On December 20, 2013, a group of non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs, including The Ave Maria Foundation, Domino's Farms Petting Farm, and Thomas More Law Center, are represented by the public interest firm The Thomas More Law Center. The plaintiffs asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate, even with the accommodation for non-profit religious organizations, is unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiffs asked for both a preliminary and permanent injunction keeping the government from enforcing the contraception insurance mandate against them because it violates the owners' deeply-help, Catholic religious beliefs. On December 23, 2013, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order against the defendant. The defendants opposed this motion on the grounds that the accommodation to the ACA mandate does not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious freedom under RFRA or cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm. On January 13, 2013 U.S. District Court (Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III.) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 23, 2014, the court granted a joint motion to stay the case pending the defendants' decision to appeal the preliminary injunction. The order referenced two expedited appeals in similar cases in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Catholic Diocese of Nashville v. Sebelius, FA-TN-0001 in this database, and Michigan Catholic Conference v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0014 in this database. Defendants filed an appeal to the Sixth Circuit on March 13, 2014, but the case closed before the Court of Appeals ruled on the case. The plaintiffs jointly stipulated to the case's dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) on February 2, 2018, presumably due to the result of Zubik v. Burwell, FA-PA-0010 in this database, and the case is now closed.

Summary: On December 20, 2013, a group of non-profit organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiffs believe that even with the accommodation for non-profit, religious organizations, the Affordable Care Act's contraception insurance mandate violates their owner's religious beliefs. On January 13, 2013 U.S. District Court (Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III.) granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On January 23, 2014, the court granted a joint motion to stay the case pending the defendants' decision to appeal the preliminary injunction. In February 2018, the plaintiffs jointly stipulated to dismissal, and the case is now closed.


On December 3, 2013, plaintiffs, two employees of BNSF Railway Company who were married to same-sex spouses, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington against the BNSF Railway Company under the federal Equal Pay Act, 29 USC §206(d)(1), §216, and related sections. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they asked the court to declare that BNSF must pay company spousal benefits, regardless of the BNSF employee's sex or sexual orientation, and to enjoin the defendant from continuing its benefit discrimination and denial of plan benefits. The plaintiffs also asked for compensatory damages for the benefits they should have received thus far. Later, in an amended complaint, plaintiffs added causes of action under Title VII, ERISA, and a state anti-discrimination statute, all of which stemmed from the same denial of benefits. The case arose from BNSF's definition of marriage. Plaintiffs were residents of and legally married in Washington State. BNSF, however, defined marriage as between a man and a woman. As a result, the firm denied benefits to plaintiffs' same-sex spouses, which led to the lawsuit. On September 22, 2014, the District Court for the Western District of Washington (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the ERISA claim for lack of jurisdiction and allowed the remaining claims to continue, by granting in part and denying in part the defendant's motion to dismiss. On February 24, 2015, the Court (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal. Prior to settling, BNSF had voluntarily started providing benefit coverage for same-sex spouses, including the plaintiffs' spouses.

Summary: On December 3, 2013, plaintiffs, two employees of BNSF Railway Company who were married to same-sex spouses, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Western District of Washington against the BNSF Railway Company under the federal Equal Pay Act. Plaintiffs were residents of and legally married in Washington State. BNSF, however, defined marriage as between a man and a woman and denied benefits to plaintiffs' same-sex spouses. In January 2014, BNSF voluntarily changed its policies and started providing benefit coverage for same-sex spouses, including the plaintiffs' spouses. The parties eventually settled privately. On February 24, 2015, the Court (Judge Ricardo S. Martinez), dismissed the case pursuant to the parties' joint stipulation of dismissal.


On July 9, 2013, several lesbian and gay couples, one widow, and two teenage children of one of the same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and private counsel, and they asked the court to declare that Pennsylvania laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enjoin the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs with cost of suit and reasonable attorneys fees. The plaintiffs alleged that the ban violated their rights to Due Process and Equal Protection and that they suffered harm by being denied tax and employment benefits available to opposite-sex couples, along with the social stigma of not being allowed to marry. On May 20, 2014, the Court (Judge John E. Jones III) granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and declared Pennsylvania laws that ban same-sex marriage violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Whitewood v. Corbett, 2014 WL 2058105 (M.D. Pennsylvania 2014). A county clerk moved to intervene on June 6, 2014. This motion was denied by the court and the clerk appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (USCA). The USCA submitted this case to a panel of the court for possible summary action. On July 7, 2014, the USCA affirmed the District Court's (Judge Jones) denial of the motion to intervene. The case was closed on February 3, 2015.

Summary: On July 9, 2013, several lesbian and gay couples, one widow, and two teenage children of one of the same-sex couples filed a lawsuit against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Pennsylvania laws banning same-sex marriage were unconstitutional, enjoin the enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage, and award the plaintiffs with cost of suit and reasonable attorneys fees. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and enjoined enforcement of laws banning same-sex marriage.


Plaintiffs are service members in the U.S. Armed Forces, married to spouses of their same sex. They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on October 27, 2011, challenging the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other exclusionary provisions of the U.S. Code. The statutes in question preclude the military from providing the plaintiffs marital benefits and family support that are offered to heterosexual couples. The plaintiffs, represented by the Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, allege that DOMA: (1) violates their Equal Protection rights, (2) violates the 10th Amendment and constitutional principles of federalism, (3) places an unconstitutional condition on the fundamental right to marry, and (4) is impermissible as a bill of attainder. On June 5, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a motion to stay the case pending the outcome of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision on the petition for a writ of certiorari in the First Circuit Gill/Massachusetts case; Judge Stearns granted the stay the following day. The Supreme Court held Gill pending its decision in Windsor v. United States, which also raised the issue of DOMA's constitutionality. On June 27, 2013, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Court struck down the relevant provision of DOMA. On October 2, 2013, the District Court in this case held (in light of Windsor, the decision by the Department of Defense to construe "spouse" to include same-sex spouses, and the President's directive to extend veterans' benefits to same-sex spouses) that the definition of "spouse" to exclude same-sex spouses is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and that the plaintiffs are entitled to apply for benefits for which they were previously precluded from applying, "without regard to being a couple of the same gender." On December 17, 2013, the District Court denied the plaintiffs attorneys' fees, finding that the United States' litigating position was "substantially justified" by its deference to Congress, and therefore that the United States is not liable for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). This decision was upheld by the First Circuit on September 23, 2014.

Summary: Plaintiffs are former service members of the U.S. Armed Forces, married to spouses of their same sex. They filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on October 27, 2011, challenging the constitutionality of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and other exclusionary provisions of the U.S. Code. The statutes in question preclude the military from providing the plaintiffs marital benefits and family support that are offered to heterosexual couples. In light of Windsor v. United States and executive decisions, the District Court held that the definition in the Code of "spouse" to exclude same-sex spouses is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and that the plaintiffs are entitled to apply for benefits for which they were previously precluded from applying, "without regard to being a couple of the same gender."


On June 13, 2013, the Disability Rights Section of the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (“United States”) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island against the State of Rhode Island (“State”) and City of Providence, Rhode Island (“City”) (including the Providence Public School Department) under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 597 (1999). The United States asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The United States alleged that the defendants unnecessarily segregated 90 individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities (I/DD) (predominantly suffering from autism and Down Syndrome) in sheltered workshops and adult day programs by failing to provide adequate programs that would support positions in integrated settings that paid at least the minimum wage. Specifically, the United States alleged that these 90 individuals were sent to a workshop in an old elementary school and tasked with packaging TV remotes and medical supplies or sorting jewelry. These individuals were paid far below minimum wage, with an average per hour wage of $1.57. Though these individuals expressed a desire to work outside of the Training Thru Placement, Inc. (TTP) program, they were not given the opportunity to pursue outside employment. Some individuals in TTP had been working at TTP for up to 30 years. The United States further alleged that the defendants put 85 students between the ages of 14 and 21 in Providence Public School Department at risk of the same unnecessary segregation in the same programs by, among other things, placing them in sheltered workshops as part of the secondary school curriculum, failing to opportunities to explore integrated job placement settings in violation of Rhode Island law, and awarding the students certificates of attendance rather than granting them high school diplomas. These students also sorted jewelry for low to no wages. The United States alleged that this program (the Birch program) was a pipeline to the TTP program. The lawsuit developed from an investigation by the United States into the State’s practices that began in January 2013. By June 7, the United States released a report that the State and City violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. (The same investigation also led to another lawsuit, United States v. Rhode Island.) In this case, the parties entered into an eight-year interim settlement agreement and jointly moved to dismiss on the same day the case was filed, likely based on work that had already taken place during the United States’ investigation. Under the agreement:

The United States agreed that this agreement resolved all claims the United States had against the defendants regarding the specified populations.
The City agreed it would cease providing a sheltered workshop as part of its services for students with I/DD.
The State agreed it would neither fund nor place any more individuals with I/DD in specified adult sheltered workshops and segregated day programs.
The City agreed that each student would be a part of a person-centered planning process that includes information about transition plans to integrated placements beginning at age 14 as well as transition services that give students the opportunity to learn about integrated employment opportunities and placements.
The State agreed to provide supported integrated employment services, placements, and integrated day services to each individual in segregated workshop as well as a professional evaluation of the effect of employment upon the individual's public benefits funding.
The State agreed that all integrated placements made pursuant to the settlement would allow individuals to work as much as they were willing and able and provide them with at least minimum wage.
The State and City agreed to presume that all individuals are capable of working in integrated employment settings for the purposes of job placement, to conduct all assessments of ability to do particular employment at integrated work settings rather than sheltered workshops, and to provide employment services to students after their 18th birthday allowing them to choose to leave school for employment in the workforce.
The State agreed to allow for integrated non-work activities that would allow individuals with I/DD to be integrated into the community allowing them to choose their non-work activities and whom to do those activities.
The City and State agreed to ensure that all students are given all opportunities to earn appropriate educational credentials such as a high school diploma.
The State agreed to support networking between students and individuals with I/DD who had received job placements within the community.
The defendants agreed to contract with a technical assistant provider to provide assistance and support for integrated employment services.
The defendants agreed to ensure that transition, placement, and integrated supports have adequate funding that "follows the person" rather than staying with a particular institutional or job placement.
The defendants agreed to develop a quality improvement program that would involve regular on-site reviews for at least three years.
The defendants agreed to collect and report data on a monthly basis.
The defendants agreed to split the cost of a monitor to evaluate their implementation of the Agreement.
Each defendant agreed to appoint an Interim Settlement Agreement Coordinator to oversee compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.

 The settlement was structured as a conditional dismissal--the case was dismissed, contingent on compliance with the settlement. While efforts to comply proceeded, District Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. retained jurisdiction over the case. On July 23, 2019, the court-appointed monitor resigned from the case. The parties agreed to find a new monitor by the end of September and to submit memoranda if they either found an acceptable candidate or came to an impasse. This window to replace the monitor was later extended to the end of November. On August 20, 2019, the court-appointed monitor submitted his final report on compliance with the consent decree. The monitor determined that the City was in substantial compliance with the terms of the interim settlement agreement. There were two areas of concern, however: the notification procedure for scheduled planning meetings and the requirement of trial work experiences for the Birch students. Specifically, the City had not appropriately notified parents of planning meetings, preventing them from requesting a representative at those meetings. Also, while the majority of Birch students received two or more 60-day trial work experiences before exiting the Birch program, not all students had received those experiences. The City took steps to address both of these concerns, which led the monitor to conclude that the City was in substantial compliance despite these problem areas. On September 26, 2019, the court granted the United States’ motion to dismiss the City from the Interim Settlement Agreement. The DOJ press release can be found here. On November 12, 2019, the court asked the remaining parties to submit memoranda of their views on the services and the role of the court-appointed monitor. According to a later order, the court hoped that agreeing on qualifications would help the parties agree on a replacement monitor. But the court’s hopes went unfulfilled. On November 21, 2019, the City submitted its memorandum and noted that the parties had been unable to come to an agreement on these issues. In response, the court appointed its own interim monitor on November 25. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 13, 2013, the Disability Rights Section of the United States Department of Justice's Civil Rights Division filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island lawsuit against the State of Rhode Island and City of Providence, Rhode Island including the Providence Public School Department, under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134. The United States asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants violated Title II of the ADA by unnecessarily segregating 90 individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) and placing 85 individuals with I/DD at risk of the same unnecessary segregation in sheltered workshops and adult day programs. On the same day, the parties entered into an eight-year interim settlement agreement where the defendants agreed to stop funding new admissions to sheltered workshop and segregated day programs, agreed to provide services to transition both students and those individuals in segregated settings to more integrated employment and non-employment settings, agreed to provide students with all opportunities to earn high school diplomas and participate in state employment services after their 18th birthday, agreed to appoint a monitor and agreed that the City of Providence would stop using sheltered workshops as part of its high school curriculum for students with I/DD. As of November 21, 2019, monitoring is ongoing.


The National Association of the Deaf, Western Massachusetts Association of the Deaf and Hearing Impaired, and a deaf Massachusetts resident belonging to both organizations, brought this case under the Americans with Disabilities Act against Netflix. The plaintiffs alleged that by failing to provide closed captioned text to its on-demand movie and television streaming service known as "Watch Instantly," Netflix failed to provided full and equal access to the deaf and hard of hearing. The lawsuit was filed June 16, 2011 in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The plaintiffs, represented by the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund and private co-counsel, sought declaratory relief, an injunction requiring Netflix to provide effective communication through closed captioning and easy identification of captioned content, and attorney's fees and costs. On November 11, 2011, the court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied the defendant's Motion to Dismiss, because the FCC did not have primary jurisdiction over the case and Netflix's arguments that the there was not a ripe complaint and actual injury were not persuasive. Additionally, the court found Netflix's argument that the case be dismissed or transferred because of a similar case pending in the Northern District of California unpersuasive. 2011 WL 5519883. On June 19, 2012, Judge Michael A. Posner denied Netflix’s motion for judgement on the pleadings. 869 F.Supp.2d 196. The court rejected Netflix’s argument that the Watch Instantly website was not a place of public accommodation covered by the ADA and agreed with the plaintiffs that the website fell within multiple ADA categories, such as “service establishment,” “place of exhibition or entertainment,” and “rental establishment.” The court also determined that the plaintiffs adequately pled that Netflix owns and operates the Watch Instantly website, the Twenty-First Century Communications and Video Accessibility Act complemented not supplanted, the ADA, and the new FCC regulation on captioning did not render plaintiffs’ claim moot. The parties entered into settlement negotiations and submitted a settlement to the district court for its approval on October 10, 2012. Under the settlement, Netflix agreed to provide closed captions on 100% of its streaming content within two years and to improve its interface so that subscribers could more easily identify content that was captioned. Additionally, Netflix agreed to provide training to customer service representatives on handling questions about captioning issues. The announcement of the settlement explained that Netflix began its closed-captioning program in 2010 and increased captioning for 90% of the hours viewed. Captions were displayed on a majority of the more than 1,000 devices on which the service was available. The court maintained jurisdiction of the case for four years to assure compliance with the terms of the decree, and the plaintiffs monitored Netflix's progress. Netflix agreed to pay $795,000 for past and future attorneys fees and costs, including monitoring costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: Two groups who advocate for deaf and hard of hearing people and an individual brought this ADA case against Netflix for failing to provide closed captioned text to its on-demand service known as "Watch Instantly." The case was filed June 16, 2011 in the United States District Court for the District of Massachussets. On November 11, 2011, the court (Judge Michael A. Ponsor) denied the defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The parties entered into settlement negotiations, which resulted in a settlement submitted to the district court for its approval on October 10, 2012. The settlement asked Netflix to implement closed captions in 100% of Netflix streaming content within two years and provided four years of court oversight. Netflix also agreed to pay $795,000 for past and future attorneys fees and costs, including monitoring costs.


On October 30, 2019, seven individual plaintiffs and Latino Network filed this putative class-action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, challenging President Trump’s October 4, 2019 “Presidential Proclamation on the Suspension of Entry of Immigrants Who Will Financially Burden the United States Healthcare System” (the “Proclamation”). The plaintiffs, represented by the Innovation Law Lab, the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the Justice Action Center, and private counsel, alleged that the Proclamation imposes a new ground of inadmissibility whereby immigrants will be denied visas unless they prove they can get health insurance. The individual plaintiffs are U.S. citizens in the process of sponsoring family members for visas, but face denial under the new Proclamation. The plaintiffs sued President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department of State, alleging that the Proclamation is ultra vires and violates the Administrative Procedure Act and Fifth Amendment due process. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Michael H. Simon. In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the Proclamation would block nearly two thirds of all prospective legal immigrants from receiving visas to travel to the U.S. Specifically, they claimed the Proclamation would bar qualified immigrant applicants from receiving visas and entering the U.S. unless they can establish, to the satisfaction of a consular officer, that they either will be covered by approved health insurance within 30 days after entry, or are wealthy enough—and/or healthy enough—to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs. The plaintiffs argued that such a policy contravenes well-established immigration and healthcare laws, exceeds the scope of the President’s statutory authority, and violates procedural due process and equal protection. On November 1, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order. The court heard oral argument on November 2 and granted the plaintiff’s motion, temporarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the Proclamation for at least 28 days. 2019 WL 5685204. On November 8, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, as well as a motion to certify two subclasses: (1) a subclass of U.S. citizens who are petitioners sponsoring a visa for family members; and (2) a subclass of foreign nationals who are visa applicants. On November 11, the plaintiffs also filed a motion to compel the administrative record. On November 15, the court ordered the defendants to produce the record by November 20. 2019 WL 6050111. On November 26, 2019, the court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Proclamation. The court found that the Proclamation contravened and overrode Congress’s intent as expressed in certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). 2019 WL 6324560. On November 27, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding another individual plaintiff to represent the Visa Applicant Subclass. On December 4, 2019, the defendants appealed the grant of the preliminary injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (#19-36020). The defendants requested an emergency temporary stay of the district court’s preliminary injunction, as well as a stay of the injunction pending appeal. On December 20, the Ninth Circuit denied the request for a temporary stay. The Court found that the status quo would be disrupted by granting the temporary stay request because the Proclamation would make major and unprecedented changes to American immigration policy and the harms the government would allegedly suffer absent the stay were long-term rather than immediate. 944 F.3d 1222. Back in the district court, the defendants were ordered to supplement the administrative record on February 11, 2020. On April 7, 2020, Judge Simon granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. He certified the following two subclasses: (1) U.S. Petitioner Subclass
"Individuals in the United States who currently have or will have an approved or pending petition to the United States government to sponsor a noncitizen family member for an immigrant visa; and whose sponsored family member is subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to a consular officer's satisfaction that he or she 'will be covered by approved health insurance' within 30 days after entry or will be able 'to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs;'"
 (2) Visa Applicant Subclass
"Individuals who are foreign nationals who (i) have applied for or will soon apply to the United States government for an immigrant visa; (ii) are otherwise eligible to be granted the visa; but (iii) are subject to the Proclamation and unable to demonstrate to the satisfaction of a consular officer that they 'will be covered by approved health insurance' within 30 days after entry or will be able 'to pay for reasonably foreseeable medical costs.'"
 In his order, Judge Simon explained that the U.S. Petitioner Subclass plaintiffs had standing because they had shown a credible threat or realistic danger of injury from the Proclamation. On April 25, 2020, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of a new Presidential Proclamation that had been issued on April 22, 2020, titled "Suspension of Entry of Immigrants who Present a Risk to the United States Labor Market During the Economic Recovery Following the 2019 Novel Coronavirus Outbreak" (No. 10014). The plaintiffs requested that the court restrain enforcement of the Proclamation to the extent that it prevents certain underage members of the Visa Applicant Subclass from accessing emergency consular processing services to prevent their aging out of their place in the visa queue (which could prevent them from receiving visas). On April 29, Judge Simon issued an opinion and order denying the plaintiffs' motion. He found that the court's existing jurisdiction in this lawsuit focused only on the October 4th Proclamation, and that the new April 22nd Proclamation was completely unrelated. Thus, Judge Simon concluded that there was no basis for invoking the All Writs Act to suspend the new Proclamation. On May 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion and order denying the defendants' motion to stay the district court's preliminary injunction pending appeal. The Court found that the government had failed to meet its burden of showing irreparable harm. It also concluded that the government had not sustained its burden of showing that it had a strong likelihood of prevailing against the plaintiffs' claims on the merits. Finally, it held that the nationwide scope of the district court's injunction was appropriate given the nationwide class. 2020 WL 2110978. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On October 30, 2019, seven individuals and Latino Network filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, challenging President Trump's new proclamation, which restricts visas for immigrants without health insurance. The plaintiffs claimed the proclamation was ultra vires, and violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. The court issued a nationwide preliminary injunction, which the defendants appealed to the Ninth Circuit. In April 2020 the District Court certified two subclasses: (1) a subclass of U.S. citizens who are petitioners sponsoring a visa for family members; and (2) a subclass of foreign nationals who are visa applicants. On May 4, 2020, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. The case is ongoing.


On July 18, 2012, Wheaton College, a Christian liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Specifically, the plaintiff objected to the ACA rules requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception, which the plaintiff considered an abortifacient. The plaintiff did not object to other forms of contraception. Claiming that providing coverage for emergency contraception would both contravene its Christian faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On August 10, 2012, the defendant departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff qualified for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the defendants were in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because the safe harbor period did not protect it from private ERISA lawsuits seeking to enforce the contraception mandate, and because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the emergency contraception coverage requirement. On August 24, 2012, the District Court (Judge Ellen S. Huvelle) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Judge Huvelle found that, in light of the defendants' efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff had not alleged a concrete and imminent harm, and that as a result the plaintiff lacked standing and its claim was not yet ripe for review. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 887 F. Supp. 2d 102 (D.D.C. 2012). The plaintiff appealed the dismissal and injunction denial to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (Case No. 12-5273). The case was consolidated with Belmont Abbey College v. Sebelius (Case No. 12-5291) on appeal. On December 18, 2012, the Circuit Court (Judges Merrick B. Garland, Thomas B. Griffith, and A. Raymond Randolph) affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of ripeness, and ordered that the lawsuit be held in abeyance pending the issuance of the amended contraceptive coverage regulations. The defendants were directed to file status reports with the court every 60 days from the date of the abeyance order. Wheaton College v. Sebelius, 703 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2012). On August 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered the lower court to vacate the August 24, 2012, judgment and dismiss both cases as moot. The plaintiffs refiled this case in the Northern District of Illinois on December 13, 2013. Wheaton College v. Sebelius.

Summary: In 2012, a Christian liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for emergency contraception through their group health insurance plan. In August 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and denied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that the plaintiff had not demonstrated imminent harm. The plaintiff appealed that order to the D.C. Circuit, which affirmed the dismissal and injunction denial and ordered that the case be held in abeyance pending the issuance of amended regulations by the defendant departments. On August 13, 2013, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and ordered the lower court to dismiss both cases as moot. The plaintiffs refiled this case in the Northern District of Illinois on December 13, 2013.


On November 22, 2010, HIV-positive prisoners incarcerated by the Massachusetts Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a lawsuit against UMass Correctional Health and the Massachusetts DOC. They brought the case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, et seq.; and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. The plaintiffs, represented by Massachusetts Prisoners' Legal Services, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the state's policies related to the distribution of HIV medications constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and a denial of equal protection and the right to privacy, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. For many years prior to this lawsuit, prisoners in the Massachusetts DOC were able to keep their medications in their cells. This "Keep on Person" ("KOP") program enabled HIV-positive prisoners to take their medications consistently and privately. When UMass Correctional Health - an arm of the University of Massachusetts Medical School hired by the DOC to provide health services to prisoners - terminated the KOP program, HIV-positive prisoners were required to go to the "med line" at their prison's health services unit for each dose of medicine. No other medications were removed from the KOP program. Plaintiffs claimed that the removal of HIV medication from the KOP program has hindered plaintiffs' access to their needed medications and, as a result, has increased the risk for error, contagion, infection, breach of privacy, and the exacerbation of existing illnesses. On October 3, 2013, District Judge Rya Zobel granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims. 2013 WL 5505364 (D. Mass 2013). On plaintiffs' appeal, on September 12, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Judges Kayatta, Baldock (sitting by designation), and Selya, affirmed the grant of summary judgment in an opinion by Judge Kayatta. Nunes v. Mass. Dept. of Correction, 766 F.3d 136 (1st Cir. 2014).

Summary: In November 2010, HIV-positive prisoners incarcerated by the Massachusetts DOC filed a lawsuit claiming that the DOC's policy prohibiting them from keeping medications in their cells constituted statutory and constitutional violations. In October 2013, the District Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and in September 2014, the Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment.


On August 1, 2011, the religious leaders of the Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic churches of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, against the governor and attorney general of Alabama, and the district attorney of Madison County, Alabama. The plaintiffs, represented by the churches' attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B. 56 violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the law would prevent the churches and members of their congregations from freely practicing their religious duties to minister to "all of God's children" without regard to immigration status. Several provisions of H.B. 56 criminalize actions such as harboring or transporting an undocumented immigrant. Plaintiffs claimed that such actions were regularly undertaken by churches directly or by their congregants, and criminalizing the actions prevented the free exercise of their religious faith. The Court (Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) ordered this case and two other related cases consolidated (United States v. Arizona and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley), but that order was dissolved a month later. On August 5, 2011, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which the court denied on September 28, 2011. The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge one provision of the law, and the other challenges to separate provisions were moot because enforcement was already preliminarily enjoined in the related case, United States v. Alabama [IM-AL-0005]. The Court granted the parties' requests to stay proceedings given the appeals pending in the related cases, United States v. Alabama and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley [IM-AL-0006]. On October 30, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion to dismiss the case as moot assuming the Court enters the proposed order in the related case, United States v. Alabama. In that case the parties asked the Court to enter a permanent injunction of Sections 13 and 27 of H.B. 56. If the injunction was granted, plaintiffs agreed that they would have received relief in this case. The day before, the parties in the related cases, United States v. Alabama and Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Bentley, filed joint reports and proposed orders for judgment. Unlike in this case, those parties did not move to dismiss but rather agreed to permanent injunctions of most of the challenged provisions. As noted above, if granted the proposed order in United States v. Alabama would permanently enjoin the sections of the law (13 and 27) that were at issue in this case. The court in the related cases issued orders on Nov. 25, 2013 approving settlements that permanently enjoined defendants from enforcing several provisions of H.B. 56, including 13 and 27. The same day, this court dismissed the case as moot without prejudice. The case is now closed.

Summary: On August 1, 2011, the religious leaders of the Methodist, Episcopal, and Roman Catholic churches of Alabama filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the governor and attorney general of Alabama, and the district attorney of Madison County, Alabama in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Northeastern Division. The plaintiffs, represented by the churches' attorneys, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the recently enacted H.B. 56 violated their constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that enforcement of the law would prevent the churches and members of their congregations from freely practicing their religious duties to minister to "all of God's children" without regard to immigration status. The court denied part of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction for lack of standing. In October 2013, the parties filed a join motion to dismiss the case as moot.


On August 27, 2019, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland (in Baltimore). The federal government sued Baltimore County for injunctive relief for employment dicrimination, alleging violations by the County Police Department of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), in its recruitment and hiring practices. Specifically, the federal government alleged that the Baltimore County Office of Human Resources and Baltimore County Police Department developed and issued a series of discriminatory written exams to screen entry-level police officer applicants. Three different variations of the exam were used from 2009–2013, 2014, and 2015–2016. All three variations resulted in statistically lower pass rates for African American applicants compared to the pass rates for white applicants. The exams allegedly used as a pass/fail screening device in a multi-stage application in which those who failed were not permitted to move on to subsequent stages of the application process. The Department of Justice alleged that the material tested on the exams was not job-related consistent with business necessity and did not otherwise meet the requirements of Section 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). DOJ further alleged that as a result of these exams, BCPD has hired fewer African American applicants as BCPD entry-level police officers and police cadets since January 1, 2013, than it would have had it used a nondiscriminatory screening device. The government sought injunctive relief requiring that the defendant: 1. Refrain from using written exams to screen applicants that result in a disparate impact on African Americans where such exams are not consistent with business necessity and do not otherwise meet the requirements of Section 703(k) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); 2. Provide remedial relief to and make whole all persons who have suffered individual loss as a result of the discrimination alleged; and 3. Adopt other appropriate nondiscriminatory measures to correct the present effects of its discriminatory policies and practices. The parties were referred to Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite on August 27, 2019; it was reassigned in early September to District Judge Catherine C. Blake. Shortly after entering discovery, the parties began negotiating a settlement agreement. Following a year of telephone conferences (between the parties)and hearing resets, the parties agreed to a settlement. On May 19, 2021, Judge Blake entered an order granting the parties' joint motion to finalize the settlement agreement. The amended settlement includes the following: (1) Enjoining the County from using the challenged exams and requiring the County to develop a new schematic which would not lead to a disparate impact against African American applicants (unless the impact is job-related and consistent with business necessity) (2) Individual relief in the form of back pay for certain affected applicants who had been denied under the old policy, and priority hiring relief for up to twenty of those applicants in certain circumstances. (3) Procedures and timelines for implementing the above. The settlement agreement allowed the court to appoint an officer to monitor compliance with the settlement. Once the federal government and the county agree that everything in paragraphs 33-47 has been done, the case will remain open for approximately 90 days to give the federal government an opportunity to object to the rule change selected by the county. Based on the scope of the settlement, it seems likely that this will be at least a couple of years. The settlement has been entered as final by the court and all objections to the agreement were overruled in May 2021. So the case remains open for implementation.

Summary: The United States sued Baltimore County seeking to enjoin the use of discriminatory exams used by the county police department in their hiring process. Following protracted negotiations, the parties came to a settlement agreement. The agreement stipulates that: (1) The County in enjoined from using the challenged exams and requires the County to create a new schematic which would not lead to a disparate impact against African American applicants (unless the impact is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity) (2) The County shall provide for individual relief in the form of back pay for certain affected applicants who had been denied under the old policy, and priority hiring relief for up to twenty of those applicants in certain circumstances. (3) Procedures and timelines for implementing the above.


COVID-19 Summary: This action was filed on April 28, 2020 by sixteen individuals with undocumented spouses alleging violations of the First and Fifth Amendment within the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. Plaintiffs sought an injunction that would allow them to receive recovery payments and a declaration that the eligibility qualifications in the act were unconstitutional. On May 29, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss which was denied on August 5. No outcome yet. <hr> This case was brought to determine who was eligible to receive emergency financial assistance under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) in the form of refundable tax credits of $1,200 or $2,400 in the case of individuals filing a joint return. The CARES Act, which was passed on March 27, 2020, was designed to alleviate financial hardships caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The credits were only open to “eligible individual[s],” which did not include “nonresident alien[s].” Eligibility status was determined by the presence of a social security number (SSN) on a recent tax return. In the case of a joint tax return, eligibility was limited to individuals whose spouse also had an SSN. Therefore, the tax credits were not available to otherwise eligible individuals filing a joint tax return if their spouse was undocumented. The plaintiffs in this case were sixteen individuals with undocumented spouses who were ineligible to receive the CARES Act tax credits. They filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland on April 28, 2020 against the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the U.S. Internal Revenue Service, arguing that the CARES Act was in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech and association. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that the CARES Act was unconstitutional and unenforceable, as well as an injunction to enjoin defendants from enforcing the CARES Act’s SSN requirement for payments. The plaintiffs also sought a class certification, including all persons who were eligible for tax credits except for the fact that their spouses lacked social security number. The case was assigned to Judge Ellen L. Hollander. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on May 19. On May 29, 2020, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that sovereign immunity, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim justified dismissal. The Federation for American Immigration Reform filed an amicus brief in support. The plaintiffs responded to the defendant's arguments on June 5. On August 5, 2020, Judge Hollander denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 4547950.The judge determined that sovereign immunity in the case was waived by defendants through § 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which allowed suits against the United States for relief other than money damages. The government had argued that the defendants did not suffer any injuries and therefore did not have standing to sue, the judge determined that deprivation of a CARES Act payment did qualify as an economic injury and discriminatory treatment, both of which were considered sufficient to find that the plaintiffs had standing. In addition to the issue of standing, the defendants also contended that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The plaintiffs alleged that the CARES Act burdened their fundamental right of marriage and singled them out for disfavored treatment on the basis of marriage. The judge held that plaintiffs adequately alleged that the CARES Act imposed a discriminatory burden on the fundamental right of marriage and that the government lacked a rational basis for discriminating against married taxpayers on the basis of their spouse's immigration status. For these reasons, the judge denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' cause of action under the Fifth Amendment. The defendants also argued for dismissal for failure to state a claim under the First and Fifth Amendments. The plaintiffs argued that they were deprived of recovery payments based on their association with their spouses. The court cited precedent from the Supreme Court holding that marriage is a protected form of free association under the First Amendment and therefore denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the First Amendment cause of action. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In April 2020, plaintiffs with undocumented spouses filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against the United States Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service. Plaintiffs were denied payments if they filed a joint tax return with an undocumented spouse. The plaintiffs, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, alleged that their ineligibility to receive CARES Act recovery payments during the COVID-19 pandemic violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights. On August 5, the court denied a motion to dismiss by the defendants. The case is ongoing


On October 24, 2002, the American Civil Liberties Union, joined by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression, and the Freedom to Read Foundation, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”). The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, claiming violations of FOIA. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ withheld records related to the government's implementation of the USA Patriot Act--specifically records that indicate the number of times the DOJ used particular surveillance and investigatory tools authorized by the Patriot Act since the Act took effect. The plaintiffs had requested expedited processing of their FOIA request on the grounds that the records sought pertained to "a matter of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about the government's integrity which affect public confidence." The government granted the request on September 3, 2002, but had not furnished the request as of the time of filing. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a preliminary injunction on November 13, 2002 which sought an immediate response to their request from the DOJ. After a court hearing before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle, the plaintiffs and the defendant agreed that the defendant would finish its processing of the requested documents by January 15, 2003. Judge Huvelle therefore denied the motion for the preliminary injunction and ordered that the defendant complete the processing by the agreed-upon date. The DOJ released a portion of the records requested, those collected by the DOJ's Office of Information and Privacy and Office of Intelligence Policy, on January 15, 2003. The defendant moved for partial summary judgement on January 24, 2003, claiming that there were no issues of material fact regarding the defendant's compliance with the FOIA. The DOJ sought and received several extensions for the FBI's portion of the documents, and completed the order on March 3, 2003. The defendant then moved for summary judgement on March 7, 2003, claiming there were no issues of material fact regarding the defendant's compliance with FOIA for this set of documents. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgement on March 21, 2003. Throughout the litigation, although it is not clear as to when, the plaintiffs narrowed the focus of their litigation, seeking improper withholdings in the released documents under two exceptions to the FOIA claimed by the defendant: Exemption 1 and Exemption 5. Exemption 1 authorizes the withholding of records “specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and . . . in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 5 shields “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the agency.” Id. at § 552(b)(5). The plaintiffs argued that Exemption 1 did not preclude disclosure because the aggregate statistical data that they sought on the number of times the DOJ used particular surveillance and investigatory tools authorized by the Patriot Acts had not been classified, and that Exemption 5 is inapplicable because they sought only factual information that is not protected. On May 19, 2003, Judge Huvelle denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgement and granted the defendant's motions for summary judgement, holding that the the DOJ's withholdings under Exemption 1 were appropriate and that the dispute over Exemption 5 was "largely illusory." Based on the Court's examination of the released documents, Judge Huvelle concluded that the data that the plaintiffs sought was properly withheld under Exemption 1 and that any arguments as to Exemption 5 were without merit. The case is now closed.

Summary: On October 24, 2002, the American Civil Liberties Union and four other nonprofit organization plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), alleging that the DOJ witheld records related the government's implementation of the USA Patriot Act. The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction for the release of the requested documents, and the plaintiffs and defendant agreed that the defendant would finish processing the requested documents by January 15, 2003. After several extensions, the DOJ released the documents on March 3, 2003. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOJ improperly withheld information within the documents under FOIA exemptions 1 and 5, which authorize the withholding of records in the interest of national defense and those that would not be available by law to a party in litigation, respectively. Both parties motioned for summary judgement. On May 19, 2003, Judge Huvelle denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgement and granted the defendant's motion, holding that the witholdings were proper.


On September 30, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Borland Software Corporation on behalf of a female Vietnamese employee who was being paid less than her white male counterparts. The EEOC brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, seeking its costs and seeking monetary and injunctive relief for the employee. The parties had been participating in settlement negotiations and reached settlement shortly after the case was filed. The Court entered the agreement as a Consent Decree on October 19, 2005. The 3-year decree provided monetary and injunctive relief. Borland agreed not to discriminate or engage in practices that cause a disparate impact, not to retaliate against the employee, to provide EEO and diversity training to the employee's supervisors and relevant Human Resources representatives, and to notify the EEOC of the training's completion. Borland was required to pay the employee $66,500 for backpay damages and $13,500 for uncovered expenses. The employee's salary was raised from $100,000 to $110,000. No further court involvement appears on the docket and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Borland Software Corporation on behalf of a female Vietnamese employee who was being paid less than her white male counterparts.The parties had been participating in settlement negotiations and reached settlement shortly after the case was filed. The 3-year consent decree provided monetary and injunctive relief, including anti-discrimination, anti-retaliation, and training provisions.Borland was required to pay the employee $66,500 for backpay damages and $13,500 for uncovered expenses. The employee's salary was raised from $100,000 to $110,000. No further court involvement appears on the docket and the case is now closed.


On June 18, 2002 the United States filed a lawsuit under Title VII in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation, alleging that the Department of Parks and Recreation engaged in a pattern or practice of race and/or national origin discrimination in making promotion decisions. The United States sought remedial and injunctive relief. Specifically, the United States contended that the Parks did not follow its stated policy in posting vacancy notices when a job opened for a managerial position. Furthermore, the United States alleged the defendant did not follow its stated EEOC policy of conducting panel interviews and using a prescribed rating system in promoting employees. Instead, Parks used its "Class Of" program in furtherance of its alleged pattern or practice of discrimination against black and Hispanic employees, creating a separate promotional track for white Class Of participants whom Parks recruited directly from college. In comparison to Parks' overall workforce, the composition of the Class Of program was disproportionately white and non-Hispanic. Class Of members who chose to continue their employment with Parks routinely and swiftly had been promoted into high level permanent positions throughout the agency over equally or more qualified black and Hispanic veteran employees. Parks promoted Class Of participants to management positions for which it never posted vacancy notices, sought applications, or conducted a formal interview process, and certain management positions were created specifically for Class Of recruits, so that it was impossible for anyone else to apply, interview, and be considered for the positions. The individual plaintiffs alleged that they were equally or more qualified than these whites and would've applied for the position had they been given the opportunity, and that they suffered retaliation after complaining of discrimination at the Department of Parks and Recreation. In a related case Wright v. Stern begun in May 24, 2001, there were additional claims of discrimination. In addition to the claims stated above, the plaintiffs alleged that the DPR (Department of Parks and Recreation) engaged in disparate treatment by concentrating Black and Hispanic employees in neighborhoods with a predominantly minority population. Plaintiffs claimed to have been offered assignments only at DPR locations in minority populated areas and denied assignments in, or transfers to, predominantly "Caucasian" areas. Plaintiffs alleged that racial segregation also existed within administrative offices, such that "Caucasian" employees occupied perimeter offices while African-American and Hispanic employees were clustered at work stations in the middle of the floorspace. Plaintiffs also alleged that they were forced to work in a racially hostile environment in which employees made racially derogatory remarks and nooses were displayed in DPR facilities. On January 14, 2003, plaintiffs' application to compel further discovery response from defendants was granted in its entirety. US Magistrate Judge Dolinger held that personnel files maintained by department's deputy commissioner were subject to disclosure, and deputy commissioner's business calendars and notebooks were subject to disclosure. On July 9, 2003, in the Southern District Court of New York (Judge Chin) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification for present and former Parks and Recreation Hispanic and African-American employees. On June 8, 2005, the plaintiffs and the defendants agreed to enter into a consent decree and judgment in favor of United States of America against City of New York and New York City Department of Parks and Recreation. On September 15, 2006, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. Judge Chin dismissed plaintiffs' claims of racially hostile environment on the grounds that the plaintiffs did not present enough evidence from which a reasonable jury could find a systemic culture of racial harassment or that that harassment was standard operating procedure at Parks. Judge Chin also dismissed plaintiffs' claims of discriminatory assignment of employees (segregation) and underfunding on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence that it was Parks' standard operating procedure to make assignments based on race or engage in a policy, pattern, or practice of underfunding parks in predominantly African-American or Hispanic neighborhoods. However, defendants' motion to dismiss claims of discrimination in promotion and compensation, as well as retaliation, was denied. On February 25, 2008, the parties finally reached a settlement agreement, which contained both injunctive and monetary relief. Among other things, it enjoined Parks from "unlawfully discriminating against any employee based on race, color or national origin with respect to salary, compensation, or in making compensation decisions." It also provided for the City to pay about 11 million dollars in settlement of all monetary claims. On May 15, 2008, the Court (Judge Chin) finally approved the settlement agreement and the case was dismissed.

Summary: This case was brought by current and former employees of the New York City Department of Parks and Recreation (Parks) against the New York City and Parks seeking injunctive and monetary relief. On May 15, 2008, the case was settled with plaintiffs obtaining about 11 million dollars and other equitable relief.


On May 2, 2008, five African-American residents of Antioch, California filed this class-action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Antioch and its police department for allegedly engaging in a discriminatory campaign that targeted African-American households whom the city believed to be receiving Section 8 housing rent assistance. The plaintiffs claimed that the alleged campaign violated the Fair Housing Act (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq.), 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, as well as a number of California statutes. Representing the plaintiffs were the Impact Fund, Public Advocates Inc., Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, and the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the police department (1) unlawfully searched the homes of African-American Section 8 families without their consent or a warrant; (2) threatened the families' landlords by suggesting they would be liable for the activities of their Section 8 tenants; (3) encouraged neighbors of the African-American Section 8 families to file nuisance reports against them; and (4) put pressure on the local Housing Authority in charge of the Section 8 program in order to try and terminate the voucher benefits of the tenants being targeted, seventy percent of whom were African-American. On September 2, 2010, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, defining the class as "all African-Americans who have held, currently hold, or may hold Section 8 housing vouchers, and all members of their households, who reside, have resided or will reside, in the City of Antioch." 2010 WL 3632197 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010). Also on September 2, the Court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleading seeking to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for statutory damages under California law on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to comply with the Government Tort Claims Act. 2010 WL 3632199 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2010). On December 20, 2010, both parties filed a joint motion for approval of class action settlement. Among various other provisions, the settlement provided that (1) the City of Antioch will not publicly identify Africa-American Section 8 recipients; (2) the City will not focus on African-American Section 8 recipients on the basis of their race or Section 8 status in its policing efforts, except when using race to identify a suspect; (3) the City will pay $180,000 to be divided equally among the five named plaintiffs; (4) the City will pay $180,000 in attorney's fees and costs; and (5) class members who are not named plaintiffs release their injunctive and declaratory relief claims, but do not release any individual claims for monetary relief. The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss the suit with prejudice. On April 6, 2012, the court (Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong) dismissed the case with prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement for three years.

Summary: This case was brought by five African-American residents of Antioch, California against the City of Antioch and its police department. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the police department had engaged in a discriminatory campaign targeting African-American households whom the city believed to be receiving Section 8 housing rent assistance. The case was settled; the plaintiffs received injunctive relief under which the City agreed not to focus on African-American Section 8 recipients on the basis of their race or Section 8 status in its policing efforts. The defendants agreed to pay $180,000, to be divided equally among the five named plaintiffs.


On September 13, 2011, the Freedom from Religion Foundation ("FFRF") and three of its members filed a lawsuit against the United States of America, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. Plaintiffs brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides a tax exemption for certain housing expenses of "ministers of the gospel" (the "parsonage exception"). Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that, both on its face and as administered by the IRS and the Treasury, the parsonage exception violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing preferential tax benefits conditioned on religious affiliation. Further, the individual plaintiffs claimed that this discriminatory treatment on the basis of religious criteria violated their equal protection rights under the Due Process Clause. FFRF is a non-profit membership organization that advocates for the separation of church and state. The three individual plaintiffs each received a portion of their salary from FFRF in the form of a housing allowance, but, as they were not practicing religious clergy, they did not qualify for the parsonage exception. None of the plaintiffs claimed the parsonage exception on their tax returns or filed a claim for refund after payment. On December 23, 2011, defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis that the District Court lacked jurisdiction. Defendants claimed that plaintiffs lacked standing because they had not alleged a direct, personal injury to themselves as a result of enforcement of the parsonage exception. Plaintiffs countered that they had been injured, because the statute did not permit them to claim the housing expense exemption. Defendants also claimed that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiffs did not allege that the United States had waived its sovereign immunity from suit. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 13, 2012. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint on February 24, 2012 on largely the same grounds. On June 28, 2012, the District Court (Judge Barbara B. Crabb) ordered plaintiffs to show cause for why the case should not be dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds. Judge Crabb noted that the Administrative Procedure Act provides a general waiver of sovereign immunity where an individual seeks review of agency action, but that plaintiffs had not identified an agency action, only the act of Congress. Plaintiffs responded on July 16, 2012 and moved to amend their complaint. Judge Crabb granted plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and denied defendants' Motion to Dismiss on August 29, 2012. With regard to the issue of sovereign immunity, Judge Crabb found that any failure by plaintiffs to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act could be resolved by amending the case caption. The case caption was amended to name as defendants Timothy Geithner (Secretary of the Department of the Treasury) and Douglas Shulman (Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service) in their official capacities, as they headed the agencies responsible for administering the parsonage exception. With regard to standing, plaintiffs identified their injury as unequal treatment due to the fact that "ministers of the gospel" could receive the parsonage tax exemption but plaintiffs could not. Judge Crabb held that plaintiffs had standing because it was clear from the face of the statute that plaintiffs were not entitled to the parsonage exemption, and their standing was not contingent on making a futile claim to the IRS. On June 28, 2013, defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which Judge Crabb granted in part and denied in part on November 22, 2013. Judge Crabb granted the motion with respect to plaintiffs' initial challenge to § 107(1), a section of the parsonage exception which applies to in-kind housing provided to a minister; the plaintiffs conceded they did not have standing to bring this claim. Judge Crabb denied the motion as to plaintiffs' challenge to § 107(2), a section of the parsonage exception which applies to rental allowances paid to ministers. On its own motion, the District Court then granted summary judgment to plaintiffs as to §107(2). First, Judge Crabb found that plaintiffs had standing to sue because it was clear from the face of the statute that they were excluded from an exemption granted to others based on religious affiliation. Second, Judge Crabb held that § 107(2) violates the Establishment Clause because the exemption provides a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so is not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise. Judge Crabb enjoined defendants from enforcing § 107(2), to take effect at the conclusion of any appeals. Defendants filed a notice of appeal on January 24, 2014. The case was argued on September 9, 2014 and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the case on November 13, 2014 (2014 WL 5861632). The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge § 107(2). The Court of Appeals found that plaintiffs had not been injured because they were never denied a benefit conditioned on religious affiliation; since they never asked for the parsonage exception, they were never denied it. The Court of Appeals vacated the District Court's judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. On January 6, 2015, the District Court accordingly dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

Summary: On September 13, 2011, the Freedom from Religion Foundation ("FFRF") and three of its members filed a lawsuit against the United States of America, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Commissioner of the IRS. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of 26 U.S.C. § 107, which provides a tax exemption for certain housing expenses of "ministers of the gospel" (the "parsonage exception"). On November 22, 2013, the District Court held that plaintiffs had standing to challenge the parsonage exception. Further, the Court held the exception was unconstitutional because it provided a benefit to religious persons and no one else, even though doing so was not necessary to alleviate a special burden on religious exercise. On November 13, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the District Court's judgment. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had never been denied the parsonage exception because they had never requested it, and so they had suffered no injury. Without an injury in fact, plaintiffs had no standing to sue. The Court of Appeals remanded with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The District Court dismissed the case on January 6, 2015.


This lawsuit was brought on June 25, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. This complaint was filed in response to police conduct amidst the protests that followed the killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. However, unlike most other cases in this collection, the conduct of the police in this case were aimed at the plaintiffs specifically. Plaintiffs were directors of an organization created by Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) called Chicago Freedom School and the institution itself. They were represented by attorneys from the People's Law Office and the Community Justice and Civil Rights Clinic at Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. Defendants were the City of Chicago, the Superintendent of Chicago Police, investigators from the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection (BACP) and several Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers. The complaint alleged that, in an effort to aid protesters, the Chicago Freedom School announced that they would open their facility to people looking to take a break, charge their cell phones, and get refreshments and pizza. Later in the night, investigators from the BACP and a number of CPD officers parked outside the Chicago Freedom School, and began to tell the directors of the organization that they needed to inspect the building because they received reports that the School was housing and feeding people in violation of their business license. Defendants entered the building without a warrant and issued a cease and desist order, claiming that they were "preparing and serving food on the premises" without a proper license. The complaint alleged violations of the First and Fourth Amendments, as well as several counts regarding violations of Illinois state law including the Illinois state constitution, the Illinois Civil Rights Act of 2003, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction, as well as monetary damages. The case was assigned to the Honorable Thomas M. Durkin and Magistrate Judge Sunil R. Harjani. While the docket does not say so, the Chicago Freedom School announced on July 3, 2020 that the CPD had rescinded the cease and desist letter. The cease and desist letter was rescinded as part of a larger settlement with the city, though we do not have access to the rest of the terms of that settlement. On August 17, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This case arose out of the protests that followed after the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. Plaintiffs, an activist organization and its directors, sued the City of Chicago, members of the Chicago Police Department, and members of the Department of Business Affairs and Consumer Protection. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants illegally raided their organization, accusing plaintiffs of housing and preparing food for protesters outside the scope of their business license. Defendants entered the building without a warrant and issued a cease and desist order, claiming that they were "preparing and serving food on the premises" without a proper license. The lawsuit claims that defendants' actions were in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as Illinois state law. The Chicago Freedom School announced on July 3, 2020 that the CPD had rescinded the cease and desist letter. On August 17, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case, and the case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: Prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons sought injunctive and declaratory relief after the prison in which he was incarcerated failed to implement COVID-19 testing and other precautionary protocols. Because the plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit, the claim was dismissed. <hr> The COVID-19 outbreak began in late 2019 and grew quickly in the United States in March 2020. The World Health Organization declared a health emergency in January of 2020 and then declared a global pandemic on March 11, 2020. President Donald Trump declared a national emergency on March 13, 2020, and states across the country instituted shut-downs of schools, restaurants, bars, and gyms shortly thereafter. Social distancing, testing, and isolation are key methods of preventing the spread of COVID-19. On March 18, 2020, the plaintiff, a prisoner in custody at USP Florence in Colorado, filed this class-action lawsuit against the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the warden of USP Florence in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiff filed the suit on behalf of himself and all other prisoners in BOP custody, alleging that the defendants knowingly risked the safety and lives of their wards by failing to implement safety and testing protocols in violation of the plaintiff class’s Eighth Amendment constitutional rights. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. In the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that, as of the time of filing, the prisoners in USP Florence’s custody were “sitting ducks.” They alleged that the Bureau of Prisons had suspended visits and prisoner movement, but had failed to order COVID-19 testing kits, and that certain facilities within the Bureau of Prisons lacked hand sanitizer and soap for hand washing. The plaintiffs requested that the court issue an injunction, requiring the BOP to test those showing symptoms and to screen for COVID-19 by at least testing for fever daily. They also sought an injunction and declaratory relief declaring that all BOP staff testing positive for COVID-19 be excluded from contact with BOP prisoners The case was deemed improper for summary judgment and was assigned to Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang. On March 31, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. In this new motion, the plaintiffs alleged that the BOP failed to screen inmates or staff members for COVID-19 and that the BOP "is sitting on an infectious powder keg and is doing exactly nothing to prevent it exploding." The plaintiffs requested that the court order the BOP to take action by immediately starting to test and screen incarcerated people and quarantine all those that tested positive. Since the plaintiffs had filed for injunctive relief, the case was reassigned to a District Judge. On March 31, the case was reassigned to Judge Philip A. Brimmer. The defendants filed their response on April 6, 2020, and the plaintiffs replied on April 13. On April 16, Judge Brimmer denied the plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order, noting that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies (even though the plaintiff alleged that such remedies would be useless since they could take up to 90 days to complete). 454 F. Supp. 3d 1087. Even if the plaintiffs had not failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, Judge Brimmer found that the temporary restraining order would be moot since the BOP had implemented screening, quarantining, and testing measures. The court did not rule on the motion for a preliminary injunction. The defendants filed a response to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on April 22, reiterating that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and that he failed to show irreparable harm and deliberate indifference by the defendants. On June 4, Judge Brimmer denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 3000961. Judge Brimmer found that the plaintiff still had not exhausted his administrative remedies and that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim because the defendants had implemented mitigation measures. Judge Brimmer then referred the case to Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 16, 2020, naming only Federal Bureau of Prisons and the Warden in his official capacity as defendants. A little over a week later, the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and moved for summary judgment, contending that the plaintiff still had not exhausted his administrative remedies. On October 22, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted the defendants motion for summary judgment. 2020 WL 6204275. Judge Brimmer determined that the plaintiff had not filed any administrative grievances before suing the defendants, and therefore failed to exhaust his options before seeking a judicial remedy. The case is now closed.

Summary: An incarcerated individual at in custody of U.S. Bureau of Prisons sought injunctive and declaratory relief after the prison failed to implement COVID-19 testing or precautionary protocols. Because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit, the claim was dismissed.


On June 13, 2018, a resettlement non-profit for the Somali community and six Black apartment–renters and –seekers in Faribault, Minnesota, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs sued the City of Faribault under the Fair Housing Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, sought injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, along with attorneys’ fees, claiming violations of the Fair Housing Act and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution. The plaintiffs alleged that the City of Faribault adopted a discriminatory housing ordinance in order to target the growing population of Black and Somali residents. The ordinance allowed police to evict an entire household if they deemed any one member to have engaged in criminal activity, even without an arrest or prosecution. It also prohibited landlords from leasing to tenants with any criminal record and limited the number of people allowed to reside in a unit to two people per legal bedroom plus one. The plaintiffs alleged that the ordinance had the intent and effect of denying dwellings specifically to Black and Somali residents. The case was assigned to Chief Judge John R. Tunheim. On June 29 2018, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, and the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on Dec 18, 2019. Since the lawsuit was filed, the parties have vigorously litigated discovery, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 13, 2018, a resettlement non-profit for the Somali community and six Black and Somali residents of Faribault, Minnesota, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota. The plaintiffs alleged that a Faribault ordinance violated the Fair Housing Act and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and Minnesota Constitution. The case is ongoing.


On July 18, 2005, a group of migrant forestry workers admitted to the U.S. under the H-2B foreign worker program filed suit against their employer Alpha Services, L.L.C., in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219) and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871). The plaintiffs alleged that Alpha and its officers failed to pay the plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage and overtime wages and failed to maintain complete information on the terms and conditions of the plaintiffs' work as migrant workers as required by law. Attorneys with the Southern Poverty Law Center, Immigrant Justice Project, and private firms represented the plaintiffs. On December 27, 2005, the District Court (Judge William H. Barbour Jr.) conditionally certified the plaintiffs' FLSA claim as a collective action. The class consisted of "[a]ll non-supervisory workers admitted as H-2B temporary foreign workers pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b), who were employed by the Defendants between December 27, 2002 through present." 2005 WL 3557178. Shortly thereafter, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, which resulted in a resolution of the case. As part of the settlement, Alpha agreed to pay the named plaintiffs $6,000 each, opt-in plaintiffs between $500 and $3,000 each, and class members $200 each. In addition, Alpha agreed to the following: 1. entry of a Consent Decree ensuring compliance with the federal migrant worker laws; 2. periodic audits by workers and supervisors to monitor Alpha's compliance, along with granting plaintiffs' attorneys access to audits and other company records; 3. not require workers to surrender their passports or other identification documents to the company or its agents; 4. not require deeds, deposits or collateral of any kind as a condition of employment; and, 5. not retaliate against the plaintiffs in any way. The Court approved the settlement and entered a Consent Order on September 6, 2006. The Court agreed to retain jurisdiction until December 31, 2007, in order to oversee enforcement of the settlement. Some disputes broke out during the implementation period about whether certain class members had opted in or not, which affected how much money they would receive under the settlement. The disputes were resolved by early 2008, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice on May 19, 2008. It is now closed.

Summary: A group of migrant forestry workers filed suit against Alpha Services, L.L.C., alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers Protection Act. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs the statutory minimum wage and overtime wages and failed to maintain complete information on the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' work. The parties reached a settlement in which Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiffs an undisclosed sum of money. Defendant also committed to policy changes, including an agreement ensuring compliance with the federal migrant worker laws.


On October 8, 2008, several sex offenders in Missouri filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the State of Missouri, several cities and counties in Missouri, and several police departments in Missouri. The plaintiffs were represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation and private counsel. They asked the court for a preliminary injunction that prevented the police from enforcing R.S.Mo. §589.426, which prohibits certain activities for sex offenders on Halloween night, against them. The statue stated that sex offenders must: A) avoid all Halloween-related contact with children; B) remain inside his or her residence between the hours of 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.; C) post a sign at his or her residence stating, 'No candy or treats at this residence; and D) leave all outside residential lighting off during the evening hours after 5 p.m. The Plaintiffs also asked for a declaratory judgment stating that the statute was unconstitutional under the federal constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that they should not be subject to R.S.Mo § 589.426 since they were required to register as sex offenders based on convictions entered prior to June 30, 2008, which is when R.S.Mo § 589.426 was enacted. They alleged the statute was unconstitutional stating that it was ambiguous and did not give sex offenders ample notice of what conduct was prohibited. On October 27, 2008, the District Court (Judge Carol E. Jackson) enjoined the defendants from enforcing R.S.Mo §589.426 on October 31, 2008. On October 30, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals (Eighth Circuit) granted the defendants motion for stay, allowing the defendants to enforce the statute on October 31, 2008. On September 25, 2009, the District Court (Judge Carol E. Jackson) stayed all pending proceedings until State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor was concluded in Missouri state court. The stay was issued because Charles Raynor was charged under R.S.Mo §589.426 when he was required to register as a sex offender before the enactment of R.S.Mo. § 589.426. If the court ruled that under Missouri law, R.S.Mo. §589.426 could not apply retrospectively, the plaintiffs' case would be moot. On October 27, 2010, the District Court (Judge Carol E. Jackson) dismissed the plaintiffs' claims as moot. This was based on the decision in State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor where it was ruled that R.S.Mo. §589.426 could not be enforced retrospectively against anyone required to register as a sex offender before its enactment. Since all of the plaintiffs were sex offenders who were required to register as sex offenders before R.S.Mo. §589.426 was enacted, the statute could not be enforced against them. On August 25, 2011, the District Court (Judge Carol E. Jackson) ordered that the defendants reimburse the plaintiffs for attorneys' fees and court costs. On May 10, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals (Eight Circuit) ordered that the plaintiffs were not entitled to fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. They based this on the fact that the plaintiffs' only victory was for a preliminary injunction that prevented the enforcement of R.S.Mo § 589.426 on October 31, 2008, and that this preliminary injunction was stayed. Since the plaintiffs' case was later dismissed as moot, the court ruled that they did not receive the judicial victory that was necessary for the recovery of attorney fees and court costs.

Summary: On October 8, 2008, several sex offenders in Missouri filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri against the State of Missouri, several cities and counties in Missouri, and several police departments in Missouri. They alleged that R.S.Mo. § 589.426 should not be enforced against them, as they were required to register as sex offenders based on convictions entered prior to June 30, 2008, the date R.S.Mo. § 589.426 was enacted. The plaintiffs originally received a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the statute, but the injunction was stayed until after the injunction was moot. Due to the outcome of a separate court case, the defendants agreed not to enforce R.S.Mo. § 589.426, and the plaintiffs' lawsuit was dismissed as moot.


On February 9, 2015, the orders in Searcy v. Strange (PB-AL-0005 in this Clearinghouse) and Strawser v. Strange (PB-AL-0010 in this Clearinghouse), took effect: the ban on same-sex marriage was now illegal in Alabama, according to the federal courts. However, the Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court, Roy Moore, strongly disagreed. He had sent an order to probate judges and state employees, threatening them with legal action by the governor, if they issued or recognized same-sex marriage licenses. The chief justice claimed that the federal court orders bound only the Alabama Attorney General and his employees and no one else. Alabama's probate judges faced competing orders: the federal court's would allow same-sex marriage, but the chief justice's would not. The result was legal chaos. Some probate judges followed the federal court order and issued same-sex marriage licenses but most probate judges refused and many ceased issuing marriage licenses entirely, including the Mobile County Probate Court. On February 9, 2015, the attorneys in Searcy v. Davis filed this lawsuit, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses that day in Mobile County. The defendants were the Alabama Governor, Attorney General, Chief Justice, and various Mobile County officials. Plaintiffs claimed that their Fourteenth Amendment rights were being violated and they requested an emergency injunction commanding the defendants to issue marriage licenses. On February 10, 2015, the District Court (Judge Callie V. S. Granade) denied the plaintiffs' request for immediate relief but invited them to participate in a preliminary injunction hearing, in Strawser, in two days time. On February 24, 2015, Judge Granade dismissed the Mobile County officials from the case, granting the stipulation for dismissal filed by plaintiffs and the county officials. In response to the Strawser litigation, the plaintiffs eventually received their marriage licenses. As a result, on March 26, 2015, Judge Granade granted their motion to dismiss: the claims against the governor were dismissed with prejudice; but the claims against the attorney general and the chief justice would be dismissed without prejudice unless they filed an objection before April 2, which the chief justice did. On April 2, 2015, Chief Justice Moore requested that the claims against him be dismissed with prejudice. On June 16, Moore withdrew his request to dismiss with prejudice, stating that the plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss was sufficient. As a result of this concession, Judge Granada dismissed the plaintiffs' complaints against Chief Justice Moore without prejudice on June 22, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: On February 9, 2015, the attorneys in Searcy v. Davis filed this lawsuit, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on behalf of same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses that day in Mobile County. The defendants were the Alabama Governor, Attorney General, Chief Justice, and various Mobile County officials. Plaintiffs requested an emergency injunction commanding the defendants to issue marriage licenses. In response to Strawser v. Strange (PB-AL-0010 in this Clearinghouse), the plaintiffs eventually got their marriage licenses and Judge Granade dismissed the case.