This is one of a collection of § 1983 inmate cases filed in Louisiana federal courts to challenge the operation and conditions of confinement in the Louisiana prison system and in parish and city jails throughout Louisiana. These cases have worked their way through the federal courts over the last four decades and are part of this collection, located at PC-LA, JC-LA and JI-LA. This case stems from a report published in October 1995 by the Human Rights Watch. The report, titled "Children in Confinement in Louisiana," detailed abuse of juveniles confined in secure facilities throughout Louisiana. Former President Jimmy Carter asked the United States Department of Justice [DOJ] to investigate pursuant to its authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. The DOJ determined that a new investigation was appropriate and would not conflict with the DOJ's involvement in the pre-CRIPA lawsuit Williams v. Edwards, [PC-LA-1 of this collection], which challenged conditions of confinement at adult prisons in Louisiana. On April 25, 1996, the DOJ notified State of Louisiana (State) that it would investigate the State's secure juvenile correctional facilities, including the Jetson Correctional Center for Youth in Baton Rouge (Jetson), the Training Institute at Bridge City (Bridge City), the Louisiana Training Institute at Monroe (later renamed Swanson Correctional Center for Youth) (Swanson), and the Tallulah Correctional Center for Youth (Tallulah). Because of the severity of abuse found at Jetson and Bridge City, the DOJ took the unusual step of issuing an interim report on July 15, 1996. According to the DOJ, virtually every juvenile interviewed reported being hit, kicked, punched, and strangled by corrections officers. Orthopedic injuries, such as broken jaws and dislocated fingers, were the primary reason detainees sought medical care. Such injuries were reportedly inflicted both by guards and by children whom the guards would bribe to attack other juvenile detainees. Further, detention center staff failed to intervene to protect young and cognitively impaired children from being sexually abused by older children. Detainees hesitated to report abuse for fear of retribution. The DOJ recommended that the State take specific steps to eradicate the abuse at Jetson and Bridge City. On July 30, 1996, the State implemented a statewide program, Project Zero Tolerance, in an attempt to eliminate abuse. Project Zero Tolerance proved to be ineffective. In its second interim report, issued on October 3, 1996, the DOJ noted that twenty-eight children confined at Tallulah were hospitalized for severe injuries during the first twenty-days of Project Zero Tolerance. Guards escaped detection by beating detainees in areas not monitored by closed circuit video. Guards also allowed children to fight in areas not monitored by video. At Swanson, the DOJ discovered a practice called a "sixty", in which the guards would give a child a package of sixty cookies if that child could injure another detainee significantly enough to require hospitalization. The DOJ believed that the culture of violence was exacerbated by excessive use of physical and chemical restraints. Tallulah and Swanson also had significant problems with suicide prevention, mental health care, HIV testing, sex between detainees and guards, universal blood borne pathogen precautions, and medical care for asthmatics, especially those in boot camp. The DOJ, noting that Project Zero Tolerance was clearly insufficient, recommended that the State take new steps to address these problems, including expanding closed circuit video monitoring. On June 13, 1997, the DOJ issued its final findings letter, outlining the unlawful conditions that it uncovered at the State juvenile facilities. A copy of the letter was sent to the Court overseeing Williams v. Edwards No. 71-98-B, [PC-LA-1], a case in which the DOJ intervened. The findings letter charged that the State failed to protect juvenile detainees from harm, which was evinced by systematic and life threatening physical abuse and juvenile-on-juvenile violence. Some of the DOJ other concerns related to (1) abuse investigations, (2) classification of detainees, (3) inappropriate commitment of mentally ill and developmentally delayed children to corrections facilities, (4) accessible accommodations for children with physical disabilities (5) dental and medical care, (6) rehabilitative services, (7) staff-to-detainee ratios and training, (8) overly-restrictive mail, telephone, and visitation rules, (9) access to courts, and (10) substandard care for children with HIV or AIDS. The DOJ also asked the Department of Labor to examine the State's work programs for juvenile detainees, suspecting violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. In the Spring of 1998, the District Court in Williams v. Edwards No. 71-98-B, [PC-LA-1] ordered the DOJ, to retour the four juvenile facilities and submit a report on the conditions. In July 1998, a second private class action lawsuit, Brian B. v. Stalder was filed concerning conditions of confinement at Tallulah. [JI-LA-6] In November 1998, the DOJ filed suit against the State in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (CRIPA), and 42 U.S.C. §14141, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Jetson, Bridge City, Swanson and Tallulah facilities. The suit, styled U.S. v. Louisiana, was consolidated with Williams v. Edwards, Civ. No. 71-98-B [PC-LA-1] and Brian B. v. Stadler, Civ. No. 98-886-B-M1 [JI-LA-6] A.A., et al. v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., et al. CIV.A. 00-246-B-M1 [JI-LA-7] was later also made part of the consolidated cases. In November 1999, the parties reached an agreement to resolve the education claims in the consolidated cases. The District Court (Judge Frank J. Polozola) approved the settlement and conditionally dismissed the education claims. (Final dismissal came in January 2003 when full compliance was achieved). In April 2000, the DOJ and defendants entered into a settlement agreement ("the Jena Agreement") to resolve demands for preliminary injunctive relief sought by the DOJ in U.S. v. State of Louisiana, and by the Private Plaintiffs in A.A., et al. v. Wackenhut Corrections Corp., et al. CIV.A. 00-246-B-M1 [JI-LA-7] regarding conditions at Jena Juvenile Justice Center. An amendment to the Jena Agreement was filed on May 9, 2000. In August 2000, the parties entered into the "2000 Settlement Agreement" which resolved the issues of juvenile justice; medical, dental, mental health and rehabilitative services; and access to the courts. The District Court approved the 2000 Settlement Agreement and conditionally dismissed those claims in October 2000. In January 2003, the parties entered into the "2003 Settlement Agreement," which dismissed and/or modified various provisions of the 2000 Settlement Agreement. It also provided for the appointment of an Independent Expert to monitor compliance. In 2004, the parties entered into the "2004 Settlement Agreement," which terminated many of the provisions in the 2000 and 2003 Settlement Agreements, including termination of all provisions relating to the Bridge City and Tallulah facilities and provisions relating to medical and dental care at all facilities. What remained were provisions relating to juvenile justice, rehabilitation and mental health care at Swanson and Jetson. In January 2006, the Independent Expert determined that the State had reached substantial compliance with the 2004 Settlement Agreement. It was also noted that the State was in the process of implementing a new model for troubled youth in secured care facilities, which moved away from a correctional-based approached, called the "Louisiana Model" (LAMOD). On April 28, 2006, all parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the cases, citing that the State had reached substantial compliance with the provisions of the 2004 Settlement Agreement. The District Court (Judge James Brady) approved the motion and dismissed all of the consolidated cases on May 2, 2006.

Summary: This is a § 1983 inmate case filed in Louisiana federal courts to challenge the operation and conditions of confinement in Louisiana juvenile detention facilities as a result of Department of Justice investigations documenting severe abuse problems and other deficiencies. The parties entered into various consent decrees over the years. On April 28, 2006, all parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the cases, citing that the State had reached substantial compliance with the provisions of the 2004 Settlement Agreement. The District Court (Judge James Brady) approved the motion and dismissed all of the consolidated cases on May 2, 2006.


On May 04, 2011, deaf and hard of hearing prisoners filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the officials at the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by a group of public and private lawyers, the plaintiffs alleged that, while in IDOC custody, they were denied the assistance they needed to effectively communicate and participate in IDOC programs and services, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of all prisoners who were deaf or hard of hearing, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. For nearly the first two years, the parties engaged in settlement talks. However, in April 2013, the settlement status hearings came to an end and discovery commenced. On October 10, 2014, the parties reinitiated settlement talks. The parties were unable to come to a settlement agreement and recommenced discovery as of April 13, 2015. On October 8, 2015, Judge Marvin E. Aspen released an order granting the plaintiffs' class-action certification. 311 F.R.D. 177. He also denied in part and granted in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment, but only dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of cruel and unusual punishment as it pertained to "communicative isolation." The rest of the plaintiffs' claims stood as the case proceeded. Additionally, in June 2015 the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel supplemental discovery as to the death of a named plaintiff, who they claimed died of a burst appendix because he was unable to communicate with corrections officers. Though the defendants resisted this discovery, they were ordered to produce it by an order from the Magistrate Judge Young B. Kim on December 18, 2015. In 2016, the case moved towards trial. On August 2, 2016, Judge Aspen denied the plaintiffs' six motions in limine seeking to preclude multiple defense exhibits and witnesses. 2016 WL 4091625. Judge Aspen also denied the defendants' two motions in limine seeking to bar plaintiffs' deposition testimony and certain exhibits and witnesses. He reopened discovery through October 10, 2016, to allow for inquiry into current prison conditions and for Plaintiffs to depose any newly disclosed defense witnesses. In September of 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel responses to new discovery requests, which was granted on November 17, 2016. After several additional months of discovery, the parties agreed to resume settlement discussions. The first one was held before Magistrate Judge Kim on April 5, 2017, and it was followed by ten subsequent conferences over the course of the next year. On April 30, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, IDOC agreed to: (1) adopt a policy and procedure for identifying deaf and hard of hearing inmates through hearing screening and audiological evaluations; (2) create and maintain a centralized database of deaf and hard of hearing inmates; (3) issue deaf and hard of hearing inmate identification cards; (4) perform auxiliary aids and services assessments for deaf and hard of hearing inmates; (5) provide preliminary accommodations prior to auxiliary aids and services assessments; (6) maintain auxiliary aids and services assessments and implement individualized inmate communication plans; (7) conduct IDOC staff training on matters regarding deaf and hard of hearing inmates; (8) provide deaf and hard of hearing accommodations at inmate orientation; (9) make certain communication devices/technologies available; (10) make television accessible for deaf and hard of hearing inmates; (11) implement a tactile notification system; (12) ensure equal access to prison employment; (13) remove hand restraints for deaf and hard of hearing inmates when they are communicating through ASL; (14) ensure that inmates are not transferred solely because of their deaf or hard of hearing status and consider requests of deaf or hard of hearing individuals to be housed together; and (15) create and disseminate materials memorializing deaf and hard of hearing inmates' rights. The settlement agreement stipulated that the court and class counsel would monitor compliance with the settlement agreement. The parties agreed that IDOC would pay class counsel $1,500,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The court retained jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the settlement agreement for not less than two years following the effective date. The court required that IDOC provide notice to the class members by May 26, 2018 and set a fairness hearing for July 26, 2018. Following the class members' objections, the plaintiffs filed a motion for final approval of the class settlement agreement and in opposition to those objections. Following the fairness hearing on July 26, 2018, Judge Aspen granted the parties' joint motion for final approval of the class settlement, finding that the settlement was fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the class. On August 6, 2018, the parties filed a joint status report outlining the specific dates by when IDOC must complete certain steps under the class settlement. On June 8, 2020, Magistrate Judge Kim entered a memorandum order and opinion regarding a motion from the plaintiffs to enforce the settlement's audiological evaluation requirement. The plaintiffs alleged that the IDOC was using Licensed Hearing Instrument Dispensers (LHIDs) to conduct these audiological evaluations, rather than licensed audiologists. LHIDs are trained in fitting and servicing hearing instruments, while audiologists are much more comprehensively trained in identifying, measuring, monitoring, and testing hearing and other audiologic disorders. The plaintiffs further allege that the IDOC is not completing these evaluations in a reasonable time period. The IDOC admitted that it violated the settlement by retaining LHIDs to conduct audiological evaluations for one year following the settlement's approval. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement, and ruled that the IDOCs noncompliance necessitated sanctions. The court ordered the IDOC to pay the plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The court also extended its jurisdiction to supervise and enforce the settlement for an additional year. The case is ongoing with periodic reporting as of October 4, 2020.

Summary: This is a class action filed by deaf and hard of hearing prisoners in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections, represented by a consortium of public interest and law firm lawyers. They alleged systemic violation of their rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act to effective communication, rendering them isolated and unsafe in Illinois prisons. After extensive rounds of discovery and settlement negotiations, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which the court approved on July 26, 2018.


On September 8, 2015, two Alexander City residents who had been jailed for their inability to pay traffic or misdemeanor fines and costs filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by counsel from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs sued the City of Alexander and the Police Chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court to grant declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Alexander City had a practice of arresting individuals who could not pay traffic or misdemeanor fines and costs in full on the date assessed, and jailing them until they paid or sat out the amount owed at a base rate of $20 per day. The defendants removed the plaintiffs from their jobs, families, and homes, destabilizing their lives. The plaintiffs alleged this practice violated the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as constituted false imprisonment under Alabama state law. The plaintiffs further alleged this practice was implemented pursuant to the authorization of the Police Chief. The plaintiffs sought class certification for declaratory and injunctive relief. On September 8, 2015, the plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction directing the defendants to stop jailing persons who were not able to pay their fines and costs in full on the date of their adjudication. The case was assigned to Judge Gray Michael Borden on October 30, 2015. On November 25, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw their motions to certify class, for temporary restraining order, and for preliminary injunction. The same day the court granted the motion to withdraw, denied the motion for preliminary injunction as moot, and denied the motion for class certification as moot. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on December 1, 2015. In the new complaint, the plaintiffs only sought to define a damages class, abandoning the attempt to certify a class for injunctive or declaratory relief. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on December 15, 2015. Discovery proceeded, with disputes arising along the way. The case was reassigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth on June 15, 2016. The parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class settlement on January 17, 2017. On March 13, 2017, the court granted preliminary approval of the settlement and conditionally approved the following settlement class: "All individuals who, on or between September 8, 2013, and September 8, 2015, were arrested and jailed for their failure to pay fines and court costs by the Alexander City Police Department." Per the agreement, the defendants were to pay class members a total of $680,000. The allocation of that fund was divided as follows: (1) $30,000 equally divided and paid to the two named plaintiffs, (2) $500 per day spent in jail for each class member who submitted a claim, (3) distribution of unclaimed payments to class members who had submitted claims in proportion to the number of days each one spent in jail, and (4) distribution of any residual money to the nonprofit Volunteer Connections of Central Alabama. The settlement also provided $202,000 in attorney's fees to class counsel. No injunctive relief was included in the settlement. The defendants did not admit any responsibility or liability with respect to the allegations. Following a fairness hearing, the court granted final approval of the settlement on August 4, 2017. The court retained jurisdiction for the purposes of the distribution of the class settlements. In addition to the relief described in the settlement, following the filing of the lawsuit, the city changed their policies to allow low-income citizens of Alexander City to pay off fines either in installments or through community work. As of November 21, 2019, there was no additional activity on the docket. Presumably, the defendants completed their required payments per the settlement agreement and the case is closed.

Summary: In 2015, two Alexander City residents who had been jailed for their inability to pay traffic or misdemeanor fines and costs filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by counsel from the Southern Poverty Law Center, plaintiffs sued the City of Alexander and the Police Chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged the City's practice violated the Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Following the filling of the lawsuit, the city changed their policies to allow low-income citizens of Alexander City to pay off fines either in installments or through community work. For this reason, the settlement did not include injunctive relief. The parties settled the suit in 2017 with the terms that the defendants pay class members a total of $680,000.


On March 11, 2018, the mother of a deceased prisoner at the Logan Correctional Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and Wexford Health Sources, a contractor for IDOC. Represented by the Uptown People’s Law Center and the Northside Transformative Justice Center, the plaintiff alleged that officials at the Logan Correctional Center subjected her daughter to cruel and unusual punishment and discriminated against her on the basis of her mental illnesses. The complaint alleged that the decedent was placed in solitary confinement as a punishment for her mental illness, that the prison failed to place her in an inpatient program despite actual knowledge of its necessity, and that the prison failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations. Such conduct, the plaintiff alleged, was in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act (RA). The case was assigned to Judge Sue Myerscough. On June 4, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted for both the ADA and RA claims asserted in the complaint. On August 6, 2018, Judge Myerscough denied the motion to dismiss in full, determining that the plaintiff's pleadings were sufficient to assert a cognizable claim under both laws. As of April 11, 2020, the case is proceeding through discovery.

Summary: In March of 2018, a plaintiff filed a lawsuit on behalf of her deceased daughter against the Illinois Department of Corrections. The plaintiff alleged that the prison system failed to provide the decedent with appropriate medical treatment for her mental illnesses and punitively placed her in solitary confinement as a result of her conditions, all in violation of the Eighth Amendment, the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act.


On August 17, 2004, a female employee filed this suit against Costco in United States District Court in the Northern District of California under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and the Fair Employment and Housing Act, California Government Code 12940. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, alleging that Costco discriminated against her and other similarly situated females. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that Costco's management discriminated against her based on her sex when granting promotions and that the defendant retaliated against her after she complained. The original plaintiff filed the suit by herself, but was soon allowed to add two more plaintiffs as the case progressed. These named plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, charged that Costco's managerial promotion methods had a pattern and practice of gender discrimination, and disparate impact on women. Because the defendant's failed to notify employees of specific promotion opportunities through job postings, or any other alternative means, female employees were unable to apply for promotions. This practice, in combination with a promotion decision-making process that was arbitrary and done by a nearly all-male managerial force, led the plaintiffs to file suit. On January 11, 2007, the District Court (Judge Patel) granted class certification. The District Court certified a class of all current and former female Costco employees nationwide who have been denied promotion to General Manager or Assistant General Manager positions or denied promotion to Senior Staff positions since January 3, 2002. The Court did not certify the plaintiffs claims over FEHA, only those made under Title VII. With the certification, the Court granted an opt out opportunity to be provided in the class notice. The Court granted the class certification for the claims of damages and injunctive relief. 240 F.R.D. 644. The defendants appealed the District Court's decision, arguing that the District Court abused its discretion in certifying the class. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals heard the appeal after the Supreme Court gave its decision in Dukes v. Walmart (a class action case with a similar fact pattern) and issued an order on September 16, 2011. The court held that one plaintiff had standing to bring the suit and was adequate representation but the two other plaintiff representatives may be inadequate representation because they were former employees. The Circuit Court also held that the District Court used the wrong legal theory in determining that the class met the commonality and typicality requirements for class certification. The case was remanded for the District Court to determine if the two plaintiffs could be adequate representation and to apply the correct standard in determining if the class met the commonality and typicality requirement. 657 F.3d 970. The plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint on March 23, 2012, altering their prayer for relief. In an attempt to alleviate the Ninth Circuit's concerns, the plaintiffs requested certification with one plaintiff as the representative of the injunctive relief class and one plaintiff as the representative of the monetary relief class. On September 25, 2012, Judge Chen, writing for the District Court, granted class certification once again. After reviewing the case on remand from the Seventh Circuit, the District Court still held that the plaintiffs provided significant evidence of company wide policies and gender disparity to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of class certification. 285 F.R.D. 492. After hearings and negotiations, the parties reached a settlement, and Judge Chen approved the settlement on May 27, 2014. Per the settlement, the three representative plaintiffs were awarded a $10,000 service fee, $3,950,000 for attorneys' fees, $633,959.64 for costs, and $300,000 for future work in administering the settlement. The settlement outlined the procedure by which the class members could claim their award out of an 8 million dollar settlement fund, with the possibility of individual claims ranging from $25,000 to $250,000. The settlement also outlined programmatic relief the class would receive, including a posting process for promotions, training of staff on hiring and promoting, and the use of a psychologist to conduct routine job analyses and evaluate promotion processes. The settlement lasted for two years. This case is now closed. Following the settlement, one named plaintiff proceeded on individual claims of disparate treatment and retaliation, citing some facts not previously mentioned in the class action complaint. On May 22, 2015 Judge Chen granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion for summary judgment with regard to this claim. Judge Chen narrowed the claims that the plaintiff would bring to trial to "(1) the disparate treatment claim and (2) the retaliation claim, but only with respect to failures to promote that took place 300 days prior to the DFEH charge for retaliation specifically (and not disparate treatment)." 2015 WL 2453158. The parties then proceeded to engage in trial preparation and settlement talks simultaneously. On July 24, 2015, proceedings were held before Judge Chen, noting that the parties had settled the matter. This settlement agreement is not available on the docket. On July 28, the final named plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her claims against the defendant. This case is now closed

Summary: This case was brought by a female employee of Costco against Costco Wholesale Corporation, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages for Costco's alleged discrimination against female employees. The class was certified by the District Court on September 25, 2012 and the parties reached a settlement on May 27, 2014, which included monetary and programmatic relief, as well as compensation for attorneys' fees and costs. This case is now closed.


On March 8, 2018 the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a complaint against the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act. The complaint alleged that the defendant had failed to respond to EPIC’s 2016 FOIA request for information about the Department’s use of drones in the United States for domestic surveillance. The plaintiff requested that the court order DHS to release the requested information and pay appropriate attorneys fees. The case was assigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. DHS began searching its documents after the complaint, but a status report filed on May 9, 2019 by EPIC alleged that DHS was unnecessarily slowing down the search for documents. EPIC stated that DHS promised to complete the search for documents 45 days after the complaint, but once it failed, they kept moving the deadline for completing the search back 45 more days. EPIC added that an "error with its search tasker" prevented DHS from completing the search at the time of filing the status update. DHS acknowledged the error in a status report filed on the same day, but noted that many DHS component agencies had completed their searches and were beginning to disclose requested documents to EPIC. In response to these status reports, Judge Jackson issued an order obligating DHS to complete its search by June 12, 2019 and setting a reviewing schedule of 300 pages per month by July 29, 2019. He issued this order on May 13. In a June 17, 2019 status report, DHS said that its search was complete, but potentially relevant documents were still being uploaded to DHS servers. DHS wrote that this process should take a few days, but promised to adhere to the production schedule set in the May 13 order. The case was reassigned to Judge Carl J. Nichols on June 24, 2019. According to a March 9, 2020 status report, the parties had successfully completed document production without the need to go to the court to contest the withholding of any documents. The parties negotiated a private agreement on attorney fees later in the year, and submitted a stipulation of dismissal on May 12, 2020. The case is now closed.

Summary: The Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a lawsuit in 2018 against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act. EPIC sought an injunction to access information they requested in an unfulfilled 2016 FOIA request on the use of drones in domestic surveillance. During discovery, EPIC accused DHS of intentionally slowing the search for documents, which led to a court order imposing a deadline for completing document search. DHS complied with the order, and document disclosure and allocation of attorneys fees did not necessitate further court intervention. The case was dismissed on May 12, 2020.


On December 9, 2016, an army veteran filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the Secretary of the Army for violating the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. This veteran was deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 and suffered from service-related mental health issues. He was subsequently dismissed with less-than-Honorable discharges. Represented by the Veterans Legal Services Clinic and Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School and the Connecticut Veterans Legal Center, the veteran sought equitable and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. He claimed that the Army failed to treat and accommodate his mental health conditions, which were a direct result from his service. As a result, the veteran alleged, he was charged with a variety of infractions that led to his less-than-Honorable discharge. The veteran also alleged that his less-than-Honorable discharge status impeded his access to services and benefits that help veterans heal their wounds and thrive in civilian society. The case was assigned to Judge Warren W. Eginton. About five months later, the veteran amended his complaint to a class-action complaint and added a class representative as a plaintiff. The class representative brought the same claims as the original plaintiff and also alleged that the military violated the Little Tucker Act by recouping her enlistment bonus without cause. Claims for military pay and allowances under $10,000 are actionable under the Little Tucker Act. Upon discharge, military personnel receive a certificate that characterizes their service, which impacts their eligibility for various benefits and support services administered by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). The Army Discharge Review Board ("ADRB") was created by Congress specifically to address unjust and improper discharges. On September 3, 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel directed all records-correction boards to give "special consideration" to PTSD diagnoses and to consider PTSD and related conditions as "potential mitigating factors" for the misconduct that caused a discharge with "other than honorable conditions." The veterans alleged that the ADRB wrongfully denied their applications for discharge upgrades. The veterans asked the court to ensure that the Army employs consistent standards in considering the effects of class members' PTSD when determining whether to upgrade their discharge statuses. The veterans also sought individual status upgrades to "Honorable" to accurately reflect their service and to recoup any enlistment bonuses redacted in light of their less-than-Honorable discharges. The Army filed a motion to dismiss the case in March 2017. This motion was denied one month later without prejudice. Three months later, in June 2017, the veterans moved to certify their class. The Army opposed the motion, and it was eventually denied without prejudice. That same month, the Army filed another motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for voluntary remand. The court denied the motion to dismiss but granted voluntary remand in September. Judge Eginton reasoned that a voluntary remand would be the most efficient way to correct the representative veterans' discharge statuses and to complete the record for the veterans' class-action suit. In October, the second representative plaintiff's discharge status was upgraded to honorable, and the Army was barred from recouping her enlistment bonus. The original plaintiff's discharge status was not reconsidered until March 2018 due to administrative issues and errors. On June 4, 2018, the Army filed another motion to dismiss and the veterans filed another motion to certify the class. The Judge granted the veterans' motion in December, 2018, rejecting the Army's arguments regarding redressability, mootness, and exhaustion of administrative remedies, and certifying the class pursuant to FRCP 23. The class was certified as:
 All Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan era—the period between October 7, 2001 to present—who:

were discharged with a less-than-Honorable service characterization (this includes General and Other-than-Honorable discharges from the Army, Army Reserve, and Army National guard, but not Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges);

have not received discharge upgrades to Honorable; and

have diagnoses of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions or record documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions at the time of discharge attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo standards of liberal and special consideration.

 A few weeks later, on January 9, 2019, the Court rejected the Army's motion to dismiss, citing the same reasoning discussed in his order certifying the class. The parties began to negotiate discovery plans. On November 12, 2019, the case was reassigned to Judge Charles S. Haight, Jr. It was then referred to Magistrate Judge Robert Spector on January 7, 2020 for the purpose of considering settlement by the parties. Since then, the parties have participated in a series of settlement conferences. The parties filed a Joint Motion for Settlement on November 17, 2020. The parties agreed that class members that already applied to reconsideration of their discharge status would be permitted to reapply for reconsideration if their symptoms indicated PTSD or PTSD-related conditions. Veterans that had not already applied for reconsideration would be provided referred to legal and medical assistance to support their reconsideration applications. The defendants also agreed to update their review procedures and provide annual training to the reviewing board that is specifically tailored to mental health conditions. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $185,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiff's counsel. As the settlement agreement is being implemented, the case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 2016, a veteran filed this suit against the Secretary of the Army, claiming that the Army failed to treat and accommodate his mental health conditions, which were a direct result from his post-9/11 deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan, and improperly dismissed him with less-than-Honorable discharges. Now as a civilian, his less-than-Honorable “status” impedes his access to the very services and benefits normally available to veterans to enable them to heal their wounds and thrive in civilian life. In 2018, additional plaintiffs joined the suit, making this a class action on behalf of other similarly situated veterans. The parties have participated in a series of settlement conferences and filed a joint motion for settlement on November 17, 2020. This case is ongoing.


IN 2010, after Louisiana proposed a reduction in available nursing hours as part of Louisiana Medicaid's Long-Term Personal Care Services (LT-PCS) program, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The named Plaintiffs, seeking to represent a class of similarly situated individuals with disabilities, had each been approved for about 40 in-home nursing hours through the LT-PCS program. The proposed cuts would cap nursing hours at 32. The Plaintiffs alleged that this reduction would put them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (under the Supreme Court precedent, Olmstead v. L.C.) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Plaintiffs also argued that the state had provided inadequate notice of the changes in violation of the Medicaid Act and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The State filed a motion to dismiss (October 21, 2010) which was later converted (in December 2010) to a motion for summary judgment, seeking to resolve the case in their favor before trial. In April 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest in support of the Plaintiffs. On May 18, 2011, Judge James J. Brady denied the Defendants' motion and allowed the case to proceed, and on June 6, 2011, Judge Brady certified the plaintiff class. After these plaintiff successes and a period of discovery, the parties settled. In January 2012, the court entered a settlement agreement designed to meet the care needs of the plaintiff population. Under this agreement, the State promised to create enrollment slots so that the affected population could enroll (in an expedited fashion) in the Louisiana's Community Choice Waiver program to meet their home care needs. Recipients who are deemed eligible to receive the new maximum of 32 LT-PCS hours will be notified of the option of expedited enrollment in the CC Waiver instead. The agreement outlines the criteria for admission to the CC Waiver program and obligates the state to resolve such requests by June 30, 2012. The agreement is to be enforceable only until December 31, 2012, but the deadline will be extended if the state has failed to meet its obligations by that time. On Jan. 18, 2013, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case with prejudice, because both agreed that the conditions outlined in the Settlement Agreement have been met. On Jan. 29, 2013, Judge Brady dismissed the case.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals with disabilities requiring home care services, challenged Louisiana's proposed reduction of in-home nursing care hours under the state's Medicaid-provided Long Term Personal Care Services (LT-PCS) program. After a period of litigation, the state agreed to provide a substitute for the LT-PCS care by allowing individuals receiving the maximum care hours to apply for new Community Choice Waiver slots.


This is one of many lawsuits brought challenging the Obama Administration's 2012 Health and Human Services (HHS) mandate requiring employers to pay for employees' contraception and abortifacients via medical insurance coverage. Many religious hospitals, charities, universities, and other enterprises owned or controlled by religious organizations or individuals who opposed contraception on doctrinal grounds argued the mandate violated their religious beliefs. For a full list of contraception insurance mandate cases, please see our collection here. On February 21, 2012, a college organized as a not-for-profit corporation, along with its majority stakeholder, another shareholder, and two affiliated companies filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the federal government, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). They alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the Alliance Defense Fund and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. A motion by the ACLU to file an amicus brief was denied by District Judge Joy Flowers Conti. On September 13, 2012, Judge Conti denied defendants' motion to stay discovery pending resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss. On March 6, 2013, Judge Conti granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion to dismiss with respect to RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the notice and comment claim under the APA. 929 F. Supp. 2d 402. On April 19, 2013, Judge Conti granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 22, 2013, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On June 17, 2013, defendants filed a notice of appeal for the April 19 preliminary injunction. On June 18, 2013, Judge Conti granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 960 F. Supp. 2d 588. On August 17, 2013, defendants filed notice of appeal of the June 18 preliminary injunction. On September 12, 2013, defendants filed a motion to vacate both preliminary injunctions, which was eventually denied on October 18, 2013. 2013 WL 5704948. On November 12, 2013, the plaintiff filed another motion for a preliminary injunction, which the District Court granted on December 23, 2013. The injunction lasted until a decision on the merits of the case. On February 11, 2014, the defendant filed notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. (No. 14-1374). On February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Chief Judge McKee and Circuit Judges Rendell and Sloviter) ruled that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious expression. 778 F.3d 422. Next, Geneva College asked for a rehearing en banc, and the Third Circuit denied the motion on April 13, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the same panel of the Third Circuit granted a temporary stay pending response by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell. On August 11, 2015, Geneva College filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case. The Court planned to consider whether notifying the federal government by signing a form identifying the employer as a religious nonprofit that objects to the contraceptive services mandate (so that the government can work with the insurer or benefits provider to ensure employees have contraceptive coverage) violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, or constitutes the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. This case was consolidated with six other cases dealing with this issue. Together, the cases are known as Zubik v. Burwell. This case was argued on March 23, 2016. On March 29, 2016, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S. Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. The case then went back to the Third Circuit for consideration on remand. On June 20, 2016, on remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revoked its prior mandate in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion. On April 16, 2018, by agreement of the parties, the Third Circuit dismissed the appeal with respect to District Court’s grant of preliminary injunctive relief to Geneva College. The case returned once again to Judge Conti of the District Court. The change in presidential administrations during the appeal regarding the District Court's earlier grant of a preliminary injunction prompted Geneva to file a motion for permanent injunction and declaratory relief on March 20, 2018. The Court granted the motion on July 5, 2018. 2018 WL 3348982. The Court reasoned that the government’s position conceding that enforcement of the ACA’s Mandate and accommodation process against Geneva would violate RFRA and the Government's indication that it did not intend to offer a substantive defense with respect to that matter, along with the Court’s prior orders, opinions, and findings of fact and conclusions of law, led to the conclusion that Geneva made the required showing for a preliminary injunction. The Court noted that the proposed injunction and declaratory relief requested by Geneva in the March 20 motion was broader than the relief requested in the second amended complaint, and did not refer to the requirements of the mandate and accommodation that Geneva showed violated Geneva’s rights under RFRA. Consequently, the Court narrowed the injunction, granting Geneva:
permanent injunctive relief against application of the mandate, . . . regulations and accommodation process by defendants to Geneva, or to the health insurance plan of or insurer for Geneva, with respect to Geneva providing, paying for, making accessible, or otherwise facilitating or causing access to coverage or payments through an insurance company or any other third party for contraceptive coverage services to which Geneva has religious objections (including those Geneva College views as abortion, abortifacients, embryo-harming pharmaceuticals, or related education and counseling).
Additionally, the court granted Geneva declaratory relief, stating that defendants' enforcement of the mandate and the accommodations procedure violated Geneva’s rights under RFRA. Since the Court granted plaintiffs' requested relief, Geneva filed a consent motion for voluntary dismissal of its remaining claims on July 9, 2018. The Court granted the motion on July 12, and dismissed the case without prejudice. The parties came to a settlement regarding attorneys' fees on October 11, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 21, 2012, a college organized as a not-for-profit corporation, along with its majority stakeholder, another shareholder, and two affiliated companies sued to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On March 6, 2013, Judge Conti granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part and denied the motion to dismiss with respect to RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause, and the notice and comment claim under the APA. Plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction, and on June 18, 2013, Judge Conti granted the motion. Next, Geneva College appealed to the Third Circuit, and on February 11, 2015, the Third Circuit (Chief Judge McKee; Circuit Judges Rendell and Sloviter) ruled that the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff’s religious expression. On August 11, 2015, Geneva College filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. On November 6, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the accommodation to the contraceptive services mandate violates the RFRA. This case was consolidated with six others, and is known as Zubik v. Burwell. After the case was argued in the Supreme Court on March 23, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order on May 16, 2016 remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals. The Court ordered that the parties be given time to come to agreement on ensuring contraceptive access without burdening religious freedom. 136 S. Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of these cases. On June 20, 2016, on remand, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit revoked its prior mandate in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion. Due to the vastly different attitude towards the mandate by the new presidential administration, the plaintiff moved for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief from the District Court, which the Court granted in July of 2018. The case is now closed.


On October 6, 2017, parents with perceived or actual intellectual disabilities who had been investigated for child abuse or neglect by New York City's Administration for Children's Services filed this class action lawsuit against New York City in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide services, programs, and training tailored to the plaintiffs' needs and, as a result, they were disadvantaged during each stage of a child welfare case. The plaintiffs were represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group and private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Alison Nathan. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on September 28, 2018. On September 3, 2019, Judge Nathan referred the case to Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses for the purpose of settlement. The next day, Judge Nathan administratively denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. This would allow the plaintiffs refile the motion later if they so chose. The parties have been engaged in settlement discussions and the case is ongoing as of May 2020.

Summary: Parents with perceived or actual intellectual disabilities who had been investigated for child abuse or neglect by Defendant City's Administration for Child Services brought this class action lawsuit claiming violations of Title II of the Americans with Disability Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action about medical care in the Riverside County jails settled in 2015. On April 4, 2020, plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce the consent decree, seeking implementation of expert-endorsed coronavirus-related protocols including social distancing. On April 16, the Court agreed, requiring planning and potentially prisoner transfers. A formal COVID-19 plan was approved in July 2020 and revised in October 2020.
 On May 8, 2013, three prisoners in Riverside county jails filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Riverside (California) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the access to both physical and mental healthcare was so deficient that it violated the Eighth Amendment proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, violated prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment rights, and constituted deliberate indifference to prisoners' health needs. The class was divided into two subclasses, termed the Medical Subclass and the Mental Health Subclass, though the classes were not mutually exclusive. Represented by the Prison Law Office, the plaintiffs sought attorneys' fees, declaratory relief, and an injunction requiring the county to develop a plan to address the deficiencies of its jails' healthcare system and to provide at least minimally adequate health care. According to the plaintiffs, some prisoners were told that doctors would only see those with court orders and that Sheriffs' deputies sometimes refused to provide forms. Prisoners had no other way to acquire or file forms. The plaintiffs alleged that in order to get access to healthcare they frequently needed to get court orders, file grievances, and file Health Need Requests (which cost $3), all of which they said were frequently ignored. By California state law a grand jury evaluates county jails every year. The June 14, 2012, Riverside County Grand Jury Report stated "In July, 2011, DMH was advised. . . .that the medical/mental health staffing levels in county jails needed to be restored to 2007 levels, in order to be in compliance with [state law]. As of this writing, the Grand Jury learned through sworn testimony that during the eight months following the 2010-2011 Grand Jury report, DMH staffing levels were allowed to decrease even further." As of May 31, 2012, only two of the five full-time physician positions in the jails were filled, and the county had multiple vacancies for nurses and nurse supervisors; only 65 of 101 total Detention Health Services positions were filled. Because of these vacancies, the plaintiffs alleged, medication distribution was erratic and doses were often supplied at irregular times or missed entirely. The plaintiffs also alleged that many prisoners received psychotropic drugs when their medical records were illegible or contained no treatment plan, monitoring, or other indications the treatment with the drugs was necessary, and sometimes with no record of informed consent. On April 30, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding a fourth named plaintiff. On August 20, 2014 the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding factual allegations and plaintiffs. 2014 WL 5304915 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014). On September 2, 2014, Judge Virginia Phillips granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants wanted to appeal the class certification, but Judge Phillips denied the petition for permission to appeal the order granting class action certification. After settlement negotiations, the parties agreed to resolve the litigation without trial. The parties agreed that certain closely related claims relating to disability discrimination were also appropriate for resolution in this case and the plaintiffs field an amended complaint on November 24, 2015. On December 22, 2015, Judge Phillips granted the parties' motion for preliminary approval of their proposed class action settlement agreement. On April 28, 2016, Judge Phillips granted final approval of the agreement. The Consent Decree included a Remedial Plan designed to meet the minimum level of health care necessary to comply with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as to ensure non-discrimination against inmates with disabilities as required by the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. For example, the defendants agreed to provide, among other things: (1) confidential screening for health care concerns for all new inmates; (2) readily available health care request forms; (3) daily collection and triage of health care request forms, with urgent concerns seen the same day and routine concerns seen within 72 hours; (4) confidential settings in which medical and mental health care encounters can take place; (5) pill call twice a day at regular times; (6) maintenance of medical and mental health information in a single electronic record; (7) sufficient medical and mental health staff available to ensure compliance with the Remedial Plan; (8) timely and appropriate care for chronic care patients and those in need of specialty services; and (9) a full range of structured mental health treatment options, including thorough assessments, group and individual therapy, psychotropic medications, and designated housing with specialized programming. The defendants also agreed to submit a status report to plaintiffs' counsel every six months detailing their compliance with the Consent Decree and their implementation of the Remedial Plan. The parties also agreed to have two court-appointed experts complete two comprehensive reviews and reports during the first year of the Consent Decree and subsequent reports as needed or requested. The duration of the Consent Decree was set at four years from the date of its entry, with the option to extend any provision with which the defendants are not in substantial compliance. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $1,250,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. Additionally, the parties agreed that the plaintiffs would be compensated for their reasonable time and reasonable expenses relating to monitoring and enforcing the Consent Decree (not to exceed $150,000). The first monitoring/implementation activity in the docket is dated April 6, 2020, after the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic. In response to the pandemic, plaintiffs sought to enforce the consent decree's mandate to “meet the minimum level of health care necessary to fulfill Defendant’s obligations under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Court-appointed experts made recommendations for physical distancing recommendations, but the County was not following them. The plaintiffs suggested that the County could follow the recommendations in several ways, including by transferring prisoners to a new, currently empty, jail, relocating particularly vulnerable prisoners; and even releasing people to allow for physical distancing. The Court agreed with the motion, noting:
At the hearing, Defendant did not have information regarding conditions in the existing county jail facilities, insisted that moving prisoners to a newly completed, empty jail in Indio was not feasible, and admitted that it had not researched alternative housing options such as recreation centers, halfway houses, and hotels. Rather than having created a plan to safeguard those most vulnerable to the COVID-19 virus, Defendant conceded that it has not conducted an analysis of its own records to identify particularly vulnerable prisoners. It also has not conducted an analysis of its jail population to determine whether there are any low-level offenders who might be eligible for early release.
 The Court found, "Should the County be unable to implement adequate social distancing within its existing jail facilities and take other necessary steps to decrease risk of infection, this Court has the authority to order the transfer of prisoners to different facilities." It therefore granted plaintiffs' request that the County be required “to submit a plan to the Court to implement the Governor’s order for physical distancing for all Californians housed in the jails." Specific requirements were outlined in the written order dated April 16, 2020: 1. An evaluation of current jail capacity to house people safely consistent with physical distancing to reduce transmission of COVID-19 2. A plan to safely house and care for people incarcerated in the jails who are at high risk for severe complications from COVID-19 based on guidance from the CDC and the Court experts. 3. Adequate hygiene and cleaning measures, including education of the people incarcerated in the jails, consistent with the CDC’s guidelines. 4. Measures to address the mental health needs of people held in quarantine or isolation The court also ordered mediation to resolve any disputes over the adequacy of the plan and the production of underlying data. A status report was provided on April 24, detailing that during the mediation the Defendants provided information that satisfied a significant number of the issues posed by Plaintiffs, and that the Defendant was in process of preparing a written plan to provide to Plaintiffs pursuant to the court’s order on April 14. Furthermore, the Defendant agreed to provide the Plaintiffs’ counsel relevant COVID-19 statistics every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday for the duration of the State of Emergency. The Court approved the proposed COVID-19 plan on July 22, 2020. On October 15, 2020, the court approved a stipulated agreement between the parties to revise the COVID-19 plan. The defendants agreed to allow ten people out of their cells in the dayroom at a time to provide the inmates with more time out of their cells. The defendants also agreed to allow individuals in dorm housing to move around when other inmates had dayroom time without limitations. The Defendants also agreed to provide Plaintiffs' counsel with weekly data reports of out-of-cell time for each cohort in celled housing for each day and test results including the purpose of testing and the housing location at the time of testing. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2013, three prisoners in Riverside county jails filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Riverside (California) alleging that the access to both physical and mental healthcare was so deficient that it violated the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment. On April 28, 2016, the Court approved the parties' Consent Decree and Remedial Plan, which called for enhanced provision of medical and mental health services to inmates and awarded the plaintiffs $1,250,000 in attorneys' fees and expenses. The Consent Decree was set to last four years and its enforcement is still ongoing as of January 3, 2019. On April 4, 2020, plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce the consent decree, seeking implementation of expert-endorsed coronavirus-related protocols including social distancing. On April 16, the Court agreed, requiring planning and potentially prisoner transfers. A mediation was held on April 17, during which the Defendant satisfied many of the issues posed by the Plaintiffs. On October 15, the court approved a stipulated agreement between the parties to revise the COVID-19 plan.


On March 30, 2000, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, in coordination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's discriminatory policies and practices, African-American female borrowers were charged higher mortgage broker fees than similarly situated white male borrowers. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant provided financial incentives to mortgage brokers to steer loan applicants to Delta and that the defendant approved loans without regard to the borrower's ability to repay. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on April 10, 2000 that was signed by the court (Judge Sifton). Under the settlement agreement, the Defendant-bank is prohibited from lending engaging in any lending practices based on sex, race, or color. In addition, Delta has agreed to create a $7,250,000 remediation fund as well as an amelioration fund consisting of 525,000 unregistered shares of common stock to compensate borrowers impacted by the Defendant-bank's previous discriminatory measures. This case was the first case for DOJ to litigate with combined allegations of fair lending and consumer protection.

Summary: On March 30, 2000, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against a bank, in coordination with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Federal Trade Commission, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The parties agreed to a consent decree, under which the bank is prohibited from lending engaging in any lending practices based on sex, race, or color. In addition, Delta has agreed to create a $7,250,000 remediation fund as well as an amelioration fund consisting of 525,000 unregistered shares of common stock.


On October 8, 2012, two affiliated companies, Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC, along with their owners, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from CatholicVote Legal Defense Fund, the Thomas More Society, and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending mandatory contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. The state of Michigan, the Life Legal Defense Fund, and the Bioethics Defense Fund appeared as amici curiae in support of plaintiffs; the ACLU and the ACLU Fund of Michigan submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of the defendants. On October 12, 2012, District Judge Robert Jonker denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction; the plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit denied a temporary injunction pending appeal. On September 17, 2013, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny a preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the plaintiff's RFRA claims for lack of jurisdiction. On September 30, 2013, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's RFRA claims without prejudice. On October 22, 2013, the plaintiff filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. That petition was held at the Supreme Court while the Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (also known as Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius). The Hobby Lobby decision issued on June 30, 2014: In 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. The Court emphasized, however, that alternative methods for meeting the government's asserted interest were available. In light of the Hobby Lobby opinion, on July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in this (Autocam) case, and remanded it to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit for further consideration. On December 11, 2014, the Sixth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand to the District Court for entry of a permanent injunction. On January 5, 2015, the District Court entered a permanent injunction preventing the federal government from enforcing the version of the contraceptive mandate that applied in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs. The injunction only applied to that version of the mandate, and did not enjoin the government from enforcing a revised version of the mandate that complied with the decision. On February 25, 2015, the parties notified the District Court that they had reached an agreement on attorney's fees and costs and no further proceedings were necessary.

Summary: In 2012, two affiliated companies, Autocam Corporation and Autocam Medical, LLC, along with their owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the federal government, under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from CatholicVote Legal Defense Fund, the Thomas More Society, and private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), contending that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On October 12, 2012, District Judge Robert Jonker denied plaintiffs' motion for an injunction in an unpublished opinion, which plaintiffs appealed to the 6th Circuit. The 6th Circuit affirmed the district court's opinion and remanded the case for dismissal. Autocam sought Supreme Court review, and on July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court vacated the 6th Circuit judgment , and remanded for further consideration in light of its Hobby Lobby decision issued the day before. Following Hobby Lobby, the District Court granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive services mandate on January 5, 2015.


This action, filed February 3, 2017, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Represented by private counsel and several advocacy organizations--the University of Minnesota Center for New Americans and the Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota -- plaintiffs argued that in preventing valid US visa holders from entering the US, the EO violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought emergency declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs were two married couples. In each couple, one individual was a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the US petitioning for visas for his/her respective spouses. The visas were granted, and the spouses, who were nationals of one of the seven nations subject to the Executive Order, were prevented from entering the U.S. In both cases, the couples were separated as a result of the Executive Order. With their complaint, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin the defendants from both revoking the issued visas and prohibiting the visa holders from entering the US. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya Chutkan. On February 5, 2017, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to Judge Chutkan that one of the plaintiffs was allowed to enter the US and had become a Lawful Permanent Resident. A second plaintiff was allowed to board a plane to the US on February 6, 2017. On February 7, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a notice that they were withdrawing the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. On Mar. 6, prompted by adverse developments in another lawsuit challenging the Executive Order, in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). On March 8, the parties reached an agreement in this case and stipulated to a dismissal, with each party to bear its own costs and fees. The court granted the dismissal on the same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: This action, filed February 3, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017, Executive Order also known as the travel ban. The plaintiffs were two married couples. In each couple, one individual is a citizen or lawful permanent resident of the US petitioning for visas for their respective spouses. The visas were granted, and the spouses, who are nationals of one of the seven nations subject to the EO, were prevented from entering the US. In both cases, the couples were separated as a result of the EO. On February 5, 2017, plaintiffs' counsel wrote to the district court judge that one of the plaintiffs was allowed to enter the US and had become a Lawful Permanent Resident. A second plaintiff was allowed to board a plane to the US on February 6, 2017. On February 7, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a notice that they were withdrawing the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. On March 8, the parties reached an agreement in this case and stipulated to a dismissal, with each party to bear its own costs and fees. The court granted the dismissal on the same day. This case is now closed.


On September 07, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3601, against the Eastman Housing Authority ("EHA") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. (Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Dublin Division). The Defendant maintains and owns nine public housing developments in the City of Eastman and surrounding areas. The Plaintiff claimed that the Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race or color in connection with the rental of dwellings in EHA housing developments. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges the Defendants steered applicants and residents to housing complexes on the basis of race and color; 2) selected white applicants over eligible black applicants who had higher positions on the EHA waiting list so that white applicants could be placed in vacant housing units ; 3) selected black applicants over white applicants on the EHA waiting list so that white applicants would not be housed in vacant units in majority black complexes; and 4) provided inferior treatment to black tenants in the terms, conditions and/or privileges of rental of EHA properties. The Plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The parties announced a settlement the same day the Complaint was filed, and on October 18, 2010, the Court (Judge Bowen) approved a five year consent decree. In addition to general prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of race or color, and the use of HUD-approved policies with respect to applications and admissions, record-keeping and permission to inspect, the decree required the Defendant to pay $320,000 into an escrow to compensate persons harmed the EHA's discriminatory rental practices. The settlement ended in 2015 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 07, 2010, the United States sued the Eastman Housing Authority ("EHA") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia for violations of the Fair Housing Act. Allegedly the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination based on race or color by steerig African American families away, falsley denying the availability of units, and other practices designed to avoid renting to people of color. The parties announced a settlement the same day the Complaint was filed and the District Court (Judge Bowen) approved a five-year Consent Decree that set out specific HUD-approved policies and practices for Defendant to follow in the application and admission processes, along with record keeping, reporting, and openness to inspection.


This case was originally named West v. City of Santa Fe. It was recaptioned when one of the court severed one of the plaintiffs from the original case to pursue claims against the City of Santa Fe alone; the original case pursued claims against the city of Hitchcock, Texas. The new case was titled Fuller v. Santa Fe, 3:18-cv-00283 (S.D. Tex.). On November 3, 2016, three individuals under threat of being jailed for failure to pay fines to the City of Santa Fe filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the City of Santa Fe, the Municipal Judge, and the Chief of Police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants run a modern-day debtors' prison to raise revenue for the City. They claimed that city officials have colluded on an unconstitutional two-tiered system of justice by which the City and Municipal Judge agreed to raise the costs of the traffic and other misdemeanor fines to boost revenue and the City extracts payments from local residents. Police officers regularly jail people who fail to pay their fines without giving them access to a lawyer or the chance to mount a legal defense, nor are they given the opportunity to see a judge for the constitutionally mandated hearing on their ability to pay. Moreover, the police chief makes jail intolerable, giving detainees too little food to eat and depriving them of medical care. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Texas, the plaintiffs asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys fees. They also sought class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that the revenue-generating scheme begins with Municipal Court proceedings, which its jurisdiction is limited to tickets for class C misdemeanors. These offenses are defined by Texas law as "nonjailable," "fine only" offenses, punishable by a fine up to $500. For an individual unable to make timely payments in full, the Municipal Court issues a "capias pro fine" warrant for failure to pay a fine. Individuals who have a capias pro fine have two options: pay in full or turn themselves in to the police. Police also search for people subject to capias pro fine warrants, sometimes arresting people at their homes in front of family, friends, and neighbors. Though police have the option of taking such individuals before a court, they do not. Instead, they transfer them to the police chief and book them into jail where they will be held until they pay their debt in full or satisfy the fines with "jail credit." The allegations continued, claiming that once in jail, individuals are subjected to unsafe conditions without proper food. The complaint terms this the "Hungry Man policy," and alleges that jailed individuals are fed one Pop Tart for breakfast, one Pop Tart for lunch, and a frozen meal, such as a Hungry Man meal, for dinner. This amounts to only about 750 calories a day, which is less than half of the calories the average sedentary adult requires, and less than a third of the calories sedentary young men require. Judge George C Hanks, Jr. denied class certification without prejudice on September 18, 2017, without providing a detailed reason in the order. On October 11, 2017, one of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed his claims; the other two plaintiffs proceeded on this single case without him. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 23, 2017, adding a magistrate judge, in his individual capacity, and the Chief of Police, in his official capacity, as defendants. The case was temporarily assigned to Magistrate Judge Andrew Edison on June 1, 2018. On June 4, 2019, the defendants filed a sealed motion calling the plaintiff's capacity to prosecute the lawsuit into question. This appeared to be due to some health issue, since the District Court granted a 60-day stay of the case on June 18, 2019 to allow the plaintiff to access medical care in hopes of continuing the suit after. Magistrate Judge Edison provided a recommendation against granting the defendant's various motions to dismiss on August 16, 2018, saying that all plaintiffs in the case had standing and that the injuries alleged in the case amounted to civil rights violations. 2018 WL 4047115. Though he did not explicitly recommend severing the claims against Hitchcock and Santa Fe at this point, the Magistrate Judge discussed each plaintiff's claims against their respective cities separately. This likely influenced Judge Hanks's decision to sever the two cases when he adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation on September 19. 2018 WL 5276264. The case was reassigned to Judge Jeffrey V. Brown. Judge Brown conditionally dismissed the case on October 23, 2019 because the parties had come to a settlement agreement in Fuller v. City of Santa Fe that covered the class of plaintiffs named here. The Clearinghouse has been unable to find text of a settlement agreement. The case was officially dismissed on December 6, 2019 because neither party filed a motion to dispose of the case on a final judgment by that deadline set in in the October 23 order.

Summary: On November 3, 2016, three individuals who have been, or fear they will be, jailed for failure to pay their outstanding fines to the City of Santa Fe, filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Eventually, this case was severed into two separate ones: this one, against the city of Hitchcock, and Fuller v. City of Santa Fe, against the city of Santa Fe. Fuller v. City of Santa Fe settled for an undisclosed amount, and the plaintiffs in this case were covered by that settlement. The case is closed.


On April 27, 2010, Shelby County, Alabama, filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the Voting Rights Act's preclearance provision, Section 5. The county sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional in declaring Shelby County a "covered" jurisdiction and requiring that it obtain approval from the Department of Justice prior to implementing any voting changes. Following a decision in September of 2010 that the United States could not conduct additional discovery regarding issues of standing and Section 4(a)'s bailout provision, 270 F.R.D. 16 (D.D.C. 2010), the District Court (Judge Bates) granted the Justice Department's motion for summary judgment and granted Shelby County's motion for summary judgement on September 21, 2011. 811 F.Supp.2d 242. The main issue was whether the Act's preclearance requirement constituted a "congruent and proportional" response to a real threat that states would violate minority voting rights. Judge Bates found the Act was indeed a"congruent and proportional remedy" to the 21st century problem of voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals likewise held that the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act fell within Congress' authority under the Fifteenth Amendment and that the disparate effect on different jurisdictions was sufficiently related to the targeted problem of voting discrimination to survive judicial review. 679 F.3d 848. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 133 S.Ct. 594, and on June 25, 2013, reversed. In a 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court struck down Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. It found that Section 4's formula, under which states and other jurisdictions needed preclearance, was unconstitutional. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). The Court held that Section 4, while appropriate at the time it was passed, no longer provided an accurate list of jurisdictions that discriminated against minority voters. The formula at the time of the Act's passage, named as "covered" jurisdictions those states or political subdivisions that had maintained a test or device (like literacy and knowledge tests, good moral character requirements, etc.) as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election. Subsequently, the trigger election was changed to 1972. The Court concluded Section 4 impermissibly violated the "equal sovereignty" of the states. The Court did not express its views on the constitutionality of Section 5, under a different coverage formula. Justice Ginsburg dissented (joined by three others), and Justice Thomas concurred to express his view that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Without a coverage formula, the Act's preclearance regime is not operative. It remains technically possible for the Congress to pass a new coverage formula.

Summary: On April 27, 2010, Shelby County filed this lawsuit in the District Court of the District of Columbia, challenging the preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, under which certain states and localities must obtain approval from the Department of Justice prior to implementing any voting changes. The District Court and the Court of Appeals held the Act constitutional, but on June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act--the formula for which jurisdictions were governed by the preclearance regime--impermissibly undermined the "equal sovereignty" of the states. Because the Court offered no view on Section 5 of the VRA, it remains technically available to the Congress to pass a new coverage formula. Without such a formula, the Act's preclearance regime is not operative.


On August 14, 2015, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff is a consortium of immigrant advocacy organizations that represents civil detainees. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that ICE had unjustifiably failed to respond to a request for records within the statutorily mandated timeframe. These records related to allegations that detention officers employed by the GEO Group sexually abused female asylum-seekers who were detained with their children in the ICE family detention center in Karnes City, Texas. The plaintiff maintained that the records contained information about the facility’s laundry room, which GEO detention officers allegedly used to sexually assault women in the late night and early morning hours. Earlier in 2015, an investigation of the substantive allegations had led to a report by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). Reviewing over 360 hours of time-lapsed surveillance video footage, OIG explained that it had uncovered no evidence substantiating the allegations. However, according to former detainees, the sexual assaults happened in a "blind spot" in the laundry room where they would not be captured on the security camera. Therefore, the plaintiff submitted a FOIA request for physical and electronic records concerning the laundry room and its associated security camera. At the time of the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff had received no agency records responsive to the request. On August 14, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint stating that ICE's online FOIA tracking tool indicated that a request for documents had been sent, and that an estimated delivery date of those documents was to be on August 19, 2015. However, there is no note of the documents being delivered on that date or any date thereafter. After a long stretch of rescheduling orders, on June 29, 2016 the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing it had fulfilled its statutory obligations under FOIA. The plaintiff, however, filed no response brief by the deadline. The Court took the plaintiff's silence to mean that the plaintiff did not oppose the defendant's argument that the search was adequate, that the defendant had produced all non-exempt portions of responsive records, and that the defendant had properly withheld material under FOIA's statutory exemptions. Therefore, the Court granted the defendant's summary judgment motion and closed the case on August 22, 2016. This case is now closed.

Summary: On Aug. 14, 2015, the immigration advocacy organization RAICES sued ICE under FOIA for records pertaining to possible sexual assaults in an ICE detention facility. After ICE produced records, plaintiff did not file an opposing brief, and the Court granted ICE's motion for summary judgment and closed the case on Aug. 22, 2016.


In June 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division launched an investigation into the conditions at the juvenile justice facilities at the Adobe Mountain School, Black Canyon School, and Catalina Mountain School in Arizona, pursuant to Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. and the pattern or practice provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Arizona facilities violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents in the areas of: suicide prevention, education, mental health care and medical care. On January 23, 2004, the DOJ issued a findings letter which detailed the violations and set out a series of minimum remedial measures to bring the facilities up to constitutional standards. The State accepted the recommendations and the parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement to ensure compliance. So that the Agreement could be judicially enforced, the DOJ filed a formal complaint on September 15, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. That same day, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Memorandum of Agreement. The agreement identifies and proscribes remedies for five substantive areas: training in suicide prevention; the installation of a juvenile justice system in which youths can raise grievances without fear of retribution from staff; provisions in special education; adequate health care services; and adequate mental health services. On September 27, 2004, District Court Judge Earl H. Carroll ordered that the case be conditionally dismissed and placed on the inactive docket pending compliance w/the Memorandum of Agreement lodged with the Court. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for a period of three years to monitor compliance. On September 26, 2007, Judge Carroll granted a joint motion to dismiss the case. A Consultants Committee report attested to Defendant compliance with the negotiated agreement, thus allowing for the case dismissal.

Summary: In June 2002, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division launched an investigation into the conditions at the juvenile justice facilities at the Adobe Mountain School, Black Canyon School, and Catalina Mountain School in Arizona. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the Arizona facilities violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents. The DOJ and the State negotiated an Agreement for reforms. The DOJ then filed a formal complaint on September 15, 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona so that the Agreement could be judicially enforced. On September 27, 2004, Judge Earl H. Carroll ordered that the case be conditionally dismissed pending compliance with the Agreement lodged with the court. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for three years to monitor compliance. On September 26, 2007, Judge Carroll dismissed the case on grounds that compliance with the Agreement had been satisfied.


On September 14, 2007, the EEOC filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC represented a class of individuals claiming discrimination based upon race and national origin in hiring, promotion, job assignment, demotion, and discharge by Faribault Foods. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Faribault Foods engaged in disparate treatment against its Hispanic workforce. For example, it allegedly enforced English-proficiency requirements for entry-level positions that did not require English proficiency. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. On October 17, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard House Kyle) approved a consent decree. The decree consolidated this case with a separate class action suit filed by the same aggrieved individuals (Mendez v. Faribault Foods, Inc.). Under the decree, Faribault Foods was generally enjoined from any future violations of Title VII or the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. It was also required to conduct three hours of diversity training annually for its managers. Further, the defendant was required to conduct all employee orientation and workplace policy training in Spanish, translate its safety procedures and job openings into Spanish, and provide a Spanish interpreter for all reviews and disciplinary actions. The decree also required Faribault Foods to establish a diversity committee to promote and provide feedback of its diversity efforts. It was further required to reimburse tuition for any successfully completed English-language courses by its employees. Finally, the defendant was to pay $465,000 to the class claimants. The consent decree was to remain in effect for a period of two years. On March 28, 2008, the Court granted final approval and certification of the settlement class and the consent decree. The certified class was defined as: "Hispanic current and former employees of Faribault Foods that were discriminated against during their employment on the basis of their race and national origin." In the March 28 order, the Court also retained jurisdiction over these matters for purposes of ensuring compliance with the consent decree. The three year enforcement period ended without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by the EEOC on behalf of Hispanic employees of Faribault, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief and damages for the company's discriminatory practices against Hispanic employees based on race and national origin. This case was resolved through a class-action settlement which was granted final approval by the Court on March 28, 2008. The settlement included monetary damages, and the establishment of non-discriminatory policies.


On August 23, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), on behalf of a black employee, filed a lawsuit in the Southern District Court of Texas, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, against Satchel's BBQ & Steaks, Inc. The EEOC sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and other forms of affirmative relief claiming that the defendant subjected the complainant to a racially hostile work environment because of his race, Black. On September 20, 2005, the District Court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) entered a consent decree where the defendant, among other things, agreed to pay the complainant $12,000.


On September 11, 2000, a paraplegic woman sued the Santa Cruz School District in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California for failing to provide access to persons with mobility impairments at the nursery school her children attended. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that paths from the parking lot to the school grounds, front doors, playground, bathrooms, and activities requiring parent-child involvement were inaccessible, all in violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 USC §12131 et seq; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 29 USC 794; (3) California Government Code §§4450 et seq; and (4) The California Civil Rights Acts, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54 and 54.1. The Plaintiff sought an injunction forcing the Defendant to remove architectural and other barriers to disabled access, unspecified damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. On August 7, 2003, the District Court dismissed the case, noting that a settlement agreement had been reached. The details of this settlement agreement are not publicly available. The case is now closed.

Summary: A paraplegic woman filed suit agains the Santa Cruz School District for alleged violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. The case settled, but the settlement agreement is not publicly available.