On October 22, 2010, three immigrants from Somalia were indicted on criminal charges in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. The case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey Miller. A superseding indictment added a fourth defendant to the charges on January 14, 2011. Each defendant was represented by private counsel, and one was additionally represented by the Civil Rights Clinic in Austin, Texas. The charges were related to the defendants’ alleged material and financial support for the terrorist group Al-Shabab, and consisted of five counts: (1) Conspiracy to Provide Material Support for Terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2339A(a); (2); Conspiracy to Provide Material Support to a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2339B(a)(1); (3) Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §956; (4) Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (h); (5) Providing Material Support for Terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). The four defendants were convicted by jury verdict on February 22, 2013. 2013 WL 8351225. The named defendant was convicted on all five counts; two defendants were convicted only on counts 1, 2, 3, and 5; the fourth was convicted only on counts 1, 2, and 5. After several months of pre-sentence investigation, the defendants filed a joint motion for a new trial on September 5, 2013. The motion was based on congressional testimony from the NSA and the FBI relating to materials provided by Edward Snowden regarding NSA surveillance in this particular case. In their new trial motion, the defendants argued: (1) that collection by the NSA of electronic data related to the named defendant violated the First and Fourth Amendment, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); (2) that cleared defense counsel should have been provided with the Government’s confidential response to their FISA motion and the ex parte request for a protective order under the Confidential Information Protection Act ("CIPA"); and (3) that the Government failed to provide required discovery and exculpatory materials. The court denied each of these arguments in its November 14, 2013 order denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial, finding that the public disclosures made by the NSA and the FBI provided no new facts to alter the court's FISA and CIPA rulings. 2013 WL 6079518. The court also denied the defendants' arguments that the Government had violated the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as FISA and CIPA. Finally, the court found that the Government had complied with its obligations to provide required discovery and exculpatory materials. The four defendants were sentenced to 15 years, 13 years, 10 years, and 6 years, respectively. Each of the four defendants filed appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in late November 2013. On October 29, 2015, the defendants submitted their joint appeal. They alleged that (1) the convictions should be reversed because the government, through the NSA’s surveillance program, acted beyond the authority granted to it by 50 U.S.C. §1861; (2) the NSA’s surveillance program violated the Fourth Amendment; (3) the convictions should be dropped and a new trial ordered because the government did not provide exculpatory information and/or notice of its surveillance activities; (4) the district court excluded the appellants’ access to relevant evidence while at the same time allowed the government’s irrelevant and prejudicial evidence; and (5) there was insufficient evidence for the jury to support the fourth appellant’s convictions. On November 10, 2016, Judges Marsha S. Berzon, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and Jack Zouhary heard oral arguments. On July 18, 2018, a defendant's lawyer wrote the court asking them to consider how the Supreme Court's recent decision in Carpenter v. United States affects the current case. 2018 WL 3073916. The lawyer argued that the reasoning animating the holding in Carpenter is what is at issue in this case's challenge of the government’s bulk collection, retention, and subsequent review of phone records. The Ninth Circuit released an opinion (by Judge Berzon) on September 2, 2020, upholding the charges against the defendants but stating that the government may have violated the Fourth Amendment through the bulk telephony metadata collection program. 2020 WL 5225704. Judge Berzon relied on the Carpenter decision to state that bulk telephony metadata collection may violate the Fourth Amendment because the information wireless carriers collect off cell phones is so revealing about an individual's habits that warrantless collection would be an unreasonable search without a warrant. She added that the bulk telephony metadata collection program violated FISA Subchapter IV, stating that the “statement of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation" language in the Subchapter is intended to limit the scope of the government's ability to request FISA warrants, and that bulk metadata collection was not sufficiently limited to comply with the statute's intent. However, she declined to suppress the evidence collected against the defendants as a result of the FISA violation, writing that the FISA Subchapter IV does not allow suppression as a remedy in contrast to other areas of the statute that do, and that, upon review of the classified FISA warrants at issue, the information collected from the metadata program was not material to the successful FISA warrant application. Turning to the Fourth Amendment's notice requirement, Judge Berzon wrote that, while the defendants found out about the collection of their metadata in an unusual way through the Snowden disclosures, they were given notice to contest the metadata collection in the form of this lawsuit, and that the lack of notice at the District Court was not prejudicial from in-camera review of the record. However, she did mention that the government is obligated to disclose impending use of foreign intelligence surveillance data in order to give the defendants a chance to contest it. The case remains open until the window for a petition for review by the Supreme Court closes.

Summary: In 2010 and 2011, four Somali immigrants were indicted on criminal charges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The charges were related to the defendants’ alleged material and financial support for the terrorist group Al-Shabab. In February 2013, the defendants were convicted by jury verdict. The defendants each appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the appeals were consolidated in April 2014. In a September 2, 2020 opinion, the Ninth Circuit severely questioned the legality of the NSA's bulk telephony metadata collection program under Fourth Amendment law and interpretation of FISA Subchapter IV, but upheld the convictions, saying that the information obtained through the FISA violation was not material to the successful FISA warrant application. The case remains ongoing until the window for appeal to the Supreme Court closes.


On September 30, 1985, two adult men with developmental disabilities filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Department of Mental Retardation and managers and doctors affiliated with Southbury Training School, an intermediate care facility for people with intellectual disabilities (ICF/MR) in Southbury, Connecticut. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Social Security Act. This lawsuit was filed shortly after the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division announced investigative findings about Southbury pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. That federal investigation led to both a CRIPA lawsuit, United States v. Connecticut, ID-CT-0003, and a class action, Messier v. Southbury Training School, ID-CT-0005. Although it appears that the CRIPA and class action lawsuits were sometimes treated as companion cases, it seems that this case, McCoy v. Belmont, was separately litigated. On June 9, 1988, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint (the one in the file), alleging constitutional and state law violations. According to the complaint, after moving to Southbury in 1968, the plaintiffs lived in one of the institution's cottages. The plaintiffs received no habilitation programming and, as a result, neither gained nor maintained communication and other independent living skills. Southbury gave the plaintiffs no opportunity to participate in the community. Instead, they spent their days sitting on the dirty floor of a smelly and windowless common room. The plaintiffs were occasionally injured by improper physical restraint; one plaintiff's back was broken in three places. In addition, major illnesses were generally untreated. One plaintiff's scoliosis was completely untreated and caused organ damage. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Judge Jose A. Cabranes) assigned the case to a magistrate judge (Judge Joan G. Margolis). On March 10, 1992, the parties entered a consent decree, which required Southbury to employ a "core group" of staff with person-specific training to care for the plaintiffs in a Southbury house, to promptly and comprehensively treat the plaintiffs' medical conditions, to support self-advocacy, and to commence individualized habilitation programming. The plaintiffs' parents, as their guardians, were given the authority to approve or reject staff assigned to the house. Four years later, on March 28, 1996, the court (Judge Margolis) found the State in contempt for failing to comply with the consent decree's standards for programming, medical care, and preventing and reporting abuse and neglect. The court awarded compensatory damages, attorneys' fees and costs. Between August and November 1996, the parties submitted proposed schedules of compliance for the court's consideration. On December 12, 1996, the court ordered the parties to abide by a partial schedule of compliance, based on similarities in their proposals. On June 22, 1998, the court appointed a Special Master (Edward Skarnulis, Ph.D.) to propose a schedule of compliance for the contested parts of the consent decree. On May 18, 1999, the Special Master recommended that Southbury install a new administrative team, including on-site shift managers. The Special Master also recommended that the plaintiffs' parents, who had moved into Southbury's house at some point, relocate to their own home. Both parties contested the Special Master's recommendations and the court scheduled hearings. The court (Judge Margolis) denied the plaintiffs' request for discovery of the Special Master, holding that the Special Master was entitled to judicial immunity as an agent of the court. McCoy v. Belmont, No. 85-465, 1999 WL 33117446 (D. Conn. Aug 9, 1999). The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and the State filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Once hearings on the Special Master's report concluded, the plaintiffs petitioned the District Court to reopen hearings on January 24, 2000. The court (Judge Margolis) refused, holding that additional hearings were unnecessary because the new testimony was cumulative and would not introduce new information. McCoy v. Belmont, No. 85-465, 2000 WL 303222 (D. Conn. 2000). The plaintiffs appealed again to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. On March 14, 2000, the District Court (Judge Margolis) adopted the Special Master's report and denied the State's motion for relief from the judgment. McCoy v. Belmont, No. 85-465, 2000 WL 1050911 (D. Conn. March 14, 2000). The court held that the defendants had failed to show that a significant change of law or fact justified non-enforcement of a consent decree. On December 20, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal of the discovery ruling, reasoning it lacked jurisdiction over the decisions of a magistrate judge. On January 5, 2001, the Second Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' appeal from the district court's refusal to reopen the Special Master hearings. On July 15, 2002, the District Court (Senior Judge Ellen Bree Burns) partially granted a motion by the plaintiffs for contempt, but denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and another motion by the State for relief from the judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's rulings on September 29, 2003. In June 2005, hearings on all remaining motions were held; judgment is apparently still pending as of May 31, 2006. We have no further information on the disposition of this case. In addition, the docket we have begins almost three years after the Complaint was filed. On July 10, 2007, the Court granted in part defendants' motions for contempt and modification of the consent decree because of plaintiffs' abuse of defendants' staff and changed circumstances, respectively. The modification prevented one of plaintiffs' parents from visiting during meal times and being involved in the staff selection process to avoid administrative obstacles; the Court also denied plaintiffs' motion for contempt. The plaintiffs appealed this decision with respect to the modification of the consent decree, but on September 4, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. As of July 11, 2014, this case has had no other significant activity.

Summary: On September 30, 1985, two adult men with developmental disabilities filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut against the Connecticut Department of Mental Retardation and Southbury Training School. The plaintiffs alleged that defendants' failure to provide habilitation programming, to provide opportunities to participate in the community, to provide appropriate medical care, and abusive restraining methods violated their rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The parties entered a consent decree on May 10, 1992, and since then, there have been compliance issues and misconduct by both parties. The consent decree was modified in 2007 to reduce involvement of plaintiffs' parents because of misconduct. As of July 7, 2014, there has been no other significant activity.


On May 23, 2012, Occupy Wall Street, an unincorporated association engaged in continuous political protest, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the City seized or damaged property amounting to over 3,600 books and related library furnishings. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the City's failure to adequately supervise and train officers led to them to convert over $43,000 worth of property. Plaintiffs brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and sought damages in the amount of the lost property, punitive damages against unspecified officers who acted outrageously, and litigation costs. The case was assigned to Judge George B. Daniels. After some procedural preliminaries, on April 9, 2013 the parties settled their dispute. The settlement was with prejudice and without costs, expenses, or additional fees outside of the agreement. According to the settlement, the City of New York agreed to pay defendants $47,000 for the loss of property. The City also agreed to pay attorney's fees in the amount of $185,000 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1988, and $1,248.58 for costs and expenses incurred in the matter. The settlement did not include any injunctive terms.

Summary: On May 23, 2012, Occupy Wall Street, an unincorporated association engaged in continuous political protest, filed a lawsuit against the City of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of New seized or damaged property amounting to over 3,600 books and related library furnishings. The case was settled on April 9, 2013, with the City of New York paying plaintiffs $47,000 in compensation, and $186,248.58 in attorney's fees and associated costs.


On July 2, 2019, a United States citizen born in Puerto Rico filed this putative class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiff sued the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Driver Services (DDS) and an inspector of the Georgia DDS under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d). The plaintiff, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and LatinoJustice PRLDEF sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The plaintiff claimed that DDS discriminated against Puerto Rican-born applicants for Georgia drivers’ licenses, took and retained his original identity documents, and denied class members equal protection of the laws and the privileges due to Puerto Rican-born U.S. citizens. The defendants requested an extension of time to answer, which was granted by Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr. on August 29, 2019. On September 23, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion to stay proceedings to allow the parties to resolve the dispute out of court, which was granted. The case has been stayed until December 31, 2019 and is ongoing.

Summary: A Puerto Rican-born citizen sued the Georgia Department of Driver Services for discriminating against him and depriving him of his equal protection and due process rights in the Northern District of Georgia. The case has been stayed until December 31, 2019.


The Plaintiff, a thirty-five-year-old single mother with seven children, filed this class-action complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Texas (Austin Division) on October 27, 2015. The Plaintiff, represented by the Texas Fair Defense Project and the University of Texas School of Law Civil Rights Clinic, sued the City of Austin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Plaintiff claimed that the City had a practice of jailing people who are too poor to pay their fines for traffic tickets and other petty misdemeanors in violation of their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and counsel under the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The Plaintiff herself was indigent. Her annual income as a childcare aid at an elementary school was less than $6,000 and she received food stamps, free school lunches for her children, and Section 8 housing assistance. She could not afford expenses like car insurance or auto-inspections, and thus, when she started receiving traffic tickets for driving without an inspection or insurance, she was not able to pay off the fines. In December 2010, the Plaintiff was arrested and incarcerated in a local jail. Her sentencing judge did not inquire into her ability to pay for the fines or appoint counsel to represent her. Because of her incarceration, she lost her job. The Plaintiff was again arrested and incarcerated in 2013 for driving without a valid license and insurance, and for driving with expired registration. She subsequently received two more traffic tickets after her release. At the time she filed this complaint, the Plaintiff’s two traffic tickets were still outstanding. Along with the initial complaint, the Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification. The City filed a motion to dismiss on November 17, 2015, but on December 8 the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On December 28, the Court dismissed the Plaintiff’s pending motion for class certification as well as the City’s Motion to dismiss in light of the amended complaint. The City filed a new motion re-urging the court to dismiss the amended complaint and on January 11, 2016, the Plaintiff filed a new motion for class certification. On January 19, 2016, a stipulation was entered between the parties agreeing that the Court need not determine the Plaintiff’s motion for class certification at the time, and that any determination made would be after the completion of discovery. On March 15, 2016, District Judge Sam Sparks approved the City’s motion re-urging a motion to dismiss and dismissed the case without prejudice. The court agreed with the City’s argument that even if the Plaintiff’s allegations were taken as true (that Austin municipal judges failed in practice to appoint counsel and conduct indigency hearings), the judges were still performing their judicial functions, and those actions cannot constitute municipal policy. The rules governing a municipal judge’s response to an individuals’ inability to pay a fine and his/her ability to issue a warrant if the fine is not paid leaves discretion to the judge and does not mandate any particular action. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2015, an indigent single mother filed this Civil Rights Act of 1871 complaint in the District Court for the Western District of Texas (Austin Division). Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the city's policy of jailing those too poor to pay their traffic ticket fines violated fundamental rights to due process, equal protection and counsel. The court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that a magistrate judge's application of discretionary rules cannot constitute municipal policy. The case closed in March 2016.


On April 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Lauderdale County Detention Center in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming he was the victim of excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleged that the jail administrator and sheriff were individually liable for the actions of the corrections officers under supervisory liability. Specifically, on July 11, 2004, Corrections Officers pepper sprayed Plaintiff at close range after a verbal argument. The type of pepper spray was meant for crowd control. Plaintiff was then put in a poorly ventilated cell, where he could not wash off and was not provided medical care. Plaintiff could not breathe and Defendants mocked him. Plaintiff was given an insufficiently long shower, and was then placed in a group cell, where the pepper spray made his cellmates' eyes burn. For 12 hours, Plaintiff continued to have trouble breathing and was not provided medical care. Plaintiff was then released and his doctor treated him for chemical conjunctivitis in his eyes and irritant-induced bronchospasms in his lungs. Plaintiff complained to Defendant supervisors, the jail administrator and the sheriff, who approved of Defendants' actions. Plaintiff alleged a pattern of Defendant jail supervisors not investigating or punishing the use of pepper spray. On July 17, 2006, and on October 12, 2006, the Court (Judge Inge Prytz Johnson) denied Defendants' motions to dismiss. Defendants appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 8, 2007, Judges Frank M. Hull, Charles R. Wilson, and William H. Pryor vacated the District Court's order denying Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Court remanded for further consideration because the District Court had not explained why it had denied Defendants' motions to dismiss. Danley v. Allen [sic], 480 F.3d 1090, 1092 (11th Cir. 2007). District Court Judge Johnson again denied Defendants' motion to dismiss on April 24, 2007. The Court found that according to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendants were not justified in pepper-spraying Plaintiff and Defendant jail supervisors had created an atmosphere allowing the practices of the Defendant Corrections Officers. Danley v. Allen 485 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (N.D. AL 2007). Defendants appealed again on May 15, 2007. On August 22, 2008, 11th Circuit Judges Edward E. Carnes, Susan H. Black and Jane A. Restani affirmed the District Court's denial of Defendants' motions to dismiss. Danley v. Allyn, 540 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2008). The Court found that the initial spraying was not excessive. However, the Court found that Defendants' confining Plaintiff in a cell without medical treatment constituted excessive force. Furthermore, the Court found Defendants' mocking of Plaintiff circumstantial evidence of malicious intent. The Court also found that Plaintiff stated a claim against the Defendant supervisors because they had prior knowledge of corrections officers treating inmates in the same way. The parties reached a Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims. The agreement stated that pepper spray or OC spray meant for crowd control would no longer be used on individual inmates. The Detention Center would either implement a separate policy for using pepper spray meant for crowds in situations with multiple inmates or would destroy the pepper spray. The Settlement Agreement contained training requirements and requirements to update the policies for chemical and OC sprays, which would state that chemical sprays are not to be used to punish inmates. Each use of chemical or OC spray would be documented and investigated and inmates would be able to decontaminate properly after being sprayed. The agreement was to be accomplished within 90 days and during this time the District Court would maintain jurisdiction over the case. Defendants would provide policy changes to Plaintiff for review and documentation of the implementation of these requirements. Additional settlement terms were confidential. On March 17, 2009, Judge Johnson dismissed this case without prejudice, retaining jurisdiction in order to enforce the parties' settlement agreement.

Summary: On April 6, 2006, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Lauderdale County Detention Center in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. Plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming he was the victim of excessive force and deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.The parties reached a Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release of All Claims. The agreement stated that pepper spray or OC spray meant for crowd control would no longer be used on individual inmates. The Detention Center would either implement a separate policy for using pepper spray meant for crowds in situations with multiple inmates or would destroy the pepper spray. The Settlement Agreement also contained training requirements and requirements to update the policies for chemical and OC sprays, which would state that chemical sprays are not to be used to punish inmates. The case is closed.


Prison Legal News, a non-profit monthly publication that reports on criminal justice-related issues and a project of the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC), filed this lawsuit in in the United State District Court for the Eastern District of California in April 2011. According to the complaint, Sacramento County jail officials refused to deliver PLN's monthly publication to prisoners and failed to notify PLN of that censorship in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Jail officials argued that the publication presented a hazard because it has staples and mailing lables or stickers. On March 8, 2012, Judge John Mendez entered a preliminary injunction against the jail, noting the jail officials' "exaggerated response to any security concerns posed by PLN." On July 16, 2012, the parties reached a settlement and the judge issued a Consent Decree. The decree stated that the "Florida Department of Corrections is permanently enjoined from censoring Prison Legal News' written communications without due process of law. To comply with due process of law, this permanent injunction modifies the Florida Department of Corrections' current notification procedures as follows: (1) The Florida Department of Corrections must notify Prison Legal News when it first impounds a particular written communication by Prison Legal News. (2) The notification must specify the prison rule, including the subsection, purportedly violated and must indicate the portion of the communication that allegedly violates the cited regulation. (3) The Florida Department of Corrections does not have to notify Prison Legal News when copies of that same written communication are subsequently impounded, unless the subsequent impoundment decision is based on a different or additional reason not already shared with Prison Legal News. (4) The Florida Department of Corrections' Literature Review Committee must notify Prison Legal News of any final determination regarding written communication by Prison Legal News. (5) The Literature Review Committee's notification must provide the basis for its decision, including the specific prison rule violated and the portion of the communication that violates the cited regulation. (6) The Florida Department of Corrections does not have to notify Prison Legal News when copies of that same written communication are subsequently rejected, unless the subsequent rejection decision is based on a different or additional reason not already shared with Prison Legal News." All claims in this case have been adjudicated and the case is now closed.

Summary: Sacramento County jail officials refused to deliver the Prison Legal News to prisoners, claiming its staples and mailing stickers presented a hazard. The Court issued a preliminary injunction on March 8, 2012, ordering officials to deliver the publication to subscribers.


On April 29, 2016, a prisoner at the Waupun Correctional Institution (WCI) in Wisconsin, filed this pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington against the warden and other prison officials at WCI under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The original complaint named several other plaintiffs similarly situated in solitary confinement conditions, alleging that their First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights were being violated. The plaintiff described in his complaint that the administrative confinement unit conditions were harsh and unsanitary. Specifically, he described that cells were infested with insects, that the light in his cell was always on, that he was only allowed out of his cell four hours a week to access the recreation room, and that the recreation room was covered in urine and feces. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that prisoners in administrative confinement were subject to manipulation and assaults by the guards. The main plaintiff, who had been in administrative segregation for over 25 years, alleged that the isolating conditions at WCI caused him to develop serious mental illnesses. The plaintiff moved for class certification, preliminary injunction, and to be assigned counsel. All of these motions were denied by Judge Rudolph Randa on June 30, 2016. The judge denied class certification because under federal law pro se litigants are not allowed to represent other pro se litigants. In June, according to a  prison news website, the plaintiff went on a hunger strike to protest his administrative confinement. To convince the plaintiff to begin eating again, the warden agreed to recommend the plaintiff be moved to the Wisconsin Resource Center. On July 25, 2016, the plaintiff submitted an amended complaint that did not include the other plaintiffs. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff requested preliminary injunction, injunctive relief, declaratory judgment, and damages. Specifically, the plaintiff requested injunctive relief limiting the use of administrative confinement, allowing a pathway for prisoners in administrative confinement to move to the general population, and that the prison implement various accountability measures. The plaintiff also requested declaratory judgment acknowledging that his rights had been violated and that the administrative confinement was harmful and punitive in nature. And finally, the plaintiff requested both punitive and compensatory damages totaling $400,000 from each defendant. Due to the unavailability of Judge Randa, the case was reassigned to the Chief Judge William Griesbach. On November 2, 2016, the plaintiff was moved to the Wisconsin Resource Center where he had access to treatment and the possibility of moving to the general population. As a result, the Chief Judge dismissed his motion for preliminary injunction as moot. 2016 WL 6989795. The plaintiff’s motions to appoint counsel were consistently denied because, despite his mental illness, he had demonstrated he was able to file complaints. On June 8, 2017, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case because he was unable to effectively argue the case without counsel or an expert witness. On June 9, 2017, Judge Griesbach, granted the plaintiffs motion and dismissed the case without prejudice.

Summary: A prisoner in solitary confinement at the Waupun Correctional Institution in Wisconsin filed this lawsuit pro se against prison officials for violating his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. He alleged that the administrative confinement conditions were harsh, unsanitary, unsafe, and that manipulation and assaults by guards had caused him to develop a serious mental illness. The plaintiff requested damages of $400,000 in punitive and compensatory damages from each defendant, and injunctive relief to be removed from administrative confinement. After filing his complaint, the plaintiff was moved to the Wisconsin Resource Center where he had access to treatment and the possibility of being moved to the general population. On June 8, 2017, the plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the case because he was unable to effectively argue the case without counsel or an expert witness. The motion was granted the following day.


On October 25, 2016, the Youth Justice Coalition and two Los Angeles men filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Los Angeles had violated the two individual plaintiffs’ due process rights through its practices in obtaining and enforcing “gang injunctions.” They further claimed that the practice harmed the Youth Justice Coalition, by diverting valuable and limited resources from the Coalition’s mission in order to defend these individuals’ rights. The plaintiffs sued the City, the City Attorney, and the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department. In order to remedy these violations, the plaintiffs sought class certification; a declaration that the City’s gang injunction practices violated the United States Constitution and the California Constitution; temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the enforcement of gang injunctions; and attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to Judge Valerie Baker Fairbank. The complaint detailed the process of obtaining and enforcing gang injunctions, which had been pioneered by the City of Los Angeles. After identifying a target gang, the City would bring a civil action against the gang in a state court proceeding. Because gangs are not legally organized entities, this type of civil action invariably resulted in a default judgment against the named gang and its members. The resulting injunctions prohibited gang members from engaging in a variety of otherwise lawful activities, such as wearing certain clothing, appearing in public with friends and family, or carrying a cell phone. Violators of such injunctions could be (and frequently were) charged with contempt of court, punishable by six months in jail and a $1,000 fine. There were 46 separate gang injunctions covering as many as 10,000 residents of Los Angeles; in no case had the City had to litigate on the merits of a case before obtaining a gang injunction. The two individual plaintiffs had both been served with gang injunctions, and as a result, they had been forced to limit daily actions within their community. One plaintiff feared going out in public with his father, and the other chose to stop taking union jobs in a certain neighborhood for fear of being stopped by the police. On December 15, 2016, the court granted a joint stipulation dismissing the City Attorney and the Chief of Police as defendants. In exchange for this dismissal, the City agreed not to file any motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint. On January 27, 2017, the court granted one of the individual plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction barring the City from enforcing the gang injunction against him. That same day, the court granted a joint stipulation to stay the case, pending settlement discussions. The stay continued for several months as the parties continued to negotiate a settlement agreement and submit status reports. The stay was ultimately lifted on July 3, 2017, because the parties had determined that they could not come to agreement. The case was reassigned to Judge Virginia A. Phillips on July 21, 2017. Judge Phillips held a hearing on August 30, 2017, as to the second plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, which was granted on September 7, 2020. This injunction barred the City from enforcing the gang injunction against the second individual plaintiff. In October, the plaintiffs moved for class certification of “[a]ll persons currently, or who are in the future, subject to a Los Angeles Gang Injunction who were not named as defendants in or otherwise parties to the civil nuisance abatement action to obtain that injunction, and who do not have contempt proceedings for violation of an injunction currently proceeding against them.” The defendants agreed to this class definition on November 6, 2017. Early the next year, on January 29, 2018, the plaintiffs requested that the court expand the preliminary injunctions to cover all class members; the court granted this motion on March 15, 2018. 264 F.Supp.3d 1057. (By this point in time, the City had removed as many as 8,500 individuals from its list of people covered by its gang injunctions, presumably as a result of this and similar litigation; the class was therefore composed of approximately 1,500 members, rather than 10,000.) The City appealed the expanded preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2018. On November 7, 2019 (and again on January 8, 2020), after several months of mediation, the Ninth Circuit’s Mediator instructed the City to submit a motion or a stipulation to dismiss the appeal. When the City failed to submit the required motion or stipulation, the Ninth Circuit deemed the failure “a request for voluntary dismissal,” and dismissed the appeal on February 20, 2020. As of July 31, 2020, no further proceedings have occurred in the district court.

Summary: On October 25, 2016, Youth Justice Coalition and two Los Angeles men filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the City of Los Angeles, the City Attorney, and the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department for a policy of imposing gang injunctions. The district court imposed two preliminary injunctions barring the defendants from enforcing the gang injunctions as to the two individual plaintiffs in the case; it later expanded the injunction to cover a class of all Los Angeles residents covered by such injunctions. The City appealed that ruling to the Ninth Circuit; after nearly two years of mediation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal. As of July 31, 2020, further proceedings are pending in the district court.


On April 29, 2003, a woman represented by a group of private attorneys from New York and D.C. law firms filed a class action suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that the Clinton County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional blanket policy and/or practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Clinton County Jail, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband. Plaintiff alleged that the unconstitutional strip searches were conducted pursuant to a written policy up to October 24, 2003. Plaintiff further alleged that while the County's written policy was revised on October 24, 2003, corrections officers ignored the revised policy and continued to carry out the practice of blanket strip searches. Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary and punitive damages, and class certification. Defendants, the County and the Sheriff, answered by generally denying all allegations. Extensive discovery and litigation followed. On July 5, 2007, the District Court certified the case as a class action. The class consisted of all persons in either of two subclasses, A or B, who were placed into the custody of the Clinton County Jail after being charged with misdemeanors, violations, violations of probation or parole, traffic infractions, civil commitments or other minor crimes and were strip searched upon their entry into the Clinton County Jail pursuant to the policy, custom and practice of the Clinton County Sheriff's Department and the County of Clinton. Class A included those strip searched between February 28, 2003 and October 24, 2003, while Class B included those strip searched between October 24, 2003 and the date on which the Clinton County Sheriff's Department and/or the County of Clinton ceased, or was enjoined from, enforcing their unconstitutional policy. Mitchell v. County of Clinton, 2007 WL 1988716 (N.D. N.Y. July 05, 2007). A representative plaintiff was approved for class A and plaintiffs were granted leave, over defendants' objection, to name a representative plaintiff for class B. Mitchell v. County of Clinton, 2008 WL 85092 (N.D. N.Y. Jan. 07, 2008). On October 8, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to pay $1.15 million to the estimated 2,700 potential members of the plaintiff class. On December 4, 2009, Magistrate Judge David R. Homer released a final order granting approval of the class action settlement for all members of the class who did not opt out of the settlement. In addition, the representative member of each of the two subclasses received specific amounts of compensation, with $25,000 for the representative of Class A and $10,000 for the representative of Class B. The plaintiffs were also granted $324,730.93 in attorney's fees. The case is now closed.

Summary:
On April 29, 2003, a woman filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging that the Clinton County Sheriff's Department had an unconstitutional practice of strip searching all individuals who entered the Clinton County Jail, regardless of the crime for which they were charged and without reasonable suspicion that the individuals were concealing weapons or contraband.

On October 8, 2008, the parties reached a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the settlement, the defendants agreed to pay $1.15 million to the estimated 2,700 potential members of the plaintiff class. As of June 2009, the settlement is still undergoing the approval process of the court.


On September 4, 2003, female students, on behalf of themselves and all similarly situated individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. against West Chester University of Pennsylvania of the State System of Higher Education, also known as West Chester University. Plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that West Chester University had violated plaintiffs' statutory rights under Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and related regulations and interpretations, by discriminating on the basis of sex in intercollegiate athletics by failing effectively to accommodate the interests and abilities of women student athletes and potential student athletes, and by failing to accord women student athletes equal treatment and benefits. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the recent elimination of its women's gymnastics team perpetuated West Chester University's continuing violation of Title IX's standards. On November 12, 2003, the District Court (Judge Barclay Surrick) granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction directing defendants to reinstate the West Chester University women's gymnastics team. On May 7, 2004, the Court dismissed without prejudice all claims other than the claim that defendant violated Title IX when it sought to eliminate the women's gymnastics team as of the 2003-04 academic year. On March 31, 2006, the Court granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for awarding of attorneys' costs and fees, and awarded plaintiffs $148,472.59, which was to be paid by defendants. On April 24, 2007, the Court denied plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and amendment of attorneys' fees. The case was terminated on April 7, 2007.

Summary: In 2003, plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that West Chester University had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972 by discriminating on the basis of sex in intercollegiate athletics. On November 12, 2003, the Court granted plaintiffs' preliminary injunction directing defendants to reinstate the West Chester University women's gymnastics team, and on May 7, 2004, the Court dismissed all claims except that defendant had violated Title IX when it sought to eliminate the team. Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs on March 31, 2006. The case was closed on April 7, 2007.


In September of 2006, the EEOC Chicago District Office brought suit in United States District Court, Northern District of Illinois, against Roadway Express, Inc., a freight hauler. The suit alleged that the defendant subjected African-American employees to harassment and different terms and conditions of employment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Shortly thereafter, several of the employees intervened as plaintiffs bringing a class action suit. The defendant moved to dismiss the class claims in part. The motion was granted in part and denied in part; the intervenor-plaintiffs claims regarding job assignments were dismissed because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 2007 WL 2198363 (N.D.Ill. July 31, 2007). On September 29, 2009, an amended complaint was filed. The amended complaint elaborated on the first complaint in-depth, listed all parties and all allegations. On September 14, 2010, a preliminary order approving a consent decree was filed. On June 27, 2012, the consent decree was amended. The settlement enjoined Defendant from discriminating on the basis of race or retaliating against any employee who complained about race discrimination. It also awarded the class $10,000,000. On December 16, 2015, the court found that Defendant had complied with the consent decree and the case was closed.

Summary: In 2006, employees of an Illinois freight hauler filed a class action suit for discrimination on the basis of race. In 2012, the parties settled for $10 million.


On October 27, 2008, several first-time voters who were removed from voting rolls because they were incarcerated at the time of the election brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Ashland County Board of Election alleging violations of their due process and equal protection rights, as well as under state law for voter's registration. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the county violated state and federal law by removing them from the voting registration list without adequate procedure. The plaintiffs amended the complaint 2 days later to include an action under the First Amendment right to free speech. On October 31, 2008, the Court (Hon. Donald C. Nugent) denied plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, and dismissed their suit. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to stay pending appeal. On November 4, 2008, the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed the District Court's decisions regarding the federal claims, but reversed the lower court's decision regarding the state claim. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case to allow the plaintiffs would be able to quickly file a suit in state court, before they would run out of time to vote in the election. The plaintiffs refiled their lawsuit in state court, but the Court (Ronald P. Forsthoefel) dismissed plaintiffs' action. There is no information explaining the dismissal.

Summary: On October 27, 2008, several first-time voters who were removed from voting rolls because they were incarcerated at the time of the election brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against Ashland County Board of Election. After amending their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated their due process, equal protection and First Amendment rights, as well as state law for voting registration. On October 31, 2008, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio dismissed their suit, and four days later, the United States Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit affirmed the decisions regarding plaintiffs' federal claims. The Court of Appeals vacated the decision regarding the state law claim, and dismissed it to allow plaintiffs to file a state court claim in time to possibly receive relief before the election - the State Court (Ronald P. Forsthoefel) dismissed plaintiffs' action, but there is no information explaining the dismissal.


On April 15th, 2019, St. Vincent Catholic Charities (a Michigan foster care agency) and several of their volunteers filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) and related agencies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, claimed that the Attorney General and MDHHS had violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by threatening to terminate their state funding because they refused to certify same-sex couples as potential foster parents. St. Vincent had contracted with the State to provide foster care services, including evaluating and certifying prospective foster parents. Because of its religious beliefs, St. Vincent refused to perform evaluations or certifications of same-sex couples. It did, however, match children with same-sex couples who had been certified by other foster care agencies. The Michigan legislature passed a law in 2015 to protect St. Vincent’s right to continue this practice. But after the general election in 2018, the newly elected Attorney General threatened to terminate St. Vincent’s if it continued to refuse to certify same-sex couples. St. Vincent sought an injunction to stop the State from terminating its contracts. The dispute over St. Vincent's practices is longstanding. In 2017, the ACLU, on behalf of two same-sex couples, had sued the MDHHS for allowing St. Vincent to refer same-sex foster parents to other agencies based on religious objections. After the new Attorney General was elected, she settled the case with the ACLU. The settlement stipulated that State would prohibit all foster care agencies from turning away same sex-couples. Once St. Vincent initiated their suit, the ACLU moved on May 21st, 2019 to intervene in the case in order to enforce their settlement. Their motion to intervene was denied on June 4th, 2019 and is pending at the Sixth Circuit as of January, 2020. For more information on that case, see Dumont v. Lyon. In this suit, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction the day after the case was filed, and the case was assigned to Judge Robert J. Jonker. On September 26th, 2019, Judge Jonker granted St. Vincent’s request for a preliminary injunction, preventing the State from suspending their contract with St. Vincent. The Judge found that State’s actions were likely an attempt to regulate religious belief in violation of the First Amendment, rather than an attempt to prevent discrimination. The Judge raised the fact that St. Vincent had matched foster children with same-sex couples as evidence that St. Vincent’s conduct was not discriminatory. He also focused on statements made by the Attorney General during her election campaign—including describing the plaintiffs as “hate-mongers”—that the Judge thought indicated a bias against St. Vincent’s religious beliefs. Finally, the Judge held that the preliminary injunction would serve the public interest by allowing St. Vincent to continue to operate instead of burdening Michigan’s already stretched foster care system. The defendants filed a motion to stay the injunction on October 10th, 2019. Judge Jonker denied the stay on October 22, 2019. On January 6th, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to certify a question as to the proper interpretation of the 2015 law passed by the legislature to the Michigan Supreme Court because whether the law allowed the state to deny funding to the plaintiffs was “a foundational legal issue in this case.” As of January, 2020, a decision on that certification is pending. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 15th, 2019, St. Vincent Catholic Charities, a foster care agency, and several of their volunteers filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the Michigan Attorney General and the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services (MDHHS) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. St. Vincent, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, claimed that the Attorney General and MDHHS had violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Religious Freedom Act by penalizing them for refusing to perform home evaluations of same-sex prospective foster parents. St. Vincent refused to perform the evaluations because of their religious objections to same-sex marriage. On September 26th, 2019, Judge Robert J. Jonker issued a preliminary injunction in favor of St. Vincent, enjoining the State from penalizing them.


This lawsuit, brought on October 10, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenged President Trump's revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiffs were Santa Clara County and a labor union representing thousands of county employees, and they sought to enjoin the government from ending the program. Not only did the DACA recipients stand to lose benefits and security they had relied upon, but the plaintiffs argued that their employers and communities stood to lose the benefits these recipients provided to them. As a result, the plaintiffs contended that revoking DACA violated Fifth Amendment due process, equal protection, and the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought equitable estoppel, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. In 2012, the Obama administration created the DACA program via DHS policy statements. The program offered work permits and temporary protection from deportation to undocumented immigrants who had been brought to the United States as children. As of 2017, there were an estimated 800,000 DACA recipients. On September 5, 2017, President Trump announced that he was ending the program in March unless Congress acted within the next six months. As the complaint highlights, the Obama administration promoted DACA by making key promises to immigrants: that any information they provided in the application process would not be used for immigration enforcement, and that barring criminal activity or fraud in their DACA applications, DACA recipients would be able to renew their status and keep their benefits. The plaintiff Santa Clara stated that 38% of its residents are born outside of the U.S., and that its high immigrant population meant that DACA’s rescission would be particularly harmful to the county. The other plaintiff, Service Employees International Union Local 521 (Local 521), was a labor union that represents over 10,000 individuals employed by Santa Clara county. Local 521 joined the suit to protect the rights of its current and future members, and to act on their behalf. The plaintiffs argued that DACA recipients had come to rely on the program and on the assurances that their private application information would not be used against them, but that both their ability to receive important benefits and be safe from deportation were put in danger. The plaintiffs further argued that the government did not provide sound rationale for its decision to rescind DACA, and that this decision was clearly driven by racial animus. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Howard R. Lloyd. On October 16, the case was related to the other DACA cases under Judge William Alsup. This case was also reassigned to him. The related cases are: State of California v. Department of Homeland Security (No. 17-cv-5235), Garcia v. USA (No. 17-cv-5380), City of San Jose v. Trump (No. 17-cv-05329), and Regents of the University of California v. Department of Homeland Security (No. 17-cv-05211); all of which are in this Clearinghouse. On October 6, in a related challenge led by Regents of University of California before this judge, the government filed the administrative record, available here, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA—from its inception to the decision to rescind it. On October 17, after the University in the related case moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, the court ordered them to do so in all related cases, including this one. The court found that the defendants did not produce all documents leading to the rescission, specifically documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. On October 18, the defendants moved to stay further proceedings at this court in light of their intent to appeal this ruling to the Ninth Circuit. The court declined to enter a stay, and the defendants appealed by filing a petition for a writ of mandamus to the district court and emergency motion for stay. On October 23, the district court replied to the Ninth Circuit's invitation to answer the government's petition stating it would not stay proceedings in light of the narrow window of time until the DACA was scheduled to end on March 5, 2018. On November 16, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for a writ of mandamus and vacated the stay of discovery and record expansion that had been entered. The District Court immediately ordered the federal government to file an augmented administrative record by November 22. On November 17, the federal government filed an emergency motion noting that it intended to file an application for mandamus with the Supreme Court, and requesting that the Ninth Circuit stay its order pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the forthcoming petition. On November 21, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the federal government's motion, noting that jurisdiction was with the District Court and instructing the federal government that further relief must be sought in a new petition for mandamus. Meanwhile, in the District Court, Judge Alsup on November 20 agreed to stay all discovery until December 22, at which point the augmented administrative record was due. On December 1, 2017, the government filed notice that they appealed the Ninth's Circuit denial of mandamus relief and applied for a stay to the Supreme Court. On December 21 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit's denial and remanded the case, arguing that the district court should have stayed implementation of the October 17 order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. The Supreme Court stated that the lower court should have "first resolved the Government’s threshold arguments" (that the Acting Secretary’s determination to rescind DACA was unreviewable because it was "committed to agency discretion," 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2), and that the Immigration and Nationality Act deprived the District Court of jurisdiction). "Either of those arguments, if accepted, likely would eliminate the need for the District Court to examine a complete administrative record." 138 S.Ct. 443 (2017). The same day, the district court stayed the order compelling the government to complete the administrative record. On January 9, 2018, the court denied the government's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction from November 2017 and provided provisional relief to the plaintiffs. The order indicated the court would separately dismiss the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court ordered a nationwide preliminary injunction, ordering that DACA remain in effect on the same terms and conditions that existed prior to the rescission. However, the government did not need to process new applications from individuals who never before received deferred action. The court then granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss on January 12, dismissing the plaintiffs' Regulatory Flexibility Act and equitable estoppel claims, as well as the individual plaintiffs' declaratory relief claims. The court sustained the plaintiffs' APA, due process, and equal protection claims (with a few exceptions from the various complaints of the related cases). The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit one week later. The government also sought certiorari from the Supreme Court on January 18 while the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, arguing that the Supreme Court's immediate review was warranted because of how long the appeal would take in the Ninth Circuit and how time sensitive the issue was. The Supreme Court denied cert without prejudice on February 26, 2018, indicating the justices assumed "that the Court of Appeals will proceed expeditiously to decide this case." The related cases were consolidated in the Ninth Circuit for the purposes of appeal. In February and March 2018, the parties and amici filed their briefs, which can be found here. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on November 8, 2018. The panel held that the government's decision to rescind DACA was reviewable because it was based on a belief that law foreclosed any alternative because the agency lacked authority rather than an exercise of discretion. The panel further concluded the decision was reviewable because the government based rescission only on the belief that DACA went beyond DHS' authority and so the APA's bar did not apply, and the decision did not fall within the three discrete occasions when the INA bars judicial review of DHS decisions. As to the merits of preliminary injunction, the panel held that "DACA was a permissible exercise of executive discretion" and the government's belief that DACA was illegal was wrong. 908 F.3d 476. Thus, the panel concluded the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in showing that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The panel also held that a nationwide injunction was appropriate because it "promotes uniformity in immigration enforcement, and is necessary to provide the plaintiffs here with complete redress." Id. The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5, 2018. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in three DACA cases: Regents of University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen, and NAACP v. Trump, all of which were pending before different circuit courts of appeal. The Court consolidated the three cases (No. 18-587). The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA, that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program, and that the rescission was unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious in violation fo the APA. 140 S. Ct. 1891. Following the Supreme Court's decision, in another case challenging the DACA recession, Casa De Maryland v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate to reinstate DACA and set aside the recession memo on a nationwide basis on June 30, 2020. On July 17, 2020, the District Court of Maryland ordered DHS to reinstate DACA as it existed before the issuance of the recession memo and ordered DHS to resume accepting initial DACA applications. However, Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf instead issued a memorandum entitled "Reconsideration of the June 15, 2012 Memorandum Entitled 'Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children" on July 28, 2020 ("Wolf Memorandum"). In this memo, Acting Secretary Wolf stated that he would reconsider DACA's future in light of the Supreme Court's decision. In the interim, the memo instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. Later in August, Deputy Director for Policy for USCIS Joseph Edlow issued a memorandum implementing the Wolf Memorandum. On August 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2020. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs substituted some of the defendants to reflect new individuals occupying the relevant roles and to add additional responsible officials, including Deputy Director for Policy Edlow. The amended complaint argued that Acting Secretary Wolf's actions were invalid under the Federal Vacancies Reform Action, Homeland Security Act, and the Appointments Clause of the Constitution because he lacked proper authority to issue the Wolf Memorandum. In addition, the plaintiffs argued that the Wolf Memorandum and Edlow Memorandum violated the APA because Wolf and Edlow acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and an injunction preventing the defendants from altering or limiting DACA program and vacating the Wolf and Edlow Memoranda. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in another case challenging the Wolf Memorandum,Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump, ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017 after it found that Acting Secretary Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary. The order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. Then, in early 2021, President Biden took office. On the day of his inauguration (January 20, 2021), President Biden signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” In light of potential additional agency action to implement the memorandum, the parties filed a joint stipulation to stay further proceedings and vacate pending deadlines on March 22, 2021. They agreed to provide the court with status updates every 60 days. The first is due May 24, 2021. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Santa Clara County and a labor union filed this lawsuit on October 10, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging President Trump's revocation of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). The plaintiffs argued that revoking DACA violated due process, equal protection, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction to keep DACA in place, which was later affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The government petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for review and oral argument was heard on Nov. 12, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further action consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court. DHS then issued a memorandum on July 28, 2020, stating that Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf would reconsider DACA's future and in the interim, instructed USCIS to reject all initial requests for DACA, to only grant advance parole to current DACA beneficiaries in exceptional circumstances, and grant DACA renewals for only one-year, rather than two-year, periods. In response to the Wolf Memorandum, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, arguing that Wold did not have the authority to issue the memo and that Wolf's actions were arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. Before any additional activity on the amended complaint in this case, on December 4, the court in Batalla Vidal v. Nielsen and State of New York v. Trump ordered DHS to fully reinstate DACA as it existed prior to the attempted recession in September 2017. On December 7, 2020, USCIS updated its website to indicate that effective that day it would accept initial DACA applications, extend renewals to two years, and accept applications for advance parole. On January 20, 2021, President Biden took office and signed a memorandum directing DHS and the Attorney General “to preserve and fortify DACA.” The parties agreed to stay the proceedings pending the implementation of this memorandum. As of May 14, 2021, this case is ongoing.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by Johns Hopkins University regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. In a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. Johns Hopkins later voluntarily dismissed the university's claims.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit In response to the new directive, Johns Hopkins University filed this lawsuit on July 10, 2020, represented by private counsel. The University sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Plaintiffs argued that the new directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in a number of ways. First, the complaint asserted that the new directive was arbitrary and capricious, because it did not give a reasoned basis for the new action nor consider important elements of the problem and it failed to consider important reliance interests established since the original exemption in March. Second, the university asserted that the new directive violated the APA because it did not actually rescind or even amend the previous order, and was therefore in contradiction of established law, violating the APA. Third, the university claimed that this new directive did not follow the proper procedure, because defendants failed to abide by notice-and-comment rule-making procedures when issuing the order. The university also asserted the directive violated due process because it constituted deprivation of property without any notice or opportunity to be heard and it left no indication as to how the university and its international students could retain their visas. Finally, the complaint asserted that the order violated guarantees of academic freedom under the First Amendment. The university sought injunctive relief in the form of a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction prohibiting the government from enforcing the directive. They also sought an order vacating and setting aside the directive, as well as declaratory relief. The university also sought attorney's fees and costs. On July 13, the university submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the government from enforcing the directive. That same day, the case was assigned to Judge Dabney L. Friedrich. Judge Friedrich instructed defendants to file a response to Johns Hopkins' motion for a temporary restraining order by the next day, July 14. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, President and Fellows of Harvard College, the parties conferred and the government agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. The court denied the university's motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction as moot on July 14. On October 6, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as moot and the university filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 20, 2020.

Summary: Johns Hopkins University commenced this lawsuit against DHS and ICE after a July 6 directive by ICE that would effectively force international students at American universities to take in-person classes or risk deportation. The lawsuit alleged that the directive violated the Administrative Procedure Act as well as Due Process rights and academic freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. The lawsuit sought injunctive relief prohibiting the government from enforcing the new order, declaratory relief that would call the order illegal, an order vacating and setting aside the directive, and attorney's fees and costs. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. The university voluntarily dismissed its claims on October 20, 2020.


In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed three statutes modifying the State's Medicaid plan. Under the Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., such modifications must be approved by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) prior to being implemented. In September and December 2008, California submitted amendment proposals to CMS that incorporated most of the rate reductions the Legislature had already included in these statutes. Before CMS had completed its review of the amendments, this suit and several others seeking injunctions to prevent the rate reductions were filed. The plaintiffs in this case were a group of several associations of California medical professionals, pharmacies, and hospitals. On January 29, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Central District of California against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. Private counsel represented the plaintiffs in this action and the Attorney General of California represented the defendant. The group of plaintiffs sought an injunction to invalidate the cutbacks to California's Medicaid program ("Medi-Cal") mandated by the State Legislature. On September 18, 2008, Governor Schwarzenegger had signed into law AB 1183, which included a five percent rate reduction for payments to certain intermediate care facilities under the Medi-Cal fee-for-service program, a five percent rate reduction to payments to pharmacies and adult day health care, and a one percent rate reduction for all other Medi-Cal fee-for-service benefits. This amended an earlier law, which had a higher, 10 percent rate reduction and had been struck down by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California in Independent Living Center of Southern California v. Shewry. (see related case PB-CA-0016) The plaintiffs in the instant case alleged that AB 1183 violated Title XIX, because they had not been approved by CMS and because the State had failed to study the potential effects of the rate reductions on the quality of and level of access to care available to Medi-Cal recipients. Plaintiffs argued that California had not shown that, were the rate reductions to go into effect, the State would be able to enlist enough providers as to make Medi-Cal services sufficiently available to benefit recipients, as required by 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(30)(A). The plaintiffs alleged that because these rate reductions violated federal Medicaid law they were therefore preempted by the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to find that AB 1183 was in violation of federal law and to prevent its enforcement. On February 11, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of rate reductions for pharmacies and adult day health care centers. A second motion for preliminary injunction followed on February 13, 2009 regarding the rate reductions for hospital services. On March 9, 2009, Judge Christina Snyder issued orders on these motions for preliminary injunction granting the motion as to adult health care centers and denying the motion as to hospitals. For the motion relating to hospitals, Judge Snyder found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits but had not shown a likelihood of irreparable harm. Cal. Pharmacists Assoc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 630 F.Supp.2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The defendants and plaintiffs then appealed the orders granting preliminary injunction and denying preliminary injunction, respectively, to the Ninth Circuit. On April 6, 2009, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court had abused its discretion in not granting the preliminary injunction as to hospitals and granted the plaintiff's motion for stay pending appeal. On March 3, 2010, the Ninth Circuit found that in implementing the rate reductions the State had not relied on responsible costs studies or studied the impact of the contemplated rate changes prior to setting the rates, and was therefore in violation of 42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(30)(A). The Ninth Circuit, therefore, affirmed the district court's order granting the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Cal. Pharmacists Assoc. v. Maxwell-Jolly, 563 F.3d 847 (9th Cir. 2009). In light of this, on April 16, 2010, Judge Snyder issued an order vacating her March 9, 2009 order and granting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction with regard to hospitals. On March 24, 2010, the defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution could serve as a basis for a cause of action in this case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review on January 18, 2011, consolidating this case with four others that raised the same issue, 131 S.Ct. 992 (2011). These four cases were Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry (Clearinghouse case code PB-CA-0016), Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly (PB-CA-0019), Dominguez v. Schwarzenegger (DR-CA-0031), and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Shewry (Docket #: 3:08-cv-05173-SC). On June 1, 2011, Judge Snyder issued an order removing this action from the list of active District Court cases pending the decision of the Supreme Court. Oral argument before the Supreme Court took place on October 3, 2011. After oral argument, while the cases were pending in the Supreme Court, CMS approved California's amendments to its Medicaid plan. In light of this change, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce Title XIX against a state. Instead, on February 22, 2012, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, with instructions to take into account CMS's approval of the amendments. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2012). Back in the Ninth Circuit, on May 22, 2012, the plaintiffs, joined by parties in other Ninth Circuit cases, filed a unanimous joint motion to refer parties to mediation. That motion was granted on the same day, and parties began mediation on May 25, 2012. On September 16, 2013, the caption of the case was changed to reflect that Toby Douglas was the Director of the Department of Health Care Services, and David Maxwell-Jolly’s name was omitted. After a span of two years of mediation, the parties negotiated a settlement. On May 27, 2014 the plaintiffs, joined by parties in other Ninth Circuit cases, filed a joint motion to dismiss each of the cases voluntarily, with each side bearing its own costs and fees on appeal. The motion was granted and the appeals dismissed on May 28, 2014. The settlement itself was executed in April 2014, and was submitted to the district court for approval on August 19, 2014. Judge Snyder granted the motion, approving the settlement agreement on September 22, 2014, and dismissed the case with prejudice on April 23, 2015. Under the settlement agreement, the Department of Health Care Services and its Director (collectively, “the Department”) agreed to forgo recoupment claims against Medi-Cal providers arising out of the preliminary injunctions in these cases, except with respect to Medi-Cal providers who are not represented here and choose to opt out of the settlement agreement, the plaintiff hospitals in Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Maxwell-Jolly (Docket No. 08-CV-5173-SC), Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Douglas (Docket No. CPF-09-509658), and North Bay Healthcare Group v. Douglas (Docket No. CGC-11-512059), and any providers who institute a new suit or fail to dismiss a pending suit or administrative action under AB 5 or AB 1183 rate reductions. The plaintiffs agreed to release state and federal entities from liability relating to the rate reductions, excluding claims about the Department’s accuracy in calculating reimbursement. The Department released the plaintiffs from liability relating to any payments not made while the rate reductions were enjoined, but where federal approval from CMS was ultimately obtained or where the Department withdrew its requests for approval regarding proposed amendments from CMS. The district court retained jurisdiction over the enforcement of this order until January 1, 2016.

Summary: In 2008 and 2009, the California Legislature passed three statutes modifying the State's Medicaid plan. Under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, such modifications must be approved by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS") prior to being implemented. In September and December 2008, California submitted amendment proposals to CMS that incorporated most of the rate reductions the State Legislature had included in the statutes. Before CMS had completed its review the amendments, this suit, and several others seeking injunctions to prevent the rate reductions were filed. The plaintiffs in this case, a group of associations of California medical professionals, pharmacies, and hospitals, filed suit in federal court on January 29, 2009 against the Director of the Department of Health Care Services of the State of California. The plaintiffs alleged that because these rate reductions violated federal Medicaid law they were preempted by the Supremacy Clause. The plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The Trial Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the rate reductions for adult health care centers and denied one motion for hospitals. These decisions were appealed to the Ninth Circuit. The Appellate Court found that the preliminary injunction regarding hospitals should have been granted as well. On March 24, 2010, the defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court granted review, hearing the case together with four related cases. While the cases were pending before the Supreme Court, CMS approved California's amendments to its Medicaid plan. The Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for the suit and instead remanded the cases to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration on February 22, 2012. At the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs moved for mediation with the defendants, and after two years of mediation, they came to a settlement agreement, executed in April 2014 and approved on September 22, 2014. In exchange for the plaintiffs releasing liability for claims relating to the statutory rate reductions of 2008 and 2009, the defendants would not seek recoupment for payment owed by the plaintiffs under the overturned injunction. The district court retained jurisdiction over this settlement agreement until January 1, 2016.


On May 30, 2008, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) conducted a CRIPA investigation of the Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta (GRHA) and recorded several statutory violations. The DOJ concluded that numerous conditions and practices at GRHA violated the constitutional and statutory rights of its residents. In particular, the DOJ found that GRHA: (1) failed to adequately protect its patients from harm; (2) failed to provide appropriate mental health treatment; (3) failed to use seclusion and restraints appropriately; (4) failed to provide adequate nursing and health care; (5) failed to provide adequate services to populations with specialized needs; and (6) failed to provide adequate discharge planning to ensure placement in the most integrated setting. Then, on January 15, 2009, the DOJ conducted another CRIPA investigation, this time of the Northwest Georgia Regional Hospital in Rome. In this investigation, it established the same list of violations it found in its May 30, 2008 investigation. As a result, the DOJ filed this lawsuit against the State of Georgia on January 15, 2009 in the Northern District Court of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Charles A. Pannell, Jr. The U.S. alleged that the services, protections, support, and treatment provided by the GRHA, which housed individuals with developmental disabilities, mental illness, and addictive diseases, was below professional standards and standards required by federal law. The complaint sought injunctive relief to remedy several areas in which the facility's services departed from acceptable standards, including the prevention of abuse and neglect, the provision of mental health services, general healthcare, nutrition, and the provision of physical therapy. The U.S. brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), alleging that Georgia had failed to meet its obligation to provide appropriate services to individuals with disabilities in the most integrated setting possible, to provide adequate special education services where appropriate, or to ensure the inclusion of those with limited English skills. The U.S. also brought claims under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Titles XVIII and XIX of the Social Security Act ("SSA"), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On the same day the U.S. filed its complaint, the parties submitted a negotiated settlement agreement. The proposed Agreement applied to all Georgia Psychiatric Hospitals and included extensive provisions aimed at the following: 1) protecting patients from harm; 2) improving mental health care; 3) improving treatment planning; 4) eliminating the use of seclusion or restraint except in the case of specific emergencies; 5) improving medical and nursing care; 6) developing service programs for patients with specialized needs, such as limited English proficiency; and 7) pursuing discharge planning whenever possible. The Agreement proposed several methods through which these areas would be improved, including staff training, the creation and implementation of protocols and policies, and monitoring. The parties asked the court to retain jurisdiction over the matter during the period of enforcement. On February 11, 2009, Judge Charles A. Pannell issued an order adopting the proposed settlement agreement on a temporary basis. Soon afterward, on March 2, 2009, private individuals and Georgia Advocacy, Inc. filed objections to the proposed Agreement. In sum, these stakeholders argued that the Agreement failed to indicate any plan through which the State would reach the goals it set out to achieve. As such, the stakeholders argued that it was nothing but a promise by the State to "do better." Accordingly, they sought that the parties include a "meaningful and concrete corrective action plan" before approving the Settlement Agreement. The parties and stakeholders met to discuss the issue and, on June 12, 2009, the United States filed a status report explaining that all interested parties had agreed the State would work with the U.S. and stakeholders to create an implementation plan, which it would submit along with its first compliance report. Given these new terms, on September 30, 2009, the court ordered that the parties submit a new proposed agreement, prompting another round of negotiations. On January 28, 2010, the U.S. filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. The U.S. alleged that defendant continued to fail to serve individuals in their hospitals in the most integrated setting possible and that those individuals continued to face an unacceptable risk of serious physical harm—including death, suicide, and assault—due to inadequate services. Among other things, the U.S. asked that the State be required to immediately take steps to place individuals in the most integrated setting possible, that an independent monitor be appointed promptly to monitor the State's progress toward implementing the proposed Order, and that the monitor issue an action plan within one month of appointment. The motion also indicated that, given the uncertain status of the Settlement Agreement and the defendant's failure to implement its terms, the U.S. did not intend to renew the motion to finalize the Settlement Agreement. Instead, along with the motion for a preliminary injunction, it filed a Complaint in a separate case (PB-GA-0004) and moved to file an Amended Complaint in the ongoing case. The U.S. sought to consolidate the two cases and indicated that together, they would provide relief the U.S. requested. The Complaint in the new case was brought under the ADA, while the proposed Amended Complaint in the existing case was brought under CRIPA. In response, on February 15, 2010, the defendant filed to enforce the Settlement Agreement, arguing that it was binding as a temporary order of the court. While all of these motions were pending, on August 9, 2010, Judge Pannell ordered the parties to begin discovery. On September 23, 2010, Judge Pannell denied plaintiff's motions to amend the Complaint and consolidate the cases. The court ordered that the 2009 proposed Settlement Agreement would be adopted as a final order, and explained that the issues the U.S. sought to remedy through an Amended Complaint could instead be addressed through the Complaint filed under the new case in January 2010 ("the 2010 case"). The court also explained that the two cases should remain separate to maintain judicial efficiency and avoid confusion. As for the motion for a preliminary injunction, the court found that because the Settlement Agreement did not address issues related to the immediate relief requested, the U.S. should refile the motion in the 2010 case. On October 19, 2010, the parties jointly moved to return the case to the court's inactive docket and retain jurisdiction only to enforce the Settlement Agreement. The court granted the motion on October 21. On February 5, 2014, the parties notified the court that the Settlement Agreement had terminated on January 15, 2014. The parties indicated that the State had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the Agreement and explained that they would continue to pursue discharge and planning goals through the Agreement reached in the 2010 case. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on February 28, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: Plaintiff, the U.S. Department of Justice, brought filed this lawsuit against the State of Georgia in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on January 15, 2009, following an investigation into conditions and services provided at Georgia Regional Hospital of Atlanta. The U.S. alleged that the Hospital was providing grossly inadequate services to individuals housed there who had developmental and mental disabilities and that, consequently, individuals in the Hospital faced serious risk of harm. Along with the Complaint, the parties filed a proposed Settlement Agreement aimed at improving these conditions over a period of five years. After a series of setbacks, the Agreement was adopted as a final order of the court on September 23, 2010. The case was dismissed in February of 2014 after the parties notified the court that Georgia had achieved substantial compliance with the terms of the Agreement.


On March 16, 1984, the United States filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq, against the State of Indiana, the Indiana Department of Mental Health (IDMH), and officers of various state agencies, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The government asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, alleging that conditions at Logansport State Hospital (LSH) and Central State Hospital (CSH) constituted unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Specifically, it contended that the defendants failed to provide sufficient staff, keep adequate records, provide adequate residential care, adequately communicate medical information to staff, maintain an adequate physical environment, prescribe and administer psychotropic medication safely, employ measures assuring the quality of residential care, adequately protect residents for risks associated with telephone orders, and adequately monitor and review pro re nata prescriptions of psychotropic medications. Previously, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) notified the Governor of Indiana on June 16, 1982, and on October 6, 1983, of its intention to investigate alleged unconstitutional conditions at the institutions. State officials cooperated with these investigations and indicated, from the outset, a willingness to remedy long outstanding deficiencies at the institutions. The Governor created a Commission on Directions in Mental Health and the General Assembly appropriated a large increase in funding for capital projects in state hospitals. Consequently, state and federal officials determined to negotiate a settlement agreement rather than engage in protracted litigation. The same day as the complaint was filed, March 16, 1984, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement established (1) general principles and (2) protocols with respect to (a) increased minimum staffing, (b) monitoring the advance of objectives including staff attendance, record keeping, quality of care, staff communication, medication administration, and restraints and seclusion, (c) monitoring plans for implementation of the agreement, and (d) monitoring compliance. On April 6, 1984, the District Court (Judge James E. Noland) approved the consent decree. Judge Nolan ordered that the decree was binding on all parties and that defendants had to give full access to the DOJ to inspect for compliance, and provided that the Court would retain jurisdiction of the matter, enabling any party to apply for further orders as necessary to ensure compliance. We have no more information on this case.

Summary: On March 16, 1984, the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §1997 et seq. The DOJ alleged that the defendants, the state of Indiana and two state hospitals, had failed to provide adequate care and an adequate environment to the people living in the hospital. On April 6, 1984, the court approved a consent degree designed to improve these issues.