The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of indigent individuals who have been sentenced by the Montgomery Municipal Court to probation with Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”) for failure to pay fines, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on August 3, 2015. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued the City of Montgomery (“the City”) under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. The plaintiff alleged that the City exceeded its authority under Alabama law by requiring the municipal court to attach probation and fees to all court orders, even orders to pay fines. The plaintiff also alleged that the City violated the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing JCS, a private party hired by the City, to imprison indigent offenders for failing to pay fines without giving them a hearing or effective assistance of counsel. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged that the attorney hired by the City to represent indigent defendants failed to provide adequate counsel. The plaintiff requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and demanded that the Court void the contract between the City and JCS. The plaintiff also asked the Court to enjoin the City from outsourcing fine collection and probation services to a private party. Finally, the plaintiff sought damages for himself and all class members. The case was assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth. The plaintiffs alleged that the City’s policy and practice of imprisoning indigent offenders for failing to pay fines without considering offenders’ ability to pay created a debtor’s prison where indigent offenders were forced to “sit out” their fines. This scheme allegedly benefited JCS and certain court-appointed officials, including the attorney that represented the plaintiff, and began when the City hired JCS to run the City’s probation services and to collect fines and fees from offenders. To compel offenders to pay their fines, JCS employees purportedly threatened to revoke offenders’ probation. After collection, JCS distributed a portion of the proceeds to itself and directed the rest toward the adjudged fines. When offenders failed to pay, JCS was empowered to establish payment and reporting schedules, impose additional fines, and revoke probation, despite JCS’s clear financial stake in these decisions. The plaintiffs alleged that the City rarely examined whether the fees and probation periods JCS imposed exceeded their statutory maximums. Finally, the plaintiffs asserted that the City failed to provide offenders with adequate representation, especially during indigency hearings. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 14, 2015 that added JCS as a defendant, as well as JCS’s successor, Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc. (“CHC”), and CHC’s parent company, CHC Companies, Inc. (“CHCC”). The amended complaint levied the same claims against the new parties and added a claim that the City and the JCS defendants engaged in racketeering under 18 U.S.C. 1962(a)–(d) by conspiring to use the municipal court’s authority and the City’s police power to extort money from the poor. On March 10, 2017, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motions to dismiss. 2017 WL 957540. The Court noted the similarity between this case and several other cases involving the treatment of indigent persons in Alabama cities, most notably McCullough v. City of Montgomery. The Court indicated that its opinion should be read in conjunction with the opinion filed in that case and in similar cases before the Court. The Court preserved the plaintiff’s claims regarding denial of due process and Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations but struck down the plaintiff’s racketeering claims. The Court also upheld the plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on August 28, 2018. This complaint replaced the racketeering claims with “money had and received” claims, which alleged that the City and the JCS defendants exceeded their authority by requiring offenders to pay illegal and exorbitant fees. The complaint also added claims of false imprisonment against these same parties. On March 29, 2019, the Court denied the plaintiff’s motions to certify the class and for partial summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court also found that the plaintiff’s claim for restitution was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which prevents litigants from challenging state court orders in federal courts as a means of relitigating matters already decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the restitution claim and dismissed it. On the same day, the Court also denied the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted the City’s motion to dismiss the money-had-and-received and false imprisonment claims. 2019 WL 1440284. In denying the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court concluded that this case was distinct enough from McCullough v. City of Montgomery to allow the plaintiff his day in court. With regard to the money-had-and-received, the Court found that the plaintiff did not state a claim because he did not adequately allege that the City retained the fees JCS collected. Finally, the Court held that the City was immune from liability for the plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim. Several months later, on December 20, 2019, the Court denied the plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a third amended complaint, finding that the plaintiff delayed in filing the complaint and that filing it would unduly prejudice the defendants. 2019 WL 7170449. In an extensive memorandum filed on July 7, 2020, the Court resolved defendants' independent motions for summary judgment. 2020 WL 3799690. First, the Court granted the City’s motion regarding the alleged Fourth or Eighth Amendment violations. Second, the Court dismissed the plaintiff’s due process and equal protection claims that were based solely on the JCS-City contract or the alleged conspiracy between the City and JCS. Fourth, the Court found that the City was not liable for certain municipal court procedures. Finally, the Court partially granted the City’s motion on the due process, equal protection, and Sixth Amendment claims based on actions prior July 16, 2012, but denied the defendants' motion for all other due process, equal protection, and Sixth Amendment claims (which were the only remaining claims left after this order). In the same order, the Court opined on claims pertaining to non-City defendants. The Court found that CHC was not liable for JCS’s activities and granted CHC’s motion for summary judgment. The Court also granted JCS’s motion regarding their alleged Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments violations and the money-had-and-received claim. The also Court found that JCS did not deny the plaintiff due process or equal protection as a result of alleged conspiracies between JCS and the City. The Court denied JCS’s motion as to all other aspects of the plaintiff’s due process, equal protection, Sixth Amendment, and false imprisonment claims. The Court denied the motion for summary judgment filed by the attorney hired by the City to represent indigent defendants. This case remains ongoing.

Summary: The plaintiff, individually and on behalf of indigent individuals who have been incarcerated or sentenced by the Montgomery Municipal Court to probation with Judicial Correction Services, Inc. (“JCS”) for failure to pay fines, filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama on August 3, 2015. Represented by The Evans Law Firm, P.C., the plaintiff sued the City of Montgomery, an attorney hired by the City, and JCS under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3)-(4). The plaintiff alleged that the City exceeded its authority under Alabama law by requiring the municipal court to attach probation and fees to all court orders, even orders to pay fines. The plaintiff also alleged that the City violated the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by allowing JCS, a private party hired by the City, to imprison indigent offenders for failing to pay fines without giving them a hearing or effective assistance of counsel. Lastly, the plaintiff alleged that the attorney hired by the City failed to provide the plaintiff with adequate counsel. The plaintiff requested declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202 and demanded that the Court void the contract between the City and JCS. The plaintiff also asked the Court to enjoin the City from outsourcing fine collection and probation services to a private party. Finally, the plaintiff sought damages for himself and all class members. The case was assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth. Although the Court declined to certify the class and dismissed many of the plaintiff’s claims, this case is ongoing, and many of the plaintiff’s due process, equal protection, and Sixth Amendment claims against the City and JCS remain.


On August 9, 2017, five active duty servicemembers in the United States military who openly identified as transgender people filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the President, Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, and other government agencies. Three additional plaintiffs, including one student at the U.S. Naval Academy and one student participating in the Reserve Officers’ Training Corps, were added to the suit in an amended complaint. The plaintiffs sued under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment, as well as under the theory of estoppel. The plaintiffs, represented by GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and private counsel, sought declaratory judgment that the ban on transgender people from military service is unconstitutional. The plaintiffs also sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting implementation of the President’s directive to prohibit transgender individuals from serving in the Armed Forces. Specifically, on July 26, 2017, President Trump announced, through a series of tweets, a prohibition on the open service of transgender people in the military. On August 25, 2017, the President signed a formal directive to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security categorically excluding transgender people from enlisting or serving openly in the military. From June 2016, when the U.S. military adopted a policy to permit transgender servicemembers to serve openly, the military provided ongoing support for openly transgender people serving in the armed forces. In reliance on the promises of the U.S. military, transgender servicemembers self-identified and pursued medical treatment for the purpose of gender transition. According to the plaintiffs, estoppel prevented the military from rescinding the rights, benefits, and protections promised to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on August 31, 2017, to prohibit the defendants from implementing the ban on transgender people enlisting and serving in the U.S. military. On October 4, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. On October 30, 2017, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The order prohibited the defendants from complying with the accession and retention directives of the Presidential directive until the case is resolved. The order effectively reverted to the status quo with regard to the hiring and retention of opening transgender servicemembers. The court also held that it did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the prohibition against the expenditures of medical treatment relating to gender transition because none of the plaintiffs established a likelihood of being harmed by that prohibition. Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim of relief under the theory of estoppel but permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint with regard to estoppel. 275 F.Supp.3d 167. On November 21, 2017, the defendants appealed to the D.C. Circuit, but then filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on December 29, 2017. Back in the district court, on March 2, 2018, the defendants filed a partial motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction only with regard to President Trump as a party to the lawsuit. On April 6, 2018, the plaintiff filed the second amended complaint and took out the estoppel claim. The defendant then filed a motion to dismiss again on April 20, 2018, as well as a motion for summary judgment and motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The plaintiff then filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on May 11. On August 6, 2018, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the defendants’ partial motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction only to the extent that it ran against the president. Accordingly, President Trump was dismissed as a party from this case. On the same day, Judge Kollar-Kotelly also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, together with the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. 315 F.Supp.3d 474. On August 24, 2018, Judge Kollar-Kotelly also denied the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment. 322 F.Supp.3d 92 On August 27, the defendant again appealed to the D.C. Circuit. On January 4, 2019, Judges Griffith, Wilkins, and Williams issued a per curiam judgment that the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction is reversed and the preliminary injunction is vacated without prejudice. The circuit court stated that the district court made an erroneous finding that the new policy was merely an implementation of the 2017 policy. The circuit court reasoned that the government took substantial steps to cure the procedural deficiencies in the enjoined 2017 memorandum and the new policy was no longer a blanket ban on transgender service. As a result, the court believed that the public interest weighed in favor of dissolving the injunction. In addition to the D.C. Circuit’s per curiam judgment, the Supreme Court recently issued a relevant order in Trump v. Karnoski. 586 U.S. 18A625 (Jan. 22, 2019). In Karnoski, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the government from taking any action on transgender individuals in the military inconsistent with the status quo that existed prior to the 2017 memorandum. Based on these decisions, the scope and breath of discovery of this case might change, so the district court ordered the parties to file a joint status report by March 28, 2019. On March 8, 2019, the defendants filed a notice to inform the court that they intended to release a Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) to implement the new policy in the near future. The court issued a notice and stated that the defendants could not implement the policy because the preliminary injunction ordered on October 30, 2017, was still effective. It said that the fact that three other nationwide preliminary injunctions were stayed had no impact on the continued effectiveness of this court’s preliminary injunction. Therefore, the defendants were not permitted to implement the new policy until a mandate is issued by the D.C. Circuit. As of May 9, 2020, the parties have been continuing to engage in discovery.

Summary: On August 9, 2017, active duty transgender service members in the U.S. military filed this lawsuit in the District of Columbia against the President and many government agencies. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting implementation of the President’s August 2017 directive to prohibit transgender individuals from serving in the Armed Forces. On October 30, 2017, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction. After more litigation, on August 6, 2018, Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the defendants’ partial motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion to partially dissolve the preliminary injunction only to the extent that it ran against the President. On January 4, 2019, Judges Griffith, Wilkins, and Williams from the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and also vacated the preliminary injunction without prejudice. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that the government took substantial steps to cure the procedural deficiencies in the enjoined 2017 memorandum and the new policy was no longer a blanket ban on transgender service. The case is ongoing in discovery.


On January 29, 2019, the Texas League of United Latin American Citizens (Texas LULAC) and National League of United Latin American Citizens filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued the Texas Secretary of State and the Attorney General of Texas, under section 11(b) of the Voting Rights Act. The plaintiffs, represented by their General Counsel, Campaign Legal Counsel and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They claimed that defendants had created Texas's Election Advisory No. 2019-02 and an accompanying "Possible Non U.S. Citizens" list (the Advisory) that intimidated legitimate voters from participating in the May 2019 elections, particularly targeting citizens of the Latino community across the state of Texas. Specifically, the Advisory contained data of supposed “matches” of non-U.S. citizens and registered voters to local election officials. These matches were found by comparing non-citizens identified in Department of Public Safety citizenship data and registered voters, to local election officials. The plaintiffs claimed that the citizenship data was over a quarter century old, and many non-citizens had since naturalized. The Texas Secretary of State issued instructions to local registrars and election administrators to not release data to the public. The plaintiffs alleged that these actions and the deliberately public roll-out of this program “cast a pall of suspicion” over the validity of local registration rolls and contributed to voter intimidation in Texas, especially against immigrants and those in the Latino community. Plaintiffs noted that members of the Latino community had already reacted to the publicity campaign by withdrawing their voter registrations. The case was randomly assigned to Judge Fred Biery on the date the complaint was filed. Shortly after, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on February 4, 2019 and the defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 11, 2019. The defendants argued that the alleged injuries were not traceable or redressable by them because the counties, rather than the defendants, were responsible for cancelling any voter’s registration for noncitizenship. In addition, the defendants argued that the allegations against the Attorney General were disconnected from the relief sought and limited to a press release that stated his authority over election-related crimes. On February 22, 2019, two other cases, <i> Garibay v. Whitley </i> and <i> MOVE Texas Civic Fund v. Whitley </i> (5:19-cv-00159 and 5:19-cv-00171, respectively), were consolidated to this docket because of their similarity in questions of fact and law. Following a hearing, Judge Biery denied the motion to dismiss on February 27, 2019. At the same time, he denied the plaintiffs’ request for relief regarding the Attorney General’s press release. Though he found the press release “arguably vituperative in tone,” it nevertheless stated the Attorney’s General authority. In addition, Judge Biery temporarily put the Advisory program on hold. He ordered local officials not to remove any person from the current voter registration without authorization from the court. The order also signaled his skepticism about the voter registration review process, nothing that the flawed process meant “perfectly legal naturalized Americans were burdened with what the Court finds to be ham-handed and threatening correspondence from the state which did not politely ask for information but rather exemplifies the power of government to strike fear and anxiety and to intimidate the least powerful among us.” The next day the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint, in the form of a class-action complaint on behalf of all U.S. citizens and registered voters of Texas who had been singled out for investigation and removal from the voter rolls by the Texas Secretary of State because they were born outside the United States. The complaint added the voter registrars for counties across Texas. In addition, the complaint added various individual plaintiffs who had been impacted by the Advisory personally, as well as the Southwest Voter Registration Project, Mi Familia Vota Educational Fund, La Union del Pueblo Entero and Unidos US. In this complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Advisory violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the federal Voting Rights Act. They sought class action certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. On March 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed their third amended class action complaint, alleging similar violations to the First and Fourteenth Amendments and the federal Voting Rights Act, and adding several more plaintiffs who had been specifically injured by the Advisory, including the Organization of Chinese-Americans-Greater Houston. On March 27, 2019, Judge Biery denied a motion to dismiss previously brought by the county voter registrars. Though the county defendants argued that they only acted on the direction of the Secretary of State, the court found that the registrars were those who would send the alleged correspondence leading to voter intimidation. The two parties reached a settlement on April 25, 2019. The defendants agreed to rescind Election Advisory 2019-02 within five days of the Settlement order, and to advise county voter registrars and elections administrators to take no further action on any data files the Secretary of State sent them in connection with Election Advisory 2019-02. The defendants agreed to update their set of non-U.S. Citizen holders of driver’s licenses or personal identification cards, and to only flag individuals who had registered to vote and subsequently provided information suggesting they were non-citizens. Furthermore, the defendants agreed to distribute new training materials to county voter registrars and election administrators advising that voter registrars and election administrators should not immediately cancel any voter’s registration, providing guidance on lawful means to investigate voter eligibility, and noting that the registrar should send a notice of examination to the person suspected of not being eligible for voter registration. Under the agreement, all claims of breach were to be brought through a new lawsuit in state or federal court. The plaintiffs indicated in the settlement that they are not conceding the state’s effort comply with federal law, leaving the possibility to file a future complaint if the plaintiffs were concerned with future reviews. Finally, the defendants agreed to pay $450,000 in attorney's fees and costs. On April 26, 2019, the plaintiffs and the defendants filed a join motion to dismiss because they reached a settlement agreement. As part of this settlement agreement, plaintiff agreed to dismiss all claims against the defendants in all of the consolidated cases in their entirety with prejudice. This motion was granted and the case dismissed by Judge Biery on April 29, 2019. As of October 2019, there was no further activity on this case. The settlement agreement remained in place.

Summary: In 2019, the League of United Latin American Citizens filed a complaint against the Secretary of State and Attorney General of Texas. The plaintiffs alleged that the Election Advisory, which was accompanied by a list of Possible Non-U.S. Citizens, violated the Voting Rights Act. On April 26, 2019, the parties filed a join motion to dismiss because they reached a settlement agreement. The motion was granted on April 29, 2019. As of October 2019, there was no further activity on this case. The settlement agreement remained in place.


On September 28, 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of disabled employees who lost their jobs after taking leave related to their disability. The complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a), 12112(b)(5)(A) and (b)(5)(B) and Title I of Civil Rights Act of 1991. The EEOC asked the court to grant injunctive relief and for compensatory and punitive damages to the disabled defendants. On May 2, 2013, the District Court (Judge Harry D. Leinenweber) approved a two-year consent decree in which the parties agreed: [1] to forbid the defendant from not allowing disabled employees to return to work and to prohibit the defendant from retaliation against the people who filed ADA complaints; [2] to damages in the amount of $400,000 to be distributed among 14 claimants; [3] that the defendant must keep and make publicly available records of employees who are returning to work after medical leave; [4] to have all of defendant's human resources employees trained in the ADA and the American Family and Medical Leave Act; [5] that the defendant hire an Accommodations Consultant to review all of defendant's decisions about medical leave; [6] that the defendant post notice of the decree for duration of the decree. This agreement closed the case.

Summary: On September 28, 2012, the EEOC brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against a bank, on behalf of 14 disabled employees who lost their job after taking leave related to their disability. On May 2, 2013, the parties agreed to a 2 year consent decree that included an injunction forbidding defendant from discriminating on the basis of disability, requiring defendant to reform its medical leave policies, and awarding $400,000 to the fourteen employees.


On September 20, 2004, current and former prisoners of the Florida State Prison ("FSP") filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials and Florida's Department of Corrections ("DOC"). The plaintiffs, represented by Florida Institutional Legal Services and Florida Justice Institute, asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants' use of chemical agents constituted cruel and unusual punishment and torture. Employees of the Florida DOC are permitted to use chemical agents, including pepper spray and tear gas, under certain circumstances. The plaintiffs, who have various mental, physical, and psychological disorders, alleged that defendants abused their authority. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendants sprayed them with excessive quantities of chemical agents, on multiple occasions, often without first issuing any orders or warnings. As a result, plaintiffs were subjected to severe physical pain and mental distress. On March 9, 2009, Judge Timothy Corrigan issued a judgment and an injunction. The Court concluded that the policies of the Florida DOC as applied to two of the plaintiffs resulted in violations of the Eighth Amendment. 2009 WL 605306. The Court enjoined FSP officials from allowing the non-spontaneous application of chemical agents to these two plaintiffs without first consulting with mental health staff. The Court also mandated that any non-spontaneous spraying of the two plaintiffs be videotaped. The Court entered judgment for the defendants with respect to the remaining plaintiffs, finding that the use of chemical agents against them was not cruel and unusual. Previously, the parties had stipulated to entry of an order of partial dismissal applicable to the plaintiffs' claims for money damages.

Summary: In September 2004, prisoners of the Florida State Prison filed a lawsuit alleging cruel and unusual punishment based on FSP officials' use of chemical agents to discipline inmates. In March 2009, the Court found that two prisoners with mental illnesses suffered unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment at the hands of FSP officials who used chemical agents on them. The Court entered judgment for the defendants with respect to the remaining plaintiffs.


On February 21, 2006 plaintiffs, a group of females, filed suit against their current or former employer, Sutton Ford, Inc., in the Federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that Sutton Ford and individual male employees had violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), and state law and were liable for assault and battery. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant created and fostered a hostile work environment. Specifically they alleged that Sutton Ford engaged in gender discrimination against women by tolerating and fostering rampant sexual harassment, allowing supervisors to make promotions and favorable assignments contingent upon sexual favors, retaliating against women who complained, and constructively discharging female employees. One plaintiff also alleged that Sutton Ford had engaged in racial discrimination against Caucasians. On September 15, 2006 the district court (Judge Elaine E. Bucklo) granted defendants' motions to dismiss the counts related to assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress and two complaints that were time barred but denied defendants' motion to dismiss a retaliation claim. On October 31, 2006 the parties reached a settlement agreement on the remaining counts awarding the plaintiffs unspecified monetary damages. The case was closed on December 14, 2006.

Summary: On February 21, 2006 plaintiffs, a group of females, filed suit against their current or former employer, Sutton Ford, Inc., in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. They alleged that the defendant created and fostered a hostile work environment and engaged in gender discrimination against women by allowing sexual harassment, retaliating against women who complained, and constructively discharging women. On September 15, 2006 the district court granted defendants' motions to dismiss multiple counts and on October 31, 2006 the parties reached a settlement agreement on the remaining counts awarding the plaintiffs unspecified monetary damages.


On June 24, 1999, plaintiffs, all persons who use wheelchairs for mobility, filed suit against a Denver city amphitheater in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming discrimination in provision of parking accommodations. The defendant, the City and County of Denver, operated the Red Rocks concert amphitheater in Denver. According to the Third Amended Complaint - the only one publicly available - filed on August 24, 2000, the plaintiffs alleged that the parking facilities at the venue were very inconvenient to the plaintiffs, who had to park vans and unload wheelchairs, forcing them to travel dangerous paths to the concert venue. The complaint also alleged that the employees were not helpful and often rude. The plaintiff brought counts under: (1) The Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq; and (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. Plaintiffs sought an injunction requiring the City to comply with the statutes, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On October 10, 2006, the District Court entered a consent decree, in which the City agreed to provide a shuttle van system, expand parking spots for persons with disabilities, and to implement new policies for training staff. The City also agreed to contract for the Cross-Disability Coalition to monitor compliance for the 2000, 2001, and 2002 concert seasons. The City agreed to pay liquidated damages of $500 for each violation of the consent decree, beginning on January 1, 2003 and $50,000 in attorneys' fees and other fees and costs of reviewing compliance with the decree.

Summary: Disabled plaintiffs alleged discrimination at a city amphitheater's parking accommodations. The parties entered into a consent decree requiring defendants to provide shuttle services, additional accessible parking and training for employees. The City paid $50,000 in attorneys' fees.


On January 27, 2016, Concerned Pastors for Social Action filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the state of Michigan and the City of Flint under the federal Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §300j-8(a). The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from the ACLU, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested that the court: (1) declare the defendants were in violation of their duties under the Safe Drinking Water Act, (2) enjoin the defendants from continuing to violate the Safe Drinking Water Act, (3) order that the defendants take all steps necessary to remedy their violations, and (4) grant any equitable relief the court deemed necessary to mitigate the health and medical risks faced by Flint residents. The Safe Drinking Water Act stipulates that cities must mitigate lead in their water. Part of mitigation is taking account of the corrosiveness of the water; the more corrosive the water, the more it breaks down a protective layer surrounding the lead pipes that water is carried in. This protective layer is built up over time and nearly impossible to restore. According to the Safe Drinking Water Act, once a city reaches optimal corrosion treatment, it must maintain the optimal level. The background of this case is that Flint is a struggling city; more than 40% of its residents live below the poverty level, and nearly 25% of its working age citizens are currently unemployed. In 2011, in response to the economic hardship Flint was facing, Governor Rick Snyder declared a financial emergency. He stripped the elected city officials of their power and installed an Emergency Manager to oversee the city in November 2011. Flint had historically received its drinking water from Detroit. Detroit’s drinking water is drawn from Lake Huron and treated with chemicals to make it less corrosive. Detroit’s water was “finished,” meaning it was safe to drink. In March of 2013, when the price of Detroit’s water rose, Flint's Emergency Manager decided to switch its drinking water source to a new water supply system. This system was based around a new water pipeline that was not scheduled to finish until June 2016. According to the plaintiff’s complaint, the Governor’s appointed Emergency Manager did not want to negotiate with Detroit over its higher prices to supply the City's water until the new pipeline could be finished. In early 2014, the Emergency Manager decided that the Flint River would be the City's water supply in the meantime. At that time, Flint had not treated its own water in nearly 50 years. The Flint River had known problems—swimming in the water was not recommended because of elevated levels of bacteria; fish in the river contained mercury (a neurotoxin) and PCB (a carcinogen); and local industrial and agricultural runoff caused high levels of contamination. In 2011, outside consultants had concluded that, in order to use the Flint River as a drinking water source, the City’s system would need $50 million in upgrades. The Flint Water system did not perform all of these upgrades. They did not undertake the research required by the Safe Drinking Water Act to learn how to optimize corrosion control. Nonetheless, on April 29, 2014, the Flint Water System began pumping Flint River water into the homes of its customers. It did not treat the water to reduce its corrosiveness at all. And it did not attempt to minimize the leaching of lead from its pipes. The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ), the agency in charge of enforcing the Safe Drinking Water Act in Michigan, started notifying the City of violations of the Safe Drinking Water Act as early as December 2014. The City continued to tell its citizens that the water was safe to drink. After a customer started reporting health problems in her children in early 2015, the EPA, the MDEQ, and the City of Flint were notified of the high levels of lead in the city’s water. No one notified Flint’s residents. After Flint’s situation started garnering more attention, the city expanded its budget in order to buy water from Detroit. But the damage had been done. The lead of the pipe was exposed due the corrosiveness of the Flint River water. Even purchasing water from Detroit could not help—the tap water still contained lead in actionable concentrations. Flint’s mayor declared a state of emergency in Flint in December of 2015. Governor Snyder declared a state of emergency in Genesee County on January 5, 2016. On January 21, 2016, the EPA used its authority under the Safe Drinking Water Act to issue an Emergency Administrative Order directing the City of Flint, the MDEQ, and the State of Michigan to take certain remedial measures. Although Flint said it would comply with the EPA’s order, the other two necessary decisionmakers, Michigan and the MDEQ, challenged the EPA’s authority. Meanwhile, Flint’s drinking water still posed an imminent health threat to its citizens. This case was filed a week later, and was assigned, randomly, to Judge Mark Goldsmith. On March 7, 2016, the State defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Primarily, they alleged that the sole authority over the Flint Water Crisis rested with the EPA and that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction. Additionally, the State defendants stated that they had Eleventh Amendment protection because the plaintiffs sought relief for “past violations” of the Safe Drinking Water Act; the designation of "past" violation matters because the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for state actors is only for <i>prospective</i> declaratory and injunctive relief. The State defendants also noted they were not “owners or operators” of the Flint Water System and therefore could not be sued under the Safe Drinking Water Act. On March 24, 2016, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary injunction. They asserted that they would be likely to succeed on the merits because the Defendants were still failing to adhere to optimal corrosion control or monitor the lead in the water. The named Defendants were all “owners and operators” of the Flint Water System—even the state defendants because of their control over the finances and operations of the system due to the appointment of the Emergency Manager. The plaintiffs also asserted irreparable harm—Flint’s drinking water remained unsafe to drink, and portions of Flint’s population lacked reliable alternatives to the tap water. On April 15, 2016, the defendants asked Judge Goldsmith to recuse himself. In 2014, Judge Goldsmith worked for four weeks in Flint and drank the lead-laden water. The defendants asked the Court to consider the “appearance of . . . impropriety.” On April 26, 2016, Judge Goldsmith recused himself over the protests of the plaintiffs, who thought his recusal might cause too long of a delay. By a second random draw, Judge David M. Lawson was assigned to the case. On July 2, 2016, Judge Lawson denied the Defendants's motion to dismiss. The Court reasoned that under the Administrative Procedure Act, district courts could review EPA compliance orders, despite the assertion that only a circuit court could issue judicial review. As for the specific compliance orders regarding the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Court determined that the plaintiffs were not seeking an appeal of a final determination of an EPA compliance order, because they were not subject to the compliance order and would probably like to see the order enforced. Because the suit was entirely collateral to the EPA compliance order, the Court determined that it had subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court also declined to abstain from the case under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, and found that the relief requested by the plaintiffs was prospective and therefore excluded the State defendants from Eleventh Amendment immunity. (The harm “. . .is not, as the defendants would read it, the damage to the lead service pipes, [but i]nstead, the harm is the continued leaching of lead into the drinking water.”) Finally, the Court determined that the plaintiffs had alleged enough facts to determine that the State actors were indeed operators of the Water System, despite CERCLA precedent that seemed to indicate the contrary. 194 F. Supp. 3d. 589. On November 10, 2016, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief. The Court agreed with the plaintiffs that they were likely to succeed on the merits and that at least some Flint residents struggled to obtain the water that they needed to sustain themselves. Accordingly, the Court ordered the defendants to provide door-to-door water bottle delivery to all non-exempt houses serviced by the Flint Water System. Exempt houses were those that had a filter, those that refused to permit a water filter to be installed, those that affirmatively opted out of the filter service, and those that were non-occupied. Additionally, the defendants were ordered to provide updated information about the status of the water supply to residents; the information was to be presented in English, Spanish, Chinese, Arabic, and Hmong, so that it would be accessible to the vast majority of the houses serviced by the system. 2016 WL 6647348. On November 17, 2016, the defendants filed an emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending the appeal of the decision with the Sixth Circuit. Notice of the appeal was filed with the Court on November 21, 2016. On December 2, 2016, the Eastern District Court denied the Motion to Stay, believing that the Sixth Circuit was unlikely to find for the defendants. On December 16, 2016, the lower court was proven correct. The Sixth Circuit in a per curiam decision joined by Judges Keith and Donald, denied the defendants’ motion to stay. It also held that the defendants had only a slim likelihood of success on the merits and were unlikely to be irreparably harmed by the preliminary injunction. Judge Sutton dissented, believing that the defendants had a strong likelihood of success on the merits. Judge Sutton also advised that the parties "talk to each other," stating “everyone has the same interests in mind: delivery of safe water.” 844 F.3d 546. (Sutton, J., dissenting). The parties did end up talking to each other—by March 27, 2017, they reached a settlement. The defendants agreed to replace the lead service lines to at least 18,000 households served by the Flint Water System. The city agreed to excavate pipes and replace any lead pipe it discovered with copper pipe at no cost to the recipient. This was to be accomplished within three years of the effective date. The state of Michigan agreed to allocate $87,000,000 to the replacement of the service lines. Flint’s water was to be monitored regularly for consecutive 6 month periods. Water samples collected by the defendants were to be reviewed by an independent monitor. Discontinuation of funding for the monitoring program was to occur in the event that the 90th percentile of lead in the water samples contained below-actionable levels of lead for two consecutive 6-month periods. The defendants were also instructed to expand their installation and maintenance of and education on water filters. Defendants were to continue distributing water until May 1, 2017. On May 1, the defendants could start closing points of distribution if the average number of daily bottle pickups was less than 20 for the first three weeks of the previous month and the point of distribution provided clear notice of their impending closure for at least a week. The State defendants were directed to maintain health programs, like the Medicaid expansion, the Elevated Blood Lead Level Case Management service, the Michigan Food Pantry expansion, and the Child and Adolescent Health Center expansion. The settlement also provided for $895,000 in attorneys' fees for the plaintiffs' counsel and for the court to maintain jurisdiction in order to enforce the settlement. On March 28, 2017, the court issued an order approving the settlement agreement and dismissing the case. Accordingly, on March 31, 2017, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal of the preliminary injunction. On December 27, 2017, the plaintiffs sought judicial enforcement of the information sharing provisions of the settlement agreement (paragraphs 117 and 118). The plaintiffs alleged that, for nine months, the State was not complying with these provisions, as they had failed to provide the plaintiffs with timely, accurate, and complete status reports and timely responses to the plaintiffs’ requests for additional information. There were three particular areas on which the State failed to provide status reports: (1) verification of filter installations following service line replacements, (2) a maintained list of addresses of the residents who refused to grant the City permission to replace their service lines and (3) the notification of new water system customers to CORE staff so these individuals could provide filter services promptly. Because this non-compliance made it difficult for the plaintiffs to enforce the agreement, they sought a more extensive reporting and certification process and greater oversight from the Court. On March 15, 2018, Judge Lawson granted the plaintiffs' request. The plaintiffs filed another motion to enforce the settlement agreement on June 21, 2018. This time, the plaintiffs alleged further noncompliance. Under the agreement, paragraph 29 required the City to conduct 18,000 excavations to replace the lead and galvanized steel pipes with copper ones. While the agreement required a minimum of 18,000 excavations it was unclear how many lead and steel services were actually located in the City. Therefore, the City was required to excavate at least 6,000 lines and use the data from those excavations to estimate (1) whether it was likely that more than 18,000 of these pipes existed within the City and (2) whether the $97 million in funding allocated under the agreement would sufficiently cover the cost of excavation and replacement, or if the State needed to find additional funding. Paragraph 30 required the State to commission a report as to their findings from the initial excavations. The State submitted its report on February 8, 2018, stating that it found lead and galvanized steel service lines at roughly 70.7% of the 8,843 homes where excavations were conducted. It concluded (1) it was not reasonably likely that there were more than 18,000 of these service lines within the City and (2) the $97 million in funding would reasonably cover the costs for the remainder of the excavations. The City reached this conclusion by assuming that the 70% rate would continue to drop each year. In their motion, the plaintiffs alleged that the City’s conclusions were based on flawed methods and presumptions and requested the Court to order the City to revise its conclusions based on sound methods conducted by experts. Before this motion resolved, the plaintiffs filed a motion to also have paragraphs 38 and 117 of the agreement enforced by the Court. The settlement agreement required the City to take steps to ensure the health and safety of all City residents during and after the excavations. Specifically, paragraph 38 required the City to install a faucet filter at each home immediately after its service line is replaced to reduce the risk of increased lead levels in the water. Paragraph 117 required the City to produce a quarterly status report regarding this progress. The plaintiffs alleged that, according to the City’s quarterly report on May 25th, the City had delayed installation of filtration faucets and inadequately documented and reported filter verification efforts. The plaintiffs requested that the Court force the City to comply with these two provisions of the Agreement. After a consolidated hearing on the two outstanding enforcement motions, Judge Lawson ordered the enforcement of paragraphs 38 and 117 on September 10, 2018. Judge Lawson ordered the City to attempt proper filter installation within three business days of service line replacement and to provide the plaintiffs with weekly reports describing the City’s filter installation processes. The plaintiffs filed a supplemental brief that enforcement of these paragraphs would render the previous motion unnecessary. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion to enforce paragraphs 29 and 30 and Judge Lawson subsequently dismissed the motion as moot on October 5. The case remains ongoing for enforcement.

Summary: In 2016, a nonprofit association of religious leaders in the Flint Area filed this suit in the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to force the City of Flint and the State of Michigan to provide clean water for citizens plagued by the lead-laden water streaming through their service pipes. The plaintiffs alleged that the damage to their city's aquastructure was caused by the miserly penny-pinching of the City's Emergency Manager. In late 2016, the plaintiffs received a preliminary injunction that forced the defendants to provide bottled water deliveries to eligible recipients. In March of 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which the State agreed to set aside $87 million to replace the damaged water pipes.


This class action suit, filed on March 15, 2018, sought to enjoin the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from detaining asylum seekers in order to deter other potential migrants from seeking refuge in the United States. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, were asylum seekers who had been detained without individualized determinations that they posed a flight risk or danger to the community. The plaintiffs sued DHS under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge James E. Boasberg. The plaintiffs stated that, upon arriving in the U.S., the government determined they had a credible fear of persecution and referred them to immigration courts for further assessment of their asylum claims. In the meantime, DHS detained them and did not provide individualized review of the need for detention. The plaintiffs argued that they were not detained due to individualized assessments that they pose a flight risk or danger to the community, but rather because DHS wanted to deter other migrants from seeking asylum in the U.S. The plaintiffs argued that DHS adopted this broad policy of detaining asylum seekers at five Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) offices--the offices in Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, and Philadelphia--on the basis that it would deter other migrants. The plaintiffs argued this policy was in violation of a 2015 opinion from this district court, as well as Supreme Court precedent holding that such general deterrence interests can inform criminal but not civil detention and that a conclusory national security interest was not sufficient to support the policy. On March 20, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to certify the class, defined in the complaint as: "(1) All arriving asylum seekers; (2) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution or torture; and (3) who are or will be detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; (4) after having been denied parole under the authority of ICE’s Detroit, El Paso, Los Angeles, Newark, or Philadelphia Field Office." The plaintiffs then moved for a preliminary injunction on March 30, 2018, seeking to enjoin the government from continuing to apply its deterrence policy. On April 24, 2018, the government moved to dismiss the case, claiming that the court should dismiss the complaint in its entirety because the court lacked jurisdiction to grant constitutional injunctive relief and because the complaint failed to allege facts that, taken as true, could plausibly demonstrate that the alleged unlawful deterrence policy exists. On July 2, finding that the circumstances warranted extraordinary relief, Judge Boasberg granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and granted class certification on a provisional basis for purposes of the preliminary injunction. Judge Boasberg held that it was likely that DHS had a policy or practice of detaining asylum seekers in violation of its own guidance or regulations, and so he ordered the government to follow a 2009 ICE Parole Directive--a set of principles and procedures establishing the processes by which the agency must determine whether an asylum seeker will be detained or released pending their immigration hearing. The court enjoined the defendants from denying parole to any provisional class member without first giving an individualized determination, through the parole process, that such provisional class member presented a flight risk or a danger to the community. Moreover, Judge Boasberg required that the individualized determinations be based on the specific facts of each provisional class member’s case rather than categorical criteria applicable to all provisional class members. The court then held the motion to dismiss in abeyance as the parties worked together to implement the injunction and resolve outstanding issues outside of the courtroom. On Oct. 22, 2018 the court permitted the plaintiffs to conduct discovery for the limited purpose of determining if the government was complying with the preliminary injunction. In a December 21, 2018 status report, the plaintiffs reported concerns about the defendants' noncompliance with the court's preliminary injunction order. On February 28, 2019, Judge Boasberg filed an opinion and order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. He denied the motion as to the plaintiffs' APA and due process claims, but granted it as to certain defendants, dismissing them from the case. He found that his prior opinion foreclosed most of the defendants' arguments as to the plaintiffs' APA claims, and that he did not need to weigh in on the due process claim, as a decision at this point would not affect the outcome of the case. 2019 WL 1003440. The defendants filed the administrative record on April 8. On April 11, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a finding of civil contempt against the Los Angeles ICE Field Office for alleged ongoing violations of the court's preliminary injunction. They also requested that the court appoint a special master to oversee the Field Office's compliance with the injunction. In a July 3 telephonic status conference, Judge Boasberg ordered the plaintiffs' motion for contempt to be held in abeyance pending the parole-grant rates to be disclosed in the defendants' next report. He noted that the rates at the Los Angeles Field Office had risen in the last report. On July 19, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. On September 20, the defendants filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On January 29, 2020, the parties filed a joint status report proposing that they withdraw their pending motions for summary judgment and that the court set a new briefing schedule to give the plaintiffs sufficient time to review any supplementation of the administrative record that may occur, as the defendants had recently completed collecting documents from the ICE field offices. The court entered an order to effectuate the parties' requests. On February 7, Judge Boasberg issued an opinion and order denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for contempt. Judge Boasberg noted that he was denying the motion because the defendants had volunteered to implement certain remedies to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction, but that he also found it necessary to mandate certain measures to enforce the injunction. He ordered that the staff of the Los Angeles Field Office receive training on the 2009 ICE Parole Directive (which they are supposed to be following pursuant to the injunction). He also ordered that field office officials provide short explanations when rendering parole decisions to better inform asylum seekers of their reasoning. Finally, he declined to appoint a special master, concluding that the above measures would be sufficient to ensure compliance. 2020 WL 601629. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This class action suit, filed on March 15, 2018, sought to enjoin the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from exercising its policy and practice of detaining asylum seekers in order to deter other potential migrants from seeking refuge in the United States. The plaintiffs were asylum seekers who had been imprisoned without individualized determinations that they posed a flight risk or danger to the community. They asserted violations of the INA, the APA, and Fifth Amendment Due Process. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to the plaintiffs and class certification on a provisional basis on July 2, 2018. In February 2019, the court mostly denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, preserving the plaintiffs' APA and due process claims, but dismissing certain defendants from the case. The plaintiffs filed a motion for civil contempt against one ICE Field Office in April 2019, alleging it was not in compliance with the injunction. In February 2020, the court mandated certain measures for the Field Office to enforce the injunction. The case is ongoing.


This Multi-District Litigation case included over 40 cases arising in more than half of the states in the U.S. Together, those cases challenged various aspects of the decision by FedEx Ground to classify its drivers as independent contractors under a variety of theories and statutes that included (depending on the case) both state and federal law. During the litigation’s long and complex procedural history, several of the cases were certified as class actions, at least in part, and over 2,000 pleadings or orders were filed. The MDL litigation began in 2005 with the common question of whether FedEx Ground drivers were employees or independent contractors. The history of this MDL case began in 1998 when FedEx acquired Roadway Package Services, Inc. (RPS) and adopted its independent contractor business model. FedEx adopted the RPS business model without modification and continued to engage its local drivers as independent contractors using the RPS Operating Agreement. FedEx re-branded RPS as FedEx Ground in 2000, but its fundamental business model and relationship with the drivers—including the substantive terms of the contract and the terms and conditions of the drivers' employment—remained unchanged. RPS's early business decision to conduct its core business operation with the services of workers classified as independent contractors has long faced legal scrutiny. In 1988 and 1989, the NLRB decided two cases case finding the RPS drivers to be employees under the common law agency test in Roadway Package Service, Inc. 288 NLRB 196 (1988) and Roadway Package Service, Inc.292 NLRB 376, 378 (1989) enf'd 902 F.2d 34 (6th Cir. 1990). Since acquiring RPS, FedEx had steadfastly stood by and defended the independent contractor model in every state and federal legal forum, including a group of class action cases filed between 2004 and 2009 asserting various statutory and common law claims under the laws of over 40 states as well as federal claims arising under the FLSA, ERISA and the FMLA. The first of the court cases to go to trial was Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc., which was filed in California in 2000. Liability issues were tried in 2004, and the litigation was finally completed nine years after it started following a merits appeal and completion of the damage computation in early 2009. The plaintiffs' primary claim was for reimbursement of employment related expenses under California Labor Code § 2802. In the nine-year litigation, a class was certified (over FedEx's objection that its relationship with every driver was different, precluding class adjudication), the drivers were held to be employees by the trial and appellate courts under California's Borello standard (a common law agency test with an "economic realities" overlay), and a judgment was entered awarding substantial damages to each class member. The liability issues are discussed in Estrada v. FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. 354 Cal. App. 4th 1 (2007). In its opinion, the California Court of Appeals detailed the substantial right of control reserved to FedEx in the drivers' operating agreement taking account of the substantial class-wide evidence presented by the plaintiff drivers of the actual control FedEx exercised—in conformance with its written policies and procedures—over every "exquisite detail" of the drivers' work. While Estrada was winding its way through the courts, drivers all over the country filed employment law class actions, as well as individual discrimination and wrongful termination claims in over 40 states. These cases all posed the identical threshold legal question: are the FedEx Ground drivers FedEx's employees, or are they independent contractors who run their own businesses? On FedEx Ground's initiative—over the plaintiffs' strong objections—in 2005 these cases were coordinated into a multi-district litigation docket entitled In re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. Employment Practices Litigation, MDL 1700 and transferred for all pretrial proceedings to Judge Robert Miller in the Northern District of Indiana. Except for the nationwide ERISA claim pleaded in the Kansas case, and a nationwide FMLA claim pleaded in the California case, virtually all of the claims in these cases were asserted on behalf of statewide classes and pleaded state claims. Source. The plaintiffs in the class action cases characterized as "Wave 1," "Wave 2" and "Wave 3" moved the district court for class action certification. In re FedEx Ground Package System, Inc., Employment Prac. Litig., F.Supp.2d (N.D. Ind. March 25, 2008). As the court summarized, these class actions "assert that although FedEx Ground represents to its drivers that they are only partnering with FedEx Ground and will essentially own their own businesses, all FedEx Ground drivers sign the FedEx Ground Operating Agreement, which actually reserves to FedEx Ground the right to exercise pervasive control over the method, manner, and means of the drivers' work." FedEx opposed class action treatment, arguing that "the plaintiffs' claims turn on individualized issues, including whether contractors should be classified as employees under the states' statutory tests, and whether any individual contractor can meet the high bar for rescission of his individual contract." In a 164-page opinion, the district court certified the Wave 1, Wave 2 and Wave 3 cases as class actions with respect to cases involving drivers from Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin; the court denied class action treatment for drivers from Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, South Dakota and Virginia. The district court noted that it had previously granted class action certification with respect to drivers from Kansas, bringing to 20 the total number of states for which class action treatment had been approved. Because it had previously granted class action treatment on behalf of the Kansas drivers, the district court used its prior ruling as a benchmark against which it considered the new class action certification motions. The court held that class action complaints containing only former drivers as named plaintiffs could still proceed as class actions on behalf of former and current drivers because "courts have held that former employees have standing to represent a class consisting of both current and past employees." But with respect to defense efforts to defeat class action treatment on the ground that individual inquiries would be required to determine whether the Operating Agreements were valid and the manner and extent to which the "right to control" will impact the validity of the Operating Agreements, the federal court rejected this argument with respect to the laws of certain states, but agreed with FedEx Ground that common questions would not predominate under the laws of other states. That presented the primary basis for the difference among states for which the court certified class actions and states for which it denied motions for class certification. Source. In 2009 and 2010, while the MDL docket was still active, the Eighth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit were both called on to decide cases addressing the employment status of FedEx drivers who worked under a nearly identical operating agreement as the plaintiffs in the MDL docket. The two Circuit courts reached different conclusions. The first case, FedEx Home Delivery v. National Labor Relations Board, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) was a petition to enforce an NLRB order directing FedEx bargain with a Teamsters local that had been certified to represent drivers at FedEx's Wilmington, Massachusetts terminal. In the administrative proceedings, the NLRB again concluded that the FedEx drivers are employees. The D.C. Circuit denied the enforcement petition. A divided panel of the court agreed with FedEx that the drivers are properly classified as independent contractors. To get there, the majority applied a novel—and now controversial—formulation of traditional common law agency test. Rather than focusing on FedEx's reserved right to control the method and means of the drivers' work, the Circuit instead focused on the drivers' asserted "entrepreneurial opportunities". The second case, Huggins v. FedEx Ground Package Systems, Inc. 592 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2010), was a negligence case arising from a trucking accident in which FedEx was sued by the injured plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, finding that a triable issue of fact existed under Missouri's common law agency test as to whether the over-the-road driver who caused the accident was a FedEx employee so that liability could be imputed to FedEx under the respondeat superior doctrine. The court's analysis was founded on the premise that the "touchstone" of the traditional agency test is "the right of control." While the court noted that the driver who caused the accident did not have a direct relationship with FedEx but instead was employed by a FedEx contractor, it concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a reasonable inference that FedEx had a right to control his performance and was therefore his employer under the common law test. Source.  Status of In Re Fedex  On August 11, 2010, the court granted summary judgment with respect to the claims of FedEx’s Kansas drivers. Applying Kansas law, and focusing on the “right of control,” the court concluded the terms of the FedEx operating agreements under which the drivers worked did not render them employees. Finding the agreement to be controlling, the court largely rejected arguments by the plaintiffs regarding the control they claimed that the company actually exercised, and drew a distinction between the company’s requirements as to results versus the manner and means by which work was to be performed. Following that decision, the court directed the parties to brief the same issues regarding the cases in states other than Kansas. On December 13, 2010, the district court issued an opinion granting summary judgment for FedEx in most of the other states. Even after granting so much of FedEx’s summary judgment motion, however, several large cases remained. For example, the FLSA and FMLA claims remained as well as certain state law tort or statutory claims. The court did grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for a few claims, such as the Kentucky Wage Payment statute claim. 758 F.Supp.2d 638 (N.D. Ind. 2010). The cases involving claims which were not certified for class adjudication, that include a mixture of certified and uncertified claims, or that pleaded individual claims only but which were transferred to the MDL docket have been—or are in the process of being—remanded to the transferor courts for trial or other further proceedings. These include cases that pleaded class claims which were not certified by the Court such as those from California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Vermont, and Virginia. On August 27, 2014, the Ninth Circuit reversed the MDL court and ruled that FedEx driers in California and Oregon were employees. 765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014). On June 12, 2015, FedEx settled with the drivers in California and agreed to pay $228 million. The settlement covered approximately 2,300 drivers in California only, and covered the time period 2000-07 only. It did not resolve the myriad of other misclassification lawsuits that had been filed by FedEx Ground drivers in other states. On June 15, 2016, parties in the cases pending in twenty states (Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin) moved for preliminary approval of their settlement agreement. The twenty class settlements proposed to the court were the product of mediation. Judge Robert J. Miller, Jr. found that the amount of the proposed settlements were within the range of possible approval and should be preliminarily approved. The court granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlements on August 17, 2016. On February 9, 2017, Judge Miller denied an emergency injunction request by co-lead counsel for the class and the defendant, which would have limited the communications of members of the class in the New Jersey case who objected to the proposed settlement to other members of the class. Judge Miller found that the class representatives did not misrepresent their objections about the proposed settlement, and that they had the right to inform other members of the class about their misgivings. Despite this, he found the New Jersey settlement agreement to be valid on February 14, 2017, finding it to be sufficiently fair despite the misgivings of the class representatives. On March 15, 2017, Judge Miller granted the motions for indicative ruling granting final approval of the class action settlements in the remaining states, including New Jersey. The United States Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit granted the motion for limited remand on March 22, 2017. The various settlements were approved on April 28, May 1, and June 19, 2017, and attorneys' fees were partially awarded. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on October 16, 2017. The ERISA class action settlement was preliminarily approved on September 5, 2018. The settlement included a $13,325,000 fund to resolve all ERISA claims, with a maximum of $4,377,062 from the fund going to attorney's fees. 52% of the remaining money was apportioned to resolve life insurance claims to legal heirs and estates, and 48% was allocated to resolve ERISA benefits claims. On March 22, 2019, the Court gave final approval to the settlement and dismissed the action with prejudice. The plaintiffs' attorneys disputed how the settlement allocated attorney's fees amongst themselves, but they resolved their issues with the help of a special master, and the court approved a modified fee award on October 17, 2019. This case is now closed.

Summary: This multi-district litigation included over 40 cases arising in more than half of the states in the U.S. Together, the plaintiffs challenged various aspects of the decision by FedEx Ground to classify its drivers as independent contracts under a variety of theories and statutes that included (depending on the case) both state and federal statutes. The MDL began in 2005 with the common question of whether FedEx Ground drivers were employees or independent contractors. In 2015, FedEx agreed to pay $228 million to settle the claims by California drivers. Cases from the remaining states settled, with attorneys' fees granted in part, in 2017. The ERISA class action is now settled, and the case is closed.


On April 28, 2006, an African-American homeowner represented by private counsel filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against Novastar Mortgage under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and 1983, the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The plaintiff, acting individually and on behalf of a putative class of all protected racial groups who entered into residential mortgage loans with Novastar, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. The plaintiff claimed that Novastar discriminated against minority borrowers through predatory lending. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Novastar engaged in racially discriminatory conduct by targeting undereducated minorities and providing subprime loans to them with interest rates and terms dissimilar to those provided to similarly-situated white borrowers. The plaintiff further alleged that Novastar set interest rates based on the perceived financial sophistication of the borrower rather than the risk of extending the loan, and that it encouraged discriminatory conduct by offering its brokers financial incentives to secure these higher interest rates. Novastar filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court (Judge Bernice B. Donald) denied on December 20, 2007, holding that the plaintiff had standing to bring the suit and had sufficiently stated all of her claims. Jackson v. Novastar Mortgage, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 636 (W.D. Tenn. 2007). Novastar appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit on August 1, 2008. Meanwhile, on September 12, 2008, one of Novastar's creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Novastar in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. In Re: Novastar Mortgage Inc., 1:08-BK-12125 (Bankr. Del. 2008). Under the federal bankruptcy code, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays other actions against the debtor. Consequently, pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding in Delaware, the plaintiff in this case was statutorily barred from pursuing her discrimination action against Novastar. On this basis, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Keith, Cole, and Cook) denied Novastar's petition, and the District Court (Judge Donald) administratively closed the case on December 23, 2008. In its order, however, the District Court emphasized that the parties could easily reopen the case upon resolution of the Delaware bankruptcy litigation. Nevertheless, as of June 15, 2015, the case remains closed, though the bankruptcy action ended in March 2009.

Summary: In April 2006, an African-American homeowner filed a putative class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Tennessee against Novastar Mortgage, alleging racial discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Novastar engaged in predatory lending by targeting undereducated minorities and providing subprime loans to them with interest rates and terms dissimilar to those provided to similarly-situated white borrowers. Novastar moved for summary judgment, which the District Court denied. While the Sixth Circuit considered the denial on interlocutory appeal, a creditor filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition against Novastar in Delaware, which imposed an automatic stay on the predatory lending action. Pursuant to the automatic stay, the District Court administratively closed the case in December 2008, pending resolution of the bankruptcy proceeding. Though the Delaware bankruptcy litigation ended in March 2009, this case remains closed as of June 15, 2015.


On December 17, 2013, D.H., a lesbian student in Moss Pointe School District, filed this federal lawsuit against Moss Point School District ("MPSD") in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiff alleged MPSD violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. She sought injunctive relief, damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the school district had discriminated against D.H. on the basis of her gender expression and sexual orientation by failing to adequately protect D.H. from harassment by employees and students. While attending Moss Pointe Middle School, students and staff referred to D.H. as "it" and "he/she." On several occasions the staff refused to let her participate in gender segregated activities, claiming they did not know her gender, and refused to let her use the women's bathroom. The plaintiff's complaint also alleged that the school district's acts and omissions surrounding the harassment created a hostile climate that deprived D.H. of access to educational opportunities. On January 27, 2015, D.H. and MPSD reached a settlement agreement. The agreement is not published, but the Southern Poverty Law Center wrote a summary providing general details of the agreement. According to the summary, within the settlement the school district agreed to implement new anti-bullying and discrimination policies and publish them in the parent/student and employee handbooks as well as on the school district's website. MPSD also agreed to adopt and implement new equal educational opportunity policies geared toward prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender identity or expression and sexual orientation. Lastly, MPSD agreed to reform its procedures for addressing student and parent complaints of bullying and harassment. The financial terms of the settlement were not disclosed. The case was dismissed with prejudice as to all parties on February 18, 2015. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.

Summary: Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, on December 17, 2013, a lesbian student sought injunctive relief and damages against Moss Point School District, alleging that the District discriminated against her based on her gender expression and sexual orientation. The parties settled on January 27, 2015. Within the settlement, the District agreed to reform its anti-bullying and discrimination policies as well as its procedures for addressing harassment complaints. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement.


This action, filed February 8, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO-1) ban on admission to the US of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and it sought "to protect and defend the Iranian-American community in the United States and abroad from the harmful and discriminatory effects of the Executive Order and its implementation." The complaint argued that the EO-1's enforcement violated the First Amendment Establishment Clause, Fifth Amendment rights to Equal Protection and Due Process rights, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The plaintiffs were individual Iranian nationals as well as Iranian-American organizations. The individuals included students with F-1 visas, a lawful permanent US resident, dual citizens of Iran and the US, a resident of Iran with an approved J-1 visa, refugee families approved for resettlement through the US Refugee Admissions Program, a family awaiting reunification in the US after receiving green cards, a refugee couple that went through the vetting process of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, and an asylum grantee currently in the US. The organizations were the Pars Equality Center, the Iranian American Bar Association, the National Iranian American Council, and the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans. The case was assigned to District Judge Tanya Chutkan. The same day as they filed the complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendants from enforcing the provisions of EO-1 that amounted to the alleged violations. On March 6, 2017, prompted by adverse developments in the Ninth Circuit in Washington v. Trump, the President rescinded EO-1 and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). That day, the government filed notice in this case of the new EO. In response to EO-2, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction on March 16, which mooted their February 8 motion for a preliminary injunction. Numerous civil rights organizations filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs' position on Mar. 23: the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Center for Reproductive Rights, the Chicago Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights, the Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, the Mississippi Center for Justice, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, the National Coalition on Black Civic Participation, the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, and the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. The brief added the argument that "even if this court were to review the EO under a 'rational basis' test [rather than the strict scrutiny test the plaintiffs seek], the Order would still violate the Constitution’s equal protection guarantee." On April 4, two additional briefs were filed in support of the plaintiffs by former national security officials as well as Human Rights First, KIND (Kids in Need of Defense), and Tahirih Justice Center. On May 11, after an evidentiary hearing on the preliminary injunction motion in this case and Universal Muslim Association of America v. Trump, Judge Chutkan stayed resolution of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that plaintiffs could not show that they faced irreparable harm, citing the two nationwide injunctions that were then in effect. On June 2, the government filed an emergency motion to stay the proceedings pending Supreme Court review ofInternational Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP v. Trump which the court granted while denying without prejudice the motion for a preliminary injunction on June 20. The court reasoned that in light of the "substantial overlap between the legal issues present here and those that the Supreme Court," a stay was "the most appropriate path for conserving the court’s resources and adjudicating these cases in the most efficient manner possible." The plaintiffs filed several motions in response, including a motion to lift the stay, a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a motion for temporary restraining order. The court denied them all. 2017 WL 7201732. The Supreme Court was set to hear oral argument in IRAP on October 10, 2017. However, the travel ban imposed by EO-2 was set to expire in the weeks leading up to oral argument. On September 24—the same day the ninety-day ban was set to expire—the Trump Administration issued EO-3 which indefinitely restricted travel from the following eight countries: Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela, and Yemen. In response, plaintiffs moved to have the stay lifted. On October 12, the court granted that motion in part, allowing plaintiffs to file an amended complaint and a new motion for a preliminary injunction. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs argued that the proclamation "continues the most discriminatory aspects of the prior two Executive Orders" and requested that the court impose a preliminary injunction. A hearing on the preliminary injunction was set for November 2. However on October 25, plaintiffs filed a supplemental memo to their preliminary injunction. They noted that after they filed their motion for a preliminary injunction on October 12, the administration issued a new executive order concerning refugeesthat—when implemented based on the State Department's guidelines—amounted to an effective ban on Muslim refugees. Based on those developments, plaintiffs sought to modify the scope of the preliminary injunction to enjoin the government from "suspending processing of refugees." Plaintiffs also filed an amended complaint in early November. A preliminary injunction hearing took place on Nov. 8. On January 3, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to set a briefing schedule. However, defendants opposed that motion, asking the court instead to stay this case pending the resolution of all all appellate proceedings in the IRAP and Hawaii cases. The court granted the defendants' motion for a stay on March 2, citing "substantial overlap" between plaintiffs' case here and  Hawaii which was pending review by the Supreme Court. In the March 2 order, the court also dismissed plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice. On July 31, 2018, the plaintiffs filed notice of voluntary dismissal of the case, likely as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii upholding the travel ban issued on June 26 (available at 138 S. Ct. 2392). The case is now closed.

Summary: This is one of several cases challenging President Trump's ban on admission to the United States of nations from certain foreign nations, often called the travel ban. The plaintiffs amended their complaint as President Trump issued new versions of the travel ban. The court denied preliminary relief because other courts hearing similar challenges had enjoined the ban, and the litigation was often stayed awaiting developments in other cases. The plaintiffs eventually dismissed the case, likely due to the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the travel ban in <i>Hawaii v. Trump</i>.


On August 12, 2015, a group of young individuals (aged 8-19) in Oregon, represented by their guardians, filed a complaint against the United States and various government officials in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asserted harm from carbon dioxide pollution and climate destabilization due to government action and/or inaction. The plaintiffs alleged that instead of implementing a course of effective action to phase out carbon pollution, the defendants continued to permit, authorize, and subsidize activities that produce enormous quantities of carbon dioxide emissions. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection clause, the Ninth Amendment, and the public trust doctrine. They sued under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 for declaratory and injunctive relief, including ordering the defendants to implement a remedial plan to phase out fossil fuel emissions so as to stabilize the climate system. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on September 10 with slight changes. On November 12, the National Association of Manufacturers, American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers, American Petroleum Institute moved to intervene as defendants and Magistrate Judge Thomas M. Coffin granted this motion on January 14, 2016. 2016 WL 183903. On November 17, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. On November 10, 2016, Judge Ann L. Aiken adopted the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Coffin and denied the motion to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiffs stated valid constitutional and public trust doctrine claims, and also that the plaintiffs had alleged concrete and imminent injuries. 217 F.Supp.3d 1224. On March 7, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to appeal the November 10 opinion as well as a motion to stay proceedings in this case pending consideration of the motion. On June 8, 2017, Judge Aiken adopted the report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge Coffin to deny the motions. 2017 WL 2483705. The next day, the defendant filed a writ of mandamus in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which the circuit court denied. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on May 9, 2018 and then a motion for summary judgment on May 22, 2017. On October 15, Judge Aiken ordered that the motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted in part and denied in part. Similarly, defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Judge Aiken found that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether activists suffered injury in fact, whether equitable remedy could redress injuries, and whether federal government acted with deliberate indifference to human safety. 339 F.Supp.3d 1062. On October 18, 2018, the defendant filed a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court as well as an application for a stay pending disposition of this writ of mandamus. The next day, the Supreme Court issued an administrative order staying the trial scheduled on October 29 and all discovery. On November 2, the Supreme Court denied the application for stay without prejudice. On November 21 2018, the district court found sufficient cause to revisit the question of interlocutory appeal and certified this case for interlocutory appeal. The Ninth Circuit granted permission to appeal on December 26, 2018. 949 F.3d 1125. It heard oral arguments on June 4, 2019 in Portland, Oregon (Judges Mary H. Murguia, Andrew D. Hurwitz, and Josephine L. Staton). On January 17, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, with instructions to dismiss for lack of Article III standing. The Ninth Circuit ruled that although the plaintiffs had established the first two elements of standing (injury and causation), their claims were not redressable by a federal court, because that would involve a host of complex policy decisions that had been entrusted to the political branches. The court made this ruling “reluctantly,” but concluded that the plaintiffs would have to make their case to the political branches “or the electorate at large.” 947 F.3d 1159. The plaintiffs moved for rehearing en banc on March 2, 2020. As of July 10, 2020, that motion is pending.

Summary: A group of young people in Oregon filed this lawsuit on August 12, 2015, challenging the U.S. government’s inaction on climate change. Represented by Wild Earth Advocates and private counsel, they brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. Following the government’s attempt to have the lawsuit dismissed, the district court ruled that the suit could move forward. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling, instructing the district court to dismiss the case for lack of Article III standing. The plaintiffs moved for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit; as of July 10, 2020, that motion is pending.