On May 8, 2017, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) filed this lawsuit against the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. NWIRP challenged the “cease and desist” letter it had received from DOJ five weeks prior. The letter instructed NWIRP to stop assisting unrepresented immigrants in deportation proceedings. Specifically, EOIR chose to interpret its rule governing attorney misconduct to require that NWIRP either commit to full legal representation of <i>every</i> immigrant in removal proceedings it presently assists, or refrain from providing them any form of legal assistance (including brief consultations). NWIRP stated that this would deprive thousands of immigrants of the chance to consult with a lawyer. In addition to claiming that DOJ’s order violated the First and Tenth Amendments and seeking declarative and injunctive relief, NWIRP also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO). NWIRP alleged that the DOJ order infringed on the free speech of NWIRP lawyers by prohibiting their ability to screen, consult with, advise, or otherwise assist immigrants in need of legal services without taking each one on as a client. The case was assigned to Judge Richard A. Jones. After hearing oral arguments, Judge Jones granted NWIRP’s motion for a TRO on May 17, 2017, and temporarily restrained DOJ from enforcing—or threatening to enforce—sanctions against NWIRP lawyers who consult with or offer limited services to pro se immigrants in deportation proceedings. Judge Jones further granted the TRO on a nationwide basis, precluding DOJ from issuing cease-and-desist letters to other non-profit organizations providing legal services to immigrants. The TRO was set to remain in effect until the Court ruled on NWIRP’s planned motion for a preliminary injunction. NWIRP moved for a preliminary injunction on June 8, arguing that the TRO should be extended until there was a full trial on the merits. A hearing on the motion was held on July 24, and Judge Jones granted the preliminary injunction on July 27. The order stated that NWIRP was likely to succeed on the merits of its First Amendment claim because the government's regulation failed to meet strict and intermediate scrutiny. The Court wrote that "the Government may not regulate in a way that chills the ability of non-profit organizations to obtain meaningful access to the courts, especially when that access is sought to advance civil-rights objectives. In this context, the Government may regulate 'only with narrow specificity'... The Government has not done so in this instance." Further, the Court stated that "the Government has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from NWIRP’s activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed." DOJ filed a motion to dismiss on Aug. 4, arguing that the six-year statute of limitations for civil actions against the United States barred NWIRP's claims. DOJ further argued that NWIRP's First Amendment claim failed because "the immigration courts...are a nonpublic forum where the government is permitted to regulate speech in a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral manner." Finally, DOJ argued that the NWIRP's Tenth Amendment claim failed because EOIR rules prevail if they come in conflict with state rules "so that the agency can consistently regulate practice across the nation." DOJ also filed a motion to stay discovery pending the Court's review of its motion to dismiss, but the Court denied a stay on Sept. 18. On Dec. 19, the Court granted and denied in part DOJ's motion to dismiss. The Court denied DOJ's statute of limitations claim, holding that the statute of limitations does not apply to a facial challenge of a law under the First Amendment nor was NWIRP outside of the statute of limitations on its Tenth Amendment claim. The court denied DOJ's request to dismiss NWIRP's First Amendment claim, finding that NWIRP successfully alleged its as-applied and facial challenges. The court dismissed NWIRP's Tenth Amendment claim. 2017 WL 6492703. On Jan. 16, 2018, Judge Jones scheduled a bench trial starting Nov. 13, 2018. However, on Aug. 14, 2018, the Court granted the parties' stipulated motion to appoint a magistrate judge for mediation and to stay proceedings. The Court continued to stay proceedings as the parties negotiated, and finally, on March 28, 2019, the parties reached a tentative settlement agreement. The parties filed their settlement agreement with the Court on April 17. As part of the settlement, the defendants will undertake a rulemaking process to amend the regulation at issue in this case. The parties also agreed to jointly seek a stay from the Court, which will then retain jurisdiction of this case during the rulemaking process. NWIRP agreed to dismiss their lawsuit if the defendants issue a final rule that is consistent with their requests to permit attorneys to consult with or offer limited services to pro se immigrants. The defendants also agreed to pay $380,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs. On April 18, the Court extended the stay in the case pending rulemaking until Jan. 17, 2020, at which time the parties will provide a status report to determine whether an additional stay is necessary. On January 16, 2020, the Court extended the stay in the case until March 2, 2020 to facilitate the conclusion of the DOJ rulemaking process. The Court continued to stay the case throughout 2020 pending rulemaking. The next status report is due February 27, 2021.

Summary: In May 2017, the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project (NWIRP) sued DOJ, challenging a “cease and desist” letter in which DOJ had instructed NWIRP to stop assisting unrepresented immigrants in deportation proceedings. The Court granted a TRO and PI, and the parties entered mediation, eventually reaching a settlement in April 2019. The Court has retained jurisdiction over the case pending a rulemaking proceeding to be conducted by the defendants.


On February 26, 2018, The State of Texas and 19 other states filed this action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The complaint named as defendants: the United States of America, the United States Department of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, United States Internal Revenue Service, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Represented by various states' attorneys general, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a 2017 amendment to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA). The plaintiffs alleged that the December 22, 2017 amendment known as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 forced an “unconstitutional and irrational regime onto the States and their citizens” because it eliminated the tax penalty of the ACA without eliminating the individual mandate requiring that most Americans have “minimal essential coverage.” Multiple states and parties intervened in the case as defendants including 16 states and the District of Columbia. Notably, the United States House of Representatives intervened to argue in favor of the ACA as an intervener defendant. Plaintiffs also named John McCain as an additional defendant because of his vote against repeal of the individual mandate on July 28, 2018. The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment in an extraordinary motion stating that they would settle or withdraw from the complaint if McCain would file a rescission of his nay vote. McCain, though, passed away due to brain cancer on August 25, 2018 and is no longer a party to the suit. The Supreme Court had interpreted the mandate in <i>NFIB v. Sebelius</i>, 567 U.S. 519 (2012), as part of a tax penalty applying to individuals covered by the mandate. Thus, the mandate was a lawful exercise of Congress's taxing power. As a result, the plaintiffs alleged that eliminating the tax penalty in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 made not only the individual mandate unlawful, but also the rest of the ACA unlawful. The complaint sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that the individual mandate of the ACA exceeded Congress's Article I constitutional enumerated powers; (2) a declaratory judgment that the ACA violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment; (3) a declaratory judgment that the ACA violated the Tenth Amendment; (4) a declaratory judgment under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA); and (5) injunctive relief against federal officials from implementing, regulating, or otherwise enforcing the ACA. On April 23, 2018, the complaint was amended to add Special Counsel for Civil Litigation as attorneys for plaintiff states. A month later, on May 16, 2018, Judge Reed C. O'Connor granted a motion for 16 states and the District of Columbia to intervene as defendants. By the time oral arguments concerning the preliminary injunction began on September 5, 2018, multiple associations and scholars offered amicus briefs in support of the defendants. While the defendants agreed that the individual mandate requirement was unconstitutional, they argued that all other provisions of the ACA were severable and thereby enforceable. Finally, on December 14, 2018, Judge O'Connor denied the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction and instead granted the plaintiffs' partial summary judgement on count one of the plaintiffs' complaint. The court found the individual mandate unconstitutional because it no longer triggered a tax and held that the provision was inseverable from the rest of the ACA. However, Judge O'Connor also granted defendants' motion to sever count one from the remaining claims in order to make the judgment final and therefore immediately appealable. In the same order, Judge O'Connor granted the defendants' motion to stay the judgment pending appeal. The defendants appealed from the judgement on count one on January 3, 2019 to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. By March 25, 2019, the court granted dismissal of both the State of Maine and the State of Wisconsin as plaintiffs and Judge O'Connor granted the United States House of Representatives defendant intervener status. The Fifth Circuit heard oral arguments on July 9, 2019, and the case is ongoing pending the appellate court's decision.

Summary: The State of Texas and 19 other states brought suit alleging that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 made the individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) unconstitutional. Plaintiffs claimed that the 2017 amendment that eliminated the tax penalty of the ACA rendered not only the individual mandate unlawful, but also the rest of the ACA. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on the claim that the individual mandate of the ACA exceeds Congress's Article I constitutional enumerated powers and is inseverable. The judgment is currently stayed pending appeal in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.


On April 10, 2012, the Public Defender of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Luzerne County. Represented by the ACLU of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff alleged that his termination was threatened because of complaints he had made against the county about the lack of funding for the public defender's office, lack of attorneys for the public defender's office, and inability to adequately represent clients. The plaintiff alleged that the threatened termination would violate his 1st and 14th Amendment rights and he sought injunctive relief. The plaintiff also requested a temporary restraining order to prevent his removal from the position of Chief Public Defender for Luzerne County, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and attorneys' fees. The same day, the plaintiff in this case, along with citizens who were unable to obtain a public defender based on lack of availability, filed a class action in state court under the Civil Rights Act, §1983, and Article I, § 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The class action sought to compel the County to increase resources for the Public Defender. Plaintiffs requested an order requiring Defendants to promptly appoint private or conflict counsel when the Office of the Public Defender (OPD) declines representation of any adult defendant due to excessive workloads or lack of resources. The plaintiffs also sought a writ of mandamus compelling the defendants to lift the hiring freeze; an order allowing the plaintiff Public Defender to continue with his work until the OPD had adequate resources to represent all indigent adult criminal defendants prosecuted in Luzerne County; a peremptory judgment compelling defendants to provide necessary funding so that the OPD is capable of providing representation to all qualified indigent defendants prosecuted in Luzerne County that satisfy the standards set by the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions; and attorneys' fees and costs. In the federal court case, the plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction. On April 19, 2012, the parties entered a stipulation requesting withdrawal of the plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction. The judge approved the request to withdraw that same day. The terms of the withdrawal stipulated that the plaintiff shall remain in his official capacity as public defender, that he will not be subject to any adverse employment action in retaliation for protected First Amendment activity, and that his job was not in imminent danger. The case was dismissed on March 11, 2013. The class action was assigned to Judge Joseph Augello. On June 15, 2012, Judge Augello ordered the county to lift the hiring freeze, immediately provide confidential meeting space for OPD clients and lawyers, provide counsel for people turned away from the OPD either by hiring private counsel or by expanding OPD, and not to turn away any more indigent clients. Judge Aurello also ordered the parties to meet and create a plan to fix the problems with OPD. The parties attended mediation for months but could not agree to a solution. The county replaced the Chief Public Defender in April 2013 and asked the court to dismiss the class action, arguing that only the chief public defender could sue the county over the condition of the OPD. Judge Augello agreed with the county and dismissed the case on October 22, 2013. The plaintiffs for the class action appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, arguing that the clients of the OPD were entitled to bring suit to protect their rights. On October 14, 2014, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court affirmed the ruling. As part of its opinion, the Court noted that mandamus was not an available form of relief because the Appellants had not demonstrated a clear right to relief. The plaintiffs next appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which changed the name to Kuren v. Luzerne to reflect the that Flora was no longer a party to the suit. Because of the importance of the case, the U.S. Department of Justice as well as numerous national legal organizations, including the American Bar Association and the Innocence Project, filed friend-of-the-court briefs in support of the plaintiffs. In a landmark opinion issued on September 28, 2016, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that Gideon v. Wainwright extends the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to state courts, and also noted that Sixth Amendment violations need not await conviction and sentencing. As such, the Court ruled that public defender clients have the right to sue counties to force them to provide adequate funding to their public defender offices, as long as they demonstrate “the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.” Here, the Court found that the plaintiffs met that standard by demonstrating the possible risk of injury due to Luzerne County’s alleged failure to provide adequate funding. With respect to the mandamus, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, ruling that the writ of mandamus was not an available remedy in this case. The Court stated that mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, or to compel action in matters involving judgment and discretion. It is not used to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way, as the Appellants sought here by requesting that the hiring freeze be lifted. The case was remanded for proceedings consistent with the opinion. The docket for the trial court's proceedings could not be found. The case is now closed.

Summary: The plaintiff here filed a complaint in federal court that his termination was being unjustly threatened concurrently with a complaint in state court seeking to compel the Public Defender's Office to increase resources for the Public Defender. The plaintiff concurrently filed a class action complaint in state court, along with plaintiffs who were eligible for public defending but had been denied service. The class action suit sought to compel the County to increases resources for the Public Defender. The federal complaint was dismissed after stipulations that plaintiff will remain in his job as public defender and will not suffer adverse employment action. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the indigent clients had a rightful cause of action.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a putative class-action complaint filed on May 8 challenging the requirement for a social insurance number to qualify for the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) stimulus checks. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the SSN requirement and requiring the defendants to hold in escrow funds for the issuance funds to the proposed class. On June 30, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in several U.S. District Courts. The case is stayed pending the final decisions in related cases.
 On May 8, two U.S. citizens married to spouses without SSNs filed a suit against various government defendants to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the CARES Act. The plaintiffs alleged that 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (the Exclusion Provision), as enacted by Section 2101 of the CARES Act, violated due process, equal protection, and the penumbra of privacy rights under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs filed this action at the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin as a declaratory and injunctive action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory relief stating that the Exclusion Provision violated due process and equal protection of the Fifth and First Amendments. The plaintiffs also filed for injunctive relief and a TRO prohibiting the enforcement of the Exclusion Provision and requiring the defendants to hold in escrow sufficient funds for the issuance of stimulus checks to members of the proposed class. Included in the proposed class were all U.S. citizens similarly situated who would otherwise qualify for the stimulus check. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and demanded a jury trial. The plaintiffs were represented by private attorneys, and the case was assigned to Judge J P Stadtmueller. On March 27, President Trump announced the CARES Act, authorizing the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute up to $1200.00 to each eligible individual earning under $75,000. To qualify for the stimulus check, Section 2101 required an eligible individual’s spouse to provide a “valid identification number” on their most recent tax return filed with IRS, but only SSNs were accepted. The plaintiffs argued that, as SSNs were only issued to citizens or immigrants with work authorization, Section 2101 was discriminatory on the basis of their fundamental right to marriage. In effect, the provision excluded otherwise qualifying individuals married to immigrants who used an Individual Tax Identification Number (ITIN) instead of SSNs to pay their taxes. Both plaintiffs did not receive stimulus checks because their spouses lacked an SSN. On June 30, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in several other U.S. District Courts. The plaintiffs filed a joint stipulation to stay the case, which was adopted by the judge on September 28. The case will remain stayed until 7 days after a final decision has been rendered in one of the related cases,  Does v. Trump (PB-WI-0005),  Doe v. Trump (PB-IL-0014), and  Doe v. Trump (PB-CA-0055). On August 10, 2020 in PB-WI-005, the District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the case on the grounds that one or more of the related cases may be dispositive. On September 2, 2020 in PB-CA-0055, the District Court for the Central District of California granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that the need for speed and administrative efficiency in distributing the checks was a valid rational basis for the Exclusion Provision. 2020 WL 5492994. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 30 and the appeal was voluntarily dismissed on January 21, 2021. On January 19, 2021 in PB-IL-0014, the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs stated that, in December 2020, President Trump passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, which contained a provision that amended the CARES Act to allow stimulus checks for a spouse or otherwise qualifying child as long as the valid identification number of at least one spouse was included on the tax return. Thus, the new act retroactively repealed and replaced the Exclusion Provision with one that provided substantially the same relief as sought by the plaintiffs. As of March 11, 2021, this case is still stayed.

Summary: This is a putative class-action complaint filed on May 8 challenging the requirement for a social insurance number to qualify for the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) stimulus checks. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the SSN requirement and requiring the defendants to hold in escrow funds for the issuance funds to the proposed class. On June 30, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to stay the case given that similar complaints already were filed in several other U.S. District Courts. The case is stayed pending the results in related cases. The case is stayed pending the final decisions in related cases.


On June 21, 2012, the United States Department of Justice filed this action against the town of Colorado City, Arizona, the city of Hildale, Utah, and utilities serving them. The lawsuit was filed under the Fair Housing Act Amendments (42 U.S.C. § 3601); Title III of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000b); and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the municipalities had unconstitutionally established a religion, and denied equal protection of the laws and use of public facilities on the basis of religion. Specifically, the DOJ alleged that the municipalities had become arms of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints ("FLDS") and had failed their duty to provide policing, housing, and utilities to non-members and former members of the FLDS. This was the DOJ's first lawsuit to include claims under both the Fair Housing Act and Section 14141, the federal statute that allows the Attorney General to address patterns or practices of police misconduct. A religious and charitable trust called the United Effort Plan Trust (UEP Trust) owned much of the land in Colorado City and in Hildale, and was controlled until 2005 by the FLDS. Because a Utah court determined that the UEP Trust had violated its legal duties to the beneficiaries of the trust, the FLDS was removed as trustee, and a Special Fiduciary, not affiliated with the FLDS, was appointed in 2005. The Special Fiduciary's repeated attempts to administer the trust for the benefit of non-FLDS and FLDS members were rebuffed by the Marshall's Office of the two municipalities. The legal rulings relating to property agreements had been ignored, and the Marshall's office began occupying UEP Trust land. The DOJ alleged that the Marshall's Office refused to arrest FLDS members accused of assaulting or committing crimes against non-FLDS members, and also that the office arrested non-FLDS members without cause. The Marshall's Office was also accused of assisting in illegal evictions of non-FLDS members from UEP Trust-owned property, and of taking non-FLDS members' property without cause. The municipal utilities were also implicated in the lawsuit. The DOJ alleged that water and electric service had been outright denied or unreasonably delayed to non-FLDS members. Some residents had been waiting on water or electric service since 2009. Lastly, the municipalities were accused of denying non-FLDS members access to public parks and the city zoo. The Marshall's Office was accused of threatening non-FLDS members with arrest if they played in or otherwise used the park or zoo. Three weeks after filing the complaint, the DOJ moved to transfer the matter to Judge James A. Teilbog, suggesting that the case was related to Cooke v. Colorado City, 3:10-cv-8105-PCT-JAT, which was pending before Judge Teilbog. Judge Teilbog denied the motion, which was filed in Cooke, because the DOJ's case might include factual and legal issues distinct from Cooke and because the cases were in different stages of litigation. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in August 2012, which the Court (Judge H. Russel Holland) denied on November 29, 2012, finding that the U.S. stated a plausible cause of action for its first two claims and dismissing its third, with leave to amend. 2012 WL 12842256. On December 10, 2012, the court denied the defendants' motion for an order changing venue from the District of Arizona to the District of Utah. Considering the availability of witnesses, the burdens on the witnesses and the parties, the interest of justice, and the plaintiffs' preference for remaining in the District of Arizona, the court held that a transfer of venue was not appropriate. 2012 WL 12929901. In March 2013, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, contending the statute of limitations precluded the DOJ's Fair Housing Act claim. The court denied the motion on June 6, 2013, holding that the statutory period did not begin until a plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe the defendants had engaged in a practice of housing discrimination--the timing of that clock-starting point had yet to be determined. The parties then engaged in extensive and contentious discovery. The court issued many rulings from 2013 to 2015 regarding evidence, including sanctions against the defendants for spoliation of evidence on July 28, 2014. 2014 WL 3724232 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2014). In late 2014, the defendants moved for summary judgment regarding damages and the DOJ moved for partial summary judgment. On June 17, 2015, Judge Holland denied the DOJ's motion for partial summary judgment and granted in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment; he held that the DOJ was precluded from requesting FHA damages from any defendant on behalf of the aggrieved persons, should the DOJ prevail on its FHA claims in Count II. The court also dismissed the DOJ's claims against the power company. The defendants' motions were otherwise denied. The case proceeded to trial before a jury, which lasted for 25 days in January-March 2016. On March 7, 2016, the jury returned a verdict finding that the towns of Colorado City, Arizona, and Hildale, Utah, and their joint water company systematically discriminated against individuals who were not members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (FLDS) in the provision of housing, utility and policing services in violation of the Fair Housing Act. The jury also issued an advisory verdict on the DOJ's claims under Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Because this statute (in contrast to the Fair Housing Act) did not include a right to a jury trial, the jury’s verdict as to the Section 14141 claim was advisory and could be considered by the court, but was not binding. In its advisory verdict, the jury found that the Colorado City Marshal’s Office (CCMO), the cities’ joint police department, operated as an arm of the FLDS church in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amendment; engaged in discriminatory policing in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment and the establishment clause; and subjected individuals to unlawful stops, seizures and arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Because these advisory findings were not binding, the 14141 claim remained under consideration by the district court, who would issue a ruling on whether the defendants engaged in these constitutional violations, and if so, what relief was appropriate. The court scheduled a non-jury evidentiary hearing for October 24, 2016, regarding the 14141 claim. On April 18, 2016, the parties filed a settlement agreement that defendants would pay $1.6 million to resolve the monetary claim under the Fair Housing Act. The settlement agreement memorialized the settlement terms reached by the parties and presented to and approved by the court on March 7, 2016. The court issued an order officially approving the settlement agreement on April 19, 2016. An evidentiary hearing was held on October 24 through 27, 2016, addressing the U.S.'s request for injunctive relief based on the Fair Housing Act violations and the jury's advisory findings with respect to policing. After receiving comments under seal from the parties about simplifying and facilitating implementation of injunctive relief, Judge Holland issued a Judgment and Decree Granting Injunctive Relief on April 18, 2017. The Court permanently enjoined the defendants from engaging in any conduct violating the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the Fourth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Regarding policing practices, the Court required that the defendants do the following: hire a professional consultant in the field of policing; develop new policies and procedures for hiring new officers; conduct a wide-ranging search for candidates to fill two police officer positions (to be filled within six months); implement new policies and procedures for internal affairs investigations; conduct a comprehensive review of all CCMO policies and procedures; purchase body cameras for CCMO officers and implement a pilot program for their use; provide annual training to officers on the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, state and federal Fair Housing Acts, landlord/tenant law, and trespass law; and hire a Mentor for the Chief Marshal. Regarding fair housing practices, the Court enjoined defendants from violating the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, the injunction prohibited the defendants from making housing unavailable or denying housing opportunities to individuals because of their religion; discriminating in the terms, conditions, or privileges of housing rentals or sales; or coercing, intimidating, threatening, or interfering with a person in the exercise or enjoyment of a right granted by the Fair Housing Act. Additionally, the Court called for the renewed discussions between the UEP Trust and Colorado City regarding approval of a subdivision plat; development of objective, uniform, and non-discriminatory policies and procedures to govern the operation of the defendants' building departments; amendments to the defendants' water services regulations; review of the defendants' culinary water impact fee; the development of publicly available internet websites for each municipality; in-person training on the requirements of this injunction and the policies, procedures, and regulations adopted in accordance with it; and the appointment of one or more monitors, who will review municipal decisions by the defendants implicating the Fair Housing Act, oversee implementation of all aspects and terms of the injunction, and issue written reports every 90 days. The injunctive relief was to remain in effect for ten years or until otherwise ordered by the Court. On August 1, 2017, Judge Holland issued an order amending the decree granting injunctive relief with respect to training. The Court ordered that the Fair Housing Act training will be completed by August 16, 2017 by the Southwest Fair Housing Council. The Court further ordered that constitutional training was to be completed by September 15, 2017 (with was extended to September 25), and that training on policies and procedures was to be completed within 30 days after the last policy, procedure, regulation, or ordinance was adopted or amended. On July 19, 2017, the defendants appealed the District Court's grant of a permanent injunction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 7, 2018, the City of Hilldale withdrew its appeal. The remaining defendants' continued litigation. On August 26, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court. They found that, "In holding that the Towns violated § 12601, the district court correctly interpreted the statute and did not err in admitting the statements of FLDS leaders. We need not address Colorado City’s arguments about the district court’s Fourth Amendment-related factual findings because, even if those arguments are correct, the error was harmless." 935 F.3d 804. Monitor reports from 2018 indicated that there were no outstanding Fair Housing injunction requirements. Additionally, the police consultant's reports noted staffing changes in the marshal's office and progress in relationships between the marshal's office and other law enforcement agencies. On December 23, 2019, Judge Holland issued an order reducing the frequency of monitors' reports to two per year. On May 13, 2020 Judge Holland wrote a letter thanking the court monitor and police consultant and affirming that defendants were still in compliance with the injunction. As of June 2020, monitors continue to submit reports as enforcement of the injunction continues.

Summary: In this unusual 2012 case, the U.S. Justice Department alleged that The Twin City Area (Hildale, Utah and Colorado City, Arizona), came under the influence of The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (FLDS). After a jury trial, the court imposed a lengthy and detailed injunction, which is ongoing.


On June 24, 2013, a for-profit company filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of West Virginia under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff, represented by the public interest firm Liberty Institute, sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owners. On July 26, 2013 the plaintiff filed an amended complaint but did not make any substantive changes. On August 23, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss to the case on the grounds that the plaintiff's free exercise of religion was not substantially burdened by the ACA mandate. On December 10, 2013, Judge Thomas E. Johnston of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia stayed the case pending a decision by the Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), a substantially similar case. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. In light of this decision, on July 15, 2014, the parties jointly submitted a proposed Consent Order Granting Preliminary Injunction, preliminarily enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ACA's contraceptive requirement against the plaintiffs or assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance. On December 9, 2014, the parties jointly moved for an Entry of Injunction and Judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, which permanently enjoined the defendants from (1) enforcing the ACA's contraceptive coverage requirement, (2) assessing any penalties or fines for noncompliance, and (3) taking any other actions based on noncompliance with the requirement. On May 29, 2015, Judge Johnston issued a judgment accepting the parties' submission. On October 28, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement on the plaintiffs' claim for attorneys' fees and costs, the terms of which are unknown. On October 30, 2015, the case was dismissed.

Summary: On June 24, 2013, a for-profit corporation filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the Administrative Procedure Act against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The plaintiff asked the court to rule that the Affordable Care Act's (ACA) contraception insurance mandate was unconstitutional. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, and upon the joint stipulation of the parties, the court ordered that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the contraceptive coverage requirement or imposing any fees or penalties for noncompliance.


COVID-19 Summary: On June 5, 2020, a non-profit corporation advocating for social and racial justice and individual citizens filed this class action suit for violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief enjoining Portland police from using tear gas. On June 9, the court granted the TRO and enjoined the defendants from using tear gas, and the TRO was expanded to include non-lethal weapons on June 26. On June 30, the plaintiffs moved for a finding of contempt and for sanctions against the defendant for non-compliance, which was later amended. On November 27, the court granted this motion in part. The parties submitted a joint proposal of remedies for the contempt finding on December 18. On March 16, 2021, the court ordered sanctions that included training for Portland Police Bureau officers and circulating the TRO.
 On June 5, 2020, Don't Shoot Portland, a non-profit corporation that advocates for social and racial justice in Portland, and individual Portland residents filed this class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs, represented by the Oregon Justice Resource Center and private counsel, sued the City of Portland under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the City violated plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that defendant's indiscriminate use of tear gas against crowds of non-violent protestors participating in protected speech was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs further contended that the use of tear gas was particularly dangerous during the global COVID-19 pandemic. The plaintiffs, who simultaneously filed a motion for temporary restraining order (TRO), sought injunctive relief enjoining the City of Portland from using tear gas as a crowd control measure. They also sought attorney's fees. The case was assigned to Judge Marco A. Hernandez. The plaintiffs asserted that beginning on May 29, 2020, and continuing every night for more than a week, Portland residents "demonstrated in the streets demanding justice for George Floyd and demanding an end to police violence." The plaintiffs alleged that defendant, in response to these protests, acted unlawfully by "tacitly and explicitly authoriz[ing] the use of indiscriminate crowd control munitions on crowds of protesters by justifying uses of similar tactics, including tear gas shot indiscriminately into crowds of protesters" that had committed no criminal acts and posed no threat of violence. The plaintiffs also asserted that they "were engaged in constitutionally protected acts of free speech" and that defendant's "continued use of tear gas on protesters . . . would chill a reasonable person from continuing to engage in protected First Amendment Activity." The plaintiffs also stated that the "use of tear gas is particularly dangerous at the present time because it is specifically designed to irritate the respiratory system and to cause people to expel mucus and aspirated saliva," which is the principal way in which COVID-19 spreads. The complaint included a statement from a local university president expressing concern that "the use of tear gas could significantly exacerbate the spread [of COVID-19]." The plaintiffs defined the proposed class as "all individuals who currently or who will in the future engage in protest activities that follow the death of George Floyd opposing police violence and white supremacy." On June 6, the defendants responded to the motion, arguing that during the thirty-five days of protests, there had also been violent riots, and such measures are necessary to ensure that "peaceful protestors have a full and free opportunity to exercise their constitutional rights, while preventing rioters from injuring people and doing significant damage to property." They argued that the plaintiffs did not meet their burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, that the balance of hardships weighs in their favor, or that an injunction would be in the public interest. On June 9, the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order was granted in part, and restricted the defendants from using tear gas or its equivalent for 14 days, limiting their usage to situations in which the lives or safety of the public or the police are at risk. 465 F.Supp.3d 1150. On June 18, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, claiming that the defendants had changed their methods since the TRO, using a variety of "less-lethal” weapons indiscriminately against plaintiffs instead. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on June 24 adding an additional plaintiff. They further sought declaratory relief stating that the Portland Police Bureau’s Crowd Control Directive violated the Fourth Amendment. On June 26, the parties stipulated to an additional TRO which additionally restricted the use of less lethal launchers, rubber ball distraction devices, aerosol restraints, and long-range acoustical devices. The district court approved the order the same day, and the order is in effect until July 24. On June 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a finding of contempt and for sanctions against the defendant. They claimed that Portland Police Bureau members used "less-lethal weapons” in violation of the June 26 order on June 27-28. Therefore, they sought the following:

A complete ban on the use of certain “less lethal weapons” in any crowd control situation.

A requirement that any use of “less lethal weapons” must be specifically authorized by a politically accountable leader, such as Mayor Ted Wheeler, the commissioner of the Portland Police Bureau.

Prohibiting the individual members who violated the Court’s order from participating in any future crowd control operations.

Compensatory fines of sufficient size to compensate the individual class members for their injuries and deter future violations.

 The same day, they moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from using "less lethal" weapons against protesters who were only engaged in passive resistance. They requested that if such weapons must be used, the defendants must ensure that no one engaging in passive resistance was impacted. A week later, defendants submitted their responses in opposition to plaintiffs' request for a TRO. The City of Portland and Multnomah County submitted separate but substantively similar responses to the plaintiffs' request for a TRO. They argued that the plaintiffs should be denied the TRO because they could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, they would not be irreparably harmed without the TRO, and the balance of equities did not weigh in plaintiffs' favor. They also argued that, were the judge to grant the TRO, the version proposed by plaintiffs was too restrictive. By mid-July, the plaintiffs submitted a supplemental memorandum supporting their motion to hold the defendants in contempt. They argued that the PPB's use of "less-lethal" weapons and tear gas on several occasions in late June represented violations of the court's Less Lethal Weapons Order and the Tear Gas Order. The defendants did not deny that the PPB used these tactics, but that their use of tear gas and less-lethal weapons fell within the limitations of those orders (to protect public safety). The plaintiffs filed an amended motion for finding of contempt and for sanctions on August 12. The amended motion focused on alleged violations late in the night on June 30, 2020. The plaintiffs claimed that the PPB fired pepper balls, impact munitions, smoke grenades, and pepper spray into the crowds against people who were attempting to follow orders or engaged only in passive resistance. The defendants responded on September 4, arguing that the plaintiffs did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the defendants violated the orders, and that it would be difficult to identify the officers who engaged in the specific alleged misconduct with the limited information they provided. On September 9, defendant City of Portland submitted a motion to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. They argued that the plaintiffs' claims were conclusory and failed to plausibly support a claim for relief. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs lack standing to assert Fourth and First Amendment violations as it is an organization suing on its own behalf. In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs sought leave from the court to file an amended complaint that added factual allegations related to Don't Shoot Portland's mission and activities, the First Amendment claims, and the claims against the city as well as to broaden the dates of incidents to include those since the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. Defendant City of Portland did not object to the amendment. The court granted leave and denied the City of Portland's motion to dismiss as moot. On October 7, the plaintiffs filed the third amended complaint. After holding oral argument on the motion for a finding of contempt in late October, the Court granted the motion in part on November 27, 2020. --- F.Supp.3d ----2020 WL 7049089. The court identified nine incidents that the plaintiffs argued violated the June 26 TRO through the PPB's use of less-lethal weapons. It found that in only three of the nine incidents did the plaintiffs show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant City of Portland violated the TRO. In two of these incidents, officers fired numerous rounds from a less-lethal launcher at individuals carrying a banner. The court found that nothing suggested that the banner was a weapon or would be used by the protestors as a weapon and that the protesters were complying with PPB's directions at the time the officer fired his less-lethal weapon. In the third incident, the court similarly found that an officer's use of impact munitions against an individual approaching an item in the road was not in response to active aggression. Accordingly, in these cases, the officers should not have used less-lethal weapons and violated the TRO. However, in the other five incidents, the court found that the defendants complied with the TRO because the individuals against whom force was used had kicked smoke canisters towards police officers, attempted to throw items at the police, and attempted to start a fire. The court then set out to determine remedies for the violations of the June 26 TRO. On December 4, the court held a hearing to determine how to proceed with the remedies for the contempt motion. The parties exchanged proposals and filed a joint remedy proposal on December 18. Oral argument on the remedies portion of the contempt motion was held on January 13, 2021. On March 16, 2021, the court ordered coercive sanctions that included training for PPB Rapid Response Team grenadiers and supervisors, removal of a PPB officer from crowd control events pending an internal investigation, circulation of the TRO to all PPB officers, and training for all PPB officers by the end of the year. The court declined to order additional sanctions proposed by the plaintiffs because they lacked a way for the City of Portland to purge itself of the contempt and avoid the sanction (making it more punitive than coercive). The sanctions would remain in effect until the City of Portland demonstrates compliance with the TRO to the court. With the agreement of both parties, the court converted the TRO on using tear gas, which was entered on June 9, 2020, into a preliminary injunction that would remain in effect until a final decision on the merits was issued. As of April 1, the case is still ongoing.

Summary: On June 5, 2020, a non-profit corporation advocating for social and racial justice and individual citizens filed this class action suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The plaintiffs sued the City of Portland, alleging that the Portland police violated plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment rights by indiscriminately using tear gas against protestors involved in protected speech. They sought injunctive relief enjoining Portland police from using tear gas. On June 9, the court granted the TRO and enjoined the defendants from using tear gas. The following week, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging that the defendants had changed their methods since the TRO, using "less-lethal” weapons against plaintiffs instead, and an additional TRO was issued related to the less-lethal weapons. On June 30, the plaintiffs moved for a finding of contempt and for sanctions against the defendant for non-compliance, which was later withdrawn. They also sought a preliminary injunction. On June 9, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order in part and restricted the use of tear gas to situations in which the lives or safety of the public or the police were at risk. The parties later stipulated to an additional TRO which additionally restricted the use of less-lethal launchers, rubber ball distraction devices, aerosol restraints, and long-range acoustical devices. On June 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a finding of contempt and sanctions against the defendant. After briefing and oral argument, the court granted the motion in part; the parties exchanged remedy proposals and filed a joint remedy proposal on December 18. On March 16, 2021, the court ordered sanctions that included training for Portland Police Bureau officers and circulating the TRO. The case is ongoing as of April 1, 2021.


On June 27, 2000 a former female corrections officer at Pelican Bay State Prison filed a Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and several Pelican Bay officials. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, alleging that the CDCR and Pelican Bay had failed to remedy the sexually hostile environment created by prison inmates (which included a pervasive practice of inmate exhibitionist masturbation directed at female officers) in violation of her Title VII rights. The plaintiff further alleged that the Defendants had then retaliated against her by terminating her on account of her repeated complaints, in violation of her First Amendment rights. The Plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief. On March 25, 2002, the District Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson) granted in part and denied in part the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The surviving claims included: (1) the Title VII hostile work environment claim against the CDCR, (2) the Title VII retaliation claim against the CDCR based upon adverse employment actions not including the plaintiff's termination, and (3) the § 1983 claim that the individual defendants retaliated against the plaintiff in violation of her First Amendment rights. The case proceeded to jury trial in March 2003. At trial, the plaintiff's case-in-chief included testimony from fellow correctional officers and an expert on prison administration. The jury returned a unanimous verdict on April 3, 2003, finding CDCR liable under Title VII for sexual harassment and retaliation, and the individual Pelican Bay officials liable under § 1983 for retaliation in violation of plaintiffs' First Amendment rights. The jury awarded $500,000 to the plaintiff in economic damages, $100,000 in noneconomic damages, and $100 in punitive damages against each individual defendant. On May 15, 2003, the plaintiff moved to amend the judgment to include permanent injunctive relief. The District Court granted her motion in part and entered a permanent injunction prohibiting CDCR from engaging in unlawful employment practices at Pelican Bay Prison, including sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment, sexual discrimination, and retaliation. The Court referred the matter to a Special Master to monitor compliance and to develop a remedial plan. The Court also awarded attorneys' fees. The defendants appealed after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S.Ct. 1951, in 2006. The Supreme Court had held that “when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.” The defendants argued that the plaintiff had not been speaking “as a citizen” when she complained and thus the defendants had not violated her First Amendment rights. On September 13, 2006, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt) affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded in part. 468 F.3d 838. It affirmed CDCR's liability under Title VII, but remanded the First Amendment retaliation claim in light the Garcetti v. Ceballos. The Court found that the jury had been improperly instructed as to which of the plaintiff’s statements constituted protected speech and remanded the case to decide:
1. whether a letter written by the Plaintiff to the director of the CDCR constituted protected speech; 2. whether the Defendants were protected by qualified immunity; 3. whether the erroneous jury instruction on protected speech was harmless error; and 4. whether the damages or attorney’s fees amounts were valid in light of the jury instruction error.
The Circuit Court issued an amended opinion November 3, 2006 with minor additions, and in that opinion denied a rehearing. 486. F.3d 528. The Defendants appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 549 U.S. 1323. On remand, the District Court found for the plaintiff on all remaining issues. Specifically, the Court:
1. found the letter was protected speech because the Plaintiff was not acting pursuant to her official job duties when she wrote it; 2. rejected the Defendants’ argument that they were entitled to qualified immunity under Ceballos, indicating that that case did not alter the long-standing right of public employees to speak out on matters of public concern as a citizen. 3. found that the erroneous jury instruction resulting in harmless error—despite the instruction, the weight of the evidence for the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim clearly supported a finding of the Defendants’ liability; and 4. held that because the jury instruction was harmless, the damages award and attorneys’ fees award would remain unchanged.
 2007 WL 1670307. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision on April 11, 2008. 289 Fed. App'x 146. The parties continued to litigate over attorneys’ fees and monitoring costs issues. The case was closed in 2010, but plaintiff’s counsel continued to monitor the defendants’ compliance with the injunction. In May 2012, the defendants moved to terminate the injunction (or, alternatively, to modify the monitoring process). On November 5, 2012, the Court denied the motion to terminate the injunction, reasoning that the defendants had not provided a legal basis for terminating a permanent injunction. However, because there had been no reports of the defendants ever failing to comply with the injunction, the Court granted the motion to modify the monitoring process and discontinued the plaintiff’s monitoring responsibilities. The parties then continued to litigate to resolve all remaining fees and costs issues. The case remains closed and has had no filing activity since December 2012.

Summary: In 2000 a former female corrections officer at Pelican Bay State Prison filed this Title VII sexual harassment lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and several Pelican Bay officials. The Plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VII, alleging that the Defendants had failed to remedy the sexually hostile environment created by prison inmates, in violation of her rights under Title VII, and had wrongfully terminated her as a result of her complaints, in violation of her First Amendment rights. At trial, a jury found the CDCR liable and awarded monetary damages, and the plaintiff moved for and received a permanent injunction prohibiting the CDCR from engaging in unlawful employment practices. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the CDCR's liability under Title VII, but remanded the First Amendment retaliation claim in light of the intervening Supreme Court decision <i>Garcetti v. Ceballos</i>. On remand, the District Court found for the plaintiff on all remaining issues and upheld the jury verdict, finding that any errors in jury instructions were harmless. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, and the case is now closed.


On November 7, 2007, a hearing-impaired inmate at Polk Correctional Institution in Polk City, FL, filed this lawsuit, pro se, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He sued four corrections officials responsible for organizing and providing accommodations for disabled inmates in his lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, alleging that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his disability. Representing himself, the plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief. The plaintiff also sought class certification. To reduce or eliminate noise levels to better monitor and control prisoners in the television day rooms, the prison installed modular audio level cut-off equipment on the institution televisions that would convert the television audio to a FM radio signal for air wave transition. These "audio decorders" permit the televisions to be turned down to their lowest speaker level, this reducing the noise pollution while allowing prisoners to hear, understand, and clearly enjoy the television audio through a radio with earbuds or headphones at a personally selected audio level. However, these radios were insufficient for the plaintiffs' impairment, so he requested that the institution allow him to have his family pay a special vendor for a speaker-less AM-FM radio with the decibel level high enough to accommodate his hearing impairment. According to his complaint, the plaintiff submitted a formal request to Defendant Young, for "reasonable modification or accommodation" on June 26, 2007. Defendant Young sent the plaintiff's request to Defendant Long, the Chief Health Officer of the prison, to get verification of his disability and for the medical officer's findings and opinion of the requested accommodation. On August 2, 2007, Defendant Long issued a discussion of findings to Defendant Young saying that though the plaintiff is hearing-impaired, he was not sure that the AM-FM radio requested by the plaintiff would provide any better benefit that the radio available through the prison store. On August 3, 2007, Defendant Young denied the plaintiff's reasonable accommodation request. On August 23, 2007, Defendant Taylor, the statewide ADA coordinator, agreed with Defendant Young's decision to deny the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff then filed a request for administrative review, which was received by a representative of Defendant Secretary McDonough, and referred it to Defendant Taylor who again denied the plaintiff's request, adding that allowing the requested radio would be a security risk. The plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that the defendants were discriminating against him on the basis of his disability. In an amended complaint filed on December 3, 2007, the plaintiff dropped the class action attempt. On May 21, 2008, the plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel, that, though originally denied by Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill, Jr., was eventually granted and the plaintiff was appointed counsel. On September 9, 2008, the defendants filed their first motion for summary judgment. In a June 22, 2009 report, Magistrate Judge Sherrill recommended the motion be granted in part and denied in part. He concluded that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff had been excluded from the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of the correctional facility and his disability had not reasonably been accommodated and therefore the motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims should be denied. As for the equal protection claim, the magistrate judge concluded that the plaintiff had come forward with evidence to show that other inmates have received radios with higher decibel audio as he has requested and therefore the motion to dismiss to that claim should be denied. The magistrate judge also recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff's speech therapy claim (that he needs the higher decibel radio and speech therapy to learn to speak) and the plaintiff's individual capacity liability claim under the ADA be denied. On August 11, 2009, U.S. District Court Chief Judge Stephan P. Mickle, accepted the magistrate's recommendations over the defendants' objections to the magistrate's recommendations. The plaintiff again tried to amend the complaint, to re-add class action allegations, and the magistrate judge, in an August 12, 2010 report and recommendation, suggested that the Court grant the motion to amend in part, and deny it in part. The magistrate's recommendations were accepted by Judge Mickle on November 22, 2010, permitting the plaintiff to file an amended complaint with class action allegations, but disallowing the addition of prisoner plaintiffs. A month later, the defendants appealed that November 22 opinion adopting the magistrate's recommendations, but their appeal was dismissed, sua sponte, for lack of jurisdiction. On January 11, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case with Blackburn v. Florida Department of Corrections (4:10-CV-569-SPM/WCS) and Johnson v. Florida Department of Corrections (4:10-CV-570). While waiting for the Court to rule on this motion, the plaintiff filed a number of motions including an emergency motion to enjoin the defendants from retaliating against him, an emergency motion for writ of habeas corpus, an emergency motion for injunction to ordering the defendants to transfer the plaintiff, and an emergency motion to depose the plaintiff. These motions were either deferred or immediately denied by the magistrate judge. As for the motion to consolidate, the magistrate recommended it be denied in a February 23, 2011 report and recommendation, a recommendation that was accepted by Judge Mickle on March 28, 2011. A month later, Magistrate Judge William C. Sherrill Jr. denied the plaintiff's motion for a hearing concerning the motion for preliminary injunction and petition for writ of habeas corpus at that time. On July 20, 2011, he issued a report and recommendation that the plaintiff's motion to certify and motion for a preliminary injunction be denied. This recommendation was adopted in a September 19 order by Judge Mickle, and the parties were permitted to file motions for summary judgment within 20 days of this order. On October 11, 2011, Magistrate Judge Sherrill, Jr. granted a motion to substitute a party, replacing former Department of Corrections Secretary Edwin G. Buss with Secretary Kenneth S. Tucker. On October 31, 2011, the substituted defendant filed a second motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff filed his own motion for summary judgment. Magistrate Judge Sherrill recommended that the defendant's motion was granted as to liability for nominal damages for the ADA claim, but otherwise denied, and that the plaintiff's motion be completely denied. Before the parties filed objections to these recommendations, they filed a notice of settlement. The settlement allowed the plaintiff's attorneys to send electronic equipment for the plaintiff to use with his hearing aid to hear the television transmissions and radio signals. On March 8, 2012, the Judge Mickle dismissed the case. On May 3, 2012, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen the case to modify the settlement agreement. Judge Mickle reopened the case on May 10, and adopted a modification of paragraph 4. The case was dismissed with prejudice. On July 26, 2012, the plaintiff filed a motion for injunction and notice of inquiry but the Court denied the motion in an opinion the next day. The parties went to mediation of August 2, 2012, after which the defendant agreed pay $237,500 in settlement of any and all claims for attorney's fees, expenses, and costs of litigation. This case is closed.

Summary: On November 7, 2007, a hearing-impaired inmate at Polk Correctional Institution in Polk City, FL, filed this lawsuit, <i>pro se</i>, in the District Court for the Northern District of Florida. He sued four corrections officials responsible for organizing and providing accommodations for disabled inmates in his lawsuit under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, alleging that the defendants had discriminated against him because of his disability. Representing himself, the plaintiff asked the court for injunctive relief. The plaintiff also sought class certification. The parties eventually settled, and allowed the plaintiff to have electronic equipment, approved by the facility, that he could use with his hearing aid to hear the television transmissions and radio signals. This case is closed.


The town of Gilbert, Arizona, enacted a town code that limited the number of signs churches could place announcing the time and place of their meetings. On March 8, 2007, Good New Presbyterian Church, represented by attorneys from the Alliance Defense Fund, challenged this code by filing this § 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment because the code regulated signs based on the content of the speech. Specifically, the plaintiffs noted that the code allegedly afforded ideological and political signs more protections than signs for religious assemblies. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because groups and individuals similarly situated to the Good News Presbyterian Church were allowed to display larger signs, more signs, signs without time limits, and signs that are not restricted to certain areas. The code violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the sign restrictions hindered the plaintiffs’ ability to invite others to their services, which was an instruction of their sincerely-held religious beliefs. The plaintiffs also alleged that the code violated the Arizona Religious Freedom Amendment because it penalized the exercise of religion by subject it to greater restrictions that were not applicable to other activities. Finally, the plaintiffs alleged that the code violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the code did not define what would be considered an “ideological” sign and, thus, there was allegedly no warning or notice as to what would be considered an ideological sign. For these violations, the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 30, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction against the defendants that would keep them from enforcing the town code. On April 17, 2007, the defendants also moved for a preliminary injunction. The defendants stated that the parties stipulated to an injunction pending the outcome of the litigation and asked the district court to enter it. On May 9, 2007, the court entered the stipulated preliminary injunction. On January 8, 2008, the town amended its code. The changes allowed event signs to be displayed for 12 hours before the event, stated that four signs per property were permitted, and permitted non-profit organizations to display signs in addition to religious assemblies. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that alleged that the amended sign code still violated Free Speech, Free Exercise, Equal Protection, and Arizona state law. The amended complaint no longer alleged that the town code violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Following the amendments, the plaintiffs moved for a second preliminary injunction that would enjoin the defendants from enforcing the amended code. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a second preliminary injunction on September 30, 2008. 2008 WL 11339947. On October 27, 2008, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of their preliminary injunction to the Ninth Circuit. On November 5, 2008 the defendants moved for summary judgment. However, on December 2, 2008, the district court ordered that the plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment would be stayed until the Ninth Circuit ruled on plaintiff’s appeal. On November 20, 2009, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the second preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that the code was a content-neutral regulation that did not impermissible favor commercial speech over non-commercial speech. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to consider the plaintiff’s allegations that the code violated the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause by favoring some noncommercial speech over other non-commercial speech. 587 F.3d 966. The case then proceeded to discovery. On August 27, 2010, both parties moved for summary judgment. On February 11, 2011, the district court granted the town of Gilbert’s motion for summary judgment stating that the Code did not violate the First Amendment’s Freedom of Speech because the code did not distinguish on the basis of the message. Additionally, the district court found that the code did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the code did not regulate on the basis of content, “but rather to address legitimate concerns of safety and aesthetics.” The district court also found that the code did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because the code, while applying restrictions to qualifying event signs that were different from those applied to political and ideological signs, did not apply restrictions that were more restrictive. Additionally, the court noted that the qualifying event sign restrictions applied to both the plaintiffs and “any other non-profit wishing to direct the public to an event.” Finally, the district court found that the code did not violate Arizona state law because it did not compel the plaintiffs to do something in violation of their religious beliefs. 832 F.Supp.2d 1070. On March 11, 2011, the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Ninth Circuit. On February 8, 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit stated that the code was permissible, as there was no discrimination “among similar events or speakers” and that the treatment on the signs was content neutral. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit stated that the code did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to free exercise of religion or equal protection of the laws. 707 F.3d 1057. The plaintiffs then petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 1, 2014. 573 U.S. 957. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on June 18, 2015. The Supreme Court held that the signs were content based and, thus, the code must be subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court found the code lacked narrow tailoring because the code was “hopelessly underinclusive” because of the greater flexibility it allowed ideological and political signs to operate with. As a result, the Supreme Court found the town code unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Court then remanded to the district court consistent with the opinion. 135 S.Ct. 2218. On December 30, 2015, the district court entered a permanent injunction with prejudice against the town from enforcing the code. No attorneys' fees were awarded and the case is now closed.

Summary: A church in Arizona challenged the Town of Gilbert's Sign Code, which limited the number of signs, the location of signs, and the duration the signs could be up regarding the church's weekly meetings. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the Code violated the First Amendment.


On March 31, 2004, a Native American inmate in the California Department of Corrections (CDC) filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the CDC in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Western Division. The plaintiff, represented by the ACLU, claimed that the CDC's hair grooming policy that prohibits male inmates from maintaining their hair longer than three inches violates his rights to religious freedom. The plaintiff asked the court for preliminary and permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the CDC from punishing him for his religious beliefs and compelling the CDC to lift all disciplinary sanctions that have been imposed on him as a consequence of his refusal to adhere to the grooming policy. He also asked for a declaration that the policy violates his rights under RLUIPA. The plaintiff is a Cahuilla Native American and an active participant in his tribe. According to the plaintiff's religious faith, hair is a symbol of knowledge and wisdom and is only to be shorn upon the death of a close relative. The plaintiff believed that if he were to cut his hair he would be unable to join his relatives in the afterlife. Except upon his father's death in 1980, the plaintiff had not cut his hair since 1971. On May 11, 2004, the Court (Judge Ronald S.W. Lew) issued an order denying the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. On appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Court (Judge Pregerson) reversed and remanded the District Court's order holding that (1) the policy imposed a substantial burden on the plaintiff's religious practice, (2) the policy was not the least restrictive alternative to achieve the CDC's interest in prison security, and thus violated RLUIPLA, (3) the plaintiff faced the possibility of irreparable injury absent issuance of an injunction, and (4) the balance of hardships favored the plaintiff. On January 1, 2007, the parties reached a settlement agreement. The CDC agreed to a permanent injunction against the grooming policy that had been in place (the record is unclear, but presumably, the new policy includes some exemptions). California also agreed to expunge from the plaintiff's record all violations of the hair grooming policy, and to not re-incarcerate the plaintiff based on these violations. If re-incarcerated for other reasons, they agreed to not use these violations to determine his classification. Lastly, the CDC agreed to pay $130,000 to the ACLU of Southern California for reasonable attorneys fees. On July 5, 2007, the case was dismissed with prejudice and the court retained jurisdiction for the sole purpose of enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement.

Summary: This lawsuit was filed in 2004 in the federal district court for the Central District of California by a Native American prisoner in California, who sought an exemption from the prison's hair and grooming policy under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. After the district court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction was reversed on appeal, the parties reached a settlement agreement in January 2007. The State agreed to change the hair grooming policy, to expunge from the plaintiff's record all violations of the prior policy, and to not re-incarcerate the plaintiff based on these violations. If re-incarcerated for other reasons, the State agreed to not use these violations to determine the plaintiff's classification. Lastly, the ACLU of Southern California received $130,000 for attorneys fees.


On March 29, 2017, plaintiffs, death row prisoners held in prolonged solitary confinement at Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana. The plaintiffs sued the warden of Angola under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They claimed that placing prisoners in solitary confinement merely because they had been sentenced to death violated their Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment and their Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The plaintiffs, represented by the Cardozo Civil Rights Clinic, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. This case was assigned to Judge Shelly D. Dick. The plaintiff noted in the complaint that anyone sentenced to death was automatically confined to solitary confinement on death row upon their arrival at Angola. The placement in solitary confinement was not based on violation of prison rules, behavioral considerations, or anything other than their death sentence. Over 75 percent of the 70 prisoners had been in solitary confinement for over a decade. The complaint also alleged that the plaintiffs were confined to windowless cells the size of an average home bathroom for 23 hours per day. In contrast to other prisoners at Angola, those on death row were denied any opportunity to challenge their placement in solitary confinement through any administrative means, nor were they given periodic reviews to determine whether they needed to remain in solitary confinement. In the complaint, the injunctive relief sought included permanently enjoining the defendants from violating the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of prisoners. The plaintiff also asked the court to grant a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to present a plan to the Court within 30 days that provided for the release from solitary confinement of the death row prisoners. On December 15, 2017, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify two classes. The first, a due process class, included “[a]ll current and future Death Row prisoners at Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, as well as other prisoners sentenced to death at Angola who are similarly situated.” The second, an Eighth Amendment class, included “[a]ll current and future Death Row prisoners who are now, or will be, on Death Row under the conditions described above for more than five continuous years.” In August 2018, the parties began settlement negotiations. As part of the negotiations, the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for class certification under the condition that it would be reinstated if negotiations were unsuccessful. Their motion to withdraw was granted by Judge Dick on September 8, 2018. The parties continued to negotiate for settlement (unsuccessfully) through the rest of 2018 and all of 2019. On January 6, 2020, the court informed the parties that further efforts to facilitate settlement by the Court would not continue, and that the parties should anticipate going to trial if they could not reach an agreement. As of May 26, 2020, this case is ongoing.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana by death row prisoners held in solitary confinement for over 25 years. The prisoners challenged their placement in solitary confinement, which they claimed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The case is ongoing.


On October 10, 2013, Prison Legal News (“PLN”) filed this lawsuit on behalf of itself and Sullivan County Jail prisoners in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued Sullivan County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by both private and public interest legal counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming violations of the First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The plaintiff claimed that Sullivan County and its sheriff implemented unconstitutional policies that censored prisoner’s access to PLN’s monthly publication and correspondence mailed to prisoners. The policy (Policy I), established in October 2011, required that all mail communication fit on a standard postcard. Any mail the Jail received that did not fit the permitted standard was returned to the sender. The plaintiff also argued that the jail’s current policies were a form of content-based discrimination because the defendants maintained and permitted other magazines inside the jail and prohibited the plaintiff’s materials. On October 30, 2013, plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining the defendants from implementing their policy prohibiting non-postcard mail communication to prisoners as a violation of both sender and recipients’ First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights. District Judge J Ronnie Greer ordered for defendants to provide a response to plaintiff’s motion by November 22, 2013. On November 21, 2013, the defendants filed a motion requesting a time extension to submit their response to the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, claiming that it was unaware of the previously provided deadline. Judge Greer granted that request and the defendants filed their response on December 9, 2013. The defendants argued that the preliminary injunction request was inappropriate and unnecessary given jail safety concerns, permittance of plaintiff’s content to prisoners if properly addressed to an individual, and the October 24, 2013, policy that abandoned the previous postcard-only policy. During 2014, both parties filed subsequent supplement briefs in support and opposition of the preliminary motion under local rule 7.1(d). On March 26, 2015, Judge Greer submitted an order denying the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction because the issue of due process was not properly before the Court. Judge Greer permitted the plaintiff’s ten days to amend its complaint and allege claims based on Sullivan County Jail’s new policy. The plaintiff filed a new motion for preliminary injunction on the same day. On March 27, 2015, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, in compliance with the District Court’s order. Plaintiff argued that the new jail policy (Policy II) did not go into effect until November 4, 2013, after receiving the plaintiff’s first complaint. Further, the policy provided no clear procedure regarding magazines, the “mail rejection” section remained identical to Policy I and violated senders’ due process rights, and the “mail collection and delivery” section violates both sender and recipient due process rights. Defendants filed their answer and response to the motion for preliminary injunction on April 10, 2015. In the answer and response, the defendants argued that the new policy that went into effect on April 9, 2015 (Policy III), addressed the plaintiff’s remaining concerns and rendered the plaintiff’s argument moot. The plaintiff filed another response and supplemental brief on June 4, 2015. The plaintiff renewed its motion for preliminary injunction on June 19, 2015. On June 24, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to strike, on grounds that the renewed preliminary injunction did not fairly comply with local rules and unfairly imposed on the time and resources of the defendants. Additionally, the defendants argued the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf of prisoners. On March 16, 2016, Judge Greer granted the defendant’s motion to strike and granted the plaintiff motion for preliminary injunction filed on March 26, 2015. The Court determined that the plaintiff did have standing to sue on behalf of prisoners because they both shared common constitutional interests. A jury trial was set for August 15, 2017, however, both parties reached an agreement on July 18, 2016. Both parties agreed to settle the case on grounds that the defendants pay $50,000.00 in damages and attorney’s fees. On July 21, 2016, the Court Clerk filed an offer of judgment in favor of the plaintiff. On August 11, 2016, the plaintiff filed a satisfaction of judgment notice. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, Prison Legal News filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. The complaint alleged that Sullivan County Jail's mail correspondence policy violated the First Amendment and Fourteenth Due Process Rights of both the plaintiff and Sullivan County Jail prisoners. Plaintiff requested preliminary, declaratory, and monetary relief. In 2016, the Court granted the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief and the parties reached a settlement that awarded $50,000.00 in damages and attorney's fees. The case closed in August 2016.


On June 11, 2018, the U.S. Government filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued the New York City Housing Authority ("NYCHA") under the U.S. Housing Act of 1937 (42 U.S.C. § 1437d(j)(3)), the federal Anti-Fraud Injunction Act (18 U.S.C. § 1345), and the Toxic Substances Control Act (15 U.S.C. § 2616(a)(1)). The government sought injunctive relief, appointment of a monitor, and equitable relief. The plaintiff claimed that NYCHA violated the basic health and safety regulations of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and repeatedly engaged in deceptive practices. Specifically, they claimed that NYCHA failed to protect the residents from lead paint, failed to provide "decent, safe, and sanitary" housing per HUD's regulations, falsely said that they comply with HUD's regulations by disguising the true conditions of its properties, provided inadequate heat to the homes, and did not fix leaks, peeling paint, and other deteriorations. The plaintiff also claimed that NYCHA's typical response to external inquiries is to cover up or minimize problems that it knows to exist and make false statements to HUD and the public. The case was assigned to Judge William H. Pauley III. In addition to filing the complaint on June 11, 2018, the plaintiff also submitted a proposed consent decree calling for a non-judicial monitor, and among other injunctive and monetary agreements: <blockquote> (1) a requirement that NYCHA comply with federal, state, and local lead paint statutes and regulations; (2) a requirement that NYCHA comply with federal regulations requiring HUD housing to be decent, safe, sanitary, and in good repair; (3) injunctive relief requiring NYCHA to establish a Compliance Department, Environmental Health and Safety Department, and Quality Assurance Unit in consultation with the monitor; and (4) injunctive relief requiring NYCHA to comply with federal regulations and rules relating to lead-safe work practices, lead abatement, lead paint disclosure and notification, and prioritization of lead paint hazards. </blockquote> On November 14, 2018, Judge Pauley III denied the consent decree for not being fair, reasonable, or consistent with the public interest. He also claimed that it had fatal procedural flaws, including unrealistic enforcement mechanisms. 347 F.Supp.3d 182. On January 31, 2019 the parties signed an agreement that called for the appointment of a non-judicial monitor. The agreement provided that within 14 days of appointment of the monitor, the plaintiff would voluntary dismiss the claims without prejudice. The parties also filed a joint motion to stay the proceedings for forty-five days in order to allow them to obtain a monitor to satisfy the condition precedent to dismissal under the parties’ agreement. On February 1, 2019, Judge Pauley III approved this motion. On March 14, 2019 the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, and the court ordered the case be dismissed without prejudice on March 15, 2019 because the parties had appointed a monitor on February 28, 2019 and finalized a settlement agreement. The defendant agreed to remedy the deficient conditions in NYCHA properties, comply with all obligations under federal law, reform its management structure, and coordinate with HUD and the City. The settlement required installing a monitor to oversee development, issuing quarterly reports, convening with a community engagement committee, and changing the leadership (CEO) for NYCHA. Additionally, NYCHA was required to meet specified compliance requirements for lead paint and other health and safety issues, establish a compliance department, environmental health and safety department, a quality insurance unit, submit to inspections, and update all systems related to heat, elevators, trash, pests, and other disruptions. The monitor, HUD, EPA, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office all held certain oversight roles under the agreement. At any time five years from the effective settlement date (March 15, 2019), either party can move to terminate the agreement and it will be terminated if the defendants have satisfied the specified criteria, which includes with compliance with obligations outlined in settlement for the twelve months prior to requesting termination and complying with all applicable laws. Regarding costs, the settlement required the City to bear the costs of the monitor, consultant, and all updates necessary. The City agreed to commit at least $2.2 billion in funding in the next 10 years to address issues with the NYCHA buildings. If the defendant fails to comply with the agreement, HUD, EPA, or the United States may enforce the agreement by seeking injunctive relief or an order of specific performance. The court agreed to retain jurisdiction over the settlement until termination of the agreement. As of May 29, 2020, there was no additional activity on this case. The settlement agreement is ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the U.S. government filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the New York City Housing Authority violated basic health and safety regulations of the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and repeatedly engaged in deceptive practices. The parties have settled, and NYCHA is required to comply with laws and standards outline in agreement. The settlement agreement is ongoing.


On July 22, 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The DOJ brought this suit on behalf of an employee of the University who had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that the University had discriminated against her in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying her a reasonable accommodation. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the University of Michigan did not offer the employee a transfer or reassignment after she suffered a back injury that prevented her from being able to carry out her job. In addition, according to the complaint, the University did not give the employee "priority placement" into a vacant position as outlined in the University's own Standard Practice Guide, even after the employee applied for several jobs at the University. Instead, the University utilized a "best qualified" standard in selecting candidates for a vacant position, even when considering reassignments for reasonable accommodation. The DOJ requested monetary relief on behalf of the employee and injunctive relief to address the University's ADA violations. The University of Michigan settled with the DOJ in a consent decree filed with the complaint. Without admitting fault, the University agreed to modify its policies, practices, and procedures, including eliminating the application of the "best qualified" standard when considering reassignments as a reasonable accommodation and implementing a policy to reassign employees with disabilities to vacant positions for which they are qualified without competition for the position, when no accommodation is available in the current job. In addition, the University agreed to train its supervisors and human resource staff regarding the requirements of reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Finally, the University agreed to pay $156,674.37 to the employee mentioned in the complaint and an additional $58,445.47 to another affected individual. The consent decree was signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman on August 3, 2015 and scheduled to last 2018. No further docket entries exist, so the case is closed.

Summary: In 2015, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the University of Michigan. The DOJ brought this suit on behalf of an employee of the University who had filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, claiming that the University had discriminated against her in violation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act by denying her a reasonable accommodation. The case was settled in a consent decree, requiring the University to modify its policies, practices, and procedures and train its supervisors and human resource staff, as well as pay a total of $215,119.84 to affected individuals.


On June 12, 2012, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit against the State of Florida and the Florida Secretary of State in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The DOJ brought this action under Section 8 of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-9, alleging that the State of Florida violated the NVRA by conducting a systematic program to purge voters from its voter registration rolls within the statutorily-required 90-day quiet period before an election for federal office. In addition, the DOJ alleged that Florida's use of inaccurate and unreliable voter verification procedures violated NVRA's requirements that any such program be uniform and nondiscriminatory. The DOJ sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction against Florida taking any further steps in connection with its voter purge program. On June 15, 2012, the DOJ moved for a temporary restraining order to enjoin the State from implementing the program. Various organizations, including the Judicial Watch, True the Vote, and the Brennan Center for Justice at the NYU School of Law filed amicus briefs in support of the motion. On June 28, 2012, U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle denied the motion finding that the State had "abandoned the [voter purge] program." Judge Hinkle held that the State's program did not violate the 90-day quiet period provision of the NVRA. However, Judge Hinkle noted that it was likely that the voter purge was invalid because it was not "uniform" and "non-discriminatory." Judge Hinkle emphasized that it was possible for the State to design a program program that "accurately identifies noncitizens who are registered to vote without unnecessarily challenging citizens could meet the requirement of uniformity and nondiscrimination," but that the current program likely violated the NVRA. 870 F. Supp. 2d 1346 (N.D. Fla. 2012). In June of 2012, four individuals and an organization, Judicial Watch, moved to intervene in this action, claiming that if noncitizens were improperly registered to vote, it would dilute the votes of properly registered voters. Another organization, True the Vote, moved to intervene as well, wanting to ensure that the state properly maintained accurate voting lists. On September 27, 2012, the parties moved jointly to stay the proceedings until after the election. Judge Hinkle granted the motion on October 10, 2012. Judge Hinkle denied the motions to intervene on November 6, 2012, finding that the intervening parties had their interests adequately represented by the State. On January 10, 2013, the parties jointly stipulated to dismiss this action, and on January 16, 2013, Judge Hinkle dismissed the case. Although the legality of the program was not fully litigated in this case, in 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the 2012 voter purge program did, in fact, violate the NVRA. Arcia v. Fla. Sec'y of State, 772 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2014). More information about that case can be found at VR-FL-0170 in this Clearinghouse.

Summary: In this lawsuit, filed in June 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice alleged that Florida has violated the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) by conducting a systematic program to purge voters from its voter registration rolls within the statutorily-required 90-day quiet period before an election for federal office. In addition, the DOJ alleged that Florida's use of inaccurate and unreliable voter verification procedures violates the requirement in Section 8 of the NVRA that any such program be uniform and nondiscriminatory. The lawsuit seeks a declaratory judgment and an injunction against Florida taking any further steps in connection with its list purge program. U.S. District Judge Robert Hinkle denied the government's motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that the State had abandoned the program. The DOJ voluntarily dismissed this case in January 2013.