On August 9, 2011, Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), doing business as Prison Legal News (PLN), a publisher that produces a monthly journal concerning criminal justice issues, filed suit in the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Michigan against the Livingston County Sheriff and Livingston County under 42 U.S.C. §1983. PLN, represented by private counsel and the Human Rights Defense Center, claimed that defendants had implemented a mail policy at the Livingston County Jail that restricted the right to free expression held by PLN and its subscribers as protected by the First Amendment. PLN sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. Specifically, PLN alleged that Livingston County Jail had, without notice, censored and prevented addressees from receiving mail sent by PLN and did not provide them an opportunity to appeal the censorship decision. Moreover, PLN challenged the jail's postcard-only policy, which restricted correspondence to prisoners via postcards. PLN argued that these actions and policies violated their right to freedom of speech, press, and association protected by the First Amendment and that denying inmates notice of this censorship and an opportunity to appeal the decision to censor mail violated their right to due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. On October 7, 2011, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On January 12, 2012, PLN filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On October 12, 2012, the ACLU Fund of Michigan filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the plaintiff. On March 29, 2013, after a number of discovery disputes, District Court Judge Denise Page Hood denied PLN's motion and granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion. The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction because it found that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the requisite likelihood of success on the merits, and because the issuance of injunctive relief could have a significant effect on the safety of both inmates and jail personnel alike. Prison Legal News v. Bezotte, No. 11-CV-13460, 2013 WL 1316714, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2013). As for the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court found that plaintiff's First Amendment claims survived except to the extend that the plaintiff had failed to state a constitutional claim for failure to allow visitation of inmates or delivery of "legal mail" that is not personally marked to an individual inmate. The court also found that the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim remained. Prison Legal News v. Bezotte, No. 11-CV-13460, 2013 WL 1316732 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 29, 2013). Over the course of the next year, both PLN and defendants moved for reconsideration of these motions. These motions were denied by District Court Judge Denise Page Hood, though the court did issue an amended order granting in part and denying in part defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings. Prison Legal News v. Bezotte, No. 11-CV-13460, 2014 WL 1405214, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2014). This amended order was largely identical to the order issued on March 29, 2013. The parties continued litigation various discovery disputes. Also during this time, on April 16, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to reflect the fact that Human Rights Defense Center was actually the entity that had the capacity to sue, rather than Prison Legal News. On March 31, 2016, in an order regarding various motions, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the earlier (March 29, 2013) order denying the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief. The court did so because it recognized that the prior order had failed to address Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. The court went on to address that claim here. To start, the court found that the plaintiff did have constitutionally protected interests in: (a) receiving notification from defendants when defendants reject (i.e., do not deliver) mail Plaintiff sends to designated inmates at the Livingston County Jail, and (b) being able to appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party (at least with respect to the initial copies of any publication). Because of this, the court went on to analyze the motion for a preliminary injunction based on this Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. In looking at the likelihood of success on the merits of this claim, the court applied the four factor test from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), that the Supreme Court had identified to determine whether a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights. The court found that the defendant had failed to satisfy the first factor because it had not provided a legitimate penological interest to justify the defendant's practice of not notifying the sender or the designated inmate recipient of the fact that the sender's mail to such intended inmate recipient was rejected (information which necessarily precluded the ability to appeal any such rejection to a third party). Based on this, the court found that the plaintiff's 14th Amendment procedural due process claim was likely to be successful on the merits. The court also found that the other three factors in the preliminary injunction analysis weighed in plaintiff's favor on this particular claim. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to a preliminary injunction as to defendants' failure to provide notice to, and an opportunity to appeal by, plaintiff and designated inmate recipients when defendants reject publications sent by Plaintiffs to such designated inmates at Livingston County Jail. Effectively immediately, in every instance that defendants rejected mail sent by plaintiff to a designated inmate at the Livingston County Jail (at least with respect to the initial copy of any publication), the defendants must: (a) notify Plaintiff of such rejection; (b) notify the designated inmate recipient of such rejection; and (c) notify Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient of the right to--and afford Plaintiff and the designated inmate recipient the opportunity to--appeal any such rejection to an impartial third party. In that same March 31, 2016 order regarding various motions, the court also granted both parties’ motions for sanctions against each other regarding various earlier disputes. The court would later issue an order on April 29, 2016, that recognized the parties stipulation to withdraw their respective requests for monetary sanctions. On another procedural note, on April 4, 2016, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, adding the Lieutenant with the office of the Sheriff of Livingston County and bringing claims against him in his individual and official capacity. This amended complaint also added a Fifth Amendment takings clause complaint based on allegations that the defendants improperly exercised control over and converted for their own use property that was entrusted to defendants for delivery to specific prisoners. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on July 29, 2016, and in the meantime continued litigating various procedural disputes, including a motion by plaintiff for civil contempt and for enforcement on the preliminary injunction on the Fourteenth Amendment due process claim. Plaintiff alleged that they had sent mail labeled "legal mail" but that it was returned to the sending address unopened. The court held a hearing on the summary judgment motions on October 6, 2016 and on March 31, 2017, the court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment with regard to the new Fifth Amendment takings clause claim, but denied both parties motions for summary judgment on the remaining claims because the court found genuine disputes of material fact during its application of the four Turner v. Safley factors. Shortly after this, on May 10, 2017, the court required a settlement conference to be conducted before Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. That conference was held the following week, and the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement. The settlement agreement was attached as an exhibit to the stipulated order of voluntary dismissal that ended the litigation on June 30, 2017. Under the agreement, Livingston County would accept up to 30 subscriptions per month of the Prison Legal News addressed to specific inmates, and the Livingston County Jail would deliver up to 30 books per month to specific inmates. In the event that Human Rights Defense Center sends more than 30 issues of Prison Legal News, and/or more than 30 books per month, Human Rights Defense Center would contact the Jail administrator, who agreed not to unreasonably withhold the delivery of these additional materials. The agreement also required the Jail to give notice of any censorship of these materials to both the HRDC and the inmate to whom it was addressed. Finally, Livingston County would pay plaintiff $295,000. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement. As of April 18, 2019, there does not appear to have been further litigation regarding compliance with the settlement. That said, the docket does contain two pro se hand written document filings (dated in May and August of 2018) where it appears that an inmate is challenging censorship practices at an institution in Texas.

Summary: On August 9, 2011, Human Rights Defense Center (PLN) filed suit against the Livingston County Sheriff and Livingston County claiming that defendants had implemented a mail policy at the Livingston County Jail that restricted the right to free expression held by PLN and its subscribers, and also that the defendants had violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Due Process right by denying adequate procedures for the censorship practice. After years of litigation, during which the plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, but failed to do so on the First Amendment claim, the parties finally settled on June 30, 2017. Among other things, the settlement agreement provided for: defendants to accept up to 30 subscriptions per month and 30 books per month, provided that they were addressed to specific inmates still residing at the jail. The defendants also agreed to pay $295,000, and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the agreement.


On October 19, 2000, a group of women farmers and ranchers filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture ("USDA") in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged in their complaint that the USDA had engaged in systematic discrimination against women farmers in ranchers in its farm loan and loan servicing programs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that women had been denied the opportunity to apply for loans in the USDA "Minority and Socially Disadvantaged Program" (which listed women as eligible applicants), and experienced delayed loan processing and servicing, all due to gender discrimination. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the USDA failed to investigate discrimination complaints brought to their attention, and also ignored reports from the Office of the Inspector General and Civil Rights Action Team, which described widespread failure to respond to complaints and keep records, and a lack of accountability regarding resolving these issues. Plaintiffs brought this action under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1691, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 551. They sought a declaration that the USDA's discriminatory practices were unlawful, compensatory damages of at least $3,000,000,000, and an order prohibiting discrimination and mandating full and timely enforcement of civil rights complaints. On January, 11, 2001, USDA moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint, pointing to the availability of alternative administrative remedies, time-barring issues, and the unavailability of APA claims when other causes of action are available. On February 20, 2001, the plaintiffs' moved for a preliminary injunction, asking the court to order the USDA to align their practices with the requirements of ECOA. The same day, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class of "Women, minorities and other protected participants in FSA's farm programs who petitioned, or would have petitioned had they not been induced, tricked, or otherwise prevented from timely filing a complaint, the USDA at any time between 1/1/1981, and 12/31/1999, for relief from acts of discrimination visited on them, as they tried to participate in such farm programs and who, because of the failings in the USDA civil rights complaint processing system [], were denied equal protection under the laws of the United States and deprived of due process in the handling of their discrimination complaints." District Court Judge James Robertson entered an order on March 2, 2001, denying the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. On December 13, 2001, Judge Robertson entered an order granting in part and denying in part USDA's motion to dismiss. Judge Robertson dismissed the APA and ECOA failure to investigate claims. 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25201 (D.D.C. 2001). The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. the Judge Robertson entered an order on September 29, 2004, denying plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, stating that the class lacked a showing of commonality stemming from a common policy of discrimination. 224 F.R.D. 240 (D.D.C. 2004). The plaintiffs filed an appeal of this order, which the Court of Appeals joined with the previous appeal regarding Judge Robertson's dismissal of the APA and ECOA claims. On March 3, 2006, the Court of Appeals (Judge David B. Sentelle) entered a judgment affirming in part and reversing in part. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of class certification and the dismissal of the failure to investigate claim under ECOA, but remanded the failure to investigate claim under the APA. 439 F.3d 723 (D.C. Cir. 2006). On May 19, 2006, District Court Judge Robertson entered a stay on the case. On November 30, 2007, Judge Robertson, after reviewing his decision regarding the failure to investigate claims under the APA, again dismissed the APA claim and the non-credit discrimination claims. 525 F. Supp. 2d 155 (D.D.C. 2007). Judge Robertson ruled that when a victim of discrimination can sue directly remedy her injury, no action lies under the APA for failure to adequately investigate, monitor, or police that discrimination. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. On December 4, 2007, Judge Robertson continued the current stay on the case. On April 24, 2009, the Court of Appeals (Judge Judith W. Rogers) affirmed the District Court's decision in this case and the similar decision in the Hispanic farmers discrimination case, Garcia v. Vilsack, except remanded the District Court's dismissal of the non-credit disaster claims. 563 F.3d 519 (D.C. Cir. 2009). On July 19, 2010, District Court Judge Reggie B. Walton stayed the case pending settlement negotiations. On March 23, 2011, approximately 286 individuals entered a motion to intervene. However, this was held in abeyance by Judge Walton pending the stay. In response to USDA's settlement proposal (which included an administrative claims framework), the plaintiffs filed their fourth amended complaint on July 13, 2012. The new complaint included a new series of counts, alleging that USDA had discriminated against women farmers by offering them an inferior settlement framework compared to the more generous frameworks given to African American and Native Americans who brought similar discrimination suits. In those counts, the plaintiffs asserted that the proposed framework was inferior because it appropriated much less money to the administrative claims process than the other settlements, required more evidence of discrimination, and since there was no certified class, the plaintiffs had no guaranteed access to counsel. The plaintiffs entered a putative class of "Women farmers who wish to apply for relief through USDA's administrative claims program for women farmers, but who, due to USDA's decision in offering a different program for women farmers, do not have the opportunity to apply for relief on equally beneficial terms to those offered by USDA to similarly situated African Americans and Native Americans." USDA moved to dismiss these additional count for lack of standing on September 24, 2012. The same day, USDA launched the "Hispanic and Women Farmers and Ranchers Claim Resolution Process." This claims process was open for 180 days, ending on March 25, 2013. The deadline was eventually extended to May 1, 2013. On October 15, 2012, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. USDA moved to stay the case on November 2, which Judge Walton granted on November 18. On December 11, 2012, Judge Walton entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs' claims regarding the discriminatory framework proposal, and denying their motion for summary judgment. 908 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D.D.C. 2012). However, the counts related to declaratory judgment and violation of the ECOA remain. On April 4, 2013, the Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association, Inc. moved to intervene in this suit. Both parties opposed this motion. On June 13, 2014, the Court (Judge Robert E. Payne) denied the Motion to Intervene. 304 F.R.D. 77. The BFAA appealed, and the appellate court denied the motions as moot given the passage of time and procedural posture of the case. 2014 WL 6725751. As of March 13, 2015, the administrator of the Claim Resolution Processed had received over 53,000 claims, 22,163 of which were deemed timely, and complete. The administrator then sorted eligible claims into three tiers with awards of up to $250,000. As of March 2015, all eight plaintiffs who participated in the program had been mailed their funds. In all, the administrator approved and paid out a total of 3,210 claims. On April 8, 2015, the Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the first two counts of their original claim (alleging discrimination when seeking farm loans) and to reinstate counts III through VI of their amended claim (alleging discrimination in the more recent claims administration process.) On November 14, 2016, Judge Walton granted the Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss and denied their motion to reinstate, at which point all the Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed. The Plaintiffs requested reinstatement of several claims from their fourth amended complaint, which was denied. The Plaintiffs were then only allowed to file separately for an award of fees, costs, and expenses. The Plaintiffs request for fees was denied on May 7, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 19, 2000, a group of women farmers and ranchers filed suit against the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging discriminatory practices involving farm loans and loan servicing. Defendants proposed a settlement agreement involving a administrative claims framework in 2012, but plaintiffs alleged additional discrimination, citing more generous settlements proposed to African American and Native American farmers who had sued regarding similar discrimination. Plaintiffs' claim related to the proposed framework was dismissed on December 11, 2012 by Judge Reggie B. Walton, but the original discrimination claims remain (this case is ongoing).


On April 6, 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The EEOC sued Henry's Turkey Service, a supplier of workers for poultry processors, on behalf of thirty-two men with intellectual disabilities. The EEOC alleged wage violations, disparate treatment, and maintenance of a hostile work environment based on the claimants' intellectual disabilities, and sought money damages and injunctive relief. The facts, all either admitted or proven true at trial, included that the men were employed by Henry's for a period of more than 30 years and that during this entire 30 year period the men were paid $65 a month, working at least 35 hours per week, and were never paid overtime when they should have been eligible. Non-disabled workers at the same facilities holding the same or similar positions received substantially higher wages. All of the claimants received monthly deposits of Social Security and/or Supplemental Security Income into their individual bank accounts. The defendant, by way of an officer listed as Designated Representative Payee on all of these accounts, had sole access to these funds, which according to the defendant were used to "reimburse" the company for the men's "room and board" and "in kind care." The defendant argued that the expense it bore for "room and board" and "in kind care" should be credited toward and justify the men's low wages. Further allegations, also proven at trial, included that, at least during the period from February 2007 to February 2009, the men were kept in substandard housing in a converted schoolhouse. They were subjected to harsh discipline, including but not limited to being restrained, being confined to rooms, and being denied restroom access. They were denied access to medical care. The men were hit and kicked by supervisors employed by Henry's. They were also subjected to derogatory and humiliating name-calling based on their disabilities. On June 25, 2012, the EEOC moved for partial summary judgment on the wage violations claims, which the court (Judge Charles R. Wolle) granted on September 18, 2012. The court found that there was no genuine dispute as to any material fact relevant to these claims, and therefore held as a matter of law that the defendant had engaged in unlawful and discriminatory pay practices in violation of the ADA, U.S.C. §12112(a). The EEOC, on behalf of the intellectually disabled employees, was awarded $1,374,266.53 plus prejudgment interest of $283,568.06, an amount based on the comparable market rate for the labor performed from February 2007 through February 2009. EEOC v. Hill Country Farms, 899 F.Supp.2d 827 (S.D. Iowa 2011). A jury trial on the other claims raised by the EEOC was held from April 23 through April 29, 2013. On May 1, 2013, the jury found for the workers on all claims, including disparate treatment as to the terms or conditions of employment of the intellectually disabled men, and maintenance of a hostile work environment. It found that each of the 32 workers was entitled to $5,500,000 as compensation. The jury also found that the defendant acted with malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of the disabled former employees, and that each of these former employees was entitled to $2,000,000 in punitive damages. The jury, following precedent, was not informed that the ADA and connected statutes capped damages at $50,000 per claimant. 42 U.S.C. §1981a (b)(2), (3)(A). Bound by this statutory limit, the district court entered a judgment on May 14, 2013, for the EEOC for $1,600,000 (equal to $50,000 per claimant) plus an additional $188,329 in interest. This judgment was in addition to the previously issued $1.37 million award of damages and interest for wage discrimination, discussed above. On May 23, 2013, the parties agreed to injunctive relief which included: [1] a requirement that Henry's or any of Henry's officers that reopen business inform the EEOC; [2] a permanent injunction to stop discriminating; [3] ADA training for employees and supervisors of any successor business; and [4] a requirement that Henry's or its successor business retain a mental health consultant to consider requests for reasonable accommodations. On June 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Wolle) entered final judgment approving the injunction agreed to in the May 23 stipulation, confirming the monetary awards already awarded by the court and added a requirement that Henry's pay the EEOC's costs of $10,487, and the court required the payment of post-judgment interest so long as the judgment remained unpaid. On August 6, 2013, Henry's appealed the pretrial denial of its summary judgment motion to the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit. On May 9, 2014, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court, stating simply that the district court did not err in refusing to vacate the motion for partial summary judgment and that it found no plain error in the admission of any evidence. 564 F. App'x 868 (8th Cir. 2014). There is nothing more in the docket after this holding, but since there was an injunctive remedy, presumably it remains open for enforcement if need be. As the New York Times reported in September 2015 collecting the money owed to the 32 men in this case, however, was troublesome. The combined judgments in this case and a previous one by the DOJ resulted in Henry’s owing over $3 million. The officers of Henry’s Turkey Service transferred many of their assets to their adult children and heirs; therefore, collection of the funds from the officers themselves proved to be difficult, and satisfaction of the judgment continued to elude the former employees. However, a land deal concerning a property dispute in Mills County, Texas, where Henry’s Turkey Service was based, piqued the interest of the the EEOC. They asked the United States attorney’s office for the Northern District of Texas to monitor this land deal for any suspicious activity. It turned out that this land deal involved a confidential settlement in which about $600,000 would have gone to the heirs of Henry’s Turkey Service, instead of to Henry’s itself or the former employees involved in this case. Federal officials were said to have found evidence of a “fraudulent transaction” and the U.S. Attorney filed an Emergency Motion for Turnover Order on August 26, 2015 in Case No. 3:12-CV-4737-P in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The motion asserted that the property in question belonged to Henry's, and therefore the court had the authority to turn over the property to the United States. The United States also requested that the court order that the U.S. should receive the $600,000 for application of debt owed of HCF. On September 3, 2015, with leave of the Court, the EEOC filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the motion. U.S. District Chief Judge Jorge A. Solis granted the Emergency Motion for Turnover Order on September 11, 2015. The order overrode the confidential settlement, re-directing the $600,000 in funds to the United States for application of the judgment for the 32 former employees. Judge Solis wrote that “[t]his was an intentional scheme concocted solely to shield a substantial sum of money from the United States collection efforts. Accordingly, the Court finds… any benefit due to the Estate under the Settlement Agreement is the property of HCF and, as such, is subject to this Court’s authority to aid the United States in obtaining satisfaction of its judgment against Henry and HCF.” In addition, the EEOC  announced  in September 2015 that it had managed to collect $272,000 of the the judgment through garnishments and liens. Adding in the additional $600,000 from the case before Judge Solis, the EEOC was able to coordinate with the U.S. Department of Labor to distribute $872,000 to the class members. As of December 2017, the EEOC was expected to collect an additional $900,000 from the estate of Kenneth Henry, who died in 2016. Distribution of this sum would bring the total recovery to roughly $1.7 million.

Summary: In 2012, the EEOC, on behalf of 32 intellectually disabled men, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against Hill Country Farms D/B/A Henry's Turkey Service. The EEOC demonstrated that Henry's discriminated against the men by paying the only $65 a month for full-time work, denying them access to medical care, physically and emotionally abusing them, confiscating their government benefits, forcibly confining them, and providing substantially substandard housing. The court awarded the EEOC $3.4 million in damages, to be distributed to the disabled claimants and granted injunctive relief. The defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in 2014.


On December 12, 1999, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the State of New Jersey and its Division of State Police under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The DOJ alleged that the defendants engaged in an unconstitutional pattern or practice of performing vehicle stops and searches of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey roadways, including the New Jersey Turnpike. Simultaneously with the filing of the government's complaint, the parties filed a joint application for the entry of the consent decree. The terms of the consent decree included:
A prohibition of racial profiling and racial discrimination of any kind by state troopers;
Documentation of various information (including race) for every traffic stop
New policies and procedures for receiving, investigating, and resolving citizen complaints;
Public reporting on a semiannual basis by the State Police about its law enforcement activities;
Creation of an Office of State Police Affairs by the Attorney General of New Jersey to assist in the implementation of the consent decree; and
Establishment of an independent monitor to oversee the implementation of the consent decree.
 In accordance with this consent decree, the parties selected Dr. James D. Ginger and Alberto Rivas, Esq. to act as the Independent Monitoring Team. The team was charged with oversight of the implementation of the provisions of the consent decree and with providing quarterly reports to the court. On October 6, 2000, the office of the Independent Monitor began providing status reports to the District Court. Similarly, the State Police began providing the District Court with progress reports and semiannual public status reports on October 27, 2000. On April 6, 2004, the District Court granted the parties' joint motion to dissolve certain portions of the 1999 consent decree which related to changes in the investigation and resolution of citizen complaints. On June 5, 2007, three individual members of the State Police moved to intervene in this action; they had filed lawsuits in state court alleging claims of employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment against the State of New Jersey, the State Police, and requested a federal judgment declaring that certain State Police documents regarding the consent decree, which were obtained from an anonymous source, should not be considered confidential. On December 6, 2007, U.S. District Judge Mary L. Cooper issued an order to show cause as to why this motion should not be denied, since both the discrimination and disclosure issues were then being addressed in a New Jersey state court proceeding. As of March 19, 2008, the individuals had failed to respond to the order to show cause, and thus Judge Cooper deemed their motion to intervene withdrawn. On August 27, 2009, the parties jointly moved for the termination of the consent decree. According to the parties, beginning with the tenth status report (for the period ending March 31, 2004) through the most recent report (for the period ending December 31, 2007), the monitors found that the defendants were in substantial compliance with the consent decree. On September 21, 2009, after considering the joint motion and its supporting documents, issued an order terminating the consent decree, closing this case.

Summary: On December 12, 1999, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the State of New Jersey and its Division of State Police under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 alleging an unconstitutional pattern or practice of performing vehicle stops and searches of African American motorists traveling on New Jersey roadways. The lawsuit was filed with a consent decree which was administered beginning December 31, 1999. The consent decree was terminated on September 21, 2009.


On May 6, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against Virginia in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The Plaintiff sued pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j. The case was assigned to Judge Leonie M. Brinkema. The events leading up to this lawsuit began in March 1997, when the DOJ informed the Governor of Virginia that it was commencing an investigation of the Central State Hospital (CSH). CSH is an institution covered by CRIPA and operated by Virginia to provide psychiatric treatment and other services to persons with mental illness. In April 1997, the DOJ conducted on-site inspections and evaluations of CSH. It found that conditions at CSH constituted a pattern of violations of the constitutional and federal statutory rights of patients, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794. In June 1997, the Plaintiff advised Virginia of these findings. Virginia then voluntarily started to develop a written plan to address the care provided at CSH. This plan would later get incorporated into the Settlement Agreement. On May 6, 1999, the DOJ filed both the complaint and Settlement Agreement in anticipation of the resolution of this case through the execution of the Agreement. To avoid adversarial litigation, the parties agreed upon a Plan (described in the Agreement) to remedy CSH's deficiencies that the U.S. found. The Settlement Agreement included the following important provisions for the Plan, among several other smaller promises: - The U.S. shall tour the facility with its expert consultants to assess the status of implementing the Plan. - The parties will share information necessary to determine Virginia's compliance with the Agreement. - Virginia shall provide the U.S. with quarterly summaries of each open or founded allegation of abuse and/or neglect, as well as other problematic incidents as defined in the Administrative Practice Manual. - Virginia shall allow the U.S. to take a certification tour, which is to permit the U.S. to assess the status of Virginia's implementation of the Plan. - By no later than July 1, 2000, Virginia shall provide written notice to the United States that it may conduct the certification tour (called the "Notice Date"). - If the Plaintiff found that Virginia failed to implement the Plan, the Plaintiff may file a motion to vacate the dismissal without prejudice and to restore the Action to the Court's active docket. This motion must be filed within ten months of the Notice Date. - If the Plaintiff fails to file a Motion to Restore within this time frame, Virginia shall be conclusively entitled to an order dismissing this case with prejudice. Judge Brinkema dismissed the case without prejudice on the same day the Settlement Agreement was filed. However, the case was not fully closed on this date because as explained more fully above, the Agreement stated that the U.S. may restore the case if Virginia failed to implement the Plan. By October 4, 2001, the government had not filed a motion to restore. Virginia thus filed a motion to dismiss the case. Judge Brinkema granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The case closed in 2001.

Summary: In May 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against Virginia and the Virginia-operated institution, Central State Hospital (CSH), in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The DOJ alleged that the conditions at CSH constituted a pattern of violations of the constitutional and federal statutory rights of CSH patients. The U.S. sued pursuant to Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997-1997j. In May 1999, the Court approved the parties' Settlement Agreement. In 2001, the Court dismissed the case with prejudice. The case closed in 2001.


On January 29, 2009, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District for the Eastern District of Michigan under the Fair Housing Act against a local property owner and his property manager. At issue was the treatment of female tenants in several single-family dwellings in Ypsilanti, Michigan. The U.S. alleged that the property manager engaged in a pattern and practice of subjecting current and prospective female tenants to sexual discrimination and harassment, and that the owner knew or should have know of his behavior and took no action to stop it. The complaint (subsequently amended) sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief along with civil penalties. The specific facts alleged were that the property manager demanded sexual favors from female tenants in exchange for rental and for services, subjected them to unwanted verbal sexual advances; entered the apartments of female tenants without permission or notice; granted and denied tangible housing benefits based on sex; and took adverse action against female tenants when they refused or objected to his sexual advances. After a full trial, a jury found liability in the amount of $115,000 on August 6, 2010. On September 20, the U.S. then sought injunctive relief and penalties, which District Judge Julian Abele Cook granted on March 3, 2011. The Order imposed the maximum allowable $55,000 in civil penalties against the property manager and $27,500 against the owner. Additionally, it imposed a fairly detailed injunction:

It imposed a general prohibition against gender discrimination.
It required the owners to adopt and distribute written non-discrimination policies, identifying and giving contact information for the owner and any manger, and providing information necessary for filing a complaint with the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Defendants were required to post EHO signs and to receive and provide EHO for the owners and any current and future employees.
 It required detailed record-keeping and reporting requirements to allow compliance monitoring.
 It permanently prohibited the property manager, from ever having "any involvement in the management, rental, or maintenance of any dwelling, as defined by the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 802(b)."
 The case terminated on May 18, 2011. The injunction period for payments to the plaintiff was later extended through the end of 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: The Department of Justice brought suit against a property owner and property Manager in Michigan, alleging that the property manager engaged in a pattern and practice of subjecting current and prospective female tenants to sexual discrimination and harassment. A jury found liability in the amount of $115,000 for the plaintiff. The court imposed an injunction on the defendants that included a general prohibition against gender discrimination and a requirement that defendants adopt and distribute written non-discrimination policies.


On November 23, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601 against the owner of a single-family house in Orland Park, Illinois that was made available for rent. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant refused to rent the Orland Park house to African-American tenants. The plaintiff presented the results of testing conducted by the local fair housing center that indicated that the defendant was willing to rent to white persons, but that when a black person or, as in this case, a mixed-race couple applied, suddenly the house was not available. The testers recorded conversations with the owner, including one in which the owner confirmed the house was available, then asked the caller if her husband was black. The owner told the tester that "blacks had been trying to break the color barrier", that they "did not belong in the neighborhood" and that "since she was white" he would offer her the house at a discount. The individuals denied housing also filed a lawsuit and the cases were consolidated. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On January 19, 2011, the Court (Judge Young B. Kim) approved a consent Decree agreed to by the parties. The defendant acknowleged liability and, in addition to general prohibitions aginst race discrimination, agreed not to engage personally in the renting, management , or showing of any dwelling, that rather, a third party approved by the United States would perform those services. The consent decree also required the defendant to create and distribute a non-discrimination policy, pay $30,000 in monetary relief, and pay $5,000 as a civil penalty to the United States. The order was set to last a period of five years from the date of its entry. These five years passed with no further activity, and the case is now presumably closed.

Summary: In this 2011 race discrimination case against the owner/renter of a single family dwelling, the United States secured a consent decree that, in addition to general prohibitions against race discrimination, forbid the owner/defendant from personally engaging in any aspect of the rental of any dwelling in which he had an ownership interest. Rather, a third party approved by the United States would provide those services to ensure that no comments or actions designed to discourage rental by non-whites could take place.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds, argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of these cases please see our collection of the Contraception Insurance Mandate cases here. On January 29, 2014, several privately-owned automobile dealerships filed this lawsuit challenging the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in the U.S District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The ACA's contraception mandate required employers to provide health insurance coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with reproductive capacity. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, alleging that the mandate infringed on their rights to free exercise of religion and free speech, the establishment of religion prohibition and equal protection, all in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The plaintiffs, represented by the Liberty Institute, complained that no exemption or accommodation existed for for-profit organizations such as theirs, even if they objected to the Mandate based on sincerely-held religious beliefs. On March 19, 2014, the District Court (Senior Judge Paul A. Magnuson) granted the plaintiffs' March 3, 2014, motion for stay until the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (later recaptioned as Burwell v. Hobby Lobby). Because the government agreed to not take action while waiting for the Supreme Court's ruling, the plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction was denied as moot. On May 28, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' renewed preliminary injunction and enjoined the defendants from enforcing the contraception mandate, again, while waiting for the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby ruling, which was handed down on June 30, 2014. In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In this case, on December 10, 2014, the District Court entered a judgment--stipulated by both sides--that in light of the Supreme Court's Hobby Lobby decision, the government was enjoined from enforcing the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs. In March of 2015, the Court granted an extension of time for the plaintiffs to move for attorneys' fees. There are no further entries on the docket, so we do not know how the issue was resolved. The case is now closed.

Summary: A group of privately-owned automobile dealerships filed a lawsuit U.S District Court of Minnesota against the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The plaintiffs claimed that the contraceptive mandate to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA"), violated their free exercise of religion and speech the establishment of religion prohibition and equal protection under the First Amendment, the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. On May 28 2014, the District Court granted an unopposed preliminary injunction, and on December 10, 2014, entered a stipulation for entry of judgment enjoining the defendants from enforcing the contraceptive requirements in ACA.


On August 26, 2020, a legal services provider and seven individuals with Temporary Protected Status (TPS) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The individual plaintiffs, along with the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN), challenged a new “policy alert” from the government (“the Policy”) that dismantled TPS beneficiaries’ means of obtaining lawful permanent residency (LPR). Represented by Democracy Forward Foundation, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network (CLINIC), and Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, the plaintiffs alleged that the Policy violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), equal protection under the Fifth Amendment, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and the Appointments Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, vacatur of the Policy, and fees under the APA and INA. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. The complaint explained that immigrants with TPS are protected from deportation so long as their home countries are afflicted by armed conflict, natural disaster, or epidemic. However, so long as immigrants with TPS remain in the U.S., they are under an “awaiting deportation” status. This prevents them from becoming lawful permanent residents, and once their home country is deemed safe, they will be deported. The plaintiffs claimed that, since the Immigration Act of 1990 amended the INS, immigrants with TPS have been able to circumvent the “awaiting deportation” status by leaving the country and coming back through lawful channels. This is based on the wording of the statute, which states that any immigrant “ordered deported or removed … who has left the United States, shall be considered to have been deported or removed in pursuance of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(g) (emphasis added). According to the complaint, on December 20, 2019, the Office of the Director of USCIS issued the Policy, purporting to clarify the status of TPS beneficiaries who left the country. It determined that lawful return to the U.S. removes awaiting deportation status, thereby eliminating the method by which TPS beneficiaries could become eligible for LPR. The plaintiffs argued that the government neither provided any reasoning for the “clarification,” nor acknowledged that this shift would depart from decades of practice and literal interpretation of statute. The Policy, the plaintiffs said, was particularly devastating because TPS status was removed from several countries that were still afflicted by substantial instability, including Sudan, Nicaragua, Nepal, Honduras, Haiti, and El Salvador (though as of November 13, 2020, their TPS status was nonetheless being maintained by a preliminary injunction issued in another case challenging DHS's TPS rules. See Ramos v. Nielsen). Lacking a means to LPR, immigrants from these countries who previously had TPS, and who would face great danger if forced to return, would have no legal recourse to allow them to stay in the U.S. should the injunction expire. Plaintiffs argued that the Policy facially violated the previously mentioned clause of the INS (8 U.S.C. § 1101(g)). The complaint further averred that it violated the APA because no notice was given and the Policy was “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” It also stated that the Policy was driven by “animus against immigrants of color” in violation of equal protection. Moreover, the plaintiffs pointed out that the Policy was issued under the supervision of USCIS's Acting Director, who they alleged was serving in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and appointments clause, both because he was unqualified and because he was appointed by someone who lacked authority to appoint him. See L.M.-M. v. Cuccinelli, another challenge to the validity of the Acting Director's appointment, for more information. On October 21, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction or, in the alternative, expedited partial summary judgment. The motion was orally denied without prejudice on November 12, 2020. As of November 13, 2020, the court is awaiting the defendant’s answer to the complaint, which is due by December 4, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Immigrants with Temporary Protected Status filed suit to enjoin USCIS from implementing a new policy that would block their route to permanent residency status. Plaintiffs argued the policy violated the INA and equal protection, and that its implementation violated the APA, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, and the appointments clause. The case is ongoing.


This is a case about whether South Carolina is required to provide proper therapy to children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) on Medicaid. On May 18, 2018, a child diagnosed with ASD and prescribed applied behavioral analytics treatment filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. The plaintiff sued the Director of the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought to enjoin South Carolina to provide him with necessary treatment. The plaintiff alleged that the agency that administers South Carolina’s Medicaid program violated his rights under Title XIX of the Social Security Act and several sections of the Medicaid Act, which provide that state Medicaid plans must provide “early and periodic screen, diagnostic, and treatment services” for eligible individuals with reasonable promptness. The case was assigned to Judge J. Michelle Child. Approximately two and a half years before the filing of this lawsuit, the plaintiff was diagnosed with ASD and prescribed applied behavioral analysis treatment by a licensed physician. Applied behavioral analysis treatment is a widely accepted treatment for ASD, however, it requires regular and lengthy sessions with trained providers. After that treatment was authorized on November 10, 2015 by the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, the plaintiff was placed on a waiting list to receive applied behavioral analysis treatment, where he continued to remain almost three years later. The plaintiff’s mother had no way of affording this treatment other than through Medicaid. The plaintiff also alleged that over 1,000 other South Carolina children with ASD who received healthcare through Medicaid faced long waits for treatment. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that this was due to South Carolina’s low payments for the services in question under Medicaid, which led to a dearth of providers willing to accept patients like the plaintiff. The defendant moved the court to dismiss the case on July 3, 2018. On July 24, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, omitting the allegations that South Carolina’s Medicaid rates for the services in question were inadequate, but requesting the same relief. Since that point, the case has moved slowly with deadlines relating to amendments to pleadings, expert witnesses, and mediation being repeatedly adjourned. As of writing this summary, the case is still pending and Judge Childs has issued no substantive opinions or orders.

Summary: In 2018, a South Carolina child with Autism Spectrum Disorder filed this class-action complaint in the United States District Court of the District of South Carolina. The plaintiff alleged that his rights under the Medicaid Act were violated when South Carolina’s Medicaid program did provide him with treatment for his disability, despite a wait of close to three years. The case remains pending.


This is another case, like those in Hazleton, Pennsylvania (IM-PA-1), Valley Park, Missouri (IM-MO-1), and Riverside, New Jersey (IM-NJ-1, and IM-NJ-2) about a city's efforts to bar undocumented immigrants from its jurisdiction. In this case, the City of Escondido passed an ordinance preventing landlords from renting or "harboring" illegal aliens in their property and imposing other related restrictions on rental and eviction proceedings. On November 3, 2006, a consortium of public interest organizations and lawyers and some firm lawyers filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, seeking a declaration of the Ordinance's unconstitutionality. On November 7, they sought a TRO, which the Court (Judge John A. Houston) granted on November 20. Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F.Supp.2d 1043 (S.D.Cal. 2006). A Preliminary Injunction hearing was scheduled for March, but in December, the City acceded to the lawsuit, agreeing to entry of a permanent injunction against enforcement of the ordinance, and paying plaintiffs' counsel $90,000 in attorneys fees. The injunction was entered on December 15, 2006.

Summary: On November 3, 2006, a consortium of public interest organizations and lawyers and some firm lawyers filed this complaint against the City of Escondido in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Plaintiffs sought a injunctive relief, claiming that a recently passed city ordinance that imposed many restrictions on renting property to "illegal aliens" was unconstitutional. A permanent injunction was entered on December 15, 2006.


On October 6, 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville) against the Knox County Sheriff’s Office. PLN sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendant violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of speech, due process, and equal protection by unlawfully censoring the books, magazines, and other mail they sent to inmates at the Knox County Jail. PLN claimed that from November 2014 to October 6, 2015, the defendant refused to deliver all publications and enveloped mail sent by PLN to prisoners at Knox County Jail, which censored PLN’s correspondence with inmates at the jail on matters of public concern. PLN also claimed that the defendant failed to inform them of the alleged violation of the jail's mail policy and depriving them of the opportunity to contest the decision. Represented by private counsel, PLN asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. On October 6, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. On February 3, 2016, Judge Thomas A Varlan granted the plaintiff’s motion to stay the action until March 31, 2016, which suspended court proceedings so that the parties could engage in mediation. All other pending motions, including the plaintiff's Oct. 6 Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, were denied with leave to refile upon lifting the stay. Mediation efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, and the plaintiff did not refile their motion. On October 13, 2016, the defendants filed an amended answer in which they admitted liability on the plaintiff’s First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, stating that the jail had revised their inmate mail policy to remove the restrictions that formed the basis for PLN’s constitutional challenges. On June 26, 2017, the parties filed a joint stipulation agreeing that: 1) PLN’s claims against the defendants should be dismissed, and 2) PLN sustained $25,000 in compensatory damages as a result of the defendant’s unconstitutional practices and should be awarded that amount. They also agreed that these two stipulations resolved all issues in the case except for the plaintiff’s entitlement to injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, and costs. The plaintiff moved for a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from resuming their unconstitutional practices in the future. The defendant argued that their voluntary cessation of unconstitutional conduct was genuine and that returning to their old practices would be an irrational waste of county resources, given the cost of litigation. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, holding that the issue of injunctive relief was moot because the defendant carried its burden of showing it would not readopt its unconstitutional mail policy in the future. The court noted that its denial of the plaintiff’s motion for permanent injunction did not close the case because the parties had yet to file motions concerning the plaintiff’s entitlement to attorney’s fees, the only remaining issue of the case. The parties settled as to attorneys fees on April 4, 2018. The amount they settle for is private. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Tennessee (Knoxville). PLN sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, against the Knox County Sheriff's Office. PLN claimed that the Sheriff's Office rejected censored, withheld and refused to deliver all publications and enveloped mail sent by PLN to prisoners at Knox County Jail. The Sheriff's Office also failed to provide procedural due process with regard to violation of the jail's mail policy, customs, and practices.


On Sept. 25, 2017, a group of Christian Indonesian nationals living in the United States filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including its component Boston and Manchester Field Offices of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Represented by the private law firm Nixon Peabody, the plaintiffs filed motions for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and stay of removal, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs alleged they were long-time residents in the United States. Despite being subject to final orders of removal for years, they had been able to remain in the country and periodically check-in under Orders of Supervision, through a voluntary ICE program called "Operation Indonesian Surrender." According to the plaintiffs, ICE had recently terminated this program. In June 2017, ICE's Boston Field Office instructed plaintiffs to prepare for removal to Indonesia, instead of allowing them time to seek relief in Immigration Court. As Christians, the plaintiffs feared persecution for their minority religious beliefs if they returned to Indonesia. The plaintiffs alleged that ICE's actions violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Chief Judge Patti B. Saris was assigned to the case. The next day, Sept. 26, Judge Saris held a hearing and then issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining the defendants from removing all named plaintiffs from the United States. On Sept. 28, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended class petition for writs of habeas corpus and mandamus, and an amended complaint. The plaintiffs asked for immediate relief from custody under their Orders of Supervision (absent an individualized finding of danger or flight risk), and certification of a class of similarly-situated individuals who had participated in Operation Indonesian Surrender and now risked imminent deportation. The plaintiffs amended their causes of action to include, in addition to Due Process and CAT, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)'s asylum provisions, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act (FARRA). At the Court's request, the defendants submitted a statement on jurisdiction on Oct. 3, 2017. They argued that under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, the district court lacked jurisdiction over the government's decision to enforce a final removal order, and that jurisdiction lay instead with the Immigration Courts. The defendants also maintained that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over most of the plaintiffs, who were not in detention and some of whom did not reside in the District. (One plaintiff was detained but had filed a separate habeas petition, Rombot v. Moniz, No. 1:17-cv-11577 (D. Mass. Aug 22, 2017).) Also on Oct. 3, the defendants produced documents relating to Operation Indonesian Surrender. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on Oct. 6, adding more named plaintiffs. Judge Saris held an evidentiary hearing on Oct. 20. On Nov. 22, the defendants appealed Judge Saris's TRO to the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which opened a new docket (No. 17-2160). On Nov. 27, Judge Saris issued an order holding that the District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over all of plaintiffs' claims (except the habeas claim, addressed in Rombot, which she dismissed without prejudice). Judge Saris enjoined defendants from removing plaintiffs until the Court ruled on the preliminary injunction motion or until further order of the Court. 2017 WL 5707528. On Dec. 20, defendants filed their opposition to plaintiffs' Sept. 25 motion for preliminary injunction and stay of removal. Defendants argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over the claims, which an Immigration Court should adjudicate. According to defendants, plaintiffs failed to show that defendants were likely to remove them before proceedings in an Immigration Court, and in the alternative they failed to show they were likely to face torture or death if removed. Plaintiffs replied on Jan. 5. Judge Saris held a Jan. 17, 2018 hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction and stay of removal. On Feb. 1, she issued an order granting the preliminary injunction. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16568. She found that, absent a stay, defendants would be likely to deport plaintiffs to Indonesia before the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and First Circuit could consider plaintiffs' motions to stay and reopen. Thus plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that they would be denied due process before being removed to a country where they have a credible fear of persecution. The order stayed defendants from removing any plaintiff from the United States until one of the following occurred: - a plaintiff failed to file motions to reopen and to stay with the BIA or the Immigration Court after receiving his or her A-file; or - a plaintiff did file these motions, but the Immigration Court denied them, and the plaintiff failed to appeal the denial to the BIA; or - a plaintiff did appeal the denial to the BIA, but BIA denied the appeal and the plaintiff failed to appeal this denial to the First Circuit; or - a plaintiff did appeal the denial to the First Circuit but the First Circuit did not order the stay to continue. On Mar. 30, defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the First Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-1281). The district court stayed its proceedings on June 27, pending resolution of the appeal. On February 6, 2019, a First Circuit panel of Judges Sandra Lynch, William Kayatta, and David Barron dismissed the case because the parties agreed that the terms of the injunction had been met and an appeal was no longer necessary. The panel denied the motion fo vacate. The defendants did not appeal to the Supreme Court, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On Sept. 25, 2017, a group of Christian Indonesian nationals living in the United States who were threatened with imminent removal filed this suit against the DHS and ICE's Boston and Manchester Field Offices. The court issued a TRO, enjoining defendants from removing all named plaintiffs from the United States, which a First Circuit panel upheld on appeal. The defendants filed no further appeals and the case is now closed.


Because this case predates PACER, the Clearinghouse has limited information on what occurred. On April 9, 1990, prisoners in the Kern County jail filed a complaint in the Eastern District of California against the county. The plaintiffs, represented by private firms and the Prisoner Rights Union, filed the complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on violations of plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint revolved around allegedly inadequate conditions in the jail. The plaintiffs claimed that overcrowding led to issues of inedible food, insufficient numbers of beds for prisoners, inadequate medical and mental health care, and other poor living conditions. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and attorney’s fees from the county. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Robert E. Coyle. On June 5, 1990, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion for class certification. The Clearinghouse does not have access to these motions so we do not know precisely what was sought. On June 27, 1990, the action was referred to Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds. On October 2, 1990, Chief Judge Robert E. Coyle granted the motion for preliminary injunction. The order required that the defendant maintain a cap on their prison population, provide all prisoners with beds, give certain prisoners access to day rooms, and make other changes to their processing procedures. This preliminary injunction was modified before trial, but the Clearinghouse does not have access to the documents that explain those modifications. On March 21, 1991, Chief Judge Coyle granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The class was certified as all present and future Kern County jail inmates, starting April 9, 1990. A jury trial ensued from May 1991 to June 1991. The available documents do not indicate the precise outcome of this trial. On March 20, 1992, the case was reassigned to Judge Garland E. Burrell. And on October 8, 1992, Judge Burrell ordered a permanent injunction based on the reports and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Moulds. This injunction ordered defendants to give all prisoners better access to the law library, place a cap on inmate populations, have more staff on duty, have translators on staff when inmates who request them were seeking medical or mental health services, allow certain inmates in administrative segregation better access to exercise equipment, and ensure all the prisoners get beds. However, the district court refused to order the defendants to stop using padded safety cells for suicidal inmates. In late November 1992, the defendant and plaintiffs filed cross-appeals to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs appealed the court’s refusal to bar the use of safety cells. The defendants appealed the district court’s order for the exercise policy to be changed and for the prison to provide non-inmate translators. While the permament injunction appeals were pending, on September 27, 1993, Magistrate Judge Moulds granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for sanctions, which the plaintiffs appealed. On January 28, 1994, Judge Garland Burrell, adopting in full the report and recommendations from Magistrate Judge Moulds, awarded plaintiffs attorney’s fees totaling $381,871.08. The defendants appealed this order to the 9th circuit. On May 17, 1994, the 9th circuit held that, due to a jurisdictional defect, it could not hear the plaintiffs' appeal of the order for sanctions. We don’t have access to know what the jurisdictional defect was. The 9th circuit transferred the appeal back to the district court for further action. On January 13, 1995, the 9th Circuit (Circuit Judges Cecil F. Poole, William C. Canby Jr., and Pamela Ann Rymer) affirmed the district court’s permanent injunction decision in part and reversed the decision in part. See 45 F.3d 1310 (1995). The appeals court affirmed the district court’s holding to refuse to enjoin the County from using safety cells, holding that temporary placement in safety cells was sometimes needed to deprive the prisoners of all means of harming themselves. The appeals court also affirmed the district court’s order to provide translators for prisoners during medical and mental health interviews, contending that this order was consistent with the jail’s existing policy. The appeals court reversed the decision of the district court with regard to the County’s policy on exercise access for prisoners housed in administrative segregation. The appeals court held that confinement and lack of exercise for these prisoners did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. On May 22, 1995, the 9th Circuit granted the defendant’s motion to vacate and remand the order for attorney’s fees made in January 1994. The proceeding was remanded back to the district court for further action. On July 7, 1995, the 9th Circuit (Circuit Judges Poole, Canby, and Rymer) denied the plaintiffs-appellants-cross appellees' petition for rehearing and rejected the suggestion for rehearing en banc. See 75 F.3d 448, 449 (9th Cir. 1995). After litigating over attorney’s fees for over a year, on September 30, 1996, Judge Burrell, based on the report and recommendations of Magistrate Judge Moulds, awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in the amount of $380,451.08. The defendant appealed this order awarding attorney’s fees on October 21, 1996. The plaintiff filed a cross-appeal on November 4, 1996. But on April 2, 1997, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice. The case was dismissed with prejudice on February 9, 1998. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the details of the voluntary dismissal. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 1990, Kern County Prisoners filed a class action lawsuit against the county for inadequate mental and physical health care within the prisons and other inadequate conditions. The court ended up granting the petitioners a preliminary injunction and, eventually, a permanent injunction and attorney's fees. The parties cross-appealed to the 9th circuit, who reversed some parts of the injunction and affirmed others. The parties ended up reaching a settlement in 1997. The case is now closed.


On January 30, 2018, Disability Rights Florida filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC). The case was assigned to Judge Robert Hinkle. The plaintiff alleged that FDOC provided inadequate mental health treatment to prisoners in violation of the Eighth Amendment, Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 12132, and the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. § 701. The plaintiff brought the suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, in addition to attorneys' fees. Specifically, the complaint alleged a number of constitutional and statutory violations, including a lack of individualized treatment planning, a lack of individualized treatment services, an inadequate number of hours for out-of-cell treatment and activities, inadequate treatment for patients engaging in self-injurious behavior, inappropriate psychotropic medication practices, and inadequate discharge planning. The complaint also alleged excessive use of isolation and restraint on inpatient mental health units, an inadequate punitive or disciplinary process for patients on the inpatient mental health units, limited to no coordination between medical and mental health teams for those in inpatient mental health units, and inadequate training of security and clinical staff assigned to the inpatient mental health units. In December 2016, before this suit was filed, the plaintiff notified the defendant of its intention to file this lawsuit and sent the defendant a draft copy of the complaint and a letter suggesting that the parties engage in mediation. Beginning in January 2017, the parties engaged in pre-litigation mediation sessions with Judge Harvey E. Scheslinger in order to negotiate a resolution. In December of 2017, after twelve months of mediation, the parties reached a final agreement. The parties agreed to remedy the constitutional violations, submit to independent monitoring, and pay attorneys' fees. In order to remedy the constitutional violations, the defendant promised to create and revise individualized treatment plans, mandate a minimum number of out-of-cell hours, appropriately treat inmates engaging in self-injurious behavior, appropriately administer psychotropic medication, and implement discharge planning. Finally, the parties agreed that Judge Schleslinger should preside over the case and enforce the settlement agreement because of his involvement with the mediation process. On January 31, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion in which they asked the court to approve the proposed settlement agreement. After transferring the case to Judge Schlesinger, the court adopted the settlement agreement on February 7, 2018. The court retains jurisdiction over the case until December 31, 2020, or 60 days after the receipt of the final monitoring report, whichever is sooner. In December 2019, the plaintiffs notified the defendants of their belief that the defendants were not in substantial compliance with the agreement at several prisons. The parties engaged in negotiations regarding the results of the first round of monitoring developed corrective action plans to address shortcomings identified in the first compliance assessment. But then the COVID-19 pandemic began causing several prisons to implement quarantines and interrupting the second round of monitoring under the agreement. The parties agreed to amend the settlement agreement and requested the court approve the modification in December 2020. Under the amended agreement, the court’s jurisdiction was extended until June 30, 2022. The court approved the settlement amendment on December 15, 2020. As of March 29, 2021, monitoring for compliance of the settlement agreement was ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, Disability Rights Florida filed suit against the Florida Department of Corrections (FDC) in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff alleged that FDOC failed to provide adequate mental health treatment to its prisoners in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties reached a settlement that involved substantive reforms to the mental health treatment system, ongoing compliance monitoring, and attorneys' fees.


This lawsuit challenges President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) suspending entry into the United States of citizens or nationals of Syria, Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Somalia, Sudan, and Libya. This case also challenges the government's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), alleging it was a precursor to the EO's "extreme vetting" of Muslims, and chronicled the government's attempts to resist disclosure of documents about this program. The original complaint was filed on January 23, 2017, (four days before the first Travel Ban EO was issued) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (in Seattle). On January 26, the court scheduled a status conference for May 2, 2017. The amended complaint, filed February 1, 2017, alleged that U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interpreted the January 27 EO to mandate suspension of adjudication of all pending petitions, applications, or requests from citizens or nationals of the seven banned countries, and that this suspension violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection, and Due Process. The plaintiffs also alleged that the EO had or would expand USCIS's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), which they argued imposed extra-statutory rules and criteria on Muslim applicants to delay and deny immigration benefits to which applicants were entitled. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought class certification for all others affected by the "Muslim ban" and by the "extreme vetting" that the plaintiffs alleged resulted in a suspension of review of applications for naturalization and LPR (Lawful Permanent Residence). The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the ACLU, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and private law firms. The case was assigned to District Judge John C. Coughenour. The plaintiffs were both Muslims. One was a Somali national, refugee, and LPR who had been waiting over three and a half years for adjudication of his naturalization application. The other was an Iranian nonimmigrant visa holder who had been waiting three years for adjudication of his LPR application. The plaintiffs alleged that they met all INA statutory criteria for the successful adjudication of their respective applications, but nevertheless that USCIS had suspended the adjudication of their applications under CARRP or its "extreme vetting" successor program. The plaintiffs moved for class certification on February 9, 2017. First, the plaintiffs argued that CAARP and the EO were unlawfully delaying or denying the immigration applications of thousands of people nationwide. The plaintiffs then proposed two nationwide classes: one class of naturalization applicants (LPRs applying for citizenship and subject to CAARP or its "extreme vetting" successor program, whose applications had not or would not be adjudicated within six months of filing), and one class of adjustment of status applicants (the same, except for persons applying for LPR status). The government filed a motion to transfer on March 2, 2017. They noted that USCIS had already granted the first plaintiff's naturalization application on February 22. Because the second plaintiff lived in North Dakota, defendants requested that the case be transferred to the District of North Dakota. Following developments in other litigation, including Washington v. Trump, in the Ninth Circuit, on March 6, the President rescinded the January 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). On March 21, 2017, plaintiffs responded to the government’s motion to transfer, arguing that the first plaintiff should remain as a proposed class representative because USCIS had delayed his application for so long, despite its recent approval. The plaintiffs also announced that their second amended complaint would add more plaintiffs in the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on April 4, 2017, arguing that EO-2 had essentially the same effect on plaintiffs as the first EO because it targeted almost the same countries and allowed CAARP or a successor "extreme vetting" program to continue. The second amended complaint also listed three additional Muslim plaintiffs from Libya, Iraq, and Pakistan who had all waited over one year for adjudication of their immigration applications. On April 10, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to amend their February 9 motion for class certification, retaining the same two proposed classes but adding the new plaintiffs as additional class representatives. On April 11, Judge Coughenour dismissed as moot the original class certification motion and replaced it with the amended motion. Judge Coughenour also lifted the stay on defendants' motion to transfer venue and denied the motion. The court noted that, although the first plaintiff had recently been approved for naturalization, additional plaintiffs who resided in the Western District of Washington had just been added to the plaintiffs' amended complaint. Consequently, the government could not argue that there were no longer plaintiffs with viable claims in the District. The government moved to dismiss on April 18. It argued that, first, no case or controversy existed because the plaintiffs had no interest in adjudication of their applications. Second, it argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing under both the EO and the Naturalization Clause. Third, defendants also alleged that plaintiffs had not stated sufficient facts that the EO or "extreme vetting" caused their application delays or denials. Finally, defendants argued that plaintiffs had not established viable claims that CAARP violated Due Process, INA, or APA (as a substantive agency rule or final agency action). On June 13, the case was reassigned to District Judge Richard A. Jones. On June 21, District Judge Jones granted the plaintiffs' April 10 class certification motion, and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' April 18 motion to dismiss. District Judge Jones held that there was a case or controversy because the plaintiffs sought both an injunction on adjudication of their applications as well as a declaration that CAARP and any "extreme vetting" successor program was unlawful. Although the district judge dismissed plaintiffs' Due Process claim for the class alleging procedural violations in adjustment of status (because adjustment does not present a protected property interest such as naturalization does), all other claims were allowed to proceed. 2017 WL 2671254. Judge Jones certified two nationwide classes of plaintiffs: a "naturalization class":
A national class of all persons currently and in the future (1) who have or will have an application for naturalization pending before USCIS, (2) that is subject to CARRP or a successor "extreme vetting" program, and (3) that has not been or will not be adjudicated by USCIS within six months of having been filed.
 And an "adjustment class":
 A national class of all persons currently and in the future (1) who have or will have an application for adjustment of status pending before USCIS, (2) that is subject to CARRP or a successor "extreme vetting" program, and (3) that has not been or will not be adjudicated by USCIS within six months of having been filed.
 On July 5, 2017, the government filed a motion for reconsideration of District Judge Jones' June 21 order, arguing that plaintiffs could not show commonality in how CAARP had injured them and that the nationwide class certification and six-month adjudication deadline were erroneous. This was later denied on August 16, 2017. The court explained that the government had failed to identify an error in his order but instead simply had tried to re-argue the same position. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130836. The parties filed a joint status report and discovery plan on July 28, 2017. District Judge Jones scheduled the trial for Sept. 24-28, 2018 and set a discovery and briefing schedule. From October 2017 through April 2018, the parties engaged in a number of disputes over discovery. This resulted in an order to compel production of documents issued by District Judge Jones on April 11, 2018. In this order, the court criticized the government’s intransigence during the discovery process, writing:
The Court has repeatedly explained to the Government that orders from the federal bench are mandatory, not voluntary...The executive branch does not stand alone in the federal system; the Government may not usurp the judicial branch and decide for itself when or if it will produce documents.
In response, the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, seeking vacatur of the district court's production orders, and, on April 20, filed an emergency motion in the district court for a stay of discovery pending appellate review. The Ninth Circuit opened a new docket (18-71171). District Judge Jones issued an April 24, 2018, order interpreting defendants' emergency motion as in fact a motion to consider the court's April 11 order, which Judge Jones declined. The district court ordered that rather than providing case-by-case determinations to plaintiffs, defendants could provide a sample of them instead to the court by May 1. 2018 WL 1737939. Defendants then asked the Ninth Circuit to stay the emergency petition in the meantime while defendants provided this sample to the district court. On May 10, 2018, the district court granted the government’s motion for reconsideration of the April 11 order. This allowed the government to produce the class list under an attorney eyes only provision. 2018 WL 2159784. Later, the court granted the parties' stipulated order requesting that the district revise its protective order to permit plaintiffs’ counsels’ administrative and technical staff to also view and access the names, Alien numbers, and application filing dates of unnamed class members. The parties continued to dispute the scope of discovery and proposed deadlines throughout 2018. A bench trial was scheduled for July 2019, but on January 14, 2019, the court granted the defendants' motion to stay all deadlines in preparation for trial due to the lapse in appropriations funding for the DOJ. On February 14, 2019, the district court ordered the stay of deadlines lifted and for discovery to recommence. In October 2019, the district court set a bench trial for August 2020. But because of the time-consuming nature of the discovery process, the parties filed a joint motion to temporarily suspend the case schedule in March 2020. The court granted this and struck the August 17, 2020, trial date. Discovery continued through much of 2020. On December 18, 2020, the court set a March 2021 deadline for plaintiffs to file a motion and brief for summary judgment and an April deadline for defendants to file their cross-motion and brief. Despite President Biden’s revocation of the Travel Ban EOs on Inauguration Day (January 20, 2021), the case continued. The district court reset the summary judgment deadlines on February 25, 2021, with all summary judgment motions and replies due by July 2, 2021. On April 5, 2021, the court substituted President Biden for former President Trump as a defendant. It appears that the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on March 25, 2021, and that the government filed its cross-motion for summary judgment on May 4, 2021, but this is difficult to confirm as these filings are sealed. As of July 23, 2021, the parties were disputing which filings related to the summary judgment briefs the district court should classify as “highly sensitive documents.” This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, two Muslim men (one a Somali national and lawful permanent resident, the other an Iranian nonimmigrant visa holder) filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (in Seattle). Suing the federal government, the plaintiffs alleged that US Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) interpreted former President Trump’s January 27 executive order (the first of the Travel Ban executive orders) to mandate suspension of adjudication of all pending petitions, applications, or requests from citizens or nationals of the seven banned countries, and that this suspension violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause, and Due Process Clause of the Constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the order had or would expand USCIS's Controlled Application Review and Resolution Program (CARRP), which they argued imposed extra-statutory rules and criteria on Muslim applicants to delay and deny immigration benefits to which applicants were entitled.


On June 24, 2014, plaintiffs, two same-sex couples living in Missouri, filed a lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri Sixteenth Judicial Circuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Director of Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds in his official capacity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Missouri Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State of Missouri's laws barring same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the bans deprived them of the fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause, made impermissible distinctions based on gender under the Equal Protection Clause, and would not pass rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. The Jackson County Recorder of Deeds had denied plaintiffs' marriage license applications solely because their relationships were same-sex. In response, plaintiffs brought suit asking the court to declare Missouri's same-sex marriage bans unconstitutional and to issue an injunction directing the defendant to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples with otherwise valid applications. On July 11, 2014, the Circuit Court (Judge Edith L. Messina) granted the Missouri Attorney General's uncontested motion to intervene as a matter of right on the state's behalf. Four days later, the Attorney General filed a notice of removal in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, which moved the case to federal court. From then on, the Attorney General handled the defense on behalf of the state and the Recorder of Deeds. On November 7, 2014, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) held that Missouri's same-sex marriage bans violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and it permanently enjoined the defendant at the Recorder of Deeds from denying marriage license applications based on the applicants' gender. Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 5810215, (W.D. Mo. 2014). The district court, however, dismissed one count in the plaintiff's complaint, which said that same-sex marriage bans did not pass rational basis review. This argument, the court held, was precluded by the decision in Citizens for Equal Protection v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867-68 (8th Cir. 2006). The district court stayed the effects of its judgment until the judgment was final. Plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay, which the district court denied. On December 5, 2014, the Attorney General filed a notice of appeal for the district court's November 7th order (No. 14-3779). On December 8, the plaintiffs filed a notice of cross-appeal for the count in its complaint (No. 14-3880), which the district court had dismissed. On the same day, the district court awarded plaintiffs attorneys' fees ($$31,610), expenses ($165.30), and costs ($100), staying the order pending completion of all appeals. On January 22, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the same-sex couples’ motion to vacate the district court's stay and the opposing party's motion to stay the appeal. Instead, the Eighth Circuit granted the same-sex couples' alternative motion to expedite the appeal. Argument was set both in this case and in two other same-sex marriage cases, Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard (PB-SD-0001 in this Clearinghouse) and Jernigan v. McDaniel (PB-AR-0004 in this Clearinghouse), for the second week of May, but on April 29, 2015, the Court of Appeals deferred further consideration of the cases until after the Supreme Court rendered a decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, in June 2015 (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). On June 26, 2015, the day after the Obergefell decision by the Supreme Court, the parties moved to dismiss the case. On July 1, 2015, the Eight Circuit granted the State of Missouri’s motion to dismiss its appeal and also granted appellees/cross-appellants' motion to dismiss their cross-appeal in No. 14-3880. The appellees/cross-appellants' motion to vacate the district court's stay order was denied as moot. On July 2, the district court granted the plaintiffs’ second motion to vacate the stay of its November 7, 2014 judgment, and lifted the stay on the same day. On July 24, 2015, the appellees/cross-appellants’ motion for attorney’s fees was granted, at the amount of $27,883.50. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 24, 2014, plaintiffs, two same-sex couples living in Missouri, filed a lawsuit in state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Director of Jackson County Department of Recorder of Deeds in his official capacity. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Missouri Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the State of Missouri's laws barring same-sex marriage violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The District Court (Judge Ortrie D. Smith) held that Missouri's same-sex marriage bans violated the U.S. Constitution and permanently enjoined the defendant at the Recorder of Deeds from denying marriage license applications based on the applicants' gender. The court, however, stayed the effects of its judgment until the judgement was final. The case was on appeal to the Eighth Circuit, where it is being held pending the outcome of the Obergefell case in the Supreme Court. After the Obergefell decision, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the case in July 2014, and later that month the plaintiffs were awarded $27,883.50 in attorneys’ fees. The case is closed.


In June 2017, a JP Morgan Chase Bank employee filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). He received a right to due letter from the agency in February 2019. On May 30, 2019, the plaintiff filed this class action against JP Morgan Chase Bank in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. Represented by the ACLU, the ACLU of Ohio, and the employment law firm Outten & Golden LLP, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that the company discriminated against him and other fathers by denying them paid parental leave on the same terms as mothers. He alleged that JPMorgan’s parental leave policy violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Ohio Fair Employment Practices Act, and other state and local laws that prohibit employers from discriminating against employees based on sex or sex-based stereotypes. That same day, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for class certification, preliminary approval of a settlement class, and proposed notice procedure for absent class members. The case was transferred to Judge Susan Dlott days later. Under the settlement, the defendant agreed to maintain its current gender neutral parental leave policy, which was clarified following the filing of the plaintiff’s discrimination charge. It also agreed to train those administering the policy on its gender neutral application and to pay $5 million to fathers who claimed they were denied the opportunity to take additional paid parental leave as primary caregivers. The Chase settlement is the first private class action to settle sex discrimination claims for a class of fathers who claim they were denied the opportunity to receive equal paid parental leave given to mothers. The court granted preliminary approval of the plaintiff’s request for class certification of those who had similarly been unlawfully denied paid parental leave on the same terms as mothers on June 21, 2019. It set a date for a fairness hearing for November 6, 2019. The case is ongoing

Summary: A plaintiff employee at JP Morgan Chase Bank filed this class action against his employer for violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. He claimed that biological mothers were eligible for 16 weeks of paid parental leave, while fathers were only eligible for two weeks of paid parental leave. The case settled and is ongoing pending final approval.