On January 21, 2009, an inmate at Rikers Island filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the City of New York. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary damages as well as an award of costs and attorneys fees, claiming that Officers of the New York City Department of Corrections in their official capacity intentionally subjected the plaintiff to excessive force, assault and battery, and deprivation of liberty. At the time of the incident, the plaintiff was in custody at Rikers Island as a pre-trial detainee and was awaiting trial for the murder of police officer Russel Timoshenko. The plaintiff alleges that on October 26, 2007, on the order of their Captain, four corrections officers searched his cell and that the search failed to reveal any contraband. The officers then performed a strip search, which also failed to result in any contraband. After a few hours, the plaintiff claims that the guards returned to perform a second strip search. At that time, the plaintiff asked why he needed to be strip searched again and put his arm on top of the holding pen lock. In response, the guards repeatedly jabbed the key into the lock until the plaintiff removed his hand. The five guards then entered the plaintiff's cell, handcuffed him, and proceeded to punch the plaintiff in the ribs, kick him repeatedly, beat him with handcuffs meant to bind prisoners' feet, and called the plaintiff "a f*****g cop killer," a "black stupid monkey," and told the plaintiff that they should kill him. The plaintiff lost consciousness during the assault. When he later came to, Emergency Medical Services transferred the plaintiff to Elmhurst Hospital where he received multiple x-rays to his chest, pelvis and fingers, as well as CT SCANS of his head, spine, pelvis and chest. The plaintiff was found to have suffered various fractures to his face, bruising and hemorrhaging to his left eye, a laceration above his right eye, a broken nose, a spinal fracture, and a chipped incisor tooth. The plaintiff brought suit, alleging that the guards used excessive and unnecessary force for no penological purpose when they repeatedly hit, punched and kicked the plaintiff while he was handcuffed. The plaintiff requested a jury trial, where he sought monetary damages (special, compensatory and punitive) against the defendant, as well as an award of costs and attorneys' fees and any other relief the Court deemed proper. The City of New York also demanded a jury trial, which began on August 15, 2011 and concluded on August 24, 2011. The jury deliberated for five hours and returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. On September 7, 2011, Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein decreed that the plaintiff's civil suit was dismissed.

Summary: Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. §1983 suit against New York City and five guards, employees of the New York City Department of Corrections, for excessive force, assault and battery, and deprivation of liberty. The plaintiff requested a jury trial, seeking special, compensatory, and punitive damages, as well as costs and attorneys' fees and any other relief the Court deemed appropriate. The trial lasted for seven days in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein) and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Judge Hellerstein dismissed of the suit on September 7, 2011.


This class action lawsuit alleged that the City of Chicago’s failure to equip signalized street intersections with accessible pedestrian signals (ASPs) constituted illegal discrimination against Chicago’s blind residents and visitors. ASPs are used by blind pedestrians to travel safely at intersections. In municipalities which have installed ASPs, blind pedestrians can receive information and warnings about oncoming traffic by listening to the sounds played by the signal (e.g. “Walk sign is on”) or by holding a button at the intersection which will vibrate to communicate the same information that seeing persons can read on pedestrian signals. According to the plaintiffs, of the over 2,500 signalized traffic intersections in Chicago, only 11 communicate information to people with vision related disabilities. On September 23, 2019, plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (in Chicago). An amended complaint was filed on October 3, 2019. The plaintiffs included three named blind individuals and a non-profit organization American Council of the Blind of Metropolitan Chicago (ACBMC). The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all persons with vision-related disabilities who use, or seek to use, pedestrian signals in Chicago. The plaintiffs estimated that the putative class consisted of over 60,000 Chicago residents and also encompassed many more legally or completely blind people who visit or commute to Chicago every year. In the amended complaint, the plaintiffs named the City of Chicago, the Chicago Department of Transportation, Chicago Mayor Lori Lightfoot in her official capacity, and Acting Commissioner of the Chicago Department of Transportation Thomas Carney in his official capacity, as defendants. Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The lawsuit was brought under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The crux of the ADA claim was that the City of Chicago’s management of its street crossing signals violated its statutory non-discrimination duty to operate “programs, services, or activities” in a way that is readily accessible to and usable by people with disabilities. The Section 504 claim was based on the fact that the City of Chicago receives federal financial assistance and the law mandates that no individual shall “solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). In response to a motion to dismiss by the Defendants, District Judge Elaine Bucklo issued an order dated March 9, 2020, dismissing claims against the Chicago Department of Transportation, Mayor Lightfoot, and Acting Commissioner Carney. In the same order, the judge also struck the plaintiffs’ claims based on violations affecting only deaf or blind-deaf individuals. The remainder of the motion to dismiss was denied. Amidst discovery proceedings, the U.S. Department of Justice filed a Complaint in Intervention on April 14, 2021. The DOJ complaint reasserts many of ACBMC’s allegations but, importantly, introduces a demand for compensatory damages from injuries caused by Chicago’s failure to comply with Title II and Section 504. With the DOJ’s involvement in the case, fact discovery was extended until September 30, 2021, and expert discovery till January 31, 2022. Dispositive motions and accompanying memoranda following discovery were set for a due date of February 22, 2022.

Summary: In 2019, American Council of the Blind of Metropolitan Chicago filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs allege that the City of Chicago’s failure to equip signalized street intersections with accessible pedestrian signals (ASPs) violates the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In April 2021, the DOJ intervened as a plaintiff. Discovery is ongoing and scheduled to end in early 2022. Plaintiffs are seeking injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and compensatory damages against the City.


This case is one of a pair of lawsuits filed against the Arizona Attorney General to challenge his practice of seizing money wire transferred to Mexico through Western Union. In an attempt to curtail the smuggling of undocumented immigrants by trafficking organizations (known as "coyotes") from Mexico to Arizona, the Arizona Attorney General had obtained warrants and seized millions of dollars of money that was wire transferred to Mexico. The Attorney General focused on amounts over $500, which were believed to have been sent as payments to Mexican smugglers who had transported people or drugs into Arizona. On October 18, 2006, three individuals who claimed they had transferred money through Western Union for legitimate purposes but had their money seized by authorities brought this putative class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. They brought the complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the seizures violated their rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as money damages. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen M. McNamee. Plaintiffs' complaint was subsequently amended twice, but the substantive claims remained the same. Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Class Certification. On March 31, 2010, the court denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, Torres v. Goddard, No. CV 06-2482-PHX-SMM, 2010 WL 3023272 (D. Ariz. July 30, 2010), and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit then denied plaintiffs' permission to immediately appeal the court's ruling. Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and defendants' filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. On September 4, 2012, the court granted defendants' motion, finding that defendants were entitled to absolute immunity. Torres v. Horne, No. CV-06-2482-PHX-SMM, 2012 WL 3818974 (D. Ariz. Sept. 4, 2012). The case was therefore dismissed. Plaintiffs then appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [Docket Number: 12-17096]. On July 15, 2016, the panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment. The panel was made up of Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Judge Alex Kozinski, and Judge Jay S. Bybee. The Ninth Circuit found that, although defendants did have qualified immunity in regard to some actions, they did not have absolute immunity over all of their actions. The case was remanded back to the district court. Torres v. Goddard, 793 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2015) On July 1, 2016, the district court ruled in favor of defendants again, holding that defendants had qualified immunity for the acts for which they did not have absolute immunity, and dismissed the case. Torres v. Goddard, 194 F. Supp. 3d 886 (D. Ariz. 2016). Plaintiffs once more appealed the case to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On June 25, 2018, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion. Due to Judge Reinhardt’s death and Judge Kozinski’s retirement, the panel was made up of Judge Jacqueline Nguyen, Judge John Owens, and Judge Jay S. Bybee. Torres v. Goddard, No. 16-16315, 2018 WL 3099433 (9th Cir. June 25, 2018). This opinion was filed with the District Court on July 17, 2018, and the case closed without appeal.

Summary: In October 2006, three individuals who sent money through a wire transfer and had that money seized filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona. The plaintiffs sued the Arizona Attorney General under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging hat the seizures violated their rights secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs were ultimately unable to recover because the defendants had qualified immunity. The case closed without appeal.


On April 4, 2002, current and former Hispanic employees of Bashas', Inc. filed a class action in the U.S. District Court of Arizona under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, against Bashas'. The plaintiffs, represented by an Impact Fund attorney and private counsel, sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged national origin and race discrimination of their employer in pay and working conditions on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Latino employees. After some discovery disputes, Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2004 WL 5642419, on August 29, 2005, the District Court (Judge Robert C. Broomfield) certified the proposed class on the issue of working conditions, but denied certification of such class as to the issue of pay due to a lack of commonality within the class. Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2005 WL 6182338 (D. Ariz. Aug. 29, 2005). Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and offered to redefine the pay discrimination class. The District Court denied their motion, 2006 WL 5987819, and the plaintiffs appealed the Court's decision to the 9th Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling that the plaintiffs failed to establish commonality within the proposed class regarding the pay discrimination claim, in an opinion by Judge Procter R. Hug on July 29, 2008. The Court found it an abuse of discretion of the lower court and remanded the case back to the District Court for further consideration. Parra v. Bashas', 536 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2008). (In the meantime, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was also proceeding against the same defendant, seeing enforcement of an administrative subpoena. The court in this case agreed to plaintiffs' request that that matter be transferred to it. 2009 WL 1024615. ) Upon remand, the District Court (Judge Broomfield) finally granted the plaintiff's original motion for class certification on the pay issue on May 31, 2013. In the same opinion, the court also, at defendants' request, decertified the working conditions class, in light of the recent Supreme Court precedent of Dukes v. Wal-Mart. This ended the decade-long dispute as to the issue of class certification. Parra v. Bashas', Inc., 2013 WL 2407204 (D. Ariz. May 31, 2013). Pursuant to party stipulation, the court amended the class on March 31, 2014 to "All Hispanic workers currently and formerly employed by defendant Bashas’ in an hourly position at any Food City retail store between April 4, 1998 and July 1, 2007, who have been subject to the challenged pay policies and practices." The court explicitly excluded "any member who worked for Food City for less than eight (8) hours during the Class Period or any person who was first hired for an hourly position at Food City after January 2, 2005." The case was reassigned to Judge Diane J. Humetewa on July 2, 2014. On July 11, 2014, the parties filed notice that they had reached a settlement. The proposed class settlement, filed with the court on Aug. 27, 2014, required Bashas' to pay $6.5 million "for class damages, administrative expenses, service awards to the named plaintiffs..., and attorneys’ fees and costs." From this fund, the settlement proposed to set up a $400,000 administrative cost fund to account for challenges associated with the duration of the litigation. Specifically, locating class members would be difficult because 90% of them were no longer employed at Food City and many of whom likely moved from the addresses on file to new homes, including Mexico and Central America. Further, the fact that many class members only spoke Spanish made communicating updates to them more difficult. Payouts to class members were to be determined on the basis of payroll records by calculating "the difference between his or her actual hours worked and hourly rates received at Food City, with the same number of hours at the hourly rates paid at Bashas’ and A.J.’s Fine Foods for the same time period." Further, if a class member did not qualify for a payout, the settlement provided a mechanism for disputing the determination. The settlement also provided for the possibility of a second round of distributions using residual funds after the first payout. Any funds left after these payouts were to be given to the University of Arizona Law School Immigrant Workers’ Clinic, the ASU Alumni Law Group, and Community Legal Services of Arizona. The court approved the settlement on April 24, 2015 after a fairness hearing. The same day, the court granted attorneys’ fees of $1,625,000 and costs of $178,761.26. The court dismissed the case with prejudice, but retained jurisdiction for the purposes of enforcing the settlement. The case is now closed.

Summary: On April 4, 2002, current and former Hispanic employees of Bashas', Inc. filed a class action in the U.S. District Court of Arizona under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against their employer Bashas', Inc. The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief as well as class certification. They alleged national origin and race discrimination of their employer in pay and working conditions on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated Latino employees. The District Court in 2005 certified the proposed class on the issue of working conditions, but denied certification of such class as to the issue of pay. The 9th Circuit reversed in 2008, concluding the District Court abused its discretion in the denial. Upon remand, the District Court certified the class on both issues in 2013. This case is ongoing.


This case was brought in response to an event that occurred on April 14, 2017 in Worth County. That day, approximately 40 uniformed police officers arrived at Worth County High School and put the school on lockdown to conduct a drug search. They did not have a search warrant. Although the officers had a “target list” of thirteen suspected students, the officers subjected the entire student body of 900 students to hands-on body searches. The plaintiffs reported that officers had touched them inappropriately, “manipulated” students’ breasts or genitals, and inserted their hands inside students’ undergarments. On June 1, 2017, nine high school students filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. The case was assigned to Judge Leslie Abrams. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, the plaintiffs sued the Worth County Sheriff’s Office — specifically the officers who were involved in the searches. The plaintiffs alleged that the drug searches were an unconstitutional search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment; that they violated their right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment; and that they violated the Georgia State Constitution. Represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory relief, and attorneys’ fees. On June 20, 2017, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding additional officers as defendants; and on June 23, the court granted an unopposed motion to dismiss claims against 26 individual defendants. On August 4, the plaintiffs moved for class certification. The proposed class would consist of “all students seized and searched by Worth County Sheriff’s Office employees at Worth County High School on April 14, 2017, other than those identified on the Sheriff’s target list.” On September 5, 2017, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ state law claims. They argued that Georgia law had no damages remedy for violating the state constitution and that the defendants were entitled to official immunity. On October 10, 2017, the parties filed a motion to stay discovery because they had begun discussions regarding class certification and a possible settlement. The court granted this motion nine days later. On November 21, the court granted a motion to stay all proceedings. On December 4, the parties had reached a settlement agreement, and they filed a joint motion to certify the class. Under the terms of the proposed $3 million settlement, the defendants agreed to notify the class members through mail and newspaper advertisements and collect response forms from the class members regarding the April 2017 drug search. They would pay damages between $1,000.00 and $6,000.00 to each class member and attorneys' fees of $450,000. The remaining funds would be used to start a fund to benefit Worth County High School students. The court preliminarily approved this settlement agreement and certified the class on March 23, 2018. The last fairness hearing for class members to voice their concerns was held on July 11, 2018. There were no objections. The court approved the final settlement on January 9, 2019. The case is presumably now closed. A similar case was filed in criminal court around the same time that this case was filed in civil court. On October 3, 2017, a grand jury in South Georgia indicted the Worth County Sheriff and two of his deputies for sexual battery, false imprisonment and violation of oath of office by a public officer. After subsequently being indicted two more times on a combined 156 charges involving events unrelated to this case, the sheriff pled guilty on July 25, 2018 to three counts of violation of oath of office, one of which stemmed from the school search. As part of his plea deal, he was sentenced to six months in prison (including time served), five years probation, and was barred from holding public office for five years, among other conditions.

Summary: On April 14, 2017, approximately 40 uniformed officers arrived at Worth County High School and put the school on lockdown to conduct a drug search without a search warrant. Nine high school students filed a putative class action. The parties came to a settlement that was approved in January of 2019.


On December 14, 2012, Domino's Food and its owner filed this lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the federal government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Thomas More Law Center, a Catholic non-profit legal aid organization, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On March 14, 2013, Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Zatkoff found that, while the question of whether or not a for-profit corporation possess free exercise rights is unresolved, Domino's Farms, distinct from its owner, may assert free exercise rights on his behalf. In this way, Domino's Farms Corp. is merely the instrument through which the owner exercises his religious beliefs. And because the contraception mandate burdens the plaintiffs' sincerely held religious beliefs beyond the least restrictive means, plaintiffs showed a high likelihood of success of the merits and would suffer irreparable without the injunction. On May 13, 2013, the government filed an interlocutory appeal with the Sixth Circuit challenging the preliminary injunction. On June 26, 2013, Judge Zatkoff granted the parties' joint motion to stay the proceedings pending the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in two substantially similar cases, Autocam Corps. v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0005 and Weingartz Supply Co. v. Sebelius, FA-MI-0006. On October 23, 2014, following the Supreme Court's June 30, 2014 decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius and subsequent decision to remand Autocam to the Sixth Circuit for consideration under Hobby Lobby, the government voluntarily dismissed its interlocutory appeal. On December 3, 2014, Judge Zatkoff entered a permanent injunction and judgment against the government, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. The injunction protected the plaintiffs against government enforcement of the version of the contraception mandate that existed prior to the Hobby Lobby decision. Prior to Hobby Lobby, closely-held for-profit religious employers did not have an opportunity to notify the government of their objection to the contraception mandate, and compel the government to work with their insurer to provide contraception coverage directly to their employees. The decision did not preclude the plaintiffs from bringing suit under later versions of the mandate. On March 9, 2015, the parties notified the court that they had reached an agreement on attorneys' fees and costs.

Summary: On December 14, 2012, Domino's Food, and its owner filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District of Michigan against the Federal Government, seeking to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. The plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On March 14, Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Hobby Lobby v. Sebelius, the plaintiffs were granted a permanent injunction on December 3, 2014, against government enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate that was in force at that time.


On May 8, 2017, ten residents of Madison County filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs sued Madison County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filing both class action-based and individual-based claims. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as monetary relief and attorneys’ fees. The case was assigned to District Judge William H. Barbour, Jr. In their complaint, the plaintiffs pointed out that, although only 38% of Madison County residents were black, approximately 73% of arrests in Madison County between May and September 2016 were of black individuals. Black individuals were nearly five times more likely to be arrested compared to white individuals. The plaintiffs claimed that, in implementing a coordinated top-down program of methodically targeting black individuals for suspicionless searches and seizures while they are driving their cars, walking in their neighborhoods, and even just spending time in their own homes, the defendants had violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. This program included discriminatory practices in the use of vehicular roadblocks, pedestrian checkpoints, and warrantless and consentless searches black residents' homes. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants used excessive force, made unreasonable searches and seizures, and violated the plaintiffs’ right to equal protection. In July 2017, the parties began discovery. In February 2018, the defendants filed two motions to dismiss the claims of two specific defendants for failure to prosecute, arguing that the two plaintiffs failed to respond to interrogatories, prejudicing the defendants. The judge granted these two motions, dismissing without prejudice. In March and April 2018, the defendants filed seven different motions for summary judgment. These motions targeted the various claims of individual plaintiffs and some class action claims. In all of these motions, the defendants argued that none of the plaintiffs had evidence to support their claims of intentional race discrimination. The defendants further alleged that some of the claims were time barred by statutes of limitation. On March 14, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify three classes. The first, the targeting class, was defined as all black persons who presently or in the future will reside in or travel through Madison County. The second, the roadblock subclass, was defined as all black persons who travel or will travel by car through majority-black areas of Madison County. The third, the pedestrian stop subclass, was defined as all black persons who travel or will travel by foot in Madison County’s majority-black neighborhoods. On April 13, 2018, the defendants moved for summary judgment again, this time with respect to the target class and the pedestrian stop subclass. The defendants argued that the complaint presented no evidence of a top-down policy of intentional race discrimination. On January 4, 2019, the court denied the plaintiff’s motion to certify class, finding that the membership in all of the proposed classes could not be ascertained, and there was doubt as to whether all of the class members were harmed in the same way. The court noted that plaintiffs could amend their complaint to cure these defects, and the plaintiffs did so on February 4, 2019 and filed a new motion to certify class on the same day. The case was had been reassigned to District Judge Carlton W. Reeves on January 15, 2019. On February 12, 2019, the defendants moved for a settlement conference and to stay proceedings. The court granted both motions on February 26, and also granted the plaintiff’s motion to file a second amended complaint. The parties engaged in a settlement conference on June 10, 2019, and the plaintiffs were allowed to file their second amended complaint. The parties continued to negotiate in settlement discussions before the magistrate judge, until they filed a Joint Motion to Approve Consent Judgment on September 23, 2019. The court granted the motion on October 9, 2019, and the case was dismissed with prejudice on October 23, 2019. The resolution was captured in three documents: the Consent Decree, the Settlement Agreement, and the Apartment Incident Agreement. The parties agreed to maintain the confidentiality of the Settlement Agreement and the Apartment Incident Agreement. The Consent Decree enjoins the Madison County Sheriff’s Department (MCSD) to implement and provide training on three new policies: an Unbiased Policing Policy, a Checkpoint Policy, and a Pedestrian Stops and Enforcement Policy. The Consent Decree also requires Madison County and MCSD to establish a five-member Community Advisory Board with the authority to (1) review MCSD Data regarding vehicular checkpoints and pedestrian stops, (2) receive civilian complaints concerning the MCSD, (3) make recommendations to the MCSD about its compliance with the Consent Decree, and (4) file enforcement proceedings against Defendants following a process outlined in the Consent Decree. The Consent Decree was determined to remain in effect for four years. The case is ongoing, given the ongoing nature of the consent decree.

Summary: This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by ten residents of Madison County in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had racially discriminated against black residents in vehicular roadblocks, pedestrian checkpoints, and warrantless searches of the homes of black residents. The parties agreed to a Consent Decree implementing new policies for vehicular checkpoints and pedestrian stops, and also establishing a Community Advisory Board to monitor adherence to the Consent Decree.


Two consolidated federal district court cases in North Carolina alleged voter intimidation before the November 2020 elections. One was Drumright v. Cole, 1:20-cv-00998; the other was Allen v. City of Graham, 1:20-cv-00997. Both were filed on the same day by participants in the same event. On October 31, 2020, police dispersed an event held in front of the Graham, NC courthouse, using pepper spray. The event titled, the "I Am Change March to the Polls," was held on the last day of early voting and same-day voting registration. Participants marched from the Wayman Chapel AME Church to the Alamance County Courthouse. Once arriving at the north-side of the courthouse, event organizers began assembling a small stage, gave a speech about a local Confederate monument, and held a silent vigil for George Floyd who had died in police custody. At the top of the courthouse’s northern steps was a row of deputies from the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office. According to the event's participants, police began dispersing the event seconds after the silent vigil ended and without warning. This prevented the event’s planned march to local polling stations. Many attendees sought medical attention because of the pepper spray. On November 2, 2020, participants from the dispersed event filed two separate complaints in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina. Judge Catherine Eagles was assigned to both cases.

Plaintiffs in Drumwright v. Cole were represented by the ACLU of North Carolina and the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. Defendants included the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office and the Graham Police Department. The Drumwright plaintiffs pursued various federal claims including voter intimidation under 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Voting Rights Act); first amendment suppression and excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs’ civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Remedies sought included both injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that defendants’ dispersion violated the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The Drumwright plaintiffs also sought damages (including punitive damages) as well as attorney’s fees and costs.

Plaintiffs from Allen v. Graham were represented by private counsel and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund. Defendants included the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office, City of Graham, and the Graham Police Department. The Allen plaintiffs also brought very similar claims under 52 U.S.C. § 10307 (Voting Rights Act), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985. Relief sought included injunctive and declaratory relief stating that the police’s actions were unlawful. The Allen plaintiffs also sought damages (including punitive damages) as well as attorneys’ fees and costs.

A month after filing, on December 4, 2020, before much more had happened, the Court consolidated the two cases, designating Allen as the lead. On December 14, 2020, both the Drumwright and Allen plaintiffs filed amended complaints. Both complaints added new state law claims, including assault, battery, and violations of Article I, Sections 12 and 14 of the North Carolina Constitution which protects free speech and assembly. Both complaints also added additional plaintiffs who had participated in the event and additional defendants from the Graham Police Department and Alamance County Sheriff’s Office. The Drumwright plaintiffs added the City of Graham as a defendant. On February 12, 2021, defendants from both the City of Graham and the Graham Police Department moved to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim and because of qualified immunity. The motion was directed at both Drumwright and Allen’s claims. Generally, defendants claimed that plaintiffs’ assertions were not specific enough to rise to an actionable claim. Further, they sought dismissal of claims under the North Carolina Constitution as plaintiffs have alternative remedies available. On March 2, 2021, defendants from the Alamance County Sheriff’s Office filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was directed only at Drumwright’s claims. In the accompanying memorandum, these defendants presented similar arguments to those presented by Graham defendants the prior month. On May 10, 2021, the Allen parties participated in mediation. According to the mediator’s report filed on May 21, 2021, the result was a settlement where “[o]nly [Allen] claims settled” and where Drumwright was “not mediated or settled.” The settlement provided that the parties would stipulate to the dismissal of all Allen claims with prejudice; that stipulation was filed June 25, 2021. We do not have the settlement documentation, which was not filed on the record. However, given that the settlement was effectuated by dismissal, it must not have included any court action or enforceability. Additionally, the mediator’s report stated that it included financial compensation. The court issued an order addressing two motions on June 2, 2021. First, the court denied the Alamance County defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was directed only at claims in Drumwright. Second, the court granted in part the Graham City defendants’ motion to dismiss. The motion had originally been directed at both Drumwright and Allen claims, but the Allen claims had settled in the meantime, mooting out the motion. Regarding the Drumwright claims, the court dismissed only the § 1983 constitutional claims against two defendants (the Graham Chief of Police and one other officer). The motion was otherwise denied. 2021 WL 2223772. As of July 9, 2021, the remaining parties were conducting discovery with respect to the Drumwright part of the case; the Allen part was settled. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Two consolidated cases alleged voter intimidation by police before the November 2020 elections. One was Drumright v. Cole, 1:20-cv-00998; the other was Allen v. City of Graham, 1:20-cv-00997. On October 31, 2020, police dispersed an event held in front of the Graham, NC courthouse, using pepper spray. Both of the aforementioned cases were filed on two days later against the Graham Police Department and the Alamance County Sherrif’s Office. Both cases listed similar claims of excessive force and voter intimidation. They also alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Allen claims were settled by mediation. The settlement stipulated the complete dismissal of the Allen claims. The court subsequently granted the dismissal of Drumwright’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claims against only two defendants (the Graham Chief of police and one other officer). All other Drumwright claims proceeded. This case is ongoing.


The plaintiffs in this case were former employees of Huntleigh USA Corporation who worked as screeners at Portland International Airport and were not retained as employees when airport screeners became federal employees. They filed suit individually and as a putative class on November 2, 2002, against NCS Pearson, Inc. and the Department of Transportation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. Nothing in the record indicates that the suit was ever certified as a class action, but class action status was not ever denied. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought monetary relief, claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The case was assigned to Judge Robert E. Jones. According to the complaint, plaintiffs entered into an agreement with the Transportation Security Administration [TSA] that they would receive hiring preference, and did not look for new jobs as a result. TSA hired the defendant, NCS Pearson, to administer the employment screening test. Plaintiffs alleged that the screening test was a pretextual basis for discrimination on the basis of race, gender, age, and other protected classes, and furthermore, that the test was not fairly administered. Plaintiffs further alleged that the defendant’s employees harassed them throughout the process, and that they were not hired as a result of the screening. The former Huntleigh employees who were rehired alleged that they were paid less than other similarly situated employees. Plaintiffs also filed a breach of contract claim, alleging that they were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between the defendant and TSA, and that the defendant breached the contract with TSA. On the same day as filing the complaint, plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, which requested immediate retesting of all class members under court supervision and the immediate hiring of all who passed the test. On March 3, 2003, Judge Jones denied plaintiffs' request for preliminary injunction on the grounds that the available evidence did not demonstrate unlawful discrimination sufficient to justify pre-litigation relief. Plaintiffs additionally failed to satisfy various administrative requirements that were necessary for bringing their claims. Between March and December of 2003, plaintiffs amended their complaint. Defendants also successfully sought the dismissal of several plaintiffs through hearings. On December 15, 2003, the defendant moved for summary judgment. On March 30, 2004, Judge Jones granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part. This judgment dismissed all of the plaintiffs’ claims against the government. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim was dismissed on February 14, 2005. Various plaintiffs were dismissed from the complaint throughout the following months, it is unclear why, but it was presumably due to a lack of evidence to suggest the defendant interfered with future employment opportunities. After a lengthy discovery process, a jury trial began on April 10, 2006 and lasted until April 19, 2006. The jury found that the defendant intentionally interfered with twenty-two of the twenty-three remaining plaintiffs' prospective economic relationship with TSA, and awarded monetary relief based on economic and non-economic damages to those individual plaintiffs. In total, the plaintiffs won over $500,000 -- about $25,000 per plaintiff. All requests for attorneys’ fees were denied. The case is now closed.

Summary: Former screeners of Portland International Airport, who were not retained as employees when airport screeners became federal employees, filed suit individually and as a putative class against NCS Pearson, Inc. and against the government in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon on November 2, 2002. Plaintiffs alleged discrimination in the hiring process, and sought monetary relief, claiming violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. The government was dismissed from the action, and after a jury trial, the jury awarded twenty-two (of fifty-plus) plaintiffs damages based on the defendant’s interference in their prospective employment.


On September 11, 2015, two Planned Parenthood clinics and three Arkansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Department of Human Services, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violations of the Medicaid Act and the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, enjoining the Department of Human Services from excluding Planned Parenthood as a Medicaid provider. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that on August 15, 2015, the Department had notified the Planned Parenthood clinics that it would soon terminate their Medicaid provider agreements. While the Department gave no reason for the termination, a press release by Arkansas Governor Asa Hutchinson indicated that the decision was in reaction to videos released by anti-abortion advocates claiming that Planned Parenthood clinics in other states had illegally sold fetal tissues. The plaintiffs claimed that such videos were both misleading and had no relevance to their ability to offer quality Medicaid services. Further, they claimed that termination of their Medicaid provider agreements violated the Medicaid Act by denying the individual plaintiffs their right to choose the willing and qualified health care provider of their choice; the First and Fourteenth Amendment by penalizing the individual plaintiffs for their constitutionally protected association with abortion providers; and the Equal Protection Clause by singling the plaintiffs out for unfavorable treatment. On September 18, 2015, U.S. District Judge Kristine G. Baker issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Department from suspending Medicaid payments to the clinics for the following 14 days. On October 2, 2015, the court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining the Department from suspending Medicaid payments to the clinics for services received by the individual plaintiffs. On October 5, 2015, the Department appealed the preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. While the appeal was pending, on October 5, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify a class of all Medicaid patients receiving or desiring to receive health services from Planned Parenthood. The court granted class certification on January 25, 2016. On March 3, 2016, the court amended the class certification to remove any requirement that the plaintiffs notify class members. On September 28, 2016, the court issued a new preliminary injunction, enjoining the Department from suspending Medicaid payments to the clinics for services received by any members of the plaintiff class. This included any Arkansas Medicaid patient who received services from the clinics. On October 27, 2016, the Department appealed the second preliminary injunction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. This appeal was consolidated with the Department’s October 5, 2015 appeal of the first preliminary injunction. On November 30, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion regarding the preliminary injunction on August 16, 2017. 867 F.3d 1034. The court (Judges Colloton, Melloy, and Shepherd), vacated both preliminary injunctions in a 2-1 opinion. The court found that the plaintiffs did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims, because the Medicaid Act did not unambiguously create a federal right for individual patients that can be enforced under § 1983. Judge Melloy dissented, because he would join the four other circuit courts and numerous district courts that all have found a private right of enforcement under the Medicaid Act. After the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion, the plaintiffs again filed a motion for the district court to grant a preliminary injunction on January 19, 2018, this time on their constitutional claims rather than their Medicaid Act claim. The court denied this motion on July 30, 2018. While the court was considering that motion, the Department filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the Medicaid Act claim; the court denied that motion on March 24, 2019. It concluded that judgment on the pleadings was neither necessary nor helpful at this stage of the litigation. In the same order, the court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to stay the proceedings. On March 20, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a motion for stay, claiming that they were not able to effectively pursue discovery due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The court granted stay on the same day. The plaintiffs further filed motions for stay on May 15, 2020 and July 15, 2020, which the court granted on the days they were filed. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 11, 2015 two Planned Parenthood clinics and three Arkansas Medicaid patients filed this lawsuit in United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. The plaintiffs sued the Arkansas Department of Human Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Medicaid Act and the First and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the Department from excluding Planned Parenthood as a Medicaid provider. On January 25, 2016, Judge Baker granted the plaintiffs’ requested class certification. She issued a preliminary injunction on September 28, 2016, enjoining the Department from suspending Medicaid payments to the plaintiff clinics for services received by any Arkansas Medicaid patient. The injunction was vacated by the Eighth Circuit in August 2018. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a new preliminary injunction in July 2018. As of August 2020, the litigation is stayed due to the Covid-19 pandemic.


This lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri in August 2012 by the owner of a publishing business named Caged Potential, against the Missouri Department of Corrections. The plaintiff was represented by the ACLU. The plaintiff's cousin was a prisoner at Crossroads Correctional Facility in Cameron, Missouri who wrote a novel, "So Far From Paradise." The book's publisher received nine orders for this book from prisoners at Crossroads and mailed copies in November 2010 and January 2011. Crossroads mailroom staff seized the novels and refused to deliver the books to the inmates. The plaintiff never received notice that the books were seized and not delivered. The plaintiff argued that without notice, a publisher had no way of knowing that the publication had not reached its intended recipient and therefore could not appeal the decision to withhold the publication; this, the plaintiff argued, violated due process and led to violations of the First Amendment, when prisoners and publishers were erroneously denied the ability to communicate with each other. On November 8, 2012, the Court (Nanette K. Laughrey) granted class certification; the plaintiff class was "All current and future publishers, distributors, and authors of written materials, who mail books, publications, or other written materials to inmates incarcerated in prisons operated by MODOC." On November 15, 2012, Judge Laughrey granted a preliminary injunction, requiring all Missouri prisons to notify senders whenever written materials they send are censored, seized, and withheld from prisoners. The judge also ordered that after getting such notice, senders must have an opportunity to appeal the censorship. 2012 WL 5462932. On March 28, 2014, the Court approved, over the objections of some of the plaintiffs, a settlement agreement awarding $33,479 in attorney fees. The defendants agreed to notify senders of books, publications, personal correspondence, pictures, and recorded materials of censorship decisions and to notify them of their opportunity to appeal those decisions as set forth in the procedure attached as Exhibit B to the agreement.

Summary: In a challenge brought by a publisher whose books were barred from prisoners in Missouri without notice, on November 15, 2012, Judge Laughrey granted a preliminary injunction, requiring all Missouri prisons to notify senders whenever written materials they send are censored, seized, and withheld from prisoners. The judge also ordered that after getting such notice, senders must have an opportunity to appeal the censorship. The parties settled in 2014.


On September 30, 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Lifecare Management Services, LLC, and subsidiary LifeCare Hospitals of Pittsburgh, Inc. (collectively "Lifecare") for discriminatory employment practices (disparate treatment and hostile work environment) in violation of Section 102(a) of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a). The EEOC brought the claims as a result of charges filed by a business office manager at LifeCare Hospitals. The EEOC sought injunctive relief (in the form of an order not to discriminate against employees with disabilities, to develop policies to provide equal employment opportunities for such individuals, and to reinstate the employee) and monetary relief (back pay with interest, compensation for out-of-pocket expenses and emotional pain, and punitive damages). On October 17, 2008, the employee was allowed to intervene in the case. Her amended complaint, filed November 11, 2008, added charges for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, the FMLA, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations act. She sought reinstatement, back pay, front pay, compensation, attorney fees, and punitive damages. On September 30, 2008, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Lifecare Management Services, LLC, and subsidiary LifeCare Hospitals of Pittsburgh, Inc. (collectively "Lifecare") for discriminatory employment practices (disparate treatment and hostile work environment) in violation of Section 102(a) of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a). The EEOC brought the claims as a result of charges filed by a business office manager at LifeCare Hospitals. The EEOC sought injunctive relief( in the form of an order not to discriminate against employees with disabilities, to develop policies to provide equal employment opportunities for such individuals, and to reinstate the employee) and monetary relief (back pay with interest, compensation for out of pocket expenses and emotional pain, and punitive damages). On October 17, 2008, the employee was allowed to intervene in the case. Her amended complaint, filed November 11, 2008, added charges for discrimination and retaliation under the ADA, the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations act. She sought reinstatement, back pay, front pay, compensation, attorney fees, and punitive damages. Having been diagnosed with a form of colon cancer that was particularly likely to reoccur, the employee took a leave of absence under the FMLA. She was terminated a few weeks after the leave ended but soon allowed to resume work on a part-time basis largely from home. Later a new supervisor required her to work full time. He removed her full-time staff assistant, which in combination with other changes significantly increased her duties, even compared to her previous full-time employment. Eventually human resources told her to take a 12-week severance with pay and health insurance or risk being terminated for cause, which would involve no health insurance. After a series of misundertandings over whether she should continue to report to work, during which she repeatedly sought clarification, she was terminated for failure to report to work. Although she obtained unemployment compensation, Lifecare provided the state with inaccurate information about her loss of employment, which led to a proceeding on charges of fraud and the possibility that she would have to pay back $13,000 in benefits. She eventually prevailed in retaining her benefits. The parties participated in mediation and eventually reached a settlement agreement. On May 8, 2008, Lifecare and the intervening employee stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of her claims because the settlement with the EEOC covered the terms of her compensation. The Court (Judge Gary Lancaster) entered the settlement as a Consent Decree on May 12, 2009. Under the consent decree Lifecare did not have to reinstate the employee but did have to pay her $100,000 and all parties bore their own costs. Lifecare was required to keep detailed records of all complaints it received for the next year about a possible incident of disability discrimination and make them available to the EEOC upon request. Lifecare was also required to provide anti-disability-discrimination training to all employees and investigative training to all supervisor employees for the next year. Finally, Lifecare had to prepare a report at the end of the 1-year period of all the complaints of possible disability discrimination during that time and how they were handled. The 1-year period passed without incident, and the case is now closed.

Summary: The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against Lifecare Management Services, LLC, and subsidiary LifeCare Hospitals of Pittsburgh, Inc. (collectively "Lifecare") for discriminatory employment practices in violation of Section 102(a) of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112(a). The EEOC alleged that the Lifecare's revocation of accommodations for a business office manager who had worked at the company in that position for 29 years and the increased scrutiny and discipline to which they subjected her constituted impermissible disparate treatment and created a hostile work environment. The employee subsequently joined the lawsuit but withdrew when all parties reached a settlement agreement. The settlement was entered as a consent decree and provided the employee $100,000 while requiring Lifecare Hospitals of Pittsburgh for the next year to provide anti-discrimination and investigation training, to maintain records of disability discrimination complaints, and to report to the EEOC those complaints and how they were handled. The 1-year period for the decree passed without incident, and the case is now closed.


On March 30, 2010, six plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York against Bank of America and Merrill Lynch. The plaintiffs represented a putative class of female financial advisors employed in the United States by either Bank of America (at any time since March 16, 2006) or Merrill Lynch (at any time since March 7, 2008). Plaintiffs filed the lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; and anti-discrimination state laws in New York, Florida, Missouri, and New Jersey. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that defendants' discriminatory policies in compensation and business opportunities created a disparate impact on female financial advisors. Plaintiffs also alleged that defendants retaliated against them when they complained about the discrimination. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, an award of back and front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorneys' fees for alleged sex discrimination. On October 26, 2011, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court (Judge Joseph F. Bianco) denied on September 27, 2012. Calibuso v. Bank of America, 893 F. Supp. 2d 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes earlier that year, defendants argued that plaintiffs' class claims could not meet the commonality requirements under 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because the claims were based on subjective, managerial decisions. The court disagreed, reasoning that the plaintiffs in this case had alleged that discriminatory policies guided those subjective decisions, and that the Supreme Court in Dukes made clear that the commonality requirement could be satisfied "if the subjective decision-making was operated under a general policy of discrimination." Id. at 377 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Following the order denying the defendants' motion to dismiss, the parties proceeded with discovery. On April 19, 2013, the case was reassigned to Judge Pamela K. Chen. On September 6, 2013, the parties submitted a proposed settlement for the court's approval. On September 30, two individuals, one of them a class member, sought to intervene to represent African American women who they believed would be harmed by the programmatic relief in the proposed settlement. Along with one of the named plaintiffs, they also objected to the proposed settlement on the basis of the inadequacy of the proposed injunctive relief for the affected class of female financial advisors. On October 4, 2013, Judge Chen denied the motion to intervene. The intervenors filed a notice of appeal of this denial to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals on November 1, 2013, but ultimately withdrew their appeal after Judge Chen approved the class-action settlement on December 27, 2013. Prior to the approval of the settlement, the objectors and class counsel reached agreement based on certain changes to the original settlement proposal. The approved settlement included attorneys' fees and costs, monetary relief to named plaintiffs, and a $775,000 settlement fund to resolve the individual non-class claims of four named plaintiffs. In addition to monetary relief, the settlement included programmatic relief, binding for three years from February 1, 2014. The programmatic relief included a study and periodic review by an independent settlement monitor, maintenance of a gender-neutral Account Distribution Policy, and quarterly reviews of account redistributions. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for those three years, and the case is now closed.

Summary: This case was brought by six plaintiffs against Bank of America and Merrill Lynch. The plaintiffs represented a putative class of female financial advisors employed in the U.S. by either Bank of America (at any time since March 16, 2006) or Merrill Lynch (at any time since March 7, 2008). Plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive relief for alleged sex discrimination, including, inter alia, gender disparities in compensation and business opportunities. The parties reached a settlement agreement providing monetary and programmatic relief, which was approved on December 27, 2013. The court retained jurisdiction over the case for three years, and the case is now closed.


On June 17, 2012, this fourth lawsuit over Florida's voter purge program was filed by a group of civil and voting rights organizations against the Florida Secretary of State under Section 1983, the Voting Rights Act, and the National Voter Registration Act. They argue that the purge program discriminated against black and Latino citizens, and that it illegally happened within 90 days of a federal election. Before trial, the two sides entered into a stipulation regarding some of the claims. Florida agreed to re-add any voters to the rolls whose non-citizenship could not be verified and also ensured that no registered voter would have to submit a provisional ballot due to their presence on a list of potential non-citizens. In return, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss most of their claims. On the claim that the purge violated minority rights because it took place within 90 days of an election, the District Court (Judge William Zloch) found that the NVRA only restricted mass removals of voters because of changes in residence. As such, he ruled that Florida's removal of voters did not violate the NVRA, since the act did not disallow a purge of voters who were not eligible to register to vote in the first place. 908 F.Supp.2d 1276 (S.D. Fla. 2012). On November 1, 2012, the plaintiffs appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which eventually reversed the District Court's decision. In an opinion filed on December 4, 2014, the Eleventh Circuit declared Florida's removal of voters in this case violated the NVRA prohibition against systematic removal within 90 days of an election. The Court of Appeals rejected the statutory interpretation that the NVRA only prohibited the removal of citizens who have changed residences, and ordered the District Court to provide any further relief needed in the interest of justice. The District Court entered the new final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on February 12, 2015. The parties settled on attorneys' fees outside of the Court. The case is now closed.

Summary: On June 17, 2012, in this fourth lawsuit over Florida's voter purge program, a group of civil and voting rights organizations sued the Florida Secretary of State under Section 1983, the Voting Rights Act, and the National Voter Registration Act. They argue that the purge discriminates against black and Latino citizens, and that it illegally takes place within 90 days of a federal election. The parties agreed to re-add any voters whose non-citizenship could not be verified. However, the district court found that the purge did not violate minority rights. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the decision and remanded that the district court declare Florida's removal of voters in this case did violate the NVRA. The parties settled on attorneys' fees outside of the Court.


On August 21, 2007, a group of California students, their parents, and a related nonprofit filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Education (DOE) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that moderate- and low-income minority students were being harmed by the DOE's regulation allowing interns and others who had not achieved full state certification to qualify as "highly qualified" teachers. The plaintiffs, represented by a combination of public interest and private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Administrative Procedure Act, claiming that the defendants' regulation implementing the Federal No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act violated a congressionally mandated requirement. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that by designating teachers who were in the process of achieving full certification as "highly qualified" the DOE had violated the clear congressional directive that "highly qualified" teachers teach students in their core classes. Congress defined "highly qualified" teachers as those who had completed their teacher preparation and had received full state certification. The DOE's regulation, however, allowed for a teacher to be classified as "highly qualified" while in the process of achieving full certification. The result, the plaintiffs alleged, was that intern-teachers, still in the process of being trained, were disproportionately teaching low-income and minority-descent students. On motion for summary judgment, the district court (Judge Phyllis J. Hamilton) evaluated the plaintiffs' claim that the regulation conflicted with the NCLB. Applying Chevron deference (where a court defers to the agency's interpretation of a statute unless unreasonable), the court found that the regulation did not conflict with the statute because the NCLB never defined the phrase "full State certification as a teacher (including certification obtained through alternative routes to certification)." Therefore, Congress gave the DOE the discretion to clarify what the statute meant, including the ability to issue a regulation certifying that a teacher was "fully qualified" while in the process of achieving full certification. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that the DOE's regulations classifying teachers who were making progress towards achieving full certification, rather than having already been fully certified under state law, should not be afforded Chevron deference because it was unreasonable. In essence, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants' regulation resulted in the situation where, "a first-day participant in an alternative certification program working towards full state certification and a thirty-year, fully-certified teaching veteran are equally considered 'highly qualified' under the regulation, and states and districts are permitted to treat them identically for purposes of hiring, distribution, planning and public reporting." But the DOE argued that whether the federal regulation defined "highly qualified" as only one who has achieved full certification or to also include those who are in the process of achieving full certification, the decision would still be up to the state to define who is fully certified under their own state law. Moreover, because the NCLB has been interpreted to not create an enforceable right against a state, a victory in this suit would not redress the plaintiff's alleged injury, thus leaving the plaintiffs without standing to bring their claim. While initially issuing an opinion that held the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring to challenge the regulation, the original Ninth Circuit panel (Judges Dorothy W. Nelson, William A. Fletcher, and Richard C. Tallman), in a rare reversal, withdrew and replaced their first opinion with a new one. In the new opinion, the Circuit reversed itself and found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the regulation. After finding that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the regulation at issue, the majority held that the regulation failed Chevron's test of deference to agency regulations. The court held that the regulation was invalid because "it is inconsistent with the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." The holding was based on "the difference between the meaning of "has obtained" in [the statute] and the meaning of demonstrat[es] satisfactory progress toward in [the regulation]." On October 12, 2010, the defendants moved for a rehearing. Then, in December of 2010, Congress passed a bill that included an amendment that would codify the Department of Education's regulation interpreting the No Child Left Behind Act's "highly qualified" classification as encompassing teachers who had not achieved full state certification and were still in the midst of their training programs. The amendment remained in the final bill signed by the President. As a result, Congress effectively overturned the Circuit's finding that the regulation was not entitled to Chevron deference and codified the Department of Education's interpretation of "highly qualified." The amendment, however, remained in effect only through the 2012-2013 school year. On May 10, 2012, the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for rehearing and issued a new opinion in light of the amendment to the NCLB Act. The Circuit concluded that because of the temporary nature of the amendment, the plaintiffs' claims were not moot. But the Circuit agreed that the amendment overturned its prior decision. The Circuit also held that the plaintiffs' attorneys were not entitled to attorneys' fees because the DOE's position was "substantially justified." There have been no further updates to this case since the Ninth Circuit's decision in 2012. There is no reason to think that this case is still ongoing.

Summary: On August 21, 2007, a group of California students, their parents and a non-profit filed a lawsuit under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Francisco Division for violating the teacher quality provisions of the federal No Child Left Behind Act. Specifically, the Plaintiffs alleged that by allowing teachers who were in the process of achieving full certification to teach full time, the Defendants violated the congressional directive that "highly qualified" teachers teach students in their core classes. The District Court granted Summary Judgment for the Defendants, holding under Chevron deference that the Defendants' interpretation of the No Child Left Behind Act was not unreasonable. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision on September 27, 2010, holding that the Defendants' policy was against the clear intent of Congress. On October 12, 2010 the Defendants filed a motion for rehearing en banc, however in December of 2010, the NCLB was amended to allow teachers who had not achieved full state certification to teach as "highly qualified" teachers. This amendment was only in effect through the 2012-2013 school year. The case was closed on July 5, 2012.


This case concerns the conditions of confinement at the Federal Medical Center, Carswell (hereafter FMC-Carswell), a women’s prison in Fort Worth, Texas. The original plaintiffs included over seventy prisoners who alleged systemic failure to implement proper COVID-19 protocols, unjustified denial of medical care and hygiene products; low-quality food, and emotional abuse by prison staff. These 70+ plaintiffs filed their complaint on August 3, 2020, in the U.S District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, without counsel, seeking both injunctive relief and damages. The plaintiffs asserted that the prison’s conditions amounted to “deliberate indifference” and “wanton infliction of pain” in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s bar against cruel and unusual punishment. The case was assigned to Judge Mark Pittman. The plaintiffs sought to bring this suit as a class action. But on August 11, 2020, the Court denied class certification, and then severed the case into seventy different cases, each with its own plaintiff. Many of them decided to proceed in those individual cases, filing motions seeking release. On December 22, 2020, the Court construed these as motions for compassionate release, and denied them all, stating that only the sentencing court had appropriate jurisdiction to release. This judgment, entered in 30+ individual cases, explicitly did not decide the plaintiffs’ other claims for monetary and other relief. In the same order, the Court appointed counsel from a private firm as well as the Texas A&M School of Law Civil Clinic, and instructed the appointed attorneys to consider consolidating the remaining plaintiffs' cases, and filing an amended complaint. On April 23, 2021, counsel duly filed a motion to consolidate 37 cases, and also asserted a new cause of action for discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 alongside the plaintiff’s original cause of action for unconstitutional conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. No decision has yet been made on the consolidation. This case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2020, female prisoners at the Federal Medical Center, Carswell filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Allegations included a failure to implement COVID-19 protocols, low-quality food, and abuse by prison staff. A motion to consolidate the remaining 37 plaintiff's cases has been filed. The case is ongoing.


Throughout his campaign and presidency, Donald Trump advocated for the construction of a wall along the southern border of the United States. In 2018, President Trump requested that Congress appropriate $5.7 billion to build a steel border wall. Congress refused, and instead appropriated $1.375 billion for 55 miles of wall. President Trump signed that appropriations bill, but also declared a national emergency under the National Emergencies Act, directing the Department of Defense to reallocate military funds in order to build the wall. On the same day as the president’s national emergency declaration, this lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Several landowners in Starr County, Texas, with property on the United States–Mexico border, asserted that the construction of the wall through their property threatened “imminent invasion of their privacy and the quiet enjoyment of their land.” The Frontera Audubon Society, a non-profit Texas environmental organization, contended that the construction of the wall would destroy critical habitat and impair the ability of the Society’s members’ to observe wildlife. Their complaint, filed on 2/15/2019, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against President Trump and his Secretary of Defense, and was assigned to Judge Trevor N. McFadden. The plaintiffs alleged that President Trump’s declaration exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority, because the Constitution grants all appropriations authority to Congress. Through the National Emergencies Act, Congress had given some power to the executive to reallocate military funds in an emergency; the plaintiffs contended, however, that the Act was not intended to allow the president to circumvent Congress when Congress had explicitly refused to provide the funding that he was seeking. Additionally, the plaintiffs asserted that in light of government statistics indicating a significant decline in legal and illegal border crossings, there was no emergency at the southern border. Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the National Emergencies Act allowed reallocation of funds only for military construction projects, and that the border wall did not fit into that category and was thus ineligible for reallocated funds. In April 2019, the Trump administration submitted sworn declarations to the court, committing to use no reallocated funds for the section of border wall in dispute in this case, but rather to use only funds appropriated by Congress in its 2018 or 2019 appropriations bills. As a result, the plaintiffs dismissed their claims on April 22, 2019, and the court dismissed the case the next day.

Summary: Several Texas landowners with property on the U.S.-Mexico border, together with the Frontero Audubon Society, sued the Trump administration, seeking to prevent construction of a border wall. Filed on February 14, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, this lawsuit claimed that the administration’s attempt to fund construction through a national emergency declaration was in violation the National Emergencies Act and constitutional separation of powers. The Trump administration declared to the court that the sections of border wall in dispute would be constructed using only the limited funding that Congress had authorized for the wall. The plaintiffs then dismissed their claims.


On October 4, 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against Connecticut's Departments of Mental Retardation (DMR), Social Services (DSS), and Public Health (DPH) and Southbury Training School, an intermediate care facility for people with intellectual disabilities (ICF/MR) in Southbury, Connecticut. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on behalf of both current and future Southbury residents. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions at Southbury violated residents' rights under the Due Process clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. This lawsuit followed in the wake of an earlier investigation of Southbury, conducted by the United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA). 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. That federal investigation led to a CRIPA lawsuit, United States v. Connecticut, ID-CT-0005, which was apparently treated as a companion case to this one at points during litigation. Another private suit, McCoy v. Belmont, ID-CT-0006, appears to have been litigated separately. Judge Ellen B. Burns of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut adjudicated all or part of these three lawsuits. According to the complaint in this case, conditions at Southbury worsened after the 1986 consent decree entered in United States v. Connecticut. Inhumane living conditions at Southbury placed residents at risk of physical harm and death. For the institution's convenience, residents' behavior was controlled with physical and pharmaceutical restraints instead of behavior modification programming. Similarly, according to the complaint, the institution also sacrificed residents' choice, dignity, privacy, and individuality for convenience by scheduling bathing, toileting and eating to occur communally. Southbury was located in a remote rural area and did not provide community living placements, family support, employment opportunities, recreation, and adequate medical and psychological care, thereby isolating residents from their families and communities. The plaintiffs' other complaints addressed advocacy, residents' rights, facility accessibility, sanitation, staff-to-resident ratios, property ownership, and Do Not Resuscitate Orders (DNR Orders). The Complaint was amended three times, but we only have a copy of the original version. On October 6, 1994, the court (Judge Ellen B. Burns) declined to consolidate this lawsuit with United States v. Connecticut. On February 7, 1996, the court reinforced the disunion between the lawsuits by denying Southbury's motion to dismiss for res judicata. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 915 F. Supp. 133 (D. Conn. 1996). The court reasoned that the Messier plaintiffs were not in privity with the United States and, therefore, were not barred from litigating the issues. A second challenge to the integrity of the plaintiffs' claims was raised when seven Southbury residents and two advocacy groups sought to intervene in the lawsuit. The would-be interveners feared that, if granted, the relief sought by the plaintiffs would precipitate closure of Southbury. On March 6, 1996, the court disagreed and interpreted the plaintiffs' prayer as one that would require Southbury to consider community placements for all residents but only to use community placements when appropriate. Institutional placement would still be available for individuals who would benefit from living in a structured environment. The court certified the class on July 7, 1996, and refused to dismiss the claims against DPH and DSS on September 4, 1996. It appears that the parties engaged in discovery, and occasionally sought the court's opinion on procedural disputes. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1991 WL 136170 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 1998) (ruling on plaintiffs' subpoena of documents from non-party); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1998 WL 422858 (D. Conn. June 29, 1998) (finding documents written by defense experts to be protected as strategic work products); Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1998 WL 841641 (D. Conn. Dec. 2, 1998) (compelling defendants to return borrowed documents to the plaintiffs and permitting plaintiffs to re-depose defense witnesses). On November 5, 1998, the court refused both to allow 611 of Southbury's 724 residents either to opt-out of the plaintiff class or to be defined as a subclass. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 183 F.R.D. 350 (D. Conn. 1998). Although the court recognized that members of a class certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) might sometimes be permitted to opt-out of a class, the court found no substantive reason for allowing the 611 residents to opt-out in this case. The court reiterated that pending litigation would not have the effect of closing Southbury and chastised Southbury advocacy groups, which had used misinformation to recruit residents for the opt-out petition. On January 5, 1999, the court issued two rulings. First, the court permitted the plaintiffs to add a named plaintiff to protect the community placement claim, but refused to allow any substantive amendment. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1999 WL 20907 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1999). Although Southbury had moved almost all of the named plaintiffs to a community-based residence, the court recognized that many individuals appropriate for community placements remained institutionalized. Adding another named plaintiff would preserve deinstitutionalization and community placement claims. Second, the court entered a mixed ruling on four motions for summary judgment on January 5, 1999. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1999 WL 20910 (D. Conn. Jan. 5, 1999). The court awarded summary judgment to DPH on the plaintiffs' DNR Order claim. The court held that a private physician could impose a DNR Order on a patient without due process protections, even if the patient was not terminally ill and had a developmental disability. The court also granted summary judgment to the defendants on all Social Security Act claims, finding that the system for inspecting and licensing ICF/MRs contained sufficient safeguards to preclude licensing claims. The court also entered summary judgment for DSS on the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act claims because the plaintiffs failed to show that Connecticut's vocational rehabilitation programs actually discriminated against severely disabled individuals. The court dismissed DSS from the litigation and denied all other summary judgment requests. A 120-day trial on the remaining due process, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims was conducted between January 25 and October 21, 1999. On September 14, 1999, the court refused to order the defendants to compensate one of the plaintiffs' experts for time spent waiting to testify. Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., No. 94-1706, 1999 WL 795556 (D. Conn. Sept. 14, 1999). On October 4, 1999, the court refused to enter partial summary judgment on issues also raised in United States v. Connecticut. Sometime after the trial concluded, the court put the case on hold. On November 12, 1999, the parties entered mediation (Owen Eagan, Neutral), which appears to have produced a partial settlement. On December 14, 2001, the court refused to enforce the partial settlement. On November 11, 2002, with the case still on hold, the plaintiffs made a motion to intervene in the United States v. Connecticut. On January 7, 2003, the court denied their motion. After United States v. Connecticut was finally adjudicated in 2006, the court returned its attention to Messier in May of 2006. The court initially intended to open the record to accept additional evidence on community placement. The plaintiffs objected and, on May 5, 2006, filed a motion to determine liability on the current record. On June 2, 2006, the court agreed to issue a ruling on the basis of the 1999 trial. On June 5, 2008, the Court held that plaintiffs' claims were moot, following the decision in United States v. Connecticut; however, some individual remedies were needed for community placements for appropriate persons, though the plaintiffs appealed this decision and the conference was canceled pending the appellate decision. In October of 2008, the Second Circuit held that it would not hear the appeals until the District Court entered a judgment. As a result, the District Court set status conferences to take place on January and June of 2009. In the following months, the parties continued discovery and held a number of settlement conferences. On July 14, 2010, the Court granted a preliminary motion for a settlement agreement. The agreement required training of staff in recommending the appropriate setting for individuals, reallocation of funding to support community-based settings, implementation of programs for transition to such communities, and the hiring of a "Remedial Expert" to assure proper compliance. In November, 2010, the Court approved the settlement agreement as final, finding that it was a fair agreement. Lengthy litigation regarding attorney fees followed, and on January 23, 2013, the Court held that plaintiffs would be awarded attorney fees for their successful claims, but as of July 9, 2014, the Court did not decide an amount. The Court reheard a motion challenging this arrangement and it denied the motion to reconsider. In 2018, plaintiffs filed an appeal with the Second Circuit, which they withdrew in 2019. As of April 2019, the settlement agreement has terminated.

Summary: On October 4, 1994, a class action lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut against Connecticut's Departments of Mental Retardation (DMR), Social Services (DSS), and Public Health (DPH) and Southbury Training School, an intermediate care facility for people with intellectual disabilities (ICF/MR) in Southbury, Connecticut. The plaintiffs claimed that the conditions at Southbury violated residents' rights under the Due Process clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. The Court (Judge Ellen B. Burns) granted four motions for summary judgment for the defendants, though the due process, ADA, and Rehabilitation Act claims survived. On July 14, 2010, the Court signed a preliminary settlement agreement that became final on November of 2010. Since then, the Court decided that plaintiffs should be awarded attorney fees for their successful claims, but the amount of fees is still being decided as of July 9, 2014.


On February 2, 2002, a female employee ("KL") filed a charge of discrimination against her employer, Caterpillar Inc. ("Defendant"), with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Plaintiff"). At that time, KL was employed at the Defendant's facility in Aurora, Illinois. This action arose out of the EEOC's subsequent investigation into sexual harassment allegedly occurring at that facility. The EEOC brought sexual harassment claims on behalf of five current at that time Caterpillar employees-VE, SI, LJ, WH, RT-and sexual harassment and retaliation claims on behalf of two former Caterpillar employees-KL, and DG. On August 13, 2003, the Chicago District Office of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff sued Caterpillar, Inc. under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The plaintiff sought permanent injunctions enjoining the defendant from engaging in any employment practice that discriminates on the basis of sex and from retaliating against any employee for participating in protected activity; to order the defendant to institute and carry out policies that provide equal employment opportunities for women; require the defendant to provide women back pay, pecuniary losses and punitive damages; and order the defendant to provide training regarding sexual harassment and retaliation in the workplace. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against a class of female employees because of their sex by subjecting them to a pattern or practice of sexual harassment and by retaliating against them for asserting Title VII violations. On September 22, 2004, Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer denied the defendant's motion for partial summary judgement and for dismissal of the plaintiff's pattern or practice claims. She permitted the plaintiff to proceed on the sexual harassment claims on behalf of the women who had worked with RG, Safety and Security Manager at Caterpillar's Aurora Illinois facility as there was a reasonable nexus between RG's charge and the pattern and practice allegations in the case. On reconsideration, Judge Pallmeyer withdrew the limitation to women who worked with RG and approved a plant-wide class. The defendant sought leave to take an interlocutory appeal of this ruling. On February 22, 2005, Judge Pallmeyer certified a question for review by the Court of Appeals as follows: in determining whether the claims in an EEOC complaint are within the scope of the discrimination allegedly discovered during the EEOC's investigation, must the court accept the EEOC's administrative determination concerning the alleged discrimination discovered during its investigation, or instead, may the court itself review the scope of the investigation? On that same day, Judge Pallmeyer determined that the case would proceed as a class action. On June 1, 2005, the Seventh Circuit decided that "if courts may not limit a suit by the EEOC to claims made in the administrative charge, they likewise have no business limiting the suit to claims that the court finds to be supported by the evidence in the Commission's investigation. The existence of probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable." On February 9, 2006, the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge Geraldine Soat Brown for settlement. On August 9, 2007, Judge Pallmeyer granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's retaliation claim on behalf of DG, the plaintiff's sexual harassment claims on behalf of LJ and RT, and the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages on behalf of WH. In all other respects, the defendant's motion for summary judgment was denied. A bench trial was held from March 13, 2008 until April 7, 2008. On June 18, 2009, Judge Pallmeyer entered judgment in favor of the defendant on all counts and denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive and equitable relief. Based on the evidence as a whole, Judge Pallmeyer concluded that any unwelcome sexual conduct KL suffered was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment during her employment with Caterpillar. 628 F.Supp.2d 844. This case is now closed.

Summary: In 2003, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant discriminated against a class of female employees because of their sex by subjecting them to a pattern or practice of sexual harassment and by retaliating against them for asserting Title VII violations. In 2009, Judge Pallmeyer entered judgment in favor of the defendant on all counts and denied the plaintiff's request for injunctive and equitable relief. This case is now closed.


On September 21, 2016, six named plaintiffs filed this class action lawsuit against Onondaga County in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union Foundation and Legal Services of Central New York, the plaintiffs challenged the isolation of juveniles in solitary confinement at the County Justice Center. This practice, they alleged, violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. In addition to exposing them to serious harm, plaintiffs subclass members claimed the Onondaga Sherriff’s Office and Syracuse City School District denied them basic education and services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). The plaintiffs sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, as well as class action certification. On January 2, 2017, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice filed a statement of interest regarding the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction. Citing both scientific findings and case law, the DOJ emphasized the greater psychological vulnerability of juveniles compared to adults. Specifically, the DOJ pointed to evidence that isolating juveniles causes serious harm. This case was assigned to U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd. On February 22, 2017, Judge Hurd held the plaintiffs had complied with Rule 23’s requirements for class certification and demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. Judge Hurd therefore, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The certified class was composed of 16- and 17-year-olds being detained at the Onondaga County Justice Center. He also ordered that defendants be immediately enjoined and restrained from imposing 23-hour disciplinary isolation. Judge Hurd further granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and ordered that defendants immediately provide juveniles the proper education mandated under New York law, and specifically comply with the special education requirements under the IDEA. Finally, he ordered that all imposed discipline include meaningful social interaction with other and not directly harm a juvenile’s psychological condition. On April 10, 2017, Judge Hurd approved the parties’ joint stipulation and order for an interim settlement agreement. On August 28, 2017, he approved the final settlement agreement. The settlement agreement prohibited any juvenile from being locked in solitary confinement unless the juvenile posed an imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility, and placed time limitations on how long the juvenile could be kept in solitary confinement. The settlement also prescribed procedures for staff to take to minimize and periodically reassess the circumstances requiring solitary confinement. Furthermore, the defendants were required to implement a comprehensive behavior management system and apply a least-restrictive sanctions system. Defendants were also required to provide certain education opportunities to the juveniles, especially those with a disability. Lastly, the settlement included reporting and monitoring procedures to ensure that the defendants adhered to the settlement conditions. The parties were to engage in good-faith negotiations over reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs for plaintiffs’ counsel after court approval of the settlement agreement. The settlement was made court-enforceable, and was set to last until October 1, 2019, or until all juveniles were moved out of the relevant facility, whichever came last. On December 13, 2017, the settlement was entered after the parties did not receive any class-member objections to the settlement agreement. No enforcement activity appears in the docket. On October 31, 2019, the parties notified the Court that all juveniles had been transferred out; the Court accordingly closed the case on November 8, 2019.

Summary: In 2016, juvenile plaintiffs challenged the disciplinary practice of solitary confinement in Onondaga County jails. The plaintiffs alleged both a serious psychological harm and the deprivation of required educational services. U.S. District Judge David N. Hurd denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and granted plaintiffs' immediate injunctive relief against the practice. He further mandated the provision of appropriate education and meaningful social interactions. Judge Hurd also certified the plaintiffs' proposed class of 16- and 17-year-olds being detained at the Onondaga County Justice Center. On August 28, 2017, he approved the final settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, among other things, prohibited any juvenile from being locked in solitary confinement unless the juvenile posed an imminent threat to the safety and security of the facility, and placed time limitations on how long the juvenile could be kept in solitary confinement. The case was closed in November 2019, after all juveniles were transferred out of the facility.