On September 28, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants subjected the female complaining party to a sexually hostile work environment and terminated her in retaliation to her opposing these practices. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief against the defendants. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge William Wall. The defendants successfully had the lawsuit dismissed in July 2007, as the EEOC failed to demonstrate that Grace Church and Diocese were an integrated enterprise or an employer of the complaining party. At the same time the EEOC's partial motion for summary judgment was denied. The court granted the EEOC leave to amend their complaint. 2007 WL 4914663. On December 18, 2007, the EEOC filed an amended complaint against the defendants. On January 25, 2008, Diocese moved to dismiss the EEOC’s amended complaint. Diocese argued that the EEOC did not sufficiently plead that Diocese was an employer under Title VII, and therefore the amended complaint should be dismissed. The court did not agree. On July 15, 2008, the court denied Diocese’s motion to dismiss EEOC’s amended complaint. For nearly three years, the parties underwent discovery proceedings. On November 30, 2012, settlement discussions began. The complainant intervened as a plaintiff, on May 20, 2013. The next day, the parties’ reached an agreement, and the court approved their consent decree. This consent decree allowed the court to retain jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. The decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The defendants next agreed to adopt non-discriminatory policies and procedures. In addition, the defendants agreed to provide anti-employment discrimination training to all employees, post notices of this lawsuit’s resolution in prominent places where employee notices were posted, report regularly to the EEOC, and keep records up to date that were relevant to employment discrimination. There are no indication of non-compliance by the parties, and the duration of the consent decree has lapsed. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Grace Episcopal Church of Whitestone, Inc (Grace Church). and Episcopal Diocese of Long Island (Diocese) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, female, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complainant intervened in this lawsuit. In 2013, the court approved the parties' consent decree. This decree concerned monetary and injunctive relief. For the monetary relief, the Grace Church agreed to pay $192,000.00 to the charging party and claimant. For injunctive relief, the defendants agreed to refrain from retaliation and sex discrimination. The case is presumably closed.


On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division as well as the Governor of Missouri, the Director of the Missouri Department of Social Services, the Director of the Family Support Division, the Director of the Department of Revenue and the Director of the Motor Vehicle and Driver Licensing Division. Under Missouri law, the Family Support Division (“FSD”) has the authority to issue an order suspending the driver’s license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months’ worth of child support payments or at least $2,500, whichever is less. The complaint challenged the statute, alleging that it perpetuates a cycle of poverty by unconstitutionally suspending the driver’s licenses of parents who are unable to pay child support. The plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleged that the statute makes no inquiry into the reason for the nonpayment before ordering a license suspension and provides no notice about the procedure for contesting suspension. The plaintiffs claimed that the statute drives parents further into poverty because these individuals often lose their jobs because of lack of reliable transportation to travel to work. Further, parents who have had their licenses suspended are often unable to visit or help care for their children. Furthermore, the complaint raised the issue that noncustodial parents who cannot afford to make their child support payments are already criminalized under a different Missouri law that is punishable with fines and jail time. The complaint alleged that once the licenses are suspended, it is extremely difficult to obtain reinstatement, even if the parent manages to start making regular payments because the reinstatement process is entirely without clear process, guidelines or communication. The plaintiffs argued that even attorneys making in-person visits to the child support offices, filing petitions with FSD, requesting hearings, and communicating directly with FSD could not navigate the process successfully. Thus, the plaintiffs claimed that FSD’s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents’ driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the suspensions violate substantive due process because they discriminate on the basis of wealth and are not narrowly tailored to the collection of child support, the best interests of children, or any compelling government interest. The complaint further alleged that the suspensions infringe on plaintiffs’ substantive due process because it violates their fundamental right to travel and violates their procedural due process because FSD does not guarantee a hearing or provide notice of a hearing. The complaint also alleged that the suspensions deprive the plaintiffs of equal protection because the defendants use their unique position as government actors to use debt collection methods that are not available to private creditors. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver’s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver’s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs’ and class members’ driver’s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the factual allegations of the original complaint. After filing their amended complaint, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion to certify a class on November 1, 2019. The case was first assigned to District Judge Ronnie L. White and later reassigned to District Judge Rodney W. Sippel on February 5, 2020. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case proceeded to discovery. On July 28, 2020, the court denied the plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class without prejudice and instructed the plaintiffs to refile it after the court issues an amended case management order. On September 24, 2020, the court held the plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed on June 1, 2020, in abeyance until the court receives notification from the defendants that they plan to resume issuing new license suspensions for failure to pay child support. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: On March 4, 2019, two named plaintiffs filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the Missouri Department of Social Services Family Support Division and a number of other Missouri public officials challenging a Missouri law that allows the Family Support Division ("FSD") to suspend the driver's license of non-custodial parents that owe at least three months' worth of child support payments or at least $2,500 in child support payments, whichever is less. The plaintiffs claimed that FSD’s indefinite suspension of non-custodial parents’ driver’s licenses because of their inability to pay child support violates their constitutional rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The two named plaintiffs filed the complaint on behalf of themselves and a class, defined as anyone who has had or will have his or her driver’s license suspended due to an inability to pay child support. The class sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin the defendants from ordering and enforcing driver’s license suspensions, reinstate plaintiffs’ and class members’ driver’s licenses and grant reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The amended pleading added two new named defendants and supplemented the allegations of the original complaint. On May 1, 2019, the court partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on all counts except the plaintiffs’ claim for violation of procedural due process. 2020 WL 2104766. The case remains ongoing.


On May 31, 2012, the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"), on behalf of over 20,000 African American and Hispanic borrowers, filed this lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against SunTrust Mortgage in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The DOJ asked the court for injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant engaged in discriminatory lending practices that adversely affected African American and Hispanic borrowers. Specificlly, Plaintiffs claimed that from 2005 to 2009, Defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race and national origin in residential mortgage lending. On September 14, 2012, the Court approved a consent order resolving the plaintiffs' claims. The settlement provided $21 million in compensation for African American and Hispanic borrowers who were charged higher fees based on their race or national origin. The settlement also required the defendant to continue using the new policies and practices that it adopted during negotiations leading up to the lawsuit and that avoided discriminatory practices by the mortgage lenders. On November 4, 2016, Judge Robert E. Payne signed off on the parties Consent Order of Dismissal with Prejudice. The order stipulated that two organizations which received a portion of the settlement, The Up Center and Tallahassee Lenders' Consortium, and had not yet spent all of the money distributed to them. The order states that these organizations had until November 30, 2016 and January 15, 2017 respectively to spend those funds in accordance with the 2012 Consent Order, or they will return unutilized money to SunTrust. The case is now closed.

Summary: The United States, on behalf of more than 20,000 African-American and Hispanic borrowers, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts. The same day, the court approved a consent decree in which Defendants agreed to pay $21 million to plaintiffs and to follow policies and procedures to prevent discrimination against borrows for reason of race or national origin. The case is now closed.


This class action involving adult care givers, either relatives of the children or close friends of the children's parents, caring for Pennsylvania children whose parents are unable to provide care was filed on August 16, 2000, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were represented by the Juvenile Law Center and ACLU; they sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state for failing to provide for the financial needs of these children, claiming that the state violated Title IV-E of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 670, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Pennsylvania state laws. The complaint alleged that the state violated state and federal law by failing to meet the financial needs of these children. Specifically, the state failed to: notify the plaintiffs and other similarly situated caregivers ("kinship caregivers") of their right to apply for and receive per diem foster care benefits for the children in their care, process applications for foster care benefits from them and other kinship care givers, and reimburse them for the care of the dependent children placed in their homes at the same per diem rate as non-kinship foster care givers. The plaintiffs filed for class certification on August 17, 2000. In late August of 2004, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary approval of a proposed settlement agreement. After many amendments of the proposed class, the court finally granted the class certification for settlement purposes on October 29, 2004. On April 1, 2005, the court approved and ordered the settlement agreement, in which, according to the plaintiff's website, the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare agreed to issue a bulletin clarifying the obligation of county youth agencies to treat caregivers similar to the plaintiffs, like all other foster parents. Additionally, the agreement included a notice to be provided to all kinship caregivers stating their rights to receive their legal benefits. The docket does not include any additional activity after the approval of the settlement.

Summary: Plaintiffs, either relatives of the children or close friends of the children's parents, are adult care givers caring for children whose parents are unable to provide care. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state for failing to notify and provide the plaintiffs with per diem foster care benefits for the children in their care. This case was filed in 2000, and a settlement agreement was reached in 2005.


The U.S. Justice Department filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County Arizona officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona on October 31, 1997, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action stems from an investigation authorized under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, as a result of allegations that poor conditions in the Maricopa County Jails (Jails) violated inmates' constitutional rights. The investigation was commenced on August 8, 1995, and it focused on allegations of excessive force and denial of adequate medical care. On March 25, 1996, the Justice Department sent a letter to the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, stating that the Department of Justice had concluded that unconstitutional conditions exist at the Jails with respect to the use of excessive force against inmates and deliberate indifference to inmates' serious medical needs. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, to Ed King, Chairman, Maricopa County Board of Supervisors (Mar. 25, 1996). The findings of excessive force included punching and kicking inmates and the use of cuffs, restraint chairs and stun guns. Systematic factors in the Jails were found to lead to excessive force because of inadequate and inexperienced staffing, the overavailability of non-lethal weapons, overcrowding in intake, insufficient training and inadequate tracking of potentially problematic staff. The findings regarding medical care included insufficient access to medical care, inadequate medical screenings in intake, inadequate protection from infectious disease, inadequate psychiatric care and deficient medical care for prisoners on work furlough. The letter concluded by stating that pursuant to CRIPA, the Attorney General would be permitted to institute a lawsuit if the identified deficiencies were not corrected. The instant lawsuit was subsequently filed, alleging that Maricopa County had failed to adequately address the stated constitutional violations resulting from the CRIPA investigation. On November 18, 1997, the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona (Judge Roger G. Strand) issued an order granting the dismissal of the civil action conditioned upon compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement by the defendants. U.S. v. County of Maricopa, No. 97-2273 (D.Ariz. Nov. 18, 1997) (order granting conditional dismissal). The remedies mandated by the settlement agreement included the construction of a new intake facility to reduce congestion and waiting time, access to adequate toilet and shower facilities for inmates on work furlough, increased staffing, increased in-service training, changes in Jail policy regarding use of force and restraint techniques, and improved investigations and increased sanctions for incidents of use of excessive force. The case was dismissed by Judge Strand on July 6, 1998.

Summary: On October 31, 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Justice Department filed this lawsuit against Maricopa County Arizona officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. The lawsuit was filed after the DOJ conducted an August 1995 investigation that found that poor conditions in the Jails had violated the constitutional rights of the inmates. The case was conditionally dismissed pursuant to the fulfillment of a settlement agreement on November 18, 1997. The case was fully dismissed on July 6, 1998.


On March 12, 2015, five immigration attorneys and thirteen noncitizen individuals filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Represented by Stacy Tolchin, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild, and the American Immigration Council, plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that CBP had failed to timely respond to their or their clients' FOIA requests, in violation of FOIA's statutory requirement for government agencies to respond to requests within 20 business days. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that CBP had a systemic pattern and practice of such delays. The plaintiffs had been waiting for CBP’s response to their FOIA requests for at least seven months and most for more than a year. These delays had, in turn, prevented them from filing for immigration status. On September 17, 2015, Judge James Donato denied CBP’s Motion to Dismiss, stating that "CBP’s records [as available through FOIA] are critical to noncitizens and their attorneys in evaluating immigration options and the possibility of remaining legally in the United States." 132 F. Supp. 3d 1170 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2015). The parties settled, and Judge Donato granted their joint motion to dismiss on September 3, 2016. On September 8, 2016, the parties signed the settlement agreement. During the litigation, CBP had made significant progress in clearing its FOIA backlog from over 30,000 cases to just over 3,000, and had responded to all plaintiffs' requests. The parties agreed that CBP would post its monthly FOIA statistics on its website for three years, and that CBP would pay plaintiffs' attorney fees. The settlement agreement did not explicitly state that it was court-enforceable.

Summary: Immigration attorneys and noncitizen individuals sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection for violating the Freedom of Information Act by failing to respond to FOIA requests within 20 business days. CBP significantly cleared its FOIA backlog during the litigation, and in a settlement with plaintiffs, CBP agreed to post its monthly FOIA statistics on its website.


On June 9, 2014, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Western District of Texas on behalf of African-American and Hispanic applicants to entry-level firefighter positions against the City of Austin. The plaintiff alleged that since at least 2011, the fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for entry-level firefighter positions has had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans and Hispanics, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically, they alleged that African-American and Hispanic applicants passed the 2012 test at a rate that was statistically significantly lower than white applicants, and that by only selecting the top 1500 candidates to move on to interview stage of the process, the City of Austin increased this disparity. The city also used the scores as a component of an applicant's ranking on the fire department hiring list, leading to African-American and Hispanic individuals being processed for hire at a significantly lower rate than white individuals. They also alleged that a similar testing and ranking process used in 2013 will have a similar disparate impact, that these tests are not essential to the duties of firefighting, and that there are alternative means for screening candidates that would not have a discriminatory impact. On the same day, the U.S. and the City of Austin offered a joint settlement agreement pending a fairness hearing before the court. The agreement provided that:
1) the city will develop a new nondiscriminatory test for screening applicants but that the city can use parts of its previous tests for filling up to 90 open positions immediately; 2) the city will provide back pay to African-American and Hispanic applicants from 2012 who claim to have passed the work-related parts of the test but not the unrelated parts; 3) the city will make 30 priority appointments of Hispanics and African-Americans (the shortfall of diversity candidates in 2012 due to the discriminatory hiring practices), with retroactive seniority dates; and 4) there will be a fairness hearing to rule on the legality and equitability of the agreement, with any objections from interested parties such as the firefighters' union and those who may claim back pay. The parties also proposed a second fairness hearing for the court to approve or modify any individual relief awards. As proposed, the court will enforce the decree for four years, until the city's back-pay obligations are satisfied, or until the implementation of a new, nondiscriminatory testing procedure; whichever comes later but no more than eight years.
On June 11, 2014, District Judge Lee Yeakel granted the motion for provisional approval of the consent decree and scheduled a fairness hearing on the consent decree. The Austin Firefighters Association (AFA) filed a motion to intervene in the case but on September 15, 2014, Judge Yeakel denied their motion because at the time of the suit the AFA did not have a current collective bargaining agreement with the city. Furthermore, the AFA failed to show that they had an interest that could not be satisfied by other means, such as collective bargaining and the objection process within the settlement agreement. On October 18, 2014, Judge Yeakel denied the AFA's motion to reconsider their motion to intervene, at which point the AFA appealed to the Fifth Circuit (docket # 14-51132). In a per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit denied the AFA's motions to stay the proceedings in the lower court, and to expedite their appeal. On October 29, 2014, the first of the fairness hearings was held before Judge Yeakel. On November 7, 2014, Judge Yeakel approved the consent decree. In response to objections, the Court found no basis to conclude that the priority hire and retroactive seniority provisions of the Decree would compromise public safety, or stigmatize or provide an unearned windfall to individuals hired through the priority hire process. Rather, the Court found that those provisions achieved an appropriate balance between providing effective remedial relief under Title VII, and protecting the legitimate interests of the City and its existing firefighters. The parties agreed to pay their own costs of litigation. Following a fairness hearing, Judge Yeakel approved the individual relief of backpay on August 21, 2015. The consent decree expired on November 7, 2018. The parties had complied with all of the terms of the agreement.

Summary: On June 9, 2014, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint in the Western District of Texas on behalf of African-American and Hispanic applicants to entry-level firefighter positions, against the City of Austin. The plaintiff alleged that since at least 2011, the fire department's practice of requiring applicants to pass an examination in order to be considered for entry-level firefighter positions has had a disparate impact on the hiring of African-Americans and Hispanics, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On November 7, 2014, the Court approved a consent decree that would eliminate any discriminatory hiring practices and compensate those who had been impacted by these practices. The parties had fully complied with the consent decree as of November 7, 2018, and the consent decree accordingly expired on that date.


On November 18, 2010, the United States, on behalf of a Caucasian tenant and her mixed-race child, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Fair Housing Act against the manager and owners of a Vicksburg, Mississippi apartment building. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that the tenant's lease was terminated due to both the race of the tenant's daughter and the tenant's association with African-Americans. The parties proceeded with discovery for the next two years and trial was set for August of 2012. The parties also initiated a settlement conference in January 13, 2012, which resulted with an agreement subject to the court's approval. On March 20, 2012, the court entered a consent decree enforcing the settlement agreement. The defendants did not admit to any violation of the Fair Housing Act, but agreed to change their practices and policies to prevent future violations. This agreement required the defendants to notify the public of their compliance with the Fair Housing Act, provide nondiscrimination training to their employees, provide notification to the United States of other complaints of discrimination, and pay plaintiffs $17,500 in settlement of the case. The consent decree was in effect until 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: The United States, on behalf of a Caucasian tenant and her mixed-race child, filed a federal lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against the manager and owners of a Vicksburg, Mississippi apartment building, claiming that the tenant's lease was terminated due to both the race of the tenant's daughter and the tenant's association with African-Americans. The parties entered into a consent decree in which the defendants agreed to comply with the Fair Housing Act, notify the public of their compliance with the Fair Housing Act, provide nondiscrimination training to their employees, 4) provide notification to the United States of other complaints of discrimination, and pay plaintiffs $17,500. This consent decree is in effect until 2014.


On August 19, 2002, female prisoners in Alabama filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The prisoners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment. This class action suit, brought on behalf of all female state prisoners in Alabama, was based on the following claims of unconstitutional conditions: overcrowding, inadequate supervision in open dorms, inadequate inmate classification, inmate violence, the availability of weapons, the small number of segregation cells, inadequate living space, inadequate ventilation, extreme heat during the summer, and inadequate medical and mental health care. The prisoners were represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights along with several private attorneys. On December 2, 2002, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama (Judge Myron H. Thompson) granted a preliminary injunction to prisoners incarcerated at the Julia Tutwiler Prison for Women (Tutwiler). Laube v. Haley, 234 F.Supp.2d 1227 (M.D.Ala. 2002). The Court found that significant understaffing in greatly overcrowded inmate dorms resulted in an impermissibly unsafe environment for inmates. The Court also ordered state officials to submit a plan to remedy the unconstitutional conditions. Judge Thompson rejected the initial plan submitted by the state by holding that a lack of funding was no excuse for deficiencies in the plan. Laube v. Haley, 242 F.Supp.2d 1150 (M.D.Ala. 2003). In February 2003, Judge Thompson granted the defendant's motion to substitute parties. The case was subsequently referred to as Laube v. Campbell. Correctional officers then moved to intervene in the action by contending that the unconstitutional conditions at Tutwiler prevented them from performing duties which were necessary to avoid civil liability and criminal penalties. Judge Thompson denied the motion and held that correctional officers' interests did not warrant intervention. Laube v. Campbell, 215 F.R.D. 655 (M.D.Ala.2003). On March 28, 2003, Judge Thompson held that that the preliminary injunction had expired. Laube v. Campbell, 255 F.Supp.2d 1301 (M.D.Ala. 2003). The Court found that under the provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3626, a preliminary injunction automatically expires after 90 days. The Court additionally noted that the prisoners were able to move for another preliminary injunction if they so desired. Subsequently, the parties reached settlement agreements. On August 23, 2004, Judge Thompson approved the two four-year settlement agreements proposed by the parties: a conditions settlement agreement and a medical settlement agreement. Laube v. Campbell, 333 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D.Ala. 2004). The conditions settlement agreement covered population flow, heat, ventilation, exercise, recreation, safety and security staffing, segregation cells, and classification. The medical settlement agreement covered access to care, intake medical screening, available medical services, medical staffing, pharmaceuticals, records and reporting. Litigation continued over attorney's fees and modifications to the settlement agreements. On August 31, 2007, Judge Thompson issued a 107 page Opinion and Order, ruling on the prisoners' application for attorneys' fees and awarding plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and expenses totaling $538,178.14. The Court noted that if additional enforcement fees were incurred, the prisoners could make further application for payment of those fees. On December 17, 2009, the Court held a status conference during which the parties notified the court of the defendant has satisfied all of the terms of the settlement agreements. In light of this conference, on January 25, 2010, the court issued an order of final judgment closing the case. However, on May 12, 2010, another prisoner filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 14, 2010, the court (Judge Myron H. Thompson) denied the motion for reconsideration. The prisoner appealed this denial to the Eleventh Circuit. On November 10, 2010, the Eleventh Circuit found that the appeal was frivolous and dismissed the appeal.

Summary: In 2002, female prisoners in Alabama filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The prisoners sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenging conditions of their confinement under the Eighth Amendment. In 2004, the parties agreed to two settlements agreements addressing the conditions. In 2010, after the defendants reached compliance with all terms in the settlements agreements, the court closed the case.


On April 17, 2014, a group of immigrants awaiting "reasonable fear" determinations (part of the process of seeking relief from deportation for people who fear persecution in their home country) filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") and the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Southern California, the ACLU of Northern California, the National Immigrant Justice Center, and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, claiming that USCIS is violating plaintiffs' rights under the APA and federal regulations. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that USCIS does not conduct timely reasonable fear determinations, which are mandated to be completed within 10 days of referral to USCIS. On July 17, 2014, the defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), arguing that the named Plaintiffs' individual claims are now moot as all five named Plaintiffs have now received reasonable fear determinations, and that the 10-day period is "only a non-binding internal processing goal, not a mandatory deadline that confers enforceable rights on aliens." Plaintiffs filed their opposition on August 18, 2014, responding that the claims of the putative class are inherently transitory and strongly rebuking defendants' claims of the "aspirational" nature of the 10-day period. On November 21, 2014, the Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, and further granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification. Settlement discussions then began, and on August 20, 2015, the Court approved a preliminary class action settlement pending a fairness hearing. On October 27, 2015, the Court approved the final settlement and attorneys' fees and costs of $327,047.66. Under the settlement, USCIS must meet a goal of making a reasonable fear determination with an average of 10 days, and not in excess of 20 days. The settlement also included provisions to ensure compliance; it was scheduled to last for 5 years after its approval.

Summary: On April 17, 2014, a group of immigrants filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California alleging that the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services unlawfully delays reasonable fear determinations beyond the mandatory 10-day period. On October 27, 2015, the Court ordered a settlement requiring USCIS to meet a goal of making a reasonable fear determination with an average of 10 days, and not in excess of 20 days. The settlement also included provisions to ensure compliance.


On May 22, 2018, two prisoners at the Anchorage Correctional Complex, both practicing Muslims, brought this lawsuit against the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging that prison officials failed numerous times to accommodate their religious needs during Ramadan. According to the plaintiffs, during both the 2017 and 2018 Ramadan seasons they received only two bagged meals per day, which were smaller, less in number, and lower in calorie count than the legally required amount. In some instances these meals allegedly included sandwiches containing pork, which they did not eat because of their religious beliefs. They alleged that this “Ramadan Policy” violated the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). Represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), they filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees. Since Ramadan was still ongoing at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs also moved for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction that would compel prison officials to provide them with nutritionally adequate and pork-free meals through the end of Ramadan on June 15. The case was initially assigned to District Judge John W. Sedwick, but was re-assigned to District Judge H. Russel Holland on May 23, 2018 after Judge Sedwick recused himself (Judge Sedwick did not give a reason in his recusal order). After a hearing, Judge Holland granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order after deciding that they were likely to succeed on their RLUIPA claims. 2018 WL 2392498. The court reserved the issue of a preliminary injunction for later adjudication after the parties briefed the issue. But on May 31, the defendants stipulated that they would comply with the TRO's provisions through the end of the month of Ramadan and any subsequent Ramadan that occurred during the litigation. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. The DOC filed its answer to the complaint on June 26, 2018, largely denying the plaintiffs' pertinent factual allegations. In addition, the department also asserted several affirmative defenses: that the DOC official defendants in the suit were protected by qualified immunity, that the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to exhaust administrative remedies made a lawsuit in federal court premature, and that the damages suffered by the plaintiffs were de minimis. On July 6, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to further allege that officials at the prison prohibited Muslims from holding religious services or study groups, while allowing Christian prisoners to do the same. The DOC denied these allegations in its answer filed on July 20, 2018. After the parties proceeded through discovery, the court ordered the case ready for trial by the end of August 2019. But on September 3, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. They filed the agreement with the court on September 5, 2019 and the court filed approval the next day. The court dismissed the case with prejudice and retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement. The settlement provided that prisoners fasting during the month of Ramadan would receive meals consisting of 3,000 calories per day, and that they would be two hot meals between sunset and dawn. The defendants agreed to provide pork-free meals with labels indicating as much. And the settlement provided that Muslim prisoners would be permitted to congregate for daily prayers, weekly religious services, and Islamic study groups. The settlement also included that CAIR would provide a four-hour religious sensitivity training to staff statewide. The defendants agreed to pay $102,500 in damages and attorneys' fees. The settlement did not indicate an enforcement period, but that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement's terms. The case appears closed.

Summary: Two practicing Muslim prisoners at the Anchorage Correctional Complex filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska in May 2018. They alleged that the prison instituted a "Ramadan Policy" during the Ramadan seasons of 2017 and 2018 that provided them with meals that were less in number and nutritional content than that which was legally required, and in some cases included pork, which their faith forbids them from eating. Plaintiffs alleged that this "Ramadan Policy" violated their rights under the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. On May 23, 2018, they obtained a temporary restraining order compelling the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC) to provide them with legally adequate meals that met their religious needs through the end of Ramadan that year. In September 2019, the parties settled for injunctive and monetary relief.


On June 4, 1999, a former student filed this lawsuit against Pleasant Hill Public School District (Missouri) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri, under Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that he was harassed on the basis of his sex and sexual orientation. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the school district was aware that he was enduring discrimination on the basis of sex and were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination and its injurious effects on his education. On July 20, 2000, the Department of Justice filed a complaint against the school district and entered the case as a plaintiff-intervenor. On July 31, 2000, the court (Judge Gaitan) approved the parties' consent order. The school district agreed to allow a court-appointed expert to develop a comprehensive mandatory training program for all school district board members and employees, develop a plan to prevent, identify, and eliminate harassment and discrimination on the basis of sex and sexual orientation, conduct a climate report, report to the court for a two-year period. Plaintiff was awarded compensatory damages and attorney's fees.

Summary: A former student filed a lawsuit against his school district for ignoring the harassment and discrimination he faced because of his sex and sexual orientation while attending high school. The parties signed a consent order awarding the plaintiff monetary and injunctive relief.


On June 28, 2010, the publisher of a Prison Legal news, a monthly civil rights magazine for prisoners, filed a civil rights action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the sheriff of Galveston County Jail, alleging violation the plaintiff's constitutional rights to free speech and due process. Plaintiff, represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as nominal compensatory and punitive damages. Galveston County Jail had implemented a policy in December 2006 that only permitted inmates who subscribed to Prison Legal News to receive it with special authorization from prison administration; otherwise, the publication was placed in their stored property. Plaintiff asserted that it did not receive notification of the change in the prison's policy nor did their subscribers prior to censorship. On February 24, 2011, the case settled, and the Court (Judge Kenneth M. Hoyt) dismissed it accordingly (although retaining jurisdiction over the case for purposes of enforcing this stipulated judgment). The settlement recognized that PLN is entitled to receive notifications of mail rejection from every publication that it sends, and the subscribers are allowed to receive their subscriptions unless there is a safety or security concern. The Sheriff must maintain a subscription to PLN for five years in the law library available to the prison population. The Defendant was ordered to pay $5,500 in damages. The case is now closed.

Summary: In June 2010, Prison Legal news, a monthly civil rights magazine for prisoners, filed a civil rights action against the sheriff of Galveston County Jail, alleging that Galveston County Jail had implemented a policy in December 2006 that only permitted inmates would receive PLN mailings; otherwise, the publication was placed in their stored property. Plaintiff noted it did not receive notification of the change in the prison's policy nor did their subscribers prior to censorship. The case was settled in February 2011. The settlement acknowledged PLN's right to receive notification os rejection and for subscribers to continue receiving subscriptions unless there is a security concern. Defendant was also ordered to pay damages.


This lawsuit, filed February 13, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO-1) barring legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and barring Syrian refugees indefinitely. The complaint argued that by indefinitely barring Syrian refugees, EO-1 violated the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and exceeded executive power under Article II of the Constitution. This lawsuit argued that EO-1 effectuated President Trump's long-standing campaign promise of implementing a "total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States," and that it unlawfully and unconstitutionally prevented the plaintiff, a Syrian refugee, from reuniting with his wife and daughter, who resided in Aleppo. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff filed the complaint in the Western District of Wisconsin, where it was immediately assigned to District Judge William M. Conley and Magistrate Judge Stephen L. Crocker. The plaintiff was a Syrian Sunni Muslim asylee who, after fleeing to the United States in 2014 and being fully vetted by US immigration authorities, was granted asylum status in 2016 because of the torture and religious persecution he had suffered in Syria. After being granted asylum in the US, the petitioner filed a derivative asylum application in 2016 in order to reunite with his wife and only surviving child, who remained in Syria. The petitioner claimed that his derivative asylum application had cleared the security vetting process and had been returned to the USCIS Nebraska Service Center for final processing before it was halted by EO-1. The plaintiff filed a motion to proceed anonymously in order to protect his wife and daughter from harm that they stood to suffer in Aleppo, were his identity to have been revealed. Along with the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and summary judgment. On February 13, 2017, District Judge Conley issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion to proceed anonymously. In the same order, Judge Conley instructed the government to file a response by February 17, 2017, informing the court of: 1) the current status of the plaintiff's derivative asylum request; 2) whether the government continued processing derivative asylee/refugee petitions for Syrian nationals after the January 27 EO; and 3) if not, whether the government took the position that the preliminary injunction issued by the court in State of Washington v. Trump enjoined EO-1's enforcement as to the processing of derivative asylee/refugee petitions for Syrian nationals. Upon receipt of these filings, the court said it would determine the next steps. On February 17, the government filed a response to Judge Conley's February 13 order (documents not available), and the court issued an order denying the motion for preliminary injunction as moot. On March 6, 2017, after adverse developments in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded the January 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). As a result, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 10, 2017, and moved for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. District Judge Conley set a telephone status conference for that day, and at the conference found that the plaintiff was at great risk of suffering irreparable harm were the TRO to be denied. The court then granted the TRO as it applies to plaintiff John Doe, noting that "while defendants object to the entry of temporary injunctive relief, they argue during the hearing that the executive order may not even apply to plaintiff's asylum relative petition, thus ameliorating any harm to the government, or at least any harm caused by the brief period covered by this temporary restraining order." This was the first temporary restraining order to be granted in a case responding to EO-2. The court ordered the defendants to respond to the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction by March 16, and scheduled an in-person hearing for March 21. After a number of extensions to the hearings and filing deadlines, on April 28, the plaintiff filed a notice of withdrawal of the motion for a temporary restraining order and permanent injunction, as well as a notice of voluntary dismissal. On May 1, the case closed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) without further order of the court. Many documents in this case are unavailable.

Summary: The plaintiff was a Syrian Sunni Muslim asylee who was granted US asylum because of the torture and religious persecution he had suffered in Syria. The plaintiff filed this suit because President Trump's January 27, 2017, EO halted the derivative asylum application that plaintiff had filed on behalf of his wife and sole living child, who remain in war-torn Aleppo. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the provisions of Trump's executive order which prevent his family's applications from being processed. This case featured the first temporary restraining order granted by a federal district court in response to the March 6, 2017, version of the Travel Ban (EO-2). The parties presumably settled as the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on April 28, 2017.


On September 13, 2006, several Department of Juvenile Justice parolees filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. (They amended the complaint a week later.) The plaintiffs sued California and the persons and entities administering California's juvenile parole system under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their complaint, they claimed that California's policies and practices regarding the revocation of juvenile parole violated the their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and assistance of counsel. They also alleged violation of statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because California failed to provide training and accommodations to permit juveniles with physical and mental disabilities to participate effectively in the revocation proceedings against them. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel, as well as attorneys from the Prison Law Office and the Youth Law Center. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, attorney's fees and costs, and that the court retain jurisdiction until fully assured of compliance with remedial orders. For their constitutional claims, the plaintiffs alleged that, in contrast to the process provided for adult parole violators (pursuant to a 2004 stipulated order in Valdivia v. Schwarzennegger, No. S-94-0671 (E.D. Cal.), PC-CA-0052 in this Clearinghouse), California failed to provide preliminary hearings for juveniles accused of parole violations, and that prompt hearings, even if a single revocation hearing process was constitutional, did not occur, in any event. The complaint listed numerous deficiencies in the juvenile revocation limited hearing process then available (e.g., unfairly burdensome continuances, vague standards, use of unreliable evidence, lack of translation of documents or advice of procedures/rights, insufficient accommodation of disabilities, insufficient availability of counsel). On February 28, 2007, in an unpublished order, the district court (Senior District Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) certified a class consisting of juvenile parolees in or under the jurisdiction of California, including all juvenile parolees with disabilities, as defined under federal law, who are: (i) in the community under parole supervision or who are at large; (ii) in custody in California as alleged parole violators, and who are awaiting revocation of their parole; or (iii) in custody, having been found in violation of parole and returned to custody. In the same order, the court denied several defense motions, including motions that the plaintiffs disclose their full names (instead of using their initials in their pleadings) and that certain allegations be stricken. As the case proceeded, discovery disputes came at times to the court's attention. In a May 25, 2007, unpublished ruling, Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows allowed California to withhold certain budget documents from discovery under the deliberative process privilege. On reconsideration, however, Judge Karlton held on July 6, 2007, in an unpublished ruling, that since the deliberative process privilege was qualified (rather than absolute), the budget documents should be produced to the plaintiffs in light of their need for the materials and the need for accurate fact-finding, given the documents' relevance in depicting the administrative burden associated with providing increased procedural protections to the class. On September 18, 2007, the district court issued an unpublished order granting the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment as to their due process claim, but denying that portion of the motion seeking, without trial, injunctive relief. The court ruled that California's system of juvenile parole revocation failed to afford due process because the state failed to afford a sufficiently prompt hearing to those juveniles facing parole revocation. Judge Karlton did not determine whether the state needed to afford both a preliminary hearing and a final revocation hearing in every circumstance (i.e., both for alleged technical violators and for alleged law violators) but ruled that, since in neither circumstance was the hearing promptly provided, the state parole revocation process for juvenile offenders violated the juveniles' due process rights. Three days later, Magistrate Judge Hollows granted a motion to impose sanctions on defendants for failing to produce discoverable files and to adequately provide answers to interrogatories. On April 21, 2008, Judge Karlton appointed Chase Riveland to be the Special Master in the case. The plaintiffs followed that appointment with a series of motions for summary judgment, which Judge Karlton referred to the Special Master on June 3, 2008. On June 4, 2008, the parties reached a settlement in the case. Under the terms of the settlement:

attorneys would be appointed for every juvenile parolee charged with a violation of parole within 8 business days

juveniles would receive a preliminary probable cause hearing within 13 business days,

if no probable cause is found, the juvenile would receive a full revocation hearing within 35 calendar days of the parole hold,

juveniles would have the right to present evidence and witnesses at their probable cause and revocation hearings,

clear policies would be developed to spell out which behavior warrants revocation of parole or a return to a DJJ facility,

youth who were not revoked would be promptly released and DJJ would end a policy of temporary detention for youth continued on parole,

juveniles could not be returned to the DJJ for more than a year, and a revocation cannot be extended beyond a year, except for cases of serious in-custody misconduct,

accommodations for mental and physical disabilities and for effective communications would be provided, 9)

would no longer be automatically shackled during revocation proceedings and policies would be developed to determine when and how a youth could be restrained, and

a prompt administrative appeal system that includes the appointment of attorneys would be put into practice.
 On October 7, 2008, the district court (Judge Karlton) approved the class action settlement. On January 5, 2009, special master Chase Riveland filed his first status report, in which he reported that the defendants "have made important progress and are laying a solid foundation for the needed changes." On May 28, 2009 the special master filed his second status report, which determined that a "great majority of the remedy's features are now in place, although the execution of some components remains challenging." The report found that a number of rights were being better protected; however, there continued to be incomplete or inconsistent practices. Specifically, the special master found that the issues needing the most attention included the "practices identifying and accommodating disabilities and effective communication needs... and the more nuanced aspects of substantive due process in revocation hearings." The special master made no recommendations in this report. On November 30, 2009 the special master filed his third status report, which found that "defendants continue to make good progress in building a solid revocation system." The special master noted that the state's budget crisis could have an impact on the state's ability to continue making progress towards compliance with the remedy. In terms of issues that were identified, the special master noted that "to better preserve due process, all concerned need a greater understanding of the elements of violations." Nevertheless, the report made clear that "systems are beginning to function more consistently, there is sustained effort to examine and address deficient practices, and the parties are reaching more agreements on policy." The special master made no recommendations in this report. On July 23, 2010 the special master filed his fourth status report. The special master reported that he had found substantial compliance in several requirements for attorney representation. For that reason, the special master recommended that the court order that the stipulated settlement's requirements dealing with the appointment of an attorney no longer be the primary focus of the special master. Again, the special master highlighted the defendants' continued difficulties to ensure the accommodation of the most severely disabled parolees. Moreover, the special master noted that the defendants' reporting system presented one of the largest obstacles to compliance with agreement. Specifically, the system "was not designed for all of the necessary compliance reporting -- which is sometimes in tension with management reporting needs - and the outdated technology renders changes unreasonably difficult." In May 2010, Chase Riveland ended his assignment as Special Master, and was apparently replaced first by Patricia A. Gray and then by Virginia Morrison. On January 4, 2011 special master Virginia Morrison filed a fifth status report. She recommended that the defendants had reached substantial compliance with an additional seven requirements of the settlement. Two areas where further work is required was identified in this report. Specifically the special master wrote that the parties need to work on "building up the revocation documents and hearing practice, so that what is delivered accomplishes effective communication and satisfies due process standards, and establishing the policies, procedures, regulations, and internal systems needed to deeply root due process protections for juveniles in the state's system." On June 21, 2011, the special master issued a sixth status report. She recommended to the court that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with an additional 4 requirements of the settlement. The report noted that should the court accept the special master's findings, the defendants will have achieved substantial compliance on 17 of the settlement's requirements. However, the report noted that "significant challenges require attention in order to satisfy due process and this Court's orders." Specifically, the report made clear that the defendants still faced challenges regarding the provision of accommodations to those parolees with special needs. On December 12, 2011, the special master issued a seventh status report. The special master recommended to the court that the defendants had achieved substantial compliance with an additional nine requirements of the settlement. The report noted that should the court accept the special master's findings, the defendants will have achieved substantial compliance on 26 of the settlement's requirements. On June 27, 2012, Senate Bill 1021 was approved by the Governor and resulted in the termination of most juvenile parole operations as of January 1, 2013. However, juvenile parolees who were detained on a parole hold prior to January 1, 2013, would have their revocation proceedings conducted in early 2013. On June 21, 2012 the special master issued her eighth status report. The report noted that should the court accept the special master's findings, the defendants will have achieved substantial compliance on 30 of the settlement's requirements. The master noted that it was the most rapid implementation of a settlement that she had seen in her 21 years of experience. On September 10, 2012, the court adopted the special master's eighth report in full. The defendants eliminated coercive procedures and actions, such as committing juveniles to time in prison without the advice of counsel. They abolished practices that could keep revoked parolees incarcerated indefinitely. They systematized decision-making so that the steps are predictable, proceedings are based on evidence, and staff work to inform and involve the juveniles. All proceedings were provided with exceptional timeliness, and a substantial proportion of juveniles are diverted from revocation into alternatives to incarceration. Overall, the defendants had demonstrated compliance with virtually all of the injunctions' requirements. On January 18, 2013, the court agreed to the parties' stipulated process for conclusion of the case. The parties would notify the class members and then move to terminate the injunction. Then, the special master would recommend whether the injunction should be terminated and the court would rule on the motion. The following month, the plaintiffs filed a motion to terminate the injunction and the special master also recommended that the case be terminated. On April 1, 2013, the court granted the motion to terminate the injunction. Once the final class member had been released, the parties and the special master filed their motions regarding remaining attorneys' fees and monitoring fees. The defendants agreed to pay the fees and costs. Once the final fee issues were resolved, the court terminated the case on July 10, 2013. Subsequently, on additional motion for undisputed fees and costs was granted. Then, on January 16, 2014, Judge Karlton expressly terminated the position of the special master, as well.

Summary: In 2006, four juveniles representing a class of juvenile parolees, claiming that the state of California's policies and practices regarding the revocation of juvenile parole denied the plaintiffs' constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and assistance of counsel. The district court ruled in January 2008 that DJJ was violating juvenile parolees' due process rights in parole hearings, and ordered that attorneys be appointed to represent "each and every" DJJ parolee in revocation proceedings. In 2008, the parties reached a settlement in the case. In 2014, after the defendants had fully complied with the settlement, the case was terminated.


On November 4, 2015, residents of Pagedale who had received warnings that they may receive tickets, have been ticketed, or will be ticketed by the city filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the City of Pagedale under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging violations of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by both private counsel and a public interest law firm, asked the court for certification of their proposed Ticket and Warning Recipients class, declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Pagedale used its code enforcement and municipal court to generate revenue, violating the Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Constitution and abusing the City’s police powers. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City’s search for revenue resulted in government intrusion into the homes of residents by dramatically increasing the number of non-traffic tickets issued, ticketing for conditions it terms “nuisances,” regulating things not included in its Code, and fining or imprisoning residents for minor infractions (including such things as basketball hoops or dish antennas in the front of houses, not walking on the right side of crosswalks, or wearing one’s pants below the waist in public). The plaintiffs also alleged that Pagedale’s municipal court system, through its opacity and inaccessibility, denies ticketed residents their right of due process. On December 7, 2015, the City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ class allegations. On December 21, 2015, the City also moved to dismiss one of the individual plaintiffs' claims for lack of justiciable controversy. On January 22, 2016, the court (Judge Rodney W. Sippel) denied the City’s motion to strike the class allegations from the plaintiff’s complaint. The court determined that, while the class is quite broad, it does not lack any possible relation or logical connection to the subject matter, so a motion to strike is not appropriate. On March 10, 2016, Judge Sippel denied the defendant's motion to dismiss in part and granted it in part. Only Count IV of the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged a Section 1983 violation based on the "city's practice of treating harmless activities and conditions as nuisances and fining Pagedale residents for harmless activities and conditions exceeds the City's police powers and causes irreparable injury to plaintiffs' constitutional rights," was dismissed. Judge Sippel found that Count IV failed to identify any violation of a right protected under the Constitution or federal law, an essential element of a Section 1983 claim. The rest of the plaintiff's case proceeded to discovery. 2016 WL 915303. On September 2, 2016, Judge Sippel referred the case to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). The parties selected Stephen J. Limbaugh as the Neutral. On October 17, 2016, the Neutral reported that the parties participated in ADR in good faith but did not reach settlement. The parties proceeded with discovery, and the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on October 18, 2017. On January 10, 2018, the parties entered a proposed consent decree, which provided for steps for reform of Pagedale municipal court practices and city prosecutions as well as eliminating part of the municipal code the city deemed "nuisance" behavior. The consent decree did not require Pagedale to refund money to citizens who were ticketed, but those who were ticketed would not face jail unless they had an attorney or had waived their right to an attorney. Pagedale was to submit reports for five years after the decree was entered. The consent decree stated that both parties would cover their own costs and fees. Following a February 2, 2018 hearing on the proposed consent decree, Judge Sippel granted preliminary approval of the proposed consent decree. In a February 6, 2018 order, Judge Sippel also certified the plaintiff's proposed class, which is defined as "all persons who, at any time since January 1, 2010, have received warning that they may receive tickets, have been ticketed, or will be ticketed by the city of Pagedale." Judge Sippel finalized the consent decree on May 21, 2018. As of May 2020 the case remain ongoing for enforcement purposes, but there has been no further action in the docket.

Summary: In 2015, residents of the City of Pagedale filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged that the City was using its code enforcement and municipal court to generate revenue, violating the Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses of the Constitution and abusing the City's police powers. After the court denied a motion to dismiss by the defendants, the parties engaged in unsuccessful settlement negotiations. On January 10, 2018, the parties entered a proposed consent decree, which provided for steps for reform of Pagedale municipal court practices and city prosecutions as well as revisions to the municipal code. The consent decree was finalized on May 21,2018.


On July 29, 2014, the National Federation of the Blind, a national organization representing the interests of blind and visually-impaired Americans, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Vermont. The plaintiffs sued the online eBook company Scribd under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Represented by private counsel and Disability Rights Advocates, the plaintiff asserted that Scribd discriminated against blind persons in violation of the ADA by failing to provide full and equal enjoyment of the site’s services (i.e. exclusively visual interface inaccessible to the blind, buttons inaccessible using screen access software, etc.). The plaintiff asked the district court to grant a permanent injunction that would require the defendant to make its website services and apps fully accessible to and independently usable by blind persons. The plaintiffs also asked for declaratory and monetary relief. The case was assigned to Judge William K. Sessions III. On October 29, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the ADA only applied to physical places of public accommodation. The court denied the motion on March 19, 2015 and found that Title III applies to internet-based retailers and service providers. 97 F.Supp.3d 565. The defendant sought a stay for an interlocutory appeal, asserting that the district court's order involved a controlling question of law with substantial ground for difference of opinion that ought be answered before the trial case went forward. The court denied the stay on May 29, 2015 (2015 WL 3454738) and the trial court proceeded. On November 10, 2015, the parties settled and jointly moved the court to dismiss the litigation with prejudice. The agreement included contractual obligations to address the plaintiff’s accessibility concerns, working with the plaintiff to provide an ADA-compliant accessible website and phone app by 2017. No party admitted wrongdoing or asserted the agreement as an admission of wrongdoing. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement and provided for a dispute resolution procedure that entitled the plaintiff to specific performance in the event of a breach. The parties stipulated to dismissal and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, the National Federation of the Blind filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Vermont. The plaintiff, representing the rights of the blind persons, sought a permanent injunction against the defendant Scribd, provider of eBooks, to make the services provided by its website and apps fully accessible to blind persons and to maintain that accessibility. On November 10, 2015, the parties settled the case and Scribd agreed to address accessibility concerns, promising full accessibility by 2017.


On August 31, 2017, a resident of Bozeman, Montana, who was unable to pay his court debt that grew to nearly $4,000 out of a small $185 civil infraction, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff sued the governor of Montana, the Attorney General of Montana, the administrator of the Motor Vehicle Division of Montana, and the Bureau Chief of the Driver Services Bureau of Montana all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by Equal Justice Under Law, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The plaintiff claimed that, by indefinitely suspending the driver's licenses of people who failed to pay court-ordered fines, costs, and restitution, even where nonpayment was solely due to indigence and thus not willful, the defendants had violated the equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process rights. The case was assigned to Judge Sam E. Haddon. On October 17, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, arguing that the plaintiff had filed after the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Judge Haddon denied this motion without prejudice to allow renewal following the determination of class certification. On March 2, 2018, the plaintiff moved to certify class, defining the class as “All Montana drivers who currently have, or will have, at least one driver’s license suspension because of unpaid court debts and who did not, or will not, receive an ability-to-pay hearing before the suspension.” Later in March, the parties filed a stipulation of dismissal, requesting that the court dismiss the governor of Montana as a defendant. The parties proffered this voluntary dismissal after agreeing that the governor was not a proper defendant in this action because he does not administer the statutes challenged in the suit. In April 2018, the court entered an order specifying due dates for discovery and supplemental briefs regarding the motion to certify class. An initial hearing on certifying the class was held on October 16, 2018. Judge Haddon did not approve the class in an October 17 order, but granted the plaintiff leave to amend his class certification complaint. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2018, which included classes for all current and future "individuals whose Montana driver’s licenses are... suspended for nonpayment of a fine, cost, or restitution under Mont. Code Ann. § 61-5-214(1)(b) and who were unable to afford to pay the fine, cost, or restitution at the time of suspension." The current suspended license holders and future suspended license holders were separate classes. This new complaint also removed Governor Bullock as a defendant, matching the previous stipulation. A hearing on the amended class was held on January 8, 2019. Judge Haddon again denied these classes the following day (2019 WL 145627), stating that creating a class in this situation was not useful, because if injunctive relief is granted to the plaintiffs individually, the entire class will get the benefit, certified or not. Litigation on the underlying claims continued, with the defendants filing a motion for summary judgment on April 12, 2019. However, on May 15 of that year, the parties filed a motion to say due to the passage into law of HB217, which eliminated nonpayment of fees as a reason to strip a Montana driver of their license. A month later, the parties filed a stipulation for dismissal that the court granted on June 17. The case is closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by a resident of Montana, who was unable to pay his court debt that grew to nearly $4,000 out of a small $185 civil infraction, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana. The plaintiff alleged that by indefinitely suspending the driver's licenses of people who failed to pay court-ordered fines, even where nonpayment was solely due to indigence, the defendants had violated equal protection, substantive due process, and procedural due process rights. The parties jointly moved to dismiss the case once Montana Governor Steve Bullock signed into law a bill ending the practice of stripping drivers licenses from individuals unable to pay fines. The case is closed.


On November 21, 2011, two protesters associated with Occupy Austin, a large continuous political protest, who had been arrested for trespassing, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the City of Austin and a number city employees in their official capacities. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the City of Austin's administrative policy of issuing "Criminal Trespass Notices" banning individuals from city property, including City Hall, imposes a prior restraint on their First Amendment rights of expression. They sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First Amendment and Due Process rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed these trespass notices were overbroad and vague, delegating unrestrained discretionary authority to a wide range of city employees to ban any individual from any or all city property for substantial periods, solely because that individual's conduct is subjectively viewed as "unreasonably disruptive or harmful." The City of Austin had provided its employees with a chart of suggested duration of exclusions based on descriptions of the disruptive or harmful conduct. Conduct was described in terms of the level of harm to persons or property, the level of disruption to City business or events, and the presence of similar past conduct. Each of these factors was measured with three imprecise quantifying terms, "no" "some" and "significant," with each quantifier receiving substantially differing suggested exclusion durations. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief stating that the city's trespassing law is facially unconstitutional as well as injunctive relief against further enforcement of the policy. On December 22, 2011, the District Court (Judge Lee Yeakel) partially granted defendants' motions to dismiss. The court found that the plaintiffs' claims against the city employees were redundant of the plaintiff's claims against the City of Austin. The court therefore dismissed the plaintiffs claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities and without prejudice to claims against those defendants in their individual capacities. On September 27, 2012, the District Court (Judge Lee Yeakel) found that the city's administrative bulletin Criminal Trespass Notices on City Property, was unconstitutional on its face and enjoined the City of Austin from further enforcement of the City's policy of issuing criminal-trespass notices. The court found that by barring access to the City Plaza, which the court recognized as a traditional public forum, the trespassing notices restricted protected-speech conduct. The court held that the policy burdened more speech than was necessary to secure the City of Austin's substantial government interests of control and maintenance of public property, and to provide city-owned facilities for business and other approved activities, and thus was not narrowly tailored. Finally, the court held that the policy was impermissibly broad and risked erroneous deprivation of first amendment interests. On October 5, 2012 the City of Austin filed a motion to amend the judgment. The District Court (Judge Lee Yeakel) denied that motion on February 4, 2013.

Summary: On November 21, 2011, two protestors who had been arrested for trespassing filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the City of Austin and a number city employees in their official capacities under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First Amendment and Due Process rights. On September 27, 2012, the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the City's policy of issuing criminal trespass notices was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest.


On March 13, 2014, a non-profit law firm advocating for the rights of immigrants, Americans for Immigrant Justice (AI Justice), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The case was assigned to Judge Kathleen Williams. AI Justice sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). After interviewing immigrant detainees who reported having been kept in cold, overcrowded holding cells for days on end, AI Justice had filed a FOIA request in March 2013, asking the defendants to provide documents regarding their temporary holding policies and the conditions in the temporary holding cells in the Rio Grande Valley sector. The defendants had not responded to the request within the applicable time period and still had not responded a year later. AI Justice sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees. The defendants completed their initial document search and issued a response to the plaintiff’s FOIA request on March 9, 2015. The defendants produced responsive documents to some but not all parts of the plaintiff’s request. Pursuant to FOIA exemptions, the defendants redacted portions of the documents that contained personal information or information used by law enforcement. Unsatisfied, AI Justice argued that the defendants’ search was inadequately thorough and the FOIA exemptions were inappropriate. The parties conferred and began collaborating to resolve the issues between them. These conferences lasted for several months and took place entirely without intervention of the court. The parties sought to postpone their trial date several times while they attempted to reach a settlement. On August 26, 2015, the parties jointly moved to remove this case from the trial calendar, as they had resolved all of their disputes regarding the FOIA request and now only disagreed on whether the plaintiff should receive attorney’s fees. Five days later, the court granted the parties’ motion and requested that they file a stipulation of mootness. The parties resolved their dispute regarding attorney’s fees before filing that stipulation of mootness on September 8, 2015. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $8,750.00. The next day, Judge Williams dismissed the case. This case presumably closed in September 2015. Nothing else appears on the docket after the case’s dismissal.

Summary: In March 2014, Americans for Immigrant Justice (AI Justice) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. AI Justice sued U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for failing to respond to its FOIA request and disclose documents related to immigrant holding cells. The parties settled in August 2015. The defendants produced enough documents to satisfy the plaitiff and agreed to pay the plaintiff's attorney's fees.


On February 20, 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, claiming that the defendants "wrongfully withheld agency records requested by Plaintiff by failing to comply with the statutory time limit for processing FOIA requests." The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from EFF, asked the court for injunctive relief. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the government agreed to expedite plaintiff's FOIA request but ultimately refused to process the request and disclose any information. On December 21, 2007, the plaintiff had issued a request for materials concerning exchanges that Justice Department officials had with members of Congress or agents of telecommunications companies concerning amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), "including any discussion of immunizing telecommunications companies or holding them otherwise unaccountable for their role in government surveillance activities." Soon after, plaintiff formally requested that defendants expedite each request because of an "urgency to inform the public." The government granted the expedite request, but no documents were released, which led to this lawsuit. On April 4, 2008, the district court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) granted a preliminary injunction requiring defendants to expedite the plaintiff's FOIA request. On September 24, 2009, the court denied summary judgment for defendants and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff under FOIA Exemption 6. The defendants appealed part of the summary judgment motion. On April 20, 2010, the Ninth Circuit (Judge Michael D. Hawkins) affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the plaintiffs with respect to the release of names and email addresses under FOIA Exemption 6, reversed as to email address that exposed identities. The court vacated, however, the district court's denial of summary judgment for the defendants and granted summary judgment for the plaintiff as to FOIA Exemptions 3 and 5. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Following the remand, the parties arranged for certain documents to be disclosed to the plaintiff. Those disclosures have been uploaded to the plaintiff's website and are made available below as well. After these disclosures were made, the plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal. On September 29, 2010, the district court dismissed this case with prejudice.

Summary: In 2010, the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California found that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 by refusing to process Electronic Frontier Foundation's FOIA request. ODNI lost on summary judgment and was forced to disclose the requested information.


On May 11, 2015, a Muslim prisoner filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and the Warden of Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Security Prison (“ADX”), where the plaintiff was incarcerated. Represented by the Civil Rights Clinic of the University of Denver-Sturm College of Law, the plaintiff brought his claims under <i>Bivens</i> and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”). He alleged that the prison’s practice of distributing his medication between 6:00 am and 6:00 pm during Ramadan – in violation of his religious faith – violated his rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise clause and under the RFRA. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was ultimately assigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson. On October 9, 2015, the plaintiff filed a substantially more detailed amended complaint. This complaint added several defendants, including individual wardens, medical staff members, and chaplains at the prison in their official and individual capacities, as well as the United States of America. It also expanded the relief sought. The plaintiff asked for: broader declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to respect his religious exercise, compensatory and punitive damages for the BOP’s “malicious and/or reckless deprivation” of his right to exercise his religion, and damages for the defendants’ failure to provide proper medical care because of his beliefs. He asked that the defendants be required to provide him Halal meals and to permit him to engage in group prayer. In the statement of facts, the plaintiff described specific examples of times that the defendants had intentionally disrespected his religion, such as mocking him and throwing the Holy Quran in the trash. He still alleged that the defendants’ actions had violated his First Amendment and RFRA rights, but he also added allegations stating violations of the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Clause. On February 10, 2016, the defendants filed three separate motions to dismiss. First, the United States argued that the plaintiff’s tort claim for the alleged failure to provide proper medical care should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust the remedies available before filing the lawsuit. Second, the Official-Capacity Defendants argued that the injunctive relief claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, and that the medication administration claim should be dismissed as moot because the prison had accommodated Plaintiff for the 2015 Ramadan. Third, the Individual-Capacity Defendants alleged that they were protected by qualified immunity. These were referred to Magistrate Judge Kristen L. Mix. On August 30, 2016, Magistrate Judge Mix recommended that the court grant in part and deny in part these motions. Judge Jackson adopted the recommendation on October 25, 2016. 2016 WL 6212518. This dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff’s medication during Ramadan claim and dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment (as to access to an Imam) claims against the Individual-Defendants. The plaintiff’s First Amendment and RFRA claims against the Official-Defendants (as to a Halal Diet, access to an Imam, the Sunnah fasts, and group prayer), the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Equal Protection claim against the Official-Defendants, and the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims against the Individual-Defendants remained. Both parties moved for the Court to reconsider the August 30th order. On January 17, 2017, Judge Jackson granted the defendants’ motion but denied the plaintiffs’ motion. 2017 WL 219343. Therefore, all of the plaintiff’s claims against Individual-Defendants were dismissed. Meanwhile, the parties had been engaging in discovery and preparing for trial for the remaining claims against the Official-Defendants. In December 2016, the court set a two-week jury trial for January 8, 2018. But on May 9, 2017, Judge Jackson referred the parties to the Magistrate Judge for a settlement conference. Presumably based on these settlement talks, the trial dates were pushed back. These settlement talks failed, and on November 20, 2017, the BOP moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff’s Sunnah fasting claims, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the remedies available before bringing the lawsuit. On December 5, 2017, Judge Jackson denied the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment. Although the order is not available, the docket states, “Since the parties appear to be largely starting over, and since there appears to be the possibility that changes within the BOP might moot the case, the Court elects not to address motions at this time.” In January 2018, the defendants transferred the plaintiff to a new prison in Terre Haute, Indiana. In a status report filed by the plaintiff on January 30, 2018, the plaintiff’s attorneys notified the court that the defendants had been unwilling to grant them access to communicate with their client since the transfer. They had no information on the conditions of confinement at the new prison. The attorneys speculated that the defendants had made this transfer in an attempt to deprive the court of jurisdiction in the matter. The plaintiffs then attempted to use this transfer as an opportunity to file a supplemental complaint. On April 10, 2018, Judge Jackson held that the transfer neither mooted the claim nor allowed the plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint. On April 18 the parties jointly agreed to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. The parties then began again to prepare for trial. On August 1, 2018, Judge Jackson issued an order addressing numerous pretrial motions. 2018 WL 3647915. He denied the plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking private regular access to an Imam, holding that this presented too great of a security risk. He denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue and failure to exhaust. He granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss claims as to procedures that applied to ADX but not to Terre Haute as there was no reason to believe that the plaintiff would return to ADX. At this point in the case, the Federal Bureau of Prisons was the only remaining defendant, with the remaining claims consisting of two RFRA claims. One challenged the defendant’s alleged failure to provide the plaintiff with a Halal diet and the other challenged the defendant’s failure to provide the plaintiff with access to an Imam. On August 20-21, 2018, the Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons asked the Warden at Terre Haute to provide Halal meals for the plaintiff. Within four days, the prison began providing the plaintiff with these meals. Similarly, just days before trial, the prison hired an Imam to provide classes at the prison. The plaintiff, who is a Sunni Muslim, opposed this Imam because he believed (seemingly incorrectly according to the court’s final order) that the new Imam was Sufi and therefore inconsistent with his beliefs. A bench trial was held on August 27, 2018. On September 13, 2018, Judge Jackson held that the plaintiff’s Halal diet claims had been resolved, but noted that this had only occurred on the eve of trial after years of litigation. 2018 WL 4356787. He required that the meals continue past the lawsuit barring “compelling governmental interests.” He further held that defendant’s hiring of an Imam, however unsatisfactory to the plaintiff, had satisfied the defendant’s duty. Finally, Judge Jackson held that the plaintiff was the prevailing party, and could be awarded attorney’s fees under the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Awards Act of 1976. Litigation continued as to the appropriate amount for these fees. During the course of this litigation, on October 12, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to alter judgment to reflect that they had satisfied their duty by hiring the Imam. The court issued an amended final judgment on April 15, 2019 that ruled in favor of the defendants on this matter and left all other issues resolved in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on this issue, and as of April 5, 2020 was awaiting a ruling. This case is ongoing.

Summary: A Muslim prisoner brought this case alleging violations of his rights under the RFRA and the First and Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He alleged that the prison had violated his rights by forcing him to take medication between 6am and 6pm during Ramadan, denying him access to group prayer, denying him Halal meals. The case ended with an order granting many, but not all, of the plaintiff's requested relief.


On December 19, 2004, several African Americans who applied for and were denied jobs at Von Maur brought suit against Von Maur in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. The plaintiffs claimed that the Defendant violated Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §1981, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act. The plaintiffs also made tort violations, claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in Von Maur’s hiring practices, including but not limited to failing to interview qualified African Americans, misplacing their applications, discouraging African Americans from applying, subjecting African Americans to stricter scrutiny during interviews and terminating their employment because of their race. The plaintiffs were represented by a private attorney and sought compensatory and punitive damages. The case was initially assigned to Judge Thomas J. Shields but reassigned to Judge Ross A. Walters on January 21, 2005. The complaint was amended several times in 2005, as the plaintiffs added additional named plaintiffs. In July 2006, the case was consolidated for the purpose of discovery with a separate private action brought against Von Maur, EEOC v. Von Maur. Extensive discovery followed between 2006 and 2008. On August 29, 2008, the court entered summary judgment for the employer as to claims of twelve applicants because the statute of limitations had passed and some claims failed to establish the required pretext for discrimination. However, claims of five others survived the motion. 574 F.Supp.2d 959 On September 22, 2008, the two cases were consolidated for trial, however, the parties settled on October 29, 2008. 2008 WL 11336227. In the settlement, Von Maur agreed to: 1. Pay a total of $50,000 in full settlement of the claims, within 10 days of the consent decree. 2. Post a notice for 2 years stating that: Von Maur will not discriminate in hiring on the basis of race, retaliate against any person who participated in this proceeding and that it will train all supervisory, management and human resources department employees regarding race discrimination and Von Maur’s policy prohibiting race discrimination. 3. Hold training sessions regarding the rights of applicants and employees under Title VII, and the employer’s obligations under Title VII, with an emphasis on what constitutes differential treatment of minority employees in the workplace, how to keep Von Maur free of such forms of discrimination, and what constitutes unlawful retaliation. They also agreed to additional training to all managers and all employees and supervisors in its Human Resources Department(s) regarding how to conduct a prompt and effective investigation into allegations, complaints, or charges of employment discrimination. 4. For 2 years, report every 6 months, until June 30, 2010, on information of all applicants for employment, names and races of applicants hired and any complaint of race discrimination. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2004, several African Americans who applied for a job at Von Maur, Inc. and denied brought suit against Von Maur, Inc. The plaintiffs alleged racial discrimination in Von Maur’s hiring practices including but not limited to failing to interview qualified African Americans, misplacing their applications, discouraging African Americans from applying, subjecting African Americans to stricter scrutiny during interviews and terminating their employment for racial reasons. The parties settled on October 29, 2008.