On June 25, 2018, three plaintiffs filed this class-action lawsuit challenging the federal government's forcible separation of minor children from their parents, as well as its practice of prolonging the separation by failing to conduct credible fear interviews in a timely manner. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Patrol, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, Citizenship and Immigration Services, Health and Human Services, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and the respective administrators of each agency in their official capacities. The plaintiffs, mothers of young children, had entered the United States seeking asylum for themselves and their children. In May 2018, the mothers were separated from their minor children (six, five, and eight years old, respectively) and relocated to a detention center in Washington State as part of the federal government’s zero-tolerance policy targeting illegal entry. The plaintiffs challenged the federal government’s forcible separation of minor children from their parents, as well as the practice of prolonging this separation by failing to conduct credible fear interviews in a timely manner. The plaintiffs asserted Fifth Amendment due process claims, as well as violations of asylum statutes and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The three women filed the complaint in federal district court in the Western District of Washington on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated parents, and the case was assigned to Judge Marsha Pechman. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 15, 2018. The amended complaint acknowledged that the day after the plaintiffs filed their complaint, a federal court in the Southern District of California implemented a nationwide injunction against family separation. While the plaintiffs were not waiving their claim for relief under the earlier filed claims (challenging the zero-tolerance policy as it applied to family separation and credible fear interviews), they planned not to pursue the claims further, pending the governments’ compliance with the nationwide order. The plaintiffs also added a claim against the government’s bond hearings process, challenging the legality of the government’s practice of excessively prolonging the detention of asylum seekers by delaying their bond hearings and failing to establish any timeline for these hearings. In August, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, confirming that they will not pursue the claims that were addressed by the nationwide injunction issued in July. The plaintiffs later moved to certify a class. That motion was amended in September, and defined two proposed classes as follows: • Credible Fear Interview (“CFI”) Class: All detained asylum seekers in the United States subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) who are not provided a credible fear determination within 10 days of requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official, absent a request by the asylum seeker for a delayed credible fear interview. • Bond Hearing (“BH”) Class: All detained asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection, were initially subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), were determined to have a credible fear of persecution, but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within 7 days of requesting a bond hearing. On September 6, 2018, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. The defendants claimed that the court was not authorized to hear the plaintiffs' claims challenging the timing of credible fear interviews. The defendants also sought dismissal on the grounds that members of the Credible Fear Class had no right to enter the U.S. or to have the determination of their admissibility subject to any procedural safeguards. The defendants further argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not amenable to resolution in a class-action suit and that the APA did not provide a cause of action for certain claims that were made. On September 20, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief from the court, asking that the court order the EOIR defendants to 1) conduct bond hearings within seven days of a hearing request, 2) place the burden of proof in those hearings on DHS, 3) produce a recording or verbatim transcript of the hearings and 4) produce a contemporaneous written decision with particularized determinations. In the absence of this action, the plaintiffs asserted that they will face irreparable harm in the form of violations of their constitutional rights, prolonged detention, and interference with their ability to pursue their asylum claims. On December 11, 2018, Judge Marsha Pechman issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Judge Pechman concluded that the court had jurisdiction to hear the suit, that both classes adequately stated a claim for constitutional relief from alleged violations of due process by the defendants, and that the Bond Hearing class succeeded in stating a claim under the APA concerning certain procedural safeguards. Judge Pechman granted the motion in part, resulting in the dismissal of the Credible Fear Interview class' APA claim and the Bond Hearing class' APA claim concerning the timing of bond hearings. 354 F. Supp. 3d 1218. On March 6, 2019, Judge Pechman granted the plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Class Certification and certified the following classes:
Credible Fear Interview Class: All detained asylum seekers in the United States subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) who are not provided a credible fear determination within ten days of the later of (1) requesting asylum or expressing a fear of persecution to a DHS official or (2) the conclusion of any criminal proceeding related to the circumstances of their entry, absent a request by the asylum seeker for a delayed credible fear interview. Bond Hearing Class: All detained asylum seekers who entered the United States without inspection, were initially subject to expedited removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), were determined to have a credible fear of persecution, but are not provided a bond hearing with a verbatim transcript or recording of the hearing within seven days of requesting a bond hearing. 2019 WL 1056466.
On April 5, 2019, Judge Pechman issued an order granting the plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The injunction mandated that the defendants conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond request by a class member and that the burden would be placed on the defendants to demonstrate why the class member should not be released on bond. The injunction also mandated that the bond hearing be recorded and that a written decision with individualized determinations and finding be produced at the conclusion of a bond hearing. 379 F. Supp. 3d 1170. On April 26, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to vacate the preliminary injunction. On May 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint in light of the Attorney General's decision in the Matter of M-S-, "announcing that immigrants in removal proceedings awaiting the determination of their application for asylum must be detained for the duration of that process, subject to release only under a highly-limited 'parole' system adjudicated solely by immigration officials." The plaintiffs added three new claims to challenge the Attorney General's decision; (1) that section § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) is unconstitutional, (2) that the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of M-S- violates section 1225(b)(1), and (3) Matter of M-S- should have been issued in notice and comment rulemaking. The plaintiffs also amended the complaint to add declaratory and injunctive relief mandating that the defendants do not follow a policy of denying bond hearings to noncitizens found to have a credible fear of persecution. On May 28, 2019, in wake of the Attorney General's decision, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Modification of the Existing Preliminary Injunction. The plaintiffs sought to have the preliminary injunction modified to ensure that class members found to have credible fear would be granted a bond hearing before an impartial adjudicator to determine if further detention is justified. On July 2, 2019, Judge Pechman issued an order affirming the previously entered preliminary injunction and modifying the injunction to conclude that the Bond Hearing Class is constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing pending resolution of their asylum applications. Judge Pechman found that the statute denying these class members a bond hearing is unconstitutional because "any statute that provides for 'no bond hearing at all' is unlawful on its face." 387 F. Supp. 3d 1219. On July 3, 2019, the defendants appealed the order affirming and modifying the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. Only July 9, 2019, the defendants filed an Emergency Motion to Stay Pending Appeal the district court's preliminary injunction, arguing that the injunction will cause substantial harm to the defendants by "drastically limiting the government’s ability to enforce the immigration laws that Congress has written." On July 12, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary stay on the preliminary injunction to allow for the parties to file briefs on the Motion to Stay Pending Appeal. On July 22, 2019, Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder, William Canby, and Morgan Christen issued an order granting in part and denying in part the defendants' Emergency Motion to Stay. The appeals court declined to stay the part of the district court injunction holding that the Bond Hearing Class is constitutionally entitled to bond hearings pending resolution of their asylum applications. The appeals court granted the motion to stay the part of the injunction regarding deadlines for requested bond hearings and the procedural guidelines for those bond hearings, finding that these procedures would impose a short-term hardship on the government and the immigration system. After hearing oral argument in October 2019, on March 27, 2020, a Ninth Circuit panel (Judge Sidney R. Thomas, Judge Michael Daly Hawkins, and Judge Bridget S. Bade) issued an opinion and order affirming in part the district court's preliminary injunction and directing the district court to "reconsider some of the technical aspects of its order." 2020 WL 1482393. Writing for the panel, Judge Thomas concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their due process claim regarding the availability of bond hearings, "that they are constitutionally entitled to individualized bond hearings before a neutral decisionmaker," and that "the theoretical availability of the habeas process did not alone satisfy due process." Moreover, Judge Thomas held that the district court did not abuse its discretion "in concluding that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm absent the grant of a preliminary injunction," in the form of "substandard physical conditions, low standards of medical care, lack of access to attorneys and evidence as Plaintiffs prepare their cases, separation from their families, and retraumatization of a population already found to have legitimate circumstances of victimization." However, Judge Thomas vacated and remanded to the district court Part A of the preliminary injunction, which laid out the procedural guidelines for the required bond hearings, to further develop the factual record and to revisit the scope of the injunction. Judge Bade dissented from the panel's opinion and order and concluded that:
"despite Congress unequivocally barring lower courts from issuing classwide injunctions against the operation of certain immigration statutes, the majority opinion gives a green light for the district courts in this circuit (as well as this court) to issue (and uphold) such relief. And, even if the district court had jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, the preliminary injunction is overbroad and exceeds what the Constitution demands."
 The defendants then filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the Ninth Circuit’s decision on August 24, 2020. The case was docketed in the Supreme Court as No. 20-234. The parties agreed to stay the case while the cert petition was pending in the Supreme Court, and the district court stayed the case on September 11, 2020. The Supreme Court granted the cert petition on January 11, 2021. In the same order, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case the Ninth Circuit in light of the Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security earlier in the summer. On February 16, 2021, the defendants requested that Ninth Circuit stay appellate proceedings. The Ninth Circuit granted this motion and held the appeal in abeyance. It further directed the parties to file a status report within 60 days of how the case should proceed. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Three plaintiffs, mothers of minor children, filed this class action complaint challenging the federal government's forcible separation of minor children from their parents, as well as its practice of prolonging the separation by failing to conduct credible fear interviews in a timely manner and its practice of excessively prolonging the detention of asylum seekers by delaying their bond hearings. They plan not to pursue the separation claims, pending the government's compliance with a nationwide injunction against family separation, but they continue to seek relief for the bond hearings claims. The district court certified two classes; the Credible Fear Interview Class and the Bond Hearing Class. The district court ordered a preliminary injunction, mandating that the government conduct bond hearings within seven days of a bond request and finding that denying bond hearings to these class members is unconstitutional. In March 2020, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction and remanded proceedings to the district court to reconsider the procedures for the bond hearings. The defendants filed a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, seeking further review of the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Supreme Court granted the cert petition on January 11, 2021. In the same order, it vacated the judgment and remanded the case the Ninth Circuit in light of the Court’s decision in Thuraissigiam v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security earlier in the summer. The defendants then requested the Ninth Circuit hold the appeal in abeyance. The case is ongoing.


The U.S. Census Bureau, a division of the U.S. Department of Commerce, conducts a census every ten years. The census surveys the number of persons in each household and, in the process, gathers certain demographic information about those persons. The Bureau’s stated goal in administering the census “is to count every person living in the United States once, only once and in the right place.” In 2018, the Department of Commerce announced the final list of questions for the 2020 decennial census that it will submit to Congress. This would include a question asking the citizenship status of every person in every household in the US, which has not been done since 1950. The citizenship question asked, “Is this person a citizen of the United States?” and required the respondent to select one of the following responses: 1) “Yes, born in the United States”; (2) “Yes, born in Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, or Northern Marianas”; (3) “Yes, born abroad of U.S. citizen parent or parents”; (4) “Yes, citizen by naturalization – Print year of naturalization”; or (5) “No, not a U.S. citizen On April 17, 2018, the city of San Jose and the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI) filed a complaint against Wilbur Ross, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce; the U.S. Department of Commerce; Ron Jarmin, in his official capacity as Acting Director of the U.S. Census Bureau; and the U.S. Census Bureau. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census violated the Constitution’s “actual Enumeration” mandate and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prohibition against “arbitrary and capricious” agency action. Further, to avoid irreparable harm, the plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the Bureau from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. The plaintiffs claimed that that fewer people would respond to the 2020 Census if it included a citizenship question. The inaccurate data would in turn result in funding allocations that would disadvantage San Jose and its residents. The data from the 2020 Census would be used not only to allocate congressional seats but also to determine funding for public health, education, transportation and neighborhood improvements, all of which are determined based on the population as determined by the Census. An increase in the undercount of persons living in San Jose, and specifically an increased undercount of minority populations, would lead to San Jose and its residents suffering harm through both lost representation in the United States House of Representatives and millions of dollars of foregone federal funding. BAJI claimed it would also be harmed due to the diversion of essential and limited resources—including time and money—from other important matters that it ordinarily would have been addressing through dialogues, presentations, workshops, publications, technical assistance and trainings to build alliances between African American and immigrant communities, in order to educate its diverse constituents regarding issues related to the census citizenship questions. Like the residents in San Jose, the minority and immigrant communities BAJI serves would also be deterred from responding to the 2020 Census because of the citizenship question. The complaint was filed in the US District Court of California (Northern District – San Jose Division). The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd, but San Jose did not consent to a US Magistrate Judge’s jurisdiction, and the case was randomly reassigned to U.S. District Judge Lucy H. Koh. On May 22, 2018, Judge Richard Seeborg signed an order relating this case to an earlier case assigned to him. In that case, State of California v Ross (PB-CA-0049 in this Clearinghouse), the plaintiffs also claimed that the inclusion of a citizenship question operated by design to depress an accurate count of certain immigrant communities residing in the United States, in violation of the Constitution and the APA. Thus, San Jose v. Ross was reassigned to Judge Seeborg for all further proceedings. The defendants moved to dismiss all claims asserted against them on June 21, but the judge rejected the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the decision to add a citizenship question to the 2020 Census and that the plaintiffs had properly stated claims for relief under both the Enumeration Clause of the Constitution and the APA. On November 2, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The court found that there was a material dispute of fact regarding whether, and to what extent, the addition of the citizenship question would impact the final enumeration of the public. The judge also concluded that there were material disputes regarding whether Secretary Ross failed to “consider an important aspect of the problem” before making his decision. The judge accordingly denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment on December 14, 2018. 362 F.Supp.3d 749. After the case survived summary judgment, the parties prepared for trial. The bench trial began on January 7, 2019. On February 15, 2019, the same day as closing arguments, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a related case regarding the census, State of New York v. Department of Commerce (PB-NY-0032 in this Clearinghouse). The defendants recommended the court defer its ruling until the Supreme Court had finished its proceedings. The plaintiffs opposed staying the case, and the court agreed. On March 6, 2019, the court held that the decision to add a citizenship question violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Enumeration Clause. 358 F.Supp.3d 965. The court held that the decision to include the citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious, was an abuse of discretion, and was not otherwise in accordance with the law. Notwithstanding the discretion given to the Secretary, the court found that the addition of the citizenship question would result in an undercount. Accordingly, on March 13, 2019, Judge Seeborg issued an order entering judgment for the plaintiffs on their APA claims, vacating Secretary Ross's decision to include the citizenship question on the 2020 Census, and permanently enjoining the defendants from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. On the same day, the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The case was docketed as No. 19-15457. On March 18, 2019, the defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in Department of Commerce v. New York, and affirmed the district court’s judgment that the decision to add a citizenship question violates the APA. Following its decision, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for writ of certiorari, docket No. 18-1214. The judgment was vacated and the case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Department of Commerce v. New York. The Ninth Circuit subsequent remanded the action the district court. The plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to enter final judgment on July 30, 2019. On August 1, 2019, Judge Seeborg granted the motion, vacated the prior judgment, and entered final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on the APA claims and the defendants on the claims under the Enumeration Clause. The defendants were permanently enjoined from including a citizenship question or asking about citizenship on the 2020 census. The court was to retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the order until the 2020 Census results are processed and sent to the President by December 31, 2020. Since that date has passed, the case is closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs sued the US Department of Commerce to prevent the Census Bureau from including a citizenship question on the 2020 Census. After trial, Judge Seeborg enjoined the defendants from including the citizenship question on the 2020 Census. The defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit and filed a petition for writ of certiorari before judgment. The Supreme Court issued its opinion in another case about the census, Department of Commerce v. New York, and affirmed the district court's judgment that the citizenship question violated the APA. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its decision in Department of Commerce v. New York. Back in the district court, Judge Seeborg permanently enjoined the defendants from including the citizenship question and retained jurisdiction over the matter until the 2020 Census results are reported to the President by December 31, 2020.


On October 23, 2012, a teenager detained awaiting a parole revocation hearing filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the MacArthur Justice Center and Uptown People's Law Center, asked the court for a declaratory judgment that the policies of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board regarding parole revocation hearings were unconstitutional. They also requested that the Court enjoin the defendant from subjecting juveniles awaiting a parole revocation hearing to these policies. The plaintiff alleged that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board was violating his due process rights by depriving him of counsel, not providing a timely hearing, and not allowing him to present evidence at his parole revocation hearing. The plaintiff also filed for class certification in a motion alongside the complaint. The case was initially assigned to Judge Samuel Der−Yeghiayan, and later reassigned to Judge Andrea Wood and referred to magistrate judges for settlement conferences. In early 2014, the parties reached a consent judgment that was filed with the court. On May 2, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a new motion to certify a class for purposes of settlement. On May 8, the court preliminarily approved the settlement and class certification of "all juvenile parolees in the State of Illinois who currently or who will in the future face parole revocation proceedings." On July 25, 2014, an amended complaint was filed to include the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice as a defendant and remove the governor. The court finally approved the class on July 31. The court also finally approved the consent decree on August 28, 2014. The decree provided that the Illinois Prisoner Review Board must provide counsel during the parole revocation hearing process and included terms for the procedures for presentation of evidence at the hearings and the time frame for the hearing to take place. The parties also agreed to third party monitoring of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board's compliance with the decree for 18 months. In February 2015, the plaintiffs filed to enforce the consent decree, arguing that the defendants refused to provide the documents necessary for the plaintiffs to evaluate compliance with the consent decree. However, they subsequently withdrew the motion in April 2015 after the plaintiffs received the information and documents they sought. The monitor proceeded to file numerous reports over the next several years. On February 17, 2016, the monitor filed three reports were filed with the court for the past quarters. Each report indicated that the defendants were making progress toward complying with the consent decree, but that they were still not fully compliant. Two more reports were filed on September 19, 2016, indicating that "the spirit of the MH Consent Decree is being fulfilled and Defendants are in substantial compliance." The report also indicated that further monitoring was necessary to ensure that administration changes and budget issues did not threaten continued compliance. On April 26, 2017, the monitor filed two more reports indicating the same concern. The ninth quarter report on August 14, 2017 stated that there was still substantial compliance, but that a continued risk existed that certain individual cases would not be compliant and that the defendants were not complying with payment of fees to the monitor and youth attorneys. The monitor subsequently continued to provide oral reports to the court at status hearings in 2018. In September, the monitor filed a letter with the court indicating their conclusions. They stated that the defendants were still not consistently complying with the paragraph of the consent decree requiring payment of representation for the youths' representation, which was the final provision left for the defendants to complete. However, since the youths had had continued representation, the monitor suggested there was no longer a need for active monitoring. On October 12, 2018, the court terminated the independent monitoring provision of the consent decree, which closed the case.

Summary: On October 23, 2012, a teenager detained awaiting a parole revocation hearing filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff alleged that his due process rights were violated by the policies of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board for parole revocation hearings. The case settled with a consent decree in August 2014 and closed after the defendants achieved near-total compliance in October 2018. The case is now closed.


On March 30, 2004, children in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Human Service's Division of Family and Children's Services, on behalf of abused and neglected children in the State of Mississippi, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Human Services (DHS) and the Division of Family and Children's Services (DFCS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by private and public counsel, the plaintiffs asked for declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that the defendants harmed and put at risk members of the plaintiff class in numerous ways: failing to investigate or confirm credible reports of abuse and neglect; failing to provide services to children found to be abused or neglected; failing to respond to requests for applications by people interested in becoming foster and adoptive parents, resulting in a shortage of foster parents; placing children in unsafe or unsuitable care and failing to monitor in-custody children to ascertain that they are safe; over-institutionalizing foster children by placing children of all ages in institutional or group settings regardless of their needs; failing to provide foster children with necessary medical, dental, and mental health services; and failing to file petitions to free children for adoption by terminating parental rights in accordance with federal statutory timeframes. The complaint also alleged that the state was repeatedly denied federal funds because of deficient case record documentation and the placement of children in unlicensed homes and facilities, and that the defendants failed to follow through the reform plan they initiated in the late 1990s to address the state's systemic child welfare failures. All this, the plaintiffs said, was due to understaffing, mismanagement, and the failure to implement necessary reforms, which resulted in violations of Substantive Due Process, Procedural Due Process, Equal Protection, state law, and the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the defendants' violation of class members' rights was unlawful; a permanent injunction forbidding the defendants to subject members of the plaintiff class to practices that violated their rights, including remedial provisions to ensure that a detailed curative plan was developed, implemented, and monitored; and an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On March 30, 2004, plaintiffs sought class action certification for two plaintiff subclasses: (1) all children who are or will be in the custody of DFCS ("In-Custody Class"); and (2) all of those children who are not in DFCS custody, but have been or are at risk of being abused and neglected and about whom the defendants have received a report of abuse or neglect ("Protective Services Class"). The defendants then moved to dismiss on June 1, 2014 and filed a motion to stay consideration of the motion for class certification pending a ruling on the motion to dismiss. On November 18, 2004, the Court (Judge Tom S. Lee) dismissed all claims sought to be asserted by and on behalf of the "Protective Services Class" and also dismissed the claims of the "In-Custody Class" for violation of their alleged procedural due process rights and for violation of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. Hence, there only remained claims of the putative "In-Custody Class" for violation of their substantive due process rights. 351 F. Supp. 543. On March 11, 2005, the Court (Judge Lee) granted class certification for the "In-Custody Class" only, reasoning that even though each plaintiff and proposed class member may not have suffered the same type or degree of harm, because it appeared that defendants' alleged acts and omissions posed a significant risk of similar harm to all (or at least the requisite "significant number" of) children in DHS custody, the requirements of commonality and typicality were satisfied. Judge Lee also held that plaintiffs' allegations related to defendants' actions and inaction with respect to the class as a whole and the relief plaintiffs sought would be relief with respect to the class as a whole. Discovery and litigation continued while the parties entered settlement discussions. These talks were successful and, on April 3, 2007, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a stipulated settlement agreement. The court granted this motion the same day. The settlement stated that the parties agreed to move directly to the remedial phase of the litigation, and that the parties would attempt to agree on a remedial plan developed by the defendants and the Council on Accreditation (COA). The plan would state specific actions and timelines for the defendants to achieve accreditation and conform the state standards with federal standards regarding foster care and would also cover the services and plans for the named plaintiffs. It would be court enforceable and provide for an outside monitor. The parties agreed to mediation to try to facilitate settlement and that they would proceed to a trial as to the scope of the necessary remedy, if such mediation failed. On November 8, 2007, the parties agreed upon the Mississippi Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan and filed a joint motion for its approval. On January 4, 2008, the court approved the plan. The Plan stated that:<ul><li> the named plaintiffs who remained in state custody as of the Stipulated Settlement Agreement all will have an individual plan that provides for permanency and independent living services monitored by the plaintiffs' counsel; <li> the defendants will meet the standards and outcome measures of this Plan within five years of the court's approval or within any earlier interim timelines specified; <li> the DFCS's foster care services will be accredited by COA; <li> the director of DFCS will have an advanced degree relevant to the agency's mission and services and at least five years of related experience; <li> no DFCS caseworker will carry an excessive caseload and individual caseloads shall be measured monthly; <li> all newly hired DFCS foster care workers will have an advanced degree in social work or a comparable human services field, or a B.A. in social work or a comparable human service field with two years of related experience; <li> the DFCS will maintain a training unit to provide comprehensive child welfare training to all employees; <li> the DFCS will begin implementing a separate continuous quality improvement (CQI) system and will improve recordkeeping and information retention in a variety of specified ways; <li> the DFCS will engage in a thorough screening of the child and conduct an individualized assessment of the family upon taking the child in custody for foster care services; <li> shortly after a child's entrance into foster care, a team meeting will be convened to develop a service plan for the child and to document a permanency plan in the child's case record; <li> the DFCS will maintain a well-publicized statewide child abuse hotline for the reporting of abuse and/or neglect; <li> each child will receive a comprehensive health assessment, periodic medical examinations, and all medically necessary follow-up services and treatment throughout their stay in state custody; <li> the DFCS caseworkers will screen each child for general and special educational needs and take reasonable steps to ensure that school-age foster children are registered for and attending accredited schools; <li> regardless of whether a child's foster care placement is being supervised by DFCS or by a contract agency, the assigned DFCS caseworker will meet with the child and visit at least once a month during the child's placement; <li> the DFCS will make available a sufficient number of appropriate placements for all children in its custody; and <li> defendants' compliance will be monitored by independent monitoring. </ul>There was also a fees settlement agreement. On August 7, 2008, the Court (Judge Lee) granted attorneys' fees and expenses to the plaintiffs of nearly $5 million. Monitoring fees continued. On June 5, 2009, the monitor's report noted that, despite the defendants' significant accomplishments, including initiatives that had been introduced and were being managed by a newly hired and experienced team of child welfare professionals, the pace of progress during Period 1 did not meet the Agreement's requirements. To meet the required reforms within the five-year timetable, the monitor stated that the defendants would need to accelerate and intensify their efforts. The next year, the monitor's report noted that, although DFCS has been reorganized under a new management team and had received more funding, both the pace and breadth of defendants' progress during Period 2 was, again, inadequate. Specifically, efforts to satisfy the Agreement requirements continued to be belated and were often insufficient. On July 6, 2012, the parties agreed to and the court approved the Modified Mississippi Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan, the filing of which constituted the commencement of Implementation Period 3. This third implementation plan and each subsequent annual implementation plan were incorporated in the Agreement and would be developed jointly with the parties 90 calendar days prior to the end of the previous 12-month period. The Modified Mississippi Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan provided a more specific statewide and region-by-region approach to reform. On March 9, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt, requesting that the Court find that defendants in noncompliance with the Period 3 Implementation Plan and the July 9 Order. They requested that the Court appoint experts with expertise in implementing child welfare system reform to conduct an organizational analysis. On July 23, 2015, Judge Lee ordered that the defendants retain Public Catalyst to conduct an organizational analysis of DFCS to assess the state of the system and hire an Executive Director of DFCS. Judge Lee also ordered that the parties negotiate a Court-enforceable Remedial Order based on the recommendations within three weeks of the date of the Final Organizational Analysis Report. Judge Lee ordered that the DFCS Executive Director consult with an Advisory Group of three experts for not less than three years following the filing date of the Remedial Order and stated that if the defendants did not comply with the terms of the order, then the plaintiffs could immediately seek a hearing on the remedial portion of their motion. On December 22, 2015, Judge Lee granted the parties' Joint Motion for Entry of Interim Remedial Order ordering that the defendants house DFCS within the Mississippi Department of Human Services (MDHS), that DFCS begin oversight of its own budget, personnel, and management information system functions, that DFCS implement caseload standards as set forth in the Modified Settlement Agreement (MSA), and that DFCS build a better-resourced DFCS Field Operations team and better allocate its resources. Finally, Judge Lee ordered that the remedy phase of the motion for contempt shall be continued until May 15, 2016 at which time the parties shall submit a Final Remedial Order to the Court or, in the absence of an agreement on a Final Remedial Order, the plaintiffs shall proceed with the remedy phase of the contempt motion. Defendants failed to meet the standards set forth in the MSA. On January 6, 2016, the Monitor submitted a report concluding that "defendants' performance declined" on both statewide and regional levels. No region met "even half" of its requirements. The Monitor identified a number of systemic issues, including excessive caseloads, inadequate supervision, and poor services exacerbated by a 26% increase in the number of children in need of defendants' care from 2013 to 2015. Little progress was made during 2016. Judge Lee did grant a motion for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees made under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 after reducing some hourly rates to reflect Mississippi norms on May 6. And on May 19, the parties agreed to a second stipulated remedial order in which the defendants admitted to being out of compliance with the MSA. In addition, they agreed that Public Catalyst would certify whether defendants were in compliance with the specified sections of the Interim Remedial Order. On December 6, 2016, the Monitor released additional findings on defendants' compliance with the MSA. The Monitor identified high-quality work as "more the exception than the rule," and concluded it was "imperative that defendants work to enhance quality and consistency on all steps of the . . . process." The defendants asserted that they were addressing the problem areas. Shortly thereafter, the parties revamped their settlement agreement and enforcement protocols. The December 19, 2016 Second Modified Mississippi Settlement Agreement and Reform Plan laid out comprehensive new standards in (1) leadership; (2) child safety; (3) family-based placement; (4) placement standards; (5) visitation; (6) permanency; (7) transitions to adulthood; (8) child well-being; and administrative details of the settlement. It took effect on January 1, 2017. At the same time, the parties adopted a Stipulated Third Remedial Order (STRO). The STRO specified specific steps that the defendants were to take to meet their obligations. It also reiterated that defendants were not in compliance with the MSA but acknowledged that they lacked "the capacity to comply." Judge Lee granted another motion for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees on July 21, 2017, largely rejecting defendants' objections that plaintiffs' fee requests were overly vague; another fee award was granted on April 9, 2018. On May 31, 2018, plaintiffs moved for an order declaring defendants in contempt for noncompliance with the STRO. In particular, they alleged that only 61% of defendant's employees met performance targets; the STRO required 90%. Over the next months, the parties engaged in discovery. On January 17, 2019 the court deferred ruling on compliance until after the monitor's June report was filed. After the report was filed on June 11, 2019, the plaintiffs renewed their motion. Discovery continued, as did the biannual reports from the monitor. As of May 20, 2020 discovery is ongoing with oral argument set for August 4, 2020.

Summary: Children who are currently or will be in the custody of Mississippi's Division of Family and Children's Services (DFCS) sought broad injunctive reform of Mississippi's child welfare system. The parties reached a stipulated settlement agreement in 2007 that granted two remedial options: a plan agreement or continued litigation. The parties sought and the court approved a remedial plan in 2008 consisting of specific instructions on reform implementation. The remedial plan was later modified in 2012. Defendants were held in contempt on July 23, 2015, and further modifications of the agreement followed. The case is ongoing.


On October 26, 2011, the ACLU filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to compel the defendants to comply with its request for documents under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U. S. C. § 552. The plaintiff sought the release of any and all records about the government's use and interpretation of USA Patriot Act Section 215 that authorized the government to obtain "any tangible thing" that was "relevant to" a terrorism investigation. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), 552(a)(4), and 552(a)(6) by failing to make responsible efforts to search for the requested records, and failing to grant the plaintiff’s requests for waivers and/or limitations of fees, and failing to promptly process the plaintiff’s request and release the requested records. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had wrongfully withheld records under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security and that it had exhausted its administrative remedies to obtain them. On December 9, 2011, Judge William H. Pauley approved the parties’ stipulation to narrow the scope of the plaintiff’s FOIA request to the following documents. 1. Legal opinions or memoranda concerning or interpreting USA Patriot Act Section 215; 2. Guidelines for government personnel regarding the use of USA Patriot Act Section 215; 3. Reports provided to Congress by the defendants concerning the government’s interpretation or use of USA Patriot Act Section 215; 4. Rulings, opinions, or memoranda of the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) concerning USA Patriot Act Section 215; and 5. Legal opinions or memoranda concerning rulings, opinions, or memoranda of the FISC interpreting USA Patriot Act Section 215. Judge Pauley also issued an order that gave the defendants until March 15, 2012 to process and produce these documents or notify the plaintiff of any complete or partial withholdings of these documents pursuant to FOIA exemptions. On February 27, 2012, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment regarding a report that had been received by congressional intelligence committees on the intelligence collection authorities authorized under USA Patriot Act Section 215. Judge Pauley had previously held the report to be within the scope of the plaintiff’s FOIA request, and the New York Times had filed a parallel lawsuit against the defendants to obtain it. (New York Times v. Department of Justice). The defendants argued that: 1. They had properly withheld the report under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security because public disclosure of the requested report would expose sensitive intelligence sources and methods to adversaries of the United States. 2. They had also properly withheld the report under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for being exempted from disclosure by statute because the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, protected intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. On March 26, 2012, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment regarding the report that had been received by congressional intelligence committees. It argued that: 3. The report cannot be withheld in its entirety under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) or 552(b)(3) because it contains “secret law” in the form of the government’s legal interpretation of its authority to collect “any tangible things” pursuant to USA Patriot Act Section 215. 4. The court, at a minimum, should conduct a private judicial review of an unredacted version of the report and order the defendant to the release segregable portions of it that describe the defendants’ legal interpretation of US Patriot Action Section 215. On May 17, 2012, Judge Pauley, having conducted a private judicial review of the requested report, granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The judge held the defendants had properly withheld the report in its entirety because it contained information that could be used by the United States’ adversaries to threaten its foreign intelligence capacities and all non-exempt portions of the report were inextricably intertwined with the report’s exempt portions that they could not be released in a redacted version of the report (872 F.Supp. 2d. 309). In the meantime, from March 2012 to August 2012, the defendants released several hundred pages of documents but withheld several documents for reasons of personal privacy, national security, and interagency or intra-agency deliberative process. On December 13, 2012, the plaintiff limited the scope of its FOIA request to information about the types of information and “tangible things” the government believed Patriot Act Section 215 allowed it to collect and relevance standard the government used to determine whether Section 215 applied. On February 8, 2013, the defendants released parts of thirty-five documents relating to congressional reports and withhold the remaining parts of these documents under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security. The defendants also withheld the following documents in full: 1. Six documents in possession of the FBI under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(e) for being law enforcement techniques; 2. The Weich Letter under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security; 3. The Census Memorandum under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) for being part of the interagency or intra-agency deliberative process; and 4. More than Seventy-four documents in possession of the NSD under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security; twenty-four related to congressional reporting; nine of which related to internal government communication and analyses; forty of which related to guidelines and training documents; and an unspecified number related to FISC materials, opinions, and/or orders. The defendants also provided Judge Pauley with a classified Vaughn Index that listed and described the withheld FISC documents for private judicial review. The defendants did not disclose the Vaughn Index to the plaintiff. Finally, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on their full and partial withholdings and argued that: 1. They had properly withheld documents for reasons of national security, statutory exemption, deliberative process, and law enforcement techniques, and 2. They had produced all reasonably segregable portions of the documents. On April 26, 2013, the defendants filed a supplemental memorandum to their motion for summary judgment. They clarified that one of the withheld NSD document was also exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) for being part of the interagency or interagency deliberative process. They also noted that all the NSD documents were also withheld under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for reasons of statutory exemption pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. On May 10, 2013, the plaintiff further reduced the scope of its FOIA request to the Census Memorandum and all the NSD documents except for the one withheld under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). The plaintiff also filed a cross motion for summary judgment and argued that: 1. Submitting a classified Vaughn Index for private judicial review without disclosure to the plaintiff, was procedurally improper as the defendants had yet not released a sufficiently detailed public explanation of their withholdings. 2. Legal interpretations of public law were not exempt from disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) or 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). 3. FISC rules did not bar the defendants from disclosing FISC opinions under FOIA; and 4. The Census Memorandum could not be withheld as a deliberative product under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) because it embodied the defendants’ working law, or alternatively, because the defendant had adopted and relied upon it. On June 6, 2013, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) decided to declassify certain information related to the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in response to publication of FISC orders in the Guardian. On July 31, 2013, the defendants released parts of two congressional reports to the plaintiff and withheld the remaining parts under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security and under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for reasons of statutory exemption pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. On August 13, 2013, the parties agreed to withdraw their motions for summary judgment because the defendants required additional time to reprocess the documents contested in this lawsuit and determine what effect, if any, the DNI’s declassification decision had on their disclosure. From September 2013 to January 2014, the defendants released parts of more than a thousand pages from dozens of documents, including parts of several FISC orders and legal opinions. On February 7, 2014, the plaintiff further revised the scope of its FOIA request to fully withheld FISC opinions or orders that related to bulk collection of any information. On April 4, 2014, the defendants filed motion for summary judgment and a Vaughn Index that referenced at least eight FISC orders and legal opinions that they were withholding in full and provided justifications for these withholdings. The defendants argued that these orders and opinions were properly withheld under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security and under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for reasons of statutory exemption pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. On May 2, 2014, the plaintiff filed a cross motion for summary judgment. It argued the following: 1. The withheld FISC orders contained legal reasoning and publicly acknowledged information that the government could not withhold under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) or 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); and 2. Judge Pauley should evaluate the withheld FISC orders listed in the Vaughn Index in a private judicial review. On July 8, 2014, the defendants released parts of three FISC orders in the public record that the plaintiff had identified as being absent in the Vaughn Index and the defendants had failed to locate in their previous search for documents within the scope of the plaintiff’s revised FOIA request. On October 6, 2014, Judge Pauley granted in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. He found that the defendants did not have to confirm or deny the existence of FISC orders and legal opinions that related solely to the bulk collection of information other than telephone metadata or release these orders and opinions if they existed. Lacking faith in the defendants’ segregation determinations, the Judge also ordered the defendants release the remaining items in their Vaughn Index for private judicial review. (59 F.Supp.3d 584). On October 24, 2014, the defendants submitted copies of the FISC orders and legal opinions withheld in full for private judicial review. They also filed a supplemental memorandum to their motion for summary judgment. They reiterated their argument that the FISC orders and legal opinions contained no reasonably segregable, disclosable information and were properly withheld in full under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security and under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for reasons of statutory exemption pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. On March 31, 2015, Judge Pauley granted the remaining part of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. He found that the FISC orders and legal opinions contained no reasonably segregable, disclosable information and were properly withheld in full under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) for reasons of national security and under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) for reasons of statutory exemption pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947. (2015 WL 1566775). The case is closed. The case is cross-referenced to New York Times v. Department of Justice, which is also closed.

Summary: On October 26, 2011, the ACLU filed a lawsuit to compel the government to comply with a Freedom of Information Act request in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking the release of records regarding the government's use and interpretation of Section 215 of the Patriot Act. The case is ongoing.


On April 14, 2017, plaintiff, a Medicaid eligible individual who had been diagnosed with hepatitis C Virus, filed this class action complaint against Nick Lyon, in his capacity as executive director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS). The complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and it alleged that the MDHHS violated several provisions of the Medical Assistance Program, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 by its then existing prior-authorization criteria for hepatitis C treatment. The complaint alleged that the criteria's requirement that individuals suffer certain levels of measurable liver damage before they could become eligible for direct-acting antiviral medications. More specifically, this practice violated three separate provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396 by: (1) excluding qualified Medicaid recipients from "medically necessary" treatment as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A); (2) discriminating among similarly situated Medicaid recipients in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B); and (3) failing to provide medically necessary treatment with "reasonable promptness" as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). The defendants initially filed a motion to dismiss the claim, but in October of 2017 the parties began discussing settlement possibilities and agreed to mediation. The parties then reached an agreement after a formal mediation with Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen on January 27, 2018. On May 29, 2018, the court granted preliminary approval of the proposed class action settlement and set a date for a fairness hearing. The court granted final approval of the settlement on August 31, 2018, and awarded plaintiff's counsel $199,000 in attorney fees, an amount the defendants had agreed not to contest in the settlement. The settlement class was defined as: All individuals that: are or will be enrolled in Michigan's Medicaid Program at the time of class certification; have been or will be diagnosed with a chronic infection of Hepatitis C virus; are 18 years or older; and require or in the future will require treatment for Hepatitis C with direct-acting antiviral medication and who do not meet the MDHHS current treatment criteria, which restricts direct-acting antiviral treatment to individuals with a minimum metavir fibrosis score criteria of F-2. The defendants denied any liability in the settlement, but agreed to replace the MDDHS prior-authorization criteria and institute amended criteria to provide coverage for direct-acting antiviral treatment to all Eligible Michigan Medicaid beneficiaries diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C. The schedule for expanding direct-acting antiviral treatment coverage was set as follows: (a) defendant will provide coverage for all eligible beneficiaries with a metavir fibrosis score of F-1 and above on October 1, 2018; (b) defendant will provide coverage for all beneficiaries with a metavir fibrosis score of F-0 and above on October 1, 2019. The court issued a stipulated order dismissing the case on April 15, 2019 and an amended order on stipulation of dismissal on May 17, 2019.

Summary: The plaintiff, a Medicaid eligible individual who had been diagnosed with hepatits C, filed this class action complaint on August 14, 2017, alleging that the defendant, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS), was violating plaintiff's rights under the Medical Assistance Program 42 U.S.C. § 1396. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant's practice of denying eligibility for direct-acting antiviral medications to individuals who had not displayed sufficient levels of liver damage was excluding qualified recipients from "medically necessary" treatment. The parties agreed to settle the matter in October of 2017, and they jointly moved to certify a class for settlement. The Court granted final approval of the class action settlement in August 2018. The settlement required defendants to implement amended criteria that would provide coverage for direct-acting antiviral treatment to all eligible Michigan Medicaid beneficiaries diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C. The agreement went into effect on October 1, 2018, the date on which the defendants agreed to provide coverage for all eligible beneficiaries with a metavir fibrosis score of F-1 and above. The defendants agreed to provide coverage for all remaining beneficiaries on October 1, 2019. The parties agreed to and the court approved $199,000 in fees for plaintiffs counsel.


On Dec. 5, 2017, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG) brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The case was assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth. The plaintiff is a nonprofit organization promoting immigrants' rights. According to the complaint, the plaintiff seeks information on the defendants' use of mobile biometric devices and applications in immigration applications and enforcement. The complaint alleged that on Mar. 17, 2017, the plaintiff and another organization, Mijente, had submitted a FOIA request to the defendants. The requests sought records concerning ICE's use of mobile biometric devices and applications, and DHS's investigations of civil rights or civil liberties in the use of these devices and applications. The complaint further alleged that, to date, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from the defendants. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. The parties engaged in back-and-forth litigation over document production for the next year. On May 17, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to stay the case to allow them to narrow the issues requiring further litigation. Specifically, the plaintiff requested time to more thoroughly assess the draft <i>Vaughn</i> Index that had been provided by the defendants. The court granted the motion on May 20. The parties then attempted to work together informally for several months to narrow the issues and work out which documents needed to be produced. On Dec. 11, 2019, the plaintiff filed a status report asking the court to start setting the defendants' schedule for producing documents, as the defendants had continuously failed to meet self-imposed deadlines. On Jan. 13, 2020, the parties filed a joint status report indicating that the defendants had provided additional documents and that they intended to continue resolving issues informally and without the need for the Court's involvement. On Mar. 4, 2020, the parties filed their most recent joint status report, noting that the plaintiff was in the process of assessing the defendants' revised production of documents to determine whether any issues remained to be addressed through dispositive motions or otherwise. The parties' next joint status report is to be filed on May 4, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On Dec. 5, 2017, the National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG) brought this suit in D.D.C., suing DHS and ICE under FOIA. Plaintiff sought records concerning ICE's use of mobile biometric devices and applications and DHS's investigations of civil rights or civil liberties in their use. This case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: On April 27, 2020, four individuals held at the Federal Correctional Center (FCI) brought this emergency putative class action requesting the immediate release or home confinement of medically vulnerable individuals and implementation of safety measures to lower the risk of COVID-19. On April 30, the petitioners requested an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and sought preliminary certification of the proposed class. On May 5, the respondents filed for a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied a few days later. The court also granted in part and denied in part the motion for a temporary restraining order which required defendants to institute a process for release for medically vulnerable individuals. The court extended coverage of the process to include individuals already approved for release to a reentry center on May 29. On July 27, the parties reported that they came to a settlement agreement and the plaintiffs' class was certified for settlement purposes on August 11. The court approved the settlement agreement after a fairness hearing on September 18. The court retained jurisdiction to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the agreement. On December 11, the court granted motion to enforce the settlement and, on January 19, the court granted in part and denied in part a second motion to enforce the settlement. The case remains ongoing.<hr> On April 27, 2020, four individuals held at the Federal Correctional Center (FCI) in Danbury, Connecticut filed this putative class action at the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Represented by the Legal Clinic of the Quinnipiac University School of Law, Yale Law School's Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, and private attorneys, they brought the lawsuit against FCI Danbury and the Federal Bureau of Prisons as a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and as an injunctive and declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §2201-02. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, resulting in confinement conditions that violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs proposed a class of all detainees held or to be held in the custody of FCI Danbury. They also proposed a subclass of detainees aged 50 and over, or those medically vulnerable. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and/or a writ of habeas mandating the release or immediate home confinement of medically vulnerable detainees, and the implementation of safety measures against the risk of disease and death posed by COVID-19. Pending the habeas actions, the petitioners sought an "enlargement" of custody for detainees to home confinement as a provisional remedy. The case was assigned to Judge Micheal P Shea. The four plaintiffs are currently at higher risk of serious harm due to underlying medical conditions such as lupus, asthma, and hypertension. On April 30, the petitioners requested an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to implement measures to reduce the density of the population and maximize social distancing. They also sought preliminary certification of the proposed class for that order. On May 5, the respondents filed for a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative remedies. On May 12, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 2405350. It found that neither the PLRA (Prison Litigation Reform Act) or res judicata precluded the relief sought, and excused the plaintiffs from the exhaustion of administrative remedies, finding that they had shown that they would likely suffer irreparable harm if they were required to exhaust the administrative remedy process before seeking relief in court. In the same opinion, the court also granted in part and denied in part the motion for a temporary restraining order. The court ordered a filing of a list of “medically vulnerable inmates at Danbury FCI,” defined as individuals in custody aged over 65 and/or who have underlying medical conditions specifically identified by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control as a higher risk for COVID-19, and ordered the implementation of home confinement process for those individuals within three days. The court also ordered a timely process of evaluating compassionate release based on COVID-19 within seven days. Finally, the court ordered an individualized explanation for each denial of home confinement and a status report to be submitted to the court within thirteen days. During a telephonic status conference held on May 26, the plaintiffs indicated that they knew of multiple individuals who qualified as medically vulnerable but who were not included on the list of medically vulnerable inmates that the defendants listed for home confinement, as required by the TRO. The defendants indicated a willingness to conduct a further search to identify additional medically vulnerable inmates. Therefore, the court ordered an extension of the deadline for compliance with the temporary restraining order by fourteen days, through June 9, 2020. Another status conference was held on May 28, and the parties agreed to confer on a possible agreement on matters including home confinement review by a medical clinician, usage of a medical record code that allows automatic qualification for the medically vulnerable subclass, and a means of identifying inmates who should be included in the subclass but are not captured by the code. The court ordered the parties to submit a notice that would describe any agreements on these matters and indicate whether court intervention is needed by June 2. The court also found that while more than two weeks have passed since the May 12 temporary restraining order, there has not been a single release to home confinement. Therefore, it ordered defendants to either release to home confinement all those listed as eligible for home confinement or provide a safety reason against home confinement by June 4 to ensure full compliance with the order. Additionally, the court discussed with both parties its need to better understand the home confinement review process under the temporary restraining order and ordered submission of any agreement about a process to generate a random sample of the records by June 4. Finally, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that mistakes may have caused the denial of home confinement for certain individuals and ordered re-review for home confinement by June 9. On May 29, the court addressed the plaintiff’s request to take similar action with respect to those inmates already determined to be appropriate for placement in a Residential Reentry Center (RRC). 2020 WL 2813072. Recognizing that the schedule for such placement is unclear and that social distancing may still be inadequate at a communal half-way house, the court granted the plaintiff’s request in part. The defendants were ordered to release to home confinement those who were approved for community placement at an RRC, as long as they did not have a violent offense of conviction, a sexually-related offense of conviction, or a high-risk assessment score, or provide a safety reason against home confinement by June 9. On June 8, the plaintiffs moved for sanctions against the defendant, seeking an order that would preclude the defendants from disputing that FCI Danbury’s system for responding to sick call requests was inadequate and untimely. In June, the named plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal and on June 15 the court dismissed their claims. On June 16, the plaintiffs filed an amended habeas petition with new named plaintiffs. The case was then referred to Judge Thomas O. Farrish for settlement purposes. Two plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on July 29. On July 27, the parties reported that they came to a settlement agreement and that they planned to file a joint motion to certify the settlement class by August 3. Under the agreement, once identified as medically vulnerable, the defendant will consider the individual's suitability for home confinement. A medical clinician either employed or appointed by the BOP will verify that all medical conditions are identified for the home confinement review, and the review process will follow the standards previously outlined in the temporary restraining order, including speedy consideration for release to home confinement and substantial weight provided to each individual’s COVID risk factors. The agreement was tentatively scheduled to terminate on October 31, 2021. The plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class for settlement purposes on August 3, which was granted on August 11. 2020 WL 4605224. On August 25, an individual filed a motion to intervene, which was denied by the court three days later because the individual was not incarcerated at Danbury FCI, was not a member of the provisionally certified class, had no interest in a settlement between the Warden at FCI Danbury and a class of inmates at that facility, and a habeas relief was not available to those housed at BOP facilities not located within the District of Connecticut. Between the end of August and beginning of September, multiple putative class members filed objections to the settlement. On September 11, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for approval of a class action settlement, which required the defendants to adhere to the procedures and standards established in the temporary restraining order and provide for expedited consideration for home confinement, with jurisdiction retained by the court to enforce the settlement. After a fairness hearing, the court approved the class action settlement agreement on September 18. In light of the Court's approval of the settlement and its findings at the hearing, it disposed of the remaining pending motions, including the motion for preliminary injunction and the motion for sanctions. The court also denied multiple emergency motions to intervene, amend the complaint, or for bail because the filers either were or would become members of the class and if not, disposing of the action in their absences would not impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. On October 12, pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties jointly filed a motion to dismiss the case. The court retained jurisdiction over the settlement to the extent necessary to enforce its terms. On October 28, one of the proposed intervenors appealed the denial of their motion. The appeal has not been assigned a USCA Case Number yet. On December 6, the plaintiffs moved to enforce the settlement agreement and require the defendants to immediately release medically vulnerable class members who were approved for home confinement. The court granted the motion on December 11, finding that the defendants breached the agreement. 2020 WL 7297016. The court stated that the defendants were barred from delaying the transfer of any class member beyond fourteen days without communicating with the plaintiffs' counsel within 5 days of the fourteen-day period. On December 17, the plaintiffs moved again to enforce the settlement agreement, which the court granted in part and denied in part on January 19, 2021. 2021 WL 165015. The court ordered that the parties meet and identify specific class members whose cases warranted re-review and ordered that the defendants re-review the identified inmates for home confinement within fourteen days. On the same day, an inmate at a prison in Louisiana filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the court on February 11 due to lack of jurisdiction, and a notice of appeal. The appeal has not been assigned a USCA Case Number yet. A status conference wasscheduled for April 9. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 27, 2020, four individuals held at the Federal Correctional Center (FCI) filed a putative class action against the FCI and the Federal Bureau of Prisons at the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, resulting in unsuitable confinement conditions in violation of their Eighth Amendment rights. On May 12, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of merit and granted in part the motion for temporary restraining order. Settlement conferences were held in June. On July 27, the parties reported that they have come to a settlement agreement, and the plaintiffs' class was certified for settlement purposes on August 11. The court approved the settlement agreement after a fairness hearing on September 18. The court retained jurisdiction to the extent necessary to enforce the terms of the agreement. On December 11, the court granted motion to enforce the settlement and, on January 19, the court granted in part and denied in part a second motion to enforce the settlement. The case remains ongoing.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the countries granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. A little over a month later on March 9, 2021, DHS officially abandoned the rule and the petitions for certiorari were voluntarily dismissed by the government. San Francisco Sues Over the Public Charge Rule On August 13, 2019, the City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, and United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and its acting secretary in his official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s Final Rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increases the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. According to a New York Times article, the new standards would directly affect about 1.2 million applicants annually, primarily immigrants from Africa and Latin America. The rule was initially set to be implemented on October 15, 2019. The plaintiffs alleged that the Rule is unlawful because it "conflicts with the language and intent of the statutory provision it purports to interpret [the Immigration and Nationality Act], the broader congressional framework of U.S. immigration law, and federal statutes governing the public benefits enumerated in the Final Rule." The plaintiffs also claimed that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, failing to meet basic procedural requirements of administrative rulemaking and explain why the Rule, which has been relied upon by local communities and immigrants for years, has been changed. The plaintiffs further contended that that Rule would be harmful; that it would coerce immigrants and their family members to disenroll from public benefits, undermine the plaintiffs' health and safety-net systems, and inflict significant financial harm on the plaintiffs. After the plaintiffs declined to proceed before a magistrate judge, the case was randomly assigned to District Court Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton on August 21, 2019. On August 21, 2019, Judge Hamilton issued an order relating this case with State of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security (IM-CA-0157). Plaintiffs Seek A Nationwide Preliminary Injunction On August 28, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, seeking a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule. The plaintiffs argued that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because of their likely success on the merits and that absent an injunction, the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm. The plaintiffs also asserted that a nationwide injunction was necessary, as a "geographically limited injunction is likely to generate more confusion without significantly preventing disenrollment" and would not account for legal residents moving throughout the United States. Judge Hamilton issued an order relating another case, La Clinica De La Raza v. Trump, to this case, on August 30, 2019 (IM-CA-0149). On September 13, 2019, the defendants filed an opposition to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, arguing that the plaintiffs have "no basis for turning their abstract policy disagreement with the Executive Branch into a nationwide injunction." The defendants asserted that because the plaintiffs are "municipalities rather than aliens governed by the Rule," they cannot meet jurisdictional requirements. Furthermore, the defendants contended that the Rule is not unlawful, as it "reflects Congress’s delegation of broad authority to the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of 'public charge'" and was "the product of a well-reasoned process that considered the plain text of the statute, legislative intent, statistical evidence, and the substance of hundreds of thousands of comments submitted by the public." The Court Grants a Geographically Limited Preliminary Injunctions Following a hearing on October 2, 2019, Judge Hamilton issued an order granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on October 11, 2019. 408 F.Supp.3d 1057. Judge Hamilton concluded that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and would be irreparably harmed absent an injunction. However, Judge Hamilton did not grant the plaintiffs' request to enjoin the implementation of the Rule nationwide. Because the plaintiffs did not establish "the necessity of such relief," the scope of the injunction was limited to California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. The defendants filed a motion for stay of injunction pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit on October 25, 2019. Defendants argued that they are likely to succeed on appeal because the plaintiffs lacked standing and did not fall within the zone of interests of the relevant statute. Defendants also contended that, because they would be "forced to grant lawful permanent residence (“LPR”) status to aliens likely to become public charges at any time under the Rule," they would suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a stay as their interest in "ensuring that 'aliens be self-reliant'" would be affected. On October 30, 2019, the defendants filed an appeal of the order for preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was docketed the next day (Docket No. 19-17213). In the Ninth Circuit, on November 15, 2019, the defendants filed an emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. The defendants' arguments before the Ninth Circuit mirrored the arguments they put forth in their motion to stay in the district court. The Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court Stay the Preliminary Injunctions On December 5, 2019, a Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Jay Bybee, Sandra Ikuta, and John Owens) issued an order and opinion granting the defendants' emergency motion to stay the district court's injunction. 944 F.3d 773. The panel also granted a stay of a nationwide injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule that was issued by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington (State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security). The panel first concluded that the plaintiffs had standing and that the motion was not moot, despite nationwide injunctions put in place by district courts in Maryland and New York. Next, the panel found that the defendants demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Rule's definition of public charge was consistent with the relevant statutes and not arbitrary or capricious. Finally, the panel determined that the defendants had adequately explained the reasons for the Rule, that they would suffer irreparable harm absent a stay, and that, despite potential harms to the plaintiffs, these factors weighed in favor of granting a stay. Judge Bybee concurred, and wrote a separate opinion to note that "no one should mistake the court’s judgments for its policy preferences" and that it was time for Congress to weigh in on recent immigration debates instead of leaving them for the courts to decide. Judge Owens concurred with the majority's jurisdiction analysis but would have denied the defendants' motions to stay, in light of: "(1) government’s heavy burden due to the standard of review, (2) opaqueness of the legal questions before the court, (3) lack of irreparable harm to the government at this early stage, (4) likelihood of substantial injury to the plaintiffs, and (5) equities involved." On December 19, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ninth Circuit's order granting stay of the preliminary injunction. In light of the Ninth Circuit's order granting stay and a Second Circuit Decision in State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security denying a motion to stay a nationwide injunction, on January 8, 2020, the defendants filed a motion in the district court for stay pending appeal. Judge Hamilton granted this motion on January 10, 2020. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court, in State of New York, issued a stay on all nationwide injunctions enjoining the defendants from implementing the Rule. 140 S.Ct. 599. Following this decision, the defendants indicated that the Rule would be implemented and enforced starting February 24, 2020. On February 18, 2020, the Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration. Judge Bybee and Judge Ikuta voted to deny the motion and Judge Owens voted to grant the motion. The rule went into effect six days later. On June 10, 2020, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the State of New York v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security injunction that had been stayed by the Supreme Court. 962 F.3d 208. The Second Circuit followed suit on August 4. 969 F.3d 42. The Fourth Circuit reversed yet another injunction on August 5, but it did so without reference to the rulings of the Seventh or Second Circuits, and in large part because of the Supreme Court's stay of their injunctions back in January. 971 F.3d 220. Preliminary Injunction is Affirmed in the Ninth Circuit then Stayed On September 15, 2020, a new Ninth Circuit panel (Circuit Judges Mary Schroeder, William Fletcher, and Lawrence VanDyke) heard arguments for the district court's stayed preliminary injunction. On December 2, 2020, citing the recent other circuit court decisions, it issued an order and a 2-1 opinion affirming the injunction and vacating the nationwide application of the State of Washington v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security injunction. 981 F.3d 742. Writing for the majority, Judge Schroeder first concluded that the plaintiffs had standing because they were suffering financial harm from immigrants shifting to state and local aid. Next, she found that the plaintiffs demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the Rule's definition of public charge was inconsistent with a reasonable interpretation of the statutes and was arbitrary and capricious. She also found that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the plaintiffs. Finally, she determined that the nationwide injunction was not appropriate because identical injunctions had been and were still being litigated in other federal district and circuit courts. Judge VanDyke dissented from the majority's analysis for the same reasons as the December 5, 2019 decision, citing the Supreme Court's stays from January, a dissenting opinion from the Seventh Circuit's June decision, and the Fourth Circuit's August decision. Despite the affirmation, on December 16, 2020, the parties jointly requested a stay of the Ninth Circuit's affirming order, pending the Supreme Court's disposition on petitions from the Second and Seventh Circuits. Judge Hamilton in the district court granted the parties' request on December 17, as did the Ninth Circuit panel on January 20, 2021. The new public charge rule was to remain in effect until the Supreme Court ruled on the petitions. On January 22, 2021, the Defendants filed their own petition to the Supreme Court. The Rule is Officially Abandoned and Vacated On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for DHS to review agency actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On March 9, 2021, DHS formally abandoned the rule. The government voluntarily dismissed its appeal to the Seventh Circuit, lifting the stay of the Northern District of Illinois' November 2, 2020 decision vacating the Public Charge Final Rule nationwide from (Cook County v. Wolf). That same day, at all parties' requests, the Supreme Court dismissed the pending petition for Cook County, as well as a similar petition for the Second Circuit (New York v. DHS) and the petition for this case. On March 10, eleven state attorneys general, led by Ken Paxton of Texas, moved to intervene as defendants in the Ninth Circuit. They filed similar motions in the Seventh and Fourth Circuits, and a day later on March 11, they filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene on behalf of the government and stay the judgment from Cook County. On April 9, 2021 the Ninth Circuit ruled 2-1 to deny the motion to intervene without an opinion. 2021 WL 1310846. However, Judge Vandyke wrote a lengthy dissent, arguing that the Biden administration was now colluding with the plaintiffs in the Public Charge lawsuits, making their interests at odds with the interests of the states who were seeking to intervene. He explained that this case was clearly still worth pursuing, since it had sufficient merit to warrant Supreme Court review and the government was circumventing APA requirements. Moreover, even though the Rule had been vacated, there was still a chance the Supreme Court may reverse that decision, making this lawsuit not yet moot. As of April 11, 2021, the Public Charge Final Rule has been abandoned and vacated nationwide. The parties are currently conferring on how this will impact litigation. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 13, 2019, the City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs challenged the Department of Homeland Security's Final Public Charge Rule (the Rule), which added non-cash benefits to the factors considered in determining whether a person applying for legal permanent residence is likely to become a public charge. The plaintiffs alleged that the Government violated the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its statutory authority and claimed that the Rule was "arbitrary and capricious." In October 2019 the district court ordered a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from implementing and enforcing the Rule in California, Oregon, the District of Columbia, Maine, and Pennsylvania. After the government appealed the district court's order for preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit, a Ninth Circuit panel issued an order staying the injunction pending appeal. The preliminary injunction was subsequently affirmed in December, 2020. However, the order was stayed a few weeks later, leaving the stay of the preliminary injunction in effect. The Rule was abandoned by DHS on March 9, 2021 and vacated nationwide. As of March 27, 2021, the case is ongoing.


On November 8, 2013, four same-sex couples from Idaho filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court or the District of Idaho under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Idaho. The plaintiffs, represented by both private and public interest attorneys, asked the court to declare that Idaho laws banning same-sex marriage are in violation of the Constitution, to enjoin enforcement of these laws, and to require that the defendants issue marriage permits to same-sex couples and recognize same-sex marriages of other states. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Idaho's ban on same-sex marriage and on recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated in other states deprives them of their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the ban on same-sex marriage violated their Equal Protection rights, constituting sexual orientation and gender discrimination. On January 28, 2014, the Court granted the state's motion to intervene, citing Idaho's strong interest in the case. On May 13, 2014, the Court (Judge Candy Wagahoff Dale) granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss. In its opinion, the Court declared that Idaho's marriage laws are unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the State of Idaho from enforcing any laws or regulations that do not recognize same-sex marriages validly contracted outside Idaho or prohibit same-sex couples from marrying in Idaho. Latta v. Otter, 2014 WL 1909999 (D. Idaho 2014). The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals (USCA). On May 15, 2014, the USCA granted a stay of the district court's injunction against enforcement of the same-sex marriage ban pending appeal. On Oct. 7, 2014, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Judges Reinhardt, Berzon, and Gould) affirmed the district court's decision. 2014 WL 4977682. The court applied heightened scrutiny, and determined that the state had failed to identify any legitimate purpose for the same-sex marriage bans. In the same opinion, the court reversed the judgment in  Sevcik v. Sandoval , a Nevada same-sex marriage case in which the district court had upheld the state's marriage ban. That same day, the court issued an order instructing that both lower courts promptly issue a permanent injunction enjoining the states from enforcing any same-sex marriage ban. The next day, the state petitioned Justice Anthony Kennedy, the circuit justice for the 9th Circuit, for an emergency stay of the order. Justice Kennedy initially ordered the stay, but then reversed himself later in the day: The emergency stay would remain in effect for Nevada, but not for Idaho. 2014 WL 5025970. On Oct. 10, 2014, the Supreme Court officially denied the state's request for a stay and vacated Justice Kennedy's previous orders. On October 13, 2014, the Ninth Circuit granted the Plaintiffs' motion to dissolve the stay. Meanwhile, the defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari on June 30, 2015, four days after ruling same-sex marriage prohibitions were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges. On December 19, 2014, the district court awarded the plaintiffs $401,663.08 in attorney fees and costs, and an additional $226,890.85 on Aug. 3, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On November 8, 2013, four same-sex couples from Boise filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho challenging Idaho's laws prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to respect the legal marriages of same-sex couples who married in other states. The lawsuit argues that Idaho's ban on same-sex marriage violates the United States Constitution's guarantees of equal protection and due process. The plaintiffs were granted summary judgment in district court, which the 9th Circuit affirmed on Oct. 7, 2014.