This lawsuit, brought on October 5, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenged President Trump's revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs were a group of nonprofit organizations and DACA recipients who sought to enjoin the federal government from ending the program. Not only did the plaintiffs stand to lose benefits and security they had relied upon, but the plaintiffs argued that the rescission was motivated by discriminatory animus toward individuals from Mexico and Central America. As a result, the plaintiffs contended that revoking DACA violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought equitable estoppel, injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment. In 2012, the Obama Administration Department of Homeland Security created the DACA program by issuing a series of policy changes. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children. As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless congress acts within the next six months. As the complaint highlights, the Obama administration in promoting DACA made key promises to immigrants: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement, and that barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. The plaintiffs included a series of nonprofit organizations devoted to civil rights, and in particular immigrant rights. The plaintiffs also included individuals who came to the U.S. as children from various nations in South America. Some were students, others were working, and still others had started families in the U.S. They argued that the DACA rescission would lead to loss of work authorization and many vital benefits, loss of the ability to attend college, risk of deportation, breaking up of families. Further, the plaintiffs highlighted that the government had issued "guidance suggesting an intention to welch on those promises and to share that information with ICE and CBP." The case was assigned to Judge Roger W. Titus. On Nov. 15, 2017, the government moved to dismiss the case. The court denied in part and granted in part the government's motion to dismiss on Mar. 5, 2018. The court enjoined the government from using or sharing information provided by DACA applicants through the DACA program for enforcement or deportation purposes. The court granted the plaintiffs' estoppel claim, finding that there would be "substantial risk for irreparable harm." The court ordered that if the government "needs to make use of an individual Dreamer’s information for national security or some purpose implicating public safety or public interest," it could petition the court for permission on a case-by-case basis. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35373. The court also declared that the DACA rescission memo was valid and constitutional. The court found that the memo "neither curtails DHS’s discretion regarding individual immigration reviews, nor does it prevent the agency from granting Dreamers deferred action status again in the future," making "DACA and its rescission...more akin to non-binding policy statements...not subject to notice-and-comment requirements" under the APA. The court also found that the decision to rescind DACA was not arbitrary and capricious under the APA, "but rather was a carefully crafted decision supported by the Administrative Record...[I]t is irrelevant whether this Court, a judge in California or New York, or even a justice on the Supreme Court might have made a different decision while standing in the shoes of DHS." Because the government rescinded the program under the "reasonable belief that DACA was unlawful, the decision to wind down DACA in an orderly manner was rational." 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35373. Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' Equal Protection and Due Process claims. The court found no merit in the equal protection claim because the executive branch was fulfilling its duty to enforce the law in rescinding DACA, there was no affirmative showing of bad faith, and a facially valid motive to rescind was sufficient. The court also found that DACA did not create any due process entitlements nor did it curtail DHS' discretion in individual immigration reviews. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35373. The court ordered the case closed. The government then expressed uncertainty about the scope of the injunction, and on Mar. 12, the court directed the parties to collaborate to reach agreement on the specifics of implementing the injunction. On Mar. 15, the court approved the parties' joint proposed textual revisions. On April 27, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed the case to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The parties' briefs can be found under the documents section of this page. Oral argument occurred before the Honorable Robert B. King, Albert Diaz and Julius N. Richardson on December 11, 2018. On May 17, 2019, the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's decision. The appeals court affirmed the district court’s rulings that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and that DACA’s rescission did not require notice and comment under the APA. But it reversed the district court’s ruling sustaining the rescission of the policy as valid under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The court vacated DACA’s rescission as arbitrary and capricious and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On the issue of the use of information provided by DACA applicants, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling finding the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive relief on equitable estoppel grounds, reversed the grant of summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor, and vacated the injunction. Finally, the court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to DACA’s rescission and the related changes to the Department’s policies governing use of information provided by DACA applicants, and thus vacated the district court’s judgment on those issues and dismissed those claims. 2019 WL 2147204. On May 24, 2019, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking review of the Fourth Circuit's decision. The government also requested expedited consideration of its petition, which the Supreme Court denied on June 3, 2019. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to view the petitions in three DACA cases: Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, Regents of the University of California v. DHS, and NAACP v. Trump. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. The decision of the Court was released in June 2020. Following its decision in Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents, the Supreme Court denied the Government’s petition for certiorari in this case, and effective June 30, 2020, the stay on the Fourth Circuit’s mandate was lifted. After the Supreme Court released its decision in the three DACA cases and denied certiorari in this case, plaintiff’s counsel sent a letter to Judge Grimm on July 17, 2020 asking that the District Court retain jurisdiction to ensure appropriate relief will be granted. The letter raised questions about the government’s compliance with the Fourth Circuit’s mandate and asked that the government be required to explain the efforts it was taking to comply with the mandate including a discussion of its efforts: (i) to rescind the memoranda issued by both Acting Secretary Duke and Secretary Nielsen as well as any associated guidance issued to DHS employees, (ii) to begin processing properly submitted initial DACA applications as it would have under the status quo ante restored by the Fourth Circuit’s mandate, and (iii) to begin processing properly submitted applications for advance parole Since the plaintiffs prevailed, and the government’s effort to repeal deportation protections for Dreamers was “arbitrary and capricious,” the letter also asked for award of costs and fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act 28 USC Sec. 2412. On the same day, Judge Grimm issued an order that: 1. Declared the DACA recission and actions taken by the Government to rescind the DACA policy “arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);” 2. Restored the DACA policy to its pre-September 5, 2017 status; and 3. Enjoined the government from implementing or enforcing the DACA recission or taking any other action to rescind DACA that is not in compliance with applicable law. In the order, Judge Grimm also applied the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to deny the plaintiff’s estoppel claim and injunction request, pertaining to DACA’s information-sharing policies, because the policies in question were vacated. Following the order, plaintiffs sent Judge Grimm a letter to notify him that the government did not appear to be complying with the order because the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services had not updated their website to reflect that the policies announced on September 5, 2017 being declared void. On July 28, 2020, Department of Homeland Security Acting Secretary Chad Wolf issued a memorandum (Wolf Memorandum) outlining how the Department should proceed on DACA matters. On August 14, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting the “Court issue an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt or, in the alternative, to compel compliance with the Fourth Circuit mandate to restore DACA to its pre-September 5, 2017, status.” Two weeks later, Defendants filed a response, which included an argument that there was no basis for an order restoring DACA to its pre-September 5, 2017 status because the plaintiffs did not challenge the Wolf Memorandum. On September 4, plaintiffs filed a reply to the government’s response where they, for the first time, questioned the validity of the Wolf Memorandum on the grounds that “Acting Secretary” Wolf was “illegally appointed” under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act. As of October 25, 2020, the order to show cause remained pending. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit, brought on October 5, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, challenged President Trump's revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs argued that the rescission was motivated by discriminatory animus toward individuals from Mexico and Central America. As a result, the plaintiffs contended that revoking DACA violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, and the APA. The district court found that the rescission did not violate the APA, that the constitutional claims were without merit, and that DACA’s rescission did not violate principles of estoppel. It did, however, order the government (on grounds of estoppel) to comply with the policies promulgated in 2012 on the use of information provided by DACA applicants and enjoined it from altering these policies. On May 17, 2019, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings that the plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and that DACA’s rescission did not require notice and comment under the APA. But it reversed the district court’s ruling sustaining the rescission of the policy as valid. The court vacated DACA’s rescission as arbitrary and capricious and remanded the matter for further proceedings. On the issue of the use of information provided by DACA applicants, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s ruling finding the plaintiffs entitled to injunctive relief on equitable estoppel grounds, reversed the grant of summary judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor, and vacated the injunction. Finally, the court of appeals found it unnecessary to decide the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to DACA’s rescission and the related changes to the Department’s policies governing use of information provided by DACA applicants, and thus vacated the district court’s judgment on those issues and dismissed those claims. The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court which has yet to be addressed, but the Supreme Court did agree to consolidate and review three other DACA cases. It heard oral argument in that appeal on November 12, 2019, and decided for the plaintiffs. After that decision the Court denied certiorari in this case which lifted the stay on the Fourth Circuits decision to vacate the DACA rescission as arbitrary and capricious and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Back in District Court Judge Grimm issued an order declaring the DACA rescission and actions taken by the Government to rescind the DACA policy “arbitrary and capricious, in violation of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);” restoring the DACA policy to its pre-September 5, 2017 status; and enjoining the government from implementing or enforcing the DACA rescission or taking any other action to rescind DACA that is not in compliance with applicable law. After the government allegedly failed to comply with the Fourth Circuit's mandate, plaintiff's filed a motion requesting the “Court issue an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt or, in the alternative, to compel compliance with the Fourth Circuit mandate to restore DACA to its pre-September 5, 2017, status.”


The EEOC brought this suit against Ford Motor Credit Company in September 2006 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville). The case was assigned to Judge Aleta A. Trauger. The complaint alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to keep confidential the medical information of an employee with HIV. The complainant intervened, alleging violations of the ADA and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After the court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and the parties agreed to dismiss the intervenor-plaintiff's state claims, the parties entered into settlement negotiations before the Magistrate Judge. These failed in March 2008, and the parties proceeded to prepare for trial. In August 2008, though, the parties negotiated a settlement. The parties continued to disagree as to the lawfulness of the defendant's activities, however both desired to settle to avoid continued expense of litigation. The defendant's agreement to a settlement was not to be construed as an admission of a violation of Title VII. The consent was set to be binding for two years from the date of entry on September 17, 2008. It contained provisions for an injunction against discrimination with respect to disclosure of medical information as well as training. The consent decree also awarded $75,000 in damages to the plaintiff and required two annual reports to the EEOC. Parties agreed to pay their own attorney's costs and fees. The consent decree has since run its course and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: The EEOC brought this suit against Ford Motor Credit Company in September 2006 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee (Nashville). The complaint alleged violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to keep medical information of an employee with HIV confidential. The complainant intervened, alleging violations of the ADA and the Tennessee Human Rights Act, invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The parties settled out of court.


On June 27, 2016, a resident of Flint who drank and bathed in lead-contaminated water filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on behalf of herself and her minor child. (The complaint named, but did not describe, a second individual plaintiff who was also a resident of Flint exposed to unsafe water.) The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the City of Flint, the State of Michigan, and various government officials and private contractors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. They sought general, compensatory and punitive damages, an order declaring the defendants’ conduct unconstitutional, equitable relief to remediate the harm they had suffered, and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ failure to provide safe drinking water and provision of deliberate misinformation about the safety of the drinking water violated their due process and common law rights. This case is one of many filed in response to the 2014 Flint water crisis, which occurred when Flint began to draw corrosive water from the Flint River to save money, exposing thousands to lead and other toxins. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants knew the water was contaminated yet continued to publicly state the water was safe. By so doing, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants showed deliberate indifference to their bodily integrity and property rights, breached their contract to provide safe water, breached the implied warranty that the water they sold was safe, and interfered with the plaintiffs’ ability to enjoy their home constituting a nuisance. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ failure to adequately test the water was negligent and the failure to provide safe drinking water was grossly negligent. On October 27, 2016 the defendants moved to change venue, arguing that the overwhelming extent of adverse media coverage would make a fair and impartial jury nearly impossible in the Eastern District of Michigan. The defendants requested a venue change to an out of state metropolitan venue or the Northern Division of the Western District of Michigan, which they claimed was the least prejudicial venue in the Michigan. In the following weeks all defendants moved to dismiss. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim; some defendants who were government officials sued in their official capacities raised immunity defenses and argued that the proprietary function exception to governmental immunity did not apply to the sale of water. On January 23, 2017 the court (Judge Judith E. Levy) denied the motion to change venue. The court noted that plaintiffs can ordinarily choose the venue, the majority of the defendants lived nearby, and most of the evidence was in the area. It determined that a venue change so far before trial would be premature. 2017 WL 6390962. On June 5, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the motions to dismiss. Judge Levy dismissed the plaintiffs’ breach of contract, breach of implied warranty, nuisance, trespass, gross negligence, professional negligence, IIED, and NIED claims. She also dismissed the plaintiff’s due process claims that related to property loss and state-created danger. Judge Levy also dismissed the plaintiffs’ bodily integrity claims as to the government defendants and officials acting within their official capacities and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. But the plaintiffs’ bodily integrity claims against officials acting in their individual capacities and their ordinary negligence claims against the contractors survived. 2017 WL 2418007. Meanwhile, Judge Levy indicated that she planned to consolidate all of the class action cases arising from the Flint water crisis. In this case, the plaintiffs moved for leave to add class allegations and consolidation with the other class actions on June 23. Judge Levy consolidated the class actions on July 27 with Waid v. Snyder. But she declined to consolidate this case, likely because it was not originally filed as a class action. As of May 2020, this case has not been consolidated. Litigation also continued over the court’s decision on the motions to dismiss as various government officials appealed the district court’s decision denying them qualified immunity, and district court proceedings were stayed in October 2017 so that those appeals could proceed. 2017 WL 4875618. The Sixth Circuit (Judges Griffin and White, with Judge McKeague dissenting in part) largely affirmed the district court on January 4, 2019. The Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs had stated a claim for harm to bodily integrity against officials who were not entitled to qualified immunity, although it dismissed the claims against other officials against whom the plaintiffs had alleged only negligence. The Sixth Circuit also determined that Flint was not an “arm of the state,” which could have conferred additional immunity on some officials, despite being run by an emergency manager. 912 F.3d 907. The Sixth Circuit denied to petition for rehearing en banc. 912 F.3d 907. The case returned to the district court, but on August 14, 2019, the City of Flint filed a petition to appeal to the Supreme Court. The city challenged the Sixth Circuit's decision to expand the right to bodily integrity to protection from exposure to environmental toxins. The city also requested review of whether it is plausible that the decisions of government officials acting with the approval of regulatory enforcers and the advice of experts can be found to be conscience-shocking. For the claim against the city defendants to pass the Twombly plausibility standard, the plaintiffs must show how the government engaged in discretionary conduct that deprived them of a constitutionally protected liberty interest was constitutionally repugnant. To do this, the plaintiffs must allege conduct that was "conscience shocking". Additionally, the city asked the Supreme Court to decide if there was a clearly established constitutional right. The city argues that even if a bodily integrity violation occurred, it was not clearly established. Finally, the city challenged the ruling that a municipality under complete control of the state is not an "arm of the state" and consequently not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. On January 21, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the petition and refused to hear the case. Supreme Court Case No. 19-205. In the district court, the most recent status conference was held before Judge Levy over telephone (due to the COVID-19 pandemic) on May 20, 2020. The case has been briefed and the next status conference is set to be held on June 24, 2020. As of May 2020, the case remains open.

Summary: On June 27, 2016, two residents of Flint who bathed in and consumed lead contaminated water filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued various state entities, their employees, and private companies responsible for water testing and feasibility under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought general, compensatory and punitive damages, an order declaring the conduct unconstitutional, equitable relief and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs claimed that the failure to provide safe drinking water and deliberate misinformation about the safety of the drinking water constituted state created danger, violation of bodily integrity, and deprivation of contractually created property rights. While the court dismissed most of the plaintiffs' claims, the Sixth Circuit allowed a narrow species of due process claims against individual government employees to proceed, and negligence claims against private companies also survived. The city of Flint appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking review of the decisions on Eleventh Amendment immunity and whether there was a clearly established right to bodily integrity, and whether this right should extend to protection from environmental toxins. The Supreme Court denied to hear the case. The case is ongoing in the district court.


On January 4, 2017, indigent driver’s license holders filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the Tennessee statute at issue automatically revoked driver’s licenses of people who failed to pay court fines, costs, or litigation taxes within one year, without consideration of their ability to pay. The plaintiffs, represented by both public interest and private lawyers, sought to enjoin the defendants from revoking driver’s licenses and to reinstate all revoked licenses after waiving the reinstatement fees. They also asked for a declaration that the Tennessee statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is second of two cases challenging Tennessee’s practice of rescinding the driver’s licenses of those who are unable to pay the fines without consideration of their indigence. In the companion case, (here in the Clearinghouse), Robinson v. Purkey, a preliminary injunction was granted prohibiting license suspensions for failure to pay fines unless the legislature enacts a statute requiring inquiry as to the defendant's ability to pay--the court required reinstatement of licenses suspended for nonpayment and to waive reinstatement fees. The plaintiffs moved for a class certification on January 5, 2017, which was met with defendants’ motion to dismiss on March 3, 2017. The plaintiffs then filed a renewed motion for a class certification and a motion for summary judgment on August 18, 2017. On October 10, 2017, co-defendants Governor of Tennessee and Attorney General of Tennessee were dismissed without prejudice. The only remaining defendant, Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security, filed a motion for summary judgment on November 6, 2017. On March 26, 2018, District Judge Aleta Trauger denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Judge Trauger certified the class as “[a]ll persons whose Tennessee driver’s licenses have been or will be revoked pursuant to the Statute [Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-24-105(b)] and who, at the time of the revocation, cannot or could not pay Court Debt due to their financial circumstances.” 303 F. Supp. 3d 585. On July 2, 2018, Judge Trauger granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court held that revocation of indigent drivers' licenses for failure to timely pay court debts, without inquiry into drivers' ability to pay, violated their due process and equal protection rights. 329 F. Supp. 3d 475. Following the judgment, the defendant appealed the case to the Sixth Circuit on July 25, 2018. Judge Trauger granted the defendant a partial stay pending appeal on July 31, 2018. As of February 15, 2019, the case pending on appeal. On May 22, 2019, the Governor of Tennessee signed into law HB0839, which amended the statute to allow an exception for indigence. Because the amended statute essentially granted the relief that the plaintiffs had sought in this case, they moved to dismiss their claims as moot. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the state's appeal on September 12, 2019, vacated the district court's judgment, and remanded with instructions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the case on September 30, 2019. As of August 7, 2020, the only outstanding issue is the question of attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: On January 4, 2017, indigent driver’s license holders filed a putative class action against the Tennessee Department of Safety and Homeland Security under 42 U.S.C. §1983 in the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs alleged that the Tennessee statute at issue required automatic revocation of driver’s licenses of people who failed to pay court fines, costs, or litigation taxes within one year, without consideration of their ability to pay. The plaintiffs, represented by both public interest lawyers and private lawyers, sought a declaration that the Tennessee statute violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. On July 2, 2018, Judge Trauger granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement and denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgement. The defendant appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on July 25, 2018. In May 2019 the Governor of Tennessee signed HB0839, amending the statute to include an exception for indigence; the appeal and the case were both dismissed in September 2019. As of August 2020, the only outstanding issue is the question of attorneys' fees and costs.


On December 21, 2018, detainees at California’s Alameda County Jail filed a class-action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County of Alameda in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sued for violations of their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and California state law. The plaintiffs asked the court for a declaration that the jail’s ongoing practices violated their constitutional and statutory rights, and injunctive relief ordering the jail to end the use of “safety cells” and to give prisoners with psychiatric disabilities access to adequate mental health care. The case was assigned to Judge Nathanael M. Cousins. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that suicidal prisoners were thrown into “safety cells,” “where they are stripped naked and given only a smock to cover themselves. The safety cells contain no furniture and only a hole in the ground for prisoners to use as a bathroom, meaning that prisoners have to sleep and eat on the same floor that they must also urinate and defecate on and are also unable to wash their hands after going to the bathroom.” Although jail policy limited confinement in these cells to seventy-two hours, the complaint alleged that the prisoners had been forced to stay in those cells for a week or more at a time, causing prisoners to stop reporting suicidal feelings to staff in order to avoid being thrown into these cells. On December 6, 2019, the plaintiffs and the jail filed a joint motion for class certification. On January 21, 2020, the court certified a class of “All adults who are now, or in the future will be, incarcerated in the Alameda County Jail,” and a subclass of all members of the primary class “with a psychiatric disability,” as defined by the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and California statute. As of August 2020, a jury trial is scheduled for January 25, 2021.

Summary: In December 2018, California detainees filed a civil class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the County of Alameda in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the County of Alameda’s jail policies and practices violated their rights by stripping suicidal prisoners and throwing them into bare solitary cells with a hole in the ground for a bathroom. Class certification was granted on January 21, 2020; as of August 2020, a jury trial is scheduled for January 25, 2021.


This case is about whether, despite the protections afforded by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) to Native American families, officials in Pennington County, South Dakota removed Native American children from their homes without sufficient evidence or adequate hearings. On March 21, 2013, three native parents and the Oglala Sioux Tribe and the Rosebud Sioux Tribe brought this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota. They sued the Secretary of the South Dakota Department of Social Services (DSS), the State's Attorney for Pennington County, the presiding judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court of the state of South Dakota, and the person in charge of Child Protective Services (CPS) for Pennington County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private counsel and the ACLU, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs challenged three policies, practices, and customs: “(1) removing Indian children from their homes without affording them, their parents, or their tribe a timely and adequate hearing as required by the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment], (2) removing Indian children from their homes without affording them, their parents, or their tribe a timely and adequate hearing as required by the Indian Child Welfare Act, and (3) removing Indian children from their homes without affording them, their parents, or their tribe a timely and adequate hearing and then coercing the parents into waiving their rights under the Due Process Clause and the Indian Child Welfare Act to such a hearing.” On April 22, 2013 the plaintiffs moved to certify their class, and by May 20, 2013, all defendants had moved to dismiss, arguing: “(1) the court should not entertain this action under the Younger and Rooker–Feldman abstention doctrines; (2) plaintiffs failed to exhaust their state court remedies; (3) plaintiffs lack standing; (4) plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (5) plaintiffs' ICWA claims cannot be vindicated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” On January 28, 2014, Chief Judge Jeffrey L. Viken certified the class as “all other members of federally recognized Indian tribes who reside in Pennington County, South Dakota, and who, like plaintiffs, are parents or custodians of Indian children.” On the same day, Judge Viken also denied each of the five claims raised by the defendants in their motions to dismiss. 993 F.Supp.2d 1017. The plaintiffs then filed two separate motions for partial summary judgment on July 11, 2014; one concerned the due process claims and the other concerned their claim regarding ICWA, specifically that the defendants were violating § 1922, which allows for the emergency removal of a native child only “in order to prevent imminent physical damage or harm to the child.” Judge Viken granted both motions for partial summary judgment on March 30, 2015. Judge Viken found that judicial and prosecutorial immunity did not apply to the defendants, and that the practice and policies of the defendants violated both the requirements of ICWA and due process. He summarized the violations as follows: “(1) failing to appoint counsel in advance of the 48-hour hearing; (2) failing to provide notice of the claims against Indian parents, the issues to be resolved and the state's burden of proof; (3) denial of the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses; (4) denying Indian parents or custodians the right to present evidence in their own defense; and (5) removing Indian children on grounds not based on evidence presented in the hearing.” Additionally, he noted that even though the two Tribes reached a separated agreement in May of 2014 with the State's Attorney and DSS, which maintained that they would provide both “the petition for temporary custody and the ICWA affidavit to Indian parents at 48–hour hearings,” this did not negate the plaintiffs’ right to relief. The presiding judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit Court still maintained that “§ 1922 and the due process rights…do not apply at 48–hour hearings,” and therefore it is not “absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” 100 F. Supp. 3d 749. However, on February 19, 2016, Judge Viken granted in part the defendant’s motion for reconsideration based on “minor misstatements” of material facts in the March 30 order, and subsequently he amended the grant of partial summary judgment. 2016 WL 697117. Plaintiffs again moved for partial summary judgment on July 5, 2016, which the defendants moved to strike on July 26, 2016. On December 15, 2016, Judge Viken denied the defendants’ motion to strike and again granted the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Whereas plaintiffs’ first motion for summary judgment challenged the “policy of ignoring § 1922,” the second motion challenged the policy of “misinterpreting and misapplying § 1922.” Judge Viken found that the DSS continued to seek emergency custody “based exclusively on evidence of emotional damage,” when “Congress intended § 1922 to be limited solely to “imminent physical damage or harm” in determining whether to initiate or terminate emergency proceedings.” 220 F. Supp. 3d 986. Consequently, on the same day, Judge Viken granted the plaintiffs' request for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. In his declaratory judgment, he berated the defendants for continuing to “disregard this court's March 30, 2015, partial summary judgment order” and failing to comply “with § 1922 and the Due Process Clause when dealing with Indian children, parents, custodians and tribes in 48-hour hearings.” Judge Viken therefore issued a detailed permanent injunction against the DSS and CPS, but not the presiding judge, which largely forbid the violations outlined in the March 30 order so as to protect “the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and “the statutory rights of the plaintiffs guaranteed by the Indian Child Welfare Act.” On January 1, 2017 the defendants filed their appeal of Judge Viken’s December 15, 2016 decision. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs again filed two additional motions for partial summary judgment, which alleged “inadequate training and supervision” of CPS staff and against DSS for failing to end the placement of Native children when the reason for the placement ends. However, on September 29, 2017, Judge Viken denied both motions because the motions addressed claims not made in the original complaint. The plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint on January 21, 2018 which added the allegations made in the motions for partial summary judgment to the complaint as a fourth and fifth claim. However, on September 14, 2018, the Eighth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals vacated the orders granting partial summary judgment and declaratory and injunctive relief, and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the claims that gave rise to the orders. The Eighth Circuit held that the district court should have abstained under Younger because “South Dakota's temporary custody proceedings are civil enforcement proceedings to which Younger principles apply.” Abstention, the court reasoned, “was warranted because “a federal court should not intervene where such interference unduly inhibits the legitimate functioning of the individual state's judicial system.” In this case, the relief granted “would interfere with the state judicial proceedings by requiring the defendants to comply with numerous procedural requirements at future 48-hour hearings.” 904 F.3d 603. Following this decision, which left only claims four and five of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint in contention, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on October 22, 2018. The plaintiffs, meanwhile, appealed to the Supreme Court, which declined to hear the appeal on October 8, 2019. On January 16, 2020, Judge Viken granted defendants' motion to dismiss as claims four and five also rested on judicial policies and practices of the state, which under the Eighth Circuit’s decision required abstention, and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The case is now closed.

Summary: This is a class action lawsuit by Native American parents in Pennington County, South Dakota alleging that DSS, CPS, the State's Attorney, and the presiding judge of the state's Seventh Circuit court violated the ICWA and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs were originally granted injunctive and declaratory relief, but the Eighth Circuit vacated those orders and remanded the case. Following that decision, the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, and judgment was entered in favor of the defendants.


This case is part of the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse's coverage of the Carter Page Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants. For more information on litigation to disclose the warrants that inspired this case, please see this link. For a summary of the warrants and information on ongoing efforts by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to protect the confidential information in them, see this link.
The FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On April 4, 2017, the James Madison Project (a Washington, DC-based nonprofit dedicated to promoting public transparency in the intelligence community) and a USA Today national security reporter filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552), requesting that the Department of Justice (DOJ) release documents from the FISC relating to surveillance on the Trump 2016 campaign and any minimization procedures related to them. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. In a separate case, the FISC released an opinion (available in this Clearinghouse under caseNS-DC-0127) emphasizing this case as one that could lead to lawful release of information in the Carter Page FISA warrants. The plaintiffs, in their complaint in this case, said that the initial FOIA request and ensuing lawsuit were based on a tweet from President Trump's Twitter account on March 4, 2017 accusing the Obama administration of illegally monitoring his campaign. They argued that subsequent statements from President Trump and Press Secretary Sean Spicer constituted prior official disclosure of the surveillance, and the documents should be released. The initial FOIA request sent to the DOJ on March 6, 2017 asked for copies of the orders authorizing surveillance on the Trump campaign, any applications for those orders, and any minimization procedures applied to the orders. The plaintiffs alleged that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had not provided any responsive documents at the time of filing the complaint. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on March 15, 2017, saying that six hours after they filed the initial complaint, the FBI filed a response (known as a Glomar response) to their initial FOIA request saying it could not confirm or deny the existence of the FISC documents. The plaintiffs noted that since this response was received after they filed the complaint in District Court, they were exempt from exhausting administrative remedies and could proceed with the litigation. The new complaint added an extra count against the DOJ National Security Division, alleging that the plaintiffs had exhausted all administrative avenues to get the requested documents through the DOJ without success and therefore could add the DOJ National Security Division to this complaint as a defendant. The DOJ filed a motion for summary judgment on July 14, 2017. The government alleged that the Glomar response was proper under the following exceptions to FOIA: the national security exception (1), the exception to protect sources in an ongoing intelligence investigation as required by the National Security Act (3), the exception to information collected as part of an ongoing investigation (7a), and the exception for information that would reveal law enforcement techniques (7e). The DOJ added that it had properly filed national security disclosures describing why the requested information had to be protected in line with exception 1's requirements. The DOJ also argued that the President's broad statements related to some form of surveillance were not an official acknowledgement of the requested records, since the tweets and press statements were broad and did not acknowledge a specific investigation. The plaintiffs filed a cross motion for summary judgment in response to the DOJ's motion on August 18, 2017 contesting the DOJ's characterization of the administration's conduct as not an acknowledgement of an investigation. They provided quotations from the President and Spicer repeating that Trump himself was not the target of surveillance in the 2016 campaign. In addition, they cited a lengthy press statement from Spicer responding to news reports about specific FISA warrants against the campaign; they argued that the response to specific investigations was enough to acknowledge their existence. The plaintiffs also highlighted denials of investigations into President Trump directly from FBI Director James Comey and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper as proof that there was some sort of investigation going on. The DOJ responded to this motion on September 17, saying that no amount of media speculation or response to media speculation could amount to official disclosure of an investigation. Instead, they alleged that disclosure of an investigation must be officially done. The plaintiffs contested this in a September 29, 2017 response, saying that, if the court applied the DOJ's logic, an intelligence agency could simply protect information about an intelligence by saying it is responding to a media request. The case was reassigned to Judge Timothy J. Kelly on September 18, 2017. It was randomly reassigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta on November 2. Judge Mehta allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefs distinguishing or analogizing this case from separate James Madison Project FOIA litigation (James Madison Project v. Dep't of Justice, No. 17-cv-144) decided on January 4, 2018, which said that "political statements" were not official acknowledgements of FISA investigations. In their response brief dated January 17, the DOJ reiterated previous arguments about the breadth of the contested government statements, saying they did not amount to disclosure. The James Madison Project, in its January 22 response, stressed that the White House statements responded to news reports of specific FISA investigations, and the specificity present here made them not like the "political statements" in the previous case. On February 14, after the release of new information from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) officially acknowledging FISA investigations into the Trump campaign in January 2018, the DOJ provided a proposed schedule for settlement negotiations, which the plaintiffs accepted two days later. The plaintiffs filed a status report on July 24 asking for renewed briefing, in light of new tweets from the President contesting the legitimacy of redactions of the Carter Page FISA applications released as part of this litigation. Judge Mehta did not grant the request immediately, referring the parties to new rounds of negotiation on August 8. These negotiations fell apart, and Judge Mehta set a new briefing schedule on August 22. The DOJ's motion for summary judgment, filed on October 19, 2018, recited the same FOIA exceptions as the first motion for summary judgment and added in a 7d exception, saying that disclosing certain information would reveal the identity of confidential sources. The plaintiffs responded on November 9 requesting partial summary judgment. They focused on a September 17, 2018 White House press release that said the President "directed . . . immediate declassification" of the Page FISA warrants and subsequent tweets from the President that read:
I met with the DOJ concerning the declassification of various UNREDACTED documents. They agreed to release them but stated that so doing may have a perceived negative impact on the Russia probe. Also, key Allies’ [sic] called to ask not to release. Therefore, the Inspector General . . . has been asked to review these documents on an expedited basis. I believe he will move quickly on this (and hopefully other things which he is looking at). In the end, I can always declassify if it proves necessary. Speed is very important to me – and everyone!
The plaintiffs argued that this warranted discovery into 21 pages of the Page warrants, since the DOJ apparently promised to release unredacted versions of them in response to a Presidential "order." Even if such a promise did not exist, the plaintiffs argued that discovery was warranted to know if it did exist or not. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the President's statement should still impact review of the redactions, and summary judgment in favor of the defense was not warranted. The DOJ replied to the plaintiffs on November 30, 2018, contesting the plaintiffs' characterization of the tweet and prior press releases as an "order" to disclose the Page FISA warrants, saying that it instead was a statement from the Press Secretary. The defendants denied the existence of any such order and argued that there was no issue of material fact that justified more discovery. The plaintiffs responded on December 20 that this statement from the Twitter account could not be a Press Secretary statement, the tweet was specific enough to allow discovery into this particular FISA warrant, and that the current record was not enough to show that there was no issue of material fact regarding the existence of an order or not. Judge Mehta released an opinion denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment on July 30, 2019. He stated that, under FOIA, the agency protecting the information has the responsibility to show that the information is protected by a national security exemption (exemption 1) and not disclosed by the government, and that enough ambiguity remains surrounding the President's supposed order to disclose the Page FISA warrants to allow more discovery into the matter. He added that there remains a dispute over whether exemptions 7d and 7e covered this content, since the President's order to declassify the documents might impact the sources and methods in the contested section. 2019 WL 3430728. The government filed another motion for summary judgment on August 30, 2019, including a statement from DOJ officials saying that they never received a declassification order for the information at issue. They argued that this settled the issue as to whether the press releases and tweets amounted to a declassification order. The plaintiffs submitted a response contesting this claim on September 13. The release of the FBI Inspector General's "Crossfire Hurricane" report into surveillance of the Trump campaign impacted this case; some of the confidential information requested in this case was released in that report. However, some information still remained classified, and litigation continued. For more information on the Crossfire Hurricane report, see NS-DC-0138 in this Clearinghouse. Judge Mehta granted the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment on March 3, 2020. Upon reviewing the declaration from DOJ officials, he found that the lack of direction to declassify the documents at issue meant that the press release and tweets were not official orders, and summary judgment was warranted. 2020 WL 1033301. The plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider on March 13, 2020, arguing that, while the issue on the classification of the 21 pages was decided by the new statements from DOJ officials, outstanding questions remained as to the remaining classified pages in the Page FISA warrants, focusing on two other tweets from the President that cast doubt on the redactions in the warrants overall. The plaintiffs did admit that they failed to contest this issue in later motions, and in their response brief on March 26, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' lack of action on this issue meant they had abandoned it. Judge Mehta did allow reconsideration of the issue and released an opinion on May 4, 2020. However, he granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue, because the tweets the plaintiffs highlighted did not reveal any personal knowledge of a declassification order and were just "bad faith assertions" that were not enough to stand up to a motion for summary judgment. With all contested issues decided, the plaintiffs filed a notice of dismissal on July 31, 2020. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 4, 2017, the James Madison Project (a Washington, DC-based nonprofit dedicated to promoting public transparency in the intelligence community) and a <i>USA Today</i> national security reporter filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia asking for any information on surveillance of the Trump 2016 campaign under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). This case led to the disclosure of some of the Carter Page FISA warrants. It features extensive briefing on the use of President Trump's Twitter account and the White House press office as mechanisms to order declassification of records. The case closed in 2020.


On June 16, 2015, an arrestee in Dothan, Alabama, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff sued the city of Dothan. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, alleging that Dothan had instituted a money-based detention scheme, where individuals who were arrested for minor traffic offenses and misdemeanors were released from custody almost immediately upon payment of a generically set bail amount. However, individuals who were too poor to pay this amount remained imprisoned for up to seven days while they awaited their docket to be called. Dothan did not allow for unsecured bonds, where an individual is released by promising to pay the amount if the person later does not appear. Furthermore, Dothan held the hearings for these imprisoned individuals in an empty courtroom that was closed to the public; the individuals appeared via video while still in jail. The plaintiff claimed that, as a result, Dothan had violated the Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection of the plaintiff (and those similarly situated) by jailing him because he could afford to pay the generic bail amount. The plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory relief, compensation for the damages suffered as a result of Dothan's conduct, and attorneys' fees. With the complaint, the plaintiff also filed a motion for class certification and a temporary restraining order (TRO) to grant the plaintiff's release and halt Dothan's policies. On June 18, 2015, Chief Judge William Keith Watkins granted in part the plaintiff's motion for a TRO, ordering the plaintiff's release, but denied all other respects of the motion. Judge Watkins also set a hearing to determine whether to convert the TRO to a preliminary injunction. However, on June 25, 2015, Dothan moved to deny the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction as moot because Dothan had begun allowing unsecured bonds for release from prison for minor traffic offenses and misdemeanors. Dothan noted that the plaintiff had conceded that this bail system cured any constitutional problems. Judge Watkins subsequently issued an order on June 26, 2015 requiring that Dothan and its employees, officers, and agents comply with the new bail system as outlined in Dothan's June 25 motion. Judge Watkins also dissolved the TRO as the parties pursued settlement on the remaining issues. On April 13, 2016, the court granted the parties' joint motion for entry of a consent decree. The parties agreed that the procedures set forth in Dothan's June 25 motion satisfied the plaintiff's concerns. Per the consent decree, (1) Dothan was to comply with the new procedures for a minimum of three years, (2) Dothan was to notify the court of any intent to materially alter the procedures, (3) the plaintiff could request a preliminary injunction if it found Dothan was noncompliant, and (4) all damages claims were dismissed with prejudice. The consent decree expired in 2019 without any further docket activity, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On June 16, 2015, a recent arrestee in Dothan, Alabama, filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law, the plaintiff sue the city of Dothan. The plaintiff claimed Dothan violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection as a result of Dothan's policy of requiring secured generically set bonds which the plaintiff was unable to pay. The case settled after Dothan began to accept unsecured bonds.


This is the litigation that came out of the death of Sandra Bland in jail in Waller County after a routine traffic stop led to her arrest. Although the Clearinghouse does not focus on damage actions like this one, because of the widespread interest in this case, we've posted the key documents in the case for use by the public. On August 4, 2015, the mother of Sandra Bland filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS), Waller County, and several employees of the Waller County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code §§ 71.002-004 and § 71.021. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff alleged that her daughter, Sandra Bland, was assaulted by a TDPS Highway Patrol Trooper and that officers of the WCSO and TDPS willfully and wantonly caused her daughter’s death. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that on July 10, 2015, after a routine traffic stop a TDPS Highway Patrol Trooper instructed her daughter to get out of the car and he then assaulted and wrongfully arrested her. Afterward, Bland was brought to Waller County Jail where, after informing the officers that she had attempted suicide before, she was left in her cell unattended for three days, at which point she committed suicide. Video of the traffic stop is available via Youtube here, here, and here. After filing the initial complaint, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 26, 2015, again on September 29, 2015, and the final amended complaint on January 19, 2016. The defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings on January 8, 2016, in order to protect a defendant officer's Fifth Amendment constitutional rights during concurrent criminal proceedings. On April 21, 2016, Judge Hittner granted the defendant’s motion in part and denied in part. Specifically, defendants were ordered to complete all discovery prior to their deposition during their criminal proceedings. 2016 WL 6915963. Several of the discovery requests are posted here and here. On October 31, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Order of Dismissal after reaching an out of court settlement which, according to the Houston Chronicle, granted the plaintiff $1.9 million and stipulated that county officials would improve how inmates are booked and supervised at the jail and other facilities lacking immediate access to medical services. The case was dismissed on November 1, 2016. The Department of Public Safety's investigative report was completed in 2017; the Clearinghouse obtained it via a records request to DPS, and it is posted here.

Summary: On August 4, 2015, plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The plaintiff sued the Texas Department of Public Safety (TDPS), Waller County, and several employees of the Waller County Sheriff’s Office (WCSO) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code sections 71.002-004 and 71.021. On October 31, 2016, the parties filed a Joint Order of Dismissal after reaching an out of court settlement wherein the plaintiff received $1.9 million and the case was dismissed on November 1, 2016.


In April 2006 the Milwaukee office of the EEOC brought this suit in U.S. District Court, Southern District of Iowa, alleging that the defendant, Von Maur, violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to hire black applicants because of their race. In July 2006, the case was consolidated for the purpose of discovery with a separate private action brought against Von Maur in the Southern District of Iowa, Ward v. Von Maur. On September 22, 2008 the two cases were consolidated for trial, however, the parties settled on October 29, 2008. For information about the settlement, see Ward in this Clearinghouse.

Summary: In April 2006 the Milwaukee office of the EEOC brought this suit alleging that the defendant, Von Maur, Inc., violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to hire black applicants because of their race. Later, the case was consolidated with a separate private action brought against Von Maur, and the parties settled on October 29, 2008 in which Von Maur agreed to pay a sum of $50,000, post a 2-year notice stating that they will not discriminate on the basis of race, to hold training sessions to prevent racial discrimination. The court also required the defendant to keep records of and report all applicants, racial information of hired applicants and of any complaints regarding racial discrimination.


On September 30, 2016, three individuals with severe mental illness deemed incompetent to stand trial in criminal proceedings against them filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Alabama Department of Mental Health under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs, represented by the Alabama Disability Advocacy Program, the ACLU of Alabama Foundation, and private counsel, sought declaratory and both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that individuals with severe mental illness who had been deemed incompetent to stand trial in Alabama had to wait an average of eight months between the date of the court order committing them to the Alabama Department of Mental Health for treatment and the actual start of their treatment. During that time, these individuals were forced to stay in county jails that lacked the resources they needed. The case was assigned to Judge Myron H. Thompson and referred to Magistrate Judge Charles S. Coody. The Alabama Department of Mental Health moved to dismiss the case on November 4, 2016, and the court denied the motion on November 30, 2016. On December 23, the plaintiffs amended the lawsuit to proceed as a class action, and they sought a preliminary injunction. Settlement negotiations delayed the scheduled preliminary injunction hearing. The parties settled. They filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of the settlement on April 4, 2017, and the Court agreed on May 9, 2016. In doing so, the Court granted class certification. The class was defined as all persons who have been, or will be during the period that this Agreement remains in effect, charged with a crime, within the meaning of Rule 1.4(b) of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, in a court of competent jurisdiction in the State of Alabama, and detained in an Alabama city or county jail or Alabama Department of Corrections facility while awaiting a court-ordered Mental Evaluation or court-ordered Competency Restoration Treatment. Before the settlement could be finalized, the parties had to provide notice of the settlement agreement to the settlement class and criminal defense counsel of settlement class members, state officials, and the Alabama Circuit Courts. The parties did so, and the Court held conferences for class members to voice their objections to the settlement. Because none of the class members who had voiced objections wanted to testify, the court decided not to hear testimony from class members. On January 25, 2018, the Court ordered a final settlement approval and approved the negotiated consent decree. (The motion for a preliminary injunction from December 2016 was denied because the settlement made it moot.) Under the terms of the settlement, the Alabama Department of Mental Health agreed to provide for mental health treatment for incarcerated individuals to be completed within forty-five days by the end of twelve months and within thirty days by the end of twenty-four months. The Department also agreed to install more beds to accommodate more patients and provide training for relevant personnel. The Alabama Disability Advocacy Program agreed to monitor compliance. The Decree was set to last at least 3 years. If the state failed to achieve substantial compliance nine months prior to the end of that term, the plaintiffs could move to extend the term by four months. In the meantime, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the decree, on the plaintiffs' motion. Under the Consent Decree, the state was to pay the plaintiffs $270,000 in legal fees incurred through March 13, 2017. The Department agreed to pay for the monitoring at a rate of $195 per hour, as well as for attorneys' fees sustained after March 13, 2017 at a rate of $275 per hour. 2018 WL 564856. On February 2, 2018, the plaintiffs sought their legal fees, estimating that the state owed $342,986 in attorneys' fees and $9,677 for other litigation costs. The fee dispute settled on March 19, 2018, for $66,794 in attorneys' fees and $8,688.84 in other litigation costs. Monitoring of the consent decree is ongoing until at least 2021. The first status report of 2019 resulted in the parties entering into a joint remedial plan for noncompliance on November 4, 2019. The court held a status conference on the parties' progress and barriers to compliance on February 5, 2020, and the parties modified the consent decree later that month. The modifications required the defendant to update their policy of deciding how to prioritize the allocation of outpatient evaluations among the counties that the Health Department serves. As of April 12, 2020, this case is ongoing as the court monitors compliance with the consent decree.

Summary: Three individuals with mental illnesses brought this lawsuit against the Alabama Department of Mental Health in September 2016 in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiffs alleged they had been deemed incompetent to stand trial in the criminal proceedings against them and had been court-ordered to receive mental health treatment from the Alabama Department of Mental Health, but the average wait time for treatment was eight months, during which they had to stay in jail. The plaintiffs argued that the Alabama Department of Mental Health's failure to provide timely treatment violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In 2018, the parties reached a settlement that outlined a plan for more efficient mental health treatment procedures for the plaintiff class over the next three years and required the state to pay the plaintiffs' legal fees.


On October 12, 2010, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§3601-3631, against the owner and manager of a 26-unit apartment building located in Akron Ohio. The U.S. sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, and civil penalties, alleging that the Defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of familial status in their rental of apartments. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Defendants refused to rent to families with small children. The case was litigated for several months, but then settled. On June 8, 2011, the Court (Judge David Dowd) approved a three-year Consent Decree which, in addition to general prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status, requires Defendants to adopt a non-discrimination policy, to include the words "Equal Housing Opportunity" on all advertising, to train all personnel in equal housing opportunity requirements, and to report any complaints. Defendants agreed to pay $50,000 in damages to one family, and a $10,000 civil penalty to the United States. On June 5, 2014, just before the consent decree was set to expire, the parties jointly moved to extend it to June 8, 2015. Judge Dowd approved this motion the following day. There was no further litigation, and the consent decree has since terminated. The case is now closed.

Summary: This fair housing case brought by the U.S. Department of Justice against the owner of a 26-unit apartment building in Akron was litigated for several months, but then settled on June 8, 2011. It was resolved by a three-year Consent Decree which, in addition to general prohibitions against discrimination based on familial status, requires Defendants to adopt a non-discrimination policy, to include the words "Equal Housing Opportunity" on all advertising, to train all personnel in equal housing opportunity requirements, and to report any complaints. Defendants agreed to pay $50,000 in damages to one family, and a $10,000 civil penalty to the United States.


On May 6, 2008, individual plaintiffs filed a collective action in the Western District of Pennsylvania for unlawful retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) including the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA), against PPG Industries, a Pennsylvania corporation. The plaintiffs, who were former employees of PPG, requested that the court certify the class, declare the individual plaintiffs to serve as representative plaintiffs, and grant a declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs had previously filed a class action in 2007, EE-PA-0242, against PPG for violations of the ADEA for PPG's practice of having terminated older workers sign release agreements in which the terminated workers waived claims under the ADEA. Plaintiffs argued, however, that the agreements were not compliant with the OWBPA and were therefore unenforceable. Defendant counterclaimed that plaintiffs were in breach of the agreements, which contained covenants not to sue. Plaintiffs claim they were essentially forced to sign these agreements in order to obtain severance benefits upon their termination. Based on the parties' interactions in the previous case, plaintiffs brought this suit claiming that defendant knew or should have known that its counterclaim in the first suit was not viable and that its intent in bringing the claim was to retaliate against the plaintiffs for enforcing their rights under the ADEA. Plaintiffs also claim that defendant has threatened future retaliation for plaintiffs' attempts to enforce their rights under the ADEA. On June 17, 2008, defendant filed an unopposed motion to consolidate this case with the original case filed by plaintiffs in May 2007, EE-PA-0242. On June 18, 2008, the District Court (Judge Arthur Schwab) granted defendant's order to consolidate the cases. Accordingly, further proceedings in this case can be found at EE-PA-0242.

Summary: On May 6, 2008, individual plaintiffs filed a collective action in the Western District of Pennsylvania for unlawful retaliation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against PPG, plaintiffs' former employer. The claim was based on PPG's counterclaim in a prior suit, EE-PA-0242, brought by the same plaintiffs, which plaintiffs allege constituted retaliation under the ADEA. On June 17, 2008 on an unopposed motion, this case was consolidated with the original, EE-PA-0242.


On November 27, 2012, a group of individual servicewomen and the Service Women's Action Network (a nonprofit organization that supports servicewomen and veterans) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the Secretary of the Department of Defense ("DoD"). The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from private practice and from the ACLU Women's Rights Project and its Northern California Chapter, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, challenging as unconstitutional DoD's official policy barring women from serving in units whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that this 1994 policy could not be justified by any important governmental objective and therefore violated their right to equal protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On January 24, 2013, DoD rescinded the 1994 directive and stated that "[i]ntegration of women into newly opened positions and units will occur as expeditiously as possible, considering good order and judicious use of fiscal resources, but must be completed no later than January 1, 2016." The Military Services, consisting of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, were ordered to submit plans for implementing the new policy to the Secretary by May 15, 2013. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on October 31, 2013, arguing that DoD had continued to exclude women from applying for or serving in hundreds of thousands of combat positions despite rescinding the 1994 policy directive. DoD responded that this challenge was not ripe because the department was still in the process of implementing the new policy. At the parties' request, on May 5, 2014, the District Court (Judge Edward M. Chen) entered a limited stay of the case until January 1, 2016, the deadline for implementing the new policy; this was later extended. In a case management statement dated January 5, 2017, the plaintiffs took the position that the case should remain stayed until it becomes more certain if, and how, implementation of the directive will proceed under the Trump administration. The defendant countered that the plaintiffs do not have standing to maintain the action, and that the claims alleged are moot. The court continued the stay throughout 2017 and hosted periodic case management conferences. At the end of that year, on December 18, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. This complaint added further detail to the first amended complaint and restated the same request for relief: a declaration that the defendants had violated the plaintiffs' right to due process and equal protection of the laws, and injunctive relief ending gender-based exclusionary policies and practices and allowing women to apply for all combat-related positions. The defendants moved to dismiss for improper venue, non-justiciability, and lack of standing. Just under five months later, on May 1, 2018, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. 320 F. Supp. 3d 1082. The court allowed the plaintiff another opportunity to file a third amended complaint. On June 28, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint that challenged the DoD's Leaders First policy, which assigned junior servicewomen exclusively to units with female leaders, and the Marines' segregation of basic training by sex. The defendants again moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. On November 29, 2018, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. Specifically, the court found that the Network had organizational standing to challenge both DoD policies, associational standing to challenge the Marines' training policy, and that the plaintiffs had adequately stated a claim. However, the court found that the Network had not pled facts to establish that it had associational standing to challenge the Leaders First policy. 352 F. Supp. 3d 977. Following the previous order, the parties began engaging in discovery. On February 26, 2020, Judge Chen referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for settlement discussions. A settlement conference is scheduled for May 21, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 27, 2012, a group of individual servicewomen and the Service Women's Action Network, a nonprofit organization that supports servicewomen and veterans, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the Secretary of the Department of Defense ("DoD"). The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment DoD's official policy barring women from serving in units whose primary mission is to engage in direct ground combat. DoD rescinded this policy on January 24, 2013, and the parties asked the District Court to stay the proceedings until January 1, 2016, the deadline for DoD to implement a new policy. In 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging that DoD continued to exclude women from some roles, which survived a motion to dismiss. Settlement negotiations are ongoing as of May 2020.


This class action suit was brought on March 11, 1994 in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York by parents of preschool children with disabilities against Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York. The plaintiffs sued under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that these children were denied their rights to appropriate educational services under state and federal law. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that preschoolers with disabilities were wrongfully denied timely referrals and evaluations to special education and were automatically being placed in the most restrictive classroom settings, which violated state and federal law. The plaintiffs also alleged that disabled preschool students with limited English proficiency were denied timely special education evaluations in the appropriate language and were being placed in inappropriately restrictive classroom settings. Throughout the pre-trial discovery process, the parties met several times for settlement negotiations. Eventually, on September 10, 1998, the parties notified the court they would submit a proposed order of settlement to include an order preliminary approving the settlement together with the notice to be provided to the class. The parties' proposed order of settlement was approved on January 28, 1999. The settlement document is not in this Clearinghouse, however, the order of settlement includes references to the defendant implementing integrated placement options; training; collecting data; and monitoring compliance. On September 25, 2003, the Court ordered that the total attorneys' fees and costs payable to plaintiffs' counsel was $60,000, including all outstanding attorneys' fees, costs, and disbursements incurred by the plaintiffs' counsel. This case is now closed.

Summary: A class action suit was brought by the New York City parents of preschool children with disabilities against Board of Education, alleging that these children were denied their rights to appropriate educational services under state and federal law. The parties eventually settled, and the defendant agreed to implement integrated placement options and training, collect data, and monitor compliance. The plaintiff was awarded $60,000, including attorney's fees and costs.


On December 19, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under Title VII of the Civil Right Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 against Lee's Food Corp.—the owner entity of Food Rite Community Supermarket. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against a prospective female employee when it failed to hire her as a part-time courtesy van driver because she is a female. In October of 2012, the prospective hire responded to an advertisement for a job as a part-time courtesy van driver. Although she met the minimum qualifications for the position, the defendant allegedly told her that he would not hire a female for the position out of concern that she would be at greater risk of being a victim of a crime while on the job. Instead, the defendant hired a male to fill the position. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge David J. Novak and referred to Magistrate Judge M. Hannah Lauck on May 8, 2014 with the intent of a quicker resolution. The parties entered into a consent decree on August 12, 2014. The consent decree provided that the defendant shall not discriminate against any person on the basis of sex or any other protected category within the meaning of Title VII, nor discriminate or retaliate against any person because of his or her opposition to any practice made unlawful under Title VII or because of the filing of a charge of discrimination, the giving of testimony or assistance, or the participation in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under the statute. The consent decree also required the defendant to adopt, implement, and distribute a formal, written anti-discrimination policy and post it so it was visible to employees. The defendant also agreed to provide an annual training program to explain the requirements of Title VII and its prohibition against sex discrimination in the work place, as well as the defendant’s policy. The defendant agreed to provide the EEOC with reports every six months and allow the commission to review compliance with the decree. Lee’s Food Corp was also ordered to pay the woman $10,500. The consent decree lasted for three years and the case is now closed.

Summary: In December of 2013, a female applicant filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia alleging that the defendant company violated her civil rights when it refused to hire her because she was female. Parties entered into a consent decree on August 12, 2014. Defendant paid $10,500 to the plaintiff, adopted a formal anti-discrimination policy, implemented a training program, and agreed to send reports to the EEOC every six months of the decree's duration. The case is now closed.


On June 9, 2000, three parents, as guardians ad litem of their minor daughters, filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota against the South Dakota High School Activities Association. The students represented in the suit were all members of volleyball teams at high schools within the Association. The plaintiffs alleged that the Association violated Title IX of the Education Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring girls volleyball to be played during the winter season. At the time the suit was filed, girls high school volleyball was played during the fall season in 46 of 50 states. All South Dakota boys high school athletic teams played their schedules during the traditional seasons for their sports. The complaint alleged that the South Dakota girls high school volleyball players were denied opportunities provided to South Dakota's male high school athletes. By requiring the sport to be played in the winter, the South Dakota girls were prevented from effectively competing for college athletic scholarships. The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction requiring the Association to schedule girls high school volleyball during the traditional fall season. On November 6, 2000, Judge Lawrence L. Piersol granted a motion for intervention by the United States. The United States filed an amended complaint on November 7, 2000. On December 5, 2000, the parties filed a stipulation agreeing that the Association would schedule girls volleyball during the traditional fall season for every school year, beginning with the 2002-2003 school year. The Association would also schedule girls high school basketball during the traditional winter season and would reimburse the plaintiffs for their attorneys' fees. Finally, within 180 days of the Consent Order, the Association would submit to the court and all parties a detailed plan establishing how the Association would implement the transition and new scheduling of the girls high school volleyball and basketball season. After, the Association would submit to the court and the parties a report annually for two consecutive years describing how the Association had completely and successfully implemented the approved plan. Judge Piersol entered a consent order approving the stipulation that same day. The Association submitted the plan to implement the season transition on May 11, 2001. After oral arguments, Judge Piersol approved the plan on August 30, 2001. The Association filed the required annual reports on August 28, 2003 and August 27, 2004. Judge Piersol directed dissolution of the consent order and dismissed the case on June 29, 2005.

Summary: Parents, as guardians ad litem of their minor daughters, and the United States as a plaintiff-intervenor, filed suit against the South Dakota High School Activities Association, alleging that the Association had violated the students' rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring girls volleyball to be played in the winter, rather than the traditional fall season, while all male sports were held in their traditional seasons. In a settlement agreement, the Association agreed to implement a plan to permanently switch girls volleyball to the fall season and girls basketball to the winter season, thereby affording female athletes the same opportunities as provided to male athletes.


On August 31, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shawnee County and the Shawnee County Department of Corrections. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the Defendants censored PLN's monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners who were held in custody by the Shawnee County Jail in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the defendants adopted and implemented policies that unconstitutionally restrict correspondence to prisoners, which policies on their face prohibited prisoners from receiving any sort of book, magazine, or other publication, such as those published by the plaintiff. On February 23, 2012, the parties filed a joint stipulation for entry of stipulated judgment and settlement agreement. The agreement required the defendants to modify the Jail's mail policy, including allowing the PLN's mailings to be delivered. The defendants agreed to pay $75,000 in damages, attorney fees, and costs. On March 5, 2012, Judge Kathryn H. Vratil approved the stipulated judgment and settlement agreement.

Summary: On August 31, 2011, Prison Legal News (PLN) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Shawnee County and the Shawnee County Department of Corrections, alleging that the Defendants censored PLN's monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners. On February 23, 2012, the parties agreed to a settlement agreement requiring the defendants to modify the Jail's mail policy, including allowing the PLN's mailings to be delivered, and to pay $75,000 in damages, attorney fees, and costs.


On October 19, 2012, two evangelical Christian business owners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiffs brought suit under the First and Fifth Amendments, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. Represented by private counsel and the American Center for Law and Justice, the plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. The suit alleged that federal rules adopted as part of the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for contraception through their company's group health insurance plans. Specifically, the plaintiffs objected to the ACA rules requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiffs considered an abortifacient. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene their Christian faith and compel speech contrary to their beliefs, the plaintiffs sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for themselves and other business owners with similar religious objections. On December 20, 2012, the District Court (Judge Richard E. Dorr) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a threat of imminent irreparable harm and that the question of whether the mandate was justified by a compelling government interest merited "deliberate investigation." American Pulverizer Co. v. DHHS, Slip Op. 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012). Judge Dorr further found that the facts of the case were nearly identical to those in O'Brien v. HHS, in which the Eighth Circuit had recently stayed the same defendant departments from enforcing the contraception mandate against the plaintiffs, evangelical Christian small-business owners. The defendants appealed the injunction to the Eighth Circuit (Case No. 13-1395). On February 20, 2013, District Court Judge Goldberg granted the defendants' joint motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the Eighth Circuit appeal. On February 26, 2013, in a clerk order not attributed to any individual judge, the Eighth Circuit granted the defendants' motion to hold the case in abeyance pending its own decision in the O'Brien appeal (Case No. 12-3357). On April 21, 2014, this case was reassigned to District Judge M. Douglas Harpool. On September 4, 2014, the Eighth Circuit granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the appeal following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, on June 30, 2014. On October 30, 2014, the District Court granted a permanent injunction for the plaintiffs. The injunction protected the plaintiffs against government enforcement of the version of the contraception mandate that existed prior to the Hobby Lobby decision. Prior to Hobby Lobby, closely-held for-profit religious employers did not have an opportunity to notify the government of their objection to the contraception mandate, and compel the government to work with their insurer to provide contraception coverage directly to their employees. The decision did not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit under later versions of the mandate. The parties agreed that petitions for attorney's fees or costs would be submitted to the court by January 28, 2015, but no petitions were submitted during that period.

Summary: In 2012, evangelical Christian business owners filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on their religious freedom by requiring them to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their companies' group health insurance plans. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction against government enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate that was in force at that time.


On November 20, 2012, the United States of America filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiff sued the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Board of Police Commissioners under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The Department of Justice asked the court for (1) a declaration that defendants' law enforcement practices violated the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and (2) an injunctive order that defendants cease engaging in such practices, implement procedures to remedy the unlawful policing, and adopt measures to identify, correct, and prevent future unlawful policing. The complaint alleged the East Haven Police Department ("EHPD") enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion and demonstrated anti-Latino bias through officials' derogatory statements made to that effect. Such practices, according to the complaint, violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, namely the rights to due process and equal protection. The USA further claimed the EHPD, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, violated Latinos' constitutional rights by subjecting them to unreasonable searches and seizures and exposed them to unjustified excessive use of force. The same day the complaint was filed, the parties--having entered into an Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing--filed a Joint Motion for Conditional Dismissal. U.S. District Court Judge Alvin W. Thompson approved the agreement and conditionally dismissed the case on December 21, 2012. The agreement entailed, among other features, implementing remedial training relating to the use of force, stops and searches and seizures, bias-free policing, supervisory review, and the complaint-review process. The agreement would terminate after the city had been in compliance with the provisions for two consecutive years. The parties anticipated that this would take four years to achieve. As stipulated by the agreement, the parties selected a compliance expert to report on the implementation of the terms of the agreement. In a joint status report filed June 28, 2013, the parties noted implementation was proceeding "very well." Between 2012 and 2014, the parties file joint motions to amend or correct the agreement a number of times; each was granted by the court. The Town continued to be monitored by a Compliance Expert. On November 30, 2017, both parties moved for the termination of the Settlement Agreement, which was granted on December 13, 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 20, 2012, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 against the Town of East Haven and the East Haven Board of Police Commissioners, alleging the East Haven Police Department enforced traffic and immigration laws against Latinos in a discriminatory fashion. The parties entered into an Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing and the Court conditionally dismissed the case on December 21, 2012. Since then, the parties have been jointly modifying the agreement, and filing compliance reports, the last of which was filed and approved on July 13, 2017. The case is now closed.


On January 17, 2006, Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging Alameda County's policies and practices concerning strip searches in Alameda County jails. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that he was subjected to a group strip search prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. Plaintiff alleged that such a practice violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. To remedy the alleged violations, Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. The District Court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) held an initial scheduling conference and submitted the case to the Court's alternative dispute resolution program. Mediation was held on November 28, 2006, but did not produce a settlement. Through subsequent negotiations, the parties eventually settled. Following a November 16, 2007 fairness hearing, the District Court approved the class action settlement. Under the settlement, two separate classes of claimants were created: (1) those booked into the Santa Rita Jail from 1/17/04 to 12/31/06 who were strip searched in groups; and (2) those booked into Santa Rita Jail or Glenn Dyer Jail from 1/17/04 to 12/31/06 on charges not involving violence, drugs, or weapons who were strip searched, except for those who were required to submit to such searches as a condition of parole or probation. Defendants agreed to pay a maximum of $6.15 million to settle all claims of both classes. Of that sum, $1.175 million went to class counsel Mark Merin for attorneys' fees. Up to $275,000 was allocated for the costs of claims administration. Finally, a total of $4.7 million would be used to pay individual claims, based on an agreed distribution formula.

Summary: On January 17, 2006, Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California challenging the Alameda County's policies and practices concerning the use of strip searches in jails. The named plaintiff, a citizen arrested for an outstanding traffic warrant, alleged that he was subjected to a strip search with a group of several others. He further alleged that his treatment was the result of the official Alameda County Jail policy, under which officers routinely subjected custodial detainees to strip and visual body cavity searches prior to arraignment and in the absence of any reasonable suspicion of contraband or weapons. Plaintiff alleged that such a policy violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution as well as California state law. The case was eventually settled in November 2007; Defendants agreed to pay a maximum of $6.15 million to settle all claims of both classes.