executives from the HR and Legal departments to meet semi-annually to review compliance with the above requires; and (7) providing certification to class counsel every six months for two years from October 16, 2015 detailing what programmatic changes were actually done. 2015 WL 10090564. The settlement was finally approved, and the action was dismissed, on February 11, 2016. The court maintained jurisdiction over the case. There has been no action on the docket since July 12, 2016.

Summary: In February of 2013, female pharmaceutical sales employees sued their employer for gender discrimination in regard to pay, benefits and promotional opportunities. The case was settled in October 2015. Defendants agreed to implement programmatic changes and establish a settlement fund of $8,200,000.