On June 29, 2017, the Baltimore Brew (a media organization) and an individual who had previously settled a suit against the Baltimore Police filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. They sued the City of Baltimore and its police under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. Represented by the ACLU of Maryland and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought an injunction, declaratory relief, and damages, claiming that the City’s use of gag orders in police brutality settlement agreements violated the First Amendment. They also claimed that the gag order and liquidated damages provision in the individual plaintiff’s settlement were void as contrary to public policy. Finally, the individual plaintiff alleged that the City had breached the settlement agreement. This case arose from a police brutality incident involving the individual plaintiff. In 2012, the plaintiff’s apartment was burglarized. She called the police, but a dispute developed between the plaintiff and responding officers. By the end of the night, the officers had “beaten, tased, tackled, choked, and handcuffed” her. So she sued the city for wrongful arrest and physical abuse. The City agreed to pay her $63,000 to settle the case. But there was a catch: the individual plaintiff had to “limit [her] public comments regarding the [case] and the [underlying incident] to the fact that a satisfactory settlement occurred” (the gag order). And if she talked about the case with anyone, “the City is entitled to a refund of fifty percent,” or $31,500. The Baltimore Sun got wind of the settlement and published an article about it. Online commentators accused the individual plaintiff of provoking the police to get settlement money. In response, she posted her version of events. The City viewed her posts as a breach of the settlement agreement. So it paid her only $31,500. In this lawsuit, the individual plaintiff alleged that the gag order was unconstitutional and against public policy; the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable; and the City breached the settlement because it paid her only $31,500 rather than the full amount, and then demanded a refund. For its part, the Baltimore Brew (the Brew) claimed that the City’s widespread use of gag orders—included in about 95% of police brutality settlements—infringed on press freedoms. District Judge J. Frederick Motz dismissed the case in a terse one-page opinion issued on October 4, 2017. Judge Motz reasoned that the settlement provided for a payment of $31,500 if the individual plaintiff discussed the case, which she did, so the plaintiffs had no case. But he neglected to address the Brew’s claims. So nine days later, Chief Judge James K. Bredar re-opened the case. And on October 18, the case was reassigned to Judge Marvin J. Garbis. The plaintiffs then moved for reconsideration of all issues. After another round of briefing, Judge Garbis dismissed the case on November 29, 2017. First, he dismissed the Baltimore Police as a defendant because it was not involved with the settlement agreement at issue. Next, he found that the Brew did not have standing because it was unable to identify a “concrete and particularized” injury. Judge Garbis then dismissed the individual plaintiff’s First Amendment claims because “fostering confidence” in settlements and “reducing time and resources spent on litigation” outweighed any public interest in police “accountability and transparency” that might have been served by disclosing the terms of settlement agreements. Finally, he disposed of the individual plaintiff’s breach of contract claims on statute of limitations grounds. 2017 WL 5885657. The plaintiffs appealed. The parties submitted briefing during the summer of 2018, and the Fourth Circuit heard oral arguments in January 2019. Circuit Judge Henry F. Floyd delivered an opinion on July 11, 2019, reversing the district court which Judge Stephanie D. Thacker joined. Judge Floyd held that the gag order “amounts to a waiver of [the individual plaintiff’s] First Amendment rights,” which “strong public interests rooted in the First Amendment make . . . unenforceable and void.” He rejected the City’s argument that “fairness” entitled it to “the full value of its hush money.” In addition, Judge Floyd found that the Brew’s allegations were sufficient to establish standing at the motion to dismiss stage because it had a “right to gather news” from “willing speakers” that the City silenced with gag orders. Judge A. Marvin Quattlebaum, Jr. dissented. He would have upheld the district court’s order because “parties have a right to rely on the certainty of contracts entered into knowingly and voluntarily.” 930 F.3d 213, 2019 WL 3022327. The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the district court where it was reassigned to Judge Deborah K. Chasanow. On December 16, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Now that the Fourth Circuit had declared the City’s gag order inconsistent with the First Amendment, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had committed a constitutional tort when they withheld half of the individual plaintiff’s settlement award as punishment for speaking out about her abuse. While they conceded that a breach of contract claim for nonpayment of the full settlement award was barred by the statute of limitations, the plaintiffs insisted that damages for the constitutional tort should be equal to the withheld amount of $31,500, plus interest. In their opposition to summary judgment, the defendants argued that they had not committed a constitutional tort, as they had not prevented the plaintiff from speaking, nor punished her for doing so. Withholding the $31,500 was not a punishment but rather a contractual, bargained-for right to pay less for the settlement if the plaintiff chose to speak publicly about it. And even if the Court determined that the defendants had committed a constitutional tort, they insisted that the plaintiff would only be due nominal damages, not the full $31,500—which should only be available for a breach of contract claim—and certainly not the full amount, plus interest. This case is still ongoing. As of August 25, 2020, the Court has not yet adjudicated the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

Summary: A news organization and individual who settled her police misconduct claim with Baltimore sued to stop the City from using gag orders to silence victims of police misconduct who settle with the City. After losing a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs appealed and the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal. The case is now ongoing on remand.


On September 26, 2002, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC filed this lawsuit on behalf of an employee of ABC Propane against ABC Propane, as well as Bell Gas and Cortez Gas Company. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the individual employee had been retaliated against after she filed an earlier discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Specifically, the September 26 complaint alleged that before June 17, 2002, the individual employee had filed an employment discrimination charge with the EEOC against Ballew Distributing, a company that shared common management and ownership with both defendants in this case. Then, the employee began working for defendant, ABC Propane, around June 17, 2002. Around June 19, 2002, defendants’ management officials discovered the employee had filed an EEOC discrimination charge and allegedly fired her. On September 26, 2002, the EEOC also followed up on the employee’s charge against Ballew and filed another lawsuit, 02-cv-1213 on behalf of the employee. In that suit, the plaintiff alleged that the employee was subjected to a hostile work environment at Ballew based on her gender. These two cases were originally consolidated for pretrial purposes by Judge Bruce D. Black on June 16, 2003. He held that these cases involved common questions of law or fact, and that consolidating them would make discovery more efficient. He reserved a determination on whether these two cases should be tried separately. On December 24, 2003 each defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. Defendant ABC argued that the employee’s termination was not the result of retaliation. Judge Black denied the motion. Defendants Bell Gas and Cortez argued they were not the claimant’s employer and therefore could not be held liable. Judge Black rejected this argument and dismissed Bell Gas and Cortez’s motions for summary judgement as well. Meanwhile, in 02-cv-1213, Judge James A. Parker entered a consent decree on January 14, 2004 granting the claimant’s co-worker $20,000 and dismissing the case as pertaining to the claimant’s co-worker. On March 26, 2004 Judge Black referred the consolidated case to Magistrate Judge Lourdes A. Martinez to decide whether these two cases should remain consolidated for all purposes, including trial. Magistrate Judge Martinez recommended that the cases should not be consolidated because the two cases involved different claims, different parties, different elements of damages, the witnesses in the two cases would testify to different facts, and the defendant parties are different in each case. Judge Black affirmed Magistrate Judge Martinez’s decision on July 14, 2004 and set a trial for this case for September 7, 2004. On September 22, 2004, Judge William P. Johnson, writing for Judge Black, entered a consent decree describing monetary and injunctive relief for the claimant. She was awarded $36,000 and all defendants were ordered to undergo specific training that had been required by a consent decree in another, also related case, 02-cv-1090. The specific training included distribution of the sexual harassment policy to all employees, and for each defendant company to retain and pay a lecturer to conduct an annual training about sexual harassment and retaliation that all employees were required to attend for the first year. Additionally, all defendants were required to report any changes in their sexual harassment and retaliation policy, as well as the results of the training to the Regional Attorney of the Commission’s Albuquerque Office at least once every 6 months for two years. This two year period has passed, and the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2002, the EEOC filed suit on behalf of an employee of ABC Propane against ABC Propane, Bell Gas, and Cortez Gas Company for firing the employee in retaliation. Plaintiff alleged after ABC found out that the employee had filed a discrimination claim against parent company Bell Gas, ABC fired her. In 2004, the parties reached a settlement that resulted in monetary damages for the employee and instituted an annual, two year training program on sexual assault and retaliation for all defendant companies.


On December 9, 2013, a United States citizen of Latino national origin filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by the Legal Aid Society Employment Law Center, brought this complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state law against the state of California. He sought monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief, claiming employment discrimination in violation of the Due Process Clauses and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution and California State Constiuttion, national origin discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and National Origin and Ancestry Discrimination in Violation of California Fair Employment and Housing Act. The case was assigned to Judge William Alsup. Specifically, the plaintiff had applied for a job as a Correctional Officer with the California Department of Corrections in 2011. He claimed that he was unlawfully removed from consideration because he reported in a background questionnaire that prior to becoming a permanent resident and then citizen of the United States, he used a social security number that was not his own to obtain work. Plaintiff paid all required taxes using an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) until he obtained his own social security number. He was reportedly removed from consideration because his use of a fake social security number was deemed to "show a lack of honesty, integrity and good judgment." A similar series of events occurred when plaintiff reapplied for the same position in 2013. The state responded that questions about the use of a false social security number were necessary to conduct a thorough background investigation of candidates. The state also asserted that there was no Title VII violation because the plaintiff's claim rested on immigration status and not national origin, and because the hiring statistics indicated that there was no discriminatory effect on Latino hiring at the California Department of Corrections. On May 7, 2014, the District Court (Judge William Alsup) dismissed plaintiff's Section 1983 equal protection and substantive due process claims, as well as the Title VII claim against the State Personnel Board, but denied motions to dismiss the Title VII claim against the California Department of Corrections and procedural due process claim. The District Court dismissed all state law claims without prejudice. 2014 WL 1867067. On July 17, 2015, the District Court denied without prejudice the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, and directed plaintiff to engage in further discovery prior to his final opportunity to move to amend his equal protection claims and Title VII claim against the State Personnel Board. The court granted him leave on October 29, 2014. 2014 WL 5474950. The plaintiff filed his third and final amend complaint the same day. On March 12, 2015, the state filed another motion for summary judgment. On July 21, the court granted the plaintiff’s Title VII claims, holding that asking applicants whether they had ever used a fake social security number had a disparate impact on Latinos. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' equal protection claim. 119 F.Supp.3d 1065. The court issued a final order as to relief on September 28, 2015. This order held that the plaintiff should be allowed to finish the hiring process. If he was able to successfully pass background investigation and complete the training academy, he would be awarded $140,362 in backpay. The plaintiff was also granted attorneys’ fees. 2015 WL 5681029. On October 6, 2015, the state appealed the judgment to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October 30, 2015, the plaintiff moved for the award of his attorneys’ fees. The parties disagreed about how much in attorneys’ fees would be appropriate, so the court decided that a third party should decide the amount. 2015 WL 7423229. On January 28, 2016, the court appointed a special master to make this determination. The special master decided that the state owed the plaintiff $1,237,024.82 in fees and costs, and the court approved this amount on June 16, 2016. 2016 WL 3360638. Four days later, the state appealed the order granting attorneys’ fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. (Its first appeal had not yet been ruled on.) On May 16, 2017, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s judgment as to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation but reversed the judgment as to the State Personnel Board because the Personnel Board was not part of the hiring process and had no say in the questions on the job application. 701 Fed.Appx. 613. The case was remanded to the District Court to reassess damages against one state defendant rather than two. 2017 WL 6270383. On January 30, the parties filed a stipulation in the Ninth Circuit stating that they resolved the attorneys’ fees dispute informally, outside of court. In light of this stipulation, the Ninth Circuit dismissed all pending motions as moot on March 27, 2018. There are no further entries in the docket since March 2018. The case is presumably closed.

Summary: On December 9, 2013, a United States citizen of Latino national origin filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under Title VII, 28 U.S.C. §1983, and state law against the state of California. The plaintiff asked the court for compensatory damages and injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming employment discrimination. Plaintiff was removed from consideration for a job as a Correctional Officer because he reported in a background questionnaire that he had previously used a social security number that was not his own to obtain work. The parties settled out of court in January 2018.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed by inmates in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, seeking the release of medically vulnerable people and appropriate hygiene and social distancing measures for those still in the facility. The court denied to enter a temporary restraining order on July 3, and on February 4, 2021 the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.<hr> On May 5, 2020, an incarcerated person in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison filed this pro se action in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama via a letter that outlined the conditions in the facility and medical concerns related to COVID-19. On May 27, now represented by the Fair Fight Initiative, the Advancement Project National, the Center for Constitutional Rights, and private counsel, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. In the new complaint, the plaintiffs sued the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison and the City of Baton Rouge under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, they alleged that their continued detention in unsafe conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic was a violation of their rights, requesting the release of certain vulnerable individuals, as well as improved hygiene and social distancing measures. The case was assigned to Judge Brian A. Jackson and referred to Magistrate Judge Scott D. Johnson. The plaintiffs asserted that, as of May 14, "[t]here have been at least 93 confirmed COVID-19 cases in the EBRPP . . . but the jail’s lack of meaningful testing leaves no doubt that this number is grossly undercounted." Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that "the jail has chosen to warehouse detainees who test positive for or exhibit symptoms of COVID-19 in a building that has been condemned since 2018." That same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, seeking to represent all those who were, or would be, held at the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison, as well as the following subclasses: the "Pretrial Subclass," which contained all those who were currently held in the facility who had not yet been convicted; the "Post-Conviction Subclass," which contained all those who had been sentenced; the "Medically Vulnerable Subclass," which included all those who were over the age of 65, or who were particularly at risk due to an underlying medical condition. On May 28, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for temporary restraining order, requesting the release of all those in the Medically Vulnerable Subclass. On June 5, both defendants filed motions opposing the temporary restraining order; these motions were refiled on June 8 due to filing errors. On July 3, Judge Jackson denied the motion for temporary restraining order, stating that while the plaintiffs were requesting habeas relief, they were actually seeking remedy for constitutionally deficient conditions under the Eighth Amendment. Furthermore, Judge Jackson found that it was "unlikely that Petitioners could establish a claim of subjective deliberate indifference," because of the measures the defendants had taken to protect inmates from COVID-19. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 28, arguing that the plaintiffs did not have standing (due to the named plaintiff and others no longer being incarcerated), that they had failed to exhaust available remedies, and that they could not show a pervasive pattern of serious deficiencies in providing for their basic needs. On August 18, the plaintiffs responded, arguing that they had standing to bring their claims and that they had brought claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The city defendants also filed a motion to dismiss on October 23. On February 4, 2021, Judge Jackson granted both motions to dismiss, finding that Defendants had made efforts to implement COVID mitigation measures, supplying masks, providing cleaning supplies and soap, and conducting universal temperature checks and COVID-19 tests. Ultimately, Judge Jackson concluded that the plaintiffs had not properly demonstrated subjective deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: Incarcerated persons in the East Baton Rouge Parish Prison filed this action in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, requesting the release of medically vulnerable inmates, as well as mitigation measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the facility. The court denied to enter a temporary restraining order on July 3 and on February 4, 2021 the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss.


On July 25, 2012, the Center for Independent Living (a nonprofit disability advocacy and support organization) along with several named individual plaintiffs with disabilities necessitating the use of wheelchairs or scooters filed this class-action lawsuit against Wal-Mart in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs were represented by Disability Rights Advocates, the Disability Rights and Education Fund, and private counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that the store's refusal to provide wheelchair-accessible point-of-sale (POS) terminals at many of its California stores, when accessible alternatives were readily available, constituted illegal discrimination against people with disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, the California Civil Code, and the California Disabled Persons Act. The plaintiffs claimed that Wal-Mart's use of completely inaccessible POS systems, its refusal to install accessible alternatives, and its failure to provide a paper-printout alternative to the POS system for signature functions and information conveyance constituted an ongoing and systemic pattern and practice of discrimination. Wal-Mart had been informed at least as early as 2005 that its POS terminals were inaccessible. The plaintiffs sought an injunction enjoining future violations of the ADA and the Unruh Act, an injunction ensuring wheelchair and scooter users full and equal access to POS terminals, money damages, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. On August 13, 2012, a separate class-action suit was filed in California state court with substantially similar allegations, but including specific allegations involving Wal-Mart's Sam's Club stores as well (<i>Partida v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.</i>). Wal-Mart moved to have the second case removed to federal court because it involved issues arising under federal law (the ADA). This motion was granted on November 21, 2012. Wal-Mart then filed an unopposed motion to have the two cases consolidated, which was granted. The cases were consolidated for all purposes on April 3, 2013. On April 12, 2013, United States District Judge Charles R. Breyer granted a motion filed by the Center for Independent Living's attorneys, appointing them as interim class counsel for the plaintiffs. The parties then pursued a mediated settlement. On June 18, 2013, Judge Breyer approved a motion granting a ninety-day stay pending further mediation. He later granted six additional orders staying the case as the parties continued to pursue a settlement. The settlement negotiations succeeded. On January 23, 2017, Judge Breyer entered an order dismissing the case and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement stipulated that specified Wal-Mart locations must include Point of Sale (POS) devices accessible to individuals with disabilities. The settlement further required training of Wal-Mart employees, internal monitoring, and reporting to the plaintiffs' counsel. The agreement was to conclude when the last new POS device was installed in the specified facilities, which was scheduled to occur within two years of the settlement. More than three years have elapsed since the parties reached a settlement. The Clearinghouse does not know if the settlement was fully performed, but there has been no docket activity suggesting that any implementation dispute reached the court as of May 2020.

Summary: On July 25, 2012, the Center for Independent Living (a non-profit disability advocacy and support organization) and several named individual plaintiffs with disabilities necessitating the use of wheelchairs or scooters filed this federal class-action suit against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. The Plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart's refusal to provide wheelchair-accessible point-of-sale (POS) terminals at its many of its California stores, when accessible alternatives were readily available, was illegal discrimination against people with disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and State law. On June 18, 2013 the parties began settlement negotiations. On January 23, 2017, Judge Breyer entered an order dismissing the case and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. The agreement required specified Wal-Mart locations to install certain Point of Sale devices accessible to individuals with disabilities. The settlement was scheduled to have run until 2019, and there has been no further substantive docket activity as of May 2020.


The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. An aggrieved person, which is defined as "a person who is the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose communications or activities were subject to electronic surveillance," may bring a FISA claim against any person who committed a FISA violation; the aggrieved person is entitled to recover actual damages, punitive damages, and reasonable attorney's fees and costs. However, FISA allows a violator to assert as a defense that he "was a law enforcement or investigative officer engaged in the course of his official duties and the electronic surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search warrant or court order." For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. On February 22, 2011, three individuals filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California as a putative class action against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), two FBI officers in their official capacities, and five FBI agents in their individual capacities (agent defendants). The complaint alleged that the FBI used a paid confidential informant to infiltrate several mosques in Southern California and to "indiscriminately collect personal information on hundreds and perhaps thousands of innocent Muslim Americans." The plaintiffs alleged that the FBI used the informant to gather information as part of a counterterrorism investigation known as Operation Flex, which was "a dragnet surveillance" program, the "central feature" of which was to "gather information on Muslims." The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1), and FISA (50 U.S.C. § 1810). The plaintiffs defined their class as “[a]ll individuals targeted by Defendants for surveillance or information-gathering through the informant and Operation Flex, on account of their religion, and about whom the FBI thereby gathered personally identifiable information," and sought injunctive relief for the individual plaintiffs and the class, and damages for themselves as individuals. On April 11, 2011, the parties stipulated to defer class certification proceedings until after the parties filed any initial dispositive motions, and United States District Judge Cormac J. Carney approved the stipulation on April 20, 2011. On August 1, 2011 and August 9, 2011, the government and agent defendants, respectively, moved to dismiss the claims on various grounds, including failure to state a claim, qualified immunity, and state secrets privilege. The plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint on September 13, 2011, which the government and agent defendants again moved to dismiss on November 4, 2011 and November 11, 2011. On August 14, 2012, Judge Carney issued two orders. In one order, Judge Carney dismissed the FISA claim against the government, concluding that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for damages under that statute. However, Judge Carney permitted the plaintiffs' FISA claim against the agent defendants to proceed, rejecting the agent defendants' claim of qualified immunity. 885 F. Supp. 2d 978. In the other order, Judge Cormac dismissed all the other claims in the case on the basis of state secrets privilege. Judge Cormac found that, based on the classified declarations and supplemental memorandum submitted by the government, the "subject matter of this action, Operation Flex, involves intelligence that, if disclosed, would significantly compromise national security." Since the government would need to rely on the privileged material to defend against the plaintiffs' claims, "the risk of disclosure that further litigation would engender [could not] be averted through protective orders or restrictions on testimony." 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022. On October 12, 2012, the agent defendants appealed the denial of qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' FISA claim to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 2, 2012, Judge Carney approved the the parties' stipulation to stay all further proceedings related to the remaining FISA claim pending the agent defendants' appeal. On December 3, 2012, Judge Carney entered a partial final judgment, at plaintiffs' request, to allow the plaintiffs to immediately appeal the court's dismissal of the majority of their claims. On January 3, 2013, the plaintiffs appealed their dismissed claims to the Ninth Circuit. On April 2, 2014, the appeals court granted a joint motion to consolidate both the plaintiffs and agent defendants' appeals. On November 24, 2014, the Electronic Frontier Foundation submitted an amicus brief in support of the plaintiff appellants. On February 28, 2019, a panel of the Ninth Circuit (Marsha S. Berzon and Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges and George Caram Steeh III, Senior District Judge) affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's orders and remanded the case. In analyzing the plaintiffs' FISA claim against the agent defendants, the panel considered separately three categories of audio and video surveillance alleged in the complaint: (1) recordings made by the informant of conversations to which he was party; (2) recordings made by the informant of conversations to which he was not a party; and (3) recordings made by devices planted by FBI agents. The panel found that the agent defendants were entitled to dismissal on qualified immunity grounds as to the first two categories of surveillance. However, as to the third category of surveillance, the court found that two of the agent defendants, who had directly supervised the informant and were responsible for planting the devices, were not entitled to qualified immunity. The other three agent defendants, who generally supervised the other two agent defendants, were entitled to qualified immunity because the complaint did not "plausibly allege their personal involvement with respect to the planted devices." The panel then addressed the remaining claims which had all been previously dismissed pursuant to the state secrets privilege. It held that the district court had erred in determining sua sponte that particular claims warranted dismissal under the state secrets privilege. The panel found that Congress intended FISA to displace the state secrets privilege and the common law dismissal remedy with respect to electronic surveillance. Therefore, FISA procedures, which involves in camera and ex parte review by district courts, rather than a dismissal, were appropriate when "an aggrieved person affirmatively challenges, in any civil case, the legality of electronic surveillance or its use in litigation, whether the challenge is under FISA itself, the Constitution, or any other law." After holding that the state secrets privilege did not warrant dismissal of this litigation in its entirety, the panel remanded the case back to the district court to be analyzed under the FISA procedures. 916 F.3d 1202. After issuing the opinion, the Ninth Circuit received a request to rehear the case en banc. The measure failed to receive the majority of the votes of the judges on the Ninth Circuit, so the case returned to the District Court for further review. Judges in favor and opposed to rehearing the case en banc released dissents and concurrences respectively; these were added to the February 2019 opinion in a July 20, 2020 revised opinion. The dissent, written by Judge Patrick Bumatay, feared that replacing the state secrets doctrine with FISA would lead to rampant disclosure of state secrets protected by FISA in cases where electronic surveillance is an issue. Instead, he argued that the two doctrines should coexist, saying that FISA should only come up when a party contests the admissibility of a FISA application or warrant, and the state secrets doctrine should frame analysis in any other context. The concurrence, written by Judge Gould, took issue with the dissent's broad characterization of their opinion. He stated that this was a narrow, remedy-based case, turning on whether a civil case should be dismissed because of confidential information protected under FISA, which is what the District Court did, or if the case could proceed without telling the plaintiffs about the confidential information presented against them through the in camera review process. He stressed that the information would still be protected, just under a different framework than the state secrets doctrine. 965 F.3d 1015. The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on December 18, 2020. They requested that the Supreme Court review the Ninth Circuit's holding that FISA should replace the state secrets doctrine, and argued that FISA should supersede the state secrets doctrine only in instances when the admissibility of a FISA warrant or application is involved, much like the way Judge Bumatay suggested in his dissent. Responses to the petition are due on January 19, 2020; the case is ongoing.

Summary: In February 2011, three Muslim individuals filed a putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. Plaintiffs alleged that the FBI had used an informant to gather information on hundreds of Muslims based solely on their religion, violating their First and Fifth Amendment rights and FISA. After United States District Judge Cormac J. Carney dismissed the majority of their claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. A panel of three judges held that the district court had erred in determining sua sponte that particular claims warranted dismissal under the state secrets privilege. In finding that Congress intended FISA procedures to displace the state secrets privilege and the common law dismissal remedy with respect to electronic surveillance, the panel remanded the case back to the district court to be analyzed under the FISA procedures. The Ninth Circuit released a revised opinion in July 2020 with a new concurrence and dissent after a failed vote to rehear the case en banc. The defendants filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court on December 18, 2020; the case is ongoing.


On June 17, 2003, a male employee of the University of Iowa filed a lawsuit against the University in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa (Davenport) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Iowa Civil Rights Act, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution. The plaintiff filed the lawsuit on behalf of himself and a class of all male employees who are or who may become biological fathers and who have been or who may become subject to the parental leave policy. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, asserting that the University's policy illegally discriminated against biological fathers because it failed to provide them parental leave paid out of accumulated sick leave, but provided biological mothers and adoptive parents that benefit. On November 19, 2003, the Court (Judge Ronald E. Longstaff) granted the plaintiff's motion to certify the class. On July 21, 2004, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court granted. With respect to the Title VII claim, the Court held that the policy did not illegally discriminate against biological fathers on its face or in the University's application. With respect to the federal equal protection claim, the Court applied rational basis review after finding that there was no fundamental right implicated by the policy. The Court then held that the plaintiff "[did] not sufficiently discredit the legitimate purposes set forth by Defendants" and that he "[failed] to demonstrate the lack of a rational relationship between the operation of the policy to the purpose in the policy." Johnson v. Univ. of Iowa, 408 F.Supp.2d 728, 749 (2004). With respect to the plaintiff's claim that the policy violated the Iowa Civil Rights Act, the Court noted that "Iowa courts have used federal law for guidance in interpreting the ICRA." Id. The Court then simply applied its Title VII analysis to this claim and held that the policy did not violate the ICRA. Lastly, with respect to the Iowa Constitution Equal Protection Clause claim, the court noted that "[t]o determine the proper analysis of cases implicating the Iowa Equal Protection Clause, it is necessary to evaluate both Fitzgerald III, and Bierkamp. These are two cases where the Iowa Supreme Court departed from federal rational basis equal protection analysis." Id., 751. Specifically, the Court found that, under these cases, it must conduct "a more searching analysis of the relationship between the University's asserted purpose and the means it used to reach that purpose." Id. Ultimately, however, the court applied its findings concerning the federal protection clause and held that its findings hold "even under the more searching analysis required by the Iowa Equal Protection Clause." Id. On appeal by the plaintiff, the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on all claims. Johnson v. University, 431 F.3d 325 (8th Cir. 2005).

Summary: This class action lawsuit was brought by a male University of Iowa employee against the University. The plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief, alleging that the University's Parental Leave Policy illegally discriminated against biological fathers on the basis of sex. The defendant made a motion for summary judgment on all claims, which the court granted on December 16, 2004.


On August 1, 2005, a group of men, who claimed they were wrongfully searched, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Oakland, the Oakland Chief of Police, and Oakland police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights through a policy and practice of performing strip searches and body-cavity searches in public on only “reasonable suspicion” that people were hiding something illegal. The plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief and damages. This case was related to eight similar cases pending in the Northern District of California. On September 20, 2005, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for class action and individual relief for injuries and violation of their civil rights. On October 6, 2005 the case was reassigned to Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. Discovery proceeded for 18 months. On January 29, 2007, Judge Patel denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 2007 WL 219796. The parties each moved for summary judgment, and the individual defendants sought qualified immunity (immunity from liability for a public official who is performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights). On March 27, 2008, Judge Patel granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Judge Patel issued a declaratory judgment that the Oakland Police Department’s (“OPD”) policies were unconstitutional in certain respects. Judge Patel denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability and declaratory relief for the individual searches at issue. The strip-search policy was held unconstitutional because it provided too low a threshold for officers seeking to check for contraband on suspects in public places. The Court held that while reasonable suspicion is adequate to justify a strip search in the context of a detention facility when institutional security is a concern, it is “insufficient to justify a strip search in the field.” The police policy was held unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed strip searches of any kind in the field to be performed on less than probable cause. Judge Patel also found that an earlier version of the policy, enacted in 1998, was unconstitutional because it did not require that more invasive body-cavity searches be conducted by medical personnel. 621 F.Supp.2d 779 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Litigation continued regarding the plaintiffs’ claims for liability and declaratory relief on the individual searches at issue. The plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification, but on January 13, 2009, Judge Patel again denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 2009 WL 88433. On December 14, 2009, Judge Patel granted in part an individual plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim for the unlawful strip search that a defendant officer conducted on the plaintiff. Judge Patel declined to rule on the issues of qualified immunity and damages because factual disputes needed to be resolved first. 675 F.Supp.2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The officer petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to rule on the issue of qualified immunity. On January 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s petition because there were still material questions of fact regarding qualified immunity, and the defendant had not asked the district court to rule on qualified immunity either by filing a motion for summary judgment or at trial. On March 3, 2010, Judge Patel found that two of the cases were related to each other (C-08-4255MHP and C-04-4843MHP), but the other claims had been misjoined. Judge Patel gave the plaintiffs in those actions twenty days to drop all but one of the plaintiffs in each of the actions and to file new actions for each of the dropped plaintiffs. On December 1, 2011 the case was reassigned to Judge Susan Illston. Discovery and settlement negotiations proceeded for the next two years. On April 18, 2013, the parties agreed to a settlement of injunctive and declaratory relief claims. The City of Oakland through the OPD agreed to institute a new policy concerning strip searches in the field. The OPD was required to capture and retain all complaints about strip searches conducted in the field and all reports of such searches for a period of two years from the entry of the order. Those reports were forwarded to the plaintiff’s counsel every six months, and the court maintained jurisdiction to ensure compliance for the two years. In the absence of any further proceedings, these related matters were fully and finally dismissed with prejudice on April 18, 2015. The case is closed.

Summary: On August 1, 2005, a group of men, who claimed they were wrongfully strip searched, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Oakland, the Oakland Chief of Police, and Oakland police officers. On April 18, 2013, the parties agreed to a settlement of injunctive and declaratory relief claims requiring the defendants to institute a new policy limiting strip searches in the field.


On June 9, 2009, several agricultural growth and trade associations that employ immigrant workers under the H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa programs filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Court of North Carolina under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants' proposed "Solis Final Rule" is arbitrary and has significant deficiencies, such as opening agricultural growers to significant liability and requiring growers to give different wages and work conditions to H-2A workers on short notice and without an adequate public comment period. Before the promulgation of the "Chao Rule," the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program was plagued with severe administrative and processing issues, such as long delays, but was the only viable legal route to obtaining certain immigrant workers. Then, in January 2009, after months of working on solving many of the issues associated with the H-2A program and receiving comments from the public, the DOL promulgated the "Chao Rule." As a result of this rule, the H-2A program was streamlined, the calculation of wages and required expenses were clarified, and workers were given more rights. Employers also did not have to pay for the moving expense during the first week of work, which the growers pushed for. It also included in the H-2A program guest workers in the logging industry and agricultural packing house operations and excluded such workers from certain FLSA regulations. These workers used to have to apply under the H-2B program which, unlike the H-2A program which has no caps, had longer application wait times since the caps for the whole year were generally filled by March. In March 2009, Hilda Solis was sworn in as Secretary of Labor and proposed the "Solis Final Rule" to replace the "Chao Rule." The "Solis Rule" would potentially allow workers to sue their employers for FLSA violations that occurred from January 2009 to March 2009 even though they were legal and not violations under the "Chao Rule." The plaintiffs alleged that DOL promulgated a new rule without a reasonable public comment period and in the middle of the growing season. Further, they alleged that the DOL's reasoning behind replacing the "Chao Rule" with the "Solis Rule" was flawed and would significantly harm the farming business. On July 1, 2009, the District Court (Judge William Lindsay Osteen, Jr.) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction due to the relatively slight amount of harm the defendants will suffer from not being able to implement the new "Solis Rule" and the likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits. On August 4, 2009 , the defendants appealed this ruling to the Fourth Circuit. On October 14, 2009, the District Court (Judge Osteen) denied the defendants' motion to stay the case until their appeal is decided, and on November 19, 2009, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer, Judge Dennis W. Shedd, and Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III) likewise denied the defendants' motion to stay the district court case. While the appeal was pending, on December 3, 2009, the District Court (Judge Osteen, Jr.) allowed other farm organizations and individuals to intervene as defendants. On March 30, 2010, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Niemeyer, Judge Shedd, and Judge Wilkinson) dismissed the defendants' appeal. The parties went through discovery and on October 4, 2011, the District Court (Judge William Lindsay Osteen, Jr.): denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the federal defendants; granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the defendant-intervenors; permanently enjoined implementation of the new "Solis Rule;" and dismissed the defendant-intervenors' claims. On November 1, 2011, the defendant-intervenors filed a notice of appeal but on December 21, 2012 the Fourth Circuit (Judge Albert Diaz, Judge Barbara Milano Kennan, and Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III) affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The District Court retained jurisdiction for the bill of costs and on January 17, 2013 charged defendants $384.74 to be paid to the plaintiffs.

Summary: On June 9, 2009, several agricultural growth and trade associations that employ immigrant workers under the H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa programs filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Court of North Carolina under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"). The plaintiffs opposed the "Solis Final Rule" which would replace the previous H-2A rule (the "Chao Rule"). The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and permanently enjoyed implementation of the Solis Rule.


On July 26, 2007, a woman residing in a rooming unit with her children, both under the age of 16, filed a lawsuit under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, and New York state law against the City of New York in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming that a provision of the New York City Housing Maintenance Code (HMC section 27-2076) which prohibited children between the ages of one and sixteen from residing in single residence occupancy units discriminated on the basis of familial status. On October 1, 2008, the court (Jed S. Rakoff) held that the City had carried its burden of demonstrating that HMC section 27-2076 furthered legitimate government interests in the health, safety, and welfare of children that could not be achieved through other alternatives and that it did not violate the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff's requests for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief were denied. This case is closed.

Summary: A woman residing in a rooming unit with her children, both under the age of 16, filed a lawsuit under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, and New York state law against the City of New York, claiming that a provision of the New York City Housing Maintenance Code (HMC section 27-2076) discriminated on the basis of familial status. The court (Jed S. Rakoff) held that the City had carried its burden of demonstrating that HMC section 27-2076 furthered legitimate government interests in the health, safety, and welfare of children and that it did not violate the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff's requests for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief were denied. This case is closed.


COVID-19 Summary: Inmates held at Weld County Jail (Colorado) with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Weld County. They sought injunctive relief, in the form of following public health guidelines in the jail, and declaratory relief. The parties received preliminary approval of a class action settlement on December 29, 2020.
 On April 7, 2020, inmates held in Weld County Jail with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Weld County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the conditions of confinement violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They alleged that the defendant had failed to adequately address the COVID-19 pandemic and that Weld County Jail was not following public health guidelines. They also claimed that they shared common utilities, such as toilets, that they were unable to practice social distancing, and that they did not have regular access to hand soap. The plaintiffs sought class certification, a temporary restraining order, and that the court order the defendant to implement a plan that would ensure compliance with public health guidelines. Concurrent with the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and expedited hearing. The plaintiffs' proposed class was: All current and future persons held at the Weld County Jail who are at high risk of complications from COVID-19 because
 (a) they are age 55 or older; or (b) they have the following chronic health conditions: cancer; autoimmune disease (including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, Sjogren’s, Crohn’s); chronic lung disease (including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchiectasis, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis or other chronic conditions associated with impaired lung function); history of cardiovascular disease; chronic arthritis; chronic liver or kidney disease; diabetes; hypertension; heart failure; HIV; on chronic steroids or other immunosuppressant medications for chronic conditions; (c) they have history of smoking or other substance abuse disorders; or (d) they are pregnant.
 On April 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw their request for a temporary restraining order and moved for a setting of a preliminary injunction hearing. On April 15, 2020, Judge Philip A. Brimmer granted the motion and set a preliminary injunction hearing for the week of April 27, 2020. On April 17, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for limited expedited discovery, seeking: (1) an inspection of the Weld County jail by plaintiffs' medical expert; (2) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals in isolation or quarantine; (3) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals at the jail who had tested positive for COVID-19; and (4) copies of all policies and procedures issued by defendants concerning COVID-19. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the inspection would be unnecessary and an undue burden. On April 21, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for limited expedited discovery. Judge Brimmer granted a limited inspection of Weld County Jail and the requested daily reports, but denied the request for all policies and procedures. On April 26, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to block a public records request by the plaintiffs for "policies, procedures, manuals, guidelines, training materials, and orders relating to the coronavirus." On April 27, 2020, Judge Brimmer denied the motion, asserting that the defendant had failed to show that it would suffer any harm by complying with the plaintiffs' request. On May 11, the plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction was granted in part. 2020 WL 2320174. Specifically, the court ordered that on or before May 18, the defendant provide a list of persons “medically vulnerable” currently held at the Weld County Jail (over the age of 65 or with medical conditions). Additionally, they were required to institute a policy to ensure medically vulnerable inmates are “socially distanced” from other inmates housed in the Jail, enhanced sanitization, and increased monitoring for COVID-19 for those medically vulnerable by May 21. The defendants were also required to provide a report on the same day. The case has been reassigned to Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews on May 12. On May 18, the defendants notified the court of their complete compliance with the court's preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs disagreed and filed a motion for a hearing regarding the defendant's non-compliance on May 21. On July 2, the court denied the motion finding that the plaintiff's purpose of asking for a hearing is unclear. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not ask that defendant be held in civil contempt for violating the preliminary injunction order nor ask the court to modify the preliminary injunction order. Instead, they sought a hearing because of an “imbalance in access to relevant information," but failed to explain why this information must be probed at a hearing rather than through the discovery process. On July 24, the plaintiffs sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days, which was granted on July 29. The plaintiffs again sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days on September 3, which was granted the next day. The preliminary injunction continued to be extended until December 9, 2020. On November 11, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for the preliminary approval of class settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties reported that they had successfully negotiated a resolution to the dispute. The parties included in their motion a proposed consent decree that would ensure measures to protect class members from COVID-19. The parties reported that the proposed consent decree was negotiated at arms-length without any conflicts of interest. Both parties conceded that they were uncertain of what the eventual outcome of the litigation would be considering the novelty of COVID-19. Both parties agreed that a settlement would be more valuable than proceeding to trial, given the complexity of the resolution and the immediacy of the COVID-19 crisis. Consent Decree The proposed consent decree implemented the CDC's definition of "medically vulnerable", subject to future modification by the CDC. The defendant agreed to identify medically vulnerable inmates during booking and intake and to protect such individuals during the remainder of the intake process. The WCJ agreed to attempt to house medically vulnerable inmates in single-cell units during intake and to use specified procedures to minimize exposure if single cells are not available. The WCJ agreed to continue to limit the exposure of medically vulnerable inmates in the general jail population and pledged to permit the maximum amount of daily out-of-cell time for inmates consistent with social distancing protocols. As part of the consent decree, the WCJ agreed to medically isolate COVID-19 positive inmates in isolation units and to ensure that such an environment would be non-punitive. The jail also promised to use enhanced sanitation procedures, to distribute masks, and to regularly monitor medically vulnerable inmates for COVID-19 symptoms. The jail also agreed to provide testing for inmates consistent with CDC guidelines and to continue remote visitation opportunities. WCJ agreed to maintain modified arrest standards that would remain in place for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis and pledged to advise Weld County police chiefs to be judicious with jail space. The consent decree also provided that the defendant comply with robust data reporting to plaintiffs' counsel to monitor compliance with the decree. The plaintiffs and the class were required to release all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising from COVID-19 at the WCJ prior to the decree. The expiration of the decree was set at the expiration of the executive order made by the Governor of Colorado declaring a state of emergency, unless the order was renewed or replaced. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $122,387.60 for attorney's fees and costs. The November 11 motion also included a certification of settlement class and appointment of class counsel. The parties sought to certify all past, present, and future inmates housed at WCJ from April 7, 2020 through the end of the COVID-19 emergency who are "medically vulnerable". The two proposed class representatives fell within the high-risk populations vulnerable to COVID-19. Counsel for the plaintiffs were appointed class counsel. On December 11, 2020, Judge Brimmer ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to clarify the meaning of "past" and "future" within the definition of the class and to discuss locations for posting the notice of the settlement within the WCJ in English and Spanish, as well as a location for sending objections. On December 29, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted the joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties agreed to withdraw past inmates from the proposed class and agreed that the extension of the consent decree to the end of the COVID-19 emergency covered future medically vulnerable inmates. The parties designated one of plaintiffs' counsel as the person to receive objections to the proposed settlement. The parties also agreed to upload the class notice to the WCJ's jail-wide television system in English and Spanish. The court preliminarily certified all present and future medically vulnerable inmates through the end of the COVID-19 emergency and ordered that plaintiffs' attorneys were appointed class counsel. On February 16, 2021, the court issued a final judgment granting the joint motion for final approval of class action settlement and final certification of the proposed class and dismissing the case with prejudice.

Summary: Inmates held at Weld County Jail with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Weld County. They sought injunctive relief, in the form of following public health guidelines in the jail, and declaratory relief. On December 29, 2020, the court granted a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On February 16, 2021, the court issued final judgment granting the class action settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.


On April 16, 2002, plaintiffs, Santa Cruz residents who suffered various forms of blindness, filed a complaint against the state transit agency in the United States District Court for the District of Northern California for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. and various state laws. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant failed to implement systems to announce at which stop a bus was stopping and, for individuals waiting at a bus stop, to announce which bus had arrived. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged they had missed stops and taken the wrong bus. The plaintiffs alleged the defendant had been aware of its inaccessible bus system since at least 1989 and that bus drivers were not helpful and lacked training. On July 11, 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and filed it with the court. The defendant agreed to install "talking technology" equipment to announce bus stops, ensure discipline of drivers who did not comply with the changes, and pay for an outside agency to monitor compliance by riding buses for at least 100 hours per quarter. The agreement was to last two years from the date on which the last bus was fitted with the talking technology. The defendant also agreed to pay $5000 to each plaintiff and $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On July 22, 2003, the court dismissed the case by stipulation. The case is now closed.

Summary: Blind plaintiffs sued a state transit agency because its buses did not have an audio-announcement system to warn them when the bus was approaching their stop. The agency settled and agreed to install an electronic announcement system, pay $5000 to each plaintiff, and pay $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs.


On July 27, 2012, the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, and the Waterkeeper Alliance filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that the Taylor Finishing Company, a swine concentrated animal feeding operation, illegally polluted under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and that this pollution endangered human health and the environment. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge James C. Dever III and Magistrate Judge James E. Gates. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the CWA and RCRA by causing the release of pollutants, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and bacteria, onto the lands and into waters surrounding defendants’ facilities near the Neuse River Basin. The complaint described that defendants caused illegal discharges of pollutants without a permit, illegal open dumping of swine waste, and illegal treatment, storage, and disposal of swine waste. The plaintiffs argued that this disregard for disposal requirements created an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment. Between September and November of 2013, the three defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint claiming that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to serve a proper notice of intent to sue prior to filing the complaint. But before the motions were decided, on April 25, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The defendants filed responsive motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On August 26, 2013, Judge Dever denied the motion and the parties proceeded to discovery. On October 21, 2014, the NCEJN filed a stipulation of dismissal, asking that the court dismiss their claims with prejudice and that each party bear their own costs. The court granted this motion later that month. On November 21, 2014, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim due to insufficient evidence and the undisputed fact that none of the plaintiffs had suffered an injury that could be causally connected to the defendants’ conduct. On that same day, one of the defendants moved for summary judgment of count three of the second amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs could not establish that there was an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment caused by the defendant. Additionally, another defendant filed a similar motion for summary judgment, even asking that the court enter judgment in their favor on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. On January 14, 2015, Judge Gates entered a report and recommendation with the court, recommending that the court deny without prejudice the three pending motions for summary judgment. 2015 WL 1630602. On April 13, 2015, Judge Dever agreed with Judge Gates and denied the motions without prejudice. 2015 WL 1880200. Then, defendants filed a notice of bankruptcy with the court and on June 3, 2015, the court entered an order staying the action pending resolution of the bankruptcy case. After the stay, negotiations took place and on June 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a notice of a proposed consent decree. The agreement required that the contaminated lagoon be inspected annually, that the defendants remove sludge from the lagoon, and that records are kept regarding the activities. The consent decree further stipulated that the parties would make a joint public statement, that the plaintiffs could not do sample testing on the defendant’s surrounding property, and that the defendants must operate their facility in accordance with the terms of the facility’s permit. The parties agreed to seek enforcement of the terms in bankruptcy court so the court would not retain jurisdiction over the matter. On August 13, 2018, the court approved the consent decree. The parties subsequently filed a stipulation to a voluntary dismissal of the case. The case was closed on August 29, 2018.

Summary: This 2012 lawsuit was brought by the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, Inc., and the Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Taylor Finishing Company under the CWA and the RCRA, alleging that the company had caused the release of hazardous pollutants into the Neuse River Basin. In June 2018, the parties entered into a private consent decree and the court approved it in August.


In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics. They argued that this system violated their rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of certain civil rights statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights as a candidate, and as taxpayers and voters, were violated by the defendants' practice of coercing employees as a condition of keeping their jobs to contribute money to various Democratic organizations and candidates. Defendants had also allegedly coerced employees into doing political and campaign work both during their regular working hours and on their own time for candidates endorsed by the organization and its affiliates. Finally, defendants had allegedly coerced employees into voting for specific party candidates. Plaintiffs asserted that these coercive practices directly resulted in the defeat of independent candidates and perpetuated the dominance of the Democratic Party in Cook County. On November 6, 1969, District Court Judge Abraham Marovitz granted defendants' motion to dismiss. 310 F.Supp. 1398 (1969). The district court found that plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the alleged violations of the rights of employees and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate injury. Plaintiffs appealed and filed an amended complaint joining additional Democratic defendants and numerous Republican defendants also engaged in the patronage system. On October 23, 1970, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Fairchild reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. 435 F.2d 267 (1970). Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the course of the next couple of years, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations resulting in a consent order entered into by the majority of the defendants. The order was approved by District Court Judge Marovitz on May 5, 1972.  356 F.Supp. 1241 (1972). The order prohibited compulsory or coerced political financial contributions and permanently enjoined politically motivated firings, demotions, transfers, or other punishment of government employees. This consent order came to be known "the Shakman decree." Litigation continued for several years involving those defendants that declined to enter into the aforementioned consent agreement. On September 24, 1979, District Court Judge Nicholas Bua issued a ruling concluding that the patronage system infringed upon the plaintiffs' rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 481 F.Supp. 1315 (1979). Defendants appealed. On August 5, 1987, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Ripple reversed the district court, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing. 829 F.2d 1387 (1987). The circuit court found that a number of very speculative inferences would be required to connect plaintiffs' alleged injury with activities attributed to the remaining defendants. However, the circuit court explicitly noted that nothing in the holding could be construed as affecting the continued validity of the Shakman decree. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the next two decades, litigation continued with periodic revivals for enforcement of the consent agreements and for seeking damages or lawyers' fees. Also, consent agreements, like that entered into in 1972, were periodically made with various defendants. Individual defendants found to be substantially compliant with the terms of consent decrees were intermittently dismissed from further requirements related to the consent agreements. On August 28, 2006, plaintiffs filed an application to hold Cook County and other government personnel in civil contempt for violation of the consent agreements. A series of negotiations between the parties began that month and a settlement was reached. As part of the settlement, on November 29, 2006, District Court Judge Wayne R. Andersen, appointed a compliance administrator in an effort to ensure future compliance with the decree. On May 15, 2014, the parties jointly moved for a hearing regarding the substantial compliance of the City of Chicago. On June 16, 2014, the court found the City of Chicago to be in substantial compliance and dismissed the City from the case. On November 18, 2014, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee the determination of which positions within the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) could be properly exempt from compliance with the consent decrees. Employers could take political affiliation into account when filling particular positions if that consideration was relevant for effective performance. This order arose from the IDOT's overuse of exemptions. On August 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to expand the Special Master's responsibilities to oversee all bodies under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Illinois. On November 28, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, reasoning that the Special Master's experience and oversight would aid in compliance and avoid downstream litigation when non-compliance was uncovered. Tensions once again came to a head on September 6, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, alleging that the Clerk of Cook County violated the consent agreements. The County Clerk argued that the court was unable to rule on the alleged violations and that the consent agreements were irrelevant due to changes in legal and factual circumstances over the past few decades, but the court ultimately ruled on April 17, 2020, in favor of the plaintiffs. The court thus found the County Clerk in violation of the consent agreements and additionally appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance. On July 14, 2020, Governor Pritzker moved to vacate the consent decree, arguing that the State of Illinois has been substantially compliant with the decree. The State additionally argued that the consent agreements were so far removed from the original controversy that there was no longer a relevant claim under law. As of February 26, 2021, the litigation concerning the State of Illinois is still ongoing.

Summary: In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate in the election for delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels claiming that the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics violated their constitutional rights. Litigation was heavily complicated by procedural and standing issues, though it gave way to consent decrees prohibiting the patronage system. As of February 26, 2021, the State of Illinois has attempted to vacate the consent agreements, claiming that it is substantially compliant with the agreements' requirements.


On December 19, 2007, attorneys with Community Legal Services of Arizona and Farmworker Justice filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on behalf of American farmworkers who had been replaced by foreign workers during 2006-2007 and previous citrus harvesting seasons. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802 et seq., by providing false and misleading information to the federal government concerning the terms and conditions of employing farmworkers. Plaintiffs, who all worked for defendants during the 2005-2006 season, alleged that defendants refused to rehire them for the 2006-2007 season and instead told the government that they couldn't find any workers, therefore forcing them to hire migrant workers under the H-2A foreign guest-worker program. Plaintiffs sought lost wages and an injunction to prevent the defendants from discriminating against U.S. workers in their hiring practices. Shortly after the case began, it was consolidated with another action for pretrial purposes only (Reynaldo Guerra Jimenez, et al. v. Servicios Agricolas Mex Inc., et al., No. CV07-1492-PHX-GMS). On September 20, 2010, the Court (Judge G. Murray Snow) entered an order denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 742 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. Az. 2010). The Court found that the plaintiffs had put forth evidence that defendants had refused to rehire them and had instead hired non-citizen immigrant workers. The Court held that the defendants had deprived the plaintiffs of an equal right to contract, as was enjoyed by others, and that the defendants had engaged in such discrimination against the plaintiffs based on their citizenship status. The Court denied summary judgment to all other claims. On April 8, 2011, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement in the Jimenez case; however, the parties also informed the Court that they were unable to settle the claims in this case. The Court unconsolidated the two cases and dismissed Jimenez with prejudice. From August 23 through September 2, 2011, a seven-day bench trial was held before Judge Snow. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law after they rested their case. On March 27, 2012, Judge Snow entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2012 WL 1030084 (D. Az. Mar. 27, 2012). The Court found that the defendants violated the "working arrangement" they had undertaken with certain plaintiffs, and that they did not inform these plaintiffs prior to the beginning of the season that defendants would not be employing them. As a result, the Court found, a number of the plaintiffs were unemployed for some time at the beginning of the harvest season while they sought work elsewhere. The Court held this was a violation of a provision of AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1832(c), and awarded statutory damages in the amount of $500 to ten of the plaintiffs, $250 to another ten, and $150 to another eight. The Court awarded no relief to the remaining 143 plaintiffs. The Court entered judgment accordingly on April 26, 2012. On May 25, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the Court's final judgment. The case was argued before and submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March of 2014. On March 6, 2015, a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges affirmed the District Court’s holding, stating that the defendants had complied with the AWPA regarding the remaining plaintiffs. 592 Fed.Appx. 613 (Mem). The defendants were able to show that “the job” in dispute was no longer the same opportunity due to a 90-mile location change. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 19, 2007, a group of U.S. citizens and permanent residents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA") against an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor. Following a trial, the District Court awarded statutory damages to certain of the plaintiffs, finding that defendants had violated a provision of the AWPA. The Court denied all further relief. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding on March 6, 2015.


On July 9, 2014, a lawfully-present alien authorized to work in the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc., under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. Represented by private counsel and MALDEF, he sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing the defendant’s advertised practice of requiring new employees to have had three or more continuous years of U.S. residency, hold permanent visas, and read and write English fluently, the plaintiff alleged that the company unlawfully refused or rescinded employment contracts to individuals based on their status as non-citizens or permanent residents. The named plaintiff, who had applied for employment and interviewed with the defendant, alleged that after one of its employees learned of his status as a non-citizen without a green card, the company decided to decline him an employment contract because of his alienage status. On September 4, 2014 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. After hearing oral arguments, Judge Katherine Forrest denied the motion to dismiss on November 11, 2014, holding that the plaintiff could successfully plead intentional discrimination by alleging that the defendant acted pursuant to a facially discriminatory policy. In this case, Judge Forrest found that the policy facially discriminated against lawfully present aliens without green cards, who, as lawfully present aliens, are protected by § 1981. 69 F.Supp.3d 364. The defendants moved to appeal shortly after, and on December 20, 2014 Judge Forrest stayed the case pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision whether or not to accept the defendant’s interlocutory appeal. On March 17, 2015, the Second Circuit granted the defendants permission to appeal the District Court’s (non-final) denial of their motion to dismiss. However, before appellate briefing, the parties settled, out-of-court. On May 20, 2015 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation for dismissal of the case with prejudice, with each party to pay their own fees and expenses. Although the details of the settlement are unclear, on August 19, 2015, MALDEF posted the following on Facebook, which appears to be related to the settlement in this case: "As part of an amicable legal agreement, MALDEF and Northwestern Mutual have launched a new recruitment program aimed at immigrants authorized to work, without sponsorship, including those in the DACA program, interested in a financial representative internship or financial representative contract." According to the post, individuals may be eligible for up to $7,500 in awards if they were told on or after July 1, 2010 that they were ineligible for a financial representative internship or contract because of their work authorization or immigration classification.

Summary: In the Southern District of New York in July of 2014, a lawfully-present alien alleged he was denied employment contract because of his alienage status and brought a class action suit against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. In May of 2015, the case settled out of court with a favorable outcome for the plaintiff.


This lawsuit is part of an ongoing legal battle, across several cases, over allowing transgender individuals access to public facilities matching their gender identities. With eleven states joining together to challenge the DOJ, DOE, EEOC, and DOL over their interpretations of antidiscrimination statutes, it represents the broadest challenge to date of the Obama administration’s position that transgender individuals should have access to bathrooms, changing rooms, and other public facilities and services that are in accordance with their gender identities. The eleven states filed this suit in response to the heightened debate over transgender rights that began after the North Carolina passed House Bill 2 (HB2), on March 23, 2016. The law prohibited municipalities from enacting antidiscrimination policies, curtailed private right of action to enforce antidiscrimination statutes in state courts, required that in restroom and changing facility access in government buildings be restricted based on biological sex, and formally changed the definition of sex in the state's antidiscrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,” which prevents discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. The law sparked widespread condemnation from progressives, and a lawsuit from the ACLU, in North Carolina. It also prompted the DOJ to send a letter to North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory on May 4, 2016, informing him that they believe the law violates federal law and requesting that the governor not enforce it. After McCrory responded to their letter with a lawsuit against the DOJ on May 9, the DOJ brought its own lawsuit against North Carolina in the Middle District of North Carolina, arguing that HB2 violated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Violence Against Women Re-Authorization Act (VAWA). The lawsuit that the DOJ brought against North Carolina threatens the state with a potential loss of millions of dollars in federal aid if the state is found to be non-compliant with the statutes cited. The eleven states that are plaintiffs in this case feared similar action by the DOJ against themselves, and so on May 25, 2016, they filed this lawsuit against the DOJ and against all other agency rules and guidance stating that antidiscrimination statutes require states to provide transgender individual access to public accommodations consonant with their gender identities. They filed their lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgement Act), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Administrative Procedure Act), and 5 U.S.C. § 611 (Regulatory Flexibility Act). Specifically, they asked the court to find that the agencies have violated federal law and the Constitution and to issue an injunction preventing the agencies rules, regulations, and guidance on the subject from having legal force. The judge issued an order granting the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F. Supp. 3d 810. The order found that the action was reviewable and plaintiffs had standing. The judge also held that the Department of Education was not entitled to deference because Title IX was not ambiguous and referred to biological sex. The district court further clarified the preliminary injunction on October 18, 2016, ruling that the injunction did apply nationwide. 2016 WL 7852331. The preliminary injunction and clarification were appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 21, 2016 (Docket No. 16-1534). The district court denied a stay on the injunction on November 20, 2016, finding that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on appeal and suffered no irreparable harm. 2016 WL 7852330. After the change in presidential administrations, the DOJ and DOE issued new guidance that withdrew the previous guidance on transgender access to public facilities. That guidance can be found below. On March 2, 2017, the government filed an unopposed motion to withdraw the appeal, which was granted. The case was dismissed in the district court without prejudice on March 3, 2017.

Summary: Eleven States sue the DOJ and other agencies over their position that transgender access to bathrooms and other public facilities is required by Title IX, Title VII, and the Violence Against Women Act, asking for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Northern District Court of Texas. The Court granted the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F.Supp.3d 810. The preliminary injunction was appealed and the case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice due to a voluntary withdrawal by defendants on March 3, 2017, due to a change in presidential administrations and policy.