This class-action lawsuit concerns the Trump administration’s decision to block New York residents from participating in the Global Entry program, allegedly in retaliation for the state’s Green Light Law, which allows undocumented immigrants to obtain New York driver’s licenses and limits federal immigration officials’ access to records held by New York’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Since February 2012, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has operated a nationwide Global Entry program. This program, one of several Trusted Traveler Programs (TPPs) directed by Congress, allows pre-approved, low-risk travelers to receive expedited clearance through certain airports when they arrive to the United States. Enrollment is open to U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, U.S. lawful permanent residents, and nonimmigrant aliens from a number of foreign countries. Before participating in the program, applicants must submit to a background check, interview with CBP, and pay a fee. Membership must be renewed every five years. In 2019, New York passed the Driver’s License Privacy and Protection Act, commonly known as the Green Light Law. This law did two things: first, it authorized New York to issue driver’s licenses regardless of citizenship status, allowing undocumented immigrants to legally drive in the state. Second, it prohibited federal immigration authorities from accessing DMV records without a judicial warrant, preventing the Trump administration from using these records for its aggressive immigration enforcement campaign. Shortly after New York’s Green Light Law went into effect, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that New York residents would no longer be eligible to enroll or re-enroll in the Global Entry program on February 5, 2020. This change was necessary, DHS said, because the agency had lost access to information about such applicants maintained by the DMV. DHS did not explain what information it needed from the DMV, why it would be relevant, or why this eligibility change should apply to the 3.5 million New York residents who had no records with the DMV in the first place. On February 10, 2020, a group of New York residents now ineligible for Global Entry filed this class-action lawsuit against both the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Represented by the New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), the plaintiffs alleged that DHS’ eligibility change violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Specifically, the complaint suggested that the change was “arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion,” because curtailing CBP’s access to DMV records would have little to no effect on the agency’s ability to assess applicants for Global Entry. Instead, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants made the change to punish New York for passing its Green Light Law and allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses. The complaint also alleged that the defendants violated the principle of equal sovereignty guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment, because the eligibility change targeted New York residents for differential treatment, as well as the doctrine of coercion prohibited by the Tenth Amendment, because the true aim of the change was to coerce New York into repealing its Green Light Law. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the eligibility change violated the Administrative Procedure Act and the Tenth Amendment, stop the defendants from implementing the change, and award attorney’s fees and costs to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs later amended the complaint to include two additional named plaintiffs. The case was assigned to Judge Jesse M. Furman and related to New York v. Wolf, 20-cv-1127, a nearly identical case filed the same day by the state of New York in the Southern District of New York. In addition to the claims for relief brought in the class-action lawsuit, New York argued that the eligibility change violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the decision discriminated against New York residents and was not rationally related to any legitimate government interest. The cases were informally consolidated and coordinated for purposes of scheduling and case management. The cases began with a slew of discovery disputes. On April 1, 2020, Judge Furman ordered the defendants to produce the administrative record related to the Global Entry eligibility change, as well as a privilege log listing any documents withheld from that record on the basis of privilege. The defendants provided a redacted version of the administrative record but objected to providing a privilege log, arguing that privileged communications were not part of the official record, and thus not required under the APA. On April 29, Judge Furman issued an opinion rejecting this argument and ordering the defendants to provide a privilege log by the original deadline. 2020 WL 2049187. The plaintiffs later moved to compel the production of documents and redacted sections omitted from the administrative record on the basis of privilege. After reviewing these omissions himself, Judge Furman granted the motion to compel in part, and denied it in part, accepting the defendant’s claim of privilege over some of the omitted materials. 2020 WL 3073294. On April 15, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims in both cases. The defendants argued that the eligibility change did not impinge on New York’s equal sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment because it was a policy decision related to international travel—a subject usually handled by the federal government, not a “sensitive area[] of state and local policymaking.” The eligibility change should also survive a Tenth Amendment challenge, the defendants argued, because it was “sufficiently related to the problem that it targets”—namely, the data restrictions imposed by New York’s Green Light Law. To support this argument, the defendants insisted that targeting New York residents was justified because it was the only state that restricted CBP’s access to DMV records, a false statement that they would later retract. Finally, the defendants argued that the eligibility change did not violate the Tenth Amendment’s coercion doctrine because there was no financial inducement connected to Spending Clause legislation, and neither the increased airport wait times nor the economic impact that might result from the change were unduly coercive. In short, New York was still free to implement it Green Light Law or repeal it of its own volition. With regard to the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claim, the defendants argued that the eligibility change would easily pass the permissive rational basis review required under the Due Process Clause. In their reply, the plaintiffs disputed the defendant’s argument that the equal sovereignty principle would not apply when the policy at issue was normally handled by the federal government. In any case, the complaint did not allege that the eligibility ban impinged on New York’s sovereignty because it impacted international travel, but because it was enacted to retaliate against New York’s Green Light Law, public safety legislation that was clearly under the purview of the state government. Moreover, banning all New York residents from using Global Entry did not sufficiently target the supposed problem of New York’s records restriction; the ban was both overinclusive, because it applied to residents without DMV records, and underinclusive, because it did not apply to residents who had DMV records but lived abroad. With respect to the coercion claim, the plaintiffs insisted that they did not need to plead a Spending Clause violation or a financial inducement. The eligibility change was unconstitutionally coercive, they said, because it was enacted to force New York to repeal its Green Light Law. As for the Fifth Amendment claim, the plaintiffs insisted that the eligibility change would fail rational basis review because a desire to punish New York was not a legitimate government end. On April 17, Judge Furman certified the class and approved NYCLU as class counsel. The class was defined as follows:
All New York State residents whose applications to enroll or re-enroll in Global Entry were pending at the time Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf issued his decision to prohibit the enrollment or re-enrollment of New York residents in U.S. Customs and Border Protections Trusted Traveler Programs or who otherwise intend to enroll or re-enroll in Global Entry.
 On June 19, with their motion to dismiss the constitutional claims still pending before the court, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the APA claims raised by the plaintiffs in both cases. First, the defendants insisted that the eligibility change was not reviewable under the APA because the administration of the Trusted Traveler Programs (TPPs) was committed to CPB’s discretion by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). Second, even if the eligibility change was subject to judicial review under the APA, the defendants argued that it would be upheld, because it reflected a “reasoned conclusion that as a result of the Green Light Law, CBP no longer had access to information necessary to vet TTP applicants from New York.” Finally, the defendants argued that eligibility change was not subject to the notice-and-comment requirement under the APA because it was either a general statement of policy or an interpretive rule. On July 10, the plaintiffs filed their own cross-motion for summary judgment, reiterating their argument that the eligibility change was arbitrary and capricious because it lacked a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made” and relied on a pretextual justification to punish New York for passing a law that the Trump administration did not like. On July 23, 2020, while still considering the defendant’s motion to dismiss and both parties’ motions for summary judgment, Judge Furman asked the parties to respond to a DHS press release stating that the agency would be reversing the eligibility change at issue in these cases and allowing New York residents to participate in Global Entry. Specifically, Judge Furman asked the parties to advise the court on what effect the announcement would have on these cases, and whether or not they should be dismissed as moot. On that same day, the defendants submitted a letter to Judge Furman correcting several misstatements they made in briefs and declarations before the court. The letter admitted that New York was one of several states that do not transmit certain DMV records to CBP, but it was the only state barred from participating in the Global Entry program. The defendants acknowledged that these corrections severely undermined their argument that the eligibility change was not arbitrary and capricious because the record restrictions imposed by New York’s Green Light Law uniquely prevented CBP from assessing the risk of Global Entry applicants from that state. The defendants therefore asked to withdraw their motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and confirmed that DHS had decided to restore New York residents’ access to Global Entry and other Trusted Traveler Programs. In a subsequent letter filed with the court on July 28, the defendants requested that these cases be dismissed as moot, a request that the plaintiffs opposed. On July 29, Judge Furman released an order responding to the defendants’ corrective statement and mootness argument. First, Judge Furman accepted the withdrawal of the defendants’ motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and ordered the parties to present formal briefs addressing whether or not the cases should be dismissed as moot. The parties were also ordered to confer in good faith to settle the plaintiffs’ request for attorneys' fees and costs. Finally, Judge Furman ordered the defendants to present a comprehensive report of any and all inaccurate statements in the record, including who made the misstatements, why they were inaccurate or misleading, what steps defendants’ counsel took to ensure their accuracy, and when and how they learned otherwise. Judge Furman also invited the plaintiffs to indicate other misstatements they believed the defendants had made. On October 13, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to dismiss and vacated the TTP decision, to the extent that it was still in effect, because the court found that the decision may well have been pretextual and was arbitrary and capricious. The court also pointed out that the defendants continued to subvert the APA by making misleading statements when forced to defend the decision in court. On November 13, the plaintiffs filed a joint motion for a permanent injunction. The motion argued that (1) the court should issue an injunction to ensure that the Ban is not reinstated, and (2) in order to craft the proper injunction, this court should hold that the Ban violated the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. The defendants filed their memo in opposition on December 7, 2020. In response to these motions, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief on January 19, 2021. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the ordinary relief of vacating the decision and remanding was insufficient to redress their injuries, and therefore they were not entitled to an injunction. Further, the court found that the plaintiffs' proposed injunction was overbroad and therefore inappropriate. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In February, 2020, a group of New York residents filed this class-action lawsuit against U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs alleged that the Trump administration retaliated against New York for allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain drivers licenses by blocking New York residents from participating in the Global Entry program, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Tenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment. In July, DHS voluntarily reversed the policy in question, after admitting that they had made misleading and inaccurate statements to the court. As of August 8, 2020, this case is still pending. The court is currently determining the extent the government’s misstatements and deciding if the case should be dismissed as moot.


On February 24, 2011, the estate of a mentally ill inmate who committed suicide in the Sutter County Jail filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against Sutter County, the California Department of Mental Health, the county sheriff, and other mental health providers charged with his care. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, Title II of the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and state law. The plaintiffs also allege medical malpractice, negligence, negligent supervision, training, hiring, and retention, wrongful death and failure to furnish/summon medical care. Specifically, the decedent was experiencing mental health issues and required psychiatric treatment. On several occasion from 2009 to 2010, decedent was involuntarily hospitalized pursuant to California law at a county mental health facility. In 2010, the decedent was jailed multiple times. The last time he was jailed, a judge ordered his transfer to a hospital for treatment but the jail did not transfer him. After being placed in solitary confinement and denied treatment at the jail for four weeks, he committed suicide in his cell. Since that time, the Sutter County Grand Jury issued a report finding, among other things, that the Jail has known deficiencies with relation to its provision of mental health care and medical treatment to inmates. For example, the Grand Jury found deficiencies such as inadequate medical staffing, lack of required training on suicide prevention and other medical treatment, non-compliant medical policies and procedures and a non-compliant medical program. According to the Grand Jury, those deficiencies were "unacceptable." Plaintiffs also allege that, since Decedent's death, several other inmates have also passed away from preventable causes. On January 9, 2012, Magistrate Judge Gregory Hollows issued an opinion granting in part and denying in part the defendant Sutter County's motion for a protective order and for temporary state of discovery. Magistrate Hollows ordered immediate discovery regarding the identities of potential defendants but stayed all remaining discovery for thirty days. 2012 WL 94618, (E.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2012). On February 8, 2012, Judge Morrison England issued an opinion granting the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' first amended complaint with leave to amend. 2012 WL 423704 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2012). The plaintiffs amended their complaint. Again, the defendants moved to dismiss each of the plaintiffs' claims. On August 31, 2012, Judge England issued an opinion granting the defendants' motion in part and denying it in part. Judge England did not dismiss the all of the deliberate indifference claims, the loss of parent/child relationship claim, the professional negligence/medical malpractice claim, the negligence claim, the failure to furnish/summon medical care claim, and the wrongful death claim. Judge England did dismiss the Title II of the ADA claims, the Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claim, the state law civil rights claim, and the negligent supervision, training, hiring and retention claim. 2012 WL 3778953 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012). Following this order, the parties went through discovery and preparations for the trial. The parties also entered into settlement negotiations. On July 22, 2014, the parties reached a private settlement agreement and agreed to dismiss the case. The County agreed to pay $800,000 and promised to consider expert recommendations to improve the treatment of prisoners with serious mental illness and medical conditions at the jail going forward. On September 4, 2014, Judge England dismissed the case.

Summary: In 2011, the estate of a man with serious mental illness who committed suicide in jail filed a civil rights lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiffs filed the lawsuit against the county, county employees, and the California Department of Mental Health. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for compensatory and punitive damages because the man was denied access to clinically necessary and court-ordered psychiatric hospitalization while in the County's jail before he committed suicide in jail. The parties settled the case.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a case brought by several churches in California, challenging state restrictions on worship brought on by COVID-19. The churches requested injunctive relief, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No outcome yet. <hr> Three California churches brought this lawsuit against Governor Gavin Newsom and state and county public health officials, challenging state restrictions on worship. The complaint was filed July 15, 2020 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Represented by the American Center for Law and Justice, the National Center for Law and Policy, and private counsel, the churches alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, nominal damages, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Kimberly J. Mueller. The state’s COVID-19 public health guidance prohibited singing and chanting during worship services (the "Worship Ban"); this prohibition was enforceable by fines and imprisonment. However, the prohibition did not extend to secular activities, including day care centers, entertainment, schools, and, most notably, protests against police violence. The churches argued that the state’s guidance showed bias against religious worship, in violation of the churches’ freedom of speech, freedom of religious exercise, and equal protection rights. On August 8, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint, which added additional factual allegations in light of updated COVID-19 orders in the state and in the defendants' county. Additionally, the plaintiffs withdrew their initial motion for a preliminary injunction and filed a new one on August 12, 2020. They continued to request that the court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the Worship Ban and enjoin the county orders enforcing the Ban. The defendants filed oppositions in mid-October, and the court scheduled a hearing for November 6, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: Three California churches sued state and county officials, challenging COVID-19-related restrictions on singing and chanting during worship services. They alleged that the restrictions, applicable only to worship services, were a violation of the churches' First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.


On May 24, 2007, 5 former employees of PPG Industries, Inc., filed this federal suit in the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking individual relief, class action status for similarly situated former employees (40 years of age or older), and collective action remedies (see 29 U.S.C. §216(b)) for alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief in the form of attorney fees, damages with interest for lost earnings and benefits, liquidated damages (under the ADEA), and an injunction against PPG's discriminatory termination of employment. The plaintiffs alleged as follows. The complaint alleged that a new CEO had pursued aggressive cost-cutting through "reductions in force" (RIF), which in the context of comments he made about older employees caused the idea that older employees were not pulling their weight and needed to be removed to percolate down through the ranks of management. Management then engaged in pervasive age discrimination in firing older employees and replacing them with new ones. PPG's methods included immediate firing without notice or opportunity for correction, fabrication of poor performance reviews to use as leverage during firings, and offering "retirement packages" that were exactly the same as the offers for other terminated employees. The firings took place without explanation or with the explanation that they were corporate downsizing. Although at first younger employees were immediately assigned to the older employee's position, PPG eventually sought to disguise its behavior by delegating the work out to multiple younger employees and then later filling the position under a new title. PPG sometimes hired back the exact same employees to do the same work on a contract rather than salaried basis. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant engaged in these discriminatory practices for at least a decade. Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on August 7, 2007, that elaborated on the allegations of the first complaint and clarified the legal basis for the suit. Most notable among the added facts were the following: that PPG had moved from an objective, numerical system of performance review to a subjective, non-numerical system susceptible to manipulation and inconsistency; that PPG violated its written policy of reinstating, retraining, or relocating employees terminated as part of an RIF when positions became available; and that PPG violated its written policy of performing a disparate impact analysis of RIFs. Plaintiffs divided the counts into a collective action for disparate treatment under the ADEA, a collective action for disparate impact under the ADEA, and a class action under ERISA. Because of differing legal standards for collective actions and class actions and the similarity in available relief, Plaintiffs later withdrew the Erisa count (October 16, 2007). On September 10, 2007, PPG filed a counterclaim for breach of contract, claiming that release agreements included in the severance packages barred the Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees from filing suit and entitled PPG to repayment of the severance pay and to attorney fees. Plaintiffs attempted to amend their complaint to add retaliation under the ADEA on the ground that PPG's counterclaim was improper because the agreements were legally unenforceable, but the Court (Judge Arthur J. Schwab) rejected the amendment on timeliness grounds (November 26, 2007). On May 6, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their retaliation claims as a separate lawsuit (docket: 08-cv-00616), which was consolidated into this case on June 18, 2008. On February 26, 2009, adopting the recommendations of Special Master Kevin Lucas, the Court held, among other things, that the releases were unenforceable and barred the Defendant from pursuing a breach of contract claim. 2009 WL 596014 (W.D. Pa. 2009). The next day, contrary to the Special Master's recommendation (2009 WL 579234 (W.D.Pa. 2009)), the Court restricted the Plaintiffs' case to claims that accrued on or after December 31, 2005. 2009 WL 501907 (W.D. Pa. 2009). On March 24, 2009, the Court denied Plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees for the ADEA claims as premature and for the counterclaim issue over the releases. 2009 WL 792909 (W.D. Pa. 2009). In accordance with the Court's decision on the counterclaim, Defendant filed an amended counterclaim for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment, seeking the difference between the severance actually paid and what would have been paid without the release (June 30, 2009). The case continued with significant discovery disputes. The parties participated in mediation from October 23, 2007, through September 16, 2009, but did not reach a settlement. Eventually, though, the parties did reach a settlement, and on November 20, 2009, the Court approved the settlement. Because the settlement is private and not a consent decree, its exact terms are not available. The parties indicated that the settlement involved no non-monetary relief and no terms that required continued court supervision. The parties stipulated to the settlement class as the 58 former PPG employees who filed a consent to join and stipulated that the named plaintiffs were authorized to settle on behalf of all. The Court approval order awarded legal costs to the parties according to the terms of the settlement but did not indicate whether the settlement actually shifted the costs in any way. The order dismissed the claims and counterclaims with prejudice. It also left open the option to reinstate the docket if proceedings related to the settlement should become necessary. The case is closed.

Summary: Private counsel for 5 former employees of PPG Industries, Inc., filed suit against the company for the individual employees, as a class action for similarly situated former employees (40 years of age or older), and as a collective action (29 U.S.C. §216(b)) for alleged violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief in the form of attorney fees, damages with interest for lost earnings and benefits, liquidated damages (under the ADEA), and an injunction against PPG's discriminatory termination of older employees' employment. PPG filed a counterclaim for breach of contract based on claim releases in the severance packages given to the terminated employees. For procedural reasons Plaintiffs filed a separate lawsuit for retaliation under the ADEA alleging that the counterclaim was improper because the releases were unenforceable. That lawsuit was consolidated into this one, the releases were found unenforceable, and PPG amended its counterclaim to be for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. The case involved extensive discovery issues and the parties eventually agreed on a settlement. The settlement was private, so its exact terms are unavailable, but the parties indicated that it involved only monetary relief. The case is closed.


On June 17, 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a nonprofit organization that promotes civil liberties related to technology, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The EFF sued the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The EFF filed an amended complaint on July 11, 2008. The EFF alleged that the defendants wrongfully withheld records that the EFF requested under FOIA. The EFF’s mission was to inform policymakers and the public about civil liberty issues related to technology, and to defend those liberties. The EFF used FOIA in its work to gather information about pertinent federal agency activities. The EFF’s FOIA claims concerned proposed amendments to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) granting the U.S. government greater authority to conduct widespread surveillance with the assistance of telecommunications companies. In early 2008, the EFF submitted two FOIA requests for records related to the efforts defendants and the telecommunications companies took to amend FISA to keep the telecommunications companies from being held liable for their cooperation with surveillance efforts. According to the EFF, the defendants did not respond within the statutory timeframe, nor did they release all documents when ordered to do so by the court. (The EFF later filed a second, similar FOIA request, which was also litigated. See NS-CA-0018 in this Clearinghouse.) On September 24, 2009, the district court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) filed an order denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment while granting the EFF’s cross-motion for summary judgment and ordering the disclosure of withheld records. On October 8, 2009, the defendants appealed the judge’s order to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge Hawkins wrote the April 9, 2010 opinion for the court. 639 F.3d 876. Judge Hawkins ordered defendants to release the names and email addresses of telecommunication carriers and their agents under FOIA Exemption 6 except those email addresses that have a privacy interest and little public interest, and remanded the same issue under FOIA Exemption 3. The court also remanded the question of releasing communications. Following the remand, the parties arranged for certain documents to be disclosed to the plaintiff in this case and the EFF's other FOIA case. Those disclosures have been uploaded to the plaintiff's website and are also made available at NS-CA-0018 in this Clearinghouse. After these disclosures were made, the plaintiff filed a stipulation of dismissal, which the court granted on September 29, 2010. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2008, Electronic Frontier Foundation, a nonprofit organization that worked to promote civil liberties related to technology, filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of California against the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Justice. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants wrongfully withheld records the plaintiff requested under the Freedom of Information Act. In 2009, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ordered the release of names and some e-mail addresses under one contested FOIA exemption, and remanded the question of releasing names and e-mail addresses under another contested FOIA exemption, as well as the question of releasing communications.


On June 3, 2010, the ACLU filed this lawsuit against the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) requesting an injunction requiring compliance with a FOIA request submitted to the ODNI on November 18, 2009. The original FOIA request included requests for records in seven categories, all related to the government's surveillance programs authorized under FISA Amendments Act § 702 (FAA § 702). For an overview of FAA § 702 surveillance programs, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=14411 in this Clearinghouse. The ACLU filed a motion to strike classified declarations submitted by ODNI on August 17, 2011, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on July 1, 2011. The ODNI argued that all of the material requested fell within FOIA Exemptions 1, 3, and 7(E). On November 15, 2011, the District Court (Judge Richard J. Sullivan) denied the ACLU's motion to strike, holding that the classified declarations were acceptable, but that the government was required to submit affidavits for individualized in camera review by the court in order to ensure that the government was only withholding properly exempted documents under FOIA exemptions. 2011 WL 5563520 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2011) On March 30, 2012, the court ruled on the cross motions for summary judgment, denying the ACLU's motion and granting the government's. The court held that, based on the government's affidavits submitted in response to the November 15 order, the material being requested through the original FOIA request fell properly within the FOIA exemptions claimed by the government. 2012 WL 1117114 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) There was no appeal.

Summary: On June 3, 2010, the ACLU filed a suit against the ODNI requesting an injunction forcing compliance with a FOIA request regarding material relating to FISA Amendments Act § 702 authorized surveillance. The ACLU filed a motion attempting to strike classified affidavits from the government arguing that the material requested was subject to FOIA Exemptions. The court denied that motion, but ordered the goverment to submit further affidavits supporting their argument for in camera review. Upon reviewing those affidavits, the court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, ending the case.


On July 27, 2004, three white police officers from Springfield, IL, filed this lawsuit against the city in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of Illinois under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that the city engaged in race discrimination in violation of Title VII and their right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the city discriminated against them on the basis of race when it gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated African-American colleague when calculating his years of service to the police department for purposes of determining salary and benefits. At various times between the late-1980s and -1990s, the plaintiffs and their colleague all voluntarily resigned from the Springfield Police Department to pursue other job opportunities. They all eventually sought to rejoin the department. When the plaintiffs reentered the force, they were treated as entry-level officers in terms of pay, benefits, and seniority. When their African-American colleague returned, however, the police department gave him credit for his years of prior service, thereby restoring his pay and benefits to their pre-resignation level. The police department acted pursuant to a new city council ordinance, passed on March 28, 2000, that specifically granted the African-American officer a retroactive leave of absence to enable him to receive credit for his previous service. The city council's stated justifications for the ordinance included diversity in the police force. This action originally arose in state court. On April 3, 2003, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against the city in the Illinois Circuit Court for the Seventh Judicial District, claiming a violation of the state's equal protection clause. On November 10, 2003, the court dismissed the action as time barred, and the plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on March 2, 2004. The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's decision on July 22, 2004. Groesch v. City of Springfield, 349 Ill. App. 3d 1046 (2004). A few days later, on July 27, the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in federal district court. On February 1, 2005, the Court (Judge Jeanne E. Scott) denied the city's motion to dismiss, holding that the original state court judgment did not preclude the plaintiffs from pursuing their claims in federal court. Relying on the "paycheck accrual" rule, the Court explained that each paycheck constituted a separate act of pay discrimination for which the police officers could bring a separate claim. The parties then engaged in discovery for the next year. On July 6, 2006, the Court (Judge Scott) dismissed with prejudice one plaintiff's claims for monetary damages because he had filed for bankruptcy and the city had purchased his damages claims from the bankruptcy estate. The Court (Judge Scott) granted in part and denied in part the city's motion for summary judgment on December 29, 2006. Groesch v. City of Springfield, 2006 WL 3842085 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 29, 2006). Specifically, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for damages arising out of paychecks issued before April 3, 2003, the date the plaintiffs initiated the state court action, on the theory of claim preclusion: the plaintiffs could have brought these claims in that earlier state court suit but failed to do so. For similar reasons, the Court also dismissed all other claims that the plaintiffs brought before November 10, 2003, when the state trial court issued its judgment. The Court did, however, allow the plaintiffs to pursue their pay discrimination claims based on paychecks issued after November 10, 2003. At the request of the parties, the Court (Judge Scott) issued a stay in the proceedings on February 2, 2007, pending the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). The Ledbetter Court ultimately rejected the paycheck accrual rule and held that the plaintiffs' claims of sex discrimination in pay were time barred. Based on this decision, on July 11, 2007, the district court (Judge Scott) reviewed its December 29 order and dismissed as untimely filed the police officers' remaining Title VII claims. 2007 WL 2684085 (C.D. Ill. July 11, 2007). The Court also dismissed the Section 1983 claims, holding that these claims were barred because they could have been brought in the earlier state court action. The plaintiffs appealed the district court's decision on August 10, 2007. While the appeal was pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Congress enacted the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, overturning the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire. The Ledbetter Act, which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, provides that the statute of limitations for filing a pay discrimination claim with the EEOC resets with each discriminatory paycheck. On March 28, 2011, the Seventh Circuit (Judge William J. Bauer, Judge David F. Hamilton, and Judge Diane P. Wood) ruled on the plaintiffs' appeal. Groesch v. City of Springfield, 635 F.3d 1020 (7th Cir. 2011). In light of the Ledbetter Act, the court reversed the district court in almost every respect, holding that the Act's construction of the paycheck accrual rule meant that the plaintiffs' Title VII and Section 1983 claims were not in fact time barred. The claims filed after the state court judgment, on November 10, 2003, could therefore proceed on remand. But the circuit court affirmed the district court in holding that claim preclusion barred recovery for any claims arising before the state court judgment. Shortly after the Seventh Circuit's remand, the parties began settlement negotiations. Presumably those negotiations were successful, because on October 16, 2012, the district court (Judge Sue E. Myerscough) acceded to the parties' request and issued an order dismissing the case with prejudice.

Summary: Three white police officers from Springfield, IL, brought suit against the city in federal district court alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs claimed in particular that the city discriminated against them on the basis of race when it gave preferential treatment to a similarly situated African-American colleague in determining his salary and benefits. The parties ultimately settled after the Seventh Circuit reversed in part and remanded the district court's ruling in favor of the city. The district court had based its opinion on the Supreme Court's decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), but Congress overruled that decision with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.


On September 30, 2013, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on behalf of 3,100 African American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency referred this case to the plaintiff after completing investigatory action because a bank purchased the defendant. The plaintiffs alleged that, as a result of the defendant's policies and practices, African-American and Hispanic borrowers unfairly paid higher prices for their residential mortgage loans than non-Hispanic White borrowers. The complaint asked the court for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and monetary damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant set wholesale loan prices unrelated to credit risk characteristics and loan terms. The defendant did not justify or document the reasons for the amount of broker fees and prices set above the par rate; failed to monitor for disparities based on race or national original because of its policies and practices; and created a financial incentive for mortgage brokers to charge higher fees and interest rates for loan applications submitted to the lender. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on September 30, 2013, that was entered by the Court (District Judge Anthony J. Trenga) on October 3, 2013. Under the consent order, the defendant agreed to compensate certain African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers through a settlement fund. After disbursing the $2,850,000 Settlement Fund to effected parties, more than $200,000 remained in the fund. On November 13, 2014, the court ordered this remaining money to be disbursed to three organizations chosen by the parties - National Council of La Raza, the Northern Virginia Urban League, and the Greater Washington Urban League. After completing the disbursements, this case was dismissed on January 26, 2015. It is now closed.

Summary: Following an investigation completed by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, on September 30, 2013, the United States Department of Justice filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against a bank, alleging that it engaged in discriminatory lending practices on behalf of 3,100 African American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers. The plaintiff filed a proposed consent order on September 30, 2013 that was entered by the Court (District Judge Anthony J. Trenga) on October 3, 2013. Under the consent order, the defendant agrees to compensate certain African-American and Hispanic residential mortgage borrowers through a settlement fund.


On June 05, 2006, a California prisoner incarcerated at Centinela State Prison, proceeding pro-se, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the warden and two correctional officers, alleging violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated the First Amendment, Eighth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when they denied the plaintiff outdoor exercise for more than 11 months, did not allow him privileges that other inmates specifically received, and required him to sign a pledge form against his political beliefs. On March 12, 2007, the defendants moved to dismiss the Eight Amendment claim on the grounds that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies. The defendant withdrew this motion on February 20, 2008. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the First Amendment and Equal Protection claims on April 11, 2007 and for summary judgment on the Eight Amendment claim on August 7, 2008. Both motions were granted by the District Court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) on February 24, 2009. On March 11, 2009, the plaintiff appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On July 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals (Judge Stephen Reinhardt) reversed the dismissal and remanded the case back to the District Court. On June 2, 2011, the defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. On January 12, 2012, the District Court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief as moot due to him being transferred to another prison. The Court further referred the case to the federal Pro Bono Project for assignment of counsel for the plaintiff. On June 13, 2012, the parties settled and the plaintiff's claims were dismissed without prejudice pending payment of the settlement. On November 20, 2012, the Court entered a notification of satisfaction of settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On June 05, 2006, a California prisoner filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the warden and two correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging violations of the First and Eight Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for denying the plaintiff outdoor exercise for thirteen months. While the District Court held that the prison officials acted reasonably, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that there was a question of fact. The parties subsequently settled and the plaintiff's claims were dismissed with prejudice on November 20, 2012.


On October 21, 1997, several coaches and female student athletes filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico against New Mexico Highlands University. The plaintiffs, represented by public interest attorneys, claimed that NMHU violated state law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Title IX by denying them equitable access to athletic scholarship funding and other benefits including equipment, supplies, locker rooms, travel, coaching, publicity, and facilities. The athletes sought injunctive relief and damages. On November 8, 1999, the District Court (District Judge John E. Conway) defined the class as all "present and future female students who participate as athletes in intercollegiate athletics." The trial began on November 15, 1999. Before the matter was submitted to the jury, the court granted defendants' motion to decertify the class, concluding that trial testimony had demonstrated that no named plaintiff was a member of the class on the date the motion for class certification was filed. The jury thereafter returned a verdict awarding compensatory damages to the named plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed motions seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and reconsideration of the class decertification order. Both motions were denied and plaintiffs appealed. On January 9, 2002, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Circuit Judges Murphy, Hall, and Porfilio) reversed the District Court's orders decertifying the class and denying plaintiffs' motion for injunctive and declaratory relief, remanding the case to the District Court to enter an order certifying the class and for further proceedings on the request for declaratory and injunctive relief. Paton v. N.M. Highlands Univ., 275 F.3d 1274 (9th Cir. 2002). The injunctive relief was ordered by the District Court (District Judge John Edwards Conway) on February 8, 2002, whereupon parties engaged in a series of settlement negotiations that ended in 2007 with no resolution recognized by the District Court. On Feb. 15, 2012, the District Court (District Judge Conway) entered an order directing plaintiff to show cause, if plaintiff so had, within fourteen days of the order, why the instant case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Plaintiff failed to respond to the order, and the District Court (District Judge Conway) dismissed the claims in this action with prejudice on March 8, 2012.

Summary: In 1997, university coaching staff and female student athlete plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against New Mexico Highlands University ("NMHU"), claiming that it intentionally discriminated against them on the basis of their gender. A jury returned a verdict for the individual plaintiffs. The district court decertified the class before the end of the trial, which was overturned and remanded by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Upon remand, the parties were unable to settle the case and this case was dismissed for failure to prosecute on March 8, 2012.


On December 8, 2000, a mother of a female student filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas against Kilgore Independent School Districts on behalf of her minor daughter, at student within the school district. The complaint alleged that the school district had violated Title IX by denying her daughter access to try out for the cheerleading team due to previous disciplinary action while two male students, who received identical disciplinary actions, were allowed to participate in athletics. The complaint alleged that the school district's enforcement of the disciplinary actions had a disparate impact on the female students' ability and opportunity to participate in programs and athletics. The complaint also alleged that the school district violated Title IX by providing uniforms, equipment and supplies on an unequal basis to male and female athletic teams. On May 29, 2001, the plaintiff amended her complaint to seek class action certification on behalf of all female students at Kilgore Independent School District that were affected by the school district's unequal treatment and disproportionate emphasis on male athletic programs and extracurricular activities over female programs. Specifically, the plaintiff cited funds and benefits provided to male athletes that were not equally provided to female athletes. The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Judge William M. Steger for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas ordered a mediation conference for the parties on July 20, 2001. Magistrate Judge Judith K. Guthrie filed a mediation report on August 28, 2001, indicating that the parties had reached a settlement. The plaintiff moved to dismiss the case on October 4, 2001. Judge Steger granted the motion to dismiss on October 9, 2001. No settlement agreement was filed with the court.

Summary: In 2000, mother of a female student filed suit against a school district, alleging that it had violated Title IX by denying her daughter access to cheerleading tryouts as a result of disciplinary action, while male students receiving the same disciplinary action were not barred from participating in athletics for the upcoming school year as a result of the punishment. The plaintiff also alleged that the school district violated Title IX by promoting and funding male athletic programs in a manner unequal to the funding and promotion provided for female programs. The parties reached a settlement during mediation and the case was dismissed on October 9, 2001. No settlement agreement was filed with the court.


On February 7, 2017, three current and former female employees of Sandia Corporation filed this class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. The plaintiffs sued Sandia Corporation, a federally-funded nuclear weapons research and development contractor, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New Mexico Human Rights Act, and the New Mexico Fair Pay for Women Act. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. The plaintiffs alleged that Sandia’s company-wide policies and practices disadvantage female employees in performance evaluations, pay, and promotions. Specifically, all named plaintiffs allege receiving less pay than comparable male coworkers as a result of these policies, as well as not receiving promotions for which they were eligible and qualified. One of the named plaintiffs raised concerns about the treatment of women at Sandia and alleged that she suffered retaliation as a result. The defendant moved to dismiss plaintiff’s state law claims on March 17, 2017. Because the named plaintiffs worked for Sandia National Laboratories at its corporate headquarters on the Kirtland Airforce Base, which is a federal enclave, the defendants claimed the federal enclave doctrine precluded plaintiff’s state law claims. In response, plaintiffs moved for jurisdictional discovery on March 31, 2017. On June 12, 2017, District Judge James O. Browning conducted a telephonic motion hearing regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss state law claims and plaintiff’s motion for jurisdictional discovery. A motion hearing regarding defendant’s motion to dismiss was held on January 19, 2018, and Judge Browning asked both parties to submit supplemental briefs. On March 31, 2018, Judge Browning granted the motion to dismiss state law claims and concluded that the federal enclave doctrine bars the state law claims. On August 9, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, as well as a motion to stay discovery pending ruling on the motion to dismiss. On September 20, Magistrate Judge denied the motion to stay discovery because the defendant had not met its difficult burden of justifying the suspension of the discovery process that had been ongoing for more than a year. On October 17, a hearing was held with regard to the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Judge Browning ruled that he would not decide the motion to dismiss until after the class certification hearing and directed the plaintiffs to submit their motion for class certification by March 25, 2019. On January 18, 2019, Judge Browning ordered that the defendant withdraw its motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ class claims without prejudice. On January 30, 2019, Judge Browning addressed a discovery dispute regarding class certification and ordered the defendant to produce policy documents from 2018 as well as electronically stored information related to the VP of human resources. The defendant redocketed its motion to dismiss on April 11, 2019, because the plaintiffs failed to pursue class certification by the court’s deadline of April 1 and failed to seek an extension. The plaintiffs then filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice on May 6 and a motion for final judgment on May 17. Before issuing a final judgment, Judge Browning issued a memorandum opinion on the plaintiff's state law claims under the New Mexico Human Rights Act and New Mexico Fair Pay for Women Act. Judge Browning wrote that these were invalid because, since the alleged discrimination occurred on a military base, federal enclave doctrine applied, and, since federal enclave doctrine predated these New Mexico laws, they were unenforceable on a federal enclave. The plaintiffs claims were dismissed with prejudice. Judge Browning issued a final judgment on May 24, 2019, dismissing the case with prejudice. The case is closed; the time frame for appeal has lapsed.

Summary: In 2017, current and former female employees of nuclear weapons developer Sandia National Laboratories filed this class action in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico. Plaintiffs alleged that Sandia’s policies and practices in pay, promotion, and The defendant moved to dismiss the claim on April 11, 2019, because the plaintiffs failed to pursue class certification by the court’s deadline of April 1 and failed to seek an extension. Judge Browning issued a final judgment on May 24, 2019, dismissing the case with prejudice. The case is closed.


On February 27, 2015, following long delays in the processing of their Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applications, nine Afghans and Iraqis under threat in their home countries for supporting U.S. operations filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiffs, represented by the International Refugee Assistance Program (IRAP), sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of State (DOS). Congress passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 (RCIA) and the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 (AAPA), making Iraqis and Afghans under threat because of their service to the United States eligible for SIVs and directing such applications to be completed within nine months. Seeking injunctive and mandamus relief, plaintiffs alleged that defendants failed to make reasonable efforts to protect the plaintiffs and diligently process the plaintiffs' SIV applications, contrary to Congress's direction and in violation of the RCIA and AAPA. The case was assigned to Judge Gladys Kessler. Plaintiffs, who were granted leave to proceed by pseudonym because of the risk of reprisal they faced, asserted that they were trapped in Iraq or Afghanistan while waiting for the U.S. government to process their applications. Delays in the processing of their applications ranged from one-and-a-half to over six years. Plaintiffs described multiple assassination attempts and a steady barrage of death threats, including from ISIS and the Taliban. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants' "failure to provide timely adjudication of their applications has exposed them and their families to serious, imminent threats to their life and well-being as a result of their service to the United States." 2015 WL 1245035. On September 1, 2015, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Defendants asserted that the plaintiffs lacked standing and failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because plaintiffs had received final refusals of their applications. Defendants further argued that they "enjoyed unlimited discretion over SIV processing and that the court could not enforce Congress’s instruction to process SIVs within nine months." On January 28, 2016, following extensive briefing from the parties, Judge Kessler issued an order granting in part and denying in part defendants' motion to dismiss. First, Judge Kessler concluded that the plaintiffs had standing; "Plaintiffs have been injured by the failure to obtain final decisions on their SIV applications, that injury is caused by the Government's failure to act, and the injury would be redressed by an order from this Court." Next, Judge Kessler found that, in contrast to defendants' assertions, seven of the plaintiffs' applications were in process and had not received final refusal. Judge Kessler further concluded that “adjudication of Plaintiffs’ SIV applications within a reasonable time is non-discretionary” and that “judicially manageable standards exist to measure the Government’s performance of its duty.” Finally, Judge Kessler denied defendants' argument that plaintiffs failed to properly state a claim, finding that "Plaintiffs have properly stated their claims under the APA . . . and the Mandamus Act." 168 F. Supp. 3d. 268 (D.D.C. Jan. 28, 2016). However, Judge Kessler granted defendants' motion to dismiss with regard claims that defendants failed to provide plaintiffs protection from imminent threats. Judge Kessler found that the RCIA and APAA provided significant discretion to defendants to carry out this protection and that there were no. standards to enforce the statutory command. On March 21, 2016, the parties entered into a consent order, agreeing to suspend the suit for 90 days, during which the government was to process the plaintiffs' SIV applications. According to an IRAP press release, "all plaintiffs received a decision within 3 months pursuant to the agreement and thirteen of them and their families now live safely in the United States." The case is now closed.

Summary: Iraqis and Afghans who worked for the U.S. government in their home countries who applied for Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to the U.S. filed this lawsuit against the Departments of State and Homeland Security in February 2015 after they experienced long delays in the processing of their applications. The plaintiffs alleged that both agencies were violating a 2013 congressional mandate that SIV applications must be processed fully within nine months, resulting in threats to their lives and well-being. In January 2016, the court denied in part the defendants motion to dismiss, concluding that the government had a duty to decide the applications in a timely manner and that it had failed to do so. In March 2016, the parties entered into an agreement, by which defendants were to promptly process plaintiffs' SIV applications. All of the plaintiffs had their applications processed within three months. The case is closed.


On May 18, 2017, a 29-year old pregnant army veteran filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiff sued the Sheriff, Court Clerk, Court Magistrate, and District Court Judge of Randolph County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201. The plaintiff, represented by Equal Justice Under Law, the ACLU, Civil Rights Corps, and Southern Poverty Law Center, sough declaratory and injunctive relief. She claimed that the county practice of setting predetermined bail amounts without considering a person's flight risk, the danger they present to the community or whether the person can afford the bail, violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiff was arrested on May 17, 2017. She was not able to afford the $7,500 bail, and so she was told she would remain in jail until June 6, 2017. The plaintiff also submitted a motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and class certification. The proposed class was defined as "all arrestees who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable to pay the secured monetary bail amount required for their release." The same day that the plaintiff filed her complaints and motions, the court (Magistrate Judge Terry F. Moorer) granted her motion for a temporary restraining order releasing her from jail. Later documents in the case indicate that by the time Judge Moorer had granted the temporary restraining order, Grover Poole Bail Bonding Company had already issued a surety agreement to cover her bond. On May 24th, the defendant judge ordered this bond be converted into a personal recognizance signature bond - meaning the plaintiff would not have to make any payments to the bond company. Based on her release, Judge Watkins held the motion for a preliminary injunction was moot on May 25. On June 1, 2017, Judge Watkins ordered mediation. As the mediation carried on, the defendants moved to dismiss the case arguing that the defendants had immunity and that the claims were moot because the plaintiff had been released. Judge Watkins denied these motions on July 14th, holding that they did not have immunity and that the controversy was not moot because it met the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" standard. 265 F. Supp. 3d 1344. On September 8, 2017, defendant Randolph County District Court Judge issued a standing bond order providing that those who cannot afford to pay bonds are entitled to a bond hearing within 72 hours of arrest to "obviate the need for a preliminary injunction." On December 5, 2017, Judge Grover ordered the parties to show cause as to why the case shouldn't be stayed pending resolution of Walker v. City of Calhoun (CJ-GA-0012), a similar Georgia case, by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. On March 21, 2018, Judge Watkins declined to stay the case pending Walker, rejected plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, and refused defendant's motion to dismiss the case as moot. Judge Watkins found that defendants had corrected many of the wrongs that a preliminary injunction could address in their September 8, 2017, except for the standing bond order. Moreover, Judge Watkins held that the plaintiff failed to established "a substantial likelihood of success" on her remaining claims that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires procedural safeguards in bond hearings such as an attorney, the opportunity to present evidence, and clear and convincing evidence that pretrial detention is necessary. 301 F.Supp.3d 1136. Nevertheless, Judge Watkins also found that defendants' new procedures did not render the case moot. The parties continued to dispute whether defendants' standing bond order passed constitutional muster and disagreed in particular over whether 72 hours was a permissible limit on detention without a bond hearing. Even if the new order was constitutionally adequate, it would not moot the case under a three-factor test from Flanigan's Enters., Inc., of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, because (1) "there do not appear to be any explanations independent of this litigation" for the order; (2) there is "some concern that Defendants...will revert to those prior practices" after the litigation; and (3) the changes consist only of "unilateral actions and statements" by one defendant. Therefore, Judge Watkins allowed the case to proceed. On September 10, 2018, Judge Watkins approved plaintiff's class certification request under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2):

There are enough class members to make joining all of them in a single lawsuit impractical;

Class members share common questions of law or fact;

Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class;

Plaintiff will adequately represent the class' interests; and

 Defendants have acted similarly towards all class members.

 Judge Watkins also rejected defendants' proposal to create one class of arrestees who cannot afford bonds despite hearings and another of arrestees who cannot afford bonds and were jailed for at most 72 hours. 2018 WL 4323920. On September 13, 2018, Judge Moorer was removed from the case, likely due to his elevation from magistrate judge to district judge for the Southern District of Alabama. Judge Gray M. Borden was assigned as the new magistrate judge. The case is ongoing. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 28, 2018. This complaint added a fourth claim alleging a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and sought injunctive relief against the Sheriff and declaratory relief against all other defendants. Discovery continued on the new complaint. Judge Watkins granted the defendant's motion to stay the case pending the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Hester v. Gentry, a factually similar case that occurred in a different Alabama county jail. Hester v. Gentry has not yet been decided; the case is ongoing.

Summary: A 29-year old pregnant army veteran filed this class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. The plaintiff sued the Sheriff, Court Clerk, Court Magistrate, and District Court Judge of Randolph County under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 28 U.S.C. §2201. She claimed that the county practice of setting predetermined bail amounts violated her 14th amendment rights. Judge Moorer granted her motion for a temporary restraining order. The case is stayed pending the outcome of a factually similar case in a different Alabama county at the Eleventh Circuit; this case is ongoing.


The plaintiff in this case lived with her two minor sons for a time in shelters run by the District of Columbia. Homeless since 2004, she relies on a wheelchair for mobility and claimed that the shelter system was administered in such a way as to discriminate against against persons with disabilities. Her suit, filed on July 3, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, claims violations of Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504, and the Fair Housing Act. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that she was housed in an inaccessible unit on the fourth floor. It took forty-five minutes for her to painfully climb the stairs. The hallways were not wide enough for her wheelchair, and she was often trapped in her unit, rather than risk the climb downstairs. Though there was a working elevator to the fourth floor, her site manager told her she was not permitted to use it, and her requests for a first floor unit were denied. The plaintiff claimed that the shelters were generally inaccesssible to persons with mobility impairments, and that the refusal by staff to make reasonable accommodations to their placement policies violated the law. At the time she filed her suit, there was a settlement in place between the United State Department of Justice and the District of Columbia. DJ#204-16-96. This settlement contemplated future implementation of physical access plam for the shelter program, changes to the process by which reasonable modification requests are made and decided, direction to and oversight of contractors and subcontractors that provide services for the shelter program, and enhancements to the training of shelter staff; provisions that would apply to the plaintiff. On February 24, 2009, the plaintiff entered a settlement agreement that in addition to requiring payment of monetary damages to her and to a Special Needs Trust Fund, required defendant to modify all its reasonable modification forms, to keep records of requests for reasonable modifications and the steps taken pursuant to such requests, provide training for its staff, to increase annual expenditures for repairs and modifications that enhance the accessibility and safety or units or common areas used by residents with disabilities. The case was closed the same day.


On June 20, 2011, two deaf prisoners filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina against the federal Bureau of Prisons. Represented by private counsel and the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights, the plaintiffs filed pursuant to Bivens claiming violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. In addition, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Fifth Amendment due process rights, First Amendment Freedom of Speech, and First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide them with effective communication and auxiliary aids necessary to accommodate their disability. The discriminatory conduct deprived the plaintiffs of their ability to receive adequate and informed medical treatment, participate in institutional disciplinary proceedings, effectively take part in any rehabilitative, educational, or religious programs, or communicate with those within and outside the institution. The plaintiffs requested declaratory and injunctive relief. On April 11, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. On June 22, 2011, the case was transferred to Judge James C. Dever, with a revised case number of 5:11-ct-3118. The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment. The plaintiffs also filed for summary judgment on count two of their amended complaint. On March 11, 2013, Judge Dever denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on count two, granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss, and denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Judge Dever dismissed count one under the Rehabilitation Act for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Judge Dever dismissed count five under the Fifth Amendment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Eight claims of the plaintiffs' claims survived. 2013 WL 943406 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 11, 2013). Discovery was contested and the plaintiffs filed a motion to compel the production of documents. On September 12, 2014, the district court issued an ordering denying the plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of documents from the defendants. 2014 WL 4545946 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2014). On March 31, 2015, the Court granted in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, denied the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, and dismissed as moot the remaining counts of the amended complaint. 2015 WL 1470877 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 31, 2015). The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on May 27, 2015. The case went to the Fourth Circuit as Appeal No. 15-6826. On November 5, 2015, after the plaintiffs submitted their appellate brief and while the defendants’ response brief was pending, Plaintiff Boyd filed a notice notifying the Fourth Circuit that he had “some limited ability to hear and understand speech in certain contexts.” See Notice, Appeal No. 15-6826, at Doc. 31. On this date, Boyd also filed a motion for voluntary dismissal of his appeal, and proposed that each party bear its own costs and attorneys’ fees. The U.S. opposed this proposal. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal because Boyd was not determined to be deaf. 849 F.3d 202 n.1. On January 4, 2016, the district court dismissed Boyd's motion for a voluntary dismissal because the court lacked jurisdiction. On February 23, 2017, the Fourth Circuit ruled on the appeal of the District Court's grant of summary judgment, affirming it in part, vacating it in part, and remanding for further judgment. 849 F.3d 202. The Court of Appeals found that the defendant was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff's medical needs by failing to provide him with an ASL interpreter for medical appointments, particularly when he was suffering from seizures as a result of inadequate medical care. The Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiff had adequately shown substantial risk of serious harm resulting from the defendant's actions. The court also reversed the summary judgment on plaintiff's First Amendment claims, finding that defendant's security complaints regarding the requested videophone were exaggerated, and that defendant substantially interfered with plaintiff's ability to communicate outside of the prison walls. The Fourth Circuit also found that the supplies given to the plaintiff to alert him of emergencies were inadequate. The court referred the case to Magistrate Judge James E. Gates for a court-hosted settlement conference on May 18, 2017. Defendants moved for dismissal due to lack of jurisdiction, or in the alternative, judgment on the pleadings, on September 29, 2017. After reaching a partial settlement, the parties moved jointly to dismiss the case in part with prejudice on November 2, 2017. Under this partial settlement, the defendants agreed to provide the plaintiff with several accommodations, including in-person ASL interpreter services and calls through video relay service that facilitates communication with non-ASL speakers. The court granted this motion on November 3. This limited the litigation to the plaintiff's First Amendment claim regarding access to a videophone for communication. A bench trial was held before Judge Dever from November 6-7, 2017. Judge Dever denied the defendant's motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for judgment on the pleadings on September 12, 2018. On February 12, 2019, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the BOP's failure to install and provide the requested videophone equipment violated the First Amendment. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration on March 12, 2019, requesting that the court alter the judgment. The court subsequently denied this motion on June 21, 2019. The plaintiff then appealed both orders to the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit (Circuit Judges Henry F. Floyd, Motz, Diana Gribbon Motz, and Barbara Milano Keenan) agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the district court’s judgment on January 13, 2021. 984 F.3d 347. It remanded the case to the district court for judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Though the Fourth Circuit agreed with the defendants that the ban on videophone for communication bore a rational connection to the defendant's interests in prison safety, rehabilitation of the plaintiff, and protection of the public, it found that other factors weighed in the plaintiff’s favor. First, the plaintiff lacked alternative means to communicate with other deaf individuals. The Fourth Circuit found that the district court erroneously concluded that video relay service was an alternative means because video relay service only permitted communication with non-deaf individuals. Here, the plaintiff was asserting an interest in communicating with the deaf community—an interest video relay service couldn’t fulfill. Second, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court overlooked the substantial evidence that the defendants already have resource-efficient means of managing the risks of videophone calls in evaluating the hypothetical risks of these calls. Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court did not explain why existing safeguards for videophone calls did not mitigate the risks of the calls to a de minimis level. It noted that the district court improperly focused on the nature of the risks of videophones rather than the likelihood of the risks materializing. As of April 1, 2021, the Fourth Circuit had issued its mandate and this case was ongoing in the district court.

Summary: In 2011, two deaf prisoners filed a lawsuit against the United States Bureau of Prisons in the US District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, their Fifth Amendment due process rights, First Amendment Freedom of Speech, and First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants refused to provide them with effective communication and auxiliary aids necessary to accommodate their disability.


On September 20, 2013, the United States of America filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Piedmont Regional Jail Authority, Virginia, pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C § 1997. The plaintiffs, represented by the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division attorneys, asked the court for permanent injunctive relief, alleging that the Jail's conditions of confinement deprived them of their rights, privileges and immunities afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that, among other things, the defendant permitted unqualified personnel to evaluate and manage serious medical conditions, inadequately screened incoming prisoners for medical issues, inadequately trained its staff on suicide prevention, mental health care and first-responder health care, charged excessive co-payments for prisoners, and did not adequately supervise prisoners on suicide watch. On September 6, 2012, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice issued a "Findings Letter", where it concluded that certain conditions at the Jail violated the constitutional rights of the inmates. The parties filed a joint motion to enter into a settlement agreement on September 20, 2013. On October 1, 2013, the Court (Judge James Spencer) issued an order granting the joint motion for settlement and approving the settlement agreement in its entirety. Under the agreement, the Jail is to provide more appropriate medical staffing, better screen and document prisoners' health issues, reduce or exclude co-payments, and implement comprehensive policies for suicide prevention. The Jail must file bi-annual compliance reports and must notify the Monitor, James Welch, and the plaintiff upon death of any prisoner, or any serious suicide attempt. If the Monitor finds non-compliance, the plaintiff shall give notice to the defendant and allow 30 days to cure the failure. If the failure is not cured, the plaintiff may initiate contempt proceedings without further notice. The agreement provides that the Court (Judge John Spencer) shall retain jurisdiction over the action until the defendant is determined to have substantially complied with the agreement. The agreement shall terminate when the Jail has achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the agreement and has maintained such compliance for a period of 18 months. If substantial compliance has been achieved and maintained for 18 months, the parties will jointly stipulate to dismissal of the case within 30 days. The agreement is binding upon all the parties, including successors in office. The parties do not foresee any further litigation and the parties have foregone their obligations to preserve potentially discoverable information. On September 6, 2012, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice issued issued a "Findings Letter", where it concluded that certain conditions at the Jail violated the constitutional rights of the inmates. The parties filed a joint motion to enter into a settlement agreement on September 20, 2013. On October 1, 2013, the Court (Judge James Spencer) issued an order granting the joint motion for settlement and approving the settlement agreement in its entirety. Under the agreement, the Jail is to ensure medical staffing is sufficient and are properly licensed and trained, to ensure the initial screenings of incoming prisoners are fully documented and available to medical staff, to implement a system to provide each prisoner with a comprehensive health assessment with follow-up procedures, to ensure that all officers are trained annually in providing first-responder medical care and are trained on suicide prevention and mental health care, to exclude co-payment from health care at the Jail leaving only co-payment fee to see a nurse and is not to require co-payment if it results in effectively denying care to the prisoner, to provide sufficient mental health staffing and mental health screening including a chronic care program, to implement comprehensive policies for suicide prevention. The Jail shall file with the Court bi-annual compliance reports, the first of which is due within 180 days of the date when the Court (Judge John Spencer) signs and enters the agreement. Thereafter, the Jail is to file bi-annual compliance reports every six months. The Jail shall notify the Monitor and the plaintiff upon death of any prisoner, or any serious suicide attempt. If the Monitor finds non-compliance, the plaintiff shall give notice to the defendant and allow 30 days to cure the failure. If the failure is not cured, the plaintiff may initiate contempt proceedings without further notice. The parties have jointly selected James Welch to be the Monitor of the implementation of the agreement. He is to have full and complete access to the Jail, records, staff and prisoners. The Monitor is to issue an initial report 120 days after the defendant files its first compliance report, and every 180 days afterwards. The agreement provides that the Court (Judge John Spencer) shall retain jurisdiction over the action until the defendant is determined to have substantially complied with the agreement. The agreement shall terminate when the Jail has achieved substantial compliance with the provisions of the agreement and has maintained such compliance for a period of 18 months. If substantial compliance has been achieved and maintained for 18 months, the parties will jointly stipulate to dismissal of the case within 30 days. The agreement is binding upon all the parties, including successors in office. The parties do not foresee any further litigation and the parties have foregone their obligations to preserve potentially discoverable information. The last action of the Court (Judge John Spencer) was an order granting motion for an extension of the time to file on February 3, 2014. The reporting deadlines under the agreement have been extended for 60 days.

Summary: On September 20, 2013, the plaintiff, the United States of America, filed a complaint with U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against Piedmont Regional Jail, under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C § 1997. The plaintiff alleged violation of constitutional rights of the prisoners due to the quality of health care services at the jail. The parties entered into a settlement agreement that was approved by the Court, under which the jail is to improve its health care services. The implementation of the agreement is to be done through compliance reports that are analyzed by the mutually appointed Monitor. The Court retained jurisdiction over the action until the substantial compliance with the settlement agreement is achieved.


In September 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) Philadelphia District Office filed suit against Wal-Mart Stores. According to the complaint, which was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, Wal-Mart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for, and ultimately terminating, a pharmacy technician who suffered from permanent physical disabilities resulting from a gunshot wound. Judge Andre Davis was assigned to this case. After the complainant intervened in the suit, both Wal-Mart and the EEOC moved for summary judgment. Both motions were denied (with the exception of a single, narrow issue: the EEOC's motion regarding the unavailability of an "undue hardship" defense was granted). Settlement discussion began on April 22, 2008. Sometime later, on June 9, 2008, the court approved the parties' consent decree. The court retained jurisdiction for three years to ensure compliance. This decree included monetary relief, attorney’s fee and costs, training, notice and postings, reporting requirements, and prohibiting the defendant from ADA violations. More specifically, this consent decree required: 1.The defendant to pay $200,000.00 in monetary relief and $50,000.00 in attorney’s fees to the intervenor-plaintiff. 2.The defendant to provide ADA training to employees in manager and supervisor positions. 3.The defendant to post notices of this agreement and a revised ADA policy for its business. These notices were to be displayed in locations visible to all employees. 4.The defendant to provide regular reports to the EEOC on compliance with the ADA. 5.The defendant to engage in acts or practices that promote compliance with the ADA. This consent decree was amended, on May 8, 2009. This amendment listed the Wal-Mart stores that would be affected by the consent decree. The duration of the consent decree has lapsed and the docket shows no further activity. Therefore, this case is closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the complainant filed suit against Wal-Mart Stores in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that Wal-Mart violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for a pharmacy technician who suffered permanent physical disabilities. In 2008, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree included monetary relief, attorney’s fee and costs, training, notice and postings, reporting requirements, and prohibiting the defendant from ADA violations. This case is closed.


Notes from the NAACP website: On February 27, 2006, the National NAACP and the Reading Branch NAACP joined an employment lawsuit against the City of Reading, Pennsylvania. The suit charges the Reading Fire Department with implementing discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices against African Americans and other minorities. Although the City of Reading was 11% African-American and 37% Hispanic, the Fire Department was virtually all-white. Of the Fire Department's 147 full-time, uniformed employees, there were no African-Americans and fewer than five Hispanics. The complaint alleged that the City's discriminatory employment practices include: refusing to recruit and hire African Americans and other minorities for firefighter positions on the same basis as whites; basing such recruitment on a primarily "word of mouth" system that results in the employment of friends and relatives of current City firefighters, the vast majority of whom are white; failing or refusing to adopt nondiscriminatory recruitment, application, testing, and selection techniques for the position of firefighter; and failing or refusing to take appropriate action to correct the effects of its past discriminatory policies and practices. Plaintiffs in the case sought relief in the form of: a permanent injunction barring the City from discriminating against African American and other minority firefighter candidates on the basis of race and/or national origin; a permanent injunction directing the City to adopt and implement a vigorous recruitment program designed to attract qualified African American and other minority applicants for employment in numbers which at least reflect the proportion of minority applicants and candidates in and around the City; lost income and benefits; reasonable attorneys' fees and expert fees. On March 27, 2007, the parties entered into a settlement which was approved by the court as a consent decree. Under the terms of the consent decree, the defendants agreed to encourage minority applicants into the firefighter program. The docket has no entries after the consent decree, and we have no further information in this case.

Summary: On February 27, 2006, the National NAACP and the Reading Branch NAACP joined an employment lawsuit against the City of Reading, Pennsylvania charging the Reading Fire Department with implementing discriminatory recruitment and hiring practices against African Americans and other minorities. On March 27, 2007, the parties entered into a settlement which was approved by the court as a consent decree under which the defendants agreed to encourage minority applicants into the firefighter program.


On August 14, 2009, the Department of Justice Civil Rights Division (DOJ) began an investigation of conditions at the Leflore County Juvenile Detention Center ("LCJDC") in Greenwood, Mississippi pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997, and the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141. On March 31, 2011, the DOJ issued an investigative findings letter concluding that conditions at LCJDC violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights of the youth confined there. The United States concluded that youth confined to LCJDC are: (1) exposed to excessive physical restraint and isolation as a means of discipline; (2) given inadequate educational opportunities; and (3) exposed to great risk of harm from inadequate mental health care, including inadequate screening, monitoring and treatment of suicidal youth. The letter noted that the DOJ hoped to work with the County to reach an amicable and cooperative resolution, otherwise a lawsuit may be initiated. On May 12, 2015, the DOJ filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. The DOJ sued Leflore County of Mississippi under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Represented by its own counsel, the DOJ sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The DOJ alleged that, in the course of operating a detention center for children, the defendant County had violated the Fourteenth Amendment by practicing inadequate suicide prevention policies, failing to investigate abuse, and causing unreasonable risk to the safety and welfare of the minor prisoners. The day after the complaint was filed, the parties jointly moved for entry of a settlement agreement. This case was originally assigned to Judge Debra M. Brown and Magistrate Judge Jane M. Virden but was reassigned to Judge Neal B. Biggers after Judge Brown recused herself on May 18, 2015. On June 18, 2015, Judge Biggers granted the joint motion for entry of settlement agreement. The settlement required the defendant County to first conduct a policy review, submit to the DOJ alternatives to policies not accepted by the DOJ, and then implement the approved alternatives. The policy areas of focus were inmate intake, screening and evaluation, policies and procedures regarding mental health, medical history, education, classification, and orientation, the use of force, behavior management, the use of forced isolation as punishment, suicide preventions, and due process/grievance processes. The defendant was required to train its staff regarding these policy changes. Additionally, the County was required to submit a comprehensive action plan for implementation and give annual compliance reports. The agreement was to terminate after the defendant County achieved substantial compliance with all substantive provisions of the agreement and has maintained compliance for at least 12 months. The court was to retain jurisdiction to ensure compliance. As of June 8, 2020, there is no indication on the docket that the settlement agreement has terminated, so presumably, the case is ongoing for compliance purposes.

Summary: On March 31, 2011, the DOJ issued an investigative findings letter concluding that conditions at the Leflore County Juvenile Detention Center violated the constitutional and federal statutory rights of the youth confined there. The United States concluded that youth confined to LCJDC are: (1) exposed to excessive physical restraint and isolation as a means of discipline; (2) given inadequate educational opportunities; and (3) exposed to great risk of harm from inadequate mental health care, including inadequate screening, monitoring and treatment of youth who are suicidal. On May 12, 2015, the DOJ filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi. On June 18, 2015, the court entered a settlement agreement and as of July 23, 2015, the case is ongoing for compliance purposes.