On December 23, 2008, several homeless individuals with mental or physical disabilities, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California, filed a suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, against the City of Laguna Beach, CA, and its Police Department and City Council. The plaintiffs alleged that §18.04.020 of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code, which banned sleeping and camping in public places, violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by criminalizing the involuntary condition of homelessness. They also alleged that their Fourth Amendment right to be free from illegal searches and seizures and Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process were violated, and that the City was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 - 12181, which forbids discrimination on the basis of disability by public entities. The plaintiffs sought preliminary and permanent injunctions preventing the enforcement of the contested local ordinance, and declaratory judgments acknowledging that the Defendants had violated the rights of the Plaintiffs in the manner alleged. They also sought to recover legal costs, including attorneys' fees and expenses. A year prior to filing the lawsuit, the ACLU of Southern California had initiated discussions with the City of Laguna Beach about changing the ordinance; these discussions were not fruitful. The plaintiffs in their complaint pointed to a report prepared by a City-appointed Homeless Task Force, which found that the wealthy community of Laguna Beach was unique among cities in Orange County, CA in that its homeless population, at the time numbering close to fifty people, consisted almost exclusively of "chronically homeless" individuals--persons with mental or physical disabilities who experience long term or repeated homelessness. The Task Force had also determined that Orange County as a whole and Laguna Beach in particular had insufficient shelter space, which according to the report meant the homeless often had no option but to sleep outdoors. Laguna had no year-round beds available in shelters for the homeless. The City made beds available only intermittently from mid-December through mid-March, with funding available for no more than forty nights during this period. The homeless plaintiffs had been regularly subjected to police harassment and cited for sleeping in public when they had nowhere else to sleep. On March 3, 2009, the City Council voted to repeal the contested portion of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code. On June 19, 2009, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, wherein the City agreed to provide plaintiffs' counsel with written notice at least thirty days prior to any City Council public meeting at which action would be proposed to add or revise provisions pertaining to the restriction or prohibition of sleeping or camping in public places within the City. The parties agreed to ask the Court to seal, expunge, or destroy any record created after June 18, 2007, relating to arrests of or citations to the Plaintiffs or any other persons for violating the repealed portion of Laguna Beach Municipal Code §18.04.020. The City agreed to pay the Plaintiffs $9000 in attorneys' fees. On July 20, 2009, in light of the settlement, the Court issued an order granting the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to have all records created after June 18 relating to arrests or citations under the contested ordinance sealed, expunged, or destroyed. On the same day, the Court (Judge Cormac Carney) ordered the case dismissed, but retained jurisdiction for the three year period of the settlement.

Summary: On December 23, 2008, several homeless individuals with mental or physical disabilities, represented by attorneys from the ACLU of Southern California, filed a suit in federal Court against the City of Laguna Beach, CA. The Plaintiffs alleged that a local ordinance that banned sleeping in public violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by criminalizing the involuntary condition of homelessness. They also alleged that their Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated, and that the City was in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Plaintiffs sought injunctions preventing the enforcement of the contested local ordinance, and declaratory judgments acknowledging that the Defendants had violated the rights of the Plaintiffs in the manner alleged. On March 3, 2009, the City Council voted to repeal the contested portion of the Laguna Beach Municipal Code, and on June 19, 2009, the parties entered a Settlement Agreement, wherein the City agreed to provide Plaintiffs' counsel with written notice at least thirty days prior to any City Council public meeting at which action would be proposed to add or revise provisions pertaining to the restriction of sleeping or camping in public places within the City. The parties agreed to ask the Court to seal, expunge or destroy any record created after June 18, 2007, relating to arrests of or citations to the Plaintiffs or any other persons for violating the repealed portion of the Municipal Code relating to sleeping in public. The City agreed to give the Plaintiffs $9000 in attorneys' fees.


On July 22, 2005, the Detroit and Indianapolis offices of the EEOC filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The complaint alleged that the employer had failed to give a physically disabled employee a reasonable accommodation and discharged her in violation of the ADA. EEOC asked the court to permanently enjoin the employer from engaging in unlawful employment practices and grant relief to those employees who had been discriminated against. On October 26, 2005, the case was consolidated with the ongoing litigation in EEOC v. Magna Donnelly Inc., EE-MI-0048. Both cases had been brought under the ADA in the same court, and dealt with the same corporation's employment discrimination practices and policies.

Summary: On July 22, 2005, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against the Magna Donnelly Corp., Inc., a for profit corporation, under the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The EEOC claimed that the corporation had failed to reasonably accommodate persons who were able to perform the essential functions of the position yet suffered from disabilities. On October 26, 2005, the case was consolidated with the ongoing litigation in EEOC v. Magna Donnelly Inc., EE-MI-0048.


On March 14, 2014, several same-sex couples residing in Indiana filed a lawsuit against the state of Indiana, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU and private counsel, asked the court to declare that the Indiana law banning same-sex marriage was unconstitutional; they sought both temporary and permanent injunctive relief. (Plaintiffs amended the complaint on April 3, 2014.) Plaintiffs claimed that Indiana's ban on same-sex marriage violated their rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Furthermore, they claimed that the lack of Indiana's recognition of same-sex marriages in the state, and marriages legally conducted in other states, had interfered with the flow of various benefits, both tangible and intangible, within their families. On June 25, 2014, the Court (Judge Richard L. Young) decided the case for the plaintiffs. In an opinion entered in this case, as well as Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), and Lee v. Pence (PB-IN-0008), Judge Young entered a judgment on both plaintiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment. He entered a permanent injunction ordering the State: not to deny marriage licenses to same-sex applicants and not to enforce the same-sex marriage ban; and to administer the same services and benefits to all married couples regardless if they are same-sex or different-sex. The district court stayed its decision pending appeal; defendants filed that appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the same day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Posner. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014). As in the district court, that opinion addressed this case as well as Baskin v. Bogan (PB-IN-0005), and Lee v. Pence (PB-IN-0008). The defendants sought review in the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals stayed the effective date of its decision pending the Supreme Court's resolution of that review petition. The Supreme Court denied review in Bogan v. Baskin (as well as several other cases) on October 6, 2014, and the next day, the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the District Court's judgment invalidating and enjoining Indiana's prohibition of same-sex marriage.

Summary: This is one of three federal district court cases challenging the same-sex marriage ban in Indiana. The District Court enjoined Indiana's prohibition on same-sex marriage. On October 7, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued its mandate affirming the decision.


On October 11, 2013, children with disabilities enrolled in New York City public schools, filed this lawsuit against the New York Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, §504 of The Rehabilitation Act, and the Individuals with Disabilities Act. The plaintiffs alleged that the school district had forcibly interrupted the education of students with disabilities through repeated misuse of emergency medical services (EMS) to remove these students from school even though they were not in need of medical care. Instead, the district relied on EMS to address disruptive behavior. The plaintiffs also alleged this practice was unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and that it violated state law and city regulations. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to halt this practice, as well as damages and attorneys’ fees. The plaintiffs were represented by Legal Services NYC and private counsel. On March 18, 2014, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding five additional plaintiff-parents and their children as well as new factual details. On March 31, 2014, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. April 7, 2014 – referring case to magistrate judge James L. Cott for settlement. From June 30, 2014 through November 6, 2014, the parties held five settlement conferences in front of Magistrate Judge Cott. In light of the settlement conferences, the defendants removed their motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on September 24, 2014. On December 15, 2014, the parties entered a settlement agreement that required policy changes and training for the defendant, as well as reporting requirements throughout the stipulation period that runs until June 30, 2018. In addition to injunctive relief, the defendant won $502,621.7 in emotional damages and out-of-pocket costs for eleven plaintiff-children and their parents and $613,000 in attorneys fees. The terms of agreement were enforceable by the court. On January 14, 2015, Magistrate Judge Cott approved all the individual plaintiffs’ infant compromises, which outlined how the plaintiff parents would use the plaintiff children’s damages money. Most put the money into trusts for their chidlrens’ future use. Although the court maintains jurisdiction to monitor the settlement, all the disputes are now resolved.

Summary: In 2013, children with disabilities in New York City sued the New York Department of Education in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. Plaintiffs allege that New York City Schools frequently misused emergency medical services to remove students with disabilities in non-emergency situations, in violation of federal disability laws, among other claims. In 2014, the parties reached a stipulated agreement that required the City change its policies and practices relating to its handling of children with disabilities and awarded monetary damages to the plaintiffs. The period of the stipulation agreement runs until June 30, 2018.


COVID-19 Summary: Five immigration detainees filed a habeas petition and a motion for a temporary restraining order challenging their continued detention in Michigan jails despite their heightened vulnerability to COVID-19. On April 14, the district court denied the plaintiffs' request for a TRO. On April 29, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiffs' habeas petition and dismissing their claims. <hr> On April 7, 2020, five immigration detainees filed a habeas petition and lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Department of Justice (DOJ). The plaintiffs were being held in ICE custody at the Monroe County Jail and the St. Clair County Jail in Michigan, and alleged they were particularly vulnerable to serious illness or death if infected by COVID-19. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, the ACLU Immigrants’ Rights Project, the ACLU National Prison Project, and private counsel, the plaintiffs sought a writ of habeas corpus and an order for the plaintiffs’ immediate release on the ground that their continued detention violated the Due Process Clause or, in the alternative, injunctive relief to the same effect. The plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) requesting immediate release in addition to their complaint. The plaintiffs also sought declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. The complaint claimed that the plaintiffs faced a heightened risk of contracting the virus due to their confinement. It further stated that the plaintiffs were older adults and/or had underlying medical conditions creating a high risk of serious infection. The plaintiffs alleged that their continued detention subjected them to unlawful punishment in violation of their Fifth Amendment right to substantive due process. The plaintiffs also stated that one of the plaintiffs had been scheduled to be removed from the U.S. in March, but ICE had indefinitely delayed that departure date. Consequently, the plaintiff was being detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which authorizes a 90-day period of mandatory post-final-order detention during which ICE is supposed to effectuate removal. The plaintiffs alleged that this plaintiff would necessarily be detained beyond this 90-day period due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and should therefore be immediately released under an order of supervision. On April 14, Judge Murphy denied the plaintiffs' emergency motion for a TRO. In his opinion, Judge Murphy stated that the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims were more properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment standard for claims relating to health concerns. He then concluded that at this early stage, the plaintiffs had failed to show that they are or will be exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm such that this relief was warranted. Judge Murphy noted that detention centers were implementing recommendations for preventing the spread of COVID-19, and that the plaintiffs had not provided much facility-specific information regarding the outbreak. 2020 WL 1872362. The defendants filed their response to the plaintiffs' habeas petition on April 17. On April 29, 2020, Judge Murphy issued an opinion and order denying the plaintiffs' habeas petition and granting in part and denying in part a motion they had filed on April 20 seeking leave to submit additional evidence. Judge Murphy first noted that of the original five petitioners, only two still had live claims; since filing, one had been released, one had been deported, and one had been transferred to a facility in Louisiana. Consequently, the only claims remaining related to the Monroe facility and the plaintiff being detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Addressing the plaintiffs' due process claims, Judge Murphy again noted that the claims were more properly analyzed under the Eighth Amendment's deliberate indifference standard because they related to health concerns. He found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had objectively been exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm; rather, he stated that COVID-19 posed a risk of serious illness to all Americans, whether detained or not. He concluded that COVID-19 had not "breached the walls" of the Monroe detention facility, and that detention centers were implementing precautions to prevent its spread. He next noted that most of the evidence the plaintiffs had presented was not specific to the Monroe facility, but rather focused on ICE facilities throughout the U.S. Judge Murphy next addressed the claim that one plaintiff was being detained in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) because his removal was not reasonably likely in the foreseeable future. He concluded that the statute's 90-day period of mandatory post-final-order detention would not expire until May 25, 2020, at the earliest, meaning that the plaintiff had only alleged a potential future violation. Consequently, Judge Murphy denied the plaintiff's claim without prejudice. Judge Murphy entered a final judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs did not file an appeal, and the case is closed.

Summary: On April 7, 2020 five immigration detainees filed a habeas petition and motion for a temporary restraining order in the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking their immediate release from detention due to their increased vulnerability to COVID-19. On April 14, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for an emergency TRO. On April 29, the court issued an opinion denying the plaintiffs' habeas petition and dismissing their claims.


On June 28, 2018, the NAACP, the Connecticut State Conference of the NAACP, and several private citizens of Hamden and New Haven filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. The plaintiffs sued the state of Connecticut and the Connecticut State Elections Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Represented by the Rule of Law Clinic at Yale Law School and the NAACP, they claimed that the Defendants' 2011 Redistricting Plan, which entailed "prison gerrymandering," violated the “one person, one vote” principle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought a declaration of unconstitutionality, an injunction against conducting elections for the Connecticut House of Representatives and Senate under the 2011 Redistricting Plan in the 2020 electoral cycle, and—in the event that the defendants were unable to implement a plan that was satisfactory—a court-ordered redistricting plan. The plaintiffs also sought attorney’s fees. This case was assigned to Judge Warren W. Eginton. The complaint explained that in 2011 Connecticut adopted a redistricting plan for use in the 2018 and 2020 elections. The plan implemented "prison gerrymandering" in drawing lines for state legislative districts, which meant that it counts incarcerated individuals as residing in a state prison facility, rather than at their pre-incarceration address. In Connecticut, prison gerrymandering had become a particularly severe problem because of the State’s concentration of prisoners at facilities that are significant distances from their home communities. As a result of this practice, prisoners were not likely to have their legislative interests protected by representatives from the rural areas where prisons are located. The complaint alleged that such prison gerrymandering inflated the voting strength of rural white voters and diluted the voting strength of urban African-American and Latino voters. On September 6, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case. They argued the case was barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that the complaint failed to state a claim. On February 15, 2019, Judge Eginton denied the defendant's motion and allowed the case to go to discovery. On March 7, 2019, the defendants appealed the order to the Second Circuit, stating that it violated Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. On September 24, 2019, the Second Circuit issued an opinion affirming the district court's decision as to the Eleventh Amendment claim. However, it also remanded the case because the claim presented a substantial federal question, therefore a three-judge panel was required. 939 F.3d 470. On September 26, 2019, the case was transferred to Judge Janet Bond Arterton. On October 15, 2019 the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, addressing several claims made by the defendants in their motion to dismiss and alleging that they there was a racially disparate impact, even if less than 10% of the population was impacted by prison gerrymandering. On October 17, 2019, in response to the Second Circuit's opinion, United States Circuit Judges John M. Walker, Jr. and Peter W. Hall were designated to hear and determine the action. As of November 22, 2019, the case is still ongoing.

Summary: In 2018, the NAACP, the Connecticut State Conference of the NAACP, and several private citizens of Hamden and New Haven filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' 2011 Redistricting Plan, which is expected to be used in the 2018 and 2020 elections, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied and then appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal, the denial was affirmed but the case was remanded to be heard by a three-judge panel. The case is still ongoing.


On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Bishops of Joliet, IL and Springfield, IL, on behalf of their respective dioceses, along with several affiliated Catholic organizations, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. Plaintiffs contend that this mandatory contraception coverage violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. On February 8, 2013, the court (Judge John W. Darrah) granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness. The court noted that the Federal Government had indicated in the Advanced Notice of Proposed Rule Making (ANPRM) its intention to amend the regulation. And while these amendments did not eliminate the possibility of imminent injury to the Plaintiffs, it did impact the likelihood of injury such that it was not "certainly impending." The court also held that the Plaintiffs inability to plan for the future based on the uncertain law did not impact their daily business.

Summary: On May 21, 2012, the Catholic Bishops of Joliet, IL and Springfield, IL, and several affiliated Catholic organizations, filed a lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois against the Federal Government under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000bb), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 706(2)), and the First Amendment. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, seek to enjoin enforcement of provisions of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) extending universal contraception coverage in employer-sponsored private health insurance coverage. On February 8, 2013, Judge John W. Darrah granted defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of standing and ripeness.


On October 7, 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security implemented two new asylum processes to expedite applicants’ credible fear interviews, the Prompt Asylum Claim Review program and the Humanitarian Asylum Review Process. Under these programs, asylum seekers subject to credible fear interviews would be kept in U.S. Customs and Border Protection facilities, called “ice boxes” for their cold temperatures, rather than U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention centers. On December 5, 2019, the Las Americas Advocacy Center filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union, claimed that the new programs for expedited removal violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.), the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.), the Convention against Torture, and the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that Customs and Border Protection facilities only allowed them to contact attorneys by phone and otherwise limited their access to legal counsel. That, they said, deprived them of opportunities to meaningfully participate in credible fear interviews, which determined whether they could pursue a claim for asylum or other protection. On the same day, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, adding as plaintiffs asylum seekers who had been sent back to their home countries after receiving a negative evaluation for their credible fear interviews under the new programs. On December 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction. The case was assigned to Judge Ketanji Jackson on December 20, 2019. The plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment on January 27, 2020. The judge has not ruled on the plaintiffs’ motions for a preliminary injunction and summary judgment as of February 7, 2020. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On October 7, 2019, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security implemented two new asylum processes which would expedite applicants’ credible fear interviews. The Las Americas Advocacy Center sued, claiming that the new programs violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, the Convention against Torture, and the Due Process Clause. Represented by the ACLU, the plaintiffs filed motions for a preliminary injunction and the summary judgment.


On March 19, 2015, an Illinois prisoner filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against numerous members of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) tactical team “Orange Crush,” the wardens at Illinois River, Menard, Big Muddy River, and Lawrence Correctional Centers, and other IDOC officials. The plaintiff, represented by Loevy & Loevy and the Uptown People's Law Center, sought injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, both for himself individually and for a class of other similarly-situated Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) inmates. Specifically, the named plaintiff claimed that during an April 2014 search of cells at Illinois River Correctional Center, the members of the IDOC tactical team "Orange Crush" beat, abused, and sexually humiliated the plaintiff, destroyed his property, and otherwise inflicted punishment for the sole purpose of causing humiliation and needless pain. The plaintiff further alleged that this conduct at Illinois River was not an aberration. Rather, Orange Crush conducted similarly abusive search procedures at three other IDOC facilities: Menard, Big Muddy River, and Lawrence Correctional Centers. The plaintiff sought to represent a class consisting of all IDOC inmates subjected to “shakedowns” in 2014, as well as all present and future inmates of these four IDOC facilities. In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged violations of the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, when state officials intentionally, wantonly, and/or maliciously inflicted unnecessary physical and emotional pain and suffering on IDOC inmates. In addition, the plaintiff argued that the defendants' strip search procedures violate several provisions of the Prison Rape Elimination Act National Standards, 28 C.F.R. § 115. Lastly, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants acted with the intent or knowledge that there was a high probability that their conduct would inflict severe emotional distress upon the inmates. The case was assigned to District Judge Staci M. Yandle. It was initially assigned to Magistrate Judge Philip M. Frazier, but was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Stephen C. Williams on October 16, 2015. Various defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on May 29, 2015, and this motion was granted in part and denied in part on January 28, 2016. The court dismissed the portions of the complaint dealing with the Prison Rape Elimination Act, as the Act did not provide for private cause of action. The court determined that the remainder of the complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court (Magistrate Judge Williams) approved a confidentiality order on July 10, 2017. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify the class on October 12, 2018. As the litigation progressed, the Court granted many motions to consolidate cases by plaintiffs alleging similarly improper stripe search techniques and cell shakedowns. The complete list of docket numbers for the consolidated cases can be found at the end of this summary. In January of 2019, a number of cases were then severed because their facts fell outside of the class perimeters including time frame and location. The severed cases included Turner v. Spiller, et al., 3:16-cv-131-SMY-MAB; Williams v. Mull, et al., 3:15-cv-523-SMY-MAB; and, Chairs v. IDOC, et al., 3:15-cv-1359-SMY-MAB, each in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. On March 26, 2020, Judge Staci Yandle of the Southern District of Illinois issued an order granting Plaintiffs' class certification request. The class consists of all prisoners housed at: Menard Correctional Center between April 4, 2014 and April 16, 2014; Illinois River Correctional Center between April 21, 2014 and April 29, 2014; Big Muddy Correctional Center between May 12, 2014 and May 19, 2014; or Lawrence Lawrence Correctional Center between July 7, 2014 and July 11, 2014 Each of the below cases were filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois and consolidated with this case (<i>Ross v. Gossett</i>) as of February 2020: Hamilton v. McCallister, 15-281-SMY-SCW Miller v. Duncan, 15-415-SMY-SCW McDaniel v. McCallistor, 15-515-SMY-SCW Sultan v. Duncan, 15-611-SMY-SCW Cortes v. Stolworthy, 15-690-SMY-SCW Watts v. Big Muddy River Correctional Center, 15-692-SMY-SCW Dunmore v. Duncan, 15-706-SMY-SCW Brooks v. IDOC Director, 15-1060-SMY-SCW Verser v. Duncan, 15-1263-SMY-SCW Johnson v. McCallistor, 15-308-MJR-SCW Tolliver v. Wexford Health Sources, 16-cv-00130-SMY Smith v. Godinez, 16-cv-00248-SMY Tenney v. Baldwin, 16-cv-00115-SMY Harding v. Balwin,16-cv-083-SMY Miller v. Baldwin, 16-cv-00416-SMY Truly v. Moore, 16-cv-783-NJR Fisher v. McCallistor, 15-cv-00007-SMY-RJD Clark v. Tact Team, 17-cv-00146-SMY-RJD Knox v. Butler, 17-cv-00494-SMY Smith v. Unknown Party, 16-cv-00745-SMY-MAB Discovery commenced in May 2020. On June 4, 2020, the government filed an appeal of the earlier class certifications to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The circuit court has yet to rule on the issue, but the earlier class certification has been stayed pending that appeal. Discovery remains ongoing in the district court and the case remains open.

Summary: In March 2015, an Illinois prisoner brought this class action suit seeking damages and injunctive relief against the State of Illinois, alleging that during an April 2014 search of cells at Illinois River Correctional Center, the members of the IDOC tactical team "Orange Crush" beat, abused, and sexually humiliated the plaintiff, destroyed his property, and that such misconduct was endemic. Class certification was granted in March of 2020. The case remains open and in Discovery.


On February 6, 2006, the State of Connecticut Office of Protection and Advocacy for Persons With Disabilities (an independent State agency charged with advocating for persons with disabilities), along with several persons with mental disabilities residing in nursing facilities, filed this lawsuit against the State of Connecticut, its Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, its Department of Public Health, and its Department of Social Services in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Bringing their claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants were violating these two acts by warehousing and segregating mentally ill patients in three nursing facilities that were either locked or severely restricted. The plaintiffs alleged these patients desired community-based treatment instead. On March 31, 2010, the district court (Judge Alvin W. Thompson) denied the defendants' motions to dismiss and certified the case as a class action. The class consisted of persons with mental illness who desired to and were capable of receiving community-based treatment and were institutionalized in Chelsea Place Care Center, Bidwell Care Center, or West Rock Health Care Center or were at risk of entry into these facilities. 706 F. Supp. 2d 266. Discovery proceeded throughout the rest of 2010 and into 2011. In April 2011, Judge Thompson granted the parties' joint motion to stay the case so that they could try to negotiate a settlement. For the next three years, the parties negotiated. On June 17, 2014, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which was approved by Judge Thompson on July 2. The settlement agreement required the State to ensure that all class members who were eligible for and desired community-based services in a community-based setting were afforded those services. The State was also required to explain the benefits of community-based services and settings to all class members. Moreover, even for those class members who chose to remain in the nursing homes (rather than take advantage of a community-based setting), the State would continue to discuss and recommend community-based settings with them. The parties also agreed to the appointment of a remedial expert to ensure the State's compliance with the settlement agreement. The court was to retain jurisdiction over the case for four years to ensure compliance. The State also agreed to pay $1.3 million in attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs. Starting in 2014, the appointed Remedial Expert filed quarterly status reports to the district court outlining the State's progress toward compliance with the settlement agreement. The court's jurisdiction was scheduled to end in July 2018. However, in January 2017, new class members, not subject to protections of the original settlement agreement, were identified. While defendants fully implemented and accomplished each benchmark within the timelines specified and were in compliance with the Settlement Agreement as to all other Class Members, the newly identified class members did not directly receive the specific protections of the settlement agreement. Thus the parties agreed to extend the jurisdiction with regards to these newly discovered class members only, for periods of six to eighteen months specific to the new class members, so that the defendants could give them the benefits of the settlement agreement. Quarterly reports were to continue through the extended period for the new class members. The court approved these provisions on June 25, 2018. The original portions of the Settlement Agreement terminated pursuant to their terms on July 2, 2018. As of this update, the most recent status report was entered on April 22, 2019. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On February 6, 2006, Connecticut's State Protection and Advocacy Organization and several individuals filed suit against the State of Connecticut and three State agencies in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. They claimed that the State was segregating patients with mental illnesses who desired community-based treatment in three nursing facilities. In 2014, the parties settled. The State agreed to provide community-based services and settings to all members of the class. New class members were discovered in 2017, and the court's jurisdiction was extended to these new class members only. The case is ongoing for enforcement.


COVID-19 Summary: This was a habeas action filed on behalf of a class of prisoners at the Federal Medical Center Devens in Massachusetts, seeking the release of inmates in light of COVID-19 so that the facility could properly socially distance. The court denied the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction on May 8, 2020 and dismissed the action on July 2, 2020. <hr> Three federal prisoners at the Federal Medical Center, Devens, Massachusetts filed this class-action habeas corpus petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on April 15, 2020. Alarmed by the rapid spread of COVID-19 in prisons across the country, the plaintiffs sought the release of enough inmates from FMC Devens that the remaining inmates would be able to maintain 6 feet of social distancing at all times, as recommended by the Centers for Disease Control. Represented by the ACLU, the ACLU of Massachusetts, and private counsel, they argued that their continued detention, with the high likelihood of a deadly outbreak sweeping through the prison, was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The petition pointed to the CARES Act, as well as guidance from Attorney General William Barr, instructing federal prisons to expand the use of compassionate release and home confinement to reduce prison populations during the pandemic. The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of all inmates in custody at FMC Devens; a subclass of inmates at high risk of injury or death from COVID-19; and a subclass of inmates who could qualify for early transfer to home confinement. For themselves and for the class, they sought declaratory judgment, and requested a special master to oversee the prison’s compliance with the order. On April 24, 2020, the court denied approximately 2 dozen individual requests to be “added as a class member,” because no class had been certified. On May 4, 2020, a member of the proposed class died of COVID-19 at FMC Devens. On May 5, Plaintiff Grinis was transferred to home confinement by order of his sentencing judge (criminal case 18-cr-10206), to serve the remaining 6 weeks of his sentence. Skeptical of the claim that the prison’s failure to de-densify would amount to cruel and unusual punishment, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction. In that order, dated May 8, 2020, the court also indicated that there was “a substantial question” regarding whether habeas corpus was the proper source for the relief that the plaintiffs sought. 2020 WL 2300313 This “substantial question” was answered on June 11, 2020, when the court ruled that the action was improperly brought as a habeas petition. Although a habeas petition in name, the action was in reality a civil claim governed by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that unless the plaintiffs reframed their complaint and proceeded under the PLRA, the action would be dismissed. 2020 WL 3097360 On June 18, 2020, the plaintiffs declined the court’s invitation to reframe their complaint. Even if it were legally appropriate to proceed under the PLRA, the pandemic’s rapid spread would make it impossible to obtain relief quickly enough to protect their lives and health. They asked the court to vacate its ruling of May 8, arguing that since the court had ruled that it did not have jurisdiction, it should not have addressed the merits of their habeas petition at all. On July 2, 2020, the court dismissed the action, clarifying that it did have jurisdiction over any habeas petition brought before the court; the petition had been dismissed because the plaintiffs had not properly stated a claim under §2241 and declined to vacate the earlier judgment. As of September 23, 2020, the plaintiffs have not appealed the ruling.

Summary: Medically vulnerable prisoners in the Federal Medical Center in Devens, Massachusetts, brought this petition for habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts on April 15, 2020. They alleged that continuing to incarcerate medically vulnerable prisoners, in facilities where social distancing was not possible, was a violation of the Eighth Amendment. They sought to represent a class of all inmates at FMC Devens, and sought an injunction or a writ of habeas corpus ordering the prison to release enough prisoners to allow social distancing in the prison. The court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary injunctive relief. On June 11, 2020, the court ruled that habeas corpus was not the proper vehicle for the relief that the plaintiffs sought. Instead, they must reframe their action as a civil complaint, compliant with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, in order to proceed. After the plaintiffs declined that invitation, the court dismissed the action on July 2, 2020. As of July 27, 2020, there has been no appeal.


The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requires the government to obtain a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) before it may conduct any domestic electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information. The warrant applications are made ex parte and must include a sworn statement by a federal officer of the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the government's belief that the target of surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Once a FISC judge receives a warrant application, the judge can order approval of the surveillance only if the judge finds that there is probable cause to believe that the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. Because the orders only authorize surveillance up to 90 days, the government must file an application for an extension that meets the same requirements as the initial warrant application and obtain a renewal order from the FISC for continued surveillance. For the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse collection of FISA matters, see our special collection. In 2013, Wesley Harris, an FBI agent in Los Angeles, California, read a Wired.com article (https://www.wired.com/2013/01/china-transport-first-flight/) reporting that the Chinese had developed a military transport plane, with similarities to the United States's C-17 aircraft, which had been developed by Boeing. The article mused that "Beijing may also have acquired some of the C-17's blueprints from a spy working at Boeing." Subsequently, Agent Harris launched an investigation, which soon focused on Keith Gartenlaub, who was working at Boeing at the time. In June 2013, a magistrate judge in Los Angeles issued a warrant authorizing a search of Gartenlaub's email account (2013 email search). The FBI subsequently submitted an application for a FISA warrant to the FISC. The FISC authorized a search of Gartenlaub's home and computer, which were executed by FBI agents on January 29 and 30, 2014. During that search, FBI agents found hard drives containing child pornography. In August 2014, the FBI obtained additional search warrants from a magistrate judge, authorizing searches of Gartenlaub's home, storage units, and computers for evidence of child pornography. In the subsequent search, the FBI seized three hard drives containing child pornography. On August 27, 2014, Gartenlaub was charged in a criminal complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California following his arrest. Gartenlaub was arrested that day on a federal charge of knowingly possessing child pornography. In addition to filing the criminal complaint, the government filed a notice of intent to use information obtained from electronic surveillance and physical searched conducted pursuant to FISA. On February 2, 2015, the defendant filed, under seal, a motion seeking disclosure of the FISA materials, suppression of all information gathered through FISA, and a Franks v. Delaware hearing in order to establish that the FISA application and resulting search warrant application contained intentional or reckless material falsehoods and omissions. On May 4, 2015, the government filed a largely classified, ex parte opposition to Gartenlaub's FISA motion, arguing that the court should conduct an in camera, ex parte review of the FISA materials due to the classified and highly sensitive nature of the FISA materials. On August 6, 2016, District Judge Christina A. Snyder, in a sealed opinion, refused to disclose to Gartenlaub the FISA application and order, and she denied his motion to suppress the fruits of the FISA search. On December 10, 2015, Gartenlaub was convicted by a jury for receipt and possession of child pornography; Judge Snyder dismissed the receipt count as multiplicitous. On August 29, 2016, Gartenlaub was sentenced to 41 months of imprisonment and $3,430 in restitution. On September 9, 2016, Gartenlaub appealed his conviction and his sentence to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. On February 15, 2017, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union filed an amicus brief in support of Gartenlaub and reversal. On December 4, 2017, the parties conducted oral arguments in front of Circuit Judges Kim McLane Wardlaw and Ronald M. Gould, and District Judge for the District of South Dakota Lawrence L. Piersol (sitting by designation). On February 24, 2018, John D. Cline, attorney for Gartenlaub, wrote a letter to the appeals court's clerk. On February 2, 2018, President Trump had declassified and approved the release of a House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) majority memorandum that summarizes portions of a FISA application targeting Carter Page, an American citizen and a onetime foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign. See In re Carter W. Page, NS-DC-0127 in this Clearinghouse. Cline argued that the declassification of the HPSCI memorandum demonstrated that "it is possible to discuss publicly the merits of a FISA application without damaging national security;" therefore, he reasoned that if the HPSCI memorandum could be disclosed without harming national security, then a comparable disclosure of the FISA application for Gartenlaub should also be disclosed. On October 2, 2018, in an unpublished and unsigned memorandum, the appeals court affirmed Gartenlaub's conviction. First, the appeals court found that a rational jury could have found the essential elements, including knowledge, of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In particular, the government had demonstrated that Gartenlaub knew that child pornography was present on his computer and that he had accessed the child pornography through his password-protected computer user account. The appeals court also found that the district court did not commit plain error by failing to suppress the evidence from Gartenlaub's computer, since "[n]o controlling authority dictates the conclusion that the government's [FISA] search and subsequent use of FISA-derived materials in a non-national security prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment." But the appeals court did note that this case came "perilously close to the exact abuses against which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect." Furthermore, despite a circuit split as to what deference appeals courts should give a district court's determination that a FISA order was based on probable cause, the appeals court declined to resolve the issue. It believed that probable cause existed here, under either a de novo or an abuse of discretion standard of review, to support the FISA warrant. Lastly, after having conducted an in camera review of the underlying FISA materials, the appeals court concluded that the disclosure of the FISA materials to Gartenlaub was not "necessary to make an accurate determination of the legality of the search." On March 7, 2019, Gartenlaub appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme Court. His petition for certiorari was denied on April 22, 2019. In December 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General issued a report examining Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) applications. Following that report, in March 2020, the Inspector General issued a memorandum that included discussion of systemic errors in FBI FISA applications. This information was previously unavailable to Gartenlaub. In response to the memo and report, on April 22, 2020, he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC §2241, in the United States District Court Central District of California Western Division. The petition argued that the March 2020 Inspector General Memorandum revealed "systemic, pervasive and serious errors and omissions” in FBI FISA applications around the same time his FISA application was submitted in January 2014. The memo discussed applications from October 2014 through September 2019. All 29 FBI FISA applications the Inspector General reviewed contained errors, omissions, and/or procedural failures. Petitioner argued that, in light of the fact he was unable to review his FISA application and that his requests for a Franks hearing was denied, this new previously concealed evidence of systemic errors in FBI FISA applications is grounds to vacate his conviction, grant a new trial, or at least vacate his lifetime probation. The habeas case was assigned to District Judge Otis D. Wright, II, as a 28 USC § 2255 case. The docket number is 2:20-cv-03711. As of November 13, the case was still ongoing.

Summary: In August 2014, Keith Gartenlaub was charged in a criminal complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for knowingly possessing child pornography. The defendant argued that the government violated his Fourth Amendment by using evidence obtained from a FISA warrant in a non-national security prosecution. However, District Judge Christina A. Snyder refused to disclose to the defendant the classified FISA application and order, and she denied his motion to suppress the fruits of the FISA search. In December 2015, a jury convicted the defendant for receipt and possession of child pornography, and the defendant was sentenced to 41 months of prison. In September 2016, the defendant appealed his conviction to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which, in an unpublished and unsigned memorandum, upheld his conviction in October 2018. On March 7, 2019, Gartenlaub appealed his conviction to the United States Supreme Court. His petition for certiorari was denied on April 22, 2019. On April 22, 2020, Gartenlaub filed a motion, under 28 USC § 2255, seeking habeas relief.


This lawsuit was filed on July 22, 2020 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon by four individual plaintiffs represented by the ACLU Foundation of Oregon and private counsel. The complaint arose out of the protests that followed the police killing of George Floyd in May of 2020. After Mr. Floyd's killing protests broke out across the country condemning what happened to Mr. Floyd, police brutality, and racial inequality more generally. While the protests were mostly peaceful, there was some violence and property destruction at certain protests. By mid-July, President Trump deployed federal law enforcement against protesters in Portland, threatening to do the same in other cities as well. These law enforcement agents had neither their own names nor agency names attached to their uniforms. The four plaintiffs in this case were all individuals with medical training who were using that training to assist people injured during the protests. They brought suit against the City of Portland, one named Portland police officer, sixty unnamed Portland police officers, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service, and forty unnamed federal law enforcement agents. The complaint alleged that at various points between early June through mid-July, defendants had engaged in tactics to quell the protests that violated their First and Fourth Amendment rights, and that the federal government was in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. They alleged that the defendants were engaging in behavior, in violation of the First Amendment, which would have a "chilling effect" on the plaintiffs' speech. Furthermore, they alleged that the defendants' use of chemical weapons, semi-lethal projectiles, and riot batons against peaceful protesters represented excessive use of force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the complaint asserts that the federal defendants were acting arbitrarily and capriciously in using anti-protest tactics, thereby violating the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought injunctive relief and declaratory relief. They also sought compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees and costs. Two days after filing the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order against the federal and municipal defendants. The case was assigned to Judge Karin J. Immergut. Before the court held a hearing on the motion for a temporary restrainting order, the federal defendants announced an intention to reduce their presence in Portland. Shortly after, the plaintiffs filed withdrew their motion. On August 21, the plaintiffs submitted a second motion for a temporary restraining order against the municipal defendants and order to show cause as to why a preliminary injunction should not be entered against the municipal defendants. By September 2, 2020, Judge Immergut had issued her ruling. 2020 WL 5231486. She denied the motion, finding that the the plaintiffs did not allege sufficient facts and legal support to warrant specialized treatment for protest medics. She also held that the TRO was unworkable in practice, given the chaotic circumstances of the protests and that the line between protest medic and protester was not sufficiently clear. The case is ongoing as of October 8, 2020.

Summary: This case was filed by four private individuals who were administering medical assistance to those injured during the protests in Portland, Oregon that followed the police killing of George Floyd. The plaintiffs sued the City of Portland and federal law enforcement for violation of their First and Fourth Amendment rights, claiming that they were illegally attacked while peacefully protesting. They also argued that the federal law enforcement's tactics represented a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. They also sought attorney's fees and costs. Judge Immergut denied the plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order against the municipal defendants on September 2, 2020. The case is ongoing as of August 6, 2020.


On March 31, 2005, several current or former employees of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") who were forty years old or older filed this age discrimination lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, against the FAA and the U.S. Department of Transportation ("DOT"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and alleged that the FAA and DOT discriminated against them by targeting their jobs for outsourcing and terminating their federal employment on the basis of age. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the FAA violated the ADEA through their decision, as announced on February 1, 2005, to contract out the Flight Service component of Air Traffic Control, resulting in the termination of the plaintiffs' positions with the FAA, the elimination or reduction of their pay and retirement benefits, and the premature termination of their federal employment. The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, back pay and benefits, front pay, record correction, and attorneys' fees. On June 26, 2005, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to stop the FAA from outsourcing the Flight Service component. The court (Judge Richard W. Roberts) denied this motion on September 30, 2005, concluding that the plaintiffs' projected job loss was not likely to constitute irreparable harm because it could be corrected by money damages. 2005 WL 3276163. The plaintiffs filed an interlocutory appeal to the D.C. Circuit on October 5, 2005, but the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's denial on December 28, 2005. On June 29, 2005, the plaintiffs filed a motion to certify the class, but the court did not rule on this motion. The case instead moved forward with the plaintiffs constituting a putative (uncertified) class of over eight hundred members. In the meantime, the plaintiffs sought to add many additional plaintiffs. The court granted a motion to add new plaintiffs on March 31, 2006. On August 24, 2005, the defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or in the alternative, for summary judgment. Judge Roberts denied this motion on January 8, 2007, holding that the court had jurisdiction over the case, the defendants did not have sovereign immunity under the ADEA, and summary judgment would be premature without discovery. 474 F.Supp.2d 1. The court denied, without prejudice, the plaintiffs' motion for class certification on February 7, 2007. For the next several months, the parties engaged in discovery. This process was interrupted when, on June 8, 2007, the plaintiffs' attorney, Gebhardt & Associates, moved to withdraw as counsel. After the plaintiffs' former union could no longer pay for the representation, Gebhardt had sought payment from the individual plaintiffs. More than 700 of the 912 individual plaintiffs had not paid attorneys' fees or expenses, putting the firm in a position of providing pro-bono representation for hundreds of plaintiffs. The defendants opposed this motion, concerned that a case involving more than 900 pro-se plaintiffs would turn into a logistical nightmare for the defendants' attorneys. On September 14, 2007, proceedings were held before Judge Roberts. He denied the plaintiffs' motion to withdraw attorney as to all but 20 individual plaintiffs who specifically declared they wished to proceed pro se. With so many plaintiffs living all across the country, much of the litigation concerned the dismissal of individual plaintiffs who failed to respond to letters asking whether they wanted to continue with the case. Three such plaintiffs moved for reconsideration of their dismissal. Judge Roberts denied their requests on February 17, 2009. 597 F.Supp.2d 84. Other individuals sought to enter the litigation. On January 7, 2008, Judge Roberts denied the motion to join or intervene, holding that the individuals missed the deadline to join. 529 F.Supp.2d 24. On April 27, 2009, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, and on June 15, 2009, the plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. For years following this, the court did not rule on these motions. On May 21, 2014, the plaintiffs filed a motion to expedite consideration of their cross-motion for summary judgment. After they filed this motion, the docket remained inactive for nearly two years, until April 1, 2016, when it was reassigned to Judge Paul L. Friedman following Judge Robert's retirement. On June 30, 2016, the court issued a minute order directing the parties to update the court on the background and status of the case, including whether there was a need for new briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment and whether the parties were amenable to mediation. On September 27, 2016, the plaintiffs withdrew the cross-motion for summary judgment and instead filed a supplemental brief in opposition to the defendants' motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2016. Attorneys for the plaintiffs also changed, and on December 14, 2016, Judge Friedman granted Gebhardt's motion to withdraw as attorney, satisfied that the plaintiffs were adequately represented by new counsel. 220 F.Supp.3d 130. On May 26, 2017, Judge Friedman granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim but denied the motion regarding the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims. 2017 WL 2312884. On August 18, 2017, the plaintiffs moved to substitute the personal representatives for estates of deceased plaintiffs. Judge Friedman issued an order on October 16, directing the plaintiffs to clarify "whether counsel do in fact represent the personal representatives of the decedents' estates." 2017 WL 4675733. Judge Friedman granted the plaintiffs' motion for substitution of estates on December 13, 2017. On March 27, 2018, Judge Friedman granted the dismissed plaintiffs' motion asking to reinstate their claims. On the same day, the court also granted the prospective plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the Court's prior orders and permitted the prospective plaintiffs to join the case. The plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint on April 10, 2018, to add additional identified individuals as plaintiffs. On July 17, 2018, Judge Friedman granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery after it closed nine years ago. The court ordered that "discovery is reopened for the limited purpose of permitting expert reports and testimony regarding the requirements of the A-76 process and the extent to which the FAA process was consistent with or different from the requirements and practices of other agencies conducting A-76 competitions." On July 27, 2018, the plaintiffs moved to join an additional 114 plaintiffs, but the motion was denied without prejudice on March 21, 2019. That same day, the court granted in part and denied in part the plaintiffs' motion to reinstate all individuals who had expressed their intention to participate as plaintiffs in this case. By December 2020, settlement negotiations were underway. As of April 8, 2021, the case is ongoing: the parties have reached a settlement and expect to file it by April 28.

Summary: This case was brought on March 31, 2005, by current and former employees of the Federal Aviation Administration who were 40 years old or older against the Administrator of the FAA and the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, back pay and benefits, front pay, record correction, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the FAA and DOT discriminated against them by targeting their jobs for outsourcing and terminating their federal employment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. On May 26, 2017, Judge Friedman granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim but denied the motion regarding the plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims. The case is ongoing, with the parties having reached a settlement on April 8, 2021.


On September 25, 2002, female employees of CB Richard Ellis filed a lawsuit against their employer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been discriminated against on the basis of their gender and asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs contended that there was a sexually hostile and offensive work environment, that they were sexually harassed, and that they lost favorable job assignments and other job related benefits. According to the PACER docket, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification on August 31, 2004. On September 9, 2006, they withdrew their motion for class certification, pending a settlement agreement. According to the PACER docket, the court approved a class action settlement agreement on January 9, 2008, according to which, defendant agreed to pay $3.4 million attorneys' fees, $35 million to named plaintiffs as incentive awards, and other monetary awards to be determined on a case-by-case basis. Additionally the settlement defined some equitable relief defendant should provide, such as no retaliation, having a harassment-free workplace policy, etc.

Summary: This case was brought by female employees of Defendant seeking monetary, declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court approved the final settlement in favor of the plaintiffs on January 9, 2008.


This entry describes the consolidated federal class action lawsuits arising out of the Flint water crisis. Background Flint, Michigan historically purchased safe drinking water from Detroit. But in 2014, Flint began to draw water from the Flint River. The Flint River's water was corrosive, but Flint did not properly treat it. The water corroded pipes, causing lead and other toxic substances to leach into Flint's water supply. As a result, many Flint residents were exposed to contaminated water and sustained physical and mental injuries. The Individual Lawsuit At first, this case (Waid) was one of many similar lawsuits filed after the public found out how dangerous Flint's water was. On February 8, 2016, a group of Flint residents filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against the State of Michigan, the City of Flint, and many individual city and state employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq.), and state law. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants switched Flint's water supply to the Flint River knowing that the water was unsafe, violating several laws as well as their substantive due process right to bodily integrity. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. On February 11, the case was reassigned from District Judge Matthew Leitman in Detroit to District Judge John Corbett O'Meara and Magistrate Judge Mona Majzoub in Ann Arbor. Given the magnitude of the Flint Water Crisis, other individuals had filed similar claims in federal court. On April 12, 2016, the plaintiffs in this case and Gilcreast v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newman, P.C. moved to consolidate their cases with Mays v. Snyder. On September 12, 2016, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that substituted a § 1983 procedural due process claim for the original complaint's § 1983 bodily integrity claim and added state-law claims against private engineering firms that helped to design and manage Flint's water supply system. Meanwhile, several of the defendants filed a motion to change venue on October 27, 2016. They argued that local media attention over the Flint water crisis was so overwhelming that it would be nearly impossible to find a fair and impartial jury. They requested a transfer out of state or to the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs responded, and the Court never granted the motion. Soon after, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss some of the claims against five Michigan Department of Environmental Quality employees. Judge O'Meara entered an order dismissing the Safe Drinking Water Act and some state-law claims against these five defendants on November 3, 2016. However, procedural due process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, trespass, gross negligence, and professional negligence claims remained. The defendants filed additional motions to dismiss and persuaded Judge O'Meara to dismiss the case on February 7, 2017. Adopting the reasoning from McMillian v. Snyder, Judge O'Meara found that the plaintiffs' claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were precluded by the Safe Drinking Water Act. The plaintiffs' Safe Drinking Water Act claims, in turn, were barred by the plaintiffs' failure to provide adequate notice. And with no viable federal claims left, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims. Therefore, Judge O'Meara dismissed the case in its entirety. At this point, a dispute broke out between the defendants about whether the case should have been dismissed. It turned out that Veolia North America (one of the private engineering firm defendants) wanted to keep the state tort claims in federal court. Veolia filed a motion on March 7, 2017 to alter or amend the judgment, arguing that the federal court had jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' state law claims under the Class Action Fairness Act. The state disagreed, but Judge O'Meara found that the Act applied and granted Veolia's motion on May 3. Similar disputes about the Safe Drinking Water Act and the Class Action Fairness Act emerged in other Flint water crisis lawsuits. Eventually, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined:

The Safe Drinking Water Act did not preempt § 1983 due process and equal protection claims, Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391 (later consolidated with this case);

The “local controversy” exception to the Class Action Fairness Act applied to a Flint water class action filed in state court and removed, justifying remand, Mason v. Lockwood, Andrews & Newnam, P.C., 842 F.3d 383; and

The “local controversy” exception to the Class Action Fairness Act did not apply to a Flint water class action filed in state court and removed after other class actions related to the Flint water crisis had already been filed against the same defendants, Davenport v. Lockwood, Adam & Newnam, P.C., 854 F.3d 905 (later consolidated with this case).

For reasons that are not clear to the Clearinghouse, Judge O'Meara recused himself on May 12, 2017. The case was assigned to Judge Paul D. Borman, who recused himself two days later. The case was then assigned to Judge Judith E. Levy. Consolidation On June 9, 2017, the plaintiffs in this case filed a joint motion to consolidate the other ten pending class action cases related to the Flint Water Crisis. Judge Levy granted the motion to consolidate the following eight cases on July 27, 2017: Nos. 16-cv-10796, 16-cv-11173, 16-cv-11247, 16-cv-12875, 16-cv-14498, 17-cv-10343, 17-cv-10360, and 17-cv-10799. Judge Levy also consolidated this case with No. 17-cv-10996 on August 14, No. 17-cv-10941 on October 25, No. 15-cv-14002 on April 9, 2018, and No. 16-cv-10323 on April 17, 2018. After consolidation, the plaintiffs filed several amended complaints. They eventually proceeded under the consolidated class action complaint filed on January 25, 2018. The amended complaint added § 1983 bodily integrity claims, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims involving racial and wealth discrimination, a 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) racial animus claim, a Monell claim alleging that Flint's policies and practices led to violations of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and additional state law claims. However, non-class actions were not consolidated. Instead, Judge Levy directed all individual federal plaintiffs to use a standardized complaint—the "Master Short Form Complaint." The Short Form contained checkboxes of all defendants and causes of action that plaintiffs could use to describe their individual claims. Details were spelled out in a Master Long Form Complaint that the Short Form incorporated by reference. Judge Levy's order directing individual plaintiffs to use the Long and Short Forms was filed in this case on January 23, 2018. However, the Long and Short Forms themselves were filed in Walters v. Flint (No. 16-cv-10164), one of the individual federal cases, on December 15 and 22, 2017 respectively. Judge Levy also marshaled additional resources to help resolve the litigation. She appointed former Senator Carl Levin and former Wayne County Chief Judge Pro Tem Pamela Harwood as facilitative mediators on January 9, 2018. And on July 5, she appointed Deborah Greenspan as Special Master to help with discovery and other matters. Mediation continued during the subsequent legal disputes. Legal Questions On August 1, 2018, Judge Levy ruled on the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Levy found:

The plaintiffs failed to state a state-created danger claim because the government's actions did not increase the risk of harm posed to the plaintiffs by any third parties or create a “special danger” to specific individuals;

The individual plaintiffs (but not the business plaintiffs) stated bodily integrity substantive due process claims under Guertin v. Michigan, and the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity;

The plaintiffs failed to state an equal protection claim based on the theory that Flint residents received different water than other Genesee County residents because they did not allege that the defendants controlled both water supplies;

The plaintiffs did not state a § 1985(3) racial animus claim or a related state-law race discrimination claim because the plaintiffs consisted of all water users in Flint rather than those of a particular race;

The plaintiffs adequately pled that policies promulgated by Flint's emergency manager “may fairly be said to represent official policy for Flint,” supporting the plaintiffs' Monell claims;

The plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with adequate specificity;

The plaintiffs' ordinary negligence claims against the private defendants were improper because the private defendants relied on specialized expertise that fit under the professional negligence rubric, and gross negligence was not a separate tort under Michigan law; and

The plaintiffs failed to state a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against the private defendants. 329 F. Supp. 3d 369.

The court's decision was short-lived. Individual defendants who had not been dismissed moved for reconsideration starting on August 15. Others appealed, starting on August 21. And the plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint on October 5. Judge Levy vacated the August 1 decision to allow the plaintiffs to amend on November 9. As a result, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a series of appeals from the August 1 decision on February 19, 2019. 2019 WL 4121023. On April 1, 2019, Judge Levy granted the plaintiffs' request to amend their bodily integrity claim against the former Governor and the factual allegations of the complaint but denied the motion to amend as to all other claims. The April 1 order also addressed the defendants' renewed motions to dismiss. Most of the reasoning tracked the court's August 1 order. Specifically, Judge Levy granted Michigan's motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity. She also dismissed the plaintiffs' state-created danger, equal protection, § 1985(3), fraud, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and gross negligence claims. After this order, the only claims remaining in the suit were bodily integrity against various city and state officials, Monell liability against the City of Flint, and professional negligence against two private defendants (Lockwood and Veolia). 384 F. Supp. 3d 802. In the ensuing weeks, various defendants filed a series of appeals. During the summer and fall of 2019, the parties engaged in discovery and continued to work on a settlement. On January 23, 2020, several of the defendants filed for a protective order, asking that they not be deposed until the Sixth Circuit ruled on whether they were entitled to qualified immunity. In response, Judge Levy stayed discovery related to claims against which they claimed immunity. 2020 WL 1815040 (Apr. 9, 2020). The Sixth Circuit resolved the remaining legal disputes over the summer of 2020. First, the court (Judges Karen Nelson Moore and Gilbert S. Merritt) denied qualified immunity to the city and state officers on the plaintiffs' bodily integrity claim because of factual disputes about what the officers knew at the time. Next, it determined that Flint could not claim Eleventh Amendment immunity because it was not an "arm of the state" notwithstanding control by the state's emergency manager. Finally, the court held that the Governor could be sued for prospective injunctive relief under the Ex parte Young exception to state sovereign immunity. (The court did ask the district court to decide whether to dismiss the former State Treasurer in light of new evidence suggesting that the Treasurer was not in office when key decisions about Flint's water were taken.) Judge Eric E. Murphy concurred in part and dissented in part, arguing that the bodily integrity claims against the former Governor and Treasurer should be dismissed. 960 F.3d 303. On June 2, 2020, the same panel unanimously allowed discovery to proceed against the former Governor and State Treasurer, who had sought protective orders while they continued to litigate their qualified immunity defenses. 960 F.3d 820. Settlement On August 20, 2020, the plaintiffs reached a preliminary settlement with the State defendants. According to a press release from the plaintiffs' attorneys and a news report, Michigan agreed to create a $600 million settlement fund against which Flint residents and businesses could make claims. About 80% of the funds were earmarked for minors, and $12 million would be spent on educational programs for children harmed by lead. The amount of attorneys' fees was not determined, and the private defendants (Lockwood and Veolia) were not parties to the proposed settlement. The court stayed the case as to the State defendants on September 1, 2020, possibly to allow the parties to finalize the settlement agreement. Litigation against the private defendants continued.

Summary: On February 8, 2016, a group of Flint, Michigan residents filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against Michigan’s Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the City of Flint, and several government employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and state law. On July 27, 2017 Judge Levy consolidated this case with other class actions related to the Flint water crisis. Judge Levy later dismissed many of the plaintiffs' claims, but due process claims against various government employees and professional negligence claims against government contractors remained. The plaintiffs and State defendants tentatively agreed to a $600 million settlement in August, 2020.


The Dallas district office of the EEOC brought this suit against Razzoo's, L.P., a bar company, in March 2005 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The EEOC argued that Razzoo's had violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act by engaging in a pattern or practice of discrimination against a named male complainant and a class of similarly situated men. The EEOC claimed that Razzoo’s had subjected males to disparate terms and conditions of employment, termination, and promotion, and had refused to hire male applicants for bartender positions. On September 20, 2007, the Court (Judge Jorge A Solis) limited the class action size to ninety after the EEOC claimed that the class might be anywhere from ninety to one hundred and fifty and the defendant argued that the class should be limited to seventeen. In April 2008 the parties settled the case, and on May 6, 2008, Judge Solis signed a consent decree that required the EEOC to waive any further right to raise claims, and Razzoo’s agreed to neither discriminate nor retaliate against any employee as stated in Title VII. Specifically, Razzoo’s was required to: refrain from creating a hostile environment for male employees, abandon a 80/20 quota hiring system that favored women, train all employees in gender-neutral hiring and promotion practices, refrain from retaliation against any employee who makes a complaint to the EEOC, affirm a “Zero Tolerance Policy” regarding discrimination and retaliation, and spend no less than $225,000.00 to retain the services of a human resources firm to establish a Human Resources Department within Razzoo’s. Additionally, Razzoo’s was required to establish a $775,000.00 Claim Fund to resolve all claims for damages resulting from the case. The consent decree was in effect for thirty months and it was not be construed as an admission of wrongdoing by Razzoo’s. 2005 WL 6188542. The case is now closed.

Summary: Dallas district office of the EEOC brought suit against a bar company in March 2005 in the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The suit claimed that the bar company had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination against a named male complainant and a class of similarly situated men by subjecting males to disparate terms and conditions of employment, termination, and promotion, and by refusing to hire male applicants for bartender positions. The parties settled and the defendant was required to pay $1,000,000.00 to acquire the services of a human resources company to pay for any damages as a result of this case.


On September 10, 2013, organizations, associations, and advocacy groups, their staffs, and their members who subscribed to major American telecommunication companies filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the National Security Agency ("NSA"), the Department of Justice, and the United States of America. The plaintiffs, represented by the Electronic Frontier Foundation and private counsel, sought an injunction permanently enjoining the United States' mass call-tracking program and requiring the government to purge from its possession all of the plaintiffs' call records already collected. The plaintiffs claimed that the NSA's ongoing tracking of their phone call exceeded statutory authority under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") and violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the NSA's surveillance invaded the plaintiffs' privacy, threatened to dissuade potential clients and others from contacting them, and compromised their ability to serve their clients' interests and their institutional missions. On July 24, 2013, Judge White granted the plaintiffs' motion to relate this case with Jewel v. NSA, NS-CA-0002, in this Clearinghouse. Jewel v. NSA addresses the federal government's mass call-tracking program, but on behalf of individual AT&T customers in a class action, instead of on behalf of various organizations as this lawsuit does. Notably, unlike Jewel, this lawsuit is not a class action and addresses the NSA's relationship with all major American telecommunication providers. The defendants were served with the summons and complaint on September 23, 2013. On November 6, plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment, arguing that the bulk phone records collection is not authorized under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act (codified as Section 1861 of FISA), and is unconstitutional under the First Amendment. They filed numerous declarations in support which highlight the alleged chilling effect of the NSA surveillance. On March 10, 2014, Judge White entered a temporary restraining order requiring the preservation of relevant evidence pending the parties' further briefing and the Court's final determination of the preservation issues. In its restraining order, the Court required that the government refrain from "destroying any potential evidence relevant to the claims at issue in this action, including but not limited to prohibiting the destruction of any telephone metadata or 'call detail' records, pending further order of the Court." This order applied to this case, as well as Jewel v. NSA and Shubert v. Obama, NS-CA-0006, in this Clearinghouse. This temporary restraining order directly conflicted with an order to destroy all metadata within five years of collection issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted], BR 14-01, NS-DC-0051, in this Clearinghouse. As a result, the FISC granted temporary relief from the five-year destruction requirement but required that telephony metadata being preserved beyond the five-year limitation not be used by the NSA for any purpose. On October 31, 2014, the plaintiffs moved for a hearing on the partial summary judgment motion and motion to dismiss. The defendants requested this be denied because the plaintiffs' claim that the Section 215 telephony metadata program violated the Fourth Amendment was before the Ninth Circuit. On December 9, 2014, the Court denied the motion for hearing. The plaintiffs moved for a hearing again on May 22, 2015, which was denied on June 1, 2015 for the same reason. On September 11, 2015, the plaintiffs moved for judicial notice of a fact within a government filing in a FISC proceeding that stated, "AT&T, Verizon, Verizon Wireless, and Sprint have participated in the NSA's phone records program." The defendants requested this motion be denied as the fact was still disputed. On July 19, 2017, due to changes in the Upstream Internet Acquisition technique utilized by the NSA, the Court ordered the defendants comply with the new standards and destroy data that was previously held under the restraining order with the exception of forms of online communication that included any identifier of a plaintiff. On June 3, 2019, Judge White ordered the parties to provide their positions on how the case should proceed, given that the District Court had issued judgment in favor of the National Security Agency in Jewel v. NSA and that decision went up to the Ninth Circuit on appeal (docket 19-16066). The parties in this case filed a joint motion stating that they wished to stay the case until the Jewel appeal is resolved. They submitted a stipulation with a proposed order for a stay on September 20, and Judge White granted the stay on September 25. The Ninth Circuit has not ruled on Jewel as of June 19, 2020, and this case is ongoing.

Summary: On September 10, 2013, twenty-two organizations filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against the National Security Agency ("NSA"), the Department of Justice, and the United States of America, claiming that the government's mass call-tracking program exceeds statutory authority and violates the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The case is pending, though it is stayed pending the outcome of a related case before the Ninth Circuit.


In September 2006, the Denver District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit against Outback Steakhouse of Florida, OS Restaurant Partners, and OS Restaurant Services (the latter two doing business as Outback Steakhouse) in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado alleging discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Individual complaining parties intervened in the lawsuit in November 2006, November 2007, and September 2007. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had discriminated against women employees by failing to hire or promote women to management positions and for failing to offer equal conditions of employment, especially as related to training and opportunities for advancement. The parties engaged in discovery between 2006 and 2008. On December 29, 2009, Judge Christine M. Arguello approved of a consent decree granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff. In addition to prohibiting retaliatory treatment towards any employees involved in this lawsuit, the Consent Decree also prohibits Outback from "discriminating against any employee or applicant on the basis of gender, in hiring, promotions, pay, terms and conditions of employment including providing women less favorable job assignments, less training opportunities, less opportunity for advancement, or creating or condoning a gender-based hostile work environment." The same "training and conditions of employment" should be available to all employees, and "scheduling and assignment of work shall be made in an equal and nondiscriminatory manner." The consent decree was scheduled to last four years. As there is no additional noteworthy activity reflected in the docket sheet, presumably the case closed in 2013.

Summary: This case was brought by the EEOC against Outback Steakhouse of Florida, Inc, OS Restaurant Partners, Inc., and OS Restaurant Services, Inc., seeking injunctive relief for Outback Steakhouse's discriminatory hiring and employment practices against women. The case was settled on December 29, 2009 through the issuing of a consent decree, resulting in relief granted.


A class of children in foster care custody in Michigan, represented by Children's Rights, filed this class action suit against the state of Michigan and the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) in U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan on August 8, 2006. They alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution's First, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments; federal law including the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 670 et seq.; and state law. The complaint alleged maltreatment and neglect of foster children in state custody, a lack of basic physical and mental health services for foster children, excessive lengths of stay in state custody, and frequent moves among multiple foster placements. The plaintiffs attributed these violations to a severe shortage of foster homes, high casework caseload, poor monitoring and planning of child services, and inadequate funding resources. In November 2006, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, but the court denied the motion on April 11, 2007. Meanwhile, in February 2007, Judge Nancy G. Edmunds had certified the class of plaintiffs as children who are now or will be in the foster care custody of Michigan's DHS in in-home or out-of-home placements. The parties entered discovery, and in August 2007, the court appointed the Children's Research Center, a division of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, as an independent expert to report on the Michigan foster care system's case practice and compliance with standards. After several months of vigorously contested discovery, the defendants again moved for partial dismissal, but subsequently withdrew the motions. The parties had attempted settlement negotiations between September 2006 and March 2007, prior to discovery. After extensive discovery, the parties engaged in a second round of settlement negotiations in early 2008. When the parties could not reach an agreement, the court finally set a trial date of July 7, 2008. The parties proposed a joint settlement agreement on July 3, 2008. The settlement agreement established standards and outcome measures that the defendants must meet over a five-year implementation period under the supervision of an independent monitor who would review and report on the defendants' compliance with the settlement agreement. On October 24, 2008, the court approved the settlement agreement. The Settlement Agreement provided for increased services for children in foster care; organizational changes in DHS; and increased training and supervision for caseworkers. The independent monitor provided reports on the state's compliance before the court every three months. After election of a new Michigan governor in January 2011, who appointed new DHS management, the parties entered into discussions to update the original settlement agreement. On July 18, 2011, the court approved a modified settlement agreement (MSA). Monitoring has continued since the MSA was entered. On December 2, 2014, the defendants moved to dissolve or modify the MSA. The defendants argued that, under Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 443 (2009), the consent decree should be vacated because plaintiffs could not prove that defendants were currently violating federal law in their administration of Michigan’s child welfare system. Nearly one month later, however, defendants withdrew their motion. Monitoring continued through 2015. On Feb. 2, 2016, the court approved a joint implementation, sustainability, and exit plan. The plan superseded the MSA and was to terminate upon the completion of specified goals. The new agreement established dozens of commitments DHHS was to achieve and 14 commitments DHHS had already achieved satisfactorily and must be maintained. As of March 16, 2018, monitoring is ongoing.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a class of children in the foster care custody of the Michigan Department of Human Services (DHS) in in-home or out-of-home placements, filed suit against the state in federal court in August 2006. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2008 which provided for increased services for children in foster care; organizational changes in DHS; and increased training and supervision for caseworkers. An independent monitor continues to review the state's compliance with the agreement.


On June 21, 2016, plaintiffs, six indigent adults incarcerated in Utah jails and detention centers, brought this class action lawsuit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah. The plaintiffs sued the State of Utah and the Attorney General of Utah under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Utah state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel and the ACLU of Utah, sought injunctive and monetary relief claiming violations of their Sixth Amendment rights, including plaintiffs’ right to effective assistance of counsel, and their Fourteenth Amendment rights, including right to due process. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to provide constitutionally adequate legal representation to indigent adults accused of crimes punishable by incarceration in Utah’s District and Justice courts. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants’ failure to provide adequate legal representation was due to the state statutorily delegating the duty to provide indigent criminal defense to the individual counties and municipalities of the state, and then failing to provide funding, logical support, or oversight to the counties or municipalities. In support of their claim of failure to provide funding, plaintiffs alleged that Utah provided no financial support to any county or municipality in the state. Additionally, plaintiffs supported their claim with investigations and assessments conducted by the ACLU of Utah, the Sixth Amendment Center, and the Utah Judicial Council. On July 1, 2016, plaintiffs amended the complaint to emphasize alleged harm on individually named plaintiffs. The case was moved from the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County to the United States District Court for the District of Utah on July 13, 2016. On July 20, 2016, defendants filed motion to consolidate case with <i> Cox v. Utah </i>, a similar case in which the plaintiffs, indigent individuals in Utah charged within Washington County of Utah, alleged deficiencies in Utah’s indigent defense program. Then, on July 26, 2016, plaintiffs sought certification of a class comprised of all indigent adults charged or to be charged with one or more crimes in a District or Justice Court within the State of Utah. On August 5, 2016, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and for lack of jurisdiction. From August 8, 2016 through January 4, 2017, motions were stayed in consideration of the defendants’ motion to consolidate cases, but this motion was rendered moot after <i> Cox v. Utah </i> was dismissed. District Judge David Nuffer then granted a partial lift of stay to rule on the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but the stay remained in effect for all other matters, including the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. On March 23, 2018, Judge Nuffer granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish their standing to sue or to state a claim. Specifically, he found that that there were insufficient allegations of an actual or complete denial of appointed counsel, insufficient allegations that the plaintiffs’ public defenders had entirely failed to subject the prosecution’s cases to meaningful adversarial testing, and insufficient allegations that the plaintiffs’ public defenders had been called upon to render assistance under circumstances where competent counsel very likely could not. Furthermore, Judge Nuffer found that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently demonstrate a causal connection between their alleged injury and defendants’ conduct. Lastly, he found that the declaratory relief sought by the plaintiffs in their amended complaint, a judgment that the defendants were not complying with US and Utah Constitutions, did not meet the standard of redressability. 2018 WL 1472484. The case is now closed.

Summary: A class-action lawsuit was brought against the State of Utah and the Attorney General of Utah under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants failed to provide constitutionally adequate legal representation to indigent adults accused of crimes in Utah’s District and Justice courts for which there is a possibility of incarceration. In March 2018, District Judge Neffer granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to allege sufficient facts to establish their standing to sue or to state a claim. The case is now closed.