On January 3, 1979, prisoners housed in Puerto Rican prisons filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, against the Administration of Corrections of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Action and Education Corporation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the prison system provided inadequate healthcare. They also alleged that the living conditions in the system led to unusually high levels of inmate death, and that the use of solitary confinement cells known as "calabozos" for housing persons voluntarily seeking protective custody constituted cruel punishment. They also complained that the prisons were overcrowded and unsanitary, containing insufficient light and ventilation, as well as a lack of privacy. As the discovery process moved forward, the plaintiffs added complaints in the areas of due process, equal protection, rights of free association, and the right of access to the courts. On January 5, 1980, Judge Juan Manuel Perez-Gimenez found that the defendants had "blatantly violated the federal Constitution's interdiction against cruel and unusual punishment," running a prison system that was rampant with suicides, violent deaths, raw sewage running in the dormitories and kitchens, toilets that didn't work, prescriptions that did not get filled, no beds or mattresses, no soap, toothbrushes, or toothpaste, food contaminated by rats or other vermin, untrained staff, and overcrowding. Judge Perez-Gimenez found that "psychotic mad men are kept for weeks and months (some pre-trial detainees) caged like animals, without clothes, without toilet facilities, without medicines, forced to eat with their hands and in most cases without ever seeing a doctor." The Court also found that other inmates, seeking asylum from threats of death or serious injury in the general penal population, lost all their privileges, all rehabilitation programs, all chance for parole, and all recreation, all the while being locked in dungeons called "calabozos." In light of these findings, the Court granted a preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, finding that the prison system needed system-wide changes, and that irreparable harm would occur if immediate relief were not granted. 497 F.Supp. 14. Six years later, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that their Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights continued to be violated. On March 21, 1986, Judge Perez-Gimenez re-examined the defendants' compliance with the injunction, and found that the defendants had "all too frequently offered the appearance of compliance with the decree as a substitute for obedience, that the laws of the Commonwealth had been ignored by administrators (at all levels) who disobeyed in silence, and vast sums of money, whose expenditure had been repeatedly proffered to the court as evidence of reformation, had been wasted without bringing about any substantial and enduring change in the reality of daily life in Puerto Rico's prisons." In order to enforce its orders, Judge Perez-Gimenez decided to appoint two court monitors to assess compliance, report on conditions in the prison system, and prepare a detailed remedial order. 672 F.Supp. 591. On the same day, Judge Perez-Gimenez entered a second order finding that since the defendants had not appealed the court's orders, the plaintiffs were overwhelmingly likely to succeed in this case and it would be inequitable to delay awarding the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees. 1986 WL 21347. One year later, the plaintiff class asked the court to hold the Governor of Puerto Rico, the Administrator of Corrections, and individual parole board members in contempt for failing to comply with the court's orders. On July 23, 1987, Judge Perez-Gimenez held that the failure of the defendants to comply with the Court's orders amounted to civil contempt of court, ordering them to pay $50,000.00 for violations to the court's orders. Judge Perez-Gimenez also ordered that the defendants would pay a daily fine whenever an inmate was held living in an institution where the maximum capacity had been exceeded. 697 F.Supp. 37. On September 10, 1986, the parties entered into a stipulation requiring the defendants to provide each prisoner within the jurisdiction at least 55 square feet of living and sleeping space no later then December 31, 1987. Shortly before the deadline for compliance, the defendants asked the court to modify the space order. On September 14, 1987, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, holding that they had failed to show that compliance would result in pernicious consequences, and that they had failed to show changed circumstances warranting relief. He also held that the building project that the defendants had undertaken to increase dramatically the available beds for housing did not entitle the prison authorities to relief. 672 F.Supp. 627. The next week, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered, due to defendants’ continued non-compliance, a $50,000 sanction, with a daily fine of $10 per inmate whenever an inmate was held in an institution where the maximum capacity was exceeded. In an effort to lower the jail population, Judge Perez-Gimenez also ordered the implementation of an expedited bail project. These efforts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful in lowering the population to acceptable limits. On August 15, 1988, the court increased the daily fine to $50 per inmate. As further incentive, the court ordered that the daily fine would be increased in September to $60 per inmate. In response to this influx of funds, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered a special advisory committee be appointed to help the court appropriately spend the accumulated money. On December 23, 1988, the defendants filed a second motion for relief, asking the court to change the requirement to 35 square feet rather than 55 for at least another year and a half. The court held hearings on this motion from May 3-8, 1990, and on June 7, 1990, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the defendants' motion to change the 55 square foot standard and ordered the defendants to present the court with a comprehensive compliance plan within 30 days. Judge Perez-Gimenez warned the defendants that if they did not present the plan in a timely fashion, the court would grant damages to the plaintiffs. 1990 WL 83321. In the meantime, the inmates motioned the court to close the Ponce District Jail (popularly known as "El Castillo") because of the continuing violations of the rights of the detainees. On July 28, 1988, Judge Perez-Gimenez found that the defendants had violated the rights of the inmates of the jail by housing them with convicted inmates and by refusing them access to medical services. While Judge Perez-Gimenez refused to order immediate closing of the jail, he agreed to impose conditions on its continuing operation. 697 F.Supp. 37. The defendants appealed, and on September 26, 1989, the U.S. Court of Appeal for the First Circuit (Judge Stephen Gerald Breyer) affirmed the District Court's decisions, holding that the defendants' compliance with the court orders had not been substantial enough to invalidate the finding of contempt, and that the sanctions imposed by the district court were not too high. 887 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989). The defendants sought Supreme Court review, and on March 19, 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari. 494 U.S. 1046 (1990). A few months later, a member of the plaintiff class named Domingo Grajales Cardona filed a complaint with the court, alleging that several defendants had retaliated against him for his cooperation with the plaintiff attorneys in this lawsuit. The court held a hearing and found that the defendants had taken him from his cell, handcuffed him, beaten him, locked him inside a box, and shot several tear gas bombs at him inside the box. Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered each of the four named defendants in the lawsuit to pay the Grajales $125.00 in damages. 704 F.Supp. 16. Shortly after the court’s June 7, 1988 order, negotiations between the parties broke down. The court found that the plaintiffs had been making reasonable requests, and that the defendants had not negotiated in good faith. The plaintiffs asked the court to hold the defendants in contempt, and the court held a hearing on October 22, 1990. Shortly before the hearing, the defendants again asked the court to modify the stipulation requiring 55 square feet of space for each inmate. On January 10, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the defendants' motion and imposed contempt sanctions on them for their noncompliance with the Court's orders. 754 F.Supp. 942. A month later, the court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs' attorneys' fees. 757 F.Supp. 140. On May 30, 1991, the court entered an order directing the defendants to enter into a contract for conducting evaluations and preparing plans of corrective action to address problems in the jail's living environment. The defendants failed to do so, and on July 18, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez held that the court would appoint a special master to enter into the contract on behalf of the prison officials. 771 F.Supp. 11. The defendants asked the court to grant them partial and temporary relief from the contempt fines. On June 25, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, holding that the increase in population at some institutions due to the necessary closing of admission at other institutions due to life-threatening environmental and health conditions did not amount to an unforeseen condition that would excuse compliance. 775 F.Supp. 477. On October 10, 1991, Judge Perez-Gimenez expressed its extreme frustration with the defendants' ongoing disobedience to the court's orders, noting that the defendants had paid a total of $68,240,910.00 in fines based on their violation of the requirements that the inmates be given a stipulated amount of living space. In an effort to force compliance, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered the Clerk of the Court to transfer $1,000,000.00 from the special account currently holding the fine money to the United States Treasury each week. 775 F.Supp. 487. For the next hear and a half, the court closely monitored the case, intermittently approving plans from the court monitors, the special advisory committee, and the appointed special master in areas of medical administration, rehabilitation of drug users, bed space and population management, building codes and staff training. The court also continued to disperse attorney’s fees and other costs in monthly intervals. On August 19, 1992, the defendants orally requested an injunction barring the opposing counsel from engaging in ex-parte communications with employees, which was summarily denied by the court. The court also ordered that all future applications for funds be filed jointly by plaintiffs and defendants. The defendants also motioned for a permanent discharge of fines for the dates of November 1991 to May 1992 on September 1, 1992. This issue was fully briefed, and on March 12, 1993, the defendant additionally motioned for a permanent discharge of all fines. These motions were dismissed on June 14, 1993. The court continued to closely monitor various projects presented by the appointed monitors and committee. In the meantime, the plaintiffs motioned on April 29, 1993, to hold the defendants in contempt for violating the court’s orders to construct a psychiatric hospital. Judge Perez-Gimenez set the hearing for September 27, 1993. Three days before the hearing, both parties motioned to continue the hearing, which was granted by the court. In October of 1993, the plaintiffs motioned for a temporary restraining order reducing the populations of Section Q of the Bayamon Metropolitan Institute and to increase custodial staff. The court held a meeting in his chambers later that month, where the both parties agreed to a stipulation regarding the restraining order. The plaintiffs submitted an order, which was signed by Judge Perez-Gimenez on October 28, 1993. On December 17, 1993, the court established that the parties would have a period of discovery, culminating in a pretrial hearing on April 5, 1994, to resolve any outstanding disputes. The plaintiff responded by filing an amended complaint on December 31. Both parties motioned for summary judgment. On April 28, 1994, the parties entered into a stipulation wherein the defendants agreed to file an organizational plan within 90 days, detailing their plan to achieve compliance with the court's orders on facility standards. The court continued to monitor monthly expenses of the monitors, committees, and programs. The court approved the stipulation regarding the facilities rehabilitation program on June 8, 1994. Two months later, on August 16, 1994, the plaintiffs motioned to compel the defendants to comply with the court-approved stipulation. The defendants continued to regularly stipulation to requests made by the plaintiffs regarding custodial and sociopenal staffing, security, and classification. These were approved on September 13, 1994. The court approved more stipulations regarding these issues and other miscellaneous items on December 5, 1994. The court continued close monitoring of the expense and programs authorized by the court. On January 31, 1995, Judge Perez-Gimenez ordered the defendants to file a list of all Administration of Correction Facilities reflecting the maximum capacity at 55 square feet of living and sleeping space per prisoner for each such institution and for each housing unit. The defendants filed an answer to the amended complaint on February 15, 1995. The defendants also continued to file motions requesting time to complete tasks in their multiple stipulations. The court granted some motions for more time and denied others, imposing fines for non-compliance with the stipulations. On May 24, 1995, the court ordered that a hearing to be set regarding the Roster Management and Facilities Rehabilitation Program. This hearing was continued upon information that the parties had reached an agreement. In June, the court held the Administrator of Correction in contempt, fining him $100 each day that he did not comply with the court’s order of reference (specific order is not available). This was resolved on July 6, 1995, when the court ordered an injunction, directing the Administrator of Correction to refrain from allowing false documents of compliance before the court, and to circulate a notice to every employee of their duty to truthfully disclose all information to the court monitor. The monitoring of the expenses and programs in the Administration of Corrections continued for several years. On February 28, 1997, the court suspended the joint compliance consultant and instead appointed an expert witness to offer recommendations. The expert witness identified a health crisis within the prison health program, and recommended that a receiver be appointed. Both parties objected to this recommendation. A hearing on the correctional health program was throughout August and September. Judge Perez-Gimenez also issued a check to the Secretary of the Treasury of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the amount of $1.5 million to cover the expenses for the existing contract until the defendants had an opportunity to develop a detailed budge proposal. The parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law following the hearing. The court-appointed expert witness also submitted a proposed order with a revised plan for a receiver of a correctional health program. On May 18, 1998, the court ordered a Joint Health Coordinator to run the correctional health program, with a reporting and financial structure fully dependent on the court for operation. Meanwhile, on January 30, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to hold the defendants in contempt of the court's orders, asserting that the defendants had disobeyed in the areas of inmate classification, crowding, and staffing. On December 20, 2000, Judge Perez-Gimenez held the defendants in contempt, finding that they were not entitled to protection under the defense of impossibility. 124 F.Supp. 2d 774. A dispute arose regarding the extent to which the Secretary of the Puerto Rico Department of Health was to control decisions regarding the process of transfer of responsibility for inmate health care from the defendants to a nonprofit private corporation, an action that had been included in the earlier stipulation. The district court assigned new duties to the chief health care coordinator in order to facilitate the transition, and the Secretary appealed. On July 15, 2002, the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Bruce Marshall Selya, dismissed that appeal, holding that the District Court's order did not modify the previously issued injunction, and thus was not immediately appealable. 303 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002). On October 1, 2003, the defendants asked the court to terminate the consent orders that had been entered by the court pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). On January 26, 2004, Judge Perez-Gimenez denied the motion, finding that the historical systemic indifference to the inmates' medical and mental health needs, as well as the institutional failures to comply with the Court's orders, continued to threaten the health and safety of the plaintiff class, requiring the continued operation of the prospective relief in favor of the plaintiffs. 300 F.Supp.2d 321. The defendants appealed, and on August 6, 2004, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 378 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2004). The defendants asked for Supreme Court review, and on January 10, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. 532 U.S. 1054 (2005). On February 8, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion asking the court to order the defendants to show why they should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with food services that passed constitutional muster. The court set the matter for a hearing. Despite being granted additional time to file, the defendants opted not to file any response. Prior to the hearing the parties attempted to reach a negotiated stipulation which would address the various area of noncompliance. These negotiations were unsuccessful. As a result, the court held a multi-day hearing in May of 2010. At these hearings, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of 13 witnesses, including inmates currently in the custody, the Administration of Corrections' Director of Food Services, and an expert in nutrition, diets and food security, as well as voluminous documentary exhibits demonstrating the extent of the violations of the court's orders, and the defendant's knowledge and deliberate indifference to the ongoing constitutional violations. On this basis, Judge Perez-Gimenez required the implementation of critical food safety practices and permitted the oversight and implementation of those practices, ordering the defendants to submit an itemized list of what they will do in terms of creating the positions and staffing within forty-five days. 2010 WL 4922700. For the next several months, Judge Perez-Gimenez continued to monitor the defendants' compliance with the orders that had been entered, including food services order, mental health plan and financial disbursements. In April of 2011, Judge Perez-Gimenez recused himself from the case. On May 10, 2011, Judge Paul J. Barbadoro was assigned the case. Judge Barbadoro denied the plaintiffs next motion for disbursement of funds, and issued a statement reiterating that counsel needed to submit a memorandum with any future requests for funds. Judge Barbadoro further ordered on September 19, 2011, that the parties should submit reports of current compliance or non-compliance of the various orders to prepare for settlement discussions. The parties submitted these reports in November. On December 14, 2011, Judge Barbadoro appointed Judge Charles Cordero as settlement master for the negotiations, with regular status reports to the court. The parties reached an injunctive agreement the following year. The settlement agreement superseded all prior orders, and outlined nine areas where the defendant agreed to change its practices: (1) access to the courts, (2) laundry services, (3) classification, (4) medical services, (5) food services, (6) admission cells, and (7) recreation (8) staffing and security, and (9) environmental conditions. The defendants agreed to have a staffed library, legal supplies, access to attorneys and a working grievance procedure. The defendants agreed to provide three sets of clean clothes to each inmate, clean bedding that was changed weekly, adequate soap in the laundry service area, and a laundry procedure that guaranteed the laundry machines would be serviced within 30 days of a need for repair. The defendants agreed to follow the developed classification manual for classifying and housing inmates. The defendants agreed to follow the 2011 Mental Health Plan and to keep a file of each inmate’s current medications. The defendants agreed to follow the 2009 Federal Food Code. The defendants agreed to use the prisons' admissions area as a temporary location for inmates and not keep them there for more than 24 hours. The defendants agreed to establish a recreation plan with at least two hours outside for five days a week. The defendants agreed to initiate a recruitment plan to fill the identified 635 missing officers system-wide, as well as the estimated yearly attrition of 250 workers per year. The defendants agreed that the new officers would receive 40 hours of initial training, as well as 40 hours of annual training. Finally, the defendants agreed to regularly evaluate and fix any environmental concerns. The defendants also agreed to other miscellaneous provisions, including the elimination of double bunking, canceling visits as a disciplinary measure, and regular parole review. On December 13, 2012, Judge Barbadoro signed the settlement agreement. It was scheduled to last two years, and stated "Upon completion of said time period, the relief stipulated by the parties shall be terminated, unless otherwise provided by the Court pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act." The court continued to monitor the expenses of the prison system through monthly invoice reports. On May 16, 2013, the plaintiffs submitted a status report, alleging that the defendants were not in compliance in several areas. First, the plaintiffs stated that the inmates’ access to court had been compromised, with no paralegal assistance in the prison libraries and an undeveloped grievance procedure. Second, the plaintiffs alleged there was a laundry service problem, causing clothing and bedding shortage. Third, the plaintiffs alleged that the prison did not have enough money in their budget to run the medial service program. The plaintiffs also had concerns with the defendant’s ability to meet the required staffing, environmental and capacity standards. The court held a series of video status conferences with both parties to discuss the settlement agreement and budget issues. On May 5, 2014, Judge Barbadoro requested another status report with the ongoing points of contention between the parties. The parties submitted a spreadsheet that highlighted many of the same problems as the May 16, 2013 report: There were no paralegals, no grievance procedures, and not enough clean laundry. The plaintiffs expressed concern that there was still no transportation of inmates to medical care. The plaintiffs alleged that the food was not up to the agreed upon 2009 Federal Food Code standards. They alleged that the inmates were not receiving daily opportunities for physical movement. Finally, the plaintiffs were alleged that there was not enough trained staffing in most areas of the facility, that the buildings were in a state of disrepair, and that double bunking of maximum-security inmates was still occurring. The defendants asserted that they were either in the process of complying or had complied with all the regulations. On September 15, 2014, the defendants motioned to amend the settlement agreement, arguing that, in light of the current financial distress of Puerto Rico, it was too high of a financial burden on the defendants. The plaintiffs responded later that month, objecting to the changes. On December 4, 2014, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to extend the court’s supervision of the settlement agreement, which was scheduled to end December of 2014. Judge Barbadoro immediately granted an order extending the settlement agreement until December 31, 2014. On December 19, 2014, the defendants withdrew their motion before the court to amend the settlement agreement. On the same day, the parties filed an unrelated, joint final private settlement before the court for damages to the prisoners incarcerated under unconstitutional conditions. The damages settlement, while nominally submitted to the court, continued to be discussed between the parties for several months. On March 2, 2015, Judge Barbadoro requested that the parties either file an amended damages agreement or file a notice of intent not to file an amended agreement. The parties immediately filed requesting until March 13, 2015 to submit the proposed agreement, which the court granted. The final damages agreement, a private settlement and benefits proposal, was submitted on March 30, 2015. In the agreement, the parties proposed a system of giving individual inmates who had been incarcerated between 1980 to present a package of various educational, housing, health, recreation, public transportation and Department of Correction commissary benefits. On May 4, 2015, the court entered an order requesting estimates from both the plaintiffs and defendants on final costs associated with complying with the 2012 injunctive settlement agreement. Judge Barbadoro approved the damages settlement on November 30, 2015. On February 3, 2016, the plaintiffs started destroying old files relating to this case. The court continued to be focus on financially resolving both the damages and injunctive agreement aspects of this case. On March 31, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion requesting that the claims period begin on May 15, 2016 and end after 6 months on November 15, 2016. Judge Barbadoro granted the motion on April 1, 2016 and ordered that the plaintiffs publish notice of the claims via newspapers and take the notice website live to ensure that class members receive proper notice of the benefits they were entitled to under the settlement. On May 9, 2016, the court granted a motion that stipulated that the notification plan be paid for with fine funds. On August 23, 2016, Judge Barbadoro ordered that the remaining fine funds would be paid to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. The more than $20 million would be used to benefit inmates in Puerto Rico's correctional system. The court would continue to oversee the funds and the Commonwealth had to receive approval for the intended use of the funds from the court. The Commonwealth's obligation to pay the remaining fines was cancelled. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico continued to request approval of the funds from the court that benefitted Puerto Rican inmates. The court approved all requests. Some of the funds were used for improved educational programs for inmates and improved electronic recording for the management of inmates. The last action on the docket was September 6, 2019.

Summary: On January 3, 1979, prisoners being housed in Puerto Rican prisons filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Administration of Correction of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The District Court (Judge Juan Manuel Perez-Gimenez) found blatant violations of the federal Constitution's interdiction against cruel and unusual punishment. The Court is involved to correct the violations ever since. However the defendants have failed to comply for decades. On October 10, 1991, the District Court expressed its extreme frustration with the defendants' ongoing disobedience with the Court's orders, noting that the defendants had paid a total of $68,240,910.00 in fines based on their violation of the requirements that the inmates be given a stipulated amount of living space. On December 13, 2012, the District Court approved a final injunctive agreement, which was set to expired in 2014. The parties also settled a damages agreement for all inmates who have been incarcerated from 1980 to present with a series of government benefits, which is in the process of being dispersed. The court also stipulated that the remaining fine funds be given to Puerto Rico for the use of benefitting inmates in Puerto Rico.


On June 2, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a class action against the Governor of Georgia and other state officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations, business associations, and individuals. Plaintiffs challenged Georgia's comprehensive immigration law, House Bill 87 ("HB87"). The organizational Plaintiffs claimed that HB87 would cause them to divert resources from their traditional missions in order to educate the public on the effects of the new law. The individual Plaintiffs claimed that they would be subject to investigation, detention, and arrest under HB87 because of their status as, or association with, unauthorized aliens. In their complaint, Plaintiffs argued that HB87 violates the Supremacy Clause, the Fourth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the constitutional right to travel. Plaintiffs asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 8, 2011, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the enforcement of portions of HB87 that would go into effect on July 1, 2011. On June 14, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss. Defendants contended that the Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the District Court lacked jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims. The Court held a hearing on the motions on June 20, 2011. On June 27, 2011, the District Court (Judge Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.) issued an order granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction against Sections 7 and 8 of the law, and granting in part and denying in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 793 F. Supp. 2d 1317 (N.D. Ga. 2011). Section 7 of the law created three distinct state criminal violations: (1) transporting or moving an illegal alien, O.C.G.A. § 16-11-200(b); (2) concealing or harboring an illegal alien, id. § 16-11-201(b); and (3) inducing an illegal alien to enter the state of Georgia, id. § 16-11-202(b). The District Court found these provisions preempted by the criminal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, particularly 8 U.S.C. § 1324. Section 8 authorized police officers to investigate the immigration status of individuals who cannot produce adequate identification to prove citizenship, provided probable cause exists that the individual has committed a crime. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-100(b). In implementing this investigatory provision, officers were not permitted to "consider race, color, or national origin . . . except to the extent permitted by" the United States and Georgia Constitutions. Id. § 17-5-100(e). The District Court likewise enjoined this provision as preempted. Defendants appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. In December 2011, Defendants sought to stay the appeal pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision of Arizona v. United States, a case involving the Ninth Circuit striking down an Arizona law similar to this one. (Click here for the Clearinghouse entry on this case.) The Eleventh Circuit declined to stay proceedings. On August 20, 2012, in an opinion by Judge Charles Wilson, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's preliminary injunction. The Court held that, as a result of the Supreme Court's Arizona v. United States analysis (which had since been decided), Section 7's criminalization of various immigration-related conduct was preempted. The Court also held that Section 8's authorization of police inquiry regarding persons without proper documentation (the "papers please" provision) was not properly subject of a pre-enforcement facial challenge; rather, plaintiffs' challenge would have to focus on implementation, and was therefore premature. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012). The Court denied the defendants' request for rehearing en banc. On March 20, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thrash) entered a permanent injunction, enjoining Section 7 of HB87. The same day, Defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Section 8 of HB87, arguing that Plaintiffs' facial challenge could not move forward in light of the Arizona decision and the Eleventh Circuit's ruling in this case. In opposition, Plaintiffs argued that they needed more discovery to pursue their claims. On July 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Thrash) granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' challenge to Section 8. The Court held that, as a result of the Arizona and Eleventh Circuit decisions, Plaintiffs' "burden to establish the facial unconstitutionality of section 8 now appears to be insurmountable." The Court further held that "[a]ny further challenges to [HB87] must take the form of as-applied challenges." In granting the motion, the Court dismissed all remaining claims in the case. Ga. Latino Alliance for Human Rights v. Deal, 958 F. Supp. 2d 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2013).

Summary: This case was brought on June 2, 2011 to challenge Georgia's comprehensive immigration law, HB87. On August 20, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's grant of a preliminary injunction staying enforcement of the part of the law that purported to criminalize transporting or harboring an illegal alien. However, applying the Supreme Court's recent decision in U.S. v. Arizona, the court of appeals found that challenge to the "papers please" provision of the state law was premature, and needed to await implementation.


On December 17, 2003, a coalition of immigration rights advocacy groups, which included the National Council of La Raza (NCLR), New York Immigration Coalition (NYIC), American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), Latin American Workers Project (LAWP), and UNITE, filed suit against several federal agencies (FBI, DOJ, ICE, Homeland Security) in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, seeking to halt the government practice of entering and disseminating civil immigration information to state and local enforcement officials through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. Plaintiffs contended that the federal government had been entering information into the NCIC about outstanding immigration warrants or orders of deportation, exclusion or removal ("absconders") and alleged violations of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System ("NSEERS violators"). Plaintiffs further contended that because Congress had generally preempted state and local law enforcement officials from enforcing immigration law, defendants were causing state and local officials to make unconstitutional arrests based on the information entered. The federal agencies moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The District Court (Senior Judge I. Leo Glasser) granted the agencies' motion and dismissed the case for lack of standing. Judge Glasser held that "speculation that some unauthorized party at some point in the future might access immigration violators file in NCIC database in violation of alleged privacy right of members of advocacy organizations was not actual or imminent and concrete and particularized injury necessary for advocacy organization to have standing." National Council of La Raza v. Gonzales, 468 F.Supp.2d 429, 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). Plaintiffs appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, (Judges Straub, Raggi, Sessions) affirmed the dismissal on July 3, 2008. There was no opinion issued.

Summary: In 2003, a coalition of immigration rights advocacy groups filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against several federal agencies, seeking to halt the government practice of entering and disseminating civil immigration information to state and local enforcement officials through the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The case was dismissed for lack of standing, and the U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in 2008.


On October 22, 2018, media site Buzzfeed and one of its reporters brought this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and several of its components--Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Customs & Border Protection, and U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services. The case alleged violations of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Specifically, the plaintiffs had filed a FOIA request for unedited video, audio, and photographs of migrants and migrant children, and of children being separated from their parents and subsequently held in U.S. detention facilities. According to the complaint, the defendants had failed to provide an adequate response to the request. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs requested injunctive relief and attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Randolph D. Moss. This case was interrupted by a 34-day government shutdown. The case was therefore stayed from December 30, 2018 to February 6, 2019, when the shutdown ended. After the stay was lifted, the parties began submitting a series of joint status reports outlining their ongoing negotiations over the defendants’ search for responsive documents. On June 5, 2020, the parties reported that negotiations had become deadlocked, with the defendants still refusing to hand over the requested child detention records. In response to the breakdown in negotiations, Judge Moss ordered the parties to submit short notices outlining the bases for any anticipated motions for summary judgement. On June 30, the defendants filed their notice, listing two anticipated arguments: first, that they argued that the plaintiffs’ FOIA request did not “reasonably describe” the records sought in a way that ICE could process without undue burden. Second, the defendants insisted that they had no responsive records depicting “migrant children being separated from their parents,” because ICE did not separate children and parents, but rather held “family units” together in “family residential centers.” A week later, the plaintiffs submitted their own notice. They argued that the defendants’ pre-motion filing ignored months of negotiations and concessions regarding the scope of their FOIA request, and that this request was no longer burdensome or unreasonably described, as they were now seeking only those records that should have been preserved in connection with five other federal lawsuits. This case is still ongoing as of August 15, 2020. The defendants’ full motion for summary judgment is due on August 28, 2020 and the plaintiff’s response and cross motion is due on October 2, 2020.

Summary: On October 22, 2018, a Buzzfeed reporter and Buzzfeed brought this lawsuit against the U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security, Customs & Border Protection and Citizenship & Immigration Services in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. They alleged the violation of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs had requested from the defendants, agencies subject to FOIA, unedited video, audio and photographs of migrants and migrant children, and others seeking asylum and children being separated from their parent(s) and subsequently held in U.S. detention facilities. However, the defendants had not provided an adequate response to the request. The plaintiffs sought an injunctive order for compliance with the FOIA; specifically, that they release videos, audio recordings, and photographs depicting the detention, treatment, removal and intake of migrant children, as well as attorney fees and costs. The case is still ongoing.


On February 17, 2007, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ), opened an investigation of the Cook County Jail, under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). In July 2007, the DOJ conducted on-site inspections of the jail, interviewing staff and inmates, and on August 3, 2007, the DOJ notified jail officials of potentially life-threatening deficiencies at the jail, including grossly unsanitary conditions and inadequate emergency key precautions, which the jail immediately began to improve. As DOJ continued to investigate, its lawyers found a series of serious problems with the jail. For example, in one case, an inmate left untreated for a gunshot wound developed sepsis and died. Another inmate's medical problems went untreated, causing him to eventually need an amputation. Just one dentist served 9,800 inmates, and he only dealt in extractions. Indeed, the investigators found that twenty-five percent of the dental procedures result in infection. On July 11, 2008, the DOJ issued a 98-page findings letter detailing its conclusion that the jail was operating to deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights in many respects. The DOJ and the county then negotiated a settlement to the matter, and on May 13, 2010, DOJ filed its formal complaint and both parties filed a proposed settlement. On May 26, 2010, Judge Virginia M. Kendall issued an agreed order that addressed those problems and appointed four experts in the areas of Corrections, Medical, Mental Health, and Sanitation to monitor Defendants' compliance with the Order, who were to submit reports to the court on a semiannual basis. The proposed settlement contained comprehensive provisions on use of force, protection from harm, medical care, mental health care, sanitation, training, quality assurance/performance improvement, fire and life safety, and improved policies, procedures, and practices. The order would terminate when Defendants have achieved substantial compliance with each of the provisions of the Agreed Order and have maintained Substantial Compliance with the Agreed Order for a period of 18 months. On May 27, 2010, the Defendants filed a motion for a Prisoner Release Order. In a previous case, Duran v. Sheriff Thomas Dart (case no. 74 C 2949), Judge Shadur had ordered a Prisoner Release Order on March 22, 1983. (Duran is JC-IL-0002 in this Clearinghouse.) That order remained in effect over all the subsequent years. In addition to that order, Judge George M. Marovich, who succeeded Judge Shadur as the U.S. District Court Judge to whom this matter was assigned, entered a transfer order on November 14, 2003, permitting the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC) to transfer to the Illinois Department of Corrections all persons remanded to the CCDOC who had unexpired terms of imprisonment as a result of being released on a mandatory supervised release order ("Parole"). Despite having years to comply with the previous court orders, the CCDOC still had daily concerns whether a spike in arrests, or some other factor not under the CCDOC's control, would increase the number of inmates beyond the number of living units available. At the time, the daily population at CCDOC exceeded 90% of capacity. Therefore, the Defendants sought to continue the March 22, 1983 Prisoner Release Order entered by Judge Shadur and the November 14, 2003 Order entered by Judge Marovich pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(C). Defendants asked that the Prisoner Release Order permit the Sheriff to release individuals in such numbers necessary to reduce and relieve overcrowding, thus allowing solutions to the identified constitutional deficiencies. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, even if the parties agree, such an order can be entered only by a three-judge district court after certain findings are entered by that court. The requisite findings include: an ongoing violation of constitutional rights, with crowding as the primary source of the constitutional deficiencies, and weighing of public safety concerns. Pursuant to this statute, a three-judge court was convened. On January 11, 2011, Judge Richard A. Posner, Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman, and Judge Kendall denied the motion for entry of the proposed released order without prejudice, inviting the parties to submit a revised motion consistent with the discussion and directives in their opinion, plus evidence to support an estimate of the number of prisoners expected to be released if a revised order was approved. U.S. v. Cook County, Illinois, 761 F.Supp.2d 794 (N.D. Ill. 2011). The Defendant responded and the Plaintiffs agreed with the revised proposed order. On March 14, 2011, the three Judges stated that the revised proposed order complied with the directives in their opinion and was satisfactory with the exception of the provision stating that the Sheriff "may release detainees in order to reduce the population of CCJ to 85% of its available bed capacity," upon specified conditions. On March 29, 2011, the three Judges approved the modified released order that allowed the release on electronic monitoring of up to 1,500 pretrial detainees to prevent overcrowding and thus reduce the number of potential constitutional violations stemming from overcrowding at CCJ. On June 13, 2011, Judge Kendall ordered that, by agreement of the parties, the Sheriff of Cook County was authorized to retain Patricia Hardyman, Ph.D. of the Criminal Justice Institute, Inc. in Middletown, Connecticut to consult with and aid the Sheriff in creating a classification system compliant with the Agreed Order entered on May 26, 2010. The Court monitored the Defendants' compliance with the provisions of the order through reports of assigned monitors and the parties and periodic status conferences. The May 2017 monitoring report marked the first finding of achievement of substantial compliance with all areas of the order. On May 18, 2017, the DOJ moved to dismiss the Sheriff from the case, finding that the Sheriff and the CCDOC had achieved and sustained substantial compliance with the requirements assigned to the Sheriff under the order. At a June 9, 2017 hearing, Judge Kendall granted a motion to dismiss the Sheriff and lifted formal oversight of the Cook County jail in that respect. Because other provisions unrelated to the Sheriff still required 18 months of sustained compliance according to the order, limited twice-yearly monitoring continued. The November 2017 monitoring report found continued substantial compliance, marking 6 months of full substantial compliance. In that report, the monitor noted areas for improvement, particularly in regard to healthcare, and noted that in order to maintain substantial compliance regarding access to care, the County must address these areas prior to the next monitoring visit. The May 2018 report highlighted sustained substantial compliance with regards to medical and dental care. The parties filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss the remaining sections of the agreed order on June 12, 2018. The parties agreed that Cook County achieved and maintained substantial compliance with all of the Agreed Order provisions for which it bore responsibility, and therefore found it appropriate to conclude the Agreed Order. Judge Kendall granted the motion on June 26, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: After an investigation of Cook County Jail (CCJ) under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ), issued a findings letter on July 11, 2008, detailing its conclusion that the CCJ was operating to deprive prisoners of their constitutional rights in many respects. On May 13, 2010, the DOJ, on behalf of inmates from the CCJ, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1997 against Cook County and the Cook County Sheriff, proposing a previously negotiated settlement. On May 26, 2010, Judge Virginia M. Kendall issued an agreed order that addressed those problems and appointed four experts to monitor the Defendants' compliance with the order, who were to submit reports to the court on a semiannual basis. Defendants achieved substantial compliance in all areas in May 2017, and monitoring concluded in May 2018.


On June 12, 2015, this lawsuit was brought by an indigent person arrested by the City of Moss Point, Mississippi (the City), who was jailed for a prolonged period after she was unable to pay the fee demanded for release under the city’s “secured bail” schedule. Under that policy, persons arrested by the city were required to post a bail ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars, based on the offense committed, without any consideration of the person’s ability to pay. The plaintiff argued that the City’s policy violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Represented by public-interest legal groups Equal Justice Under Law and the MacArthur Justice Center, along with private counsel, the plaintiff brought suit in the U.S. federal Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, under § 1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The plaintiff requested class certification to represent other similarly situated individuals, a declaration that the City had violated the constitutional rights of arrestees who were unable to pay the City’s secured bail, preliminary and permanent injunctive relief requiring the City to stop jailing arrestees for their inability to pay the City’s secured bail, damages to the named plaintiff to compensate for her period of confinement, and legal costs and attorneys’ fees. On October 14, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached a settlement. That same day, the judge assigned to the case, District Judge Louis Guirola Jr., found the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief and plaintiff’s motion for class certification moot in light of the settlement. Under the agreement, the City would abandon its secured bail requirement for persons seeking release from jail after a warrantless arrest or after an initial warrant arrest. Instead, it would release those persons if they agreed to provide an unsecured bond (under which persons only pay the court if they fail to adhere to the conditions of their bail) or a recognizance (a promise to comply with the conditions of bail). The City also agreed to improve its procedures for notifying arrestees of court dates. On November 6, 2015, Judge Guirola entered a declaratory judgment holding that the City's use of secured bail against the plaintiff was a violation of the 14th Amendment right to equal protection. 2015 WL 10322003. On November 12, 2015, Judge Guirola entered a final judgment, ordering the parties to abide by the terms of the settlement agreement. The plaintiff's counsel agreed to notify defendants of any perceived breach, and to give defendants a reasonable amount of time to resolve the breach before seeking enforcement of the agreement in court. The City also agreed to notify the plaintiff and counsel if it find that any of its employees or agents had violated the agreement. The case was dismissed and is now closed.

Summary: On June 12, 2015, a person jailed by the City of Moss Point, Mississippi (the City) for failing to pay a secured bail fee sued the City in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, arguing that the City had violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiff sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. On November 12, 2015, District Judge Louis Guirola Jr. entered a final judgement ordering the parties to follow a settlement agreement that they had reached earlier, under which the City agreed to end its secured bail policy. The case is now closed.


On September 16, 2015, the plaintiff, a former female technical employee of Microsoft, filed this class action lawsuit in the Western District of Washington against Microsoft Corporation. The plaintiff, represented by Outten & Golden LLP, sued the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), and state law. The plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant’s policies, patterns, and practices, female technical employees received less compensation and were promoted less frequently than their male counterparts. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the force ranking system used by the defendant systematically undervalued female technical employees, resulting in lower pay and fewer promotions than male peers despite equal or better performance. On October 27, 2015, the plaintiff amended her complaint to include additional named plaintiffs. On November 12, 2015, the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on the following: plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to allege intent to discriminate by defendant; plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims for failure to allege a causal relationship between the forced ranking system and the alleged disparate impact; and plaintiffs’ retaliation claims for failure to state a prima facie case of retaliation. Defendant also moved to strike plaintiffs’ class definition on the grounds it was not ascertainable and the plaintiffs’ Title VII claims on grounds of timeliness. On March 7, 2016, the court (Judge James L. Robart) denied defendant’s motion to strike the class definition as it was not implausible on its face and the plaintiffs deserved to develop the facts and/or and definition of their class via class discovery. The court denied the motion to strike Title VII allegations on grounds of timeliness without prejudice as the motion raised a relevant dispute. The court denied the motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ disparate treatment claims as the plaintiffs satisfied the pleading requirements of the claim. The court also denied the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim as the allegations created a plausible inference that the plaintiffs suffered at least one adverse employment action while working for the defendant. However, the Court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the disparate impact claims as the plaintiffs did not demonstrate sufficient factual allegations to show how the forced ranking system caused a systematic undervaluation of female technical employees. The Court granted plaintiffs thirty days to amend the complaint to resolve the lack of detail with respect to the disparate impact claim. 2016 WL 4472930. On April 6, 2016, the plaintiffs submitted their second amended complaint, which contained additional factual allegations to support their disparate impact claim. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the disparate impact claims of the second amended complaint on April 25, 2016. On October 14, 2016, the court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, finding the additional facts sufficient to make the plaintiffs’ claims plausible. 2016 WL 6037978. Over the next year, the parties engaged in class discovery. On October 27, 2017, plaintiffs moved for class certification of female employees in Stock Levels 59-67 working in the Engineering and/or the I/T Operations Professions from September 16, 2012, to the present. On April 6, 2018 the defendants moved for summary judgement. They argued that the plaintiffs were procedurally barred from bringing their claims due to statute of limitation issues and that they could not establish a proper case for disparate treatment. They also alleged that the named plaintiff's constructive discharge claim failed due to her continuing to work long after the work conditions became allegedly intolerable, and that their retaliation claims failed due to no adverse action being taken against them. On June 25, 2018, the court denied the plaintiff's class certification in a sealed order. 2018 WL 3328418. The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not affirmatively demonstrated commonality of fact, typicality of claims, or adequate protection of interests among the class. On July 9, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit (Docket No. 18-80080). On July 11, 2018, the court issue an order granting partial summary judgement for the defendants. 2018 WL 3584701. The defendant's motion for summary judgement for the denial of punitive damages under state law was granted, and the rest of their motion was denied, including leaving open the possibility for punitive damages under federal law. Due to identifying information contained within the order it has been sealed. On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs appealed this order to the 9th Circuit (18-35791). Both appeals are ongoing.

Summary: On September 16, 2015, the plaintiff, a former female technical employee, filed this class action against the defendant under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e). The plaintiff alleged that as a result of defendant’s policies, patterns, and practices, female technical employees received less compensation and were promoted less frequently than their male counterparts. The court eventually denied class certification, and on July 11, 2018 partially granted the defendants summary judgement motion on the issue of state punitive damages. The plaintiffs have appealed both orders to the 9th Circuit and the case is ongoing as of November 19, 2019.


On June 19, 2012, a prisoner incarcerated at the Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and Equal Justice Initiative, sought relief from his sentence under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The plaintiff claimed that denial of relief by the Virginia courts ran contrary to federal law clearly established by Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, the plaintiff, who was serving two life sentences without parole for conduct committed as a minor, claimed that the state’s refusal to give non-homicide juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release ran counter to Graham v. Florida, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide to life without parole. On July 15, 2002, nearly ten years prior to filing his habeas corpus petition, the plaintiff had been found guilty of rape and abduction for conduct that occurred on July 6, 1999, when the plaintiff was 16 years old. On March 4, 2003, he was sentenced to serve two terms of life imprisonment. Under the Virginia Code, the plaintiff was ineligible for parole. On May 17, 2010, more than seven years after the plaintiff received his sentences, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Florida. In light of the new Supreme Court precedent, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Vacate Invalid Sentence in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court on May 11, 2011. The circuit court denied the plaintiff’s motion, concluding that Virginia’s geriatric statute, which allows prisoners to apply for condition release at the age of sixty, provides an appropriate mechanism for compliance with Graham. The Supreme Court of Virginia refused the plaintiff’s petition for appeal on April 13, 2012, and denied his petition for rehearing on June 15, 2012. The plaintiff subsequently petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. On November 15, 2012, Red Onion State Prison and the Commonwealth of Virginia moved to dismiss. On July 24, 2013, Magistrate Judge Lawrence R. Leonard issued a report and recommendation, recommending that respondents’ motion to dismiss be granted. 2013 WL 10799406. In his opinion, Judge Leonard discussed a Virginia Supreme Court case, Angel v. Commonwealth. The Angel decision explained that the state does have methods in place for allowing juvenile offenders an opportunity for release: the geriatric release statute provides prisoners with the opportunity to apply for conditional release at age sixty. Further, reviewing of a claim raised in a § 2254 petition is impermissible unless the state court decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; the report concluded that this showing was not made in this case. On July 1, 2015, after supplemental briefing, the District Court (Judge Arenda L. Wright Allen) denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss and granted the prisoner's petition. 2015 WL 4042175. The District Court held that the state court determination was contrary to clearly established federal law and involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. First, Graham imposes a flat ban on life sentences without parole for juvenile non-homicide offenders. Second, the theory that the state complies with Graham by allowing prisoners to apply for geriatric release misapplies Graham’s governing principle that children warrant special consideration in sentencing. Respondents appealed, but on November 7, 2016, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the petitioner is entitled to relief from his unconstitutional sentence. 841 F.3d 256. Judge Wynn explained that the state court adjudication was an unreasonable application of Graham. It was unreasonable for the Virginia state courts to conclude that geriatric release amounted to a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on maturity and rehabilitation, as is demanded by Graham. Judge Niemeyer, in dissent, argued that the Virginia court’s decision in Angel v. Commonwealth was reasonable and should be given deference. The state's petition for rehearing en banc was denied. On January 24, 2017, Red Onion State Prison and the Commonwealth of Virginia moved to stay the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. On February 1, 2017, the Fourth Circuit granted the motion to stay the mandate. On June 12, the Supreme Court granted cert and, in a per curiam opinion, reversed. On August 25, Fourth Circuit then reversed the district court's judgment. Neither court provided reasoning for its decision. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 19, 2012, a prisoner incarcerated at the Red Onion State Prison in Pound, Virginia, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The plaintiff, who was serving two life sentences without parole for conduct committed as a minor, claimed that the state’s refusal to give non-homicide juvenile offenders a meaningful opportunity to obtain release ran counter to Graham v. Florida, in which the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing juvenile offenders who did not commit homicide to life without parole. On July 1, 2015, the District Court granted the petition. On November 7, 20156, the Fourth Circuit affirmed. On February 1, 2017, the Fourth Circuit granted a motion to stay the mandate pending the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari.


On June 25, 2004, an employee of Mills Fleet Farm Inc. filed a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, against his employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the defendant had maintained patterns, practices, policies, customs, and usages which were unlawful and which discriminated on the bases of race and gender. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that the defendant required potential hires to take a pre-employment test that collected race, color, and gender information and also failed to hire minorities while offering jobs to less qualified Caucasians. According to the PACER docket, the plaintiff never filed a motion for class certification. The parties reached a private, confidential settlement agreement, and on March 1, 2005, the court (Judge Paul A. Magnuson) dismissed the case with prejudice. No further information was available.

Summary: On June 25, 2004, an employee of Mills Fleet Farm Inc. filed a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn. Stat. § 363, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, against his employer in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiff contended that the defendant required potential hires to take a pre-employment test that collected race, color, and gender information and also failed to hire minorities while offering jobs to less qualified Caucasians. The plaintiff never filed a motion for class certification, and the parties reached a confidential settlement agreement. The parties stipulated to voluntary dismissal, and on March 1, 2005, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.


On 07/10/2008, plaintiffs--a group of attorneys, journalists, and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations represented by the American Civil Liberties Union--filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the United States challenging the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (FISA) under Article III of the Constitution, the Fourth and First Amendments, and separation of powers principles. FISA provides a framework governing "applications for orders authorizing electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information, including surveillance of communications between persons located within the United States ("domestic communications") and surveillance of communications between persons located outside the United States ("international communications")." Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). Section 702 of FISA, 50 U.S.C. § 1881a, as added by the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), permits the Attorney General and DNI to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance targeting the communications of non-U.S. persons located abroad, but the government need not establish probable cause that the target of electronic surveillance is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, nor must government specify the nature and location of the facilities or places that surveillance will occur. Plaintiffs argued that Section 702 violates the Fourth Amendment because it authorizes government to acquire communications of U.S. citizens and residents without obtaining individualized warrants based on probable cause. They argue Section 702 violates the First Amendment by substantially burdening lawful expressive activity. They argue that Section 702 violates Article III and separation of powers principles by allowing the process of judicial review established in the FAA allows the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to issue orders in the absence of a case or controversy. Both parties moved for summary judgment, but the district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing under Article III. In August 2009, the district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment. Amnesty Int'l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The district court found that the plaintiffs could only demonstrate "an abstract fear that their communications will be monitored under the FAA," and that "the chilling of their speech that they attribute to the statute is actually the result of their purely subjective fear of surveillance." Id. at 645, 653. The plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of the Appeals for the Second Circuit, which reversed the district court's judgment in March 2011. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011), denied rehearing in banc, 667 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2011). The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled 5-4 in February 2013 that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they "cannot demonstrate that the future injury they purportedly fear is certainly impending." Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013).

Summary: In July 2008, plaintiffs--a group of attorneys, journalists, and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations--filed suit in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the National Security Agency (NSA), the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), and the United States challenging the constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1881 (FISA) under Article III of the Constitution, the Fourth and First Amendments, and separation of powers principles. In February 2013, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to bring the claim. Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013).


Starting in 2005 and continuing for more than a year, the City of Fresno, CA had a policy of immediately seizing and destroying on the spot the personal possessions of homeless individuals during sweeps conducted by the City of Fresno Police Department and City of Fresno Sanitation Department. The City used large compactors to immediately crush the seized possessions. These sweeps were all conducted without warrants and were intended to remove homeless persons, their encampments, and their property from both public and privately owned locations within Fresno, including repeated sweeps on land owned by California Department of Transportation (Caltrans). Several homeless individuals who had been affected by the policy filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated against the City of Fresno, Caltrans, and related officials. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California on October 17, 2006. The plaintiffs were represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Northern California, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, and private counsel. The named plaintiffs had lost possessions to these sweeps, including items critical to their survival such as medication, tents, blankets, and personal documents and records, as well as other irreplaceable items such as photographs and in one instance the ashes of a deceased relative. The plaintiffs alleged that these sweeps, often conducted without any notice, were raids that had the purpose and effect of harassing and removing homeless individuals. Plaintiffs argued that the sweeps constituted unlawful takings, in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and also violated the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures, and their Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection rights, 42 U.S.C § 1983, and California statutory and constitutional law. Plaintiffs sought temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions enjoining Fresno from conducting the sweeps, a permanent injunction preventing the practice, and a judgment declaring the sweeps and the destruction of the Plaintiffs' property unlawful. They also sought the return of whatever property had not been destroyed, damages of no less than $4000 per incident, punitive and exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order on the same day as their complaint. On October 25, the Court (Judge Oliver W. Wanger) granted a restraining order until hearing on the issue of a preliminary injunction could be held. He found that the City had violated the plaintiffs' Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the equivalent provisions of the Constitution of California. He held therefore that the Plaintiffs' case had a strong likelihood of winning on its merits. The Judge recognized that between 4,400 and 8,800 residents of Fresno, or one to two percent of the City's population, were homeless, and shelter was available for only about 1.4% percent of these individuals, and that despite the City's arguments to the contrary, the existence of shelters did not justify the confiscation of property belonging to homeless persons camping in public. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 2006 WL 3542732 (W.D. Cal. 2007). On December 8, 2006, the Court ordered a preliminary injunction, enjoining the City from conducting sweeps that would result in the seizure and destruction of private property without first giving constitutionally adequate written notice of the pending sweep, seizure, and destruction, and a meaningful opportunity for individuals to be heard and to retrieve property prior to its destruction. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597 (W.D. Cal. 2007). On January 12, 2007, the Director of Caltrans, named as a defendant in his official capacity, filed a motion for the claims against her to be dismissed for, among other things, lack of jurisdiction. The Court denied this on March 19, 2007. Kincaid v. City of Fresno, 2007 WL 833058 (W.D. Cal. 2007). This was followed by several months of discovery. On August 14, 2007, the Court certified the class. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 244 F.R.D. 597 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On April 25, 2008, during oral argument Judge Oliver W. Wanger declared that the City's "practice of announce, strike, seize [and] destroy immediately is against the law." On May 12, 2008 the court issued two opinions, one of which denied various motions for summary judgment filed by both parties on a number of issues, and granted summary judgment in favor of two of the individual defendants in regard to State law claims against them for money damages. The substantial claims of the case were not decided in this opinion. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 2008 WL 2038386 (N.D. Cal. 2008). The other May 12 opinion granted in part and denied in part another motion for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiffs against the City defendant, holding that the City of Fresno's raids were unlawful, that any seizure and immediate destruction of property proven at trial would be held to be a violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that State law established a private right of action against the City with respect to the State law claims. Kinkaid v. City of Fresno, 2008 WL 2038390 (N.D. Cal. 2008). On July 25, 2008, the Court approved a class-action settlement negotiated by the parties. According to the settlement, the City of Fresno would post written notice at least three days prior to any future sweeps that would involve the removal of personal property, and will store any items of apparent value for ninety days so that might be reclaimed. Caltrans also agreed to comply with the legal principles set forth in the court's preliminary injunction throughout the state. The Settlement divided the the class members into five subgroups, based on the value of their seized property, whether they were victims of repeated unconstitutional sweeps, whether they were present when the sweeps occurred and actively prevented from reclaiming their property, whether they suffered severe emotional distress or hardship as a result of the sweeps, and other factors. The City of Fresno agreed to pay $1,000,000 into a Housing Allowance Fund. This fund was established to assist the lawsuit's class members with expenses related to housing, such as security deposits, first and last months rent, or rent payments, or to aid in the purchase a vehicle or medical care. Only members of the third, fourth, and fifth sub-classes would receive assistance from this fund, in amounts of $1500, $3500, or $9000. The City also agreed to set aside $400,000 in a separate Cash Fund to compensate individuals who suffered the unconstitutional seizure of property. The settlement established a system for filing claims, accounting for the number of times claimants were subjected to the illegal sweeps and their value of the seized property. The minimum and maximum values for claims was $500 and $5000, depending on which sub-class to which the claimant belonged. Claimants could make multiple claims. Caltrans agreed to pay $85,000 into this cash fund. The City of Fresno agreed to pay $850,000 in legal and costs fees to Plaintiffs, and Caltrans agreed to pay $85,000 of the Plaintiffs fees and costs. At the time of the most recent report from the Settlement Administrator, March 8, 2012, there was just over $80,000 remaining in the two funds. Administrative costs were keep very low during the life of the settlement, and the funds were effectively distributed to the claimants. The Court retained jurisdiction over the case for five years in order to assure compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement ended in 2013, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The case was filed on behalf of homeless people whose personal property was confiscated by police and city workers. The court issued a temporary restraining order against the City of Fresno, followed by a preliminary injunction prohibiting the City from continuing to seize and destroy the property of homeless people. The parties settled the case in June 2008, with the defendants agreeing to stop their unlawful practices and to create two funds to provide relief valued at between $500 and $14,000 to each claimant, depending on the value of the property seized and the emotional distress caused, among other factors.


On July 2, 2015, plaintiffs -- two same sex couples -- filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Rowan County Clerk Kim Davis, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Kentucky, asked the court for both injunctive and declaratory relief, alleging that Davis's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses and the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The plaintiffs also sought class action certification for all persons similarly situated. The case was assigned to United States District Judge David Bunning. This case is a direct result of the Supreme Court decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, which held that same sex couples had a fundamental right to marry. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Immediately after <i>Obergefell</i>, the Governor of Kentucky had explicitly instructed all county clerks to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples. So once this case was filed, Davis filed a third party complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Governor and State Librarian of Kentucky alleging that the Governor's mandate to issue marriage licenses violated her right to religious conscience under the First Amendment. Arguments in the District Court centered on whether Ms. Davis, as an elected official, had a right to deny same sex marriage licenses as a matter of religious liberty. Judge Bunning found that the instruction by the Governor to issue same-sex marriage licenses was facially neutral as to its implication on any particular religion. The Court therefore found (applying a rational basis test) that the Governor's goal was simply to ensure that the activities of the State of Kentucky were consistent with the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. Ms. Davis, therefore, had no relevant protected religious liberty interest. As a result of this reasoning, on August 12, 2015, Judge Bunning issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendant from continuing to refuse marriage licenses to same sex couples. 123 F. Supp. 3d 924 (E.D. Ky. 2015). Davis immediately appealed to the Sixth Circuit (docketed no. 15-5880), and filed a motion to stay the injunction pending appeal. The district court denied the motion to stay, but then temporarily stayed the order to give the appellate court an opportunity to review the denial of the stay. On August 26, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied the motion for a stay. 2015 WL 10692640. Davis further appealed to the United Supreme Court, which also denied her application for stay. 136 S.Ct. 23. Nonetheless, Davis continued to refuse marriage licenses to same sex couples. After a hearing on September 3, 2015, she was held in contempt of court, and jailed for civil contempt until September 8, 2015, at which time she was released from jail provided that she not interfere with the ongoing issuance of marriage licenses by Rowan County's deputy clerks. Davis appealed. She also sought an injunction against the Kentucky government prohibiting state authorities from directing her to authorize the issuance of marriage licenses while her appeal was pending at the Sixth Circuit. On September 11, 2015, the district court (Judge David L. Bunning) denied Davis's request. 2015 WL 9461520 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 11, 2015). Davis also asked the Sixth Circuit to stay the plaintiffs' injunction against her pending her appeal. On September 17, 2015, the Sixth Circuit denied her request. Finally, Davis asked for an emergency stay of the injunction against her. The district court denied this request. 2015 WL 9460311 (E.D. Ky. Sept. 23, 2015). Davis then appealed the denial of the stay of the September 3 order (docket no. 15-5978), but the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial on November 5, 2015. 2015 WL 10692638 (6th Cir.). The Sixth Circuit scheduled oral argument on Davis's remaining appeals for July 28, 2016. After she was released from jail, Davis had returned to work and she changed the forms that they used to issue marriage licenses. Worried that these forms would not be considered valid, the plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the injunction against Davis and require her to use the old forms. However, on February 9, 2016, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request as moot because the forms were valid and same-sex marriage licenses were being issued by the office. On April 19, 2016, the Sixth Circuit issued an order dismissing the state defendants from the case for lack of jurisdiction. On July 13, 2016, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the multiple pending appeals pursuant to Senate Bill 216, which would allow the removal of the name of the county clerk from marriage license forms. 667 Fed.Appx. 537. SB 216 was to take effect prior to oral arguments in the Sixth Circuit, rendering the appeals moot. In response, the district court vacated the preliminary injunctions and denied all pending motions as moot on August 18, 2016. On July 21, 2017, the district court awarded the plaintiffs $224,703.08 in attorneys' fees and costs. 267 F.Supp.3d 961. It required Kentucky, rather than the Clerk’s Office or Rowan County, to pay the award. Davis appealed the award in the Sixth Circuit on November 22, 2017 (docket no. 17-6404). The Kentucky defendants also appealed the fee award (docket no. 17-6385). Throughout 2018, the parties briefed the appeal. Oral argument was held on January 31, 2019. Judges Richard Griffin, Helene White, and John Bush affirmed the district court’s award of attorney’s fees on August 23, 2019. 936 F.3d 442. In addition, the Sixth Circuit affirmed that the liability should be imposed on Kentucky because Davis acted on Kentucky’s behalf when issuing and refusing to issue marriage licenses. The plaintiffs then had until November 4, 2019 to submit a request for attorneys' fees for all work performed subsequent to the July 21, 2017 order. On November 4, 2019 the plaintiffs submitted a request for an extension to submit the request. As of January 2020, this case was ongoing.

Summary: This case in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky concerns the defendant county clerk's refusal to issue marriage licenses to same sex couples, because of her religious beliefs. District Judge Bunning found she lacks a protected religious liberty interest and held her in contempt. She was released from jail conditioned on her not interfering with deputy clerks' issuance of licenses. She appealed. While her appeals were pending, the Kentucky General Assembly passed Senate Bill 216, which would allow the removal of the name of the county clerk from marriage license forms. SB 216 rendered the appeals moot and the district court vacated the preliminary injunctions. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $224,703.08 in attorneys' fees and costs. This case is ongoing.


On July 13, 2011, the plaintiffs, a Mormon man and four Mormon women who were cohabitating and involved in a polyamorous relationship, filed a lawsuit in the U.S District Court of Utah against the State of Utah under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs are a self-described "plural family," in which only one couple, the male plaintiff and one of the female plaintiffs, holds an official marriage license. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Utah Code Ann. §76-7-101 ("Utah Statute"), which makes it a crime when a person, "knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person was a husband or wife . . . purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person," violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs began starring in a TLC reality television show in 2010 called "Sister Wives," which documented their lifestyle and religious beliefs. They argued that they had been prosecuted under the Utah Statute solely because of their religious beliefs. On May 31, 2012, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for mootness because the plaintiffs had moved to Nevada, and the Utah County Attorney's Office had closed its file on the plaintiffs and adopted a policy ("the UCAO policy") under which the Utah County Attorney would bring bigamy prosecutions only against those who (1) induce a partner to marry through misrepresentation or (2) are suspected of committing a collateral crime such as fraud or abuse. The plaintiffs fell into neither category. On the same day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment. On Dec. 13, 2013, District Court Judge Clark Waddoups granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declared the Utah Statute facially unconstitutional. 947 F.Supp.2d 1170 (2013). The court found that while the cohabitation prong of the statute (the phrase "or cohabits with another person") was facially neutral, it was not operationally neutral and had been used, through a pattern of enforcement, to specifically target religious cohabitations. The court then found that because the cohabitation prong was not operationally neutral it was subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection clause, which it failed. The court further found that the cohabitation prong violated the Due Process clause under the right to privacy as articulated in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). Finally, the court found that the cohabitation prong was not articulated with a reasonable degree of clarity and was therefore void for vagueness. In order to preserve the remainder of the statute, the court severed the phrase "or cohabits with another person" from the law. The court then narrowed the construction of the terms "marry" and "purports to marry," as a broad understanding of these terms would once again give rise to the constitutional dilemmas posed by the cohabitation prong. The court thus ordered a narrowing construction of the terms to "prohibit[] bigamy in the literal sense--the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible possession of two purportedly valid marriage licenses for the purpose of entering into more than one purportedly legal marriage." The court did not address the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On Dec. 20, 2012, the court's judgment on these issues was vacated because the case had mistakenly been closed before the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were heard. On Aug. 27, 2014, Judge Waddoups renewed his ruling that the cohabitation prong violated the constriction as outlined above and granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. 2014 WL 4249865. The Court further awarded plaintiffs their attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses incurred under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. On Sept. 24, 2014, the State appealed the district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. On Sept. 4, 2015, the court ordered that judgment in the amount of $242,500 for attorneys' fees in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants should be entered. On May 13, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied the petition for en banc review. The panel decided, however, sua sponte, to amend the district court's decision. The Tenth Circuit found the case had become moot, but the district court nevertheless denied the Utah County Attorney's motion to dismiss the case as moot and instead granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. Any live case or controversy had been extinguished a year and a half before the district court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs and over two years before the entry of final judgment. Thus, because the case became moot prior to final adjudication, vacatur and dismissal without prejudice were appropriate. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, but their petition for a writ of certiorari was denied. On Mar. 9, 2017, pursuant to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' remand instruction, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs was vacated and the case was dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: On July 13, 2011, a Mormon man and four Mormon women cohabitating and engaged in a polyamorous relationship filed a lawsuit asking the court to declare that Utah Code Ann. §76-7-101 ("Utah Statute"), which makes it a crime when a person, "knowing he has a husband or wife or knowing the other person was a husband or wife . . . purports to marry another person or cohabits with another person," violated their Constitutional rights. On August 27, 2014, Judge Waddoups ordered that the "cohabitation" prong of the Statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and struck it from the Statute for vagueness.


On February 19, 2019, a man serving a life sentence in a Florida prison filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Florida Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the Declaratory Judgment Act. The case was ultimately assigned to Judge Robert L. Hinkle. The plaintiff, represented by the Social Justice Law Collective and the Florida Justice Institute, sought a declaration that the Department had violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also sought a preliminary and permanent injunction that would restore his access while in prison to digital media files that he had previously purchased. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Department of Corrections had violated his constitutional rights when they switched from the Digital Music Player Program to the current Multimedia Tablet Program without allowing inmates to retain their previously-purchased digital media and digital media players. The Department implemented the Digital Music Player Program in 2011 in order to provide a secure method by which prisoners could browse, select, purchase, and download digital content to MP3/MP4 players, made specifically for use by inmates in a correctional setting. Advertisements to inmates emphasized that once they purchased media, they would always own it and could delete and re-order digital media that they had purchased from a cloud-based library at no additional cost. In 2017, the Department terminated its contract with the Digital Music Player Program vendor, entered into a new contract with a competing vendor, and transitioned to the Multimedia Tablet Program. Under the new program, inmates were required to purchase a new multimedia device and were required to surrender their previous digital media players, along with all the digital content they had purchased for the previous devices. Inmates had the option of sending the player/files to someone outside the prison at an additional cost, but they could no longer access the media files they had purchased while in prison. Although inmates who had participated in the Digital Music Player Program received discounts on the new program, they did not receive any other form of compensation for the taking of their digital media players and files. Because inmates had purchased the devices and files specifically to use while in prison, the plaintiff claimed that the Department’s transition to the Multimedia Tablet Program amounted to an unconstitutional taking of private property (particularly for inmates serving a life sentence who would not benefit from sending the device to family or friends outside the prison). The plaintiff also claimed that the Department’s transition to the new program violated the plaintiffs’ substantive Due Process rights; he claimed that the transition was implemented in the Department’s legislative capacity, was arbitrary and capricious, and had no rational basis. The plaintiff sought to represent a class defined as All Florida Department of Corrections prisoners whose digital media files were taken, or will be taken, pursuant to the Multimedia Tablet Program.” On April 5, 2019, the Department filed a motion for a more definite statement. The court denied this motion on May 3, 2019. On May 20, 2019, the Department filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, and failure to join a required party. The court denied the motion on on May 30, 2019, holding, among other things, that “Under the plain language of Rule 12(h)(1)(A), the Secretary waived the venue defense by failing to include it in the motion for a more definite statement.” On June 3, 2019, the plaintiff moved to certify the class. The Department sought summary judgment on August 21, 2019. The court denied both motions on September 25, 2019. Regarding the class certification motion, the court held that the proposed class failed to meet the numerosity requirement, writing that “the Department’s policy change, when coupled with the replacement media players and credits available to affected inmates, will make some inmates winners and some losers. The record gives no information at all on the number in each category. A class cannot properly be certified unless there are enough losers to meet the numerosity requirement.” Regarding the Department’s motion for summary judgment, the court held that the motion ignored a critical part of the plaintiff’s claim, and contrary to the Department’s assertions, the plaintiff’s claims presented genuinely disputed material facts. The plaintiff sought amend the order denying class certification on October 25, 2019. On January 9, 2020, the court denied this motion, “based on evidence that, while the original class-certification motion was pending, [the plaintiff] prepared a fraudulent document for submission in a prison disciplinary proceeding,” deeming the plaintiff inadequate as a class representative. On January 21, 2020, the plaintiff again filed a motion to alter or amend the order denying class certification. On March 2, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint. The proposed changes included addition of two new individual plaintiffs and new factual allegations. A day later, the Department moved for summary judgment. The court granted leave for plaintiff to amend the complaint on March 6, 2020. The Department filed a motion to dismiss the proposed changes to the complaint on March 20, 2020. At a hearing on April 15, 2020, the parties announced that they had reached a settlement agreement, contingent upon certification of a class for settlement purposes and, in due course, the court’s approval of the settlement. The court partly granted the plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider class certification on April 16, 2020. According to this order, a class was certified consisting of “all current Florida Department of Corrections prisoners whose digital media files were taken, or will be taken, pursuant to the Department’s termination of the MP3 program, and who purchased more than 75 songs through that program.” In addition, the court denied the Department’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment on the same day. The court reasoned that “denial is based on mootness with this exception: the Department’s assertion that the plaintiffs lack standing and the court lacks jurisdiction is not moot but is denied on the merits.” On May 14, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. According to this motion, the Department “agreed to restore the ability of each member of the Class to listen to a certain, agreed upon number of songs that were previously purchased under the Digital Music Player Program through the issuance of Settlement Credits,” among other things. The agreement also required the Department to pay the plaintiffs $150,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. The court issued an order preliminarily granting the proposed settlement on May 26, 2020. On July 13, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion to amend the class definition, to include inmates who had purchased 100 songs, rather than 75. In addition, on July 14, 2020, the parties jointly filed a fully executed settlement agreement, which, among other things, removed an individual plaintiff as a class representative. On July 27, 2020, the court approved the parties’ joint motion to amend the class definition. As of August 3, 2020, this case is ongoing; the Final Fairness Hearing, which will determine whether the Settlement Agreement is fair, reasonable, and adequate, is scheduled for December 4, 2020.

Summary: In 2019, a man serving a life sentence in a Florida prison filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He claimed that the Florida Department of Correction’s transition between digital media programs for inmates, without allowing the inmates to keep the devices and files they had previously purchased, violated their constitutional rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court gave preliminary approval of a settlement agreement on May 26, 2020. As of August 3, 2020, the Final Fairness Hearing is scheduled for December.