On February 14, 2012, a group of minority Boston City police officers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the City of Boston. The plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that police promotional exams used in 2008 to promote sergeants to lieutenants had a disparate impact on black and latino officers. The plaintiffs contended that the multiple-choice examinations used were unfairly biased against minority candidates and failed to measure certain other job-related skills (for example, interpersonal skills) that are necessary for the position of lieutenant. The case was originally assigned to Judge Joseph L. Tauro of the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Various extensions of time and stays were granted. On December 26, 2013, Judge Tauro took senior status and was replaced on the case by Judge William G. Young. In January 2014, Judge Young set a trial date for December 2014. The bench trial began on December 15, 2014, and concluded on January 7, 2015. In May 2015, both parties submitted post-trial briefs with proposed findings of fact. On November 16, 2015, Judge Young issued his decision, ruling that the 2008 promotional exam did unfairly disadvantage minority candidates and was insufficiently job-related to survive scrutiny under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On February 1, 2016, before beginning a jury trial for damages, both parties agreed to enter mediation with goal of settling upon appropriate remedies and damages. The assigned meditator, Judge Robert B. Collings, filed a report on June 9, 2016, stating that the parties did not settle. Settlement negotiations were complicated by the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in May 2016 in the related case of Lopez v. City of Lawrence, which held that the 2008 police promotional exams did not violate Title VII. As a result, the plaintiffs and defendant jointly sought interlocutory review. Judge Young granted this motion, and certified the question to the First Circuit on July 9, 2016. The First Circuit denied the joint motion for interlocutory review without prejudice pending the District Court's application of Lopez to the facts of this case. Following briefing by both parties on Lopez's application to this case, Judge Young affirmed his prior determination in favor of the plaintiffs on July 26, 2017. Noting the factual differences between this case and Lopez, Judge Young found that the City had failed to show that the test was job-related to the position of lieutenant and consistent with "business necessity." On August 11, 2017, Judge Young granted the plaintiffs' renewed motion for interlocutory review, and the issue returned to the First Circuit. However, after more than a year of the case pending review, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the district court on April 11, 2019. Six days later, on April 17, 2019, the First Circuit denied permission to appeal. The district court reopened the case on May 7, 2019. On May 22, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification. They also filed a motion in limine to preclude evidence and testimony from defendant's 2014 promotional exam. After a motion hearing on June 13, 2019, Judge Young denied class certification but expressed no opinion on whether or not others may join as plaintiffs. On July 1, 2019, he also denied the motion in limine. Several plaintiffs moved to intervene, but the court denied these motions on September 24, 2019. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that same day, alleging one Title VII disparate impact claim and one state-law disparate impact claim. They again sought class certification. As of May 22, 2020, the defendants have filed an answer but discovery has been limited while the parties conduct the damages proceedings from the previous action. The damages trial began on October 28, 2019. The remaining issued were whether there was a binding presumption that entitled the plaintiffs to back pay and, if so, whether Boston had successfully rebutted that presumption by introducing evidence of scores from the new exam given in 2014. The court issued an order on the outcome of the trial on May 13, 2020, finding that there was a binding presumption, but that the defendants had successfully rebutted it. 2020 WL 2475644. As of May 22, 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: In February 2012, a group of minority polices officers filed suit against the City of Boston alleging that police promotional exams used in 2008 were unfairly biased against minority candidates and violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In November 2015, Judge William G. Young ruled that the promotional exams did indeed violate Title VII and were unfairly biased against black and latino officers. In February 2016, the police officers and the City of Boston entered mediation to determine remedies and damages. However, the First Circuit ruling in Lopez v. City of Lawrence in May 2016 held the 2008 promotional exam did not violate Title VII. Consequently, the parties jointly sought interlocutory review which was granted and certified by Judge Young to the First Circuit in July 2016. After the First Circuit directed Judge Young to reconsider the case in light of its ruling in Lopez, Judge Young affirmed his original decision for the plaintiffs. Judge Young then granted the parties' joint motion for interlocutory review in August 2017. There has been no further docket activity since that time.


This class action challenged President Trump's January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO-1) which prohibited admission to the US for nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The plaintiffs commenced this lawsuit on February 7, 2017, in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU of Washington and private counsel. On November 29, 2017, this case was consolidated with <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=16295"Jewish Family Service of Seattle v. Trump, No. C17-1707JLR. Although another suit challenging the EO had been filed in Washington on January 30, 2017, this claim specifically sought to protect non-immigrant visa holders – primarily students – who were either trapped inside the United States unable to leave with assurance that they would be able to return, or stuck abroad. The complaint acknowledged that the Temporary Restraining Order granted by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in States of Washington and Minnesota v. Trump provided plaintiffs temporary relief, but argued that the chaotic rollout of EO-1 along with the temporary nature of the extant order left the plaintiffs in limbo. The complaint alleged that EO-1 violated Fifth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The complaint sought class certification and an injunction barring the government from enforcing the order against non-immigrant visa holders. On February 10, the case was assigned to Judge James Robart, who was also presiding over States of Washington and Minnesota v. Trump. Prompted by adverse developments in the 9th Circuit in Washington v. Trump, on March 6, 2017, President Trump rescinded EO-1 and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). On March 14, the plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, that asserted a class-action claim on behalf of Washington residents who were 1) nationals of the Designated Countries with 2) non-immigrant visas who 3) did not have unexpired multiple-entry visas. The amended complaint also asserted a claim on behalf of refugees and asylees who 1) "now reside" in Washington and who had 2) filed derivative applications for family members who have "completed and cleared their final security screenings as of the effective date of the Revised Order." The amended complaint challenged the EO-2 on First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, RFRA, INA, and APA grounds. On April 10, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order to extend deadlines. On April 11, the individual plaintiffs filed a series of declarations and a motion for class certification. Another lawsuit challenging EO-2, Hawaii v. Trump, led to a March 15, 2017, preliminary injunction against its enforcement; the government appealed the injunction on March 30, and the Ninth Circuit scheduled expedited briefing, with argument to take place on May 15. In this case, on April 11, the court adjusted the deadlines in light of those developments. On April 26, the court entered the parties' joint stipulation that the government need not respond to the plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and that the plaintiffs would file a Second Amended Complaint before May 8, with the defendants' response due by May 22. On May 8, the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. On May 22, Judge Robart directed the parties to file memoranda explaining why the case should not be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in Hawaii. On May 26, the parties filed a joint stipulation agreeing that a stay would be appropriate and agreed that all deadlines, including the Defendants' deadlines to respond to the Second Amended Complaint and class certification moment, should be so stayed. On May 30, Judge Robart directed that all proceedings in the case should be stayed pending the Ninth Circuit's resolution of the Hawaii appeal. The parties agreed to file a joint status report by July 14. On July 13, the parties filed a joint status report agreeing that the stay should remain in place until the conclusion of the Supreme Court proceedings in Hawaii and IRAP. On November 2, the parties filed a stipulation and proposed order to lift the stay of proceedings, which the court granted that day. On November 6, the plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint and accompanying motion for a preliminary injunction. Amended plaintiffs were refugees and asylees in Washington who had filed petitions to reunify with their family members; the Episcopal Diocese of Olympia, a religious entity which supports refugee resettlement in Washington; and the Council on American-Islamic Relations-Washington ("CAIR-WA"), a non-profit that promotes community understanding of Islam through dialogue, education, civil liberties protection, and coalition-building. On November 21, the court ordered the plaintiffs to show cause as to why the current case should not be consolidated with a case filed on related grounds, Jewish Family Service of Seattle v. Trump. Eight days later, the parties agreed that the cases could be consolidated so long as the actions retain their separate character, the parties to one action would not be designated as parties to the other, the parties could continue to file separate briefings so long as they were not duplicative, and consolidation would not affect the parties' page limits. That same day, the court consolidated the two cases and the Doe plaintiffs joined the Jewish Family Service ("JFS") plaintiffs' preliminary injunction motion. On December 23, the court granted the Doe plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, restraining the defendants from suspending the processing of "following-to-join" ("FTJ") refugee applications. The court also granted the JFS plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, restraining the defendants from suspending the processing of refugee applications of refugees from countries on the Security Advisory Opinion list ("SAO countries"), but limited the scope of the injunction to those refugees who have a bona fide relationship with a person or entity in the United States. On December 27, the government filed a motion for reconsideration. In response, the court ordered plaintiffs in the consolidated cases to file a joint response to the defendants' motion. 288 F. Supp. 3d 1045. The government then filed an emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction on December 29, ultimately appealing the grant of the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit on January 4, 2018. On January 5, 2018, the district court denied the government's motion for reconsideration. 284 F. Supp. 3d 1182. That same day, the defendants filed a notice requesting that the court, in considering the stay motion, specifically consider whether to stay only that portion of the preliminary injunction order that enjoined defendants from enforcing the challenged provisions of EO-3 against refugee applicants whose sole connection to the U.S. was through resettlement assurance. The court denied both this request for a more limited stay and the defendants' Dec. 29 emergency stay motion on January 9. 284 F.Supp.3d 1172. The plaintiffs filed a cross-appeal to the Ninth Circuit (18-35026) regarding the Dec. 23 injunction on January 11. On January 16, the defendants moved to stay district court proceedings pending the appeal. At the Court of Appeals, defendants filed a motion to dismiss their own appeal and remand for dismissal on February 21. In their motion, defendants argued that the case was moot because the enjoined policies (suspending the "following-to-join" refugee program and suspending the processing of refugee applications of refugees from countries on the Security Advisory Opinion list) had expired by their own terms. The plaintiffs filed a motion opposing the motion to dismiss, noting that the defendants had not rescinded the agency memo that indefinitely suspended FTJ admissions and have made no guarantee that they will not invoke it at some point again. On Mar. 29, 2018 the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court and ordered the parties to address whether the claim was moot. 2018 WL 1774089. The government moved to dismiss and dissolve the preliminary injunction in the district court on May 25, 2018. The court denied this motion without prejudice on July 27. The court held that the plaintiffs' request for limited discovery was appropriate as to the issue of the government's compliance with the preliminary injunction. The court held that such discovery did not extend to the merits of the compliance question, but rather was limited to the factual dispute of mootness between the parties. On January 2, 2019, the government moved to stay the proceedings in light of the government shutdown. District Judge Robart denied the motion on January 28 (after the government had reopened), but ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding any adjustments necessary because of the shutdown. The parties reached a settlement agreement in the consolidated cases on November 13, 2019. According to the settlement, the government would be required to expedite the refugee resettlement applications of over 300 refugees affected by the ban. In addition, any refugee benefitting from the settlement who will travel to the United States would be counted among refugees settled in 2018, ensuring that they would not take any slots away from the 18,000 refugees that the Administration planned to resettle for the year 2020. Further information about the settlement can be found here. On February 10, 2020, the parties stipulated to a voluntary dismissal in light of the settlement agreement. As of April 2020, there has been no further docket activity, and the case is presumably now closed.

Summary: This class action challenged President Trump's January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO-1) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. Counsel for the plaintiffs are the American Civil Liberties Union and private attorneys. On Nov. 29, 2017, this case was consolidated with Jewish Family Service of Seattle v. Trump, No. C17-1707JLR (W.D. Wash.). The parties reached a settlement under which the government would help to resettle 300 refugees affected by the Travel Ban.


This case is related to the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse's coverage of the Carter Page Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) warrants. For more information on litigation to disclose the warrants that inspired this case, please see this link. For a summary of the warrants and information on ongoing efforts by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to protect the confidential information in them, see this link.
The FISA requires the government to obtain a warrant from the FISC before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On August 7, 2018, Judicial Watch, a conservative-leaning nonprofit specializing in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation to expose government mismanagement, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking records surrounding surveillance of the 2016 Trump presidential campaign. In a separate case, the FISC released an opinion (available in this Clearinghouse as NS-DC-0127) flagging this case as one that could lead to lawful release of information in the Carter Page FISA warrants. The case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. The complaint stated that the plaintiff initially submitted its FOIA request with the DOJ on May 29, 2018, and that as of the date of the complaint, the DOJ had not provided any responsive information to the request. The plaintiff sought information from three offices within the DOJ: the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the office of a particular former Associate Deputy Attorney General, and the Office of the Director of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. It was looking for any information these offices had pertaining to communications and background information on Fusion GPS, a commercial research and intelligence firm, and various sources publicly disclosed as the basis for the "Steele Dossier," the primary document the DOJ used to pursue FISA surveillance of Trump 2016 campaign advisor Carter Page. After the complaint was filed, representatives from the plaintiff organization and the DOJ met to discuss a schedule for releasing relevant, non-exempt records under FOIA. In an October 19, 2018 status report, the parties agreed to produce documents on a six-month timeframe, with more updates to come as needed. As investigation commenced, more responsive documents were found that necessitated other searches, and this, combined with the government shutdown in late 2018 and the COVID-19 pandemic, delayed completion of this document request. As of the most recent status report, filed on December 11, 2020, the parties anticipate that the DOJ will be able to estimate a date for final document production in early 2021. The case and document production is still ongoing; Judicial Watch has not yet contested any of the DOJ's withholdings.

Summary: On August 7, 2018, Judicial Watch, a conservative-leaning nonprofit specializing in Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation to expose government mismanagement, filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under FOIA (5 U.S.C. § 552) against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) seeking records surrounding surveillance of the 2016 Trump presidential campaign. The records sought in this case may impact the Carter Page FISA warrants. The parties have agreed to a document production schedule, and document disclosure is ongoing.


On October 20, 2010, a Muslim inmate confined to the Federal Correctional Institution in Minersville, Pennsylvania, filed a lawsuit in the the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff, represented by counsel from the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project and private counsel, asked the court for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and monetary damages, claiming that his right to free exercise of religion was violated. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the prison's policy, which only allowed Muslim to pray in the chapel or their individual cells, precluded the plaintiff from praying while he was at work or recreation. On October 12, 2011, Judge William W. Caldwell denied the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, summary judgment. Judge Caldwell held that the record contained sufficient evidence to lead a reasonable finder of fact to conclude that the defendants substantially burdened the plaintiff's exercise of his religion and that the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff and other Muslim inmates were treated differently from similarly situated inmates with other religious beliefs. On May 10, 2013, the parties agreed to a compromise, settlement and release of both the Religious Freedom Restoration Act claim and the equal protection claim. The defendants agreed to a policy that allowed Muslims to pray at work and recreation at the times required by Islam with adequate floor covering. The defendants also agreed to pay $150,000 in full satisfaction of all claims, demands and rights to attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. On June 3, 2013, Judge Caldwell dismissed the case.

Summary: In 2010, a Muslim inmate confined to the Federal Correctional Institution in Minersville, Pennsylvania, filed a lawsuit in the the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act against the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The plaintiff claimed that the prison's policy, which only allowed Muslim to pray in the chapel or their individual cells, precluded the plaintiff from praying while he was at work or recreation. In 2013, the parties settled the case with the prison agreeing to allow Muslims to pray at work and recreation.


On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin filed this lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented President Trump's Jan. 27 and Mar. 6 Executive Orders that ban admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Specifically, plaintiffs sought information "concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding Executive Order No. 1, including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order." The request at issue in this particular lawsuit concerned implementation at CBP’s Chicago Field Office, including Chicago's O'Hare International Airport, and other international airports and ports of entry across the Midwestern states in which plaintiffs were located. In the complaint, plaintiffs argued that the requested records "would facilitate the public’s understanding" of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders through the Chicago Field Office, in particular at O'Hare Airport, and that "[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable." Plaintiffs argued that CBP detained approximately 17 persons at O'Hare on Jan. 28 under Executive Order No. 1, and refused to release information about the detainees, even to their lawyers. On Apr. 12, the case was assigned to Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr. On May 8, the government filed a motion to treat all of the ACLU's FOIA cases as "multi-district litigation," effectively seeking to consolidate them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. For the transfer motion, see the document on this case's page. On May 10, the government filed an unopposed motion requesting an extension of time, until June 29, to respond to the plaintiffs' complaint. Judge Dow granted this motion on May 15. On May 12, the government moved to stay proceedings pending the decision by the judicial panel regarding the multi district litigation. The ACLU responded on May 30, and the government replied on June 7. On June 19, defendants filed a notice of a decision in a related case, ACLU of Maine v. CBP. The District Court of Maine had granted defendants' motion for a temporary stay of proceedings. On June 26, CBP filed notice of a decision in related cases. On June 27, the ACLUs of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin filed a joint status report. On June 28, Judge Dow granted the government's May 12 motion to stay all proceedings pending decision on the motion to transfer. On Aug. 2, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied defendants' transfer motion. On Aug. 21, the ACLUs filed a joint status report. On Sept. 22, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Weisman for discovery supervision, the settlement conference, and all discovery motions, including the ACLUs' Sept. 22 motion. The parties' Jan. 16, 2018 status report stated that CBP had processed approximately 2300 pages of records. The next status reports of February through June noted continuing processing. Status reports filed September through November indicated that the ACLU was reviewing CBP's production for adequacy. The parties continued to work together to produce all the requested documents. Besides a brief stay that occurred when the government shut down in December of 2018, the production was relatively straightforward. On August 29, 2019, the parties submitted a stipulation to dismiss the case, which the court granted a few days later. The documents released by the government in all the ACLU cases are available through this case page. This case is closed.

Summary: On Apr. 12, 2017, the ACLUs of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, South Dakota, sued sued DHS under FOIA, for information on the implementation of the travel ban Executive Orders at regional airports. Defendants were unable to consolidate all nationwide ACLU cases in multidistrict litigation, and this case is proceeding here.


COVID-19 Summary: This was a putative class action filed in May 2020 by four prisoners incarcerated in the Ohio state prison system who sought improved prevention measures, testing, and medical care during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court denied the plaintiffs' demand for a preliminary injunction on August 3, 2020 and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on November 13, 2020 and the case was closed on December 3. <hr> This putative class action lawsuit was filed on May 15, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Eastern Division. The suit was brought by four prisoners in the Ohio state prison system (two in the Marion Correctional Institute, one in the Allen Correctional Institute, and another in the Richland Correctional Institute). Represented by private counsel, they brought this suit against Governor Mike DeWine and Annette Chambers-Smith, the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("the Department"). The plaintiffs sued under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, and the Ohio Constitution, seeking relief based on deprivations of their Eighth and Sixth Amendment rights. The suit alleged that the Department had insufficient capacity to prevent and treat COVID-19 and the failure to implement preventative measures and appropriate medical care led to an exponential increase in infections across the state's prison system. They also alleged that the Department failed to institute a policy that would enable attorneys to effectively communicate with their clients while in-person visitation was suspended. The prisoners requested declaratory and injunctive relief, including release for a certain category of prisoners and adequate COVID-19 prevention, testing, and care, as well as attorneys' fees and costs. The prisoners alleged that as of May 2020, the Department has reported "that of 7,536 tests given, 4,439 have been positive... 59% of the tests given," and that 49 prisoners have died as a result of COVID-19 while in the custody of the Department. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson, and then later Judge Edmund A. Sargus. On June 19, the prisoners filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit defendants from violating their constitutional rights by withholding protective measures and care necessary to protect their health. On June 26 and June 30, both defendants independently filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction. On August 3, Judge Sargus issued an opinion and order that denied the prisoners' motion for a preliminary injunction, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part as to the claims under state law and against the Governor, but allowed the constitutional claims to go forward against the Director of the Department. 2020 WL 4436362. Judge Sargus denied the motion for preliminary injunction because the evidence presented failed to show that the Department displayed deliberate indifference when responding to the risk. Defendants provided evidence "showing [they] reasonably sought to implement responsive actions to the spread of the virus in accordance with CDC guidelines." Judge Sargus also noted that the prisoners had failed to identify any ongoing litigation they were involved in that would implicate a Sixth Amendment right to counsel and also failed to provide substantial evidence of denial of access to counsel. On November 13, the prisoners filed a notice of voluntary dismissal. The case was dismissed without prejudice on December 3, 2020.

Summary: On May 15, 2020, four prisoners filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs, claiming violations of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments and the Ohio Constitution. The court denied the plaintiffs' demand for a preliminary injunction on August 3, 2020 and the plaintiffs filed a voluntary dismissal on November 13, 2020.


The plaintiff is a trans woman who filed her complaint pro se on July 1, 2015, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. She named as defendants the Warden and Administrative Captain of the prison she was housed in as well as two of the doctors at the facility. The case was assigned to Judge Lynn Adelman. The plaintiff initially only sought damages, but moved for injunctive relief as well during the litigation. The complaint was styled as a class action and listed the names of three other plaintiffs on it, but throughout the litigation the court treated them as co-plaintiffs rather than as a class. The issue of class certification was never formally ruled on. She alleged that in denying to diagnose her with Gender Identity Disorder, prison doctors and administration denied her access to medically necessary gender-affirming treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment (note: Gender Identity Disorder is no longer used to describe transgender people, the term has been replaced in the DSM with Gender Dysphoria). Her complaint outlined her extensive mental health history, including recurrent self harm and suicide attempts. She attributed her pervasive depression in part to gender dysphoria. She argued that she has repeatedly made her gender identity know to medical staff, and by refusing to diagnose and treat her GID, they acted with deliberate indifference to her serious medical need. She also alleged that they had violated the Prison Rape Elimination Act by housing her near inmates who they knew to be a threat to her safety. Finally, she brought state-law claims for medical malpractice and negligence against her psychologist based on allegations that the doctor ignored her requests for treatment or transfer. Over the course of the litigation, the plaintiff also filed a motion for diagnostic evaluation, a motion to appoint counsel, and a motion for a John Doe criminal investigation. Both parties also filed motions for summary judgment. On May 25, 2018, Judge Adelman granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the case. 2018 WL 2389732. Her decision and order also denied the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief and all other motions. In June of 2018, the plaintiff filed motions to amend and vacate judgment, which were subsequently denied on Nov 1, 2018. As of May 31, 2020, there is no update.

Summary: A trans woman incarcerated in Wisconsin filed a pro se suit against prison staff and officials in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on July 1, 2015. She alleged that their failure to diagnose and treat her with Gender Dysphoria amounted to deliberate indifference to her serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment. She was seeking damages and injunctive relief. Judge Adelman granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on May 25, 2018 and dismissed the case.


In 1994, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice notified Terrell County, Georgia that it intended to investigate conditions in the county jail. In 1995, following the investigation, the DOJ notified the Chairman of the Terrell County Commission of its findings and made recommendations regarding staffing and supervision, grievance system, exercise, visitation, access to reading materials and religious services, medical and mental healthcare, dental care, suicide prevention, general sanitation, fire safety, plumbing, lighting, ventilation, overcrowding, and food services. On June 7, 2004, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Terrell County in the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. On September 30, 2006, Judge Sands granted the DOJ's motion for summary judgment. Judge Sands held that conditions at the Terrell County Jail were unconstitutional. On December 21, 2007, Judge Sands rejected the defendants' proposed remedial plan in favor of the DOJ's proposed plan, with slight modification. On December 14, 2010, Judge Sands granted the DOJ's motion to hold the defendants in civil contempt for violation of the court's remedial order and to stay the termination of the remedial order. On October 17, 2011, Judge Sands approved a modified remedial order resolving the DOJ's motion to hold the defendants in contempt. The modified order removed substantive provisions of the remedial order that the defendants had attained substantial compliance with, but retained provisions related to the three remaining areas of significant concern: adequacy of staffing, medical and mental healthcare, and suicide prevention. On July 15, 2014, Judge Sands terminated the modified order and dismissed the case upon the recommendation of the parties who agreed that the defendants had achieved compliance with most or all of the components of each provision and had maintained compliance for at least six months.

Summary: In 1994, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice began an investigation of the jail in Terrell County, Georgia. In 2004, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Terrell County in the US District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The judge terminated his remedial order in 2014.


This is a federal class action lawsuit for monetary damages against the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department (SLMPD) for its response to anti-police brutality protests on September 17, 2017. For the injunctive suit filed by the ACLU of Missouri against the City of St. Louis that also arose out of the events of September 17, 2017, see Ahmad v. City of St. Louis. Following the acquittal on September 15, 2017, of a SLMPD officer for the 2011 killing of the 24-year-old-African American man, Anthony Lamar Smith, protests broke out in St. Louis. On the night of September 17, the five named plaintiffs of this lawsuit and a putative class of 118 other individuals were subjected to “kettling” by police near downtown St. Louis following their involvement in protests. Kettling is a crowd control technique used by police. To “kettle” protestors is to surround them in a corral-like fashion which makes it easier for police to conduct arrests and often cuts off the protestors’ access to food, water, and bathrooms. On September 17, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri (in St. Louis). An amended complaint was filed on January 15, 2020, which named as defendants the Chief of the SLMPD, the St. Louis Director of Public Safety, a large number of senior SLMPD officers, and all officers who were employed by the SLMPD on September 17, 2017. The City of St. Louis was also named as a defendant. This action included claims brought under 42 U.S.C §1983 and other tort claims based in Missouri state law. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages. The civil rights claims by the plaintiffs against the officers were: 1) that the SLMPD interfered with their First Amendment rights to speech and assembly, 2) that the actions taken by the SLMPD, including the use of zip-cuffs and chemical munitions, violated the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on excessive force, 3) that members of the putative class were subjected to unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 4) that all SLMPD officers conspired to deprive the putative class members of their civil rights, 5) that the officers were deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of protestors in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. There was an additional §1983 claim against the City of St. Louis for failure to train and supervise the SLMPD and for a custom of allowing unreasonable searches and seizures and the use of excessive force by police. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and asked that the District Court hold the ordinances which authorized the police action in question (St. Louis Code of Ordinances 15.52.010 and 17.16.275) unconstitutional on their face and as applied on September 17, 2017. Ordinance 15.52.010 defines unlawful assembly and makes it a misdemeanor. Ordinance 17.16.275 defines interference with pedestrian and vehicular traffic and, likewise, makes such interference a misdemeanor. The plaintiffs claimed that these local codes violated the Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process because they were unconstitutionally vague and failed to provide adequate notice as to what constitutes illegal conduct. Defendants collectively filed four separate motions to dismiss which were granted in part and denied in part in an order dated February 22, 2021. In the order, District Judge Catherine Perry dismissed, without prejudice, all claims against officers against whom no specific allegations were made. Judge Perry struck all claims for punitive damages against the City of St. Louis. Judge Perry also denied supplemental jurisdiction over Count XVII of the Amended Complaint, which argued that the Chief of Police and Director of Public Safety should be held vicariously liable for the actions of all officers involved in the “kettling,” and dismissed the claim without prejudice. Judge Perry dismissed, with prejudice, the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, and the Missouri state law claims against the officers of abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and conversion. 2021 WL 677909. The February 2021 order left only six police officers and the City of St. Louis as remaining defendants. The remaining six officer defendants are all alleged to have held supervisory roles or directed the movements of other officers during the incident. These defendants appealed the denial of the motion to dismiss claims against them to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and filed a brief to the Eighth Circuit on April 22, 2021. District Judge Perry stayed all motions in the case pending the resolution of the interlocutory appeal. The case is therefore ongoing on appeal, with no current movement in the district court.

Summary: In 2019, individuals who participated in 2017 anti-police brutality protests in St. Louis filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs alleged a number of civil rights violations and tort claims following an incident where the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department allegedly "kettled" protestors on September 17, 2017. Hundreds of police officers were named in the original complaint but the District Judge narrowed the action to only six officers who held supervisory roles during the protest and the City of St. Louis themselves. As of June 17, 2021, the six remaining officers were appealing the denial of their motion to dismiss to the Eighth Circuit and the District Judge granted a stay of the original action pending the resolution of the interlocutory appeal.


On April 22, 2019, President Donald Trump (in his capacity as a private citizen) and various Trump business entities filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against Representative Elijah E. Cummings (in his official capacity as Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform), Peter Kenny (in his official capacity as Chief Investigative Counsel of the House Committee on Oversight and Reform), and Mazars USA LLP (President Trump’s personal accountant). The plaintiffs alleged that a subpoena issued by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform (Committee) on April 15, 2019 to Mazars seeking financial records and information from 2011 through 2018 was unenforceable because it had no legitimate legislative purpose. They sought a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act (28 U.S.C. § 2201) that the subpoena was invalid and unenforceable; a permanent injunction to quash the subpoena and prevent the committee from enforcing or using it in any way; a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction prohibiting Mazars from producing any information related to the subpoena; and reasonable costs and expenses including attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. The case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. The plaintiffs alleged that the subpoena was part of a coordinated, politically-motivated campaign organized by the Democratic Party to “expose Plaintiffs’ private financial information for the sake of exposure, with the hope that it will turn up something that Democrats can use as a political tool against the President now and in the 2020 election.” Both parties seemed to agree that the subpoena was motivated in part by the testimony of Michael Cohen (Trump’s former personal lawyer) to the Committee on February 27, 2019, which Plaintiffs also deemed a “partisan stunt” conducted “under the guise of [an] investigation.” During his testimony, Cohen had alleged that financial statements prepared by the President’s accountants falsely represented the President’s assets and liabilities. The plaintiffs claimed that, because the subpoena threatened to expose the plaintiffs’ confidential information and lacked “a legitimate legislative purpose,” the court had the power to declare the subpoena invalid and enjoin its enforcement. On the same day they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent Mazars from turning over any documents to the Committee. They also filed an emergency motion to shorten the time that the defendants had to respond to the motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. On April 23, 2019 the parties met and set a briefing schedule on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, which rendered the emergency motion and motion for a temporary restraining order moot. The plaintiffs also consented to the Committee’s intervention as a defendant and entered a joint stipulation a few days later agreeing to dismiss Chairman Cummings and Mr. Kenny as defendants without prejudice. The Committee agreed to postpone its return date on the subpoena to Mazars until seven days after the court ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 9, 2019 the court notified the parties that the trial on the merits of the case would be consolidated with the hearing on the preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 2063207. Oral argument went ahead as scheduled on May 14. On May 20, 2019 the court issued an opinion entering judgement in favor of the Oversight Committee and against the plaintiffs. 380 F. Supp. 3d 76. The court explained that Congress has broad investigative authority (playing an important “informing” function, but confined by constitutional structures and Supreme Court precedent), and that courts tasked with deciding whether Congress has used its investigative power improperly must be highly deferential to the legislative branch. The court found that the legislative reasons offered by the Committee adequately justified the subpoena (and noted that the Committee had identified several pieces of actual legislation that it asserted was related to its overall investigation of the President), and that the plaintiffs’ contentions as to why those reasons were invalid were not persuasive. It also declined to grant a request made by the plaintiffs at the oral argument seeking to stay the return date of the subpoena beyond the seven days already agreed upon by the parties, pending final appellate review by the D.C. Circuit. The defendants appealed the court’s ruling on May 21, 2019; a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments on July 12. On October 11, 2019, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, explaining that the court’s analysis “must be highly deferential to the legislative branch.” Further, since the subpoena was directed not at the President but at a third party (Mazars), this case did not directly raise separation of powers concerns. 940 F.3d 710. On November 13, 2019, the D.C. Circuit denied the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc; on November 18, United States Chief Justice John Roberts stayed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling pending appeal before the United States Supreme Court. The Court heard oral arguments in this case, consolidated with Trump v. Deutsche Bank, on May 12, 2020. The United States, in addition to filing an amicus brief, was granted leave to appear as amicus curiae and to present oral arguments in support of the plaintiffs. On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court unanimously declined to enforce the congressional subpoenas. In a 7–2 opinion, the Court vacated the decision of the D.C. Circuit and remanded for further consideration. It explained that the lower courts had not adequately considered the separation of powers issues involved in the case and instructed the D.C. Circuit on remand to consider the following:

Availability of information: if the information sought was readily available elsewhere, courts should not enforce a congressional subpoena of the President’s personal information.
Breadth: courts “should insist on a subpoena no broader than reasonably necessary to support Congress’s legislative objective.”
Congress’s evidence for why it needed a subpoena: “The more detailed and substantial the evidence of Congress’s legislative purpose, the better,” especially if the intended legislation pertained to the President.
The burden placed on the President by a subpoena: because Congress “is a rival political branch,” courts should be wary of Congress’s “incentive to use subpoenas for institutional political advantage.”
 “Other considerations may be pertinent as well,” the Court concluded, but “one case every two centuries does not afford enough experience for an exhaustive list.” 140 S. Ct. 2019. As of August 17, 2020, the remand is pending before the D.C. Circuit.

Summary: On April 22, 2019, President Donald Trump filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging a congressional subpoena issued to his personal accounting firm (Mazars) by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. He claimed that the subpoena had no valid legislative purpose and that Mazars should be ordered not to comply with the subpoena. (Although named as a defendant, Mazars took no position in the litigation.). The district court granted summary judgment to the Oversight Committee; that judgment was later upheld by the D.C. Circuit. On July 9, 2020, the United States Supreme Court vacated the lower courts’ decisions, and remanded for further consideration of the separation of powers concerns raised by the plaintiffs. As of August 17, 2020, the case is ongoing.


On September 25, 2007, with the assistance of private counsel, a black former employee of Champion Windows of Pittsburgh filed suit for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981, which prohibits private discrimination that impairs the right to make and enforce contracts. The employee alleged that Champion Windows had demoted and then fired him because of his race and in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination. The employee sought injunctive and monetary relief, including reinstatement, back pay with interest, compensation for emotional distress, punitive damages, and attorney's fees. On November 15, 2007, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a separate lawsuit against Champion Windows of Pittsburgh on behalf of the employee, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. The EEOC alleged that Champion Windows had provided the employee with less than it provided to white employees in the same position (no corporate cell phone, Home Depot credit card, or Helper; an uninspected, inoperable truck, different tools, and lesser compensation) and that Champion Windows had demoted and fired the employee for complaining about the discriminatory treatment. The employee intervened in that lawsuit, adding claims under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Court (Judge Arthur J. Schwab) consolidated the two cases on January 14, 2008. The parties participated in mediation on March 4, 2008. The employee reached a settlement of his claims with Champion Windows contingent on Champion Windows's entering into a consent decree with the EEOC. The EEOC and Champion Windows later entered into a 4-year consent decree, which was adopted by the Court on May 30, 2008. The decree provided for monetary and injunctive relief. Under the decree Champion Windows paid the employee $100,000 in settlement of the EEOC's claims. Champion Windows also had to update its policies, improve its complaint procedures, provide all supervisors with yearly antidiscrimination training and yearly training on antidiscrimination laws and effective investigation, train all employees and supervisors in its Human Resources department on conducting an effective investigation, post a notice on its bulletin boards, and report annually to the EEOC that it has complied with the decree. The parties bore their own fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: A black former employee of Champion Windows of Pittsburgh filed suit for violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, alleging that Champion Windows had demoted and then fired him because of his race and in retaliation for complaining about race discrimination. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed a separate lawsuit against Champion Windows of Pittsburgh on behalf of the employee, alleging disparate treatment on the basis of race and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The employee intervened in that suit, bringing claims under Title VII and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The 2 suits were consolidated. The parties participated in mediation, and the employee settled his claims with Champion Windows on the condition that Champion Windows enter into a consent decree with the EEOC. The 4-year decree provided for monetary and injunctive relief. Under the decree Champion Windows paid the employee $100,000 in settlement of the EEOC's claims. Champion Windows also had to update its policies, improve its complaint procedures, provide all supervisors with yearly antidiscrimination training and yearly training on antidiscrimination laws and effective investigation, train all employees and supervisors in its Human Resources department on conducting an effective investigation, post a notice on its bulletin boards, and report annually to the EEOC that it has complied with the decree. The parties bore their own fees and costs. The case is closed.


In this case, the Florida Department of State is suing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, seeking access to the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system of records, to use it to check voter registration records to verify that voters are citizens. Florida brought the case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, on June 11, 2012. DHS had declined to provide access to the SAVE database pending consultation with the Attorney General. In documents included in the related case, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12122>VR-FL-0168</a href>, the DOJ Civil Rights Division wrote in a letter to the Florida Secretary of State that Florida's ongoing verification efforts violate the National Voter Registration Act (because they are too close in time to an impending election) and the Voting Rights Act (because they were not pre-cleared by the Department of Justice). The case is ongoing.

Summary: In this case, the Florida Department of State is suing the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, seeking access to the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system of records, to use it to check voter registration records to verify that voters are citizens. Florida brought the case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, on June 11, 2012. DHS had declined to provide access to the SAVE database pending consultation with the Attorney General. In documents included in the related case, [], the DOJ Civil Rights Division wrote in a letter to the Florida Secretary of State that Florida's ongoing verification efforts violate the National Voter Registration Act (because they are too close in time to an impending election) and the Voting Rights Act (because they were not pre-cleared by the Department of Justice). The case is ongoing.


On October 4, 2011, members of the Occupy Wall Street movement filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs' lawsuit stems from a demonstration and march crossing the Brooklyn Bridge that took place on October 1, 2011. The plaintiffs alleged that during that demonstration, the New York Police Department "engaged in a mass false arrest of approximately 700 persons who participated in, or were in proximity to," the demonstration and that "[t]he NYPD, as a matter of policy and practice, engages in unconstitutional tactics to disturb, disrupt, penalize, infringe upon and criminalize constitutionally protected speech and assembly." They claimed that this conduct violated the plaintiffs' rights guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs, represented by Partnership for Civil Justice and Southern Legal Counsel, sought class certification, damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief. The plaintiffs also sought entry of an order declaring the arrests in question to be null and void, and authorizing each individual class member to deny that such an arrest ever occurred in response to any inquiry, such as an employment application. On December 12, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. This added several named plaintiffs to the litigation as well as additional claims, namely claims alleging violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and N.Y. General Municipal Law § 50-e. Second Am. Compl 1, 39. The Second Amended Complaint also amended the remedies sought, adding a paragraph requesting:
Entry of a declaratory judgment that N.Y. City Adm. Code § 10-110(c) parading without a permit code provision is unconstitutional, facially or as applied to the extent it is applied as a strict liability offense, and entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement as a strict liability offense (i.e., enforcement in the absence of fair notice or warnings/orders to those subject to potential arrest);
 Id. 42. This was added in response to the defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint. In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that the Fourth Amendment claims should be dismissed because N.Y. City Adm. Code § 10-110(c) had provided the arresting officers with probable cause for the arrests. New York City Adm. Code § 10-110(c) provides that a "procession, parade or race shall be permitted upon any street or in any public place only after a written permit therefor has been obtained from the police commissioner." On December 23, 2011, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint. The defendants advanced two main arguments, namely (1) that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because probable cause existed for the arrests, and (2) that the plaintiffs' claims for damages against the City and its officials should be dismissed because the rights at issue were not clearly established. On the qualified immunity point, the defendants argued that probable cause existed for the arrests because the plaintiffs participated in a "parade" without a permit in violation of N.Y. City Administrative Code, § 10-110, and that the video proof on which the plaintiffs relied in their complaint demonstrated that the marchers violated Penal Law § 240.20(5) by "obstruct[ing] vehicular ... traffic" on the roadway of the Brooklyn Bridge. On June 7, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jed S. Rakoff) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint in part and denied it in part. Specifically, the Court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against the officers who arrested them, but dismissed the claims for damages against the City, Mayor Bloomberg, and Police Commissioner Kelly. In denying the motion to dismiss the claims against the arresting officers, the Court explained that the defense of qualified immunity at this stage hinged on whether it would "be clear to reasonable police officers, in the situation the defendant officers confronted, that they lacked probable cause to believe (i) that the plaintiff demonstrators had committed a crime and (ii) that the plaintiff demonstrators had received fair warning?" Garcia v. Bloomberg, 865 F. Supp. 2d 478, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Court found that there were two criminal statutes that the plaintiffs apparently violated. However, the Court found that the Second Amended Complaint adequately alleged that the plaintiffs failed to receive fair warning, and thus concluded that the defense of qualified immunity did not defeat the claims at this stage of the litigation. As to the claims for damages against the City, Mayor Bloomberg, and Police Commissioner Kelly, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately allege such claims. The plaintiffs had advanced three arguments for these claims. First, they argued that the existence of "Disorder Control Guidelines," the arrests of protesters in 2003 and 2004, and arrests that occurred a week before the incident in this case, all supported the conclusion that the City has a policy of conducting mass false arrests in order to discourage protesting. Second, the plaintiffs argued that Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly either ratified or directly participated in the alleged constitutional violations by failing to act or investigate the incidents. Finally, the plaintiffs argued that Mayor Bloomberg and Commissioner Kelly faced liability based on their failure to train the arresting officers. The Court rejected each of these three arguments, finding the facts cited in support of them too attenuated or implausible to support actionable claims, and thus dismissed those claims. Id.at 491-94. On June 28, 2012, the officer defendants appealed the District Court's denial of their motion to dismiss the complaint against them on qualified immunity grounds. The defendants argued that the District Court had erred in concluding that the complaint, and the other materials that could properly be considered on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, did not establish that the defendants had probable cause to arrest the plaintiffs for disorderly conduct. The Second Circuit disagreed. On August 21, 2014, a divided Second Circuit (Judges Guido Calabresi and Gerard E. Lynch, with Judge Lynch writing the opinion) affirmed the District Court's ruling. The Second Circuit found that:
Taking plaintiffs' allegations as true, as we must, we believe that they have adequately alleged actionable conduct. Plaintiffs have alleged that the police directed the demonstrators' activity along the route of their march, at times specifically condoning, or even directing, behavior that on its face would violate traffic laws. When the bottleneck at the pedestrian walkway of the Bridge led the demonstrators to pool into the roadway, the police did not immediately direct them out of the street, and when they did undertake to issue such a warning to clear the roadway, they did so in a way that no reasonable officer who observed the warning could have believed was audible beyond the first rank of the protesters at the front of the crowd. According to plaintiffs' account, the police then retreated back onto the Bridge in a way that would reasonably have been understood, and was understood, by the bulk of the demonstrators to be a continuation of the earlier practice of allowing the march to proceed in violation of normal traffic rules. We emphasize that the procedural posture of this case presents a formidable challenge to defendants' position. They urge us to find that qualified immunity is established for all defendants based on plaintiffs' version of events (plus a few inconclusive photos and videos). The evidence, once a full record is developed, may contradict plaintiffs' allegations, or establish that some or all of the defendants were not aware of the facts that plaintiffs allege would have alerted them to the supposed implicit permission. We express no view on whether some or all of the defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity at a later stage of the case. But to reverse the district court's denial of qualified immunity on a motion to dismiss, we would have to say that on the basis of plaintiffs' account of events, no officer who participated in or directed the arrests could have thought that plaintiffs were invited onto the roadway and then arrested without fair warning of the revocation of this invitation. Since we cannot do so on this limited record, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
 Garcia v. Does, No. 12-2634-cv, 2014 WL 4099270, at *9 (2d Cir. Aug. 21, 2014) (footnotes and citation omitted). Judge Debra Ann Livingston dissented. She wrote that the majority had turned the qualified immunity standard upside down, and would have found that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at *13. On December 17, 2014, the Second Circuit entered an order granting the defendants' petition for rehearing en banc and withdrawing its opinion of August 21, 2014 was. On the petition for rehearing, the Second Circuit then concluded that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. On February 24, 2015, the Second Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. The court found that:
In this case, the facts alleged in the Complaint, and those depicted in the videos, do not bear out plaintiffs’ legal conclusion that the officers’ actions constituted “an actual and apparent grant of permission” to the demonstrators to utilize the roadway. Still less do those facts plausibly describe a situation in which reasonable officers would have clearly understood that their actions were interpreted by the demonstrators as a grant of permission, such that arresting the demonstrators would violate clearly established law. Accordingly, dismissal of the Complaint is required.
 Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 97 (2d Cir. 2015). The Second Circuit's remanded the case to the district court. On April 28, 2015, the plaintiffs requested leave to filed a third amended complaint. The third amended complaint would contain new allegations, most relating to a police chief who was the ranking officer on the scene. These included allegations that the chief admitted he erred in not using police resources like scooters or mesh to block protestors from accessing the roadway. Other new allegations in the third amended complaint would concern the command and decision-making structures of the NYPD, again focusing primarily on the chief on the scene. In a September 10, 2015 order, Judge Rakoff denied the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend. He found that none of the additional allegations would contradict the Second Circuit's findings, stating that the new material had no bearing on its finding that the police had probable cause to arrest the marches, and that the further similar allegations of limited permission earlier in the march or implied permission on the roadway would still not be enough to defeat qualified immunity. Judge Rakoff, finding the proposed amendments to the complaint futile, denied leave to amend, and directed the clerk of court to enter a final judgment dismissing the complaint with prejudice and close the case. 2015 WL 54441222. Per Judge Rakoff's order, the district court closed the case on September 15, 2015. The plaintiffs appealed the decision denying their request to amend their complaint to the Second Circuit on October 2, 2015. On October 13, 2016, the Second Circuit (Circuit Judges Gerard E. Lynch, Christopher F. Droney, and Chief District Judge Christina Reiss of the District of Vermont, sitting by designation) issued a summary order affirming the district court's decision. It found that:
The proposed Third Amended Complaint does not alter our conclusions in Garcia III. Rather, it only asserts that Esposito had better knowledge of the state of mind of the demonstrators than the other individual officers had, namely that Plaintiffs lacked the intent to violate the law. But the state of mind of the demonstrators—whether they thought that they were participating in a sanctioned, First–Amendment–protected roadway march or whether they were intentionally or recklessly blocking traffic—is irrelevant to the question of probable cause . . . Absent the allegation of specific facts to support a direct communication from police to marchers that the marchers were permitted to occupy the road, the Third Amended Complaint fails to change our prior conclusion that the defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs for violating N.Y. Penal Law § 240.20(5).
 Garcia v. Bloomberg, 662 Fed. App'x 50, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2016). The plaintiffs petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review on June 19, 2017. 136 S.Ct. 2266 (Mem). The case is now closed after the dismissal of the plaintiffs' complaint.

Summary: In October 2011, members of the Occupy Wall Street movement filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs' lawsuit stems from arrests that occurred during demonstration and march crossing the Brooklyn Bridge on October 1, 2011. The case was dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.


An group of lawyers and other professionals involved in criminal defense sued the state of Arizona on May 8, 2017 to toss out as unconstitutional a state law that bars defense lawyers from contacting crime victims without obtaining permission from the prosecutor’s office. Represented by the ACLU of Arizona, the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona and sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees. Describing that some of them had been subject to professional discipline and even threatened with criminal charges for alleged violations of the “victim’s rights” law, they alleged that that the law was unconstitutionally overbroad and constituted a prior restraint on free speech in violation of the First Amendment. Two days later, on May 10, they moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from enforcing the law. The state filed an answer on May 30, 2017. It indicated its intention to file a motion to dismiss the complaint and questioned the allegation that some of the plaintiffs had been threatened with criminal charges, noting that none had ever been brought for violations of the victim’s rights law. The state filed its motion to dismiss on June 21. It argued that a favorable decision would not actually redress the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries because the Arizona State Bar, which is the primary enforcement body for the no contact law, would be the proper defendant. On June 29, 2017, a group of crime victims and victims’ advocates (“the victims”) moved to intervene in the litigation, saying that the the state would not be able to adequately represent crime victims’ interests in upholding the law. The state did not object to their intervention. The victims also filed a proposed response to the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have a realistic possibility of succeeding on the merits. On March 30, 2018, after several months of discovery, District Judge Steven P. Logan dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint, and also denied both motions for a preliminary injunction and the victims’ motion to intervene (2018 WL 1570244). He concluded that the plaintiffs’ lacked standing to bring the lawsuit. The court agreed with the state that, since it was not responsible for enforcing the law, the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries could not be traceable to it. However, the court was unpersuaded by the state’s arguments that the plaintiffs would never be able to make a sufficient showing of standing, and gave the plaintiffs’ leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiffs did just that on May 4, 2018 to address the defect identified in Judge Logan’s opinion. They cited the state attorney general’s authority to seek attorney sanctions with the state bar and role as the administrator of the victims’ rights program. The state filed its reply brief on May 25, asserting that the new allegations were substantially no different from the old ones, and also arguing for Younger abstention (which prohibits federal courts from adjudicating claims if it would interfere with ongoing judicial proceedings at the state level). Judge Logan again granted the state's motion to dismiss this second amended complaint in a March 15, 2019 order (373 F.Supp.3d 1242). He stated that the plaintiffs have sufficiently stated an injury, the threat of enforcement action against what they believe is an unfair law. However, he wrote that the injury is not traceable to the Attorney General's conduct because he is not the primary enforcer of the law in this instance; the Attorney General could only refer violations of the law to the state bar association, which would then take disciplinary action. This denied the plaintiffs standing to sue the Attorney General. Judge Logan gave the plaintiffs another chance to amend their complaint. The plaintiffs filed another amended complaint on April 26, 2019. This complaint sought identical declaratory and injunctive relief from previous complaints, but added the state bar association, Chief Bar Counsel for the State of Arizona, and the bar association's private investigator as defendants. Shortly after this complaint was filed, both the state and the state bar association moved to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and on a Younger abstention. The state bar association also sought immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Judge Logan partially granted the defendants' motions to dismiss the second amended complaint on February 27, 2020 (2020 WL 954941). Though neither defendant argued that the complaint lacked traceability, the Judge noted that the complaint amended very few facts from the prior complaint, which was dismissed for lack of traceability. Therefore, he said that the claims against the state should be dismissed. This time, he dismissed the case with prejudice, since filing another complaint on this same fact pattern would be futile. As for the state bar association, Judge Logan agreed with the Eleventh Amendment immunity claim, since the bar association is the investigative arm of a state agency. However, Judge Logan found that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded a traceable, redressable injury against the Chief Counsel of the Bar Association and the private investigator. Those defendants would oversee and carry out an investigation into the contested law, chilling the plaintiff's ability to fight what they see as an unconstitutional state law. The defendants filed a motion for reconsideration of the lack of dismissal of the case against the investigator on March 12, 2020. They argued that the Judge did not adequately consider the factual basis for relief and the subject matter jurisdiction arguments he raised in his motion to dismiss. The Judge has not ruled on this motion, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: A group of criminal defense lawyers challenged the constitutionality of an Arizona law that bars counsel for criminal defendants from contacting crime victims or their relatives without having the prosecutor's office serve as an intermediary. They brought their lawsuit in May 2017 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They alleged that the "victim's rights" law was unconstitutionally overbroad and constituted an impersmissible prior restraint of free speech in violation of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the Chief Counsel of the state bar association and her investigator, and the case continues against these new defendants; all other defendants have had the case against them dismissed with prejudice


On March 16, 2001, four plaintiffs paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois, who were subsequently arrested for alleged technical parole violations filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of themselves and on behalf of their classes. The plaintiffs sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under color of state law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. The plaintiffs, represented by private council, asked for injunctive relief prohibiting the Illinois Department of Corrections from continuing to follow the Department's policy of transferring parolees out of Cook County Jail before the parolees had, or had waived, their constitutional right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing. The plaintiffs also asked the court to permanently enjoin the Department from continuing this policy and for award costs and attorney’s fees. The plaintiffs alleged as follows. Each of the four plaintiffs was paroled from the Big Muddy Correctional Center, and, during their parole, was assigned to a parole agent in Cook County. Each of the four plaintiffs was arrested on a technical violation of their parole; each of the plaintiffs denied committing the violation. Each of the plaintiffs, after his arrest, was taken to Cook County Jail. The plaintiffs further allege that none of them were notified of their charges. None of the plaintiffs were scheduled for a parole revocation hearing, and the Illinois Department of Corrections did not obtain a waiver of their right to a preliminary parole revocation hearing. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs each had a constitutional right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing, they were transferred out of the Cook County Jail to the Joliet Correctional Center. From there, the corrections department acted according to policy and transferred the plaintiffs to the site of their parole, the Big Muddy Correctional Center in Ina, Illinois, which is hundreds of miles from Cook County and Chicago. Three of the plaintiffs had been detained for over 60 days and had still not had their preliminary parole revocation hearing. The fourth plaintiff was detained for over 60 days before his preliminary parole revocation hearing, where the court eventually found no violation and ordered him released. Each plaintiff has a constitutionally protected right to a prompt preliminary parole revocation hearing nearby the site of his arrest. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the plaintiffs should have had preliminary hearings within ten days of arrest. Instead, they were transferred hundreds of miles away from the site of their arrest and were forced to wait at least two months for their hearing. The violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights were allegedly a direct result of Illinois Department of Corrections policy. The number of parolees affected by this particular Department of Corrections policy was estimated to be over 500. Despite the impact of the policy on hundreds of parolees, the policy had been in place for less than a year. On August 15, 2001, the plaintiffs filed an amended class action complaint. The only substantive change between the original class action complaint and the amended class action complaint was the replacement of one of the class representatives. Now, two of the class members had been released following extremely delayed preliminary parole revocation hearings instead of just one. The two classes now being represented were (1) “a class of Cook County parolees who have been or will be arrested for technical parole violation in Cook County, Illinois form June 1, 2000 to the present” and (2) “a class of Cook County parolees who were detained without the benefit of a prompt preliminary parole revocation and who have been, or will in the future be, found not to have violated the terms and conditions of their parole.” On September 13, 2001, less than a month after the amended class action complaint, the parties submitted a stipulated dismissal to the court. The dismissal was subject to an agreement with the Illinois Department of Corrections to change their policy with regard to the detainment of parolees with alleged technical parole violations. First, the Department directed that, absent exigent circumstances, parolees who are arrested for technical parole violations must be held in a location reasonably near the arrest or alleged violation. For alleged violators in Cook County, the holding site must be within sixty miles of Cook County or the nearest Department Reception and Classification Center. Second, the Department directed its administrators to notify alleged violators that they may retain an attorney and procure witnesses for their hearings. This notification was to come when the administrators notified the alleged violators of their charges. Third, the Department directed its administrators that parolees who request witnesses or who confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses can obtain testimony either in person or through a “telephonic link up.” The only caveat to this is that if the witness testimony “bears substantial guarantees of trustworthiness” in-person or telephonic testimony would not be required. Fourth, the Department directed its administrators that parolees arrested for technical parole violations in Cook County must have preliminary hearings within ten business days. The ten-day deadline need not be followed when (1) the parolee waives the preliminary parole revocation hearing; (2) the parolee requests a continuance; (3) the parolee is unavailable due to health reasons (to be determined by the Department), or (4) the hearing officer continues the hearing for up to fourteen business days to obtain evidence, ensure the attendance of witnesses, or for other good cause shown. Finally, the Department directed its administrators that when alleged parole violation is supported only by an unverified written statement by a parole agent, that hearing officer must also see (1) an affidavit or other sworn document from the parole agent, (2) a copy of the violation of the violation report, or (3) sworn oral testimony of the parole agent. The last provision of the stipulated dismissal asserted that the dismissal was not an admission of liability and would not serve as precedent or be admissible in any proceeding. (However, see King v. Walker on this Clearinghouse, in which this case's Stipulated Dismissal was attached as an appendix to that case's complaint.) On September 13, 2001, the Court (Hon. Matthew F. Kennelly), in a minute order, dismissed the case based on the terms of the Stipulated Dismissal. Judgment was entered on July 24, 2003. There is no reason to believe the case is still open.

Summary: On March 16, 2001, plaintiffs on parole in Cook County, Illinois filed this action in the Northern District of Illinois suing the Illinois Department of Corrections under state law and 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging violations of their constitutional right to due process. Plaintiffs were allegedly denied their constitutional right to prompt preliminary parole revocation hearings nearby the site of their arrest and were instead transferred hundreds of miles from Cook County and forced to waits months, all according to Department policy. In a stipulated dismissal, the Illinois Department of Corrections changed their policies with regard to parolees arrested for technical violations to be more reflective of those parolees' constitutional rights.


Here is the summary I posted on the Clearinghouse, 6/23/2020: On November 19, 2018, individuals whose driver’s licenses were suspended because of failure to pay traffic tickets filed this putative class action against the Alabama Law Enforcement Agency in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming under 42 U.S.C. §1983 that Alabama’s practice of suspending driver’s licenses without procedural protection violated the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was assigned to Judge William Keith Watkins. A provision in the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure authorized courts to order the suspension of driver's licenses without notice, hearing, or inquiry, for nonpayment of traffic tickets. The plaintiffs failed to pay traffic tickets because of their financial difficulty and as a consequence, their driver’s licenses were suspended. Because they lived in rural areas where public transportation was unavailable, this left them without transportation between work, home, education, and medical care. On November 19, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction; on December 21, 2018, the state moved to dismiss. On May 1, 2019, the court issued orders on a series of motions. First, it denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunction. Because the plaintiffs had outstanding traffic tickets in addition to the tickets at issue in the case, and the court therefore could not restore the plaintiffs' driver's licenses even if the plaintiffs prevailed in the case, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. As the court determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit, it dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction. Second, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The court determined that as the plaintiffs lacked standing, class certification is inappropriate. Third, the court found that it need not decide the merits of the defendants’ claims to dismiss. 2019 WL 1938794. The court dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On November 19, 2018, plaintiffs filed this class action suit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, claiming that the Alabama law which authorized courts to suspend driver's license following non-payment of traffic ticket without procedural protection violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim for failure to state the claim, lack of standing, and sovereign immunity. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 1, 2019.


On June 30, 2010, this suit was filed by a group of Americans denied boarding onto international flights into the United States because of their inclusion on the "No Fly List." The suit was filed in U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint named as defendants the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Terrorist Screening Center, which created the list. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional rights to due process, as well as violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. The plaintiffs sought clearance to return to the United States and injunctions requiring the defendants to adopt procedures for notice and opportunity to challenge inclusion on the list. The case was assigned to U.S. District Judge Anna J. Brown. The plaintiffs immediately sought a preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to allow them to return from locations abroad where they had been stranded by their inclusion on the list. On October 20, 2010, without a response to this motion from the defendants or an injunction from the court, the defendants apparently allowed the plaintiffs to return to the U.S. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction, but they remained on the list, and the suit continued with respect to notice for the reasons of their inclusion and a meaningful process for challenging their inclusion. The defendants then filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that the District Court lacked jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs had failed to include as a defendant the Transportation Security Administration, which administers the Traveler Redress Inquiry Program (TRIP), the statutory redress process for individuals wrongfully denied boarding. On May 3, 2011, Judge Brown granted the government's motion to dismiss. Judge Brown held that because the internal orders of the TSA denying removal from the list were reviewable only in federal courts of appeals, the District Court lacked jurisdiction. 2011 WL 1667471. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the District Court's decision on July 26, 2012. Writing for a unanimous panel, U.S. Circuit Judge Richard C. Tallman held that the District Court had jurisdiction to review the plaintiff's procedural challenge because the plaintiffs did not request review of a TSA order, but rather challenged the adequacy of the redress process itself. The case was remanded to the lower court. 686 F.3d 1122. The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment in the District Court. Ruling on these motions on August 28, 2013, the court held that the plaintiffs' due process rights were potentially implicated by the denial of their ability to fly. But the court lacked a sufficient factual record to determine whether the defendants' policies actually violated the plaintiffs' due process rights. It requested that the parties submit further information regarding the defendants' existing policies. 969 F.Supp.2d 1293. Following these submissions, on June 24, 2014, Judge Brown issued an opinion holding unconstitutional the No Fly List redress procedures. The court held that the procedures did not sufficiently apprise the plaintiffs of the reasons for their inclusion or allow meaningful administrative challenges. The result was an unfair and stigmatizing deprivation of the liberty interest in international travel. However, Judge Brown declined to issue an injunction, instead requiring that the government propose new procedures. The defendants initially appealed this decision but quickly withdrew their appeal. 28 F.Supp.3d 1134. On December 19, 2015, the government notified the court that seven of the plaintiffs had been removed from the list, and that the remaining plaintiffs had been provided letters of explanation for their continued inclusion. The court entered non-final judgment in favor of these plaintiffs. 2015 WL 1883890. The court asked the parties to brief on the details and adequacy of the new review procedure used by the defendants. Accordingly, the parties submitted stipulated facts and cross-motions for summary judgment. The defendants argued that they had instituted new procedures which allowed the plaintiffs to receive written explanations for their inclusion on the list and to submit a written response or other evidence contesting the decision. The plaintiffs argued that this new process was still insufficient because it did not allow the plaintiffs to contest their inclusion in front of a neutral fact finder or provide other due process safeguards. On March 28, 2016, Judge Brown denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgement and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgement in part. The court held that due process did not require the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to challenge their inclusion on the list before a neutral fact finder. However, the court asked the defendant to develop the record as to whether some of the plaintiffs had received full notice regarding the reasons for their inclusion. 2016 WL 1239925. The court allowed the defendants to submit this additional information under seal due to its classified status. After they submitted, the court granted the defendants' remaining motions for summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ claims that they had not received adequate notice from the court's earlier March 2016 order. The court asked the parties to submit a status report with respect to the remaining issue of whether the District Court retained jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to the plaintiffs’ inclusion on the No Fly List in light of the adopted redress and review process. The parties stipulated to the outlines of the new review process, and the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on January 18, 2017, arguing that decisions under the new process were final administrative decisions that were unreviewable by the District Court under the Administrative Procedure Act. On April 21, 2017, Judge Brown granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, agreeing that the new TRIP procedures made the defendant’s No Fly List determinations final and unreviewable by the District Court. 2017 WL 1434648. On August 7, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit; the appeal was captioned as <i>Kashem v. Barr</i>. The plaintiffs argued the revised review procedures still failed to provide adequate due process protections. A panel of Circuit Judges Raymond C. Fisher and Consuelo M. Callahan and District Court Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo upheld the District Court's dismissal on October 21, 2019. Procedurally, the panel found that, because the TSA had final say over who is placed on the No Fly List and who is not after an internal policy chance, district courts no longer had jurisdiction to rule on No Fly List cases. They found that the an association with terrorist groups and potential for future criminal activity was not impermissibly vague criteria for classification on the No Fly List. In addition, they wrote that balancing the state interest of national security against the potential denial of liberty from a wrongful placement on the list, with the chance to appeal classification to DHS, did not deprive the plaintiffs of their due process rights. 941 F.3d 358. The plaintiffs declined to appeal the outcome to the Supreme Court. The case is closed.

Summary: A group of citizens and lawful permanent residents contested their inclusion on the No Fly List on due process grounds. The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon ordered the Department of Justice to develop new procedures allowing the plaintiffs to challenge their inclusion on the list, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs contested the proposed new procedures for inclusion on the list, and, due to internal administrative changes at the TSA, the district court found that it no longer had jurisdiction to hear the case. The plaintiffs appealed; the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's opinion on jurisdiction and held that the new review procedures protected the plaintiff's due process rights and were not unconstitutionally vague. The case is closed.


On October 15, 2007, several religious groups teamed with other individuals and filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, asserting a constitutional challenge to Oklahoma state law - HB 1804 ("Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007"). The law made it a felony crime for a person who, knowingly or in reckless disregard of an alien's status, transported, harbored or concealed any undocumented immigrant. Plaintiffs maintained that the state's attempt to enforce federal immigration law through HB 1804 was unconstitutional as such action was pre-empted by the Supremacy Clause. This challenge was similar to the one made in Lozano v. City of Hazleton, Pennsylvania [IM-PA-1] and other cases filed throughout the country. In addition to federal pre-emption, plaintiffs asserted violations of due process, equal protection and other provisions of the U.S. and Oklahoma Constitutions. Shortly after filing suit, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and expedited hearing on the matter. On its own, without any motion by the parties, the District Court (Judge James Payne) considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' challenge to HB 1804. Judge Payne determined that none of the named plaintiffs had standing to bring the action and therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction over the case. Judge Payne recognized that HB 1804 could still be subject to a constitutional challenge at some point but reasoned that could "only be achieved through a suit brought by Plaintiffs with well-defined injuries causally connected to HB 1804." The case was dismissed on October 22, 2007. Nat'l Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78658 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 22, 2007). Instead of appealing the ruling, plaintiffs refiled the lawsuit on October 25, 2007. The refiled case was assigned to District Judge James Payne and given case no. 4:07-cv-00613-JHP-FHM. On October 31, 2007, the District Court (Judge Payne) denied plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction. National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 3232442 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 31, 2007). That day, plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint, which challenged the constitutionality of the Act, as well as the constitutionality of five other Oklahoma state statutes relating to the issuance and renewal of driver's licenses. Defendants moved to dismiss the case. On December 12, 2007, Judge Payne granted defendants' motion and again dismissed the case for lack of standing. In his order, Judge Payne found that "some Plaintiffs ignore the need to describe the injuries actually caused by the challenged statutes, while the illegal alien Plaintiffs complain of grievances that could best be remedied by simply compliance with federal law." National Coalition of Latino Clergy, Inc. v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 WL 4390650, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91487 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 12, 2007). Plaintiffs' request to reconsider was denied. Nat'l Coalition of Latino Clergy v. Henry, No. 07-CV-613-JHP, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94871 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 28, 2007). Plaintiffs did not appeal the ruling.

Summary: On October 15, 2007, several religious groups teamed with other individuals and filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, asserting a constitutional challenge to the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007. The law made it a felony crime for a person who, knowingly or in reckless disregard of an alien's status, transported, harbored or concealed any undocumented immigrant. Just one week later, the District Court (Judge James Payne) dismissed the case sua sponte for lack of jurisdiction. Several days later, Plaintiffs refiled the case; Judge Payne subsequently granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, holding the Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the law.