COVID-19 Summary: On March 25, 2020, Planned Parenthood filed this suit challenging Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton's interpretation of Governor Greg Abbott’s Executive Order. The Attorney General singled out abortion providers and suggested that he believed the provision of nonemergency abortions would violate the Executive Order. On March 30, 2020, the district court issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, but the Fifth Circuit temporarily stayed the district court's order. On April 20, 2020, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals directed the district court to partially vacate the temporary restraining order and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction on April 23. On June 24, the parties submitted a joint stipulation in which the plaintiffs agreed not to seek attorney’s fees other costs or expenses from the defendant, and the defendant agreed not to enforce the March 22 Executive Order until a final non-appealable judgment has been made.
 On March 25, 2020, Planned Parenthood and other Texas abortion providers brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the Western District of Texas. Represented by Planned Parenthood Federation of America, the Center for Reproductive Rights, and the Lawyering Project, the plaintiffs challenged the Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton's interpretation of Governor Greg Abbott’s March 22, 2020, Executive Order GA 09, “Relating to hospital capacity during the COVID-19 disaster” (“the Executive Order”), as applied to abortion. Further, to the extent that the Texas Attorney General's interpretation is consistent with the Executive Order, plaintiffs challenged the order itself. The plaintiffs also challenged the Texas Medical Board’s emergency amendment to 22 TAC § 187.57 (“Emergency Rule”), which imposes the same requirements as the Executive Order. Citing the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the need to preserve hospital capacity and personal protective equipment, the Executive Order prohibits all surgeries and procedures that are not immediately medically necessary to correct a serious medical condition of, or to preserve the life of, a patient who without immediate receipt of such care would be at risk for serious adverse medical consequences or death. On March 23, 2020, Attorney General Paxton issued a press release singling out abortion providers and suggesting that he believed the provision of nonemergency abortions would violate the Executive Order. The release stated that “[t]hose who violate the governor’s order will be met with the full force of the law” and threatened criminal penalties, including jail time. The plaintiffs alleged that by stating that the Executive Order applies to “any type of abortion,” the Attorney General’s news release suggested it also prohibits medication abortion, which involves taking medications orally. The plaintiffs alleged constitutional equal protection and substantive due process violations. First, the plaintiffs claimed that by banning all non-emergency abortion prior to viability, or alternatively by banning non-emergency abortion after ten weeks of pregnancy and allowing no exception for patients prior to ten weeks of pregnancy, the Executive Order and corresponding Attorney General interpretation and the Emergency Rule, as applied to abortion, violate substantive due process. Second, the plaintiffs claimed that by selectively burdening patients’ fundamental right to abortion without justification, and by singling abortion providers and their patients out for differential treatment from providers of other medical services and their patients, the Executive Order and corresponding Attorney General interpretation and the Emergency Rule, as applied to abortion, violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs sought immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, followed by a preliminary injunction, and ultimately a permanent injunction, restraining the defendants from enforcing or complying with the Executive Order and corresponding Attorney General interpretation and the Emergency Rule, as applied to abortion. The same day, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. The defendants responded on March 30, 2020, arguing that the court should deny the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order for five reasons: (1) the plaintiffs cannot establish a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims because they are being treated exactly like every other physician and clinic in Texas during a national emergency, and the right to abortion does not have preeminence over all of the other individual liberties that are being temporarily curtailed; (2) the plaintiffs fail to allege irreparable harm because they have not alleged that even a single patient will not be able to receive an abortion after the expiration of the Executive Order in three weeks; (3) the balance of the equities weighs in the State’s favor because the critical need to protect public health justifies this temporary order; (4) preserving across-the-board application of the Executive Order is overwhelmingly in the public’s interest; and (5) and the court cannot issue a temporary restraining order in any event because it lacks jurisdiction. Also on March 30, 2020, District Judge Lee Yeakel granted the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order until a telephonic hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction on April 13. 2020 WL 1502102. Judge Yeakel stated that while he understands the public health concerns relating to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Executive Order as applied to abortion violates Roe v. Wade. The defendants filed an emergency motion for stay and a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 31, 2020, The circuit court temporarily stayed the district court's order. On April 8, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for a temporary restraining order, which the court granted on April 9. 2020 WL 1815587. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again stayed the district court's order, but on April 13 dissolved the stay as to medication abortions because it was unclear whether the Executive Order applied to medication abortions. 800 Fed.Appx. 293; 2020 WL 1866010. On April 17, 2020, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. On April 20, 2020, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the district court to vacate the temporary restraining order with respect to: 1. The part restraining enforcement of the Executive Order as a “categorical ban on all abortions provided by Plaintiffs;” 2. The part restraining the Governor of Texas and the Attorney General; 3. The part restraining enforcement of the Executive Order as to medication abortions; 4. The part restraining enforcement of the Executive Order as to patients who would reach 18 weeks after the first day of their last menstrual period on the expiration date of the Executive Order and who would be “unlikely” to be able to obtain abortion services in Texas; and 5. The part restraining enforcement of the Executive Order after 11:59 p.m. on April 21, 2020. 956 F.3d 696. However, the court did not vacate the temporary restraining order with respect to the part restraining the Executive Order as to patients “who, based on the treating physician’s medical judgment, would be past the legal limit for an abortion in Texas—22 weeks after the first day of the patient's last menstrual period—on April 22, 2020.” On April 23, 2020, plaintiffs provided notice to the court that they withdrew their pending motion for a preliminary injunction in light of the defendants' response. On June 24, the parties submitted a joint stipulation in which the plaintiffs agreed not to seek attorney’s fees other costs or expenses from the defendant, and the defendant agreed not to enforce the March 22 Executive Order until a final non-appealable judgment was made. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On March 25, 2020, Planned Parenthood filed this suit challenging Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton's interpretation of Governor Greg Abbott’s Executive Order. The Attorney General singled out abortion providers and suggested that he believed the provision of nonemergency abortions would violate the Executive Order. On March 30, 2020, the district court issued an order granting plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, but the Fifth Circuit temporarily stayed the district court's order. On April 20, 2020, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals directed the district court to partially vacate the temporary restraining order and the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for preliminary injunction on April 23. On June 24, the parties submitted a joint stipulation in which the plaintiffs agreed not to seek attorney’s fees other costs or expenses from the defendant, and the defendant agreed not to enforce the March 22 Executive Order until a final non-appealable judgment was made.


On July 1, 2009, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Corrections filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. The plaintiff sued the Indiana Department of Corrections (DOC) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion as a result of the Indiana DOC’s denial of kosher meals to prisoners whose religion requires them to keep kosher. The named plaintiff in this case had his kosher diet card suspended according to a policy that imposed a thirty-day suspension of a prisoner’s diet card if he did not use it at least seventy-five percent of the time. The named plaintiff, who claimed he did not receive notice of the policy, did not present his religious diet card at breakfast because the breakfast provided at the time was not kosher and he had received permission to remain in his cell during breakfast. Because he therefore only used his diet card at sixty-two percent of meals, the chaplain suspended the plaintiff’s card. During the suspension period, the plaintiff could not receive a kosher diet and was forced to eat the regular food. Subsequently, the DOC discontinued the use of pre-packaged kosher meals altogether, determining that kosher diets were no longer to be provided to any prisoners, including those whose religion requires them to keep kosher. Instead, prisoners requesting a kosher diet were provided vegetarian meals that were not kosher. On August 18, 2009, the plaintiff amended his complaint, originally an individual claim regarding the suspension, to also challenge the system-wide termination of kosher diets on behalf of a putative class of similarly situated individuals. On December 7, 2009, Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson granted the plaintiff’s motion for class certification. The court defined the certified class as: All prisoners confined within the Indiana Department of Correction, including the New Castle Correctional Facility, who have identified, or who will identify, themselves to the Indiana Department of Correction as requiring a kosher diet in order to properly exercise their religious beliefs and who have requested such a diet, or would request it if such a diet was available. For the next year, the parties engaged in discovery. On July 19, 2010, both parties filed for summary judgment. On November 1, 2010, Judge Magnus-Stinson declared that the termination of the class’s kosher diets violated RLUIPA and granted summary judgment on the issue in favor of the plaintiffs. 753 F. Supp. 2d 768. She also granted the named plaintiff’s individual claim for declaratory relief that the application of the 75-percent policy to him violated his First-Amendment rights and his rights under RLUIPA. Judge Magnus-Stinson granted the named plaintiff’s individual claim for nominal damages against the chaplain who suspended his diet card but denied the claim against the DOC’s Director of Religious Services who implemented the 75-percent policy. On November 22, 2010, the plaintiff submitted a proposal for a permanent injunction in accordance with the court’s declaratory judgment. On December 8, 2010, Judge Magnus-Stinson entered a final judgment and injunction in the case. The permanent injunction required the Indiana DOC to supply a kosher meal option for all meals served within any of their facilities and to provide certified kosher meals to all prisoners who request such meals in writing for sincerely held religious reasons. On January 6, 2011, the defendants filed a notice of appeal in the Seventh Circuit and a motion to stay the enforcement of the injunction pending appeal. The U.S. Department of Justice filed a Statement of Interest arguing that the court should deny the defendants’ motion to stay. On January 25, 2011, Judge Magnus-Stinson denied the motion to stay the injunction except as it pertained to nominal damages against the DOC chaplain. The defendants then voluntarily dismissed their appeal. Almost immediately following the injunction, the court started receiving pro se motions by class members seeking to intervene to enforce the injunction. On January 22, 2015, Magistrate Judge Debra McVicker Lynch granted the motions of two people, represented by the ACLU of Indiana, confined within the DOC to intervene as named plaintiffs to pursue contempt remedies against the DOC. On May 14, 2015, the intervening plaintiffs filed an amended motion for contempt. The intervening plaintiffs alleged that the DOC terminated one of the plaintiff’s kosher diet plan without warning in 2014 because he purchased certain items he believed were kosher from the commissary. The other formally applied for a kosher diet plan in 2013 and was denied, despite stating a clear need in his application, because the DOC found that the vegetarian meal did not contain any food that he stated his diet prohibited. The plaintiffs argued that these denials, and similar denials to many other class members, represented a failure to substantially comply with the judgment. The two intervening plaintiffs requested that the court find the DOC in contempt and order the DOC to create a new system for determining sincerity with regard to the receipt of kosher diets. The parties subsequently entered into a private settlement agreement. The confidential settlement agreement put in place substantive requirements to remedy the problems that had arisen regarding the approval and monitoring of kosher diets. Following notice to the class and a fairness hearing on July 27, 2016, the court approved the settlement agreement, and the pending contempt action was dismissed. The agreement remained in effect for three years. Since the dismissal of the contempt action, the court acknowledged receiving letters in 2017 from incarcerated individuals alleging ongoing issues with kosher meals, but Judge Magnus-Stinson did not reopen the case. The case closed on July 27, 2019.

Summary: In 2009, an Orthodox Jewish prisoner filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Plaintiffs alleged that the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC)'s denial of kosher meals to prisoners whose religion requires them to keep kosher violated their First Amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). In 2010, injunctive and declaratory relief was granted in favor of the plaintiff on summary judgment, requiring that the DOC provide certified kosher meals to all inmates requesting them for religious reasons. When ongoing violations occurred, a contempt motion was brought against the DOC in 2016, but the parties reached a private settlement agreement. The court continued to receive letters in 2017 from prisoners alleging noncompliance, but the court did not reopen the case. The terms of the agreement ended in July 2019 and the case closed.


On December 13, 2001, one current and nine former female agents and supervisors of defendant filed a lawsuit against defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Chicago Branch. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, alleging that they had been discriminated by defendant in, inter alia, promotions, training, compensensation, hours, transfers and job assignments based on sex. The Complaint further alleged a pattern or practice of gender-based harassment at defendant as well as a hostile work environment. The case was assigned to Judge James H. Alesia. On February 5, 2002, Judge Alesia concluded that joinder of the plaintiffs was improper under Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint without prejudice. On February 26,counsel for plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint, naming Ms. Radmanovich as the sole class representative. In addition, plaintiffs' counsel filed nine additional cases on behalf of the other plaintiffs who were originally named in the action. Eight of the nine additional suits were brought as individual actions, while one of them, the Palmer action (EE-IL-0284) was filed as another putative class action. On May 1, 2003, the plaintiff filed a motion for class certification. However, on June 26, 2003, Judge Alesia denied the motion on the ground that the proposed class would be "totally unmanageable." In November, 2003, the parties agreed to mediation in an effort to settle all of the pending cases. On March 3, 2004, the mediator proposed that all of the foregoing cases be settled for a totla payment by defendant of $8.5 million. On March 12, 2004, the parties indicated that they would accept the mediator's proposal. On January 12, 2005, the court (Judge James Zagel) approved the parties' settlement.

Summary: This case was brought by former employees of defendant seeking monetary and injunctive relief. On January 12, 2005, the court approved the parties' settlement agreement.


On May 26, 2009, recipients of In-Home Service Support (IHSS) care filed a lawsuit under the Supremacy Clause against Arnold Schwarzenegger and other government officials in the Northern District Court of California. The Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, claiming that in enacting Section 12306. 1 (d)(6), the California Legislature failed to consider the required factors of efficiency, economy, quality of care, and access to services prior to its enactment. The IHSS program provides crucial medical assistance to low-income elderly people and disabled people as part of California's Medicaid program (also called "Medi-Cal"). The types of assistance that IHSS providers give are bathing, feeding, dressing, and providing the medications IHSS recipients require. The IHSS program allows recipients to reside safely in their homes and costs less than institutionalized care. At the time of this case, there were over 360,000 IHSS providers giving assistance to 440,000 individuals in California. Providers are often relatives, such as a parent, that leave a full-time job in order to care for a child or other person. The wages began at $8.10 per hour to $12.10, but with the state's reductions decreased to at most $10.10 per hour. Under the Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., such modifications must be approved by the Department of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) prior to being implemented. In September and December 2008, California submitted amendment proposals to CMS that incorporated most of the rate reductions the Legislature had already included in these statutes. Before CMS had completed its review the amendments, this suit and several others seeking injunctions to prevent the rate reductions were filed. In the case at hand, Plaintiffs motioned for a preliminary injunction on June 4th, 2009. Defendants repeatedly challenged Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, objecting to the declarations of Plaintiffs' witnesses and evidence filed by the Plaintiff. After a series of back and forth objections, the Northern District Court for California (Judge Claudia Wilken) ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs and granted Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Wilken granted Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on June 26th, 2009, just a few days before IHSS cuts were set to take effect on July 1st, 2009. In the Court's order, Judge Claudia Wilken concluded that the Plaintiffs established the necessary criterion for being granted a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs, according to Judge Wilken, established both a strong likelihood of success and that they would suffer irreparable injury if IHSS cuts were implemented. Judge Wilken found that State Defendants had violated the procedural requirements of the Medicaid Act, including the consideration of how IHSS cuts would affect efficiency, economy, and quality of care given by IHSS providers to elderly and disabled recipients (42 U. S. C. §1396a(a)(30)(A)). State Defendants did not consider factors laid in the federal statute when they decided to implement California Welfare and Institutions Code § 12301(d)(6). The Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued a decision on March 3, 2010. Judge Milan D. Smith reasoned that the factors of efficiency, economy, and quality of care applied to the statute in dispute, the California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12306.1(d)(6). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also wrote in the opinion that the legislative report Defendants had submitted regarding the quality and access in the IHSS system was inadequate under the Medicaid provision. Other important parts of the opinion included the Court's finding that Plaintiffs did show irreparable harm in showing that IHSS providers would be harmed by reduction in their hourly wages and benefits, in addition to IHSS recipients. The Court of Appeals found that the balance of hardships and the public interest also weighed in favor of implementing the preliminary injunction. In deciding to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, the Court of Appeals needed to review the District Court's finding for abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion and agreed with the District Court's first decision. Dominguez et al v. Schwarzenegger, 596 F.3d 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2009). On March 24, 2010, the Defendants petitioned the United States Supreme Court to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit holding that the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution could serve as a basis for a cause of action in this case. During the period between the Appellate Court decision and the Supreme Court's grant of review, the case remained active at the District Court level. On June 8, 2010, prior to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, the District Court granted class certification, and on July 2, 2010, it ordered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Defendants from lowering hourly wages and benefit contributions of IHSS workers in the County of Fresno. The Supreme Court granted certiorari review on January 18, 2011, consolidating this case with four others that raised the same issue. These four cases were Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc. v. Shewry (Clearinghouse case code PB-CA-0016), Managed Pharmacy Care v. Maxwell-Jolly (PB-CA-0019), California Pharmacists Association v. Maxwell-Jolly (PB-CA-0020), and Santa Rosa Memorial Hospital v. Shewry (Docket #: 3:08-cv-05173-SC). Oral argument before the Supreme Court took place on October 3, 2011. After oral argument and while the cases were pending before the Supreme Court, CMS approved California's amendments to its Medicaid plan. In light of this, the Supreme Court declined to issue a ruling on whether the Supremacy Clause could serve as a basis for a private suit to enforce Title XIX against a state. Instead, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit Court's decision and remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for reconsideration, with instructions to take into account CMS's approval of the amendments. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 132 S. Ct. 1204 (U.S. 2012). After the Supreme Court decision was issued, the parties entered settlement mediation. On March 26, 2013, the parties were granted a joint motion to stay proceedings at the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals pending the approval of the class-action settlement agreement at the District Court level. On April 4, 2013, the District Court granted preliminary approval of a settlement. Final approval of the settlement was granted on May 23, 2013. The Settlement also resolved Oster v. Lightbourne (In the Clearinghouse as DR-CA-0027: V.L. v. Wagner, see related cases), a suit that raised similar issues. For the purpose of the settlement, the plaintiff classes from these two suits were combined and expanded to include all IHSS recipients who resided in Alameda, Calaveras, Contra Costa, Fresno, Los Angeles, Madera, Marin, Mariposa, Mendocino, Monterey, Napa, Placer, Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San Mateo, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Solano, Sonoma, Yolo, and Yuba counties. The settlement would prevent the IHSS wage cuts from coming into effect, keeping them at the statutory rates that were in place prior to the 2009 amendments contested in Dominguez. The terms also included an eight-percent cut in IHSS employee service hours for twelve months, which would then be replaced by a seven-percent cut in service hours, contingent on the passing of the legislation described below. These cuts in service hours would be inclusive of and not in addition to an already existing 3.4 percent cut in hours. The attached legislation would repeal an earlier bill that cut authorized IHSS service hours by twenty percent across the board, implementation of which was delayed pending the outcome of these suits and related litigation. 12306.1(d)(6), the amendment which lowered IHSS wages, would also be repealed. If this legislation was not passed by the California Legislature and delivered to the Governor by November 1, 2013, then the Parties were to meet and confer to determine whether they could agree upon a mutually acceptable solution. If the Parties did not reach a new agreement, then any Party would be able to declare the settlement agreement void. No attorneys' fees or costs were awarded. On Sept. 3, 2014, the court approved amendments to the settlement to which the parties stipulated. The State was given a deadline to submit proposed legislation authorizing an assessment on home care services by Feb. 1, 2015. There has been no further docket activity, and the case appears to be closed.

Summary: This case was brought by in-home supportive services (IHSS) providers and Medicaid recipients who required these services, represented by private counsel, against the State of California. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief after the State implemented budget cuts for IHSS wages enacted by the California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 12306.1(d)(6). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court granted cert review. While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the Federal Government approved the California IHSS plan amendments. In light of this, the Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further review. The parties then settled. The settlement is conditioned on the State passing legislation that would stop the IHSS pay rate reductions being passed by November 1, 2013.


On July 5, 2016, plaintiff, a male-to-female transgender inmate incarcerated by the Colorado Department of Corrections [CDOC] who resided in a male facility, filed suit against the chief of psychiatry and the executive director of the CDOC for failure to provide her with appropriate undergarments and other items that were available exclusively to female prisoners in conformity with her gender identity, in spite of the fact that she was developing breasts as a result of her hormonal treatment. The complaint was originally filed pro se, but was eventually taken on by the Civil Rights Clinic at the Sturm College of Law at the University of Denver. The amended complaint was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleged a violation of the Eighth Amendment based on her inadequate medical care while incarcerated, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, since her treatment was different than that of cisgender prisoners. The plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The amended complaint contained additional claims of verbal harassment and physical and sexual assault by guards and other inmates that took place in the prison, all of which she reported to the prison, which the plaintiff believed to be the result of her gender identity and expression. She also represented a belief that the appropriate undergarments would make her less vulnerable to attack. Additionally, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff did not have adequate medical treatment to address her gender identity disorder beyond hormone treatment, including sex reassignment surgery. The case was assigned to Judge Marcia S. Krieger and referred to Magistrate Judge Scott T. Varholak. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in December, 2016. In the meantime, the plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 25, 2017. After the case was consolidated with related cases on September 11, 2017, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint on October 12, 2017. Plaintiff moved for preliminary injunction on February 20, 2018 and later withdrew this motion voluntarily. The court did not address the merits of the claim because the parties reached a settlement agreement on June 22, 2018. The student attorneys settlement allowed transgender women to have access to bras and the full range of undergarments available to prisoners in female facilities, to evaluation for gender confirmation surgery, and to the female canteen list, which will allow transgender women the ability to purchase and wear makeup. The case was terminated on September 21, 2018.

Summary: A male-to-female transgender prisoner filed a complaint against prison employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, for the prison's failure to provide her with appropriate undergarments and medical treatment in line with her gender identity. The case settled out of court, and the prison agreed to allow transgender women to have access to bras and the full range of undergarments available to prisoners in female facilities, to evaluation for gender confirmation surgery, and to the female canteen list.


On February 19, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas against Texas Champion Bank, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"). The plaintiff, represented by the U.S. Attorney's Office, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages to all of the victims of the defendant's discriminatory policies, alleging that the defendant discriminated against Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin on unsecured consumer loans. In March 2010, the FDIC performed an investigation to determine whether the defendant was complying with the ECOA. Once it had reason to believe that the defendant had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination, the FDIC referred the matter to the Department of Justice. Based on data from 2006 to 2010, the DOJ found that on average, and with all other factors accounted for, the defendant charged higher interest rates on unsecured loans to Hispanic borrowers than to non-Hispanic borrowers. The significant statistical disparity between the interest rates charged to Hispanic borrowers and non-Hispanic borrowers were a result of the broad discretion the defendant gave to its loan officers and negatively impacted Hispanic borrowers. On March 5, 2013, the District Court (Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos) entered a consent order between the parties. The defendant did not admit to any pattern or practice of discrimination. The order enjoined the defendant from engaging in any act or practice that discriminates on the basis of race or national origin in any credit transaction in violation of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Among other things, the defendant's employees will have to participate in a training program and will be subject to monitoring and reporting requirements. Unique to this case, the defendant has to set up a Complaint Resolution Program for consumers. The defendant also has to place $700,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered. The consent decree terminated in 2017, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On February 19, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas against Texas Champion Bank, under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), alleging that the defendant discriminated against Hispanic borrowers because of race and national origin on unsecured consumer loans. The Court entered a consent order between the parties on March 5, 2013. The defendant was required to place $700,000 into a settlement fund to compensate for monetary damages that aggrieved persons may have suffered.


On June 10, 2013, several death row inmates filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and the Louisiana State Penitentiary. The plaintiffs, represented by the Promise of Justice Initiative and private counsel, alleged they were subject to serious mental and physical health risks from continuous exposure to severe seasonal heat, which they claimed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. On December 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge Brian A. Jackson) ordered that the defendants immediately develop a plan to reduce and maintain the heat index in the death row tiers at or below 88 degrees Fahrenheit. In addition, the court sanctioned defendants based on their bad faith attempts to manipulate data and to abuse discovery. This was based on what plaintiffs had asserted before, that in response to an order to “monitor, record, and report the temperature, humidity, and heat index in each of the death row tiers,” defendants had instead attempted to manipulate the evidence by putting soaker hoses on awnings to mist the walls of certain tiers, and also unsuccessfully attempting to develop a sprinkler system to wet the roof and yard of the prison. Court thus awarded the plaintiffs reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The defendants appealed this ruling and moved to stay the order. On January 17, 2014, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to stay pending appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. A month later, the Fifth Circuit also denied a stay pending appeal. Pursuant to the District Court's order, on February 17, 2014, the defendants submitted a plan to keep the index in death row at or below 88 degrees Fahrenheit between April 1 and October 31. The defendants hired an expert, who determined that the only way to maintain this temperature was to install facility-wide air conditioning. Accordingly, the defendants proposed the addition of nine tons of air conditioning capacity on each death row tier. The plan also provided for automatic monitoring and recording of temperature and humidity data, one cold shower per day for each inmate, and the provision of clean ice and ice chests. As the District Court proceeded with the case (and while the appeal proceeded before the Fifth Circuit), the United States Department of Justice filed a notice of interest in the case, expressing its view that if the Court found a constitutional violation, broad relief--including an independent monitor and access rights for the plaintiffs' counsel--was within the authority of the District Court. (The United States took no position on whether the conditions at Angola violated the Eighth Amendment.) On May 23, 2014, the District Court (Judge Jackson) approved the State's remediation plan and chose a monitor. On June 3, 2014, the court rendered final judgment, finding for the prisoners on the Eighth Amendment claim and for the State on the Americans with Disabilities Act claim. The State appealed. This time, on June 6, 2014, the Fifth Circuit granted a stay while that appeal was pending. According to the informal Supreme Court Docket on Westlaw, the prisoners asked the Supreme Court Justice Scalia (who is the Circuit Justice for the Fifth Circuit) to vacate the stay on June 30, but on July 3 Justice Scalia denied that request. On July 8, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, in a decision by Judge Edith Jones. The Court of Appeals upheld the liability finding of the resolution of the Eighth Amendment and disability claims, but said that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the injunction was too broad. The District Court's order to maintain the heat index at or below 88 degrees, the Court explained, amounted to a requirement of facility-wide air conditioning -- and that was not constitutionally compelled. A narrower remedy would suffice: a daily cold shower, or fans and ice containers, or plentiful cold drinking water and ice. In addition, the relief should not have been awarded facility wide. Since the action was not a class action, relief should have been awarded for the three plaintiffs, individually. Judge Reavley dissented, explaining that the injunction was sufficiently narrow. The Court remanded for crafting of an appropriately tailored injunction. Meanwhile, the attorney’s fees and costs that plaintiffs had been granted on December 19, 2013 were still at issue. On July 20, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a request of $16,892 for attorney’s fees and costs. The court reassessed costs and damages at $15,262, and this ruling was entered on July 20, 2015. Plaintiffs and defendants agreed to attempt settlement as to the plaintiff’s motions for attorney’s fees, and submit confidential affidavits regarding settlement efforts by April 11, 2016. On December 22, 2016, the District Court ordered the defendants to implement remedial measures described as the “Third Plan” whenever the heat index exceeded 88 degrees in plaintiffs’ death row tiers. Defendants appealed this ruling once more to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the District Court violated the Fifth Circuit’s July 8, 2015 judgment. Meanwhile, on May 2, 2017, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had taken away the exhaust fans in plaintiff’s cells, and that defendants were violating the court’s injunctive order and were failing to maintain the status quo. Plaintiffs once more sought attorney’s fees for this violation. On December 22, 2017, special master Paul J. Hebert submitted a status report that was adopted as the court’s opinion, finding that the defendants were in fact complying with the Third Plan and that it seemed to be working, despite plaintiff’s objections. As such, the court denied plaintiff’s requests for attorney’s fees, though they did order defendants to pay for plaintiff’s expert costs. On July 8, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, in a decision by Judge Edith Jones. The Court of Appeals upheld the liability finding of the resolution of the Eighth Amendment and disability claims, but said that under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the injunction was too broad. The District Court's order to maintain the heat index at or below 88 degrees, the Court explained, amounted to a requirement of facility-wide air conditioning -- and that was not constitutionally compelled. A narrower remedy would suffice: a daily cold shower, or fans and ice containers, or plentiful cold drinking water and ice. In addition, the relief should not have been awarded facility wide. Since the action was not a class action, relief should have been awarded for the three plaintiffs, individually. Judge Reavley dissented, explaining that the injunction was sufficiently narrow. The Court remanded for crafting of an appropriately tailored injunction. Meanwhile, the attorney’s fees and costs that plaintiffs had been granted on December 19, 2013 were still at issue. On July 20, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a request of $16,892 for attorney’s fees and costs. The court reassessed costs and damages at $15,262, and this ruling was entered on July 20, 2015. Plaintiffs and defendants agreed to attempt settlement as to the plaintiff’s motions for attorney’s fees, and submit confidential affidavits regarding settlement efforts by April 11, 2016. On December 22, 2016, the District Court ordered the defendants to implement remedial measures described as the “Third Plan” whenever the heat index exceeded 88 degrees in plaintiffs’ death row tiers. Defendants appealed this ruling once more to the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the District Court violated the Fifth Circuit’s July 8, 2015 judgment. Meanwhile, on May 2, 2017, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had taken away the exhaust fans in plaintiff’s cells, and that defendants were violating the court’s injunctive order and were failing to maintain the status quo. Plaintiffs once more sought attorney’s fees for this violation. On December 22, 2017, special master Paul J. Hebert submitted a status report that was adopted as the court’s opinion, finding that the defendants were in fact complying with the Third Plan and that it seemed to be working, despite plaintiff’s objections. As such, the court denied plaintiff’s requests for attorney’s fees, though they did order defendants to pay for plaintiff’s expert costs. On January 31, 2018, the Fifth Circuit issued a judgment (Judges Jerry E. Smith, Rhesa Hawkins Barksdale, and Stephen A. Higginson). The court began by explaining the procedural history of the entire case. They then went on to decide the claim of whether the Third Plan violated the Fifth Circuit’s July 8, 2015 judgment. The court held that the "heat index" part of the Third Plan violated the Fifth Circuit’s July 2015 ruling, finding that it was not necessary or relevant. The court upheld the rest of the plan as having already been approved by the court and found necessary to remedy the harm experienced by the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court for review on if the PLRA prohibited ordering a maximum “heat index” to remedy the constitutional violation caused by the heat. Special Master Paul J. Hebert filed a status report that was last amended on June 4, 2018. According to the special report, the unremediated areas in the death row tiers were excessively hot, and ranged from 88 to 103 degrees Fahrenheit almost every day in June through September. The plaintiffs withdrew their motion for attorney's fees on August 15, 2018. After reaching a settlement agreement, the parties filed a joint motion for conditional dismissal on November 5, 2018, and the plaintiffs dismissed their pending cert petition in the Supreme Court. Under the settlement, the defendants agreed to provide a minimum of fifteen minutes of shower time each day, ice machines and ice containers, fans, water, icy breeze units, and diversion of cool air from the guard’s pod to the area of plaintiffs’ cells on any day when the heat index in plaintiffs cells exceeds 88 degrees. In addition, if the defendants plan to make any modification that will substantially impact these required steps, they agreed to seek leave from the plaintiffs before doing so. Judge Jackson approved the motion and moved the case to the inactive docket on April 18, 2019. On May 30, 2019, the parties submitted an addendum slightly modifying the requirement for the defendants to divert cool air from the guard’s pod to provide for increased cool air. As of April 11, 2020, the court retains jurisdiction over the settlement as provided in the agreement. One year after substantial compliance has been achieved, if no motion to restore the case to the Court's active docket has been filed, the parties will jointly move for final dismissal.

Summary: In June 2013, death row inmates filed this suit in the Middle District of Louisiana against the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and the Louisiana State Penitentiary, seeking declaratory ad injunctive relief. Plaintiffs alleged that their exposure to extreme seasonal heat posed serious health risks. In December 2013, the District Court found that this exposure amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and ordered the defendants to develop a plan to reduce and maintain a heat index at or below 88 degrees Fahrenheit in all death row tiers. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the liability finding, but found the District Court's injunction too broad and remanded for crafting an appropriately tailored injunction. As such, The District Court ordered that defendants comply with the "Third Plan." Plaintiffs and defendants continued to debate over whether the defendants were complying with the status quo, and plaintiffs sought further attorney's costs. The court denied this second request, using as basis a later special master expert report that affirmed defendants had indeed been in compliance. Meanwhile, defendants appealed the "Third Plan," stating that it violated the Fifth Circuit's prior judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The parties settled the case in April 18, 2019, and the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement until the defendants have reached one year of full compliance.


On January 27, 2012, a same-sex couple and another individual in a same-sex relationship, all citizens of Hawaii, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Hawaii under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Hawaii. The plaintiffs, represented by private attorneys, asked the court for a declaration that the restriction of the right of marriage to opposite sex couples under § 572-1 of the H.R.S and under the "marriage amendment" violates Due Process and Equal Protection under the U.S. Constitution. Further, plaintiffs asked the court to permanently enjoin the Governor, the Director, and any person acting on their behalf from enforcing the restriction. In 1994, the Hawaiian legislature added language to § 572-1 to specifically define marriage as between a man and a woman. In 1997, the legislature passed a "Marriage amendment" which states that only the legislature has the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples. The people of Hawaii ratified this amendment in November 1998. During the same session, the legislature also passed H.B. No. 118, the Reciprocal Beneficiaries Act, which allowed persons who are legally prohibited from marrying, the ability to register as reciprocal beneficiaries and obtain certain rights (associated with marriage). Defendant Abercrombie admitted § 572-1 violates due process clause and equal protection clause. On May 2, 2012 Court granted Hawaii Family Forum (HFF) motion to intervene as a defendant. Jackson v. Abercrombie, 282 F.R.D. 507 (D. Haw. 2012). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on June, 15, 2012, which was granted. On August 8, 2012, the Court, Alan C. Kay, Senior U.S. District Judge, granted summary judgment for defendants, holding the issue is one for the legislature to decide. On September 10, 2012, plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On September 7, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. However, on November 13, 2013, before any arguments had been heard, Governor Abercrombie signed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. Beginning December 2, 2013, same-sex couples living in Hawaii and tourists can marry in the state. On October 10, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered that the district court decision be vacated and that the case be remanded with directions to dismiss. On October 23, 2014, the case was dismissed as moot.

Summary: On January 27, 2012, a same-sex couple and another individual in a same-sex relationship, who are citizens of Hawaii, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Hawaii under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the state of Hawaii, seeking the declaration of the restriction of marriage to opposite sex couples under § 572-1 of the H.R.S unconstitutional. On November 13, 2013, Governor Abercrombie signed a bill legalizing same-sex marriage. Beginning December 2, 2013, same-sex couples living in Hawaii and tourists can marry in the state.


The plaintiffs, several individuals with developmental disabilities, filed this challenge to South Carolina's proposed reduction of services under its MR/RD (intellectual disabilities and related disorders) Waiver program. In January 2010, the South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services (SCDHHS) announced a plan to reduce home-based services under the MR/RD Waiver as well as to cap the number of nursing and other home-care hours available through the Waiver. The plaintiffs contended that these reductions would force them to move to institutions in order to receive necessary services. The plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina on March 24, 2010. The plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction on April 29, 2010. The federal magistrate judge (Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks) issued a report and recommendation granting the motion on November 24, 2010. Judge Hendricks found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for an injunction and ordered the state to maintain the Plaintiffs' services at the level they were provided prior to 2010. The District Court (Judge J. Michelle Childs) adopted this report and recommendation as an order on March 7, 2010. At the same time, the parties engaged in a dispute over the inclusion of the governor (Gov. Mark Sanford and later Gov. Nikki Haley) as a defendant. Governor Sanford first moved to be dismissed from the case on April 21, 2010. On December 6, 2010, Magistrate Judge Hendricks recommended dismissing the Governor. On February 1, 2011, Judge Childs ordered that the Governor be dismissed with respect to those claims filed in the original complaint. The plaintiffs, however, had alleged additional claims against the Governor. On October 26, 2011, Sanford and Haley moved to be dismissed from the case, claiming that state sovereign immunity applied to their official actions. The court granted this motion and dismissed the governor and former governor on June 13, 2012. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on this matter, which the court denied on June 27, 2012, concluding that "plaintiffs have not demonstrated a recent change in the law, newly discovered evidence, or a clear error by this court which merits any alteration or amendment to the prior order." 2012 WL 2428109. Plaintiffs then filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; the Fourth Circuit denied the appeal on October 25, 2012. On the substantive claims, both parties filed motions for summary judgment in August 2012. At that time, two of the three plaintiffs had prevailed in appeals to the South Carolina Administrative Law Court and had not faced reductions in their services as a result. On March 7, 2013, District Judge Cain granted in part and denied in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment. Because two of the three plaintiffs had prevailed in the Administrative Law Court, the Court found their claims moot and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. However, the last plaintiff's claims remained ripe, and the Court denied the defendant's motion. The court also denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and the defendant's motions to dismiss. 2013 WL 869607. On July 14, 2014, the defendants moved to dismiss the third plaintiff's claims as moot. At this point, the last plaintiff had received his desired relief (having his adult companion services restored) through administrative and state channels. The Court thus granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss on December 10, 2014, and issued a judgment dismissing the case. One plaintiff then filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in January 2015, arguing that the March 7, 2013 order was in error. On April 29, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court. In February 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court denied the petition in April 2017. On May 1, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion for attorneys' fees and GAL fees. The defendants moved to dismiss the motion, arguing that it was untimely. On July 28, 2017, Judge Timothy Cain granted the defendants' motion, denying the plaintiff attorneys' fees without addressing the merits of his claim. 2017 WL 4457775. In August, the plaintiff appealed the denial of fees to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. On June 19, 2018, Judges Motz, Keenan, and Senior Circuit Judge Shedd affirmed the denial for plaintiff attorneys' fees "for the reasons stated by the district court." They also denied the plaintiff's motion to supplement the record, finding that the facts and legal contentions were already sufficiently presented to warrant additional materials unnecessary. On August 14, the Fourth Circuit denied defendant's petition for rehearing en banc. Four days later, the Fourth Circuit issued a mandate affirming the district court's judgement. The case is closed.

Summary: Plaintiffs, individuals with disabilities in South Carolina, filed this lawsuit to challenge South Carolina's reduction of services under the MR/RD Waiver. The District Court granted a preliminary injunction preventing the reduction in services in March 2011. After two of the plaintiffs were able to prevent a reduction in services, the district court dismissed the remaining plaintiff's claims as moot. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment on appeal.


On September 28, 2015, Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU), represented by private counsel, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiff sued the Utah Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to enjoin the defendants from preventing PPAU's access to federal funds it is otherwise qualified to receive. The plaintiffs claimed that on August 14, 2015, the Governor of Utah directed state agencies to "cease acting as an intermediary for federal grant money going to PPAU for non-abortion related services." The Governors directive was a response to a misleading video created by antichoice activists misrepresenting Planned Parenthood and falsely accusing the organization of "selling fetal body parts." The Utah Department of Health followed the Governor's directive, and planned to interfere with Planned Parenthood's access to federal funding for non-abortion services. The plaintiffs argued that the state's actions would cause irreparable harm to Planned Parenthood and its patients. On September 29, 2015, Judge Clark Waddoups issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from denying funding to PPAU until October 15, 2016. On October 15, 2015, Judge Waddoups held a hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction. On December 22, 2015 he issued an order denying the preliminary injunction and vacating the temporary restraining order. On December 27, 2015, PPAU filed an interlocutory appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the preliminary injunction decision. The case was stayed at the district court level while the Tenth Circuit decided on the appeal. On July 12 2016, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower courts decision and imposed a preliminary injunction enjoining the state from defunding PPAU. On September 7, 2016, Judge Dee Benson for the district court issued a preliminary injunction order in line with the Court of Appeals ruling. Subsequent to Tenth Circuit's July 12, 2016 order, a poll was called, sua sponte, to consider en banc rehearing. Upon that consideration, a majority of the active available judges of the court voted to deny. Judge Briscoe and Bacharach wrote separate concurring opinions as to the denial of en banc rehearing. Judge Gorsuch wrote a separate dissent, that Judges Tymkovich, Hartz and Holmes joined. On April 28, 2017, the parties submitted a stipulation proposing a permanent injunction. The proposed permanent injunction provided that Utah would not deny funding to the Plaintiff on impermissible constitutional grounds, including the Plaintiff’s provision of or advocacy for legal abortion; or the Plaintiff’s association or affiliation with the national Planned Parenthood organization or its affiliates, or other organizations with which provide for the advocacy of legal abortion. The proposed injunction would not require the defendants to continue contracts, renew contracts, or issue new contracts to the Plaintiff. However, if the defendants defunded, declined to renew, or did not issue a contract to the Plaintiff, they were required to state in writing a legitimate basis for doing so and provide that writing to the Plaintiff within thirty (30) days of the time their decision takes effect. Legitimate bases could not include unproven allegations against the national Planned Parenthood organization or its affiliates or the Plaintiff’s provision of or advocacy for legal abortion. On May 5, 2017, the Court adopted the parties' stipulated permanent injunction. On May 9, the parties stipulated to dismiss the case, with prejudice, in light of the permanent injunction. The Court did so on May 10. The case is now closed, and the permanent injunction is still in place.

Summary: On September 28, 2015, Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) filed this suit in the U.S. Court for the District of Utah. The plaintiff sued the Utah Department of Health under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin the defendants from defunding PPAU.The parties agreed to a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from defunding PPAU on May 5, 2017. The case is now closed. On December 22, 2015 Judge Waddoup issued an order denying the preliminary injunction and vacating a temporary restraining order. On August 8. 2016, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and imposed a preliminary injunction enjoining the state from defunding PPAU. Litigation continues at the district court level, but there has been little activity over the last several months.


On April 13, 2006, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Ceisel Masonry under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S. Code § 1981. The plaintiffs, representing named Hispanic employees of Ceisel Masonry and a class of other Hispanic employees of Ceisel Masonry, asked the court for injunctive relief enjoining the defendant from discriminating against employees based on national origin, and monetary relief to compensate for losses. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had created a hostile work environment. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had engaged in unlawful employment practices in harassing Hispanic employees and retaliating against these employees when they complained. The parties engaged in discovery for the next two years. In August of 2008, both parties filed motions for partial summary judgment. On January 23, 2009, Judge Harry D. Leinenweber denied all motions. He held that an issue of fact remained as to harassment; an employer's foreman did not act act as a supervisor creating liability for the employer; and the defendants assertion of a positive defense that employee had failed to take preventive or corrective measures could not be decided by summary judgment. 594 F.Supp.2d 1018 (N.D.Ill. 2009). On May 22, 2009 the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber approved a consent decree between the two parties. Specifically, the decree ordered an injunction enjoining harassment based on national origin and an injunction enjoining retaliation against persons who complain about violations of Title VII or Section 1981. The decree also ordered Ceisel Masonry to implement anti-harassment and anti-discriminatory policies, training, supervisory accountability systems, postings of notice, record keeping, and reporting. The decree ordered $500,000 in monetary damages to class members and a total of $220,000 for the three named employee complainants.

Summary: On April 13, 2006, the Chicago District Office of the EEOC brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff sued Ceisel Masonry under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S. Code § 1981. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant had created a hostile work environment. On May 22, 2009 the Honorable Harry D. Leinenweber approved a consent decree between the two parties.


On June 29, 2010, a resident of Camden, New Jersey filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Article 1, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution against the Camden Police Department, several of its police officers, and two prosecuting attorneys. The plaintiff, represented by the New Jersey chapter of the ACLU, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages as well as injunctive relief, claiming that he had been falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted and denied due process. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Camden Police Department had arrested him without probable cause and threatened him with charges of possession of a controlled substance unless the plaintiff told the officers the location of drugs within his friends house. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with possession of controlled substances, to which he pled guilty, and was sent to the county jail for over a year. Prior to the filing of this lawsuit, one of the defendant officers pled guilty to conspiring to deprive others of their civil rights. He also identified at least four other members of the Camden Police Department who had also participated in the conspiracy. The officer admitted that he and the others had planted drugs on innocent people and threatened certain individuals with arrest using planted evidence if they did not criminally implicate themselves or others. Roughly 185 other criminal cases were withdrawn or vacated because of this conspiracy. On January 14, 2011, the defendants Dow and Faulk moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. Both motions were granted on June 22, 2011 and August 18, 2011, respectively. For the remainder of the case, there were lengthy discovery proceedings. On January 11, 2013, the District Court (Judge Robert Kugler) ordered the case be dismissed on the grounds that the parties had settled out of court. The Camden Police Department agreed to pay $3,500,000 spread between the 87 plaintiffs whose civil rights had been violated by the Camden Police Department as a result of the conspiracy.

Summary: On June 29, 2010, a private citizen of Camden filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and Article 1, Section 7 of the New Jersey Constitution against the Camden Police Department. The plaintiff, represented by the New Jersey chapter of the ACLU, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages as well as an injunctive relief, claiming that he had been falsely arrested, maliciously prosecuted and denied due process. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Camden Police Department had arrested him without cause and held him in a police van outside his friends house for hours, and while there, the officers had threatened him with charges of possession of a controlled substance, which the officers had produced, unless the plaintiff told the officers the location of other drugs within his friends house. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with possession of controlled substances and, believing that a jury would almost certainly convict him, he pled guilty and according to his plea deal, was sent to the county jail for over a year. Following a dismissal of claims by the District Court, the city of Camden agreed to pay $3.5 million to 87 plaintiffs whose civil rights were violated.


On September 13, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a class action against the Sheriff of Santa Rosa County, Florida under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Pensacola Division. The plaintiffs challenged the defendant's recently instituted policy and practice ("Postcard-Only Mail Policy") that forbids inmates of the Santa Rosa County, Florida jail ("Jail") from sending letters enclosed in envelopes to their parents, children, spouses, friends, other loved ones, or other correspondents. Instead, jail inmates must write all of their correspondences in a postcard format except for privileged/legal mail. The plaintiffs allege this new policy impermissibly restricts inmates' ability to exercise their rights to communicate with correspondents outside the jail and these correspondents' right to receive these inmates' communications and expressions, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Represented by attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union of Florida and the Florida Justice Institute, Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the Postcard-Only Mail Policy and declare that it violates their constitutional rights. On September 20, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint. The next day, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. On December 14, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a Second Amended Complaint. On February 24, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Third Amended Complaint. On April 15, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On May 26, 2011, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification was granted. On February 13, 2012, the parties entered into a consent decree in which the defendant agreed to: 1) allow inmates to send letters, 2) provide writing materials to inmates upon intake, 3) provide writing materials to indigent inmates, 4) provide indigent inmates with legal writing materials, 5) offer writing materials for sale to all inmates at a reasonable price and with no content or volume restrictions, 6) place no restrictions on the volume or number of writing materials received by inmates from third party sources or other inmates, and 7) provide the plaintiffs with reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses. The decree allowed for judicial enforcement.

Summary: Persons incarcerated at the Santa Rosa County, Florida jail filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida to challenge the jail's "postcard only" policy. The case was ultimately resolved with a consent decree in which the defendant agreed to allow inmates to send letters, provide inmates with legal and writing materials, and provide the plaintiffs with reasonable attorney fees, costs, and expenses.


On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Qwest Communications in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint alleged discriminatory discipline and termination of two employees based on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and discriminatory discipline and termination of one employee based on association with the other two employees in violation of Title VII. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief on behalf of the three employees. The court granted the three complainants motions to intervene in December 2005. Two of the intervenor-plaintiffs alleged race and national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII, violation of 42 USC ß1981, race and national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Oregon law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge. The third intervenor-plaintiff alleged association disparate treatment and retaliation in violation of Title VII, violation of 42 USC § 1981, race and national origin discrimination and retaliation in violation of Oregon law, intentional infliction of emotional distress, reckless infliction of emotional distress, and wrongful discharge. On May 22, 2008, Judge Michael R. Hogan granted in part and denied in part a request by the defendant for summary judgment. The court granted most of the request expect for a few claims. The hostile work environment and discriminatory discharge claims remained (though these claims were dismissed as to one of the intervenor-plaintiffs). On December 29, 2008, the parties’ began settlement discussions that resulted in a consent decree. On February 4, 2009, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree called for the defendant to provide anti-discrimination training, report to the EEOC that the training was completed, and post a notice of this lawsuit’s resolution to be visible by all its employees. This decree had a duration of six months. The case docket indicates no record of non-compliance. Furthermore, the duration of the consent decree has lapsed. Therefore, this case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Qwest Communications in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The complaint alleged discriminatory discipline and termination of two employees based on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and discriminatory discipline and termination of one employee based on association with the other two employees in violation of Title VII. In addition, three individuals intervened as plaintiffs. In 2009, the court approved the parties' consent decree. This decree required the defendant to provide anti-discrimination training, post a notice of the lawsuit's resolution, and to report to the EEOC. This case is closed.


This suit, filed on Sept. 14, 2017, challenged President Trump's authorization of the construction of a border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. Plaintiffs, environmental advocacy organizations (Defenders of Wildlife, the Sierra Club, and the Animal Legal Defense Fund), sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for failing to comply with existing laws and for taking actions beyond the scope of its authority. Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California. On Jan. 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) No. 13767, which directed DHS to "take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border." The EO cited as its authority the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996. IIRIRA § 102 allows the Secretary of DHS to "take such actions as may be necessary to install additional physical barriers and roads ... in the vicinity of the United States border to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry into the United States." Further, under the REAL ID Act of 2005, the Secretary may "waive all legal requirements [that the] Secretary, in such Secretary’s sole discretion, determines necessary to ensure expeditious construction of the barriers and roads under this section.” IIRIRA also restricts judicial review of such action. Despite this, plaintiffs argued that § 102 also limits the Secretary's discretion to issue waivers, and that defendants had here overstepped these limits. First, plaintiffs argued that the IIRIRA waiver provision is limited to "the installation of 'additional physical barriers and road[s]...in areas of high illegal entry,'" and does not authorize replacement of existing barriers and roads, construction of temporary prototype walls, or the construction of barriers and roads in areas that are not "of high illegal entry into the United States." Further, plaintiffs argued that the Secretary's authority to issue waivers had expired in 2008, and that Congress had never again granted this authority since 2005. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary did not explain how DHS had identified "high illegal entry" at the proposed border wall sites. Plaintiffs asserted that DHS twice attempted to exercise this waiver, on Aug. 2 and Sept. 12, 2017, with respect to portions of the California border pursuant to the EO. In so doing, plaintiffs argued that DHS violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and various federal environmental statutes. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the border wall would harm borderland wildlife areas and thus plaintiffs' members who frequented these areas. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, plaintiffs sought a declaration that the IIRIRA waiver provision did not apply to DHS's proposed activities pursuant to the EO, that the two California waivers did not comply with the IIRIRA waiver provision, and that both the California waivers and the IIRIRA provision itself violated the Presentment Clauses, the Nondelegation Doctrine, and the separation of powers doctrine. The case was first assigned to Judge Jeffrey T. Miller and then reassigned to Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on Sept. 20. The Court also, on Sept. 15, granted plaintiffs' request to relate this case to another recent case filed by environmental groups challenging the border wall, Center for Biological Diversity v. DHS. The parties jointly requested on Oct. 20 that this case be consolidated with Center for Biological Diversity and California v. U.S.. On Oct. 24, Judge Curiel granted the motion. This case has been consolidated with Center for Biological Diversity v. DHS and continues at that page.

Summary: This suit, filed on Sept. 14, 2017, challenged Trump's authorization of the construction of a border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. Plaintiffs, environmental advocacy organizations, sued the DHS for failing to comply with existing laws and for taking actions beyond the scope of its authority. This suit has been consolidated with and continues at IM-CA-0103.


In February 2005, the EEOC's Boston Area Office (with participation from the New York District Office) brought this action against David Lerner Associations, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaint alleged that the defendant subjected the charging parties, female employees, to a sexually hostile work environment resulting in their constructive discharges. The alleged discrimination consisted of unwelcome touching, offensive comments and gestures, pressure to wear provocative clothing, and threats of violent retaliation. The case was originally assigned to Judge Robert N. Chatigny and was reassigned to judge Mark R. Kravitz in September 2005. Three of the charging parties intervened with similar claims and prayers for relief in September 2005, and a fourth party intervened in November 2005. The defendant moved to dismiss on May 24, alleging the plaintiff had failed to reconcile its claims in good faith. It alleged that the plaintiffs sought litigation over mediation from the start of the claim. On October 25, the court denied the motion to dismiss and the case proceeded to discovery. The parties held two unsuccessful settlement conferences before reaching a settlement in October 2006 through a consent decree. The three-year decree, containing anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation clauses, required the defendant to: implement written Title VII policies and procedures, display EEOC-provided Title VII notices and posters, provide annual Title VII training for all employees, report to the EEOC at specified intervals, and pay a total of $1,500,000 in damages. In addition, the defendant's Chief Executive Officer was required to send a memorandum to all employees affirming the defendant's commitment to Title VII compliance. Aside from a motion to release funds, the case has since been closed and inactive.

Summary: The EEOC Boston Area Office brought an action against David Lerner Associations, Inc. Together with four female employees, the EEOC alleged sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The complaint contained allegations of a hostile work environment, including unwelcome touching, offensive comments and gestures, and threat of retaliation. After the court denied a motion to dismiss, the parties settled via a three-year consent decree. The defendants agreed to pay a total of $1.5 million in damages.


On June 18, 2012, prisoners at an Administrative Maximum Facility prison in Florence (ADX), filed this class-action lawsuit in the District of Colorado against the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and certain BOP officials who were responsible for the operation of ADX. Represented by private counsel and the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated BOP policy and the Eighth Amendment by failing to properly diagnose and treat prisoners at ADX with serious mental illness. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, they sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring reform of the mental health care system at ADX, among other relief. (At the request of the first named plaintiff, he was withdrawn from the lawsuit and the caption was adjusted accordingly.) The case was assigned to Judge Richard P. Matsch. On October 9, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that it failed to state a claim. On April 23, 2013, Judge Matsch denied the defendants' motion to dismiss but did dismiss two defendants who were being sued in their official capacities, finding their inclusion redundant. Later in 2013, the parties began settlement discussions while undergoing discovery. Individual prisoners also filed motions for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, which were all denied by the court. On April 16, 2014, the proceedings were stayed for 60 days with the exception of written discovery, document production, and the continuing settlement conferences at the parties' request. The parties extended the stay until February 25, 2015. On June 15, 2015, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and discovery continued. On November 3, 2015, Judge Matsch held that the plaintiffs had established standing to pursue claims for declaratory and injunctive relief for prisoners with mental illness housed at ADX. 2015 WL 13264094. On November 16, 2016, the plaintiffs moved, unopposed, for preliminary approval of the settlement terms and the proposed notice to the class. On November 17, 2016, Judge Matsch issued an order granting the motion, and on December 29, 2016, he issued an order approving the settlement following a fairness hearing. 2016 WL 8786871. The settlement agreement contained substantive provisions regarding screening and diagnosis of mental illness, provision of mental health care, suicide prevention, and conditions of confinement to reduce the risk of the development or exacerbation of mental illness. Additionally, it stated that units for mental health treatment would be developed in Atlanta, Georgia, Allenwood, Pennsylvania, and Florence, Colorado. It laid out an extensive list of initiatives ADX had to undertake, including using and enhancing an at-risk recreation program, creating group therapy facilities and private counseling areas, screening all inmates for mental illness, and taking steps to ensure access to treatment, among several other initiatives. It stated that the defendant had to pay attorneys’ fees and costs and the obligations under the settlement were to be effective for three years, unless the plaintiffs consented to termination between two and three years or the court grants a one-time one-year extension. The court also appointed a monitor to ensure compliance with the settlement agreement. On January 17, 2017, Judge Matsch issued a stipulated order certifying the settlement class and subclass and dismissing the action with prejudice, subject to the court’s retention of jurisdiction for enforcement. The court certified a screening class consisting of all people confined at ADX between the date of the order and the end of the compliance period, and a subclass consisting of all people confined at ADX between the date of the order and the end of the compliance period who have been diagnosed by the Bureau or its representative personnel or contractors with a covered mental illness. In the fairness hearing, some members of the class raised two objections: that the prisoners should receive money damages, and that someone should be held accountable for their conditions of confinement. On January 25, 2017, one plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal, but on February 7, 2017, he voluntarily withdrew his appeal. On February 13, 2017, another plaintiff submitted a notice of appeal, and on February 14, 2017, he filed an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On September 21, 2017, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the objections to the settlement agreement, but affirmed the district court’s approval of the class action settlement. 709 Fed.Appx. 886. The Tenth Circuit also allowed the objecting plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis, granting him counsel but still requiring him to pay all filing fees. On December 22, 2017, a class co-plaintiff filed a letter with the court requesting to see the monitors for the purpose of providing information regarding ongoing policies and practices in the prison that the district court has already stated amounted to constitutional violations. The court did not formally reply to this letter. Supplemental settlement proceeding occurred regularly throughout 2018 and 2019, but no additional orders have been issued by the court. The docket reflects members of the class receiving payment from the time of settlement through March, 2020. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 18, 2012, prisoners at ADX-Florence, a "Supermax" facility, filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado against the Federal Bureau of Prisons and certain BOP officials who are responsible for the operation of ADX. Plaintiffs claim that the defendants violated BOP policy and the Eighth Amendment by failing to properly diagnose and treat prisoners at ADX with serious mental illness. They sought injunctive relief requiring reform of the mental health care system at ADX, among other relief. On December 19, 2016, Judge Richard P. Matsch approved a settlement agreement, which contains negotiated substantive provisions regarding screening and diagnosis of mental illness, provision of mental health care, suicide prevention, and conditions of confinement to reduce the risk of the development or exacerbation of mental illness. On January 17, 2017, Judge Matsch issued a stipulated order certifying the settlement class and subclass and dismissing the action with prejudice, subject to the court’s retention of jurisdiction for enforcement. One objector appealed this settlement approval decision, but the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's approval on September 21, 2017. The case is ongoing.


On September 24, 2013, a resident of Georgia filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Grady County and the judge who presides over the state court of Grady County. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Southern Center for Human Rights, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and compensatory damages. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the class members' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Takings Clauses by unlawfully imposing "administrative costs" on people who had been convicted of misdemeanors and were being sentenced to probation. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant judge devised and enforced a moneymaking scheme for the county under which he would impose administrative costs on criminal defendants to enable the county to collect the money and deposit it in the county treasury. These costs often ranged between $700 and $800 for each defendant, regardless of the underlying offense. The plaintiff claimed that, from July 2011 to July 2012, about 540 state defendants paid administrative fees amounting to more than $296,000. The plaintiff pleaded guilty on July 9, 2012, to driving under the influence. The defendant judge sentenced her to one year of probation and, in addition to imposing the statutorily authorized costs and fees, he ordered that the plaintiff pay the county $700 in unspecified administrative costs. That same month, the defendant judge sent a letter to the Grady County Commission in which he explained that he was doing his best to make money for the county and requested a salary increase based on these efforts to "maximize" revenue. Georgia's Judicial Qualifications Commission issued a public reprimand to the defendant judge for this and other ethical violations on March 18, 2013. The District Court (Judge W. Louis Sands) granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss on August 13, 2014. The court began by rejecting the county's attempt to dismiss the § 1983 claims, holding that the plaintiff properly stated claims against the county for its own direct violations of the Due Process and Takings Clauses. The court also let proceed the federal claim for declaratory relief and the state constitutional claim. It did, however, dismiss the plaintiff's state tort claims against the county on the basis of sovereign immunity. As for the allegations against the defendant judge, the district court denied his motion in its entirety. The court in particular rejected his argument that, because he was acting in his judicial capacity, he enjoyed judicial immunity from the federal and state law claims. The court determined that the immunity doctrine did not apply because the plaintiff sufficiently alleged that the defendant judge was acting in a legislative capacity when he created and enforced the policy requiring state court defendants to pay administrative costs. In the months following the order, the parties engaged in mediation and ultimately reached a settlement. On March 18, 2015, the District Court (Judge Sands) entered an order certifying the class and preliminarily approving the parties' proposed settlement agreement. The court certified a class consisting of all individuals who were forced to pay administrative costs in connection with a criminal case before the defendant judge on or after September 24, 2011. The class included about 400 people. Under the agreement's terms, the defendants were to pay each class member $100 in compensatory damages as well as refund those who paid administrative costs in an amount up to $700. Meanwhile, on September 9, 2015, the court granted the plaintiff $96,362.63 in attorneys’ fees and $4,392.34 in costs, for a total of $100,754.97. Following a fairness hearing on September 15, 2015, the court granted final approval of the settlement agreement on October 14, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On September 24, 2013, a resident of Georgia filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against Grady County and the judge who presides over the county's state court. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants violated the class members' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Takings Clauses by unlawfully imposing "administrative costs" on people who had been convicted of misdemeanors and were being sentenced to probation. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant judge devised and enforced a moneymaking scheme for the county under which he would impose these administrative costs on criminal defendants to enable the county to collect the money and deposit it in the county treasury. On March 18, 2015, the District Court (Judge W. Louis Sands) entered an order certifying the class and preliminarily approving the parties' proposed settlement agreement. Under the agreement's terms, the defendants will pay each class member $100 in compensatory damages as well as refund those who paid administrative costs in an amount up to $700. The court approved the settlement on Oct. 14, 2015. The case is now closed.


On February 8th, 2015, a class of around 2,000 mostly black, impoverished residents of Jennings, Missouri filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the City of Jennings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, as well as the First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from Equal Justice Under Law, the ArchCity Defenders, and the St. Louis University School of Law, asked the court for a declaratory judgment acknowledging the City of Jennings violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and an injunction to permanently alter the City’s policies and practices. The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Jennings violated their constitutional rights by imprisoning them for failure to pay the city debts. The city jailed them in inhumane conditions and without adequate counsel. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the City of Jennings maintained a policy and practice of jailing residents over unpaid traffic fines, court fees, and other minor offenses. The plaintiffs alleged the City of Jennings used its municipal Court and jail as revenue generators for the city government, based many of its claims on invalid or arbitrary arrest warrants, held inmates in deplorable conditions, and created a hopeless cycle of debt and imprisonment for indigent residents. The plaintiffs in this case are each residents of Jennings who, at some point, were imprisoned for their inability to pay a petty debt to the city. None of the plaintiffs were afforded legal counsel or an inquiry into their inability to pay, despite pleading indigence, and all were held in inhumane, unsafe conditions in the jail. This debtor's’ prison policy generated millions of dollars in revenue for the city government. On September 16th, 2015, the court (District Judge Carol E. Jackson) partially granted a joint motion for relief, and implemented a permanent injunction on behalf of the plaintiffs. The injunction laid out lawful policies for the City of Jennings to assess the ability of indigent individuals to pay fees, to collect debts through the civil system, and to meet legal standards of care in the jail. On July 13, 2016, Judge Jackson granted preliminary approval of a class action settlement agreement. According to the Washington Post, the defendants agreed to pay $4.7 million to the class of plaintiffs, available here. The judge granted final approval of the class action settlement for $4.7 million on December 14, 2016. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 8th, 2015, a class of around 2,000 mostly black, impoverished residents of Jennings, Missouri filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. The plaintiffs sued the City of Jennings for violating their constitutional rights with unjust and inhumane imprisonment, and for criminalizing poverty.