On March 30th, 2010, four Medicaid-eligible children of Mississippi with behavioral or emotional disorders filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396d et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the Mississippi Department of Mental Health (the Department) and the Mississippi Division of Medicaid. The Complaint alleged that the State of Mississippi failed to meet the needs of and discriminated against children with mental illnesses. Plaintiffs claimed that they were unlawfully separated from their families and forced to cycle through institutions that failed to provide adequate services. They further alleged that the state failed to provide federally mandated and medically necessary home and community-based mental health services. Represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and private counsel, the plaintiffs requested a preliminary and permanent injunction. Children's Rights Inc., counsel for plaintiffs in the child welfare case, Olivia Y. v. Barbour (in the Clearinghouse as CW-MS-0001) filed a motion for those plaintiffs to intervene in this case. Olivia Y., which pertains to foster care, was already settled and in the implementation phase. On September 30th, 2011, the court denied intervention. Judge Henry Wingate held that the interests of Olivia Y.'s plaintiffs were not substantially impacted by the outcome of the instant case. 2011 WL 4590790 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2011). On April 8, 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) entered an appearance as an amicus curiae. On December 22, 2011, the DOJ wrote a letter to the court reporting its investigative findings related to the suit. The letter supported plaintiff's claims that the mental health services being offered by the state were grossly inadequate. It concluded the state was in violation of the ADA, the EPSDT (Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment) provisions of the Medicaid Act, and other federal statutes by not providing services to individuals with mental illness and/or developmental disabilities in the most integrated setting. The letter concluded that if Mississippi declined to enter into voluntary compliance negotiations, or if negotiations were unsuccessful, the United States might take action, including initiating a lawsuit. Plaintiffs submitted notice of these findings to the Court on February 27, 2012. On August 23, 2013, Magistrate Judge Michael T. Parker issued a document entitled Report and Recommendations, in which he recommended that the Court grant defendant’s motion to dismiss the allegation that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) by failing to affirmatively provide EPSDT services to Plaintiffs, and grant the plaintiff’s motion to lift the stay on discovery so that the Court can schedule a case management conference. Magistrate Judge Parker concluded that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim in the first instance because 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) required only that defendants provide notice of the availability of EPSDT services, provide for or arrange screening services where requested, and then arrange for treatment either directly through Medicaid or a third party. As a result, Judge Parker found that the statute did not require defendants to seek out parties who were eligible as the plaintiffs had alleged, but only required that defendants provided services after they were requested. 2013 WL 12303126. Plaintiffs objected to the magistrate judge's recommendations on September 6, 2013. The parties continued to respond to each other regarding this objection. Following the letter from the DOJ, the parties entered into negotiations. On August 29, 2014, the DOJ and the State reached an agreement addressing remedial measures the State would implement in response to the DOJ’s and the plaintiffs’ claims. As part of the agreement, Mississippi retained the Technical Assistance Collaborative (“TAC”) to provide assessments of permanent supportive housing for the mentally handicapped and assessments of Mississippi’s existing mental health services. TAC recorded its findings in the March 2015 TAC Report. On April 24, 2015, defendants filed a motion for a protective order in response to a complaint to compel public access to records by Gannett River States Publishing Corporation d/b/a The Clarion-Ledger. The complaint alleged that the TAC Report should be made public because it was paid for with taxpayer money, it was the understanding of the organizations and families who participated in the assessment for the TAC Report that the TAC Report would be public, and the “exemptions” and/or “privileges” asserted by the Department of Mental Health to keep the report private were inapplicable. Magistrate Judge Parker approved the agreed protective order on May 6, 2015 based on the confidential nature of the settlement negotiations, of which the TAC report was a part. The order stated that statements made and documents generated or exchanged by one of the parties to the negotiations or the TAC in the course of the settlement negotiations should not be disclosed by any of the parties to the negotiations to anyone who is not a party, counsel, or expert participating in the negotiations. Additionally, the order provided that counsel for defendants should provide plaintiffs' counsel with a copy of the March 2015 TAC Mississippi Children’s Behavioral Health Needs Assessment. On June 24, 2015, in response to the agreed protective order, Gannett River States Publishing Corporation d/b/a The Clarion-Ledger filed a motion to intervene and to vacate the protective order. The Clarion-Ledger claimed that it was well-established that they may intervene for the limited purpose of challenging the protective order and that the protective order should be vacated because the Department failed to show good cause as to why the TAC Report must be protected from public disclosure. On August 28, 2015, Judge Parker issued an order granting in part and denying in part The Clarion-Ledger’s motions. 2015 WL 5097209. Judge Parker granted the motion to intervene because the motion was timely, The Clarion-Ledger had an interest in the matter, the disposition of this action could impair The Clarion Ledger’s ability to protect its interest, and the existing parties to the suit inadequately represented its interest. Judge Parker denied the motion to vacate because the TAC Report was part of a mediation or settlement conference, making it confidential and not subject to disclosure. The parties continued negotiating, but reached an impasse. Accordingly, on December 17, 2015, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Termination of Settlement Negotiations between the plaintiffs and the DOJ and the defendants and requested a scheduling conference. The Notice asked for decisions to be rendered on outstanding motions, which included defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motion for class certification, and plaintiff's motion to lift the stay of discovery (Docket Nos. 15, 29, and 56). It also requested a case management conference with respect to Count II, plaintiffs’ ADA claim. The same day, Judge Parker stated that an order was forthcoming on those motions and that the Court would hold in abeyance the motion for class certification. There was little movement in the case in the subsequent months. On May 25, 2016, plaintiffs filed a motion for resolution of the pending motions. On July 12, they moved the court to transfer the case to Judge Tom Lee, who was adjudicating a similar case, Olivia Y. v. Barbour. On August 3, the Clarion Ledger, a local newspaper, filed a motion to vacate the protective order preventing it from accessing the TAC Report, arguing that since settlement negotiations had ceased, the public interest in accessing the report now outweighed the parties' interest in resolving the matter. On October 9, Judge Wingate granted plaintiffs' motion for resolution of the pending motions. On October 19, Judge Parker denied the Clarion Ledger's motion to vacate the protective order on the TAC Report. 2016 WL 6106479. On October 24, 2016, District Judge Henry T. Wingate denied plaintiffs' motion to transfer the case, finding that the Olivia Y. case was not active and ongoing, so transfer was inappropriate. On November 7, 2016, more than three years after Magistrate Judge Parker filed his Report and Recommendations regarding defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count One of the Complaint - which alleged that the defendants violated 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(43) by failing to affirmatively provide EPSDT services to Plaintiffs - Judge Wingate adopted the findings in the Report and granted the Motion to Dismiss Count One. Judge Wingate agreed with Judge Parker that plaintiffs had an affirmative duty to request EPSDT services. Judge Wingate also lifted the stay on discovery on that day, allowing the discovery process to move forward. On December 6, 2016, the court consolidated this case with United States v. Mississippi. 2016 WL 7650605. In that case, the U.S. alleged that Mississippi discriminated against adults with mental illness in a way that resulted in unnecessary institutionalization. On December 7, 2016, plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification, which had never been decided by the court. On January 13, 2017, three of the four plaintiffs in the case, J.B., L.P., AND L.M., moved to voluntarily dismiss their claims since they had all turned 21 and aged out of the State's mental health system for children. The court granted this motion on March 19, 2017, leaving only one plaintiff in the case. Also on January 13, 2017, the remaining plaintiff, L.S., moved to amend the complaint due to the decision to no longer seek class certification and other changes that had occurred over the six years since litigation commenced. On April 14, the court granted in part the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint. However, since the EPSDT claim from the original Complaint had been dismissed, the court precluded the plaintiff from resurrecting this claim. On April 24, 2017, L.S. filed an Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint alleged that the State had failed to provide L.S., who had both developmental disabilities and mental illness, with services in the most integrated setting appropriate and had unnecessarily institutionalized him. Plaintiff confined his claims to the ADA and Section 504. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees and costs. Over the next two months, the parties conferred and were able to reach a settlement agreement. On June 29, 2017, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint and filed the Settlement Agreement with the court. The Agreement provided as follows: 1) Within 21 days of the execution of the agreement, the State would remove L.S. from East Mississippi State Hospital to an intermediate care home, where he would receive a variety of services. He would also be enrolled in the ID/DD Waiver Program, and would receive person-centered planning to determine and coordinate his services according to his needs. Defendants agreed to pay $7,500 in attorney's fees to L.S.'s attorney. Finally, the Agreement gave the court jurisdiction to enforce its terms until L.S.'s enrollment in the Waiver Program or nine months until he transitioned into the intermediate care facility, whichever came earlier. On June 30, 2017, the court issued a Final Judgment dismissing the case with prejudice and incorporating into the Judgment the terms of the Settlement Agreement. As of June 2018, there has been no further activity, and the case now appears closed.

Summary: On March 30th, 2010, the class of Medicaid-eligible children of Mississippi with behavioral or emotional disorders filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The complaint alleged that the state of Missouri failed to meet the needs of children and discriminated against children with mental illnesses resulting in unnecessary institutionalization. They further accused the state of failing to provide federally mandated and medically necessary home and community-based mental health services. The plaintiffs claimed violations of state obligations under the Medicaid Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The parties attempted to negotiate, but in December 2015, Plaintiffs notified the Court that the parties had reached an impasse in their negotiations and requested decisions on outstanding motions. In November of 2016, the court dismissed Plaintiff's EPSDT (Medicaid) claim. After three of the four plaintiffs reached adulthood, the remaining plaintiff amended his complaint to include only individual ADA and Section 504 claims. The parties were able to reach a Settlement Agreement in the summer of 2017, and the remaining plaintiff was moved out of the Mississippi State Hospital and into a more integrated setting. The case was dismissed on June 30, 2017.


On May 27, 2016, former California state prisoners filed this class action lawsuit against Securus Technologies (a prison phone service provider) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Court of California. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought class action certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The complaint asserted that Securus had recorded prisoners’ phone calls in violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act, which allowed for statutory damages of up to $5,000 for every unlawfully recorded call, and also alleged negligence. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Securus recorded confidential attorney-client phone calls without permission of all parties and that Securus shared recordings with law enforcement personnel. Based on the Intercept's article that 70 million phone call recordings were made by Securus, the plaintiffs estimated that half a million calls between public defenders and clients were unlawfully recorded each year. The putative class was specified as all persons in California whose conversations were eavesdropped on or recorded by Securus from June 1, 2008 to May 27, 2016, without permission and while in the custody of law enforcement officers or agencies and their attorneys. This case was assigned to Judge Jeffrey T. Miller. On July 5, 2016, the defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that plaintiffs lacked standing because their phone calls were not recorded and they were no longer in prison. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on July 26, 2016, which included additional causes of action, such as fraudulent concealment/intentional omission of material facts, fraud and intentional misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and conversion. The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on August 26, 2016. On October 24, 2016, Judge Miller granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion. The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ conversion claim without leave to amend and dismissed the fraudulent misrepresentation claim with leave to amend. The court denied the remainder of the defendant’s motion. 2016 WL 6157953. The plaintiffs timely amended the fourth cause of action in their second amended complaint on November 7, 2016. The defendant moved to dismiss the second amended complaint on November 25, 2016. On January 26, 2017, Judge Miller granted in part and denied in part the defendant's motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)’s particularity requirements and California law in alleging misrepresentations. 2017 WL 385743. On February 8, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint to satisfy the fraud claim under Rule 9(b). The defendant again moved to dismiss, and on March 29, 2017, Judge Miller granted the motion without leave to amend, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead fraud. 2017 WL 1166365. On October 10, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class comprised of other prison detainees whose calls had allegedly been recorded by the defendant, which the plaintiffs asserted comprised over 120 individuals. On the same day, the plaintiffs requested that documents in this case be sealed. Judge Miller granted the motion to seal on November 7. On April 12, 2018, Judge Miller denied the plaintiffs’ motion to certify class without prejudice because the plaintiffs had failed to identify an ascertainable and manageable class. 2018 WL 1782926. The plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on May 22, and filed a renewed motion to certify a class on July 11, 2018, and Judge Miller ordered the parties to meet and confer to create a joint discovery plan on August 7, 2018. On August 17, 2018, the court granted the parties’ motion to stay its ruling on the renewed motion to certify class pending the result of the parties’ attempt to secure private mediation. On November 21, 2018, Judge Miller denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, certifying a class consisting of every person in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer in California (and their attorneys) who had been eavesdropped on or recorded by the defendant. 331 F.R.D. 391. The plaintiffs petitioned for leave to appeal the denial of the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment to the Ninth Circuit. This petition was denied. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 5728. However, the Ninth Circuit granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal the district court’s class certification decision. 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 6334. On April 17, 2019, Judge Miller granted the defendant's motion to stay the case pending resolution of the defendant's appeal before the Ninth Circuit. 383 F. Supp. 3d 1069. Following the Ninth Circuit's grant of review of Securus' petition, the Ninth Circuit appointed a mediator. After multiple status conferences with the mediator, a settlement agreement was reached between the parties. On March 12, 2020, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal without prejudice pending approval of the settlement by the district court. In its June 16, 2020 order preliminarily approving the parties' settlement agreement, the court approved the following class definition: "Every person who was a party to any portion of a conversation between a person who was in the physical custody of a law enforcement officer or other public officer in California, and that person's attorney, on a telephone number designated or requested not to be recorded, any portion of which was eavesdropped on or recorded by Defendant Securus Technologies, Inc. by means of an electronic device during the period July 10, 2008 through June 16, 2020." 2020 WL 6799401. Under the settlement agreement, Securus agreed to make available to its customers a no-cost “private call” option for approved numbers, implement message prompts advising callers whether the call will be recorded, and post on its website information about designating numbers as approved. The defendant also agreed to provide plaintiff's counsel with bi-annual compliance declarations and to pay attorneys' fees and costs. The court awarded $870,000 in attorneys' fees and costs, as well as $10,000 to each of the three named plaintiffs as a service award. Final judgment in the suit was entered on November 19, 2020. The court retained jurisdiction for purposes of enforcing the parties’ settlement agreement.

Summary: Former prisoners filed a class action lawsuit against Securus Technologies, Inc. (a prison phone service provider) in the U.S. District for the Southern District Court of California in May 2016. The plaintiffs alleged that Securus unlawfully recorded privileged calls between prisoners and their attorneys and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, and monetary damages. The plaintiffs obtained certification of a class of affected individuals, and the defendants appealed the class certification to the Ninth Circuit. The parties reached a settlement agreement in late-2020 in which Securus agreed to provide private call options for approved numbers, to notify its customers when a call would be recorded, and to publicize information about how to get a number designated as approved for private calls. The plaintiffs were awarded attorneys' fees and costs.


On June 10, 2004, two death-sentenced inmates at the Mansfield Correctional Institution in Mansfield, Ohio, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. They asked the Court to stay their executions and issue an injunction against the defendants' use of their current lethal injection protocol, which they alleged would violate their Constitutional rights by torturing them to death. Specifically, they feared that the short-acting anesthetic used by the defendants would wear off too soon, allowing them to feel the excruciatingly painful effects of the potassium chloride that was used during the lethal injection process. In addition, they argued that the defendants' use of pancuronium bromide would paralyze them, making them unable to cry out or alert their executioners that the anesthetic had worn off too soon. On September 3, 2004, Plaintiff Dennis asked the Court to stay his execution while the claim was pending. On September 16, 2004, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio (Judge Gregory L. Frost) denied Dennis's motion, arguing that he should have brought his claim to the court at an earlier time, which would have allowed the Court to consider the merits of the claim without requiring entry of a stay. Plaintiff Dennis appealed. On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judges Richard Fred Surhheinrich, Eugene Edward Siler, and Martha Craig Daughtrey) affirmed the District Court's decision and dismissed the appeal without a written opinion. Dennis was executed by lethal injection on October 13, 2004. As to Plaintiff Cooey, the defendants asked the District Court to dismiss the complaint, claiming that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. On September 24, 2004, the District Court (Judge Frost) granted their motion and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Cooey returned to the District Court and re-filed his complaint on December 8, 2004. The defendants asked the district court to dismiss the complaint based on the statute of limitation and res judicata, in addition to arguing that the complaint should be construed as a successive habeas petition. On March 28, 2005, the District Court denied the defendants' motion but granted them permission to pursue an interlocutory appeal. Before the Sixth Circuit heard the appeal, the plaintiff requested that they stay their decision until after the U.S. Supreme Court made a decision in the case of Hill v. McDonough. The Sixth Circuit granted the stay, and the Supreme Court decided the case on June 12, 2006, unanimously holding that a challenge to the method of execution as violating the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution properly raised a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a cause of action for civil rights violations, rather than under habeas corpus. This meant that the Court had effectively ruled that a prisoner who had previously sought habeas relief was not barred from bringing a later challenge under §1983. Following the decision by the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit heard arguments regarding the appeal. On March 2, 2007, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Suhrheinrich) remanded the case back to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2007). The plaintiff sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court, and on April 19, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay of execution. The plaintiff then asked the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on June 1, 2007, the Sixth Circuit refused to rehear the petition. Cooey v. Strickland, 2007 WL 1574663 (6th Cir. Jun.1, 2007). Cooey was executed by lethal injection on October 14, 2008.

Summary: This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim was brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio by two inmates who were sentenced to death at the Mansfield Correctional Institution. They claimed that the Defendants method of lethal injection violated their Constitutional rights by torturing them to death. One Plaintiff was dismissed on September 16, 2004 because his complaint was not timely. He was executed by lethal injection on October 13, 2004. The other Plaintiff was then dismissed without prejudice because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies. After exhausting his administrative remedies, the second Plaintiff re-filed his complaint on December 8, 2004, however because he waited for a Supreme Court decision in Hill v. McDonough, his case became barred by the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals thus directed the District Court to dismiss the complaint on March 2, 2007. The Supreme Court declined to vacate the stay of execution, and the second Plaintiff was executed by lethal injection on October 14, 2008.


On April 6, 2016, the Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative, a nonprofit organization devoted to furthering prisoners' rights, and three juveniles sentenced to life in prison, filed this class-action lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland against Governor Larry Hogan and three other state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs moved for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding Maryland’s parole system for exacting disproportionate punishment. Specifically, the plaintiffs requested a declaration that Maryland's statutory scheme requiring judges to impose life sentences without taking a defendant's youth into account to be unconstitutional, remedy the state's failure to provide a meaningful opportunity for release for juveniles in prison for life, and provide individual relief for the three plaintiffs based on violations of the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The plaintiffs also argued that the Governor's clemency was unconstitutional because it was exclusive for prisoners confined for life and devoid of any standards. On May 26, 2016, the families of the victims of the three plaintiffs, as well as the Maryland Crime Victim Resource Center, filed a motion to intervene in the suit as defendants based on Article 47 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint. The intervenors argued that they should be allowed to intervene in order to assert their rights to be notified of and participate in any proceedings related to defendants who had injured them. They also argued that amici status was insufficient. On June 13, the defendants filed a motion taking no position on the victims' requests but noting that it did not need their assistance to put up a sufficient defense. On July 8, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or alternatively, a motion for summary judgment. The defendants argued that the plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim was barred by the U.S. Supreme Court's rule in Heck v. Humphrey because a ruling in their favor would necessarily conclude that their life sentences were invalid. Further, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs failed to make a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted under the Eighth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendments and that their complaint in fact showed that they were receiving meaningful opportunities for release. Third, in the alternative, the defendants argued that summary judgment was proper because the plaintiffs had the opportunity to participate in the parole process and in fact did receive parole. Finally, they argued that the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the prisoners did not exhaust their rights under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. On August 30, 2016, Judge Hollander denied the victim families' motion to intervene, concluding the families had no right under Maryland law to intervene in the suit. The families had no protectable interest to gain or lose as a result of the proceedings and no rights at stake. Additionally, the families did not show that the State could not protect their interests nor that their objectives were substantially different from the State's. Judge Hollander also refused to grant permissive intervention, concluding that it would cause significant burdens to the litigation. Instead, she granted the families amicus status. 316 F.R.D. 106. On December 7, 2016, Judge Hollander sent a memorandum to the parties, asking them to submit briefs on the impact of a recently decided 4th Circuit case on the defendants' motion to dismiss. LeBlanc v. Mathena, 2016 WL 6652438 (4th Cir. 2016) held that Virginia's geriatric release program provided "no meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" because it had few governing standards. Under Virginia's system, the State Parole Board could deny geriatric release for any reason "without considering a juvenile's maturity and rehabilitation." The parties subsequently provided updated memoranda. On December 20, 2016, the three named plaintiffs moved for a writ of habeas corpus, requesting that they be present at oral argument on January 4, 2017, given that they faced life imprisonment if the court were to dismiss the case against them. The defendants did not oppose the motion and Judge Hollander granted the writs. On February 3, 2017, Judge Hollander issued her decision, denying plaintiffs' motion to strike and granting in part and denying in part the defendants' motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs had moved to strike the amici's filings for improperly asserting defenses not raised by the defendants. Judge Hollander denied the motion to strike but refused to consider any of the novel arguments raised by the amici. On the motion for summary judgment, Judge Hollander held that summary judgment was inappropriate before discovery and that the plaintiffs were entitled to discovery on their claims prior to such point. 2017 WL 467731. Under the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Judge Hollander held that plaintiffs' challenge to Maryland's parole system was cognizable under § 1983 because it did not challenge their sentences or convictions themselves. However, she also concluded that the plaintiffs' did not make a plausible claim that Maryland's parole system violated Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. On the statute of limitations defense and administrative exhaustion claims, Judge Hollander held that the plaintiffs' complaint was not time-barred nor exhausted. Finally, on the motion to dismiss, Judge Hollander concluded that the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller, Graham, and Montgomery applied to juvenile prisoners sentenced to life without parole. Since the governor's clemency authority lacked any clear standards and since parole was almost never granted to juvenile lifers, the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim that they had no meaningful opportunity for release, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and Article 25 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. As such, the plaintiffs "sufficiently alleged that Maryland’s parole system operates as a system of executive clemency, in which opportunities for release are 'remote,' rather than a true parole scheme in which opportunities for release are 'meaningful' and 'realistic,' as required in Graham." Judge Hollander then directed the defendants to answer the complaint, which they did on February 28, 2017. On March 30, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge A. David Copperthite for settlement. On August 1, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge. J. Mark Coulson for discovery and related scheduling. From March 30 to October 6, the parties engaged in discovery and litigation surrounding the terms of discovery. On September 27, 2017, Judge Coulson issued an order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion to compel. Plaintiffs' were seeking "risk assessment" documents of inmates in efforts to better understand the parole process. Defendants opposed this due to confidentiality concerns for inmates not related to this matter. Judge Coulson allowed for six "risk assessment" reports be given to the plaintiffs in order to protect confidentiality while also allowing the plaintiffs some degree of information to better understand the process. 2017 WL 4280779. The parties were engaged in settlement negotiations until negotiations fell apart in June of 2018. On June 28, 2018, plaintiffs moved for a partial judgment on the pleadings and a permanent injunction. The motion alleged that the role of the Governor in Maryland's parole system was unconstitutional in that sole authority to parole was given to the Governor. Furthermore, the parole system failed to make a distinction for juveniles, which the Supreme Court had held are entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate maturity and rehabilitation. The permanent injunction would stipulate to parole boards that they consider juvenile lifers for parole in their normal course, without the approval or review of the Governor. On October 17, 2018, Judge Coulson issued a memorandum opinion concerning a discovery dispute. The defendants had sought a protective order regarding confidential information, namely inmate records, the tests administered in the parole process, and personnel records of psychologists who conduct those tests. Judge Coulson approved the protective order for the inmates records and denied it for the tests and personnel records as long as the personnel records had redacted identifying information. 2018 WL 5026369. Judge Coulson issued another order on October 25, 2018, limiting plaintiffs' access to only records concerning the actions of the Governor when Governor Hogan was in office. 2018 WL 5026369. Judge Coulson again issued a memorandum order concerning a discovery dispute on July 15, 2019. Plaintiffs had moved for reconsideration of the limit on risk assessment records of juveniles. Judge Coulson denied the motion, asserting that the plaintiffs were simply trying to relitigate a ruling. 2019 WL 3081196. As of January 31, 2020, the parties were still engaged in discovery. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The Maryland Restorative Justice Initiative, a non-profit organization dedicated to fighting for prisoners' rights, and three inmates who, as juveniles, were sentenced to life in prison, filed a § 1983 suit against Governor Hogan and officials from the Department of Corrections, alleging that Maryland's parole system violated the Eighth Amendment by providing no meaningful opportunity for parole for juvenile lifers.


NOTE: There are two separate cases, in two separate district courts, with the caption Hadix. The first one, in the Eastern District of Michigan, was filed in 1980, under docket number 2:80-cv-73581-JF. (It is in the Clearinghouse as PC-MI-0003.) This summary and documents are for the Western District of Michigan case, 4:92-CV-110, which was initiated in 1992 when the Eastern District Judge, John Feikens, split the earlier Hadix case in two, and sent part of it (the part relating to medical and mental health care) to the Western District. The first case case started on September 18, 1980, when inmates at the State Prison of Southern Michigan filed a class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Michigan Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief for a catalog of unconstitutional conditions at the prison. On February 13, 1985, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (Judge John Feikens) approved a consent decree in that case, settling the issues of sanitation, safety, medical and mental health care, fire safety, overcrowding, security, food service, management and operations, and mail. For other proceedings in the Eastern District case, see the relevant case summary (PC-MI-3). On April 21, 1992, the defendants asked the district court to relinquish control and supervision of the mental health provisions of the consent decree; the plaintiffs asked the court to adopt the mental health orders entered in USA v. Michigan (No. 1:84-CV-63) (PC-MI-0007) by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan (Judge Richard A. Enslen). On May 15, 1992, the district court (Judge Feikens) denied both requests. On further consideration, however, on June 5, 1992, the district court relinquished control and supervision of the provisions governing mental health care and medical care, transferring them to Judge Enslen for further proceedings as he deemed appropriate. 792 F.Supp. 527 (E.D. Mich. 1992). At this point, the case was consolidated with Knop v. Johnson (PC-MI-0006), another class action lawsuit against the Michigan DOC. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed both cases with regard to the findings regarding access to courts. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1992). The court (Judge David A. Nelson) held that the DOC's duty to provide assistance in gaining access to the courts included assisting with prisoners' challenges to their convictions and conditions of confinement. On March 8, 1993, The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Knop v. McGinnis, 507 U.S. 973 (1993). On June 4, 1993, Judge Enslen ordered defendants to submit a plan for providing access to the courts consistent with this opinion. On December 22, 1994, Judge Enslen rejected defendants' plan. Litigation continued regarding discovery and attorneys fees. On October 1, 1996, the district court adopted the defendants' proposals in both of the consolidated cases for legal writer programs that would provide access to the courts. On July 3, 1996, the Court (Judge Enslen) denied the defendants' request for termination of the consent decree. Hadix v. Johnson, 933 F.Supp. 1362 (W.D.Mich. 1996). The plaintiffs asked the district court to grant them attorneys fees for their counsels' unpaid work up to this point in the litigation, and the defendants argued that the PLRA's cap on attorneys fees should apply to any fee award that the judge made. On May 23, 1997, the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) awarded the requested fees, holding that the PLRA's fee cap could not apply to litigation filed before the PLRA's effective date. Hadix v. Johnson, 965 F.Supp. 996 (W.D.Mich. 1997). (Back in the Eastern District, Judge Feikens did the same.) The defendants appealed. On April 17, 1998, the Sixth Circuit (Justice Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy) held that the fee cap imposed by the PLRA did not apply to fee petitions, regardless of whether the work was performed before of after the PLRA's enactment date. The court then partially upheld and partially reversed the fee award, remanding the appeals back to the district courts for further consideration. Hadix v. Johnson, 143 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendants sought and obtained review by the Supreme Court. On June 21, 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor) held that the PLRA limits attorney fees for post-judgment monitoring services performed after the PLRA's effective date, but does not limit fees for monitoring performed before that date. Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343 (1999). Sometime in 1994, a class of inmates at five different correctional institutions in Michigan asked the both district courts for injunctive relief against the defendants, alleging that the defendants had violated their constitutional right of access to the courts. The cases were consolidated with the Western District Hadix, and the Western District Court (Judge Enslen) granted injunctive relief to the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants not to cut off funding for prison legal services programs. On April 1, 1999, the Sixth Circuit (Judge Daughtrey) held that the inmates had not shown widespread actual injury necessary for them to have standing to bring the class action lawsuit, and remanded the case back to the Western District Court. Hadix v. Johnson, 173 F.3d 958 (6th Cir. 1999).The defendants asked the Sixth Circuit to rehear the case en banc, and on April 1, 1999, the Sixth Circuit denied that request. Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1999). On March 18, 1999, the Eastern District transferred several additional components of the original consent decree (regarding water temperatures, housing temperatures and ventilation in the Southern Michigan Correctional Facility, and some issues relating to housing in the Egeler Correctional Facility) to the Western District. The Eastern District explained that the rationale for transfer was that health care was implicated in these provisions. On December 2-3, 1999, the court (Judge Enslen) conducted hearings on the medical health care provisions of the consent decree and other issues transferred by the Eastern District. The court found some remaining constitutional violations, relating to medical and mental health care, and to temperature, ventilation and fire safety conditions at several facilities, but agreed with the defendants to terminate some of the Consent Decree provisions as no longer necessary. On November 15, 2000, the Eastern District transferred to this court some additional fire safety issues. On January 8, 2001, the district court granted defendants' request to terminate enforcement of the mental health provisions of the Consent Decree; the termination became effective in early February 2001. (On June 27, 2001, the Eastern District issued its Order of Termination, terminating its jurisdiction over all sections of the Consent Decree remaining in the Eastern District.) In June 2002, the Western District held yet another hearing, and found continuing constitutional violations with respect to medical care and fire safety. The defendants were required to submit a remedial plan, which in February 2003 the court ordered as an injunction. The defendants appealed. The 6th Circuit Hadix v. Johnson, affirmed in part and reversed in part, 367 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2004), remanding the fire safety provisions of the injunction for further factual development. After an additional hearing, and in a very extensive opinion, the District Court (Judge Enslen) again found the existence of constitutional violations with respect to fire safety, and ordered a revised version of the prior remedial plan implemented. 2005 WL 2243091 (W.D. Mich., Sept. 14, 2005). Although the mental health care provisions of the consent decree had been terminated in 2001, plaintiffs moved on September 8, 2006 to reopen the terminated provisions and for a preliminary injunction pertaining to mental health care. The cause for the motion was the death of a restrained Michigan prisoner, T.S., and other fatal cases in which, plaintiffs alleged, inmates' deaths were attributable to delays or malfeasance in the provision of mental health care. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court granted a preliminary injunction. Hadix v. Caruso, 461 F. Supp. 2d 574, 2006 WL 3275865 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 13, 2006). The Court lifted the prior termination under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6), explaining that jurisdiction has been retained because enforcement of the medical health and fire safety provisions of the consent decree was ongoing. In granting relief, the Court found numerous constitutional violations. It held that the punitive use of in-cell restraints "constitutes torture and violates the Eighth Amendment," and enjoined the practice. It also held that psychiatric and psychological staffing levels were constitutionally inadequate, and ordered defendants to file a staffing plan. The Court also required daily psychologist rounds in the segregation unit and required protocols for medical/mental health staff and interdisciplinary meetings after finding that patients with medical and mental health problems fall into "the black hole between the disciplines." On December 5, 2006, the defendants appealed the court's decision to grant the injunction. Two days later, the court issued a permanent injunction holding the defendants in contempt for their failure to comply with the consent decree's hiring requirements. The court ordered the defendants to provide additional staffing throughout the Hadix facilities - particularly nursing staff. On April 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals denied the defendants' request to overturn the injunction. On February 22, 2007, the district court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from transferring prisoners from Hadix facilities other than routine transfers not intended to reduce prison population. On May 14, 2007, the district court granted the defendants' motion to terminate the court's jurisdiction over the 8-Block of the Parnall Correctional Facility. Ultimately the case went to trial, and on August 8, 2008, the parties made their closing arguments before district judge Robert J. Jonker. On March 31, 2009, the court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove that the defendants failed to comply with the November 2006 preliminary injunction, or that the defendants failed to comply with the mental health provisions of the consent decree. They also noted that it seemed as though the Hadix class had all but disappeared with the closing of multiple correctional facilities. Hadix v. Caruso, 2009 WL 891709 (W.D. Mich. 2009). The plaintiffs then appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the District Court's opinion was affirmed. Hadix v. Caruso, 420 Fed.Appx. 480 (6th Cir. 2011). (In the meantime, on August 14, 2008, the parties filed a stipulated order to terminate Section III of the 1985 Hadix consent decree concerning fire safety.) On January 17, 2012, the plaintiffs' motion to add new parties to the Hadix class was granted, enabling them to continue with the litigation. Most recently, on June 22, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulation of dismissal of the heat abatement portion of the consent decree. On September 29, 2015, district judge Robert J. Jonker wrote an opinion on this case. He ordered the consent decrees sections II.A.3.b; II.A.4.a; II.A.5.a; II.A.7; and II.A.11 as closed, denied the plaintiff’s request for ongoing prospective injunctive relief, and terminated federal supervision over the Hadix facilities and the Hadix class. This case is now closed.

Summary: Portions of this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case, first started in 1980, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan in 1992. The Plaintiffs, prisoners in correctional institutions in the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), claimed that certain conditions of the facilities were unconstitutional, and that they did not have proper access to courts. The earlier case had resulted in a Consent Decree in 1985. After the Court denied the Defendant's 1992 motion to terminate the Consent Decree, the Plaintiffs were awarded attorneys fees despite the Defendant's objections under the PLRA. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on April 17, 1998, and the Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court on June 21, 1999. The District Court then granted injunctive relief to the Plaintiffs on the issue of access to the courts, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the Plaintiffs did not suffer widespread actual injury necessary for them to have standing to bring a class action lawsuit. Litigation continued over the mental health care provisions of the Consent Decree, which eventually ended in termination of that portion of the Consent Decree in February of 2001. In June of 2002, however, the court found that the Defendants were in violation of the medical care and fire safety portions of the Consent Decree and ordered the Defendants to correct the outstanding problems. This was sent back to the District Court by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, the District Court made slight alterations to its order with largely the same outcome. The mental health care provisions were brought back to the forefront of the litigation in September of 2006 due to the death of a prisoner which was allegedly attributable to delays in the provision of mental health care. The Court entered a preliminary injunction, finding numerous constitutional violations. The Defendants appealed, however, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals denied their request to overturn the District Court. In early 2009 the Plaintiffs claimed that the Defendants had failed to comply with the November 2006 preliminary injunction, and with the mental health provisions of the Consent Decree. The Court concluded that the Plaintiffs failed to prove these allegations and also noted that it seemed as though the Hadix class had all but disappeared with the closing of multiple correctional facilities. On January 17, 2012, the Plaintiffs motion to add new parties to the Hadix class was granted, enabling them to continue with the litigation. On June 22, 2012, the parties agreed to a stipulation of dismissal of the heat abatement portion of the Consent Decree. On September 29, 2015, District Judge Robert J. Jonker ordered the consent decrees at issue as closed, denied the plaintiff’s request for ongoing prospective injunctive relief, and terminated federal supervision over the Hadix facilities and the Hadix class. This case is now closed.


On April 28, 2016, the Alabama chapter of the NAACP, Greater Birmingham Ministries, and two African-American plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Alabama in their official capacities under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief that would prohibit the defendants from enforcing a state law that nullified a city minimum wage law. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants had violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the complaint described the efforts of the Alabama legislature to undermine the City of Birmingham’s ordinance raising its minimum wage to $8.50 per hour (later adjusted to $10.10) as an effort to prevent the City from helping its African-American residents. At the time, Birmingham was the only city in Alabama that had raised its minimum wage above the federal minimum wage. At the beginning of the Alabama Legislature’s 2016 legislative session, the House of Representatives, with only white representatives voting in favor, approved a bill preventing cities from raising the minimum wage. The state Senate fast-tracked the bill through committees within 36 hours and passed it via a roll call vote on February 25, 2016, with only white state senators voting in favor. The Governor signed the bill 90 minutes after its passage. On June 2, 2016 the case was reassigned from a Magistrate Judge to Judge R. David Proctor. On June 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that added ten plaintiffs and three defendants. The additional plaintiffs included the Alabama Legislative Black Caucus and its members, including several members of the Alabama House of Representatives and state Senate, as well as registered voters in the City of Birmingham. The additional defendants included the State of Alabama, the City of Birmingham, and the Mayor of Birmingham in his official capacity for the purpose of providing complete relief. The complaint additionally alleged violations of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; a de jure policy of maintaining white control over black majorities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifteenth Amendment, and the Thirteenth Amendment; de jure segregation in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and intentional racial discrimination in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Judge Proctor denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss without prejudice on July 1, 2016 and the case proceeded over the course of the summer of 2016. On February 1, 2017, Judge Proctor dismissed the case for, among several reasons, failure to sue the correct defendants, failing to state a claim under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and failing to plausibly plead an equal protection claim. Judge Proctor determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the Attorney General and Mayor and City of Birmingham; that the complaint did not implicate the Voting Rights Act; and that the plaintiffs failed to adequately allege an equal protection violation because the amended complaint made conclusory allegations unsupported by specific factual allegations. Judge Proctor also determined the complaint did not implicate the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and that the plaintiffs previously conceded their privileges and immunities claim. On March 2, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed Judge Proctor’s dismissal. On July 25, 2018, the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal on all but one count. The court found that the plaintiffs stated a plausible claim that nullification by Governor Bentley of the $10.10 minimum wage requirement had the purpose and effect of discriminating against black citizens of Birmingham. While the court found that plaintiffs had standing to sue the attorney general and the State of Alabama for injuries under the Minimum Wage Act, the court found the City of Birmingham to be an improper defendant. To analyze the validity of the plaintiff’s intentional discrimination claim, the court looked to the Minimum Wage Act’s impact. Given that the Act affected 10% more black wage workers than white wage workers and the hourly pay disparity between black and white workers, the court found it plausible that the act bore more heavily on black workers. The court cited the fact that the Act denied a significant increase in pay to around 40,000 Birmingham residents, most of whom are black. The plaintiffs had to show on the face of the complaint that the enactment of the Act had a discriminatory purpose. The court found that plaintiff’s allegations that the Act was introduced by a white representative and was objected to by all black members of the state legislature and that the Act was accelerated without opportunity for public comment or debate were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Additionally, the court affirmed the importance of considering Alabama’s historic effort to disenfranchise black citizens. When looking to the district court’s dismissal of the complaint, the court of appeals strongly criticized the lower court’s standard of allowing “only the clearest proof” to suffice. The court of appeals asserted that this extraordinary standard has no place in equal protection law given the implicit nature of modern discrimination. The 11th Circuit granted an en banc rehearing and the case is ongoing as of November 2019.

Summary: Plaintiffs sued agents of the State of Alabama for the passage of a bill restricting cities from increasing their minimum wages. Plaintiffs alleged the bill discriminated against African-American residents of the City of Birmingham. Their case was dismissed for failure to state a claim. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal on all but one claim, finding that plaintiffs had stated a valid complaint alleging intentional discrimination. The case was remanded and is ongoing as of November 2019.


On January 14, 2005, a group of anti-war demonstrators including the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER), the Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation, the National Council of Arab Americans, a pastor at a congregational church, and a civilian whose son died in the Iraq War (collectively, “the demonstrators”) sued the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service (NPS), and the Director of the Secret Service (collectively, “the government”) under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3)–(4) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The protesters contended that NPS had issued the Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) permits before accepting applications from the general public, and also contended that setting aside area that couldn’t be used by the public during the Inaugural Parade was unconstitutional. Represented by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, the demonstrators alleged that the government violated their Equal Protection rights as well as their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for redress of. The demonstrators asked the court to declare the government’s actions unconstitutional and to enjoin the NPS from setting aside its regulations for the PIC in the future. This case was assigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman. The government urged the court to deny the demonstrators’ request for injunctive relief. The government emphasized that the demonstrators already had access via permit to nine sites along the Parade route, including John Marshall Park, one of the largest parks along Pennsylvania Avenue. The government also argued that the PIC’s application for a permit to use Freedom Plaza was submitted before ANSWER’s application, and that the NPS followed proper procedures in issuing the PIC permit. On January 18, 2005, the court denied the demonstrators’ motion for preliminary injunction. On July 28, 2005, ANSWER filed an amended complaint that dropped the other plaintiffs. The Amended complaint challenged three governmental actions as constitutional violations: (1) NPS exempting itself from the permitting regulations, (2) a prohibition on signs that was issued by the Secret Service, and (3) a policy granting the Presidential Inauguration Committee (PIC) exclusive access along the parade route. Again, declaratory and injunctive relief for future parades was sought for these claims. Almost two years later, on June 13, 2007, the court granted in part the government’s motion to dismiss. 493 F.Supp.2d 34. The Court found that no relief could be granted for ANSWER’s claims pertaining to the 2005 Inauguration parade that sought declaratory judgment, and therefore the court dismissed them. The other three claims, however, were allowed to continue. The court ruled in ANSWER’s favor on March 20, 2008, granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the first claim involving the NPS exempting itself from the permitting regulations. 537 F.Supp.2d 183. The court found that the NPS permitting regulations were not applied in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner and therefore declared the actions unconstitutional and enjoined the NPS from exempting themselves from the permitting process in the future. ANSWER filed a supplemental pleading alleging that the NPS’ regulatory set-aside for the PIC violated the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause by favoring individuals affiliated with the administration and disfavoring others. The government moved to dismiss the supplemental pleading, but the court denied the motion on January 14, 2013 and affirmed that ANSWER has standing to pursue its full claim. 915 F.Supp.2d 93. On January 28, 2016, the court granted the defendants’ summary judgement motions on the second and third claims. 153 F.Suppp.3d 395. The court found that the sign ban was content-neutral. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the court determined that the sign ban was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s substantial interest in ensuring safety and managing the flow of pedestrian traffic during an inaugural parade. Regarding the exclusive access claims, the government also upheld the constitutionality of setting aside space only usable by the Presidential Inauguration Committee. Here, the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve the government’s interest in planning and executing the Inaugural Parade. On February 29, 2016, ANSWER appealed the court’s ruling on the constitutionality of the exclusive access claim. On October 14, 2016, while awaiting the appeals court decision, ANSWER and the Secretary of the Interior settled ANSWER’s claim for attorneys’ fees for litigating NPS’ permitting violations; the defendants agreed to pay $90,000. Then, on January 17, 2017, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision on the exclusive access claim, finding that the set-aside was subject to intermediate scrutiny, that it was narrowly tailored to a significant government interest, and that it left open ample channels for communication for demonstrators and the public. 845 F.3d 1199. The case is now closed.

Summary: On January 14, 2005, a group of anti-war demonstrators including the Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalition (ANSWER), the Muslim American Society Freedom Foundation, the National Council of Arab Americans, a pastor at a congregational church, and a civilian whose son died in the Iraq War sued the Secretary of the Interior, the Director of the National Park Service, and the Director of the Secret Service under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)(3)–(4) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by the Partnership for Civil Justice Fund, the plaintiffs alleged that the government violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, and their right to equal protection under the law by violating National Park Service (“NPS”) regulations by exempting the Presidential Inauguration Committee (“PIC”) from the regular permit process for reserving space along the Inauguration Day Parade route and by banning sign supports from the Parade. The plaintiffs alleged that these actions together prevented the public from accessing the Parade route and from exercising their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare the government’s actions unconstitutional and to enjoin the NPS from setting aside its regulations for the PIC in the future. The district court found that the NPS’ regulatory set aside violated NPS regulations but was not unconstitutional. The court also upheld the government’s sign support ban. The D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision on appeal.


On May 18, 2017, the Georgia State Conference of the Georgia NAACP, the Troup County Chapter of the NAACP, Project South, and a small number of named and unnamed plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against the City of LaGrange, Georgia in the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued the city on one federal claim – violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §3604(b) – and two state claims: tortious interference with utility service and unconscionability. They sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, compensatory damages, and attorneys’ costs. The plaintiffs objected to two policies regarding the provision of municipal utilities in the City of LaGrange. The first policy required an individual to pay any outstanding court debt prior to receiving utility service from the City. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans, was the only policy of its kind nationwide, and was not justified by any legitimate purpose. The second policy required an individual to provide a valid social security number and government-issued photo identification in order to receive utilities. The plaintiffs argued that this policy had a disproportionate impact on Latinos and was not justified by any legitimate purpose. On July 21, the City of LaGrange moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The City argued that disparate impact theory did not apply to cases brought under 42 U.S.C. §3604(b). It further argued that the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Fair Housing Act as not applying to post-acquisition conduct; that is, it did not apply to conduct that occurred after a housing sale or rental transaction, and that the conduct at issue fell into that category. Finally, the City claimed their policies were reasonable, and not arbitrary, artificial, or unnecessary. Judge Timothy C. Batten, Sr. granted the City of LaGrange’s motion to dismiss on December 7, 2017, ruling that the defendants were correct in their interpretation of the Eleventh Circuit’s narrow reading of the FHA. Judge Batten found that the plaintiffs did not present cognizable claims under the Fair Housing Act because all but one plaintiff alleged violations that occurred post-acquisition of housing, and that the plaintiff’s injury was not sufficiently concrete to have standing. Having dismissed the federal claim, Judge Batten did not address the two state claims. The plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on January 4, 2018. The Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Wilson and Branch, and District Judge Vinson, sitting by designation) issued an opinion on October 10, 2019, vacating the District Court’s decision and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Appellate Court ruled that §3604(b) encompasses some post-acquisition conduct and the basic utility services in question fell within the scope of services covered by §3604(b). It directed the District Court to determine anew whether the plaintiffs’ disparate impact allegations stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. This opinion was made a judgment of the District Court on November 25. On December 23, 2019, the parties filed an amended joint preliminary report and discovery plan and Judge Batten ordered that discovery end on August 18, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: The Georgia NAACP and other plaintiffs challenged policies in place in the City of LaGrange, GA, limiting provision of utility service to individuals with outstanding court debt and to individuals who lack photo identification and valid social security numbers. The case was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On October 10, 2019, the Court of Appeals vacated the District Court’s decision and remand the case for further proceedings. The case is pending discovery.


On March 18, 2015, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, along with the Attorneys General from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska, filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The case, brought against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), asked the court to strike down the DOL final rule defining "spouse" for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611. The FMLA defines "spouse" as "a husband or wife, as the case may be." 29 U.S.C. § 2611(13). In 1993, the Department's Interim Final Rule defined "spouse" as "a husband or wife as defined or recognized under state law for purposes of marriage in states where it is recognized." 58 Fed. Reg. 31817, 31835 (June 4, 1993). The 1995 Final Rule clarified that the law of the State where the employee resides would control for the purpose of determining eligibility for FMLA spousal leave. 80 Fed. Reg. 9990 (Feb. 25, 2015). Under the new rule, 29 C.F.R. Part 825, the FMLA moved from a "state of residence" to a "place of celebration" rule for the definition of spouse. That means that it would cover same-sex spouses if their marriage took place in a state that recognizes same-sex marriage, even if they lived in (or moved to) a state that does not recognize same-sex marriage. The rule, described here, was scheduled to become effective on March 27, 2015. On March 26, 2015, the day before the rule's effective date, the District Court (Judge Reed O'Connor) entered a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement. It's unclear whether that order applies to application of the rule outside of Texas, or outside of the states that are parties. The court granted defendants’ request for a hearing, and scheduled it for April 10, 2015. 95 F. Supp. 3d 965, 2015 WL 1378752, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38264. On April 24, 2015, the states of Louisiana, Georgia, Texas, Nebraska and Arkansas filed a second amended complaint. The plaintiff states alleged that: (1) the Windsor decision affirmed states’ authority to define and regulate marriage, a principle embodied in the full faith and credit statute; (2) the DOL’s Final Rule ignores that that the federal full faith and credit statute expressly reserves the right to the States to refuse to recognize as marriages same-sex unions performed under the laws of other States; (3) by requiring plaintiff states to recognise out-of-state same-sex marriage for the purposes of the FMLA, the DOL is interfering with plaintiff states’ enforcement of their duly enacted law by forcing plaintiff states to violate either state law or a federal regulation; (4) the Final Rule conflicts with the federal full faith and credit statute and the Windsor decision; (5) Congress did not pre-empt state law defining marriage in the FMLA; and (6) the new rule harms the states as well as employers within the states. The plaintiff states sought a declaratory judgment that the Final Rule is unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act and that it unlawfully attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and requested temporary relief in enjoining the Final Rule from taking effect on March 27, 2015. On April 27, 2015, the district court stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse). The defendant filed a motion to dissolve preliminary injunction on the same day. On June 26, 2015, in light of the Obergefell decision, the district court lifted the stay of this case, and granted the defendant’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction that was issued on March 26, 2015 as it found that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, as required by the four-factor preliminary injunction test. 2015 WL 13424776, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190764. On July 17, 2015, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action, and the case was subsequently closed. However, on August 4, 2015, the defendants filed a motion for the court to vacate its March 26, 2015 order granting the preliminary injunction. On February 2, 2016, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to vacate as (1) the defendants are not suffering from the “vagaries of circumstance” because the preliminary injunction has lost its effectiveness, and that (2) the court is not obligated to vacate on the grounds that matters of “broad issues of law” discussed within the order may “recur in future litigation”. 2016 WL 3636072, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92575. As of November 2018, there has been no further action in this case since the February 2, 2016 order.

Summary: On March 18, 2015, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, along with the Attorneys General from the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Nebraska, filed this federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The case, brought against the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL), asked the court to strike down the DOL final rule defining "spouse" for purposes of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611. On March 26, 2015, the day before the rule's effective date, the District Court entered a preliminary injunction barring its enforcement. In April 2015, the district court stayed the proceedings pending the Supreme Court decision in Obergefell v. Hodges. The defendant filed a motion to dissolve preliminary injunction on the same day. On June 26, 2015, in light of the Obergefell decision, the district court lifted the stay of this case, and granted the defendant’s motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. In July 2015, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of this action, and the case was subsequently closed. However, in August 2015, the defendants filed a motion for the court to vacate its March 26, 2015 order granting the preliminary injunction. In February 2016, the district court denied the defendants’ motion to vacate, and as of November 2018, there has been no action since.


On February 9, 2012, a Catholic media network filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff, represented by in-house counsel and the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide employee insurance coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On May 4, 2012, the defendant departments moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The U.S. argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff had not alleged any facts showing that it did not qualify for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the U.S. was in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the offensive contraception coverage requirement. On March 25, 2013, Chief District Court Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn granted the U.S. motion to dismiss. Chief Judge Blackburn found that, while the plaintiff had alleged sufficient imminent harm to establish standing to bring the case, the government's efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the anticipated amendments rendered the plaintiff's claim not yet ripe for review. On October 28, 2013, Plaintiff's revived their complaint in the Southern District of Alabama. Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. et al v. Sebelius.

Summary: In 2012, a Catholic media network filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted pursuant to the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. In March 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review.


On September 9, 2011, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the sheriff of Orleans Parish. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP). The plaintiffs specifically alleged that the policy against the delivery of such publications also failed to provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard to review decisions censoring and excluding books and magazines distributed by the plaintiffs to OPP prisoners. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner in contravention of over thirty years of well-settled case law. On December 2, 2011, Judge Jay C. Zainey approved a consent judgment for injunctive relief only. The defendants agreed to the distribution of the plaintiffs' monthly publication and to adopt and implement a new written policy regarding "Incoming Publications" for prisoners at the jail. On September 17, 2012, Judge Zainey ordered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for a total of $15,000, not including attorney fees and costs. On March 11, 2014, Judge Zainey approved the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation of attorney fees and costs of $72,754.61.

Summary: On September 9, 2011, the Prison Legal News filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for Kansas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the sheriff of Orleans Parish. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages, claiming that the defendants' unlawfully censored and excluded the plaintiff's books and magazines protected by the 1st and 14th Amendments, which are sent to individual subscribers in custody at the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP). Judge Jay C. Zainey approved a consent judgment for injunctive relief only ordering the defendants to distribute the plaintiffs' monthly publication and to adopt and implement a new written policy regarding "Incoming Publications" for prisoners at the jail. Judge Zainey also ordered $87,754.61 in damages and attorney fees and costs.


On November 13, 2017, several organizations (National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers Guild (NIPNLG), Mijente Support Committee, and Detention Watch Network) brought this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Represented by counsel from NIPNLG itself and Public Citizen Litigation Group, plaintiffs sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs are nonprofit organizations promoting immigrants' rights. According to their complaint, they sought information on "Operation Mega," which news sources had reported as an ICE immigration enforcement operation to apprehend non-citizens nationwide in mid-September 2017. On the same date that news sources had reported "Operation Mega," ICE had released a press release stating that no nationwide operation was planned due to recent weather disasters in Florida and Texas. The complaint alleged that on September 12-14, 2017, plaintiffs and other requesters nationwide had submitted FOIA requests to each of defendant's field offices, seeking records concerning "Operation Mega" or related operations, including another named "Operation Safe City." The complaint further alleged that, to date, plaintiffs had not received a substantive response from defendant. Plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On November 14, 2017, the case was assigned to Judge Amit P. Mehta. On January 8, 2018, the parties filed a joint status report. The defendant expected to produce the first batch of 500 responsive documents in February. The latest status report, of Mar. 6, confirmed the defendant's production and specified defendant would produce another 500 pages in March, followed by 1000 pages in April and each subsequent month. ICE substantially completed document production on March 19, 2019, and the parties narrowed their disputes from there. On January 15, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asking the Judge to protect the “Homeland Security Investigations Criminal Street Gangs Investigations Handbook” because it was an internal agency memorandum and that it would disclose investigatory procedures. The plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2020 alleging that the plaintiff did not meet the standards for withholding under FOIA. Judge Mehta has not ruled on the motions as of June 10, 2020, and the case is ongoing.

Summary: On November 13, 2017, several immigrant rights' organizations sued ICE under FOIA, seeking records on a mass immigration enforcement operation called "Operation Mega," planned for September 2017, or related operations. ICE finished document production in 2019, and the parties filed motions for summary judgment related to one Handbook in early 2020. The case is ongoing.


In December of 1990, the United States Department of Justice, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et al, investigated the Arlington Developmental Center (ADC) in Tennessee. The investigation revealed that conditions in the facility seriously threatened the health and safety of its developmentally delayed residents. The Department of Justice found that residents were subject to abuse and neglect, inadequate medical care, an unsafe physical environment, and lack of educational services. On January 21, 1992, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the State of Tennessee pursuant to CRIPA in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, alleging that the state had failed to provide humane conditions and adequate treatment at Arlington Developmental Center. The case was styled United States v. Tennessee, Civ. No. 92-2062. (W.D.Tenn.1992)(''the United States case"). The case followed a similar action that was filed against the ADC by private plaintiffs, styled People First of Tennessee v. Arlington Developmental Ctr., No. 92-2213 (W.D.Tenn.1992)(''People First case'') (See ID-TN-1 of this collection). On August 7, 1992, the District Court (Judge Jon Phipps McCalla) denied the state's motion for summary judgment in the United States case. U.S. v. Tennessee, 798 F.Supp.483 (W.D. Tenn. 1992). A lengthy trial in the United States case began on August 30, 1993 and continued through October 1993. On November 22, 1993, the Court (Judge McCalla) made issued an oral ruling against the defendants, finding that the conditions at ADC violated the due process rights of the residents. Written findings of fact were issued by the Court on February 18, 1994. On September 2, 1994 entered a detailed remedial order to correct the violations the Court found. The order called for the appointment of a monitor. Linda R. O'Neall, Ph.D. was subsequently appointed to that position. On June 30, 1995, Judge McCalla issued an emergency order after the monitor reported that a state of medical emergency existed at the facility. After the state failed to comply with the emergency order, the court entered a preliminary injunction on July 21, 1995 required the center to hire a Developmental Medicine Physician, additional physicians for overnight coverage, additional nurses, and a full-time psychiatrist. On August 9, 1995, Judge McCalla found the state in contempt for failure to comply. In a reported opinion dated November 6, 1995, the court described the state's history of noncompliance in this matter and approved appropriate sanctions. United States v. Tennessee, 925 F.Supp. 1292 (W.D. Tenn. 1995). On September 27, 1995, the Plaintiffs and the Intervenor in the People First case (ID-TN-1) were named as Intervenors in the United States case. Defendants remained in contempt and on June 26, 1996 the court entered a stipulation and order whereby, in lieu of sanctions for contempt, the defendants agreed to develop three comprehensive plans addressing compliance with previous orders, downsizing the facility, and community placement of residents. The court approved the State's proposed community placement plan on August 21, 1997. On June 28, 1999, the court ordered the creation of workgroups to facilitate implementation of the plan but later suspended the workgroups. The parties appealed the order suspending the workgroups and submitted a mediation settlement agreement. The District Court (Judge Bernice Bouie Donald) denied a motion to approve the settlement agreement on February 24, 2003. U.S. v. Tennessee, 256 F.Supp. 2d 768 (W.D. Tenn. 2003). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Judge Boyce F. Martin Jr.) vacated and remanded the decision of the district court on June 23, 2005. United States v. Tennessee, 143 Fed. Appx. 656 (6th Cir. 2005). On May 16, 2006, the parties submitted a proposed settlement agreement to resolve various pending matters. The goal of the settlement, reached pursuant to the state's decision to close ADC, was to "ensure an orderly and careful closure of the ADC, the safe transition of Class Members presently living at ADC to community residences, and the accelerated development of a comprehensive network of services and supports for Class Members as they enter and live in the community." The court approved the settlement on Feb. 15, 2007. The settlement set out provisions relating to the transition of class members in light of ADC's closure, including the need for a specific closure plan and transition plan, support resources for families and class members, the development and improvement of community-based services and supports for class members, and improvement of individualized services provided to ADC residents. The settlement also provided for monitoring. Over the next several years, litigation continued over the scope and enforcement of the settlement. On January 17, 2013, the court approved a joint exit plan. If the state completed the plan's requirements by the end of 2013, the court would dismiss the case with prejudice. The court dismissed the case and vacated all injunctive relief on December 3, 2013, finding that the state had complied with the exit plan. Over the course of the litigation, People First were granted attorney's fees periodically. In total, the court awarded them over $4.4 million. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 1990, the DOJ conducted an investigation into the the Arlington Development Center, which revealed that residence were subject to abuse and neglect. The DOJ filed a lawsuit. After several years, the parties entered into a settlement. The case ended in 2013, when the court found that the state had complied with the settlement.


This case involved a challenge to the Trump Administration's immigration policies concerning asylum and family separation. On June 26, 2018, a coalition of states filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the Trump Administration and its top immigration officials, challenging the Administration’s practice of refusing entry to asylum applicants at the southern border as well as its family separation policy. The states, represented by their attorneys general, were Washington, California, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia, and the District of Columbia. The states alleged that they suffered immediate and irreparable injuries to their sovereign, proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests, and sought relief for substantive and procedural due process violations, equal protection violations, and violations under the Administrative Procedure Act and asylum laws. The case was assigned to District Judge Marsha Pechman. Specifically, the states argued that the Administration’s policies harmed their sovereign and proprietary interests by 1) interfering with their licensing authority and rendering them unable to enforce their own legal mandates and public policy, and 2) burdening their state-funded legal, healthcare, education, and other programs. They also argued that their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health and well-being of their residents were harmed by the policy. On July 11, 2018, the federal government moved to dismiss, transfer, or stay the proceedings pending the resolution of a related class-action lawsuit, Ms. L. v. ICE, which was active in the Southern District of California. It's here in the Clearinghouse). According to the federal government, the states wished to engage in “sweeping and burdensome” discovery, duplicative of what was already being conducted in Ms. L In that case, a class of parents who had been separated from their children had already been certified. Since the class members in Ms. L included individuals the plaintiff states purported to represent, the defendants claimed that ongoing litigation in the present court would interfere with the orderly administration of that case. The defendants argued that the court should dismiss the case out of comity and, in the alternative, that the case should be transferred to the Southern District of California or stayed until the Ms. L case had progressed further. On August 8, 2018, Judge Pechman heard oral arguments on the motion to dismiss, transfer, or stay the proceedings. She ordered the case transferred to the Southern District of California, finding that there was substantial overlap between the states’ claim in this case and the class claim in Ms. L Judge Pechman noted that the government had much to do in the way of reuniting separated families and that requiring the government to respond to multiple orders from multiple district courts would only stand in the way of those efforts. 2018 WL 3752220. The case was transferred to the Southern District of California and given a new docket number, 3:18-cv-1979. It was assigned to Judge Dana M. Sabraw. On March 18, 2019, the defendants requested that the proceedings in the present case either be bifurcated or held in abeyance. On May 20, Judge Sabraw granted defendants' request to hold this case in abeyance pending the outcome of the proceedings in Ms. L. (As of June 23, 2021, in Ms. L. v. ICE, the parties continued to work on implementing their court-approved settlement agreement. Additionally, a steering committee was continuing efforts to contact all parties and attorneys relevant to the certified class. The above was reported in a joint status report published on May 19, 2021. This case is ongoing, though in abeyance.

Summary: On June 26, 2018, a coalition of states filed this lawsuit challenging the Trump Administration's practice of refusing entry to asylum applicants at the southern border, as well as its family separation policy. The case was transferred to the Southern District of California and is currently being held in abeyance until litigation in a similar case, <u>Ms. L v. ICE</u>, concludes.


On March 12, 2018, a group of U.S. citizen children, their non-citizen parents, and other non-citizen adults filed this class action lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs challenged DHS’ new rule for determining whether or not to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for immigrants from countries facing various crises warranting their nationals to stay in the U.S. rather than be returned home. The plaintiffs argued that the new DHS rule violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment as well as requirements set out by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Represented by the ACLU, the National Day Laborer Organizing Network, and private attorneys, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. This case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and assigned to Judge Edward M. Chen. As the complaint explained, TPS is a formal mechanism by which individuals from designated countries can legally stay and work in the U.S. when their countries are facing armed conflict, natural disaster, or other extraordinary circumstances making it untenable for them to return. Breaking from previous administrations’ practices, the Trump administration adopted a new rule in assessing whether to continue TPS status that allowed it to ignore consideration of any new crises that emerged since TPS status was granted. The complaint argued that the new DHS rule threatened more than 200,000 individuals with the risk of losing their right to legally work and live in the U.S. Thus, the complaint argued that over 200,000 U.S. citizen children faced the choice of being separated from their families or leaving the only home they had ever known. Moreover, the complaint highlighted President Trump’s various past statements to argue that issuance of the new rule was motivated by racial animus. The plaintiffs were a combination of children who were U.S. citizens, their non-citizen parents with TPS status, and other adults with TPS status. The plaintiffs also sought to represent the following class: “The U.S. citizen children, from ages five to eighteen, of all TPS holders from El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan.” On May 3, 2018, the parties filed a joint letter brief concerning a discovery dispute they were having. The plaintiffs were seeking early discovery to support a motion for a preliminary injunction, but the defendants opposed the request. On May 17, Judge Chen directed DHS to begin assembling the administrative record to avoid delay if production is later required. DHS moved to dismiss the case on May 21. On June 15, the parties filed another joint letter brief regarding their discovery dispute. Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that discovery should not be limited to the administrative record given that they had pled separate constitutional claims. The defendants claimed that the court should first order production of the administrative record before considering questions of possible discovery. Judge Chen issued a summary order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss on June 25, 2018. 2018 WL 3109604. The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the case because, although the courts were limited in reviewing TPS designation determinations, this case did not challenge a particular determination but rather a broader policy. The court also held that the APA claim stood because DHS had not provided any reasoned explanation for the new rule as required under the APA. The court maintained the Fifth Amendment equal protection claim based on the plaintiffs' racial animus argument, holding that the Fifth Amendment barred racial discrimination in the immigration setting regardless of how much deference the executive branch normally receives on immigration matters. Finally, the court maintained the due process claim because the APA and equal protection claims were sufficiently pleaded. Judge Chen also ordered the defendants to respond to plaintiffs' discovery requests and to produce the administrative records for the TPS termination of Sudan and Nicaragua within 10 days, and for El Salvador and Haiti one week later. On June 26, Judge Chen directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether the court should reconsider its holding with respect to the plaintiffs' equal protection claims in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Hawaii. On July 20, Judge Chen referred the parties to Magistrate Judge Sallie Kim to address their ongoing discovery dispute. On August 6, 2018, Judge Chen issued another order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, this time elaborating on his prior order and addressing intervening case law. 321 F.Supp.3d 1083. In addition to affirming his previous conclusions regarding the plaintiffs' APA and due process claims, Judge Chen found that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged that racial and national-origin animus held by President Trump was a motivating factor in DHS's decision to terminate TPS designations, violating equal protection. On August 10, Magistrate Judge Kim granted the plaintiffs' request to require the defendants to produce documents they had withheld on the basis of the deliberative process privilege. That same day, the defendants sought an emergency stay of the Magistrate's order pending review by the district court. On August 13, Judge Chen denied the defendants' emergency motion, finding that the production of documents could not be delayed. Judge Chen then denied the defendants' request for relief from the discovery order on August 15. The plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on August 23, which Judge Chen granted on Oct. 3, 2018. 2018 WL 4778285. The court held that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, including family separation and being forced to move back to countries where neither the children nor adults had any remaining ties. Moreover, the court held that the U.S. economy itself would be hurt if thousands of TPS status holders were suddenly removed. The court found that DHS had not provided any justification for its new rule, and that if anything, the rule was implemented out of racial animus and to affect the administration's pre-determined outcome to terminate TPS status. Subsequently, DHS appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit, which assigned the appeal case number 18-16981. The district court approved the parties’ joint motion to stay proceedings pending the appeal on October 26, 2018. In the district court on Feb. 26, 2019, Judge Chen found Bhattarai v. Nielsen (located here in this Clearinghouse) to be related and reassigned the case to his docket. The Ninth Circuit heard oral argument on Aug. 14, 2019. On Aug. 21, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs addressing whether (1) the government had waived any argument concerning the scope of the administrative record; if not, (2) whether the district court made sufficient findings to warrant additional discovery to supplement the record; and (3) whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering additional discovery. The parties filed their supplemental briefs. On September 14, 2020, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. 975 F.3d 872. In an opinion by Judge Callahan, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court did not have jurisdiction to review the plaintiffs APA because the TPS statute itself states that the Secretary of Homeland Security possesses full and unreviewable discretion in designating foreign states under the statute. The Ninth Circuit also found that there was not sufficient likelihood that the plaintiffs would succeed on the merits of their claims, as they did not provide adequate evidence linking President Trump's statements about other countries to the DHS Secretaries' TPS decision-making. As such, after vacating the preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings.

Summary: On March 12, 2018, children who are citizens of the U.S., their non-citizen parents, and other non-citizen adults filed this class action against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The plaintiffs challenged DHS’ new rule for determining whether or not to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for those countries facing various crises warranting their nationals to stay in the U.S. rather than be returned home. The plaintiffs argued that the new DHS rule violated Fifth Amendment due process and equal protection and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court granted a preliminary injunction on Oct. 3, 2018. DHS appealed, and the Ninth Circuit issued a decision on September 14, 2020, vacating the preliminary injunction and remanding the case back to the district court.