On December 13, 2013, Wheaton College, a Christian school, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The college sued the Department of Health and Human Services under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq.). The college, represented by the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the Final Mandate of the Affordable Care Act, which requires the college to offer health insurance plans that provide free coverage of contraceptives that the college views as abortifacients, violates the RFRA; the APA; the Free Exercise, Free Speech, and Establishment Clauses of the 1st Amendment; and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 5th Amendment. The college had previously filed this suit in the District of the District of Columbia, where it was dismissed as moot by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on August 13, 2013 Wheaton College v. Sebelius. Specifically, Wheaton claimed that its identity as a Christian liberal arts college forbids it from providing access to abortion, including what it views as abortifacient drugs or devices. The college claimed that these religious beliefs preclude it from participating in the ACA's regulatory scheme to provide and subsidize these drugs and devices. Nor can the college participate in the accommodation offered by the government, which would still require it to designate an agent to pay for the objected-to services on Wheaton's behalf, as well as to take steps to trigger the coverage; the accommodation itself violates the school's religious beliefs, Wheaton argued. The Final Mandate was set to go into effect on July 1, 2014. On June 23, 2014, the district court (Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr.) denied Wheaton's motion for a preliminary injunction of the Final Mandate. 50 F.Supp.3d 939. The court held that Wheaton had no likelihood of success in establishing a substantial burden on its religious exercise, given the accommodation that the government offered it. On June 30, 2014, the day before the regulations took effect, Wheaton filed an emergency motion for reconsideration, which the court denied based in part on the  Hobby Lobby  decision handed down by the Supreme Court that same day. Nothing in that decision, the court said, overruled controlling 7th Circuit precedent regarding the sufficiency of the government's accommodation. 2014 WL 3034010. That same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit (Judge Richard Posner) also denied Wheaton's emergency motion for an injunction pending appeal, stating that  Hobby Lobby  emphasized that the accommodation provision "constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government's aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty." 791 F.3d 792. However, the Supreme Court granted a temporary injunction on June 30, 2014, over the dissents of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. 573 U.S. 943. On July 3, 2014, the Supreme Court ordered that the injunction remain, pending appeal, so long as Wheaton informed the Secretary of HHS of its religious objections in writing. In other words, the college did not have to follow the accommodation's procedures. Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan dissented. 573 U.S. 958. On July 1, 2015, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the District Court’s denial of Wheaton’s request for a preliminary injunction. On December 2, 2015, the District Court issued a minute entry granting the parties’ joint motion to stay the case until the ruling in Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell, consolidated as Zubik v. Burwell, so that the parties could evaluate the case following that ruling. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam order remanding all seven cases to their respective courts of appeals, ordering the lower courts to give the parties time to come to agreement on an approach that "accommodates petitioners’ religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered by petitioners’ health plans 'receive full and equal health coverage, including contraceptive coverage.'" 136 S.Ct 1557. The Court took no position on the merits of this case. This case them resumed activity as the parties entered into settlement discussions, which continued through 2017. On January 18, 2018, following the election of Donald Trump and a drastic shift in administration, Wheaton moved for permanent injunction, stating that because the government had "now admitted that this mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),"and that the court should issue an injunction and end the litigation. The court granted the motion and issued a permanent injunction on February 22, 2018. On September 7, 2018, Wheaton filed a motion for attorney's fees in which they requested $1,178,135.30. On December 20, 2018, Wheaton withdrew its motion without explanation. There has been no substantive docket activity since and the case is presumed closed.

Summary: In 2013, Wheaton College, a Christian liberal arts school, filed this lawsuit in the Northern District of Illinois. The College sued the Department of Health and Human Services under the RFRA and APA, after the case was previously filed and dismissed in the District for the District of Columbia. The college claimed that the contraception mandate of the ACA, as well as the accommodation offered by the government to those religious entities that oppose the mandate, substantially burdened their religious beliefs. In 2018, the federal government conceded that the mandate violated the RFRA, and the court enjoined its enforcement.


This case is part of the series of Signal International cases. It was consolidated with Achari v. Signal International and continues on that page. On Oct. 15, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. Plaintiffs filed this suit after District Judge Jay Zainey denied class certification on Jan. 3, 2012 in a related case, David v. Signal International. Plaintiffs claimed that they were brought into the United States to provide labor and services to defendant, Signal International, a company providing repairs to offshore oil rigs based in Pascagoula, Mississippi, with operations in the Gulf Coast region. The complaint alleged that plaintiffs paid Signal's recruiters as much as $16,000 for travel, visa, and recruitment fees, but upon arrival in the United States discovered that they would not receive the green cards promised to them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to pay additional fees ($1,050 per month) to live in racially-segregated labor camps and were subject to squalid living conditions and threats of both legal and physical harm if they complained about the conditions or decided not to provide labor. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (18 U.S.C. § 1589 et seq.) and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981), as well as claims for fraud, fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. In Mar. 2014, the Court (Chief U.S. District Judge Louis Guirola, Jr.) transferred this case to the Eastern District of Louisiana. On Apr. 24, 2014, Judge Susie Morgan ordered that this case be consolidated with the Achari case. This case continues at the case page for Achari.

Summary: On Oct. 15, 2013, two Indian guestworkers filed suit in S.D. Miss. for harm suffered as a result of an allegedly fraudulent and coercive employment recruitment scheme. In Apr. 2014, the court transferred this case to E.D.La where it was consolidated with the Achari lead case.


On October 17, 2014, a Christian couple who are ordained ministers and run a wedding chapel in Idaho filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against the City of Coeur d'Alene. The plaintiffs, represented by Alliance Defending Freedom, asked the court to prohibit the city from enforcing the anti-discrimination ordinance that prohibits the plaintiffs from refusing to marry same-sex couples. The plaintiffs also sought a declaratory judgment that this ordinance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and damages. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that, because they are ordained ministers who believe that marriage is a union between a man and a woman, an ordinance that prohibits them from refusing to marry same-sex couples violates their religious freedom. Furthermore, because each day that the couple refuses to perform a single same-sex wedding ceremony counts as a new charge against them, they could be sentenced to thirty years in jail and $30,000 in fines for refusing to marry one couple for a month. On three subsequent occasions, the parties stipulated to a brief stay of proceedings, and indicated to the court that a settlement of the action was a distinct possibility. The action did not settle and, on February 23, 2015, the defendant moved to dismiss the claim. On March 16, 2015, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. They allege a violation of (1) their First Amendment right to freedom of speech, including compelled speech, viewpoint discrimination, unconstitutional conditions, and unbridled discretion; (2) their First Amendment right to free exercise of religion; (3) their rights under the Idaho Free Exercise of Religion Protected Act (FERPA); (4) their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; and (5) Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. Plaintiffs sought compensatory and nominal damages, temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, a declaratory judgment, and attorneys’ fees. On March 31, 2015, Judge Ronald E. Bush denied plaintiffs’ motion for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction as moot, as the passage of time since the original filing, the multiple stays, and the amended complaint presented a different context than the one which prompted the motion originally. This meant that the defendant’s motion to dismiss was also denied as moot. On March 25, 2016, the court filed a memorandum opinion and (1) found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring a claim for economic injuries for the single day of October 15, 2014 when they closed their business location; (2) granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint as the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a claim for economic injuries for other periods; and (3) that the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the anti-discrimination ordinance. 172 F.Supp.3d 1118. On April 12, 2016, the defendant served an offer of judgment on plaintiffs. On April 29, 2016, plaintiffs accepted the offer and notified the court accordingly. The court subsequently awarded plaintiffs $1000.01, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs prior to the date of the offer of judgment. $1000.01 was paid to the plaintiffs on May 3, 2016, and filed as satisfaction of judgment on May 24, but there was no mention of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.

Summary: In 2014, A Christian couple who are ordained ministers and run a wedding chapel in Idaho filed a lawsuit against their city for threatening to enforce against them a law that prohibits them from refusing service to same-sex couples, on the basis of religious freedom. In March 2016, the court (1) found that plaintiffs had standing to bring a claim for economic injuries for the single day of October 15, 2014 when they closed their business location; (2) granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint as the plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a claim for economic injuries for other periods; and (3) that plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the anti-discrimination ordinance. In April 2016, the defendant served an offer of judgment on plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs accepted the offer. The court subsequently awarded plaintiffs $1000.01, plus reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs prior to the date of the offer of judgment.


This case arises out of an incident beginning on January 29, 2016, when a 50-year-old disabled homeless man from Sacramento was arrested and accused of second-degree burglary of an uninhabited dwelling. He was taken to the Sacramento County jail and told that he would only be released if he paid $10,000. The same day, the plaintiff filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The case was assigned to Judge Troy L. Nunley. The plaintiff sued the County of Sacramento, Kamala Harris in her official capacity as the Attorney General of California, and the Sacramento County Sheriff, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. The plaintiff, represented by Equal Justice Under Law, moved to certify a class of “all arrestees who are or will be in the custody of the County of Sacramento County who and are or will be detained for any amount of time because they are unable to pay money bail.” He sought a declaratory judgment that Sacramento County’s wealth-based detention scheme violated his constitutional rights. He also sought a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the County of Sacramento and Sacramento County Sheriff from using money bail to detain any person due to his or her inability to make a monetary payment, and requiring that all release and detention decisions be based on factors other than wealth status or ability to pay. The plaintiff claimed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of his or her inability to pay, and that the County’s policy of requiring money bail pursuant to California Penal Code § 1269(b) amounted to unconstitutional wealth-based detention. Specifically, he claimed that:

The County’s wealth-based detention system was excessive in relation to its purpose of ensuring court appearances; at any given time, there were approximately 4,400 inmates in the Sacramento County Jail, roughly 57% of whom were being detained pretrial. Furthermore, the complaint indicated that while tying pretrial freedom to wealth-status was the norm for Sacramento, many other jurisdictions throughout the country employed non-monetary conditions of release, and released arrestees with pretrial supervision practices that could help increase court attendance and public safety without requiring detention.
The detention system failed to provide for individualized risk assessment levels, leading to consistent imprisonment of poor people and release of rich people regardless of whether an individual was dangerous or a flight risk.
Subjecting the poor to unnecessary pretrial detention disrupted employment and housing, caused instability for care-dependent relatives, and led to worse outcomes at trial when compared with those who were released pretrial.
On February 4, 2016, the court denied the motion for a temporary restraining order. The Attorney General then moved to dismiss the case, and the County joined the motion and moved alternatively for a more definite statement of law. On October 11, 2016, the court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim and granted the motion for a more definite statement of law regarding the Due Process claim. The court also denied as moot the pending motion for class certification. The plaintiff then filed an amended class-action complaint, proposing the same class definition as the original complaint. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General moved to dismiss the case and the County and Sheriff jointly filed a separate motion to dismiss. The defendants moved to dismiss under four main arguments: first, that the plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, second, that the County was not liable for the Sheriff’s conduct because the Sheriff was acting on behalf of the state; third, that the County was not liable because its involvement with the bail law amounted to ministerial compliance with state law instead of a deliberate choice; and fourth, that the plaintiff failed to state a claim. On October 26, 2018, the court ruled on the defendants’ motions together granting in part and denying in part. 343 F. Supp. 3d 924. Specifically, the court held that:

The Eleventh Amendment did not bar the suit, because the claim fell within an exception for the putative class members seeking injunctive relief against state officers in their official capacities for alleged violations of federal law.
The County was not liable for the claim challenging the Sheriff’s actions because the Sheriff was acting on behalf of the State rather than the County.
The plaintiff had stated plausible claims that the bail law was either facially invalid or excessive in relation to its purposes under the Due Process Clause.
As of August 2020, the case is in discovery.

Summary: In 2016, an indigent arrestee in the Sacramento County Jail filed this class action complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California. The plaintiff alleged that Sacramento County’s wealth-based detention scheme violated his Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection rights. The County moved to dismiss the case, and the court granted the motion with respect to the Equal Protection claim. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint, and the County moved to dismiss the case again. The court found that the plaintiff had stated a viable Due Process claim. As of August 2020, the case is in discovery.


On December 19, 2007, plaintiff, a minister who attempted to dissuade women seeking an abortion in front of an abortion facility, filed this lawsuit against the City of Oakland under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel and the Life Legal Defense Foundation, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, claiming that the defendant's ordinance regulating conduct in front of women's healthcare facilities is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the ordinance making it unlawful, within 100 feet of the entrance of a "reproductive health care facility," to "willfully and knowingly approach within eight feet of any person seeking to enter such a facility… without the consent of such person… for the purpose of counseling, harassing, or interfering with such person…" was not being enforced in an even-handed manner. Under the ordinance, the term "counseling" is defined as "engaging in conversation with, displaying signs to, and/or distributing literature." However, the plaintiff alleged that the City had a policy of not enforcing its ordinance against those individuals engaging in pro-choice speech outside of the women's healthcare facilities, while the City enforced the ordinance prohibiting counseling against those whose speech contained anti-abortion content. On August 4, 2009, District Court Judge Charles Breyer granted summary judgment in favor of the City. In response to the plaintiff's facial challenge to the ordinance, the district court held that its language was nearly identical to the statute upheld by the Supreme Court in <i>Hill v. Colorado</i>. The district court wrote that "as in Hill, the Ordinance applies 'equally to all demonstrators, regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference to the content of the speech.' And, as in Hill, 'the State's interest[] in protecting access . . . [is] unrelated to the content of the demonstrators' speech.'" In response to the plaintiff's as applied challenge, the district court found that the defendant was not failing to enforce the ordinance by allowing escorts who facilitate access to the reproductive health facilities to approach patients seeking care while disallowing the plaintiff to approach the patients any closer than 8 feet. The district court wrote that, "escorts who approach women for the purpose of facilitating their access into a clinic are not approaching 'for the purpose of counseling, harassing, or interfering.'" Hoye v. City of Oakland, 642 F.Supp.2d 1029 (N.D. Cal. 2009). Plaintiff appealed. On July 28, 2011, Judge Marsha Berzon of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote for the court affirming in part and reversing in part the district court's decision. The circuit court agreed that the ordinance was constitutional on its face, but that the defendant was applying the ordinance in an unconstitutional manner. The circuit court found that the City's police department was enforcing the statute against "efforts to persuade women approaching reproductive health clinics not to receive abortions or other reproductive health services, and not to communications seeking to encourage entry into the clinic for the purpose of undergoing treatment." That is, the police department did not require the "escorts" to receive consent to speak to women seeking to enter the clinics, while it did require anti-abortion protestors to receive such consent. The circuit court remanded the case with instructions to grant plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in part and grant him relief consistent with the opinion. 653 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2011). Following this ruling, the City issued new police training materials that were meant to educate officers as to the neutral application of the ordinance. On December 16, 2011 District Court Judge Breyer ruled that these training materials were adequate to grant the plaintiff relief consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. The district court noted that if the police officers enforced the ordinance in a way that was inconsistent with the training materials, the plaintiff may revive his case. On May 31, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for entry of judgment with proposed language for a three part order. Judge Breyer entered judgment on August 3, 2012, holding that: the City's policy of exempting speech facilitating access violated the First Amendment, that the City must enforce the ordinance in an evenhanded manner, and that the ordinance was constitutional on its face. On October 1, 2012, Judge Breyer awarded plaintiff legal fees to the amount of $361,269.43. 2012 WL 4644307 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012).

Summary: On December 19, 2007, plaintiff, a minister who attempted to dissuade women seeking an abortion in front of an abortion facility, filed a lawsuit asking the court to declare that an Oakland ordinance that made it unlawful to, within 100 feet of the entrance of a reproductive health care facility, approach within eight feet of a person seeking to enter such a facility without their consent for the purpose of counseling, harassing, or interfering with that person, was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. On July 28, 2011, Judge Marsha Berzon of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit wrote for the court ordering that the ordinance was constitutional on its face according to established Supreme Court precedent, but that the City had an unconstitutional policy of exempting speech facilitating access while targeting pro-life speakers like the plaintiff.


On September 30, 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado The EEOC sued the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, on behalf of seven full-time law professors, under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. It alleged that the University discriminated against the complainants by paying them substantially less than male full-time law professors even though their work was substantially equal. The complaint sought monetary relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Wiley Y. Daniel. On January 3, the EEOC filed an amended complaint. The amended complaint contained no significant differences but merely rephrased some of the claims for relief. Over the course of the litigation, seven female full-time law professors intervened. Four of those intervenors filed their own complaints. The following year, after several months of negotiations, the parties filed a joint motion requesting that the court enter a consent decree they believe is fair, reasonable, equitable and not the product of collusion. On May 18, 2018, Judge Daniel granted the motion and approved the consent decree. The consent decree term was 6 years; it included monetary relief and injunctive relief (required changes to policy and procedure). Under the consent decree, the complainants, several intervenors, and their attorneys received $2,660,000 after each plaintiff-intervenor signed a release waiving their right to bring suit in a future claim on the matter. Additionally, the University was required to increase salaries for the female law professors to better equalize pay among male and female law professors at the University. The consent decree enjoined the University from engaging in sex discrimination affecting compensation and permanently enjoins retaliation against any individual related to the case. The University was required to adopt and maintain a policy statement encouraging employees to report any conduct believed to be discriminatory. The University was also required to provide salary and compensation disclosures, as well as conduct a study to consider whether any disparities in compensation are attributable to gender or to gender combined with other protected characteristics like race. Further, the University was required to provide equal employment opportunity training and training in the new policy and procedures for all law school employees. All records concerning implementation of the consent decree were to be maintained by the University. The parties were to appoint an independent consultant to evaluate the University’s compliance with the consent decree. The decree was set to last for 6 years, with the Court retaining jurisdiction over compliance disputes. Implementation is ongoing.

Summary: This 2016 lawsuit was brought by female law professors at the University of Denver in the U.S. District for the District of Colorado. Under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, the plaintiffs alleged that the University discriminated against them by paying them substantially less than male professors. On May 18, 2018, Judge Daniel approved a consent decree under which the University would provide back pay wages, undergo EEO training, an make policy and procedural changes.


On July 22, 2005, a group of Arlington residents who have mobility impairments that require that they use motorized wheelchairs filed a lawsuit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas for an injunction requiring the City to bring its curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots into ADA compliance. In their complaint, plaintiffs point to more than one hundred curbs and poorly maintained sidewalks in Arlington that they allege make their travel impossible or unsafe. They also point to at least three public facilities lacking adequate handicap parking. In response to plaintiffs' Fourth Amended Complaint, defendant filed a motion to dismiss on April 30, 2007, arguing that the claim was out of time; that the plaintiffs lacked standing to invoke Title II or Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; and that the alleged facts did not state a legal claim of discrimination (that an enforceable duty only arose when new construction or alteration triggered the duty). On March 31, 2008, Judge Terry R. Means granted defendants motion and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that their claims were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs appealed. On July 7, 2009, the Fifth Circuit issued an opinion finding that the ADA authorizes plaintiffs' claims because the City's curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots are a service, program, or activity within the meaning of Title II. The Court also held that, although the district court correctly held both that the plaintiffs' claims were subject to a two-year statute of limitations, and that they accrued on the date the City completed any noncompliant construction or alteration, it improperly burdened the plaintiffs with proving accrual within the two years preceding the filing of their complaint. The Court therefore vacated the district court's judgment of dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. Circuit Judge Prado dissented, arguing that the statute of limitations was triggered by the plaintiffs' encounters with, not the City's completion of, noncompliant sidewalks, curbs, or parking lots. On August 23, 2010, the Fifth Circuit granted a petition for rehearing and withdrew its July 7, 2009 Opinion. On rehearing, the Court held that sidewalks, curbs, and parking lots are not Title II services, programs, or activities, and thus, plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the regulations unless noncompliance has denied access to a service, program, or activity. Where a cause of action is established, the statute of limitations is triggered when the plaintiff knew or should have known that he or she was excluded from a city service, program, or activity. Again, the Court vacated the district court's judgment for improperly burdening plaintiffs with proving accrual within the two years preceding the filing of their complaint and remanded for further proceedings. On January 26, 2011, the Fifth Circuit ordered that the case be reheard by the Court. On October 11, 2011, the Fifth Circuit issued its en banc decision, finding that the District Court had erred in granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court held that all public sidewalks that were built or modified after the passage of the ADA are covered by Title II, and that the plaintiffs here had a valid private right of action to challenge the inaccessible sidewalks. The court also held that the statute of limitations did not bar this claim because it begins to run only when plaintiffs knew or should have known about the violation (regardless of when the sidewalks were actually constructed). Following this decision, the City petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case, but the Supreme Court denied certiorari review in February 2012. In October 2012, the City Council approved a Settlement Agreement to resolve the plaintiffs' claims rather than proceed to trial. Through this agreement, the City has promised to remedy specific sidewalk violations over a period of 25 months. The City will also engage in efforts to proactively comply with ADA requirements going forward, and will hire an ADA coordinator. The City also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' attorney's fees.

Summary: Plaintiffs are Arlington residents who depend on motorized wheelchairs for mobility. They filed a lawsuit under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. In their complaint, plaintiffs asked the court for an injunction requiring the City to bring its curbs, sidewalks, and parking lots into ADA compliance. After the district court dismissed their complaint on motion from the defendants, plaintiffs appealed. After two opinions by the three-judge panel (the first was withdrawn by the Court), the Court of Appeals issued an en banc decision in October 2011, finding that the District Court had improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The City then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court denied certiorari in February 2012. Instead of returning to the trial court at that time, the parties settled in October 2012. The City agreed to modify its sidewalks so that they will be wheelchair-accessible.


On July 28, 2009, plaintiffs, two anonymous individuals who signed a voting petition and the group that organized the petition drive, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington against the State of Washington under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, challenged the constitutionality of the state's Public Records Act as applied to the referendum process, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They sought declaratory relief and an injunction against defendants from making referendum petitions available to the public. Specifically, the petition at issue was organized by opponents to a law signed by the governor of Washington that extended the rights and privileges of gay and lesbian domestic partners. Washington law permits the public to petition for a review of new laws in a referendum by collecting the signatures of 4% of the voters for governor in the previous election. Opponents of the new law organized a campaign entitled "Protect Marriage Washington" and turned in a petition containing 138,500 signatures. Various groups immediately filed requests under the Washington Public Records Act seeking the names and contact information of those who had signed the petition. The plaintiffs in this case were two anonymous individuals who signed the petition and the group that organized the petition drive. Their complaint contained two counts. The first was a facial challenge to the Public Records Act as applied to referendums in general. It claimed that the First Amendment protects the names and contact information of those signing referendum petitions from being disclosed to the public. The second count was an as applied challenge to the constitutionality of the Public Records Act in this particular referendum. It claimed that releasing the names of petition signers in this instance will lead to threats and harassment. On September 10, 2009, District Court Judge Benjamin Settle granted the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of the first count. The court did not reach the merits of the as applied challenge. The State appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. On October 22, 2009, a three judge panel (Judges Tashima, Pregerson, and Smith) overruled the district court. 586 F.3d 671 (2012). The panel reasoned that the district court had erred in applying strict scrutiny since even assuming petition signing is political speech, it is neither private nor anonymous. The circuit court held that the government had a valid interest in both promoting transparency and accountability and in informing voters of who was putting the measure on the ballot. Plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court which granted certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit on June 24, 2010 in an 8-1 decision written by Chief Justice Roberts. 130 S.Ct. 2811 (2010). Justice Thomas was the lone dissenter. Justices Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Stevens, and Scalia each filed concurring opinions. The overall holding was that the state's interest in preventing fraud sufficed to overcome the facial challenge to the Public Records Act as applied to referendums. The Supreme Court then remanded the case for litigation on the merits of the as applied challenge to the Public Records Act in this particular referendum. On October 17, 2011, the District Court ordered summary judgment for the State on the as applied challenge. 823 F.Supp.2d 1195 (2011). The district court found the plaintiffs evidence of potential harassment insufficient to grant an as applied exemption. And on November 8, 2011, the district court denied plaintiffs' motion for a stay pending appeal. On November 21, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States also denied plaintiffs' request for a stay pending appeal, with Justice Alito filing a short dissent. 132 S.Ct. 449 (2011). The signed petitions therefore became publicly available. On October 23, 2012, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's grant of summary judgment and dismissed the case as moot because the requested relief of preventing dissemination of the petitions could not be effectively realized. 697 F.3d 1235 (2012).

Summary: On July 28, 2009, plaintiffs, two anonymous individuals who signed a voting petition and the group that organized the petition drive, filed a lawsuit against State of Washington challenging Washington's Public Records Act as applied to voting referendums based on the First Amendment. Plaintiffs asserted two claims: first, that releasing information about who signed petitions for referendums in general violated the First Amendment, and second, that release in this particular case will result in harassment. The District Court in the Western District of Washington granted a preliminary injunction based on the first count alone, the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit. On October 17, 2011, on remand, the District Court ordered summary judgment for the State on the second claim. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the case as moot on October 23, 2012.


On 07/11/2000, Prison Legal News filed this suit in the District of Nevada. PLN sued the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) under 42 U.S.C. §1983. PLN, represented by the ACLU National Prison Project, asked the court for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief, prohibiting NDOC from engaging in further unlawful censorship of books, magazines and other correspondence from PRISON LEGAL NEWS, as well as damages. PLN claimed that NDOC’s censorship of PLN’s speech violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. PLN asked the Court for injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, PLN claimed that NDOC censored Plaintiff’s written speech, including the journal "Prison Legal News," as well as books and other correspondence mailed by Plaintiff to NDOC prisoners in the State of Nevada. In July 2000, PLN applied for a preliminary injunction in the District of Nevada to forbid officials of NDOC, formerly Nevada Department of Prisons from maintaining a blanket exclusion of Prison Legal News from Nevada Department of Prisons institutions. Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was granted in August 2000. On September 26, 2000, the parties stipulated to a judgment by the Court that all prisoners in the custody of NDOP shall be permitted to subscribe to the publications of their choice and shall receive all issues of those publications without interference with limited exceptions. On June 28, 2013, PLN filed two motions: A motion alleging that NDOC was in violation of the Court’s 2000 Order, on the basis that PLN received substantiated reports of statewide censorship and rejection of PLN publications, without notice to the inmate-subscriber or PLN, the publisher; and a motion to substitute/update defendants. On July 8, 2013, the Court (Judge Howard D. McKibben) granted PLN's motion for substitution of defendants: James Gregory Cox in his official capacity as Director of the NDOC, and E.K. McDaniel in his official capacity as Deputy Director of Operations for NDOC, were substituted for Defendants Jackie Crawford, Robert Bayer and John Slansky. On July 16, 2013 this case was reassigned from Magistrate Judge Robert A McQuaid, Jr. to Magistrate Judge William G. Cobb. On July 17, 2013, PLN filed a second amended complaint, adding the claim that NDOC was in violation of the Court's 2000 settlement agreement. Further, PLN sought to declare NDOC's policies banning return address labels and publications not from approved vendors or publishers, as well as its requirement that all books be sent using First Class, as unconstitutional on their face and as applied. On January 14, 2016, the parties entered into a settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, PLN agreed to the dismissal of this action with prejudice, holding the dismissal of claims in abeyance for ten years, for court-monitoring. The underlying 2000 Consent decree discussed in the Settlement Agreement would remain in force. The January 2016 settlement required NDOC to take proactive steps to ensure compliance with the 2000 Consent decree, including: Reviewing of all incoming publications on a case-by-case basis, regardless of the identity of the publisher; Refraining from censoring/banning books, simply because the books' publishers are not on a list of approved vendors/publishers--such lists should be for the purposes of reference only and made available to a publisher or vendor on request. The settlement agreement also addresses issues of due process and requires NDOC to provide notice of censorship decisions and opportunity for appeal to both senders and receivers NDOC was given 60 days to implement these changes. The court continued to retain jurisdiction to enforce the consent decree. On March 3, 2016, Judge McKibben dismissed this case without prejudice. The court approved and adopted the stipulation and addendum to the stipulation for dismissal of this action without prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction over this action to consider any motion to reopen the case to compel compliance with the terms of the stipulated settlement.

Summary: In July 2000, Prison Legal News filed this suit against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) for unconstitutional censorship of written speech in the form of PLN's publications and other materials mailed to NDOC prisoners. PLN was represented by the ACLU National Prison Project. PLN claimed that NDOC's censorship practices violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. PLN claimed that NDOC censored Plaintiff’s written speech, including the journal "Prison Legal News," as well as books and other correspondence mailed by Plaintiff to NDOC prisoners in the State of Nevada. In September 2000, the parties stipulated to a judgment by the court that PLN claimed NDOC violated in a second amended complaint filed on July 17, 2013. Pursuant to this second complaint, on January 14, 2016 the parties entered into a further settlement agreement. As a result of this agreement, PLN agreed to the dismissal of this action with prejudice, holding the dismissal of claims in abeyance for ten years. On March 3, 2016, the Court [Judge Howard D. McKibben] dismissed this case without prejudice, approving and adopting the stipulation and addendum to the stipulation for dismissal of this action without prejudice. The court retained jurisdiction over this action to consider any motion to reopen the case to compel compliance with the terms of the stipulated settlement.


This case is one of the many filed in federal district courts across the country by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the ACA's system for ensuring that employee health insurance covers birth control. Here, the plaintiff, a Catholic liberal arts college, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), against the U.S. Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury. The plaintiff asked the court for both declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that federal rules adopted under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) violated its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. Claiming that providing coverage for contraception would both contravene its Catholic faith and compel speech contrary to its beliefs, the plaintiff sought an exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate for itself and other institutions with similar religious objections. On May 4, 2012, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that the plaintiff could not claim any imminent harm because the plaintiff had not introduced evidence to prove it did not qualify for the enforcement "safe harbor" period extending until January 1, 2014, and because the defendants were in the process of amending the contraceptive coverage regulations to accommodate the objections of religious institutions like the plaintiff. In its brief opposing the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff argued that it could claim imminent harm because the anticipated amendments likely would not change the offensive contraception coverage requirement. On July 10, 2012, the defendants moved to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. On July 31, 2012, Magistrate Judge Sheri P. Chappell of the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida denied the motion, finding that the "large number of other challenges" by similarly situated plaintiffs would require the defendants to conduct discovery regardless of the outcome of the defendant's motion to dismiss this particular case. 2012 WL 3128015. The defendants sought review of this order on August 3, 2012, and on November 28, 2012, Judge John Antoon II issued an order sustaining defendants' objections, overturning the July 31, 2012 order, and granting the motion to stay discovery pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. On March 29, 2013, Judge Antoon granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Judge Antoon found that, in light of the defendants' efforts to address the plaintiff's concerns via the safe harbor period and the anticipated amendments, the plaintiff's claim was not yet ripe for review. 2013 WL 1326638. On August 29, 2013, the university refiled its complaint, which was eventually assigned to Judge James S. Moody. On October 22, 2013, the university moved for summary judgment, which Judge Moody denied one day later as premature. On November 19, 2013, the defendants moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. However, on December 11, 2013, Judge Moody stayed the case, in light of a substantially similar case pending before the Supreme Court, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). On June 30, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Hobby Lobby. In a 5-4 opinion by Justice Alito, the Court held that the HHS regulations imposing the contraceptive mandate violated RFRA when applied to closely-held for-profit corporations. On August 7, 2014, the plaintiff moved to reopen the case, and the court granted the motion on the same day. The plaintiff also moved for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendant from assessing fines or taking other enforcement action against the university for not following the mandate or accommodation procedures. On July 3, 2014, the Supreme Court issued an interim order in  Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014), which held that to obtain an injunction pending appeal, an eligible organization is not required to follow the notice procedures under the Final Rules. Rather, it is enough for the organization simply to inform the HHS in writing that it objects to the contraception provisions. Following this ruling, HHS issued Interim Final Regulations providing that an eligible organization seeking accommodation need only to inform the department in writing of its religious objection to the mandate, and include the name of its insurance plan and type, and the name and contact information for any of the plan's third-party administrators and health-insurance issuers. On July 30, 2014, the plaintiff provided notice to the defendant of its objection to the mandate, but did not include any of the other information that the Interim Final Regulations required. On October 28, 2014, Judge Moody granted the university's motion for a preliminary injunction. He ruled that the university did not need to follow either the Final Rules or the Interim Final Regulations for the injunction to take effect. The judge also stayed the case pending the resolution of the appeal in  Eternal Word Television Network, Inc. v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., et al. ("EWTN"), No. 14-12696-CC (11th Cir.). On March 21, 2016, the parties filed a joint notice to notify the court that the Eleventh Circuit issued a decision in EWTN, see 2016 WL 659222 (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2016), and stayed the mandate because the same question at issue in both  EWTN  and in this case was being reviewed on the merits by the Supreme Court in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). The notice also stated that the parties planned to notify the Court within 30 days of the final disposition of  EWTN . On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Zubik v. Burwell recognizing the need for government policy to balance religious objections to the ACA contraceptive mandate with providing full access to healthcare for coverage, and vacated the judgments below and remanded to the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits. On October 6, 2017, President Trump changed federal government's policy on the matter, removing the requirement that employers provide contraception coverage through health insurance plans. Following this change in policy, on October 10, 2017, the defendants voluntarily dismissed their appeal. This case was dormant until June 22, 2018, when the plaintiffs moved for permanent injunction and declaratory relief citing concerns that future government policies could still infringe on their religious freedoms. On July 11, 2018, the court granted the motions. The court provided a permanent injunction that prohibited the government from mandating provision of sterilization or contraceptive drugs, devices, or procedures and related education and counseling to which the plaintiffs had sincerely held religious objections. Following this ruling, the parties filed notice on October 9, 2018 that the matter of attorneys' fees had been voluntarily settled by both parties. The case is now closed.

Summary: In 2012, a Catholic liberal arts college filed a RFRA challenge to rules adopted under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, arguing that the rules infringed on its religious freedom by requiring it to provide coverage for contraception through its group health insurance plan. In Oct. 2014, the Court granted the university a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the HHS contraception mandate. In Dec. 2014, this injunction was appealed by the defendants to the 11th Circuit where it was stayed pending rulings on similar litigation. In May 2016 the Supreme Court issued a decision in <i>Zubik v. Burwell</i>, recognizing the need for government policy to balance religious objections to the ACA contraceptive mandate with providing full access to healthcare for coverage. The case was relatively dormant until the Trump Administration changed government policy removing the contraception coverage requirement for employers. Following this change in policy the defendants dismissed their appeal. On June 22, 2018, the plaintiffs filed for permanent injunction and declaratory relief. The court granted this motion on July 11, 2018 and issued a permanent injunction. The case is now closed.


This case was one of 12 cases filed on May 21, 2012, in federal district courts across the country, by non-profit Catholic organizations challenging the ACA's provisions to ensure that employee health insurance covers birth control. In each, the plaintiffs objected to notifying the government or their health insurer that they were claiming a religious exemption from provision of contraception. That self-certification assisted the government in working with the insurer or health benefits provider to ensure that the plaintiffs' employees would have access to contraception. The employers who filed this group of cases argued that this approach violated their religious liberty because their certification started a chain of events that resulted in their employees receiving contraception. This particular case was filed by Bishop Zubik, of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Pittsburgh, and the Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Pittsburgh. (See Zubik v. Sebelius [II] for the second iteration of this claim, which is in front of the Supreme Court in the spring of 2016; on March 23, 2016, the Supreme Court will hear argument on whether the current regulation violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.) In 2010, Congress passed the Affordable Care Act, which requires employers who offer their employeees health insurance to provide coverage of preventive care and screenings for women, without cost sharing (such as a copayment, coinsurance, or a deductible), following guidelines established by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In 2012, HHS's regulation was issued, and required covered of were issued, and included “[a]ll Food and Drug Administration . . . approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all women with reproductive capacity,” as prescribed by a health care provider. 77 Fed. Reg. at 8725. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv). The implementing regulations, issued in February 2012, authorized an exemption from contraceptive coverage for the group health plan of a “religious employer,” 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a). In order to qualify as a “religious employer,” an employer had to meet the following criteria: (1) Has the inculcation of religious values as its purpose. (2) primarily employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves persons who share its religious tenets; and. (4) is a non-profit organized as a church At the same time as posting the regulations, HHS established a temporary enforcement “safe-harbor” for group health care plans sponsored by certain non-profit organizations with religious objections to contraceptive coverage that did not qualify as religious employers. Such organizations were required to "self-certify" that they satisfied the safe-harbor criteria. On March 21, 2012, HHS published an “advance notice of proposed rulemaking” (“ANPRM”), in which it announced its intention to propose regulatory amendments that “would establish alternative ways to fulfill the requirements of [the ACA] when health coverage is sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that objects to the coverage of contraceptive services for religious reasons and that is not exempt under the final regulations published February 15, 2012.” 77 Fed.Reg. 16,501. The plaintiffs asked the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to find that the federal government had violated their rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and the First and Fifth Amendments, by requiring them to start the process that would provide contraception to their employees. Represented by private counsel, they asked the court to issue a preliminary and permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement against them of the ACA's contraception mandate or certification requirement. On November 27, 2012, the District Court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) granted the government's motion to dismiss without prejudice for lack of ripeness and standing. 911 F. Supp. 2d 314, 318 (W.D. Pa. 2012). The Court found that since the government was amending the regulation to address the concerns of religious employers, the plaintiffs' claims were not ready for judicial review, particularly since the plaintiff hadn't yet been hurt by the regulations. On January 23, 2013, plaintiffs appealed the District Court's order to dismiss. The parties then reached an agreement that was not made public, and on July 23, 2013, a clerk for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Marcia M. Waldron) dismissed the case pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b), without cost to either party. The final regulation came out in July 2, 2013, On October 8, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit, again in the Western District of Pennsylvania. See Zubik v. Sebelius [II]. The Supreme Court will hear that case on March 23, 2016; decision is expected by the end of June 2016.

Summary: Plaintiffs, a non-profit corporation of Catholic parishes, schools, and charities, filed a lawsuit against the Federal Government under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) asking the court to grant a preliminary and permanent injunction against enforcement of the requirement that it expressly claim a religious exemption from the ACA's contraception mandate. On November 27, 2012, the court (Judge Terrence F. McVerry) granted the Federal Government's motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness and standing. The Church at first appealed but then voluntarily dismissed the case on July 23, 2013. On October 8, 2013, the Church filed a new lawsuit; that's the case that's before the Supreme Court in spring 2016.


On July 1, 2019, four unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the United States filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The plaintiffs, represented by Goodwin Proctor LLP, Kids in Need of Defense, the Catholic Legal Immigration Network, and Public Counsel sought declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs claimed that a new USCIS policy would retroactively strip them of protections granted under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) in violation of the APA and the Fifth Amendment's due process clause. Specifically, they claimed that the new policy would act retroactively on individuals with pending asylum applications because it applied to any USCIS decision made after June 30, 2019. Additionally, the plaintiffs alleged that they could lose asylum eligibility because of the retroactive application of a filing deadline that did not exist when they filed their applications. On July 1, 2019, the plaintiffs moved for a temporary restraining order to preserve the prior policy until the court considered the new policy's validity. On August 2, the court (Judge George J. Hazel) granted the motion for a temporary restraining order, which it later converted to a preliminary injunction. On December 20, 2019, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, adding U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as a defendant. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim against ICE on January 3, 2020. On June 3, 2020, the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss because it found the all of defendants' arguments within the motion to be "unpersuasive, premature, or unsupported by necessary evidence." The plaintiffs then filed a motion to certify a class on June 15, 2020. Defining the class broadly, they sought to include all individuals nationwide who were subject to the challenged USCIS policy. The defendants filed their response in opposition to class certification on July 13. On June 29, 2020, the court issued a scheduling order in which, the defendants were to release the administrative record that led up to the challenged policy's adoption, which they did on July 24. In light of ongoing conversations about deficiencies in the administrative record, the parties jointly filed a motion to stay the summary judgment briefing on August 10. On December 21, 2020, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for class certification and the motion to stay the summary judgment schedule. The court certified the following class: "certifies the following class: All individuals nationwide who prior to the effective date of a lawfully promulgated policy (1) were determined to be an Unaccompanied Alien Child; and (2) who filed an asylum application that was pending with the USCIS; and (3) on the date they filed their asylum application with USCIS, were 18 years of age or older, or had a parent or legal guardian in the United States who is available to provide care and physical custody; and (4) for whom USCIS has not adjudicated the individual’s asylum application on the merits." The plaintiffs had additionally moved to amend the preliminary injunction on July 7, 2020. Regarding that motion, in the same December 21 opinion the court ordered that defendants are: (1) enjoined and restrained from relying on the policies set forth in the 2019 Redetermination Memorandum as a basis to decline jurisdiction over asylum applications of individuals previously determined to be unaccompanied alien children; (2) enjoined and restrained from rejecting jurisdiction over any asylum application filed by plaintiffs and members of the class whose applications would have been accepted under the 2013 policy; (3) enjoined and restrained from deferring to EOIR determinations in assessing jurisdiction over asylum applications filed by plaintiffs and members of the proposed class; and (4) enjoined and restrained during the removal proceedings of any plaintiff or member of the class (including EOIR proceedings before immigration judges and members of the Board of Immigration appeals) from seeking denials of continuances or other postponements in order to await adjudication of an asylum application that has been filed with USCIS, from seeking EOIR exercise of jurisdiction over any asylum claim where USCIS has initial jurisdiction under the terms of the 2013 policy, or from otherwise taking a position in such individual’s removal proceedings that USCIS does not have initial jurisdiction over the individual’s asylum application." Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on January 11, 2021; the defendants filed their answer on February 12, 2021. On February 18, 2021, the defendants appealed the district court's decision to certify the class to the Fourth Circuit (21-1187). As of April 8, 2021, the Fourth Circuit has not yet issued an opinion. The case is ongoing.

Summary: In 2019, four unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the United States filed this class action complaint in the federal court of the District of Maryland. The plaintiffs alleged that the policy of retroactively applying a new asylum policy to previously pending USCIS asylum applications violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment. The court granted a temporary restraining order until the new policy's validity had been determined, and then converted the temporary restraining order into a preliminary injunction and additionally granted class certification, which the defendants then appealed to the Fourth Circuit. The case is ongoing.


On July 20, 2009, individuals who claimed to be victims of unlawful force and violence at the hands of the Metro Gang Strike Force filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota against the Strike Force and other law enforcement agencies and police officers in the Minneapolis area. The lawsuit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and Minnesota state law. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief and punitive damages. The plaintiffs were individuals who had allegedly been subjected to excessive force during raids conducted by the now-defunct Strike Force, a task force made up of police from the Twin Cities and surrounding communities to prevent gang activity. Many of the plaintiffs had property, including vehicles, cash, and televisions, confiscated by the Strike Force. Some of the plaintiffs were also physically injured by Strike Force officers during these raids. Allegedly, the Strike Force ransacked the plaintiffs’ homes and did not provide a receipt or inventory for the property that was taken. The plaintiffs stated that the Strike Force targeted undocumented individuals because the Strike Force knew these people were especially vulnerable. Multiple status conferences in 2009 and 2010 were followed by a settlement; a judicially-enforced settlement agreement was eventually entered on November 4, 2010 and Judge Joan Ericksen signed off on the settlement on December 16, 2010. The defendants agreed to create a $3 million settlement fund to pay for approved claims, special master fees, law enforcement training and education, and other administrative costs. Additionally, the defendants paid plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and the settlement agreement outlined the procedure for plaintiffs to claim monetary relief, including getting approval from Judge Ericksen. The Settlement also provided for training to be developed and implemented, with the participation of a plaintiffs' representative, covering civil rights; community based policing; constitutional use of drug-courier profiles by law enforcement agencies; courtroom testimony and procedure; forfeitures; investigative report writing; pretextual stops; property handling procedures; racial and ethnic sensitivity; and search and seizure. In accordance with the settlement agreement, payments for attorneys’ fees were dispensed throughout 2011 and 2012. The special master awarded payouts to the victims from the settlement fund in 2012. The lawsuit and its settlement concluded on September 4, 2012 once Judge Ericksen authorized payment to all claimants that received awards. Since the settlement concluded in September 2012, settlement funds have been continuously released in order to pay minor class members and cover their attorneys’ fees.

Summary: Victims whose homes were ransacked and private property was confiscated by members of the Metro Gang Strike Force received payouts from a settlement agreement.


On December 7, 2011, a political activist and supporter of Occupy Minnesota filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under § 1983 against the County of Hennepin. The plaintiff, represented by a public interest law firm, asked the court for injunctive relief revoking the notice of trespassing and permitting the plaintiff to enter government property without interference, and for compensatory and punitive damages, claiming that the defendants had arrested her without probable cause on account of her political activism. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that she was a legal observer for an Occupy Minnesota protest standing on a public sidewalk outside a government building when the defendants arrested her for trespassing. Two days prior to the incident in dispute, security for the Hennepin County government building served a "trespass notice" upon the defendant resulting from writing political slogans in chalk on government property. The notice barred the plaintiff from Hennepin County government property for 365 days, or until the notice was resolved on appeal to the security manager. Two days later, while the plaintiff was serving as a legal observer for the National Lawyers Guild, Hennepin County security guards approached her and told her that she could not enter the property because of her prior trespass notice. She claimed that at that moment, two deputy sheriffs arrived and placed her under arrest for trespassing. She spent seven hours in county jail before she was released on bail. She was charged with trespass, but the prosecution dropped the charge at the plaintiff's second court appearance. On January 18, 2012, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her case, because she had reached a settlement with the defendants. According to news reports, the defendants agreed to pay the plaintiff $15,000 and revoked her ban from government property. In return, the plaintiff agreed not to chalk or otherwise deface government property. Additionally, the defendants agreed to change their policy for appeals from bans from county government property. Now, if the county wants someone barred from the property for longer than 45 days, that person can appeal and must get a hearing within 10 days. If the hearing official agrees with the trespass order, she must issue a written decision justifying her action.

Summary: On December 7, 2011, a political activist and supporter of Occupy Minnesota filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota under § 1983 against the County of Hennepin. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants arrested her for trespassing without probable cause on account of her political activism. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case after reaching a settlement with the defendants where the defendants agreed to pay her $15,000 and change their policy on trespassing.


On Feb. 7, 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union of Oregon filed this lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552). Represented by its own counsel and by a private law firm, the plaintiff filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon. The case was assigned to Magistrate Judge Paul Papak. According to the plaintiff, in Jan. 2017, ICE had confirmed to news media that its agents were arresting noncitizens at Oregon courthouses. The plaintiff sought information on ICE practices of monitoring, detaining, and arresting individuals on suspicion of immigration violations at and around state courthouses within Oregon, as well as surveillance of legal observers filming federal immigration agents or participating in rallies, protests and vigils in the vicinity of courthouses in Oregon. The plaintiff stated that it had submitted a FOIA request to ICE on Oct. 10, 2017, seeking the following: 1) Records created or received in the ICE Seattle Field Office or any ICE Oregon offices since Jan. 20, 2017 regarding immigration enforcement actions in or near Oregon courthouses; 2) Records concerning the number of individuals who had been detained, arrested, or otherwise subject to questioning by ICE agents or any officials working in cooperation with ICE, in or near an Oregon courthouse, since Jan. 1, 2017; 3) Records concerning policies, guidelines, and standards of conduct for officers conducting enforcement actions at or near courthouses; 4) Records concerning policies, guidelines, and standards of conduct related to discrimination, race-based or otherwise, for officers conducting enforcement actions; 5) Records regarding compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(e) (procedures for the government to initiate removal proceedings), including internal policies; 6) Communications since Jan. 1, 2017 between any public employees working in an Oregon county’s district attorney’s office and any ICE employees working in Oregon; 7) Communications since Jan. 1, 2017 between any public employees working in Oregon’s judicial branch and any ICE employees working in Oregon; 8) Communications since Jan. 1, 2017 between any public employees working for an Oregon law enforcement agency and any ICE employees working in Oregon; 9) Records concerning activities and enforcement action(s) of ICE agents or officials working in Hillsboro, OR on Sept. 18, 2017 (site of the arrest of two Latino U.S. citizens at a courthouse vigil, who alleged that ICE racially profiled and wrongly identified them as undocumented persons); 10) Records created by ICE agents or officials who were deployed to, worked in, or present in Hillsboro, OR on Sept. 18, 2017; 11) Communications with or records sent from any ICE official to any other federal government agency or official with information from, about, or related to events or persons at the Washington County courthouse(s) and/or in Hillsboro, OR on Sept. 18, 2017. The complaint further alleged that, at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff had not received a substantive response from any of the defendant agencies, and that the plaintiff had constructively exhausted all required administrative remedies. The plaintiff sought a disclosure order under FOIA, legal fees, and expedited action. On June 26, the court ordered the defendants to produce 2,500 pages of records per month for July and August. In August, the court ordered the defendants to produce in September all of the documents currently in ICE's possession relating to specific search terms provided by the plaintiffs, as well as 5,000 records per month in October and November. The case was reassigned to Magistrate Judge Jolie A. Russo on Sept. 20. In a November status report, the plaintiff reported that the defendants' production of responsive records remained incomplete and that they had been failing to comply with the court's production order for the previous two months. Consequently, the plaintiff requested additional court involvement in order to obtain the defendants' compliance. The defendants argued that they could not produce the court-ordered number of pages in the timeframes set forward due to lack of staff and overall FOIA workload. In a November 28, 2018, telephonic proceeding, the court ordered the defendants to produce all outstanding documents by July 1, 2019 (with a production rate of at least 2,000 documents per month). This deadline was later changed to Aug. 1, 2019. In an Aug. 2019 status report the parties reported that the defendants had completed initial production of all identified records responsive to the plaintiff's Oct. 2017 FOIA request. The parties requested additional time to confer and discuss issues the plaintiff had identified concerning the records produced. The defendants later agreed to some supplemental record production, but the parties continued to disagree over the scope of redactions and information withheld by the defendants. On April 7, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendants argued that they had properly withheld information under various FOIA exemptions and privileges and that they had complied with their obligations under FOIA. On July 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal with prejudice and Magistrate Judge Russo ordered the case dismissed on July 15, 2020 without costs awarded to either party. The court implied that the case had been settled in a previous order directing the parties to file their final papers, but we do not have access to the settlement. This case is now over.

Summary: The ACLU of Oregon filed this FOIA suit against DHS and ICE seeking information on ICE practices of monitoring, detaining, and arresting individuals at Oregon state courthouses, as well as surveillance of legal observers filming federal immigration agents or participating in rallies, protests and vigils around Oregon courthouses. The defendants completed initial production of all records responsive to the plaintiff's FOIA request in August 2019. However, the parties continued to disagree over the scope of redactions and information withheld by the defendants. On April 7, 2020, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The case is ongoing.


The plaintiffs in this federal class action in California are disabled individuals who use motorized wheelchairs. They claim that Uber discriminated against them by failing to take adequate steps to provide the same reliable on-demand transportation services to individuals who use wheelchair accessible vehicles. The plaintiffs allege that Uber's wait times for wheelchair accessible vehicles are up to twelve times longer than wait times for non accessible vehicles. The plaintiffs also claim that wheelchair accessible vehicles cannot be booked in advance the way other vehicles can. On October 24, 2018, a class of individuals who are disabled because of a mobility impairment, Independent Living Resources San Francisco, and Community Resources for Independent Living, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Uber Technologies under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Title III), the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and California Disabled Person Act. Represented by Disability Rights Advocates and private counsel, they sought class certification, declarative, and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that Uber had systematically discriminated against persons in the Bay Area with mobility impairments by not offering adequate services for those using motorized wheelchairs. Specifically, it claimed that while Uber ostensibly offers wheelchair accessible services in the form of UberWAV, the option is either unavailable or takes on average five times longer than normal alternatives, making it an ineffective component of Uber’s transportation system. The plaintiffs sought class certification, declaratory relief, a permanent injunction, and costs and attorney's fees. The plaintiffs had filed a substantially similar case in Alameda County Superior Court in February 2018. The Alameda court dismissed the complaint without leave to amend on September 24, 2018. This lawsuit followed. The federal case was initially assigned to Judge Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers but then Judge Richard Seeborg issued an order relating this case to another case assigned to him, Crawford v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 17-cv-02664-RS. In Crawford, an individual plaintiff sued Uber for violating the ADA. bench trial is scheduled for October 4, 2021. This case was officially reassigned to Judge Seeborg in January 2019. Uber filed a motion to compel arbitration in February 2019, claiming that the plaintiffs were bound by Uber's Terms of Use. The plaintiffs did not use Uber themselves, but Uber claimed that they dispatched agents to test the service for them. In May 2019, Judge Seeborg denied the motion to compel arbitration, but granted Uber limited discovery to determine if there was an agency relationship between the plaintiffs and people who used Uber's wheelchair accessible vehicle service. Uber was also allowed to engage in discovery to determine if the testers agreed to Uber's mandatory arbitration clause. In July 2019, Judge Seeborg granted Uber's renewed motion to compel arbitration. Judge Seeborg determined that the testers were acting as agents of the plaintiffs, that the testers agreed to the mandatory arbitration clause in Uber's terms of service, and that the plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration agreement to the same extent as their agents. The case was stayed while the parties undergo arbitration. 2019 WL 3430656. As of May 2020, the case is open but stayed.

Summary: In 2018, individuals in the Bay Area who are disabled because of a mobility impairment filed this class action complaint in Alameda County Superior Court. The plaintiffs alleged that Uber had systematically discriminated against persons in the Bay Area with mobility impairments by not offering adequate services for those using motorized wheelchairs in violation of California law and the ADA. The state court dismissed the case and the plaintiffs brought suit in federal court in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. Judge Richard Seeborg granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration, and the case was stayed while the parties arbitrate.


In September 2006, the San Francisco District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit against restaurant chain Sizzler USA Restaurants in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California alleging discrimination on the basis of gender (female) and national origin (Mexican) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the complaining party was subjected to a hostile work environment and constructive discharge. The complainant intervened in the lawsuit in January 2007. On May 16, 2008, an entry of default was entered against the defendants, and on May 20, 2008 the court granted the EEOC's motion to compel documents from the defendant. After the EEOC filed a motion for discovery order for civil contempt on June 23, 2008, the parties reached a settlement. The five-year consent decree was entered into on August 28, 2008. The agreement enjoined the defendants from engaging harassment or retaliation on the basis of in sex or national origin. Further, the defendants agreed to modify their employment policies to include a provision requiring employees be provided the antidiscrimination and complaint procedure in their native language, among other things. The agreement required that the revised policy be posted in the restaurant and distributed to all employees. Further, the defendants agreed to hold supervisors accountable for discriminatory behavior, ensure supervisors enforced and carried out the nondiscrimination policies, and train employees on discrimination and harassment issues. The defendants were required to pay the charging party $300,000 and file periodic reports with the EEOC District Office for five years after the entry of the consent decree. As there was no further enforcement action, presumably the case is now closed.

Summary: In 2006, the EEOC filed this case against Sizzler USA Restaurants, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The EEOC alleged sex and national origin discrimination. In 2008 the parties reached a settlement agreement which included monetary compensation, as well as requirements for training and reporting.


On June 28, 2013, the United States Department of Health and Human Services issued a final rule concerning the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the "Mandate"). The regulations of the final rule required health insurance plans to provide coverage of abortifacients, with an accommodation for employee health plans by certain qualified religious organizations. The Plaintiff is a non-profit Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God religious denomination. It was required under the accommodation provisions to sign and deliver a self-certification to a third party administrator, who could unilaterally choose to supply abortifacients in violation of the religious belief held by the college. Failure to comply with the Mandate would result in monetary fines that would cause a severe economic consequence to the college. On August 6, 2014, the Plaintiff brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor and Department of the Treasury under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (the "RFRA"). Represented by private counsel, the Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys' fees, claiming that the Defendants violated the RFRA as well as the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On October 20, 2014, the Plaintiff and the Defendants filed a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of the case with prejudice against all Defendants. It is unknown whether the Plaintiff obtained any relief.

Summary: On August 6, 2014, a non-profit Christian college brought a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor and Department of the Treasury under the Declaratory Judgment Act and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The Plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys fees, claiming that the Defendants' enforcement of the accommodation requirements under the ACA regulations violated the RFRA as well as the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses of the U.S. Constitution. On October 20, 2014, the parties filed a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of the case with prejudice against all Defendants. The case is closed.


On October 16, 2009, the Georgia Advocacy Office (GAO), a non-profit Georgia corporation that provides protection and advocacy services to individuals with disabilities, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The plaintiffs sued Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities and the Regional Hospital Administrator at Southwestern State Hospital (SWSH) under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 10801. The plaintiffs, represented by the Fulton County Attorney’s Office, the Georgia Advocacy Office, and private counsel, sought injunctive and declaratory relief requiring the defendants to comply with the Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act (PAIMI) and permit plaintiffs entrance to their facilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they suspected a patient had been sexually assaulted while at SWSH. When GAO tried to investigate the facility, the defendants denied them access. Along with their complaint, the plaintiff also filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a motion for a preliminary injunction. On October 22, 2009, Judge Charles A. Pannell Jr. denied the temporary restraining order and set a hearing for the motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on November 2, 2009, which included more information on the responsibilities of the GAO and the defendants. Throughout November and December, the parties attempted to come to an agreement. As they did so, the plaintiff removed the motion for a preliminary injunction. These negotiations were unsuccessful, and on May 7, 2010, both parties filed a motion for summary judgment. Judge Pannell Jr. denied both motions on March 9, 2011. He held that there were still issues of fact to be resolved, and that the PAIMI Act required parties to try to resolve conflicts through mediation before initiating litigation. The parties entered into mediation with a third party in April 2011. By September, they had formed a stipulation agreement, which Judge Pannell approved on September 30, 2011. The agreement required the defendants to provide plaintiffs with reasonable unaccompanied access to their facilities, information, and records. The agreement was to be enforced through the court until August 31, 2014. The parties were unable to agree as to peer review documents (documents created when health care providers evaluate one another). This issue remained open in court, and on October 31, 2011, the plaintiffs filed a motion for permanent injunction requiring the defendants to provide them with access to peer review documents when requested. On May 9, 2012, Judge Pannell Jr. granted the motion for permanent injunction, holding that peer review document were within the definition of “record” as outlined in the PAIMI Act. He then granted plaintiffs attorneys fees on September 12, 2012 for $39,561.50.

Summary: On October 16, 2009, the Georgia Advocacy Office (GAO) filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief guaranteeing them access to investigate state hospitals in Georgia. Judge Pannell Jr. approved a stipulated agreement on September 30, 2011, requiring the defendants to grant access to their institutions and documents when the GAO sought to investigate.


On January 30, 1996, the United States Department of Justice (D.O.J.) filed a complaint under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. et seq. (Title VII) against the City of New York, Board of Education and the New York City Department of Personnel in the U.S. District Court of Eastern New York. The D.O.J. sought a preliminary injunction, alleging that the defendant had violated Title VII by discriminating against minorities in custodial hiring. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the New York City Board of Education discriminated on the basis of race in custodial hiring practices by: (1) administering written entry-level exams a as prerequisite for obtaining a custodial position that had disparate impact on blacks and Hispanics; and (2) that recruiting practices for those tests had disparate impact on blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and females. In February 1999, the lawsuit resulted in a settlement agreement that awarded employment benefits to a group of 59 individuals composed of black, Hispanic and Asian men and women, and non-minority females. This spawned interventions in that action by two groups supportive of the settlement, and one group opposed. Those supportive were 31 of the 59 beneficiaries (the "Caldero" and "Arroyo" intervenors). Those opposed were four white male custodial employees (the "Brennan" intervenors), who railed against the adverse effect the agreement had on their seniority rights in regard to (1) school building transfers, (2) temporary care assignments, and (3) layoffs. Rather than rely on their intervention rights, they also, together with two other white male custodial employees, brought a separate action (but by order dated November 24, 2004, the court consolidated both actions). They asserted that their seniority rights were violated in those three aspects under both Title VII and the 14th Amendment, and sought injunctive relief. On September 11, 2006, the court (Judge Frederic Block) declined to enter the Agreement as a consent judgment. The court declared, however, that the Agreement is valid under Title VII, except to the extent that it grants preferential seniority as to layoffs to non-victims of race, national origin and gender discrimination. The court further declared that the Agreement is valid under the 14tha Amendment, except to the extent that it (1) grants preferential seniority as to layoffs to non-victims of discrimination, and (2) grants relief to racial or ethnic minorities based on the recruiting claim. The court also declared that one of the 59 beneficiaries is not a member of protected class. Finally, the court grants class-action status to those whose layoff-protection rights were displaced by non-victims of discrimination. On August 22, 2008, the clerk of the court entered the judgment and the case was closed.

Summary: This case was brought by the United State against the New York Board of Education seeking injunctive relief. In February 1999, the case was settled, but because the settlement agreement adversely affected some white custodial employees' seniority rights, they intervened and asked the court to not approve the part in the Agreement that violated their seniority rights. On August 22, 2008, the court closed the case, and held that the parts of the Agreement that affected the white employees' seniority violated Title VII and the 14th Amendment.