This is the first U.S. District Court to rule on the National Security Agency's ("NSA") so-called "Bulk Telephony Metadata Program" under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), commonly referred to as Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Under the program, the NSA has apparently collected records from large telecommunication companies about virtually all domestic telephone calls. These records, termed "telephony metadata," include the phone numbers placed and received; the date, time and duration of calls; some location identifiers; and calling card numbers. The records, however, allegedly do not include the parties' names, addresses or financial information or the call's content. On June 5, 2013, London's Guardian newspaper reported about the NSA's surveillance efforts based on a classified document leaked by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden. Following the leak, the U.S. government admitted that it has for a number of years collected, compiled, and analyzed telephony metadata, as business records, from certain telecommunication companies. The following day, on June 6, 2013, individual subscribers of Verizon Wireless, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the NSA, claiming that the NSA's program exceeded statutory authority under FISA and violated the First and Fourth Amendments. The plaintiffs, among other things, sought an injunction to stop the collection of their individual phone records and also an order requiring the disposal of any records previously collected about them. On December 16, 2013, U.S. District Judge Richard Leon granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. 957 F. Supp. 2d 43. While Judge Leon found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to proceed with their allegations that the NSA exceeded its authority under FISA, he said that this finding did not preclude consideration of the plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Therefore, he analyzed whether the NSA violated the plaintiffs' "reasonable expectation of privacy," protected by the Fourth Amendment, when it collected and queried their telephone metadata records, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. Judge Leon held that the NSA's Bulk Telephony Metadata Program likely violates the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, as an "indiscriminate and arbitrary" invasion of citizens' reasonable expectation of privacy. Judge Leon was troubled by a number of issues in the case, including the close and apparently unsupervised relationship between the NSA and telephone companies, as well as the apparent ineffectiveness of the program. The court ruled that the Supreme Court precedent Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which established that phone metadata is not subject to the Fourth Amendment, was distinguishable. For Judge Leon, the 34-year-old precedent was distinguishable, given modern surveillance capabilities, the evolving role of phones and technologies in the digital age, namely cell phones, and the telecommunication companies' daily dump of bulk metadata records to government. Although Judge Leon ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, he stayed his order to allow the government time to appeal, in light of the significant national security interests at stake and the novelty of the constitutional issues. The federal government appealed the district court's decision to the District of Columbia U.S. Court of Appeals on January 9, 2014. Under a "sunset" clause, the relevant section of the U.S. Code amended by Section 215 was scheduled to revert to its pre-2001 form on June 1, 2015 unless Congress acted. See Pub.L. No. 109-177, § 102(b)(1), 120 Stat. 192, 194-95 (2006); Pub. L. No. 112-14, § 2(a), 125 Stat. 216, 216 (2011). That date came and went without any legislative action. One day after the deadline, however, Congress enacted the USA Freedom Act, which revived the language added by Section 215 with some substantial changes, eliminating the government's holding of the bulk telephony metadata and presumably mooting (or substantially altering) this case. See Pub. L. No. 114-23, Tit. I, 129 Stat. 268, 269-77 (2015), codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861. The Act's changes do not take effect until 180 days after the date of enactment--November 29, 2015. Id. § 109(a), 129 Stat. at 276. On August 28, 2015, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. There was no opinion for the court. The judgment was announced in a per curiam order, which explained why the case was not moot notwithstanding the significant statutory alterations ordered in June 2015--which had not yet taken effect. Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote an opinion setting out her view that the plaintiffs had "barely" fulfilled the requirements for standing--and might be able to bolster that showing on remand. She did not agree with the district court, however, that a preliminary injunction was appropriate because the plaintiffs had not established a sufficient likelihood of prevailing in the case as a whole. Judge Stephen Williams emphasized that the government had acknowledged bulk collection from Verizon Business Network Services, whereas the plaintiffs were subscribers to Verizon Wireless. Accordingly, they lack direct evidence that information about their calls was ever collected--and therefore lacked standing. Judge David Sentelle dissented; he explained that would have dismissed the case outright. The case accordingly continues in district court. Judge Leon explained that he interpreted the remand as asking him to determine whether limited discovery is appropriate to satisfy the standing requirements set forth in Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S.Ct. 1138 (2013). On remand, on September 8, 2015, plaintiffs sought leave to file a Fourth Amended Complaint, adding additional plaintiffs who were subscribers to Verizon Business Network Services, not just Verizon Wireless. At a hearing on September 16, 2015, Judge Leon granted the motion (which was uncontested). A few days later, plaintiffs filed a renewed motion for preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin the bulk telephony metadata program, which had not yet expired. A hearing was held on October 8, 2015. On November 9, 2015, Judge Leon decided that the new plaintiffs in the case had made a sufficient showing of standing, and were entitled to a preliminary injunction. The court granted an injunction against continued collection and querying of the telephone record metadata for the new plaintiffs, only. Even though the telephony metadata program was scheduled to expire and be replaced by a significantly different program later that month, the court declined to stay its order. The government immediately sought a stay from the Court of Appeals, which in a per curiam order (Tatel, Griffith, Millett) granted a limited stay on November 10, 2015, "to consider the merits of the motion for a stay." The court required briefing on the stay motion to be completed by November 16, 2015. That day, the panel granted a stay; the D.C. Circuit denied rehearing on banc on November 20, 2015, with a concurrence by Judge Brett Kavanaugh staying his view that the metadata program was consistent with the Fourth Amendment. On February 11, 2016, the plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint in which they reasserted their constitutional claims under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments. The defendants responded on February 19, with a motion to quash service on the Director of the NSA and a motion to dismiss the individual federal defendants who were being sued while serving in their official capacities. On May 30, Judge Leon filed an order to stay the case pending final disposition of the defendants’ appeal of the District Court’s preliminary injunction. Less than a week later, the plaintiffs filed a motion to lift the stay. The stay was lifted on September 20, 2016. On that day, Judge Leon granted the defendants’ motion to quash and motion to dismiss the individual federal defendants; the complaint is now dismissed as to those parties. On November 17, 2016, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. One year later, on November 21, 2017, Judge Leon granted the defendants' dismissal. He combined this case with a similar case also filed by the plaintiffs in the district of DC (1:13-cv-00851). He granted the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed both cases with prejudice, explaining that plaintiffs' requests for declaratory and prospective injunctive relief are mooted by the USA FREEDOM Act, which prohibits bulk collection of metadata. The plaintiffs therefore no longer have a live Article III case of controversy. On December 21, 2017, plaintiffs appealed Judge Leon's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (Docket #17-5282). On January 7, 2019, the Appeals Court (Circuit Judges Rogers, Srinivasan, and Pillard) concluded in a per curiam order, on its own motion, that oral argument would not be necessary and that it would dispose of the appeal on the basis of the record and the presentations in the briefs. On February 5, 2019, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they only generally alleged that “they communicate with various individuals in countries [plaintiffs] imagine might attract government surveillance.” The case is now closed. On March 2, 2019, Luke Murry, National Security Advisor to Republican House Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy, discussed the status of the USA FREEDOM Act during a podcast for the national security website Lawfare. Mr. Murry disclosed that the Trump administration “hasn’t actually been using it for the past six months,” and that the administration might not ask Congress to renew its legal authority, which is set to expire on December 15, 2019.

Summary: This is the first U.S. District Court to rule on the National Security Agency's ("NSA") so-called "Bulk Telephony Metadata Program" under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 ("FISA"), commonly referred to as Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. On December 16, 2013, U.S. District Judge Richard Leon granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that program likely violates the Fourth Amendment as an unconstitutional search. The injunction was reversed by the D.C. Circuit in August 2015; on remand, some individual plaintiffs succeeded in re-establishing their right to an injunction. On November 21, 2017 Judge Leon dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the wake of Congress passing the USA FREEDOM ACT. On December 21, 2017, plaintiffs appealed Judge Leon's decision to the D.C. Circuit. On February 5, 2019, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they only generally alleged that “they communicate with various individuals in countries [plaintiffs] imagine might attract government surveillance.” The case is now closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This is a class action brought on behalf of all prisoners of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief that would require MDOC to adhere to CDC COVID-19 guidelines. However, after the Sixth Circuit vacated a similar injunction in another case, the plaintiffs agreed to dismiss this case.
 On April 29, 2020, prisoners of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) brought this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. Represented by the Michigan State Law School Civil Rights Clinic and private counsel, the plaintiffs sued MDOC and the wardens of several MDOC facilities. Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs alleged violations of their Eighth Amendment rights. Specifically, they claimed that MDOC's inadequate response to the COVID-19 pandemic constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The case was assigned to Judge Mark A. Goldsmith and Magistrate Judge R. Steven Whalen. The next day, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order requiring the defendants to take additional precautions against COVID-19, including: social distancing, personal protective equipment, soap and sanitizer, quarantine and isolation for those with symptoms, adequate health care, and testing. The plaintiffs also filed a motion to certify a class that would include "all inmates who currently are, or who in the future will be, incarcerated in the MDOC's custody, at its different prisons, and who are subjected to MDOC's policies and practices regarding COVID-19." This class represented over 37,000 individuals. On May 4, the plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction as well as a temporary restraining order, seeking the same relief as they did in the initial motion. The defendants filed a response on May 12. After the Sixth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Williams, found here in the Clearinghouse, the parties entered into an agreement. In Williams, the Court of Appeals held that federal prison officials had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 and, therefore, the Eighth Amendment rights of the prisoners in that case had not been violated. In light of this decision, the plaintiffs here agreed to withdraw their motion for a temporary restraining order and motion to certify the class, and the case was stayed pending any outcome of an appeal in Wilson. The plaintiffs also agreed to dismiss the case if the Wilson decision was not appealed, reversed, or modified. The Wilson decision stood. So, on October 20, 2020, the court entered a stipulated order dismissing this case, which is now closed.

Summary: This is a class action filed in the Eastern District of Michigan, seeking improved conditions for all prisoners of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) to guard against COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought preliminary relief, including protective equipment, soap and sanitizer, social distancing, adequate health care, testing, and quarantine for all members of the class. After a Sixth Circuit decision vacating a similar injunction in <i>Wilson v. Williams </i>, the parties agreed to stay this case and dismiss it if the <i>Wilson</i> decision was not modified. It was not, and the court entered a stipulated order dismissing this case.


The Philadelphia District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought this lawsuit against Spitzer Management, Inc., an auto dealership, in September 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. The case was assigned to Judge Ann Aldrich. The complaint alleged that Spitzer management had created a hostile work environment for employees by harassing a Nigerian complainant, a Korean complainant, and other employees based on their national origin in violation of Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e). The complaint also alleged that Spitzer constructively discharged the Korean employee on the basis of his ethnicity. The EEOC sought injunctive and monetary relief for the complainants. On June 26, 2008, the EEOC filed another lawsuit against the defendant alleging racial discrimination and retaliation on behalf of a different employee. On September 19, 2008, the parties filed a joint motion with the court asking that the two cases be consolidated for the purpose of discovery and trial. On February 24, 2009, two of the complaining employees filed motions to intervene. Since neither the plaintiff nor the defendant opposed the motion to intervene, the court granted the motion. The two intervenors filed an amended complaint on April 12, 2010. This complaint alleged that the defendants discriminated on the basis of race and national origin and retaliated against the intervenor plaintiffs. These plaintiffs, represented by their own private counsel, sought injunctive, monetary, and declaratory relief, claiming violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Revised Code § 4112 as well as abuse of process. The plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim alleged that the defendants brought lawsuits against these plaintiffs to dissuade them from engaging in protected activity such as opposing illegal discrimination and retaliation. On May 6, 2010, Judge John R. Adams replaced Judge Aldrich on the case. And then, on October 20, 2010, the court ordered that this lawsuit be consolidated with three other cases, all of which were brought by the EEOC alleging that the defendant's Motor City dealership had engaged in discrimination in violation of Title VII. This case, however, served as the leading case. On September 7, 2010, the defendant filed separate motions for summary judgment on each claim before the court. Judge Adams granted in part and denied in part the motion. 866 F. Supp. 2d 851. Specifically, he found that there was no evidence: of pervasive harassment against the Yemeni employee; that the Yemeni employee was constructively discharged; that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the Nigerian employee's filing an EEOC charge and his suspension; and that there was no evidence suggesting that the president of the defendant company was involved in any of the plaintiffs' discipline. However, Judge Adams did find that there was sufficient evidence to proceed to trial regarding the severity and pervasiveness of the defendant's conduct toward the Korean employee; the Korean employee's alleged constructive discharge; the employer's alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in preventing the harassment of the Korean employee; and the abuse of process claim. On January 14, 2013, a jury trial began. During the course of the trial, the plaintiff objected to certain documents presented by the defendants. On January 22, the plaintiff moved for a mistrial and a default judgment against the defendants, alleging the defendants had engaged in 'gamesmanship' through the "last-minute production and misrepresentation regarding the investigatory notes" that had been central to the case. On January 23, the court declared a mistrial. On May 22, 2013, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for default judgment, however, the court awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs as sanctions against the defendants. 2013 WL 2250757. The court arrived at this sanction after coming to three conclusions. First, the defendants’ failure to produce the original documents to the plaintiffs during discovery was not an act of negligence. It was intentional. The court arrived at this conclusion when it observed that in less than 24 hours, only after the court demanded the documents, the defendants were able to locate and produce the documents. These documents were documents that the plaintiff requested during discovery. The defendants gave no reasons for withholding the documents. Second, the defendants’ misconduct deprived the plaintiffs of meaningful discovery, which prevent the plaintiffs from being able to meaningfully prepare for trial. The withheld documents were files that the defendants had on their employees. More specifically, these documents contained information on employee evaluations, hiring and firing information. The court deemed these documents as relevant for discovery and the trial. And finally, the court declared that the sanction of attorney fees and costs was more appropriate than granting a default judgment. The court reasoned that a default judgment would have constituted a windfall in favor of the plaintiffs. In other words, the judgment would benefit the plaintiffs more than they deserved. To the court, the evidence that the court observed was not strong enough to grant the plaintiffs a default judgment. The court ordered the following attorney fees and costs for the defendant to pay: $49,000 to the EEOC, $148,920 to one plaintiff, and $115,395 to another (this amount was later adjusted to $130,415). The parties then began preparing for retrial, with a special master overseeing discovery. Before the second attempt at a trial, the parties reached a settlement. On September 12, 2013, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree was set to last for five years and the court retained jurisdiction to enforce it. The consent decree had the following terms: 1) the defendants were prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination and retaliation; 2) the defendants had to pay $50,000 to each plaintiff and intervenor; 3) the defendants had to develop anti-discrimination policies, anti-harassment policies, and complaint procedures; 4) the defendants had to provide management accountability concerning discrimination and retaliation; 5) the defendants were required to offer anti-discrimination training; 6) the defendants had to report to the EEOC on any employment discrimination and/or retaliation complaints filed to the defendants; and 7) the defendants had to post a notice of the decree in all their employment establishments and ensure it was visible to all its employees. There was no further litigation during the span of the consent decree, so the case is presumably closed.

Summary: In 2006, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. Two individuals joined the EEOC as plaintiffs when they intervened in 2010. The complaint alleged that Spitzer Management, Inc, the defendant, had created a hostile work environment for employees by harassing a Nigerian complainant, a Korean complainant, and others based on their national origins. The complaint further alleged that Spitzer constructively discharged a Korean employee on the basis of his national origin. This conduct, alleged the complaint, violated Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Ohio Revised Code § 4112. In 2013, trial began. The trial ended in the court declaring a mistrial, for the court discovered that the defendant withheld valuable documents during discovery. The court awarded attorney fees and costs to the plaintiffs in the amount of $328,335. Later that year, the court approved the parties’ consent decree. This decree awarded the plaintiff monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief. There has been no further litigation, and the case is now closed.


Prison Legal News produces a monthly publications and books that are mailed to subscribers within the Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC). On November 6, 2015, Prison Legal News filed this § 1983 lawsuit in the U.S. District Court of Arizona against the ADOC alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that ADOC's refusal to deliver issues of the monthly publication to inmates when the publication contained articles with "non-selacious descriptions of sexual activity" was censorship in violation of the First Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that they were not given constitutionally adequate notice under the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. After the filing of the complaint, the parties engaged in extensive discovery. On December 22, 2016, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings. They argued that, because the law regarding the submission of sexually explicit materials to inmates was unclear, the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Additionally, the defendants argued that the plaintiff’s due process claim should be dismissed because the plaintiffs were provided with notice and opportunity to respond to the decision that their publication would be excluded. The defendants stated that the plaintiffs were successful in reversing three of the four decisions and, in the fourth decision, the article was published with a two paragraph redaction. Additionally, the defendants noted that, shortly after the plaintiff’s complaint was filed, the defendants “voluntarily adopted and implemented an administrative regulation requiring that publishers be given notice if their publications are excluded.” Finally, with respect to the First Amendment claim, the defendants stated that the plaintiff challenged the defendants’ old publication policy, and not the recently adopted one. On September 30, 2017, the court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claim as moot. However, the court gave the plaintiffs leave to amend the First Amendment claim to conform with the evidence presented up to this point. On October 13, 2017, the plaintiffs submitted a second amended complaint. In the second amended complaint, plaintiffs added two additional prison staff defendants. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had also been censoring one of the books they sought to deliver to subscribers. The plaintiffs alleged that the refusal to deliver the book was also a violation of due process. On May 14, 2018, both parties moved for summary judgment. On March 8, 2019, the court granted in part and denied in part the motions for summary judgment. 2019 WL 1099882. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the due process claim because the plaintiffs were not given adequate notice or an opportunity to respond to the exclusion of their publications, even under the new policy. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff's due process claim against two of the defendants who had been personally involved with the exclusion in their individual capacity. However, the court dismissed the due process claims against the other defendants in their individual capacities. On the First Amendment claim, the court held that the defendants’ policy was unconstitutional on its face because it was overbroad and not rationally related to its interest in rehabilitation. The court also held that the policy was unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff’s materials because the excluded text was not related to the defendants’ interests and was “educational and informative in nature.” Each party was directed to file proposed language on the final injunctive relief for the claims on which the plaintiff prevailed. The court did not make a ruling on the as-applied challenge to the book, as neither party briefed the constitutionality of the policy as applied to the book. The parties continued with discovery for a trial set for October, 2019. On September 13, 2019, Prison Legal News filed a notice of partial settlement and release. The court approved the settlement on October 2, 2019 in an order that also dismissed with prejudice the claims against several defendants in their individual capacities and the First Amendment claims for injunctive relief. The court retained jurisdiction over the settlement. In execution of the settlement, the court ordered the defendants to make policy amendments on November 6, 2019. The court entered injunctive relief that required ADC to revise its policy “to establish bright-line rules that narrowly define prohibited conduct in a manner consistent with the First Amendment; limit the discretion available to ADC’s employees and agents; and ensure consistency in the exclusion of sexually explicit material." It also ordered ADC to require all its mailroom personnel to receive an email with the court’s order and inform them of best practices for compliance, as well as require them to sign an acknowledgement that they received and understood the order. Several of the defendants appealed the November 6 order as well as the March 8 denial of their motion for summary judgment. They also filed a motion to stay proceedings regarding attorneys' fees and costs pending the outcome of their appeal. The court granted the stay on December 19, 2019. As of this writing on April 11, 2020, litigation is stayed pending the appellate outcome and the settlement remains in force. This case is ongoing.

Summary: Prison Legal News filed this lawsuit against Arizona Department of Corrections alleging that ADOC officials refused to deliver to subscribers issues that contained articles about sexual assault in prison. The district court granted summary judgment in part for the plaintiff, but one of its First Amendment claims remained ongoing. The parties settled these claims on October 2, 2019, but several of the defendants appealed both the summary judgment decision and implementation to the Ninth Circuit. That appeal is pending and the case is ongoing.


On January 15, 2015, the Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center (CREEC), along with three individual plaintiffs, brought this action against Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT), Inc., which operates 35 hotels in the state of California, as well as many hotels elsewhere in the United States. Plaintiffs alleged that HPT violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and California's Unruh Civil Rights Act by failing to provide wheelchair accessible vehicles at its hotels. Plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction requiring HPT to comply with the two aforementioned statutes. The case was assigned to Judge Jon S. Tigar. The three individual plaintiffs all require wheelchairs for mobility. Each claimed in the complaint that he or she was deterred from staying at HPT's hotels around California by HPT's lack of wheel-chair accessible shuttle services. All three plaintiffs stated that they hoped to stay at HPT's hotels in the future and would do so if they learn that HPT does provide wheelchair-accessible vehicles. On November 12, 2015, the plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification, in which they defined the class as “Individuals who use wheelchairs or scooters for mobility who, since January 15, 2013, have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of transportation services offered to guests at hotels owned and/or operated by Hospitality Properties Trust because of the lack of equivalent accessible transportation services at those hotels.” On January 13, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing. On April 15, 2016, Judge Tigar denied plaintiffs' motion for class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet commonality, typicality and FRCP §23(b)(2) requirement. 317 F.R.D. 91. On May 6, 2016, the plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, and the parties agreed to stay the case until the Ninth Circuit's decision. The Ninth Circuit granted the plaintiffs' petition to hear the appeal on July 27, 2016. On April 11, 2017, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's decision to deny class certification. 867 F.3d 1093. Back in district court, the parties prepared for the discovery and dispositions. On September 4, 2018, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that there was no dispute of facts and the only issue here was whether the defendant qualified as “a private entity which operates” a fixed route or demand responsive system under ADA. On February 26, 2019, Judge Tigar denied this motion, finding that any private entity that provides a transportation service itself or by a person under a contractual or other arrangement or relationship with the entity was qualified and the defendant could be such an entity. 2019 WL 935134. The plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on May 14, 2019. In June 2019, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Susan van Kuelen for mandatory settlement negotiations. By January 2020, the parties reached a settlement. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the settlement, but according to CREEC, HPT agreed to provide transportation at the covered hotels that complied with the ADA. The court dismissed the case with prejudice on January 31, 2020. The Clearinghouse does not know how long the settlement agreement will remain in effect.

Summary: The CREEC and three plaintiffs who require wheelchairs for mobility brought this class action suit for declaratory and injunctive relief against Hospitality Properties Trust (HPT). Plaintiffs asked that the court declare HPT's practices of not providing wheelchair-accessible vehicles to guests with disabilities to be in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and Unruh Civil Rights Act. Further, plaintiffs requested an injunction compelling HPT to comply with the ADA and Unruh Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff sought for a class certification; however, it was denied for lack of commonality and typicality. The defendant sought summary judgment, claiming it was not a responsible entity under ADA, but the court denied the motion. The parties reached a settlement in January 2020. The Clearinghouse does not have access to the settlement, but according to CREEC, HPT agreed to provide transportation at the covered hotels that complied with the ADA.


COVID-19 Summary: This is an action brought by the Maryville Baptist Church against the enforcement of various COVID-19 related gathering orders issued by the Governor of Kentucky, which kept them from holding in-person and drive-in services. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction that would keep the defendant from enforcing gathering orders. On May 2, the Sixth Circuit granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction but declined to enjoin the prohibition of in-person gatherings. On May 8, the District Court granted the motion for injunction, enjoining the prohibition of in-person services as long as the plaintiffs adhered to social-distancing guidelines. The defendants moved to dismiss. The case is ongoing.
 On April 17, 2020, Maryville Baptist Church and its pastor filed an action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kentucky. Represented by Liberty Counsel, the plaintiffs sued the Governor of Kentucky under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), 42 U.S.C. §2000cc, et seq, the Kentucky constitution, and state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the enforcement of various COVID-19 related gathering orders issued by the governor -- which were enforced through the dispatch of the Kentucky State police and posted notices of criminal violations and quarantine requirements on all vehicles during the Easter Sunday worship service -- violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Article IV of the Constitution, RLUIPA, and state law. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from enforcing the gathering orders, to allow for drive-in and in-person church services insofar as the social distancing requirements were met, and a termination of the notices filed by the Kentucky State Police. The case was assigned to Judge David J. Hale, then referred to Judge Regina S. Edwards. Additionally on April 17, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction. Judge Hale denied the TRO the following day, stating that the plaintiffs had not proved they were likely to succeed on the merits, as the gathering orders applied not only to religious conduct and faith-based gathering, but applied broadly to all gatherings and congregative activity. 2020 WL 1909616. The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit on April 24 and filed an emergency motion to enter an injunction of the gathering orders, pending appeal. On May 2, the Sixth Circuit granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction pending the appeal, enjoining the defendant from enforcing the gathering orders against drive-in services at the Maryville Baptist Church, as long as the plaintiffs adhered to the public health requirements mandated for "life-sustaining" entities. The court declined to grant the plaintiffs' request for an injunction as to in-person services. The court noted that the plaintiffs' claims would be moot after May 20, the date had agreed to permit places of worship to reopen. 957 F.3d 610. On May 4, the plaintiffs renewed their motion for a preliminary injunction pending appeal, which was granted on May 8. In his order, Judge Hale noted that the defendants were enjoined from enforcing the ban on mass gatherings to in-person services at the church as long as plaintiffs adhered to public health requirements set by state officials. 2020 WL 2393359. Also on May 8, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. They claimed that the Eleventh Amendment barred suits against state officials due to sovereign immunity and that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the RLUIPA because the gathering orders regulated conduct, not land use. The defendants amended their motion to dismiss on May 12, noting that other district courts had similarly denied the relief plaintiffs were requesting. The same day, the Sixth Circuit consolidated a case, Theodore Roberts v. Robert Neace, for the purpose of appeal. On May 12, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for clarification or status conference, stating that the governor's newly issued guidelines for faith-based organizations rendered the previous order unclear. The motion was denied the next day. On June 17, the plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss. On June 29, the defendants filed a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and injunction pending appeal, arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court had addressed a similar matter in the case  South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom. The defendants claimed that in his concurrence, Justice Roberts had made clear that the mass gatherings order in question passed the constitutional muster and should not be enjoined. The plaintiffs responded on July 20, arguing that the court has no jurisdiction to consider the motion and that a Supreme Court Justice's concurrence in another case is not binding. In the Sixth Circuit, the Commonwealth of Kentucky filed filed an amicus brief in support of the plaintiffs on July 7. On July 28, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claim was moot because places of worship could now hold indoor in-person services The case is ongoing.

Summary: On April 17, 2020, Maryville Baptist Church and its pastor filed an action against the enforcement of various COVID-19 related gathering orders issued by the Governor of Kentucky. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory and permanent injunction, requesting to enjoin the defendant from enforcing gathering orders. On May 2, the Sixth Circuit granted in part the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction but declined to enjoin the prohibition of in-person gatherings. On May 8, the District Court granted the motion for injunction pending appeal and the initial motion for preliminary injunction as to in-person services. The defendants moved to dismiss the case. The case is ongoing.


This lawsuit, filed by the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on Aug. 30, 2017, challenged U.S. Attorney General Sessions' imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal funding to the city. Philadelphia, represented by private counsel, filed its complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The case was assigned to Judge Michael M. Baylson. In its complaint, Philadelphia alleged that the Department of Justice (DOJ) was pursuing the federal government's anti-"sanctuary city" policy by new but still unlawful means. Since the narrowing (in Santa Clara) of President Trump’s Jan. 25, 2017 Executive Order 13768, the President's ability to place new immigration-related conditions on federal funds was now more limited. Subsequently, DOJ threatened to withhold critical federal law enforcement funding, the Byrne JAG Program, from cities, including Philadelphia, that would not certify compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (this provision provided that a local government entity could not prohibit or restrict communication between government entities or officials and federal immigration authorities.) Philadelphia alleged its own compliance with § 1373, explaining that its agents did not collect immigration status information in the first place, and as a result, the city was in no position to share or restrict the sharing of information. However, Philadelphia's policies allowed local law enforcement to cooperate with federal authorities and to share identifying information about criminal suspects in the city. Philadelphia further noted that its policies sought to foster trust between the city's vibrant immigrant population and the city's officials and employees. Philadelphia contended that it had, for years, prohibited its officers from asking individuals about their immigration status, and that its community policing and safe city standards functioned best "without the city's active involvement in the enforcement of federal immigration law." Philadelphia further noted that it relied upon the funding supplied by the Byrne JAG program to support critical criminal justice programming in the city, including funding the Philadelphia Police Department, District Attorney's Office, and local court system. Philadelphia contended that in DOJ's July 25, 2017 press release, as Philadelphia interpreted it, DOJ placed three conditions upon the receipt of any Byrne JAG funds in FY 2017: Philadelphia must 1) certify that the City complied with § 1373 (the "certification condition"); 2) permit Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials to access "any detention facility" in Philadelphia in order to meet with any persons of interest to DHS (the "access condition"); and 3) provide at least 48 hours' advance notice to DHS regarding the "scheduled release date and time" of an inmate for whom DHS requests such advance notice (the "notice condition"). Philadelphia alleged that DOJ lacked constitutional or statutory authority to place the above conditions on the Byrne JAG program. Statutorily, Philadelphia argued that the Byrnes JAG statute did not grant DOJ the authority to impose these conditions. Constitutionally, Philadelphia argued that DOJ was usurping the authority both of Congress to spend funds, and of state and local governments to administer their own law enforcement. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, Philadelphia asked for a declaration that it complied with § 1373 and that DOJ's immigration-related conditions on Byrne JAG funding were unconstitutional. Philadelphia sought an injunction enjoining DOJ from imposing these conditions. On Sept. 28, Philadelphia moved for a preliminary injunction. Philadelphia sought a declaration that DOJ's imposition of the new conditions on Byrne JAG funding was unlawful, that the action was contrary to the federal statute and to the Constitution's separation of powers, that Congress would have violated the Spending Clause in permitting the AG's action, and that Philadelphia was in full compliance with § 1373 (to the extent that compliance could be made an applicable condition to the receipt of Byrne JAG funds). Philadelphia also requested that the Court permanently enjoin DOJ from imposing the aforementioned three conditions in conjunction with the Byrne JAG application, as well as any future grants under the Byrne JAG program. On Oct. 12, DOJ filed its opposition to the preliminary injunction motion. DOJ argued that Philadelphia's policies were frustrating the federal government's ability to remove immigrants with criminal records from the country. DOJ also maintained that it had long imposed conditions on federal grant funds to aid law enforcement, including on the Byrne JAG program, and that Philadelphia's position would allow the City, not DOJ, to determine the conditions associated with a federal grant that Congress had authorized the DOJ to award. On Oct. 19, a number of cities, legal scholars, and social/legal service organizations filed amicus briefs in support of the city's preliminary injunction motion. On Nov. 15, 2017, the Court found that Philadelphia had demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claim that it substantially complied with § 1373, and enjoined the DOJ from rejecting Philadelphia's FY 2017 application for Byrne JAG funding. 2017 WL 5489476 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2017). On Jan. 8, 2018, Philadelphia filed an amended complaint. Noting the Nov. 15 preliminary injunction order, the city alleged that DOJ had still failed to disburse the City's FY 2017 Byrne JAG grant, and sought a writ of mandamus to compel it to do so. DOJ, however, appealed the District Court's preliminary injunction order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on Jan. 16 (docket no. 18-1103). DOJ argued that the District Court erred in evaluating Philadelphia's compliance with § 1373 in advance of any final agency action supported by the record. Further, according to DOJ, the District Court did not explain how Philadelphia was in substantial compliance with § 1373, over DOJ's objection that Philadelphia deliberately refused to comply. In the District Court, DOJ moved to dismiss Philadelphia's amended complaint on Feb. 1, 2018, arguing that the challenged conditions were not unlawful under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Administrative Procedure Act (APA), or Constitution. On Feb. 22, fifteen states and the District of Columbia filed an amicus brief supporting Philadelphia. On Mar. 13, Judge Baylson denied DOJ's motion to dismiss. First, he held that Philadelphia's claims were ripe as challenges to final agency action under the APA. Next, Judge Baylson held that Philadelphia had advanced plausible arguments that the Byrne JAG statute did not authorize DOJ to impose the challenged conditions, and that DOJ had violated the APA, separation of powers doctrine, Spending Clause, and/or Tenth Amendment. Additionally, Philadelphia had made out a proper claim for a declaratory judgment that it complied with § 1373. The parties filed summary judgment motions on Apr. 13. Judge Baylson held a three-day bench trial from Apr. 30 to May 2. Meanwhile, a series of cities and scholars filed amicus briefs in support of Philadelphia. On June 6, 2018, Judge Baylson granted the city equitable relief, holding it was entitled to receive its JAG funding. 309 F. Supp. 3d 289. The court found that Philadelphia generally had "no knowledge whether a person is or is not a citizen." Because the government presented little evidence that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) could discern this information either, the court held that the Byrne JAG funding conditions were not useful. The court found that Philadelphia's policies were adopted in good faith and so as to protect individual civil rights. Indeed, the court found that "[t]he City assumes great risk if it violates individuals’ civil rights, which would, inter alia, subject the City to endless litigation and very expensive damage claims for violating civil rights of prisoners." Thus the court found that even if the funding conditions were valid, Philadelphia was in compliance or substantial compliance with the conditions. On June 28, 2018, the court issued an additional memorandum to explain a portion of its June 6 decision providing that if a government agency "has probable cause to assert that an individual in the custody of the City of Philadelphia is a criminal alien...and seeks transfer to federal custody of such individual within a city facility, it shall secure an order from a judicial officer of the United States for further detention, as allowed by law." The court stated that this provision was necessary to ensure both the individual's rights by avoiding the use of immigration detainers, as well as the safety of the public since without the provision, the City would have to release individuals entitled to release. The court found that immigration detainers are not court orders and do not have legal effect. The government appealed the decision to the Third Circuit (docket no. 18-2648). On Feb. 15, 2019, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. First, the Court held that the challenged conditions were unlawfully imposed because Congress did not grant the Attorney General the authority to impose them. Thus, the Court affirmed the District Court's order to the extent it enjoined enforcement of the conditions against the plaintiff. Next, the Court held that the portion of the District Court's judgment establishing that a judicial warrant is necessary to transfer a criminal noncitizen to federal custody exceeded the scope of equitable relief required in the case. Accordingly, the Court vacated that part of the order. 916 F.3d 276. The government filed a petition for rehearing, but the Third Circuit denied the request on June 24, 2019. The government indicated an intention to seek a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court, but as of Mar. 25, 2020, there has been no further action in the case. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On Aug. 30, 2017, the City of Philadelphia challenged U.S. Attorney General Sessions' imposition of immigration-related conditions on federal law enforcement funding to the city. The District Court granted Philadelphia's motion for preliminary injunction on Nov. 15, 2017, and the DOJ appealed to the Third Circuit. The parties filed summary judgment motions, and on June 6, 2018, the District Court granted the city equitable relief, holding it was entitled to receive its federal funding under the Byrne JAG program. The government appealed the decision to the Third Circuit, and on February 15, 2019, the Court largely affirmed the District Court judgment, agreeing that the Attorney General had exceeded his statutory authority in imposing the conditions. The Court only vacated one aspect of the equitable relief granted (related to the District Court's finding that a judicial warrant was necessary to transfer a criminal noncitizen to federal custody). The government sought rehearing but the Third Circuit declined. The government expressed an intention to seek a writ of certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court; but as of March 25, 2020, there has been no further action in the case.


On December 13, 2013, the City of Miami filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, suing Bank of America and Countrywide Financial, under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). Represented by the Miami City Attorney’s Office and private counsel, the city sought injunctive relief and damages for discriminatory lending practices. Specifically, it claimed that the banks had engaged in redlining and reverse redlining, both of which led to a disproportionately high number of loan foreclosures in Miami neighborhoods with large minority populations. The case was initially assigned to Judge Joan A. Lenard. Upon her recusal, it was assigned to Judge Robin S. Rosenbaum, then later reassigned to Judge William P. Dimitrouleas. On July 8, 2014, the court granted the banks’ motion to dismiss, finding that the city lacked standing to sue under the FHA because its alleged economic injuries were not “affected by a racial interest.” 2014 WL 3362348. In addition, the court held that the city had not alleged facts identifying the banks’ practices as the cause of the alleged disparity, and held that the statute of limitations had expired. The city filed a motion for reconsideration and for leave to file an amended complaint on July 21, 2014, which the court denied on September 8, 2014. The city then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit on October 7, 2014. On May 12, 2015, that court consolidated the appeal with <i>City of Miami v. Wells Fargo & Co.</i> (for purposes of oral argument only). On September 1, 2015 the court (Judges Stanley Marcus, Charles Wilson, and Harvey Schlesinger) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an unjust enrichment claim under Florida law, but reversed the decision to dismiss the FHA claims, holding that the city actually had standing to bring the FHA claims and that the district court had erred in its causation analysis. 800 F.3d 1262. The banks appealed the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling to the United States Supreme Court, and the district court on July 13, 2016 granted an order staying proceedings while the appeal was pending. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 8, 2016 and ruled on June 2, 2017. 137 S. Ct. 1296. It held that the city had standing to sue under the FHA. However, the Eleventh Circuit had erred in finding that the city met the FHA’s proximate-cause requirement simply because the city’s injury was foreseeable. The Supreme Court, requiring “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged,” instructed the Eleventh Circuit to analyze more closely how directly the banks’ actions had harmed the city. Only if the Eleventh Circuit found a sufficiently direct relation could it allow the city to sue under the FHA. While the appeal was pending before the Supreme Court, the city had filed a second amended complaint (providing facts showing that the violation was within the statute of limitations), the district court had again denied the city’s claims (171 F.Supp.3d 1314), and the city had filed a third amended complaint. On remand from the Supreme Court, Judge Stanley Marcus of the Eleventh Circuit directed the parties to file briefs as to the meaning of proximate cause under the FHA. On April 30, 2018, both parties submitted their supplemental briefs. In addition, the Court of Appeals granted leave for several amici to file briefs addressing these issues on May 30, 2018. Nearly a year later, on May 3, 2019, the Eleventh Circuit issued a ruling as instructed by the Supreme Court. The court set about to “endeavor carefully to apply the Court’s mandate to these complaints, to determine if they plausibly state a claim under the Fair Housing Act.” The court found that there was indeed “some direct relation” between the banks’ violations of the FHA and the city’s tax revenue loss, even though there were other causal steps involved. “The Supreme Court has never held that the presence of an intervening causal step or the involvement of a third party necessarily bars a finding of proximate cause as a matter of law, and we decline to establish so hard and fast a rule.” It explained that bad loans “in the aggregate will mean foreclosures in the aggregate, which will mean loss of property value and a reduction in the tax base.” The Eleventh Circuit sent the case back to the district court for further proceedings. On May 24, 2019, the banks filed a petition for a rehearing before the entire Eleventh Circuit. The petition was denied on August 26, 2019. On December 9, 2019, the district court re-opened the case, directed the city to file an updated version of its complaint, and set a jury trial for February 15, 2021. On January 29, 2020, the city abruptly dismissed all of its claims against the banks, and the district court dismissed the case the next day. Although the city never provided any explanation for its decision, Wells Fargo announced that the “dismissal was initiated by the city and is not related to a settlement, and Wells Fargo is providing nothing in exchange.” In light of the dismissal of the case, the Supreme Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s May 3, 2019 ruling.

Summary: In 2013, the City of Miami filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. The city alleged that Bank of America and Countrywide Financial had engaged in a pattern of discriminatory mortgage lending in violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1968 (FHA). When the district court dismissed the lawsuit, the city appealed to the Eleventh Circuit. Upon losing in the Eleventh Circuit, the city appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which vacated the Eleventh Circuit's decision and sent the case back for further proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit then ruled that the city's case could proceed, and the district court re-opened the case and set a date for a jury trial. The banks appealed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling to the Supreme Court; while that appeal was pending, the city abruptly dismissed all of its claims. In light of that dismissal, the district court closed the case, and the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Eleventh Circuit.


On December 1, 2010, plaintiffs, high school students in the Birmingham City Schools (BCS), filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. The plaintiffs sued the Birmingham Board of Education (BOE), the Birmingham Police Department (BPD), and several BPD officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs alleged that the School Resource Officers (SROs), police officers who worked in the high schools, had repeatedly used pepper spray on students in order to enforce school discipline. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center, brought a class action suit, on behalf of all current and future BCS high school students, for declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that pepper spraying students on campus violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as state tort law. They sought an injunction enjoining the defendants from continuing this practice. In addition to the class claims, the plaintiffs also brought individual claims for compensatory damages as a result of being pepper sprayed. The case was initially assigned to Chief Judge Sharon Lovelace Blackburn who recused herself on May 19, 2011. It was reassigned to Judge Abdul K. Kallon. On July 20, 2011, Judge Kallon dismissed a few claims against the assistant high school principal and dismissed all remaining claims against the BCS Superintendent and the BOE, by granting in part and denying in part the school defendants' motion to dismiss. In light of that decision, that same day, the court denied the plaintiffs' motion for class certification without prejudice, allowing the plaintiffs to refile the motion with an amended complaint. On August 31, 2012, the Judge Kallon granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. 2012 WL 3849032. The Chief of the BPD and the SROs petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit for permission to appeal the class certification order. On September 25, 2012, Judge Kallon denied the police defendants' motion to stay further class action proceedings pending the resolution of the appeal. The court decided on its own, however, to stay all proceedings in the case because it planned to deny police defendants' and the assistant high school principal's earlier motions for summary judgement based on immunity grounds. Staying the proceedings, the court reasoned, would give the defendants the opportunity to appeal their qualified immunity defenses. On October 3, 2012, as promised, Judge Kallon denied the motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, while granting summary judgment on a few claims against the Chief of the BPD. Both the assistant principal and the police defendants appealed the district court's partial denial of the motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Meanwhile, on December 20, 2012, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied permission to the police defendants to appeal the class certification order. This meant that the class action claims could continue. A few months later, the assistant high school principal reached a settlement with the plaintiffs settling all district court claims and all claims and issues on appeal. Both sides bore their own costs. As a result, on February 22, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the assistant principal's appeal of the district court order denying summary judgment on immunity grounds. And on April 16, 2013, the District Court (Judge Abdul K. Kallon) dismissed the claims against the assistant principal; the only remaining defendants were the Chief of the BPD and the SROs. On September 19, 2013, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the SROs were not entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed the remaining claims for lack of appellate jurisdiction. J.W. v. Roper, 541 Fed. Appx. 937 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). The parties resumed discovery in the district court on plaintiffs' remaining claims. Judge Kallon held a twelve day bench trial in late January and early February 2015. On September 30, 2015, the court released its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 143 F. Supp. 3d 1118 (N.D. Ala. 2015). First, the court found that two of the plaintiffs succeeded on the merits of their individual excessive use of force claims because neither resisted arrest or posed a danger to anyone, whereas the other plaintiffs all exhibited grounds for use of the chemical spray. The court awarded these two plaintiffs $5,000 in damages each. Next, the court found that the six plaintiffs who the SROs directly sprayed succeeded on the merits of their excessive force claim for the SROs' failure to decontaminate them. The court also awarded these six plaintiffs $5,000 in damages each. Finally, on the class claims, the court concluded that the Fourth Amendment violations occurred pursuant to a policy or custom of the BPD and that the plaintiffs are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. Rather than issue a permanent injunction, however, the court ordered the parties to meet and confer to devise a training and procedure plan to improve the policies related to the use of chemical spray in Birmingham schools. Thus, the district court granted the plaintiffs relief on most of their claims. On October 16, 2015, the defendants appealed the following district court decisions to the Eleventh Circuit: the order granting class certification, the rulings on the parties' motions in limine, the interlocutory orders denying qualified immunity, the evidentiary rulings during the trial, and the final order issued on September 30. Specifically, the SROs found liable on the decontamination claims argued that they were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims. Additionally, Chief Roper appealed the district court's ruling on the class claims. The defendants did not appeal the district court's award of $5,000 to two of the plaintiffs who succeeded in their excessive use of force claims. After extensive review of the lengthy trial transcript and documentary evidence, the Eleventh Circuit issued its opinion on September 24, 2018. 904 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2018). The appeals court found that the SROs were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' decontamination claims because the relevant law was not clearly established at the time of their conduct in 2009, 2010, and 2011. Further, the appeals court held that the class-based claims for declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the use of the chemical spray and the decontamination policy failed for lack of standing. Thus, on December 14, 2018, Judge Kallon entered judgment for the two plaintiffs for $5,000 each on their excessive force claims and entered judgment for the defendants on all other claims. The court dismissed the case with prejudice and the case is now closed.

Summary: On December 1, 2010, plaintiffs, high school students in the Birmingham City Schools (BCS), filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the Birmingham Board of Education (BOE), an assistant high school principal, the BCS Superintendent, the Chief of the Birmingham Police Department (BPD), and several School Resource Officers (SROs) who were police officers that worked in the high schools. The plaintiffs alleged that the police officers violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution as well as state tort law by pepper spraying students on campus. Plaintiffs brought a class action suit and individual claims for damages. In 2013, the assistant high school principal reached a settlement with the plaintiffs settling all claims, such that the only remaining defendants were the Chief of the BPD and the SROs. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the SROs were not entitled to qualified immunity. Following a 12-day bench trial in early 2015, the district court granted the plaintiffs relief on most of their claims, awarding $5,000 each to two plaintiffs who alleged excessive use of force, $5,000 each to six plaintiffs alleging failure to decontaminate, and granting declaratory and injunctive relief for the class claims. The defendants appealed the decisions on the decontamination claims and class claims to the Eleventh Circuit, which reversed and found that the SROs were entitled to qualified immunity on the decontamination claims and that the class-based claims failed for lack of standing. The case is now closed.


On June 2, 2010, a man who was harassed by the police and issued a false citation filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, Ann Arbor Division against the City of Detroit. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan, alleged violation of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as claims under state law. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the Police Officer's harassment and issuing a citation for a fictious crime violated his constitutional rights. On November 12, 2008, the plaintiff was in his car, which was legally parked in Downtown Detroit. The plaintiff routinely parked in this spot during the day, seeing as he was a homeless veteran, and his residence was closed during the day. The plaintiff was approached for apparently no reason by police officers who demanded identification. The police officers later claimed that the plaintiff was rude to them. They issued him a citation under City Ordinance 38-11-8 for "Loitering in a Known Narcotics Area." This was a fictious crime. The plaintiff complained at a Detroit Police Department precinct, but was rebuffed, and was unable to convince a judge to dismiss the charge. The ACLU of Michigan entered an appearance on the plaintiff's behalf and eventually secured dismissal of the frivolous charge. The ACLU then sued on behalf of the plaintiff asking for compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive relief. On February 8, 2011, the Court (Judge Corbett O'Meara) dismissed the state law claim, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claim, which was largely cumulative with the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment Claim. On February 17, 2011, the Court (Judge Avern Cohn) consolidated this case with a companion case filed simultaneously by the ACLU, (Letten v. Hall, 2:10-cv-12182-AC-VMM) because the cases contained similar questions of law. That case is also in our database (PN-MI-5: http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11981). The case was eventually settled privately. The Settlement is posted here and at the page for Letten v. Hall. The case was closed on February 18, 2011.

Summary: A man who was legally parked on a street in Detroit was cited for "loitering in a known narcotics area," which was not a crime. The Michigan ACLU filed a lawsuit on his behalf, which was eventually consolidated (and settled) with another companion case, Letten v. Hall (http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11981). The case was eventually settled privately with damages and an agreement to improve complaint reporting and training for Detroit police officers on First and Fourth Amendment rights.


On July 16, 2013, a Louisiana resident, who had legally married his husband in Iowa, filed a lawsuit against the State of Louisiana in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Louisiana laws which denied recognition of valid, out-of-state same-sex marriages were unconstitutional. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that Section 15 of the Louisiana Constitution and Louisiana Civil Code article 3520 violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and that non-recognition of legal marriages violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint on Aug. 9, 2013. On Sept. 26, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the case for improper venue and to transfer the case to the Middle District of Louisiana. On Oct. 16, 2013, the court ordered counsel for both sides to submit supplementary papers to the court by Oct. 30, 2013, addressing whether the venue was appropriate. In an opinion dated Nov. 26, 2013, and filed on Nov. 27, 2013, the court granted the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, and denied as moot the motion to dismiss or transfer the case for improper venue. Reconsideration was denied on Jan. 13, 2014. On Jan. 21, 2014, the court ordered that the present case be consolidated with another case, no. 2014-cv-00097. On Jan. 23, 2014, the plaintiffs in the newly consolidated action moved the court to de-consolidate their cases, though the court denied this motion on Jan. 27, 2014. Additionally, on Mar. 18, 2014, the court ordered Forum for Equality Louisiana v. Barfield consolidated with the present case. After these consolidations, the plaintiffs consisted of six same-sex couples, all of whom lived in Louisiana and were lawfully married in other states. Judge Martin L. C. Feldman rendered judgment on Sept. 3, 2014, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The opinion explained that the court found Louisiana's decision to neither permit nor recognize same-sex marriage to be supported by a rational basis, because of the state's interest in defining the meaning of marriage though the democratic process. This was the first federal court opinion to uphold a same-sex marriage ban following the Supreme Court's 2013 decision in Windsor v. U.S.; several dozen other opinions had come out the other way. On Sept. 5, 2014, the plaintiffs appealed the decision. While the appeal was still pending, on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Obergefell v. Hodges. In a 5-4 opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the right to marry is fundamental and that it demeans gay and lesbian couples to deprive them of access to marriage. Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow states to ban same-sex marriage. On July 2, 2015, in line with the new precedent from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision so that judgment could be entered in favor of the plaintiffs. 791 F.3d 616. The district court did so the same day. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90202. On Oct. 8, 2015, the parties reached a settlement agreement with respect to attorney's fees and costs, though the outcome of these negotiations is not known. The case is now closed.

Summary: An individual seeking recognition of his same-sex marriage validly entered into under the laws of Iowa brought suit against Louisiana, claiming that Louisianan laws denying gay marriage were unconstitutional. On Sept. 3, 2014, the Court ruled in favor of the defendants and granted their order for summary judgment, which resulted in the dismissal of this case. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case.


On April 30, 1999, Bomani Tyehimba, an African-American male, filed a lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging that he was subjected to a racially discriminatory stop, search and detention by officers of the Cincinnati Police Department [CPD]. That suit was initially styled Tyehimba v. City of Cincinnati, (99-cv-00317-SJD-MRM). Tyehimba was represented by private counsel and counsel the ACLU. On December 13, 2000, Tyehimba moved for leave to amend his complaint. The District Court (Judge Susan J. Dlott) granted him leave. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Tyehimba filed another motion for leave to amend the complaint on March 14, 2000. He also filed a motion to certify the case as a class action, a motion for a preliminary injunction and a proposed joint litigation plan, and a request for a status conference. The proposed amended complaint added two local civil rights organizations as plaintiffs: Friends of Cincinnati Black United Front ("CBUF") and the American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation, Inc. ("ACLU"). The amended complaint alleged a thirty-year pattern and practice of racial profiling and discriminatory law enforcement against African-Americans by the CPD. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief, as well as class certification. The class action certification was granted. The District Court held a status conference on March 21, 2001. The parties advised the District Court of their interest in establishing a collaborative procedure to address the issues raised by plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint. All discovery and motion practice was then stayed by the District Court as the parties continued settlement talks. On April 7, 2001, CPD officers shot and killed Timothy Thomas, a young Black man. The shooting sparked three days of riots in Cincinnati, causing the mayor to declare a state of emergency and decree a dawn to dusk curfew. On April 12, 2001, the parties entered into a Collaborative Settlement Agreement (also referred to as the "Agreement" or "Collaborative Agreement"). The Collaborative Agreement was the product of a joint fact finding mission and structured conflict resolution process which had as its goal that the parties would work together to develop agreed upon reforms to the CPD. The ACLU, the CBUF, the City, the CPD, the designated lead counsel for the putative plaintiff class, and the local Fraternal Order of Police [FOP] participated in the process. The Collaborative Agreement was submitted to the District Court for approval. Also on April 12, 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice entered into a Memorandum of Agreement [MOA] with the CPD, resolving the DOJ's separate investigation of the CPD. See PP-OH-2 of this collection for the MOA. On May 3, 2001, the District Court issued an order establishing a collaborative procedure to be utilized by the parties. Tyehimba v. City of Cincinnati, 2001 WL 1842470 (S.D.Ohio May 3, 2001). The District Court appointed Dr Jay Rothman and the ARIA Group, Inc. to manage the collaborative procedure. The District Court also issued an order tolling all action in several other civil rights cases against the CPD that were pending before the court. On February 19, 2002, the District Court entered a protective order governing the parties' negotiations under the Court's order establishing the collaborative procedure. On April 19, 2002, the District Court granted the motion to certify provisionally the class and to approve the Collaborative Agreement subject to a fairness hearing. Class notifications were approved and a fairness hearing was held on June 6, 2002. On August 5, 2002, the District Court granted the parties' joint motion for class certification and approved the Collaborative Agreement, thereby settling all claims. In re Cincinnati Policing, 209 F.R.D. 395 (S.D.Ohio 2002). By separate order, the District Court appointed Saul Green as Monitor and Richard Jerome as Deputy Monitor to oversee the reform implementation process. The Collaborative Agreement called for the following: implementation of Community Problem Oriented Policing ("CPOP"), the establishment of the Citizen Complaint Authority, the creation of an extensive data collection system to track police activity and incorporation of all of the terms of the MOA entered into by the DOJ and the CPD. By the terms of the Collaborative Agreement, pending individual damage claims of numerous plaintiffs who alleged excessive force by officers of CPD were tolled. On April 7, 2003, the District Court granted CBUF's motion to withdraw as class representative, finding that the ACLU would continue to adequately represent the class. On May 21, 2003, individual plaintiffs and representatives of the CPD entered into a Collaborative Agreement Global Damage Claims Settlement, to resolve the pending individual damage claims of numerous plaintiffs that were tolled by the Collaborative Agreement. The District Court approved the settlement and granted the parties' joint motion to establish a qualified settlement fund. Matthew L. Garretson was appointed as the fund administrator. The City paid $4.5 million into the settlement fund to resolve all individual damage claims. On November 18, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion for a court order directing the City and the FOP to comply with the terms of the Collaborative Agreement, alleging that the Monitors had been denied access by top CPD officials to police ride alongs and training sessions. The issue was referred to Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz who conducted an evidentiary hearing on January 24, 2005. He then issued his report and recommendation finding CPD in breach of the Agreement. On March 28, 2005, the District Court adopted the Magistrate's report and recommendation and ordered that as a consequence of CPD's material breach, the Collaborative Agreement was entered as an order of the court. The District Court retained jurisdiction to resolve any further disputes arising from the Agreement. On August 26, 2008, the parties met for a final hearing and discussed ongoing efforts to improve police-community relationships and the case was closed.

Summary: In April 1999, an African-American male filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against the Cincinnati Police Department, alleging that he was subjected to a racially discriminatory stop, search and detention. An amended complaint sought to certify a class and alleged a thirty-year pattern and practice of racial profiling and discriminatory law enforcement against African-Americans by the CPD. In April 2001, the parties entered into a Collaborative Settlement Agreement, which was submitted to the District Court for approval. In August 2002, the District Court approved the Collaborative Agreement, which called for the implementation of Community Problem Oriented Policing, the establishment of the Citizen Complaint Authority, and the creation of an extensive data collection system to track police activity. In May 2003, individual plaintiffs and representatives of the CPD entered into a Collaborative Agreement Global Damage Claims Settlement to resolve pending individual damage claims of numerous plaintiffs that had been tolled by the Collaborative Agreement. The city paid $4.5 million into the settlement fund to resolve the individual damage claims. In March 2005, the District Court found that CPD had breached the Collaborative Agreement by denying monitors access to police ride alongs and training sessions and ordered that the Collaborative Agreement be entered as an order of the Court. This order lasted until August 26, 2008, when the parties met for a final hearing and discussed ongoing efforts to improve police-community relationships.


On August 18, 2020, a coalition of cities, counties, Indian tribes, advocacy organizations, and individuals represented by the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights, the Brennan Center for Justice, and the law firm Latham & Watkins LLP sued the U.S. Department of Commerce (“Department”), the Department Secretary, the U.S. Census Bureau (“Bureau”), and the Bureau Director in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by abandoning the Bureau’s COVID-19 plans and pursuing a “rush plan” that would truncate 2020 Census timelines, undercount communities of color, and produce inaccurate census results. The plaintiffs asked the Court to declare the rush plan unconstitutional under the Enumeration Clause and unlawful under the APA; to vacate the rush plan and reinstate the Covid-19 Plan; and to enjoin the defendants from implementing the rush plan or otherwise interfering with the Covid-19 plan. The case was assigned to Judge Lucy H. Koh. This case was brought amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely disrupted the 2020 Census by suspending operations and creating significant delays in counting processes. In response, the Bureau implemented a COVID-19 plan delaying operations timelines to give the Bureau enough time to ensure the quality and accuracy of 2020 Census data. The COVID-19 plan extended the deadline for reporting state population totals to the President from December 31, 2020 to April 30, 2021, and the deadline for reporting redistricting numbers to the states from March 31, 2020 to July 31, 2021. Then, on August 3, 2020, the Secretary of Commerce and the Census Bureau Director abruptly reversed course and announced that the Bureau would abandon the COVID-19 plan and adopt a rush plan. The rush plan required states to comply with the original 2020 Census deadlines, forcing them to complete 7.5 months of data collection and processing work in roughly half the time. The Bureau’s about-face was criticized by census experts, who concluded that the rush plan would significantly undermine the quality of the 2020 Census by undercounting communities of color, especially undocumented immigrants. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that (1) the Bureau violated its duty under the Enumeration Clause to make census-related decisions that “bear a reasonable relationship to the accomplishment of an actual enumeration of the population,” and (2) the Bureau’s decision to abandon its COVID-19 plans and pursue the rush plan was arbitrary and capricious under the APA because the Bureau did not adequately explain its decision, and (3) the explanation the Bureau provided was pretextual. In sum, the plaintiffs argued that the Bureau abandoned the COVID-19 plan and pursued the rush plan in a thinly veiled attempt to exclude undocumented people from the state population totals used to apportion the U.S. House of Representatives, which would result in a more favorable post-Census apportionment for the Republican Party. On September 5, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a temporary restraining order, enjoining the Bureau from implementing the rush plan until the court conducted a hearing on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5291452. On September 17, 2020, the Court extended the order up to seven days or until the Court ruled on the plaintiffs’ motion, whichever came first, in part because the defendants failed to produce the administrative record pursuant to a court order. 2020 WL 5578931. In the meantime, Louisiana and Mississippi moved to intervene in the case, arguing that the states had significant protectable interests in the matter that were not adequately represented by the parties. The states also warned that the plaintiffs aimed to “pad the census count in certain jurisdictions.” The plaintiffs opposed the states’ motion to intervene on October 7, 2020. In a 78-page ruling on September 24, 2020, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the rush plan was likely arbitrary and capricious; that plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction; that the balance of hardships tipped sharply in plaintiffs’ favor; and that a preliminary injunction was in the public interest. 2020 WL 5739144. The injunction order stayed the rush plan deadlines for completing data collection and for reporting total state population totals and enjoined the defendants from implementing them. The next day, September 25, 2020, the Court denied the federal government’s motion to stay the Court’s order pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit, requesting an immediate administrative stay and filing an emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal. On September 30, 2020, in a partial ruling on the government’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit denied the government’s request for an immediate administrative stay because it would have “upended, rather than preserved” the status quo. 2020 WL 5815054. While the parties awaited the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the government’s emergency motion to stay, the district court issued a clarifying order addressing numerous allegations of defendants’ noncompliance with the original temporary restraining order and the preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 5876939. In the October 1, 2020 order, the Court specified the scope of the injunction and ordered tailored relief to ensure defendants complied with it. This relief included direct text messages from the Bureau Director to all Bureau employees informing them of the injunction and the new census deadlines, as well as a sworn affidavit from the Bureau Director declaring that the Bureau was complying with the injunction order. Finally, the Court denied as moot plaintiffs’ September 30, 2020 motion to compel and for sanctions for defendants’ noncompliance with court orders, and plaintiffs’ September 30, 2020 motion for a temporary restraining order pending the Court’s ruling on plaintiff’s motion to compel and for sanctions. One week later, on October 7, 2020, the Ninth Circuit granted in part and denied in part the government’s emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction pending appeal, holding that the government was entitled to a stay to the extent that the district court enjoined it from abiding by existing statutory deadlines but was not entitled to a stay regarding the implementation of the rush plan. 2020 WL 5940346. Under this order, the census count had to continue until October 31, 2020. The government appealed to the Supreme Court, which stayed the injunction on October 13, 2020, pending the disposition of the government’s Ninth Circuit appeal and the government’s petition for writ of certiorari. 2020 WL 6041178. This stay allowed the Census Bureau to cease its counting operations in accordance with the rush plan. This case is ongoing.

Summary: On August 18, 2020, a coalition of counties, cities, Indian tribes, advocacy organizations, and individuals sued the U.S. Department of Commerce, the Department Secretary, the U.S. Census Bureau, and the Bureau Director in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the U.S. Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) by abandoning the Bureau’s Covid-19 plans and pursuing a “rush plan” that would truncate 2020 Census timelines, undercount communities of color, and produce inaccurate census results. The plaintiffs asked the Court to declare the rush plan unconstitutional under the Enumeration Clause and unlawful under the APA; to vacate the rush plan and reinstate the Covid-19 Plan; and to enjoin the defendants from implementing the rush plan or otherwise interfering with the Covid-19 plan. The Court granted plaintiffs’ motion to stay and for a preliminary injunction, which prohibited defendants from implementing the rush plan. After several appeals, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ emergency motion to stay the preliminary injunction, allowing the Census Bureau to cease its counting operations in accordance with the rush plan. This case is ongoing.


On June 1, 2017, the Dilley Pro Bono Project, an organization that provides pro bono legal representation to individuals seeking asylum, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agency, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The case was assigned to Judge Christopher Cooper. Dilley Pro Bono Project specifically provides legal representation to minors and women confined in the South Texas Family Residential Center, which is in Dilley, Texas. The plaintiff claimed that its First Amendment rights and its clients' right to counsel were violated by a new ICE policy requiring pre-approval of telephonic medical evaluations of people seeking asylum. The plaintiff argued that these medical evaluations were crucial to its ability to represent clients in asylum cases, and that this new hurdle interferes with that representation. The plaintiff stated that in March 2017, one of its attorneys had her permission to visit the South Texas detention center revoked when she scheduled a telephonic medical evaluation without pre-approval from an ICE agent. ICE then officially issued the pre-approval policy in May. The plaintiff claimed that because it only had two full-time attorneys and four full-time legal assistants at the time, the revocation of one attorney's permission to visit, in addition to the new policy, severely limited its ability to represent clients. The complaint alleged that the policy and practice of requiring pre-approval unlawfully infringed upon the Dilley Project's First Amendment right to associate with the minors and women in the South Texas detention center, as well as upon those individuals' ability to get adequate counseling. In addition, it alleged that the policy's issuance violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiff requested both a preliminary and a permanent injunction; it sought reinstatement of visitation rights for the attorney whose permission to visit had been revoked, as well as an order prohibiting ICE from enforcing the pre-approval policy or implementing other similar restrictions. The plaintiff also sought attorneys’ fees. The parties entered into settlement discussions on August 11, 2017, and reached an agreement on August 15, 2017. The settlement still allows ICE to implement the policy, but the time frame for responding to pre-approval requests for telephonic medical evaluations is limited to within four business hours after the request is made; a notice of scheduling the appointment should be given two hours in advance. If the request is denied, ICE will provide a detailed explanation for the denial. If the plaintiff disagrees with the decision, then the parties will address jointly and informally any such dispute. In addition, the settlement reinstates the visitation permission for the attorney who had that permission revoked. Each party was to pay their own attorneys' fees. The Court retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement until February 15, 2020. That period has passed and the case is now closed.

Summary: On June 1, 2017, the Dilley Pro Bono Project sued DHS and ICE in the D.C. District Court. The Dilley Project was challenging ICE's implementation of a new policy requiring ICE to pre-approve telephonic medical evaluations for detained asylum seekers. The Project claimed that the policy violated the First Amendment Rights of the Project and its clients, and that its issuance violated the APA. The parties reached a settlement which was entered by the Court in August 2017. The agreement provided for a structured time frame within which ICE was to provide any necessary pre-approvals for telephonic medical evaluations. The Court retained jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing the terms of the settlement until February 15, 2020. That period has passed and the case is now closed.


On June 11, 2009, individuals with developmental disabilities and housed in state-run psychiatric institutions in Pennsylvania filed this class action against the state Department of Public Welfare (DPW) in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs claimed that Pennsylvania had failed to provide community-based treatment and habilitation services that would prevent them from being institutionalized. Some of the plaintiffs had diagnosed psychiatric disorders, while others were individuals with disabilities who claimed to be housed in psychiatric facilities even though they had no mental illness. The plaintiffs alleged that the Department of Public Welfare violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They requested class certification, declaratory and injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs. On September 8, 2009, the court certified the class of individuals with developmental disabilities institutionalized in state psychiatric facilities and not subject to the jurisdiction of the criminal courts. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on September 17, 2009. Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie denied this motion on November 19, 2009. On July 30, 2010, the parties submitted a settlement agreement, which was approved by Judge Christopher C. Conner on September 2, 2010. Pursuant to the agreement, DPW agreed to: • assess each plaintiff's eligibility for Medicaid waiver services and develop individualized assessment plans; • develop individualized community support plans for eligible individuals; • ensure that individuals who are eligible for a community-based waiver program are not discharged to a personal care home; • establish a review committee to determine which institutionalized individuals were eligible for release into the community; • provide funding for additional services both in institutions and in the community; • implement enhanced services in state hospitals; • provide the plaintiffs with incident reports concerning class representatives or class members no later than five days after their occurrence; and • issue status reports to the plaintiffs that contain funding updates (every 12 months) and updates on the discharge of class representatives and class members, as well as the admission of individuals to state hospitals (every six months). The settlement agreement was set to terminate 90 days after the provision of community services to the last person identified as eligible for such services. The defendants agreed to pay the plaintiffs $210,000 for attorneys' fees, litigation expenses, and costs incurred. The docket reflects no further litigation in the case since December 2, 2010.

Summary: Individuals with developmental disabilities residing in psychiatric institutions claimed that the state was forcing their unnecessary institutionalization. Pursuant to a settlement agreement, Pennsylvania agreed to modify its service provision to ensure that individuals are able to receive adequate habilitation and support services in the community and be released from institutions.


NOTE: This case is being tracked in close to real time by the Stanford/MIT Healthy Elections Project. So for more current information, see  their tracker. COVID-19 Summary: This lawsuit was filed on May 18, 2020, by the national congressional committee of the Democratic Party and the Oklahoma Democratic Party against the Oklahoma State Election Board, challenging various Oklahoma election laws in light of COVID-19. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief enjoining the defendants from enforcing the challenged provisions and requiring the defendants to provide prepaid postage and postpone the county certification deadline by a week. On September 17, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and terminated the action.
 On May 18, 2020, the national congressional committee of the Democratic Party and the Oklahoma Democratic Party filed a complaint against the Oklahoma State Election Board to challenge the constitutionality of various restrictions for absentee voting such as the Notarization, Witness, Photo Identification, and Postage Requirements, as well as the Absentee Assistance Ban and the Election Day Receipt Deadline. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 and injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically, they sought an order enjoining the defendants from enforcing the challenged laws and requiring the defendants to provide prepaid postage on all absentee ballots and to postpone the county certification deadline by a week for the November 2020 general elections. The plaintiffs also sought attorney fees and were represented by private attorneys. The case was filed at the U.S. District for the Northern District of Oklahoma and was assigned to Judge John Edward Dowdell. In the complaint, the plaintiffs noted that many Oklahomans anticipated voting absentee to avoid the risk of contracting COVID-19 by voting in-person. The plaintiffs noted that the requirement to obtain notarization, secure a witness, copy identification and purchase stamps required voters to risk infection and expend money to participate in the election, which created an undue burden on the right to vote against the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They also alleged that the Postage Requirement was an unconstitutional poll tax against the Fourteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments. The plaintiffs further noted that the Absentee Assistance Ban foreclosed organizations from providing assistance to constituents by delivering their sealed voted ballots upon request, which would primarily assist low-income communities with fewer polling locations. Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that the ban which limits the number of voices who will convey the DCCC’s Oklahoma Democratic Party’s messages violates Free Speech and Associational Rights. Lastly, the plaintiffs challenged the Election Day Receipt Deadline, which imposed a cut off time for 7:00 PM on Election Day to count the ballots regardless of when the ballot was postmarked. The plaintiffs argued that because the current postal system was overburdened, the deadline threatened to disenfranchise voters for circumstances beyond their control in violation of due process. On June 11, the complaint was amended to additionally request an order enjoining the Ballot Request Criminalization, which prevents a third party from assisting in requesting absentee ballots on behalf of individuals, and from enforcing the Absentee Assistance Criminalization, which prevents a third party in assisting in the collection and submission of their absentee ballots. On June 19, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue, or in the alternative, to transfer the case to the Western District of Oklahoma. The defendants argued that the only proper defendant was the Secretary of the Oklahoma State Election Board, who resides in the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs filed a response on July 10 and argued that other members of the Election Board were also proper defendants because they had authority over county election boards. The plaintiffs noted that numerous people burdened by the challenged restrictions resided in the Northern District of Oklahoma; therefore, they argued the venue was proper. On August 4, the court found that the Board Members were proper defendants and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss or transfer venue. On August 19, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction, and a hearing was held on August 26. On September 17, the court denied the plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief and terminated the action, finding that the state’s interest in preventing voter fraud and maintaining confidence in voting outweighed the burdens imposed upon Oklahoma voters. 2020 WL 5569576. The case is ongoing.