On March 20, 2001, several female employees of Pacific Telephone and Telegraph ("PT & T", a subsidiary of AT&T) filed a lawsuit under Title VII and ERISA against defendants AT & T in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary damages and equitable relief. While at PT & T, each of the female plaintiffs took temporary leaves of absence due to pregnancy prior to 1979. Pursuant to policies in place at the time, PT & T did not give "service credit" to women who took temporary disability leaves due to pregnancy during the time they were on leave, while it did offer such credit to employees who were on temporary leave due to other disabilities. Service credit is important because it affects "Net Credited Service" ("NCS"), which in turn affects other job benefits such as pension payments, seniority for layoffs, etc. The NCS for each plaintiff calculated by PT & T was carried over to AT & T when they became AT & T employees. The plaintiffs alleged that the failure to credit them with the time they were on disability leave due to pregnancy constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, in violation of Title VII, and was a breach of the AT & T benefit plan's fiduciary duty to treat all plan members equally, in violation of the ERISA. On August 11, 2003, the district court (Judge Martin Jenkins) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as to the Title VII claim, but denied the plaintiffs' motion as to the ERISA claim. The district court's order was based on 1) the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1979 ("PDA"), which includes pregnancy under the umbrella of discrimination due to sex, and 2) the 9th Circuit case Pallas v. Pacific Bell, 940 F.2d 1324, which held that Pacific Bell violated Title VII in calculating retirement benefits after PDA, when it gave service credit for all pre-PDA temporary disability leave except leave by reason of pregnancy. AT & T appealed, and on March 8, 2006, a panel of the 9th Circuit reversed the district court. Hulteen v. AT & T Corp., 441 F.3d 653. However, on July 19, 2006, the 9th Circuit decided to review the case en banc. Hulteen v. AT & T Corp., 455 F.3d 973. On August 17, 2007, the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court by an en banc decision. Hulteen v. AT & T Corp., 498 F.3d 1001. However, on May 18, 2009, the Supreme Court reversed the 9th Circuit, holding that an employer does not necessarily violate the PDA when it pays pension benefits calculated in part under accrual rule, applied only pre-PDA, that gave less retirement credit for pregnancy than for medical leave generally. AT & T Corp. v. Hulteen, 129 S.Ct. 1962. On August 10, 2009, the district court dismissed the case.

Summary: The case was brought by several female employees of defendants against defendants AT & T seeking monetary damages and equitable relief for discrimination on the basis of sex. The action went all the way up to the Supreme Court, which held that the defendants' practice did not violate Title VII.


On July 16, 2018, a group of minor children who recently came to the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Health and Human Services, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and all relevant sub-agencies of DHS, including Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). They brought the lawsuit under the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. They argued that the defendants’ policy of taking children away from their parents and then moving them across state lines without any notice to the children, their families, or counsel, violated their Due Process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, their right to seek protection under the Asylum Statute, their rights as guaranteed by the Flores settlement, and the Administrative Procedures Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that this policy harmed them by depriving them of the ability to seek counsel. The plaintiffs, represented by Legal Aid Society, sought an order enjoining the defendants from taking any action to remove children from New York state without providing 48 hours of advance notice to children, their families, and counsel in order to permit legal consultation so that they may make informed decisions concerning their rights and potential claims. “Notice” was to include the location to where the minor child would be moved, the location where the child’s parent(s) reside, and the purpose of the move. The complaint also sought class certification for “all minor children within the New York State who enter the United States at or between designated ports of entry who have been or will be separated from a parent or parents absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child who are detained in ORR custody, ORR foster care, or DHS custody.” Given the urgency of the situation, this case moved very quickly. The day after the complaint was filed, Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the plaintiffs limited injunctive relief. This relief restrained the defendants “from taking any action to remove minor children clients of the Legal Aid Society from New York State who are in ORR custody without providing 48 hours’ advanced notice.” The relief was to remain in effect until July 19, 2018, subject to extension. On July 19, 2018, Judge Jesse M. Furman transferred the case to Southern District of California to be consolidated with Ms. L v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, due to the similar nature of the cases. Updates concerning further litigation can be found there.

Summary: On July 16, 2018, a group of minor children who recently came to the United States filed this putative class action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the government's policy of taking the plaintiff children away from their parents, crossing state lines, and not informing the parents where their children had been taken, violated their rights. Judge Swain immediately granted temporary relief and then Judge Furman transferred the case to the Southern District of California.


On February 22, 2018, a former civil immigration detainee filed a putative class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas. The Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sued the private prison company CoreCivic, Inc. under the Federal Trafficking in Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (the “TPVA”). The Plaintiff claimed that civil immigration detainees had been forced to work for 1-2 dollars a day or no wages under threats including solitary confinement and denial of basic services. Additionally, the Plaintiff also brought claims of negligence and unjust enrichment against CoreCivic. The Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, including disgorgement of profits and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. In addition, the Plaintiff sought certification of the class as “All civil immigration detainees who performed labor for no pay or at a rate of compensation of $1.00 to $2.00 per day for work performed for CoreCivic at any detention facility owned or operated by it from February 20, 2007 to the applicable opt-out date, inclusive.” According to the Plaintiff’s complaint, the civil immigration detainees were forced to perform labor such as cleaning the “pods” where they were housed, cooking meals, and cleaning, maintaining, and operating the detention facilities. Detainees who refused to work were threatened with punishments such as confinement, physical restraint, substantial and sustained restriction, deprivation, solitary confinement, and retaliatory transfer to other facilities. Some were also denied basic hygiene supplies such as toothbrushes, toothpaste, or sanitary napkins unless they worked. During one instance, after the Plaintiff filed a complaint signed by other detainees against the facility for serving food infested with worms, the facility responded by fabricating a chickenpox outbreak and placing all the female detainees in quarantine. During the quarantine, the women received spoiled food and water contaminated with dog hair. The Plaintiff alleged this was in retaliation for the original complaint about the infested food. The Defendant moved to dismiss on June 8, 2018, arguing that the TVPA does not apply to labor performed by lawfully detained immigration detainees held in a private detention center and that the complaint failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim. Judge Lee Yeakel denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on March 1, 2019 because the text of the TVPA ("[w]hoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by . . . any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm”) did not exclude the federal government or private centers performing a federal function. 2019 WL 4388425. In addition, Judge Yeakel found that solitary confinement and the threat of solitary confined sufficiently alleged the means to achieve forced labor and thus, the Plaintiff’s action could proceed. The Defendant subsequently filed a motion for Certificate of Appealability for Interlocutory Appeal on the denial of its motion to dismiss. The Defendant's motion was based in part on similar cases against the Defendant being appealed in other states such as Georgia. Judge Yeakel granted the motion on June 10, 2019, along with the Defendant’s motion to stay all proceedings pending the resolution of the appeal. On June 24, 2019, this case was appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Docket #19-50691). The issue on appeal to the Fifth Circuit was whether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors. As of October 10, 2019, this case is ongoing.

Summary: On February 22, 2018, a former civil immigration detainee filed a putative class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Texas. The Plaintiff represented by private counsel sued CoreCivic, Inc. under the Federal Trafficking in Victims Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (the “TPVA”). The Plaintiff claimed that civil immigration detainees had been forced to work for 1-2 dollars a day or no wages under threats including solitary confinement and denial of basic services. Additionally, the Plaintiff also brought claims of negligence and unjust enrichment against CoreCivic. The Plaintiff seeks class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages including disgorgement of profits and attorneys fees. The Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on June 8th, 2018 which was denied by Judge Lee Yeakel on March 1st, 2019 (2019 WL 4388425). Judge Yeakel granted Defendant's motion for Certificate of Appealability for Interlocutory Appeal on June 10th, 2019, along with the Defendant’s motion to stay all proceedings until the appeal is completed. On June 24, 2019, this case was appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, (Docket #19-50691). The issue on appeal to the Fifth Circuit is whether the TVPA applies to work programs in federal immigration detention facilities operated by private for-profit contractors. As of October 10, 2019, this case is ongoing.


On February 28, 2017, an incoming college student whose mother was not a U.S. citizen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Rosemary Collyer. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia and several government employees involved in the D.C. Tuition Assistance Grant Program (DCTAG) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the District of Columbia Administrative Procedures Act, and D.C. CODE §§ 38.2702(c)(2). The plaintiff, represented by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, alleged that the defendant had violated the Supremacy Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution as well as the District of Columbia's Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees. DCTAG was a federal tuition assistance program that provided financial aid to D.C. residents attending college. To be eligible for DCTAG, applicants had to have been domiciled in D.C. for twelve consecutive months before the start of their freshman year. The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, had lived in D.C. with her mother for the plaintiff’s whole life. However, because her mother was not a citizen, her mother could not establish domicile. The plaintiff was denied funding for the 2015-2016 school year because she had been a dependent of a noncitizen in the previous twelve months. When she reapplied for the 2016-2017 school year, the defendants allegedly told her that she would never be eligible for DCTAG because her parent did not have the “requisite citizenship status.” The parties settled the case out of court on April 26, 2017. The court dismissed the case without prejudice until June 12, 2017. If June 12, 2017 passed and neither party moved to reopen the case, the case would be dismissed with prejudice. That date passed with neither party moving to reopen the case, so the settlement was presumably consummated. We do not know the terms of the settlement because all settlement proceedings happened outside of court. The case is now closed.

Summary: In February 2017, an incoming college student whose mother is not a U.S. citizen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia because she was denied financial aid for college because her mother was not a citizen and thus could not prove domicile. The plaintiff alleged that this violated her equal protection and due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. She also alleged that the defendants had overstepped their authority under D.C. law. The parties settled out of court in April 2017.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an action seeking to enjoin California from enforcing EO N-64-20, which allowed Californians to vote by mail in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. No outcome yet. <hr> On May 21, 2020, five registered California voters filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. Represented by attorneys from Judicial Watch, the plaintiffs sued the governor and secretary of state of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Elections and Electors Clauses, and state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the governor's EO N-64-20, which allowed Californians to vote by mail to preserve the public health, arguing that the changing the "time, place, and manner in which Californians" vote was unconstitutional. The case was assigned to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. The case is ongoing.

Summary: California voters challenged an executive order that permitted Californians to vote by mail in the upcoming elections. They argued that the order unconstitutionally violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the Electors and Elections Clauses, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.


On March 16, 2018, the nonprofit Turning Point for Women and Families and individuals who were forced to remove their religious head coverings for post-arrest photographs while in the custody of the New York Police Department filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), § 1983 for violations of plaintiffs’ right to freely exercise their religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and New York state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP and the Council for American-Islamic Relations New York Inc., sought injunctive relief against the challenged policy, an order stipulating the adoption of non-discriminatory post-arrest photography policy, declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs also asked the court to certify the class as all individuals who were forced to remove their religious head coverings for post-arrest photographs while in NYPD custody. Judge Robert W. Sweet was first assigned and then replaced with Judge Analisa Torres. Specifically, the lawsuit alleged that the NYPD enacted and maintained a policy of forcing individuals who wore head coverings as part of their religion to remove these coverings in order to take booking photos after being arrested and that these photos were then stored in and easily accessible NYPD database. The plaintiffs claimed that this policy violated RLUIPA and the Free Exercise Clause because it placed a substantial and undue burden on protected religious practices. In addition, they said that the forced removal of religious head coverings could be a distressing experience, and, in some cases, required individuals to violate their own religion. They further claimed that these policies were not only discriminatory and unnecessary, but that they were out of step with nationwide policies regarding post-arrest photographs. The City of New York filed a motion to dismiss on June 13, 2018, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim. Both parties filed supplemental points regarding the motion, but oral arguments were delayed based on talks of settlement agreements between the parties. On January 23, 2019, the court opened discovery and approved the parties’ jointly submitted discovery plan on February 1, 2019. On March 24, 2019, the presiding judge passed away and the case was reassigned to Judge Judge Analisa Torres, with all urgent and routine case management matters assigned to Magistrate Judge Kathrine H. Parker. Discovery resumed on June 19, 2019. During this time, settlement talks were still ongoing. On January 16, 2020, this case was related to Elsayed v. City of New York, No. 18-cv-10566, another case involving forced removal of religious head coverings while in NYPD custody proceeding in the Southern District of New York. The court largely denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss on September 30, 2020. However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages because the plaintiffs conceded that the City is immune from punitive damages. One of the plaintiff’s claims for compensatory damages was dismissed for failure to file a timely notice of claim. The parties reached a partial settlement agreement in late October, and the court approved it on November 5, 2020. This settlement included the plaintiffs and defendants both in this case and in Elsayed. Under the agreement, the City agreed to make changes to its Patrol Guide regarding its post-arrest photography policy. The agreement also awarded reasonable fees to the plaintiffs’ attorneys. It did not resolve the monetary claims of the organizational or personal plaintiffs in this case, although the parties in the Elsayed case came to a separate settlement agreement concerning monetary damages. On February 16, 2021, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification as "a class consisting of all persons who were required to remove religious head coverings for post-arrest photographs while in NYPD custody". The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 16, 2018, the nonprofit Turning Point for Women and Families and individuals who were forced to remove their religious head coverings for post-arrest photographs while in the custody of the New York Police Department filed this class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), § 1983 for violations of plaintiffs’ right to freely exercise their religion under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and New York state law. The plaintiffs, represented by Emery Celli Brinckerhoff & Abady LLP and the Council for American-Islamic Relations New York Inc., sought injunctive relief against the challenged policy, an order stipulating the adoption of non-discriminatory post-arrest photography policy, declaratory judgment, compensatory and punitive damages and attorney’s fees. On November 5, 2020, a settlement agreement was reached resolving the claim for injunctive relief. The monetary claims are still pending. The plaintiffs also asked the court to certify the class as all individuals who were forced to remove their religious head coverings for post-arrest photographs while in NYPD custody, this motion was granted on February 16, 2021.


In September 30, 2005, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued The Boeing Company under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, alleging that Boeing terminated and retaliated against two female employees for discriminatory reasons and on the basis of their gender. The EEOC sought to permanently enjoin Boeing from engaging in discriminatory employment practices and compel Boeing to compensate the two employees for pecuniary losses, mental and emotional distress, and punitive damages. Specifically, the EEOC claimed that two female employees were transferred and eventually terminated due to complaints they made about perceived unlawful sex discrimination. The case was assigned to Judge Frederick Martone. During discovery, Boeing moved to sever the claims, arguing that they would be prejudiced if both claims were heard together. The Court denied this motion, finding that the claim was nothing more than a generalized assertion of prejudice. On April 11, 2007, Boeing moved for summary judgment. On August 16, 2007, the Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that the defendant articulated sufficient nondiscriminatory reasons for the layoffs and there was not enough evidence to support a causal link with regards to the retaliation claims. The EEOC was ordered to pay for Boeing’s costs. On October 16, 2007, the EEOC appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 8, 2009, the Court of Appeals determined that the EEOC had presented specific and substantial evidence for a jury to find in their favor, and thus ruled that the summary judgment finding was premature. The Court reversed and remanded the case. 577 Fd.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2009). On remand, the parties jointly proposed a consent decree on January 22, 2010. Boeing agreed to pay each employee $140,000, implement employee training programs around sex discrimination and Title VII retaliation, and develop written policies related to these issues. Boeing and its employees were also permanently enjoined from sexually harassing employees or retaliating against them (including those involved in this suit) for filing discrimination complaints. Boeing agreed that, if employees were identified to have performed such conduct, they would be disciplined according to the policies. The records of the employees involved in this suit were also agreed to be expunged of references to the discrimination charges and references to this suit. The case is now closed.

Summary: In September 2005, the EEOC sued Boeing on behalf of employees sued the company alleging that that Boeing terminated two female employees for discriminatory reasons and in retaliation of the employees' filing discrimination complaints. The case was initially decided in Boeing's favor through summary judgment in the District Court but, on appeal to the 9th Circuit, was reversed and remanded. The parties eventually settled, with Boeing agreeing to pay a total of $280,000 and implement new policies and training around sex discrimination and retaliation.


This case consolidated two separate fair housing lawsuits, which were then settled together. The Fair Housing Center of Washtenaw County, Inc. (also known as the Fair Housing Center of Southeastern Michigan), filed the first action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The suit, filed July 16, 2009, alleged that Acme Investments, Inc., which owned and operated Ivanhoe House Apartments, in Ann Arbor, Michigan, of systematic discrimination against African Americans in violation of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. On March 3, 2010, the United States filed a similar action against the same defendants in the same court, Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-10853, to enforce the provisions of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. The case had been developed through testing, which revealed that Acme employees frequently told African American persons that no units were available while simultaneously telling white persons units were available to rent or inspect. They also refused to process applications by African Americans. The cases sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, along with civil penalties. Judge Sean Cox consolidated the two cases on March 31, 2010. The parties entered settlement negotiations and on July 7, 2010, the Court entered a three-year consent decree for the parties. The Consent Decree forbids discrimination, and includes provisions requiring training, public notice, and record-keeping. Defendants agreed to pay $35,000 to the aggrieved persons, $40,000 to the Fair Housing Center, and a $7,500 civil penalty. There was no further docket activity until 2013. On July 2, the court extended the Consent Decree to Jan. 6, 2014. There is no subsequent docket activity, and the case appears to now be closed.

Summary: This case consolidated two separate fair housing lawsuits, which were then settled together. The Fair Housing Center of Washtenaw County, Inc. filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The suit, filed July 16, 2009, alleged that Acme Investments, Inc. (which owned and operated Ivanhoe House Apartments, in Ann Arbor, Michigan) of systematic discrimination against African Americans in violation of the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, and the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. The parties entered settlement negotiations, and on July 7, 2010, the Court entered a three-year consent decree which forbids discrimination and includes provisions requiring training, public notice, and record-keeping. Defendants agreed to pay $35,000 to the aggrieved persons, $40,000 to the Fair Housing Center, and a $7,500 civil penalty.


On May 18, 2016, a group of parents and guardians of noncitizen children who had recently arrived in the United States filed this class action suit against the School Board of Collier County, Florida and the Superintendent of the Collier County Public Schools. The claim was filed in the U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida. In September 2016, the United States issued a Statement of Interest in support of the plaintiffs' claim. The litigation arose out of the defendants' implementation of an amendment to its Policy 5112.01 on August 2013. This policy provides in relevant part:
No person shall be permitted to attend the regular high school program after attaining the age of nineteen (19). Those who attain the age of nineteen during a school year may complete that school year. Persons who are seventeen years old or older and who, by earning eight credits per academic year, cannot meet graduation requirements, including grade point average, prior to the end of the year during which they attain the age of nineteen, shall not be permitted to attend the regular high school program beyond the end of the academic year in which they attain the age of seventeen. Such persons shall be afforded any opportunity to pursue a high school diploma through the Adult High School or General Educational Development (GED) programs of the District.
In May 2016, the School Board shifted enrollment of high school to a centralized location, the Student Relations Department. Whenever a student who is seventeen or older seeks to enroll, an enrollment specialist gathers the academic records and other pertinent records and gives these to the Executive Director for Secondary Programs, Curriculum, and Instruction. The Executive Director then makes the final recommendation as to enrollment. The Executive Director considers certain factors, including the student's English proficiency, as well as whether the student has an interruption or gap in prior education. The plaintiffs alleged that the noncitizen children were systematically excluded from enrolling in the local public high school because they did not speak English fluently. Instead, plaintiffs claimed that the County was funneling these students into the local technical college, which does not provide instruction in basic subject areas or provide credit towards a high school diploma. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Equal Education Opportunities Act ("EEOA"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), along with violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The complaint also alleged the defendants were violating the Florida Educational Equity Act ("FEEA"). The plaintiffs were represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center. After the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs amended the complaint. The defendants again filed a motion to dismiss on September 9, 2016. The Department of Justified filed a statement of interest and recommended that the court deny the motion. On March 17, 2017, Judge Sheri Polster Chappell granted in part and denied in part the motion. 2017 WL 1050374. Judge Chappell dismissed the Title VI claim against the Superintendent, agreeing with the defendants that the Superintendent could not be sued under Title VI because she was not a recipient of federal funds. The Court also dismissed the § 1983 claims for violations of Equal Protection and Due Process against the Superintendent, finding them duplicative of the claims against the School Board. The Court denied the motion to dismiss all the other claims and permitted the Title VI and § 1983 claims against the School Board to proceed. On June 21, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the School Board to enroll in school all English Language Learners identified in regular high school. After the motion was argued before a magistrate, the court denied the motion on March 14, 2018, finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the irreparable injury needed because they had not established how they or others similarly situated will face actual and imminent injury unless the preliminary injunction issued. The court first noted that Adult ESOL proves a pathway for student plaintiffs to attain their future goals of pursuing higher education at a college, university, or technical school, or to enter the labor market. The court also reasoned that this was different from cases where other plaintiffs had suffered injury because of denial or effective denial of any public educational opportunity at all. The court looked to whether the challenged practice "significantly interferes" with the exercise of a right to education and found that it did not. The plaintiffs were still receiving English-language instruction at the other schools and still had the ability to obtain a GED, which would empower them to pursue their future goals. Finally, the court noted that the plaintiffs' excessive delay in moving for mandatory preliminary injunctive relief mitigated against finding irreparable harm. Around the same time, on January 12, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, which the court granted in part and denied in part on October 17, 2018. The court only granted class certification for the due process claim because it found the remaining claims failed to satisfy the commonality requirement of FRCP Rule 23 The due process claim relied on the alleged total absence of any procedure to contest the denial of enrollment in public high school, and the question of whether defendants had any such procedure is one that applied equally to all putative class members. By contrast, the EEOA claim required to show that the defendant had failed to take "appropriate action" under the statute. In determining this, the court would need to examine each student's relative success or failure in overcoming language barriers to determine if the defendant's action of placing them in ELCAE or Adult ESOL qualified as appropriate action. As for the remaining claims, commonality failed because each of them required the court to examine why defendants denied a particular student enrollment in regular high school. Because each of the remaining claims had discrimination as one element of proof, and the record demonstrated that defendants actually did conduct individualized reviews of each student before deciding whether to permit enrollment, the court decided that these claims were not capable of classwide resolution. For the due process claims, the certified class was defined as:
All foreign-born, English Language Learner (ELL) children ages fifteen to twenty-one whose last completed schooling (not including adult education courses) was at a non-U.S. school, and who, after August 1, 2013, while residing in Collier County, sought or will seek to enroll in the Collier County public school system serving grades K-12, and were or will be denied enrollment by the Defendants.
Since then, the parties continued litigating various discovery disputes, and the plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief based on the due process claim. On March 12, 2019, the parties held a mediation that resulted in an impasse, and the litigation continued. The parties participated in a court-ordered settlement conference on May 13, 2019. As a result, the parties reached an agreement and filed approval of their class-action settlement on July 23, 2019. After a fairness hearing on October 8, 2019, the court approved the settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice. The agreement established a notification and administrative appeals process for any student determined to be ineligible for enrollment in the regular high school program. As of May 26, 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket to enforce the settlement.

Summary: In May 2016, plaintiffs filed this class action suit against the School Board of Collier County, Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the school systematically excluded English Language Learners (ELL) from enrolling in the local public school. Instead, the complaint alleged that ELL were funneled into a local technical college that does not provide high-school credit. In September 2016, the United States issued a Statement of Interest in support of the plaintiffs' claim. The court granted the motion for class certification for the due process claim, but denied class certification the plaintiffs' remaining claims. The parties settled the case in July 2019; as of May 26, 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket to enforce the settlement.


On October 10, 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County of San Diego. The plaintiff, represented by public interest and private counsel, sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages, claiming that the county's mail policies and practices in its jails violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, PLN claimed that the County's postcard-only mail policy and its book-size limitation unconstitutionally limit PLN's ability to communicate with prisoners. Further, PLN contended that the County violated the Due Process Clause by failing to provide them with adequate notice and an opportunity to appeal these censorship decisions, and that by prohibiting the delivery of PLN's publications but allowing the delivery of the publications of others who are similarly situated, the County deprived PLN of equal protection under the law. On October 17, 2014, PLN moved for preliminary injunction. On May 7, 2015, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) granted in part and denied in part PLN's motion for a preliminary injunction requesting that the Court enjoin the County from continuing to enforce both the postcard-only mail policy and the soft-cover book-size limitation, as well as a mandate that County comply with due process requirements. Finding that PLN had established a likelihood of success on the merits, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) ordered the County to suspend enforcement of the postcard-only policy for incoming mail no later than May 21, 2015, and to provide written notice and an administrative appeal process to senders and inmates when the County refuses to deliver publications and correspondence to inmates at the County's jails. The Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) denied PLN's motion to enjoin the book-size restriction, concluding that PLN failed to establish a likelihood of success on its claim that the restriction violated its First Amendment rights. On June 5, 2015, the County sought an interlocutory appeal in the 9th Circuit. On November 18, 2015, PLN and the County moved for a joint settlement. The county agreed to allow plaintiffs to receive both unsolicited and subscription non-postcard mail, as long as such material does not conflict with regular mail policy. The agreement also held that any time a piece of mail was not delivered, both the sender and the receiver would receive notice of the censorship, with information on how to appeal the decision to a person who is not the original censor. Both the interlocutory appeal and the original claims were dismissed with prejudice. On May 18, 2016, the Court granted the parties' joint motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), which governs voluntary dismissal. Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes retained jurisdiction over all disputes between the parties arising out of the settlement agreement, including the interpretation and enforcement of its terms. Both parties consented to the Magistrate Judge's jurisdiction. The case was dismissed on February 7, 2018, with the Magistrate Judge retaining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The case is ongoing for settlement purposes. As of April 10, 2020, there have been no further entries in the docket.

Summary: In October 2014, Prison Legal News (PLN) brought this suit seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and damages against the County of San Diego, alleging that the County's mail policies and practices in its jails violate the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. In May 2015, the Court (Judge M. James Lorenz) granted a preliminary injunction, which enjoined the County's enforcement of its postcard-only policy, and mandated that the County comply with due process requirements. It declined to enjoin enforcement of the County's book size restrictions. In November 2015 PLN and the County moved for a joint settlement. The County agreed to allow most non-postcard mail to reach inmates, so long as such material does not conflict with regular mail policy.


On April 17, 2007, the Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America (MPVA) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12131 et seq. (ADA), against the University of Michigan. The complaint alleged that the University was discriminating against disabled members of the Plaintiff group and others similarly situated by denying them equal access to seating at the University of Michigan Football Stadium. The United States of America joined the case as a Plaintiff Intervenor on November 27, 2007, bringing additional claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794. The University of Michigan Football Stadium is the biggest football stadium in America--it has a seating capacity of over 107,000. At the time of the MPVA's initial complaint, there were fewer than 100 wheelchair accessible seats in the stadium, and these seats were consolidated in a single area. The MPVA alleged that the stadium had undergone multiple substantial renovations which the University knew or should have known would trigger compliance with the ADA, and that under the ADA guidelines the stadium must have at least 1% of its seating be accessible to wheelchair users. These seats must be distributed throughout the stadium, at various price ranges. The MPVA alleged that the wheelchair accessible section failed to provide adequate companion seating, as only one companion could accompany each wheelchair user, and these companions were forced to sit behind the wheelchair user, instead of next to him or her. It was also alleged that, among several other issues, the restrooms and the concessions were largely inaccessible and there was insufficient parking space for the disabled. The complaint alleged that the denial of basic accessibility resulted in the isolation of the disabled and the perpetuation of social stigmas, loneliness, and social deprivation, and that therefore the University seriously injured the MPVA and its members, and others similarly situated. The United States of America joined the case as an intervening plaintiff on November 27, 2007, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. In its complaint, the government raised many of the same arguments as the MPVA, and made additional claims arising under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §794. The United States and the MPVA sought to have the court enjoin the University from engaging in discriminatory policies and practices against the disabled, and order the University to bring the stadium into compliance with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. On March 10, 2008, the parties entered into a consent decree, in which the University denied having violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, but agreed to make substantial changes to its practices and policies, and to the stadium itself. The University agreed to add one section of additional 96 accessible seats and 96 companion seats by the start of the 2008 football season, and to add several more sections in locations around the stadium by the start of the 2010 season, as well as at least 379 additional accessible seats dispersed throughout the stadium, also by the start of the 2010 season. The parties committed to negotiate, at the end of 2010, regarding whether additional seats were necessary. The University also committed to ensuring its ticketing and pricing policies to afford wheelchair users the opportunity to fully participate in the stadium's services, programs, and activities. The University agreed to create a separate waiting list for purchasing season tickets solely for individuals needing wheelchair-accessible seating, and to assign these purchasers the same wheelchair and companion seats throughout the season. The University agreed to make substantial changes to increase the accessibility of the restrooms in the stadium. It agreed to add wheelchair parking spots to two parking lots, and to provide accessible transportation from these lots to the stadium and back. Beginning in March 2009, both the United States and the MPVA can initiate negotiations regarding additional parking or accessible transportation, if they have concerns about the adequacy of the parking or transportation arrangement. The University further agreed to provide training on all components of the Consent Decree to all its employees and contractors who have contact with patrons with disabilities. The Department of Justice has the option of attending these training sessions while the Decree is in effect. The University agreed to aggressively market and publicize, during the full period of the Decree, the availability, location, and prices of the newly expanded accessible seating, as well as other accessibility-enhancing changes to the stadium. The University agreed to report regularly to the MPVA and the Department of Justice on its progress in implementing the Consent Decree, and to submit to their monitoring of the same. The University also made several other commitments secondary to those discussed above in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree expired in March 2013, five years after its start date.

Summary: On April 17, 2007, the Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The United States, represented by attorneys from the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, joined the case as an intervening plaintiff on November 27, 2007. The plaintiffs brought the case under under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. They alleged that the University was discriminating against disabled members of the Plaintiff group and others similarly situated by denying them equal access to seating at the University of Michigan Football Stadium. The stadium had less than 100 wheelchair accessible seats out of a total capacity of 107,000. The University denied the allegations, but entered a Consent Agreement with the plaintiffs, committing to substantially improve the accessibility of the stadium and agreeing to report its progress to and allow monitoring by the plaintiffs for five years.


This case is about discriminatory housing practices in New York City. In the fall of 2012, the Fair Housing Justice Center received a complaint alleging that the Esplanade Residences refused to rent to people who use wheelchairs. As a result, the FHJC launched an investigation into the matter by sending "testers" to observe the residences' polices while posing as potential renters. Based on the findings of the investigations, on May 29, 2013, the FHJC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601. Represented by a private public interest firm and a non-profit legal organization, the plaintiffs alleged that the owners and managers of five independent senior living residences were discriminating on the basis of disability, religion, and race in violation of fair housing laws. Specifically, the complaint alleged three violations of the Fair Housing Act for discrimination of the bases of disability, religion, and race, as well as violations of state fair housing laws. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, in the form of policy change, and damages. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Ronald Ellis and Judge Analisa Torres. The defendants filed their answer on July 22, 2013. Following a pretrial conference on August 30, the parties agreed to a settlement conference before a magistrate judge prior to proceeding to trial. Initially, this conference was set for October 8, 2013, but was rescheduled twice. FHJC filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2013 and added a jury demand. On November 1, the plaintiff withdrew the amended complaint, making the complaint filed on May 29 the operative complaint. On November 8, FHJC filed a motion for leave to amend their complaint in order to add Chestnut Operating Company as a defendant in light of information uncovered in discovery. On November 21, the defendants consented to the amendment of the complaint and, on December 18, they filed an answer. The settlement conference was held on November 22, 2013 and did not settle at that time, according to a minute entry. The conference was adjourned to January 6, 2014. The parties engaged in several conferences that did not result in settlement throughout 2014, many of which were adjourned multiple times for reasons related to discovery. The case was reassigned to Judge Valerie E. Caproni. The final conference was held on November 12, 2014. The parties reached a settlement on December 11, 2014 and a stipulation for voluntary dismissal was filed on January 8, 2015. The settlement included policy changes to conform the defendants' policies to the requirements of the Fair Housing Act. The defendants would not discriminate against residents or prospective residents on the basis of disability, religion, or race by denying housing, falsely representing unavailability of housing, advertising in a way that indicated discrimination. Specifically, the defendants would end a practice of inquiring into a prospective renters religion or disability, they would provide reasonable accommodations and a means by which to request them, include more diverse models and the phrase "Equal Opportunity Housing" in their advertising, and train their employees on these new policies. The agreement also contained certain measures particular to each housing complex. In addition to the policy changes, the settlement agreement included a monetary settlement of $297,500 for damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. The obligations under the settlement agreement would continue for four years, through which the court would retain jurisdiction. The case was dismissed with prejudice on January 12, 2015 with the court retaining jurisdiction only to enforce compliance with the settlement. No docket entries have been filed since 2015, and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In the fall of 2012, the Fair Housing Justice Center received a complaint alleging that the Esplanade Residences refused to rent to people who use wheelchairs. As a result, the FHJC launched an investigation into the matter by sending "testers" to observe the residences' polices while posing as potential renters. Based on the investigation's results, on May 29, 2013, the FHJC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601. It alleged violations of the FHA for discrimination of the bases of disability, religion, and race, as well as violations of state fair housing laws. The parties reached a settlement on December 11, 2014 and a stipulation for voluntary dismissal was filed on January 8, 2015. The settlement included policy changes to conform the defendants' policies to the requirements of the Fair Housing Act, as well as a monetary settlement of $297,500 for damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs.


On December 9, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Step Three, Ltd, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII. Step Three, Ltd. is a Hawaiian resort retailer. The EEOC brought the lawsuit on behalf of a former employee who was fired when she became pregnant. The EEOC sought injunctive relief and monetary damages for pregnancy discrimination. Two days after the complaint was filed, the parties settled; Judge Alan C. Kay signed off on their jointly proposed consent degree on December 13, 2013. The two-year consent decree requires the defendant settled to pay $60,000 to the victim and provide her with a neutral reference. The defendant also agreed to hire a consultant to ensure compliance with Title VII and the ADA; revise the company's anti-discrimination policies and procedures; provide annual training for staff; and hold supervisory staff accountable for engaging in or failing to address discrimination, harassment or retaliation on the job. The EEOC will monitor compliance with the agreement. There is nothing more in the docket sheet after the 2013 settlement; presumably the case was closed as of December 2015.

Summary: On December 9, 2013, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title VII against Step Three, Ltd. The EEOC brought the lawsuit on behalf of a former employee who was suffering from infertility and was fired when she later became pregnant. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which the district court signed as a consent order. The defendant was required to pay $60,000 to the victim and revise the company's anti-discrimination policies and procedures as well as training for staff.


COVID-19 Summary: Immigration detainees held by ICE, each being over the age of 50 or having a serious underlying condition, petition the court for protection due to COVID-19. The court granted a temporary restraining order to the most vulnerable petitioners, as defined by the CDC, which grants selected petitioners protection through social distancing by single celling and PPE. The order was amended to require the defendants to post informational signage and to test vulnerable detainees bi-weekly for COVID-19. <hr> On March 25, 2020, an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus and a complaint for injunctive relief was filed by immigration detainees held by ICE, each petitioner being over the age of 50 or having a serious underlying condition. The petitioners are twenty-four civil immigration detainees currently held at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”) in Batavia, New York. They are represented by Prisoners' Legal Services of New York, Journeys End Refugee Services, and private counsel. The petitioners claimed that their continued detention during the COVID-19 global pandemic violates their 5th Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to their serious medical needs. On March 26, the petitioners also filed a motion for temporary restraining order seeking immediate release from ICE detention. On March 26, 2020, the court ordered that the petitioners must file a memorandum the following day explaining each petitioner’s (1) detention status, (2) medical evidence supporting the claim that they face a grave risk of developing complications or death if he or she contracts COVID-19, and (3) the proposed terms and conditions of release. A memorandum was filed on behalf of each petitioner detailing these components of their individual situations. Following the initial filing and this order, multiple medical doctors filed declarations and memorandums in support of the emergency petition and injunction. On April 2, 2020, the court issued a decision and order regarding the motion for a temporary restraining order to grant release. 467 F. Supp. 3d 74. The court granted the motion in part, holding that the current conditions of detainment during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their substantive Due Process rights; however, the court also denied the motion in part, finding that immediate release was not the appropriate remedy. The court ordered the to petitioners provide information about who are “vulnerable individuals” as defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”). In a memorandum submitted to the court by Captain Abelardo Montalvo, M.D., 13 of the petitioners were identified as meeting the CDC’s definition of vulnerable individuals and 8 of whom had their own cells. On April 7, 2020, the court ordered more information from a medical doctor to be submitted to the court regarding (1) if individuals with epilepsy and/or those who are over 50 years of age and confined to detention facilities similar to BFDF meet the CDC’s criteria for vulnerable individuals, (2) the types and qualities of personal protective equipment (“PPE”) available to the vulnerable petitioners, (3) the types of PPE available to the staff interacting with the vulnerable petitioners. On April 9, 2020, after many more declarations and memorandums from medical professionals, the court granted in part the temporary restraining order requiring the continuation for “social distancing” measures with respect to the petitioners identified as “vulnerable.” 2020 WL 1809677. This requires placing these petitioners in single-occupancy cells, accommodation to eat meals in those cells and to bathe and shower in isolation, provision of sufficient shower disinfectant, masks, and soap, and a requirement that staff wear masks when interacting with these detainees. An update on the conditions at BFDF was filed on April 20, followed by various declarations filed on April 24. On April 24, the court ordered that in light of the petitioner's substantial submissions and the government's opposition to entering a preliminary injunction, the temporary restraining order was extended until May 1, 2020. On April 27th, the court converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction in light of 46 of the 319 detainees testing positive for COVID-19. 2020 WL 1986923. The preliminary injunction was planned to extend until at least May 16, 2020. On April 30, a text order was issued explaining that the defendants had released four of the petitioners, rendering moot their petitions. The preliminary injunction remained in place with respect to the other plaintiffs. That same day, the defendants provided the court with a status update in which they asserted compliance with the terms of the preliminary injunction. On May 20, Judge Vilardo amended the April 27 preliminary injunction to require the defendants to post signs advising detainees to wear masks and maintain 6 feet of distance, and to require bi-weekly testing of detainees housed in vulnerable detainees' units. 2020 WL 2557832. The defendants submitted weekly status reports detailing the conditions of confinement for each vulnerable petitioner (cell occupancy, meal and bathing accommodations, PPE availability); the total number of infected detainees; the total number of infected staff members; and the total number of positive and negative COVID tests. On August 31, Judge Vilardo converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction. 2020 WL 5107566. The status of each of the original 27 petitioners was included in the order; 15 had been released, and most of the remaining petitioners were housed in single-occupancy cells. The final injunction ordered that the terms of the preliminary injunction were to remain in place until the Governor of New York lifted the social-distancing restrictions (i.e, permitted individuals to get closer that six feet apart without a mask). However, because the actions taken by the defendants pursuant to the injunction remedied the constitutional violations, Judge Vilardo found that release was "unnecessary." On February 22, 2021, the plaintiffs moved to modify the permanent injunction. The parties attended oral argument on February 25, and the court directed the defendants to submit to the court a plan for vaccinating detainees who would otherwise qualify for vaccination and ordered the plaintiffs to file a brief regarding employee testing. The parties submitted their respective papers on March 3, and further oral argument was scheduled for March 4, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Immigration detainees held by ICE, each being over the age of 50 or having a serious underlying condition, petition the court for protection due to COVID-19. The court granted a temporary restraining order to the most vulnerable petitioners, as defined by the CDC, which grants selected petitioners protection through social distancing by single celling and PPE. The TRO became a preliminary injunction, then on Aug. 31 the Court converted it into a permanent injunction lasting as long as the social-distancing regulations promulgated by the New York Governor.


In September 2008 the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC brought this lawsuit against Interstate Hotels, LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging discrimination on the basis of national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant created a hostile work environment and retaliated against complainant, a Hispanic employee, and others following their opposition to such practices. The complainant intervened in the lawsuit in December 2004. Following mediation, discovery, and a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, the parties settled the lawsuit in October 2005 through a consent decree. The 30 month decree, containing a non-retaliation clause, required the defendant to: make reports on complaints and other compliance reporting, redistribute a notice of employee rights, provide training to its managers, supervisors, and human resources department, and pay $320,000 among an unknown number of individuals. The only additional activity that shows up in the docket is the dismissal of an intervenor defendant, HMC Acquisition Properties, a month after entry of the decree. Since there is no subsequent enforcement activity, presumably the matter closed finally in April 2008.

Summary: The EEOC sued Interstate Hotels, LLC in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in September 2008, alleging Title VII violations. Following mediation, discovery, and a motion for summary judgment by the defendant, the parties settled the lawsuit in October 2005 through a consent decree, which was set to last 30 months. Since there is no subsequent enforcement activity, presumably the matter closed finally in April 2008.


On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request at issue in this particular case concerned implementation at CBP's Boston Field Office, including Boston's Logan International Airport and other smaller international airports and ports of entry throughout New England. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding" of how defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through CBP's Boston Field Office, and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." Plaintiffs argued that "[a]t Boston’s Logan International Airport, implementation of the order harmed both individuals and institutions. Scholars and academics from Boston-area institutions were denied entry into the United States. Doctors from New England hospitals and patients seeking medical care were delayed, denied entry, or subjected to unnecessary anguish." The case was assigned to Judge George Z. Singal. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as "multidistrict litigation" effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion and subsequent procedure see this case. On May 11, the government filed a motion to stay proceedings pending the decision by the judicial panel regarding the multidistrict litigation. The ACLU opposed the government's motion on May 31, and on June 14 the government replied. On June 19, Judge Singal granted the motion to stay for the next 60 days. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion. The next day, Judge Singal lifted the stay. Defendants answered the complaint on Aug. 24. Although the court soon set a trial schedule, the court then vacated this at the parties' request on Sept. 15. The parties agreed to instead submit a joint status report by Nov. 1. In their Nov. 1 status report, the parties sharply disputed defendants' progress on identifying local records. Defendants had, as of Oct. 17, produced a list of core search terms and had begun locating records. Plaintiffs argued that defendants had refused to release any records or to estimate a time frame for doing so, and asked the court to set a production deadline or timeline. The Court held a Nov. 21 status conference, and ordered the parties to brief several issues of document production. Both parties sent separate letters to the Court on Dec. 8. Defendants asked the Court to permit CBP to process plaintiff's request in coordination with the other ACLU cases "as swiftly as practicable." Plaintiffs, meanwhile, asked the Court to order CBP to process the request responsively to this specific case, and to produce 820 pages monthly until Nov. 2018. Both parties filed responses on Dec. 22. In the status report of Mar. 30, 2018, the parties described the government's 16 productions to date and their disputes over the adequacy of production. Subsequent status reports indicated the government has processed and produced thousands of responsive pages. According to a December 17, 2018 status report, the defendants satisfied their production obligations to the satisfaction of the plaintiffs by their November 30 deadline. The parties reached a private settlement agreement on March 27, 2019 for attorney fees, and they submitted a stipulation of dismissal two days later. The case is closed. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island sued CBP under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at New England airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation. The defendants met their production obligations by the November 30, 2018 deadline, and the parties reached a private settlement agreement in March 2019. The case is closed.


On May 30, 2008, plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the Public Citizen Litigation Group, filed a class action complaint in the United States District Court of Connecticut alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. The proposed class consisted of all female applicants for the position of Correction Officer at the State of Connecticut Department of Correction who participated in the Correction Officer selection process and failed only the timed run portion of the physical fitness test. The complaint sought injunctive relief and attorneys fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the State of Connecticut Department of Corrections' hiring process violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The hiring process for the position of Corrections Officer consisted of a written exam, a physical test, a criminal background check, and an interview. During the relevant period, the physical test involved a sit and reach test, a one-minute sit-up test, a one minute push-up test, and a timed one and a half mile run test. The applicants were required to reach a minimum sex-by-age standard. The Class is comprised of female applicants who failed only the run portion of the physical test. On average, female applicants failed the physical fitness test at a statistically significant higher rate than their male counterparts; every administration of the physical test resulted in a disparate impact on the female applicants. The Department of Corrections utilized the test on three occasions after becoming aware of the disparate impact on women; however, in 2007, the run portion of the test was modified to a 300 meter run test, which does not create an adverse impact on female Correction Officer applicants. The one and a half mile run test was not proven to be a factor associated with the performance of essential or critical physical functions of the Corrections Officer position. The run test was, also, not shown to have predictive value. Judge Janet C. Hall certified the class, January 4, 2010, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The defendant's subsequent motion to decertify the class was denied, but the plaintiff's motion to modify the class was granted. The original class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), the modified class maintained the certification with respect to issues of liability and class-wide injunctive relief. A separate class was certified under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) with regard to the determination of monetary damages and individualized injunctive relief. The Court held that the class consisted of all female applicants who participated in the selection process for the position of Corrections Officer and failed only the 1.5 mile run portion of the physical fitness test at any time from June 28, 2004 until final judgment. On July 23, 2013, plaintiff requested that the Court preliminarily approve proposed settlement and enter the proposed settlement order for the disparate impact hiring claims. The parties extensively negotiated the settlement agreement with the assistance of Magistrate Judge Fitzsimmons. On July 26, 2013 Judge Hall granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary approval of the settlement; the Judge also granted the proposed notice of settlement and the class action settlement procedure. Under the settlement the State of Connecticut will pay $1,851,892 in gross back pay to be distributed to the class members on a pro rata basis. If all eligible class members participate (124 women), each will receive approximately $15,000 in back pay, which is close the the actual economic loss that each class member suffered. The settlement also included equitable relief such as an expedited hiring process for class members who decided to reapply for the Correction Officer position, pension credits, and options for one-time compensation in lieu of certain seniority benefits. The settlement agreement also provided for the payment of plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs, $1,232,463.

Summary: This is a class action lawsuit (filed in May 2008 and settled in July 2013) for injunctive and compensatory damages involving a State hiring process that resulted in a disparate impact for female applicants. The settlement agreement required the State defendant to implement fair hiring practices and pay back pay, as well as other compensatory damages, to the class.


Ten New York residents, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, brought this class action against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department on January 21, 2021 in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; First Amendment violations, including retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights; and violations of the plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also alleged municipal liability on the part of the City of New York. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers, with the approval of their supervisors, regularly engaged in the practice of using excessive force against and falsely arresting peaceful protestors during the widespread racial justice protests that took place in the summer of 2020. The complaint specifically alleged that on different occasions, officers responded to the plaintiffs’ peaceful participation in the protests with violence, including: striking plaintiffs repeatedly with batons, fists, and bicycles; tackling plaintiffs to the ground and pinning them with their bodies; indiscriminately pepper spraying plaintiffs; tightly zip-tying or handcuffing plaintiffs’ wrists for extended periods of time, causing significant pain; and kettling plaintiffs to prevent their compliance with curfew. According to the complaint, the actions taken by officers resulted in loss of circulation, lacerations, fractures, nerve damage, bruising, abrasions, sprains, debilitating pain, and emotional distress to the plaintiffs and other protesters. In addition, the complaint alleged that several of the plaintiffs were arrested and held without cause in unclean, overcrowded cells, without food, water, or medical assistance to treat their injuries. Plaintiffs further alleged that – despite the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic – police officers responding to protests frequently failed to wear masks or to assist detained protesters in covering their noses and mouths, and on occasion even forcibly removed protesters’ masks, exposing protesters to a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs also alleged that on numerous occasions, NYPD officers confiscated personal belongings, including cell phones and eyeglasses, and declined to return them or returned them damaged. The case was related to People of New York v. New York and assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon. In January 2021, Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three other police conduct cases (People of New York, Payne v. De Blasio, and Wood v. De Blasio) for pre-trial purposes. On February 4, 2021, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 6 that further alleged violations of the New York State Constitution and state law, including claims of assault and battery, conversion, false imprisonment and unreasonable detention, negligent training and supervision, and excessive detention. As of March 16, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court.

Summary: A group of ten New York City residents filed this class action suit against the NYPD and the City of New York on January 21, 2021. The suit alleged that the NYPD regularly falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper to the plaintiffs and class members.


On August 16, 2013, a same-sex couple filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky against the state of Kentucky. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court to declare that Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enter a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ban on the plaintiffs or any other same-sex couple, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs alleged that Kentucky's laws against same-sex marriage violated the constitutional rights guaranteed to them by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They claimed that the prohibition of same-sex marriage interfered with the flow of public and private benefits between the couple and interfered with their ability to build their family. On October 8th, 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge John G. Heyburn, II. There was very little activity involving this case until February 12, 2014, when the court dismissed the case without prejudice.

Summary: On August 16, 2013, a same-sex couple filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Kentucky U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Kentucky . The plaintiff asked the court to declare that Kentucky laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enter a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ban on the plaintiffs or any other same-sex couple, and to award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees.


On February 16, 2016, Washington Medicaid enrollees filed this putative class action against the Washington State Health Care Authority (WHCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs alleged that WHCA’s Hepatitis C (HCV) treatment policy violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act (also known as the “Medicaid Act”) by excluding qualified Medicaid recipients from medically necessary treatment, discriminating among similarly situated Medicaid recipients, and failing to provide treatment with reasonable promptness as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396. The plaintiffs sought a court declaration that WHCA may not apply policies that limit treatment of HCV with direct-acting antiviral medications (DAAs) to Medicaid enrollees. The complaint further sought an injunction to prevent any future or ongoing efforts by WHCA to use and enforce such policies. Specifically, a named plaintiff enrolled in Medicaid was diagnosed with HCV. Her doctor prescribed a type of DAA that could effectively cure the disease in more than 90% of the individuals treated. But when she attempted to fill her prescription through her Medicaid coverage, WHCA denied the request because the drug was too expensive. WHCA did not offer this plaintiff any other medication as an alternative to treat her HCV. On March 18, 2016, the plaintiffs moved for a class certification and a preliminary injunction. District Judge John Coughenour granted plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction on May 27, 2016, enjoining WHCA from continuing to apply its 2015 HCV treatment policy in order to conform with existing state and federal Medicaid requirements. On July 21, 2016, Judge Coughenour granted plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification after finding that the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements were all met. The Court certified the class as all individuals who 1) are or will be enrolled in WHCA’s Medicaid Program on or after October 10, 2014, 2) require HCV treatment with Harvoni or other similar DAAs, and 3) do not meet the coverage criteria for HCV medication adopted by WHCA in February 2015. The parties then reached a settlement and on November 21, 2016, filed an joint motion for preliminary approval. Judge Coughenour preliminarily approved the settlement on January 5, 2017, and then held a fairness hearing. On April 10, 2017, Judge Coughenour finally approved the settlement, finding it to be fair, reasonable, and adequate. The terms were: The 2016 Preliminary Injunction Order would remain in effect for three more years, with the Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce it; WHCA would pay each class representative $7,500 as a case contribution award, and class counsel was awarded fees and litigation costs totaling $343,394. The three-year enforcement period has passed, and this case is closed.

Summary: On February 16, 2016, Washington Medicaid enrollees filed a putative class action lawsuit against the Washington State Health Care Authority (WHCA) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that WHCA’s Hepatitis C (HCV) treatment policy violated Title XIX of the Social Security Act by excluding qualified Medicaid recipients from medically necessary treatment as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396. Judge Coughenour approved the parties' settlement agreement on April 10, 2017, which awarded each class representative $7,500 as a case contribution award and awarded fees and litigation costs totaling $343,394. The injunction remained in effect for three years before terminating.


On December 21, 2012, a former prisoner filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Clackamas County jail. The plaintiff, represented by the Oregon Law Center, claimed violations of her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and her Fourth Amendment right against unlawful seizure. She also brought a a state-law false imprisonment claim. The plaintiff sought damages and attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that she was improperly detained based solely on a federal immigration detainer issued by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The case was assigned to Judge Janice M. Stewart. The plaintiff was originally arrested for violating a domestic violence restraining order and was booked into jail on March 12, 2012. By March 15, ICE had issued the detainer, which indicated that the agency was investigating whether the plaintiff was subject to removal from the United States. The form requested that the jail maintain custody of the plaintiff for not more than 48 hours after she would otherwise have been released to allow the Department of Homeland Security time to take custody of the her. On March 29, the plaintiff pleaded guilty to one of her charges and should have been released that same day. Instead, the jail held her for another 19 hours based solely on the detainer. The plaintiff was told that, because of the detainer, she would remain detained regardless of bail being posted. The plaintiff claimed that by denying her the opportunity to be released by posting bail solely due to the existence of the detainer, the jail deprived her of her due process rights. She also claimed that by continuing to hold her without any basis in state law after her criminal matter had been resolved, the jail effected an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, she claimed the imprisonment was without legal authority and in violation of Oregon law. Because the facts of the matter were undisputed, the County moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment as to her § 1983 claims. On April 11, 2014, the District Court issued an opinion and order granting summary judgment to the County with regard to the due process and false imprisonment claims, and granting summary judgment to the plaintiff with regard to her unlawful seizure claim. 2014 WL 1414305. The court found that the County's continuation of the plaintiff's detention based on the ICE detainer constituted new, "prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody." After the plaintiff's resolution of her state charges, and at any time prior had the plaintiff posted bail, the County no longer had probable cause to justify her detention. Her remaining in custody counted as a new, initial seizure without probable cause, which violated her Fourth Amendment rights. The only issue left for trial was the amount of damages owed to the plaintiff for the jail's violation of her Fourth Amendment right. On May 4, 2015, two weeks before a jury trial was set to begin, the plaintiff accepted the defendant's offer of judgment. On May 5, the District Court entered an order granting the plaintiff $30,100.00 in damages against the County, as well as reasonable costs and attorneys fees. The plaintiff later filed a motion for attorney fees and costs in the sum of $124,944.04. On June 3, 2015, the County filed an appeal from the judgment to the Ninth Circuit (docket #15-35439). On June 17, the plaintiff filed a cross-appeal. On August 28, 2015, the District Court issued an opinion and order awarding the plaintiff attorney fees in the sum of $94,531.70 and costs in the sum of $2,841.44, for a total of $97,373.14. 2015 WL 5093752. On September 14, 2015, both parties' appeals were voluntarily dismissed as the matter had been resolved in the District Court. The case is closed.

Summary: This § 1983 lawsuit was filed in December 2012 against a county jail in Oregon. The plaintiff claimed violations of her 14th and 4th Amendment rights due to her continued detention based solely on a detainer order issued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The court granted partial summary judgment to both parties in April 2014, finding for the plaintiff on her 4th Amendment claim. The parties settled before trial and the plaintiff was awarded $30,100.00 as well as attorneys fees and costs.


Pilots of Southwest Airlines Co. (Southwest) brought this class action case against their employer after being deprived of the proper amount of retirement contributions and sick leave benefits during leaves of absence to serve in the U.S. military. Represented by private counsel, the pilots sued Southwest in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on July 14, 2017 under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (the Act). The pilots sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The pilots claimed that Southwest failed to comply with the Act, which mandated that private airline companies make retirement contributions and provide accrued paid sick leave to pilots for all periods in which they engaged in qualified military service and were subsequently reemployed by the company. They alleged that Southwest prevented pilots from receiving the full amount of retirement contributions they were owed both by failing to make contributions and by failing to provide inform pilots about the amount of retirement contributions that they could make and Southwest matched. They further claimed that Southwest did not allow the pilots to accrue paid sick leave but permitted pilots on comparable forms non-military leave to accrue sick leave. The parties went through mediation in June 2018 and then began negotiating a settlement. The case was stayed for almost a year. On August 6, 2018, Judge James Donato ordered that the case would be sent to trial if a motion for a preliminary approval of settlement was not filed by September 5. On September 12, 2018, both parties signed a settlement agreement and on December 5, 2018, Judge Donato granted conditional certification of settlement class and preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. The conditionally certified settlement class included 1,478 current (as of the date of the order) and former pilots employed by Southwest that took short-term military leave from Southwest between January 1, 2001 and the preliminary approval date. Under the agreement, Southwest had to add to a pilot's sick leave balance 100% of the sick leave alleged denied between 2008 and the preliminary approval for the settlement and 77% of the sick leave allegedly denied from 2001 to 2007. This was estimated to cost Southwest more than $13 million. In addition, Southwest had to pay $5.8 million into a settlement fund that would cover retirement contributions, $1,000 payments to class members no longer employed by Southwest, and attorneys' fees and costs. If any funds remained in the net settlement fund after 180 days from the date the checks were mailed, they would be donated to a mutually approved non-sectarian, non-profit 501(c)(3) charitable organization. Under the agreement, the court retained jurisdiction over this matter for three years beyond the final approval date of the settlement. If all the payments had not been made after three years, the court could extend its jurisdiction until all payments were made. Judge Donato granted final approval of settlement on October 4, 2019. The court will retain jurisdiction into 2022.

Summary: In 2017, current and former pilots of Southwest Airlines filed a class action complaint against their employer in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. They alleged that Southwest failed to provide the retirement contributions and sick leave for military duty leaves of absence that are mandated by the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act. In 2018, the parties reached a settlement agreement whereby Southwest restored current employees sick leave and paid $5.8 million to cover retirement contributions, compensation for and restoration of sick leave, and attorneys’ fees. Under the settlement, the court retained jurisdiction for three years.


On May 17, 2005, an individual employee filed a lawsuit individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals against his employer, General Electric Co. ("GE"), under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Connecticut Human Rights Act, Connecticut General Statute 46a-60 et seq., in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged racial discrimination against African-Americans and asked the court for injunctive relief to change GE's pay and promotion policies and procedures, as well as monetary and equitable relief. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that GE had systematically discriminated against African-American managers and professional level-employees by denying African-American managers the same pay afforded white managers, and by denying African-Americans promotions that were awarded to less qualified white employees. Further, the plaintiff contended that senior GE officers and managers had improperly interfered in bonuses and ratings of white managers, decreased bonuses for minority employees, and frustrated the plaintiff's investigation of a white employee accused of embezzlement. Moreover, the plaintiff claims that GE breached his contract, retaliated against him, intentionally inflicted emotional distress, intentionally and negligently represented the plaintiff and those similarly situated, and created a racially hostile environment. There was little motion practice in this case. The parties engaged in settlement negotiations through mediation, but the results of such negotiations are unclear. The parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice, and the Court (Judge Peter Dorsey) signed it on January 25, 2006.

Summary: This case was brought by African American employees against General Electric alleging employment discrimination based on race and seeking declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief. The parties stipulated to a dismissal with prejudice on January 25, 2006. The reason for the stipulation is unclear, but the parties had engaged in settlement negotiations.


On June 13, 2012, several same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of North Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court to declare that laws banning same-sex couples from participating in second-parent adoption violated the U.S. Constitution, direct the defendants to recognize same-sex out-of-state marriages, allow same-sex couples to enter into marriage in North Carolina, and enjoin the defendants from enforcing any laws that prohibit same-sex marriage or adoption by same-sex couples. The plaintiffs claimed that North Carolina's laws prohibiting same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Additionally, they alleged that the state's ban on same-sex marriages deprived the couples and minor children of the same flow of benefits (including medical benefits) that a different-sex couple would receive and obstructed their ability to build their family. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 19, 2013, which the state moved to dismiss on Sept. 10 and 11, 2013. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction on Apr. 9, 2014, seeking to enjoin the state from denying recognition of valid same-sex marriages from other states. On Oct. 9, 2014, North Carolina Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate moved to intervene on behalf of themselves and their constituents. The court granted their motion five days later. On Oct. 14, 2014, the court declared North Carolina's laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional in preventing in-state same-sex marriages as well as recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages. The court enjoined the state from implementing or enforcing these laws. The court based its decision on precedent from the Fourth Circuit in Bostic v. McDonnell, which held a Virginia law banning same-sex marriage and making such marriages invalid violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court denied certiorari for that case. This court held that it was bound by decisions made in the circuit court above. 14 F. Supp. 3d 695. The state appealed to the Fourth Circuit. On February 10, 2015, the court placed this case in abeyance pending the United States Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States declared, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy in reference to the case Obergefell v. Hodges, that the right to marry was fundamental. In the opinion, the Court held that it demeaned gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. The 14th Amendment therefore prohibited states from banning same-sex marriage. Justice Kennedy was joined without further writing by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor. Each of the four dissenters--Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito--wrote a dissent. On Aug. 12, 2015, pursuant to a motion for voluntary dismissal, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal. The parties then litigated attorney's fees. The plaintiffs settled their attorney's fees with the intervenors for $44,501.36. The plaintiffs indicated that they sought $254,720.00 in attorney's fees from the defendants. There is no further docket activity after August 2017 to indicate the resolution of the remaining attorney's fees, though the case appears to be closed.

Summary: On June 13, 2012, several same-sex couples who wish to have a state recognized marriage filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of North Carolina, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of North Carolina. The plaintiff, represented in part by the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the court to declare that laws banning same-sex couples from participating in second parent adoption, direct the defendants to recognize same-sex out-of-state marriages, allow same-sex couples to enter into marriage in North Carolina, enjoin the defendants from enforcing any laws that prohibit same-sex marriage or adoption by same-sex couples, and to award plaintiffs costs of suit and attorneys' fees. As a result of the holding in Obergefell v. Hodges, the court found in favor of the plaintiffs.