On December 31, 2015, three indigent individuals residing in Indiana filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on August 19, 2016. The plaintiffs sued the Allen County Council, Allen County Board of Commissioners, and Allen County Public Defender Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress the alleged deprivation of their constitutional rights. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Defendants from violating their Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, and their equivalent provisions under the Indiana state Constitution. Plaintiffs also sought an injunction to enjoin the Defendants from making expenditures of funds on indigent defense services likely to result in violations of constitutional rights. Lastly, plaintiffs sought costs and attorneys' fees. This case was initially assigned to Judge Philip P. Simon. The plaintiffs proposed a class defined as, “all individuals who have or will have misdemeanor criminal cases pending in the courts of Allen County, Indiana, who have or will have an attorney assigned to them due to indigency and have not been convicted or entered into a plea agreement.” Plaintiffs claimed that Defendants, for years, operated a constitutionally, structurally, and systemically deficient public defender system for indigent individuals charged with misdemeanor crimes. They alleged that these failures resulted in ineffective assistance of counsel and constructive denial of counsel for misdemeanants represented by the Allen County Public Defender Office. Defendants alleged that Plaintiffs knew about these deficiencies for at least 10 years. Plaintiffs also claimed that public defenders in Allen County had caseloads consisting of hundreds of additional misdemeanor cases; did not meaningfully conducted any legal research into Plaintiffs’ cases; did not meaningfully investigate Plaintiffs’ charges; did not file any substantive motions in the cases; did not hold a single confidential in-person meeting with Plaintiffs outside a courthouse; and devoted less than one year in whole to the defense of each of class Plaintiffs’ cases. The public defender system failed to provide clients with adequate advise, consultation, and communication with attorneys; the ability to make informed decisions about their legal rights; meaningful opportunity to present defenses against charges; proper attorney assistance prior to waiving of rights; and proper, prompt, and accurate information regarding plea alternatives, jail alternatives, and the consequences of plea agreements and criminal sentences. Throughout 2016, the parties engaged in discovery and mediation talks. On February 15, 2017, a mediator reported that mediation talks had finished without resolution. On May 1, 2017, the case was reassigned to Chief Judge Theresa L. Springmann. The parties continued litigation, particularly addressing discovery and class certification. Judge Springmann denied the plaintiffs motion for class certification on August 14, 2017. She held that the defendants had raised an issue as to the plaintiffs' standing and the court's jurisdiction over the case. As such, she ruled that she could not decide class certification until issues of standing and jurisdiction had been addressed. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss on September 17, 2017. On June 20, 2018, Magistrate Judge Susan Collins stayed proceedings on the defendants' motion to dismiss, sighting settlement conversations. The parties had a status conference with Judge Collins in late August where they announced officially that they had reached settlement, but that one of the three plaintiffs may not agree to sign. The contents of the settlement were not available. Defendants moved to enforce the settlement on September 18, 2018. Judge Springmann decided to keep this motion under advisement to give the hold-out plaintiff, now proceeding pro se, time to reply. The plaintiff filed a petition for relief on November 19, 2018. The court did not issue an official order regarding these two motions until July 25, 2019, when it denied defendants motion to enforce and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs petition for relief. The petition was granted only insofar as it requested the defendants' motion be denied. No other additional relief was granted. Defendants proceeded to reinstate their motion to dismiss on September 9, 2019. On February 5, 2020, after the hold-out plaintiff failed to file a timely reply, the court granted the motion as it applied to claims that she had brought individually. The other plaintiffs stipulated to dismissal of the remaining claims on April 1, 2020, and the case was subsequently dismissed with prejudice the same day. This case is now closed.

Summary: Class action suit brought by misdemeanor defendants in Allen County, Indiana on August 19, 2016. The suit was filed against the Allen County Council, Allen County Board of Commissioners, and Allen County Public Defender Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged ineffective assistance of council that defendants had known about for 10 years. The case is ongoing.


On September 5, 2019, the Black Parallel School Board and three students in the Sacramento City Unified School District (SCUSD) filed a class action in United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs sued SCUSD and a selection of its officers under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), and state law. Represented by Disability Rights California, the National Center for Youth Law, Western Center on Law and Poverty, and the Equal Justice Society, the plaintiffs sought a court order for injunctive relief against SCUSD, declaratory judgment, class certification, and attorneys' fees. Specifically, they requested that SCUSD reform its policies and procedures to identify, offer, and provide accommodations and modifications to all eligible students. The plaintiffs claimed that SCUSD created and perpetuated an unlawful school system that results in modern-day segregation and mistreatment of students with disabilities, particularly Black students with disabilities, in violation of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Civil Rights Act, and Fourteenth Amendment. In 2017, the Council of Great City Schools, a coalition of 75 of the nation’s largest urban public school systems, had released a report regarding the inadequate special education accommodations in the SCUSD. In 2018, nonprofit advocacy groups expressed their disappointment regarding SCUSD’s continuing failures and demanded immediate action. The plaintiffs' class-action lawsuit claimed that SCUSD had been notified of its discriminatory conduct years ago through the 2017 report, but SCUSD had not taken effective steps to eradicate the problems. As of October 2019, the case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 5, 2019, the Black Parallel School Board and three students in the Sacramento City Unified School District (SCUSD) filed a lawsuit against the SCUSD. The suit alleged districtwide discrimination against students with disabilities, especially Black students. The plaintiffs claimed the discrimination segregates and denies students with disabilities a meaningful opportunity to be educated alongside their peers and excessively disciplines students for behaviors linked to their disabilities. The case is ongoing.


Executive Order 12,333 ("EO 12,333") is the foundational source of authority for government agencies, including the National Security Agency ("NSA"), to conduct surveillance of foreigners outside of the United States. Under EO 12,333, intelligence agencies have collected records containing the location information of mobile phones. In May 2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the ACLU Foundation filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests with the government agencies regarding records that are the subject of this lawsuit. The plaintiffs submitted administrative appeals after denial and receiving no response from the agencies. On 12/30/2013, ACLU and the ACLU Foundation filed this lawsuit against Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of State, and NSA in the U.S. District for the Southern District of New York. This is an action under FOIA, seeking the release of records that describe the government's understanding of its surveillance authority under EO 12,333 as well as the rules that regulate the government's acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of the communications of Americans swept up in that surveillance. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief. On October 31, 2014, the ACLU filed a second amended complaint. On March 16, 2015, the district court (Judge Analisa Torres) issued the Stipulation and Order, which required National Security Division (“NSD”) of the Department of Justice to search and produce identified documents that were currently in effect or created after September 11, 2001. After the completion of the NSD's production of these documents, the parties agreed to continue their discussions regarding whether searches for documents created before September 11, 2001 will be undertaken, including whether conducting such searches would be unduly burdensome to NSD. See this Order On February 26, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that each defendant agency satisfied its obligation under FOIA to conduct a reasonable search to discover the requested documents. On April 20, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment. On August 18, 2016, the court ordered defendants to complete its review of the materials for responsiveness to the plaintiffs' requests, submit a letter informing the court as to the number of responsive documents found and proposing a date by which the defendants will produce the responsive documents. The court’s decision on the parties' cross-motions for partial summary judgment was held in abeyance pending the defendants' review of these additional materials. The plaintiffs submitted a letter on September 29, 2016 to request reinstatement of plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants also asked the court to reinstate the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. The defendants claimed that their searches were adequate, and that many documents which were not turned over were covered by exemptions to FOIA. Exemption 1 protects classified national security documents from disclosure. Exemption 3 protects documents whose disclosure is otherwise statutorily prohibited. Exemption 5 shields privileged communications between or among executive officials (for example, those protected by attorney-client privilege). Finally, Exemption 7 protects law enforcement techniques used in investigations or prosecutions. On March 27, 2017, the district court (Judge Kimba M. Wood) denied the plaintiffs’ motion and granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion. Judge Wood denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the adequacy of FBI’s, NSD’s, and CIA’s searches. Judge Wood found that the defendants had met their burden regarding Exemption 7 (protecting disclosure of techniques and procedures of law enforcement investigations and prosecutions) and granted their motion. He found that some documents were covered by Exemptions 1, 3, and 5 as well, granting defendants summary judgment as to those documents, while denying them summary judgment as to others. On August 17, 2017, the court issued an order in response to both parties' motions for partial summary judgment as to remaining contested documents. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs' motion. The court found that the defendants properly withheld documents under Exemptions 1, 3, or 5. The plaintiffs appealed on October 20. On May 30th, 2019 the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's August 2017 decision. Judge Jose A. Cabranes delivered the opinion, holding that because certain OLC documents were not binding law, they were covered by attorney-client privilege and therefore protected by Exemption 5. Furthermore, he added documents created by the intelligence programs were protected by Exemptions 1 and 3. 925 F.3d 576 The agencies' documents released from this FOIA lawsuit are available at the ACLU website.

Summary: Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Department of Justice, Department of State, and National Security Agency (“NSA”) in the U.S. District for the Southern District of New York. This is an action under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 ("FOIA"), seeking the release of records that describe the government's understanding of its surveillance authority under Executive Order 12,333 ("EO 12,333") as well as the rules that regulate the government's acquisition, retention, use, and dissemination of the communications of Americans swept up in that surveillance. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief. On March 16, 2015, Judge Analisa Torres entered the Stipulation and Order which requires National Security Division (“NSD”) of the Department of Justice’s document searches for production of the identified documents that were currently in effect or created after September 11, 2001. In May of 2019, the 2nd Circuit held that the desired documents were covered by Exemptions 1, 3, and 5, and affirmed the lower court's ruling.


On March 19, 2018, a criminal defense attorney in Galveston, Texas, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. He sued a Galveston County Court judge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the Civil Rights Corps, requested declaratory and injunctive relief together with attorney's fees. He claimed that the defendant judge had retaliated against him for speaking out against abusive practices in the Galveston County criminal justice system in violation of his First Amendment rights. According to Muting Gideon's Trumpet: The Crisis in Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, indigent defendants in Texas struggle to obtain competent representation. Judges frequently appoint defense lawyers based on their reputations for moving cases along quickly, personal friendship, or political support. In the early 21st Century, the state adopted the Texas Fair Defense Act (TFDA) to standardize how courts appoint lawyers for indigent defendants. Under TFDA, judges appoint the lawyer whose name appears at the top of a rotating list. The plaintiff provided criminal defense services to indigent defendants in Galveston, Texas. The defendant judge appointed him to represent several indigent defendants under TFDA. In one case, the plaintiff hired a third party investigator to interview witnesses. In others, he challenged the constitutionality of jailing defendants who could not afford bail. Later, the plaintiff complained to the Texas Indigent Defense Commission about several abusive practices in the Galveston criminal justice system. The relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant judge quickly broke down. The complaint alleged that the defendant judge refused to authorize the plaintiff to spend funds he requested for additional investigators. The judge also cut back on the plaintiff's compensation, citing the plaintiff's "excessive out of court hours." Eventually, the defendant judge removed the plaintiff from all but one of his cases and, with one exception, stopped assigning him to new cases. In response, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the defendant judge for retaliation in violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. The defendant judge promptly moved to dismiss the case. First, he argued that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring a claim on behalf of indigent defendants. Second, he argued that the complaint was too vague and speculatory to state a claim for retaliation. On December 17, 2018, Magistrate Judge Andrew M. Edison issued a report and recommendation granting in part and denying in part the defendant judge's motion to dismiss. Judge Edison rejected the defendant judge's argument that the plaintiff lacked standing as "predicated on an inaccurate summation" of the complaint, which alleged harm to the plaintiff rather than the plaintiff's clients. He also found that the plaintiff had properly pleaded the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim: (1) an adverse employment action; (2) speech involving a matter of public concern; (3) the public interest in disclosure outweighed the defendant's interest in efficiency; and (4) the speech was a substantial factor in the adverse employment action. Nevertheless, Judge Edison recommended that the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief and attorney's fees be dismissed under Davis v. Tarrant. In Davis, the Fifth Circuit held that appointing an attorney under TFDA is a judicial act, so judges enjoy broad immunity from suits brought under § 1983 for violations of TFDA. District Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. signed an order adopting the Magistrate's recommendations on January 24, 2019. The plaintiff pressed on with his claim for declaratory relief. On April 4, 2019, the parties notified the court of third party mediation and soon reached a settlement. The settlement provided that:

Both parties would follow the TFDA and Galveston County Indigent Defense Plan;

The plaintiff's obligations would be contingent on his continued acceptance of appointments; and

The defendant judge would not admit any wrongdoing.

 Judge Hanks entered an order directing the parties to agree to the terms of the settlement agreement on April 22, 2019. The case is now closed. Related Opinions: 2018 WL 7115180 2019 WL 313432

Summary: A defense lawyer sued a judge who he alleged had removed him from cases for spending too much time and money on indigent defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The lawyer's claims for injunctive relief were dismissed due to judicial immunity, and the lawyer settled his declaratory claims with the judge.


On September 30, 2005, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Creative Networks, LLC and its parent company, Res-Care, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff, representing two former employees of Creative Networks, LLC, asked the court for a permanent injunction, a policy change within the company, and monetary compensation. The plaintiffs claimed that the two employees had been retaliated against after they had opposed unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that one employee had been terminated in retaliation and the other employee had been threatened with termination. On November 18, 2005, Res-Care, Inc., the parent company to Creative Networks, LLC, moved for dismissal. As a parent company, it claimed that it had no control over its subsidiaries' employee practices. On December 29, 2006, Judge Stephen M. McNamee rejected the motion because, prior to discovery, there remained an issue of material fact as to Res-Care's involvement. (Labor & Empl. L. P 141108) Following discovery, on March 19, 2009, Judge McNamee granted Res-Care's April 11, 2008 motion for summary judgment. Judge McNamee found that the parent company and the subsidiary were distinct corporate entities and there was no evidence that Res-Care was involved in the subsidiary's hiring or firing practices. On March 9, 2009, Judge McNamee denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment with regard to one complainant's allegations. The defendant alleged (1) that a "counseling session" with one employee was not an adverse employment action and (2) there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal link between the alleged retaliation and the employee's participation in a Title VII charge. Judge McNamee found that the evidence provided by the EEOC was both proper and sufficient. On January 15, 2010, Judge McNamee denied the defendant's April 10, 2009 motion for summary judgment with regard to same employee. In this motion, the defendant asserted (1) the employee's participation as a named witness was not protected under Title VII, and (2) the defendant had a legitimate and non-discriminatory reason for the counseling session. Judge McNamee rejected both assertions. On May 24, 2010, Judge McNamee signed and approved a consent decree. The decree imposed a permanent injunction on Creative Networks, LLC, enjoining the company from retaliating against its employees because of their opposition to discrimination or their participation in charges against unlawful discrimination. It also imposed notice, training, reporting, and retaliation policy requirements. It further granted $110,000 in monetary relief to the two employees and required the defendant to expunge their files and provide neutral references. The decree's effective period was 18 months, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.

Summary: On September 30, 2005, the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Creative Networks, LLC and its parent company, Res-Care, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs claimed that two employees had been retaliated against after they had opposed unlawful discrimination in the workplace. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that one employee had been terminated in retaliation and the other employee had been threatened with termination. On May 24, 2010, Judge McNamee signed and approved a consent decree. The decree's effective period was 18 months, and there is nothing more on the docket - so presumably the matter ended in 2011.


On December 17, 2002 plaintiffs, California residents with disabilities that required them to rely on wheelchairs or scooters for mobility, filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) against Taco Bell Corporation. Plaintiffs, represented by the Impact Fund and private counsel, claimed the Defendant denied them, on the basis of disability, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim they had encountered barriers to accessibility including "queue lines" that were too narrow to navigate in a scooter or wheelchair, self-serve soda machines that were too high to access from a wheelchair or scooter; and inaccessible parking, doors, and seating. On December 23, 2004, the Court (Judge Hamilton) certified a class of: "[a]ll individuals with disabilities who use wheelchairs or electric scooters for mobility who, at any time on or after December 17, 2001, were denied, or are currently being denied, on the basis of disability, full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of California Taco Bell corporate restaurants." Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., 220 F.R.D. 604 (N.D. Cal. 2004). On October 5, 2004, the Court (Judge Hamilton) appointed a Special Master, Bob Evans, as an expert in the Department of Justice Standards For Accessible Design, (28 C.F.R. part 36, app. A, and Title 24 of the 2002 California Building Code) to visit Taco Bell sites, determine compliance with these regulations, and recommend how to remove barriers to accessibility, although he would not determine whether such modifications were "feasible" for purposes of the ADA and other statutes. The parties agreed to each pay half of the Master's fees. On December 7, 2004, the Court (Judge Hamilton) denied the defendant's motion to modify the class definition. Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 02-5849, 2004 WL 5669683 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2004). The defendant argued that the class should be modified as to state law damages claims because of problems with commonality and typicality. On January 12, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion to adopt the findings of the special master. They sought partial summary judgment as to three architectural elements: the queue lines; the force needed to open doors; and the knee clearance of seating areas. On August 8, 2007, the Court (Judge Hamilton) denied in part and granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. Moeller v. Taco Bell Corp., No. 02-5849, 2007 WL 2301778 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2007). The Court denied the motion as to the queue lines, finding that auxiliary lines could be equivalent facilitation. But the Court held that almost 400 conditions in more than 160 Taco Bell restaurants violated the ADA and/or the state access laws. On November 7, 2008, the Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which argued the statute of limitations. On December 23, 2009, the Court denied another of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, with little commentary. On April 4, 2010, the parties stipulated to a bifurcated trial regarding an individual exemplary store. A bench trial was held in June 2011, and in the resulting Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the district court found for the plaintiffs, and ruled that classwide injunctive relief was appropriate. In particular, the court found that the evidence established violations with respect to each of the 12 elements at issue, covering physical access to parking, parking signage, door accessibility, queue accessibility, access to tables and drinks, and restroom access. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero for settlement. However, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___ (2011), prompted the defendants to move for decertification of the class and the plaintiffs to move for a modification of the class certification order. On July 26, 2012, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion Taco Bell's motion, and denied the plaintiff's motion, in light of Dukes. The court granted decertification with respect to damages claims but not with respect to injunctive relief. The court argued that "Dukes mandates decertification of the damages portion of the class as certified" because "no claim for individualized relief may be combined with a class injunction under Rule 23(b)(2)." With regard to injunctive relief claims, the court found that "there are sufficient 'questions of law or fact common to the class' to warrant certifying a class for injunctive relief." On Mar. 4, 2013, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment "on whether the four named plaintiffs may proceed with claims regarding barriers encountered by them at stores not disclosed in the first amended complaint." The court granted the motion Aug. 5, 2013, arguing that the plaintiffs may not proceed on claims not raised in the first amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on Nov. 21, 2013 and moved for permanent injunction on Jan. 15, 2014 to compel Taco Bell to comply with accessibility protocols. On May 20, 2014, the parties jointly moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, which the court granted on June 4. The Settlement Agreement required Taco Bell restaurants to be in compliance with accessibility statutes for two years. Specifically, Taco Bell was to (1) instruct managers to inspect each store for accessibility issues daily, (2) have a compliance monitor check all establishments semiannually, (3) have a construction monitor inspect any new establishment for accessibility compliance, (4) ensure any subsequently acquired restaurants are in compliance, (5) provide annual training regarding accessibility statutes to individuals involved with facility maintenance, construction, and engineering, and (6) maintain records of its monitoring efforts. The Agreement was valid for two years. After a fairness hearing, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement on Sept. 24, 2014. The court granted class counsel $5,175,000 in reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs the same day. The case was dismissed with prejudice on Sept. 29. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 17, 2002, California residents with mobility impairments sued the Taco Bell Corporation alleging its restaurants presented numerous barriers to accessibility. The Court (Judge Hamilton) held that almost 400 conditions in more than 160 Taco Bell restaurants violated the ADA and/or the state access laws. At a bench trial in 2011, the court ruled for the plaintiffs on a large variety of physical access issues relating to parking, doors, queues, and restrooms. The court held that classwide injunctive relief was appropriate, and assigned the case to a magistrate judge for settlement. However, the defendant has since filed a motion to modify the class certification order. As of this writing, that motion remains pending.


The named plaintiffs, former preschool-aged children with various disabilities, filed this lawsuit against the District of Columbia in July 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs alleged that the District had engaged in a pattern and practice of failing to provide special education and related services to them and other children, in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and District of Columbia law. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, reimbursement for funds expended by them to obtain education services denied them by defendants' legal violations, and "compensatory education." In August 2006, the Court (Judge Royce Lamberth) certified a class action pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 237 F.R.D. 319. The plaintiff class is defined as: All children who are or may be eligible for special education and related services, who live in, or are wards of, the District of Columbia, and (1) whom defendants did not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child was between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive, or (2) whom defendants have not or will not identify, locate, evaluate or offer special education and related services to when the child is between the ages of three and five years old, inclusive. Toward the end of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In August 2010, Judge Lamberth ruled upon those motions and concluded, among other things, that defendants "denied a [free appropriate public education ("FAPE")] to a large number of children aged 3 to 5 years old, in violation of § 1412(a)(1)(A) of the IDEA." 730 F. Supp. 2d 84. However, this ruling applied only for the period 2007 and earlier, which were the only years for which data was available. In 2011, and about a month before a scheduled bench trial that would determine defendants' remaining liability, defendants filed a Motion to Decertify the Class, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing and could no longer satisfy the commonality or typicality requirements of Rule 23(a). In April 2011, before ruling on defendants' decertification motion, the Court held a two-day bench trial on the question of defendants' liability for the period 2008 to the present. At the end of the trial, Judge Lamberth ordered the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, reserving decision for a later date. While the decision was pending, the Supreme Court handed down Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011), holding that class action status was inappropriate in a nationwide employment discrimination case brought by female employees. Judge Lamberth nonetheless denied class decertification in an opinion issued November 16, 2011, which also found the District liable for additional IDEA violations. The District appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed on class certification, and remanded for additional consideration. 713 F.3d 120. The Court of Appeals was concerned about a class made up of members with different types of claims. Back in the trial court, Judge Lamberth denied the city's request to dismiss the case (on the grounds that the plaintiffs were now too old to have standing to sue). 302 F.R.D. 1. The Court held the plaintiffs' standing at the time they filed their complaint was sufficient, given the "inherently transitory" nature of special education litigation. Judge Lamberth certified four subclasses of plaintiffs in response to the D.C. Circuit's ruling: children who were not identified for services; children who weren't provided with a timely evaluation; children who didn't receive a timely decision about their eligibility; and children who weren't provided with a "smooth and effective" transition into preschool programs. On October 14, 2014, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. On June 10, 2015, Judge Lamberth granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment with respect to all IDEA claims through April 6, 2011, but granted defendant's motion for partial summary judgment for subclass 2 from April 6, 2011 to the present. 109 F. Supp. 3d 12. Judge Lamberth also granted the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment with respect to all Rehabilitation Act claims after March 22, 2010. As such, remaining for trial were the IDEA claims from April 6, 2011 to the present for subclasses 1, 3, and 4, and all Rehabilitation Act claims prior to March 22, 2010. After the partial grant of summary judgment, a trial was set for November 13, 2015. After conclusion of the trial, Judge Lamberth found for plaintiffs on all remaining claims. 194 F. Supp. 3d 30 (2016). The judgement granted the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The relief stipulated that the defendants would reach specific numerical benchmarks for enrollment in special education services and come in full compliance with IDEA regulations. The injunction also established reporting requirements and was set to last until the defendant established it was in substantial compliance with the injunction's requirements. On June 24, 2016, the defendants appealed the judgment, but on June 23, 2017, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's judgment in all respects. 860 F.3d 713. As part of their relief, the plaintiffs requested over $9 million dollars in attorney's fees. However, Judge Lamberth ordered that plaintiffs recalculate and subtract a 5% penalty. The plaintiffs then revised their figures to approximately $7 million which defendants were ordered to pay. Still, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's order for calculating attorney's fees. On May 21, 2019, the court of appeals vacated and remanded the district court's order, requiring the district court to provide specific, countervailing evidence justifying its matrix for calculating fees. 924 F.3d 585. On October 8, 2019, the parties reached a settlement agreement as to attorney's fees and submitted it to the District Court for approval. On March 4, 2020, the district court ordered that the defendants pay the plaintiffs' counsel an additional $1,084,000 in fees and expenses, bringing the total to $8,084,000. The court continues to monitor compliance with the injunction.

Summary: In 2005, students aged 3-5 in the District of Columbia filed a class action suit alleging that the schools had failed to locate and provide services to preschool children with disabilities, and so violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and other statutes. The Court certified a class and found for the plaintiffs in April 2011, ordering relief, but that decision was vacated on an appeal that found that the class was improperly certified. The case has now returned to the District Court and four subclasses have been re-certified. Following a grant of partial summary judgment for the plaintiff, the case went to trial where Judge Lamberth found for the plaintiffs on all IDEA claims through April, 2011 and all Rehabilitation Act claims through March, 2010. Judge Lamberth then granted injunctive relief and attorney's fees for plaintiff. After years of litigation regarding attorney's fees, the District Court ordered the defendants to pay a total $8,084,000 for the plaintiffs' legal costs.


On June 18, 2014, four prisoners housed in the Wallace Pack Unit, a medical and geriatric prison operated by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), brought suit individually and on behalf of those similarly situated in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act against TDCJ. The plaintiffs, represented by the Texas Civil Rights Project, the University of Texas School of Law Civil Rights Clinic, and private counsel, asked that TDCJ be required to provide safe housing conditions at the Pack Unit, claiming that the non-climate controlled interior of the Unit violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the failure of TDCJ to provide air conditioning to inmates at the Pack Unit during the summer constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment, and that TDCJ's failure further violated the ADA by failing to reasonably accommodate prisoners with heat-sensitive disabilities. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The Wallace Pack Unit, operated by TDCJ, is located outside Houston, TX, in Navasota. Deep in the south of Texas, the Pack Unit is a medical facility housing geriatric prisoners, prisoners with disabilities, and prisoners with chronic mental problems. The Pack Unit dormitories, in which the vast majority of prisoners live, are not air conditioned or otherwise climate controlled. The interior of the prison in the summer regularly becomes so hot that inmates sleep on the floor, only marginally cooler than their beds, and the stainless steel tables in the dormitories become hot to the touch. Most of the prisoners at the Pack Unit who suffered heat-related illness were not working outside at the time of their illness, but were simply housed in the hot dormitories. Even the correctional officers' union made numerous public requests for the prison housing areas to be air conditioned. At the time of the complaint, TDCJ had refused to do so. The plaintiffs (and many others at the medical and geriatric prison) suffered from disabilities, putting them at increased risk of heat-related injury or death. These disabilities are known to be exacerbated by heat, include hypertension, asthma, traumatic brain injury (TBI), COPD, and diabetes. Plaintiffs and others also took medications known to increase the risk of heat-related illness and death, including antihistamines (for allergies), Benztropine (to treat TBI), and diuretics. Several of the plaintiffs and many other inmates had suffered heat-related illness in the past. After a year of discovery, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 6, 2015, a second amended complaint on May 9, 2016, and a third amended complaint on May 7, 2017. The Court (Judge Keith P. Ellison) granted class certification on June 14, 2016. 2016 WL 3258345. He defined the certified class as, "All inmates who currently are, or in the future will be, incarcerated at the Pack Unit, and who are subjected to TDCJ's policy and practice of failing to regulate high indoor heat index temperatures in the housing areas." He also certified two subclasses, the "Heat-Sensitive Subclass" and the "Disability Subclass." The Fifth Circuit later upheld the district court's class certification decision. 868 F.3d 354. On June 21, 2016, the Judge Ellison granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction requiring TDCJ to provide EPA-compliant drinking water through September 22, 2016. 2016 WL 3406439. Water at the Pack Unit had previously contained arsenic levels up to four-and-a-half times the level permitted by the EPA. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. On July 21, 2016, the Fifth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a stay of Judge Ellison's injunction pending appeal. It heard oral arguments on September 27, 2016, but then dismissed the appeal as moot because the injunction had expired. 677 F. App'x. 915. Meanwhile, in District Court, the parties continued litigation over the temperature in the Pack Unit and plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. On August 17, 2016, Judge Ellison denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judge Ellison denied the plaintiffs' motion for attorney fees on December 7, 2016. He stated that the plaintiffs were not yet a prevailing party pending the Fifth Circuit's decision on the defendants' appeal of the preliminary injunction prohibiting arsenic laden water. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiffs moved for another preliminary injunction to ensure relief for inmates during the upcoming summer months. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought an injunction ordering TDCJ to lower the temperatures inside the prison to 88 degrees and to develop a heat wave policy. In the alternative, the plaintiffs sought relief in the form of open windows, on-demand showers, monitoring of water consumption, respite areas, wellness checks, inmate trainings, portable cooling units, individual water coolers, and a transfer of heat-sensitive inmates into cooler housing. On July 19, 2017, Judge Ellison granted the preliminary injunction in a 100-page opinion stating, "[p]risoners are human beings with spouses and children who worry about them and miss them. Some of them will likely someday be shown to have been innocent of the crimes of which they are accused. But, even those admittedly guilty of the most heinous crimes must not be denied their constitutional rights. We diminish the Constitution for all of us to the extent we deny it to anyone." He ordered TDCJ to implement a functioning respite program for the young and healthy inmates; to reduce temperatures in dormitories housing heat-sensitive inmates to 88 degrees; to place insect guards on the windows so inmates may cool down from the outdoor breeze without letting insects into their dormitories; and to develop a heat-wave policy for the Pack Unit. The preliminary injunction was to remain in place for 90 days. 2017 WL 3049540. On August 8, 2017, Judge Ellison issued an order specifically outlining the steps the defendants were to take to satisfy the preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed this order to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on August 18. In late August, Hurricane Harvey hit the gulf and cause severe damage to the Houston area.. In light of the hurricane, and the subsequent relocation of prisoners from the Wallace Pack Unit, the defendants moved to modify the preliminary injunction. Judge Ellison denied this motion on September 14, 2017 holding that the risk to the class members remained and the defendants had several avenues to stay in compliance with the preliminary injunction, notwithstanding the hurricane. On October 11, 2017, Judge Ellison granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend the preliminary injunction to October 30th, given the expected heat of 88 °F through the month. The plaintiffs moved to make the order permanent on October 30th. Judge Ellison again granted an unopposed motion to extent the preliminary injunction to the summer of 2018 in January 2018. Meanwhile, several class members had sent letters to the court requesting to be removed from the class because their transfer to air-conditioned units (in compliance with the preliminary injunction) had lead to a loss of access to services, such as substance abuse classes. Judge Ellison granted these requests on January 29, noting "many of the conditions causing the individuals to ask to leave the class exist because of TDCJ's own decisions about how to implement the Court's second preliminary injunction. Nevertheless, class members may choose to be removed from the lawsuit." The parties reached a settlement agreement on January 31, 2018 and proposed it to the court on March 6, 2018. The agreement included a settlement class defined as, "[a]ll inmates who currently are, or in the future will be, incarcerated at the Pack Unit, and who are subjected to TDCJ's policy and practice of failing to regulate high indoor heat index temperatures in the housing areas." This class included two subclasses - a 'heat sensitive' subclass and a 'disability' subclass. This settlement class narrowed the previous litigation class based on the dates in which individual class members were held at the Pack Unit. The proposed settlement would require the prison to ensure air conditioning for class members during the summer months, a guarantee of air conditioning if class members were moved to other units, and air conditioning while being transported in vehicles. It also included $4.5 million for attorney's fees and costs. The court would maintain jurisdiction to ensure compliance until the legislature passed a bill for the installation of permanent air conditioning (temporary air conditioning would be used if the legislature did not pass a bill for permanent air conditioning). That same day, several class members moved to stay the case, asked for independent counsel, and sought declaratory relief. They expressed concern that they had not been given input as to the settlement agreement, fear that the proposed class definition might exclude them, and frustration with the $4.5 million attorney fee award proposal. On March 12, 2018, Judge Ellison entered an order regarding a proposed notice for class members who would no longer be a part of the class under the new class definition—specifically to notify those who become a part of the class during the injunction phase, but are not part of the class under the proposed settlement. On March 23, 2018, Judge Ellison granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to extend the preliminary injunction, requiring TDCJ to comply with the proposed settlement agreement by maintaining a heat index at the Pack Unit housing areas at no greater than 88 degrees. On March 27, 2018, Judge Ellison granted the amended certification of the Class and Subclass, but only for the purposes of effectuating the settlement, expressly stating that if the settlement was terminated or not completed, then the amended class certification was null and void. He also approved the Class Action Notice and Opt Out Form. On April 5, 2018, 192 prisoners appealed to the 5th Circuit (189 of whom were not members of the settlement class), stating that they were members of the original class and/or subclass members who were excluded from the class and settlement. Docket No. 18-20216. The 5th Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on March 25, 2019, since the appellants were non-class members and were therefore not affected by the settlement in a way that would allow jurisdiction. The court advised the appellants that they could vindicate their constitutional rights by bringing separate legal challenges to TDCJ practices. On June 8, 2018, Judge Ellison entered an order approving the settlement agreement, despite multiple filed objections. The court retained jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to the settlement agreement. Following this order, Judge Ellison granted various motions of class members wishing to opt out of the settlement agreement. On August 9, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, due to the fact that TDCJ was imprisoning at least 37 class members in the LeBlanc Unit in Beaumont—which was supposed to be air conditioned, but was being kept at temperatures over 90 degrees—violating the terms of the settlement agreement. That same day Judge Ellison entered an order finding that the defendants were in breach of the settlement agreement and directing that the class members be moved somewhere that complied with the settlement. On September 15, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt, order to show cause, and sanctions due to the defendants' repeated violations of the settlement agreement and misrepresentation of conditions that violated the settlement, which prevented discovery of violations of the agreements. On December 11, 2019, Judge Ellison entered an order granting limited discovery relating to the violations of the settlement agreement and the misrepresentations, but deferred judgment on the plaintiffs' motion for contempt. 2019 WL 6733002 As of March 29, 2020, the case remains ongoing and under the jurisdiction of the court.

Summary: Class action against Texas Department of Criminal Justice alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs brought suit over extremely hot indoor temperatures at Wallace Pack Prison in southern Texas, a medical and geriatric prison the interior of which is not climate controlled. The Court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the TDCJ to provide EPA-compliant drinking water to the inmates through September 22, 2016. The defendants appealed the preliminary injunction, but the Fifth Circuit ultimately issued an opinion declaring the issue moot. On July 19, 2017, Judge Ellison granted a preliminary injunction ordering TDCJ to lower the temperature in dormitories for heat-sensitive inmates to 88 degrees. The parties reached a settlement agreement, which they proposed to the court on March 6, 2018 and which was approved on June 8, 2018. On August 9, 2019, the court found that defendants were in breach of the settlement, housing class members in facilities whose temperatures exceeded 90 degrees and ordered them to move class members to compliant facilities. As of March 29, 2020 the case remains ongoing.


On May 4, 2006, nine Muslim males, who applied to be naturalized as United States citizens, passed all their interviews and related tests, and had been waiting for more than 120 days - some as long as 2 years - to be scheduled for their oath ceremonies, and the advocacy group Arab American Action Network brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against various federal immigration agencies. Plaintiffs, who were represented by attorneys with the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Midwest Immigrant & Human Rights Center, and the Competition Law Group, LLC alleged that that the naturalization process for Muslim males (or males from countries with a significant Muslim population) took significantly longer to complete than other naturalization applicants. Individual plaintiffs alleged gender discrimination and violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a). They sought a judicial determination of naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), as well as other declaratory and injunctive relief. The Arab American Action Network sought relief under the Freedom of Information Act. The Government moved to dismiss the case. While that motion was pending, the Government produced approximately 3.4 million immigration records to plaintiffs. After analyzing that information, plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint on January 26, 2007, substituting several new plaintiffs for some of the original plaintiffs whose naturalization applications had been finally adjudicated. The Government renewed its motion to dismiss. A Third Amended Complaint was filed on September 19, 2007 adding new plaintiffs. On September 20, 2007, the District Court (Judge John F. Grady) granted the government's motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part. The Court dismissed the claims of the individual plaintiffs and remanded them back to the U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services. The Court granted the plaintiffs until November 12, 2007 to file an amended complaint as to the class action allegations. Antonishin v. Keisler, 2007 WL 2788841 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2007). Plaintiffs filed a fourth amended complaint which asserted class claims that the government's unreasonable delays in processing naturalization applications violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint sought certification of a class consisting of: All persons who are or will be lawful permanent residents applying for naturalization to become U.S. citizens, whose applications are pending in Illinois, Indiana, or Wisconsin, and whose naturalization applications are not adjudicated within 120 days after the date of their initial examination. Defendants moved for dismissal of the fourth amended complaint (now known as Yan Bashkin et al. v. Keisler et al.). Plaintiffs moved for vacatur of the opinion and order of September 20, 2007, which had dismissed most of their claims. On June 13, 2008, the court (Judge Grady) considered these motions together and denied them in part as moot. With regard to the plaintiffs whose applications had been processed, the court dismissed their claims. The court did not dismiss the claims of plaintiff Ismail Suleiman, whose naturalization application was denied. Instead the court vacated its earlier dismissal-in-part, which meant that Suleiman could continue his case on all claims. But there is no evidence that he did so.

Summary: Nine Muslim males had been waiting - some as long as 2 years - to be scheduled for their naturalization oath ceremonies. They brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois against various federal immigration agencies, alleging gender discrimination and violations of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(a). They sought a judicial determination of naturalization applications pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1447(b), as well as other declaratory and injunctive relief. The Arab American Action Network sought relief under the Freedom of Information Act. The government moved to dismiss each of the amended complaints, which were updated as plaintiffs' naturalization applications were granted. The fourth amended complaint (which requested class certification and was known as Yan Bashkin et al. v. Keisler et al.) was denied in part as moot (because plaintiffs' applications had been processed), although the court vacated its dismissal of the third amended complaint with regard to plaintiff Ismail Suleiman (whose naturalization application was denied).


This is a class action about the unequal treatment of female general custody prisoners in the Oneida County Jail (“the Jail”). On May 12, 2020, three female general custody prisoners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York on behalf of themselves and the jail's female general custody prisoners (present or future). The plaintiffs sued the Oneida County Sheriff and the Chief Deputy of the Oneida County Jail under the Declaratory Judgment Act for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; they also alleged violations of Article I § 11 of the New York State Constitution. Represented by the Legal Services of Central New York, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Jail from denying female general custody prisoners equal access to the housing and program benefits that male general custody prisoners receive. The case was assigned to Judge Mae A. D'Agostino. Plaintiffs claimed that the Jail discriminated against female general custody prisoners on the basis of gender by restricting these prisoners to “linear housing units” as opposed to “podular housing units” (pods), where male general custody prisoners are held, and by denying them equal access to programming and benefits. For men, the complaint explained, linear housing units were typically used to isolate prisoners with behavioral and disciplinary issues. But for women, they were used more generally. The plaintiffs set out many allegations about the problems with linear units, which were smaller than pods and severely restricted prisoner movement. In particular, it said, some of the units had not been updated since 1965 and were covered in dirt and human excrement that female prisoners were forced to remove using limited cleaning supplies. At best, linear units had small common spaces with four picnic tables, no air conditioning and frosted windows that did not open. At worst, linear units did not have hot water, television or books. The plaintiffs’ unit (at the time of the complaint) had one shower and one phone, only one of which could be used at a time. Plaintiffs alleged inconsistent access to hot water and clean cold water and could only watch television every other day. When they did, plaintiffs could only choose from a small selection of DVDs. Plaintiffs were allowed only one hour of outdoor recreation a day, and they did not have access to exercise equipment. In contrast, pods, where male general custody prisoners were housed, allowed prisoners to move freely unless they were mandated to lock-in. Pods resembled small high school cafeterias and were connected to recreation areas with exercise equipment, basketball hoops and a large window to let in fresh air. Pods also had small libraries with games and reading materials for the prisoners, a separate room for prisoners to video call their loved ones, cable televisions, hot water dispensers, microwaves and air conditioning. Finally, pods contained eight showers (one for every seven prisoners) and seven telephones (one for every eight prisoners), which were in separate areas. Male general custody prisoners’ cells were bigger than the women's cells and had windows, unlike women's housing. In addition to having more humane housing, plaintiffs alleged that male general custody prisoners who exhibited good behavior were given access to programming and benefits that similar female general custody prisoners were denied, including free video calls and extra commissary items. Female general custody prisoners were also limited to laundry work programs, whereas male general custody prisoners had access to numerous work programs, including food service, car wash, general library, print shop, grounds maintenance, building maintenance and janitorial services. The plaintiffs moved for class certification a week after filing their complaint, and also moved for a preliminary injunction on June 10, 2020, asking the court to provide the plaintiffs the same housing privileges and benefits as male prisoners. On August 3, 2020, Judge D'Agostino granted the plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification but denied the plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. 2020 WL 4449527. In denying plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Judge D'Agostino held that the plaintiffs were not sufficiently likely to succeed on the merits, because they probably could not demonstrate that female general custody prisoners were not receiving substantially equivalent treatment to their male counterparts. Furthermore, Judge D'Agostino held that the balance of equities tipped in the defendants' favor because the public interest is best served when courts do not interfere with the daily operations of local jails. On August 8, 2020, plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit. No further action has been docketed at this time. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 12, 2020, three female general custody prisoners filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals. The plaintiffs sued the Oneida County Sheriff and the Chief Deputy of the Oneida County Jail under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and under Article I § 11 of the New York State Constitution. Represented by the Legal Services of Central New York, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the Jail from denying female general custody prisoners equal access to the housing and program benefits that male general custody prisoners receive.


On October 30, 2012, five prisoners at the Isabella County Correctional Facility in Mount Pleasant, MI filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Eastern Michigan against the County of Isabella, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Michigan, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the facility's lack of exercise time violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, the two female prisoners brought a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, alleging that the facility's unwillingness to allow females to serve as "trustees" or participate in community service programs constituted a violation, since participation in those programs led to early release. The case was settled on August 23, 2013, following limited litigation. The settlement, in the form of a stipulated order of dismissal, called for the Court to maintain jurisdiction over the case until August 15, 2018. The order called for a new policy allowing recreation time for all prisoners for at least one hour a day, five days a week. Additionally, the parties agreed to a new policy allowing both male and female prisoners to participate in the "trustee" and community service programs, with efforts to maintain a ratio consistent with the population at the facility. The settlement also called for an award of $3,000 for each of the female plaintiffs and $60,000 in attorneys' fees.

Summary: On October 30, 2012, five prisoners at the Isabella County Correctional Facility in Mount Pleasant, MI filed this lawsuit alleging that the facility's lack of exercise time violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, the two female prisoners brought a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause, alleging that the facility's unwillingness to allow females to serve as "trustees" or participate in community service programs constituted a violation. The parties ultimately settled, with the agreement calling for a new recreation policy and equal access to the trustee and community service programs.


On July 8, 2008, Kevin Jackson, a California inmate suffering from hepatitis C, filed this class action suit in U.S. District Court against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jackson filed in the Central District of California (Docket No. 2:08-cv-04454), but on 8/19/2008, the matter was transferred to the Eastern District of California, and given a new docket number (2:08-cv-01954)/ The class, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the state's deficiencies in treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The suit charged that the Department of Corrections excluded thousands of inmates from liver biopsies and other treatments, allowing the hepatitis to progress. The plaintiff later amended the complaint, no longer seeking a class action but instead seeking damages for the specific harm done to him. The CDCR filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiff had not sought out the proper remedies before filing the suit, violating the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The district court (Judge Morrison England) denied the motion, ruling that it was misplaced (2009 WL 3296677). He held that, even though the plaintiff had not yet exhausted his remedies, the amended complaint properly addressed the issues raised by the defendants. Over time, it appears that the plaintiff's attorney stopped pursuing this action. On March 12, 2012, Judge England dismissed the claims under Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute. The court cited failure to comply with an order of the court (to show cause why it should not dismiss for failure to prosecute) as the grounds for dismissal.

Summary: Kevin Jackson, a California inmate suffering from hepatitis C, filed this class action suit against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, though he eventually amended his complaint to an individual claim. He alleged that the state's deficiencies in treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The case was ultimately dismissed for failure to prosecute.


On October 9, 2015, seven impoverished individuals incarcerated by the City of Jackson filed this class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal anti-trafficking laws, and the declaratory judgment act in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Court of Mississippi. The plaintiffs alleged that they were imprisoned because they were unable to pay debts owed to the City for traffic violations and other misdemeanor offenses. As a result, the plaintiffs argued that the City violated their Sixth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the MacArthur Justice Center and from Equal Justice Under Law, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages. The plaintiffs alleged that they were indigent citizens who had outstanding debts payable to the City that stemmed from minor offenses. Many of them were disabled. The City allegedly presented the plaintiffs with the option to “pay or stay,” meaning they could either pay off the money owed to the City or be incarcerated to pay off their debts. The plaintiffs were allegedly forced to sit out their debts in the Hinds County Jail at a rate of $25.00 per day since they were unable to pay. There was an option for the plaintiffs to “work off” their debts at the Hinds County Penal Farm at a rate of $58.00 per day; however, some of the plaintiffs were unable to do so due to their disabilities. City officials did not review the plaintiffs’ ability to pay or other alternatives to imprisonment, such as community service, prior to their incarceration. Less than a month later, the parties’ filed notice with the court that they were attempting to settle the case and requested additional time for negotiations. After several request for more time, the parties notified the court on June 9, 2016, that the case had settled. On June 20, 2016, District Judge Tom Lee signed off on a joint settlement agreement. The City agreed to a declaratory judgment acknowledging that it was unconstitutional to incarcerate someone simply because she does not have the ability to pay. In all misdemeanor cases moving forward, the City agreed not to detain or incarcerate individuals because of their inability to pay fines. Instead, these individuals would be given the option of participating in a community service program in lieu of being incarcerated. Additionally, future defendants would not be incarcerated unless the City found it necessary to do so after a hearing and provision of counsel. The City agreed to make determinations about defendants’ ability to pay on a case-by-case basis; judges would to consider financial hardships when sentencing and determining community service requirements. Furthermore, the City agreed to develop training programs so its employees could comply with the settlement agreement and to make accommodations for people with disabilities to be able to participate in the community service program. The settlement did not include monetary relief. The City agreed to implement the entire settlement within 120 days, and to meet with the plaintiffs' counsel every three months for the first two years after entry of the settlement to discuss ongoing compliance issues. The City also agreed to notify plaintiff's counsel within 24 hours of someone being detained for willful failure to pay. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement, which had no specified end date. The Professional Bail Agents Association of Mississippi filed a motion to intervene on June 28, 2016 after the settlement agreement was signed and approved. This non-profit disputed the settlement agreement’s provisions regarding monetary bail in municipal court. This motion was denied on August 25, 2016. The case is otherwise administratively closed.

Summary: Settlement reached in case involving indigent plaintiffs who were incarcerated because they lacked the ability to pay off debts stemming from traffic violations and other minor offenses.


On November 2, 2017, five residents of Flint, MI filed this lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims. The plaintiffs sued the State of Michigan and state employees for personal injuries and property damage arising out of the Flint Water Crisis under Michigan state law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the remediation of harm caused to plaintiffs, monitoring, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. This is one of many cases arising out of the Flint Water Crisis. The plaintiffs claimed that city and state officials chose to use the Flint River as a primary source of water for residents in Flint, despite knowing that the water was unsafe for consumption. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that Flint officials began using water from the Flint River in 2013, despite multiple environmental studies conducted in 2011 and 2012 warning against it. Although initially filed in a Michigan state court, the defendants removed the case to federal court on February 28, 2018. The defendants supplied two bases for federal jurisdiction: first, that they qualified as federal officers because the Environmental Protection Agency controlled their operations; and second, that they acted under federal statutes and rules including the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Surface Water Treatment Rule, and the Lead and Copper Rule. The case was originally assigned to Judge John Corbett O’Meara and quickly reassigned to Judge Judith E. Levy, who handled most of the cases related to the Flint water crisis. The plaintiffs moved to remand the case. The court remanded the case a series of related orders. First, on March 29, 2018, Judge Levy determined that the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Mays v. City of Flint foreclosed the defendants’ argument that they were eligible for federal officer removal. In the same order, Judge Levy expressed concern at exercising jurisdiction over a state-law claim based only on “general[] references” to federal law and directed the defendants to show cause why the case should not be remanded. Then, on April 3, 2018, the court granted a stipulated order remanding the cases against defendants who served as emergency managers in Flint. Finally, on April 17, 2018, Judge Levy remanded the remaining claims. Judge Levy wrote that under Nappier v. Snyder, removal based on a substantial federal question required the unanimous consent of all defendants, which did not exist in this case as to the defendants who stipulated to remand. The defendants appealed on May 10, 2018. They soon recognized that binding Sixth Circuit precedent foreclosed their appeal absent action by the Supreme Court on Nappier or further developments in Waid v. Snyder, a consolidated case involving federal class actions arising from the Flint Water crisis. The parties stipulated to a voluntary dismissal on July 6, 2018. The case then resumed in state court. The court (Judge Christopher Murray) denied the defendants’ motion for summary disposition on July 27, 2018. The defendants appealed, arguing that they enjoyed governmental immunity. The case and appeals are ongoing.

Summary: On November 2, 2017, five residents of Flint, MI filed this lawsuit in the Michigan Court of Claims. The plaintiffs sued the State of Michigan and many state employees for personal injuries and property damage arising out of the Flint Water Crisis. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief requiring the remediation of harm caused to plaintiffs, monitoring, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Although initially filed in a Michigan state court, this case was removed by the defendants. This district court remanded the case and, after an unsuccessful appeal by the defendants to the Sixth Circuit, litigation is proceeding in state court.


On November 2, 2012, two (unrelated) Catholic business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA") by the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ActRight Legal Foundation, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Claiming that each of the two options available to them under the rules--providing contraceptive coverage or ceasing to provide insurance altogether--would contravene their Catholic faith, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. Plaintiff Annex Medical terminated their employees' group health coverage as a result of their objection to contraceptive coverage. On December 27, 2012, the court granted the ACLU leave to appear as amicus curiae for purposes of the motion for preliminary injunction only. In its brief opposing the injunction motion, the ACLU argued--as did the U.S.--that the contraception mandate did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious liberty rights under RFRA. The amicus brief further argued that the plaintiffs could not use RFRA to infringe on the rights of their female employees by denying those employees the equal health benefits guaranteed by the contraception mandate. On January 8, 2013, the District Court (Judge David S. Doty) denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that indirect financial support of subjectively objectionable conduct was not a substantial burden on the plaintiffs' religious freedom, and that the government's interest in providing for the health of women and children outweighed the plaintiffs' alleged harm. Annex Medical v. Sebelius, 2013 WL 101927 (D. Minn.). The plaintiffs appealed the injunction denial to the 8th Circuit and filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal. On January 17, 2013, District Court Judge Doty denied this emergency motion on the same grounds as his original injunction denial. 2013 WL 203526 (D. Minn.). The parties filed a joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the 8th Circuit appeal, which Judge Doty granted on January 25, 2013; a week later, the Court of Appeals enjoined the U.S. from enforcing the mandate against the plaintiffs for the duration of the appeal. On March 1, 2013, the Court of Appeals denied the defendants' motion to consolidate the appeal with appeal No. 12-3357 (O'Brien v. HHS). The case was argued on October 24, 2013. On September 5, 2014, the Court of Appeals dismissed plaintiff Tom Janas, former business owner, from the appeal for lack of standing. (769 F.3d 578) For plaintiff Annex Medical and majority shareholder Stuart Lind, the Court remanded the case to the District Court for additional consideration of subject-matter jurisdiction. Since plaintiff Annex Medical had fewer than 50 employees, they were not legally mandated to provide health insurance coverage. The injury they alleged is that the defendants have created a regulatory framework causing them to be unable to find an insurer that will sell insurance to them without contraceptive coverage. The Court of Appeals found that the District Court needed to conduct additional fact-finding to make this determination. On August 18, 2015, the District Court granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint, and the plaintiffs made changes to address a regulatory update in the federal government's formulation of the contraceptives mandate, setting out their continued objection to health insurance that provided contraceptive coverage for their employees, even if provided by the government working with the insurer. On August 19, 2015, the District Court granted a permanent injunction, with consent of the defendants, against enforcement of the version of the contraception mandate that existed when the Supreme Court decided Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, on June 30, 2014. The version of the mandate the Court ruled on in Hobby Lobby did not give for-profit employers an option to object based on religious grounds. The decision did not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit under later versions of the mandate, including the accommodation for closely-held for-profit religious corporations that was issued by the federal government on July 14, 2015. On October 13, 2015, the District Court granted additional time for the plaintiffs to file a motion for attorneys' fees and costs. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2012, Catholic business owners filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their businesses' group health insurance plans. On August 19, 2015, the District Court for the District of Minnesota, with the consent of defendants, granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction against enforcement of the contraception mandate as it existed at the time of the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby.


On October 9, 2003, plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff, the Cook County Department of Corrections Director, the Cook County Department of Public Health Director, and the Cermak Health Services of Cook County Chief Operating Officer in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiff, an attorney proceeding pro se and then represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, compensatory, and injunctive relief, claiming he was the victim of an unreasonable visual cavity search and a urethral swabbing test in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleged state law violations of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, on October 9, 2002, a judge found plaintiff in civil contempt and Sheriff's deputies took plaintiff to the Cook County Jail. Defendants claimed, but plaintiff denied, that plaintiff signed a "consent for [medical] treatment" form. Plaintiff alleged he was not informed of his right to refuse the urethral swab test and was unaware of what medical tests would be performed during intake and therefore could not consent. Plaintiff alleged that a doctor threatened the inmates, saying, "you don't want to piss-off the dick doctor," prior to the test. Then Sheriff's deputies did a visual body cavity search of plaintiff in a group of 40-50 inmates. On August 8, 2005, the Court (U.S. District Court Judge Matthew F. Kennelly) denied summary judgment to defendants and found that plaintiff could proceed under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, but not under the Eighth Amendment, which does not apply to pretrial detainees. The Court held: (1) There were fact issues as to whether visual cavity searches were necessary for all incoming inmates and Sheriff's deputies had no reasonable suspicion that plaintiff concealed contraband. (2) There were fact issues as to whether urethral swabbing of all inmates violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the consent form did not state that the health screening included an invasive test. Furthermore, defendants did not provide evidence of STDs in the jail and the urethral swabbing was not conducted in private. Thompson v. County of Cook, 412 F. Supp. 2d 881 (N.D. Ill. 2005). On January 31, 2006, jury trial began before U.S. District Court Judge Kennelly. On February 7, 2006, the Court (U.S. District Court Judge Kennelly) dismissed the claims against Defendant Cook County as to the strip search and dismissed claims against Defendant Sheriff as to the urethral swab test. Plaintiff previously withdrew his state law claims. The jury then found for defendants on all remaining counts. On February 21, 2006, plaintiff moved for a new trial. On April 18, 2006, the Court (U.S. District Court Judge Kennelly) granted a new trial as to the strip search because the jury's verdict as to the body cavity search was against the weight of the evidence. The search was unreasonable because Sheriff's deputies had no reasonable suspicion that plaintiff concealed contraband. The Court affirmed the verdict for defendants as to the urethral swabbing procedure because the Court found that plaintiff had consented to the procedure. Thompson v. County of Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807 (N.D. Ill. 2006). On March 29, 2007, the Court (Judge Kennelly) dismissed the case pursuant to a stipulation.

Summary: This case was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in 2006 by an attorney who was subjected to a cavity search and urethral swabbing by Sheriff's deputies at the Cook County jail after being held in civil contempt by a judge in an unrelated case. After a jury trial and the grant of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, the case was dismissed by stipulation. We have no further information.


The plaintiff, a 31-year-old resident of Queens, New York, brought this lawsuit against the City of New York and the New York City Police Department on December 14, 2020 in the Southern District of New York. The complaint alleged that NYPD officers, with the approval of their supervisors, regularly used excessive force against and falsely arrested peaceful protesters during the widespread racial justice protests that took place in the summer of 2020. The plaintiff specifically alleged that on June 4, 2020, while he participated peacefully in a protest in Mott Haven, NYPD officers struck the plaintiff with a baton before throwing him facedown to the ground and handcuffing him tightly with plastic zip ties. The plaintiff further alleged that officers left the zip ties in place for several hours while transporting him to Queens Central Booking and processing him for arrest, leading to significant pain and swelling in his hand. According to the complaint, the plaintiff was then held overnight in a cramped cell without food or water. The plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging excessive force and unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as retaliation for the exercise of First Amendment rights. In addition to claims against NYPD officers, the plaintiff brought claims against Mayor Bill de Blasio, NYPD Commissioner Dermot Shea, and NYPD Chief of Department Terence Monahan for their personal supervisory involvement in the alleged policy of excessive force. The complaint also asserted municipal liability on the part of the City of New York based on a policy, custom, or usage of excessive force and retaliation against peaceful protesters. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper. The case was related to Payne v. DiBlasio and assigned to Judge Colleen McMahon on December 15, 2020. Judge McMahon consolidated this case with three other police conduct cases (Payne, Sow v. City of New York, and People of New York v. New York), for pre-trial purposes. On February 4, 2021, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Gabriel W. Gorenstein. On March 3, the Police Benevolent Association of the City of New York moved to intervene in the case. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 5, seeking class action certification and adding additional claims of assault, battery, and false imprisonment under the common law. As of March 16, 2021, the case remains pending in the District Court.

Summary: A Queens resident filed this lawsuit against the NYPD on December 14, 2020. The suit alleged that the NYPD regularly falsely arrested and used excessive force against peaceful protesters during the 2020 racial justice protests in violation of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. It also alleged the common law violations of assault, battery, and false arrest and imprisonment by NYPD officers. The amended complaint requested class certification with the plaintiff as class representative. The plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable costs and attorneys’ fees, and any other relief the Court deemed just and proper to the plaintiff and class members.


This case is about a Trump Administration rule intended to create barriers for people applying for asylum in the U.S. On January 8, 2021, four immigration legal service providers—the National Immigrant Justice Center, Immigrant Defenders Law Center, Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, and Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center—filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) under 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Administrative Procedure Act), 5 U.S.C. § 601, et seq. (Regulatory Flexibility Act), and the Fifth Amendment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees. They claimed that the EOIR issued the rule without statutory authority, acted contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and violated the procedural due process rights of refugees. The plaintiffs also claimed that EOIR failed to undertake and publish a final regulatory flexibility analysis, as required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA). During its final weeks in office, the Trump Administration published a new rule: Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. It was published on December 16, 2020, following a truncated 30-day comment period; it was signed only by the Director of EOIR and not by the Attorney General (or acting Attorney General). The rule was scheduled to take effect on January 15, 2021, and would impose procedural barriers for individuals seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The case was assigned to Judge Reggie B. Walton. On January 12, 2021, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a stay of the rule's effective date under 5 U.S.C. § 705. The court granted the motion on January 14, 2021. As of March 4, 2021, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In December 2020, the Trump Administration published a new rule, which would impose procedural barriers for individuals seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). On January 8, 2021, four immigration legal service providers—the National Immigrant Justice Center, Immigrant Defenders Law Center, Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project, and Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center—filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Executive Office for Immigration Review under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' fees, claiming that the rule was issued without statutory authority, was contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act, and violated the procedural due process rights of refugees. They also claimed that EOIR failed to undertake and publish a final regulatory flexibility analysis, as required under the Regulatory Flexibility Act. On January 14, 2021, the court granted a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a stay of the rule's effective date. This case is ongoing.


This lawsuit was brought by four Muslim inmates incarcerated at Virginia’s Riverside Regional Jail, alleging that they had suffered religious discrimination by jail officials. According to the complaint, the jail had funded and proactively provided extensive opportunities and dedicated spaces for Christian religious instruction and worship, but had not allowed Muslim inmates to accept even donated religious materials or to attend religious classes taught by Muslim volunteers. Further, the jail had denied Muslim inmates adequate nutrition during the month of Ramadan. Finally, jail officials had created arbitrary religiosity tests which inmates must satisfy before qualifying to receive meals which satisfied their religious dietary requirements. One of the four plaintiffs originally filed the suit pro se on July 9, 2018, naming 23 jail officials as defendants. He filed an amended complaint on November 21, 2018; represented by the Council on American-Islamic Relations this time, he named three similarly-situated inmates as co-plaintiffs. The plaintiffs alleged that the jail had violated their rights under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; the Virginia Constitution; 42 U.S.C. §1983; and 42 U.S.C. §§2000cc et seq. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. Filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the case was assigned to Judge Anthony J. Trenga. On September 23, 2019, the October 7 jury trial was postponed until the court could rule on multiple defendants’ motions for summary judgment. As of June 18, 2020, those motions are pending.

Summary: Four Muslim men incarcerated at Virginia’s Riverside Regional Jail allege that they were discriminated against because of their faith. They allege that jail officials did not allow them to attend religious classes or access religious texts, although inmates of other faiths were allowed such privileges; they were denied adequate nutrition during the month of Ramadan; and they were required to pass arbitrary religiosity tests before receiving meals satisfying religious dietary requirements. They brought suit under the U.S. Constitution, the Virginia Constitution, 42 U.S.C. §§1983 and 2000cc et seq.