COVID-19 Summary: This is a habeas and injunctive action brought on behalf of immigration detainees in the Folkston ICE Processing Center. The detainees requested release, arguing that continuing detention would violate their constitutional rights because they suffered from underlying medical conditions that made them especially vulnerable to COVID-19. The court refused to issue preliminary relief, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case in August 2020. The parties filed certain redacted documents publicly, and on November 18, 2020, the case was dismissed. <hr> On April 8, 2020, three detainees in the Folkston ICE Processing center brought this action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the ICE Field Office, and the Folkston ICE Processing Center. The plaintiffs sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment Due Process rights. Specifically, they alleged that the conditions at Folkston, including the failure to provide adequate medical care, housing in close quarters, and unsanitary living spaces put the plaintiffs at a severe risk for contracting COVID-19. They alleged that their underlying medical conditions made them particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death from the virus, and that release was the only appropriate remedy. The plaintiffs also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to secure their immediate release at the same time they filed their complaint. The original case (No. 4:20-cv-0069) was transferred in-district and received a new docket number (No. 5:20-cv-00046). The original case was assigned to Judge Christopher L. Ray, but the case was assigned to Judge Lisa Wood and Magistrate Judge Benjamin W. Cheesbro after the transfer. On April 18, Judge Wood denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary relief. She explained that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims because their evidence did not show that release was the only way to remedy unsafe conditions of detention. Judge Wood also found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that they had a cause of action because circuit precedent suggested that habeas petitions could not be used to challenge conditions of confinement. 2020 WL 1914916. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on May 1. On May 7, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with more detail about the legal theories behind their Fifth Amendment claim, which the defendants moved to dismiss on May 18. On May 8, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and an emergency writ of habeas corpus. On July 8, Judge Wood denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and writ of habeas corpus, finding that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their constitutional claims. The order reiterated that a habeas petition could not be used to challenge conditions of confinement and questioned whether any other cause of action existed. Assuming that one did, Judge Wood denied relief because the evidence about the Center's COVID response (or lack thereof) was conflicting, no evidence suggested that officials had been deliberately indifferent to the detainees' needs, and the plaintiffs had not established that the defendants had failed to comply with ICE guidelines that the plaintiffs said ICE had agreed to follow. 2020 WL 3839938. Five days later, Magistrate Cheesbro took a "preliminary peek" at the defendants' motion to dismiss and found it contained sufficient merit to warrant granting a stay of discovery until the court ruled. The plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on August 12, 2020, and the court dismissed the case the next day. The Clearinghouse does not know whether the parties settled out of court around the same time. Judge Wood stayed the case for 60 days for the parties to submit motions or agreements about docket filing restrictions, specifically the partial unsealing of certain documents. On October 13, Judge Wood extended the stay to November 11 at the parties' request. On November 18, 2020, the case was dismissed.

Summary: This is an action about the conditions of detention in the Folkston ICE Processing Center brought by medically vulnerable detainees seeking release. The plaintiffs alleged that their continued detention, in light of COVID-19, was unconstitutional, and that release from detention was the only appropriate remedy. The court denied a TRO on April 18, and then later on July 8 denied a preliminary injunction. On August 13, the court dismissed the case at the plaintiffs' request. The case was stayed pending a partial unsealing of documents and dismissed on November 18, 2020.


On September 22, 2006, landlords and employers in Valley Park Missouri and the non-profit Equal Housing Opportunity Council brought suit as plaintiffs in state court against the City of Valley Park. Represented by a large group of lawyers from advocacy organizations (including the ACLU), law school clinics, and several St. Louis law firms, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City of Valley Park's Ordinance 1708 was unlawful, under both state and federal law, and a temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction against its enforcement. The Ordinance made it illegal to employ or house an "illegal alien" (the term was undefined). The Court (Judge Barbara Wallace) granted a temporary restraining order on September 25, 2006, at the plaintiffs' request. Valley Park immediately amended the ordinance, substituting Ordinance 1715. After a hearing, Judge Wallace promptly enjoined its operation as well. The parties began discovery. In October 2006, Valley Park removed the case to federal court, where it proceeded before Judge Richard Webber of the Eastern District of Missouri. Once the parties agreed to the continued suspension of the Ordinance's implementation until a later hearing on its merits, discovery proceeded while the plaintiffs sought remand to state court and attorneys' fees. On October 26, 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss certain individual defendants. On November 15, 2006, the District Court (Judge Webber) remanded the case to state court, on plaintiffs' motion. The court denied the plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and denied the defendants' pending motion to dismiss as moot. 2006 WL 3331082. On February 20, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings. The defendants subsequently moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Just before the scheduled trial, the city again amended the ordinance, passing two replacements. One had to do with housing, the other with employment. On March 7, 2007, the state court (Judge Wallace) held that the new ordinances did not moot the case and were void in their entirety. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment and entered permanent injunctions against operation of Ordinances 1708 and 1715. The court held the Ordinances went beyond Valley Park's authority as a 4th Class municipality, and found that the housing provisions conflicted with state landlord-tenant law. The trial court also declined to award the plaintiffs attorneys' fees. 2007 WL 857320. Both parties appealed the order. On June 3, 2008, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for mootness because the ordinances in issue were validly repealed. The plaintiff was not awarded attorneys' fees. 254 SW 3d 264. Meanwhile, after the trial court's order was issued, the City Council tried to repeal the new versions of the housing ordinance. The vote to do so was vetoed by the Mayor, however, and an override was unsuccessful. The status of the employment ordinance was less clear; its effective date language stated that it would not come into effect until the preliminary injunction in this case was lifted, but that injunction had been made permanent by the court's decision. On April 4, 2007, many of the plaintiffs in the case filed a new case challenging the replacement housing ordinances passed by the city (Reynolds II: docket no. 07CC-001420). They requested a temporary restraining order, preliminary, and permanent injunction, as well as attorneys' fees and a declaratory judgment. The plaintiffs argued that the ordinance had the same intent to target immigrants, and merely shifted the burden from landlord's to the city to prove that the prospective tenant was not lawfully in the U.S. The court in that case (Judge Whittington) promptly granted a temporary restraining order, on April 5, 2007. By the parties' agreement on April 25, that restraining order was extended until briefing and resolution of dispositive motions. At about the same time, one of the plaintiffs in Reynolds I filed her own challenge, Gray v. City of Valley Park. When she moved for a preliminary injunction, the City removed that case to federal district court. Details are available at <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=9476">IM-MO-0002/a>. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on May 31, 2007. Next, in July 2007, the City amended the housing ordinance to eliminate the provisions referring to immigration status. The city then filed a motion to dismiss this case as moot, which Judge Barbara Ann Crancer granted on August 4, 2007. In August 2007, the City amended the employment ordinance to make it effective even without the lifting of the injunction in the first state court case. The plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt on August 16, 2007, arguing that this violated the court order in the first state-court case. Judge Wallace denied that motion on October 16, 2007 without comment. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 22, 2006, landlords and employers in Valley Park Missouri and the non-profit Equal Housing Opportunity Council brought suit as plaintiffs in state court against the City of Valley Park. Represented by a large group of lawyers from advocacy organizations (including the ACLU), law school clinics, and several St. Louis law firms, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the City of Valley Park's Ordinance 1708 was unlawful, under both state and federal law, and a temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction against its enforcement. The Ordinance made it illegal to employ or house an "illegal alien." After the case was removed to federal court and then remanded back to state court, the state court entered judgment on the pleadings for the plaintiffs and a permanent injunction against the ordinances. The case is now closed.


In 1994, the United States Department of Justice investigated conditions at Clover Bottom Developmental Center in Nashville, Greene Valley Developmental Center in Greeneville, and Nat T. Winston Developmental Center in Bolivar, Tennessee. The investigation also included the Harold Jordon Habilitation Center, a program at Clover Bottom. The investigation revealed numerous violations of the constitutional and statutory rights of the developmentally delayed residents of the facilities. The Department of Justice suspected that the abuse of residents by staff at Clover Bottom constituted criminal behavior. On November 15, 1996, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee against the State of Tennessee on behalf of individuals residing at the three facilities. The complaint alleged numerous violations of the constitution, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Tennessee state law. These included failure to provide education and adequate medical care, abusive treatment, and insufficient staffing. The lawsuit followed a similar private lawsuit filed against the state, People First of Tennessee v. Clover Bottom Developmental Center, Civ. No. 96-cv-01056 (M.D.Tenn.), ID-TN-0002 in the Clearinghouse, and essentially simultaneously with the complaint, the U.S. moved to consolidate the cases; this motion was granted two weeks later. All three parties immediately settled, and the settlement was approved by Judge Echols in November of 1996. The state agreed to a number of changes, including the following: • Create person-centered evaluation of citizens in need of services • Develop community programs and resources • Increase staffing and staff training • Improve living conditions in the centers • Provide education for school-age residents For a record of compliance litigation information, please see ID-TN-0002. The court monitored the settlement until September 8, 2017, when Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw issued an order in a related case that stated the parties agreed that defendants had "completed and fulfilled" their obligations under the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 1996, following an investigation by the Department of Justice, the United States filed a lawsuit against the State of Tennessee alleging constitutional violations of developmental delayed residents residing at the state's developmental facilities. A settlement was reached approved by Judge Echols. The court monitored the settlement until September 8, 2017, when Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw issued an order in a related case that stated the parties agreed that defendants had "completed and fulfilled" their obligations under the settlement. The case is now closed.


On April 26, 2007, the ACLU of Northern California, the ACLU Immigration Rights Project, and other public interest groups filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California representing a seven-year-old United States citizen, who was detained for ten hours by U.S. Immigration Customs and Enforcement Agency (ICE) officials. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was unlawfully detained following an ICE raid of his (alien) father's apartment. Even though the authorities were shown the plaintiff's passport, which identified him as a U.S. citizen, ICE took the plaintiff into custody with his father and transported him to the ICE processing center in San Francisco. His father was not permitted to make non-detention arrangements for his son. Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages. The ACLU reported that the lawsuit came after scores of reports of alleged abusive practices by immigration officials, including illegal entries and searches by ICE agents, inappropriate tactics related to children, ethnic profiling, and due process violations. Four months the case was filed, ICE had changed its child detention policies to prevent detention of US citizens or lawful permanent residents. The case successfully reached a court approved settlement. $30,000 was to be paid to the plaintiff, only $1,400 of which was paid to cover attorney's fees. In addition, plaintiff's father was granted deferred action status for two years, to be reviewed biennially, to facilitate to acclimation of his son to American life and his education here in order in order that he might have a solid cultural and academic basis for his return to the United States, should he have to leave with his father if his father is eventually deported.

Summary: In 2007, a seven-year-old US Citizen was detained for 10 hours when his alien father was taken into custody during an ICE immigration raid. The father was not allowed to make non-detentive arrangements for his son. ICE settled the case for $30,000, $28,600 of which went directly to the plaintiff, and deferred action in the father's potential deportation proceedings. Four months after filing the case, ICE had changed its child detention policies to prevent detention of US citizens or lawful permanent residents.


On February 21, 2019, a former Yemeni diplomat filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued President Donald Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Attorney General William Barr in their official capacities under the Declaratory Judgement and Mandamus Acts for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by the Constitutional Law Center for Muslims in America, the plaintiff sought declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief that the U.S. use good faith efforts to ensure his daughter's safe return to the country. The plaintiff sought to prevent the federal government from depriving his daughter of her citizenship and to require the government to allow her to return to the country. His U.S.-born daughter and his grandson were located at Camp Roj in Syria. The plaintiff claimed that the U.S.'s failure to use reasonable efforts to facilitate the return of his daughter and grandson as obligated under both the Constitution and the Fourth Geneva Convention would cause immediate and irreparable harm. He brought this action as the next friend of his daughter and grandchild. However, the defendants argued that the children were no longer U.S. citizens, had joined ISIS, and were barred from reentry. The plaintiff had also requested expedited consideration of his claims. On March 4, 2019, the Court held a hearing on the plaintiff’s request and denied expedited treatment. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and an added motion for partial summary judgment on April, 26 2019 on the grounds that the plaintiff lacked standing as next friend of his daughter and grandson. The Defendant’s move in the alternative for summary judgment on these claims based on the undisputed facts and the attached Department of State certification and contemporaneous underlying official records. On December 9, 2019, Judge Reggie B. Walton issued a memorandum opinion, granting the plaintiff's renewed motion for expedited relief. Judge Walton also granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, summary judgment. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on two counts, finding that the defendants offered evidence showing that the plaintiff had diplomatic immunity at the time his daughter was born and therefore she did not acquire citizenship by birth and her son did not acquire citizenship as a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen. The court dismissed also dismissed one court on the ground of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Summary judgment was denied on all other counts. The case was appealed to the D.C. Court of Appeals. On January 19, 2021, Judge Neomi Rao issued the opinion for the court, affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants and the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for declaratory judgment that he would not violate the bar of contributing to terrorism if he sent money to his daughter and grandson. 985 F.3d 893. The case remains open.

Summary: The father of an Alabama woman who traveled to Syria to join ISIS filed this lawsuit against the Trump administration over its decision to rescind her US citizenship. The lawsuit, which names President Trump, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, and Attorney General William Barr, asked the court to prevent the federal government from depriving the daughter of her citizenship and to require the government to allow her to return to the country. The case remains open.


The Immigration and Nationality Act provides an expedited path to citizenship for non-citizens serving in the U.S. military. In 2017, President Trump’s Secretary of Defense implemented a new internal policy which made the expedited naturalization process lengthier and more difficult. Objecting to this new policy, 6 non-citizen service members, represented by the ACLU, ACLU of Southern California, and ACLU of the District of Columbia, filed this class action against the Secretary and Department of Defense on April 28, 2020. The complaint, filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ellen S. Huvelle, alleged that the Department’s policy violated both the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§553, 706) and the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §1440). They sought a declaration (under 28 U.S.C. §§2201-2202) that the Department’s policy was illegal, and injunctive relief (under 5 U.S.C. §702) preventing the Department from implementing the new policy. The plaintiffs alleged that de-expedited naturalization process injured them in several ways, including: ineligibility for promotion to military positions available to citizens; denial of access to consular services while deployed overseas; and inability to sponsor family members seeking to immigrate. The plaintiffs sought certification as a class of “All individuals who: (a) are non-citizens serving honorably in the U.S. military; (b) have requested but not received a certified [Department of Defense] Form N-426; and (c) are not…covered by [<i>Kirwa v. U.S. Dep’t of Def.</i>, 285 F. Supp. 3d 21 (D.D.C. 2017)].” Along with the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and for summary judgment. The defendants likewise moved for summary judgment on May 22, 2020. As of June 8, 2020, all motions are pending.

Summary: On April 28, 2020, 6 non-citizen members of the U.S. military filed a class action lawsuit against the Department and the Secretary of Defense, alleging that the Trump administration's new policy on certifying honorable military service was a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief.


This class action by female employees at American Airlines, Inc. was filed on September 10, 2004, in the U.S. District Court Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought class certification as well as declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the defendant's health plan insurance policy discriminated against female employees by providing less complete coverage to women. The class action complaint alleged that the American's failure to provide the plaintiffs with health insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant engaged in disparate treatment by excluding prescription contraceptives and related services from its employees benefit plan while covering other prescription medications, and that the defendant's practice of excluding prescription contraception from its health insurance plan, which were available for use only by women, resulted in disparate impact. The requested relief included preliminary and permanent injunctions against the defendant from engaging in unlawful practices (including an injunction ordering the defendant to provide coverage for the full range of prescription contraceptive drugs and devices and coverage for contraceptive-related services); a judgment declaring that the unlawful practices violated Title VII (PDA); an order restraining the defendant from any retaliation against the plaintiff or any class member; and costs and disbursements (including reasonable attorneys' fees). On July 6, 2009, the parties agreed upon a Stipulation of Settlement and Release. The agreement stated that the completion of the settlement would not constitute an admission of liability or wrongdoing on the defendant's part and that when settled, the case would be dismissed on the merits with prejudice as to the defendant. The settlement included the following terms and conditions:

that the conditional class certification be granted for purposes of the settlement only
 that starting on January 1, 2011, the defendant's health insurance plan will offer coverage to pharmacy-filled prescription contraceptives, but will exclude all other contraceptives not specifically identified and authorized that require medical intervention (this coverage will remain in place for at least 3 years, but is subject to periodic plan changes and revisions).
The settlement stated that the defendant will be responsible for the costs of notice and attorney fees if the combined total is not in excess of $1,000,000 (class counsel will settle the division of these attorneys' fees and costs amongst themselves), and the defendant will provide a $10,000 incentive award to the named plaintiff for serving as the class representative.
 A few days after reaching the settlement, the court certified plaintiffs' class for settlement purposes only and granted preliminary approval of the proposed settlement. On September 30, 2009, the court granted final approval of the settlement. The court awarded $1,000,000 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and granted the $10,000 incentive award for the named plaintiff.

Summary: Plaintiffs, all current female employees at American Airlines, Inc., sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendant's health plan insurance policy discriminated against female employees. In July 2009, the parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement in September 2009. The settlement agreement consisted of an injunction ordering defendant to provide coverage for the full range of prescription contraceptive drugs and coverage for contraceptive-related services, and also awarded plaintiffs $1,000,000 for reasonable attorneys' fees and costs and granted a $10,000 incentive award for the named plaintiff.


On June 28, 2004, a prisoner at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) and transferred to the Tecumseh State Correctional Institution (TSCI) filed this lawsuit after being severely injured by prison guards. Filing in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nebraska, the plaintiff sued the wardens of both maximum security prisons, the director of all Nebraska prisons, and multiple agents of the state prison system, including several medical personnel, under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. In his pro se complaint, the plaintiff described the manner in which he was treated by prison guards after he had attempted escape from prison. He claimed that this treatment violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, monetary relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Joseph F. Bataillon. The case appears both as El-Tabech v. Clarke and El-Tabech v. Houston. The plaintiff had been apprehended after he failed to escape the prison. However, his abuse began when one guard jumped and slammed his knees on his back even though he was motionless, faced down on the ground, and complying with all orders. Several months later, the plaintiff was permitted to see a doctor only to discover his injuries required surgery to repair a “full thickness rotator cuff tear” inflicted upon him by the guard. The plaintiff also suffered a hernia and damage to one of his eyes. Over the next few months, prison administration placed the plaintiff on “intensive management” (IM) despite the fact that he was not a threat to himself or the staff. After being sentenced to 60 days in the Control Unit (CU), the plaintiff remained in solitary confinement for 449 days before he brought this lawsuit. During his time in the cell, he suffered from total isolation and was seldom permitted basic needs, like bathing and access to sunlight. In this cell, rodents and insects were common. The defendants denied the plaintiff medical treatment and the plaintiff was exposed to human waste. Additionally, the defendants permitted the plaintiff access to law library only one hour a week. The plaintiff claimed that he was not given meaningful opportunity to contest the extended disciplinary segregation. The plaintiff also claimed that the prison personnel had religiously discriminated against him by depriving him the opportunity to practice his religion, denying him a kosher diet, and mocking and derogating the plaintiff, his practices and his family when they visited him in prison. Early in the litigation, the plaintiff filed three separate motions requesting court appointed counsel. Judge Bataillon denied all three because indigent civil litigants do not have a constitutional or statutory right to counsel. In October 2004, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss the complaint. They argued that the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim was insufficient because he failed to allege facts that would amount to deliberate indifference. They asked the court to dismiss the claims regarding medical personnel at the prison because there was no allegation that they ever provided treatment to the plaintiff. On November 1, 2004, the plaintiff filed the first motion for a temporary restraining order, asking the court to prohibit the defendants from denying him kosher meals. The court denied this motion on a technical error. On May 31, 2005, the plaintiff filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order as well as a motion for preliminary injunction. The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendants from denying the plaintiff the necessary medical treatment for his shoulder, eye, and hernia. On August 31, 2005, Judge Bataillon ruled on the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The court granted the motions as to the due process claim and the claims against the medical defendants and denied the motions as to the plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim and the other claims against the non-medical defendants. In that same order, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order because the plaintiff made insufficient allegations as to a threat of irreparable harm. On September 8, 2005, the plaintiff filed a motion to certify a class, defining the class as “All past present and future prisoners housed in solitary confinement under IM status, and subjected to the cruel and unusual punishment through the conditions of confinement inflicted by the defendants.” On September 14, 2005, the plaintiff filed another motion for preliminary relief. This time, the plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendants from obstructing and denying plaintiff the right of access to courts and the right to kosher meals. In March 2006, the plaintiff obtained representation from private counsel. On June 6, 2006, Judge Bataillon entered an order denying the plaintiff’s motion to certify class and the plaintiff’s September 14, 2005 motion for preliminary relief. The court denied the motion to certify class because pro se parties may not serve as class representatives and the scope of the class definition was too broad and vague. On June 9, 2006, with the help of new counsel, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. This amended complaint contained few substantive changes. Rather, the plaintiff’s original pro se complaint was reformatted and distilled to reflect a typical civil complaint. As of March, 2007, the plaintiff had been in solitary confinement for nearly six years. For this reason, the plaintiff moved for summary judgment of his due process claim. He argued that his liberty interest was significant and the risk of erroneous deprivation was high enough to warrant summary judgment while the cost of the requested procedures was minimal. On March 30, 2007, the plaintiff filed another motion for summary judgment, this time seeking adjudication of his RLUIPA and free exercise of religion claim. In support of this motion, the plaintiff argued that the defendants had placed a substantial burden on the exercise of the plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs. On May 18, 2007, Judge Bataillon denied both of the plaintiff’s summary judgment motions. The court found that there was no evidence that the plaintiff did not receive notice of his IM status hearings and that he had the opportunity to fully present evidence of his due process claim. As such, Judge Bataillon found summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the plaintiff's due process claim. Regarding the RLUIPA and freedom of religion claims, the court found that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning the allegations of cost and security in affording the plaintiff a kosher diet. The parties disagreed over the cost and feasibility of options to accommodate the plaintiff’s kosher requirements. Consequently, the court allowed the claim to proceed to trial. 2007 WL 2066510. Following the trial, Judge Bataillon entered judgment for the plaintiff. According to the court, while deference was due to prison officials’ expertise under both RLUIPA and the First Amendment, the evidence demonstrated that the defendants did not select the least restrictive means to achieve their goal. Therefore, the court found that the defendants violated the plaintiff’s right to freedom of religion when they denied him reasonable access to a kosher diet. As part of the judgment, Judge Bataillon ordered the parties to negotiate the feasibility of providing the plaintiff and other prisoners similarly situated with various kosher foods. On September 21, 2007, the parties submitted a joint stipulation detailing the results of their negotiation. The parties agreed that the the defendants would develop and implement procedures and protocols to provide nutritionally sufficient kosher meals. The agreement required monitoring and reporting to ensure the defendants' compliance with the agreement. The defendants were also required to post a prayer schedule and “adjust activities or reduce disturbances as appropriate.” On October 5, 2007, the court ordered the implementation of the settlement. On December 5, 2007, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs. Judge Bataillon granted this motion, awarding $204,856.28. 2008 WL 1995304. After several months following implementation of the agreement, the plaintiff discovered feces wrapped in plastic in his meal prepared and delivered by TSCI staff. On August 26, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt. Agreeing with the plaintiff, Judge Bataillon granted the plaintiff’s motion for contempt, finding that the defendants had not shown that they had made all reasonable good-faith efforts to comply with court’s order. A few months later, the plaintiff also filed a motion for relief, as the defendants had not yet paid the $204,856.28 under the court’s order. On February 4, 2009, Judge Bataillon granted this motion for relief, ordering the defendants to pay the original sum plus an additional $7,857.72 in interest. The court also found that the interest rate should be increased to 14% to ensure compliance. The defendants appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. On March 18, 2009, the plaintiff filed a supplemental motion for attorneys’ fees under the RLUIPA and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. In another victory for the plaintiff, the court granted this motion and awarded the plaintiff an additional $73,360.20 in attorney's fees and $271.20 in recoverable costs. 2009 WL 1663440. The defendants also appealed this decision. On August 18, 2009, the defendants filed a motion to stay proceedings pending the two appeals to the Eighth Circuit. Judge Bataillon denied this motion because the defendants delayed paying the court’s earlier judgment for attorney fees for more than a year and the plaintiff’s ability to recover would have been hampered by a stay. 2009 WL 3352829. On August 13, 2010, the Eighth Circuit entered an opinion remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with their opinion. The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff's attorney had spent an unreasonable and unnecessary amount of time on the successful portion of the motion and asked the district court to review this portion of the award on remand. The court also addressed the defendants’ argument that the district court abused its discretion by increasing the post-judgment interest rate on the May 2008 fee award. The Eighth Circuit saw 14% to be a punitive increase in interest rate without clear and convincing evidence of a failure to comply with the underlying order. The court remanded the case for determination of an appropriate compensatory post-judgment interest rate that was in line with federal statutes. 616 F.3d 834. On January 7, 2011, in light of the Eighth Circuit’s opinion, the plaintiff filed an amended motion for attorneys’ fees, reducing the fees sought by 43%. Judge Bataillon granted this motion, awarding $74,145.07 in attorneys’ fees and costs. On June 20, 2011, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of judgment, informing the court that the defendants paid the balance. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 2004 lawsuit was from by a prisoner of the Nebraska State Penitentiary in the U.S. District for the District of Nebraska. After being sentenced to 60 days in solitary confinement, the plaintiff remained in solitary for 449 days before bringing this lawsuit. He had been physically abused, denied Kosher meals, and prevented from praying. The plaintiff alleged that the prison officials' actions violated the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. After lengthy litigation, motions for summary judgment, and a trial, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant prisons were required to reform their practices and award attorney's fees and costs.


The San Antonio and Dallas Offices of the EEOC filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Defendant was Farris Concrete Company, a commercial and industrial concrete provider. The controversy involved the alleged harassment and constructive discharge of the complainant based on her sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The lawsuit was filed in April 2002 and was resolved by consent decree in January 2004. The complainant, who did not intervene in the case, was awarded $15,000, expungement of the incident from her personnel file, and a guarantee of neutral reference. In addition, the company was required to provide training and had to post a Notice of rights. The decree was to last for two years.

Summary: The San Antonio and Dallas Offices of the EEOC filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas in 2002 against Farris Concrete, alleging sex discrimination. A consent decree was entered in 2004, which provided for monetary damages and injunctive relief.


On August 25, 2016, a Mexican-born Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipient living in New York filed this suit against U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by Make the Road New York, the National Immigration Law Center, and the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services Organization, sued under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and 5 U.S.C. § 551, alleging that the revocation of his employment authorization was unlawful, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to have the authorization reinstated. He also sought an award for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis and Magistrate Judge James Orenstein. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that USCIS granted the plaintiff a three-year employment authorization under DACA, which had been expanded by the Obama administration in 2014. That authorization was then revoked pursuant to a nationwide injunction granted by the U.S. District Court in United States v. Texas (IM-TX-0034 in this Clearinghouse), enjoining the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) from implementing the expansion of DACA, which had allowed the grant or renewal of deferred action and three-year employment authorization to individuals such as the plaintiff. In place of the three-year employment authorization, the plaintiff was issued a two-year authorization, which would require the plaintiff to go through the burdensome application process more frequently than under the expansion plan. The plaintiff claimed that the United States v. Texas court had issued an overly-broad injunction, lacked jurisdiction to bind New York residents, and that revocation of his three-year employment authorization violated the APA. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 29, 2016. Further proceedings were then postponed until briefing was completed, and there was no further activity in the case until Feb. 2017. On April 5, the court granted the parties' joint motion to stay the briefing schedule indefinitely pending proceedings in the U.S. v. Texas case. Nothing significant happened until Sept. 5, 2017, when the Trump administration revoked DACA. That day, the plaintiffs moved for a pre-motion conference, which the court immediately granted. The plaintiffs stated that they wanted leave to amend their complaint, highlighting that "[m]illions of people have benefited from, and relied on, the DACA program over the past five years," including the DACA recipients themselves and those close to them. As a result, the plaintiffs argued that "the Government has failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its reversal, in violation of the [Administrative Procedure Act]" and that "the Administration’s reversal is unconstitutionally motivated by anti-Mexican and anti-Latino animus, in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Pursuant to a Sept. 7 court order, the plaintiffs filed a letter on Sept. 11 stating the additional claims they planned to assert in an amended complaint, the interests of individual parties they want to add as plaintiffs, and additional defendants they wanted to name. The letter asserted additional claims that the government violated the APA, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, and Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process. The plaintiffs also stated they were seeking to add as plaintiffs individuals with current DACA status, and as defendants President Trump, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security (Elaine Duke), and the Attorney General (Jeff Sessions). The plaintiffs filed that amended complaint on Sept. 19. In addition to including the aforementioned changes, the amended complaint also requested class certification for a "class consisting of (1) all persons with DACA as of September 5, 2017; and (2) all persons who are or will be eligible for DACA under the terms of the 2012 Guidance" for all claims except the Regulatory Flexibility Act claim. Also on that day, the plaintiffs gave notice of voluntarily dismissing the defendants named in the original complaint. On Oct. 6, the defendants filed the administrative record, which included a series of government documents pertaining to DACA from its inception up to the decision to rescind it. The plaintiffs then moved to compel the defendants to complete the administrative record, arguing that the defendants did not produce all relevant documents leading to the rescission. Specifically, they omitted related documents that Acting Secretary Duke did not directly review. The court granted the motion on Oct. 19. The defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which granted an emergency motion for a stay of discovery and record supplementation in the district court pending consideration by the Second Circuit on Oct. 20. On Oct. 27, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the rescission was an enforcement action "presumed immune from judicial review" and that the government provided ample explanation for the rescission based on the enjoinment of DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of Americans) in U.S. v. Texas. On Nov. 9, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion. 2017 WL 4737280. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government violated due process by failing to provide individualized notice of the rescission because the plaintiffs lacked standing. The court did find, however, that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the DACA rescission. The court reserved ruling on the government's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and denied all other parts of its motion. On Dec. 11, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, naming Kirstjen M. Nielsen as a defendant in her capacity as the Secretary of DHS. They filed motions for a preliminary injunction and class certification on Dec. 15. The plaintiffs wanted to enjoin the rescission and certify a class defined as: "(1) all persons with deferred action through DACA as of September 5, 2017; and (2) all persons who are or will be eligible for deferred action under the terms of the original DACA guidance issued by DHS in 2012; (3) except the individual recipients of, or applicants for, deferred action through DACA who are Plaintiffs in other actions challenging the DACA Termination pending in a U.S. District Court as of December 11, 2017." The government moved to dismiss the new complaint on Dec. 26. Meanwhile, a series of entities filed amicus briefs. The following entities filed in support of the plaintiffs: over 100 companies, educational justice organizations, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, historians, public education groups, law enforcement leaders, workers' organizations, legal services organizations, New York University, Latino/a services and support organizations, the Mexican government, dozens of religious organizations, immigration nonprofits, various U.S. cities and counties, and civil rights organizations. On Dec. 27, the Second Circuit denied the government's petition for mandamus and lifted the district court's stay on discovery. Seeking to appeal the court's Nov. 9, 2017 decision, two days later, the government moved to stay further supplementation of the administrative record in the district court in light of its pending filing of a "petition for writ of mandamus challenging the scope of the administrative record and discovery in these matters." The court granted the motion on Dec. 30 pending consideration of the government's motion for certification of interlocutory appeal of the Nov. 9 order. On Jan. 8, the court granted the government's motion for certification of interlocutory appeal and stayed further proceedings pending resolution in the Second Circuit. 2018 WL 333515. The government appealed the Nov. 9 order that day. On Jan. 31, 2018, the Second Circuit ordered that the petitions for leave to appeal be held in abeyance while the district court resolved the motions for injunctive relief and dismissal. On Feb. 13, 2018, the district court granted the preliminary injunction, holding that the government had not provided a legally sufficient basis for ending the DACA program. 279 F. Supp. 3d 401. The court found that while the government could end DACA, the question was whether they provided the necessary legally adequate reasons for the rescission. The court found that the decision to end the program was based on an erroneous conclusion that DACA was unconstitutional and violated the APA and the Immigration & Nationality Act (INA), and that this conclusion in turn relied on the "plainly incorrect factual premise" that courts have found the related DAPA program to have "constitutional defects." The court also found that the purported reason for rescission was contradictory in that the government claimed DACA must end because it was unconstitutional and yet also provided for a wind-down period in which certain DACA renewal applications would continue to be adjudicated. As a result, the court held that the rescission was arbitrary and capricious and enjoined the government from ending the program on a nationwide basis pending the court's decision on the merits of the case. In the same order, the court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification as moot. The government filed notice on Feb. 20 that it had appealed the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit. On March 29, 2018, the district court granted in part and denied in part the government's motion to dismiss. 279 F. Supp. 3d 401. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the rescission violated the APA's requirement for notice-and-comment, finding that the rescission memorandum was a general statement of policy exempt from the notice-and-comment requirement rather than a legislative rule. This finding led the court to further dismiss the plaintiffs' claim regarding Regulatory Flexibility Act violations since an RFA violation is contingent on a notice-and-comment requirement in the first place. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claim that the government changed its information-use policy but left the door open to other challenges of that policy. The court sustained the plaintiffs' equal protection claim that the rescission was motivated by racial animus against Latinos, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged the rescission had a disparate impact. Further, the court found that while the plaintiffs may not have sufficiently alleged that Acting Secretary Duke or the Attorney General had discriminatory intent, they did sufficiently allege that President Trump may have had such intent and that his influence on the rescission cannot be ignored. The government promptly appealed the decision to the Second Circuit, which granted leave to appeal the November 9, 2017, and March 29, 2018 orders of the district court. Meanwhile, the defendants sought certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court before judgment in this case, as well as in Regents of the University of California v. DHS and NAACP v. Trump. In both this case and Regents of the University of California v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the district courts had granted a nationwide injunction to maintain the DACA program. In NAACP v. Trump, the district court also found that the vacatur of rescission was proper, but later granted a limited stay for certain DACA applications pending appeal. All three cases were appealed to the Circuit courts as well. On June 28, 2019, the Supreme Court agreed to consolidate and hear these three cases. 139 S.Ct. 2779. The Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 12, 2019, on the issues of whether DHS's decision to wind down the DACA policy is judicially reviewable and whether DHS’s decision to rescind DACA is lawful. On June 18, 2020, in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor), the Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. 2020 WL 3271746. The case was remanded to the district court. 966 F.3d 1036. On July 28, 2020, the Acting Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum effectively suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. The plaintiffs sought to challenge the memorandum on the grounds that the Acting Secretary was not lawfully appointed to his position and thus did not have the authority to issue the memorandum. The plaintiffs also argued that the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The district court directed the parties to brief their cross-motions for partial summary judgment on whether the Acting Secretary lawfully held his position. Before the district court issued its opinion, the plaintiffs filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on August 28, 2020. In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs (composed of four new DACA recipients and dropping one old recipient) renamed President Trump as a defendant and added as defendants the purported Acting Secretary of DHS, DHS, the Deputy Director for Policy of USCIS, and USCIS. The plaintiffs also redefined the class to include “[a]ll persons who are or will be prima facie eligible for deferred action under the terms of the Napolitano Memorandum" and defined a subclass including individuals who had DACA applications pending between June 30, 2020 and July 28, 2020 that had not been adjudicated. The plaintiffs alleged that the President, the purported Acting Secretary, and DHS had violated the FVRA and the Appointments Clause of the U.S. Constitution by failing to adhere to the appointments process. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the purported Acting Secretary's predecessor held his position for more than 210 days in violation of FVRA and thus had no authority to appoint a successor. Moreover, the purported Acting Secretary had not been confirmed by the Senate. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged, the Acting Secretary lacked the authority to issue the memorandum. On November 14, 2020, the court found that the Acting Secretary was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary of DHS and therefore did not have the authority to issue the memorandum. 2020 WL 6695076. Accordingly, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment and denied defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment. The court also granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification of the newly proposed class; the certification consisted of a main class (the "DACA Class") and a subclass (the "Pending Applications Subclass"). The DACA Class included all persons who are or will be prima facie eligible for deferred action under the terms of the 2012 Napolitano Memorandum. The Pending Application Subclass included all persons who had an application for deferred action through DACA, whether initial or renewal, pending at USCIS on any date between June 30, 2020, and July 28, 2020, that have not been or will not be adjudicated in accordance with the 2012 Napolitano Memorandum. The plaintiffs filed another partial motion for summary judgment on November 24, 2020. The court granted the plaintiffs’ motion on December 4, 2020, vacating the Acting Secretary's memorandum and ordering DHS to resume processing DACA applications and to notify the public accordingly. 2020 WL 7121849. he order required DHS to accept initial DACA applications, accept advance parole applications, and grant DACA renewals for two-years. On December 7, 2020 USCIS updated their website and indicated that effective that day, USCIS would accept initial applications, extend one-year DACA renewals to two-years, and accept applications for advance parole. This case is ongoing.

Summary: A Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) recipient living in New York filed this suit against United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The plaintiff alleged that, pursuant to an injunction issued by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas enjoining the expansion of DACA, USCIS had unlawfully revoked a three-year employment authorization that had previously been granted to him. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring the revocation unlawful and in violation of the procedures required under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and restoring his three-year employment authorization. A nationwide injunction was issued, and the defendants petitioned the Supreme Court of the U.S. for a writ of certiorari on Nov. 5 which was granted on July 3, 2019. On June 18, 2020, the Supreme Court held that the DACA rescission was subject to judicial review under the APA and that the DHS secretary had offered insufficient justification to rescind the program. On July 28, 2020, the purported Acting Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum effectively suspending DACA while DHS reviewed it. The plaintiffs challenged the memorandum on the grounds that (1) the Acting Secretary did not have the authority to issue the memorandum, and (2) the memorandum was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. While the parties awaited the court’s decision, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint alleging various constitutional and statutory violations pertaining to the Acting Secretary’s appointment and agency action following the Supreme Court’s decision. On November 14, 2020, the district court found that the Acting Secretary was not lawfully serving as Acting Secretary of DHS and thus did not have the authority to issue the memorandum. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On December 4, 2020, the court vacated the memorandum and ordered DHS to resume processing DACA applications. This case is ongoing.


On October 17, 2007, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund (MALDEF) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of New Mexico filed a civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of five Latino families in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff's Department sanctioned an operation to locate, detain and arrest Latinos in an effort to apprehend undocumented immigrants. As part of the operation, plaintiffs alleged that on September 10, 2007, sheriff's deputies raided homes of Latinos without search warrants and stopped, detained, and interrogated Latino motorists and Latinos walking on the street without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Some Latinos that objected to the tactics were allegedly assaulted by deputies and issued bogus criminal charges in an attempt to cover the deputies' misconduct. Plaintiffs asserted violations of the Fourth Amendment, due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, and corresponding provisions of the state constitution. They sought monetary damages and declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent further immigration raids by the Sheriff's Department. On April 3, 2008, the parties entered into a settlement, which the court adopted on May 27, 2008, dismissing the case. Under the terms of the settlement, the Otero County Sheriff's Department agreed to a settlement of $100,000 and changes to its operational procedures. Under the agreement, deputies agreed not to inquire about a person's immigration status in minor cases and not to hold a person who is not under arrest for federal immigration officers. The department also agreed to accept the matricula consular (consulate-issued identification card) as a valid ID.

Summary: On October 17, 2007, a civil rights suit was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of five Latino families in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Plaintiffs alleged that the Sheriff's Department sanctioned an operation to locate, detain and arrest Latinos in an effort to apprehend undocumented immigrants. On April 3, 2008, the parties entered into a settlement, which the court adopted on May 27, 2008, dismissing the case.


On December 28, 2006, five individuals represented by private counsel, the Urban Justice Center, and the National Senior Citizens Law Center, filed a class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the Social Security Administration's policy of unlawfully suspending or denying benefits to persons who were found to have outstanding warrants for an alleged violation of a probation or parole condition violated the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(x)(1)(A)(v) and 1382(e)(4)(A)(ii), and 20 C.F.R. §1339(b). The plaintiffs claimed that the SSA failed to inquire into the facts of individual cases or verify the individuals named in warrants were in fact those whose benefits were to be suspended or denied. Instead, the SSA relied on a computer matching program used by the Social Security Administration, which lacked the capabilities to accurately identify whether the individual had in fact committed a violation. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that the SSA was unlawfully denying or suspending benefits to individuals without any regard to whether or not there had been a judicial finding that the individual had in fact committed such a violation. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, class certification, and an award of attorneys' fees and costs. On February 26, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Sidney Stein) denied the plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order, and on March 8, 2007, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits. On September 22, 2008, Judge Stein granted SSA's motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment. The plaintiffs appealed, and on March 19, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that the "SSA's practice of treating a warrant alleging that a recipient is violating a condition of probation or parole as sufficient and irrebuttable evidence that the recipient is in fact violating a condition of probation or parole is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the Social Security Act." The Second Circuit vacated the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant and its denial of summary judgment for the plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings. On March 18, 2011, Judge Stein certified a nationwide class consisting of "[a]ll persons nationwide whose SSI and/or OASDI benefits were denied and/or suspended based solely on the existence of a warrant for an alleged violation of probation or parole during the period from October 29, 2006 to and including such time in the future when final relief is entered in this action." In April 2012, the court granted injunctive relief; it enjoined the challenged practice going forward; restored to SSA's roles the members of the class (who could number up to 140,000 people), pending hearings on their ongoing eligibility; and ordered their inappropriately-suspended benefits to be paid to them. According to the National Senior Citizens Law Center, this could require payment of back-benefits of up to $1 billion. The Court gave the SSA 60 days to propose an implementation plan. SSA filed the implementation plan on June 12, 2012. The plan required SSA to identify and notice the class members, and to then provide remedial relief consisting of reinstating benefits and payments, re-opening claims previously denied due to warrants for alleged violations of probation or parole, and vacating determinations of non-disability on claims filed after benefits were suspended due to such warrants. The plan also required SSA to report its progress quarterly. The parties then stipulated that attorneys' fees of $620,000 would be awarded to the plaintiffs. The court endorsed the stipulation on Sept. 12, 2012 and ordered the case closed.

Summary: This class action, filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 28, 2006, successfully challenged the Social Security Administration's policy of suspending or denying benefits to persons with outstanding warrants for alleged violations of probation or parole. The plaintiff class ultimately won an estimated $1 billion in back-benefits.


On July 19, 2016, limited-English-proficient ("LEP") immigrants who, while aged 17-21, were or could have been in the future denied their right to equal educational opportunities and meaningful public education brought this class-action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the School District of Lancaster. The plaintiffs sued under the Equal Education Opportunity Act and Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the defendant has a custom, practice, and policy of refusing to admit older immigrant LEP students into the District's regular high school, McCaskey, which had an International School specially tailored to the academic needs for new students in need of language supports and accommodations. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the District either refused to admit them altogether, or assigned them to an "alternative" school, Phoenix Academy, a school for underachieving students which runs more like a disciplinary school than a traditional public high school. Moreover, Phoenix Academy lacked adequate and appropriate supports of immigrant LEP students, and was academically inferior by all measures and offers no extracurricular opportunities. Represented by attorneys from Pepper Hamilton LLP, the Education Law Center, and the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction, directing the District to admit the plaintiffs and class members to McCaskey and to make available the full range of curricular and extracurricular programs and activities before the 2016 fall semester. On July 22, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their motion for preliminary injunction, as well as a motion to expedite discovery. A telephone conference was held on July 25, after which the plaintiffs' motion to expedite discovery was granted. On August 9, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. A hearing was held on August 19 and 23 on the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, before U.S. District Court Judge Edward G. Smith; after the hearing, both parties filed memorandums of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On August 26, 2016, Judge Smith granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in part, requiring the school district to permit the school-age plaintiffs who wish to attend the main high school beginning August 29, 2016, until the resolution of this matter. 2016 WL 4493202; 2016 WL 4493201. The defendant appealed this order on August 30, 2016. On August 26, Judge Smith also referred the case to Magistrate Judge Marilyn Heffley for a settlement conference, which was held on September 27. On October 11, 2016, Judge Smith denied the plaintiffs' original motion for class certification without prejudice so that the plaintiffs could amend their motion after the completion of class-related discovery. Judge Smith, in an October 14, 2016, order, also denied the plaintiffs' more recent emergency motion for class certification and entry of preliminary injunction to protect similarly situated students without prejudice for refiling after the Third Circuit has concluded its review of defendant's appeal on the matter. In December 2016, Judges Fisher, Krause, and Malloy of the Third Circuit heard oral arguments on the defendants’ appeal of Judge Smith’s preliminary injunction. The court affirmed Judge Smith’s ruling based on violations of the EEOA, agreeing that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the EEOA, that irreparable harm to the plaintiffs was likely, that the balance of harms favored the plaintiffs, and that preliminary relief was in the public interest. Regarding the state claims, the court held that the lower court erred in finding that the plaintiffs showed a likelihood of success on the merits, but held that nothing in the preliminary injunction order relied on the plaintiffs proving likely violations of state law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its ruling. 847 F.3d 121. On February 14, 2017, Magistrate Judge Heffley ordered a second settlement conference to be held in early April. Two days later, on February 16, Judge Smith denied the school district’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. The parties held settlement conferences throughout the spring of 2016, and proposed a consent decree at the end of June. On June 29, 2017, Judge Smith signed a consent decree order. The consent decree provided procedures by which the school district was to enroll immigrant students, including by evaluating their English language proficiency and placing them in appropriate programs. It prohibited the school from denying educational opportunities to students based on age or national origin. It also: committed the school to creating new staff positions and providing translation and interpretation services, created a compensatory education fund for students, and required additional teacher certification. The school district was required to make periodic monitoring reports. Further, the district was required to pay $300,000 for the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and $70,000 for the plaintiffs’ litigation costs. On July 5, the court issued a stipulation and order that, by consent of the parties, the action was deemed resolved. The consent decree expired on June 30, 2019, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On July 19, 2016, limited-English-proficient ("LEP") immigrants who, while aged 17-21, were, are, or may be in the future denied their right to equal educational opportunities and meaningful public education, brought a class-action lawsuit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the School District of Lancaster. The plaintiffs sued under the Equal Education Opportunity Act and Section 601 of the Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, alleging that the defendant has a custom, practice, and policy of refusing to admit older immigrant LEP students into the District's regular high school, McCaskey, which has an International School specially tailored to the academic needs for new students in need of language supports and accommodations. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the District either refused to admit them altogether, or assigned them to an "alternative" school, Phoenix Academy, a school for underachieving students which runs more like a disciplinary school than a traditional public high school. Moreover, Phoenix Academy lacks adequate and appropriate supports of immigrant LEP students, and is academically inferior by all measures and offers no extra-curricular opportunities. U.S. District Court Judge has granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, in part, but has denied the plaintiffs' motions for class certification without prejudice. The court approved a consent decree in 2017, which expired in June 2019.


On July 11, 2007, paraplegic residents of Illinois who use wheelchairs for mobility, filed a civil action arising under Section 202 of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §794(a) and 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Sheriff of Cook County and Cook County, Illinois in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Elaine Bucklo). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a trial by jury, and damages. They claimed discrimination because of disability while assigned to the Residential Treatment Unit ("RTU") of the Division Eight and the hospital wing of Division Eight, Cermak Hospital, during the time they were held in custody of the Cook County Jail. Plaintiffs claimed the RTU of Division Eight failed to provide appropriate shower facilities, toilet facilities, transportation and beds for persons who use wheelchairs. All of the plaintiffs claimed they suffered physical injuries, were subjected to emotional distress, and were deprived of equal protection law, as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and were discriminated against in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12132 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In the Amended Complaint, 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7450. Plaintffs sought certification of a class to include all former and current mobility impaired inmates at the Cook County Department of Corrections who on or after July 12, 2005, were subjected to discrimination because of their disabilities in violation of §202 of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 and §504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 because the defendants failed to provide appropriate shower facilities, appropriate toilet facilities, and appropriate beds for persons who use wheelchairs. The plaintiffs sought monetary relief. On March 26, 2008, Judge Bucklo certified plaintiffs' proposed class. 249 F.R.D. 298 (N.D. Ill. 2008). On November 25, 2009, Judge Bucklo, denied all of the parties' motions and cross-motions for summary judgment. 681 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ill. 2009) On September 17, 2010, Judge Bucklo approved a proposed class settlement which provided that the defendant Cook County would, within 30 days, pay incentive awards of $25,000 each to two of the plaintiffs, $15,000 to a third plaintiff, and $10,000 to the fourth plaintiff. Defendant Cook County also agreed to pay attorneys' fees and costs of $700,000 and $35,000 respectively. The court reserved jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement until September 1, 2011. The settlement ended without substantial further litigation, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This disability discrimination case, filed against Cook County, Illinois in 2007, resulted in a class settlement for payment of damages and attorney fees in the total amount of $810,000. Plaintiffs claimed that while they were incarcerated, defendants failed to provide appropriate shower facilities, appropriate toilet facilities, and appropriate beds for persons who use wheelchairs, all in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act.


On November 21, 2006, a Senegalese immigrant** detained in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) petitioned the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for a writ of habeas corpus. Represented by the ACLU of California and its Immigrants' Rights Project as well as Stanford Law School's Immigration Clinic, he sought a preliminary injunction ordering his immediate release on the grounds that his lengthy detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As an alternative to immediate release, the plaintiff requested a preliminary injunction ordering an immigration judge to hold a hearing at which the government would have the burden of justifying his detention. This habeas petition was filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The case was assigned to Judge Terry J. Hatter, Jr. and Magistrate Judge Fernando M. Olguin. At the time this complaint was filed in November 2006, the plaintiff had been detained in ICE custody for 18 months without a bond hearing. He has a long and complex immigration history, beginning from his entry on a student visa which he overstayed. In January 2003, Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) whose functions were transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in March 2003, initiated removal proceedings against him. Several months later, an Immigration Judge (IJ) ordered him to voluntarily depart the United States by June 24, 2003 or be subject to deportation to Senegal. Because he failed to depart by that date, the IJ's alternative order, a removal order to Senegal, took effect. In March 2005, ICE apprehended the plaintiff and detained him pending execution of his removal order. He moved to reopen those proceedings based on his marriage to a U.S. citizen and ineffective assistance of counsel in his initial IJ proceedings. The IJ denied his motion to reopen, and that decision was affirmed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In July 2005 and July 2006, ICE conducted post custody reviews in which they concluded that the plaintiff's ongoing detention remained justified because he was allegedly a flight risk. On January 4, 2007, the district court granted a preliminary injunction requiring a bond hearing before an IJ. Pursuant to the injunction, the IJ conducted a hearing on February 9, 2007 to determine whether the plaintiff’s prolonged detention remained justified. After receiving evidence from both sides, the IJ ruled that the plaintiff did not present a sufficient danger to the community or risk of flight to justify the detention, which by then had extended over 22 months. Accordingly, on the same date, the IJ ordered that he be released on bond. The government appealed the preliminary injunction order to the Ninth Circuit, while the habeas petition remained pending in the district court. Meanwhile, the parties appeared for oral argument before the Magistrate Judge on November 14, 2007. On December 19, 2007, Magistrate Judge Olguin issued a Report and Recommendation that the plaintiff's continued detention (up until his release in February 2007) was not authorized by statute and that he was, in fact, entitled to release, disagreeing with the government's arguments that the plaintiff was a flight risk. On February 6, 2008, Judge Hatter adopted the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and issued a judgment granting the plaintiff's habeas petition under the conditions already imposed by the Immigration Judge. The government also appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. In September 2008, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case to the district court. Diouf v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2008), also known as Diouf I. First, they held that at the time the plaintiff filed his habeas petition, he was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), not § 1226(a), as the plaintiff and the district court had erroneously assumed. Second, they held that the plaintiff's detention was authorized by statute because, although it was prolonged, it was not indefinite. Detention is indefinite only if there is “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Third, they held that the injunction constituted an abuse of discretion because it relied on the erroneous premise that the plaintiff was being detained under § 1226(a). The plaintiff then filed a petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit. On April 27, 2009, the Ninth Circuit issued an order denying that petition, because the justices had unanimously voted against rehearing. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether § 1231(a)(6) requires that non-citizens detained pursuant to that authority be given a bond hearing, whether the Due Process Clause requires a bond hearing, and whether the ICE post-custody reviews the plaintiffs received satisfy the Due Process Clause. The plaintiff remained free on bond during this period, although ICE had the authority to detain him again. On remand, Judge Hatter denied the habeas petition on May 18, 2009 to conform with the Ninth Circuit's decision. In August 2009, the parties each filed briefs regarding the plaintiff's preliminary injunction request. On September 9, 2009, Judge Hatter denied the preliminary injunction, concluding that procedural due process did not entitle individuals facing prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) to a bond hearing. He reasoned that the plaintiff had already received adequate due process via ICE's two post-order custody reviews and that the government's decision to detain the plaintiff for nearly two years was not in violation of due process because of the plaintiff's likelihood of his future deportation and other concerns. On October 19, 2009, Judge Hatter denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. On November 9, 2009, the plaintiff appealed the preliminary injunction denial to the Ninth Circuit. As of March 9, 2010, the parties completed briefing as ordered. On September 20, 2010, the Ninth Circuit ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether the court had jurisdiction over the individualized bond hearing issue raised in the preliminary injunction claim. They noted that this was unclear since the plaintiff was no longer detained, nor had he been re-detained or denied a bond hearing since their 2008 decision in Diouf I. On September 27, 2010, the Court denied the plaintiff's motion to introduce two governmental reports regarding ICE's non-compliance with post order custody reviews, finding that this case did not merit an exception to the general rule that they not consider evidence that was not presented to the district court. On March 7, 2011, the 9th Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2011), also known as Diouf II. In a published decision, the Court held that an individual facing prolonged immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is entitled to release on bond unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community. As such, the Court ordered that non-citizens detained for over 6 months pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) are entitled to an individualized bond hearing. The Court held that prolonged detention without adequate procedural safeguards raised serious constitutional concerns. They adopted the following definition of prolonged detention: "When detention crosses the six-month threshold and release or removal is not imminent, the private interests at stake are profound. Furthermore, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker is substantial. The burden imposed on the government by requiring hearings before an immigration judge at this stage of the proceedings is therefore a reasonable one." The government filed a petition for rehearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit, which was denied on September 28, 2011, as no judge voted for rehearing. On remand, the parties sought several postponements due to settlement negotiations. On March 23, 2012, the parties jointly moved for final judgment, agreeing that the plaintiff had achieved the remedy sought through his habeas petition. On April 18, 2012, Judge Hatter ordered that the plaintiff should remain released under the terms of the immigration judge's 2007 order absent changed circumstances. It also ordered that the government would have to provide the plaintiff with a bond hearing in accordance with Diouf II if they ever detained him again. On December 13, 2012, the parties informed the court that they had settled regarding the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. As of February 25, 2013, the case is closed. **In a separate proceeding, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiff a stay of removal. Diouf v. Clement, No. 06-71922 (9th Cir. filed April 13, 2006). On June 19, 2007, the ACLU of Southern California brought a class action suit with the plaintiff in this case as the named plaintiff, seeking to stop ICE's practice of forcibly drugging people facing deportation. In January 2008, ICE changed its policy, issuing a memo that a court order is required before they may forcibly administer drugs on anyone in their custody. That case is available here in this Clearinghouse.

Summary: A detained immigrant and spouse of a U.S. citizen sought habeas relief after being detained for over 18 months without a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. The case culminated in a published decision from the Ninth Circuit, holding that an individual facing prolonged immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is entitled to an individualized bond hearing and to release on bond unless the government establishes that he is a flight risk or a danger to the community.


On September 27, 2010, an Arizona prisoner, Robert Gamez, brought this suit in the U.S. District Court of the District of Arizona against the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, filing pro se, asked for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the ADOC violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate mental health services or sufficiently trained staff to deal with prisoners with mental health issues. The District Court (Judge Frederick Martone) dismissed the original complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Each of the first two amended complaints were also dismissed with leave to amend for the same reason. On March 6, 2012, eighteen months after the original complaint was filed, Gamez filed a third amended complaint. The plaintiff, now represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, expanded the suit to include a class. New allegations included that the prison deprived prisoners of general health care, that prisoners did not receive adequate treatment even when they could receive care and that the defendants subjected prisoners in isolation to unconstitutional conditions. However, in a ruling on March 21, 2012, Judge Martone dismissed the suit. He found that the sudden expansion of the case to include thirteen new plaintiffs and seeking class treatment was not "within the contemplation of the court" when it allowed for a third amended complaint. This, along with the 18-month complaint phase, led him to dismiss the case without prejudice. On March 22, 2012, a team of lawyers from the ACLU, the Prison Law Office and private practice filed a lawsuit alleging similar claims against the ADOC. The case was filed as Parsons v. Ryan, with docket number CV12-0601-PHX-NVW. See related cases for more information.

Summary: On September 27, 2010, an Arizona prisoner, Robert Gamez, brought this suit alleging that the ADOC violated his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide adequate mental health services or sufficiently trained staff to deal with prisoners with mental health issues. However, by the time of the third amended complaint, the number of plaintiffs had grown to fourteen and they sought class treatment on a variety of issues. For these reasons, the court dismissed the claim.


This is a case about three prison phone providers allegedly colluding to inflate the price of calls made from individuals incarcerated at U.S. jails and prisons and lying to local governments and customers about the costs. On June 29, 2020, four individuals who paid $9.99 or $14.99 to accept collect calls from three prison phone providers filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corp., Securus Technologies, LLC, and 3Cinteractive Corp. (3CI) under federal antitrust laws and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants charged $9.99 or $14.99 for a one-time collect call from an incarcerated person in a secret agreement to eliminate competition and fix prices in violation of federal antitrust laws. While the defendants claimed their high prices were due to “transaction fees,” the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants secretly pocketed the difference. Represented by Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC, Handley Farah & Anderson PLLC, Justice Catalyst Law, Human Rights Defense Center, and the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, the plaintiffs sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from continuing their unlawful misconduct and to recover actual, compensatory, and treble financial damages for the victims of that misconduct. The plaintiffs requested the court certify the class and three subclasses to include persons and entities that have paid $9.99 or $14.99 to receive a single collect call operated by 3CI. The plaintiffs also requested declaratory relief and recovery of damages as well as attorney’s fees and costs. This case is assigned to Judge Paul W. Grimm. On September 24, 2020 Judge Grimm granted a motion for appointment of interim co-lead class counsel. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 29, 2020, four individuals who paid $9.99 or $14.99 to accept collect calls from three prison phone providersof prisoners filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that three providers of inmate calling services (Global Tel*Link, Securus Technologies, and 3CI) colluded to fix the price of these one-time collect calls and lied about prices in violation of federal antitrust laws and RICO. The defendants claimed that their high prices were due to "transaction fees," but the plaintiffs alleged the transaction fees were much lower and the defendatns were pocketing the difference. This case is ongoing.


On September 15, 2005, plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Marshals on behalf of hundreds of men who had been arrested during several protests against the International Monetary Fund. Following their arrests, plaintiffs were transferred to the custody of the U.S. Marshall and then detained in holding cells at the D.C. Superior Courthouse. Plaintiffs alleged that, while in custody, they were subjected to unlawful strip searches which had been conducted by deputy U.S. Marshals in the absence of any individualized reasonable suspicion. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the George Washington University Law School and the People's Law Resource Center, alleged that such searches violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages and class certification. On April 19, 2006, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the suit. The District Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the claims raised against two former U.S. Marshals who were sued in their official capacity, but refusing to dismiss the claims raised against Marshal Dillard in his individual capacity. Specifically, the Court held that (1) Plaintiffs' Bivens claims were timely; (2) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that Marshal Dillard was a state actor; (3) Marshal Dillard was not entitled to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss phase; and (4) Plaintiffs adequately stated a claim under the Fourth Amendment. Bame v. Clark, 466 F.Supp.2d 105 (D.D.C. Dec 11, 2006). Marshal Dillard initially filed a notice of appeal but subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal. The appeal was dismissed by the District Court on June 11, 2007. Bame v. Dillard, 2007 WL 1760490 (D.C.Cir. Jun 11, 2007). On May 22, 2008, Judge Rosemary M. Collyer granted class certification. Bame v. Clark, 2008 WL 2168393 (D.C.Cir. May 22, 2008). On August 25, 2009, Judge Collyer denied the defendant's and the plaintiff's motions for summary judgment. Bame v. Dillard, 647 F.Supp.2d 43 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The defendant appealed. On March 25, 2011, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Judge dismissed the case, holding that it was not clearly established in 2002 that the strip search of a person being introduced into a detention facility violated the Fourth Amendment, and that therefore, the defendant was entitled to qualified immunity and to summary judgment. Bame v. Clark, 637 F.3d 380 (D.D.C. 2011).

Summary: On September 15, 2005, plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States Marshals on behalf of hundreds of men who had been arrested during protests. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed the case, holding that it was not clearly established in 2002 that the strip search of a person being introduced into a detention facility violated the Fourth Amendment.


A private plaintiff brought suit against Convergys Corporation in the United States District Court for the District of Utah in September 2005. Her complaint alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII for unequal pay, discipline, constructive discharge and retaliation based on gender. The EEOC brought its own suit (EEOC v. Convergys Corp., 2:05-cv-00812-DAK (D. Utah Sept. 28, 2005), and the cases were consolidated in December 2005. The private plaintiff's case was designated the lead case. The EEOC's complaint alleged violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for unequal pay based on gender (female). After several discovery motions, an unresolved motion for summary judgment by the defendant, and an unresolved motion for partial summary judgment by the EEOC, the cases were settled by consent decree in May 2007. The two-year consent decree, containing an anti-discrimination clause, required the defendant to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide training for all supervisors and human resource employees, maintain records concerning implementation of the decree, annually report to the EEOC, and pay a total of $67,000 in monetary relief and attorney's fees to the complainant. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2009.

Summary: A private plaintiff brought suit against Convergys Corporation in the United States District Court of Utah in September 2005, alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act and Title VII for unequal pay, discipline, constructive discharge and retaliation based on gender. The EEOC brought its own suit against the defendant and the cases were consolidated in December 2005, with this lawsuit as the lead case. The cases were settled by a two-year consent decree in May 2007. The decree, containing an anti-discrimination clause, required the defendant to post notice of its anti-discrimination policy, provide training for all supervisors and human resource employees, maintain records concerning implementation of the decree, annually report to the EEOC, and pay a total of $67,000 in monetary relief and attorney's fees to the complainant.


On September 26, 2011, the EEOC filed a complaint in the Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of female employees who had worked for Venture, Inc. The EEOC asked the court for injunctive relief, pecuniary damages, punitive damages, and the commission's costs for the action, claiming that the defendant violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that an employee of defendant sexually harassed female employees, created a hostile work environment, propositioned female employees for sex, and that defendant failed to respond to complaints, ultimately firing an employee who complained. On November 22, 2013, a consent decree was entered. Defendant did not acknowledge any wrongdoing but agreed to pay $325,000 to settle the claim. The amount paid to each employee was to be determined by the EEOC. The consent agreement also required defendant to implement policies to avoid future harassment, including by including of non-harassment criteria on employee evaluations, creating an anonymous complaint system, training employees on sexual harassment and their rights, and creating a reporting system that will track claims of such harassment. Defendant was required to notify its employees of the requirement placed upon it within sixty days and to report all complaints of sexual harassment to the EEOC every 180 days for 30 months. Parties were to bear their own costs. An objection to the consent decree was filed December 30, 2013.

Summary: EEOC filed a lawsuit alleging violations of the Civil Rights Act on behalf of female employees of a retail store chain. The defendant allegedly failed to respond to complaints of sexual harassment and fired an employee for complaining about harassment. A consent decree directly payment of $325,000 to the employees and compliance with specified terms for 30 months.


On January 13, 2012, members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota against the State of South Dakota, Shannon County, and Fall River County, under §2 and §5 of the Voting Rights Act, the Indian Citizenship Act, 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Declaratory Judgment Act, and state law. They argued that the lack of early voting in Shannon County, the county where the Oglala Sioux reside and which is populated entirely by Native Americans, violated the plaintiffs' rights. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 6, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, arguing the motion was moot because they had voluntarily agreed to provide early voting in Shannon County through 2018. On March 14, 2012, Judge Karen Schreier agreed with the defendants’ reasoning and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 2012 WL 871262. On September 27, 2012, Judge Schreier denied defendant Gant’s motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity under the 11th Amendment of the US Constitution because the plaintiffs sought future relief through an injunction and not retroactive relief, therefore the <i>Ex Parte Young</i> exception doctrine to sovereign immunity applied. Furthermore, Judge Schreier denied defendant Gant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for standing because the infringement of the plaintiffs’ voting rights was a harm directly linked to Gant’s conduct that could be redressed through a court ruling. Lastly, Judge Schrieir found that the plaintiffs succeeded in stating a claim on all grounds, therefore denying Gant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 2012 WL 4482984. On October 4, 2012, Judge Schreier ruled against another motion to dismiss the action, which had been filed on August 10, 2012. Judge Schreier held that, although the defendants voluntarily agreed to provide early voting in Shannon County through 2018, the plaintiffs’ claims were not moot because of the likelihood of the issue recurring in the future. The defendants' agreement to provide early voting would expire in 2019, and there was no funding allotted to continue the early voting past 2018. 2012 WL 4748071. On October 17, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss on new, ripeness, grounds. They claimed that the plaintiffs' alleged harm was too distant and uncertain for the court to maintain jurisdiction because early voting was guaranteed until 2019. Judge Schreier granted this motion on August 6, 2013. All pending motions were denied as moot. 2013 WL 4017036. Judge Schreier denied the defendants’ request for their bill of costs since the relief the plaintiffs obtained was only obtained after the lawsuit was filed. This case is now closed.

Summary: On January 13, 2012, members of the Oglala Sioux Tribe of South Dakota filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota against the State of South Dakota, Shannon County and Fall River County, alleging that the lack of early voting in Shannon County deprived the 100% Native American population in the area full access to the ballot. Because the defendants eventually agreed to provide the plaintiffs with access to early voting through 2018, the trial judge granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims on ripeness grounds on August 6, 2013. The case is now closed.