On January 14, 2014, three women who wished to marry their incarcerated (male) partners filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Moniteau County Recorder of Deeds of the state of Missouri. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court to declare that Mo. Rev. Stat. § 451.040.2 (a Missouri law that required both signers of a marriage license to appear in front of the recorder of deeds) is unconstitutional, issue an injunction requiring the defendant to issue marriage licenses to plaintiffs and others engaged to marry individuals who are unable to appear, and award the plaintiffs costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs asserted that marriage is a fundamental right protected by the United States Constitution that is not changed by the incarcerated status of their fiancées. They claimed Missouri law, which requires that marriage license applications be signed "in the presence of the recorder of deeds or their deputy," violated this right and deprived plaintiffs of important federal and state benefits and privileges afforded to married couples. On February 6, 2014, the Court (District Judge Gary A. Fenner) decided in favor of the plaintiffs. 2014 WL 572316. It ruled that the requirement that marriage licenses be signed "in the presence of the recorder of deeds or their deputy," was unconstitutional as applied to situations where an applicant for a marriage license is physically unable to appear in the presence of the recorder of deeds or their deputy due to incarceration. Amos v. Higgins, 2014 WL 572316 (W.D. Missouri 2014). The Court further enjoined defendants from requiring the presence of applicants who could not physically appear in front of the defendants due to incarceration, and also required defendants to issue licenses to applicants who presented reasonable written proof as to the authenticity of the signature of an applicant on a marriage license application and reasonable verified proof that the applicant is physically unable to appear in the presence of the recorder.

Summary: On January 14, 2014, three women who wished to marry their incarcerated (male) partners filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Missouri U.S. District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Moniteau County Recorder of Deeds of the state of Missouri. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), asked the court to declare that a Missouri law requiring both signers of a marriage license to appear in front of the recorder of deeds is unconstitutional. On February 6, 2014, the Court decided in favor of the plaintiffs.


On November 8, 2011, an immigrant rights advocacy organization filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The plaintiff, represented by the American Immigration Council and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that DHS had failed to make a reasonable search for and disclosure of requested documents concerning individuals' access to legal counsel during their interactions with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. (The same day, AIC filed a similar lawsuit relating to a similar records request made to a different DHS component, U.S. Customs and Border Protection. For information on that one, see IM-DC-0018 in this Clearinghouse.) On May 31, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, claiming that it had provided the plaintiff with "all non-exempt, responsive records in accordance with the FOIA." On November 27, 2012, the district court (Judge James E. Boasberg) granted the motion to dismiss in part as to the second cause of action and denied it in part. Am. Immigration Council v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 905 F.Supp.2d 206 (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2012). Th parties then negotiated a settlement, and the plaintiff filed a stipulation of settlement agreement and dismissal on March 15, 2013. The settlement agreement required the defendant to provide INS GC’s 1986 memo regarding a refugee applicant’s right to counsel, written training documents USCIS developed to implement a pertinent memo in 2011 (the December 21, 2011 interim memo) and in 2012 (the May 23, 2012 final memo). The agreement also required the defendant to conduct a search for records responsive to the plaintiff's FOIA request and produce to AIC all responsive, non-exempt documents. The defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff $45,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. The court dismissed this case with prejudice.

Summary: In November 2011, an immigrant rights advocacy organization filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The plaintiff, represented asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendant was unlawfully withholding records. In March 2013, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which required the defendant to provide relevant documents and search and produce records responsive to the FOIA request made by the plaintiff.


On October 3, 2019, noncitizen children and their parents filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, challenging the Trump Administration's separation of asylum seeker families. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU Immigrant Rights Project, sued various personnel from five federal departments: the Department of Justice (DOJ), the White House, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); and the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). Proceeding under §§ 1985 and 1986 and Bivens, the plaintiffs claimed violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The complaint alleged that defendants’ policy of separating children from their parents at the U.S. border caused irreparable psychological and physical damage to children and parents. Additionally, it was asserted that the practice was intended to inflict pain on immigrants both to induce the plaintiffs to abandon their asylum cases and to deter other immigrants from seeking asylum. It also stated that after children were separated, they were detained in punitive conditions and that the defendants failed to adequately track children so as to reunite children with their parents. The plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as the establishment of a recovery fund to provide health services. They also sought certification of two classes: (1) a class of all minor children who had arrived since 2017 and been separated from their parents by DHS or its agencies without a hearing demonstrating that a parent was unfit or dangerous to the child, and (2) a class of all parents of minor children subjected to the same separation with a hearing. The case was assigned to Judge James A. Soto. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction on February 14, 2020. That motion was denied on August 31, 2020, when the court concurrently granted plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint. On September 3, 2020, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, adding three claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. These claims alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and loss of consortium and were brought individually by the plaintiffs rather than as a part of the class action allegations. On November 13, 2020, the individual defendants re-filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and lack of jurisdiction. On November 23, 2020, the United States did the same and additionally argued the venue was improper. As of March 25, 2021, the motions to dismiss remained pending. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In October 2019, immigrant children and their parents filed a putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Arizona. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by separating children from their parents at the U.S. border. The case is ongoing


On December 1, 2008, eleven African American plaintiffs, who sought to represent a class of over 10,000 members, filed a lawsuit against Compass Group PLC and its subsidiaries, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII, Philadelphia state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages in excess of $1 billion, claiming that Compass had engaged in a pattern and practice of race and color discrimination. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were subjected to racial slurs, discriminatory work assignments and compensation, discriminatory promotional and disciplinary policies and practices, and other discriminatory terms of employment. Further, plaintiffs alleged that Compass retaliated against those employees who complained of the discrimination by demoting them, stripping them of job duties and responsibilities, or terminating them. Plaintiffs additionally accused Compass of negligent hiring, training, and supervision, and claimed that Compass knew or should have known that its employees were engaging in unlawful conduct towards the plaintiffs. On April 27, 2009, the court ordered the case suspended, presumably so the parties could reach a settlement agreement. On August 11, 2009, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, noting the parties had reached a settlement. The contents of the settlement is not available.

Summary: In 2008, eleven African American plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against Compass Group PLC and its subsidiaries, claiming that compass had engaged in a patter and practice of race and color discrimination. In August 2009, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, noting the parties had reached a settlement agreement. The contents of the settlement is not available.


On August 31, 2011, an inmate at the Daviess County Detention Center filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Daviess County and the Daviess County Detention Center. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that they were denied medical attention for serious medical needs and necessary medication prescribed by medical authorities because of the defendants' neglect and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs specifically alleged the defendants that the jail had a blanket policy to deny all psychotropic drugs regardless of their needs and doctors' prescriptions. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' conduct was intentional or grossly negligent, and was indicative of not only deliberate indifference to, but active malice and a total and reckless disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs. On July 23, 2008, Judge Joseph H. McKinley denied the defendants' motion for a more definitive statement. On June 16, 2009, Judge McKinley granted in part and reserved in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. French v. Daviess Cnty., Ken., 2009 WL 1766928 (W.D. Ky. June 23, 2009). On August 18, 2009, Judge McKinley denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and granted summary judgment for the reserved portions of the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Judge McKinley also denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Judge McKinley held that the plaintiff failed to show that any jail personnel deprived him of narcotic pain medication because of an alleged no-narcotics policy. Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to show that placing him on a Valium detoxification protocol was the result of deliberate indifference on the part of jail personnel. French v. Daviess Cnty., Ky., 2009 WL 2589513 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 19, 2009). On May 5, 2010, Judges Merritt, Cole, and Cook of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court held that jail officials were not able to obtain reliable information that French needed narcotic pain medication or Xanax. Officials instead made reasoned, individualized determinations as to French's care, such as placing him on a detoxification protocol and transporting him to the hospital. Consequently, jail officials were not deliberately indifferent to French's serious medical needs. French v. Daviess Cnty., Ky., 376 F. App'x 519 (6th Cir. 2010).

Summary: On August 31, 2011, an inmate at the Daviess County Detention Center filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Daviess County and the Daviess County Detention Center. The plaintiffs claimed that they were denied medical attention for serious medical needs and necessary medication prescribed by medical authorities because of the defendants' neglect and deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Judge Joseph H. McKinley granted summary judgment for all defendants and denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a very longstanding class action addressing appropriate treatment of noncitizen children in federal immigration custody. On March 26, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion seeking promptly release due to COVID-19 risks. On March 27, 2020, the court issued an order to the federal agencies detaining immigrant children to “make continuous efforts” to release the children from custody because of the risk posed to them by COVID-19 and to provide an accounting of their efforts to release those in custody by April 6. On April 24 the court issued an order requiring defendants to release children without unnecessary delay to eligible sponsors. On May 22, following interim reports from defendants, the court expressed concern with defendants' compliance and ordered enhanced monitoring and further status reports. The plaintiffs again sought to enforce the settlement on August 14, which was granted on September 4.
 Note: We've tagged this case as one challenging President Trump's immigration executive orders because those executive orders and their implementing memoranda, included as "resources," below, touch on many of the matters subject to longstanding court oversight in this case. On July 11, 1985, attorneys from the National Center for Immigrants' Rights, the National Center for Youth Law, and the ACLU Foundation of Southern California represented four minors who filed this class action complaint against the U.S. Attorney General, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), its regional commissioner, and two private operators of INS detention facilities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action, in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, presented a class-wide challenge to (a) INS policy to condition juveniles' release on bail on their parents' or legal guardians' surrendering to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; (b) the procedures employed by the INS in imposing a condition on juveniles' bail that their parents' or legal guardians' surrender to INS agents for interrogation and deportation; and (c) the conditions maintained by the INS in facilities where juveniles are incarcerated. The challenged policy, under which the INS conditioned release of the administratively-arrested minors on the surrender of their parents or guardians for INS questioning or possible deportation proceedings was then-new; it had become effective on September 6, 1984, in the INS' Western Region. The plaintiffs noted that juveniles detained pending exclusion proceedings were eligible for bond without the bond eligibility condition that existed for juveniles detained pending deportation. The plaintiffs alleged that the new policy resulted in lengthy incarceration of juveniles in substandard conditions, without education, supervised recreation, or reasonable visitation opportunities; unreasonably subjected them to strip and body cavity searches; and served as a thinly-veiled device to apprehend the parents of the incarcerated juveniles and to punish children. The INS policy and the conditions of detention, according to the plaintiffs, violated (a) the INA, 8 U.S.C. sections 1101 et seq., including 8 U.S.C. section 1252(a)(2) and implementing regulations and Operating Instructions; (b) the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. sections 552 et seq., including 5 U.S.C. section 553(b)-(c); (c) the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; (d) the First Amendment and federal constitutional privacy rights; and (e) the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, TIAS 6577, 19 U.S. 6223 [hereafter United Nations Protocol], and customary international law. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, class action status, habeas corpus writs for themselves and members of their class to allow their release on bail, and an award of attorneys' fees and costs. Pre-Settlement Agreement Proceedings By November 30, 1987, the federal defendants and the plaintiffs entered into a memorandum of understanding to settle those aspects of the complaint alleging unlawful conditions of detention for the minors. The agreement established a network of community-based shelter care programs for minors held in INS custody. Next, the aspect of the case alleging that the minors were unconstitutionally subjected to strip and body cavity searches came before the district court upon cross-motions for summary judgment. On March 7, 1988, District Judge Robert J. Kelleher ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. His opinion cited the lack of productive results from such strip searches and the failure of the defendants to establish a plausible, much less compelling, need for a blanket policy of searching minors in custody for administrative violations, rather than criminal offenses. Absent reasonable suspicion that a strip search would yield a weapon or contraband, Judge Kelleher said the practice violated the Fourth Amendment. Flores v. Meese, 681 F. Supp. 665 (C.D. Cal. 1988). The INS had also moved for partial summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' challenge to the bond condition. Judge Kelleher held that conditioning release, as alleged, did not violate federal statutory or international law, but deferred decision on the federal constitutional claims until further discovery had been completed. However, the judge later ruled that the bond release condition violated the Equal Protection clause since no rational reason existed for treating alien minors in deportation proceedings differently than those in exclusion proceedings. The INS subsequently published for comment a proposed regulation that allowed for release of detained minors on bond to the custody of certain adults, per an order of preference included in the regulation, unless the INS determined detention remained necessary to ensure the minor's appearance at INS proceedings or to ensure safety. The district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, saying the new regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 242.24, constituted a due process violation. The district court's unpublished order invalidated the blanket detention of minors where a "responsible adult," albeit not a parent, relative, or legal guardian, could ensure the minor's attendance at the deportation hearing, and it required a hearing before a neutral and detached official in each case to determine whether release was appropriate and the conditions of release. On appeal, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling the INS had the discretion under statutory law to issue the regulation and not limit release to merely ensuring a minor's appearance at proceedings. On the due process claim, the court said that even if a minor had a right to be released to an unrelated adult, that right was not fundamental, and was thus subject to reasonable restriction. Absent a fundamental right, minimum scrutiny of the regulation sufficed. The panel cited that both the plenary power of the U.S. to control its borders and the limited nature of juveniles' rights compared to adults’ rights warranted this result. Additionally, citing the civil nature of the proceedings, the court ruled that the procedural due process appropriate in criminal cases did not fully apply here. The panel opinion said the district court should, in assessing the INS procedures, balance the factors applicable in civil case due process settings (e.g., private interest, risk of erroneous deprivations, and governmental interest). Flores by Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 934 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1990). Seeking rehearing en banc, the plaintiffs contended that the panel majority erred by failing to recognize their fundamental interest in liberty, and that no procedure other than an individual hearing before an independent officer could provide adequate protections for the right at stake. On August 9, 1991, the en banc Ninth Circuit held that the INS's blanket detention of children during the pendency of deportation proceedings was unconstitutional. The court said that illegal aliens had due process rights and that the INS had not shown that it had a need to impinge upon those rights in the manner it did. The court further found that the agency's judgment was not entitled to the usual deference accorded to administrative rulings since the interests of minors fell outside the agency's area of expertise. Consequently, the en banc court held that the INS’s policy was unconstitutional, and held in favor of the plaintiffs. Flores ex rel. Galvez-Maldonado v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The federal defendants' petition for certiorari, seeking Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's opinion, was granted on March 2, 1992. Barr v. Flores, 503 U.S. 905 (1992). The Supreme Court examined the language in the uniform deportation-exclusion rule, 8 C.F.R. § 242.24, in order to determine whether the ruling that alien juveniles should be released to responsible adults was correct. The court concluded that it was not. They held that the regulation accorded with both the Constitution and the relevant statute, which the court found gave the U.S. broad discretion to continue custody over arrested aliens. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. The court found that the detained minors, for whom the U.S. was responsible, had no fundamental right to be released to a private party when no parent, close relative, or legal guardian was available, and the regulation therefore did not violate their right to due process. The court further found that the earlier consent decree ensured placement of the juveniles in facilities providing appropriate care, making the regulation sufficient to dispense with individualized hearings on placement. Additionally, the court found that automatic review was not required by the due process clause, as INS procedures provided for a right to have deportability decisions reviewed, in a context where the juveniles were able to exercise that right intelligently. 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (Scalia, J.). After the case returned to the district court, the plaintiffs filed a motion in November 1993 to enforce the earlier consent decree regarding conditions of confinement. They argued that the decree had been violated in several respects, in that: (1) the detained minors were non-delinquent children forced to endure prison-like treatment and restraints on their liberty; (2) the class members were subject to inappropriate disciplinary practices and unofficial physical abuse; (3) the detained class lacked adequate education or reading materials; (4) the class members were also denied any adequate recreation; and (5) the INS did nothing to assist the minors to understand the proceedings against them. The plaintiffs sought an order barring the INS from incarcerating class members in juvenile halls and other facilities not licensed for the care of dependent minors or, alternatively, directing the INS to comply with specific state standards protecting nondelinquent minors, as well as those standards expressly set out in the decree. We do not have information on the resolution of this motion. The Flores Settlement and Its Early Enforcement In the late summer of 1996, the parties executed a comprehensive settlement of the case. Their Settlement Agreement set out nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of minors in the custody of the INS. It superseded all previous INS policies inconsistent with the terms of the agreement, which would expire in 5 years (or earlier, with substantial compliance) and had monitoring, reporting, and enforcement provisions. The Agreement provided for payment to plaintiffs' counsel of $374,110.09 in full settlement of their attorneys' fees and costs claims. The settlement resulted, among other things, in annual compliance reports filed with the court. The case docket shows that in December 2001, Judge Kelleher entered a stipulated order that the Agreement would terminate 45 days after defendants' publication of final regulations implementing the agreement. However, those regulations were never published, and so the Agreement remained in effect. Over time, disputes surfaced. On November 14, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement. Years of discovery disputes and meetings with the court followed, with the parties finally amicably resolving their differences and a withdrawal of the enforcement motion on June 6, 2007. Plaintiffs' 2015 Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement in Response to ICE's No-Release Policy In the summer of 2014, a surge of Central American family migration led to numerous changes in policy by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including its subordinate agencies, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which between them had succeeded INS as the relevant immigration agencies. ICE adopted a blanket policy to detain all female-headed families, including children, in secure facilities for the duration of the proceedings that determined whether they were entitled to remain in the United States. On February 2, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement, arguing that this "no-release" policy violated the Agreement. More specifically, the plaintiffs challenged: (1) ICE's no-release policy, which the plaintiffs argued breached the Agreement's requirements that the U.S. minimize the detention of children and consider releasing class members to available custodians; (2) ICE's practice of confining children in secure, unlicensed facilities, which the plaintiffs argued breached the Agreement’s requirement that the U.S. hold class members that they do not release in facilities that are licensed to care for dependent minors; and (3) ICE's practice of exposing children in Border Patrol custody to "harsh, substandard" conditions and treatment, which the plaintiffs argued breached the Agreement’s requirement that the U.S. provide class members with a minimum level of care even while they await release or transfer to a licensed placement. On February 27, 2015, DHS both opposed the motion to enforce and filed a motion to amend the Agreement, which the plaintiffs opposed. The case had since been assigned to Judge Dolly Gee, and after a hearing in April, Judge Gee decided for the plaintiffs in all respects. 212 F. Supp. 3d 864 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015). Pointing to the Settlement Agreement's text, she rejected the U.S.'s argument that the decree only protected unaccompanied minors (only minors apprehended with a female relative were covered by the challenged policies). She agreed with the plaintiffs that ICE's blanket no-release policy could not be reconciled with the Agreement's grant to class members of a right to preferential release to a parent—even though that meant that ICE would generally need to release the accompanying parent, as well, as long as doing so would not create a flight risk or a safety risk. Judge Gee further found that both the unlicensed and secure status of the family detention facilities were non-compliant with the consent decree. She held that the fact that no state agency existed to license these types of facilities, which housed families rather than just children, did not mean that the licensing requirement in the decree should be disregarded. Rather, the impossibility of licensure cut in favor of release. In addition, Judge Gee explained that the U.S. violated the Agreement when it placed class members in Border Patrol holding cells for a few days, pending their transfer to family facilities: "It is true that the Agreement holds Defendants to a lower standard—'safe and sanitary'—with respect to the temporary holding cells. But Defendants have wholly failed to meet even that minimal standard." Id. at 881. Judge Gee rejected each of the U.S.'s arguments seeking amendment of the Decree based on purported changes in law and fact. These covered much of the same ground as the enforcement motion. Most importantly, the U.S. sought to exclude accompanied minors from the Decree's protections and to eliminate licensure requirements for family detention. The Court declined to amend the Decree. Instead, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause, proposing significant remediation to bring the U.S. into compliance, and requiring full briefing on that proposal by mid-August. On August 21, 2015, the Court rejected the U.S.'s request that the court reconsider the remediation requirements. Judge Gee found that the U.S. had not demonstrated a material change in fact or law meriting a reconsideration. She ordered the U.S. to implement the following changes no later than October 23, 2015: (1) make and record prompt and continuous efforts toward family reunification and the release of class members; (2) unless otherwise required by the Agreement or law release class members without unnecessary delay to parents (including parents apprehended with class members) or other guardians in accordance with the Agreement; (3) refrain from detaining accompanied class members in facilities that were unlicensed or otherwise failed to meet the standards set forth in the Agreement; (4) release accompanying parents of class members in accordance with applicable laws; (5) monitor detention facilities to ensure that they meet the living conditions and other standards required by the Agreement; and (6) provide class counsel with collected statistical information on a monthly basis. 212 F. Supp. 3d 907 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2015). On September 18, 2015, the U.S. appealed Judge Gee's holding that the Agreement applied to all minors in immigration custody, what they perceived to be her order to release the parents of minors, and her denial of their motion to modify the Agreement. On July 6, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the Agreement applied to accompanied minors and its denial of the U.S.'s motion to modify the Agreement. However, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge Gee's holding to the extent that it might create a new duty for the U.S. to release the parents of accompanied minors. 828 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016). The judgment took effect on August 30, 2016. (Judge Gee later responded to the Ninth Circuit's holding by denying that she had intended to create affirmative rights for adults under the consent decree, and had merely intended to state that the U.S. should adhere to existing law and regulations in the Ninth Circuit on the subject of mandatory detention and bond hearings for detainees.) Further proceedings continued in the district court, including a second motion to enforce that the plaintiffs filed on May 19, 2016. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S., in defiance of Judge Gee's summer 2015 holding, was still holding members of the plaintiff class under conditions that violated the terms of the Agreement. They asked the Judge to issue an additional order requiring the U.S. to adhere to the terms of the Agreement, with the intention of making the U.S.'s obligations under the settlement Agreement more clear. They also asked for a special monitor to be appointed to oversee the U.S.'s compliance with the terms of the Agreement. Court Order Mandating Compliance with Bond Hearing Provision of Settlement Agreement During a July 22, 2016 status conference, Judge Gee gave the parties until August 19 to conduct additional settlement negotiations before Judge George H. King, the Chief Judge of the Central District of California. The parties had not reached a settlement by September 15, 2016. Judge Gee heard both oral argument and evidence on several dates that followed. After briefing, on January 20, 2017, Judge Gee issued an order that the defendants were in breach of the Flores Agreement by denying minors in removal proceedings the right to a bond redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge in every case. Judge Gee disagreed with the defendants' argument that the 2002 Homeland Security Act (HSA) and 2008 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) superseded the bond-hearing provision of the Agreement. Rather, Judge Gee agreed with the plaintiffs that savings clauses of these statutes preserved the relevant provision of the Agreement, which provided a right to bond hearings not addressed by the HSA or TVPRA. Consequently, Judge Gee granted the plaintiffs' motion to enforce HHS's compliance with the bond-hearing provision of the Flores Agreement. 392 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2017). On January 30, 2017, the Court held another evidentiary hearing on the plaintiffs' May 19, 2016 motion to enforce the Agreement. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants were not required to place class members in expedited removal proceedings or subject them to "mandatory detention," and that an expedited removal order was not a final order of deportation or exclusion. In the meantime, on January 25, 2017, the defendants filed an application for a stay of the Court's January 20, 2017 order enforcing the bond-hearing provision of the Flores Agreement, pending appeal authorization. Judge Gee denied the stay on February 3, 2017. The defendants filed a notice of appeal on February 17, 2017, and sought an "emergency" stay pending resolution of the appeal from the Ninth Circuit. The defendants argued that by mandating bond hearings for unaccompanied immigrant minors in HHS custody, the district court's order infringed on HHS's statutory directive and implementing guidance, placed extra-statutory burdens on EOIR's Immigration Courts, and conflicted with BIA and Ninth Circuit precedent. The court's motions panel—Judges Clifton, Canby, and Friedland—granted the defendants' motion for a stay on February 24, 2017, expressing no view on the merits, but finding that the defendants had established a sufficient showing of irreparable harm to justify preservation of the status quo rather than immediate implementation of the order. The motions panel set a briefing schedule and calendared the case before a randomly selected panel in April 2017. Oral argument was held on April 18, 2017, before Circuit Judges Marsha Berzon, Stephen Reinhardt, and Wallace Tashima. Back in the District Court, the plaintiffs filed a June 14, 2017 joint request for an order for their May 19, 2016 motion to enforce the Agreement. On June 27, 2017, Judge Gee issued an order, granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion. On the whole, Judge Gee found that the defendants were substantially non-compliant with many aspects of the Agreement. Specifically, the defendants had failed to ensure detainees' access to food, water, sanitation, temperature controls, sleeping conditions, and information about their legal rights. For minors specifically, the defendants had failed to make and record continuous efforts to release minors where possible, and to otherwise place them in secure licensed facilities. Judge Gee wrote: "Defendants entered into the Flores Agreement and now they do not want to perform—but want this Court to bless the breach. That is not how contracts work." 394 F. Supp. 3d 1041. Judge Gee ordered the defendants to propose a Juvenile Coordinator to monitor the Agreement within 30 days. (This obligation had existed in the original Agreement but apparently no such person had ever been appointed.) Judge Gee specified that the Juvenile Coordinator would report periodically to the court, which would again assess the defendants' compliance after a year from the Coordinator's appointment. If progress was still insufficient at that point, the court would then consider the plaintiffs' request for an independent monitor. In late July 2017, the defendants proposed Juvenile Coordinators, which Judge Gee approved on August 24. The Juvenile Coordinators submitted a proposal for how they would bring the Rio Grande Valley Sector CBP Stations into compliance with the Agreement. On October 18, Judge Gee set a schedule for future compliance status reports and the plaintiffs' responses; deciding to hold a June 29, 2018 status conference on whether the defendants were at that time in substantial compliance with the June 27, 2017 order. On July 3, 2017, the Ninth Circuit lifted the stay of the district court's January 20, 2017 order (enforcing the Flores Agreement's provision mandating bond hearings for unaccompanied immigrant minors in HHS custody) pending appeal, effective immediately. The Court followed this with an opinion written by Judge Reinhardt, finding that neither the HSA nor TVPRA statutes had invalidated Paragraph 24A of the Agreement, which provides that a "minor in deportation proceedings shall be afforded a bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge." Judge Reinhardt wrote:
Our reading of the statutes is dictated by the ordinary tenets of statutory construction. By their plain text, neither law explicitly terminates the bond-hearing requirement for unaccompanied minors. Moreover, the statutory framework enacted by the HSA and TVPRA does not grant ORR exclusive and autonomous control over the detention of unaccompanied minors. Rather, the statutes leave ample room for immigration judges to conduct bond hearings for these children. Additionally, holding that the HSA and TVPRA do not deny unaccompanied minors the right to a bond hearing under Paragraph 24A affirms Congress's intent in passing both laws. These statutes sought to protect a uniquely vulnerable population: unaccompanied children. In enacting the HSA and TVPRA, Congress desired to better provide for unaccompanied minors. Depriving these children of their existing right to a bond hearing is incompatible with such an aim.
862 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. July 5, 2017). The defendants did not file a petition for rehearing en banc. The Ninth Circuit's mandate came into effect on Sept. 28, 2017. The plaintiffs requested $448,540 in attorneys' fees in the Ninth Circuit on Nov. 1, 2017. However, on Jan. 9 the parties jointly asked the Court to stay the proceedings and place the matter in mediation; the Court did so on Jan. 16. Back in the district court, on Aug. 28, 2017, the defendants appealed Judge Gee's June 27, 2017 order to enforce the Agreement. The Ninth Circuit opened a new appeals docket (No. 17-56297) the same day. The defendants filed their brief on Jan. 5, 2018. The Ninth Circuit set oral argument for the week of Dec. 10, 2018. On Nov. 14, 2017, Judge Gee ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $1,061,160.80 in attorneys' fees and $3,848.82 in costs and expenses. On Jan. 16, the defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new appeals docket (No. 18-55063) the next day. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Apr. 27 after the parties moved for voluntary dismissal. Plaintiffs' 2018 Motion for Further Enforcement of the Agreement On Apr. 16, 2018, in the district court, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the Agreement, and the defendants then filed an ex parte application seeking relief from the Agreement in the form of (1) exemption from the Agreement’s release provisions so that ICE could detain alien minors who had arrived with their parent or legal guardian together in ICE family residential facilities, and (2) exemption from the Agreement’s state licensure requirement. On July 9, 2018, the court denied such relief, holding that the request was a "thinly veiled motion for reconsideration" and that there was no "showing of changed circumstances that the parties could not have foreseen at the time of their Agreement." 2018 WL 4945000. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which in turn assigned the latest appeal case number, 18-56204. Shortly after, on July 30, the district court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement. The court held that the plaintiffs sought procedural remedies not available in the Agreement but that they were "entitled to only such relief as is explicitly or implicitly authorized" in the Agreement. Ultimately, the court held that it had the authority to determine if the defendants had breached the Agreement. Accordingly, the court ordered the defendants to (1) transfer class members out of the Shiloh Treatment Center if they posed a risk of harm, (2) abandon unnecessary security measures at Shiloh and allow class members to make private phone calls, (3) provide notice of reasons for placement in secured facility, (4) take out of secured facilities class members who did not meet certain conditions, (5) comply with all Texas child welfare laws, (6) stop requiring ORR approval prior to release, and (7) stop requiring post-release services be in place prior to the release. 2018 WL 10162328. Once again, the defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which assigned the appeal case number 18-56286. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Mar. 22, 2019, after the defendants moved for voluntary dismissal. On Oct. 10, 2018, the plaintiffs cross-appealed the July 30th decision to the Ninth Circuit to the extent that it denied the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement; the Ninth Circuit assigned the cross-appeal case number 18-56335. However, the Ninth Circuit later closed the docket on Apr. 1, 2019, after the plaintiffs moved for voluntary dismissal. Due to the ongoing issues of non-compliance with the Agreement, Judge Gee also found it necessary to appoint an Independent Monitor to ensure compliance with the June 27, 2017, and July 30, 2018 orders (as well as other orders issued during the history of the case). On Oct. 5, 2018, the court appointed Andrea Sheridan Ordin as the Special Master/Independent Monitor ("the Monitor") of the Agreement. However, on Oct. 12 the defendants requested reconsideration of the appointment; the defendants were concerned that the order expanded the scope of the Monitor's oversight to include ORR's compliance with the July 30 order, which had found ORR in partial breach of the Agreement. On Nov. 5, the court denied the defendants' motion for reconsideration. On Nov. 2, 2018, the plaintiffs gave notice that they would be filing another motion to enforce the Agreement, seeking a classwide order declaring the defendants in anticipatory breach of the Agreement, and enjoining the defendants from implementing a new regulation that they proposed on Sept. 7, 2018. That regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 45486, sought to create a federal alternative to the Agreement's requirement that facilities be state-licensed, which would allow DHS to detain families together until immigration proceedings were completed. Where state licensing was unavailable, a family detention would still be considered "licensed" if DHS hired a third party to ensure compliance with ICE-established standards for family residential centers. The defendants claimed that these regulations would implement the Flores Agreement and thereby trigger the termination of the Agreement 45 days after publication, per the 2001 stipulation in the case. On Nov. 21, Judge Gee deferred ruling on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the Agreement until the defendants published the final regulations, finding that the plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm in the absence of injunctive relief because their motion prompted the defendants to affirm that they would not immediately implement the final rule. Once the final regulations were issued, both parties would file briefs with the court addressing the question of whether the regulations were consistent with the terms of the Flores Agreement. Back on Nov. 13, the Ninth Circuit consolidated two of the defendants' appeals (17-56297 and 18-56204). Then, on Dec. 4, 2018, the defendants appealed the district court's Oct. 5 and Nov. 5 orders (relating to the appointment of the Monitor and the denial of the defendants' motion for reconsideration of the appointment, respectively). The Ninth Circuit assigned the appeal case number 18-56596. This appeal was voluntarily dismissed upon the motion of the government on May 22, 2019. Plaintiffs' 2019 Motion to Enforce and Application for TRO in Response to Poor Conditions of Confinement On June 26, 2019, plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO), alleging violations of the settlement agreement. The TRO demanded that the government remedy conditions amounting to a “public health emergency” at its El Paso and Rio Grande Valley CBP facilities. The District Court granted the TRO, ordering the government to immediately permit medical professionals and intensive case management teams access to the affected facilities and class members held therein. The following day the government filed its response, and on June 28, the District Court ordered the parties to participate in expedited mediation before the Monitor to remedy the conditions at issue. This matter remains subject to ongoing mediation. The same day, the plaintiffs also filed a Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement. The motion alleged that the minors’ confinement at an unlicensed detention center in Homestead, Florida violated provisions of the settlement agreement. According to the plaintiffs, this practice resulted in the government routinely failing to, “expeditiously transfer minors to licensed[, non-secure] facilities,” regulated by child welfare and foster care authorities. Detention at Homestead purportedly resulted in detained children being held for periods of up to several months in prison-like conditions. Through this motion, the plaintiffs requested that the District Court order class members to be transferred to a licensed detention center within 14 days of arrival at the Homestead facility or released to a sponsor. On Aug. 2, 2019, the government responded by contending that the facility was not a “secure” juvenile detention facility per the terms of the agreement. The government argued that it was under no obligation to expeditiously transfer detained children to licensed facilities to conform to the terms of the settlement agreement. On Aug. 15, 2019, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the defendants’ consolidated appeal (17-56297). In a panel decision authored by Judge Berzon, the Court held that the issues raised by the government were beyond its jurisdiction. The Court noted that the terms of the settlement agreement limited the scope of the Ninth Circuit’s review to modifications of the agreement. Flores v. Barr, 934 F.3d 910, 914 (9th Cir. 2019). Here, the Court held, the orders of the District Court properly enforced the terms of the agreement and did not alter its content. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s order requiring that the government provide specific hygiene and sleeping arrangements was an interpretation of the agreement’s demand that minors be held in “safe and sanitary” conditions. Id. at 912. Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the District Court’s order that the government make and record efforts aimed at releasing class members subject to expedited removal was consistent with the INA and the Ninth Circuit’s prior interpretation that the Flores Settlement, “creates a presumption in favor of releasing minors.” Id. Last, the Ninth Circuit considered the District Court’s order that the detaining of minors in secure, unlicensed family detention centers was prohibited under the agreement. The Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s complaint as to this order, holding that the government failed to challenge the order until after its appeal had already been submitted. Id. at 914. Plaintiffs' Motion to Enforce in Response to the Government's Final Rule and Notice of Termination of Settlement Agreement On Aug. 23, 2019, the government issued a final rule in the Federal Register relating to the “Apprehension, Processing, Care, and Custody of Alien Minors and Unaccompanied Alien Children,” which purported to constitute final regulations implementing the Flores Settlement. On Aug. 30 the government filed a notice of termination of the Agreement and a motion to the same effect. According to the government, the final rule satisfied the government’s obligation to publish regulations implementing the provisions of the settlement agreement. The government claimed that the final rule sufficiently addressed the “main substantive provisions of the Agreement” as to conditions of confinement and procedural rights owed to detained minors. The same day, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion to enforce in response to the government’s issuance of the final rule. According to the plaintiffs, the final rule was in violation of the agreement’s mandate that, “[t]he final regulations shall not be inconsistent with the terms of th[e] Agreement.” They claimed that the rule: (1) permitted, “DHS to detain accompanied class members indefinitely;” (2) allowed, “DHS to detain children in secure facilities having no state license to house children;” (3) stripped, “children of their right to neutral and detached review of decisions of the Office of Refugee Resettlement […] to detain them in lieu of release to their parents and other available custodians;” and (4) replaced, “the Settlement’s mandatory and enforceable provisions with aspirational declarations of dubious force and effect.” The plaintiffs requested that the District Court order the defendants’ continued adherence with the Flores Settlement. On Sept. 27, 2019, the District Court issued a permanent injunction denying the government’s motion to terminate the Settlement and enjoining its implementation of the new regulations. According to the Court, the final rule did not have the effect of terminating the agreement and the government had not established a valid alternative reason to terminate. Flores v. Barr, 407 F. Supp. 3d 909 (C.D. Cal.). The District Court’s finding was based on various provisions of the final rule that were held not to conform to the Flores Agreement. These breaches concerned the fact that the final rule did not comport with the settlement agreement as to both its standards regarding acceptable conditions of confinement and its provisions ensuring appropriate oversight over the detention of minors. Further, the final rule failed to provide mandatory protections stipulated under the agreement and to follow criteria for determining when detention should be imposed on minors. Hence, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion to enforce insofar as it sought to ensure the Flores Settlement would remain in effect. On November 14, 2019, the government appealed the District Court’s permanent injunction to the Ninth Circuit. In its opening brief, the government argued that the district court failed to consider "dramatically changed circumstances," "including the promulgation of comprehensive new rules that the parties themselves envisioned as terminating the Agreement, statutes implementing much of the Agreement over a decade ago, and a crisis of irregular migration by families and children." Moreover, the government argued that the district court focused too heavily on the "outdated" decree and its history of compliance, rather than "evaluating the agencies chosen solutions" and the equities of the final rule going forward. The plaintiffs maintained that the district court did not abuse its discretion and that "the new regulations are inconsistent with the agreement and fail to trigger the agreement's sunset clause." The court vacated the scheduled oral argument in April due to the outbreak of COVID-19 and it has yet to be rescheduled. COVID-19 Proceedings On March 26, 2020, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO) due to the nationwide outbreak of COVID-19. They sought an order to "promptly release children to available custodians, or if they are not entitled to release under Paragraph 14, to transfer them to non-congregate settings, or justify why it has done neither." The plaintiffs argued that COVID-19 threatened children and the unprecedented social distancing measures being enforced to combat the transmission of COVID-19 "are all but impossible for children held in congregate detention." The plaintiffs asserted that a TRO was appropriate because continued detention despite the risk posed by COVID-19 violated the plaintiffs' rights to prompt release and safe and sanitary conditions of confinement under the settlement agreement. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that "increased risk of exposure to a deadly virus by virtue of placement in congregate detention facility for children who are neither flight risks nor a danger represents a paradigmatic example of imminent irreparable harm." The next day the government filed its opposition to the application for TRO, arguing that the TRO should not be granted because the plaintiffs had not established that there had been any violations of the agreement, that the requested relief would "increase the risk of harm to class members in ICE and ORR custody by eliminating existing protections and creating confusion," and because "Plaintiffs’ proposed order would also have the Court order extensive procedural and coercive relief that is found nowhere within the four corners of the Agreement." On the same day, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' TRO application. Judge Gee declined to order an immediate release of all class members but concluded that "an orderly, yet prompt, disposition of minors’ claims of suitable placement is a responsible way to proceed." Judge Gee ordered that the government, by April 10, 2020, show cause why a permanent injunction should not issue requiring the government to make and record efforts to release class members and "enjoining Defendants from keeping minors who have suitable custodians in congregate custody." Moreover, Judge Gee ordered that ORR and ICE facilities make themselves available for inspection and provide an accounting of their efforts to release those in custody by April 6. Judge Gee found that plaintiffs demonstrated "serious questions as to the merits of their claim that ICE has breached the FSA with regard to the provision of safe and sanitary conditions and appropriate medical care and living accommodations in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak." Judge Gee also concluded that plaintiffs "have a strong likelihood of succeeding on their claim that both ICE and ORR have breached the FSA in their failure to release minors to suitable custodians in a prompt manner and to record their continuous efforts towards minors’ release." On April 6, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for TRO, which acted as a show of cause as to why preliminary injunction should not be issued. The defendants asserted that a preliminary injunction should not be issued because the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of demonstrating that defendants had violated the Flores Agreement. Furthermore, the defendants contended that a preliminary injunction would hold the defendants to a requirement not found in the Flores Agreement, "that any ‘unexplained delay in releasing a child in ORR and ICE custody. violates [] Paragraphs 14 and 18 of the FSA.’” In their reply to the defendants' opposition, the plaintiffs argued that requiring the defendants to share the efforts towards prompt and continuous release does not modify the terms of the Agreement. Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because preliminary reports indicated that the TRO resulted in defendants releasing children without unnecessary delay. In accordance with the TRO, defendants submitted spreadsheets with information about the class members, containing detail about each minor's circumstances and "detailed summaries of efforts to release the minors and reasons why the minors remained in custody." Defendants also submitted video tours of selected facilities and reports about steps taken and areas of improvement with regards to compliance with COVID-19 guidance. From this data, plaintiffs identified "several issues that may result in unnecessary delay of minors’ release in violation of the FSA." Plaintiffs also argued that ICE had not sufficiently implemented protective measures against COVID-19 and requested a preliminary injunction ordering defendants to "abide by the FSA and to continue to require, as an interim measure, that the agencies provide summaries of efforts towards family reunification or release of minors to the Monitor and Class Counsel." In light of the materials submitted by the defendants and the questions raised by the plaintiffs, on April 10 Judge Gee issued an order extending the TRO by 14 days and required the defendants, by April 24, to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not be issued. Moreover, Judge Gee granted the defendants request to file a second supplemental response to plaintiffs' concerns about conditions at the facilities and their questions "regarding whether certain of their policies have caused unnecessary delay in the release of Class Members in violation of Paragraphs 14 and 18 of the FSA. Judge Gee ordered that defendants' second supplemental response be filed by April 17 and that Plaintiffs may file their reply by April 22. After monthlong briefing, on April 24, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' request for enforcement of the FSA. 2020 WL 2758792. Judge Gee ordered defendants to "continue to make every effort to promptly and safely release Class members who have suitable custodians." Judge Gee also found that because the COVID-19 pandemic made fingerprint checks difficult to obtain, defendants' requirement of a fingerprint-based check violated the FSA. Judge Gee also ordered that ORR and ICE Juvenile Coordinators submit monthly reports documenting their compliance with the court's order. Following this order, ICE and ORR coordinators filed interim reports on May 15. Plaintiffs filed responses to each report, identifying deficiencies and raising concerns about defendants' compliance with the FSA, CDC guidance, and court orders. On May 22, Judge Gee issued an order about the updated juvenile coordinator reports, highlighting deficiencies with defendants' compliance. 2020 WL 2758795. Judge Gee stated that "[c]ontrary to the April 24, 2020 Order, ORR has not provisionally released any minors whose vetted sponsor are unable to obtain fingerprints due to pandemic-related closures." Judge Gee ordered the provisional release of one minor whose release has been delayed due to fingerprinting. Judge Gee also found that ICE's report "continues to show lack of compliance with Paragraph 18 of the FSA, which requires Defendants to 'make and record the prompt and continuous efforts on its part toward family reunification and the release of the minor." Finally, Judge Gee expressed concern with the implementation of public health guidances at the FRCs. The order required defendants to file updated reports by June 8 and the parties to confer regarding appropriate protocols to inform detained guardians about their children’s rights under the FSA. The defendants appealed the April 24 order to the Ninth Circuit on June 23. On June 25, ALDEA - The People’s Justice Center, Proyecto Dilley, and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs, arguing that the court's intervention is needed as ICE continues to violate the FSA and the April 24 and May 22 orders. A status conference was held on June 26. The court recognized that while there was progress made from the defendant's side, there was an increase of COVID-19 cases in their facilities and there are potential issues of non-compliance raised by the plaintiffs, the amicus brief, and the independent monitor. Therefore, the ICE was ordered to transfer the class members who have resided at the FRCs for more than 20 days to non-congregate settings by July 17 and to urgently enforce its existing COVID-19 protocols. Further, the parties were directed to file a joint status report regarding the outcome of their efforts to meet and confer. On July 8, the parties submitted a joint status report, the defendants objected to the court's prohibition on the transfer of minors in ICE juvenile detention to adult facilities when they age out of juvenile detention, and stated their intent to bring a motion asking the court to lift this prohibition. The plaintiffs stated their intent to oppose such motions, arguing that the health situation at the Northwest ICE Processing Center where the remaining two minors would likely be transferred, is described as a “tinderbox” where COVID will spread rapidly to detainees. The other minor plaintiff was to be released. On July 20, three Flores Class Members who were detained by ICE together with their parents sought to intervene. The defendants opposed, arguing that they are already represented by class counsel in this matter. On July 21, the defendants appealed the May 22 order to the Ninth Circuit. The monitor's July 22 Report on the Use of Temporary Housing for Minors and Families under Title 42 noted that the temporary housing program has been transformed by the Title 42 expulsion policies into an integral component of the immigration detention system for UACs in U.S. custody. The monitor recommended the expulsion of all UACs, particularly those below the age of 15 years, from the current temporary housing program, as the temporary housing program was not constructed to serve as a major detention system to care for large numbers of young children for protracted periods of time and it a COVID-19 outbreak is also likely. The defendants sought to stay the case pending a decision on the motion to intervene on July 23, which was denied two days later. On July 29, the court denied the intervention. On August 6, the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services (RAICES), Proyecto Dilley, and Aldea - the People’s Justice Center filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. They claimed that the ICE continues to fail to conduct individualized custody determinations or make and record continuous efforts at prompt release, and that COVID-19 outbreaks continue to grow at Karnes and Dilley because of this failure. The plaintiffs filed two motions to enforce the settlement on August 14. The plaintiffs argued that the current administration substantially restricted its asylum policies and the defendants are no longer in compliance with the FSA because ICE fails to provide advisals to parents regarding their children’s release rights or to adopt release procedures. The plaintiffs requested the court order ICE adopt advisals of rights and procedures to release class members. The plaintiffs also argued that ICE's history of failing to comply with the FSA warrants a finding of contempt. In the second motion, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants were placing children in hotels and unlicensed placements for weeks at time before expelling them pursuant to the COVID-19 border closure. The settlement agreement required that children must be placed in non-secure facilities licensed to care for dependent minors. The defendants appealed the June 26 order to the Ninth Circuit on August 24. On August 28, Aldea The People's Justice Center, Proyecto Dilley, and The Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs. Three days later, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International USA sought to file amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement regarding ICE’s placing of children in hotels and unlicensed facilities on September 4. 2020 WL 5491445. The other motion to enforce the settlement filed on August 14 remained pending. Judge Gee ordered the defendants to cease placing minors at hotels and to transfer all minors currently held in hotels to licensed facilities. The defendants appealed the order, and moved for a temporary administrative stay and a stay pending appeal. The administrative stay was granted by the Ninth Circuit on September 13, however, the stay of the order was denied on September 16, reasoning that the district court is familiar with the detention conditions of immigrant children in facilities administered by the DHS and HHS, and therefore the defendants should first bring their request for a stay to the district court. The same day, the defendants moved to stay September 4 order the pending appeal, which the district court denied on September 21. 2020 WL 5666550. The district court ordered the September 4th Order to be effective as of September 28. On September 28, DHS was to cease placing minors at hotels. However, they were permitted to implement brief hotel stays as necessary and in good faith for not more than 72 hours. Again, the defendants renewed their emergency motion for a temporary administrative stay and a stay pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit granted a temporary administrative stay, but then denied the emergency motion for a stay on October 4. 977 F.3d 742. The defendants appealed the denial of the stay to the Ninth Circuit on October 15. On September 18, Judge Gee granted in part the plaintiffs’ other motion to enforce the settlement agreement regarding the defendants’ failure to provide advisals of rights to class members and their parents. Judge Gee ordered ICE to disseminate a notice of rights as revised by the court and to issue an updated policy or instruction regarding the settlement to its employees. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to the extent it sought to provide a specific release protocol to ICE employees or release decision worksheet to class members and parents. The plaintiffs, defendants, and amicus parties (Aldea, The People’s Justice Center, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Proyecto Dilley, RAICES) each filed comments on the proposed procedures and advisal notice. The court made revisions to the draft notice of rights and the ICE directive to employees. The parties are to attempt to finalize the documents and file a joint status report by November 30, 2020. On October 16, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to terminate a transfer restriction contained in the June 26 order which prohibited ICE from transferring into an adult detention facility, a minor who ages out of an ICE juvenile detention facility. More coming soon.

Summary: This longstanding matter concerns the detention of foreign minors apprehended by immigration authorities. It was filed in the 1980s and settled in 2001. In 2015, C.D. Cal. found that DHS's 2014 family detention policy violated the 2001 settlement, and entered an order to show cause requiring substantial remediation. In 2016, the 9th Cir. largely denied an appeal by the U.S. against C.D. Cal's ruling in favor of plaintiffs. C.D. Cal. continues to order the defendants to comply with the settlement agreement, and defendants continue to appeal these rulings. In September 2019, the district court issued a permanent injunction and the government appealed to the Ninth Circuit in November; the appeal is pending. In March 2020, in response to the outbreak of COVID-19, the district court issued an order for the government to promptly dispose of the class members' claims for release to outside sponsors and for the inspection of government facilities to ensure compliance with public health guidelines. The Court issued further orders in April and May of 2020 requiring defendants to comply with the settlement agreement and expressing concern with their compliance. The plaintiffs again sought to enforce the settlement on August 14, which was granted on September 4. The case is ongoing.


On September 29, 2014, the surviving widow of a same-sex marriage filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the Social Security Administration (SSA). The plaintiff, represented by the Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, asked the court to declare that several SSA regulations were invalid and contrary to the governing Social Security statutes, affirm that the plaintiff met the marriage requirements, declare that a person previously married to someone of the same sex met the marriage requirements for Social Security Survivor benefits, so long as the courts of the state the individual resided in would find that the marriage valid, declare that the plaintiffs marriage would have been recognized by Rhode Island, enjoin the defendant to process the plaintiff's application for widow's and lump sum death benefits, and to award the plaintiffs any attorney's fees or costs of suit. At the time of her wife's death, the plaintiff had been in a same-sex marriage that was formalized in Massachusetts. The plaintiff claimed that on January 17, 2012, the SSA informed her that her marriage did not meet the marriage requirements, and denied her application for benefits. The SSA decision was partially due to the reasoning that the plaintiff's marriage was never a valid marriage under Rhode Island State law. The plaintiff alleged that the SSA violated the rights guaranteed to her by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution by discriminating on the basis of sex and refusing to recognize same-sex marriages that occurred out-of-state. She further claimed that though Rhode Island had not legalized same-sex marriage, it still recognized marriages validly performed in other states. According to a press release by GLAD, the plaintiff received $30,000 in back benefits from SSA as a part of a private settlement on December 1, 2014. On December 15, 2014, the plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal with the court.

Summary: On September 29, 2014, the surviving widow of a same-sex marriage filed a lawsuit in the District of Rhode Island, U.S. District Court, against the Social Security Administration (SSA). The plaintiff asked the court to affirm that the she met the marriage requirements, declare that a person previously married to someone of the same sex meets the SSA marriage requirements (so long as the courts of the state the individual resides in would find that the marriage valid), declare that the plaintiffs marriage would have been recognized by Rhode Island, enjoin the defendant to process the plaintiff's application for widow's and lump sum death benefits, and to award the plaintiffs any attorney's fees or costs of suit. In a private settlement in December 2014, the plaintiff received back benefits from SSA.


The Detroit District Office of the EEOC brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, against Victory Lane. The complaint, filed in May 2004, alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; specifically that Defendant subjected the charging party to a sexually hostile work environment. The parties entered into a consent decree in January 2005. The decree, valid for two years, required Defendant to pay the charging party a total of $7,500 and provide Title VII training to its managers and supervisors. Defendant was enjoined from discriminating or retaliating in violation of Title VII and required to post a notice of non-discrimination at its facility. The decree was entered in 2005 and scheduled to last 2007. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: The Detroit District Office of the EEOC brought this action in 2004 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Victory Lane, alleging sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The parties entered into a consent decree in 2005, which provided for monetary and injunctive relief.


On August 18, 2014, an individual who had been ordered to refrain from standing for more than five seconds on public sidewalks in the City of Ferguson or face arrest, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The suit was filed against the County of St. Louis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought injunctive and declaratory relief, in addition to nominal damages and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff's claims arose from allegations that the County of St. Louis, and various law enforcement agencies involved in the protests arising from the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, instituted a policy of prohibiting individuals from standing on public sidewalks for more than five seconds under threat of arrest in violation of the First Amendment and Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On October 6, 2014, the District Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff on the basis that the defendant's policy of requiring peaceful protestors to walk, rather than stand still, violates the Constitution and that defendant would likely continue to apply the policy without such an injunction. 52 F.Supp.3d 936. Specifically, the preliminary injunction barred defendants from enforcing or threatening to enforce a policy or practice of arresting individuals who are peaceably standing or assembling on the public sidewalks and otherwise complying with all laws. On November 4, 2014, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint with the defendants' consent, adding three additional plaintiffs and the City of Ferguson as a defendant. On December 22, 2014, upon the joint motion of the parties, Judge Perry entered an order permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing or threatening to enforce any rule, policy, or practice granting law enforcement officers the authority to arrest, threaten to arrest, or order to move individuals violating no statute, ordinance, or regulation and who are peaceably standing, marching, or assembling on public sidewalks in Ferguson. Judge Perry awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs in the amount of $153,767 on September 24, 2015. 2015 WL 5638064. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 18, 2014, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the County of St. Louis and associated law enforcement agencies. The suit alleged that the law enforcement agencies' policy of prohibiting protesters from standing still in the wake of the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri violates the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. On October 6, 2014, the District Court (Judge Catherine D. Perry) issued a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs finding that such policy violates the Constitution and barring defendants from threatening to arrest individuals otherwise complying with the law while standing still on public sidewalks. Upon the joint motion of the parties, the court entered a permanent injunction on December 22, 2014. The case is now closed.


On August 4, 2010, Communities Actively Living Independent and Free (CALIF) and a few individuals with mobility disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the city unlawfully failed to properly install accessible pedestrian rights of way, including curb ramps, sidewalks, crosswalks, and pedestrian crossings. The complaint asserted two federal claims under the American with Disabilities Act (the ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and four state law claims. Represented by private counsels, the plaintiffs sought declarations, preliminary and permanent injunctions and damages relief. On December 10, 2010, the court (Judge Consuelo Marshall) dismissed plaintiff's the state law claims without prejudice and the plaintiffs commenced a state court action against the City following this Court’s dismissal. On January 3, 2011, Judge Consuelo Marshall granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification for injunctive and declaratory relief only, and appointed class counsel. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment and on February 25, 2013, the Court granted the motion but denied without prejudice any request to preclude evidence that may be used for multiple purposes. In the mean time, plaintiff and the City undertook extensive discovery and engaged in extensive discovery as well as numerous discussions regarding settlement of the claims. On January 8th, 2016, the plaintiff motioned for approval of settlement and certification of settlement class. On February 29, 2016, the court certified the settlement class and granted preliminary approval. On August 25th, the court granted the approval of the final settlement agreement and found that it is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the best interests of the Settlement Class as a whole. In the settlement Agreement, the city agreed to expend a total of $1,367,142,684 during the compliance period for program access improvement. The agreement laid out specific amount of funding for every five years that the city must spend for the next thirty years. Both parties agreed all program access improvements and new construction in the city will comply with the standards set forth in the 2010 standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act. In accordance with the settlement agreement, the court reserves exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the plaintiffs, the settlement class members, and the City, throughout the term of the settlement agreement, for the sole purpose of supervising the implementation, enforcement, construction, and interpretation of the settlement agreement. Following the approval of the settlement agreement, the court entered the final judgment of this case, releasing all plaintiffs' claims against the City. On August 25th, the court also granted plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees and costs. Through calculation and evidence submitted, the court awarded $10,269,745.07 in attorneys’ fees and $1,533,751.77 in costs to the plaintiffs.

Summary: On August 4, 2010, Communities Actively Living Independent and Free (CALIF) and individuals with mobility disabilities filed a class action lawsuit against City of Los Angeles in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the City unlawfully failed to properly install and maintain accessible pedestrian rights of way. On August 25th, 2016, the court granted the final approval of the settlement between the parties. The settlement requires the City to expend a total of $1,367,142,684 to implement an access improvement program during the compliance period.


In February 2002, the EEOC's Baltimore District Office filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against L.A. Weight Loss, a company that at the time operated over 400 "weight loss centers" nationwide. The complaint alleged a "pattern or practice" of failing to hire men, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC also alleged that L.A. Weight Loss fired a female employee in retaliation when she complained about the company's hiring practices. Shortly after the suit was filed, the discharged female employee intervened as a plaintiff. In November of 2005, she and the defendant came to terms on a settlement. The EEOC's case continued on, despite repeated settlement conferences before Magistrate Judge Paul W. Grimm. In 2007, the parties both moved for summary judgment; the defendant's motion was denied, and the EEOC's motion was granted in part and denied in part. In early 2007, LA Weight Loss changed its name to Pure Weight Loss. In January of 2008, Pure Weight Loss filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy. On March 19, 2008, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to stay the proceedings for six months. Judge William D Quarles, Jr denied the motion to stay proceedings on May 20, 2008. The parties negotiated a consent decree, which Judge William D Quarles, Jr. approved on December 1, 2008. According to the EEOC website, the consent decree included a $20 million claim in bankruptcy (16,842,656 in back pay and $3,157,344 in punitive damages) payable to the men who the EEOC deemed were subjected to discrimination from L.A. Weight Loss's illegal hiring practices from January 1, 1997 through the entry of the decree. The consent decree also included injunctive relief. It prohibited the company from discriminating against job applicants and employees on the basis of sex and from retaliating against employees. It required the company to use an electronic tracking system for applicants, to retain information on applicants based on categories defined by the EEOC, and to create a discrimination-complaint procedure. The decree provided relief for the men discriminated against under the old practices by requiring the company to hire some of them. Lastly, the decree set hiring goals for Pure Weight Loss and mandated that the company do quarterly reviews to assess its progress. This 10-year consent degree expired in 2018 without any motions to enforce noncompliance. The case is closed.

Summary: In February 2002, the EEOC's Baltimore District Office filed suit in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against LA Weight Loss. The EEOC alleged that LA Weight Loss violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act through a "pattern or practice" of failing to hire men and for firing a female employee in retaliation when the employee complained of these hiring practices. On December 1, 2008 Judge William Quarles, Jr. approved the parties consent decree. The 10-year decree expired in 2018.


Plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against the Defendant-lender on April 25, 2006, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging that the Defendant-bank had an unwritten policy of not lending in predominantly minority areas of Detroit. Plaintiffs' suit included claims under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3619, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. 1691, and federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982. On October 27, 2006, the Court (Judge Nancy G. Edmunds) granted the Defendant's motions to dismiss some of the claims under the FHA and ECOA as time-barred. JAT, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank of the Midwest, 460 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Mich. 2006). Judge Edmunds rejected other defense motions at this stage, finding that Defendant's substantive defenses were more appropriate at the summary judgment stage. On July 9, 2007, Judge Edmunds denied Plaintiffs' motion for class action certification. JAT, Inc. v. Nat'l City Bank of the Midwest, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49198 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007). After extensive discovery proceedings, the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on June 10, 2008, holding that the Plaintiffs did not have enough factual support to proceed with their claim. 2008 WL 2397657 (E.D. Mich. June 10, 2008). The Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, they withdrew their appeal and the case was dismissed on December 19, 2008.

Summary: This Fair Housing Act lawsuit was filed on April 25, 2006 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against a branch of a national bank. The Plaintiffs, representing a class of minorities in Detroit, claimed that the Defendant had an unwritten policy of not lending in predominantly minority areas of Detroit. The court denied class certification and after extensive discovery, the granted summary judgment for the Defendants on June 10, 2008, holding that the Plaintiffs did not have enough factual support to proceed with their claim. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, they withdrew their appeal, and the case was dismissed, on December 19, 2008.


On September 30, 2004, former and current employees of FleetBoston Financial Corporation filed a lawsuit under ERISA against FleetBoston in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney fees and costs. Plaintiffs claimed that they were negatively impacted when FleetBoston changed its Pension Plan to one based on a cash balance formula. The Court (Judge Janet C. Hall) granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion to dismiss on March 31, 2006. The Court dismissed Counts II, III, and VI in their entirety. It further granted the motion to dismiss as to all claims pursuant to ERISA § 503(a)(1)(B). However, the Court denied the motion to dismiss as to the remaining claims in Counts I, IV, and V. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 427 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Conn. 2006). Also on March 31, 2006, the Court certified Plaintiffs' class under 23(b)(2). The class was defined as follows: people who "(a) are former or current Fleet employees who on December 31, 1996 [the day before the Amended Plan's effective date] were not at least age 50 with 15 years of vesting service, and (b) participated in the Fleet Pension Plan before January 1, 1997, and (c) have participated in the Fleet Pension Plan at any time since January 1, 1997." Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 235 F.R.D. 165 (D. Conn. 2006). On July 24, 2006, the Court granted Defendant's second motion to dismiss with respect to Count II and the part of Count V premised on the Summary Plan Description's (SPD) lack of an explanation of how benefit accruals under the plan are reduced by advancing age. The Court denied the motion with respect to the remaining parts of Count V. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 2092086 (D. Conn. Jul. 24, 2006). On October 16, 2006, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for amended class certification and certified the proposed class pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(1)(A). Further, the Court denied Defendant's motion to certify the SPD class (Count IV) under Rule 23(b)(2). Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 238 F.R.D. 345 (D. Conn. 2006). Also on October 16, 2006, the Court denied Defendant's motions for a certificate of appealability or for reconsideration of the decision in which the Court refused to dismiss Count I of the Complaint. The Court found that an interlocutory appeal was not appropriate because it would not help to avoid protracted litigation, nor was this an exceptional or rare circumstance. The Court denied the motion to reconsider because it found that the statutory language in question was unambiguous. Richards v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., 2006 WL 3000768 (D. Conn. Oct. 16, 2006). The Court preliminarily approved the class settlement between the parties on April 24, 2008. Including attorneys' fees and incentives for class representatives, the total monetary payment to the class totaled $83,401,000. On October 15, 2008, the Court granted final approval to the settlement and dismissed the case. By a separate order on the same day, the Court granted Plaintiffs' attorneys about $17.5 million in fees and costs. The Court also granted $15,000 to the class representative. The case was closed in October 2008. There was some later litigation related to bonding issues, but the case is now complete.

Summary: This case was brought by current and former employees of FleetBoston Financial Corporation alleging violations of ERISA as a result of FleetBoston changing to a cash balance formula for determining pension benefits. The case was settled in October 2008, resulting in a payment of more than $80 million for the benefit of the class.


On November 15, 2017, the National Women’s Law Center and the Labor Counsel for Latin American Advancement filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Tanya S. Chutkan. The plaintiffs sued the federal Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the Administrator for the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) (a division of the Office of Management and Budget), and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), under the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and an order from the court vacating an order issued by OIRA that stayed planned revisions to employer demographic reporting obligations. Because a pay gap persisted—between both men and women and between white, non-Hispanic men, and people of color—the EEOC and other federal agencies sought to improve enforcement of federal laws prohibiting pay discrimination. After a multi-year study, the EEOC concluded that it would revise a longstanding employer survey, the Employer Information Report EEO-1, to require that employers include W-2 earnings data for employees by sex, race, ethnicity, and job category. Beginning in February 2016, the revisions to EEO-1 went through a seven-month process of notice and comment, public hearings, and changes to reduce employer burdens. The final revisions to the EEO-1 were sent to OMB in September 2016, and OMB approved the changes. However, in August 2017, after President Trump took office, the new Administrator of OIRA issued a short memorandum that immediately stayed the revisions to the EEO-1. The memorandum provided virtually no explanation, citing the Paperwork Reduction Act to justify its actions. The decision to issue this memorandum was made in secret and without notice and comment. Following the decision, the EEOC published a Federal Register notice stating that EEO-1 filers should not submit pay data in their filings. The plaintiffs claimed that the agencies lacked the authority to stay a collection of data required by the agency rule governing the EEO-1 and, thus, that the stay was unlawful. Specifically, the plaintiffs made the following claims that the agencies had violated the Administrative Procedures Act:

Because OMB did not have authority to stay an ongoing collection of information that had already been approved and that was required by regulation, the agencies acted in a manner that was in excess of their legal authority and had thus violated the Administrative Procedures Act.
Alternatively, because the agencies had reviewed a previously approved collection of information without meeting the requirements under the Code of Federal Regulations, the agencies acted in a manner contrary to law in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.
The memorandum staying the effectiveness of EEO-1 cited to the Paperwork Reduction Act, a law that established a process by which federal agencies obtain approval from OMB to collect certain types of information from the public, as a justification, but this law specifically states that it does not increase OMB’s authority over substantive agency policies. Thus, because the agencies wrongfully used the Paperwork Reduction Act to justify their actions, they violated the Paperwork Reduction Act and, in turn, the Administrative Procedures Act.
Because the agencies did not provide a reasoned basis for their decision to review and stay the effectiveness of EEO-1, they acted in a manner that was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.
With regard to the EEOC, it acceded to OMB’s unlawful actions and thus violated the Administrative Procedures Act.
In February 2018, the agencies moved to dismiss the case. In October 2018, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. In December 2018, the agencies moved for summary judgment. The court ruled on all motions on March 4, 2019. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement and denied the agencies’ motions. The court found that the agencies’ stay of pay data collection violated the Paperwork Reduction Act and the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the agencies’ actions were arbitrary and capricious. The court vacated OMB’s stay and the EEOC’s announcement of the stay and reinstated the revised EEO-1. 358 F.Supp.3d 66. On March 18, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a request for a status conference; the conference was held on March 19, 2019. The plaintiffs claimed that the agencies had delayed complying with the court’s order and were unwilling to provide information about their plans to comply. The parties continued to litigate over the enforcement of the court’s order, with multiple third parties submitting amici briefs. A hearing was held on April 16, 2019. On April 25, 2019, the court issued an order granting declaratory and injunctive relief, requiring, among other things, that the EEOC “collect EEO-1 Component 2 pay data for calendar years 2017 and 2018” by September 30, 2019. On May 3, 2019, the agencies appealed this order, as well as the order on summary judgment and order on motion to dismiss (D.C. Circuit docket #19-5130). While the appeal was pending, the agencies filed a series of status reports outlining the steps that they were taking to comply with the district court’s order. On June 9, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (Judges Srinivasan, Pillard, and Rogers) issued a short, unpublished per curiam order. It granted the agencies’ motion in part and dismissed the appeal as moot, in light of the parties’ stipulation that the government had substantially complied with the district court’s post-judgment orders. It remanded the case to the district court. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, the National Women’s Law Center and the Labor Counsel for Latin American Advancement filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Office of Management and Budget, OIRA, and the EEOC. The plaintiffs alleged that the Office of Management and Budget had exceeded its legal authority and violated the Administrative Procedures Act when it issued a memorandum in August 2017 staying a recently-approved revision to the Employer Information Report EEO-1. The revisions required employers to report earnings data for employees by sex, race, ethnicity, and job category. The court found that the agencies had violated the Administrative Procedure Act, and it vacated the stay. The agencies appealed; the appeal was partly granted and the case remanded to the district court. The case is ongoing.


On May 30, 2018, two low-income citizens facing permanent license revocation filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Thomas D. Schroeder. The plaintiffs sued the commissioner of the North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) under §1983 for alleged violations of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. The plaintiff class was represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and the ACLU of North Carolina. The parties sought class action status for a statewide class of those whose driver’s licenses had been indefinitely revoked for failure to pay traffic tickets. The state's statute required automatic license revocation 40 days after a court judgment and nonpayment of the traffic ticket. This affected hundreds of thousands of North Carolina residents. The class claimed the DMV’s enforcement of the statute failed to assess the plaintiffs’ abilities to pay or whether their non-payment was willful, because the DMV revoked licenses before conducting pre-deprivation hearings. The plaintiff class sought declaratory relief stating that the North Carolina statute and the DMV’s enforcement was unconstitutional. They also sought to enjoin the DMV from revoking future licenses with a preliminary and permanent injunction, and to mandate the DMV to lift prior revocations. The plaintiffs requested to certify two classes of individuals: first, those in danger of having their licenses indefinitely revoked in the near future, and second, those who already had their licenses indefinitely revoked. On August 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added two plaintiffs to the suit and a second motion for preliminary injunction. On August 21, 2018 the defendant filed an answer to the amended complaint and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On March 31, 2019, Judge Schroeder filed an opinion and order on the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and class certification. 381 F.Supp.3d 619. He granted judgment in favor of the defendants on the substantive due process and equal protection claims, saying that because the right to possess a drivers license does not impede a constitutionally enshrined right, like access to counsel or the courts, it is not subject to fundamental fairness review. He added that this policy easily passes rational basis review, since it is meant to compel compliance with traffic laws. However, he noted that the defendants did not ask for judgment on the plaintiff's due process claims, so those claims continued. He certified both classes. The plaintiffs appealed Judge Schroeder's decision to enter judgment in favor of the defendants on the substantive due process and equal protection claims on April 17, 2019, Fourth Circuit docket 19-1421. One week later, Judge Schroeder granted a motion to stay proceedings until the appeals court makes a decision on the case. The appeal has been fully briefed, and oral argument was initially set for March 17, 2020, but it was rescheduled in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. As of June 2020, a new oral argument date has not yet been set. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Four low-income citizens facing permanent license revocation filed this class action in North Carolina federal court against the DMV under §1983. They alleged DMV violated Fourteenth Amendment Due Process because license revocation hearings did not provide an adequate inquiry into the plaintiffs' ability to pay. In an opinion on the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court granted class certification and allowed procedural due process claims to continue, but dismissed the equal protection and substantive due process claims. The plaintiffs appealed this decision and proceedings were stayed to accommodate the appeals court decision; no appellate decision has yet been rendered.