On September 11, 2014, two men, married in their church but not allowed to marry under Alabama law, filed this § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs had applied, unsuccessfully, for a marriage license in Mobile County, Alabama. They initially represented themselves without lawyers. Later, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Southern Poverty Law Center, ACLU of Alabama Foundation, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and a private lawyer joined as counsel. The plaintiffs argued that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because it violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs requested that the court overturn the section of the Alabama State Code that mandated the ban on same-sex marriage. On October 17, 2014, the State of Alabama filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction because the plaintiffs had named the state in their complaint, and the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits against an unconsenting state. After retaining counsel the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on February 10, 2015, naming the Alabama Attorney General and a Mobile County Probate Judge as defendants. The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief. Prior to the amended complaint the plaintiffs filed a motion for immediate preliminary and permanent injunctive relief on December 1, 2014. On January 26, 2015, the District Court (Judge Callie V.S. Granade) entered a preliminary injunction. It prohibited the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the Alabama laws that ban same-sex marriage. Judge Granade adopted the reasoning from Searcy v. Bentley (PB-AL-0005), decided just three days earlier, in which she had held that Alabama's laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional because they violated the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. As in Searcy, the court stayed the injunction until February 9, giving the defendant time to seek a further stay pending appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On February 3, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte consolidated the appeals in this case and in Searcy and denied the Alabama Attorney General's motions for a stay pending appeal. In response, the Attorney General filed an application for stay with U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, the Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit. Judge Granade denied the plaintiffs' request to lift the stay on February 4, 2015. Late on February 8, 2015, with Judge Granade’s stay set to expire, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, sent an order to probate judges and state employees, threatening them with legal action by the governor if they issued or recognized same-sex marriage licenses. The Chief Justice claimed that the Searcy and Strawser orders bound only the Alabama Attorney General and his employees and not Alabama's probate judges. On February 9, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the application for stay, with Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Antonin Scalia, dissenting from the denial. Strange v. Searcy, 135 S. Ct. 940 (2015). As a result, Judge Granade’s orders in Strawser and Searcy took effect: Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal, at least according to the federal courts. Alabama's probate judges faced competing orders: Judge Granade’s orders in Strawser and Searcy would allow same-sex marriage, but Chief Justice Moore's would not. The result was legal chaos. Some probate judges followed the federal court order and issued same-sex marriage licenses, but most probate judges refused; and many ceased issuing marriage licenses entirely. In the plaintiffs' county, Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis refused to issue any licenses that day. As previously mentioned, on February 10, 2015, Judge Granade granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint, which added Probate Judge Don Davis as a defendant and also added, as plaintiffs, three other same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses from Mobile County. In addition, the district court scheduled a hearing, in two days' time, on the plaintiffs' proposed injunction, which would prevent the defendants from enforcing Alabama's same-sex marriage ban. On February 11, 2015, two conservative groups, the Alabama Policy Institute and the Alabama Citizens Action Program, filed an emergency petition in the Alabama Supreme Court. The petition sought a writ of mandamus ordering the state's probate judges "not to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and not to recognize any marriage licenses issued to same-sex couples." See In Re: King (PB-AL-0009). The next day, on February 12, 2015, Judge Granade held a hearing and then issued an order, declaring the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage to be unconstitutional, and enjoining Probate Judge Don Davis from refusing to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs in this case. Strawser v. Strange, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (S.D. Ala. 2015). In response, that afternoon, Mobile County began issuing same-sex marriage licenses. On February 15, 2015, Jefferson County Probate Judge Alan King filed a motion for leave to intervene in this case. The probate judge argued that the conservative groups were using their state court petition to thwart the district court's January 26 order. On February 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion to enforce the January 26 order. They asked the district court to force the Alabama Attorney General to comply with the January 26 order by using his authority to dismiss the conservative groups' petition in the Alabama Supreme Court. The Attorney General had this power, the plaintiffs argued, because the conservative groups had filed as "relators," purportedly on behalf of the state. Probate Judge Alan King made a similar motion. On February 20, 2015, Judge Granade denied Probate Judge King's request to intervene, because, the court held, Judge King did not have a legally recognizable interest in the lawsuit's subject matter. The court also denied King's and the plaintiffs' motions seeking to compel the state Attorney General to have the conservative groups' state court petition dismissed. On March 3, 2015, the Alabama Supreme Court, responding to the petition filed in In Re King, declared that the Alabama law prohibiting same-sex marriage did not violate the Constitution. The Alabama Supreme Court also enjoined Alabama's probate judges from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples, claiming that District Court decisions on the constitutionality of laws were not binding on Alabama courts, and that Judge Granade’s injunctions applied only to the parties in Strawser and Searcy. 2015 WL 892752. Mobile County Probate Judge Don Davis, however, was under a February 12 federal injunction in this case, which forbid him from refusing to issue marriage licenses to the plaintiffs. Because of the conflicting injunction, the probate judge asked to be dismissed from the state action. The Alabama Supreme Court refused. Instead, the Alabama Supreme Court ordered him, by March 5, to advise it on whether there was a true conflict. The Alabama Supreme Court implied that there was no conflict if the February 12 federal injunction required Probate Judge Davis to issue licenses just to the plaintiffs in Strawser. Following the Alabama Supreme Court's decision, Mobile County stopped issuing marriage licenses entirely. Back in this case, on March 12, 2015, Judge Granade ordered Probate Judge Davis to respond to the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file an amended complaint (adding more parties), certification of plaintiff and defendant classes (as plaintiffs, all same-sex couples seeking to marry in Alabama and as defendants, all Alabama probate judges), and a preliminary injunction. Judge Granade later ordered the Alabama Attorney General to respond as well. On March 16, 2015, Judge Granade denied Probate Judge Davis's motion to stay the February 12 injunction against him. On May 21, 2015, Judge Granade granted class certification for both the plaintiff and defendant classes. The plaintiff class was defined as: All persons in Alabama who wish to obtain a marriage license in order to marry a person of the same sex and to have that marriage recognized under Alabama law, and who are unable to do so because of the enforcement of Alabama's laws prohibiting the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and barring recognition of their marriages. And the defendant class was defined as: "All Alabama county probate judges who are enforcing or in the future may enforce Alabama's laws barring the issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples and refusing to recognize their marriages." 307 F.R.D. 604. In a separate order on that same date, Judge Granade issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting all members of the defendant class from refusing to issue marriage licenses solely on the basis that the couple asking for a license was of the same sex. In her order, Judge Granade specifically forbade the probate judges from following the contrary order from the Alabama Supreme Court. She stayed her injunction, however, pending the resolution of Obergefell v. Hodges, a case before the Supreme Court where the justices would consider whether the Constitution provided a right for same-sex couples to marry. On June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court ruled on Obergefell v. Hodges. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). The Court held that the right to marry is fundamental, and that the 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. In response, Judge Granade lifted her stay, and the preliminary injunction requiring Alabama Probate Courts to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples went into effect. On July 17, 2015, the Alabama Attorney General’s Office asked the Eleventh Circuit to dismiss Alabama's appeal, and to instruct Judge Granade that the final judgment in Searcy, which permanently enjoined the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing the Alabama Laws prohibiting same-sex marriage, rendered moot the Strawser plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction against the Alabama Attorney General. On August 20, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit agreed to dismiss the appeal, but refused to issue the instructions that the Alabama Attorney General’s Office had asked for, finding that the question of whether the Strawser plaintiffs’ request for a permanent injunction was moot was properly left to Judge Granade in the first instance. On October 20, 2015, the Eleventh Circuit responded to a separate set of appeals from June 2015, by Alabama Probate Judge Tim Russel. The Court of Appeals found that Russel’s appeal of Judge Granade’s order denying his motion to dismiss on April 23, 2015, and his appeal of her preliminary injunction requiring him to issue same-sex marriage licenses on May 21, 2015, were moot because the Alabama Supreme Court’s order requiring Probate Judges to follow the Alabama Laws prohibiting same-sex marriage was overturned by Obergefell. Separately, on January 6, 2016, then Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore issued an administrative order telling Alabama probate judges that, contrary to Strawser, Searcy, and Obergefell, they still had a duty to follow the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage and not issue marriage licenses to same sex couples. As a result of this order, the Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission filed charges against Roy Moore on March 4, 2016. Moore was suspended from his position pending the results of his hearing before the Alabama Court of the Judiciary, which took place on August 8, 2016. Moore was previously suspended and then removed from his position as Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice in 2003, when he placed a statue of the Ten Commandments in front of the Alabama Supreme Court’s building and then failed to comply with a federal injunction ordering him to remove it. On September 30, 2016, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary again suspended Moore for the remainder of his term as Chief Justice. On June 7, 2016, Judge Granade again declared the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage unconstitutional, and granted the plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring Alabama Probate Judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses. On June 15, the plaintiffs asked for an additional permanent injunction against the Attorney General of Alabama, which would be enforceable by the plaintiff class. They argued against the Alabama Attorney General’s position that the injunction granted in Searcy made an additional permanent injunction unnecessary, noting that the injunction issued in Searcy wouldn’t be enforceable by the plaintiff class in Strawser. On August 22, 2016, Judge Granade issued an amended final judgment, making the permanent injunction enforceable against the Attorney General of Alabama. On August 23, 2016, the plaintiffs were awarded $943.00 in costs. And on January 20, 2017, the plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded $315,000.00 in fees. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 11, 2014, two men married in their church, but not allowed to marry under Alabama law, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs had applied, unsuccessfully, for a marriage license in Mobile County, Alabama. They argued that Alabama's ban on same-sex marriage was unconstitutional because it violated their rights to Due Process, Equal Protection, and the free exercise of religion. The District Court granted the plaintiffs preliminary injunctive relief, prohibiting the Alabama Attorney General from enforcing Alabama laws that ban same-sex marriage. The Court's order was stayed until February 9. The defendant appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court, both whom refused to extend the stay. As a result, on February 9, the district court order took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, at least according to the federal courts. Many state probate judges refused to issue licenses, however, citing an order from the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, and later a decision from that same court, requiring them not to issue same-sex marriage licenses. The case was stayed pending the outcome of Obergefell v. Hodges, which on June 26, 2015 held that the right to marry is fundamental, and that 14th Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. On June 7, the district court judge ruled that the Alabama laws prohibiting same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, and issued a permanent injunction requiring the Alabama probate judges to issue same-sex marriage licenses.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 14, 2020, the State of New York filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York to challenge Department of Labor regulations interpreting the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the state alleged that the rule conflicted with the plain language and purpose of the statute by creating broad, unauthorized benefits exclusions and imposed new restrictions and burdens on employees. On August 3, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and struck down four provisions of the FFRCA; the case closed shortly thereafter. <hr> On April 14, 2020, the State of New York filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The state sued the U.S. Department of Labor and the Secretary of Labor under § 702 and § 706 of the Administration Procedure Act. It sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the state alleged that the U.S. Department of Labor’s regulations unlawfully narrowed workers’ eligibility for emergency family and paid sick leave guaranteed by the Families First Coronavirus Response Act (FFRCA), thus undermining the Act’s public health and economic security purposes. The FFCRA reimbursed businesses that provided emergency family leave and paid sick leave for employees unable to work because of the coronavirus pandemic. On April 1, 2020, the Department of Labor released a final rule to implement these components of the Act that included broad exclusions and new restrictions. The state alleged that the Final Rule conflicted with the plain language and purpose of the statute Congress enacted. Namely, it claimed that the Rule limited employee eligibility to those circumstances where the employer determined in its sole discretion that the employer has work for the employee. The Rule also selected a broader definition of “health care provider” that would allow for more exemptions from the paid leave requirements and required employees to provide their employer with extensive documentation in order to obtain paid leave. On April 14, 2020, the state filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the court should vacate the challenged restrictions. The case was assigned to Judge Paul Oetken. On April 28, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a cross motion for summary judgment. They argued that New York State lacked standing, that the Department of Labor is entitled to Chevron Deference, and that the rule's requirements are a proper exercise of their rulemaking authority. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and granted in part and denied in part the cross-motions for summary judgment on August 3, holding that the decision to implement the four limitations under the FFRCA's regulations set by the Department of Labor exceeded its authority. 2020 WL 4462260. Specifically, the court struck down the definition of "health care provider," and the provisions that banned intermittent leave based on qualifying conditions that implicated an employee’s risk of COVID-19 transmission, that required employer consent for intermittent leave, and that required employees to submit documents to their employer prior to taking leave. The court entered judgment on August 25 according to the August 3 opinion and order and closed the case.

Summary: On April 14, 2020, the State of New York sued the Department of Labor to challenge the Department's regulations interpreting the Families First Coronavirus Response Act. Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, the state alleged that the rule conflicted with the plain language and purpose of the statute by creating broad, unauthorized exclusions for employees and new restrictions and burdens. On August 3, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and struck down four provisions of the FFRCA.


On July 13, 2017, the plaintiffs, a person on the terrorist watchlist and his family, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Commissioner of US Customs and Border Protection, the Acting Director of US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Executive Associate Director of Homeland Security Investigations, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the Attorney General of the United States, the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of the Terrorist Screening Center. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the ACLU of Minnesota, and Robins Kaplan, LLC, the plaintiffs brought their claims under the Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs claimed that while returning from a trip outside of the country, CBP officers surrounded the family's vehicle with weapons drawn, handcuffed the plaintiff on the terrorist watchlist, and detained him and his family for eleven hours at the U.S.-Canada border. The plaintiffs alleged that, among other things, the family members were isolated from one another, asked questions, patted down, and had their phones confiscated. The plaintiff on the terrorist watchlist claimed that his arrest, detention, unnecessary and extended restraint, incarceration, and interrogation constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and constituted an excessive use of force in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment. The other plaintiffs claimed that their detention and unnecessary and extended restraint constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of their rights under the Fourth Amendment. The plaintiff on the terrorist watchlist further claimed that both of his procedural and substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment were violated. All plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' seizure was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion not in accordance with the law and contrary to constitutional rights, therefore violating the Administrative Procedure Act. Finally, the plaintiff on the terrorist watchlist claimed that being on the watchlist itself violated the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was assigned to Judge Donovan W. Frank and referred to Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz. On October 12, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a more detailed amended complaint. The plaintiffs submitted their original claims and brought three additional claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. All of the plaintiffs brought assault and false arrest/false imprisonment claims. The wife of the plaintiff on the terrorist watchlist also brought a battery claim. On November 7, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case. The plaintiffs filed a motion in opposition to the defendants' motion to dismiss on December 21, 2017. The defendants filed their reply in support of their motion to dismiss on January 19, 2018. Parties argued the motion to dismiss before Judge Donovan W. Frank on March 2, 2018. The court issued a minute entry for proceedings the same day and noted that a written order would be issued. The court issued a written order on September 27, 2018 dismissing with prejudice the plaintiffs' fifth claim for relief (violation of substantive due process rights under the Fifth Amendment). However, the rest of the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied. 346 F.Supp.3d 1290. Next, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiffs amended complaint on October 25, 2018. Based on their admissions and denials, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the relief requested, or to any relief whatsoever, and request that this action be dismissed with prejudice. The case was briefly stayed in early 2019 due to a lapse in federal appropriations. During a pretrial conference, the parties expressed an interest in settling the case for monetary relief, and on May 20, 2019, they filed a motion to stay discovery during an attempted settlement negotiation. Magistrate Judge David T. Schultz granted the motion on May 24, staying the case until August 5, 2019. He extended the stay until August 21 to allow for more settlement conferences; the docket indicates that a binding settlement was reached on that date. On March 30, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a sealed motion with a petition to approve of the settlement award for the minor plaintiffs in the case. Judge Frank approved the settlement on April 10; the amounts distributed to the minors were redacted. On May 21, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with a proposed order. The following day, Judge Frank dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: An individual on a terrorist watchlist was stopped by Border Patrol when re-entering the country. He and his family were detained for over ten hours. After the plaintiffs withstood a motion to dismiss from the defendants, the case moved to settlement negotiations. The parties settled for an undisclosed amount, given the national security implications of the subject matter and that the settlement was distributed to minors. The case is closed.


On April 23, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiff sued the Massachusetts Department of Corrections (DOC) under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Represented by private counsel, PLN sought monetary and injunctive relief, including attorneys fees. Specifically, the complaint alleged that DOC violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by not listing PLN as an approved vendor and by refusing to deliver PLN publications to prisoners. PLN is a news organization that publishes content specifically for the prison population. It publishes a monthly magazine called Prison Legal News and also distributes to inmates books and other materials concerning the legal rights of prisoners. The magazine consists of articles from legal scholars, attorneys, inmates and from the wire services. The plaintiff maintained that from 1998 to 2003, Massachusetts DOC ordered and received PLN publications largely without incident. However, the plaintiff alleged that in 2003, the DOC began refusing to deliver PLN materials -- without any process to challenge the DOC's actions. The plaintiff further claimed that DOC lacked clear guidelines for approving book/magazine vendors at its institutions. After discovery, on May 12, 2009, the case was dismissed after the parties reached an out-of-court settlement. Pursuant to the settlement: (1) DOC agreed to pay PLN $5,000 (a figure that includes attorneys fees and costs). (2) DOC agreed to allow PLN to distribute its publications as long as it complied with its "inmate mail" regulations. (3) DOC agreed to provide general notice to all of its inmates that they may order and receive publications from PLN. (4) DOC agreed to notify PLN in writing if any publication sent by PLN is received at the institution but not delivered to the inmate.

Summary: Plaintiff Prison Legal News brought suit against Massachusetts Department of Corrections for denying inmates access to its publications. DOC and PLN entered into a private settlement agreement in which DOC stated that it would permit inmates to receive PLN publications.


On February 3, 2015, minors in the custody of the Arizona foster care system filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Department of Child Safety, the Arizona Department of Health Services, and the Arizona Health Care Cost Containment System under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title XIX of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. § 1396). The plaintiffs, represented by Children’s Rights, Inc., the Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, and private counsel, sought class certification and both declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and provisions of the Medicaid Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that certain child welfare policies and practices exposed them to physical and emotional harm and unreasonable risk of harm while in the State’s care. Over the past several years, Arizona had experienced a dramatic increase in the number of children in state foster care, nearly doubling from 2003 to 2012. The plaintiffs alleged that this growth had been fueled by extensive state budget cuts to important support services that had previously helped keep families together. The plaintiffs alleged that these cuts resulted in problematic policies and institutional issues in Arizona, including: a severe shortage of physical, mental, and behavioral health services available to children in state care; a widespread failure to conduct timely investigations of reports that children have been maltreated while in state custody; and severe and sustained shortage of family foster homes. Allegedly, there was also a widespread failure to engage in basic child welfare practices aimed at maintaining family relationships, such as placing siblings together, placing children with their biological parents on a trial reunification basis, coordinating visits between children and their biological families, and having caseworkers make regular visits with the children’s biological parents to monitor progress toward family reunification. Due to these problems, children were frequently placed far from their home communities, forced to change schools, separated from their siblings, and did not receive the mental and physical health care that they required. On September 29, 2015, Judge Roslyn O. Silver denied the defendants’ motion to abstain and dismiss due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 156 F. Supp. 3d 1024. On May 13, 2016, the Court ordered that one of the three next of friends (in this case, a person who represents a minor unable to maintain a lawsuit on his or her own behalf) be dismissed because they were ineligible to be a next friend. 2016 WL 8200450. After two years of continuous discovery disputes and scheduling delays, Judge Roslyn O. Silver granted class certification for the plaintiffs on September 30, 2017. The class was defined in three parts as: "General Class: All children who are or will be in the legal custody of DCS due to a report or suspicion of abuse or neglect. Non-Kinship Subclass: All members in the General Class who are not placed in the care of an adult relative or person who has a significant relationship with the child. Medicaid Subclass: All members of the General Class who are entitled to early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services under the federal Medicaid statute." The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and on December 19, 2017, the Ninth Circuit granted the right to appeal the class certification issued on September 30, 2017. On January 3, 2018, the defendants moved to stay further action in the case while the class action appeal was decided by the Ninth Circuit. The defendants argued that the District Court proceedings should be stayed because discovery for the class action was time intensive and expensive, and the deadlines for dispositive motions in the District Court conflicted with deadlines in the Court of Appeals. The plaintiffs argued that an indefinite stay would cause irreparable harm to children in foster care. On February 13, 2018, Judge Silver denied without prejudice the defendants’ motion to stay, finding that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on the merits. However, on February 27, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a motion to stay pending the decision on the class certification. On June 4, 2018, one of the plaintiffs filed a handwritten motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint, requesting the certification of an additional subclass called “Plaintiffs with Mental Illnesses,” of which he would be a member. Judge Silver denied this motion on September 24, 2018, since a class certification appeal was still pending before the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit released its decision on April 26, 2019, affirming two of the certified subclasses and vacating and remanding one. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the General Class and the Non-Kinship Subclass, but vacated and remanded the Medicaid Subclass, finding that the district court failed to make a finding that each member of the class was subject to identical future significant risk of Medicaid violations that would support injunctive relief. 922 F.3d 957. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs would recertify the Medicaid class and that additional discovery would be needed. On July 31, 2019, the plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for class recertification, and on August 9, 2019, Judge Silver ordered the defendants to pay the costs of additional discovery, which were projected to range from $135,000-$150,000. On October 11, 2019, Judge Silver granted the plaintiffs’ motion to recertify the Medicaid subclass. After this final subclass was created, the defendants in the initial action filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 2019. They contested the Ninth Circuit's decision to certify the class and most of the subclasses, stating that the classes, as written, did not have similar injuries across all members of the class. They contested the Ninth Circuit's Parsons v. Ryan decision, the basis for upholding the classes at issue here, that certified a class with disparate injuries because the injuries were caused by the same statewide policy, and urged the Supreme Court to overturn it. The Supreme Court denied the petition on March 20, 2020. The case, with all of its classes and subclasses, continues.

Summary: In 2015, minors in the custody of the Arizona foster care system filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, alleging that certain child welfare policies and practices exposed them to physical and emotional harm and unreasonable risk of harm while in the State’s care. On September 30, 2017, the plaintiffs were granted class action certification for three subclasses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed two of the plaintiffs' subclass certifications but remanded the third. The district court re-certified the third subclass on October 11, 2019. The defendants filed a cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court on the Ninth Circuit's class certification decision on December 12, 2019, but it was denied on March 20, 2020. The case, and all of its subclasses, continues.


On March 16, 2007, employees of VLM, Inc., most from Pakistan and Central and South America, filed a class action lawsuit against VLM in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary relief, alleging they were owed overtime pay. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that VLM had engaged in a policy and practice of requiring their employees to regularly work over 10 hours per day, without providing overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. On October 11, 2007, the Court (Judge John Gleeson) authorized notice of a class action under the FLSA's provisions for collective actions, allowing similarly situated employees to opt into the lawsuit. Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126, 2007 WL 2994278 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2007). After notice had been issued and only four additional VLM employees had opted in, on March 2, 2008, the Court (Judge Gleeson) certified a traditional Rule 23 opt-out class action to pursue claims under state law, finding that employees' evident fear of retaliation for participating in the opt-in process justified the additional approach. Guzman v. VLM, Inc., No. 07-CV-1126, 2008 WL 597186 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2008). The parties began discussing a settlement later that year, and came to an agreement in July of 2009. The settlement agreement required VLM to pay a total of $540,000 in FLSA class claims and legal fees. On August 14, 2009, the Court (Magistrate Judge Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.) entered a consent decree approving the settlement and maintained jurisdiction to ensure the terms of the settlement were enforced. After the payments were made, the Court (Judge Kiyo A. Matsumoto) dismissed the case on September 29, 2010.

Summary: On March 16, 2007, employees of VLM, Inc., filed a class action lawsuit against VLM in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the New York Labor Law, claiming that VLM had required them to work in excess of 10 hours a day without providing overtime compensation as required by federal and state law. A opt-in class was certified under FLSA, and later a Rule 23 opt-out class was also certified. The parties settled and a consent decree was issued on August 14, 2009, requiring VLM to pay $540,000 in FLSA class claims and legal fees.


On September 19, 2005, seven foster children filed a putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor of Nebraska and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services. The Plaintiffs, represented by Children's Rights, Inc., the Nebraska Appleseed Center, and private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Defendants were violating Plaintiffs' substantive and procedural due process rights under the United States Constitution; Plaintiffs' rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) and the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) program of the Medicaid Act. Plaintiffs also contended that Defendants were in breach of their own obligations under the state's State Plan contracts with the federal government under Titles IV-B and IV-E of the Social Security Act by denying Plaintiffs' rights to services and benefits as direct third-party beneficiaries of these State Plan contracts. On January 19, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard G. Kopf) entered a memorandum and order adopting Magistrate Judge David L. Piestar's Report and Recommendation denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on Younger abstention grounds. Specifically, the Court found Plaintiffs' proposed class definition to be "both ambiguous and inconsistent with [Plaintiffs'] stated intent," and held that, even if less vague, the intended class lacked commonality and typicality. The Court further concluded that, under the doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief would interfere with pending state proceedings (here, the children's state juvenile court proceedings) in a way that offends principles of comity and federalism. The Court subsequently entered judgment for Defendants. Carson P. ex rel. Foreman v. Heineman, 240 F.R.D. 456 (D. Neb. 2007).

Summary: On September 19, 2005, seven foster children filed a putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor of Nebraska and the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, alleging numerous violations of their federal constitutional and statutory rights. On January 19, 2007, the District Court (Judge Richard J. Kopf) entered a memorandum and order dismissing the case on Younger abstention grounds, holding that the federal court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief would interfere with pending state proceedings (here, the children's state juvenile court proceedings) in a way that offends principles of comity and federalism.


The plaintiffs, children who had been made wards of the state and placed in foster homes in Illinois, brought this lawsuit on September 15, 1988, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, against the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). Represented by the Office of the Cook County Public Guardian, the plaintiffs sued under the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628, 670-679. They challenged the defendants' practice of placing siblings in separate homes and denying them the opportunity to visit each other in violation of their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In 1989, the defendants moved for summary judgment. Though U.S. District Court Judge Ann C. Williams did not reject the First Amendment claim regarding the plaintiffs' right to associate with their siblings, nor the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights claims regarding plaintiff's liberty interest in their relationships with their siblings, the Judge did dismiss the claim under the Adoptive Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. <i>Aristotle P. v. Johnson</i>, 721 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Il. 1989). In October 1989, Judge Williams certified a class of plaintiffs consisting of children in the custody or guardianship of DCFS, who are subjects of neglect, dependency or abuse petitions and have not been placed with their siblings in foster homes, and have been denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings. The parties conferred on potential settlement during most of 1990-1993, and in December 1993, the parties proposed a consent decree. The following March, a notice of class action went out to all children who are subjects of abuse, neglect, or dependency positions in the Juvenile Court of Cook County. After a fairness hearing, Judge Williams approved the consent decree on March 11, 1994. Specific provisions in the decree provided standards for the placement of children, permanency planning, mental health, education, health care, protective services, initial assessments of children, adequate food/shelter/clothing, caseload ratios, information systems, licensing, training, and quality assurance. The terms of the consent decree established minimum visitation rights for siblings who could not be placed together for well-defined reasons. DCFS must provide written notice to siblings upon a decision that they cannot have joint placements and upon any decision to change a sibling placement. Transportation subsidies are provided to foster parents who transport children and supervise sibling visitation. Agencies who contract with DCFS and who do not comply with the consent decree are subject to monetary sanctions. In February 1997, the parties made a joint motion to extend the consent decree to 1999. On motion, parts of the consent decree were extended several more times--in particular, the parts about sibling visitation. The provisions about sibling placement ended, however, in 2003, based on the Department’s demonstration of substantial compliance. On March 8, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a report seeking, once again, to extend the sibling visitation provisions of the decree and to seek additional relief. The plaintiffs complained that DCFS had not provided sufficient proof to establish that it was in substantial compliance with the consent decree, and outlined five major problems in DCFS's performance: 1) DCFS had tendered only about a third of its total reviews for the two-year period from March 2012 through March 2014; 2) The reviews that DCFS had render were flawed because they were based upon biased cases that were not randomly selected; 3) DCFS used its own 75% threshold as substantial compliance in reviewing a case; 4) DCFS excluded cases that were not exceptions as outlined by the decree; and 5) DCFS did not respond to the plaintiffs' request for a randomized sibling visitation study of Cook County Cases. As a result, the plaintiffs requested that the Court extend the consent decree for two year and to do the following: 1) Order DCFS to tender all the QA reviews completed since March 2012; 2) Order DCFS to adopt a verifiable methodology or random sampling in its QA review process; 3) Order DCFS to use only the reasons that are specified in the consent decree to disqualify cases; 4) Order that DCFS amend its policy so that sanctions can be given out based on QA reviews; and 5) Order DCFS to comply with the plaintiffs' December 18, 2013 discovery request. On February 23, 2015, Judge Charles R. Norgle, Sr., over the defendant's objections, granted the plaintiffs' requested two-year extension and additional relief. On February 22, 2017, the plaintiffs again requested that the court extend the consent decree for two years. The plaintiffs cited many of the same concerns that they had about the defendant's compliance in their March 2014 motion. In addition to a two-year extension of the consent decree, the plaintiffs requested that the court order the defendant to contract with an independent auditor to conduct the remaining sibling visitation reviews. After granting several of the defendant's motions to extend the deadline for submitting its response to the plaintiffs' motion to extend the consent decree, the court gave the defendant until November 13, 2018 to file its response. However, the docket does not reflect any further activity after the court's most recent extension. As of August 2020, the docket does not indicate whether the defendant filed its response by the deadline.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a class of children in the custody or guardianship of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), who have not been placed with their siblings in foster homes, and have been denied regular and reasonable visitation with their siblings, brought suit in 1988 under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs and defendant DCFS entered a consent decree in 1993, which extends until 2017, providing for regular visitation rights. In February 2017, the plaintiffs requested that the Court extend the consent decree for two more years. As of February 3, 2019, the defendant's response is still pending.


On July 19, 2004, a group of students at Kansas state universities and their parents filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, seeking to overturn a provision of Kansas Statutes § 76-731a, a Kansas law that permitted certain undocumented aliens to qualify for in-state tuition. The law at issue provided that any individual (including undocumented aliens) who attended an accredited Kansas high school for three years and either graduated or earned a Kansas GED, qualified for in-state college tuition at Kansas state universities. In addition, undocumented and documented non-citizen aliens were required to sign an affidavit agreeing to upgrade their immigration status as soon as they are eligible. Plaintiffs, who were represented by the Federation for American Immigration Reform and private attorneys, alleged that the law unlawfully discriminated against U.S. citizens who are not Kansas residents in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was preempted by federal immigration law, namely 8 U.S.C. § 1623. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin application of the law to undocumented aliens. Defendants moved to dismiss the case. Two groups, the Kansas League of United Latin American Citizens (KLULAC) and the Hispanic American Leadership Organization, Kansas State Chapter (HALO) were allowed to intervene as defendants in the case. Day v. Sebelius, 227 F.R.D. 668 (D.Kan. Feb 24, 2005). The intervening defendants, who were represented by the National Immigration Law Center, the ACLU, and META, Inc., also moved to dismiss the case. On May 10, 2005, the District Court (Judge Richard D. Rogers) held a hearing on the motions to dismiss. Following the hearing, the parties submitted additional materials to the Court for its consideration. Based on that additional evidence, the Court converted the motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment. The Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their Equal Protection claim and had no private cause of action for their statutory preemption claim under 8 U.S.C. § 1623. Day v. Sebelius, 376 F.Supp.2d 1022 (D.Kan. 2005) Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing for all of their claims. Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1130 (10th Cir.2007). Plaintiffs' petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc was denied Day v. Bond, 511 F.3d 1030, 2007 WL 4376052 (10th Cir. Dec 17, 2007). The plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and on June 30, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. This case was closed.

Summary: A group of students at Kansas state universities sought to overturn a Kansas law that permitted certain undocumented aliens to qualify for in-state tuition. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, and the plaintiffs' appeals were ineffective.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 4, 2020, individuals detained in Miami-Dade County jails filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, seeking habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction in part, and the defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On June 15, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. A jury trial was scheduled for March 1, 2021, but the case was voluntarily dismissed on September 29. <hr> On April 4, 2020, individuals detained in the Miami-Dade County jails filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs, who alleged they were particularly vulnerable to COVID-19, sued the County and County officials. The plaintiffs, represented by the Advancement Project, Community Justice Project, Civil Rights Corps, and Dream Defenders, sought a writ of habeas corpus and injunctive and declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that the defendants violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that conditions at the Metro West jail endangered their health and safety during the COVID-19 pandemic. They alleged that the defendants failed to provide basic hygiene supplies, health care, testing, or social distancing. The plaintiffs argued that the risk was severe because at least 15 jail employees had tested positive for COVID-19 as of April 4. On April 5, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs asked the court to require defendants to take basic steps to safeguard the health of individuals at the jail who, due to their confinement, experienced an increased risk of infection and death. Plaintiffs also sought immediate release for people who were particularly vulnerable because of age or preexisting medical conditions. Also on April 5, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The class would include “all current and future persons detained at Metro West during the course of the COVID-19 pandemic.” Separately, the plaintiffs defined a medically-vulnerable subclass as “all current and future persons held at Metro West over the age of fifty, as well as all current and future persons held at Metro West of any age who experience an underlying medical condition that places them at particular risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19.” The subclass sought a writ of habeas corpus. The court held a conference on the TRO order on April 6 before Judge Kathleen Williams. On April 7, the court referred the case to Magistrate Judge Edwin Torres for discovery issues. Also on April 7, Judge Williams issued an order granting in part plaintiff’s emergency motion for a TRO. 2020 WL 1692668. The order required that by April 9, defendants file under seal a list of all medically vulnerable individuals who were detained at Metro West and a notice describing the particular measures they employed to protect these individuals from the risk of COVID-19. Further, the court ordered that defendants communicate sufficient information about COVID-19 and measures taken to reduce risk, implement social distancing measures, ensure that each incarcerated person receives free hygiene products, provide reasonable access to showers and laundry, require jail staff to wear PPE and regularly wash their hands, ensure proper testing for individuals with symptoms, and waive charges for medical care. To address individuals diagnosed with or exposed to COVID-19, the court ordered that defendants provide adequate medical care and quarantine procedures that allow continued access to showers, mental health services, and phone calls with family without placing these individuals in cells used for disciplinary confinement. 2020 WL 1692668. On April 21, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The court granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, but denied their request for immediate release on April 29. 457 F.Supp.3d 1287 (Apr. 29, 2020). The preliminary injunction was in effect for a period of 45 days and required the defendants to implement adequate distancing, communication, hygienic supplies, testing, and medical care free of charge for COVID-19 related symptoms. The defendants were also required to provide the court a report of COVID-19 population every three days and a proposal outlining steps to ensure additional social distancing safeguards within 7 days. One of the plaintiffs, Winfred Hill, was released the week before the order and his claims were dismissed as moot. The same day, the defendants appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. On May 5, the Eleventh Circuit granted the defendant’s motion for a stay pending appeal, staying the injunction issued by the District Court requiring COVID-19 safety measures. 958 F.3d 1081. A group of corrections experts and a separate group of Eighth Amendment scholars filed amicus briefs in support of the plaintiffs. On June 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of plaintiff Winfred Hill's claims as moot. They argued that the court intended to dismiss all of Hill’s claims, even those on behalf of the class. Therefore, they sought an order clarifying that Hill's claims on behalf of the class were not moot. The defendants did not oppose the motion and the court ordered that the claims of any released plaintiffs on behalf of the class were not moot on June 17. The motion was later denied on July 28. On June 15, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case back to the district court. 961 F.3d 1276 (Jun. 15, 2020). The appellate court found that the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs had met the deliberate indifference requirement for the preliminary injunction, stating that “[f]ailing to do the ‘impossible’ doesn’t evince indifference, let alone deliberate indifference.” A jury trial was scheduled for March 1, 2021, but after a few weeks of discovery, the parties filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on September 28, 2020.

Summary: On April 4, 2020 individuals detained in Miami-Dade County jails filed a class action complaint in the Southern District of Florida, seeking habeas, injunctive, and declaratory relief due to the risk that COVID-19 posed to detainees. They obtained a TRO that required the County to take precautions to reduce the risk of COVID-19 in the Metro West facility, and the court granted the preliminary injunction in part. The defendants appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction on June 15. A jury trial was scheduled for March 1, 2021, but the case was voluntarily dismissed on September 29.


On March 1, 2016, the EEOC filed this lawsuit under Title VII and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Pallet Companies in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The complaint was filed on behalf of a female employee who alleged she had been unlawfully discharged on the basis of sexual orientation when she tried to file a complaint about sexual harassment. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that, in 2014, the employee was sexually harassed by her supervisor regarding her sexual orientation as a lesbian. She filed a complaint about the harassment to Human Resources through the employee hotline. A Human Resources representative asked her to resign from her position. When she refused, she was discharged. The parties immediately entered settlement discussions, and quickly came to an agreement. On June 28, 2016, Judge Catherine C. Blake approved the parties' joint consent decree. The remedy included a payment of $182,2000 to the employee, which covered $7,200 in back pay with interest and $175,000 in compensatory damages. Pallet Companies was also ordered to contribute $10,000 annually to the Human Rights Campaign for two years. In addition, the consent decree ordered the defendant to implement policies on sexual orientation and no retaliation. The agreement specified training, monitoring, and notice and posting standards for Pallet Companies to meet. The decree provided that the court would retain jurisdiction over this matter and the parties for two years, until June 28, 2018. The two years of enforcement passed without any further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2016, the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiff alleged that Pallet Companies had discriminated against a LGBT employee by discharging her when she complained about sexual harassment. In 2016, the parties reached a settlement that required Defendant to pay $182,000 in damages to the employee and injunctive relief.


On March 24, 2014, ACLU of Michigan, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to protecting individuals' constitutional rights, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Livingston County, Livingston County's sheriff, and the County's jail administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and attorney's fees, alleging that the defendants violated their constitutional rights by their "postcard only" policy, which required all mail sent to the jail, except bona fide legal mail, had to be on standard white postcards with no pictures. As a result, ACLU's mail to the inmates was not delivered. The plaintiffs alleged violation of their First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. On April 9, 2014, the plaintiffs filed motions for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction. On April 11, 2014, the Court (Judge Denise Page Hood) issued an order granting the TRO and ordering the jail to deliver ACLU's mail to specifically named inmates. 2014 WL 12659924. On April 25, 2014, the Court extended the TRO until May 13, 2014. On May 15, 2014, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The Court reasoned that the mail sent by ACLU to the prisoners was, in fact, legal mail, and enjoined the defendants from refusing to deliver the mail to prisoners. The prison was ordered to continue delivering ACLU's mail to the prisoners, and if any prisoner was no longer in custody, the prison had to return the mail, and indicate that the intended recipient was no longer in custody. 23 F.Supp.3d 834. The defendants appealed the injunction to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. On May 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to stay the injunction pending the appeal. The District Court denied the motion on May 27, 2014, stating that, although the defendants will suffer some harm, the balancing of public interests weighs in favor of denying stay. 2014 WL 12662064. On July 10, 2014, the Sixth Circuit also denied the motion to stay, stating that ACLU's would likely be ruled legal mail and that the balancing of public interests weighs in favor of denying stay. On August 11, 2015, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's decision to grant a preliminary injunction for the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the preliminary injunction was appropriate on the grounds that the plaintiff was likely to succeed on their First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. 796 F.3d 636. Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in response to this order, which was denied on March 4, 2016. Shortly after, the parties began to engage in settlement discussions. The parties entered into a voluntary settlement agreement on September 23, 2016. The defendant agreed to adopt a policy treating properly labeled mail from an attorney as legal mail, regardless of whether the attorney had an attorney-client relationship with the prisoner. The defendant also adopted a policy that required notice of undelivered mail, and the opportunity to contest non-delivery. The parties stipulated to voluntary dismissal, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on September 23, 2016. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 24, 2014, ACLU of Michigan, a not-for-profit organization dedicated to protecting individuals' constitutional rights, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Livingston County, Livingston County's sheriff, and jail administrator, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and attorney's fees, alleging that the defendants violated their constitutional rights. On May 15, 2014, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit Cort of Appeals. On May 16, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to stay the injunction pending the appeal, which was denied by both the District Court and the Sixth Circuit. The case settled and was dismissed with prejudice on September 23, 2016.


On February 15th, 2002 a bus driver filed suit against his former employer, Durham Transit, and supervisor in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants had engaged in reverse discrimination against Caucasian drivers by reducing and eliminating the routes and charters assigned to them. He further alleged the company and supervisor had retaliated against him by firing him for baseless reasons. The case was joined by two African American drivers who alleged retaliation after they supported the plaintiff. The district court (Judge Milton I. Shadur) certified a class on April 8th, 2003 consisting of up to forty white drives who might have been adversely affected. Discovery continued until the parties reached a settlement agreement on October 12th, 2004 after engaging in mediation. The district court (Judge Milton I. Shadur) approved the settlement agreement on March 23rd, 2005. Durham agreed to pay plaintiffs and their lawyers a total of $192,000 to settle all claims.

Summary: On February 15th, 2002 a bus driver filed suit against his former employer, Durham Transit, in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois claiming reverse discrimination against Caucasian drivers. The district court (Judge Milton I. Shadur) certified a class on April 8th, 2003. The parties reached a settlement agreement on October 12th, 2004 which was approved on March 23rd, 2005. Durham agreed to pay plaintiffs and their lawyers a total of $192,000 to settle all claims.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class action brought on April 21, 2020, by eleven individuals held at the Arkansas Department of Corrections, requesting reasonable accommodations for those incarcerated who face health risks from COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a TRO and preliminary injunction requesting the immediate release and home confinement of those who are at high-risk due to age or medical conditions, and those with disabilities. The plaintiffs' TRO and preliminary injunction were denied on May 4 and May 19, respectively. The case is ongoing. <hr> On April 21, 2020, eleven individuals held at the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC) filed this emergency putative class action against the State of Arkansas at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs, representing a proposed class of those currently incarcerated or to be incarcerated in the ADC during the COVID-19 pandemic, brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. under § 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they alleged that the ADC lacked reasonable safety precautions for incarcerated individuals in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the denial of reasonable accommodations recommended by the CDC for correctional facilities constituted illegal discrimination against individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs sought declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and/or a writ of habeas corpus for the release of at-risk populations, appropriate COVID-19 measures, and a monitor with medical expertise to ensure compliance. The plaintiffs were represented by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Disability Rights Arkansas, the Arkansas Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and private attorneys. The case was assigned to Judge Kristine G Baker and referred to Magistrate Judge Joe J. Volpe. Within the proposed class were two subclasses facing a heightened risk of death or injury: the “High-Risk Subclass,” comprised of detainees over the age of 50 or with serious medical conditions, and the “Disability Subclass,” comprised of detainees with disabilities. On April 21, the plaintiffs submitted an emergency motion for TRO (temporary restraining order) and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to immediately release or transfer members of the High Risk and Disability subclass. The plaintiffs submitted a supplemental motion for TRO and preliminary injunction on April 27, requesting that the court immediately issue a TRO requiring defendants to undertake basic social distancing and sanitation measures, in addition to the demands stipulated in the initial motion for TRO. The defendants submitted a response in opposition to the initial TRO on April 30, arguing that the ADC had already implemented most of the remedial measures the plaintiffs had requested. The supplementary TRO was denied on May 4, 2020, however the initial emergency motion for TRO and preliminary injunction matter remained pending. 2020 WL 2110896. Following a hearing on May 7, on May 19, the court denied the initial motion for TRO and preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their Eighth Amendment and ADA claims -- additionally finding that the defendants had taken steps to limit the spread of COVID-19 by limiting visitors, providing health and safety information, providing protective equipment, enhancing hygiene and sanitation of the facilities, and implementing social distancing and release measures. 2020 WL 2561956. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 22, claiming sovereign immunity, the plaintiffs' failure to state a claim and failure to exhaust state remedies. On July 13, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, which added additional plaintiffs and the Arkansas Department of Health as a defendant. In this complaint, the plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the members of the Disability Subclass members against the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). A subset of the defendants filed another motion to dismiss on August 18, claiming failure to state a claim for similar reasons as their previous motion. They also argued that the plaintiffs' added ADA claim failed to seek any reasonable accommodation that the defendants did not already provide, and sought accommodations that plaintiffs never requested before bringing suit. A subset of the plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal on October 1, which was adopted by the court on October 16. The Governor of Arkansas was dismissed from the case without prejudice and the court also allowed the dismissal of the claims of three plaintiffs without prejudice. An additional stipulation of dismissal was filed on December 18 2020 and adopted on December 28, 2020. That order dismissed claims by three plaintiffs without prejudice and dismissed Jerry Bradshaw from this action without prejudice. On February 4, 2021, Defendant Wellpath, LLC, which provides healthcare services to inmates in DOC facilities, filed a motion to dismiss claiming failure to state a claim and immunity as an emergency responder under the Arkansas Emergency Services Act. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 21, 2020, eleven individuals held at the Arkansas Department of Corrections (ADC) filed an emergency class action against the State of Arkansas. The plaintiffs alleged that the ADC lacked reasonable safety precautions for incarcerated individuals in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the denial of reasonable accommodations recommended by the Correctional and Detention Facilities constituted illegal discrimination against individuals with disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and/or a writ of habeas for appropriate COVID-19 measures and a monitor with medical expertise to ensure compliance, as well as attorney fees. The plaintiff's TRO and preliminary injunction were denied on May 4 and May 19, respectively. The case is ongoing.


In October 1974, prisoners at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Walpole, Massachusetts, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The prisoners alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by a lack of books in the law library at the prison. A consent decree was issued for the creation of a law library. On December 14, 2006, plaintiff Andrew Kilburn in place of the deceased, Julian Stone brought a pro se suit for contempt of the 1974 order. On April 10, 2007, Judge Joseph L. Tauro held that there was no contempt of the order and dismissed. Charles E. Kaine was then substituted as plaintiff and filed a complaint for enforcement of the 1974 consent decree on September 10, 2008. On January 31, 2014, the defendants made a motion to terminate the consent decree. In dispute was an update of materials to an electronic database. Judge Tauro found for the defendants and terminated the consent decree. He found the consent decree no longer equitable under 60(b)(5) due to the changing circumstances in the reference market and the availability of creating electronic databases.

Summary: In October 1974, prisoners at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution in Walpole, Massachusetts, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Massachusetts Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The prisoners alleged that their constitutional rights had been violated by a lack of books in the law library at the prison. A consent decree was issued in 1974 for the creation of a law library. Plaintiff, Andrew Kilburn, again brought suit for a violation of that consent decree which was dismissed. In 2014, Charles E. Kaine filed a complaint for the enforcement of the consent decree. The defendants motioned to terminate it. The Court granted the defendants' motion finding the consent decree no longer equitable.


On June 7, 2013, the Catholic owners of a company filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury, and the Internal Revenue Service. The plaintiff, represented by Mohrman & Kaardal P.A., asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging the federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would contravene their religious faith and involve them in a "public scandal" according to the Catholic Church, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate. On July 3, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. On July 5, 2013, defendants gave notice of non-opposition to plaintiff's motion. On July 8, 2013, Judge Ann D. Montgomery ordered the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rules on either O'Brien v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services  or Annex Medical, Inc. v. Sebelius, which involve similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. However, on June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby that HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. This ruling created a new standard for for-profit companies challenging the contraception mandate. Following the ruling, the Eighth Circuit remanded Annex Medical for additional fact-finding, and on November 12, 2014 the Eastern District of Missouri in O'Brien entered an injunction on the joint motion of the parties establishing that the government could not impose that version of the contraception services mandate against the plaintiffs, but further regulations were open to enforcement and to litigation. On November 20, 2014, the District of Minnesota entered an injunction and judgment that very closely matched the injunction entered in O'Brien and similar cases around the country. The court entered the injunction based on the stipulation of the parties, establishing that the government would not enforce the version of the contraceptive services mandate at issue in Hobby Lobby against closely-held for-profit corporations like that of the plaintiffs. Prior to the Hobby Lobby ruling, no for-profit corporations had access to a religious exemption to the mandate. After the ruling, the government designed an exemption similar to the one used for non-profit religious employers, allowing religious, closely-held for-profit employers to notify the government of their religious objection to contraception. The government would then work with the insurer directly to provide contraception coverage to the employees. The court's order also awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On January 5, 2015, the court granted an extension of the deadline to file for attorney fees and costs until March 15, 2015.

Summary: The Catholic owners of a company filed this lawsuit on June 7, 2013, seeking an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate under the APA, RFRA, and the First and Fifth Amendments. On July 8, 2013, the U.S. District Court of Minnesota granted plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. On November 20, 2014, the court entered a permanent injunction and judgement establishing that the government cannot enforce the version of the contraception mandate challenged in Hobby Lobby against the plaintiffs.


This single Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse case summary describes developments in a series of cases instituted by a disabled state prisoner in New York and dealing with safe transportation of prisoners who use wheelchairs. The cases were: 01-cv-1140 (Southern District of New York) 04-cv-6621 (Western District of New York), 05-cv-6025 (retaliation claim, Western District of New York), 05-cv-2903 (failure to protect claim, Southern District of New York). The same prisoner also filed a bladder care case (filed in the Southern District as 03-cv-07664, and then transferred to the Western District 05-cv-6504), but that litigation is treated separately in PC-NY-0063. On February 14, 2001, the paraplegic, wheelchair-using New York state prisoner filed a pro se complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. After obtaining counsel in that action, he filed a first amended complaint on September 6, 2002, against officials of the New York State Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS"). That first amended complaint contained transportation-related allegations similar or identical to the allegations contained in a separate complaint he later filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. Through his Southern District lawsuit, plaintiff sought injunctive relief requiring the named defendants to transport in a safe manner disabled prisoners who require the use of a wheelchair. He alleged that he and similarly-situated prisoners were often transported by DOCS vehicles to receive medical care not available within the facilities housing them. During these occasions, he said, their wheelchairs were inappropriate for use in vehicles or were insufficiently secured within the vehicles. On May 6, 2003, plaintiff moved District Judge Deborah A. Batts, in the Southern District of New York, for a preliminary injunction, asking that defendants be ordered to transport plaintiffs in a safe manner and with procedures and equipment that are consistent with the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). Less than three weeks later, DOCS transferred plaintiff to a prison facility outside the Southern District and, on June 9, 2003, filed their opposition to issuance of the requested injunction, saying his transfer to the different facility made his request moot. On August 8, 2003, Judge Batts denied the requested injunctive relief. After the plaintiff had been moved in 2003, and represented by private counsel, he filed a second complaint on December 12, 2004, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York. In it, he noted that his move in a vehicle while in a wheelchair to his new facility occurred with the same disregard for his safety as the defendants had previously displayed and reiterated many allegations made in his transportation-based Southern District lawsuit. Plaintiff's transportation-based complaints in both districts basically asserted six causes of action. He alleged that defendants' failure to provide safe transportation to prisoners who require a wheelchair for mobility, including plaintiff: (1) demonstrated deliberate indifference and/or willful neglect to plaintiff's serious medical needs constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (2) deprived plaintiff of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; (3) discriminated against qualified individuals with disabilities, including plaintiff, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; (4) discriminated against qualified individuals with disabilities, including plaintiff, solely by reason of their disability, in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; (5) by failing to provide adequate treatment of plaintiff's wrist injury suffered during the unsafe transportation of him in a wheelchair, a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference and/or willful neglect to plaintiff's serious medical needs constituting cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; and (6) by failing to provide adequate treatment of that wrist injury, a defendant demonstrated deliberate indifference and/or willful neglect to plaintiff's serious medical needs and deprived him of liberty and property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as appropriate injunctive relief and attorney's fees. In the Western District transportation-based case, a defense motion to dismiss was denied by District Judge Charles J. Siragusa in a July 27, 2005, unpublished order. Judge Siragusa ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar plaintiff's effort for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their official capacity as to the first cause of action, nor his seeking damages from those officials in his third and fourth causes of action. Neither were his claims so similar to those made in the Southern District case that the Western District case would have to be dismissed under the first-to-file rule, according to the judge. He noted that the parties had agreed to dismiss the second and sixth causes of action. Plaintiff's request that this case be certified as a class action was granted in an order by Judge Siragusa, on April 5, 2006 (as modified on July 20, 2006). The judge described the class as consisting of DOCS inmates who use a wheelchair during vehicular transportation. The judge rejected the defendants' claim that class certification would be error in that the Eleventh Amendment barred a federal court from granting part of plaintiff's requested relief (required training for DOCS employees). Shariff v. Goord, 235 F.R.D. 563 (W.D.N.Y. 2006). On October 20, 2011, Judge Siragusa approved the parties' settlement of both the plaintiff's personal injury claims and the class claims in two separate stipulations. The defendants were ordered to pay $20,000 in damages and $74,942.11 in attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to address the inadequacies in transportation for prisoners in wheelchairs. The plaintiff agreed to discontinue all pending litigation except Shariff v. Goord, 05-cv-6504 (PC-NY-0063). Litigation that was discontinued included the original motor vehicle wheelchair accident claim (01-cv-1140), a retaliation claim (05-cv-6025), and a failure to protect claim (05-cv-2903).

Summary: This single Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse case summary describes developments in a series of cases instituted by a disabled state prisoner in New York and dealing with safe transportation of prisoners who use wheelchairs. The cases were resolved on October 20, 2011, through a court-approved settlement that required the defendants to ay $20,000 in damages and $74,942.11 in attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants also agreed to address the inadequacies in transportation for prisoners in wheelchairs.


This lawsuit is one of several cases arising from immigration raids conducted by federal authorities at Swift meat packing plants across the country. (See Valenzuela v. Swift Beef Company, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-02322-N (N.D. Tex.) [IM-TX-0019], and Swift & Company v. ICE, No. 2:06-cv-00314 (N.D. Tex.) [IM-TX-0020]). In this case, which was filed on September 12, 2007, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) and several U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents sued the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, challenging the Swift raids. Plaintiffs alleged that on December 12, 2006, federal immigration authorities raided six Swift plants and swept up about 12,000 meatpacking workers, thousands of which were Union members. Plaintiffs alleged that the warrantless raids were unlawful in that groups of workers were herded up and detained without any reasonable suspicion that the workers were aliens in violation of federal immigration law. Detained workers were not allowed to retrieve their immigration papers or speak to Union attorneys, and some were taken away without the chance to make arrangements for their children to be picked up from school or daycare. The Union and individual members argued that the raids violated the Immigration and Nationality Act and deprived members of their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs were represented by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, union attorneys, and private counsel. On September 12, 2007, plaintiffs moved to certify a class of "all persons subjected to group detention without warrant or a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that they are immigrants unlawfully present in the United States in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act during work-place enforcement activities conducted by [ICE] agents." Two months later, on November 13, 2007, defendants moved to dismiss. After the Court (Judge Mary Lou Robinson) on March 25, 2008, denied a motion by more than thirty groups for leave to appear and file amicus briefs, there is an unexplained yearlong gap in the docket with no activity listed. The next docket entry is on March 4, 2009, where the Court (Judge Robinson) denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, finding that the proposed class was too vague to be supportable. Later in the year, on September 16, the Court (Judge Robinson) converted defendants' motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and invited the parties to submit briefs and any additional evidence. Following several extensions and a discovery dispute, ending in the Court granting the defendants a protective order pending a ruling on defendants' qualified immunity, on March 11, 2011, the Court (Judge Robinson) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. United Food and Commercial Workers International Union v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2011 WL 856937 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 11, 2011). The Court found that the Union lacked standing to bring suit, and that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing to claim injunctive relief, as a future invasion of a legally protected interest was unlikely. As to the individual plaintiffs' claims for damages, the Court granted summary judgment to the defendants on plaintiffs' unlawful detention claim because it found that ICE had acted reasonably in detaining them, on plaintiffs' access to counsel claim because their Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached and because there is no civil action for violation of Miranda rights, and on plaintiffs' childcare claim because it found that the amount of time plaintiffs were denied the ability to make arrangements for their children "was not disproportionate to what was reasonably necessary to process the large number of aliens detained." The Court entered judgment for the defendants the same day, and ordered that plaintiffs pay defendants' attorneys fees.

Summary: On September 12, 2007, the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCW) and several U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents sued the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), alleging that ICE raids of six Swift meat packing plants late in 2006 were conducted in violation of plaintiffs' Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights not to be unlawfully seized or denied counsel. On March 11, 2011, the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to request injunctive relief and that their claims for damages lacked merit because ICE's actions had been reasonable.


This is one of a collection of § 1983 inmate cases filed in Louisiana federal courts to challenge the operation and conditions of confinement in the Louisiana prison system and in parish and city jails through Louisiana. These cases worked their way through the federal courts for three decades. This case originated in 1969 and pursuant to that action a class was certified consisting of those persons incarcerated in the facilities for Orleans Parish Prison system. On June 25, 1970, following a hearing on the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary and permanent injunction, the District Court (Judge Christenberry) entered an order granting injunctive relief to the plaintiffs. The District Court noted that the conditions in the Orleans Parish Prison system were a "shock to the conscious." He detailed the extreme deficiencies which included severe overcrowding in a dilapidated structure that was infestation by rats, mice, roaches and vermin. Hamilton v. Schiro, 338 F.Supp. 1016 (E.D. La. 1970). We have little information about case activity from 1970 to 1981. In 1981, the Louisiana Department of Corrections sought a writ of supervisory mandamus to stay all federal court litigation pertaining to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in Louisiana prisons and jails. In response, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered that all federal litigation then against state, parish or local prison facilities, relating to inmate population issues, be consolidated in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, in an effort to avoid inconsistent decrees. Hamilton v. Morial, 644 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1981). Thereafter, many Louisiana state, parish, and city facilities entered into consent decrees which specified inmate population limits and officer-to-inmate ratios. Since 1981, those facilities were under the judicial oversight of District Judge Frank J. Polozola of the Middle District of Louisiana. Over the years Judge Polozola revised the decrees to adjust population caps and officer-to-prisoner ratios as necessary. In 1988 new lawsuits were filed and subsequently consolidated with the Hamilton case. In 1991, the parties resolved issues relating to medical care (Phase I of the litigation) and mental health services (Phase II), which were memorialized in judgments approved by the District Court. On January 22, 1992, the plaintiffs, represented by the National Prison Project of the ACLU, filed an Amended Complaint alleging continuing violations in Orleans Parish Prison system. That part of the litigation was designated as Phase III and was resolved by the entry of an environmental Consent Decree on November 22, 1993. In March 1994, the State and the Sheriffs executed an agreement entitled "Basic Jail Guidelines" in their effort to ensure that the prison system in Louisiana would operate consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Louisiana. In July 1994, a new action, Lambert v. Morial, 94-2502, involving female inmates, was initiated. On December 21, 1994, with the consent of all parties, the Court (1) expanded the class in Hamilton to "any and all inmates housed in the Community Correctional Center, House of Detention, Old Parish Prison, Templeman I, II, and III, and any and all female inmates housed in any facility in the Orleans Parish Prison System," (2) extended consent decrees on the medical issues, psychiatric program, and the environmental consent decree to cover the amended class, and (3) transferred and consolidated the remaining issues in the Lambert case into the Hamilton case -- to be handled as Phase IV of the litigation. On March 9, 1995, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint which sought continued enforcement of certain non-compliance with prior Decrees, as well as relief for Phase IV of the litigation. A partial amended complaint was filed on April 5, 1995 to add allegations to the Second Amended Complaint. On August 10, 1995, the parties filed a Stipulation resolving the issues of Phase IV. In 1996, the Hamilton plaintiffs sought intervention in the case Williams v. Edwards, pending in the Middle District of Louisiana before Judge Frank J. Polozola to challenge dismissal of population cap consent decrees. After intervention was denied, an appeal was taken but dismissed as untimely. Hamilton plaintiffs v. Williams plaintiffs, 147 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 1998). Between 1996 to 2005, the parties litigated numerous motions regarding enforcement of the various consent decree provisions. Magistrate Judge Alma Chasez heard and resolved the various motions and disputes of the parties and was charged with monitoring compliance. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, causing massive flooding throughout the city. Reports quickly emerged from the jail deputies, employees, and inmates, that class members were stranded at the jail for days and were only rescued when the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections was called in to assist. Based on these reports, the plaintiffs' counsel sought to interview his clients and obtain records to determine whether any of the consent decree had been violated before, during, or after the storm. The jail denied his requests. The attorney also filed a motion with the Court for a temporary restraining order to preserve evidence and to enter and inspect the jail. The court denied the motion. On June 1, 2006, the court also denied the attorney's motion for access to class members. On June 15, 2006, the defendant sheriff filed a motion for partial dismissal, without prejudice. The plaintiffs did not oppose this motion. In fact, on July 18, 2006, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice the remainder of their civil rights claims in this case. In light of the court's rulings denying him access to his clients, the attorney was no longer able to represent his clients fully and this case served no purpose that advanced the civil rights of the prisoners. Dismissing this class action without prejudice would remove a potential barrier to other cases in which prisoners at the jail could pursue their rights. On August 23, 2007, the Magistrate Judge (Alma L. Chasez) issued a report and recommendation that the plaintiffs' motion be denied in part and granted in part. The Magistrate Judge recommended dismissing all of the claims without prejudice, but that all consent decrees setting forth economic responsibilities between the Sheriff, the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana remain in force and effect until further orders of the Court. The Magistrate Judge also recommended that a notice be posted in the jail to inform class members of the dismissal. 2007 WL 5271891 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2007). The City of New Orleans objected to the recommendation, preferring instead that the case be handled through administrative closure. (That is, that it be put on the inactive docket, though remaining technically open.) The State of Louisiana also objected to the recommendation. The State argued that administrative closure was the proper method for suspending activity in this case case, while maintaining the consent decrees in effect between the parties. The State further opposed the filing of any new separate class action litigation involving the jail without consolidation of those issues with this case. The plaintiffs objected only to the language of the notice that the Magistrate Judge recommended to inform class members of the dismissal. On June 20, 2008, the district court (Judge Jay C. Zainey) adopted the magistrate's report and recommendation with the plaintiffs' requested changes to the notice. The court dismissed the remaining claims in the case over the objection of the state and city defendants. The court ordered that 1) all of the plaintiffs' claims, whether the subject of a consent decree or not, be dismissed without prejudice; 2) the plaintiffs' counsel, the ACLU National Prison Project, be discharged as counsel for the plaintiffs; and 3) all consent decrees, judgments, orders, minute entries or settlement agreements entered into the record of this case setting forth or establishing any economic or financial responsibilities or obligation between or among the sheriff, the City of New Orleans and/or the State of Louisiana, as well as the rights of such parties to seek judicial modification thereof, shall remain in full force and effect, in their entirety, until further orders of the court, and the court expressly retained jurisdiction. 2008 WL 2522129 (E.D. La. June 20, 2008). On November 27, 2012, the court (Judge Zainey) reopened the case so that the Sheriff could pursue an adjustment to the current per diem rates provided by the 2003 Consent Decree. However, no orders were issued modifying any of the consent decrees. As of March 18, 2016, there have been no new docket entries and the case appears to be dormant.

Summary: This is one of a collection of § 1983 inmate cases filed in Louisiana federal courts to challenge the operation and conditions of confinement in the Louisiana prison system and in parish and city jails through Louisiana. This case originated in 1969 and pursuant to that action a class was certified consisting of those persons incarcerated in the facilities for Orleans Parish Prison system. The parties entered into multiple consent decrees over the years.


On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of race pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against their employer and their union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification, an order declaring liability, injunctive and equitable relief, back and front pay, lost benefits, compensatory damages, emotional distress damages, pain and suffering damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process by the predominantly Caucasian managerial staff. They also alleged that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training, that the Union failed to represent them adequately and fairly or to properly process their grievances, that the Union consented to Lockheed's discriminatory practices, and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. The EEOC sought to intervene, but on January 29, 2001 the district court (Judge Forrester) denied this motion. On May 9, 2001 the union and the plaintiffs reached an unspecified settlement and the union was formally dismissed from the case on March 25, 2003. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and the plaintiffs thereafter were to proceed individually. On September 26, 2003 the district court (Judge Forrester) dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

Summary: On May 10, 2000 plaintiffs, African American employees of Lockheed Martin, filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination on the basis of race against their employer and their union, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been systematically excluded from the promotional process, that they had not been provided with necessary opportunities for overtime or training, that the Union failed to represent them adequately and fairly or to properly process their grievances, that the Union consented to Lockheed's discriminatory practices, and that they were subjected to a hostile work environment. On May 9, 2001 the union and the plaintiffs reached an unspecified settlement. On August 2, 2001 class certification was denied by the district court (Judge Forrester) and on September 26, 2003 the case was dismissed without prejudice for lack of prosecution.