On February 20, 2018, a married same-sex couple filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Administration for Children and Families, the Office of Refugee Resettlement, and the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) for violating the Establishment Clause (U.S. Const. Amend I) and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses. Plaintiffs claim that the Federal Defendants unconstitutionally provided taxpayer funds to USCCB (and their sub-grantees) to administer federal child welfare services for unaccompanied refugee children, as they granted these funds fully knowing that USCCB discriminates against same-sex couples seeking to foster or adopt children through these programs. Plaintiffs sought declaratory relief from Defendants admitting to their constitutional violations, and injunctive relief requiring Federal Defendants to ensure Plaintiffs can apply to these programs without discrimination and with adequate safeguards to prevent any use of religious or other criteria to exclude applicants based on their sexual orientation, sex, or the same-sex character of their marriage. They also sought nominal monetary damages and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. This case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. In February 2017, Plaintiffs, sought to foster a child through Catholic Charities of Fort Worth, a subgrantee of the USCCB under the Unaccompanied Refugee Minor (URM) Program and the Unaccompanied Alien Child (UAC) Program. After the Catholic Chartiy realized that the plaintiffs were a same-sex couple that did not “mirror the holy family,” their application was denied. Plaintiffs immediately reported this discrimination to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), but did not receive a response until mid April 2017. ORR’s response did not address the questions and only asked for the name of the staffer who allegedly discriminated against her and her wife. Plaintiffs provided this information in early May 2017 and received a “thank you” note the next day, but did not receive any further communication from either ORR or the Catholic Charity. In March 2018, about one month after their initial filing, Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add the National LGBT Bar Association as a plaintiff. The Association is a professional membership-based organization comprised of more than 10,000 members of the legal community who support LGBT rights. They joined the suit on behalf of their members who were federal taxpayers who contributed to the general revenues from which Congress appropriated funds to the child welfare programs at issue in this case. They objected to paying for federally funded child welfare services that were provided in a discriminatory manner based on religious principles to which they did not subscribe. In May 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. They claimed that the individual plaintiffs lacked standing because their alleged injury was not fairly traceable to the government’s challenged conduct, would not be redressable by a favorable decision, and that they did not have taxpayer standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, and oral argument was set for late November 2018. After the argument, parties were instructed to submit a joint status report within two weeks of the hearing. The first status report was submitted on December 14, 2018, and the second was scheduled to be submitted a month later. However, the lapse of appropriations for the federal government in early January 2019 derailed this plan. The next joint status report, submitted on February 8, 2019, indicated that while parties engaged in a good-faith effort to reach a settlement, they remained unable to resolve their issues at that time. In mid-February 2019, the court issued an order stating that the proceedings for Defendants’ motion to dismiss would go forward, while encouraging the parties to continue their settlement discussions. On June 12, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court agreed that none of the plaintiffs had taxpayer standing to assert an Establishment Clause violation, and as that was the only claim asserted by the National LGBT Bar Association, they were dismissed from the case. The married couple, however, had sufficient individual standing to pursue all three causes of action, and therefore the remainder of the Defendant’s motion to dismiss was denied. 391 F.Supp.3d 23. As of March 17, 2020, the parties were still engaged in discovery.

Summary: A married lesbian couple sued the Department of Health and Human Services and other federal agencies in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for violating the Establishment Clause and the Fifth Amendment’s Equal Protection and Substantive Due Process clauses. Plaintiffs claim that the Federal Defendants unconstitutionally provided taxpayer funds to Catholic charities to administer federal child welfare services, as they granted these funds knowing that these charities discriminates against same-sex couples. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief from Defendants admitting to their constitutional violations, and injunctive relief, as well as nominal monetary damages and reasonable costs and attorney’s fees. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was granted in part and denied in part. The case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a joint class action lawsuit and habeas petition brought on behalf of children confined in four secure care facilities operated by the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice, seeking release and mitigation in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs alleged that children are at-risk for contracting and transmitting COVID-19 and that they may be vulnerable to life-threatening complications both during and after the infection itself appears to have resolved. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order and later also requested an order requiring the defendants to give the plaintiffs access to confidential communication with their counsel. On June 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification for the proposed class. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 29 and filed a motion to dismiss on October 20. A settlement conference was held on November 10. The parties reached a confidential settlement in November 2020 and, following a conditional dismissal period, the case is now presumed closed.<hr> On May 14, 2020, this lawsuit was filed on behalf of children confined in secure care facilities in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under the habeas statute, 22 U.S.C. § 2241, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its severity in Louisiana. Represented by the Juvenile Law Center, the Promise of Justice Initiative, and private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that the Louisiana Office of Juvenile Justice ("OJJ") had not significantly reduced the population of confined children and had failed to implement an updated pandemic policy or a remedial plan in the four OJJ secure care facilities that complied with CDC guidance. Moreover, they alleged that OJJ’s policies placed children at a substantial risk of serious, long-term mental, developmental and emotional harm, in part because of isolation and the cessation of therapeutic services. The case was assigned to Judge John W. deGravelles. The plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all children who are, or will in the future be, confined at the four secure care facilities operated by OJJ: Acadiana Center for Youth in Bunkie; Bridge City Center for Youth; Swanson Center for Youth Columbia; and Swanson Center for Youth Monroe. The plaintiffs alleged that children are at-risk for contracting and transmitting COVID-19, and that they may be vulnerable to life-threatening complications both during and after the infection itself appears to have resolved. In OJJ facilities, 97% of the children who were tested had tested positive. On May 15, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order that would enjoin the defendants from (1) continuing to confine all children who are currently within 180 days of their release dates; (2) continuing to confine children who are presumptively eligible for release; (3) failing to test children for COVID-19; (4) using "Behavioral Intervention Rooms" for any child who tests positive for COVID-19 or displays symptoms of the disease; (5) confining children to their dormitories for lengthy periods of time; (6) using pepper spray on children; and (7) continuing the suspension of structured educational and rehabilitative programming in OJJ facilities. They also requested that the court require the defendants to develop and implement, within 48 hours, a plan to mitigate the substantial risk of serious harm from COVID-19. On May 27, the defendants responded to the plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order, claiming that they had implemented an appropriate response to the pandemic including social distancing, modification of educational and rehabilitation services, and testing and monitoring that exceeded CDC guidelines. They argued that the plaintiffs had failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for multiple reasons, including that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that granting the plaintiffs' requests were not in the public interest. On June 2, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification for the proposed class. On June 19, they also asked the court to order the defendants to provide all putative class members with access to confidential communication with counsel by video or telephone. They claimed that the defendants had obstructed the putative class members from contacting their counsel, or at the very least, had been dilatory and evasive in facilitating the request for the children to do so. The defendants moved for summary judgment on July 29, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact, as the court found during the evidentiary hearing that the plaintiffs had not come close to meeting the constitutional threshold for habeas relief or relief. On August 13, the plaintiffs then moved to withdraw class certification and to defer a ruling on the summary judgment motion until the parties could conduct discovery. Judge deGravelles granted this motion on September 24 and referred the parties to Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on October 20, and the plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion on November 10. Additionally on November 10, the parties participated in a settlement conference, where they "reached amicable resolution of all claims in this matter subject to the terms and conditions identified on the record." Magistrate Judge Wilder-Doomes then recommended a 60-day conditional dismissal, which Judge deGravelles entered on November 11, 2020. On January 11, 2021, the plaintiffs requested the dismissal deadline to be extended by 30 days, which Judge deGravelles granted that same day. The extended deadline, February 10, 2021, passed and no further docket entries were filed, so compliance with the parties' settlement agreement is presumed complete; however, the terms of that settlement are not public.

Summary: The plaintiffs filed suit in the Middle District of Louisiana, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and its severity in Louisiana, on behalf of children confined in four secure care facilities. The plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order that would require improved testing measures, better care of the children confined, and the release of children who were within 180 days of their release dates or were presumptively eligible for release. They further requested an order requiring the defendants to give the plaintiffs access to confidential communication with their counsel. The parties reached a confidential settlement agreement and after a conditional dismissal period, the case is now closed.


On July 15, 2004, the Philadelphia office of the EEOC filed this race discrimination case against Allstate Insurance Company (its subsidiary, Encompass Insurance, Inc.) claiming that Allstate discriminated against a black employee when it fired her from her position as a Customer Service Representative for alleged performance problems. The employee had been hired by the Defendant's predecessor in 1987. After the Defendant acquired the company in 2000, the complainant alleged, her supervisor harassed her because of her race, up to and including terminating her employment because she complained to Human Resources about his behavior. The Human Resources manger ignored her complaints and refused to assign her to another supervisor. The employee filed her Intervenor Complaint on March 25, 2005. After a brief discovery dispute, the case was resolved by Consent Decree, entered on April 13, 2007. The Decree requires Defendant not to discriminate on the basis of race or to retaliate against empoyees who complain about such discrimination, to post the EEO notice, and to review and update its policies against discrimination and retaliation, including publishing an effective complaint procedure, the minimum requirements of which the Decree sets out in detail. The Defendants also agreed to provide non-discrimination training to all its managers and supervisors. Additionally, the Decree provides that the employee's file be expunged of all reference to her charge of discrimination and prohibits Defendant from divulging any of its facts or circumstances to any employer or potential employer. Defendant agreed to pay the complainant $115,000.00 in damages. The Decree specifies for tax reporting purposes how the amount should be divided and designated. The settlement term was two years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2009.

Summary: This race discrimination case against an insurance company was brought on July 15, 2004 by the EEOC and joined by the individual employee as Intervenor Plaintiff in March 2005. The parties entered into a Consent Decree on April 13, 2007, which, in addition to providing $115,000.00 to the employee, required the Defendant, Allstate Insurance, to implement non-discrimination policies and an effective complaint procedure.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a preexisting class action addressing conditions of confinement in ICE custody, particularly for noncitizen detainees with medical or mental health needs, or other disabilities. On March 24, 2020, plaintiffs sought an emergency order addressing the COVID-19 infection risks of detainees with special risk factors, or releasing them. On April 20, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motions for certification of subclass and preliminary injunction. The defendants appealed and the plaintiffs sought to enforce the injunction. The defendants file a second appeal, which is currently in abeyance pending the resolution of the first appeal, and the plaintiffs moved for a Special Master to ensure the defendants' compliance with the preliminary injunction. A hearing regarding the motion for a Special Master is scheduled for March 8, 2021 and a trial is set for April 26, 2022.
 On August 19, 2019, Al Otro Lado and the Inland Coalition for Immigrant Justice, as well as 15 individuals who are currently being detained by the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in a total of 8 facilities across 6 states, filed this class-action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs are represented by the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center, Disability Rights Advocates, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and private counsel. The plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), as well as 8 federal employees of these departments under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.). Judge Jesus G. Bernal is presiding over the case after it was transferred from Judge Dale S. Fischer. The plaintiffs claimed that the federal government failed to ensure that detained immigrants received appropriate medical and mental health care, as well as failed to ensure that detained immigrants with disabilities were provided with accommodations and were free from discrimination. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants’ punitive use of segregation violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought no damages but rather injunctive relief to change how the U.S. government treated detained immigrants in its custody. This case is one of a number of cases challenging how the federal government treated detained immigrants. Related cases include Torres v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 5:18-cv-02604 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 14, 2018); and Novoa v. The GEO Group, No. 5:17-cv-02514 (C.D. Cal. Filed Dec. 19, 2017), or IM-CA-0142 in this Clearinghouse. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction on March 24, 2020. They asserted that ICE failed to test for the virus, provide basic sanitation supplies, or check symptoms. That, they said, violated the Due Process Clause, the Rehabilitation Act, and risked irreparable harm. As a result, the plaintiffs requested that ICE (1) identify all people in ICE custody with Risk Factors (defined by heightened risk of illness or death upon contracting the virus); (2) conduct an assessment of medically necessary precautions that needed to be implemented to ensure the health and safety of those persons; (3) release the individuals with Risk Factors within 48 hours if medical safeguards could not be implemented within 24 hours absent an "individualized finding of dangerousness to community; (4) modify its COVID-19 protocols to address deficiencies; and (5) appoint a Special Master to oversee this process. On March 25, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. Plaintiffs proposed two classes. Subclass one consisted of:
 All people who are detained in ICE custody who have one of the Risk Factors placing them at heightened risk of severe illness and death upon contracting the COVID-19 virus. The Risk Factors are defined as being over the age of 55; being pregnant; or having chronic health conditions, including: cardiovascular disease (congestive heart failure, history of myocardial infarction, history of cardiac surgery); high blood pressure; chronic respiratory disease (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease including chronic bronchitis or emphysema, or other pulmonary diseases); diabetes; cancer; liver disease; kidney disease; autoimmune diseases (psoriasis, rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus erythematosus); severe psychiatric illness; history of transplantation; and HIV/AIDS.
 Subclass two consisted of:
 All people who are detained in ICE custody whose disabilities place them at heightened risk of severe illness and death upon contacting the COVID-19 virus. Covered disabilities include: cardiovascular disease (congestive heart failure, history of myocardial infarction, history of cardiac surgery); high blood pressure; chronic respiratory disease (asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease including chronic bronchitis or emphysema, or other pulmonary diseases); diabetes; cancer; liver disease; kidney disease; autoimmune diseases (psoriasis, rheumatoid arthritis, systemic lupus erythematosus); severe psychiatric illness; history of transplantation; and HIV/AIDS.
 On April 3, 2020, the defendants filed their opposition to the motion for preliminary injunction. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not have a cognizable injury in that none of them had demonstrated that they had been exposed to COVID-19. They also argued that plaintiffs had failed to show that ICE had been deliberately indifferent to the putative class or that ICE's measures in response to COVID-19 resulted in punitive conditions of confinement. Finally, they argued that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable harm caused by ICE's response to COVID-19. The defendants also filed their opposition to plaintiffs' motion for class certification on April 3, 2020. The defendants argued that the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for class certification because the five named plaintiffs had different medical conditions and were detained at different detention facilities. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs' claims were not representative of the proposed class of individuals. On April 15, 2020, Judge Bernal rejected ICE's motion for reconsideration re transferring the case, and its motion to dismiss. The Court denied the government’s motion to divide the nationwide lawsuit into 15 individual cases in eight district courts. He also denied ICE’s motion to strike the 200-page complaint. On April 20, 2020, Judge Bernal granted plaintiffs' emergency motion to certify subclass and their emergency motion for preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim and would suffer irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of their rights, thus warranting the granting of their motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Bernal stipulated that the preliminary injunction would remain in effect as long as COVID-19 continued to pose a substantial threat of harm to the members of the subclasses. On May 29, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs did not state a claim upon which relief may be granted or allege a cognizable cause of action. They also argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative exhaustion and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the case. On June 19, the defendants appealed the preliminary injunction and class certification to the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs sought to enforce the April 20 preliminary injunction on June 24, since about 70% of the Subclass members not subject to mandatory detention were still detained. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-55634. The parties attended oral argument on December 9. Back in the district court, Judge Bernal granted the motion to enforce in part on October 7, ordering defendants to conduct "timely" custody determinations that should take no longer than a week and provide notice of the determination to the Subclass member. 2020 WL 6541994. The Court clarified that only in rare cases should a Subclass member not subject to mandatory detention remain detained. The case was ordered to Magistrate Judge Shashi H. Kewalramani for settlement conference on August 19. The defendants sought to stay discovery pending appeal on September 17, but Judge Bernal denied the motion on October 30. On December 7, 2020, the defendants again appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. The appeal was assigned USCA Case No. 20-56297. On December 17, they moved to stay the appeal On January 6, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to hold in abeyance the second appeal (USCA Case No. 20-56297), pending the resolution of the first appeal (USCA Case No. 20-55634). Back in the district court, on January 21, the plaintiffs moved for a Special Master to ensure the defendants' compliance with the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants failed to conduct required custody determinations and continued to transfer people between facilities. The plaintiffs also claimed that the defendants' pandemic response requirements document continued to be inadequate, unenforced, and failed to address emerging issues, such as vaccine distribution or new, more virulent strains of COVID-19. The defendants responded in opposition to the motion for a Special Master on February 15 and disputed that they were in noncompliance with the Court's orders. Regarding vaccine distribution, the defendants explained that ICE was not itself evaluating when to vaccinate, but instead, that vaccinations would follow the various state vaccination plans. With respect to new strains of the virus, ICE indicated there were no specific recommendations they were following other than the standard guidance. A hearing on the appointment of a Special Master is scheduled for March 8, 2021. As of February 18, the case remains ongoing with a trial before Judge Bernal set for April 26, 2022.

Summary: In August 2019, 15 individuals who are currently detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs, as well as two nonprofit groups who advocate for immigrant rights, filed a class action suit against U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement for violating their Fifth Amendment rights, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case is ongoing and is in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs seek injunctive relief and immigration reform. In March 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the plaintiffs sought emergency relief to obtain protection against the disease. The court granted preliminary injunction on April 20, which the defendants appealed and plaintiffs sought to enforce the injunction.


On March 14, 2000, an inmate in California corrections system (CDCR) filed this lawsuit in District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of CDCR in his official capacity and CDCR personnel in their individual capacities under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The plaintiff claimed prison officials violated his due process rights by incorrectly validating him as a gang member and placing him in administrative segregation (“Ad-Seg”) while at Deuel Vocational Institution, and later in a Security Housing Unit (“SHU”) at Pelican Bay State Prison. Prison officials placed the plaintiff in Ad-Seg and the SHU after he was “validated” as an associate of the Northern Structure prison gang. The plaintiff claimed that his due process rights were violated because he was not in fact an associate of the prison gang and his validation was not supported by sufficient, reliable evidence. The plaintiff also claimed that his due process rights were violated because he was not given notice and an opportunity to present his views before being placed in segregation, and because he was denied meaningful opportunities to challenge his validation and continued retention in segregated housing. The plaintiff originally filed this case pro se. By order filed May 17, 2002, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to all of the claims alleged in the complaint. (2002 WL 1034043). The plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and the Ninth Circuit appointed the law firm of Howard, Rice, Nemerovski, Canady, Falk & Rabkin to represent the plaintiff on appeal. In a published decision the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act did not require dismissal of an entire action where a prisoner’s complaint contains exhausted and unexhausted claims. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit instructed that the proper treatment of a “mixed” complaint depends on the relatedness of the claims, and held that if an exhausted claim was intertwined with an unexhausted claim, the claims should all be treated as exhausted. Id. at 1177. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari. 549 U.S. 1204 (2007). On remand, the plaintiff continued to be represented by counsel. The Court found that plaintiff’s due process claims were interrelated, and allowed the plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging a single due process violation arising out of his gang validation and placement and retention in Ad-Seg and the SHU. As originally filed, the plaintiff's first amended complaint named as defendants a number of CDCR personnel sued for damages in their individual capacity, along with the Secretary of CDCR who was sued in his official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief. In December 2006, the law firm of Chapman, Popik & White replaced Howard Rice as the plaintiff’s counsel of record. The parties engaged in extensive discovery and further motion practice, including motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment filed by the defendants. On September 30, 2009, (Judge Susan Illston) denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment (2008 WL 619017). The defendants noticed an interim appeal of the Court’s denial of qualified immunity. The interlocutory appeal caused the cancellation of the March 23, 2008, trial date and stayed all proceedings in this Court. The plaintiff then decided to dismiss the remaining individual defendants and all claims for damages in order to moot the pending appeal. In October 27 2008, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the individual defendants and to dismiss the appeal as moot, and the case was remanded to the district court. Continuing to prepare for the trial, in December 2008, the Court ruled that the attorneys-eyes-only restrictions of the protective order for the defendant's confidential gang validation evidence would be lifted for trial purposes. The defendant took an emergency appeal from that ruling by petition for writ of mandamus, which the Ninth Circuit granted over the plaintiff’s opposition on December 24, 2008. As a result, the Court was required to prevent disclosure to the plaintiff of certain materials compiled by CDCR in course of its gang validation process. From January 13 to February 12, 2009, the Court (Judge Illston) held a bench trial on the plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiff presented 17 witnesses, including three experts and testimony from plaintiff over three separate sessions. Defendant presented 4 witnesses, including its experts. Approximately 300 documentary exhibits were entered into evidence at trial. On September 30, 2009, the Court (Judge Illston) issued a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court found that the plaintiff’s due process rights were violated when he was initially validated as a Northern Structure associate because he was never given notice of the initial validation investigation, and was never afforded the opportunity to be heard prior being validated or placed in administrative segregation. The Court also found that this deprivation of procedural due process was not cured in any of the subsequent administrative hearings and inmate appeals because none of these proceedings constituted a meaningful review of the gang validation. Finally, the Court found that the plaintiff’s substantive due process right were violated because the items of evidence used to validate the plaintiff as a prison gang associate lack sufficient indicia of reliability to meet the “some evidence” standard as required by the case law. Based upon expert psychological testimony and evidence at trial, the Court found that the plaintiff’s experience in the SHU caused him to develop depression and post-traumatic stress disorder, and that he currently suffers from these conditions, despite his parole from Pelican Bay. The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a judicial declaration that his gang validation was never supported by accurate or reliable evidence and was implemented in violation of his procedural rights. The Court directed defendant Matthew Cate, as Secretary of CDCR, to expunge the plaintiff’s validation as a Northern Structure associate from CDCR records, to report the expungement to all gang-related law enforcement databases and clearinghouses to which the original validation was reported previously, and to remove all documents related to the validation from plaintiff’s prison file. The parties continued litigating attorneys fees until 2012. The court awarded roughly $1,088,000 in total attorney's fees and costs. On June 22, 2012, the court issued an order confirming payment the attorneys' fees and costs. As of March 28, 2016, the case appears closed.

Summary: In 2000, an inmate in California corrections system (CDCR) filed this lawsuit in District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of CDCR and individual CDCR personnel under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The plaintiff claimed prison officials violated his due process rights by incorrectly validating him as a gang member and placing him in segregation while at Deuel Vocational Institution, and Pelican Bay State Prison. The Court found in favor of the plaintiff and directed CDCR to expunge plaintiff’s validation as a Northern Structure associate from CDCR records, to report the expungement to all gang-related law enforcement databases and clearinghouses to which the original validation was reported previously, and to remove all documents related to the validation from plaintiff’s prison file.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by the University of California regents regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas could risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The universities in this case later voluntarily dismissed their claims.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, student visas have regulations that limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the defendant in this case, issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This meant that international students at schools that planned to conduct classes fully online would have to either transfer to another school that was at least partially in-person, return to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had either transitioned fully online or decided not to have classes at all to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days. It also ordered schools with hybrid systems to certify each F-1 student to ensure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit Twenty public and private universities filed this lawsuit on July 13, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The universities, represented by private counsel, sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and ICE. The universities alleged that the defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in two ways. First, the directive was arbitrary and capricious because it was not based in reasoned decision-making. Second, the directive was arbitrary and capricious because the supposed reasons behind it were only pretextual. The universities requested that the court grant declaratory relief calling the directive illegal. They also requested injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction that would prohibit the government from enforcing the new directive. They also asked that the court vacate and set aside the directive altogether. Finally, they requested reasonable costs and attorney's fees. That same day, the universities also submitted a motion for summary judgment which largely followed the same arguments as the original complaint, and a motion to accelerate or expedite briefing and discovery. On July 14, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Mustafa T. Kasubhai. Judge Kasubhai referred the motion for a temporary restraining order to Judge Michael J. McShane. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, President and Fellows of Harvard College, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the July 6 directive rescinded. Therefore, on July 15, Judge Kasubhai asked the parties in this case to confer to discuss how to proceed with the case. On July 17, the parties jointly filed a status report. In order to effectuate the rescission of the July 6 directive, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance. The universities withdrew, without prejudice, the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, the motion for summary judgment, and the motion to expedite or accelerate litigation. After further discussions in light of concerns about student confusion over the current status of the regulations, ICE agreed to issue new guidance and information on its website providing clarification that the original guidance from March is once again in effect. The universities reserved concerns that the new guidance might allow ICE to prevent individuals with valid student visas from entering the country if they are new students and intend to take only online courses during the fall semester. The universities filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on August 26, 2020.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in response to a July 6, 2020 directive by ICE that would have effectively forced international students to either attend in-person classes or risk deportation. Twenty public and private universities filed this suit against DHS and ICE, arguing that the directive was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. However, just two days later, plaintiffs in a separate case over the same directive came to an agreement with the government to get them to rescind the order. The court in this case asked the parties to confer and discuss how they would like to proceed given the rescission. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The universities filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on August 26, 2020.


On June 1, 1993, Children's Rights, the ACLU, and private co-counsel filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin against the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and the Milwaukee County Department of Human Services. The complaint alleged abuse and neglect of children in the Milwaukee child-welfare system, inadequate investigations into abuse and neglect, lack of services, improper foster care placement, and high caseworker caseloads. The plaintiffs alleged violations of state law and federal law, including the Adoption Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79(a); Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), 42 U.S.C. § 5101-5106(a); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12121-12150; and Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794. In early 1995, the court granted the state defendants' motion to dismiss claims as to the state defendants brought under 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) of the Adoption Assistance Act and under the Rehabilitation Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. Additionally, the Court certified the class of plaintiffs as children who are in foster care in Milwaukee County, and children about whom the county Department of Human Services received reports of abuse or neglect. Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268 (E.D. Wisc. 1995). The case then proceeded towards a trial bifurcated into a liability stage and a remedy stage. However, during preparations for trial in 1995, the Wisconsin state Legislature passed a provision that required the state Department of Health and Social Services to propose a plan for state takeover of the Milwaukee County child welfare system by 1998. In light of the legislative action, the Court denied the state defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on constitutional issues, adjourned the trial date, and required the parties to determine whether the law provided interim relief and how relief affected the liability and remedial aspects of the case. After both plaintiffs and defendants provided a series of briefings to the Court, the plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction in February 1997. The plaintiffs claimed that the pending state takeover would only exacerbate problems in Milwaukee County's child welfare system. In response, the Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction under CAPTA. Jeanine B. v. Thompson, 967 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Wisc. 1997). In 1998, the Court dismissed as moot the plaintiffs' claims against the county and proceeded with discovery for trial. After extensive discovery, the plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint in 1999 and a second supplemental complaint in 2000. Trial was set for 2003. In September 2002, however, the parties reached a settlement agreement that provided for phased improvements to the Bureau of Milwaukee Child Welfare, which included decreased caseworker caseloads, elimination of shelter placements, and special diagnostic/assessment centers for children. The parties modified the settlement agreement in 2003 and again in 2012, although the main substance of the agreement remained the same. The agreement is to remain in force until the defendants are in full compliance with its terms and the Court terminates jurisdiction. Attorneys' fees have been awarded to the plaintiffs in the amount of $950,000. As of the date of this summary, monitoring continues.

Summary: Children's Rights and the ACLU filed a class action lawsuit in 1993 against the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services and the Milwaukee County Department of Human Services, alleging abuse and neglect of children in the Milwaukee child welfare system. During the course of litigation, the Wisconsin state legislature passed a provision requiring state takeover of the Milwaukee County child welfare system by 1998. The parties settled the remaining issues in 2002 in a settlement agreement that provided for decreased caseworker caseloads, elimination of shelter placements, and special diagnostic/assessment centers for children. The parties modified the settlement agreement in 2003 and again in 2012. The case is ongoing.


On December 28, 2008, a prisoner at the Doña Ana County Detention Center ("the jail") filed a complaint against the jail in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The plaintiff was mentally ill at the time of his arrest; he alleged that after he was booked into the jail, kept in administrative segregation for nearly two years, and was subject to inhumane conditions of confinement and denied adequate medical care. As a result, he endured physical and mental deterioration. When the plaintiff was transferred out of jail for a psychiatric review after 18 months of solitary confinement, he was underweight, disheveled, and unaware he had spent the last 18 months in solitary confinement. After only two weeks of mental health treatment, the plaintiff was returned to the jail and again placed in solitary confinement. The plaintiff requested medical and dental treatment and was denied both. The plaintiff was then forced to pull his own tooth. Ultimately the charges against the plaintiff for driving while intoxicated and receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle were dismissed and he was released from jail 22 months after he was arrested and booked. The plaintiff filed a complaint and the case proceeded through years of discovery motions, and eventually to trial. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages and attorneys' fees and costs. After a multi-day trial in January 2012, the jury found the jail and two individual employees liable for depriving the plaintiff of his constitutional rights to humane conditions of confinement, adequate medical care, and procedural due process. As a result of these constitutional deprivations, the jury found that the plaintiff was entitled to compensatory damages from the jail and punitive damages from the individual employees. Included among the specific findings of the jury was that the plaintiff's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act were violated and that the jail was liable for false imprisonment and negligent operation or maintenance of a building. The jury awarded $15.5 million in compensatory damages and $6.5 million in punitive damages, for a total award to the plaintiff of $22 million. The County filed several motions during and after trial, all of which were denied. The defendants argued the district court judge was biased and should have recused herself, and also that there was an improper and undisclosed attorney-client relationship between the plaintiff's lawyer and a testifying witness. The court ruled that the defendants failed to substantiate any of these claims, failed to meet their burden of proof, and asked for relief to which they were not entitled. The District Court declined to set aside the judgment and award in favor of the plaintiff on January 8, 2013. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, but in March 2013, stipulated to dismiss the appeal after reaching a settlement agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept a $15.5 million settlement and all parties agreed to end litigation without further appeals. The case is now closed.

Summary: A mentally ill inmate in New Mexico was kept in solitary confinement for 22 months after being booked on charges of driving while intoxicated and transporting or receiving a stolen car. While in solitary confinement, the plaintiff was denied medical and dental health care, and was largely denied mental health treatment. As a result, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition deteriorated while in the Doña Ana County Detention Center. The plaintiff filed a complaint under the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The case proceeded to trial and he was awarded a total of $22 million in compensatory and punitive damages. The defendants appealed, but dismissed their appeal after reaching a settlement agreement whereby the plaintiff agreed to accept a $15.5 million settlement and all parties agreed to end litigation without further appeals. The case is now closed.


In October 2006, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, acting pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq., commenced an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the King County Correctional Facility ("KCCF"). During the course of this investigation, the DOJ conducted on-site inspections of the jail, held interviews with staff and prisoners, and reviewed numerous documents (including jail policies and procedures, incident reports, investigative reports, prisoner grievances, and staff personnel files). Upon completing its investigation, the DOJ issued a November 13, 2007 findings letter concluding that certain conditions at the jail violated the constitutional rights of prisoners. In particular, the DOJ found that prisoners were not adequately protected from harm in that they were at risk of physical attacks from inmates, the exercise of excessive force by staff, exposure to custodial sexual misconduct, and suicide. The DOJ also concluded that prisoners did not receive adequate medical care. In addition to listing the constitutional inadequacies, the findings letter also outlined numerous remedial measures which it suggested ought to be implemented at the jail in order to remedy these inadequacies. On January 14, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington under CRIPA, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, against King County to enjoin the County from depriving prisoners in KCCF of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States argued that the County failed to protect prisoners at KCCF from serious physical harm, custodial sexual misconduct, and self inflicted harm, and failed to provide adequate medical care. On February 26, 2009, Judge Richard A. Jones issued an order granting the parties' joint motion for conditional dismissal, with two conditions. First, King County was ordered to comply with the terms agreed to by the parties in a memorandum of agreement. Second, the United States was permitted, for three years, to seek relief if King County failed to comply with the stipulated terms.

Summary: After a DOJ investigation in 2006 regarding the conditions of confinement at the King County Correctional Facility, the United States filed a lawsuit in 2009 against King County alleging unconstitutional abuse by the County. In February 2009, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington granted the parties' joint motion for dismissal under which the parties agreed to certain stipulated terms.


This federal lawsuit challenges North Dakota's refusal to allow same-sex marriages or recognize those celebrated in other states. It was filed on June 6, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, by seven same-sex couples. (Prior to this lawsuit, it seems that North Dakota was the only state that bans same-sex marriage without such a challenge pending.) One couple sought to marry in North Dakota; four were North Dakota residents who had married elsewhere; one couple had moved to North Dakota after a marriage elsewhere; and one, who married and resided out-of-state, included a member who worked for the State but whose benefits were adversely affected by the recognition ban. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Karen K. Klein. On July 1, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. On July 22, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On January 20, 2015, the court (Chief Judge Ralph R. Erickson) ordered a stay in this case pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. On January 23, 2015, the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Alice R. Senechal as referral judge. On June 29, 2015, following the Supreme Court's Obergefell decision holding that state bans on same-sex marriage violate the 14th Amendment, the plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay and enter judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. That same day, Chief Judge Erickson granted the motion, granting the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and denying the defendants' motion to dismiss. The ordered declared N.D. Constitution Art. XI § 28, and North Dakota Century Code §§ 14-03-01 and 14-03-08 unconstitutional and invalid as applied to same sex marriages, and ordered the defendants to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, subject to the same restrictions and limitations applicable to opposite-sex couples. The parties stipulated to and jointly moved for an award of attorney's fees to the plaintiffs on August 26, 2015. The court ordered the defendants to pay $58,000 in attorney's fees and costs to the plaintiffs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 on September 14, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: This federal lawsuit challenges North Dakota's refusal to allow same-sex marriages or recognize those celebrated in other states. It was filed on June 6, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the District of North Dakota, by seven same-sex couples. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges declaring state bans on same-sex marriages unconstitutional, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiffs on June 29, 2015.


On May 4, 2020, three voters and an advocacy organization brought this suit to place an initiative on Michigan’s 2020 general election ballot. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to enjoin the ballot-access signature requirement and filing deadline. The plaintiffs also filed a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the defendants from enforcing the deadline. On June 11, the preliminary injunction was granted, and the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit denied to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On July 23, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. <hr> On May 4, 2020, three voters and an advocacy organization seeking to place an initiative on Michigan’s 2020 general election ballot filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Governor of Michigan, the Secretary of State of Michigan, and the Michigan Bureau of Elections. The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the state’s signature and filing requirements for the general election ballot. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the combination of Michigan’s ballot access procedure and Governor Witmer’s executive order precluded organizations from submitting ballot initiative petitions in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking an order requiring the defendants to enjoin the ballot-access signature requirement and filing deadline. The plaintiffs also filed a temporary restraining order (TRO) to bar the defendants from enforcing the deadline. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought attorney fees. The case was assigned to District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. The plaintiffs were self-represented. The plaintiffs had submitted a ballot initiative petition to the Michigan Secretary of State on January 16, 2019 which was rejected on the basis that the plaintiffs did not meet the state's signature and filing requirements. Michigan election law required proponents of the ballot initiative to submit 340,047 valid signatures by May 27 to meet the signature and filing deadline. On March 23, 2020 Governor Whitmer announced an executive order prohibiting all public gatherings, which remained in effect for over two months. Prior to the executive order, the plaintiffs had collected approximately 210,000 signatures with two months remaining. The defendants excluded the plaintiffs’ ballot initiative from the 2020 general ballot. On June 11, 2020, the court granted the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3097266. The injunction required the defendants to reduce the burden on ballot access and to narrow its restrictions to make the ballot initiative application constitutional. The defendants submitted a notice of the proposed remedy on June 18, with the option of either extending the deadline or allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to qualify for the 2022 ballot with the signatures already collected. The court rejected the proposed remedy on June 23 for not properly remedying the constitutional violation. On June 23, 2020 the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 20−01594. The same day, the defendant’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal was denied by the district court. WL 3447694. The following day, the defendants filed an emergency motion to stay the district court order pending appeal to the Sixth Circuit. On July 2, the Sixth Circuit denied the motion to stay and directed the district court to address any further remedies proposed by the defendants by July 15. 2020 WL 3603684. Furthermore, the court precluded the defendants from enforcing the petition deadline against the plaintiffs if they fail to propose a constitutional remedy by the July 15 deadline. On July 23, 2020, one of the individual plaintiffs amended her previous statements. She conceded that the actual amount of signatures collected by the plaintiffs was substantially less than the 210,000 figure stated in the complaint and withdrew her statement that the ballot initiative had hundreds of thousands of supporters. On the same day, all of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. On September 22, 2020, the court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause as to why the preliminary injunction should not be vacated. None of the plaintiffs responded, so the district court vacated its preliminary injunction on October 19, 2020. On December 9, 2020, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the defendants' appeal. The case is now closed.

Summary: This suit was brought by three voters and an advocacy organization seeking to place an initiative on Michigan’s 2020 general election ballot. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring the defendants to enjoin the ballot-access signature requirement and filing deadline. The plaintiffs also filed a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring the defendants from enforcing the deadline. On June 11, the preliminary injunction was granted, and the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit. The Sixth Circuit denied to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On July 23, 2020, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case after one of the plaintiffs amended her previous statements regarding the number of signatures that the plaintiffs had gathered. The case is now closed.


The EEOC's Miami district office sued Dias Landscapes, Corporation on March 30, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The EEOC's complaint alleged that the defendant violated Title VII by discriminating against Black, Haitian employees. Specifically, the EEOC alleged that the defendants had segregated its workforce and later discharged three individual claimants. The parties entered into a consent decree on December 15, 2006, stipulating that the defendant would pay the complainants $150,000 in damages, post a notice of compliance with Title VII, provide Title VII training to its employees, draft and distribute a non-discrimination policy, report complaints of discrimination semiannually, and allow the EEOC to enter the defendant's premises to ensure compliance with the consent decree. The case was closed on January 5, 2007, but the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decree, set to last for three years. Since there is not further activity on the docket, this case is presumably closed.

Summary: The EEOC sued Dias Landscapes on March 30, 2006, alleging Title VII violations. On December 15, 2006, the parties entered a three-year consent decree. The case was closed on January 5, 2007, but the Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decree, set to last for three years. Since there is not further activity on the docket, this case is presumably closed.


The Philadelphia District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Oak Lane Printing and Letter Service Co., Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey in March 2006. The complaint alleged age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Two employees, aged 55 and 60, were allegedly discharged while younger, similarly-situated employees were not. An unsuccessful settlement conference was held in December 2006. The defendant moved for summary judgment in May 2007, which was denied. The parties prepared for trial that was scheduled in May 2008. On June 26, 2008, the parties agreed to a court enforceable consent decree that required the defendant to pay $52,700 to one of the charging parties and $24,800 to the other, as well as to adopt anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies in compliance with the ADEA and to provide training to employees. The consent decree was in effect for two years. As of 2018, there has been no further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the EEOC filed suit against Oak Lane Printing and Letter Service Co., Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA. The complaint alleged that the defendant discharged two employees, ages 55 and 60, and retained younger similarly situated employees. In 2008, the case settled with a 2 year consent decree which provided monetary damages and injunctive relief in the form of required policy changes, employee training, and other requirements.


On August 21, 2010, a man of Hispanic origin filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, against the Cobb County Police Department. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that the police stopped, searched, and arrested him without reasonable suspicion and probable cause, which violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiff alleged that the police used excessive force and that he was falsely imprisoned. He requested compensatory and punitive damages. This case was filed after the defendants' arrest charges were dismissed. The background of the arrest is as follows: Plaintiff was riding a bicycle in Cobb County on March 26, 2010. The defendants, sitting in a marked patrol car, allegedly stopped the plaintiff because they believed he was Hispanic and not a U.S. citizen. The defendants claimed that they stopped the plaintiff because he failed to yield to traffic. The plaintiff contended that the defendants broke his nose and left eye socket during questioning and arrest. After the arrest, the plaintiff spent over four months in the Cobb County Jail on charges of misdemeanor grade obstruction or hindering law enforcement officers. At this time, the defendants lacked authority to enforce federal immigration law, but the county jail was authorized to process immigration violations pursuant to an agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Contesting the arrest charges, the plaintiff filed a motion to suppress evidence by arguing that the defendants' stop and detention were unconstitutional. The motion was granted by the Cobb County State Court (Judge Progers) on August 10, 2010. All criminal charges by the defendants for arresting the plaintiff were dismissed and defendants declined to further pursue the charges. However, the plaintiff faced immigration proceedings due to the improper arrest by the defendants. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed this case to recover damages incurred from the dismissed arrest charges. On May 10, 2011, the District Court (Judge Forrester) dismissed this case with prejudice based on a settlement submitted by the parties.

Summary: On August 11, 2010, a Hispanic man filed a lawsuit against the Cobb County Police Department, alleging that the police illegally stopped and arrested him using excessive force. The Cobb County State Court dismissed the arrest charges. In this case, the plaintiff sought damages for the alleged illegal arrest and sustained injuries. On May 10, 2011, the District Court (Judge Forrester) dismissed the case with prejudice based on a settlement submitted by the parties.


Representing the class of persons under age twenty-one who were eligible for behavioral health services through Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) mandate, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., the Bazelon Center, Arizona Center for Disability Law, and National Center for Youth Law brought suit in 1991 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona, against the state of Arizona. Both parties sought summary judgment, but in 1993, District Judge John Roll denied the motions. The defendants argued that the challenged conduct did not constitute state action at all because the Arizona Department of Health Services contracted with private health care providers to provide behavioral health services to eligible children. The court disagreed, holding that even though the private providers made decisions about levels of care for children, the state was ultimately responsible for the providers' compliance with the federal Medicaid statute. J.K. v. Dillenberg, 836 F. Supp. 694 (D. Ariz. 1993). In 1995, plaintiffs renewed their motion for partial summary judgment, and on May 13, 1996, the Court granted the motion, declaring certain aspects of the state's policy unlawful and enjoining the defendants from reducing any plaintiff's Title XIX covered services based on medical needs assessments without providing notice and a fair hearing. (The Court denied the state's cross motion for summary judgment.) The case continued to move towards trial on other issues, but on August 10, 1998, the court granted the parties' joint motion for a year-and-a-half stay of all litigation, on specified terms from the joint motion (not available in the Clearinghouse). The agreement was at least in part to allow time for an independent expert to assess the adequacy of mental health and substance abuse services provided to the plaintiffs. After completion of the independent study, the parties began settlement negotiations. They reached a settlement on March 27, 2001, which the district court preliminarily approved on April 5, 2001. Notice was provided to the class, and a fairness hearing was held on June 26, 2001, at which time the court approved the settlement. Under the settlement, which was set to last until July 2007, the State agreed to increase funding for training, respite care, pilot projects, and improvements in the structure of the state's behavioral health managed care system. The agreement rested on broad principles that "require initiatives to improve front-line practice, enhance the capacity of private agencies to deliver needed services, promote collaboration among public agencies, and develop a quality management and improvement system focused on sound practice." The defendants agreed to move as quickly as practicable to deploy a system in compliance with the principles. The agreement allowed for court enforcement, but did not impose any deadlines for compliance. However, it did specify that "none of the parties may engage in activities which delay, prolong or frustrate performance of the obligations of this Agreement with the aim of taking advantage of the time-limited nature of this Settlement Agreement. The Court may, after application and a hearing, impose severe sanctions for such conduct." On December 3, 2001, after a stipulation by the parties, the court approved attorneys’ fees payable to the plaintiffs' counsel of $1.2 million. Over the next several years, attorney's fees were paid to plaintiffs' counsel for its work monitoring and enforcing the settlement. In January 2006, the plaintiffs invoked the settlement agreement's dispute resolution process, claiming that the state had not complied with the agreement, and in particular had failed to "move as quickly as is practicable to develop a Title XIX behavioral health system that delivers services according to the [settlement's] Principles" as required. On November 21, 2006, the parties agreed to amend the 2001 settlement by extending its compliance date from July 2007 till July 2010. On March 6, 2009, plaintiffs again invoked the dispute resolution provisions by sending a letter to defendants, listing six serious issues in dispute. Although the parties agreed to the basic rules governing contract interpretation, they disagreed about the test to apply to determine whether defendants have breached any contractual obligation. Plaintiffs asserted that the test is whether defendants have substantially complied with the terms of the Agreement, while Defendants asserted that performance should be measured under a standard of good faith. The parties were unable to resolve their differences, and on November 13, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs asserted that defendants were in noncompliance because there were still too few intensive community services for children with complex needs, no quality management system, inadequate substance abuse services , inadequate training, a lack of promised benefits for youth aged eighteen to twenty-one, and no system for determining whether children were being served according to the settlement agreement. The defendants objected, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to use the agreement's dispute resolution process, and that as a result the entire case should be terminated. In September 2010, the Court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion to enforce. The plaintiff re-urged the Court to enforce the settlement, and defendant moved again to dismiss the case and terminate the Court's jurisdiction. In February 2012, the Court again denied the motions. Furthermore, because the parties could not resolve the matter through mediation, the Court recommended appointment of a Special Master. The Court outlined that the Special Master was to issue a written report recommending to the Court a resolution of the parties' differences concerning the interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and to recommend how to proceed in resolving any disputes arising under the Agreement if necessary. On November 15, 2012, the Court (Judge A. Wallace Tashima) signed an order appointing Justice Ruth V. McGregor as Special Master. On May 17, 2013, the Special Master submitted the Special Master’s Report and Recommendation to the Court. The Special Master recommended that the Court limit the disputes for resolution to the issues expressly raised in plaintiffs’ March 2009 letter. The Special Master determined that the defendants had complied with contractual obligations related to substance abuse treatment, and that all other issues either did not raise a dispute cognizable under the Settlement Agreement or required factual development. On July 9, 2013, Judge Tashima Adopted Special Master’s Report and Recommendation and granted Motion Special Master’s Application for Compensation, requiring the defendants to pay 100% of the Special Master’s fee. Parties continued litigation until March 12, 2014, when plaintiffs filed Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement. On March 21, 2014, Judge Tashima granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Vacate Hearing and Dismiss Litigation, and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a class of persons under age twenty-one who were eligible for behavioral health services, brought suit in the U.S. District of Arizona, in 1991, against the state of Arizona for failure to provide adequate services through Medicaid's Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) mandate. A settlement was approved in 2001, under which the State agreed to increase funding for training, respite care, pilot projects, and improvements in the structure of the state's behavioral health managed care system. The agreement rests on broad principles that "require initiatives to improve front-line practice, enhance the capacity of private agencies to deliver needed services, promote collaboration among public agencies, and develop a quality management and improvement system focused on sound practice." The defendants agreed to move as quickly as practicable to deploy a system in compliance with the principles. The agreement allowed court enforcement, but did not impose any deadlines for compliance. It was eventually extended to July 2010. Before it expired, plaintiffs sought enforcement; defendants sought termination. Parties were unable to resolve their differences, and the Court recommended appointment of a Special Master to issue a written report recommending a resolution of parties' differences. On May 17, 2013, the Special Master's Report and Recommendation was submitted. The Report recommended that the Court find that defendants complied with contractual obligations related to substance abuse treatment and that all other issues either did not raise a dispute cognizable under the Settlement Agreement or required factual development. The Report and Recommendation was adopted on July 9, 2013. Parties continued litigation until May 12, 2014 when plaintiffs filed Notice of Withdrawal of Motion for Enforcement of Settlement Agreement. On March 21, 2014, Judge Tashima granted the parties’ Joint Motion to Vacate Hearing and Dismiss Litigation, and the case was dismissed without prejudice.


This suit, brought on September 18, 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenged President Trump's revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiffs were DACA recipients who sought to enjoin the government from ending the program. Not only did the plaintiffs stand to lose benefits and security they have relied upon, but the plaintiffs argued that the communities in which they reside also stand to lose valuable contributing members. The complaint argued that the DACA program made promises to its recipients upon which they have relied for their entire lives in America. As a result, the plaintiffs contended that revoking DACA violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. They sought equitable estoppel, injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program by DHS policy statements. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children. As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless Congress acted within the next six months. As the complaint highlighted, the Obama administration in promoting DACA made key promises to immigrants: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement, and that barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. The plaintiffs, represented by public and private counsel, were six individuals who were brought into the U.S. at young ages and lived, worked, and studied in California. One was a practicing attorney, one was a special education teacher, and four others attended graduate school. The plaintiffs argued that they each relied on the government's promises. They also argued that the revocation of DACA was fueled by President Trump's anti-Mexican racial animus evidenced in his past statements and actions. Moreover, the plaintiffs stated that the government took "affirmative steps to reduce the protections applicable to information provided in connection with the DACA program" as evidenced by a January 2017 Executive Order mandating that all agencies “ensure that their privacy policies exclude persons who are not United States citizens or lawful permanent residents from the protections of the Privacy Act regarding personally identifiable information.” The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero. On Sept. 20, the case was marked as related to two other cases: State of California v. Department of Homeland Security, No. 17-cv-05235, and Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, No. 17-cv-05211. The next day, the case was reassigned to Judge William Alsup. On Oct. 16, County of Santa Clara v. Trump and City of San Jose v. Trump, were added as related cases. All are in the Clearinghouse. On Oct. 6, 2017, in a related challenge led by Regents of University of California before this judge, the government filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception to the decision to rescind it. On Oct. 17, after the University in the related case moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so in all related cases, including this one. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission, specifically related documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court on Oct. 18 in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The court denied staying proceedings on Oct. 19, and the defendants appealed the next day by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the district court and emergency motion for stay. On Oct. 23, 2017, the district court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until the DACA ends on March 5, 2018. On Nov. 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit denied defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered, and the District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by Nov 22, 2017. On Nov. 17, 2017, the federal government filed an emergency motion noting that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the Supreme Court no later than Nov. 20, 2017 and requesting that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the forthcoming petition. On Nov. 21, 2017, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction currently lies with the District Court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, in the district court, Judge Alsup on Nov. 20, 2017, agreed to stay all discovery until Dec. 22, 2017 at which point the augmented administrative record will be due. On Dec. 1, 2017, the government filed notice that they appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On Dec. 21 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the district court should have stayed implementation of the Oct. 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have "first resolved the Government’s threshold arguments (that the Acting Secretary’s determination to rescind DACA is unreviewable because it is “committed to agency discretion,” 5 U. S. C. §701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprives the District Court of jurisdiction). Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record." 138 S. Ct. 443. The same day, the district court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction from Nov. 1, 2017 and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss under for failure to state a claim. The court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the recession. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who never before received deferred action. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on Jan. 12, 2018 dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims as well the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit on Jan. 16, 2018. The government also sought certiorari from the Supreme Court on Jan. 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on Feb. 26, 2018, indicating the justices assume "that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case." The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. In February and March 2018, the parties and amici filed their briefs, which can be found here. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on Nov. 8, 2018. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because it was based on a belief that law foreclosed any alternative because the agency lacked authority rather than on exercise of discretion. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because the government based rescission only on the belief that DACA went beyond DHS' authority and so the APA's bar did not apply, and the decision did not fall within the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. As to the merits of preliminary injunction, the panel held that "DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion" and the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. 2018 WL 5833232. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it "promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress." Id. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in three DACA cases: Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and NAACP v. Trump, all of which were pending before different circuit courts of appeal. The Court consolidated the three cases (No. 18-587). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation fo the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020 ("Wolf Memorandum"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 3, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that Acting Secretary Wolf's actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in another case challenging the Wolf Memorandum,Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump, ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: A group of DACA recipients filed this lawsuit on Sept. 18, 2017, challenging President Trump's revocation of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. The plaintiffs argued that revoking DACA violates due process and equal protection, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Regulatory Flexibility Act. On Jan. 9, 2018, the court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, which was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review and oral argument was heard on Nov. 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


On April 2, 2008, the female inmates of a private jail in Indianapolis, brought a class action lawsuit against Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), claiming the conditions of confinement and the medical care at a CCA facility in Indiana violated their Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of mail policies, availability and handling of grievances, medical care, and privacy of medical information at the jail. The plaintiffs emphasized that the jail provided inadequate medical care and exposed inmates to inhumane living conditions so egregious that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The prisoners were subjected to overcrowded living conditions in which upwards of 150 prisoners were forced to share a single toilet and sink; deprived of food and water for extended periods of time; housed in trash, mold and insect-infested living conditions; and required to reveal confidential medical information in the presence of other prisoners. On June 12, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, defining their class as "any and all persons currently, or who will be in the future, confined in the jail facility." On December 2010, the district court certified the class, but dismissed many of the claims filed in plaintiffs' complaint from class certification. Specifically, the court held they were entitled to proceed on the “inherently transitory” exception, in which the plaintiffs must show that "it is uncertain that a claim will remain live for any individual who could be named as a plaintiff long enough for a court to certify the class; and there will be a constant class of persons suffering the deprivation complained of in the complaint.” The district court found that the plaintiffs met the test to proceed as a class for declaratory and injunctive relief. However, the court dismissed the individual plaintiffs’ claims because they were no longer incarcerated at the jail. A class defined as “any and all persons currently, or who will be in the future, confined to the jail" was certified by the district court. The dismissed issues included claims that the jail failed to provide adequate medical care, personal and legal mail, record claims, and that the conditions of confinement inside the jail were inhumane, and that the procedures in the jail violated inmates' rights under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA"). The court allowed three class claims to proceed: The Unsafe Conditions Count alleged the presence of mold and insect infestations, inadequate security staffing, and broken heating and air conditioning systems in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Privacy Count alleged violations of HIPAA’s medical privacy provisions because two prisoners were in the same room at the same time when they were questioned about their medical history. Finally, the Incentives Count alleged “that CCA paid its administrators financial incentives to encourage them to treat fewer medical patients, decline to report errors, and generally report more favorable conditions than were in fact present” at the jail. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied on January 25, 2011. On January 28, 2011, CCA moved for summary judgment on the remaining issues, and on April 13, 2011, the district court granted their motion as to the three remaining class-action claims and dismissed the case in its entirety. In regard to the HIPAA claims, the court found that “HIPAA does not grant a private right of action.” Thus, those claims were dismissed. As for the plaintiffs’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, the district court held that it would consider the claims in light of conditions at the jail as they currently exist, not as they existed in 2008 when the lawsuit was filed. The plaintiffs sought review of the court's decision to deny their class certification for their claim regarding CCA's reduction of daily pill calls for inmates from three times a day to two times a day; the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of CCA regarding conditions of confinement, and the district court's order denying plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment claiming the district court erred on the evidentiary standard to create a constitutional violation. On August 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed an appeal to the United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. On September 14, 2012, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s finding that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the class certification typicality requirement for claims challenging CCA’s reduction of medication calls from three to two times a day. The Court also affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to CCA, noting that CCA had “presented an affidavit from 2011 in which the jail warden testified that measures had been taken to remedy the ... problems in 2008 and 2009, after plaintiffs had left the jail.” The plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that such remedial measures had not been taken and, therefore, failed to establish an ongoing constitutional violation warranting injunctive relief. 694 F.3d 890, Sept. 14, 2012. This case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit claiming that the conditions of confinement and the medical care at a CCA facility in Indiana violated their Eighth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the jail regarding conditions of confinement; however, the appeals court affirmed the district court's decision.


On January 12, 2007 the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, some borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their automobile loans based on their marital status. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant instructed its automobile dealers that it could price loans to non-married co-applicants at higher prices unrelated to credit risk characteristics and loan terms. In some instances, the defendant specifically instructed automobile dealers to prevent non-married co-applicants from applying for a loan altogether. DOJ's allegations are based from information acquired by the Federal Reserve Bank during a routine examination of Compass Bank in 2003. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order that was entered by the Court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) on February 21, 2007. Under the consent order, the defendant agreed to implement policies and procedures designed to prohibit lending distinctions based on marital status and to provide staff with education training. In addition, the defendant agreed to pay up to $1.75 million to certain borrowers who were charged higher interest rates based on their marital status. The consent order ended in 2009 without any further litigation. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 12, 2007 the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The plaintiffs alleged that as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, some borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their automobile loans based on their marital status. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order that was entered by the Court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) on February 21, 2007. Under the consent order, the defendant agrees to implement policies and procedures designed to prohibit lending distinctions based on marital status and will provide staff with education training. In addition, the defendant will pay up to $1.75 million out to certain borrowers who were charged higher interest rates based on their marital status.