On September 2, 1986, Plaintiffs, three homeless families with dependent children, together with the National Coalition for the Homeless, filled a lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), in his official capacity, and the HSS. The Plaintiffs alleged that HSS had failed to properly monitor and enforce the compliance of States participating in the federal Emergency Assistance to Families program (EAF), established pursuant to Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. S 601 et seq. (the "Act"), and which was designed to provide prompt access to emergency shelter assistance for homeless families. The complaint alleged that HHS had not performed the specific actions required by the Act and its implementing regulations to assess each state's compliance with its approved plans, and had failed to take any action adequate to ensure that states actually provided emergency shelter assistance to eligible homeless families. The claim was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§706(1)-(2), which requires Federal agencies to comply with their administrative regulations and which forbid arbitrary and capricious enforcement. The Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the court that HHS was obligated to ensure States adhere to their commitments relating to the EAF program, and an injunction compelling HHS to ensure participating states provided sufficient funding to guarantee emergency shelter assistance. On April 11, 1989, the District Court (Judge John Garrett Penn) granted HHS's Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue. Coker v. Bowen, 715 F.Supp. 383 (D. D.C. 1989). The Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which on May 4, 1990 (Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg), affirmed the lower court's decision. The Appellate Court found that the Administrative Procedure Act did not create a private cause of action under which a suit could be brought to demand judicial review of a federal agency's failure to enforce statutory provisions. The case is closed.

Summary: On September 2, 1986, Plaintiffs, three homeless families with dependent children, together with the National Coalition for the Homeless, filled a lawsuit in the U.S District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HSS), in his official capacity, and the HSS. The Plaintiffs alleged that HSS had failed to properly monitor and enforce the compliance of States participating in the federal Emergency Assistance to Families program (EAF), established pursuant to Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. S 601 et seq. (the "Act"), and which was designed to provide prompt access to emergency shelter assistance for homeless families. The complaint alleged that HHS had not taken any action adequate to ensure that States actually provided emergency shelter assistance to eligible homeless families. On April 11, 1989, the District Court granted HHS's Motion to Dismiss, finding that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue HHS for the alleged injury. The Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which affirmed the lower court's decision. The case is closed.


On May 9, 2017, a Georgia resident filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. In her first amended complaint filed on May 18, 2017, she challenged the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)’s arbitrary denial of her Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status renewal application, alleging that it violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendants’ decision violated the APA because it was arbitrary and capricious. She also sought to compel the defendants to find that she was eligible for a renewal for her DACA status and to unrevoke and approve her DACA status. On May 23, 2017, the plaintiff filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Preliminary Injunction. She sought to temporarily enjoin the revocation of her DACA status pending an eligibility determination that comports with the APA and Due Process Clause. On June 12, 2017, Judge Mark Cohen preliminarily enjoined USCIS’s decision to terminate the plaintiff’s status under the DACA program as well as the termination of her employment authorization. In addition, the plaintiff’s DACA status was reinstated pending the defendants’ re-adjudication of her renewal application in a manner consistent with DHS’s standard procedures. The defendants then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order, which was denied by Judge Cohen on July 31, 2017. On August 14, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings pending further administrative action because they were in the process of re-adjudicating the plaintiff’s DACA application and staying the case until her application is re-adjudicated would preserve judicial economy. This motion was granted on August 21, 2017. On October 25, 2017, the defendants filed an emergency motion to dismiss the case, or to dissolve the June 12 Order granting preliminary relief because USCIS has issued a new decision denying the plaintiff’s CADA renewal request after complying with this court’s order. The plaintiff immediately filed a second amended complaint the next day with similar claims as the first amendment complaint. On November 1, the plaintiff filed a second motion for preliminary injunction as well as an opposition to the defendants’ motion to dissolve. On November 8, 2017, Judge Cohen denied the defendant’s emergency motion to dismiss without prejudice in light of the second amended complaint. On January 12, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment on all claims. Judge Thomas Thrash then stayed proceedings in light of lapse in appropriates of federal funding on January 22. On May 25, 2018, the parties filed a joints stipulation of settlement to dismiss this case pursuant to their settlement agreement. Under the settlement agreement, USCIS will grant the plaintiff’s May 2017 DACA renewal request, including her application for work authorization, within two business days after execution of this agreement, such that her DACA and employment authorization will be valid from the date of approval through May 9, 2019. USCIS agreed to deter action with respect to the plaintiff until at least May 9, 2019 and to not issue a new Notice of Termination during that time period unless the plaintiff took part in conduct that rendered her unable to continue to meet the DACA guideline. The parties also agreed to bear their own costs and fees. Judge Cohen granted this stipulation and dismissed this case with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On May 9, 2017, a Georgia resident filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). She challenged USCIS's arbitrary denial of her Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status renewal application in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On May 25, 2018, the parties filed a joints stipulation of settlement to dismiss this case pursuant to their settlement agreement. Under the settlement agreement, USCIS will grant the plaintiff’s May 2017 DACA renewal request, including her application for work authorization, within two business days after execution of this agreement, such that her DACA and employment authorization will be valid from the date of approval through May 9, 2019. The case is now closed.


On March 13, 2008, a minority homeowner filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against private banks and lenders, Citifinancial Services and Citigroup Inc., under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact on minority applicants in their home financing policies and practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' policy authorizing unchecked, subjective surcharge of additional points and fees to an otherwise objective risk-based financing rate, had a discriminatory impact on minority homeowners, creating a significantly higher likelihood of exposure to discretionary points and fees. Plaintiff sought damages, declaratory and injuctive relief. On May 21, 2008, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding two named plaintiffs. On July 21, 2008, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on the basis of a failure to state a claim. On August 14, 2008, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law of the Boston Bar Association, a non-profit organization established to provide pro bono legal counsel in cases of race and national origin discrimination, filed a motion to amicus brief. It opposed the motion to dismiss and argued that the weight of the precedent supports disparate impact claims under ECOA and FHA. On March 31, 2009, the Court (Mark L. Wolf) allowed the filing of the amicus brief and denied the motion to dismiss. The reasoning of the court is not available from PACER. In the meantime, two of the individuals plaintiffs filed for bankruptcy. Trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion to substitute party and dismiss the action on October 22, 2009, which was granted by the Court on April 16, 2010, and their complaint was dismissed with prejudice. On May 12, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, substituting the plaintiffs. The complaint reiterated the original allegations. The parties went into mediation and reached a settlement. On August 1, 2011, the parties file a motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed and represented: 1) to provide telephonic housing counseling services; 2) to continue non-discretionary pricing policy; 3) to enhance its Fair Lending policy to address concerns raised in this litigation; 4) to have personnel trained in fair lending. Some class members were eligible for a $90 check or a credit of $200 against closing costs. The defendant agreed to pay $400,000 in attorney's fees and $15,000 in service fees to the plaintiffs. However, the Court denied the motion on December 22, 2011, as it ordered the parties to file memorandum explaining the effects of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), on certifying class in the present case. The parties filed their memorandums, and the Court issued an order of preliminary approval on March 6, 2012. The order certified class of "all African-American and Hispanic borrowers (including, without limitation, individual borrowers, joint-borrowers, and co-borrowers) who obtained a loan between January 1, 2004 and June 24, 2011." Following a fairness hearing, the Court issued a final judgment approving the order August 10, 2012. That ended the case.

Summary: On March 13, 2008, a minority homeowner filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against private banks and lenders, Citifinancial Services and Citigroup Inc., under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq. ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants maintained a pattern or practice that had a discriminatory impact. The parties settled and the Court issued a final judgment approving the settlement agreement on August 10, 2012. The defendants agreed to maintain a non-discretionary pricing policy and pay $415,000.00 in attorney's and service fees.


On December 6, 2001, a number of healthcare providers and members of the state's Medicaid-established Child Health Management Services (CHMS) program filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Medicaid Act against the director of the Arkansas Department of Human Services (ADHS), the plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's proposal to remove certain CHMS programs from the state's Medicaid plan and to cease paying for them violated their substantive and procedural due process rights and the Medicaid Act. Specifically, the state intended to stop paying for CHMS early-intervention day treatment for children who don't have a serious medical problem, but are still considered at risk. Plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. On the same day as they filed their complaint, plaintiffs sought temporary injunctive relief; the state opposed such relief and moved to dismiss the matter altogether for failure to state a claim. The Court (Judge William R. Wilson) held a four-day trial beginning a week after the complaint was filed, and then, on Dec. 19, 2001, permanently enjoined the state from implementing the proposed spending cuts. (The court denied the motion for temporary injunctive relief as moot.) The court held that the Medicaid Act mandated that the state's plan must specifically include in its services early-intervention day treatment. Judge Wilson announced his ruling from the bench; there is no written opinion. DHS appealed the decision to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals that same day. On July 15, 2002, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges McMillian, Heaney, and Riley) affirmed that at-risk children have a federal right to early-intervention day treatment when a physician recommends it. However, it reversed the lower court's holding to the extent that it required CHMS early-intervention day treatment services to be specifically included in the state's Medicaid plan. All that is required, the appellate court held, is that the state plan pay part or all of the cost of treatments for conditions discovered by a screening process when those treatments meet the definitions set forth in the Medicaid Act. The case was remanded to the district court with orders to modify its injunction in light of the appellate court's holding, as well as to consider the plaintiffs' procedural due process claim, which the district court initially did not reach in its decision. On July 30, 2002, Judge Wilson entered an amended injunction, which did not require the state to specifically include CHMS early-intervention day treatment services in the state plan, but did require it to pay for those services when prescribed by a physician. The state must also inform potential Medicaid recipients about these available services. The district court then held a number of hearings on the plaintiffs' procedural and substantive due process claims. On Nov. 27, 2002, Judge Wilson issued an Order and Opinion holding for the plaintiffs on all three of their counts: that the state's proposed plan was in violation of the Medicaid Act; that the state violated plaintiffs' procedural due process by failing to conduct a study about the effect such a change in the program would have had on the efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access to care, as required by the Medicaid Act; and that the state's attempt to move the CHMS services off-plan for cost savings violated plaintiffs' substantive due rights because it "shocked the conscience." On December 18, 2002, the Court issued a second Order extending its injunction to the federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), the federal regulatory authority for the Medicaid program, and ordered that CMS continue to pay federal matching funds to any state expenditure on early-intervention day treatment services, even though CMS was not a party to the suit. The state moved to amend the court's judgment and raised the question of whether guidelines published by the Arkansas Foundation for Medical Care, Inc. (AFMC), the organization contracted by the state to determine the eligibility of CHMS participants, also violated their procedural and substantive due process rights. The plaintiffs requested to amend their complaint to make AFMC a party and directly challenge the legality of those access guidelines. And on Dec. 18, 2002, the Court granted their request. That same day, the state and CMS appealed the Court's Nov. 27, 2002, Order and Opinion to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. Throughout 2003 and 2004, the plaintiffs were granted permission to amend their complaint a number of times, which eventually culminated in a fifth amended complaint filed on Jan. 4, 2005. Meanwhile, on April 16, 2004, the 8th Circuit issued an opinion on the state's and CMS's appeal. It affirmed the lower court's holding that the state violated plaintiffs' procedural due process rights, but reversed district court's decision that the state violated substantive due process rights. It also reversed the district court's enjoining of CMS because the agency wasn't a party to the underlying suit. Plaintiffs moved to compel ADHS and AFMC to reveal the names of the peer reviewers responsible for determining when and whether CHMS services are medically necessary. On Nov. 29, 2004, the district court granted the motion. The next month, AFMC appealed the decision to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. During this period, the district court also considered damages claims against defendants who were current or past high-level supervisors of ADHS. They all moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. ADHS contended that it was entitled to absolute immunity under the 11th Amendment because it was an agency of the state of Arkansas. On Feb. 7, 2005, the district court (Judge Wilson) denied all but one of the defendant's motions for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. It was silent as to the ADHS's 11th Amendment claim. The state and remaining defendants appealed to the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 17, 2006, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals issued opinions on both outstanding appeals: AFMC's appeal regarding disclosure of the peer supervisors, and the qualified and absolute immunity claims of the individual defendants and ADHS. The appellate court held that the relevant Medicaid regulations did not require AFMC to reveal the names of its peer supervisors, and so reversed the district court on that count. With regard to the immunity claims, it affirmed the district court's decision rejecting the qualified immunity claims, but ordered that it dismiss ADHS from the suit on 11th Amendment grounds. The remaining individual defendants who were not granted qualified immunity appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Apparently the parties settled, because on June 25, 2007, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment because it had become moot. Selig v. Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc., 551 U.S. 1142 (2007). On Nov. 11, 2008, back in district court, the remaining plaintiffs entered a stipulation of dismissal with the defendants because both sides agreed to an undisclosed settlement agreement. The court then dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On December 6, 2001, a number of healthcare providers and members of Arkansas's Medicaid-established Child Health Management Services (CHMS) program filed this § 1983 suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas against the director of the Arkansas Department of Health (ADHS). At issue was ADHS's plan to remove certain CHMS programs from the state's Medicaid plan, and to stop paying for those services all together. The district court permanently enjoined the state from stopping payment on those services. A number of appeals followed, but that core injunction still held. Eventually, plaintiffs settled with defendants in November 2008 and the court dismissed all remaining claims.


On September 10, 2008, a wheelchair user brought a class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of individuals with disabilities who encountered various barriers to accessibility at many of California's 92 Burger King restaurants. He alleged that inaccessible restrooms, high counters, seating areas, and other aspects of Burger King restaurants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)) and California statutes including the Unruh Act and the California Disabled Persons Act. The complaint alleged that Burger King worked closely with franchisees, overseeing construction and restaurant design, and that these leased restaurants presented numerous barriers to accessibility, including "entry and restroom doors that were very difficult to open, parking lots with insufficient or inadequate accessible parking spots, inaccessible restrooms, narrow or steep sidewalks/ramps, queue lines that were too narrow for . . . wheelchair[s] to navigate, inaccessible seating areas, and drink machines and condiments that were difficult for [the plaintiffs] to reach." On November 26, 2008, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction both because Castaneda lacked standing to assert claims with respect to Burger King stores he did not personally visit and because the state law claims destroyed diversity jurisdiction; and under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, citing a lack of specificity in the complaint. On February 18, 2009, the court denied the motion in a published opinion ruling that the plaintiffs adequately pled the existence of common discriminatory barriers and policies at Burger King stores, that the plaintiffs pled their ADA claim with adequate specificity, and that supplemental jurisdiction existed over the state law claims. Castaneda v. Burger King Corp, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The Court also denied the defendant's motion in the alternative for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e) and to strike class allegations under Rule 12(f). On August 19, 2009, in a published opinion, Magistrate Judge James Larson ordered that exception circumstances warranted the defendant's disclosure of work product. Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 259 F.R.D. 1994 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Specifically, the court ordered Burger King to produce measurements of counter heights, ramp slopes, and other information, even if this was "work product" it had gathered to remediate the accessibility problems at franchised restaurants. The plaintiffs were unable to obtain this information because Burger King did not identify these restaurants until after the remediation work had commenced. The plaintiffs moved to certify a class consisting of "all individuals with manual and/or mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric scooters and who were denied during the liability period, or are currently being denied, on the basis of disability, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations in any BKL Restaurant," which the plaintiff estimated to consist of 1000 individuals. On September 25, 2009, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, in a published opinion. Castaneda v. Burger King Corp., 264 F.R.D. 557 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The court found that typical ADA class actions proceed against a single store on behalf of all persons with disabilities using that store. The Castaneda action, however, proceeded against 92 stores throughout California, which differed so much in design that there were no common issues among the stores. Thus, "such a large sprawling class will not be certified. Instead, separate classes will be certified against each of the ten individual restaurants where a named plaintiff encountered alleged access barriers." Id. at 559-60. The court certified ten classes, corresponding to 10 separate restaurants, as: "All individuals with mobility-impairment disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric scooters for mobility who, at any time on or after April 16, 2006, and up to the date of the class notice, were denied, or are currently being denied, on the basis of their mobility-impairment disability, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of [the particular restaurant applicable to that class]." Id. at 564. The plaintiffs appealed this decision. (The appeal ultimately became moot after the parties settled.) On February 11, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to violations of disability standards in one restaurant, number 2055. On that same day, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs' claim for statutory damages under the Unruh Act and California Disabled Persons Act, arguing that franchisees -- not Burger King -- had engaged in discriminatory conduct. Burger King also sought summary judgment as to the ADA claims because the ten restaurants were built before the ADA was enacted. However, the court did not consider these motions because the parties settled the case. On July 12, 2010, the court approved the settlement agreement. The settlement included an injunction requiring Burger King to remove barriers to accessibility using checklists with specific criteria for remodeling, alteration, maintenance, and monitoring of compliance. The agreement required Burger King to maintain three types of periodic access surveys including: daily surveys by franchisee-managers to ensure access to restrooms and condiments; surveys every three years of parking lots and restroom fixtures; and successor remodeling surveys whenever a restaurant is remodeled, which is roughly every 20 years. The court would retain jurisdiction to enforce these terms for six years after finalization of the agreement. The settlement also provided for a cash payment of $5,000,000 to the named plaintiffs and 382 class members who opted in. Burger King also agreed to pay $2,500,000 to plaintiffs for attorney's fees and costs, with reductions as an incentive for compliance with the agreement. No docket entries appeared after 2011. The settlement expired in 2016, so the case is now closed.

Summary: On September 10, 2008, a wheelchair user brought this class action on behalf of individuals with disabilities who encountered various barriers to accessibility at many of California's 92 Burger King restaurants. He alleged that inaccessible restrooms, high counters, seating areas, and other aspects of Burger King restaurants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and California statutes. After the court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion to certify the class, the parties settled. The agreement asked the court to issue and supervise an injunction requiring Burger King to remove barriers to accessibility, issue new guidelines to franchisees and managers, and conduct regular inspections. The settlement also included monetary relief of up to $7.5m, depending on how many class members opted in and how expediently Burger King performed its obligations.


On March 12, 2015, three residents of Clanton, Alabama, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs sued the Judicial Correction Services, Inc. ("JCS") and the City of Clanton. The plaintiffs filed their complaint pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (RICO). They alleged that Clanton and JCS had entered into a contract where individuals who were unable to pay fines or court costs resulting from an arrest for a traffic violation or misdemeanor must enter "pay-only probation." Pay-only probation required these individuals to make regular payments to JCS and regularly report to a JCS employee in order to avoid being arrested again. The plaintiffs claimed that this effectively created a racketeering enterprise that extorted money from impoverished individuals under threat of jail and misused the criminal justice system for profit. As such, the plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, voiding the contract between Clanton and JCS, as well as monetary damages. The case was assigned to Judge Myron Thompson. The plaintiffs struggled to pay the monthly fees under the direct and indirect threats of incarceration by JCS employees. In order to pay, the plaintiffs skipped meals, stopped paying their other bills, and took out high-interest predatory loans. On March 30, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and also moved for class certification and a preliminary injunction. On April 21, 2015, both JCS and the City of Clanton moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. The court denied this motion on April 28, 2015. On June 16, 2015, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss the City of Clanton as a defendant, noting in an attached exhibit that the plaintiffs had reached a settlement agreement with Clanton. The agreement stipulated that Clanton had terminated its contract with JCS and that those with JCS pay-only probation would instead report directly to the Clanton Municipal Court. The agreement was set to be effective for five years. The settlement agreement required that if the City of Clanton enter into a contract with any probation-related or money-collection-related services within five years of June 16, 2015, the City must provide notice to the plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiffs waived any claim for costs or fees including attorney's fees in the settlement. On June 19, 2015, Judge Thompson entered a judgment dismissing the City of Clanton and denying the City's motion to dismiss as moot. The case against JCS continued. The plaintiffs also moved to withdraw their motion for a preliminary injunction and class certification, which the court granted on July 7, 2015. On August 19, 2016, the plaintiffs filed notice that the parties had reached a settlement agreement in principle. The court stayed further proceedings on August 24, 2016, as the parties finalized their settlement agreement. In a status report filed on December 7, 2016, the parties indicated they had finalized a settlement agreement, which was awaiting approval by the Bankruptcy Court where a plaintiff currently had proceedings. The status report indicated the parties would file a stipulation of dismissal once the Bankruptcy Court approved the settlement. In Bankruptcy Court, Judge Dwight H. Williams, Jr. approved a settlement agreement on December 8, 2016. The terms of the settlement agreement with JCS were confidential. Back in Civil District Court, on December 13, 2016, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal. The court dismissed the case with prejudice the next day, December 14, 2016. Following this suit, JCS was no longer being contracted by the state of Alabama. One hundred and fifteen other U.S. cities stopped contracting with JCS as well after the foreign company was identified as a predatory and illegal business. The settlement was ongoing and set to expire in June 2020. As of April 7 2021, there had been no additional activity and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: Three residents of Clanton, Alabama, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs sued the Judicial Correction Services, Inc. ("JCS") and the city of Clanton. The plaintiffs alleged that Clanton and JCS created a racketeering enterprise that extorted money from impoverished individuals under threat of jail and misused the criminal justice system for profit. The plaintiffs settled with the two defendants separately. The settlement agreement with the City of Clanton required that if the City of Clanton enter into a contract with any probation-related or money-collection-related services within five years of June 16, 2015, the City must provide notice to the plaintiff's counsel. The Clearinghouse does not have access to a copy of the settlement with JCS as the terms were kept confidential.


This suit, filed on April 9, 2018, challenged a report created and issued by defendants the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States required this report, known as the Initial Section 11 Report. Muslim Advocates—a nonprofit organization—filed the complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, arguing that the report was biased and misleading against Muslims and the threat they pose to the United States. The plaintiff claimed this further stigmatized Muslims in the US while stoking anti-Muslim sentiments and filed the complaint under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) for violations of the Information Quality Act (IQA). Specifically, the plaintiff sought a retraction and correction of the report to bring it in compliance with the IQA. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. The IQA and its implementing guidelines required that when federal agencies publish information to the public, the information meet threshold levels of quality, objectivity, utility, and integrity. Executive Order 13780 ("the EO"), which President Trump signed on March 6, 2017, significantly restricted individuals from six Muslim-majority countries from being able to enter the US. Further, Section 11 of the EO required DHS, in consultation with the DOJ, to collect and publish information regarding foreign nationals and terrorism. This requirement included information on: foreign nationals who have participated in terrorism-related activities in the US, foreign nationals who have become radicalized since entering the US, honor killings, and "any other information relevant to public safety and security." According to the complaint, the report misled the public in several ways: (1) by focusing on international terrorism thereby artificially inflating the proportion of terrorist incidents committed by foreign nationals relative to native born citizens, (2) by including individuals who committed acts of terror abroad but had minimal ties to the US, and (3) by counting foreign-born individuals rather than foreign nationals in its figures. The plaintiff argued that such misleading information perpetuated the Trump administration's discrimination against Muslims as well as general anti-Muslim stereotypes and sentiments. As such, the plaintiff argued that the report was harmful to Muslim communities. On April 10, 2018, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. On August 2, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing and did not have a right of action under the IQA. On August 22, the government requested the court to stay the case because their IQA guidelines allow petitioners to submit an administrative appeal of IQA responses. On August 23, 2018, Magistrate Judge Corley ordered the matter stayed until November 28, 2018. On November 29, 2018, Magistrate Judge Corley ordered the matter further stayed pending the plaintiff's administrative appeal and a joint status report. The parties stipulated that the stay would expire on February 19, 2019. The defendants issued its final response in the plaintiff's administrative appeal in the week of February 18, 2019. On April 1, 2019, the plaintiff filed its first amended complaint to include a summary of the administrative appeal. The plaintiff asserted that in its final response in the administrative appeal, defendants admitted that "the information quality concerns raised by plaintiff have merit" and that “information in the Report could be criticized by some readers, consistent with some of the concerns" raised by the plaintiff. The plaintiff contended that despite these concessions, defendants declined to retract or correct the report and continue to disseminate it, in violation of the IQA. On April 29, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively for failure to state a claim. The defendants asserted that every court to have considered a claim alleging a violation of the IQA has rejected it, reasoning that third-parties have no basis to enforce legal rights under the IQA. The defendants further alleged that the plaintiff lacked standing, as the plaintiff was unable to establish an injury in fact that is traceable to the report and that the plaintiff's claim was unlikely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. The defendants last argued that its responses to the plaintiff's administrative appeal do not constitute "final agency action" and are thus not reviewable under the APA. On July 19, 2019, Magistrate Judge Corley issued an order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Judge Corley held that the plaintiff did not adequately state a claim because its claim, premised on alleged violations of the IQA, was not subject to judicial review under the APA. Judge Corley was inclined to order that the complaint be dismissed without leave to amend, as there was nothing to suggest that the plaintiff could amend its complaint to correct the deficiencies noted by defendants. However, Judge Corley granted the plaintiff 30 days leave to file an amended complaint. 2019 WL 3254230. On September 16, 2019, Judge Corley entered final judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff after plaintiff did not file an amended complaint by the August 19, 2019 deadline. Plaintiff has not filed an appeal of the district court's final judgment and the case is now closed.

Summary: Muslim Advocates filed this suit on April 9, 2018 challenging a report created and issued by defendants the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The report, which was required by Executive Order 13780: Protecting the Nation From Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States. The plaintiff argued that the report was biased and misleading against Muslims and the threat they pose to the United States, and therefore further stigmatized Muslims in the U.S. while stoking anti-Muslim sentiments. The complaint was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act for violations of the Information Quality Act. Specifically, the plaintiff sought a retraction and correction of the report to bring it in compliance with the IQA. On July 19, 2019, the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that the alleged violations of the IQA are not subject to judicial review under the APA. The case is now closed.


On June 9, 2015, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area filed this nationwide class action against the Hertz Corporation and Sterling Infosystems, Inc., on behalf of the plaintiff and all similarly situated applicants. The plaintiffs alleged that Hertz and Sterling systematically violated federal law based on the way they conducted criminal background checks of Hertz job applicants. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), employers must provide job applicants with a clear written disclosure in a standalone form and get job applicants' express written consent before conducting a background check. The FCRA also requires that, before denying or revoking a job offer based on background check results, employers must provide the applicant with a copy of the background check and a statement of rights under the FCRA, and give the applicant a reasonable amount of time to respond to the accuracy of the report. Hertz never provided the plaintiffs with a disclosure that it may obtain consumer reports and did not receive the plaintiffs' authorization for such reports. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, damages, and attorneys' fees on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. The parties apparently participated in a settlement discussion in June 2015, but we have no record of whether they reached a settlement. The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff on August 24, 2015.

Summary: Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fair Credit Report Act by Hertz, for failing to get written consent for a background check, failure to provide prospective employees a copy of any background check conducted, and failure to give job applicants a reasonable amount of time to respond to any negative information in the background check. They filed a putative class action in the Eastern District of California in June 2015. The case was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff on August 24, 2015.


On August 23, 2006, the New York and Boston offices of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against American Industrial Sales Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. The complaint was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the corporation had engaged in sex discrimination against an individual complainant employee and a class of similarly situated women. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief. Specifically, EEOC alleged that the company's owner, President, and Vice President had engaged in sexually harassing conduct, including inappropriate and unwanted touching, sexual advances, and demands for sexual favors, all of which had created a hostile work environment. When individual employees complained about these actions, they were terminated. For the following year the parties engaged in discovery. In September 2007, Judge Jonathan W. Feldman referred the case to mediation. On May 13, 2008, the court entered a consent decree. This decree required the defendants to adopt anti-discrimination policies, train their employees to adhere to the policies, report to the EEOC regarding discrimination complaints, and pay the plaintiffs $ 375,000 in monetary damages. The court maintained jurisdiction over the decree for three years. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this complaint in the U.S. District for the Western District of New York. The complaint alleged that the company's owner, President, and Vice President subjected the complainant and a class of similarly situated women to sexual harassment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In 2008, the court ordered the acceptance of the parties' consent decree. The decree required the defendants to comply with Title VII and to pay $375,000 to the plaintiff. The case closed in 2011.


The Center for Legal Advocacy brought this lawsuit on behalf of criminal defendants with mental illnesses who had been held for months in Colorado jails awaiting placement in a competency restoration program after having been found incompetent to stand trial. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and filed on August 31, 2011 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The Center accused the Colorado Department of Human Services (CDHS) and the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo (CMHIP) of violating the criminal defendants’ Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia S. Krieger. Under a 2006 settlement agreement (known as the "Zuniga Agreement") arising from Colorado state court cases, the Department of Human Services had committed to providing evaluation and placement for treatment within 30 days after a judge determined that a criminal defendant was incompetent to stand trial. This agreement expired in 2009 when the state opened a new 200-bed forensic mental health facility; however, the new facility did not solve the long-standing delays, and the Center for Legal Advocacy then filed this lawsuit. Represented by staff attorneys and private counsel, the Center sought a preliminary and permanent injunction requiring the state to complete competency evaluations within seven days of a court order and to admit a person for restoration treatment within seven days after evaluation and determination of incompetency. The Center also sought a declaratory judgment and attorneys’ fees. Colorado criminal defendants found to be mentally incompetent receive restoration treatment at the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo; CMHIP is the only mental hospital in the state authorized to provide such treatment. Because CMHIP was beyond capacity, criminal defendants found to be mentally incompetent were forced to wait in county jails, sometimes for months, before being admitted to receive treatment. In some cases, their detention in county jail while awaiting treatment was longer than their sentence would have been if they had pled guilty. The Center argued that once a person accused of a crime has been found mentally incompetent to stand trial, the only lawful purpose for continued detention is to restore that person to competency. If the state is not actively restoring the person to competency, the plaintiff argued, continued detention is a violation of the person’s due process rights. On November 21, 2011, the parties agreed to settlement negotiations before Magistrate Judge Boyd N. Boland. On April 9, 2012, the court approved a settlement agreement. The agreement established deadlines for providing services to defendants with mental illnesses and required CMHIP to submit monthly reports to the plaintiff, with the first report due September 1, 2012. The Department of Human Services agreed to pay the plaintiff $75,000. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the agreement until 60 days after the delivery of CMHIP’s final report. On October 28, 2015, the plaintiff moved to reopen the case in order for the court to enforce the settlement. During the intervening three years, CMHIP had been submitting reports showing compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement, but the plaintiff's investigation into the case of one defendant (who had been held in solitary confinement while awaiting restoration services) revealed that the state was fabricating data. The plaintiff alleged that the state had been in breach of the agreement since at least March 2015, but due to the “false and misleading” information in the monthly reports, the plaintiff had not become aware of the breech until July 2015. On November 19, 2015, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang. The court granted the motion to reopen the case on December 18, 2015. On July 29, 2016, the court approved a second settlement agreement. The state agreed to pay $196,000 to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff agreed not to seek further attorneys’ fees or costs. The state did not admit liability, but it agreed to provide monthly reports to the plaintiff and to an independent consultant chosen by the parties, and to meet quarterly with the independent consultant and the plaintiff, until July 2021. The agreement provided for extending or shortening the duration of the agreement, depending on the state’s compliance or non-compliance. Significantly, the agreement allowed the state a six-month waiver of deadlines if it informed the plaintiff that “Departmental Special Circumstances,” defined as unexpected events beyond the state’s control, prevented it from meeting the deadlines specified in the agreement. The court retained jurisdiction until 60 days following the delivery of the final monthly report. Two years later, on June 13, 2018, the plaintiff again filed a motion to reopen the case, for the court to enforce the second settlement agreement. The plaintiff said that the state was continuing to violate the agreement’s deadlines and that people with mental illnesses were still being held in jails for months while awaiting competency restoration services. “Not only do the current delays violate the timeframes Defendants twice agreed to in the settlement agreements, they also are in violation of the United States Constitution.” The continued delays, the plaintiff alleged, were “the result of ineptitude, a tragic pattern of institutional indifference, or both.” The state had invoked the “Departmental Special Circumstances” clause of the agreement in June 2017, suspending the agreement’s deadlines for six months. When that six-month grace period expired in December 2017, the state invoked the clause again. When that grace period expired in June 2018, the state continued to violate the deadlines required by the agreement, but without invoking the clause again. The plaintiff contended that the agreement did not allow the state to invoke the special circumstances clause multiple times consecutively; the state responded that there was nothing in the agreement suggesting that they could not, and that there had been an “unanticipated spike” in referrals for restoration treatment services. During the course of the litigation, the Colorado General Assembly had worked to pass a bill that would have helped reduce jail wait times for defendants with mental illnesses. The plaintiff supported this bill until late in the process, when the bill was amended to allow the state to keep detainees with mental illnesses in jail for up to five months while receiving jail-based competency restoration services. On June 14, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff's motion to reopen the case for the limited purpose of considering whether the settlement agreement had been breached and whether to order enforcement, but it reserved judgment on the question of whether the state had, in fact, breached the agreement. On August 15, both parties moved for summary judgment. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment was denied on November 9, 2018; the plaintiff’s motion was granted in part the same day. The court discussed four issues it considered at the summary judgment phase:

The first was whether the settlement agreed allowed the state to invoke the special circumstances clause repeatedly, without limitations. The court found that there was no numerical limit specified in the agreement; there was, however, a “non-numeric limit”: the agreement explicitly limited invocation of special circumstances to “circumstances beyond the control of the Department which impact the Department’s ability to comply with the timeframes.”
Second, whether the state breached the agreement when it re-invoked special circumstances in December 2017. The court denied summary judgment on this question.
Third, whether the state breached the agreement in June 2018, when it continued in non-compliance without re-invoking special circumstances. The court granted summary judgment on this question, finding that as of June 2018, the state was in breach of the agreement.
Fourth and finally, the question of what remedies the court should impose. The court declined to issue injunctive relief in this order, indicating that it would permit the state “no more than six months (and perhaps far less)…to come back into compliance.” It also indicated that if it later concluded that the state had been acting in bad faith, attorneys’ fees might be awarded to the plaintiff.
On December 18, 2018, the court appointed special masters Groundswell Services, Inc. and its experts Drs. Neil Gowensmith and Daniel Murrie. The court indicated that the special masters would replace the independent consultant, that the state would pay for the services of the special masters, and that the state was required to come into compliance and stay in compliance continuously for 18 months. In January 2019, after submitting to the court a comprehensive plan for compliance, the state sought referral to a magistrate judge for settlement negotiations. The court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Michael E. Hegarty. On February 28, 2019, the state submitted an amended comprehensive plan for compliance. On April 2, 2019, the court issued a consent decree. It established specific timelines and limitations that the state must follow. It also established liquidated damages, and specific fines for non-compliance with deadlines. The state’s fines were capped at $10 million per year; the state was required to issue a weekly report indicating areas of non-compliance and tabulating total fines owed. The fines were to be paid into an independently-administered fund which would be used for providing non-Department services for defendants with mental illnesses. The state was required to create a comprehensive plan for compliance and a community-based outpatient competency restoration system focusing on triage instead of traditional waitlists. The Department agreed not to propose, sponsor, or support any legislative actions that would conflict with the terms of the decree. The special masters would hold regular meetings between the parties. The consent decree was to remain in force until December 1, 2025, or until the state had been in strict compliance with the decree, as certified by the special masters, for two years (or for one year if the department had also reduced a specified class of detainees’ wait times to 21 days for that year). The decree also awarded $654,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiff. In the event of violations of the decree, the plaintiff would be awarded attorneys’ fees and costs for pursuing the violation. If the court found a material violation, it could order immediate enforcement of the agreement or injunctive relief, impose liquidated damages of up to $10,000 for each day of noncompliance, or fashion any other relief it deemed appropriate. The state submitted its Long-Term Comprehensive and Cohesive Competency Plan, as required by the agreement, on March 2, 2020. The state paid over $1 million in fines as of August 2019, and the parties are engaged in negotiations about how to adjust fines incurred in 2020 (estimated to exceed $2 million) in light of unexpected delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The court’s supervision of the state’s compliance is ongoing.

Summary: The Center for Legal Advocacy brought this lawsuit on behalf of criminal defendants with mental illnesses in Colorado who were held in jail for months while awaiting competency restoration treatments. The parties agreed to several settlement agreements that the Center accused the state of violating. The most recent agreement, an April 2019 consent decree, imposes fines of up to $10,000,000 per year if the state fails to meet deadlines for providing restoration services.


On May 6, 1992, inmates at the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana (MCC) filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Governor of Indiana, and the State Department of Corrections (DOC), in Marion County Superior Court. The plaintiffs, filing pro se and subsequently represented by ACLU of Indiana, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, complaining that conditions and practices at the prison violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged long term solitary confinement; arbitrary and irrational rules; physical abuse; denial of visitation; inadequate medical, and mental health care; inadequate educational, vocational training, recreational, and rehabilitative programs. Upon motion by the defendants, the case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 29, 1992, and ultimately transferred to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana on July 7, 1992. After consolidating this case with several others, the Court (Chief Judge Allen Sharp) on September 22, 1992 referred the case to Magistrate Judge Robin D. Pierce for settlement conference. Several conferences were held, and a settlement agreement was reached between the two parties. Approval of the settlement On January 5, 1994, Judge Pierce submitted his report and recommendation that the Court approve the Agreed Entry (AE) reached by the parties. On February 11, the Court (Judge Sharp), noting that the AE went well beyond constitutional minima, adopted the report and recommendation, approved and entered the AE. Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp 723 (N.D. Ind. 1994). It went into effect on February 15, 1994. Several inmates appealed the matter despite recommendations by the court that they would not get a better settlement for injunctive relief. The AE provided for: the assignment of prisoners out of the MCC only under specified conditions; the transfer of prisoners out of the MCC after a specified period of time, provided that certain conditions are met; a commissary at the MCC, with a list of particular items to be made available; inmate access to radios and televisions under specified conditions and at inmate expense; expanded visitation and telephone privileges; the availability of additional reading materials for prisoners; increased opportunities for prisoner recreation; increased privileges with respect to keeping of personal property in cells and in the storage room; improvements in the condition of bedding; a decrease in the intensity of the 24-hour lights in the cells; additional access by prisoners to personal hygienic items; the establishment of a policy concerning the use of force by DOC personnel; expanded provisions for medical care, including mandatory psychiatric evaluations for all prisoners upon their admittance to the MCC; an expanded law library containing specified reference materials, and provisions for greater access to legal materials by prisoners; increased educational opportunities for prisoners; a substance abuse program; and improvements in inmate grievance procedures. Taifa v. Bayh, 846 F. Supp 723 (N.D. Ind. 1994). On September 9, 1994, the Court (Judge Sharp) granted a motion by plaintiffs for attorney's fees. After Magistrate Judge Roger B. Cosbey conducted conferences on the matter, he issued a report and recommendation on November 30, 1994, that the order granting fees be vacated. Pursuant to the Seventh Circuit granting appeal on December 12, 1994, the Court (Judge Sharp) vacated the order granting fees to the plaintiffs' attorneys as moot on December 21, 1994. On February 5, 1996, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Ilana Diamond Rovner) affirmed the District Court's acceptance of the AE. This was the Seventh Circuit's review of Judge Sharp's February 11, 1994 order, which was appealed by several of the individual plaintiffs. The Seventh Circuit found that there was no abuse of discretion by the District Court and held that the AE was not defeated by allegedly unlawful provisions, and could reasonably be found to be fair and adequate relief. Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191 (7th Cir. 1996). Enforcement of the settlement By May 16, 1994, the Court had received several (and in some cases duplicate) motions for contempt by one of the prisoners. At that time, Judge Sharp issued an order denying all such motions. The motions by the inmate increased in frequency and duplicity until October 24, 1994, when Magistrate Judge Pierce issued a report and recommendation that all of the inmate's motions and objections be denied, and that he be barred from submitting any more before the Court. The inmate was allowed to make motions only when he also presented a sworn affidavit listing the names, dates, and specific allegations, and that the matter had not been previously submitted to the court. The Court (Judge Sharp) accepted the report and recommendation on November 4, 1994. Taifa v. Bayh, 867 F. Supp 799 (N.D. Ind. 1994). On August 22, 1995, the Court (Judge Sharp) issued an order regarding the contempt motions filed by several of the inmates in the previous year. On April 6, 1995, several alleged violations of the AE were remedied, and the remaining violations were consolidated to 6 issues before the court. They dealt with: conduct board hearings; law clerks for prisoners with special needs; law library visits, and legal materials for prisoners in disciplinary segregation; availability of prisoner's handbook; classification; and fruit juice availability at the commissary. The Court (Judge Sharp) accepted the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Pierce, and denied the contempt motions regarding fruit juice and circulation of the handbook, but granted the other four. Taifa v. Bayh, No. 3:92-cv-0429 AS, 1995 WL 646300 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 1995). Some inmates appealed the matter. One of the motions referenced in the August 22, 1995, order was a motion for contempt or in the alternative preliminary injunction regarding the placement of the one of the prisoner plaintiffs felt was in the MCC in violation of the AE. On September 26, 1995, the Court (Judge Sharp) denied this motion. The court found that--notwithstanding the settlement terms that required more--the prisoner had no constitutional liberty interest in more process than he was afforded. Taifa v. Bayh, No. 3:92-cv-0429 AS, 1995 WL 803816 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 1995). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Kenneth Francis Ripple) reversed and remanded the District Court's two contempt orders in September 1996. On appeal, the defendants argued that because portions of the AE incorporated Indiana State Law, the Eleventh Amendment did not permit a Federal Court to order compliance with state law, and thus review was inappropriate. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Ripple) disagreed, and found that the AE only borrowed relevant definitions from the state law, and did not rely on state law for enforcement. Komyatti v. Bayh, 96 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court reversed the August 22, 1995 order of the District Court denying two of the six contempt motions, and remanded the case for proceedings consistent. Damage actions The plaintiffs litigated damages pro se, and individually. On June 6, 1996, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana disposed of an individual plaintiff's damages claims against the defendants. The Court (Magistrate Judge Pierce) found that the plaintiff's claims were unclear as to whether damages occurred before or after the February 15, 1994 AE went into effect, making them possibly moot. The complaint and hearings were also unclear about who was actually injured, as several witnesses talked about their own injuries, not those of the individually complaining inmate. The Court found no actual constitutional damages claim either. Judge Pierce recommended that the Eleventh Amendment should bar individual damages suit against the defendants in their official capacities, and since the plaintiff made no specific complaint to any defendant in his or her individual capacity, the complaint should be held moot. Taifa v. Bayh, No. 3:92-cv-0429 AS, 1996 WL 441809 (N.D. Ind. June 6, 1996). On July 24, 1996, Chief Judge Sharp adopted and ordered the report and recommendation. Isby v. Bayh, No. 3:92-cv-0429 AS, 1996 WL 441820 (N.D. Ind. July 24, 1996). Modification of the Settlement According to the Human Rights Watch Report Cold Storage, in October 1996, the Indiana DOC obtained a modification of the Agreed Entry to permit it to turn three-quarters of the prison (renamed the MCF) into a facility housing inmates serving long-term disciplinary sentences from around the state. In order to secure plaintiffs' consent to the modification of the Agreed Entry, the State agreed that treatment of disciplinary segregation inmates at the MCF would be softer than such prisoners would receive elsewhere. For example, the modified Agreed Entry required two hours of recreation per day for disciplinary segregation inmates at the MCF, compared to the half hour per day then provided at the alternative Secure Housing Unit. On September 12, 1997, the Court (Judge Sharp) reaffirmed the disposal of injunctive claims pursuant to the partial judgment of February 15, 1994. Then, on December 18, 1997, the Court denied a non-party plaintiff's complaint of violation of the AE regarding limitations on shower time, law library access time, and recreation time. Various inmates filed more motions for contempt and all were denied. Termination of prospective relief On August 7, 2003, the defendants filed a motion to terminate all prospective relief granted and approved so far. On October 27, 2003, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Indiana (Judge Sharp) granted the motion to terminate relief pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), disposed of all motions before the Court, and terminated the case. On May 1, 2006, class member Eric D. Smith filed a pro se motion for contempt against defendants alleging several violations of the AE. On May 3, 2006, the defendants responded to the contempt motion by noting that the case and the AE had been terminated and thus there was not an existing order in place for the court to enforce. Smith replied by alleging that he was never given notice of the October 27, 2003 termination order, and prayed for relief from the court against the resurgence of old practices at the MCC. Following a hearing on September 11, 2006, the District Court (Judge Sharp) denied Smith's contempt motion as moot. Another non-party class member filed a pro se motion for contempt on July 30, 2009. Within the week, the District Court denied the motion, referring the potential class member to class counsel. The case is closed.

Summary: On May 6, 1992, inmates at the Maximum Control Complex in Westville, Indiana (MCC) filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Governor of Indiana, and the State Department of Corrections (DOC), in Marion County Superior Court. The plaintiffs, filing pro se and subsequently represented by ACLU of Indiana, alleged that conditions and practices at the prison violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. A settlement agreement was reached between the two parties and on February 11, 1994, the Court (Judge Sharp) signed the Agreed Entry. Since then, many inmates have filed motions for contempt for noncompliance, though the court has denied all of them. In 1996, the Agreed Entry was modified, and in 2003, it was terminated pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Although the case was terminated on that date, the Court has still received some motions for contempt which it has denied.


On May 10, 2016, four individuals who were arrested in the Bronx for low-level misdemeanors filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the State of New York's Unified Court Systems for failure to provide the constitutionally guaranteed rights to a speedy trial and due process. The plaintiffs sought class certification for people similarly affected by the structural and systemic court delays in the Bronx Criminal Court. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Bronx Criminal Court’s inordinate delays violated the plaintiffs’ Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as New York state’s criminal procedure laws, which require prosecutors to be ready for trial within 90, 60, or 30 days of the commencement of a criminal action depending on the category of misdemeanors. According to the complaint, although there were over 45,000 misdemeanor arraignments in 2015, only 98 went on trial. Further, the few people who managed to exercise their right to trial waited on average 642 days for nonjury and 827 for a jury trial, and many people ended up taking plea bargains and giving up their right to a trial because of the Bronx Criminal Court’s overall dysfunctional administration. The plaintiffs, represented by the Bronx Defenders and private counsel, sought declaratory and equitable relief. The case was assigned to District Judge George B. Daniels and Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. On June 30, 2016, the State moved to dismiss because none of the four plaintiffs had cases pending in Bronx Criminal Court and thus lacked standing to sue. The State further argued that the Court should abstain from reviewing the case since the plaintiffs’ claims involved the state judiciary, and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim. On December 22, 2016, Judge Daniels granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss. First, the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the case for lack of standing and also dismissed Governor Cuomo as a defendant. But the Court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss on abstention grounds because the judge could contemplate granting declaratory and injunctive relief that would not necessarily interfere with or restructure the state court’s lawful authority. The Court also rejected the argument that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim after it found that one of the plaintiffs waited 877 days between his arraignment and a final resolution. The Court allowed the plaintiffs to submit an amended complaint. 2016 WL 7489098. On January 23, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On March 8, 2017, the parties met with Judge George B. Daniels and interim pretrial conference was scheduled. The plaintiffs also filed for class certification. While the court was deliberating whether to grant the plaintiff's request for class certification, the parties agreed to stay the litigation while they sought an enforceable settlement agreement over the course of the next six months. After a series of stay extensions, the parties were able to agree to a settlement hearing before a magistrate judge. The court referred the case to Magistrate judge Gabriel Gorenstein on February 12, 2018. On August 9, 2018, the court entered the parties settlement agreement. The parties agreed to stay the litigation for four years, but the plaintiffs retained the right to reinstate the litigation at any time. If the plaintiffs reinstate litigation within four years, they retain all rights to attorneys fees. However, in the event the plaintiffs do not reinstate within the four year period, their case will be dismissed without prejudice and without costs or fees to any party. In exchange, the defendants agreed to continue to decrease the number of misdemeanor cases pending for more than one year, though the parties did not agree to a legally binding goal. To ensure compliance, the defendants gave the plaintiffs access to records including activity reports, criminal records data, and reports relating to court delay, trial capacity, and the allocation of judicial resources by New York City. This settlement agreement did not include an admission of guilt from the defendants. The case is ongoing, and as of May 2020 the plaintiffs have not sought to reinstate the litigation.

Summary: In May 2016, individuals who were arrested in the Bronx for misdemeanors filed a class action complaint in the S.D.N.Y. against the New York Governor Andrew Cuomo and the administrators of New York State's Unified Court System for Bronx Criminal Court's failure to provide the constitutionally guaranteed rights to a speedy trial and due process per Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law that requires a speedy trial timetable. The plaintiffs further alleged that Bronx Criminal Court had inordinate delays compared to other boroughs and sought declaratory and equitable relief. The parties reached a settlement on August 9, 2018. The defendants agreed to reporting standards and to continue decreasing the number of misdemeanor cases pending for over a year, and if they comply the plaintiff's will allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice after four years.


On September 21, 2009, two climate and environmental justice nonprofits filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Pittsburgh. The plaintiff, represented by the local American Civil Liberties Union, Center for Constitutional Rights, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that City of Pittsburgh officials violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Pittsburgh officials deliberately adopted a strategy to harass, intimidate, discourage and ultimately prevent the plaintiffs from exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly during the International Coal Conference and the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh during the week of September 20, 2009. One of the two non-profits wanted to provide a 24-hour-a-day camp in a downtown park demonstrating a sustainable lifestyle from September 20 to 25, 2009. The second non-profit wanted to provide food to demonstrators, and also serve as a model for sustainable living from September 19 through 26, 2009. Both plaintiffs claim that defendants' actions rendered them unable to demonstrate, silenced their political message about global climate change, and caused them to suffer emotional distress. On September 22, 2009, the District Court (Judge Gary L. Lancaster) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. On May 25, 2010, the Court dismissed all claims except for four claims related to demonstration permits, confiscated materials, and detention of members. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the claims by one plaintiff against two of the officers on December 21, 2011. The parties settled the case and filed a stipulation of dismissal on October 12, 2012, which the Court entered the same day. According to the ACLU's news, the City of Pittsburgh agreed to pay $143,000 to settle the claims.

Summary: On September 21, 2009, Three Rivers Climate Convergence and Seeds of Peace Collective, two climate and environmental justice nonprofit organizations, filed a lawsuit against the City of Pittsburgh in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The groups claimed that the City of Pittsburgh officials deliberately adopted a strategy to harass, intimidate, discourage and ultimately prevent the plaintiffs from exercising their First Amendment rights to free speech and assembly during the International Coal Conference and the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh during the week of September 20, 2009. After the G-20 Summit and Coal Conference were over, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include claims for the confiscation and destruction of property by the City of Pittsburgh in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Following partial dismissal of claims by the District Court and the Court of Appeals, the parties settled on October 12, 2012. According to the ACLU's news, the City of Pittsburgh agreed to pay $143,000 to settle the claims of Seeds of Peace Collective and Three Rivers Climate Convergence.


On October 13, 2011, eight students (including minors) of Hoover High School (HHS), filed a class-action lawsuit in the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the California Constitution against the cities of Glendale and Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming discrimination, unlawful search and seizure, and conspiracy to violate civil rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that on Friday, September 24, 2010, administrators at Hoover High School and officers from the Glendale Police Department, the Los Angeles Police Department, and the Probation Department interrogated, photographed, and collected personal information from approximately 56 students, all of whom were Latino although the school is only 25 percent Latino. As the students went to the tables where they normally eat lunch, Hoover administrators ordered them into nearby classrooms, where multiple armed and uniformed police officers were waiting for them. The students were detained for between 30 and 90 minutes, during which time they were told that they were on a "gang list" and the officers searched some students and their belongings. They were allowed to leave only after they had submitted to interrogation about their personal information and activities and were forced to pose for mock "mug shots." The school officials and police had no evidence that the students were doing anything illegal or breaking school rules at the time they conducted the roundup. (www.aclusocal.org/kl) On September 21, 2012, plaintiffs settled with the City of Glendale. On October 19, the County of Los Angeles answered the amended complaint. Subsequent negotiations resulted in an additional settlement, and in September 2013, pursuant to the settlement agreement, the case was voluntarily dismissed against the remaining defendants. Under the settlements, joint operations between the school officials and police must be approved by the superintendent, except in emergencies. Glendale Unified School District clarified that its policies governing teachers' and administrators' interactions with police, including the requirement that parents be notified when students are interrogated by police, apply both to officers entering from off-campus and those permanently assigned to schools. The Glendale Police Department agreed to train all of its officers on department policies related to interactions with students on campus and to revise its policies regarding racial profiling. Both agencies also agreed to allow independent verification that all information collected during the incident has been destroyed. The agencies also paid monetary damages and attorney's fees. On September 27, 2013 the Court dismissed with prejudice the claims against the Defendants since all Plaintiffs had reached the age of majority. However, the court retained jurisdiction for a year after the order. As of March 23, 2018 there has been no additional activity, and the case appears to be closed.

Summary: Eight students sued the Cities of Glendale and Los Angeles following a round-up of Latino students at Hoover High School. Though the students had not violated and rules or laws, they were allowed to leave only after they had submitted to searches, interrogation about their personal information and activities, and posing for mock "mug shots." The settlement included monetary relief as well as policy changes by the school district and police departments.


On October 7, 2003, a group of former employees filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act ("OWBPA"), 29 U.S.C. § 626(f), against International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) in United States District Court of the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, injunctive and compensatory relief as well as double damages, alleging that IBM discriminated against its older employees. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that IBM held a pattern and practice of discrimination in both individual terminations and involuntary group terminations, known as Resource Actions. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation, 2904252 WL 1 (N.D.C.A. 2007). Each of the named plaintiffs, with one exception, had signed a general termination covenant agreeing not to sue the company. These releases were considered binding, and were intended by IBM as a means to prevent this type of litigation. The plaintiffs claim these waivers had a disparate impact on them. On February 12, 2004, IBM filed a counterclaim against the plaintiffs, seeking attorney's fees for all the proceedings under this litigation. IBM further demanded a jury trial for these proceedings. (Counterclaim, page 2). On May 4, 2004, the Court (Judge Whyte) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs motion to dismiss the counterclaim. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation, 27844 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 (N.D.C.A. 2004). The plaintiffs appealed this decision. This Ninth Circuit accepted the case, but took an enormously long time to come to a decision. On August 31, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Berzon, Judge Callahan, Judge Rawlinson) reversed the District Court's decision, vacated the decision on the counterclaim and remanded the case back to the District. The Circuit Court ruled that under the OWBPA, employees may not waive their right to sue unless they do so "knowingly and voluntarily." The Court stated that IBM's waiver was not written in a clear and calculated manner, thus, the "knowingly" standard was not met, and plaintiffs case still had merit. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation, 461 F.3d 1149 (9th Circuit. 2006). The defendant appealed this decision by the Circuit Court, asking for a rehearing en banc. On January 12, 2007, the United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Berzon, Judge Callahan, Judge Rawlinson) denied the defendant's appeal. However, in this decision, with the consent of both parties, the Court modified its previous decision on the defendant's counterclaim. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation, 472 F.3d 1087 (9th Circuit. 2007). On October 3, 2007, the District Court (Judge Whyte) granted the defendant's motion to dismiss certain claims. The Court dismissed the plaintiffs first claim under the OWBPA with prejudice and dismissed the plaintiffs disparate impact claim regarding individual terminations. Syverson v. International Business Machines Corporation, 2904252 WL 6 (N.D.C.A. 2007). The plaintiffs the moved to amend their complaint, and on November 6, 2007, filed their Third Amended Complaint. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) (voluntary dismissal), the Court dismissed the case with prejudice on January 29, 2009. Each party was to bear his own costs in the litigation.

Summary: This case was brought by former employees of International Business Machines (IBM) against IBM seeking declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief. Plaintiffs claimed that IBM had discriminated against them based on their age. The case was dismissed voluntarily on January 29, 2009. It is unclear what relief, if any, Plaintiffs received.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an action seeking to enjoin California from enforcing EO N-64-20, which allowed Californians to vote by mail in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. No outcome yet.
 On May 24, 2020, the Republican National Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the California Republican Party filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued the governor and secretary of state of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Electors and Elections Clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs challenged the governor's EO N-64-20, which allowed Californians to vote by mail to preserve the public health, arguing that the changing the "time, place, and manner in which Californians" vote was unconstitutional. The case was initially assigned to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller, but was reassigned to Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. because it was related to another case filed a few days earlier by California voters,  VR-CA-0169 in the Clearinghouse. The case is ongoing.

Summary: National and local Republican organizations challenged an executive order that permitted Californians to vote by mail in the upcoming elections. They argued that the order unconstitutionally violated the Fourteenth Amendment and the Electors and Elections Clauses, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.


On February 22, 2016, individuals with mental illness and/or in need of addiction and substance abuse services who were exiting jails, prisons, nursing homes, mental health institutes, or who were currently homeless, filed this class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued the State of Colorado, the Colorado Department of Healthcare Policy and Financing, the Colorado Department of Local Affairs, and the Colorado Department of Human Services, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The plaintiffs, represented by The Orchid Mental Health Legal Advocacy of Colorado, sought a permanent injunction to require defendants to ensure housing, treatment and other services be brought to scale to meet the needs of the class. Specifically, the plaintiffs asserted that class members were forced to wait when seeking housing or treatment, or didn’t receive these services at all. The plaintiffs sought to represent three sub-classes: a) Adults with have “mental illness” who met the level of care for Colorado Medicaid Long Term Care Home and Community Based Services; b) Adult patients at Colorado’s Mental Health Institutes who were soon to be released from the Colorado Mental Institutes and were in need of discharge planning; and c) Adults who were institutionalized or at risk of institutionalization, including those who were homeless or in need of addiction care. On June 15, 2016 the defendants filed an unopposed motion to Stay discovery and initial disclosures. Defendants expressed their concern that the Plaintiffs’ complaint was so vague and ambiguous that the Defendants could not reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. On July 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismissed the case against the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 22, 2016, individuals with mental illness and/or in need of addiction and substance abuse services who were exiting jails, prisons, nursing homes, mental health institutes, or who were currently homeless, filed this class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. They brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction requiring to require defendants to ensure housing, treatment and other services were brought to scale to meet the needs of the class. On July 31, 2016, the plaintiffs moved to voluntarily dismissed the case against the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.


On February 14, 2011, disabled plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Burger King Corporation. Suing under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12181 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act, the plaintiffs, represented by private council, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought to correct Burger King's policies and practices to include measures necessary to ensure compliance with Disability Access Requirements and to include monitoring of such measures, to remove unlawful access barriers and to prevent their recurrence so that the plaintiffs and those similarly situated who use wheelchairs or scooters will have full and equal enjoyment of Burger King restaurants. This case is the second part of a class action brought against Burger King Corporation. In the first part of the litigation, Castaneda v. Burger King Corporation, DR-CA-0032. The plaintiffs alleged that the restaurants that Burger King Corporation leases to its franchisees in California violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, and the California Disabled Persons Act. Plaintiffs alleged that Burger King violated these regulations by pursuing discriminatory policies or practices that resulted in unlawful architectural or design barriers which denied customers who use wheelchairs or scooters access to services at these restaurants. In Castaneda, the parties reached a class settlement and final approval of which was granted by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in 2010. This case is in our database appearing as DR-CA-0032. The plaintiffs filed this action in February 2011 against Burger King, bringing the same claims and asserting class action allegations as to the remaining 86 restaurants not included in the Castaneda settlement. On May 6, 2011, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss on the same basis the defendant's motion to dismiss was denied in Castaneda. In the case at hand, the defense brought identical arguments in its motion to dismiss as in Castaneda (arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction for all restaurants plaintiffs had not personally visited) but the Court found no change in the law to warrant a change in ruling. On October 28, 2011, the defendant moved for relief from discovery requiring Burger King to product for inspection numerous disability-access surveys of Burger King stores detailing architectural measurements arguing the materials are trial-preparation materials protected by Rule 26(b)(3). On December 7, 2011, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Corley denied the motion for relief from discovery. The parties initially moved for settlement on June 14, 2012. After initial motion for settlement, the plaintiffs moved for certification of 86 restaurant-specific settlement classes. On July 2, 2012, the plaintiffs entered an amended complaint listing an additional plaintiff that had visited each of the remaining 86 Burger King restaurant, eliminating the need for an overreaching injunctive class certification. Thus, the defendant did not oppose certification of the restaurant-specific settlement classes, for settlement purposes only. The Court approved the class certification on the same day the amended complaint was entered. On October 12, 2012, the plaintiffs entered a motion for final approval of a settlement agreement. The court (Judge William Alsup) granted this on October 29, 2012. The settlement provided for significant injunctive relief including all of the measures agreed to in Castaneda, including the elimination of all accessibility barriers and the use of mandatory checklists with specific accessibility items for remodeling, alterations, repairs and maintenance. Additionally, this settlement provided for an additional remedial measure that Burger King would include in its manual to its franchisees the recommendation that franchisees check the force required to open all public exterior and restroom doors twice per month to ensure that they do not required more than five pounds of pressure to open. Finally, the settlement provided for a cash payment of $19 million to satisfy and settle all claims for damages, including attorney's fees and costs. The settlement concluded without further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This is the second part of a class action asserted against Burger King Corporation. Plaintiffs filed this complaint in 2011, alleging that Burger King violated Federal and state law by denying customers who use wheelchairs or scooters access to services at their restaurants. Parties settled the case and Burger King agreed to remedy their access issues and pay $19 million in damages and attorney's fees and costs.