On January 10, 2012, a deaf individual who had been arrested and detained on a number of occasions since 2007 for violating his probation in Denver, CO, filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado against the City and County of Denver. He proceeded under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; represented by attorneys from the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center and the Center for Rights of Parents with Disabilities, he asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, money damages, and attorney's fees and costs. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that during his detentions in 2010 and 2011, he was denied access to a sign language interpreter, and had requests for a TTY or video phone rejected or delayed. During these detentions, the plaintiff also alleged he was also not provided with required auxiliary aids and services necessary to ensure effective communication. The plaintiff further alleged that Denver systematically, knowingly, and intentionally discriminated against him and other deaf and hard of hearing individuals, that it was likely that he would suffer discrimination in the future, and that the City had been on notice since at least 2007 its deficiencies in providing effective communication for deaf and hard of hearing detainees. On April 26, 2013, the defendants, the City and County of Denver, offered judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68. in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $15,000. The judgment would be exclusive of any accrued reasonable costs and attorney fees, and would include any and all liability of the defendants in regards to the transactions or occurrences referenced in the plaintiff's complaint. On May 9, 2013, the plaintiff's acceptance of the offer of judgment was filed with the court; judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff on May 22, 2013, by the clerk. On January 24, 2014, Chief Judge Marcia S. Kreiger determined the reasonable attorney fees and issued an order granting attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff.

Summary: In 2012, deaf individual sued the City and County of Denver under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff by not providing him with the required auxiliary aids and services necessary to ensure effective communication. Defendants made an offer of judgment in the amount of $15,000, which was accepted by the plaintiff.


On April 21, 2003, plaintiffs, a group of protestors detained and interrogated by the D.C. Metropolitan Police, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the D.C. Police and the FBI in the United States Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by several public interest organizations, asked the court for compensatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights, as well as alleging a civil conspiracy to violate their rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were targeted for wearing black clothing (which the D.C. Police believed was linked with the belief in 'Anarchy'), and detained and arrested without probable cause. The protest that was the subject of the suit was against the war in Afghanistan and the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; it took place in D.C. on April 20, 2002. The plaintiffs had returned to a parking garage in which they had parked and had access to the internet. While they were congregated and eating, D.C. Metro Police approached them with drawn guns. The protestors were dressed in black. They were accosted and insulted by the police, then handcuffed and taken into custody. Their vehicle and personal belongings were searched without consent. Several of the plaintiffs were interrogated in video interviews, recordings of which were later disseminated within the FBI. The plaintiffs were interrogated about the nature of the political activities and associations, their travel arrangements and housing accommodations in D.C. They were released, but later charged with Unlawful Entry into the parking garage (in which the plaintiffs had parked their vehicle). The charges were dismissed at the D.C. Superior Court for being baseless. The plaintiffs claimed in their lawsuit, filed a year later, that they were arrested in violation of the First Amendment right to freedom of speech and association, and that they were arrested as part of an illegal intelligence-gathering operation designed to monitor protected First-Amendment activities of select political organizations, of which the plaintiffs were presumed to be a part. On September 11, 2007, the Court (Judge John Bates) partially granted the FBI's motion for summary judgment. The Court found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to declaratory or injunctive relief in regards to the dissemination of arrest records and interrogation video because they could not demonstrate that the harm was continuing. The compensatory action was maintained against the FBI and the entire action against the MPD was allowed to continue. On March 31, 2009, the Court ruled on MPD's motion for summary judgment. The Court found that most of the individual officer defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, but that the District of Columbia's policy of targeting black-clad protestors for enforcement created a genuine issue of material fact as to a valid constitutional claim. On November 13, 2009, the plaintiffs and defendants made a joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice following a Settlement Agreement. The Agreement awarded the plaintiffs $450,000 to be divided amongst them. This amount was inclusive of attorney's fees. The case was closed on November 16, 2009.

Summary: Protestors at a rally in D.C. who were wearing all black entered a parking garage to access food in their vehicle. They were arrested, their vehicle was searched without their consent, and they were interrogated by special agents from the FBI about their associations with people and their political history. They were charged with unlawful entry into the parking garage, but the charges were dismissed. The resulting civil rights case settled in 2009 for $450,000.


On June 2, 2016, two Florida Planned Parenthood clinics filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued the Florida Department of Health and the Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the rights to privacy and equal protection under the Florida Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from implementing provisions of HB 1411, which would defund Planned Parenthood clinics, impose unconstitutional inspection requirements, and enforce ambiguous and nonmedical definitions to regulate health care providers offering abortion services. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the state had implemented HB 1411 in an attempt to target abortion providers. According to the plaintiffs, the act violated Planned Parenthood's equal protection and due process rights by cutting off access to federal money because Planned Parenthood offers abortions, even though none of this money is used for abortions. In addition, it allegedly violated due process, equal protection, and Fourth Amendment rights by imposing unprecedented inspection requirements as well as regulations imposing an ambiguous "trimester" definition. On June 30, 2016, Judge Robert Hinkle granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction in part. He temporarily enjoined the defendants from defunding Planned Parenthood and from imposing the inspection requirements. He noted, however, that the defendants had clarified the meaning of the "trimester" definitions, and it was therefore no longer ambiguous or unconstitutional. On August 18, 2016, Judge Hinkle made the June 30 preliminary injunction permanent. On October 24, 2016, Judge Hinkle granted the plaintiffs' motion for a determination of entitlement to a fee award. On December 14, 2016, the parties settled on an amount for attorney's fees and on January 25, 2017, they informed the court that these attorney's fees had been paid. This case is now closed.

Summary: On June 2, 2016, two Florida Planned Parenthood clinics filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiffs sued the Florida Department of Health and the Florida Agency for Healthcare Administration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Due Process and Equal Protections Clauses of the U.S. Constitution, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the right to privacy and equal protection under the Florida Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from implementing provisions of HB 1411, which would defund Planned Parenthood clinics, impose unconstitutional inspection requirements, and enforce ambiguous and nonmedical definitions to regulate health care providers offering abortion services. On June 30, 2016, Judge Robert Hinkle temporarily enjoined the defendants from defunding Planned Parenthood and from imposing the inspection requirements. On August 18, 2016, he made his preliminary injunction permanent.


On October 19, 2011, dependent students denied Florida in-state tuition by state undergraduate institutions because of their inability to prove their parents' lawful immigration status filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Florida State Board of Education and the State University System of Florida Board of Governors. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy that classified them as non-residents based on their parents' federal immigration status was unconstitutional, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause under the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs were all United States citizens born in the United States and they had lived in Florida for many years. They were unable to establish their parents' lawful immigration status, which was required under the defendants' policy to determine eligibility for in-state tuition. Hence, the public institutions in Florida denied in-state tuition to the plaintiffs due to such state regulations, and, as a result, the plaintiffs either had to delay their higher education or forego it entirely. On February 24, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding several individuals from the defendant agencies in their official capacity as defendants to the lawsuit. The District Court (Judge Kevin M. Moore) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Ruiz v. Robinson, 2012 WL 3278644 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012). The Court reasoned that the expenses and burden of maintaining a class action outweighed the benefit of granting class certification in this case, and the Court did not find an imminent threat of mootness that would require a class certification in this case. On August 31, 2012, the Court granted summary judgment in part to the plaintiffs and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Ruiz v. Robinson, 892 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2012). The Court held that the defendants' regulations that classified the plaintiffs by virtue of their parents' undocumented immigration status violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. The Court found that the defendants' classification did not advance any legitimate state interest. The Court denied as moot the Supremacy Clause claim raised by the plaintiffs. On October 25, 2012, the Court entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their equal protection claim. The Court declared the defendants' regulations unconstitutional and an incorrect interpretation of the relevant substantive laws. The Court also issued an injunction that banned such regulations. Thus, the defendants could no longer require dependent citizen students who could otherwise establish their and their parents' Florida residency to provide proof of their parents' lawful immigration status for determination of their eligibility for in-state tuition benefits. On December 18, 2012, both parties entered into a settlement agreement on attorneys' fees and litigation costs. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs in sum of $100,000. This ended the case.

Summary: On October 19, 2011, dependent students denied in-state tuition by the state undergraduate institutions for their inability to prove their parents' lawful immigration status filed a lawsuit in the federal court against the Florida State Board of Education and the State University System of Florida Board of Governors. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. They alleged that the defendants' regulations that classified them as non-residents based on their parents' federal immigration status was unconstitutional, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Supremacy Clause under the United States Constitution. On February 24, 2012, the plaintiffs amended their complaint. On August 9, 2012, the District Court (Judge Kevin M. Moore) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. On August 31, 2012, the Court granted summary judgment in part to the plaintiffs and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court held that the defendants' regulations in question violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court declined to reach the Supremacy Clause claim. On October 25, 2012, the Court declared the defendants' regulations unconstitutional and issued an injunction that banned such regulations. On December 18, 2012, both parties settled on attorneys' fees and litigation costs.


On April 18, 2011, a prisoner formerly incarcerated at the New York State Green Haven Correctional Facility (GHCF) filed this pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the GHCF, the New York State Department of Correctional Services, and the Queens County District Attorney's Office. Bringing this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants violated his constitutional rights by searching his cell, confiscating legal papers, sentencing him to 3 years in the Secure Housing Unit (SHU), and failing to adequately protect him from other prisoners. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged a Fourth Amendment claim resulting from a pat frisk and subsequent search of his prison cell, an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim resulting from his three-year sentence to SHU confinement, an Eighth Amendment claim regarding his altercation with a fellow prisoner, a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim arising in connection with his disciplinary hearing, and a right of access to the courts claim under the First and Sixth Amendments. On December 1, 2011, U.S. District Judge Shira A. Scheindlin granted the District Attorney's Office defendants' motion to dismiss all claims against them. Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-02694, 2011 WL 6034374 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On May 2, 2012, the Court allowed the Eighth Amendment claim regarding SHU confinement to proceed, rejecting all other claims. The court found that holding a prisoner in the SHU for two years might constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Peoples v. Fischer, No. 11-cv-02694, 2012 WL 1575302 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On June 26, 2012, Judge Scheindlin granted in part the defendants' motion to reconsider and dismissed all claims against one of the defendants for lack of personal involvement in the alleged conduct. Peoples v. Fischer, 898 F. Supp. 2d 618 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). However, Judge Scheindlin elaborated her thinking on the SHU issue, and declined to grant qualified immunity to the remaining defendants. Judge Scheindlin noted that the plaintiff's "placement in the SHU for such a time period was grossly disproportionate to the non-violent violation that he was found to have committed. He has therefore stated a plausible claim that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment." (Judge Scheindlin also accepted the plaintiff's amended complaint; it incorporated the Court's May 2 rulings and waived any challenge that would affect the length of his confinement.) On August 23, 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union (assisted by students from the NYU Civil Rights Clinic) filed an appearance to represent the plaintiff. They filed an amended complaint on December 6, 2012. It dealt only with the issue of isolation, but broadened the action, framing it as a challenge to the constitutionality of "New York State's practice of arbitrarily sentencing tens of thousands of incarcerated individuals to months and years of extreme isolation and solitary confinement for alleged infractions that often present no threat to prison safety." The complaint alleged that New York State used extreme isolation as punishment more than any other prison system in the United States—4,300 prisoners on any given day lived in isolation (some for years at a stretch), "imposed as a sanction for offenses as minor as 'untidy cell or person,' 'unfastened long hair,' 'littering,' and 'unreported illness.'" The complaint claimed that the conditions in isolation are physically and mentally damaging and violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On February 19, 2014, the parties agreed to a stipulated stay of the litigation, during which the parties would work to reform the New York segregation system. The remedy for violation of the stipulation would be vacating the stay and proceeding with the litigation. The reforms included: • An alternative to SHU sanctions for prisoners under the age of 18; • A presumption against SHU sanctions for pregnant prisoners; • Alternatives to SHU sanctions for prisoners with significant intellectual disabilities (entitled "Correctional Alternative Rehabilitation") which included several hours per day of out-of-cell group programming; • Central office oversight of SHU confinement; • New guidelines, policies, and training for confinement sanctions in prison disciplinary hearings; and • Immediately increasing outdoor exercise time at several facilities, and providing headphones and "in-cell study packets" at others. On December 16, 2015, the plaintiffs notified Judge Scheindlin that a final settlement agreement had been reached. The settlement provided for (1) a reduction in the frequency and duration of SHU sentences, (2) improvements to the conditions of SHU confinement, and (3) mechanisms for implementation and enforcement of the agreed-upon measures over a five-year period. The settlement agreement also required the defendants to pay $1.1 million for attorneys' fees and costs, including $129,900 as incentive awards for the class representatives, and up to $100,000 a year over the course of the settlement. The parties jointly moved for a conditional class certification in order to move forward for a fairness hearing for final approval of the settlement. Judge Scheindlin issued an order on December 23 providing preliminary approval of the settlement agreement and certifying the class. On February 19, 2016, the case caption was amended to change the named defendant to Anthony Annucci, Acting Commissioner of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. On June 15, 2015, the district court began receiving letters from class members voicing their concerns. After receiving a total of 164 letters, on March 21, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a final motion for settlement approval. On March 31, 2016, Judge Scheindlin approved the motion, finding the settlement agreement fair, reasonable, and adequate, and also noting that the majority of the letters submitted by class members were in support of the settlement agreement. By stipulation of the parties, the case was dismissed on April 4, 2016, and the court retained jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the settlement agreement for the five-year period. Peoples v. Annucci, 180 F.Supp.3d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The case was then reassigned to Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. on April 16. The parties filed an annual joint status report on June 5, 2017. According to the report, the parties had thus far worked together successfully and did not require the court's intervention. The report indicated that the defendants had implemented the changes called for in the first year of the Settlement Agreement, including the construction of capital improvements, the installation of rolling phone carts in all SHU cells, a tablet pilot program and, perhaps most importantly, the implementation of the Progressive Inmate Movement System (PIMS), a behavioral incentive program that provides prisoners in special housing units with greater benefits and privileges that reduce isolation and improves SHU conditions. The defendants provided the necessary training to its employees and revised their disciplinary guidelines. The parties also indicated that there were fewer prisoners sent to a SHU cell in the last year, and that those persons' stays in the SHU were shorter. Following a meeting between the parties to discuss the second year implementation of the Settlement Agreement, the defendants issued a status update on June 5, 2018. The status update noted continued decrease in the number of incarcerated individuals serving time in a SHU cell, reduced lengths spent serving time in a SHU cell, and additional training and instructions for officers to charge incidents at the lowest appropriate tier level. Additionally, the defendants noted improvements in recreational and educational opportunities for people serving time in a SHU cell. In 2019, New York Civil Liberties Union published a report on the current state of solitary confinement using data obtained in part from this litigation. Enforcement of the settlement is ongoing.

Summary: In this case filed by a pro se New York prisoner, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a two-year assignment to solitary confinement for a non-violent disciplinary offense was "grossly disproportionate" and therefore might well constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. At this point, the New York Civil Liberties Union (assisted by students from the NYU Civil Rights Clinic) entered the case as the plaintiff's counsel, filing an amended complaint which broadened the action, framing it as a challenge to the constitutionality of "New York State's practice of arbitrarily sentencing tens of thousands of incarcerated individuals to months and years of extreme isolation and solitary confinement for alleged infractions that often present no threat to prison safety." The new complaint focused on the non-violent nature of many of the disciplinary infractions that lead to isolation assignments, and alleges that the conditions in isolation are physically and mentally damaging, in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case reached a final settlement on December 16, 2015, which was approved by the district court on March 31, 2016. The five-year enforcement period is still in effect and the case is ongoing.


On April 10, 2007, attorneys with the Texas Civil Rights Project filed this class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs challenged the treatment of juveniles in the custody of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). The plaintiffs alleged that the TYC routinely and daily violated the constitutional rights of children incarcerated in TYC facilities and "relegated their youthful lives to a living hell." The plaintiffs asserted claims for: denial of due process; lack of access to courts; forced self incrimination; failure to protect; excessive force; sexual assault; failure to provide medical treatment; retaliation for exercising right to free speech; violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. and Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 701. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. The complaint was amended on May 5, 2007, to name additional plaintiffs. On November 19, 2007, A.B., one of the individually named plaintiffs, moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the TYC from requiring him to confess to his alleged crime as a condition of completion of its sex offender treatment program and release from custody. A.B., who maintained his innocence of an attempted rape charge, asserted that the program violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, as the appeal in his criminal case was still pending. On April 11, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement through mediation. According to the Texas Civil Rights Project, TYC agreed to pay $625,000 and to make extensive changes to facilities and policies outlined in a nine page document.

Summary: On April 10, 2007, attorneys with the Texas Civil Rights Project filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Western District of Texas, challenging the treatment of juveniles in the custody of the Texas Youth Commission (TYC). Plaintiff alleged that the TYC routinely and daily violated the constitutional rights of children incarcerated in TYC facilities and "relegated their youthful lives to a living hell." Plaintiff asserted claims for: denial of due process; lack of access to courts; forced self incrimination; failure to protect; excessive force; sexual assault; failure to provide medical treatment; retaliation for exercising right to free speech; violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. and Section 504 (Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C. § 701. On April 11, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement through mediation. The settlement distributed an unspecified amount of monetary damages to plaintiffs.


On September 6, 2002 twenty-one developmentally disabled individuals and an advocacy organization, the ARC of Texas, filed suit against the Texas Department of Human Services, the Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. They alleged that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to provide sufficient community based services to which the plaintiffs were entitled. This meant they were needlessly confined or might be forced to leave their families. They also alleged that the defendants were unlawfully restricting their choice of services, denying them the opportunity to apply for services, and failing to provide prompt services. They sought class action status and declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 17, 2003 the court (Judge Ron Clark) transferred the case to the Western District of Texas because that was where some of the plaintiffs and all of the defendants resided. On May 23, 2003 the court (Judge Sam Sparks) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity grounds. The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals but on August 11, 2004 the Court of Appeals (Judges Garza, King, and Reavley) affirmed the district court. The parties then proceeded into discovery in preparation for trial. The court (Judge Sparks) granted the plaintiffs' motion to withdraw their motion for class certification on October 15, 2005. On May 22, 2006 the court (Judge Sparks) denied or dismissed all pending motions for summary judgment. A trial was then delayed as the parties pursued settlement negotiations. A settlement was reached and on October 6, 2006 the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal with prejudice. On October 12, 2006 the court (Judge Sparks) dismissed the case. The details of the settlement are not known.

Summary: On September 6, 2002 plaintiffs filed suit against the Texas Department of Human Services, the Texas Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, and the Texas Health and Human Services Commission in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. They alleged that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to provide sufficient community based services. On March 17, 2003 the court transferred the case to the Western District of Texas. On May 23, 2003 the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and on August 11, 2004 the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. On May 22, 2006 the court denied or dismissed all pending motions for summary judgment. A settlement was reached and on October 12, 2006 the case was dismissed.


This is a suit arising out of the water crisis in Flint, Michigan. Plaintiffs, who sought to represent a class of Flint water users, initially filed suit in Genesee County Court in Flint on January 19, 2016. They alleged tort claims of gross negligence, fraud, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress by state officials over the course of the crisis. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. Specifically, they claimed that these state officials changed the City of Flint’s water supply to the Flint river despite substantial evidence that this water was toxic and hazardous and then continued to use the Flint river to supply water to the city despite mounting evidence of E. Coli and lead. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Four defendants attempted to removed the case to Federal Court on April 27, 2016, where a parallel class-action suit (Mays v. Snyder) had been filed one year earlier. The four defendants were state-level employees of the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality who played an important role in switching the source of Flint’s water source and in monitoring the Flint River water. The four employees contended that they were entitled to removal because they were acting as agents of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in enforcing the Safe Drinking Water act when they complied with an EPA emergency order concerning the water crisis. Defendants had filed a motion to dismiss in Mays v. Snyder on April 4, 2016, which would summarily be granted less than a year later. Therefore, whether or not Defendants would successfully be able to have the case tried in federal court would have important implications as to whether the plaintiffs could hold them liable. If the defendants were successfully able to remove the case to federal court, the Snyder ruling would be, at the very least, strong precedent to dismiss these suits as well. Plaintiffs subsequently filed for a motion to remand to State Court on May 11, 2016. This motion was granted on October 6, 2016. The court (Judge John Corbett O'Meara) found that state officials were not acting directly under the control of the federal government and so were state agents and not federal agents. Moreover, the court found that the plaintiffs alleged claims under state tort law, not as federal claims over which the federal courts had jurisdiction. However, the court did not award the plaintiffs attorney’s fees, finding that the defendants had reasonable basis for removal. 324 F.Supp.3d 918. Defendants appealed and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Gilman, Suhrheinrich, and McKeague) affirmed the district court’s ruling on September 11, 2017. They concluded that the four defendants had not sufficiently shown federal jurisdiction in this case and ordered the case be remanded to state court. 871 F.3d 437. The defendants then filed for certiorari to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied Certiorari on April 17, 2018.

Summary: Flint water users filed a class action tort claim in Genesee County Court in Flint on January 19, 2016. They alleged tort claims of gross negligence, fraud, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress by state officials over the course of the crisis against a number of state officials. Four Defendants who were employees at the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality tried to removed the case to Federal Court on April 27, 2016. The District Court, later affirmed by the Circuit Court, held that these state employees were not acting as federal agents despite the presence of an EPA emergency order. Therefore the case was remanded to State Court.


The Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) is a non-profit publisher of Prison Legal News and other publications for prisoners. After many issues of Prison Legal News were withheld from prisoners in Michigan from 2016 to 2019, HRDC filed this lawsuit on August 22, 2019, in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. it sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) under Section 1983. HRDC was represented by its own counsel, along with co-counsel from Honigman and the MSU Law School Civil Rights Clinic. The complaint alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory, punitive, and nominal damages, attorneys' fees, and a jury trial. Specifically, the complaint alleged that issues of Prison Legal News, as well as some other one-off HRDC publications, were withheld from prisoners between September 2016 and July 2019. Different issues were withheld at different prisons, and the complaint lists 22 different Michigan prisons where materials were withheld at some point. This is the alleged censorship under the First Amendment. HRDC also alleged that MDOC almost never provided notice that it was withholding materials, and failed to offer any process for HRDC to appeal its decision. HRDC did appeal a few times by sending letters to some of the prisons in question, and those appeals were all denied except for one. This is the alleged Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The judge on the case is Judge Thomas L. Ludington. On Jan. 6, 2020, the judge denied injunctive relief and dismissed all defendants except for the Director of MDOC. 431 F.Supp.3d 925. Discovery is due at the end of July 2020, and a settlement conference and pre-trial hearing are also scheduled.

Summary: On 8/22/19, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. They sued the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) under Section 1983. They alleged that prison officials were violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments by withholding HRDC publications such as Prison Legal News from prisoners who were duly subscribed to them. In January 2020, the requested preliminary injunction was denied and all defendants were dismissed except for the director of MDOC. The parties are currently engaged in discovery.


On October 8, 2013, three Catholic non-profit 501(c)(3)s and a trustee for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, Pennsylvania filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, Department of Treasury, and their respective Secretaries in their official capacities. Plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the government violated their statutory rights (including RFRA and the APA) and First Amendment right to freedom of religion by mandating that they subsidize, facilitate, and or provide coverage for various reproductive health services for their employees. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. The suit was related to a previous lawsuit, brought by plaintiffs in the same court in May of 2012. That suit was dismissed by the same court, without prejudice, upon the government's assurance that the mandate at issue would not be enforced against plaintiffs, and that the regulations at issue were to be amended. This case was disposed of in a series of combined orders issued by Judge Arthur J. Schwab, that applied to both this suit and Zubik v. Sebelius. The cases were formally consolidated on appeal on February 11, 2014. See summary of Zubik v. Sebelius for details covering the preliminary injunction granted and subsequent appeals to the Third Circuit and Supreme Court. This case is now being considered on remand by the Third Circuit.

Summary: On October 8, 2013, Plaintiffs, three Catholic non-profit 501(c)(3)s and a trustee for the Roman Catholic Diocese of Erie, Pennsylvania filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, Department of Treasury, and their respective Secretaries in their official capacities. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the government violated numerous statutes (including RFRA and the APA) and their First Amendment right to freedom of religion by mandating that they subsidize, facilitate, and or provide coverage for various reproductive health services for their employees. Case was handled in a series of joint orders with Zubik v. Sebelius, before being consolidated wit that case on appeal.


On June 28, 2013, the United States Department of Health and Human Services (the Health Department) issued a final rule concerning the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the Mandate). The regulations of the final rule required health insurance plans to provide coverage of contraception and abortifacients, with an exemption for health plans offered by churches and their integrated auxiliaries. The regulations of the Mandate also provide an accommodation for health plans by certain qualified religious organizations, but it still resulted in the organization's provision of coverage for abortion-inducing products, contraception, sterilization, and related counseling. Such an organization was required to execute a self-certification of its non-profit, religious status as well as its opposition to coverage of contraceptive services. The organization was further required to provide the self-certification to its insurance company or, if self-insured, to a third party administrator (TPA). The insurance company or TPA was then automatically required to provide or arrange payments for contraceptive services for the organization's employees and participants of the plan. The Diocese of Greensburg (the Diocese), operated a self-insured health plan through a charitable trust (the Trust), and the trust provided coverage to diocesan-entities, including a non-profit corporation (the Corporation) and a Catholic school (the School), both affiliated with the Diocese. While the Diocese was exempt from compliance with the Mandate, the Corporation and the School were only accommodated. Both the Bishop and the Diocese were thus required to facilitate coverage of abortifacients, contraception, sterilization, and related education and counseling through their participation in the operation of the Trust under the self-certification provision, and they argued that this was contrary to their sincerely held religious beliefs. In a case with similar facts, Zubik v. Sebelius, 13-cv-1459, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165922 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2013), the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania granted the Bishops, Dioceses, and their affiliates a permanent injunction that enjoined the federal government from applying or enforcing the requirements under the Mandate. The Diocese reached out to the government for an extension to itself and its affiliated entities, but the government refused to agree to an injunction. On May 27, 2014, the Diocese, along with its Bishop, the Corporation and the School, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Treasury, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. The plaintiffs claimed that the Mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs' religious beliefs and threatened the plaintiffs with imminent injury that should be remedied by a court, in violation of RFRA, APA and the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The defendants conceded that, aside from their "self-insured church plan" argument in the present case, their arguments were otherwise identical to those made in Persico v. Sebelius, 13-cv-303 and Zubik II. The defendants claimed that the plaintiffs failed to establish injury in fact, because they could have offered a self-insured church plan to their employees and the federal government would have no regulatory authority to require TPAs of self-insured church plans to provide contraceptive services for the participants. On June 20, 2014, Judge Arthur J. Schwab, for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, issued a memorandum opinion and an order, granting the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction enjoining the federal government from enforcing the Mandate's requirements against the plaintiffs. Judge Schwab's opinion relied on the same reasoning as that in Persico and Zubik. The Court declined to address the "self-insured church plan" contention raised by the defendants for lack of facts. The defendants appealed the order to the Third Circuit. The Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction on Aug. 20, 2014, rejecting the defendants' "self-insured church plan" argument. On Oct. 3, 2014, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the record for the purposes of the appeal was complete by Nov. 4, 2014. On Oct. 19, 2017, the case was dismissed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit without cost to either party.

Summary: On May 27, 2014, a Roman Catholic diocese and its affiliates filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Treasury, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the ACA's contraception coverage requirement substantially burdened their religious beliefs in violation of RFRA, APA, and the First Amendment. In June 2014, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs enjoining the defendants from enforcing the mandate requirements against the plaintiffs, and in Aug. 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a permanent injunction.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It is stayed during defendant's bankruptcy and settlement proceedings. On Aug. 7, 2013, four Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on January 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were allegedly brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International. Signal is based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and is in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs in the Gulf Coast region. Three plaintiffs worked at Signal's site in Orange, Texas and one plaintiff worked in Pascagoula. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $20,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees to live in racially segregated labor camps ($1050 per month), and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (18 U.S.C. §1584 et seq, the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §1962, the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. §2201), as well as claims of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by a private law firm. In July 2014, Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn denied Signal's motion to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs in this case only overlapped with the David case insofar as their FLSA claims in the David case were concerned. Magistrate Judge Hawthorn found the similarity in issues in the cases was not substantial enough to warrant transfer because the current venue was otherwise proper. In June 2015, Magistrate Judge Hawthorn severed and transferred Signal's cross-claims against co-defendants (immigration attorneys, recruiters, and labor brokers) to the Eastern District of Louisiana, finding that there was significant overlap between Signal's crossclaims in this case and in David. In July 2015, the Court stayed the case after Signal filed for bankruptcy. In re Signal Int’l, Inc, et al., No. 15-11498 (Bankr. D. Del. July 12, 2015). As a part of the bankruptcy filings, the plaintiffs entered into a plan support agreement (PSA) which contemplated a settlement of the claims of this lawsuit against Signal entities through a consensual chapter 11 plan proposed by Signal. The PSA became effective on Dec. 14, 2015. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. In this case, Meganathan, the Court asked the parties for updates every 120 days as to the status of the bankruptcy proceedings. However, the latest is from Nov. 8, 2016 (simply stating that the proceedings remain ongoing). The bankruptcy case closed on February 5, 2019, however the case remains open and no further updates have been filed.

Summary: On August 7, 2013, four Indian guestworkers filed suit in E.D. Tx. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In July 2015, the Court ordered to stay the case due to Signal's bankruptcy, with status reports on the proceedings due every 120 days. The bankruptcy case closed on February 5, 2019, but the case remains open with no updates.


On June 26th, 2000, several housing tenants filed a lawsuit, known as King v. Blakely, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiffs sued the Blakely Housing Authority (“BHA”) under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §3601), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by a combination of public interest and private attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the Blakely Housing Authority to change its racially discriminatory housing policies. Plaintiffs also sought money damages as applicable. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the BHA racially-segregated its housing projects, with African-American residents being placed in certain projects and white residents being placed in others. Plaintiffs further alleged that one project was reserved almost exclusively for whites since it was built, while other four projects operated by BHA are currently over 90% occupied by African Americans, with few or no white residents. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged multiple instances of misconduct by the Executive Director of BHA, including that he made statements indicating his intention to maintain racial segregation in BHA housing and that he retaliated against plaintiffs by refusing to grant them housing when they participated in a demonstration against the segregated housing at Blakely. Immediately after filing their initial complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify class. Before the motion was decided, on June 10th, 2002, the federal government filed a case against Blakely Housing Authority in United States v. Blakely. This action alleged the same misconduct that King v. Blakely alleged. After this case was filed, the court granted the motion to certify the class on September 18th, 2003. The class was certified as: “all past, present, and future African-American tenants and applicants of BHA, who were, are, or will be subjected to racial discrimination” Eventually, the parties entered a consent decree, which was approved by the court on March 21st, 2005. The terms of the consent decree required the BHA to “create and submit for approval to the United States and HUD written Uniform and Nondiscriminatory Procedures for: (1) receiving, handling, processing, rejecting, and approving rental inquiries and applications made in-person, by telephone, or by other means; (2) assigning prospective tenants to new units; and (3) transferring existing tenants to different units.” Furthermore, the consent decree required BHA to send a certified check for $190,000 to the attorneys for private plaintiffs and another check for attorneys fees for plaintiff. Finally, the terms of the consent decree were set for four years. The consent decree was terminated after the period elapsed in 2009. Then the case closed.

Summary: On June 26th, 2000, several housing tenants filed a lawsuit, known as King v. Blakely, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. Plaintiffs sued the Blakely Housing Authority (“BHA”) under the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. §3601), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief along with money damages to remedy the Blakely Housing Authority's racially-segregated housing projects.


On May 12, 2014, five same-sex couples living in Alaska filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, against the state of Alaska. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare Alaska's same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional, to recognize valid marriages carried out in other states, and to enjoin the enforcement of the marriage ban. In their complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that Alaska's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They also claimed that the inability to enter into marriage with their chosen spouse interfered with their procurement of benefits and formation of their families. The original judge presiding over the case, H. Russell Holland, recused himself on May 21, 2014. The case was then reassigned to Judge Timothy M. Burgess. On October 12, 2014, Judge Burgess granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, declaring Alaska's same-sex marriage laws unconstitutional for violating the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution and enjoining enforcement of any laws that prohibit same-sex couples from marrying or deny recognition of lawful same-sex marriages from other states. 56 F.Supp.3d 1056. On October 14, 2014, the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October 15, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted a temporary stay of the District Court's judgment until midnight on October 17, allowing appellants to seek a stay from the Supreme Court of the United States. On October 17, 2014, the Supreme Court denied the application for stay, dissolving the temporary stay granted by the Court of Appeals. On February 27, 2015, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' (opposed) motion to stay the appeal pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). The proceedings were stayed until 14 days after the decision issued in  Obergefell . On April 15, 2015, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses through to October 2014 in the amount of $127,720.90. Two of plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the April 15 order on May 13, 2015. On July 1, 2015, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, with the costs allocated pursuant to the stipulation. On September 2015, the district court held that the motion for reconsideration failed to provide any justification warranting the use of the ‘extraordinary remedy’. Since then, there has been no further action in this case.

Summary: On May 12, 2014, five same-sex couples living in Alaska filed a lawsuit in the District of Alaska U.S. District Court under against the state of Alaska, asking the court to declare that Alaska's same-sex marriage ban was unconstitutional, recognize valid marriages carried out in other states, enjoin the enforcement of marriage ban, and award costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The District Court declared Alaska's same-sex marriage laws unconstitutional in October, 2014, and the Defendants appealed that decision. On February 27, 2015, the Ninth Circuit granted the appellants' opposed motion to stay the appeal pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On April 15, 2015, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses through to October 2014 in the amount of $127,720.90. Plaintiffs’ counsel appealed for reconsideration of the April 15 order, but this motion was denied in September 2015. There has been no further action since.


Four same-sex couples in Wisconsin filed this federal lawsuit on Feb. 3, 2014, challenging Wisconsin's 2006 constitutional amendment that barred same-sex marriage, and a "marriage evasion law" prohibiting couples - gay and straight - from going elsewhere to marry if the marriage would be prohibited in the state. (Penalties for violating this law, which is apparently unique to Wisconsin, include up to $10,000 in fines and nine months in prison.) Represented by the ACLU LGBT Project, the ACLU of Wisconsin, and the Chicago firm Mayer Brown, plaintiffs filed the suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin. Like other similar lawsuits, the complaint alleged that the state's ban on same-sex marriage violated equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs consisted of three same-sex couples who wished to be married in Wisconsin and one same-sex couple who asked the state of Wisconsin to recognize their marriage that was formalized in another state. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that any Wisconsin laws that ban same-sex marriage are in violation of the United States Constitution. They also sought an injunction preventing the defendants from enforcing laws that ban same-sex marriage and requiring the recognition of the marriages of same-sex couples already legally married in other states, as well as an award of costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. On June 6, 2014, District Judge Barbara B. Crabb granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs. Judge Crabb declared the laws that prohibited same-sex marriages in Wisconsin to be unconstitutional and she asked both the plaintiffs and the defendants to submit a proposed injunction that complies with the contents of the order. The defendants filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Stay of the order on the same day that the order was signed, seeking clarification of the order's scope. This was granted, and a hearing was held on June 9, 2014. At that point, the motion to stay was denied by the district court. County clerks around Wisconsin began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples and in some cases performing marriage ceremonies for them. However, on June 13, Judge Crabb stayed enforcement of her decision. She explained that a stay entered by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Herbert v. Kitchen compelled her to do so. On July 10, 2014, the state appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals combined the case for briefing and oral argument with a similar Indiana case, Baskin v. Bogan. On September 4, 2014, the Seventh Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge Richard Posner, and joined by Judges Williams and Hamilton, found in favor of the plaintiffs and affirmed the district court's judgments invalidating and enjoining these two states' prohibitions of same-sex marriage. The opinion primarily addressed the question of equal protection and said that the states of Indiana and Wisconsin have no rational basis behind the prohibition of same-sex marriage. The court also suggested that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation has all the hallmarks of a 'suspect class'. The Court stayed its mandate pending a decision on the defendants' petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court denied the petition on October 6, 2014 and the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate. On March 27, 2015, the court entered the parties' Stipulation and Agreement as to Costs and Attorneys' Fees. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $1,055,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On April 20, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the injunction. The plaintiffs argued that the Department of Health Services treated them differently from heterosexual married couples by refusing to place both of their names on their child's birth certificate. Judge Crabb found that the injunction did not encompass the alleged birth certificate issue and denied the plaintiffs' motion without prejudice on July 7, 2015. As of January 2019, no further docket activity is reflected since 2015 and so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: Four same-sex couples in Wisconsin filed this federal lawsuit on Feb. 3, 2014, challenging Wisconsin's 2006 constitutional amendment that barred same-sex marriage, and a "marriage evasion law" prohibiting couples - gay and straight - from going elsewhere to marry if the marriage would be prohibited in the state. The plaintiffs won in district court; and on September 4, the Seventh Circuit United States Court of Appeals upheld the district court's decision which declared Wisconsin's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional. As of January 2019, no further docket activity is reflected since 2015 and so the case is presumably closed.


On January 31, 2017, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and other counsel filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a group of Syrian-born U.S. would-be immigrants. The action challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States. The case was filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and civil complaint; it sought immediate return of the plaintiffs to the United States. The complaint argued that the federal government's actions violated plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Immigration Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants' actions were in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Eastern District of New York on January 28. That order prohibited defendants from using the executive order to remove the plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge Joseph Leeson Jr. Plaintiffs were all born in Syria. Over a decade ago, one of the plaintiffs immigrated to the United States and later applied for immigrant visas for his two brothers and their families. On December 19, 2016, after waiting thirteen years, plaintiffs were approved for Permanent Resident visas. On January 28, 2017, plaintiffs arrived at Philadelphia International Airport. Immediately, they were detained and denied access to family and counsel. Defendants revoked plaintiffs’ visas and told them that they could either return to Syria or risk arrest; the plaintiffs returned to Syria that day. At the same time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to have their visas reinstated and be granted immediate re-entry to the U.S. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for February 2, 2017 and then rescheduled for February 8, 2017. After an intervention by Congressman Charlie Dent (R-PA), plaintiffs' lawyers announced that plaintiffs had received approval to enter the United States on Feb. 5. They left Syria that day and were scheduled to arrive at John F. Kennedy International Airport on Feb. 6. On Feb. 13, after the plaintiffs were admitted to the U.S., the Court ordered the case to be stayed for 60 days so that the parties could discuss settlement. The Court also denied the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order without prejudice. On Mar. 6, 2017, prompted by an adverse ruling in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On Apr. 12, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The Clearinghouse does not have access to this document. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 31, 2017, the ACLU of Pennsylvania and other counsel filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of a group of Syrian-born U.S. would-be immigrants. The action challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 executive order banning nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen from entering the United States. The case was filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus and civil complaint; it sought immediate return of the plaintiffs to the United States. The complaint argued that the federal government's actions violated plaintiffs’ Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Immigration Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the defendants' actions were in violation of a temporary restraining order issued by the Eastern District of New York on January 28. That order prohibited defendants from using the executive order to remove the plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge Joseph Leeson Jr. Plaintiffs were all born in Syria. Over a decade ago, one of the plaintiffs immigrated to the United States and later applied for immigrant visas for his two brothers and their families. On December 19, 2016, after waiting thirteen years, plaintiffs were approved for Permanent Resident visas. On January 28, 2017, plaintiffs arrived at Philadelphia International Airport. Immediately, they were detained and denied access to family and counsel. Defendants revoked plaintiffs’ visas and told them that they could either return to Syria or risk arrest; the plaintiffs returned to Syria that day. At the same time the complaint was filed, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to have their visas reinstated and be granted immediate re-entry to the U.S. A hearing on the motion was scheduled for February 2, 2017 and then rescheduled for February 8, 2017. After an intervention by Congressman Charlie Dent (R-PA), plaintiffs' lawyers announced that plaintiffs had received approval to enter the United States on Feb 5. They left Syria that day and were scheduled to arrive at John F. Kennedy International Airport on Feb. 6. On Feb. 13, after the plaintiffs were admitted to the U.S., the Court ordered the case to be stayed for 60 days so that the parties may discuss settlement. The Court also denied the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order without prejudice. On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On April 12, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The case is closed.


After a long delay in the processing of his Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) application to the U.S., on Nov. 6, 2015, an Iraqi citizen who supported U.S. reconstruction efforts in his home country filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff, represented by the private law firm Mayer Brown LLP, sued the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and the directors of those agencies. In 2008, Congress enacted the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act (RCIA), making Iraqi nationals under threat because of their support of U.S. operations in Iraq eligible for SIVs. In 2013, Congress amended the RCIA and directed that the processing of each SIV application should be completed within 9 months. Plaintiff alleged that defendants failed to make a determination on his SIV application within nine months, in violation of the RCIA and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiff sought injunctive and mandamus relief to compel defendants to adjudicate his SIV application without any further delay. Plaintiff, who was granted leave to proceed by pseudonym because of the risk of reprisal he faced in Iraq, asserted that, at the time the complaint was filed, it had been over five years since he began the SIV application process. Plaintiff further contended that in the time that his application was in delayed processing, "terrorist groups and militias . . . hostile to U.S. forces and the Iraqi government . . . resumed their threats against individuals who have assisted the U.S. Government." Plaintiff asserted that he and his family received threats and acts of violence because of his affiliation with the U.S. government. Moreover, plaintiff stated that his wife and daughter had received SIVs and were planning to move to the U.S. without him, "creat[ing] and additional hardship as his wife and child will be forced to start a new life in a strange country without him." 2015 WL 9647660. According to the complaint filed in Afghan and Iraqi Allies v. Pompeo, at some point in January of 2016, defendants provided the requested relief and adjudicated plaintiff's SIV application without seeking a dismissal. Following defendants' adjudication of plaintiff's SIV application, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.

Summary: An Iraqi national who worked for the U.S. government in his home country who applied for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) to the U.S. filed this lawsuit against the Departments of State and Homeland Security in November 2015 after he experienced long delays in the processing of his application. The plaintiff alleged that both agencies were violating a 2013 congressional mandate that SIV applications must be processed fully within nine months, resulting in threats to his family's lives and well-being. Shortly after the complaint was filed, defendants provided the requested relief and adjudicated plaintiff's SIV application. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case filed March 30, 2020, by a particularly vulnerable immigration detainee, the Court granted release on April 5, holding that ongoing detention was unlawfully punitive given the grave threat posed by detention during the coronavirus pandemic. Additional detainees intervened, and the Court has granted additional releases and has converted the TROs ordering releases into preliminary injunctions. The Court certified a class, instituted procedures for bail applications from detainees within the class, and continued to grant temporary releases upon application. The defendants appealed the releases on October 2. Applications for release are ongoing and the appeal is pending. <hr> On March 30, 2020, an individual lawful permanent resident, in removal proceedings in Detroit and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) at the Calhoun County jail, filed this emergency habeas petition and complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff sued ICE and two of its officers, the acting director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Attorney General of the United States, and the director of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). The plaintiff claimed that her continued detention violated her Fifth Amendment rights by exposing her to substantial risk of illness and death. The plaintiff sought emergency relief via a writ of habeas corpus or an injunction "ordering Defendants to immediately release [Petitioner], with appropriate precautionary public health measures, on the grounds that her continued detention violates the Due Process Clause [of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments].” The case was assigned to Judge Judith E. Levy. The case was prompted by the outbreak of COVID-19 in Michigan; as of April 5, 2020, there were "15,718 confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 617 known related deaths, with 238 confirmed cases within the [MDOC] system specifically." The outbreak resulted in public health measures emphasizing and enforcing social distancing throughout the area. However, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) "noted that many detention conditions create a heightened risk of danger to detainees," as detainees are unable to exercise effective social distancing and good hygiene measures. "Even the most stringent precautionary measures" to slow the spread of COVID-19 in detention facilities are likely to be inadequate; "medical experts at the Department of Homeland Security have warned that detention confinement creates a 'tinderbox scenario' where rapid outbreak is extremely likely, and extremely likely to lead to deadly results as resources dwindle on an exponential level." The spread of COVID-19 (for which there is no vaccine, known treatment, or cure) would be especially dangerous for detainees over the age of 50 or those with certain underlying health conditions such as lung, heart, and kidney disease. The first plaintiff was 56 years old and asserted that she suffered from several health conditions, including essential primary hypertension and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, making her particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death in the event that she contracts COVID-19. The plaintiff alleged that because of her underlying health problems and the conditions of confinement making disease prevention difficult, continued detention amounted to punishment and failed to ensure her safety and health, violating her right to due process. The plaintiff asserted that despite the measures taken by the facility to mitigate the risk of a COVID-19 outbreak, "due to her underlying serious health conditions, there is no communal holding facility where she could be incarcerated during the COVID-19 pandemic that would be constitutional." The plaintiff simultaneously filed an application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) "requesting that the Court order Petitioner’s release during the pendency of her immigration proceedings due to the substantial risk to her health posed by COVID-19 as a result of Petitioner’s continued detention in the enclosed group environment endemic to the Calhoun County Correctional Facility." On April 5, Judge Levy issued an opinion and order granting the application for TRO in part. Judge Levy ordered the defendants to release the plaintiff immediately, "subject to the following restrictions: Petitioner is subject to fourteen days of home quarantine; Petitioner must comply with all Michigan Executive Orders; and Petitioner must appear at all hearings pertaining to her removal proceedings." Judge Levy enjoined the defendants from arresting the plaintiff for civil immigration detention purposes until the State of Emergency in Michigan is removed and required them to show cause by April 10 as to why the TRO should not be converted into a preliminary injunction. Judge Levy concluded that the plaintiff established the likelihood of irreparable harm; "confinement at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility renders her substantially likely to contract COVID-19, and Petitioner’s severe health conditions render her substantially likely to suffer irreparable harm or death as a result." Moreover, Judge Levy found that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits of her due process claim, stating that the release of the plaintiff was the only reasonable response to the substantial risk to her safety and that continued detention was "both unrelated and contrary to the government purpose of carrying out her removal proceedings." Lastly, Judge Levy concluded that the public interest favored the plaintiff's release because of the risk that her constitutional rights would be deprived absent an injunction and because her release would protect public health. 2020 WL 1672662. (The next day, Judge Levy issued an amended opinion and order adding a term of supervision for the plaintiff's release; "respondents may impose other reasonable nonconfinement terms of supervision.") On the same day as she granted the first TRO, Judge Levy also granted a motion allowing two individuals to intervene. The intervenors, represented by the ACLU of Michigan and the law firm Paul Weiss, filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus and complaint for injunctive relief, as well as an emergency motion for TRO. Judge Levy issued an order limiting the parties' responses to the intervenors' motion for TRO to whether the reasoning in the Court’s amended order applied to intervenors' motion. In that order, Judge Levy stated that the intervenors' motion raised substantially similar factual and legal issues as the plaintiff's application for TRO. Following expedited briefing, on April 9, Judge Levy issued an opinion and order granting in part the intervenors' motion for a TRO, requiring that one of the intervenors be immediately released from detention for the duration of the COVID-19 State of Emergency in Michigan or until further Court order. The other intervenor who requested immediate release in the motion for TRO had already been released from ICE detention on an Order of Supervision. The intervenor who was granted immediate release from detention was 55 years old and suffered from hypotension, hernia, and prostrate issue. Judge Levy concluded that, although the intervenor presented a less severe risk than the plaintiff who had been granted immediate release, the intervenor was warranted immediate release "because he is at a sufficiently heightened risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19," applying the same reasoning used in the April 5 order for TRO. Moreover, Judge Levy found that the intervenor's "alleged incomplete access to medical care weighs in favor of granting relief." The defendants were required to show cause, by April 21, as to why the TRO should not be converted into a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 1809675 On April 10 the defendants filed their response to the Court's order to show cause as to why the April 5 TRO should not be converted to a preliminary injunction. Defendants argued that "the Court erred in finding a high likelihood of irreparable harm because '[plaintiff] has not shown that she has a substantial risk of exposure to COVID-19 at CCDC.'" Moreover, the defendants asserted that the plaintiff did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits because she “has not shown that Respondent is deliberately indifferent in light of the precautions taken at CCDC to reduce exposure to COVID-19.” Lastly, the defendants contended that the plaintiff "cannot show that her continued detention amounts to impermissible punishment.” A week later, on April 17, Judge Levy issued an opinion and order converting the April 5 TRO into preliminary injunction, requiring the plaintiff's continued release. In concluding that converting the TRO into a preliminary injunction was "appropriate and necessary," Judge Levy found that plaintiff was "at unreasonable risk of contracting COVID-19 should she remain in the Calhoun County Correctional Facility, regardless of precautions taken," and that she was at "serious risk of severe illness and death should she contract COVID-19." Judge Levy stated that "to order Petitioner’s continued civil detention would be to play Russian roulette with her rights and with her life." 2020 WL 1899570 In their response to the court's order to show cause, the defendants argued that a preliminary injunction was unwarranted with respect to the intervenor because the intervenor had not shown his risk of exposure to COVID-19 sufficiently to state a cognizable constitutional claim and because he had not shown that defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Furthermore, defendants argued that the public interest favors denying injunctive relief because releasing intervenor "would support a finding that it is unconstitutional for ICE to detain any noncitizen during the COVID-19 pandemic." On April 22, Judge Levy issued an opinion and order converting her second TRO into a preliminary injunction, requiring release to last through the duration of the COVID-19 outbreak. Judge Levy concluded that injunctive relief was appropriate because intervenor had "shown a high likelihood of irreparable injury were he to be returned to the Calhoun County Correctional Facility, both in the form of substantial risk to his health and life from COVID-19 and due to his alleged constitutional violations." Moreover, Judge Levy found that intervenor's "age and mobility limitations place him at a high risk of severe complication and/or death from a COVID-19 infection," thus establishing a high likelihood of success on the merit of his deliberate indifference claim. Last, Judge Levy concluded that granting injunctive relief for this one highly vulnerable individual would not serve as precedent for releasing many non-citizens from immigration detention. The plaintiffs then submitted yet another motion for a temporary restraining order, which made basically the same complaints as the previous ones. The defendants filed a response to that motion a few days later, and then, on May 12, Judge Levy issued an order partially granting that motion but as a preliminary injunction. She found that some, but not all, of the plaintiffs had demonstrated a risk of severe illness or death, and so granted the motion as to those individuals. She requested supplemental briefs from both sides, then issued another order on May 23. This second order granted release for two more plaintiffs. On June 5, the plaintiffs submitted another motion for a TRO, which made the same arguments as the previous complaints, but with regard to different inmates. On June 28 the court granted that motion for all but one of the inmates named in that motion. All together, Judge Levy ordered about a dozen releases. Meanwhile, on June 14, the plaintiffs also submitted a motion to certify the class. The proposed class was defined as "all noncitizens who are detained in Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody at Calhoun." The motion also contained a subclass, defined as "all noncitizens who are detained in ICE custody in the Calhoun County Correctional Center, and who have one or more risk factors placing them at heightened risk of severe illness or death if exposed to COVID-19." On July 31, the court granted class certification. The order certified a class of noncitizens detained in ICE custody at Calhoun and a habeas subclass of noncitizen detainees in ICE custody at Calhoun who have at least one medical problem that places them at greater risk of serious illness or death. On August 4, Judge Levy issued an order establishing bail hearing procedures for the members of the habeas litigation subclass. The procedures included individualized bail hearings akin to criminal proceedings that consider danger and flight risks beginning on August 12 for members of the subclass, once the court had determined each individual's membership in the subclass. On August 19, Judge Levy issued an order amending the class and habeas litigation group definition to include "noncitizens formerly detained at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility and released as a result of an order issued by the undersigned." This order was issued to cover detainees with functionally identical claims who had individually applied for release and were no longer in custody, but still faced re-detention should their order or injunction expire or be overturned. The defendants then filed a motion to amend the June 28 order granting the preliminary injunction that resulted in the release of six medically vulnerable detainees on the basis that a recent Sixth Circuit decision constituted an intervening change in controlling law rendering the decision an error in law. On August 25, Judge Levy issued an opinion and order denying the defendants' motion and holding that the decision was not at odds with the initial order and was not binding precedent because it was an unpublished opinion. Between September 28 and October 22, Judge Levy issued four orders granting bail applications for six detainees, noting that Calhoun County Correctional Facility at that time had twelve positive cases for COVID-19. After receiving notice from Defendants that an additional thirteen detainees and two staff members tested positive for COVID-19 at Calhoun County Correctional Facility, the court held an emergency hearing to hear testimony on the surge in cases and precautionary measures on October 26. On October 27, Judge Levy issued an order requiring the defendants to submit a proposed plan to address the risks to detainees, particularly individuals that have been identified as high-risk detainees. Defendants submitted a response on October 27, highlighting segregated housing, bi-weekly testing, mask mandates in common areas for detainees and staff. In the subsequent weeks, the plaintiffs alleged that the implementation of the defendants' plan failed to address the escalating crisis in the facility. The number of COVID cases among people incarcerated at the facility and the facility's employees increased. As such, because the class members were still being exposed to deliberate-indifference level of harm in the facility, Judge Levy granted the bail applications of eight class members deemed not to be a flight risk on November 30. 2020 WL 7027435. Judge Levy continued to grant additional bail applications in the following weeks. See, e.g., 2020 WL 7264756. To get a better sense of the conditions at the facility, Judge Levy also ordered for an in-person inspection to be conducted by the plaintiff's expert. On January 7, 2021, Dr. Homer Venters submitted his report pursuant to this order. His report detailed "fundamental, structural issues" at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility that still persisted despite the defendants' precautions. Specifically, there was a lack of social distancing, a lack of comprehensive testing, and inadequate screening for COVID-19 symptoms. Dr. Venters concluded that the plaintiffs continued to raise substantial claims of law for habeas litigation group members because the risk of infection was too high for individuals with a pre-existing conditions. Meanwhile, the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit multiple orders granting bail. These appeals remain pending while the case is ongoing.

Summary: In March 2020, during the outbreak of COVID-19 in Michigan, a civil immigration detainee critically vulnerable to the infectious disease filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff filed a habeas petition, suing ICE and its directors for violation of her constitutional rights. The plaintiff argued that continued detention in the face of a potential outbreak in the detention facility, which would expose the plaintiff to substantial harm, amounted to punishment and failed to ensure their safety and health, in violation of the Due Process Clause. On April 5, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order seeking immediate release from the detention center. On April 9, the court also granted an intervenor's motion for temporary restraining order and required him to be released immediately. After issuing five injunctions for thirteen detainees, the court on July 31 granted class certification. The court established a class of immigrant detainees at Calhoun and a subclass seeking habeas release of those detainees who faced one or more medical problems that increased risk of serious illness or death. The court then instituted procedures for processing bail applications from detainees qualifying as members of the subclass. On August 4, Judge Levy issued an order establishing bail hearing procedures for the members of the habeas litigation subclass. On August 19, Judge Levy issued an order amending the class and habeas litigation group definition to include detainees with functionally identical claims who had individually applied for release and were no longer in custody, but still faced re-detention should their order or injunction expire or be overturned. Between September 28 and October 22, Judge Levy issued four orders granting bail applications for six detainees, noting that Calhoun County Correctional Facility at that time had twelve positive cases for COVID-19. After notice of positive cases in the facility, the court required the defendants to produce a public health plan, which ultimately included testing and social distancing measures. The defendants appealed the releases on October 2. The case is ongoing.


On December 4, 2008, a class of pregnant women who gave birth while incarcerated in the Cook County Jail in Chicago, Illinois, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and state law had been violated. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that defendants' policy of shackling pregnant women to their birthing tables for several days surrounding birth, without breaks to walk or use the bathroom, violated the women’s constitutional rights. Between December 2007 and December 2008, the Cook County Jail transported pregnant female prisoners to Stronger Hospital when they went into labor. The Sheriff allowed the practice of shackling women to their obstetric tables before, during, and after birthing. The purported justification for this practice was the repeated escape attempts of mothers during childbirth. The plaintiffs alleged that this practice not only endangered the health of the mother and child, but also led to indignity and humiliation for the mothers because the shackles would not be removed for any purpose, forcing mothers to soil the beds. This practice, plaintiffs claimed, also greatly increased the chances of infection. One plaintiff had been shackled for two days to the hospital bed. Another plaintiff was shackled to the bed, without permission to use the bathroom or to leave for five days. Other class representatives alleged similar experiences involving shackling between December 2007 and December 2008. On December 9, 2009, the court (Judge Amy J. St. Eve) denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, finding that the proposed plaintiffs did not fulfill the adequacy of representation requirement for class action certification. The court also found that class action would not be superior to other available methods for adjudicating the controversy. The plaintiffs attempted to bring an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, but the court denied leave to appeal on March 23, 2010. On May 10, 2010, after the plaintiffs' attorneys filed a myriad of individual claims against Cook County, the plaintiffs made an amended motion to certify a class. The Court certified the class on June 22, 2010. Thereafter, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. The defendants argued that supervisory liability could not attach unless the plaintiffs could prove that the Sheriff was personally involved in enforcement of the policy. The court denied the defendants' Motion to Dismiss on December 29, 2010. The court found that the plaintiffs' allegations in the complaint were sufficient in alleging that the defendant Sheriff knew of and was involved in the enforcement of the shackling policy sometime after December 2007. Thereafter the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 20, 2011, the Court granted the defendant Sheriff's motion for summary judgment as to damages against him in his individual capacity but denied the defendants and plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment on the Substantive Due Process and state law negligence claims. Following a series of settlement conferences, the plaintiffs submitted a settlement agreement to the court for approval on May 17, 2012. The agreement provided that a total settlement fund of $4.1 million would resolve all class liability for the shackling policy and would be allocated to class members via a point distribution system that took account of the nature and duration of the shackling each class member endured. On August 30, 2012, Judge St. Eve approved the settlement and the court dismissed the case without prejudice with leave to reinstate by August 30, 2013. Judge St. Eve granted the plaintiff's motion to expedite first payout to class members. At the conclusion of all settlement payments, almost $900,000 remained in the settlement fund. So, on December 14, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to close out administration, requesting the remaining funds be used for a substance abuse and mental health treatment program for women. Within the Cook County Circuit Court, Haymarket Center and the Maternal Objectives Management (MOMS) program oversaw such programs. The defendant refused to release the remaining funds, and so the Haymarket Center filed a motion to intervene on September 22, 2017, arguing entitlement to the funds as part of the settlement agreement. On October 19, 2017, Judge St. Eve granted the defendant's motion for relief and denied the Haymarket Center's motion for intervention and enforcement. As Cook County cancelled the contract with Haymarket Center in September 2016, any such funds diverted to the Haymarket Center would not be allocated to members of the class. Instead, Judge St. Eve ruled that the defendant could retain the money in a special fund to provide in-house treatment and counseling services for women in Cook County custody. The plaintiffs filed a motion on October 31, 2017 requesting reconsideration and a stay of judgment regarding Judge St. Eve's order granting defendant's relief. On April 9, 2018, Judge St. Eve granted the motion for reconsideration and denied the plaintiffs' motion for a stay as moot. The Court held that it had failed to properly incorporate the terms of the settlement agreement in its 2012 dismissal of the case, and therefore lacked jurisdiction to alter the settlement agreement—even though the County had ended its contract with Haymarket. Thus, the defendants were required to comply with the Payout Procedure of the settlement and allocate the remaining settlement funds to Haymarket. The case is now closed.

Summary: A group of pregnant women previously incarcerated at the Cook County jail in Chicago, Illinois at the time they gave birth filed this class action against Cook County in December of 2008. The plaintiffs claimed that the policy of shackling women to an obstetric table before and during labor, as well as for days after they have given birth, with no allowance for breaks to walk or use the bathroom violated their constitutional rights. The case settled in May 2012 for 4.1 million dollars. The case is now closed.