On June 1, 2011, a child imprisoned at the Henley-Young Juvenile Justice Center filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against Hinds County, Mississippi under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the Southern Poverty Law Center, alleged that the county's confinement policies and practices violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged excessive confinement in cells, inadequate mental health care, verbal abuse, and inadequate rehabilitation efforts. The plaintiff sought class certification, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages. Within the same week of filing, the complaint was amended to include two plaintiffs (Disability Rights Mississippi and an additional child imprisoned at Henley-Young) and additional causes of action under the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986, the Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Program, and of the Protection and Advocacy Developmental Disabilities Program (together, these are the Protection and Advocacy statutes). The amended complaint also alleged that, by preventing plaintiffs from speaking to their attorneys, the defendant violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights by denying them access to the courts. On July 25, 2011, the Court (Judge Daniel P. Jordan) granted a preliminary injunction, making previous state court orders that limited Disability Rights Mississippi’s access to youth in the Henley-Young Juvenile Center unenforceable because of the Protection and Advocacy statutes mentioned above. The Court ordered the parties to agree on and submit a draft for a preliminary injunction. The next month, the Court signed an injunction giving Disability Rights Mississippi much greater access to the Henley-Young Juvenile Center and its residents. The parties began settlement negotiations, and in early 2012, the parties reached a settlement. On March 28, 2012, the Court approved the settlement agreement and certified a settlement class of "all children who are currently, or who will in the future be, confined at the Henley-Young Juvenile Justice Center." In accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (18 U.S.C.S. § 3626), the agreement would terminate at the end of two years unless the Court made written findings that relief remained necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation. The settlement agreement required Henley-Young Juvenile Center to change its intake procedures to include health screening and provide greater access to medication; to improve staffing and lower crowding; to allow youth more time out of their cells and provide educational and rehabilitative programming; to make punishment/discipline less severe; to provide for better hygiene, food and clothing; to allow more visitation with family and implement policies preventing verbal abuse by staff and suicide by youth; and to allow for continued access to the center by the plaintiffs. In February of 2014, the plaintiffs moved the Court to extend the agreement and require defendants to pay attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs for not complying with the settlement agreement. On April 25, 2014, the Court extended the agreement, finding that the defendants had not substantially complied with its provisions. It also found that because the agreement was a consent decree, and not a private agreement between the parties, it could hold the defendants in contempt of the Court and require them to pay attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. However, the Court decided that it would hold defendants in contempt, but not require them to pay fees on that date. The defendants were given until March 28, 2016 to comply, and the plaintiffs would be able to file another motion for the fees if the defendants did not comply. In August 2014, the court's monitor issued his first status report recognizing significant but partial progress in compliance with the terms of the consent decree. Status reports were issued through the rest of 2014, 2015, and the first part of 2016. On January 27, 2016, the monitor noted continued compliance with the agreement and that it was the first time that the defendant institution had "adequate and stable leadership." On March 25, 2016, Judge Jordan extended the consent decree to March 28, 2018 at the request of both parties. On April 15, 2016, the Hinds County Youth Court, led by Judge Skinner, filed a motion to intervene, arguing that the settlement agreement's provision allowing Henley-Young Juvenile Justice Center to release juveniles without the Hinds County Youth Court’s authority violated Mississippi law. He also filed a related lawsuit in state court. The parties then jointly filed a motion for an injunction enjoining any state court action, arguing that the consent decree was no broader than needed to effectuate federal law. On May 25, 2016, Judge Jordan issued an agreed order maintaining the status quo and enjoining the state court proceeding until a ruling on the merits was issued. The Hinds County Youth Court then sought to execute subpoenas but both parties resisted, filing motions to quash on June 16, 2016. On June 21, 2016, Judge Jordan granted the motion to quash, finding that the Hinds County Youth Court had no standing to issue subpoenas. On June 27, 2016, the parties and the Hinds County Youth Court came to a settlement. Hinds County Youth Court agreed to withdraw as intervenor. The original settlement agreement was also amended to delete a provision restricting stays at the facility to 21 days and allocating funding to the facility for mental health services. The parties agreed that the Hinds County Youth Court would have jurisdiction over releases after the 21-day period at the facility and only allow detention beyond the 21-day period if no other facilities were available and the child was referred for health services. As evidenced in the tenth and eleventh Monitoring Reports, Hinds County made meaningful progress during 2017 to address the issues identified. Hinds County had still not met all of the required objectives by the end of the extended two-year decree, so on March 30, 2018, Judge Jordan granted a joint motion to extend the consent decree. Disability Rights Mississippi also filed a motion to extend the consent decree on November 14, 2018 in anticipation of unremediated issues. At a settlement conference on March 19, 2019, the Court found that the Thirteenth Monitoring Report included recommendations straying from the core objective of the remedy (removing constitutional violations at the facility through narrowly drawn means). The parties thereafter met to revise and issue a Third Amended Consent Decree, which removed some objectives determined to be nonessential. The Court approved the Third Amended Consent Decree and extended the enforcement period until March 28, 2021. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On June 1, 2011, a juvenile detainee filed a class action against Hinds County, Mississippi for cruel and unusual punishment, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After amending the complaint to include new plaintiffs and a class of plaintiffs with disabilities, as well as charges of violating Protection and Advocacy statutes, the parties submitted a settlement agreement the was signed by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi on May 27, 2012. The court has twice extended the length of the settlement beyond the original 2 year period due to defendant's lack of compliance. A third decree was submitted and approved in 2019, which extended the enforcement period until March 2021. The case is ongoing.


On April 23, 2018, five residents of Tennessee filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs sued the Tennessee Correctional Services, and two for-profit probation companies, Community Probation Services (CPS) and Progressive Sentencing, Inc. (PSI), all under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the Civil Rights Corps and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was originally assigned to Chief Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr. The plaintiffs claimed that CPS and PSI, through their contract with Tennessee Correctional Services, acted as "for profit probation officers" overseeing the collection of fines and other court debts on behalf of Giles County. In this role, the defendants allegedly maximized their own profits for the purposes of collecting court debts by adding additional fees and surchages on top of the existing debt owed by probationers. The companies' supervision of probation payments, according to the plaintiffs, consisted of charging monthly fees' the probationers often could not afford, repeatedly making threats of jail time to induce payment, and humiliating supervision of drug testing. They also alleged that this created a conflict of interest: purportedly neutral probation officers were financially inclined to impose higher costs on indigent probationers. Claims The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated RICO by acting as an extortionate enterprise focused on creating financial hardship. Individuals who were supervised by the companies had lost homes, jobs, and personal belongings, suffered severe medical problems; they had gone without food, clothing, and medicine for themselves and their children to pay for the escalating supervision fees that the companies demanded under threat of arrest and jailing. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that Giles County's process for setting bail violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They alleged that judges set bail for probationers alleged violations without an inquiry into their ability to pay. Consequently, the plaintiffs faced the prospect, and in some instances were, jailed for up to 10 days. The plaintiffs alleged that this deprivation of liberty violated the constitutional prohibition against wealth-based detention and discriminated against them on the basis of their indigence. Early Procedural History On the same day the complaint was filed, the plaintiffs moved to certify two classes, a class for equitable relief encompassing “[a]ll persons who, at any time since April 23, 2014, (1) have incurred, or will incur, court-imposed financial obligations arising from a traffic or misdemeanor case in Giles County General Sessions or Circuit Court; and (2) are currently being supervised, or will be supervised, on probation in that case by any of the defendants” and a separate damages class under the same definition. On July 13, 2018 the case was transferred to Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. On the same day, plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order barring the defendant from jailing one of the named plaintiffs. The order was granted. Judge Campbell held that the plaintiff had demonstrated she was likely to succeed on the merits of both Fourteenth Amendment challenges. Further, the Court held that her jailing would cause an immediate and irreparable harm to her and the four children she supports. On July 30, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a class-wide preliminary injunction. Giles County moved to dismiss the complaint on August 6, 2018. They argued that the plaintiffs' claims were misplaced; judicial actions, not Giles County policy or custom, were the source of the plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations. Additionally, they argued that Giles County retained sovereign immunity for any abuse of process claim, and therefore could not be liable for the plaintiff's allegations of wealth-based detentions. For the next few months, the parties traded motions on the preliminary injunction and class action certification. U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeffrey S. Frensley denied a non-party's motion to quash testimony. 2018 WL 5728527. The court also held that private parties would not be subject to adjudications on injunctive relief on January 3, 2019. On January 7, 2019, Judge William L. Campbell Jr denied as moot a number of motions related to exclusion of testimony and evidence. 2019 WL 298474. Preliminary Injunction On February 14, 2019, the judge granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction against the county's enforcement of bail requirements for an indefinite period. 2019 WL 633012. Judge William L. Campbell Jr. held that the county's failure to inquire into the probationers' failure to pay, and subsequent jailing for that failure to pay, likely violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court found that the county's secured bail policy was entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny because "plaintiffs have demonstrated an inability to afford bail and an absence of meaningful consideration of alternatives to secured bail." Further, the defendants' failure to make factual findings concerning the arrestee's ability to pay, the necessity of detention, or the adequacy of alternative conditions of release was also held likely to be unconstitutional. Judge Campbell rejected the defendants' argument that they were following the statutorily-defined process, finding that there was "no state statute requiring such a procedure" and holding that the Supremacy Clause allowed the Court to enjoin the process. The order stated that the defendant correctional services agency was enjoined from detaining any person on misdemeanor probation for a secured bail amount unless there was (1) notice to the arrestee and an opportunity to be heard by an appropriate judicial officer; and (2) findings by that judicial officer concerning the arrestee’s ability to pay, alternatives to secured bail, and whether pre-revocation detention is necessary to meet a compelling governmental interest. Giles County and the Sheriff appealed this order on March 20, 2019 to the Sixth Circuit. Summary Judgement and Appellate Proceedings On April 18, 2019, CPS and one of its employees moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified and sovereign immunity for their actions. Over the next few months, the parties began discovery and attempted to settle the dispute. On June 14, 2019, Judge William L. Campbell Jr. denied the motion for summary judgment without prejudice as premature, allowing discovery to continue. The defendants appealed on June 19, 2019. United States Magistrate Judge Jeffrey S. Frensley held on October 29, 2019 that the named defendant PSI was compelled to produce electronically stored information, rejecting the defendant's motion to stay discovery pending a decision on the previous motion for summary judgment. 2019 WL 5957004. Meanwhile, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction on December 23, 2019 in an opinion written by Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton. The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs should have sued the state judges rather than the sheriffs and county officials who enforced the bail requirements. 945 F.3d 991. Judge Sutton held that the alleged violation was the product of two actions - the judge's determination of bail without consideration of financial condition and Giles County's jailing of the probationer. Both were actionable. Consequently, the court found that since the plaintiff is the "master of the complaint" they were free to choose which parties to sue. In addition, the Court found that since the sheriff was "actively administering" the alleged unconstitutional policy, sovereign immunity did not apply, rejecting the defendant's argument that the preliminary injunction unduly expanded ex Parte Young liability. On February 28, 2020 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of summary judgment for CPS and one of its employees. 803 Fed.Appx. 846. The court held that qualified immunity did not apply to the defendants because they faced "no prospect of damages liability." Judge Sutton also rejected CPS's argument that they acted in an official capacity barring any money damages of relief. The threshold question was whether CPS acted for the state or the county. The court held that because the county paid judgment, CPS's actions were county actions. Consequently, since county actions are not eligible for sovereign immunity, neither was CPS's action; the court indicated it knew of "no case in which a private probation company has successfully invoked sovereign immunity." Current Status As of June 7, 2020 the case is ongoing and is in discovery with class certification and motions for summary judgment and dismissal pending. The most recent docket entry was filed on June 4, 2020 and was a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction filed by the defendant PSI.

Summary: This 2018 class action lawsuit was brought by five residents of Tennessee in the U.S. District Court for the District of Tennessee. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, two for-profit probation companies, had violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by operating an extortionate enterprise of charging additional fees on top of the court debts they were tasked with collecting. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted a preliminary injunction banning the defendants from detaining probationers after arrest until they pay bail without considering the person's ability to pay. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction. The case is ongoing and is in discovery, with multiple motions pending.


This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. In the fall of 2019, district court judges from across the country granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule. But after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. The District Court in this case issued a judgment enjoining the public charge rule for the Department of State on July 29, 2020. On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. Make the Road New York Sues Over the Public Charge Rule On December 19, 2019, individuals facing deportation, their United States citizen relatives, and nonprofit organizations that assist noncitizens filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs sued the State Department (DOS); the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS); and President Trump, claiming violations of the APA, an ultra vires proclamation by the President, and violations of Fifth Amendment Equal Protection. They alleged that Trump Administration’s changes to the asylum system, various deferred-action programs, and to the family-based immigration system had the purpose and effect of excluding lawful status immigrants "from predominately nonwhite countries." They also alleged that the new rules would essentially create a wealth test for entry into the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that these discriminatory impacts were deliberate and purposeful, and would cause substantial harm in destroying their families, penalizing the use of benefits, and diverting resources from them. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Judge George Daniels. Background on the Public Charge Rule: Changes to the Foreign Affairs Manual, Presidential Proclamation, and Department of Homeland Security’s Interim Rule Beginning in January 2018, the DOS published revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) that changed how consular officers should interpret the public charge rule, which defines personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. The change increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that if a consular officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa. The plaintiffs asserted that the effect of this Rule would be to force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain entry to the U.S. On October 4, 2019, President Trump issued a proclamation (the Proclamation) relating to the public charge rule, ordering DOS and HHS to deny visas to those who cannot prove they will be able to get health insurance. A week later on October 11, 2019, when the Department of Homeland Security's similar public charge rule (DHS Rule) was beginning to be enjoined by courts around the country, DOS formalized the changes to the FAM by implementing the Interim Final Rule. This rule mirrored the DHS Rule, explicitly expanding the definition of "public charge" for the purposes of granting visas. The Proclamation was enjoined nationwide on November 26, 2019 in Doe v. Oregon. 2019 WL 6324560. This case followed soon after, seeking to enjoin and vacate the 2018 FAM revisions, the Interim Final Rule, and the Proclamation. On January 14, 2020, this case was accepted as related to Make the Road New York v. Cuccinelli (S.D.N.Y. 2019). The Plaintiffs Seek a Preliminary Injunction and Defendants Move to Dismiss On January 21, 2020, plaintiffs moved for preliminary injunction, asserting that they were likely to prevail on their claim and if the policies were allowed to continue plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm in the form of indefinite family separation, health risks, and loss of resources for the entities that support noncitizens. On February 13, defendants moved to dismiss, asserting that plaintiffs lacked subject matter jurisdiction and failed to state a claim. Plaintiffs additionally sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from enacting their policies until there was a hearing on the preliminary injunction motion. The temporary restraining order was intended to protect the plaintiffs from the harms outlined in the complaint until the preliminary injunction motion could be adjudicated. The court rejected the emergency motion on February 21. The DOS rule went into effect on February 24, 2020. District Court Grants Preliminary Injunction, Denies Motion to Dismiss On July 29, 2020, Judge Daniels issued an order granting a preliminary nationwide injunction against the new rule. 475 F.Supp.3d 232. He held that (1) plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction by being denied visas, which would result in indefinite family separation; (2) an injunction would be "heavily" in the public interest; and (3) a nationwide injunction was appropriate because these problems were not geographically isolated. The court also granted defendants' motion to dismiss in part, allowing President Trump to be removed as a party from the case. However, Judge Daniels denied every other part of the motion, finding that (1) plaintiffs’ APA claim was within the zone of interest of the INA; (2) plaintiffs; challenge to the 2018 FAM changes were not moot; (3) the APA authorizes judicial review of the DOS's actions; (4) defendants had likely violated the APA; (5) plaintiffs had adequately stated an equal protection claim; and (6) the Proclamation was likely contrary to the INA and ultra vires. On September 22, 2020, defendants filed an interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction to the Second Circuit, docket no. 20-3214. They also moved in the District Court to stay the July order pending appeal. The defendants asked Judge Daniels to rule on their motion by October 16, but he declined to do so. The defendants also asked to the Second Circuit to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. Changes with the Biden Administration On February 2, 2021, President Biden issued an Executive Order calling for government agencies to review actions related to the implementation of the public charge rule. On February 10, the Second Circuit entered an order holding the proceedings on the interlocutory appeal in abeyance. On February 20, defendants moved to stay proceedings for 90 days while the new administration reevaluated the rule. The court granted the motion on February 22. As of February 27, 2021, the FAM revisions, Interim Final Rule, and the Proclamation are enjoined nationwide. The Second Circuit has yet to rule on defendants' appeal of the injunction and the stay of the order pending appeal. Proceedings in both the Second Circuit and District Court are currently on hold while the new administration reevaluates its approach to the public charge rule.

Summary: In December 2019, individuals facing deportation, their United States citizen relatives, and nonprofit organizations that assist noncitizens sued various U.S. Departments alleging that Trump Administration immigration policies created a wealth test and excluded lawful immigrants from nonwhite countries, leading to the destruction of families, penalization of the use of benefits, and the diversion of resources. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They obtained a preliminary nationwide injunction on July 29, 2020. The case is ongoing.


On November 14, 2014, a man who had been left in jail for twenty-three days after his court-ordered release date filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. Department of Corrections, and several employees of the D.C. Department of Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and common law. The plaintiff’s release was ordered on March 18, 2014, but he was not released until April 10, 2014. He alleged that his over-detention was illegal false imprisonment, constituted negligence on the part of the defendants, and violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiff sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. On February 2, 2015, the defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The case was assigned to Judge Amy Berman Jackson. On February 9, 2015, the Department of Corrections filed a motion to dismiss because, as an agency within the D.C. government, it could not be a party to any lawsuit. On February 27, the parties filed a stipulation that dismissed the Department of Correction from the case. On August 14, 2015, the warden of the D.C. Jail filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the official-capacity claims against defendant Smith are duplicative of his claims against the District of Columbia and that the complaint did not allege any viable individual-capacity claims against him. On December 15, the court granted this motion, and the warden was dismissed as a defendant. 149 F.Supp.3d 128. On February 1, 2016, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Alan Kay for mediation. Initial attempts at mediation were unsuccessful. On April 21, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding two individual defendants and an additional claim against the District of Columbia. Then, on May 11, the plaintiff moved for discovery costs and fees, alleging that the defendants had claimed that certain documents did not exist and then failed to provide the plaintiff with them once the plaintiff found out that they did exist. The case was randomly reassigned to Magistrate Judge Robinson to decide on this motion. On December 6, Magistrate Judge Robinson granted the motion in part and denied it in part: the District of Columbia was precluded from using those documents, and the plaintiff was granted $18,428.30 in fees and costs. 319 F.R.D. 40. (Judge Jackson would later reduce this amount down to $15,579.90. 249 F.Supp.3d 106.) In December 2016 and January 2017, both sides sought summary judgment; after the parties alleged different versions of the facts, the court denied both motions as moot on February 21, 2017. On March 31, 2017, the defendants filed another motion for partial summary judgment, as did the plaintiff two weeks later. Nearly a year later, on March 30, 2018, the court granted both of these motions in part and denied them both in part. The constitutional claims and the false imprisonment claims against the two individual defendants were dismissed, leaving only the negligence claim at issue for those defendants. The false imprisonment and negligence claims against the District of Columbia were decided in favor of the plaintiff, as was part of the due process claim. For all other claims against the District of Columbia, the plaintiff was denied summary judgment. The District of Columbia was granted summary judgment as to the plaintiff's negligent supervision and training claim and part of the plaintiff's due process claim. 2018 WL 1568878. On April 20, 2018, the court referred this case, with consent of the parties, to Magistrate Judge G. Michael Harvey for mediation. In July of 2018 the parties agreed to pretrial conference and trial that was to occur in late October of that year. However, for reasons unknown to the Clearinghouse, both the conference and the trial were delayed until February of 2019. After the trial the court asked for proposed findings of fact from both sides. The case is still ongoing.

Summary: In November 2014, a man who had been left in jail for twenty-three days after his court-ordered release date filed this lawsuit in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff alleged that his over-detention was illegal false imprisonment, constituted negligence on the part of the defendants, and violated his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. In March 2018, the court granted summary judgment to some but not all of the plaintiff's claims. In February of the following year the parties went to trial, but the docket does not indicate that any verdict has been reached. The case is ongoing.


On July 3, 2017, the Human Rights Defense Center (HRDC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. HRDC sued the County of Los Angeles and several agents of the Sheriff’s Department under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. HRDC sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. HRDC claimed that by prohibiting the delivery of the plaintiff’s magazines and enveloped mail to prisoners housed in the Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail (MCJ), the defendants had violated the prisoners’ First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. HRDC also alleged violations of comparable provisions in the California Constitution. The case was assigned to District Judge Manuel L. Real and Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar. On July 17, 2017, HRDC moved for preliminary injunction. HRDC sought to enjoin Defendants from improperly censoring the items that HRDC mails to prisoners at the MCJ. They requested that the court require defendants to provide adequate written notice and an administrative appeal process to both prisoners and senders when defendants refuse to deliver publications or correspondence. On August 25, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The defendants requested that the court dismiss the all claims against the individually named defendants and the state claim against all defendants including the County. The defendants argued that the allegations failed to demonstrate that any of them had any role in the conduct that formed the basis of the complaint. The defendants also argued that the complaint did not allege any threats, intimidation or coercion, a fundamental element of the state law claim. On September 25, 2017, Judge Real denied the motion for preliminary injunction. 2017 WL 6523442. The court found that there was not a significant likelihood that the plaintiff’s claim would succeed on the merit, noting that the plaintiff had not shown that the defendants enacted any specific regulation causing rejection of the plaintiff’s written content. The court also pointed to a lack of irreparable harm if it denied the motion. The plaintiffs had not clearly stated how injunctive relief would be successful or referenced a specific policy implemented by the defendants or proposed alternative policy. The plaintiffs appealed Judge Real’s decision to deny preliminary injunctive relief on September 27, 2017 to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On November 14, 2017, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the state law claim and the claims against the individual defendants. 2017 WL 10402603. The court found that the individual claims were based on “conclusory allegations and generalities, without any allegation of the specific wrong-doing by each Defendant.” Judge Real found that the claim failed to plausibly allege that defendants threatened, intimidated, or coerced the plaintiff. On April 12, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to stay pending review of a settlement agreement. On April 17, 2018, Judge Real ordered a dismissal of the case because the parties had settled. On May 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal without prejudice. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Alka Sagar for enforcement of the settlement, the terms of which are not available on the docket or on HRDC's website. As of May 2020, there have been no additional entries in the docket since September 2018. Depending on the terms of the settlement, the case may be ongoing for enforcement purposes.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the HRDC in the U.S. District for the Central District of California. They alleged that the defendant had violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners by prohibiting delivery of HRDC's magazines to prisoners at Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail. Judge Real denied HRDC's motion for a preliminary injunction and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss part of the claims. In April 2018, the parties settled.


On June 4, 1998 a group of African Americans filed suit against Boeing Co. and several subsidiaries, their employers, alleging racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants had engaged in a pattern or practice of behavior that included policies that had a disparate impact on African-American employees and disparately treated African American employees. They also alleged that the defendant had breached its employment contract with them and had engaged in negligent misrepresentation. They sought class certification, injunctive relief, and damages. On September 30, 1999 the district court (Judge Coughenour) certified a class of roughly 15,000 members comprising all salaried African-American employed by the defendants since June 6, 1994, and approved a consent decree reached by the parties. It provided for general injunctive relief consisting of prohibition of discrimination, monetary damages for the class of roughly $7.3 million, and attorney fees of $4.05 million. Various class members objected to the settlement and appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. On November 26, 2002, the Ninth Circuit (Judges Berzon, Lay, and Trott) held that the consent decree was unfair and remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. On January 10, 2005 the district court (Judge Pechman) granted the defendants summary judgment on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 discrimination claims that had been added by the plaintiffs and were now barred by the statute of limitations. On January 21, 2005 the district court (Judge Pechman) re-certified the class and bifurcated the disparate treatment and disparate impact claims for trial. On January 17, 2006 the district court (Judge Pechman) ruled for the defendants in a bench trial regarding the disparate impact claims and on February 6, 2006 a jury found for the defendants on the disparate treatment claims. On May 4, 2007 the district court (Judge Pechman) dismissed or transferred all remaining individual claims and entered final judgment. The case concluded on February 27, 2008 when the Ninth Circuit (Judges Beezer, Tallman, and Tashima) affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on January 10, 2005.

Summary: On June 4, 1998 a group of African Americans filed suit against Boeing Co. and several subsidiaries, their employers, alleging racial discrimination in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Specifically, they alleged that the defendants had engaged in a pattern or practice of behavior that included policies that had a disparate impact on African-American employees and disparately treated African American employees. On September 30, 1999 the district court certified a class of roughly 15,000 members and approved a consent decree providing for general injunctive relief, $7.3 million in damages, and $4.05 million in fees. Various class members objected and appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Ninth Circuit ruled on November 26, 2002 that the consent decree was unfair and remanded the case to the district court. On January 10, 2005 the district court granted the defendants summary judgment on some of the discrimination claims and on January 21, 2005 the court re-certified the class. On January 17, 2006 the district court ruled for the defendants in a bench trial regarding the disparate impact claims and on February 6, 2006 a jury found for the defendants on the disparate treatment claims. On May 4, 2007 the district court dismissed or transferred all remaining individual claims and on February 27, 2008 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs on January 10, 2005, ending the case.


On July 15, 2004, a volunteer prisoners' rights advocate filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his complaint, the plaintiff requested injunctive and declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages against the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and the Stateville Correctional Center. He alleged that the defendants' ban on distributing, "Stateville Speaks" inside Stateville Corrections Center was in violation of the First Amendment right to free speech and publication and Due Process as well as the Illinois Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff was represented by the Uptown People's Law Center. In the summer of 2003, the plaintiff had sponsored an essay contest for inmates to answer the question, "Who am I", "What Can I Do to be Better?" The inmates submitted essays, which were judged by writers from the Chicago Tribune, CNN, and Chicago Sun Times. Based on the success of the contest, in the summer of 2004, the plaintiff published the essays in a book titled, Inside Prison Heart. Following the publication, the plaintiff and one of the Stateville inmates, discussed publishing a newspaper, to be distributed within the prison. The proposed publication, "Stateville Speaks" would be a compilation of essays, poems, and news items written by inmates. A similar prison newspaper had been published years earlier. In December 2003, the Chief of Operations at Stateville (COO) approved the publication, but in January 2004, a newly-appointed COO would not allow the publication within the prison. In March 2004, the plaintiff raised funds through private donors and published Stateville Speaks outside of the prison. According the IDOC's criteria, none of the printed material was prohibited. He then sent copies to the defendants. Two to three weeks passed without any response from the defendants. So, the plaintiff distributed copies to five inmates, with the intention of distributing another 100 copies within the prison. However, later in March, the prison refused to deliver the publication, and referred the matter to a "Publication Review Committee." That committee never responded to the plaintiff's inquiries. This case ensued. In August 2004, one month after the plaintiff filed his first complaint and five months after the first denial of permission, the defendants again stated that the material was prohibited and refused to deliver newspapers within the prison. In November 2004, the defendants shifted positions, and permitted distribution, but only if the plaintiff removed one article and a portion of another article. At no point was the plaintiff offered a method by which to appeal any decision. On January 7, 2005, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. On September 1, 2005, the defendants' motion to dismiss was denied by the District Court (Judge Ronald A. Guzman). The District Court held that the First Amendment protected plaintiff's right to publish the speech of Stateville inmates and to distribute it the inmates. In November the parties settled, and on January 31, 2006, a stipulation of dismissal was entered. Although the agreement is not available, a 2006 Prison Legal News article explained that under the settlement, the state revised its policy to provide for written notice of rejection of any publication to the aggrieved prisoner and to the publisher within 30 days, after which time the prisoner may submit a supportive statement within seven days and the publisher may object within 21 days. The defendants also agreed $15,000 in attorney fees. As of January 31, 2006 the case is closed.

Summary: On July 15, 2004, the plaintiff--a volunteer prisoners' rights advocate--filed this lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiff alleged that the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) and the Stateville Correctional Center violated his First Amendment right to free speech and publication and Due Process as well as the Illinois Civil Rights Act by barring the publication and distribution of the newspaper, "Stateville Speaks." In November 2006, the parties' signed a private settlement agreement, which allowed prisoners and publishers to file objections to censorship notices.


On January 15, 2020, six individual plaintiffs, along with the Tahirih Justice Center and Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the Trump Administration’s new policy of removing asylum seekers to Guatemala pursuant to an “asylum cooperative agreement” (ACA). The individual plaintiffs are noncitizens who came to the U.S. seeking asylum and were subsequently removed to Guatemala pursuant to the new policy. Represented by the National Immigrant Justice Center, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Human Rights First, the plaintiffs sued the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA), and the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiffs alleged that the government’s new policy violated the APA, INA, FARRA, and the Suspension Clause. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order paroling the individual plaintiffs into the U.S. and vacating their removal orders, as well as attorneys fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Emmet G. Sullivan. The U.S. signed ACAs with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador in the summer of 2019, and on November 19, 2019, the government issued an Interim Final Rule establishing procedures for the removal of asylum seekers from the U.S. to those three countries. On November 20, the government issued written guidance implementing its ACA with Guatemala and began removing non-Guatemalan asylum seekers there. The plaintiffs challenged the Rule, as well as the agency guidance implementing the Guatemala ACA, arguing that they unlawfully deny individuals the right to apply for asylum in the U.S. The plaintiffs brought the following claims: 1) the Rule violated the INA’s safe third country provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A), which requires an individualized likelihood-of-persecution determination in every case prior to removal to a third country; it also requires that any receiving nation be equipped to provide asylum seekers access to full and fair asylum procedures. 2) the Rule violated the withholding of removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and FARRA, which bar the removal of individuals to countries where they would face torture or persecution on account of a protected ground. 3) the Rule violated the expedited removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), by denying access to a credible fear interview, and by depriving asylum seekers of numerous procedural safeguards created by Congress. 4) the Rule violated the APA because it is arbitrary and capricious and it was issued without the use of notice-and-comment procedures. 5) the Rule violated the Suspension Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it subjects individuals to expedited removal to third countries without the constitutionally required level of federal court review of an expedited removal order. The plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is due by February 28, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On January 15, 2020, six asylum seekers and two non-profits filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the Trump Administration's new policy of removing asylum seekers to Guatemala pursuant to an "asylum cooperative agreement." The plaintiffs alleged violations of the APA, INA, and the U.S. Constitution, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.


On 10/22/2015, this lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against the Governor of New Jersey and New Jersey Department of Health officials. Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen represented by the ACLU and private counsel, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that, upon her return to the United States from a foreign country, Defendants had unlawfully detained and quarantined her in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. She also alleged false imprisonment and invasion of privacy. Prior to the incidents giving rise to these allegations, Plaintiff, a nurse specializing in public health, spent approximately one month in Sierra Leone supervising the treatment of patients infected with the Ebola virus. During this time, she followed strict protocol to avoid exposure to the disease. Prior to her return to the U.S., New Jersey Governor Christie signed an Executive Order putting into effect an "Ebola Preparedness Plan" for the state. When she arrived in New Jersey, state and CDC officials escorted Plaintiff to a Quarantine Station, where she was examined and questioned and apparently found to be in good health. Nonetheless, New Jersey Department of Health (DOH) officials and Governor Christie decided to quarantine Plaintiff. Without explaining what was happening and without a signed quarantine order, officials transported Plaintiff in an ambulance to an isolation tent. While there, her temperature was checked several times with two different thermometers, one indicating a normal temperature and the other indicating an elevated temperature. Although Plaintiff tested negative for Ebola and had no symptoms, she was kept in quarantine for a total of 80 hours. During this time, no one gave her an explanation for her detention. In the meantime, Governor Christie addressed the situation on public television, describing Plaintiff as "obviously ill." On January 15, 2016, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint. The motion to dismiss argued that Plaintiff's constitutional claims should be dismissed because Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. It also argued that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim for false imprisonment and invasion of privacy. On September 2, 2016, District Court Judge Kevin McNulty granted the motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's federal claims. Judge McNulty agreed with Defendants' contention that legal precedent at the time of Plaintiff's quarantine did not clearly establish that detaining Plaintiff and placing her in quarantine violated her constitutional rights. Thus, Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. He also stated that while there is no bright-line rule for detaining those exposed to infectious disease at the border, authorities possess broad discretion with respect to such matters so long as their orders are not overbroad or unreasonable in relation to the public health interests at stake. 205 F.Supp.3d 579. However, the court denied Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiff's state law claims, finding that Plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts in support of her claims of false imprisonment and invasion of privacy/false light. 205 F.Supp.3d 579. The parties requested a stay of discovery, and were soon able to negotiate a settlement. They submitted a stipulated order of dismissal on June 27, 2017. The next day, Judge McNulty ordered the case dismissed with prejudice and without costs to either party. The terms of the settlement agreement included the implementation of less restrictive and more transparent quarantine procedures for those suspected or at-risk of Ebola infection. It also required that quarantined individuals be notified of their rights. There apparently was no financial settlement. The text of the agreement can be found here or with the documents below.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in October 2015 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey against Governor Christie and State Department of Health officials. Plaintiff alleged Defendants had unlawfully detained and quarantined her at the border in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law. In June 2017, the parties reached a settlement agreement.


On August 12, 2011, a teenage inmate at the Robert N. Davoren Complex (“RNDC”) on Riker’s island, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff’s claims stemmed from an incident in June 2010 where the plaintiff was beaten by other inmates at the facility. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and The Legal Aid Society, sued the following: the City of New York, the Supervising Warden of the New York Department of Correction (“DOC”), the Chief of Department of the DOC, the Warden of RNDC, the Deputy Warden for Security of RNDC, and a number of unnamed corrections officers who were working at RNDC at the time of the incident. The plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. He sought compensatory and punitive damages as well as reasonable attorneys’ fees. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged the existence of an ongoing practice (“The Program”) at the RNDC in which guards allowed inmates to assault other inmates as a way to control and discipline those in custody. The plaintiff claimed that existence of The Program had been substantiated by an investigation conducted by New York City’s Department of Investigation and the DOC’s Inspector General. In 2008, a RNDC correction officer was indicted and convicted for using inmates as enforcers and encouraging inmate-on-inmate violence. The plaintiff claimed he fell victim to this practice in June 2010, when an inmate at RNDC assaulted him in the presence of corrections officers who did nothing to stop the attack. Four other inmates joined the initial assault, and the plaintiff was beaten until he lost consciousness. After months of discovery disputes, the plaintiff asked the court to impose sanctions on the defendants in February of 2012. Specifically, he alleged that the defendants had failed to comply with discovery requests. Although the case was initially assigned to District Judge Robert Patterson, in April 2012, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Frank Maas for settlement. On June 15, the parties submitted a stipulated settlement agreement regarding the attorney’s fees for work tied to the motion for sanctions, and the City of New York paid $13,000 to the plaintiff’s attorneys. In July of 2012, the Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, noting that the defendants had failed to produce information including: the investigation done following inmate-on-inmate assaults at RNDC, personnel records for the officers working at the site during the relevant time period, and a significant set of documents generated by the “Gang Intelligence Unit” at Riker’s Island. The Court imposed sanctions of $10,000 on the New York Law Department. Shortly after that order, the parties agreed to a settlement of the entire case in which the City of New York paid the plaintiff $850,000 in damages and attorneys fees. The Court ended the case with a stipulation and order of dismissal on August 31, 2012.

Summary: On August 12, 2011, a teenage inmate at Riker's Island sued the City of New York and several jail officials over a Program in which guards watched and encouraged beatings among inmates. After lengthy discovery disputes, the case settled in 2012, with the defendants paying the plaintiff $850,000.


This lawsuit filed on January 30, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO-1). EO-1 barred legal immigrants and refugees from seven majority-Muslim countries from entering the US and prohibited Syrian refugees from entering the US indefinitely. The complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (in Alexandria) by a group of Muslim American activisits and political leaders as well as 12 anonymous plaintiffs residing in the US with varied immigration statuses who would not be able to leave and re-enter the US as a result of EO-1. The case was assigned to Judge Anthony Trenga. The complaint argued that one of the purposes of EO-1 was to “initiate the mass expulsion of immigrant and nonimmigrant Muslims lawfully residing in the US by denying them the ability to renew their lawful status or receive immigration benefits afforded to them under the Immigration and Nationality Act.” Moreover, it argued that EO-1 applied only to Muslims. Therefore, according to the complaint, EO-1 had an illegal purpose and effect and violated the First Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, Equal Protection, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The complaint named (all in their official capacity) then US President Donald Trump, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Department of State as defendants. Represented by private counsel and attorneys from the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that EO-1 violated the Fifth Amendment, and an injunction requiring the government to remedy the Constitutional violations caused by EO-1, a jury trial, and attorneys’ fees. While all versions of the complaint in this lawsuit referenced claims for relief for plaintiffs and “others similarly situated” the docket does not indicate that a motion for class certification was ever filed. On March 6, 2017, the President rescinded EO-1 and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). In response, plaintiffs filed both an amended complaint and an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction on March 13, 2017. The amended complaint argued that the history and text of the rescinded EO-1 revealed an illegal purpose. Further, the effects of EO-2 continued to impact Muslims seeking entry to the US as EO-2 still allowed the illegal purpose of the rescinded EO-1 to take effect. The amended complaint removed the Free Exercise claim and added an allegation that EO-2 violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). District Judge Trenga denied plaintiffs’ emergency motion on March 24, 2017. He found that while plaintiffs had standing to challenge EO-2, they failed to show the EO-2 exceeded the President's authority. Additionally, the court found that plaintiffs had not shown they would be likely to succeed on the merits of their Establishment Clause claim. Diverging from the court in Trump v. Hawaii, the district judge refused to use the President's past statements as evidence of the order's discriminatory nature, reasoning that "the Court cannot conclude for the purposes of the Motion that these statements, together with the President’s past statements, have effectively disqualified him from exercising his lawful presidential authority." 245 F. Supp. 3d 719. On April 21, 2017, the government filed a motion to stay proceedings pending the outcome of IRAP v. Trump where oral arguments in front of the Fourth Circuit had been scheduled for May 8, 2017. The government pointed to how the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland had issued a nationwide injunction barring the enforcement of Section 2(c) of EO-2 and the disposition of that case on appeal would affect the district court’s consideration of the legal issues in this case. The court stayed proceedings on April 24, 2017, and continued the stay on August 18, 2017, following the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari for IRAP after the Fourth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court remanded IRAP to the district court with orders to dismiss the case as moot on October 11, 2017, as EO-2 expired on September 24, 2017. In response, the district court lifted the stay on this case for the limited purpose of allowing plaintiffs to file an amended complaint so that they could address the most recent version of the travel ban EO-3 (issued on September 24). Plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint on December 26, 2017, and made substantively similar arguments to their first amended complaint. Following plaintiffs' amended complaint, the government moved to stay proceedings on January 5, 2018, pending the resolution of the IRAP and Hawaii cases which had both made their way back to the Supreme Court. The court granted defendants' motion to stay on January 9, 2018. There were no further proceedings from January 2018 to June 2021. Following President Biden’s revocation of the travel ban EOs on his Inauguration Day (January 20, 2021), the parties submitted a joint stipulation of dismissal on June 25, 2021. Accordingly, District Judge Trenga signed an order dismissing the case on the same day. This case is closed.

Summary: This lawsuit, filed January 30, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO-1) which barred entry to the US to travelers from seven majority Muslim countries and barred Syrian refugees from entering the US indefinitely. Plaintiffs argued EO-1 violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection, and the Administrative Procedure Act. On March 6, 2017, the President rescinded EO-1 and replaced it with a narrower one (EO-2). Plaintiffs argued that EO-2 still enabled the constitutional and statutory violations of EO-1 despite its changes. On March 24, 2017, the court denied preliminary relief and refused to consider President Trump’s past statements as evidence of discrimination, contrary to the ruling in Hawaii v. Trump . On April 24, 2017, court stayed this case pending the outcome of a Fourth Circuit decision in a similar case IRAP v. Trump. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint in late December 2017 responding to the third version of the travel ban (EO-3) but no rulings were ever made on it as the district court granted the government’s January 9, 2018, motion to stay proceedings pending the resolution of the IRAP and Hawaii cases at the Supreme Court. As a result there were no further proceedings in this case between January 2018 and June 2021. President Biden rescinded EO-3 upon his Inauguration, January 20, 2021. As a result, this case was voluntarily dismissed on June 25, 2021.


On July 10, 2017, Public Citizen filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of the Army (Army) under the Privacy Act and, in the alternative, the Administrative Procedure Act. Public Citizen, represented by the Public Citizen Litigation Group, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was first assigned to Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly but was then randomly assigned to Judge Royce C. Lamberth on July 19, 2017. Public Citizen filed this lawsuit to enjoin what it believed to be ongoing and imminent violations of the Privacy Act. The Privacy Act prohibits any agency from collecting, using, maintaining, or disseminating records describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. Public Citizen was concerned that many states would soon submit protected information to the Army as requested by the Vice Chair of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity, a temporary commission established on May 11, 2017, by President Donald Trump's executive order 13799. Public Citizen claimed that, by accepting the protected information, the Army would violate the Privacy Act’s prohibition on collecting such information. According to Public Citizen, if the Army allowed the Commission to download the information, the Army would violate the Act’s prohibition on disseminating the information. On the same day the complaint was filed, Public Citizen filed a notice of a related case. The case, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Pres. Advisory Comm’n on Election Integrity, grew out of the same event. Without receiving an answer from the Army or any dispositive motion, Public Citizen voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on July 25, 2017 when the Commission announced that it would no longer use the SAFE system to collect voter data. The case is now closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was filed by Public Citizen, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Public Citizen brought the case to prevent ongoing and imminent violations of the Privacy Act. Public Citizen alleged that the Army would violate the Act by receiving and disseminating protected information regarding individuals' exercise of First Amendment Rights. Without precedent, Public Citizen voluntarily dismissed the case.


On June 6, 2012, several individuals and organizations affiliated with New Jersey's Muslim community filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the public interest organization Muslim Advocates, alleged they had been subjected to illegal surveillance (in New Jersey) by the New York City Police Department solely because of their religion. The case was assigned to Judge William J. Martini. According to the complaint (amended once to include additional plaintiffs), the NYPD initiated a spying program in early 2002 to monitor Muslim life in and around New York City. The monitoring entailed taking photographs and videos, recording license plate numbers, and utilizing undercover officers and informants. The plaintiffs were among the targets of the program; numerous New Jersey mosques, as well as restaurants, retail stores, student associations, and grade schools associated with the Muslim community were also identified as targets of the NYPD. Non-Muslim communities had apparently not been subject to such monitoring. The result, the plaintiffs claimed, was that the NYPD had discriminated against them on the basis of their religion, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs further alleged the NYPD's surveillance--in singling out Muslims--was not neutral with respect to religion or general applicability and thus contravened the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Accordingly, the plaintiffs requested: (1) declaratory judgment that the NYPD's surveillance violates both the First and Fourteenth Amendments, (2) injunctive relief forbidding the NYPD from targeting the plaintiffs for surveillance solely because of their religion, and (3) an order to expunge all records relating to the plaintiffs obtained through the NYPD's surveillance. The defendant moved to dismiss in December 2012. The court granted the motion on February 20, 2014, finding the plaintiffs had neither established standing nor pled facts sufficient to state a claim for discrimination. As to the issue of standing, the court held there had been no injury, explaining plaintiffs' claims mirrored those of the plaintiffs in Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), where no injury was found--the asserted "chilling effect" was insufficiently strong to count. Moreover, the court held there was no causation, accepting defendant's argument that the Associated Press, not defendant, was principally responsible for plaintiffs' alleged injuries, because it was the AP that made the surveillance public and therefore known to the plaintiffs. Finally, as to the claims of discrimination, the Court explained that the plaintiffs, under Iqbal, needed to plead sufficient facts to show the NYPD's surveillance was conducted with a discriminatory--rather than investigative--purpose. But the court found the plaintiffs had not done so: "The more likely explanation for the surveillance was a desire to locate budding terrorist conspiracies." Hassan v. City of New York, 2014 WL 654604, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2014) On October 13, 2015, the Third Circuit (Judge Thomas L. Ambro, Judge Julio M. Fuentes, and Judge Jane R. Roth) reversed the District Court's judgment and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceeding. Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277 (3d Cir. 2015). In an opinion by Judge Ambro, the Third Circuit found sufficient particularized injury to support jurisdiction in the case. In addition, the Court found that the constitutional claims had been adequately pled:
While the City compares Plaintiffs' claims to the conclusory allegations in Iqbal, those were far from what we have here. In our case, Plaintiffs allege specifics about the Program, including when it was conceived (January 2002), where the City implemented it (in the New York Metropolitan area with a focus on New Jersey), and why it has been employed (because of the belief "that Muslim religious identity... is a permissible proxy for criminality," Compl. ¶ 36). The Complaint also articulates the "variety of methods" by which the surveillance is carried out. See, e.g., id.¶ 39 ("tak[ing] videos and photographs at mosques, Muslim owned businesses and schools"); id. ("monitor[ing Muslim] websites, listservs, and chat rooms"); id. ¶ 46 ("snap[ping] pictures, tak[ing] video, and collect[ing] license plate numbers of congregants as they arrive at mosques to pray"); id. ¶ 47 ("us[ing] undercover officers... to monitor daily life in [Muslim] neighborhoods ... and sermons and conversations in mosques"); id. ¶ 49 ("plac[ing] informants or undercover officers in all or virtually all MSAs"). These allegations are hardly "bare assertions ... amount[ing] to nothing more than a `formulaic recitation of the elements' of a constitutional discrimination claim."Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544, 545, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).
In addition, the Court emphasized that the District Court had erred in its understanding of the Equal Protection Clause: "While the absence of a legitimate motive may bear on whether the challenged surveillance survives the appropriate level of equal-protection scrutiny, "intentional discrimination" need not be motivated by 'ill will, enmity, or hostility' to contravene the Equal Protection Clause." Religious discrimination is unconstitutional, said the court, unless it satisfies the "strict scrutiny" test. Plaintiffs had said enough to survive dismissal under this test. The Court concluded:
What occurs here in one guise is not new. We have been down similar roads before. Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II are examples that readily spring to mind. We are left to wonder why we cannot see with foresight what we see so clearly with hindsight — that "[l]oyalty is a matter of the heart and mind[,] not race, creed, or color." Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302, 65 S.Ct. 208, 89 L.Ed. 243 (1944)."
(Judge Roth concurred, arguing that intermediate rather than strict scrutiny was applicable, but agreeing that the District Court erred and the case should be remanded to proceed towards trial.) The case was reopened in the District Court on November 6, 2015. The defendants answered the complaint on January 15, 2016. On February 4, 2016, the parties met and conferred and agreed to resolve the matter through settlement. Settlement discussions continued for two years. One of the named plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed her claims on October 27, 2017. The parties reported settlement of the matter at a February 20, 2018 settlement conference, and Judge Martini ordered administrative termination of the action. Pursuant to the order, the case was to be automatically dismissed 60 days from February 20, 2018, unless the parties filed for dismissal, or requested that the case be reopened for failure to consummate the settlement, prior to that time. In the settlement agreement the defendants agreed to the following policy changes:
 - the defendants shall act in accordance with the Revised Handschu Guidelines - the defendants will provide the plaintiffs with the full draft of the Proposed Policy Guide; the defendants will meaningfully consider Plaintiffs’ recommendations and proposed revisions and will respond to them in writing or meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ Counsel on a timely basis after receiving recommendations and proposed revisions - the defendants will make public, with necessary redactions, the final version of the Proposed Policy Guide within 60 days of finalizing revisions - the defendants will include in the Proposed Policy Guide a written protocol setting forth the manner in which the NYPD Intelligence Bureau will fully comply, absent exigent circumstances, with N.J.S.A. 2A:156A-35 through -37 regarding proposed entry into New Jersey for law enforcement purposes - the defendants agree that the Revised Handschu Training PowerPoint shall positively emphasize the City’s stated interest and obligation in protecting the Equal Protection and First Amendment rights of all individuals regardless of race, ethnicity or religion, and avoiding racial, ethnic and religious stereotyping - the defendants will provide Plaintiffs’ Counsel the opportunity to provide suggested changes and comments which Defendant will meaningfully consider incorporating into the Revised Handschu Training PowerPoint - the defendants agree to disclose all of the Zone Assessment Unit’s (f/k/a the Demographics Unit) DD5s, “Weekly MSA Reports,” and all other documents created or maintained by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, except Handschu investigative statements, if any, regarding Plaintiffs to Plaintiffs’ counsel for their review and thereafter to use reasonable and diligent efforts to expunge them permanently from the NYPD Intelligence Bureau information systems. Defendant further agrees to seal and archive the Demographic reports of Muslim communities in New Jersey and make them available to members of the NYPD only with approval of the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters, Deputy Commissioner for Intelligence and Counterterrorism, Chief of Intelligence or the Executive Officer of the Intelligence Bureau. - the defendants agree that a high-ranking official from the Intelligence Bureau, shall attend a public meeting in New York City where the plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiffs’ community in New Jersey will have the opportunity to speak directly with the designated representatives of the city - the defendants will issue a statement affirming that it exercises care in the conduct of investigations involving political activity so as to protect constitutional rights, including the right to be free from investigation in which race, religion or ethnicity is a substantial or motivating factor
In addition, the defendants agreed to pay a combined $52,500 to the plaintiffs and $950,000 in attorneys' fees. On April 11, 2018 Judge William J. Martini signed an order approving the settlement and dismissing the case with prejudice.

Summary: Several individuals and organizations affiliated with New Jersey's Muslim community filed suit against the City of New York in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, alleging they had been subjected to illegal surveillance by the New York City Police Department solely because of their religion. The NYPD's monitoring, the plaintiffs claimed, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against them on the basis of their religion and contravened the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment because, by singling out Muslims, it was not neutral with respect to religion or general applicability. The District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, finding Plaintiffs lacked standing and nevertheless had pled insufficient facts to state a claim. On October 13, 2015, the Third Circuit reversed the District Court's judgment and the case remanded to the District Court for further proceeding. The parties reached a settlement agreement in the matter on February 20, 2018. On April 11, 2018 Judge William J. Martini signed an order approving the settlement and dismissing the case with prejudice.


On August 1, 2011, the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama against the State of Alabama, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The U.S. sought to prevent the implementation of the recently enacted state legislation H.B. 56, arguing it was preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act and therefore in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. H.B. 56 was designed to address numerous aspects of immigration regulation and enforcement. H.B 56's provisions require, whenever practicable, the determination of immigration status during any lawful stop by the police where there is "reasonable suspicion" that an individual is unlawfully present. The United States claimed that the emphasis on maximum enforcement of immigration status laws ignores other objectives that Congress has established for the federal immigration system and undermines the federal government's balance of immigration objectives and priorities. On August 2, 2011, the district court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) consolidated this case with two related cases, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006) and Parsley v. Bentley (IM-AL-0007), for consideration of Motions for Preliminary Injunctions made by plaintiffs in each of the cases. A month later, however, the court dissolved the consolidation order and ordered all pleadings to be filed in the separate cases, as appropriate. The court granted amicus curiae status to many organizations, including many South and Central American countries, the NAACP, several fair housing organizations, the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights, and the National Lawyers Guild. A day before the Preliminary Injunction hearing in August 2011, Alabama filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the hearing, on August 29, 2011, the court ordered enforcement of H.B. 56 temporarily enjoined. A month later the court issued a memorandum opinion granting a Preliminary Injunction for certain provisions of H.B. 56, but denying it for other provisions. Both plaintiffs and defendants then filed cross-appeals with the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals heard oral arguments on March 1, 2012. Following the hearing, the court issued an order expanding the district court's injunction pending complete resolution of the appeals. On November 20, 2012, the Court of Appeals (Judge Charles R. Wilson) held that most of the challenged provisions could not stand. United States v. Alabama, 691 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012). The court found that Section 28, which requires the immigration verification of newly enrolled students, violates the Equal Protection Clause. In addition, the court affirmed the district court's decision that section 11(a), 13(a), 16, and 17 are likely preempted. The court reversed the district court's holding as to section 10 and 27 and remanded for the entry of a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Alabama v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013). On remand, the parties reached agreement on a proposed final order to end the case. They filed this with the district court on October 29, 2013. The order would permanently enjoin defendants from implementing the majority of the challenged provisions. The state would not enforce provisions criminalize the solicitation of work by unauthorized or failing to register one's immigration status. Plaintiffs will agree to dismiss their remaining claims without prejudice. On the same day, the parties in a related case, Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006), submitted a similar agreement and proposed order. There the parties also agreed to the permanent injunction of sections 10, 11(a), 13 and 27 as well as additional provisions 11(f) and (g). The settlement in this case would also enjoin enforcement of sections 16 and 17. In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, the parties agreed to the permanent injunction of Section 28. The plaintiffs in this case agreed to dismiss their claim against Section 28, assuming the court enters the permanent inunction against the provision sought in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama v. Governor of Alabama (IM-AL-0006). In Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama, the plaintiffs also agreed to dismiss the rest of their claims, but specified that a number of those agreements to dismiss (sections 12, 18, 19, and 20) depended upon the defendants' representation that they would interpret the provisions to be consistent with U.S. v. Arizona and "neither require nor authorize state or local law-enforcement officers to stop, detain, arrest, or prolong the detention of any person for the purpose of ascertaining that person's immigration status or because of a belief that the person lacks lawful immigration status." On November 25, 2013, the Court (Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn) issued an order pursuant to the parties' agreement and the Eleventh Circuit's decision. The order permanently enjoined defendants from implementing sections 10, 11(a), 13, 16, 17, and 27 of H.B. 56. The court also dismissed without prejudice the plaintiff’s challenges to Section 12(a), 18, and 30 of H.B. 56. Finally, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims that challenged Section 28 because of the permanent injunction that was entered in Hispanic Interest Coalition of Alabama. The case was closed on November 25, 2013.

Summary: On August 1, 2011, the United States filed a lawsuit under the Immigration and Nationality Act against the State of Alabama for declaratory and injunctive relief in the U.S. District Court of Alabama, Northern District. The United States sought to prevent the implementation of the recently enacted state legislation H.B. 56 as preempted by federal law and therefore a violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. H.B. 56 was designed to address numerous aspects of immigration regulation and enforcement. The United States claims that the emphasis on maximum enforcement of immigration status laws ignores other objectives that Congress has established for the federal immigration system and undermines the federal government's balance of immigration objectives and priorities. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of certain provisions of H.B. 56. Plaintiffs appealed, seeking an injunction for further sections of H.B. 56. The U.S. Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit expanded the injunction to further sections and found that section 28 violated the Equal Protection Clause. In November 2013, the Court enjoined defendants from enacting most of H.B. 56 and dismissed the plaintiff's remaining claims without prejudice.


On November 27, 2013, eleven minority individuals who had been subjected to stop-and-frisks by the Miami Gardens Police Department filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the city of Miami Gardens, its mayor, city manager, and chief of police as well as numerous individual members of the MGPD. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, brought their suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking redress for the violation of their constitutional and civil rights. Specifically, they alleged the defendants' stop-and-frisks are conducted on the basis of race or national origin--instead of probable cause or reasonable suspicion--and thus contravene both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In their complaint, the plaintiffs identified three defective policies of the MGPD that gave rise to the alleged violations. First, the MGPD employed a quota policy, requiring officers to make a monthly minimum amount of citations, field contact reports, and arrests. Second, MGPD officers abused the "Zero Tolerance Zone Policy" aimed at reducing trespassing and loitering. Officers policing zero tolerance zones would conduct stop and frisks and arrest individuals, notwithstanding that property owners had opted out of the policy or requested--during such incidents--officers desist. And third, the "Racial Targeting Policy" commanded officers to focus their stop-and-frisks on young black males, even where reasonable suspicion was lacking. Accordingly, in addition to monetary compensation, the plaintiffs requested (1) declaratory judgment that the stop-and-frisk policy and practice is unconstitutional; (2) an injunction prohibiting the MGPD's stop-and-frisks generally and its use of quotas and employment of the Zero Tolerance Zone and Racial Targeting policies specifically; and (3) an order that the MGPD adopt remedial policies and programs terminating its practice of stop-and-frisks. The defendants initially filed several motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Court (Judge Donald L. Graham) denied the motions as moot in light of the plaintiffs' amended complaint. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed claims against most of the individual defendants, leaving claims only against the city, chief of police, deputy chief of police, and the major in the MGPD who issued the Racial Targeting Policy. The defendants subsequently filed another motion to dismiss, which the Court granted and denied in part. The Court found that Florida statute immunized the defendants against the plaintiffs' conversion claim, but it refused to dismiss their battery claims, explaining the record was insufficiently developed to make such a determination. Finally, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, noting that the plaintiffs had not opposed the motion. On April 25, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, in which they removed the individual police officer defendants. Thus, the remaining defendants were the City of Miami Gardens, as well as the Chief, Deputy Chief, and Major of the MGPD. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed their third and final amended complaint, in which they added a few details about the MGPD's practices. The parties then engaged in extensive discovery. On August 11, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to bifurcate, requesting separate trials for each individual plaintiff. The City and the MGPD defendants each filed separate motions for summary judgment on January 30, 2015. On that same date, several plaintiffs filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. On May 27, 2015, Judge Graham rule on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion and denying the plaintiffs' motion. 2015 WL 11202372. Specifically, the Court granted summary judgment for defendants on the plaintiffs' state law claims because the plaintiffs did not strictly adhere to the notice requirements set forth in Florida's sovereign immunity waiver statute. The Court also held that all incidents occurring prior to November 27, 2009 were time-barred pursuant to the Florida statute of limitations for tort actions. Although the Court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiffs' Monell claims premised on the zero tolerance zone ordinance, the Court declined to grant summary judgment for the defendants' on the plaintiffs' Monell claims predicated upon the unwritten quota policy and the racial profiling policy. The Court held for the defendants on the plaintiffs' failure-to-train claim, but held that neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the selective enforcement claims. Finally, the Court held that neither party was entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' supervisory liability claims and that, assuming the plaintiffs could establish their constitutional injuries, the defendants would not be entitled to qualified immunity. At settlement conference on June 23, 2015, the parties reached a full settlement. The details of the settlement are unknown, but according to news reports, under pressure from the harassment allegations, Police Chief Matthew Boyd resigned in 2013. On July 14, 2015, the parties filed a joint notice of voluntary dismissal with prejudice. Each party agreed to bear their own fees and costs. The case is now closed.

Summary: Eleven minority individuals who had been subjected to stop-and-frisks by the Miami Gardens Police Department brought this action against the city of Miami Gardens and various individual defendants. They alleged the defendants' stop-and-frisks are conducted on the basis of race or national origin-instead of probable cause or reasonable suspicion-and thus contravene both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On May 27, 2015, the Court ruled on the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motions, while denying the plaintiffs' motion. The parties reached a settlement agreement in June 2015 and agreed to a voluntary dismissal with prejudice. The case is now closed.


This case is a revival of a dismissed claim from the Northern District of Alabama. (FA-AL-0002) On October 28, 2013, a nonprofit Catholic media network filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") and the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"). Plaintiffs, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") extending universal contraception coverage to employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Specifically, plaintiffs noted that they had always ensured that their self-insured health plan did not cover services inconsistent with their religious beliefs and contended that compliance with the contraception coverage requirement was a substantial burden on their religious exercise. Plaintiffs further claimed that, though they were eligible for the accommodation to the mandate available to nonprofits, they remained burdened by the mandate which, they alleged, violated the First Amendment. On June 17, 2014, Judge Callie V. S. Granade granted summary judgment for the defendants on the counts related to RFRA, the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause on substantial burden to religious exercise and establishment of religion, and compelled speech. Judge Grande also granted the defendants' motion to dismissed all the remaining constitutional claims. She denied defendants’ motion to dismiss the claims related to violations of the Administrative Procedure Act. On June 18, 2014, the District Court stayed the remaining claims, all related to the Administrative Procedure Act, pending the appeal of partial summary judgment. On June 18, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On June 30, 2014, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the Eleventh Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction pending appeal. The Eleventh Circuit heard oral argument in this case on February 4, 2015, and on February 18, 2016, Judge Jill Pryor ruled that the contraception regulation did not substantially burden the plaintiffs' religious exercise. The court further held that the government had a compelling interest in ensuring contraception coverage, and the mandate was the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. However, the court stayed its ruling pending a Supreme Court decision in Zubik v. Burwell. On May 16, 2016, in Zubik, the Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557, 1560. The Court took no position on the merits of the case. Following the ruling in Zubik, on May 31, 2016, the Eleventh Circuit vacated their prior decision against the plaintiffs, and ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing addressing the Supreme Court's concerns in Zubik. The court also enjoined enforcement of the contraceptive mandate against the plaintiffs pending further order of the court. On July 29, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to stay the appeal in order to have more time to finish the research necessary for their supplemental brief and they proposed submitting status reports every 60 days or until a resolution between the parties was found. This motion was granted on August 10, 2016. Also on August 10, 2016, the defendants requested a materially identical order to the remand order given in Zubik. The order was granted on October 3, 2016. The order stipulated that the Government could still ensure that women covered by the plaintiff’s health plans obtained without cost the full range of FDA approved contraceptives and the government could rely on this order to facilitate this process. It also required the plaintiffs not to be penalized for failure to provide the relevant notice. The parties continued to file status reports until October of 2017. In October of 2017, President Trump signed an executive order related to the Affordable Care Act. On October 6, 2017, new regulations were passed that would affect this case and the department of Health and Human Services conceded that requiring certain objecting entities to follow the requirements in the Affordable Care Act violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the enforcement did not serve a compelling government interest and was not narrowly tailored. In response to this development, on October 16, 2017, the plaintiffs requested a stay while the parties discussed a resolution. On October 19, 2018, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to lift the stay, vacate the lower court’s ruling, and remand the case given concessions made by the government and new interpretations of the Affordable Care Act promoted by the Department of Health and Human Services. The government had issued interim final rules that acknowledged that its interests would be satisfied as long as women had access to a plan with some contraceptive coverage, including that of a family member in addition to their earlier concessions. On November 29, 2018, the ruling of the District Court was vacated. With the challenged rules no longer in effect, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion to dismiss on January 9, 2019, which the court granted the next day. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case is a revival of a dismissed claim from the Northern District of Alabama. (FA-AL-0002). In 2013, a Catholic media network filed a RFRA challenge to the Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. After the Supreme Court directed lower courts to oversee negotiated solutions to similar cases in Zubik v. Burwell, the government conceded that the original rules violated the RFRA. With the rules no longer enforced, the plaintiffs dismissed the case.


On May 1, 2018, a D.C. resident with intellectual disabilities civilly committed in a North Carolina federal prison filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia, the D.C. Department of Disability Services (DDS), and the director of DDS in his official capacity. The complaint alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and D.C. laws, including the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Act (CIDA). The plaintiff was represented by American University, Washington College of Law, Disability Rights Law Clinic, the Arc of the United States, and private counsel. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to Chief Judge Beryl Howell. The plaintiff alleged that D.C. law entitled him to treatment for his intellectual and developmental disabilities in the D.C. area. Specifically, he claimed that after being arrested and found incompetent prior to standing trial, DDS should have begun civil commitment proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court. This would have allowed him to receive treatment close to his family in D.C. Instead, the plaintiff was placed in a federal prison in North Carolina and a separate petition for federal civil commitment had been filed. The plaintiff claimed that this could lead to his indefinite incarceration in the federal prison system, which would prolong separation from his family. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on June 14, 2018 for failure to state a claim. They alleged that the plaintiff was not a qualified individual under the ADA, that he had not allege discrimination on the basis of his disability, and that CIDA did not create a private right of action. On September 28, 2018, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. The court held that under the ADA, the plaintiff failed to show that defendants discriminated against him because of his disability. The court found that the defendants’ decision not to petition the court for him to remain in D.C. was not apparently on the basis of his disability. And, the plaintiff failed to prove that D.C was required to begin commitment proceedings in every case regarding civil commitment for a D.C. resident. Instead, the court held that CIDA provides D.C. with discretion in beginning commitment proceedings. 2018 WL 4682023. In response, the plaintiff filed a motion on October 26, 2018 to alter the judgment to be without prejudice and to permit him to amend the complaint. On May 8, 2019, the court denied the motion to alter the judgment and amend the complaint. The court again focused on how the defendants’ decision not to petition the court for him to remain in D.C. was not based on his disability. The court noted this could not be cured by additional facts and that the new factual alleged by the plaintiff were available prior to the entry of judgment. The plaintiff then appealed both the dismissal of the claim and the denial of his motion to alter the judgment to the D.C. Circuit on June 7, 2019 (docket number 19-7057). The parties and amicus for the plaintiff have filed numerous briefs on the appeal. Oral argument was scheduled for April 2, 2020. As of January 2020, the appeal remained pending and the case was ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, a D.C. resident with intellectual disabilities civilly committed to a federal prison in North Carolina sued D.C. and DDS for alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, the D.C Human Rights Act, and the Citizens with Intellectual Disabilities Act. The plaintiff claimed that after being found incompetent to stand trial, DDS should have begun civil commitment proceedings in the D.C. Superior Court. This would have allowed the plaintiff to receive treatment close to his family rather than being placed in the federal prison system. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in June 2018. In September 2018, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The court held that the plaintiff had not proved he was being discriminated against based on his disability and that D.C. was not obligated to begin commitment proceedings in every case regarding the civil commitment of a D.C. resident. The plaintiff filed a motion on October 26, 2018 to alter the judgment to be without prejudice and to permit him to amend the complaint. After the court denied the motion to alter the judgment, the plaintiff appealed this and the dismissal of his claim. As of January 2020, the appeal remained pending and the case was ongoing.