On March 24, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Judge Terrence McVerry was assigned to this case. The EEOC alleged that the defendant-company discriminated against a female employee on the basis of sex and in retaliation for reporting the discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the Commission alleged that the employee was sexually harassed by a superior, and after complaining to the Human Resources department, the superior retaliated against her by denying her the ability to be promoted and receive salary increases, excluding her from group emails and voicemails, and making her feel isolated and unwelcome in the office. On April 11, 2005, the party who was the subject of the alleged discrimination motioned to intervene. The Court granted her motion on April 22. The plaintiffs sought several forms of relief. The EEOC requested a permanent injunction barring defendant from retaliating against employees who complain about unlawful discrimination. It also requested that the Court require defendant to institute practices and programs that create equal employment opportunities for women and to make the affected female employee whole, by paying her damages related to losses she suffered as a result of the discrimination and retaliation (back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, medical expenses), as well as punitive damages. It also sought attorneys' fees. On April 6, 2006, the defendant moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, asserting that because the affected employee settled her claims against the company through a confidential monetary settlement and ended pursuing litigation in this matter. The defendant argued that since the complaint filed by the EEOC did not challenge a policy or practice or allege discrimination against any other employee, the Court did not have the required subject matter jurisdiction. The Court denied the defendant's request on August 8. Although this was an issue of first impression in the circuit, the Court adopted the reasoning in a similar case out of the Eastern District of New York: Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bay Ridge Toyota, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 167 (E.D. N.Y. 2004). In that case, Judge Glasser concluded that the employer’s private settlement of the employee’s sexual harassment claim did not bar the EEOC from bringing an action based on the discrimination alleged by the employee. Glasser concluded that the EEOC could still pursue injunctive relief even where the employee had entered into a settlement with the employer, because of the EEOC’s unique role in vindicating the public interest. Consequent to Glasser's opinion in Bay Ridge Toyota, the Court held that the EEOC's claim that sought damages for the affected individual employee (i.e., victim-specific relief) was barred, but that the EEOC could maintain its request for injunctive relief. Soon after the Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to overturn the Court's order denying its dismissal. Defendant's appeal was denied on November 3, 2006, by Circuit Judges Dolores Sloviter, Richard L. Nygaard, and Michael A. Chagares, without stated reasoning. On January 8, 2007, defendant moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, Novartis advanced two arguments: first, it contended that because the EEOC now sought only injunctive relief, the Court had to dismiss the claim because the EEOC could not obtain injunctive relief as a matter of law; and second, it argued that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether its actions violated federal law, thereby defeating any possibility of injunctive relief as a matter of law. The Court denied defendant's motion for summary judgement on September 28, disagreeing with both of Novartis' arguments. A bench trial was held on February 4, 2008. On October 15, 2008, the Court issued its ruling and judgment in the case. The Court found and ruled in favor of the defendant. The Court found that the EEOC failed to present any credible evidence to show that Novartis took any retaliatory “adverse action” against affected employee because she engaged in protected activity, i.e., complaining to Human Resources. Accordingly, the Court entered judgment in favor of Novartis. The Court stated that even had the EEOC presented that evidence, Novartis articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for taking certain adverse actions against the affected employee, that were not pre-textual for unlawful retaliation against the employee. On January 13, 2009, the Court ordered that the EEOC pay defendant $3,863.60 in costs taxed. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged sex discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In February 2008, a bench trial was held. Some months later, the court ordered a judgment in favor of the defendant.


On May 28, 1985, the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ] notified the Governor of the Virgin Islands that it was commencing an investigation of alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility, St. Croix, Virgin Islands, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997. The DOJ issued a findings letter on January 23, 1986, advising that it had reasonable cause to believe that inmates confined to the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility were being deprived of their constitutional rights. On October 23, 1986, the DOJ filed suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997 in the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands, alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility. The parties settled the case shortly thereafter and a formal Consent Decree was approved by the District Court (Judge O'Brien) on December 1, 1986. The Decree called for various reforms to Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility in the areas of fire safety, security, sanitation and medical care. Implementation of the specified reforms called for in the Consent Decree occurred for years. The DOJ employed a penology expert, John Dahm, to monitor compliance and to assist in development of a correction plan. Several enforcement and contempt motions filed by the DOJ followed over the years. According to the docket, a Show Cause Hearing was held on February 8 - 10, 2006 before Magistrate Judge Cannon. On April 18, 2006, Judge Cannon granted the DOJ's motion to find defendant in contempt and appointed a Special Master. On May 15, 2007, the Court again found the defendants in contempt. Throughout the next few years the parties engaged in numerous evidentiary disputes and, on September 12, 2011, the case was reassigned to Judge Wilma A. Lewis. On August 31, 2012, the parties filed a joint motion for settlement that prescribed prospective relief to resolve any remaining compliance issues within the correctional facility. On May 14, 2013, Judge Lewis granted the joint motion and adopted the settlement agreement as the court's order. The parties later agreed to Kenneth A. Ray as the monitor for the facility's remaining reforms. On December 30, 2014, the court held the defendants in contempt for failure to pay the Monitor's monthly fees as required by the court's order from June 6, 2014. As of June 14, 2021, the case is still ongoing and the monitor continues to file reports with the court.

Summary: On October 23, 1986, the DOJ filed suit pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 in the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement at the Golden Grove Adult Correctional Facility. The parties settled the case quickly and the court approved a formal Consent Decree calling for reforms to the facility in the areas of fire safety, security, sanitation and medical care. The case is still ongoing and a newly assigned monitor continues to file monitoring reports to the court.


On May 9, 2016, the Mississippi chapter of the ACLU and two gay individuals who were engaged filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued the state of Mississippi under 42 U.S.C § 1983, alleging that the state’s Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, which allowed businesses to refuse to provide services based on their religious beliefs, violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a preliminary injunction to prevent the law from taking effect on July 1, 2016, along with attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs challenged Mississippi House Bill 1523, the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act (HB 1523). HB 1523 was passed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling legalizing same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges; it granted broad protections to private business owners and government officials who didn't want to provide services to same-sex married couples based on their sincerely held religious beliefs. Plaintiffs alleged that these protections would make it more difficult for same-sex married couples to get services than different-sex married couples, and thus imposed burdens on same-sex married couples not faced by different-sex married couples. The plaintiffs argued that these burdens violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, which—consistent with Obergefell—require that states allow same-sex couples access to civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as different-sex couples. On June 20, U.S. District Court Judge Carlton W. Reeves denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction against H.B. 1523. Judge Reeves noted that there must be a substantial threat of immediate, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs to justify a preliminary injunction. But in this case, Judge Reeves stated that the risk of injury was not imminent because the couple planned to marry in the next three years. (2016 WL 3449911). However, ten days later, on June 30, 2016 Judge Reeves granted a preliminary injunction of H.B. 1523 in another suit, Barber v. Bryant (2016 WL 3562647). On August 8, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to request a stay in this case until the resolution of Barber v. Bryant and Campaign for Southern Equality v. Bryant, two cases (which were consolidated) in the Southern District of Mississippi also challenging H.B. 1523. For more information on these cases, see here in the Clearinghouse. On October 17, 2016, Judge Reeves granted the defendant's motion for a stay. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143292. On June 22, 2017, the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs in Barber did not have standing. 860 F.3d 345. The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. The parties in this case then conferred and filed a Joint Stipulation of Dismissal without Prejudice on September 26, 2018, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Mississippi chapter of the ACLU and a same-sex couple contemplating marriage brought suit against the state of Mississippi for promulgating a law that allows private businesses and government officials to deny same-sex married couples services based on their sincerely-held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs argued that the law violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment by making it more difficult for same-sex couples to receive services and imposing burdens upon same-sex marriages that aren't imposed on different-sex marriages.


On September 7, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The DOJ sued Humboldt County under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) alleging that Humboldt County discriminated against individuals with disabilities by failing to make County facilities, programs, services, and activities accessible. Previously in 2005, the DOJ reviewed Humboldt County’s with Title II of the ADA in 2005 and identified over 200 violations of ADA standards in newly constructed or altered facilities and over 900 barriers to access in County programs, services, and activities. Following the review, the DOJ and the County entered a  Project Civic Access agreement requiring the County to take specific actions to become compliant with the ADA. The DOJ alleged that Humboldt County failed to take the required actions and, in response, filed this lawsuit. The DOJ sought declaratory relief, an injunction preventing Humboldt County from failing to comply with the ADA and requiring employee training on the requirements of the ADA, and compensatory damages. Immediately, the DOJ filed a proposed consent decree. On September 13, 2016, Judge Nandor J. Vadas approved and entered the consent decree. Under the consent decree, Humboldt County agreed to bring its facilities, programs, services, and activities into compliance with the ADA and make the county more accessible to individuals with disabilities within three and a half years. Humboldt County agreed to take a wide array of steps to reach compliance, including:

 Provide curb ramps at all intersections

 Implement effective communication training programs for all employees who communicate with the public

 Make emergency shelters accessible to individuals with disabilities

 Ensure that the County’s websites are compliant with the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.0 Level AA Success Criteria

 Hire an ADA Coordinator approved by the United States to coordinate the County’s effort to comply with the consent decree and the ADA within 180 days

 Hire an architect approved by the United States to certify alterations, additions, or modifications made by the County within 180 days

 Hire a web accessibility consultant approved by the United States to maintain website accessibility
The county agreed to pay $275,000 in compensatory damages. The Court retained jurisdiction for the duration of the consent decree, three and a half years. The United States may apply for extension of the consent decree if the County fails to comply. As of January 27, 2021, there was no additional activity in the case and the United States had not applied for extension of the consent decree. Presumably, the consent decree ended and the case was closed.

Summary: On September 7, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The DOJ sued Humboldt County under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) alleging that Humboldt County discriminated against individuals with disabilities by failing to make County facilities, programs, services, and activities accessible. Immediately, the DOJ filed a proposed consent decree. On September 13, 2016 Judge Nandor J. Vadas approved and entered the consent decree that provided a wide array of steps Humboldt County agreed to take to bring its facilities, programs, services, and activities into compliance with the ADA and make the county more accessible to individuals with disabilities within three and a half years. The county agreed to pay $275,000 in compensatory damages. As of July 18, 2020, there has been no additional activity on this case.


Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, against the Alabama Medicaid Agency, on August 12, 2010, alleging that the denial of home-based Medicaid services as opposed to institution-based services violated the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiff was paralyzed from the collar bone down and requires assistance performing daily activities. When his mother was able to take care of him, Alabama Medicaid was able to provide some supplemental in-home care services as part of a waiver program. When his mother could no longer take care of him, the plaintiff was forced to live in an institution even though he could have lived in the community with appropriate home care services. A community placement would be particularly valuable to him as he is pursuing higher education at the University of Montevallo. The Plaintiff filed a complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and the United States filed a Statement of Interest in support of the plaintiff's motion. Judge Mark E. Fuller of the Middle District of Alabama denied the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction on November 12, 2010. In the discovery process that followed, it was revealed that the Plaintiff's eligibility for Medicaid waiver services was in doubt. After additional discovery, the plaintiff agreed to dismiss the case in April 2012 because of these issues.

Summary: Plaintiff was an individual with tetraplegia (paralysis below the collar bone) who lived in an institution and sought placement in the community with nursing services. He alleged that the state's failure to provide him with community-based services violated the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. During discovery, plaintiff's eligibility for Medicaid waiver services became unclear. The plaintiff agreed to dismiss the case in April 2012 because of these issues.


On July 13, 2000 a group of developmentally disabled individuals and two advocacy organizations filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. On September 11, 2000 the Tennessee Department of Finance and Administration was substituted as the defendant. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were violating the Medicaid Act by denying them the opportunity to apply for community based treatment, by denying their applications for such treatment, or by placing them on long waitlists after approving the applications. On April 30, 2001 the court (Judge Robert L. Echols) certified a class of all developmentally disabled residents of Tennessee who fell into one of the three categories in the complaint. On May 7, 2003 the court (Judge Echols) denied competing motions for summary judgment and on June 15, 2004 the court (Judge Echols) approved a settlement agreement between the parties. The settlement aimed to both reduce the period individuals spent on the waitlists and to provide interim services to those on the waitlist that better met their needs. The defendants agreed to provide additional slots for community based treatment and allocate additional funds in the first two years of the settlement agreement. They also agreed to develop a better case management program, reform the application process, and take other measures to alleviate the burdens of those on the waitlists. Specific measures for the final three years of the duration of the agreement were to be negotiated by the parties at a later date. Disputes arose regarding whether the defendant was in compliance with the settlement and as to whether the settlement should be vacated because of a change in Sixth Circuit law. The court (Judge Echols) denied the defendants' motion to vacate the settlement and dismiss the case on September 12, 2007 and denied the plaintiffs' motion for specific performance on July 8, 2008. The defendants appealed and on March 9, 2009 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals (Judges Martin, Rogers, and Sutton) reversed and remanded for reconsideration. Negotiations regarding specific provisions related to additional funding for community based treatment slots for the final three years of the settlement also reached an impasse. On July 24, 2009 the court (Judge Echols) vacated the settlement as to the provision regarding provider network capacity and granted the defendants summary judgment on the remaining issues in dispute. The case was closed on February 5, 2010 after the settlement agreement expired.

Summary: On July 13, 2000 a group of developmentally disabled individuals and two advocacy organizations filed suit against the Tennessee Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities in the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. They claimed that the defendants were violating the Medicaid Act by preventing them from receiving community based treatment. On April 30, 2001 the court certified a class and on June 15, 2004 the court approved a settlement that included provisions to provide more slots for community based treatment services. The court denied the defendants' motion to vacate the settlement and dismiss the case on September 12, 2007 and denied the plaintiffs' motion for specific performance on July 8, 2008. The defendants appealed and on March 9, 2009 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for reconsideration. On July 24, 2009 the district court vacated the settlement as to one provision and granted the defendants summary judgment on the remaining issues in dispute. The case was closed on February 5, 2010.


On August 1, 2013, immigration detainees filed this lawsuit in the Western District of Washington against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) challenging the government's policy and practice of detaining immigrants in deportation proceedings even when they were released from criminal custody some time earlier. They alleged that this practice violates the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the plaintiffs' due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Washington, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, and the firm of Gibbs Houston Pauw, sought class certification and injunctive and declaratory relief. In particular, plaintiffs requested individualized bond hearings. The plaintiffs were lawful permanent residents who were convicted of crimes and were released from criminal custody long before they were detained by ICE. When detained by ICE, they were held in mandatory detention. Plaintiffs alleged that ICE has misapplied the mandatory detention statute, 8 U.S.C § 1226(c), to individuals like them who have been living in the United States for years since their release without incident. They argued that the statute only allows mandatory detention for people who are convicted of certain crimes and who are taken into immigration custody at the time they are released from the criminal justice system for such a crime. On October 7, 2013, the court (Judge Richard A. Jones) terminated the defendants' motion for a scheduling conference and the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and a permanent injunction. The court found that the case could be resolved based on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and the defendants' motion to dismiss. On March 11, 2014, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying under Rule 23(b)(2) “[a]ll individuals in the Western District of Washington who the government asserts or will assert are subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) and who were not taken into immigration custody immediately upon their release from criminal custody for an offense referenced in § 1226(c)(1).” Khoury v. Asher, 3 F.Supp.3d 877, 890 (W.D. Wash. 2014). The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction without prejudice, but issued declaratory relief in the following form: “The government may not subject an alien to mandatory detention via 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) unless the government took the alien into custody immediately upon his release from custody for an offense described in subparagraphs (1)(A) through (1)(D) of § 1226(c).” On April 9, 2014, the court entered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendants appealed the class certification to the Ninth Circuit. On August 4, 2016, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court certifying a class of immigrant detainees and declaring their entitlement to bond hearings. The court reasoned that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), stating that mandatory detention only applies to immigrants detained "when [they are] released" from criminal custody, conveyed a degree of immediacy and therefore applied only to immigrants detained promptly after their release from criminal custody. Khoury v. Asher, 667 Fed. Appx. 966 (9th Cir. 2016). In reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit cited to a related case decided the same day and reaching the same conclusion that the government may detain without a bond hearing only those immigrants it takes into immigration custody promptly upon their release from criminal custody. Preap v. Johnson, 831 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2016). The government appealed both decisions and on March 19, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in order to resolve a circuit split on the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Nielsen v. Preap, 138 S. Ct. 1279 (2018). On March 19, 2019, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split, issued a decision in <i>Nielson v. Preap</i> reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgments and remanding the cases. Justice Alito, writing for the majority, concluded that a noncitizen does not become exempt from mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) through the failure to take him into immigration custody immediately upon release from criminal custody. Justice Alito further held that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of § 1226(c) was contrary to the plain text and structure of the statute. In reaching this conclusion, the majority engaged in a rigorous grammatical review and justified its conclusion by stating that "an official’s crucial duties are better carried out late than never." Furthermore, the majority concluded that there were no constitutional questions involved and that the decision resolved only a statutory question. Justice Breyer, along with Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor, dissented, stating that the language of the statute was not plain and that “[t]he words 'when the alien is released' require the Secretary to detain aliens under subsection (c) within a reasonable time after their release from criminal custody — presumptively no longer than six months." Moreover, Justice Breyer stated that the court should have invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance to avoid the constitutional questions that might be raised in the event of an arrest years after release from state custody and the denial of a bond hearing. 139 S. Ct. 954. On May 1, 2019, in light of the Supreme Court's decision, the Ninth Circuit issued an order vacating its 2016 order and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's decision. After the parties filed a proposed order for dismissal, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on May 31, 2019. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, immigration detainees brought a lawsuit against DHS and DOJ claiming that the government was misapplying the immigration mandatory detention statute. They alleged that the government's practice violates the INA and their due process rights. Plaintiffs sought class certification and injunctive and declaratory relief. The court (Judge Richard A. Jones) denied injunctive relief but granted class certification and declaratory relief. The defendants appealed the decision to the 9th Circuit. The 9th Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. In March 2019, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a decision reversing the Ninth Circuit's judgment, concluding that the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) allows mandatory immigrant detention of immigrants long after their release from state custody. Following the Supreme Court's decision, the parties voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is now closed.


On August 6, 2003, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (OPA) filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Connecticut against the Connecticut Department of Corrections and two prisons it operated. Represented by a coalition of attorneys from the local ACLU, ACLU's National Prison Project, local legal aid organizations, the plaintiffs alleged that prisoners and detainees with mental illness who were confined at CDC's Northern Correctional Institution and Garner Correctional Institution were subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. According to the complaint, the facilities housed both prisoners and pretrial detainees and subjected individuals with mental illness to conditions that exacerbated their mental illnesses. The plaintiffs detailed the isolation and lack of access to exercise or light, as well as prevalence of use-of-force and restraints. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to bar defendants from subjecting prisoners with mental illness to these unconstitutional conditions. Soon after the filing of the lawsuit, the parties entered into settlement negotiations and participated in many court ordered settlement conferences. The parties reached a tentative settlement agreement in March 2004. Approval of the proposed agreement was debated by the Connecticut Legislature and a public hearing was held by the joint Judicial Committee of the Connecticut State Senate and House. The settlement was ratified and the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss and approve the settlement with the District Court on September 22, 2005. The District Court (Judge Robert N. Chatigny) entered an order of dismissal and approved and adopted the terms of the Settlement Agreement on September 26, 2005. The District Court retained jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the Settlement Agreement for three years. The Agreement provided that services for seriously mentally ill prisoners would be consolidated at the Garner Correctional Institution in Newtown, Connecticut, which would be designed as the mental health institution for the CDC. In order to initially determine which prisoners would be transferred to Garner, an evaluation of the entire prison population at Northern would be conducted by the UConn Health Center Psychiatric staff. The Agreement also called for increased staffing and changes to mental health evaluation and services. All prisoners and detainees held in the most restrictive form of confinement at NCI were assessed by psychiatric experts to determine whether their placement was appropriate. Individuals with serious mental illness or who were at risk of developing serious mental illness were transferred to a facility with intensive psychiatric services. The parties each designated a mental health consultant and a confinement consultant to monitor and evaluate compliance. The parties subsequently submitted the issue to the court whether the four monitoring consultants would be granted access to prisoners' mental health records. On March 30, 2007, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' request. The issue was that while the plaintiffs required access to prisoners' medical records in order to monitor compliance, the defendants were concerned that disclosure without prisoners' consent would violate their constitutional rights. The court applied a balancing test and concluded that the state's interest in disclosure outweighed the burden on the constitutional right, especially because OPA was a state agency designed to protect civil rights. The court denied the motion in part as to certain protected materials, but otherwise granted it and allowed access to the records for the express purpose of monitoring compliance. On August 5, 2008, the plaintiffs filed a motion for contempt for the defendants' failure to pay expert consultants' reimbursements. The plaintiffs subsequently withdrew the motion by the end of the month after the parties resolved the issue out of court. The defendants made payments to the plaintiff's consultants until December 2008. The court's jurisdiction over the settlement has ended and the case is now closed.

Summary: On August 6, 2003, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities (OPA) filed a § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Connecticut against the Connecticut Department of Corrections and two prisons it operated. Represented by a coalition of attorneys from the local ACLU, ACLU's National Prison Project, local legal aid organizations, the plaintiffs alleged that prisoners and detainees with mental illness who were confined at CDC's Northern Correctional Institution and Garner Correctional Institution were subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The parties settled in September 2005. The settlement required the institutions to provide psychiatric services to prisoners with mental illnesses and to place them in appropriate housing. The settlement was in force for three years and the case closed in 2008.


The Louisville Area Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Kentucky Convention Hotel Partners, LLC (doing business as Louisville Marriott Downtown) and White Lodging Services Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky in July 2006. The complaint alleged religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Four female, Muslim employees were allegedly denied employment at the Louisville Marriott Downtown when they refused to take off their hijabs at the request of White Lodging Services Corp. In May 2007 Kentucky Convention Hotel Partners was granted its motion to dismiss. Judge Charles R. Simpson, III said that the plaintiffs had shown the court no evidence that KCHP had any control in hiring or management decisions. The case against White Lodging Services Corp. continued. White Lodging moved for summary judgment on January 5, 2009, but the court denied its motion on March 31, 2010. Judge Simpson rejected White Lodging’s argument that its contract with a third-party housekeeping service insulated it from liability, and found that the complainants had stated a prima facie case of religious accommodation discrimination. The parties jointly proposed a consent decree in June, and Judge Simpson signed the consent decree on July 2010. In the decree, White Lodging denied wrongdoing, but agreed to not discriminate or harass employees on the basis of their religion, or retaliate against any employees who filed or aided in the investigation of a Title VII complaint. It also agreed to pay each complainant $10,000, for a total payment of $40,000. White Lodging agreed to submit two semi-annual reports and provide training to all of its employees at the Louisville location. The consent decree lasted for 12 months, and the matter appears to have closed in 2011.

Summary: The Louisville EEOC brought this suit against Kentucky Convention Hotel Partners,LLC and White Lodging Services Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky in July 2006. Four female, Muslim employees were allegedly denied employment when they refused to take off their hijabs at the request of White Lodging. The case against KCHP was dismissed, and the case against White Lodging ended in a consent decree in July 2010. The complainants were each paid $10,000, and White Lodging agreed to not discriminate against employees on the basis of their religion, retaliate against any complainants, provide semi-annual reports, and provide training for its Louisville location employees.


On July 8, 2015, a group of ten children in the foster care system and the Public Advocate of New York filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by private counsel, nonprofit advocacy organization A Better Childhood, and the office of the New York Public Advocate, the plaintiffs brought this action against New York City, the New York City Administration for Children Services (ACS), New York State, and the New York State Office of Children and Family Services (OCFS), under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202. The case was assigned to Judge Laura Taylor Swain. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the First, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA), 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq., common law contractual claims, and state social services laws on timely and adequate provision of adoption and foster case management services. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants caused irreparable harm to the plaintiffs by their failure to protect the children in ACS custody from maltreatment, to provide the children with permanent homes and families within a reasonable time, and to provide foster placements and services that ensure the well-being of the children. The complaint also alleged that the defendants failed to remedy the systemic deficiencies plaguing NYC’s child welfare system by the city defendants’ failure to exercise adequate and meaningful oversight over contract agencies; the defendants’ failure to ensure an adequately staffed and appropriately trained child welfare workforce, to address deficiency in the processes to make improvements foster placements in NYC, to ensure meaningful case plans and service plans for foster children are developed and implemented, and to ensure timely adjudication of family court proceedings. The plaintiffs also moved for class certification along with the complaint. The case proceeded with discovery under U.S. Magistrate Judge Henry B. Pitman. On October 20, 2015, the state defendants filed a proposed settlement agreement with the court, requiring a more rigorous monitoring of the city foster care system. The proposed settlement required OFCS to hire a monitor and a research expert to review and assess the operations of NYC Foster Care system including the placement process, the cause of maltreatment of children, the availability and appropriateness of services, and the recruitment of an appropriate and sufficient array of placements for children in the foster care system. The monitor would submit quarterly reports to the OCFS who, with ACS, would determine actions necessary to address any findings. The research expert would conduct annual reviews of case record samples of children in the custody of ACS to determine compliance with state and federal laws. If the expert found substantial non-compliance, the expert would write a written individual case report which will be shared with ACS and OCFS who would then be required to work with the voluntary agency in breach of the law to conduct a corrective action. For any corrective action plans, ACS would report to OCFS on a quarterly basis on the status and follow-up measures. The settlement was not approved for several months due to procedural complications, including the required fairness hearing. Both the city defendants and various organizations that represent foster children in the family court objected to the settlement, although neither were parties to the action. The city attempted unsuccessfully to have the court stay all proceedings in the case, including the approval of the settlement agreement with the state. On April 22, 2016, U.S. District Judge Laura Taylor Swain entered an order to preliminarily approve the consent decree subject to the rights of individual class members to challenge the settlement agreement and to show why a final judgment dismissing this case against State Defendants should not be entered following a fairness hearing. In the same opinion, the court conditionally certified the class for purposes of providing notice, but the formal class certification is pending. On July 12, 2016, the court granted Parent Advocates and Children's Advocates motion to intervene. 2016 WL 3960558. On August 12, 2016, the magistrate judge denied the plaintiffs' motion for final approval of the settlement and vacated the conditional certification of the class. 2016 WL 4367969. First, the judge held that the settlement lacked procedural fairness, because the settlement was drafted a week after the complaint was filed in the absence of any meaningful discovery into the merits of the claims. Second, the court held that the settlement would not save much expense of the litigation, because even if the settlement with the State defendants was approved, the plaintiffs had to continue the litigation with the City defendants. Third, the court heavily weighed on the intervenors' concerns that the consent decree had inadequate provisions. The intervenors expressed their concerns about the consent decree that the roles and objectives of the Research Expert and Monitor were vague, remedies did not address the alleged civil rights violations, and the seven-year covenant not to sue is unprecedented in its duration. Lastly, the judge held that the corrective actions defined in the Consent Decree were not specific enough and therefore the plaintiffs would be able to gain more robust remedies if they were to prevail at trial. On September 12, 2016, the district court granted the city defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' AACWA claims premised on 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(10) and 671(a)(22), statutes regulating the state plan for foster care and adoption assistance. In the same opinion and order, the judge dismissed claims asserted against ACS and Commissioner Carrion, without prejudice to the litigation of those claims as against the Defendant City. 2016 WL 4750178. On September 27, 2016, Judge Swain denied class certification without prejudice to renewal. She held that here, the request for class certification failed to meet commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. Namely, Judge Swain held that the consistency of plaintiffs’ broad assertions in the amended complaint were questionable in that problems (such as mental health issues, undue length of time in foster care, and lack of successful resolution of obstacles to family reunification) are attributable to faulty management and oversight of the foster care system. Therefore, she held that certification of a broad unitary class of children who are or will be in foster care was not appropriate. On November 16, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the case was moot as to six of the nineteen plaintiffs who had since left foster care since those six plaintiffs no longer had a basis to assert claims for equitable relief. On January 25, 2017, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the State of New York and the New York State OCFS from the case. On July 30, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for class certification. The motion has yet to be decided and the case remains pending as of April 15, 2021.

Summary: Ten children abused and neglected during their time in New York City's foster care system sued City and State defendants. The plaintiffs' allegations against ACS for its failure to exercise proper oversight over the voluntary foster care agencies were based on state, federal, and constitutional claims. The proposed settlement required OCFS to hire a monitor and a research expert to implement a systemic reform in NYC foster care system. But the City defendants and organizations that represent foster children in the Family Court have objected to the settlement and the city has tried unsuccessfully to have the court stay all proceedings in the case. In April, 2016, the court entered an order to preliminarily approve the settlement, but in August 2016, the court rejected the settlement. In September, the court dismissed the AACWA claims premised on 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(10) and 671(a)(22) and the claims asserted against ACS and Commissioner Carrion, without prejudice to the litigation of those claims as against the Defendant City. Subsequently, the court denied class certification without prejudice to renewal, calling into question the reliability of the facts asserted in the amended complaint were attributable to faulty management of the foster care system. As of April 15, 2021, the case remains ongoing and is pending class certification.


In January 2001, a female manager filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging that Allstate Insurance Company intentionally created and maintained an unequal workforce that injured its female employees. Plaintiff further alleged she was sexually harassed by a supervisor and then passed over for promotion as retaliation for rejecting her supervisor's advances. Plaintiff alleged that Allstate failed to conduct an adequate investigation into those matters. On September 2, 2004, Plaintiff filed suit, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alleging that Allstate engaged in systematic discrimination against women in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963. Plaintiff was represented by private counsel and asserted that: Allstate violated Title VII by discriminating against her and a class of female managerial employees to such an extent that the gender-based discrimination amounted to a policy or practice; Allstate violated the Equal Pay Act by paying putative class members lower wages than similarly situated male employees; Allstate had retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. Plaintiff moved for class certification on behalf of all female managers who had worked at Allstate at any time from May 2001 to the time of her complaint. The District Court denied the motion for class certification because the circumstances of the putative class members' employment were too widely varied, and that plaintiffs' evidence regarding commonality was too weak to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2). In response to the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Plaintiff again moved for class certification, focusing her complaint on Allstate's compensation policies. The court concluded that the case would require thousands of individual hearings to determine both liability and damages. The court again denied Plaintiff's motion for class certification, highlighting flaws in Plaintiff's evidence, including the widely varying responsibilities, supervisors, locations and pay grades of the proposed class members. The court also noted that, in employment discrimination cases, there is often no need for class certification because most employees have sufficient financial incentive to litigate individually. The court found the economic loss for members of the putative class would be substantial enough to give each individual an interest in controlling her own lawsuit. Plaintiff settled her individual claims with Allstate and three intervening plaintiffs appealed the denial of class certification. The intervenors alleged that the district court erred in denying Plaintiff's claim because it did not separately analyze her disparate impact claim from her pattern-or-practice claim. The two claims are different because a disparate impact claim requires a showing that a facially neutral employment practice falls more harshly on one group than another and can't be justified by business necessity, while a pattern-or-practice claim requires a showing that an employer regularly and purposefully discriminated against a protected group. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification. The court noted that although Plaintiff had used the language of both "disparate impact" and "pattern-or-practice" claims in her second motion for class certification, she only developed her pattern-or-practice claim. Although Plaintiff was no longer a party to the suit, as intervening plaintiffs, the intervenors could only present arguments that Plaintiff could have appealed. Therefore, since Plaintiff did not develop her disparate impact claim, it was not preserved for appeal and it was not error for the district court not to analyze it separately. Further analysis available at http://www.nsclc.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Court-Decisions-from-2009.pdf

Summary: This is a lawsuit in which current and former female Allstate Insurance managers have sued Allstate alleging gender discrimination in pay. The district court refused to certify it as a class action. The original plaintiff settled her complaint with Allstate and three intervening plaintiffs entered the litigation in her place. The intervening plaintiffs appealed the denial of class action status arguing that the District Court did not analyze original plaintiff's pattern-or-practice claim separately from her disparate impact claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court and held that the disparate impact language was only used in passing and was therefore not preserved for appeal.


On August 11, 2016, the Women's Liberation Front ("WoLF") - an unincorporated association of radical feminists dedicated to the total liberation of women and fighting to end male violence, regain reproductive sovereignty for women, and preserve women-only spaces - filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice, alleging that the Department's May 13 Guidance, which required schools to provide restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of sex, but allowed transgender students access to such facilities consistent with their gender identity, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1872, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the May 13 Guidance violated the express terms of Title IX, which provides women with their own facilities, by expanding the definition of "sex" beyond its biological definition, and equating its definition with the definition of "gender identity." On October 24, 2016, the DOJ filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On October 31, 2016, WoLF filed a motion to stay, which was granted by Magistrate Judge William P. Lynch on November 2, 2016, pending the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gloucester County School Board v. G.G., which was expected to address the proper interpretation of Title IX and its coverage of trans students. However, on January 20, 2017, Donald Trump became President of the United States. His administration refused to support the previous DOJ's efforts to protect trans students from discrimination. Therefore, before the Supreme Court could hear Gloucester County School Board v G.G., the Department of Justice withdrew the May 13 Guidance. With the defendant's withdrawal of the May 13 Guidance, the plaintiff no longer had a legal claim in this suit. So, on March 16, 2017, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its complaint. Because voluntary dismissals are without prejudice, the plaintiff can file another case case if the Department of Justice were to reinstate the May 13 Guidance.

Summary: On August 11, 2016, the Women's Liberation Front ("WoLF") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice, alleging that the May 13 Guidance, which required schools to provide restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of sex, but allowed transgender students access to such facilities consistent with their gender identity, violated the Administrative Procedure Act, Title IX of the Educational Amendments if 1872, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. With the election of Trump, the DOJ ended it's efforts to protect trans students from discrimination, and so the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed this case.


This is the eighth time the Justice Department has notified a criminal defendant that evidence being used against him came from a FISA warrantless wiretap, a move that is expected at some point to set up a Supreme Court test of whether such eavesdropping is constitutional. (As explained below, however, this case was resolved by guilty plea and will not be that test case.) All the cases are available in the Foreign Targeting (702, 703, 704) special collection. On January 7, 2016, Aws Mohammed Younis Al-Jayab was charged in a criminal complaint that was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California following his arrest. He was arrested on a federal charge of making a false statement involving international terrorism. He pleaded not guilty to that charge. The court (Judge Sara Ellis) ordered Al-Jayab be held without bail, citing he was a flight risk and danger to the community. In early March, the FBI requested and was granted access to Al-Jayab’s two cellphones, an iPhone 6S and a Samsung Galaxy S5. FBI agents were reportedly able to bypass the Samsung Galaxy’s security and gain access to multiple Facebook accounts operated by Al-Jayab. On March 17, 2016, Al-Jayab was indicted by a grand jury in Sacramento in the Northern District of Illinois for attempting to provide material support to acts of violence overseas. The indictment contended that Al-Jayab gave false statements to agents from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services during an interview on October 6, 2014. In the interview, Al-Jayab indicated that he never supported terrorist groups and that the purpose of his trip to Turkey was to visit his grandmother. The California indictment contended that both statements were false. According to the criminal complaint filed in the Eastern District of California, Al-Jayab is a Palestinian born in Iraq, who came to the United States as an Iraqi refugee in October 2012. Between October 2012 and November 2013, while living in Arizona and Wisconsin, Al-Jayab communicated via social media with numerous individuals about his intention to go to Syria to fight for terrorist organizations. The complaint further alleged that on November 9, 2013, he flew from Chicago to Turkey and then traveled to Syria. According to the complaint, between November 2013 and January 2014, Al-Jayab reported on social media that he was in Syria fighting with terrorist organizations. Al-Jayab returned to the United States on January 23, 2014, and settled in Sacramento. In 2013, Al-Jayab communicated over social media with fellow U.S.-based Iraqi refugee Omar Faraj Saeed Al Hardan. Al-Jayab spoke to Al Hardan about weapons training, and the two discussed travel to Syria. Al-Jayab bragged about his experience fighting in Syria and promised to teach Al Hardan how to enter Syria and fight with weaponry. Al Hardan was arrested on January 8, 2016. On April 8, 2016, the U.S. notified the court and defendant, pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 1825(d) and 1881e(a) that it intended to use information "obtained or derived from" physical searches and "acquisitions acquired pursuant to" Section 702. The defendant's lawyer responded in the press that the defendant would ask the court to suppress the evidence, as unconstitutionally derived. On July 22, 2016, the defendant filed a petition for court appointed counsel, and the court stated that this case was sufficiently complex as to warrant appointment of two attorneys to represent him. On August 11, 2016, the defendant's attorney informed the court that he has been contacted by a Swiss journalist asking about Al-Jayab’s alleged role in an ISIS plot in Bern, Switzerland. On March 30, 2017, the government provided Swiss documents to the defendant. On January 16, 2018, the defendant filed a petition to dismiss the indictment based on combatant immunity. The defendant’s attorneys submitted that the doctrine of combatant immunity precludes the domestic prosecution of a lawful combatant who attempted to, or engaged in, recognized hostilities. It was further argued that should the allegations in the indictment be true for the purposes of the motion, the alleged conduct is privileged because the defendant was a protected, lawful combatant as recognized by long-standing common law principles. Moreover, the defendant’s conduct was privileged under international law because the Syrian War was an international armed conflict, or more specifically an internationalized armed conflict, and the defendant was associated with Syrian opposition groups that qualify for combatant immunity under international law. On June 28, 2018, United States District Judge Sara L. Ellis granted in part the Government’s motion for a protective order under Section 4 of CIPA. The Court also granted in part and denied in part Al-Jayab’s motion for notice of surveillance techniques used during the course of the investigation. The Court held that the Government must provide Al-Jayab with an affidavit in compliance with 18 U.S.C. § 3504. The Court denied Al-Jayab's motion (1) to suppress evidence obtained or derived from warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act; (2) for disclosure to cleared counsel and objection to secret ex parte ClPA litigation of Fourth Amendment suppression issue, (3) for discovery regarding the intelligence agencies’ surveillance pursuant to Executive Order 12333, (4) to suppress evidence obtained or derived from the physical surveillance conducted pursuant to FISA, and (5) for disclosure of the underlying FISA and § 702 materials. The redacted version of the opinion and order was made public on August 2, 2018. On October 29, 2018, a Superseding Information was filed by the United States Attorney. In this filing, it was stated that in February 2003, the US Secretary of Treasury designated Ansar Al-Islam was a Specially Designated Global Terrorist under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224, and in March 2004, the US Secretary of State designated Ansar Al-Islam as a foreign terrorist organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The filing further stated that between October 2012 and January 2014, the defendant knowingly provided material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization (Ansar Al-Islam), knowing that the organization was a designated foreign terrorist organization, and that the organization had engaged in, and was engaging in, terrorist activity and terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 23398B. On October 31, 2018, the defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to the Superseding Information. The defendant voluntarily pled guilty to knowingly providing material support to a foreign terrorist organisation, and knowingly providing a materially false statement to federal agents in a matter involving international terrorism. The defendant waived in open court prosecution by indictment, and consented to proceeding by information rather than by indictment. A plea agreement was entered into on November 2, 2018. It was agreed that the maximum term of imprisonment for both charges were to be 15 years. On October 31, 2019, Judge Ellis issued a final judgment on the case. She sentenced the defendant to 5 years in prison and 20 years of parole. The case is now closed.

Summary: In January 2016, the defendant was charged in a criminal complaint that was unsealed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California following his arrest. He was arrested on a federal charge of making a false statement involving international terrorism. In March 2016, the defendant was indicted by a grand jury in Sacramento in the Northern District of Illinois for attempting to provide material support to acts of violence overseas. The defendant voluntarily pled guilty in October 2018 subsequent to superseding information filed by the United States Attorney and was sentenced to 5 years in prison and 20 years of parole.


On Feburary 22, 2016, eight Oregonians with disabilities and the Association for Oregon Centers of Independent Living (AOCIL) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701). The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, asking the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) take action to fix curb ramps around the state. The plaintiffs alleged that persons using wheelchairs were forced to navigate their chairs in traffic on busy highways because of lack of adequate curb ramps, and that blind people could only guess where and when it was safe to cross the street, in direct violation of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. This act requires state and local governments to ensure persons with disabilities have access to the pedestrian routes in the public right-of-way. The plaintiffs additionally alleged that ODOT has done little to make the roads safe and accessible to people with disabilities despite its legal obligations. Oregonians with disabilities were barred from the most important streets of their cities and towns by badly-constructed or missing ramps. For instance, in Portland, broken and missing curb ramps on Lombard Street in North Portland prevented people in wheelchairs from safely using public transit and going to stores. On April 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On May 25, 2016, defendants filed motion to dismiss. On June 22, 2016, a settlement conference was held between the parties. Then, on November 7, 2016, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. On December 5, 2016, plaintiffs and defendants entered into a stipulation of settlement, and submitted joint motion seeking approval of the agreement as a class action settlement. After initially granting preliminary approval and allowing the parties to go forward with notice procedures, the court granted final approval of the settlement as fair, reasonable, and adequate on March 27, 2017. The settlement included the following provisions. ODOT agreed to complete an updated inventory of curb ramps and pedestrian crossing signals by December 31, 2017. From there, ODOT agreed to remediate both curb ramps and pedestrian crossing signals according to more specific terms in the agreement. ODOT also agreed to commit $5 million to improve curb ramps and pedestrian crossing signals once ODOT and the plaintiffs identified locations and/or priorities. ODOT budgeted $18 million for the 2018 to 2021 Oregon Statewide Transportation Improvement Program (STIP) to implement the terms of the settlement agreement. The settlement also provided for an Accessibility Consultant to work with the defendants as they carried out their obligations under the agreement, and to monitor and report on the conditions over time. Both the defendants and the accessibility consultant would file annual reports under the agreement. Additionally, the agreement required ODOT to set up a process for receiving public complaints and requests regarding accessibility and transportation infrastructure. The agreement was set to terminate once ODOT completed their obligations under section 4 (governing remediation of curb ramps) and section 5 (governing remediation of pedestrian crossing signals). The parties agreed to announce the settlement in a joint press release describing their partnership in improving accessibility throughout the Oregon highway system. The defendants did not admit fault in the settlement, and the entire agreement was subject to state law regulating funding, although ODOT agreed to make diligent efforts to obtain necessary appropriations. The agreement also included a schedule for curb ramp remediation compliance, and required ODOT to reach the following targets by certain dates: remediation of 30% of non-compliant curb ramp locations by the end of 2022; remediation of 75% of non-compliant curb ramp locations by the end of 2027; and remediation of all non-compliant curb ramp locations by the end of 2032. In the event disputes arose, the settlement provided for a resolution process that looked first to cooperation between the parties and the accessibility consultant. If the dispute persisted, the parties would submit the dispute to a special master first, with a process for the parties to appeal that decision to Judge Simon in the District Court, and then if necessary, to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 29, 2017, two days after approving the agreement, the court issued a judgment stating that it would retain jurisdiction for the life of the agreement, and the plaintiffs would be awarded attorneys' fees in an amount to be determined in a supplemental judgment. On June 5, 2017, the court appointed the Hon. Janice Simon (Ret.) as the special master. As of May 16, 2020, there have been no additional filings in the District Court related to enforcement of the terms of the settlement agreement. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On Feburary 22, 2016, eight Oregonians with disabilities filed a lawsuit in federal court for the District of Oregon under Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act of 1973, demanding that the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) take action to fix curb ramps around the state. The parties jointly moved to certify a class action, and the court approved a final settlement on March 27, 2017. The settlement required ODOT to take numerous actions to address the curb ramps and pedestrian crossing signals around the state, and provided for annual reporting by both the defendants and an Accessibility Consultant who would be appointed pursuant to the terms of the settlement. The court retained jurisdiction over the settlement for the life of the agreement, which is set to terminate in 2032.


On June 6, 2019, a noncitizen detained in Irwin County Detention Center filed this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiff alleged that the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) had a practice of setting unaffordable bonds. The complaint stated that such individuals often remain in detention for months or even years as they await the resolution of their immigration cases, and that they therefore suffer disproportionate consequences that detainees with greater financial means do not--separation from their families, obstacles to employment, deprivation of adequate medical care, harsh living conditions, and inability find attorney representation. The lawsuit named U.S. Attorney General William Barr, the Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR); the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the Director of the ICE Atlanta Field Office; and the Warden of the Irwin County Detention Center. The plaintiff filed these claims under the All Writs Act; the Immigration and Nationality Act; the Declaratory Judgement Act; and Habeas Corpus. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) Foundation Immigrants’ Rights Project and the ACLU of Georgia, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Within the complaint, the plaintiff also sought to certify a class of “All individuals who are or will be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on a monetary bond set by an U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer and/or an immigration judge in the Middle District of Georgia.” This motion was eventually withdrawn, and the plaintiff filed a new motion for class certification on August 14, 2019 for those who are or will be detained on a monetary bond set by an ICE officer and/or an Immigration Judge in the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiff also filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction on August 14, asking the court to enjoin the defendants to establish bond-setting procedures that would protect the entire class from unlawful detention based on their lack of financial resources. On September 2, 2019, Torres-Soto was removed from the suit, and the case was renamed. Abiala v. Barr. On October 8, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. As of May 27, 2020, both the motion for preliminary injunction and the motion to dismiss are pending.

Summary: In 2019, immigrants detained at Irwin County Detention Center filed this putative class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The plaintiffs alleged that the practice of failing to account for ability to pay when setting bonds violated their Fifth Amendment Rights. The case is ongoing pending motions to certify the class and a preliminary injunction.


On October 25, 2011, a group of citizens (Occupy Ft. Meyers) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida against the City of Fort Myers, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging that the defendant's municipal code unconstitutionally suppressed plaintiff's activities. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcing certain portions of the code and to declare that such portions violated the rights to free speech, assembly and association, under the First Amendment. Defendant had employed a code requiring a special permit-signed by the chief or authorized member of the police department-for every parade, procession or public open-air meeting. Around October 11, 2011, the plaintiff began organizing the Occupy Fort Myers movement and held political activities (e.g., rally, building tents and information booths) at Centennial Park to promote awareness of the influence of private money in the nation's political process. The plaintiff attempted to acquire a "Special Events" permit but was denied presumably due to lack of the required liability insurance policy. On October 20, 2011, the police department of the defendant began issuing citations to plaintiff for remaining overnight in the park. Subsequently, plaintiff filed this suit. The plaintiff argued that defendant's code: (1) provided targeted regulation of political speech with uncontrolled discretion in City officials to approve or deny permits; (2) included vague language as to cause citizens to censor speech and conduct; and (3) included language suppressing citizens' liberty interest in lounging on public benches and places. The defendant contended in part that portions of the code-some of which were to be repealed-were not enforced and thus request for the preliminary injunction was moot. On November 15, 2012, the District Court (Judge Steele) issued an order for preliminary injunction to some of the plaintiff's claims. On November 17, 2011, the defendant denied plaintiff's request for a permit, and around 11:00 pm, the police department demanded that the plaintiff leave the park or face arrest. The plaintiff and defendant negotiated a settlement agreement. On March 4, 2013, the District Court (Judge Steele) dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On October 25, 2011, a group of citizens of the Occupy Fort Myers movement filed a lawsuit against the City of Fort Myers, challenging that certain portions of the municipal code violated the rights of free speech, assembly and association. On November 15, 2012, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (Judge Steele) issued a preliminary injunction. On March 4, 2013, the case was dismissed with prejudice after a settlement was negotiated.


On May 23 2006, a state pretrial detainee of the Morris County Correctional Facility, filed, pro se, a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking injunctive relief and damages for violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendment rights in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that jail officials had subjected him to mandatory strip searches, denied him access to legal phone calls and interfered with his mail, and committed sanitary violations relating to footwear and mattresses. The plaintiff was a pretrial detainee. He alleged that he was subject to daily, mandatory strip searches from August 30 to September 8th, 2005, from March 14 to March 17, 2006, and from March 20 to March 25, 2006. Plaintiff claimed the sole purpose of these searches was to humiliate him. On August 26, 2006, the Court (Judge Dennis Cavanaugh) dismissed several of the claims sua sponte as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The Court allowed the strip search and interference with legal mail claims to proceed. On June 8, 2007, Judge Cavanaugh, after converting the Defendants' motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the case was closed.

Summary: Pro se pretrial detainee plaintiff's allegations of daily strip searches and interference with legal against Morris County Correctional Facility in New Jersey were allowed to proceed passed the 'screening stage.' However, all claims were dismissed when summary judgment was granted in favor of the Defendants.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a lawsuit brought by seventeen different states and Washington D.C. regarding the July 2020 release of ICE regulations which, in effect, meant that students on F-1 visas would risk deportation if their school shifted to online learning. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. In order to effectuate the rescission, ICE removed the guidance from its website and replaced it with the previous guidance which exempted students from the limitation on online learning credits in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal on October 7, 2020.
 Background Generally speaking, F-1 visas (colloquially "student visas") can be granted to international students who attend American universities. However, regulations on the granting of these visas limit the amount of online or distance learning the student can engage in. According to these regulations, an international student can engage in only one such class or three credits of that class per semester. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(f)(6)(i)(G). The COVID-19 outbreak in early 2020 made this regulation untenable, as schools and universities had to shift to online learning systems. In response, defendant ICE issued an exemption on March 13, 2020, affirming that international students would be permitted to continue distance learning in the United States under their F-1 visas. The exemption would apply until the end of the emergency. However, on July 6, 2020, ICE issued a new directive stating that it would rescind that exemption. This directive would then mean that international students at schools that would still be fully online would have to either transfer to other schools that were at least partially in-person, go back to their countries voluntarily, or risk deportation. The directive also ordered schools that had gone fully online or had simply decided not to have classes to submit an "operational change plan" within nine days, and ordered schools that would have a hybrid system to certify each F-1 student to make sure that they were not taking entirely online courses. The Lawsuit This lawsuit was filed on July 13, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts by seventeen states and Washington D.C.. Plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The complaint alleged two violations of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701. First, it claimed that the directive constituted arbitrary and capricious agency action, because defendants 1) failed to give a reasoned basis for the shift in policy; 2) failed to consider important aspects of the problem like reliance interests of schools and students, the need to protect health and safety, and the burden on institutions as a result of the directive; 3) failed to consider that the COVID-19 outbreak had not subsided; and 4) because the directive required compliance with a timetable that would have been nearly impossible for plaintiffs to adhere to. Second, plaintiffs argued that the directive was unlawful because defendants failed to use notice-and-comment rulemaking in issuing the new order. They sought declaratory relief that would render the order unlawful, a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from enforcing the order, and an order vacating and setting aside the directive. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Allison D. Burroughs. Meanwhile, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same directive, President and Fellows of Harvard College, the parties conferred and the government agreed to rescind their implementation of the directive and to return to the March policy. On October 7, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.

Summary: This lawsuit, brought by seventeen states and Washington D.C., was leveled against U.S. DHS and ICE over a July 6, 2020 directive that would have effectively forced all international students to attend in-person classes or risk deportation. The lawsuit alleged two violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. First, the directive was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore illegal. Second, the defendants did not engage in notice-and-comment rule-making, and therefore the directive was unlawful on procedural grounds. On July 15, in a different lawsuit filed against the administration over the same July directive, plaintiffs met with counsel for the government and worked to get the regulations rescinded. The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims on October 7, 2020.


On January 13, 1993, a group of former employees of New York Telephone Company age 40 or older filed a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("the ADEA"), the New York Human Rights Law ("the HRL"), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") against defendants New York Telephone Company ("NYT") and NYNEX Corporation in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Foley Square Division. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and other appropriate legal and equitable relief, claiming that defendant NYT unlawfully discharged or otherwise discriminated against them and other similarly situated in the implementation of the NYNEX Force Management Plan ("FMP"). Between October 13, 1992 and December 11, 1992, NYT implemented a reduction in force (the "Fall 1992 RIF") discharging some 600 management employees. The Fall 1992 RIF was implemented in accordance with an approach described in the FMP, a plan designed by NYT's parent, NYNEX Corp. The basic procedure involved the creation of "banding entities" or "bands" comprised of similar employees. Under the FMP, employees within each band were to be evaluated by teams of NYT supervisors on the basis of two categories, "Added Value" and "Performance." Once evaluated, employees were rated as "Maximum, High, Medium, or Low" and ordered by seniority within each rating. The least senior employees with a Low rating was first eligible to be placed "at risk," and more senior employees with Low ratings would follow. This lawsuit is mainly based on two provisions of the Fall 1992 RIF: First, NYT excluded from the banding process employees who had either (1) been hired within 2 years of the RIF; or (2) received a promotion within the past year; Second, evaluations of banded employees included whether the employee had been awarded an academic degree within the past 2 years. Plaintiffs claimed that because the employees who had been hired within the past 2 years or had received a degree were most likely to be people younger than 40, this was discriminating against older employees. On July 21, 1993, the district court (Judge McKenna) granted the plaintiffs' motion for an order directing defendants to provide the names and addresses of all potential class members. On September 22, 1995, the district court (Judge Koeltl) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, but denied the plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate the case. On January 28, 1997, the court approved a settlement reached between the parties. However, because we cannot retrieve the settlement agreement, the details are unknown. On April 18, 1997, the case was dismissed.

Summary: This case was brought by a group of former employees of New York Telephone Company age 40 or older against defendants New York Telephone Company and its parent NYNEX Corp. seeking monetary and equitable relief. On January 28, 1997, the case was settled.


On October 23, 2006, a class action lawsuit was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e; the New York State Human Rights Law, New York Executive Law § 296; and the New York City Human Rights Law, New York City Administrative Code §§ 8-101 against Gristede's Operating Corp., a retail chain of grocery stores. Former female cashiers of Gristede's, represented by private counsel, claimed that the company engaged in discriminatory company-wide practices and policies with regard to placing, promoting, and compensating women with the effect of denying them equal opportunities. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant channeled women into lower-paying, part-time positions such as cashier or bookkeeper; this was done without regard to their qualifications or capabilities. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that store managers and upper management, the overwhelming majority of whom were male, almost uniformly offered promotions to males. The complaint was amended on June 21, 2007 and again on January 1st, 2010. The major allegations remained unchanged, though some of the specific plaintiffs were added and removed from the case. There was a lengthy and contentious discovery battle between the parties. On March 8, 2010, the District Court (Judge Laura Taylor Swain) issued an order that (1) denied Defendant's motion to strike expert reports and (2) certified the proposed class. First, the court summarized the findings of fact up to this point in discovery. The court determined that the defendant's hiring and promotional decisions were primarily made by males and were highly discretionary, with no objective criteria to follow. Further, there was evidence that most female prospective employees were told cashier positions were the only ones available, and that they were never informed of promotional opportunities. The court in this order allowed expert testimony based on statistical information that may show that gender disparities exist in the defendant's hiring and promoting practices. Also, the court certified a class of "all current and former female Gristede's employees who worked for Gristede's at any time between November 2, 2004 and the date of final judgment in this matter." This class was certified, however only for the purposes of conjunctive and declaratory relief. After two years of discovery motions and hearings, the parties agreed to a Settlement that awarded the Plaintiffs' $1,450,000 in May of 2012. On November 15, 2012 the court issued an order approving the preliminary settlement and conditionally certifying the settlement class. In March 1, 2013 the plaintiffs moved for final certification of class and approval of the settlement. Judge Swain approved it on June 19th, 2013. 2013 WL 3146772. The class was finalized, and included female employees of the Defendant between November 2, 2004 and November 14, 2012. The settlement included the monetary award to the Plaintiffs of $1,450,000, and forward-looking corrective measures, including prohibiting the steering of females into low paying jobs, maximizing efforts to increase female participation at the management level, and posting management positions online that are available to everyone. The corrective measures were to be enforced by a compliance monitor. The parties were also instructed to make good faith efforts to negotiate proper attorneys' fees. The case was closed August 14, 2013.

Summary: On October 23, 2006 a class action lawsuit was brought against Gristede's Operating Corp., a retail chain of grocery stores under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and other Federal and state laws. The plaintiffs, former female cashiers, claimed the Defendant engaged in discriminatory practices of placing, promoting and compensating women with the effect of denying the equal opportunities. The court eventually certified the class in 2010, and approved a settlement in 2013 that included $1,450,000 in monetary award, and corrective measures to be enforced by a compliance officer. The case was closed on August 14, 2013 with the parties still negotiating attorneys' fees.


On March 4, 2004, parents, as next friends of their minor daughters, individually and on behalf of all those similarly situated, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California under state law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. against Alhambra Unified School District (AUSD) and individual District Board members and employees and the City of Alhambra. Plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the California Women's Law Center and the Legal Aid Society--Employment Law Center, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that AUSD had violated Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 by denying female student athletes' equal treatment and benefits in comparison with male student athletes. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that AUSD had discriminated against plaintiffs' daughters and all similarly situated in the funding of athletics; the granting of opportunities to participate in athletics; provision to teams of publicity and support; access to weight training facilities; the scheduling of games and practice times; the hiring of coaches; and the provision of locker rooms and facilities for both practice and competition. Plaintiffs' motion for class certification for injunctive relief was granted by the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) on October 4, 2004. On March 4, 2005, the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) deemed filed and served plaintiffs' only amended complaint, previously lodged with the Court on February 16, 2005. On December 19, 2005, the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) preliminarily approved parties' settlement agreement that settled all claims, except that the court would retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the City of Alhambra until they made a certain payment of money and over the District defendants until the end of the specified compliance period; the parties also agreed to submit the issue of attorneys' fees and costs to be awarded to the court for determination on the basis of briefs submitted. On January 31, 2006, the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) finally approved the settlements. On February 27, 2006, the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) awarded plaintiffs half of the attorneys' fees they requested. Plaintiffs filed a 59(e) motion for reconsideration and would eventually appeal the Court's determination of fees. On May 1, 2006, the Court (District Judge Dickran Tevrizian) dismissed the case, retaining continuing and exclusive jurisdiction to enforce the agreements' terms and the authority to make all orders necessary to enforce compliance with the agreements' terms. On July 23, 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (District Judge Leighton, and Circuit Judges Prescott and Wardlaw) awarded plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees and costs on appeal, vacating and remanding to the District Court for the Central District of California plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees incurred prior to the filing of the Rule 59(e) motion. On March 3, 2009, the District Court for the Central District of California (District Chief Judge Audrey B. Collins) awarded plaintiffs the full amount sought for attorneys' fees prior to the filing of the Rule 59(e) motion and for attorneys' fees on remand. On January 28, 2010, Appellate Commissioner Peter Shaw determined and granted appellants' attorneys' fees. On August 3, 2012, the Court (Judge Audrey B. Collins) granted in part defendants' motion to terminate the Court's continuing jurisdiction, retaining jurisdiction over the section of the settlement requiring defendants to provide equal athletic participation opportunities to girls until that section was satisfied. On December 12, 2013, the Court (Judge Audrey B. Collins) determined that defendants had fulfilled all of their obligations under the settlement agreement, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The settlement agreements provided for a grievance policy, Title IX training, and future monitoring of defendants, who agreed therein to create two new softball fields; dedicate new locker room facilities for female students; provide equal access to weight rooms and other facilities, as well as for desirable practice and game times; equitable funding and fund-raising opportunities; equitable publicity; and enhanced coaching. The case was closed on December 12, 2013.

Summary: On March 4, 2004, plaintiffs filed for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Alhambra Unified School District had violated state law and Title IX of the Education Amendment of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by denying plaintiffs' daughters' and those similarly situated equal access to interscholastic and other school-sponsored athletics. The parties reached a settlement agreement on December 19, 2005, and plaintiffs were awarded half of attorneys' fees and costs sought on February 27, 2006. Plaintiffs appealed, and were awarded the full amount of attorneys' fees and costs sought on remand on March 3, 2009. The settlement agreements provided for a grievance policy, Title IX training, and future monitoring of defendants, who agreed therein to create two new softball fields; dedicate new locker room facilities for female students; provide equal access to weight rooms and other facilities, as well as to desirable practice and game times; equitable funding and fund-raising opportunities; equitable publicity; and enhanced coaching. The case was closed on December 12, 2013.