NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: On April 7, 2020, the Chair of the Texas Democratic Party, the Texas Democratic Party, and individual voters filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Texas in order to secure expanded vote-by-mail in advance of primary election runoffs scheduled for July and the November general election. On May 19, the court granted a preliminary injunction allowing voters to vote by mail, which the defendants appealed. On June 4, the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunction and the case was petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court. The case is ongoing.
 On April 7, 2020, the Chair of the Texas Democratic Party, the Texas Democratic Party, and individual voters filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Governor of Texas, the Texas Secretary of State, the Travis County Clerk, and the Bexar County Elections Administrator under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that under the 14th and 15th Amendments, holding traditional elections would impose unconstitutional and illegal burdens on voters unless officials clarify state law to expand voting by mail in light of the state’s attempts to limit the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Earlier, on March 20, 2020, some of the plaintiffs had filed a state court lawsuit seeking to determine the application of state law. (That one is VR-TX-0448 in the Clearinghouse.) There, the plaintiffs argued that state law allows voters to choose to cast their ballots by mail under the circumstances of the pandemic. According to the complaint, Texas authorities supported the conclusion that state law permits mail-in ballots under the circumstances of the pandemic. After a hearing on April 15, the court granted a temporary order allowing mail-in votes for the July elections due to the pandemic, with a hearing scheduled later on August 10 to determine what happens after the July elections. The ruling was later affirmed by the Fourteenth Circuit. The state appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court of Texas, which ruled that residents  do not qualify under current state rules to receive a mail-in ballot. The plaintiffs decided to file the subsequent federal suit in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on the Wisconsin primary on April 6, 2020. In that case,  found here in the Clearinghouse, the Supreme Court held that it was too late to remedy constitutional harms. Thus, the plaintiffs here decided to act as early as possible, according to their complaint. On April 29, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, including a Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process claim and a voter intimidation claim. The same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Specifically, the relief sought included (1) allowing the plaintiffs and voters like the plaintiffs to be eligible to receive a mail ballot, to cast that ballot, and to have that ballot counted by the appropriate authority; and, (2) enjoining the defendants from threatening voters or voter groups with criminal or civil sanction for voting by mail or communicating with or assisting voters in the process of vote by mail. On May 11, the League of United Latin American Citizens and the Texas League of United Latin American Citizens sought to intervene. The motion was denied on May 13, as the request was within forty-eight hours of the scheduled hearing. The defendants responded to the motion for preliminary injunction on May 12, claiming that sovereign immunity barred injunctive relief and requested that the Court abstain from ruling on the claims until the conclusion of the state court litigation, which was ongoing at the time. On May 14, the Public Interest Legal Foundation and Landmark Legal Foundation filed an amicus brief in opposition to the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The same day, Harris County filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The court granted the plaintiff's preliminary injunction on May 19, stating that any eligible Texas voter who seeks to vote by mail in order to avoid transmission of COVID-19 can apply for, receive, and cast an absentee ballot in upcoming elections during the pendency of pandemic circumstances and that the defendants may not deny any mail ballots received. 2020 WL 2541971. The order remained valid until a judgment on the matter was issued, or the pandemic subsides. The same day, the defendants immediately appealed to the Fifth Circuit. The Bexas County Elections Administrator and the Attorney General of Texas moved to dismiss the case on May 21 and May 27, respectively. On June 4, the Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending appeal. 2020 WL 2982937. The court found that there was no evidence that the state had prevented the plaintiffs from voting. This decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court the next day. On June 16, the district court stayed the case pending the conclusion of the appellate proceedings related to the preliminary injunction order. On June 26, the Supreme Court refused to vacate the stay. On July 7, plaintiffs sought to expedite their appeal, which was granted on July 17. The appeal is ongoing and an oral argument was heard on August 31.


On August 15, 2012, a mother and her three minor daughters filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 against the Wood County Board of Education and Van Devender Middle School. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. They alleged that the School's single-sex education program approved by the Board violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. The three daughters were students who were subject to a program dividing boys and girls into separate classrooms for certain subjects and educated them with distinct teaching methods. The plaintiffs claimed that their school experiences were adversely affected by the physical differences between the boys' and girls' classrooms and the gender-differentiated teaching techniques. On August 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Joseph R. Goodwin) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order. The Court noted that two important issues needed further development in this case, which were the voluntariness of the single-sex classes and the availability of substantially equal coeducational alternatives at the School. Judge Goodwin held a preliminary injunction hearing on August 27, 2012, and on August 29, 2012, granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs. The injunction banned single-sex classes at the School for the remainder of the 2012-2013 school year and until the school's program met the requirements of the Constitution and Title IX. Particularly, the school was forced to comply with the requirement of complete voluntariness under the Department of Education regulations. 888 F. Supp. 2d 771 (S.D.W. Va. 2012). Evidence showed that the students were involuntarily placed in the relevant school program and could only opt out, but the School failed to provide parents and guardians with timely notice and procedural instructions about the opt-out option. On October 15, 2012, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss the case. The Court dismissed all plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants in light of their entitlement to qualified immunity and the redundancy of the claims. Hence, the Board remained as the only defendant in the case. On July 3, 2013, the parties entered a Consent Decree, with defendant denying any liability for sex discrimination in violation of federal law. The Consent Decree prohibited the Defendant from providing any Single-Sex Activity not in accordance with the Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution and Title IX requirements, as presented in the Opinion and Order on August 29, 2012, for the remainder of the 2012-2013 school year, as well as the school years through 2015. If the defendant sought to initiate a Single-Sex Activity not exempted in the Decree at any public school during the school years between 2015 and 2018, the Defendant would be forced to provide the plaintiff with at least 120 days notice prior to initiating the Activity. The plaintiff retained the right to visit the School, so long as she provided 5 days notice, to ensure the school was acting in accordance with federal law and the Consent Decree, for the five year duration the Decree was in effect. The Consent Decree awarded the plaintiff $65,000 in attorneys fees and an undisclosed sum of damages. In accordance with the Consent Decree, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to dismiss the case with prejudice on July 29, 2013. On August 6, 2013, the judge granted the motion, incorporating the consent decree. The Court’s jurisdiction over the Consent Decree, as well as the Court’s Permanent Injunction was to terminate on July 4, 2018. The case is presumed closed.

Summary: On August 15, 2012, a mother and her three minor daughters filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia against the Wood County Board of Education and Van Devender Middle School. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the School's single-sex education program approved by the Board violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. On July 3, 2013 the parties entered a Consent Decree, awarding the plaintiffs money for damages and attorneys' fees, as well as prohibiting the defendant from having certain single-sex activities for five years. The Consent Decree and the Court's injunction will end on July 4, 2018.


This civil rights case is related to the treatment of “Occupy Oakland” protestors by the police and sheriff’s department in Oakland, CA. The plaintiffs brought this class action lawsuit on January 14, 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against police officers and the City of Oakland, as well as the Alameda County sheriff and corrections officers. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive relief to protect their constitutional rights. They claimed that the defendants had violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law by holding them in jail following the mass arrest of plaintiffs without a chance to disperse. On January 28, 2012, the plaintiffs attended an “Occupy Oakland” march. As they marched, they alleged that they were corralled by the police, never given an opportunity to disperse, and placed under mass arrest. While corralled, the “class members were pushed, clubbed, and driven into a shrinking space by these two advancing lines.” Instead of being issued citations, class members were sent to the county jail. The plaintiffs alleged that they were kept in inhumane and humiliating conditions during this time. They were released between 12 and 85 hours later and were not charged. Following an alternative dispute resolution phone conference, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler. On November 21, 2014, the motion for preliminary approval of the Class Action settlement was denied due to issues with the settlement itself (the original settlement contained an error in class definition, the scope of the release was impermissibly broad, undeliverable funds were not allocated, and attorney’s fees were not properly handled) as well issues as the class notification. These issues were mostly fixed; District Judge Nathanael Cousins certified the class and granted preliminary approval of the settlement agreement on January 5, 2015, with issues in class notification corrected later. The class consisted of “the approximately 360 people who were arrested in the mass arrest on Broadway between 23rd and 24th Streets in Oakland on January 28, 2012, and who were never charged with any crime related to this arrest." 2015 WL 65501. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to pay $1,360,000 to the plaintiffs, including attorney’s fees and costs, and to seal and destroy the arrest records and biological samples from the mass arrest. The case against the individual defendants was dismissed on April 7, 2015 by Judge Cousins as part of the settlement agreement. On July 30, 2015, Judge Cousins issued an order granting a supplemental order of exoneration and to seal and destroy arrest records. The case is now closed, having had no activity since July 30, 2015. While this case did not yield injunctive relief, another case did. On September 9, 2019, a court approved a settlement agreement in the similar case of Spalding v. City of Oakland, under which the Oakland Police Department and the Alameda Sheriff’s Office adopted new policies regarding crowd control and mass arrests.

Summary: This is a case about mass arrest and detention related to the “Occupy Oakland” march on January 28, 2012. On January 14, 2013, persons who had been arrested filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Oakland and the Alameda County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, monetary damages, and the destruction of records pertaining to the arrest. They claimed that they had been subject to 14th amendment violations, false arrest and imprisonment, violation of state law, and negligence during the course of their arrest and detention. Plaintiffs’ arrest records pertaining to this event were sealed and destroyed as part of a $1.36 million settlement.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action for California prisoners with mental illness. After a three-judge court denied a motion for a prisoner release order as premature (see PC-CA-0057), plaintiffs sought relief before a single district judge. This has been granted in part; on April 10, Judge Mueller ordered the defendants to provide a strategic plan for achieving compliance with CDC guidance on managing COVID-19 in correctional detention facilities. On April 24, the court ordered the Program Guide requirements for the transfer of class members to DSH inpatient hospital beds to be temporarily modified to include COVID-19 screening. On November 4, the court ordered that the defendants consult with the Special Master and make modifications to the staffing plan and on December 3, 2020, the court adopted the Special Master's report in full and directed the defendants to file a list of the persons who would be most knowledgeable of the steps required to complete implementation of the recommendations adopted by the court. The defendants appealed this order
 NOTE: All the documents in this case relating to the prison overcrowding proceedings, which led to imposition of a statewide prison population cap, affirmed by the Supreme Court, are presented in a related case record, PC-CA-0057. See "related cases" below. Summary: On April 23, 1990, mentally ill inmates in California state prisoners filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The inmates sued the California corrections and mental health officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The inmates alleged that mental health care provided at most California penal institutions violated their constitutional rights. They also filed a claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, but that claim was eventually dismissed. The inmates, represented by the Prison Law Office, Legal Aid, the Disability Rights and Education Defense Fund, and private counsel sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge John F. Moulds. On October 14, 1991, the court (Judge Lawrence K. Karlton) certified a class of all present and future inmates with serious mental disorders at California penal institutions (except San Quentin State Prison, Northern Reception Center at Vacaville and California Medical Facility-Main at Vacaville). A preliminary injunction was issued concerning the exposure of inmates on psychotropic medications to extreme heat. Subsequently, following significant discovery, the matter was tried in an extensive trial before the magistrate during March, April and May of 1993. After the state filed objections to the magistrate's June 1994 recommended findings in favor of the plaintiffs, the court (Judge Karlton) on September 13, 1995, granted a permanent injunction, holding that the evidence supported the magistrate's factual findings and that the defendants had been deliberately indifferent to systemic deficiencies in inmates' mental healthcare, including inadequate screenings, understaffing, delays in access to care, deficiencies in medication management and involuntary medication, inadequacy of medical records, inadequately trained staff, improper housing of mentally ill inmates in administrative segregation, and the deliberately indifferent use of tasers and 37mm guns on inmates with serious mental disorders. Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F.Supp. 1282 (E.D. Cal. 1995). The court ordered that new policies and protocols be developed, and ordered that a special master be appointed to monitor compliance with the court-ordered injunctive relief. On December 11, 1995, the court (Judge Karlton) appointed J. Michael Keating, Jr., to serve as Special Master, setting out his duties, powers and compensation. The Special Master began work and hired staff, but ceased his work pending further court direction after passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On July 12, 1996, the court (Judge Karlton) held that the Special Master's compensation was not subject to the limitations contained in the PLRA. Wilson v. Coleman, 933 F.Supp. 954 (E.D. Cal. 1996). This ruling, along with two others also involving compensation of special masters under the PLRA, were heard together on appeals filed by inmates seeking writs of mandamus to vacate the district court orders that the PLRA not apply to master's appointed prior to its passage. On December 24, 1996, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Fletcher, Farris and Tashima) rejected these claims. Wilson v. District Court, 103 F.3d 828 (9th Cir. 1996), and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on May 19, 1997. Wilson v. District Court, 520 U.S. 1230 (1997). The state in 1996 appealed the early preliminary order concerning inmate exposure to heat, but on November 14, 1996, this appeal was rejected due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Fletcher, Ferguson and Samuel P. King), holding in an unpublished opinion that no final order had ever been issued concerning the heat exposure. Coleman v. Wilson, 101 F.3d 705, 1996 WL 665551 (9th Cir. Cal.) Nov. 14, 1996). The parties litigated disputes over attorneys' fees and costs, which were substantial in this case, and the United States intervened in the case filing a memorandum of law on the constitutionality of the relevant PLRA provisions. The court subsequently issued a number of orders granting various payments of fees. On June 6, 1997, the Special Master reviewed the remedial plans submitted by the state, and made a number of recommendations about modifications to them. On June 27, 1997, Judge Karlton approved those recommendations, and approved the defendants' remedial plans as so modified, directing the Special Master to monitor defendants' implementation of them. Between 1998 and 2006, the court accepted numerous compliance reports from the Special Master and issued a number of orders regarding compliance and implementation of remedial measures, including orders related to filling vacancies in mental health staffing, training, suicide prevention, outpatient beds, transfers of inmates to places that would better serve their mental health needs, and other measures. In May and August 2006, the court accepted plans submitted concerning long-term care and bed utilization. In September 2006, the court adopted the inclusion of language in the Revised Program Guide concerning the clinical competency of psychiatrists. Subsequent reports addressed suicide trends in administrative segregation units. On October 4, 2006, California Governor Schwarzenegger issued the Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation. See PC-CA-0057 for more discussion. In this case, the inmates moved for a TRO to prevent the transfer of inmates out-of-state. After a hearing on November 3, 2006, Judge Karlton denied the motion but ordered that an appropriately-credentialed mental health clinician employed by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) accompany the inmates on their transfer flight. Under the PLRA, a population cap on a prison or a prison system may be entered only by a specially constituted three-judge district court. The inmates accordingly filed a motion to convene a three-judge district court to impose a prison population cap. A similar motion was filed in the related class action case Plata v. Schwarzenegger in which the CDCR's health care system was subject to Court oversight and remediation [PC-CA-18], and also in Armstrong v. Schwarzenneger [PC-CA-0001], a large-scale prisoner disability discrimination case. These motions and the resulting proceedings are described in PC-CA-0057, with many of the crucial documents. While litigation over prison overcrowding ensued, the Special Master continued remediation work. His reports and corresponding court orders addressed issues which included: annual projections for mental health program populations, creation of a data collection system to track inmate referrals to various mental health services and administrative segregation, improvements in the pay scales of state mental health care workers, retrofitting of Administrative Segregation Unit Intake Cells for suicide prevention, assessment and treatment of inmates with exhibitionist or paraphilia behaviors, and implementation of an Enhanced Outpatient Program at Reception Centers and creation of additional mental health beds. On October 9, 2007, Judge Karlton appointed Matthew A. Lopes, Jr., previously the deputy special master, to become the special master for this case. On February 26, 2008, the court approved a construction settlement between the parties. The agreement provided for the construction of 5000 mental health beds and 5000 medical beds, and the Plata Receiver was required to file quarterly reports. On October 7, 2008, the court ordered the Defendants to do the following: 1) develop a plan to address overall dysfunction in custody/mental health relations at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) within 90 days; 2) develop a plan for maximum utilization of all dormitory beds at SVSP within 90 days; 3) implement and maintain institutional electronic and manual tracking logs for inmates who have been placed into alternative housing pending Mental Health Crisis Bed (MHCB) transfers, and dates, times, and places of return to regular housing for inmates not transferred to an MHCB; 4) construct the mental health treatment and counseling space at SVSP and the mental health treatment and programming space at California Medical Facility (CMF) as described in their development Proposals submitted in response to the Court's 10/18/07 Order; and 5) disseminate the complete Monthly Report of Information Requested and Response to Court Order regarding Staff Vacancies and CDCR Mental Health Crisis Bed Monthly Report on a regular and timely basis. Remedial work (in particular building) was somewhat stalled while the overcrowding three-judge-proceedings moved along. For details on that part of the case, see PC-CA-0057. The three-judge court ordered a reduction in prison population (and the Supreme Court affirmed), and this case continued. In January of 2013, the state moved to terminate the injunction on the grounds that it was no longer necessary to correct the ongoing violation of a federal right. Under the PLRA, the court was required to rule on that motion within three months or the challenged injunction would be stayed pending resolution of the motion. On April 5, 2013, Judge Karlton rejected the termination motion holding that the state's evidence was tainted by ethical violations committed to obtain it. Furthermore, he found that the state had failed to demonstrate that the court-enforced relief was no longer necessary. The following week, on April 11, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the existing judgment, and seeking additional relief relating to in-patient care; on May 6, 2013, they filed a similar motion relating to segregation (solitary confinement); on May 29, 2013, they filed another similar motion relating to use of force and disciplinary measures. Trial on the first, in-patient motion was held June 19 to June 24, 2013; Judge Karlton granted the motion in part on July 11, 2013, ordering the special master to report to the court on the adequacy of staffing levels at the Salinas Valley Psychiatric Program SVPP; and to complete one round of monitoring of the adequacy of all inpatient programs and report to the court by the end of March 2014. On July 12, 2013, Judge Karlton ordered that defendants establish a suicide prevention management workgroup (“SPMW”) in response to a report reviewing the suicides that occurred during the first six months of 2016. The group comprised of CDCR clinical and administrative staff, DSH staff, experts provided by the Special Master, among others. The group was intended to adopt measures that would reduce suicides. Trial on the solitary confinement and use of force motions began October 1, 2013, and spread over 28 days in October, November, and December 2013. Judge Karlton granted the motions in part on April 10, 2014, ordering the defendants to revise policies and create plans related to use of force and segregated housing involving inmates with mental illness. On August 29, 2014, the defendants submitted plans and policies addressing sections of the April 10 order. The defendants also requested the October 10, 2002, order be discharged and that a section of the April 10 order be modified. In particular, the defendants planned to create "specialty housing units for housing mentally ill inmates who are removed from the general population for disciplinary reasons." On August 29, 2014, Judge Karlton approved the defendants' plans, discharged the October 10, 2002 order, and modified the April 10 as requested by the defendants. Finally, Judge Karlton ordered the defendants to implement their proposed plan. The defendants also continued to submit the triannual reports and additional ordered reports in 2014. Because Judge Karlton was retiring from the federal bench, also on August 29, this case was reassigned to Judge Kimberly J. Mueller for all further proceedings. The Special Master’s expert conducted an audit of all 34 CDCR institutions and reported his findings on January 14, 2015. The report found that although the CDCR improved its suicide prevention practices, it had not implemented a standardized program for the identification, treatment, and supervision of inmates at risk for suicide. On February 3, 2015, the Court ordered that the defendants adopt the recommendations included in the report. Annual audits of the suicide prevention practices continued with steady progress. On March 2, 2015, the district court approved the parties' new settlement agreement. The CDCR agreed to implement revised policies to ensure that prisoners with psychiatric disabilities will not be unlawfully excluded from prison programs and services or be discriminated against because of their disabilities. The settlement agreement also provided that the implementation of these revised policies will be monitored by the Special Master. On May 4, 2015, the court issued a stipulated response and order on the special master's January 2015 report on the CDCR's implementation of policies and procedures on rules violation. In August of 2015, the parties had a status conference to discuss the issue of timely access to inpatient psychiatric hospitalization because the plaintiffs alleged that the CDCR had allowed significant backsliding to occur. On November 10, 2016 the parties held a status conference in which the Court ordered that the defendants show cause explaining why the waitlists for inpatient care were increasing, in violation of orders to eliminate the waitlists and prevent their recurrence. The defendants responded that they would not be able to eliminate the deadlines for the foreseeable future, and certainly not by the specified date. As such, the Court ordered another status conference be held on January 23, 2017. There, the Court ordered that the defendants work with the Special Master and plaintiffs where applicable to adopt continuous quality improvements to work toward an elimination of the waitlists. The defendants were also ordered to confer with the Special Master at least thirty days in advance of any changes to inpatient beds. On April 19, 2017, after the defendants failed to do so for an extended period of time, the Court ordered that the defendants come into compliance with the Program Guide requirements that inmates be transferred to the appropriate level of care in a timely manner. The defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit on May 19, 2017. On November 28, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the appeal, determining that the Ninth Circuit did not have jurisdiction since the order was not “final.” 743 Fed. Appx. 875. On October 10, 2017, the Court issued an order that the defendants come into compliance with the Revised 2009 Program Guide, in terms of the ratios of bed and staff needed for the prisoners. The Court noted that the defendants should be able to use the annual population projections to determine the approximate number of beds and staff needed. The Court stated that the issue must be remediated with greater urgency than had been shown, and noted that it appeared additional bed space needed to be built. On November 9, 2017 the defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit as well, arguing that failing to adhere completely to the Program Guide was not an Eighth Amendment violation. On November 28, 2018, the Ninth Circuit denied the appellant’s request, finding that the Program Guide set the constitutional standards by which the defendants must adhere or else place its prisoners at serious risk. 756 Fed. Appx. 677. Following the October 10, 2017 order from the Court, Judge Mueller noted that progress had been made with regards to staffing levels, significant improvement was still needed in order for the defendant to be in compliance. The parties disagreed over the requirements for using telepsychiatry services, and the Court ordered the Special Master to evaluate the appropriateness and draft recommendations. The defendants appealed this order to the Ninth Circuit, on August 1, 2018. The Ninth Circuit denied the appeal, finding that it did not have jurisdiction since the order was not an injunction directed at the defendants, but rather it was directed at the Special Master. 2019 WL 7173051. Through additional status conferences throughout August and September of 2018, the parties were able to agree to standards for telepsychiatry services. On October 5, 2018, the plaintiffs requested a status conference after Dr. Golding, one of the defendant’s psychiatrist experts, alleged that compliance data provided to the court was inaccurate and presented in a materially misleading way. After reviewing a report prepared by Dr. Golding detailing the alleged fraud, the Court ordered that an independent investigator be hired to review the allegations. On December 28, 2018, the defendants appealed the hiring of an independent investigator. On January 14, 2020, the defendants voluntarily dismissed the appeal. On December 14, 2018, the Court issued an order appointing Charles J. Stevens of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher as a neutral expert to conduct an independent investigation into certain allegations raised in the Golding Report. The neutral expert found that some of Dr. Golding’s allegations that CDCR’s data reporting practices resulted in the reporting of misleading data, but that the evidence did not indicate that CDCR intentionally misled the Court or Special Master. Specifically, the neutral expert found that two issues were misleading:

The neutral expert found that CDCR’s reporting of data relating to its “Timely Psychiatry Contacts” was misleading because it showed a higher level of compliance with Program Guide requirements than it should have as a result of CDCR’s inclusion of non-confidential encounters with inmates as qualifying evaluations under the Program Guide. The neutral expert did not, however, find that CDCR intentionally misled the Court or the Special Master, and did not recommend that the Court hold an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

The neutral expert found that the “Timely MH Referrals” performance indicator that CDCR uses to report compliance with medication nonadherence appointments was misleading because it did not include all of the patients who required a medication noncompliance appointment, and therefore overstated compliance with the Program Guide requirements. The neutral expert did not find, however, that CDCR intentionally violated the Program Guide by undercounting medication noncompliant patients in a manner intended to provide misleading data to the Court or the Special Master, and did not recommend an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

 Although the neutral expert did not recommend evidentiary hearings on the matter, the Court did recommend that the defendants and Special Master confirm the language of the Program Guide to prevent future misleading information. On July 3, 2019, the Court approved the Special Master's 2018 Revision to the Mental Health Services Delivery System Program Guide ("2018 Program Guide Revision"). In response to a court order, the Special Master submit a report and recommendation on December 19, 2019, which included a list of negotiated or court-ordered remedial measures covering custodial issues that were not included in the 2018 Program Guide Revision. The court adopted the Special Master's report and recommendation on February 11, 2020. On April 29, 2019, the Court ordered the defendants to file a status report on the funding process for the construction of 100 mental health crisis beds, and further ordered the defendants to file an update every thirty days until the funding process is complete. On February 4, 2020, the court ordered defendants to deposit $950,000 with the Clerk of the Court to be invested in the interest-bearing account previously opened for this action. On April 7, 2020, in light of the exigent circumstances posed by the novel coronavirus, the court ordered defendants to deposit an additional $2,000,000 into the account. In their May 15, 2020, status report, defendants reported that 108,850 inmates were housed in the State’s adult institutions and no inmates were housed in out-of-state facilities. Defendants further reported that the State’s prison population is approximately 127.9% of design capacity. On May 29, the special master recommended the court to employ his expert's analysis of the psychiatrist employment compensation at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and the Department of State Hospitals. The expert had detailed the following five recommendations to aid the hiring and retention of psychiatrists: - Provide a system of consistent and larger salary increase opportunities for psychiatrists throughout their employment tenure at CDCR and DSH; - Provide a system of compensation differentials to incentivize psychiatrists to fill [CDCR] Central Valley positions, and to retain incumbents in those positions - Increase and improve the office space and facilities provided to [CDCR and DSH] psychiatrists to perform their job functions at its facilities; - Improve the working environment for CDCR and DSH psychiatrists; - In conjunction with improving CDCR and DSH psychiatrists’ overall working conditions, better inform psychiatrists of the value of their compensation and their compensation relative to their peers. The defendants opposed the implementation of the recommendations, arguing that they were “too vague and ambiguous to adopt.” On June 5, 2020, the defendants were ordered to pay the special master $3,000,000, as per the 1995 order requiring that the special master’s fees and expenses be borne by the defendants. According to defendant's May 27 status report, the Governor’s proposed budget for the 2020-21 fiscal year contains an appropriation of $91,032,000 for construction of 50 new licensed crisis beds, which will be considered by the Legislature in the 2020 Budget Act. The defendants do not expect any COVID-19-related delays. COVID-19 Update: On March 20, 2020, during a quarterly status conference, Judge Mueller ordered the Special Master to convene a COVID-19 task force to address the health risks posed to prisoners. The plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Modification of the Population Cap. The plaintiffs requested that the population cap (set at 137.5% of designed capacity) be reduced given the changed circumstances, the increased risk of contraction faced by prisoners by the COVID-19 pandemic, and the lack of alternative remedy. A three-judge panel denied the motion, finding that under FRCP 60(b)(5) and PLRA 18 U.S.C. 3626, the motion was not properly before the Court. The case was initially brought to determine whether a release of prisoners was necessary to remedy California's structural failure to provide constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care services within the state prisons. Although the Court denied the motion on April 4, it did so without prejudice allowing the plaintiffs to seek relief in procedurally appropriate forums. 2020 WL 1675775. Meanwhile, the defendants released a statement of their plan to address COVID-19. In the two days after the Three-Judge Panel denied the plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Population Cap, four more prisoners (including one member of the Coleman class) tested positive for COVID-19, bringing the total to seventeen as of April 6, 2020. In anticipation of the parties' upcoming status conference, Judge Mueller issued an order requiring the parties to file briefs determining the constitutional minima for physical safety, and what steps would need to be taken to ensure adequate physical distancing. Judge Mueller also ordered the defendants to provide a plan to achieve a defined level of physical distancing for class members, including the number of class members per institution and mental health level of care and descriptions of the housing space at each institution. In response to this order, the plaintiffs argued that the Constitution requires that incarcerated persons be protected from substantial and known risks of serious harm. The plaintiffs filed a declaration provided by Dr. Marc Stern attesting to the risks posed by COVID-19 in the defendants' facilities. The defendant, meanwhile, argued that the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard cannot be measured by physical distancing alone, but must be considered alongside the other steps the defendant alleged to have implemented such as suspending admissions and accelerating the release of several thousand prisoners. Together, the parties filed a joint status report addressing the Court's questions. In the report, the defendants detailed process changes to reduce physical contact, such as adjusting scheduled movements and dining schedules. However, the plaintiffs contested that, although the defendants implement the aforementioned procedures, those plans do not comply with the Court's order for physical distancing. As evidence to their claim, the plaintiffs noted that the total number of prisoners tested positive for COVID-19 increased to 33, including 22 class members, as of April 9, 2020. On April 10, Judge Mueller ordered the defendants to provide a strategic plan for achieving compliance with CDC guidance on managing COVID-19 in correctional detention facilities. The plan was ordered to include housing objectives and timelines for class members not granted early release, and continuity plans for providing mental health care. In the same order, Judge Mueller authorized the plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery concerning the availability of extra space at state hospitals to provide the care that is necessary to class members. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. The defendants noted in their strategic plan the steps taken by CDCR to minimize the spread of COVID-19. Among these included releasing 3,400 prisoners early who were within sixty days of their official release date, increasing cleaning within the institution and making hand sanitizer available to prisoners, and transferring prisoners from dormitory housing to empty housing units. The defendants also included steps they plan to take moving forward. To communicate information to prisoners, staff, and the public, the CDCR created a website that includes a tracking tool for prisoner testing and results (https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/covid19/). The defendants stated their intention to restrict transfer of prisoners unless necessary. An expedited release plan was implemented, where prisoners not convicted of a violent crime and with less than sixty days left to serve were released early. The defendants suspended public visitation, and worked with Global Tel Link and JPay to provide some additional free calls and electronic messaging. Judge Mueller also extended the waiver of state law licensing requirements to allow the defendants to convert 37 cells into 70 temporary ICF beds and two observation rooms for high-custody prisoners referred for ICF care. As per an April 17 order to file a stipulation identifying the “temporary departures from certain Program Guide requirements” for the provision of mental health care that the defendants had implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 24, the court ordered the Program Guide requirements for transfer of class members to DSH inpatient hospital beds to be temporarily modified to include COVID-19 screening in accordance with the protocols agreed upon by the parties. 2020 WL 1974229. On May 7, 2020, the Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for reconsideration or clarification. In doing so, the Court stated that it would consider a stipulation of the parties. In the following weeks, the parties met and conferred on a number of occasions under the supervision of the Special Master regarding DSH access, in light of the coronavirus pandemic. On May 13, the plaintiffs agreed that the defendants' current processes for transferring class members to DSH hospital beds were consistent with Program Guide requirements. The parties further agreed that the current procedures, while adequate in practice, were not fully captured in the defendant’s written guidelines, which the defendants agreed to update. The stipulation was approved on May 18. On May 26, the defendants appealed the April 24 and May 7 orders to the Ninth Circuit. This appeal, which was assigned USCA Case Number 20-16062, was later voluntarily dismissed by the defendants on October 9, 2020. A status conference was held on June 26 and the court ordered an amount of $968,100.89 in fees and costs for the First Quarter of 2020 as the parties previously agreed. On July 2, the plaintiffs submitted a brief of evidence supporting their claims of serious mental illness as a risk factor for COVID-19 and the need for mental health interventions. On July 23, the defendants were ordered to pay $3,000,000.00 as part of the agreed Special Master’s fees and expenses. On July 24, the parties sought a 30-day extension of the March 27 stipulation for the implementation of a provisional policy regarding the the use of telepsychiatry to provide mental health services to its inmate-patients due to COVID-19, which was granted on July 27. On July 28, the court ordered the defendants to continue delivering mental health care during the pandemic and to promptly identify whether any incarcerated persons with serious mental illness will have to be moved to accommodate the isolation and quarantine bed set-asides. Two days later, the court ordered the parties to file briefs regarding how the defendants could reduce the number of persons with mental illness in CDCR prisons to levels that that will bring defendants into compliance with the requirements of the October 10, 2017 order. On August 3, the court reviewed the Special Master's February 2020 amended report, and provisionally adopted its recommendations for one year, and ordered the parties to jointly file an updated Program Guide and an updated Compendium of Custody Related Remedial Measures beginning September 1, 2021, and continuing annually thereafter. On August 21, the defendants sought to delay and vacate the hearing set for September 10, which the plaintiffs opposed. The district court denied the motion, but delayed the hearing date by fourteen days. On September 2, the defendants appealed the August 3 order to the Ninth Circuit, which was assigned USCA Case Number 20-16734. On September 25, the district court ordered the defendants to file a report on staffing capacity within 7 days and subsequently every 4 weeks. On November 4, 2020, the court ordered that the defendants consult with the Special Master and task force, make minimal modifications to the staffing plan, such as by including psychiatric nurse practitioners, and submit their proposed revisions to the court. On December 3, 2020, the court adopted the Special Master's report in full and directed the defendants to file a list of the persons who would be most knowledgeable of the steps required to complete implementation of the recommendations adopted by the court. On December 17, 2020, the court also ordered the defendants to update the continuous quality improvement tool within three months. On January 4, 2021, the defendants appealed the December 3 order. The appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 21-15039. Later that month, on January 22, the defendants provided the list of persons most knowledgeable of the steps required to complete implementation of the court's recommendations. The parties continue to file joint status reports and hold status conferences. A status conference is scheduled for May. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: In 1990, mentally ill inmates in California state prisoners filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against California corrections and mental health officials alleging that mental health care provided at most California penal institutions violated their constitutional rights. The parties settled the case. Monitoring and implementation of the settlement agreement is ongoing.


This suit, brought on September 14, 2017, challenged President Trump's revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiff was the City of San Jose, and it argued that the rescission violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The City sought a declaration that rescinding DACA was unlawful, and an injunction to halt the rescission and any steps to deport DACA recipients. The background leading up to this case was lengthy. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program via DHS policy statements. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children, as long as they met certain criteria. As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless Congress acted within the next six months. As the complaint highlighted, the Obama administration made key promises to immigrants: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement, and that barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. In the complaint, San Jose noted that over a quarter of DACA recipients lived in California. The complaint emphasized that San Jose, the tenth-largest city in America, "has always been a place for immigrants[,] with almost 40% of its current population having been born in another country." San Jose further noted that the city employed many DACA recipients, and that the federal government's actions would cause San Jose to experience a significant loss of tax revenue and loss of experienced employees. San Jose alleged that DACA rescission violated Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by targeting individuals for discriminatory treatment based on their national origin without lawful justification. It also alleged that defendants had violated the APA by carrying out government action without first going through notice and comment. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Susan van Keulen on Sept. 14, and reassigned to Judge William Alsup on Sept. 21 after the case was related to Regents of the University of California v. Department of Homeland Security (No. 17-cv-05211), Garcia v. USA (No. 17-cv-5380), and State of California v. DHS (No. 17-cv-5235). The case was later related to County of Santa Clara v. Trump (No. 17-cv-05813). On Oct. 6, in a related challenge led by Regents of University of California before this judge, the government filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. On Oct. 17, after the University in the related case moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so in all related cases, including this one. The court ultimately found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission, specifically related documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on Oct. 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The court denied staying proceedings on Oct. 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus and an emergency motion for stay. On Oct. 23, the district court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until the DACA ended on March 5, 2018. On Nov. 16, the Ninth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus, and the District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by Nov 22. On Nov. 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion noting that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the Supreme Court no later than Nov. 20, and requesting that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the forthcoming petition. On Nov. 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, holding that jurisdiction lied with the District Court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on Nov. 20 agreed to stay all discovery until Dec. 22, at which point the augmented administrative record would be due. On Dec. 1, 2017, the government filed notice that they appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On Dec. 21 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case. The Court held that the district court should have stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have "first resolved the Government's threshold arguments (that the Acting Secretary's determination to rescind DACA was unreviewable because it was "committed to agency discretion," 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record." 583 U.S. ____ (2017). The same day, the district court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. On Jan. 9, 2018, the district court denied the government's Nov. 1, 2017 motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. The order indicated the court would separately deny the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the rescission. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who never before received deferred action. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on Jan. 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 16, 2018, and also sought certiorari from the Supreme Court on Jan. 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time-sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied certiorari without prejudice on Feb. 26, 2018, indicating the assumption of the justices "that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case." The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. UC Regents, et al v. USA, et al, Case Number 18-80037 USCA 9th Circuit March 19, 2018. In February and March 2018, the parties and amici filed their briefs, which can be found here. The Ninth Circuit (Judges Kim McLane Wardlaw, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and John B. Owens) affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. The panel held that "DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion" and the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. 2018 WL 5833232. Thus, the panel concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it "promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress." Id. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in three DACA cases: Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and NAACP v. Trump, all of which were pending before different circuit courts of appeal. The Court consolidated the three cases (No. 18-587). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation fo the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020 ("Wolf Memorandum"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that Acting Secretary Wolf's actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in another case challenging the Wolf Memorandum,Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump, ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Sept. 14, 2017, the City of San Jose filed this lawsuit in response to the Trump Administration's attempt to end Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), arguing that such a rescission violates the Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction on Jan. 9, 2018 to keep DACA in place, which was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review and oral argument was heard on Nov. 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On October 15, 2008, the Mental Health Project (MHP) teamed up with groups across the country to file this national class action lawsuit against the Social Security Administration (SSA) for revoking the retirement and disability benefits of over 100,000 poor, elderly and disabled Americans under an arbitrary and unlawful benefit suspension policy. The effort is led by the National Senior Citizens Law Center and the pro bono counsel of Munger, Tolles & Olson, and includes Disability Rights California and the Legal Aid Society of San Mateo County. Under a 1996 law, SSA must suspend the benefits of people who are "fleeing to avoid prosecution" for a felony. The law was enacted to prevent wanted fugitives from receiving benefits. The plaintiffs alleged that thousands of elderly and disabled Americans who are not "wanted," and indeed, who may have been completely misidentified, have been caught up in the system that SSA has used to implement the law. On March 30, 2009, the parties reached a settlement in the case. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to reinstate the payments of those who had been wrongfully denied their benefits. The defendants also agreed to pay specified legal fees to the plaintiff class attorneys. The court maintains jurisdiction over the management of the settlement until it is complete. Multiple parties, including the County, intervened to object to the terms of the settlement. These documents are sealed, so the contents of the parties' motions are unknown. Judge Wilken denied the motion to intervene, approved the final Settlement Agreement, and directed entry of the final judgment on September 24, 2009. One intervenor appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 2015. The Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on April 14, 2015. The docket was last updated relating to a stipulation of settlement on March 8, 2017.

Summary:
On October 15, 2008, public interest attorneys filed a national class action lawsuit against the Social Security Administration (SSA) for revoking the retirement and disability benefits of over 100,000 poor, elderly and disabled Americans under an arbitrary and unlawful benefit suspension policy. Under a 1996 law, SSA must suspend the benefits of people who are "fleeing to avoid prosecution" for a felony. The plaintiffs alleged that thousands of elderly and disabled Americans who are not "wanted," and indeed, who may have been completely misidentified, have been caught up in the system that SSA has used to implement the law.

On March 30, 2009, the parties reached a settlement in the case. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to reinstate the payments of those who had been wrongfully denied their benefits.


On December 8, 2003, thirteen African Americans filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Arkansas against Nucor Corporation. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that Nucor discriminated against them on the basis of race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., and Section One of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981a. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, equitable remedies, back pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. On August 24, 2004, the District Court (Judge Harry F. Barnes) severed the plaintiffs' claims into four cases and transferred each to the judicial district in which the unlawful employment practices allegedly occurred. Accordingly, this case was transferred to the District of South Carolina. For the next nine years, the parties engaged in a protracted legal battle concerning class certification. Initially, on August 7, 2007, the District Court (Judge C. Weston Houck) denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification. But exactly two years later, this ruling was overturned by the Fourth Circuit Court (before Judge M. Blane Michael, Judge Roger L. Gregory, and Judge G. Steven Agee). Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149 (4th Cir. 2009). The District Court subsequently granted certification on February 16, 2011, although it modified the class composition on April 27, 2011, upon the defendants' request. The Court defined the class as "All African-Americans who are . . . or were employed by Nucor Corporation . . . at any time between December 2, 1999 . . . in the beam mill, hot mill, cold mill, melting, maintenance, and shipping departments, and who may have been discriminated against because of Nucor's challenged practices." The battle continued. After the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes in June 2011, the defendants' filed a motion to decertify the class. On September 11, 2012, the Court granted the motion with respect to what it termed plaintiffs' disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, but denied the motion with respect to the plaintiffs' hostile work environment claim. Both parties appealed the district court's decision in different ways. Below is a brief summary of how both issues progressed following the September 2012 order. The "Discriminatory Job Promotion Practices" section of this summary refers to the plaintiffs' disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, and is so titled because of the way that the Fourth Circuit later labeled these claims. Hostile Work Environment Claim The defendants again sought to decertify the class based on the hostile work environment claim, this time based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Comcast Corp v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (2013), but the District Court again denied to do so on September 27, 2013. The defendants moved for reconsideration but the court denied that on February 14, 2014. The defendants eventually sought permission to appeal under Rule 23(f), but on July 25, 2014, the Fourth Circuit denied the request as untimely, explaining that Rule 23(f) permits review only when an appeal from a certification order is filed within fourteen days of the order. The Circuit Court treated the September 11, 2012 order as the order at issue, and explained that the four motions for decertification of the hostile work environment class did not affect the time component here. These four motions by the defendant did not reset the time for appeal because none of the District Court rulings in response to them altered the original ruling of the District Court on this issue. It explained that holding otherwise would render 23(f)'s deadline "toothless" by allowing parties to circumvent it by filing motions to amend or decertify at any time after the district court's original order on the issue. On August 25, 2014, the Fourth Circuit denied to rehear the issue en banc. Discriminatory Job Promotion Practices Claim The plaintiffs originally responded to the September 11, 2012, order that granted decertification of the class with regard to the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims by filing a motion to amend the order on September 25, 2012. The District Court denied this motion to amend on April 5, 2013, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the Court had committed a clear error of law. The plaintiffs then sought permission to appeal the District Court's order decertifying the class in this respect, and the Fourth Circuit granted permission to appeal on June 18, 2013. On May 11, 2015, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs and vacated the portion of the District Court's September 11, 2012 order that had decertified the class with regard to the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims. The Fourth Circuit opinion referred to these claims as "discriminatory job promotion practices" claims. In answering the question of whether the workers had presented a common question of employment discrimination through evidence of racism in the workplace, the Fourth Circuit explained that "the critical question is thus not whether the data used is perfect but instead whether it is reliable and probative of discrimination." It reasoned that the plaintiffs' statistical evidence was methodologically sound and yielded results that satisfied Wal-Mart's heightened requirement of commonality. It also explained that the surrounding circumstances and anecdotal evidence of discrimination in this case helped animate the statistical findings in a way that made them legally significant. In light of the Fourth Circuit's holding, the District Court certified the promotions class on December 22, 2015. With both the promotions class and the hostile work environment class certified, the litigation proceeding through discovery and other motions practice for years. On July 26, 2017, the case was reassigned to Judge David C. Norton. On December 26, 2017 the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement. The Court granted preliminary approval the following day. Under the agreement, the settlement class would be comprised of: "all African-Americans who are, or were employed by Nucor Corporation or Nucor Steel Berkeley at the Nucor Berkeley manufacturing plant in Huger, South Carolina at any time between December 2, 1999 and April 27, 2011, in the beam mill, hot mill, cold mill, melting, maintenance, and shipping departments, and who may have been discriminated against because of Nucor's challenged practices, and who did not opt out of the class." The settlement awarded an aggregate amount of $22,500,000, which defendants would put into a fund that would be distributed to individual members and that would also be used to pay class counsels' attorneys' fees and expenses, class representatives' expenses, notice and administration costs, and other applicable taxes and fees. The amount of each individual settlement payment would be based on information provided through claim forms that would assess the relative strength of the alleged merits of the settlement class member's claim(s) based on various factors outlined in the agreement. In addition to reimbursement of reasonable expenses, the settlement included an agreement by defendants not to object to attorneys' fees of up to $10,000,000. The settlement also contained provisions awarding injunctive relief in which Nucor agreed to take certain actions with regard to Nucor Steel Berkeley. Among other things, these provisions included Nucor providing training on non-discrimination/harassment, and Nucor incorporating various provisions into the appropriate company policies to deal with any complaints of discrimination and/or harassment. On February 22, 2018, the Court granted final approval of the settlement, finding it fair, reasonable, and adequate as required by F.R.C.P. Rule 23. The final agreement provided monetary relief totaling $22,500,000. Of this, $10,000,000 would go to class counsel for attorneys fees, and another $975,699.22 would go to counsel for reimbursement of costs. The Court also approved $40,000 service payments to each of the class representatives. The remaining money would go into the fund so that it could be distributed to individual members of the class under the terms of the agreement. Final judgment on the class litigation was entered on April 13, 2018. The only remaining issue at that point was one individual class member's request to opt out of the class. The Court resolved this on December 7, 2018, finding that this individual plaintiff was bound by the January 2017 opt-out deadlines included in the class notice and was therefore unable to opt out of the class. Any remaining litigation between these parties was officially ended on December 27, 2018, when the Court granted a joint stipulation for dismissal with prejudice.

Summary: Plaintiffs, African-American former or current employees of Nucor Corporation, brought this class action lawsuit in 2003 alleging that Nucor discriminated against them on the basis of race. After years of litigation and appeals over class certification, a class was certified which included claims based on a hostile work environment and discriminatory job promotion practices. The case ended with a court approved class settlement in 2018. The settlement agreement provided for comprehensive injunctive relief and monetary relief totaling $22,500,000. Approximately $10,000,000 was awarded to counsel, and much of the remaining amount was used to set up a fund that would distribute money to individual plaintiffs based on the relative strength of their claims according to a system established by the agreement.


On February 23, 2012 the plaintiff, a New York City Police Officer, filed a complaints against the City of New York, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), sought compensatory damages and an injunction ordering the City of New York to cease all retaliation against the plaintiff. He claimed that his superiors at his precinct had targeted him for retaliation and harassment, because he had repeatedly complained about the use of an illegal quota system at his precinct. According to his complaint, these practices were in violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 8 of the New York State Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff police officer claimed that an illegal system of quotas mandating numbers of arrests, summonses, and stop-and-frisks was in use in the 42nd precinct. He alleged that police officers were under intense pressure to meet their quotas and that officers who do not meet their quotas faced punishments ranging from undesirable assignments or the loss of overtime to separation from partners and poor evaluations. He stated that on four occasions he complained to his commanding officers about the use of the quota system by his mid-level superiors, but that no action was taken to stop the practice. As a result of his complaints, he was personally targeted by his mid-level superiors for harassment and retaliation. Specifically, in his 2010 and 2011 evaluations, he received reduced marks that put him at risk of being fired, accompanied by comments such as "[he] is argumentative and questioning regarding his assignments." He was also permanently reassigned to a new partner, unique among officers who failed to meet their quotas, and he was denied overtime, time off, and was denied the sorts of assignments that offer overtime and that officers of his seniority usually would receive. On April 12, 2012, Judge Barbara S. Jones granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Matthews v. City of New York, No. 12 CV 1354 (BSJ), 2012 WL 8084831 (S.D.N.Y. April 12, 2012). The court found that the plaintiff police officer was acting as an employee and not as a civilian when he notified his superiors of the quota system. Thus, the Court held his speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection. On November 28, 2012, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed. Matthews v. City of New York, 488 Fed. Appx. 532 (2d Cir. 2012). The Court found that there was insufficient discovery to conclude that the plaintiff spoke pursuant to his official duties, and so ordered the district court to re-open the case and begin discovery proceedings in order to decide whether as a matter of law the plaintiff's speech was entitled to constitutional protection. On remand, on July 29, 2013, Paul Adam Engelmayer of the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted summary judgment for the defendant. Matthews v. City of New York, 957 F.Supp.2d 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). The court found that the police officer was speaking pursuant to his official duties and therefore held that his speech was unprotected by the Constitution. On August 1, 2013, the plaintiff appealed the summary judgment order to the Second Circuit. On February 26, 2015, the Second Circuit (Judges John M. Walker, Peter W. Hall, Garvan Murtha of the United States District Court District of Vermont, sitting by designation) vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff police officer's comments on precinct policy did not fall within his official duties and that he spoke as a citizen because he elected a channel with a civilian analogue to pursue his complaint. 779 F.3d 167. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court. The parties and the district court formed a new case management plan and the parties proceeded with fact discovery. A settlement conference was held before Magistrate Judge Debra C. Freeman on October 27, 2015. On November 17, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached a verbal agreement on the material terms of a settlement. Judge Englemayer entered the parties' stipulation and order of settlement and dismissal on December 7, 2015. Under the settlement agreement, the defendant agreed: 1) to void the plaintiff police officer's 2011 evaluation's 2.5 rating and to confirm in writing that the plaintiff was no longer subject to Level 1 Command Monitoring as a result of his 2011 negative rating now deemed void; 2) to pay the plaintiff back wages of $35,582.78; 3) to pay the plaintiff compensatory damages of $125,000; and 4) to pay attorney fees of $130,000 to the NYCLU. Upon the defendants' compliance with the above terms, the action was dismissed with prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 23, 2012 the plaintiff, a New York City Police Officer, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York under § 1983 against the City of New York. The police officer claimed that he was retaliated against for complaining to his commanding officers about the quota system in place in his precinct. On July 29, 2013, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, because it found that the police officer was speaking pursuant to his official duties and that therefore his speech was not constitutionally protected. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment and reversed, and the parties settled in 2015.


On August 30, 2012, Plaintiff Electronic Frontier Foundation filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Plaintiff sought injunctive relief against Defendants Department of Justice, Office of Information Policy (OIP), and National Security Division (NSD) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Plaintiff is a non-profit corporation based in Massachusetts focused on informing policy makers and the general public about civil liberties issues related to technology and to act as a defender of those liberties. On July 26, 2012, the Plaintiff requested from OIP and NSD documents relating to the government’s collection of foreign intelligence pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) as amended by the FISA Amendment Act (FAA) of 2008. This request was made shortly after Senator Ron Wyden of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence requested the public release of information concerning the government’s Section 702 collection under the FAA. Four statements concerning the Section 702 surveillance activities were declassified in response to the Senator’s request, revealing to the public for the first time that the implementation of Section 702 had sometimes “circumvented the spirit of the law”, at least once violating the fourth amendment. The Plaintiff asked the Defendants to expedite their FOIA request as their business was “primarily engaged in disseminating information” and because the requests involved a “matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exists possible questions about the government’s integrity which affects public confidence.” There is a generally applicable twenty-day deadline for the processing of any FOIA request, and more than thirty days had passed since the original request was made by the time this action commenced. The Plaintiff sought injunctive relief ordering the documents to be processed and sent to them immediately, for all fees to be waived, and attorney’s fees covered. The Defendants alleged that on August 13, 2012, NSD notified the Plaintiff that it refused to expedite the FOIA request because the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate a “compelling need” for expedition. The Defendants established that it expected to complete processing of the FOIA request by December 5, 2012, at which time they would produce any responsive, non-exempt information to Plaintiff. On January 3, 2013, NSD produced two partially redacted, responsive documents to the Plaintiff’s counsel. Three other responsive documents were withheld pursuant to two exceptions in the FOIA statute that prevent disclosure of information that would harm an interest of national defense or foreign policy, as well as information that is prohibited from disclosure by another statute. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on April 1, 2013, but in June (while the motion was still pending), Edward Snowden—a former government contractor—leaked to media outlets thousands of classified documents relating to the U.S. government’s intelligence surveillance program. The President subsequently ordered the Director of National Intelligence to review and declassify all the information that could be disclosed without harming national security in an effort to enhance transparency and regain the public’s trust. Some of this newly declassified information was contained in the five responsive documents that the Defendants had identified to the Plaintiff on January 3, 2013. In light of the new status of these documents, the Defendants withdrew their motion for summary judgment, reprocessed the five documents, and reproduced them to the Plaintiff with redactions. The Plaintiff disagreed with the redactions made to one of these documents: an October 2011 Foreign Sovereign Intelligence Court (FISC) Opinion. On September 4, 2013, the Defendants moved for summary judgment, and on October 2, 2013, the Plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment. The sole issue presented in the Motions was whether the Defendants were justified in withholding the redacted information in the October 11 FISC Opinion. The Court agreed to conduct an in camera review of the unredacted document and ordered the Defendants to explain certain redactions. In response, the Defendants lifted many of the redactions and disclosed the information that was the subject of the Court’s questions. A brief stay was issued from October 3 until October 18, 2013 in response to the October 2013 federal government shutdown that prohibited the Defendants from working. On July 18, 2014, District Judge Amy B. Jackson granted the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and denied the Plaintiff’s cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 57 F.Supp.3d 54. She found that the Defendants met their burden to show that the redacted information could reasonably damage the country’s national security if released, and that therefore, the remaining redactions were properly withheld. On November 7, 2014, the Plaintiff moved for attorney’s fees. It argued that it was eligible for fees (1) because it obtained various judicial orders issued by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and FISC and (2) because its efforts were necessary to the release of the redacted 2011 FISC Opinion (the “catalyst theory”). The Plaintiff argued that its efforts caused the disclosure of all the information in the 2011 FISC opinion that could be revealed by a FOIA request. The Defendants argued that the Plaintiff should not be awarded attorney’s fees because the government’s disclosure of the 2011 FISC Opinion was not caused by the litigation, but rather by Edward Snowden’s unauthorized leaks and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s subsequent declassification initiative. If this argument was accepted, it would cancel the Plaintiff’s eligibility for attorney’s fees as the Plaintiff must be the substantially prevailing party to be eligible. On September 30, 2015, Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey granted in part and denied in part the Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. The Court sided with the Plaintiff’s argument and found that the Plaintiff was eligible for an award of fees. The Court also found that the Plaintiff met the four criteria for entitlement to attorney’s fees. First, the result of this case added to the public benefit as the disclosure of the 2011 FISC Opinion had a significant impact on the public discussion of the NSA’s surveillance programs and was still ongoing. Second and Third, the Plaintiff organization’s objectives and status as a non-profit make it clear that they sought the documents in question primarily for public dissemination on an issue of public importance, rather than for commercial purposes (therefore passing the “Commercial Benefit” and “Plaintiff’s Interest” requirements). Fourth, the Court did not find the Defendants’ assertion of a FISC rule as a bar to disclosure compelling. The Court reduced the total amount of fees awarded to the Plaintiff because of hourly calculations that it found questionable. The Plaintiff was awarded total fees in the amount of $49,124.50 and total administrative costs of $350. On November 16, 2015, the Defendant notified the Court that it would not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s decision on the award of attorneys’ fees. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2012, a civil liberties non-profit filed this freedom of information act (FOIA) complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief for the expedited production of documents related to the federal government's collection of foreign intelligence. The Defendants withheld most responsive information pursuant to FOIA exemptions, but ultimately turned over much of it because of the Edward Snowden leaks in April 2013 that resulted in the public declassification of some of the documents. In 2014, Judge Amy B. Jackson found that the Defendants had met their burden to show that all redacted information was withheld properly and granted their Motion for Summary Judgment. Attorney's fees were awarded to the Plaintiff, however, as the Court found they met the requirements for eligibility and entitlement. The case closed in November 2015.


On December 9, 2013, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”), a public interest research institution focused on privacy, freedom of expression, and democratic values in the information age, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. The plaintiff sought the processing of its expedited FOIA request and the release of the following: 1. Semiannual reports to Congressional committees on use of pen registers and trap and trace (PRTT) devices for surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act; 2. All information the defendant had provided to these committees on this subject; and 3. All records the defendant had used in preparing these reports and information. The plaintiff alleged that it was lawfully entitled to these reports under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A) and that the defendant’s failure to process and respond to its request for these records violated the FOIA statutory deadline. Alongside its suit, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction requiring the defendant to expedite the processing of its FOIA request and complete its processing within twenty days. On February 11, 2014, Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Jackson held that EPIC had failed to demonstrate that it would suffer irreparable harm if the DOJ was not ordered to produce the records immediately. Moreover, the Court noted that the classified nature of the documents weighed in favor of the DOJ. 15 F.Supp.3d 32. On March 18, 2014, the defendant released to the plaintiff the first tranche of records relating to its FOIA request, twenty-five semiannual reports to Congressional committees on use of PRTT devices for surveillance. The defendant withheld portions of these documents for reasons of “national security” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), “exemption by statute” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) and 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(C), and “disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures” under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). On May 29, 2014 and August 6, 2014, the defendant released to the plaintiff the second and third tranches of records relating to its FOIA request, fifty-two documents used by the defendant to produce the semiannual reports to Congressional committees on use of PRTT devices for surveillance. The defendant, like it did in the first tranche of records, withheld portions of these documents for reasons of “national security,” “exemption by statute,” “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and “disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures.” On October 31, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and attached to it, as an exhibit, a Vaughn index that listed the 139 documents that the defendant had withheld in full or in part and specified for each document under which exemption(s) information had been withheld. The defendant noted that the plaintiff had agreed not to challenge its withholding in full of thirty-eight documents. It further argued that it had satisfied the plaintiff’s FOIA request because that the information it had withheld from the documents was exempt from disclosure under “national security,” “exemption by statute,” “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,” and “disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedure.” On November 21, 2014, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. It did not challenge any of the defendant’s withholdings under “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” and argued the following: 1. The defendant had improperly redacted information from twenty-five semiannual reports under “national security” and “disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedure” 2. The defendant had failed to disclose “reasonably segregated portions” of discussions of documents it had withheld in full, including significant United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) legal interpretations, discussions of FISC jurisdiction and Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act procedures, and statistics about the number of pen registers filed and U.S. persons targeted. In December 2014, the defendant released the statistics about the number of pen registers filed and U.S. persons targeted, which it had previously, incorrectly redacted from three semiannual reports. On February 4, 2016, Judge Jackson denied both the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment. He noted that the number of documents whose exemption issues the parties contested had narrowed substantially since the motions were filed and held that the defendant had failed to establish with sufficient specificity its justifications for withholding information in the remaining contested documents. The judge then ordered the defendant to file an updated Vaughn Index, listing the challenged withholdings in the remaining contested documents, and to submit unredacted revisions of these documents to the court for a private review. (2016 WL 447426). On March 18, 2016, the defendant filed a revised Vaughn Index and submitted the contested documents to the court for private review. The defendant also released to the plaintiff previously withheld portions of seventy-three pages from five semiannual reports but redacted portions of these pages that it had previously released as unredacted in the first tranche of documents in March 2014. On April 8, 2016, the defendant again filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant argued that it had released all the non-exempt, reasonably segregable portions of the contested documents and that the information it had withheld from these documents was exempt from disclosure under “national security,” “exemption by statute,” and “disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedure.” On April 8, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The plaintiff argued the following: 1. The defendant had implicitly conceded in its most recent release of documents that certain redacted portions of the documents it initially released were not properly exempt and that certain redacted portions of the reprocessed pages were not properly exempt. 2. The defendant had not provided evidence to show that the remaining disputed material was exempt. 3. The court record contradicted many of the defendant’s claims about exemption, which was evidence of bad faith. On November 7, 2017, Judge Jackson granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered the defendant to reprocess the contested parts of the semiannual reports one more time to address certain issues identified in his opinion. 296 F.Supp.3d 109. On October 12, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal due to a private settlement agreement between the parties. According to EPIC's website, as a result of this lawsuit the DOJ released hundreds of pages of materials related to the governments FISA applications and FISC proceedings. These materials include Semiannual Reports from the Attorney General concerning FISA authorities and related documents filed by the DOJ in the FISC. The released documents can be found here on EPIC's website. This case is now closed.

Summary: In December 2013, Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the National Security Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 5 U.S.C. § 552. EPIC sought the processing of its expedited FOIA request for the release of semiannual reports and information submitted to Congressional committees on surveillance devices and the records that DOJ used to prepare these submissions. In March, May, and August 2014, DOJ released to the EPIC twenty-five semiannual reports and fifty other documents relating to its FOIA request but withheld other documents in full and portions of the released documents. On October 12, 2018, the parties filed a joint stipulation of dismissal due to a private settlement agreement between the parties. The case is now closed.