On January 1, 2011, immigrants whose work authorization was denied filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, claimed that USCIS had unlawfully found plaintiffs ineligible for employment authorization based on the erroneous determination that their adjustment applications were no longer pending at the time employment authorization was sought. Further, plaintiffs alleged that the immigration court was not providing them with evidence that demonstrated that they had renewed their adjustment of status applications in removal proceedings. Plaintiffs sought class certification and injunctive, declaratory, and mandamus relief. In an amended complaint, plaintiffs added the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") as a defendant. Each named plaintiff was a beneficiary of an I-140 immigrant visa petition based on employment (or status as a spouse) and had applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident (I-485). USCIS denied the adjustment applications, and each plaintiff was consequently placed in removal proceedings. In those removal proceedings, each plaintiff renewed his adjustment application and filed an application for employment authorization (I-765) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 274a.12(c)(9). USCIS denied their employment authorization applications, finding that plaintiffs' adjustment applications were no longer pending despite the renewal of said applications in the removal proceedings. Plaintiffs sought (1) to compel USCIS to interpret Section 274a.12(c)(9) to mean that adjustment of status applications filed during removal proceedings count as pending before the immigration grant; and (2) to compel EOIR to issue some type of confirmatory receipts to individuals who have renewed adjustment applications, so that individuals could prove they have renewed their adjustment applications when seeking employment authorization. On August 9, 2012, the parties settled. The settlement stipulated that USCIS recognizes that adjustment of status application properly renewed with the immigration court by an alien in removal proceedings constituted a "pending" application for purposes of renewing employment authorization. The defendants denied all liability and the individual named plaintiffs' claims were dismissed without prejudice. Even after settlement, court activity continued. On April 26, 2013, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On May 20, 2013, they withdrew the motion. The settlement set out that if EOIR and USCIS met certain key terms, the parties would file a joint stipulation to voluntarily dismiss the action with prejudice; this has not happened. The settlement was set to last until either that voluntary dismissal takes place, or two years, whichever is later. Since there has been no voluntary dismissal, this case remains open, though currently inactive. (There has been no docket activity since 2013.)

Summary: On January 1, 2011, immigrants whose work authorization was denied filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Plaintiffs claimed asserting that their applications had been unlawfully denied due to the misinterpretation of the federal immigration law. On August 9, 2012, the court dismissed the case pursuant to a settlement agreement, in which USCIS recognized that adjustment of status application properly renewed with the immigration court by an alien in removal proceedings constitutes a "pending" application for purposes of renewing employment authorization.


On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Arizona filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen aimed at shedding light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump's January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders (EO) that banned admission to the U.S. for nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Specifically, the plaintiff sought information “concerning CBP’s local implementation of President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order...as well as any other judicial order or executive directive issued regarding the Executive Order,” including President Trump’s March 6, 2017 Executive Order. The request concerned implementation at sites within the purview of CBP’s Tucson Field Office, including Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport. The request also concerned the number of individuals who were detained or subjected to secondary screening, extended questioning, enforcement examination, or consideration for a waiver at the aforementioned airports pursuant to the EO. In the complaint, the plaintiff argued that the requested records “would facilitate the public’s understanding of how Defendants implemented and enforced the Executive Orders,” and that “[s]uch information is critical to the public’s ability to hold the government accountable.” The case was assigned to Judge Deborah M. Fine. On May 8, 2017,  the government filed a motion to treat all of these FOIA cases as “multidistrict litigation,” effectively consolidating them before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The ACLU filed their opposition to the motion to transfer on May 30, arguing that “[g]ranting consolidation and transfer would promote forum-shopping and delay, not justice.” On August 3, 2017 the U.S. District Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation denied the government’s consolidation motion. In its order, the Panel found that, although the thirteen FOIA cases shared “a limited number of factual issues,” these issues “appear[ed] relatively straightforward and unlikely to entail extensive pretrial proceedings.” Litigation continued over a production schedule, and on June 5, 2018 the court (now Judge Diane Humetewa) ordered the government to complete its production on a rolling basis by November 30, 2018. On June 22, 2018 the court amended its order to indicate that documents were to be processed by, rather than produced by, November 30, 2018. On December 4, 2018, the defendants reported that the processing of documents was completed on October 31, 2018. On May 24, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for attorneys’ fees, claiming that it was entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $88,900 and costs in the amount of $400.00. The court granted the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees in the amount of $76,900 and costs in the amount of $400.00 on March 27, 2020. On March 31, 2020, the court directed the court clerk to close the case. This case is closed.

Summary: On April 12, 2017, the ACLU of Arizona filed this suit under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). This was one of over a dozen such suits; each aimed to shed light on how U.S. Customs and Border Protection implemented President Trump’s January 27 and March 6 Executive Orders that banned admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. The document production was completed on October 31, 2018; the case is closed.


This class-action lawsuit was filed on April 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs were elderly and/or disabled recipients of Medicaid who received daily twenty-four-hour split-shift in-home care through the New York State Medicaid program. The suit was filed against the Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health and the Executive Deputy Commissioner of the New York State of Temporary and Disability Assistance (the "State Defendants"), and against the Administrator of the New York City Human Resources Administration/Department of Social Services (the "City Defendant"). Plaintiffs brought the action under the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq. and its implementing regulations; Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq. and its implementing regulations; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; and the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief. The City Defendant had notified members of the putative class that their home care service hours would be reduced, even though their current level of care was physician-prescribed and there had been no changes to their medical conditions or treatment needs, on the basis that the plaintiffs did not meet the "total assistance" requirement of Medicaid regulations. Plaintiffs argued that this policy was arbitrary and irrational, and that because there was not change in the plaintiffs' conditions, these reductions violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Plaintiffs argued that the defendants had discriminated against plaintiffs on the basis of disability and that they had put the plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization, contrary to the integration and anti-discrimination and mandates of the ADA and Section 504. Plaintiffs also alleged the defendants had violated the Medicaid Act by denying Medicaid recipients a level of equal in amount, scope, and duration to that provided to other Medicaid recipients with the same medical needs. On June 12, 2012, the parties agreed to a joint stipulation in lieu of temporary restraining order proceedings before the court, wherein the defendants agreed not to reduce the hours of any additional patients, with very limited exceptions, while the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was pending before the Court. On June 28, 2012, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint that removed references to preliminary relief. On August 29, 2012, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all claims against the Executive Deputy Commissioner. The Commissioner of the New York State Department of Health remained in the case. On September 4, 2012, the Court (Judge Shira A. Scheindlin) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction in part, preventing the defendants from reducing any patients care while the case was pending or until further decisions, except in cases where there were changes to a patient's condition that made the service reduction medically appropriate, as certified by a physician who had personally examined the patient. The Court declined to reinstate twenty-four-hour split-shift care for all those patients whose level of care had been reduced between October 4, 2011 and the date of the injunction. Strouchler v. Shah, 891 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The Court denied the Defendants' motion to modify this preliminary injunction on September 12, 2012. On October 5, 2012, the Court (Judge Scheindlin) granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification, with the Court amending the definition as: "[a]ll New York City Medicaid recipients of continuous personal care services who, at any time since January 1, 2011, have been threatened with unlawful reduction or discontinuance of these services or whose care has been unlawfully reduced or discontinued because the City Defendant has determined that they do not meet the medical criteria for these services." The Court explained that, because the preliminary injunction was in place, it was unnecessary to include the words "or will be." Strouchler v. Shah, 286 F.R.D. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). On October 15, 2012, the parties filed a joint stipulation, with the defendants' agreeing to reinstate the split-shift care of an individual member of the purported class whose service had been reduced to sleep-in care prior to the date of the preliminary injunction. On November 12, 2012, in the wake of the Hurricane Sandy disaster, the Court ordered the defendants to restore split-shift care to 16 individuals identified by the plaintiffs. This order was modified by an order dated November 16, 2012, which referred to a state-level directive ordering the restoration of split-shift care to certain individuals already being served by a "managed long-term care provider." The parties then proceeded to the discovery phase of the litigation, while engaging in settlement negotiations. Two years later, on May 27, 2014, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by Judge Scheindlin on September 12 of the same year. Under the terms of the settlement agreement, the State and City Defendants agreed that continuous personal care services of any Medicaid recipient thereof shall not be reduced or terminated for any of five reasons: "the recipient needs only 'some' assistance;" "the recipient's needs can be predicted or scheduled;" "the recipient's only medical needs are turning and positioning;" "there has been a change in the recipient's medical condition, unless [the State or City] Defendant submits to the recipient a notice that identifies the change and states why the prior services are no longer needed;" or "there has been a mistake in the previous assessment, unless the [local district or City Defendant] submits to the recipient a notice that identifies the mistake and states why the prior services are not needed." The agreement further stipulates that the State Defendant is to make best efforts to amend state law such that it is consistent with the agreement under the New York State Administrative Procedure Act. In exchange, the plaintiffs released the City and State Defendants from all claims. The case was closed on September 16, 2014.

Summary: This class-action lawsuit was filed on April 23, 2012 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiffs suit were elderly and/or disabled recipients of Medicaid who received daily twenty-four-hour split-shift in-home care, without which they would not have been able to live in their own homes in the general community. The suit was filed against New York City and State health officials. The Defendants had notified members of the putative class that their home care service hours would be reduced, even though there had been no changes to their medical conditions or treatment needs. Plaintiffs argued these reductions violated the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, the Medicaid Act, and prior court orders. On September 4, 2012, the Court granted in part the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, preventing the Defendants from reducing patients from split-shift care to a lower level of care while the case was pending, with some exceptions. On November 12, 2012, in the wake of the Hurricane Sandy disaster, the Court ordered the Defendants to restore split-shift care to 16 individuals identified by the Plaintiffs. On May 27, 2014, the parties filed a settlement agreement, which was approved by the Court on September 12 of that year. Under the agreement, the defendants agreed not to terminate or reduce personal care to Medicaid recipients for a variety of reasons. The case was closed on September 16, 2014.


On February 14, 2008, a pretrial detainee filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiff sued TransCor America, LLC and two of its employee officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988. TransCor is a company that transports pretrial detainees and prisoners throughout the United States for federal, state, and local governments. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, initiated this action on behalf of himself and all persons similarly situated. He requested declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The complaint included two claims for relief for: (1) violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and (2) violation of civil rights under California Civil Code § 52.1. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's policy, practice, or custom of transporting pretrial detainees and prisoners in poor conditions amounted to violations of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. He also claimed that these practices violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from the use to excessive force. The plaintiff alleged that TransCor transported pretrial detainees and prisoners in small metal cages in which they could neither stand up nor lie down for more than 24 hours at a time, handcuffed, chained, and in shackles. He also claimed that TransCor failed to provide its detainees with adequate foods, fluids, exercise, hygiene, and medical care. Plaintiff also claimed that after four days of traveling, the two individual defendant employees of TransCor sprayed his face with pepper spray, walked him into poles, and punched him. Plaintiff was not allowed to shower or change clothes or see a nurse or a doctor until approximately two days later. On May 8, 2008, the case was assigned to Judge Susan Illston who remained the district court judge for the life of the case. On August 11, 2008, she denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint but granted its motion for a more definite statement on the plaintiff's claims under California law. In response to that order, on August 21, 2008, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint adding two additional named plaintiffs and specifying its claimed civil rights violations under California law. Discovery began in early 2009. Judge Illston issued a protective order to maintain business confidentiality for TransCor. On October 14, 2009, Judge Illston denied the defendants' motion to transfer venue and granted the plaintiffs' motion to file a second amended complaint. 2009 WL 3334889. On October 19, 2009, the plaintiffs filed their second amended complaint. It widened the definition of the class to include pretrial detainees and prisoners whose claims were timely as of February 14, 2006, two years before the original complaint was filed. The plaintiffs indicated that they had unintentionally excluded class members, including juveniles and state hospital inmates, who they learned more about during pre-class certification discovery. On February 16, 2010, Judge Illston granted part of the plaintiffs' motion for class certification by granting certification to a class more narrow than sought by the plaintiffs. 2010 WL 583972. Specifically, it defined the class as pretrial detainees and prisoners transported by TransCor on behalf of a state agency between February 14, 2006 and February 16, 2010 who were forced to remain in restraints in the transport vehicle for more than 24 hours without being allowed to sleep overnight in a bed. It excluded anyone transported by TransCor on behalf of a federal agency. She also established a subclass to include people transported for more than 24 hours without being allowed to sleep in a bed. On March 16, 2010, Judge Illston approved the plaintiffs' motion to post a notice of pendency of this class action in Prison Legal News for three successive months. The defendants subsequently sought to appeal that order. On April 21, 2011, Judges Raymond Fisher and Milan Smith Jr. of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, denied defendants' petition to appeal the District Court's class action certification. On January 24, 2011, the United States Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for writ of certiorari. Once back before the District Court, the parties each moved for summary judgment. On August 8, 2012, Judge Illston granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that on a class-wide basis, the fact that class members were transported, restrained, and denied overnight sleep in a bed for 24 hours did not amount to a constitutional violation. 2012 WL 3257659. She noted that this did not preclude finding a constitutional violation for individual prisoners who were detained for longer periods or in different conditions with specific injuries. On October 11, 2012, Judge Illston denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend the class certification order to establish classes of persons transported for two, three, four or more days. The effect of these orders was to restart the clock on the statute of limitations applicable to claims of persons who had been in the originally certified class. On December 12, 2012, the court granted the plaintiffs' request to prominently publish information about the litigation in Prison Legal News, explaining that the claims of other prisoners would be barred if they did not move to file their own actions in court. On January 31, 2013, Judge Illston ordered the case dismissed with prejudice after the parties advised her that they agreed to a private settlement, though she noted that they could file something with the court within the next 90 days to get it back on the calendar if settlement had not yet occurred. On April 3, 2013, Judge Illston granted the parties' request to amend the order to stipulate that while the claims for the three named plaintiffs were dismissed with prejudice, the claims of the other class members were dismissed without prejudice. It also stated that the settlement did not include any side paying the others' attorney fees. On April 8, 2013, members of the original class who did not settle filed another class action complaint in the Northern District of California, which is also in this Clearinghouse. On May 24, 2013, Judge Illston issued a notice that this second suit against Transcor America was related to the first and would be reassigned to her. Transcor moved for a venue transfer to the Middle District of Tennessee, which Judge Illston granted finding that while either venue was generally proper, Tennessee was more convenient as the location of TransCor's headquarters, non-party witnesses, and relevant documents. That case was transferred on August 29, 2013. This case, however, is now closed.

Summary: In February 2008, a pretrial detainee filed this class action suit against a private prison transport company claiming the conditions under which detainees were transported were cruel and unusual; detainees were held, handcuffed and shackled, in cages too small to stand up or lie down in, denied adequate fluid, hygiene or medical care for as many as four days of travel. The company attempted to appeal the judge's definition of the class to the United States Supreme Court but certiorari was denied. The case was later settled between the company and the three named plaintiffs. As a result, other members of the class filed their own separate lawsuit with a related claim against the same company.


[For unknown reasons, the docket does not begin with the complaint, but instead begins with a 1988 order and skips ahead nearly three years to a motion filed in 1991.] On August 15, 1988, prisoners brought this class action lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut. They sought to challenge the policies and practices of the Connecticut Department of Corrections (DOC) pertaining to the care, custody and confidentiality issues of prisoners with AIDS, AIDS-Related Complex (ARC), or HIV infections. The prisoners were represented by attorneys from the Legal Services Organization at Yale Law School, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union Foundation, and the Center for Children's Advocacy. On February 10, 1989, Judge Peter Dorsey certified the plaintiff class. The class consisted of all persons who were at any time since August 15, 1985, or would be, subject to the care and custody of the DOC, but excluding the individuals in the class certified in Smith v. Meachum, also in this Clearinghouse (PC-CT-0008). The plaintiffs sought interim relief of their claims relating to deficiencies in the provision of information about HIV infection to the prison population and the inadequate counseling services available for the results of HIV-related tests. A consent judgment was filed on November 2, 1990 regarding health care for HIV-infected prisoners and the confidentiality of HIV-related information. These provisions included sections on intake and assessment, delivery of routine health services, access to medical care for acute illnesses, drug therapies, health care records, prescription and administration of medications, emergency kits, diet, mental health care, dental care, eye care and additional criteria for HIV-infected women, discharge planning, housing of symptomatic HIV-infected prisoners, staff education, staffing, quality assurance, confidentiality and monitoring. An Agreement Monitoring Panel (AMP) was to be established to monitor compliance with the Judgment. The AMP was to provide monitoring reports, and the DOC was also required to submit written compliance reports. 1990 WL 261348. Magistrate Judge Joan Margolis approved the Consent Judgment, and notice was given to interested parties. District Judge Jose Cabranes approved the Consent Judgment on December 6, 1990. The docket begins with a 1988 order referring the case to Magistrate Judge Margolis, signed by Judge Cabranes, and skips ahead nearly three years to a motion by plaintiffs filed on August 5, 1991 for injunctive relief and enforcement of judgment. The docket indicates that several compliance reports and AMP reports were filed between 1991 and 1993. On October 7, 1993, Judge Cabranes issued an order stating that in accordance with colloquy with counsel on the record in open court at a hearing on October 4, 1993, the case was to be closed by October 18, 1993 if no objection was received. On April 26, 1994, Judge Cabranes issued an Order of Dismissal, and the case was closed. The next entry on the docket indicated that a letter was sent to the court by plaintiffs on May 2, 1994, and on May 6, 1994, the court modified the Order of Dismissal such that the action was to remain under the court's active supervision with respect to monitoring the defendants' compliance with the Consent Judgments. On November 19, 1998, the case was reassigned to Judge Christopher Droney. Monitoring continued, and status conferences were held periodically. On January 29, 2001, Judge Droney issued an order giving consent to trial before Magistrate Judge Margolis. Several other status conferences were held, and on February 24, 2003 the court ordered the State of Connecticut to reimburse plaintiffs' counsel for services rendered from May 2000 through February 2003. The court received a letter on December 7, 2016, from a former prisoner regarding the consent judgment entered in this case. However, as the author of the letter no longer resided in a DOC facility, the following day, the court found that the author was no longer a class member. As of December 2019, the docket shows no further activity.

Summary: On August 15, 1988, prisoners brought a class action suing the Connecticut Department of Corrections for the quality of care and confidentiality provided to inmates coping with AIDS. The prisoners were granted class action status and then were granted a consent judgment in 1990 which provided for an Agreement Monitoring Panel to ensure compliance with the consent judgment. Monitoring of compliance may continue, but there has been no recent activity on the docket as of December 2019.


Individuals with developmental disabilities residing in Pennsylvania's ICF/MR ("intermediate care facilities/intellectual disability") institutions filed this lawsuit claiming that they are inappropriately denied the opportunity to receive services in the community, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act under the 1999 Supreme Court precedent Olmstead v. L.C.. The Plaintiffs argue that they are inappropriately institutionalized. They allege that they are candidates for community placement and that they wish to live in the community, but the state's policies and procedures (including the failure to use certain state assessment tools, the limitation on the availability of Consolidated Waiver funds, and the state's failure to accept funds from the federal government's "Money Follows the Person" program) prevent their community placement. The Plaintiffs filed their complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania on June 22, 2009. The district court (Judge John E. Jones) granted the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification on September 2, 2009. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on on September 24, 2009, but the court denied their motion on January 25, 2010. On November 10, 2009, a group of ICF/MR residents who wished to continue residing in institutions filed a motion to intervene in the lawsuit, claiming that their interests weren't adequately represented by the class. The District Court (Judge Jones) denied this motion on March 10, 2010, finding that the proposed intervenors would not be considered part of the class (because the class was defined by its members' desire to live in the community) and that their interests were not sufficiently affected by the case, because the outcome would only affect those who wanted to leave institutions. On April 5, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention. 432 Fed.Appx. 94. In June 2010, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The United States (DOJ Civil Rights Division) filed a brief supporting the Plaintiffs' motion. On January 27, 2011, the court granted summary judgment for the Plaintiffs. Then, on April 29, 2011, the parties entered a settlement agreement and received the court's preliminary approval. The settlement agreement will, if adopted, create a "Planning List" for ICF/MR residents who wish to transition to the community. The State will implement an integration plan that would move 50 to 100 ICF/MR residents to the community each year for a period of five years and will continue to move individuals on the Planning List to the community until no remaining class members are left in ICF/MR facilities. In the period leading up to the court's fairness hearing on the class settlement agreement, the group of proposed intervenors (the same individuals whose intervention had been previously denied) once again moved to intervene. On August 16, 2011, the District Court once again denied this motion. Then, on September 2, 2011, the court held a fairness hearing and gave its final approval to the settlement agreement. The proposed intervenors, however, once again appealed their denial of intervention to the Third Circuit. On December 12, 2012, the Court of Appeals reversed the district court, finding this time that the proposed intervenors had established that they would be adversely affected by the implementation of the settlement agreement, as some ICF/MR institutions would likely close as a result. Therefore, intervention in conjunction with the remedial stage was appropriate. The Court of Appeals ordered that the District Court's September 2011 approval of the settlement agreement be vacated and that the pro-institution individuals be permitted to intervene in order to challenge the settlement and seek decertification of the class. 701 F.3d 938. On June 11, 2014, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into a revised settlement agreement. The revised settlement agreement was a result of mediation between the plaintiffs, defendants, and the intervenors - thus now recognizing all applicable interests in the case. The revised settlement agreement still utilizes a planning list but at an adequate volume and pace given DPW's budget constraints and administrative burdens. On September 25, 2014, the District Court approved the revised settlement agreement and closed this case.

Summary: Individuals with developmental disabilities residing in Pennsylvania's ICF/MR institutions challenged policies that led to unnecessary institutionalization in violation of Olmstead. Although the parties reached a settlement agreement which would allow ICF/MR residents who desired community placement to transition to the community, the case remained open after a December 2012 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, which allows developmentally disabled individuals who wish to continue residing in institutions to challenge the settlement. In September 2014, the District Court approved a revised settlement agreement by the parties and closed this case.


On March 28, 2007, juvenile prisoners of the Alameda County Juvenile Hall filed a class action civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the policies, practices, and customs concerning the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Hall. The named plaintiffs were all juveniles who alleged that they were arrested for petty offenses and then repeatedly subjected to strip searches and/or visual body cavity searches. The searches were allegedly performed pursuant to the official Alameda County Juvenile Hall policy, in which officers routinely subjected detainees in their custody to strip and visual body cavity searches before they were arraigned and without having any reasonable suspicion that the juveniles possessed contraband or weapons. That strip search policy, plaintiffs alleged, violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and California state law. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, monetary damages, and class certification. The County and the other individually named defendants filed answer generally denying all allegations. On August 22, 2008, the Court (Judge Maxine M. Chesney) approved a preliminary order granting class certification and approving of the parties' Consent Decree. In the Consent Decree, the Defendant agreed to revise its strip search policy to be in compliance with state and federal law, and to pay damages of up to $4,286,660 to the Plaintiff Class who choose to file claims for damages. The Defendant also agreed to pay $1,000,000 in attorneys fees and up to $250,000 for costs associated with the litigation. The Court officially entered judgment on February 27, 2009 and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Summary: On March 28, 2007, juvenile prisoners of the Alameda County Juvenile Hall filed a class action civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, challenging the use of strip searches and visual body cavity searches in the Alameda County Juvenile Hall. On August 22, 2008 the parties signed a Consent Decree in which the Defendant agreed to revise its strip search policy, to pay the Plaintiff Class up to $4,286,660 in damages, and to pay $1.25 million in fees and costs. The case was dismissed with prejudice on February 27, 2009.


This is a case about the right of media access for five prisoners involved in the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) prison uprising in April 1993. After 11 days of rioting, one guard and nine prisoners were murdered, as well as many injuries and tens of millions of dollars of damage. Four prisoners were sentenced to death for their involvement in the riot and classified as restricted population inmates. Journalists sought in-person interviews with the prisoners for the twentieth anniversary of the riot. On December 9, 2013, five prisoners from the SOCF and four media outlets filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) and ODRC's Communications Chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the prison’s interview policies violated their rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments. Represented by the ACLU of Ohio, the plaintiffs sought a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from denying in person media access to the prisoner plaintiffs and requiring a specific and appealable factual basis for any denial with a right to an evidentiary hearing before the court, as well as attorney’s fees and costs. They claimed that they should have been allowed media interviews and that the defendants’ restrictions on media and public access to information were unreasonable. Their interview requests were denied in part due to the anticipated content of the interviews and the potential impact on crime victims. After filing their answer, the defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings on March 18, 2014. The plaintiffs responded to this motion and, following the defendant’s reply, Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus denied the defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings on March 31, 2015. The court held that the plaintiff’s claims were within the statute of limitations, they had not failed to exhaust their administrative remedies, they had standing due to their adequately pled particularized injury, and that, at the pleadings stage, the court was unable to dismiss on a failure to state a claim since it could not yet determine if the “terms of access are reasonably imposed” or if the prisons at issue provided “substantial press and public access to the prison.” 2015 WL 1476551. The Law Offices of Vasvari & Zimmerman took over the representation of the plaintiffs from the ACLU of Ohio on July 6, 2015. On March 24, 2017, Chief Judge Sargus granted in part and denied in part the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment against four of the prisoner plaintiffs, holding that the defendants had applied a reasonable and content-neutral policy in denying interviews with these plaintiffs and that there was no evidence that the defendants had treated the four dismissed prisoner plaintiffs differently than other restricted population inmates. The court denied summary judgment against the remaining plaintiffs. They were the media plaintiffs and one prisoner who was not a restricted population inmate. 2017 WL 1134772. Three days later, the court stayed the case pending the outcome of court-ordered mediation. The remaining plaintiffs filed a request to lift the stay, to continue the scheduled mediation, to reconsider summary judgment, and to allow limited discovery. Chief Judge Sargus granted the continued mediation and waited to rule on the lift of the stay lift, reconsideration of summary judgment, and allowance of discovery until after mediation on June 21, 2017. On July 13, 2017, defendant ODRC voluntarily modified its media policies in order to remedy the surviving injuries. They removed “victims issues that would present a concern” and “the nature of the interview” from consideration when determining whether to approve media interview requests. In August 2017, all of the media plaintiffs' requests to interview the remaining prisoner plaintiff were approved. Chief Judge Sargus denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of summary judgment and motion to compel discovery on September 21, 2017. He granted the plaintiff’s motion to strike the jury demand. The defendants moved for a dismissal of the case as constitutionally moot, arguing that the plaintiffs had fully obtained all of the relief they could receive from this case. On November 28, 2017, Chief Judge Sargus granted the defendants' motion and held that the plaintiffs did not have a live, concrete controversy. On December 27, 2017, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Circuit Judge Julia Smith Gibbons affirmed the partial grant of summary judgment and the later motion to dismiss on September 26, 2018. She held that because the media plaintiffs may now interview the prisoner plaintiff, they no longer need an injunction to prevent the defendants from denying interviews based on the fact that the prisoner plaintiff was involved in the SOCF prison uprising. Chief Judge Gibbons also noted that other than declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees, but a request for attorney’s fees was not enough to save a case from being dismissed as moot. Attorney’s fees were denied and the case was dismissed as moot. 2018 WL 4611039. The ruling of the district court was affirmed and a mandate issued on October 18, 2018. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2013, prisoners involved in the 1993 Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF) prison uprising and media outlets filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The plaintiffs sued the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) and ODRC's Communications Chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violation of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In 2017, summary judgment was granted against four of the prisoners and the SOCF approved all of the media plaintiff’s requests to interview the remaining prisoner plaintiff. The District Court dismissed the case on mootness, the plaintiffs appealed, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The case is closed.


On January 14, 2009, disability rights advocacy organizations and individuals with disabilities in the Los Angeles Area filed a lawsuit on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the City and County of Los Angeles under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; The California Disabled Persons Act, California Civil Code § 54 et. seq. and California Government Code § 11135. The plaintiffs, represented by counsel from Disability Rights Advocates and the Disability Rights Legal Center, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney fees and costs alleging that the defendants discriminated against the 800,000 people with disabilities in the Los Angeles area by failing to create an emergency response plan that would accommodate individuals with disabilities. That failure, the plaintiffs allege, has caused individuals with disabilities to be a greater risk for serious injury or death as the result of a disaster. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that, among other things, the defendants failed to provide mechanisms to communicate with individuals with communication-related disabilities during disasters, the defendants also failed to ensure that the emergency shelter facilities were accessible to individuals with mobility related disabilities, and defendants failed to make specific plans for how to transport individuals with disabilities in response to a disaster. On April 13, 2010, the District Court (Judge Consuelo B. Marshall) certified the case as a class action and identified the class as stipulated to by the parties as all those who are disabled according to the Americans with Disabilities Act that live within the jurisdiction of emergency preparedness services of the City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles County. On October 7, 2010, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, the agency responsible for enforcing the ADA and Section 504, filed a Statement of Interest supporting plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The statement argued that the defendants violated the ADA and Section 504 by failing to account for individuals with disabilities in its disaster response planning and thereby denied them access to public accommodations that received federal funding. On February 10, 2011, the District Court (Judge Marshall) issued an order that among other things, partially granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Court found the defendants were liable under the ADA, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and The California Disabled Persons Act (a violation of the ADA is also constitutes a violation of the California Disabled Persons Act) because the defendants have failed to create any plans that provide persons with disabilities access to the emergency-related benefits of notification regarding emergencies, evacuation services, transportation, and accessible shelters, all of which are provided to those who do not have disabilities. The defendants failed to provide access to shelters by failing to determine which if any of the shelters are accessible to person with disabilities and those with disabilities requiring specific needs such as accommodations that allow for service animals. The court rejected the defendant's argument that it could make ad hoc accommodations for individuals with disabilities and thus did not need to plan for those needs by noting that the purpose of an emergency response plan is to reduce the need for ad hoc decision making by anticipating eventualities. <i>Communities Actively Living Independent and Free v. City of Los Angeles</i> 2011 WL 4595993. On November 9, 2011, the District Court (Judge Marshall) issued an injunction requiring the City of Los Angeles to hire a consultant to evaluate their current emergency management plan and help create a new plan within three years. The City of Los Angeles appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On February 14, 2012, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed by the parties. On June 10, 2013, after years of negotiations and hearings on some objections to the settlement agreement, the District Court (Judge Marshall) approved a six-year settlement agreement between the plaintiffs and the County of Los Angeles where the defendants agree to continue to use consultants to improve their emergency response plans that must be adopted within the six-year term of the agreement; appoint a monitor to oversee the implementation of those plans; and the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism using the magistrate judge as the arbiter of any disputes. On that same day, the District Court (Judge Marshall) also awarded the plaintiffs with attorney fees of $1,225,000 and compensation for the costs of monitoring the settlement agreement of up to $75,000. On July 18, 2013, the District Court (Judge Marshall) entered an order dismissing the case against the County of Los Angeles, but pursuant to the settlement agreement the court retained jurisdiction over disputes arising under the settlement agreement. The parties jointly stipulated that the work required to remedy the violations found by the court was complete, and the court dismissed the case with prejudice on December 5, 2014. The court retained jurisdiction over the case to monitor compliance for more than four years. On October 26, 2018, the parties jointly moved to end the court's jurisdiction over the settlement agreement. The court terminated its jurisdiction on November 16, 2018. This case is now closed.

Summary: On January 14, 2009, disability rights advocacy organizations and individuals with disabilities in the Los Angeles Area filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the City and County of Los Angeles. The Court found that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the California Disabled Persons Act by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities in their emergency response plans thereby excluding disabled persons from government programs and services. In 2011, the court enjoined the City of Los Angeles to hire a consult and create a plan to serve individuals with disabilities within three years. In 2013, the County of Los Angeles reached a settlement with the plaintiff class which involved the adoption of a new emergency response plan that included reasonable accommodations for individuals with disabilities within six years and appointed a monitor to oversee the agreement. The court has also approved fees and costs for the plaintiffs of $1,300,000. The court has retained jurisdiction over disputes arising under the settlement agreement.


On December 10, 2019, a group of arrestees detained by Canadian County who have a financial condition of release that they cannot afford and was set without the presence of counsel and the NAACP of Oklahoma, on behalf of its members, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Canadian County District Court 26th Judicial District and the Special District Judges who oversee and implement the Bail Setting Policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU Disability Rights Program, the ACLU of Oklahoma, and private counsel sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Specifically, they claimed that the Bail Setting Policy—which imposed bail without making any inquiry into an arrestee’s ability to pay and solely based decisions on amounts set forth in a published bail schedule—constituted wealth-based discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, a failure to provide counsel at a critical stage in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and violated both procedural and substantive due process. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the policy violated the First Amendment by failing to provide the public with access to bail determinations. The plaintiffs with disabilities also alleged that by administering a bail policy that does not take into consideration an individual’s disability and does not provide the modifications or effective communication services the defendants discriminated on the basis of disability in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The same day, plaintiffs requested to certify a class and a subclass for arrestees with a disability who were subject to the same bail policy. The case was originally assigned to Judge David L. Russell, but was reassigned to the newly commissioned Judge Jodi W. Dishman on December 24, 2019. On January 22, 2020, defendant Canadian County District Court moved to dismiss all claims arguing that it is not an entity capable of being sued because it is not a political subdivision and is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983, and even if it were, the plaintiffs failed to allege enough facts to state a claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. The same day, the District Judge and Special Judge defendants also moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint because it failed to state a claim and because the judges are entitled to absolute judicial and legislative immunity. Additionally, they argued that Younger abstention counsels against the court hearing the case because of the potential interference with state court proceedings. The plaintiffs filed their responses to the defendants' motions to dismiss on February 12, and defendants filed their replies on February 19. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On December 10, 2019, the NAACP of Oklahoma and a group of arrestees detained by Canadian County who cannot afford their bail, which was set without the presence of counsel, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The plaintiffs sued the Canadian County District Court 26th Judicial District and the Special District Judges who oversee and implement the Bail Setting Policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and 29 U.S.C. § 794 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs claimed that the Bail Setting Policy—which imposed bail without making any inquiry into an arrestee’s ability to pay and solely based decisions on amounts set forth in a published bail schedule—violated the Equal Protection, Due Process Clauses, Sixth Amendment, First Amendment, and both procedural and substantive due process. Plaintiffs with disabilities also alleged discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class and subclass. On January 22, 2020, defendants moved the dismiss the claims. The case is ongoing.


On November 4, 2005, a group of former residents of the Altoona Center, a former state-operated intermediate care facility for persons with mental disabilities filed a lawsuit against the Connonwealth of Pennsylvania under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and various Medicaid statutes in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendants' decision to close the Altoona Center violated their rights under the above-mentioned statutes because no other institution or community-based care facility would be as integrated as the Altoona Center and placement of them into other places might result in abuse, neglect or death. On January 23, 2006, in response to the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction, the Court (Judge Robert Greene) adopted a protocol that would allow the defendants to close the Center and transfer the plaintiffs to other community-based care facilities. On March 23, 2007, the Court (Judge Kim Gibson) denied the proposed intervenors' motion to intervene. On January 12, 2009, the Court (Judge Gibson) granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the cause of action here did not concern the practice of treatment and evaluation of the plaintiffs.

Summary: This case was brought by a group of residents of a former state-operated care facility for mentally disabled against the state of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On January 12, 2009, the Court ruled in favor of the defendants in a summary judgment.


On July 12, 2012, an American woman and a Filipina, residents of California and married under California law, and their son, the biological child of the Filipina spouse, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). The plaintiffs, represented by the Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, the Public Law Center, the Asian Law Alliance, and private counsel, brought suit under 42 U.S.C § 1983; the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.; and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, challenging the defendants' denial of the Filipina spouse's application to waive grounds of inadmissibility for permanent resident status. While an opposite-sex spouse can have grounds of inadmissibility waived under Section 212(i) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), if denial of permanent resident status would "result in extreme hardship to [his or her] citizen...spouse," Section 3 of the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7, which defines "marriage" under federal law as "only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife," renders such a waiver unobtainable for a similarly situated same-sex spouse. Plaintiffs claimed that Section 3 of DOMA thus violates the equal protection and substantive due process protections of the Fifth Amendment, and asked the Court for a declaratory judgment that Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional and an injunction barring the defendants from applying Section 3 to remove, detain or deny immigration benefits to the Filipina spouse, her son (who is eligible for lawful permanent resident status as a derivative beneficiary of his mother's application), or others similarly situated. Class certification was provisionally granted, but the case was stayed pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307. Following the decision in Windsor, defendants maintained that they were reconsidering applications delayed or denied under DOMA. Accepting this as true, the court dismissed the case as moot.

Summary: On July 12, 2012, an American woman and a Filipina, residents of California and married under California law, and their son, the biological child of the Filipina spouse, filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and its Citizenship and Immigration Services. The plaintiffs challenged the defendants' application of DOMA to deny the Filipina spouse's application to waive grounds of inadmissibility for permanent resident status due to the hardship that her failure to attain said status would cause her American same-sex spouse. Class certification was provisionally granted, but the case was stayed pending the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, No. 12-307. Following the decision in Windsor, defendants maintained that they were reconsidering applications delayed or denied under DOMA. Accepting this as true, the court dismissed the case as moot.


In 2005, plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens who were incarcerated in U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, filed suit against the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and three high-ranking U.S. Army officers, alleging violations of the Fifth Amendment due process clause, Fifth and Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the law of nations prohibitions against torture and against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, 6 U.S.T. 3316 and 6 U.S.T. 3516. Plaintiffs alleged they were subject to torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading detention while in U.S. military custody, including beatings, sexual assault, deprivation of food and medical care, and mock executions. The plaintiffs originally filed separate actions in United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, the Northern District of Illinois, the District of South Carolina, and the Southern District of Texas. The multidistrict litigation was consolidated in United States District Court for the District of Columbia, pursuant to an order dated June 17, 2005 under 28 U.S.C. § 1407, and an amended consolidated complaint was filed in January 2006. The American Civil Liberties Union represented the plaintiffs. In March 2006, each of the four defendants moved to dismiss the case. After extensive briefing and oral arguments, the district court dismissed the case against all defendants in March 2007 on the grounds that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to several counts of the complaint, and absolute immunity as to the law of nations and Geneva Conventions complaints, pursuant to the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671, 2674, 2679. In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007). The district court declined plaintiffs' suggestion to infer causes of action for tort liability pursuant to Bivens. The plaintiffs appealed on May 24, 2007 to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal. Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011), rehearing en banc denied, (Sept. 19, 2011).

Summary: In 2005, plaintiffs, four Afghan and five Iraqi citizens who were incarcerated in U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, filed suit against the U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and three high-ranking U.S. Army officers, alleging violations of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the law of nations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, 6 U.S.T. 3316 and 6 U.S.T. 3516. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, a decision affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed in June 2011.


This federal lawsuit is a challenge to a reduction in in-home personal care hours provided to eligible Medicaid recipients in Washington. The plaintiffs in this case were individuals with disabilities who receive in-home personal care and would risk institutionalization if the amount of in-home care is insufficient to meet their care needs (which were determined by the state's individualized assessment process under Medicaid). There are also three organizational plaintiffs which serve individuals with disabilities in Washington. After Washington announced its reduction of care hours (deemed necessary to control state spending), the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington on December 23, 2010 and sought to prevent the reductions from taking effect by filing an accompanying motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On December 30, District Judge Thomas S. Zilly denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The United States filed a statement of interest supporting the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction in January 2011. After some scheduling issues and minor motions, Judge Zilly denied the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction on February 9, 2011. The plaintiffs then appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In December 2011, Judge William Fletcher, writing for a 2-1 majority, reversed the District Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Fletcher's opinion held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of their ADA claims, and that they would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. In June 2012, the Ninth Circuit declined to rehear the case en banc. In October 2012, Washington Governor Christine Gregoire (press release) decided not to appeal the denial of preliminary injunction to the U.S. Supreme Court, thanks in part to an advocacy effort on the part of disability rights organizations. On May 23, 2013, defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the Due Process claims. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on June 17. The parties jointly moved to withdraw their motions on July 18, 2013 to engage in settlement discussions aimed at resolving the case. The court granted their joint motion on July 22. The parties reached a settlement agreement, and the court dismissed the case on September 20, 2013, leaving open the option for parties to reopen the case within 60 days. Since neither party did so, the case is presumably closed. The exact terms of the settlement agreement are unknown.

Summary: Individuals with disabilities receiving in-home care services (and organizations representing them) sued the state of Washington to enjoin the state's proposed reductions in in-home nursing care hours, alleging that this reduction would place plaintiffs at risk of unnecessary institutionalization in violation of the ADA. The parties reached a settlement agreement in 2013, but the terms of the agreement are unknown.


On January 14, 2011, the United States Department of Justice filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, under the Fair Housing Act against a landlord. On behalf of a family of African-American tenants alleging housing discrimination, DOJ asked the Court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. The complaint alleged that the defendant landlords had abusively evicted the tenants and yelled racial epithets at them repeatedly. On April 11, 2011, the parties entered into a consent decree which enjoined the defendants from: 1) refusing to rent or negotiate for the rental of a dwelling to any person because of race or color, 2) making any advertising that indicates a preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race or color, and 3) coercing any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, rights granted or protected by the Fair Housing Act. The defendants agreed to pay $25,000 to the tenants and $5,000 in attorneys' fees. The duration of the order was three years. There was no further activity on the docket after the three year timeframe ended and now the case is presumed closed.

Summary: The United States Department of Justice, on behalf of African-American tenants alleging housing discrimination, filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing Act against landlords, claiming that the tenants had been evicted based on their race. On April 11, 2011, the parties entered into a consent decree in which the defendants agreed to discontinue any discriminatory practices, and to pay $25,000 to the tenants and $5,000 in attorneys' fees. The duration of the order was three years and the case is now presumed closed.


COVID-19 Summary: This class action challenges Louisiana's treatment of people in jail and prison who test positive for COVID-19, specifically the policy of transferring both pre-trial and post-conviction patients to the previously-closed Camp J at Angola Prison. On May 15, the court denied the emergency motion for a temporary restraining order, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case on June 1. The court dismissed the case without prejudice on June 11. <hr> On April 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed this class action complaint alleging that The Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections's (“DOC”) COVID-19 management plan was inconsistent with the CDC Guidance and placed incarcerated individuals at substantial risk of serious harm. Plaintiffs sought to certify a class of all prisoners and pretrial detainees subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The case was assigned to Chief Judge Shelly D. Dick. Specifically, plaintiffs challenged the DOC's plan to transfer COVID-19 patients from prisons and jails across the state to Camp J at the Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”). According to the DOC, patients who test positive for COVID-19 could be transported to LSP’s Camp J for medical isolation. As of April 11, 2020, at least 40 people had been transferred to Camp J. LSP's Camp J was closed in 2018. Previously, it had housed inmates in solitary confinement. According to plaintiffs, the building was notorious for its lack of ventilation, heating, and cooling. Because Camp J’s buildings did not have proper ventilation, plaintiffs argued that its facilities were extremely inappropriate for housing patients with COVID-19, an illness that causes severe respiratory symptoms. Moreover, Camp J was located over an hour away from the nearest medical facility, and plaintiffs alleged that LSP was unable to provide constitutionally adequate medical support on-site. Moreover, plaintiffs alleged that the DOC’s response to COVID-19, including the DOC's 10-page "Flu Regulation" policy, was insufficient to address the pandemic and therefore increased the likelihood that COVID-19 patients would not receive proper treatment. Additionally, plaintiffs alleged that the DOC was not implementing a policy consistent with CDC recommendations, including social distancing and effective quarantining. Also on April 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin Defendants from transferring COVID-19 patients to LSP. A hearing was held on April 30, 2020. On April 25, 2020, Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification. The proposed class consisted of two subclasses: (1) a subclass of all incarcerated individuals who were, or would in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices; and (2) a subclass of all individuals held in pre-trial detention who were, or would in the future be, subjected to the medical care policies and practices of the DOC, and subjected to the DOC’s COVID-19 policies and practices. On May 15, 2020, Judge Dick denied plaintiffs' emergency motion for a temporary restraining order. 2020 WL 2510248. On May 18, 2020, the defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to certify the class. On June 1, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. In light of this, the court found the motion to certify moot on June 5 and dismissed the case without prejudice on June 11. The case is now closed.


This lawsuit, filed on January 31, 2017, challenged President Trump’s January 27, 2017 Executive Order (EO) ban on admission to the U.S. of nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. It was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado on behalf of a Libyan citizen who attended university in the United States. The plaintiff was represented by private counsel. The complaint argued that the threat of being detained or barred from reentry to the U.S. solely pursuant to the EO violated Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process rights, the First Amendment Establishment Clause, federal immigration statutes, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). It further argued that "the unlawful and unconstitutional discrimination against [the plaintiff] and others similarly situated is part of a widespread policy, pattern, and practice infringing on rights of many people traveling after issuance of the EO now subject to suspension, detention and removal." The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief to "prevent such unlawful and unconstitutional harms from occurring now and in the future." The case was assigned to Judge R. Brooke Jackson. The plaintiff lived and attended college in Colorado. He worked and paid taxes in the U.S. The plaintiff's family lived in Libya, and he alleged he was unable to visit them for a family emergency or any other reason due to the risk of not being able to return to the U.S. Soon after filing the original complaint, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on February 10, seeking to designate a class of "all other persons who are nationals of the Designated Countries who currently are, or recently have been, lawfully present in Colorado on student visas and who, but for the January 27, 2017, Executive Order, would be able to travel to the United States or leave and return to the United States." The amended complaint also claimed violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Next, on February 17, the plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and a concurrent motion to expedite the injunction briefing schedule. But on February 21, Judge Jackson denied that motion, finding that the plaintiff had not shown sufficient need for expedited action, given that the EO had been suspended by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington and the 9th Circuit in State of Washington v. Trump. However, Judge Jackson stated that he would reconsider expedited action if the Ninth Circuit's order were vacated or the government released a new EO. Prompted by the adverse developments in the 9th Circuit in the Washington v. Trump case, on March 6, the President rescinded the January 27 EO and replaced it with a narrower one, Executive Order 13780. On the same day, the defendants in this case filed a notice informing the court of the change. The defendants argued that the case was now moot; the plaintiff, they said, would not be affected by the new EO because he was in the United States on January 27 and because he already held a valid student visa. But the defendants soon learned that the plaintiff's student visa had expired, and they therefore filed a March 9 correction to the Mar. 6 notice. In the correction, the defendants noted the visa issue, but also stated that the new EO would not affect the plaintiff; he would be in the United States at the time of its implementation on March 16, whereas the new EO only applied to people outside the United States on that day. The defendants noted that the plaintiff planned to travel to Canada from March 17-23, but reiterated that the new EO would not apply so long as he were in the United States on March 16. The plaintiff's ability to reenter the United States, according to the defendants, would be governed by the INA rather than the EO. Also on March 9, the defendants filed an unopposed motion for an extension of the March 10 deadline to respond to the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. Judge Jackson granted this motion on March 13. Defendants, on April 3, then requested another extension until April 24, citing the need for additional time to respond in light of injunctions granted by other courts against the revised EO. On April 5, the plaintiff asked the court to withdraw his February 17 motion for preliminary injunction, in light of the revised EO. He specified that the defendants consented to the withdrawal and agreed that the plaintiff reserved the right to raise any issues with the new EO in subsequent motions, if necessary. Judge Jackson granted the plaintiff's request for withdrawal on April 5. On April 21, the defendants filed an unopposed motion for a 60-day extension of the April 24 deadline to respond to the plaintiff's first-amended complaint. The defendants again cited the need for additional time to respond in light of the injunctions on the revised EO. Judge Jackson granted this motion on June 13, setting the defendants' response to be due June 23. However, on June 22, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay proceedings, pending the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii v. Trump and IRAP v. Trump. Judge Jackson granted the motion to stay on June 26. The Supreme Court issued a decision in Hawaii v. Trump on June 26, 2018. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the EO, finding it was a lawful exercise of the President's discretion. On May 2, 2019, the plaintiff in this case notified the district court that he was voluntarily dismissing all of his claims. The case was then closed on May 3, 2019.

Summary: This action, filed on Jan. 31, 2017 in D.Colo. by a Libyan LPR, challenged President Trump’s Jan. 27 EO travel ban which would affect the plaintiff's ability to travel outside the U.S. Litigation continued over the subsequent months as the administration revised the ban. The case was then stayed, pending the outcome of the Hawaii and IRAP cases at the U.S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court issued a decision on June 26, 2018, rejecting the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the EO. The plaintiff in this case then voluntarily dismissed all of his claims on May 2, 2019, and the case was closed.


On May 1, 2014, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), an international non-profit digital rights group, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The plaintiff sued the Department of Justice (DOJ) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552. The EFF, representing itself, sought the expedited processing and release of records requested from the DOJ and the National Security Division (NSD). The EFF claimed that the requested records concerned an actual or alleged federal government activity about which there is an urgency to inform the public, and that the requests were made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information. Specifically, the EFF claimed that the requested records also involved a matter of widespread and exceptional media interest, with possible questions about the governments’ integrity, and thereby affected public confidence. The case was assigned to Judge Rosemary M. Collyer. The DOJ responded on June 2, 2014, and generally denied any and all allegations. The DOJ noted that there has been an ongoing public debate about the government’s foreign intelligence collection pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as amended (“FISA”), and that there is legislation pending in Congress. On August 1, the EFF filed for a preliminary injunction and sought an order requiring the DOJ to expedite the processing of the four FOIA requests DOJ-NSD and to complete the processing and release of all records within 10 days. The four requests were: (1) August 23, 2013 request seeking disclosure of two Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinions; (2) October 31, 2013 request seeking disclosure of two FISC opinions and associated documents; (3) (3) February 24, 2014 request seeking disclosure of any still secret Foreign Intelligence Court of Review (FISCR) decisions and any opinion and orders of the U.S. Supreme Court in any matter appealed from the FISCR; and (4) March 14, 2014 request seeking disclosure of three separate FISC opinions and related documents. In response, the DOJ submitted a 22-page memorandum of law on August 8, 2014, arguing that: (1) the EFF is unlikely to succeed on the merits of its claim that the DOJ failed to expedite the processing of the four FOIA requests; (2) the EFF has not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a mandatory injunction; (3) the mandatory emergency injunction that EEF sought would harm the public interest; and (4) EFF’s requested mandatory injunction is improper because it would afford them full relief, not intermediate relief. It appears that the DOJ produced various documents, and EFF withdrew most of its requests. On September 5, 2014, the EFF withdrew its request for preliminary injunction, and the Court granted the EFF’s request to a firm schedule for agency determinations on its FOIA requests. On October 30, 2015, the court noted in its opinion that at this point, EFF challenged only the withholding of one single document (a specific FISC opinion). The court denied the EFF’s request on the grounds that it is exempt from disclosure because the opinion is properly classified and because its disclosure is prohibited by statute. The court referenced a related FOIA suit also involving EFF and the release of a FISC opinion (Electronic Frontier Foundation v. DOJ, 57 F. Supp. 3d 54 (D.D.C. 2014)), whereby Judge Amy Berman Jackson held that the DOJ properly withheld the FISC opinion because the information was classified and exempt from disclosure under FOIA. Summary judgement was entered in favor of the DOJ. 141 F.Supp.3d 51. 2015; U.S. Dist. LEXIS 147182. The EFF filed an appeal to United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on December 30, 2015. On January 12, 2016 the EFF requested the district court to reconsider its judgement, arguing that the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015), enacted on June 2, 2015, rendered the government’s classification decision improper. The EFF referred specifically to Section 402 of USA Freedom, now codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1872. EFF argued that the DOJ’s exemption claims are inconsistent with the requirements of USA FREEDOM, for (1) the withheld opinion contains a significant interpretation of 50 U.S.C. § 1809, and (2) because the withheld opinion can no longer be ‘validly’ classified in full, the exemption invoked by the DOJ cannot apply. On February 16, 2015, EFF withdrew the motion for reconsideration subsequent to receiving the Government’s view that Section 402 of the USA FREEDOM Act applies only prospectively to significant decisions of the FISC. During the same period, on January 29, 2016, the EFF submitted to the appellate court a statement of issues, within which it questioned whether the district court erred in ruling that the DOJ was not obligated under the FOIA to disclose a responsive, requested record here the agency failed to establish that the record was properly withheld in its entirety under FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. On April 8, 2016, EFF moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, as the FISC opinion it sought had become publicly available. The court clerk ordered the case as dismissed on April 27, 2016. 2016 WL 3041648. The case is closed.

Summary: In 2014, an international non-profit digital rights group, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), filed a FOIA request in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Plaintiffs sought the expedited processing and release of records requested from the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the National Security Division. It appears that during the litigation process, the DOJ produced various documents, and EFF withdrew most of its requests. In October 2015, the District Court denied EFF’s request for one specific Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinion on the grounds that it was exempt from disclosure because the opinion was properly classified and because its disclosure was prohibited by statute. EFF appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in December 2015. In April 2016, EFF moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal, as the FISC opinion it sought had become publicly available. The case is closed.


On August 22, 2007, lawful permanent residents whose naturalization adjudications had been delayed more than 120 days filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of California against the DHS, FBI, DOJ, and USCIS. Plaintiffs alleged that the delay in adjudicating their naturalization applications violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC 1447(b)), which requires applications to be adjudicated within 120 days. Plaintiffs also claimed that defendants had violated the Administrative Procedures Act for unreasonable and extraordinary delay in adjudication and for failure to follow notice-and-comment requirements. Finally, they brought a claim for violation of due process. The plaintiffs sought class certification on behalf of "[a]ll persons residing within the Southern District of California who have submitted or will submit applications for naturalization to CIS, and who have met all statutory requirements for naturalization, and whose applications for naturalization are not adjudicated within 120 days of the date of their naturalization examinations." They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They also asked to be naturalized by the district court. The ACLU brought the lawsuit as part of a nationwide effort to challenge systemic delays in naturalization caused by the USCIS decision to expand dramatically the databases used for the FBI name check. Using this over-inclusive database caused prolonged delays for lawful permanent residents who applied for citizenship. On March 11, 2008, the District Court (Judge Roger T. Benitez) dismissed plaintiffs' claims with respect to the unreasonable delays, the notice-and-comment procedures, and due process. The court remanded the named plaintiffs' naturalization applications to the agency "with instructions that USCIS adjudicate plaintiffs' naturalization without unreasonable delay." On August 22, 2008, plaintiffs filed notice to appeal the district court's order to remand. In April 2009, USCIS and the FBI undertook a "Joint Business Plan" that committed new resources to eliminating the backlog of delayed FBI name checks for naturalization applicants. That month, the appeal was voluntarily dismissed. In August 2009, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees, finding that plaintiffs were not the prevailing parties.

Summary: In 2007, lawful permanent residents whose naturalization adjudications had been delayed more than 120 days alleged that the delays violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, the APA and their right to due process. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. They also asked to be naturalized by the district court. The court dismissed plaintiffs' claims and remanded to USCIS to adjudicate the naturalization applications without delay. This case was part of a broader impact litigation initiative, and in April 2009, USCIS and the FBI undertook a "Joint Business Plan" that committed new resources to eliminating the backlog of delayed FBI name checks for naturalization applicants.


Riddick v. Facebook is a lawsuit brought to hold Facebook accountable for discriminatory advertising practices relating to users’ personal characteristics such as sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, marital status, citizenship, primary language, immigration status, and age. Facebook’s discriminatory practices violate California Civil Code Sections 51, 51.5, and 52. This lawsuit was brought in concurrence with 66 civil rights lawsuits filed against employers including employers Nebraska Furniture Mart, Sandhills Publishing Company, Need Work Today, Renewal by Andersen LLC, Rice Tire, JK Moving Services, Enhanced Roofing & Modeling, and Xenith for using Facebook ads to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, age, disability, and other protected classes. The claims were filed in response to an  investigation by ProPublica which exposed the discriminatory advertising on Facebook. In November 2016, the first civil rights lawsuit was filed against Facebook in California, on behalf of millions of people of color who had missed opportunities for housing, jobs, and credit. This prompted a second major lawsuit by the Fair Housing Advocates in New York. On July 26, 2018, this action was moved to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act. Facebook moved to consider whether this action was related to Onuoha v. Facebook (Mobley v. Facebook) (N.D. Cal.). On September 10, 2018, the court found that the cases were not related. Additionally, on October 31, 2018, Facebook moved to dismiss the plaintiff's second amended complaint. Facebook lawyers initially moved to have Riddick v. Facebook and the four related cases dismissed. When the CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, testified before congress earlier in April 2018, he acknowledged that protecting people from illegal ad discrimination was a work in progress. Following the hearing, Facebook agreed to a civil rights audit. The holistic review of all possible civil rights issues on Facebook was led by Laura Murphy, the former head of the ACLU in Washington, and included experts from the Congressional Black Caucus, the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, and the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus. The outcome of this review led to a settlement of this charge and several other pending cases. Prior to settlement, on November 19, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a third amended complaint. The plaintiffs alleged that Facebook and other advertiser defendants violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the California Civil Code by collaborating "in creating, developing, and/or utilizing" tools to "not publish, not provide, and not send ads and the information in those ads" to persons "based on their protected personal characteristics." In March 2019, Facebook reached settlements in three civil rights cases and two complaints before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission over ad discrimination on its platform. The settlement included Riddick v. Facebook (N.D. Cal.), Communications Workers of America v. Facebook (EEOC), Spees v. Facebook (EEOC), Mobley v. Facebook (N.D. Cal.), and National Fair Housing Alliance v. Facebook (S.D.N.Y), all available on the Clearinghouse. Facebook COO Sheryl Sandberg commented on the settlement in a blog post: “There is a long history of discrimination in the areas of housing, employment, and credit, and this harmful behavior should not happen through Facebook ads…We can do better.” Sandburg attributed the civil rights audit in Facebook’s decision to settle. The terms of the settlement included promises by Facebook to make significant changes to their advertising tools to curb the availability of advertisers to target users based on protected characteristics. The changes will affect Facebook, Instagram, and Messenger. Facebook agreed to create a separate portal for ads in areas of housing, employment and credit. The parties agreed to monitor the changes for three years and to study the potential that the algorithm creates unintended bias. Finally, Facebook promised to change how it targets audiences for advertisements without using protected classes like race and gender to generate an audience. On March 19, 2019, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint. As of April 2020, the settlement was being enforced.

Summary: Riddick v. Facebook is a lawsuit brought to hold Facebook accountable for discriminatory advertising practices relating to users’ personal characteristics such as sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, marital status, citizenship, primary language, immigration status, and age. Facebook’s discriminatory practices violate California Civil Code Sections 51, 51.5, and 52. Facebook settled promising to remove tools that allow for advertisers to discriminate on the basis of age, race, sex, and other characteristics.


COVID-19 Summary: On May 7, two churches in Illinois sued the Governor of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Governor’s stay-at-home order and restoration plan, which limited gatherings to 10 or fewer people. The court denied the request for a TRO on May 13, the Seventh Circuit denied the plaintiff's request for an injunction pending appeal, and the Supreme Court denied the appeal on May 27. On June 16, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. <hr> On May 7, the Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church and Logos Baptist Ministries filed this action against Governor J.B. Pritzker, seeking to overturn the restrictions on religious activities imposed by the stay-at-home order and his “Restore Illinois” plan. The plaintiffs brought this case in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois as a declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and as an injunctive action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, and state law. Specifically, the two Chicago-area churches argued that the plan, which continues to limit in-person gatherings to 10 or fewer people for the first 3 phases and threatens criminal sanctions for noncompliance, was unconstitutional. The case was assigned to Judge Robert W. Gettleman and Magistrate Judge Judge Jeffrey I. Cummings. On May 8, the plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the government from enforcing the gathering orders, which would keep the plaintiffs and their congregants from being subject to criminal sanctions for hosting in-person worship services where they were implementing social distancing and hygiene protections. On May 13, the district court denied the request for TRO and preliminary order, finding that “[t]he Order, without doubt, is rationally based in light of the need to slow the spread of COVID-19 in Illinois.” Judge Gettleman, pointing out that none of the those participating in the religious activity were wearing protective masks, claimed that the plaintiffs’ request and “blatant refusal to follow the mandates of the Order are both ill-founded and selfish.” 2020 WL 2468194. The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit the next day requesting an injunction pending appeal, which was denied on May 16. 2020 WL 2517093. On May 27, the plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On May 29, the Governor issued Executive Order 38, which supersedes the Executive Order at issue. The new order removed the limitations on religious gatherings and specifically exempted the free exercise of religion from the restrictions outlined in the order. The defendants moved to dismiss the appeal the same day, claiming that the case has become moot as the restrictions underlying plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief are no longer in effect. The same day, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the application for injunctive relief, citing a new public health guideline issued on May 28 by the Illinois Department of Health. 2020 WL 2781671. On June 2, the defendant moved to stay pending appeal. The plaintiffs did not oppose the motion, and the court granted the stay on June 8. On June 16, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the injunction, finding that religious services were analogous to congregate functions that occur in auditoriums, such as concerts and movies. Such indoor activities put "members of multiple families close to one another for extended periods, while invisible droplets containing the virus may linger in the air." They stated that unlike some necessary activiites, like meatpacking warehouses or care for the elderly, religious gatherings could alternatively happen through the internet, small worship gatherings, or drive-in services. Ultimately, they held that the new Executive Order had not discriminated against religion, and thus had not violated the First Amendment. 2020 WL 3249062. The plaintiffs requested a rehearing on July 10, which was denied on July 27. The case is ongoing.

Summary: On May 7, two churches in Illinois sued the Governor of Illinois, seeking declaratory and injunctive action against the Governor’s stay-at-home order and restoration plan which limited gatherings to 10 or fewer people. The district court denied the request for TRO and preliminary order, which the plaintiffs unsuccessfully appealed to the Seventh Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court.