COVID-19 Summary: This case was filed on April 8, 2020 by several inmates in Virginia's state prisons, seeking safety remedies and early discharge. The case settled on May 12, 2020 and is being monitored weekly by the court. <hr> Full Summary: This lawsuit was filed on April 8, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The lawsuit was filed amidst the outbreak of COVID-19 that occurred early in 2020. The plaintiffs were twenty-seven inmates held in Virginia state prisons. Represented by the ACLU Foundation of Virginia (ACLU-VA) and private counsel, they sued Virginia Governor Ralph Northam, Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security Brian Moran, the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections Harold Clarke, and the wardens of twelve different correctional facilities in Virginia. The lawsuit argued that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in four ways. First, the defendants placed the inmates in quarters with very limited spacing, making them susceptible to contracting COVID. Second, the defendants did not procure equipment or develop any policies regarding sanitation for the inmates. Third, the defendants did not develop any policies to arrest the spread from prison staff to the inmates. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the lack of medical supplies and testing for staff and inmates represented a violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Henry E. Hudson. By May 11, however, it appeared that the parties had worked out a solution. They moved to dismiss the case and enter a settlement agreement. In the settlement agreement, the defendants conceded to a system of early discharge that had been passed in April, of conditional pardons, a grievance system, the suspension of medical co-pays, expansion of PPE and testing, and new housing policies. The agreement was to last until the court decided that it was no longer necessary, determined by the extent of the spread of the coronavirus. The next day, the court entered the agreement. The defendants filed weekly status reports that updated the court as to their ongoing efforts to detain the spread of the virus and improve hygiene in the detention centers. On July 2, an inmate submitted a declaration which claimed that the prison was not properly washing the face masks they had given to the inmates, contrary to the terms of the settlement agreement. However, it does not appear that very much came of this. Additionally, on September 8, the parties notified that court that they had agreed on a plan to resume transferring individuals from jails to VDOC custody. The plan provided for quarantine and testing procedures. Additionally, the defendants agreed to cease transferring individuals eligible for early release or those who with local motions pending, including motions for release on Home Electronic Monitoring or for reconsideration of their criminal sentence. In response to the plaintiffs' notice of non-compliance dated September 22, on December 14, the parties notified the court that they resolved the matters. The plaintiffs agreed to provide the defendants with an updated list of ACLU-VA volunteer attorneys to help coordinate attorney phone calls. Additionally, the defendants agreed to inform high-risk inmates on the procedure for requesting expedited early release screening, create an anonymous complaint hotline for inmates, inform the correctional staff on how to report COVID-19 concerns, place the ALCU-VA in contact with the VA Department of Health, and consider prioritizing early release for approved inmates in the event of future COVID outbreaks at a correctional facility. Furthermore, in response to an inmate's motion for release and numerous letters form inmates requesting relief under the settlement, on February 4, 2021 the court announced it did not have the authorization to mediate individual inmate disputes or order the release of inmates from custody. As of February 4, 2021, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In this case, filed in April of 2020, several inmates in Virginia state prisons sued the Virginia governor, the director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), the Secretary of Public Safety and Homeland Security, and wardens of state prisons across the state for violations of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the lack of care regarding the COVID-19 outbreak that began in early 2020 constituted cruel and unusual punishment, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The case was assigned to District Judge Henry E. Hudson. About a month later, the parties had reached a settlement. The defendants agreed to begin an early release program, conditional pardons, expand testing, improve social distancing rules, and enhance PPE and sanitation efforts. The court would have jurisdiction for as long as the court felt it the pandemic still posed a threat. The case is ongoing as of February 4, 2021.


On June 25, 2018, detainees in the Genesee County Jail in the City of Flint who bathed in and consumed lead-contaminated water filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued Genesee County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and sought compensatory and punitive damages along with attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the failure to provide safe drinking water and the delay in providing safe drinking water constituted cruel and unusual punishment and violated the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants knew the Jail’s water was contaminated, yet forced the plaintiffs to continue drinking it. They claimed that the defendants prohibited the plaintiffs from accepting deliveries of bottled water, failed to ensure that adequate bottled water was given to the plaintiffs, withheld bottles of water from the plaintiffs forcing them to continue drinking contaminated water, restricted plaintiffs to less than the minimum required amount of water per day, and withheld water as punishment. For more information about a similar suit involving the Genesee County Jail that sought injunctive relief, please see Long v. Pickell. On October 18, 2018, the defendants responded to the complaint. They contended that a) the plaintiffs could not have been exposed to lead because the water service lines to Genesee County Jail are not made of lead, b) as soon as they became aware of the possibility that the water in the Genesee County Jail could have been contaminated with lead they tested the water sources, and c) they provided adequate bottled water as soon as they became aware of the publicity surrounding the water supply while they waited for the water to be tested. However, on August 14, 2020 after close to two years of discovery, the parties stipulated to the dismissal without prejudice of this case, with the provisions that the statute of limitations for the case's claims would be tolled for 120 days after the dismissal and that this case's discovery would be usable if the plaintiffs were to refile their case. As of April 19, 2021, the case is officially closed. But the case appears still to be open because class members continue to write to the court asking for it to be reopened, as well as other relief, and litigation over these requests is ongoing.

Summary: On June 25, 2018, detainees in the Genesee County Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued individuals and entities responsible for their care in the Jail under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought punitive and compensatory damages and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the failure to provide adequate safe water was cruel and unusual punishment violating their Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and caused significant negative health effects. However, after two years of discovery, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the case in August 2020.


On June 10, 2004, the estate of a deceased former inmate of the District of Columbia jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia against the D. C. Department of Corrections. On November 18, 2004, another former inmate of the Jail, who had simillarly suffered a stabbing attack, joined the suit through the Amended Complaint. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for damages resulting from claims of wrongful death, unsafe jail conditions, due process violations, and cruel and unusual punishment violations. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that due to the increased population in the D.C. Jail, which was not accompanied by an increase in corrections personnel, jail conditions created a substantial risk that plaintiffs would be exposed to physical harm and that the defendants were aware of the increased risk and did nothing to mitigate that risk. On December 11, 2002, the originalplaintiff was stabbed and killed by a fellow inmate while in pretrial detention at the D.C. Jail. The additional plaintiff was stabbed two days later. Plaintiffs claimed the stabbings were only possible because the cell block in which Plaintiffs were housed was overcrowded and understaffed by security personnel. Shortly before Mr. Pendleton's death, the D.C. jail was relieved of court-imposed population cap and the population had risen by nearly 40%. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants had been well informed of the situation in the jail but had not resolved the safety concerns at the time of the incident. The case was heard in District Court (Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, replaced by Judge Ricardo M. Urbina). Defendants moved for summary judgment on June 30, 2005, which was denied October 18, 2005. Concurrently, the parties participated in sealed settlement proceedings before a District of Columbia Magistrate Court (Judge John M. Facciola, replaced by Judge Alan Kay). After discovery was closed but before the case had come before open court, a private settlement was reached, at which point the case was voluntarily dismissed by Plaintiffs on November 18, 2008. According to the website for Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, this case secured "the largest settlement ever in an inmate wrongful death suit against the District of Columbia." http://www.washlaw.org/projects/dc-prisoners-rights.

Summary: In 2004, the estate of a deceased former inmate of the D.C. Jail and another former inmate brought suit U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia against the Department of Corrections of the District of Columbia, alleging that the overpopulated conditions of the jail led to the plaintiffs being stabbed. In 2008, the parties settled out of court.


This is a class action suit regarding the legality of withholding an individual's background check report during adverse employment application decisions. On April 26, 2017, an individual who sought and was denied employment at The Madison Square Garden Company and MSGN Holdings, L.P. (MSG) filed this lawsuit in New York County Supreme Court. The plaintiff sued MSG for violations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the New York State Fair Credit Reporting Act (NY FCRA). Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensation for damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. On May 26, 2017, MSG removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The case was assigned to Judge Alison J. Nathan and Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. The case was later reassigned to Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman and then to Judge Sarah L. Cave. The plaintiff alleged that MSG failed to provide job applicants with copies of their background check reports and other required notices before making adverse employment decisions as required by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and the New York Fair Credit Reporting Act (NY FCRA). FCRA requires that employers using consumer reports to make adverse employment decisions must provide a copy of the report to the individual along with notification of its intent to take adverse action and a summary of the individuals’ rights under FCRA. NY FCRA requires that an entity must provide a copy of the background check if it contains criminal conviction information. On July 14, 2017, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding a claim that MSG’s refusal to hire individuals with past convictions violated the New York City Human Rights Law (NYCHRL) and had a disparate impact on Black and Latino applicants. After various procedural delays and adjournments, MSG filed a motion to stay the proceedings, which the court granted on August 15, 2018. On June 24, 2019, the plaintiff moved for preliminary approval of a class action settlement, conditional certification of settlement classes, and approval of plaintiff’s proposed notice of settlement, which the court granted on August 8, 2019. 2019 WL 3759501. On November 4, 2019, plaintiffs moved for certification of the settlement classes, final approval of class action settlement, approval of service awards, and attorneys' fees and expenses. After a final hearing on November 19, 2019, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to certify a class and approve the settlement on August 7, 2020. Two classes were certified. The FCRA Class was defined as “individuals who were denied employment with MSG based on the content of his or her Background Check Report from April 26, 2015 through the date of Preliminary Approval of the Settlement,” and the NYC class was defined as “individuals who applied for employment with MSG in New York City, New York and who were denied employment based on MSG’s determination that they failed to fully or accurately disclose their criminal conviction history from May 8, 2014 through the date of Preliminary Approval of the Settlement” under Rule 23(a) and Rule 23(b)(3). 2020 WL 4572678. Under the settlement, class members were awarded over $500,000 in damages in exchange for releasing MSG from all discrimination claims, and the court awarded $750,000 in reasonable attorneys' fees. Furthermore, MSG also agreed to change its policy regarding hiring and employment of those with criminal records. MSG would contract with a Consumer Reporting Agency to provide pre-adverse action letters to applicants denied employment based on their background checks. MSG would also only require that applicants disclose criminal conviction history for the five years preceding an application and would no longer require that applicants disclose convictions for possession of marijuana, except for convictions with intent to sell marijuana. If applicants did not fully or accurately disclose their criminal conviction histories, MSG would request an explanation for the lack of disclosure prior to making any adverse employment decisions. The court entered the judgment on August 10. The settlement agreement is set to expire two years after the date of judgment or MSG's full compliance with the settlement's policy changes, whichever is later.

Summary: In April 2017, an individual denied employment sued The Madison Square Garden Company and MSGN Holdings, L.P. (MSG) in New York County Supreme Court for violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the New York State Fair Credit Reporting Act. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as compensation for damages and reasonable attorneys' fees. The plaintiff alleged that MSG failed to provide job applicants with copies of their background check reports and other required notices before making adverse employment decisions. The parties reached a class settlement that provided for $500,000 in damages, $750,000 in attorneys' fees, and policy changes that limited the defendants' reliance on the criminal histories of job applicants in hiring decisions. The settlement is set to remain in effect until at least 2022.


This putative class-action lawsuit was filed on June 24, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs were residents, tenants, property owners, and business owners in Seattle's Capitol Hill neighborhood, and they brought suit against the City of Seattle. Background This lawsuit was one of many that arose out of the widespread protests that swept the nation in the spring and summer of 2020. The protests were most directly traceable to the police killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis late that May, calling for an end to racial injustice and police brutality. Although protests spread throughout the country, they were especially forceful and durable in Seattle. After the Seattle Police Department left and boarded the East Precinct building on June 8, 2020, protesters declared Capitol Hill an autonomous area. The region quickly became known by different names, including Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) or Capitol Hill Occupied Protest (CHOP). While some claimed that CHOP was an area dedicated to protest, arts, and providing for others, others said that there was rampant lawlessness, property destruction, and violence. The Lawsuit While claiming that they supported the underlying inspiration for CHOP and recognizing participants' First Amendment rights, the lawsuit accused the City of abandoning that area, leaving the plaintiffs susceptible to vandalism, violence, property destruction, and other criminal activity. The plaintiffs accused the City of supporting CHOP, even as they acknowledged dangerous conditions. Further, the plaintiffs argued that the City left CHOP blocked off from public access, damaging the plaintiffs' ability to operate their businesses. The plaintiffs charged the City with violating the U.S. Constitution and the state constitution, as well as Washington statutory law. First, the complaint argued that the plaintiff class's procedural due process rights were violated by the City helping CHOP participants occupy the area and limiting the plaintiff class's access to their property. Second, plaintiffs argued that the City created a nuisance by impeding traffic, thereby interfering with the plaintiff class's enjoyment of their property. Next, the plaintiffs argued that the City's assistance of CHOP represented a state-created danger, violating the putative class's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fourth, they argued that the City violated a clause of the Washington constitution which prohibited any municipality from giving property away unless for the needy. Finally, plaintiffs argued that the City's actions represented a violation of the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause. The plaintiffs asked for monetary damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. An End to CHOP On July 1, 2020, after several publicized acts of violence, the  Seattle Police Department dispersed the protests, bringing the existence of CHOP as an "autonomous zone" to an end. The Seattle Police Department were called in after  Seattle Mayor Jenny Durkan issued an executive order labeling CHOP an unlawful protest. The Lawsuit Continues: The City's Motion to Dismiss and Deny Class Certification On July 10th, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The new complaint was much the same as the original, but it took out the nuisance count and the Washington Constitution count, and added a count for violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss and deny class certification on July 23. They argued that § 1983 claims must allege that a government institution caused harm directly. The City claimed that it did nothing to directly expose plaintiffs to harm. Further, the City argued that the Due Process Clause does not compel the government to protect the life, liberty, or property of citizens by private actors. The City also claimed that it did not directly place the plaintiffs in danger, and therefore did not breach the "state-created danger" exception. Seattle argued that its actions did not represent a "taking," as they were just a temporary loss of access to property. The motion argued that the City did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, because the City did not discriminate against anyone. Finally, the City argued that class certification was improper, because the plaintiffs complained of distinct harms at different times with differing damages. On September 10, the City additionally filed a motion to stay discovery pending a decision on the motion to dismiss. The Court granted the City's motion to dismiss the claim based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution but denied the City's motion to dismiss with respect to all the other claims on October 16, 2020. 2020 WL 6120008. Regarding the Equal Protection claim, the plaintiffs had proposed two groups allegedly treated differently by the City: (1) "areas occupied by CHOP versus other areas of the City" and (2) "[p]laintiffs versus CHOP participants." The Court found that the plaintiffs failed to show that individuals in the area occupied by CHOP were similarly situated to individuals in other areas of the City. In addition, the Court found that the City's alleged favoritism towards CHOP participants did not necessarily mean the City disfavored the plaintiffs. Furthermore, even if the proposed classes were similarly situated, the Court found that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the City acted without any rational basis for treating the plaintiffs differently. However, though the Court dismissed the Equal Protection claim, the Court permitted the plaintiffs' to file a second amended complaint within fourteen days and allowed the plaintiffs' procedural due process, substantive due process, and unlawful takings claims to proceed. In the same opinion, the Court also denied the City's motions to deny class certification and stay discovery. The Court held that it would be improper to decide class certification on the pleadings in this case and that discovery should be permitted to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to discover evidence to show if there were in fact common questions. The plaintiffs proceeded to file a second amended complaint on October 30, 2020. Two businesses were removed as plaintiffs. In addition, the plaintiffs removed the Equal Protection claim and re-added claims for negligence and nuisance. The remainder of the complaint was largely the same as the original. In mid-November, the National Police Association then sought leave from the Court to participate in the case as amicus curiae. The National Police Association expected to present positions in support of the plaintiffs and believed that its briefs would aid the Court by providing its perspective on a municipality's decision to supply or decline to supply police protection service. The Court denied the National Police Association's motion on December 7, 2020 without prejudice. Throughout December, the parties proceeded with discovery. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.

Summary: This lawsuit deals with the existence of Seattle's "Capitol Hill Occupying Protest" or CHOP. The plaintiffs, several business owners and individuals in the Capitol Hill neighborhood, filed this lawsuit against the city of Seattle, arguing that the city had left them open to violence, vandalism, and property destruction. They argued that this violated the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss on all charges. The court granted the city's motion to dismiss the claim based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution but denied the city's motion to dismiss with respect to all the other claims on October 16, 2020. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint removing two businesses as plaintiffs and removing the Equal Protection claim. The case is ongoing as of January 2, 2021.


On October 1, 2019, a criminal defense lawyer practicing in Texas filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued Tom Green County and its two elected District Attorneys under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff claimed violations of her First Amendment rights. In June 2018, plaintiff was serving as appellate counsel in a criminal case. In her arguments, plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the plea bargain system on the grounds that convictions by plea bargains violated the jury-trial rights outlined in the Texas and United State Constitutions. The plaintiff alleged that in retaliation, the Tom Green County District Attorney's Office implemented a policy of refusing to enter into plea bargains with the plaintiff unless she signed an "Additional Admonishment" agreeing that her argument regarding the constitutionality of plea bargains was wrong. This policy forced the plaintiff to withdraw from her criminal-defense cases due to ethical reasons, leading to lost job opportunity. The plaintiff sought injunctive and compensatory damages. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on January 3, 2020, asserting that the plaintiff had failed to support a claim for relief, because the "real party in interest" was Texas rather than Tom Greene County. As of February 24, 2020, the case was ongoing.

Summary: In October 2019, a criminal defense attorney sued the Tom Green County District Attorney's Office, alleging retaliation for asserting in court that plea bargains were unconstitutional. The alleged retaliation was the District Attorney's Office's refusal to enter into plea bargains with clients represented by the plaintiff. As of February 2020, the case was ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action brought on behalf of prisoners in the Illinois Department of Corrections seeking various types of relief in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs alleged that as people in groups who are particularly vulnerable to the virus, they were exposed to a heightened risk of COVID-19. On April 10, the judge denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 20. No outcome yet.
 On April 2, 2020, a group of prisoners filed this class action lawsuit against the Governor of Illinois and the Illinois Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Represented by the Uptown People's Law Center, Equip for Equality, the MacArthur Justice Center at Northwestern University, the Illinois Prison Project, and Loevy & Loevy, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and for violations of the the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.). The plaintiffs requested that a special master be appointed to assess eligibility for release for six different subclasses of prisoners, including groups individuals who were medically vulnerable due to age or underlying conditions or soon to be eligible for release. The same plaintiffs filed a similar case for habeas relief. For more details, see here in the Clearinghouse. The case was assigned to Judge Steven Seeger, but Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. was assigned as an emergency judge. Immediately, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction which asked the court to preliminarily certify the putative subclasses concerning the medically vulnerable prisoners and to order the defendants to transfer members of both those subclasses to their homes to self isolate. The parties submitted briefing on April 6 specifically addressing how the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") applied to the relief sought for the medically vulnerable subclasses. The plaintiffs argued that the relief sought met the PLRA requirements of being narrowly drawn, extending no further than necessary to correct the violation of their rights, and was the least intrusive means. Conversely, the defendants argued that the court should not provisionally certify the medically vulnerable subclasses because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies as required by the PLRA, they were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth Amendment and ADA claims, and they had not demonstrated more than a possibility of harm. On April 10, Judge Dow released an order denying the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. He concluded that the PLRA barred the court from granting the temporary restraining order, finding that the plaintiff's request amounted to a prisoner release order under the terms of the PLRA. The PLRA required a previous court order that the defendants' failed to comply with, the release order must be issued by a three-judge court, and the preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn. The court held that the plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction did not meet these requirements. The court also denied the preliminary class certification for the medically vulnerable subclasses because the commonality requirement for class certification could not be met. On April 29, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss which argued that the plaintiffs had failed to plead a plausible claim on the merits. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 20 and as a result, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss as moot. The amended complaint demanded that prisoners most vulnerable to COVID-19 be provided access to lifesaving protective measures, and in some instances, transfer to home detention. The parties submitted a joint status report on February 19, 2021. The parties anticipated finalizing a settlement agreement by March 5, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: Prisoners of the Illinois Department of Corrections filed a class action lawsuit, requesting a temporary restraining order that would release particularly vulnerable individuals in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court found that the PLRA barred the court from granting the temporary restraining order. Later the defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was denied as moot after the plaintiffs had filed an amended complaint on May 20. The case is ongoing.


On March 15, 2012, a Catholic business owner filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by the American Center for Law & Justice and the Fidelis Center for Law and Policy, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated his religious freedom by requiring him to provide coverage for contraception through his business's group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene his Christian faith and compel speech contrary to his beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for himself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On May 21, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. The defendants argued that the plaintiff had not alleged any imminent injury, and that he thus lacked standing and had failed to state a legitimate claim. On June 11, 2012, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, with additional facts supporting his allegation of imminent injury. The defendants moved to dismiss this amended complaint on the same grounds as the original complaint. On September 28, 2012, the District Court (Judge Carol E. Jackson) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Jackson found that the contraceptive coverage mandate did not impose a substantial burden on the plaintiff's religious freedom, nor did it compel the plaintiff to speak, to subsidize speech, or to subsidize expressive conduct. O'Brien v. DHHS, 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (E.D. Mo. 2012). The plaintiff appealed this dismissal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and moved for an injunction pending appeal. On November 28, the Eighth Circuit (unsigned, with Circuit Judge Morris S. Arnold dissenting) granted a stay pending appeal, without comment. Judges William Jay Riley, Steven M. Colloton, Jane Kelly heard oral argument on October 24, 2013. On September 8, 2014, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case back for proceedings consistent with the recent Supreme Court’s decision in <i>Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores</i>. On November 12, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion for entry of injunction and judgment and sought a judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, a permanent injunction, and to dismiss all other claims against the defendants. On November 12, 2014, the Court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs on claims under RFRA, permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing the disputed June 30, 2014 Contraceptive Coverage Requirement against the plaintiff, and dismissed all other claims against defendants. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, a Catholic business owner filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on his religious freedom by requiring him to provide coverage for contraception through his business's group health insurance plan. In October 2012, Plaintiffs appealed the District Court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, which the 8th Circuit reversed and remanded the case back for proceedings. On November 12, 2014, the parties filed a joint motion for entry of injunction and judgment following a recent Supreme Court decision and so the Court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs on claims under RFRA claim and dismissed all other claims.


This is a federal class-action lawsuit challenging Alabama’s bail system, specifically the fact that indigent defendants are routinely jailed pre-trial due to their inability to afford a predetermined bail bond required for release, which the plaintiffs allege deprives indigent defendants of their right to due process, equal protection and pre-trial liberty. The ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Civil Rights Corps joined in the suit seeking to end the allegedly unlawful detention scheme. The plaintiffs brought suit against the State of Alabama, a number of court administrative offices and personnel, the sheriff, and a number of magistrate and district judges. On February 21, 2017, four named plaintiffs filed a proposed class-action lawsuit representing indigent and incarcerated individuals at the Cullman County Detention Center in the Northern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged that they are being detained solely because of their indigence and, if they were not impoverished and were able to post cash bail, they would not be incarcerated awaiting their trial. In sum, the plaintiffs argued that cash bail is unconstitutionally excessive when imposed on indigent defendants. On April 18, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding additional defendants in their individual capacity as well as their official capacity. The complaint also named all predecessors and successors for these individuals. The complaint took issue with Alabama’s bail schedule and bail statute, set forth in 15-13-111 of the Alabama Code and Rule 7 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, which the plaintiffs alleged are routinely applied to indigent defendants in an unconstitutional manner. Appellate courts in Alabama have held that cash bail is a permissible form of bail for pretrial detention and that the Constitution of Alabama does not prohibit cash bail post-conviction. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the State of Alabama imposed excessive bail in the form of cash bail, which kept indigent defendants incarcerated in pre-trial detention awaiting a hearing, as well as post-conviction proceedings enforcing payments of court costs and fines. The plaintiffs alleged that Alabama routinely sets cash bail for defendants charged with non-capital crimes, who failed to appear for court appearances, or who were arrested on failure to pay court costs and fines after conviction. The complaint further alleged that this bail process violated the defendants’ constitutional protection against excessive bail and constitutional right to Due Process of Law. The complaint proceeded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The complaint sought certification as a class action for any criminal defendants affected by pretrial detention due to failure to post cash only bail. The complaint requested declaratory relief and injunctive relief to permanently enjoin the State of Alabama from imposing cash only bail and declare that the courts in Alabama are in violation of the Constitution of the United States when imposing cash-only bail for indigent defendants and when imposing bail in minor misdemeanor prosecutions. The case proceeded before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala. On June 5, 2017, the plaintiffs filed for a temporary restraining order, though the court denied the request on June 8, 2017. The case proceeded through discovery. On June 15, 2017, six additional individual plaintiffs filed an amended intervenor complaint. This complaint also added a number of defendants, including three judges, two magistrates, the Circuit Clerk of Cullman County, four Sheriffs of the Cullman County Sherriff’s Office, three county commissioners, the Alabama Administrative Office of the Court, and the Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of the Court. This amended intervenor complaint alleged that the defendants set and enforced bail at $1,000,000 in all first-degree drug trafficking/manufacturing cases without any regard to the financial ability of the accused, allegedly in order to assure that the accused remain in jail. This practice was in line with the policy of the Alabama Administrative Offices of the Court, which directed all state magistrates to set bail within the “Bail Schedule” without regard to the financial status and ability of the accused or whether the bail, as set, ensured the appearance of the accused for hearing or trial. Further, it was alleged that the Alabama Administrative Offices of the Court failed to properly train, oversee, and supervise the courts and court officials with respect to bail policies. Ultimately, on July 17, 2017, the Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and dismissed four of the named plaintiffs and four of the named defendants. On March 9, 2018, plaintiff Bradley Hester filed an intervenor complaint. The plaintiff, Hester, was represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Alabama, the American Civil Liberties Union, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Civil Rights Corps. The intervenor complaint alleged that the money bail practices in Cullman County and Alabama generally detained people based on their wealth rather than on their suitability for release. In addition to claims based on an allegedly unconstitutional bail schedule, the complaint also alleged that the court magistrates and judges did not review the predetermined financial conditions of release for weeks or months, leaving individuals who could not afford the predetermined bail amount detained for weeks or months without any opportunity for an individualized release hearing. This detention occurred for many defendants before they had been convicted of a crime. The plaintiffs argued that non-financial conditions of release alone or in combination with unsecured money bail would be as effective or more effective than secured money bail. This intervenor complaint sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief, specifically, an injunction against the Sheriff from prospectively jailing arrestees unable to pay secured monetary bail without an individualized hearing with adequate procedural safeguards. On March 27, 2018, the court terminated 11 plaintiffs. Six named plaintiffs and intervenor plaintiffs, all defendants in the Cullman County Court System, remained in the suit against the State of Alabama and a number of individuals, including the Cullman County Sherriff, one Magistrate judge, two District Court Judges, the Circuit Clerk of Cullman County, the Cullman County Commission and three individual commissioners, the Alabama Administrative Office of the Court, two Magistrates, and the Director of the Alabama Administrative Office of the Court. On September 4, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining the Cullman County Sheriff from detaining indigent defendants who cannot afford to post a property bond or a surety bond as a condition of pretrial release. The following day, the court denied the Sherriff’s motion to dismiss, originally filed on March 28, 2018. The following week, on September 13, 2018, the defendants filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, appealing the judgment on the preliminary injunction and the order dismissing the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss. The court did not stay the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal. As of November 2020, the appeal on the preliminary injunction remains ongoing. Oral argument is scheduled for December 16, 2020. The district court case also remains ongoing.

Summary: This is a federal class action lawsuit seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, challenging Alabama’s bail system. The plaintiffs argued that indigent defendants are routinely jailed pretrial due to their inability to afford a predetermined bail bond required for release, which the plaintiffs allege deprives indigent defendants of their right to due process, equal protection, pretrial liberty and the protection against excessive bail. On February 21, 2017 and in multiple amended and intervenor complaints thereafter, plaintiffs brought suit against the State of Alabama, a number of court administrative offices and personnel, the sheriff, and a number of magistrate and district judges. The ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Civil Rights Corps joined in the suit seeking to end the allegedly unlawful detention scheme. The case proceeded before Judge Madeline Hughes Haikala through discovery. On September 4, 2018, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining the Cullman County Sheriff from detaining indigent defendants who cannot afford to post a property bond or a surety bond as a condition of pretrial release. The following day, the court denied the Sherriff’s motion to dismiss, originally filed on March 28, 2018. The following week, on September 13, 2018, the defendants filed a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, appealing the judgment on the preliminary injunction and the order dismissing the Sheriff’s motion to dismiss. The court did not stay the preliminary injunction pending resolution of the appeal. As of November 2020, the appeal on the preliminary injunction remains ongoing. Oral argument is scheduled for December 16, 2020. The district court case also remains ongoing.


This is a case about employment discrimination on the basis of sex and pregnancy. On August 12, 2020, a female employee filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff sued Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against her by refusing to give her proper break time to pump breastmilk while on shift and initially sought class certification. On December 29, 2016, the plaintiff requested a break to pump breastmilk. She claimed that her managers refused to allow her to pump as the restaurant was busy. The plaintiff’s breasts began to visibly leak through her shirt, and she was required to continue serving customers. Upon seeing that she was leaking, the plaintiff’s managers informed her that she would be permitted to take a break in fifteen minutes. During this time, the plaintiff claimed she was still required to interact with customers with a soaked-through shirt. The plaintiff claimed that approximately forty minutes after being allowed to pump, she was called into the office by her managers and berated. The plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender and pregnancy in violation of Title VII. The EEOC issued a determination that there was reasonable cause to believe that the defendant violated Title VII and permitted the plaintiff to file this lawsuit. Upon filing on August 14th, 2020, the case was assigned to Judge Eileen S. Willett. On August 14, 2020, the case was reassigned from the Magistrate to the District Court to Judge Steven P. Logan, per local rules. On August 14th, 2020, Judge Logan issued a preliminary order stating that any motion to dismiss the case is discouraged if the pleading can be cured by filing an amended pleading. On September 1, 2020, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint was largely identical to the original, except that the plaintiff was now suing individually with no collective action allegations. Accordingly, the scope of relief was amended to eliminate relief to other individuals similarly situated. There was no additional information from the pleadings as to why the class allegations were dropped. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit against her employer, Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant discriminated against her due to her sex by refusing to allow her to take a break during her shift to pump breastmilk. The case is ongoing.


This lawsuit was filed on November 12, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiff, a left-wing advocacy group called Priorities USA, sued Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel in her official capacity. They were represented by private counsel. The group claimed that two Michigan laws, the "Voter Transportation Ban" and the "Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban," violated the U.S. Constitution. The Voter Transportation Ban prohibited the hiring of vehicles to bring voters to an election, unless that voter is physically unable to walk. The Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban created strict limits on the handling of absentee ballots by third parties. The lawsuit argues that these provisions were in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States. The provisions violated the First Amendment, the complaint argued, in that they created an undue burden to vote and they violated the organization's rights to free speech and association. The Fourteenth Amendment charge asserted that the provisions violated the Equal Protection Clause because they only exempted one type of disability -- people unable to walk -- while leaving out many other people who cannot transport themselves to the polls, including people with visual and other physical impairments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to District Judge Mark A. Goldsmith and Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen. A month later, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds. First, they argued that the plaintiff lacked standing, as they had not been injured and could not sue as a representative. The motion also argued that the plaintiff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted with regards to both the Voter Transportation Ban and to the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban. The defendants argued that the laws only minimally burdened rights to vote and rights to free speech, and were supported by important interests. Judge Goldsmith issued an order on December 23 suggesting that the plaintiffs amend their complaint. In response, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 27, 2020. The new amended complaint added two new plaintiffs. The first, Rise, Inc. was a student-run voter mobilization group operating in Michigan and California. The second, Detroit/Downriver Chapter of the A. Philip Randolph Institute (DAPRI) was a self-described "senior constituency group" of the AFL-CIO. The amended complaint also made changes to the underlying complaints. The first count now alleged that the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by being unconstitutionally vague. The amended complaint retained the arguments that the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban was in violation of free speech and free association rights, and also that it created an undue burden regarding the right to vote. They also inserted a new argument, claiming that the state laws conflicted with Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act (which holds that voters can choose from whom they receive assistance in voting if they are blind, disabled, or unable to read/write). The plaintiffs put forth many of the same claims with regards to the Voter Transportation Ban in the amended complaint, claiming that it was unconstitutionally vague, violated free speech and association rights, created an undue burden to the right to vote, and was superseded by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1973. Regulations pursuant to that act allow corporations and labor organizations to transport voters to and from the polls. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees and costs. At the same time, the plaintiffs began a separate lawsuit with a complaint identical to the amended complaint under this docket. They claimed to have done this "out of an abundance of caution" to make sure that the new arguments regarding standing were properly considered. They immediately moved to consolidate the new case with this one, and the new case was dismissed on February 14, 2020. On January 28, 2020, a day after the amended complaint was filed, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary and permanent injunction. Here, the plaintiffs argued that their claims were meritorious, that they would suffer irreparable harm if injunctive relief was not granted, that a preliminary injunction would not cause substantial harm to others, and that the injunction was in the public interest. On the last day of January, the case was reassigned to District Judge Stephanie Dawkins Davis. On February 10, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing the alterations made to the plaintiffs' complaint still did not grant them standing, because they had not shown that they were actually planning on participating in any of the prohibited behavior. They also argued that the federal statute regarding the Voting Rights Act and the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban did not conflict, because the latter only prohibits third parties from actively requesting to take a voter's absentee ballot, whereas the Voting Rights Act ensures the voter's ability to ask for assistance in voting. Similarly, they argued that the Voter Transportation Ban did not conflict with the federal regulations, because the Voter Transportation Ban only forbade hiring someone for the purpose of taking the voter to the poll, but did not prohibit the plaintiffs from taking voters to the polls out of their own will. A little over a week later, the defendants then filed a brief in opposition to the motion for a preliminary and permanent injunction. The brief more or less rehashed the same arguments they made in the motion to dismiss, adding that the plaintiffs would not face irreparable injury (but that the state would) and that an injunction would not be in the public interest. Over the next few months, several other organizations submitted motions to intervene, including the Michigan Republican Party, the Republican National Committee, the Michigan House of Representatives, and the Michigan Senate. So on May 8, 2020, the court held a hearing regarding those parties' motions to intervene as well as the motion to dismiss. Two weeks later, the court issued an granting the parties' motions to intervene and granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. The court dismissed Counts III and VII of the amended complaints, those being the allegations that the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban and the Voter Transportation Ban constituted an undue burden to the right to vote. 2020 WL 2615766. On June 1, the intervenors (the Michigan Republican Party and the Republican National Committee collectively and the Michigan House of Representatives and the Michigan Senate collectively) submitted similar responses to the amended complaint, which denied all of the allegations apart from the already dismissed counts, and asked that the court dismiss the case. They also submitted lists of affirmative defenses. Two days later the defendant submitted a response to the amended complaint, which was more or less the same as what the intervenors had submitted. Over the next few weeks, the intervenors responded to the motion for preliminary and permanent injunctions. The plaintiffs then filed a reply to the responses, and Judge Davis then scheduled a hearing for July 14 to listen to arguments regarding the proposed preliminary and permanent injunctions. The case is ongoing as of July 28, 2020.

Summary: This case, started on November 12, 2019, involved a progressive organization that sued Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel over two Michigan laws that limited the organization's get-out-the-vote (GOTV) efforts. One of these laws, the Absentee Ballot Organizing Ban, prohibited organizations from requesting to handle voters' absentee ballots. The other, the Voter Transportation Ban, forbade the hiring of motor vehicles to carry voters to polling centers. The plaintiffs claimed that these laws violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The case is ongoing as of July 28, 2020.


On May 26, 2009, prisoners at the Colorado State Penitentiary (CSP) filed this pro se lawsuit against the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The main pro se plaintiff had been sentenced to death on May 17, 1996 and automatically incarcerated at CSP, the highest security level prison in the CDOC. He, along with others at the prison, were subject to a CSP policy prohibiting prisoners from any outdoors exercise. The plaintiffs asserted that this policy, specifically that the lack of sunlight, constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it created a substantial risk of harm to his mental and physical health. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiff moved for class action certification on May 26, 2009 because he believed his claims were common to all 750 prisoners at the CSP. The court (Judge Zita Weinshienk) denied this motion on July 9, 2009, holding that, because the plaintiff was a pro se litigant, he could not represent other pro se litigants under federal law. She also denied his motion for a preliminary injunction allowing prisoners to exercise outside because plaintiff did not demonstrate that he would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was denied. In addition, Judge Weinshienk dismissed some of the pro se plaintiffs and instructed the remaining plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. On September 25, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. The defendant responded by filing a motion to dismiss in December of 2009. In January of 2010, the magistrate judge recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted. On March 10, 2010, the last remaining plaintiff filed a third amended complaint to narrow his claim and the relief sought, and to amend the case caption to name only the executive director of the CDOC. The parties scheduled discovery, and on November 24, 2010, the defendant and plaintiff both moved for summary judgment. On Feb 9, 2011 the case was reassigned to Judge William J. Martinez upon his recent appointment on the court. The parties continued to prepare for trial. On May 20, 2011, attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union began representing the plaintiff, and on May 25, 2011, there was a settlement on all claims and the case was administratively closed, presumably because the settlement agreement reserves the right for the plaintiff to come to court to enforce the agreement.

Summary: On May 26, 2009, a prisoner who was sentenced to death and incarcerated in the maximum security Colorado State Penitentiary filed suit against the executive director of the Colorado Department of Corrections. He claimed the policy prohibiting prisoners from outdoors exercise was a violation of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment because the long-term sun deprivation posed serious health risks. The ACLU settled the case on May 25, 2011.


On June 28, 2006, individuals residing in New York State who properly filed their immigration naturalization papers filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), alleging that the federal government had a custom and practice of failing to grant or deny the plaintiffs' applications for naturalization within 120 days of their initial examinations, and of unlawfully withholding and unreasonably delaying the adjudication of applications for naturalization. The plaintiffs alleged that in addition to not processing naturalization applications within 120 days, the government also failed to complete criminal background checks within a reasonable time, therefore denying them substantial and unique benefits of citizenship such as the right to vote, the right to obtain passports, and the right to file visa petitions for family members. The complaint asserted violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C 1447(b), and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 706(1). The plaintiffs, who were represented by attorneys for the New York Legal Assistance Group, requested a preliminary injunction and class certification. The government moved to dismiss the case and to sever the claims of the individual plaintiffs into separate cases. The District Court (Judge Edward R. Korman) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss on November 2, 2006, except as to one plaintiff whose naturalization was to be granted by CIS. The Court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the defendants' motion to sever as premature because discovery was not complete. On July 3, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendants agreed to adjudicate at least 90% of the naturalization applications that had been pending in the Eastern District of New York for at least 120 days on or before August 25, 2008. They further agreed to provide reports to the plaintiffs regarding the details of their actions before September 2, 2008. This case is now closed.

Summary: On June 28, 2006, naturalization applicants filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), alleging that the agency was unlawfully not processing applications within 120 days. After two years of litigation, they won injunctive relief in the form of a settlement agreement, and CIS agreed to complete 90% of the applications that had been pending for over 120 days before August 25, 2008.


This case was brought by the Prison Legal News (PLN) on behalf of prisoners and pre-trial detainees held in custody at Ventura County jails. PLN provides a monthly journal, informational brochures, and paperback books that all discuss issues involving the criminal justice system. PLN alleged that the Ventura County jails' mail policies and practices unconstitutionally restrict PLN's correspondence with inmates. More specifically, PLN argued that the Ventura County jails' mail policies lacked clarity, failed to provide adequate notice to PLN, and did not give PLN the opportunity to challenge their policy as censorship. This case arose after PLN made numerous attempts to contact inmates at Ventura County jails. PLN mailed materials to inmates held at Ventura County jails starting in February 2012, only for the materials to be returned to sender due to "suggestive" or "unacceptable ads inside." After further research, PLN discovered that Ventura County revised their written mail policies to specifically exclude PLN's materials from being delivered to inmates. The jail also had a postcard-only policy, under which postcards were the only acceptable form of incoming mail. In February 2013, PLN filed a state tort claim against the defendant, but the defendant continued to exclude PLN's materials from being delivered to inmates irregardless of PLN's legal actions. On January 31, 2014, PLN filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. §1983 arguing that the defendant's actions violated the inmates' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Represented by Rosen, Bien, Galvan & Grunfeld, plaintiff asked for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. On June 16, 2014, Judge George H. King granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction and ordered defendants to suspend enforcement of their postcard-only policy. The court further ordered defendants to stop refusing to deliver correspondence to inmates on the basis of its subscription content, print medium, or sexually "suggestive" material. The defendants appealed this preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit on June 27, 2014. While the matter was on appeal, the parties entered into settlement negotiations. After several weeks, the parties stipulated to dismiss certain defendants from the case, and on August 22, 2014, Judge King dismissed with prejudice all defendants except for the County of Ventura and the Sheriff of the Ventura County in the sheriff's official capacity. On August 27, 2014, the plaintiff filed a stipulation for a permanent injunction, and the defendants moved to voluntarily dismiss their appeal pending in the Ninth Circuit. In response, on September 4, 2014, Judge King granted this permanent injunction whereby defendants were ordered to permanently abide by the terms of the earlier preliminary injunction. Additionally, defendants were ordered to not prohibit inmates from ordering books, magazines, and other publications. Finally, defendants were required to implement training procedures for mailroom staff and conduct annual legal updates. Additionally, as part of the settlement agreement, the county agreed to pay Prison Legal News $350,000 for damages, costs and fees. Instead of continued monitoring by the court, Judge King ordered that the plaintiff was to notify the defendants of any violation of the injunction whereby a magistrate judge would determine any contested matters in binding arbitration. However, the court maintained jurisdiction over the settlement agreement until defendants file a motion to terminate, sometime after July 31, 2017. As of November 26, 2017, no further actions have been taken by either party, and so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: This case was brought in January, 2014 by the Prison Legal News (PLN) on behalf of prisoners and pre-trial detainees held in custody at Ventura County jails. PLN alleged that the defendant's mail policies and practices unconstitutionally restrict PLN's correspondence with inmates. In September 2014, the court ordered a permanent injunction, ordering defendants to cease their contested restrictions on correspondence.


This case was filed by a group of writers and activists on January 13, 2012, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. They asked the Court to hold one unconstitutional one provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (the NDAA). The NDAA had been enacted two weeks before; plaintiffs charged that § 1021 of the NDAA violates their free speech and associational rights, under the Constitution's First Amendment, and also violates due process. Section 1021 of the NDAA--entitled "Affirmation of Authority of the Armed Forces of the United States to Detain Covered Persons Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force"--provides for detention without trial, under the law of war, for "A person who was part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces." It states, however, that "Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect existing law or authorities relating to the detention of United States citizens." On February 27, 2012, they filed a motion for a for a temporary restraining order. The court held an evidentiary hearing on March 30, 2012. On May 16, 2012, Judge Forrest preliminarily enjoined operation of the challenged section. Several of the plaintiffs testified that they feared that their reporting or related work that involved contact with terrorists would render them subject to military detention, even though they did not support violence. As the district court's opinion explained: "At the hearing on this motion, the Government was unwilling or unable to state that these plaintiffs would not be subject to indefinite detention under § 1021. Plaintiffs are therefore at risk of detention, of losing their liberty, potentially for many years," for conduct protected by the First Amendment. Judge Katherine Forrest therefore found that plaintiffs were entitled to a preliminary injunction: they had shown that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim, that they faced irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities tilted in their favor. Hedges v. Obama, 12 CIV. 331 KBF, 2012 WL 1721124 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2012). On June 6, 2012, Judge Forrest issued an order to clarify whom the injunction covers, mainly that the injunction applies generally and not just to the parties to the action. Hedges v. Obama, 12 CIV. 331 KBF, 2012 WL 2044565 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2012). On August 7, 2012, Judge Forrest held a hearing on whether the preliminary injunction should be converted to a permanent injunction. That same day, the government appealed the preliminary injunction. On September 12, 2012, Judge Forrest issued a permanent injunction. Hedges v. Obama, 890 F.Supp.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y 2012). On September 14, 2012, Judge Forrest denied the government's motion to stay pending appeal. On September 17, 2012, in an opinion by Judge Raymond J. Lohier, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ordered a stay of the District Court's permanent injunction pending a decision on the defendants' motion to stay. Hedges v. Obama, 12-3176 L, 2012 WL 4075626 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2012). On October 3, 2012, the Second Circuit granted the government's motion to stay. On February 19, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the plaintiffs' application to vacate the stay. Hedges v. Obama, 133 S. Ct. 1307 (2013). On July 17, 2013, the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's decision and remanded. In an opinion by Judge Lewis A. Kaplan, the Second Circuit held that Section 1021 of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act had no bearing on the government's authority to detain the American citizen plaintiffs and that those plaintiffs therefore lack Article III standing. Moreover, the non-citizen plaintiffs failed to establish a sufficient basis to fear detention under the statute to give them standing to seek preenforcement review. Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013). On February 11, 2014, Judge Forrest dismissed the case as there were no remaining issues in this matter following the determination of the Second Circuit. On April 28, 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States denied the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari. Hedges v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1936 (2014).

Summary: In 2012, a group of writers and activists filed a federal lawsuit in the Southern District of New York asking the Court to hold unconstitutional one provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (the NDAA) -- § 1021. The plaintiffs charged that § 1021 violated their free speech and associational rights, under the First Amendment and also violated due process. The District Court granted a permanent injunction, but the Second Circuit vacated the District Court's decision.


On July 31, 2018, the plaintiffs, persons required to wear and pay for GPS ankle monitors, filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the company that created and distributed the ankle monitors, the parent company, several individual employees of the company, Alameda County, and the Chief Judge and Chief Probation Officer of Alameda County. Represented by Equal Justice Under the Law, the plaintiffs brought their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), the Fourteenth Amendment, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was assigned to Judge William Alsup. The plaintiffs claimed that they, and others similarly situated, could not afford to pay the high fees required by the company that made and maintained the ankle monitors. The plaintiffs argued that because they were threatened with imprisonment if they did not make these payments, the high fees constituted a pattern of racketeering activity that caused the plaintiffs damage, including financial harm, disruption of family ties, deterioration of health, and mental stress. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant company violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by erecting unnecessary barriers and using deceptive and illegal practices to ensure supervisees lacked (a) access to fee adjustments to which they are lawfully entitled, (b) ability-to-pay-inquiries, (c) adequate notice of fee calculation, and (d) neutral judicial review of fee demands. The plaintiffs also claimed that the company defendants violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by violating their right not to be imprisoned or punished simply because of their wealth status. The plaintiffs argued that the county defendants violated the plaintiffs' rights under the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing the company defendants to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that the company defendants engage in abuse of process by using the Alameda County court system to extort fees from people sentenced to Leaders in Community Alternative's (LCA) ankle monitoring program who do not have the financial resources to meet LCA's demands for payment. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that subjecting the plaintiffs to the defendants' alleged conduct was unlawful; an order and judgment preliminarily and permanently enjoining the defendants from continuing the above-described policies and practices against the plaintiffs and the class of similarly situated people; a judgment compensating the plaintiffs and the class of similarly situated individuals for the damages that they suffered as a result of the defendants' unconstitutional and unlawful conduct; a judgment granting the treble and punitive damages authorized by statute based on the Defendants' willful and egregious violations of the law; and an order and judgment granting reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On October 5, 2018, the plaintiffs voluntarily moved for dismissal of the Chief Judge of Alameda County, and Judge Alsup dismissed the charges on the same day. On October 11, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs responded on November 1, 2018 and the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Donna M. Ryu for Mediation and Settlement. Judge William Alsup granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss on December 14, 2018. 2018 WL 6591449. Judge Alsup first addressed issues of standing and abstention before moving to the plaintiffs’ Constitutional and RICO claims. Judge Alsup found that he could not grant injunctive relief because none of the plaintiffs are currently participating in the defendant ankle-monitoring company’s electronic-monitoring program. Additionally, Judge Alsup found that the plaintiffs cannot seek injunctive relief on behalf of the putative class even if they themselves lack standing. Judge Alsup then denied the defendants motion to dismiss on abstention grounds, citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Almodovar v. Reiner, “Probation is not a pending criminal action for Younger purposes.” Judge Alsup then moved to the Constitutional claims made by the plaintiffs. First, he determined that rational-basis review applied to the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim against Alameda County. He dismissed the Equal Protection claim because the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Alameda County violated the Equal Protection Clause. Next, he dismissed the plaintiffs’ Due Process claim against Alameda County, finding that the complaint failed to allege facts plausibly suggesting that Alameda County had notice of any alleged misconduct by LCA. Judge Alsup then found that the complaint failed to show a causal connection between Probation Chief Still’s conduct and any constitutional violation and therefore granted the Alameda defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claims against Probation Chief Still. Turning to Constitutional claims made against LCA, Judge Alsup found that plaintiffs failed to state a cognizable claim for a violation of their due process or equal protection rights and therefore granted the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims against LCA. Judge Alsup then evaluated the RICO claim. The plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing a specific intent to defraud and therefore failed to allege that the defendants engaged in wire fraud. The plaintiffs' claim under the Travel Act failed because plaintiffs failed to allege that LCA used “any facility in interstate commerce” to extort funds from. However, the plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state violations of the Hobbs Act and the Penal Code. The plaintiffs’ RICO allegations survived LCA’s motion to dismiss but the motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ RICO claim as to the remaining LCA defendants was granted. Finally, Judge Alsup reached the Abuse of Process claim. The plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that these reports were filed to scare program participants into paying LCA’s fees, and so they did not allege a claim for abuse of process. The motion to dismiss this claim was granted. In conclusion, the Alameda County’s motion to dismiss was granted and LCA’s motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. The only claim remaining against LCA is the plaintiffs’ RICO claim. On June 6, 2019, the court denied class certification to the plaintiffs. 2019 WL 2394428. The plaintiffs had sought certification on behalf of “[a]ll individuals who have been or will be put on LCA’s Electronic Monitoring program by the Alameda County Court system from July 31, 2014, until this litigation is complete, who were threatened with jail by LCA or any of its employees, agents, or representatives.” The court found that the type and degree of LCA employees’ threats of jail to the plaintiffs varied dramatically. The court also found no evidence of a uniform LCA policy to threaten putative class members and that putative class members varied dramatically in income level, abating the common fact of plaintiffs’ poverty. For these reasons, the court held that there were not sufficient common questions of law and fact to hold together a class. On December 19,2019, the court granted summary judgment to the defendants. 2019 WL 6911634. In order for the plaintiffs to make out a claim under the RICO act, they needed to show predicate offenses of extortion. In order for LCA employees’ threats of jailing plaintiffs to be extortionate, the court found, the statements must have threatened direct action to send plaintiffs to jail rather than reporting failure to pay for ankle monitors to the court, the latter of which was within defendant’s legal rights. The court found no evidence of the former and granted summary judgment to defendants. On January 15, 2020, plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Attempts at mediating the case failed. The status of this appeal is pending.

Summary: The plaintiffs were individuals required to wear and pay for GPS ankle monitors by Alameda County. They sought class certification and relief. All claims except RICO claims were dismissed in December 2018. In June 2019, class certification was denied and summary judgment was granted to the defendants in December 2019. The plaintiffs appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit; the appeal is pending.


On January 12, 2015, the New York Times (“the Times”) submitted a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request to the National Security Agency (“NSA”) pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552. The Times sought copies of all NSA Inspector General Reports related to three topics: the NSA’s content collection activities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) amendments section 702 (and the predecessor law, the Protect America Act); bulk phone records collected under Section 215 of the Patriot Act; and bulk Internet metadata collected under the FISA pen register/trap and trace provision (the ‘FISA PR/TT’ program). The NSA informed the Times that it would deny the request for expedited processing, but it did not address any other aspect of the request. The NSA did not communicate any further within the 20 days as required by FOIA. Therefore, on March 31, 2015, the Times filed a complaint requesting the documents sought in the original FOIA request. On May 15, 2015, Judge Katherine B. Forrest signed a jointly agreed to schedule, under which the NSA would process and release all nonexempt responsive documents in three batches, on August 11, 2015, November 10, 2015, and February 10, 2016. The parties agreed at the time that if they disputed the extent of the released documents, then they would resolve the dispute through summary judgment motions rather than proceeding to trial. The NSA engaged in an extensive declassification process and released hundreds of pages of material, many of which contained redactions. Following the three releases, the New York Times challenged certain redactions, some of which the NSA agreed were appropriate for publication in a supplemental release. The remaining conflict between the Times and the NSA concerned three redactions in two NSA Inspector General Reports. The Times challenged a redaction in the “Report on the Special Study of NSA’s Purge of Pen Register and Trap and Trace Bulk Metadata.” The report was said to summarize the Office of the NSA Inspector General’s “special study of the Agency’s processes to destroy Pen Register and Trap and Trace (PR/TT) bulk metadata from its declared systems, databases, and backups before the authority expired on 9 December 2011.” The Times also challenged two redactions in the “Report on the Special Study: Assessment of Management Controls Over FAA §702.” The report stated that it summarized the Office of the NSA Inspector General’s “special study of management controls that ensure compliance with Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA §702) and the Targeting and Minimization Procedures associated with the 2011 Certifications.” On March 22, 2016, the NSA moved for summary judgment and submitted a declaration in support of the motion from David J. Sherman, the Agency’s Associated Director for Policy and Records and the official responsible for processing FOIA requests for NSA records. After the Times submitted its own motion for summary judgment on April 21, 2016, the court found the NSA’s and Sherman’s reasonings for the redactions persuasive. The Times argued that the NSA had not sufficiently justified the redactions under FOIA; however, the court stated that the reasonings set forth by the Defendants were “both logical and plausible.” On August 25, 2016, Judge Katherine B. Forrest signed an order granting summary judgment in favor of the NSA and denying summary judgment in favor of the Times. 205 F.Supp.3d 374. The case is now closed.

Summary: On March 31, 2015, the Times submitted a complaint requesting that the court order the NSA to release documents. The NSA agreed to provide redacted documents, which in turn caused the Times to request the court to require the NSA to eliminate the redactions. The court deemed the redactions appropriate and granted summary judgment in favor of the NSA on August 25, 2016.


COVID-19 Summary: In this case, on March 26, 2020, Judge Analisa Torres ordered ICE to release ten particularly vulnerable noncitizen detainees from ICE detention in New York, in light of the grave threat posed by congregate detention during the COVID-19 pandemic. The respondents filed an interlocutory appeal on June 19, which is still pending before the Second Circuit.
 On March 24, 2020, ten individuals detained by ICE in county jails in New York filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The petitioners, who each have underlying health conditions and illnesses, sued the Director of the New York Field Office of ICE and the Acting Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The petitioners, represented by the Brooklyn Defender Service, sought a TRO releasing them from detention and restraining respondents from arresting petitioners for civil immigration detention purposes during the pendency of their immigration proceedings. The petitioners claimed that their incarceration in ICE detention without adequate protection for their health during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the conditions of the detention facilities pose serious and potentially fatal risks to their health. The jails in which petitioners are incarcerated each report confirmed cases of COVID-19. Previous to the suit, Brooklyn Defender Services emailed the U.S. Attorney’s Office and requested that ICE release particularly vulnerable individuals from detention, but ICE ignored their requests for release. The Office responded that they could not provide a timeframe for a response. On March 25, the attorney emailed the U.S. Attorney again and informed him of petitioners’ intent to seek a TRO. On March 26, petitioners filed an amended petition and the court held a hearing. Later that day, Judge Analisa Torres granted the TRO, finding that ICE continued to be deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of people in immigration detention. Judge Torres explained that "Confining vulnerable individuals such as Petitioners without enforcement of appropriate social distancing and without specific measures to protect their delicate health ‘poses an unreasonable risk of serious damage to their future health,’ and demonstrates deliberate indifference." The court ordered the respondents and the Hudson, Bergen, and Essex County Correctional Facilities to immediately release petitioners on their own recognizance and restrained respondents from arresting them for civil immigration detention purposes while they await immigration proceedings. The TRO expired on April 9, 2020, but on April 1, Judge Torres had ordered the parties to show cause why the TRO should not be converted into a preliminary injunction. On April 8, the court ordered that the TRO would remain in effect until April 23. On April 23, the court granted the petitioners' request for a preliminary injunction. The injunction included: (1) petitioners would remain released, subject to conditions to be set by the court, and (2) respondents would be restrained from arresting petitioners for civil immigration detention purposes unless they first obtained the court's permission. Further, Judge Torres ordered that the parties meet and confer, and propose reasonable conditions of release for each petitioner by April 24. The injunction will remain in effect until the court orders otherwise. Then, on April 27, the court issued orders pertaining to release conditions for the petitioners. The respondents filed an interlocutory appeal on June 19, which is still pending before the Second Circuit.

Summary: On March 24, individuals detained by ICE in county jails in New York filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) in the Southern District of New York. On March 26, the court granted the TRO, ordering the respondents to immediately release petitioners on their own recognizance and restrained respondents from arresting them for civil immigration detention purposes while they await immigration proceedings. On April 23, the court granted a preliminary injunction.


On October 22, 2007, the Prison Legal News (PLN) filed suit against Fulton County and its sheriffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It challenged the Fulton County Jail mail policy that barred prisoners' receipt of any and all books, magazines, and newspapers (other than religious publications). PLN claimed that the jail's policy violated the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, as well as Georgia state law. PLN further claimed that the mail policy had previously been declared unconstitutional in the case <i>Daker v. Barrett</i>, No. 1:00-CV-1065-RWS (N.D. Ga. July 22, 2002). PLN sought declaratory and injunctive relief, barring enforcement of the mail policy. The case was assigned to Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr. Fulton County denied that the mail policy was unconstitutional. On December 18, 2007, PLN moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the continued enforcement of the mail policy. Two days later, Fulton County Sheriff instituted a modified mail policy and claimed that the case was moot in light of the new policy. After hearings on the motion, the court entered a preliminary injunction on February 4, 2008, enjoining enforcement of the old mail policy and requiring that the new mail policy remain in effect. Fulton County was also ordered to notify PLN of any changes made to the new mail policy. Under the new mail policy, the Jail permitted PLN subscriptions to be delivered to imprisoned subscribers. On March 25, 2008, PLN filed an amended complaint to reflect the changes brought about by the preliminary injunction. The amended complaint refers to the mail policy originally at issue in the case as the former policy and requests declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring the defendants to comply with the new, current policy as amended by the parties in settlement negotiations. On September 2, 2008, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment with regard to the individual liability for nominal damages against the defendant sheriff, an agent of the county. On July 13, 2009, the court denied in part and granted in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment: it granted the motion as to the injunctive and declaratory relief but denied the motion as it relates to damages against the sheriff in his individual capacity. The court denied PLN’s cross-motion for partial summary judgement. After what can only be assumed to be settlement negotiations, on November 9, 2009, the court ordered a consent judgment, entering judgment on behalf of the plaintiff and against the defendant in an amont of $30,000. Later that month, PLN filed a motion for costs and fees that the court granted, awarding to the plaintiff $119,759.21. The case is closed. On April 26, 2016, pursuant to the 2008 order, the defendant provided notice to the court to a proposed change to the mail policy whereby the prison would only allow post-card mailing in order to curtail the flow on contraband through the mailing system. On June 24, 2016, PLN filed a notice of objection to Fulton County’s unilateral change to the court ordered mail policy. The docket ends in January 2017. We do not know how this issue resolved.

Summary: This 2007 lawsuit was brought by Prison Legal News (PLN) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff alleged that, in barring prisoners' receipt of any and all books, magazines, and newspapers, the defendant had violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After settlement negotiations, Judge Parnell ordered a consent judgment in November 2009. In 2016, PLN objected to the defendant's change in mail policy.