COVID-19 Summary: The plaintiffs in this West Virginia jail conditions class-action case filed an emergency motion for relief on March 25, 2020, seeking an order to require the defendants to develop, disclose, and implement a plan to take appropriate actions to protect the plaintiff class from COVID-19. The court denied the motion because it found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim. <hr> On December 18, 2018, the plaintiff, a pretrial detainee at West Virginia's Western Regional Jail, filed a pro se complaint against the jail in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiff alleged that he had been exposed to unsanitary conditions in the jail, including a lack of clean clothes, filthy showers, and inmates with staph and other infections. The case was assigned to Judge Robert C. Chambers. On April 25, 2019, two cases were consolidated with this case (Docket No. 3:18-1436 and 3:18-1533) because they involved common questions of law and fact. That same day, the plaintiffs filed the first amended class action complaint on behalf of all "inmates housed in jail facilities throughout West Virginia." Represented by Mountain State Justice, the plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (42 U.S.C. § 12132). The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the unconstitutional conditions within the jail. Specifically, they alleged discrimination against those with disabilities, failure to promptly provide necessary medical and mental health treatment, and failure to provide sanitary living conditions. The defendants moved to dismiss on September 23, 2019. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on December 19, adding additional plaintiffs to the case. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification on February 3, proposing a class that consisted of "All persons who were at any time on or after December 18, 2018, or who will be, admitted to a jail in West Virginia with a discernable, treatable medical and/or mental health problem." The plaintiffs also sought to certify a subclass of incarcerated individuals that met "the definition of being a “qualified individual with a disability” under the ADA." On March 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in light of COVID-19. They requested that the court order the defendants to create, implement, and disclose an appropriate evidence-based plan to help prevent a COVID-19 outbreak, to minimize the impact if an outbreak were to occur, and to contribute to broader efforts to "flatten the curve." They requested a plan that included: inmate and staff education, requiring staff who experience COVID-19 symptoms to stay home until tested (or for a mandatory 14 days), healthcare and custodial staffing plans to keep the facilities running safely as staff members stay at home, staffing plans for services provided by detainees and prisoners themselves as they get sick, screening, testing, treatment, and housing of plaintiffs, plans for additional precautions to prevent exposure of vulnerable populations, provision of hygiene and cleaning supplies to all inmates, housing plans for inmates exposed to the virus, enhanced plans for cleaning shared spaces, coordination with community hospitals, and the removal of charges for methods of communication and psychological support while visitation is eliminated. They additionally requested that the court order some of those held to be released so that jails could practice proper social distancing and permit the appropriate quarantine and treatments of individuals in custody who get COVID-19. On April 1, Judge Chambers issued an order directing the defendants to provide a redacted copy of their COVID-19 response plan to the Court, and to plaintiff's counsel and their expert witness by 5 p.m. that day. Following this, the expert was required to respond by 5 p.m. on April 2. The defendants were to provide a response to the expert before April 3 at 3 p.m. The court scheduled a hearing for April 6, 2020. On April 8, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because their claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits. The court stated that the defendants had been responsive to the COVID-19 pandemic and had produced a comprehensive plan to address the spread of the virus in the state jails and prisons. Furthermore, the court was unwilling to choose a fixed number to release as the plaintiffs had requested. Finally, the court said that because there were no reported cases of COVID-19 in West Virginia prisons, the timing of the motion was also a factor in the decision -- specifically, it was impossible to conclude that the defendants had acted with the required deliberate indifference that would lead to an Eighth Amendment violation. The court stated that as time progressed, if the defendants' current plan was unable to address the spread of COVID-19 in the prisons and jails effectively, the plaintiffs would have a greater likelihood of success on the merits. 2020 WL 1802935. The ACLU of West Virginia moved to intervene on April 10, for the limited purpose of seeking to unseal court records. The ACLU argued that the response plans for correctional facilities in response to COVID-19 had significant implications for incarcerated people, their loved ones, and the employees of West Virginia's correctional facilities, and should not remain under seal. Intervention was granted on April 15. On April 23, the court granted in part and denied in part the ACLU of West Virginia's Expedited Motion to Unseal Court Records. 2020 WL 1958632. The Court found that the defendants concerns that unsealing documents would risk anxiety and retaliation amongst the incarcerated population was not sufficient to overcome the First Amendment right of access. However, the Court declined to unseal and unredact the jail's COVID-19 plan, as the Court had not even asked for an unredacted version. The plaintiffs agreed to a voluntary dismissal of their conditions-of-confinement claim on May 22. In July, multiple defendants moved for summary judgment, but the court found that the defendants’ motions were moot on October 29, 2020 because the court had already dismissed those plaintiffs with prejudice for failing to prosecute their case. 2020 WL 6365451. A few months later, on December 21, 2020, the court denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. 508 F.Supp.3d 28 The court granted the defendants’ motions as to five plaintiffs’ ADA claims, finding that those plaintiffs had failed to state claims under the Act. However, the Court found that a sixth plaintiff had stated a claim under the ADA. In addition to this last surviving ADA claim, the plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claims were allowed to proceed, as the Court found that the defendants’ inaction rose to the level of deliberate indifference to prisoners’ mental and medical health. Finally, the Court noted that the claims were not moot because the plaintiffs were litigating on behalf of a class, and that the plaintiffs had not failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because the jail’s grievance process were not sufficiently available to the incarcerated plaintiffs. The court dismissed the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation from the case pursuant to the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, leaving the case to proceed against the Division Commissioner. On the same day in a separate decision, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as to the plaintiffs’ “Jail Class,” but reserved judgment on the plaintiffs’ "Disability Subclass" because only one of the plaintiff’s ADA claims remained. 338 F.R.D. 80. The Jail Class included all persons who were or would be admitted to a jail in West Virginia. The disability subclass included all persons who were or would be admitted to a jail in West Virginia and who were disabled within the meaning of the ADA. The court ordered the parties to file memoranda regarding the suitability of the disability subclass class for certification. On January 5, 2021, defendants filed a petition for permission to appeal the order granting class certification, but the petition was denied. As of March 12, 2021, the case is ongoing as the parties participate in mediation proceedings.

Summary: A class action filed by inmates in the jail system in West Virginia seeking to enjoin unconstitutional conditions of confinement. During the discovery phase, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs sought an injunction that would require defendants to formulate and implement a plan for the safety of detainees and prisoners and their medical care. On April 8, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction because they were unlikely to succeed on the merits. On October 29, the court dismissed two plaintiffs with prejudice for failing to prosecute their case. On December 21, the court denied in part and granted in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment. The court dismissed five of the six remaining plaintiffs’ ADA claims but found that the plaintiffs’ claims were not moot, that the plaintiffs had not failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, and that the plaintiffs had not failed to state a claim of deliberate indifference. The court also dismissed the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation from the case pursuant to the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal, leaving the case to proceed against the Division Commissioner. On the same day in a separate decision, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification as to the plaintiffs’ “Jail Class,” but reserved judgment on the plaintiffs’ disability subclass.


On August 16, 2016, probationers and parolees who were deaf or had hearing impairments and who were under the control and supervision of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("LDPSC") brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the LDPSC and its Secretary under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the defendants failed to provide the auxiliary aids and services the plaintiffs needed. They alleged that the defendants, by denying them access to auxiliary aids, denied the plaintiffs an equal opportunity to successfully complete their probation and parole and to effectively participate in post-release rehabilitative programs, which in turn could (and for at least one plaintiff did) result in a finding that they had violated their probation or parole. Represented by attorneys from the Advocacy Center, the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and Proskauer Rose, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as attorneys' fees, court costs, expert costs, and litigation expenses. They also sought class certification. The background of the case was that Louisiana had entered a 2008 Resolution Agreement with the U.S. Department of Justice, which established procedures to provide auxiliary aids and services to deaf or hard-of-hearing prisoners under the control and supervision of the LDPSC. However, the resolution did not address probationers and parolees, like the plaintiffs in this matter. This is problematic because while on probation and or parole, individuals must comply with certain terms and conditions imposed on them, or be subject to punishment, including an extension of their probation or parole, or incarceration. The plaintiffs alleged here that they were unable to comply with all the terms and conditions of their probation and or parole, or to participate meaningfully in the defendants' programs because the defendants had not ensured effective communication with the plaintiffs by providing the requisite auxiliary aids and services. On July 21, 2017, the parties stipulated to an agreement that any resulting final judgment of the court would apply to "affected individuals" identifiable as of the date of the judgment. The parties stated the agreement was meant to replace litigating class certification, and they acknowledged that those considered to be "affected individuals" could change over the course of the litigation. On April 4, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. Oral argument on this motion was held on January 31, 2019. In an order issued on March 4, 2019, Judge deGravelles denied summary judgment. He noted that the defendants had "identified a number of facts" that suggested they acted lawfully, including the provision of interpreters at some meetings and instances in which plaintiffs refused offers of interpreters. The parties attended a settlement conference in chambers before Magistrate Judge Erin Wilder-Doomes on March 27, 2019. This conference resulted in an agreement, and case was dismissed on April 1. The settlement included requirements that the defendants amend their policies and practices surrounding five main issues: 1) intake and assessment of affected individuals; 2) provision of qualified interpreters; 3) records retention; 4) training and; 5) grievance procedures. Defendants also agreed to pay $425,000 in attorneys' fees. As of April 17, 2020, there has been no further action in the docket, but the court retains jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement.

Summary: On August 16, 2016, probationers and parolees who were deaf or had hearing impairments and who were under the control and supervision of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections ("LDPSC") brought this class action in the District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the LDPSC and its Secretary under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the defendants failed to provide auxiliary aids and services to probationers and parolees who were deaf or had hearing impairments. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants, by denying them access to auxiliary aids, denied the plaintiffs an equal opportunity to successfully complete their probation and parole and to effectively participate in post-release rehabilitative programs, which could (and for at least one plaintiff did) result in a finding that they had violated their probation or parole. The parties reached a settlement in which the defendants modified their processes related to intake, interpreters, record retention, training, and grievances. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement.


On March 5, 2013, residents of New York City who were substantially limited in their sight and who were also current or former applicants or recipients of food stamps from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and/or Medicaid filed this class action suit. The plaintiffs were unable to receive their benefits even though they were eligible because they were unable to fill out the necessary applications due to their limited sight. The plaintiffs sued the commissioner of the New York Human Resources Administration, the acting commissioner of the New York State Department of Health, the commissioner of the New York Human Resources Administration, and the Office of Temporary Disability Assistance under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983. The case was assigned to Judge Thomas P. Griesa. On March 12, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction requiring the defendants to immediately begin providing the plaintiffs, and other similarly situated New York City residents, with alternative formats for communications and applications for Food Stamps and Medicaid. On the same day, the plaintiffs also moved for class certification. On August 7, 2013 the court certified the class of “ [a]ll New York City Residents who were substantially limited in seeing, who are current or future applicants for or recipients of Food Stamps and/or Medicaid, and who need materials in accessible alternative formats for effective communication regarding the Food Stamps and/or Medicaid program.” By August 8, 2013, the parties started to meet in hopes of reaching settlement. Because Judge Griesa believed the parties could reach a settlement, he denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on December 9, 2013. Over the next two years, the parties engaged in negotiations. On July 24, 2015, the parties submitted a settlement which the court approved on October 23, 2015. In addition, the court awarded the plaintiffs attorneys’ fees in the amount of $600,000. In terms of remedies, the settlement agreement stated that the defendants would provide applications in large print and data formats both in person and online. Publications were to be made available in both primary and alternative formats. The application and online MyBenefits pages were to allow for people to inform social services that they were blind or visually impaired and what alternative format they would prefer. These requests for an alternative format must have been honored without requiring medical documentation to support the request. Additionally, the SNAP website was to be altered to ensure that people with differing abilities will be able to submit applications and recertification of SNAP benefits online. Certified readers were to be available by telephone during normal business hours to help applicants understand the SNAP and Medicaid applications and braille alternatives would be available for any person who requests them. The settlement included a number of date-specific deadlines. It also explained that the district court would retain jurisdiction until a year after that last specified deadline, unless the period was extended by the court. As there are no further entries in the docket after April 13, 2018, and the settlement was set to expire in December 2018, this case is presumed to be closed.

Summary: A class of plaintiffs, New York City residents who were substantially limited in sight and Food Stamps and/or Medicaid eligible, sued New York City offices involved with the Food Stamps and/or Medicaid application or information dissemination processes for not providing accessible materials for those applicants substantially limited in sight. A settlement was reached and approved by the court on October 23, 2015. The settlement included a number of date-specific deadlines. It also explained that the district court would retain jurisdiction until a year after that last specified deadline, unless the period was extended by the court. The implementation period is thus ongoing--it was set to end December 2018 or later. The case is presumably closed.


This case arose out of litigation in a similar case, Disability Rights Montana v. Opper. For more information, see Opper's Clearinghouse page here. On May 15, 2015, Disability Rights Montana filed a lawsuit against the Director and Warden of the Montana Department of Corrections in their official capacities. Both of these defendants had been named as defendants in the original complaint filed in Disability Rights Montana v. Opper. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the Eighth Amendment's protections against cruel and unusual punishment through their treatment of prisoners with serious mental illnesses. The plaintiffs argued that the defendants violated their rights by placing prisoners in solitary confinement between 22 and 24 hours per day for months and even years at a time, failing to use standards to diagnose prisoners with mental illnesses, refusing to provide prisoners with psychiatric medications, using no system to classify prisoners according to their mental illness diagnoses, and having no system to evaluate the efficacy of its program for prisoners' mental health. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief as well as injunctive relief. Plaintiffs sought to require defendants to take immediate steps to ensure that prisoners with serious mental illnesses were provided with constitutionally adequate care and enjoin the defendants from placing prisoners with serious mental illnesses in solitary confinement. The new case was again before Judge Haddon in the District Court for the District of Montana. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the court granted that motion on September 3, 2015. This was the same day that the court rejected the DPHHS and State Hospital's motion to dismiss in the first case discussed above. This was also a summary order. The plaintiff appealed that dismissal to the Ninth Circuit. While it's not entirely clear what the dismissal was based on, the plaintiff's brief to the Ninth Circuit claimed that the dismissals were mixed up and that the Judge refused to correct that. The plaintiffs argued that the court intended to dismiss the due process claims against the Montana DPHHS and Montana State Hospital and that the court did not intend to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims against the DOC and Montana State Prison. It's not entirely clear from the record what the grounds of the dismissal were, but as discussed below, the parties litigated the issue as if the District Court had dismissed on the grounds that the pleadings did not meet the (12)(b)(6) pleading standard required. The appeal was docketed in the Ninth Circuit on October 1, 2015. Following that, the plaintiff and the defendant Montana DOC and Montana State Prison engaged in protracted settlement discussion through at least February 27, 2018. Oral argument was held on March 7, 2019. The plaintiff asked the Ninth Circuit to reverse the dismissal of the claim against the DOC and the State Prison, and to assign the case to a different judge on remand. On July 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, remanded it for further proceedings, and reassigned the case to the Judge Donald W. Molloy. 930 F.3d 1090. In an opinion by Judge Gould, the court held that the plaintiffs' complaint met the pleading requirements by describing specific facts sufficient to support a plausible claim for relief. The court noted that the allegations, if true, described a "distressing pattern of placing mentally ill prisoners in solitary confinement for 'weeks and months at a time' without sufficient mental health care..." The case is ongoing back in the district court as of October 2019.

Summary: On May 15, 2015, Disability Rights Montana filed a lawsuit against the Director of the Montana Department of Corrections and the warden of Montana State Prison. Both of these defendants were previous named as defendants in a separate complaint filed in Disability Rights Montana v. Opper (also available on the Clearinghouse). In the amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants had violated 8th Amendment protections against cruel and unusual punishments by subjecting prisoners with serious mental illnesses to solitary confinement for months or even years at a time. The complaint was dismissed. Parties engaged in protracted settlements discussion through February 2018. On July 19, 2019, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and reassigned the case to Judge Molloy. The case remains open.


On October 23, 2014, three unhoused individuals filed a complaint against Miami-Dade County and the Florida Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ enforcement of the Miami-Dade County Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. They brought the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, who were registered sex offenders, claimed that the Ordinance—which prohibited registered sex offenders from residing within 2,500 feet of a school—forced hundreds of individuals into homelessness. The plaintiffs alleged that the retroactive application of the housing restriction held a punitive intent, violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. and Florida Constitutions. This clause prohibits the government from punishing actions retroactively. The plaintiffs, represented by ACLU of Florida, sought declarative and monetary relief as well as a permanent injunction against the future enforcement of the ordinance. Back in 2013, officials from Miami–Dade Public Schools and the Homeless Trust requested the County Police Department re-classify the Miami Bridge, an emergency youth shelter, as a “school” subject to the Book Ordinance's residency restriction. The complaint alleged that through this effort, the officials had directly intended to evict the former sexual offenders. Their lobbying succeeded, and the plaintiffs, along with many others, were forced to leave their homes. They were unable to find new housing. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance’s failure to define “school” created vagueness and that removing plaintiffs from their homes without notice and an opportunity to be heard violated their fundamental right to housing and safety. Lastly, the plaintiffs alleged that the retroactive application of the Ordinance violated the federal and state Ex Post Facto clause because its debilitating effects were punitive. The complaint was amended on December 20, 2014, removing the claim that the Ordinance violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights to meaningful notice and opportunity to be heard. The defendants each filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint. Judge Paul Huck granted these motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice on April 3, 2015. 2015 WL 13389882. The plaintiffs sought relief from the court's dismissal, arguing that they could have amended the complaint to assert a viable vagueness challenge. In this motion for relief, they did not contest the court's dismissal of their ex post facto and substantive due process claims. The motion was denied on June 23, 2015, because the plaintiffs had not previously requested the amendment and the ordinance did not apply to the named plaintiffs. 2015 WL 3886841. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction for failure to state a claim. Eleventh Circuit Judges Gerald Bard Tjoflat, Charles R. Wilson and Jill A. Pryor reversed the District Court’s dismissal as to the ex post facto challenges in 2017, stating that the plaintiffs alleged plausible ex post facto challenges to the residency restriction. 846 F.3d 1180. On October 5, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint with the addition of three more plaintiffs. Miami-Dade County moved for for summary judgment on August 8, 2018, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the statute of limitations. The court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment on September 21, 2018, but did not grant it. Instead, the case proceeded to a bench trial held on October 26, 2018. Judge Paul C. Huck found that, while the statute of limitations had not passed, the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the residency restriction had no rational connection to its goal of protecting children. So, he entered judgment for the defendants on December 19, 2018. 2018 WL 10780510. Four of the plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Eleventh Circuit on January 18, 2019 (19-10254). The appeal was dismissed as to two of the plaintiffs on April 27, 2020. Oral argument was held on June 9, 2020. On October 8, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the district court. Circuit Judges Beverly Martin and Kevin Newsom alongside District Judge Keith Watkin (sitting by designation) held that county lacked notice of as-applied ex post facto challenge to ordinance and that the county would be substantially prejudiced by addition of the plaintiffs' as-applied ex post facto challenge. 974 F.3d 1333. The case is ongoing back in the district court.

Summary: On October 23, 2014, three unhoused individuals filed a complaint against Miami-Dade County and the Florida Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants’ enforcement of the Miami-Dade County Lauren Book Child Safety Ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs, who were registered sex offenders, claimed that the Ordinance's prohibition on registered sex offenders from residing within 2,500 feet of a school forced hundreds into homelessness. The plaintiffs sought declarative and monetary relief as well as a permanent injunction against the future enforcement of the ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed on January 23, 2019. On October 8, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed.


On July 16, 2014, a male prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California government. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that California's blanket exclusion of male prisoners from the Alternative Custody Program (ACP) violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The ACP is a community-based program aimed at reuniting low-level offenders with their families and providing inmates with rehabilitative services within the community. The plaintiff is a male prisoner with two children and an ailing mother with Stage IV colon cancer whom he wished to care for. He filed the lawsuit and requested a preliminary injunction, because he was rejected by CDCR from participating in the program for no other reason than that he is a man. As originally enacted by the Legislature in 2010, the ACP could have been open to at least some men, although men would still have been required to be "primary caregivers of dependent children ... immediately prior to incarceration" while women applicants faced no such restriction. Nonetheless, when CDCR began offering the ACP in 2011, it limited access to female inmates and excluded all men. The Governor subsequently signed a statutory amendment writing this discrimination into law. Defendants answered plaintiffs complaint, claiming that the plaintiff was not “similarly situated” to female prisoners for the purposes of equal protection analysis and that the ACP serves objectives that address the specific needs and unique characteristics of female inmates. On October 14, 2014, the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from continuing to exclude male prisoners from the ACP because of their gender. On January 30, 2015, both parties moved for summary judgement. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgement on September 9, 2015, stating that prohibiting male inmates from applying to the ACP was unconstitutional and enjoined the defendants from applying or enforcing the provision excluding men from the ACP. 2015 WL 5255422. The defendants appealed on October 9, 2015, but on March 16, 2016, the parties voluntarily dismissed the appeal for unknown reasons. On April 14, 2016, the defendants filed a report in district court, outlining the changes it made in developing and implementing an Alternative Custody Program for male inmates. The defendants also submitted a copy of amended regulations governing the program, reflecting that it was now open to all regardless of gender. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014, a male prisoner in the custody of the California Department of Corrections filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the California government. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that California's blanket exclusion of male prisoners from the Alternative Custody Program (ACP) violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The court denied preliminary injunctive relief but later granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgement and ordered injunctive relief for the plaintiffs. The appeal filed by defendants was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to the stipulations of both parties. On April 14, 2016, the defendants filed a report in district court, making clear that they had opened the Alternative Custody Program to all regardless of gender.


On July 10, 2017, the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL), filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. LCCRUL sued the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Commission) and other agents of the executive branch under the Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA), the Mandamus and Venue Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). LCCRUL, represented by its own counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. LCCRUL claimed that the Commission was being used to advance private agendas. According to LCCRUL, the Commission was born out of President Trump’s unfounded claim that there were three to five million illegal votes cast in the 2016 Presidential Election. As such, LCCRUL alleged that the Committee was in violation of FACA, which imposed strict transparency requirements when any part of the executive branch seeks the advice or recommendation of a group that includes non-federal officials. On the same day the complaint was filed, LCCRUL moved for a temporary restraining order (TRO), asking the court to : 1. order the defendants to produce records of the Commission's responses to LCCRUL's request prior to the Commission’s July 19, 2017 scheduled meeting, 2. require the Commission to open the July 19 meeting to in-person public attendance and participation, and 3. enjoin the Commission from holding the July 19 meeting until it met its records and public access obligations under FACA. On July 18, 2017, the court denied this motion without prejudice, reasoning that the case was not likely to succeed on the merits and that the defendants’ prior disclosure was sufficient for the public and LCCRUL to engage in an informed debate regarding the activities of the Commission. LCCRUL appealed this denial to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. On December 20, 2017, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the appeal, having received a consent motion for voluntary dismissal from LCCRUL. According to the plaintiff, the defendants failed to honor commitments to the court to produce relevant records prior to the July 19 meeting. In response, on July 21, 2017, LCCRUL moved for a status conference and for limited expedited discovery. On August 30, 2017, this motion was granted in part and denied in part. Specifically, the court required the Commission to submit declarations detailing the actions taken to identify documents for collection and potential disclosure. Additionally, the court asked the parties to file a joint status report and stayed the defendants’ obligation to answer the complaint. On October 13, 2017, LCCRUL filed a motion to compel compliance with the above order, arguing that many records were improperly lumped together and that they were incomplete. On January 3, 2018, President Trump disbanded the commission. On June 28, 2018, the court denied without prejudice LCCRUL’s motion to compel compliance and for limited discovery, finding that the plaintiff was not entitled to the disclosure of any documents associated with a then-defunct commission. 2018 WL 3213297. On August 29, the defendant moved to dismiss the case because the commission had been disbanded. Then, on September 7, the plaintiffs also moved to voluntarily dismiss the case without prejudice. Their motion noted that they had substantially received what they sought in their complaint: 1. The defendants formally apologized for the failure to release the documents, 2. The defendants had released the documents to the public by former Commissioner Matthew Dunlap. They can be found here. 3. The documents released demonstrate disturbing plans of the Commission to lay the groundwork for voter suppression efforts, based on fraudulent claims of voter fraud. 4. The defendants had formally disbanded the commission. Judge Kollar-Kotelly then ordered the case dismissed without prejudice. This case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law (LCCRUL) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. LCCRUL sued President Trump and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity under FACA, the Mandamus and Venue Act, and the APA. LCCRUL alleged that the Committee was in violation of FACA, which imposed strict transparency requirements when any part of the executive branch seeks the advice or recommendation of a group that includes non-federal officials.


On May 9, 2007, represented by the civil rights firm Relman, Dane & Colfax, Plaintiff brought this action against NovaStar, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiff is a national non-profit organization with the mission and purpose of increasing fair and equal access to credit, capital, and banking services and products for all Americans, regardless of race, national origin, or disability. In its original complaint, Plaintiff asserted that Defendant, a private lending corporation, maintained a discriminatory policy of prohibiting lending to properties involving row houses, property on Indian reservations, and properties involved with adult foster care facilities. Plaintiff claimed that this disproportionately had an adverse effect on African Americans, Native Americans, and the disabled, in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. Plaintiff claimed that these discriminatory policies adversely affected it in two ways: (1) they interfered with its efforts to assist, educate and advocate for the promotion of fair lending, and (2) required it to commit scarce resources to investigate complaints and educate the public about Defendant's lending practices. Consequently, Plaintiff sought: (1) declaratory judgment that Defendant was violating the FHA, (2) preliminary and permanent injunctions enjoining Defendant from discriminating in this manner, (3) compensatory damages that would fully compensate Plaintiff for the diversion of resources and frustration of mission that was caused, (4) punitive damages for the willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, (5) attorney's fees. On May 30, 2007, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Section 3604 of the FHA should be read narrowly. If done so, Defendants argued, mortgage financing is not covered by the FHA. Judge Royce C. Lamberth denied this motion on April 28, 2008, stating that case law and the broad language of the FHA prohibited discriminatory mortgage financing. Plaintiff moved on April 28, 2008, for an entry of default, arguing that Defendant had failed to answer their complaint. However, Judge Lamberth denied this motion on May 1, 2008, providing no reason. 2008 WL 977351 (D.D.C. 2008). On March 27, 2009, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding W. Lance Anderson, the president of NovaStar, as a co-defendant. Anderson moved to dismiss this complaint on April 27, 2009, arguing that the court lacked personal jurisdiction. Judge Lambert denied Anderson's motion to dismiss on June 22, 2009, in which he stated it was clear that Anderson exerted significant influence over NovaStar's policies, procedures and operations, and is more than just "an employee" of the entity. 631 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2009). On July 13, 2009, Judge Lambert ordered a stay on this case for mediation. The parties submitted a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on December 1, 2009, citing an undisclosed settlement agreement. However, according to the Relman, Dane & Colfax website, the parties agreed to three settlements, in which "the mortgage lenders and their affiliates agreed to discontinue the discriminatory policies, implement training programs to ensure their practices are compliant with the Fair Housing Act and compensate the NCRC for the diversion of its resources and the frustration of its mission caused by the discriminatory practices. Altogether the three mortgage companies paid more than $1 million to resolve the claims."

Summary: Plaintiff, a non-profit committed to promoting fair lending practices, brought an action against Defendant, a private real estate investment fund, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on May 9, 2007. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant violated the Fair Housing Act by maintaining a policy of prohibiting lending to row house properties, properties on Indian reservations, and properties involving adult foster care facilities. On December 1, 2009, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of this case, citing a settlement agreement that included Defendant agreeing to discontinue the discriminatory policy, implement training programs, and compensate Plaintiff for the diversion of resources it caused (over $1 million).


On April 19, 2018, two prisoners incarcerated in the Georgia State Prison filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the prison’s warden, regional director, and four other prison employees under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights, the plaintiffs sought damages and attorneys fees. The case was assigned to Chief Judge J. Randal Hall. The plaintiffs alleged that the Georgia State Prison’s warden and regional director were aware of a routine practice of excessive force against prisoners, but did not take reasonable steps to protect the prisoners. The plaintiffs alleged two separate instances of unlawful assault had occurred on August 11, 2017. In one instance, two prison officers removed the plaintiff from a prayer service. When the prisoner asked why he was being removed, the officers slammed the prisoner’s head to the ground causing his skull to fracture and a life-threatening blood clot. In the second instance, two officers removed the second plaintiff from a psychiatric appointment. While the plaintiff was laying face down in the hallway, the officers repeatedly punched the plaintiff and kicked him in the eye. The assault caused the plaintiff to suffer nasal bone fractures, a concussion, and a traumatic eye injury that required surgical repair. On November 5, 2018, the warden and regional director filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs failed to establish a causal connection linking the two defendants to these two instances of assault. The defendants argued that the five cases of past abuse noted in the plaintiffs' complaint alleged a history of widespread abuse, but failed to demonstrate sufficient proof. The two parties filed a joint motion to stay pending settlement on March 19, 2019. On June 13, 2019, the court ordered the claims dismissed with prejudice as agreed upon by all parties. Each party was to bear its own cost of attorney fees. No other terms of the settlement are available. The case is closed.

Summary: Two prisoners sued employees of the Georgia State Prisons for two separate instances of unlawful assault occurring on April 19, 2018. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties agreed to an undisclosed settlement, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on June 13, 2019.


On July 22, 2019, fourteen Iranian American families represented by a private immigration lawyer filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (in Santa Ana) to contest the administrative delays in the adjudication of case-by-case waivers to Presidential Proclamation 9645. (Proclamation 9645 was the third of four executive orders issued by President Trump that placed restrictions on people who sought to travel from a number of majority Muslim countries into the US and is referred to as EO-3 below and in other entries in this collection). Plaintiffs classified themselves as belonging to one of two groups in the original complaint: “petitioner plaintiffs” who were US citizens and lawful permanent residents, and “beneficiary plaintiffs” the relatives or fiancées of the petitioners who were visa applicants and Iranian nationals. The plaintiffs claimed that the beneficiary group met all the requirements for obtaining family or fiancée based visas before their applications were refused pursuant to EO-3 and that the waiver process provided for by Sec. 3(c) of EO-3 was not properly followed by the State Department. The complaint named (in their official capacity) the Secretary of State, the State Department’s Passport and Visa Examiner, two members of the State Department’s “PP 9645 Brain Trust,” the acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and seven consular officials as defendants. The “PP 9645 Brain Trust” was, according to the complaint, a team within the State Department that promulgated the Department’s rules for the adjudication of Sec. 3(c) waivers. The plaintiffs’ claims were based on the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. First, the plaintiffs alleged that the federal government violated the APA’s requirement under 5 U.S.C. §555(b) to “conclude a matter presented to it” “within a reasonable time” by failing to adjudicate the beneficiary plaintiffs waiver applications within 90 days. Second, the plaintiffs alleged that the State Department’s “unlawful designation” policy of requiring final approval from consular managers (namely visa chiefs and consular section chiefs) of consular officers’ decisions regarding who should receive a Sec. 3(c) waiver was not authorized by EO-3 and thus amounted to a violation of the APA’s prohibition on arbitrary and capricious agency action (5 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) and (D)). The due process claims involved both substantive and procedural elements. The plaintiffs argued that the State Department’s policy on Sec. 3(c) waivers infringed on their liberty interest in maintaining the “integrity of the[ir] family unit” and that this policy deprived them of their ability to show that they met the statutory requirements for a visa. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney’s fees to remedy these alleged violations. The case was assigned to District Judge James V. Selna and Magistrate Judge Douglas F. McCormick. Five days after they filed their complaint, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on July 27, 2019. In this motion, they asked the district court to declare the government’s failure to “process, adjudicate, and issue” a reasonable decision on the plaintiffs waiver applications unlawful and to order the government to adjudicate waiver requests for the beneficiary plaintiffs within 15 days. Before any rulings were made on the merits of the complaint and preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs filed a motion for expedited production of administrative records on July 31, 2019. Here, the plaintiffs requested the promulgating guidance and policies of EO-3 and argued that this information was necessary so that the waiver adjudication process could be “clearly and definitively defined” for the district court before the hearing on the preliminary injunction. The government filed oppositions to both plaintiff motions on August 16, 2019. Magistrate Judge McCormick heard arguments on this expedited discovery motion on August 27, 2019, and denied the motion on the same day. The magistrate determined that the plaintiffs had not shown that the requested information was necessary for the court to fairly rule on the merits of the preliminary injunction. The government filed a supplemental declaration in opposition to the preliminary injunction request on September 6, 2019. In this notice, they informed the court that the consular officer had granted waivers and issued nonimmigrant visas to two of the beneficiary plaintiffs and that a third beneficiary plaintiff was being considered for a waiver. In addition to providing these facts, the government asked the court to deny the motion for preliminary injunction and dismiss the claims of the three plaintiff-families as moot. Based on a sentence in the government’s August 16 filing in opposition to the preliminary injunction that said “were the Court to order the State Department to decide the waiver requests within the next two weeks, the State Department would likely deny the waivers on the ground that the national-security and public-safety vetting required by the Proclamation has not yet been completed,” the plaintiffs filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions on September 9, 2019, against the government defendants and their counsel for what the plaintiffs described as “implicit threatened retaliation.” District Judge Selna heard arguments on the motion for preliminary injunction on September 16, 2019, and issued an order and opinion denying the motion on September 24. The court found that the question of whether the requested preliminary injunction would save the plaintiffs from irreparable harm was speculative because there was no guarantee that an injunction mandating the government to process the waiver requests would result in a grant of those waivers. As a result, the court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the high standard necessary for a preliminary injunction. 2019 WL 6841991. The district judge ruled on the sanctions issue on October 3, 2019, holding that the government’s reasoning for opposing the 15 day adjudication mandate requested by the plaintiffs in their preliminary injunction motion was not improper or meritorious of sanctions. 2019 WL 6872902. On October 15, 2019, the government filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. Before a hearing could be held on this motion, four of the plaintiff families voluntarily dismissed their claims on November 13, 2019, leaving ten families remaining as plaintiffs. The district court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss on December 3, 2019, and issued an order granting the motion on the same day. While the district court disagreed with the government’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were not justiciable under the APA, it was persuaded by the government’s arguments that those claims failed on the merits. First, the plaintiff’s unreasonable delay APA claim failed, according to the district court, because neither EO-3 nor the Immigration and Nationality Act (that EO-3 was issued pursuant to) required a 90 day deadline for the State Department to adjudicate decisions on waivers to visa denials. Second, District Judge Selna disagreed with the plaintiff’s argument that the State Department’s alleged practice of requiring consular section chiefs to agree with consular officers’ determinations regarding waivers constituted an unlawful agency action under the APA (5 U.S.C. §706(2)(a) and (d)) and dismissed this claim. Third, the district court held that the complaint’s Fifth Amendment claim failed, citing the 2015 Supreme Court decision Kerry v. Din (135 S.Ct. 2128), because unadmitted nonresident aliens do not have a right of entry to the US. and because the right to live with non-citizen family members is not a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Lastly, the court made a finding that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege that the government owed them a clear, non-discretionary duty, and as a result, the mandamus claim was dismissed. Because the plaintiffs’ counsel declined leave to amend at the hearing, the court initially ordered that the dismissal would be with prejudice. 2019 WL 7195621. Three days after their complaint was dismissed, the plaintiffs’ counsel filed a paper exaplaining that his decision during the hearing to decline the opportunity to file an amended complaint had been in error; he asked the court to amend its December 3 order to allow for a re-filing of the complaint. The court granted this request in a December 10, 2019 order, amending the dismissal to be without prejudice to allow re-pleading within twenty days. The plaintiffs met this deadline and filed an amended complaint on December 30, 2019. Despite their dismissal on December 3, 2019, the plaintiffs included the exact same arguments for their APA claims and mandamus claim in this amended complaint as those in the original complaint. The due process claim was also reproduced in the amended complaint but included an additional four paragraphs that elaborated on why the State Department’s implementation of the waiver scheme constituted a violation of liberty and property interests. The amended complaint added a Fifth Amendment equal protection claim that was not included in the original complaint. In this claim, the plaintiffs argued that new visa applicants seeking waivers to EO-3 have their waivers adjudicated by an automated process that was not in place for the beneficiary plaintiffs and that the failure to use this process for the beneficiary plaintiffs amounted to a violation of their right to equal protection. In response to the amended complaint, the government filed another motion to dismiss on January 13, 2020. A plaintiff family left the lawsuit on January 18, 2020, and another family voluntarily dismissed their claims on February 20, 2020, leaving eight families as plaintiffs. While a hearing on the renewed motion to dismiss was originally scheduled for March 16, 2020, the district court vacated the hearing date and asked the parties to submit requests for oral argument. The plaintiffs requested a hearing but the district court found that oral argument would not be necessary to decide the motion and instead issued an opinion granting the motion to dismiss on March 18, 2020. District Judge Selna held that the plaintiffs did have standing to bring their claims against the government and that the plaintiffs’ APA claims were justiciable by the district court. However, on the merits of the APA and Fifth Amendment claims, the district court made the same findings as its December 3, 2019, order and opinions. As for the added equal protection claim, the court found that the only distinguishing factor between the plaintiffs and those visa applicants whose claims were processed by the automated system was “when the new processing system went into effect.” Because classifications based on timing are not “suspect or quasi-suspect,” the district court applied rational basis review and held that the system did not violate equal protection. All substantive claims were dismissed without prejudice including the mandamus claim as Judge Selna found that the plaintiffs had not established that the government owed them a “clear non-discretionary duty.” 2020 WL 3051089. Two days after the amended complaint was dismissed, the plaintiffs appealed the dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit which opened a new docket (No. 20-55325) on March 20, 2020. The case was released from mediation on July 29, 2020, and the parties filed their briefs later that year. The Court of Appeals scheduled oral argument for March 2, 2021. However, this hearing was never held because President Biden revoked the travel ban EOs upon his inauguration on January 20, 2021. As a result, the Ninth Circuit held that the case was moot and ordered that the action be dismissed on February 9, 2021. The Court of Appeals noted that President Biden’s inaugural proclamation which undid the travel ban also directed the State Department to resume visa processing “in a manner similar to that which Plaintiff-Appellants seek in their operative complaint.” 2021 WL 1226734. The Court of Appeals issued its mandate on April 6, 2021, ending the case.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed July 22, 2019, challenged the State Department’s implementation of President Trump’s September 24, 2019, Executive Order (EO-3) which was the third of four orders by the former President that restricted travel to the US for nationals of majority Muslim countries. The plaintiffs were 14 Iranian American families who claimed that the State Department failed to properly adjudicate case-by-case waivers to the travel ban’s restrictions on visa issuance in contravention of the waiver process that EO-3 itself laid out and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to remedy the State Department’s Constitutional and Administrative Procedure Act violations. District Court Judge James Selna denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction in September 2019 and granted two separate motions to dismiss by the government first in December 2019 and later in March 2020. The plaintiffs appealed the later dismissal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Before a hearing could be held on the appeal, President Biden rescinded EO-3 upon his inauguration; the Ninth Circuit held that the case was moot in February 2021 and issued its final mandate on April 6, 2021, ending the case.


On May 2, 2019, Buzzfeed News and one of its reporters filed a complaint under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the FBI. The complaint stated that the plaintiffs had filed an initial FOIA request with the DOJ on March 21, 2019 seeking the following information on an expedited timeline:
Copies of any and all records, which includes but is not limited to FBI 302s, emails, memos, letters, charts, used by the Office of Special Counsel Robert Mueller during the drafting and preparation of its FINAL REPORT [emphasis in original] relating to the Office’s investigation into: any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and (ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and (iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ refused to comply with this request or provide any responsive records. The plaintiffs filed subsequent FOIA requests for component documents of the initial request, and alleged that none of these were fulfilled:

A March 25 FOIA request for the subpoenas and warrants used by the Mueller investigation;

A March 25 FOIA request for "all documents and records" maintained by the Special Counsel's office during this investigation;

A March 27 FOIA request for interview reports (also known as FBI 302s) used by the Mueller investigation;

A March 27 FOIA request for all non-investigative communications used by the Mueller investigation team; and

An April 3 FOIA request for summaries written by the Mueller investigation team.

Loevy & Loevy and other private counsel represented the plaintiffs. The case was initially assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly. A June 15, 2019 status report showed that the defendants attempted to narrow the scope of the plaintiffs' FOIA requests, but the plaintiffs refused to modify their requests. The status report stated that the DOJ would have to process over 19 billion pages of data in order to comply with the request, and that the DOJ anticipated completing a preliminary review by September 26, 2019. Given the large volume of documents affected, the defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on August 27, arguing that the document request was unduly large and several of the FOIA requests were impermissibly vague. The case was reassigned to Judge Reggie Walton on September 4, 2019. On September 5, the DOJ filed a motion to consolidate this case with 19-cv-1626 in the same District Court; that case (also before Judge Walton) was another FOIA case requesting the 302 forms from the Mueller investigation. Judge Walton issued an order granting the consolidation of the cases on October 3, 2019. Given the multiple FOIA complaints on this specific document type, Judge Walton issued another order on November 11 directing the DOJ to prioritize the review of the 302 forms at the pace of 500 pages per month. On November 3, 2019, Buzzfeed published an article releasing the contents of the first tranche of documents that the DOJ gave them as part of this FOIA request. This document set highlighted that the 2016 campaign was pleased with the release of Hillary Clinton's email tranche, initially falsely attributing it to a Ukrainian hack of DNC headquarters, and noting a campaign-wide effort to prevent the candidate from discussing Russia-related issues. On November 22, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, arguing that the November 11 order should not put a stay on processing of certain other document types, the non-public records and the summaries. The plaintiffs argued that, since the DOJ already agreed to expedited processing of these documents, the stay should not impact this processing. Judge Walton issued an order on November 28 granting the motion with regard to the summaries but not for the non-public records; the order did not provide any reasoning for this decision. He modified this order slightly in a December 16 order, which directed the DOJ to release the 302 forms and narratives that it released to Congress to the plaintiffs without further delay. Buzzfeed publicized the second tranche of documents it received from the DOJ in a December 2, 2019 article. This tranche of documents focused on the early days of the Trump White House, when Paul Manafort was facing criminal charges and FBI director James Comey was fired. The documents emphasized the reactions of various White House officials, who were initially hopeful that the "Russia thing" would be over soon. Buzzfeed released the third tranche of documents it received from the DOJ in a January 2, 2020 article. These documents focused on the structure of the Trump organization and the Trump White House, referencing Michael Cohen's interactions with Eastern European and Central Asian counterparts in creating deals for the Trump Organization. The documents also shed light into staffing the Trump White House and showed that Fox News anchor Sean Hannity had significant access to daily goings on at the White House. Buzzfeed updated this release in a January 17 article, providing more detail on both findings. The plaintiffs filed a status report on January 7, 2020, stating that while the defendants had released the proper documents, the documents contained redactions of information that was already public in other releases. They also asked the court to expedite processing of the 302 forms, saying that, at the current pace, the DOJ would not complete processing of the forms until a few days before the 2020 presidential election. The plaintiffs argued that it would be in the public interest to get these documents at a quicker pace in order to provide voters with a full picture of Russian interference in the election. The defendants also filed a status report on the same day, noting that the plaintiffs could contest redactions on the summary judgment stage, not the status report stage, and defended their use of FOIA Exception 5 to redact the information. The defendants also argued that the current pace of document review sufficiently protected the public interest while maintaining security of redacted information. On February 8, Judge Walton issued an order directing the defendants to process 800 documents per month, speeding up the timeline. Buzzfeed released another document tranche in a February 3, 2020 article. This tranche of documents focused on the internal perceptions of White House officials on the Comey firing and news articles shortly after they took office speculating on the 2016 campaign's ties to Russia. Responding to the defendants' status report, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment contesting the use of Exception 5 in the defendants' releases on February 3, 2020, arguing that the defendants unfairly redacted information in their releases that was publicly released in the Mueller report. The defendants contested this allegation in their own motion for summary judgment filed on February 24, arguing that the redactions protected privileged work product and Presidential communications. They also argued that the Mueller report did not disclose the redacted information. Buzzfeed's March 3 article releasing new documents from the FOIA request largely built on the previous releases, showing the importance of Sean Hannity in White House inner circles and general unease from the interview targets surrounding the Trump campaign's events with many politically connected Russians present. Judge Walton issued a minute order on March 10, 2020 dismissing the motion for judgment on the pleadings from August 27 of the year prior; the issue was essentially moot since the parties were processing the requested documents. The COVID-19 pandemic impacted processing of documents in this case. An April 13 status report showed that document processors were deemed nonessential employees and document processing had halted. An April 27 status report stated that processing would resume on April 29, and a May 27 status report reflected this. Judge Walton ordered the parties to return to the 800 documents per month processing schedule on June 9, 2020. After processing resumed, Buzzfeed released another document tranche in a June 30, 2020 article. These documents contained largely the same information as the previous ones, focusing on the promotion of unfounded rumors surrounding the Clinton email releases and internal dysfunction on campaign staffing decisions. Beside containing the internal campaign staffing drama, Buzzfeed's August 3 document release included interview summaries from high ranking White House officials Jared Kushner and K.T. McFarland, though these interviews were heavily redacted due to "ongoing investigations." Buzzfeed's September 1 document release confirmed that at least one investigation into the Trump campaign was ongoing, and included interviews with campaign staff that showed the 2016 campaign had a diffuse and poorly organized campaign finance system. After reviewing the redactions in the released documents, Judge Walton issued an opinion on the outstanding cross motions for summary judgment on September 3, 2020. 2020 WL 5253897. He agreed with the defendants, saying that the redactions did represent privileged work product and Presidential communications, and added that the Mueller report did not publicize redacted information. Buzzfeed's October 1 document release confirmed that the Trump 2016 campaign was in dire financial straits and was seeking large donations to subsidize a social media program in the last days of the 2016 campaign. These documents also discussed the circumstances surrounding the firings of Roger Stone and Paul Manafort. On October 8, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to further expedite document processing in light of the upcoming 2020 Presidential election. Judge Walton issued an order the following day directing the DOJ to make a "good faith effort" to release the documents before the election. Buzzfeed released an additional document tranche in an October 3 article. These documents discussed Paul Manfort's outreach to politically connected Russian nationals. This document tranche also included documents from Michael Flynn's interview with the FBI, but the document was almost completely redacted. On December 7, 2020, Judge Walton ordered the defendants to re-process 302 documents pertaining to Michael Flynn, given the President's pardon of Flynn. Buzzfeed received these documents on January 15, 2021 and published an article about their contents. The documents discussed Flynn's interactions with foreign contacts, both Russian and Turkish, and how he communicated these contacts to the Trump White House and campaign. Though the Buzzfeed articles imply that the DOJ has completed document processing, the case is not yet closed.

Summary: On May 2, 2019, Buzzfeed and one of its reporters filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking documents from the Department of Justice (DOJ) on Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation into the Trump 2016 campaign. This entry discusses Buzzfeed's efforts to secure these documents and summaries of the information in the documents. The case is ongoing.


On December 16, 2009, several registered sex offenders residing in Nebraska brought suit against the State of Nebraska in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act. The state law banned individuals on the sex offender registry from accessing social media, criminalized their use of websites, and required consent to search. The plaintiffs claimed that this Act departed significantly from the previous sex offender registry and violated the U.S. and Nebraska Constitution: 1. by imposing retroactive criminal punishment for past acts; 2. by punishing a single offense twice; 3. by imposing a cruel and unusual punishment; 4. by permitting a continuous and unreasonable search and seize by law enforcement; 5. by violating the right to due process; 6. by violating the right to equal protection of the law and constituting special legislation; 7. by violating the right to free speech; 8. by substantially impairing the contractual plea agreements entered into by some Plaintiffs; and 9. by violating the separation of powers mandated by the Nebraska Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and permanent injunction and demanded a jury trial. The case was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge David L. Piester, but was later reassigned to District Judge Richard G. Kopf, then to Magistrate Judge Zwart. On December 30, 2009, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. Judge Kopf mostly denied this motion, holding that the Nebraska statute did nothing more than what was permitted or required by the United States Congress. Nonetheless, he did grant part of the preliminary injunction: As applied to individuals who had been convicted of sex offenses but had completed the entirely of their sentences, Nebraska was temporarily prohibited from enforcing the consent to search requirement and the prohibition against use of social media websites accessible to minors. 2009 WL 5184328. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs attempted to litigate the same claims in state court. On January 7, 2010, Judge Kopk requested that the courts of the State of Nebraska refrain from issuing any orders enjoining Nebraska’s Sex Offender Registration Act and related legislative bills while cases were pending. On March 15, 2010, the plaintiffs amended the complaint, adding plaintiffs. In April, both the defendants and plaintiffs moved for summary judgment. On August 16, 2010, both the plaintiffs’ and defendant’s motion for summary judgment were denied in part and granted in part. The court held that the consent to search requirement and internet monitoring requirements violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the court held largely in the defendant's favor, finding that: (1) the in-person reporting, public disclosure, and “offense of conviction” methodology provisions did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause and double jeopardy; (2) the registration and public notification requirements did not violate substantive due process; (3) the amendments were also not void for vagueness; (4) the act did not violate due process or free speech rights. 734 F.Supp.2d 882. A period of discovery followed between 2010 and 2012. On April 19, 2011, the court approved in part and denied in part the plaintiffs’ motion to compel, holding legislative intent behind amendments was relevant, but that the plaintiffs' request for documents was overly broad. 788 F.Supp.2d 975. Ultimately, the plaintiffs prevailed on October 17, 2012. Judge Kopf found that the statutes violated the First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause. 898 F.Supp.2d 1086. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees of $292,564.88. 2012 WL 6681855. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 16, 2009, several registered sex offenders residing in Nebraska brought suit against the State of Nebraska under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the constitutionality of the Nebraska Sex Offender Registration Act. The state law banned registrants from social media, criminalized use of websites, and required provision of internet identifiers along with consent to search. The plaintiffs claimed that this new Act New was a significant departure from the previous sex offender registry and a violation under the U.S. and Nebraska Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief and permanent injunction and demanded a jury trial. On Aug 16, 2010, the court ordered partial summary judgment and found that the consent to search requirement and internet monitoring requirements violated Fourth Amendment rights. However, an in-person reporting, public disclosure, and “offense of conviction” methodology provisions did not violate Ex Post Facto Clause and double jeopardy and the registration and public notification requirements did not violate substantive due process. The amendments were also not void for vagueness. A summary judgment was not warranted on due process challenges nor free speech challenges. The plaintiffs prevailed on October 17, 2012, and Judge Kopf found that the statutes were not narrowly tailored, overboard and vague under the Due Process Clause and violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees of $292,564.88.


On May 23, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division ("DOJ") sent its "findings letter" to the District of Columbia's mayor, advising him of the results of the June 2005, DOJ investigation of conditions and practices at the St. Elizabeth's Hospital, a District facility having approximately fifteen buildings housing adults with acute, long-term mental health needs and forensic needs. The investigation occurred under the authority of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997. According to the letter, DOJ and expert consultants visited the facility, reviewed a wide array of documents there, and conducted interviews with personnel and residents. The letter commended St. Elizabeth's staff for providing a high level of cooperation during the investigation, as well as the dedication many showed for patient well-being. Nevertheless, the investigation found numerous deficiencies in patient care at St. Elizabeth's. DOJ concluded that these deficiencies at St. Elizabeth's existed in four topic areas, including (1) protection from harm (e.g., assaults, elopements, suicides, over-reliance on seclusion, restraints, and psychotropic medications, inadequate risk management and quality assurance, environmental health and safety issues) (2) psychiatric and psychological care and treatment (e.g., inadequate treatment planning, assessments, diagnoses, and services), (3) medical and nursing care and treatment (e.g., poor symptom and medication documentation, inadequate infection control); and (4) discharge planning and placement in the most integrated setting. The letter provided details of deficiencies for all four of these categories. The letter listed, at length, minimally-acceptable remedial measures for each of these categories. It invited continued collaboration toward resolving the deficiencies and alerted the District that, absent improvement, a CRIPA lawsuit would be filed to compel correction of the deficiencies and protection of St. Elizabeth's patients' rights. The DOJ letter eventually resulted in cooperative resolution of the hospital's cited problems, at least on paper. District officials and the DOJ reached an agreement that became the basis of a consent judgment filed contemporaneously with a CRIPA complaint against the District. Via DOJ Civil Rights Division lawyers, on May 11, 2007, the United States filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia a CRIPA lawsuit against the District and its officials responsible for operation of St. Elizabeth's. The complaint alleged violations of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C § 12101, and implementing regulations. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to end the substantial departures from generally accepted professional standards of care at the hospital in the multiple aspects mentioned in the findings letter. Simultaneously, a settlement agreement was filed which set out detailed remedial measures that the District agreed to implement at St. Elizabeth's. The agreement also provided for the District to pay for a compliance officer to oversee and report (to the parties and hospital administration) on compliance with each of the agreement's provisions. Measured from the agreement's effective date, the agreement established 12, 18, 24, and 36-month time-frames for compliance, depending on the provision at issue. The District also agreed to submit to the United States a corrective action plan every four months and a status report every six months during the agreed-upon five-year period of court jurisdiction over the matter. On October 26, 2011, the U.S. filed a modified settlement agreement, approved by the court, that commended the hospital for continuing to cooperate with the earlier agreement. The revised settlement provided for continuing jurisdiction. Following the successful implementation of the remaining provisions of the agreement, the case was dismissed in September 2014. However, the parties' joint motion to dismiss gave notice to the court that monitoring between St. Elizabeth's Hospital and University Legal Services would continue. A separate case seeking similar injunctive and declaratory relief to improve conditions at St. Elizabeth's had been filed earlier in the same federal court by a protective and advocacy organization, represented both by private counsel and by the organization's counsel. See University Legal Services, Inc. v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, no. 1:05-cv-00585-TFH-JMF. In that case, extensive discovery and motion practice preceded the CRIPA case's settlement and continued even after the July 27, 2007 CRIPA settlement.

Summary: This 2006 case was brought by the DOJ Civil Rights Division in the U.S. District Court, District of Columbia under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §1997 following an investigation of conditions and practices at the St. Elizabeth's Hospital ("St. E's"), a District facility having approximately fifteen buildings housing adults with acute, long-term mental health needs and forensic needs. A consent judgment was filed contemporaneously with the complaint implementing remedial measures for the hospital. The case was dismissed in 2014 when the defendant reached compliance.


In September 2003, the EEOC filed this suit against North Central Supply, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the defendant terminated the charging party, a female employee, because she was pregnant. The charging party intervened in the suit in November 2003. After some discovery and scheduling orders, the EEOC and the defendant settled in September 2005 through a consent decree. The charging party and the defendant eventually settled their claims in April 2006. The September 2005 consent decree contained non-discrimination and non-retaliation clauses and had a term of five years. Under the terms of the decree, the defendant agreed to: provide semi-annual reports to the EEOC, post a Title VII notice, adopt and distribute an anti-discrimination policy, and provide annual Title VII training for its supervisors and managers. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement; the case was presumably closed in 2010.

Summary: In September 2003, the EEOC filed this suit against North Central Supply, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of South Dakota on behalf of a female employee, alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The EEOC contended that the employee had been fired for being pregnant. The charging party intervened in the suit in November 2003. The EEOC and the defendant entered into a settlement decree in September 2005, while the employee and the defendant settled their claims in April 2006. The consent decree required the defendant to provide semi-annual reports to the EEOC, post a Title VII notice, adopt and distribute an anti-discrimination policy, and provide annual Title VII training for its supervisors and managers.


On December 19, 2016, five pregnant women in Allegheny County Jail (ACJ) brought this suit against Allegheny County and jail officers in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Suing under § 1983, they alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment right to notice and opportunity to be heard via the Due Process Clause. Represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, the Abolitionist Law Center, and private counsel, the plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief, equitable damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. These plaintiffs alleged that they were subject to solitary confinement for up to 24 hours per day for minor rule infractions. For example, one plaintiff was subjected to solitary confinement because she had three pairs of shoes when she was only allowed two. While in solitary confinement, the plaintiffs alleged that they were not given an opportunity to shower or exercise, and that they were not allowed any recreational materials such as books, papers, pens, or magazines. Finally, the amount of time spent in solitary confinement ranged from six to twenty-two days. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were not receiving the proper pre-natal nutrition. The plaintiffs stated that because of the lack of nutrition, they were forced to supplement meals with food purchased from the commissary and, moreover, feared for the health of their fetuses. the plaintiffs explained that this was especially problematic for those inmates. This concern was especially problematic for pregnant women placed in solitary confinement. On February 14, 2017 the plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of all women at ACJ now, and in the future, who were pregnant or post partum. The suit was referred to a magistrate for mediation on May 15, 2017. That mediation was scheduled for July 7, 2017. On November 8, 2017 the parties reached a settlement. The agreement stipulated that for three years, Allegheny County jail would provide plaintiffs' counsel with a list of pregnant women detained or incarcerated upon plaintiffs' counsel's request. Additionally, the Allegheny County jail would provide plaintiffs' counsel with quarterly discovery: copies of documents related to the placement of any pregnant women in restrictive housing, and the total number of misconducts and informal resolutions issued to pregnant women resulting in loss of privileges. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that Allegheny County jail would adopt a new policy that would require the jail to provide counseling, health assessments, and adequate nutrition and supplements to pregnant women, women post partum, and lactating women in the jail. The new policy required that pregnant women be seen by a qualified healthcare professional at least once per month, and that medical care will be provided regardless of the woman's disciplinary status. The new policy also required that women who qualify receive the pregnant/nursing diet regardless of where they are housed in the jail. The new policy further required that pregnant women receive the opportunity to exercise for at least two hours per day and that women be given access to showers and hygiene supplies. The case was voluntarily dismissed as a result of the settlement agreement on November 15, 2017. The court retains jurisdiction to enforce the settlement until November 2020.

Summary: Plaintiffs, pregnant women at Allegheny County Jail (ACJ), sued the county and members of the staff for violations of Due Process and Cruel and Unusual Punishment rights because of improper nutrition at ACJ as well as their use of solitary confinement. A settlement was reached on November 8, 2017. The case is now closed.


On April 30, 2013, a group of California public school teachers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Represented by private counsel and the Center for Individual Rights, the plaintiffs asked the district court to strike down California's agency-shop law. The law requires public employees to pay some union fees as a condition of public employment; the plaintiffs argued that this unconstitutionally abridged their freedom of speech and association. They sought an injunction barring the union from requiring nonunion employees to pay money to support the union in any way. Under California law, a union is allowed to become the exclusive bargaining representative for public school employees in a bargaining unit such as a public school district by submitting proof that a majority of employees in the unit wish to be represented by the union. Cal. Gov’t. Code § 3544(a). Once a union becomes the exclusive bargaining representative, it may establish an “agency-shop” arrangement with that district, whereby all employees “shall, as a condition of continued employment, be required either to join the recognized employee organization or pay the fair share service fee.” Id. § 3546(a). The fee is supposed to cover only “chargeable” union expenditures--those germane to collective bargaining, not expenditures on other matters. Plaintiffs conceded that their challenge was entirely foreclosed by Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 963 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992). In Abood, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of compelling employees to pay their fair share of the costs of collective bargaining. In Mitchell, the 9th Circuit further held that the First Amendment did not require an “opt in” procedure, but allowed California's "opt out" approach. Plaintiffs wanted to get to the Supreme Court, where they could ask the Court to overrule Abood. So they asked the District Court in this case to grant judgment on the pleadings to the defendants. The court did so, in a short opinion by Judge Josephine Staton, on December 5, 2013. 2013 WL 9825479. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and on appeal, similarly sought summary affirmance to tee the issue up for the Supreme Court. In a one-paragraph order issued (per curiam, by Judges Canby, Clifton, and Owens) on November 18, 2014, the 9th Circuit, did so. 2014 WL 10076847. Plaintiffs then sought certiorari review in the Supreme Court, which was granted on June 30, 2015. 135 S.Ct. 2933. Arguments took place January 11, 2016; the case was decided on March 29, 2016. 136 S.Ct. 1083. In a one-sentence per curiam opinion saying “The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided court.” The plaintiffs asked for a rehearing, which was denied. The case is now closed.

Summary: In this case, filed in 2013, a group of California public school teachers asked the district court strike down California's agency-shop law, which required them to pay some union fees as a condition of public employment; the plaintiffs argued that this unconstitutionally abridged their freedom of speech and association. Because the case is controlled by Supreme Court precedent. On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the lower courts. The case is now closed.


On December 20, 2004, minority employees of the Library of Congress (LOC) filed this lawsuit on behalf of themselves, minority job applicants and all past, current, and future employees of the LOC in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant, the Librarian of Congress, engaged in discrimination against minority employees in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs alleged discrimination in compensation, promotions, wage classifications, job assignments, and recruitment. The plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant maintained a hostile work environment for minority employees and retaliated against minority employees who brought these discriminatory practices to the attention of management. On June 6, 2005, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On May 16, 2006, the district court (Judge Henry H. Kennedy, Jr.) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. 2006 WL 1371683. On July 28, 2008, the court (Magistrate Judge Alan Kay) issued an order imposing sanctions on the plaintiffs for disobeying a discovery order. On April 27, 2009, the district court issued an order allowing the plaintiffs to file a motion for class certification out of time. The plaintiffs were required to file their motion on or before June 22, 2009, and the court allowed them to conduct discovery related to class certification. On January 5, 2010, Magistrate Judge Kay issued an order denying the plaintiffs' motion to direct defendant to preserve data and documents. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion without prejudice because it found that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with a local "meet and confer" rule. Magistrate Judge Kay issued a Report and Recommendation on February 17, 2010 recommending that the court deny the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to require the defendant to compile and publish annual Equal Employment Opportunity plans and related reports as required by Title VII. Magistrate Judge Kay did not consider the merits of the plaintiffs' motion and instead found that the defendant had not waived its immunity to suit and that the plaintiffs did not have standing to enforce the provisions of the statute because they had not shown they had suffered an "injury in fact." The court recommended that the motion be denied without prejudice with leave for the plaintiffs to file a motion to amend their complaint in order to address the issue of standing. On April 9, 2010, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively motion for summary judgment. On February 28, 2011, the court denied the the plaintiffs' motion for permanent injunction. On March 12, 2013, the court denied without prejudice and with leave to renew the defendant's motion to dismiss or in the alternative motion for summary judgment as to failure to exhaust administrative remedies and res judicata. The plaintiff filed a motion to bifurcate issues of liability and issues of individual relief on April 2, 2014 and filed a motion to certify a class on April 25, 2014. On May 20, 2014, the defendant filed motion to dismiss, or alternatively motion for summary judgment. On March 30, 2016, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to certify a class and denied as moot plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate issues of liability and issues of individual relief. The court further granted the defendant's motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(b) because the plaintiffs did not file a memorandum of law in opposition to this motion and, therefore, the court deemed the defendant's motion conceded. The court entered judgment in favor of the defendant and closed the case.

Summary: This case was brought by minority employees of the Library of Congress on behalf of themselves and a putative class of past, current, and future employees and applicants. Plaintiffs brought the case against James Billington, Librarian of Congress, alleging that the Library of Congress violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. Because Plaintiffs did not file a memorandum of law in opposition to this motion, the court deemed Defendant's motion to dismiss as conceded. The court entered judgment in favor of Defendant on March 2016.


On October 22, 2009, homeless individuals represented by Idaho Legal Services and the National Center on Homelessness and Poverty filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho against the City of Boise. The plaintiffs had been cited under a pair of Boise municipal ordinances that made it illegal to sleep or camp in public parks and other public areas, despite the lack of available beds at the city's shelters. The complaint alleged that criminalizing homelessness in this manner constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and a violation of the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinances, damages under federal civil rights law, and declaratory and injunctive relief voiding the plaintiffs' prior citations and holding the ordinances unconstitutional. The city sought and won a motion for summary judgment, entered by Magistrate Judge Ronald Bush on July 6, 2011. 834 F. Supp.2d 1103. Judge Bush held that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the ordinance criminalized homelessness. In addition, the court said that the claims had been mooted by subsequent clarifications of enforcement protocols by the Boise police and an amendment to the ordinance that provided a more precise definition of "camping." The plaintiffs appealed, and the case was reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit on March 7, 2013. 709 F.3d 890. In an opinion issued by a panel consisting of Judges Susan Black, Susan Graber, and Johnnie Rawlinson, the court determined that the plaintiffs' claims for backward-looking relief were not jurisdictionally barred since they did not seek relief from the state court itself. The court further held the plaintiffs' claims for prospective relief had not been mooted by the defendants' new "voluntary conduct" in the form of protocols and amendments for the enforcement of the ordinances. On remand, the defendant filed for summary judgment again on August 15, 2013. The district court issued an opinion on January 27 2014, granting the the motion for summary judgment as to the damages claims because the plaintiffs had not yet had their convictions overturned via direct appeal. At the court's direction, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint omitting the damages claims, with the request for prospective injunctive and declaratory judgment as the only surviving claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on December 31, 2014, asserting that the plaintiffs could no longer bring their claims because some plaintiffs could not be located by counsel and others had no active disputes with the defendants. The plaintiffs filed for summary judgment on April 30, 2015. On July 6, 2015, the United States filed a statement of interest, detailing its support of the plaintiffs' position, arguing that the court must consider whether it was possible for homeless residents like the plaintiffs to conform their conduct to the ordinances when shelters were full. On September 28, 2015, Judge Bush issued an opinion again dismissing the suit in its entirety. 2015 WL 5708586. The opinion held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the ordinances because the defendants had further amended the ordinances to make exceptions for circumstances where shelters were full, mooting the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiffs appealed again to the Ninth Circuit on October 29, 2015 (15-35845). On September 4, 2018, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit of Judges Marsha Berzon, Paul Watford, and John Owens reversed. 902 F.3d 1031. The Ninth Circuit held the Eighth Amendment prohibited Boise from enforcing the ordinances against homeless residents forced to sleep outside by a lack of shelter space. The court also held that two of the plaintiffs in the suit had shown they could be eligible for retrospective injunctive relief that could vacate their previous citations, and injunctive relief banning future enforcement of the ordinances. The case was remanded again to the District Court. The defendants filed a motion for rehearing <i>en banc</i> by the full Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but the court denied this motion on April 1, 2019. Subsequent to the denial, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court. The court denied that petition on December 16, 2019. 920 F.3d 584. After the denial of cert, litigation resumed in the district court on the remaining issues in the case. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on March 10, 2020. The remaining claim was an Eighth Amendment violation for penalizing plaintiffs based on their homeless status. They sought injunctive relief enjoining defendants from enforcing Boise Municipal Code §§ 5-2-3(A) and 7-3A-2(A), declarative relief, damages, and attorneys' fees. As of May 20, 2020, this case remains ongoing.

Summary: Homeless residents of the City of Boise sued the City in federal district court in 2009 because of the allegedly unfair targeting of anti-camping and loitering ordinances against the City's homeless. The plaintiffs alleged that the enactment and enforcement of these ordinances had the effect of criminalizing homelessness, in violation of their 14th and 8th Amendment rights. The district court twice dismissed the suit, but a Ninth Circuit panel reversed both times, holding that the ordinances may violate the Eighth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion for rehearing <i>en banc</i>. The defendants requested the Supreme Court review the decision, but it too declined to hear the case. After the denial of cert, litigation resumed in the district court. The plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint on March 10, 2020. As of May 20, 2020, this case remains ongoing.