On March 31, 2016, U.S. citizens who had engaged in peaceful protest filed this lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (State Court, Kentucky). The case was later moved to the District Court of the United States, Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs sued then-Presidential Candidate, Donald J. Trump, and two individual participants at Trump's rally. The plaintiffs brought claims alleging assault and battery and incitement to riot. They alleged that these claims attached to Trump through agency and vicarious liability, and that he had acted negligently for a failure to provide better security. Specifically, the plaintiff's complaint explained that they had attended a presidential campaign rally for Donald J. Trump with the intention of peaceful protest. As Plaintiffs were protesting, Trump allegedly said “Get ‘em out of here,” following which the individual defendants physically attacked the Plaintiffs until they were forced to leave the rally. Trump also allegedly said “Don’t hurt ‘em. If I say ‘go get em,’ I get in trouble with the press, […]” Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages (for physical injury, humiliation, emotional distress, mental anguish), punitive damages, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of their costs. On May 20, 2016, Trump and one of the individual defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which Judge David J. Hale granted in part and denied in part on March 31, 2017. The Court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss for counts on incitement-to-riot and negligence but granted Defendant Trump’s motion to dismiss on counts of vicarious liability, as the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to state a plausible claim that these individual defendants had acted as agents of the Trump defendants. The individual defendant's motion to dismiss a claim for punitive damages was granted as well. To this, Defendants moved for interlocutory appeal or, alternatively, for the judge in the district court to reconsider the earlier order. Judge Hale granted this motion on August 9, 2017. Here the Court revisited its earlier decision and reversed its prior ruling as to the defendants' negligence, leaving only the count of incitement-to-riot standing. The Court’s rationale was that the negligent-speech theory was incompatible with the First Amendment. It further found that negligence was an inappropriate vehicle for Plaintiff’s allegations in that they failed to establish that the security provided at the rally was inadequate to prevent violence, and that the purported negligence of ordering audience members to remove protestors was subsumed by Plaintiff’s incitement-to-riot claim. This remaining question of “Does the First Amendment protect Donald J. Trump’s […] statement “Get ‘em out of here,” or may the statement be found to constitute incitement of a riot?” was promptly certified for immediate appeal. Defendant Trump also moved for a writ of mandamus, but this was dismissed as moot. On September 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s final claim of incitement to riot. The Court found that the district court failed to identify which allegations supported a plausible finding that Trump had incited tumultuous and violent conduct posing grave danger of personal injury (this conduct was a necessary element of Kentucky’s statutory definition of a riot), especially when considering Trump’s later statement of “Don’t hurt ‘em.” The Court thus concluded that Plaintiffs had not satisfied their burden of “rendering all other [explanations] implausible, and that Plaintiff needed more than to allege a mere probability or possibility that Defendants acted unlawfully. The Court also referred to First Amendment Protection, finding that the reaction of listeners did not alter the otherwise protected nature of speech and that Defendant Trump’s speech did not include a word encouraging violence that would have transformed it into unprotected speech. This case is now closed.

Summary: On March 31, 2016, Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court (State Court, Kentucky). The case was later moved to the District Court of the United States, Western District of Kentucky. Plaintiffs sued Defendant Donald J. Trump, and Defendants H and B for assault and battery, as well as counts of incitement to riot, agency and vicarious liability, negligence, and punitive damages. The allegations are as such: Plaintiffs attended a presidential campaign rally for Defendant Donald J. Trump with the intention of peaceful protest. As Plaintiffs were protesting, Defendant Trump allegedly said “Get ‘em out of here,” following which Defendants H, B, and an unknown defendant physically attacked the Plaintiffs until they were forced to leave the rally. Defendant Trump also allegedly said “Don’t hurt ‘em. If I say ‘go get em,’ I get in trouble with the press, […]” Plaintiffs sought compensatory damages (for physical injury, humiliation, emotional distress, mental anguish), punitive damages, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest and recovery of their costs. On May 20, 2016, Defendant Trump and B moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which the Court granted in part and denied in part on March 31, 2017. To this, Defendants moved for interlocutory appeal, which was granted on August 9, 2017. Defendant Trump also made a petition for a writ of mandamus, but this was dismissed as moot. On September 12, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s final claim of incitement to riot.


On December 27, 2013, a Latino individual filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court in the Western District of Washington. He sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States of America, specifically the United States Border Patrol (USBP) and the Anacortes Police Department (APD) in Anacortes, WA. The plaintiff, represented by the Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, asked the court for compensatory damages and attorney fees on the basis of five claims: false arrest, false imprisonment, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and abuse of process. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that that the APD improperly took him into custody during a routine traffic stop when they suspected that he was not in the country legally. On March 23, 2015, Judge James L. Robart granted summary judgment partially in favor of the plaintiff and partially in favor of the government. On the counts of false arrest and false imprisonment, Judge Robart determined that the police acted outside their authority when they initially took the plaintiff into custody, but that later, after the plaintiff admitted that he was in the country illegally, it was proper to place him in a detention center. On the other three counts, Judge Robart granted summary judgment to the government. Shortly after, the parties reached a settlement agreement of $10,000. The plaintiff further recovered $8,500 from the Anacortes Police Department in a separate complaint. As a result, on March 31, 2015, the court dismissed the remaining claims and closed the case.

Summary: In 2013, a Latino plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Border Patrol and Anacortes Police Department alleging false arrest and imprisonment after he was taken into custody at a routine traffic stop on suspicion that he was in the country illegally. The case was settled out of court and the plaintiff received $10,000.


On July 8, 2010, an African-American 1st grade boy, on behalf of the rest of the students at his elementary school, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The suit was filed under 42 U.S.C § 1983 against the Recovery School District and the Louisiana Board of Elementary and Secondary Education. The plaintiff, represented by council from the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, asked the court for injunctive relief on behalf of the students at Plaintiff's school as well as a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages for himself. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the school district's policy of having armed police officers restrain students who violate minor school rules by handcuffing them to chairs caused the plaintiff serious harm, and violated plaintiff's rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. At the time of the alleged violations, plaintiff was a first-grade student at Reed Elementary School. Plaintiff was six years old, was about four feet tall, and weighed approximately 60 pounds. On May 4, 2010, plaintiff allegedly failed to follow his teacher's directions. As a result, a police officer took plaintiff to an in-school suspension room where plaintiff was confined with much older students who harassed and teased him. Plaintiff was confined in this room by having his ankle chained to a chair. Two days later, on May 6, 2010, plaintiff got into a minor altercation with a classmate over a seat in the lunchroom. An armed police officer observed this, dragged plaintiff to the principal's office where plaintiff was again forcibly chained to a chair. Plaintiff's parents were not made aware of these incidents until plaintiff complained of pain on his arm and leg after the May 6th incident. Plaintiff's father then met with school officials. At this meeting he was told that the school's policy of restraining children for minor offenses would continue. At his meeting, plaintiff's father was informed that his son would now be suspended for three days. On February 2, 2011, the court (Judge Lance M. Africk) signed an order dismissing the case after a settlement was reached. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center's website, the settlement included changes to the district's policies which prohibited the use of fixed restraints, limited the use of handcuffs, and provided formal training to all security personnel.

Summary: In 2010, an Aftrican-American 1st grade boy, on behalf of the rest of the students at his elementary school, filed a lawsuit against the Recovery School District after being forcibly restrained by being handcuffed and shackled to a chair for violation of minor school rules in accordance with school policy. In early 2011, a settlement was reached which involved changing the district's policy on using restraints and handcuffs. The settlement also provided for formal training of school security personal.


In June 2005, the EEOC district office in Wilmington, Delaware brought this suit against Nabstar LLC, a regional hotel chain, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware. The complaint alleges that the defendant violated 29 U.S.C. section 626(b) (ADEA) when it terminated a 74-year old female two weeks after the defendant acquired her former employer. Specifically, the defendant replaced the 74-year old with a 28-year old after the aggrieved employee performed satisfactorily for 6 years prior. After the parties could not reach a settlement in mediation and a defendant motion for summary judgment was pending for two months, the parties entered into a consent decree in August 2006. The consent decree stated that the defendant must (1) not discriminate or retaliate against persons because of his or her age; (2) not divulge any details pertaining to this litigation to any identifiable or potential employer of the aggrieved employee; (3) pay the aggrieved employee a total of $10,000 in satisfaction of all claims relating to this litigation; (4) conspicuously post a notice in its Wilmington facility conveying its commitment to anti-age discrimination; (5) draft a policy or policies against age discrimination and provide a reporting system for complaints; (6) distribute the policies to individual employees and have a receipt of receipt in each personnel file; and (7) provide ADEA training to all of its supervisors and managers in its Newark, Delaware facility. The term of this agreement was two years. The docket sheet does not show any further enforcement took place; the case was presumably closed in 2008.

Summary: The EEOC sued a hotel chain that had replaced a 74-year-old employee who performed satisfactorily with a 28-year-old under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The parties entered into a two-year consent decree that required the hotel chain to pay $10,000 in damages and comply with ADEA requirements.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Aug. 7, 2013, 28 Indian guestworkers filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, IDavid v. Signal International. Plaintiffs were brought to the United States to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs that was based in Pascagoula, Mississippi and had operations in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $25,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay additional fees ($1050 per month) to live in racially segregated labor camps, and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. The complaint alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. §1590 (trafficking)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §1981), as well as claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs were represented by private law firms. In Oct. 2013, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) consolidated this case and Achari v. Signal International, Krishnakutty v. Signal International, and Devassy v. Signal International, and then transferred the consolidated case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Oct. 24, 2013, the case was assigned to Judge Susie Morgan and consolidated with the Achari case. This case continues on that page.

Summary: On Aug. 7, 2013, 28 Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Oct. 2013, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action was brought on behalf of all people confined at Federal Correctional Institution Fort Dix in New Jersey who are vulnerable to COVID-19 because of their age or underlying health conditions. Petitioners sought temporary enlargement of custody for all class members, or if temporary enlargement is insufficient, the immediate release of all class members. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the case on May 27, 2020. On June 10, the district court denied reconsideration of the order; the case appears to be closed now.
 On May 4, 2020, the petitioners filed a class action lawsuit and petition for writs of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and private counsel, the petitioners sued the Federal Bureau of Prisons and the warden at the Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI") at Fort Dix, under the federal habeas statute 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that their custody violated the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Petitioners also filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claiming that they were subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Section 504 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which requires Fort Dix to reasonably accommodate people with disabilities. The case was assigned to Judge Renee Marie Bumb. The petitioners alleged that the almost 3,000 people held at FCI-Fort Dix resided in units of up to 300 people, and that the warden had warned that “social distancing [was] not possible in this environment.” As of May 1, 2020, the BOP had reported 40 positive prisoner cases at Fort Dix, although petitioners estimated that the number of actual cases was significantly higher. The four named petitioners were all medically vulnerable due to underlying health conditions. The petitioners sought to represent a class consisting of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at FCI-Fort Dix who are over the age of 50 or who experience medical conditions that make them uniquely vulnerable to COVID-19, including (a) lung disease, including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (e.g. bronchitis or emphysema), or other chronic conditions associated with impaired lung function; (b) heart disease, such as congenital heart disease, congestive heart failure and coronary artery disease, or other chronic conditions associated with impaired heart function; (c) chronic liver or kidney disease (including hepatitis and dialysis patients); (d) diabetes or other endocrine disorders; (e) neurological and neurologic and neurodevelopment conditions, including disorders of the brain, spinal cord, peripheral nerve, and muscle such as cerebral palsy, epilepsy (seizure disorders), stroke, intellectual disability, moderate to severe developmental delay, muscular dystrophy, or spinal cord injury; (f) hypertension; (g) compromised immune systems (such as from cancer, HIV, receipt of an organ or bone marrow transplant, as a side effect of medication, or other autoimmune disease); (h) blood disorders (including sickle cell disease); (i) inherited metabolic disorders; (j) history of stroke; (k) a developmental disability; (l) a current or recent (last two weeks) pregnancy; or (m) severe obesity. Petitioners also sought to represent a subclass consisting of all current and future people in post-conviction custody at Fort Dix who have qualifying disabilities within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. Petitioners sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, petitioners requested temporary enlargement of custody (e.g., home confinement) or bail pending habeas corpus during the pendency of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus; if temporary enlargement did not bring the conditions at Fort Dix into compliance with the Eighth Amendment and the Rehabilitation Act, petitioners sought immediate release for class members. The petitioners cited to Wilson v. Williams as an exemplar case in which the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio ordered enlargement of custody for medically vulnerable prisoners at FCI Elkton pending resolution of a class habeas petition on the merits, because of the outbreak already raging at the facility. On May 6, 2020, petitioners filed an emergency motion for a preliminary injunction ordering temporary enlargement of custody (or bail pending habeas corpus) of petitioners and class members during the pendency of the petition for writs of habeas corpus. On May 18, 2020, respondents filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, as well as an opposition to petitioners' motion for a preliminary injunction. On May 27, the court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and granted the motion to dismiss, dismissing the case without prejudice. 2020 WL 2745247. The plaintiffs subsequently requested reconsideration on June 2, which the court denied on June 10. 2020 WL 3074026The court noted that they "afforded Petitioners an opportunity to put forward more facts to back up their conclusory, and to a degree contradictory, accusations, but they have not done so." They agreed with the defendant that the plaintiffs were attempting a "discovery fishing expedition." The case appears to be closed with no further relevant docket entries.

Summary: On May 4, 2020, petitioners filed a class action lawsuit and petition for writs of habeas corpus in U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, claiming that their custody during the COVID-19 pandemic violates the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Petitioners also filed suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, claiming that they were subject to unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, which requires Fort Dix to reasonably accommodate people with disabilities. Petitioners sought temporary enlargement of custody for all class members, or if temporary enlargement was insufficient, the immediate release of all class members. The court denied the motion for preliminary injunction and dismissed the case on May 27, 2020. On June 10, the district court denied reconsiderationof the order.


An Indiana Department of Corrections prisoner filed this class action lawsuit pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 16, 2013. The plaintiff, who was previously convicted of a sex offense but has maintained his innocence since, alleged that the Indiana Department of Corrections has made it mandatory for all convicted sex offenders to participate in the Indiana Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (INSOMM) program. The INSOMM program requires participants admit their misconduct as part of a plan of therapy. Participants must admit not only the crimes of which they have been convicted but also all other sexual misconduct, including acts that still could be prosecuted which the plaintiff argued violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The plaintiff alleged that refusing to participate in the INSOMM program resulted in reports of his conduct, segregation, loss of privileges at the prison, and loss of good-time credit towards early release. On September 11, 2013, District Judge Richard L. Young dismissed this case for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Judge Young relied on Entzi v. Redmann, 485 F.3d 998, 1004 (8th Cir. 2007), which he interpreted to hold that a state's exercise of discretion over a prisoner's release (such as a good-time credit program) does not make self-accusation compulsory. The plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that Indiana's good-time credit program is not discretionary, since prisoners are entitled to credits unless they misbehave. On May 29, 2014, the Court of Appeals issued an order vacating the judgment and remanding the case with further instructions. 564 F. App'x 844 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court of Appeals held that it was not necessary to rule on whether the good-time credit program was mandatory since the much of the relief the plaintiff was seeking is not available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 instead. The Court of Appeals instructed the District Judge to ask the plaintiff whether he was willing to have the suit treated as a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Otherwise, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's case should be dismissed. The plaintiff entered his order of agreement pursuant to the Court of Appeal's order on June 2, 2014, thus continuing this lawsuit. On October 23, 2014, the District Court consolidated five additional cases with the plaintiff's case, and an attorney from the Indiana Federal Community Defenders was appointed to represent the plaintiffs. On November 3, 2014, plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification and a motion for preliminary injunction seeking an order enjoining the Indiana Department of Corrections from continuing to compel the plaintiffs' participation in INSOMM. On September 30, 2015, Judge Young granted the plaintiff's motion for class certification, defined as "[a]ll persons incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction who have been asked to participate in the Indiana Sex Offender Management Program, who have refused to participate because they refuse to confess guilt on the primary offense or disclose other criminal conduct as required by the INSOMM program, and who have been subjected to disciplinary action in the form of lost credit time and/or demotion in credit class as a result." Judge Young also denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction as moot, allowing the plaintiffs to file a new consolidated motion for preliminary injunction in light of the court's class certification order. Over the next two years, parties engaged in discovery. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment on July 10, 2017. Defendant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on August 31. The court (Judge Young) granted plaintiffs' motion, and the class petition for habeas corpus, on September 28, 2017. The judgment required the Indiana Department of Corrections to vacate any disciplinary proceedings and sanctions of any member of the class based on their refusal to participate in the INSOMM program, and to establish a new projected release date for each class member. Defendant appealed the summary judgment on October 30, 2017 to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal (Docket No. 17-03256) was argued before the Seventh Circuit on October 26, 2018, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on April 25, 2019. Judge Diane Wood, joined by Judges Diane S. Sykes and Michael Y. Scudder, found that the INSOMM program compelled self-incrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment because it forced prisoners to either admit to past crimes or lose eligibility for early release. 922 F.3d 371. In early 2020, the plaintiffs requested a status conference to help them identify class members and determine the relief to which each class member is entitled. The case is ongoing.

Summary: An Indiana Department of Corrections inmate filed this class action lawsuit <i>pro se</i> under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on May 16, 2013. The plaintiff, who was previously convicted of a sex offense but has maintained his innocence since, alleged that the Indiana Department of Corrections has made it mandatory for all convicted sex offenders to participate in the Indiana Sex Offender Management and Monitoring (INSOMM) program, which violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Class action certification was granted on September 30, 2015. The district court granted the petitioners summary judgment on September 28, 2017, which the Seventh Circuit upheld on April 25, 2019. The case is ongoing while the parties figure out what kind of relief is most appropriate.


On Mar. 31, 2017, plaintiff Cora Currier sued the defendant agencies under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Cora Currier is an employee of First Look Media Works and a staff reporter for The Intercept, an online news and journalism platform. Currier's complaint sought disclosure of agency records by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of State (DOS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) (along with the DOJ's component Offices of the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Legal Counsel, Legislative Affairs, and U.S. Marshals Service). Specifically, Currier sought the disclosure of records concerning the development and execution of travel restrictions barring nationals of several Muslim-majority countries from entering the United States pursuant to President Trump's Jan. 27 Executive Order 13769. The complaint alleged that on Feb. 1, 2017, Currier submitted a FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies seeking copies of records concerning the analysis and implementation of the Executive Order. Currier requested expedited processing on all requests. The complaint further alleged that, as of the date of filing, Currier had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies and had exhausted all applicable administrative remedies. Additionally, the complaint alleged that not only had DHS, DOS, and DOJ failed to expedite the processing of Currier's requests, the agencies had also exceeded the generally-applicable 20-day statutory deadline for the processing of any FOIA request. Currier sought an order requiring DHS, DOS, and DOJ to produce the requested records in their entirety, to provide for expeditious proceedings in the action, and to award Currier costs and attorneys' fees. On Mar. 31, the case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Curley. (On Mar. 6, 2017, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 Executive Order and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780.) On May 19, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint alleged that on Apr. 3, 2017, Currier submitted a FOIA request to the defendant federal agencies (including the Department of Defense (DOD), which the amended complaint added to the suit as a defendant) seeking copies of records concerning the analysis and implementation of the second Executive Order. The complaint further alleged that, as with the first round of FOIA requests, the defendant federal agencies had not yet responded. Currier sought an order requiring DHS, DOS, DOD, and DOJ to produce the requested records in their entirety, to provide for expeditious proceedings in the action, and to award Currier costs and attorneys' fees. On July 20, Currier moved for a preliminary injunction, requesting that the Court order the defendant agencies to complete the expedited processing of her FOIA request by no later than Sept. 5. On Aug. 24, Magistrate Judge Jacqueline Scott Corley heard oral argument on the preliminary injunction motion. That day, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer regarding the government's rolling document productions. The parties' Jan. 11, 2018 status report noted that several defendants were making monthly rolling productions, while others had completed production. The latest status reports from February 2018 through June 2020 stated the same. The parties will continue to file monthly reports. Declassified versions of some documents released by the government are available through this case page, below. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiff Cora Currier, an employee of First Look Media Works and staff reporter for The Intercept, sued the DHS, DOS, DOJ, and DOD under DOIA, seeking records concerning the development and implementation of travel restrictions barring nationals of several Muslim-majority countries from entering the U.S. pursuant to President Trump's Jan. 27 Executive Order. The defendants are currently searching for documents.


On September 28, 2006, a consortium of immigrant rights advocacy groups, including Northwest Immigrant Rights Project and the American Immigration Law Foundation, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the Department of Homeland Security's refusal to comply with the precedent decision of the Ninth Circuit in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2004). Plaintiffs alleged that federal immigration officials had been ordered to deny applications for "Permission to Reapply for Admission After Deportation or Removal" filed on form I-212 (I-212 waiver application) when ten years had not elapsed since the applicants' last departure. Plaintiffs asserted that this practice violated the Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft decision, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Fifth Amendment. As a result of the practice, plaintiffs were denied the opportunity to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status and faced possible deportation proceedings. Contemporaneously with initiating the lawsuit, plaintiffs requested a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction and class certification. The government filed papers with the court opposing the requested relief. Following an injunction hearing, the District Court (Judge Marsha J. Pechman) issued a preliminary injunction and certified the case as a class action. In an order dated November 13, 2006, Judge Pechman ruled that: (1) plaintiffs were not required to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit; (2) plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that the policy violated the INA; and (3) the requirements for class certification were satisfied. Gonzales v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 239 F.R.D. 620 (W.D. Wash. 2006). On motion by the defendants, the Court (Judge Pechman) modified the wording of its preliminary injunction on December 19, 2006, to make clear that it extended only to class members whose I-212 waiver applications were adjudicated within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit. Defendants appealed the injunction, and on January 24, 2007, the District Court entered an order staying discovery and further action in the trial court pending resolution of defendants' appeal to the Ninth Circuit. On November 30, 2007, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Consuelo M. Callahan, Judge William C. Canby, Jr., and Judge Cynthia H. Hall) vacated the District Court's preliminary injunction. Duran Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007). It found that under the Supreme Court's decisions in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967(2005), courts are required to defer to an administrative agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute even if there is earlier judicial precedent to the contrary; therefore, since the Court found that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had reasonably interpreted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in In re Torres-Garcia, 23 I. & N. Dec. 866 (BIA 2006), to dispose of plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, it had to defer to the BIA's judgment. After considering and ultimately rejecting a petition by plaintiffs for rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate on January 23, 2009. That same day, the District Court (Judge Pechman) entered a temporary restraining order to keep class members from being deported while it finished adjudicating the case. On February 6, 2009, however, it found that in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision, there was little likelihood that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits and thus denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Gonzales v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 2:06−cv−01411, 2009 WL 302283, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12661 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 6, 2009). On February 27, it also denied plaintiffs' motions to amend their complaint and amend and redefine the class in order to challenge the retroactive application of the Ninth Circuit decision, reaffirming its decision in its order denying the preliminary injunction that the Ninth Circuit decision could not be interpreted to apply only prospectively. Gonzales v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. 2:06−cv−01411, 2009 WL 506848, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18753 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2009). Having ruled on all of the legal questions before it, the Court entered judgment for the defendants. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on October 25, 2011. Duran Gonzales v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit stated that its previous decision, Duran Gonzales v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 508 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 2007), applied retroactively. However, on March 1, 2012, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its decision in a related case, Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 649 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2011), and ordered rehearing en banc. The Ninth Circuit stayed its mandate in the present case pending the outcome of the en banc decision. On October 19, 2012, the court issued its en banc decision in which it overruled the retroactivity analysis that the court applied in Duran Gonzales v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 659 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2011). Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The Ninth Circuit ruled that, when it overturns its own precedent in light of the contrary statutory interpretation by an agency, it will treat such instances as if the agency changed its rule, and analyze whether it applies retroactively under the Montgomery Ward test. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 1322, 1328 (9th Cir. 1982). The five factors of the test include: 1) whether the case is of first impression; 2) whether the new rule is an abrupt departure from an old practice or if it merely fills a void in an unsettled area of law; 3) the extent to which a party subject to a new rule, relied on the old rule; 4) the degree of burden that retroactive application places on the party; 5) the statutory interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance on the old rule by the party. Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit ordered the parties in the present case to submit briefs discussing the effect of the Garfias-Rodriguez decision. On March 29, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued an order, withdrawing its previous opinion, vacating the District Court's decision, and remanding the case for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit refused to apply law of the case in light of its en banc decision. It also added that it was expressing "no opinion on . . . . whether the Montgomery Ward factors can be adjudicated on a class-wide basis." On July 23, 2013, the Ninth Circuit issued its mandate. On remand, the case was set for trial. However, the parties reached a settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 16, 2014, but the settlement was not yet perfected. On March 14, 2014, the parties entered a joint stipulation to reopen the case to enter the final settlement agreement. The District Court issued its preliminary approval on March 21, 2014, also reopening the case. The Court amended the class definition, and dividing the class into three subclasses. The settlement involved remedies for class members who submitted adjustment of status and I-212 waiver applications on or after August 13, 2004 and on or before November 30, 2007. Under the agreement, various subclasses are entitled, with variations that can be seen in the agreement for more detail, to have their immigration cases reopened and adjudicated on the merits, based on the Montgomery Ward factors and without retroactive application of In re Torres-Garcia. The defendants agreed to give notice to all potential class members and, within 24 months of the effective date, provide a list of all class members and the status of the immigration proceedings. The agreement was to terminate within 30 months of its effective date. Following a fairness hearing, the Court issued a final order, approving the settlement agreement, on July 21, 2014.

Summary: A consortium of immigrant rights advocacy groups filed this case in the Western District of Washington to challenge the Department of Homeland Security's policy of denying applications for "Permission to Reapply for Admission After Deportation or Removal" filed on form I-212 (I-212 waiver application) when ten years had not elapsed since the applicants' last departure. Plaintiffs asserted that this practice violated Ninth Circuit precedent in <i>Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft</i>, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Fifth Amendment. While the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the Ninth Circuit ultimately reversed, finding that the courts owed deference to an administrative interpretation of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act that disposed of plaintiffs' claim. However, following the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in a related case, the Ninth Circuit withdrew its decision, vacated the District Court's decision and remanded the case. The parties eventually settled, and the District Court approved the settlement agreement on July 21, 2014. The Court certified class, who were entitled to reopening of their immigration case based on the Ninth Circuit's judgment.


On February 26, 1997, African American employees of Lufkin Industries filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against their employer. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and equitable relief, attorneys' fees and costs, an injunction, and any other appropriate equitable relief. The plaintiffs claimed that they were discriminated against on the basis of race in hiring, job assignments, training, evaluations, promotions, demotions, discipline, compensation, lay-offs, recalls, rehires, terminations, and other terms and conditions of employment. On October 22, 1997, Judge Thad Heartfield denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. The Court stated that the plaintiffs should have the chance to do discovery related to their claims. The parties engaged in discovery over the next two years. In 1998, the case was reassigned to Judge Howell Cobb. Judge Cobb granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on March 31, 1999. The class was certified as: "All Black persons employed for any period of time by defendant Lufkin Industries on or after March 6, 1994, to date, whose compensation, remuneration, benefits, job assignments, promotional opportunities, career advancement and other terms and conditions of employment have been, may have been, or may become, adversely affected by defendant Lufkin Industries' past or present systems of administering hiring, wages, salaries, job assignments, training, evaluations, promotions, demotions, terminations, layoffs, recalls, and rehires." 187 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Tex. 1999). In July 2000, the court held a bench trial before Judge Cobb. The parties presented testimony and evidence at the trial. After the trial, the parties agreed to stay the case while they attempted mediation. After three years, mediation proved unsuccessful and the plaintiffs reopened the case, filing their second amended complaint on March 28, 2003. On July 11, 2003, the Court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the disparate treatment class claims to the extent that disparate treatment claims, if asserted, would be severed from this case. The Court also ruled on various discovery motions from both parties, denying the defendant's motion to transfer the case to a different court for trial and denying the plaintiffs' motion to bifurcate the trial. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the dismissal of disparate treatment class claims on August 1, 2003. The Court denied the plaintiffs' motion primarily because the Court had never certified a disparate treatment class, and the Court had provided mechanisms by which the plaintiffs could individually pursue disparate treatment claims. The parties entered a stipulation regarding the geographic scope of the class, which the Court signed on October 27, 2003. The stipulation modified the original class certification so that only employees working at the defendant's Angelina County, Texas, facilities were eligible for the class. The Court denied the defendant's motion to amend the class certification to exclude salaried employees on October 30, 2003. On the same day, the Court denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. On November 18, 2003, the Court denied three unions' motions to intervene as of right as defendants. The unions (the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers; the Glass, Molders, Pottery, Plastics, & Allied Workers International Union; and the International Association of Boilermakers) had filed their motions only 34 days before the trial. Thus, the Court found that the unions' motion failed the timeliness requirement of Rule 24(a)(2). On August 31, 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's denial of the motion to intervene. McClain v. Lufkin Industries, 108 Fed. Appx. 176 (5th Cir. 2004). The Court filed a memorandum and order serving as its findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench trial on January 13, 2005. McClain v. Lufkin Industries, 2005 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 42545 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 13, 2005). The Court again found that the plaintiffs had satisfied the requirements for class certification and that the plaintiffs had sufficiently exhausted their administrative remedies. The Court enjoined Lufkin Industries against racially-biased assignment and promotion practices. The Court also ordered Lufkin to pay back pay to employees who had been discriminated against. The defendants appealed this decision. The Court granted in part and denied in part Lufkin Industries' motion to amend and make additional findings of fact on February 14, 2005. The Court did amend its judgment to award pre-judgment interest at the rate of 5% instead of 10% on the back pay, but the Court denied the remainder of the defendant's requests. On August 29, 2005, the Court amended its final judgment and concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to back pay and injunctive relief. The Court also awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. The Court denied without prejudice the plaintiffs' motion for a supplemental award of attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses on September 19, 2005. In 2015, Judge Cobb passed away, and the case was reassigned to Judge Ron Clark. After considering the defendants' appeal, on February 29, 2008, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated and remanded in part, the District Court's judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. McClain v. Lufkin Industries, 519 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2008). The Fifth Circuit (Circuit Judges Edith H. Jones, Patrick E. Higginbotham, and Edith Brown Clement) vacated the District Court's judgment insofar as it held the defendant liable for discriminatorily assigning newly hired African Americans to a certain division. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment regarding the defendant's liability for its discriminatory promotional practices. The parties filed their final joint status report on back pay issues on March 31, 2009. The parties had resolved some issues on their own, but several issues remained that needed to be resolved by the Court. On April 2, 2009, Judge Clark issued an order regarding attorneys' fees. 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 27983 (Apr. 2, 2009, E.D. Tex.). The Court found that the plaintiffs were the prevailing party even though a final judgment on the merits had not been entered. As such, the Court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiffs $4,740,195.80 for attorneys' fees and $932,603.84 in litigation related expenses through January 1, 2009. Further, the Court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $140,562.26 in taxable costs. On April 7, 2009, Judge Clark approved the parties' proposal to appoint Industrial Organizational Psychologist Dr. Michael Campion to review the defendant's promotion policies, procedures, and practices to address and remedy the Court's findings of unlawful subjectivity in promotions. Judge Clark issued an order regarding damages on June 19, 2009. The parties had already agreed that damages should be awarded for the time period between 1996 and 2002 in the amounts of $1,901,417 for hourly employees and $128,055 for salaried employees. The Court found that damages must also be awarded for the time period from 2003-04. The Court also ordered the plaintiffs to file a brief outlining their claim for hourly promotion discrimination between 2005-07. Judge Clark denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on June 19, 2009. In light of previous rulings in the case, the Court refused to find that the defendant did not discriminate when promoting employees to, and within, salaried positions or that damages and injunctive relief were barred. The defendant appealed the Court's award of attorneys' fees and costs to the plaintiffs. However, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal on August 28, 2009, because it did not qualify under the collateral order doctrine because the award would be reviewable on appeal after the District Court entered a final judgment. McClain v. Lufkin Industries, 342 Fed. Appx. 974 (5th Cir. 2009). Judge Clark issued an injunction to partially remedy the discrimination found earlier by the Court on December 18, 2009. 2009 WL 5814125 (Dec. 18, 2009, E.D. Tex.). The injunction: (1) appointed an outside ombudsperson to monitor compliance, investigate complaints, and report to the Court; (2) required compliance with certain promotion procedures; (3) outlined testing protocols for determining promotions; (4) imposed training requirements; and, (5) imposed reporting and internal monitoring requirements. The Order remained in effect for five years after the date of its entry (December 18, 2009). Judge Clark issued an order regarding monetary relief on December 22, 2009. 2009 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 125630 (Dec. 22, 2009, E.D. Tex.). The Court awarded $3,269,845 in back pay (plus pre-judgment interest) and appointed a third-party administrator to administer the funds. The Court issued its final judgment on January 15, 2010. 2010 WL 455351 (Jan. 15, 2010, E.D. Tex.). The defendants were ordered to pay $3,269,848 in back pay; $2,218,421.48 in pre-judgment interest; and post-judgment interest was to be calculated at the rate of 0.41%. The order also governed the allocation of payments to the plaintiffs and again outlined the payments due to the plaintiffs' attorneys. On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court denied certiorari review. The defendants were also denied rehearing and therefore the court proceeded to implement the December 2009 injunction. After implementing the injunction, the district court held periodic status conferences with the parties in an attempt to narrow the disputed issues and to identify areas of agreement. When the parties reached agreements on certain other issues related to the scope and terms of injunctive relief, the court would amend the injunction to reflect those stipulations. On December 21, 2011, Judge Clark entered the first amended injunction. A third amended injunction came on December 19, 2012 and a fourth on July 17, 2013. The injunction expired pursuant to its own terms on December 19, 2014. The case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by African American employees of Lufkin Industries against Lufkin Industries seeking declaratory and equitable relief to remedy racial discrimination in various terms and conditions of employment. The Court granted Plaintiffs an injunction and back pay, and final judgment was entered in the case on January 15, 2010, but the case is ongoing. On December 21, 2011 an amended injunction was put in place to remain in effect for five years. The injunction expired in 2014 and the case is now closed.


On March 20, 2013, a for-profit business and its owner filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Administrative Procedures Act, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The plaintiffs, represented by Thomas More Law Center, a Catholic non-profit legal service, alleged that the Federal Government had violated these acts and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate that required employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that providing contraception coverage would violate the owner's religious beliefs. On March 22, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an emergency temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On the same day, Judge Denise Page Hood denied the motion for an emergency restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the motion for preliminary injunction. In a written opinion, the court explained that other courts had held that the contraception mandate applied only to the corporate entity, not to its officers or owners, and that any burden imposed on an individual owner was "remote and too attenuated to be considered substantial for purposes of the RFRA." Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 13–11229, 2013 WL 1190001, *1, *4 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013). Because the plaintiffs had not expressly made a distinction between the corporate entity and its owner, who brought the suit as the entity's sole shareholder, the court found that the plaintiffs had not shown that they had an action under RFRA. On May 21, 2013, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in a written opinion. Again, regarding the plaintiffs' RFRA claim, it cited to the proposition that the mandate only applied to the corporate entity, and thus any burden imposed on individual owners was not considered substantial for purposes of the RFRA. On the plaintiffs' First Amendment claim, the court found that the individual plaintiff owner had not demonstrated that the contraception mandate violated the Free Exercise Clause based on his argument that the mandate was not neutral nor generally applicable, because the mandate's purpose was to promote public health and gender equality. On the same day, the plaintiffs appealed from the order denying the motion for a preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On May 31, 2013, the parties filed a joint motion in district court to stay the proceedings pending the outcome of the appeal. The district court granted the motion to stay on June 12, 2013. On Oct. 24, 2013, Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey for the Sixth Circuit denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and remanded the case to district court with instructions to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626, 633 (6th Cir. 2013). The court cited the law of the Sixth Circuit, announced in the recent decision in Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618 (6th Cir. 2013), which established that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' requests for injunctive relief. 733 F.3d at 628. The court noted that Autocam held that the individual owners/shareholders lacked standing to bring their claims against the government in their individual capacities under RFRA, nor could they assert the individual plaintiffs' claims on their behalf. The court emphasized that incorporating a business created a "distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created it, who own[ed] it, or whom it employ[ed]." 733 F.3d at 631 (quoting Autocam, 730 F.3d at 624. On November 12, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a petition with the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and the case was placed on the docket two days later as Case No. 13-591. Soon after, on November 26, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a substantially similar case with the same defendants, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.. On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in that case, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On July 1, 2014, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs' petition for writ of certiorari, and on August 4, 2014, vacated the judgment in this case in light of the Hobby Lobby decision and remanded to the Sixth Circuit for further consideration. On January 7, 2015, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for any further proceedings. On February 3, 2015, the defendants filed a joint motion to reopen the case at the district court level. On February 12, 2015, the district court issued a permanent injunction enjoining the defendants from enforcing the ACA contraception mandate against the plaintiffs, and ordered that a judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiffs on their RFRA claim, and dismissing all of the other claims. The court also ordered the parties to meet and confer on the issue of attorneys' fees and costs. On July 10, 2015, the parties notified the district court that they had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs - they did not specify the details of the agreement - and that no further proceedings were necessary. We believe the case is now closed.

Summary: A for-profit company and its owner sought an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violated the owner's religious beliefs. The district judge denied the plaintiffs' request for an injunction, which the Sixth Circuit affirmed, then the plaintiffs sought review in the Supreme Court. After the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, it vacated the judgment in this case, and remanded to the Sixth Circuit. On Feb. 12, 2015, the district court entered a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiffs


On December 10, 2009, Hispanics who had been restrained and interrogated by law enforcement agents filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio against the U.S. Border Patrol and several Ohio police departments, accusing the defendants of racial profiling. Individual plaintiffs along with the organizational plaintiffs (Ohio Immigrant Worker Project and the Farm Labor Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO), were represented by private counsel and Advocates for Basic Legal Equality. Although the complaint was brought as a class action, the plaintiffs never sought class certification. The plaintiffs alleged that they were restrained and interrogated by the defendants about their immigration status because of their Hispanic appearance, in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. These claims were brought against federal defendants as Bivens claims and against local defendants under § 1983. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants had conspired to violate their right to equal protection in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and § 1986. They requested injunctive and declaratory relief. In their first amended complaint, filed on March 1, 2010, the plaintiffs added claims pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and alleged violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs also added requests for compensatory relief. A settlement conference was held in May 2010, but did not lead to a settlement. On September 29, 2010, the District Court (Judge Jack Zouhary) denied without prejudice defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The court, however, questioned whether subject matter jurisdiction was proper in this case. There followed a long period of discovery. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding factual allegations against federal defendants and attempted to file a third amended complaint to add claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act, but leave to file was denied by the court on June 16, 2012. Over the course of six months in 2012, the plaintiffs settled with the local defendants and dismissed all claims against the local defendants with prejudice. The settlement agreements were not publicly released. These settlements left only the claims against the federal defendants. However, on October 19, 2012, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, finding that plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. <i>Muniz-Muniz v. U.S. Border Patrol</i>, No. 3:09 CV 2865, 2012 WL 5197250 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 19, 2012). The district court, therefore, dismissed the plaintiffs' case in its entirety on November 15, 2012. The plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. On December 20, 2013, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Sixth Circuit held that the waiver of sovereign immunity in the APA applied to all non-monetary claims against federal agencies. 741 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2013). After the case was remanded, the parties engaged in further discovery. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims for lack of standing and moved for summary judgment. On May 28, 2014, the district court (Judge Zouhary) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. 2014 WL 11429041 (N.D. Ohio May 28, 2014). Discovery continued for the next year and a trial date was set for the summer of 2015. The court held the two-week bench trial in June 2015. After the trial, the court had the parties submit post-trial briefs. After reviewing these briefs and the evidence presented at the trial, on February 24, 2016, the district court (Judge Zouhary) found for the defendants. Judge Zouhary held that the plaintiffs alleged an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing, but that they failed to demonstrate that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) maintained a policy or custom that had a discriminatory effect on Hispanics that was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Judge Zouhary also held that the plaintiffs failed to establish that CBP had a policy or practice of escalating consensual encounters through immigration interrogations or encouraging local law enforcement officers to unconstitutionally prolong their investigations. 162 F.Supp.3d 623 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 24, 2016). On April 19, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision. However, on August 24, 2017, the Sixth Circuit (Circuit Judges Kethledge, Meritt, and White) upheld the district court's decision. 869 F.3d 442 (6th Cir. 2017). This case is now closed.

Summary: Hispanics restrained and interrogated by law enforcement agents filed a 2010 racial profiling suit against the U.S. Border Patrol and Ohio police departments. Plaintiffs and local defendants reached undisclosed settlement agreements in 2012. After a 2015 bench trial, the district court found for the defendants in 2016, and the 6th Cir. upheld the decision in 2017.


On January 22, 2018, a father and his minor son filed this lawsuit in the District Court for the Central District of California. The plaintiffs sued the U.S. Department of State (DOS) for not granting U.S. citizenship to the child plaintiff, because he was born outside of the U.S. to a same-sex dual-nationality couple. Represented by the nonprofit organization Immigration Equality and the private law firm Sullivan & Cromwell (who also represented the plaintiffs in a similar lawsuit filed the same day), the plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief granting birthright U.S. citizenship to the child. The adult plaintiff, a natural-born U.S. citizen, married his Israeli-citizen husband in 2010 in Canada. The couple continued living in Canada because the U.S. citizen held joint Canadian citizenship and could sponsor his husband for legal residence there, which he could not do in the United States at the time. Some years later, each man contributed his sperm to conceive two children, born through a surrogate in Canada in 2016. The children's birth certificates listed only the names of the two fathers as parents. However, when the fathers applied for U.S. citizenship for the children, DOS only recognized the citizenship of the son born of the sperm of the U.S. citizen, under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 301(g) (8 U.S.C. § 1401(g)) (governing derivation of U.S. citizenship for a child born abroad to a U.S. citizen). DOS did not recognize U.S. citizenship of the child plaintiff, born of the sperm of the Israeli citizen, because he lacked a biological or adoptive relationship to the U.S. citizen adult plaintiff. According to plaintiffs, DOS erroneously considered this child born "out of wedlock" and not entitled to U.S. citizenship at birth under INA § 309 (8 U.S.C. § 1409). Thus the child plaintiff could only travel to the U.S. with the rest of his family on a temporary tourist visa. The plaintiffs asserted that DOS had a policy of discrimination against the children of same-sex couples. Any child born to a U.S. citizen woman married to a man was born "in wedlock." But a child of a U.S. citizen who was not the biological or adoptive parent, but instead conceived through reproductive technology, could be considered born "out of wedlock." The plaintiffs argued that this policy, which largely burdened same-sex couples, was unsupported by the INA's text and intent to keep families together, as well as case law supporting the rights of same-sex married couples. The plaintiffs alleged that DOS's policy and its application to the plaintiffs violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) as arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the INA. On January 24, 2018, the case was assigned to Judge John F. Walter. Status reports filed in May and July 2018 stated that the parties were continuing to try to resolve the matter without resorting to litigation. On August 21, 2018, Judge Walter referred the parties to private mediation. On November 27, 2018, Judge Walter issued an order for plaintiffs to show cause as to why the case should not be dismissed with respect to the child plaintiff, as a guardian ad litem had not yet been appointed as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c). The order called for the plaintiffs to file an ex parte application to appoint a guardian ad litem by December 3, 2018, which they did. On December 4, 2018, Judge Walter issued an order granting the application. In early January, the parties engaged in a flurry of motions and amended complaints. On January 4, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion amending their complaint to remove the Equal Protection claim. They retained the other three causes of action. Three days later, they filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the Due Process claim and the 8 U.S.C. § 1503 claim for a declaration that the child plaintiff is a U.S. citizen. The same day, DOS also moved for summary judgment on the Due Process and the APA claims. A week later, on January 14, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On February 21, 2019, Judge Walter granted each party partial summary judgment. 2019 WL 911799. He held that DOS was entitled to summary judgment on the APA claim, finding that the plaintiffs had an adequate alternative remedy to the APA claim in their § 1503 claim. Judge Walter ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to summary judgment on the § 1503 claim, finding that there was no dispute over the material facts and that Ninth Circuit authority did not condition citizenship under § 301 of the INA upon a biological connection to both of the child’s married parents. Because the plaintiffs prevailed on the § 1503 claim, the parties agreed, and Judge Walter ruled, that the plaintiffs’ claim for declaratory judgment on the Due Process claim was moot. On March 7, 2019, Judge Walter ruled that the child plaintiff was a citizen of the United States who acquired his citizenship at birth under § 301 of the INA; ordered DOS to issue the child plaintiff a U.S. passport within 45 days of the judgment; ordered DOS to issue the child plaintiff a Consular Report of Birth Abroad if the parents decided to apply for one; prohibiting DOS from charging the family any additional fines (since their first applications were improperly denied); entering judgment for DOS on the APA claim; and dismissing the plaintiffs' Due Process claim as moot. Judge Walter retained jurisdiction to adjudicate on applications for attorneys' fees and costs. On March 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”) for an award of attorneys' fees. Because the defendants planned to appeal the district court's decision, the parties agreed to defer the proceedings related to the motion until a final judgment was reached. On May 6, 2019, the defendant appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, docket number 19−55517. The parties issued a joint status report stating they had agreed upon an amount to be paid in attorney fees on May 9, 2019, but the court ordered deferment in light of the appeal on May 13, 2019. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court on October 9, 2020. 2020 WL 5991163. The Court noted that the district court correctly ruled that the child-plaintiff was a citizen of the United States under Ninth Circuit precedent. The Ninth Circuit issued its mandate and its judgment took effect on January 25, 2021. The parties filed a joint status report on February 2, 2021. The case remains ongoing.

Summary: A same-sex married couple sued the US Dept. of State (“DOS”) for not granting their son US citizenship. The parents conceived twins through a surrogate in 2016; one child was conceived using sperm from the parent with US citizenship, the other child was conceived using sperm from the parent with Israeli citizenship. The DOS only granted citizenship to the child biologically born from the US citizen’s sperm, stating that the other baby was born “out of wedlock.’ The district court ruled that the child plaintiff was a U.S. citizen by birth, and the case is ongoing pending on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.


On September 30, 2013, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") brought this lawsuit against Catastrophe Management Solutions ("CMS") under Title VII in the Southern District of Alabama. The EEOC alleged that CMS violated Title VII by withdrawing an offer of employment to a black woman when she refused to cut off her dreadlocks during the hiring process and claimed CMS's policy prohibiting dreadlocks discriminated based on race. The plaintiff sought injunctive and monetary relief on behalf of the individual who was denied a position. On December 12, 2013, CMS moved to dismiss the plaintiff's case. CMS alleged that the plaintiff's complaint did not contain sufficient facts to show racially discriminatory intent on CMS's behalf. Additionally, CMS pleaded that it is impossible to discriminate on style choices under Title VII. On March 27, 2014, Senior United States District Judge Charles R. Butler, Jr. granted CMS's motion to dismiss, noting that no evidence was submitted in the complaint to demonstrate racially discriminatory intent, that while hair type (e.g. kinky) is an immutable characteristic, hairstyle (e.g. dreadlocks) can be changed, and that dreadlocks are not a hairstyle worn exclusively by black people. On the same day, the court issued a final judgment for CMS. On April 28, 2014 the court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add expert evidence demonstrating racially discriminatory intent. On August 14, 2014, the plaintiff appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. On September 15, 2016 Judge Adalberto Jordan, Judge Julie E. Carnes of the 11th Circuit and Judge Eduardo Robreno of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation, issued a judgment for the defendant. 837 F.3d 1156. On December 13, 2016, the 11th Circuit issued a revised opinion affirming the judgment of the district court, finding no evidence for racially discriminatory animus in the plaintiff's complaint and stating that hairstyle is mutable, regardless of its correlation to hair type, and therefore not protected under Title VII. The 11th Circuit opinion also noted that regardless of CMS's policy's disparate impact on black job candidates and employees, there is no disparate treatment because of the mutability of hairstyle. On October 31, 2016 the plaintiffs petitioned for an en banc hearing. The NAACP submitted an amicus brief on December 2, 2016 in favor of the en banc hearing, but the 11th Circuit ultimately denied the petition on December 5, 2017. On April 4, 2018, the woman who was denied employment moved to intervene in order to file a petition for writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court denied this on May 14, 2018. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2013 a black job applicant filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of Alabama after being denied employment by a prospective employer, Catastrophe Management Solutions. ("CMS") The plaintiff alleged that CMS's policy of refusing employment to people with dreadlocks was prohibited by Title VII as a form a racial discrimination. In 2014, the district court dismissed the case for failure to state a plausible claim of racial discrimination. That same year, the plaintiff appealed to the 11th Circuit. In 2016, the 11th Circuit affirmed the dismissal.


On March 20, 2018, several inmates filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued the Commissioners of the New York State Board of Parole under 42 U.S.C §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the New York State Board of Parole violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by repeatedly denying their parole applications. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The case was assigned to Judge Vincent L. Briccetti. Specifically, the complaint alleged repeated instances where individual plaintiffs who were sentenced to prison for crimes committed as juveniles were denied parole arbitrarily. The complaint alleged that the New York State Board of Parole cherry-picked instances of misconduct to justify denying parole instead of reviewing parole applications holistically. In one instance, the Board allegedly relied on a single misbehavior from twenty years ago as a reason to deny parole to an inmate. This denial occurred even though the inmate had earned a master's degree while incarcerated, had been commended by local prison officials for helping to rehabilitate other prisoners, had low likelihood of recidivism, and had no instances of misconduct while in prison. The impact of these denials was that inmates, who had been sentenced for varying ranges of time, had their sentences extended beyond when they were supposed to be paroled. On March 23, 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to certify their class for the lawsuit. Judge Briccetti denied their motion without prejudice on April 26, 2018, as being premature. Plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to force the commissioners to review all of the application materials for an upcoming May Parole hearing on April 19, 2018. Judge Briccetti denied the motion and gave his reasoning verbally at a May 15 hearing. On June 22, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and on qualified immunity grounds. Shortly afterwards, the court, on its own motion, allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, which was filed on July 18. This amended complaint added six more named plaintiffs. On August 3, 2018, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On September 20, 2019, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' Sixth Amendment claims and all claims for injunctive relief, but ruled that the plaintiffs' Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims for declaratory relief could proceed. As of July 2020, the case is in discovery.

Summary: On March 20, 2018, several inmates filed a class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Commissioners of the New York State Board of Parole. The plaintiffs claimed that the Board of Parole violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by repeatedly denying their parole applications. As of July 2020, the case is in discovery.


On July 13, 2006, two individuals, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 class action lawsuit against Defendants Allegheny County in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, challenging the Allegheny County Bureau of Corrections' policy and practice of strip-searching all individuals entering Allegheny County Jail (ACJ) who were placed in jail clothing, regardless of their criminal charge and without reasonable suspicion to believe they were concealing a weapon or contraband. Plaintiffs, through private counsel, filed their complaint on behalf of themselves and a purported class of thousands of others who were strip searched at ACJ after having been charged with minor criminal offenses. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages for themselves and all class members, as well as a declaratory judgment that Allegheny County's former policy and practice on strip searches was unconstitutional. Defendants answered the plaintiffs' complaint by requesting that the court either dismiss the case or grant the defendants summary judgment. The case was assigned to District Judge Terrence F. McVerry, who referred it to Magistrate Judge Robert C. Mitchell. Magistrate Mitchell recommended that the defendants' motion to dismiss be denied. District Judge McVerry adopted the recommendation and denied Defendants' motion to dismiss. Delandro v. County of Allegheny, 2007 WL 81061 (W.D.Pa. Jan 08, 2007). On November 30, 2007, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction and class certification. In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from illegally strip-searching all pretrial detainees entering custody at ACJ in the absence of individualized reasonable suspicion. And in an Order dated March 18, 2008, the Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. Upon the completion of discovery, the plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the strip-search policy. The defendants responded to the plaintiffs' motion and filed their own motion for summary judgment, arguing in part that the search policy was justified by ACJ's need for security and safety. Defendants further sought summary judgment for those claims directed at the individually named defendants brought in their official capacity. On December 2, 2009, the Court granted the plaintiffs' partial motion for summary judgment of liability as to the County, and granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the individual defendants. Following that order, the parties engaged in settlement negotiations, which ultimately resulted in a settlement agreement. The settlement agreement recognized that the County had changed its policy to stop strip-searching all pretrial detainees on a blanket basis and to stop strip-searching misdemeanor detainees in the absence of reasonable suspicion of a weapon or contraband. The settlement agreement required all correction officers to have access to the policy and be trained on proper search policy. The settlement agreement also created a fund of three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) to compensate class members, and dictated that $18,000.00 will be requested for each of the two (2) class representatives. The Settlement Agreement provides that each class member who submits a timely claim form will be granted a pro rata share of the settlement fund in an amount not to exceed $3,000.00 per class member. Any undistributed funds will be donated to Neighborhood Legal Services Association of Allegheny County, PA.

Summary: On July 13, 2006, two individuals filed a class action lawsuit, on the behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, against Allegheny County, challenging its policy of strip-searching. Everyone placed in jail clothing when entering Allegheny County Jail was striped-searched, regardless of their criminal charge, and without reasonable suspicion that they were concealing a weapon or contraband. The parties settled for $3,000,000, which included money to compensate the class members, named plaintiffs, and the attorney fees.


In September 2004, the Miami District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Associated Security Enforcement, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant subjected the charging parties, female employees, to a sexually hostile work environment consisting of unwelcome sexual comments and requests for sex. In addition, the defendant retaliated against one of the charging parties by demoting her and eventually terminating her employment as a result of her rejections of his sexual advances and/or her complaints of the harassment. Three charging parties intervened in the suit in March 2005. After several discovery disputes and scheduling orders, the court issued an order in February 2006 stating that the defendant had defaulted as to liability. A jury trial to determine damages was held in early March, and the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding damages of $1,337,164.78. The court also granted equitable relief, including annual training sessions; development and implementation of an anti-harassment policy; posting of notice; writing letters of apology to the complainants; giving positive references to the complainants; and expunging the complainants' employment records. The defendant was also enjoined from retaliatory practices and ordered to file semi-annual reports with the EEOC's Miami District Office for a period of four years. The reports included information regarding the receipt of complaints of unlawful discrimination or retaliation made by any of the defendant's employees. Attorneys continued to file time records until August 15, 2011. The case is now closed.

Summary: Miami District Office of the EEOC brought this suit against Associated Security Enforcement, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida alleging discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendant subjected the charging parties, female employees, to a sexually hostile work environment consisting of unwelcome sexual comments and requests for sex. In addition, the defendant retaliated against one of the charging parties by demoting her and eventually terminating her employment as a result of her rejections of his sexual advances and/or her complaints of the harassment. Three charging parties intervened in the suit in March 2005. The court enjoined the defendants from these practices and granted equitable relief. A jury trial awarded damages to the plaintiffs.


On July 1, 2014, several same-sex couples living in Colorado filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against state and county officials. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that Colorado's same-sex marriage ban violated their constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. They asked the court to declare the ban unconstitutional, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing it, and to order the defendants to issue marriage licenses to eligible same-sex applicants and to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. On July 11, 2014, Judge Robert E. Blackburn recused himself and the case was reassigned to Judge Raymond P. Moore. On July 23, 2014, Judge Moore granted the plaintiffs' preliminary injunction, which forbid the defendants from enforcing the same-sex marriage ban. However, the court stayed the injunction until August 25, 2014. Judge Moore also granted the defendants' motion to stay all other proceedings in the case until three days after the final mandate was issued in a similar case, Kitchen v. Herbert (PB-UT-0001 in this Clearinghouse). On August 21, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stayed Judge Moore's preliminary injunction pending the Colorado Attorney General's appeal of the order. On September 18, 2014, the Tenth Circuit abated the appeal pending further order of the court. On October 6, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied petitions for writ of certiorari in two cases, Herbert and Smith v. Bishop (PB-OK-0001 in this Clearinghouse), in which the Tenth Circuit held that Utah and Oklahoma's same-sex marriage bans were unconstitutional. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014). By declining to hear those cases, the Supreme Court let the lower court decisions stand: same-sex marriage was effectively legalized in those states. In response, on October 7, 2014, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal in this case, granting the Colorado Attorney General's motion. Ten days later, on October 17, the District Court (Judge Raymond P. Moore) permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing Colorado's same-sex marriage ban, ordered the court clerk to enter judgement for the plaintiffs, and awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs, granting the defendants' unopposed motion. Eventually the parties settled and Judge Moore dismissed the case on January 28, 2015.

Summary: On July 1, 2014, several same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, asking the court to declare Colorado's ban on same-sex marriage unconstitutional, to enjoin the defendants from enforcing it, and to order the state to issue marriage licenses to eligible same-sex applicants and to recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. On October 17, 2014, the District Court (Judge Raymond P. Moore) permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing Colorado's same-sex marriage ban, ordered the court clerk to enter judgement for the plaintiffs, and awarded the plaintiffs attorneys' fees and costs. Eventually the parties settled and Judge Moore dismissed the case on January 28, 2015.


On July 26, 2010, the United Spinal Association and Disabled in Action represented by Disabled Rights Advocates filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Board of Elections in the City of New York under the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.) and the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794). They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants knowingly failed to fix deficiencies in accessibility at polling places throughout New York City. The parties each sought summary judgment. On August 8, 2012, the District Court (Judge Deborah A. Batts) granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Board of Elections' failure to remedy the accessibility issues at various polling places across the city denied disabled voters a meaningful opportunity to participate in or benefit from the city's voting program and was in violation of both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 882 F. Supp. 2d 615. Accordingly, the judge ordered the Board of Elections to implement a program to allow voters with disabilities the ability to vote. Following an appearance by the Department of Justice, the two sides and the DOJ came to an agreement regulating the new procedure that the Board of Elections would follow to ensure that voters with disabilities had fair access to the polls. The court ruled that it would retain jurisdiction over the case to monitor compliance until December 2016, and that implementation would be overseen by Magistrate Judge Henry Pitman. In the meantime, the City appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on November 5, 2012. The Second Circuit (Judge Carbanes, Hall, and Chin) heard oral argument on December 12, 2013 and then on May 14, 2014, the court issued its decision affirming the district court’s ruling. The court held that the plaintiffs did not need to show that any voters had been “disenfranchised” by the barriers, but only needed to show that the Board of Elections failed to provide “meaningful access” and that the Board had failed to dispute the existence of barriers. In addition, the court acknowledged the difficulty of meeting the requirements of the remedial order but concluded that injunctive relief was a reasonable remedial order, albeit one that would require prudent oversight. 752 F.3d 189. Afterward, on February 5, 2015, the parties reached an agreement for attorney’s fees in the amount of $1.8 million which the judge confirmed on March 10, 2015. In January 2017, Judge Batts extended the court's jurisdiction over the case until December 2019. Meanwhile, the defendants continued to take measures to comply with the court’s remedial order and plaintiffs filed reports about the status of election location access. The parties hired a third-party expert to survey sites and make recommendations for alterations to meet the requirements of the remedial order. Then, on February 14, 2017 the plaintiffs moved to join the New York Department of Education to enforce the remedial order. They did so because roughly half of all polling locations in New York are at schools, and 83% of them (according to the DOJ) were not fully accessible for people with disabilities. On October 11, 2017, Judge Pitman issued an opinion recommending that the District Court reject the plaintiff’s motion to join the Department of Education. 2017 WL 8683672. While Judge Pitman recognized that if the Department of Education had been included at the start of litigation, it would have allowed for more complete relief to be rendered, he did not think it appropriate to join the Department without giving them a chance to defend themselves in court. On March 27, 2018, Judge Batts adopted Judge Pitt's recommendation. 2018 WL 1582231. On April 26, 2018, the parties reached a settlement agreement as to payment of attorneys' fees for all post-judgment activity. Under the settlement, the City of New York agreed to pay Disability Rights Advocates $455,000. On May 30, 2019, the parties filed a joint motion to reopen the case. Specifically, they asked that the court to reduce the defendant's reporting requirements. On June 11, 2019, Judge Batts granted the motion. On November 27, 2019, the plaintiffs wrote to the court and recommended that the court allow its jurisdiction over enforcement of the remedial order to expire as scheduled on December 31, 2019. The plaintiffs agreed that the defendant was compliant with the court order and had substantially improved polling place accessibility. The defendants submitted a similar letter on December 1, 2019. On January 10, 2020, Judge Batts acknowledged receipt of both letters and declared that the court's jurisdiction was thereby terminated. The case is now closed.

Summary: On July 26, 2010, the United Spinal Association and Disabled in Action filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the Board of Elections in the City of New York. On August 8, 2012, the District Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the Board of Elections' failure to remedy the issues at various polling places across the city denied disabled voters a meaningful opportunity to participate in or benefit from the city's voting program. The decision was affirmed by the Second Circuit. After several years of ongoing monitoring, both parties wrote to Judge Batts and asked that the court allow its jurisdiction over enforcement of the remedial order to expire as scheduled. On January 10, 2020, Judge Batts declared the court's jurisdiction terminated. The case is now closed.


On April 30, 2014, six same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio U.S. District Court against the State of Ohio. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought a declaration that Ohio laws banning same-sex marriage were in violation of the Constitution, an injunction against enforcing the ban, and an award of compensation for attorney's fees and costs. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that their rights to due process and equal protection had been abridged. The plaintiffs also alleged that they suffered harm by being denied tax and employment benefits that are available to different-sex couples, along with the social stigma of not being allowed to marry. On April 30, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs then filed a motion for a permanent injunction and declaratory relief on June 28, 2014. However, once the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015), (PB-OH-0003 in this Clearinghouse), District Judge Michael R. Barrett entered a final judgment and declaratory judgment that the Ohio laws at issue violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution on May 27, 2016. The Court permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the state laws. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 30th, 2014, six same-sex couples filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Ohio U.S. District Court against the State of Ohio. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that Ohio laws banning same-sex marriage were in violation of the Constitution, issue an injunction against enforcing the ban, and to award the plaintiffs compensation for expenses and attorney's fees, claiming that their constitutional rights were violated. The case is still ongoing. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court declared that the state laws at issue violated the 14th Amendment and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing the state laws. The case is now closed.