On May 3, 2017, Muslim Advocates filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This suit sought documents related to the government's border searches of electronic devices in the possession of individuals from one of the seven nations targeted by President Donald Trump’s Jan. 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO), known as the Muslim Ban, as well as individuals that Customs and Border Protection agents perceived to be Muslim, regardless of their country of origin. The plaintiff, a nonprofit organization, argued that such border searches "dramatically increased" after the EO was issued. On May 18, the case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman, and reassigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich on Dec. 4, 2017. Since the filing of the complaint, the parties submitted several status reports through November 2018. The defendants produced batches of requested non-exempt records periodically. On March 6, 2019, the parties submitted a joint status report indicating that the defendant had completed its record disclosure to the plaintiff and the plaintiff had finished its review of the files. The status report indicated that the plaintiffs had some questions about withheld documents, but the status update said that the parties succeeded in working out their issues without the need of a court order. The parties then turned to the allocation of attorney fees. On December 5, 2019, the plaintiffs submitted a stipulation of dismissal, and Judge Friedrich dismissed the case on the same day. The status reports leading into the stipulation of dismissal indicated that the parties were close to resolving all disputes over attorney fees and expected them to be solved by December 4; though there is no ECF indicating distribution of attorney fees on that date, the dismissal stipulation on December 5 makes it appear that they came to a private agreement on December 4. The case is closed.

Summary: On May 3, 2017, Muslim Advocates filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This suit aimed to shed light on the government border searches of electronic devices in the possession of individuals from one of the seven nations targeted by President Donald Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order known as the Muslim Ban, as well as individuals who Customs and Border Protection agents perceived to be Muslim regardless of their origin. The plaintiff, who is a nonprofit organization, argued that such border searches "dramatically increased" after the EO was released. The defendant and plaintiff were able to resolve all disclosure disputes and allocation of attorney fees without court orders. The plaintiffs submitted a stipulation of dismissal on December 5, 2019, and the case was dismissed with prejudice that day.


On April 28, 2005, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. §552, the plaintiffs sought expedited processing and release of agency records the plaintiff had requested from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), a component of the defendant, the United States Department of Justice. Specifically, the plaintiffs sought records of the FBI’s use of certain controversial provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act that were up for potential congressional reauthorization before December 31, 2005. The PATRIOT Act was enacted quickly following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. In part, the Act expanded the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) powers. Because there was some concern about these expanded surveillance power prior to passage, the PATRIOT Act included a “sunset” provision; certain PATRIOT Act provisions were to become ineffective on December 31, 2005 without further congressional action. The plaintiff claimed there was a strong and urgent need for Congress and the public to know how the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) had been using the sunsetting provisions, particularly as congressional committees were holding PATRIOT Act oversight hearings in April and May 2005 and determining whether to reauthorize the sunsetting provisions of the PATRIOT act before December 31, 2005. EPIC had initially made a FOIA request to the FBI for agency records related to their use of the relevant provisions on March 29, 2005, requesting expedited processing of the request due to the public interest in how the FBI has used expanded law enforcement powers granted by the PATRIOT Act. On April 12, 2005, the FBI purportedly granted processing of plaintiff’s request, but as of the filing of the complaint on April 28, 2005, the FBI had not provided plaintiff with any indication of when its processing might be completed. On June 14, 2005, EPIC filed a motion to compel expedited processing of its FOIA request. On October 4, 2005, the FBI provided an “interim response” to plaintiff’s FOIA request, consisting of 252 pages of responsive material, but did not indicate when it might complete processing of the request. The plaintiff argued in a memorandum request a status hearing that the volume of news coverage regarding the initial pages released, which the New York Times reported “disclosed at least a dozen violations of federal law or bureau policy from 2002 to 2004 in the handling of surveillance and investigative matters," reflected the significant public interest in the information and the pressing need for its prompt release. On November 8, 2005, Judge Gladys Kessler granted the motion for expedited processing of EPIC’s FOIA Request. The parties were unable to come to an agreement regarding the timeline for processing the remaining pages, so Judge Kessler ordered on November 16, 2005 that defendant would complete the processing of 1500 pages every 15 calendar days and provide all responsive pages to plaintiff until processing was complete. The defendant completed processing of the plaintiff’s requested documents on January 17, 2006. Judge Kessler order that the defendant pay the Electronic Privacy Information Center $12,000 for attorney’s fees and costs, and dismissed the action on August 29, 2006. The case is now closed.

Summary: In April 2005, the Electronic Privacy Information Center filed this action in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, seeking release of FBI records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff sought records of the FBI's use of certain provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act granting expanded surveillance powers, which were up for reauthorization at the end of the year. The FBI provided the records, according to court order, by January 2006, and the case closed in August 2006.


On June 18, 2013, plaintiffs, a group of Muslim residents of New York City, as well as two mosques and a charitable organization called Muslims Giving Back, filed this §1983 suit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, sued the New York City and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) alleging unlawful surveillance that targeted Muslims in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments and the New York state constitution. The case was assigned to Judge Pam Chen. Discovery proceeded and led to an opinion by Judge Chen on Nov. 22, 2013. 998 F. Supp. 2d 70. She explained that "Plaintiffs seek a wide range of documents and information relating not only to the NYPD's surveillance and investigation of the plaintiffs, but the NYPD's investigative policies and activities relating to all Muslim individuals and organizations, and relating to all non-Muslim individuals and organizations, where the policy or activity is or was based on the individual's or organization's religious speech, beliefs, practices, and activities." The city opposed these requests, arguing that only documents related to the particular plaintiffs should be discoverable. The court sided largely with the plaintiffs, ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery regarding NYPD policies and programs involving Muslims because that discovery would be necessary for proving discriminatory intent. However, the court denied discovery on investigative policies and activities related to non-Muslim individuals, which was sought to provide a comparison with the plaintiffs. Litigation was stayed from July 22, 2014, to January 6, 2016, while the parties negotiated a settlement agreement. On January 7, 2016, the parties submitted an agreement for approval by the court. The settlement dictated that the defendant would conform its investigations involving political activity to the Constitution, including the elimination of racial profiling as a motivating factor for investigation. The defendant also agreed to remove the "Radicalization in the West Report" from its website. In addition, the guidelines established in Handschu v. Special Services Division limiting NYPD investigations of political activity were modified. The modified guidelines: (1) Established the Handschu Committee to oversee investigations and set out the requirements for the appointment of a Civilian Representative; (2) Required that choices in investigation techniques take into account the effect on religious and political activities of individuals, including those not the target of investigation; and (3) Required that undercover investigations only be used when there were no less intrusive means to acquire the sought after information. The guidelines also dictated that investigations respect the constitutional right to be free of investigation in which race, religion, or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor. The defendant paid $1,671,686 in attorney fees and expenses. The agreement was to last at least five years subject to the defendant achieving substantial compliance with all provisions. On February 2, 2017, a Muslim individual filed a letter to the court and sought instant intervention because the NYPD allegedly violated the Handschu guidelines during its investigation. Both parties filed responses and argued that intervention was not proper because there was no common interest and it was untimely. The court denied this motion to intervene on March 20, 2017. On March 6, 2017, plaintiffs and defendants submitted a letter on behalf of both parties on the proposed settlement and on March 16, 2017, they updated the letter to reflect the recent revisions made to the Handschu Guidelines, which enhanced overall protection from NYPD surveillance for New York’s Muslims. The revisions strengthened the rules that NYPD must follow when investigating political and First Amendment activity in New York City and required the installation of a Civilian Representative, a lawyer who was never previously employed by NYPD, to serve as the watchdog of NYPD’s surveillance operations. This Civilian Representative has to be appointed by the Mayor and could not be taken off the committee without a judge’s approval. On March 20, 2017, the court approved the settlement agreement and dismissed the case with prejudice, although the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The case is ongoing for enforcement purposes, but as of April, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket.

Summary: On June 18, 2013, plaintiffs, a group of residents of New York City who are Muslim, as well as two mosques and a charitable organization located in New York City, filed a § 1983 suit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against New York City and the New York City Police Department (NYPD) alleging unlawful surveillance that targets Muslims in violation of the Fourteenth and First Amendments and the New York state constitution. The court approved a settlement agreement on March 20, 2017. The case is ongoing.


On April 24, 2007, non-profit public interest corporations and a regional network of peace and social justice groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, against the Miami-Dade County and the Miami-Dade College. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. They alleged that the local ordinance that employed a permit scheme for expressive activities in public fora was subject to arbitrary enforcement, and that the loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of their rights to free expression under the First Amendment. The plaintiffs intended to hold an anti-war demonstration near the campus entrance during a commencement address by the then president at Miami-Dade College on April 28, 2007. The County's permit scheme required the plaintiffs to obtain a lane closure permit for their proposed parade route and rally, but the County refused to accommodate them. Without a permit, the participants of the parade would be forced to crowd onto the sidewalks, which would likely violate the County's loitering ordinance. The plaintiffs feared that the County would penalize their members and shut down the parade. Feeling that their freedom of speech was infringed, the plaintiffs challenged the permit and loitering ordinances. The parties reached an agreement regarding the April 28 demonstration after the initial complaint was filed. The plaintiffs agreed to march and rally on designated sidewalks and grassy areas, and the defendant agreed not to enforce the loitering ordinance against the plaintiffs during the protest. Given the agreement, on April 26, 2007, the District Court (Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga) denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a preliminary injunction. The April 28 demonstration was able to proceed. On May 11, 2007, the plaintiffs stipulated to voluntarily dismiss the case against the Miami-Dade College. The Court granted the stipulation on the same day. The Miami-Dade County remained as the only defendant in this case. On September 14, 2007, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. On June 4, 2008, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction banning the County's future enforcement of the permit and loitering ordinances. The Court further ordered the parties to schedule a mediation regarding compensatory damages and attorneys' fees. In the opinion, Judge Altonaga found that the permit ordinance was constitutionally overbroad due to the unlimited discretion provided to the County officials and the lack of procedural safeguards. In addition, the Court declared the loitering ordinance unconstitutionally vague, because the ordinance failed to provide people with fair notice and encouraged arbitrary enforcement. On August 20, 2008, the parties stipulated a settlement agreement, in which the County agreed to pay the plaintiffs compensatory damages and attorneys' fees. The Court consented to the stipulation in its August 22 Final Judgment. This ended the case.

Summary: On April 24, 2007, non-profit public interest corporations and a regional network of peace and social justice groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the Miami-Dade County and the Miami-Dade College. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, alleging that the local permit and loitering ordinances were subject to arbitrary enforcement of local officials and impaired their freedom of speech in public. The parties reached an agreement subsequently, which allowed the April demonstration to proceed. On May 11, 2007, the plaintiffs dismissed the lawsuit against the College. The County remained as the sole defendant in the case. On September 14, 2007, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. On June 4, 2008, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and issued a permanent injunction banning the County's future enforcement of the disputed ordinances. On August 20, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement, in which the County agreed to pay the plaintiffs compensatory damages and attorneys' fees. This ended the case.


On September 15, 2011, former prisoners at the Western Massachusetts Regional Women's Correctional Center ("WCC") filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Hampden County Sheriff's Department. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought money damages, alleging that the Sheriff's Department violated their Fourth Amendment rights by allowing male officers to be present for and videotape non-emergency strip searches. Following discovery and arguments on the specifics of the Sheriff Department's policies with regards to non-emergency strip searches, on May 23, 2013 the District Court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The class consisted of 178 current and former WCC inmates who were videotaped by male correctional officers during strip searches. The Sheriff's Department appealed, but the First Circuit denied hearing the appeal. On August 26, 2014, Judge Ponsor granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding that the mere presence of male corrections officer during non-emergency strip searches violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights. Further proceedings were deemed necessary to determine the issue of liability and potential monetary and equitable relief. The Sheriff's Department appealed the order to the First Circuit. While that ruling was pending on appeal, the court stayed further proceedings on Oct. 3, 2014. Meanwhile, the parties reached a settlement in March 2015: the state (not the county) agreed to pay $675,000. $475,000 was allocated to the plaintiffs' attorneys for fees and $22,000 for costs; $20,000 to the lead plaintiff; $2,000 each to four plaintiffs who were deposed, and the remaining class members were set to receive at least $850, and more depending on the claiming rate. In addition, defendants agreed to change their policy to prohibit male officers from holding the video camera during strip searches except in exigent circumstances, as defined in the Prison Rape Elimination Act regulation, which defined "exigent circumstances" to be "any set of temporary and unforeseen circumstances that require immediate action in order to combat a threat to the security or institutional order of a facility." PREA Standards § 115.5. The defendants were to provide plaintiffs with statistics, a copy of the video of the full movie and strip search and any reports or materials documenting the need for the male videotaping up until June 30, 2016. On April 2, 2015, the First Circuit remanded the case back to the district court in response to the parties' joint motion requesting the remand for purposes of holding a settlement fairness hearing. A preliminary fairness hearing was held on April 9, 2015, and Judge Ponsor agreed to proceed to a final fairness hearing. On September 10, 2015 the court found the settlement fair and reasonable, and approved it; it also granted $475,000 in attorneys' fees and $22,000 in costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The First Circuit terminated the appeal on Sept. 16, 2015 in response to the parties voluntarily dismissing the appeal. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 15, 2011, former inmates at a Massachusetts Correctional Center filed a class action against Hampden County Sheriff's Department on allegations that the Department violated their Fourth Amendment rights by allowing male officers to be present for non-emergency strip searches. Judge Ponsor approved a settlement agreement in 2015.


On August 3, 2012, two African-American men filed this class action lawsuit, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued the City of Pittsburgh, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 42 U.S.C. § 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as applied by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Pennsylvania, asked the court for injunctive relief, alleging that the city's hiring process for police officers led to a low number of African-American hires because of discriminatory treatment with respect to African-American applicant, including a screening process that harmed qualified African-American applicants by giving preferential treatment to those with family and friends already on the police force and using other subjective criteria. The plaintiffs were all African-Americans who applied for positions as entry-level police officers but did not receive such positions during the application process. The plaintiffs claimed that the hiring practices by the city had lead to a statistically significant lack of African-American police officers. In August 2013, the parties executed a Stay of Litigation Agreement that included the parties bringing in Dr. Leaetta Hough as an expert to review the hiring practices by the police force. The parties met with Dr. Hough, on March 31, 2014, to discuss her recommendations to revise and improve the hiring system that was having an adverse impact on African-American applicants. On June 29, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for settlement that included some of the suggestions from Dr. Hough's report to diversify the police department and make payments to those who have been harmed by the application process from 2008 to 2014. The city agreed to pay $985,000 in damages and up to $600,000 in attorneys' fees. In addition, the settlement also sets up a structure to review and improve the city's selection process to increase the participation of qualified African-Americans.

Summary: In 2012, two African-American men filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs claimed that Pittsburgh's hiring practices led to a statistically significant lack of African-American police officers. The parties settled and Pittsburgh agreed to pay $985,000 in damages, up to $600,000 in attorneys' fees, and to review and improve the city's selection process to increase the participation of qualified African-Americans.


This is one of three identically named cases in the Clearinghouse. For the 2005 case challenging New Jersey's overuse of Conditional Extension Pending Placement (CEPP), see PB-NJ-0003. For the 2005 case generally challenging the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities in New Jersey, which was settled together with this case, see PB-NJ-0007. On April 16, 2008, New Jersey Protection and Advocacy (NJP&A) filed this lawsuit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and § 1983 against the state's Department of Human Services in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief regarding New Jersey's practice of wait-listing eligible citizens instead of providing them services. Specifically, the plaintiff asked the Court to direct the State to offer and provide home and community-based services with reasonable promptness to eligible individuals. NJP&A, a non-profit corporation, is the federally funded agency designated to serve as New Jersey's protection and advocacy system for people with disabilities. The named plaintiffs were Medicaid recipients with disabilities. These individuals received services from the New Jersey Department of Human Services, Division of Developmental Disabilities and met the requirements for Medicaid's home and community-based waiver services (HCS). All of the individuals named in the Complaint would be able to live in less restrictive settings with waiver supports and services. Instead, they were all on a waitlist for services under the HCS program for years without notification of their status or how long they would have to wait. On September 9, 2008, Judge Anne E. Thompson granted the state's Motion for a More Definite Statement and Motion to Strike. The court ordered the disclosure of the identities of the named plaintiffs (who had been identified with only initials in the Complaint) to the State. The court also ordered the plaintiffs to strike the statements of interested parties that had been included in the Complaint. On March 10, 2009, the court issued an order notifying the Attorney General of the United States that the constitutionality of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act had been called into question in this case. The order required the United States to file a request with the court if it wished to intervene. The United States did so on May 18, 2009. The court denied the State's motion to dismiss on July 23, 2009. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring suit and that the State's 11th Amendment arguments were inapposite. After a long period of discovery and concurrent settlement negotiations, the parties ultimately agreed to a settlement in December 2012, which was entered by the court upon the case's dismissal in March 2013. The settlement agreement resolved both this case and the longstanding Olmstead case challenging New Jersey's unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with developmental disabilities (PB-NJ-0007). Through this agreement, the State agreed to discharge all community-eligible individuals from institutions by 2017 (approximately 600 people) and expand community-based services as alternatives to institutional placements. The State also increased screening and diversion services for those who are slated for placement in an institution. The agreement included funding for a consultant to assist in implementing the agreement and allowed for Disability Rights New Jersey to serve as a monitor. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $700,000 for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in the litigation. As of November 2018, it was not clear from the docket whether the monitoring period had continued past 2017. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by New Jersey Protection and Advocacy against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services challenging the long waitlist to obtain community-based services for individuals with disabilities. The plaintiffs alleged that the waitlist placed them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. The parties reached a settlement in early 2013.


On October 9, 2001, a group of pre-trial detainees represented by private counsel filed a class action civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, challenging the naked confinement policy of the Saginaw County Jail. Plaintiffs alleged that, under the policy, the County Sheriff and deputies placed detainees they found to be uncooperative or disruptive in administrative segregation cells, after being stripped naked. Plaintiffs further alleged that they were viewed while naked by jail personnel and inmates of the opposite gender. This policy, plaintiffs maintained, was unconstitutional. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, monetary damages and class certification. Over the course of the litigation, the complaint was amended six times. Following years of extensive discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction. The District Court (District Judge David M. Lawson) held that the County's policy violated due process and was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The judge ruled that the sheriff and individual officers, however, were entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and absolute immunity on the state claims. The Court declined to enter a preliminary injunction. Rose v. Saginaw County, 353 F.Supp.2d 900 (E.D.Mich. 2005). Plaintiffs then moved for class certification or to add new individual plaintiffs to the case. Defendants opposed certification and sought leave to add a defense that plaintiffs' claims were barred by exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Judge Lawson denied these motions, found that certification was inappropriate and that the PLRA did not apply to the case, as the plaintiffs were not confined when the suit was filed. Rose v. Saginaw County, 232 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Mich. 2005). In an attempt to broker a settlement, Judge Lawson referred the case to Magistrate Judge Patrick J. Duggan for a settlement conference and appointed former Wayne County, Michigan Circuit Judge Pamela Harwood as a facilitator to conduct a mediation session. Negotiations were broadened and the parties discussed a global settlement of four related cases - Rose v. Saginaw County, Brabant v. Saginaw County, Abner v. Saginaw County, and Whittum v. Saginaw County - in which there were approximately 94 plaintiffs. Settlement negotiations stalled and the defendants moved for sanctions and to dismiss the case, alleging that the individual plaintiffs failed to appear at settlement conferences and mediation. Plaintiffs maintained defendants' motion was without merrit, as plaintiffs' attorneys attended the various conferences with full authority to settle the case. Judge Lawson denied the defense motion by an unpublished order dated July 19, 2007. The parties reached an agreement to resolve the individual plaintiffs' damage claims in Rose v. Saginaw County (case no. 01-10337) and two similar cases, Abner v. Saginaw County (case no. 05-10323), and Brabant v. Saginaw County (case no. 05-10030). Under the agreement, approved by Judge Lawson on January 11, 2008, a special case evaluation process was established to determine the monetary value of individual claims. Each plaintiff's claim would be evaluated by a three-attorney panel, consisting of a plaintiff specialist chosen by plaintiffs' counsel, a defense specialist chosen by defense counsel and the chairperson, retired state judge Harwood. The panel would recommend a settlement value for each claim, which would either be accepted or rejected by the parties. If the recommendation was rejected, the claim would be set for trial. The County agreed to pay plaintiffs' counsel a fee equal to thirty-percent (30%) of the amount of each case settled or tried to a conclusion, subject to a cap in the amount of $400,000 on the total amount of attorney's fees and costs claimed by the plaintiffs. On March 10 and 12, 2008, several Plaintiffs accepted the court recommended settlement payouts, and their claims were dismissed with prejudice. Four plaintiffs rejected the settlement recommendations, went to trial and were awarded between $25,000 and $50,000 each by a jury on March 18, 2008. Judgment was entered on these jury verdicts on March 20, 2008. Due to the great amount of time between the initial complaint and the judgment, Plaintiffs moved for, and were granted interest on their damages dating back to the original complaints. The remaining three Plaintiffs' claims were consolidated on March 20, 2008 to be included with James Abner, III v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10323, which was dismissed on February 17, 2010 for want of prosecution.

Summary: This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case was filed on October 9, 2001 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Saginaw County Jail. The Plaintiffs claimed that the jail's naked confinement policy violated their constitutional rights. After years of extensive discovery, several plaintiffs came to private settlements with the Defendant on March 10 and 12 of 2008. Four remaining Plaintiffs went to trial and were awarded between $25,000 and $50,000 each by a jury. Judgment was entered on these jury verdicts on March 20, 2012. Plaintiffs then made a motion for interest to be added to these damages dated back to the original complaints, which was granted on June 19, 2008. The remaining three Plaintiffs' claims were consolidated on March 20, 2008 to be included with James Abner, III, et al. v. Saginaw County, docket no. 05-10323, which was dismissed on February 17, 2010 for want of prosecution.


This case is about fair hearings for individuals in immigration detention. On April 30, 2020, the three immigration detainees in Maryland filed a class action lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s failure to provide fair hearings to people in immigration detention on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Maryland, the Capital Area Immigrants' Rights (CAIR) Coalition, and a public interest organization. The complaint and habeas petition pointed to two flaws in the government's bond hearings that made subsequent detentions a violation of procedural due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that prohibits further detention without a constitutionally adequate bond hearing that places the burden of proof on the government and requires the court to consider ability to pay in setting bond amount. The case was assigned to Judge Catherine Blake. The complaint alleged first that the government jails noncitizens pending their removal proceedings without being required to demonstrate that such detention was even warranted in the first place, placing the burden of proof on the noncitizen to satisfy an immigration judge (IJ) that they posed no danger or flight risk. Second, the government then conditioned release on payment of a money bond, without any requirement that IJs consider the noncitizen’s financial circumstances when setting a bond amount. As a result, the plaintiffs (and other similarly situated) were detained arbitrarily, either because the government was not required to prove that their imprisonment was in fact necessary, or their bond that was set unnecessarily beyond their financial means. Together, these created a process that violated their procedural due process rights and the INA. The complaint also included the COVID-19 pandemic as an aggravating factor in the case. On May 5, 2020 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which the court granted on May 29. On May 22, the plaintiffs filed their motion for class certification. The purported class was defined as all people who are or will be detained under the INA and had or will have a bond hearing before the immigration court in Baltimore, Maryland. On July 27, the defendants filed an appeal (No. 20-1828) to the Fourth Circuit challenging the preliminary injunction. The defendants submitted a motion to stay proceedings on August 25, which was granted on August 26. On appeal, there were three issues: (1) whether due process requires the government to bear the burden of justifying a noncitizen’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence at bond hearings under the INA; (2) whether due process requires an IJ to consider a noncitizen’s ability to pay a bond and his suitability for release on alternative conditions of supervision at bond hearings under the INA; and (3) whether the INA barred the class-wide preliminary injunction. The government filed its opening brief on December 4. The plaintiffs have filed three motions for extended time; their response brief is currently due on June 4, 2021. Meanwhile, back in the district court, Judge Blake denied class certification on December 4, 2020; the parties were briefing the preliminary injunction order's appeal in the Fourth Circuit and the case had been stayed. Judge Blake denied the motion without prejudice to renewal after the conclusion of the appeal. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 30, 2020, the three immigration detainees in Maryland filed a class action lawsuit challenging the Trump administration’s failure to provide fair hearings to people in immigration detention on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated. The complaint and habeas corpus petition pointed to two flaws in the government's bond hearings that made subsequent detentions a violation of procedural due process and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). On May 5, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which was granted on May 29. On July 27, 2020, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Fourth Circuit (No. 20-1828). The case is ongoing.


On September 12, 2012, the United States filed a complaint against Luther Burbank Savings in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The U.S. sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). The U.S. also sought civil penalties available under the Fair Housing Act. Settlement negotiations preceded the filing of the complaint, and the U.S., represented by the Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division, filed a Proposed Consent Decree at the same time. The complaint alleged that the defendant engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination in its residential mortgage lending activities. From 2006 to 2010, Luther maintained a minimum loan amount policy of $400,000 for its single-family residential mortgage loan program. The U.S. alleged that this policy had a disparate impact on African-American and Hispanic borrowers. The period that Luther enforced this policy resulted in very few single-family residential mortgage loans in majority-minority census tracts compared to other prime lenders. Very few single-family residential mortgage loans to African-American and Hispanic borrowers also arose under the policy. The complaint alleged that Luther knew that low levels of lending to African Americans and Hispanics resulted from the policy. The Office of Thrift Supervision referred the case to the Department of Justice after identifying fair lending issues during an examination of the bank. Luther discontinued its $400,000 minimum loan amount policy in June 2011. Judge John A. Kronstadt entered the Consent Order on October 12, 2012. Under the agreement, Luther was prohibited from establishing a similar minimum loan amount policy in the future and must provide fair lending training for its employees. The defendant was required to invest $1.1 million in a program to increase financing for mortgage loans made to qualified borrowers seeking loans in California of $400,000 or less. The order also required Luther to spend $450,000 in partnerships with organizations that provided credit and financial services to minorities, $300,000 to promote its products and services to all potential customers, and $150,000 on consumer education programs. The consent decree order called for three years of enforcing the agreed upon terms. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 12, 2012, the United States sued Luther Burbank Savings, alleging the bank's minimum loan amount policy had a disparate impact on African-American and Latino borrowers in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. The United States also filed a proposed consent order. The order, entered in October 2012, prohibits Luther from having future policies similar to the minimum loan amount policy, and requires Luther to invest in the markets it had previously neglected. The case is now closed.


This lawsuit was filed by the State of Oregon through Ellen Rosenblum, the Oregon Attorney General, on July 17, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The State sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and Federal Protective Service, as well as ten unnamed and unidentified law enforcement officers. The complaint alleged that these federal agencies were involved in detaining people in Portland, hauling them into unmarked vehicles, and taking them to the courthouse without a warrant. President Trump began deploying these federal agencies to Portland in mid-July of 2020, in response to the protests that took place in that city since the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. The complaint alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments, and that the defendants' actions constituted a public nuisance. The First Amendment charge argued that the federal government took these actions to discourage protests against racial inequality, therefore violating residents' freedom of expression. The Fourth Amendment charge accused the agencies of unreasonable seizures, alleging that in at least one case the agents did not have a warrant to arrest a man. The Fifth Amendment complaint argued that these actions also represented a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. Finally, the public nuisance allegation claimed that the federal agencies unreasonably interfered with the public's right to safety, peace, comfort, and convenience. The State of Oregon sought declaratory relief and injunctive relief in the form of a permanent injunction that would bar defendants from these tactics and also requiring that they identify themselves and their agency, explain to detainees why they were being arrested, and refrain from arresting people without probable cause or a warrant. The case was assigned to Judge Marco A. Hernandez, but then reassigned to Judge Michael M. Mosman. Three days later, the State of Oregon submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO), requesting that the court enjoin the defendants from detaining individuals without a warrant, to mandate that defendants identify themselves and their agencies, and to explain to any detainee why they were being arrested. The defendants filed a memo in opposition, arguing that the State did not have standing. They also argued that the plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits, would not suffer irreparable harm, and that the balance of equities and public interest was not in the plaintiff's favor. On July 24, Judge Mosman denied the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order because the State of Oregon lacked standing to succeed in the lawsuit. 2020 WL 4253209. In order to for the State of Oregon to have standing to sue on behalf of its citizens under the  parens patriae doctrine, the State of Oregon needed to make a very particularized showing, but Judge Mosman found that the State of Oregon had failed to articulate a distinct interest from the interests of private parties and that the State was more than a nominal party. In additional, Judge Mosman found that even if the State had  parens patriae standing, there was not enough evidence that unlawful seizures were likely to continue in the future and thus, the State still had not met its burden to show it had standing for injunctive relief. That same day, the City of Portland filed a motion requesting to appear and participate as amicus curiae. That motion was granted on July 27. On September 16, 2020, the State of Oregon voluntarily dismissed the case, as the federal agents had stopped engaging in the allegedly illegal behavior. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought on July 17, 2020 by the State of Oregon through the Attorney General of Oregon, Ellen Rosenblum. It sued several federal agencies including the DHS, CBP, USMS, and Federal Protective Services, as well as ten unnamed and unidentified officers. The suit came as President Trump ordered federal law enforcement agencies to exert force in Portland, Oregon, following months of protests against racial inequality after the killing of George Floyd. The complaint alleged that the federal agencies were detaining people off the streets without warrants, putting them into unmarked vans, and taking them to the courthouse without telling them the crime for which they were detained. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, prohibiting the agencies from arresting people without warrants, mandating that the agents identify themselves and the agencies they work for, and explaining to all detainees the crime for which they would be arrested. The State of Oregon sought a temporary restraining order, but the Court denied it on July 24 because the State lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. On September 16, 2020, the State of Oregon voluntarily dismissed the case, as the federal agents had stopped engaging in the allegedly illegal behavior. The case is now closed.


On March 31, 2011, female prisoners at an Illinois women’s prison were strip searched as part of a training exercise for new guards. Several of the prisoners filed this putative class action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections, Lincoln Correctional Center, and Logan Correctional Center under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by civil rights attorneys Loevy and Loevy, they sought damages, costs and attorney’s fees, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the strip searches were conducted in a way that violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. Specifically, they claimed that the strip searches were unnecessary, demeaning, dehumanizing, and humiliating. The plaintiffs had to stand naked in a line with 8-10 other inmates in a room with other inmates and guards who were not conducting the searches. The prisoners who were menstruating had to remove their menstrual products, they were not given new ones, and many got blood on themselves, their clothes, and the floor. The prisoners had to stand barefoot and naked on a floor covered in menstrual blood, raise their breasts, life their hair, turn around, bend over, spread their buttocks and vaginas, and cough. The case was assigned to Judge Richard Mills. On October 21, 2014 Judge Mills granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 2014 WL 5349870 (C.D. Ill. 2014). Judge Mills certified the two classes. Class I included all individuals subjected to the March 31, 2011 strip search at Lincoln Correctional Center. Class II included all women who are incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center and all women who will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future. Lincoln Correctional Center was converted to an all-male prison and the majority of inmates were sent to Logan Correctional Center. On April 14, 2016 the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the Fourth Amendment claim because, it held, a visual inspections of a prisoner could not constitute an unreasonable search. 2016 WL 11265636 (C.D. Ill. 2016). The district court denied summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim and that claim went to trial. A jury trial was held before Judge Mills on November 14-18, 2016. On November 21, 2016, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, finding that the searches had not been intended to humiliate or conducted to gain sexual gratification. Judge Mills entered the verdict for the defendants on November 22, 2016. The plaintiffs appealed; they did not contest the jury verdict against them on the Eighth Amendment claim but appealed to the Seventh Circuit to reinstate the Fourth Amendment claim. (Docket No. 16-04234). On November 30, 2017, the case was argued in front of a panel of three judges: Circuit Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge Daniel A. Manion, and District Judge John Z. Lee (sitting by designation). On July 16, 2019, the Seventh Circuit issued an opinion affirming the decision of the District Court that granted summary judgment to the defendants. Judge Lee dissented, arguing that whether or not the Fourth Amendment applied depended on whether the prisoners had a reasonable expectation of privacy, not on whether guards or the prisoners themselves conducted the searches. 930 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2019). Rehearing en banc was granted December 18, 2019. 788 Fed. Appx. 387 (Mem). On May 14, 2020 the case was argued en banc via Zoom. On August 11, 2020 the en banc Seventh Circuit reversed the previous panel’s ruling. In an opinion by Circuit Judge Amy J. St. Eve, the court held that “the Fourth Amendment protects a right to bodily privacy for convicted prisoners, albeit in a significantly limited way, including during visual inspections.” 969 F.3d 769, 774. The Seventh Circuit then remanded the case back to District Court for further proceedings on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims. Judge Easterbrook, who wrote the reversed panel opinion in this case, filed a dissent, arguing that convicted prisoners have no rights under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 788. The District Court received the Court of Appeal's mandate on September 3, 2020, but no proceedings have happened as of October 1, 2020. The case remains open.

Summary: In 2012, female inmates at Lincoln Correctional Center in Illinois brought a lawsuit against the correctional center in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois. The inmates claimed that their constitutional rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendment were violated during a 2011 strip-search. In 2016, the district court entered judgement in favor of the defendants and the inmates appealed to the Seventh Circuit. The case was argued in 2017 in front of a panel of three judges and in 2019 the district court's decision was affirmed. The inmates petitioned for rehearing en banc, which was granted. The case was reargued in front of the Seventh Circuit via Zoom (due to COVID-19) in May of 2020. On August 11, 202 the en banc Seventh Circuit reversed the panel decision, finding that the plaintiffs had a limited Fourth Amendment right bodily privacy, and remanded to the District Court for further proceedings.


On March 13, 2012, plaintiffs—medically fragile children or children who need skilled care services—filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against Florida's Agency for Health Care Administration and Department of Health. After consolidating two similar cases in Spring 2012, plaintiffs' amended complaint sought relief under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Act, on behalf of two subclasses: children who live at home but are at risk of future institutionalization, and children placed in geriatric nursing facilities. The plaintiffs also named eQHealth, the organization contracted to serve Florida's Medicaid utilization review entity, as a defendant. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel, the FSU College of Law Public Interest Law Center, and the North Florida Center For Equal Justice. They sought to compel the state to provide services that would allow them to live in their homes and communities, to cease the practice of denying or reducing plaintiffs' services at recertification where there has been no change in the medical necessity of such services, and to award compensatory services to remedy conditions that had resulted from past failures to provide medically necessary services. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on June 1, 2012. The Florida state agency defendants claimed that they had provided services in accordance with state and federal Medicaid requirements and that they had not enacted a policy that favored institutionalization. The United States sent a Statement of Interest to the Court on June 28, 2012, urging the Court to deny defendants' motion to dismiss. Specifically, the United States stated that plaintiffs had adequately identified a state policy that placed them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA, stated a valid claim that defendants violated the "reasonable promptness" provision and EPSDT provisions of the Medicaid Act by unreasonably applying their definition of medical necessity, and alleged a clear violation of PASRR requirements of the Nursing Home Reform Act. On July 17, Judge William Zloch denied the motion to dismiss in a short order, saying that the issues would be better addressed in a motion for summary judgment. On September 4, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ) sent a Findings Letter to the attorney general of Florida stating that, based on the DOJ investigation of the state system with respect to six large nursing facilities that housed the majority of children with medically complex or fragile conditions, the State had failed to meet its obligations under Title VII of the ADA and 28 CFR Part 35 by unnecessarily institutionalizing hundreds of children in nursing facilities and by placing many others at risk of such placement. For instance, although some community-based services were available through the Medicaid State Plan, the State had acted irrationally and placed several restrictions on the availability of these services. The DOJ noted that these children could live at home with their families or in other more integrated community settings if adequate services and support was provided. Specifically, the DOJ recommended that the State increase community capacity by allotting additional waiver slots, amend existing policies, including policies that may lead to inappropriate denial of medically necessary services, and expand other community services to serve children in or at risk of entering nursing facilities. The DOJ also recommended that the State develop and implement an active transition plan to ensure that services and support are available to serve the children. This transition plan should include individuals knowledgeable about community living options, rather than rely on the staff of nursing facilities for such arrangements. A few weeks later, the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, the Florida Department of Health, and the Florida Department of Children and Families responded to the Findings Letter. They noted that, upon receiving the Findings Letter, they conducted their own multiagency investigation and found the assertions in the DOJ's letter to be unfounded. They stated their interest in working collaboratively with the DOJ but noted that they required certain documents from the DOJ before they could start working on any issues. On February 21, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to mootness because they claimed that they had voluntarily implemented policy changes to the specific rules, practices, and regulations challenged by the plaintiffs. The Court (Judge Ron S. Rosenbaum) denied the motion on August 6, 2013. On September 25, 2013, Judge Rosenbaum denied without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. At issue was whether the plaintiffs were really challenging the state's systematic practice of institutionalizing at-risk children (which would be appropriate for a class action) or whether the plaintiffs were, as defendants contended, just challenging individualized executions of the state's policy (which would be less amenable to class certification). The judge determined that the record was not sufficiently developed to show what kind of case this was. The plaintiffs could move to recertify after they completed more discovery. On December 6, 2013, Judge Rosenbaum granted the plaintiffs' motion to consolidate their case with one that the Department of Justice had brought against the state for unnecessarily segregating and institutionalizing children with disabilities in violation of the ADA. On December 19, 2013, the plaintiffs renewed their motion to certify the class. The defendants opposed and renewed their own motion to dismiss the claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Shortly thereafter, the case was reassigned to Judge William J. Zloch, who referred the parties to mediation on June 17, 2014. On September 9, 2014, Judge Zloch denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification without prejudice with leave to refile following the Court's ruling on the defendants' renewed motion to dismiss. The defendant's motion was eventually denied on December 29, 2014. On January 30, 2015, the plaintiffs settled with the defendant eQHealth, the Louisiana non-profit organization that contracted frequently with Florida. The plaintiffs asked that the court retain jurisdiction over eQHealth pending fulfillment of the settlement agreement, but the terms of the settlement were not stipulated. In April 2015, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. The defendants, in turn, moved for judgment on the pleadings. On April 17, 2015, the final mediation report was handed into the court. The remaining parties were apparently unable to settle. On August 7, 2015 the court on the recommendation of the magistrate judge denied the plaintiff's motion for class certification. 2015 WL 11143082. The court found the class was not clearly defined and certification unnecessary. On September 1, 2015, the court adopted a report and recommendation submitted by Judge Patrick M. Hunt, which suggested to the court to grant in part and deny in part the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. 2015 WL 11143083. At stake was a portion of the plaintiffs' request for an injunction forcing "compensatory services" to make the plaintiffs whole after they were consistently denied medically necessary services. The defendants argued that compensatory damages are only available for plaintiffs for suits arising from the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The court agreed, judging in favor of the defendants on the request for the injunction seeking compensatory services. However, Judge Hunt noted that the plaintiffs request under the Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic and Treatment Services (EPSDT provisions) would necessarily require the defendants to provide services to "correct or ameliorate defects and physical and mental illnesses and conditions discovered" by the screenings performed by the defendants. On February 29, 2016, the court again adopted a report and recommendation by Judge Hunt, which this time recommended denial of the class certification requested by the plaintiffs. 2016 WL 3753705 The reason for the denial was twofold. First, the class was denied was because the definition of the class was overly broad. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class under the following parameters: "All current and future Medicaid recipients in Florida under the age of 21, who are (1) institutionalized in nursing facilities, or (2) medically complex or fragile and at risk of institutionalization in nursing facilities." Judge Hunt noted that this definition included all children who could be institutionalized, as opposed to those who would be unnecessarily institutionalized. Thus, the definition was found to be too broad. Second, the class was found to be unnecessary. The plaintiffs tried to argue that the class was necessary due to the fact that three plaintiffs from the original suit had already passed away, and in order to prevent their case from becoming moot, they needed a class. The court decided that the probability of the case becoming moot was so low that certifying the class would be unnecessary. On March 21, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, but in September 2016, it was denied as moot. On June 1, 2016, the defendants moved to dismiss several of the plaintiffs' claims due to their deaths and lack of subsequent parties representing the decedents interests. On June 27, 2016, the court granted the motion to dismiss four of the plaintiffs. Also on June 27, 2016, the court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff A.R.'s claims as moot per the recommendations of the Magistrate Judge. This matter was reconsidered due to the plaintiffs filing an untimely objection, but this reconsideration was denied on June 30, 2016 with the dismissal of plaintiff A.R. being reaffirmed. On September 20, 2016, the court dismissed the United States of America as plaintiffs. 209 F. Supp.3 d 1279. The court found that the Attorney General could not file a suit under the plain language of Title II of the ADA. On January 19, 2017, the court dismissed plaintiff A.G.'s claims for mootness due to him aging out of the Medicaid program. The plaintiffs had previously sought class certification to prevent this issue. Plaintiff A.G. turned 21 years old and as a result became ineligible for the Florida medicaid program, and his claim was ruled moot as a result. On June 9, 2017, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the three remaining plaintiffs, citing the recommendation of the magistrate judge. The defendants had argued that the plaintiff's claims should be dismissed due to the previously offending policies being changed or removed, rendering the claim moot. The magistrate judge found that while usually a change in policy such as this would not render a claim moot, when it is a government policy being changed there is more consideration given. The magistrate judge determined that the offending policies had been unambiguously terminated, made in good faith with substantial deliberation, and consistently applied. As a result, the remaining plaintiffs claims were moot. Six plaintiffs appealed this dismissal to the 11th Circuit. On May 16, 2019, the court affirmed the district court's ruling. The United States also appealed their dismissal to the 11th circuit. On September 17, 2019, the court reversed the District Court's dismissal of the plaintiff and remanded it for further proceedings. The court ruled that the Attorney General could sue under Title II of the ADA as Congress had approved enforcement by any means authorized by law. This case is ongoing as of November 20, 2019.

Summary: On March 13, 2012, plaintiffs (represented by private counsel and by the FSU College of Law Public Interest Law Center, and the North Florida Center For Equal Justice) filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Florida, seeking to compel the state to provide services that will allow them to live in their homes and communities, rather than institutionalizing them in geriatric nursing homes. They also demanded the state cease the practice of denying or reducing Plaintiffs' services at recertification where there has been no change in the medical necessity of such services, and to award compensatory services to the Plaintiffs to remediate conditions that have resulted from past failures to provide medically necessary services. The case was consolidated with a DOJ case against Florida alleging they had violated the ADA when they unnecessarily segregated and institutionalized disabled children. The Plaintiffs against sought class certification due their claims becoming moot once they aged out of the Medicaid program, but this certification was dismissed. Plaintiffs were slowly dismissed for mootness due to this with the court finally fully dismissing the remaining Plaintiffs for mootness on June 9, 2017. The Plaintiffs appealed to the 11th Circuit which affirmed the District Court's ruling on May 16, 2019. Concurrently, in the consolidated DOJ case the United States was dismissed due to the District Court finding that the Attorney General could not sue under Title II of the ADA. However, the United States appealed to the 11th Circuit and on September 17, 2019, the court reversed the dismissal finding that the United States was privy to all legal means of enforcement and remanded the case for further proceedings.


On February 12, 2014, four married, same-sex couples and a nonprofit organization filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaration that any Louisiana laws that do not recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions are unconstitutional and that the enforcement of such laws violates citizens' right to free speech. They also sought to enjoin enforcement of such laws, require the defendants in their official capacities to recognize the plaintiffs' marriages as valid and enforceable under Louisiana law, and award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. The Louisiana Anti-Recognition Laws prohibited Louisiana officials from recognizing the marriages of same-sex couples entered into in another jurisdiction where same-sex marriages were legal. The plaintiff claimed that the Louisiana Anti-Recognition Laws violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States constitution. The plaintiffs also alleged that the laws infringed upon their freedom of speech. This case was consolidated with a similar Louisiana case,  Robicheaux v. Caldwell, on March 18, 2014. On September 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Michael North entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910 (E.D. La. 2014). The Court found that the State of Louisiana had a legitimate interest under a rational basis standard of review for addressing the meaning of marriage through the democratic process, and that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a genuine dispute regarding a First Amendment violation. The order denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' motion for the same. On September 4, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. While this appeal was under submission, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), which held that the right to marry is a fundamental right under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and that same-sex couples may not be deprived of that right. Thus, on July 1, 2015, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 791 F.3d 616 (5th Cir. 2015). The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 12, 2014, four married, same-sex couples and a nonprofit organization filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana against the State of Louisiana. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare unconstitutional any Louisiana Laws that do not recognize the legal marriages of same-sex couples performed in other jurisdictions, enjoin enforcement of such laws, declare that the enforcement of such laws violates citizens' right to free speech, require the defendants in their official capacities to recognize the plaintiffs' marriages as valid and enforceable under Louisiana law, and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. On September 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Michael North entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On September 4, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Following the Supreme Court's precedent in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Fifth Circuit reversed the District Court's decision and remanded for entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class-action complaint brought on April 9, 2020, by nine detainees at the Dallas County Jail, who have either been infected with COVID-19 or are at risk due to underlying conditions, seeking release from detention due to the risks to their health in light of the virus. The court rejected the request for temporary restraining order on April 26. The plaintiffs amended their complaint, but the habeas claims were dismissed again on August 18. On September 25, defendants filed another motion to dismiss for lack of standing for the claims pertaining to one of the subclasses because those class members had been released. A trial is scheduled for May 25, 2021. No outcome yet. <hr> On April 9, 2020, nine individuals detained in Dallas County Jail petitioned for the release of all medically-vulnerable detainees and other detainees who are not medically-vulnerable to reduce the population of the jail so that a six-foot social distance can be maintained. Represented by the ACLU, Civil Rights Corps, and Next Generation Action Network, and private counsel, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. under § 2241, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they alleged that their detention violates their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by subjecting them to a serious risk of contracting COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the detention conditions posed an unreasonable risk against the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. They also sought a temporary restraining order (TRO), injunctive relief, and a writ of habeas corpus ordering the identification and release of all class members identified as medically vulnerable and further as necessary to ensure reasonable safety. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas and assigned to Judge Ada Brown. Plaintiff Oscar Sanchez, who is being held pretrial on multiple charges, has a history of severe chronic asthma and has begun to show symptoms that are consistent with COVID-19. The petition includes eight additional named plaintiffs who have either tested positive for COVID-19 or are at risk due to medical conditions. The plaintiffs pointed to the jump in a week from five reported COVID-19 infections of detainees and jail employees to almost 30 as of April 7, 2020, a lack of COVID-19 testing and failure to institute social distancing practices, failure to provide the necessary education and protective equipment for safety and hygiene, and failure to segregate detainees with symptoms and illness from other detainees and guards. On April 12, the plaintiffs moved to certify the matter as a class action and proposed two classes. The “Pre-Adjudication Class” consisted of current and future detainees in pretrial custody at the Dallas County Jail and further divided with the “Medically-Vulnerable Pre-Adjudication Subclass.” “Medically-Vulnerable” is defined as those over the age of 50 and/or with experiences of medical conditions. The “Post-Adjudication Class” consisted of current and future detainees in post-adjudication custody at the Dallas County Jail, with a subclass of “Medically-Vulnerable Post-Adjudication Subclass.” The State of Texas, Governor Greg Abbott (who issued an executive order on March 29 prohibiting local officials from releasing dangerous felons from jails), and Attorney General Ken Paxton filed a motion to intervene in the case the next day due to concerns of releasing criminals, including Billy Chemirmir, who they labeled as "possibly one of the state’s most prolific serial killers.” In its motion to dismiss on April 15, the defendants argue that the federal court cannot grant the plaintiff’s motion because the inmates have not exhausted other avenues available to them, which they claimed was required under both the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the rules governing habeas. The plaintiffs amended their petition with three additional detainees as plaintiffs on April 17. On April 20, the court granted the state's motion to intervene, and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs’ motion for TRO, preliminary injunction, and writ of habeas corpus was denied on April 27. The Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ habeas action. They also noted that the plaintiffs have not exhausted administrative, state court, and PLRA remedies. The court further pointed to concerns of federalism and separation of powers implicated in dictating policy for jail operations. 2020 WL 2615931. On April 19, the defendants submitted an amended motion to dismiss. On August 18, the court granted the motion to dismiss in part and deferred in part, ruling that plaintiffs had not exhausted available state court remedies nor stated a claim for habeas relief because their claims raised questions unrelated to the causes of their detention, but deferred ruling on plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. On September 25, defendants filed another motion to dismiss the Post-Adjudication Class claims for relief alleging that all of the named plaintiffs in that class had been released and therefore they lacked standing and their claims for § 1983 injunctive relief were moot. On October 26, the three intervening parties moved to withdraw, which was granted by the court the following day. The parties are currently in discovery. A trial is scheduled for May 25, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 9, 2020, nine inmates detained in Dallas County Jail petitioned for the release of all medically-vulnerable inmates and other inmates who are not medically-vulnerable to reduce the population of the jail so that a six-foot social distance can be maintained. The plaintiffs sought attorneys’ fees, a declaratory judgment that the detention conditions posed an unreasonable risk against the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. They also sought TRO, injunctive relief and a writ of habeas corpus ordering the identification and release of all class members identified as medically vulnerable and further as necessary to ensure reasonable safety. On April 20, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs’ motion for TRO, preliminary injunction and writ of habeas was denied on April 27. The plaintiffs amended their complaint, but their habeas claims were dismissed again on August 18. A trial is scheduled for May 25, 2021. The case is ongoing.


On December 13, 2010, the USAA Federal Savings Bank filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission requesting injunctive and declaratory relief due to allegations of non-compliance with the federal Homeowners' Loan Act. Specifically, The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission had received a complaint, in June 2009, from an individual that USAA Federal Savings Bank had discriminated against her when they had denied the cash out refinancing loan on her investment property. In order to investigate this complaint, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission attempted to retrieve documents to look into the USAA Federal Saving Bank's lending practices. Rather than turn over documentation to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, USAA Federal Savings Bank filed this lawsuit under the argument that only the Office of Thrift Supervision, USAA's federal regulator at the time of the lawsuit, can oversee the USAA's lending practices. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission filed a motion to dismiss on February 7, 2011. On February 10, 2011, the court [Judge Timothy J. Savage] requested that both parties file motions for summary judgment. On April 28, 2011, the United States filed a statement of interest in this matter in which it stated that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's motion for summary judgment dismissing USAA Federal Savings Bank's lawsuit should be granted, and USAA's motion for summary judgment should be denied. The United States also stated that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, as a state agency certified by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development to enforce a state fair housing law substantially equivalent to the Fair Housing Act (FHA), is authorized by the FHA to investigate lending discrimination complaints as a matter of law. After completing oral arguments on August 10, 2011, the court [Judge Timothy J. Savage] issued an order granting the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's motion for summary judgment on August 23, 2011. The court concluded that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's investigation, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, was not preempted by federal law. Rather, it was mandated by federal law. (2011 WL 3715056). On August 31, 2011, the court dismissed the case.

Summary: On December 13, 2010 the USAA Federal Savings Bank filed a complaint against the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission requesting injunctive and declaratory relief due to allegations of non-compliance with the federal Homeowners' Loan Act. The court [Judge Timothy J. Savage] issued an order granting the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission's motion for summary judgment on August 23, 2011. On August 31, 2011, the court dismissed the case.


On June 28, 2002, four African-Americans filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., against General Investment & Development Co., Windsor Property Management Co., and Windsor Investment Co. in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit on behalf of themselves and on behalf of a putative class of all African-American persons currently and previously employed by any of the defendant companies. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, back pay, punitive and compensatory damages, and attorney's fees, alleging that Defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had failed to promote former and current qualified African-American employees in favor of equally or less qualified white employees. Plaintiffs further alleged that Defendants had failed to notify former and current qualified African-American employees of job openings to which equally or less qualified white employees were subsequently appointed. On September 16, 2002, Defendants filed four separate motions to dismiss concerning: (1) the class action claims; (2) the Title VII claims due to lack of venue; (3) Counts I, II, V, and VI relating to the Title VII claims; and (4) the claims based on the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (DCHRA). On March 10, 2003, the Court (Judge Reggie B. Walton) issued a memorandum opinion in which it concluded that "rulings on defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' class action claims and two of the plaintiffs' District of Columbia Human Right Act claims must be deferred and that defendants' remaining motions should be granted in part and denied in part." Quarles v. Gen. Inv. & Dev. Co., 260 F.Supp.2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2003). The parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, and on April 15, 2003, the court approved the parties' stipulation of dismissal. The court then dismissed with prejudice plaintiffs' individual complaints and dismissed without prejudice plaintiffs' class complaint.

Summary: This putative class action lawsuit was brought by African-American employees of General Investment & Development Co., Windsor Property Management Co., or Windsor Investment Co. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, back pay, punitive and compensatory damages, and attorney's fees, alleging that Defendants had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination on the basis of race. The parties reached a confidential settlement agreement, and on April 15, 2003, the court approved the parties' stipulation of dismissal.


On January 3, 2014, Muslim prisoners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) for failing to provide certified halal meals to the prisoners. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the failure to provide a halal-certified diet was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) and a violation of the Fifth Amendments' equal protection requirement. The prisoners' Religious Diet Program provided kosher meals, however the meat in kosher meals was not slaughtered according to Islamic law, and furthermore had the tendency to be contaminated by alcohol and other products forbidden under Islamic law. Prisoners were also offered a "no-pork" or "no-flesh" alternative meal plan, however these too were susceptible to contamination by products forbidden under Islamic law. Prisoners had the option of purchasing food through the commissary, however there were very few halal-certified products, and prisoners were unable to afford such products. As a result, the prisoners had to violate their religion in order to survive. The Federal Bureau of Prisons' Religious Diet Program originated after a 1980 lawsuit filed by Muslim inmates seeking access to halal meals. In response to that suit, in 1984 the BOP voluntarily instituted the Modified Common Fare Religious Diet Program, which would be free of pork and pork derivatives, free of contamination, and would include at least three hot entrees a week to accommodate the religious diet needs of the Muslim and Jewish inmates. <i>See Al Shakir v. Carlson</i>, 605 F. Supp. 374, 375 (M.D. Penn. 1984). Although some halal meals were served at different facilities after 1984, at some point the Federal Bureau of Prisons abandoned the Modified Common Fare Religious Diet Program in favor of a Religious Diet Program called the Certified Processed Foods Program, which consisted of individual sealed trays of pre-prepared kosher-certified meals. The Religious Diet Program meals were not certified as halal. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's failure to provide the plaintiffs with meals that conformed to their religious beliefs placed a substantial burden on their religious exercise, a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which did not further a compelling government interest. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendant's failure to provide them with halal meals violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction requiring the defendant to provide the plaintiffs with a halal-certified diet that conformed to their religious beliefs. They also asked for attorney's fees. The parties engaged in discovery for several years. On October 11, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from denying Plaintiffs access to halal-certified meals with meat that accord with their religious beliefs. On October 28, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims of three plaintiffs for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that their claims were moot because they had been moved the Federal Correctional Complex in Terre Haute and had not requested to be placed in the BOP's Certified Religious Diet Program. On July 28, 2017, following additional discovery, the plaintiffs filed, and the court granted, a motion for leave to supplement their preliminary injunction with material factual information that had been unavailable to them at the time of the initial briefing in late 2016. On September 19, 2017, Judge Lawrence ruled on all of the pending motions. He denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as moot. Judge Lawrence then ordered the parties to present all of their arguments in summary judgment briefs. In late 2017, both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. On September 19, 2018, Judge Lawrence denied both parties' motions for summary judgment. After several months of discovery, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a second motion for summary judgment on June 1, 2019. After a status conference held by phone, the parties reported that they had made progress in their settlement negotiations, and requested the defendants' pending motions be dismissed without prejudice. On June 2, 2020, the parties stipulated a dismissal in this case. They filed a settlement agreement with the court on September 2, 2020 which guaranteed the plaintiffs access to a Halal diet meeting accreditation and nutritional standards during the duration of their current incarceration with the BOP as long as they did not violate any general rule or condition of the Religious Diet Program. Specifically, the defendant agreed that the Halal diet would offer the provision of Halal meat no fewer than seven times per week. The defendant also agreed to keep records regarding the Halal diet and to furnish them to the plaintiffs upon request. Along with the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees, which was referred to Magistrate Judge Mark Dinsmore and remains pending before the court.

Summary: In 2014, Muslim prisoners filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiffs sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons for failing to provide certified halal meals to the prisoners. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the failure to provide a halal-certified diet was a violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and a violation of the Equal Protection Guarantee under the Fifth Amendment. The parties reached a settlement agreement in September 2020, guaranteeing the plaintiffs access to a Halal diet meeting accreditation and nutritional standards during the duration of their current incarceration with the BOP.


On October 29, 2008, four current and former female employees of Dell, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Dell under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought class action certification for a class of similarly situated female employees company-wide. Represented by private counsel, they sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages in excess of $500,000,000. Plaintiffs alleged, as individual and class action claims, that Dell had engaged in systemic sex and age discrimination perpetrated through discriminatory compensation and placement, discriminatory denials of promotions and pay raises, and discriminatory terminations. Individually, Plaintiffs each alleged retaliation for their complaints to the company regarding gender discrimination. Specifically, two Plaintiffs claimed that they were maliciously denied bonuses and targeted for the company's April 2008 mass layoffs, when they were terminated while the company retained less qualified men. The two other Plaintiffs claimed Dell failed to provide them with equal pay or promote them. On November 13, 2008, Dell requested the case be transferred to the Western District of Texas. Dell argued that an ongoing case in that jurisdiction (Hubley v. Dell, Inc., EE-TX-0463 on this site) was filed by a different class representative whose similar putative class action claims encompassed the claims in the instant case. Each of the Plaintiffs in Chapman were also subject to a forum selection clause in their employment agreement that required all arbitration to be conducted in the Western District of Texas. On December 17, 2008, all parties agreed to transfer the case. (Plaintiffs subsequently requested that Hubley v. Dell be stayed until the outcome of the instant case. This motion was never ruled on.) On May 20, 2009, the parties informed the court that a settlement had been reached. On July 13, 2009, the court granted Plaintiffs' request to dismiss the case with prejudice. The settlement agreement is not available.

Summary: In 2008, four current and former female employees of Dell, Inc. filed a lawsuit against Dell under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, in the Northern District of California. Plaintiffs sought class action certification, which was not granted. In December 2008, the case was transferred to the Western District of Texas. In July 2009, the parties reached a settlement agreement and the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The settlement agreement is not available.


On May 28, 2014, the New York Times filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, seeking the production of agency reports from the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The plaintiff alleged violation of FOIA because the defendant failed to release disclosable records in its possession in response to FOIA requests. The records included reports that offered a detailed history of the massive surveillance and data collection programs implemented by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) after September 11. Represented by in-house counsels, the plaintiff sought a court declaration that the documents sought by the FOIA requests were public and must be disclosed; it also sought to compel the defendant to produce the materials within 20 business days of court order. As a result of Edward Snowden’s releasing of classified materials in 2013, the government acknowledged certain previously secret programs and declassified details of their operations. However, the OIG reports remained secret. The New York Times then filed two FOIA requests to seek the release of these classified reports but failed to receive any information. Since this lawsuit commenced, the defendant expressed willingness to make substantial disclosures. The parties negotiated a rolling production schedule with four production dates from late October 2014 to February 2015. Judge Analisa Torres approved the schedule on August 28, 2014. After reviewing the produced reports, the plaintiffs believed that the documents were improperly redacted. On October 7, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. They asked the court to require the defendant to make public the withheld sections of the report pursuant to FOIA. On December 11, 2015, the defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. The government argued that the challenged redactions properly fell within the scope of a FOIA exception and did not contain information that has been officially waived. On August 18, 2016, Judge Torres granted the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Judge Torres stated that because the withheld information “has a rational nexus to the agency’s law-enforcement duties,” the government is exempt from disclosure under the various statutory exemptions. There is no further docket activity since August 22, 2016, and so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: On May 28, 2014, the New York Times filed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) seeking the production of agency reports from the Office of Inspector General (OIG). The plaintiff alleged violation of FOIA because the defendant failed to release disclosable records in its possession in response to FOIA requests. The plaintiff sought to compel the production of the records. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment in 2015. On August 18, 2016, Judge Torres granted the defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. The case is now closed.


Louis DeJoy, Postmaster General of the United States, announced an “operational pivot” within the U.S. Postal Service shortly after his tenure began on May 6, 2020. Postal Policy Changes began on June 17, 2020, when the USPS announced the removal of 671 high-speed mail sorting machines nationwide, a reduction of approximately 10%. A second announcement on July 10, 2020 prohibited “late trips” and “extra trips,” meaning that postal drivers were barred from departing for delivery points after the prescribed time or for non-scheduled delivery trips. In addition to these nation-wide changes, USPS launched the Expedited to Street/Afternoon Sortation initiative in 400 localities on July 25, 2020. The pilot program proscribed mail carriers in select localities from sorting mail in the morning. Instead, carriers were required to depart earlier for deliveries, leaving mail that arrived overnight to be sorted in the afternoon and delivered the following day. According to USPS records, on-time delivery of First-Class Mail started to decline in late June 2020. This trend would continue as the changes took effect. On or around July 29, 2020, the USPS General Counsel issued a warning and recommendation via letter to 46 states and the District of Columbia: unless states paid First-Class postage for election mail, there was a risk that voters would not receive their ballots in time to return them by mail. This was a change to USPS policy, which historically treated election mail and political mail as marketing mail on an expedited First-Class basis. On August 18, 2020, Mr. DeJoy suspended operational initiatives in light of the approaching election and the ongoing pandemic, specifying that Post Office retail hours would not change, mail processing equipment and blue collection boxes would not be moved, mail processing facilities will not be closed, and overtime will be approved as needed. Aside from the mail processing equipment, all other Postal Policy Changes remained in place. On August 21, Louis DeJoy testified at the Senate Homeland Security Government Affairs Committee Hearing, stating that the “extra trips” policy would remain and the removed high-speed mail sorting machines would not be returned. Although he stated that states would not need to pay First-Class postage for election mail during the Senate Committee Hearing, he reaffirmed the USPS General Counsel recommendation just three days later. On August 24, 2020, Mr. DeJoy testified before the House Committee that states and election boards should follow the recommendation of the USPS General Counsel to pay First Class postage to ensure ballots are delivered on time. The following day, August 25, the States of New York, Hawaii, and New Jersey; the City of New York; and the City and County of San Francisco filed this lawsuit against Defendants Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Louis DeJoy, in his official capacity as Postmaster General of the United States; and the United States Postal Services. It was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The Plaintiffs alleged that USPS Postal Policy Changes, announced and implemented in June and July 2020, violated both federal law and the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Postal Service acted beyond the agency’s authority under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) by failing to seek an advisory opinion from the Postal Regulatory Commission at a reasonable time prior to implementing the Postal Policy Changes in June and July 2020. 39 U.S.C. §1661. In addition, Plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. Postal Service acted beyond the agency’s authority under the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA) by ignoring the requirement to give the highest consideration to the convenience and efficiency of processing, transporting, and delivering important letter mail. 39 U.S.C. §101. The complaint also alleged that the agency acted outside of its legal authority under the PRA by eliminating access to postal services to certain populations, failing to meet the requirement that the U.S. Postal Service provide ready access to postal services to the entire population of the United States. 39 U.S.C. §403. Furthermore, the State Plaintiffs alleged that government Defendants’ actions will undermine the State’s constitutionally delegated role to regulate congressional elections in violation of the Elections Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The power to regulate the procedural mechanisms for congressional elections is left to the States, who exercised that power by establishing mail-in voting procedures to ensure safe and secure voting during the COVID-19 pandemic. The President has voiced his opposition to provide additional resources to the U.S. Postal Service. He consistently expressed his opposition to mail-in voting. The State Plaintiffs alleged that this was done with the intent to impair the delivery of mailed ballots. On September 2, 2020, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction regarding their Postal Accountability and Enhancement claim. On September 5, 2020, the court decided not to consolidate the present lawsuit with Richardson v. Trump; NAACP v. U.S. Postal Service; or Vote Forward v. DeJoy. On this same day, the County of Santa Clara, the City of Columbus, and thirty local and tribal governments filed an Amicus Brief in support of the Plaintiffs. Two additional Amicus Briefs in support of the Plaintiffs followed on September 9, 2020 and September 22, 2020 from fourteen Democratic Senators and the United States House of Representatives. On September 27, 2020, Judge Emmet G. Sullivan granted the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction due to the U.S. Postal Service’s failure to request an advisory opinion from the PRC before abruptly adopting policies that have nationwide impacts on postal services. 2020 WL 5763775. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In June and July 2020, the U.S. Postal service implemented significant Postal Policy Changes. The States of New York, Hawaii, and New Jersey; the City of New York; and the City and County of San Francisco filed this lawsuit the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; Louis DeJoy, in his official capacity as Postmaster General; and the U.S. Postal Service under the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, the Postal Reorganization Act, and the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that the agency acted beyond its authority and in violation of the Elections Clause when implementing the Postal Policy Changes, causing nationwide delays in First-Class mail and impeding efforts by states and localities to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 and ensure safe alternatives to in-person voting. In September 2020, The D.D.C. granted the motion for preliminary injunction against the government defendants. This case is ongoing.