On November 13, 2013, twenty-six protesters associated with Occupy Philadelphia, a large continuous political protest, filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia and nine city police commissioners and officers. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed, inter alia, that the City of Philadelphia had used excessive force, including assault and battery, to forcefully restrain protesters from exercising their freedom of expression on public property. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and sought compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that in the early morning of November 30, 2011, police officers removed them from a public space where protesters had been gathering for the previous seven weeks as part of an ongoing protest. The process of removal involved destruction of encampments and all personal property contained therein. Additionally, the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Philadelphia police made orders to arrest protesters, which the plaintiffs claim was based solely upon the anticipated protests resulting of their decision to evict the protesters. In the process of arrest, the plaintiffs were surrounded by defendant police officers on bicycles, corralled against the wall of a building, and unable to move. The plaintiffs were then handcuffed and taken into custody. On March 6, 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The District Court (Judge Berie M. Schiller) ordered oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, which were held on April 15, 2014. On May 20, 2014, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims of excessive search and unreasonable search, finding that the plaintiffs' complaint had not offered sufficient facts on either claim. 2014 WL 2115479. The order granted the plaintiffs leave to amend the complaint. On July 23, 2014, Judge Schiller consolidated another case, Reyes v. Ramsey, with this action, and directed that the claims of the plaintiff in Reyes be added to the plaintiffs' amended complaint. The plaintiffs filed their amended complaint on August 14, 2014. The parties engaged in discovery throughout the rest of 2014 and 2015. A discovery dispute arose concerning the deposition of the Police Commissioner. On November 15, 2014, the court granted the defendants' motion for a protective order for the Commissioner, finding that as a high-ranking official, he should not have to sit for deposition unless his testimony would be necessary and unavailable from a lesser ranking officer. The court stated that if information obtained in the depositions of lesser ranking officers were to suggest that the Commissioner's deposition was necessary, the plaintiffs could move for reconsideration of the protective order. The plaintiffs filed such a motion for reconsideration on November 30, 2015, and the court vacated the protective order, finding that subordinate officers' testimony provided ample evidence that the Commissioner was directly involved in the subject matter of the litigation and therefore permitting the plaintiffs to take his deposition. On July 25, 2016, the case was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to the agreement of the parties. The settlement does not appear to be publicly available.

Summary: On November 13, 2013, twenty-six protestors associated with Occupy Philadelphia filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas against the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the City of Philadelphia and nine city police commissions and officers in their capacities under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First Amendment and Due Process rights. The parties reached a private settlement agreement in 2016.


On November 13, 2012, a mother filed a lawsuit against the Davis County Schools in the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, on behalf of her two children, A.W. and C.W. The Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and bringing suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983, sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as nominal damages, alleging that the school district violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing a children's book, In Our Mothers' House, from the library shelves to a restricted access section. The book depicts a same-sex couple and their three adopted children. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the book should be returned to the regular collection and that similar books should not be restricted from student access. Plaintiffs also sought to class certification. Defendant argued that the book violated Utah's sex education law, U.C.A. 1953 §53A-13-101, which prohibits sex-education curricula from using instructional materials that advocate homosexuality. Defendant also claimed that because elementary school students have structured time in the library, such time should be treated as part of the curriculum. The matter was referred to alternative dispute resolution on December 11, 2012. It then settled. Defendants agreed to return the book to regular circulation, to not remove the book from libraries for any reason based on its content, and not to rely on Utah Code §53A-13-101 as a basis for content discrimination. Plaintiffs agreed that the book may be restricted on a per-student basis, just as any other book may, at the request of a parent or guardian. As part of the agreement, both parties filed motions to dismiss. The case closed on February 4, 2013.

Summary: Plaintiff, on behalf of her two children, filed suit alleging that her childrens' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were restricted when the Defendant school district removed a book depicting children with same-sex parents from regular circulation to the restricted section of the school library. In February 2013, the matter settled: Defendants agreed to return the book to regular circulation, to not remove the book from libraries for any reason based on its content, and not to rely on Utah Code §53A-13-101 as a basis for content discrimination. Plaintiffs agreed that the book may be restricted on a per-student basis, just as any other book may, at the request of a parent or guardian. As part of the agreement, both parties filed motions to dismiss. The case closed on February 4, 2013.


This action was brought on March 23, 2011, by a married couple who sought an order allowing the U.S. citizen spouse to petition for his foreign national husband to become a permanent resident of the United States. Such petition is allowed for heterosexual spouses, but under the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), not for same-sex spouses. The U.S. citizen plaintiff filed his visa petition on January 9, 2011; when he brought the lawsuit, it had not been acted on. But they pointed out that the position of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) was that because of DOMA, it lacked authority to allow a spousal petition for a same-sex couple. Likewise, the Board of Immigration Appeals could not hold DOMA unconstitutional. Accordingly, plaintiffs sought relief by the district court. On January 5, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Chicago (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber), found that the plaintiffs could proceed with their lawsuit even though USCIS had not yet rendered a final decision on the visa application. 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1330, at *16. On July 12, the Court stayed the matter to give USCIS sufficient time to adjudicate the application. USCIS reached its decision on August 6, 2012, and informed the Court the following week that it was denying the visa, both because of DOMA and separately (and alone sufficient, the government said) for other, unrelated reasons. Those non-DOMA reasons were explained in a document filed under seal. On September 20, 2012, the Court granted the U.S.'s oral motion to dismiss without prejudice. Presumably this was with the agreement of the plaintiff, but no further details appear in the case record.

Summary: This case was an action brought on March 23, 2011, seeking to allow a U.S. citizen to petition the government to allow his foreign national husband to become a permanent resident, in the way allowed for heterosexual couples but banned under DOMA for same-sex spouses. On August 6, 2012, USCIS denied the visa petition based on DOMA and another, separately sufficient, ground. On September 20, 2012, the cased was dismissed without prejudice.


This case is about the legality of a rule change proposed August 3, 2020 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was set to go into effect October 2, 2020. The Final Rule (specifically, the USCIS Fee Schedule & Changes to Certain Other Immigration Benefit Request Requirements, 85 Fed. Reg. 46,788) increased the cost of applying for immigration benefits, including naturalization and asylum. The plaintiffs, eight non-profit organizations that provide a variety of services for low income applicants for immigration benefits, filed this lawsuit on August 20, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the acting secretary of the DHS, the senior official performing the duties of deputy secretary of the DHS, and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Represented by the American Immigration Lawyers Association and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706) and sought an injunction against the enforcement of the Final Rule, a stay against its enforcement, and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs asserted that the Final Rule was procedurally defective, contrary to law, and arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). The plaintiffs further asserted the Final Rule violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause by denying indigent people the right to access a statutory process for seeking immigration benefits. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged violations of the Homeland Security Act, the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998 and the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, they argued that the two individual defendants had assumed their positions without constitutional or statutory authority, so the rule was void. In their complaint, the plaintiffs outlined the fee increases proposed by the Final Rule, and in particular, they highlighted the increase in price for asylum seekers: from $0 to $630. The rule, for the first time in U.S. history, would charge a non-waivable fee of $50 to apply for asylum plus $580 to obtain their first employment authorization for all asylum seekers. The USCIS and DHS’s budgets would increase by 21% as a result of these and other changes in the rule. By switching from ability-to-pay principles on which the plaintiff’ organizations relied to a beneficiary-pays principle, the plaintiffs contended the Final Rule would transform the purpose of the USCIS from “adjudicating immigration benefits to one that serves this Administration’s goals of reducing immigration and naturalization for low-income applicants and deterring asylum seekers.” 2020 WL 4930113. On August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Jeffery S. White granted the motion on September 29, 2020. While he pointed out that “the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) permits USCIS to impose a fee “for the consideration of an application for asylum [and] for employment authorization” so long as the fees do not “exceed the Attorney General’s costs in adjudicating the applications,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d), he held that the plaintiffs’ claim that the Acting Secretary of DHS was not validly serving in office was likely to succeed. Moreover, the court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on at least some of their APA claims. The court agreed with the plaintiffs’ allegation that “a more detailed justification” was required for the “significant departure” from the ability-to-pay principle to the beneficiary-pays principle. Because the defendants only looked at past data, and the U.S. had never charged a fee for asylum seekers before, the defendants failed to consider the effect of the decrease in ability to pay both on the plaintiffs’ organizations and the asylum seekers themselves. 2020 WL 5798269. The court also held that the plaintiffs successfully established a likelihood of irreparable harm. The haste with which the plaintiffs filed their complaint after the rule change was proposed (within three weeks) supported their claim of urgency, and their showing of the need to significantly alter their programs to the determent of the population they served supported their claim of harm. Finally, the court found that the public interest would be served by the injunction. The court found that the public interest would be served both by not exposing vulnerable and low-income applicants to further danger and, in regard to the probable invalidity of the appointment, by avoiding an overreach of executive power. 2020 WL 5798269. As the validity of the entire Final Rule was called into question by the court’s findings, Judge White held it “appropriate to stay the effective date of the Final Rule pending resolution of the merits in this case.” 2020 WL 5798269. The case is currently ongoing.

Summary: This case is about the legality of a rule change by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The rule, for the first time in U.S. history, would charge all asylum seekers a non-waivable fee of $50 plus $580 to obtain their first employment authorization. Eight non-profit organizations that provided a variety of services for low income applicants for immigration benefits sued to enjoin enforcement of the rule. On August 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Jeffery S. White granted the motion on September 29, 2020 and stayed the rule's effective date pending resolution on the merits.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a pre-existing class action about non-citizen kids in HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) custody. Plaintiffs are seeking emergency releases of nearly all such children, in light of the grave risk of infection in congregate settings. The court denied the plaintiffs' application for TRO on April 2.
 This class action suit, filed on June 29, 2018, sought to enjoin the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), of which ORR is a component part, from causing grave harm to migrant and asylum-seeking children in its care. 2018 WL 3209193. The plaintiffs--represented by the Center for Human Rights & Constitutional Law, National Center for Youth Law, the Immigration Law Clinic at the UC Davis Law School, and private counsel--were members of the class protected under the consent decree issued in Flores v. Sessions (“Flores Settlement”), available here in this Clearinghouse. The plaintiffs alleged violations of that Settlement, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA) 18 U.S.C. § 1589, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 5 U.S.C. § 703, as well as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and First Amendment’s Freedom of Association Clause. They sued the Secretary of HHS and the Director of ORR under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 2241, the APA, Bivens, the TVPRA, and the rights conferred to the plaintiffs in the Flores Settlement. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief, a writ of habeas corpus for their release from ORR custody, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California and assigned to Judge Dolly Maizie Gee. The named plaintiffs are several children in ORR custody (in facilities in Texas, California, New York, and Michigan) and two nonprofit organizations, the San Fernando Valley Refugee Children Center, Inc. and the Unaccompanied Central American Refugee Empowerment. The plaintiffs alleged that ORR confines unaccompanied alien children in residential treatment centers (RTCs) without a meaningful opportunity to challenge allegations that they are dangerous or pose a flight risk or that their parents or other custodians are unfit to care for them. The complaint also states that the children are detained in conditions where they are administered psychotropic medication for weeks, months, or longer without parental consent or any other procedural safeguards. Several children were reportedly prescribed medications that increase suicidality, intentional self harm, pain, nausea, insomnia, and other symptoms in children. One of the children alleged they were assaulted by staff on multiple occasions, including with pepper spray, but that no disciplinary action was taken. The class included all children in ORR custody (a) whom ORR refused to release to their parents or other available custodians who completed family reunification packets but are allegedly unfit, (b) who have been or will be in an RTC or other facility for more than 30 days without notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding release, (c) who have been or will be administered psychotropic medication without procedural safeguards (e.g., parental consent), and (d) who are natives of non-contiguous countries and to whom ORR blocks legal assistance in matters related to their custody, medication, and release. On July 9, 2018, Judge Gee granted the plaintiffs leave to use pseudonyms for the named plaintiffs and their next friends (i.e., family members, custodians, or sponsors), who sued on their behalf, and ordered the parties to use these pseudonyms in all documents filed with the court. The court subsequently granted leave to both parties to file documents under seal in order to protect the identities of the minors. Class Certification On August 2, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class. On August 3, 2018, one named plaintiff detained in a southern Texas facility, moved for a preliminary injunction for his release from ORR custody “without unnecessary delay” as provided by the Flores Settlement and the TVPRA. On August 17, 2018, another named plaintiff detained in a southern Texas facility, similarly moved for a preliminary injunction for her release. On August 17, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue and for failure to state a claim for which the court can grant relief. The defendants argued that this lawsuit was duplicative of the Flores litigation, and claimed that the plaintiffs were trying to rewrite or re-bargain that settlement by bringing this case. On September 6 and 10, 2018, the court denied both preliminary injunction motions for lack of jurisdiction. In both cases, the court found that the cited sections of the Flores Settlement and the APA did not authorize the court to order the release of the minors. The motions were dismissed without prejudice, indicating that they could refile in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the ORR Field Specialists in Texas responsible for the minors’ care. Judge McGee found that habeas matters would be properly venued before those specialists in that court if the plaintiffs were to refile. On September 7, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint, which included two more named plaintiffs and additional detail concerning the original complaint's named plaintiffs’ mental health, including hospitalization due to their extreme distress at not being released to their families. It also described fundraising and other community efforts made in preparation of the children’s release. On September 10, 2018, Judge Gee denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as moot because the plaintiff’s amended complaint was treated as superseding the first. In the same order, she denied the plaintiff’s motion for class certification. Judge Gee reasoned that it would be more efficient to decide on that motion at a later date, because it was anticipated that the defendants would again move to have the case dismissed. On September 18, 2018, the defendants again moved to have the complaint dismissed for improper venue and failure to state claim. On September 28, 2018, the defendants supplemented their motion to dismiss, requesting that the case be transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia if it were not dismissed. Also on September 28, 2018, the plaintiffs again moved to certify the class. This class definition’s first four elements were the same as those in their August motion for class certification; the new motion added one more element, narrowing the class to include only children who have or will have a behavioral, mental health, or intellectual and/or developmental disability and who are placed in an ORR facility because of that disability. On November 2, 2018, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The defendants' motion to dismiss was granted only with regard to the plaintiffs' claims to enforce the Flores Agreement, but was denied in all other respects, including the plaintiffs' claims that "ORR failed to provide sufficient procedural safeguards for alien minors to exercise their Flores rights." In the order granting the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Judge Gee granted each of the proposed classes but slightly re-wrote the definitions of some classes. On November 16, 2018, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's November 2 order, asserting that in re-writing the definitions of the "legal representation class" and the "disability class," the court failed to consider material facts and denied defendants the opportunity to address the newly created class. On December 27, 2018, Judge Gee issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion for reconsideration and simultaneously issued an amended version of the November 2 order. The amended order made a slight change to the "disability class" to reflect the defendants' concern with the class. On March 2, 2019, defendant E. Scott Lloyd -- the former Director of ORR who was also sued in his individual capacity under Bivens -- filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint and action against him for lack of personal jurisdiction and a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The defendant asserted that the complaint did not establish that the court had personal jurisdiction over him, failed to give notice of the claims against him, failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against him, and failed to defeat his qualified immunity. On April 23, 2019, following the parties' stipulation for mediation, Judge Gee issued an order referring the matter to Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym for mediation proceedings. Over the next several months, the parties underwent the discovery process and conferred to attempt to reach a settlement. On August 21, 2019, Judge Gee issued an order granting E. Scott Lloyd's motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the plaintiffs' Bivens</> claim against him was not "supported by a cognizable legal theory" and because "special factors counsel against recognizing such a remedy in this context." As such, the individual defendant in his individual capacity was dismissed. The parties have exchanged proposed settlements but have failed to reach an agreement. A bench trial is currently scheduled for January 19, 2021. The case is ongoing. On March 25, 2020, in light of the nationwide outbreak of COVID-19, the plaintiffs filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and for issuance of an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The plaintiffs requested that the court issue an order "requiring ORR to release children it has already detained for 30 days to ready custodians, transfer them to non-congregate settings, or else justify why it has done neither." At the time the application was filed, there were a reported 46,481 cases in the U.S. and 593 deaths and several staff members at ORR facilities had tested positive for COVID-19. No cure or vaccine existed at the time of filing so social distancing and frequent hand washing were the only effective measures to prevent the transmission of COVID-19. The plaintiffs contended that the "vast majority of children in ORR custody live in congregate settings, where they spend all of their time in close proximity to other children and staff members" and are thus unable to practice effective methods of preventing transmission. Moreover, while the elderly and those with underlying health conditions remained the most vulnerable to serious illness or death from COVID-19, the plaintiffs stated that "approximately 6% of infected children and 11% of infected infants had severe or critical cases," demonstrating a risk of severe harm to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs claimed that a TRO was appropriate because Flores Settlement, the TVPRA, and the First and Fifth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution each vest children who have custodians available to receive them with substantive rights against ORR’s keeping them in congregate care, especially during a global pandemic." On March 27, 2020, the government filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for TRO. The government asserted that if there is a claim that the Flores Agreement has been violated, that claim "must proceed in a Flores enforcement action." The government also argued that the plaintiffs' due process claim lacked merit, proclaiming that they have "gone to extraordinary lengths to care for children in a profoundly challenging situation, while also fulfilling its statutory mandate under the TVPRA for expeditious release of children to custodians who will care for them, implementing measures both to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and provide appropriate medical care in the case of infection." Finally, the government contended that, considering the risk posed by the proposed mass transit of plaintiffs and strained resources for administrative hearings caused by COVID-19, plaintiffs "fail to show how their alleged injury would be redressed by the relief they seek." On March 28 Judge Gee issued a TRO in Flores v. Reno, ordering the government to promptly dispose of the class members' claims for release to outside sponsors and for the inspection of government facilities to ensure compliance with public health guidelines. Following oral argument on April 2, Judge Gee issued an order denying the plaintiffs' application for TRO and order to show cause. Judge Gee concluded that the TRO issued in Flores rendered "the most urgent portions of Plaintiffs’ request for interim relief moot," and thus a TRO here was not appropriate. On October 2, 2020, the defendants moved for partial summary judgment. The Defendants alleged that some of the claims were barred by res judicata, as the Court had already decided the issues in Reno v. Flores. The defendants further argued that, even if the claims were not barred, the policies and procedures implemented satisfied the judicial standards for procedural due process. The same day, the plaintiffs also moved for partial summary judgment on different claims. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants' non-compliance with the Flores Settlement Agreement violated their right to procedural due process, and required court intervention. The court held a hearing on this cross-motion for summary judgment on December 22, 2020. The parties are engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations and discovery, issuing periodic status reports. As of March 12, the case is ongoing.

Summary: In June 2018, unaccompanied immigrant children in the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) custody sued ORR and HHS, of which it is a component agency, in District Court for the Central District of California. Plaintiffs alleged Due Process and Flores Settlement violations due to their continued detainment in ORR custody even though they had parents or other custodians available to receive them, and because ORR administered psychotropic drugs on them without parental consent. In September 2018, the court denied preliminary injunctions for two of the named plaintiffs detained in southern Texas ORR facilities for lack of jurisdiction. The court found that their habeas petitions were properly venued in the Southern District of Texas against the ORR Field Specialists responsible for their care if the plaintiffs were to refile. In November 2018 the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and denied most of the defendants' motion to dismiss, granting the motion only with regard to the plaintiffs' claims to enforce the Flores Agreement. The parties have been undergoing discovery and settlement negotiations since 2019 but have not yet reached an agreement. In March 2020, during the nationwide outbreak of COVID-19, the plaintiffs requested an order requiring ORR to release children it has already detained for 30 days or transfer them to non-congregate settings; the court denied this request in early April. The case is ongoing.


On February 27, 2004, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the policies and procedures used by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to adjudicate applications for naturalization. Plaintiffs alleged that the agency failed to apply the correct standard for determining whether applicants have "good moral character" and failed to adjudicate applications within 120 days as prescribed by law. Plaintiffs asserted claims under § 310(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c); the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201; and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Attorneys with the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and the American Immigration Lawyers Association, as well as private counsel, represent the plaintiff class. Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and class certification. The District Court (Judge Robert S. Lasnik) denied class certification on November 24, 2004. A second motion for class certification was granted in part on November 13, 2005. During the course of the litigation, the District Court entered several stipulated orders, granting judicial naturalization to some of the named petitioners. On August 10, 2005 the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement. After notice to class members and a fairness hearing, the Agreement was approved by the District Court (Judge Lasnik) on February 16, 2006. Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services agreed to change its process for deciding "good moral character" issues in applications for naturalization. The agency also agreed to reopen denial of naturalization applications of class members whose applications were denied on good moral character grounds. The parties stipulated that the class consisted of:
All persons who have applied or will apply for naturalization in the jurisdiction of the Seattle District Office, and who have been or may be denied on or after May 4, 1998 on the basis of a lack of good moral character, excepting those who have been subsequently naturalized or those who are statutorily barred from naturalization.
On August 17, 2007, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement. On January 2, 2008, the Court found that motion to be mostly moot, but ordered the defendants to process the application of one of the members of the plaintiff class. Lee v. Gonzales, No. 04-cv-00449, 2008 WL 53175 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 2, 2008). On April 3, 2008, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for enforcement, which the court partially granted on May 19, 2008. The Court ordered the defendants to complete their review of thirty-three applications within thirty days of the order. Lee v. Mukasey, No. 04-cv-00449, 2008 WL 2117064, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122359 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2008). When the defendants, in a filing styled as a status report, requested additional time to process the remaining applications, the Court (Judge Lasnik) issued a third order regarding enforcement, requiring the defendants to provide detailed information regarding any delays in processing and to make updates on its progress every two months until all class members' applications were adjudicated. The defendants continued to process applications, submitting six bimonthly status reports to the Court, and on June 8, 2009, the Court (Judge Lasnik) issued its fourth and final order on enforcement, finding that all but three applications had been processed, and ordering the defendants to continue submitting status reports on these applications. On July 1, 2009, the defendants filed their final status report, informing the Court that the last three class members with pending applications had been naturalized. On September 24, 2009, the Court partially granted a motion by plaintiffs for attorney's fees, awarding them with $58,897.50 for work done prior to the defendants' final status report on July 1. Lee v. Holder, No. 04-cv-00449, 2009 WL 3064794, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92404 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2009).

Summary: On February 27, 2004, plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the policies and procedures used by the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services to adjudicate applications for naturalization. Plaintiffs alleged that the agency failed to apply the correct standard for determining whether applicants have "good moral character" and failed to adjudicate applications within 120 days as prescribed by law. A settlement agreement in which the defendants agreed to change their process for deciding "good moral character" issues and to readjudicate class members' applications was approved by the District Court on February 16, 2006, and the final class member's application was processed on on July 1, 2009.


Two Occupy Wall Street protesters brought this suit on February 8, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the City of New York and the New York Police Department. During a 2011 demonstration, plaintiffs were pepper sprayed by highly-ranked police officer. Defendant officers further assaulted and detained the plaintiffs, all without a warrant or legal process. The plaintiffs brought this cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as well as state civil rights law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary relief for physical pain and mental suffering due to the violations. On May 21, 2014, the court related 9 other cases to this case for further proceedings. Two of these cases are in the Clearinghouse under Crisp v. The City of New York and  Lawler v. City of New York . On March 9, 2015, Judge Robert W. Sweet reassigned the case to Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger for general pretrial matters, including scheduling, discovery, and settlement. On June 30, 2015, the parties reached a settlement and agreed to resolve the remaining issues raised in the complaint without further proceedings and without admitting any fault or liability. The court dismissed the claim with prejudice, but retained jurisdiction over the action to enforce the terms of the settlements between parties. According to The New York Times, the defendant paid a total of $332,500 in damages (between $52,000 to $60,000 to each plaintiff). Additionally, the New York Times reports that the NYPD released a statement saying that the NYPD has not altered its pepper spray guidelines.

Summary: On February 8, 2012 Two Occupy Wall Street protesters sued in the Southern District of New York for being pepper sprayed by a high-ranking police officer. On June 30, 2015, both parties settled and plaintiff received damages.


On January 3, 2006, a group of former employees filed suit under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461 ("ERISA"), against Pharmacia Pension Plan, Pfizer Inc. and Monsanto Company in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief alleging that the defendants were unlawfully miscalculating pension benefits. On January 1, 1997, Monsanto converted its employees' pension plans from conventional benefit plans taking a specified percentage of a participant's salary to cash balance plans where the benefit is based upon a hypothetical account balance. Monsanto later split into two and plaintiffs alleged that after the conversion of their plans and split of the company they were no longer receiving the benefits they should have been receiving. On May 10, 2006 the district court (Judge G. Patrick Murphy) denied plaintiff's motion to appoint plaintiff's counsel as interim class counsel. On June 14, 2006 the court (Judge Murphy) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. A number of other cases with the same essential complaints and issues had been filed between 2004 and 2006 and on September 1, 2006 the case was consolidated with others under the lead case Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan. Subsequent developments can be found under that case in the collection.

Summary: On January 3, 2006, a group of former employees filed suit under the ERISA against Pharmacia Pension Plan, Pfizer Inc., and Monsanto Company in United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs asked the Court for injunctive and equitable relief alleging that the defendants had been unlawfully miscalculating pension benefits since their plans were converted from a conventional benefit plan to a cash balance plan. On June 14, 2006 the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. On September 1, 2006 the case was consolidated with others under the lead case Walker v. Monsanto Co. Pension Plan.


Plaintiff is an employee of St. John's Medical Center who brought suit under §§ 502 and 510 of ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act) when her employer's health care administrator denied coverage to her legal wife. The plaintiff filed a class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on June 19, 2012. On January 24, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for a preliminary injunction on the same day. On May 1, 2014, the Court (Judge Nelson S. Roman) dismissed the case, finding that the clause in the Plaintiff's plan excluding coverage of same-sex spouses was not in conflict with § 510 of ERISA, which says that discrimination against a beneficiary of a plan unlawful. The Court found that ERISA regulates plans but does not dictate terms, and that § 510 has been interpreted primarily to prevent termination of employees right before benefits come due to deny them those benefits. On May 22, 2014, the Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On January 13, 2015, the Court (Judges José A. Cabranes, Raymond J. Lohier, Jr., and Christopher F. Droney) affirmed the judgment of the District Court and dismissed the case. On March 6, 2015, costs taxed in the amount of $323.20 were awarded to Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield against Jane Roe.

Summary: Plaintiff is an employee of St. John's Medical Center who brought suit under §§ 502 and 510 of ERISA when her employer's health care administrator denied coverage to her legally married wife. The District Court dismissed the case in May 2014, saying the plan did not violate any part of ERISA. On January 13, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit confirmed the judgment of the District Court


On February 23, 2012, five Maryland state prisoners who are deaf filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and other state entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide the proper interpretive services, videophones, and other hearing devices. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages. On March 13, 2013, Judge Ellen Hollander issued an opinion and an order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. Judge Hollander also denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Jarboe v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 2013 WL 1010357 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2013). The parties entered into settlement talks and had several settlement conferences. Subsequently, the parties reached a tentative agreement. On February 20, 2015, Judge Hollander dismissed the case without prejudice to the parties' rights to reopen the case if the settlement agreement is not consummated.

Summary: In 2012, five Maryland state prisoners who are deaf filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services and other state entities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the right to free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide the proper interpretive services, videophones, and other hearing devices. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages. The parties have reached a tentative settlement agreement.


On June 20, 1994, inmates of the Criminal Justice Complex in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. The plaintiffs, who were represented by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union and others, sued the Governor of the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections; they asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the poor conditions of their confinement. Specifically, they complained of the inadequacy of the building in which they were housed to hold prisoners, up to five prisoners in each cell, lack of a functioning sink in each cell, only one showerhead for use by all prisoners in each cluster, overcrowding (population was, they said, 4 times capacity), lack of sufficient beds, transmission of infectious diseases, and defective plumbing. They also complained of inadequacies in the areas of sanitation, programming, exercise, food service, medical care, personal safety, noise levels, and an environment of tension, stress, and hostility. They contended that the overcrowding led to a high risk of violence, as well as infestation with roaches, rats, flies, mosquitoes, and mice. They complained of contaminated drinking water, moldy showers, broken cooling and ventilation systems, broken windows, asbestos particles in the air, poor lighting, risk of fire, poor medical care, inadequate classification and screening procedures, lack of delivery of prescription medication, poor dental care, poor mental health care, discrimination against disabled prisoners, excessive use of force, failure to protect prisoners from one another, denial of access to a law library and to attorneys, and interference with religious practices. On October 12, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which they submitted to the court for approval. Under the terms of the agreement, the defendants agreed to limit the population to 97 inmates (less than half of the former population), to house female inmates separately from male inmates, and to eliminate double-celling. The agreement also addressed problems in the areas of insufficient mattresses, providing a storage area in each cell for each inmates' personal possessions, establishing a comprehensive kitchen maintenance and sanitation plan, preventive maintenance, clean drinking water, plumbing, electrical, mechanical, ventilation, air conditioning, nutrition, lighting, noise levels, temperature control, personal hygiene, provision of linens, soap, shampoo, and toothpaste, vermin and pests, fire safety, medical care, substance abuse treatment, medications, intake evaluations, disease testing, record-keeping, mental health care, inmate safety, activities, recreation, education, use of force, and other concerns mentioned in the complaint. The case was assigned to Judge Stanley Brotman, and the court adopted the agreement as a consent decree in December of 1994 and awarded the plaintiffs $155,000 in attorneys' fees. Over the next two years, the defendants paid only one third of the attorneys' fees that had been ordered by the court, and the plaintiffs asked the court to hold them in contempt for this violation, as well as for other violations of the decree. Judge Brotman held hearings on these motions, and on November 26, 1996, the defendants asked the district court to modify the consent decree. They informed the court that over the two years following the adoption of the consent decree, the Virgin Islands experienced five major storms, which they alleged to have caused unforeseen and unbudgeted financial setbacks for the entire populace of the Islands, resulting in an unprecedented public debt. They alleged that due to these concerns, they were unable to comply with the consent decree in two areas: 1) overpopulation of the facility, and 2) psychiatric evaluation, care, and management of the prisoners. Due to this situation, they asked the court to excuse them from complying with these portions of the decree. The defendants then asked the district court to terminate the consent decree pursuant to the recently-enacted Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On January 30, 1997, Judge Brotman found for the plaintiffs; he held that the defendants' conduct and the conditions at the prison violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting the prisoners to inhumane conditions of confinement. The Court further found that the defendants had violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by discriminating against prisoners with disabilities, and that they had violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) by instituting unreasonable policies regarding inmate religious practices. The Court also found that they had denied the inmates meaningful access to the courts and defied the court by refusing to pay the attorneys' fees. Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). A month later, the court held the defendants in contempt and ordered them to submit regular reports to the court on their progress. (In a separate case addressing whether the federal government could constitutionally house prisoners in any of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections facilities, on April 2, 1997, District Judge Thomas Moore found that the prison conditions were unconstitutional and issued an order that no persons detained under process of the U.S. Government and any of its agencies should be lodged or housed in any facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. In the Matter Of: Federal Detainees Housed or Lodged in the Facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections on St. Croix, 1997 WL 182301 (D.Virgin Islands April 2, 1997). On April 25, 1997, Judge Moore modified that order to allow the U.S. Marshal to lodge federal detainees in Bureau of Corrections facilities in St. Croix when required by logistical difficulties of moving such prisoners between the Virgin Islands and the Guaynabo Metropolitan Detention Center. In the Matter Of: Federal Detainees Housed or Lodged in the Facilities of the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections on St. Croix, 1997 WL 222647 (D.Virgin Islands, April 25, 1997).) On December 2, 1997, the district court (Judge Brotman) ruled on another motion by the plaintiffs for civil contempt. The Court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to monetary sanctions, and ordered the defendants to continue reporting on their progress. Carty v. Schneider, 986 F.Supp. 933 (D.Virgin Islands 1997). Four years later, the district court did hold the defendants in contempt of the consent decree, finding that they had not made a reasonable effort to comply with the court's orders. Carty v. Turnbull, 144 F.Supp.2d 395 (D.Virgin Islands 2001). On February 27, 2007, the district court again held the defendants in contempt, finding that the defendants had failed to even file a reply to the plaintiff class motion for an order holding the defendants in contempt for failure to comply with the consent decree's requirements in the area of mental health care. On February 21, 2008, the court ordered a corrections expert to inspect the prison facilities. On January 12, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to terminate the consent decree and remove the court supervision. The court then filed a scheduling order setting discovery deadlines and a date for a hearing. The defendants did not comply with the deadlines, leading the court to rule that the defendants would not be permitted to present evidence contradicting the findings of the plaintiffs' corrections expert or of any remedial efforts taken since the experts' tour of the prison facilities. The defendants ultimately withdrew their motion to terminate. On May 18, 2010, the court issued an opinion regarding the report made by the corrections expert on his visit to the prison facilities. Carty v. DeJongh, 2010 WL 2024524. The court found the defendants were still not in compliance with the settlement agreement and ordered them to resolve all deficiencies swiftly and fully. The order required that the defendants supply the court with periodic status reports on its compliance with the settlement agreement and other remedial orders. The defendants submitted the status reports, as ordered, for the following two years. On March 4, 2011, plaintiffs moved for the appointment of an expert to work with the defendants on population management and prisoner classification issues. Judge Brotman agreed on June 28, 2011, issuing an order assigning Dr. James Austin to serve as a population manager and classification expert. The order also required Dr. Austin to perform periodic criminal justice assessments to assist the government in reducing the prisoner population at the Criminal Justice Complex and Annex. The defendants moved for reconsideration, on October 7, 2011, and apparently this reconsideration motion was never ruled upon. On May 13, 2013, parties proposed a new settlement agreement. Under the settlement, the defendant agreed to make significant improvements to classification and housing of prisoners, prisoner supervision, general security, housing and environmental health conditions, population control, development of policies and procedures, use of force, use of physical restraints, addressing prisoner grievances, programming, staffing, fire safety, medical and mental health care, training of staff, and monitoring of the prison. The settlement also stated that relief would terminate when the defendant has achieved and maintained substantial compliance for one year. On August 14, 2013, the court approved the settlement. There was very little progress towards compliance, however. So as the court explained later (in an order dated March 11, 2016) on May 10, 2015, Dr. James Austin--who had been designated the court's expert on population management in 2011--sent an email to the defendants notifying them that he wanted to make a site visit to the correctional facilities in June 2015, to conduct his criminal justice assessment in line with the June 28, 2011 order. The defendants' response was that no provision of the consent decree authorized such an assessment and, as such, Dr. Austin could not perform that task. On June 2, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the June 28, 2011 order. On December 9, 2015, a regularly scheduled quarterly evidentiary hearing was held. During the hearing, the defendants acknowledged that nothing had superseded the original order; the court (Judge Gomez) accordingly ruled orally that day that the 2011 appointment remained in effect. That decision was filed in written form in an order dated March 11, 2016. During the two years following the order, plaintiffs continued to work to enforce the settlement agreement more generally, with contested motions relating to site visits and the like. Following the settlement, notice of expert reports were filed monthly and status reports and evidentiary hearings occurred quarterly. In response to two years of continuing reports and evidentiary hearings, the plaintiffs filed a motion on December 13, 2018 to set additional goals and request information including (1) the total number of inmates in need of intermediate or inpatient care; (2) the dates those inmates will be transferred to psychiatric facilities; and (3) for the 2018 calendar year, the number of inmates in need of intermediate or inpatient care at appropriate psychiatric facilities that have been released. The court ordered on December 17, 2018 that the defendants produce the requested information. The defendants responded with the information on December 28, 2018. On January 4, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to submit a plan detailing how and when training will be completed on the Use of Force policies including: Umbrella Use of Force, Restraint Devices, Video Recording, Cell Extractions, and Reporting Requirement, being completed no later than March 15, 2019. On February 15, 2019, the parties filed their quarterly status reports. The defendants' report noted completed training of employees and ongoing plans to update their reporting requirements and policies. The plaintiffs status report indicated violent incidents from failure to hospitalize that occurred over the quarter and the defendants failure to meet five of their quarterly goals, which required mental health trainings, tracking referrals for mental health care, increased oversight, and improvements to disciplinary system. On February 19, 2019, the defendants filed a motion for a protective order in response to the plaintiffs' counsel publishing video footage online entitled “Brutality Against Prisoners Is Often Unseen. In this Virgin Islands Jail, It Was Caught on Video.” The defendants claimed this to be a security risk and requested that the video be taken down. The court denied the motion. On March 5, 2019, the court ordered that the parties each file a brief addressing if the court needed to appoint a receiver. The court expressed concerns regarding the defendants' continuing failure to provide for the timely transfer of seriously mentally ill prisoners in need of inpatient or intermediate care as required by the settlement agreement. The court asked the parties if the appointment of a receiver should be considered in this matter given the nearly 25-year history of non-compliance. Following the order, both parties requested time extensions to prepare their responses. On April 15, 2019, both parties submitted briefs addressing if a receiver should be appointed. On August 1, 2019, the court held a status conference with the parties to discuss how the defendants could make meaningful progress toward substantial compliance with the 2013 and the 1994 Settlement Agreements. The court and parties agreed to that the court appointed mental health expert and the security expert each submit an independent plan outlining a pathway to compliance. The court experts submitted plans and on August 15, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to complete certain short-term tasks by August 31, 2019 and September 30, 2019. These included developing a position description for an additional mental health professional at the Alexander Farelly Criminal Justice Complex, working to secure an alternate psychiatrist, submit a report identifying progress towards the 2018 staffing goals, and to complete hospital security training. The court further ordered that failure to comply with any of the tasks may result in sanctions starting at $2500 per day for each uncompleted task. The court experts also submitted numerous near-term, mid-term, and long-term tasks in their plans. However, the defendants asserted several objections to these tasks. The defendants did not present alternative tasks by which it could achieve substantial compliance with the 2013 and the 1994 Settlement Agreements. As a result, on September 13, 2019, the court ordered the defendants to file a plan proposing “specific, demonstrable, and tangible tasks necessary to be undertaken to obtain substantial compliance” with the settlement agreements. The defendants filed a plan with the court on September 30, 2019. On November 27, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to add a quarterly goal. The plaintiffs requested that the court add the complete installation, testing, and implementation of the new CCTV surveillance system. As of December 2019, the plaintiffs’ motion to add a quarterly goal remained pending, the court had not appointed a receiver, and the parties continued to submit quarterly status reports. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 20, 1994, inmates of the Criminal Justice Complex in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor of the Virgin Islands and the Virgin Islands Bureau of Corrections. The inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated by the poor conditions of their confinement, which they said fell below contemporary standards of human decency. After 20 years of successive court-ordered remedies, the parties most recently entered into a settlement agreement approved by the court in August 2013. Enforcement of the settlement continued.


On September 12, 2012, youth confined in facilities operated by the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court against the IDJJ. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the Roger Baldwin Foundation of the ACLU, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that systemic IDJJ conditions, services, and treatment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the IDJJ:

Failed to provide youth with minimally adequate education and mental health;
Failed to protect youth;
Subjected youth to improper and excessive room confinement; and
Held youth beyond their release dates after failing to secure appropriate community placement.
 In October 2012, Judge Matthew F. Kennelly certified a plaintiff class consisting of all youth confined by the IDJJ, and a sub-class consisting of all members who have special education needs. In December 2012, the District Court approved a consent decree and appointed three experts to investigate IDJJ conditions and services and report their findings and recommendations. In September 2013, experts filed reports, finding inadequate education and mental health services, excessive solitary confinement, and other deficiencies. Under the terms of the consent decree, the parties jointly submitted a proposed remedial plan on March 14, 2014, followed by a revised plan on April 4, 2014. The District Court approved the remedial plan on April 7, 2014, obligating the IDJJ to implement the plan, and the ACLU and court-appointed experts to monitor and enforce the plan. Beginning in July 2014, the parties and court-appointed monitors negotiated numerous changes to IDJJ policy in such areas as special education, individualized mental health services, and protection of LGBT youth. The District Court approved. On April 24, 2015, the District Court approved a new confinement policy that:

Completely prohibited punitive isolation;
Narrowly limited non-punitive isolation for purposes of safety;
Guaranteed that youths placed in non-punitive isolation will continue to receive ordinary education and mental health services; and
Mandated that youth confined for 24 hours or longer be allowed out of their rooms for at least 8 hours each day.
 The consent decree called for yearly reporting by monitors on the defendants' progress until all IDJJ facilities showed substantial compliance with the decree for a period of at least one year. In addition, the court awarded the plaintiffs $502,666 in attorneys' fees and costs as of April 7, 2014. On October 30, 2015, the parties filed a joint status report. The monitor-authored report commended the IDJJ for progress on drafting implementation of new procedures, but also highlighted areas of continued need for improvement. The report pointed to a lack of sufficient educational and medical personnel, and questioned whether new programs purporting to replace excessive confinement measures were in fact still forms of excessive confinement. On November 5, 2015, Judge Kennelly issued a supplemental order dictating the required ratios of mental health staff to classes of confined youth delineated by the severity of their condition. The order gave the IDJJ 120 days to comply. On May 10, 2016, following another status update from the parties, the court again issued a supplemental order to comply with staffing ratios for mental health professionals. The IDJJ had apparently made some effort to comply with the required ratios but had not yet fully complied. The court again gave the IDJJ 120 days to comply. On June 30, 2016, the court awarded additional costs and attorneys' fees for the plaintiffs totaling $197,500. These fees covered the period between April 2014 and April 2015. On December 12, 2016, the parties filed yet another status report. The IDJJ had still not fully complied with the consent agreement's educational program requirement. The IDJJ cited security issues at its facilities that prevented regular classes from being held, but maintained it had complied with hiring requirements for additional educational and mental health staff. On February 16, 2017, Judge Kennelly issued an order requiring additional status reporting by IDJJ through 2017. On July 27, 2016 the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel compliance, alleging that some IDJJ facilities were violating elements of the consent agreement related to confinement and facility conditions. The report alleged that facility staff retaliated against residents for disorderly behavior by filing charges against them at the district attorney's office. This violated the IDJJ's agreement not to file criminal charges or use punitive confinement in response to disorderly behavior by residents at its facilities. The motion sought an injunction against this practice. On December 13, 2017, the parties field an amended consent decree requiring that the IDJJ notify the plaintiffs of any criminal prosecutions against facility residents. The amended decree provided for continued supervision subject to yearly reporting by monitors until the IDJJ complied with all terms of the agreement. Status reports consistently demonstrated a lack of compliance by the IDJJ. After a status hearing on February 11, 2019, Judge Kennelly ordered the parties to confer and revise the remedial plan to address the shortcomings. Specifically, parties need to address placement of IDJJ youth in psychiatric institutions when needed, as well as arrangements for youth that have acute mental health needs short of hospitalization. The parties filed the amended remedial plan and Judge Kennelly approved it on March 28, 2019. Monitoring continued from there, with periodic adjustments of policy. As of April 20, 2020, this case is ongoing for monitoring purposes.

Summary: In September 2012, youth confined in facilities operated by the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ) filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under § 1983 against the IDJJ. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that systemic IDJJ conditions, services, and treatment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. After granting class certification, the District Court approved a consent decree and a remedial plan, under which the IDJJ is responsible for making numerous changes to its policies in such areas as solitary confinement, special education, mental health services, and protection of LGBT youth.


On April 20, 2006, four migrant and seasonal agricultural laborers who worked for Del Monte Fresh Produce's Georgia farms at various times during the 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006 harvest seasons filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871. The class action lawsuit was filed against Del Monte Fresh Product (Southeast) ("DMSE") and its parent company, Del Monte Fresh Product, NA ("DMNA"). Plaintiffs alleged that defendants: 1) failed to pay the promised wage rate; 2) failed to reimburse plaintiffs for costs that they incurred in order to work on defendants' farms; and 3) violated federal employment laws. Plaintiffs were represented by attorneys for the Southern Poverty Law Center. Shortly after the suit was filed, the parties filed a joint motion to have the case transferred to the Northern District of Georgia. On June 30, 2006, the District Court (Judge Donald L. Graham) entered an order granting the motion to transfer. The case was transferred and assigned docket number 06-cv-02000-JEC in the Northern District of Georgia. The Del Monte defendants contended that they had not employed any of the plaintiffs and therefore had no liability in the case. Del Monte maintained that the farm labor contractors who recruited plaintiffs were their true employers, not Del Monte. In order to resolve the issue of defendants' status as plaintiffs' employer, the District Court (Julie E. Carnes) entered a bifurcated discovery schedule, with discovery first concentrating on the employer issue. Numerous discovery disputes arose, which were ultimately resolved by the Court in May 2007. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast), Inc., 2007 WL 1500269 (N.D. Ga. 2007). The main disputes centered on the proper location for depositions of class representatives who lived in Mexico and who’s immigration status made it challenging to travel to the United States. Defendants disputed that they should have to travel to Mexico for the depositions. The court found that defendants could travel to Mexico (with plaintiffs bearing the differential cost) for the deposition or depose plaintiffs by phone or video conference. By separate order, the Court, with agreement by the parties, denied without prejudice plaintiffs' motions for class and collective action certification, until the court decided the employer issue. Following the initial discovery period, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the employment issue. On March 19, 2008, the Court dismissed plaintiffs' claims against DMNA on the grounds that the parent corporation did not employ plaintiffs, but denied summary judgment to DMSE on the FLSA and AWPA claims. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Se.), Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2000-JEC, 2008 WL 754452 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 19, 2008). Plaintiffs filed a motion to alter the judgment and clarify the record on March 26, 2008. They asked the court to clarify that DMSE remained a defendant in the case as to all claims and asked the court to vacate the judgment with respect to DMNA. On April 10, 2008, plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification on behalf of two classes of workers: 1) guest-workers recruited from Mexico pursuant to the temporary agricultural work visa program, known as the "H-2A program" and 2) non-H-2A migrant and seasonal agricultural workers recruited from within the U.S. Plaintiffs also sought certification of a collective action to pursue their FLSA claims. The Court denied class certification for the first two classes but granted certification of the FLSA collective action. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Se.), Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2000-JEC, 2009 WL 10670185 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2009). In the same order, the Court granted plaintiffs motion to alter the judgment in part and clarified that the DMSE remained a defendant, but it declined to vacate the judgment with respect to DMNA. Plaintiffs appealed the decision to not certify the class, but lost in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals (Judge Charles Wilson, Judge William Pryor, and Judge Emmett Cox), which on December 3, 2009, affirmed the district court's denial of class certifications. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (SE), Inc., 354 F. App'x 422 (11th Cir. 2009). While the appeal was pending, the parties attempted to proceed with merits discovery in the district court. Discovery stalled, however, due to a number of disputes. On December 10, 2009, the District Court granted: (1) plaintiffs' motion for leave to file their third amended complaint, (2) plaintiffs' motion for joinder to add 52 opt-ins as individual plaintiffs on Counts I and II of the complaint, and (3) the parties' joint motion for extension of time to complete discovery. The court denied: (1) plaintiffs' motion to intervene, (2) plaintiffs' motion for a protective order to limit discovery to a small sample of the opt-in plaintiffs, (3) defendants' motion to stay discovery, and (4) plaintiffs' motion for a scheduling conference. Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce (Se.), Inc., No. 1:06-CV-2000-JEC, 2009 WL 4801357 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2009). On April 15, 2010, the District Court approved a confidential settlement agreement with 63 workers. The court approved of an undisclosed settlement amount to be paid to the workers as well as payment of attorneys' fees and costs. Defendants did not admit liability. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. All of plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed on the merits and with prejudice. There was no further activity on the docket. Presumably, there were no disputes over the settlement agreement and the case was closed.

Summary: On April 20, 2006, migrant and seasonal agricultural laborers sued their employer, Del Monte Fresh Produce (Southeast) ("DMSE") and its parent company, for violating federal labor laws. The district court dismissed the claims against the parent company, leaving DMSE as the only plaintiff. The court also denied plaintiffs' Rule 23 class certification, but granted certification of a collective action to pursue their FLSA claims. This decision was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Following the circuit court decision, the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement. The court approved the agreement including payment of a settlement amount to the 63 plaintiffs.


On February 26, 2018, an asylum seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo (Ms. L.) filed this lawsuit and a writ for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. 2018 WL 1310160. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and its parent agency, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and several other government entities all under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal asylum statutes, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Dana M. Sabraw. This immigration case involved the United States government’s forcible separation of over 2,000 asylum-seeking families who arrived at the southern border without documentation. The plaintiff and her seven-year-old daughter were victims of this policy. Since their arrival on November 1, the plaintiff and her daughter had been detained. For the first 4 days upon arriving, they were detained together until the plaintiff was then sent to the Otay Mesa Detention Center in the San Diego area where she remained for nearly four months without her daughter. Ms. L. asserted violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the federal asylum statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 which provides that all non-citizens with a well-founded fear of persecution shall have the opportunity to seek asylum, and APA violations for arbitrary and capricious ICE practices and failure by ICE to consider paroling detained asylum seekers as per its own parole directive. When the officers separated them, the plaintiff could hear her daughter in the next room frantically screaming that she wanted to remain with her mother. No one explained to the plaintiff why they were taking her daughter away from her or where her daughter was going or even when she would next see her daughter. The plaintiff claimed that by forcibly taking a 7-year-old child from her mother, without justification or even a hearing, the defendants were in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. On March 2, 2018, the plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction and a motion to expedite resolution of said motion. The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendants from continuing to separate her from her daughter and argued that expedition was necessary to remedy the devastating harms that this separation was inflicting with each passing day. In support of this argument, the plaintiff offered testimony from nine medical experts who asserted that the trauma of forced separation from a parent imposes severe and long-lasting psychological and emotional damage on young children, especially children who are incarcerated and have already suffered the trauma of fleeing their home country. For reasons not apparent from the docket, on March 8, 2018, Judge Sabraw granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff’s motion to expedite. She also required the plaintiff to provide a DNA sample to verify her maternity to her daughter. When the results of the DNA test came back on March 12, 2018, they showed a 99.99999% probability of maternity. On March 9, 2018, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to modify this lawsuit into a class action and adding a new named plaintiff, Ms. C. 2018 WL 3155677. That same day, the plaintiffs moved for class certification, asking that the court certify a class defined as “[a]ll adult parents nationwide who (1) are or will be detained in immigration custody by the Department of Homeland Security, and (2) have a minor child who is or will be separated from them by DHS and detained in ORR custody, absent a demonstration in a hearing that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child.” On March 19, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction for classwide relief that would order the defendants to reunite the class members with their children and to discontinue their family separation practice. Given this motion, the court denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion for individual preliminary relief. On April 6, 2018, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint. First, they argued that the original plaintiffs' claims were moot because she has been released from ICE detention and reunited with her daughter. Second, the defendants asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction over Ms. C.’s habeas claim and that venue was improper for Ms. C.’s other claims. Third, the defendants claimed the court lacked jurisdiction to review ICE’s decision to detain rather than parole the plaintiffs, and also lacked jurisdiction to review ICE’s decision about where to detain the plaintiffs or to order ICE to detain them in a particular facility. Fourth, they contended that separation of the plaintiffs from their children did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Fifth, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under both the APA and the Asylum Act. Partially agreeing with the defendants, Judge Sabraw granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss on June 6, 2018. 302 F.Supp.3d 1149. Specifically, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims under the APA and relating to the federal asylum statute but retained the plaintiffs’ due process claim. The administration's practice of separating families at the border was formally abandoned on June 20, 2018, through Executive Order No. 13841. The Executive Order reestablished a policy to maintain family unity and directed that "alien families be detained together 'during the pendency of any criminal improper entry or immigration proceedings involving their members.'" The Executive Order did not provide any guidance on the reunification of families or future family separations. On June 26, 2018, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, finding that the class was sufficiently numerous, that there were common questions of law among the class, that the plaintiffs are typical of the class as a whole, and that the plaintiffs would represent the class adequately. 331 F.R.D. 529. On that same day, Judge Sabraw granted the plaintiffs’ motion for classwide preliminary injunction, requiring much from the government to remedy the harm. 310 F.Supp.3d 1133. Specifically, the court enjoined the defendants, and their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all those who are in active concert or participation with them, from detaining class members in DHS custody without and apart from their minor children, absent a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child, unless the parent affirmatively, knowingly, and voluntarily declines to be reunited with the child in DHS custody. Second, if the defendants chose to release class members from DHS custody, the defendants, were preliminarily enjoined from continuing to detain the minor children of the class members and had to release the minor children to the custody of their respective class members. Third, the court required that the defendants must reunify all class members with their minor children who were under the age of five within fourteen days of the entry of this order and that the defendants must reunify all class members with their minor children that were age five and over within thirty days of the entry of this order. Fourth, the defendants were required to immediately take all steps necessary to facilitate regular communication between class members and their children who remained in DHS custody. Fifth, the defendants were required to immediately take all steps necessary to facilitate regular communication between and among all executive agencies responsible for the custody, detention or shelter of class members and the custody and care of their children. Sixth, the defendants were preliminarily enjoined from removing any class members without their child, unless the class member affirmatively, knowingly, and voluntarily declined to be reunited with the child prior to the class member’s deportation, or there was a determination that the parent is unfit or presents a danger to the child. Finally, the court retained jurisdiction to entertain such further proceedings and to enter such further orders as may be necessary or appropriate to implement and enforce the provisions of this order and preliminary injunction. 310 F.Supp.3d 1133. On July 3, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint claiming that the government had separated thousands of migrant families over the past year without a legitimate purpose. 2018 WL 3575383. It forwarded the idea that the government's true purpose in separating these families was to deter future families from seeking refuge (i.e., asylum) in the United States. It referenced Attorney General Jeff Session's May 2018 announcement announced “a new initiative” to refer “100 percent” of immigrants who cross the Southwest border for criminal immigration prosecutions, also known as the “zero-tolerance policy," by which all parents who are prosecuted would be separated from their children. The complaint asserted that the true purpose of this new policy was to separate families in the hope that it would deter other families from seeking refuge in the United States. It also referenced President Trump's Executive Order (EO) of June 20, 2018, which purported to end the practice of family separation but allowed DHS to separate families for "the child's welfare" without setting forth how that standard would be applied. The complaint highlighted that this EO made no provision for reunifying families separated prior to its issuance or for returning children to parents who had already been deported. The plaintiffs moved for a stay of removal and a temporary restraining order (TRO) on July 16, 2018. 2018 WL 3575386. The plaintiffs requested that the court order the government not to remove parents until one week after they have been reunited with their children given rumors that the government was planning mass deportations to be carried out imminently and immediately upon reunification. The plaintiffs claimed that class members were at imminent risk of deportation without being advised of their rights under the injunction or the effect of waiving their children's rights against prolonged detention under the Flores settlement. That same day, constitutional law scholars including Dean Erwin Chemerinsky of Berkeley Law filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs' arguments regarding the district court's authority to grant the TRO. The scholars asserted that the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution forbids the government from delaying reunification of class members and their children until the eve of physical removal from the country; they said that this was because doing so would deny the plaintiffs and their families an effective means to fairly consider and present valid grounds for asylum and other relief from deportation. In opposition to the TRO, the government argued that the district court lacked the authority from staying the deportation of class members who had final orders of expedited removal (because in the procedural posture of their individual immigration cases, many had not passed an asylum screening and so did not have the right under federal law to present their asylum claims before an immigration judge). The parties filed a joint status report on July 19, 2018, in which the government stated that they had identified 2551 separated children from age 5 to 17 but that only 848 had been interviewed and cleared for reunification. 2018 WL 3575388. Many of these families were united but kept detained, mostly at two private family detention facilities in Texas. The plaintiffs noted that the government had failed to provide them a list of class members who had been released from ICE custody, a list of those who had been deported, as well as a list of parents with final removal orders, who needed to be counseled on their options and their children's options immediately. The next week in July 2018, Judge Sabraw ordered the government to provide the plaintiffs with a list of all class members who had been deported and of all who had been released into the interior of the country. She also ordered the plaintiffs and the government to produce a written plan for reuniting parents who had been deported but whose children remained in the United States; she later ordered each to appoint people to implement those plans. On August 3, 2018, she ordered the government to provide information regarding class members who the defendants found ineligible for reunification with their children because of alleged criminal histories. Judge Sabraw issued an order clarifying the scope of the injunction on August 16, 2018. She ordered that the injunctive relief did not limit DHS's authority to detain adults in its custody and that reunification did not give a parent a right to release if their detention was lawful. She ordered that if DHS was trying to reunify a detained adult in its custody with their child, the parent could either (i) waive the child's rights under the Flores settlement so that the family could be detained together in DHS custody or (ii) waive his or her right not to be separated from his or her child under this court's injunction and allow the child to be detained in the custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) and treated as an unaccompanied minor. That same day, the government informed the court of a "disturbance" at the ICE family detention center in Karnes County, Texas, between adult male class members who were being held there with their children. They said that the whole group of men were separated from their children again overnight but would be returned to Karnes. The TRO was denied as moot after Judge Sabraw granted a TRO for the plaintiffs in M.M.M et al v. Sessions (3:18-cv-01832-DMS-MDD, ECF No. 55), a family separation lawsuit filed by private counsel on August 3, 2018. The plaintiffs in M.M.M. are the children of class member parents in this case and the complaint raised issues surrounding the asylum process for families that had been separated at the border. The TRO granted for M.M.M. on August 16, 2018, stayed the deportation orders of Ms. L. class member parents pending the resolution of their children's asylum claims, in order to maintain family unity. In that order, Judge Sabraw ordered the parties in both cases to meet and confer with the government and to propose a solution. On August 23, 2018, the parties filed a new joint status report. 2018 WL 4144367. The government reported that they had identified 2,654 separated children ages 0-5 of which 1,923 had been reunited with a separated parent and 203 had been discharged to a sponsor (i.e., another family member or adult friend of the family) or had turned 18. 528 separated children remained in ORR custody; parents of 343 children of that group had been deported. The plaintiffs had received information from the government of 412 parents who had been deported. 231 parents had been reached by the plaintiffs and NGOs but 140 had not; of that group, neither party had a phone number for 41 parents and the phone numbers of 38 parents were inoperable or ineffective. The plaintiffs noted that they were investigating reports from deported parents who appeared to have been coerced or misled by U.S. government actions that deprived them of their right to seek asylum. These incidents include parents who were told that they needed to accept removal and not pursue asylum in order to be reunited with their children, and parents who were required to sign documents they did not understand, in languages they do not speak, that had the effect of waiving their right to seek asylum. The government appealed the court's order granting class certification to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in August 2018 (see 18-56151). Those proceedings were stayed in November 2018 before the parties had briefed the issues. On August 30, 2018, the parties filed another joint status report in which the plaintiffs identified discrepancies between lists it provided of parents and children. They also flagged that they had learned of separated children through legal service providers and NGOs who did not appear on government lists. The parties continued to file approximately weekly joint reports in September and October 2018 and less frequent reports in November 2018. As of September 23, 2018, 1,977 children had been reunited with their parents. Over 100 deported parents had not been reached in spite of significant NGO support. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on October 9, 2018. It added two named plaintiffs who were separated from their children at the time of the credible fear interviews (i.e., asylum screening) and who had received a negative determination. One of the women's negative determination had been affirmed by an immigration judge such that she had exhausted all administrative remedies and could be deported at any time. This complaint also added a right to family integrity under the Due Process Clause and asserted more robust violations under the federal asylum statute. That same day, Judge Sabraw granted the parties' motion for preliminary approval of a settlement agreement, in which she approved classes in this case and in M.M.M. for the purposes of settlement only. A key component of that agreement allowed parents to have a new credible fear screening in "good faith" to determine whether a positive determination is warranted; with a positive determination, an asylum seeker may submit an asylum application and present their claim before an immigration judge. This was important because many parents had received negative determinations due in part to the trauma they were experiencing while separated from their children. On October 16, 2018, Judge Sabraw granted the plaintiffs' motion to require immediate implementation of the settlement agreement. This required the government to allow 60+ class members in detention who had elected to take advantage of the asylum procedures set out in the settlement agreement but who the government had refused to orient until final approval of the settlement. She noted that it was the government's statutory obligation to allow people asserting a fear of persecution access to an asylum screening. The government informed the court on October 25, 2018 that it had released a total of 2,404 children and was working towards release of an additional 47. Together and Free, a grassroots organization that provides assistance to separated families, filed a notice of objection on November 6, 2018 to the fairness and adequacy of the proposed settlement agreement. It noted that many families which were treated as reunified were not in fact, as many parents remained in ICE custody while their children had been released to friends or extended family members. It also highlighted that deported family members did not receive adequate relief, as the settlement only would allow a reopening of their cases and a new asylum screening in "rare and unusual" instances. The court certified the settlement classes and granted final approval of the class action settlement on November 15, 2018, in response to the plaintiffs' motion filed the week prior. 2018 WL 7075890. Separate counsel were appointed for each of three groups: nonprofit organizations for members of the parent class who remained physically present in the United States, the ACLU for members of the parent class who had been physically removed from the United States, and private counsel for the child class. It provides that class members with expedited removal orders are entitled to a sua sponte review of their negative credible fear determinations and the opportunity to present additional evidence to an asylum officer. On December 14, 2018, the ACLU requested that the court clarify that the scope of the Ms. L class included parents whose children were separated from them before June 26, 2018, which was the date when the court granted the preliminary injunction. The government filed their opposition to this motion on February 6, 2019 (the deadline was extended because of a government shutdown), arguing that this backward-looking definition conflicted with the forward-looking language of the settlement. 2019 WL 927180. The court granted this motion on March 8, 2019, and modified the class definition to include parents who entered on or before June 1, 2017; she noted that there was no dispute that they were subjected to the same family separation policies as the parents who indisputably fit into the scope of the class. 330 F.R.D. 284. On February 8, 2019, the court issued an order further clarifying the settlement agreement. It states that where a child was issued a Notice to Appear (NTA) in immigration court but a parent had not because they had received a negative CFI determination, the parent's case would be reviewed again so that both parent and child were deported or both placed in immigration court proceedings. On February 22, 2019, the court issued an order on the plaintiffs' motion to enforce the settlement agreement for class members who had not submitted executed waiver forms, after the plaintiffs filed their reply in support of this motion on February 13. 2019 WL 259140. Judge Sabraw did not outright grant the motion but ordered the government to provide plaintiffs' counsel with a list of names of people subject to removal for failure to execute these forms. She also required that the government advise ICE to not remove class members until they were advised of their rights under the settlement agreement and an opportunity to execute the relevant forms. On April 5, 2019, the government filed a proposed plan to identify additional Ms. L. class members through statistical analysis of ORR records of 47,000 children who were released from its custody on or after June 1, 2017. From there, the government says they will manually review the case records of children who appeared to have the highest probability of having been separated, a process that they estimate will take 2 years to complete. Following a status conference and review of the parties' status report, Judge Sabraw issued an order on April 25, 2019, approving the government's plan to identify additional class members and mandating that the plan be completed within six months. 2019 WL 1868487. On June 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to allow 21 parents deported without their children to travel to the U.S. to obtain an opportunity to reunite with their children. The parents are part of a group of 51 parents deported without their children that the plaintiffs identified as being deprived of an opportunity to apply for asylum, currently in danger, and possessing bonafide asylum claims. The government rejected all 51 applications without any individualized explanations. However, 30 of these parents managed to make it to the U.S.-Mexico border and all of them passed their credible fear interviews or were placed directly into immigration proceedings before an immigration judge, and were subsequently reunified with their children. The plaintiffs asserted that the remaining 21 parents are no different than those 30 and sought a remedy, appropriate under the Settlement Agreement and Ninth Circuit law, to provide a pathway to legal travel to the U.S. where they would "almost certainly" pass their credible fear interviews and reunite with their children. On July 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction and request that the court clarify the standard for ongoing separations. The plaintiffs asserted that from June 2018 to June 2019 the defendants separated more than 900 children based on criminal history of the parents, no matter how insignificant the crime, and a unilateral determination that the parent is unfit or dangerous. The plaintiffs requested that the court set guidelines and work with the parties to create a process for resolving disputes about separations. The defendants argued that their practices were no different than the practices of other administrations and that the number of separations was a small fraction of individuals entering the border during that time, reflecting a careful exercise of discretion consistent with the court's order. On September 4, 2019, Judge Sabraw issued an order granting in part and denying in part plaintiffs' motion to allow parents deported without their children to travel to the United States. After initially requesting relief for 21 parents, the plaintiffs reduced the request to 18 parents. The court found that 11 of the parents were entitled to the requested relief and 7 were not, as these parents failed prove that they were wrongfully removed. 403 F.Supp.3d 853. After holding a status conference with the parties, Judge Sabraw issued an order on September 20, 2019, mandating that defendants "produce all governing documents memorializing standardized procedures, guidelines and guidance for separating parents and children at the border." The government informed the court on October 16, 2019, that it had released 2,788 children out of 2,814 possible children of potential class members for the original class period and identified 1,290 children of potential expanded class members. On January 13, 2020, Judge Sabraw issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to enforce preliminary injunction. Judge Sabraw, considering the defendants' implementation of guidelines and additional practices, its authority to secure the borders, and the scope of the class and need to avoid individualized determinations, found that defendants were exercising discretion consistent with the court's orders and plaintiffs' right to family integrity. Accordingly, Judge Sabraw concluded that there was no need for the court to intervene to further enforce the preliminary injunction. However, Judge Sabraw did find that the defendants were not acting consistently with the court's order with regard to DNA testing and requested clarification regarding separations based on family residential center standards. 415 F.Supp.3d 980. The defendants filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss the appeal in the Ninth Circuit on February 26, 2020. The appeal had been stayed since November 2018 and no briefs had been filed by either party. As of March 4, 2020, the case is ongoing in the district court. The defendants' answer to the plaintiffs' third amended complaint is due by April 10, 2020.

Summary: This 2018 class action lawsuit was brought by an asylum seeker from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that the DHS, ICE, and several other government agencies had violated the Asylum Act, the APA, and the Fifth Amendment by separating the plaintiff and her daughter under the Trump Administration's policy of family separation. The court has granted class certification and a preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing.