On November 14, 2011, two photographers asked by police for IDs after they took pictures in the subway filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, against the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of New York State (NYCLU), sought declaratory and monetary relief, alleging false arrest, assault, and battery, in violation of their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the transit authority's ID rule was unconstitutional because it was vague and prone to arbitrary enforcement. On March 19, 2012, the City (but not the Transit Authority) made an Offer of Judgment to the plaintiffs, offering them compensatory damages in sum of $7,502 plus reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. The plaintiffs accepted the offer on April 2, 2012, thus releasing and discharging the City from the suit. The District Court (Judge Cheryl L. Pollak) consented to the Offer of Judgment and its acceptance. One of the plaintiffs then withdrew participation in the lawsuit, but the other remained; the Transit Authority remained as a defendant. On March 23, 2013, the District Court (Judge Pollak) granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and denied the Transit Authority's motion to dismiss the case. The Court declared that the ID rule of New York City Transit Authority was unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied. Judge Pollak found that the ID rule, which had criminal applications, did not provide sufficient definiteness for ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and that it failed to discourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. In addition, she ruled, the ID rule reached a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. Barry v. City of New York, 2013 WL 1182083 (S.D. N.Y. 2013). The Transit Authority filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit. On May 8, 2013, the plaintiff and the Transit Authority settled the remainder of the case. The New York City Transit agreed to pay attorneys' fees and litigation costs in sum of $14,500 to the plaintiff and to withdraw its appeal of the District Court's March 21, 2013 order. This ended the case.

Summary: On November 14, 2011, two photographers asked by police for IDs after they took pictures in the subway filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, against the City of New York and the New York City Transit Authority, alleging false arrest, assault, and battery and challenging the constitutionality of the ID rule. On March 19, 2012, the City (but not the Transit Authority) made an Offer of Judgment to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs accepted the offer and, subsequently, one of them withdrew from the lawsuit. The other plaintiff and the Transit Authority remained. On March 23, 2013, the District Court (Judge Cheryl L. Pollak) granted summary judgment to the plaintiff and denied the Transit Authority's motion to dismiss the case, holding that the ID rule was unconstitutionally vague and that it failed to discourage arbitrary enforcement. The Transit Authority filed a notice of appeal to the Second Circuit. On May 8, 2013, the plaintiff and the Transit Authority settled the remainder of the case. This ended the case.


On August 15, 2005, residents of an intermediate care facility (IMD) with mental illness filed a lawsuit under the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead, the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against various Illinois state officials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and legal services, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that they were needlessly segregated in a restricted institution that failed to provide them with the most integrated setting appropriate for their needs. Plaintiffs had histories of mental illness and were residents of Monroe Pavilion Health and Treatment Center, an intermediate care facility (IMD). Plaintiffs argued that many IMD residents could be served in a more community-integrated setting, but that the state had insufficient policies and procedures in place to help residents transition out of an institutional setting. Further, Plaintiffs alleged that there were long waiting periods for admission to supporting housing programs, requiring many individuals to be inappropriately institutionalized or face homelessness. On November 13, 2006, the Court (Judge William T. Hart) certified a class to consist of Illinois residents who: (1) have a mental illness; (2) are institutionalized in a privately-owned institution for mental diseases; and (3) may be able to live in an integrated community setting with appropriate supports and services. Williams v. Blagojevich, 2006 WL 3332844 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 13, 2006). On January 2, 2008, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to quash and/or modify subpoenas. Williams v. Blagojevich, 2008 WL 68680 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 2008). The parties submitted a joint status report on February 18, 2010, stating that they had reached a settlement "in principle." The Court preliminarily found that the modified proposed consent decree was within the appropriate range of fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness, on May 27, 2010. On July 27, 2010, the Court issued an opinion and order. The Court held that class notice had contained misleading statements and that attorneys for objecting plaintiffs would not initiate contact with additional class members. Williams v. Quinn, 2010 WL 3021576 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 27, 2010). The Court issued a consent decree on September 29, 2010. The purpose of the consent decree was to assure that Defendants provide Plaintiffs with the opportunity to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate. Among other requirements, the decree called for Defendants to: implement measures to provide community-based services; provide independent, professionally appropriate evaluations for each class member in order to determine appropriate community-based services; develop services plans based on the results of those evaluations; ensure that class members receive complete and accurate information regarding their rights; and, create an implementation plan to accomplish the obligations in the decree. The decree also provided that Defendants would pay $1,990,000 to class counsel in fees and any additional costs and expenses. On the same day, the Court issued an order granting final approval of the settlement agreement and retaining jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the consent decree. Williams v. Quinn, 2010 WL 3894350 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2010). After the parties submitted their own recommendations regarding a monitor, the Court issued an agreed order appointing Dennis Jones to serve as monitor on November 1, 2010. The case was closed, and there has been no further litigation.

Summary: This case was brought by residents of an intermediate care nursing home with mental illness against various Illinois state officials alleging that the state did not have policies and procedures in place to allow them and others to transition into more community-integrated housing. The Court issued a consent decree on September 29, 2010, which, in part, required Defendants to implement measures to provide adequate community-based services.


On May 5, 2010, three journalists who were arrested during the 2008 National Republican Convention filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the cities of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Woodbury, as well as several police officers and officials. The plaintiffs, represented by private and public interest firms, including the Center for Constitutional Rights, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, the Federal Tort Claims Act, and state law, and asked the court for injunctive relief, a declaration of fault, and damages. Plaintiffs claimed defendants violated freedom of the press, committed unlawful searches and seizures, and engaged in common law false arrest, assault, and negligence. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed their arrest and detention, while documenting public protests and police activity in their capacity as members of the press, were without probable cause and were conducted with excessive force. On October 7, 2010, plaintiffs amended their complaint to name previously unnamed individual defendants. On November 8, 2010, defendant John Doe, an unidentified Secret Service Agent, filed a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. On May 31, 2011, the District Court (Judge Susan R. Nelson) denied the motion in part and delayed ruling in part to allow for discovery. The parties reached a settlement on September 29, 2011. The settlement is confidential and under seal. The parties jointly filed a Stipulation of Dismissal with Prejudice on January 19, 2012, and on January 24, 2012, the Court approved the settlement terms and dismissed the action with prejudice.

Summary: On May 5, 2010, three journalists filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the cities of St. Paul, Minneapolis, and Woodbury, as well as several police officers and officials, alleging that their arrest and detention were without probable cause and were conducted with excessive force. The parties reached a confidential settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice on January 24, 2012


On July 28th, 2006 twelve black former employees of or applicants to the Walsh Group filed a class action complaint against the company in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged a variety of discriminatory practices against black employees and applicants. These included systematically laying off black employees while retaining non-black employees, refusing to hire black applicants, giving less desirable and more dangerous assignments to black employees, and fostering a hostile work environment. The plaintiffs are seeking a declaratory judgment, monetary damages for back pay, fees and costs, injunctive relief requiring the Walsh Group to cease its illegal practices, and orders requiring the Walsh Group to institute a selection procedure to prevent future discrimination and place the individual plaintiffs in the positions they had sought. On March 30, 2012, Judge entered an order regarding the class certification. The plaintiffs' class certification is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs sought to certify the following classes: (1) "Hostile Work Environment Class" (2) “Hire, Re-Hire and Promotion Class,” (3) “Work Hours and Compensation Class” and (4) “Layoff and Termination Class”. The court examined four classes respective against two legal standard set out in Federal Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). The court concluded that it would certify the hostile work environment class and the disparate impact class, but denied other two classes for failing to satisfy the legal requirements. On November 27th, 2012, with the agreement of both parties, the case was referred to a magistrate judge for a settlement conference. On December 12th, 2013, parties report to the court that the case has settled and the court granted the joint motion to dismiss the case.

Summary: This class action was filed by black applicant and employees of the Walsh Group on July 28, 2006 claiming discrimination on the basis of race (black) in hiring, terms and conditions of employment and work environment. The case is ongoing with the motion for class certification pending.


This is the first case filed in the Signal International cases. On Mar. 7, 2008, twelve Indian guestworkers recruited for work in the United States in exchange for green cards filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, plaintiffs were recruited to provide labor and services to defendant Signal International, a company based in Mississippi with operations in the Gulf Coast region, which was in the business of providing repairs to offshore oil rigs. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant ran a fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs also named the following agents as co-defendants for their involvement in the scheme: Malvern C. Burnett, his law offices, and his Gulf Coast Immigration Law Center (New Orleans lawyers); Global Resources and Michael Pol (Mississippi-based recruiters); Dewan Consultants and Sachin Dewan (India-based recruiters); Indo-Amerisoft and Kurella Rao (New Orleans labor brokers); and J&M Associates (Mississippi-based labor brokers). Plaintiffs later added others, including Billy Wilks of J&M. Plaintiffs asserted class action claims, on behalf of a class of over 500 workers, under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) (18 U.S.C. § 1589 (forced labor) and 18 U.S.C. § 1590 (trafficking)), the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. § 1962), the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1985). Plaintiffs also asserted collective action claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), and claims for damages under a theory of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. Several plaintiffs also brought individual claims of false imprisonment, assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs were represented by the ACLU, the Southern Poverty Law Center, the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, the Louisiana Justice Institute, and attorneys from several large private law firms. Plaintiffs alleged that they paid recruiters as much as $20,000 each for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States found out they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay additional fees of $1,050 per month to live in racially segregated labor camps in Mississippi and Texas with security guards and oppressive rules, and were subject to squalid living conditions, more dangerous and less desirable work assignments than those given to American workers, and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Defendant Signal filed a third-party complaint alleging that it did not misrepresent the immigration incentives to any of the plaintiffs, and that it was relying on the recruiters and their lawyers to lawfully provide foreign workers. During discovery, Magistrate Judge Daniel Knowles granted a protective order in Apr. 2009 prohibiting inquiries into current immigration status, current address of any plaintiff, or employers of any plaintiff after they left Signal. Magistrate Judge Knowles held that the damage and prejudice that would result from discovery into current immigration status outweighed its probative value, and noted the order was necessary since undocumented litigants would likely drop out of the suit if forced to produce immigration documents. In Aug. 2010, Magistrate Judge Knowles denied a motion by Signal to compel production of T- and U-visa applications, since it would necessarily result in an inquiry into the plaintiffs' current immigration status. On Nov. 10, 2010, the District Court (Judge Jay Zainey) granted Signal's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claim for class certification for injunctive relief, and plaintiffs filed a supplemental motion to certify the class for claims under the TVPA, Civil Rights Act, RICO Act, and KKK Act. Discovery continued for two more years. On Jan. 3, 2012, Judge Zainey again denied class certification because not all of the questions of law or fact common to the class members predominated over any questions affecting only individual members. Because claims under the TVPA necessarily involve the victim's perspective, the Court concluded these claims were not proper for certification. A determination on forced labor requires the jury to consider an individual's consent or lack thereof and whether the victim was coerced subjectively to provide labor based on the defendant's threats. Even if there were characteristics common to the class, such as immigration status or payment of exorbitant fees, the Court found that these characteristics did not substitute for the subjective aspects of why each plaintiff would stay at Signal. Additionally, part of the harms claimed were financial and reputational harms -- factors that were uniquely individual in nature. Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim for discriminatory employment practices on the basis of race, national origin, and immigration status was also found to be inappropriate for class status. Plaintiffs acknowledged they would need to forgo emotional distress claims in order to be granted class certification. The Court noted that the recruitment refunds plaintiffs sought were not attributable to the workplace discrimination allegedly carried out by Signal. The Court was also concerned that plaintiffs' willingness to forgo emotional distress recovery threatened the rights of the class members, since the complaint alleged a significant amount of emotional harm. Given that each individual plaintiff in this case had the potential for a large recovery, the Court did not find that class certification would be superior to individual trials. The Court found that plaintiffs' RICO claims were inappropriate for certification because the predicate acts that need to be proven require individualized proof. Plaintiffs would also be unable to show causation for their RICO injuries without resorting to individual proof of reliance. Finally, the Court found plaintiffs' KKK Act claims to be inappropriate for certification because the kind of coercion needed to show a violation of the 13th Amendment -- physical or legal coercion that requires the victim to work by law -- was not at issue in this case. Once class certification was denied, it was decided that this case would proceed with the twelve named plaintiffs. Judge Zainey determined the initial trial would consist of five of the named plaintiffs; the plaintiffs would select three and Signal would select two. On July 12, 2014, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied Signal's motion to transfer all of the cases pending against it to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Aug. 5, 2014, plaintiffs filed their final Sixth Amended Complaint. On Aug. 12, 2014, District Judge Susie Morgan denied Signal's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims under the FLSA for recruitment fees. The Court granted Signal's motion to dismiss claims for inbound travel and visa expenses under the FLSA, because plaintiffs did not plead that these expenses were primarily for the benefit of Signal. On Oct. 14, 2014, Judge Morgan denied Signal's motion for interlocutory appeal of the Court's prohibition of discovery on plaintiffs' post-Signal information including immigration status. On Jan. 6, 2015, Judge Morgan determined that the law of India would govern the claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation, while the law of Mississippi would govern the claims of breach of contract, quasi-contract, and agency. On Jan. 27, 2015, Judge Morgan issued an order pertaining to briefing she had required the parties to submit on issues of law under the TVPA. She found that punitive damages were allowed under the TVPA, while the affirmative defense of in pari delicto (arguing that two parties are equally at fault) is not, as it is squarely at odds with the policy behind the TVPA. She also found that psychological and reputational harm were included in the definition of "serious harm" under the TVPA. By the time of trial, the only remaining defendants were Signal, Burnett, and Dewan. (Co-defendants J&M, Rao, and Pol were all in bankruptcy proceedings, which stayed judgment against them.) A 24-day jury trial concluded on Feb. 18, 2015; the jury awarded plaintiffs $14,100,000 in damages. The jury decided in favor of plaintiffs regarding their claims of discriminatory terms and conditions of employment, retaliation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment, and in favor of the defendants regarding RICO and fraud (these being subsumed under the other claims). The jury decided the breach of contract claim in favor of Burnett and Dewan but awarded damages to plaintiffs against Signal, Burnett Law Offices, and Dewan Consultants. The TVPA claim was divided similarly, with the jury finding in favor of Burnett and Dewan but against Signal, Burnett Law Offices, and Dewan Consultants. The TVPA findings for Burnett and Dewan were reversed by the Court on Sept. 9, 2015. Post-trial, the parties contested whether the Court should enter a final judgment for the five trial plaintiffs despite the pending claims from the other seven plaintiffs, or whether the second trial should take place first. On Mar. 20, 2015, the Court entered final judgment, reasoning that the plaintiffs had “been waiting since the George W. Bush Administration for their day in court,” and that there was no “just reason” to delay a final determination. On Aug. 14, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion to receive attorneys’ fees (for over $5 million). After the District Court enjoined the Burnett defendants from transferring money out of their bank account, on Aug. 28, Dewan and Burnett both appealed plaintiffs' motion on Sept. 23, 2015. However, parties appear to have settled the matter, including dismissing the appeal. We do not have information on the terms of this specific settlement of attorneys' fees. In Dec. 2015, in the related EEOC case, the EEOC announced that the parties had reached a settlement for all cases, approved by the bankruptcy court. Signal would pay $5 million to 476 guestworkers through a claims process. All aggrieved individuals included in the litigation could receive relief in spite of the bankruptcy proceedings. Signal's CEO also issued an apology for its conduct. On Apr. 18, 2017 in David, the District Court entered a sealed stipulated judgment as to Dewan. The same day, the Court dismissed Burnett as a defendant, with prejudice. On Apr. 26 the Court also dismissed Dewan as a defendant, without prejudice. The court ruled plaintiffs had the right to reopen the action against Dewan if the settlement was not carried out by Aug. 1, 2018. On Aug. 2, 2018 the plaintiffs and defendants submitted a Joint Motion to extend the time period Dewan had to complete the settlement until October 1, 2018, with the Court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement against Dewan. As of the writing of this summary (on November 30, 2019), there has been no indication that the defendants completed the settlement. It is unclear whether litigation remains ongoing for the remaining seven plaintiffs, as a trial date has yet to be determined; or whether their claims have been settled. The many related cases are listed below.

Summary: In 2008, 12 Indian guestworkers filed a class action in E.D.La in a large labor trafficking case. After 7 years of litigation, the court held a jury trial for 5 named plaintiffs, concluding in Feb. 2015, and resulting in a $14.1m award for the plaintiffs. The parties appear to have settled the issues of attorneys' fees and damages owed to the other 7 plaintiffs.


On July 28, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a complaint on behalf of a disabled individual and her minor children in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) against Bank United. The complaint alleged that the defendant had engaged in discriminatory housing practices against the disabled individual. Specifically, it alleged that the defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her disability in her application for Federal Housing Administration-insured mortgage loan. The defendant allegedly repeatedly inquired into the nature of her and her children's disability, and, as a result, the complainant withdrew her application. The complaint asked for declaratory, injunctive and monetary relief. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, and the court issued a consent decree on August 5, 1999. Under the agreement, the defendant was permanently enjoined from establishing, publishing, or applying policies or practices that request or require the disclosure of confidential personal or medical information or the nature or extent of disability and from any other discrimination on the basis of disability as prohibited by the Fair Housing Act. The defendant agreed to pay $25,000 to the individual and her children in exchange for the release of all claims arising from the facts at issue. The defendant also agreed to implement procedures ensuring that no discrimination on the basis of disability occurs, whereas the bank can only request documentation that relates to the source of payments for the loan. The defendant also had to keep records relating to any persons that applies for a mortgage on the basis of disability income. The defendant agreed to provide anti-discrimination training. The defendant agreed to send pertinent files to the United States. The duration of the agreement was three years and three months. The case is closed.

Summary: On July 28, 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a complaint on behalf of a disabled individual and her minor children in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3602 (h) against Bank United. The defendant repeatedly inquired into the nature of her and her children's disability, and, as a result, the complainant withdrew her application. The parties settled. The defendant was enjoined from inquiring into personal and medical information or the nature or extent of disability, and paid $25,000 to the injured individual.


On March 12, 2001, two African-Americans who were former employees of Groot Industries filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for monetary and injunctive relief, alleging racial and national origin harassment and discrimination. Specifically, they alleged that defendants subjected African Americans and Hispanics to inferior terms and conditions of employment due to their race and national origin, and also discriminated against them in connection with promotions, work assignments, compensation, transfers, discipline and terms and conditions of employment. Following the filing of complaint, plaintiffs moved to add two more Hispanic plaintiffs as class members and class representatives. On August 5, 2002, the Court (Judge Joan B. Gottschall) granted plaintiffs' motion to add Hispanic plaintiffs with respect to the § 1981 claims, but denied their motion to add under the Title VII claim, because the two Hispanic plaintiffs did not file timely charges of discrimination with the EEOC and their claims did not arise out of sufficiently similarly discriminatory treatment as those allegations found in the African American plaintiffs' EEOC charges. On March 31, 2003, the Court (Judge Joan B. Gottschall) partly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment against the two African-American plaintiffs, because plaintiffs did not show enough evidence with regard to discriminatory discharge and retaliatory discharge. The case seemed to develop in favor of defendants. On September 2, 2003, the Court (Judge Gottschall) denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification and on the same day, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment against the two Hispanic plaintiffs, because the two plaintiffs did not present enough evidence to support their discriminatory discharge and hostile work environment claims. In light of this, on September 29, 2004, the parties agreed to a tentative settlement on an individual basis, and the plaintiffs' counsel moved to dismiss the case with leave to reinstate within 60 days. The Court granted plaintiffs' motion.

Summary: This case was brought by former African-American and Hispanic employees of defendants against defendants seeking monetary and injunctive relief. On September 29, the Court granted plaintiffs' motion to dismiss due to the parties' settlement.


On June 20, 2006, six low-level sex offenders filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, against the state of Georgia. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the ACLU of Georgia, challenged provisions of the state's new sex offender law that prevented sex offenders from living and working within one-thousand feet of school bus stops and churches. The plaintiffs had committed their crimes when they were young (often statutory / consensual sex acts with a person a few years younger), and argued that the Georgia law violated their rights because it did not distinguish between low-level and high-level sex offenders, nor did it allow them to seek an exemption. They further alleged that the law automatically exposed persons to felony prosecution and forced nearly all sex offenders out of their homes, and that it would also undercut church efforts to reform sex offenders. On June 27, 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Clarence Cooper granted a restraining order against the enforcement of the bus stop portion of the law and scheduled further hearings. The court's discussion focused on whether or not "bus stops," as defined in the statute, meant places where school buses actually stopped to pick up schoolchildren, or places formally designated as bus stops by the relevant school board. The court ruled that "bus stops" must be designated, and since no school board had yet designated any bus stops, the court denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction. On June 29, 2006, the Judge Cooper certified a plaintiff class of all persons who registered with the State of Georgia as sex offenders on or before July 1, 2006 and who reside within 1000 feet of a currently-designated school bus stop or a school bus stop designated in the future. Following the issuance of the TRO (temporary restraining order), three counties designated their "bus stops" to remove the ambiguity, and then entered into consent orders that barred enforcement of the law until further order of the court. The plaintiffs then filed another motion for preliminary injunction challenging the residency restrictions barring a home within one-thousand feet of a church. This was filed on behalf of nine elderly and sick sex offenders who mostly live in nursing homes. Each of the affected counties allowed these sex offenders to remain in their nursing homes. The District Court permitted the key portions of the plaintiffs' case to move forward, including challenges based on the following constitutional provisions: (1) Article 1, § 10 of the Georgia Constitution, which provides that states cannot pass laws that increase punishments for criminal acts after they have been committed ; (2) the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects certain fundamental rights from being infringed upon; and (3) the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution, which protects religious beliefs and religious practices. On October 14, 2008 the plaintiffs filled their 4th amended complaint. The plaintiffs made clear that the most significant part of their challenge to the law involved the school bus stop provisions. Prompted by some changes to the law, in March 2009, the Court decertified the previously defined class and certified several new subclasses, including all persons who are registered, are required to register, or will be required to register in the future as sex offenders pursuant to § 42-1-15 who (1) reside in counties in which the school board has designated school bus stops for purposes of § 42-1-15 and (2) either do not own their own homes or do not fall within the homeowner exemption of § 42-1-15(f) or (g), as determined by the sheriff in the county where such persons are registered. The 2009 order found that one of the plaintiffs had standing to represent this subclass because she was leasing a residence that fell within 1,000 feet of a school bus stop in Columbia County. Within the same March 2009 order, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the sex offender law's provision that barred registered sex offenders from engaging in volunteer activities at church. The district court found that "because the Church Volunteer/Employment Provision fails to provide fair warning to Plaintiffs or adequate guidance to law enforcement, it is substantially likely that it is unduly and unconstitutionally vague." Lastly, the District Court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' takings claim on behalf of renters affected by the sex offender law. In September 2010, the Court approved the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of several claims. But the school bus stop claim based on substantive due process and vagueness remained. Then, in March 2011, the Court allowed the Plaintiffs to substitute new named plaintiffs. However, the counties in which the plaintiffs lived rescinded the bus stop designations. Accordingly, on September 30, 2013, the District Court dismissed what was left of the case, finding no remaining plaintiffs with standing to bring it. This case is closed.

Summary: This civil rights class action lawsuit was filed in 2006 against the State of Georgia in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs, six low-level sex offenders, challenged provisions of Georgia's then-new sex offender law that prevent sex offenders from living and working within one-thousand feet of school bus stops and churches. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Center for Human Rights and the ACLU of Georgia, had all committed their crimes when they were young, and they argued that the law violated their rights because it neither distinguished between low-level and high-level sex offenders, nor allowed them to seek an exemption. On March 30, 2009 the District Court certified a class of "all persons who are registered, are required to register, or in the future will be required to register as sex offenders pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 42-1-12." Within the same order, the District Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from enforcing the sex offender law, insofar as it restricts registered sex offenders from engaging in volunteer activities at church. Yet, after the named plaintiffs were substituted and the case renamed <i>Smiley v. Perdue</i>, the plaintiffs' class action was dismissed on September 30, 2013. This case is closed.


On April 30, 2013, a for-profit company filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the First Amendment, Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedure Act . The plaintiff, represented by the American Freedom Law Center, asked the court for an exception to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that providing insurance coverage of contraception would violate the religious beliefs of the corporation's owner. On May 24, 2013, the plaintiff filed an unopposed motion for a preliminary injunction. The same day, Judge Ellen S. Huvelle entered the preliminary injunction, which directed the defendant not to enforce the ACA insurance mandate regarding contraception against the plaintiff until 30 days after the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled in Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services , which involved similar legal issues and the same defendant as this case. Gilardi was held while the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. On June 30, 2014, the court held in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On October 24, 2014, Judge Huvelle held that based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate in place on June 30, 2014. Judge Huvelle did not extend the ruling to future versions of the mandate, and directed the parties to come to an agreement on attorney's fees and costs. On January 13, 2015, the district court cancelled the last status conference in this case.

Summary: A for-profit company is seeking an exception to the Affordable Care Act's mandate requiring employers to provide health insurance coverage of contraception because it violates the owner's religious beliefs. The court granted injunctive relief pending the outcome of Gilardi v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services . Gilardi was held while the Supreme Court decided Burwell v. Hobby Lobby. On June 30, 2014, the Court held in Hobby Lobby that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violate RFRA, when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On October 24, 2014, Judge Huvelle held that based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Hobby Lobby, the plaintiffs were entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcement of the version of the contraceptive mandate in place on June 30, 2014.


On August 11, 2010, the plaintiffs--deaf students who were sexually assaulted by a group of fellow students at a state-run school for the blind and deaf--brought this suit against the State of Hawaii. Represented by private counsel, and suing both individually and on behalf of a class of students sexually assaulted at the school between 2001 and 2013, they filed the case in Hawaii state court requesting damages, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees. The lawsuit alleged a hostile environment, discrimination, and denial of benefits under Hawaii state law, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400, et seq.; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq; intentional infliction of emotional distress and physical injury; and for violation of their rights under the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were raped and bullied by a group of fellow students while attending the school, and that the state's lack of adequate supervision and failure to properly handle or report these assaults resulted in the plaintiffs' extreme mental and physical distress. On September 9, 2011, the defendants removed the case from Hawaii state court to the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii (Judge Kevin S.C. Chang). On September 13, the state counterclaimed that one of the plaintiffs perpetrated one or more of the assaults alleged in the Complaint; the state argued that this plaintiff's parent could be held liable for the conduct under a negligence theory. The state also sought leave to file a third-party complaint claiming that individual student attackers should be held liable for all of plaintiffs' claims against them; the Court allowed the third-party complaint to be filed. One of the individual defendants named in the action filed a third party complaint (later amended) and cross-claim a couple of weeks later, on September 21, 2011. The individual defendant also filed a motion for a protective order, which was denied on October 14, 2011. See Doe v. Hawaii, 2011 WL 4954606 (D. Haw. Oct. 14, 2011). Four individuals and the Hawaii Office of the Public Guardian intervened in the action on behalf of the plaintiffs on April 11, 2012. On September 5, 2012, three additional individuals were joined in the action as plaintiffs-in-intervention. The case then settled. On February 19, 2013, the Court granted the plaintiffs' consolidated joint motion to certify a class and approve the notice of proposed settlement. On April 22, the Court approved the settlement and the plaintiffs-in-intervention's motion for approval of attorney fees and costs, awarding the plaintiffs $527,925.40. On May 6, 2013, the Court entered a stipulation to amend the order approving settlement and granting motions for attorneys' fees and costs, awarding the class a total of $5,750,000. In addition to the damages, the settlement agreement contained substantial injunctive relief. It required that the state undertake specific reforms, including reporting, training, and hiring requirements and improved monitoring of school grounds and buses. Malia Zimmerman, $5.75 Million Settlement Awarded to Deaf and Blind Students Sexually Assaulted by Gang at Hawaii Public School, Hawaii Reporter (Feb. 24, 2013),  http://www.hawaiireporter.com/5-75-million-settlement-awarded-to-deaf-and-blind-students-sexually-assaulted-by-gang-at-hawaii-public-school/123. The amended agreement also provided for attorneys' fees and costs for the class counsel in an amount not to exceed $1 million.

Summary: On August 11, 2010, a class of deaf students who were sexually assaulted by a group of fellow students at a state-run school for the blind and deaf, brought suit against the State of Hawaii in Hawaii state court. The state moved the case to federal district court. It involved allegations of creation of a hostile environment, discrimination, and denial of benefits under Hawaii state law, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, Individuals with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; intentional infliction of emotional distress and physical injury; and for violation of their rights under the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The parties settled, and on May 6, 2013, the Court entered a settlement agreement, awarding the plaintiffs $5.75 million for damages and attorneys fees and costs, and requiring the State to undertake specific actions relating to management of the school for the deaf and blind, including reporting, training, and hiring requirements and improved monitoring of school grounds and buses. The injunctive component of the settlement is scheduled to last 18 months.


On July 13, 2010, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division notified Robertson County of its intent to open an investigation of conditions at the Robertson County Detention Center ("RCDF"). On August 26, 2011, the DOJ issued a letter finding that Robertson County failed to protect prisoners from harm due to inadequate suicide prevention measures and inadequate mental health services. According to the DOJ, the County did not take adequate measures to remedy the unconstitutional conditions at RCDF, and so on April 26, 2013, the Attorney General filed this lawsuit on behalf of the United States in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The U.S. sued Robertson County, the County Mayor, the Robertson County Commissioners, and the Sheriff as the principal agents responsible for the conditions at RCDF under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §1997. The plaintiff alleged that the RCDF violated prisoners’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to inmates’ health and safety by not implementing adequate suicide prevention tactics and lacking an overall strategy to assist inmates with mental health illnesses. On April 30, 2013, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that stipulated that prisoners were to have timely access to a qualified mental health professional (QMHP) and that the QMHPs were to work as part of an interdisciplinary team to maintain a risk profile for each individual. It further outlined that RCDF would develop and implement policies to provide adequate mental health services to inmates as well as a training program for staff. In the ninth and final compliance report, the United States reported that Robertson County had maintained substantial compliance with all of the 48 provisions in the agreement and had operated a substantially adequate mental health care system for a sufficient period of time to warrant completion of the settlement agreement. As such, the parties jointly moved to dismiss the case and to terminate the settlement agreement and the order that enforced it. On March 30, 2018, District Judge William L. Campbell, Jr. granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. There are no other entries apparent on the docket and the case is presumably closed.

Summary: After Robertson County failed to adequately respond to a 2011 DOJ letter that found its jail was in violation of the Constitution, on April 26, 2013, the Attorney General filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. The plaintiff sued Robertson County under Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. §1997. The plaintiff alleged that the RCDF violated prisoners’ Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by exhibiting deliberate indifference to inmates’ health and safety by not implementing adequate suicide prevention tactics and lacking an overall strategy to assist inmates with mental health illnesses. On April 30, 2013, the parties settled. On March 30, 2018, the court dismissed the case and terminated the settlement agreement. The case is presumably closed.


On January 23, 2006, prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services and serving sentences for second degree murder filed a class action lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against Governor Pataki and the New York State Division of Parole. Plaintiffs alleged that Governor Pataki instigated an unofficial policy of denying parole release to prisoners convicted of A-1 violent felony offenses solely on the basis of the violent nature of such offenses, and thus without proper consideration of any other relevant or statutorily mandated factor. This unofficial policy, plaintiffs alleged, resulted in unconstitutional enhancements of their sentences in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the ex post facto clause. Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim. The District Court (Judge Brieant) denied the motion. Graziano v. Pataki, 2006 WL 2023082, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52556 (S.D.N.Y., July 17, 2006). Defendants subsequently filed a second motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed opposition papers and moved for class certification on behalf of a class consisting of: all prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services who: 1) were convicted of A-1 violent felony offenses; 2), were eligible for parole release; and 3) have been denied parole solely because of the "seriousness of the offense." Hearing on pending motions occurred on July 20, 2007, and the motions were taken under submission by the Court. Shortly thereafter, the parties advised the Court that they expected to reach a settlement of the case and asked the Court to defer its ruling on all pending motions. In November 2007, settlement negotiations broke down and the defendants notified the Court that they no longer wished to pursue settlement. Shortly thereafter, the District Court (Judge Charles L. Brieant) denied the defendants' motion to dismiss and granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Graziano v. Pataki, 2007 WL 4302483 (S.D.N.Y. Dec 05, 2007). On Dec 10, 2010, the US District Court (Judge Seibel) dismissed the case. On January 11, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. On November 14, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a per curium opinion affirming the judgment of the lower court.

Summary: Prisoners in the custody of the New York State Department of Correctional Services filed a class action lawsuit against Governor Pataki and the New York State Division of Parole. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants instigated an unofficial policy of denying parole release to prisoners convicted of A-1 violent felony offenses solely on the basis of the violent nature of such offenses. This unofficial policy, Plaintiffs alleged, resulted in violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the ex post facto clause. On Dec 10, 2010, the US District Court (Judge Seibel) dismissed the case. On January 11, 2011, Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. On November 14, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued affirmed the judgment of the lower court.


On September 30, 2009, following a two year investigation, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of New York under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA) against Erie County. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that confinement conditions at Erie County Holding Center (ECHC) and the Erie County Correction Facility (ECCF) violated the federal constitutional rights of inmates incarcerated there. The complaint and the attached findings letter detailed the defendants' alleged failures in the areas of protection from harm, environmental safety, medical care, mental health care, and suicide prevention. The court (Judge William M. Skretny) ordered expedited discovery related to suicide prevention and mental health treatment protocols at ECHC. 2010 WL 986505 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2010). The court subsequently granted additional motions to expedite discovery, granted in part and denied in part the plaintiff's motion to compel, and granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for a protective order. 2010 WL 1038650 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2010). On June 22, 2010, the court approved the parties' stipulated settlement agreement concerning only the suicide prevention and related mental health claims. As part of this stipulation, the parties agreed to select a Joint Compliance Officer (JCO) with relevant experience in the field of corrections, mental health care, suicide prevention, or medical care, to file with the court and provide the parties with reports evaluating the extent to which the defendants were in compliance with each substantive provision of the settlement. These reports were to be issued every four months, after a two-week comment period afforded to the parties. On July 9, 2010, the court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that CRIPA was not unconstitutional as applied to the defendants. However, despite technical compliance, the original complaint violated the spirit underlying Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, the court ordered the DOJ to file an amended complaint within 14 days. 724 F. Supp. 2d 357 (W.D.N.Y. 2010). On July 23, 2010, the DOJ filed an amended complaint. On August 25, 2011, the court ordered a stipulated dismissal of the action agreed upon by the parties. This second Stipulated Order of Dismissal resolved the remaining claims, including protection from harm, provision of medical and mental health treatment, and environmental health and safety. This stipulation recognized that, without any admission of liability on their part, the defendants would continue developing and implementing policies, practices, and procedures to address concerns at ECHS and ECCF. The Stipulated Order stated general goals with respect to each of the areas of concern raised, as well as more specific actions for achieving these goals, such as procedure development, additional training and staffing, and enhanced record keeping. On June 21, 2012, the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU) moved for leave to intervene and to unseal the the previously filed compliance reports and vacate the standing order permitting future sealed filings. The court denied the motion to unseal the records and vacate the standing order and terminated NYCLU from the case. 2013 WL 4679070 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2013). NYCLU appealed this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (13-3653). On August 18, 2014, the Court of Appeals reversed the District Court, granting NYCLU's motion to intervene and unseal the independently filed TCC records. 763 F.3d 235. On October 30, 2014, the District Court granted in part and denied in part NYCLU's motion. The court denied NYCLU's motion to unseal the semiannual compliance reports filed by the defendant and denied a motion to vacate the standing order, which allowing the sealing of future compliance reports. Following the court's order, there was a series of document requests and unsealing. This is process is still ongoing. As of May, 2020 the monitor appointed in the settlement agreement was still conducting site visits to ensure compliance with the stipulated order of dismissal.

Summary: On September 30, 2009, following a two year investigation, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of the Western District of New York under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980 (CRIPA) against the Erie County. The DOJ asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that confinement conditions at Erie County Holding Center (ECHC) and the Erie County Correction Facility (ECCF) violated the federal constitutional rights of inmates incarcerated there. The complaint and the attached findings letter detailed the defendants' alleged failures in the areas of protection from harm, environmental safety, medical care, mental health care, and suicide prevention. The parties reached two court-approved settlements that addressed all of the issues outlined in the complaint. On October 30, 2014, NYCLU's intervention was granted and certain documents were allowed to be unsealed. Compliance with the settlement remains ongoing.


On 01/11/2007, six inmates in the "awaiting trial" section of the Adult Correctional Institutions of Rhode Island (ACI) filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs, represented in part by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated because they had been discriminated against due to their "awaiting trial" status. Specifically, they claimed that they were not eligible for rehabilitative programs and services until they pled guilty or were convicted, that their dining tables were unclean, that they were not given personal hygiene supplies, that visitation was severely restricted, and that their mail was censored. On August 24, 1970, the District Court (Judge Raymond James Pettine) held that the censorship of the prisoners' mail in order to suppress any criticism of the institution or its officials served no rational social purpose supportive of prison objectives and violated the plaintiffs' First and Fourth Amendment rights. Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F.Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970). On June 1, 1975, the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the District Court, alleging that they were not provided rehabilitative services and that the defendants discriminated against prisoners sentenced to life terms, women, prisoners in protective custody, prisoners sentenced to less than one year, and prisoners in the medium Security Facility. They also complained that they had been deprived of educational and vocational training, that the classification procedures were faulty, and that they had suffered from overcrowding, inadequate heat, inadequate ventilation, lack of sanitation, rodents, inadequate showers, lack of privacy, inadequate laundry facilities, physical assault and battery by other inmates, inadequate medical care, and the mishandling of the money that had been granted to the prison system to care for them. On August 10, 1977, the District Court (Judge Pettine) held that the conditions at the prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment, that the medical treatment provided to them did not rise to the constitutional standard, and that the failure to properly classify inmates violated state law. The Court also held that pretrial detainees could be subjected only to such restraint as was necessary to assure their attendance at trial, warning the defendants that if they did not comply with the Court's orders, the Court would order the closing of all constitutionally deficient facilities. The Court also awarded the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 443 F.Supp. 956 (D.R.I. 1977). Shortly thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a motion to hold the defendants in civil contempt for failure to comply with the District Court's order requiring reclassification of prison inmates within a six-month period. On March 28, 1978, the District Court (Judge Pettine) held the defendants in contempt for their failure to comply with the Court's orders, and ordered that they must pay a fine of $1000 per day that they were late in reclassifying the prisoners. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 448 F.Supp. 659 (D.R.I. 1978). In May of 1978, the plaintiffs asked the District Court to hold the defendants in civil contempt again for failing to bring the living conditions at the Maximum Security Facility up to the constitutional standard. On July 7, 1978, the District Court found that even though the defendants had not fully complied with its orders, they had "exerted efforts to alter deplorable conditions" and that they had made some key changes. Rather than levying fines for lack of compliance, the Court granted the defendants 30 more days to comply with its orders. In order to fully comply with the Court's orders, the Governor of Rhode Island set aside the appropriate amount of money in the state's budget, but the Legislature refused to vote on the issue, instead submitting it as a bond referendum to the voters, who defeated it. After granting some additional time and a hearing, the District Court issued an order warning the defendants that there was no legal basis for further delay of compliance. The Legislature then came up with money to refurbish the prisons, and that money was matched by a LEAA grant. The defendants appealed the original order by the District Court that granted the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees, and on March 3, 1980, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit (Judge Hugh Henry Bownes) affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of their attorneys' fees. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 616 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1980). The defendants sought Supreme Court review, and on October 6, 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari. Garrahy v. Palmigiano, 449 U.S. 839 (1980). On November 19, 1980, the District Court ordered the defendants to close the old Maximum Security Facility when they finished moving into the new High Security Facility (Supermax). In 1984, the defendants asked the District Court to permit the use of the infirmary isolation cells at the Maximum Security Facility for short-term (less than 30 days) disciplinary purposes. On September 30, 1985, the District Court granted the request, provided that within 60 days the defendants submit to the court a written description of their plan for the use of the cells and a description of the steps taken to ensure that the earlier problems would not be repeated. The Court also granted the defendants another two months to complete their renovations at the old facility, which they planned to use to house prisoners. The defendants asked the District Court to reconsider the 1977 Order holding the Rhode Island prison conditions unconstitutional in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Bell v. Wolfish and Rhodes v. Chapman (PC-OH-3). On May 12, 1986, the District Court (Judge Pettine) found that the present prison conditions still violated the Eighth Amendment and held that the Supreme Court decisions in question did not affect the validity of the 1977 Order holding them unconstitutional. Palmigiano v. Garrahy, 639 F.Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1986). Two weeks later, the defendants filed a motion to alter or amend that order, and on June 25, 1986, the District Court agreed to the following modifications: 1) the defendants could hold 268 inmates in Medium Security, and 2) as of July 1, 1986, the defendants could not house more than 250 inmates at the Intake Service Center, a number which was to decline by a specified amount for the next two years. Due to an overwhelming influx of inmates following the Court's orders, the defendants were unable to maintain the necessary population levels, and the Court reconsidered its orders in light of their efforts to comply. On December 17, 1987, the Court recognized that the defendants had tried to comply with the Court's orders, but had been unable to do so due to circumstances outside their control. In light of their efforts, the Court agreed to temporarily lift the restrictions on double celling at the Intake Service Center (ISC), to allow a total inmate population of 336 at that facility. The Court ordered the defendants to make available extra beds at the Pinel Building (an annex to the ISC) within two weeks, at which time the ISC population would be reduced by the number of inmates that had been moved to Pinel. On April 6, 1989, the District Court found that the defendants had failed to bring the facilities into compliance with the Court's standing orders governing the conditions of confinement of pretrial detainees, and therefore held them in civil contempt, fining them $50 per day for each person being held over the population limit. Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 710 F.Supp. 875 (D.R.I. 1989). The defendants appealed this decision, and on August 17, 1989, the First Circuit affirmed it without opinion. Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 887 F.2d 258 (1st Cir. 1989). The plaintiffs again asked the District Court to hold the defendants in contempt of the population orders, and on May 18, 1990, the District Court found it necessary to issue immediate relief to alleviate the overcrowding, ordering that funds should be maintained to provide indigent detainees with bail, awarding prisoners 90 days of expedited good time, and awarding additional good time every 30 days until the conditions were less crowded. Palmigiano v. DiPrete, 737 F.Supp. 1257 (D.R.I. 1990). On July 3, 1990, after taking a tour of the facilities in question, the District Court noted that it was still unsure that the facilities being used could hold additional inmates without backsliding into unconstitutional conditions, but due to the pressures of the growing prison population, the Court agreed to allow the defendants to hold additional prisoners. The Court ordered additional awards of good time to prisoners in the ISC and Pinel Annexes to bring the populations there back down to 380 and 134, respectively. The Court noted that this should not apply to prisoners charged with certain violent felonies like kidnapping, murder, sexual assault, and child abuse. Unfortunately, these remedial measures did not have the desired effect of lowering the prison population, which continued to rise despite the release of a large number of offenders and pretrial detainees. On August 3, 1990, the District Court ordered the defendants to maintain at all times at least $200,000.00 in a fund to provide bail for all indigent detainees, and the Court raised the population caps on the facilities involved. The Court ordered the Special master to study the feasibility of ordering the release of pre-trial detainees held without bail, and ordered the defendants to accept for incarceration those convicted offenders who are free on personal recognizance or on bail until November 15, 1990. The Court further ordered the defendants to provide a medical screening of each prisoner within 7 days, to evaluate all tuberculosis tests within three days of the test, to employ staff whose primary duty would be to look for fires and fire hazards, to maintain fire detection and suppression equipment, to separate the beds in dormitories by at least 36 inches, to repair the ventilation system at the ISC, and to maintain proper sanitation and clean food service areas. On March 18, 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed not to house prisoners in areas not designed for housing prisoners (like corridors, hallways, dayrooms, offices, etc). The agreement restricted double-celling, mandated comprehensive classification procedures, and provided for recreation time, programming, medical and mental health care, sanitation, and regular monitoring of the defendants' compliance with the agreement. On July 15, 1994, the District Court issued an order approving the final settlement agreement. On May 16, 1995, the settlement agreement was modified to allow a higher population limit at the Jonathan Arnold Facility for Women. On July 10, 1995, the parties entered into a stipulation of dismissal, and the District Court dismissed the case. On January 3, 1997, the parties again stipulated an agreement modifying the settlement agreement to allow higher population levels in some of the facilities housing women inmates, and on March 27, 1998, the parties stipulated an agreement to allow a 42-inmate increase in population at the Medium Security Facility. We have a gap in the case at this point, but our PACER docket picks up on January 11, 2007. On June 27, 2007, the parties entered into another stipulation allowing a few additional inmates to be housed at the Women's Facility. On August 1, 2007 another stipulation order was entered. On September 4, 2007 an inmate filed a motion to intervene and change the August 1, 2007 Stipulation Order, which amended the 1994 settlement agreement and increased the capacity of the prison facilties from 922 to 1066. On September 12, 2007, Senior Judge Lagueux denied the inmate's motion to intervene in the class action, ruling that it was closed. Senior Judge Lagueux referred to his April 2007 opinion, 482 F.Supp.2d 207 (D.R.I. 2007), in which he had denied similar motions to intervene in the class action to object to amendments to the 1994 settlement agreement filed by fellow ACI inmates in 2006. On September 24, 2007, an inmate filed a notice of appeal regarding the denial of his motion. On July 2, 2008, the First Circuit affirmed the denial, stating that "the [Class Action] is closed; thus, there is no pending case in which appellants can intervene. On December 12, 2011, another Stipulation Order increased the capacity of the prison again to 1186. On February 19, 2014, Senior Judge Ronald R. Lagueux ordered the case closed finally and completely. He explained that the court receives frequent requests from inmates to reopen the case, but direct all future complaints concerning the overcrowding and prison inmate population to be directed to the State of Rhode Island's Criminal Justice Oversight Committee. This committee "was established by the Rhode Island State Legislature in 1993 for the specific purpose of enforcing the caps on the inmate population that were set forth in the 1994 Settlement Agreement."

Summary: In the late 1960's six inmates in the "awaiting trial" section of the Adult Correctional Institutions of Rhode Island filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. §1983 against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections in the U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The plaintiffs, represented in part by the National Prison Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that their constitutional rights had been violated because they had been discriminated against due to their "awaiting trial" status. They were not eligible for rehabilitative programs and services until they pled guilty or were convicted, their dining tables were unclean, they were not given personal hygiene supplies, visitation was severely restricted, and their mail was censored. On June 1, 1975, the plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in the District Court, alleging much of the same. On August 10, 1977, the District Court (Judge Pettine) held that the conditions at the prison constituted cruel and unusual punishment, that the medical treatment provided to them did not rise to the constitutional standard, and that the failure to properly classify inmates violated state law. The Court also held that pretrial detainees could be subjected only to such restraint as was necessary to assure their attendance at trial, warning the defendants that if they did not comply with the Court's orders, the Court would order the closing of all constitutionally deficient facilities. The Court also awarded the plaintiffs their attorneys' fees.


On February 10, 2014, the United States filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 ("Title VII"). The United States (the Employment Litigation Section of the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division) brought suit against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections seeking an injunction to prevent the defendant from engaging in future discrimination and back-pay damages to “make whole” those who had been harmed by the alleged discriminatory hiring. Factually, the complaint alleged that since 2000, the Rhode Island Department of Corrections had used separate written and video examinations in their screening and selection of applicants for entry-level correctional officer positions. The written examination and video examination were conducted on the same day, and only applicants who passed both were eligible for further consideration in the hiring process. Passing applications were then placed on a list in a descending-rank order based on their examination scores. The plaintiff alleged that this process had a statistically-significant, discriminatory impact on African-American and Hispanic applicants which gave rise to a pattern or practice of unintentional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. On April 25, 2014, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the Attorney General failed to comply with the procedural prerequisites set out in Title VII or bring the lawsuit within the time period required to obtain back pay. On January 9, 2015, Chief Judge William E. Smith denied the defendant’s motion and the case proceeded to discovery. 81 F. Supp. 3d 182. After several years of discovery, (see, e.g., 2016 WL 4742265), the parties participated in a settlement conference on March 31, 2017. On January 26, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion for final approval of the proposed settlement agreement which the assigned Magistrate Judge Lincoln A. Almond recommended Chief Judge Smith adopt. Despite an objection from a prospective claimant, Chief Judge Smith approved the settlement agreement on May 11, 2018. 2018 WL 217557. The settlement agreement required Rhode Island to stop using the written and video examination, create a new selection device without a racially disparate impact, hire up to thirty-seven prospective claimants with retroactive seniority benefits, and provide $450,000 in monetary relief to be distributed pro rata. On May 13, 2018, one complainant filed an appeal of the settlement with U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. All proceedings in the district court were stayed pending the appeal. On July 3, 2018, appellants filed a motion to dismiss. Noting that the appellant was not a party to the suit and not bound by the agreement, the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal and granted the motion to dismiss. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2014 the United States filed a complaint against the Rhode Island Department of Corrections alleging that its hiring practices for correctional officers have had an unintentionally discriminatory impact on African-American and Hispanic candidates. The allegedly discriminatory practice was a written and video examination that must be passed to be eligible for hiring. The case settled in May 2018 for $450,000.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was brought by two nonprofit organizations and an individual voter against the Secretary of the State of New Jersey, to challenge New Jersey’s signature matching procedure. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 3, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On June 17, the parties reached an agreement for the July primaries and the court granted the preliminary injunction in a stipulation and order.
 On May 18, the League of Women Voters of New Jersey, NAACP New Jersey State Conference, and a voter filed a suit against the Secretary of the State of New Jersey to challenge New Jersey’s signature matching procedure. Filed in the District Court for the District of New Jersey, the plaintiffs brought this lawsuit as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking relief enjoining the defendant from implementing signature verification procedures, and to establish a procedure for voters to cure deficiencies in their absentee ballots. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees. The case was assigned to Judge Micheal A. Shipp, and the plaintiffs were represented by the Campaign Legal Center, the New Jersey Institute for Social Justice and private attorneys. On May 12, 2020, Governor Phil Murphy announced an executive order mandating all-mail elections for the May local election, July primary, and November general election. To authenticate the ballots, New Jersey law required election officials to match the signature on the voter’s mail-in ballot to the signature the voter provided in their absentee voting application. If the election officials determined a discrepancy, the ballot was rejected with no opportunity for the voter to verify their ballot. The plaintiffs alleged that New Jersey’s failure to provide mail-in voters with notice and opportunity to cure deficiencies violated the fundamental right to vote and due process against the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also noted that counties with the most Black and non-English speakers had the highest rates of rejections due to signature matches. The plaintiffs further alleged that signature matching discriminated against voters with disabilities, elderly voters, very young voters, voters of color, and non-English speaking voters, in violation of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. On June 3, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction and amended the complaint to add two additional plaintiffs. On June 16, the parties jointly submitted an agreement for a consent order on the preliminary injunction pertaining to the July primaries. The next day, the court granted the preliminary injunction in a stipulation and order. Under the agreement, the defendant agreed to notify the voter within 24 hours after a decision has been made to tentatively reject a ballot due to signature, with a cure form to verify voter identity. The case is ongoing.

Summary: This lawsuit was brought by two nonprofit organizations and an individual voter against the Secretary of the State of New Jersey, to challenge New Jersey’s signature matching procedure. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. On June 3, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction. On June 17, the parties reached an agreement for the July primaries and the court granted the preliminary injunction in a stipulation and order. The case is ongoing.


On November 15, 2004, a black, middle-aged, female employee sued her employer, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, alleging race, age, and gender discrimination in promotions and on-the-job treatment, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as further amended by the Section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, and the federal Age Discrimination In Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 633a. Specifically, Plaintiff claimed that during her 10 years with the FDIC, she had received superior performance reviews, until she worked under several supervisors named in the complaint. The plaintiff alleged that these supervisors had subjected her to humiliating and degrading treatment, including excluding her from meetings, giving her inferior work assignments, criticizing her work unnecessarily, and punishing her for filing complaints. She also alleged she was passed over for promotion, despite being one of the best qualified and most experienced candidates. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages; an injunction ordering nullification of past disciplinary actions against her, correction of FDIC records reflecting the plaintiff's performance, and preventing future discrimination; and attorneys' fees and costs. The parties engaged in a protracted discovery battle and then settlement negotiations. It is unclear whether the parties settled. The docket notes that the case is "CLOSED, JURY, MEDIATION, TYPE-H." The last entry on the docket, on March 3, 2008, notes that the plaintiff agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case. Several entries before this one note that settlement negotiations were ongoing. The docket notes a related case involving the same defendant. In <i>Conanan v. Powell,</I> employees of the FDIC filed a class action complaint alleging race discrimination in promotions. This case was also filed in the District of Columbia, (1:00-cv-03091-ESH.) The plaintiffs filed their complaint on December 22, 2000, before Judge Ellen S. Huvelle. The case ended in a consent decree December 3, 2002. The case appears in the Clearinghouse Database as EE-DC-0049.

Summary: A black, middle-aged, female employee sued the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation alleging race, age, and gender discrimination in promotions and on-the-job treatment. It appears the case ended in a settlement agreement, although it was not publicly available at the time of this writing.


On December 17, 2012, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, against the City of Portland ("the City") based on the conduct of the Portland Police Bureau ("PPB"). The United States, represented by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Oregon and the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"), sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The complaint alleged that officers of the PPB engaged in a practice of unconstitutional use of force against individuals with actual or perceived mental illness. Specifically, the United States claimed that: (1) police encounters with such individuals too frequently resulted in a higher level force than necessary; (2) PPB officers employed tasers more times than necessary on such individuals, or in circumstances where such force was not justified; and (3) PPB officers used a higher degree of force than justified for low level offenses. The United States alleged that this conduct amounted to a pattern or practice by law enforcement officers that deprived individuals of their rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The plaintiff brought the claim under 42 U.S.C. § 14141. The United States also argued that these violations resulted from the City's failure to provide adequate policies, training and supervision. This lawsuit was the culmination of an 18 month-long investigation of the PPB by the DOJ pursuant to Section 14141. That investigation, which began in June of 2011, was prompted by the high number of PPB officer-involved shootings that involved individuals with mental illness. On September 13, 2012, DOJ issued a Findings Letter stating that it found reasonable cause to believe the PPB was engaging in unconstitutional conduct, and that it had identified serious deficiencies in policies, training, and officer accountability measures that substantially contributed to this conduct. That same day, the DOJ and the City released a joint statement declaring the parties' mutual intent to reach a negotiated settlement agreement to resolve these issues. On December 17, 2012--the same date the complaint was filed--the parties filed a joint motion to enter a settlement agreement and conditionally dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, subject to the court retaining jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. The proposed settlement agreement included detailed provisions addressing PPB policies and practices regarding: (1) use of force; (2) dealing with persons perceived as or actually suffering from mental illness or mental health crises; (3) dealing with persons suffering from addictions and behavioral health challenges; (4) crisis intervention; (5) identifying at-risk employees; (6) officer accountability; (7) training; (8) supervision; (9) misconduct complaint intake, investigation, and adjudication; (10) transparency and oversight; and (11) community engagement. Proposed Settlement Agreement. The proposed settlement agreement also included provisions regarding the implementation and enforcement of its terms. Id. On December 18, 2012, the Portland Police Association ("PPA"), a labor union representing employees of the Portland Police Bureau, filed a motion to intervene. On January 8, 2013, a coalition of organizations seeking reform of Portland police practices also moved to intervene. Both these parties wished to participate in any negotiations of the proposed settlement agreement. On February 19, 2013, the District Court (Judge Michael H. Simon) granted in part and deferred in part PPA's motion. Op. and Order 3, Feb. 19, 2013. 2013 WL 12309780. The court also denied in part and deferred in part the coalition's motion, but granted them "enhanced amicus status for remedy purposes." Id. Ultimately, both parties were allowed to participate in the settlement negotiations. All parties reached a tentative agreement regarding the terms of the proposed settlement in December 2013. The settlement agreement provided for revisions to use of force policies and compliance audits related to use of force; training; community-based mental health services; crisis intervention; an employee information system; officer accountability; and community engagement, including creation of a Community Oversight Advisory Board (COAB). On August 29, 2014, the District Court issued an order entering the settlement agreement and conditionally dismissing the litigation. Order Entering Settlement Agreement. The Court retained jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1345, to enforce any provision of the Settlement Agreement or the two agreements that resulted from the parties' settlement negotiations. The Court further ordered the City to direct the Compliance Officer/Community Liaison, a position created under the Settlement Agreement, to provide copies to the Court of all final quarterly reports which are referenced in the Settlement Agreement. Finally, the Court directed the parties to attend annual settlement-compliance hearings. After the district court's entry of the settlement agreement, the parties had protracted disagreements and negotiations regarding the scope of involvement by the court and the public. On October 27, 2014, the City appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The City appealed based on the court's order, as a condition of its dismissal, that the parties, intervener-defendant, and amicus curiae appear at hearings whenever called by the court and to produce evidence as requested by the court. The City's position was that the district court could accept one of the settlement processes approved by the parties, which included annual status conferences, but could not order post-dismissal evidentiary hearings unless the U.S. alleged a material breach of the settlement agreement. The issues on appeal were whether the court could impose conditions on dismissal without the defendant's consent, whether the district court has jurisdiction to convene post-dismissal proceedings unrelated to enforcement of the settlement agreement, and whether the district court's order changed the terms of the settlement agreement. The appeal was referred to circuit mediation, and the parties underwent mediation with a Circuit Mediator in February 2015. On July 17, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion to remand the case to the district court for adoption and entry of a proposed amended order entering settlement agreement. The Ninth Circuit granted the joint motion for remand on July 29, 2015. Back in the district court, Judge Simon issued an order on July 30, 2015 entering the settlement agreement, conditionally dismissing litigation, and setting the first annual status conference. While the substance of the settlement agreement remained the same, the original order established periodic hearings where the parties would "present evidence," while the amended order referred only to annual status conferences. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal on September 21, 2015, pursuant to the parties' joint motion for voluntary dismissal. The United States entered its first compliance status assessment report on September 29, 2015. Its second compliance status assessment report was filed on October 18, 2016. While reporting substantial or partial compliance in many areas of the settlement agreement, the City was in non-compliance regarding its obligations relating to the Community Oversight Advisory Board (COAB). The report found that the COAB's ability to accomplish its work was significantly impaired by multiple foundational problems. The second annual status conference was held on October 25, 2018, a week after the filling of the second status report. At that status conference, the United States requested interim status conferences for the City to report its progress in developing a revised plan for the COAB and for the parties to propose modifications to the settlement agreement accordingly. The Court granted the United States's request over the City's objection and set an interim status conference. On December 14, 2016, the City filed a petition for writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit. The writ of mandamus requested that the Ninth Circuit direct the district court to withdraw its order setting a further status conference (the interim status conference) and to hold no more than one status conference a year. The City argued that, though the parties had settled on a settlement agreement rather than a consent decree, Judge Simon had "taken an escalating series of steps to enlarge the proceedings, to insinuate itself into and take control of the implementation of the settlement agreement." The City's writ petition claimed that the second annual status conference of October 25, 2016 had departed from the bounds negotiated by the parties. Specifically, the City took issue with the district court's having invited all members of the public to speak, thanking people who made disparaging comments about the defendant, and seemingly inviting the United States to invoke the settlement agreement's breach provisions. The case was referred to Circuit mediation in March 2017. During the course of the Ninth Circuit mediation, the parties addressed certain substantive settlement agreement compliance issues and developed proposed amendments to the settlement agreement. On December 26, 2017, the United States filed its third periodic compliance assessment report, which reported that the parties collaborated during 2017 to address barriers to compliance through amending language in the original settlement agreement that proved unworkable. On that same day, the parties filed a joint stipulated motion to enter an amended settlement agreement in the district court, and a motion for voluntary dismissal of the petition for writ of mandamus. The Ninth Circuit dismissed the petition of the writ of mandamus on January 3, 2018. The district court held a fairness hearing on the proposed amended settlement agreement on April 19, 2018, in conjunction with the third annual status conference. In a May 15, 2018 order, the court approved certain proposed amendments to the settlement agreement, including updated provisions on use-of-force reporting, the employee information system, Citizen Review Committee appeals, and the disciplinary process. The court conditionally approved proposed amendments regarding community engagement and oversight, pending the court's further evaluation at an interim status conference set for October 4, 2018. These proposed amendments restructured the Community Oversight Advisory Board (COAB) as the Portland Committee on Community-Engaged Policing (PCCEP). The PCCEP would have a smaller group of volunteers than the COAB, would receive more administrative support and training. The PCCEP would solicit information from the community and PPB about PPB's performance, particularly with regard to constitutional policing; contribute to and advise on community engagement; and receive public comments and concerns. In their proposed joint stipulated order entering the amended settlement agreement, the parties had requested a standing order of reference to the Ninth Circuit Mediation Program. Judge Browning denied the request for such a standing referral order in his May 15, 2018 order, which provided that, except for the amendments to the settlement agreement, his order of July 30, 2015 remained in force. The Portland City Council approved the amendments to the settlement agreement, including the community engagement provisions, on August 24, 2018, and the City began to work toward implementing the Portland Committee on Community-Engaged Policing (PCCEP). In a September 27, 2018 memorandum, the City submitted a memorandum updating the court on the establishment of the PCCEP. The memorandum reported that thirteen members had been confirmed to the PCCEP and that training for the PCCEP was underway, and requested that the court grant final approval to the remaining settlement agreement amendments concerning community engagement and the PCCEP. On October 1, 2018, the court appointed the mental health alliance as amicus curiae in the case. As of October 17, 2018, final approval of the remaining proposed amendments to the settlement agreement--those concerning community engagement and the PCCEP -- were still pending. At the October 4, 2018 interim status conference, the court deferred the motion for final approval of the settlement agreement until the next interim status conference, which was scheduled for June 6, 2019. On May 4th, 2019, the DOJ issued its Fourth Periodic Compliance Assessment Report. The report found that the Portland Police Bureau was in substantial compliance with most of the settlement provisions, although still only in partial compliance with the officer accountability provision and the community engagement provision. The problem in the officer accountability provision mostly stemmed from difficulties in quickly resolving investigations of complaints. Regarding community engagement, the PPB had still not finished fully utilizing the PCCEP. When the June 6th interim status conference came around, the court deferred final approval of the settlement agreement yet again, saying it would revisit the issue at the next meeting scheduled for February 25, 2020. By January 24, 2020, the DOJ issued an interim compliance report which found the PPB substantially compliant in all parts of the settlement agreement. However, per the agreement the PPB had to maintain substantial compliance for one year At the February 25, 2020 meeting the court once again deferred final approval. Judge Simon scheduled another meeting for the same date in 2021. The case is still ongoing as of June 17, 2020.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Justice filed a lawsuit against the City of Portland, Oregon, alleging that the Portland Police Bureau engaged in a practice of unconstitutional use of force against individuals with actual or perceived mental illness. On August 29, 2014, the Court entered a settlement agreement conditionally dismissing the case without prejudice. The implementation of the settlement agreement was subject to protracted negotiations, particularly concerning the scope of the periodic status conferences and the District Court's involvement. The parties twice went through Ninth Circuit mediation on these issues. As of October 17, 2018, the parties are still working toward full compliance under the settlement agreement.