On July 8, 2011, a group of non-profit organizations and individual plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the governor of Alabama and several other state and county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys from the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the National Immigration Law Center among other organizations, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B. 56 was preempted by federal law and therefore violated the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their organizations were affected by the legislation because their potential clients or members would be discouraged from seeking assistance or organizing for their rights by fears of being detained or questioned under the new law. The individual plaintiffs claimed that the new law would cause direct harm to them in a number of ways. A few weeks later, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the court prevent enforcement of H.B. 56 pending full resolution of the challenge. On August 2, 2011, on the request of the U.S., the court consolidated this case with two others challenging H.B. 56, for purposes of the preliminary injunction adjudication. [See IM-AL-0005 and IM-AL-0007.] A month later, however, the court dissolved the consolidation order and ordered all pleadings to be filed in the separate cases, as appropriate. The court granted amicus curiae status to many organizations, including many South and Central American countries, the NAACP, several fair housing organizations, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, and the National Lawyers Guild. The court also requested supplemental briefs from both parties addressing the Equal Protection challenge to Section 28 of H.B. 56, which required school officials to document the immigration status of enrolling students, in preparation for an August 24, 2011 hearing on the preliminary injunction. Following the hearing, the court ordered a temporary injunction, staying enforcement of the law until the court issued a detailed Memorandum Opinion on September 29, 2011. In the meantime, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on September 16, 2011. The memorandum opinion released on September 29, 2011 granted the preliminary injunction for several sections of H.B. 56, denied as moot a preliminary injunction for sections previously enjoined in the United States v. Alabama related case, but denied outright the injunction for other sections. That day, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit. They also filed an Emergency Motion to Stay/Enjoin Portions of H.B. 56 Pending Appeal. The appellate court denied this motion on October 5, 2011. While the case was pending before the court of appeals, and while United States v. Arizona (dealing with a very similar statute, in Arizona) was pending before the U.S. Supreme Court, the parties moved jointly to stay the normal rules regarding class certification. On May 16, 2012, the Alabama legislature passed several amendments to H.B. 56 that affected the provisions enjoined by the court. On May 23, the parties filed a joint stipulation that one portion of the new law was effectively the same as a provision enjoined by the court, and so all parties agreed to abide by the injunction with respect to the new provision as well. The next day, defendants moved to dissolve the injunction regarding another section of the law based on changed circumstances. The defendants argued that the basis for the court's injunction had been altered by the legislature so the injunction was no longer necessary. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit issued its opinion, by Judge Charles Wilson, on August 20, 2012. (The same panel issued an opinion in the case about an equivalent statute, in Georgia, the same day.) The Court affirmed the district court with respect to the challenges to sections 12, 18, and 30. It held that at least one organization has standing to challenge section 28 and that the HICA the plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the claim that section 28 violates the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the Court reversed the district court's decision regarding section 28 and remanded for the entry of a preliminary injunction. Because the Alabama legislature had eliminated the challenged language from section 8, the Court vacated as moot the district court's injunction of that provision and remand for the dismissal of the challenge to that section. In light of the decision regarding the substantive provisions of sections 10, 11, and 13, the Court vacated as moot the district court's injunction of the last sentence of sections 10(e), 11(e), and 13(h). Finally, the Court found sections 10 and 27 preempted in the companion case brought by the United States, and dismissed as moot the HICA Plaintiffs' appeal as to those sections. On April 29, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the 11th Circuit ruling in the U.S. v. Alabama case, which had effectively barred Alabama from enforcing its law. 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); see IM-AL-0005. On remand, on October 29, 2013, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement. The parties agreed that several provisions of the challenged law should be permanently enjoined including sections 28, 10, 13, 27, and 11(f), (g), and (a). Therefore, the state agreed to not enforce provisions that require schools to verify the immigration status of newly enrolled students, criminalize the solicitation of work of unauthorized workers, and criminalize failing to register one's immigration status. The plaintiffs also agreed to dismiss the rest of their claims, but specified that a number of those agreements to dismiss (sections 12, 18, 19, and 20) depended on the defendants' representation that they would interpret the provisions to be consistent with U.S. v. Arizona and "neither require nor authorize state or local law-enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest, or prolong the detention of any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person's immigration status or because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration status." In addition, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the rest of their claims and defendants agreed to pay $350,000 for attorney's fees and expenses. On the same day, the parties in the related case, Alabama v. United States (IM-AL-0005), submitted a similar agreement and proposed order. The agreement permanently enjoined defendants from implementing the same provisions that would be enjoined in this case (sections 10, 11(a), 13, and 27). It also enjoined section 28 and 11(f) and (g). Pending the approval of the injunction of Section 28, the plaintiffs in Alabama v. United States agreed to dismiss that claim. On November 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Sharon L. Blackburn) approved the settlement agreement, and ordered that the case be closed.

Summary: On July 8, 2011, a group of non-profit organizations and individual plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the governor of Alabama and several other state and county officials in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division. The plaintiff, represented by public interest attorneys from the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the National Immigration Law Center among other organizations, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B 56 was preempted by federal law and therefore violated the U.S. Constitution. A Motion for Preliminary Injunction was granted to prevent enforcement of some sections of the law, and both parties filed cross-appeals in the U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit. On August 20, 2012, the Court issued its opinion, affirming the district court with respect to the challenges to sections 12, 18, and 30 and finding that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on the merits of their Equal Protection claim. The court remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction. In 2013, the parties agreed to a permanent injunction against the state's enforcement of several key provisions of the law.


On June 22, 2006, female financial advisors working for Morgan Stanley, a retail financial services firm, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Northern California against their employer. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, were female and minority financial advisors employed by the defendant. They claimed that the defendants' substantially male branch managers had near unfettered discretion over compensation and distributing business to the advisors. Financial advisors earned a commission and obtained clients by referral. The complaint alleged branch managers gave more business, assistance, and opportunities to male advisors; this was a systemic, continuing pattern and practice at Morgan Stanley. The lead plaintiff also alleged she was terminated for being female and over the age of 40. The complaint sought to certify a class of all female advisors employed by the defendant from January 5, 2005 to the present and a subclass of advisors who had worked in California. The first complaint contained the following claims: (1) intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) disparate impact discrimination under the same statute; (3) gender discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't. Code § 12940 et seq; (4) on behalf of the named plaintiff only, age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; (5) on behalf of the named plaintiff only, age discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov't. Code §12940 et seq. The complaint sought: a declaratory judgment; preliminary and permanent injunctions ordering the defendant to cease discrimination; an order restoring class members to previous positions or, in lieu thereof, front pay; back pay and benefits; damages for emotional distress and punitive damages; and attorneys' fees and costs. The first amended complaint, filed on October 12, 2006, added another named plaintiff, who was a black Michigan resident. It also added a claim of gender discrimination under Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.A. §§ 37.2101 et seq. and claims of race discrimination under: Title VII; 42 U.S.C. § 1981; and the Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights Act, M.C.L.A. §§ 37.2101 et seq. A final amended complaint, filed on August 17, 2007, added a third plaintiff, a black California resident. This complaint added claims for race and color discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 on behalf of black and Latino subclasses. Related Case & Gender Discrimination Claims The defendant sought a stay of this action pending the outcome of settlement negotiations in a similar class action filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. In Augst-Johnson v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., the plaintiffs also alleged gender discrimination. That case can be found at EE-DC-0033 in this Clearinghouse. On January 19, 2007, the district court ordered a stay of the gender discrimination claims, which were eventually resolved by the settlement in Augst-Johnson. 2007 WL 163196 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15 2007). Thus, the Jaffe settlement dealt only with race discrimination claims. Settlement Agreement On February 11, 2008, the parties filed a copy of the proposed settlement agreement. The district court granted final class certification, approval of the proposed settlement agreement, and entered final judgment on October 22, 2008. 2008 WL 4667090 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2008). The parties reached the agreement with the assistance of mediator Hunter Hughes, Esq., who had also mediated the Augst-Johnson case. The settlements term was five years. The settlement class was defined as "All African Americans and Latinos who were employed as Financial Advisors or Registered Financial Advisor Trainees in the Global Wealth Management Group of Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated or its predecessor(s) at any time between October 12, 2002 and the date of preliminary approval." The settlement agreement required the defendant to: distribute its anti-harassment policy to all employees; retain an employee dedicated to increasing African American and Latino presence in the defendant's work force; work only with recruiters who would provide a diverse slate of potential employees; post all job openings on an internal job website; provide diversity training; create a more transparent and objective career path; change a "power ranking' system that rated financial advisors' performance; and implement a revised complaint process. The parties also agreed to jointly appoint a diversity monitor, Fred W. Alvarez, Esq., and industrial psychologists Dr. Kathleen Lundquist and Dr. Irwin Goldstein to assist with implementation of the changes. Monitoring included semi-annual reports to class counsel. The defendant agreed to pay $16,000,000 to a settlement trust. A trust administrator would allocate the money to class members according to a formula based on their seniority, business generated, and other factors. The District Court also awarded $25,000 to an individual plaintiff for her efforts representing the class and $950,000 in attorneys' fees and costs for litigation; $150,000 of which was to monitor and enforce the settlement. The last entry on the District Court docket, on May 24, 2010, records the objecting class members' notice of appeal. Objecting Class Members On December 10, 2007, several putative class members filed a notice of objection and a motion for discovery regarding a proposed class certification and settlement agreement. Nonetheless, on February 7, 2008, in an unpublished order, the District Court denied the objectors' motion. Jaffe v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., No. 06-3903, 2008 WL 346417 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7 2008). The objectors continued to argue against the settlement, asserting that the plaintiffs could not adequately represent Latino class members and that the provisions for monitoring and implementation were not strong enough. However, the Court disagreed and felt the settlement adequately protected the class. On July 16, 2008, the District Court allowed one of the named plaintiffs to transfer her individual claims to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Jaffe v. Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., No. 06-3903, 2008 WL 2782713 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 16 2008). Furthermore, several dozen plaintiffs opted out of the settlement. The objecting class members filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The case appeared on the docket as Jaffe v. Glover, No. 08-17599. In July 2010, appellees filed motions to dismiss for failure to prosecute and failure to provide a timely brief, which the Ninth Circuit granted. On September 7, 2011, following the merger of Morgan Stanley's Global Wealth Management Group and Citigroup's Smith Barney, the District Court approved a joint motion to modify the settlement start date to October 1, 2010 and granted several more specific modifications in light of the merger. Litigation over settlement fund distribution followed. Right before the settlement was due to expire, the parties filed a motion for extension of the settlement by two years on September 29, 2015, which the Court granted. The order also granted several modifications to the settlement, including the appointment of a Diversity Monitor and the continuation of settlement programs related to increasing participation of female, African American, and Latino Financial Advisors in teams and partnerships for an additional year past the settlement's expiration. As of December 2, 2018, there have been no further updates. The settlement term has presumably expired.

Summary: Female financial advisors working for Morgan Stanley filed a Title VII class action alleging gender discrimination. Amended complaints added plaintiffs and claims for racial discrimination. The gender action was stayed and was resolved in another lawsuit. The parties settled the racial discrimination claims, with Morgan Stanley agreeing to injunctive relief and to pay $16m to class members. After several modifications, the settlement expired on September 30, 2017.


On December 21, 2020, Pangea Legal Services and other legal organizations filed this suit against the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on behalf of refugees seeking to enter the United States for asylum. The plaintiffs alleged that DHS unlawfully changed the rules around asylum and thus restricted asylum eligibility by making it more difficult to meet the definition of a refugee, qualify for asylum review, and then meet the requirements to be granted asylum. The plaintiffs argued that such changes would frustrate their organizational missions and divert resources toward litigation. Represented by Sidley Austin, the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, and the University of California Hastings Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, the plaintiffs sought both attorneys' fees and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief the prevent implementation of the changed rules. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the rules upend precedent on refugee law and were contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act. The plaintiffs stated that the actions of the administration were in violation of law because the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security, Chad Wolf, was without authority. The plaintiffs further alleged violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, stating that DHS acted in excess of authority because it was counter to the Immigration and Nationality Act as well as the Refugee Act, in an arbitrary and capricious way because it was hastily implemented and is inconsistent with decades of precedent, and without observance of procedure because DHS failed to include stakeholders like the plaintiffs when making changes to the rules. The plaintiffs further asserted a violation of due process rights for asylum seekers. Judge James Donato was assigned to the case. On December 23, 2020, Judge Susan Illston, presiding over another case between Pangea and DHS, denied a motion to relate that case to both this suit and the case Immigration Equality v. DHS. However, Judge Donato on December 29, 2020, granted a sua sponte motion to relate this suit to that of Immigration Equality. On January 8, 2021, the court granted a preliminary injunction in the two related cases. Reasoning that the plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable chance of success at trial and that there was a risk of irreparable harm without an injunction, the court enjoined DHS from enacting the revised rules on a nationwide scale. On January 28, 2021, the two related cases were stayed so as to allow the incoming administration to review and revise the refugee policy. That status report will be due on April 19, 2021. This case is ongoing

Summary: Legal organizations sued the Department of Homeland Security for allegedly creating over-restrictive rules regarding asylum-seekers. The court reviewed this and a related case and granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the enactment of the changed rules. Due to the administration change, this suit has been stayed pending a review and potential modification of the relevant regulations.


This suit challenges Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit does not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. To start with an overview, there are, so far, four cases addressing SB4. The four cases are: Texas v. Travis County, No. 1:17-cv-00425 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0044, before Judge Sparks, and three matters before Judge Orlando L. Garcia: this one; City of El Cenizo v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00404 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0045; and El Paso County v. State of Texas, No. 5:17-cv-00459 (W.D. Tex.), IM-TX-0046. The three cases pending before Judge Garcia were brought by pro-immigration cities and counties seeking an injunction barring implementation of SB4. The other case was brought by Texas seeking a declaratory judgment upholding SB4, against pro-immigration cities and counties. On June 6, Judge Garcia ordered a consolidation of this case with the San Antonio and El Cenzino cases, with El Cenzino becoming the lead case in the consolidation. Travis County, however, remains separate. This case was quickly consolidated with the two other before Judge Garcia; please refer to El Cenizo v. Texas for further information and updates. This case was administratively closed on Oct. 24, 2017 in light of the consolidation.

Summary: This suit challenges Texas's "Sanctuary City" legislation, Senate Bill 4 (SB4), which requires local Texas law enforcement to cooperate with federal immigration officials and punishes them if they do not. Unlike the other suits in this special collection, this suit does not challenge President Trump's "Sanctuary City" Executive Order. The case is ongoing.


The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota on behalf of a transgender woman who alleged that she had been discriminated against by her former employer under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. The EEOC alleged violations of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and sought monetary and injunctive relief on behalf of the complainant. The case was assigned to Judge Ann Montgomery. The EEOC claimed that the complainant was subjected to a hostile work environment and received disparate treatment because of her sex, gender preferences, and condition of gender dysphoria. They alleged that the defendant would not allow the complainant to use common female restrooms, and its HR department implied that undergoing genital reconstruction surgery was the only condition under which she would be allowed to do so. The complainant believed that this inquiry about the details of her genitalia was an invasion of privacy. On numerous occasions and using multiple forms of proof, the complainant also requested a change of her name and sex in internal records. After some hassle and delay, only some records were changed. This incomplete change of records resulted in, for example, outside merchants referring to complainant by her former male name. The EEOC also alleged that the complainant was regularly referred to in a demeaning and derogatory manner by coworkers, and though she requested intervention, the defendant did not investigate her claims or issue any discipline. For example, coworkers and managers continually misgendered the complainant, used her former male name, and said that she looked like “Tarzan". The defendant’s employee health insurance plan also contained a clause that categorically excluded all health benefits having to do with gender transition to transgender persons, regardless of medical necessity. Only if the individual’s gender did not match what was on the initial form would these benefits be denied - theoretically, a non-transgender person could be covered for similar treatments. As a result, the complainant paid for hormone therapy and blood level tests out of pocket. The complainant announced her intention to transition and began presenting herself as female in November 2010, three years into her tenure with the employer. She began hormone therapy just two months later and provided documentation of a legal name change in February 2011. In June of 2011, she presented a doctor’s note confirming her diagnosis of gender dysphoria and a driver’s license with her sex listed as female. The complainant’s employment with Deluxe Financial ended in July 2011. On her penultimate day of work, the defendant learned that plaintiff filed a discrimination claim with the EEOC. An HR representative then demanded that she sign a release as part of a severance package, but the plaintiff refused. In October 2014, the parties began engaging in settlement negotiations. Shortly after, the complainant filed an uncontested motion to intervene as a plaintiff. On October 20, 2014, the court granted the complainant's motion. On January 20, 2016, the court approved a consent decree in which the defendant agreed to pay $115,000 ($40,000 of which covered attorney’s fees and $75,000 of which was paid directly to the complainant), alter records regarding the plaintiff’s employment, and improve workplace policies and practices. Further, the defendant agreed to issue a letter of apology to the complainant, not mention her prior legal name or lawsuit details in a reference, and to ensure that records show that she was laid off, not fired. More generally, the defendant agreed to hire an outside consultant to revise policies to reflect, among other things: a clear commitment to preventing discrimination based on gender dysphoria and transgender status; encouragement of reporting discrimination; and an assurance that the defendant will investigate allegations of discrimination. All supervising employees would then be trained annually on these commitments to ensure compliance. The defendant further committed to complying fully with employee requests for name and biographical data changes, and to allow transgender employees unhindered access to restrooms without inquiring into medical history and documentation. With the employee health plan, the defendant agreed to eliminate partial or categorical exclusions for otherwise medically necessary care solely on the basis of sex and gender dysphoria. This applied to any care that was currently available to non-transgender persons, including hormone therapy. The consent decree was set to last for three years. There has been no docket activity since the entry of the decree in 2016, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: The EEOC sued the former employer of a transgender woman who transitioned during her employment in the District of Minnesota under Title VII and the ADA for disparate treatment based on the former employee's transgender status. The employee intervened in the suit, and the parties reached a settlement in which the employee received monetary relief and the employer agreed to change its policies to end discrimination against transgender employees.


On July 29, 2014, the United States Department of Justice, on behalf of women seeking entry-level Pennsylvania state trooper positions, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania State Police. The plaintiff alleged that since 2003, the State Police's practice of requiring applicants to pass a physical-fitness test in order to be considered for an entry-level trooper positions has had a disparate impact on the hiring of women, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that since 2003 the Pennsylvania State Police have used two similar physical fitness tests as part of the application to become a state trooper that are not necessary for the performance of the job. They claimed that between 2003 and 2012, female applicants passed the test at 80% of the rate that male applicants passed, a statistically significant difference, and thus the tests had a disparate impact on the hiring of women. On November 10, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. The court (Judge Sylvia Rambo) denied the motion finding that the court had jurisdiction and that the United States had sufficiently stated a claim. 110 F.Supp.3d 544. Beginning in May 2014, the parties engaged in discovery. On August 19, 2016, both the plaintiff and defendant filed motions for partial summary judgment. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgement, finding that the United States had satisfied its burden in proving a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination and that there was no genuine dispute of a material fact for that analysis. 2017 WL 4354917. Finding that there was still a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the defendant's actions were defensible under a business necessity defense, the court denied the defendant's motion. The parties engaged in several discovery disputes between 2016 and 2018. On April 4, 2018, the parties jointly submitted a motion to stay the litigation for 90 days while the parties engaged in voluntary mediation before a federal magistrate judge. It does not appear that the mediation was successful. As of April 6, 2020, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On July 29, 2014, the United States Department of Justice filed a complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the Pennsylvania State Police. They alleged that since 2003, the State Police's practice of requiring applicants to pass a physical-fitness test in order to be considered for an entry-level trooper positions has had a disparate impact on women, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. They sought injunctive relief to stop the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices. The case is ongoing.


On December 24, 2003, a prisoner in the custody of the Michigan Department of Correction (MDOC) filed a lawsuit under Michigan Law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Correctional Medical Services, Inc. (CMS), and several individuals employed by MDOC and CMS, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The Plaintiff, represented by counsel from the University of Michigan Law School Clinical Law Program, asked the court for: declaratory, compensatory, and exemplary relief; punitive damages; attorneys' fees and costs; and, other relief as appropriate. The Plaintiff claimed that defendants failed to timely diagnose and treat his laryngeal cancer. Defendant CMS filed a motion to dismiss on February 24, 2004. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition on March 17, 2004. On August 9, 2004, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied insofar as it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's state law claims or Plaintiff's claims that were supported by Plaintiff's second grievance. Otherwise, the Court recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss be granted. On September 22, 2004, the Court (Judge Gerald E. Rosen) adopted, in part and with modification, Magistrate Judge Komive's Report and Recommendation. The Court dismissed Plaintiff's claim against CMS in its entirety and with prejudice. On August 29, 2007, Magistrate Judge Komives issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant in part and deny in part defendants Mathai and Hutchinson's motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Further, Magistrate Judge Komives issued an additional Report and Recommendation on September 5, 2007. The Report recommended that the Court should grant in part and deny in part defendants Caruso, Epp, and Pramstaller's motion for summary judgment. On March 14, 2008, the Court (Judge Marianne O. Battani) granted defendants Mathai and Hutchinson's motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff's gross negligence claim but denied the motion as to Plaintiff's other claims. Also on March 14, 2008, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion to revisit the dismissal of defendant CMS in light of new case law. Although Defendants appealed the Court's prior orders, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on July 29, 2008. Defendants failed to file a notice of appeal within the time limits set forth in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. While still in the custody of MDOC, Plaintiff suffered a recurrence of his previous symptoms. Mr. Broder passed away on December 13, 2008, from recurrent supraglottis carcinoma. However, the lawsuit proceeded with Mr. Broder's interests being represented by a personal representative. A Second Amended Complaint was filed on March 24, 2009, to reflect Plaintiff's death. The Court entered a stipulation to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against defendants Epp and Pramstaller on October 27, 2009. On December 4, 2009, the Court entered a stipulation to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's claims against defendants CMS, Mathai, and Hutchinson. It is unclear whether Plaintiff received any form of relief from Defendants.

Summary: This case was brought by an inmate in the custody of Michigan Department of Corrections against Correctional Medical Services and several individuals employed by MDOC and CMS seeking declaratory and compensatory relief. When the case began, Plaintiff claimed that defendants had failed to timely diagnose and treat his throat cancer. Although Plaintiff passed away during the case, his estate proceeded with the litigation. The parties stipulated to a dismissal on December 4, 2009. It is unclear what relief was granted to Plaintiff's estate.


On October 28, 2013, two couples filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas. Represented by private counsel, they argued that Texas's ban on same-sex marriage violated their federal Due Process and Equal Protection Rights. All four plaintiffs were Texas residents. One couple married in Massachusetts in 2009, and sought recognition of that marriage, which was denied because both were women. The other couple wished to be married in Texas, but were denied a license by the Bexar County Clerk because they were both men. Plaintiffs sought an immediate preliminary injunction against enforcement of Article I, § 32 of the Texas Constitution and corresponding provisions in the Texas' Family Code Texas Family Code § 2.001, enacted in its current form in 1997, prohibited the county clerk of any Texas county from issuing a license for the marriage of persons of the same sex. In 2003, the Texas Legislature further amended the Texas Family Code to add § 6.204, which, among other things, prohibited recognition in Texas of lawful same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. S.B. 7, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003); H.B. 38, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003). Section 6.204 declared void all marriages between persons of the same sex and all civil unions. Tex. Fam. Code § 6.204(b). In 2005, after approval by Texas' legislature, a proposed constitutionalization of the ban on same-sex marriage was placed on the ballot as Proposition 2; it passed with approximately 76% of the vote. Therefore, the Texas Constitution subsequently defined marriage as the union of one man and one woman and prevented Texas and its political subdivisions from recognizing same-sex marriages. Tex. Const. Art. 1 § 32. Not only did it prevent same-sex couples from marrying, the Texas Constitution expressly bared Texas and its political subdivisions from "creat[ing] or recogniz[ing] any legal status identical or similar to marriage." The plaintiffs' challenged all of these provisions. After a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the District Court (Judge Orlando Garcia) found for the plaintiffs on February 26, 2014, holding that the ban on same-sex marriage violated both the equal protection and due process rights of the plaintiffs. 975 F.Supp.2d 632. The Court stayed its own order pending appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On October 7, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted the same-sex couples' motion to expedite oral argument. On December 12, 2014, the District Court (Judge Orlando Garcia) denied the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay. The Fifth Circuit heard argument on January 9, 2015. Meanwhile, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v Hodges, a case challenging the constitutionality of a similar same-sex marriage ban in Ohio. In this case, the Supreme Court held that a state ban on same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of this decision in Obergefell, both parties in this case agreed that the District Court properly granted the preliminary injunction. On June 26, 2015, the plaintiffs' filed an unopposed motion to lift the stay of the preliminary injunction, which was granted by the District Court (Judge Garcia) on the same day. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction on June 29, 2015 and remanded the case back to District Court. Back in District Court on July 7, 2015, Judge Garcia entered the final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. On September 4, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for $720,794.00 in attorneys' fees and $20,202.90 in costs. Judge Garcia granted this motion in part on November 30, 2015, by awarding the full amount requested in costs ($20,202.90) and only $585,470.30 in attorney's fees. The defendant appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit. On May 10, 2017, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. The plaintiffs filed another motion for attorney's fees on May 30, 2017 to recover the cost of litigating against the defendant's appeal. On the following day, Judge Garcia of the District Court granted the motion, increasing the plaintiffs' total amount received in attorney's fees to $630,673.20. The satisfaction of judgment was entered on November 29, 2017. This case is now closed.

Summary: This is the federal court challenge to the ban on same-sex marriage in Texas. It was filed October 28, 2013, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, and on February 26, 2014, Judge Orlando Garcia found for the plaintiffs on their motion for a preliminary injunction, holding the Texas same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional. The defendant appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. But, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v Hodges on June 26, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision to grant the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs were awarded $630,673.20 for attorney's fees and $20,202.90 for costs. This case is now closed.


On April 2, 2015, a HIV positive prisoner filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiff sued under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (RA), and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against the Michigan Department of Corrections. The plaintiff, represented by Michigan Protection and Advocacy Service and by Lambda Legal, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's enforced a policy regarding HIV-positive prisoners that disproportionately and unlawfully discriminated against prisoners living with HIV. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant's policy subjected him to drastically more severe punishment after allegedly engaging in sexual conduct with another prisoner. This punishment included an indefinite period of administrative segregation that ultimately lasted nearly one year; a heightened security classification; transfer to remote facilities in the Upper Peninsula; loss of a paid work assignment where he had substantial freedom and responsibility; loss of access to the law library, despite having an active pending appeal that he was pursuing pro se; loss of educational and religious programming, some of which factored into his parole determination; inability to access the telephone on a daily basis; and removal of personal property within his cell. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. In response, on May 27, 2015, the plaintiff amended the complaint, so on June 1, 2015, Judge Paul L. Maloney denied the motion to dismiss as moot. Following Judge Maloney's denial, the plaintiff was released on parole. The defendants then refiled their motions to dismiss. On June 6, 2017, Judge Maloney granted defendants' motion to dismiss on plaintiff's ADA, RA and due process claims on the grounds that defendants were protected in their official capacity by sovereign immunity. The court further held that the majority of plaintiff's requests for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot due to his release on parole. However, Judge Maloney also determined that plaintiff retained standing for his expungement request and that discovery was necessary prior to allowing defendants to assert qualified immunity as a defense to plaintiffs claims in their individual capacities. On November 6, 2018, the parties submitted their Settlement Agreement, which set out the following proposals: - The defendant would pay $150,000 to the plaintiff - The defendant would implement revisions to three sections of its Policy Directive:<blockquote>(1) Segregation for HIV positive prisoners who are found to be guilty of misconduct if it is determined that the behavior presented a significant risk of HIV transmission; (2) Timely reporting the misconduct to the Assistant Chief Medical Officer, who will review the actual misconduct reports and document the behavior in the prisoner's health record; (3) If the behavior presented a significant risk of HIV transmission, the Correctional Facilities Administration Deputy Director, upon consultation with the Chief Medical Officer shall be informed in writing of the incident and shall review the case to determine if the prisoner should be classified to administrative segregation.</blockquote>The settlement allowed for judicial enforcement. On November 14, 2018, pursuant to their settlement agreement, the plaintiff submitted a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, which stated that the parties reached a settlement agreement resolving all the issues in this lawsuit, including costs, attorney's fees, and expenses. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, an HIV positive prisoner filed this lawsuit in the US District Court for the Western District of Michigan under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 against the Michigan Department of Corrections. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's enforced a policy that disproportionately and unlawfully discriminated against prisoners with HIV, by subjecting them to drastically more severe punishment than others for sexual misconduct. The parties reached a settlement out of court and submit a stipulation of voluntary dismissal on November 14, 2018.


On October 11, 2013, a non-profit company filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Oklahoma under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Administrative Procedure Act and First Amendment against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage for contraception. The plaintiff is suing on behalf of all non-profit, Christian-owned corporations that participate in a health plan provided by GuideStone Financial Resources of the Southern Baptist Convention. These corporations do not already qualify for the religious exception for the ACA's contraception insurance mandate. On October 25, 2013, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction for all similarly-situated corporations, which was granted by United States District Court (Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti) on December 20, 2013. Judge DeGiusti relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals 10th Circuit decision Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius v. Sebelius  in granting the motion for preliminary injunction. In the same order, Judge DeGiusti denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs had filed a request for class certification in the event the preliminary injunction was denied; as the court granted the preliminary injunction, the motion for class certification was denied as moot on December 23, 2013. On February 11, 2014, the defendants appealed the Judge DeGiusti's December 20, 2013 order granting the plaintiff's preliminary injunction and denying the defendants' motion to dismiss to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On March 26, 2014, the district court stayed proceedings pending the appeal. On March 31, 2014, the Tenth Circuit declined to consolidate this case with two others before it, Southern Nazarene University v. Sebelius and Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, on the government's request. However, on July 14, 2015, the Tenth Circuit (Judges Scott M. Matheson, Monroe G. McKay, and Bobby R. Baldock, dissenting in part) issued an opinion addressing all three cases. Little Sister of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, 794 F.3d 1151 (10th Cir. 2015). The court found that the accommodation scheme under the ACA relieves Plaintiffs of their obligations under the Mandate and does not substantially burden their religious exercise under RFRA or infringe upon their First Amendment rights. It therefore reversed the district court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, and remanded the case to the district court. The Tenth Circuit's decision reversing the preliminary injunction was vacated and remanded by the U.S. Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). In Zubik, the Supreme Court had directed the parties to file supplemental briefs suggesting a solution to their disagreement, in which employees could still receive contraception coverage without employers giving any notice to the government. On May 16, 2016, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. After a change in administrations, the defendants moved without opposition for voluntary dismissal and Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal on October 23, 2017. Back in the district court, the issued status reports indicating they had entered into settlement negotiations with the new Trump administration. On February 16, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for the court to convert the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction and declaratory relief. The motion stated that the government had now admitted that the mandate violates RFRA. The court (Judge DeGiusti) entered declaratory relief and issued a permanent injunction on March 15, 2018, enjoining the defendants from "any effort to apply or enforce the substantive requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) and any implementing regulations as those requirements relate to the provision of contraceptive drugs, devices, or procedures and related education and counseling to which Plaintiffs have sincerely-held religious objections, and are enjoined and restrained from pursuing, charging, or assessing penalties, fines, assessments, or other enforcement actions for noncompliance related thereto." 2018 WL 1352186. A final judgment was entered in the case on July 17, 2018, with judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the RFRA claim and any of the plaintiffs' remaining claims dismissed without prejudice. On August 30, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for an extension of time to file a bill of costs and motion for attorneys fees. The court granted this on August 31, 2018. As of April 14, 2020, the parties have not filed any further motions and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: A non-profit Christian corporation filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services for an exemption to the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate on behalf on all corporations participating in a specific health insurance plan. On October 25, 2014, United States District Court (Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti) granted a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff and all similarly-situated employers. Though this injunction was reversed by the Tenth Circuit in 2015, that decision was vacated by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, and a change in administration led the parties to dismiss the case. Declaratory relief and a permanent injunction were entered in favor of the plaintiff in 2018.


On August 8, 2016, the plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon against the Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) and the State of Oregon, claiming violations of the Eighth Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act. In July 2015, the plaintiff, a former prisoner, became paralyzed in his cell. Before his release into the community without any resources or the ability to take care of himself, the plaintiff sought emergency injunctive relief that he be released to an appropriate care facility paid by the State of Oregon for a reasonable period of time to provide him the ability to access care, as well as declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants failed to provide a reasonable accommodation and planned to release him without an adequate release plan, and denied him the rights and benefits in violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. On August 11, 2016, District Judge Michael J. McShane granted in part the plaintiff's motion for an emergency preliminary injunction. Judge McShane held that the ODOC was required to provide the plaintiff with a wheelchair upon release, and to release the plaintiff to an ADA-compliant motel. The ODOC was ordered to conduct twice-daily check-ins on the plaintiff through August 26, 2016: one contact by phone and one contact in-person. On August 12, 2016, the defendants moved to modify the order to allow the check-ins to be provided by a representative from an adjacent correctional facility. The court granted the motion on the same day. On September 1, 2016, Judge Michael J. McShane granted the defendants' unopposed motion for extension of time to answer. Because the court's TRO made the plaintiff's claim moot, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed this action without prejudice on September 13, 2016.

Summary: On August 2016, a physically disabled prisoner sued Oregon Department of Corrections (ODOC) and the State of Oregon in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, claiming violations of the Eight Amendment and Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. The court ordered that ODOC will provide the plaintiff with a wheelchair and conduct twice-daily check-ins for two weeks after his release.


This class-action lawsuit was brought on June 2, 2020, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The suit arose out of the protests that engulfed the nation following the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Defendants in this case are the City of Minneapolis and John Does 1-100, one of whom was a police officer who sprayed pepper spray on the plaintiff. The complaint alleges that Minneapolis law enforcement used tactics during these protests which constituted violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and that the city's failure to keep police in line also violated the Constitution. Specifically, the complaint cited 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the police used excessive force and retaliation against protesters in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that attacks on the protesters were violations of free speech and free assembly under the First Amendment. It sought at least $50,000 in monetary damages plus interest, a temporary restraining order, a permanent injunction, and attorney's fees and costs of the suit. On June 3, 2020, the case was assigned to Judge David S. Doty and referred to Magistrate Judge Becky R. Thorson. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This class-action alleged that the Minneapolis police used tactics on peaceful protesters that were in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case arose out of the nationwide protests following the police killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff in this case alleged that a police officer (John Doe 1) used pepper spray on her and her daughter while they were peacefully protesting on the sidewalk. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, claiming that the police violated her right to free speech and free assembly, and that their actions represented excessive force and illegal retaliation. They also launched a Monell complaint, saying that the city is responsible for the police officers' actions. The case is ongoing as of August 4, 2020.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas petition filed on behalf of immigrant detainees in Texas, seeking release from detention due to COVID-19. The court denied to enter any relief for the plaintiffs on July 6, 2020. Later, the plaintiffs were released and the court dismissed the case on July 31.<hr> This petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed on June 23, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Represented by private counsel, the petitioners were immigrant detainees held at the Joe Corley Detention Facility in Conroe, Texas. They brought this claim against Acting Secretary of U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE Field Office Director Patrick Contreras, Attorney General William Barr, and Facility Warden Randy Tate. The petitioners were three Cuban citizens and one Honduran citizen. As their home countries were not accepting deportees from the U.S., they were held in ICE custody for a prolonged period of time. They argued that the Joe Corley Detention Facility was doing an inadequate job at protecting against the spread of COVID-19, violating their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights and habeas corpus. The petitioners requested a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, injunctive relief releasing the detainees immediately. The court rejected all of the plaintiffs' requests on July 6, 2020. The court held that the petitioners can only use habeas corpus to protest the fact of their confinement or the duration of their confinement, but not the conditions of their confinement. Regarding injunctive relief, the court found that petitioners were not likely to succeed on the merits of the case, and so it refused to grant the injunctive relief. On July 31, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal because each of the plaintiffs had been released from Joe Corley Detention Facility. The court granted the plaintiffs notice of dismissal that same day. The case is now closed.

Summary: This petition for writ of habeas corpus was brought by several non-citizen detainees at Joe Corley Detention Facility. They argued that the conditions of their detention, especially the facility's failure to ensure their safety amidst the COVID-19 outbreak, represented violations of habeas corpus and their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. They brought suit against the DHS, ICE, the Warden of Joe Corley Detention Center, and Attorney General William Barr. The judge rejected these claims on July 6. Later, the petitioners were released and the court dismissed the case on July 31. The case is closed.


On April 23, 2018, Disability Rights Washington—the state protection and advocacy organization—filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. The plaintiff sued Governor Jay Inslee, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and the Superintendent of the State Penitentiary under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act on behalf of its constituents who are inmates with mental illness held in overly restrictive conditions due to their disability. The plaintiff, represented by Disability Rights Washington and private counsel sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys fees. The plaintiff claimed that defendants’ policy and practice of housing all inmates in need of mental health services in a more restrictive close custody setting irrespective of their actual custody classifications denies them the benefit of DOC’s services, program, and activities. Additionally, the plaintiffs claim that this practice subjects them to discrimination on the basis of their disability. The case was assigned to Judge Rosanna M. Peterson. The defendants filed their answer on May 21, 2018 and the parties then entered discovery. On February 13, 2019, the court granted the parties joint motion to stay proceedings to finalize a possible settlement, which was contingent on legislative funding. The Department of Corrections received approximately $5 million in requested funding from the Washington Legislature conditioned on the money being used to resolve this litigation. On June 27, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated and moved to dismiss all claims against Governor Inslee. The same day, the parties jointly moved for approval of their Final Settlement Agreement. The proposed settlement agreement required the defendants to review the custody score, assigned custody, and housing assignment for each person in the Residential Treatment Center at the Baker, Adams, and Rainer (Bar) Units at the Washington State Penitentiary. For those inmates whose behavioral or mental health needs dictate a higher custodial setting than their custody score under other DOC policy, they will be reviewed individually. If a more restrictive setting is required, reducing behaviors or symptoms associated with the more restrictive placement would be included as a treatment goal along with specific, objective, and individualized benchmarks in the treatment plan. The settlement also called for one designated medium security BAR unit with at least two mods designated as residential treatment units, and for physical retrofits to the new unit. The defendants would ensure that people housed in the new medium security mods have comparable out-of-cell time, program, and activities as are provided to people housed in other units. The proposed agreement called for defendants to develop a work plan, ideally within two months of execution of the agreement, including interim benchmarks, and for the parties to meet quarterly to discuss defendants’ progress. The plaintiff is entitled to reasonable monitoring and will visit the new unit twice per year. The parties intended to work in good faith to achieve substantial compliance within two years of court approval, but also requested that the court incorporate the agreement into an order and retain jurisdiction to enforce the substantive terms of the agreement for 30 months following approval. The defendants agreed to pay plaintiff $185,000 in attorneys’ fees and $25,000 annually as compensation for monitoring while the agreement remains in effect. On July 1, 2019 Judge Peterson granted the stipulated motion for approval of the settlement and terminated Governor Inslee as a defendant with prejudice. The court will retain jurisdiction for 30 months and then dismiss the case with prejudice absent an extension.

Summary: On April 23, 2018, Disability Rights Washington sued Governor Jay Inslee, the Secretary of the Department of Corrections, and the Superintendent of the State Penitentiary under the ADA and Section 504 on behalf of its constituents who are inmates with mental illness held in overly restrictive conditions due to their disability. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants’ policy and practice of housing all inmates in need of mental health services in a more restrictive close custody setting irrespective of their actual custody classifications denies them the benefit of DOC’s services, program, and activities. On February 13, 2019, the court granted the parties joint motion to stay proceedings to finalize a possible settlement. On June 27, the parties moved for approval of their final settlement agreement, which the court granted on July 1. The court will retain jurisdiction for 30 months.


On November 17, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff sued the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) Secretary in his official capacity, and GEO Group. Claiming violations of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants illegally censored PLN’s news publications and books from prisoners. Represented by the Florida Justice Institute and the Human Rights Defense Center, the plaintiff sought monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs. Judge Robert L. Hinkle was initially assigned to the case before it was reassigned to Judge Mark Walker on December 21, 2012. In January 2012, the plaintiff filed its first amended complaint. All defendants subsequently moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. On June 7, 2012, the motions were denied. The defendants then filed their answers to the amended complaint. In March 2012, the defendants moved to transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The motion was granted and it was transferred on April 3, 2012. On April 12, 2012, PLN moved to transfer the case to the Tallahassee Division, and the court granted this request on May 9, 2012. On October 10, 2012, the defendants each moved for summary judgment. On January 29, 2013, the parties moved to dismiss the CCA and the Geo Group, as defendants without opposition because the parties had reached a private settlement agreement. The court approved this dismissal and retained jurisdiction over the private settlement agreement to ensure compliance. The lawsuit against the secretary of the FDOC remained. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on March 8, 2013. On August 11, 2014, after the court held hearings on the issue, it denied both motions for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial. January 5, 2015, began a four-day bench trial between PLN and FDOC. On October 5, 2015, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s First Amendment claims but ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claims. 2015 WL 12911752. While it acknowledged that FDOC had valid security concerns regarding PLN’s publications, the court found that FDOC did not give the plaintiff proper notice before censoring those publications. Thus, the court prohibited FDOC from censoring the plaintiff’s written communication without due process of law. To ensure due process, the court ordered FDOC to give notice of future censorship of PLN’s publications. PLN appealed the dismissal of the First Amendment claim. On May 17, 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion. 2018 WL 2251249. Judges Edward Carnes (Chief Judge), Joel Dubina (Circuit Judge), and Anne Conway (US District Judge for the Middle District of Florida) were assigned to this appeal. In September of 2018, the plaintiff moved to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. On January 7, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. 139 S.Ct. 795. Following this denial, PLN moved for attorney's fees in February, 2019. On October 22, 2019, the court issued an order awarding PLN $1,148,210.89 in attorneys' fees, $33,448.57 in expenses, and $6,204.42 in costs. PLNs total judgment amount was $1,187,863.88. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the permanent injunction.

Summary: In 2011, Prison Legal News filed a complaint alleging that FDOC’s policy of censored the plaintiff’s publications and violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. In 2015, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim, but ruled in favor of the plaintiff’s Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court ordered that FDOC would have to provide notice before censoring Prison Legal News’s publications. Prison Legal News appealed to reverse the district court’s dismissal of the First Amendment claim. In 2018, however, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the decision.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action lawsuit over labor conditions in the Adelanto Detention Center. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on April 6, 2020, requesting relief from work for class members, or adequate protective clothing, antiseptic supplies, and testing, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The judge denied the motion for temporary restraining order on April 22. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on December 21, 2020, and the defendants cross moved for summary judgment and for a hearing to decertify the class. A motion hearing is set for March 1, 2021, and a jury trial is scheduled for April 13, 2021. <hr> On December 19, 2017, an immigrant previously detained from 2012 through 2015 at the Adelanto Detention Center, a civil immigration detention facility, filed this putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff sued GEO Group (GEO), a private company that owned and operated the Adelanto Facility for profit, under the Trafficking Victim Protection Act and California Minimum Wage Law. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and California state law. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that GEO maintained a practice of wage theft, unjust enrichment, and forced labor. The plaintiff alleged that GEO used detainee labor to maximize its own profits, paying detainees just $1 per day to maintain and operate the facility. Because Adelanto Facility had a practice of withholding necessary care to ensure a supply of labor, the plaintiff alleged that the labor was involuntary because detainees were forced to work in order to buy basic necessities that GEO did not provide. On February 16, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the claim, alleging that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The plaintiffs submitted a first amended complaint on July 6, 2018 with no significant deviations from their original complaint. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on July 20, 2018. The plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint on December 24, 2018, adding a plaintiff. On September 16, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint, adding plaintiffs, a claim of forced and attempted forced labor, and a claim that the defendant’s counterclaims were a form of retaliation. In its counterclaims, the defendants claimed that if the plaintiffs prevailed then the defendants would be entitled to all costs and expenses in excess of the $1.00 daily rate paid to them associated with detention because otherwise plaintiffs would be unjustly enriched. This prompted the plaintiff to file an additional counterclaim, alleging that the defendant’s counterclaim was a form of retaliation against the plaintiffs. On November 30, 2018, the court issued an order granting a stipulation to dismiss with prejudice the defendant’s first counterclaim. In response, the defendants filed an additional counterclaim seeking declaratory relief on December 19, 2018. Both parties continued to file counterclaims against one another: the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant’s counterclaims were a form of retaliation; and the defendant sought declaratory relief that no employment relationship existed between GEO and the detainees who participated in the Voluntary Work Program. On September 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class of “all civil immigration detainees who performed work for GEO at the Adelanto Detention Center in the Work Program since GEO assumed responsibility for the Facility in May 2011.” On November 26, 2019, Judge Jesus G. Bernal granted plaintiffs' motion to certify this class. On April 6, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would direct GEO to either (1) halt the use of class members in the provision of work or services under the work program, or (2) protect class members by providing protective clothing, antiseptic supplies, and testing for COVID-19. The plaintiffs simultaneously filed a motion for expedited discovery for their requests that pertained to their motion. Following oral argument, on April 22, the judge denied the plaintiffs' application for a temporary restraining order. Relatively little happened over the summer of 2020. The parties engaged in apparently contentious litigation over discovery, with the defendants requesting to reopen discovery from February of 2021 to June of 2021. On November 19, the parties attended a conference regarding the continued discovery dispute and following conversation between the parties, a hearing was scheduled for the following week. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on December 21, 2020, requesting that the court find the defendant liable for wage theft, unjust enrichment, and unfair competition; reject the defendants' affirmative defenses, and dismiss defendants' conditional counterclaim for declaratory relief. The defendants filed a cross motion for summary judgment and for a hearing to decertify the class. A motion hearing is set for March 1, 2021, and a jury trial is scheduled for April 13, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2017, an immigrant who had been detained at the Adelanto Detention Center, a civil immigration detention facility, filed this putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiff alleged the defendant, a private company that ran Adelanto, had a practice of wage theft, unjust enrichment, and forced labor, all violating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act and California state law. A class was certified in September 2019. In April 2020, the plaintiffs requested, and were subsequently denied, a temporary restraining order in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, and the defendants cross moved for summary judgment and for a hearing to decertify the class in December 2020. A motion hearing is set for March 1, 2021, and a jury trial is scheduled for April 13, 2021.


On March 10, 2011, the United States filed a race discrimination lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3619, against the owners/operators of a residential apartment complex located in Pearl River, New York, in Rockland County. The U.S. Department of Justice sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief and civil penalties, claiming that the defendant failed to inform African American prospective tenants about available apartments, while telling similarly situated white persons about the availability of the same apartments; misrepresented the price of units to African American prospective tenants to discourage their application; and failed to show available apartments or negotiate for their rental to African Americans while showing apartments and negotiating with non-African Americans. On June 16, 2011, 3 months after the Complaint was filed, the Court (Judge Vincent Briccetti) approved a five-year consent decree submitted by the parties. The decree generally enjoined the defendant from engaging in race discrimination, and required development and posting of a non-discrimination policy; equal housing opportunity training; and development of uniform standards and procedures for informing people about the availability of apartments, showing those apartments, and negotiating for their rental. The defendant agreed to submit to compliance testing, to maintain records, and to notify the U.S. about any policy changes and any complaints filed. The decree also included a $55,000 civil penalty. The consent decree expired with no further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: This was a fair housing litigation brought in 2011 by the U.S. Department of Justice in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, against a residential apartment complex in Rockland County, New York. The DOJ alleged that that the defendant engaged in a host of discriminatory practices to discourage prospective African American tenants. The matter concluded in June 2011 with a five-year consent decree with provisions for antidiscrimination policy, training, recordkeeping and monitoring, as well as required uniform standards for informing people about the availability of apartments and related practices.


On October 1, 1997, two individuals who use wheelchairs for mobility and an advocacy group, Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition, filed a class action lawsuit against Taco Bell in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. They claimed that the design of Taco Bell's restaurants did not conform with the minimum standards in the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG), 28 C.F.R. Part 36, Appendix A. Specifically, they claimed that Taco Bell's queue aisles were too narrow to navigate in a wheelchair or scooter, the counters were too high, and the staff was unprepared to assist disabled people. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages pursuant to the state anti-discrimination act. On February 3, 1999, the court certified the class of "All Colorado residents with disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric scooters for mobility who, beginning on the date two years prior to the filing of the Class Action Complaint (October 1, 1997), were discriminated against on the basis of disability by Taco Bell's failure to have queue lines that comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines in Colorado Taco Bell restaurants that Defendant owns, operates, leases to or leases from others." Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Taco Bell Corp., 184 F.R.D. 354 (D. Colo. 1999). On January 18, 2000, the parities entered into a voluntary settlement agreement. The agreement applied to all current and future Taco Bell restaurants in Colorado owned by the Taco Bell Corporation. However, there was a provision for franchisees. The plaintiffs agreed to a moratorium on lawsuits against franchisees for two years and Taco Bell agreed to provide guidelines to the franchisees to help them comply with the ADAAG. Taco Bell agreed that the design of its queue lines and counters would comply with ADAAG standards. Additionally, Taco Bell agreed to provide guidelines to its employees so they would maintain the accessible queue aisles. Taco Bell agreed to pay $210,000 in attorney's fees and costs and $50 for each class member affected, not to exceed $5700. Additionally, Taco Bell agreed to pay a Coalition official $25 per hour, not to exceed $3500 total, to monitor Taco Bell's compliance with the agreement. On March 1, 2000, in an unpublished order the court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment as moot, in light of the settlement agreement. The court approved the settlement on March 2, 2000 and dismissed the case on March 23, 2000.

Summary: Two disabled individuals who use wheelchairs filed a class action lawsuit against Taco Bell. They alleged that Taco Bell's queue aisles were too narrow to navigate in a wheelchair or scooter, the counters were too high, and the staff was unprepared to assist disabled people. After the court certified the class, the parties settled and Taco Bell agreed to bring its restaurants into compliance with Americans With Disabilities Act guidelines, and to pay some monetary relief, attorney's fees and costs.


The Los Angeles District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada against Consolidated Reality, Inc. in June 2006. The complaint alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant allegedly discharged a female employee because of her sex. The parties engaged in an unsuccessful settlement conference with an early neutral evaluator. There were several contested discovery motions and the EEOC moved for partial summary judgment, which was granted. On 4/10/2008, the court denied the defendant's motion for clarification of the court's partial summary judgment order. On October 20, 2008, the parties agreed to a one year consent decree that was order by the court. The consent decree required the defendant to pay $55,000 to the charging parties, to adopt anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies, to provide training to employees, and submit to reporting and record keeping practices. The consent decree ran its course without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the EEOC sued Consolidated Realty, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada alleging violations of Title VII prohibition of sex discrimination. The complaint alleged the defendant discharged a female employee because of her sex. In 2008, the parties agreed to a 1 year consent decree that provided $55,000 to the complainant and required the defendant to adopt new policies, training, and other requirements.


On June 14, 2017, 196 members of Congress (30 members of the Senate and 166 members of the House of Representatives) filed this lawsuit against President Donald Trump in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought a declaratory judgment establishing that President Trump had violated the United States Constitution by accepting monetary and other benefits from foreign states without first obtaining “the Consent of the Congress” as required by the Foreign Emoluments Clause. The members of Congress, represented by the Constitutional Accountability Center, also sought an injunction ordering President Trump not to accept any such foreign benefits without first obtaining the consent of Congress. President Trump had failed to seek congressional approval for at least some publicly-reported foreign benefits. He had publicly stated that some of the hundreds of entities that he owned had received funds and profits from payments made by foreign governments, and public reporting had confirmed such transactions since he took office. Examples included the president’s acceptance of intellectual property rights from the Chinese government, his acceptance of licensing fees from the government of the United Kingdom for his television show “The Apprentice,” and acceptance of payments from foreign diplomats staying in his hotels in Washington, D.C.—all in 2017. The members of Congress alleged that by accepting these benefits, the president had thwarted the transparency that the “Consent of the Congress” provision was designed to provide; denied them the opportunity, as members of Congress, to give or withhold their consent; and injured them in their constitutional role as members of Congress. An amended complaint was filed on August 15, 2017, adding additional U.S. Representatives as plaintiffs and amending some of the factual allegations. On September 15, 2017, President Trump filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, lack of a cause of action, and failure to state a claim. On September 28, 2018, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan denied this motion in part, finding that the members of Congress had standing to sue the president for violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and that the court therefore had jurisdiction to hear the case. 335 F.Supp.3d 45. The court deferred judgment on the other elements of the president’s motion to dismiss. On April 30, 2019, the court addressed those elements, fully denying the president’s motion to dismiss. 373 F.Supp.3d 191. It found that the members of Congress had properly stated a claim, that they had a cause of action under the Foreign Emoluments Clause, and that the injunctive relief they sought was constitutional. The president sought certification of the judgments (permission from the court to file an immediate appeal); the court denied certification. 382 F.Supp.3d 77. In a second amended complaint, dated June 25, 2019, the group of plaintiffs included 29 senators and 186 representatives. On July 19, 2019, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the district court had abused its discretion in denying certification for appeal, but nevertheless declined to compel the district court to certify. Rather, the appeals court remanded the question to the district court with a strong recommendation that the district court opt to certify for appeal. The same day, in response to the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, the district court voluntarily stayed discovery. On August 21, 2019, the district court reversed itself, granting certification for immediate appeal. President Trump then appealed. On February 7, 2020, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court, ruling that the members of Congress did not actually have standing to sue. 949 F.3d 14. Because they were suing as individuals, rather than as Congress, they could not assert the institutional interests of Congress, and the court had no jurisdiction over their claims. The court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case. The members of Congress appealed to the Supreme Court on July 6, 2020. As of July 17, 2020, the Court’s acceptance of that appeal is pending.

Summary: On June 14, 2017, 200 members of Congress sued President Donald J. Trump for violating the Foreign Emoluments Clause of the United States Constitution by accepting monetary and other benefits from foreign states without seeking “the Consent of the Congress.” The court denied the president’s motion to dismiss, and he appealed to the District of Columbia Circuit. That court held that the plaintiffs, as individual members of Congress, could not assert the institutional interests of Congress; the plaintiffs therefore had no standing and the court had no jurisdiction. The plaintiffs appealed to U.S. Supreme Court on July 6, 2020. As of July 17, 2020, that appeal is pending.


On January 4, 2013, a resident of Kings County, New York of Mexican descent, filed a complaint against the City of New York and a number of police officers in the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by Legal Services and private counsel, brought this claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that police officers had violated her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment by refusing to take her statement and arresting her without probable cause. Plaintiff sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney's fees. Specifically, the plaintiff had called the police after her boyfriend had physically and verbally abused her. Plaintiff spoke fluent Spanish but only limited English. When the police officers arrived, they spoke only with the plaintiff's boyfriend, who speaks English proficiently, and ignored plaintiff's Spanish requests for help. Plaintiff called the police department again and specifically asked for an officer who spoke Spanish. The department dispatched another officer. When this officer arrived, he listened to plaintiff's statement, but quickly claimed that he needed to leave and that the other officers would take her report. Plaintiff called the department a third time and asked for a high ranking officer who might be able to help her. Shortly thereafter a third officer arrived and arrested plaintiff. She was brought to the precinct and put in a cell. However, upon examination, one of the officers identified the bruises on her body as domestic abuse and took plaintiff to get treatment. At the hospital, plaintiff was handcuffed to the bed. After treatment, plaintiff was brought back to the precinct where she was released without explanation. On September 12, 2013, plaintiff filed a first amended complaint. The complaint added, as plaintiffs, a number of New York residents that had been denied police assistance based on their limited English proficiency (LEP). They claimed that the New York Police Department (NYPD) had a policy and practice of denying LEP individuals access to police protection and the broader legal system. The complaint also added the New York City Police Department, as well as a number of named police officers, to the list of defendants. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and damages. On September 12, 2013, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint that joined additional plaintiffs. On September 23, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On November 22, 2013, the United States filed a statement of interest regarding the defendants' motion. The United States noted that language-based discrimination is prohibited by Title VI and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had consistently found evidence of this type of discrimination. It further noted that that DOJ had made the NYPD aware of the continuing problems in interviewing LEP witnesses and victims, and that this may be proof of an intent to discriminate. On April 25, 2014, the parties requested that the court adjourn the oral argument on the defendants' motion to dismiss scheduled for May 1, 2014 and that discovery be stayed to permit the parties to try to resolve the case. The plaintiffs also requested that an additional plaintiff be allowed to intervene, a request the defendants did not oppose. On April 28, 2014, the court (Judge Margo K. Brodie) granted the motion to stay discovery, and granted the plaintiffs' request to join another plaintiff. The plaintiffs filed a supplement to the second amended complaint on May 2, 2014. The parties began settlement discussions, in which the DOJ was included. On October 7, 2014, the parties wrote to the court proposing an order allowing six new plaintiffs to be joined in a proposed third amended complaint. Magistrate Judge Reyes granted this request the next day. Settlement discussions continued over the course of 2015 and 2016. On June 20, 2016, the parties agreed to the voluntary dismissal of the claims of one of the plaintiffs, and Judge Brodie ordered the dismissal the next day. On August 3, 2016, the plaintiffs in another case before the Eastern District of New York involving the City's failure to provide interpretive services to LEP individuals, <i>Rodriguez v. City of New York</i>, Docket No. 16-cv-00214, requested the consolidation of that action with this case. Judge Brodie denied the motion on August 19, 2016. On December 12, 2016, the parties informed the court that they had reached agreement on provisions of a settlement regarding the revision of NYPD's language access procedures, but had not reached agreement regarding monetary damages. On January 27, 2017, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement agreement with respect to all the plaintiffs' claims for damages and injunctive relief. The parties submitted the settlement agreement to the court on May 18, 2017. The settlement included specific procedures for a domestic violence (DV) language access program, including NYPD provision of cell phones with which officers could access a telephonic interpretation service. The NYPD was to implement the DV language access program citywide across all patrol boroughs and engage in targeted outreach about the availability of foreign language interpretation services to LEP communities and community-based organizations. The agreement also provided for training of NYPD employees, and revision of NYPD policies, procedures, and training materials to reflect the language access programs. The City of New York, on behalf of all defendants, agreed to pay $297,500 in damages to be distributed among the plaintiffs. The defendants also paid $460,000 in attorney fees. The court's jurisdiction over all individual defendants, except the City of New York, would terminate with the payment of the damages and fees. The court's jurisdiction over the settlement agreement's injunctive obligations would terminate twelve months after the "citywide expansion date," the date that the DV language access program was expanded citywide to all patrol boroughs, which was to be no more than eighteen months after the effective date of the settlement. The defendants had reporting obligations during this period. The court (Judge Brodie) entered the stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal of the case on May 24, 2017. On July 10, 2018, the parties submitted a proposed stipulation and order of settlement extension, having agreed to extend the court's jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The parties proposed amendments to the settlement agreement to set a termination date of April 15, 2019. Judge Brodie ordered the settlement extension on July 11, 2018. Having passed the termination date without any additional entries on the docket, the case is presumed to be closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs are a group of residents living in New York with limited English proficiency (LEP). They are pursuing litigation against the City of New York and the New York Police Department for engaging in the policy and practice of denying LEP individuals access to police protection and the broader legal system. The United States Department of Justice has filed a statement of interests indicating there may be proof of an intent to discriminate. The parties reached a settlement agreement in May 2017, which provided for injunctive relief, including the NYPD's citywide implementation of a domestic violence language access program, and monetary damages to the plaintiffs. The settlement agreement is to be in effect until April 15, 2019.


On October 23, 2006, tenants of the Villa Serrano Apartments, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 against owners and operators of the Villa Serrano Apartments in the United States District Court of California, Eastern District. The tenants, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendants discriminated against families with children in violation of the Fair Housing Act. On May 25, 2005, the defendants gave all tenants a notice which declared that children under the age of 18 must be accompanied by a parent or adult when playing on the defendant's property, and that repeat violations of this rule could result in termination of the offending tenant's lease. In July of 2005, the defendants gave notice to the tenants that children were no longer permitted to play in the parking lot area. Tenants with children also claimed that there children were harassed by management and threatened with eviction for imagined violations and undefined misbehavior. The tenants claimed that the apartment owners' and operators' actions resulted in a loss of housing opportunities, violations of the tenants' civil rights, deprivation of the full use and enjoyment of the tenants' tenancy, and severe emotional distress, humiliation, and bodily injury. On March 31, 2009, the parties reached a settlement through mediation, under which the defendants agreed to pay the tenants $240,000. After several trips to the Ninth Circuit on the issue of attorney fees, the parties entered a settlement as to the minors' compromise and the case was closed. We have no information as to the details of the settlement.

Summary: Tenants of the Villa Serrano Apartments filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against owners and operators of the Villa Serrano Apartments. The tenants claimed that the defendants discriminated against families with children. In 2009, the parties reached a settlement under which the defendants agreed to pay the tenants $240,000. After several trips to the Ninth Circuit on the issue of attorney fees, the parties entered a settlement as to the minors' compromise and the case was closed. We have no information as to the details of the settlement.


On February 18, 2012, Louisiana College, a Christian university, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), claiming violations of these statutes and their First and Fifth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance. The plaintiffs contended that this mandatory contraception coverage violated their sincerely held religious beliefs. On January 4, 2013, the District Court (Judge Dee D. Drell) stayed discovery of the case pending resolution of similar litigation throughout the country and legislative alterations to the contraception mandate. On March 26, 2013, the Court dismissed the case for a lack of ripeness, noting that appropriate amendments could be made after August 15, 2013. On September 19, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. Specifically, they contended that the amended ACA regulation continued to violate their free exercise rights by requiring them to provide a form to a third-party administrator who arranged payment for contraception, such that coverage would apply to employees as a direct consequence of their employment with the plaintiff. On November 2, 2013, defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or for summary judgment. On November 18, 2013, the plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On August 14, 2014, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss and granted in part plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's Religious Freedom and Restoration Act claim, dismissing the remainder of the plaintiff's claims as moot. The court held that regulations requiring the University to self-certify its eligibility for an accommodation from the mandate requiring employee health insurance coverage for contraceptives violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, since requiring the affirmative act of self-certification substantially burdened the University's sincerely held belief that life began at fertilization by facilitating the provision of such contraceptive services by its insurer. The court also determined that the self-certification mandate was not the least restrictive means to accomplish the government's interests, since a limited religious exemption or other alternatives would not undermine those interests. The defendants appealed to the Fifth Circuit on October 8, 2014. On December 12, 2014, the Fifth Circuit granted defendants' motion to stay pending resolution of a number of related cases. On November 4, 2016, the court issued a per curiam order materially identical to the order in Zubik v. Burwell. That order decreed that "the parties on remand should be afforded an opportunity to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.” La Coll. v. Price, No. 14-31167 (5th Cir. Nov. 14, 2016) (included in documents). The case sat essentially without action until January 5, 2018, at which point the defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal. No reason was given for the inaction or dismissal but the court later theorized the delay was due to the pending litigation of other similar cases. Following the dismissal of the defendant's appeal, on August 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed two motions for both declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs cited concerns that as their previous motion for injunctive relief was voluntarily withdrawn, there was a possibility that the August 2014 ruling granting them relief under the RFRA could be opened up to additional litigation. As a result they requested a permanent injunction and declaration in line with the prior ruling on RFRA. Finally, the plaintiffs asked to bring a seven month out-of-time claim for attorney fees. On March 13, 2019, the court denied all of the previous motions. The court ruled that they were mystified by the first two motions because the plaintiffs already possessed a favorable ruling and their motions only opened themselves up to further litigation that could yield a less than favorable result. The court found their previous judgement as final and any additional injunctions or declarations lacked justiciability. On the matter of a late claim for attorney fees, the court denied the claim as there was no excuse for the lateness beyond the plaintiff's own neglect. There has been no further action on this case.

Summary: On February 18, 2012, Louisiana College filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Louisiana against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On August 14, 2014, the court granted, in part, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff's rights granted by the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act had been violated. After the defendant appealed to the 5th Circuit, an order was issued identical to that issued in Zubik v. Burwell, instructing the parties to reach an agreement that accommodated plaintiff's religious exercise while insuring coverage for affected employees. The case sat without any meaningful action until January 5, 2018 when the appeal was voluntarily dismissed by the defendants, ostensibly due to ongoing similar litigation. The plaintiffs then filed for a permanent injunction and court declaration essentially reaffirming the court's August 13th, 2014 ruling. The courts denied the motions on March 13, 2019, as they found their previous ruling final, and any repetition of it unnecessary.


On April 4, 2012, an African-American woman filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Eastern District of North Carolina, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. against her employer, the Edenton-Chowan school district. The plaintiff, who filed the initial complaint as a pro se litigant and later obtained private counsel, sought damages, alleging that Edenton-Chowan Schools discriminated against her on the basis of her race by refusing to promote her. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that in spite of her academic accomplishments, substantial experience in the field of education, and positive reviews from superiors, she was twice denied promotions to the role of principal on account of her race. The plaintiff also alleges that Edenton-Chowan Schools retaliated against her for filing an EEOC Charge of Discrimination. The plaintiff claimed that after filing this EEOC charge, she was again denied a promotion to a school administrator position and was eventually terminated. On December 20, 2013, the plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal, in which the parties agreed to dismiss all claims with prejudice. Each party was to bear its own costs and expenses, including attorney's fees.

Summary: In April 2012, an African-American woman sought damages under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that Edenton-Chowan Schools discriminated against her on the basis of her race by refusing to promote her and retaliating against her for filing an EEOC Charge of Discrimination. The parties agreed to dismissal of all claims with prejudice, with each party bearing its own costs and fees.