On April 7, 2005, a California state prisoner serving a life sentence with possibility of parole file a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against members of the Board of Parole Hearings (formerly the Board of Prison Terms and Parole) and the governor of California, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants maintained a review practices violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants maintained a systematic pattern of denial of parole solely based on unchangeable factors, such as the offence and pre-imprisonment conduct. The case then spent several years in discovery and motion practice. On June 2, 2008, the Magistrate Judge Gregory G. Hollows designated legal counsel for the plaintiff, who then filed Corrected Fourth Amended Complaint on January 29, 2009. The complaint contained eight named plaintiffs, but was filed as a class action seeking to represent all California prisoners serving life sentence with possibility of parole. On March 4, 2009, the Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) granted class certification to the plaintiffs, defining the class as California state prisoners who: (i) have been sentenced to a term that includes life; (ii) are serving sentences that include the possibility of parole; (iii) are eligible for parole; and (iv) have been denied parole on one or more occasions. The defendants appealed the class certification to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted the petition to appeal on June 2, 2009. The District Court started receiving motions to intervene. On October 15, 2009, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) granted the defendants' motion to stay proceedings pending interlocutory appeal in part. The proceedings were stayed only in relation to the pending motions to intervene, but denied in other respects without prejudice. On February 4, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) denied the motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's Ninth Cause of Action. With the separate order filed on the same day, the Court granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction as to Proposition 9 enjoining enforcement of Proposition 9 as to the named plaintiffs, as the plaintiffs showed the likelihood of success on the merits as to their Ex Post Facto challenge. The Court stated that the application of Proposition 9 will cause irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction due to the changes the Proposition 9 made in relation to increase in minimum deferral periods, the Board of Parole Hearings discretion and increase in maximum deferral periods. The Court, however, dismissed the Substantive Due Process claim of the plaintiffs as to Proposition 9. The defendants filed an interlocutory appeal as to preliminary injunction on March 3, 2010. They also filed a motion to stay enforcement of the preliminary injunction on March 5, 2010. On April 7, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) granted stay only in relation to one of the named plaintiffs, but the injunction remained in effect in relation to other named plaintiffs. On June 3, 2010, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the order granting class certification. In the meantime, the District Court received a lot of motions to intervene to be considered class members. On September 15, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) denied all the motions. The Court also kept receiving a number of motions for permissive joinder, all of which were denied by the Court. On January 24, 2011, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Carlos Bea) issued an order and opinion on the appeal as to preliminary injunction. The Court reversed the decision of the District Court, stating that the District Court abused its discretion and the plaintiffs did not establish that they are likely to succeed on the merits, as there was nothing on the facts in the record to infer that Proposition 9 created a significant risk of prolonging plaintiffs' incarceration. Gilman v. Schwarzenegger, 638 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010). On April 25, 2010, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) issued an order amending the definitions of certified class. As to the Eighth Cause of Action, the class is defined all California state prisoners who have been sentenced to a life term with possibility of parole for an offense that occurred before November 4, 2008. As to the Ninth Cause of Action, the class is defined all California state prisoners who have been sentenced to a life term with possibility of parole for an offense that occurred before November 8, 1988. The plaintiffs filed a motion for class-wide preliminary injunction in relation to the enforcement of Proposition 9 in violation of Ex Post Facto clause, on November 19, 2010. The plaintiffs relied on statistical data in support of granting the injunction. On August 31, 2011, the Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) appointed a neutral statistical expert to analyze the data. Based on the analysis of the data, the expert could not conclude that there is likely to be a risk of prolonged incarceration under Proposition 9 procedures. The Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) denied the motion for preliminary injunction on April 4, 2012. On March 3, 2012, the defendants entered a motion for judgment on the pleadings. On May 30, 2012, the Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) issued an order granting the motion in relation to three claims, as they challenged the substance of the parole decisions, including the complaint that the Board relies on static factors when making the decisions. On September 7, 2012, the Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) denied the plaintiffs' motion to file the Fifth Amended Complaint. It also granted the defendants' unopposed motion to de-certify classes for several causes of action. As a result, only the Ex Post Facto challenges to Proposition 9 and the Governor's powers remained as class actions. On May 6, 2013, the Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and preliminary injunction as to remaining causes of action, as well as defendants' motion for summary judgment and motion to de-certify remaining classes. Following a trial, the District Court (Judge Lawrence Karlton) issued an order that both Proposition 9 and Proposition 89 violated the Ex Post Facto rights of the class members, on February 28, 2014. The Court stated that there was sufficient evidence that Proposition 9's increase of deferral periods for parole hearing created a significant risk of imposing longer periods of incarceration on the class than was the case when the offence was committed. Furthermore, the advanced hearing proceedings available under Proposition 9 is not sufficient to protect against Ex Post Facto problems created by Proposition 9. The Court stated that, although Proposition 89 is neutral on its face allowing the Governor to reverse both grants and denials of parole, in practice it was used to tip the scales against parole grants. In effect, it denied the class members right to neutral interpretation of the rules, available prior to the new law. The Court, thus declared, both Proposition 9 and Proposition 89, as implemented, violated the ex post facto clauses. The Court also ordered injunctive relief, so that the Board of Parole Hearings is to apply California Penal Code to all members of the class as it existed prior to Proposition 9, and so that the Governor of California is to use the same standards as the Board of Parole Hearings when reviewing cases. The defendants filed an appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 27, 2014, in relation to the final judgment and all interlocutory orders. The plaintiffs filed a motion for attorney's fees on March 28, 2014. The court granted $34,201.56 in attorney's fees on Jul. 28, 2014. The case was reassigned to Chief Judge Morrison C. England, Jr. on Feb. 22, 2016. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order on Feb. 22, 2016. The court first argued that "Proposition 89 remains only a transfer of decisionmaking power, which does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause." 814 F.3d 1007. The court then argued that the district court erred in "basing its findings principally on speculation and inference" regarding Proposition 9. 814 F.3d 1007. The Ninth Circuit argued that the district court did not have enough evidence to support a finding that "an as-applied Ex Post Facto Clause violation...occurred" and that "proving a significant risk of prolonged incarceration in parole cases requires exacting evidence," a standard not met by "a decrease in the frequency of parole hearings—without more." 814 F.3d 1007. In response, on May 9, 2017, the district court vacated its prior judgment, ordered a judgment be entered for the defendants, and ordered the case closed. The case is closed.

Summary: On April 7, 2005, California state prisoner serving a life sentence with possibility of parole filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor of California, challenging parole proceedings as unconstitutional. The Court ruled that both Proposition 9 and Proposition 89 violated Ex Post Facto clause of the U.S. Constitution, as they significantly increased the risk of longer incarceration than was the case when offenses were committed.


On June 8, 2006, an African American woman with psychiatric disabilities filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against the Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (“Beth Israel”) and two employees of the hospital (one whose claim was dropped on June 24, 2008). The plaintiff, represented by the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Center for Public Representation, and private counsel, brought suit under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. She also brought state tort claims for negligence, assault, battery, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleged that she had sought treatment for migraines from the Defendant institution on her doctor’s instructions. While under the Defendants’ care, she was forcibly restrained and assaulted. The Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 13, 2007. The Plaintiff was an individual with a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because her psychiatric impairments severely limit her day-to-day activities, including caring for herself, working, and interacting with others. Her disabilities stemmed from years of extreme emotional and sexual abuse as a child, and were exasperated by the death of her son shortly after he was born. Beth Israel was familiar with the Plaintiff’s condition, as she had used the clinical and emergency services to treat her conditions for more than two decades. In March 2005, the Plaintiff began experiencing severe migraines and after several days, during which she spoke with her neurologist and his assistant, went to Beth Israel to meet with her primary care physician. This doctor was unavailable, but advised her to go to the hospital’s emergency department for treatment. After explaining to the triage nurse her symptoms and mentioning she had struggled with safety issues, the Plaintiff was told she needed a psychiatric evaluation and that her migraines would also be treated. Hospital policy at the time required patients in the psychiatric portion of the emergency department to disrobe or be forcibly stripped if they refuse. The Plaintiff was ultimately forcibly restrained and stripped. She was left alone in the room for several hours before receiving treatment from a mental health professional. The incident caused severe and long lasting mental and emotional harm to the Plaintiff. For the next two years the parties engaged in extensive litigation over discovery. On November 3, 2008, the Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, but the court never ruled on the motion because on January 13, 2009, the Parties notified the Court that they had reached a tentative settlement agreement and were finalizing details. On March 10, 2009, Judge Douglas Woodlock approved the agreement. We do not have the precise conditions of the settlement agreement, but the hospital agreed to implement a new search policy and a new restraint policy for patients. According to a jury verdict report from Lexis dating from June 4, 2007, the plaintiff was awarded zero damages. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement for two years, subject to extension for substantial non-compliance. No motions were filed suggesting non-compliance during the following two years, and the case was automatically dismissed as of March 10, 2011.

Summary: On June 8, 2006, the Plaintiff filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts against Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center (“Beth Israel”) and two employees of the hospital (one whose claim was dropped on June 24, 2008). The Plaintiff brought this action against the hospital for injunctive and declaratory relief under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The Plaintiff also requested injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory damages under M.G.L. §272, Sec. 98; M.G.L. Chapter 12, Section 11H and 11I; and state tort actions for negligence, assault, battery, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. The actions against the individual employees were for damages for interference with the Plaintiff’s civil rights under Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, malpractice, assault, battery, and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. The Plaintiff sought compensatory and/or punitive damages of $1,000,000, and costs of the suit. The case was settled in March 2009 and closed in March 2011.


The complaint for this case was filed on July 2, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. The complaint challenged an ordinance in Graham, North Carolina that forced would-be organizers of protests to obtain a permit from the city at least twenty four hours in advance. The ordinance gave the police chief total discretion to grant or deny permits based on whether the protest would cause a disturbance. Plaintiffs were individuals and organizations, including the Alamance County Branch of the NAACP and the national NAACP, who wanted to protest systemic racism, police brutality, and a local Confederate monument in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd. They were represented by counsel from the ACLU of North Carolina, the national ACLU, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, and private attorneys. Defendants were various city and county officials, including the Mayor of Graham, the Chief of Police of Graham Police Department, and the Sheriff of Alamance County. Plaintiffs brought the suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the ordinance and its enforcement violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. The First Amendment claim alleged that the ordinance was content-based regulation of speech and unconstitutional prior restraint. The Fourteenth Amendment claim alleged that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague since it did not provide notice of what standards were required to get a permit and that it violated the plaintiffs' right to travel. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Catherine C. Eagles and Magistrate Judge L. Patrick Auld. Defendants consented to a temporary restraining order (TRO) that would prohibit defendants from enforcing the ordinance for fourteen days. The court granted this consent motion on July 6. Then, on July 14, the city council repealed the ordinance, which rendered any issued or prospective injunctive relief moot. The court granted the order withdrawing motions for injunctive relief on July 16. However, on July 17, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which made the same legal complaints (violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments), but this time focused on being allowed to protest at the courthouse, rather than the ordinance. On July 28, the plaintiffs submitted a second motion for a temporary restraining order that would enjoin the defendants from prohibiting their protests at the courthouse. In early August, Judge Eagles issued her opinion regarding the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 457284. She held that, while the plaintiffs were highly likely to succeed on the merits, the balance of equities was in the defendants' favor as to the temporary restraining order. She found that the wording of the order was problematic and wanted to give defendants a chance to put in place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to protect public property. Therefore, she denied the motion for a temporary restraining order and left the motion for preliminary injunction pending. On August 14, the court issued an order granting the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 4738015. The court found that defendants' actions restricting protests at the courthouse constituted a total prohibition, rather than a time, place, or manner restriction. The total prohibition was not narrowly tailored, and so the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction. The order enjoined the defendants from prohibiting protests at the courthouse steps, the courthouse lawns, the sidewalks, and the area between the courthouse and the Confederate monument. However, the order left an exemption that allowed the defendants to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions or to temporarily prohibit protests in the event of a short-term emergency (for example, if a person had a heart attack and emergency services needed to interrupt the protest). The case is ongoing as of October 1, 2020.

Summary: This complaint, filed on July 2, 2020, came amidst the nationwide protests that occurred after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleged that a local ordinance in Graham, North Carolina violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The ordinance required would-be protesters to acquire a permit at least twenty-four hours in advance of their protest, and the Chief of Police had the authority to issue the permits. Plaintiffs, including the NAACP of Alamance County, the national NAACP, and several individual plaintiffs, sought injunctive relief and declaratory relief against the Mayor of Graham, the Graham Chief of Police, and the Sheriff of Alamance County. The city repealed the ordinance on July 14. Then on July 17, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which focused on the ability to protest at the historic courthouse, which contained a Confederate monument. They claimed that anti-racist groups were consistently denied permits to protest at the courthouse, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On August 5 the court denied the motion for a TRO, but left undecided the motion for a preliminary injunction. On August 14 the court granted the preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing as of October 1, 2020.


On March 6, 2012, the mother and minor children of a pre-trial detainee who died in jail from an infection filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Sutter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; represented by private counsel, they asked the court for monetary relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their father's substantive due process rights and the Constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed the defendants' poor medical care for their father's life-threatening infection led to his preventable death. After a series of motions to dismiss by the defendant and amended complaints filed by the plaintiffs, the parties reached a settlement agreement. On April 10, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for approval of a settlement and for orders to deposit money into blocked accounts. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $824,999. On June 11, 2014, parties agreed to the dismissal of the case.

Summary: In 2012, the mother and minor children of a pre-trial detainee who died in jail from an infection filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the County of Sutter under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants' poor medical care for their father's life-threatening infection led to his preventable death. In 2014, the parties settled the case and the defendants agreed to pay $824,999.


On August 13, 2001, two female employees of the New Orleans Saints Organization filed a lawsuit against the New Orleans Saints, its owner, and two of its partner corporations. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged various violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). One of the two plaintiffs also alleged violations of the Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. Section 2201 and 28 U.S.C. Section 2202 as well as injunctive relief. With respect to the Civil Rights Acts and the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendants (1) from imposing on their female employees unequal standards of discipline and evaluation, (2) from adversely impacting the female employees via the defendants' "restructuring" of the New Orleans Saints organization, (3) from denying female employees promotional opportunities and equal pay opportunities, (4) from maintaining a hostile workplace, (5) from sexual harassing the female employees, and (6) from retaliating against plaintiffs because of the exercise of their civil rights. With respect to the FLSA, the plaintiffs alleged that they frequently worked over forty hours a week but received either no additional compensation for those hours or insufficient compensation for those hours, in violation of the overtime provisions of Section 207. Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants failed and/or refused to keep the appropriate records regarding employee overtime, in violation of the record-keeping requirements of Section 211(c). With respect to the FMLA, the plaintiff alleged that defendants intentionally interfered with and/or restrained or denied the exercise (or attempted exercise) of rights to which she was entitled under FMLA. The plaintiff asked the court to secure the protection of and redress the deprivation of her rights under the act, seeking restitution of all rights, privileges, benefits, and income that would have been received by her but for defendants' practices. On May 30, 2002, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to extend deadlines for class certification. The plaintiffs had moved to extend the deadline for the filing of a class motion twice before, which the court had granted both times. The court denied this third motion, finding that the plaintiffs had "demonstrated a lack of interest in aggressively pursuing the interests of the putative class in matters of discovery and class certification" in violation of FRCP 23(a)(4), which requires that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. On November 12, 2003, the parties successfully negotiated a confidential settlement agreement, and the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana (Judge Eldon E. Fallon) dismissed the case without costs and without prejudice. On January 2, 2004, the court ordered dismissal of all of the defendants with prejudice. Subsequently, the law firm that had represented the plaintiffs from the start of the action until shortly after an unsuccessful settlement conference in February 2003 filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Reopen Case and to File Intervention. The court denied this motion on February 12, 2004, holding that the law firm failed to provide a basis to accomplish re-opening the case in the face of the prior dismissal with prejudice and that the law firm failed to satisfy the timeliness requirements of filing a motion to intervene provided under FRCP 24(a).

Summary: This case was brought by two female employees of the New Orleans Saints organization against the New Orleans Saints, its owner, and two of its partner corporations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged sex discrimination, including pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile workplace environment, and retaliation in employment. The case was settled between the parties privately and dismissed in November 2003.


On June 25, 2019, five asylum seekers from Angola, Cuba, and El Salvador filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Attorney General under the Refugee Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture, 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c), (d); and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The plaintiffs, represented by the International Refugee Assistance Program and the Refugee and Immigrant Center for Education and Legal Services, sought declarative, injunctive, and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that the Trump Administration issued a set of instructions (the "Lesson Plan") on April 30, 2019, to asylum officers that were designed to turn back as many asylum seekers as possible. The Lesson Plan allegedly made it far more difficult for asylum seekers to pass their “credible fear interviews.” If an asylum seeker is found to lack “credible fear,” they may be unable to apply for asylum. The case was assigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. On August 19, 2019, the defendants moved for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ case should be dismissed because it was not a legal issue over which the court could exercise its judicial authority because there was no evidence that enjoining the Lesson Plan would remedy plaintiffs' injuries and because the Lesson Plan was not subject to judicial review under the APA. Furthermore, the defendants contended that the Lesson Plan had no real impact on the credible fear process and that it was just a minor update to account for developments in the case law. On September 5, 2019, the plaintiffs cross-moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs contended that they were entitled to summary judgment on the merits because the Lesson Plan was inconsistent with the statutory and regulatory scheme of the credible fear process and was in violation of the APA. With regards to the defendants’ contention that the Lesson Plan had no real impact, the plaintiffs rebutted that the record showed a significant change to policy. Judge Jackson held a hearing on the motions for summary judgment on October 22, 2019. On March 5, 2020, Judge Jackson issued an order staying the case pending resolution of appeal in Grace v. Barr, No. 19-5013 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Judge Jackson stated that Grace v. Barr presented various questions regarding the meaning of terms under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e), the credible fear interview statute, such as the meaning of "implementation," "implement," and "written policy directive, written policy guideline, or written procedure." Judge Jackson found that because similar questions of law are relevant in the current case, it should be stayed pending resolution in the D.C. Circuit. More information about Grace v. Barr can be found here. After the D.C. Circuit released its opinion in Grace, Judge Jackson granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment on October 31, 2020. 2020 WL 6392824. Applying the Chevron deference framework, Judge Jackson concluded that USCIS unlawfully required screening officers to make credible fear determinations in a manner that is "inconsistent with the two-stage asylum eligibility framework that the INA plainly establishe[d]." Therefore, Judge Jackson declared that the provisions of the Lesson Plan that conflicted with the INA were unlawful. Because the unlawful parts couldn't be severed from the rest of the document, Judge Jackson vacated the entire Lesson Plan. Finally, judge Jackson enjoined the credible fear determinations previously made pursuant to the plan, and ordered that these plaintiffs be provided a new credible fear screening. On December 15, the defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit Court. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, IRAP, on the behalf of five asylum seekers, filed this complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that a set of instructions issued by the Trump administration were designed to turn back as many asylum seekers as possible and violated the credible fear process and their due process rights. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin ICE from continuing to apply these instructions during the credible fear process. On October 31, 2020, Judge Jackson granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.


On May 10, 2012, a group of non-citizens detained in New Jersey immigrant detention facilities filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and it component, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Represented by the ACLU Immigrant's Rights Project, Plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that their continued detention despite strong claims against deportability was a violation of their Fifth Amendment right to due process, and a misapplication of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief, ordering Defendants to demonstrate a prima facie case of deportability or inadmissibility as justification for mandatory detention. Specifically, Plaintiff Gayle claimed that his detention was a violation of the INA because he was arrested and detained by ICE five years after being released from state custody. Plaintiff Gayle claimed that this conflicted with the language of the INA, which required detention of an alien "when the alien is released" from state custody due to a criminal offense. On November 15, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify their class. The class was described as "All individuals in New Jersey who are and will be detained pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1226(c))." The motion for class certification was not acted upon. On March 15, 2013, the District Court (Judge Freda L. Wolfson) issued an order granting Plaintiff Gayle a writ of habeas corpus. 2013 WL 1090993. Judge Wolfson ruled that Defendants must hold a bond hearing to determine Plaintiff Gayle's flight risk and danger to the community within ten days of the order. This terminated the case.

Summary: In 2012, non-citizens held in New Jersey correctional facilities pursuant to mandatory detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The Plaintiffs filed suit against U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. On March 15, 2013, the court (Judge Freda L. Wolfson) granted Plaintiff Gayle's petition, and ordered a bond hearing within 10 days of the order. This terminated the case.


On November 8, 2011, the American Immigration Council (AIC), an immigrant rights advocacy organization, filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. AIC sued under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that DHS had failed to make a reasonable search for and disclosure of requested documents concerning individuals' access to legal counsel during their interactions with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). (That same day, AIC filed a similar lawsuit relating to a similar records request made to a different DHS component, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. For information on that one, see IM-DC-0017 in this Clearinghouse.) DHS moved for summary judgment, but withdrew the motion voluntarily several months later. On May 22, 2012, DHS filed a consent motion that set out a schedule for a rolling production of responsive documents over a period of between six and nine months, with monthly status reports to the court. Following this period, the parties agreed to consult regarding a renewed briefing schedule. For more than a year, DHS produced documents on a rolling basis. At the August 27, 2013, status conference, the parties identified nine documents that remained at issue. AIC requested that DHS release four of the nine documents and in exchange, AIC would forego challenges to the exemptions asserted by the defendants in the remaining five documents. On September 10, 2013, DHS determined that it could not release the four documents in full. A briefing schedule was therefore set. On November 5, 2013, DHS filed a motion for summary judgment and argued that withholding those four documents were appropriate under FOIA Exemption 7, which protects certain information that could be expected to risk circumvention of the law when disclosed. On February 25, 2014, the district court (Judge James E. Boasberg) decided that an in camera (in chambers) review of the documents in question was necessary and ordered DHS to produce redacted and unredacted copies of the disputed records. On March 21, 2014, Judge Boasberg granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment after because the in camera review of the documents convinced the court that DHS had a better argument, albeit the thin applicability of the claimed exemptions. The court agreed with DHS that each of the withheld records has a “rational nexus” to the agency’s law enforcement duties, including the prevention of terrorism and unlawful immigration. The documents therefore fell under Exemption 7 of FOIA. As a result, the court granted DHS's summary judgment for Documents 1 through 6 and dismissed as moot AIC's claim regarding Document 7. On August 29, 2014, AIC filed a motion to set a schedule regarding plaintiff’s attorneys' fees, which the court granted on September 24, 2014. In its motion for attorneys' fees and costs on October 17, 2014, AIC mainly argued for fees and costs because DHS voluntarily and unilaterally changed its position, and that AIC was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs because it substantially prevailed under FOIA. AIC also argued that the fees and costs sought were reasonable and that AIC was entitled to those fees because it met all four factors for entitlement: (1) the public benefited from plaintiff’s request, (2) plaintiff derived no commercial benefit from its request, (3) nature of plaintiff’s interest in the information supported award of fees, and (3) defendant’s conduct was not reasonable. On March 10, 2015, Judge Boasberg awarded fees and costs in the total amount of $82,513.42 out of the $131,100.21 that the plaintiff originally sought. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 8, 2011, an immigrants' rights non-profit organization filed suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, against the U.S. Department of Human Services and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought records concerning individuals' access to counsel during their interactions with CBP. In May 2012 the parties entered a consent motion setting out a timetable for a rolling production of responsive documents over a period of six to nine months. Following the rolling production of documents, nine documents remained at issue. A briefing schedule was therefore set and in November 2013, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. In March 2014, the Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed as moot the plaintiff's claims regarding the remaining document. In October 2014, the plaintiff argued for fees and costs because the plaintiff substantially prevailed and met all factors for fee entitlement. In March 2015, the Court agreed in part and granted fees and costs in the total amount of $82,513.42 to the plaintiff. The case is now closed.


On October 7, 2014, four same-sex couples and Wyoming Equality filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the State of Wyoming. The four couples live in Wyoming, two seek to get married in the state and the others seek to have their marriages, performed in other jurisdictions, legally recognized in the state. Wyoming Equality is a non-profit organization that works on behalf of LGBT causes in the state. The plaintiffs asked the court to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the enforcement of Wyoming Statute 20-1-101, which denies marriage licenses to same-sex couples and forbids the recognition of same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. The plaintiffs argued that by defining marriage as only between a man and a woman, the law deprives same-sex couples of the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the law must be overturned in light of the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Kitchen v. Herbert and Bishop v. Smith, which both held that laws banning same-sex marriage are unconstitutional. The plaintiffs also sought the costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees related to the lawsuit. On October 17, 2014, the United States District Court (Judge Scott W. Skavdahl) entered an order preliminarily enjoining the enforcement of Wyoming Statute 20-1-101, ruling Kitchen and Bishop controlled the outcome of the case. The court (Judge Skavdahl) found that Wyoming's ban on same sex marriage did violate the couples' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants decided not to appeal the case to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and on January 29, 2015 the court (Judge Skavdahl) entered an order permanently enjoining Wyoming from enforcing statute 20-1-101.

Summary: In 2014, four same-sex couples and Wyoming Equality filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming seeking an order enjoining the state from enforcing its law banning same-sex marriage. Ten days after the case was filed the court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, overturning the ban. Defendants decided not to appeal the ruling and, on January 29, 2015, the court entered an order permanently enjoining the enforcement of the law banning same-sex marriage in Wyoming.


The plaintiff in this case is a transgender, Native American woman. She was incarcerated at facilities run by the Idaho Department of Corrections. Despite multiple attempts at self-castration, the Idaho Department of Corrections and its employees had denied her medically necessary care, refused to transfer her, and failed to provide accommodations for her to express her gender identity. The defendants refused to provide the plaintiff with hormone treatment and gender confirmation surgery. Because of this, the plaintiff attempted to castrate herself on two occasions. Additionally, employees at the facilities punished the plaintiff by placing her in solitary confinement when she attempted to express her gender identity by modifying her clothes and wearing her hair in a ponytail. Represented by the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the plaintiff filed suit on April 6, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The initial complaint was handwritten. An amended complaint was filed in September 2017. This complaint alleged that the Idaho Department of Corrections and its private contractor Corizon violated her Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and her Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. She alleged discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis of sex as well as violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination on the basis of disability. In addition to constitutional claims, she filed multiple state negligence claims. She requested injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief in the form of compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. On June 1, 2018, Judge B. Lynn Winmill granted the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment with respect to the plaintiff’s negligence claims and the claims she brought under the Americans with Disabilities Act. At this hearing the court also dismissed the plaintiff's request that the court enjoin the defendant to transfer the plaintiff to a female facility. Over six months later, on December 13, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction in part. The court ordered the defendants to provide adequate medical care and gender confirmation surgery as promptly as possible. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 211391, WL 6571203 *51, 358 F.Supp.3d 1103. This order did not address injunctive relief regarding gender-appropriate clothing and commissary items because the Idaho Department of Corrections implemented a gender dysphoria policy addressing these requests on October 5, 2018. The defendants appealed the district court’s preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit on January 9, 2019. (Appeal Docket No. 19-35017 and 19-35019). Back in the district court, on Jan 31, 2019 the plaintiff filed another amended complaint. This complaint was very similar to the last one, but removed the Eighth Amendment failure to protect from harm claim. Also in the district court, the defendants filed a motion to stay the December 13, 2018 order pending appeal, which Judge Winmill denied. 2019 WL 1027979 (March 4, 2019 D. Idaho). While the case was on appeal in the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff filed a motion in the district court for an indicative ruling pursuant to Rulea 62.1 and 60(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This motion asked the court to make explicit findings that
the injunctive relief ordered ... [in the Court’s prior memorandum decision and order in this case] is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the federal right, is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that there is no evidence that granting this relief will have any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system.
 Judge Winmill denied this motion as unnecessary because her prior memorandum complies with the Prison Litigation Reform Act's requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. 2019 WL 1546927 (April 9, 2019 D. Idaho). In the Ninth Circuit, oral argument was held on May 16, 2019 before a panel comprised of Circuit Judges M. Margaret McKeown and Ronald M. Gould, and District Judge Robert S. Lasnik. On May 30, 2019, the Ninth Circuit remanded to the district court to address three issues. First, the district court needed to clarify if the order denying defendant's motion for stay pending appeal was meant to renew the preliminary injunction. Second, the court needed to clarify if its ruling on the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction also granted the plaintiff permanent injunctive relief. Finally, the court needed to clarify whether the plaintiff succeeded on the merits of her Eighth Amendment claim for permanent injunctive relief. In an opinion by Judge Winmill issued the next day, the court renewed the preliminary injunctive relief, clarified that the grant of preliminary injunctive relief also granted the plaintiff permanent injunctive relief, and clarified that the court had previously concluded that the plaintiff succeeded on the merits of her Eighth Amendment claim for permanent injunctive relief. 2019 WL 2319527 (May 31, 2019 D. Idaho). The Ninth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion on August 23, 2019 affirming all the decisions of the district court. 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019). The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit on July 1, 2019. (Appeal Docket No. 19-35552). On October 24, 2019, the district court issued an order requiring defendants to provide all pre-surgical treatments and corollary appointments or consultations necessary for gender confirmation surgery. The defendants filed yet another appeal on October 31, 2019 to the Ninth Circuit regarding Judge Winmill's October 24, 2019 order. (Appeal Docket No. 19-35917). The Ninth Circuit dismissed this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The same day, in the district court, the defendants filed an expedited motion to stay the court's October 24, 2019 order pending appeal. On November 8, 2019, Judge Winmill issued an opinion denying the defendant's expedited motion to stay. In this opinion, Judge Winmill deferred setting a deadline for the plaintiff to receive her first pre-surgical treatment and also allowed the court to hold a hearing on this limited issue. 2019 WL 5865620 (Nov. 8, 2019 D. Idaho). A hearing was held on November 21, 2019 before Judge Winmill. At the conclusion of this hearing, Judge Winmill reinstated her previous October 24, 2019 order and ordered that the plaintiff must begin receiving pre-surgical treatments no later than November 26, 2019. The defendants requested rehearing in front of the Ninth Circuit en banc, which was denied as the request failed to receive a majority of the votes of non-recused active judges in favor of en banc consideration. The Ninth Circuit issued an order denying rehearing en banc along with an opinion by Circuit Judge Diarmuid O'Scannlain respecting the decision, and and dissents from denial of rehearing en banc prepared by Judge Collins and Judge Bumatay. The entire document was 161 pages. 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. Feb 10, 2020). On March 2, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to stay litigation in the district court pending the defendants' forthcoming appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiff did not oppose the stay, but requested limited exceptions necessary to preserve critical evidence. In April 2017, Judge Winmill issued an order granting the stay. In the order, Judge Winmill ordered the defendants to preserve all relevant evidence and to continue to provide Plaintiff with pre-surgical treatment as required by the October 24, 2019 order. 2020 WL 1907560 (April 17, 2020, D. Idaho) On May 6, 2020, the defendants filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. (Appeal Docket No. 19-1280). The issues brought before the Supreme Court were
[w]hether the Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the guidelines set by an advocacy organization constitute the constitutional minima for inmate medical care under the Eighth Amendment, when the First, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all concluded that they do not.
 and
Whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding that a prison health care provider’s individualized medical decision was unreasonable and therefore constituted deliberate indifference, regardless of his subjective reasoning, conflicts with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (holding that mere negligence does not establish deliberate indifference), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (holding the provider must have known of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to find deliberate indifference).
 On the same day, the defendant-petitioner's submitted an application to stay the district court's order to Justice Kagan. On May 21, 2020, Justice Kagan denied the application. 2020 WL 2569747 (May 21, 2020 S. Ct.). The plaintiff-respondent has filed an opposition to the defendant-petitioner's brief. The defendant has until August 10, 2020 to file a response. As of July 2020, the case remains open in front of the Supreme Court.

Summary: A Native American, transgender inmate in Idaho alleged violation of her 14th and 8th Amendment rights. The Idaho Department of Corrections denied her access to adequate hormone treatment and gender confirmation surgery. The Court found for the plaintiff and enjoined defendants to provide gender reassignment surgery. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and a panel of judges affirmed the district court's decision. The defendants have now filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the United States. Briefing before the Supreme Court is ongoing as of July 2020.


This Clearinghouse record combines two cases, Heyer v. City of New York (S.D.N.Y., filed 1980), and Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority (originally E.D.N.Y., filed 2002; transferred to S.D.N.Y. in 2005 and consolidated with Heyer). On February 20, 1980, individuals with mobility impairments who were eligible for the Section 8 program commenced a class action lawsuit, Heyer v. City of New York Housing Authority, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the New York City Housing Authority under the United States Housing Act of 1937, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging that the New York City Housing Authority failed to provide individuals with mobility impairments, who have been, are, or will be qualified for the Section 8 program, with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. The District Court certified a class, and in 1982 ordered a settlement agreement that required the defendant to take certain remedial steps under the supervision of the District Court. However, the settlement had no termination provision, and at some point the settlement fell into disuse. Then on June 17, 2002, a class of individuals with mobility impairment who were eligible for the Section 8 program filed Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority in the Eastern District of New York challenging similar violations by the Housing Authority. In Bennett, the plaintiffs sued under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fair Housing Act, alleging that the New York City Housing Authority failed or refused to assist them in finding housing so that they can make use of their housing vouchers. More specifically, they claimed that the defendants failed or refused to assist them in finding housing with accommodations for individuals with mobility impairments. Represented by the New York Legal Assistance Group, the Bennett plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Unaware of the Heyer case and settlement agreement, the parties fully litigated a motion to dismiss, which was granted in a December 16, 2002 Memorandum and Order by U.S. District Judge Charles P. Sifton. The Judge agreed with the defendant that there was no subject matter jurisdiction, and denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend the complaint as futile. 248 F.Supp.2d 166. Shortly thereafter, the parties began negotiating a settlement and on May 4, 2005, the parties signed a Stipulation and Order of Settlement in which the defendants agreed to: make accommodations for disabled individuals in the application process for public housing, regularly update its lists of available apartments, work with approved real estate brokers to locate apartments that may be suitable for individuals with mobility impairments, and recommend that landlords modify apartments to suit individuals with mobility impairments. The issue of attorneys' fees was handled privately by the parties. It was not until 2005, three years after Bennett was filed, that the parties became aware of the earlier Heyer case. The Bennett case was then transferred from the Eastern District of New York to the Southern District of New York so that the new (Bennett) litigation could be consolidated with the old (Heyer) litigation. The two consolidated cases were settled in 2006, which dissolved the 1982 Heyer stipulation and substituted a new stipulation imposing certain obligations, including a reporting requirement, on the Housing Authority for a three year period to begin on April 27, 2006. However, after the Housing Authority failed to fulfill its obligations during that three year period, the Court extended its jurisdiction over the consolidated cases from 2009 to 2011. On January 30, 2012, after the plaintiffs complained about the Housing Authority's continued failure to meet the monitoring requirements, the parties negotiated the terms of yet another revised stipulation, which imposed additional obligations on the Housing Authority, including monitoring by the attorneys for the plaintiffs for three months after signing the Stipulation. This stipulation was set to run until April 30, 2014 unless extended by consent of the parties or order of the Court. There has been no further movement on the case; presumably the case is now closed.

Summary: On February 20, 1980, individuals with mobility impairments who were eligible for the Section 8 program commenced Heyer v. City of New York Housing Authority, a class action lawsuit against the New York Housing Authority for its alleged failure to provide individuals with mobility impairments who have been, are, or will be qualified for the Section 8 program with effective assistance in finding accessible housing. The District Court certified a class and in 1982 ordered a settlement agreement, which at some point fell into disuse. Then in 2002, a class of individuals with mobility impairment who were eligible for the Section 8 program filed Bennett v. New York City Housing Authority in the Eastern District of New York, challenging similar violations by the Housing Authority. Unaware of the Heyer case and settlement agreement, the Bennet parties fully litigated the defendant's motion to dismiss which was granted in a December 16, 2002 Memorandum and Order. It was not until 2005 that the Heyer litigation was discovered by the Bennett parties. After moving the Bennett case to the Southern District of New York, the parties reached an agreement in 2006 in which the Bennett case was consolidated with the 1980 Heyer case. Also in the 2006 stipulation and settlement agreement, the Housing Authority agreed to provide accommodations for individuals with disabilities looking for Section 8 housing. After the Housing Authority failed to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, the court elected to extend its jurisdiction over the case from 2009 to 2011. In 2012, the parties negotiated a revised stipulation which imposed additional obligations on the Housing Authority. Since then, there has been no further movement on this case, and the case has been closed.


On November 20, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), an independent non-profit research center dedicated to privacy and civil liberties issues, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to District Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. The plaintiff sued the United States Department of Commerce and its agency, the Bureau of the Census, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Declaratory Judgment Act. EPIC, represented by its own in-house counsel, alleged that the Census Bureau’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census without conducting and publishing Privacy Impact Assessments that analyze how citizenship data will be handled, was in violation of the APA and the E-Government Act of 2002. The plaintiff specifically alleged that the Commerce Department and the Census Bureau failed to conduct and publicly release a “legally sufficient” Privacy Impact Assessment for the “collection, processing, and storage” of personally identifiable citizenship data on the 2020 Census, as required by the E-Government Act. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, EPIC sought to compel Department to create and publish Privacy Impact Assessment, and requested that the Court enjoin the Commerce Department from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census until the Department has published a “full and complete” Privacy Impact Assessment. On January 18, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On February 8, the Court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commerce Department from including the citizenship question to the 2020 Census. 356 F.Supp.3d 85. The Court found that the plaintiff did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits - the touchstone of the preliminary injunction inquiry. The Court reasoned that plaintiff did not have a high likelihood of success on the merits, because the Bureau did not act contrary to the E-Government Act by deciding to collect citizenship data before conducting, reviewing, or releasing a PIA addressing that decision. EPIC immediately appealed. On March 11, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. On June 28, the Court of Appeals vacated the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for the purpose of dismissal. The court found that the organization lacked standing as they failed to show injury. 928 F.3d 95. On August 12, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing, which was denied on September 16. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction on October 3. Although the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on December 16, 2019, certiorari was denied on April 27, 2020. 2020 WL 1978949. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 30, 2018, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed a lawsuit challenging the Commerce Department’s decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census without conducting and publishing Privacy Impact Assessments that analyze how citizenship data will be handled. On Jan 18, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction. On appeal, the order was vacated and remanded the case for dismissal as the organization lacked standing as they failed to show injury. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, and certiorari was denied on April 27, 2020.


On February 14, 2013, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jacksonville Branch ("NAACP") and the Jacksonville Brotherhood of firefighters, a Chapter of the International Association of African-American Professional Fire Fighters (JBOF) brought this class action lawsuit for violations of Title VII in the U.S. District Court of Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that defendant, the Consolidated City of Jacksonville, through its Fire and Rescue Department ("JFRD"), engaged in discriminatory recruitment, hiring, assignment and transfer polices that have a disparate impact on black candidates and black firefighters. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The class was specified as all black candidates or aspiring black candidates for employment who were denied employment or dissuaded from applying by JFRD's discriminatory hiring process and all present or past black firefighters who have been subject to a hostile work environment, and/or discriminatory assignment and transfer policies, from July 30, 2006 to the present, two years prior to the sworn filing of the EEOC complaint. The case was assigned to District Judge Timothy J. Corrigan. On June 3, 2013, the plaintiffs moved for temporary restraining order. On October 24, 2013, Judge Corrigan denied the motion and ordered the parties to mediate by December 16, 2013. Settlement negotiations proceeded for three years, and were ultimately successful. In March 2016, the parties proposed a settlement agreement. The remedy included a payment of $250,000 to settlement funds. The city agreed to hire a group of prospective firefighters over the next five years who did not yet have a state certification and allow them to complete the required training within the 18 months of hiring. This was to meet the goal to build a fire and rescue workforce reflective of the community, first announced in 1999. The agreement covered hiring through 2021. In addition, the settlement included policies on transfer, work environment, anti-harassment training, and record-keeping and reporting obligations. The city agreed to grant requests to transfer to the most senior individual with qualifications who submits a reassignment request. The city also agreed to maintain work environment free from harassment and retaliation, provide anti-harassment training to all current and new personnel and document harassment complaints or investigations. The city agreed to provide an annual report to the Jacksonville Human Rights Commission containing information about training, work environment policy and harassment and retaliation complaints. On May 13, 2016, the parties filed a joint notice of settlement and motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. On May 16, 2016, Judge Corrigan granted the motion. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The last compliance date within this agreement is in the year 2021 and so presumably the court will have jurisdiction until that point. Implementation of the settlement agreement is ongoing and there has been no change as of April 26, 2020.

Summary: In 2013, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Jacksonville Branch (''NAACP") and the Jacksonville Brotherhood of firefighters, a Chapter of the International Association of African-American Professional Fire Fighters ("JBOF") brought this class action lawsuit for violations of Title VII in the U.S. District Court of Middle District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that City of Jacksonville had hiring and workplace policies that had a disparate impact on Black firefighters. The parties agreed to a settlement agreement in May 2016, which included $250,000 payment, hiring and anti-harassment policies as remedy.


Several individuals with disabilities filed this lawsuit to challenge Oklahoma's proposed reduction in prescription drug coverage under its Home and Community Based Services Medicaid waiver. Each of the plaintiffs has a range of (largely physical) disabilities and would qualify for nursing home care, but is able to remain in the community due to services provided via the Medicaid waiver. When the Oklahoma Health Care Authority announced that it would cover a maximum of 5 prescription drugs for those not residing in institutions, but would not limit the prescription drugs available to those residing in institutions, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint on October 1, 2002, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, claiming that this planned reduction violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) under the Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C. The Plaintiffs also claimed that the reduction in benefits violated the notice provision of the federal Medicaid Act and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. On November 1, 2002, the District Court (Judge James H. Payne) granted the state's motion for summary judgment. He found that this case was distinguishable from Olmstead because the Plaintiffs were not institutionalized, but were instead alleging a risk of institutionalization. Judge Payne held that the ADA would not apply to such a claim. The Plaintiffs subsequently filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In a decision on July 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals (Judge Lucero) reversed the District Court. The Court found that it was not necessary for Plaintiffs to be currently institutionalized in order to bring a claim under the ADA's integration mandate, and nothing in the text of the ADA or in the Olmstead decision would suggest that institutionalization is a prerequisite. On November 17, 2003, the District Court dismissed the case because the parties had entered into a settlement agreement. Under the settlement, HCBS Waiver participants can have up to 7 generic prescriptions with the option to request more through an authorization process.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed this challenge to the state's planned reduction of prescription drug coverage for individuals with disabilities who live in the community and receive services via a Medicaid waiver. The District Court held that non-institutionalized plaintiffs could not assert a claim under Olmstead. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that alleging a risk of institutionalization was sufficient. The case then settled.


On July 6, 2004, individuals who had been granted the status of lawful permanent resident by the Department of Justice's Executive Office of Immigration Review filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the United States Attorney General, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services and its Director, and the San Francisco District Director under 5 U.S.C. § 551, 28 U.S.C. § 1361 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law of Texas, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sought to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government no longer issued temporary documentation of a status change to lawful permanent residents and delayed its processes for issuing permanent documentation to individuals granted lawful permanent resident status. Without such documentation, the plaintiffs alleged, they were denied employment, travel, educational, and public benefits privileges granted to other legal permanent residents. On July 21, 2004, the case was reassigned from Judge James Larson to District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. On October 12, 2004, Judge Patel certified the class as follows: “The class consists of all persons who were or will be granted lawful permanent resident status by the EOIR, through the Immigration Courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals of the United States, and to whom USCIS has failed to issue evidence of registration as a lawful permanent resident with the exception that the class excludes the 34 named plaintiffs in Lope-Armor v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.) and the plaintiff class in Padilla v. Ridge, No. M 03-126 S.D. Tex.).” 2004 WL 2297990. On April 1, 2005, a new system of EOIR regulations went into effect. The new system reorganized the procedures governing security and law enforcement investigations of putative class members in several ways. Most significantly, it changed the timing of security examinations of applicants, requiring those examinations be completed before an immigrant’s application for adjustment of status could be heard by an immigration judge, rather than after a grant of adjusted status. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims because the new regulations rendered the claims of any class members granted LPR status after April 1, 2005 moot or otherwise non-justiciable. For those class members deemed LPRs prior to that date, defendants claimed that their claims should be dismissed without prejudice on the basis of non-justiciability, or that the class should be decertified for lack of numerosity and commonality. On July 1, 2005, Judge Patel denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. She held that questions remained as to whether the plaintiffs’ problems would be solved under the new regulations. She also expressed concern that, “[w]hile the record before this court does not evince that the DHS changed its regulations to move security clearances outside the reach of the plaintiffs’ class action, the context of the case casts some doubt on defendants’ capacity to will to address the needs of the class as a whole, rather than simply target agency action for purposes of evading review.” 2005 WL 1592872. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction. On July 25, 2005, District Court Judge Marilyn Hall Patel issued an order referring the case to Magistrate Judge Edward M. Chen for a settlement. On August 24, 2005, Judge Patel granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and request for a permanent injunction. The Court ordered the parties to submit proposals as to the appropriate scope of the injunction. 388 F.Supp.2d 1065. After reviewing proposals of the parties, Judge Patel issued a Permanent Injunction on December 22, 2005, requiring the government to begin timely processing of the plaintiffs' status documentation. 2005 WL 3542661. The class was divided into two subclasses based on differences in the procedures through which class members were adjudicated to be lawful permanent residents. Members of the pre-April 1, 2005 subclass were granted LPR status under regulations in force prior to April 1, 2005. Under the pre-April 1 regulations, an alien seeking LPR status was not required to undergo any background checks prior to his or her EOIR adjudication. Thus, members of the pre-April 1 subclass might have been granted LPR status without having completed the background checks now required by USCIS before issuing permanent documentation. In accordance with the Permanent Injunction, a Permanent Resident Card (I-551) should be mailed to the class member from the ICPS facility within 15 days of capture of the member’s biometrics at an ASC, or 60 days from the member’s USCIS InfoPass appointment, whichever date was later. In contrast, members of the post-April 1 subclass were required to complete the mandatory background checks prior to being granted LPR status. In accordance with the Permanent Injunction, a Permanent Resident Card (I-551) should be produced and mailed from the DHS Integrated Card Production System (ICPS) facility within 15 days of capture of the member’s biometrics at the ASC, or 30 days from the member’s USCIS InfoPass appointment, whichever date was later. If a class member (in either the pre- or post-April 1 subclasses) attended his initial appointment at USCIS for documentation processing on or before the effective date of this Plan, the applicable time period described in the Plan would be counted from either 15 days prior to the effective date of the Plan or the date of the initial USCIS appointment, whichever date was later. In all such cases where USCIS required the member to provide biometrics for card production, USCIS had 15 days from the effective date of this Plan or the date of the member’s ASC appointment, whichever date was later, to produce and mail a permanent I-551. For three years from the effective date of the plan, DHS was required to provide quarterly reports to class counsel listing the class members who have contacted the POC during the reporting period. On January 30, 2006, the Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for an entry of a final judgment in the case as being unnecessary at the time as the harm that was the subject of the lawsuit was ongoing. The government appealed the District Court's various rulings and orders. On February 7, 2008, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice to reinstatement in the event the district court declined to approve the settlement. On April 9, 2008, Judge Patel ordered that the case Padilla et al v. Ridge et al Padilla v. Ridge was related to Santillan et al v. Ashcroft and was re-assigned to herself. On April 14, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of a settlement agreement. On June 16, 2008, the court granted the parties' motion to consolidate this case with Padilla v. Ridge. In addition, the Judge Patel re-certified the class as follows: “All persons who have been or will be granted lawful permanent resident status prior to termination of this Stipulation by the EOIR, through the Immigration Courts or the BIA, and to whom the USCIS has failed to issue evidence of registration as a lawful permanent resident, with the exception that the class excludes the 34 named plaintiffs in Lopez-Amor v. U.S. Attorney General, No 04-CV-21685 (S.D. Fla.).” On July 21, 2008, Judge Patel approved a settlement agreement that covered both of the consolidated cases, vacated the injunction issued on December 22, 2005 and dismissed the cases. The obligations of the stipulation were to terminate 2 years from the effective day. The defendants were to institute requirements for the issuance of evidence of LPR status to class members who were issued any of the following final orders by EOIR: (i) orders granting adjustment of status to permanent residence; (ii) orders granting cancellation of removal and adjustment of status of a non-permanent resident to permanent residence; (iii) orders granting suspension of deportation and adjustment of status of a non-permanent resident to permanent residence; (iv) suspension of deportation of special rule cancellation or removal; or (v) any other form of relief from removal that EOIR may grant that results in a class member being granted LPR status at the conclusion of removal proceedings (collectively, the “covered orders”). The defendants, acting through ICE, agreed to provide a written description of the post-order instructions for obtaining documentation of LPR status from USCIS at the time the class member received a covered order. The post-order instructions were to be posted on USCIS website with links to websites maintained by DHS and DOJ. USCIS were to issue Permanent Resident Cards to class members within a specified time period in the stipulation. Moreover, USCIS were to establish a national point of contact to accept inquiries from class members who did not receive status documents within a specified time period. This process was not available to a class member who in accordance with USCIS gathered information might be a risk to national security of public safety. The Court retained no jurisdiction in this case except for sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear any class claim. The case is now closed.

Summary: A class of lawful permanent residents filed this suit against the U.S. Attorney General, Department of Homeland Security, and ICE seeking to compel the federal government to provide them with documentation of their permanent resident status in a timely manner. The case ended with a settlement agreement.


On February 27, 2007, the Electronic Frontier Foundation filed this individual lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff, representing itself, sought injunctive and monetary relief, claiming that the defendant wrongfully withheld agency records requested by the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed the defendant withheld records concerning orders by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) that allegedly authorized surveillance of international communications where there was a probable cause to believe one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization, as referenced in a letter written by the then acting Attorney General dated January 17, 2007. Additionally, the plaintiff requested any related FISC rules and guidelines associated with such orders, as referenced by the then White House Press Secretary during a press briefing on January 17, 2007. The defendants moved for summary judgment on May 11, 2007 on the grounds that the plaintiff’s requested material was exempted from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) exemption 1, which exempts matters specifically authorized by an Executive order be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy, and exemption 3, which exempts records or information that could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. On July 26, 2007, Chief Judge Thomas F. Hogan granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on grounds that defendant sufficiently met its burden of showing with reasonable specificity the above exemptions applied to the documents at issue. In the same opinion, Chief Judge Hogan denied plaintiff’s motion for an in camera review of the documents at issue as the court found the defendant’s declarations sufficient to conduct a de novo review and to verify the applicability of the asserted FOIA exemptions. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on August 8, 2007. The plaintiff claimed that an August 3, 2007 article in the Washington Post offered new evidence that supported a motion for in camera review, as the article suggested that the documents at issue may primarily constitute legal analyses, and therefore, the documents at issue would not need to be classified. This motion was denied by Chief Judge Hogan on January 29, 2008, as the court found that the details discussed within the August 3, 2007 article did not provide any new evidence relevant to the documents referenced in the January 17, 2007 letter or press briefing. The case is now closed. 532 F.Supp.2d 22.

Summary: The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed an individual lawsuit against the Department of Justice for failure to respond to a FOIA request regarding orders and guidelines that allegedly authorized surveillance of international communications when there was a probably cause to believe one of the communicants was a member of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization. The case was dismissed in summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the grounds that the defendant successfully showed that the requested documents were exempted from FOIA.


On June 13, 2007, private attorneys and attorneys for the ACLU's National Prison Project, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the ACLU of San Diego & Imperial Counties filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, challenging allegedly inadequate medical care provided to immigrant detainees at the San Diego Correctional Facility (SDCF). The Facility was a contract detention facility in Otay Mesa, California, operated by the Corrections Corporation of America. Civil immigration detainees in the custody of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, were housed there pursuant to a contractual agreement between CCA and the federal government. On average, the facility housed 600-800 male and female immigration detainees for periods of time ranging from several weeks to several years. Plaintiffs alleged that detainees were denied constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, dental, and vision care. Plaintiffs further alleged that in some instances denial of treatment put pressure on immigrants to waive their hearing rights and thereby expedite their deportation, in hopes of receiving treatment. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. ICE responded by moving to dismiss the case. In October 2007, the court (Judge Sabraw) denied dismissal as to the majority of Plaintiffs, although a few were released from the litigation on technical grounds. After Judge Sabraw denied class certification in December 2007, plaintiffs were granted permission to appeal by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Prior to argument in the Court of Appeals, they settled the case in mediation, in late 2010. Under the settlement, SDCF was required to comply with a number of National Council on Correctional Health Care standards, hire additional staffing to expedite care, take steps to expedite care when requested, new standards for balancing security and healthcare needs, and regular reporting requirements. SDCF had one year from the date of approval of the settlement to comply with NCCHC standards and receive certification from that organization of such, before the order could be terminated. The order applied only to SDCF, not to conditions in any other facility. A settlement class was certified and the settlement was approved by the District Court in June of 2011. The case was closed in July of 2012, indicating compliance with the court order without incident.

Summary: On June 13, 2007, private attorneys and attorneys for the ACLU filed a class action law suit regarding deficiencies in medical care in the San Diago Correctional Facility (SDCF) for persons being held in immigration detention. A settlement agreement was reached requiring SDCF to meet various National Council on Correctional Health Care standards, increase staffing, and report on its progress for one year following the approval of the settlement in June of 2011. SDCF appears to have complied with the agreement without incident, and the case was finally dismissed in July of 2012.


On February 9, 2007, the parents of a female minor student filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against the Eufala Independent School District No. 1, McIntosh County Oklahoma. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the school violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consitution and 42 U.S.C. §1983 by depriving their daughter of her equal treatment and benefits to participate in athletics based on her gender. The plaintiff played softball and golf; she complained that her teams had facilities (fields, locker rooms, practice times, playing times) that were much inferior to those for the boys' teams. On March 26, 2008, the Court (Steven P. Shreder, J.) dismissed the case for reason of settlement whose terms were not disclosed.

Summary: This 2007 federal lawsuit against the Eufala Public Schools, in Oklahoma, sought declaratory and injunctive relief from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, alleging that the school violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against the girls' athletic teams. The plaintiff played softball and golf; she complained that her teams had facilities (fields, locker rooms, practice times, playing times) that were much inferior to those for the boys' teams. On March 26, 2008, the Court Steven P. Shreder dismissed after a settlement whose terms were not disclosed.


This is a case challenging the constitutionality of private prisons in Arizona. On June 6, 2020, a plaintiff who was incarcerated by the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation & Reentry (ADCRR), filed this class action suit against the ADCRR Director David Shinn in the US District Court of Arizona. The plaintiff sued the Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel from the public interest organization Abolish Private Prisons, the plaintiff sought declaratory judgment that the Department’s reliance on private prisons is in violation of the Constitution. The plaintiff also sought an injunction that would forbid Director Shinn and his successors from continuing to assign prisoners to serve time in private prisons and compel the Department to discontinue use of private prisons. Attorneys fees and further relief were also requested. The case was assigned to Judge Grant Murray Snow. The plaintiff argued that the ADCRR’s reliance on private prisons amounted to a violation of his right to be free from forced servitude under the 13th amendment, his right to protection against cruel and unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment, and his due process rights and equal protection rights under the 14th amendment. According to the plaintiff, ADCRR turns prisoners into economic assets by entrusting their care to for-profit prisons, in effect turning prisoners into commodities and benefiting from their forced labor. By relying on private prisons, ADCRR also delegates the exercise of the punishment power solely belonging to the government to a private entity, a violation of the 13th amendment’s “punishment clause.” The complaint also highlighted the incentive misalignment created by the use of private prisons: through its contracts with private prisons, ADCRR incentivizes jail and prison workers and administrative professionals to work in ways that are contrary to prisoners’ due process rights. In a final count, the plaintiff argued that ADCRR’s reliance on private prisons creates disparate outcomes for prisoners in the public and private prison systems, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In July 2020, the defendants filed for a Motion to Dismiss for a Failure to State a Claim. As of October 15, 2020, the case remains open.

Summary: In 2020, current prisoners within the Arizona Department of Corrections, Rehabilitation and Reentry along with the Arizona State Conference of the NAACP, filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court of Arizona. The plaintiffs alleged that the agency was violating their rights under the 8th Amendment, 13th Amendment, and 14th Amendment by incarcerating them in private prisons instead of public facilities and refusing their application for transfer. In August, 2020, the defendants’ counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. In early fall, the plaintiffs’ counsel submitted their response for the defendants’ motion. The case remains open.


In September 2004, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Washington Group International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging discrimination on the basis of race (African-American) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint specifically alleged the defendant subjected the complainants to a racially hostile work environment and subjected them to retaliation following their complaints about this environment. The complainants intervened in the lawsuit in January and February 2005. Following some discovery and referral to mediation, the parties settled the lawsuit in January 2008 through a consent decree. The two-year decree, containing an anti-discrimination and retaliation clause, required the defendant to: make compliance reports, allow access to outsiders for monitoring, designate internal coordinators, develop its anti-discrimination policy, create a graffiti policy, post and distribute notice of employee rights, provide EEO training, implement a complaint resolution program and monitoring system, and pay $ 1,500,000 to be distributed among seventeen individuals. The settlement was scheduled to last two years, and there is no additional activity reflected in the docket sheet; presumably, the case closed in 2010.

Summary: In September 2004, the Boston Area Office and New York District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against Washington Group International, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts alleging discrimination on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The parties settled with a two-year consent decree which included a $1,500,000 payment to seventeen individuals.


On October 13, 2017, a 17-year-old pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant in immigration custody filed this suit against the Acting Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Acting Assistant Secretary for Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for interference with her right to abortion. Filing via a guardian and represented by the National, District of Columbia, and California offices of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from obstructing, interfering with, or blocking other individuals’ access to abortion. The Court assigned the case to Judge Tanya Chutkan. The plaintiff, held in a federally funded immigration facility in Texas, sought an abortion while in custody. Prevented from traveling for the abortion by facility staff, the plaintiff alleged that the March 2017 ORR policy relied on by the staff for the veto was unconstitutional. The plaintiff asserted that the policy resulted in an “undue burden” to her rights to reproductive healthcare under the protections of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. In addition, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants' practices also violated the terms of a previous settlement agreement mandating certain standards for the treatment of unaccompanied immigrants in detention, including reproductive healthcare access Flores v. Reno; and a 2013 ORR regulation requiring reproductive healthcare for victims of sexual assault. Additionally, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on October 18, 2017 for all similarly situated, pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minors in the legal custody of the federal government denied their right to abortion. The Plaintiff’s Temporary Restraining Order Fearing the health implications of late-term abortions, the plaintiff sought a TRO that would compel the defendants to allow her the necessary travel to have the abortion. On October 18, 2017, Judge Chutkan granted the TRO, finding that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm otherwise. 2017 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 175415. The defendants immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit and sought an emergency stay pending the appeal. Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and South Carolina filed an amicus brief in support. The following day (October 19, 2017) the D.C. Circuit ordered an administrative stay of the TRO awaiting a hearing on the merits on the defendants' emergency motion for a stay. 2017 WL 4707112. On October 20, 2017 Judges Karen LeCraft Henderson, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Patricia A. Millett heard the appeal. The majority lifted the administrative stay and then vacated and remanded part of the TRO. 2017 WL 9854552. The Court found that the plaintiff had an uncontested constitutional right to an abortion, but pursuant to HHS policy, the plaintiff required release to a sponsor. Judge Millett dissented. On October 22, 2017, the plaintiff sought an en banc rehearing in the D.C. Circuit, supported with an amicus brief from the District of Columbia along with California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Washington. At the October 24, 2017 hearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit vacated its previous order. 874 F.3d 735. Following the decision on and on the same day, Judge Chutkan issued an order for defendants to comply with the abortion request within 14 days without the sponsor requirement. Judge Chutkan reasoned that the process of securing an ORR sponsor could take weeks, whereas the plaintiff only had five weeks until Texas law prohibited abortions. The plaintiff successfully had an abortion on October 25, 2017 per this ACLU press release.  Plaintiff Additions while Awaiting Class Certification  On November 3, 2017, the defendants filed a motion in the District Court to stay proceedings of the claim for class-wide relief scheduled for November 20, 2017 because of the defendants’ impending petition to the Supreme Court filed on the same day. While waiting for certiorari, the plaintiff amended their complaint on December 15, 2017 to include two additional individual plaintiffs, one 10 weeks pregnant and the other 22 weeks pregnant, each seeking a TRO based on the same rationale as the original, single plaintiff. Additionally, the amendment included labeling one of these new plaintiffs as the proposed class representative. Judge Chutkan granted the TRO on December 18, 2017 (and extended it on December 31, 2017), finding that the policy of ORR that rationally mandated the TRO for the original plaintiff warranted the same risk of irreparable harm to the two additional plaintiffs. 2017 WL 6462270. The defendants appealed the order for the 10-weeks-pregnant plaintiff to the D.C. Circuit the following day (December 19, 2017). However, the defendants voluntarily dismissed the appeal when they discovered that the plaintiff was not a minor, but rather 19 years of age. Under the umbrella of the TRO, the 22-weeks-pregnant plaintiff received her abortion per a December 21 news reports.) Finding that another minor within immigration custody sought an abortion, the plaintiffs again amended the complaint on January 11, 2018 to include this fourth individual plaintiff. On March 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a renewed motion for class certification and a preliminary injunction, citing that the proposed class likely had more potential plaintiffs than anticipated. Specifically, at least three additional minors, besides the individual plaintiffs, held in the defendants' custody between August 2017 and December 2017 had requested abortions, an the defendant had allegedly obstructed these requests.  The Resolution  On March 30, 2018, Judge Chutkan granted the plaintiff's motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification. Judge Chutkan determined that plaintiffs had a strong likelihood of success on the merits because ORR’s policies and practices unduly burdened plaintiffs’ reproductive decisions. Additionally, Judge Chutkan determined that the class certified met the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judge Chutkan issued the final, amended version of the orders on April 16, 2018. In these orders, Judge Chutkan certified the class as all pregnant, unaccompanied immigrant minor children who are or will be in the legal custody of the federal government. The District Court ordered that the defendants and their respective successors were enjoined from: (1) obstructing any class members access to judicial bypass, medical appointments related to pregnancy dating, non-directive options counseling, abortion counseling, abortions, or other pregnancy related care; (2) forcing any class member to reveal that pregnancy/abortion decision to anyone; (3) retaliation against class members for abortion decisions; and (4) retaliation against those that facilitate class members’ ability to access abortion related medical care. On April 9, 2018, the defendants appealed the injunction and proposed class certification to the D.C. Circuit Court, which then denied the appeal for class certification on June 4, 2018. In the order, the D.C. Circuit Court denied the motion for stay except for the non-disclosure provision, which it granted review. On July 25, 2018 the D.C. Circuit then vacated the October 24, 2017 order, remanding to the D.C. District court to dismiss the individual claim for injunctive relief as moot. In accordance with the vacating of the October 24, 2017 judgment and the July 25, 2018 remand, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the individual plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief as moot on August 1, 2018. The plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on Sept. 18, 2018. This filing delayed the defendant’s motion to dismiss awaiting an appeal to the Circuit Court. In the interim, the District Court administratively closed the docket on March 15, 2019. The D.C. Circuit then issued the corresponding mandate on August 6, 2019, which allowed the plaintiffs to file a motion to reopen the case on August 8, 2019, which the District Court granted the subsequent day (August 9, 2019). The parties asked for additional time to provide joint status reports on whether an evidentiary hearing was necessary on August 27, 2019. The parties continued to file joint status report updating the court, culminating in a June 11, 2020 joint stipulation in which defendants agreed to abide by the portion of a previous August 12, 2019 joint stipulation stating that defendants will continue to act in accordance with the April 12, 2018 amended class certification and preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal on September 29, 2020, as the ORR agreed to implement a revised policy prohibiting shelters from interfering with access to reproductive health care, including abortions. The defendants agreed to post Know Your Rights notices on housing bulletin boards, and also agreed to pay plaintiffs' counsel $336,710 in attorneys' fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: In October 2017, a pregnant unaccompanied immigrant minor in immigration custody filed a suit against the Acting Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Acting Assistant Secretary for Administration for Children and Families (ACF), and the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) for interference with her right to abortion and other reproductive healthcare. The plaintiff asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification for immigrants similarly situated, and a Temporary Restraining Order allowing her abortion. The D.C. Circuit granted the Temporary Restraining Order, which occurred following review by the Court of Appeals. In the ensuing year, the three additional pregnant plaintiffs joined the original, with each seeking her own Temporary Restraining Order. The proceedings culminated on April 16, 2018, when the District Court certified the class of pregnant unaccompanied immigrant minors in the custody of the federal government. In the order, the D.C. District Court enjoined the ORR from refusing to provide the certified class with access to reproductive healthcare. Following the order, the federal government has abided by the stipulations of the order, no longer preventing access to reproductive healthcare for these pregnant minors. On September 29, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of voluntary dismissal due to the government's promise to abide by the order. Current as of November 6, 2020.