On October 1, 2009, several disabled individuals requiring in-home support services filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the California Department of Health Care Services and California Department of Social Services. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' proposed budget cuts would threaten their ability to remain in the least restrictive settings appropriate, which would have violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Medicaid Act, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Medicaid Maintenance of Effort Clause of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. They raised these allegations under Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Represented by attorneys from Disability Rights California and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The case was originally assigned to Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero and then reassigned to Judge Claudia Wilken. Due to budget cuts, the defendants planned on cutting funds for In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS). The IHSS program enabled aged, blind, and disabled poor to avoid institutionalization because they could remain in their homes with proper supportive services. Seniors with disabilities utilized IHSS services to avoid living in more costly nursing homes. But the defendants had scheduled the statewide budget cuts to occur on November 1, 2009. These cuts to programs would cause immediate and irreparable harm to over 130,000 people with disabilities, according to the plaintiffs, by depriving them of services that would keep them in the least restrictive setting appropriate, putting them at risk of unnecessary institutionalization. The plaintiffs claimed that because of these consequences, the cuts violated the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent, <i>Olmstead v. L.C</i>. In the first month of this case, the plaintiffs addressed the defendants’ plans to mail notices that IHSS benefits had been reduced or terminated. The plaintiffs filed several motions for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to provide adequate notice and opportunity to be heard prior to depriving the plaintiffs of necessary IHSS services, thus violating due process, as well as the Medicaid Act's notice and hearing provisions. Separate injunctions to halt mailing of these notices were granted on October 14 and October 23. The judge ruled that California could not proceed with cutting funding that would so greatly affect a large number of people with disabilities in California. On October 23, 2009, the Court prohibited the defendants from delaying benefits payments to IHSS providers, even if the defendants had planned on terminating their eligibility. The defendants appealed the order to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (09-17581). The case was deferred pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the consolidated appeals of several other cases in the Ninth Circuit, all of which also involved beneficiaries seeking to enjoin the California Department of Health Care Services from implementing state legislation reducing payments to certain medical service providers. (Maxwell-Jolly v. Indep. Living Ctr., 572 F.3D 644; Maxwell-Jolly v. Calif. Pharmacists Ass'n, 2010 WL 737650; Maxwell-Jolly v. Santa Rose Mem. Hosp., 2010 WL 2124276; certiorari granted, 2011 WL 134272). 504 Fed.Appx. 555. On January 5, 2010, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint adding another individual plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 2, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the action, that several of their claims for relief failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and that their claim for damages was barred by Eleventh Amendment state immunity. On April 23, 2010, the parties stipulated to stay all district court proceedings pending the resolution of the defendants’ appeal of the injunction. While the preliminary injunction was in place pending the outcome of the appeal, the California legislature re-wrote the applicable statutes to modify the IHSS coverage formula. Signed by the Governor on June 30, 2011, SB 73 aimed to reduce all IHSS hours by 20%. The new regime would contain a number of exemptions and provide recipients with an opportunity to request additional service hours in light of the across-the-board reductions. SB 73 was set to take effect on January 1, 2012. On December 1, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a new motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in light of the legislation. They also amended their complaint to add four more plaintiffs and remove one of the original plaintiffs, and submitted a motion to certify the class. The judge granted the TRO, which the defendants again appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (12-15366) on February 22, 2012. On March 2, 2012, the judge granted the injunction to enjoin implementation of SB 73. The court also certified a class of "all recipients of IHSS in the State of California whose IHSS services will be limited, cut, or terminated due to the budget cuts, and all applicants to IHSS in the State of California who would have been eligible for IHSS services but who are either not eligible, or are eligible for fewer services, as a result of the budget cuts." In the meantime, the United States submitted a statement of interest because the litigation implicated the proper interpretation and application the ADA's integration mandate under Title II. On January 7, 2013, the defendants’ first appeal to the Ninth Circuit (09-17581) was dismissed and remanded back to the district court. The court held that the claim was moot—it no longer presented a "live controversy" amenable to federal court adjudication because it could no longer grant effective relief in light of California's suspension statute. In March 2013, the parties submitted a joint status report with a proposed class action settlement, which was approved on May 23, 2013. The settlement prevented the planned permanent 20% cut and replaced it with smaller temporary reductions. Following the California legislature's action on these changes, the parties moved jointly on August 7, 2013 to dismiss the case and pending appeals, including a second appeal to the Ninth Circuit (12-15366). In an order filed September 3, 2014, Judge Wilken approved a modification to the settlement agreement submitted by both parties: they agreed to cooperate on legislation that would authorize an assessment of home care services as well as subsequent submission of the assessment to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval. We do not have information about how CMS proceeded on the assessment. The parties agreed that the district court would retain jurisdiction for 30 months after the date of CMS approval or disapproval of the assessment. The parties agreed to return to the district court if there were problems with this process. The 2015 California state budget, SB 97, eliminated the remaining 7% cut to IHSS services from July 1, 2015 to June 30, 2016. There was no further activity in the court after the September 3, 2014 order and the case is now closed.

Summary: This 2009 lawsuit was filed as a challenge to California's planned coverage reductions under its In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program. A federal district court judge enjoined reductions in November 2009, finding that the proposed cuts were likely to violate federal law. When California enacted a new statutory provision to reduce its IHSS coverage in 2011, the court once again enjoined its implementation. In March 2013, the parties entered a settlement that allowed the state to implement much smaller and temporary coverage reductions. And in 2015, the state passed legislation to eliminate the reductions entirely starting July 1, 2015 for one year.


On December 5, 2007, a practicing Muslim woman, represented by the ACLU, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the County of San Bernadino in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. She alleged that the defendants had violated her civil rights by forcing her to remove her headscarf (hijab) while she was in custody in San Bernardino County's West Valley Detention Center. (She had been arrested for having an invalid train pass.) On October 17, 2008, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement specified that Muslim women must be provided a private area to remove their headscarves after arrest and must be provided with county-issued headscarves to cover themselves when they are in the presence of men. The county also paid $10,000 in damages and $35,000 in attorney fees.

Summary:
On December 5, 2007, a practicing Muslim woman filed a lawsuit against the County of San Bernadino in which she alleged that the defendants had violated her civil rights by forcing her to remove her headscarf (hijab) while she was in custody.

On October 17, 2008, the parties settled the case. The settlement agreement specified that Muslim women must be provided a private area to remove their headscarves. The county also paid $10,000 in damages and $35,000 in attorney fees.


On July 30, 2006, the California Alliance of Child and Family Services, a non-profit organization that represents the interests of foster homes, filed a lawsuit under the Child Welfare Act (CWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679b, against the California Department of Social Services in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, alleged that defendant did not comply with the Child Welfare Act, as it failed to "cover the costs" for certain foster care expenses, as the CWA requires. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The crux of the dispute was the defendant's method of calculation and payment of these foster care costs. The defendant's system for determining the costs, adjusted annually based on a necessities index, was changed in 2001 so that adjustments were "subject to the availability of funds." The plaintiff claimed that this method did not adequately cover the foster care costs, since as of 2005-2006, the defendant was making foster care payments at only 80% of full costs based on proper index adjustments. On August 25, 2006, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted since plaintiff does not have a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On October 27, 2006, Judge Marilyn H. Patel denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the Child Welfare Act confers an individual right on plaintiff's members for enforcement of the foster care maintenance payments. The parties attempted to mediate on February 1, 2007, but were not able to resolve any of the disputed issues. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on July 16, 2007. Defendants then filed a motion for summary judgment on July 17, 2007. On January 14, 2008, Judge Patel denied a motion to relate the case with California State Foster Parent Association v. Wagner (in the Clearinghouse as CW-CA-0003). On March 12, 2008, Judge Patel denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court found that payment of 80% of the costs was in "substantial compliance" with the Child Welfare Act, and this was all that was required. After denial of a motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Before the appeal was heard, on September 25, 2009, Judge Patel granted a motion to relate the case with California Alliance of Child and Family Services v. Wagner. On December 14, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Circuit Judges Alfred T. Goodwin and Pamela Ann Rymer, and District Judge George H. Wu, sitting by designation) granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, reversing the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant. The court held that to "cover the costs" of these foster care expenses meant to cover all of the costs. Therefore, payment of 80% of the calculated costs was held not to be sufficient to comply with the Child Welfare Act. The Ninth Circuit then remanded the case to the district court to determine the proper injunctive and declaratory relief. 589 F.3d 1017 (9th Cir. 2009). On February 23, 2010, Judge Patel signed a judgment, as required by the Court of Appeals, for the plaintiffs. Judge Patel ordered that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment was granted in its entirety and granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief and its request for permanent injunctive relief. Judge Patel ordered that the current standard rates paid must be adjusted to be on track with the California Necessities Index (CNI), that the standardized schedule of rates shall be adjusted annually to reflect the change in the CNI, that the new fully-funded standardized schedule of rates be used to establish the AFDC-Foster Care rates paid, and that the standardized schedule of rates be adjusted annually to reflect any new departmental requirements established during the previous fiscal year. Judge Patel also stated that the plaintiff may bring a motion to recover attorneys’ fees and costs. An amendment judgment was signed on May 4, 2010, which no longer required that the standardized schedule of rates be adjusted annually to reflect any new departmental requirements. The court retained jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the parties complied with the judgment. On May 4, 2010, Judge Patel also granted plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $510,000. The defendants protested the amount of fees awarded, and on July 1, 2011, Peter L. Shaw, Appellate Commissioner, amended the judgment and awarded plaintiff $321,232.25 in attorneys’ fees and $5,520.12 in reasonable expenses. On March 29, 2012, California Alliance of Child and Family Services filed a motion to relate case. As of April 2, 2016, there has been no further action on this case.

Summary: This case challenged the state's calculation of payments for the costs of foster care in California. The District Court agreed to relate the case to California Alliance of Child and Family Services v. Wagner, in the Clearinghouse as CW-CA-0003, and ultimately the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the meaning of "cover all costs" as required by the Child Welfare Act, did not allow for "substantial compliance" as argued by the defendants, but meant indeed "all costs," and as such defendant’s payment of 80% of the calculated costs was held not to be sufficient compliance with the Act. On remand, the District Court then entered judgment for plaintiffs, along with a permanent injunction. The Court also granted plaintiff $321,232.25 in attorneys’ fees and $5,520.12 in reasonable expenses.


On September 5, 2007, two Latino borrowers filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Wachovia Corporation ("Wachovia") and its wholly-owned subsidiary World Savings Bank ("WSB") under under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive, equitable, and monetary relief, alleging intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination on minority applicants for home mortgage loans by Wachovia directly and through WSB's actions. Specifically, they alleged that Wachovia's mortgage pricing policy, whereby Wachovia allowed its authorized lenders and mortgage brokers to make subjective decisions about higher interests rates and costs, led to a higher interests rates and costs for minority applicants, compared to similarly situated non-minority applicants. Minorities were defined as non-Caucasians. The case went into alternative dispute resolution. On September 27, 2007, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, reiterating its allegations. On November 19, 2007, Wachovia was dismissed as a defendant without prejudice by the Court (Judge Thelton E. Henderson). The parties eventually settled. On October 14, 2009, the parties filed a stipulation and request for an order approving the settlement agreement. Under the agreement, one of the named plaintiffs received a lump sum payment of $30,000 in exchange for release of all claims. The other named plaintiff received a modification of his loan, reducing the balance of the loan, fixing the interest rate and extending the term of the loan, as well as forgiveness of some delinquent payments. The defendant also agreed to pay $200,000 in attorney's fees. On November 19, 2009, the Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) issued an order, approving each settlement. The individual claims were dismissed with prejudice. The class action allegations were dismissed without prejudice.

Summary: On September 5, 2007, Latino borrowers filed a class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Wachovia Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary World Savings Bank under under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiffs sought class certification, injunctive, equitable, and monetary relief, alleging intentional discrimination and disparate impact discrimination on minority applicants for home mortgage loans by Wachovia directly and through WSB's actions. The parties settled separately, with the settlement agreements approved on November 19. One of the plaintiffs received a monetary award, and the other received modifications of his loan. The class action allegations were dismissed without prejudice.


On June 9, 2020, Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County brought this lawsuit against the City of Seattle in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The complaint arose out of the protests that swept the nation following the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis. Plaintiffs alleged that the Seattle police violated the First and Fourth Amendment and brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amendment claim alleged that the Seattle police unlawfully infringed on their right to free assembly. The Fourth Amendment allegation claimed that the SPD used excessive force in the absence of an immediate safety threat. Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order, a preliminary, and a permanent injunction prohibiting the SPD from using "less-lethal" weapons or suppressing protests. They also sought declaratory relief and monetary compensation to cover the costs of the suit and attorney's fees. Three days later, Judge Richard A. Jones partially granted a temporary restraining order against the Seattle Police Department, enjoining them from using projectiles and chemical irritants against peaceful protesters. 466 F.Supp.3d 1206. Five days after that, on June 17, the court reaffirmed the TRO after a hearing at which parties voluntarily stipulated to the terms of the new order. The new order was substantively similar to the previous one, and was set to last until September 30, 2020. By July 30, the plaintiffs submitted a motion for an order to show cause as to why the defendant should not be held in contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs claimed that the SPD violated this injunction by targeting protesters, journalists, legal observers, and even medics after the preliminary injunction was issued forbidding such conduct. On August 10, the parties jointly filed a stipulation and proposed order to clarify the preliminary injunction after a ruling in another case, United States v. City Seattle. Earlier in June, the Seattle City Council had passed an ordinance to ban the crowd control irritants at issue in this case, but then Judge James Robart granted an emergency motion by the Department of Justice to enjoin the ordinance until it could be reviewed under the terms of the consent decree in United States v. City Seattle. In granting the DOJ's motion, Judge Robart noted that the preliminary injunction in this case (Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County v. City of Seattle) remained in effect. The court granted the stipulated clarification of the preliminary injunction. Under the clarified preliminary injunction, the SPD was enjoined from: (1) using chemical irritants or projectiles to re-route a protest unless necessary to prevent the specific imminent threat of physical harm or to respond to specific acts of violence or destruction of property; (2) using chemical irritants or projectiles without, when feasible, first warning that attendees and allowing time, space and the opportunity to leave; (3) targeting with chemical irritants or projectiles any individual clearly indicating they are a journalist, legal observer, and medics at such times that they are acting lawfully and in a capacity that the City knows or reasonably should know of their status. Incidental exposure to these individuals was permissible. The clarified preliminary injunction expanded but did not supersede the June 17 preliminary injunction. The parties further agreed to stay all proceedings in the case, including discovery, pending the court's decision in United States v. City Seattle on the Seattle City Council's ordinance's validity and effect. The preliminary injunction was to remain in effect for 90 days after the stay in the case was listed. Lastly, the plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause was dismissed without prejudice. Once again though, on September 30, the plaintiffs filed a motion for an order to show cause as to why the defendant should not be held in contempt for violating the clarified preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs focused on protests that occurred on four dates: August 26, September 7, September 22, and September 23. They alleged that on these dates the defendant used less-lethal weapons in a violative manner. In particular, they argued that SPD repeatedly launched explosives into crowds of protesters, used pepper spray excessively and indiscriminately, and used less-lethal weapons to re-route protests and without ordering to or giving time to disperse. In response, the defendant argued that they had complied with each of the court's orders including the clarified preliminary injunction. They argued that both the June 17 order and the August 10 clarified preliminary injunction were emailed to officers and each briefing before shifts in which officers are expected to provide crowd control included a reminder about the orders. In addition, the defendant disputed that the use of less-lethal weapons and pepper spray were used in violation of the orders. Instead, they argued that they were used to protect the safety of officers and others and prevent property destruction. In a supplemental response filed on November 2, the defendant further argued that the Monell standard of liability applied in determining whether or not the action of an individual officer could constitute the City's failure to comply with the preliminary injunction. Because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate an alleged unconstitutional action was proximately caused by an unconstitutional custom or policy, the result of deliberate indifference to a known need to train, or ratified by the City, the defendant argued that municipal liability under Monell was not established. After a hearing on the motion, the court granted the plaintiffs' contempt motion in part on December 7, 2020. --- F.Supp.3d ----; 2020 WL 7181064. The court first rejected the defendant's argument that Monell applied in civil contempt analysis. Each stipulated preliminary injunction enjoined the Seattle Police Department and any other officers, and accordingly, violations by individuals were violations of the injunctions. It then proceeded to find one incident where the defendant's use of OC spray violated the preliminary injunctions when an officer sprayed retreating protestors and three incidents where the use of blast balls violated the preliminary injunctions when officers threw blast balls indiscriminately into crowds. The court found other uses of OC spray and blast balls during the protest compliant with the injunctions or too close to call. In addition, the court held that the defendant's use of pepper balls and paintballs complied with the preliminary injunctions. Lastly, the court directed the plaintiffs to submit a brief and proposed order for sanctions. Shortly after, the plaintiffs filed a motion for sanctions and attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs did not request monetary sanctions but rather requested that the City be required to submit an officer's use of force report and body camera video to plaintiffs each time the defendant uses a less-lethal weapon covered by the preliminary injunctions. They also asked that the City be required to instruct all officers on the specific instances of contempt found by the court. The City responded by filing a motion for reconsideration on the contempt motion and to supplement the record on the contempt motion on December 21. The defendant again argued that Monell applied. In addition, they argued that evidence of more than four violations was needed to show that the City was not in substantial compliance with the preliminary injunctions. The City further argued that these four incidents were not in violation of the preliminary injunctions. The case is ongoing as of January 4, 2021, and the plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and attorneys' fees and costs and the defendant's motion for reconsideration remain pending.

Summary: This lawsuit was brought by Black Lives Matter Seattle-King County against the Seattle Police Department. In the protests following the murder of George Floyd, the Seattle Police Department unlawfully used excessive force against the protesters in violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, according to the complaint. A temporary restraining order was granted against the SPD. This TRO was made into a preliminary injunction, but plaintiffs later filed a contempt motion arguing that the defendant violated the injunction by targeting journalists, legal observers, and medics, as well as firing indiscriminately into crowds of protesters. On December 7, the court found the court violated the preliminary injunctions in four incidents and directed the plaintiffs' to file a motion with proposed sanctions. The defendant's responded by filing a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the court applied the wrong standard and incorrectly found that the four incidents violated the orders. The case is ongoing as of January 4, 2021.


On February 6, 2014, various religious leaders and scholars from the greater Los Angeles area filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District Court of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public counsel with ACLU involvement, sued the County Board of Los Angeles under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They alleged that the County had violated the United States and California Constitutions by reinstating a cross onto the design of the county seal. The plaintiffs sought an injunction prohibiting the county from using the new seal which was a violation fo the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and a violation of the California Constitution. In the complaint, the plaintiffs stated that the Los Angeles County Board of supervisors approved the restoration of the cross on the official seal. They argued the cross was unequivocally a religious symbol. In support of their claim, the plaintiffs explained that 10 years prior of the release of the new seal in 2014, the board took the cross off the seal after finding it was a clear endorsement of religious preference. As such the plaintiffs claimed the addition of the cross violated the plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Constitutional rights and was a violation of the plaintiff’s rights protected by the California Constitution. Between November 2014 and April of 2016, the parties engaged in discovery. Meanwhile, on February 9, 2015, Magistrate Judge McDermott recused himself and the case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Mumm. Additionally, on March 4, 2015, the plaintiffs notified the court one of the plaintiffs had died and the case should continue without them. On September 17, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for permanent injunction. On November 3 and November 4, of 2015, both parties filed motions detailing their proposed finding of fact. On November 12, 2015 the court heard arguments regarding the injunction. On April 6, 2016, Judge Christina Snyder granted the plaintiff’s motion finding the addition of the cross on the LA county seal violated the three-part <i>Lemon</i> Test and that a reasonable observer would find that the cross had the effect of endorsing one religion over another.177 F.Supp.3d 1194. On May 23, 2016, the court heard arguments on the plaintiff's proposed judgment and permanent injunction. The same day Judge Snyder found in favor of the plaintiffs. Judge Snyder held that the addition of the cross on the seal violated the California and Federal Constitutions. The order also included instructions for the new seal to be removed where possible and replaced with the old seal. Exceptions included published documents that contained the new seal and buildings where the removal would cause structural damage and there was no other way to cover up the cross. The defendants were permanently enjoined from using the seal with the cross in the future. The defendants were permitted to create a new seal in accords with the order given. The defendants were given a period of 145 days to comply with the court order.2016 WL 2977306 This case is closed.

Summary: On February 6, 2014, various religious leaders and scholars from the greater Los Angeles area filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District Court of California, claiming that the County Board of Los Angeles violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by reinstating a cross onto the design of the county seal. The court found the seal including the cross violated the Lemon Test and ordered the defendants to remove the seal containing the cross, return to the old seal, and enjoined them from using it in the future.


In February 2004, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ) launched an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Logansport Juvenile Intake/Diagnostic Facility in Logansport, Indiana, the South Bend Juvenile Correctional Facility in South Bend, Indiana, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997 (CRIPA), and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. 14141. Based on its investigation, the DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at the juvenile facility at South Bend violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents in the areas of: insufficient protection from harm, use of deadly force, grievance procedures, mental health care and special education services to juveniles with disabilities as required by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401. At Logansport, the DOJ concluded the mental health services were deficient. On September 9, 2005, the DOJ issued two findings letter which detailed the violations at South Bend and Logansport and set out a series of minimum remedial measures to bring the facility up to constitutional standards. The State accepted the recommendations and the parties entered into a Settlement Agreement to ensure compliance. So that the Agreement could be judicially enforced, the DOJ filed a formal complaint on February 8, 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. That same day, the parties filed a joint motion for approval of the Settlement Agreement and conditional dismissal. On February 14, 2006, District Court Judge Richard L. Young administratively closed and dismissed the case without prejudice, with final dismissal to come upon the passage of 3 years from the date of its filing or the State's earlier substantial compliance with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. On February 3, 2009, Judge Young granted a joint motion to amend order of Conditional Dismissal. Both parties agreed that the South Bend facility was the only facility not in general substantial compliance with the agreement. Judge Young extended the conditional dismissal for one year to allow this facility to achieve compliance. No action was taken until February 18, 2011, when Judge Young dismissed the case, holding that the settlement agreement had been fully complied with.

Summary: In February 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division (DOJ) launched an investigation into the conditions of confinement at the Logansport Juvenile Intake/Diagnostic Facility and the South Bend Juvenile Correctional Facility, both in Indiana, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1997 "CRIPA" and 42 U.S.C. 14141. The DOJ concluded that the conditions and practices at these two locations violated the constitutional and statutory rights of juvenile residents. Violations include: insufficient protection from harm, use of deadly force, inadequate grievance procedures, and statutory-deficient services in mental health care and special education. The DOJ and Indiana reached a Settlement Agreement concerning necessary changes Indiana would need to enact. On February 8, 2006, the DOJ filed a formal complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana so that the agreement could be judicially enforced. On February 14, 2006, District Court Judge Richard L. Young issued a conditional dismissal of the case, with the final dismissal to come after three years, or earlier, depending on when the Indiana facilities came into full compliance with the agreement. In February 2009, Judge Young granted an extension so that the South Bend facility could continue its efforts to comply with the agreement. The case was dismissed and closed by Judge Young in February 2011.


On September 25, 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this lawsuit against Video Only in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The EEOC complaint alleged that the defendant had engaged in harassment and retaliation based on race, national origin, and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It sought injunctive and monetary relief. On October 25, two employees of Video Only moved to intervene. They alleged discrimination and retaliation based on race, national origin and religion in violation of Title VII, and violations of 42 USC § 1981 and 15 USC § 1681n. Judge Garr King approved the intervention, but we do not have access to the order. Over the next several months, the parties engaged in discovery. The EEOC sought to consolidate this action with Video Only Inc (03:08-CV-00122), but the court denied this request on May 2, 2008. On June 11, 2008, the court granted several motions for summary judgment. The Court granted summary judgement for the plaintiffs on their retaliation claims, holding that Video Only was liable for the retaliation claims alleged under Title VII, ORS Ch. 659A, and § 1981. The Court also barred Video Only from raising the Faragher affirmative defense (If no tangible employment action was taken against the employee, the employer may prove the affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence by showing: (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct the harassment; and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative or corrective opportunities or otherwise failed to avoid harm). The Court also concluded that Video Only violated part of the Fair Credit Reporting Act but left the issue of willfulness for the jury. On July 23, 2008, the EEOC submitted a stipulated consent decree, which the Court approved a week later. This decree pertained to monetary and injunctive relief and had a duration of three years. For monetary relief, Video Only agreed to pay $630,000 to the plaintiffs. For the injunctive relief, the defendant agreed to refrain from retaliation and to develop anti-discrimination policies and procedures. These policies and procedures included providing anti-discrimination training for employees of Video Only Inc and ensuring that the supervisors and managers were held accountable for ensuring compliance with Title VII. In addition, the defendant agreed to report its compliance with Title VII and this decree to the EEOC. On August 12 2008, the court dismissed the case between the defendant and two intervenor-plaintiffs. The case docket shows no indication of non-compliance of the consent decree and the duration of the consent decree has ended. Presumably the case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought this suit against Video Only, Inc in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon (Portland). The EEOC alleged harassment and retaliation based on race, national origin and religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Two individuals intervened as plaintiffs as well. In 2008, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree pertained to monetary and injunctive relief and had a duration of three years. For monetary relief, the Video Only Inc. agreed to pay $630,000 to the plaintiffs. For the injunctive relief, the defendant agreed to refrain from retaliation and develop anti-discrimination policies and procedures. This case is closed.


On February 13, 2003, a prisoner in the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a suit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the DOC. The plaintiff, pro se at the time of the filing, asked the court for injunctive relief and damages, alleging that the employees of the DOC violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the employees of the DOC violated his rights, under the Due Process Clause and the 8th Amendment, by subjecting him to unreasonable strip searches, depriving him of food, exposing him to extreme temperatures, and placing him on paper restrictions. By order dated February 13, 2003, the District Court (Judge Barbara B. Crabb) ruled that Plaintiff could proceed with his claim that defendants violated his 8th Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when they denied him food, subjected him to extreme cell temperatures, conducted unreasonable strip searches and subjected him to sensory deprivation and social isolation. Judge Crabb dismissed, as legally frivolous, the plaintiff's claim that the DOC violated his Due Process rights by placing him on paper restriction. On June 3, 2003, Judge Crabb dismissed the plaintiff's claim against the DOC regarding unreasonable strip searches, stating that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim. The court also dismissed plaintiff's claim that the defendants deprived him of social interaction because the defendants had qualified immunity against liability for damages. The court further stated that injunctive relief was unnecessary in regards to the lack of social interaction because a previous class action suit against the DOC and the prison, of which the Plaintiff was a class member, resulted in a settlement agreement that addressed the issue. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the Plaintiff's two remaining claims. On December 17, 2003, the court denied summary judgment on Plaintiff's food deprivation claim, but granted summary judgment on his claim that he was subject to extreme temperatures, stating that there was not enough evidence to prove his claim to the jury. On June 6, 2004, Plaintiff was assigned private counsel. On July 30, 2004, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, alleging that the DOC's practice of depriving Plaintiff of food for multiple days in a row when he refused to comply with prison policy constituted cruel and unusual punishment and exposed his health to serious harm. Plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. The case proceeded to trial and, on December 21, 2004, a permanent injunction was granted enjoining the defendants from withholding meals from Plaintiff in response to any rule violation that does not constitute an imminent security risk. The jury also found the defendants liable for violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights and awarded plaintiff $50,000 in compensatory damages and $400,000 in punitive damages against each of the individually named defendants. On March 21, 2005, the 7th Circuit ruled that prisoners who miss meals because of rule violations were never subject to punishment, but rather were punishing themselves and therefore could not sustain cruel and unusual punishment claims. Rodriguez v. Briley, 403 F.3d 952 (7th Cir. 2005). In response to the 7th Circuit ruling, Judge Crabb vacated the judgment and instructed the clerk of the court to enter judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims. Plaintiff's petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was denied.

Summary: Plaintiff, a prisoner in the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (DOC), files an amended complaint alleging that the DOC's practice of depriving him of nutritionally adequate food as a form of punishment constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Plaintiff wins at trial, obtaining a permanent injunction against the DOC and winning damages against each of the individually named defendants. Shortly after Plaintiff won judgment, the 7th Circuit ruled in a different case that prisoners cannot sustain cruel and unusual punishment claims against prison officials when prisoners are deprived food as a result of rule violations. In response, the court vacated judgment for the Plaintiff and entered judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims.


On March 4, 2009, the United States filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court, Northern District of Texas, against a private multi-family housing provider under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The U.S. sought injunctive and monetary relief, alleging that the defendant designed and constructed housing in violation of the accessibility requirements of the FHA and the ADA. On May 8, 2009, defendants answered, arguing that the FHA does not create particular technical design standards and that their buildings were well within the flexible guidelines created by the FHA and the ADA. The defendants also argued that not all of the structures named in the Complaint were designed or constructed by the defendants, but if any units violated either Act, the issues were minor, discrete, and easily resolvable. The court ordered discovery to proceed in three phases, with the first phase limited to 52 properties in 18 states and Washington, D.C. DOJ retained accessibility experts to examine the properties and prepare reports for the court, as did defendants. On April 15, 2011, DOJ sought Partial Summary Judgment as to Liability, arguing that conditions at 32 of the 52 multifamily housing complexes identified in the first phase of discovery established a pattern or practice of discrimination against persons with a disability in violation of the FHA and the ADA. Defendants also sought partial summary judgment with respect to the remaining 20 properties no longer at issue. In November 2011, the Magistrate Judge (Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan) issued his Findings and Recommendations to deny the motions for partial summary judgment; this was adopted by the district court on January 9, 2012. The parties then settled; on June 25, 2012, the court entered a Consent Order and dismissed all claims with prejudice. The Consent Order includes an injunction to prevent the defendant from discriminating on the basis of disability as described in the FHA and the ADA and orders the defendants to pay $10.25 million into an accessibility fund to be used to develop the accessible housing stock and to retrofit existing housing units. The defendants were also ordered to pay $250,000 to the United States Treasury as a civil penalty, the largest such penalty in a DOJ FHA case to date. (DOJ press release: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crt-802.html) The defendants, for the duration of the order, must provide information to the United States regarding the design and construction of any multi-family housing units built by the defendants or related entities. The order remains in effect for 3 years from the date it was entered.

Summary: In this federal (Northern District of Texas) case alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act and the ADA, the Department of Justice and a multi-family housing developer entered into an agreement on June 25, 2012, under which the developer will pay $10.25 million into an accessibility fund to retrofit its buildings to be more accessible, as well as $250,000 as a civil penalty. This is the largest accessibility fund, and the largest civil penalty DOJ has ever obtained in a Fair Housing Act case. The consent decree also includes an injunction against any discrimination on the basis of disability.


On August 17, 2005, non-Navajo Native Americans filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued Bashas’ Inc. and the Navajo Nation under Title VII. The plaintiffs, represented by the EEOC, asked the court for injunctive relief, back pay, and punitive damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that Bashas’ Inc. engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating against the plaintiffs on the basis of their national origin, and that Bashas’ Inc. failed to make and preserve records relevant to the determination of whether unlawful employment practices had been committed. On December 14, 2006, District Judge Stephen M. McNamee ordered a stay on the proceedings pending the appeals in the EEOC v. Peabody Western Coal case. (EE-AZ-0082 in this Clearinghouse.) Judge McNamee found that the complaint filed by the EEOC in the Peabody case were substantial identical to the complaint filed against Bashas’ Inc, and so the instant case should be stayed. On December 14, 2006, November 18, 2010, and April 6, 2012 Judge Stephen M. McNamee ordered further stays of proceedings pending developments in the Peabody case. On September 26, 2014 the Peabody case was decided against the EEOC. Judge W. Fletcher of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Navajo hiring preferences was a political classification, not a classification based on national origin. As such, the preferences were not a violation of Title VII. On November 12, 2014 Judge Stephen M. McNamee dismissed with prejudice the case in accordance with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Peabody. 828 F.Supp.2d 1056.

Summary: On August 17, 2005, non-Navajo Native Americans filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs, represented by the EEOC alleged that Bashas’ Inc. engaged in unlawful employment practices by discriminating against the plaintiffs on the basis of their national origin. On December 14, 2006, District Judge Stephen M. McNamee ordered a stay on the proceedings pending the appeals in the EEOC v Peabody Western Coal case. On September 26, 2014 the Peabody case was decided against the EEOC. On November 12, 2014 Judge Stephen M. McNamee dismissed with prejudice the case.


On December 9, 2013, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C. on behalf of a disabled medical assistant against her employer, a hospital, alleging that the hospital violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and Title I of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against the employee due to her disability. The EEOC requested compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive relief, and costs for the action. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the hospital denied the employee use of her cane and then fired her when she informed them that she needed to use a cane while working. The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on February 14, 2014, and discovery was scheduled to be completed by October 2014. On August 12, 2014, the EEOC filed a stipulation of dismissal because the medical assistant, who the EEOC had filed the lawsuit on behalf of, had unexpectedly passed away on June 9, 2014, due to an automobile accident. The case is now closed.

Summary: On December 9, 2013, the EEOC filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Washington, D.C. on behalf of a disabled medical assistant against her employer, a hospital, alleging that the hospital violated the Americans With Disabilities Act and Title I of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against the employee due to her disability. On August 12, 2014, the EEOC filed a stipulation of dismissal because the medical assistant, who the EEOC had filed the lawsuit on behalf of, had unexpectedly passed away on June 9, 2014, due to an automobile accident. The case is now closed.


This class action was filed on Feb. 2, 2017 in response to President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO-1) ban on admission to the US of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Northern California and private counsel, also challenged the Department of State's Jan. 27 letter "provisionally revoking all valid nonimmigrant and immigrant visas" of nationals of these nations. The action was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint argued that the Department of State letter expanded the scope of EO-1 to include covered nationals living in the US, as well those trying to gain entry to the US It further argued that the text and history of these documents demonstrated discriminatory intent on the basis of nationality, place of birth, place of residence, or religion, and that they violate the First Amendment's Establishment, Free Exercise, Speech, and Assembly Clauses; Fifth Amendment equal protection and due process rights; the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; the Immigration and Nationality Act; and the Administrative Procedure Act. Plaintiffs were students attending California schools, the ACLU of Northern California, and Jewish Family & Community Services East Bay. The complaint sought class certification for "persons who are nationals of Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria or Yemen (the 'Designated Countries') who currently are, or recently have been, lawfully present in California and who, but for the Jan. 27, 2017 EO and the Provisional Revocation Letter, would be able to travel to the United States or leave and return to the United States." District Judge William Orrick was assigned to the case. On March 6, 2017, prompted by adverse developments in the Washington v. Trump litigation in the Ninth Circuit, the President rescinded the Jan. 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). The plaintiffs quickly responded to EO-2. On Mar. 13, plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, arguing that the EO-2 resolved "none of [the] fatal flaws" of the first EO. In addition to the violations stated in the first complaint, the amended complaint added that the EO violated the separation of powers "because it is contrary to Congress’s establishment of uniform rules of naturalization, as expressed in the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), and because it exceeds the President’s constitutional authority at the expense of Congress’s power to legislate." On March 16, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, to which defendants responded in opposition on March 30. In the meantime, other litigation against the EO-2 proceeded across the country, with some rulings ultimately having nationwide effects. On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii enjoined the EO-2 in Hawaii v. Trump. Across the country in Maryland, the District Court also granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against portions of the EO in the IRAP v. Trump case. The government appealed in both cases. On June 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to review both cases. In response to the Hawaii ruling, the government filed a motion to stay proceedings in this case pending the outcome of that Ninth Circuit appeal. District Judge Orrick set the preliminary injunction hearing for May 31, after oral arguments took place in the Ninth Circuit. However, in light of the Fourth Circuit's ruling in IRAP, the court vacated the preliminary injunction hearing. On June 19, the court approved the parties' stipulation to stay most of the proceedings while the nationwide injunction from Hawaii remained in effect. Following a series of orders regarding the Hawaii and IRAP cases, the court in this case lifted the stay on December 8. That same day, plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint and preliminary injunction motion. On December 23, 2017, District Judge James Robart enjoined on a nationwide basis certain aspects of Executive Order No. 13815 in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635" Doe v. Trump. As a result, the plaintiffs in this case conceded that they “do not currently face irreparable injury.” Given the concession and the nationwide injunction, the court stayed the case again on January 8, 2018. Case management conferences continued throughout 2018. On January 22, 2019, the district court granted the government’s motion to stay all proceedings in this case in light of the lapse of appropriations to the U.S. Department of Justice and other agencies. On May 6, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and a case management conference was held on May 21, 2019. The case closed in 2019. Many of the documents in this case are not publicly available.

Summary: This class action was filed on February 2, 2017 in response to President Trump’s January 27, 2017, Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the US of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. Plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Northern California and private counsel, also challenged the Department of State's Jan. 27 letter "provisionally revoking all valid nonimmigrant and immigrant visas" of nationals of these nations. The action was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On March 6, 2017, prompted by adverse developments in the Washington v. Trump litigation in the 9th Circuit, the President rescinded the January 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780 (EO-2). The plaintiffs quickly responded to EO-2 and moved for a preliminary injunction in March 2017. In the meantime, other litigation against the second EO proceeded across the country, with some rulings ultimately having nationwide effects. On March 15, the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii enjoined EO-2 in Hawaii v. Trump. Across the country in Maryland, the District Court also granted a nationwide preliminary injunction against portions of the EO in the IRAP v. Trump case. The government appealed in both cases. On June 2017, the Supreme Court agreed to review both cases. Deadlines were reset in this case as the Hawaii and IRAP cases worked their way through their respective Circuits. After a federal judge issued an injunction prohibiting the enforcement of certain aspects of an executive order relating to refugee policy Executive Order No. 13815 in <a href="https://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15635" Doe v. Trump, the plaintiffs in this case conceded that they “do not currently face irreparable injury.” Given this concession and the nationwide injunction, the court stayed the case again on January 8, 2018. Eventually in May 2019, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, ending the case.


On August 20, 2010, five inmates in the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against deputy sheriffs, the plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought damages, claiming violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the inmates claimed that the deputies systematically beat them during a cell extraction after the inmates protested conditions at the Jail by refusing to leave their cells. On February 25, 2013, Judge Consuelo B. Marshall denied plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' answer and enter judgment, but Judge Marshall did grant the plaintiffs' alternative motion to impose other lesser sanctions for spoliation of evidence. On July 12, 2013, Judge Marshall denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment but granted a defendant's motion for joinder and plaintiffs' motion in limine to admit the Citizens' Commission on Jail Violence Report. The defendants appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit. The plaintiffs moved that this appeal was frivolous. The Ninth Circuit denied the defendants' motion to stay the district court proceedings pending the appeal. As such, the district court proceedings continued and the Ninth Circuit never ruled on this appeal. After a five-week trial, on February 5, 2014, the jury returned a unanimous verdict of civil rights violations triggering $710,000 in damages and $240,000 in punitive damages. In addition, the district court awarded $5.4 million in attorney fees based on the difficulty of the litigation and the challenge of representing convicted inmates against law enforcement in a jail conflict. After this judgment, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law, to vacate the judgment and for a new trial, to vacate punitive damages, and/or for a new trial. The defendants also appealed the judgment to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In 2014 and 2015, the defendants filed a total of three amended appeals to the Ninth Circuit. On May 29, 2014, Judge Marshall denied all defendants' motions (1) for judgment as matter of law; (2) to vacate judgment and for a new trial after resolution of interlocutory qualified immunity appeals; (3) to vacate punitive damages; and (4) for a new trial. 2014 WL 8396787 (C.D. Cal. May 29, 2014). On December 29, 2014, Judge Marshall issued an order and opinion regarding attorney's fees. Most importantly, Judge Marshall held that (1) California's Bane Act's attorney's fees provision did not conflict with the Prison Litigation Reform Act; (2) the majority of services rendered in opposition to summary judgment would be as §1983 only time (and therefore receiving lower reimbursement rates), rather than under the Bane Act; and (3) inmates were entitled to recover fully compensatory attorneys' fees. 2014 WL 8390755 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2014). In the district court, the plaintiffs moved to retax costs and to award nontaxable expenses on May 15, 2015. They sought a total of $89,648.64. On November 12, 2015, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion to retax costs and granted their motion to award nontaxable costs of $39,928.35. On May 30, 2018, the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges William A. Fletcher and Sandra S. Ikuta, and District Judge Sarah Evans Barker, sitting by designation) affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs, award of compensatory and punitive damages, and award of attorneys' fees. 891 F.3d 776 (9th Cir. 2018). Specifically, the panel denied the defendants' request to vacate the final judgment on the basis that the district court lacked jurisdiction. Regarding the exhaustion of administrative remedies, the panel held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that a reasonable fear of retaliation made the grievance system effectively unavailable for appellees. Additionally, the panel found that the district court did not err in denying the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law based on qualified immunity: there was sufficient evidence of a constitutional violation and the law was clearly established. The supervisors were not entitled to qualified immunity or immunity under state law. Further, the panel held that the record supported the jury's verdict and the district court's ruling of municipal liability. Finally, the panel upheld the jury's award of punitive damages and the district court's attorneys' fee award. The parties agreed that the plaintiffs will be paid an additional $825,000.00 in attorneys' fees and costs relating to the appeal. The parties also agreed that the plaintiffs were owed post-judgment interest on compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs. Thus, the final total amount of the judgment was $7,289,973.77.

Summary: In 2010, five inmates in the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against deputy sheriffs. The inmates claimed the deputies violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments when the deputies systematically beat them during a cell extraction after the inmates protested conditions at the Jail. After trial, the jury returned unanimous verdict of civil rights violations triggering $710,000 in damages and $240,000 in punitive damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In total, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $7,289,973.77 in compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.


On July 18, 2017, the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund (NAACP) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The NAACP joined with a number of non-profit organizations to sue President Donald J. Trump, members of the executive branch in their official capacities, and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity (Commission) under the Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The NAACP sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a writ of mandamus. The case was originally assigned to Judge Gregory H. Woods but was reassigned to Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr. on July 27, 2017. The NAACP filed this case to enjoin the operation of the Commission because they alleged the President had neither constitutional nor statutory authority to create a new executive organ for the purpose of launching an investigation that targets individual or groups of voters. The NAACP claimed that this Commission was created to manufacture evidence supporting President Trump’s false claim of widespread voter fraud in the 2016 Presidential Election. The creation and operation of the Commission allegedly violated FACA, the APA, and the Fifth and Fifteenth Amendments. On September 5, 2017, the NAACP filed its first amended complaint, requesting new declaratory relief and adding additional factual allegations. On October 20, 2017, the NAACP filed a second amended complaint, leaving the bulk of the complaint the same. On November 3, 2017, the defendants filed a letter with the court in response to the plaintiff’s letter requesting a scheduling conference. Judge Carter construed the letter as a motion to stay and on November 17, 2017, stayed all proceedings until resolution of the motion to dismiss filed that day. The defendants asked the court to dismiss the case because the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On February 28, 2018, the NAACP filed a motion of voluntary dismissal. That same day, the court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. Parties beared their own costs and expenses. There has been no other activity on the docket, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: This 2017 lawsuit was brought by the NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund against President Donald J. Trump and the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity under the Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The NAACP claimed that this Commission was created to manufacture evidence supporting President Trump’s false claim of widespread voter fraud in the 2016 Presidential Election. On February 28, 2018, the NAACP voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is presumed closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action filed on May 6 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a temporary restraining order prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Exclusion Provision. On July 8, the court denied the temporary restraining order and on September 2, the court found that administrative efficiency was a valid rational basis for the Exclusion Provision and granted the government's motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed, and subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The court dismissed the case on January 21, 2021. <hr> On May 6, 2020, an individual married to a spouse without a social security number (SSN) filed a lawsuit against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiffs alleged that 26 U.S.C. § 6428 (the Exclusion Provision), as enacted by Section 2101 of the CARES Act, violated Due Process, Equal Protection, and the penumbra of privacy rights under the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California as a declaratory and injunctive action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that her exclusion from eligibility for the Stimulus Checks on the basis of her choice to marry a non-citizen was a violation of her First Amendment rights. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the Exclusion Provision violated the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as it infringed her fundamental choice to marry whom she wished. The plaintiff also argued that § 6428 was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest, nor rationally related to any legitimate government interest. Represented by private attorneys, the plaintiff’s proposed class sought to include all U.S. citizens married to a spouse without an SSN, and who filed joint tax returns with immigrants who would otherwise qualify for Stimulus Checks. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the enforcement of the Exclusion Provision and an order requiring the defendants to hold in escrow or earmark sufficient funds to issue Stimulus Checks to the proposed class. The plaintiff also sought attorney fees and class certification, and also requested a jury trial. The case was assigned to District Judge David O. Carter. On March 27, President Trump announced the CARES Act aimed to provide emergency assistance and health care response to individuals and families affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act authorized the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to distribute $1200.00 to each eligible individual who was a U.S. citizen, permanent resident, or a qualifying residing alien with a valid SSN. Under § 6428, the Exclusion Provision, the applicant was also required to provide a “valid identification number” or an SSN of their spouse on their tax returns. The plaintiff, married to an immigrant with an Individual Taxpayer Identification Number (ITIN) but without an SSN, did not qualify for the Advance Payment. On May 8, the plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Exclusion Provision. The same day, the case was transferred to Judge Stephen V. Wilson and Magistrate Judge John E. McDermott for all further proceedings. On May 11, the defendants filed an opposition to the temporary restraining order, noting that the plaintiff had not applied for the benefit herself. The defendants asserted that until the plaintiff herself applied for the tax benefit and was denied by the IRS, she lacked Article III standing to bring the claim. The defendant also argued that the government was also entitled to sovereign immunity. The complaint was amended on June 3 to add another plaintiff married to a non-citizen without an SSN who otherwise would have qualified for the benefit. On June 15, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and Attorneys United for Secure America both moved to file amicus briefs in support of the defendants, but their motions were denied. On July 8, the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order, finding that the plaintiff did not have a substantial argument that the exclusion provision was not rational. 2020 WL 5076999. On July 13, the court denied the defendants motion to dismiss and requested further briefing that addressed whether the Exclusion Provision had a rational basis, and therefore was constitutional. In supplemental briefs, the defendants argued that the Exclusion Provision was included to promote administrative efficiency and minimize delays in the distribution of checks. The plaintiffs argued that the Exclusion Provision discriminated on the basis of national origin and also compelled speech by forcing individuals to mark “married filing separately” on their tax return in order to receive the Stimulus Checks. The plaintiffs additionally claimed that the IRS had the capacity to distinguish which individuals met the requirements for the Stimulus Checks. Ultimately, the court held that the need for speed and administrative efficiency in distributing the checks was a valid rational basis for the Exclusion Provision, and on September 2 the court granted defendants motion to dismiss. 2020 WL 5492994. The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 30, and the appeal was assigned USCA Case Number 20-56019. On January 12, 2021, the Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' motion for voluntary dismissal. This case is now closed.

Summary: This is a class action filed on May 6 against the U.S. government to challenge the Exclusion Provision of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as a TRO prohibiting the defendants from enforcing the Exclusion Provision. On July 8, the court denied the TRO restraining order application. On September 2, the court found that administrative efficiency was a valid rational basis for the Exclusion Provision and granted the government's motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs appealed, and subsequently moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal. The court dismissed the case on January 21, 2021.


This case, filed on June 22, 2017, was brought by a parent on behalf of her minor child for wrongful incarceration by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The complaint alleged that the minor, A.H., was released into the plaintiff's custody but that a few years later, ICE arrested and detained him without cause. Represented by the ACLU of Northern California, the ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, and the private law firm Cooley LLP, the plaintiff argued that the government violated the First and Fifth Amendments, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), and the Flores Agreement. The case was filed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus as well as a complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The complaint alleged that the minor, A.H., entered the United States as an unaccompanied minor in 2015 after leaving Honduras to escape his abusive father. Shortly thereafter, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) released A.H. into the plaintiff's custody, and the two resided in New York State. The complaint stated that A.H. was eligible to receive Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status, making it possible for him to receive U.S. citizenship. However, on June 12, 2017, the plaintiff alleged that ICE agents "arrested A.H. outside his home, refused his repeated requests to contact his attorney, and interrogated him without counsel present." The next day, without notice to the plaintiff or A.H.'s attorney, two federal agents took A.H. to a secure juvenile facility in northern California. The complaint argued that the detention would prevent A.H. from attending scheduled hearings in New York regarding his immigration status, which in turn would prevent him from getting SIJ status and eventually citizenship. The case was assigned to Judge Vince Chhabria on June 23. The plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order on June 23, which Judge Chhabria granted and denied in part on June 29. The ruling was made from the bench, and there is no written memorandum accompanying it. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint on Aug. 11, 2017. The new class action complaint added two additional named plaintiffs with children in similar situations as A.H., and alleged that all had been detained on the basis of unsubstantiated gang affiliation charges. The minors, the complaint argued, were profiled as gang members on the basis of the neighborhoods they lived in. The complaint also sought to certify a class consisting of "all unaccompanied immigrant children . . . who had previously been detained in ORR custody and released by ORR to a parent or other sponsor, and who thereafter have been or will be arrested by U.S. immigration authorities on or after April 1, 2017 with allegations of gang affiliation and detained in a secure or staff secure detention center under the oversight authority of the San Francisco-based ORR Federal Field Specialist." The defendants moved to dismiss the case on Sept. 14, 2017 while the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction on Sept. 25, 2017. On Nov. 20, Judge Chhabria granted a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. 2017 WL 5569838. Judge Chhabria stated that "there is no reason to deny these minors protections that noncitizens typically get after having been released on bond or parole. . . . . By shipping the minors across the country for indefinite detention in a high-security facility before providing that hearing, the government has violated their due process rights." To ensure the government would comply with the plaintiffs' due process rights, Judge Chhabria ordered the government to (1) provide the minors with an immigration hearing by Nov. 29, 2017 so that they could contest the government's evidence of changed circumstances, (2) restore the sponsors' custody of the minors in the absence of such evidence, and (3) provide such a hearing within a week of similar arrests going forward while the lawsuit proceeded. For the purposes of the preliminary injunction only, Judge Chhabria certified the following class: "(1) the noncitizen came to the country as an unaccompanied minor; (2) the noncitizen was previously detained in ORR custody and then released by ORR to a sponsor; (3) the noncitizen has been or will be rearrested by DHS on the basis of a removability warrant on or after April 1, 2017 on allegations of gang affiliation." Finally, Judge Chhabria dismissed two of the non-federal defendants, dismissed claims brought by two of the individual plaintiffs, and denied the federal defendants' motion to dismiss regarding the due process claim. On Nov. 27, 2017, Judge Chhabria granted in part the plaintiffs' emergency application for relief, requiring the defendants to notify the plaintiffs of their upcoming hearings, to grant brief extensions to prepare or secure counsel, to inform counsel of plaintiffs' locations, to release any detained plaintiffs who already had hearings and were found not to be dangers or flight risks, and to hold hearings in the jurisdiction of the plaintiff's home or arrest. Then on Dec. 12, 2017, Judge Chhabria, granted A.H.'s emergency application for release. Judge Chhabria reiterated that, despite ORR's finding that A.H. was not a danger and could be placed with his mother, the defendants had rearrested him and detained him anyway with no prompt hearing, violating his procedural due process rights. A.H. had a Dec. 6 hearing at which the Immigration Judge ruled he was not a danger or flight risk. Thus, Judge Chhabria ordered his release. The government appealed the preliminary injunction order on Jan. 19, 2018 to the Ninth Circuit, which opened a new docket (No. 18-15114). On Feb. 14, the District Court stayed the case pending appeal. On Feb. 16, the defendants filed their opening appellate brief. They argued that the District Court erred in ruling that the government denied A.H. due process in his arrest and detention. Specifically, the defendants argued that existing procedures guaranteed due process, that the District Court lacked the authority to create new procedures, and that the injunction overburdened the government. The plaintiffs responded on Mar. 16 and the government replied on Apr. 6. In the District Court on Mar. 1, the plaintiffs moved to lift the stay, and the defendants opposed this. On Mar. 15, Judge Chhabria noted that the defendants had failed to address the plaintiffs' allegation that class members were being denied immigration benefits based on the same allegations of gang activity rejected by Immigration Judges -- which would be a reason to lift the stay. Judge Chhabria ordered further briefing from the parties, which they submitted in March. On Apr. 9, he denied the plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay, without prejudice if the plaintiffs could prove the defendants were obstructing them from seeking and obtaining immigration benefits on the basis of the affiliations of gang membership. On Oct. 1, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, holding that the injunction did not conflict with the TVPRA, that existing procedures do not adequately protect minors from being erroneously taken away from their parents, and that the Flores bond hearings were not sufficient to protect class members' TVPRA rights. Specifically, the panel found that there was no conflict between the injunction and the TVPRA because the injunction does not prevent the government from releasing minors to ORR custody as required by the TVPRA, and because the injunction orders minors to be released back to their previous sponsors, which is not at odd with the TVPRA's requirement that ORR place unaccompanied children in the least restrictive setting. Further, the panel held existing procedures to be inadequate because the ORR review process did not provide juveniles with notice of their reason for incarceration or a chance to respond to charges, and Flores hearings were not designed to account for child placement after initial determinations of detention or release were made. 2018 WL 4689978. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on Nov. 15, 2018. On Dec. 3, 2018, the court clarified the class definition in the preliminary injunction, concluding it was "not limited to minors who are taken into DHS custody solely on allegations of gang affiliation (and who otherwise meet the class definition), but rather includes those minors taken into custody based partly on allegations of gang affiliation." The court also expressly limited the class to preclude "any minors who otherwise meet the class definition and for whom DHS happens to have information about gang affiliation when he is taken into custody." Both parties continued filing discovery and scheduling motions with the court in late 2018 and early 2019. The defendants filed an administrative motion on Dec 20 to clarify the Dec. 3 order; specifically, it wanted clarification on how to apply the preliminary injunction to two specific individuals in custody and further investigation into the class in general. Judge Chhabria issued an order on that motion on Jan. 25, 2019. He said that the minors at issue did not need to be released because the preliminary injunction does not override the government's obligation to ensure that released minors have a safe place to go, and this could not be confirmed in these cases. He declined to revisit the class, saying that the defendants had provided no new or compelling reason to discuss the class. The parties expressed an interest in mediation in March 2019; on March 8, Judge Chhabria stayed proceedings on the outstanding motions to dismiss in anticipation of settlement negotiations. Judge Chhabria referred the case to Magistrate Judge Laurel Beeler for settlement negotiations on March 29, 2019, and settlement conferences began in earnest shortly thereafter. The parties reached an agreement on all material terms of the settlement on Dec. 9, 2019. The agreement has not been publicized and no claims have been made to enforce the settlement agreement. The case is closed.

Summary: This class action, filed in June 2017, was brought by a parent on behalf of her minor child, and others similarly situated, for arrest and detention by ICE without cause. On Nov. 20, the Court granted a preliminary injunction and provisionally certified the class. The government appealed the order on Jan. 19, 2018 in the Ninth Circuit, which upheld the preliminary injunction. The parties entered mediation in March 2019, and reached a private settlement agreement on December 9, 2019. The case is closed.


On June 25, 2018, Buzzfeed and Loevy & Loevy brought this Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) suit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The plaintiffs sought to shed light on ICE’s use and review of solitary confinement for individuals in its custody, citing ICE policy which requires additional oversight of decisions to hold detainees in segregation for over 14 days. Earlier, in October 2017, ICE approved the plaintiffs' expedited processing for its FOIA request filed in September 2017. Over the next several months, ICE failed to produce any documents and provide a future date for their production as required by law. In March 2018, Buzzfeed filed an administrative appeal to DHS regarding ICE’s failure to produce documents within a reasonable time frame. In April 2018, DHS responded that the request was pending but declined to provide an estimated document production date. This suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and assigned to Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson. The plaintiffs sought written notices sent to ICE field office directors documenting instances when an ICE detainee was held continuously in segregation for over 14 days, as well as reviews of those notices which were to be completed every 14 days per ICE policy. The complaint noted that, according to UN experts, holding individuals in solitary confinement for over 15 days may constitute torture and lead to irreversible psychological damage. On August 2, 2018, the defendants filed an answer to the plaintiffs' complaint admitting that it had not produced any documents in response to the FOIA request. On September 19, 2018, the defendants informed the court that it had identified over 8,100 documents responsive to the request and proposed a processing and production schedule of 400 pages per month to be completed in May 2020. The plaintiffs objected to ICE's proposed completion date as it was 3 years past the date the request was made and proposed a 90 day schedule to the court. On October 4, 2018, Judge Jackson ordered ICE to file a supplemental declaration with the court explaining its FOIA-processing capacity and the reason for delay in this case. In an answer filed on October 16, 2018, ICE stated that the plaintiffs' expedited processing request was made in error, and that ICE FOIA's office has an especially heavy workload this year, among other things. In a minute order filed on October 22, 2018, the court found that while it does not dispute ICE’s reasons for delay in this case, the “instant request qualifies for special treatment given its declared expedited processing status, and the agency’s considerable and unexplained delay in producing any records in this matter.” As such, the court ordered ICE to provide 8,100 pages of documents at the rate of 1000 pages per month, to be completed on or before August 1, 2019. The court further ordered ICE to produce the first batch of documents on or before December 1, 2019, and to file a status report 60 days after the first production and every 60 days thereafter. Following this order, the parties filed a series of status reports. In status reports filed on February 25, 2019, April 24, 2019, the parties stated the number of produced documents and plans for future document production, among other things. In the status report filed on August 26, 2019, the parties proposed the schedule for cross-motions for summary judgment. On November 26, 2019, DHS the parties filed a joint consent motion to stay summary judgment briefing. On December 5, 2019, the court granted this motion and ordered parties to file regular status reports indicating, among other things, whether further litigation will be necessary. Since that order, DHS has been filing regular status reports, and as of June 2020, the litigation is dormant as document production continues.

Summary: On June 26, 2018, Buzzfeed and Loevy & Loevy sued ICE in U.S. District Court for District of Columbia for its failure to respond to a FOIA request regarding the use and review of solitary confinement in ICE detention. ICE refused to produce documents over a year after the request was filed and provide an estimated document production date. On September 19, 2018, ICE proposed a document production schedule that would run through May 2020. Judge Ketanji Brown approved the schedule, and the document production is ongoing.


On July 10, 2012, a group of American Samoans and the Samoan Federation of America filed this lawsuit in the D.C. Circuit Court. They sued the U.S. Department of State under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934. The plaintiffs, represented by the Constitutional Accountability Center, asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that their classification as "non-citizen nationals" instead of U.S. citizens was forbidden by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and asked that they be given full citizen rights. The plaintiffs argued that American Samoa, as within the limits and subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, should fall under the Citizenship Clause, i.e. all individuals born in the region should be granted full U.S. citizenship. As of 2015, American Samoans were classified as "non-citizen nationals," a designation which denied them the right to vote, the right to serve on a jury, and the ability to hold certain public sector positions. On June 26, 2013, the Court (Judge Richard L. Leon) granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the case on the grounds that it failed to state a claim. 951 F. Supp. 2d 88 (D.D.C. 2013). The plaintiffs appealed this dismissal. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit considered their case but ultimately affirmed the Circuit Court decision and ruled in favor of the defendants on June 5, 2015. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a rehearing en banc, but the motion was denied on October 2, 2015. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, American Samoans filed a lawsuit against the United States to be granted citizenship under the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that American Samoa is under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Currently, American Samoans are classified as "non-citizen nationals" and are denied many of the rights available to full citizens. Both the D.C. Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in favor of the defendants. The case is closed.


On September 27, 2007, Electronic Frontier Foundation filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiff alleged that the DOJ had wrongfully withheld the requested records from the plaintiff. According to the complaint, on February 6, 2006, there was widespread media reporting that the National Security Agency had secured the cooperation of large telecommunications companies in its efforts to eavesdrop without warrants on international calls by suspected terrorists. On August 5, 2007, President Bush signed into law the Protect America Act of 2007, legislation that amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to expand the government's power to intercept overseas communications of Americans without warrants. In reaction to FISA, on August 16, 2007, plaintiffs requested all records from December 2005 to August 16, 2007 concerning briefings, discussions, or other exchanges that Justice Department officials have had concerning with representatives of telecommunications companies, offices of members of the Senate or House of Representatives. By letter dated August 27, 2007, the DOJ Office of lnformation and Privacy acknowledged receipt of Plaintiffs FOIA requests and informed Plaintiff that its requests for expedited processing had been granted. However, DOJ has neither completed the processing of Plaintiffs requests, nor informed Plaintiff of an anticipated date for the completion of the processing of the requests. The case was assigned to Judge Reggie Walton. On December 4, 2009, the parties reported that they were engaging in settlement discussions. On February 1, 2010, the plaintiff, with the concurrence of the defendant, voluntarily dismissed the case. The case is closed.

Summary: On September 27, 2007, a complaint was filed in the US district court for the District of Columbia against Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The plaintiffs alleged that defendant DOJ has wrongfully withheld the requested records, but the case was voluntarily dismissed after the parties reached a settlement.


On February 15, 2002, inmates at Wyoming State Prison filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Wyoming against the director of the Wyoming Department of Correction and prison officers and administrators. The class consisted of all those who were or would be inmates at the Wyoming State Prison. The ACLU and private counsel represented the class. The plaintiffs sought damages and injunctive relief, alleging that the policies and practices at the prison put inmates at the risk of unprovoked assault, and that state and prison failed to safeguard inmates against assaults by other inmates in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the complaint, the prison's staff did not respond to reports of threats to the safety of inmates, nor did they respond once an assault had taken place. The prison staff either did not observe or did not respond to the entry of inmates into a cell to which they were not assigned. The plaintiff alleged that the prison failed to hire a sufficient number of corrections officers, failed to adequately train corrections staff to ensure inmate safety from assault, failed to take steps after an inmate assault occurred to determine whether staff misconduct had led to the assault, and failed to ensure that corrections staff would adequately report and document threats to the safety of inmates. These failures created a substantial risk to the safety of the inmates. The District Court (Judge Clarence Brimmer) conditionally certified the class on August 2, 2002. Skinner v. Uphoff, 209 F.R.D. 484 (D. Wyo. 2002). On November 27, 2002, the District Court (Judge Brimmer) granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on behalf of the class. Skinner v. Uphoff, 234 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D. Wyo. 2002). The court held that prison officials had a duty "to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners." The court found that the defendants had failed to adequately train and supervise employees, failed to properly review policy violations, and failed to properly discipline employees, which all led to a risk to the safety of inmates. Both the plaintiff and the defendant were required to submit a proposed remedial plan within twenty-one days of the decision. The purpose of the remedial plans was to promptly and effectively remedy the constitutional violations. The defendants had referred to a "culture" at the prison that made it difficult for administrators to properly supervise and discipline staff; the remedial plans were to include a plan to counter the "culture" that existed. In May of 2003, the parties reached a settlement agreement regarding the plaintiff's individual claims for damages. Both the plaintiff and the defendant submitted proposed remedial plans. The District Court (Judge Brimmer) issued a final decree on October 7, 2003, to adopt and incorporate the defendant's second proposed remedial plan with modifications. The goals of the remedial plan were to (1) provide clear guidance to prison staff so that they could respond appropriately to any known threat of harm to an inmate, and to (2) ensure that prison staff involvement in protection from harm was reported, documented, reviewed, and responded to appropriately. On June 30, 2004, the District Court (Judge Brimmer) granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' costs and fees. Skinner v. Uphoff, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Wyo. 2004). On August 18, 2005, ten class members filed a pro se motion for relief from the judgment in favor of the plaintiff class. The movants asked that the District Court recuse itself, appoint new class counsel, and set aside the grant of summary judgment and reopen the case for litigation on the issue of overcrowding. The District Court denied the motion. The U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit (Judge David M. Ebel) affirmed. Skinner v. Uphoff, No. 05-8098, 2006 WL 925813 (10th Cir. April 11, 2006). On January 3, 2006, the defendants moved to terminate the decree. On January 20, 2006, the District Court (Judge Brimmer) ruled on several motions before the court. Skinner v. Uphoff, 410 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (D. Wyo. 2006). The court held that the defendants were responsible for providing copies of any investigative reports to the public and the media, but the plaintiffs' attorneys were still responsible for providing such reports to the plaintiffs and their families. The court denied the defendants' motion to require the plaintiffs' attorneys to carefully scrutinize any documents for confidential material prior to disseminating them. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for access to the outside investigator who is responsible for the investigation of suspected premeditated assaults. The court denied in part and granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for declaratory and injunctive relief holding that the defendant's were required to comply with the deadlines set by the Remedial Plan. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for formal discovery to understand and monitor the defendants' compliance with the Remedial Plan. The court deferred the defendants' motion for termination of the final decree until after formal discovery and an evidentiary hearing. On August 7, 2006, the Court (Judge Brimmer) denied the defendant's motion to terminate relief. The Court modified relief and granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's six contempt motions. The Court found two ongoing constitutional violations: First, the failure to Adequately Investigate and Abate Dangerous Conditions, and second, the failure to implement an effective internal review process for the reporting of staff errors, staff misconduct and institutional deficiencies that cause and contribute to inmate assault. On September 17, 2007, finding that the defendants resolved the two constitutional violations, the Court (Judge Brimmer) granted the defendant's motion to terminate the injunction, closing the case.

Summary: On February 15, 2002, inmates at Wyoming State Prison filed this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the director of the Wyoming Department of Correction and prison officers and administrators. The plaintiffs alleged that the policies and practices at the prison put inmates at the risk of unprovoked assault, and that the state and prison failed to safeguard inmates against assaults by other inmates. After a settlement agreement in May 2003, the District Court (Judge Brimmer) issued a final decree adopting a remedial plan to correct violations. In 2007, finding no more ongoing violations, the Court granted the defendant's motion to terminate prospective relief. As of March 2016, the case remains inactive.